HUMAN KNOWING IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUNG

by Richard Becka

Thesis presented to the School of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

St. Bernard, Arusha, 1963
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express his thanks to the Reverend Henri Gratton, O.M.I. of the School of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa under whose supervision this thesis was prepared.
Richard Becka was born November 12, 1925, in Cleveland, Ohio. He received the Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics from John Carroll University, University Heights, Ohio, in 1950. He received the Master of Arts degree in philosophy from St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri, in 1952. The title of his thesis was The Notion of Class in Modern Symbolic and Mathematical Logic. He also attended the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, before completing his studies at the University of Ottawa.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to present an investigation of the views of Carl Gustav Jung on human knowing. Insofar as Psychology is itself a knowing, we shall first present Jung's views concerning his own psychological enterprise, and we shall follow this consideration by an examination of the basic principles and theories in the Jungian analysis of human cognitive life.

In addition to reporting Jung's views, we shall simultaneously attempt an evaluation of those views from the standpoint of our own position, which we believe is rooted primarily in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. We hope to show that this tradition can both provide fundamental ordering principles for the Jungian phenomena, and at the same time be flexible enough to be enriched by this empirical psychological data.

And, finally, we hope to show the relevance of Jung's psychological data for the enrichment of our understanding of the philosophical enterprise itself. We shall attempt to show that the psychological data can contribute to wisdom's self-evaluative function while itself being ordered by that wisdom.
CHAPTER I

JUNG'S COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

I. Freud, Adler and Jung—Why Jung?

The reader might very well wonder why, of the three founders of modern researches into psychological phenomena, the author has chosen the work of Carl Gustav Jung as the subject of his study. One answer that might suggest itself is that he wished to bring the writings of Jung to the attention of Thomists, for, by and large, the writings of Jung are unknown as compared to those of Sigmund Freud. Thomistic writers such as Father Pie¹ and Jacques Maritain² have written excellent essays on the work of Freud, but the literature on Jung has not been similarly enriched by the contributions of Thomistic writers. A notable exception to this generalization is the work of Father Victor White,³ and we


believe that his work is of very significant and permanent value. However, Father White has been primarily concerned with the relationship of the psychology of Jung to religious phenomena and to theological considerations. We do not believe that his work has disposed of the need for a specifically philosophical study—one concerned precisely with the question and problem of the philosophic rapprochement to Jungian psychology. In general, then, Thomists have either not been very interested in Jung, or their interest has been primarily that of the theologian or apologist.

However, though there is this relative lacuna in philosophical literature concerning the work of Jung, this has not been the primary reason for our study. The primary reason rests on the content of the Jungian psychology itself.

After some familiarity with the writings of Jung, the reader becomes aware of the rich treatment of human cognitive life to be found there. Without denying or underestimating the significance of appetite and of appetition, Jung's writings contain extensive and careful considerations

4 Other theologically orientated writers include Raymond Hostie, Hans Schar, Josef Goldbrunner, and Emil Brunner.
and distinctions pertaining to the cognitive realm. In fact, his primary distinctions and organizing factors seem to pertain primarily to the cognitive realm rather than to the realm of appetite. We do not find the Freudian oral or anal types or a primary role given to sexual appetition or to the Adlerian will to power. Jung does not deny these factors, but they do not function as such primary conceptual instruments of differentiation and organization. Important Jungian distinctions, on the other hand, include such things as the division into the four functions of sensation, intuition, thinking, and feeling. This distinguishing scheme as well as the Jungian theory of the archetypes both concern factors which distinguish and organize our psychic life primarily insofar as that psychic life is cognitive in character. 

5 Jacobi expresses this distinctively cognitive rather than affective dimension in Jung's psychology in terms of the distinction between the formal and the material cause (drives). "Sigmund Freud looks for the causae efficiences, the causes of the later psychic disturbances. Alfred Adler considers and treats the initial situation with regard to a causa finalia, and both see in the drives the causae materiales. Jung, on the contrary, although he too naturally takes account of the causae materiales and likewise takes the causae finales as starting-and-end-point, adds to them something further and very important in the causae formales, those formative forces that are represented above all through the symbol as mediators between the unconscious and consciousness or between all the pairs of
Jung's psychology, then, is a psychology of cognition in a way that the psychologies of Freud and Adler are not. We do not wish to imply that Jung considers appetition unimportant or that he ignores it, but his careful examination of cognitive functioning is unparalleled in the work of the two other major writers. Our primary reason for investigating the work of Jung, then, lies not in simply a wish that attention be also directed toward his work, but rather because his work contains a wealth of material bearing on man's cognitive life.

II. Jung's Intended Psychology

As we investigate the psychological views of Jung, we find those views do not admit of a unilateral method of treatment. For, like most thinkers, there tends to be a distinction between his intended psychology and the actual views which he presents. What he intends to present does not always exactly correspond to what he in fact does present. However, since the major portion of his work is the

fulfillment of his intention, it is this intended psychology which shall be our primary concern. It is also this intended psychology, and its nature, that we shall first consider.

Throughout his voluminous works, Jung strongly maintains that his standpoint is that of an empirical natural science, and not that of a philosopher. To quote his own words:

Like every empirical science, psychology also requires auxiliary concepts, hypotheses and models. But the theologian, as well as the philosopher, is apt to make the mistake of taking them for metaphysical a priori assertions. The atom of which the physicist speaks is no metaphysical hypothesis, it is a model. Similarly, my concept of the archetype or of psychic energy is only an auxiliary idea, which can be exchanged at any time for a better formula. Seen from a philosophical standpoint, my empirical concepts would be logical monsters, and as a philosopher I should cut a sorry figure.6

Jung then disclaims any theological or philosophical pretensions and one is wrong if he judges this to be his purpose.

But in addition to his intended psychology being nonphilosophical, there are several other things it is not. First of all, it is a non-mathematical form of natural

6 Carl Jung, foreword to Victor White, God and the Unconscious, Chicago, Regnery, 1953, xx-xxi.
science. Though some mathematical procedures are employed, it is Jung's contention that this is a very limited part of the total procedure:

...But how much of the actual psychology of man can be witnessed and observed as measurable facts? Such facts do exist, in the realm of psychology; indeed my Association Studies have, I think, demonstrated that highly complicated psychological phenomena are none the less accessible to methods of measure. But anyone who has probed more deeply into the nature of psychology, demanding something more of it than science in the wretchedly prescribed limits of a natural science method is able to yield, will also have realized that an experimental method will never succeed in doing justice to the nature of the human soul, nor will it ever trace even an approximately faithful picture of the complicated psychic phenomena.

But, when we leave the realm of measurable facts, we are dependent upon concepts, which have now to assume the office of measure and number. That precision which exact measurements lend to the observed fact can be replaced only by the precision of the concept. 7

The psychology of Jung, then, is neither intended to be a philosophical psychology, nor a psychology employing primarily mathematical determinations and orderings, but a psychology employing "the concept" as its primary instrument. This emphasis on the role of the concept is also meant to

imply that psychology is not a pure empiricism, that it is not simply a descriptive process of the empirically given, but transcends this level of presentation:

...Nowadays, however, most of us are convinced that an objective psychology must above all be grounded upon observation and experience. This foundation would be ideal, if only it were possible. But the ideal and the purpose of science do not consist in giving the most exact possible description of facts—science cannot yet compete with kinematographic and phonographic records—it can fulfill its aim and purpose only in the establishment of law, which is merely an abbreviated expression for manifold and yet correlated processes. This purpose transcends the purely experimental by means of the concept, which, in spite of general and proved validity, will always be a product of the subjective psychological constellation of the investigator.8

This science, then, is non-mathematical, and though it is based on the empirical it is trans-empirical in the use of the concept, (yet remaining non-metaphysical). But there is yet an additional distinctive characteristic which belongs to this new psychology.

Contemporary physical science found that it was required to take the psychic into account. It could no longer even theoretically pretend to pure objectivity, but in its theories it had to include a reference to the

8 Ibid., p. 16.
subject. Physical science, however, still has the benefit of a distinction between the object and the subject in a way which psychology does not. According to Jung, in physical science there is a translation into another medium, namely, into the medium of the conceptual or the psychic. In psychology, however, this translation into another medium is not possible.

...In the other natural sciences, the question of what a thing is can be answered by a knowledge that goes beyond the thing in question, namely by a psychic reconstruction of the physical process. But in what, or through what, can the psychic process be repeated? It can only be repeated in and through the psychic; in other words, there is no knowledge about the psyche, but only in the psyche.

Although, therefore, the medical psychologist mirrors the psychic in the psychic, he nevertheless remains, consistently with his empirical and phenomenological approach, within the framework of natural science; but at the same time he departs from it in principle insofar as he undertakes his reconstruction-knowledge and explanation—not in another medium, but in the same medium. 9

From the content of the texts which we have quoted, then, there begins to emerge a picture of what Jung intends

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to do. We have some idea of his psychology of intention. However, even in these texts there are some difficulties and statements which are philosophically objectionable.

III. Statement of Intention and Statement of Universal Fact

First of all, we ought to be clear that the texts from Jung which we have quoted are not primarily an expression of how his intention was fulfilled—this would be the content of his psychology—but they are rather statements expressing the intention itself. However, they are also something more than a statement of this intention. There is no question of speculative truth or error in the mere statement of an intention. If someone tells us he intends to do something or other we might say "you're wasting your time," "that's very useful," etc., or even that it is or is not capable of bringing one happiness. But even if the intention is defective with regard to practical truth it still has its natural being and its speculative truth as an intention. With Jung's statement of his intention then we have no objection either from the standpoint of practical truth and usefulness or from the standpoint of its speculative truth insofar as it really is his intention.
However, whenever Jung passes from a statement of what he intends to do to a statement of what can be done, or even a statement of what others are doing, then he is in a speculative realm of truth and we must demand the fulfillment of the appropriate responsibility for those speculative statements.

We believe, moreover, that Jung has many times, no doubt inadvertently, made a transition from a statement of intention to a statement of universal fact, without an appropriate justification. Let us again take up Jung's various statements and see how this has occurred.

First of all, Jung does not merely say that his statements are not metaphysical assertions, but that they are not "metaphysical a priori assertions." We naturally begin to suspect the presence of a Kantian epistemology in the background. It is one thing to say that one does not intend to be a metaphysician or to write a metaphysical treatise, but it is quite another thing to imply things

10 "there is abundant evidence in Jung's own writings of the immense influence which Kant's Kritik and positivism have had upon him." V. White, Soul and Psyche, New York, Harper, 1960, p. 53.
about the nature of metaphysics. As a matter of fact, Jung not only implies, but also states quite explicitly his views on the nature of metaphysics. For example, he says:

...the conscious mind of the medieval investigator was still under the influence of metaphysical ideas, but because he could not derive them from nature he projected them into nature.11

And again:

Any honest thinker has to admit the insecurity of all metaphysical positions, and in particular of creeds. He has also to admit the unwarrantable nature of all metaphysical assertions and face the fact that there is no evidence whatever for the ability of the human mind to pull itself up by its own bootstraps, that is, to establish anything transcendental.12

Jung then is not only engaged in telling us about his own scientific endeavors but he is also telling us about the nature of science and of metaphysics. In other words, contrary to his expressed intention,13 he has engaged in


13 "As a scientist I must give a wide berth to anything dogmatic or metaphysical, since it is not the scientist's task to preach the Gospel." Letter quoted in Victor White, God and the Unconscious, Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1953, p. 72.
speculations in the metaphysics of knowledge. This of course he should not have done unless he was prepared to accept and engage in philosophical dialogue and discussion. One cannot justly claim scientific immunity under these conditions.

Now Thomists have contested these assumptions of Jung time and time again. We all know of the many discussions on the method of metaphysics, the discussions on the negative judgment, the "separatio" as precisely the rational instrument for deriving metaphysical "ideas" from nature. 14 Moreover, I think it would be generally agreed upon by Thomists that by means of the negative judgment, analogy, and judgment of supereminence, the human mind establishes a link between the imminent in nature and experience and the transcendent. 15 Or, expressed in another way, in its concern with the transcendental the metaphysical understanding is concerned simultaneously with the immanent and with the

14 One of the main texts in St. Thomas containing the expression of this idea is De. Trinitate, q.5, a.3 & 4.

15 St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 12, a. 12, c. Quotations from this work are taken from the trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York, Benziger, 1947, 3 Vols.
transcendent. However, our concern here is not to develop these points or to substantiate them, but simply to point out that there is, and has been, a very vocal tradition directly contrary to the Kantian position and one cannot contradict that tradition and simultaneously deny any responsibility for metaphysical assertions. For this denial is itself a particular metaphysical stand. Unfortunately this important denial mars a great deal of the very excellent and scholarly writing of Jung, and renders the task of appreciating and valuing his legitimate intention and its fulfillment most difficult. But there are several additional influences which Jung's philosophical viewpoints exert on his conception of his own psychological program which we have yet to consider.

We have seen that Jung understands his psychology to be non-mathematical in form, and to employ the concept as its instrument rather than number and measure. Moreover, this concept is an "empirical concept," and there is a serious attempt to adequately relate the empirical concept to the a priori. For example, in discussing the concept of

energy, Jung says:

...The concept of energy, like its correlate, the concept of time, is on the one hand an immediate, a priori, intuitive idea, and on the other a concrete, applied, or empirical concept abstracted from experience, like all scientific explanatory concepts. 17

Now it would appear that there is a certain amount of fence-straddling involved in this matter of the concepts. First of all there must be two concepts involved, for it would be difficult to see how one and the same concept could both be a priori and also "abstracted from experience." 18 As a matter of fact, as in the history of post-Kantian idealism, so also in Jung, we find that the empirical gradually yields to the rational. These two are not equal opponents, and the

17 C. G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 28.

18 That is, this would be difficult, and I think, impossible from the standpoint of a Kantian a priori. From the standpoint of Thomism, however, there is a certain sense in which this is true. Certain intelligible species, those "self-evident to all," are naturally contained in the a priori illuminative potential of the agent intellect, and these intelligible species are actualized by all men regardless of the peculiarities of their special experiences. The illuminative potential is realized, however, only through the actualization of these intelligible species from the data of ordinary sense experience. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 84, aa. 5-6.
superior strength of the rational a priori gradually asserts itself, though it seems there is a continuous resistance to it. Thus, Jung tells us that there is a "merging of the applied or empirical concept with the intuitive idea of the event." This merging does not make the intuitive to be empirical, however, but on the contrary it divorces the empirical or applied concept from the thing, for "every applied concept is unavoidably hypostatized, even against our will, though we must never forget that what we are dealing with is still a concept."

Initially it seemed as though psychology was in a more favorable position than metaphysics. It turns out, however, that this was more apparent than real. The a priori has the last word in psychology too:

...We must always bear in mind that despite the most beautiful agreement between the facts and our ideas, explanatory principles are only points

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19 It seems this resistance is both theoretical and practical or "psychological." On this latter point we might notice the unusually strong language of Jung's critique of Hegel. Cf. The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, pp. 169-71.

20 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

21 Ibid., p. 29.
of view, that is, manifestations of the psychological attitude and of the a priori conditions under which all thinking takes place.\textsuperscript{22}

The loss of an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of abstraction,\textsuperscript{23} together with the absence of a sensitiveness to the uniqueness of the intentional,\textsuperscript{24} will always effect an unnatural dichotomy between thought and the thing, and incur the loss of any real knowledge of the thing. However, there is no need for us to share Jung's irony regarding the value of his discoveries. It may well be that some of the explanations are highly "subjective," but this may mean nothing more than that it is a partial explanation, which yet may even present the essential. But whether they deal with the essential or with the accidental, in order to understand Jung's discoveries, there is no need to accept his position that they are not discoveries of aspects of the thing. This epistemology of the concept need not deter us

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{23} Jung's theory of abstraction is empiricist rather than Aristotelian. "...abstraction from experiences—hence feeble and more colourless than these." \textit{Psychological Types}, p. 377.

\textsuperscript{24} "the psyche can never know anything beyond the psyche." \textit{The Development of Personality}, p. 87.
from examining the content of those concepts. Of course it may well be that, from a philosophical point of view, some explanatory principles are only expressions of a logical unity or relation, but even these have a foundation in the ontological. From a Thomistic standpoint, consequently, one cannot simply designate all explanation as subjective or a priori without some attention also to the epistemological differences, as well as to the fundamentally realistic, or thing-centered character of all explanation.

Jung as a scientist need not justify his explanations from other than a pragmatic standpoint and we may acknowledge his right to such an intention. However, when he asserts that there can be no objective explanation, then he is involved in a philosophically universal statement of fact. As well as not being justified by the strict requirements of his empirical approach, it is of course self-destructive.

25 "beings of reason, entia rationis ... are not things, and yet they are not pure objects separated from any transobjective subject as the "phenomena" of the moderns are, for they are conceived in the image of those subjects (of which they presuppose a previous knowledge) and are constructed with elements borrowed from the real. Far from being separated from what is real, they are bound to it on these two counts." J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge. New York, Scribners, 1959, p. 133.
For if every explanation is but an expression of a subjective point of view then this explanation of explanations must also be but a subjective point of view, and a realistic view of explanations would have just as much status. The psychologist is not qualified to judge that all explanation is "subjective," whereas he would be qualified to show that the subjectivistic theory of explanation is not objective, i.e., is not universal, but is a characteristic of the psychology of only some individuals.

So far, then, we have found that Jung denies an intention of being metaphysical and he asserts the intention of using the concept as explanatory instrument. At the same time, however, he denies the traditionally maintained realistic value of metaphysics and of the concept. There is one further aspect of his program as he envisages it, however, that we would like to consider. It concerns the distinct character of the subject matter of psychology, namely, the "psychic."

It is certainly true that psychology has a subject matter distinct from that of physical science. Moreover, it seems that Jung has a valid point in not wishing to use the same method, the mathematical method, as the primary
method for considering the psychic, even though it applies so well to the non-psychic. The use of concepts more immediately related by the mind to the experiences themselves and more suited to arouse from memory our concrete everyday awareness of those experiences, seems to be a valid intention. However, what he also says about the method of the physical sciences and about the nature of psychological knowledge seems to be less satisfactory.

When he speaks of the physical scientist employing "a psychic reconstruction of the physical process," the Thomist might very well object. The physical scientist is psychically actualized when he is thinking about physical reality, but the psychic is not the matter of his consideration. To speak of a psychic reconstruction, however, gives one the impression that the psychic has now become the object of consideration. There is no empirical evidence for this assertion and it is again a philosophical assertion about the nature of things, in this case about the nature of the known. The Thomist would object that this assertion posits a representational theory of knowledge which as a

26 C. G. Jung, The Development of Personality, p. 87.
matter of fact does not do justice to the intentional character of the psychic. The psychic is for the physical scientist a pure means and not an object. Even insofar as the perceiving subject enters into his considerations it is insofar as that subject in his perceiving is essentially involved in the mobility of matter. It is the subject as matter then and not precisely as psychic which is his concern. Though Jung's presentation seems to indicate a radical distinction of the psychic from the physical, in doing so it ignores or overlooks that which is really distinguishing about the psychic, namely, its intentional character. Even if what the scientist is dealing with is a "psychic" object in the sense of an ens rationis the scientist is concerned with it, not as an ens rationis, but as somehow expressive or related to ens reale, the things of the physical world. It is as psychologist or philosopher then, and not as physicist, that he takes the psychic as such under his consideration.

27 "The intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands...the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily, but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness." St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 85, a. 2.
Moreover, the Thomist would maintain that there is another knowledge of physical nature, the philosophy of nature, which strives to attain concepts which are not merely expressive of accidental or logical unities and distinctions founded on the real, but concepts expressive of the unities and distinctions of the real in its fundamental existential ordering. This knowledge is concerned with real and basic unities and differences in things and though it is a knowledge and something "psychic" it is of physical nature.

The whole problem of reconstruction, then, seems to be off on a wrong track because it overlooks the reality of the intentional. Again, it seems to be off on a wrong track because it overlooks the analogous.

Because the physical is distinct from the psychic one need not posit the absence of all community. For the human knower, both physical and psychic share in the analogous community of being, and so there can be a "one" intentionality which is presentative of both the physical and the psychic.28 In fact if there were no such intentionality no

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28 'There are still other objects of speculation which do not depend on matter with respect to their existence...they exist in matter in some things and in others do not, e.g., substance, quality, being, potency, act, one and
one would know what Jung is talking about when he distinguishes the physical from the psychic, not even himself. For, as St. Thomas observes: "what discerns between two things must know both." Thus without denying the distinctive character of the psychic one need not exaggerate this into a total separation of the knowledge of the psychic from that of the physical. Fundamentally we know being, we know both physical and psychic being, and resting on the basis of this communal intelligibility we develop precise understandings of the particular areas of being whether those areas be that of the physical or of the psychic.

Again it is true that our experiential starting points are different in the two areas. In the physical science the primary given is the sensible extra-mental thing, in psychology the primary given is the internally sensed and intelligibly present act of the subject. But just as natural physical science does not stop where it starts, so there is no need for psychology to be fearful of abstracting as

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28 (cont.) many, and the like." St. Thomas, De Trinitate, q.5, a.1. Quoted from The Division and Methods of the Sciences, trans. by A. Maurer, Toronto, Pontifical Institute, 1953, p. 8.

29 St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.78, a.4, ad.2.
long as it is controlled and directed. If the psychic can be understood universally than it cannot be true that "there is no knowledge about the psyche, but only in the psyche." The realization of the basic intentional and analogical character of science and knowledge, then, provides the Archimedean point which enables one to understand how there is a knowledge of or about the psychic as well as about the physical. Jung of course does provide us with a knowledge about the psyche, in spite of his theories, about what he intends to do and about what he thinks can be done in understanding psychic phenomena.

As to the nature of this knowledge, we agree that

30 C. G. Jung, The Development of Personality, p. 87.

31 It is instructive to notice how, with the loss of metaphysics, Jung is tempted to look to the lower science physics for the salvation of psychology. "This strange encounter between atomic physics and psychology has the estimable advantage of giving us at least a faint idea of a possible Archimedean point for psychology. The micro-physical world of the atom exhibits certain features whose affinities with the psychic have impressed themselves even on the physicists. Here, it would seem, is at least a suggestion of how the psychic process could be 'reconstructed' in another medium, in that, namely, of the microphysics of matter. Certainly no one at present could give the remotest indication of what such a 'reconstruction' would look like." C. G. Jung, The Development of Personality, p. 89.
other conceptual instruments than those of the mathematically orientated physical sciences are useful but, as we have said, we would also maintain that this non-mathematical method does give a knowledge about its object, namely, the psychic. Moreover, we would maintain the legitimacy of non-mathematical knowledge, not only of a philosophical, but also of a non-philosophical, character. Such a knowledge employs descriptive categories which are founded on the real but which are not intended to be taken as necessarily expressive of real unities and fundamental distinctions in things. Such a knowledge is closer to biology than to the physico-mathematical knowledges. 32 Again, however, there is no need to devalue it as "a product of the subjective psychological constellation of the investigator." 33

In addition to this "scientific" or "empirical" psychology, however, we would also wish to maintain the legitimacy of an attempt to express the unities and distinctions which are not merely hooked or related to the real, but which are directly expressive of the unities and differences

32 J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 64 ff.
33 C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, p. 16.
in the realm of the existing, in other words a philosophical psychology. Though we respect the psychologist's wish not to be "philosophically" responsible for his conceptual objects and distinctions in the realm of the psychic, when his intended psychology is taken as the only psychology to the point of asserting that there can be no realistic and objective status for the objects of concepts, then we must object that he is involved in philosophical assertions of a philosophically objectionable nature.

In this section, then, we have attempted to show some of the ways in which Jung's statements of his intentions as a psychologist of an empirical bent have been fused and intermixed with philosophical assertions about the nature of psychology and of philosophy, which in turn stem from a general philosophical position about the nature of knowledge. More basic than his developed psychology or his theory of psychology is his philosophical view regarding science and knowledge. This insinuation of a somewhat objectionable philosophy in his writings, then, renders the study of Jung's work extremely difficult, for one must constantly be engaged in separating the experiential data and their groupings from the philosophical interpretations of those findings. For,
a philosophical position about the nature of the psychic influences not only the conception of the nature of one's science, but also the understanding of the subject matter of one's science, when that subject matter is itself psychic phenomena. Though as philosophers we must humble ourselves to the authority of the empirical investigator when he functions in his own realm, we must not allow ourselves to become involved in an excessive humility which gives the same authoritative value to that part of his assertion which is of a philosophical nature. But why after all should one go to all this trouble? If there is this difficulty and confusion in the works of Jung, for what reason ought one to engage in this difficult task? He has engaged in extensive research and discussion of man's cognitive life, it is true, but at the same time his work involves a confusion of the scientific and the philosophical in an unhappy fashion. However, we believe that there are especially important values to be achieved and preserved by a philosophical investigation of the cognitive psychology which Jung develops from his researches.

IV. Philosophy and Jungian Psychology
There are, it would seem, basically two types of value to be obtained from a philosophical investigation into the psychology of Jung. First, there is a value for the psychologist and secondly, there is a value for the philosopher himself.

A. The Value for the Psychologist

While we have criticized some of the philosophical admixtures in the presentation of the Jungian psychology, we also recognize the very high likelihood of such an occurrence. The psychologist is no doubt very prone to allow his philosophy to interject itself from time to time, and we ought not to be too upset about it when it does occur. 34 Again, we ought to be sparing in our criticism of the psychologist because it may very well be that he is himself unconscious of this irruption of foreign elements into his psychology. 35

34 ...unless the biologist and psychologist put blinkers on their intellect, they will inevitably be led by the very object of their science to ask metaphenomenal questions.... J. Maritain, Op. Cit., p. 65.

