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PREFACE

I

Even in the third edition of their university textbook, on the constitutional and legal history of Poland, Zdzisław Kaczmarczyk and Bogusław Leśnodorski deplored the non-existence of a sound work on Polish diplomacy or, to be more specific, on Polish diplomatic service. The same comments may be made a decade later.

The critical comments of Kaczmarczyk and Leśnodorski should not be interpreted to mean that, as far as this topic is concerned, some sort of vacuum exists in Polish historiography. Even a short list of works by such men as Krzysztof Warszewicki, Ławryn Piaseczyński, Stanisław Miński, Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro, Adam Naruszewicz, Feliks Stotwin-


2 De Legato et Legatione Liber (Kraków, 1595).


4 Józef Korzeniowski ed., Stanisława Mińskiego (1563-1607) sposób odprawiania poselstwa (Kraków, 1889).

5 "Vir consilii montis ethicorum nec non prudentiae civilis", in ... Accessere alia quaedam miscellanea eiusdem authoris (Lviv, 1730).

6 Objaśnienie kwestii czyli J. P. Zugoher użyc może praw w Polszcze ministrom dworów cudzoziemskich służących (n.p., 1785).
ski, Henryk Mościcki, Kazimierz Piwarski and Rajnold Przeździecki, will serve as proof to the contrary. These authors, as well as others, however, produced only fragmentary studies, works of popular nature and half-scholarly surveys. It was not until 1959, with the publication of the pioneer scholarly work of Adam Przyboś and Roman Żelewski, that the former trend was reversed.

Seven years later the first scholarly study on Polish diplomatic service, covering the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, appeared on the shelves of bookshops. In 1971 the monographs of Stanisław Edward Nahlik and Wacław Zarzycki were added. Two years later the work of Soviet scholars, Historia diplomatii, was translated into Polish. Finally, in 1976 Zarzycki published his monograph on the

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7 Prawo narodów naturalne połączone z praktyką państw europejskich (Kraków, 1822).
8 O dyplomacji polskiej (Warsaw, 1919).
9 Historia dyplomacji (Kraków, 1947).
11 Dyplomaci w dawnych czasach: Relacje staropolskie z XVI-XVIII stulecia (Kraków, 1959).
13 Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji (Wrocław, 1971).
diplomacy of the hetmans. 16

A very important decision was made in 1972 by various Polish academic circles. The fruits of labour of several historians are yet to be seen; however, in the near future there will appear a four-volume History of Polish Diplomacy. The first volume, which is being prepared by Marian Biskup and Zbigniew Wójcik, will cover the period from the beginning of Poland as a state to her third partition in 1795. 17

Ukrainian historians have shown little interest in this field. For this reason, a scholarly history of Ukrainian diplomacy is yet to be written. 18

There is also a great need for a good monograph on Polish and Ukrainian diplomatic service in the second half of the seventeenth century. The studies of Zbigniew Wójcik and F. P. Shevchenko, 19 for example, may be utilized by historians as a starting-point.

While Polish and Ukrainian historians neglected the topic of diplomatic service, they did a considerable amount of work in the field of diplomatic relations between the Polish Commonwealth and Ukraine. Obviously, any biography of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, any monograph or any compila-

17 Ibid., p. 4.
18 The work of V. Holobutskyi hardly fits such a category. See n. 75 below.
19 (Wójcik) "Z dziejów organizacji dyplomacji polskiej w drugiej połowie XVII wieku", Polska si. dyp1., pp. 257-367; and (Shevchenko) "Dyplomatychna služba na Ukraini pid chas vyzvoloi viiny 1648-1654 rr.", Istorychni dzherela ta ikh vykorystannia, I (1964), 81-112.
tion of sources devoted to the years 1648-1659, to part of that period or even to broader scope, could hardly ignore diplomatic relations between Warsaw and Chyhyryn. It should be noted, however, that all such diplomatic contacts were treated by historians only as fragments of their story. While it is true that several interesting articles have been written on diplomatic relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine during the years 1648-1659, so far no historian has devoted sufficient time to prepare a sound monograph on this topic. That there is a need for such a monograph, may be best illustrated by asking the reader to examine the entry for Ukraine (under Poland) in volume I (which covers the years 1648-1715) of the Repertorium edited by Ludwig Bittner and Lothar Gross.

The author sincerely hopes that this dissertation will fill certain gaps of knowledge relating to diplomacy between the Polish Commonwealth and Ukraine from 1648 to 1659 and that it will provide sufficient incentive for historians to explore this topic more deeply.

II

Up to the first half of the nineteenth century Polish historiography showed little interest in Ukraine. From the 1850's, however, with the

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20 See, for example n. 72 below (Korduba and Herasymchuk).


22 Bohdan Baranowski and Zofia Libiszowska, "Problem narodowo-wyzwolenczej walki ludu ukraińskiego w XVII w. w. historiografii polskiej", Kwartalnik Historyczny [Hereafter cited as KH], LXI (1954), 199-201.
appearance of the compilations of Michal Gliszczynski (1814-1874) and
Jan Nepomucen Czarnowski (1822-1894), the interest of historians began
to shift in this direction. With the passage of time scholarly monographs,
biographies and articles pertaining to Ukraine began to appear frequently;
moreover, great many sources were published as well.

For the period from 1850 to 1918, the following four historians may
be regarded as the leading representatives of the "Ukrainian School" in
Polish historiography: Karol Szajnocha (1818-1868), Aleksander Jabłońo-

ski (1829-1913), Ludwik Kubala (1838-1918) and Franciszek Rawita-

23 (Gliszczynski) Znaczenie i wewnętrzne życie Zaporoża podług Sakło-
kowskiego oraz Hetmani Małorosyjscy i Rozacy do czasów unii (Warsaw, 1852);
and (Czarnowski) Ukraina i Zaporoże czyli historia kozaków od pojawienia
są ich w dziejach do czasu ostatecznego przyłączenia do Rosy... (War-
saw, 1854). He used the pseudonym T. N. Czarnocki.

24 On Karol Szajnocha see Ludwik Finkel, "Karol Szajnocha. Próba ujęcia
syntezy i genezy poglądów historjograficznych wielkiego pisarza", Ziemia
Czerwieńska, I (1935), 1-17; B. Kalicki, "Najnowsze sądu o Karolu Sza-
ñoskie. (Z powodu książki: Dzieje Polski w zarysie przez Michała Bobrzyń-
skiego. Warszawa, Kraków 1879)", Przegląd Lwowski, IX (1879), 569-578,
609-618; "Karol Szajnocha. Wspomnienie pośmiertne", Przegląd Polski,
II [VII] (1868), 272-295; [X] (1868), 436-454; III [XI] (1869), 75-106, 452-
476; [XII] (1869), 90-108; Klemens Kanteczi, "Żywot Karola Szajnocha", in
Dzieła Karola Szajnocha (Warsaw, 1878), X, 239-426; and Władysław łoziński,
"Karol Szajnocha", Dziennik Literacki, XVII (1868), 33-35, 49-54, 66-67,

25 On Jabłoński see Marcelli Nałęcz Dobrowolski, "Alexander Jabłońo-
ski, zarys życia i przegląd dzieł 1829-1913", Przegląd Historyczny [Here-
after cited as PH], XVII (1913), 239-253; Franciszek Bujak ed., "Auto-
obiografia Aleksandra Jabłońskiego", KH, LIII (1939), 8-49; Tadeusz Kor-
zon, "Aleksander Jabłoński", KH, XXVIII (1914), 145-180; and Wiesław
Bieńkowski, "Jabłoński Aleksander Walerian", Polski Słownik Biograficzny
[Hereafter cited as PSB], X (1962-1964), 214-216.

26 On Kubala see Henryk Barycz, "Dwa trudne życie. Na drogach roz-
woju naukowego Tadeusza Wojciechowskiego i Ludwika Kubali", Życie
i Mysl, II (1951), 601-656; Wśród gawędziarzy, pamiętnikarzy i uczonych galicyj-
skich (Kraków, 1963), II, 177-233; L. Finkel, "Ludwik Kubala", KH, XXII
(1918), 518-524; K. K. [onarnski], "Ludwik Kubala", PH, XXI (1917-1918),
430-432; and Władysław Czapliński and Henryk Wereszycki, "Kubala Ludwik",
PSB, XVI (1971), 2-5.
Gawroński (1845-1930). The first three treated the history of Ukraine in a generally objective manner; the fourth, a self-made historian, examined her history of the Cossack period only in a negative light.

Szajnocha's vividly-written histories won him great popularity. In his last monograph, Two Years of Our History: 1646 and 1648, based on primary sources, he examined the relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine.

Jabłonowski concerned himself with history, historical geography, ethnography, heraldry, linguistics and the publication of sources. Apart from a series of articles dealing with the history of Ukraine, which appeared in the leading periodicals, the following were his major works: The Mohyla Academy of Kiev; Historical Atlas of the Polish Commonwealth (the second part of it is devoted to the "Ruthenian Territories"); A History of the Southern Rus up to the Fall of the Polish Commonwealth; and Historical Sources (he edited volumes I, V, VI, X, XVII-XXII), which contained source materials relating to the administration, economy and settlement of south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth. His Col-


For the views of an Ukrainian historian see Dmytro Doroshenko, "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography", The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., V-VI (1957), 207-211.

Dwa lata dziejów naszych 1646-1648. Opowiadania i źródła, 2 vols. (Lviv, 1865-1869). This monograph was published in Warsaw in 1879 as part of Szajnocha's works, and again in 1900 separately.
lected Works were published in seven volumes. 30

Kubala's interest in the reigns of Władysław IV (1632-1648) and Jan Kazimierz (1648-1668) led him to devote a lion's share of his monographs to the history of Ukraine. Presenting an entirely different point of view than the "Kraków School" of historians, he gained wide popularity and influenced scores of historians. The novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz based his With Fire and Sword on Kubala's works.

In his two series of historical sketches, Kubala concentrated chiefly on the events during the years 1648-1653. His biography of Crown Grand Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński is still regarded very favourably by historians to this day. The four monographs which followed deal with the period of wars from 1654-1661. 31 Kubala's works, in the view of Doroshenko, are "extremely well documented, detached and scientific in spirit"; for this reason they form "a contrast to other Polish histories of Ukraine". 32

Gawroński's works reveal a lack of objectivity. For example, while

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30 Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilanska. (Krakow, 1899-1900); Atlas historyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: Epoka przełomu w w. XVI na XVII. Dział 2. Ziemie ruskie (Warsaw, 1899-1904); Historya Rusi południowej do upadku Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Krakow, 1912); with Adolf Pawiński, Źródła dziejowe, 24 vols. (Warsaw, 1876-1915); and Pisma Aleksandra Jabłonowskiego, 7 vols. (Warsaw, 1910-1913).

31 Szkice historyczne, 2 vols. (Lviv, 1880-1881); 3rd ed. (Kraków, 1896); Jerzy Ossoliński, 2 vols. Lviv, 1883; Wojna moskiewska r. 1654-1655 (Warsaw, 1910); Wojna szwecka w roku 1655 i 1656 (Lviv, 1913); Wojna brandenburska i najazd Rakoczego w r. 1655 i 1657 (Lviv, 1917); and Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski, 1657-1660 (Lviv, 1922). A two-volume Dzieła, comprising Szkice historyczne, ser. 1 and 2 and Jerzy Ossoliński, were published in Lviv (1923-1924).

32 Doroshenko, op. cit., p. 211.
Kubala paid tribute to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and described him as an outstanding military and political leader, Gawroński painted him in the darkest colours and viewed him as a leader of the riffraff. He even attempted to prove that Khmelnytskyi was a Jew! Gawroński was more a pamphleteer than a historian. He ridiculed the Ukrainian nationalist movement and severely criticised the labours of such outstanding individuals as Volodymyr Antonovych and Mykhailo Hrushevskyi.

Notwithstanding the many shortcomings of Gawroński's works, it is by means of these works that he contributed to the re-awakening of interest in Poland relating to the history of the seventeenth-century Commonwealth and Ukraine. 33

In the 1920's and 1930's, out of the many interesting studies prepared on Ukraine as part of the Commonwealth, 34 those of Władysław Tomkiewicz deserve a special notice. 35

33 Studia i szkice historyczne, 2 vols. (Lviv, 1900–1903); Hetman Ko‐zacki B. Chmielnicki; szkic historyczny jego życia i walk (Lviv, [n.d.]); Bohdan Chmielnicki, 2 vols. (Lviv, 1906–1909); Proba pojednania z Rusia. Poselstwo Bieniewskiego od śmierci Chmielnickiego do umowy hadiackiej (Kraków, 1907); Ostatni Chmielniczenko. Zarys monograficzny (Poznań, 1919); Kozaczyzna ukraińna w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do końca XVIII-go wieku. Zarys polityczno-historyczny (Warsaw, [1923]); Geneza i rozwój idei kozacztwa i kozaczyzny w XVI wieku (Warsaw, [1924]); and Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie. Materyały do dziejów kozaczyzny i hajdamaczyzny [Hereafter cited as Sprawy] (Lviv, 1914).


The following decade and a half was a barren one. The Second World War halted most of research. From 1945 Polish historians, for obvious reasons, shied away from topics related to the history of Ukraine. In 1954 several articles treated the seventeenth-century Ukraine. Unfortunately, most of these articles, designed to commemorate "the tercentenary of the unification of Ukraine with Russia", are bad examples of historical objectivity.36

In the late 1950's Zbigniew Wójcik established himself as a leading historian of Ukraine. It should be pointed out that he is interested in the period from 1660's primarily and, besides examining relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine, he is concerned with Crimea, Russia and Turkey as well.37

Although covering a later period, the work of Jan Perdenia is sig-

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nificant and thus deserves to be mentioned also.  

Finally, it should be noted that Polish emigrant circles continue to be interested in this topic, as can be demonstrated by the studies of Stanisław Kościakowski, 39 Stanisław Kot 40 and the "Kievans" in London, England. 41

Since the 1840's various types of sources were published. 42 These, in turn, sparked the interest of historians to produce scholarly monographs dealing with the history of the Commonwealth and Ukraine in the seventeenth century. At the same time Polish historians utilized, as well, sources which were published in Kiev, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Berlin, Vienna and elsewhere. 43

Many interesting articles appeared in periodicals. The chief historical periodicals are Kwartalnik Historyczny (since 1887) and Przegląd Historyczny (since 1905).

38 Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec sprawy Ukrainy na przełomie XVII-XVIII w. (Wrocław, 1963).


43 See Section III B of this chapter, entitled "Primary Printed Sources".
The foundations of Ukrainian scholarly historiography were laid primarily by two individuals: Dmytro Bantysh-Kamenskyi (1788-1850) and Mykola Markevych (1804-1860). Both of these historians published lengthy surveys dealing with the past of "Little Russia". The main value of their surveys lies both in the authors' conscious utilization of great many primary manuscript sources and in their style, which gained for their works wide acceptance and popularity.

The foundations laid by Bantysh-Kamenskyi and Markevych were strengthened, by the middle of the nineteenth century, through the labours of various historians-ethnographers. The leading scholars in this group were Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804-1873), Osyp Bodianskyi (1808-1876), Panteleymon Kulish (1819-1897) and Mykola Kostomarov (1817-1885).

While Maksymovych produced neither a comprehensive survey, an original monograph nor an outstanding biography, he did publish great many of first-rate articles, many of which dealt with the Cossack period in the seven-

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45 Bantysh-Kamenskyi: Istoriia Maloi Rossii ... 4 vols. (Moscow, 1822). The second edition was published in 1830; the third, in 1842 (both editions were published in three volumes). The fourth edition, in one volume, was entitled as follows: Istoriia Maloi Rossii ot vodovorenia Slavian v sei stranie do unichtozheniia Getmanstva (Kiev, 1903).


46 Previously historians relied too heavily on the chronicles.

47 Doroshenko, op. cit., pp. 116-156.
teenth century. His contribution to scholarly Ukrainian historiography must be measured "by his critical evaluation of sources and by his analysis of individual problems of Ukrainian history".

Bodianskyi's contribution to Ukrainian scholarship lay in the publication of many important sources. Several of them are very significant for the study of relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine during the years 1648-1659; for example, A Brief History of Khmelnytskyi's Rebellion; The Eyewitness' Chronicle and The Register of the Zaporozhian Army in 1649.

Kulish is described by Doroshenko as "a tragic figure in the Ukrainian National Revival" and states that "he failed to occupy the place in Ukrainian historiography for which he was qualified by his talent and his sharp critical mind". The main reason for such a harsh evaluation of one historian by another is the anomalous position of Kulish in Ukrainian scholarly historiography.

48 A complete edition of his works was edited by Volodymyr Antonovych. See Sobranie sochinenii, 3 vols. (Kiev, 1876-1880).

49 Doroshenko, op. cit., p. 123.

50 They were first published in Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestvie Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom Universitete: "Kratkaia istoriia o buntakh Khmelnitskago i o voine s tatarami, shvedami i ugrami" (1847); Lietopis Samovidtsa o voinakh Bogdana Khmelnitskago i o mezhdous-obiiakh byvshikh v Maloi Rossi po ego smerti" (1846); and "Reiestra vsego Voiska Zaporozhkago v 1649 godu" (1874): All three were published separately as well: the first, in 1847; the second, in 1846; and the third, in 1875.

51 Doroshenko, op. cit., pp. 155-156.
This historian, who attempted to conciliate the differences between the Poles and Ukrainians of his own day, was deeply interested in the events in the middle of the seventeenth century. Dissatisfied with the treatment of history by his contemporaries and its analysis by them, Kulish endeavoured to find truth by himself. His passion for detachment and objectivity led him, unfortunately, to adopt very extreme views; for example, he saw the Cossacks generally as a destructive element only. Thus, in the scholarly and popular works of Kulish, one will find excessive subjectivism.

The "Ukrainian Cossackophile", as Kulish dubbed Kostomarov, emerged at the same time as one of the most influential historians. Prior to his time, according to Volodymyr Antonovych, "specialized historical science" in Ukraine was "chaotic" and was "enveloped in prejudices and fictional hypotheses"; therefore, in the view of this historian, it "hardly existed". Kostomarov made a great impact on Ukrainian historiography by collecting and analyzing primary sources, and then by using the information gleaned from them, "to portray everything artistically". Antonovych maintained that Kostomarov possessed qualities which are "very rare among historians". He may be compared to Augustin Thierry in Western Europe.

This is most vividly illustrated in the pamphlet Krashanka rusynam i poliakam na Velykadem 1882 roku.

Many of his studies dealt with Cossacks in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Osnova, vols. III, IX-XII (1861), Kulish published two studies on the times of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and Ivan Vyhovskyi. He was a prolific writer. The following are the titles of his main monographs: Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1873-1877); and Otpadenie Malorossi i ot Polski (1340-1654), 3 vols. (Moscow, 1888-1889).

"Kostomarov kak istorik", Kievskaia Starina, V (1885), xxvii, xxx-xxxi.
While Soviet historians label Kostomarov as the "founder of Ukrainian bourgeoisie-landholders' historiography", they nevertheless pay certain homage to him for his accomplishments and are ready to admit that he stood head and shoulders above his contemporaries. Since he is referred to as a "democratic" historian, and since it is said of him that his "progressive" virtues outweigh his errors and deficiencies, it seems that Kostomarov is on the way of being "rehabilitated" in the Soviet Union.

Kostomarov specialized in the seventeenth and eighteenth century "hetman period" of history. His artistically-composed studies, while containing flowing literary style and colourful characterization of Cossack hetmans and other historical figures, were based on primary sources which he gathered from Russian archives and Polish private collections. His archaeographic activity, however, was subject of severe criticism of Gennadii Karpov (1838-1890), a pupil of Sergei Solovev (1820-1879). Kostomarov, it should be noted, placed great stress on popular movements in Ukraine and minimized the role and accomplishments of Cossack hetmans.

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57 See Karpov's Kriticheskii obzor istochnikov do istorii Malorossii otnosisashchikhsia za vremia 1654-1672 (Moscow, 1870); and Kostomarov kak istorik Malorossii (Moscow, 1871). Karpov and Solovev were Russian historians.

58 Kostomarov was a prolific writer (see Doroshenko, op. cit., pp. 132-145), leaving behind him numerous articles which appeared in various journals, as well as twenty-one volumes of Historical Monographs: Istoriicheskiia monografii i izsledovaniia (St. Petersburg, 1903-1906). Among them were volumes devoted to Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Vyhovskyi.
While Kostomarov was interested in political and ethnographic history, Volodymyr Antonovych (1834-1908) concentrated his attention on socio-economic history. Antonovych produced excellent studies, which appeared as introductions to documents he edited on the Cossacks, peasants, nobles, burgesses and the Church, chronologically covering primarily Ukraine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He avoided writing broad syntheses or surveys of history. It is in his analysis of the segments of Ukrainian history that Antonovych made his greatest contribution. "He prepared the small bricks out of which the later structure of Ukrainian historical science was built".

Antonovych was responsible for forming the so-called "Kievan School" of historians, which comprised largely his students — one of them was Mykhailo Hrushevskyi — at the University of Kiev. They finally completed the foundations for modern scholarly Ukrainian historiography.

This historian was also closely associated with the Archaeographic Commission, which devoted itself to the publication of source materials. Leading historians, including Kostomarov and Kulish, edited various vol-

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59 Besidy pro chasy kozatski na Ukraini (Chernivtsy, 1897), which appeared also entitled Korotka istoriia kozachchyny (Kolomyia, 1912), was his only attempt to write a survey.

60 Doroshenko, op. cit., p. 182.
The publication of such a mass of sources, as well as great many monographs, made possible the attempt to produce a scholarly synthesis of the history of Ukraine. This task was undertaken by Hrushevskyi.

Mykhailo Hrushevskyi's (1866-1934) life was devoted to one cause: "to erect for his people, in the form of a scholarly history, a monument which could be neither over-looked nor overthrown by his northern [Russian] opponents". His life was too short to complete such a herculean task, for he managed to bring his History of Ukraine-Rus only up to 1658. It is, nevertheless, a monumental work. Its chief significance

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63 Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Yuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii, sobranye i izdanne arkheograficheskoi Komissiei [Hereafter cited as Akty YuZR], 15 vols. (Kiev, 1861-1892).

64 Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi kommissiei dlia razbora drevnykh aktov, sostoiashchei pri Kievskom, Podolskom i Volynskom General-Gubernatorie [Hereafter cited as Sbornik YuZR], 2 vols. (Kiev, 1911-1916).


66 The first volume of Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy was published in Lviv in 1898; the tenth, posthumously, in Kiev in 1937. The whole set was reprinted in New York in the years 1954-1958.
lies "in the systematic summation of information, [and] its scholarly examination and analysis". It is "a huge encyclopedia comprising all the results of previous studies of Ukrainian historiography".  

In vol. VIII, part 3, Hrushevskyi covered the period from 1648 to 1650. He devoted vol. IX, part 1 to the years 1650-1653 and vol. IX, part 2 to 1654-1657. In vol. X he dealt with events during the years 1657-1658. These volumes, as well as volumes I-VII, treated not only military and political developments; they incorporated, as well, those illustrating cultural, economic and social characteristics of the times.  

By organizing the Shevchenko Scientific Society -- a historical research center -- in Lviv, Hrushchevskyi performed one of the greatest services for the Ukrainian historiography. From the time he became the president of this organization, "the development of scholarly studies there began on a large scale, as well as in the milieu around it, and Ukrainian historiography in particular took on a new lease on life". The periodical of the Society (Zapysky) and its source series (Zherela) contained the contributions of his students. Many of them chose to work on the "Cossack" period: Stefan Tomashivskyi (1875-1930),

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67 Doroshenko, op. cit., p. 273.
68 Ibid., p. 275.
69 Full title: Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka [Hereafter cited as ZNTSh]. Volume I appeared in 1892.
Myron Korduba (1876-1948), Vasyl Herasymchuk (1880-1944) and Ivan Krypiakevych (1886-1967), were the outstanding ones. All of them made valuable contributions to the study of diplomatic relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine.

Since Ukrainian historiography developed under the influence of the ideologies of Polish and Russian statehoods, and the Ukrainian cultural-democratic, but stateless ideology, it lacked the spirit of national consciousness and the awareness of national state aspirations. At the close of the nineteenth century a new trend appeared in the Ukrainian

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72 Tomaszewskyi: Pershii pokhid B. Khmelnytskoho v Halychynu (Lviv, 1914); "Odyn moment pid Zborovom 1649r.", ZNTSh, CXVII-CXVIII (1913), 115-125; and reports of nuncios on Ukraine, 1648-1657 in Zherela, XVI, part 1 (Lviv, 1924).

Korduba: "Venetske posolstvo do Khmelnytskoho, 1650", ZNTSh, LXXVII (1907), 51-67; "Proba avstryiskoho poserednytstve mizh Khmelnytskym i Polscheiu", ZNTSh, LXXXIV (1908), 5-32; "Mizh Zamostem ta Zborovom (Stroinky znosyn Semyhorodu z Ukrainu i Polscheiu)", ZNTSh, CXXXIII (1922), 39-56; and diplomatic documents (1648-1657) in Zherela, XII, part 5 (Lviv, 1911).

Herasymchuk: "Vyhovshchyna i Hadiatskyi Traktat", ZNTSh, LXXXVII (1909), 5-36; LXXXVIII (1909), 23-50; LXXXIX (1909), 46-90; "Do pytannia pro statii B. Khmelnytskoho", ZNTSh, C (1930), 213-235. His collection of sources relating to the Union of Hadiach (from which Hrushevsky cited in his vol. X) was not published.

Krypiakevych: "Studii nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmelnytskoho", ZNTSh, CXXXVIII-CXL (1925), 67-81; CXLIV-CXLV (1926), 109-140; CXLVII (1927), 55-80; CLI (1931), 111-150; Bohdan Khmelnytskij (Kiev, 1954); and (together with I. Butych) Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho 1648-1657 [Hereafter cited as DKhmel.] (Kiev, 1961).

73 Doroshenko, op. cit., p. 302.
historiography: the stress on traditions of a national statehood. The studies of Viacheslav Lypynskyi (1882-1931), the talented historian and sociologist, which cover chiefly the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, may serve as best examples of this new trend among the historians.

Lypynskyi tackled a new area: the role of the nobles in the process of state-building. Since much of this was done during the times of Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi, the very nature of his topic required him to devote a great deal of attention to the course of diplomacy between the Commonwealth and Ukraine.

During the inter-war period, although a considerable amount of work was done by Ukrainian historians on the seventeenth century, in the Soviet Ukraine -- at least to the early 1930's -- and in such centres abroad as Lviv, Warsaw, Prague, Berlin and Paris, very little of it applied to the diplomatic relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine for the period under consideration. The notable exception was Hrushevskyi's scholarly magnum opus -- A History of Ukraine-Rus. In 1931 he completed volume IX. Volume X, edited by his daughter, was published in 1937, after his death.

Similarly, very few monographs of scholarly value, have appeared on

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74 Szlachta ukraińska i jej udział w życiu narodu ukraińskiego (Kraków, 1909); Z dziejów Ukrainy: Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Włodzimierza Antonowicza, Paulina Święcickiego i Tadeusza Rylskiego (Kiev [Kraków], 1912); the monograph on Krychevskyi, contained in Z dziejów Ukrainy, was published separately as well: Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski: Z dziejów walki szlachty ukraińskiej w szeregach powstańczych pod wodzą Bohdana Chmielnickiego (Kraków, 1912); and Ukraina na perelomi, 1657-1659: Zamitky do istorii ukraiinskoj derzhavnogo budivnytstva v XVII - im stolittiu (Vienna, 1920).
this subject matter from the end of World War II to the present day.  
There are largely two main reasons for this curious development: on the one hand, the ideology, methodology and subject matter are determined, for historians in the Soviet Ukraine, by the government and the Communist Party; on the other, those of Ukrainian historians, who live abroad and who could fill the gap easily, are denied access to the archives and libraries in the Soviet Union.

A much happier situation exists, however, in the field of source-publication. In the same period, so barren for monographs, there appeared a number of valuable sources both in Ukraine and in the emigration.

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Great many articles, monographs, biographies and source collections appeared in the Soviet Union in 1954. Since all these publications were designed to commemorate the three hundredth anniversary of the "reunification of Ukraine with Russia" and since all the authors followed the Marxist line, much of this mass of material is of little value. The following books are some examples: Borba ukrainskogo naroda protiv inozemnykh porabotitelei za vossoedinenie s Rossiей (Moscow, 1954); Vyzvolyolna viina 1648-1654 rr. i vozvodyannia Ukrainy z Rosieiu (Kiev, 1954); and Vossoedinenne Ukrainy s Rossiiei 1654-1954: Sbornik statei [Hereafter cited as VUR (Sbornik)] (Moscow, 1954). Other examples of publications are listed by Andrij Moskalenko, Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Treaty of Pereyaslav in Soviet Historiography [Research Program on the U.S.S.R., Mimeoographed Series No. 73] (New York, 1955). One monograph, because of its considerable worth, must be singled out: Ivan Krypiakevych's, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 1954).

In the years that followed special recognition must be given to the article of F. P. Shevchenko (see n. 20) and the monograph of V. Hlobutskyi, Diplomaticheskaia istoriia osvoboditelnoi voine ukrainskogo naroda 1648-1654 gg. (Kiev, 1962). This last example is a survey; thus its author offers very little new information.

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Vossoedinene Ukrainy s Rossiiei, [Hereafter cited as VUR], 3 vols. (Moscow, 1953-1954); Khmelnytskyi's documents, 1648-1657: DKhmel. (Kiev, 1961); and Dokumenty ob osvoboditelnoi voine ukrainskogo naroda 1648-1654 g.g. [Hereafter cited as Dokumenty] (Kiev, 1965). Unfortunately, these three collections show evidence of bias in the selection of sources.
(especially the Roman archival materials collected by A. G. Velykyi, A. Sheptytskyi and others). It is hoped that this much-desired activity will continue, in order to provide historians with materials for the study of diplomacy.

IV

Prior to examining the course of diplomacy between the Commonwealth and Ukraine, it will be worthwhile to comment on primary sources relating to this topic.

A. Primary Manuscript Sources

The following archives, libraries and repositories contain valuable primary manuscript sources:

1. Archives (Ukraine)

(a). Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv Ukrainskoi RSR (Kiev) and Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv Ukrainskoi RSR (Lviv)

The Ukrainian Cossack State Archives perished in 1708 when Baturyn, at this time the capital, was put to torch by the Russians. From the archival remnants and local repositions two central historical archives were created by the Soviet government, one in Kiev and another in Lviv.

Unfortunately, the above-mentioned Ukrainian archives could not have been consulted for this dissertation, for the author was unable to enter the Soviet Union. Thus, it is based chiefly on Polish archival materials and published sources from Ukrainian, Russian and Western European archives.

77 Most valuable are Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes [Hereafter cited as LNA], vol. I (Rome, 1959) and Monumenta Ucrainae Historica [Hereafter cited as MUH], vol. I (Rome, 1963).
2. Archives (Poland)

(a). Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw)\textsuperscript{78}

(i). Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie\textsuperscript{79}

AKW, the Crown Archive of Warsaw, together with the Crown Archive of Krakow and the Archive of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, comprised the chief diplomatic archives of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. By the eighteenth century the holdings of the AKW were divided — largely according to the political divisions of the times — into thirty-four sections, each of which received a separate call number. Apart from the Cossack (Ukrainian) section, various documents contained in, among others, Russian, Tatar (Crimean), Turkish and Moldavian-Wallachian sections are also useful in the study of diplomatic relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine. A great variety of documents can be found in each section listed above: letters of credence, instruction to envoys, diplomatic correspondence, diplomatic notes and diaries, treaties and the like.

