THE PRINCIPLE OF FINITY

AND

THE PROBLEM OF CONTRAPOSITION

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This dissertation, first of all, proposes an exposition and a defence of the ontological value of the principle of finality against what may be understood as a, or even the popular, modern view on the subject. Thereupon follows an application of the principle to human morality: first, in its broad outlines and later, in the more restricted sphere of marital ethics, especially with respect to the problem of contraception.

The following pages of the introduction contain our discussion as presented in synoptical form and blocked off in accordance with the chapter-divisions of the text.

Chapter 1.

The mechanistic denial of the finalist conception of the universe is today bereft of whatever spurious plausibility it had been able to derive from the science of the 19th century. Nevertheless, the defence of finality can take scant comfort from the philosophizing, 20th century scientists, especially if the teachings of Eddington, Jeans, Planck and Russell may be adduced as representative. Here, we encounter a blunt denial of finality and the substitution of chance
by Bertrand Russell. And if finality is admitted by the others, it is understood as a purely subjective creation of the mind which either entirely absorbs reality (Eddington) or mimics it so successfully that the assertion of finality (or at least, order) may be accepted as not more than a probability or a postulate of "scientific faith" (Jeans, Planck).

This being a fairly accurate picture of the "modern" attitude towards finality, therefore we begin our study with an outline of the Aristotelian-Thomistic teaching on the true concept of chance and the logical impossibility of establishing it as the root of the world's order. But it must be established (especially against today's pseudo-scientific subjectivism) that a logical impossibility is also an ontological impossibility. Hence follows a justification of the human intellect's ability to seize the real, especially in the metaphysical sphere. The affirmation of the analogical character of metaphysical being against Parmenides leads us to its presentation as a composite of existence and essence, and (more fundamentally of act and its complementary, which in all exemplifications of metaphysical being except one is denominated as potency.

Chapter 2.

The fundamental duality of created being in terms of potency and act to which the discussion of the first chapter has led us is now applied in our analysis of the principle of finality. From page 33 to page 40, the finality of nature,
whether in existence or operation, is viewed from the side of its intrinsic potentiality and consequent need of a Creator Who should be also a Creative Intelligence.

Next, there is discussed the varying measure of intrinsicism whereby the Divinely imposed ordination allows to the ascending hierarchical scale of creatures an increasingly large autonomy in the attainment of their respective ends. This autonomy is at its peak in the free will of man. Indeed, as we suggested on p 41, this autonomy, which involves the transit from physical to moral obligation in the Divine ordination, alone represents autonomy in any strict sense. And yet, in spite of this particularity, man in common with animals, plants and inanimates, is possessed of a determined nature creatively ordained to a determined end. This end in man, as in animals or plants or inanimates, likewise, does not mean anything other than the fulfillment of natural inclination.

The natural human inclination, which is nothing else than the ineluctable drive in every man towards happiness, is now analyzed in accordance with Aristotelian-Thomistic teaching. Its true nature is exposed both in relation to its subjective expression (which we called, "satisfaction") and its relation to the complexity of nature and tendency that constitutes the human composite. And the resulting conclusion for both Aristotle and St. Thomas is that man is fulfilled only in the cognitional possession and consequent volitional quiescence in the unlimited good: that is to say, God.
Thus far, the Stagirite and his greatest commentator are in agreement. From this point onwards, however, they part company. Whereas Aristotle presents this human fulfillment as something hardly more than an unobtainable ideal, the philosophy of St. Thomas understands its attainment to follow a good life (i.e., a life obedient to the exigencies for the fulfillment of its nature) as normally as the fruit follows its blossom. (Indeed, for the Angelic Doctor, it is more than a normal consequence. It is inevitable. An accidental frustration here would imply, not merely contingency, but a lie and an injustice at the very foundations of nature, and consequently in nature's God). Likewise, whereas Aristotelian Eudaemonism (at least, by its silence) might merit the Kantian taunt of egoism, the larger Thomistic conception of finality gives the primacy to disinterested love without rendering it unnatural by separating it from personal fulfillment.

Chapter 3.

The last chapter had emphasized the finality of human nature in founding human morality, particularly in its normative aspects. This present chapter will emphasize the same finality as basic in determining the content of human morality. Far from being a merely extrinsic norm of conduct (either as a regulation arbitrarily imposed by a Deity conceived after the manner of an absolute despot or as an apotheosized 'categorical imperative') the moral law is truly intrinsic to man: being
but a light for the satisfaction of his fundamental desires and for the fulfillment of his nature. This is true for the natural law, as we point out in the beginning of the chapter, since we have here nothing other than the right and salutary order both within and without man, which he discovers for himself merely by applying thereto his God-given reasoning powers. (It is, incidentally, also true for the human, positive law which is but a further determination of the natural law. And, momentarily to leave the realms of the simply natural, we add that it is true also for the Divine, positive law which is given not only to supplement the short-sightedness of human self-direction but also to elevate human nature according to its obediential potencies and in the direction of its fondest, even though inefficacious, desires).

In the continuation of this chapter, having pointed out the necessary subordination of satisfactions to operations and of operations to the human good (which is both individual and common), we enter upon a discussion of the common good, especially from the viewpoint of its status as an end for human desire and operation. Next follows an inquiry with respect to the criterion whereby the conformity or diffmity of particular acts with this common good may be judged. Against a numerous, and perhaps augmenting, group (including many Catholic scholars), which insists on judging social morality solely on the basis of foreseen consequences, we defend the traditional Thomistic view holding that finality be invoked here also. The chapter closes
with a discussion of two false presuppositions that seem basic in the sometimes violent repudiation of natural finality as a principle for the moral determination of socially significant actions.

Chapter 4.

In chapter four, the common good as represented and furthered by the founding of a family, is questioned with respect to marital ethics. It is asked if this common good allows another end for sexual activity than that of procreation. In consonance with the position already adopted, our answer is made to depend on the intrinsic finality of the sex union. Hence, this forms the object of our ensuing discussion.

It is well known that for St. Thomas the specifically conjugal relationships serve not only a procreative end but also, inasmuch as they afford a "remedium concupiscientiae", a personal end. Likewise, there is good reason to assert that the great Doctor would admit, behind the "communicatio operum" of the spouses (which he subordinated to the offspring as a mere means) a mutual love or "amicitia", standing forth as a genuine end for conjugal society. In like manner, the general Thomistic teaching on man's social and sensible nature is also invoked to include within this amicitia the specifically conjugal relationships of the spouses.

Thus far, our position concurs with that of Dr. Doms and those who take a similar "personalist" view of the marital
relationship. However, the finalistic moral criterion which we have uniformly supported, forbids further agreement. Differently from Doms, we refuse to separate its orientation towards procreation from the definition of the sex union. Even though its actual realization is clothed in contingency, procreation belongs thereto as the terminus of its de jure finality.

Therefore, the answer to the question asked above is twofold: 1. The direction of sex to personal rather than to procreative results is legitimate only if the exigencies of this de jure finality be observed. 2. Even in such cases (e.g., the practice of periodic continence), the priority of procreation as a social good demands a sufficient reason to justify its dismissal in favor of the alternative personal end.

Chapter 5.

In this chapter, we study the argument from social consequences and the "personalist" view in their opposition to contraception. Their dignity as valuable confirmations to the more fundamental finalistic argument is admitted. But it is affirmed that to dismiss the finalistic argument in favor of either one of them would not only weaken but also falsify the traditional Catholic position in this important matter.
Chapter 1

CHANCE AND THE SCIENTIST-PHILOSOPHERS.

The most cursory view sees order in nature. That is to say, it sees the unification of diverse elements following some common principle or reason. For, throughout the multitudinous changes that constitute the history of the world, there continues a persistent regularity. On the basis of this regularity, our very living is based. The loaves are different from day to day; but, nevertheless, we are convinced that the regularity of bread with all its nutritious qualities perseveres. On such a basis, science begins and prospers, and so apparent is this order to the unreflective thought of man that the Greek "kosmos" and the Latin "universum" have gone into human vocabularies as accepted designations for the world of nature.

This order so manifest in nature has received, from time to time, various explanations. But these explanations may be resolved into three classes: namely, those that explain the world's order in terms of chance; those which see a mechanistic necessity at the basis of this order; and explanations in terms of finality.
I. Chance as Explanation of World Order.

Explanation of the world's order in terms of chance is not only as old as the teachings of Democritus of ancient Greece but also as modern as the philosophy of science propounded by Bertrand Russell. For today's science, which, according to the mechanistic mind of the 19th century, seemed to have been progressively uncovering the objective laws of reality, now is content merely to mimic mathematically the tune that Nature plays, without hoping to know anything more of the player. To the question whether the human mind can go beyond this mathematical manipulation of unknowns and their organization by means of freely conceived hypotheses, Max Planck and Sir James Jeans give only a hope, based on scientific faith or on probability that nature may be something like the world of science that is the mind's own weaving. Russell, however, not only affirms that such a hope is unfounded, and hence knowledge for truth must be dispensed with in favor of knowledge for power or production, but also he charges that, underneath the mathematical web known as science (which he claims can be woven about any multiplicity), there is nothing but chaos. Thus, on page 98 of his book, The Scientific Outlook (1), he writes that science (and consequently, from his viewpoint, all knowledge) as a metaphysic may be dismissed, indeed, as a metaphysic, must be dismissed, "but human inventions can, within limits, be made to
prevail, and in the conduct of our daily life we may with ad-
vantage forget the realm of chaos and old night by which we are
surrounded".

Now, although chance productions do sometimes give the
appearance of order, common sense is agreed in recognizing the
minimum probability that chance is at the root of most of the
order it observes in the world. This probability diminishes to
zero in proportion: a) to the number of elements independent in
themselves and yet de facto united in a certain order (the pos-
sible combinations here increase almost to infinity as the num-
ber of elements increase); b) to the variety, the determined
character of their cooperation and the unified excellence re-
sulting therefrom; c) to the regularity according to which
such order recurs.

But the philosophy of Aristotle and, after him, that
of St. Thomas are not content merely to refute as improbable
any teaching that proposes chance at the root of the world's
order. It denies the idea as preposterous and impossible.
For the logical result of establishing chance at the origin
of all things is to deny that anything either in its being or
in its operation is determinedly what it is. Not even one ele-
ment would have a determinate operation, an essential structure
or nature. Everything would be indeterminately everything else.
The very first principle of reality and reasoning, the princi-
ple of identity and of noncontradiction, would be denied.

What is chance? According to the dictionary, it signifies: "to arrive without design or expectation". In his Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, (Liber II, lectio VIII, nos. 7 & 8), (2), St. Thomas distinguishes two kinds of causes: a 'per se' cause and a cause that is 'per accidens'. A per se cause is that which is essentially joined to its effect; a per accidens cause as also a per accidens effect are joined in some manner to the per se cause but not as "de ratione ejus". Thus, in no.8, lectio VIII, of his Commentary (3), St. Thomas affirms that a per accidens cause may be divided: a) from the side of the cause; b) from the side of the effect. From the side of the cause, the status of being white or of being a musician is called the cause of a house because these features are joined accidentally to the status of being an architect, which last alone is related to the house as its proper or per se cause. From the side of the effect, we might say that the debris which accompany the erection of a house is an effect of the architect. However, it is only an accidental effect, being an effect only inasmuch as it is joined accidentally to the real effect: that is, the house. In this last manner, we say that fortune (or chance) is a per accidens cause from the fact that something is joined per accidens to a per se effect: e.g., as if to the digging of a grave there is per accidens
joined the finding of a treasure.

Now common sense understands a twofold division of effects: those that follow determinedly (that is, according to instinct and physical tendency or "natural disposition" in the sub-human world, or according to intention in the human world) or those that follow as fortuitous or per accidens effects. But those that would establish a world of chance insist that the essential or determined relation between causes and effects never really existed, or at least did not exist in the beginning. They affirm that it is accidental, either now or in the beginning, not only that debris be the effect of an architect but a house as well. They affirm that it is accidental not only that a musician as such be the cause of a house but also that an architect be related to a house as its cause. Anything, either effect or cause, can be indifferently anything else. A man may be a man or anything else; a body be a body or anything else; truth may be truth or anything else.

But we cannot get away from it. Even as a shadow supposes the body that casts it, so chance has no existence apart from the determined. Thus, St. Thomas paraphrases Aristotle: "Since fortune is a per accidens cause, it follows that from fortune proceeds a per accidens effect. However, what is per accidens is not simpliciter. Whence it follows that fortune is simpliciter the cause of nothing. And this
(...) he exemplifies: and he says that even as the architect is the per se and simpliciter cause of the house, the flute-player is the per accidens cause of the same. Likewise, one coming to a certain place not for the sake of carrying away money, nevertheless is the per accidens cause of carrying away the same" (4). To deny the existence of the determined would be likewise to deny the existence of the accidental, since the accidental depends on the determined and has no existence independent of it. As Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange writes: "Ne serait-ce donc que pour sauver le hasard auquel tu tiens tant, admets du moins la finalité du moindre atome, ou du moindre corpuscule, nomme-les comme tu voudras, qui tombe, au lieu de monter, qui tombe dans un sens plutôt que dans un autre, qui tend à ce résultat plutôt qu'à tel autre. Autrement, s'il ne tend à rien, rien n'arrive, et si tu réduis tout l'essentiel à l'accidentel, tu détruis toute nature, celle de l'eau, de l'air, du feu; il ne reste plus que des rencontres fortuites et rien qui puisse se rencontrer. Il faut choisir l'absurdité radicale ou la finalité" (5).

Of course, we do not deny there are chance products in the world. The unjustified dream of reducing the variety and change of creation to a mechanical unity or a mathematical theorem wherein each element would be necessarily supposed by every other element has been today deprived of whatever plausibility it might have been able to derive in the 19th century
from the determinism postulated by the science of that time. Today, this postulate is admittedly empiriological rather than ontological. And, even in this restricted sphere, its value is brought into question by the 'indeterminist' tendency of micro-physics. (6)

If there is determinism in the world, (and we must admit that there is), it is pluralistic rather than monistic. That is to say, the events that constitute the physical history of the universe derive from many independent lines of causation: "from a family or republic of natures, not a machine where all would be bound together by necessary connections". (7) Their full explanation demands that we take into account not only a determinism of causes that cannot act otherwise than they do but also a contingency which had its beginning in the initial placement of these causes with respect to one another (which could have been much different without violating any essential structure given with the creation of nature) and which continued to exemplify itself in all the multitudinous crossings of these primitively independent causal lines that have ever taken place from the beginning to the latest moment of time.

Hence it is that Thomists distinguish in the events of nature two kinds of necessity: a 'de jure' necessity or a necessity by essence or by right; and a 'de facto' necessity
or a necessity of fact. If we prescind from the products of free wills and from their interventions in the course of nature (a problem that need not concern us here), everything in nature happens necessarily: that is to say, with a necessity of fact. Given the physical antecedents that constitute cosmic history, they cannot not happen. But some of these events are only per accidens with respect to the intrinsic ordinations of the various essences and essential structures that constitute the totality of creation and which, sometimes always, sometimes only normally (ut in pluribus), progress from ordination to actual realization of that to which they are ordained. In other words, their necessity is merely of fact and in no wise of right. It represents simply the de facto encounter, either through themselves or through their effects, of two or more causes in no wise harmonized one to another.

Therefore, we must understand a universal dichotomy of the accidental and the essential in reality: an intermingling of these two elements, in varying degrees, in all the processes of nature. But, in the last analysis, the accidental supposes the essential and has no existence as separated from it. Together with the accidental and its indetermination, there always remains in reality the invariance of the essential that may not be denied except under the penalty of
self-contradiction. On this last as a necessary basis, our thoughts and our language have meaning, and our science and our philosophy have a goal. This persistent invariance or "determinatio ad unum", as existent in the things of the world, is known as their essences or natures. Only inasmuch as there are essences whereby elements of nature are determinedly what they are: only inasmuch as there are natures supposed by operations that cannot ultimately proceed except from beings operating in a determined manner: only thus do we have the physical correlations inductively found by science and the possibility of their incorporation (at least, for the sciences of the inanimate) into all-encompassing mathematical syntheses. Even if, as seems to be the case, our scientists must stop far short of ultimate entities in their investigation of the microscopic realm and must be content with formulating, not laws of the individual, but statistical laws that represent a mean average of multitudes of distinct activities, nevertheless these uniformities also necessarily presuppose determined natures and determined activities.

II. A Modern Dissociation of Intellect and Reality.

It is true that the human intellect cannot, except for the nature of man himself, attain to a knowledge of the specificity of these natures that distinguishes them from one
another and forms the 'propter quid' of their various properties and operations. With the exception of the human object, our intellects, immersed as they are in the senses, must approach to a knowledge of these essence only from the outside, through their sensible exteriors: that is, through an almost inextricable net of outer signs (or common accidents) and intermeshed operations. (8) And one of the most significant admissions of 20th century physical science is that its portrayal of nature, far from being illustrative of ultimate reality as the materialism of the 19th century thought, is only a transcript of the tune without pretending to know the players. "We can grasp the tune but not the player". (9) The new Physics, limiting itself to the so-called "operational concepts" or pointer readings, deals with the symbols of things and must be content with what Einstein described as "extracting one incomprehensible from another incomprehensible". (10) Thus Sir James Jeans speaks of the function of science. "To speak in terms of Plato's well-known simile, we are still emprisoned in our cave with our backs to the light, and can only watch the shadows on the wall. At present, the only task immediately before science is to study these shadows, to classify them and explain them in the simplest possible way". (11) 

Now this self-imposed limitation on the competency of the intellect in the purely scientific field: that is, in
its delineation of the specificity of natures, is perfectly acceptable to all thinkers. But to urge that this incompetency attends the intellect in all its functions is justified neither by the new scientific outlook nor by the arguments brought forward by the so-called scientist-philosophers. And yet this is exactly what has happened. According to the scientist-philosophers (Eddington, Jeans, Russell, Max Planck, etc.), our only contact with the world of nature is by means of a series of subjective sensory impressions that are tailored into a scientific universe by an intellect isolated among its own forms and exigencies.

This intellect may be regarded a) as something creative (in a sense) of reality itself, inasmuch as it projects onto an unknown nature only a reflexion of its character and needs. Such seems to be the teaching of Sir Arthur Eddington. According to Professor Eddington, "atoms" and "electrons" are real inasmuch as they are not hallucinations or fictitious hypotheses but are "that for which an unquestioned striving in our nature has impelled us to seek" (12). In other words, they are elements of the physical meaning we are impelled to give to those states of awareness in our consciousness called sensations; and, as such, they are not less in the mind than elements of the esthetic and moral and religious world we build from other states of awareness.
Or b) this intellect may be regarded (as seems to be the meaning of Bertrand Russell) as a something that imposes empty, conventionally selected forms onto the unknown nature: forms that are revelatory neither of mind nor of nature. Thus he writes in his book, *The Scientific Outlook* (p. 100): "Scepticism may be painful; and may be barren, but at least it is honest and an outcome of the quest for truth". And again on page 98, he writes: "Mankind is to make the most of what is left to it. Now that science (and presumably also, the intellect) has failed him as a teacher, it is to become his servant. Power-knowledge is to be substituted for love-knowledge; the way of doing things for the way of knowing things". Science as a metaphysic may be dismissed. Indeed, as a metaphysic, it must be dismissed; "but human inventions can, within limits, be made to prevail, and in the conduct of our daily life we may with advantage forget the realm of chaos and old night by which we are surrounded".

Or c) the human intellect may be regarded as being able, in its constructions freely conceived and applied to sensations, to parallel the unknown nature's reality and indeed, by a happy coincidence, to find a sympathetic echo in the language spoken by nature. This seems to be the conviction of Max Planck and Sir James Jeans among many others. They argue that the extensive present-day domain of science, which has been successful in an amazing way in the handling of nature,
justifies the implicit belief persistent throughout the history of scientific research that the scientist's investigations place him in contact with something more than his sensations and indeed with a real, outer world that progressively reveals itself. To have limited science, according to positivistic tenets, to a mere ordering and systematizing of measured sensation would have killed at the very outset all development to its present noble proportions. Wherefore, Max Planck, wishing to incorporate himself in the glorious company of the apostles of science, accepts on faith their conviction that by succeeding hypotheses they will travel in the future as they have travelled in the past to ever clearer and more complete unveilings of the mysterious world of nature (13).

In like manner, Sir James Jeans, although he admits that the physicist is imprisoned among phenomena which he can interpret only on the basis of other phenomena, nevertheless "is more inclined to regard reality and phenomena as the two ends of a continuing road, along which it is his job to travel" (14).

The coincidence is so striking, the facts fit the theories so aptly. Therefore, they would claim the high probability of correspondence cannot be disregarded.

The common denominator of all these teachings is the conviction that the intellect is only a creator of hypotheses and is ordained merely to formulate subjective sense
impressions into harmonies that will mimic the harmonies of the unknown counterpart that is nature. Beyond that, it cannot go. Eddington speaks for all when he writes: "We can grasp the tune but not the player" (15).

III. Intellect in Direct Contact with the Real.

In opposition, we assert that such an opinion involves an unjustified representationalism that is in no wise demanded by modern Physics. Science does not demand this representationalism. For the methodological procedures and subterfuges, whereby the mind at grips with nature seeks to reduce the tangle, are equally well described, no matter what epistemological status is given to the end-result. We have before us, not a conclusion necessitated by the new science, but rather an out-and-out philosophical assumption. It is nothing more than a spatial imagination brought into play by these scientist-philosophers: a spatial imagination that establishes the cognitive faculty here and the "thing in itself" there. This last, the cognitive faculty is conceived as attempting to reach by arguing to it as to the unknown cause of subjective modifications.

But this imagination merely distorts the fact of knowledge which presents itself from the first as essentially penetrative of and conformitory to the independent reality by
which its product (whether concept or judgment or demonstration) is measured. Historically, this imagination has its roots in the universal doubt of Descartes that decreed the disjunction of psychological certitude not only from illogicalities and prejudices but also (and unreasonably) from the immediate propositions of metaphysical intellection. These propositions, which apodictically command our assent both for themselves and for the conclusions drawn from them by rigid demonstration, are basic in all human thinking whether primitive or most modernly scientific. They are unchanging and all-encompassing. They reveal error inasmuch as any statement (which is but a particular incarnation of them) is shown as contradictory to them. They establish more luminously in the truth any of these particular incarnations to the degree they approach their simplicity. And this they can do because they form the eternal and necessary scaffolding not merely of our reasoning processes but also of the complex, given reality.

Critical reflexion has not to justify their objectivity or their necessity, but merely to give testimony to the same. It proves itself a false witness when it seeks to establish the assent given them as produced by merely spontaneous or subjectively commanded mental operations, and not rather as commanded by objective relations that the
mind recognizes and in no way creates. It is simply untrue that I am at first conscious of my certitudes as mental states imposed upon me from within or accepted as a convention or as mere rules of the game. Instead, by the very positing of a judgment accepted as true, there is implicitly affirmed, in addition to the attribution of predicate to subject, the extra-mental existence of the relation affirmed. Correctly or incorrectly, as the individual case may be, each effective judgment is one and the same in proposing itself as commanded by and revelatory of things as they are independently of mind. An erroneous judgment can be succeeded only by another judgment, re-affirming under its own particular formality the immediate contact of mind with reality. Even the sceptic's judgment, whether denying or doubting such contact, implicitly asserts what it denies, namely, that what he affirms is really so.