35 "Every scientist, from the very fact that he applies himself to deciding any question, already clings in a very positive, although not conscious way, to an important number of philosophical data." Ibid., p. 49.
Again, some philosophical views may have become so much a part of the common philosophical perspective of his times that they seem to be commonly experienced fact. But on the other hand, these philosophical views do have an important influence that cannot safely be ignored. Partly, then, philosophical research can enable the philosopher to instruct the psychologist regarding his philosophical presuppositions and their presence in his writing. And, if he cannot instruct him, at least he can warn him of its presence and of the confusion he might engender by a mixture of his philosophical outlook with his empirical findings. But there is a further important contribution which the philosopher can make to the work of a Jungian psychologist.

One of the important aspects of Jung's work is the prominent position that he gives to the more spiritual dimensions of psychic life, such as religion and philosophy. He treats religion and philosophy as psychic phenomena it is true, but even without considering the question of their truth, he is of course involved in the problem of understanding the positions accurately. The philosopher, then, ought to be able to assist the psychologist in coming to understand the positions of the philosophers of the past. Moreover, a
realistic philosophy which maintains that our human knowledge is derived from experience of the external world, and that we possess a variety of capacities or powers of spiritual cognitive and affective relatedness proportioned to that reception, would, it would seem, be in a good position to assist the psychologist in his determination of whether the position in question is constitutive of psychic wholeness or on the contrary of psychic one-sidedness. The questions of the "whole truth" and of "psychic wholeness" are without doubt interrelated questions, and the more adequate a philosophy is, the more it will do justice to the whole truth and thus be constitutive of psychic wholeness. This, it seems, might have important implications not only for the theoretician but also for the practicing psychotherapist, insofar as he finds himself involved with more basic questions of his patients philosophical outlook. Whether it be his own personal philosophic outlook, or the philosophical outlook of his patient, however, the psychologist can profit from the

36 Sec St. Thomas, "Whether there are several Powers of the Soul?", Summa Theologiae, I, q. 77, a. 2 and "Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?", Summa Theologiae, I, q. 77, a. 4.
philosopher's researches and instruction concerning philosophical positions and their truth adequacy.

B. The Value for the Philosopher

On the other hand, it seems that there are a number of values for the Thomist to be obtained from a study of the psychological works of Jung. First of all, the very empirical and phenomenological character of his researches and presentations helps to insure a vital contact with experiential data. A philosopher who deals too exclusively with the universal separated from the experiential tends to lose the analogical character of his object, in this case man's cognitive life. Our knowledge of the world whether it be that of natural philosophy or whether it be metaphysical in character will be analogical if it is true to its object.  

37 Jung has objected very strongly to the view of a unity of consciousness, so much so that he rejects it and finds unity only in the unconscious.  

38 This extreme is by no means one

37 St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad. 1.

38 Id. Psychological Types, p. 624. "the notion of a uniformity of the conscious psyche is an academic chimera, ... in order to discover the uniformity of the human psyche I must descend into the very foundations of consciousness."
we would defend but if one were forced to judge between univocality and equivocation, Jung's position would not seem so strange. Human knowing is by no means something univocally one but has more of the character of a calculus of variation occurring within certain limits and having an analogously common nature. Certainly we can say things about sensation, intellection, volition, etc., which are universally true, but at the same time we ought to recognize the variety also existentially involved in that universal community. This recognition will be aided by a familiarity with the phenomenological procedures of depth psychology. Moreover for our understanding of the analogical character of human knowing, the depth psychology of Jung, which is rich in its treatment of knowing, is of prime importance. But there is a further value to be derived from the writings of Jung.

In the movement of philosophical analysis we proceed from various experiential facts to a knowledge of the foundations of those facts in terms of properties or powers and in terms of the fundamental nature of man. However, the synthetic movement of the mind has its own specific contribution to offer to the total cognitive movement of
Knowing the various powers and their relationships, it ought to be possible to derive certain possibilities of psychic functioning that may arise in the concrete. As we shall try to show in the chapters to follow there are certain basic possibilities that are in fact actualized. Now the writings of Jung aid us immeasurably in this task, for Jung can empirically show us the major variations that actually occur in man's concrete cognitive life. He gives us a problem but, in a sense, he simultaneously gives us an empirical confirmation of our answer. The problem he gives us is whether his phenomenological or empirical unities and divisions have any correlation with fundamental ontological unities or divisions. There is no reason to assume because he does not take such responsibility for his concepts that the facts which they relate to do not in fact rest on ontological unities and divisions. In some cases I believe that we can clearly see that there are ontological structures

39 On analysis and synthesis see St. Thomas, De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1.

40 As a matter of fact it would seem more reasonable to expect that at times such ontological structures would at least inadvertently and unknowingly be involved, for the scientist too is interested in the universal and the necessary.
directly involved. On the other hand, Jung contributes to the stimulation of philosophical synthesis by giving us the data to see that the important possibilities of variation that we can deduce from the ontological structures do actually occur. Thus the writings of Jung are valuable, not only for the empirical data from which our general analyses proceed, and for maintaining a vital contact with that data, but also for the data with which to develop the universal principles discovered by analysis into a knowledge of the rich variety of living "species" of human knowers. The empirical organization of cognitive experience, then, as well as its concrete phenomenological description, can have an important value for the philosopher.

V. Summary

In this chapter we have attempted to present certain general background considerations regarding human knowing as it is treated in the psychology of Jung. We considered the importance given to knowing in the Jungian psychology, we considered Jung's intended manner of presenting this knowing and we considered some important philosophical factors influencing his actual presentation. Finally, we considered
the values to be achieved by a philosophical consideration of his investigations of human knowing. In the next chapter we shall investigate some of Jung's main principles and theories regarding the knowing subject.
CHAPTER II

THE KNOWING SUBJECT

Before considering the more particularized and specific characteristics of human cognitive life, as investigated and described by Jung, we shall first consider the fundamental knowing subject as Jung understands him. In this chapter, then, our concern is to present, first, the Jungian perspective of the whole human subject and, secondly, the basic structure of the psychic dimension of that subject.

I. Psychic and Somatic

The problem of the being of man is a continuous philosophic problem. Moreover, from the history of philosophy we know that certain types of answers to this problem persistently reoccur. There are the answers of metaphysical spiritualism, of metaphysical materialism, and of metaphysical dualism. Finally there is the answer of Aristotelian hylomorphism. What, then, can we discover of Jung's position? What explicit or implicit philosophic position can we discern at the basis of his thought? This, then, is our immediate problem.
A. Opposition to Materialistic Monism

One of the most striking aspects of Jung's position is his strong opposition to the materialism of the psychiatrists. Over and over again in his works he expresses the idea that the prevailing scientific and psychiatric position is that of a one sided materialism. Thus he says:

Psychiatry has been charged with gross materialism. And quite rightly, for it is on the road to putting the organ, the instrument, above the function— or rather, it has long been doing so. Function has become the appendage of its organ, the psyche an appendage of the brain. In modern psychiatry the psyche has come off very badly. While immense progress has been made in cerebral anatomy, we know practically nothing about the psyche, or even less than we did before. Modern psychiatry behaves like someone who thinks he can decipher the meaning and purpose of a building by a mineralogical analysis of its stones.¹

And again:

...if we maintain that mental and psychic phenomena arise from the activity of the glands we can be sure of the respect and applause of our contemporaries, whereas if we attempted to explain the break up of atoms in the sun as an emanation of the creative Weltgeist we should be looked upon as intellectual cranks....

Today the psyche does not build itself a body, but on the contrary matter, by chemical action,

produces the psyche. This reversal of outlook would be ludicrous if it were not one of the unquestioned verities of the spirit of the age. It is the popular way of thinking, and therefore it is decent, reasonable, scientific, and normal. Mind must be thought of as an epiphenomenon of matter. The same conclusion is reached even if we say not "mind" but "psyche," and instead of "matter" speak of "brain," "hormones," "instincts," and "drives."²

It is Jung's contention, then, that there is a prevailing materialism in the scientific realm. This materialism constitutes an unreflective philosophical presupposition of the contemporary consciousness and its influence is pervasive in even the realm of the psychological. Jung, however, has no wish to become identified with this materialism. His own stand on this question is very definitely opposed to the reduction to the material.

From his researches in the causal factors of neuroses, Jung came to the conclusion that "the overwhelming majority of symptoms are psychologically determined."³ Moreover, when he refers to the psychological he means something distinct from the material and something which cannot fundamentally be approached by way of the material. Thus he says:


³ The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease, p. 248.
...no glandular extract that will cure a neurosis has yet been found. On the other hand, we have been taught by all too many mistakes that organic therapy fails completely in the treatment of neuroses, while psychic methods cure them. These psychic methods are just as effective as we might suppose the glandular extracts would be. So far, then, as our present knowledge goes, neuroses are to be influenced or cured by approaching them not from the proximal end, i.e., from the functioning of the glands, but from the distal end, i.e., from the psyche, just as if the psyche were itself a substance.⁴

The human knower, then, is not conceived according to a materialistic monism by Jung.⁵ Can we assert, then, that Jung

⁴ C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion, (Collected Works, Vol. XI), New York, Pantheon, 1958, p. 329. Also The Practice of Psychotherapy, (Collected Works, Vol. XVI), New York, Pantheon, 1954, p. 77. It seems that Jung never abandoned this belief in the primary importance of the psychological in the approach to mental illness. Thus even after the chemical achievements of such things as the well known "tranquilizers" and the resurgence of interest in the chemical possibilities, in 1957 he wrote the chairman of a Symposium on Chemical Concepts of Psychosis, held at the second International Congress for Psychiatry as follows: "I consider it a great honour to be nominated as Honorary President, although my approach to the chemical solution of problems presented by cases of schizophrenia is not the same as yours, since I envisage schizophrenia from the psychological point of view...psychology is indispensable in explaining the nature and the causes of the initial emotions which give rise to metabolic alterations." The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease, p. 272.

⁵ The position of idealistic monism never seems to have been seriously considered by Jung. The reality of the material even if unknown seems to go unquestioned, and the only position he actively opposes is materialistic monism.
conceives the human knower according to a metaphysical dualism or even a hylomorphism? There are texts which would seem to bear out these interpretations.

B. Metaphysical Dualism or Compositionism?

Just as at times it seems that Jung has an epistemological realism, so at times it seems that the composition he is referring to is an ontological or metaphysical composition. Thus he says:

...For just as there is an objective human body and not merely a subjective and personal one, so also there is an objective psyche with its specific structures and activities of which the psychotherapist should have at any rate adequate knowledge.6

Indeed, it almost seems at times that his view is Aristotelian or hylomorphic, so closely does it approach to the language of Aristotle. For Jung says:

...the body cannot be understood as a mere heaping together of inert matter, but must be regarded as a material system ready for life and making life possible, with the proviso that for all its readiness it could not live without the addition of this "living being." For, setting aside the possible significance of "living being," there is lacking to

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the body by itself something that is necessary to its
life, namely the psychic factor.'

However, as we examine Jung's works more closely certain
things begin to emerge from the accumulated evidence. First
of all, we begin to see that the dualism or composition is
not unquestionably taken in a fundamental metaphysical sense.
There is some sort of duality involved, but its ontological
status must be considered more carefully.

C. Phenomenal Dualism or Compositionism

Our uncertainty as to whether Jung is speaking of a
dualism in a metaphysical sense is quite justified, for Jung
himself asserts the realistic character of his presentation,
while at the same time giving us a clue as to his real the­
oretical position. He says in one place:

"So far I have based my reflections on the realistic
standpoint of scientific thinking, without ever ques­
tioning the foundation on which I stood. But in order
to explain briefly what I mean by the psychological
standpoint, I must show that serious doubt can be cast
on the exclusive validity of the realistic standpoint.

7 Id. The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche,
p. 321. Aristotle says: "soul is an actuality or formul­
able essence of something that possesses a potentiality of
being besouled." On the Soul, II, 2, 414a 28-30 (Basic
Works of Aristotle), New York, Random House, 1941, p. 559."
Let us take as an example what a naive mind would consider the realest thing of all, namely matter. We can make only the dimmest theoretical guesses about the nature of matter, and these guesses are nothing but images created by our minds.\textsuperscript{8}

Thus Jung admits to adopting a realistic approach at times, but one cannot assume that this is his own theoretical position. We see from the above text that it is opposed by the "psychological" standpoint. Moreover this statement of a limited validity for the realistic standpoint is really a cautious expression compared to other, bolder assertions. Thus we find that the psychological becomes really the only valid standpoint:

...If I shift my concept of reality on to the plane of the psyche--where alone it is valid--this puts an end to the conflict between mind and matter, spirit and nature, as contradictory explanatory principles.\textsuperscript{9}

The psychological standpoint, then, is the only valid standpoint for Jung, because psychic existence is the only existence of which we have verifiable, immediate experience.

...only an insignificant minority regards the psychic phenomenon as a category of existence \textit{per se} and draws the necessary conclusions. It is indeed paradoxical that the category of existence, the indispensable \textit{sine qua non} of all existence, namely the

\textsuperscript{8} The \textit{Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche}, p. 327.

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., p. 353; Cf. also Ibid., p. 384.
psyche, should be treated as if it were only semi-existent. Psychic existence is the only category of existence of which we have immediate knowledge, since nothing can be known unless it first appears as a psychic image. Only psychic existence is immediately verifiable.\textsuperscript{10}

We are not dealing, then, with a metaphysical position opposed to materialistic monism. The position espoused is opposed to materialistic monism, it is true, but not as an ontological or metaphysical position. What Jung is positing is primarily a basic dualistic phenomenalism. There is a plurality involved, it is true, but this is of the phenomenal order rather than the "realistic" or ontological order. If there is an "objective" character involved, it is merely that of the idealistic standpoint which separates object from thing.\textsuperscript{11} Many texts expressing this anti-ontological

\textsuperscript{10} Id. \textit{Psychology and Religion} (Collected Works, Vol. XI), New York, Pantheon, 1958, p. 480. The loss of an understanding of intentionality is especially evident in this text which seems to hark back directly to Descartes. "And certainly, considering the ideas of all these qualities which presented themselves to my mind, and which alone I perceived properly or immediately,..." \textit{Meditations, VI}, (Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 31) Chicago, Britannica, 1952, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{11} "In general, moderns take \textit{object} as pure object, cut off in itself from any \textit{thing} in which it has existence, ..." J. Maritain, \textit{The Degrees of Knowledge}, New York, Scribners, 1959, p. 91.
phenomenalism can be found. For instance:

...The so-called reality of matter is attested primarily by our sense-perceptions, while belief in the existence of spirit is supported by psychic experience. Psychologically, we cannot establish anything more final with respect to either matter or spirit than the presence of certain conscious contents, some of which are labelled as having a material, and others a spiritual, origin.\(^\text{12}\)

The dualistic phenomenalism of Jung, however, does not deny the "thing in itself" but follows the Kantian pattern. As Jung says: "Although there is no form of existence that is not mediated to us psychically and only psychically it would hardly do to say that everything is merely psychic."\(^\text{13}\)

Thus there is a thing in itself existing beyond the phenomena for Jung, but it is clear that this is unknowable.

...Both these concepts, [mind or matter] as every intelligent person today can ascertain for himself, are mere symbols that stand for something unknown and unexplored, and this something is postulated or denied according to the temperament of the individual or as the spirit of the age dictates.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{12}\) C. G. Jung, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, p. 120.


Now it does not seem that one can legitimately object to a phenomenological approach in a psychology which has no philosophical pretensions. But again we find that Jung has gone beyond the intended empirical approach, and engaged in making statements of universal fact. The denial of the knowability of being is clearly a philosophical assertion which goes beyond the bounds of a phenomenological approach. Moreover, that "every intelligent person" is a Kantian in his epistemology is certainly a view which an enormous host of philosophers would wish to contest. However, we are chiefly interested in Jung's illicit (for a psychologist with no philosophical pretensions) interjection of the Kantian viewpoint insofar as it helps us to clarify Jung's understanding of the human knower. We see that the dualism so clearly pointed out by Jung, should not be taken primarily in a metaphysical sense, but rather as a phenomenal dualism. The psyche has its own phenomenology which is irreducibly distinct from that of "matter."\footnote{15 C. G. Jung, \textit{The Practice of Psychotherapy}, p. 80.} Moreover, we see that for Jung, the human knower, the "noumenal" knower, is unknowable. Paradoxically, however, this phenomenal human knower is
sometimes discussed with apparent reference to his noumenal reality.

D. Metaphysical Dualism, Hylomorphism, and Monism

In spite of Jung's assertions about the unknowability of matter and the psyche we find that there are some at least implicit and negative assertions about the noumenal subject. It is true they are posited or considered as hypotheses, but nevertheless they do go beyond the question of phenomenal dualism, contrary to his expressed phenomenalism.

First of all, it seems at times that the possibilities for the knowing subject are those derived from the Cartesian dualism. That is, insofar as Jung does by implication refer to the ontological subject, he seems to think of it in terms of a dualism. This is revealed by the fact that he tends to conceive of the relationship between mind and body in terms either of parallelism or of interactionism, of which views he first favored that of interactionism. Thus he says:

...I consider the idea of reciprocal action tenable, and can see no reason to prejudice its credibility with the hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism. To the psychotherapist, whose special field lies just in this crucial sphere of the interaction of mind and body, it seems highly probable that the
psychic and the physical are not two independent parallel processes, but are essentially connected through reciprocal action,...\textsuperscript{16}

In the context of the problem as presented by the dualistic approach, then, Jung seemed to incline away from the Leibnizian view and hold on to a more Cartesian approach. Either view, however, has certain shortcomings from the standpoint of a hylomorphic theory. First of all, for all functions other than the purely spiritual, there is certainly a "parallelism" involved. The operations of vegetation and sense are of the soul and of matter, they are operations of the composite, and there is a natural and a spiritual immutation involved in these operations.\textsuperscript{17} As opposed to interactionism, body and soul are not distinguished as efficient cause and effect, but rather as more or less simultaneous material and

\textsuperscript{16} Id., \textit{The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche}, pp. 17-18.

\textsuperscript{17} In \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, q 78, a 3, St. Thomas asserts a natural immutation for only touch and taste, together with a spiritual immutation in the reception of the intention by each of the senses. On the basis of modern physiology, however, it would seem that this natural immutation should be extended to all of the senses. Cf. L. M. Regis, \textit{Epistemology}, New York, Macmillan, 1959, p. 204.
formal causal factors. However, when we consider the relationship of the hierarchically distinguished powers, then the standpoint of interactionism has a relevance exceeding that of parallelism. There can properly be said to be an interaction between the vegetative and the sensory, and though the sensory cannot act upon the spiritual, the action of the spiritual is conditioned by the sensory and the spiritual can, properly speaking, act upon the sensory. Parallelism and interactionism are not so much opposed by hylomorphism as transcended. The characteristics or phenomena which each seeks to express or explain can both be explained in the context of a hylomorphic view. The hylomorphic view, however, is much more difficult to understand than either position resting upon a dualistic view, for one thing because it seems to involve contradictory elements. Thus the soul is distinct from the body as an integral part of the composite and yet that part is present in the whole body and in each part of the body. The part, then, is in a sense equal to the

18 That the soul is united to the body primarily as its form and secondarily as mover is clearly shown by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologicae*, I, q 76, a 1; Ibid. I, q 76, a 7, c.

19 "the substantial form perfects not only the whole but each part of the whole" St. Thomas, *Summa Theologicae*, I,
whole, and since the human soul is itself subsistent and immortal, the part is (according to its relationship to existence) greater than the whole. In short, understanding the nature of this relationship involves a transcending of the quantitative or mathematical mode of conceiving whole and part, and using a type of conceiving by way of formal wholeness which according to its essence as form is wholly present in each differentiable material part, while yet being a "part" of the integral whole. Certainly from the standpoint of hylomorphism the viewpoints of parallelism and of interactionism both contain partial valid elements though neither is adequately comprehensive.

In Jung's later work, we find a certain change of interest from interactionism to parallelism. Thus he says:

The modern discovery of discontinuity (e.g., the orderedness of energy quanta, of radium decay, etc.,) has put an end to the sovereign rule of causality and thus to the triad of principles. The territory lost by the latter belonged earlier to the sphere of correspondence and sympathy, concepts which reached their greatest development in Leibniz's idea of pre-established harmony. 20

19 (cont.) q 76, a 3, c.

20 C. G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 517.
As in the case of the distinction between the psychic and the material, so also in the case of synchronicity phenomena, Jung wishes to remain on a phenomenal rather than an ontological level. He says:

...No reciprocal causal connection can be shown to obtain between parallel events, which is just what gives them their chance character. The only recognizable and demonstrable link between them is a common meaning, or equivalence. The old theory of correspondence was based on the experience of such connections—a theory that reached its culminating point and also its provisional end in Leibniz' idea of pre-established harmony, and was then replaced by causality. Synchronicity is a modern differentiation of the obsolete concept of correspondence, sympathy, and harmony. It is based not on philosophical assumptions but on empirical experience and experimentation.  

Again, however, we find him venturing into the realm beyond the phenomenal.

...The synchronicity principle possesses properties that may help to clear up the body-soul problem. Above all it is the fact of causeless order, or rather, of meaningful orderedness, that may throw light on psychophysical parallelism. The "absolute knowledge" which is characteristic of synchronistic phenomena, a knowledge not mediated by the sense organs, supports the hypothesis of a self-subsistent meaning, or even expresses its existence. Such a form of existence can only be transcendental,...  

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21 Ibid., p. 531.

22 Ibid., p. 506.
Finally it appears that behind the dualistic phenomenology of interactionism and parallelism, a further metaphysical view presents itself. The synchronicity phenomena inclines Jung toward a view which is neither materialistic monism, nor dualism of either a Cartesian or a Leibnizian form. It seems to point rather to a Spinozistic monism.

Thus Jung says:

Since psyche and matter are contained in one and the same world, and moreover are in continuous contact with one another and ultimately rest on irrepresentable, transcendental factors, it is not only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter are two different aspects of one and the same thing. The synchronicity phenomena point, it seems to me, in this direction, for they show that the nonpsychic can behave like the psychic, and vice versa, without there being any causal connection between them. Our present knowledge does not allow us to do much more than compare the relation of the psychic to the material world with two cones, whose apices, meeting in a point without extension—a real zero-point—touch and do not touch.\(^\text{23}\)

It would seem then that Jung's views regarding the knowing subject revolved within the general framework of continental rationalism—Descartes-Leibniz-Spinoza. Despite his opposition to rationalism, he seemed to remain under its spell. The important difference in his rationalistic inheritance, however, was that it was colored by the

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 215.
phenomenalism inherited from Kant. He was certainly opposed to monistic materialism, but what he held positively is not quite so clear. His dualism was primarily a dualism of phenomena though it functioned within the historical framework of the metaphysical interactionism of Descartes and the parallelism of Leibnitz, and ultimately seems to be founded upon the monistic metaphysics of Spinoza. A phenomenal dualism resting on a monism of substance, but perhaps we ought to be cautious in accepting this as his final position. Certainly some aspects of his work would seem at least to leave open the possibility of a hylomorphism of substance rather than a monism of the Spinozistic variety. On this point it seems that we must leave the question in the state of an opinion which the evidence does not allow us to resolve any further. In the psychology of Jung, then, the constitution of the knowing subject is not a materialistic monism, it involves a phenomenal dualism of psyche and matter, and it probably, though not certainly, involves a view of an underlying metaphysical monism.

However, the psychic itself has an important dual inner structure which is of great importance in understanding the knowing subject. It is to this division in the
psyché itself that we shall now direct our attention.

II. The Division of the Psychic - Conscious and Unconscious

In addition to the problems concerning the total knowing subject—the whole encompassing psyche and matter—there are special problems regarding the psychic alone. These problems concern the division of the psychic into the conscious and the unconscious.

A. The Existence of the Unconscious

Though we have become accustomed to speak of the unconscious with an easy familiarity, this has not long been one of western man's common beliefs. As Father White says:

...Psychology, especially since Descartes, had become exclusively concerned with consciousness, and increasingly isolated from the larger context of the entirety of life, still more so from the cosmos as a whole. 24

In the historical context of a more or less exclusive concern with consciousness, the introduction of the unconscious did not meet with a very warm reception. As Jung points out:

24 V. White, God and the Unconscious, Chicago, Regnery, 1953, p. 32.
...With the discovery of a possible unconscious psychic realm, man had the opportunity to embark upon a great adventure of the spirit, and one might have expected that a passionate interest would be turned in this direction. Not only was this not the case at all, but there arose on all sides an outcry against such an hypothesis.25

However, our purpose here is not to engage in an extended defence of the hypothesis or conviction of the existence of the unconscious, whether in terms of Jungian psychology or in terms of traditional thought. We agree with Professor Maritain that "we must recognize the existence of an unconscious or preconscious which pertains to the spiritual powers of the human soul."26 And we agree with Professor Jung, that this belief has an experiential foundation. As Jung says:

...My justification for speaking of the existence of unconscious processes at all is derived purely and solely from experience, and in particular from psychopathological experience, where we have undoubted proof that, in a case of hysterical amnesia, for

25 The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 169.

instance, the ego knows nothing of the existence of extensive psychological complexes, and in the next moment a simple hypnotic procedure is enough to bring the lost contents to complete reproduction.