(ii). Metryka Koronna\textsuperscript{80}, or the Crown Register, contains the records of the major and minor chancery. The most important books of the MK, which are closely associated with the AKW, are the diplomatic records — the Libri Legationum\textsuperscript{81}. Generally speaking, the LL contain copies of the documents described in AKW. Since, however, many original documents of AKW perished in one way or another, the LL are extremely important, for they contain valuable materials relating to the foreign policy of the Commonwealth and to her diplomatic contacts with neighbouring states.

\textsuperscript{78} Hereafter cited as AGAD.

\textsuperscript{79} Hereafter cited as AKW.

\textsuperscript{80} Hereafter cited as MK.

\textsuperscript{81} Hereafter cited as LL.
In 1658 the Crown Chancery began a new set of books in which were recorded, in the form of short summaries, all documents issued by it which were sealed and were ready to be expedited -- the Sigillata. Other registers, the Libri Inscriptionum, were kept by the Crown Chancery for the purpose of recording certain letters of patent, charters for land grants, safe conduct passes and the like. Since most of these parchment documents had perished, both the Sigillata and LI are extremely valuable sources.

(iii). Archiwum Skarbowe Koronne, or the Crown Treasury Archive, comprises many parts. Those that relate most closely to the diplomatic field are the Envoys' Accounts and the Diet Accounts -- Rachunki Poselstw and Rachunki Sejmowe. Both the RP and RS provide a great deal of information about expenses relating to diplomatic missions, the names of envoys, the length of their stay and the like. Significant amount of information relating to diplomacy may also be gathered from Royal Accounts of the Court (Rachunki Nadworne Królów).

(iv). Family and private archives of the magnates complement the official documents relating to the diplomatic contacts between the Commonwealth and Ukraine. These individuals corresponded among themselves, with high officials of the Commonwealth, her envoys, diplomatic representatives of the neighbouring states and even Cossack leaders. Their hired

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82 Hereafter cited as LI.
83 Hereafter cited as ASK.
84 Hereafter cited as RP.
85 Hereafter cited as RS.
86 Hereafter cited as RNK.
agents supplied them with accurate and up-to-date information. Because of their position, these individuals exercised a great influence on the foreign policy and diplomacy of the Commonwealth. The domestic archives, therefore, reveal a great deal about the internal and external affairs of the Commonwealth.

AGAD contains many such archives. Among those the collections of Branickis (Archiwum Branickich z Suchej)\(^{87}\) Potockis, (Archiwum Publiczne Potockich),\(^{88}\) Radziwiłłs (Archiwum Radziwiłłów)\(^{89}\) and Zamoyskis (Biblioteka Ordynacji Zamoyskiej)\(^{90}\) are very important. Family archives are also scattered throughout other archives and libraries in Poland.

A great number of miscellaneous Mss., containing original documents, copies of original documents and copies of copies may be found in AGAD as well as in other Polish archives and libraries. With regard to the latter, a great variety has been preserved. A typical noble of the seventeenth century had the habit of copying into his silva rerum, or inscription book, any material that struck his fancy: manifestoes, letters, speeches, poems, parts of books and so on.

(b). Archiwum Miasta Krakowa i Województwa Krakowskiego (Kraków)\(^{91}\)

(i). Valuable sources relating to this topic can be found in Archi-

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\(^{87}\) Hereafter cited as AB.

\(^{88}\) Hereafter cited as APP.

\(^{89}\) Hereafter cited as AR.

\(^{90}\) Hereafter cited as BOZ.

\(^{91}\) Hereafter cited as AKr.
wum Pinoccić and Zbór Rusieckich. The Mss. comprising these collections contain a great variety of documents.

(c). Wojewódzkie Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku (Gdańsk)

(i). Apart from the various Mss., which contain miscellaneous documents useful for the study of diplomatic relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine, the most valuable ones are the Recessy Stanów Zachodnio-Pruskich, which contain lengthy reports on the proceedings of the Diets of the Commonwealth.

3. Archives (Other)

(a). Significant details with regard to diplomatic relations may be found also in Hous – Hof – und Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Riksarkivet (Stockholm) and Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnykh Aktov (Moscow). The author was unable to gain access to the archive in Moscow.

4. Libraries (Ukraine)

(a). Very useful sources relating to this topic are located among the large Mss. collections of the following two libraries in Ukraine: Biblioteka Insytytutu Istorii Akademii Nauk Ukraïnskoi R. S. R. (Kiev) and Biblioteka Akademii Nauk Ukraïnskoi R. S. R. (Lviv). The author was unable to gain access to these libraries.

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92 Hereafter cited as Pin.
93 Hereafter cited as Rus.
94 Hereafter cited as AGd.
95 Hereafter cited as RSZP.
96 Hereafter cited as HHSA.
97 Hereafter cited as RA.
98 Hereafter cited as TsGADA.
5. Libraries (Poland)

The following list contains selected examples of Mss. which are useful for the study of diplomatic relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine.

(a). Biblioteka Narodowa (Warsaw): Ms. IV. 4828 contains a collection of original letters, pertaining chiefly to the reign of Jan Kazimierz, which deal with domestic and foreign affairs. BOZ (part of this collection is in BN): MS. 1218, a typical silva rerum, contains copies of miscellaneous documents of the seventeenth century.

(b). Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego (Kraków): Ms. 5, entitled "Acta Publica et Epistolae" contains various documents from 1606 to 1674.

(c). Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego (Warsaw): Ms. 53 contains copies of letters and speeches relating to domestic and foreign affairs of the Commonwealth in the years 1606-1656.


(e). Muzeum Narodowe: Biblioteka Ks. Czartoryskich (Kraków): Teki Naruszewicza (TN) compiled in the eighteenth century, contain copies of documents for the years 1648-1659 (Mss. 142-152); Ms. 384 and 388, the correspondence

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99 Hereafter cited as BN.
100 Hereafter cited as BUJ.
101 Hereafter cited as BUWar.
102 Hereafter cited as BUWr.
103 Hereafter cited as Czart.
of Jan Leszczyński (1653-1660); Ms. 401, the minutes of Senate resolutions (1656-1668); Ms. 402, largely original documents during the reign of Jan Kazimierz; and Ms. 2446, copies of documents, chiefly for the years 1656-1665.

(f). Biblioteka Polskiej Akademii Nauk (Kórnik): \(^{104}\) in Mss. 350, 1286 and 1558 are found various original documents and copies of documents pertaining to the reign of Jan Kazimierz (1648-1668).

(g). Biblioteka Polskiej Akademii Nauk (Kraków): \(^{105}\) Mss. 1056 and 1062 contain a great deal of information with regard to affairs in Ukraine.


(i). Miejska Biblioteka Publiczna im. E. Raczyńskiego (Poznań): \(^{107}\) In Mss. 5, 30, 76 and 88 are many original documents for the period 1648-1659.

6. Repositories (Poland)

(a). Zakład Dokumentacji Instytutu Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk (Kraków): \(^{108}\) Reports of foreign ambassadors and envoys, collected by archaeological commissions in the nineteenth century, are preserved here; for example, Teki Rzymskie, Teki Londyńskie and so on. Teki Pawińskiego \(^{109}\)

\(^{104}\) Hereafter cited as Kor.

\(^{105}\) Hereafter cited as PAN Kr.

\(^{106}\) Hereafter cited as Ossol.

\(^{107}\) Hereafter cited as Racz.

\(^{108}\) Hereafter cited as ZDIH.

\(^{109}\) Hereafter cited as TP.
contain a collection of the resolutions of the dietines.

7. Catalogues (Polish Archives and Libraries)

Each Polish archive and library possesses printed catalogues for its Mss. holdings. Obviously, these do not cover, especially in the archives, all of the collections. Basic data on major archival and library collections is supplied in Richard C. Lewanski's publication, Guide to Polish Libraries and Archives (Boulder, 1974). The following is a list of catalogues for the archives and libraries mentioned above.


Very useful are the catalogues of microfilm and photocopy holdings relating to "Polonica" found in foreign archives. See B. Jagiełło, H. Karczówka and D. Majerowicz, Katalog mikrofilmów i fotokopii poloniców z archiwów zagranicznych, pt. 1 (Warsaw, 1965), pt. 2 (Warsaw, 1965).

See also Barbara Smoleńska and Teresa Zielińska, "Archiwalia prywatne w Archiwum Głownym Akt Dawnych w Warszawie (Archiwa magnackie)", Archeion, XXXVIII (1962), 167-197; and "Archiwalia prywatne w Archiwum Głownym Akt Dawnych w Warszawie (Drobne i szczątkowe zespoły i zbiory)", Archeion, XXXIX (1963), 87-108.

110 It covers both AGAD and Czart. collections.
(b). AKr: Stanisław Krzyżanowski, Katalog Archiwum Aktów Dawnych Miasta Krakowa, 2 vols., I [Dyplomy pergaminowe] (Kraków, 1907), II [Rękopisy 1-3568] (Kraków, 1915); and Stanisław Kutrzeba, Katalog Kra-
jowego Archiwum Aktów Grodzkich i Ziemskich w Krakowie (Kraków, 1909).

See also Stanisław Miczulski, "Archiwum Pinoccich", Archeion, XXVII (1957), 119-141.


(d). ZDIH: Władysław Bandura, Opis zbiorów rękopiściennych przechowy-
wanych w Zakładzie Dokumentacji w Krakowie (Warsaw, 1958-1959).

(e). Biblioteka Ordynacji Krasińskich (Warsaw): Although most of its manuscript collections perished in flames in 1944, pertinent data may be still obtained from the following catalogue: Franciszek Pułaski, Opis 815 rękopisów Biblioteki Ordynacji hr. Krasińskich (Warsaw, 1915).

(f). BUJ: Władysław Wisiocki, Katalog rękopisów Biblioteki Uniwersy-

111 Hereafter cited as BOK.

112 Hereafter cited as Opis.


(i). Czart: Józef Korzeniowski and Stanisław Kutrzeba, Catalogus codicum manu scriptum Musei Principum Czartoryski Cracoviensis, 2 vols. (Kraków, 1887-1913); and Konrad Zawadzki, Rękopisy Biblioteki Czartoryskich w Krakowie (Warsaw, 1965-1967). 113

(j). Kór: Inwentarz rękopisów Biblioteki Kórnickiej (Kórnik, 1930); Ryszard Marcinak, Michał Muszyński and Jacek Wiesiołowski, Katalog rękopisów staropolskich Biblioteki Kórnickiej XVI-XVIII w. I [Mss. 5-206] (Wrocław, 1971); Maria Olszewska and Jadwiga Luczakowa, Inwentarz rękopisów Biblioteki Kórnickiej [Mss. 1613-2700] (Poznań, 1963); and Andrzej Mężynski and Stanisław Potocki, Katalog korespondencji Działyńskich, Zamoyskich i rodzin spokrewnionych ze zbiorów Biblioteki Kórnickiej XVII-XX w. (Wrocław, 1972).


(i). Ossol: Wojciech Kętrzyński et al., Katalog rękopisów Biblioteki Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, I [Mss. 1-226] (Lviv, 1881); II

113 This catalogue contains a list of Mss. microfilmed and available at BN.

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[Mss. 227-561] (Lviv, 1886); III, part 1 [Mss. 562-937] (Lviv, 1890);


8. Other Annotated Catalogues


(b). Vyzvolna viina ukraïnskoho narodu v 1648-1654 rr. Vozzeddannia Ukrainy z Rosiieu. Anotovanyi pokazhchyk rukopysnykh materialiv biblio-
B. Primary Printed Sources

Due to various reasons, most of the seventeenth-century original official documents relating to diplomatic intercourse between the Polish Commonwealth and Ukraine have perished. This was also the fate of the bulk of original official and private correspondence, reports, journals and the like. Some of these, especially documents of "public" nature, survived to this day as copies in the many seventeenth-century inscription books compiled by nobles.¹¹⁴ Other documents were preserved because they were recorded in huge codexes, in the eighteenth century, for a conscious effort was made to collect sources for the preparation of A History of The Polish Nation by Adam Naruszewicz (1733-1796).¹¹⁵ For this reason the inscription books are called "Naruszewicz's Portfolios".¹¹⁶ Other documents still, were copied by historians in the nineteenth century.¹¹⁷

In the fourth decade of the nineteenth century began publication of source materials on large scale. Historians, as well as all sorts of "lovers of the past", influenced a great deal by the rising tide of nationalism and even hyper-nationalism, began to publish various types of sources. The cheap editions of diaries, chronicles and memoirs were very well received by the public. Some of these appeared in periodicals in a

¹¹⁴ For example, Czart., Ms. 1864.

¹¹⁵ Neomisja Rutkowska, Bishop A. Naruszewicz and His History of the Polish Nation: A Critical Study (Washington, 1941).

¹¹⁶ S. Grzybowski, Teki Naruszewicza (Krakow, 1960).

¹¹⁷ For example, PAN Kr., Ms. 1056.

serial form. The works of Wespazjan Kochowski (1633-1700) and Wawrzyniec Rudawski (1617-ca., 1690) as well as the memoir of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł (1593-1656) were translated from Latin into Polish. In 1864 was published, almost in its entirety, the *silva rerum* of Michałowski.

Unlike in the Russian Empire, where Russian and Ukrainian historians-ethnographers established a single Archaeographic Commission and began to publish in a scholarly and systematic manner, such activity in the three parts of partitioned Poland was decentralized among a number of institutions. This arrangement was not in the best interest of source publication. Moreover, much material was published by private individuals. Many of such publications, some of which are listed below, were not edited at all. Thus, alongside the excellently prepared source materials, there appeared also those of poor scholarly quality.

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121. Historia polska od śmierci Władysława IV aż do pokoju oliwskiego, czyli dzieje panowania Jana Kazimierza od 1648 do 1660 r., Włodzimierz Spasowicz ed. and tr., 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1855).


The following selected sources are valuable in the study of diplomacy between the Commonwealth and Ukraine during the years 1648-1659.

B. Primary Published Sources

1. Resolution of Diets


2. Resolutions of Dietines


3. Treaties

A. Malinovskii comp., of Vols. III (1613-1655) and IV (1656-1696)
4. Correspondence and Miscellaneous Documents

M. Kostomarov et al., eds., of miscellaneous documents in Vols. III (1638-1657), IV (1657-1659), V (1659-1663), VI (1663-1668), VII (1668-1669), VIII (1648-1657, 1668-1669), XI (1657, 1672-1674) and XV (1658-1659) of Akty YuZR (St. Petersburg, 1861, 1863, 1867, 1872, 1875, 1879, 1892);

G. F. Karpov ed., Peregovory ob usloviakh soedineniia Malorossii s Velikoii Rossieiu. 1653-1654: Vol. X of Akty YuZR (St. Petersburg, 1889); and Prisoedinenie Bielorussii. 1654-1655: Vol. XIV of Akty YuZR (St. Petersburg, 1889);

N. Kamianin ed., Akty, otnosiashchesia k epokhie Bogdana Khmelnitskago [1647-1655]: Pt. 3, vol. IV of Arkhiv YuZR (Kiev, 1914);

(1657-1659) and X (1659-1663) of LNA (Rome, 1962-1965); Vol. I (1622-
1670) of Litterae S. C. de Propaganda Fide Ecclesiam Catholicam Ucrainae
et Bielarujæ spectantes [Hereafter cited as LSC] (Rome, 1954); and
Vol. I (1600-1699) of Supplicationes Ecclesiae Unitae Ucrainae et Biel-
arujæ [Hereafter cited as SEU] (Rome, 1960); Dokumenty (1648-1654)
(Kiev, 1965); DKhmel., (1648-1657) (Kiev, 1961); Ambroży Grabowski ed.,
Ojczyste spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski. Diaryusze, Relacye,
Pamiętniki, i t.p., służyć mogące do dojaśnienia dziejów krajowych i tud-
dzież listy historyczne do panowania królów Jana Kazimierza i Michała Kory-
buta, oraz Listy Jana Sobieskiego marszałka i hetmana koronnego [Hereafter
cited as Ojczyste spominki], 2 vols. (Kraków, 1845). Vol. I (1542-1702);
Vol. II (1649-1814); I. M. Kamianin ed., "Dokumenty epokhi Bogdana Khmel-
nytskago 1566 i 1567 g.g. [sic.] izvlechennye iz Glav. Moskov. Arkhiva
Ministers. Inostran. Diel", Sbornik YuZR (Kiev, 1911), I, 25-117; Myron
Korduba ed., Akty do Khmelnychyny (1648-1657): Vol. XII, pt. 5 of Zherela
(Lviv, 1911); Księga pamiętnicza (1551, 1589, 1647-1658) (Kraków, 1864);
Lettres des Pierre des Noyers Secrétaire de la Reine de Pologne Marie-
Louise de Gonzague Princesse de Mantoue et de Nevers [à Ismaël Boulliau],
pour servir à l'histoire de Pologne et de Suède de 1655 à 1659, [Hereafter
cited as Lettres] [Ed. E. Rykaczewski] (Berlin, 1859); Pamiatniki (old
ed.) (Kiev, 1845-1859); (new ed.) (Kiev, 1898): Vol. I, pt. 3 (1648-
1966, 1974); "Die Berichte der kaiserlichen Gesandten Franz von Lisola
aus den Jahren 1655-1660", Ed. Alfred Francis Pribram, Archiv für Öster-
reichische Geschichte [Hereafter cited as AÖG], LXX (1887), 1-571; Sándor
Szilágyi ed., Okmánytár II. Rákóczi György diplomacai összeköltetéseihез

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5. Annals, Chronicles, Diaries, Journals, Memoirs, Reports and General Works

Samuel Gradzki, Historia Belli Cosacco-Polonicī authore Samuele Grond- 
ski de Grondi conscripta anno MDCLXXVI, Carolus Koppi ed. ([Pest], 1789); 
Mikołaj Jemiłowski (see n. 118); Joachim Jerlicz (see n. 118); Wespazjan 
Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae ab obitu Vladislai IV. Climacter primus 
[Hereafter cited as Climacter I] (Krakow, 1683); Climacter secundus. 
Bella Sveticum, Transylvanicum, Moschoviticum, aliasque res gestas ab 
Anno 1655. ad Annum 1661. inclusive contiens [Hereafter cited as Climac- 
ter II] (Krakow, 1688); Wjuk Wojciech Kojałowicz, De rebus anno 1648 et 
1648 contra Zaporovios Cosacos gestis (Vilnius, 1651); Pamiętniki o 
Koniecpolskich: Przycynek do dziejów polskich XVII wieku, Stanisław 
Przyłęcki ed. (Lviv, 1842); Pamiętniki historyczne do wyjaśnienia spraw 
publicznych w Polsce XVII wieku, posługujące, w dziennikach domowych 
Obuchowiczów i Cedrowskiego pozostaże, Michał Balinski ed. (Vilnius, 1859); 

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is my pleasant duty, at this time, to extend my sincerest thanks to the many persons who aided me, in one way or another, in the preparation and the completion of this dissertation.

I wish to express my gratitude to the members of my doctoral committee for their critical reading of this dissertation and for their valuable comments. I am especially indebted to Professors Paul Yuzyk (University of Ottawa) and Omeljan Pritsak (Harvard University), who supervised my work.

I am also grateful for having the opportunity to participate in the seminars conducted by various scholars in the Historical Institute of the University of Warsaw, during the academic years 1968–1970. I cherish especially the kindness and advice of the late Professor Janusz Woliński.

To Professors Władysław Czapliński (University of Wrocław), Adam Kersten (University of Lublin) and Zbigniew Wójcik (Institute of Polish History, Polish Academy of Sciences), I extend my thanks for their most helpful suggestions with regard to manuscript sources within the various archives and libraries in Poland, the Soviet Union and other European countries.

The kindness and help of the directors of archives and libraries, as well as their staff, can hardly be forgotten. They saved me countless hours of sifting through mountains of documents. I thank all of you.

I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to all persons responsible for awarding me the Province of Ontario Graduate Fellowships, during my studies at the University of Ottawa; and Poland/Unesco Fellowship in Slavic Studies, as well as Polish Ministry of Education Fellowship, at the University of Warsaw. Without this much-needed financial aid, my
doctoral studies and research, in Canada and abroad, would have been impossible.

Finally, I am extremely thankful for the infinite patience of my wife.

I take full responsibility for all view expressed in this dissertation, as well as for any errors in it.
EXPLANATORY NOTES

I. In this dissertation the spelling of White Ruthenian (Belorussian, Belorussian or White Russian), Russian and Ukrainian names follows the now common English translation of the Cyrillic alphabet, which is, more or less, adapted to correct pronunciation. The system of transliteration used here is the one -- with slight changes -- prescribed by the United States Library of Congress. Original spelling, with diacritical marks, is employed for languages which use a Latin alphabet.

II. Usage has made impossible a completely consistent spelling of proper names. In an attempt to solve this difficult problem, the following system was adopted in this dissertation:

1. Generally, an attempt has been made to retain the nomenclature of the seventeenth century.

2. The spelling of place names is based on the present political divisions of Eastern Europe. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Russian is used for place names within the Russian S.F.S.R.; Ukrainian, for place names within the Ukrainian S.S.R.; White Ruthenian, for those within White Ruthenian S.S.R.; and so on.

3. There is one principal departure from the method described above: it concerns place names which have acquired forms now firmly established in English. Thus, Kiev was used instead of Kyiv; Moscow, instead of Moskva; and Warsaw, instead of Warszawa.

4. The author was unable to find a satisfactory formula for determining the ethnic, or national, origin of all persons in the seventeenth century; thus, he had to use his own discretion with regard to spelling of the names of persons.

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III. The meaning and use of the following terms deserve a special attention and clarification:

1. **Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Polish Commonwealth or Commonwealth:** Since 1569 she was a confederative state, comprising the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

2. **Ukraine:** This was the name commonly used for the area comprising three south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth: Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv. In 1658, after Ukraine became the third part of the Commonwealth, she was renamed the **Grand Duchy of Ruthenia**. This new appellation should not be confused with **Ruthenia**, a palatinate of the Commonwealth. Moreover, care should be taken not to confuse **Ukraine** of the seventeenth century with contemporary **Ukraine**, i.e., **Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic**.

3. **Ruthenians:** In the seventeenth-century Commonwealth this collective name was used to designate the ancestors of present-day White Ruthenians and Ukrainians.

IV. Unless specifically noted, all dates are given according to the Gregorian, or the New Style, calendar, which in the seventeenth century was ten days in advance of the Julian, or the Old Style, calendar.

V. In order to save time and space, the author has excluded from the Bibliography some titles which appeared in the Preface, as well as others which were used for historiographical analysis in the concluding chapter.
ABBREVIATIONS

I. Manuscripts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>AGAD</td>
<td>Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Archiwum Branickich z Suchej</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKW</td>
<td>Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koz</td>
<td>Dział: Kozackie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ros</td>
<td>Dział: Rosyjskie</td>
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<td>Dział: Szwedzkie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tat</td>
<td>Dział: Tatarskie</td>
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<td>Archiwum Radziwiłłów</td>
</tr>
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<td>ASK</td>
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<td>RNK</td>
<td>Rachunki Nadworne Krółów</td>
</tr>
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<td>RP</td>
<td>Rachunki Poselstw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Rachunki Sejmowe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOZ</td>
<td>Biblioteka Ordynacji Zamojskiej</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Metryka Koronna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>Libri Inscriptionum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>Libri Legationum</td>
</tr>
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<td>AKr</td>
<td>Archiwum Miasta Krakowa i Województwa Krakowskiego (Kraków)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pin</td>
<td>Archiwum Pinoccich</td>
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<td>Rus</td>
<td>Zbiór Rusieckich</td>
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<td>AGd</td>
<td>Wojewódzkie Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku (Gdańsk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGd</td>
<td>Korespondencja miasta Gdańska</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSZP</td>
<td>Recesy Stanów Zachodniopruskich</td>
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<td>BN</td>
<td>Biblioteka Narodowa (Warsaw)</td>
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<td>BOZ</td>
<td>Biblioteka Ordynacji Zamojskiej</td>
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<td>BOK</td>
<td>Biblioteka Ordynacji Krasińskich (formerly in Warsaw)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUJ</td>
<td>Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego (Kraków)</td>
</tr>
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<td>BUWar</td>
<td>Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego (Warsaw)</td>
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<td>BUWr</td>
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<td>Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) Staatenabteilungen: Polen I</td>
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<td>PAN Kr</td>
<td>Riksarkivet (Stockholm)</td>
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II. Imprints

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<td>AHP</td>
<td>Acta Historica Res Gestas Poloniae illustrantia usque ab anno 1507 ad annum 1795.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akty YuZR</td>
<td>Akty, otniosiachciesia k istorii Yuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii, sobranye i izdannye arkheograficheskoiu kommissiei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMG</td>
<td>Akty Moskovskago gosudarstva, izdannye Imperatorskoiu Akademieiu Nauk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOG</td>
<td>Archiv fur osterreichische Geschichte.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkhiv YuZR</td>
<td>Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi vremennoi kommissiei dla razbora drevnykh aktov, pri Kievskom Voennom, Podolskom i Volynskom General-Gubernatorie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Audientiae Sanctissimi de rebus Ucrainae et Bielarusjae (1650-1850).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>Acta S. C. de Propaganda Fide Ecclesiam Catholicam Ucrainae et Bielarusjae spectantia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASKr</td>
<td>Akta sejmikowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego.</td>
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<td>Chteniaia</td>
<td>Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnosti Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom Universitetie.</td>
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<td>W. Kochowski. Annalium Poloniae ab obitu Vladislai IV. Climacter primus.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Climacter II</td>
<td>Climacter secundus. Bella Sveticum, Transylvanicum, Moschoviticum, aliasque res gestas ab Anno 1655. ad Annum 1661. inclusive contiens.</td>
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<td>Collectanea</td>
<td>Collectanea z Dziejopisow Tureckich Rzeczy do historyi Polskiey Służących.</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Congregationes Particulares Ecclesiam Catholicam Ucrainae et Bielarusjae spectantes.</td>
</tr>
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<td>DKhmel</td>
<td>Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho, 1648-1657.</td>
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<td>Dokumenty</td>
<td>Dokumenty ob osnovoditelnoi voine ukrainskogo naroda, 1648-1654 g.g.</td>
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<td>DPR</td>
<td>Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantia.</td>
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<td>Dzieje kuj</td>
<td>Dzieje ziemi kujawskiej oraz akta historyczne do nich służące.</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Elementa</td>
<td>Elementa ad Fontium Editiones.</td>
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<td>EMKC</td>
<td>Epistolae Metropolitarum Kiovensium</td>
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<td>Erdély</td>
<td>Erdély és az Északkeleti Háború. Levelek és Okiratok.</td>
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<td>Gazette de France</td>
<td>Recueil des Gazettes Nouvelles Ordinaires et Extraordinaires, Relations et Recits des Choses Avenues tant en ce Royaume qu'ailleurs, pendant l'année ....</td>
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<td>KH</td>
<td>Kwartalnik Historyczny.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Księga pamiętnicza</td>
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<td>Lettres</td>
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</tr>
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<td>LNA</td>
<td>Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>Litterae S. C. de Propaganda Fide Ecclesiam Catholicam Ucrainae et Bielarusiae spectantes.</td>
</tr>
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<td>MHHD</td>
<td>Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomateria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUH</td>
<td>Monumenta Ucrainae Historica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ojczyste spominki</td>
<td>Ojczyste spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski. Diaryusze, Relacje, Pamiętniki, i t. p., służyć mogące do dojaśnienia dziejów krajowych i tużże listy historyczne do panowania królów Jana Kazimierza i Michała Korybuta, oraz Listy Jana Sobieskiego marszałka i hetmana koronnego.</td>
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<td>O Naprawę Rzplitej</td>
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<td>Opis 815 rękopisów Biblioteki Ordynacji hr. Krasińskich.</td>
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<td>Pamiętniki (old ed.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>Przegląd Historyczny.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisma</td>
<td>Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polska 1655-1660</td>
<td>Prace historyczne w 30-lecie działalności profesorskiej Stanisława Zakrzewskiego.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>Polski Słownik Biograficzny.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sbornik YuZR</td>
<td>Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi komissiei dla razbora drevnikh aktov, sostiashchei pri Kievskom, Podolskom i Volynskom General-Gubernatorie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEU</td>
<td>Supplicationes Ecclesiae Unitae Ucrainae et Bielarusiae.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGGD</td>
<td>Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khraniashchikhsia v gosudarstvennoi kollegii inostrannykh diel.</td>
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<td>Sprawy</td>
<td>Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie. Materiały do dziejów kozaczyzny i hajdamaczyzny.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starożytnosci</td>
<td>Starożytnosci historyczne polskie, czyli pisma i pamiętniki do dziejów dawnej Polski, Listy królów i znakomitych mężów, przypowieści, przysłowia i t. p.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VMPL</td>
<td>Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia.</td>
</tr>
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<td>VUR</td>
<td>Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei. Dokumenty i materiały.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zherela</td>
<td>Zherela do istorii Ukrainy-Rusy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNTSh</td>
<td>Zapysky Naukowego Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

I

What does diplomacy mean? Since this word has acquired at least five different meanings in the English language,¹ it is, therefore, necessary to define in what sense it will be used in this monograph.

The author proposes to employ two definitions, both of which vividly reflect the diplomatic theory and practice of the seventeenth-century Polish Commonwealth. The first of these is given by The Oxford Universal Dictionary on Historical Principles:

[Diplomacy is] the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys;² the business or art of the diplomatist; [and] skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse and negotiations.³

The second definition, formulated by Sir Ernest Satow, clarifies and broadens the one above:

Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to their relations with vassal states.⁴

Having examined the definitions of diplomacy, it will be worthwhile to clarify the meaning of diplomatic theory and diplomatic practice. By the former, it is meant a generally accepted idea of the principles and

² Included here are, no doubt, diplomatic agents of lesser rank as well.
methods of international conduct and negotiations; by the latter, the most efficient manner in the conduct of international business, the principles of negotiation which are common to all international intercourse and the organization, as well as the machinery, of a diplomatic service.  

Great many examples may be cited in order to show that the Commonwealth's diplomatic theory and practice were characteristically Western European. Even though her diplomacy originated from and was part of the Western European system, one should not conclude that her diplomacy was a mere carbon copy. On the contrary, great many factors contributed to the formation of diplomacy which was characterized by certain distinctiveness and peculiarities.

One such factor was the Union of Lublin, which came into existence at the close of the reign of King Zygmunt August (1548-1572), the last of the Jagiellons. On July 1, 1569, following protracted negotiations, a union was sworn in Lublin binding the Kingdom of Poland (Crown) and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into one confederative state -- the Polish Commonwealth. In place of the hitherto purely personal tie, represented by the king, there was created a real union between the two countries based on two common institutions -- the monarchy and the parliament. In accordance with the provisions of the union the King of Poland, henceforth jointly elected, was to become at the same time the Grand Duke of Lithuania. Both the Crown and the Grand Duchy were to have a common Diet, currency and foreign policy. However, each one was to retain separate ministries, armies, treasuries, courts.

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5 Nicolson, op. cit., pp. 16, 35.
and administration. 6 This new political arrangement was destined to exercise profound influence on foreign policy and, in turn, on diplomacy.