Thus are we led to conclude to the impossibility of making a disjunction, even in the matter of the schematic and abstract functions of the intelligence, of object as content in the mind (or phenomenon, as it is called by the moderns) and an unknown thing-in-itself, an excitant to which the mind's creativity will stand in the light of a biological reflex. The object is not a substitute for but an aspect of reality. And we do not possess this object, without that we also accept and, accepting, we attain a
something susceptible of being possessed by mind under unnumbered other aspects, and yet, under each aspect as under all, offering itself as transcending and dominating the determination it undergoes as object of mind: in short, as existing or possible of existence independently of mind. With respect to the aspects which are thereby given a status in its regard, it reveals itself as a unity in its existence: an existence everywhere truly, if variously, found by the intellect: a unity broken into the aspects seized in simple apprehensions and restored in the judgments affirming it inasmuch as, by a necessity of their nature, they affirm the unity of these aspects in the actual or possible being of things. Thus these aspects, however schematic they are, however much the result of mental construction, derive their intelligibility in the last place, not from whole-cloth creation by mind, but inasmuch as they are abstractions from the concrete absolute that is in source and resolution the proper domain of our human intelligence.

This concrete absolute lends itself to and is the foundation of the experiential uniformities uncovered in the natural sciences. Its sensible aspects in the abstraction perfected by the imagination gives the basis to the relations of order and measure in mathematics, and forms the common stuff of its mental constructions and reconstructions. But, not merely in its sensible envelope and
in its momentary and localized appearances, does the concrete absolute offer itself to thought to be moulded into harmonies by it. It may offer itself also in the intimacy of its being, as it does to the intellect in Metaphysics.

They defer to a truncated version of the field of possible knowledge who limit themselves to the systematizing of sense continuities. Nor do they advance much beyond who, recognizing the necessity of some supra-phenomenal interpretation in even the most intransigent empiricism, solace themselves with the construction of all-embracing mathematical hypotheses which for all the scope and necessity of their conclusions, nevertheless remain as extrinsic to the intimacy of reality as a fever chart is to the temperature it measures. For if it be recognized that the sense impressions are related to reality, not as subjective modifications due to an unknown and unknowable cause but as particular confrontations made by reality as such, then the ideal of possible knowledge will be denominated, not by bare sense continuities as such nor by any systematizing these may take, but by the larger reality they illuminate and, illuminating, indicate.

The whole story of any single object of research is not related by a scientific description. Moreover, the
other element outside the scope of scientific methodology may not be dismissed as a mere "undifferentiated that, roughly denoted by a word or gesture", or a "that which, arbitrarily singled out for identification to become a starting point for the accumulation of further details in the cognition of an object". (Present Philosophical Tendencies, Perry, R.B., pp. 66-67) (16).

The first cognition of an object is simple; but it is not the simplicity of a mere sense-reaction, a mere consciousness of an external stimulation. Irritability may define the response of an amoeba to its environment. But the environment of a man's senses receives from the first an intellectual interpretation that pierces to its "whatness": expressing it truly, even though in its most common and, as regards specific delineation, most poor aspects. There is the procedure of the positive sciences that probes beneath the contingent and multiple world of sense to correlate observable constancies under the rubric of physical or mathematical concepts, more often less the result of direct intuition than of elaborate reconstruction. On the other hand, by a procedure entirely different (needing no multitude of objects of experiment, but departing, if need be, from a single experience) the mind may arrive at the most universal and necessary elements of reality: the metaphysical concepts.
"Omnis nostra speculatio dependet ab inductione sicut dependet a sensu et experientia; unde si propositiones universales alicujus scientiae non sunt ita abstractae et communes quod ex quocumque individuo manifestari possit ipsarum veritas, sed ex plurium numeratione et experientia pendeat, sicut scientiae naturales, non sunt ita certae sicut aliae scientiae abstractiores et communiiores, ut metaphysica et mathematica, quorum principia in uno individuo habent totam certitudinem ut: quodlibet est vel non est". (John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus, Paris, Vivès, 1883, t.I, p. 175).

It is perfectly legitimate in the discussion of 'ens sensibile' or sensible being to restrict oneself to the sensible or phenomenal aspects and to be content with outlining the order they permit. It is perfectly legitimate in the discussion of 'ens quantitativum" (that is, extended and numbered being) to put the accent on "quantitativum", thus restricting oneself to the mathematical aspects there involved. But to accept observable sequences or mathematical formulae as the whole story is to forget that there is no part of the concrete that is not absorbed in every part by Being. There are no sensations that are not of something or of Being that is sensed; no measures that are not of something or of Being that is measured.
This phenomenon or that phenomenon is of Being. In all that it is, it is Being. It is not all of Being, but partakes of it together with all that is or can be, and is joined with all that is or can be, (whether material or spiritual) into the unity of Being and under the domination of its principles. It is merely a particularization or a contraction of an all-encompassing Being. And whereas it is attached by the senses that do not pierce beyond the surface, the Being that establishes it and renders it immediately present to the intellect, possesses it in all that it is and demands for it an interpretation according to "categories that are the condition of the existence, the nature and intelligibility of every being that is".

"Cette interprétation (i.e. that effected by metaphysical predicates) n'est pas l'effet d'une réflexion de l'intelligence sur son acte, mais l'application au donné sensible des catégories qui sont la condition de l'existence, de la nature et de l'intelligibilité de tout être quel qu'il soit". (Kremer, René, C.SS.R., "Remarques métaphysiques sur la causalité", in: Annales de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Tome IV, 1920).

Wherefore, although the function of the intellect in the new Physics is exclusively mathematical and touches the real only in order to organize the appearances of things under the categories of mathematical entities, (and hence,
by a self-limitation, views reality only indirectly), nevertheless the intellect can and does encompass reality directly. Indeed it is the glory of the human intellect that, in analyzing the transcendental being that is objectively given to it, it may pronounce principles valid for any reality whatsoever, not only that beyond its actual experiencing but even that for which no direct experience is possible.

It is true that these principles apply, not as revealing the specificities by which the various beings are what they are and distinct from one another, but merely as implicitly containing these specificities. But they do pre-contain these specificities. The concept of Being from which they are analyzed is not merely a most general manner of viewing things in the sense of a limit of indetermination: as a genus that is arrived at by so-called "total abstraction" and which needs outside differentiations to express completely the objects under its extension. There is no determination leading to specificity that is not already contained within its compass. It applies equally to what distinguishes things as to what they possess in common. Because our intellects are essentially recipient and wedded to sense, we may not with a Hegelian apriorism, by a mere contemplation of this concept, arrive at the vision of each last singular that explicitates it. Nevertheless, the external aids to its
progressive revelation are in the nature, not of accretions, but of reassertions (in the white light of a newly recognized incarnation) of its containing profundity. For Being is a content in our minds in its absolute actuality and in the ultimate degree of its logical determination, although at each moment we say truly in its regard: "We do not think perfectly our own thought".

Wherefore, the intellect may be said by its logically first act of perception and judgment, not only to encompass the actual reality that is given to it in the sensible envelope but also to encompass all possible reality, inasmuch as it then and there affirms not merely what de facto exists but also what can or cannot exist. Thus the principle of identity proceeds from two concepts analyzed out of the primitive given: namely, that of the object as de facto existent (that is, placed outside its causes) and Being as something determinate in existence. It affirms one formality of the other: "Each being is what it is": an affirmation good not only for the actual realm that is present, but for the possible realm as well. The proposition is affirmed not merely of this particular existent (that is in its particularity) but of the Being that it particularizes.
IV. The Eleatic Objection and the Aristotelian Answer.

And yet, since the particularity distinguishing one entity from another is Being (inasmuch as it is something), would it not be correct to affirm the determinateness of Being in such wise that all things would be reduced to the monism of one homogeneity known as Being? Such was the conclusion of Parmenides who affirmed the oneness of all in Being to the degree that he affirmed that multiplicity and change (which supposes multiplicity) are an illusion. But such a conclusion, as St. Thomas reminds us, inasmuch as it affirms the univocity of Being, misunderstands its very nature.


Even as life is applied to plants, animals, men, angels, etc., different in kind rather that in degree and yet intrinsically in all inasmuch as all its realizations have a similarity of proportionality: that is, as the plant is to its life, so man is to his life, etc., so is it with Being. "It (i.e. Being) is something that
I find everywhere and call by the same name, because it is in all cases made known to me by a similar relationship which the most diverse objects possess to a certain term essentially diverse, designated in each by our concept of being, as being present formally and intrinsically in it" (17).

Fundamentally, the notion of Being signifies an essence and connotes existence: not, however, existence as solitary or independent, but existence as proportioned to the essence (whereby logical essences find their completion in an ideal existence; real essences, either substances or accidents, in a real existence; and real created essences of diverse species find their completion in existences according to their kind). Even the Uncreated Real comes into the analogy of Being, inasmuch as there is also in the Divine Essence this transcendental relation to existence. There is diversity in all these exemplifications of Being. The terms of the relation are essentially diverse. "Diversa habitudo ad esse impedit univocam prae­dicationem", (De Pot., qu.7, a.7). But there is also a certain unity here that allows us, by abstraction, to think of Being without thinking explicitly of its analogues. This oneness of Being (which is a oneness of proportionality or of similarity of proportions and which may be ex-
pressed as follows: "That whose act is to exist") is ex-
emplified in all.

Now what is the ontological foundation on the
basis of which the error of Parmenides may be shown, and
the transcendental character of real Being may be reveal-
ed? It is the possibility of viewing Being as a composite
of existence and essence, or, more fundamentally, of act
and its complementary, which in all exemplifications of
Being except one is denominated as potency.

"Potentia et actus ita dividunt ens ut quidquid
est vel sit actus purus, vel ex potentia et actu tanquam
primis atque intrinsecis principiis necessario coalescat"
(Thesis I . a S. Congr. Studiorum approbata).

The error of Parmenides and of the Eleatic
School was to equate existence with what may be known as
actual existence. But between the extremes of actual
existence or pure being and non-existence and pure nothing,
we may encounter a synthesis of being and non-being design-
ated as potency.

The uninstructed common sense of men understands
in the actually non-thinking thinker a real power or po-
tency for this operation, and not merely a mere non-re-
pugnance or possibility for it. Likewise, in addition to these cases of so-called "active potency", there is commonly recognized a "passive potency" in the things of nature inasmuch as they lend themselves to be changed in this way rather than in another way. But the philosophy of Aristotle demands the affirmation of potency (both active and passive) under the penalty of otherwise denying the evident fact of change or movement in our experience. Movement cannot be accepted as an ultimate, whatever Heraclitus or his modern followers (who assert that there are not "things" but only "actions") may say. For, to affirm that change is ultimate is to affirm that there are no fixed points or, in other words, it is to affirm that everything is under the same respect everything else. It is to deny the very existence of change itself, which demands a point of departure distinct from the point of arrival (18).

And yet, as Parmenides asserts, being cannot come from non-being. That is true. It supposes the Subsistent Being which alone can create: that is, produce from a nothingness both of self and subject. Or it supposes a cause which merely participates in being and hence can produce an effect only on the supposition that a something undetermined and yet real is available for the fur-
ther determinations that constitute becoming. Unless we are to understand becoming as a succession of annihilations and creations, we must suppose a subject, remaining permanently the same and underlying change (not existing but rather co-existing under the various determinations or acts that it receives). Thus we have the fundamental division of created being into act and potency, and the Aristotelian answer to the dilemma of the Eleatics launched against the reality of motion. Becoming is the passage, not of non-being, but of undetermined being to determined being: the passage from potency to act. This potency, not being act, cannot of itself make the transition to act. It demands for its reduction thereto an active potency, which, itself, needs reduction or moving to operation. This reduction, in the last analysis, can only come from a Supreme Unmoved Mover which is its own activity and which is denominated as Pure Act (19).

In this notion of potency, we also have the means whereby individual existents may be distinguished, one from another. Actual existence is the ultimate determination of reality: the actualization of all actualizations. In composed or material substances, essence (or, more exactly, form) may be regarded as an act or actualization, since it determines the underlying permanence in material changes
to become "this" or "that". But, with respect to existence, individualized essences stand in the manner of potencies which require further determination, whereby they will stand as actually existents and not merely existent inasmuch as implicitly contained in the causes able to produce them or as in the mind that abstracts them from the "given" in experience. Nor can existence be ordered to anything else, with respect to which it would be as a potency to its act: to be determined or perfected further. For no further perfection can be added beyond existence, which would not be, itself, an existence of a certain kind.

In a word, existence may be regarded not merely as that minimum actualization whereby we declare inanimate nature as inferior to life and intellect inasmuch as it represents merely an existence: that is, merely a status of "being placed outside its causes". But existence may be regarded as that which stands to all essences however superior, as that whereby they are actual and not merely potential. Indeed, whatever the essence or however varied and numerous the sum-total of the essences, the content of this term which we call "existence" finds in them only precisions or delimitations. It exhibits itself in each and all as a something, not receiving from them, but received in them to the degree they are able to re-
ceive. In other words, these beings present themselves as a combination of a perfection which connotes in itself no limitation or imperfection (a so-called "simply simple perfection") and a something essentially recipient and limiting, namely, potency. Thus Parmenides' denial of multiplicity is refuted inasmuch as existence is shown as multiplied, not by further existence (which would be an impossibility) but in terms of potency: that is, a something intermediate between pure being or existence and pure nothingness, which last is real not inasmuch as it exists but inasmuch as it coexists. Thus also, the beings of our experience show themselves as exemplifications of "participated being", not inasmuch as they are related to Subsistent Being as emanations from it but rather as effects of its causing and (in their actuality) as images of its superabundance.

This last conclusion bases itself on two classes of argument. The first argument advances from the assertion of being in the sense of existence as a something to be accepted not only as conceivable separately from the various manners of existence that come within its compass but also as realizable separate from each and every manner: namely, as Pure Existence itself. It differs not only from a universal notion such as, for example,
humanity, which implies in its very concept a reality individuated by this or that extended body (and hence exemplifies separatedness only as an idea) but also from any universal notion which, as univocal and hence susceptible to extrinsic determinations, lacks the full determination required before subsistence can be affirmed. Hence, before the existence of a self-existent being has been proved, its possibility may be asserted. The second line of argument advances, not from the fact that existence (as a mere status of being placed outside nothingness) is held precariously by the things of our experience, but from the fact that this transcendental, (existence) is multitudinously shared by all of these in each of which it is possessed in various ways that are minus with respect to its fullness. That is, it is found in a composition wherein this unlimited perfection is contingently joined to a distinct subject limiting it. A sufficient ground for this requires that we posit a Subsistent Existence as ultimate cause. The sufficient ground for this contingency can only be an ultimate cause which we designate as Subsistent Existence, which is thus not only conceivable but is real. He alone, in the true sense, "is". All else may be said "to be", not inasmuch as there is added anything to this Being without limit, but inasmuch as, in all that they are, they are from Him. They are
constituted by His continuous causal activity and thus participate in His Being, inasmuch as an effect receiving the action (and, in some sense, the superabundance of the being of its cause) may be said to participate in the being of that cause.
Chapter 2

THE PRINCIPLE OF FINALITY AND MAN

Up to now, we have seen potency and act exemplified not only in the movement and change of existing things but also in the much more fundamental order and plane of existence itself. The same twofold division of being will now be invoked in our discussion of finality. The principle of finality as uniformly presented by Aristotle and St. Thomas is phrased as follows: "Every agent acts in view of (or for) an end." The principle proclaims the absolute necessity that ordination be the ground of every effect proceeding "per se" (that is to say, not "per accidens" or according to chance which, as we saw before, supposes per se or essential effects) from an agent. This ordination may be imposed from without; and, de facto, is imposed from without to the degree that the agent is in potency. Or this ordination may be self-imposed in the proportion that the agent is in act. Here we shall first discuss finality from the viewpoint of potency and inasmuch as the principle may be formulated as follows: "Everything, whose becoming is not a chance or an accidental becoming, becomes as fore-ordained
to an end." Later we shall discuss the principle as applicable to agents inasmuch as they are in act.

I. Finality, Created Being, and Creative Intelligence.

The potency of created beings is twofold: passive potency whereby they merely become something other than what they had been; active potency whereby, although actively producing either transitive or immanent operations, they likewise submit to the necessity of passing from potency to act. With respect to beings in passive potency (as also, by the way, with respect to created beings in active potency) we may enunciate the principle already given: "Everything, whose becoming is not a chance or an accidental becoming, becomes as fore-ordained to an end. "Omne quod movetur ab aliquo per se, non secundum accidens, dirigitur ab eo in finem sui motus" (C.G., lib. III, cap. 24) Although, doubtless, there are many effects that come to be as a result of chance, and hence can in no wise be regarded as directed in their becoming, nevertheless, as we have seen, these are the mere intersections of per se effects or of potencies that are per se actualized by determinate agents. The potency in the process of being actualized (that is, as "patiens") receives what the agent confers. Therefore, if the
giving by the agent is in virtue of an end, the receiving is likewise in virtue of the same end, although under different aspects (20). This ordination to an end (if it exists in the agent) likewise extends to the potency prior to its actualization inasmuch as, by its very definition, it affirms an aptitude or real capacity for such actualization. Hence we have the well-known Aristotelian and Scholastic principle: "Potentia dicitur ad actum", which affirms that, implicit in the very notion of potency, is a reference or ordination to the act which determines it. Such is the implication (21) of St. Thomas' argument in the Summa Theologica (I-II, question 1, article 2) where he affirms the final cause as standing first in the series of causes necessary to explain the becoming that characterizes the world of our experience. Here St. Thomas introduces his argument by means of a principle of finality that is absolutely universal: that is, able to be predicated not only of beings passively ordained to an end (whether that end be a definite mode of existence or a definite operation) but also of beings ordaining themselves to an end. Thus we read: "Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis. Cujus ratio est quia materia non consequitur formam nisi secundum quod movetur ab a-
gente. Nihil enim reducit se de potentia ad actum. A-
gens autem non movet, nisi ex intentione finis. Si e-
nim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum non
magis ageret hoc quam illud. Ad hoc ergo quod determinat-
um effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad a-
liquid certum, quod habet rationem finis." That which becomes,
becomes other than it was: a status which it can acquire
only inasmuch as this accrues to it from what is known
as an agent. But there must be something to bring it a-
bout that the agent acts this way rather than any other way.
This something is nothing other than the determination
of an end.

The mechanist denies this conclusion and affirms
that the action of every natural agent is determined ex-
clusively by its physical antecedents. Thus he would ex-
plain every ordered manifold. For example, the operation
of a bird in flying would be determined exclusively by
the fact that it has wings. But the composition of the
bird is the composition of particular existent elements
and, what is more, an ordered synthesis of these which
is adapted to flying. Here is a fact that is not self-
explanatory. On the contrary, it demands a determined
or determining efficient cause to explain not only the
existence of the individual elements but also their com-
position and the particular relations they possess to one another in that composition. Even the operation of the simplest element requires an explanation in terms of finality. The false Panlogism of Spinoza, of which all mechanistic philosophies are but a varying expression, sought to reduce the world of multiplicity and change to a mathematical process necessarily unfolding by absolute and a priori laws. Thus, even as the triangle by its very nature must have three angles equal to two right angles, so would the operations of nature proceed. But the operations of an existent do not proceed from it as something merely conceptually distinct from it as a triangle's properties derive from the nature of a triangle. In every created agent, its operation is a something really distinct from the agent that operates. Even where it exists as something inseparably contemporaneous with the agent's existence, this operation is nothing other than a superabundance of the agent's being which dwells in and actualizes the 'patiens'. It is a surplus or a something more that is super-added to the actuality possessed by the agent as merely existing. "Causa importat influxum quemdam ad esse causati." (In Metaphys. lib.V, lect.1). Therefore, in operating, every created agent in one sense becomes. It passes from potency to act: to its so-called actus secundus whereby its essence is perfected, not in
every which way, but in a determined fashion which requires a final cause. "Si agens non tenderet ad alii-
quem effectum determinatum, omnes effectus essent ei in-
differentes. Quod autem indifferenter se habet ad multa
non magis unum eorum operatur quam aliud; unde a contin-
gente ad utrumque non sequitur aliquis effectus nisi per
aliquid quod determinetur ad unum. Impossibile igitur es-
set quod ageret." (C.G., lib.III, cap.2)

Created agents thus are recipient not only as
regards their existence but also as regards their operat-
ion. Not only when the action is immanent (that is, when
in living beings the terminus of the activity is within
the living being itself) but also in transitive action
which determines or actualizes something outside the a-
gent, the created agent passes to a new and hitherto un-
possessed perfection. It proceeds from potency to act.
In the last analysis, this determination proceeds from
the Pure Act, which in Christianized Aristotelianism is
none other than the Subsistent Being Whose creative activ-
ity continuously effects not only existence in agents but
also their proper activities (22).

But, together with this impetus to action, there
is a determinate orientation or direction whereby the a-
gent is not left in a sterile indeterminacy with respect
to several, but tends to one definite terminus. This orientation of the agent to the terminus, inasmuch as it influences the action, must exist before (at least, by the priority of nature) the agent acts and produces its effect. But how can there be such an orientation: a relationship involving as one of its terms a something (the terminus) which does not yet physically exist? Our own experience gives us an answer to this problem. That is to say: our experience of nature as seen not from without but from within, namely, in our knowledge of our inner selves. Here there is truly revealed to us nature as illustrated in that particular part which has attained consciousness of self. This inner experience of our own finalism shows us how it is possible for a terminus to determine tendentially an agent to action, inasmuch as, although physically non-existent, it already exists in the realm of thought.

Can we therefore assert that, even as in human experience thought pre-contains what later eventuates as a physical effect, so is it with respect to the effects of the totality of created agents? We cannot get away from it. Every agent in which not only existence but also operation in a determined direction affirm themselves as received (that is to say, every being except the Sub-
sistent Being) demands for their sufficient reason not only a Creative Act but also a Creative Thought. Created being in its dynamic aspect demands directional determination; and this in turn, in the last analysis, demands a Creating Intellect which, together with the existence of an agent, established also in it an orientation or ordination to a definite terminus or end (23).

II. Varying Measure of Act in Creature Operations.

Of course, when we assert the potentiality of created agents in relation to their Creator, with respect to their actualization into determined operation, we have no thought of presenting them in the status of inert recipients of an impulsion that, as respects their being, is wholly from without. That would be to forget that, in addition to passive potency, there is also in reality active potency. It would be to forget that created beings, although potential, have also a measure of act. Indeed, thereby they participate in Subsistent Being: thus being in causal efficacy and well as existence variously perfect assimilations or images thereof (24).

Inasmuch as and to the degree they are in act as well as in potency, created beings are intrinsic principles with respect to their operations. They belong to the world
of nature which signifies nothing else than the totality of those beings each of which possesses "a principle of motion and rest primarily and by virtue of itself and not because of any accident" (25). Thus, in his Summa Theologica (Ia-IIae, q.6, art.1, corpus) St. Thomas distinguishes an impetus to an end which proceeds "by violence" (i.e. wholly from without) and an impetus proceeding from a principle that in varying degrees is intrinsic. The lowest degree of intrinsicism is found in inanimates and in vegetative life which are in act merely with respect to the execution of their operations. However, the object determinative with respect to these operations is in no wise possessed by them. The sole derivation of this inclination is from their physical nature on which such an inclination had initially been imprinted. "Wherefore such things are not said to move themselves but to be moved by others" (26). This intrinsicism is greater in animals which may be said to possess "intentionally" the object determinative of their operations and hence to that extent to be active rather than passive in these operations. However, in both cases the inclination is directed rather than directs itself to the object. Animals, no more than natural or vegetative agents, are masters of their inclinations. A natural appetency, introduced into them from outside,
drives them to the various goals of their activity. Therefore, of animals also we may say (with due reservations) that they are moved rather than move themselves.