From thousands of such experiences we may claim a certain justification for speaking of the existence of unconscious psychic contents. 27

We will delay no longer, then, on this question of the existence of the unconscious. Our main concern is, rather, to explore Jung's specific views regarding the unconscious, particularly his views regarding its nature and its relationship to its polar opposite, consciousness.

B. Phenomenal Status of the Unconscious

While the knowing subject involves psyche and matter, then, the psyche itself cannot be identified with consciousness, but includes the unconscious as well:

By the psyche I understand the totality of all the psychic processes, both conscious as well as unconscious... 28

As the psyche is a phenomenal and psychological factor, so also is the unconscious such a factor. Jung says:


28 Ibid., p. 583.
...The concept of the unconscious is for me an exclusively psychological concept, and not a philosophical concept in the metaphysical sense. In my view, the unconscious is a psychological boundary-concept, which covers all those psychic contents or processes which are not conscious, i.e., not related to the ego in a perceptible way. 29

Now, again, one ought not to object to this intention of avoiding philosophical questions about the unconscious.

However, Jung again goes too far in making assertions about the possibilities of such assertions and of such understanding. Not only does he say that the unconscious functions for him as a phenomenal reality, but he also says:

...On the grounds of the theory of cognition, we are as yet quite unable to make any valid statement with regard to an objective reality of the phenomenal psychological complex which we term the unconscious, just as we are equally powerless to determine anything valid about the nature of real things which lie beyond our psychological capacity. 30

This, of course, is simply an application of the Kantian theory of knowledge to the realm of psychic reality. This theory of knowledge is a philosophical rather than a psychological or phenomenological position, however, and Jung has

29 Ibid., p. 613.
30 Ibid., p. 209.
again exceeded the bounds of his expressly intended empiri­
cal approach. It is one thing to say that one is not making
an assertion about the nature of the psychic, and it is quite
another thing to say that nothing can be said or known about
the nature of that reality.

However, it is much easier to criticize an incon­
sistency than to develop a positive explanation. After all,
the main point seems to be whether an ontological explanation
of the unconscious is possible, and a full affirmative an­
swer calls for such an explanation. We shall now attempt to
sketch the outlines of such an explanation within the frame­
work of some principles of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy.

C. Ontological Status of the Unconscious

In the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory, the cognitive
activity of greatest significance is the intellectual, and
it is to this that we shall devote our attention.

Aristotle had concluded from the facts of psychic
experience that human intellectual life involves an active
and a passive principle of intelligibility. Analogous to
form and matter, their reciprocal relationships are the
essential basis of all intellectual life, though
ontologically their status is only that of accidents; better,
properties of the human soul.31 Now this distinction between
the agent and the possible intellect is not immediately con­
scious to us. The reality of the active principle of in­
telligizing is arrived at by an analysis from the facts of
experience to the requirements for making that experience
intelligible. Its specific nature, which would include the
scope of its illuminative power, is not something directly
known by us or conscious to us.32

More importantly, however, the Thomistic analysis
reveals the presence, not only of unconscious power, but
also of unconscious contents, in the intellectual life of
man. As Professor Maritain says:

...our intellect is fecundated by intelligible germs
on which all the formation of ideas depends. And it
draws from them, and produces within itself, through

31 St. Thomas, Summa Theologicae, I, q 77, a 1, ad 5.

32 "...this is the fundamental point for me, we pos­
sess in ourselves the Illuminating Intellect, a spiritual
sun ceaselessly radiating, which activates everything in in­
telligence, and whose light causes all our ideas to arise in
us, and whose energy permeates every operation of our mind.
And this primal source of light cannot be seen by us; it re­
mains concealed in the unconscious of the spirit." J. Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, New York,
the most vital process, its own living fruits, its concepts and ideas. But it knows nothing either of these germs it receives within or of the process through which it produces its concepts.\textsuperscript{33}

St. Thomas, in his time, had carried the analysis and differentiation of the states of the intelligible species into a threefold division. He said:

...The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act.\textsuperscript{34}

The ontological structures involved in intellectual knowing, then, are the intellectual powers or potencies and the intelligible species. The powers are proper qualities of an intellectual soul, and the possible intellect is the mediating principle and subject of further qualitative determinations in the order of habit and disposition. It is especially this last point, we believe, which is important for understanding the ontological status of the unconscious.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 98.

\textsuperscript{34} St. Thomas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, q 79, a 6, ad 3.
It would seem that the state of the intellect between pure potentiality and full act ought to be further divided into two sub-states. The proposed division would be made in virtue of an extrinsic relationship, a relationship to something outside of the intellect itself, namely, the will. When a species is properly a habitual determination of the intellect it is subject to use at will.\(^{35}\) But modern researches in psychology have shown that not all cognitive contents are so subject to the will. Hence, it would seem that we ought to distinguish the species which are disposable by some such term as "preconscious," and those which are not so disposable by the term "unconscious." Thomistic theory, then, does not find it impossible to give an ontological explanation of the unconscious. The intellectual unconscious consists of those accidents, those qualities or species of the intellect which are not easily or readily expressed by the subject.

Using a philosophic terminology, Jung says that the unconscious "is simply a quality of certain psychic

\(^{35}\) "Habit is that which one uses when one wills," Ibid., I-II, q 50, a 5, c. Also I-II, q 78, a 2, c.
phenomena." It would seem more accurate to say that unconsciousness designates something in the order of relation. That is, unconsciousness designates a lack of relation to the will, or a "negative" relation to the will. The character of unconsciousness is a relation or lack of relationship which a species has because of a quality of the will rather than of the intellect. That is, a specific cognitive species or complex is of species may be unexpressed either because no will activity has been actualized regarding that element or because it is the object of a "negating" act of the will. Thus Jung says:

...We know by experience that conscious contents can become unconscious through loss of their energetic value. This is the normal process of 'forgetting'....

Furthermore, experience teaches us that conscious contents can fall beneath the threshold of consciousness through 'intentional forgetting', without a too considerable depreciation of value—what Freud terms the repression of a painful content.


The "value" that Jung speaks of in connection with the repressed is, of course, a negative value or a devaluation. Hatred, fear, etc., are of course real passions and far different from apathy or lack of affect. Intellectual unconsciousness, then, designates a relative being of the species—a real relation in the case of the will's devaluation, and a relation of reason in the case of an absence of affect. The Thomistic theory, then, does seem to provide an adequate ontological basis for an understanding of the unconscious.

The possession of an impressed intelligible species is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for actual knowing. Insofar as the impressed species is present as an initial actualization of the intellect one is not thereby consciously knowing, though one is a knower in a sense other than that of pure potentiality. This knowing is called "preconscious" if it is readily brought to full actualization, and it is called "unconscious" insofar as it is without a relationship to the will or insofar as it is the object of a will act directed against its expression. Having a philosophical and ontological explanation, then, we can rightly ask that the possibility of such an explanation be reconsidered. But there is still another level to
D. Consciousness and Reflection

Consciousness in the fullest sense of the term is more than the simple "lived" awareness that we have discussed up to this point. "Lived" awareness is certainly a part of consciousness insofar as it makes us conscious of the object in a particular way or under a particular aspect. However, consciousness in a second sense means the presentation, not primarily of the thing itself, but of the cognitive medium belonging to the subject. Consciousness in the fullest sense, then, is reflective—it makes present a "conjunctio" of species and thing. It does this through a presentation of the species as revealing, in a limited way, some aspect of the thing. Full consciousness, then, involves the revelation of the thing in some particular way, and it involves the revelation of one's standpoint as a limited, partial, non-exhaustive standpoint. The lack or

38 "Consciousness in the full and proper sense, is to be described as 'the relatedness of psychic contents to the ego...insofar as they are sensed as such by the ego. 'Consciousness, therefore, in Jung's terminology is equivalent to 'reflective consciousness;'..." V. White, Soul and Psyche, New York, Harper, 1960, p. 112.
diminution of this second revelation, then, is also a kind of unconsciousness, a kind of negation or privation in the knower. 39

Consciousness, then, may concern primarily the expressed consideration of the thing itself, or it may concern the nature of the species by which it is made present and which is something belonging to the finite knowing subject. It would seem, then, that the traditional discussions on awareness and reflective awareness can also contribute toward a clarification of these further refinements in our understanding of consciousness and unconsciousness. Our next concern, however, is with the very important question of the relation between conscious and unconscious contents in the Jungian psychology.

E. The Relation of the Conscious and the Unconscious

1. Compensatory Relationship of the Unconscious

We have said that the cognitive unconscious fundamentally consists of those species which the subject does

39 It would seem that this unconsciousness is a mere negation in the "primitive," but a privation for many "civilized" men. That is, it is a lack of consciousness
not easily or readily express. However, Jung's researches have shown that there exists a very definite relationship between the expressed contents of consciousness and the unexpressed contents of the unconscious. As he says:

...I regard the activity of the unconscious (q.v.) as a compensation to the onesidedness of the general attitude produced by the function of consciousness. Psychologists often compare consciousness to the eye: we speak of a visual-field and of a focal point of consciousness. The nature of consciousness is aptly characterized by this simile: only a few contents can attain the highest grade of consciousness at the same time, and only a limited number of contents can be held at the same time in the conscious field. The activity of the conscious is selective. Selection demands direction. But direction requires the exclusion of everything irrelevant. On occasion, therefore, a certain onesidedness of the conscious orientation is inevitable. The contents that are excluded and inhibited by the chosen direction sink into the unconscious, where by virtue of their effective existence they form a definite counterweight against the conscious orientation. ...The more onesided the conscious attitude, the more antithetic are the contents arising from the unconscious, so that we may speak of a real opposition between the conscious and the unconscious; in which case, compensation appears in the form of a contrasting function. Such a case is extreme. Compensation by the unconscious is, as a rule, not so much a contrast as a levelling up or supplementing of the conscious orientation.}

39 (cont.) which ought to be present according to their historical-social potential.

40 C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, pp. 532-33.
Thus, a person's unconscious contents are not merely indifferent contents or species, but they have a compensatory relationship to his expressed species. They need not be antithetical, but may be supplemental, and in either case they have value for the individual's understanding by way of addition to that which he habitually expresses. At any rate, as unexpressed these contents are elements which the individual has not consciously come to terms with in any adequate sense.

2. Importance of Unconscious Complementariness for Philosophy

This "law of complementariness" carries some important implications for philosophers. First of all, in the area of speculative thinking (whether it be naive or refined and scientific), it warns that a dogmatic attitude may actually be a form of defense against the individual's own unconscious, rather than primarily an opposition to the "opponent's" theoretical position. Any intellectual exaggeration is liable to carry the seeds of its destruction in the subject's own unconscious. Jung says:

...When, therefore, the individual stands consistently upon one side, the unconscious ranges itself squarely upon the other, and rebels—which in all probability was what must have befallen the neo-Platonic or Christian philosophers, in so far as they represented the standpoint of exclusive spirituality.  

According to Jung, the inverse of the platonic spiritualism is a more common phenomena in our own times with the prevalence of conscious irreligion and materialism. That is, the psyche of modern man is characterized by a materialism in consciousness and a spiritualism in the unconscious.

However, our main concern is not with this particular example, but with the general bearing of complementariness on theoretical knowing. In our historical researches, in the marketplace of philosophical discussion, and in the development of our own philosophies, it has an important value for understanding the theoretical structure of human knowing.

Insofar as a theoretical position is characterized by

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43 This applies to the theoretical or avowed atheist rather than the "practical" atheist whom Maritain describes. (J. Maritain, *The Range of Reason*, New York, Scribner's, 1953, p. 103). This latter phenomenon seems to involve a dichotomy in consciousness itself; a division and disunity in the expressed speculative and practical judgmental life.
rigidity, lifelessness, and exaggeration, it may be so because a part of the cognitive content is being refused a hearing, that part, namely, which belongs to the unconscious. Rationalism tends to see only the presence or absence of logicalness in the history of philosophy, in philosophical discussion, and in one's own position, but fails to see that the individual may be involved in a personal struggle for the life of his consciously expressed theoretical outlook. His conscious outlook simultaneously represents sanity and security to him and his will is opposed to the expression and consideration of any contrary thoughts. But contraries are not contradictories, and often the value in the contrary is needed for the development of a more adequate theoretical or speculative understanding.

This relationship between the unconscious and speculative intellection enables us to develop more fully a theme which St. Thomas had expressed in his own time. This theme

44 "It should not be overlooked that many patients seem quite capable of exhibiting a modern and sufficiently developed consciousness, sometimes of a particularly concentrated, rational, obstinate kind. However, one must quickly add that such a consciousness shows early signs of a defensive nature. This is a symptom of weakness, not of strength." C. G. Jung, The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease, p. 244.
is the dependence of intellection on love and the will. This theme was expressed in its most general terms as the dependence of contemplation on the will. St. Thomas says:

...the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, ...  

In the light of modern discoveries concerning the unconscious, the extent and variety of the will's influence on intellection becomes more clearly evident. In extending to and including the exercise of contemplative activity in general, it potentially extends to all the particular realms of human knowing. The general philosophic understanding and the empirical psychological material are thus seen to be complementary and not contradictory. By utilizing both of these complementary knowledges, then, one gains an enriched understanding of lived speculative intellection; whether in one's own thought, in the thought of other philosophers, in the history of philosophy, or in philosophical education. This knowledge exerts a moderating influence on the rationalistic overvaluation of the logical process. Not that rational

45 St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II-II,q 180,a 1, c.
connectedness is unimportant, far from it, but it needs to be supplemented by an appreciation and recognition of the factor of the will and its role in the expression of speculative thinking.

In addition to the purely speculative dimensions of one's thinking, the unconscious also has an importance for the philosophy of human action. One's basic practical judgments concerning the good that ought to be done are undoubtedly related and dependent upon one's speculative judgments. Consequently, what we have said concerning the unconscious in speculative thinking has a relevance for the sphere of ethical judgment. In the specifically practical domain, again, our considerations of the unconscious are relevant to the role of universal practical intelligibilities. However, the more particularized and concrete areas of the ethical can perhaps more easily be illuminated by an understanding of the functioning of the unconscious. It is one such area that we wish now to consider.

In Aristotle's analysis of moral states, we know that he distinguishes the categories of continence and incontinence from those of temperance and intemperance. 46 In

46 "...we must now discuss incontinence and softness
continence and incontinence the individual’s reason is strongly opposed by his passion—he habitually succumbs to his passions’ influence in incontinence, and he successfully opposes it in continence. Now it seems that, in the area of continence and incontinence, the discovery of the unconscious may shed some new light.

In the traditional analysis, then, the conflict is expressed in terms of the opposition of passion and reason. The modern investigations, however, give us evidence to show that in many cases the opposition may be within reason itself, and within inclination itself. That is, the conscious judgment may involve an exaggerated devaluation of the passion and its object, and the unconscious contains an exaggerated positive valuation. Depending on the strength of the unconscious and its isolation from the conscious standpoint, it will effect a variable degree of hindrance to the

46 (cont.) (or effeminacy), and continence and endurance; for we must treat each of the two neither as identical with virtue or wickedness, nor as a different genus," Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk VII, Ch 1, 1145 a 34-37. (Basic Works of Aristotle), New York, Random House, 1941, p. 1037.

47 "...the incontinent man, knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result of passion, while the continent man, knowing that his appetites are bad, refuses
fulfillment of the consciously determined and expressed judgment. Complementariness or contrariness, then, may occur in the practical as well as the speculative life of the mind. If ethics is to fulfill its purpose of understanding and directing man in the fulfillment of his ethical life, then, it can benefit from the experience of the psychologist while itself providing an understanding of the relevant universal factors in the life of a reason, rightly ordering in the practical domain.

III. Summary

In this chapter we have considered two aspects of the knowing subject. First, we have considered what appears to be the most basic aspects of the knowing subject in the psychology of Jung. We have considered his opposition to materialistic monism. We noted that his intended phenomenological presentation of the knower is sometimes trans-

47 (cont.) on account of his rational principle to follow them." Ibid., 1145b, 12-14, p. 1037.

48 It is interesting to note that Aristotle saw that "incontinent people must be said to be in a similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk." Ibid., Ch 3, 1147, a 13-14, p. 1041.
cended by metaphysical assertions. And we considered the uncertainties which are involved in Jung's metaphysical view of the composition of the psychic-somatic knowing subject.

In the second part of this chapter we considered the knowing subject specifically with regard to the psychic dimension of his being. We considered the modern distinction between the psychic conscious and the unconscious which Jung also adheres to. We considered Jung's belief in only a phenomenological meaning for this distinction, and our own position regarding the possibility of an ontological interpretation within the framework of an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. The states of the intellect and the relationship of the intelligible species to the will was held to be of primary importance in understanding the nature of unconsciousness and consciousness in man's life of knowing.

Finally we considered the compensatory relationship of conscious and unconscious contents in Jung's psychology, and its implications for speculative and practical knowing. In the next chapter we shall consider a basic distinction in the direction and characterization of the object of awareness as manifested by Jung's distinction between extraversion and introversion.
CHAPTER III

PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDE AND HUMAN KNOWING

I. Extraversion and Introversion in Consciousness

The consideration of what Jung called the subject's psychological attitude is perhaps the most commonly known aspect of his work. Indeed, many who have no explicit knowledge of Jung or of his work use the terms introversion and extraversion as though they had always been part of language. In this chapter, however, we shall attempt to refine our understanding of both the experiential basis of this theory and the theory itself. In studying the theory, we shall also consider some relations between these phenomenological categories and certain philosophical considerations regarding human knowing. We shall also consider the relevance of psychological attitude to the dimension of the unconscious. But first we must consider the conscious dimension of psychic life as it is influenced by psychological attitude.

A. Attitudinal Types

First of all, we take it for granted that conscious human knowing involves a simultaneous presence of the other
Jung's distinction of psychological attitudes, then, relates to an habitual differentiation from this starting point. What the attitudinal distinction asserts is that human subjects tend to give an attentive priority to one or the other of these two poles. The subject's attention and interest may be centered in the other itself, the external thing; or it may be centered in the psychological subject himself with a consequent diminishment of interest in the external thing. Jung says:

The introverted type directs his libido chiefly to his own personality: he finds the absolute value in himself. The extraverted type directs his libido outwards: he finds the absolute value in the object.


Jung says: "The self, regarded as the counter-pole of the world, its 'absolutely other,' is the sine qua non of all empirical knowledge and consciousness of subject and object. Only because of this psychic 'otherness' is consciousness possible at all." The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (Collected Works, IX-1) New York, Pantheon, 1959, p. 171.

But where does Jung find the evidence for this distinction of attitudinal types? This, then, is our first question.

1. Existence of Attitudinal Types

Without attempting to approximate a cataloguing of the whole of Jung's evidence for this important distinction, we shall attempt to present its main experiential sources. These sources seem to be principally three, namely, the infra-human level, the insights into human psychology expressed by poets, philosophers, psychologists, and psychiatrists, and thirdly Jung's personal clinical experience.

First of all, then, Jung shows us that on the infra-human level there is already at least an analogue of this distinction. He says:

...Nature knows two fundamentally different ways of adaptation, which determine the further existence of the living organism; the one is by increased fertility, accompanied by a relatively small degree of defensive power and individual conservation; the other is by individual equipment of manifold means of self-protection, coupled with a relatively insignificant fertility. This biological contrast seems not merely to be the analogue, but also the general foundation of our two psychological modes of adaptation. At this point a mere general indication must suffice; on the one hand, I need only point to the peculiarity of the extravert, which constantly urges him to spend and propagate himself in every way, and, on the other, to the tendency of the introvert to defend himself against external claims, to conserve himself from any
expenditure of energy directly related to the object, thus consolidating for himself the most secure and impregnable position. 3

The psychological distinction between extraversion and introversion, then, expresses the way in which the specifically human organism solves the general biological problem of adaptation. However, at times at least, it seems that there is little of the specifically human in man's way of solving the problem of adaptation. For, Jung seems to root psychological attitude primarily in the material factor. Thus he says: "the decisive factor must be looked for in the disposition of the child," 4 and "in the last analysis it may well be that physiological causes, inaccessible to our knowledge, play a part in this." 5 But leaving aside the question of the precise etiology of the psychological attitude, we can at least say that Jung sees it to be an instance of, and in continuity with, the general problem of biological adaptation.


4 Ibid., p. 415.

5 Ibid., p. 416.
In addition to the argument by biological analogy, Jung also presents a series of authorities to strengthen the reasonableness of his distinction of attitudinal types. These authorities come from various fields of investigation, including psychiatry, philosophy, and poetry.

...On the psychiatric side Gross has drawn attention to the existence of psychological types: he differentiates between types with a restricted but deep consciousness and those with a wide but superficial consciousness. The former corresponds to my introverted and the latter to my extraverted type. William James has given an excellent description of the two types in philosophy in his book on pragmatism, and Schiller has done the same for aesthetics in his essay on "The Naive and the Sentimental." 6

Jung, then, does not claim to be offering us a totally original distinction, but rather one that many other thinkers have, in one way or another, at least partially expressed, and thus prepared the way for his own considerations.

In addition to the argument from biological analogy, and the argument from authority, then, Jung also rests his distinction on his own personal experience. As he says:

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In my practical medical work with nervous patients I have long been struck by the fact that among the many individual differences in human psychology there exist also typical distinctions: two types especially became clear to me which I have termed the Introversion and the Extraversion Types.  

The support for the theory of attitudinal types, then, comes from at least these sources: from the requirements of the problem of biological adaptation, from the authority of independent researchers, and from personal observation and experience. It seems, however, that we might present a variation of the argument concerning adaptation which has a more demonstrative or philosophical character.

Jung's distinction of attitudinal types concerns the question of the relatedness of the subject to the object, in general, to "the world." Now insofar as a "problem" develops, that is, insofar as this relatedness to the world is not able to be accomplished easily, there are only two

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7 C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, p. 9. These attitudinal differences are observable, Jung claims, not only on an individual basis but also on a collective or cultural basis. "Even a superficial acquaintance with Eastern thought is sufficient to show that a fundamental difference divides East and West.... Introversion is, if one may so express it, the "style" of the East, an habitual and collective attitude, just as extraversion is the "style" of the West." Psychology and Religion, (Collected Works, Vol. XI) New York, Pantheon, 1958, p. 481.
possibilities. One possibility is to withdraw or diminish the direct relatedness, and the other is to intensify or strengthen the effort to achieve relatedness. These are the only two possibilities, and so it seems that we can argue to a disjunctive either-or necessity of introversion or extraversion in the presence of a difficulty concerning relatedness. Since for the most part these difficulties do occur, then, we can argue to the natural necessity of the existence of introversion and extraversion. But now let us consider more carefully what we are saying when we assert the existence of attitudinal types.

2. Attitudinalized Psychic Life

a. Attitude as Subject or Object Priority

First of all, the basic typical difference has been expressed as the distinction between subject or object priority. The following passage will perhaps best express Jung's viewpoint:

...Quite generally, one could describe the introverted standpoint as one that under all circumstances sets the self and the subjective psychological process above the object and the objective process, or at any rate holds its ground against the object. This attitude, therefore, gives the subject a higher value than the object. As a result, the object always
possesses a lower value; it has secondary importance; occasionally it even represents merely an outward objective token of a subjective content, the embodiment of an idea in other words, in which, however, the idea is the essential factor; or it is the object of a feeling, where, however, the feeling experience is the chief thing, and not the object in its own individuality. The extraverted standpoint, on the contrary, sets the subject below the object, whereby the object receives the predominant value.  

The distinction between extraversion and introversion, then, rests on the priority of subject or object. The question we might first ask ourselves is what is the root cause of this priority? It seems that the root cause of the attitudinal distinction lies in appetite. The phenomenological distinction referred to concerns fundamentally, not cognition, but the direction of love issuing from the subject. At least this seems to be implied in many of Jung's statements. The text quoted above, for instance, expressed the distinction in terms of value appropriation by the subject or by the object.

We have said that various thinkers predated Jung in regard to the discovery and description of some aspects of the two psychological attitudes. Jung, however, seems to have more precisely abstracted the basic factor in the

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8 Psychological Types, p. 12.
attitudinal distinction than his teachers, and thus to have really reached a more basic conceptual standpoint, and we should give him full credit for his contribution.

The attitudinal distinction, then, is basically an habitual affective determination. As Dr. Jacobi has said: "Extraversion is characterized by a positive relation to the object, introversion rather by a negative." And: "they represent orientations that essentially condition all psychic processes..." The attitudinal distinction, or characteristic valuation, is important, then, for whatever aspect of psychic life we may consider.

An interesting sidelight on Jung's distinction in affective direction is its apparent influence even on considerations of itself. Thus the texts of Jung on this point itself seem to indicate or reveal a personal bias. For instance, in one passage, Jung says:

The general-attitude types, as I have pointed out more than once, are differentiated by their particular attitude to the object. The introvert's attitude to the object is an abstracting one; at bottom, he is always facing the problem of how libido can be withdrawn from the object, as though an attempted ascendancy on the part of the object

had to be continually frustrated. The extravert, on the contrary, maintains a positive relation to the object.\(^{10}\)

The interesting point about this text is the way in which the distinction between extraversion and introversion is made in terms of the object. If each of these attitudes is, as it were, on a par, and if the valuation in one case is directed to the object and in the other case directed to the subject, one might ask why Jung has defined the two types in particular reference to the object. Why, for instance, might he not have said that they are both constituted by their respective relationships to the subject? He might have said, for instance, that the introvert asserts the value of the subject and the extravert devalues the subject as though its ascendancy had to be resisted. The extraverted attitude is constituted by a negative relationship to the subject, while the introvert maintains a positive relation to the subject. Jung's characterization, then, would seem to be made from an extraverting standpoint. Not that we would be justified in saying that we thereby know that Jung is an extravert, because this example is insufficient evidence, as we shall

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\(^{10}\) C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 412.
show later on. Conversely, we might notice an introverted nuance in the manner of expression which St. Thomas used in talking about the relationship of the subject to the world. He says:

...For every creature endeavors, by its activity, first of all to keep itself in perfect being, so far as this is possible. In such endeavor it tends, in its own way, to an imitation of the Divine Permanence. Secondly, every creature strives, by its activity, to communicate its own perfect being, in its own fashion, to another; and in this it tends to an imitation of the Divine Causality.