Zygmunt August enjoyed a position of great strength in the formulation and the execution of foreign policy. However, within three decades following his death, political changes, constitutional innovations and other significant developments in the Commonwealth, many of which were expressed both in legislation and practice, not only weakened the power of his elected successors on the Polish throne, but also circumscribed their activities in foreign policy. In this way a stage was set for the decentralization of responsibility for foreign affairs, which was to lead to dire consequences for the state as a whole. 7

Perhaps the widespread belief among the nobles, during the interregnum of 1572-1573, that the first non-Jagiellon monarch might not hesitate to sacrifice the interests of the multi-national and multi-religious Commonwealth to those of his dynasty or faith, led them to curtail royal prerogatives in the area of foreign policy. Even though article 11 of the Union of Lublin stipulated that diplomatic contact with foreign states could be kept

6 On the Union of Lublin see the following documentary collections and monographs: Stanisław Kutrzeba and Władysław Semkowicz eds., Akta Unii Polski z Litwą (Kraków, 1932); J. Sawicki ed., Wybór tekstów źródłowych z historii państwa i prawa polskiego [Hereafter cited as Wybór tekstów], 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1951-1953); Oskar Halecki, Dzieje unii jagiellońskiej, 2 vols. (Kraków, 1919-1920); and I. I. Lappo, Velikoe Kniazhestvo Litovskoe za vremia ot zakliuchenia liublinskoi unii do smerti Stefana Batoriia (1569-1586) (St. Petersburg, 1901).

7 This sketch on the Commonwealth's diplomacy is based chiefly on the following studies: Adam Przyboś and Roman Żelewski, Dyplomaci w dawnych czasach: relacje staropolskie z XVI-XVIII stulecia (Kraków, 1959), pp. 27-61 (as well as the source materials from the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries); Zbigniew Wójcik ed., Polska służba dyplomatyczna XVI-XVIII wieku [Hereafter cited as Polska sł. dypl.] (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 11-367 (articles on diplomacy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Andrzej Wyczański, Roman Żelewski, Stanisław Grzybowski, Władysław Czapliński and Zbigniew Wójcik); and Stanisław Edward Nahlik, Narodziny nowożytnej dyplomacji (Warsaw, 1971).
only "with the knowledge and common consent of both Nations", this check on the king did not satisfy the nobles. They endeavoured to make more gains. Their representatives in the Chamber of Deputies or in the Senate would ascertain that the king directed his foreign policy in accordance with the wishes of his subjects, not in accordance with his own personal wishes, ambitions or interests.

At first glance the "Henrician Articles" confirmed by King Stefan Batory (1575-1586) in 1576, the resolutions of the Coronation Diet of King Zygmunt III (1587-1632) and the resolution of the Diet of 1593 regarding foreign envoys seem to suggest that the Diet became supreme in foreign policy. A closer look, however, will reveal that it was the Senate or, strictly-speaking, senators-resident, that gained impressive rights in the shaping and control of foreign policy. Thus, at the close of the sixteenth century this process of decentralization was quite evident: foreign policy was formulated and executed by the king, the senators and the deputies. It was not altogether a happy marriage.

The element of certainty is the most essential of all the components of sound diplomacy. Certainty can be best achieved by centralization of responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy in a single ministry, over which one individual has constant supervision. In France such a step was taken in 1626 by Cardinal Richelieu. Since the duality of the Polish-Lithuanian state structure extended to the level of ministries, the taking of a similar

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8 Wybór tekstów, I, part 1, 144-145.
step was impossible. This was another factor of Commonwealth's diplomacy.

There were two sets of officials who played an important role in foreign affairs: marshals and chancellors. Of the two, the latter shouldered most of responsibility. In the Kingdom of Poland there functioned two such ministers: the grand chancellor, the head of the major chancery; and the vice-chancellor, who headed the minor chancery. Since no clear-cut guidelines existed with regard to their duties and responsibilities, it was possible for strong-willed persons, like Jan Zamoyski or Jerzy Ossoliński, to overawe their junior-ranking colleagues. Of course, it was also possible for men like Andrzej Olszowski to out-maneouver and to eclipse the older and senior-ranking colleagues.

Parallel ministries existed in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The holders of these offices had analogous powers and were in similar positions as those of the Crown. The only more or less clear division with regard to the competence of these two pairs of ministers was one of geography: the Grand Ducal chancellors were empowered to maintain diplomatic relations with northern and eastern states; while their Crown counterparts, with western and southern states. Of course, this was hardly a hard and fast rule. For example, if the king took up residence in the Grand Duchy, the Lithuanian chancellors automatically acquired precedence over the same ministers of the Crown. Needless to say, many problems arose due to this arrangement and frequent disputes were waged over the areas of competence between the two sets of chancellors. In this way the dualism of the Commonwealth not only complicated, but even hampered, the control and conduct of her diplomacy.

The legal privileges enjoyed by the grand hetmans, the highest ranking military commanders of the Grand Duchy and the Crown, was the third factor
which had great bearing on diplomacy. Since 1590 the Diet empowered the hetmans of the Grand Duchy and the Crown to maintain diplomatic relations with certain neighbouring sovereign and vassal states: the former, with Russia, Sweden, Brandenburg and Kurland; the latter, with Turkey, Crimea, Moldavia and Wallachia. In the seventeenth century their geographical range of competence was widened to include diplomatic intercourse with additional countries. By their very presence in or near Ukraine, the Crown hetmans maintained control over and contacts with the Zaporozhian Army.

Initially, the gathering of intelligence for military purposes was the raison d'être of hetmans' diplomacy; in time, however, its scope was widened to include any information-gathering which might be useful to the state as a whole. Organizationally, their diplomacy was not integrated with the diplomatic service of the king and the Commonwealth. Thus, there existed a separate diplomatic apparatus under the direct control of the hetmans, who supplied their diplomats with instructions, full powers, letters of credence, letters of introduction and the like. It is interesting to note that while the chancellors made no attempt to restrict the diplomatic activity of hetmans' envoys, the latter were able to interfere in similar activities of the envoys of the king and the Commonwealth, if these were despatched to states within the hetmans' geographical area of competence.

The hetmans' diplomacy is frequently referred to by historians as an anomaly. Recent studies show, however, that it was an anomaly neither in the Commonwealth's nor in Western European system of diplomacy. For example, French ministers in charge of the Admiralty or of the Ministry of Finance and Trade, possessed similar powers, relating to diplomacy, to those held

10 On the hetmans' diplomacy see Wacław Zarzycki, Dyplomacja hetmanów w dawnej Polsce (Warsaw-Poznań, 1976).
by the grand hetmans of the Commonwealth.11

The extensive privileges of the hetmans described above is yet another example of the diffusion of responsibility for foreign affairs and diplomacy in the Commonwealth. This diffusion led to sad consequences. The hetmans, in their search for more power, regarded the kings and the chancellors as their rivals; thus, quite frequently they fostered and pursued foreign policy which was diametrically opposite to the one which was favoured in the royal court or the chancery. In the seventeenth century hetmans' diplomacy contributed greatly to the worsening of the international status of the Commonwealth and to her decline as a first-rate power in Europe.

The negative aspect of hetmans' activities may be used to introduce the fourth factor: the role of the "kinglets", or magnates, in the area of foreign policy and diplomacy.12 The hetmans frequently misused their diplomacy. Endeavouring to make personal gains or to secure benefits for client magnate families, they initiated secret negotiations with neighbouring states, even with those which were hostile to the Commonwealth. Similar criticism may be made of certain policies pursued by chancellors or actions taken by marshals and senators. To gain their desired ends, whether these concerned profit or vanity, some magnates were unafraid to take steps which were detrimental to the interests of the Commonwealth; indeed, a few individuals did not shudder even at the thought of treason.

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Those magnates who were neither ministers of the state nor senators were in a position to get much of that they wanted by means of "law or lawlessness". Even as private persons they were able to exercise, in one way or another, a great deal of influence on the foreign policy and diplomacy of the Commonwealth.

Due to the decentralization of the Commonwealth, weakness of the king and near impotence of the Diet, there emerged semi-sovereign "states" ruled by various "kinglets". "To become absolute sovereigns", claimed one contemporary, "they only want the privilege of coining". Indeed, such men possessed a great deal of power: they controlled vast tracts of land, held the highest offices of the state, exercised almost absolute control over their serfs and burgesses, kept private armies, garrisoned fortresses, maintained courts comprising lesser nobles, utilized a hierarchy of officials for economic matters, collected tolls and taxes from travellers and employed hundreds of servants. The magnates packed the dietines with their creatures and frequently utilized the forum of the Diet as an instrument for their personal purposes, using the deputies for the realization of their plans. At times they waged wars against their equals, terrorized their inferiors by armed raids and not infrequently pursued a foreign policy of their own liking notwithstanding that it did not suit the interests of the Commonwealth. They even organized armed expeditions and meddled into affairs of

13 Sieur de Beauplan, "A Description of Ukraine, Containing Several Provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, Lying between the Confines of Muscovy and the Borders of Transylvania. Together with their customs, Manner of Life, and how they manage their Wars", A Collection of Voyages and Travels, some Now first Printed from Original Manuscripts, Others Now first Published in English. In Six Volumes. To which is prefixed, An Introductory Discourse (supposed to be written by the Celebrated Mr. Locke) intituled, The Whole History of Navigation from its Original to this Time, Awnsham and John Churchill comps., 3rd ed. (London, 1744), I, 477.
the neighbouring states. Thus, the magnates represented yet another element which sought to gain a share in the formulation and execution of the Commonwealth's foreign policy. The magnates, by their actions, were greatly responsible for causing a havoc in her diplomacy.

The very broad and liberal interpretation of the ius legationis — it reminds one of the views which prevailed in later Middle Ages or in early Renaissance — was the fifth factor which exercised a great deal of influence on the diplomacy of the Commonwealth. The legal right to expedite and to receive envoys was not accorded only to the king, to the three "Estates" (king, senate and chamber of deputies) comprising the Diet or to Crown and Grand Ducal hetmans. It was accorded, as well, to certain individuals, institutions, corporate bodies and vassal and sovereign states. These were either part of the organism of the Commonwealth, connected to her by some ties or totally independent of her. Perhaps this right was based on the interpretation of the dual role played by envoys. One contemporary explains this role as follows: "Duplicis autem legationes sunt tituli. Quae intra Regnum, [i.e., domestic-political (internal)] vel quae ad exterros [i.e., diplomatic (external)]".¹⁴

Under this arrangement ius legationis was extended to include members of the monarch's family, the primate (Archbishop of Gniezno), during his tenure of office as interrex; rulers of Kurland and Prussia -- the latter's diplomatic service even could represent the Commonwealth in England and France; Cities of Gdansk and Riga; and foreign vassal and sovereign states.

There existed yet another body to which this rule applied: the Cossacks. No clear distinction was made by the Commonwealth's government, re-

¹⁴Nahlik, op. cit., p. 47.
garding the application of *ius legationis*; thus, it applied just as much to the registered Cossacks, represented by the "Elder" of "His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army", as to the Cossack masses in general, represented to some degree by the "Elder" of the "Knights" residing at the Zaporozhian Sich.\(^{15}\)

It should be remembered that the obvious diplomatic activity of the Cossacks — i.e., during their rebellions against the Commonwealth — is not taken into account here. Cossack leaders, representing the registered regiments or the Sich, were able to maintain diplomatic relations with foreign sovereign and vassal states even during times of peace. Thus, for example, in 1620 a mission was dispatched to Moscow by Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi;\(^{16}\) while late in 1625, the enovys of the Zaporozhians concluded an alliance with the Tatars.\(^{17}\) The main reason why the Cossacks were able to enjoy a certain form of autonomy and to conduct diplomacy, was their military strength. The power of the Cossacks, which could be increased tremendously if their ranks opened to absorb the serfs of Ukraine, the Commonwealth was neither able nor willing to crush.

By the first decade of the seventeenth century the Cossacks began to play an important role, as one of the internal factors, in shaping the foreign policy of the Commonwealth. From the second decade on, overshadowing other internal factors, they became a dominant force in her policy. This development can be seen clearly by examining the Commonwealth-Cossack treaties signed in the years 1614, 1617, 1619, 1625, 1630 and 1638.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{15}\) These terms are explained by nn. 34 and 41 below.

\(^{16}\) His envoys were granted audience on February 26 (O.S.): VUR, I, 3, 5.

\(^{17}\) Bohdan Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624-1629* (Tôdz, 1948), p. 36.

\(^{18}\) Shevchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
In 1648 Bohdan Khmelnytskyi brought the old "Cossack problem" of the Commonwealth to the international arena. With the aid of able helpers he organized a diplomatic service and established diplomatic relations with foreign states. Unsatisfied with the terms offered him by the Commonwealth, he pursued a policy of his own liking. In 1654 Ukraine became a quasi-protectorate of Russia. This arrangement lasted until 1658. In that year his successor, Ivan Vyhovskyi, bridged the gap between the Commonwealth and Ukraine. Thus, as will be shown in the following pages, from 1648 the Cossacks were transformed from an internal factor in the foreign policy of the Commonwealth, to her external partner in diplomatic negotiations.

Finally, in a brief outline, the following were some additional characteristics of the Commonwealth's diplomacy and diplomatic service. The Commonwealth did not have permanent diplomatic missions abroad, notwithstanding the efforts of King Władysław IV (1632-1648), who established the first network of consular agents. In the first half of the seventeenth century her diplomatic service, for the most part, was composed of non-professional personnel. During this period about one-third of all envoys were selected from among the magnates; some 40% from among the ranks of the nobles; while approximately 20% came from among the foreigners.

The following categories of diplomats were employed in the foreign service of the Commonwealth: envoys of the king and the Commonwealth, frequently referred to as "grand envoys"; enovys and commissioners of the king and the Commonwealth, often called "grand envoys" as well; envoys of the

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19 Ibid., pp. 81-112.
20 Czapliński, op. cit., pp. 244-245, 477.
king; secretaries of missions; various categories of diplomats in the
service of the hetmans; and several lower-ranking functionaries of the
foreign service. Ranks or categories of diplomats were based on the fol­
lowing criteria: their destination, nature of their missions and business
they had to transact. Missions sent abroad had a sporadic character, since
each one settled specific matter. Relatively few major missions were ex­
peditied during the time of peace; however, their frequency increased once
hostilities started.

In the period under discussion very sumptuous and costly missions were
sent to various countries. Some of this extravagance was partly respon­
sible for the formation of a negative attitude towards diplomacy on the part
of great many nobles of the Commonwealth. Such men viewed the costs as­
associated with the operation of the diplomatic service largely as needless
expense. They would rather see most of the funds spent on the army. Very
frequently they argued that all such costs should be passed on to the king.21

Due to this attitude of the nobles, as well as due to the lack of special
sources of revenue for the needs of diplomacy, there existed a chronic
shortage of funds. Thus, the Commonwealth's diplomacy was continually
struggling with serious financial difficulties.

For a clearer understanding of diplomatic relations between the Polish
Commonwealth and Ukraine during the years 1648-1659, which will be described
in the following pages, the reader should keep in mind all of the above­
mentioned characteristics and peculiarities of the Commonwealth's diplomacy.
He should, moreover, be fully aware of the social, economic, religious and

21 Roman Rybarski, Skarb i pieniądz za Jana Kazimierza, Michała Kory­
buta i Jana III (Warsaw, 1939), pp. 477-479.
legal condition of the Cossacks and Ruthenians who lived within the boundaries of the Commonwealth in the first half of the seventeenth century. The author hopes to shed some light on these topics by the sketches which follow.

II

In 1569 the Treaty of Union, concluded in Lublin, fused the kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into one confederative state called the Polish Commonwealth. One significant result of the Union of Lublin was that the remnant of the medieval principalities of the Kievan Rus, hitherto under the control of Lithuania, was incorporated into the Polish part of the confederation. The territories along both banks of the Dnieper River, comprising the southeastern borderlands of the Crown, were called Ukraine. The southernmost extremity of Ukraine's settled life extended into the steppes. Farther south the steppe "wilderness" -- the Wild Plains and Zaporozhe -- belonged to the Crown only nominally:

In this monograph the name Polish Commonwealth refers to the Polish-Lithuanian state as a whole. When it is necessary to distinguish the two component parts of this state, the names Crown and Grand Duchy are used for Polish and Lithuanian territories respectively.

Ukraine literally means "borderland". Throughout this monograph the name Ukraine is used in the same way as it was used by the contemporaries, who applied it generally to the territories comprising the Palatinates of Kiev, Brody (from 1569) and Chernihiv (from 1655). See Kochowski, Chronicle I, 65, as well as Macław Lipiński (Lipinski), "Nazwy "Rus" i "Ukraina" w ich pierwotnych historycznych", Z dziejów Ukrainy, pp. 47-51.

Zaporozhe literally means "land beyond the Catters" of the Dnieper River.
for, in reality, this vast territory, with its sparse population, was virtually a no-man's-land. The steppes receded near the shores of the Black Sea. Here began "the mighty bulwark of the Ottoman dynasty", the world of the Tatars, "warriors for the cause of Islam".  

Various peoples of heterogeneous origin inhabited the newly-incorporated lands of the Crown. Among them the Ruthenians constituted the dominant ethnic strain and formed the bulk of population. They possessed a distinctive language and culture, and most of them were Orthodox Christians. Also closely related to and identified with the Ruthenians was the unique socio-military element, which in time was to be known as the Cossacks.

The origin and development of the Cossacks was an organic outcome of the peculiar conditions of life among the borders of the steppes. Both the frequent incursions of Tatar hordes and the inadequately-organized system of defence were responsible for radically conditioning the lives and occupa-

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25 Ewlija Czelebi, Księga podróży Ewliji Czelebiego (Wybór), Zygmunt Abrahamowicz et al., eds. and trs. (Warsaw, 1969), 219, 222.

26 This is the old name for both Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, which survived to the twentieth century (Latin: Ruthenus, Rutheni, Ruthenia; from Rus, the name for the Kievan state and its inhabitants). In the middle of the seventeenth century the vast majority of southern Ruthenians -- i.e., the ancestors of the present-day Ukrainians -- inhabited the Crown's Province of Little Poland (Palatinates of Belz, Ruthenia, Volynia, Podolia, Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv); and the territory known as Zaporozhe. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was inhabited largely -- excluding the northern Lithuanian palatinates -- by the ancestors of the present-day White Ruthenians. See Lipiński, op.-cit., p. 48.

27 The West European form, Cossack, according to Barthold, is the result of Polish and Ukrainian pronunciation of the Turkish work Kazak, which means "robber", "disturber of peace" and "adventurer". See W. Barthold, "Kazak", Encyclopaedia of Islam, II(1927), 836.

tions of the people settled in the border regions. Unable to till soil peacefully and left virtually unprotected against the Tatar "army of pestilence", these people began to act on their own by imitating their deadly enemies. Thus, already at the close of the fifteenth century there were in existence "hordes" made up of the people of steppe borderlands. With the passage of time they adopted from the Tatars not only their methods of warfare, but also some of their ways of life and distinctive dress, and even their name -- Cossacks.

The majority of these Cossacks had no permanent homes or occupations. Some of them found seasonal work in the towns of Ukraine. Others used the steppe wilderness for diverse employment: fishing, hunting, trapping, bee-keeping and the like. Still others were engaged in steppe trade, or became, after a Tatar fashion, steppe herdsmen. With the approach of winter, these men gathered the fruits of their labour and returned to various towns close to the steppes.

But "Cossack life" was far from being limited to such peaceful pursuits. Bands of men, acting in order to forestall or to retaliate against some Tatar incursion, and some also for the sake of plunder and adventure, took part in various exploits. In the steppes they attacked Tatar herdsmen and seized their flocks of sheep or herds of cattle or horses; they also robbed Armenian and Turkish caravans. They carried out military expeditions against the Tatars by land, as well as sea-raids on the Crimean coasts and the shores of Asia Minor. During such expeditions the Cossacks destroyed Turkish galleys, plundered Muslim towns and freed Christian slaves from the captivity of the "infidels".

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29 Czelebi, op. cit., p. 235.
Under such conditions began the process of the evolution of a distinctive class of people, who, depending on circumstances, were engaged in peaceful or martial pursuits. This process was characterized by the coalescence of several ethnic and social elements. Even at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the ethnic and social backgrounds of the Cossacks resembled somewhat a mosaic. By that time, however, the Cossacks as a whole were established as a definite class of military freemen and the Ruthenian element was the dominant ethnic strain among them. The position of the Cossacks within the social structure of the Commonwealth -- where only three social classes were officially recognized (nobles, townsmen and serfs) -- was therefore unique: they constituted an anomalous "fourth" class.

The government of the Commonwealth was largely responsible for fostering precisely the conditions which enabled this anomalous class not only to exist, but also to develop. It was the tendency of the government to handle the affairs and needs of the far-removed borderlands with certain disinterest. Its policies made for this purpose were often contradictory and were characterized by curious indecisiveness and lack of imagination. By failing to provide a sound system of defence against the Tatar inroads or a means to destroy the Tatar menace, the government actually perpetuated continual guerilla warfare in the border areas. By thrusting the administration of these areas almost totally in the hands of the prefects or sheriffs (starosty), who were in a position to obey orders from Warsaw phlegmatically or even ignore them completely, it fostered chaotic administration. By being primarily interested in curbing the warlike activities of the Cossacks rather

than organizing them sensibly and taking advantage of their military potential, the government was largely responsible for their rebellions and the resulting grave problems for the whole state. The colonization policy of the government was one more factor which contributed to this evolutionary process of the Cossacks.

After 1569 Ukraine — this "promised land", this "most richest granery", this "fertile Ruthenian Egypt" and this "land overflowing with milk and honey" — became the spoil of great Polish and Ruthenian lords. These magnates, commonly called "kinglets", secured immense tracts of land, gained the highest administrative and military offices and introduced serfdom in a land hitherto without land-lords. Soon after, aided by their swarms of rapacious officials, they began systematically to exploit the local population. Since the Cossacks presented a problem not only to the expansionist policies of these "kinglets", but also to the tightly-regulated system of manorialism in general, these potentates endeavoured to reduce the Cossack to the status of serfs. The Cossacks therefore encountered new enemies in the borderlands, enemies who threatened to destroy their status of military freemen. Obviously, they had only one alternative: to oppose the new order.


Yet, even though various officials accused the Cossacks of "unsubmissiveness" and "rebellion", or called them "disobedient", this did not signify lawlessness on their part in most cases. On the one hand, some Cossacks, preferring the shelter of the borderland fortresses, attempted to gain the rights of the landed gentry and to free themselves from bearing the ever-increasing impositions of the sheriffs or their deputies. Living side by side with Polish or Ruthenian petty squires, who tilled the soil with their own hands and often suffered as the result of lawlessness of the magnates or their officials, the Cossacks cared little for the honour of possessing coats-of-arms.

On the other hand, the Cossacks malcontents fled to Zaporozhe. Here they established themselves as a military-monastic community. Operating from the Sich, their fortified island camp beyond the rapids of the Dnieper, they feared neither the threats of the Crimean khan and the Turkish sultan, nor obeyed the fiats of the Polish king. The Sich, formed as a reaction to the heavy hands of the borderland officials in the north and the Tatar danger in the south, became the centre for all dissatisfied elements of the society. This illegal "commonwealth" produced warriors who not only dared to take up arms against their suzerain, but who also carried out fantastic land and sea exploits in the forbidden Muslim world.

Both the governments of the Commonwealth and Turkey sought to reduce

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34 The first Sich was began ca. 1553 by Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi, on the Island of Khortytsia; it served as prototype and model for later structures of this nature. The Zaporozhian Sich served as a military center for all Cossacks, and it was moved from island to island as conditions demanded.

the power and attraction of the Sich. To the former, it was an illegal "state" which hatched rebels, received foreign envoys, formed alliances and spread fire and sword into the adjacent lands. To the latter, it was a nest of pirates, a scourge to Anatolia and Crimea. But neither of the two was able to destroy the Sich completely. The Zaporozhian "knights" had no problem in finding new recruits to fill their ranks. To them came adventurous men, outcasts of society and others who thirsted glory and feats of arms. There were also mass flights of fugitive serfs, even as far as the Palatinates of Ruthenia and Volynia, who searched for the forbidden Cossack fairyland.

Following each campaign of the Zaporozhians into the Turkish dominions, the Sublime Porte issued threats of war to the government of the Commonwealth. Ultimata sent from Constantinopole to Warsaw demanded either the destruction of Cossacks as a military organization or some effective control over their piratical habits. But the Commonwealth's government neither desired nor was in a position to carry out such demands. Indeed, as one contemporary remarked, the government's predicament resembled "a very hard knar, a knot strangely twisted". For a solution it required "not the sword of Alexander the Great, ... but the wisdom of Solomon".

To extricate itself out of this predicament, the government adopted various policies. On the one hand, its envoys were instructed to lodge protests against the Tatars before the sultan. The Crimean khan was bought

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36 As evident by the letter of Zygmunt III to the Senators, Warsaw, 21.X.1618 and the comments of other influential individuals: See Ryszard Majewski, Cecora, rok 1620 (Warsaw, 1970), pp. 24-25.

37 Krzysztof Palczowski, O Kozakach, ... Discurs (Kraków, 1618). Cited by Jabłoński, Pisma, II, 200.
off by the payment of "presents", or thinly-disguised humiliating tribute. Furthermore, solemn pledges of "friendship" were renewed, "eternal" treaties of peace were signed regularly and assurances were given to the sultan and his vassal that all Cossack "offenders" would be apprehended and suitably punished. Such policies proved to be futile, for neither the Zaporozhians ceased their sea raids into the Turkish possessions, nor the Tatars their incursions into the south-eastern palatinates of the Crown.

On the other hand, equally futile were the steps taken by the government to bring the Cossacks under discipline. These excellent soldiers and sailors, given a definite status and organization, would have cost the state very little to maintain as regular troops. Even the foreigners saw that they would have brought incalculable advantages to the state. The Cossacks, in the opinion of one Englishman,

would at all times, as occasion served, have been ready to have ejected great numbers of good soldiers into the Ottoman Territories, and might have conserved to balance the Power of the Tatars, which now daily infest and ruin the Borders of Poland. These people were like ill humours, which being vomited out into the Dominions of the Turk, eased and made healthy the Body politick of Poland; but being conserved within the stomach, caused Syncope, Convulsions, and such Commotions, as have of late years shaken the whole Body of the Polish Kingdom.39

Other contemporaries also proposed different courses of action for the government to follow. They emphasized the positive significance of the Cos-

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38 For example, it was revealed to the Diet that in one year 90,000 zl. was spend on 1,000 "German" infantrymen; while only 50,000 zl. on 10,000 Cossacks! Other calculations for expenditures on the army reveal the same disparity. See Majewski, op. cit., p. 25, n. 89.

39 Paul Rycaut, The History of the Turkish Empire from the Year 1623 to the Year 1667. Containing the Reigns of the three last Emperours, viz. Sultan Morat or Amurat IV. Sultan Ibrahim, and Sultan Mahomet IV. his son, the XIII Emperour now reigning (London, 1680), [part 1], p. 68. Italics in the original.
sacks to the state. Even though some of its members also shared such views, the government as a whole was reluctant to implement good advice by sound legislation. On the contrary, the government, under the heavy pressure of the magnates, began to pursue a blind course of action: it sought to find solution in repression of the Cossacks and eventual reduction of them to the status of serfs. Since it was still unable to cope with the Cossack power, it resorted to various short-term measures. These measures, often contradictory, were in most cases never executed properly; moreover, they also served as a source which nurtured the warlike characters of the Cossacks. The overall result of these actions of the government was that it only succeeded in alienating the Cossacks and caused them to rebel.

One of the ways by which the government attempted to control the Cossacks was by establishing a special category of "registered" Cossacks.

40 See, for example, Józef Wereszczyński's, Publika ... tak z strony fundowania szkoły rycerskiej synom koronnym, jako też Krzyżakom według reguły maltańskiej (Kraków, 1594); Piotr Grabowski, Polska niżna albo osada polska ([Kraków], 1596); and Szymon Starowolski, Pobudka abo rada na zniesienie Tatarów perekopskich (Kraków, 1618).

41 Starting in 1572 a certain number of Cossacks, varying from time to time, was enrolled for the service of the Commonwealth. The names of those accepted were entered into an official register (i.e., "Registered"), and they formed special regiments of the regular army. The Registered Cossacks received extensive privileges: apart from pay and uniforms, they were exempt from the jurisdiction of royal officials and were able to elect their own officers (this right was taken away for the period 1638-1648). Since they were recognized by the government, such rewards as grants of land and even ennoblement for meritorious service to the state, were within their reach.

The official Cossack Army, called His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army, was composed of Registered Cossacks. It was divided into regiments which were attached to designated towns in Ukraine; these into hundreds; and finally into tens. In 1638 the 6,000 Registered Cossacks formed six regiments: Cherkasy, Pereiaslav, Kaniv, Korsun, Bila Tserkva and Chyhyryn. In 1649 over 40,000 Registered Cossacks formed sixteen regiments: to the six already listed were added, Uman, Bratslav, Kalnyk, Kiev, Kropnyvna, Myrhorod, Poltava, Pryluku, Nizhyn and Chernihiv. The Cossack Army was a closed organization and carried out its own affairs. Except for the period 1638-
The registering of individuals brought about a clearer emergence of three general groups: the loyal registered Cossacks; the Zaporozhian outlaws; and the mass of common Cossacks, who gravitated between the two extremes.

The registered Cossacks were in a far more advantageous position than other Cossacks. They represented only a small percentage of all Cossacks and were officially recognized as regulars — "His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army" — in the service of the state. They were organized into regiments, stationed at designated towns in Ukraine and entrusted chiefly with the following tasks: maintenance of law and order in Ukraine, protection of frontiers against Tatar inroads and prevention of the Zaporozhian sea-raids into the Ottoman territories.

The legal status of these registered Cossacks rested on their "rights and privileges", which were recognized by the government. The legal status of the vast majority of the non-registered Cossacks was not clearly defined. All common Cossacks, who settled on lands owned by the nobles were subject to all laws and regulations imposed upon the serfs; but no such burdens were thrust upon the same Cossacks if they chose to live on crown lands. As far as the Zaporozhians were concerned, the government regarded them at times more or less as fugitive serfs; at other times, however, simply as a collection of dregs from various countries who were not even the subjects of the Polish king.

Since the government kept a small force of registered Cossacks, it was

1648, it had its own commander, court, chancery and ordinance officers; these, as well as all other regimental posts, were elective. The Army as a whole, under the guidance of the general staff, acted as an assembly. Similar internal organization was found at the Sich.
forced to enlist common Cossacks whenever major conflicts broke out. On such occasions, great numbers of Zaporozhians were "rehabilitated", even though they were frequently responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. In this way, thousands of non-registered Cossacks entered the ranks of His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army. Once a campaign ended, however, the same thousands were expected to return to "peaceful" occupations. By such means the government undermined its own structure: it degraded the registered Cossack "aristocracy"; weakened the authority of the registered Cossacks in general; caused loss of prestige associated with the register; provided for the common Cossacks opportunities to clamour for the "rights and privileges", which specifically were reserved for those registered; and enhanced the power of the lawless elements represented by the Sich.

There were other factors which undermined the loyalty of the registered Cossacks, erased sharp distinctions among all Cossacks and made possible greater co-operation among them. The chronic lack of funds in the state treasury meant that the registered Cossacks were frequently not paid for their military service. For this reason many of them fell under the spell of the Sich, and together with the Zaporozhians plundered the Turkish territories. In the same way, the many reductions of the quota of the registered Cossacks and the rapacity of local officials, drove others to support the causes of their malcontent brethren during rebellions. In 1638, when the government abolished most of the rights and privileges of the Cossack Army, the registered Cossacks were completely alienated. A stage was thus set for the hostilities a decade later.