When, on the other hand, we come to the peculiarly human in man, all the various earthly objects of his desire or inclination are seen as in no wise necessitating. Man not only knows the object of his desire in its content (as even the animals do) but he knows it in its status as one end among many, each having desirability and, at the same time, a lack of desirability inasmuch as merely sharing in and therefore not encompassing the totality of desirability (27). Man, inasmuch as he is merely corporeal and vegetative, possesses the inclination proper to these orders. Inasmuch as he, in common with animals, possesses sensitive cognition, he also possesses a lower appetite called "sensuality". But, together with intellect, man possesses a superior and free inclination known as the will. To this the sensitive appetites are subjected, even as the sensitive cognition that founds them by presenting particular goods is subjected to the reason which cognizes the particularity and hence limitation of these goods (28). Thus, the pleasant or the unpleasant, the convenient or the harmful, as indicated in sense co-
gnition, are, for all deliberate acts, manifestly accepted only as subject to intellectual judgments. And consequently, the called-for movements (that would have been immediately induced by the sensitive appetites) must wait on the "fiat" of the will.

Hence man presents himself as standing by his desires in a contingent relation to all the particular goods of his experience: freely determining the various ends not only of his own willing but also, to a degree, of all else inasmuch as all else are within varying limits subject to him as instruments of his will. Not only is there physical ordination in the world. There is also a human ordination by virtue of human domination over all things with respect to their use: a domination by man in a more complete sense over his own intellect, will, sensitive appetites and members; in a less complete sense over the vegetative and inanimate forces of his own body and of exterior things.

III. Aristotelian-Thomistic Teaching on Human Finality.

But man's domination over himself and other things is not absolute. Not only are there boundaries fixed to this domination in terms of physical impossib-
ility but also, in the realms of his willing, man is curb-
ed and directed. He cannot will anything except that it appear good for him (29). This good may be the genuine good: that is to say, constitutive of happiness or at least seconding its attainment. Or it may be merely an apparent good which falls short of being genuine, and which is accepted by virtue of bad thinking or bad willing.

Let us analyze the notion of the genuine good of man: that is to say, happiness. There is an element common to every fulfilled desire that is known as satisfaction. Too often we accept this merely subjective element of happiness as being its exclusive characteristic. But there are satisfactions, and there are satisfactions: differing one from another, not by virtue of their signification as fulfillment and quiescence of desire, but by virtue of the various objects of these desires. There is fulfillment of mere bodily craving; and, 'toto coelo' differing from this, there is the fulfillment or satisfaction of the highest faculty of man. Happiness, it is true, understands satisfaction. And, as such, its desiring is common and naturally necessary in all men without exception. But, far from being the sole constituent of happiness, satisfaction supposes as causal with respect to it an object whose possession realizes or brings to its
perfection the human nature of man. Or, to put it in less technical terms, this possession effects the optimum of good living in the sense of the fulfillment of human capacity. Therefore, Aristotle and St. Thomas consider satisfaction as a something adding itself, necessarily but externally, to the activity that constitutes happiness. For them it is a something "which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age" (30).

It may be taken for granted that the ultimate desire in all men is to attain the optimum of good living, even though they are not agreed on what constitutes this optimum. This optimum, understood as complete satisfaction in what is not inferior nor merely better but the best, is not merely a good that may be directed as a means to another good. Indeed, since its possession implies the want of nothing, it must be understood as the good. But, although agreed on this general formula, men differ widely among themselves in their enumeration and ordering of the goods whose possession constitutes this happy status (31). And, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, these differences include wrong and right attitudes inasmuch as for all men there is but one and the same human nature and but one and the same human end prescribed for and adequately
complementary to the genuine needs of each and every individual man.

Thus we return to our affirmation of finality in the universe and its application to man as but one of the beings of nature having in common with all the rest an intrinsic principle of movement towards a determinate end. Man is not only a free agent, able to prescribe particular ends for his action. He is also a unity comprising not only act but also a potentiality to be actualized by means of his operations. We might say, his very nature is given first in a truncated fashion and becomes whole only through human activity. This nature has no other reason of being except in relation to its actualization by proper activity; human activity has no other reason of being except in its function of achieving a finished humanity. Satisfaction can be expected. But it must be satisfaction originating in right desire and accompanying activity that is genuinely human. Man must find satisfaction. But he may find it either in the mud or in the stars: either in activities that represent something far less than the capacities or expectancies of his human nature, or in those that alone represent true happiness inasmuch as they, in giving satisfaction, also evoke not only his best but also his most truly human potentiality.
Now it is true that man, as a compound of body and soul and hence a dynamism of sensistic and spiritual desires, is directed towards many objects for his satisfaction. However, man is not merely a compound or a manifold. He is an organized whole, wherein the faculties and their corresponding tendencies and objects function, not in coordination, but rather in subordination, one to another. External goods manifestly have their sole reason of being in assuring the interior well-being of man to which they stand in the guise of mere instruments. It is less obvious that bodily satisfactions are likewise merely means to a further end. For, as Aristotle writes: "if nothing resulted from them, we should still choose each of them" (32). That is to say, this "bonum delectabile" is in itself clothed with the characteristics of an end rather than of a means. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the nature and the value of man is measured not by his body but by his rational life, it is to this that the body with its faculties and satisfactions must be subordinated. Sensible joys have their value only inasmuch as, under the enduring domination especially of the moral habits or virtues of fortitude and temperance, they are subjected to and made associates with regard to rational activity. Their value is merely relative, as is
also that of honor, reputation, etc., (which presuppose the honorable, the reputable, etc.); as likewise is that of the higher satisfactions which attach to rational activity as its "accidens proprium". The absolute to which all else are subject (either as means or as consequences) is "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete"; and this "in a complete life" for "one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy" (33).

But there are many virtues whereby man is established in the activity that achieves human perfection. There are the moral virtues whereby the often unruly appetite of man is brought to seek or to enjoy what prudence testifies as the here and now, true bonum humanum. There are also the intellectual virtues which are essentially (not merely by participation, as are the moral virtues) rational, and thus immediately dispose to the perfect human activity in which man's true happiness is found. Thus, Aristotle establishes contemplative activity at the summit of the perfection and happiness of man: affirming it as a something divine, akin to the blessed activity of God and sovereignly desirable for humans even though, by virtue of their lowly state, it
can be possessed only imperfectly (34).

Now it seems that the blessedness of contemplation (felicitas contemplativa) is for man in this life only a partial good and hence needs "felicity in action", or prudent enjoyment and perfection from the other partial goods of life, to constitute complete happiness (35). In fact, understanding wisdom as a necessary principle for prudence (since prudence, in commanding the right means to a happy life, must obviously include wisdom), we might say that the cardinal virtues of themselves uniquely generate temporal happiness, as much as the natural man may attain it here below. But, on the other hand, wisdom and its associated activity of contemplation represent the highest activity of man engaged with its most worthy object. It includes not only the human object that limits prudence and the other cardinal virtues but every object of the intellect, and especially the highest (36). Also, whereas the virtues (as also, the practical intellect which eventuates in prudence) are ordained to operations and their accompanying satisfactions which themselves are ordained to an end that is delimited to man and his living, the human intellect in its exercise of speculative wisdom immediately attains to the end to which man and his living are themselves
directed.

Corporeal satisfaction represents a human satisfaction, not merely less in degree but less in kind than the satisfaction accompanying this purely rational activity. We might say it is given for the journeying of man, whereas the satisfaction accompanying speculative wisdom is given for the terminus of the journeying: for the achievement of perfected humanity. Although, in one sense, in this life sensible satisfaction adds itself to rational satisfaction to constitute a totality greater than either element; in a more profound sense, it may be viewed as no more able to add to rational satisfaction than sensible knowledge is able to add to intellectual knowledge. Even as sensible knowledge has no other value except as an instrument required by man's intellect (not by virtue of its perfection as intellect but by virtue of its de facto limitations in being immersed in the world of the senses), so, sensible satisfaction has a mere instrumental value, adding itself to rational satisfaction to supplement an inadequacy, not in itself, but in its de facto limitation to the lowliness of earthly living. Such seems to be the thought behind Aristotle's exaltation of the rational satisfaction accompanying contemplative activity when
he writes: "But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue" (37).

Therefore, human fruition in contemplation may be regarded as constituting man's beatitude inasmuch as alone establishing him in immediate contact with his end. Such an end, or finalized terminus of man, has up to now been regarded merely as the perfect human activity in which are contained eminently all the perfections and satisfactions of the other human activities. But this end supposes an object exterior to man, whose acquisition or possession effects the afore-said perfection and satisfaction. This object is something as outside the human faculty as that which brings this potency to its full actualization. Indeed, it is something beyond (and hence outside) in the sense of containing eminently every partial good. For it must be complementary to the peculiarly human desires of man himself who can conceive the undesirability of anything short of what concretizes the absolute good and hence be moved to seek further for full quiescence.
The human will may desire this something and, on attaining to it, delight and find rest in it. But the human will does not itself apprehend or make this good present, either for its desire or its delight (38). This is the prerogative of the intellect, whose activity is measured by its efficacy, not in procuring the delight, but rather in possessing the good from which possession or beatitude the delight proceeds as a "quoddam proprium accidens quod consequitur beatitudinem" (39). Further, this is the prerogative of the speculative intellect whose activity is measured, not as a principle for man's transitive action whereby he directs himself and his environment, but as the peak of his immanent activity whereby he surmounts the poverty of his own physical existence and becomes "quodammodo omnia" being assimilated, after a sort, to the best and the highest within the competence of his knowledge.

IV. St. Thomas vs Aristotle (A)

Whether for Aristotle it is the All-perfect God Who does not refuse to be contemplated, imitated and even loved (40), or whether for St. Thomas it is
the All-perfect God Who by His love establishes Himself to be contemplated, imitated and loved: God is the one object that constitutes the most worthy object of wisdom (the most worthy habit of man's intellection or highest activity) (41). Therefore, as St. Thomas tells us, "the philosophers reserved the last part of their life, as it is said, for the contemplation of divine things, using the preceding time for the other sciences, in order that they may obtain a greater facility from these for the consideration of Divinity" (42). But for Aristotle, the human happiness is a prize limited to this life, and, even in this life, limited as something fragmentarily attained only by a few of the intelligentsia. St. Thomas, on the other hand, does not confine his discussion of human beatitude to the psychological realm, as seemingly Aristotle did. He inserts the question in the larger and in the apodictic sphere of metaphysics: presenting the tendency of man to happiness as but a specialized example of the tendency to an end common to every limited being, and indeed to all reality. Not only in article 2 of the first question of his I-IIae but throughout the whole third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, the human end and human mo-
rality characterized by that end are established as a quasi-corollary of metaphysics. The first consequence following from this viewpoint proposes beatitude as an end common to human nature as such and hence to be obtained, completely rather than fragmentarily, by all rather than by some. But, given the conclusion that human beatitude is constituted by the fulfillment of human intellection possessing the Summum Bonum, and the consequent quiescence of the will in this possession, this is manifestly impossible to man in this life. Lacking here below direct knowledge of God and other things in God; possessing this perfection, even in the minimal attainable degree, only discursively and at the end of life and, even thus, as a habit only intermittently actualized and continually subject to impediments and withdrawals (which last will be definitive at death); possessing along with it evils of the spirit and the flesh: man in this life finds frustration rather than completion in all whereby he is most completely man (43).

This natural desire for happiness in the possession of that which concretizes the unlimited good, far from being a product of human fantasy (as
of course, are so many chimerical desires), is a some-
thing given with the very will of man, being of the
very nature of his willing. And, as such, it unknow-
ingly but correctly affirms God and man's receiving
of God after this life, much as the affirmation of an
approaching pedestrian affirms Peter, who de facto is
approaching, although Peter is not yet determinatively
affirmed (44). Thus Alexander of Hales describes this
obscure knowledge of God: "Cognitio alicujus potest es-
se duobus modis, in ratione communi et in ratione pro-
pria. Potest igitur aliquid cognosci in ratione commu-
ni, et tamen ignorari sub ratione propria, sicut cum ali-
quis mel sub ratione communi, videlicet quod est corpus
molle, rubeum, ignorat autem sub ratione propria; et i-
deo cum videt fel esse corpus molle, rubeum, deceptus
credit ipsum esse mel. Similiter cognitio beatitudinis
et appetitus ipsius nobis innatus est ratione communi,
quod est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus;
tamen in ratione propria ab aliquibus ignoratur" (45).

In arriving at this conclusion, not only the
nature of the desire and the inadequacy of created goods
for its satisfaction are shown; but such a desire, fun-
damental in man and inspiring all his activity, could
be judged vain only if one were willing to commit the absurdity of denying the universality of the principle of finality (which as been exposed above). A certain analogy, arguing from the expectancy of pasturage for herbivorous animals, etc., could conclude to a like answer to happiness hunger in man. But such an analogy is not fundamental enough (46). A denial of the reality of God as the fulfillment of man necessarily includes a denial of the reality of each and every good that finalizes his willing. It asserts a movement (i.e., of the will) and simultaneously denies a determinate end for this movement. It thus commits the absurdity of denying the self-evident principle of finality.

Although an intellectual (rather than a natural or sensible appetite) and hence finding in the idea both its origination and its orientation, nevertheless the human will tends, not to the realm of the idea, but to a real existence that must be previously affirmed, whether rightly or wrongly, by the mind. This tendency to the real may be declared as implicitly contained in the tendency to the good in general which is the primordial natural characteristic of the will even as color is for the eye or sound for the hearing, etc. This
tendency, seemingly but an application of the Aristotelian distinction between the true and the good: (namely, "the true and the false are in the soul, the good and the evil, on the other hand, in things") (47), serves to differentiate sharply and perhaps most importantly the two faculties in beings endowed with consciousness: namely, the senses and the intelligence (whereby the object is reproduced within the soul) and the appetites (whereby the soul tends outwards to the real object.

The will, by an original tendency, moves to the real even as to the universal good and finds in the idea, not its all-sufficient mover, but rather the means whereby this good and its realism impose themselves on the diverse acts of willing. The presentation of unlimited good is affected by the intelligence, a notion not less abstract than that of being as such. The slumbering (not nonexistent) desire is awakened in the will which tends, not of course to an appetency of the abstract idea, but to a reality that must respond to this universal amplitude. This reality, as we have seen, is none other than God Who, as known in ratione communis, is the term of the necessary and instinctive act that founds human willing, even as the assertion of the primary principles
founds human thinking. Even as every phase of human thinking implicitly affirms the primary principles in such wise that their denial would involve intellectual suicide, so every phase of human willing implicitly affirms the reality of this initial and fundamental object of human willing which is God. He, who explicitly would deny the reality of this Good in which he should see clearly all his particular willings are fixed, would by that fact deny the reality of whatever particular good he wills (48).

Thus, whereas Aristotle in common with the best of Greek Ethicians can answer the insatiability of human desire only by offering it what is little better than the compromises and resignations of this life, St. Thomas in common with Christian philosophy affirms the object that fulfills it, even though this object is to be possessed out of this world. It is true that Catholic Dogma had previously affirmed this conclusion. But nevertheless such a conclusion may be affirmed on purely philosophical grounds, being but a particular application of the universal principle of finality, in accordance with which the whole second part of St. Thomas' Summa shows how creation, having proceeded from the
Creator as its origin, returns to the Creator again as to its end.

V. St. Thomas vs Aristotle (B)

On the one hand, St. Thomas in his Compendium Theol., c. 100, points to the evident finality in nature and the conception of God as the most perfect of beings acting according to the fullness of intelligent purpose in His creation of the world. On the other hand, not a purpose outside this Unmoved Mover but rather His own uncreated metaphysical goodness can be the end for which He wills or to which He orders anything outside Himself. But this uncreated goodness or all-encompassing perfection, unable to receive anything from the outside, is the end of creation only to communicate, diffuse and reproduce itself, all else being created and ordered to a varying resemblance with it. "Thus therefore (God) wills Himself and others; but Himself as end, others as for the end inasmuch as it is fitting to Divine Goodness that others also participate therein". (I, q.19, a.2) Not from desire does God create but rather from a love of the Uncreated Goodness, which love eventuates in the only way possible with respect to a Goodness that may not be augmented or multiplied except in the sense
that it may be participated by created beings which thereby are created and ordained as so many assimilations thereto. "Ipse autem Deus essentiam suam propter seipsam vult et amat: non autem secundum se augmentabilis et multiplicabilis est, ut ex supradictis (c.42) est manifestum, sed solum multiplicabilis est secundum suam similitudinem, quae a multis participatur. Vult igitur Deus rerum multitudolem, ex hoc quod suam essentiam et perfectionem vult et amat" (C.G., c.75, n.2).

Such being the purpose of the agent in creation, such likewise is the end in the created. Also, even as created natures have their end in being assimilated to the Divine, so also created activities (that seek a good and a perfection or completion which is none other than a participation of the Uncreated Good) tend to God and their assimilation thereto inasmuch as it is given to them. But God may be said to possess His perfection in a twofold manner: namely in being, inasmuch as His Being is infinite perfection; also in operation, inasmuch as He has perfect knowledge and love of His perfection from which proceeds His blessedness. Irrational creatures approach merely the being of the Divine inasmuch as, unconsciously, they tend to a resemblance that strives to be less dissimilar to the creative Good-
ness. The rational creature, on the other hand, is im­
pelled to seek God in assimilating himself to his Creator
not only as respects the Divine Being but also as respects
the Divine Operation. In this last manner, rational creat­
ures alone may be said to complete the orbit whereby, de­
riving from the Divine, they return to the Divine (49).
Man may deceive himself regarding to the true object of
his insatiable desire. Even with knowledge his unaided
reason may not aspire to the full satisfaction of that
desire except as a velleity. But nevertheless the uni­
que answer to human hunger born of its recognition of
and striving for unlimited good can only be the perfect­
ion and its accompanying satisfaction that accrues to
man attaining the peak of his assimilation to God, in
actually possessing and enjoying the same object that
constitutes Divine Beatitude: namely, the contemplation
of the Divine Essence (50).

And yet we cannot forget that the end of
creation is not to be established in man or in any
creature but rather in the Divine Love of the Uncreated
Goodness, the glorification of which is the final end
of the existence and activity of every creature. This
final end is achieved or pointed to by the rational
creature which is man not only in desiring to possess
that perfection for his own sake (the so-called love of concupiscence) but also in willing that glory for its own sake, (the so-called love of benevolence). For man, the twofold status, "regnare" and "servire" is inextricably united. Although "regnare" (or "to rule") is true of man in the Thomistic conception in the sense that nothing less than the fruition of God serves to complete human perfection and satisfaction, nevertheless "servire" (or "to serve") inspired by a love of benevolence, must accompany and indeed stand in the first place as the ultimate object of reference (51).

In outlining the ideal life for man, Aristotle had gone much farther along the road of truth than any of the ancients. He had corrected the tendency (at least) in the philosophies of Socrates and Plato to regard such a life as a matter of physical obligation, man falling short of such a life only through ignorance. He emphasized that man acts contrary to his real wants and his true good not only through ignorance but also through malice and weakness of will. On the other hand, differently from the Epicureans and the Stoics who presented the ideal life as a mere recipe and matter of counsel, Aristotle emphasized the note of obligation (not physical but moral) impelling man to right living. In neglect-
ing to establish his satisfactions in right objects, the Aristotelian man becomes a failure as man: he has failed to live up to his reason of being as man; he has not been true to the potentialities for complete manhood given him by nature. For in the philosophy of the Stagirite, there is a finality imposed on human nature in common with every other nature which determines its unique destination and its proper good.

But it seems that, beyond this affirmation of immanent finality and natural obligation, Aristotle's Ethics has no more to say. There are, it seems, implicit connexions between Aristotle's God and the 'Summum Bonum' of the Scholastics, which is also the Unmoved Mover at the origin of the dynamism of the universe. There is a sympathy insinuated between the Divine and the perfect man who, by that fact, possesses in himself "something of the divine" (52). But, beyond these shadowy indications, there is nothing. St. Thomas and the other Christian Philosophers, on the other hand, are definite and explicit. Even as they had established the satisfaction of human desire in the beatitude proceeding from the actual possession (by contemplation) of God Himself, so also they have established the ultimate motive of human morality in the love proceeding from such
contemplation. Even as, due to the lack of actual possession through contemplation, this beatitude is imperfect in this life, so also this adherence by love to God, the Perfect Good, must await the next life, in order to adhere indefectibly thereto. But nevertheless, in this life as in the next, God remains man's sole beatitude; and likewise, God and those particular goods that are in necessary connexion with the Eternal Law (that is, the Divine Art in creating and ordering the world) remain the sole legitimate objects of human love. "Appetitus creaturae naturalis non est rectus nisi per appetitum explicitum ipsius Dei, actu vel habitu" (De Ver., q.22, a.2, c.).

In the Thomistic view, there is a necessary hierarchy in man wherein, whether in via or in patria, the satisfaction of human desire is subordinated to human perfection. This last, in its turn, by a finite imitation of the love of the Divine Will for the Uncreated Goodness, glorifies God in a pre-eminent manner inasmuch as thereby it becomes in nature and operation as one "made to the image and likeness of God". "Beatitudo est finis quo in Deo quiescit, non in qua quiescit; quia non in ipsa sed ipsam in Deo quiescimus". (Opusc. LXI, c. VII). This willing of God and God's by man pre-eminent-
ly for the sake of God is the principal intention of the Divine Law with regard to man. "Quia vero intentio divinae legis ad hoc principaliter est ut homo Deo adhaeret, homo autem potissime adhaeret Deo per amorem, necesse est quod intentio divinae legis principaliter ordinetur ad amandum" (C. G., III, c. 116). Not by his lower faculties (which are directed only to intermediate ends) but by intellect and will does man put himself into union with his ultimate end and good which is God: the will adhering thereto, only secondarily for its own perfection and satisfaction and principally out of appreciation and desire of God for the sake of God (53).

Thus, by a larger application of the principle of finality, St. Thomas goes beyond the Eudaemonism or moral egoism of Aristotle for whom all else are subordinated as means or instruments for the perfection of man. In the Thomistic synthesis, this perfection is willed, not in the last analysis for man himself, but for something that man regards as superior to himself. The note of disinterestedness enters in to play the major part in human morality. It does not exclude the natural tendency in man to seek personal happiness. Absolute disinterestedness is a chimera, man of his very nature
being so constructed that, not the good impersonally 'taken (ly bonum), but the good that is good for him (ly bonum conveniens) must be offered to draw his willing (54). Man's desire for happiness cannot be excluded as a motive for his doing (55). But although desire is present in the willing of every finite and hence needy being, God alone exemplifying the complete generosity of sovereign diffusive goodness, nevertheless the right order of things (and hence the natural impulse of man) demands that virtuous living which is de facto a bonum utile be also a bonum honestum inasmuch as connected in some way with devotion to God and to the Divine Law, in accordance with which He wills the direction of the world (56). As we have seen above, God cannot not will that the Summum Bonum be the final end of the movement or desiring of every creature. We cannot here go into a discussion as to how this prescribed and hence possible (57) preference for God and God's is to be reconciled with the self-seeking universal in man's desiring (58). But such a conclusion proceeds necessarily, given the Thomistic premises outlining the relations between man and a Creator Who is the Sovereign Good. And only on such terms is a completely satisfying and
effective middle-way marked out for human morality that avoids equally well unnatural, utopic Stoicism and egoistic eudaemonism or hedonism (59).
Chapter 3

THE PRINCIPLE OF FINALITY AND THE MORAL PRECEPTS.