In this passage then we notice a contrary centralization on the subject. The distinct aspects of subject interest and object interest are conceived in terms of the subject. One might ask why it might not also be said that the human person tends to respond to the perfection of other beings and secondly to perfect his being through a union with the other or through an imitation of its perfection. The passage from St. Thomas, then, again expresses the relationship to object

11 Moreover, there is strong evidence from authority that this is not the case. E. A. Bennett, in a work which was corrected by Jung before publication, says: "he Jung has the psychology of the introverted thinker." C. G. Jung, London, Barrie and Rockliff, 1961, p. 18.

C. Vellert, St. Louis, Herder, 1948, Chap. 103, p. 198.

12 St. Thomas, Compendium of Theology, trans. by
and subject, but we might say, from an introverting standpoint. Again, however, this would not be sufficient evidence to say that St. Thomas was an introverted type.

We have used these examples, then, to try to show how the difference in affective direction or interest (called extraversion and introversion) can influence even statements which seemingly give recognition to both directions. The basic, or root cause, of the attitudinal difference, then, is rooted in valuation, in the life of the affections. And, according to Jung, this valuation influences the whole of man's psychic life. 13

Again, we have no wish to maintain that Jung is the only thinker for whom the attitudinal or valuational distinction is an explicit and important consideration. A contemporary of Jung, who has recently aroused a great deal of interest, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, seems either to have taken over this distinction from Jung or to have arrived at it independently. Thus he says:

...To some, the world has disclosed itself as too vast; within such immensity, man is lost and no longer counts; and there is nothing left for him

but shut his eyes and disappear. To others, the world is too beautiful; and it, and it alone, must be adored.\textsuperscript{14}

Another expression from Chardin relating to attitudinal phenomena reads as follows:

\ldots On the one hand the materialists insist on talking about objects as though they only consisted of external actions in impermanent relationships. On the other hand the upholders of a spiritual interpretation are obstinately determined not to go outside a kind of solitary introspection in which things are only looked upon as being shut in upon themselves in their 'immanent' working. Both these and those fight on different planes and do not meet; each only sees half the problem.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus the attitudinal differentiation which Jung employs seems to refer to the same phenomena which Chardin believes to be implicated in the problems of contemporary mankind. But attitudinalized psychic life is not adequately presented in its phenomenological concreteness as a question of an either/or psychology. For concrete differentiations of psychic life are by no means phenomenologically pure.


b. The Mixed Character of Psychic Life

In discussing attitudinal types, Jung is careful to point out that there is no such thing as a pure type. It is true, of course, that different individuals habitually manifest a predominance of one psychological attitude rather than the other. Both attitudes, however, belong to the psychic life of every individual. For, as Jung says: "every individual possesses both mechanisms—extraversion as well as introversion." On some occasions we assume an extraverted attitude, and on others we assume an introverted attitude. Each of us, however, probably has a greater frequency of adopting one attitude rather than the other.

For this reason, then, it is clear why we said that from one passage we could not identify Jung or St. Thomas as belonging to either type. As Jacobi says:

...Creative individuals and artists, who have constitutionally an extraordinarily close relation—as it were a direct contact with the unconscious, can only seldom be assigned a type. This is so much the truer as one simply cannot equate the artist and his work. Often, for instance, the same artist belongs in his life to the extraverted, in his

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16 Psychological Types, p. 10.
work to the introverted type, and conversely. 17

Human psychic life, then, may be habitually characterized by a particular attitude of either extraversion or introversion. While we note this phenomenon, however, we should also note that the opposite attitude is not thereby totally excluded. The situation is rather one of a predominance of one attitude over the other. An excessive or exclusively one-sided attitudinal functioning is, as a matter of fact, directly related to mental disorders, 18 whereas attitude of itself is not pathological.

17 J. Jacobi, *The Psychology of Jung*, p. 42. A good example of this seems to be manifested in the work of Adler. He says: "The criteria by which we can measure an individual are determined by his value to mankind in general. We compare an individual with the ideal picture of a fellow man, a man who overcomes the tasks and difficulties which lie before him in a way which is useful to society in general, a man who has developed his social feeling to a high degree." A. Adler, *Understanding Human Nature*, trans. by W. Beran Wolfe, New York, Faucett, 1921, p. 38. The criterion he employs is obviously an extraverted criterion, while personally Adler seems to have been of an introverted disposition. Cf. C. Jung, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, Ch. IV.

18 C. Jung, *The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease*, pp. 189-93.
c. Psychological Attitude and St. Thomas's Thought

There are several places in the writings of St. Thomas where the distinction of psychological attitude seems to be implicitly entailed. However, it would seem that the idea of an habitual direction of attention or valuation toward the subject or toward the other was to some extent assumed or taken for granted. This distinction, for example, seems to be operative in St. Thomas's questions dealing with the theological virtue of Charity. Here he discusses the love of God, the love of one's neighbor, the love of oneself and of one's body, etc. It would seem that if there are problems regarding love of one's neighbor and self, then there must be different directions in which affective life can habitually flow. Thus it would seem that contained within the general topic of Charity we find an early implicit treatment of the question of psychological attitude. However, its systematic use as a principle of understanding psychic phenomena is not to be found in St. Thomas's writings.

Moreover, if a Thomist or any Theistic philosopher were to assimilate the phenomena of extraversion and introversion to his thought, there would also be some important differences from the perspective of Jung. It would seem
that Jung's metaphysical agnosticism makes the problem appear differently than it does in the perspective of a metaphysical theism. That is, for the theist, God cannot simply be classed together with other things as an object for the human knower; but He, properly speaking, is a third term. For the theist there is the world, the self, and God, or rather—there is God, and the world and self seen in terms of relatedness to God.

When an affirmative answer is given to the metaphysical question of the existence of God it can be seen, I think, that there is an important modification introduced into the character of balance in psychological attitude. It would seem that for Jung there ought to be simply a tension of the opposites (which incidentally is a point he continuously stresses). For the theistic metaphysician, however, this opposition is not an ultimate opposition, and the relativity of this tension appears insofar as one adopts the perspective of the third term, namely, Infinite Being. Insofar as the primary valuation extends to, or is directed toward, the Divine Being, then, the claims of both the world and the self are capable of a synthesis. Thus, while the theist can admit the phenomena that Jung refers to as
introverting and extraverting tendencies, he cannot consider this an ultimate explanation. For the consciousness oriented by relationship to, or valuation of, the Divine, these two terms are capable of synthesis and inclusion within a larger whole.

Jung, however, does not always leave the problem in an irreducible tension of opposites. But the synthesis which he sometimes implies can be effected,¹⁹ cannot be effected, it would seem, within the two movements alone. It seems that what is unconsciously involved in his synthesis is a reference or a movement toward an absolute—a movement toward God. The individual, however, because of his agnostic education, may not be conscious of the existential referent of this movement. What Jung has shown us, without perhaps being considered responsible for it, is that balance and synthesis in psychic attitudinal life seems to point to the practical necessity of relationship to being outside the finite world.

¹⁹ Cf. his explanations of the "transcendent function" for example in Psychological Types, pp. 145, 159, 313, 322, 610.
The attitudinal difference, then, influences or colors all of the more specific functioning of psychic life. 20 What we are primarily concerned with, however, is its influence specifically on man's cognitive life. In the next section, therefore, we shall treat of some of the phenomena concerning extraversion and introversion and their influence on human cognitive life.

B. Attitudinal Type and Human Knowing

Though the differentiation of attitudinal types is not itself a cognitive differentiation, its influence on the cognitive realm is significant. Indeed, at times it almost seems that Jung has forgotten his own differentiations of attitudes in terms of interest, so intimate is the link with aspects of cognition. Our present concern, then, is to consider some of the correspondences which he finds between cognitive life and psychological attitude.

1. Abstractionism and Empiricism

20 "...we must treat the introversion and the extraversion types as superordinated categories to the function types." C. Jung, Psychological Types, p. 613.
Jung's description of introversion contains, for one thing, an intimate and immediate relationship with the cognitive function of abstraction. First of all, Jung finds the purpose of abstraction to be an effort to break the concrete relatedness to the object. He says:

Abstraction, then, seems to be a function which is at war with the original state of "participation mystique". Its effort is to part from the object, thus to put an end to the object's tyrannical hold. Its effect is either to lead to the creation of art forms, or to the cognition of the object.... 21

But not only does abstracting effect a "break with the object", but this is precisely an introverting process for Jung. He says:

In this work, the concept of abstraction is linked up with the idea of the psycho-energetic process involved in it. When I assume an abstracting attitude towards an object, I do not let the object affect me in its totality, but I distinguish a portion of it from its connections, at the same time excluding the irrelevant parts. My purpose is to rid myself of the object as a single and unique

21 C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, p. 366. There is a similar characterization of abstraction as implying a diminishment of relatedness to the object in the writings of Gabriel Marcel. "The world seemed to me then, as now, an indeterminate place in which to extend as much as possible the region where one is at home and to decrease that which is vaguely imagined or known only by hearsay, in an abstract and lifeless manner." G. Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, London, Harvill Press, 1948, p. 86.
whole, and to extract only a portion of it. Awareness of the whole undoubtedly takes place, but I do not plunge myself into this awareness; my interest does not flow out into the totality, but withdraws itself from the object as a whole, bringing the abstracted portion into myself, i.e. into my conceptual world, which is already prepared or constellated for the purpose of abstracting a part of the object....I visualize the abstracting process, therefore, as a withdrawal of libido from the object, or as a backflow of value from the object to a subjective, abstract content. Thus, for me, abstraction has the meaning of an energetic depreciation of the object. In other words, abstraction can be expressed as an introverting libido-movement.\(^4\)

The abstracting or introverting process, then, enables one to effect the creation of art forms or a cognition of the object. Carried too far, however, Jung sees abstraction as entailing its own particular sort of deficiency, namely, a peculiar poverty of cognitive life. Thus Jung says:

> From the conscious attitude of abstraction, which in pursuit of its ideal makes an experience from every occurrence, and from the sum of experience a law, a certain constriction and poverty results, which is indeed characteristic of the introvert.\(^5\)

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22 \textit{Psychological Types}, pp. 521-22. Those familiar with Thomistic theory can immediately see the relevance and need for the theory of abstraction which recognizes "separation" and simple abstraction, as well as "formal" and "total" abstraction.

23 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 118.
The wealth of variety in experienced objects is not possessed by the introverted knower. While introversion is characterized by abstractionism, then, extraversion is typically manifested in cognitive life by an empiricist quality.

To quote again from Jung:

...The thinking of the extravert is concretistic. His soundness and stability do not lie in himself, but very largely outside himself in the felt-into facts of experience,...To the man who has always ranged upon the side of concrete thinking, i.e., upon the side of representations of facts, abstraction appears as something feeble and decrepit, something he is well able to dispense with, in face (sic) of the solidity of concrete, sense-established facts.24

The extraverted standpoint, then, has the desirable feature of maintaining the human knower in living contact with empirical fact. However, it also has its particular deficiency insofar as the richness of experience may tend to overwhelm the mind. That is, the extraverted extreme tends to lead the mind into a confusing multiplicity of fact separated from unifying principles. As Jung says:

Because our present scientific mind adopts a one-sided, concrete, and purely empirical attitude, it has no standard by which to value the man who presents the idea; since, in the estimation of the empiricist, facts rank higher than the knowledge of

24 Ibid., p. 377.
those primordial forms in which human intelligence conceives them. This tacking toward the side of concretism is, as we know, a relatively recent acquisition, a relict from the epoch of enlightenment. The results of this development are astonishing, but they have led to an accumulation of empirical material whose very immensity gradually produces more confusion than clarity. It inevitably leads to a scientific separatism, and therewith to a specialist mythology, which spells death to universality. But the preponderance of empiricism not only means a smothering of active thinking, it also involves a danger to the laying down of sound theories within any branch of science. The absence of a general viewpoint favours mythical theory-building, just as much as does the absence of an empirical point of view.

Conscious, living, universal principles are not the forte of extravert knowing.

The two attitudinal types can be distinguished, then, by differences in cognitive functioning. The cognitive life is characterized by an abstractionist attitude in the case of introversion, and by an empiricist standpoint in the case of extraversion. However, a certain caution must be employed in using this differentiation.

First of all, the orientation by the subjective conceptual standpoint in introversion ought not to be taken in only a highly personal or individualistic sense. For, as

25 Ibid., p. 381.
was already briefly indicated, the basis of this type of
tinking is conceptualization of a universal character. The
Kantian a priori is employed by Jung as the basis for intro­
verted cognition. He says:

...But we know that the mind cannot be a tabula rasa, since we have only to criticize our principles of thought to perceive that certain categories of our thinking are given a priori, i.e. antecedent to all experience, and make a simultaneous appearance with the first act of thought, being, in fact, its pre­
formed conditions. For what Kant proved for logical thinking holds good for the psyche over a still wider range.26

Thus we might say that for Jung the introverted attitude
tends to sever the relationship of the subject to the com­
mon external or empirical world, but it serves to unite or link him to the common or universal forms or concepts of understanding. He is not necessarily caught up in merely idiosyncratic particularities of cognitive life.

On the other hand, the objective referent of extra­
version ought not to be conceived in too sensationalistic a form. For, the objective referent of this attitude may be an idea rather than a sensible object. That is, the extra­
verted cognition may consist primarily in a relatedness to

26 Ibid., p. 377.
the concrete or "empirical" ideas of the community, the collective ideational schema.

The moral laws which govern his [the extravert's] action coincide with the corresponding claims of society, i.e. with the generally valid moral viewpoint. If the generally valid view were different, the subjective moral guiding line would also be different, without the general psychological habitus being in any way changed.27

And again:

...for the extraverted judgment, the valid and determining criterion is the standard taken from objective conditions, no matter whether this be directly represented by an objectively perceptible fact, or expressed in an objective idea; for an objective idea, even when subjectively sanctioned, is equally external and objective in origin. Extraverted thinking, therefore, need not necessarily be a purely ideal thinking, if, for instance, it can be shown that the ideas with which it is engaged are to a great extent borrowed from without, i.e. are transmitted by tradition and education. The criterion of judgment, therefore, as to whether or no a thinking is extraverted, hangs directly upon the question: by which standard is its judgment governed—is it furnished from without, or is its origin subjective? A further criterion is afforded by the direction of the thinker's conclusion, namely, whether or no the thinking has a preferential direction outwards. It is no proof of its extraverted nature that it is preoccupied with concrete objects, since I may be engaging my thoughts with a concrete object, either because I am abstracting my thought from it or because I am concretizing my thought with it. Even if I engage my thinking with concrete things, and to that extent could be described as

27 Ibid., p. 418.
extraverted, it yet remains both questionable and characteristic as regards the direction my thinking will take; namely, whether in its further course it leads back again to objective data, external facts, and generally accepted ideas, or not. 28

Abstractionism and empiricism, then, are important distinguishing characteristics of cognitive life in introversion and extraversion. It should be born in mind, however, that these differences are not to be taken in too narrow a meaning. It should also be remembered that they refer, not primarily to the present object, but rather to the origin and direction that one's thinking habitually takes.

2. Speculative and Practical Knowing

But abstractionism and empiricism are not the only differentiations which Jung employs in discussing introverted and extraverted cognitive life. At times he seems to conceive of the difference in terms of what traditionally was called speculative and practical knowing. Thus, he says:

...The reflective nature of the introvert causes him always to think and consider before acting. This naturally makes him slow to act. His shyness and distrust of things induces hesitation, and so he always has difficulty in adapting to the external world. Conversely the extravert has a positive

28 Ibid., pp. 428-29.
relation to things. He is, so to speak, attracted by them. New, unknown situations fascinate him. In order to make closer acquaintance with the unknown he will jump into it with both feet. As a rule he acts first and thinks afterwards. Thus his action is swift, subject to no misgivings and hesitations. The two types therefore seem created for a symbiosis. The one takes care of reflection and the other sees to the initiative and practical action.29

And again he says: "One might perhaps say: the thinking of the introvert is rational, while that of the extravert is programmatical."30

The "perhaps" in the above passage, however, seems to express a doubt as to the legitimacy of this direct correlation. As a matter of fact, in other places Jung seems to express a more questioning attitude regarding the relationship between the mode of thought and the practical. He says:

...So far as the practical thinking of the merchant, the engineer, or the natural science pioneer is concerned, the objective direction is at once manifest. But in the case of a philosopher it is open to doubt, whenever the course of his thinking is directed towards ideas.31

29 Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, p. 54.
30 Psychological Types, p. 36.
31 Ibid., p. 429.
Certainly the thinking of the philosopher is reflective, and yet he is not immediately classed as an introverted thinker. There seems to be some problem in Jung's mind on this correlation, and we shall attempt to show the main lines of a solution in the next section. Our purpose here, however, is simply to show that in Jung's thought there was some attempt at a correlation of extraversion and introversion with not only the empiricism/abstractionism pairing of categories, but also with the division into practical and speculative thinking.

3. Some Remarks on Attitude and Knowing

There are several aspects of traditional theory of knowing which we believe can fruitfully be correlated with the preceding considerations of Jungian theory. First of all, we might inquire as to whether there is anything in traditional theory which bears on Jung's consideration of abstractionism and empiricism in their relationship to introversion and extraversion.

a. Abstractionism and Empiricism

One of the most common "axioms" of Thomistic theory is that the proper object of the human intellect is
Moreover, the proportioned object of the human intellect—that to which it is naturally and readily able to relate itself—is the being of the extra-mental material thing, the form existing in matter. But doesn't this theory contradict Jung's differentiation of extraversion and introversion as object or subject centered relatedness? If the natural object of the human intellect is extramental material being, then it would seem that the human knower is naturally, and thus necessarily, an extraverted knower. The differentiation of types, then, would be impossible. However, it seems possible to show that this contradiction is more apparent than real.

Jung's differentiation requires us to employ the classical distinction between the formal or essential and the existential more rigorously. That is, considered formally the proportioned object of the intellect is the being of material things, and this "being" taken in the sense of the essential is the characteristic object of both extraverted and introverted intellect. However, the formality

32 Summa Theologiae, I. 78, a1, c.
33 Summa Theologiae, q 85, a1, c.
of the object may be habitually considered under only one of the two manners of its existence, namely, in the mind or in the thing. Insofar as the formal perfection is considered as it is in the thing, we may speak of an extraverted consciousness. Insofar as the formal perfection (still of the thing) is considered, however, according to its manner of existing in the mind, we may speak of an introverted consciousness. The extraverted consciousness, then, considers the formality under the existential conditions of its objective inherence, the introverted consciousness considers the formality under the existential relatedness to the subject or as his possession. It seems, then, that traditional theory can make a contribution toward a fuller and more precise expression of the extraverted-introverted differentiation in its relevance to cognitive life, while yet finding the empirical psychological findings instructive for understanding human knowing as it functions in the concrete. As St. Thomas remarks, the intelligible species is primarily that by which we know, though upon reflection it can itself

34 De Ente et Essentia, Ch. III.
become an object of consideration. Consequently, there is nothing to preclude the possibility of an habitual direction of attention toward the species itself. The investigations of Jung seem to indicate that such an habitual direction is precisely what he characterizes as an introverted characteristic.

Again, the traditional differentiations of external sensation and intellection seem also to have relevance to the empiricism/abstractionism or extraversion/introversion differentiation. For, in tradition theory, the sensible exists in act outside of the subject but the intelligible in act is not something independent of the human subject. If the cognitive consciousness is more sensationalistic in character, then, it will by nature be dealing with a content more necessarily of an "objective" character than if it is more intellectualistic in character. Of course, the intellectualistic character of a content does not preclude its objective status but merely diminishes some of the necessities found in the operation of sense. For, sense is more

35 Summa Theologiae, I, q 85, a2, c.
36 Ibid., q 79, a3, ad1 et ad 3.
necessarily related to objective material conditions insofar as its operation is that of a power which is essentially of matter. 37

Again, the differentiation of abstraction from judgment in traditional theory seems to bear on this same differentiation in Jungian theory. For insofar as the habitual intellectual actuation is that of abstraction rather than judgment, (and there is nothing in traditional theory to exclude the possibility of a distinct type of act receiving an habitual operative primacy), the cognitive consciousness would correspond to the abstractionist characterization. On the other hand if the habitual intellectual actuation is that of judgment (and of course it would have to be existential judgment) the consciousness would correspond to the extraverted characterization. All of these differentiations from traditional theory of knowing, then, provide a rich philosophical background and foundation in the ontological order for philosophical understanding relevant to the empirical differentiations of extraverted and introverted consciousness as characterized by empiricism and abstractionism.

37 Ibid., q 77, a5, c.
For the actual discovery of these empirical differentiations, however, the philosopher must rely on the empirical data of the research psychologist. Our purpose, however, has been to show that these differentiations, which Jung claims to have discovered, do correlate very extensively with traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic theory and the possibilities deducible from that theory, in many important ways.

One final point of comparison may perhaps especially show the close relationship of the independent investigations of Jung with those of classical thinkers. We know that Jung stressed the importance of the direction that thought is taking for understanding extraverted and introverted attitudes. In traditional theory, we find that cognitive habits were also differentiated in terms of the terminus of judgment. Thus St. Thomas says:

...Now the beginning of all our knowledge is in the sense; ...Knowledge, however, does not always terminate in the same way. Sometimes it terminates in the sense, sometimes in the imagination, and sometimes in the intellect alone.38

Furthermore, St. Thomas was not ignorant of the fact that it

38 De. Trinitate, q6, a2, trans. by Armand Maurer as The Division and Methods of the Sciences, Toronto, Pont. Institute, 1953.
is possible for one to terminate judgment incorrectly. Thus in the same text quoted above, he says: "The person who neglects the senses in regard to natural things falls into error." The Thomistic theory on the terminus of judgment and the possible deficiencies of cognitive apprehension, then, are especially relevant and similar to the considerations which we find in Jung when he characterizes introversion and extraversion in terms of abstractionism and empiricism. The main difference might perhaps be expressed by saying that St. Thomas was especially concerned with distinguishing habits of knowing and their requirements, Jung with distinguishing human knowers in their habitual modes of functioning. Another difference is introduced insofar as St. Thomas does not give much attention to lopsidedness in cognitive functioning, but he is concerned with the intellectual habits almost entirely in their proper functioning alone. Some Thomists, however, have given further attention to the extension of a particular mode of cognitive functioning beyond its proper sphere of relevance. 40 The differences,

39 Ibid., q6, a2.

40 For instance, J. Maritain, The Dream of Descartes, New York, Philosophical Library, 1944.
however, do not destroy the important agreements in understanding between Thomistic thought and Jungian theory.

But perhaps, for the present at least, we have given enough attention to the relationships between the empiricism/abstractionism polarity and traditional theory, and we ought to briefly consider Jung's use of the speculative/practical pair of categories.

b. Speculative and Practical

In our discussion of Jung's presentation of extraversion and introversion in cognitive life, the speculative/practical polarity was employed in distinguishing introversion and extraversion, but with some difficulties. Here, too, we believe, traditional theory can contribute considerable clarification while itself being able to profit from the empirical studies.

First of all, let us attempt to show how traditional theory can shed some light on the difficulty which we found in Jung's correlation of introversion with "rational" thinking and extraversion with "programmatical" thinking.

In St. Thomas's handling of the speculative/practical distinction there is no simple division of these two
categories. In an admirably illuminating passage in the
Summa, he expresses the distinctions relevant for any con­
siderations of this subject. It might be well to quote this
passage in full.

Some knowledge is speculative only; some is
practical only; and some is partly speculative and
partly practical. In proof whereof it must be ob­
served that knowledge can be called speculative in
three ways: first, on the part of the things known,
which are not operable by the knower; such is the
knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. (sic)
Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing—as, for
instance, if a builder consider a house by defining
and dividing, and considering what belongs to it in
general: for this is to consider operable things in
a speculative manner, and not as practically oper­
able; for operable means the application of form to
matter, and not the resolution of the composite into
its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as re­
gards the end; for the practical intellect differs
in its end from the speculative, as the Philosopher
says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is
ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end
of the speculative intellect is the consideration of
truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a
house can be made, not ordering this to the end of
operation, but only to know (how to do it), this
would be only a speculative consideration as regards
the end, although it concerns an operable thing.
Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason
of the thing itself known, is merely speculative.
But that which is speculative either in its mode or
as to its end is partly speculative and partly prac­
tical: and when it is ordained to an operative end
it is simply practical. 41

41 Summa Theologiae, I, q 14, a 16, c.
It is easy to understand then how Jung might have some difficulty in correlating extraversion and introversion with rational and programmatical thinking. Certainly the purely practical would be extraverted thinking, but beyond that point it becomes much more difficult. We cannot say for instance that the purely speculative is introverted for it could admit of either the empiricist extraverted or the abstractionist introverted character. That there is some correlation between the phenomena which Jung is describing and traditional distinctions, however, does seem to be born out. However, it is also clear that a much more refined differentiation is required in order to make a correlation of the speculative/practical pair with the phenomenological categories of extraversion and introversion. This again, however, is another fruitful area for mutual aid and enrichment.