The governmental handling of the "Cossack problem" was therefore highly unsatisfactory. The government tolerated the existence of the Cos-
sacks because it was neither able to bring them under its discipline, to crush their power completely, to reduce them to the status of serfs, nor to find for them a suitable place within the organism of the state. Yet, one of the most obvious solutions for the overall Cossack problem was the extension of at least the most important rights of the ruling class -- even to the exclusion of the patents of nobility -- to the Cossacks by the government.

This very issue was raised by the delegates of the Cossack Army at the Convocation Diet of 1632. The ruling class, however, was decidedly opposed to any plan which it would have to share their precious "golden liberties" with the Cossack "rabble". The Cossacks were part of the Commonwealth's body, the delegates were told, but only as her hair and nails, which had to be cut off if they grew too long.  

By rejecting a plan which would extend political rights to the Cossacks, the government paved the way for the entanglement of the Cossack problem with the grievances and aspirations of the Ruthenian people. It was therefore directly responsible for the rebellions which erupted quite frequently, especially in the 1630's. Since the Cossacks succeeded, time after time, in inciting "nearly all of Ukraine to rebellion", the government felt justified in sanctioning severe measures against the rebels. Its orders -- "to extinguish [the fire of rebellion] with the blood of these serfs" and to extirpate Cossack "lawlessness" with "the sword and every

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42 Radziwiłł, op. cit., I, 29. See also PAN Kr., Ms. 1062, fo. 13.
43 Major rebellions occurred in the years 1590-1597, 1625, 1630, 1635 and 1637-1638.
45 Koniecpolski to Volynian Nobles, Bar, 7.IV.1630: Ibid., I, 80.
severity" — were carried out by the Crown Army and the private troops of various "kinglets". On the wake of each suppression of a rebellion came the bloody "pacification" of Ukraine and then the confiscation of the lands belonging to the rebels. It was even "more profitable for nettle to grow on such sites", reasoned one military commander, "than to have the traitors of His Majesty and of the Commonwealth multiply there". The final act of each such bloody drama was performed by the Diet, which passed a new ordinance to keep the vanquished under control. Yet, for the most part, such ordinances were never put into force. It was only that of 1638 which had the dubious distinction of being the first one to be successfully executed.

"The Ordinance of the Registered, Zaporozhian Army, in the service of the Commonwealth" was the instrument which cut the difficult Cossack Gordian knot. It was the foundation upon which rested the whole weight of the "final solution" to the state's Cossack problem. Apart from reducing the quota of the registered Cossacks, the Ordinance of 1638 also introduced two major changes in the rights and privileges of the Cossack Army.

The first important change concerned the autonomy and "democracy" of the Cossack Army. While in 1625 and 1636 the government did attempt to

46 Władysław IV to Ukrainian Officials, Warsaw, 1.XII.1637: Szymon Okolski, Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej między wojskiem Koronnem i Zaporoskiem, w r. 1637, miesiąca Grudnia, przez Jaśnie Wielmożnego JMP. Mikołaja z Potoka Potockiego, ... szczęśliwie zaczętej i dokonczonej, K.J. Turowski ed. (Kraków, 1858), p. 63.


48 Such "constitutions" or ordinances were passed by the Diets in the following years: 1590, 1593, 1596, 1601, 1607, 1609, 1611, 1618, 1619, 1620, 1623, 1624, 1626 (two), 1627, 1628 and 1635.

49 VUR, I, 255-257.
curb the self-dependence of the Cossack Army, it still did not interfere in that Army's internal organization. The only exception was the intrusion of the Crown Grand Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, who either nominated or approved the appointment of the commander of the Cossack Army. All other senior and junior officers were Cossacks who were elected to their posts by the registered Cossack rank-and-file. Therefore, heretofore, the Cossack Army was a closed organization, able to carry out its own affairs. For that purpose the Army used its own headquarters office, court, ordinance officers and adjutants. The government provided the registered Cossacks with pay and uniforms; in return, they performed military service for the state. The Ordinance of 1638 took away these rights and privileges of the registered Cossacks. An appointed commissioner, a non-Cossack, replaced the elected commander of the Cossack Army. All of its senior-ranking posts were also filled by other non-Cossack appointees. Although the Cossacks were permitted to hold junior-ranking posts in the Army, these posts were non-elective and therefore also controlled by the non-Cossack superiors. Finally, the judicature and the head-quarters office were also abolished. In this way the Ordinance of 1638 took away from the registered Cossacks their most precious privileges.

The registered Cossacks still possessed certain personal rights, but in reality, these rights elevated them only a step higher than their enserfed brethren. The former Cossack "aristocracy" was now reduced to 6,000 common soldiers. Moreover, they were isolated from their environment, restricted to live in certain areas only, kept under very strict discipline and cut off from Zaporozhe. Under this new arrangement the government hoped that
chances of future rebellions were eliminated.\textsuperscript{50}

The second important change introduced by the Ordinance of 1638 was the abolition of personal rights of all non-registered Cossacks. All Cossacks not in the service of the state were reduced to the status of serfs. The opening paragraph of the new ordinance introduced this change in the following words:

We deprive them for all times of all their former jurisdictions, seniorities, prerogatives, incomings and other dignities acquired by their faithful service from our forefathers, but at present forfeited through this rebellion, and wishing to have those, whom the fortunes of war left among the living, as commoners reduced to serfs.\textsuperscript{51}

The Ordinance of 1638 was hailed by the vast majority of the nobles as an instrument which finally managed to cauterize effectively the wounds of the decapitated Cossack "Hydra". The Cossacks were driven to their burrows -- so ran the popular saying of the day -- and there they would remain.\textsuperscript{52}

The troublesome anomalous "fourth" class ceased to exist; in its place appeared thousands of Cossack serfs. The Fortress Kodak,\textsuperscript{53} by the first cata­ract of the Dnieper, rose from its ashes, and effectively checked both "the Cossack lawlessness and the Tatar incursions".\textsuperscript{54} The fortress also made

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Tomkiewicz, "Ograniczenie", pp. 148-151.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} VUR, I, 255.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Szajnocha (1900 ed.), op. cit., I, pt. 1, 122.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Kodak was built in 1635. In the same year the Cossacks, under the leadership of Ivan Sulyma, razed it to the ground. See Aleksander Czołowski, "Kudak. Przyczynki do założenia i upadku twierdzy", KH, XL (1926), 161-166; Michał Antonów, "Przyczynki do dziejów Kudaku", Prace historyczne w 30-leciu działalności profesoorskiej Stanisława Zakrzewskiego [Hereafter cited as Prace historyczne] (Lviv, 1934), 287-294; and Maryan Dubiecki, Kudak, twierdza kresowa i jej okolice, rev. and enl. ed. (Warsaw, 1900), 60-78.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} Cited by Czołowski, op. cit., p. 175.
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possible the rapid colonization of the Ukrainian borderlands, enabled the ruling class to pursue its economic system of exploitation and guaranteed for it the joys of the times of "golden peace".  

Ukraine, formerly characterized by chaos and violence, became "as peaceful as any town within the Crown".

Following the implementation of the Ordinance of 1638 the registered Cossacks, as well as their enserfed brethren, -- all of whom were the "great lovers of liberty" -- began to experience intolerable conditions of life. The high-ranking officers of the Cossack Army proved to be men whose gods were avarice and tyranny. While such men, on the one hand, were responsible for the "unbearable lootings and extorsions of the Cossacks", the local administrative officers, on the other, burdened the Cossacks by imposing on them illegal taxes, restricted their rights to husbandry, confiscated their properties and saddled them with many other oppressive measures.

As a result of such actions, there was an interrupted flow of Cossack

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57 Beauplan, op. cit., p. 448.

58 Miaskowski to NN, Bar, 3.IV.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, p. 10.

grievances to the highest military and civil authorities. But orders issued by the hetman or the king, to curb the excesses of officials, fell on deaf ears. In Ukraine during the 1640's there was no power to execute these orders. Potentates of the stature of Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki or Aleksander Koniecpolski ruled absolutely within their own "states". They, and others like them, parcelled Ukraine among their creatures, "who reduced the Cossacks, the meritorious servants of the Commonwealth into serfs, robbed them, pulled their beards and harnessed them to plows". Too few individuals saw that "the Cossacks [were] oppressed more than the common serfs". Too late they realized that the Cossacks were prepared "to venture even into hell itself in order to cast off such bondage and oppression as the poor wretches evidently experienced".

The registered Cossacks realized that they had little choice but to resort to arms in order to protect their existence as a military class. Their appeals for justice produced little result. The king was impotent. The influence and power of the "kinglets" grew to unprecedented heights. Thus, late in 1645 several Cossack leaders initiated steps for a general uprising and even began to negotiate a military alliance with the Tatars.

60 Władysław IV to Koniecpolski, Warsaw, 24.VI.1647: Ossol., Ms. 2280/I, fo. 237; and Potocki to Ossoliński, Bar, 21.XI.1647: Czart., TN, Ms. 141, no. 61.


63 Kysil to Potocki, Kobyshiv, 16.III.1648: Sprawy i rzeczy, p. 81; and Kysil to Lubienski, [Hoshcha], 31.V.1648: VUR, II, 26.

64 Temberski, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
The Cossack-Tatar alliance failed to materialize, but in the following year an excellent opportunity presented itself for them to win back their liberties.

In 1646 King Władysław IV secretly requested Cossack support for his planned war with the Ottoman Empire. The delegates of the Cossack Army, who proceeded to Warsaw to confer with the king, were somewhat doubtful of the whole business. The very secrecy in which the king conferred with them suggested the weakness of his position. He had neither the power to declare and wage war nor to annul the Ordinance of 1638 without consulting the Diet, and the Diet would never consent to war with Turkey or to repeal its legislation against the Cossacks. Yet, if the king managed to confront the Diet with a fait accompli and to emerge a victor from the war against the Muslim world, he would be in a position to establish an absolute monarchy and thereby fulfill all his promises to the Cossacks. For these reasons the delegates of the Cossack Army agreed to carry out the wishes of the king and pledged the support of all Cossacks.

The task of preparing Cossack enlistments and the construction of sea vessels for a naval campaign could not be accomplished in secrecy. Rumours among the Cossacks regarding the new development grew in such intensity, that Crown Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki interpreted them as "sedition" and "turbulence", and took steps to restore discipline. To the nobles, the rumours, the frantic military activity and the hostile attitude of the Cossacks, signified a conspiracy of the king and the Cossacks against

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65 Wiktor Czermak, Plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV (Kraków, 1895).

66 Potocki to Leszczyński, [Bar, ca., 31.V.1646]: Ossol., Ms. 200/II, fo. 218r.
them. They decided that this must be stopped, for only fatal consequences would follow: Władysław's defeat would be disastrous to the state; his victory would endanger their liberties. The Diet of 1646 put an end to their fears: Władysław was forbidden to wage war with Turkey and compelled to demobilize his mercenary army. This also meant that the Cossacks were ordered to cease all preparations for a naval campaign.

But the ruling class was not satisfied only in halting Cossack military preparations. The nobles, after gaining victory over the king, also took the opportunity to vent their fury on the Cossacks themselves, since in their estimation, the Cossacks were "king's men" and instruments in his absolutist designs. In the words of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi — a typical example of how injustice prevailed during this time — the nobles began to treat the Cossacks as bondsmen, prepared for them conditions which were worse than those experienced by Turkish galley slaves and intended even to eradicate the Cossack name itself.

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68 Volumina Legum, IV, 83-85.

69 Khmelnytskyi to Władysław IV, Bila Tserkva, 2./12.VI.1648: DKhmel., pp. 33-34.
III

The metamorphosis of the registered Cossack "aristocracy" to common soldiers and of common Cossacks "knights" to enserfed tillers of soil paralleled other significant developments in Ukraine. One of these was the attainment by the magnates of land monopoly, great wealth, unprecedented influence and ominous power. ⁷⁰

The "states" of the "kinglets" transformed the Polish state into a curious federation of republics and monarchies which existed side by side on the principle of non-intervention. ⁷¹ These potentates were largely responsible for the perpetuation of unique conditions which created chaos within the state ⁷² and which, as it was sarcastically pointed out by a foreigner, suitably served at the same time as heaven for nobles, paradise for Jews, purgatory for kings and hell for serfs. ⁷³ The rise of the magnate class into the most prominent position within the state was accomplished by the increased oppression of the Ruthenians, especially of the unprivileged classes.


⁷¹ Jabłonowski, Pisma, II, 90.

⁷² This state of affairs was especially noted by the foreigners. Typical of such critical remarks were those made by John Barclay. See [Łukasz Opaliński], Polonia Defensa contra Ioan. Barclaium, Ubi occasione ista, de Regno Gentegue Polona multa narratur, hactenus litteris non tradita (Gdańsk, 1648).

⁷³ Jan Ptaśnik, Miasta i mieszczanstwo w dawnej Polsce (Kraków, 1934), p. 376.
The magnates took advantage of the times of "golden peace" in order to consolidate and to extend their landholdings in Ukraine. At the same time as they founded new settlements, villages and towns, they also initiated an intensive campaign of exploitation. It was their desire to thrust the impositions of serfdom upon the local population of their latifundiae.

In the western palatinates of the Crown, where the ruling class was firmly entrenched, the yoke of serfdom was the heaviest. In Ukraine, by comparison, the burdens were much lighter. The settlers, who were enticed by the magnates' agents into its frontier areas in former years, were granted exemptions from tribute and duties for long periods of time. In return for these concessions the settlers were required to provide defence against the Tatars. After their periods of "free-settlement" expired, the settlers were obliged to pay to their masters only moderate tribute and rents. This was generally the state of affairs in the 1640's on the left bank of the Dnieper. At the same time, however, conditions worsened for those living in certain districts of the right bank, for they were burdened with additional labour and specific services.

The duties and hardships of the serfs are vividly illustrated in Krzysztof Opalinski's satire, "Na ciężary i opresyją chłopską w Polszcze". See his Satyry albo Przestrogi do Naprawy, Rządu y Obyczaiow w Polszcze Należące, Na Pięć Xiąg rozdzielone ([Leszno], 1650). See also the various "inventories" of villages in the 1630's and 1640's: VUR, I, 104-105, 168-169, 340-341, 395-396; as well as the following studies and monographs: Stanisław Śreniowski, "Wieś polska w połowie XVII w.", Polska 1655-1660, I, 41-82; Jan Rutkowski, Studia z dziejów wsi polskiej XVI-XVIII w., Witold Kula ed. (Warsaw, 1956); Edward Trzyna, Położenie ludności wiejskiej w królewskich województwach województwa krakowskiego w XVII wieku (Wrocław, 1963); Zbigniew Cwiek, Z dziejów wsi koronnej XVII wieku (Warsaw, 1966); and Andrzej Kamiński, "Neo-Serfdom in Poland-Lithuania", Slavic Review, XXXIV (1975), 253-268.

Certain practices adopted by the magnates affected adversely the Ruthenian population as well. The magnates, upon a guarantee of a specified annual income, leased urban and rural areas of their estates to any individual.\textsuperscript{76} The appointed poor petty gentry to administer their estates. They also had no qualms about signing contracts with the Jews, or accepting them as their tenants, intermediaries or agents. All such individuals, apart from the task of raising adequate revenue for the magnates, took the opportunity to reap maximum profits for themselves. They therefore exacted revenue from every conceivable source and used methods which were in fact lawlessness and violence.\textsuperscript{77}

Under such a system of exploitation the conditions of life of serfs in Ukraine were extremely harsh. One foreigner remarked that "the Boors are esteemed nor used no better than Slaves";\textsuperscript{78} another, that "the Peasants in Ukraine and the neighbouring Provinces are like Slaves";\textsuperscript{79} another still, painted the following grim picture:


The peasants there are very miserable, being obliged to work three days a week, themselves and their horses, for their lord; and to pay proportionately to the land they hold, such a quantity of wheat, abundance of capons, pullets, hens and goslins; that is at Easter, Whitsontide and Christmas: besides all this, to carry wood for the said lord, and a thousand other jobs they ought not to do; besides the ready money they exact from them, as also the tithe of their sheep, honey, and all sorts of fruit, and every third year the third beef. In short, they are obliged to give their masters what they please to demand; so that it is no wonder those poor wretches never lay aside anything, being under such hard circumstances. Yet this is not all, their lords have an absolute power, not only over their goods, but their lives; so great is the prerogative of the Polish nobility (who live as if they were in heaven, and the peasants in purgatory) so that if it happens that those wretched peasants fall under the servitude of bad lords, they are in worse condition than galley-slaves.80

During the same period the conditions of the urban population of Ukraine also worsened. Due to various actions and restrictions of the magnates or their creatures, the towns became centres of agricultural districts rather than centres of commerce and industry. Apart from Kiev, the towns of Ukraine made insignificant contributions to cultural, political or social life of the state as a whole. There were many reasons for such a curious state of affairs.

The ruling class generally failed to recognize the positive value of towns to a particular region or to the state as a whole. Many towns in Ukraine shielded themselves against its tentacles by claiming self-government under the Magdeburg Law, or various privileges under royal charters. Nevertheless, all such municipal rights were often disregarded by various officials. Townspeople were generally held in contempt by the ruling class, even the wealthy merchants, who could have easily bought up dozens of

80 Beauplan, op. cit., p. 499. Italics in the original.
country squires. In fact, the townspeople in many districts of Ukraine were frequently treated no better than serfs, for they were compelled to pay various taxes and tribute and even to perform labour services. The treatment of burgesses in the "private" towns of the magnates was even worse. 81

Apart from the serfs and the townspeople, the magnates also oppressed their lesser "brethren". While, for various reasons, the potentates paid lip-service to the maxim about the quality of each noble; de facto, such equality was only a myth. There were countless examples to demonstrate that the magnates regarded the petty squires as their pedestals. If the oligarchs dared to challenge their monarch, time after time, then what obstacle could a country squire present to them?

It was characteristic of the times that the strong gained their ends by violence; only the weak had to resort to seek justice in the courts. If a magnate coveted certain property belonging to a lesser noble, this individual could not shield himself with a charter issued by the royal chancery, which confirmed his title to the land. Unless he had the backing of an equally-powerful patron, the magnate was in a position to seize that property by force. Moreover, it was possible for the magnate to take even more drastic action against his weak neighbour: he could deny the

squire's rights as a noble and force him to bear all the burdens of a serf. 82

Thus, during the time of "golden peace" not only the Cossacks, the serfs or even townspeople, but also Ruthenian nobles had various reasons for hating the "absolute" rule of the magnates and their creatures. To such ill-feeling, the religious conflict only added fuel to the fire.

IV

The religious conflict between the Orthodox and the Uniates developed after the failure to establish a church union in 1596 at the Council of Brest. 83


83 On the Union of Brest and religious conflicts see the following documentary collections and studies:

Documentary collections: VMPL, III; DPR, I; Arkhiv YuZR, pt. I, Vol. IV; and Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, 39 vols. (St. Petersburg, Petrograd, Leningrad, 1872-1927), VII and XIX.

Studies: M. J. A. Rychcicki, Piotr Skarga i jego wiek, 2 vols. (Kraków, 1850); Makari [Bulgakov], Istorija russkoi tserkvi, 12 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1877-1891), IX; Julian Pelesz, Geschichte der Union russischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1878-1880); Edward Likowski, Unia Brzeska (r. 1596), 2nd rev. ed. (Warsaw, 1907); Kazimierz Chodynicki, Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska, 1370-1632 (Warsaw, 1934); Janusz Woliński, Polska i Kościół Prawosławny: Zarys historyczny (Warsaw, 1936); Hrushevskiy, op. cit., V; Oscar Halecki, From Florence to Brest (1439-1596) 2nd ed. (New York, 1968); M. M. Solovii and A. G. Velykyi, Sviatyi Tosaft Kuntsevych: Ioho zhyttia i doby (Toronto, 1967); and M. V. Kashuba, Z istorii borotby proty Unii XVII-XVIII st. (Kiev, 1976).
At the Council the church union was supported by a majority of the Orthodox hierarchy, including the Metropolitan of Kiev. Two bishops, however, together with a large number of delegates from the monasteries and parish clergy, as well as with representatives of the laity, desired to remain members of the Orthodox Church. Having failed to reach an agreement on the question of union, the two sides eventually concluded their deliberations by excommunicating and anathemizing each other.

With the passage of time the Uniate edifice was unsteady, but it managed to stand because it enjoyed the full support of the government, which recognized only the decisions of the Roman party at the Council of Brest. By this recognition the government officially sanctioned the existence of the new Uniate Church, made it the sole representative of all the Orthodox Ruthenian people within the Commonwealth and treated the Orthodox Church as legally non-existent. Such a policy created a great hardship for the Orthodox: their church services were suppressed; and many of them lost their civil and political rights. Some twenty-five years after the Council of Brest an absurd situation prevailed: on the one hand, the Uniates possessed a hierarchy, many empty churches and a relatively small flock of faithful; on the other, the Orthodox "Schismatics" had one bishop, fewer churches and a countless number of faithful.

It was through the vigorous actions of its faithful that the Orthodox Church managed to respond to the challenges of its Uniate rival. Although

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84 On the plight of the Orthodox see the speech of Lavrentyi Drevynskyi, the deputy from Volynia, at the Diet of 1620. Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VII, 445–447.

the Eastern Church was abandoned by most of the Ruthenian aristocracy, it found other able leaders in its monasteries and in the ranks of its laity — chiefly lesser Ruthenian nobles and townspeople. Operating from such centres as Lviv, Ostoroh, Lutsk and later on Kiev, these were the individuals who prevented the Orthodox Church from falling into a deeper state of degeneration and its ecclesiastical affairs from becoming more disorganized. They took upon themselves the challenge of its regeneration. The Ruthenian serfs played only a passive role by being tenaciously attached to the traditional faith. One more segment of the Ruthenian society, the Cossacks, also made incalculable contributions to the Orthodox Church. They made possible for it to redouble its missionary activities and to organize its own defence in depth against the "Latinist encroachments".

Of course, the Cossacks were not always the staunch supporters of Orthodoxy; neither were they always the irreconcilable enemies of Uniatism. Even as late as the close of the sixteenth century their religiousness could only be measured by the antithesis with the world of Islam. The vast majority of the Cossacks paid little attention to the solemn pronouncements at the Council of Brest; also, theological polemics between the Orthodox and the Uniates and even the general plight of the Orthodox Church concerned them little. For these reasons the Cossacks were considered to be men "without religion" and religious "rebels" even by the most enlightened representatives of the Eastern Church.

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86 Jabłonowski, Pisma, II, 23.

87 Ibid., pp. 37, 101.
by the second decade of the seventeenth century the Cossacks assumed an active role in the affairs of the Orthodox Church.

From 1610, when the Cossacks made the first major public manifestation of their support for the Orthodox Church, they continued to play a vital role in the church affairs. In 1615 Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi, as well as Cossack officers and the rank-and-file of the Zaporozhian Army, became members of the Kievan Brotherhood. In 1620-1621 the Cossacks helped to restore the Orthodox hierarchy and thereby secured the continuity of the life of the Church. They acted as arbitrators between the quarreling Orthodox factions; they cooperated with the Orthodox clergy, nobles and burghesses and championed before the government for the rights of the Eastern Church; and they were prepared to draw their swords in the defence of their faith. Because of their protection, Kiev became the center from which radiated Ruthenian cultural, religious and national life.88

The Cossacks were therefore no longer mere adventurers, but doughty exponents and preservers of the traditions of the Kievan Rus. This was emphasized in a memorandum89 of the Orthodox hierarchy to the government:

[The Cossacks] are the sons of the glorious Ruthenian people, from the seed Japeth, who waged war against the Greek Tsardom [i.e., Byzantium] both on the Black Sea and on the land. This host is [a descendant] of that generation, which during [the reign of] Oleh, the Ruthenian monarch, ... attacked Constantinopole. They [are also the descendants of those, who] during [the reign of] Volodymyr, the sainted Ruthenian


89 It was based on newly-discovered Old Rus chronicler. See O. Pritsak, "The Hypatian Chronicle and its Role in the Restoration of Ukrainian Historical Consciousness", Why Endowed Chairs in Ukrainian Studies at Harvard? (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 54-60.
monarch, waged war against Greece, Macedonia and Illyria. Their ancestors, together with Volodymyr, were baptized, accepting the Christian faith from the Church of Constantinople, and even to this day are born, live and die in this faith.  

Because the Cossacks were so involved in the affairs of the Orthodox Church, they were partly responsible for its gains in 1632 from the newly-elected King Władysław IV. One of the most significant concessions to the Orthodox was the legalization of their hierarchy and the designation for it a number of episcopal sees. In the years that followed the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Petro Mohyla, — a prelate of high birth, superior character and great learning — inaugurated a period of rapid growth for the Orthodox Church. The new college he founded in Kiev in 1631, which gained the status of academy in 1658, was the most important step in the survival of the Orthodox Church in the Commonwealth. But even under these circumstances its free development was hampered by various restrictions.

Some of the Orthodox faithful considered that they suffered greater oppression than the Orthodox Christians under Islam: their churches had been taken over by the Uniates, they did not have the freedom of worship and they were denied sacraments and even public burials. Other intolerable conditions included the leasing of their churches to the Jews, who collected fees for baptisms, marriages and even for opening the churches on Sundays and holy days. Under these circumstances, all efforts to create


91 On the Kievan Academy see Aleksander Jabłonowski, Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilańska. Zarys historyczny na tle rozwoju ogólnego cywilizacji zachodniej na Rusi (Kraków, 1899-1900).

a meaningful union of churches within the Commonwealth failed to produce the expected results. 

"The Union", wrote the Lithuanian Chancellor to the Uniate Archbishop of Polatsk, Iosafat Kuntsevych, who was later murdered by Orthodox fanatics, "has not produced joy, but only discord, quarrels and disturbances. It would have been better if it never existed".

The result of the overall religious struggle between the Orthodox and the Uniates and the persecution of the Orthodox faithful were extremely significant. Those who attacked the Eastern Church were actually contributing to the solidification of all segments of the Ruthenian society. The cultural, social and ethnic cleavages, which existed between Polish or Polonized ruling class and the majority of the Ruthenian people, were further deepened by religious differences. The attempts to force Uniatism on the Orthodox Ruthenian population had the result of awakening its national consciousness and hastened the formation of the Ruthenian nationality.

As the religious and national aspirations of the Ruthenians became fused with the Cossack problem the Cossacks became the representatives of the Ruthenian society as a whole. In the Cossack ranks were found Ruthenian nobles, townspeople and serfs; and on the whole, the Cossacks received support of the Orthodox clergy. Furthermore, through the Cossacks, --

93 King Władysław IV endeavoured to create, in place of the Union of Brest, a lasting union of churches. One of his far-reaching plans was to affect a religious compromise between the Orthodox and Uniates and to create for them a separate patriarchate within the Commonwealth. On the background and issues see Mikołaj Andrusiak, "Sprawa patryjarchatu kijowskiego za Władysława IV", Prace Historyczne, pp. 269-285; and Isydor Nahaiovskyi, Obiednannia tserkyi i ide patriarkhatu v Kyievi (Toronto, 1961), pp. 37-72.

94 He was murdered in 1623. In 1867 he was canonized by Pope Pius IX.

these heirs of Kievan Rus, the armed representatives of the Ruthenian people and the faithful members of the Orthodox Church -- the most enlightened Ruthenian circles attempted to re-establish the severed political and national traditions of the former Kievan State. Thus cemented, the "alliance" of the Cossacks with the Orthodox Church posed new problems for the Polish Commonwealth.

The repercussion of this "alliance" was felt by the Commonwealth both in her foreign relations and domestic affairs. Religious conflicts within the state provided various states -- notably Turkey and Russia -- with opportunities to agitate the Cossacks and the Orthodox in order to carry out their designs. For such a purpose the Sublime Porte was in a position to prevail upon various high-ranking Orthodox clergymen or even upon the Patriarch of Constantinopole, who exercised spiritual jurisdiction over the Commonwealth's Orthodox faithful, for he was physically the subject of the Turkish sultan. Since the Muscovite Patriarchate served as a magnet for the Orthodox world, and since on some occasions Orthodox subjects of the Polish king appeared in Moscow,\(^96\) the influence of Russia was more dangerous to the Commonwealth.\(^97\)

The involvement of Cossacks in religious conflicts on the side of the Orthodox Church also caused serious domestic problems for the Commonwealth. By the 1630's the Cossack rebellions became more frequent than in former

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\(^96\) It should be noted that the contemporaries referred to Russia as Muscovy.

\(^97\) K. G. Guslistyi, "Istoricheskie sviazi Ukrainy s Rossiei do osvo-boditelnoi voiny 1648–1654 gg"*, VUR (Sbornik), pp. 36–41; and F. P. Shevchenko, Politychni ta ekonomichny zviazki Ukrainy z Rossiei u v seredni XVII st. (Kiev, 1959).
years. One of the main reasons for this development was because the Cos-
sacks made good use of their "alliance" with the Orthodox Church. In
order to secure more support for their causes, the Cossacks began to ap-
peal to the Ruthenians by the use of religious slogans. Those used in
1637 and 1638 were typical: the Cossacks took up arms not only in the de-
fence of their "golden liberties", but also in defence of their "Christ-
ian faith".  

With such slogans as "[Rise] against these adversaries of our Greek
[Orthodox] faith!" the Cossacks were successful in stirring the Ruthen-
iian society as a whole into action. Such calls were answered by the re-
ligious: priests, monks and even nuns fomented revolt among the Ruthenians.
Both the townspeople and nobles of "Greek [Orthodox] faith" provided war
materials to the Cossacks and themselves participated in rebellions. Of
course, the Ruthenian serfs needed little encouragement to rise against
"their own lords".  

Under the conditions described above, lived the Cossacks and the Ruthen-
ians in the Commonwealth. In 1648 the revolt led by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi,
shattered the hitherto existing arrangements.

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98 Pavliuk to the Cossacks, Moshny, 15.XII.1637: Okolski, op. cit.,
pp. 46-47.


100 Ibid., pp. 14-15. See also Szymon Okolski's, Kontynuacja dyaryusza
wojennego, czułością Jaśnie Wielmożnych Ich Mściów Panów Hetmanów Koronnych,
ochotę czego rycerstwa polskiego, nad zawziętymi w uporze krzywoprzysięgłych
i swobodnych kozakami, w roku 1638 odprawiona, ... K. W. Turowski ed. (Kraków,
1858), p. 90.
Bohdan Zynovii Khmelnytskyi was a typical representative of the Ruthenian half-noble and half-Cossack well-to-do landowning registered officers, who served in "His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army" in Ukraine. Khmelnytskyi was a man of substance, conservative in his outlooks and loyal to the king and the state. That this man, a product of such an environment, was eventually called a "traitor", is only a clear indication of the shortcomings of the policy pursued by the "kinglets" and their henchmen in Ukraine in the 1640's.