In our last chapter, we have presented the principle of finality as metaphysically established and have seen its application to created beings and particularly to man, especially asdictating his moral life. Beginning with the Eudaemonism of Aristotle, we have seen how a larger application of the principle of finality has led to the Thomistic conception of morality as demanding that man, by desire and action, establish both himself and the things under his will in conformity with Divinely established ends. The primary intention of the last chapter has been rather to establish the motive for being moral in tying it up with the ultimate end of man. We shall now continue to follow St. Thomas in giving a more detailed treatment of the content of the rules for man's moral life, especially in those aspects that refer to the problem of contraception or birth control (as it is euphemistically and inexactlly called). The principle of finality, as shall be seen, will continue to guide our treatment.
I. An Outline of Scholastic Moral Teaching.

The external glory of the Sovereign Divine Perfection, obtained through its analogical communication by impelling or obliging creatures to their proper good, supposes in the Divine Wisdom a plan of government of all things according to definite norms. These norms, no more than the final end of creation as such, do not proceed merely from the arbitrary will of God. But they understand what is called "the eternal law", whereby the exemplar of the essential order between created things exists from eternity in the Divine Mind, expressing speculative necessities inasmuch as founded on the Divine Essence and practical necessities on the supposition of the free Divine decree positing the existence of the world. And, as an expression of speculative necessities, they are open to discovery by human reason, without requiring the intervention of any special promulgation through a revelation. For human reason (on the supposition, of course, that it fulfills itself in right functioning and hence presents to the will, which commands the naturally subordinated lower appetencies of man, a good that is not merely apparent but also true) pronounces directives for man's activity that image the
reasons of the eternal law. We say this because it is
the nature of man to participate in the eternal law,
not inasmuch as, in common with irrational creatures,
he would be blindly led to his proper good, but inas-
much as, in mastery over his own acts, he orders and
leads himself to a freely chosen end recognized as in
conformity with it. But this is a function peculiar to
reason; and by conformity or difformity to the rightly
conceived pronouncements of reason is the morality of hu-
man acts to be determined.

"In actibus humanis bonum et malum dicitur
per comparationem ad /\rationem, quia, ut Dionysius di-
cit, bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, malum au-
tem quod est praeter rationem."

(See also the entire chapter 121 of the 3rd
book of the Contra Gentiles, entitled:
"Quod Divina Lex ordinat hominem secundum
rationem circa corporalia et sensibilia.")

However, this right conception supposes an
assimilation by reason of the eternal reasons that ul-
timately constitute the moral order. These eternal
reasons are obviously not known in themselves, that is,
in their identification with the Divine Essence. (Thus
man, being in direct contact with the Summum Bonum, would
have no need for ordination to God.) But they are known inasmuch as the reason of man is endowed with a participation of the Divine Light whereby, in viewing the proper ends of human activity on the basis of natural inclinations, it possesses primary and infallible principles as a basis for its moral judgments.

"Multi dicunt: Quis ostendit nobis bona? cui quaestioni respondens: Signatum est super nos lumen vestum tui, Domine; quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et quid malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio luminis divini in nobis." (Ia-IIae, q.91, a.2, corpus)

Thus, in the Thomistic teaching, even as the assimilation of truth by man demands that the speculative intellect possess immediate, self-evident principles, so also the right exercise of the practical intellect (which formally pre-determines or orientates man's doing, even as his appetite existentially pre-determines it) must find a basis in immediate, self-evident principles determining right ends. The absolutely first principle of the practical intellect is that which prescribes the doing of good and avoidance of evil. In other words, this principle dictates an obligation in man to seek his
happiness as constituted by the real good in contradistinction to the apparent good. In our last chapter, we have analyzed this ultimate norm for man's moral life. We have pointed out its luminous self-evidence, inasmuch as it presents itself as a something admitted as sovereignly desirable by all men: namely, the optimum of good living. We have also, all the time remaining in the sphere of the necessary and the universal, exposed in general the true nature of this sovereign good which is the object of the natural desire of man's nature, expressed through its dominant appetency: the human will. Whether we view it in the truncated fashion of Aristotle or see it in all its fullness (whether as obligation or as fulfillment) as outlined by St. Thomas, the one good that is equally of obligation and of desire (right desire) for all men is to seek the happiness that is life according to the finality of their common human nature.

There are many other formulas, which follow as explicitations of the complexity implicitly contained in this first principle, being derived from a study of human nature in its immediately apparent natural relations. Thus, they propose to man, as conformable to his true good and to the moral order, the duty of living according to a nature that is rational, social, contin-
gent: and hence, to regulate his passions, to respect the rights of others, and to honor his Creator, etc. (60).

The first principles of this practical reasoning are those that determine the properly human ends. They are immediately seized by the intellect by virtue of a habit known as synderesis and constitute the natural law, at least, in the strict sense (61). Imposed on reason which is the form of human activity, they represent man's participation of the eternal law, even as in irrational creatures the same law is participated inasmuch as here it is a form impressed after the manner of a blind inclination (62).

It is needless to say that all of these first principles are not on the same level in imposing themselves on man's recognition. Even where they are indemonstrable and hence demand consent once their terms are recognized, these terms, of course, are not always immediately apparent (63). When it is question of the conclusions (even those necessarily drawn, which constitute the natural law in the larger sense) this luminosity decreases in proportion to their remoteness with respect to the first principles. Also, once we
leave this region of discourse which has to do rather
with the determination of the properly human ends of
man, and when we ask ourselves what particular acts
are conformable to human nature, the difficulty increas­
es immeasurably. The morality of certain acts, it is
true, is immediately apparent. The mere analysis of the
object of these acts declares their moral status. Others
however, even though intrinsically related to the moral
order, require the application of many middle terms and
(even in the objective nature of things) can generate
only a speculative probability. Here, not only the in­
tellect but the inclination of a virtuous will as well
are needed to establish perfect conformity with right
moral order (64). Still other acts are only extrin­
sically related to the moral order (.e.g., those command­
ed or forbidden merely by positive law and attaining a
morality, not in themselves, but in the moral right of
the human authority to impose them).

II. The Common Good.

So much for Scholastic moral teaching in its
broad outlines. It is now necessary to be more speci­
fic.
We have repeated many times that life according to the real good of man and according to the intentions of man's Creator as expressed in the natural law is that he live according to reason. But reason exercises its guidance in detecting the final causes or ends of nature in conformity with which man must direct his appetites and his operations. Reason not only affirms that man has an obligation to order himself and his activities according to the eternal law; but it also, in recognizing that eternal law as implicit in the properly subordinated (65) inclinations of his various appetencies and in the goods to which they are ordained, affirms the various precepts of the natural law.

The first point of our discussion has to do with the dictates of reason with respect to the satisfaction of human appetites. We have already seen that even the highest satisfaction must be regarded as having but an accessory and subordinated value in comparison to the human perfection it complements (66). We have also seen how, in the philosophy of St. Thomas, not only satisfaction but also human perfection possess an accessory and subordinated value with respect to Christian charity which loves God and God's predominantly for the sake of God. Minimum moral goodness in an act
requires that this hierarchy of values be not excluded: in other words, that the act be directed to a bonum honestum. Only on this condition is the accruing satisfaction legitimate. But if this subordination be demanded for the satisfactions that pertain to functions distinctively human, then a fortiori it must be demanded for the animal satisfactions of man which are subordinated by a double title to the truly human good: namely, as accessory to the bodily good of the individual and the species; and, through the intermediary of that bodily good, subserving the rational good both individual and social (67).

To determine satisfactions as good or evil, we must direct our attention to the operations to which they are attached. But operations receive their moral value by virtue of their relation as means to the properly human good. This good may be regarded as individual or common. We have already discussed in some detail the individual good of man which is contained within the meaning of happiness. Likewise, we have also indicated the direction that will now lead us to a true notion of the common good of humanity.

In discussing the common good, we may first
of all say that, in general, the common good is a something good in itself in such wise that ordered desire for the individual good must be directed to it as to a further end. In no wise, does this subordination of the individual good to the common good as an end for desire and operation entail the sacrifice (in any final sense) of the first-named good. The conflict between these two is, in the last analysis, only apparent. With this clarification in mind, we may recall our conclusion in the last chapter that right order demands the subordination of man's individual good to the common good that is God Himself Whose external glory is the absolutely final end of creation. Subordinate to this absolutely final end but yet superior to the end that is the individual good of man, stands the good of the universe as a whole. This last is the greatest good in the created order; and to it, as parts to a whole, all individual creatures are subordinated (68). Therefore, if the disinterestedness prescribed for man indicates a final establishment of end, not in the person desiring, but in the good of an object outside that person, then rightly ordered desire and operation grant a primacy to the common goods that are (first of all) God, and (secondarily) the good of the universe as a whole (69).
However, there are important differences to be noted. The common good that is the creative Good (or God) stands towards man as an original related to its image. Man's goodness is here, not a detached part of a whole which would be total Goodness, but rather a mere analogical assimilation. Its desirability is only on account of its resemblance to the Supreme Good. And hence it is impossible to desire the Supreme Good merely in view of this particular good (70). On the other hand, man as part of the universe is not in all that he is directed towards the good of that whole. If there are certain elements in him effecting that, as a part, he must be judged subordinated to the whole, nevertheless there are also elements within him that transcend any temporal group. These last are hierarchized by virtue of their necessary relationship to his destiny to an eternal, personal union with God. Differently from the vital force of an organ which is encompassed in the vitality of the organism, the vital force of a human personality is only partially tapped in the service of society. Nothing less than the physically free (although morally obligatory) conforming of himself of truth and goodness in this life, and eventual union therewith in his after-life attainment.
of God present themselves to man as the "bonum simpli-
citer", that is at once his fulfillment and his goal. The temporal order, of which human society is the high-
est expression, supplies the environment necessary here below for that self-conformation and thereby (in that respect) constitutes a "bonum secundum quid" (or partial good) for man's seeking (71).

It is quite apparent that the social environ-
ment is so necessary for man (materially, intellectu-
ally and morally) that he dispenses with it only inasmuch as he is "a beast or a god". (72). Hence, even as a man subordinates many of his activities to the preservat-
ion of his bodily health, simply because of its useful-
ness (that is, not because of any inherent desirability pertaining thereto, but simply because of the utility of good health for his work or his pleasure), for the same reason, it might be presumed, he would work to preserve and enlarge the good that may be attained only through the organization that is human society. But this good is more than a mere "bonum utile". On the contrary, it is the maximum perfection (primarily moral but also, in due subordination, intellectual and tech-
nological) attained in the past and promised for the
future by the human species. And, as such, it is worthy of disinterested service for it is a "bonum honestum": and, indeed, it is a "bonum honestum" having absolute primacy in the temporal order established by God. And if man is obliged to foster the attainment of that good (which he is) and if this attainment demands society or a community of effort (which it does), then the good of society becomes a "bonum honestum" and demands disinterested service.

Of course, the strictures we imposed up above on this service must be kept in mind. Man is not like an irrational animal: subject to the good of his species in all that he is (73). With still less reason, is he entirely subjected to the ends of the family or of the state the two great natural societies that find their reason of being in the common good they both represent and must seek. To understand human progress as involving the reduction of even one of the least noteworthy of its members to something less than a personality (or an end in himself) is to propound a contradiction in terms. But, aside from the elements necessary to man's destiny as a personality, all others are to be subordinated, and even sacrificed when necessary for the
common good. In this sense, man is ordained as a part to a whole, as the imperfect to the perfect, as a hand to its body, etc. (74).

III. Finality and Concrete Determination of Common Good,

But according to what norms is the common good to be concretely determined with respect to all the multitudinous circumstances involving opposite interests that divide not only the individual and the collectivity but also diversely numerous groups within the community. Some will assert that the good of the majority is the sole norm. But, however useful and even necessary the application of this norm may be for many questions, it is manifestly insufficient as a sole determinant of the common good. This common good, being determined on the basis of the requirements of humanity as a whole, must take into consideration the good of future generations as well as that of men living in the present. But since no human possesses a prophetic vision able to encompass the totality of future generations, it should be obvious that the determination of the common good on the basis of the good of the greatest number
 Ultimately, there is only one criterion for determining effectively the common good of humanity: only one criterion which must be observed not only for the furthering of the perfection pertaining to man's composite effort in this world but also to ensure to him as large a share of temporal happiness as can be expected in this world. This criterion is the finality of human nature itself as expressed in its natural tendencies and demanding the obedience of all men without exception inasmuch as all share in one common human nature directed to one common end.

These natural tendencies, as we have pointed out many times before, are discoverable by a study of the various functions in man and their proper ends. As St. Thomas insists, even as an end is established in relation to wholes (e.g., entire organisms such as men, animals, etc.) so also each part of a whole has its proper end and obligation (either physical or moral) to be rightly ordained with respect to it. (76). These various functions and their operations are to be studied, however, not as isolated from one another but as appraised and hierarchized by virtue of the dignity of
their several ends in constituting the total but unified activity that is the end of man's nature, both in its status as an end in itself and in its status as partially subordinated to the various social wholes of which it is a natural part.

Some human faculties must be used. (That is, they are those necessary for man's individual perfection). Others may be used. (In general, these are faculties directed to social ends that are fulfilled without becoming a matter of obligation for each and every individual). But all demand that this use, whether a matter of obligation or of choice, be a right use: that is, in consonance with the finality of the given faculty. One of the most elementary and most important applications of the criterion of morality based on the finality of man's nature and of his various faculties forbids the perverse use of any faculty: that is to say, a use plus the frustration of the good attached to that faculty as its finis operis.

A faculty may be directed to a terminus other than its apparent end without perversion in the strict sense, inasmuch as such a direction does not involve the denial of a good. In this case, since the
good (or the fulfillment of human perfection, both individual and social) is the intention of the governing finality, it may be asserted that the faculty is used outside rather than against its finalization. Thus, for example, St. Thomas understands "inordinate" uses of faculties which involve little or no perversity in the sense we have explained above, inasmuch as no good is frustrated. The example he gives is the use of the hands (contrary to their natural destiny) as a means of walking or the use of the feet for performing operations for which the hands are naturally fitted.

"....propter hoc quod aut leve, aut nullum peccatum est si quis aliqua sui corporis parte utatur ad alium usum quam ad eum ad quem sit ordinata secundum naturam, ut si quis, verbi gratia, manibus ambulet, aut pedibus aliquid operetur manibus operandum; quia per hujusmodi inordinatos usus bonum hominis non multum impeditur;..." (C.G. lib. III, cap. 122, no.9).

Therefore, a good must be involved in the ordination in order that it be a perversity in the strict sense. And the measure of the inordination is to be judged in proportion to the dignity of the
good thus frustrated.

IV. Finality or Consequences.

A too easy conclusion from this argumentation would be to hold that naturalness or unnaturalness in the use of a faculty is to be determined solely on the basis of good or evil consequences. Thus, the wrong use of the sexual organs might be conceived as determined merely by possible evil consequences with respect to the child that is the natural effect of their exercise. For example, fornication would be forbidden because a stable union of male is female is required for the sustenance and education of the child born to their union. But the same principle, viewing evil merely on the basis of evil results, could urge that a pact entered upon by the fornicating parties to support the possible child or the competence of one alone for that duty (let us say, financial independence in the woman) removes the evil consequences and hence also the prohibition of the act. A similar argumentation would remove the taint from fornicatory unions between sterile persons. And so we might go on, upsetting the whole of established ethical practice.
However, the unnaturality that constitutes fornication or any immoral union is only secondarily derived from evil consequences. And, on the other hand, if the act is bad in its object, no number of good consequences can justify it. We may view the end of a human act in a twofold manner. There is the so-called finis operis: that is, the terminus which the act in itself and of itself is directed to attain (77). Thus, the finis operis of the watch-maker is the production of watches. There is also the finis operantis: that is, the further terminus to which an intelligent cause directs the finis operis. Thus, the finis operantis of the watch-maker may be to make a living, to obtain riches or fame, etc., etc. Applying these notions to our subject, we affirm that an act is unnatural unless the bonum with respect to which it is finalized follows (at least, as the terminus of its orientation) as its finis operis. Man's obedience to the natural law involves the ordering of each and every one of his faculties, in each and every one of their operations, in consonance with their individual finalities. Again (cf. note 76) we quote from the Summa Contra Gentiles of St. Thomas: "Sicut autem in toto, ita et in partibus hoc considerari oportet, ut scili-
cet unaquaeque pars hominis et quilibet actus ejus finem debitum sortiatur." From his commentary on the 4th Book of Sentences, we also quote: "Omne illud quod actionem reddit inconvenientem fini quem natura ex opere aliquid intendit, contra legem naturae esse dicitur." (IV Sent., dist. 32, q.1, art. 1).

No matter how good, no matter how exalted the finis operantis may be, it cannot justify performing an act that would be intrinsically evil inasmuch as its object or finis operis is "materia indebita": that is, contrary to right reason asserting its individual finality in the world-order (78).

But if it be true that the establishment of natural morality on the basis of finality demands that no single faculty or operation of man be used except in consonance with its finalization, then the natural law prescribes the bonum humanum not only as a finis operantis but also as a finis operis. In other words, it prescribes not only the end (or ends) to be achieved but also the specific means thereto: these means being presumably those judged best by the Creative Wisdom that founds the finality and the law. It may be that a faculty (having more than one end) cannot achieve its
full finality. Nevertheless, its exercise is justified, providing its orientation be determined not merely on the basis of the partial good it de facto achieves but in accord with the exigencies that would attend the attainment of its full finality (79). For example, the sexual faculties of man serve two ends: a procreative end (which is social) and a personalist end (which has to do with personal fulfillment). The finality of natural agents being determined not merely on the basis of what de facto eventuates but of what is the de jure destination of their natures (even though its realization be clothed by contingency) (80), the right exercise of sex is determined according to what St. Thomas calls "the common species of the act" (81).

As a matter of fact, the full achievement of the finality of sex (as of other natural entities) is the normal situation as far as nature is concerned. Hence, inasmuch as the obligations pertaining to normal situations are imposed also for abnormal (that is, exceptional) cases, there is a similarity here to human law which gives a universal extension to obligations necessitated by and for the ordinary situation. St. Thomas often uses this comparison (82). And many, it seems,
see here merely a rather inept application to natural law of what is valid only in positive law (83). But such a comparison, it is our belief, moves by way of illustration rather than of proof. It must be viewed in the background of the Angelic Doctor's general teaching of finality (not merely normal consequences) as the ultimate determinant of morality.

Similarly, Dr. Herbert Doms seems to misconstrue the true significance of St. Thomas' application of the principle of finality to the morality of sex. We believe we do not falsify his position when we assert that one of his main reasons for excluding the claims of the child as the primary end of marriage is because of their inadequacy to legislate for cases (admittedly inordinate) where no actual infringement of these claims is present (84). If St. Thomas determined morality merely on the basis of evil consequences, this argument of Dr. Doms would be telling. If evil results are not involved, Doms sees no reason why an act should be forbidden. Thus we read in the English translation of his book: "Thus the natural law forbids us, and doubtless under penalty of committing a serious sin, to inoculate ourselves with a dangerous disease, such
as cholera. But if I know that a certain species of cholera bacillus is harmless, or that I am immune against cholera (Pettenkofer's experiment), the natural law will no longer forbid me (at all events not under penalty of mortal sin) to expose myself to it...

There is a certain likeness between the above and the position of the child in the case of fornication by a eunuch or a woman whose ovaries have been removed" (85).

But, according to St. Thomas, it is not the evidence of evil results but rather disharmony with its natural finality (as viewed completely) that determines the evil in the exercise of a faculty.

To assist us in distinguishing between the criterion of evil from inordination and the criterion of evil from consequences, we may quote a derivative criterion as given by the Rt. Rev. Mgr. Michael Cronin. It is as follows: "An act which, if raised to a general line of conduct, would work evil for the race is bad, not merely when it is generally adopted and when it does actually work evil but in each particular case in which it is performed, and whether evil effects actually follow in the particular case or do not" (86).

As Monsignor Cronin insists, this criterion
merely assists us in recognizing what concrete acts are unnatural and hence bad. If injury to the race necessarily follows from an act in the hypothetical case (it need not be more than that) that it be raised to a general line of conduct, then that is a sign that such an act must be out of harmony with the natural order, and hence, bad. The principle does not understand that this injury to the race follows because of the likelihood that such an act will become a matter of general conduct, still less that the single act de facto injures the race. Acts are bad not merely because of their direct or indirect deleterious consequences to the race but also in cases where no evil results can be anticipated by our restricted knowledge. As we indicated several times before, it is its disharmony with the finality of human nature and its various faculties that constitutes the intrinsic badness of a given act. Hence, since participation in the human race demands universal obedience in all its members with respect to the means necessary to its end, therefore the hypothesis of general practice may be invoked in determining what is permitted or forbidden to each (87).

As we shall see later in more detail, some
authors base their condemnation of contraception on the assumption that the criterion of consequences is the sole determinant of moral evil in the social field. They conclude that contraception is universally (and hence, intrinsically) wrong in the following manner. The major premise of their argument asserts that contraception is bad solely because, on being raised to a general line of conduct, it evidently works the destruction of the common good. The minor premise asserts that there is excellent reason to believe (the application of the so-called "wedge principle": cf. p. 144) that, certain restricted cases being allowed as permissible, the practice will inevitably become universal.

But, if our contention (that disharmony with the natural order constitutes the intrinsic evil of an act) is true, then it is simply incorrect to assert that the norm of social immorality is to be established solely on the evidence of bad consequences. It is quite possible that destructive consequences for the common good, as envisioned by nature (or rather, nature's God), regulate its determination of particular social acts as inordinate. But nature has not given
to man the all-encompassing vision of humanity and its common good to permit him to tie up infallibly each social act with its ultimate consequences in human history. Therefore, not only those acts manifestly evil inasmuch as their disastrous consequences are uncovered to man's limited vision of the common good, are to be accepted by him as morally evil. Moral evil includes also acts whose distant effects are revealed only to nature's prescience. But the constitutive norm of morality (that which determines ultimately the goodness or evil of human acts) must establish man rightly with respect to both varieties of acts. This it does, if it is based on the finality of human nature which directs man away from disaster both evidenced and hidden.

It is true that "everything which contributes to the happiness and well-being of society is moral, everything which hinders it is immoral" (88). There is no dispute on that. But the question is whether the acceptance of this ideal as a finis operantis by that fact confers goodness on any act whatsoever, no matter what its intrinsic finality or finis operis. Or to view the same question from another angle. Are
we allowed by nature to use indiscriminately for the common good any means prescribed by our inadequate knowledge of the same, and hence imperil the future of humanity? We emphasize again: the common good not only must not be sought but also cannot be sought effectively except it respect what is determined by the natural order. We have already indicated why man needs a criterion for determining the common good: a criterion over and above that derived from his personal prevision of the future of his species. It is true that in the immense sphere of social planning left undetermined by the natural law, he can and he must use his personal gifts of foresight. And, according to nature's plan, this foresight plus an obedience based on faith in nature's designs for the human good are sufficient as means to his individual and social happiness.