However, it is necessary to mention another element in Thomistic theory in order to effect the full contact of the two theories.

There is one area where St. Thomas centers his attention on the knower and his habitual mode of knowing rather than on the characteristics of a cognitive habit considered in itself. This occurs when he is considering the
division of lives into the active and the contemplative. The differentiation here is precisely in terms of whether the subject habitually is intent on the contemplation of truth or whether he is habitually intent on external actions. But even here the primary interest is directed toward determining what pertains to the contemplative life in its proper and perfect functioning as also for the active life. Moreover, St. Thomas's presentation of the modes of life is made within the framework of a Christian life and both active and contemplative lives are understood within that context. Now it would seem that for general psychological and philosophical categories, however, we are required to take up the order of nature for our starting point. When this is done, then, the correlations seem to emerge more easily and clearly.

The categories of extraversion and introversion, first of all, seem to be more general differentiations than those pertaining to active or contemplative lives. In Thomistic terms, extraversion and introversion express differences pertaining to the existential status of the known.

42 Ibid., II-II, q 179, a1.
That is, they are differentiations based on a concern with a known under its extra-subjective conditions of existence, or with a known under its conditions of existence as precisely living in the existence of an intellectual knower. In this way, then, the introvert-extravert differentiation is an existential differentiation insofar as it concerns the mode of existence of the habitual object of consciousness. The Jungian meanings of empiricism and abstractionism, then, are directly related to this existential differentiation.

The differentiation of speculative and practical intellectual functioning, however, is primarily taken from the nature of the object rather than its existential status. That is, the speculative is concerned with the non-operable and the practical with the operable. However, each of these may be dealt with either in an extraverted form—empirically for the non-operable, concretely practical for the operable; or in an introverted form—abstractly for the non-operable, speculatively in mode or end for the operable. We know that some lovers of truth are lovers of empirical truth and some are lovers of abstract truth. And we know that some interested in action meditate on it abstractly (as the moral
philosopher) and some know it prudently (without reflective justification). We believe, then, that it is possible to synthesize traditional discussions on cognitive life both in its basic acts and in the differentiation of speculative and practical functioning with the empirical considerations and classifications discovered by Jung. We are then in a better position to understand the ground on which these empirical and habitual differentiations are founded. Conversely, we are better able to understand how universal features of human cognitive life manifest themselves in the existent, singular, human knowers.

But our considerations thus far have been directed toward understanding the theory of extraversion and introversion in relationship to man's consciously lived cognitive life. We have yet to consider the very important question of psychological attitudes and the unconscious. For without this consideration we would indeed have a very lopsided picture of Jung's theory.

II. Extraversion, Introversion, and the Unconscious

In Chapter two we discussed the question of the unconscious in Jungian theory. We considered the question of
its existence, and its relationship to ontological dimensions of the psychic subject. We also considered the fact that in Jungian theory it stands in very definite compensatory relationship to the conscious standpoint. Now this compensatory relationship of the unconscious, then, must very definitely be brought into the picture in any consideration of Jung's theory of extraversion and introversion.

A. The General Theory of Unconscious Attitude

1. Compensatory Nature of the Unconscious Attitude

Insofar as the unconscious of the psychic subject is placed by Jung in theoretical opposition or compensation to the conscious dimension of psychic life, we expect this relationship to affect the psychological attitude. This is precisely what we find in Jung's theory. He says in regard to extraversion:

The attitude of the unconscious as an effective complement to the conscious extraverted attitude has a definitely introverting character. It focusses libido upon the subjective factor, i.e., all those needs and claims which are stifled or repressed by a too extraverted conscious attitude.

43 C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, pp. 422-23.
And again, regarding introversion:

...As a result of the ego's defective relation to the object—for a will to command is not adaptation—a compensatory relation to the object develops in the unconscious, which makes itself felt in consciousness as an unconditional and irrepressible tie to the object.44

Thus we find an important additional dimension to the Jungian presentation of psychological attitude. We have already seen that the consciously lived psychic life is not characterized by one attitude alone, but rather that the designation by a type refers only to an habitual predominance of one attitude. In addition to this complication, then, we see now that the habitual conscious attitude is also naturally compensated for by an unconscious attitude of the opposite type. As is generally the case for the condition of the unconscious, however, the unconscious attitude is undeveloped and more primitive than the developed, exercised, and sophisticated consciously lived psychological attitude. The presence of an unconscious compensatory attitude at once makes the understanding of the opposite type possible to each, but its primitive character in the subject makes him

44 Ibid., p. 478.
susceptible to rendering a depreciatory judgment concerning this attitude in the other. If the other is of the opposite type this may be a radically false judgment.

In the development of his position, Jung places the primary emphasis for the existence of a compensatory attitude of the unconscious in empirical or clinical data. From our earlier discussion of the mixed character of psychic life, however, we can readily see that there must be some mode of existence in potentia for the attitude which is actualized though it does not predominate in the lived psychic life. It is actualized more or less frequently and/or harmoniously with the habitual attitude. Insofar as it is not disposable by the subject, not easily expressed, it fails to have the full nature of a habit, though it might be said to be a habit in the sense that we speak of natural habits or individual dispositions. These, however, lack the consciousness and free exercise belonging to the properly and fully human habit. 45

45 "Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch as habit is that which one uses when one wills,..." St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q 30, a 5, c.
The theoretical differentiation of the two attitudes in terms of subjective or objective direction of interest and attention then is not a simple unilateral directing of interest. The habitually extraverted or object-centered consciousness, then, is counterbalanced by an unconscious involvement and identification with subjective determinants though this is unconscious to the subject. Contrariwise the habitually introverted subjectively directed consciousness is counterbalanced by an unconscious tie and "participation mystique" with the object. In either case, however, the unconscious relatedness is generally of an inferior or defective nature compared to the consciously lived attitude.

2. Unconscious Attitude and Cognitive Life

The compensatory function of the unconscious attitude has, of course, a special relevance to human cognitive life. It provides a naturally complementary factor contributing toward wholeness in cognitive life though its contribution is proportionately greater insofar as it is assimilated to the lived cognitive life.

For instance, it has been pointed out that in the Jungian theory an empiricist tendency is associated with
extraversion. Now insofar as this attitude prevails, then, the cognitive life needs an abstractionist dimension in order to become freed from the limitation of concrete particularity alone. This dimension of psychic attitude is present in the subject but in an unconscious, archaic and undeveloped form. Likewise the extraverted involvement with concrete practicality mentioned earlier requires complementation by the more speculative dimensions of consideration. The seeds of this development too are to be found in the subject's own unconscious.

On the other hand the overly abstractionist character of introverted cognitive life requires an intensification of the empiricist judgmental life in order to achieve wholeness. And the tendency toward exclusively speculative functioning requires an intensification of practical judgment for full cognitive life.

We have already indicated how some aspects of traditional theory are relevant to the extravert-introvert distinction. Distinctions such as those between sensation-intellection, abstraction-judgment, being-in-the-mind—being-in-the-thing; as well as differentiations of the terminus of judgment and the types of speculative and practical
judging are certainly relevant. However, our primary interest here is simply to point out that their relevance may be to either the conscious or to the unconscious in the Jungian theory. In this theory, then, the unused aspect is not totally absent but is to be found in an unconscious and undeveloped form. Factors which, in traditional theory, were differentiated as acts or as scientific habits are presented in a different fashion in the phenomenological presentation of Jung. In the latter presentation various acts or habits are seen to more or less dominate cognitive life. The other possibilities of cognitive actuation are not totally absent, however, but are or become part of the unwilled and unexpressed dynamism or potentialities called the unconscious. As a final consideration of the unconscious attitude we would like to briefly consider some aspects of its importance for philosophic life.

B. Unconscious Attitude and Philosophic Theory

1. The Recognition of Attitudinal Difference

First of all, it seems that philosophical literature gives many indications of a recognition of the phenomenological differentiation expressed by the extravert/introvert
designations. Not only have philosophers differentiated acts and habits, but historians and critics of philosophical theories have, perhaps, been even more directly concerned with these psychological differentiations, at least indirectly. For instance, the empiricist-abstractionist differentiation used by Jung has a long history of philosophical use in the opposition between empiricist and rationalist. Again more specifically the closeness to a Jungian analysis becomes apparent when we read a critic of a particular theory. For instance, one can see the relationship to introverted cognition in Professor Gilson's description of Avicenna's theory:

For our own intellect, to learn is not to accumulate knowledge in our memory; it is to acquire the perfect aptitude to conform itself with the intelligence in act, so as to receive from it the simple intellection from which other forms will follow in an orderly manner in us; ... 46

And again:

The contemplative power of the soul is dominated by intelligible objects to which it is subjected. 47


47 Ibid., p. 199.
To take another example, we can see that Professor McKeon is quite clearly expressing an appreciation of the introverted dimension when he says:

...Certainly augustinism turned to eternal things, and even aristotelianism, finding the bases of truths in first principles, for all the origin of knowledge in experience, are faced in the opposite direction to empiricism and positivism.  

The appreciation of the extraverted, empiricist, and "existential" dimension to cognitive life is so obvious in contemporary thought that the use of texts is unnecessary. That philosophers have recognized the phenomena called by Jung extraversion and introversion in cognitive life, then, can, we believe, be easily verified. However, their approach to it was in terms of an investigation which was to reveal the absolutely universal conditions of human knowing in its actual exercise. In this respect, however, the claims of their epistemologies or psychologies need to be made less dogmatic in the light of psychological investigation. For the Jungian analysis seems to point to the conclusion that empiricism and rationalism are wrong insofar as they make a

claim to exclusive validity. Moreover, they are then not only theoretically one-sided but are practically speaking unable to recognize and give rightful respect to the compensatory attitude which is actually a reality pertaining to the unconscious dimension of cognitive life. This of course is a serious loss as far as the task of the development of philosophic life is concerned.

2. Building a More Adequate Philosophy

If our conclusions are sound, then, the psychological investigations bearing on extraversion and introversion are definitely relevant to the philosophic claims of empiricism and rationalism. Moreover, we have to conclude that, though either may be the habitually lived mode of cognitive life, it is not exclusively so either by right or in fact. The compensatory dimension is also present, though its influence may be largely shrouded in unconsciousness. This consequence incidentally seems to us to be a significant empirical confirmation of Aristotelian theory. For we know that Aristotle assimilated both the value of the empiricism of the sophists and the intellectualism of Plato into a synthesis which could neither be called simply empiricism nor
rationalism. What the psychological findings of Jung are saying to us, then, is that everyone is in fact Aristotelian in his cognitive life, though he may also, in fact, be more or less eliminating either the factor of experience or that of abstraction from its full functioning in his cognitive life. With this recognition, the task of building a more adequate philosophy takes on a different hue.

Traditionally, it was frequently thought that philosophy was a matter of purely logical reasoning and rational consequences. The psychological discoveries, however, make us more fully aware of the affective factor in one's cognitive life. We are affectively tied to an habitual mode of cognitive functioning, and our philosophic theories are influenced by those affective ties. We owe it to ourselves as philosophers, then, to try to become aware of the elements of cognitive functioning which we have tended to eliminate and render unconscious. Insofar as we are able to assimilate them to our lived cognitive life, we will be better able to understand their natural being and to enrich not only our lived cognitive life but also our reflective consciousness of that life, in other words our philosophy of human knowing.
Though we may hold a true position, it is only able to be a living philosophy insofar as we know it in its applicability to our individually actualized cognitive life. This knowledge presupposes that our cognitive life be an actual living synthesis of extraverted and introverted, empiricist and rationalist, theoretical and practical, dimensions.

But Jungian theory does not stop at considering only the priority of the individual subject or thing in the cognitive relationship. It also includes an important differentiation concerning the different modes of relatedness to either the thing or to subjective contents. This brings us, then, to the topic of our next chapter, namely, the theory of the four functions.
CHAPTER IV

PSYCHIC FUNCTIONS

Psychic life is exercised differently by individual persons, then, depending on whether the direction of interest is outwardly or inwardly channeled. But we find that psychic life is also exercised differently because of different contents in the term of an extraverted or an introverted relatedness. This further differentiation, then, brings us into direct contact with Jung's theory of functional types.

I. The Theory of Four Psychic Functions

A. Conscious Functioning

1. The Distinction of Four Functions

As a result of his clinical experience and research, Jung came to the conclusion that man possesses a functional pluralism consisting of basically four types of psychic
functioning. These four types of function relate the subject to the known by way of different specific contents. The following text expresses Jung's view of the role of each function in the total economy of psychic life. He says:

...Consciousness is primarily an organ of orientation in a world of outer and inner facts. First and foremost, it establishes the fact that something is there. I call this faculty sensation. By this I do not mean the specific activity of any one of the senses, but perception in general. Another faculty interprets what is perceived; this I call thinking. By means of this function, the object perceived is assimilated and its transformation into a psychic content proceeds much further than in mere sensation. A third faculty establishes the value of the object. This function of evaluation I call feeling.... It is the fourth faculty of consciousness, intuition, which makes possible, at least approximately, the determination of space-time relationships. This is a function of perception which includes subliminal factors, that is, the possible relationships to objects not appearing in the field of vision, and the possible changes, past and future, about which the object gives no clue.2


Moreover, in this functional differentiation sensation and intuition are grouped together as irrational functions, while those of thinking and feeling are associated as rational functions. Thus he says:

Thinking and feeling are rational functions in so far as they are decisively influenced by the motive of reflection. They attain their fullest significance when in fullest possible accord with the laws of reason. The irrational functions, on the contrary, are such as aim at pure perception, e.g. intuition and sensation; because, as far as possible, they are forced to dispense with the rational (which presupposes the exclusion of everything that is outside reason) in order to be able to reach the most complete perception of the whole course of events.  

There are several important observations to be made regarding Jung's differentiation. First of all, the predominantly cognitive character of his psychology is immediately evident through the role of the four functions. Though he repeatedly stresses the importance of emotion and affectivity in psychic life, Jung has no differentiation in affective life to parallel or equal in importance that of the cognitive theory of four functions.

Secondly, the differentiations which he arrived at from his own investigations seem to be definitely related  

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to the distinctions found in classical cognitive theory.
This is most evident, first of all, in the case of sensation.
For, he tells us that sensation is: "perception transmitted
via the sense organs and 'bodily senses'."\(^4\) That sensation
has a long history of explicit consideration as a distinct
cognitive function is, of course, well known. But what of
Jung's other irrational function, namely, the function of
"intuition"? If we examine the Jungian texts, I believe
that we will find that intuition relates fundamentally to
that area of functioning which Aristotle and St. Thomas, for
instance, referred to as internal sensation. For, it is
precisely the powers of imagination and of estimative sense
which deal with the presentation of wholes not given in the
present sense data alone. As Jung says:

...Through intuition any one content is presented as
a complete whole, without our being able to explain
or discover in what way this content has been arrived
at. Intuition is a kind of instinctive apprehension,
irrespective of the nature of its contents.\(^5\)

This is precisely what we find in the traditional presenta-
tion of imagination and estimation. The product of

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 586.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 568.
imagination has no necessary connectedness with present sensation or ideation, directly or by way of rational consequence, and thus we may say it is essentially irrational. As in the case with imagination, so also is it impossible to find the ingredients for an estimative perception in the present given elements. St. Thomas expresses this characteristic of a going beyond present sense data in his explanation of the estimative sense: "...for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the estimative power is appointed...."^6

But if we take it as accepted, then, that there is a correlation between sensation/intuition and external sense/internal sense, a problem still remains. We still have to determine what relationship, if any, exists between the two rational functions and the ontological powers differentiated by classical thought. For we know that since the object of intelligence is universal being, there is no need for a plurality of purely cognitive powers on the level of intelligence, for all intelligibility falls under the scope of a power whose object is being. Jung, however, has posited

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^6 *Summa Theologicae*, I, q 78, a4, c.
two rational functions rather than one. How, then, can we resolve this seeming incommensurability?

First of all, the function of 'thinking' involves no particular difficulty, for we easily recognize that Jung is talking about the functioning of intelligence in its specifically human or "rational" form. But what ontological power is involved in the functioning which Jung calls "feeling"?

If we consider the phenomenon of feeling as a rational function, it seems that it too can be located within the framework of traditional theory. It is a mistake to look for a distinct cognitive power, however, for what we are involved with is not a case of pure cognition. It is a cognitive or rational functioning, but one based on affective relatedness. Thus St. Thomas says:

A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it.... In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue.8

7 "But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational." St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q 79, a8, c.

8 Summa Theologiae, I, q 1, a6, ad3.
Thus even Jung's two rational functions find their place in traditional theory in the distinction between judging through pure intellection and judging through affective connaturality. 9

But if each of Jung's four functions were presented in traditional theory, why credit him with any distinctive contribution? However, his contribution, and we believe that it is significant, lies in another direction. For Jung's contribution consists, not primarily in a presentation of the distinct modes and contents of cognitive presence, but rather in his discovery of functional types. This was the discovery that individual knowers frequently tend to actualize only part of their cognitive potential and thus they are differentiated as habitually distinct types of human knowers.

2. Functional Types

While traditional theorists attended to the distinct

9 Professor Maritain has spent considerable effort in developing aspects of this latter mode of judging. See, for example, the appropriate sections of The Degrees of Knowledge, New York, Scribners, 1959, or The Range of Reason, New York, Scribners, 1952.
modes of functioning as essentially distinct acts rooted in distinct powers, Jung centered his attention on the concrete human knower and the exercise or employment of his acts and powers. His empirical research led him to these functions, then, not as expressions of ontologically distinct powers but as empirically discernible exercised "biases" of human knowers. Thus he says:

...At the very outset, nature has established marked differences in their importance for different individuals. As a rule, one of the four functions is especially developed, thus giving the mentality as a whole its characteristic stamp. The predominance of one or the other function gives rise to typical attitudes, which may be designated thinking types, feeling types, and so on. A type of this kind is a bias like a vocation with which a person has identified himself. 10

Thus, while the traditional presentation concerned itself almost exclusively with the question of the specification of acts and powers, it can welcome information regarding the exercise of those powers and the concrete employment of cognitive acts. This we believe is precisely Jung's contribution to our understanding of human knowing on this matter. Having had this differentiation pointed

10 C. G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 124.
out to us, I believe that each of us can find examples to illustrate the empirical diversity of functional types. On the one hand, the sensation type who is very attentive to the precise content and distinctions in the sensible; and, on the other hand, the intuitive type who is attentive to the consideration and/or actualization of possibilities—whether imaginative possibilities of a pleasing or beautiful nature, or estimative possibilities regarding the useful, either technologically or moralistically. In regard to the rational types we find, on the one hand, those knowers pre-occupied with the concept and the linking together of conceptual representations and, on the other hand, the discrimination of reality and being by means of, and in terms of, valuations. And the overriding influence of either the irrational or the rational dimension gives a cast to psychic life which, on the one hand, is that of chance and spontaneity, and on the other hand, that of directedness and ordering. But so far we have been concerned only with the Jungian theory of the existence of the four functions, and the lived exercise of predominantly one function which characterizes a functional type. Our next consideration concerns the relationship of the psychic functions to that dimension of the
subject called the unconscious.

B. Psychic Functions and the Unconscious

As we might suspect, Jungian theory maintains that the psychic functions have a role to play in the life of the unconscious, especially insofar as the conscious life is excessively one-sided. He says:

...Whatever we persistently exclude from conscious training and adaptation necessarily remains in an untrained, undeveloped, infantile, or archaic condition, ranging from partial to complete unconsciousness.... For it is by no means to be assumed that all those forms of activity latent in the psyche, which are suppressed or neglected by the individual, are thereby robbed of their specific energy. 11

Thus, in opposition to the consciously lived functional life, there is the compensatory functional life which is largely unconscious. Moreover, there is a certain order observable in the unconscious functional opposition:

The fact that the natural functions of the psyche cannot be deprived of their specific energy gives rise to characteristic antitheses, which can best be observed wherever these four orienting functions of consciousness come into play. The chief contrasts are those between thinking and feeling on the one hand, and sensation and intuition on the other.... These polarities have a

11 Ibid., p. 124.
markedly irritating nature, and this remains true whether the conflict occurs within the individual psyche or between individuals of opposite temperament.  

Only certain functions, then, and particularly under the urge of cultural demands, are singled out and specifically developed. The other functions are given only second-class existence, suppressed and eliminated to various degrees from the actually lived psychic life.

However, it may also be the case that the unused functions are not so much repressed as simply unactualized. For, in the Jungian theory the differentiation of functions and their development occurs from an initial undifferentiated unconsciousness. Thus he says: "...the unconscious, where all psychic functions are indistinguishably merged in the original and fundamental activity of the psyche."  

12 Ibid., pp. 124-25.
13 C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, p. 97.
14 Ibid., p. 142. It is interesting to compare this text with the similar thought of J. Maritain: "...there exists a common root of all the powers of the soul, which is hidden in the spiritual unconscious, and that there is in this spiritual unconscious a root activity in which the intellect and the imagination, as well as the powers of desire, love, and emotion, are engaged in common. The powers of the soul envelope one another, the universe of sense perception is in the universe of imagination, which is in the universe
But whether undeveloped or repressed, the main point of the Jungian theory concerns the existence of an unconscious functional counter-pole to the consciously lived psychic life, with its functional one-sidedness. Thus it is in agreement with traditional theory insofar as it implies the existence of the full range of natural powers. It differs, then, not primarily in terms of the specification of cognitive functions, but rather in its emphasis on the various modes of exercising those functions or powers. In this manner the two analyses are mutually complementary.

But the functional theory of Jung has relevance not only to the general understanding of the cognitive functions and their exercise, but also to the understanding of the specification and exercise of philosophic life itself. Since it is the task of philosophy to examine the principles of its own functioning, this consideration remains yet as


15 However, this is not to deny the differences in the order of specification which do exist. For, as we have seen, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the classical distinction of powers and the four functions of Jung's theory.
part of our task.

C. Philosophy and Functional Types

The Jungian investigations provide the philosopher with empirical data which bear on the exercise of the philosopher's own cognitive life. That is, insofar as Jung's data reveals differentiations in actually lived cognitive life in general, it has relevance for understanding the cognitive life of the philosophers. We believe that this data is important for understanding, for one thing, the perennial existence of philosophic controversy. It is likewise valuable for understanding the direction one must take in moving toward a more balanced philosophic life. But perhaps this can better be illustrated more concretely.

The contemporary western philosophic scene has, we know, been dominated by the conflicting claims of the analysts and the existentialists. If we examine this phenomena

16 What we have observed from our limited experience, Professor Gabriel Marcel has observed from his acquaintance with international congresses: "there exists in the modern world two distinct types of philosophy without any living communication between them." G. Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, New York, Philosophical Library, 1955, p. 50.
in the light of the Jungian data, then, it reveals itself in a somewhat different light. For, it presents itself not as a problem of logic or understanding "objective" data and conclusions, but rather as a problem of the exercise of a functional bias. The functional biases are, of course, those of the "thinking" and "feeling" types. The Analysts, we know, concentrate almost exclusively on the thinking and logical functions, whereas for the existentialist, logic tends to be totally excluded and the problem of philosophic life is one of "involvement" and affectivity. Since each of these two positions rightly has a claim to our appreciation, it is very easy to make the mistake of "taking sides" and opposing the other position. Traditional philosophic background, however, should make it easier for us to recognize that what has a certain relative value has been erected into a total picture of cognitive life. Moreover, insofar as the possibility of a bias toward "thinking" or "feeling" is a perennial human problem, we ought not to expect any final resolution of philosophic controversy which is founded on this functional bias. The same would apply, of course, to the bias toward either sensation or intuition.
In the light of the phenomena of functional types, then, the extremes of rationalism, voluntarism, empiricism, and intuitionism can more easily be given credit for their very real contributions. Moreover, it becomes easier to avoid seeing only the formal factor of reasoning and evidence in the genesis of these positions. Valuable as an understanding of the reasoning is, it needs to be complemented by an understanding of the quasi-efficient causality of functional bias, that is, the influence of an individual's disposition to employ only certain modes of cognitive functioning. In this way, we will be at least closer toward understanding a philosophic position in terms of its totality of causes rather than in terms of the formal cause alone. But the empirical data of psychology has a further value for philosophic life.

As philosophers or "lovers of wisdom" we are concerned not only with understanding the philosophic positions of other philosophers, but also, and primarily, with affecting the development of as full a life of wisdom in ourselves as we possibly can. The science of logic traditionally was concerned with enabling us to recognize weaknesses in the articulation of intelligible connections in our thought.
The new disciplines in psychology likewise contribute practically to the development of cognitive life. For, they reveal to us the specific lapses in modes of cognitive functioning which we habitually fall prey to, and they thus show us the direction further development must take. The practical discipline of psychology then is a complementary science to logic, and with logic it is of great value in enabling us to consciously work toward the optimum employment of our human cognitive powers.

But up to this point we have considered the theory of functions in isolation from other psychic influences. We have considered the differentiation of functional types, the role of the unconscious life of the functions, and lastly, some consequences of this theory for philosophic cognitive life.