In this period, called the "golden peace" by the gentry, many Cossacks experienced intolerable conditions of life. This was also the fate of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi: he became the victim of the lawlessness of a typical borderland magnate, Aleksander Koniecpolski, and his creatures—particularly of Daniel Czapliński. In due course he was materially ruined, arrested, incarcerated, made a fugitive and finally declared an enemy of the state. There was only one road open to him — to Zaporozhe. There he fled at the close of 1647.\footnote{On the background of Khmelnytskyi see the studies of his biographers, particularly those of Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, pt. 2, 4-174; Lipiński, "Krzyczewski", pp. 354-364; and Krypiakevych, Khmelnytskyi, pp. 13-120. Cf. Gawroński, Chmielnicki, I, 24-159.}

By the first week of February 1648 Khmelnytskyi managed to gather a sizable unit of followers and became the master of the Sich. Once he secured his position as a leader, he began to direct a campaign of agitation...
throughout Ukraine. Since he acted both as an agent of King Władysław IV and of the "conspiracy", comprising members from "all the Cossack regiments and throughout Ukraine", he was successful in gaining many new supporters for the cause he represented. Moreover, in the same month, Khmelnytskyi's envoys succeeded in concluding a military alliance with the Crimean Tatars.

The commander-in-chief of the Crown Army in Ukraine, Crown Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, attempted to deal with this situation by issuing orders to the registered Cossacks to seize Khmelnytskyi, to disperse his followers and to re-occupy the Sich. Failing to achieve this aim, he tried to lure Khmelnytskyi and his supporters out of Zaporozhe with promises of "mercy" and "forgiveness" for their deeds. Failing to make impression on them, the hetman decided to send Mikołaj Chmielecki "with a manifesto and an instruction ... in order to encourage the good [Cossacks] to keep their loyalty and to bring the evil ones to their senses". Potocki tempted Khmelnytskyi with offers of safe conduct, forgiveness for his actions and restoration of his estate. To the Cossacks he promised to make considerable concessions. Once again he failed to convince the Cossacks.


Finally, he issued a manifesto, by which he threatened to confiscate the possessions of all those who did not heed him, as well as to execute their wives and children.\textsuperscript{106}

In response to his initial offers, Potocki received politely-worded letters which contained a litany of grievances\textsuperscript{107}. Later on he learned about the demands of Khmelnytskyi: withdrawal of the whole Crown Army from Ukraine; removal of all the colonels, who were in command of the registered Cossack regiments, from their posts; disbanding of their non-Cossack guard detachments; restoration of all former liberties, privileges and rights to the Cossacks; and repeal of the Ordinance of 1638.\textsuperscript{108}

While Potocki was willing to relieve some of the high-ranking officers of their command, to take steps against those tenants who unjustly oppressed the Cossacks and to guarantee to them free access to their steppe occupations,\textsuperscript{109} the above demands were unacceptable to him. He gave his reasons for taking such a stand in a lengthy letter to the king.\textsuperscript{110}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{106} Potocki to Cossacks, Korsun, 20.II.1648: \textit{Dokumenty}, p. 15.
\item\textsuperscript{107} Khmelnytskyi and Cossacks to Potocki, Zaporozhe, 3./13.III.1648: \textit{DKhmel.}, pp. 23-30.
\item\textsuperscript{108} Potocki to Władysław IV, [Korsun], 31.III.1648: \textit{VUR}, II, 15-16; and "Pierwszy okres", p. 263.
\item\textsuperscript{109} "Pierwszy okres", \textit{Ibid.}
\item\textsuperscript{110} Potocki to Władysław IV, [Korsun], 31.III.1648: \textit{VUR}, II, 15-17.
\end{itemize}
This is a very interesting letter. In it Potocki justified his actions and gave various reasons why -- against the wishes of the king -- he was compelled to march against Khmelnytskyi. This letter contains, for obvious reasons, many intentional examples of exaggeration and overemphasis: it is still, nevertheless, a useful source, for it contains some valuable details and information.

Potocki's statement about the "conspiracy", for example, which he equated with sedition and treason, signifies that an organized plan was prepared even before Khmelnytskyi's flight to Zaporozhe in 1647. The hetman claimed that the "conspirators" wanted absolute control over all of Ukraine. His version is incredible: literally it means that plans were made to set up a sovereign state comprising the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv. It is hardly possible that at this early stage anyone even dreamed of taking such a step. What the Cossacks really wanted was autonomy in a part of Ukraine, which was largely inhabited by them, within the existing structure of the Commonwealth. Keeping this in mind, it is quite understandable why Khmelnytskyi made such demands as he did in March. The autonomy of the south-eastern Ukraine was possible only once the Cossacks regained their former liberties, once the Ordinance of 1638 was repealed and finally, once the Crown troops were no longer quartered or stationed there.

Potocki gave various reasons to the king why these demands were unacceptable. Among others, he claimed that Khmelnytskyi and his followers craved "lawlessness" and desired to do away with all the restraints placed
on them and sanctioned by the Diets. At this point Władysław was reminded that this was accomplished at a great cost: "a great deal of nobles' blood was shed". Potocki feared, no doubt, that any part of Ukraine under the Cossack control would no longer be available for the growth of latifundiae and wealth of the magnates, or even for the panis bene merenitum -- the gentry. This was, after all, the underlining issue for the "bloodshed". He also tried to convince the king that acceptance of the demands amounted to granting a licence to the Cossacks to take up arms at will against their monarch. "The late ancestors of Your Majesty, as well as Your Majesty Himself", experienced this situation many times already, argued Potocki. Yet, with the information he possessed, this "vir prudent" and this "good guardian" of the status quo, could hardly interpret Khmelnytskyi's actions as defiance to king's authority.

One report, the credibility of which cannot be questioned, states that Khmelnytskyi operated in Zaporozhe with the aid of a "red flag with a white eagle" as well as with "some kind of charters" which were granted "a year ago" by "His Majesty". According to Khmelnytskyi, these "charters" confirmed former Cossack "liberties of the land and sea". The flag, just as the mace, was one of the insignias of the office of the "Elder" of the registered Cossacks. The flag signified to the onlooking Zaporozhians royal approval of the man before whom it was flown; moreover, it was a visible symbol of his office, authorizing him to exercise power accorded to it. That such a man be entrusted with some important commission, for

111 Miaskowski to NN, Balabanivka, 16.II.1648: Lipiński, "Krzyczewski", p. 497, doc. no. v.
which he possessed royal "charters", was also quite natural to the Zaporozhians. In any case, they were hardly in a position to question the new arrival about his commission, to debate about the authenticity of the "charters" or to quibble about the seals. They were satisfied that he was a "king's man" and pledged him their support. In this way Khmelnytskyi acted as the king's agent and carried out enlistments in his name.

Does this mean that another "conspiracy", or some sort of a secret agreement, existed between Władysław and Khmelnytskyi? Many contemporaries believed that this indeed was the case.\textsuperscript{112} Considering all evidence, however, one must admit that such an arrangement is incredible. A more satisfactory explanation is that Khmelnytskyi was aware of — and indeed was prepared to support — the war plans and the aspirations of King Władysław and Crown Grand Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński. The first stage concerned the provocation of a clash with the Tatars, which was to be expanded in a general conflict with the Turks. The second stage was revolutionary, for it envisioned the transformation of the weak elective monarchy into an absolute hereditary monarchy.

\textsuperscript{112}See Sobieski's report to the Convocation Diet, 5th session, Warsaw, 21.VII.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, 120-121. Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo noted as follows: "Between him [Khmelnytskyi] and his friend the Cral [Władysław IV] a secret agreement was planned, that Akhmil [Khmelnytskyi] should raise his head in rebellion, and that the Cral should assist him with troops; in order to eradicate the Polish Grandees one and all, and to allow him to become king in his own right, who should rule, and not be ruled by them". Paul of Aleppo, \textit{op. cit.}, I, part 2, 173.
Ossoliński laboured for that goal already for some time. He aimed at eradicating the "gentry democracy", which he despised. Out of the masses of the gentry he hoped to create an aristocratic elite. This group was to be allowed to shine at the royal court, to hold high ranks in the army and to own large estates; its members, however, would no longer be capable of independent political influence or of continual interference in the administration. The running of the government was to be entrusted to capable men who would be dependent upon the king for their careers and salaries. Most of the nobles, especially the magnates and the "kinglets", were not unaware of the aims of the chancellor. Their strong opposition to the war with the Muslim world was prompted not as much from the fear of the Ottoman Empire, as from the fear of the loss of their "golden liberties".  

Precisely that which was feared by most of the nobles, was greatly desired by the Cossacks, for an absolute monarch, unshackled from the chains of obligations of the pacta convena and the resolutions of the Diets, was in a position to fulfill his promises to them. At the Convocational Diet most of the senators and the deputies were shocked to hear that the Cossacks expected drastic changes to be introduced within the Commonwealth: the masses of the petty squires — "the poor servants" of the magnates — were to be reduced to the status of "boyars" or free peasants; their "lords", or magnates, to the status of "nobles"; while the king was to

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113 Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 279-280, 283-284; Tomkiewicz, Wiśniowiecki, p. 91; and Czapliński, Dwa sejmy, pp. 32-34.
become "the only head" and was to be obeyed by all. Once this report was finished, voices rang out charging Ossolinski for setting this project. It was, indeed, the carbon-copy of the chancellor's plan.

Khmelnyskyi was his obvious ally. In Khmelnyskyi's view it was necessary to change the unteneable position of the king from a mere primus inter pares among the magnates to an absolute ruler. Only such a monarch would be able to guarantee the existence of the autonomous part of Ukraine within the Commonwealth, desired by the Cossacks, as well as to protect fully the rights of his Ruthenian subjects. "We pray to God that Your Majesty, Our Gracious Lord, may become an autocrat like other kings", he wrote to Jan Kazimierz before his election, "and not [remain] just as the late predecessors of Your Majesty, who were really in the bondage [of the nobles]".

Being aware and in support of the war plans and the aspirations of the king and the chancellor, Khmelnyskyi eventually decided to take advantage of them. Once he made up his mind to flee to Zaporozhe, he secured by deceit all the insignia of the Cossack "Elders" office as well as the royal "charters" or "Letters". All of them came into the hands of the "Elder"-designate, Ivan Barabash, in 1646 and 1647. Khmelnyskyi played

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115 Ossol., Ms. 189/II, p. 123.
116 Khmelnyskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Zamosć, 15.XI.1648: DKhmel., p. 80.
his cards well: not only was he able to gain the support of the Zaporozhians and to receive the attention of the king, but also he raised the expectations of the royalists that a naval campaign was being launched against the Muslim world.\(^{118}\) This indeed might have happened, were it not for the attitude of Potocki. Knowing that the hetman was not a whole hearted supporter of the royalist camp and not believing in his promises, Khmelnytskyi concluded an alliance with the Tatars. He did this in order to safeguard himself against Potocki and to gain the opportunity to draw the king's attention to his and to Cossacks' grievances.\(^{119}\)

Potocki, seeing that further negotiations were pointless,\(^{120}\) resolved to march against Khmelnytskyi and to crush him in Zaporozhe. He claimed that he had to act before the "rebels" strengthened their ranks and managed to penetrate into Ukraine; otherwise, he would have to deal with the rising of the serfs as well.\(^{121}\) In deciding on this course of action he ignored the orders of the king, to settle all differences with the Cossacks by negotiations and then to allow them "to go out on the Black Sea", as well as the advice of others, — particularly of the Palatine of Bratslav.

\(^{118}\) Kysil to Dolgorukov, Kobyzhcha, 28.III.1648: Akty YuZR, III, 167; and Księga pamiętnica, p. 17.

\(^{119}\) Khmelnytskyi to Władysław IV, By Bila Tserkva, 2./12.VI.1648: DKhmel., pp. 33-34.

\(^{120}\) Potocki to Kysil, Cherkasy, 14.IV.1648: Dokumenty, pp. 24-25.

\(^{121}\) Potocki to Władysław IV, [Korsun], 31.III.1648: VUR, II, 16.
Adam Kysil, — not to take such a risky step. Confident of success, late in April he appointed his son Stefan to lead a vanguard against Khmelnytskyi. A major encounter between the two forces took place on April 29 at Zhovti Vody. By May 16 the vanguard was annihilated by Cossack and Tatar troops. On May 26 the main body of the Crown Army, commanded by Potocki, also suffered an overwhelming defeat near Korsun.

These military disasters brought to an end the decade of that "golden peace" which was in effect since 1638. The Crown Army, the best troops of the state, ceased to exist. Potocki, as well as the second-in-command, Crown Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski, became Tatar captives. To make matters even worse, at a time when the Commonwealth needed a strong leader, she was to experience the usual chaos of the interregnum, for on May 20 King Władysław died. To add to the misfortune of the nobles, the southeastern palatines of the Crown became engulfed by a terrible fire — the rising of the serfs. These events foreshadowed, in the view of one knowledgeable person, a "terrible rerum metamorphosis" for the Commonwealth.
CHAPTER I

THE SEARCH FOR A NEW MODUS VIVENDI:
JUNE 1648 TO AUGUST 1649

I

In the view of one historian, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi found himself, by the month of June 1648, in a position similar to that of a man who, while attempting to vault into a saddle, jumped over a horse instead. Certainly, Khmelnytskyi managed to gain considerably more than he expected; thus, he was in a position to take another decisive step along the road he had been travelling for the past five months.

In February, by being elected hetman, he gained the highest military office. This event began a new and a decisive period in the history of Ukraine. The new Cossack hetman, notwithstanding that he took up arms to satisfy his personal ambitions, to secure official confirmation of the rights of the Cossack Army and to gain concessions for the Orthodox Church, also laid the corner stone for Ukraine's state-building. Even though he and his companions may have not fully appreciated the consequences of their actions at this early stage, each of their successes added a brick to this edifice of Ukrainian statehood.

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1 Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, pt. 3, 9.

2 Khmelnytskyi to Władysław IV, Bila Tserkva, 12.VI.1648: DKhmel., pp. 33-34; and Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, 23.II.1649: VUR, II, 108.
In the same month Khmelnytskyi's envoys concluded a military alliance with the Tatars. By taking this step Khmelnytskyi automatically gave new dimensions to the "Cossack problem": no longer was it an internal problem of the Commonwealth. Ukraine's alliance with Crimea complicated the treaty arrangements of three powers: the Commonwealth, Ottoman Empire and Russia. Ukraine thus emerged in the international arena.

There is little doubt that, had Khmelnytskyi been overwhelmed by Potocki shortly after his first diplomatic success, he would have remained a shadowy historical figure. But he was not vanquished. In the months of April and May he smashed the Crown Army in two main engagements. As a victor he became the undisputed master of Ukraine. By the beginning of June the former fugitive of Zaporozhe must have realized that he reached a fork in the road. If he took one branch, he had a chance to gain autonomy for Ukraine within the Commonwealth. Of course, she had to be restructured into a triune state to accommodate the Cossack-Ruthenian victors. If he proceeded along the way of the other branch, a chance existed for Ukraine to lead a separate existence. Thus Khmelnytskyi had to decide on the status most suitable for Ukraine: a confederation or a statehood.

Obviously, at this time his plans were far from being precisely formulated. He concluded that, before taking a decisive step in one direction, he would explore all avenues open to him. For this reason, more than for any others suggested by various historians, he halted his victorious Cossack troops near Bila Tserkva.

There were three matters of great concern to Khmelnytskyi at this time: agreement with Turkey; attitude of Russia; and military strength of the Commonwealth.

Khmelnytskyi's efforts with regard to the first matter were soon
crowned with success. In June — perhaps in the first half of the month — Colonel Fylon Dzhalialii negotiated military-commercial agreements in Constantinopole. Since the terms of these treaties were similar to those outlined in various treaties concluded between the Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, it is clear that the Turks regarded Ukraine — not the Commonwealth — as their immediate northern neighbour. Another interesting aspect of these arrangements is that they show no evidence that the Cossack hetman was regarded by Sultan Ibrahim I as his vassal. Moreover, by these arrangements with the Turks Khmelnytskyi was able to check the actions of his troublesome Tatar allies who, in the process of supporting him, managed to ravage a large part of Ukraine and to take thousands of her inhabitants as captives.\(^3\)

The second matter concerned Russia. According to the terms of the treaty concluded in 1647, Russia was obliged to aid the Commonwealth militarily if the latter were invaded by Crimea.\(^4\) When the Tatars came to the aid of the Cossacks, the Commonwealth appealed to her ally to honour her obligations. This she was prepared to do. The tsar issued an order to this effect on May 20/30, 1648. Khmelnytskyi learned about this decision after intercepting communications between the Russian borderland officials and the Commonwealth's representative, the Palatine of Bratslav, Adam Kysil. The

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\(^3\) Omeljan Pritsak, "Das erste türkisch-ukrainische Bündis (1648)", *Oriens*, VI (1953), 266-298.

Cossack hetman was thus compelled to take quick steps to prevent Russian military intervention in Ukraine, for a blow against the Tatars was at the same time a blow against the Cossacks. During June and July Khmelnytskyi began a campaign in order to convince the tsar and his officials that military intervention in Ukraine on behalf of the Commonwealth was not in the best interest of Russia.

In order to win Russian support, Khmelnytskyi resorted to flattery, temptation and threats. He flattered Alexei Mikhailovich by referring to him as the protector of Orthodoxy and tempted him with the vacant Polish throne, the recovery of Smolensk territories and with vague suggestions that Cossacks wished to accept him as their protector. The Cossack hetman also appealed for tsar's troops to support the Cossack cause; shamed the Russians that they, such staunch defenders of Orthodoxy, even considered giving aid to the "Poles" to be used against their own co-religionists; and emphasized that Russia should expect only goodwill from the Cossacks. He issued threats: if no troops were sent from Russia to aid Ukraine, the Cossacks would be forced to co-operate with the Tatars against the Russians.

Khmelnytskyi's apprehension over the possibility of Russian intervention, his lack of trust of Tatar allies and his fear of speedy recovery of the Commonwealth, -- while she received a bad wound, her back was hardly broken -- led him to seek terms from her as well. This was the third matter of great concern to him.

5 On relations between Ukraine and Russia see Jan Seredyka, "Stosunki ukraińsko-rosyjskie w 1648 r.", Historia [Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego] XXXIII (1960), 169-175.

It must be remembered that Khmelnytskyi did not cut all ties with the Commonwealth. On the contrary, he always maintained that he was a loyal subject of the Polish king. After the victorious battle near Korsun, for example, Khmelnytskyi wrote a friendly letter to one petty squire warning him of danger from marauding bands, over which he had no control. In this letter he professed allegiance to Władysław IV, expressed hope that he would deal a crushing blow to "His and our enemies" — i.e., the magnates — and wished that "God may grant that His Majesty, Our Merciful Lord, reign over us many years". In his letters to various men of influence he described himself and his troops as "the faithful subjects of His Majesty". His letter to the king, signed as the "Temporary Elder of His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army", contains many statements of loyalty from "the lowest pedestals and faithful subjects". In his letter to Kysil, Khmelnytskyi mentioned that he was fully aware that the king had no part in the "lawlessness" exercised over the Cossacks. For this reason he had no intention of "repudiating" the king "for another Lord"; on the contrary, he sent his envoys to Warsaw with statements of "faithful subordination" to the king's authority.

7Khmelnitsky to Czerny, By Bila Tserkva, 17./27.V.1648: DKhmel., p. 32.
8Khmelnitsky to Kazanowski and Zasławski, By Bila Tserkva, 2./12.VI. 1648: Ibid., pp. 39, 41.
9Khmelnitsky to Władysław IV, By Bila Tserkva, 2./12.VI.1648: Ibid., p. 34.
10Khmelnitsky to Kysil, By Bila Tserkva, 3./13.VI.1648: Ibid., pp. 44-45.
Khmelnytskyi seemed to give a clear indication of the policy he would follow in his letter to King Władysław. In it he indicated that peace was possible only if the rights and liberties of the Cossacks were restored and the power of the magnates and their creatures curbed. He implied quite clearly that the Cossacks and the king had a common interest in fighting the tyranny of the magnates. Khmelnytskyi pretended not to know about the death of the king; therefore, this strongly-worded letter of loyalty to the king and condemnation of the magnates was intentionally written for the purpose of supporting the efforts of the "peace party". It was to be interpreted also as a vote for that candidate to the Polish throne that this party supported. Moreover, this pretense conveniently enabled Khmelnytskyi to make reference to the "charters" granted by Władysław to the Cossacks — a dead king could not deny it. It was a tactic designed to gain greater concessions. At the same time Khmelnytskyi wrote polite letters to several influential persons, all of whom he considered to be supporters of the "peace party", asking them for intercession upon the Cossacks' behalf.

The "instructions" to his envoys contained various "requests" of the Cossack Army. Addressed to the king, most items of these instructions dealt with great many grievances against the administrative officials and military officers. As it is evident from the instructions, the chief aim of Khmelnytskyi was to secure the repeal of the Ordinance of 1638 and the confirmation of all former Cossack liberties "granted and confirmed by

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11 Khmelnytskyi to Władysław IV, By Bila Tserkva, 2./12.VI.1648: Ibid., pp. 33-34.

charters ... by the late Kings of Poland as well as by His Majesty". Three items specifically related to the Cossack Army: the doubling of the quota of the registered Cossacks to 12,000 men, the restoration of the former military self-government of the Cossack Army — as this was according to "the will of His Majesty" — and the granting of the back-pay for five years to the registered Cossacks. The final item showed that Khmelnytskyi's perspectives began to widen, for he called for the re-establishment of the full authority of the Orthodox Church and the restoration to the Orthodox faithful of all confiscated churches. Thus, on the whole Khmelnytskyi made, under the circumstances, very moderate claims. These amounted, more or less, to his desire of reaching a compromise with the government.

Notwithstanding Khmelnytskyi's "moderation", it was not easy for the men who guided the policies of the Commonwealth at this time to respond to him in favourable terms. There were two main reasons for this development: suspicion and distrust of Khmelnytskyi's motives; and a deep rift among the magnates and the nobles with regard to the course of action to be pursued.

Concerning the first, it was already pointed out that Khmelnytskyi indicated that he desired to gain an autonomous territory under Cossack control as far west as Bila Tserkva. When the nobles analyzed his "official" and "unofficial" requests, most of them became quite alarmed. This meant that a large portion of Ukraine would be placed in the hands of a man who was loyal to the king and who would command a regular force some three times larger than the Crown Army. Moreover, to this area officials and
Crown troops would have no access, in which the magnates would have no sway and most likely lose their fortunes and in which the Orthodox would become predominant. For these reasons it is no wonder that in the correspondence of the nobles one can find references to this "Ruthenian prince" Khmelnytskyi, who intended to carve out a "sovereign Ruthenian principality" or even to establish a "Ruthenian monarchy".  

With regard to the second, the division was a very serious matter for, at a time when unity of action was of the utmost importance, there emerged two rival groups among the nobles, each one proposing a different solution for dealing with the problems confronting the Commonwealth. One group was led by the Crown Grand Chancellor, Jerzy Ossoliński; the other was dominated by the Palatine of Ruthenia, Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki.

Ossoliński acted quickly, influencing the indecisive feeble and old Interrex, Primate Maciej Żubiński, and even used half-legal measures to accomplish his aim. His primary concern was to prevent the fusion of the Cossack "rebellion" with the rusing of the serfs, as well as to terminate the Cossack-Tatar military alliance. He believed that these sources of danger could be averted by means of governmental concessions to the Cossacks. He was even willing to grant them autonomy in Ukraine, as long as they remained part of the Commonwealth. Ossoliński reasoned that the pacified Cossacks, in order to safeguard their newly-gained concessions, could be easily induced to quell the rusing of the serfs.

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14 Kysil to Żubiński, [Hoshcha], 31.V.1648: VUR, II, 25; NN to NN, Lviv, 4.VI.1648, Uliński and Jaskólski to [Żubiński], Bar, [8].VI.1648, speech of Leszczyński at the Convocational Diet, 2nd session, Warsaw, 17.VII.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 34, 39, 109; Miaskowski to NN, Kamianets, 8.VI.1648, NN to NN, Brody, 10.VI.1648: Szajnocha, op. cit., II, part 2, 407, 409; Ostroróg to Ossoliński, Lviv, 4.VI.1648: PK, p. 424; Kochan to NN, Bar, 5.VI.1648: and Leszczyński to Chamberlin of Pomorze, Warsaw. 8.VI.1648: Dokumenty, pp. 38, 43.
Once domestic strife ended, Ossoliński planned to revive the old animosities between the Cossacks and the Tatars and then to direct the former against the Muslim world. In this way the war plans would be set into motion and the power of the candidate for the Polish throne of his own choice would be strengthened. The Cossacks could always be used as an instrument in the royalist reaction against the anti-monarchical faction of various oligarchs and nobles.  

For these reasons Ossoliński and his supporters initiated a programme of conciliatory policy towards the Cossacks. The immediate aim of this group was to stop all hostilities with the Cossacks and to settle all their demands by means of negotiations.

The main aim of the other group — to use the words of one demagogue — was to ensure that "our bondsmen would not rule over us". The loudest spokesman for this group — soon to be acclaimed as pater patriae by his followers — was Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. He was a Polonized Ruthenian "kinglet", who in his youth rejected Orthodoxy for Catholicism. Wiśniowiecki's intransigency — and that of most others belonging to this group — was motivated not so much by "patriotism" as by fear that he would lose his vast latifundiae and thousands of serfs in Ukraine.

In Wiśniowiecki's evaluation, the conflict within the Commonwealth was an insurrection of slaves, against whom must be raised the severe arm of justice. The Cossacks had to be subdued, suitably punished for their...

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15 Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 269-270, 279-280, 283.

16 This programme is illustrated quite well in the following anonymous circular: "An Opinion of One Polish Noble on the Pacification of the Zaporozhian Army": Sprawy, pp. 119-123.

17 Lubomirski to Kysil, Wiśniacz, 14.VI.1648: Dokumenty, p. 48. See also Czart., Ms. 1657, pp. 409-413.
treason and only then certain concessions might be offered to them.\textsuperscript{18} Wisniowiecki saw the ultimate ruin of the Commonwealth if Ossoliński’s policy of "contentment" of the Cossacks were pursued. He believed that such a policy would only encourage the "rebels" to continue their "lawlessness", as their ambitions would never be satisfied. Its results would be catastrophic: "the continual oppression of the nobles". He vowed rather to die than to tolerate the rule of "the bondsmen and the most foul masses".\textsuperscript{19}

Notwithstanding the opposition of Wiśniowiecki and other intransigents, be successful. It began to evolve acts with the Palatine of Bratslav, erculean task: to promise Khmelnyt-ed to cease hostilities and cut his

No better candidate could be found to carry out such a task. Kysil was Ossoliński’s friend and like himself was a staunch royalist. He was well known for his views that more could be accomplished around a conference table than on the field of battle. As the senior-ranking Orthodox magnate in the Senate and as an individual renowned for his strong support of the rights of the Orthodox Church and those of the "Ruthenian nation", Kysil held enormous prestige among, and was greatly respected by, the Orthodox clergy, nobles and townspeople. To add to his qualifications, Kysil

\textsuperscript{18} Tomkiewicz, Wiśniowiecki, pp. 6-8, 57-113, 208.

\textsuperscript{19} Wiśniowiecki to Kysil, Horochky, 21.VI.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 55-56.

\textsuperscript{20} Ossoliński to Kysil, [Warsaw], 5.VI.1648: Dokumenty, p. 36.
also had considerable experience in the diplomatic field and was considered an "expert" in Cossack affairs.²¹

Kysil not only undertook this task willingly, but considering it to be his duty to do so, also acted on his own. Before receiving official sanction from Łubieński, he despatched his trusted Orthodox priest, Petronii Lasko, to Khmelnytskyi. Upon informing the primate and the chancellor about his tactics, he expressed some reservations as well: he was uncertain whether Khmelnytskyi would believe the promises of a private individual, especially of the one who negotiated a settlement in good faith with the Cossacks a decade ago, but which was not adhered to by the government.²² It was a polite reminder to them that he did not wish to have a similar unpleasant experience once again. In their reply to Kysil, Łubieński and Ossoliński assured him that he was acting with the knowledge and consent of the senators, urged him to carry on and pledged him their support.²³

²¹ On Kysil see Appendix IB and the excellent monograph of Frank Edward Michael Sysyn, "Adam Kysil, Statesman of Poland-Lithuania: A Study of the Commonwealth's Rule of the Ukraine from 1600 to 1653" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976). Due to the appearance of this authoritative monograph, I have not included in my bibliography the biographies and biographical sketches of Kysil which were published in the second half of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth centuries.

²² Kysil to Łubieński, Hoshcha, [7.]VI.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 65-68.

²³ Ossoliński to Kysil, Warsaw, [7.] and 16.VI.1648; Łubieński to Kysil, Warsaw, 8.VI.1648; and Senators to Kysil, Warsaw, 24.VI.1648: Dokumenty, pp. 44-46, 50-52; and Szajnocha, op. cit., II, part 2, 419-421, 428-430.
In the meantime Lasko delivered his master's letter to the addressee. This long letter contains some interesting details. Writing to Khmelnytskyi as an equal, Kysil assured him that he was certain of his great "affection for the Commonwealth". For this reason he defended the Cossack leader and his followers against all charges of treason. Kysil based his defence on three reasons: that the Cossacks were always faithful to their "kings, the Lords of the Commonwealth"; that they regarded the "Crown of Poland" as their "Fatherland"; and that they would rather die than to endanger the rights of the Orthodox Church.

In analyzing the credo of Kysil, this Orthodox gente Ruthenus natione Polonus, one can see that he interpreted Khmelnytskyi's actions as a "confederation". The Cossack leader and his followers, still the faithful army of the king and the state, took up arms in defence of their "liberties". He pointed out that since they cherished their "Fatherland", it was their duty to end all hostilities and to settle their grievances peacefully. Certainly, their "Fatherland" was far from perfect, but it was worth saving, for another one so "renowned for its liberties" could not be found anywhere else in the world. Finally he reminded them that, as members of the "Ruthenian nation", they were responsible for the welfare of the Orthodox Church. Obviously, their alliance with the Muslim "infidels", which endangered the position of the Orthodox Church, had to be terminated.

Kysil ended his letter by advising Khmelnytskyi to cease all hostilities, to make no further advance westward, to rupture the alliance with the

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Tatars and to send his envoys to Warsaw with assurances of loyalty to
the government. These envoys were to acquaint the government with the
nature of Cossack grievances and to present to it their requests. Kysil
promised Khmelnytskyi to use his influence in the capital on Cossack be-
half if his recommendations were followed.

After a careful analysis of Khmelnytskyi's demands, Kysil concluded
that it was possible to appease the Cossack leader and his followers
without placing great burdens on the state. If the Cossacks were assured
that amnesty would be granted them, that the Ordinance of 1638 would be
repealed, that the rights of the Orthodox Church would be respected and
that, at least in principle, the 12,000-man quota of the registered Cos-
sacks would be accepted, Kysil was certain that he would be able to arrange
not only a cessation of hostilities but also a treaty advantageous for
the Commonwealth. 25

Khmelnytskyi agreed to accept Kysil's advice. 26 Shortly thereafter
his envoys were despatched to Warsaw. When Lasko visited the Cossack het-
man the second time he confirmed that Cossack troops retired eastwards,
that the Horde departed to Crimea and that Khmelnytskyi and his officers
wished to negotiate in good faith. 27 It appeared that Kysil managed to
score a major diplomatic coup.