V. Two Basic Assumptions?

But what lies behind this thesis that the laws of nature should be disregarded by mankind in its quest of the common good? One basic presupposition
seems to be a denial (or at least, a doubt) that nature is finalized not only to effect complete happiness for man in eternity but also the greatest measure of temporal well-being that is compatible with his super-temporal destiny. It is common to represent nature as "red of tooth and claw", and to understand man's progress and happiness as a something wrenched violently from an unwilling nature. (As if man's ability to "fight" successfully against nature were not a something already given to him from nature and did not include the instrumentality of sympathetic natural forces!)

We cannot here go into any prolonged discussion of the problem of physical evil. It is sufficient to say that man alone fails in any significant sense, either in this life or in the next. For man alone is a self-conscious and self-contained end. Death or extinction for any member of the sub-human world can be said to involve a loss or a regret, only inasmuch as we illogically endow these with human characteristics. As well might we attribute tragedy to the destruction of a stage-setting that is torn down to make way for another, in establishing the total mise en
scene of a play.

A similar misapplication of human conscious­ness also explains much misplaced horror for animal suffering. It may be agreed that DesCartes was wrong if he ever denied the difference between the cries of an animal in pain and the noise attendant on the break-up of machinery. But, even so, suffering in the unreflective life of an animal finds its best com­parison in the momentary, hardly felt flashes of pain we experience from a sudden blow. Not only may we dis­miss all anthropomorphic estimates exaggerating ani­mal suffering but also we may suppose this minimal pain to be accompanied by ample compensations (con­­jected on the basis of our established confidence in Divine Goodness). Therefore, we may conclude that, in spite of deceiving appearances, animal life with its resilience, its continually living in the present, its physical vitality, etc., is a happy li­fe. The assumption that nature is "red of tooth and claw", at least as applied to the sub-human world, may be dismissed as composed of immeasurably more fancy than fact.
But, having removed this fallacy, we must now enter the human order and seek there for some light on nature's finality with respect to human happiness. Even as it is true that (due to man's disordered nature and to the physical ills of life) complete satisfaction must be sacrificed in varying degrees as a price for the attainment of man's true good in the individual sphere; so also man, - and some men more than others, - must sacrifice certain temporal satisfactions in the service of his fellows. There will always be what are called "case-victims", whether in the physical or the psychological or the social realms of this life. We must await (even though we can await with confidence) the next life in order to possess the best and the completely satisfying at one and the same time. But nevertheless, even as imperfect happiness is the received portion of the large majority of men in their contacts with the physical and the psychological realms, so also social obligations as imposed by nature and by nature's God have the temporal happiness of the large majority in mind.

Optimism with respect to the finality of
nature in the direction of human temporal happiness is not merely a product of Christian Revelation asserting the predominance of goodness in this world on the authority of the last verse of the first chapter of Genesis. ("And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good.") (89). But on purely natural principles, Aristotle may be judged to have affirmed temporal happiness as an intention of nature in man's regard. His argument would conclude to the presence of a natural desire for this happiness in humanity on the evidence of an inborn social tendency that drives man not only to the formation of small family groups (wherein his bare physical needs could be satisfied) but also to the larger social realms (required for well-being in the sense of unlimited temporal perfectibility and its accompanying satisfactions). Thus, we (as he) may assert that the naturalness of political society includes as a necessary corollary a natural desire for temporal happiness (90). Likewise, having established above (91) (on principles admitted by Aristotle, even though he did not draw their full implications) that the principle of finality demands fulfillment for a natural
desire, we may add that nature not only inspires but also rewards this inexorable urge in the human species.

However, there is a significant difference between the absolute natural desire for happiness in man (discussed in the last chapter) and the natural desire for temporal happiness in him that we may call a relative desire. It needs consideration here. The first desire is predicated on man's status as a person. In the hierarchy of rightly ordered desires, it is absolute: that is to say, it need not be subordinated to anything else as a mere means to an end. It also demands absolute fulfillment in the sense that, whatever else may be achieved through it, its non-fulfillment in the individual represents a failure for man and a denial of the finality of his nature and of nature in general. The second desire, on the other hand, is relative. It pertains to man in his status as a member of the human species. In rightly hierarchized desires, it must be subordinated to the common good. Also, nature's finality demands that it be fulfilled only relatively to the common good: which last must be of absolute intention. When the common good is incompa-
tible with the individual temporal good, then the good of the whole takes precedence over that of the part. In the physical order, it does so as a matter of physical necessity. In the social order, it is a matter of moral necessity.

Utopia not being characteristic of our earthly state, we may expect at times, and in some humans more than in others, the necessity of sacrifices wherein the individual (temporal) good gives place to the common good. People take this for granted when it is question of the common good as represented in the community or the nation. Even the Supreme Sacrifice made by so many youths in the flower of their life is an obligation that is taken more or less for granted. But, for an increasing number today, the common good as represented in the social precepts of the natural law is denied any right to their service. This is particularly true in the field of sex. It may be difficult to recognize why the common good of mankind should demand that sex be used only within the limits of the family order in such wise that those who cannot establish it within that order (many through no fault of their own: e.g., victims of congenital per-
versions, of unfortunate marriages, etc.) must sacrifice completely that phase of temporal happiness to which the sex instinct is related. The criterion of morality, based on natural order, may at times seem arbitrary. For, although the relation between the common good and its prohibitions is often manifest, nevertheless the natural law does not restrict its application to these cases but retains the right to prohibit without explicitly showing any connexion between the prohibition and the common good. But the truth remains that any pseudo-common good, conceived by the restricted vision of man in opposition to its pronouncements, sins not only against God and His established order but also against the temporal happiness of mankind.

Another, and perhaps more common, basis for man's disregard of the laws of nature is his denial (or at least, his doubt) that nature is finalized at all. Or, if he admits a minimal finality, it is to represent nature as blindly stumbling in everywhich way: encountering innumerable failures and eventually arriving at a certain degree of progress through natural selection. Man's intelligence,
according to this view, is given him, not to act in accordance with nature but rather to rebel against nature and to correct (in line with the good as he sees it) the blunderings of nature whether as represented in the sub-human world or as represented in his own faculties.

Against such a thesis as this, the whole first chapter of our discussion has been directed. The finality of nature may be judged on the basis of conjectures arrived at from the partial viewpoint of the physical world that is open to the observational and experimental sciences. On the other hand, the metaphysical viewpoint (which concludes universally) cannot study the finality of nature apart from its relation to its All-wise and Omnipotent Creator. This metaphysical viewpoint does not commit the error of Leibniz in asserting this to be the best possible world. This finite world is only one of an indefinite number of other worlds (many of them far more perfect) that propose themselves to the Divine Liberty. But, this particular kind of universe being supposed as the object of Divine choice, then the arrangement of its elements and the functioning of its laws cannot be
bettered as means towards the pre-determined end (92).

Therefore, nature only apparently blunders. And man cannot improve on nature except in the restricted sense that, in those realms allotted by nature to his use, he can make a more perfect adjustment with respect to his true needs. These true needs cannot, as we saw before, be determined except in reference to the pre-determinations of nature herself, based on the finality of his own nature. In selective breeding for a stock-farm, it is perfectly legitimate for man to kill or to sterilize, etc. The finality directing the instincts for conservation, for procreation, etc., in animals, is in its turn subordinated to a higher finality wherein these may be manipulated in whatever way serves the rational utility of man (93). But stock-farm methods cannot justifiably be applied by man either to himself or to his fellows, no matter how exalted or how indispensable may appear the sought-after ideal to his finite appreciation of the individual or the common good. Again we must repeat, even at the risk of monotony; A bad or an unnatural means cannot be justified by a good end.
Chapter 4

THE COMMON GOOD AND THE FINALITY OF CONJUGAL SOCIETY.

The perfection required for each man, whether in his status as a personality or in his status as an individual member of the human species, demands for its preservation and advancement a right social order. This right social order is realized by each man inasmuch as he organizes his life in the practice of the precepts of justice. We have, first of all, the precepts of commutative justice which regulate the relations between individual men on the basis of their fundamental equality as possessed of the same nature and the same end. But, since man is related to his fellows not only individually but also as a collaborator in the procurement of the common good, he encounters other precepts that are included under the general titles of the precepts of distributive and of legal justice. Distributive justice, which regulates the social authorities in securing to each individual his due participation in the common good, need not concern us here. However, it is important to dwell somewhat on
what St. Thomas calls "legal justice".

Legal justice comprises the precepts by which men are established in right order with respect to the common good. Inasmuch as it is through law (whether eternal or natural or human) that man is subordinated to the common good, hence we have the name "legal justice" (94).

Legal justice has a special dignity among the virtues. Similarly as the finality of the whole man to God demands that all the acts of all his virtues be finalized to the Divine Good (see chap. II, towards the end), so the common good of humanity takes its place with respect to man, to the extent he is a part, as an end commensurate with its status as the greatest good in the created order. Only by abstraction, can personal perfection be conceived apart from its relation to the perfection of humanity as a whole. In other words, man's obligation consists in practising every virtue in view of the common good. Hence, St. Thomas insists that, even as charity is called a "general virtue" since it subordinates all the other virtues to the Divine Good, so legal justice is a general virtue inasmuch as it subordinates the
same acts to the common good (95). Therefore, to emphasize this dignity pertaining to legal justice and to eliminate any misunderstanding that would limit its range to the duties of a citizen with respect to human law, some modern authors prefer to present it under the title of "social justice" or "general justice" (96).

While on the one hand, the criterion of the common good and the ultimate determinant of the precepts of general justice is the human species, on the other hand, man can seek this good and exercise these duties only through more particularized and actually existent societies. The bewildering variety of these societies manifested to our experience, is ordered under various heads. We shall not attempt to enumerate here all the various societies that comprise the human scene, or even all the various classes of societies. It is sufficient to mention two classes of societies: purely voluntary, and necessary societies. By purely voluntary societies we understand these associations created entirely by the free choice of men. The needs of these societies have no claim on the activity of any individual except inasmuch as he freely accepts and continues to accept this subordination. We have
examples of these societies in our fraternities, scientific societies, etc. On the other hand, some societies are naturally necessary inasmuch as commanded by and for the common good. These include the family and the State, or domestic and civil society. (The Church is also a necessary society. However, its necessity, being based on a positive Divine Law and its end being supernatural, it is known as a supernatural necessary society). The family and civil society (of course, not any particular kind of civil society) are no more the product of man's free choosing than is the common good of the human species to which these are ordained as necessary means. Nor may man exercise any act in any way pertaining to these two natural societies except as determined according to their requirements. Most people take this for granted in agreeing that the State may regulate their individual freedom in making contracts, in erecting homes, even in walking across streets. But too often it must be emphasized against the defenders of the so-called "sovereignty of love" that man's sexual faculties may not be used except in the right order subordinating this use to the common good by means of the family.
Let us enter into some detail on the right order of man's sexual faculties with respect to the common good, inasmuch as they further it by procreation. Previously in this chapter, we have pointed out that individual good or perfection cannot be sought except the practice of the precepts of general justice subordinate it to the common good. But it is apparent that it is not only not commanded but also impossible that each individual engage in all the pursuits necessary for the common good. There must be a division of labor: each task being justified inasmuch as it fosters the common good (97). Even the voluntary isolation from society by the Christian hermits must receive justification with reference to the common good. This it receives inasmuch as it is incorporated in the common good by virtue of the Christian doctrine of the Communion of Saints. Likewise is it with respect to man's duty to foster the common good by procreation. There can be circumstances in which the general duty of procreation imposed on the race as a whole by the common good obliges the individual man. But, outside of those rather exceptional circumstances, the common good may be served equally well, and even better, by not procreating.
The denial of procreation in favor of other means of serving the common good may or may not involve the sacrifice of sex-life. In the first case, we have the outstanding example of ecclesiastical celibacy justified by the first place thereby given to the things of God and consequently of the common good of humanity. In the second place, sex-activity is directed to an end other than that of procreation, this other end being justified as commanded or, at least, permitted by the common good. But is this second case morally defensible? In other words: Does the common good allow another end for sex-activity than that of procreation? That question can be answered, not by considering the common good as envisioned by man's restricted foresight, but by considering it on the basis we established in the last chapter. Therein, we saw the necessity that man establish himself in harmony with the common good by conforming this activity with the finis operis of his various faculties. Only if (and inasmuch as) the intrinsic finality of his sex activity allows, is man permitted to direct it to his freely chosen ends. But what is this intrinsic finality?
I. St. Thomas and Personalist End of Marriage.

In following the Aristotelian tradition, St. Thomas distinguishes two intrinsic finalities served by marriage: the procreation and rearing of offspring, and the completion of man by the conjugal society (98).

In St. Thomas' viewpoint, we have in conjugal society even as in civil society a common good, which prevails as a "bonum divinius" with respect to the individual good of the members. This good is not merely that pertaining to the procreation and rearing of the infant, in the sense that conjugal society directs its members as mere means or instruments to something extrinsic to their individual good. But the good common to conjugal society in addition contains elements redounding to the spouses. First of all, there are those personal benefits needful for the spouses inasmuch as they are members of a fallen humanity that requires the medicine afforded by marriage. Marriage and its privileges certainly find a personal end in what is called "remedium concupiscientiae" (99).

But society in general redounds to the individual perfection of man as man, prescinding from his status as tainted with original sin.
Therefore, the question arises: Does not the conjugal society, in its formality as inclusive of (and, indeed, in a special sense, by virtue of) the conjugal act, point to an intrinsic and justifiable end perfective of the individual members? To this question, many modern Catholic Ethicians would emphatically answer in the affirmative. What St. Thomas' reply would be is by no means so evident. He is less explicit or detailed than could be desired in his treatment, especially of the so-called "secondary end" of marriage proposed by him under the title of "mutuum obsequium". The cause of the philosophy of marriage suffered an irreparable loss when death prevented the completion of his most mature work (the Summa Theologica) which would have included his last word on that great Sacrament. However, not only in his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard from which the Supplement to the Summa Theologica was compiled (which deals professedly with marriage) but also in the grand lines of his philosophy, there are indicated conclusions that de facto he did not draw (and, as some suggest (100), he could not be expected to draw, in the times in which he lived.

The solutions of Moral Theology and the
practice of the Church in re matrimoniali, especially in the centuries after the time of St. Thomas, harmonize with the great Doctor, not so much in the restricted and rather austere conclusions he de facto drew from his principles but rather in larger conclusions conformable more in spirit than in letter. In recent years, many authors have judged necessary and have offered a new statement of this adjustment, a statement claimed by them as more logical and more coherent even though it necessitated a re-casting of the classic understanding of primary and secondary ends. Since the discussion interests itself particularly in the question of what St. Thomas called the "mutuum obsequium" of conjugal life, we shall now attempt to relate his conception of the same with that proposed by the new school.

Only a misinterpretation (perhaps, in some sense, justified by the minimal place given to conjugal love in the marriage relation by many Christian casuits) can assert that Christian Theology and its greatest authority, the Angelic Doctor, ever regarded child-bearing to be "the only moral purpose of the union between man and woman which forms a family" (101).
For St. Thomas, the conjugal society certainly does find a purpose in procreation. But man is not a mere animal, in his entirety subject as a means to the preservation of the human species. Marriage is a human society in the full sense of the word, directed, at least in part, to his individual perfection (102).

Hence, the great doctor distinguishes in marriage not only an end pertaining to man in common with other animals: namely, the procreation and rearing of offspring, but also an end peculiar to man as man. "Matrimonium ergo habet pro fine principali prolis procreationem at educationem: qui quidem finis competit homini secundum naturam sui generis; unde et aliis animalibus est communis, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. (lect. XII)... Sed pro fine secundario, ut dicit Philosophus (ibid.), habet in hominibus solis communciationem operum quae sunt necessaria in vita". (Suppl., q.45, art. 1, c.). "Natura hominis ad aliquod inclinat dupliciter. Uno modo quia est conveniens naturae generis, et hoc est commune omnibus animalibus...; alio modo quia est conveniens naturae differentiae qua species humana abundat a genere in quantum est rationalis, sicut actus prudentiae et temperantiae" (IV Sent., Dist. XXVI, q.1, art. 1, ad 1).
This peculiarly human end applies itself to the insufficiency of the solitary man, completing him in a way somewhat similar to the perfection he receives from civil society.

"Sicut enim naturalis ratio dictat ut homines simul cohabent quia unus homo non sufficit sibi in omnibus quae ad vitam pertinent, ratione cujus dicitur homo naturaliter politicus, ita etiam eorum quibus indiget ad humanam vitam, quaedam opera sunt competentia viris, quaedam mulieribus; unde natura movet ut sit quaedam associatio viri ad mulierem, in qua est matrimonium". (Ibid., Dist. XXVI, q.1, art. 1, c.; cf. et., Suppl., q.41, art. 1).

II. Thomism and Dignity of Personalist End.

What is the nature of this completion? Do the spouses reciprocally perfect each other merely in their status as means directed to the procreation and rearing of children? There are texts in St. Thomas' writings suggesting that he might give an affirmative answer to that question. Thus, for example, he explicitly affirms the child as the end "ad quam sicut ad finem ordinatur tota communicatio operum
quae est inter virum et uxorem". (Suppl. q.49, art.2, ad 1; cf. et., Suppl., q. 49, art.3, c.). And yet there are other texts wherein he is just as explicit in affirming conjugal society as directed to a larger end than that embraced by the good of the child. Thus, St. Thomas explicitly distinguishes the common life as an end separate (even though subordinate) with respect to the parental end. "Et ideo, cum per matrimonium ordinentur aliqui ad unam generationem et educationem prolis, et iterum ad unam vitam domesticam"... (Suppl., 2.44, art. 1, c.). He affirms as contrary to the ends of marriage whatever would wound this common life (which differentiates human marriage from animal unions), even though all the time leaving intact the procreative and educative ends. "Pluralitas ergo uxorum neque totaliter tollit neque aliqualiter impedит matrimonii primum finem: cum unus vir sufficiat pluribus uxoribus fecundandis, et educandis filiis ex eis natis... Sed secundarium finem etsi non totaliter tollat, tamen multum impedit"... (Suppl., q. 65, art. 1, c.).

Perhaps, some light may be thrown on this seeming contradiction if we judge these texts in the
background of the Thomistic teaching on the notion of society itself. In society, as we have seen, we distinguish a common good that must be sought for itself. This is the good of the whole with respect to which man is a part. But, man being in no wise a mere instrument, the common good include in its totality an element which redounds to the individual good of the members. Thus, society in its largest outlines represents not only an ordination to a bonum honestum (the progress of humanity) but also an ordination to a bonum utile (the necessary assistance of the individual to a full life). In the conjugal society, the good of the child, by virtue of its inclusion within the bonum honestum above mentioned, is first in the hierarchy of values. All other ends, which pertain to the bonum utile of this society and which may be comprised under the general title of "mutuum obsequium" are certainly subordinated. But they are not mere means. They do not foster the development of the individual merely in his status as a progenitor any more than civil society enlarges the citizen merely in his capacity as a servant to the common good. And if St. Thomas can be quoted as affirming the mutual exchange of services by the spouses to be a mere means finding
their end in the offspring, then this exchange of services (or "communicatio operum", as it is called by the great theologian) must be understood as not constituting the entire bonum utile deriving to the members from conjugal society.

In the present day, as a result of more extended studies on the female personality, it is practically universally recognized that the woman as woman contributes largely to the personal growth of the man, especially to the man she marries. This was not the prevailing conviction in the time of St. Thomas. At that time, scholars accepted almost without question the dictum (expressed however, as a probability) of St. Augustine: "I do not see why the woman has been given to the man as a helper except to provide him with offspring" (103). In the Summa Theologica (I, q. 92, art. 1, ad 1), St. Thomas seems to deny (not merely minimize) any contribution other than generation that woman as woman can bring to the conjugal society. At least, his great commentator Cajetan understands and attempts to justify a denial here. The manifest contributions to the domestic life deriving exclusively from the wife and seemingly referred to by
Aristotle as outside the capability of the male (104) are proposed as evidence of woman's contribution (outside generation) to conjugal society. But Cajetan refuses to agree that this de facto superior ability of the woman in particular household functions stems from any personal superiority in these matters. According to him, it is merely an acquired proficiency that would have been much greater in the man did not other and more properly male duties occupy his energies (105).

Given such a low appreciation of the personality-contributions of the woman, it should not be difficult to understand how the Angelic Doctor would conclude that (at least for the man) the exchange of services has little value except in their subordination to the offspring. And yet, we believe it conformable to Thomistic thought to emphasize that, though expressing its external aspect, the mere exchange of services does not constitute the entirety of the mutuum obsequium in marriage. There is a more fundamental and a more important aspect of the good deriving to the spouses from their membership in the conjugal society, and one that only indirectly may be subjected as a means
to the child. It is their reciprocal love: what St. Thomas calls "maxima amicitia" (106). Although in discussing the indissolubility of marriage, St. Thomas does subject this amicitia as a means to the social ends, nevertheless in other places he also recognizes it as independent therefrom and, in fact, as a fundamental reality in se valuable from which the very necessity of indissolubility itself as also monogamy derives (C.G., lib. III, c.123, n.5; c.124, ns.4 & 5). The significance of this independence and its claim to be above any direct subordination to the social aims of marriage may be recognized by presenting St. Thomas' view of the status of amicitia in human society.

The necessity of society answers a man's aspirations not merely in affording comrades to be used for his own benefit or for the benefit of a common end. But it also affords an object for his disinterested love or benevolence and thus a foundation for the reciprocal disinterested love which, in all its various manifestations under the general title of friendship, embraces whomsoever man can engage in a personal relationship. "Homo naturaliter est animal civilis, et ideo homines appetunt ad invicem vivere
et non esse solitarii, etiam si in nullo unus alio
indigeret ad hoc quod ducerent vitam civilem; sed tamen
magna utilitas est communis in communione vitae socia-
lis"... (In III Polit., lect. 5) The possession of a
common end for activity or the exchange of services
in this pursuit do not specify the nature or measure
the value or the intensity of this love. Unity in a
common end is only the occasion or point of departure
for it. Over and above the object common to the coo-
peration, a new and distinct object engages the part-
ners. They no longer work merely with but now, in ad-
dition, for each other. Friendship in a true sense
goes beyond mere friendly cooperation towards a com-
mon end. Mere friendly cooperation is rather an amici-
tia utilis and therefore only amicitia per accidens.
(I-II, q.26, art. 4, ad 3; cf. et., VII. Ethic., c.III).
But it is characteristic of mutual love that the lovers
find their orientation, not to any third thing, but
to each other. Nor is this love directed as a mere
means to the exchange of services necessary for the
domestic or civil life, finding its reason of being
in fostering the same as a sort of psychological lu-
bricant. Such a subordination is characteristic of
animal couplings or animal gregariousness, which (even
as the animals themselves) are totally subjected as mere means to the ends of the species. But in the human sphere the exchange of services follows as a fragmentary effect and a sign from a relationship, whose intrinsic value is independent of whatever usefulness it may have in supplementing human needs or furthering a common cause. De facto, it possesses this usefulness. But its origin, existence, and necessary environment belong to an entirely separate realm. It stems from man himself inasmuch as he is in act rather than in potency and whereby, in finite imitation of the diffusiveness of the Divine Goodness, he is impelled to direct his good (already attained or to be attained) to the possession, not of himself alone, but of himself as multiplied by as many other "selves" in proportion as they by similitude and propinquity allow that identification of interests (107).