However, the functions are not isolated phenomena according to Jung's view, but they are intimately merged with the psychological attitude. He says:

17 Furthermore, we believe that its empirical data has relevance even for divisions within logic itself. Thus the divisions in material logic between demonstration, dialectic, poetic argumentation, and rhetorical argumentation could also be meaningfully considered from the standpoint of subjective functional differentiations.
As a matter of empirical fact the two attitudes, to which I shall come back shortly, can seldom be observed in their pure state. They are infinitely varied and compensated, so that often the type is not at all easy to establish. The reason for variation—apart from individual fluctuations—is the predominance of one of the conscious functions, such as thinking or feeling, which then gives the basic attitude a special character.  

The second part of this chapter, then, is precisely concerned with the relations between function and attitude.

II. Psychic Function and Psychological Attitude

In the latter part of Chapter III we already considered the bearing of psychological attitude on cognitive life in the theory of Jung. However, that consideration was largely in general terms applicable to the whole complex of functional life. It remains for us now, having considered the functions in particular, to consider the bearing of attitude on the individual functions. In this section, then, we shall consider, one by one, the various combinations of function and attitude as they occur in Jung's presentation. We shall also include some of our own reflections and comments on these variations.

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18 Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, (Collected Works, VII), New York, Pantheon, 1953, p. 43.
A. Sensation and Attitude

In the presentation of the sensation function Jung says:

...Sensation is related not only to the outer stimuli, but also to the inner, i.e. to changes in the internal organs.... Because sensation transmits physical changes to consciousness, it also represents the physiological impulse. 19

Thus we can see the foundation for a possible differentiation of sensation types into the extraverted and the introverted styles. For one may attend primarily to the external object stimulus or to the subjective physiological alteration. But it seems that this differentiation offers difficulties in terms of a correlation with traditional theory. For, in traditional theory, sensation deals with or presents the "other," and it is thus essentially extraverted in nature.

However, once again we have to admire the thoroughness of the classical researchers, for their work again displays an awareness of this area of psychic functioning. As we have said, the function of extraverted sensation correlates very easily with what earlier thinkers called external sensation. But in addition, the function here called

19 Psychological Types, pp. 585-86.
introverted sensation seems to be none other than that activity which the ancients called the operation of the sensus communis. 20

As St. Thomas says:

...the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived: as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is imputed, in which imputation the action of sight is completed, and from which imputation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision. 21

Thus the empirical psychological differentiation of extraverted and introverted attitudes in sensation can be correlated with two distinct powers in traditional thought. In external or extraverted sensation the concentration of attention is centered on the external sensible—in introverted sensation, or sensus communis functioning, the center of attention is the experience itself rather than its object. Insofar as traditional theorists recognized the ontological

20 For a thorough study of this sense, see:

21 Summa Theologicae, I, q 76, a4, ad2.
distinction of these two powers, it seems in accordance with their theory that a heightening of the exercise of one power together with the diminishment of the exercise of another would be a readily deducible possibility.

B. Intuition and Attitude

As in the case of sensation, so also may intuition enter into a further differentiation insofar as it occurs under the rule of an extraverted or an introverted attitude. Thus Jung says:

According to the manner in which intuition is employed, whether directed within in the service of cognition and inner perception or without in the service of action and accomplishment, the introverted and extraverted intuitive types can be differentiated.22

At first sight, it would seem that this further differentiation should be very simply correlated with the classical distinction between the internal senses of imagination and estimation. However, it seems that on this point the traditionalist is able to carry Jung's differentiation further, and to some extent, at least, make it more precise.

22 Psychological Types, p. 569.
First of all, it would seem that imagination itself could be validly differentiated into an extraverted and an introverted variety. Certainly there is such a difference between the artistic vision which is directly linked with the external thing but which in its originality is not given by that external thing, and, for example, the literary fantasy having no such direct link with the external thing. Again, the concern or interest in action and accomplishment might be accomplished by the estimative sense in an extraverted manner or by the memory in an introverted and uninvolved manner. Both of these activities fit the general definition of intuition insofar as they involve an apprehension of something outside the presently given objective data, and so they would seem to be differentiations validly included within the scope of the intuitive function. Jung's data, then, helps us to better understand the richness of variety in the functioning of the internal senses of traditional theory, while traditional theory can help us to determine further refinements in the differentiations of intuitive functioning for the Jungian theorists.

It should be pointed out, perhaps, that there is no intention here of delimiting the role of intuition to
only a sensory function. It is only that this is the area where problems with the Jungian analysis might more easily arise, and we have tried to indicate how we believe the lines of a solution might be developed. The classical "intellectus" or "intuitus" also shares in the character of presenting what is not given by the sense data itself, and thus it would not be opposed to the Jungian notion of an intuition. In a sense we might say that in the act of simple apprehension we apprehend a possibility of a mode or type of being and in the act of judgment we affirm that that possibility is realized in act in these individuals or that group of things. Sometimes a possible mode of being which is affirmed to be realized in act is later recognized as merely a possibility and not actually realized in the instances in question. Intellectual speculative intuition, then, as well as an inventive idea, could be validly included in the phenomenological class of "intuitions." In both instances the given is not the raw objective sense data. Primitively, however, Jung's function of intuition appears to be directly expressive of imaginative and estimative sense functioning phenomenologically, rather than ontologically, considered.
C. Thinking and Attitude

The functions of thinking and feeling, as has been pointed out, are the rational functions in the Jungian analysis, and their role is paramount. As a matter of fact, most of the discussion in Chapter III on the relevance of attitude for cognitive life concerned the function of thinking. But thinking is a specific mode of cognitive life for Jung, as has been indicated. For: "Thinking is that psychological function which, in accordance with its own laws, brings given presentations into conceptual connection."

Can we specify the correlation of the "thinking" function with classical theory, then, in any precise manner?

It would seem that the "thinking" phenomena which Jung has reference to are precisely those acts comprised within the scope of what was formally called the act of reasoning. Whereas intuition is responsible for creativity and originality, thinking establishes rational connectedness when it is allowed to prevail and to be exercised in a

23 Ibid., p. 611.
developed manner. Now the "thinking" function is also influenced in its exercise by the difference in the psychological attitudes of introversion and extraversion. Insofar as consciousness is extraverted, the standard of thinking is one "taken from objective conditions, no matter whether this be directly represented by an objectively perceptible fact, or expressed in an objective idea." On the other hand if the thinking is introverted "facts are of secondary importance; what, apparently, is of absolutely paramount importance is the development and presentation of the subjective idea."26

Again, it would seem that the closest correlations of traditional theory with these phenomena of extraverted and introverted thinking are found in the differentiations exposed within the act of reasoning. For instance, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori arguments would seem to be expressive of the phenomena of introverted and

24 On the respective roles of intuition and reasoning in science see esp. Ibid., pp. 75-77.

25 Ibid., p. 428.

26 Ibid., p. 481.
extraverted thinking. Again the difference in habitual modes of resolving judgments would seem to be likewise relevant. If, for example, the thinking stays on the level of the abstract, even though a resolution to the individual objects of sense might be in order, the thinking might very rightly be called introverted. Contrariwise, if the thinking were of an inductive variety which simply arrived at empirical concepts which, though universal, concerned the sensible only in its sensibility, we might rightly call it extraverted thinking.

Though these differentiations which parallel the Jungian analysis were made by earlier thinkers, it might be well to again recall the differences in treatment. The ancients considered these differentiations as expressing the different modes of psychic life or the different rational powers. Jung, however, arrived at these differentiations from considering the way in which actual individual human knowers exercise their cognitive lives and drawing empirical or phenomenological categories from this data. The starting point and main concern in the one case was the differentiations of nature, in the other case the differentiations in exercise. The two analyses seem, however, to complement
each other, or at least to call for a symbiosis. To effect this symbiosis, however, the one must move from nature to exercise and the other from exercise to nature. But we need to press on now and consider the effect of psychological attitude on the fourth function, namely, the function of feeling.

D. Feeling and Attitude

We must be careful to recognize with full impact the importance of the function of feeling in the Jungian analysis. It is not a secondary function compared to thinking but may have every bit as much validity, if not more. Jung says: "Feeling often arrives at convictions that are different from those of the intellect, and we cannot always prove that the convictions of feeling are necessarily inferior." But, rational connectedness established between things through feeling is a connectedness rooted in valuation or affect. By the thinking function we develop an intelligible differentiation and ordering of reality, or we possess reality according to this intelligible order and

27 C. G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 318.
differentiation. By the feeling function we possess an affective and valuational ordering which may be every bit as developed, both with respect to differentiation and integration as is the intelligible order achieved by the thinking function.

Again, however, this function, too, admits of attitudinal differentiation insofar as the center of attention may be swung over either to the side of the other or to the side of the subject. That is, the rule or dominant element in the affective or valuational order may on the one hand be taken from the empirical or at least objective value system, whereas, on the other hand, it may be principally determined by the subjective value system of the person. Valuation may tend to be centered in and around some objective other, whether of a concrete or ideal character, or it may tend to be centered in and around the subjective, whether the concrete subject or his "feelingly" abstract valuational schema. Depending on which attitudinal direction is habitually adopted then, the psychic life will be characterized as that of either the introverted or the extraverted feeling type.28

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28 "Feeling in the extraverted attitude is oriented by objective data, i.e. the object is the
We might ask ourselves at this point if there is any connection between this Jungian theory of attitude and feeling and traditional theory. First of all, as we have already indicated, the feeling function seems to refer to that type of functioning which earlier was called knowledge by affective connaturality. Earlier investigators noted the existence of this type of awareness and they also noticed that it was especially relevant to the sphere of moral knowledge. And it seems that we can now add to their considerations by bringing the theory of psychological attitudes into confrontation with the phenomena which they noted.

Taking the earliest form of moral judgment first, we might note that the development of moral judgment in the child is a development which takes its rule and standard from without. The valuational structure of the parents and society are ordinarily assumed by the child into himself. This, then, is clearly the exercise of an extraverted attitude with regard to valuation. The standard of valuation is outside and objective. Now this is that part of moral

28 (cont.) indispensable determinant of the kind of feeling. It agrees with objective values...." Psychological Types, p. 446. "Introverted feeling is determined principally by the subjective factor." Ibid., p. 489ff.
development which Aristotle was referring to when he said "One who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits." 29 On the other hand, however, if one is to attain to universal valuations an introverted dimension is required. For Jung, the attainment of the universal is the achievement of "the introverted feeling type, whose feeling reaches an abstract and universal character and can establish permanent values." 30 The moral philosopher's interest in universally valid valuations, then, insofar as these interests relate to real valuations, presuppose an introverted feeling dimension. Again, however, if the moral thinker's consciously attained universal valuations are to have relevance for him in his actually exercised practical or prudential judgment, an extraverted dimension is required. For it is in the extraverted valuation that one is directed toward the existent thing as an instance of a universal value incarnated in that

29 Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, Bk. I, Ch. 4, 1095b, 4-6.

30 Psychological Types, p. 125.
individual thing or action. Extraverted and introverted feeling then have relevance to the order of moral training, moral philosophy, and conscious prudence.

But the further differentiations introduced in the psychic functions because of differences in extraverted or introverted attitudes does not end the matter. There is still the factor of the unconscious to be taken into consideration in understanding attitudinalized, functional, psychic life.

III. Function, Attitude, and the Unconscious

A. Primary Function and the Unconsciousness

We have already indicated how, in the Jungian theory, the unconscious stands in a compensatory relationship to consciousness. Our task now is to spell this out more particularly in the light of our fuller considerations of attitude and function. But first let us review the factors which must be accounted for.

31 One might here develop the theme of full practical knowledge as involving both an introverted or "essential" feeling dimension, and an extraverted or "existential" feeling dimension. Both are, of course, required.
Insofar as the conscious perspective is habitually characterized by an extraverted or an introverted attitude, then, the unconscious manifests or contains the opposite attitudinal characteristic. If the conscious standpoint is extraverted, the unconscious is the seat of introverted factors, subjective ideas and valuations. If the conscious standpoint is introverted, the unconscious reveals a hidden tie to the object and the objective value structure.

Again, we have seen that the functions are distributed by Jung in terms of two pairs of opposites, standing in compensatory relation to each other. Thinking and feeling are related as opposites and sensation and intuition are also related as opposites. And, insofar as one function is habitually lived, the opposite function is found to be relegated to the unconscious.

And finally, thinking and feeling are grouped together insofar as they are rational functions, and sensation and intuition are grouped together as irrational functions. Insofar as the conscious standpoint is that of "rationality," taken in the broad sense, the unconscious is characterized and is the source of the irrational and chance. In the opposite case an irrational and chance quality of the con-
scious psychic is underwritten by an unconsciously ordered or rational connectedness.

Putting all these factors together, then, we can say that whatever function and attitude predominates in conscious functioning will be counterbalanced by the opposite or the combination of opposites in the unconscious. Thus, as an example, we might consider Jung's description of an extraverted feeling type. First of all, he says for the extravert:

...the most highly differentiated function has a constantly extraverted application, while the inferior functions are found in the service of introversion.\(^{32}\)

And further, for the extraverted feeling type:

...The extraverted feeling type is a classical example of this, for he enjoys an excellent feeling rapport with his entourage, yet occasionally opinions of incomparable tactlessness will just happen to him. These opinions have their source in his inferior and subconscious thinking, which is only partly subject to control and is insufficiently related to the object; to a large extent, therefore, it can operate without consideration or responsibility.\(^{33}\)

Thus, in this example of the extravert feeling type the unconscious contains an introverted thinking

\(^{32}\) Psychological Types, p. 426.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., pp. 426-27.
characterized by chance or irrationality. However, there is one further complicating factor in the total combination of function, attitude, and the unconscious in the Jungian theory. This is the aspect of an auxiliary function to the primarily differentiated function.

B. Auxiliary Function and the Unconscious

As might be inferred, perhaps, from what we have already considered, the functions other than the primarily differentiated function do not stand on an egalitarian basis. As a matter of fact, the empirical data reveals that there is a difference in their connectedness to the consciously exercised predominant function. Jung says:

...Accurate investigation of the individual case consistently reveals the fact that, in conjunction with the most differentiated function, another function of secondary importance, and therefore of inferior differentiation in consciousness, is constantly present, and is a relatively determining factor.34

Moreover, it is not any one of the less differentiated functions which may perform this complementary function. Thus Jung goes on to say:

34 Ibid., p. 513.
...Naturally only those functions can appear as auxiliary whose nature is not opposed to the leading function. For instance, feeling can never act as the second function by the side of thinking, because its nature stands in too strong a contrast to thinking. Thinking, if it is to be real thinking and true to its own principle, must scrupulously exclude feeling....

Experience shows that the secondary function is always one whose nature is different from, though not antagonistic to, the leading function: thus, for example, thinking, as primary function, can readily pair with intuition as auxiliary, or indeed equally well with sensation, but, as already observed, never with feeling. 35

Thus, to fully characterize the consciously lived psychic life, the auxiliary function ought to be brought into the picture. The mode of experience is characterized by habitual extraversion or introversion. It is also characterized by a primary function. And, this primary function has a specific character dependent on the auxiliary function with which it is conjoined. Jung says:

...From these combinations well-known pictures arise, the practical intellect for instance paired with sensation, the speculative intellect breaking through with intuition, the artistic intuition which selects and presents its images by means of feeling judgment, the philosophical intuition which, in league with a vigorous intellect, translates its vision into the sphere of comprehensible thought, and

Now this additional feature in the total picture of conscious functioning has a corresponding image in the picture of the unconscious. That is, it is not simply the opposites of attitude and primary function which are found there, but also a kind of auxiliary function to the primarily repressed. Thus Jung says:

A grouping of the unconscious functions also takes place in accordance with the relationship of the conscious functions. Thus, for instance, an unconscious intuitive-feeling attitude may correspond with a conscious practical intellect, whereby the function of feeling suffers a relatively stronger inhibition than intuition.

For persons familiar with traditional discussions of human knowing this association of an auxiliary function with the primary function should come as no surprise. For we know that it was a commonly asserted thesis that human knowing involved the simultaneous functioning of rational and irrational power. Whether external sense or internal, the irrational powers were said to be involved not only at the origin of intellectual experience but also whenever

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36 Ibid., pp. 515-16.
37 Ibid., p. 516.
those objects were actually considered. \textsuperscript{38} Furthermore, this association of the rational power with an irrational power was differentiated into habitual associations with external sensation or imagination as, for example, in the habits of natural philosophy and mathematics. Again, writers like Professor Maritain have developed an analysis of other areas of human experience where the intelligibility based on and expressive of affective involvement is conjoined with irrational elements. \textsuperscript{39} The Jungian differentiation then seems to be an observing of differentiations on the empirical level which are related to observed differentiating features of certain habits of knowledge or experience. But we would like to conclude this chapter with yet a few reflections on the implications of our new considerations for philosophic life.

C. Further Reflections on Philosophic Life

\textsuperscript{38} See, for example, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, q 84, a7. "Whether the Intellect Can Actually Understand through the Intelligible Species of Which It Is Possessed, without Turning to the Phantasms?"

We have concluded our presentation of Jungian theory regarding psychic content as influenced by primary and auxiliary functions, both in conscious expression and in unconsciousness. And, we have considered that content as also dependent upon the superordinate influence of psychological attitude. We believe that we are now in a better position to understand and appreciate the full range and variety in the content of psychic life that we earlier referred to. The understanding of this variety, we believe, is especially valuable for understanding the philosophic endeavor.

For one thing, it enables us to see that the differences in philosophers' conceptions of the philosophic life are not as irreconcilable as might appear, nor are these differences simply the result of errors or defects in reasoning. They are reflections on the way in which the psychic life is actually exercised and thus they are describing the real and actual. However, it is instructive to note that the style of cognitive life which they describe is first of all not restricted to those who can reflectively consider it. For cognitive styles are commonly exercised modes of cognitive bias. Insofar as a great many people will have an attraction for a particular style of cognitive
functioning (either because of likeness or need) each of the major philosophies will have a substantial following. This following will undoubtedly be related to the predominant psychic conditions and needs of the times, rather than the maturity and value of the revelations by the philosopher. This presents us with a new approach to the reality and problem of philosophic pluralism. But there are also implications for the problem of philosophic education.

It would seem for one thing that the study of the history of philosophy, which is justly valued, should be complemented by the also valuable study of comparative philosophy, along the lines revealed by an empirical-philosophical enquiry such as we have attempted to conduct here. We believe, moreover, that one whose perspective is rooted in a metaphysical tradition such as Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, is in an especially favorable position with regard to the working out of this comparative study. That this study is valuable seems to follow from our conclusion regarding the understanding of philosophic pluralism as related to psychic bias.

In addition to the implications for general philosophic education, there are also important implications for
individual or personal intellectual development. It would seem that the main effort of an individual in pursuing his philosophical development is commonly directed outwardly toward the assimilation and consideration of an ever-widening sphere of materials. However, the evidence from psychological materials would seem to reveal another direction that ought to be consciously pursued simultaneously. This is the direction of an expansion of consciousness by means of the assimilation to consciousness of, perhaps, a repressed attitude, or on the other hand, of a relatively unconscious and undifferentiated type of psychic functioning. After our detailed consideration of psychological attitude and psychic functions perhaps we might be excused if we assume an understanding of our meaning here without the use of examples to illustrate our point.

But in the enriching of one's philosophic style through the actualization of these unused potencies, the psychologist warns that care must be taken. The deepest layers of the unconscious cannot be validly taken by storm, but they must be approached gradually. Concerning this process Jung says:

...For I have frequently observed the way in which a physician, in the case of an exclusively
intellectual subject, will do his utmost to develop the feeling function directly out of the unconscious. This attempt must always come to grief, since it involves too great a violation of the conscious standpoint. Should such a violation succeed, there ensues a really compulsive dependence of the patient upon the physician, a 'transference' which can be amputated only by brutality, because such a violation robs the patient of a standpoint—his physician becomes his standpoint. But the approach to the unconscious and to the most repressed function is disclosed, as it were, of itself, and with more adequate protection of the conscious standpoint, when the way of development is via the secondary function—thus in the case of a rational type by way of the irrational function. For this lends the conscious standpoint such a range and prospect over what is possible and imminent that consciousness gains an adequate protection against the destructive effect of the unconscious.

But cognitive "style" is not the only factor to be taken into account when considering the variety in psychic life or in the philosophic life. Though it is an important determinant, one must also consider or understand the role of illuminating principles in the order of knowing. For, one and the same type of attitude or functioning may yield different total results if the illuminative principles are different. The Jungian analysis contains important discussions then, not only of the empirical diversity of attitude and functioning and its involvement in conscious and

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unconscious dimensions, but also discussions of the diversity of principles and their role in human psychic life. In the next chapter, then, we shall turn our attention to the Jungian treatment of these cognitive principles.
In earlier chapters, the topic of the unconscious was discussed in its relevance to specific aspects of psychic life. It was discussed in relation to the question of the constitution of the fundamental cognitive subject. It was discussed in relation to the question of the exercise of psychological attitude. And it was discussed in relation to the question of the exercise of the psychic functions, both alone and in conjunction with attitudinal influences. However, the unconscious is so important an aspect of Jungian theory that it still requires a further treatment in its own right. In fact, the Jungian influence in such extra-psychological areas as literature, art, etc., has probably been most pronounced in connection with his researches in the "collective unconscious." We believe that this area of research has special interest for the philosopher also, and we shall shortly consider some of these points of interest. First of all, however, we must consider some preliminary questions. And the first such question that we shall consider concerns the Jungian view of the unconscious. What is
Jung's basis for speaking of a "collective unconscious," and what is its nature?

I. The Collective Unconscious

A. The General Theory of the Collective Unconscious

Before we enter into any treatment of specific contents of the collective unconscious, we must first inquire as to why this factor was posited at all. What was the path that led Jung to introduce this highly controverted dimension, and what is the general outline of territory defined by this realm? After we have been able to satisfy ourselves somewhat on this point, then, we will take up the question of the specific contents of the collective unconscious.

1. The Existence of the Collective Unconscious

In the Jungian analysis, the "collective unconscious" is a region of the unconscious set off from the "personal unconscious." While the personal unconscious contains the idiosyncratic and individualistic content, the collective unconscious contains what is common to the whole human community. Thus he says:
...According to my view, the unconscious falls into two parts which should be sharply distinguished from one another. One of them is the personal unconscious; it includes all those psychic contents which have been forgotten during the course of the individual's life. Traces of them are still preserved in the unconscious, even if all conscious memory of them has been lost. In addition, it contains all subliminal impressions or perceptions which have too little energy to reach consciousness. To these we must add unconscious combinations of ideas that are still too feeble and too indistinct to cross over the threshold. Finally, the personal unconscious contains all psychic contents that are incompatible with the conscious attitude. This comprises a whole group of contents, chiefly those which appear morally, aesthetically or intellectually inadmissible and are repressed on account of their incompatibility.

The other part of the unconscious is what I call the impersonal or collective unconscious. As the name indicates, its contents are not personal but collective; that is, they do not belong to one individual alone but to a whole group of individuals, and generally to a whole nation, or even to the whole of mankind.\(^1\)

As might be expected, the collective unconscious is a deeper and less accessible stratum in the unconscious. In a text similar to the one just quoted, he stresses this aspect of the "primacy of the universal" in the psychic dimension. He says:

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A more or less superficial layer of the unconscious is undoubtedly personal. I call it the personal unconscious. But this personal unconscious rests upon a deeper layer, which does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition but is inborn. This deeper layer I call the collective unconscious. I have chosen the term "collective" because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals. It is, in other words, identical in all men and thus constitutes a common psychic substrate of a suprapersonal nature which is present in every one of us.\(^2\)

But lest we be guilty of fostering a misunderstanding of the theory of the collective psychic in Jung, a warning is perhaps in order at this time. The whole collective realm according to Jung is composed of both a conscious and an unconscious dimension. It should not be thought that the collective is simply identified with the unconscious realm.

Thus Jung says:

...ego-consciousness seems to be dependent on two factors: firstly, on the conditions of the collective, i.e., the social, consciousness; and secondly, on the archetypes, or dominants, of the collective unconscious.\(^3\)


Moreover, these two realms are set in the general relationship of a potentiality of opposition. For, "if the subjective consciousness prefers the ideas and opinions of collective consciousness and identifies with them, then the contents of the collective unconscious are repressed." However, even if they are not set in deliberate opposition to one another it seems as though there is a kind of natural and automatic division between the realm of collective consciousness and the collective unconscious. Thus Jung says:

...we can hardly avoid the conclusion that between collective consciousness and the collective unconscious there is an almost unbridgeable gulf over which the subject finds himself suspended.

In the writings of Jung, however, the dimension of collective consciousness, though recognized, tends to be given but slight attention; and it is very easy to form the impression that for him the collective is something which pertains to the realm of the unconscious alone. As we have shown, however, this is not the case.

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4 Ibid., p. 219.
5 Ibid., p. 218.
6 However, it is very interesting to compare Freud's continuous attention to collective consciousness, as introjected in the structure of the "superego," as contrasted
The collective unconscious, then, though it is most commonly set in opposition or contrast to the personal unconscious, is also differentiated from collective consciousness. Consciousness has a collective and a personal dimension, and unconsciousness, likewise, has a collective and a personal dimension. The more basic and inaccessible level is that of the collective unconscious.