26 Khmelnytskyi to Kysil, By Bila Tserkva, 3./13.VI.1648: DKhmel.,
pp. 44-45. Kysil relayed the news to Warsaw: Kysil to Lubieński,
Hoshcha, 16.VI.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, p. 50.
27 Report of Lasko, from 18.VI. to 7.VII.1648: VUR, II, 44-46; and
a summary of Kysil's letter, from Hoshcha, ca., 7.VII.1648: Dokumenty,
pp. 71-72.
In the first week of July, as Lasko was returning to Kysil with a report on his second successful mission to Khmelnytskyi, four Cossack envoys appeared in Warsaw: Fedir Veshniak, Hryhoryi But, Lukiian Mozyra and Ivan Petrushenko. On July 7, after paying their last respects to the body of Władysław IV, they were granted an audience, during which they delivered the letter and the written instruction addressed to the late king, into the hands of Maciej Lubieński. On the following day the senators analyzed the contents and the implications of these documents and held frequent discussions with one another. On the 9th the primate called a meeting and asked them for suggestions relating to the policy to be followed. Later on in the day a banquet was given by him in honour of the Cossack envoys.28

The meeting of the 9th provided the opportunity for the first major clash between the supporters of the "peace party" and their intransigent opponents. Knowing the aims of Ossoliński, it is not unreasonable to suggest that he and his adherents aimed at finding the solution to Khmelnytskyi's requests within the small circle of the senators. If this was impossible to achieve, the chancellor must have argued that it was imperative to dispatch the Cossack envoys immediately to Khmelnytskyi with some sort of positive answer of the senators as a whole. Ossoliński wanted to assure Khmelnytskyi that all promises made to him by Kysil will be kept and that the Convocation Diet will deal with his requests and will appoint commissioners for negotiations. Such a solution, however, was

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28 Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 46, 73-74, 77-78.
hardly acceptable to the other side.

The intransigents were represented at this meeting by such vociferous members as the personal enemy of Ossoliński, Crown Vice Chancellor, Andrzej Leszczyński, and the Bishop of Kujawy, Mikołaj Gniewosz. Worried about Ossoliński's "machinations", as well as of the implications of Khmelnytskyi's demands, they decided to lay charges against him at the Diet. They were confident of getting the support of most of the deputies not only to cause the downfall of the powerful chancellor, but also to wreck the plans of the "peace party". For these reasons they raised all sorts of objections against Ossoliński's arguments; for example, that Khmelnytskyi's "charters" would have to be secured, that an investigation would have to be launched as to who was responsible for setting seals on them and so on.

After much bargaining the following compromise was arranged between the two groups. The weighty matters dealing with Cossack affairs were to be handled at the Convocation Diet, jointly by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. This was a victory for the intransigents. Yet, the "peace party" secured an agreement for the primate to act in the name of all senators, promising Khmelnytskyi support at the forthcoming Diet. The primate was also to influence the Cossack envoys to write to Khmelnytskyi, informing him that they were treated well and that they were to be detained until the Diet resolved all matters. One of the envoys was to return to Khmelnytskyi with these letters.

Since not one of the Cossack envoys wanted to undertake this mission, a special messenger was sent with Łubieński's letter. Ossoliński sent a letter of his own as well. If their language and contents seem strange, it must be remembered that these letters were designed for public circulation;
therefore, the primate and the chancellor had to use harsh words for the Cossacks. Eventually, when the Cossack envoys consented to write, Wolski was sent with their letter to Khmelnytskyi. Since two weeks passed after their arrival in Warsaw, this delay caused serious complications. Rumors were already spread among the Cossacks that their envoys were executed in the capital.

In the meantime, on July 16, the first session of the Convocation Diet began with the traditional ceremonies. On the 17th members of both chambers assembled to listen to the reading of the "proposals" of Łubieński. Among many items, he advocated the following: that Cossack affairs be dealt with diligently; that the Cossack envoys be sent back to Khmelnytskyi, as soon as possible, with an appropriate resolution of the Diet; that amnesty be granted them; that with their aid Tatars be attacked and Ukraine be "pacified"; and that suitable persons be appointed — here was a strong plea to use the services of Kysil — to negotiate with the Cossacks. It is interesting to note that these "proposals" of the Interrex coincided with the planks of the platform of the "peace party". They were, undoubtedly, written by Ossoliński himself.


30 Księga pamiętnicza, p. 78.

31 Kryvonis to Zasławski, [Polonne?], 29.VII.1648 and Kysil to Ossoliński, Khorlupy, 9.VIII.1649: Ibid., pp. 88, 152.

32 On the Convocation Diet see Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 101-144; Dokumenty, pp. 79-82; Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 20-46; Obuchowicz, op. cit., p. 19; AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/129, fos. 436r-461v, 486r-529v; AGd., Ms. 300/R/Ee 32, pp. 37-118, 121-151; Czart., Ms. 378, pp. 580-612; PAN Kr., Ms. 367, fos. 87r-95v; BWWr., Ms. Steinwehr III, fos. 256r-264v; AGAD, AKW, Dział: Kozackie [Hereafter cited as Koz.], XXVII, 42, no. 3; Wojakowski to NN, Warsaw, 22.VII.1648; as well as despatches dated 28. and 29.VII.1648: AKr., Rus., Ms. 41, pp. 31-34, 39-41, 43-45. See also Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 281-300.
As soon as these were read, the opposition mounted an attack:

Gniewosz demanded that all letters from and to the Cossacks be read to the members. It was a good tactic, for all the deputies could hear for themselves the "unreasonable" demands of Khmelnytskyi; moreover, by raising the "charter" issue Gniewosz hoped to put Ossoliński on the defensive, trap him and eventually charge him for misusing his office or on grounds of treason.

Once the reading of the letters was finished Kysil, who arrived earlier in Warsaw, was invited to report on his mission to Russia, to outline how he managed to arrange an armistice with Khmelnytskyi and to give his views "on the origin and the causes of the Cossack war". This he did with his usual flourish. Of course, some deputies and senators were hardly pleased with his explanation, which they considered to be a condemnation of Potocki and the magnates and the defence of Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks. When some members began to pry him about the "charters" or "letters" referred to by Khmelnytskyi, Kysil was quite aware what they wanted to hear from him. Skillfully avoiding the trap, Kysil mentioned that in his opinion these were authentic, but they were the ones granted to the Cossacks by Władysław a few years back when he made preparations for war with the Turks. Khmelnytskyi pretended that they were issued a year ago, and the cunning fellow was so convincing that he induced the Cossacks to rebel. All in all, Kysil managed to shield Ossoliński quite well.

In the sessions of the 18th and the 20th all deputies were invited to the upper chamber to hear the customary "votes" — the views of individual senators on the "proposals" of the primate. To the delight of the "peace party" most of the senators reacted favourably to the "pro-
posals". The deputies listened to one speaker after another emphasizing that the conflict was caused by the various excesses of the administrative and military authorities; that, considering the circumstances, the Cossacks could hardly be blamed for concluding an alliance with the Tatars, for -- as one senator put it -- the Cossacks would "venture even into hell itself, in order to cast off such bondage and oppression as the poor wretches evidently experienced"; that the Cossack envoys should be sent back to Khmelnytskyi with a statement that amnesty will be granted to all; and that commissioners should be appointed to conclude peace with the Cossacks. Of course, each speaker also mentioned that a large army should be raised and that new commanders be appointed for it.

Views to the contrary were in a minority. Andrzej Leszczyński, for example, was against the granting of amnesty, claiming that the "traitors", who allied themselves with the "infidels", neither desired nor merited it. Yet, even he, as well as the group of belligerents, saw the necessity of supporting all other "proposals" of Łubieński. This was not the case, however, of the Palatine of Sandomierz, Prince Władysław Zasławski. This former "friend" of the Cossacks, now in the camp of the intransigents, cast his in absentia vote by letter, by which he offered his great fortune on the altar of the state for the purpose of their extermination by the sword. Opposed to any concessions to the Cossacks, Zasławski was motivated very little by the noble and lofty ideals outlined in his letter; and not even as much by his ambition and desire to equal the martial exploits of his Ostrogski ancestors, now that he was chosen a member of the "regimentary" triumvirate, as by his great fear that the massive popular uprising under Maksym Kryvonis will cause ravage, depopulation and loss of his vast estates. As far as he was concerned, any promises made to the
Cossack "serfs", "traitors", "barbarians", "wild beasts" and "perjurers" could be broken easily, for "frangenti fidelis fides frangatur eidem".33

Such pleas and advice of one of the wealthiest magnates could not fall on deaf ears; yet, there was no doubt that the "peace party" managed to secure a victory in the Senate. At this time Ossoliński decided to concentrate on his own defense. Since there were public allegations and private accusations that he was responsible for setting the seal of the state on the "charters" or "letters" mentioned in the Khmelnytskyi correspondence, the chancellor sought to settle the issue by advocating an interrogation of the Cossack envoys. He emphasized that neither he nor anyone in the chancery received or set seals on any such documents. At this time he also revealed to the members that Władysław, while still planning a war with the Turks, met and carried out discussions in secrecy with the Cossack envoys, among whom was Khmelnytskyi. Of course, Ossoliński intended that his opponents and accusers interpret this revelation in one way only: that all such documents, if they did exist, must have been prepared in Władysław's private chancery and stamped by his personal seal.

While Ossoliński's stand was supported wholeheartedly by Kysil, and even partially by his enemy Leszczyński, not all of those present at this session were satisfied that he was telling the truth. There were other reasons for suspecting the chancellor. So far they heard the contents of Khmelnytskyi's letters written to the Ducal Grand Chancellor, Prince Albrecht Radziwiłł, and to the Crown Grand Marshal, Łukasz Opaliński. Ossoliński's letter was to be read next; but to the astonishment of most members, the

33 Zasławski to Convocation Diet, Dubno, 14.VII.1648: Karol Szajnocha, Dzieła Karola Szajnochy, 10 vols. (Warsaw, 1878), X, 197–203.
primate ruled against it, giving as his reason the similarity of content to the other letters. This ruling caused an uproar in the chamber; the primate, nevertheless, disregarded all protests and stood firm by his ruling. Ossoliński's letter was not read.

In this case there was a good reason for the protests of various members. If the contents of all the letters were similar, as it was claimed by Lubieński, why was the letter written to a man surrounded by controversy and suspicion not read first? Surely, by following such a course of action he could have proven his innocence. Obviously, this letter must have contained some frank phrases of Khmelnytskyi, which the chancellor considered embarrassing or dangerous, for these could be easily misinterpreted by his opponents. For this reason Ossoliński prevailed upon Lubieński to make a ruling he did. This plan of silence did not eliminate the problem at all; under the circumstances, however, it seemed to him to be a better solution than to avoid the issue by some sort of an excuse.

At the session of July 21 more problems arose for Ossoliński as the result of the revelations of Marek Sobieski. This noble informed the senators and the deputies of the strong pro-monarchial and anti-magnate and gentry statements made by Khmelnytskyi and his officers. All of them were quite shocked to hear that the late king encouraged the Cossacks to rebel — so they claimed — and that the Cossacks would aid him in establishing absolute rule. As Sobieski finished speaking angry cries arose from the floor and the galleries, relating to yet another revival of the project of "Knights". These were obviously directed against Ossoliński, for he was largely responsible for introducing the Order of Knights of the Immaculate Conception. This project collapsed due to the opposition of
the magnates who feared that it was designed to introduce absolute rule.\textsuperscript{34}

By this time many members were prepared to hear more sensational revelations about other "machinations" of Ossoliński, as the interrogation of the Cossack envoys was completed by two secretaries of the Diet. They were disappointed in their expectations, however, for neither the private interrogation by the secretaries nor the public questioning of them by the Marshal of the Chamber of Deputies, Bogusław Leszczyński, revealed any information against Ossoliński. The envoys insisted that only their superiors knew the answers to the questions posed to them and revealed that they did not bring any royal "charters" to Warsaw. Although many members were convinced still that Ossoliński was "guilty", they were persuaded to deal with business at hand relating to the Cossacks.

The first item on the agenda called for the preparation of a suitable reply to Khmelnytskyi. Two men were chosen to prepare a draft: Adam Kysil, in the upper chamber; and Bogusław Leszczyński, in the lower. After some debate it was decided to send a single reply for the Diet as a whole. Since many members expressed reservations that Kysil's draft was too mild-sounding and pressed for the adoption of the harshly-worded one prepared by Leszczyński, the pacifists, in order not to waste time on needless debates, proposed a compromise: that the latter be adopted with some modifications. This solution was acceptable to all the members. On the 22nd a reply addressed to the Cossack Army -- not to Khmelnytskyi -- and signed by Łubieński and Leszczyński was handed to the Cossack envoys, who departed from the capital of the same day.

\textsuperscript{34}Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 104-110.
At a first glance, one may conclude that this is a preposterous reply, for the haughty and outrageous wording suggests that this is an ultimatum of the victors to the vanquished. Moreover, there is no reference whatsoever to Khmelnytskyi's demands. Yet, if one considers that this reply had to satisfy the intransigents, men who considered to be dealing with their inferiors, those who stood on guard lest the state be "dishonoured" by some statement or concession and even the pacifists, then such a wording is quite understandable. Khmelnytskyi, a noble himself, would have been greatly surprised if he received a letter written in any other form. He was quite aware — and even expected — that the men in Warsaw had to keep up certain appearances. This was the way, after all, of handling matters during this time.

Keeping this in mind, something more significant can be found among all the denounciations. A closer look will reveal the full programme of the "peace party". The message of Ossoliński and Kysil to Khmelnytskyi is quite clear: if he released captives, surrendered leaders of serf bands, ceased hostilities and terminated his alliance with the Tatars, he and his Cossack followers would be granted amnesty and would be able to settle their grievances by means of negotiations with the commissioners appointed by the Diet. Thus, the Cossack envoys departed with assurances similar to the ones made earlier by Kysil to Khmelnytskyi.  

Once the Cossack envoys were expedited, a special committee was set up by the Diet. Comprising senators and deputies, this committee was

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35 Convocation Diet to Cossacks, Warsaw, 22.VII.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 85-86.
entrusted with the task of drawing up terms of reference for the instruction to the commissioners who would be sent to negotiate with Khmelnytskyi. Both the "doves" and the "hawks" comprised the committee, but it was much easier for Ossolinski to influence the latter in such a relatively small group.

At the first meeting of this body Ossoliński invited Kysil to analyse and to propose remedies for the current troublesome state of affairs, as well as to outline the essential terms of reference for this committee in order to aid it in the preparation of an instruction to the commissioners. The chancellor made a very good move, for Kysil delivered a very convincing speech. On the one hand, he pleased the intransigents by calling for the punishment of the Cossacks and for the mobilization of an army against them. On the other hand, he also pressed for the adoption of the programme of the "peace party". So skillful was his approach and presentation, that eventually even the intransigents were forced to admit that some concessions had to be made to the Cossacks; otherwise, the Commonwealth would be plagued by a conflict with the Cossacks, Tatars and serfs. This conflict, in turn, would give a perfect opportunity to Russia and Turkey to invade her. With regard to the other matter, Kysil used the same tactics and won the day for the "peace party".

Ossoliński, who followed Kysil, strongly supported his views and then asked him to prepare a draft of instruction for the next session. Following the comments of other influential members, particularly of Albrzych Radziwiłł, Andrzej Leszczyński and Jerzy Lubomirski, the chancellor agreed that these should be taken into consideration. Some members cautioned that care must be taken to preserve the "dignity" of the Commonwealth. It is interesting to note that they equated "dignity" with integrity.
Ossoliński emphasized that he was of the same mind; at the same time, he pointed out that none of the Cossack demands tarnished the "dignity" of the state. If the Cossacks showed any inclination to tear away any part from "the body of the Commonwealth", they must be resisted by the force of arms. This is a clear indication that Ossoliński was not against the transformation of the Commonwealth, as long as her integrity was preserved. There was ample room for a Cossack autonomous state within her boundaries.

At the session of July 26 the committee prepared the instruction to the commissioners. This instruction was based almost entirely on the draft of Kysil. It contained the following provisions:

1. The commissioners, accompanied by 2,000 auxiliaries, were to proceed to Kiev, where, on August 23, they were to begin negotiations with the Cossacks. These parleys were to terminate, at the latest, on September 6.

2. The commissioners were to be granted sufficient powers, in order to conclude peace and to arrange, as quickly as possible, the cessation of all hostilities.

3. They were to offer the Cossacks the same terms as those of the agreement concluded in 1637; if these were rejected, they were authorized to make concessions corresponding to the terms of the agreements signed in 1630 or 1625.

4. Under no circumstances were the commissioners to allow the Cossacks any share in the government of the Commonwealth, or to consent to any cession of her territories to them.

5. The commissioners were to refuse to consider the Cossacks' request for a five-year back pay, on the grounds that funds sent to them for
this purpose were already in their hands; moreover, the plunder they seized covered their salaries more than adequately. In the future the Cossacks were to be compensated for their faithful service to the Commonwealth.

6. The commissioners were to hear all Cossack grievances and to promise them, whenever it was possible, justice and restitution.

7. In the event that some unforeseen changes would take place among the Cossacks, the commissioners were to carry on with their mission, even if they were required to follow the Cossacks to Zaporozhe.

8. Once peace was concluded, the commissioners were responsible for compiling a Cossack register. In the course of their compilation, the commissioners were required to check that names of non-Cossacks did not appear in the register.

9. The Cossacks were required to carry out the following conditions: to release all captives; to surrender leaders of serf bands; to return all captured cannon; to terminate their alliance with the Tatars; and to hand over all "letters" of the late king, in which he allegedly gave them permission to increase the quota to 12,000 men.

10. The Cossacks were also required to swear oaths of loyalty to the state, as well as special oaths by which they bound themselves never to conclude alliances with foreign powers or to support any group which acted against the state.

11. They were, moreover, to agree to serve the state in any authorized campaign against the Tatars or the Turks; otherwise, they were to continue to carry out their normal roles as border guards.36

36 Instruction to Commissioners, [Warsaw, 26.VII.1648]: Dokumenty, pp. 94-95.
One may wonder why Kysil and Ossoliński voted in favour of such preposterous terms. Surely, they must have been aware that neither the 1625, 1630 nor 1637 "agreements" would be acceptable to the Cossacks; moreover, that these were largely responsible for the hostilities in 1648. Obviously, both men had something else on their minds. If a member of a "peace party" took charge of the commission and was given full powers to negotiate, he would not be tied down to any great extent by the terms of the instruction; they were dangerous only if men holding the opposite views comprised the majority members of the commission. Certain steps had to be taken to prevent the appointment of undesirable intrasigents.

Ossoliński pressured Zubieński and instructed his followers to clamour for the appointment of Kysil as the senior-ranking member of the commission. Kysil, at this time, used all sorts of excuses why he could not undertake such a mission; at a convenient moment, however, appearing to be swayed by the entreaties to "save the Fatherland", he consented to take up the task.

During this one act play Ossoliński revealed to the Diet alarming news: the rising of the serfs in the south-eastern palatinates took a greater dimension and a more terrible form. The Cossacks were still relatively quiet, but there was no guarantee that they would not side with the serfs. His message was quite clear: if the members continued to procrastinate and if they did not support the candidacy of Kysil, they would be responsible for further calamities within the Commonwealth. The chancellor's plan worked: the deputies voted in favour of his policy. They even consented to thank Kysil for his initiative during the month of June.

On July 29, in the chamber closed to non-members, after slight changes
were made in the wording, an agreement was reached on the final text of
the instruction. The text, with which the intransigents were satisfied,
also satisfied the "peace party", since Kysil was in a position to sat-
isfy all the demands of Khmelnytskyi. In addition to Kysil, the following
persons were named members of the Commission: the Chamberlin of Przemysl,
Franciszek Dubrawski; the Sub-Dapifer of Poznan, Adam Sielski; and the
Chamberlin of Mazyr, Teodor Obuchowicz. The commissioners departed from
Warsaw to their destination shortly before the conclusion of the sessions
of the Convocational Diet.

The efforts to solve the grave difficulties of the Commonwealth by
diplomatic means were, however, hindered by several obstacles. One of
these obstacles was the overconfidence of the "peace party" that the
conflict would be resolved over a conference table. Furthermore, because
of the phlegmatic proceedings of the Diet and the useless debates, the
envoys of the Cossack Army were kept in Warsaw for two weeks. Their un-
necessary delay in the capital created serious misunderstandings between
the two sides, led to the worsening of tensions and eventually contributed
to the resumption of hostilities.

Another serious obstacle was the renewal of the hostilities between
the two sides before the term set for an armistice expired. Many nobles
disregarded the orders of the government and began to wage a guerilla war

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37 Instruction to Commissioners, Warsaw, 29.VII.1648: Ibid., pp. 87-89.

38 Convocation Diet, 12th Session, Warsaw, 29.VII.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, p. 138. Kysil’s first letter to Ossoliński, from Pytel, was dated 31.VII.1648: Sprawy, pp. 87-89.
against the serfs. Prince Wiśniowiecki, the leader of the reaction, being alarmed at the steady gains of the "riffraff" and the general lack of resistance of the gentry, redoubled his terroristic activities. Vindicating his own cause and that of his timid "brethren", he continued to provoke the serfs with his particular brand of atrocities. These actions came at a time when Kysil sought contact with Khmelnytskyi to begin negotiations.

Finally, after having to fight his way through the roaming bands of serfs, Kysil began to realize that there existed yet another obstacle. The success of the negotiations and the attainment of peace did not depend on the goodwill of Khmelnytskyi alone, but also on that of "the multitude of riffraff". Reports reached him that "lawless men" gained the upper hand in the Cossack camp; they did not want peace but war. Kysil speculated that if Khmelnytskyi was not killed during the disturbances among the Cossacks, then he surely remained "in the discretion of [these] congregated multitudes". Thus, it was the "rabble", the common Cossacks and serfs, that constituted the greatest menace to the Commonwealth.


Yet, Kysil remained optimistic; he was certain that all his efforts would not be in vain. He was also encouraged by the willingness of Khmelnytskyi to meet the demands of the government. The Cossack leader claimed to have sent the Tatars back to Crimea. He released all nobles which were captive in the Cossack camp, and either executed or punished many of the serf leaders. Khmelnytskyi even showed goodwill by agreeing to accept the mediation of the Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, Sylvestr Kosiv. Finally, even at the close of August his letters still expressed hope that reconciliation was possible. This was, however, only the one side of a coin.

The other side was entirely different. Khmelnytskyi must have decided sometime in July that the whole business of negotiations would come to naught. The "Poles" were not ready to make concessions; they were acting in bad faith, for while Kysil was sent to negotiate with him, a new army was being mobilized. He was, however, prepared either to carry on negotiations, or in case this failed, to wage war. He was not inactive during the term set for the armistice. On the contrary, just like his enemies, Khmelnytskyi also took advantage of the armistice and planned out his strategic moves. His diplomatic policy was devised to gain time.

At the same time as Khmelnytskyi sent manifestoes to restore order among the serfs, denounced their "lawlessness" before the officials of the Commonwealth and punished or executed some of their leaders, he also encouraged the serf movement. His emissaries and agitators fomented revolt.

\[41\] Khmelnytskyi to Kysil and Commissioners, Chyhyryn, 27.VI.; Uladivka, 19.VIII.; and Kumanivtsi, 28.VIII.1648: DKhmel., pp. 51-52, 65-66, 67-68.
among the Ruthenians in the territories where serfdom was firmly en-
trenched. From the Cossack Army he sent small detachments of troops
into areas where the serfs took up arms. These provided leaders for the
serf bands, organized them and took possession of towns or fortresses
captured by the serfs.

Although Khmelnytskyi complained to the government about the atro-
cities committed by Wiśniowiecki, he excused the actions of Kryvonis. He
also made no definite steps to restrain the activities of other popular
leaders, — Hanzha, Holovetskyi, Nebaba, Topyha, Vysochan and Morozovets-
skyi — who spread the rising of the serfs into all Ruthenian ethnic ter-
ritories of the Commonwealth. Khmelnytskyi thus created a barrier of
serfs between the Cossack troops and those of the Commonwealth. He was
protected by the serfs, and made a coordinated Crown-Grand Ducal military
action against him extremely difficult. At this time he was also able to
devote his attention to other matters, especially to the building and re-
organization of the Cossack Army. 42

While Khmelnytskyi's "bands of riffraff" intensified the serf rising
within the southern palatinates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Cos-
sack leader also attempted to create a rift between Polish and Lithuanian
nobles and to paralyze any common military undertakings. He established
contacts with Orthodox clergy, burgesses and nobles, and sought their aid.
As far as the gentry was concerned, he contacted those who expressed little
hostility to the Cossack revolt and disenchantment with their Polish

"brethren". By his declarations of goodwill to the Lithuanian magnates, Khmelnytskyi hoped to gain their sympathies for the Cossack cause. 43

Of particular interest to him were the men who were known for their views of "separatism" from the Crown. The leading figure of this group was the Lithuanian Field Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł, the head of the Calvinists in Lithuania and the "protector" of Protestants within the Commonwealth. Some kind of secret understanding was reached between Khmelnytskyi and Radziwiłł, for although the latter initiated limited action against the rising of the serfs, he still showed no desire to march against the Cossacks. 44 By these steps Khmelnytskyi was able to confine the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania within its own territories. Furthermore, he rekindled the antagonisms among the gentry of the Commonwealth.

During the same time Khmelnytskyi attempted to convince other magnates or men of influence of his good intentions. By writing humble-worded letters to them, Khmelnytskyi hoped to gain their support and intercession on Cossack behalf, as well as to camouflage his true intentions. He wrote to Wiśniowiecki that he had no quarrel with him; the serfs, not the Cossacks, were responsible for all the ravages. Being aware of the feuds among the "kinglets", he tried to set one against the other. To his most obvious enemies he wrote soothing letters, and attempted to win their confidence and to quiet their apprehensions by promising that

43 Edward Kotrubaj, Życie Janusza Radziwiłła ... (Vilnius and Vitsebsk, 1859), pp. 112-114; Obuchowicz, op. cit., pp. 19-20; and Khmelnytskyi to Zaporozhian Army, Pavoloch, 17./27.VII.1648: DKhmel., p. 58.

no harm will come to their estates. Khmelnytskyi's greatest success, however, was that he was able to convince such men as Ossoliński and Kysil that he was ready to settle everything by means of negotiations. By arranging an armistice he gained time to further his plans.

Although Khmelnytskyi was protected from the interior of the Commonwealth, he still faced danger from Russia. He was fortunate, however, that internal disturbances broke out in this country. The tsar, whether he wished to take advantage of the Commonwealth's predicament or really come to her aid, was in no position to send his troops out of Russia. Early in August Khmelnytskyi learned that no Russian troops were sent to Ukraine to aid the Commonwealth. He was therefore safe from the east.

There was no threat from the south due to the favourable arrangements he made with the Turks. The Tatars were still his allies; they urged him to open hostilities. Khmelnytskyi, however, could use them on his terms. This was the situation until the beginning of August.

Early in August the government of Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha was overthrown. During the meeting of the Janissaries, Sultan Ibrahim I was dethroned and executed. The new government in Constantinople, in an effort to please Khan Islam Giray III, left "northern affairs" in his care. While the Cossack-Tatar military alliance was officially approved

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by the new regime, as well as the anti-Commonwealth enterprise of the khan, it is evident that the Janissary oligarchy repudiated the former Cossack-Turkish agreements. At the close of the month Kalga Crim Giray led the Horde from Crimea to Khmelnytskyi's aid. The latter, however, was once more compelled to accept the terms of the khan.

Even as the Tatars marched, Khmelnytskyi continued to call for parleys and expressed hope that reconciliation with the Commonwealth was still possible. The commissioners, led by Kysil, found so many obstacles on their path, however, that it was impossible for them to achieve their aim. By the middle of September, -- after a month and a half since the commissioners' departure from Warsaw -- while relatively close to each other, the two parties even had not met. By this time even the usually-optimistic Kysil became skeptical of the whole business. Even he reluctantly admitted that the whole issue would have to be resolved by the force of arms.

Already at the close of July a great battle was fought near Staro-Konstantyniv between the forces of reaction, commanded by Prince Jeremi

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47 Pritsak, "Das erste", pp. 287-288. See also Sufi Mehmed Pasha to Ossoliński and Łubieński, [ca., late VIII.1648]: AGAD, AKW, Dzial: Tureckie [Hereafter cited as Tur.], 75, file 399, no. 695 (translation, file 404, no 701); and file 404, no. 700.

48 Hadžy Mehmed Senai z Krymu, op. cit., p. 113.

Wiśniowiecki, and those of Maksym Kryvonis, the leader of the serfs. Neither side won a decisive victory. The battle only served as a prelude to the final test of arms between the main armies.  

By the middle of September a splendid — but disorganized — army of the gentry became engaged in the "pursuit" of the Cossacks. After a few successful skirmishes, it came face to face with the main Cossack strength near Pyliavtsi. On September 23, on the third day of battle, the gentry, believing that great number of Tatars joined the Cossacks and that their officers were deserting, panicked and fled in all directions. The regulars that remained at their posts were annihilated. Such was the fate of the seemingly-powerful army.

The country squires, who came prepared to defend their "Fatherland", to terrify any foreign invaders and to compel the rebellious Cossacks and serfs to fall on their knees, were now no more than disorderly bands of fugitives. The road to the heart of the Commonwealth appeared open to the Cossack-serf-Tatar forces. "We have perished totally", despaired one noble, adding that the only hope for the salvation of the state lay in Divine Providence. Indeed, the first major attempt of the Commonwealth to solve her difficulties by diplomatic means, ended in a dismal failure.

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50 Tomkiewicz, Wiśniowiecki, 216-220.
52 NN to NN, Lviv, 29.IX.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, p. 200.
Following the Battle of Pyliavtski, Khmelnytskyi began a slow march towards Lviv. From October 6 the Cossack-Tatar army besieged the city; eventually it was lifted on the 26th after the burgesses agreed to pay an enormous ransom. At the close of the month Khmelnytskyi began to march towards Zamosć. He reached his objective early in November and laid siege to it. The Cossack Army at this time stood on the ethnographic frontiers of Poland, facing the last obstacle of considerable strength before Warsaw.

During this time the Electoral Diet (October 6–November 23) was in session in Warsaw. Most of the deputies regarded the rout at Pyliavtsi a direct result of Ossoliński's conciliatory policy to the Cossacks. Their temper indicated that this Diet would not only bury this policy, but also that any candidate for the Polish throne, who supported it, would not be elected. In November only two brothers of the late king -- Jan Kazimierz and Karol Ferdynand -- were competing for the crown. The former was supported largely by the conciliatory group; the latter, by the intransigents.


54 Jan Bytomski, Obsidio Zamosciana, quam perduelles Cosachi iunctis viribus Tartarorum, grassante et ad affligendum Regnum conspirante audacia, fatali Poloniae tempore sub interregnum anno Dni. 1648. fecerunt, ...
(Zamosć, 1649).