Now society as such (since it cannot be defined except as a unification of persons: i.e., ends in themselves) cannot be conceived except its common good contain as an integral part some satisfaction of individual needs or aspirations. And, in varying measure, each society is directed to secure for its members
that which is not only "the greatest of exterior goods" but also a most intimate consequence of virtue (namely, amicitia, which we inadequately translate as "friendship") "Omnis lex tendit ut amicitiam constituat vel hominum ad invicem vel hominis ad Deum" (I-II, q.99, art. 1, ad 2) (108).

Likewise we may say that, in the Thomistic view, the conjugal society is directed especially (and, indeed, more efficaciously than any other natural society created by human cooperation) to establish its personal value by the gift of this union in disinterested, reciprocal love known as amicitia. In the eyes of the great Doctor, the intimacy of the contact and the intensity of the love binding husband and wife stand in first place and find comparison only with the supreme union creative of parental love (109).

Possessing delights inasmuch as satisfying the sexual instincts and utility inasmuch as an adjunct to domestic society, nevertheless it possesses also the superior and in se desirable value pertaining to every amicitia fully worthy of the name.

"Et dicit quod ex praedictis apparet quod amicitia conjugalis habet utilitatem, in quantum scilicet per eam fit sufficientia vitae domesticae. Habet
etiam delectationem in actu generationis, sicut et in caeteris animalibus. Et si vir et uxor sint e-piches, idest virtuosi, poterit eorum amicitia esse propter virtutem. Est enim aliqua virtus propria utriusque, scilicet viri et uxoris, propter quam amicitia redditur jucunda utrique. Et sic patet hujusmodi amicitia potest esse et propter virtutem et propter utile et propter delectabile". (In VIII Ethic., lect. 12).

III. Thomism and Nature of Personalist End.

But even though it be admitted that St. Thomas has recognized its status as an independent personal end for conjugal society, the question may still be asked: "Did he say the last word that might be said (or even, that he himself might have said) with respect to this amicitia conjugalis? Is this merely another example, differing only in intensity, of the friendships illustrated in the various associations common to humanity? On the surface, such seems to be the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. It is difficult to find in his writings any explicit appreciation of the reciprocal fulfillment springing from the relationship of the spouses, not merely as two
persons, but as man and woman. On the one hand, sexual differences and sex functions are seemingly restricted as agents for procreation or medicine for carnal desires. On the other hand, there is noted an intense personal amicitia modelled on the friendship characteristic of civil contacts and seemingly restricted to mutual, non-sexual benefactions in the direction of the common interests of the spouses and of the rearing of their children.

But the following objection, already implicitly contained in the Thomistic synthesis, immediately suggests itself. Can an adequate conception of the common good pertaining to conjugal society exclude a personal value from the very relationships that go to specify it and reduce these to the status of mere utilitarian functions without value except in total subjection to the species? To put the objection in another way: Is the specifically human character of conjugal society saved if it be presented merely as a hybrid of purely animal and purely human relationships, joined by what is hardly more than a merely accidental union? It is true that man's sexuality is possessed in common with the beasts.
As St. Thomas writes, it is "conveniens naturae gen-
eris" (110). But, unless we caricature the teaching
of the great Doctor, we cannot understand human sex-
uality as purely animal. It is specifically human,
even as the least animal-like characteristics pertain-
ing to man. Therefore, there should be an a priori
suspicion against any theory that would conceive its
exercise as necessarily indifferent to human values,
even of the ideal or spiritual order, or, a fortiori,
hostile to the same.

It is true that the affective life of the
senses dissociates with respect to the higher elements
pertaining to the spiritual in man. And this natural
contrariness or even rebellion has been made more
manifest and more pronounced inasmuch as original
sin has deprived the sons of Adam of the preterna-
tural gifts assuring their unvarying subordination.
But this is only half the story. There are also sen-
sible affections in the human composite that are na-
turally sympathetic to the claims of man's higher
nature. A process of domestication, as it were, (or
integration by means of a sort of sublimation) rather
than subjugation (which supposes an ever-present rebell-
ion), finds and utilizes in them pre-existent aptitudes to stimulate and further human perfection.

"C'est un des grands mérites de Klages d'avoir attiré l'attention sur ce double aspect de la sensibilité humaine. Contempler un beau paysage, vibrer à l'audition d'un chef-d'œuvre musical, évoquer, sans l'ombre d'un voeu charnel et comme à travers un nimbe d'inaccessible pureté, l'image d'une personne aimée, -- l'ivresse issue de ces actes est certes profondément sensible; il n'en reste pas moins que la sensibilité qui se manifeste ici, loin d'être un obstacle à l'essor de l'esprit, en est l'inévitable complément et la sève nourricière. Prenons au contraire d'autres mouvements sensibles; par exemple la joie charnelle de manger, une brutale tentation sexuelle, le bouillonnement d'une colère animale, etc.: ces mouvements nous apparaîtront comme étrangers et hostiles, non seulement à nos idéals spirituels, mais encore aux profondes et délicates vibrations sensitives dont nous venons de parler. Il importe donc de distinguer, à l'intérieur de notre être sensitif, un "pôle" épuré, aérien, "pneumatique" et un pôle charnel, terrestre, au sens péjoratif de ces mots. Le premier

Nothing can be farther from the Aristotelianism (or Christianity) of St. Thomas than to conceive in man a warfare or an armed peace in which pure sensibility is ranged on one side and pure spirituality ranged on the other. The spiritual in man does not fight, itself alone, against the indifference or rebellion of the senses. Its warfare is with sympathetic sensible elements against other sensible elements that are indifferent or hostile to its ideals. In a word, there exists in the sphere of the sensible affections, emotions and tendencies which nourish the spirit in man, and others which inhibit it. Between these two opposite ideal (rather than real) limits that we may designate as white and black, there are in man's sensible life multitudes of shadings: interminglings of white and black in various and unstable proportions (111).
This intermingling is found especially in the love between the sexes. Sexuality can be illustrated in mankind in all its self-seeking and absorbing brutality, working not only against the enlargement of human personality in true love but also against even an elementary respect for the human person which it debases to the status of a mere instrument for animal satisfactions. But, poles apart, we have a sexual union transfigured by and expressive of elements that are characteristic of human love in its most intense and most idealistic reality: a benevolence, not with reservations, but a consecration and attempted transcendence of the entire self in an interminable soul-unity with the beloved. These elements that thus transfigure physical sexuality, although giving first place to the spiritual in man under which they are hierarchized, contain also sensible elements. These last differentiate conjugal love from the love of friendship not only inasmuch as their genesis presupposes a differentiation in the sexes (and this in a multitude of complementary phases in addition to the merely genital) but also inasmuch as their finalization is the establishment of a unique inter-penetration and consequent enlargement of personalities, on
both spiritual and physical planes.

The actual union in the conjugal relation is the par excellence expression of this inter-penetration being its only, or, at least, most adequate voluntary expression. It is intended by nature to be not only its sign but also, in one sense, its consummation. For it essentially encompasses the most complete earthly realization in the direction of the total one-ness to which, of its definition, every worthy love involving persons tends (112). This interpretation is not an arbitrary idealization such as one would expect from lovers. Nor does it represent merely what the union might be, as a consummation seconded by a most intense (and, to a large extent, involuntary) sentimental attraction. On the contrary, it is demanded by the very ontological significance of the sex act itself. And it imposes as an obligation that sex be used only within a frame-work that embraces all the rational elements (as also the sensible elements, inasmuch as they are possible) supposed by the supreme personal union it signifies and completes.
IV. A Modern Personalist View Criticized.

This personalist view of the relations between the sexes, which we have sought to show as, at least, conformable with Thomistic teaching on man's social and animal nature, represents a definite prolongation. It proposes conclusions that de facto the Angelic Doctor never drew, and it would find disputable many of his statements restricting the legitimacy of sex relations either for procreation or to serve conjugal justice by remedying the partner's concupiscence (113). But nevertheless, it may claim to lie within Thomistic horizons. A much more radical break with Thomism is characteristic of the personalist view as taught by Herbert Doms, Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Norbert Rocholl, and their many adherents (114).

The view we have advanced thus far, and which we have claimed to be within the Thomistic pattern, has many points in common with the view advanced by Doms, etc. Both views agree that the personalist end is an end for marriage and the conjugal act, as genuinely an end as is generation. The personalist end represents a value that surpasses whatever u-
tility it possesses in view of the offspring. It is likewise the reason of being for many characteristics obligatory for every true marriage, which characteristics could be derived only with difficulty by one who establishes the good of the child as the sole constitutive norm of conjugal society. Both views likewise agree that, although the unattainability of the procreative end by the conjugal act diminishes its value, it in no wise renders it without justification or even without great value both for the spouses and (indirectly) for society.

In a word, St. Thomas (understood in the large sense), even as the new school, admits a threefold terminus to the ideal conjugal act: to union, to a mutual perfection of the spouses, and to procreation. Likewise, both affirm this threefold terminus to be not a mere result but a pre-determined result: an end, which is the finis operis of the act. However, whereas St. Thomas understands the lack of fecundity as rendering any concrete conjugal act incomplete in its ontological reality, the new school asserts that, even given this lack, nevertheless the act remains ontologically achieved and possessed of its whole
sense. Independently of its results in generation, it is essentially complete: it has its full meaning in realizing the expression and fulfillment of the most intimate union of love possible in this life. The deprivation of fecundity is seemingly not more than the deprivation of an extrinsic result. (Of course, there is emphasized the supreme importance of fecundity for society and its irreplaceable efficacy in furthering the perfection of the spouses. But all this belongs to another order, related but nevertheless exterior to the inner meaning of the conjugal act).

But it may be questioned whether there can be any love-union, (short of that between man and God) which is of its essence a closed union: independent of all functionalism whereby it is directed to the service of an object beyond itself. It may be admitted that, differently from other earthly unions, this service rendered by the conjugal union (namely in the foundation of a family) is in the way of being a prolongation of the love and mutual fulfillment of the spouses. It represents a good each must wish for the other; a duty whose obligation may not be separated from the obligation of consecration to the other. Likewise,
whereas other services to society tend to the common good and, at the same time, to the perfection of the agent only in partial phases of his being, conjugal services associate the contribution to the common good with the complementing of the individual in every phase of his living and in the more fundamental and wide-reaching aspects of his being. But these features, peculiar to the conjugal union, should not force us to regard the reciprocal orientation of the spouses as its sole essential content and the enrichment by fecundity as something merely accruing, much as an accident perfects a subject already complete in its substantial reality. The new school did well in emphasizing that the marital union is more than a mere partnership essentially ordained to a common, exterior object and only per modum consequentis, or by a sort of reflection, directed to union and personal fulfillment. But its reaction, completely turning the tables, seems to reduce the social (i.e. procreative) direction, implicit in the sex-union as such, to the status of being only a per accidens orientation: actual generation thus becoming hardly more than an epi-phenomenon or mere concomitant incidental to the worthy
consummation of the love-union. In avoiding both these extremes, the just mean insists that the social and the personalist ordination of the sex-union are both genuine ends and yet unseparable inasmuch as each implies the other as its necessary complement. Let us say, the differentiation of the sexes is pre-determined to render possible the achievement of personal union in the marriage-act. But this pre-determination does not find therein anything like an ultimate terminus. Even though this love-union may be not only psychologically the only object explicitly sought but also ontologically the immediate goal of nature's intentions; even though it is something in itself desirable (a bonum honestum) and hence surpasses the valuation given to a mere means, nevertheless it is also a means: being intrinsically ordained to find its completion and perfection in generation. Considered formally, every sterile sex-union is imperfect, unfinished. In other words, the natural deprivation of actual generation asserts a deficiency in the sex-union of one or more internal or external factors required to render the pre-existent necessity of right (demanding generation) also a necessity of fact. For example, an apple tree may not
fructify. Indeed, it may include negative characteristics which render fructification an impossibility. Nevertheless, it does not cease to be an apple tree. Its definition requires that we include therein an inner orientation to the production of apples. The mere fact that apples might occur only spasmodically and the production of a trunk and branches be a common, or even an invariable result, does not justify us in establishing (let us say) the production of kindling-wood as its per se orientation, apples being only a surplus result.

V. Finality, Common Good, and the Use of Marriage.

Of course, the global finalization (that is, connoting the inter-locking causal series that constitute the totality of the world) of the sex faculties, as of any other natural agent, intends not only the necessity of right but also the contingency that clothes it. Nature is not frustrated if the necessity of right does not always eventuate in fact. Specifically with respect to man's sexual faculties, procreation is not intended to complete each conjugal union or each conjugal society. Nor are these unions
any the less in accord with nature's designs for man's individual and social good, if procreation be impossible. Man's obligation and his true good, inasmuch as tied up with his general obligation to live according to right order, affirms the necessity of directing his members in consonance with the de jure finality (necessity of right) implicit in each. The unnaturalness of contraception and similar crimes is constituted by their opposition to this de jure finality. Because of this opposition, we find them established in their proper malice as contrary to nature. Not the end sought: namely, non-procreation (although its seeking may involve a separate malice) but the abuse of the finality of the organ renders the act unnatural. Nature's invariable purpose is not that each procreative act should de facto lead to generation but that each should be faithful to its being and thus attain at least one of its ends.

From the above paragraph, it should be clear that periodic continence (the limiting of the conjugal relations to the so-called "safe" or sterile periods) may not be placed in the same category with contraception. Man's use of conjugal rights during the sterile periods, even his restriction of this use to
these times: all this remains within the horizons of the contingency with which nature clothes procreation. No genuine good, whether for the individual or for the social welfare, is determined by nature to follow from an act vitiated by contraception. On the contrary, man's individual or social good can allow (and even command) the use of periodic continence. Here we have moved beyond the sphere wherein nature determines, without allowing a justifiable variation, the particular means that must be used by man in seeking his proper good. We may now answer the question proposed on page 109 and affirm that, since nature allows another end for sex-activity than that of procreation, then it is entirely possible that man's ordination to the common good may be preserved intact, given this alternative end.

But what are we to think of the practice of periodic continence? Here, it is not merely a question of the non-use of marriage rights which in itself, like celibacy, does not in its objective reality indicate an intention against procreation. Nor is it a situation merely similar to the contracting or consummating of sterile unions or to the simple exercise of conjugal
relations on sterile days. Of themselves, these last likewise simply prescind from the procreative end of marriage. Nor yet is it merely a question of a simply inefficacious (do-nothing) desire that marriage relations should not be fecund. But here is a practice objectively orientated against procreation. It is not simply a series of acts in accidental union; but its full reality demands that we also include a governing intention impregnating each of these acts and rendering them as so many expressions of a positive disposition to exclude the procreative end in whole or in part. Therefore, in departing from the stand of the majority of the theologians, many (115) hold that the practice of periodic continence is in itself objective unlawful: "per se illicitum". However, a just cause being present, the sought-for infecundity functions with the natural order that submits the unprocreative periods not merely to man's intelligence but also to his goodwill. Hence, it is also called "per accidens licitum".

In studying this opinion, particularly as presented by Father Griese by the unknown author of the article in L'Ami du Clergé, the suspicion arises that, in their understanding, the refusal to adopt the
procreative end for the sex-act infallibly results in
directing it to an end which, if not purely utilitarian,
nevertheless possesses an intrinsic value only in the
event that procreation is physically or morally impos­
ible. But the so-called secondary ends of marriage
relations, especially in the larger view that we have
presented above, have more than a mere "substitute"
value. Unwarranted periodic continence which seeks
these exclusively, sins, not in terminating marriage
relations in something which is "honestum" only in a
truncated fashion, but inasmuch as it supposes selfish
intentions ranging themselves against an affirmative
precept of the natural law joining the utilization
of the social importance of these relations by founding
a family. Hence, it may be said to be "per se licitum"
and "per accidens illicitum". Periodic continence which
seeks the personalist end exclusively does not terminate
marriage relations in something which is "honestum" only
in a truncated fashion and hence is in need of an ex­
trinsic "good" reason to justify it as a finis operis
for conjugal relations. But this alternative for the
procreative end is of itself good; and the reasons ne­
necessary to justify it are of the same general order as
those needed to justify the non-utilization in favor of
society of any faculty, possession, etc., of social as well as of individual significance.

Even as total celibacy or total continence in marriage become evil, not because of any intrinsic deformity in such states but by virtue of evil, or even insufficiently good reasons, so is it with periodic continence. The denial of marriage by the celibate simply to avoid the burdens of parenthood seems culpably selfish (not only selfish in the sense of lacking the generosity over and above duty) not merely in the per accidens contingency of a eugenic need in his country or in humanity for his procreative services, but by his very possession of socially significant faculties. With much more reason, those who profit from relationships which involve not only personal but also social value, are commanded by this same affirmative precept of the natural law. Even aside from the exceptional circumstances (perhaps, not so exceptional in depopulating Western nations) wherein social justice towards one's own people may demand fecundity even as the cost of serious personal sacrifices, at no time is it permitted to the spouses to use this gift exclusively for their personal advantage. The personalist end and the procreative end of the marriage relation, formally
considered, are equally valid as bona honesta sufficient to justify it. But, inasmuch as the procreative end pertains to the common or social good which prevails with respect to any individual good of the same order, then an excusing reason must always be had that this general subordination be respected in an act which voluntarily stops short of its full social realization. In other words, unwarranted periodic continence is objectively or per se licit but per accidens illicit inasmuch as it is the abuse of a means that is in itself good or at least indifferent.
Chapter 5

APPLICATIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF CONTRACEPTION

None, least of all Catholics, will deny that rational opposition to blind, instinctive fecundity is the rule for a truly human married life. But Catholics differ radically from the advocates of contraception in holding that a good individual and social end can neither justify nor be expected to result from (except in an apparent and superficial sense) the use of means that flouts the Divinely established finality of man's sexual faculties. In our third chapter, we have suggested how a general metaphysical conclusion may be arrived at, associating the genuine human good with man's respect for his finality and, conversely, indicated the disaster that must inevitably follow any disregard for the same. This conclusion is valid even though we may not be able to demonstrate in concreto just what are the evil consequences or how they may follow. But neither does it exclude the possibility that sociological or psychological principles
and studies may explicate these evil consequences in all their stark reality and detail, and demonstrate their particular inevitability. Indeed, such confirmations should be expected.

It is not only the universal teaching of Catholic Scholars but also the official teaching of the Catholic Church, in condemning contraception, that "no reason", however grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and morally good". (En- cyclical on Christian Marriage, Pope Pius XI). Contraception is here regarded as "in all places and at all times and under all conditions and all circumstances, always and forever wrong. To allow it, no matter how good the reasons, would be to allow evil that good may come" (116).

I. Critical Appreciation of Social Argument vs Contraception.

Some authorities assert that this blanket-condemnation of contraception may be shown as necessitated by the disastrous consequences inevitably resulting for both the individual and society from the
adoption of any alternative attitude: In general, their argument is as follows: Unless contraception is strictly forbidden as both gravely and universally (therefore, no exceptions may be allowed) contrary to the natural law, we have the absurdity of nature and nature's God allowing disastrous consequences not only for the individual but for society as well. Contraception is gravely sinful because gravely harmful, given its widespread practice (117). It is likewise universally sinful because exceptions cannot be admitted (no matter how valid the reasons) in this realm of "masterful interests and cravings" without, before long, becoming "if not the rule, at least so common and so numerous that the objective and subjective bonum humanum protected by chastity and marriage would be deeply and disastrously undermined and frustrated" (118).

This so-called wedge action is illustrated vividly not only in the matter of divorce but also in that of contraception. "...and no sociological fact rests on a firmer observational and statistical basis than the fact that practically and in reality the groups that admit and practice contraception, for
whatsoever reason and in whatsoever exceptional situations, do not practice it in "moderation", nor have we a single workable suggestion that offers a ghost of a hope that we can ever get them to practice it in "moderation". "The wedge, once allowed entrance, pierces ever deeper and deeper" (119).

This argument is a forceful and a more readily appreciated (at least, in non-philosophical circles) presentation of the case against birth-prevention. But they seem to go too far, who in substituting this condemnation from perceived consequences, would deny as valid the more fundamental and more apodictic condemnation based on the Divinely established finality of man's sexual faculties with respect to which contraception is a perversion. In chapter 3, we have already sketched in a general way how the principle of finality, which is a fundamental principle for all human morality, attaches itself to the organs of man's sensible life and forbids their perversion. It is true that, in order to speak of perversion in any real sense, this frustration must involve some evil in the sense that it denies a genuine good necessary for the individual or social
whole in which the faculty functions as a part. But in the determination of the nature and the gravity of this evil, we do not invoke the evidence of disastrous, direct or indirect consequences. The determination is rather made on the basis of the very object of the act itself: its finis operis. Thus, the giving of life being the de jure object of the sexual union, therefore contraception (which is an artificial sundering of the bonds that tie such complete sexual functioning and this, its proper object) truly in its intrinsic direction affronts the good of the human species in a way comparable to the sin of homicide. "Inordinata vero seminis emissio repugnat bonum naturae, quod est conservatio speciei, unde post peccatum homicidii, quo natura humana jam in actu existens, destruitur, hujusmodi genus peccati videtur secundum locum tenere, quo impeditur generatio humanae naturae" (C.G., lib. III, c. 122). Therefore, "since life is the greatest physical good, every act that necessarily and positively prevents life, when life would else ensue from the act that is intended by Nature to produce it, is a serious deordination against rational nature, and against the good of nature, and against the purpose
of nature. It is comparable with eating in such a way as to cause death forthwith, or with speaking as to misuse of speech so as to compass the death of oneself or another" (120).

There are many acts that in themselves are favorable to or at least not hostile to the right human order. And yet, it may happen that more or less serious disorders foreseen to follow therefrom as per accidens results will demand compensatory reasons to justify the performance of these acts. On the other hand, there are other acts that of their nature stand disordered: being essentially vowed against a good pertaining to humanity and failing of the actual achievement of this destruction or perturbation only by virtue of what may be judged as a sort of futility rather than a more benevolent re-orientation. With respect to these acts, however, there may be affirmed a sort of hierarchy of disorder. In line with his general doctrine on the finality of the physical order which is compatible with contingency only within limits that demand the invariable efficacy of the fundamental physical laws and the normal efficacy of others, St. Thomas outlines a similar situation in the right order pres-
cribed by man's finality (121). Some moral precepts are so fundamentally implied by the necessary human ends that any deviation in respect to them, no matter what the reason, destroys this order. The non-observance of other precepts, so long as this is exceptional, may be justified and even commanded in obedience to a higher finality.

Included under the precepts of the former class are those acts from whose hypothetical universalization as a general line of conduct would proceed the out-and-out exclusion of a good vitally necessary to the individual or social good. For example, in marriage, a stable, in contradistinction to a transitory, union of the sexes is absolutely demanded inasmuch as humanity could not survive, given the universalized dissociation of the rearing of children from their generation. Included under the precepts of the latter class are those acts whose hypothetical universalization would leave the necessary human good substantially intact but yet achieved in a more or less incomplete and debilitated fashion. With respect to these last, St. Thomas allows the possibility of justified exceptions made in favor of a higher finality. Thus, for example,
it seems that, while of course holding for the absolute indissolubility of marriage by virtue of a Divine precept, he does not affirm this to be the case before the natural law. "Si ergo inseparabilitas matrimonii inter prima praecepta legis naturae contingatur, solum hoc secundo modo sub dispensatione cadere potuit. Si autem sit inter secunda praecepta legis naturae, etiam primo modo (per hunc modum non variatur cursus rerum naturalium quae sunt semper, sed quae sunt frequenter), cadere potuit sub dispensatione. Videtur autem magis inter secunda praecepta legis naturae contineri". (Suppl., q. 67, art. 2; cf. et. In IV Sent., dist. 33, q. 2, art. 2, q la 4).