In positing the dimension of the collective unconscious, Jung has no wish to go beyond the realm of an empirical phenomenological enquiry. Thus he says:

...Although this reproach of mysticism has frequently been levelled at my concept, I must emphasize yet again that the concept of the collective unconscious is neither a speculative nor a philosophical but an empirical matter. The question is simply this: are there or are there not unconscious, universal forms of this kind? If they exist, then there is a region of the psyche which one can call the collective unconscious. 7

And there is no doubt in Jung's mind that there is such an actual region. He presents a great mass of material in his

6 (cont.) with Jung's continuous attention to the collective unconscious. We believe that this difference is an important attribute of the psychological differences between those two thinkers.

7 C. G. Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 44.
writings as a basis for this belief, and he alludes to the existence of even more evidence:

I could produce many more pictures from all parts of the world, and one would be astonished to see how these symbols are governed by the same fundamental laws that can be observed in individual mandalas. In view of the fact that all the mandalas shown here were new and uninfluenced products, we are driven to the conclusion that there must be a transcendent disposition in every individual which is able to produce the same or very similar symbols at all times and in all places. Since this disposition is usually not a conscious possession of the individual I have called it the collective unconscious...^8

But though we might be prepared to admit the introduction of this dimension of the unconscious as a real phenomenological factor, there are some difficulties with Jung's presentation regarding its general nature.

2. The Nature of the Collective Unconscious

As we have just pointed out, Jung claimed no philosophical status for the collective unconscious. However, at times he clearly goes beyond the legitimate range of operation of his empiricism. He seems to be skirting very close to a physicalistic reductionism, for instance, when he says:

...The unconscious is the psyche that reaches down from the daylight of mentally and morally lucid

^8 Jung, Ibid., p. 384.
consciousness into the nervous system that for ages has been known as the "sympathetic." This does not govern perception and muscular activity like the cerebrospinal system, and thus control the environment; but, though functioning without sense-organs, it maintains the balance of life and, through the mysterious paths of sympathetic excitation, not only gives us knowledge of the innermost life of other beings but also has an inner effect upon them. In this sense it is an extremely collective system, the operative basis of all participation mystique. 9

It is in the considerations of the collective unconscious, then, that we return to some of our earliest considerations. For it is in investigating the collective unconscious that the puzzles regarding the constitution of the knowing subject are again activated. For in these excursions we find that Jung frequently found himself "obliged to undertake a more general analysis of the nature of the psyche." 10 And in doing so we find him encountering, once again, the problems regarding the knowing subject. To quote again from a text which seems to go in the direction of the materialistic reduction, we find Jung saying:

Just as the "psychic infra-red;" the biological instinctual psyche, gradually passes over into the physiology of the organism and thus merges with its

9 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

10 Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 215.
chemical and physical conditions, so the "psychic ultra-violet," the archetype, describes a field which exhibits none of the peculiarities of the physiological and yet, in the last analysis, can no longer be regarded as psychic, although it manifests itself psychically. But physiological processes behave in the same way, without on that account being declared psychic.11

But we know from our earlier considerations that it is difficult to find a clear unanimity of expression on the question of the fundamental nature of the psyche and of the subject. On the question of the collective unconscious, then, we can only refer the reader to our general conclusions in chapter two. There we stated as a tentative hypothesis that Jung maintained a phenomenal dualism with an apparent metaphysical monism, admitting at the same time our hesitancy about this conclusion. The question about the fundamental nature of the collective unconscious then merges with the question of the fundamental constitution of the knowing subject. But in our last text we used a passage which referred to the "archetypes," and we need to press our consideration further into the theory of the collective unconscious in order to directly engage ourselves with this key to a fuller understanding of the collective unconscious. Our next

11 Ibid., p. 215.
concern, then, is to explicitly deal with the archetypes of the collective unconscious.

B. Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious

It is conceivable that one could hold a theory which included a collective unconscious without that theory being that of Jung. That is, one could maintain that there is a psychic dimension distinct from and perhaps opposed to collectively lived mentality, and to personal or idiosyncratic mentality. However, there is still the question of whether or not this system is monistically constituted. For Jung, it is decidedly not monistic, for "the unconscious is not a second personality with organized and centralized functions but in all probability a decentralized congeries of psychic processes." However, though not monistic, or even centralized, there is not simply particularity in the unconscious. He says:

The concept of the archetype, which is an indispensable correlate of the idea of the collective unconscious, indicates the existence of definite forms in the psyche which seem to be present always and everywhere.  

12 Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 278.
13 Ibid., p. 42.
Moreover, in Jung's theory it is precisely the archetypes which constitute the content of the collective unconscious as a collective system containing an intrinsic pluralism. The "archetypes" are to the collective unconscious what the "complexes" are to the personal unconscious. But what are some of the sources from which Jung was able to derive the existence of this pluralistic archetypal system?

1. The Existence of Archetypes

First of all, the term "archetype" or its meaningful equivalents has a long history according to Jung, and he claims to find it at least in Plato, Philo Judaeus, Irenaeus, Dionysius the Areopagite, and St. Augustine. Jung, then, is not claiming complete originality in having recourse to archetypal factors, but only renewed interest and perhaps a heightened sense of their importance. In addition to this authoritative basis, however, Jung also claims that there is direct evidence for the existence of archetypes. Though it is difficult to recognize the existence of these factors, they are discernible through their

14 Ibid., p. 4. See also Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, pp. 135-137.
...Archetypes, so far as we can observe and experience them at all, manifest themselves only through their ability to organize images and ideas, and this is always an unconscious process which cannot be detected until afterwards.15

They are known then, a posteriori, through their organizational effect. More specifically it was first of all his experience in the realm of the pathological which led Jung to formulate the theory of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. From this beginning, however, his researches branched far out and he discovered a far more extended relevance for his theory. Thus he says:

It was this frequent reversion to archaic forms of association found in schizophrenia that first gave me the idea of an unconscious not consisting only of originally conscious contents that have got lost, but having a deeper layer of the same universal character as the mythological motifs which typify human fantasy in general. These motifs are not invented so much as discovered; they are typical forms that appear spontaneously all over the world, independently of tradition, in myths, fairy-tales, fantasies, dreams, visions, and the delusional systems of the insane.16

15 The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 231.

16 C. Jung, The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease, (Collected Works, Vol. III), New York, Pantheon, 1960, p. 261. And again: "Insane people frequently produce combinations of ideas and symbols that could never be accounted for by experiences in their individual lives, but only by the history of the human mind." (cont.)
And Jung has many hundreds of pages devoted to the presenta-
tion of the evidence of these recurring motifs.\textsuperscript{17}

Two sources of evidence which he presents seem to have special probative power. These pertain, not to the psychic products of schizophrenia, but to the psychic expres-
sions of primitives and of very young children. Regarding this latter experiential field, he says:

The child's psyche, prior to the stage of ego-
consciousness, is very far from being empty and
devoid of content. Scarcely has speech developed
when, in next to no time, consciousness is present;
and this, with its momentary contents and its memo-
ries, exercises an intensive check upon the previous
collective contents. That such contents exist in the child who has not yet attained to ego-conscious-
ness is a well-attested fact. The most important
evidence in this respect is the dreams of three- and
four-year-old children, among which there are some
so strikingly mythological and so fraught with
meaning that one would take them at once for the
dreams of grown-ups, did one not know who the
dreamer was. They are the last vestiges of a dwindling collective psyche which dreamingly

\textsuperscript{16 (cont.) The Structure and Dynamics of the
Psyche, p. 311.}

\textsuperscript{17 See especially C. G. Jung, Symbols of Transforma-
tion, (Collected Works, Vol. V), New York, Pantheon, 1956;
Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious; Aion, (Collected Works, Vol. IX - Part 2), New York, Pantheon, 1959;
reiterates the perennial contents of the human soul.\textsuperscript{18}

The archetypal motifs, then, are found throughout the whole range of psychic life and in the most inexplicable places. While giving credit to earlier researchers, Jung concludes:

\ldots_if I have any share in these discoveries, it consists in my having shown that archetypes are not disseminated only by tradition, language, and migration, but that they can rearise spontaneously, at any time, at any place, and without any outside influence.

The far-reaching implications of this statement must not be overlooked. For it means that there are present in every psyche forms which are unconscious but nonetheless active—living dispositions, ideas in the Platonic sense, that preform and continually influence our thoughts and feelings and actions.\textsuperscript{19}

Thus Jung does give us an unequivocal answer on the existence of the archetypes, and he also gives us directions of investigation if we wish to clear up our own uncertainties regarding the existence of these archetypal forms.

But let us now look a little further into Jung's understanding of the nature of the archetypes.


\textsuperscript{19} Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 79.
2. The Nature of the Archetypes

Though the archetypes are found in various and numerous psychic contents, they are by no means easy to come to know. As a matter of fact, according to Jung, we always lose something of their true character in our attempt to consciously elaborate them. Thus he says:

...The term "archetype" thus applies only indirectly to the "representations collectives," since it designates only those psychic contents which have not yet been submitted to conscious elaboration and are therefore an immediate datum of psychic experience. In this sense there is a considerable difference between the archetype and the historical formula that has evolved. Especially on the higher levels of esoteric teaching the archetypes appear in a form that reveals quite unmistakably the critical and evaluating influence of conscious elaboration. Their immediate manifestation, as we encounter it in dreams and visions, is much more individual, less understandable, and more naïve than in myths, for example. The archetype is essentially an unconscious content that is altered by becoming conscious and by being perceived, and it takes its colour from the individual consciousness in which it happens to appear.20

Thus most of the manifestations of archetypal themes are more sophisticated than the originals. In fact, Jung seems to go even further in stressing the impossibility of direct contact with the archetypes.

20 Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 5.
Not only is it the case that mythological expressions are too sophisticated to be accurately representative of the archetype itself, but this seems to be part of the nature of things. Especially in his later writings, he began to stress ever more strongly that the archetype itself was distinct from, or should be distinguished from, any content. Thus he says:

...The archetypal representations (images and ideas) mediated to us by the unconscious should not be confused with the archetype as such. They are very varied structures which all point back to one essentially "irrepresentable" basic form.... It does not appear, in itself, to be capable of reaching consciousness. I venture this hypothesis because everything archetypal which is perceived by consciousness seems to represent a set of variations on a ground theme.

...every archetype, when represented to the mind, is already conscious and therefore differs to an indeterminable extent from that which caused the representation. 21

And again:

...archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree. A primordial image is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience. Its form, however, as I have explained elsewhere, might perhaps be compared to the axial system of a crystal, which, as it were, preforms the crystalline

21 Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 213.
structure in the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of its own.\textsuperscript{22}

The archetype itself, then, is permanently in the unconscious but it is revealed obscurely and indirectly through archetypal images and ideas. But there are several other points regarding the archetypes which we ought to at least briefly consider.

For one thing, in some passages Jung speaks of an intimate relationship between instincts and archetypes. As a matter of fact, sometimes the whole reality of the archetype seems to be that of a representation of the instinct. For instance, he says:

\begin{quote}
...they [instincts] form very close analogies to the archetypes, so close, in fact, that there is good reason for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves, in other words that they are patterns of instinctual behaviour.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

In the light of our previous remarks on the necessity of distinguishing between the images and the archetype itself we might wish for a more accurate expression to maintain

\textsuperscript{22} Jung, \textit{Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious}, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{23} Jung, \textit{Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious}, pp. 43-44; See also Jung, \textit{The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche}, p. 201.
that distinction. However, this is not our primary concern here, but rather the relationship between the instinct and the archetype.

A problem about this relationship occurs, however, when we juxtapose remarks like those just quoted with other passages. For in some passages a much sharper contrast or opposition appears. Thus in one place, Jung says:

...Archetype and instinct are the most polar opposites imaginable, as can easily be seen when one compares a man who is ruled by his instinctual drives with a man who is seized by the spirit. But, just as between all opposites there obtains so close a bond that no position can be established or even thought of without its corresponding negation, so in this case also "les extrêmes se touchent." They belong together as correspondences, which is not to say that the one is derivable from the other, but that they subsist side by side as reflections in our own minds of the opposition that underlies all psychic energy. Man finds himself simultaneously driven to act and free to reflect. 24

However, the conflict between these two sets of statement is not ultimately irresolvable, according to our view. For the moment, however, let us simply note two facts about instinct and archetype. First, the two are irreducibly distinct. Second, that archetypes are in some way related as

24 Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 206.
patterns of instinct. But a further consideration of these points awaits a prior development. We must now investigate some aspects of classical psychology in its relationship to Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious and its archetypes.

3. Archetypes and Classical Psychology

In considering the relationship between classical theory and the theory of the archetypes, we shall first consider the realm of sense functioning. Following these considerations, we will then take up the realm of intellectual functioning.

a. Archetypes and the Senses

Classical theory on sensation offers a relatively clear distinction between the realms of external and internal sensation. The external senses, on the one hand, are passive powers simply, and their functioning manifests an a posteriori character. However in the internal senses the situation is otherwise and it is here that we find the manifestation of an a priori dimension in psychic life. But this a priori dimension seems to be directly expressed only with
regard to the internal sense called the estimative or cogitative sense. In this specific area, then, we find that the ancients and mediaevals asserted the presence of a real

\textit{a priori} dimension, a dimension of cognitive life not given by external sense experience. Thus St. Thomas says:

\ldots for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the estimative power is appointed:\ldots \textsuperscript{25}

So, in the realm of the estimative sense we have a domain of

\textit{a priori} determination which was recognized by the Aristotelian tradition. Again, we might notice the fact that for this tradition the estimative sense was, of course, a cognitive rather than an appetitive function. For Jung also this seems to be the case, for, as we have just seen, he insisted very strongly that we distinguish between the archetype or pattern of instinctual activity and the dynamism of the instinct itself. Thus again it is the cognitive dimension which Jung is especially interested in, and he is positing a position which agrees basically with classical thought on the matter. However, it seems that Jung has a new element to add to our understanding of the internal senses.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, q 78, a4, c.
From the nature of some of the archetypes which Jung presents, it would appear that something other than estima-
tive sense presentation is also involved. That is, it would seem that if we accept Jung's data we would have to maintain that there is an a priori dimension to the imagination as well. Expressed in philosophic terms, then, we would be asserting that there is both a sensory speculative and a sensory practical a priori. This view, we believe, would enable us to reconcile the seeming opposition, yet relationship, between the dimension of instinct and that of archetype which seems to cause Jung difficulty, as we saw above. That is, there is a smooth relationship between practical sense and instinctive dynamism, but somewhat of an oppo-
sition between speculative sense and that same instinctive dynamism. As a matter of fact, we shall see later on that Jung does seem to distinguish types of archetypes somewhat along these lines of thought. However, there might yet be some question as to whether this extension of traditional theory which we have suggested ought to be accepted. As we have pointed out, the belief in an a priori in the level of practical sense, namely, the estimative, is certainly an integral part of classical psychology. But what of the
imagination—isn't this a radically new and incongruous element which we are suggesting? We do not believe that this is the case.

First of all, one of the principles of classical theory is that all sense operation is operation of the composite, and not of the soul alone. To quote but one passage:

...some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone.26

Thus the operation of the imagination, too, is one which essentially involves matter. Now, in such a case it is possible to influence or alter the nature of a thing through actualizing or modifying the dispositions of the matter. Hence it would seem at least possible, and certainly compatible with the classical theory of sense, that this has occurred in the case of the imagination. That is, classical theorists ought to concur in the view that our human imagination, with respect to its material subject, the human

26 St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologicae*, I, q 77, a5, c.
brain, is subject to laws of heredity, and of historical continuity. If this is the case, then one might expect a certain commonality with regard to the forms of imagining which will be commonly actuated. Classical theory, it seems, has no objection to offer to the possibility or even the likelihood of such being the case, but rather finds it consistent with its own principles. Whether or not it has factually occurred and whether it is really within the potentiality of the matter of the imagination to preserve these dispositions is a matter for the empirical psychologist to discover and reveal. The evidence which Jung has presented does seem to bear out his conviction that such is, as a matter of fact, the case. Thus, conjoining the new discoveries with classical theory, the view that results is that there is an a priori in the dimension of the speculative sense, the imagination, as well as the already accepted view that there is an a priori in the dimension of the practical sense, the estimative.

But there is another respect in which classical psychology would seem to be filled out more adequately by the recognition of the archetypes. This other area concerns certain aspects of the theory of the intellectually known.
b. Archetypes and the Intellect

In classical theory, it was commonly held that there were certain elements of intellectual knowledge which were naturally possessed, and this in the domains of both speculative and practical knowledge. Thus St. Thomas says:

...we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called the understanding of principles, as the philosopher explains (Ethic, VI, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call synderesis. 27

Again some of the expressions relating to the illuminative power of the intellect seem to come extremely close to expressing a predetermination of the intellectual power itself. However this does not seem to be compatible with the view that "the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being." 28 How then can we accept the theory of natural principles of knowledge while avoiding

27 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, I, q 79, a 12, c. It would be interesting to investigate the possible influence the recognition of common principles might have had on the development of the Arabian theories of one possible or one agent intellect.

28 Ibid., I, q 79, a2, ad3.
the Platonic theory of innate ideas?

Of course one might simply answer that it is natural to the intellect to know these things and simply let that suffice as an answer. However, if we maintain that there is an a priori disposition to the apprehension of certain sensible forms on the level of internal sense, then the natural bases for differentiated forms of apprehended objects becomes much clearer. Since our intellect abstracts from the sense presentation, if there is a pre-determination of the sense, then there is a proper or immediate material cause for the presence of universal intelligibilities or meanings. Since the material from which these intelligibilities are abstracted is present by nature, it is readily understandable how they can be commonly or naturally known.

It should be noted here that what we are describing is not identical with the theory of Jung. For in his presentation there is no clear cut distinction made between the intellect and the sensory level. As a consequence he maintains a simple hereditary influence. Thus he says:

...This specific form [the human] is hereditary and is already present in the germ-plasm. The idea that it is not inherited but comes into being in every child anew would be just as preposterous as the primitive belief that the sun which rises in the
morning is a different sun from that which set the
evening before.29

Of course on this point the classical psychology differs
considerably. Though the sensory operation is essentially
an act of matter, the intellectual dimension is another mat­
ter. The intellect is a power of operating in essential or
intrinsic freedom from matter and its conditions, and its
subject is the soul alone rather than the composite.30 Con­
sequently the soul must be a subsistent thing and as it is
naturally immortal, so also is it naturally produced only
by a directly creative act.31

Though the elimination of the deepest meaning of
individual personality is indeed a serious loss in the the­
ory of Jung, it ought not to make us prejudiced against the
valuable elements in his work. As we have tried to indi­
cate, it is possible to maintain both the spiritual and sub­
sistent character of the human soul, and the theory of natu­
ral intellectual knowledge. However, we also believe that

29 Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious,
p. 78.

30 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q 77,
a5.

31 Ibid., I, q 75, a2, et a4; I, q 90, a2.
this latter point is not opposed by Jung's theory, but re-
ceives an important basis for its plausibility and reality. All that he says of the inherited and historically condi-
tioned structure of psychic functioning, however, would be understood directly in relation to the internal senses of imagination and estimation, and only indirectly of the in-
tellect. However it would still prove the sufficient condi-
tion for its being naturally known intellectually insofar as we actually know intellectually through abstraction from the presentation of the senses.

In this first part, then, we have attempted to pre-
sent something of Jung's theory of the existence and nature of the collective unconscious. We have also attempted a general presentation of the theory of archetypes and some relationships of this theory to classical psychological theory. At this point we need to go further into the ques-
tion of specific archetypal contents and we need to also consider the relationships existing between the archetypes and some philosophical principles.

II. Archetypes and Principles of Knowing
A. Archetypal Pluralism

1. Existence of a Limited Pluralism

One aspect of the archetypes which Jung continuously stressed was the impossibility of strict and clear-cut distinctions. It is a mistake, however, to think that he was thereby doing away with any categorizing whatsoever. In a text typical of his cautiousness on this question he says:

...Clear-cut distinctions and strict formulations are quite impossible in this field, seeing that a kind of fluid interpenetration belongs to the very nature of all archetypes. They can only be roughly circumscribed at best. Their living meaning comes out more from their presentation as a whole than from a single formulation. Every attempt to focus them more sharply is immediately punished by the intangible core of meaning losing its luminosity. No archetype can be reduced to a simple formula. It is a vessel which we can never empty, and never fill. It has a potential existence only, and when it takes shape in matter it is no longer what it was. It persists throughout the ages and requires interpreting ever anew. The archetypes are the imperishable elements of the unconscious, but they change their shape continually.

It is a well-nigh hopeless undertaking to tear a single archetype out of the living tissue of the psyche; but despite their interwovenness they do form units of meaning that can be apprehended intuitively.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{32} Jung, \textit{Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious}, p. 179.
There are several interesting things about this passage, but for the moment we are only interested in the question of the existence of some "units of meaning." At first it almost appears that Jung is going to leave us with a complete particularity in the realm of the archetypes, but then the qualification appears. He wants us to be ever mindful of the real individual differences in the archetypal realm and never to forget it. But at the same time he is surely not positing a kind of interior nominalism, for this would be an elimination of the very universality which he posited in the psychic realm. But we do need to keep in mind his emphasis on the particular manifestations of archetypal themes in order to safely handle what he has to say on the limited pluralism in the archetypal realm. Thus he says:

...Just as certain biological views attribute only a few instincts to man, so the theory of cognition reduces the archetypes to a few, logically limited categories of understanding.33

And again:

Since for years I have been observing and investigating the products of the unconscious in the widest sense of the word, namely dreams, fantasies, visions, and delusions of the insane, I have not

33 Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 135.
been able to avoid recognizing certain regularities, that is, types.\textsuperscript{34}

Archetypal regularities do occur then, and they enable Jung to classify or specify the nature of the archetypal pluralism more specifically.

2. The Nature of the Archetypal Pluralism

If we examine Jung's discussions on the specific archetypes, we discover that actually there are two basic categories of archetypes. There are "situation," "transformation," or "process" archetypes and there are "figure" archetypes. Thus Jung says:

...In the course of this process the archetypes appear as active personalities in dreams and fantasies. But the process itself involves another class of archetypes which one could call the archetypes of transformation. They are not personalities, but are typical situations, places, ways, and means, that symbolize the kind of transformation in question. Like the personalities, these archetypes are true and genuine symbols that cannot be exhaustively interpreted, either as signs or as allegories. They are genuine symbols precisely because they are ambiguous, full of half-glimpsed meanings, and in the last resort inexhaustible.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} Jung, \textit{Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious}, p. 183.

But let us consider the specific nature of some of these archetypes, always bearing in mind Jung's continuous warning that we cannot really capture them because of their inexhaustibility. First, what are some of the "figure" or "personality" archetypes?

The archetype closest to the surface of the unconscious and the one which analysis first brings to light is that of the "shadow" or "trickster." It symbolizes, for one thing, all the dark potentialities of the subject. Thus Jung says:

...the trickster is a collective shadow figure, a summation of all the inferior traits of character in individuals. 36

But the shadow has a positive meaning for the subject, too, for he does personify real potentialities of the subject and he does belong to the personality.

Now, as the shadow becomes assimilated to the conscious standpoint, a more fundamental personification begins to emerge. Jung says:

...the shadow, although by definition a negative figure, sometimes has certain clearly discernible traits and associations which point to a quite

36 Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 270.
different background. It is as though he were hiding meaningful contents under an unprepossessing exterior. Experience confirms this; and what is more important, the things that are hidden usually consist of increasingly numinous figures. The one standing closest behind the shadow is the anima, who is endowed with considerable powers of fascination and possession.37

The anima figure contains or symbolizes the opposite sexual identity of the subject. Thus Jung says:

It is a well-known fact that sex is determined by a majority of male or female genes, as the case may be. But the minority of genes belonging to the other sex does not simply disappear. A man therefore has in him a feminine side, an unconscious feminine figure—a fact of which he is generally quite unaware. I may take it as known that I have called this figure the "anima," and its counterpart in a woman the "animus."38

But the anima figure is itself supported by more fundamental archetypal figures, namely, those of the "wise old man" and the "mother." Jolande Jacobi expresses this deeper level with admirable clarity as follows:

...The moment has arrived for analyzing and exploring no longer the contrasexual part of the psyche as in the case of the anima and the animus, but that part of it which constitutes, so to speak our very essence—for going back to the primordial image after which it has been formed. To venture a somewhat daring formula one might say: the man is materialized spirit, the woman matter impregnated with spirit; consequently the man is essentially determined by the

37 Ibid., p. 270.

38 Ibid., p. 284.
spirit, the woman by matter. It is necessary to make conscious the whole range of possibilities one carries within oneself, from the crudest 'primordial being' up to the highest, most differentiated and most nearly perfect symbol. To this end both figures, the 'Old Wise Man' as well as the 'Magna Mater', may appear in an infinite variety of shapes.39

But even these important archetypes are capable of being transcended, and must be, if the depths of the unconscious are to be adequately brought into contact with consciousness. For in themselves they signify but parts of the whole and not wholeness itself. This is reserved for the archetype and archetypal images of "wholeness," "self," or "the child." Jung says:

Although "wholeness" seems at first sight to be nothing but an abstract idea (like anima and animus), it is nevertheless empirical in so far as it is anticipated by the psyche in the form of spontaneous or autonomous symbols. These are the quaternity or mandala symbols, which occur not only in the dreams of modern people who have never heard of them, but are widely disseminated in the historical records of many peoples and many epochs. Their significance as symbols of unity and totality is amply confirmed by history as well as by empirical psychology. What at first looks like an abstract idea stands in reality for something that exists and can be experienced, that demonstrates its a priori presence spontaneously. Wholeness is thus an objective factor that confronts

the subject independently of him, like anima or animus; and just as the latter have a higher position in the hierarchy than the shadow, so wholeness lays claim to a position and a value superior to those of the syzygy. The syzygy seems to represent at least an essential part of it, if not actually the two halves of the totality formed by the royal brother-sister pair, and hence the tension of opposites from which the divine child is born as the symbol of unity. 40

This, then, marks the 'lower limit', one might say, of the depths of the collective unconscious. Keeping in mind Jung's warning about the impossibility of really encapsulating an archetype within one rational formula, we can consider these as a fairly accurate picture of the main ingredients in the "figure" archetypal pluralism. The process archetypes, in their turn, depend on the figure archetypes and express the problems and processes in assimilating them to the conscious standpoint. Jung says:

The symbolic process is an experience in images and of images. Its development usually shows an enantiodromian structure like the text of the I Ching, and so presents a rhythm of negative and positive, loss and gain, dark and light. Its beginning is almost invariably characterized by one's getting stuck in a blind alley or in some impossible situation; and its goal is, broadly speaking, illumination or higher consciousness, by means of which the

initial situation is overcome on a higher level.\footnote{Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, pp. 38-39. Cf., V. White, O.P., God and the Unconscious, Chicago, Regnery, 1953, pp. 220-223.}

In the sphere of the process archetypes, symbols expressive of such motifs as those of "the birth of the hero," "death of the king," "sacrifice," etc., appear, and the superordinate archetype in the sphere of process seems to be that of "rebirth." Thus Jung says:

...Elsewhere I have presented a series of dream-symbols of the process of individuation. They were dreams which without exception exhibited rebirth symbolism. In this particular case there was a long-drawn-out process of inner transformation and rebirth into another being. This "other being" is the other person in ourselves—that larger and greater personality maturing within us, whom we have already met as the inner friend of the soul.\footnote{Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 130-31.}

For our present purposes, then, these considerations should suffice, and we need go no further into the question of specific kinds of transformation or rebirth archetypes. However, we do need to yet direct ourselves to an evaluative consideration of the specific archetypes which we have considered. That is, does the theory of archetypes in regard to at least some of its specific motifs have any relevance
for philosophy. We believe that this question can quite definitely be answered in the affirmative. In the next section we shall attempt to show some relationships between archetypal images and general aspects of the philosophy of man, and even to some general principles in natural philosophy and metaphysics.