55 On the Electoral Diet see Księga pamiętnica, pp. 219–360; Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 49–90; Obuchowicz, op. cit., pp. 20–22; AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/39/130, fos. 59–93, 577–637; BUWr., Ms. Steinwehr III, fos. 283r–291r; AGAD, AKW, Koz., XXVII, 42, no. 5.
Jan Kazimierz attempted to establish contact with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi well before his election. In August it was rumored in Warsaw that Jan Kazimierz carried on correspondence and negotiations with the Cossack hetman.\textsuperscript{56} Probably the basis for all speculations in the capital was the mission of Jerzy Jermolewicz\textsuperscript{57} who, according to one source, was sent by Jan Kazimierz with the request that Khmelnytskyi refrain from hostilities as these would endanger the electoral process.\textsuperscript{58} If another source is to be believed, Jan Kazimierz gave assurances that, once elected, he would satisfy all Cossack demands and enforce their rights and liberties.\textsuperscript{59} It is not certain when Jarmolewicz contacted Khmelnytskyi. The envoy, falling ill, finally appeared in the Cossack camp early in November during the siege of Zamość.\textsuperscript{60} Yet he could have sent some message earlier to Khmelnytskyi, for already in October the Cossack leader made it known that he favoured the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz.\textsuperscript{61} In any case, Khmelnytskyi responded positively: at once he notified Father Andrzej Mokrski and Zakharii Khmelnytskyi in Lviv to prepare for a mission to Warsaw;\textsuperscript{62} moreover, he renewed

\textsuperscript{56} Adersbach to Friedrich Wilhelm, Warsaw, 22.VIII.1648: UA, I, 279.
\textsuperscript{57} His name is also spelled Jarmolowicz.
\textsuperscript{58} Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 322, 460.
\textsuperscript{60} Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 322, 460.
\textsuperscript{61} Kuszewicz, op. cit., p. 549.
\textsuperscript{62} Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 322, 460.
his pledges of support — this he revealed to several persons — of Jan Kazimierz. The diplomatic manoeuvring which surrounded the election the Cossack hetman cast the deciding vote for Jan Kazimierz. The rest was accomplished by Ossoliński and Kysil. On November 14 the younger brother officially withdrew his candidacy. Six days later Jan Kazimierz became the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania.

One day after the withdrawal of Karol Ferdynand's candidacy, but five days before his official election, on November 15, Jan Kazimierz despatched his envoy, Jakób Śmiarowski, to the Cossack camp under the battlements of Zamość. Śmiarowski upon reaching Jabunki, near Zamość, on the 19th, was received with great pomp and ceremony. On the 21st he was granted audience by Khmelnytskyi. The envoy, posing as the representative of de facto king-elect, requested in his master's name that Khmelnytskyi cease all hostilities and retire his troops to Ukraine. In return, no doubt, he was assured that his own requests would be granted. The Cossack hetman agreed to abide by such an agreement.

63 Khmelnytskyi to Nobles and Burgesses of Zamość, By Zamość, 6.XI.1648: DKhmel., p. 72; Mokrski to Jan Kazimierz, [Somewhere between Zamość and Warsaw], 9./[19].XI.1648 (This letter, judging from the text, must have been dated in the O.S.): Dokumenty, p. 192; Kochowski, Climacter I, 95; Rudawski, op. cit., 1, 45; and Kysil to NN, Hoshcha, 18.V.1649: Ojczyste spominki, II, 27.


65 On the work of Ossoliński see Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 301-326.


67 Aleksander Kraushar, "Poselstwo Jakóba Śmiarowskiego do Bohdana Chmielnickiego pod oblężony Zamość w r. 1648", KH, V (1891), 818-821.
His own envoys, Andrzej Mokrski and Zakharii Khmelnytskyi were already close to Warsaw. They departed from his headquarters also on November 15. Due to the illness of Mokrski, it took them longer than Śmierowski to cover the distance between Warsaw and Zamość. Mokrski, however, managed to communicate to Jan Kazimierz the aim of his mission before his arrival in the capital with his colleague on the 24th. Upon being granted audience, the Cossack hetman's envoys presented two letters: one was addressed to the Senate; the other, to the "King of Sweden" — Jan Kazimierz.

In his letter to the senators Khmelnytskyi defended his actions, begged for forgiveness and requested the punishment of the magnates, especially Koniecpolski and Wiśniowiecki, whom he blamed for the existing conflict. He wrote to Jan Kazimierz that he was prepared to serve him faithfully and claimed that the only reason he marched to Zamość was to ensure that no one else was elected king. Khmelnytskyi also instructed his envoys to negotiate directly with Jan Kazimierz. They were to inform the government that if any candidate other than Jan Kazimierz was chosen king, it should expect neither negotiations nor peace.

Mokrski also presented the following Cossack demands to the king-elect:

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68 Mokrski to Jan Kazimierz, [Somewhere between Zamość and Warsaw], 9./[19].XI.1648 (Regarding the date see n. 63 above): Dokumenty, pp. 192-193.


70 Jan Kazimierz acquired this title after the death of Władysław IV.

71 Khmelnytskyi to Senate, By Zamość, 15.XI.1648: DKhmel., pp. 81-82.

72 Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Zamość, 15.XI.1648: Ibid., p. 80; and Recueil des Gazettes Nouvelles Ordinaires et Extraordinaires, Relations et Recits des Choses Avenues tant en ce Royaume qu'aileurs, pendant l'année 1649 [Hereafter cited as Gazette de France] (Paris, 1649), p. 32.
amnesty to all participants in the rebellion; confirmation of the rights and privileges of the registered Cossacks; increase of their number to 12,000; dependence of the Cossack Army on the king alone, not on the government; sheriffs and other officials were to hold no jurisdiction over the Cossacks; they were to be judged by the same laws as the nobles; free election of officers of the Cossack Army; blanket permission to send naval expeditions to the Black Sea; free access to and unrestricted use of the steppes; a land grant for Khmelnytskyi; official confirmation of his office as a Cossack hetman; no punishment to be rebel serfs; legal recognition of the Orthodox Church; restoration of all churches and benefices belonging to it; and the abolition of the Uniate Church. These demands did not differ greatly from those Khmelnytskyi sent to Warsaw in June. Thus, even after three decisive victories the Cossack leader limited himself to very moderate demands.

Not too many of the senators shared this opinion. After a great deal of heated debate, they decided to postpone the answer on the grounds that Khmelnytskyi's envoys were not sent to the king-elect, but only to the candidate for that office; therefore, he had to send new envoys with petitions to the king-elect. Using this pretext, they prepared an antidated manifesto in the name of the king and addressed it to the Cossack Army.

The manifesto announced the election of Jan Kazimierz. The king-

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73 Petition of the Cossack Army, By Zamość, 15.XI.1648: DKhmel., pp. 83-84.

74 Senate Session, Warsaw, 25.XI.1648: Księga pamiętnicza, p. 359; and Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 332-333.
elect ordered the cessation of all hostilities; and commanded the Cos­
sack Army to retire to its territories in Ukraine, to send the Tatars
back to Crimea and to despatch new envoys to Warsaw with assurances of
loyalty. In return, he pledged to confirm all former Cossack liberties,
rights and privileges and to appoint a commission which would examine all
Cossack grievances and begin negotiations with them. This manifesto was
despached to Khmelnytskyi by Stanisław Hołdakowski.

Jan Kazimierz, most likely acting on the advice of Ossoliński, de­
cided to circumvent these proceedings. Calling Mokrski, the king invited
him to a conference and after holding secret discussions with the envoy,
decided to reply positively to the "petitions" of the Cossacks. When
Andrzej Mokrski and Zakharii Khmelnytskyi departed from Warsaw on December
3, they carried a letter in which Jan Kazimierz stated that he agreed
to carry out the wishes of the Cossack hetman. Another letter, contain­
ing the same assurances of the king, was prepared earlier, on December 1,
and entrusted most likely to Giżowski to be delivered as soon as pos­
sible to Khmelnytskyi.

75 Jan Kazimierz to Cossack Army, [21].XI.1648: Szajnocha, op. cit.,
II, pt. 2, 471-471. This letter is dated 27.XI. Regarding the correct
date see Kubala, Ossoliński, p. 461, n. 22.

76 His name is also spelled as follows: Ołdakowski and Chołdakowski.

77 Kubala, Ossoliński, p. 333.

78 Torres to Holy See, Warsaw, 5.XII.1648: LNA, VI, 319.

79 No such letter survived; however, its contents must have been sim­
ilar to the one of December 1. See n. 80 below.

80 Jan Kazimierz to Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, 1.XII.1648: Szajnocha, op.

81 Khmelnytskyi’s Manifesto announcing end of hostilities, Ostoroh,
12.XII.1648: DKhmel., p. 86.
On the same day as the Cossack hetman's envoys departed from Warsaw, Smiarowski returned to the capital, handed over a letter from Khmelnytskyi to the king and reported to him on his mission. Jan Kazimierz, hearing of positive developments, had the satisfaction that his was a rational policy.

Shortly after the arrival of Smiarowski the royal court entertained four new Cossack envoys: Ivan Hyra, Bohdan Sokolskyi, Dmytro Cherkaskyi and Mykyta Hladkyi. These produced, no doubt, another letter from Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz and reconfirmed Smiarowski's report: the siege of Zamość had been lifted; the Tatars began their return march to Crimea; and the Cossack Army, on orders from its hetman, began to retire to Ukraine. These envoys also pressed the king to appoint Kysil to head a commission, which was to start negotiations between the two sides as quickly as possible.

In his reply Jan Kazimierz repeated the offers he made in his letter of December 1. He also added the following instructions: Khmelnytskyi and his officers were to arrive at a place designated by the commissioners to take an oath of fealty; there, the hetman was to receive the insignia of his office and then to begin negotiations. Once the negotiations were over, Khmelnytskyi was to send his envoys with the petitions of the Cossack Army to the Coronation Diet, where these were to be confirmed. The king again insisted that Khmelnytskyi was to send the Tatars back to Crimea,

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82 NN to NN, [Warsaw], 4.XII.1648: Szajnocha, op. cit., II, pt. 2, 477–478; and Jan Kazimierz to Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, 11.XI.1648: AGd., KGd., Ms. 300/53/83, fo. 44. The date 21.XI. in Księga pamiętniczka, p. 219 (the same document), is incorrect.

to march with his army back to Ukraine, to order all the serfs to return to their homes and to issue manifestoes banning lawless bands. Neither the Crown nor the Grand Ducal Armies were to hinder him in carrying out the royal orders. 84

This letter the king entrusted, most likely, once again to the care of Hołdakowski, 85 who completed his first mission prior to the close of the second week in December. Thus, once again he set out on a mission to Khmelnitskyi. Another letter containing similar statements of the king was provided most likely to the Cossack envoys who, after a short stay, departed from Warsaw on or shortly after December 11.

Hołdakowski contacted Khmelnitskyi during the march of Cossack troops eastward, accompanying him as far as Pavoloch. The envoy held discussions with the Cossack hetman regarding peace terms, and the place and schedule for negotiations. He even witnessed the publication of Khmelnitskyi's manifestoes which announced the termination of hostilities and the restoration of the socio-economic status quo in Ukraine. On January 2, 1649 he reached Sokal; 86 by another week he must have been in Warsaw.

While Khmelnitskyi was inclined to secure peace, his letter to the king announced that he would not begin negotiations with the commissioners until his envoys, whom he would send to attend the sessions of the Coronation Diet, would return to him with a favourable report. This statement was significant: Khmelnitskyi did not intend to rely alone on the promises

84 Jan Kazimierz to Khmelnitskyi, Warsaw, 11.XII.1648: AGd., KGd., Ms. 300/53/83, fo. 44.
85 Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 91.
of the king. Before negotiating with the commissioners he wanted to as-<ref>certain that the Diet approved his initial demands.  

By this time, however, it was impossible to turn the clock back. Early in December Jan Kazimierz announced the appointment of a commission, at the head of which he placed the Palatine of Bratslav, Adam Kysil. Other members included the following persons: the Castellan of Kiev, Maksymillian Brzhozovskyi; the Sub-Chamberlain of Lviv, Wojciech Miaskowski; the En-sign of Navahrudak, Mykola Kysil; the Cup-Bearer of Bratslav, Jakób Zielinski; and two royal secretaries, Zakharii Chetvertynskyi and Jakób Śmiarowski. Negotiations with Khmelnytskyi were scheduled to begin at the close of January 1649 in Kiev. 88 On December 12 the king issued manifestoes declaring an end to all hostilities. Royal instructions called upon the nobles to hold their dietines. The Coronation Diet in Krakow was scheduled to begin on January 19, 1649 and to terminate on February 9. 89

Under this schedule it was impossible for negotiations to take place. At the close of December Kysil sought funds, had no idea what Hożdakowski accomplished and was unable to gather all his colleagues at one spot. One delay followed another. 90 Jan Kazimierz finally informed Khmelnytskyi that negotiations were to be postponed till February. 91 This schedule made it

87 Kubala, Ossoliński, p. 338.
89 Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 334, 336-337.
91 Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 336, 347. He maintains, without giving a source, that Jan Kazimierz wrote to Khmelnytskyi on December 25.
difficult for the Cossack hetman to despatch his envoys to the Coronation Diet as well. Thus, all of these incidents simply sow seeds of misunderstanding between the two sides.

In the month of December, nevertheless, many individuals believed that the Commonwealth would be spared further strife and bloodshed. In Warsaw the "moderation" of the Cossack hetman was attributed to divine intervention. Under such circumstances Khmelnytskyi began a return march to Ukraine. No palatine of Kiev ever received such a welcome from the Kievan burgesses as he had, when he entered the city on the Orthodox Christmas Eve. On the outskirts of Kiev he was welcomed by multitudes of citizens. He was met by the visiting Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, who gave him a place of honour in his sleigh. They proceeded to the gates of Kiev through the processions formed by the Orthodox clergy; the crowds cheered, the bells pealed and the guns roared. The professors and students of the Kievan College honoured him with "orations and acclamations". They welcomed him as "Moses, saviour and liberator of the Ruthenian people from the Polish bondage, and as a good omen called Bohdan — God Given". On this occasion the Patriarch bestowed the title "Illustrious Prince" upon him. The archmandrite of the Monastery of the Caves prepared a feast in his honour. There were foreign envoys seeking to confer with him.

Khmelnytskyi was profoundly stirred by this enthusiastic reception

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92 Jerlicz, op. cit., I, 72.
by the Kievans. He was welcomed by all classes of the Ruthenian society in Kiev, "the mother of the cities of Rus"; the capital of old Kievan Rus, at one time a metropolis which was a rival to Constantinople, from whence Grand Princes Volodymyr and Yaroslav ruled a vast territory and where the monuments of their times were still visible -- Golden Gate, Cathedral of St. Sofiia, Monastery of the Caves. Kiev was also the cradle of the Orthodox Church among the Eastern Slavs. Even in Khmelnytskyi's time it was the most progressive centre of the religious and the intellectual life in the whole Orthodox world. By his triumphant entry into Kiev, Khmelnytskyi sanctified his military and political leadership with the halo of historical tradition. 

Moreover, it was through the discussions with the enlightened Ruthenian ecclesiastical and lay circles at Kiev, that he grasped the magnitude of his achievements. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi thus began to view his position and responsibility in a new light. He realized that he was no longer merely a leader of rebel Cossacks, but the head of all the Ruthenian people, with wider duties and more lofty political ideals. If at Zamosć he still took advantage of his military successes for the benefit of the narrow interest of the Cossack class, then at Kiev he changed his plans radically. This he revealed to Adam Kysil and the Commissioners upon their arrival at Pereiaslav on February 19, 1649.

Even prior to meeting Khmelnytskyi, Kysil was aware of great changes which had taken place in the outlook of the Cossack hetman. First of all,
he insulted the Commissioners by not receiving them in Kiev, but making them travel to Pereiaslav. At the first meeting, on February 20, they had a chance for a first-hand observation of a change in Khmelnytskyi's attitude and plans. Although he received them with great pomp and ceremony, he accepted the royal insignia of his office without enthusiasm, almost indignantly. Kysil's efforts to begin negotiations on the basis of Khmelnytskyi's declarations at Zamość brought no results. Khmelnytskyi ended the first session by a long denounciation of the "kinglets". The following day he announced that the Poles had no right to "Ukraine and all Ruthenia". He even tried to persuade the commissioners to renounce their loyalty to the Crown and to cast their lots with the Cossacks, prophesying that "Poland will perish and Ruthenia will rule very soon this year". 

At the third round of negotiations Kysil attempted to use his old stratagem of divide et impera by appealing to the personal interests of Khmelnytskyi and to the class interests of the Cossacks. He stated that the king was prepared to satisfy all the grievances of Khmelnytskyi and those of the Cossacks. As a bait he proposed to increase the number of the registered Cossacks to fifteen thousand. Kysil stated that the Cossacks were men of knightly rank; therefore, they should concern themselves with military matters and with the waging of war. The Cossacks had nothing in common with the serfs; they must sever all ties with the "rabble" and leave them to the tilling of the soil. Finally, Kysil attempted to rekindle the Cossacks' hate of the Tatars by appealing to their "patriotism" and faith. His aim, of course, was to rupture the Cossack-Tatar alliance; he also aimed at turning the Cossacks against the Turks. The Cossacks should

be aware that while they laid waste to the Crown and the Grand Duchy, they also destroyed Ruthenian ethnic territories, argued Kysil. By co-operating with the infidels, the Cossacks endangered their faith and the Orthodox Church. Rather than destroying the Commonwealth the Cossacks should wage wars in foreign lands; rather than destroying Christians within their own country, the Cossacks should destroy the infidels. 98

One member of the Commission, the Chamberlin of Lviv, Wojciech Miaskowski, summarized Khmelnytskyi's answer to Kysil. In it Khmelnytskyi refuted Kysil's arguments and outlined his new political credo:

It is useless to talk too much ... Now there is no time [to negotiate]. Hitherto I have undertaken tasks which I had not thought through; henceforth, I will pursue aims which I have considered with care. I will free all the Ruthenian people from the Polish bondage. Up to now, I have fought because of wrongs done to me personally; now, I will fight for our Orthodox faith. All the people as far as Lublin and Kraków will help me. I will not abandon them, for they are our right hand. In order that you may not subdue the serfs and then attack the Cossacks, I will maintain two to three thousand men, as well as all of the Tatar horde.... The Cossack friendship with them [Tatars] is eternal. ... I will neither wage foreign wars, nor will I draw my sword against the Turks or the Tatars. I have enough to do in Ukraine, Podolia and Volynia; and now I am enjoying sufficient ease, wealth and benefit from my land and principality as far as Lviv, Chelm and Halych. When I will reach the Vistula [River], I will say to the rest of the Poles: "Be still and keep silent Poles!" I will drive the wealthier Poles and the dukes and the princes beyond the Vistula, and if they become too unruly there, I will seek them out there too. Not a single noble or prince will I permit to set foot here in Ukraine, and if any one of them will desire to eat our bread, he must be obedient to the Zaporozhian Army, and must make no outcries against the king.

Khmelnytskyi also emphasized that he no longer considered himself only as the leader of the Cossacks, but also, "by the grace of God", as

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98 Ibid., p. 108.

"the independent ruler of Rus". While such a lofty view of his office and aims may have been purposely placed in Khmelnytskyi's mouth by Miaskowski, — who paints the Cossack hetman in the darkest colours and leaves the reader of his journal with the impression that Khmelnytskyi was intoxicated day and night — he makes quite clear the aims of Khmelnytskyi: to hold on to territories under Cossack control; to maintain his military alliance with the Tatars; and not to participate in any campaign against the Turks. Also, at this time he did not wish to sever all ties with the Commonwealth, for he still professed allegiance to Jan Kazimierz. This, however, was a very thin link.

Moreover, at this time Khmelnytskyi was not prepared to send the commissioners back to Warsaw with a declaration of war; therefore, playing for time, he signed a temporary agreement with them. Both sides agreed to an armistice, which was to last till the Orthodox feast of Pentecost. During the term of this armistice neither the Crown-Grand Ducal nor the Cossack Armies were to cross into the territories of each other, the boundaries being the Rivers Horyn and Prypiats and a line running north to Horyn from Kamianets in Podolia. Khmelnytskyi also consented to return all prisoners-of-war, on condition that his enemy, Daniel Czaplinski, would be surrendered to him.

With regard to other matters, Khmelnytskyi claimed that it was impossible for him to complete the negotiations at this time, because he was confronted by a grave logistical problem. Likewise, he was able neither

100 Ibid., p. 108.
to compile the lists of the registered Cossacks, nor to send the serfs back to their homes. Because of this problem, he requested that the nobles be advised to refrain from returning to their estates until the expiry of the armistice. By that date, he assured the commissioners, he would be fully prepared to resume the parleys. 102

In another document Khmelnytskyi really dictated his conditions for peace, even though these took the form of a humble "petition" to the king. In the name of the Cossack Army he pressed for the abolition of the Uniate Church; for the guarantee of all the rights to the Orthodox Church and the restoration to it all of its former churches, foundations and benefices; for the appointment of Orthodox Ruthenians to the offices of palatine and castellan of Kiev; and for the granting of at least three seats in the Senate to the Kievan representatives: the metropolitan bishop, the palatine and the castellan. The Catholics and the Orthodox were to retain the possession of their churches in Kiev; the Jesuits, however, were to be expelled from the city. Czapliński was to be apprehended and surrendered by the commissioners to Khmelnytskyi. Finally, Prince Wiśniowiecki was not to be given command of the Crown Army. 103

The commissioners saw that Khmelnytskyi had no intention of compromising any further. It became clear to them that they failed: Khmelnytskyi dared to dream "about a duchy and rule"; he would be satisfied with nothing less than an independent state. 104 His attitude during the negotia-

102 Agreement, Pereiaslav, 24.II.1649: Ibid., pp. 103-104.

103 Petition of the Cossack Army, Pereiaslav, 24.II.1649: Ibid., pp. 105-106.

104 Kysil and Commissioners to Jan Kazimierz, Hoshcha, 8.III.1649: Zbiór pamiętników, IV, 382.
tions was enough evidence for them that he also had no intention of keeping any agreement. The line of demarcations, the truce and the absence of nobles from their estates would give Khmelnytskyi enough time to forge a strong army without any interference. During this time he would also look for new allies. His excuses for not demobilizing the Cossack Army were too obvious: Khmelnytskyi had no intention of weakening his army; at the same time, he had no desire of creating dissensions in its rank-and-file by excluding the serfs, Furthermore, although Khmelnytskyi knew that the magnates in Warsaw would declare that his demands were impossible, he gambled that neither the king nor the "peace party" would flatly reject them. Both Jan Kazimierz and Ossoliński would try to humor him as long as possible. During this time he would gain the needed time to prepare for a new campaign in the spring of 1649.

During this time, while the commissioners were negotiating with Khmelnytskyi, the Coronation Diet was in session (January 19 to February 13, 1649). It was fortunate for the adherents of the "peace party" that Cossack delegates failed to appear before the Diet, for they did not need to defend the concessions made by Jan Kazimierz to Khmelnytskyi. It appeared to them that Khmelnytskyi, learning that the commissioners were on their way to him, decided to negotiate with them. By delaying this matter, the

106 On the interpretation and evaluation of the work of Kysil and the commissioners see Sysyn, op. cit., pp. 276-281.
107 On the Coronation Diet see Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 96-114; Obuchowicz, op. cit., pp. 23-28; AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/131, fos. 227r-286v; BUWr., Ms. Steinwehr III, fos. 339r-350v; and Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 337-341.
king and the chancellor hoped to take it out of the hands of the Diet and settle it to Khmelnytskyi's satisfaction by administrative means. Both of them believed that it was only a matter of time before all difficulties would be resolved positively in one way or another.

Both Jan Kazimierz and Ossoliński wanted peace with Khmelnytskyi almost at any cost. They still harboured the old war plans of King Władysław IV. A war with the Ottoman Empire, at a time when it was engaged in hostilities with Venice, was both desirable and necessary for the Commonwealth. She could employ the energies of the Cossacks and thus solve most of the internal problems of the state. Still, in order for such plans to be realized, peace had to be first concluded with the Cossacks. Contrary to the advice of many senators and even some of the commissioners, but pressed into action by Ossoliński, Jan Kazimierz decided to remove all the existing obstacles from the road leading to negotiations.

The resolutions of the Coronation Diet, however, tied the hands of Jan Kazimierz and Ossoliński. The war plans did not receive the necessary support. Moreover, to prevent the king from being too generous to the Cossacks, a special "watchdog" committee was formed. Comprising members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, this body was empowered to act along with the king and senators-resident in a similar capacity as the Diet with regard to the ratification of an agreement with the Cossacks. Obviously, by taking such an unusual precaution, the Diet made the pursual

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108 Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 336-337.
109 Volumina Legum, IV, 268-269; and NN to NN, Warsaw, 10.II.1649: Ms. AGd., Kgd., Ms. 300/53/101, p. 33.
of the "contentment" policy by the king and the chancellor very difficult.

Moreover, while the commissioners were on their way to open negotiations with Khmelnytskyi, the Diet resolved to increase the strength of the Crown Army and even authorized the king to call a general levy of nobles at short notice. Furthermore, although Wiśniowiecki was not appointed a temporary hetman, he was successful in recruiting more adherents to his intransigent camp. His belligerent followers issued threats against Khmelnytskyi and also expressed vehement objections to any proposed concessions for the Cossacks. Khmelnytskyi, who was well-informed about the anti-Cossack atmosphere at the Coronation Diet, could hardly have confidence in the good will of the government.

On March 8, upon his return to Hoshcha, Kysil submitted a very negative report on the outcome of negotiations with Khmelnytskyi. This report, signed by all members of the commission, also announced that Mykola Kysil and Jakób Śmiarowski were being despatched to Warsaw to reveal the outcome of negotiations in Pereiaslav. After arriving in the capital on the 20th, Kysil and Śmiarowski reported on the developments and revealed the terms only to the king and the two chancellors. The senators present at the court were not allowed to participate. Leszczyński, the vice-chancellor, sought to convince the king on two separate occasions to mobilize troops and to march against the Cossacks. His senior colleague, Ossoliński,

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110 Kysil and Commissioners to Jan Kazimierz, Hoshcha, 8.III.1649: Zbiór Pamiętników, IV, 381.


112 NN to Szołdrski, Warsaw, 23.III.1649: Ojczyste spominki, II, 15-16. A fragment of a letter, which appears to be from Franciszek Isajkowski to Kazimierz Leon (Lew) Sapieha, from Warsaw, dated ca., 20.III.1649, mentions the presence of the Lithuanian Court Marshal as well as the two Crown Chancellors. See BN, BOZ, Ms. 931, fo. 247. 
maintained, on the contrary, that under the circumstances no sacrifice was too great to satisfy Khmelnytskyi. The latter won again. 113

On March 27 Jan Kazimierz acted on Ossolinski's advice. With the exception of refusing to surrender Czapliński, whom he promised to punish severely, the king agreed to accept all other demands of Khmelnytskyi. 114 The king also attempted to win the goodwill of the Cossack hetman by granting him titles to various properties. 115 Śmierowski, to whom this mission was entrusted, also was given additional charters -- only names had to be inserted -- for the purpose of "influencing" Cossack officers to support the cause of peace with the Commonwealth. 116 The promises of the king, obviously, had the support of neither the senators-resident nor the special committee appointed by the Coronation Diet.

While Śmierowski headed for Chyhyryn, Adam Kysil, the newly-appointed Palatine of Kiev, 117 laboured to maintain peace in the period assigned for the armistice. Working semi-independently, Kysil took great pains to convince the principals in Warsaw and Chyhyryn that settlement of difficulties by negotiations was the only rational course of action to pursue. As May drew to a close, he was forced to admit that all his efforts were

113 Kubala, Ossoliński, p. 346.
114 Jan Kazimierz to Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, 27.III.1649: Ojczyste spominki, II, 113-117.
116 NN to Szodrski, Warsaw, 23.III.1649: Ojczyste spominki, II, 14; and Pinocci's report (1654): Ibid., I, 142.
in vain. In June even he had to admit that the differences between the two parties would have to be resolved not around a conference table, but on a field of battle. There was no doubt that the shrewd Cossack hetman gained the upper hand.

Khmelnytskyi took advantage of this policy of "contentment", pursued by Jan Kazimierz, Jerzy Ossoliński and Adam Kysil, and used it effectively to camouflage his far-reaching aim: to prepare the final blow for the Commonwealth, both from within and from without. In order to gain time for his plans and to keep her unprepared for war, Khmelnytskyi continued to lull to sleep the king and other influential men with his offers of peace. He also initiated some steps by which he sought to sow dissention among the gentry of the Commonwealth, in addition to other steps by which he attempted to prevent the coordinated action of Crown and Grand Ducal armies against him. Externally, his plans were very ambitious: he sought to isolate the Commonwealth and to draw into the struggle against her as many of the neighbouring countries as possible.

On the whole, Khmelnytskyi seemed to have accomplished his aims by diplomatic means. True, he was unable to rouse Russia out of her lethargy. Her statesmen were interested in his propositions, but they were cautious and in no hurry. They were proverbially "measuring the cloth seven times before they cut it". Khmelnytskyi at least had the satisfaction that while Russia would not support him, she would not aid his enemies either. Khmel-

118 On the multi-sided efforts of Kysil see Ibid., pp. 281-284. Many letters of Kysil are found in AKr., Pin., Ms. 363; BN, BoZ, Ms. 1217; Księga pamiętnicza; Dokumenty; and Arхив YuZR, pt. 3, vol. IV.

nytskyi seemed to have secured the support from Turkey and all her vassals: he was certain about the whole-hearted cooperation of Crimea; he was assured of some military aid from Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania; and he imagined that the Turks would enter into the hostilities with the Commonwealth in spite of their war with Venice. Finally, Khmelnytskyi seemed to utilize all the hostile elements within the Commonwealth for his ends.  

The realization of Khmelnytskyi's new political plans did not only depend on the support of foreign powers or the hostile factions within the Commonwealth. After all, he had a vast reservoir of "riffraff" at his disposal. At the same time as he roused the Commonwealth's neighbours, he also appealed to the Ruthenian people. Issuing calls for aid to "all the common people and the Cossacks who believed in God", Khmelnytskyi promised them freedom from their masters after a victory over the "Poles". In response to his appeals "the rebellious serfs thronged together". Having already experienced "freedom from labour and tribute", the serfs armed themselves; their slogan was: "no lords forever". They did not even want to hear any talk about negotiations with their oppressors. This was to be

a conflict to the last drop of blood. Khmelnytskyi declared that his aim was "to exterminate" the "Poles"; his militant followers cried out defiantly: "human tongues will first turn backward before the Poles will rule over us". This movement was also supported actively by Ruthenian nobles, clergy and burgesses. In April Khmelnytskyi announced the final orders for a general mobilization of his forces. His manifestoes designated all regiments to concentrate at Masliv Stav.

So far Khmelnytskyi was successful in "lulling the Commonwealth to sleep with the hope of peace and uncertain negotiations". By May he was ready; he had no further need of his mask. Early in June there was no question about his true motives and plans even in Warsaw. Smiarowski managed to send a message from Chyhyryn that Khmelnytskyi received him indignantly, treated him with contempt and showed no respect for the letter of the king. Furthermore, the astonished royal envoy heard a declaration of war. Khmelnytskyi stated that no further compromise was possible;

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121 Obuchowicz to Sapiha, Manashyn, 22.V.1649; NN to Szołdarski, Warszaw, 23.III.1649; Kysil to Khmelnytskyi, [Hoshcha, ca., late III. or early IV.1649]; Sapiha to NN, [Loeu, ca., l.VIII.1649]: Ojczyste spominki, II, 29-32, 42; Journal of Miaskowski, Hoshcha, 7.III.1649; Statements of Cossack captives, Treshyn, 18.IV.1649; Miaskowski to NN, [Kamianets], 23.IV.1649; Record of Senate Council, Warsaw 4.VI.1649; Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 385, 387, 389, 406.

122 Miaskowski to NN, Novoseltsi, 1.II.1649; Journal of Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, 26.II.1649: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 365, 383; Commissioners to Jan Kazimierz, Vasiliv, 11.II.1649: Ojczyste spominki, II, 10-12; and Jerlicz, op. cit., I, 95-96.