On the other hand, most of the more modern Catholic theologians emphasize that, by virtue of the so-called wedge-principle, limited divorce, although theoretically directed only against indissolubility, nevertheless differs little in practice from a denial of the stability absolutely necessary for marriage. Hence they affirm that the natural law denies to any human authority the right to dispense in this respect. However, given the exclusion of this wedge-principle action (which, although impossible to human authority,
nevertheless is entirely within the Divine competence), it may be held that indissolubility is one of the so-called secondary precepts of the natural law.

Those who conclude to the universal prohibition against contraception solely on the basis of its direct and indirect evil consequences would presumably agree that, in the event this wedge-principle did not operate (for example, from the interposition of Divine power) contraception could be conceived as legitimate for special exceptional cases. But, if we regard it from the viewpoint of finality, it seems impossible to consider it in this light. Differently from limited divorce which (at least, as formally considered) does not absolutely exclude the social purpose of marriage and eliminate the continuation of humanity, contraception is intrinsically directed to precisely this end. Without the necessary supposition of any conditions of fact that might allow for variance but in a manner that is direct and immediate, contraception is an act that perverts the immutable finality of man's nature and hence contradicts an intrinsic fitness which is ultimately founded on Divine Wisdom and Sanctity. Its evil seems to be intrinsic in the same manner
as the evil of blasphemy, idolatry, etc.: that is, in the sense that not even God could permit it by a special dispensation.

The argument concluding to the universal evil of contraception from direct and indirect consequences is a valuable confirmation to the more general condemnation based on right order which views it as a grave inordination. But it seems to take its proper place, not to substitute for the more metaphysical argument based on human finality, but rather to fit into its more universal framework. It is an eloquent commentary of the dictum of St. Thomas: "Non enim Deus a nobis offenditur nisi ex eo quod contra nostrum bonum agimus" (C.G., lib. III, c. 122, n.2).

II. Critical Appreciation of Personalist Argument vs Contraception.

A similar attitude seemingly must be taken with respect to the position taken by Father Doms and his group. The position of Catholic Theology in teaching that the evil in contraception is its use of inherently evil means rather than the seeking of a bad end is apt to be dismissed curtly (and wrongly, of cour-
se) by our opponents as a mere technicality. But, whereas the argument discussed above invokes the lesson of social consequences in order to emphasize the importance of this so-called technicality, the exposition of Doms illuminates its significance from the personalist side. Given the fact that nature has endowed the exercise of man's sexual faculties with a personalist value even as a social value, it follows that any inordination in this sphere cannot but react against this first-named value as well.

In the viewpoint proposed by Fr. Doms, the exercise of the sexual faculties is intended by nature to be invariably joined to, and, indeed, instrumentally subordinated to the fusion of two personalities. "Sexual giving is the giving of two human persons to each other in an act of common life, which imprints itself deeply on their personalities. Therefore, even when the act is taken lightly, that is to say when the persons who perform it violate their own dignity, they will still become one flesh" (122). It is "not merely the simple activity of particular organs"... On the contrary, its true reality demands that it be recognized as "the activity of that masculine or feminine sexuality which
influences the whole personality on every level" (123).

Therefore, any exercise of sex that voluntarily detaches itself from this unreserved, mutual self-giving that is its essential (not merely, conventional) meaning, "deeply injures the personality as such, either by offending against its dignity and spiritual grandeur, or by perverting a meaning of nature in its fullness, a perversion which affects and injures the very depths of the personality" (124).

This injury and this offence is, it goes without saying, manifest in all cases wherein naked sex passion enthrones the instincts, reducing the subject himself and his partners to the status of mere tools or instruments for brutalizing physical gratifications. But, of course, Fr. Doms understands a derogation in the self-giving that justifies sex, and a consequent affront to personality, as implicit in many other cases that are not only less manifest but also may be mistakenly regarded as genuine manifestations of true love. However, inasmuch as these do not conform to the objective framework alone apt (and hence prescribed by nature and nature's God)
for this purpose, the best intentions do not contradict the fact that these acts are evil in themselves and move in a contrary direction to the motives that inspire them.

We are not concerned here as to how Fr. Doms condemns polygamy, divorce, and the various other transgressions against marriage on the basis of their opposition to its personalist meaning. However, with respect to contraception, he writes: "If a human person interferes with the biological process itself, either before, after or during the act his giving of himself can no longer be complete or unreserved. He will then be deliberately keeping something back, doing something contrary to the unchanging meaning of the marriage act itself, something which violates the deep purpose of marital love" (125). For Doms, contraception is a deliberate distortion of the very nature of the conjugal act itself: of the inner meaning or content which must invariably accompany it and which is distinguished from its natural results: that is, procreation and mutual formation and fulfillment of the partners which require the cooperation of non-voluntary factors, and hence,
properly speaking, can only be hoped for. It is
an "interference with the way in which the anatomic-
al and physiological faculties do their share of the
work". This work is that of physically expressing
and realizing the conjugal union of personalities
in the right and effective manner as decreed by God
Himself. "Generation is, as it were, inscribed in
the form of the sexual organs and in the way in which
they function; any artificial alteration of the norm-
al biological act which succeeds in frustrating this
purpose constitutes a falsification of a mysterious
and complex act, which denotes and effects the giv-
ing of two persons to each other and its natural re-
sults. The way in which this alteration takes place
is of little importance; the act may be actually
interrupted, or mechanical, chemical or other means
may be used to prevent its consequences" (126).

Now it may be agreed that contraception
does wound deeply the personalist end of the marriage
act. And it is important to high-light this aspect
of its evil, especially in its status as intrinsically
adhering to each and every act thus tainted,
and not merely as a possible result which may be feared because the practice of contraception (as a practice) may have a certain tendency in that direction. But the inordinateness of contraception may not be understood merely from the viewpoint of its opposition to the individual good and finality of the spouses. Nor do we believe that Dr. Doms understands it in this narrow and inadequate sense. However, his almost exclusive emphasis on the personalist rather than the social significance of marriage practically ignores (we would even say, misconceives) the malice of contraception or any of the sexual perversions in their opposition to the common good of human society. Even though it be allowed for the sake of argument that the traditional principle affirming the intrinsic orientation of sex to procreation is inadequate for the determination of the perversity of these sins and hence their opposition to the common good requiring procreation must be certified on the basis of harmful consequences in this direction, nevertheless, even on this score, a much better case may be made for the social repercussions of these evils than that seemingly imagined by Dr.
Doms. This should be apparent from the argument we have already discussed which concludes to the evil of contraception and other sexual aberrations from the viewpoint of their direct and indirect social consequences.

Unless we misunderstand him, Dr. Doms seems to distinguish two separate malices in the perversion of the sexual faculties. He emphasizes that every exercise of sex must be directed to serve the fusion of personalities that the marital union signifies. Otherwise, it offends against a finality that has in view, not the social good interesting itself in the preservation of the race through procreation, but man's individual perfection. On the other hand, only when, the union having been consummated and the biological processes leading to generation instituted, man intervenes to prevent conception: only then does his actions offend against this social mission of sex. Perhaps this formulation misinterprets Dr. Doms' real thought. The argument is not too clear on the pages from which we have
abstracted it. (See the English translation, pp. 72-74; the French translation, pp. 77-78). But such is our reading. Also, the establishment of this disjunction seems to flow from his main thesis, affirming "union", in contradistinction to procreation, to be of the "meaning" of the conjugal act.

On the contrary, it is our contention that each and every exercise of the sexual faculties has a social significance determined by the direction to procreation that is inherent to the nature common to all these faculties, whatever be their individual differences or deficiencies. This significance, whether for good or for evil, is measured not by actual consequences but in accordance with their relation to the object that terminates the finality of sex as such: namely, the continuation of humanity. But does procreation pertain to the finality of sex in the sense that each and every act is marked with an ordination in that direction? Dr. Doms denies this. For him, the personal union of the spouses, and that alone, occupies that role. Inasmuch as actual generation is only a possible result depend-
ent on many conditions outside the control of the human will, therefore he refuses to include an ordination thereto in the essence of the conjugal act. Also, he claims that St. Thomas' adherence to this teaching stems from the erroneous biological ideas of the XIIIth century.

We cannot see the force of this argument nor the influence of Mediaeval biology on the position of St. Thomas (127). While admitting that the ordination of the sexes is to a union envisioning and effecting a deep personal influence on the partners, we likewise claim that this finality is intrinsically determined on the basis of generation as well. If actual generation does not always follow the union of the sexes, it certainly is not, on the other hand, a merely contingent result. Rather, it takes its place with the vast majority of physical phenomena that are truly the expression of natural finality although their de facto occurrence is not "semper" but rather "ut in pluribus".

"Natura est principium motus sive eorum quae
semper eodem modo moventur, sive eorum quae ut in pluribus uniformiter motus servant" (In III Ethic. lect. VII).

Generation belongs to the de jure finality of the sex-union and hence is a finis operis (indeed, by virtue of its connexion with the common good, the primary end) that must be taken into consideration in the determination of the exigencies attending any use of sex whatsoever.
NOTES.

CHAPTER I


2. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis...Opera Omnia, jussu impensaque
   Leonis XIII, P.M., edita... Romae, Ex Typographia Poly-
   glotta, 1885.

3. ibid., pp. 79-80.

4. ibid., p. 82: (In Phys., Lib. II, Lect. IX, n. 2)

5. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.F., Le réalisme du principe de
   finalité, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1932, p. 46.

   Scribner's Sons, 1938, pp. 183-186.

7. Jacques Maritain, "Reflexions on Necessity and Contingency",
   in: Essays in Thomism. Edited by Robert E. Brennan, O.F.,

8. Jacques Maritain, Les degrés du savoir, Desclée de Brouwer,

9. Sir Arthur Eddington, Nature of the Physical World, New York,


14. The New Background of Science, p.63

15. The Nature of the Physical World, p.292

16. Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, ..., 1921.


18. Aristotle, IV Metaphys., ch.V: passim

19. "Cette puissance, par elle-même n'étant pas l'acte, ne peut par elle-même passer à l'acte, elle demandera à être réduite à l'acte par une puissance active, qui elle-même aura besoin d'être prémue, et prémue en dernière analyse par une puissance active suprême qui soit son activité même, en ce sens immobile, acte pur, toujours identique à lui-même." Rég. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., Dieu, Son Existence et Sa Nature, Paris, Beauchesne, 1923, p.159
CHAPTER 2

20. "Est autem idem finis agentis et patientis, inquantum hujusmodi; sed aliter et aliter. Unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod patientis intendit recipere."

Summa Theol., I, q.44, a.4, corp.

21. See I-II, q. 6, A.1, corpus, where the conclusion of the argument of I-II, q.1,A.2, corpus, is exposed in these words: "Cum enim omne agens seu motum agat seu moveatur propter finem, ut supra (q.1,a.2) habitum est..."


23. There has been no anthropomorphism or unjustified application of merely human characteristics to outside agents in this argument. The demand for finality has been exposed from the viewpoint of the operations of composed being as such, where it is just as fundamental as the potency they exemplify. Likewise, the application of "thought" as a sufficient reason for finality carries with it no unjustified anthropomorphism. Although it is only within ourselves that we find the relation of thought to finalistic action, thought is predicated outside the human sphere only because it is a perfection in no wise co-terminous with human thinking but, indeed, co-terminous with being as such, with which it is in essential relation. Thus it may be applied analogically to Subsistent Being. And, indeed, it
must be applied thereto under the penalty of otherwise leaving
the ordered operation of created existences without a sufficient
reason of being. Therefore, the recognition that the ordered
operations of nature proceed to an end in a way similar to the
operations of a wise man is far from being an assumption, pre­
supposed by the argument for finality in the universe. In
reality, it is one of its conclusions. Cf., C.G., lib.III, cap.24.


26. I-II, q.6, a.1, corp.

27. I-II, q.13, a.6, corp.

28. "Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum com­
prehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia
bona." I-II, q.9, a.1, corp.

29. Absolute disinterestedness does not exist and cannot exist
in human willing. He who would set such as his goal because it
is the noble thing to do, would be by that very fact seeking and
willing for himself in the sense of willing his own perfection.

30. The Works of Aristotle translated into English..., Volume
IX, Ethica Nicomachea, translated by W.D. Ross, Oxford 1925,
Book 10: 4, 1174b,30

Cf. I-II, q.4, articles 1 and 2.

A clarification on the relations between the thought of
Aristotle and that of St. Thomas on this point is very important.
Happiness for Aristotle, as for St. Thomas, requires not only the summit of satisfaction but also the highest operation in man. For both it is just as absurd to place the happiness of man in supreme pleasure minus the possession of the highest good as it would be to imagine an equivalence in the happiness of an imbecile imagining himself as king and of the king who is happy in the true possession of his kinghood. But, allowed that happiness demands not only satisfaction but also the possession of the highest good, the question may be asked whether the possession is finalized with respect to the good or vice versa. St. Thomas makes allusion to the fact that Aristotle proposes the question without giving an answer: "Respondeo dicendum quod istam quaestionem movet Philosophus in X Ethic., cap.4, et eam insolutam dimittit." (I-II,q.4,a.2, corp.)

As a matter of fact, in the passage quoted by St. Thomas, Aristotle postpones the giving of the solution. It also seems doubtful that he ever took a definite (or, at least, a clear) stand on the problem. But there are authorities who hold that his position is the same as that of St. Thomas who leaves no doubt regarding his own stand on this matter. St. Thomas agrees with Aristotle in declaring that, outside the useful good (which is manifestly not desired for itself, but for an end), there stand as ends in themselves not only the befitting good (the "bonum honestum": e.g., knowledge, etc., which is desirable even though, as such, it may procure no pleasure: cf Ethica Nicomachea Bk.10,2,1174a, 1-10) but also the good pertaining to satisfaction (the "bonum delectabile", with respect to which
it would be as foolish to seek a further end as it is to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased: cf. *Ethica Nicomachea*: Bk.10, 2.1172b, 23; cf. St. Thomas' commentary: *In Libros Ethicorum*: Lect.II). And, indeed, since the operation of possession, which is the completion of the seeking operation, in its turn receives a further completion in the enjoyment that follows consciousness of such completion, it might seem that this perfection as ultimate is also supreme.

But 'ultimate' in the sense of being a terminus is not the same as 'ultimate' in the sense of being ontologically the best, or the peak of the finalized tendency of a being towards its proper perfection. Bonum delectabile is ultimate, not as perfecting a being from within (as Bonum honestum does) but in following the Bonum honestum: adding nothing to the being intrinsically, but rather extrinsically adhering to the completion as something derived and dependent therefrom; as, let us say, a psychological epiphenomenon. It supposes the good already attained: the internal perfection already complete. It "supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age": merely as a something concomitant, and not as a further perfection. "Dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus ibidem dicit, "delectatio perficit operationem, sicut decor juventutem, qui est juventutem consequens: unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio concomitans visionem; non sicut perfectio faciens visionem in sua specie perfectam esse." (I-II,q.4,a.2,ad1) Its status does not suppose the being complete in its species and directed thereto as an end for its operations, but rather it is to second the perfection of
the being, both in existence and operation, even as health, etc. For, thanks to it, we perform with more attention and perseverance the operations demanded for the internal completion of our being. (Cf C.G., lib.III, cap.26)

Thus, for these and other reasons, St. Thomas insists on the secondary value of pleasure. He does not, as some do, deny that the bonum delectabile has a value in itself. The pretended total disinterestedness that rejects all joy is, in his eyes, rather a vice than a virtue. It is the vice of insensibility. (Cf II-II,q.150,a.1,ad 1) But he does insist that the value of the bonum delectabile is definitely of a secondary value. The primary value pertains to the operations perfective intrinsically with respect to the operator. Although pleasure has value in itself, this value is not from itself but rather from the operation by virtue of which it becomes such pleasure: that is, either good or bad.

This subordination of satisfaction to operation is confirmed by what will be said further on in this chapter, wherein satisfaction is related to man's final end (that is, God, Who may in no wise be related to man as a means to his own good or satisfaction) and wherein a larger application of the principle of finality presents the final end of creation and the relation thereto of the created order including man.


31. "Homini inditus est appetitus ultimi finis sui in communi, ut scilicet appetat naturaliter se esse completum in bonitate.
Sed in quo ista completio consistat, utrum in virtutibus, vel scientiis, vel delectabilibus, vel iujusmodi aliis, non est ei determinatum a natura." Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, q.22,a.7

32. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, Bk.10,1097b


34. Op.cit., 1177a,10 to 1179a,30: passim

35. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Virtutibus in Communi Quaest.un., a.5, ad 8

36. II-II,q.47,a.2, ad 1

37. Aristotle, op.cit., 1177b,25-30

38. I-II,q.3,a.4, corp. "Manifestum est autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis; sed est motus ad finem. Delectatio autem adventit volunta, ex hoc quod finis est praesens; non autem, e converso, ex hoc aliquid fit praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso."

39. I-II. q.2,a.6, corp.

40. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphys., VII,4

41. Cf. Aristotle, Polit., VII

42. ...quia secundum Philosophum, K Ethic. Cf. Ethica Nicomachea, Bk.10,7,1177a,12ff; Bk.11,10 consistit in actu altissimae potentiae quae in nobis est, scilicat intellectus, et in habitu nobil-
issimo, scilicet sapientae, et etiam objecto dignissimo. quod Deus est. Unde etiam philosophi ultimum tempus suae vitae reservabant, ut dicitur, ad contemplandum divina, praecedens tempus in alius scientiis expendentes, ut ex illis habiliiores fieren ad considerandum divina." (In III Sent., Dist.35,q.1,a.2. Solutio 3)

43. Cf. C.G., lib.III, cap.48, "in toto".

44. Cf. I,q.2,a.1, ad 1

45. Summa, I, qu. III, m.II, ad 3. (cf. D.T.C., t.IV,col 826-F)

46. This argument from analogy is eloquent. Thus, Fr. Janvier: "If there is light for the eyes, harmony for the ears, sweetness for the taste, dew for the parched lily, food for the sparrow in distress, then more surely is there a bread of life and a drink of perfection and joy for the measureless hunger and thirst of the noblest of the creatures." (quoted by Meline-Browne, The Moral Law of the Family, Herder, London, [1929], p.9). But its value needs and obtains its peremptory force only in connecting it up with the principle of finality.


47. Cf. Cajetan, In I-II, q.2,a.7


49. Cf. In IV Sent., Dist.49, q.1,a.2,sol.1

51. "Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est diligibile: unum quod diligitur per modum benevolentiae, quando volumus bonum alicujus propter seipsum: sicut diligimus amicos, etiam si nihil ex eis nobis debeat accidere. Aliud quod diligitur dilectione concupiscientiae: et hoc est vel bonum quod in nobis est, vel quia ex eo in nobis aliquod bonum fit: sicut diligimus delectationem, vel vinum inquantum facit delectationem. Quidquid autem diligitur dilectione concupiscientiae, non potest esse ultimum dilectum, cum ad bonum alterius referatur, ejus scilicet cui concupiscitur; sed illud quod diligitur amore benevolentiae, potest esse ultimum dilectum. Beatitudo ergo creat a quae in nobis est, non diligitur nisi dilectione concupiscientiae, unde ejus dilectionem referimus ad nos, et per consequens referimus eam in Deum, cum et nos in Deum referre debeamus; et ita non potest esse ultimum dilectum..." (In IV Sent., Dist. 49, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula V, sol. I, ad 3).


53. "Duo enim sunt in homine quibus Deo potest adhaerere, intellectus scilicet et voluntas, nam secundum inferiores animae partes Deo adhaerere non potest, sed inferioribus rebus. Adhaesio autem quae est per intellectum completionem recipit per eam quae est voluntatis, quia per voluntatem homo quodammodo quiescit in eo
quod intellectus apprehendit. Voluntas autem adhaeret alicui rei vel propter amorem vel propter timorem, sed differenter; nam ei quidem cui inhaeret propter timorem adhaeret propter aliud, ut scilicet evitet malum, quod, si non adhaeret ei, imminet; ei vero cui adhaeret propter amorem adhaeret propter seipsum. Quod autem est propter se principalis est eo quod est propter aliud. Adhaesio igitur amoris ad Deum est potissimus modus ei adhaerendi. Hoc igitur est potissime intentum in divina lege." (C.G.,III, cap.116)

54. "si aliquod bonum proponatur quod apprehendatur in ratione boni, non autem in ratione convenientis, non movebit voluntatem." (Q.D., De Malo, q.6,a.1, corp. Cf. et. C.G.,III,cap.3; I-II, q.8,a.1,corp.)

55. "Ex necessitate beatitudinem homo vult, nee potest velle non esse beatus, aut miser." I-II,q.13,a.6,corp.

56. The minimum connexion demands that the end of action be a bonum honestum and hence of itself (at least) in apt ordination with the maximum connexion which is the actual intention, inspired by supernatural faith, hope and charity, of participating in God through a generous (and not merely obligatory) conformity with His Divine Will.

"Fides dirigit intentionem in finem ultimum, sed ratio naturalis vel prudentia potest dirigere in aliquem finem proximum, et quia ille finis proximus ordinabilis est in finem ultimum etiamsi actu non ordinetur, ideo in infidelibus quorum actus per vim rationis in talem finem diriguntur, possunt aliqui actus esse boni, sed deficiant a perfecta bonitate secundum quam actus est.
meritorius." In II Sent., Dist. 41, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2

If an act be a bonum honestum, it is necessary that it have in itself that whereby it is, itself, worthy of being done (even though nothing other should eventuate to the doer). It may in addition be a bonum utile; and it may be intended as such, providing the self-seeking in such intention does not exclude the love of the good.

"Quaedam vero appetuntur et propter se, in quantum habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis, etiamsi nihil aliud boni per ea nobis accideret; et tamen sunt appetibilia propter aliud, in quantum scilicet perducant nos in aliquod bonum perfectius. Et hoc modo virtutes sunt appetendae. Unde Tullius dicit quod quiddam est quod sua vi nos allicit et sua dignitate trahit: ut virtus, scientia. Et hoc sufficit ad rationem honesti." (II-II, q. 145, a. 1, ad 1)

57. When we say "possible" here, we imply possibility to human nature as such, its historical state as "fallen" being left out of consideration. Knowing from revelation that human nature has been wounded as a result of original sin, Catholic Theology understands an efficacious love of God above all things to be outside actual realization except our weakness be assisted by grace. Cf. 1, q. 60, a. 5, corpus; also I-II, q. 109, a. 3, corpus; cf. et., Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom, New York, 1940, p. 163: note)

58. For an illuminating discussion of this problem, consult Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (jam cit.): chapter 14, entitled, "Love and Its Object."
59. "Le bonheur pour le bonheur eut été un odieux égoïsme; le devoir pour le devoir, un formalisme stoïque et chimérique. Mais le bonheur par le devoir et pour la gloire de Dieu, c'est une ambition bien ordonnée et légitime; plus que cela, c'est une ambition obligatoire que nous ne pouvons décliner, car c'est l'ordre voulu de Dieu, ordre qu'il ne peut même pas ne pas vouloir, parce que tel est l'ordre essentiel et raisonnable des choses, que notre bonheur soit subordonné au devoir et à Dieu comme à son principe et à son terme." (Farges, La liberté et le devoir, p.239)

Chapter 3

60. "Dans l'ordre de la raison pratique, la première idée est la notion de bien et le premier principe sera: le bien et le bien seul, est ce qui est à faire. Et comme il s'agit du bien spécifiquement humain, il suffira, pour découvrir dans cet énoncé des formules qui n'en sont que l'expression plus explicite, d'envisager la nature humaine dans ses relations naturelles immédiatement apparentes: il est conforme à l'ordre moral de vivre selon sa nature raisonnable, sociale, contingente, et des lors de régler ses passions, de respecter les droits d'autrui, d'honorer le Créateur." (Dom Odon Lottin, O.S.B., "L'intellectualisme de la Morale Thomiste" in Xenia Thomistica, Romae, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1925, vol.1, p.420) Cf. In II Sent. Dist.24,q.2,a.3; q.3,a.3, ad 2.