B. Archetypes and Philosophical Principles

One of the most noticeable characteristics of Jung's handling of the archetypes is their subjective reference. That is, the archetypes constantly refer to aspects of the subject himself, or to processes he is undergoing or needs to undergo. The archetypes of "anima," "mother," etc., are aspects of the reality of the subject which need to be recognized and assimilated to consciousness in order to achieve a fuller realization of the whole self. First, then, let us consider some of the figure archetypes in their relation to the philosophy of the human subject.

1. Archetypes and the Subject

First of all, it seems evident that certain correlations can be made between various figure archetypes and
several dimensions of the subject as traditionally considered. For instance, on a rather surface level it seems that the "shadow" could be expressed as the symbolic personification and correlate of the unactualized dispositions or inclinations of the subject, the unactualized "habits" spoken of earlier as making up the realm of the repressed unconscious contents. Again, it seems that the "anima" in a male thinking type can be said to be a personification and correlate of the whole dimension of appetite and emotion. In fact this has been expressed by Jung himself in the following passage:

...Just as the anima becomes, through integration, the Eros of consciousness, so the animus becomes a Logos; and in the same way that the anima gives relationship and relatedness to a man's consciousness, the animus gives to woman's consciousness a capacity for reflection, deliberation, and self-knowledge.43

The philosophy of the powers of the human subject as a philosophy relevant to the singular existent, then, is not dependent solely on the consciously developed arguments. It also depends on the subject's relationship to his "anima." For example, the affective dimension of the human subject may be more or less strongly or forcefully eliminated from

43 Jung, Aion, p. 16.
actual exercise and expressed only by a disturbing influence of the "anima." Anima-animus, then, as expressive of the fundamental human polarity of cognition-appetition or intellect-will ought to win a responsive accord from all traditionalists. For this theory has always maintained that the human subject does in truth have this duality of principles in the order of psychic powers. What the Jungian psychology is showing us in addition, however, is that right judgment about the singular subject cannot habitually occur if we are not integrated with the anima or animus dimension. One's philosophy of the psychic powers of man is not fully accomplished by ratiocination alone, but requires psychic wholeness as a condition for its having relevance to everyday life. Rationalism and voluntarism can be lived philosophic perspectives even though the subject claims an adherence to another position.

Going deeper into the human subject, we recall that the Aristotelian analysis of the human reality presented man in terms of a composition of form and matter. It is, I believe, no stretching of Jung's data to see this perspective represented in his discussion of the archetypes of "the wise old man" and the "mother." That is, the "wise old man" is
interpreted as a personification of the principle of form or of meaning, and the "mother" as a personification of the principle of matter. 44 Again, the Aristotelian perspective insists that a proper view of the human reality is not found in the path of identification with either principle alone, but calls for a recognition of the subject as a composite entity of these two substantial principles. A materialistic or spiritualistic view of the human reality may actually be the lived position, while one's logic comes to opposite assertions. Certainly a philosopher who is interested in possessing habitually sound judgments regarding the singular cannot afford to neglect these discoveries.

It seems too fantastically coincidental to find that there is yet a further correspondence. Now we have seen that in the Jungian analysis we must go beyond the "wise old man" and the "mother" archetype to the archetype of the

44 Jung says: "For him [the psychologist] the relationship to the earth and to matter is one of the inalienable qualities of the mother archetype. So that when a figure that is conditioned by this archetype is represented as having been taken up into heaven, the realm of the spirit, this indicates a union of earth and heaven, or of matter and spirit." Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 108. See also Ibid., p. 109 for the relevance to the principles of yang and yin in classical Chinese philosophy.
child or the self. Thomistic philosophy, too, manifests this further dimension in the reality of the human subject. The whole or complete view of the human subject entails the recognition of a principle superordinate to even matter and form namely the principle of existing. The existentialist emphasis which St. Thomas added to Aristotle was intended to make clear that we must pass beyond the principles of form and matter to the recognition of their superordinate unity in relation to an act of existing. Only then do we have a philosophic grasp of the most fundamental principles of the full reality. Only then do we have to some degree an explicit grasp of what we most fundamentally are. A lived Thomistic existentialism of the human subject then seems to be dependent on the realization of the self.

Turning our attention to the process archetypes for a moment it seems that there are some philosophically relevant themes here also. For one thing, the traditional theory of the development of habit would seem to be related to the process of transformation, and would seem to require re-examination in the light of the transformation phenomena. Not only can a person stand in different relationships to objects, but he may also stand in different relationships to
his own self. Secondly, the question of the birth of a living relationship to reality rather than an abstractionism—the concern of contemporary existentialism—can perhaps now be more easily understood. Expressed philosophically it is the ideal of the confrontation or dialogue between the existent singular self and the existent singular other, occurring through the instrumentality of various illuminative and affective forms. Complete dialogue requires not only the singularity of the object, but also the singularity of the subject. The psychologist, too, is affirming this as an ideal but he is implicitly telling us that even though we hold it as an abstract theory, it cannot be a factual condition unless we become adequately related to the fundamental "self," that is, unless we be "reborn." But we shall return to this theme again in the last section, and so we need dwell on it no longer at this time. Both figure and process archetypes taken from the theory of Jung, then, can be seen to be capable of correlation with various philosophical principles through which the human subject has been traditionally conceived. However, the correspondence between the Jungian treatment of the archetypes and philosophy is not restricted to the philosophy of the human
subject. It also has relevance for general cosmological and metaphysical dimensions as well. Let us briefly consider some examples of correlation in this area.

2. Archetypes and the Other

It is apparent throughout Jung's discussion of the archetypes that he avoids relating the archetypes to the extrasubjective realm as much as possible. Moreover, when he does give them a use and value for understanding something other than the human subject, it appears to be restricted to the domain of scientific conceptualization and knowledge. However, it seems that one can escape between the horns of this dilemma quite legitimately. That is, one need not take the alternatives of subjective relevance or, on the other hand, scientific conceptualization. It seems likely that it is Jung's Kantian background which thus prejudices the case against philosophy, but we need not follow his example on this point.

First of all, the dimension of specific potentiality is characteristic of the whole worldly sphere, and not merely the sphere of man alone. Consequently, there is no need for us to seek a correlate of the "shadow" in the
realm of the human subject alone, for its relevance is much broader than that. As a matter of fact, it would seem that one might say the investigation of the "shadow" of the physical world relates to the whole scope of the inquiries of cosmological as well as scientific enquiry.

Again, it would seem that the archetypes of "animus" and "anima" can be legitimately extended beyond their relevance to the human subject alone. Their counterparts in traditional theory would seem to be expressed by the coordinates of specific form and specific inclination. Thus St. Thomas says:

...Natural appetite is nothing but an inclination and ordination of the thing to something else which is in keeping with it, like the ordination of a stone to a place below. But because a natural thing is determined in its natural existence, its inclination to some determined thing is a single one.45

Logos and Eros are much broader in extension, then, and ought not to be restricted to the human subject alone.

Again, the principles of form and matter are extended to the whole material realm in traditional thought and it

seems that there is no necessity again to restrict the relevance of the general archetypes of "Meaning" and of the "Mother." Form and matter are superordinate categories relevant to the whole of material nature in its general composition.

And finally, the archetype of the "self" too seems to have an extra-subjective referent. Jung himself finds an intimate relationship between the archetype of self and the "God-image." Thus he says:

...As the highest value and supreme dominant in the psychic hierarchy, the God-image is immediately related to, or identical with, the self....

If we take the archetype of the self as symbolically expressive of fundamental existential subjectivity, then, it would seem that traditional thought ought also to find it naturally revelatory of the Divine Subjectivity, though of course not identical with it. For it was a part of that perspective to see man as an image of God. It is interesting in this regard to consider the argument which Professor Maritain presents as the "sixth" way to God. He says:

46 Jung, Aion, p. 109.
47 See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q 93.
There is only one solution: I, who am thinking, have always existed, but not in myself or within the limits of my own personality—and not by an impersonal existence or life either, (for without personality there is no thought, and there must have been thought there, since it is now in me); therefore I have always existed by a suprapersonal existence or life. Where then? It must have been in a Being of transcendent personality, in whom all that there is of perfection in my thought and in all thought existed in a supereminent manner, and who was, in His own infinite Self, before I was, and is, now while I am, more I than I myself, who is eternal, and from whom I, the self which is thinking now, proceeded one day into temporal existence. I had (but without being able to say "I") an eternal existence in my own nature and my own personality.48

Thus it would seem that with regard to the archetype of the self too there are some important correlations with traditional considerations. On this level there seems to be yet another discovery drawn from Jung which has interesting philosophical overtones, precisely with regarding to the role of being as the primary object of the human intellect.

In describing the psychic condition of schizophrenia, Jung says:

...the schizophrenic complex is characterized by a peculiar deterioration and disintegration of its own ideational content,...49

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49 Jung, Psychogenesis in Mental Disease, p. 252.
...the associations are unsystematic, abrupt, grotesque, absurd and correspondingly difficult if not impossible to understand. Not only are the products of schizophrenic compensation archaic, they are further distorted by their chaotic randomness.50

And again:

...It is extremely difficult to imagine a psychological process which would produce such an effect. The psychotherapy of neurosis gives us no clue here, as all neurotic processes operate with fully co-ordinated psychic elements. No disintegration of ideas and so forth occur in its orbit, and if any such traces should appear in a case of neurosis we may safely suspect the existence of latent schizophrenia.51

But if schizophrenia "disrupts the foundations of the psyche,"52 if it is a disturbance reaching down into the most fundamental depths, perhaps it is not so difficult after all to imagine a psychological process which would produce such an effect. For the basic conception of the mind is the intelligibility of being, and this of course includes the whole analogical variety of being. If, then, the subject becomes "possessed" by this level of psychic functioning, would not a chaotic randomness of psychic contents be

50 Ibid., p. 263.
51 Ibid., pp. 252-253.
52 Ibid., p. 243.
exactly what should be expected? It would seem that here again the psychological and philosophical considerations of the principles of knowing complement each other.

But not only do the "figure" archetypes have relevance or relatedness to general philosophical principles, but so also do the process archetypes. For again there seems to be no necessity to restrict the relevance of death and rebirth to the process of individuation pertaining to the human subject. Certainly there is a relationship between this archetypal significance and the processes of complexification achieved in chemical syntheses, biological improvements, etc. In the area of the broad historical perspective it would seem that certainly something akin to the motif of death and rebirth is the guiding light of the perspective developed by the late Teilhard de Chardin.53

Having investigated some of the specific areas of correlation between the archetypes of Jungian theory and the principles of traditional philosophic understanding, we wish now to consider one further point previously hinted at but perhaps not clearly enough expressed in explicit form.

This point is precisely the question of the overall significance of the theory of the archetypes for the philosophical enterprise in the exercise of its goal of acquiring wisdom. To this question then we would direct the final remarks of this chapter.

3. The Role of Philosophic Principles

In the earlier chapters we considered some of the relevance of the Jungian analysis for the question of the actualization or exercise of philosophic cognition. However, it might be well to reflect for a moment on the scope of our previous considerations. It may be recalled that what was previously in question was primarily the aspect or question of the methodology and specific content of experiencing. The examination of psychological attitude showed us that psychic content might be unconsciously influenced by the direction of interest and valuation. The examination of psychic functions showed us how the unconscious preference given to particular channels of experience might affect our psychic life. And in both instances we were interested in showing that these dimensions of unconsciousness might cause distortion in the lived philosophic life in regard to its method, its
specific content, and in the existential status of the ob-
ject known.

The question of the archetypes, however, relates to
the area of first principles, that is, to the roots or seed-
bed of the mind where lie the basic intelligibilities
through which all that is known, is known. It is primarily
related to the question of the basic principles of under-
standing and their actual involvement or incarnation in our
specific judgments. Though Jung did not develop the speci-
fic correlations between his psychological considerations
and philosophic theory, he did note the intimate relation-
ship. He says:

...As the most complex of psychic structures, a man's
philosophy of life forms the counterpole to the phy-
siologically psychic dominant, it ultimately deter-
mines the latter's fate.... I can hardly draw a
veil over the fact that we psychotherapists ought
really to be philosophers or philosophic doctors--
or rather that we already are so,...54

But perhaps this statement can be legitimately turned around
to say that the philosopher is or ought to be a kind of
therapist—at least a self-therapist. This it seems

54 C. G. Jung, The Practice of psychotherapy,
(Collected Works, Vol. XVI), New York, Pantheon, 1954,
p. 79.
introduces an important new dimension to the whole question of philosophic education or development. Moreover, it is especially in relation to the question of the development of one's philosophic principles that one is concerned with issues intimately linked with the psychology of the archetypes.

If the theory of the archetypes is valid then, certain consequences can be drawn regarding the philosophic enterprise. First of all, as we have tried to indicate by the various correlations between archetypes and traditional philosophic principles, an important confirmation of the reasonableness of the basic principles of traditional thought is made available. The agreement with common understanding which was traditionally asserted is seen to be very profoundly based on the root elements in our apprehension of reality. That which is common to being is always possessed in the depths of the unconscious, though it may not be explicitly expressed. The realization of the coincidence between philosophic life in its principles and psychological wholeness is extremely important for appreciating the value of philosophic development. But philosophic development is also conceived in other respects quite differently in the
light of the theory of archetypes.

In the past, philosophical development has largely been seen as a process whose accomplishment is dependent on reception from outside sources. That is, development takes place through experience of the world directly and/or through the aid of the historical stream of philosophers who have gone before. With both sorts of material available to us, then, we engage in the task of sifting and organizing, reasoning and relating, and we develop a continuously expanding body of understanding. We have no wish to undermine the validity and importance of this aspect of philosophic development, and we too insist on its necessity for the progress of philosophy and of the philosopher. However, the psychological theory of the archetypes of the collective unconscious causes us to re-examine the exclusive validity of this approach to philosophic development.

Regardless of how accurate in every respect the ideas one assimilates from the outside and consciously elaborates into a philosophic perspective, the data of Jung seems to make one thing quite clear. These contents are not ordinarily linked to the basic contents or the basic ideational forms of the mind. For some reason or other, we fall from
the childlike contact with the basic metaphysical ideas as symbolically carried in the archetypes, and we become enmeshed in elaborating particularized spheres of apprehension and appetite. We fall "upwards," as it were, and the basic contents of our understanding become hidden in the deep. Even when we study philosophy and deal with intelligibilities of the most universal significance, they remain severed from the living depths of our mind, or at least they may likely remain severed. Those concerned with philosophic development then must take this likelihood into account.

Again, in addition to philosophic problems being rooted in ignorance or illogicality, they may also be rooted in problems of archetypal relatedness. That is, the subject may be involved in an identification with an archetype, thus swinging the fulcrum point of the knower off in one direction or another. This realization should make us less wholly dependent on our arguments and more sympathetic to divergent views insofar as we realize the difficulties of achieving psychic wholeness. For the difficulties of achieving psychic wholeness are much greater than the difficulties of understanding a particular argument form. Differing fundamental positions in philosophy, then, appear less as
deficiencies in reasoning than as tendencies toward, or actual identification with, and possession by, an archetype. If this is the actual case, then the balance can be restored only by the death of this archetypal identification and the achievement of synthesis on a higher or deeper level of consciousness. The question or problem again becomes identical with the problem of achieving psychic wholeness.

In any case, it appears now that the problem of becoming a philosopher is a very demanding task and requires that one undertake the task of assimilating the unconscious. If one avoids this task he may still be a teacher of philosophic positions, whether one or many, but he has cut himself off from having a living philosophic perspective. Though he may rationalize about first principles he will not be in touch with what is actually and existentially functioning as the first principles of his thought. To achieve this to any degree he must identify the archetypal themes operative in his lived cognitive life and raise them to some degree of consciousness. Having been freed from an unconscious archetypal identification, then, he will have, at least to some degree, a philosophic perspective which is consciously possessed and which is simultaneously his actually
lived philosophic perspective.

Finally, the discovery of the role of the archetypes of the collective unconscious for philosophic life can give new hope to those weary of controversy. For, insofar as we mutually aid one another to achieve psychic wholeness, our differences will tend to fall away. For the more fully we achieve a link with our cognitive roots, the more fully will we be converging toward the conscious possession of a philosophic community of understanding. The conclusion of our study of the archetypes of the collective unconscious, then, is that the process described by Jung as the process of individuation is, for philosophers, coincident with the achievement of philosophic wisdom, both as individuals and as participants in a philosophical community.\(^{55}\)

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\(^{55}\) In this chapter we have been concerned only with the relevance of the theory of archetypes for philosophy. This is not to deny that they also have an extremely important relevance for an even more important realm—that of religion and theology. Victor White, O.P., who pursued this area of investigation so brilliantly, said, concerning this relevance: "Indeed the findings of comparative religion, of anthropology, and of the extensive researches of the Jungians themselves, point decisively to the opinion that religious beliefs and practices universally have this psychological and social function: and also that they have to do with archetypal figures and processes found in all times and places throughout the world, as well as within the psyche of modern man." *Soul and Psyche*, New York, Harper, 1960, p. 81.
SUMMARY

The materials of our study seem to fall into two main segments. First of all, it has been our contention that the psychology of Jung is predominantly a cognitive psychology, and that it contains a highly developed cognitive system. The proof of this part of our thesis was largely attempted by an explanation of some of the major elements in the Jungian psychology, backed up by appropriate quotations, especially from primary sources. The second part of our thesis was that some of the material of the Jungian analysis is capable of being related in a meaningful way to the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophic tradition, and that a mutual enrichment is achievable through this confrontation. This part of our thesis was not always provable by reference to primary sources, but had to depend on implications derivable from those sources. Our conclusion was that both psychological and philosophic understanding gains much from this confrontation. But what are the principal areas, then, that we considered by this two-fold expository-assimilative approach?

After emphasizing the cognitive character of Jung's psychology, we attempted, in Chapter I, to clarify some of
the issues surrounding Jung's thinking concerning psychological enquiry itself. We found that Jung posited an empirical but non-mathematical approach as his own particular method of procedure. However, we also found that Jung did not adhere to his own canons of procedure too faithfully. On several occasions he became involved in philosophical issues, or he allowed his philosophical perspective to be incorporated in a supposedly empirical presentation of materials or information. On the other hand, we also found that the information brought to light by the properly exercised empirical approach was of significant value to the philosopher, and that it enabled him to better realize the full significance of the analogical reality of psychic life. We also tried to show how, conversely, the method and content of the philosophical endeavor could contribute to the psychologist's purification of his empirical methodology from extraneous, and sometimes objectionable, philosophical accompaniments. Furthermore, the philosopher might also help the psychologist to develop a more conscious, and hopefully, a more adequate philosophic perspective in which to ground his overall view of the human reality. Having considered the broad cognitive emphasis in Jung's psychology, then, and his
method of knowing the knower as contrasted with the philosophic method, we took up the basic specific contents of his cognitive psychology.

In chapter II we considered the problem of the Jungian view regarding the constitution of the human knower. We found that Jung's treatment of the basic knowing subject could profitable be divided into the dimensions of the noumenal and the phenomenal subject. Regarding the noumenal subject, the Jungian analysis was embroiled in many philosophical issues, and we saw something of the difficulties which Jung encountered on this issue. Because of these difficulties, his writings on this question were characterized by vacillation. Finally we tried to briefly indicate how he might have been moving in the direction of the hylomorphic theory which he at least seemed to have consistently required, though monism and dualism seemed to alternately call forth his allegiance. The question of the phenomenal subject drew us into a discussion of the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious dimension of psychic life. We considered the Jungian evidence for the existence of the unconscious and something of its nature. We also tried to show how we believe the theory of the unconscious may be
correlated with traditional theory on habit and will, and may even have been at least sporadically anticipated by that traditional theory. Our next problem was that of the exercised cognitive life of the knowing subject as influenced by the direction of interest.

Chapter III dealt with that best known element of Jungian psychology, namely, the differentiation of introverted and extraverted attitudes. Before considering the differentiation itself, however, some of the extensive sources of evidence for this distinction were introduced, and then the meaning of attitudinal type as subject or object centered attention was explored more closely. After this had been done, certain aspects of Thomistic thought were applied as critical apparatus to this distinction.

The general distinction of attitudinal types having been considered, its explicit relevance to cognitive life was then explored. The relationship between attitude and cognitive features discussed by Jung (such as abstractionism, empiricism, etc.) were presented, and the features of traditional theory which bear on some of these cognitive differentiations were introduced and shown to be, at least to some extent, parallel considerations. When necessary,
traditional theory was also used to suggest possible improvements in the Jungian formulation.

But we could not leave the topic of psychological attitude without assimilating the previously discussed topic of the unconscious to the attitudinal aspect of psychic life. The compensatory role of the unconscious was stressed and finally, the influence of conscious and unconscious attitudes on philosophic life was discussed.

In Chapter IV we took up the matter of the specific channels of experience, the four functions, as they are presented by Jung. The description and distinction of these functions was explored, together with the differentiation of functional types. Materials of traditional theory bearing on differing types of cognitive presence were introduced and related to the functional types. Unconsciousness in the realm of the functions was also considered.

After having considered the psychic functions in their simple conscious and unconscious dimensions, then, we brought the aspect of psychological attitude into the picture. Each of the functions was considered as influenced by attitude, and relevant philosophic considerations were brought to bear on the matter of function and attitude.
in combination.

Finally, in a third section of this chapter, the synthetic result of attitude, function, and unconsciousness in these spheres was discussed. The topic of primary and auxiliary functions was discussed and the bearing of all these matters on philosophic style was investigated.

Chapter V concluded our study with an investigation of the Jungian psychic factor called the collective unconscious. This factor contains the principles or dominants of psychic life which Jung called the archetypes. We considered the theory of the collective unconscious and its archetypes in itself and also in relation to traditional psychology. And in the second part of this concluding chapter we considered the theory of the archetypes in relation to the broad principles of traditional thought, both in their intelligible contents and as involved in the actualization of philosophic wisdom.
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APPENDIX I

ABSTRACT OF

Human Knowing in the Psychology of Jung

This thesis begins with the premise that the Jungian psychology contains a well developed cognitive system, though it also indirectly affords a kind of proof of this premise through its presented contents. Its main purpose, however, is to present this Jungian cognitive system in its important elements and to critically evaluate it in the light of an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective.

After considering the differences and relationships between a Jungian and a Thomistic approach to cognitive life, the main body of the thesis is taken up with the main elements resulting from the Jungian researches. The first such element is the Jungian view regarding the cognitive subject. This problem is seen to involve many familiar philosophic issues though here they are approached from a phenomenological standpoint. The dimension of the unconscious is explored and its relevance to some philosophical considerations is also considered. The two important issues of psychological attitude and psychic function make up two important chapters
and each of these issues is found to have surprising and interesting relations to some familiar philosophical considerations. The importance of each for the actual exercise of one's philosophical style is also discussed. The final chapter involves an extended consideration of the important Jungian theory of the collective unconscious and its dominants or archetypes. The meaning of this theory and some specific archetypes are considered along with the relevance of this theory for the question of basic philosophic principles.

The conclusion of this study is that there is much in Jungian theory which correlates with a Thomistic perspective. This relationship is very much of the order of a correlation between empirical-phenomenological data and ontological principles. But not only is there a speculative correlation, but the practical process of moving toward philosophic wisdom is also seen to be coincident with the psychologist's goal of achieving wholeness.