61. "Secundum hoc, ergo, dicendum est quod, sicut, in ratione speculativa, ex principiis indemonstrabilibus naturaliter cog-
nitis producuntur conclusiones diversarum scientiarum, quarum
cognitio non est nobis naturaliter indita, sed per industriam
rationis inventa; ita etiam, ex praeceptis legis naturalis, quasi
ex quibusdam principiis communibus et indemonstrabilibus, necesse
est quod ratio humana procedat ad aliqua magis particulariter
disponenda." (I-II, q.91, a.3, corpus).

62. "Unde, cum omnia quae divinae providentiae subduntur, a lege
aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis (a.1) patet:
manifestum est quod omnia participant aliquam legem aeternam,
inquantum scilicet ex impressione ejus habent inclinationes in
proprios actus et fines. Inter caetera autem rationalis creatura
excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae particeps, sibi-
ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio
aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum
et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae, in rationali
creatura, lex naturalis dicitur." (I-II, q.91,a.2,copus)

63. Cf. I-II, q.94,a.2, corp.

64. In order that an act, considered as here and now, be placed
by a prudential judgment in conformity with natural human desire
(and thus become practically true), there is needed in addition
to reasoning the dictate of a will that is made (by virtue)
habitually sympathetic with the objects of natural desire and hence,
as it were, judges by a sort of inclination. "Contingit enim
aliquam judicare uno modo per modum inclinationis, sicut qui habet
habitum virtutis, recte judicat de his quae sunt secundum vir-
tutem agenda, inquantum ad illa inclinatur. Unde et in X Ethic.
The cooperation of the virtuous will in the final determination of the practical intellect (immediately preceding the command to action) is demanded not only because of the well-known ability of the passions to blind the intellect in matters of conduct but also because the human intellect alone is incapable of encompassing all the bewildering variety and complication of contingent facts. The human intellect attains reality only in the abstraction of its universal elements. Yet, as practical, it reaches its full determination only in the concrete. Hence, pure reason can expect to find here only speculative probabilities at the end of its research (as is so evident from our moral manuals). That man may act rightly, a good will (made righteous by virtue) must enter in, effecting that the judgment which commands a particular action be conformable to it and hence infallible in its pure function of direction (even though not in its function as knowledge). "Dicendum quod verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur quam verum intellectus speculativi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. (lect.II). Nam verum intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem intellectus ad rem. Et quia intellectus non potest infallibiliter conformari in rebus contingenti-bus, sed solum in necessariis: idea nullus habitus speculativus contingentium est intellectualis virtus; sed solum est circa necessaria. Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum: quae quidem conformitas in necessariis non habet, quae voluntate non fiunt; sed solum in contingentibus, quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint agilibia
interiora, sive factibilia exteriora." (I-II, q.57,a.5, ad3).

65. The implication that the natural tendencies of man, inasmuch as indicating his true good to reason, are good, does not deny that each seeks a particular form of good that may contradict the good impelling other tendencies. They must be put into an order whereby they foster the development of the entire human composite. Thus St. Thomas writes in II-II, q.91,a.1,ad 1: "Natura inclinat in id quod est conveniens unicuique. Unde homo naturaliter appetit delectationem sibi convenientem. Quia vero homo, inquantum hujusmodi, est rationalis, consequens est quod delectationes sint homini convenientes quae sunt secundum rationem. Unde patet quod temperantia non contrarietur inclinationi naturae humanae, sed convenit cum ea. Contrarietur tamen inclinationi naturae bestialis non subjectae rationi."


67. Cf. I-II, q.2,a.6, corpus.

68. "Rursus: bonum particulare ordinatur ad bonum totius sicut ad finem, ut imperfectum ad perfectum: sic autem cadunt aliqua sub divina voluntate, secundum quod se habent in ordine boni. Relinquitur igitur quod bonum universi sit ratio quare Deus vult unumquodque bonum particulare in universa." (C.G.I,cap.86 no.2; Cf. et., I,q.22,a.4; q.47,a.1; q.56,a.2, ad 4; q.65, a.2)

69. "Bonum particulare ordinatur in bonum commune sicut in finem; esse enim partis est propter esse totius; unde et bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Bonum autem summum, quod est
Deus, est bonum commune, cum eo universum bonum dependeat."
(C.G., III, cap.17, no.5; cf. et. I-II, q.109,a.3)


71. "Sciendum est autem quod quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale et politicum, utpote qui indiget ad suam vitam multis, quae sibi ipse solus praeparare non potest; consequens est quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicujus multitudinis per quam praesertur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum." (In I Ethic., lect.I, no.4)

72. "Homo potest solitarius vivere dupliciter: uno modo quasi societatem humanam non ferens, propter animi saevitiam, et hoc est bestiale; alio modo per hoc quod totaliter rebus divinis inhaeret, et hoc est supra hominem. Et ideo Philosophus dicit in I Politicorum, Capite I, quod "ille qui aliis non communicat est bestia aut Deus" id est divinus vir." (II-II, q.188,a.8, ad 5)


74. II-II, q.64,a.2. corp.; I.q.60,a.5. corp.; I-II,q.90,a.2. corp.; etc.

The common good that finalizes every society may be regarded not only as that pertaining to the collectivity as such but also as that reacting on the individual by virtue of his membership in the collectivity. (Q.D., De Caritate, Quaest. unic., a.4, ad 2) The good of the collectivity has a priority over this


76. "Sicut autem in toto, ita et in partibus hoc considerari oportet, ut scilicet unaquaque pars hominis et quilibet actus ejus finem debitum sortiatur." C.G., III, cap.122,no.4

77. "Objectum, etsi sit materia circa quam terminatur actus, habet tamen rationem finis secundum quod intentio fertur in ipsum." I-II, q.73, a.3, ad 1

78. "Actus moralis recipit speciem ab objecto secundum quod comparatur ad rationem. Et ideo dicitur communiter quod actus quidam sunt boni vel mali ex genere, et quod actus bonus ex genere est actus cadens super debitam materiam, sicut pascere esurientem; actus autem malus ex genere est qui cadit super indebitam materiam, sicut subtrahere aliena: materia enim actus dicitur objectum ipsius." (Q.D., De Malo, q.2,a.4, ad 5)

79. In IV Sent., Dist.34, q.1,a.2, ad 3
80. See text: pp. 7ff.

81. "Ad decimum quartum dicendum quod lex communis datur non secundum particularia accidentia, sed secundum communem considerationem; et ideo dicitur actus ille esse contra naturam in genere luxuriae, ex quo non potest sequi generatio secundum communem speciem actus; non autem ille ex quo non potest sequi propter aliquod particulare accidens, sicut est senectus vel infirmitas."
Q.D., De Malo, q.15,a.2, ad 14.

82. For examples, see q.D., De Malo, q.15,a.2, ad 12; ibid., ad 13; II-II, q.154,a.2.

See also Dr. Herbert Doms-George Sayer, The Meaning of Marriage, London, Sheed and Ward, 1939, p.182


87. "Rectitudo naturalis in humanis actibus non est secundum ea quae per accidens contingunt in uno individuo sed secundum ea quae totam speciem consequuntur." C.G., III, cap.122
"Id quod cadit sub legis determinatione judicatur secundum quod communiter accidit, et non secundum id quod in aliquo casu potest accidere." II-II, q.154, a.2; Cf. et., Q.D., De Malo, q.15, a.2, ad 14.


91. Cf. text, pp.52 ff.

92. Cf. I, q.25, a.6, ad 1.


Chapter 4

94. See II-II, q.58, a.5 (conclusion of the article)

95. II-II, q.58, a.5; Cf. et. II-II, q.58, a.5, corpus.

96. Cf. M.S. Gillet, C.P., Conscience chrétienne et justice
For the Pagans and even for Aristotle, the common good envisioned by the principles of general justice is not humanity in general but the city or the state. And St. Thomas uniformly, in line with the Aristotelian tradition, understands the human community in the sense of a political group. However, he does not by any means deny a universal horizon to the common good or to general justice which seeks that good. His doctrine of Christian Charity, as universal as is the universal kingship of Christ (while surpassing and supernaturalizing the notion of a general justice that obliges man with respect to the totality of men) does not deny it as a natural duty discoverable by natural reasoning. It is true that Christianity accounts for the difference between the hardly functional internationalism of the pre-Christian philosophers (based on self-interest or on the vague pantheism, especially of the Stoics) and the predominance given to international altruism by even non-believing philosophers of our Christian civilization. But this merely means that we have here but another example of a natural truth entirely unknown or at least only obscurely suspected before the advent of revelation and coming to the fore by reason of the impact of Christianity on the philosophy of mankind. If you except Nietzschean philosophies, it is axiomatic among modern non-Christian philosophers that universal altruism is a duty and a necessity for the social animal that is man. Pure reason alone not only can show the inadequacy of the various arguments they offer to justify this altruism.
(whether they be based on disguised self-interest, which is the thesis of the Utilitarians, or whether they are based on a sentiment whose best justification is the claims of a falsely personified society) but also can establish this altruism on its only satisfactory foundation: namely, the finality of man and of creation as directed by and to God.

97. II-II, q.152,a.2. ad 1; cf. et. Suppl. q.41, a.2.

98. "In aliis animalibus est conjugatio inter marem et feminam solum ad procreationem filiorum; sed in hominibus mas et femina communicant non solum causa creationis filiorum sed etiam propter ea quae sunt necessaria ad humanam vitam...Amicitia conjugalis in hominibus non solum est naturalis sicut in aliis animalibus, utpote ordinata ad opus naturae quod est generatio, sed etiam est oeconomica, utpote ordinata ad sufficientiam vitae domesticae." In Libros Ethic., VIII, 12. Cf. Suppl.q.41,a.1, corpus.

99. Although the earlier writers and theologians of the Church have been quoted as teaching that child-bearing is the only justification for conjugal relations, this interpretation seems based on what is, at least in most instances, rather an exaggerated emphasis on procreation rather than an out and out denial of the validity of other ends. In their teaching on the right use of marriage, they naturally took into consideration the Pauline text: "But if they do not have self-control, let them marry, for it is better to marry than to burn". (1 Cor.VII,9) On the basis of that text, they even allowed here (at least,
as partially justifying) an intention able to prescind from the intention to procreate. However, in the opinion of very many, this intention was only relatively good: that is, inasmuch as it would be conceived to avoid a greater evil, such as fornication, etc. Nevertheless, it invariably involved an evil: namely, inordinateness in the use of the procreative act.

St. Thomas, on the other hand, denies that the use of marriage as a remedy for concupiscence need be regarded as merely the substitution of a lesser evil for one that is greater. He insists that the Pauline contrast must be understood as between a good (although a lesser good than that of continence, or celibacy, self-imposed for the love of God) and the evil, which is the product of concupiscence. Thus he writes (In Corinth. cap. VII):

"Si donum continendi non acciperunt, nubant, id est, matrimonium jungantur... Melius est enim nubere quam uri, id est concupiscentia superari... Est hic attendendum quod Apostolus utitur abusiva comparatione; nam nubere bonum est, licet minus, uri autem est malum. Melius est ergo, id est, magis tolerandum, quod homo minus bonum habeat, quam quod incurrat incontinentiae malum." (towards the conclusion)

And yet St. Thomas seemingly retains much of the austerity bequeathed to him by the ascetic tradition. In his eyes, seemingly, the use of marriage as a remedy is without all sin only when conjugal justice inspires it. Thus In IV Sent., Dist. 31, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, he writes: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod si aliquis per actum matrimonii intendat vitare fornicationem in conjuge, non est aliquod peccatum; quia hoc est quaedam redditio
debiti, quod ad bonum fidei pertinet. Sed si intendat vitare fornicacionem in se, sic est ibi aliqua superfluitas; et secundum hoc est peccatum veniale; nec ad hoc est matrimonium institum, nisi secundum indulgentiam, quae est de peccatis venialibus."


102. It is important to realize that, in marriage as in civil society, the distinction between the common good and the individual good is only an incomplete distinction. The subjection of man (even the so-called sacrifice of man) to the common good is rather the subjection of man to his own individual perfection. "Ille qui quaerit bonum commune multitudinis, ex consequenti quaerit bonum suum." (II-II, q.47,a.10, ad 2) It is man himself perfected by an activity that, as it were, universalizes him. "Bonum totius diligent quidem pars. secundum quod est conveniens, non autem ita quod bonum totius ad se referat, sed potius ita quod seipsum refert in bonum totius." (II-II, q.26,a.3, ad 2) It is not merely his duty but as well his glory to enlarge his life in this manner, thus serving humanity (according to the secular phrase) and furthering
the designs of God (according to the more ultimate theistic inter-
tpretation). Animals serve their species as instruments. For
man, to serve humanity and God through humanity is to reign.
Almost all the world recognizes the increase of stature in the
individual who consecrates or sacrifices himself for the common
good in the so-called glamorous realms: e.g., in war, science,
etc. And yet procreation is as much a social service. Nor does
it possess a more intimate analogy with animal life than that (for
example) between a soldier defending his own and a lion or tiger
doing the same. Nevertheless, the specious reasoning of today
stigmatizes the founding of a family as merely biological. It
forgets that the highest moral value may be attached to an activity,
even though nothing particularly intellectual or 'glamorous'
characterizes it. It must always be emphasized that, in the
human sphere, procreation ceases to be a mere biological function.
It is rather a social service, and one of the highest dignity and
importance.

Therefore, not forgetting that man's individual per-
fection is viewed in the attainment of the common good of society
(whether civil, religious or conjugal), we may restrict the term,
'individual perfection', to what accrues rightly to man, viewed as
a whole and not as a part. Man is a person: an end in himself,
and society would not be true to its definition if it were not
directed to further the development of the individual members in
both temporal (as far as possible) and eternal aspects.

105. "Quapropter non invenio, ad quod adjutorium facta sit mulier
viro, si pariendi causa subtrahatur." De genesi ad litteram, IX,5;
For Augustinian texts suggesting a possibly larger view of the services of the female personality to conjugal society, cf. Doms-Thisse, *Du sens et de la fin du mariage*, p. 224, note 18.


105. Cajetan, *In I*, q.92,a.1, nn.II and III

106. C.G., III, cap.123,no.5

107. This diffusiveness, finding in similitude its object, recognizes it and thus moves into benevolence. Benevolence, by virtué of a social communication which it creates (or, at least, vivifies by its benefactions*) moves towards an affective union with the beloved. This tendency, on being recognized as reciprocated, eventuates in the unity of desire and act known as friendship. (*Often social communications precede benevolence itself inasmuch as living together gives rise to a recognition of similitude.)

St. Thomas follows Aristotle (IX Ethic.lect.IV) in enumerating five properties pertaining to friendship: "Unusquisque enim amicus, primo quidem, vult suum amicum esse et vivere; secundo, vult ei bona; tertio, operatur bona ad ipsum; quarto, convivit ei delectabiliter; quinto, concordat cum ipso, quasi in iisdem delectatus et contristatus." II-II, q.25,a.7, corpus; cf. et. II-II, q.27,a.2, ad 3; q.31,a.1.

108. *In Libros Ethic.*, IX,X; *De Rege et Regno*, I, 10; C.G.,III, 128; VIII Ethic.*, I; *In III Sent.*, Dist. 27, q.2,a.2, ad 1; II-II, q.23,a.3, ad 1)
109. In III Sent., Dist. 29, q.1,a.7, ad 3; Q.D., De Virtutibus, q.2,a.9, ad 18; Ad Eph., cap.V, lect.X.

110. Suppl.q.45,a.1, corpus; In IV Sent., Dist. 26, q.1,a.1, ad 1 (These texts are quoted on pp.113-4 of the dissertation).

111. Christianity in the interests of a higher order has emphasized the dissociative elements characteristic of the sense appetites. In itself, this emphasis did not tend, as Nietzsche claimed, to a destruction or despisal of the just claims of the sense order in man. In intention and fact, it moved to warfare in order to build a true peace (established on right order) on the ruins of a counterfeit peace in which righteousness was sacrificed to a low and stagnant surface harmony. Many Christian ascetics, however, in arguing against the claims of the sense order, have used arguments and established attitudes that were more valuable polemically and practically than they were ontologically.

The attitudes thus established can perhaps explain why St. Thomas has moved farther from its exaggerations in the conclusions implicit in his principles than in many of his explicit statements, especially in the sexual sphere.

112. This statement can lead to misunderstanding unless the proper (and Divinely commanded) place of sex in its frame-work of personal union (as described in the paragraph on pp.128-29) be kept in mind. It is in substantial agreement with what Dr. Doms holds on this matter. And hence we may quote him as follows: "Mais c'est ensuite mon opinion que, par l'acte conjugal accompli dans sa perfection essentielle, qui est une unification à la fois intentionelle et
physique, la forme de l'union métaphysique la plus profonde qui puisse jamais exister entre personnes humaines est réalisée.

Cela ne veut naturellement pas dire que d'autres actes mutuels des hommes n'auraient pas une valeur morale plus grande et ne puissent fonder une union purement "morale" plus forte et plus profonde entre les hommes, que ne le fait peut-être in concreto la relation conjugale." Dr. Herbert Doms, "Du sens et de la fin du mariage: Réponse du Dr. Herbert Doms, Dozent à l'Université de Breslau au R.P. Boigelot" in Nouvelle Revue Théologique, tome 66, 1939, p.534.

We do not forget the aspects of human sexuality that make it (by reason of its all-absorbing influence on the whole man) one of the most powerful forces for selfishness and demoralization in human life. But, in addition to its so-called physical or carnal aspects, there is a psychical side in man's sex life: a region of the heart or of sentimental love that belongs to that mysterious mid-way region where the spirit and the flesh, as it were, intermingle. The influence of sentiment in intensifying the unselfish and perfecting impulses of man's spiritual nature is universally recognized. But seemingly it can also, as it were, channel and thereby direct the current of man's self-perfecting impulses. And the necessary sublimation by the spiritual purifies but in no wise destroys its specific character, disputes its direction, or refuses to accept of its richness.

If we prescind from the ever-present danger of distortion by carnality, conjugal love in its specific nature as involving physical union is meant to be and de facto is (if the totality of its exigencies be respected) for most people their individual way
towards personal perfection. It is inhuman to regard the conjugal act merely as a satisfaction of purely animal instinct: a sort of bait to snare individuals into the furtherance of the needs of the species. It also represents a too narrow conception of the human sexuality that is fulfilled by the conjugal act: forgetting in what large measure (as we indicated in our text) its finality surpasses that of being a mere generative instrument. The human and the large conception sees in this act an answer also to the need ingrained in man, to transcend the solitariness of his individual being. This need will be fully responded to only in an after-life union with God. But, here below, the complementary characteristics of the sexes and their mutual attraction are finalized not only for the purposes of procreation but also to grant such fulfillment in the most complete manner possible to human relationships.

113. See note 99.

114. Dr. Herbert Doms: cf., notes 83, 84, 100, 112.


"Our stand in this matter is upheld by a considerable number of well known contemporary theologians, such as Father J. Salsmans S.J. of Louvain, Belgium, Father Benedict Lavaud O.P. of Freiburg, Switzerland, Father Albert Doodkorte O.P. of Holland, the anonymous author of a lengthy article in the French theological periodical, L'Ami du Clergé, etc." Cf. L'Ami du Clergé, t.51, 1934, pp.737-753.

Chapter 5


117. The harmful consequences for both individual and society in the widespread practice of contraception are admitted by many who are far from agreeing to its intrinsic and universal evil and hence would freely allow it for exceptional cases. These consequences are eloquently presented by Dr. John M. Cooper in a pamphlet entitled, "Birth Control" (Washington, D.C., National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1923). We shall paraphrase some of his conclusions.

In substance, Dr. Cooper writes as follows. "The future we are actually facing, today is not a future of overpopulation, but a future of underpopulation." (p.47) To sustain the existing population without any increase whatsoever, it is necessary under our modern conditions that each married woman bear about four children. But birth control families average closer to two than to four. Moreover, it is entirely probable that the present day two-child regime will be reduced down to a still lower average.
The status of France (approx., 1913) when the death rate was greater than her birth rate is also the direction the United States is travelling. The same future faces all western civilization. In spite of cries of the contraceptionists for "quality instead of quantity", in spite of their urgings that the "fit" propagate, both quality and quantity are on the way out. "Moderate" birth control, as a matter of fact, is not observed and will not be observed (human nature being what it is), once the practice is legitimated.

Therefore, it must be concluded that birth control hurts human welfare by leading to under-population and extinction where it is practised. In practising birth control, man is not only refusing to contribute to the preservation of the human species (which, of itself, would not be necessarily sinful, since the duty does not oblige each and every individual and indeed, continence can be laudable when inspired by worthy motives). But he is part of a movement which can result only in the extinction of the human race. The act whereby he becomes part of that movement cannot but be seriously disordinate with respect to nature's manifest intention to maintain itself, and hence is contrary to the law of the God of nature.

But birth control may be judged as seriously sinful not only inasmuch as it hurts human welfare by leading to extinction but also inasmuch as it hurts human welfare "perhaps even more profoundly in subtler and less obvious ways. In its essential tendencies, it eliminates from marital life the very elements that throw about that life the mantle of the sacred and the reverent. In the long run, it undermines higher love itself. It thus tends
to break down the loftier reverence and love between husband and wife. It isolates physical sex gratification from its normal unselfish accompaniments and correctives, centers attention upon the self-regarding phases of sex, and helps to enthrone selfishness and flabbiness at the very heart of character. It reduces the marital relation to a level not superior to or different from the level of solitary vice and extra-marital indulgence. It robs the child of the natural education that comes from growing up as one of many equals in a normally-sized family. In a word, birth control tends to destroy the finer flower of human character, the higher functions of family life, the loftier sentiments of human mating, and the inner sanctities of the home." (p.81)


121. With reference to the physical order, consult: In III Sent., Dist.37, q.1,a.3; III Ethic., lect.7; In I Meteorologicorum, lect. 1, no.5; In II de Coelo et Mundo, lect.9, no.4; etc.

For the extension of these notions to the ethical order, consult: IV Sent. Dist. 33, q.1,a.2, ad 1; In III Sent., Dist.37,

123. ibid., p.54

124. ibid., p.169

125. ibid., p.125

126. ibid., pp.167-168

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