123 See the various reports, despatches and letters: Akty YuZR, III, 45, 54, 58 (Dopolnenia); VIII, 289, 294-295; Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 389, 397; Ojczyste spominki, II, 17; and Dokumenty.

124 Lanckoroński to Deputy Judge of Lviv, [Manachyn], 5.V.1649: Ojczyste spominki, II, 19.
"two walls will collide: one will fall in; the other will remain standing". In Smiarowski's opinion, the hostilities could only be prevented if the government consented to humor Khmelnytskyi with the creation of a "sovereign Principality of Ruthenia".  

Already in February 1649 Khmelnytskyi -- this "Zaporozhian Machiavelli" -- revealed to the commissioners that "by the will of God" he became the sovereign of Rus. Yet, at that time he still considered himself to be a "loyal" subject of the Polish King. Three months later, however, he decided to sever even this weak link with the Commonwealth, for he refused to acknowledge allegiance to Jan Kazimierz. This he revealed to the Russian envoy Grigorii Unkovskii, who reported it in the following form:

In Poland and in Lithuania Jan Kazimierz was elected king. ... The Poles and the Lithuanians crowned him and swore fealty to him, and the king swore an oath to them, and God delivered us from them. The king was neither elected nor crowned by us. We have not kissed the cross [i.e., swore by the cross] for him. And they had neither written nor notified us about this; and in this way, by the will of God, we have gained freedom from them. ... And we do not wish to remain under their subjection and in their bondage.

Thus, in all the Orthodox churches within the territories controlled by the Cossacks, the Orthodox faithful ceased to recite the king's name in their common prayers. All traces of the former magnate rule were slowly

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125 Record of Senate Council, Warsaw, 4.IV.1649; and Olszewski to NN, [Taikury, 25.V.1649]: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 397, 404-405.
disappearing. Khmelnytskyi aimed to unite all Ruthenian ethnographic territories within such boundaries as were ruled by the Kievan grand princes.\(^{129}\)

Even the greatest optimists began to realize that such "madness" of Khmelnytskyi must be checked. The king called on the senators to advise him how "to save and to protect the institutions of the Fatherland, ... because not only the sleeve of the gown, or the gown itself is at stake, but the whole body of the Fatherland".\(^{130}\) Realizing that the armies of the Commonwealth would be matched against the "fearless soldiers" of the Cossack Army, the king sought to gain as many troops as possible. German mercenaries were to be recruited; Prussian regiments were ordered to march south; all existing troops were to mass together; and a general call to arms was issued for the gentry.

In order to gain military aid, diplomatic support, financial help and to secure confirmation of various treaties, envoys were dispatched from Warsaw to Russia, Sweden, Transylvania, the Empire, the Holy See, Spain and France.\(^{131}\) All these efforts came too late. In hope of peace with the Cossacks, Jan Kazimierz demobilized many regiments; by this time, it was difficult for him to mobilize a strong army.\(^{132}\) Thus, as the term of the armistice expired, the Commonwealth was "neither prepared for war, nor for

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\(^{131}\) Record of Senate Council, Warsaw, 4.VI.1649: Księga pamiętnicza, p. 408; and Kubala, Ososiński, p. 351.

\(^{132}\) Obuchowicz, op. cit., p. 28.
peace negotiations”. Jan Kazimierz still tried to gain time in order to raise a strong army. He therefore proposed to Khmelnytskyi to extend the term of armistice till June 21. The other desperate steps failed completely: Khmelnytskyi would not hear any arguments against the extension of the truce; the Cossack officers did not desert their leader; there was no mutiny in the Cossack Army. Khmelnytskyi retained his command and his iron grip on the Army. Śmiarowski who attempted to bribe Cossack officers to turn against their hetman paid for his acts with his life.

III

Hostilities were resumed by both sides even before the expiry of the armistice. Khmelnytskyi sent various regiments to harass the Crown Army; at the same time, he massed his troops near Bila Tserkva and awaited the arrival of his Tatar allies.

The forces of the Commonwealth were grouped in three divisions. The first of these was commanded by two new Regimentaries: the Castellan of Belz, Andrzej Firlej and the Castellan of Kamianets, Stanisław Lanckoroński;

135 Pinocci's Report (1654); NN to Szołdrski, Warsaw, 23.II.1649; Kysil to Ossoliński and Cossack Colonels, Hoshcha, 11., 15. and 18.V.1649; and Przyjemski to Kysil, Zviahel, 15.VI.1649: Ojczyste spominki, I, 142; II, 14, 21-29, 45-46. See also Record of Senate Council, Warsaw, 6.VI.1649: Księga pamiętnicza, p. 404; Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Zboriv, 16.VIII.1649: DKhmel., p. 125; Kysil to Ossoliński, Yaroslav, 12.VI.1649: Dokumenty, pp. 226-228; and Jerlicz, op. cit., I, 98.
and was engaged in sporadic skirmishes in the region of Sluch and Horyn Rivers. As the Cossack-serf pressure mounted, this division was forced to withdraw westward and finally to seek shelter of Zbarazh, a fortress in Podolia. There it was strengthened by the arrival of several magnate regiments and finally by the private army of Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. Wiśniowiecki soon became the de facto commander of the troops. The second division, commanded by King Jan Kazimierz, acted as a reserve and marched to the aid of the first. The third division, comprising troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and commanded by Field Hetman Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, was poised to enter Ukraine from the northeast.\footnote{On the whole campaign, specifically on Battles of Loeu (31.VII.) and Zboviv (15-16.VIII.) and the siege of Zbarazh (10.VII.-22.VIII.) see the following sources and monographs: Akty YuZR, III, 315, 325, 392-393, (Dopolneniia), 45, 54, 58, 71; VII, 289, 294-295, X, 293; Dokumenty, pp. 243-245, 249-254, 259-268, 270-273, 282-284, 288-297; Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 398, 409-410, 413, 428, 435-439, 448-470; Ojczyste spominki, II, 37-50, 53-58; Hadży Mehmed z Krymu, op. cit., pp. 120-124. Ludwik Frąś, "Bitwa pod Zborowem w r. 1649". KH, XLVI (1932), 350-370; Kubala, Szkice, 73-105, 119-122; Lipiński, "Krzychewski", pp. 428-464; and Kotłubaj, op. cit., pp. 140-148, 367-371, 416-419.}

Late in May the whole Cossack Army was on the move. By July 10 it appeared before the fortifications of Zbarazh and besieged the first division. Here Khmelnytskyi divided his army into three groups. The first Cossack group continued to lay siege to Zbarazh. The second Cossack group, under Colonel Stanislaw Krychevskyi, was sent to protect Ukraine from the north against Radziwiłł's third division. On July 31 Krychevskyi suffered a disastrous defeat near Loeu, on the Dnieper. He did manage, however, to accomplish his mission: the Lithuanian troops suffered such heavy casualties that Radziwiłł thought it unwise to march south. The third Cossack group under Khmelnytskyi, together with the Tatars led by the khan, sped in the meantime to intercept the second division of the king.
On August 15 Jan Kazimierz led his division into a skillfully-prepared ambush near Zboriv. The battle during this day turned to the great disadvantage of the Poles. "For several hundred years neither Poland nor any [Polish] king had been in such straits as on August 15th", remarked one participant of the battle. "It almost came to the repetition of the disasters at Varna or Legnica, or of the times when the Tatar Batu Khan lived twelve weeks in Kraków". On the following day, when fighting ceased, this division was surrounded by Cossacks and Tatars and its situation was almost hopeless.

At that critical time Jerzy Ossoliński succeeded in establishing contact with the khan and persuaded him to negotiate peace. After two days of parleys between Ossoliński and Sefer Ghasi Aga an agreement was concluded. In it, apart from the articles dealing with Tatar matters, Jan Kazimierz pledged to Islam Giray III to make various concessions to the Cossacks.

Once parleys began with the Tatars, Islam Giray III ordered Khmelnytskyi to cease all hostilities and to begin negotiations with the repre-

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137 Miaskowski to NN, By Zboriv, 22.VIII.1649: Księga pamiętnicza, p. 439.

138 For the correspondence between Jan Kazimierz-Islam Giray III and Ossoliński-Sefer Ghazi Aga, By Zboriv, 15-16.VIII.1649, see: AGAD, AKW, Dział Tatarskie [Hereafter cited as Tat.] 60, file 72, no. 22; 62, file 2, no. 333; file 118, no. 452. Regarding negotiations see AGAD, APP, Ms. 35, fo. 848; Hadży Mehmed Senai z Krymu, op. cit., pp. 128-131; and reports in Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 437-438 and Dokumenty, pp. 272-273. See also Kubala, Szkice, pp. 97-101.

139 Text of the Polish-Tatar Treaty, By Zboriv, [18.VIII.1649]: AGAD, AKW, Tat. 62, file 4, no. 335. Polish translation is on the back of this document, as well as Ibid., file 3, no. 334. For published versions see, for example, Kubala, Szkice, p. 122.
sentatives of the king. The Cossack hetman had little choice but to yield to the pressure of the khan. Were he to refuse to heed the Tatar ruler, he faced the possibility of the Horde turning against him.

Khmelnyskyi was already contacted by Adam Kysil and Jan Kazimierz on August 15. The king declared in his letter that he was astonished that the Cossack leader dared to lift the sword against him, the anointed representative of God. He ordered Khmelnyskyi to stop all fighting and to withdraw his troops from the field of battle. Once he complied with this order, he was to send his envoys with Cossack grievances. At this time the king would appoint a commission to resolve all difficulties. Jan Kazimierz promised that if Khmelnyskyi heeded him, he would do everything in his power to restore the Cossack rights and liberties.

Khmelnyskyi’s answer to the king was delivered together with the khan’s letter. The Cossack hetman claimed that both he and his father were always faithful servants of the Crown. He did not take up arms against the king; on the contrary, this was his last resort to seek justice from

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140 Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, pt. 3, 197-219, provides a great deal of information regarding negotiations. Valuable details are also supplied by S. Tomashivskyi, "Odyn moment pid Zborovom 1649 r.", ZNTSh, CXVII-CXVIII (1913), 115-125.

141 So far historians were unaware of the exchange of letters between Kysil and Khmelnyskyi. The author has been unable to locate Kysil’s letters; he has discovered, however, three letters of Khmelnyskyi written to Kysil: one not dated (ca. 16-17.VIII.); one dated 18.VIII.; and the third dated 19.VIII. See BUWr., Ms. Steinwehr III, fo. 373.

the tyranny of the magnates. Khmelnytskyi emphasized that he would gladly place himself under the protection of the king and would obey his commands to the letter, were it not for the lawlessness of the nobles, who wielded more power than their own monarch. He concluded his remarks to the king by repeating the proposal he made at Zamosc: Cossacks wished to serve the king faithfully and to free him from the bondage of the "kinglets". 143

Jan Kazimierz responded the following day by admonishing Khmelnytskyi for the fate of his envoy Jakób Śmiarowski; however, in the interest of peace he was willing to overlook even this atrocity. Offering Khmelnytskyi another chance to earn royal favour and to keep his post of Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, Jan Kazimierz proposed that Khmelnytskyi carry out several conditions: he had to swear an oath of fealty; and to prove himself a loyal subject by ceasing to carry on diplomatic relations with foreign rulers, pledging not to stir the serfs, withdrawing all his troops from the battle area and sending all the serfs back to their homes. 144

Khmelnytskyi's answer was delivered to the king the same day. He explained in detail why Śmiarowski deserved his fate, and added that he was prepared to discuss all other matters with the Crown Grand Chancellor 145

Khmelnytskyi's envoys, who appeared during the second round of negotiations between the Crown Chancellor and the Tatar vizier, attempted at this time to introduce Cossack matters into discussion. Ossoliński, how-

143 Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Zboriv, 15.VIII.1649: DKhmel., pp. 122-123.
144 Jan Kazimierz to Khmelnytskyi, By Zboriv, 16.VIII.1649: Dokumenty, p. 281.
145 Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Zboriv. 16.VIII.1649: DKhmel., pp. 124-125.
ever, told them to return to their leader and to inform him to submit to the king all his demands in writing. Khmelnytskyi followed Ossoliński's bidding. During the same day his envoys returned with two important documents. The first was Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, whom he assured of his loyalty and requested a personal favour: capital punishment of his enemy Daniel Czapliński. The other document, an eighteen-article petition, was entitled "Articles on the Needs of the Zaporozhian Army [submitted] to His Majesty, Our Gracious Lord".

These "Articles", or a Cossack draft which was to serve as a starting-point for forthcoming negotiations, contained the following provisions:

1. All former rights, privileges and liberties, granted to Cossacks by former Polish kings, were to be recognized and reconfirmed by Jan Kazimierz.

2. Enlistment of registered Cossacks was to be carried out in the area encompassed by the following boundaries: northward from Dniester River through Berlyntsiv, Bar, Staryi Kostiantyniv and along Sluch River; eastward along the Pripiat River to the Dnieper River, along it to the north, and then east to Starodub and towards Trubchevsk; southward along the Russian border; and westward, through Zaporozhe to the Dniester. Neither Crown nor any mercenary troops were to be quartered or stationed

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146 Anonymous diary, By Zboriv, 17.VIII.1649; and "Relatio glorissimae expeditionis, ... anno 1649": Dokumenty, pp. 272–273; 296–297.

147 Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Zboriv, 17.VIII.1649: DKhmel., pp. 126–127.

148 Articles, By Zboriv, 17.VIII.1649: Ibid., pp. 128–130.
in this area. Persons excluded from the Cossack register were to be given fair treatment by their masters.

3. The Uniate Church was to be abolished within the entire Commonwealth.

4. The Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev were to be elevated to their offices by the Patriarchs of Constantinople, who were to exercise spiritual jurisdiction over them and all Orthodox clergy within the Commonwealth.

5. All former Orthodox churches, benefices, foundations and the like, both within the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were to be restored only to the Orthodox. Any person obstructing this process of restitution was to face criminal charges.

6. In the performance and celebration of rites and divine services, the Orthodox clergy was to enjoy rights, throughout the Commonwealth, similar to those enjoyed by the Roman Catholic clergy.

7. Orthodox churches could be erected in Warsaw, Krakow and Lublin, as well as in other cities and towns of the Commonwealth.

8. The Chancellors of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were to issue, without any delay, charters and other documents to the Orthodox Ruthenians.

9. Neither the Jesuits nor other Roman Catholic religious orders were to be founded in the City of Kiev.

10. All offices were to be granted only to the Orthodox in the area encompassed by the following boundaries: "from Kiev to Bila Tserkva, to the Tatar border; in the Zadniprovia; and the Palatinate of Chernihiv".

11. The Jews were neither allowed to gain leases nor establish permanent residences in the territories referred to in article 2. Those engaged in trade, however, were permitted to gain entry for a short duration.
12. Since in former and recent years many persons, who were con-
demned by the Diet as rebels, lost their lives and their properties, goods
and the like were confiscated by others, all such condemnations were to be
rescinded and all such confiscations were to be restored to their successors.

13. There was to be no demand for the return of various articles
seized from churches during the recent "turmoil".

14. All nobles, whether Orthodox or Catholic, who joined the Zapor-
ozhian Army were not to be charged with treason or infamy. If any charges
of this nature were laid against them, all these were to be declared null
and void by the Diet.

15. All acts of the Diet which infringe the rights and liberties of
the Zaporozhian Army were to be abrogated.

16. The seat of the Roman Catholic diocese was to be moved from Kiev.
The Crown Army was not to be stationed "in these territories" until it was
certain that permanent peace was achieved.

17. The Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev and two Orthodox bishops were
to gain seats in the Senate and were to enjoy the same rights and privi-
leges as the Roman Catholic senators-spiritual.

18. The king, along with six senators "of various faiths" and six
deputies, were to swear oaths to maintain the rights of the Orthodox Church
and to abide by this agreement. All the articles of this agreement were
to be published, word for word, as a "constitution" of the Diet. If in
the future any article were to be violated, the Zaporozhian Army would
regard this as a sign of bad faith of the king towards his subjects.

Jan Kazimierz gave his verbal assurances to Cossack envoys that this
petition would receive his consideration. He made similar promises in a
letter to Khmelnytskyi, adding that he would send the commissioners to negotiate as soon as possible. He again emphasized that all troops and field artillery had to be withdrawn. On August 18 Khmelnytskyi announced his delight that finally all difficulties would be settled amicably. He had already removed the guns; he had not yet withdrawn his troops, however, because of the danger from the roving bands of Tatars.

On the same day Ossoliński and other commissioners began to negotiate with the Cossack delegation. Late at night the terms of peace were finally agreed upon by the two sides. On August 19 Khmelnytskyi was called to take an oath. The commissioners had considerable difficulty in administering the oath to Khmelnytskyi, because he demanded that the king take a similar oath and that his enemy, Daniel Czaplinski, be immediately surrendered to him. Next day the whole proceedings ended with a ceremony in the king's tent. Khmelnytskyi appeared before Jan Kazimierz did homage to him and asked for his pardon. Finally, with the lifting of the siege of Zbarazh on August 22, the whole campaign came to an end.

The agreement concluded at Zboriv between Jan Kazimierz and the Commonwealth, on the one side, and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the Zaporozhian

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149 This is evident from Khmelnytskyi's reply to the king (see n. 150 below); and Anonymous diary: By Zboriv, 17.VIII.1649: Dokumenty, p. 273.

150 Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Zboriv, 18.VIII.1649: DKhmel., pp. 131-132.

151 They were the Palatine of Kiev, Adam Kysil; the Palatine of Belz, Krzysztof Koniecpolski; the Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Kazimierz Leon Sapieha; and the Castellan of Sandomierz, Stanisław Witowski.

152 Apart from the cited sources, additional details are provided by Kojałowicz, op. cit., pp. 96-97.
Army, on the other, was de facto an international treaty.\textsuperscript{153} Officially, however, it was regarded only as an act of royal grace: the king merely consented to approve the petitions of his subjects. Its official name was "A Declaration of His Majesty's Clemency to the Zaporozhian Army, made [in response] to the Articles of [its] Supplication".\textsuperscript{154}

This "Declaration" was divided into three main parts. Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11 dealt exclusively with Cossack matters. The chief provisions of these articles were the following: all former rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Army were restored; the king issued a separate charter in confirmation of this article;\textsuperscript{155} the new quota of registered Cossacks was raised to forty thousand; Cossack territories roughly comprised the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv; neither the Crown Army nor the Jews were to have access into areas where Cossack regiments were stationed; the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army was responsible for the preparation of the new register; and he was granted the district of Chyhyryn.

Articles 4 and 5 stated that all Cossacks and their supporters were granted a general amnesty. Articles 8, 9 and 10 dealt with matters pertaining to religion. All questions dealing with the abolition of the Uniate Church and with the restoration of the rights and benefices to the Orthodox Church were to be discussed at the forthcoming Diet. The metropolitan of Kiev was to receive a seat in the Senate. All offices in the

\textsuperscript{153}Kubala, Szkice, pp. 103, 105.

\textsuperscript{154}See Appendix II.

\textsuperscript{155}Charter to the Cossack Army, By Zboriv, 18.VIII.16[49]: Akty YuZR, X, 453–454.
Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv were to be restricted to nobles of the Orthodox faith. The Jesuits were neither to reside nor to found schools throughout Ukraine. Finally, all these articles were to be ratified by the Diet. Obviously, the "Declaration" modified greatly the articles of the Cossack demands.

Nevertheless, in the past the government of the Commonwealth never made such sweeping concessions to the Cossacks as it had by the Treaty of Zboriv. Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, as well as the royal charter, fulfilled the aims and satisfied the interests of all those in the ranks of the Cossack Army. The Commonwealth retained the registered Cossacks in her service and their quota was increased from six thousand to the nominal figure of forty thousand. They secured the repeal of the draconic Ordinance of 1638. Thus, this meant that they regained such rights as their military self-government and the election of their own officers. Jan Kazimierz also issued a special charter which confirmed all former Cossack liberties.

Ukraine gained political autonomy within the framework of the Commonwealth. Its new status was stressed by the royal charter and articles 2, 6, 7 and 9 of the treaty. Comprising the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, the new Cossack territories were to be ruled by the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. By the virtue of his office he assumed great powers. Cossack troops were responsible for the defense of their lands; and the Crown Army was denied access to them. As the Cossacks gained control of Ukraine, their military system of government and administration was introduced. Thus, a new military "republic" was born. Its links with Warsaw were very weak. Even these links emphasized the autonomy of Ukraine,
for only Ruthenian nobles of Orthodox faith were eligible to hold appointments within it.

Articles 8 and 10 of the treaty were further expanded by a special royal charter issued in Warsaw on January 12, 1650. It stressed that "all the Ruthenian people" — churchmen and laymen, nobles and commoners — retained their rights and liberties throughout the Commonwealth. No concessions of importance were made to the serfs, because neither the ruling class nor the Cossacks intended to liberate them.

On November 22, 1649 the Diet was convoked in Warsaw in order to deal, among many other matters, with the ratification of the Treaty of Zboriv. Due to a number of developments, the attitudes of most of the deputies towards the policy of compromise with the Cossacks in general, and the treaty in particular, were either negative or very hostile. All sorts of vicious rumors began to circulate — some individuals even spoke of "treason" — about the "intentions" of Jan Kazimierz and Jerzy Ossoliński. The chancellor, especially, became the target of all sorts of jokes, accusations and abuse. Day by day the opposition increased, particularly to the articles of the treaty which established the autonomous Cossack area.

156 For a detailed account on the activities of this Diet (from November 22, 1649 to January 13, 1650) see: AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/133, fos. 195r-288r.

157 On the ugly mood of the gentry and the activities of Kysil prior and during the sessions of the Diet see Sysyn, op. cit., pp. 292-301.

158 See, for example, the instructions to the deputies of the Palatinates of Kraków, Proszowice, 11.X.1649; Sieradz, Sądek, 21.X.1649; and Mazovia, Warsaw, 25.X.1649: ASKr., II, 390; and Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 513, 515.

159 See the lampoon: PK, pp. 422-427; and Kubala, Ossoliński, pp. 369-370.
Moreover, the apostolic nuncio, the Catholic and Uniate prelates and their lay supporters, formented a storm over the articles which they regarded as favourable to the Orthodox Church.¹⁶⁰

Khmelnitsky, who endeavoured to convince the government that he intended to carry out the agreement to the letter,¹⁶¹ sent to the Diet a small delegation headed by Colonel Maxym Nesterenko with the summaries of the register¹⁶² and with instructions to press for the ratification of the treaty.¹⁶³ Eventually, after a great deal of heated debate, after the counter-agitation of the "peace party"¹⁶⁴ and especially after the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Silvestr Kosiv, agreed to forego his right to a seat in the Senate,¹⁶⁵ the Diet ratified the treaty as a whole in rather general terms.¹⁶⁶


¹⁶¹ Khmelnitsky to Kysil, Jan Kazimierz and Ossoliński, Chyhyryn, 8.X., 11.X., 2.XI. and 25.XI.1649: DKhmel., pp. 139-146, 148-149.

¹⁶² The summaries contained the names of 40,477 Cossacks: Oświęcim, op. cit., pp. 211-221. The register itself, although dated 17./27.X.1649, was submitted to the Crown Chancery at a later date. See Lipiński, "Krzyżewski", p. 468. The register was published under the following title: Reczta wszystkiego Wojska Zaporożskiego w 1649 roku, Ed. O. Bodianski (Moscow, 1875).

¹⁶³ Instruction to Nesterenko et al., [ca., middle of XII.] 1649: DKhmel., pp. 151-152.

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, Kysil to Jan Kazimierz, Kiev, 18.XI.1649: Księga pamiątkowa, pp. 521-523; and especially the following publication: Relatio Gloriosissimae expeditionis, victoriosissimi progressus, & faustissimae pacificationis sum hostibus Serenissimi et Potentissimi Principis ac Domini, Dni. Joannis Casimiri, Regis Poloniae & Sveciae, etc. etc. ([Warsaw], 1649).

¹⁶⁵ Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 161.

¹⁶⁶ Volumina Legum, IV, 285.
The main articles of the treaty were announced in the form of king's charters granted to Khmelnytskyi and to the Cossack Army. The controversial religious question was partially solved by another charter issued to "all the Ruthenian people". The Uniate Church was not abolished, but heretofore both the Uniate and the Orthodox Churches were to enjoy an equal status within the Commonwealth. The rights of the Orthodox were confirmed to certain bishoprics; a number of monasteries and churches were to be returned to them; they were guaranteed the freedom of worship and the right to conduct their services according to the traditional Eastern rite; and as well as the right to found and to maintain their religious organizations, schools and publishing houses. The Orthodox clergy were to enjoy all the privileges due to their ecclesiastical rank. The Orthodox burgesses were to be admitted to municipal offices without any prejudice.

The Treaty of Zboriv between Jan Kazimierz and the Commonwealth, on the one side, and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the Zaporozhian Army, on the other, was built on very weak foundations. Both sides were compelled to accept its terms: the Polish king, by the exigencies of war; the Cossack hetman, by Tatar threats of retaliation. Neither side was satisfied with the treaty. Most of the Commonwealth's nobles considered its terms humiliating; these terms also neither corresponded with the actual successes of Cossack arms, nor satisfied the expectations of the Ruthenian society, especially the serfs. It was clear to all that the treaty was

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merely a temporary arrangement and that the issues would have to be solved once more in the near future by the force of arms.

Yet, the Treaty of Zboriv was not a complete failure, for the aims, desires and slogans of the Cossacks and of the Ruthenian people found their expression — at least in part — in its articles. In one way, the treaty may be regarded as a bold experiment. It served as a useful precedent for the future. Notwithstanding all its faults, the Treaty of Zboriv became one of the bricks for that edifice which was eventually completed at Hadiach in 1658.
CHAPTER II

THE PAINS OF CO-EXISTENCE:
FROM ZBORIV (1649), THROUGH BILA
TSERKVA (1651) TO PEREIASLAV (1654)

I

In Warsaw on January 12, 1650 Jan Kazimierz published manifestoes, in which he proclaimed to all his subjects that the Treaty of Zboriv had been ratified by the Diet. ¹ One week later, in additional proclamations, the king announced that "We have appointed ... Adam of Brusyliv Kysil, the Palatine and [Prefect] General of Kievan Lands, ... Our Commissioner, who shall reside in [the City of] Kiev, [in order to insure] the observance of general peace [by the liege subjects]; and to him We have granted full powers [to deal with infractions] in the observance of peace and to dispense justice [for violations] between Our Crown Army and Our Zaporozhian Army [in Ukraine]."²

 Shortly thereafter Adam Kysil departed from Warsaw. Heading for Ukraine, Kysil was determined to re-establish the old economic, social and administrative order within the new framework of the Zboriv arrangement, especially since the serfs were ordered to return to their homes and to

¹ Dokumenty. p. 314.
respect the seigniorial rights of royal officials and lay and ecclesiastic-
cal lords. He had the authority to use both Crown and Cossack troops to
punish those guilty of disobedience and to suppress those causing revolts. He was soon to find out, however, that such a task would be extremely dif-
cult to carry out.

Following the conclusion of the post-Diet dietine of the Palatinates of Kiev and Chernihiv, which he attended, Kysil proceeded to Kiev. Upon reaching the city on the 14th, he found an atmosphere of great unrest. The failure of the Diet to ratify all articles agreed to at Zboriv and general dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty in Ukraine, combined to undermine Khmelnytskyi's authority: there was a Cossack mutiny in Zaporozhe; insubordination and sedition in the Cossack rank-and-file; and many revolts of serfs in the countryside. Under such circumstances, it was hardly possible to bring into effect another article of the Treaty of Zboriv: the return of the nobles to their estates in Ukraine. This thorny question was partially solved by Kysil and Khmelnytskyi by limiting the influx of the gentry to and excluding the magnates from Ukraine. The noble "exiles", upon their return, were not to antagonize the serfs; neither were they to attempt to collect taxes. Moreover, until the "pacification" of the serfs,

3 Ibid.

4 NN to NN, Zhytomyr, 9. and 17.II.1650: AKr., Rus., Ms. 31, pp. 73-74; and Pawsza to Radziwiłł, Mazyr, 20.I., 19. and 20.II.1650: Kór., Ms. 1553, nos. 6-8.

the Crown Army was not to engage in any hostilities.⁶

Kysil believed that Khmelnytskyi and his officers, with whom he maintained daily contact, really desired to abide by the Zboriv treaty arrangements. The Cossack hetman co-operated by allowing him to perform the duties of his office; moreover, he kept his promise by despatching his envoys with the completed register. The serfs, as well as those whose names were not included in the register, were the troublemakers. Obviously, they did not cherish the fate of remaining on the estates of their former masters and of respecting their seignorial rights. Kysil's message to the king was clear: to trust Khmelnytskyi, who did everything in his power to restore the status quo; and to "accommodate" him, by granting him favourable answers to his requests, even if the rights of the nobles had to be infringed in the process.⁷

At the same time Kysil reported that diplomatic agents of Moldavia, Transylvania and Wallachia contacted Khmelnytskyi. Thus, himself acting as the diplomatic agent of the Commonwealth, Kysil was required to pay strict attention to Cossack diplomatic relations. It was his task to analyze all such contacts and to warn the king if they represented danger to the Commonwealth. Of particular interest to him were the existing alliance systems in Eastern Europe. The Cossack hetman's diplomacy could not be allowed to tilt the scales of balance of power in the Commonwealth's disadvantage, especially precisely at a time attempts were being made in Warsaw.


to involve him, depending on the outcome of negotiations with Russia and Crimea, in a conflict either with Russia or Turkey.

Even at the outbreak of Khmelnytskyi's rebellion fears were expressed in Warsaw that the tsar would take advantage of the Commonwealth's predicament by recouping and avenging for the Russian losses in the past four decades. While this did not happen in 1648, another good opportunity arose for the Russians to intervene militarily after the unsuccessful Zboriv campaign. The rumors in the capital seemed to be justified and the fears seemed to be confirmed by the belligerent attitude of the Russian embassy which appeared in Warsaw on March 16th. Grigorii Pushkin and his colleagues spoke of war: the Commonwealth was threatened with a Russo-Swedish alliance. Their terms were unacceptable.

In order to deal with this new development and to gain time, premeditated delays were arranged in negotiations with the Russian diplomats. On the one hand, messengers were despatched to Kysil, in order to gain the advice of this "expert" on Russian affairs, and instructions were issued to him to work diligently on Khmelnytskyi to draw him against Russia; on the other, envoys were sent to Bakhchysarai to induce Khan Islam Giray III, who already expressed desire for a war against Russia, to press Khmelnytskyi into an anti-Russian undertaking. In July, due to the reconfirmation of the "eternal Peace" of 1634 by both parties, the threat of Russian intervention subsided.8

8 See G. M. Lyzlov, "Polsko-russkie otnosheniia v period ot Zborovskogo mira do Zemskogo sobora 1651 g." Kratkie Soobshcheniia [Inst. Slav. AN SSSR], XXVII (1959), 45-67; and Kubala, Szkice, 125-142. Kysil produced a very interesting position paper in which he analyzed relations between the Commonwealth and Russia: Kysil to Jan Kazimierz, Kiev, 21.IV.1650: Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 5-14.
Since the warlike energies of the Cossacks had to be employed outside of the Commonwealth, Jerzy Ossoliński resumed his efforts to launch a campaign against the Turks. The engagement of Cossacks in an external war with the Muslim world was once again used as a solution to the general "Cossack problem" of the Commonwealth. Moreover, this external war also offered possibilities of the rupture of the dreaded Cossack-Tatar military alliance.

It seemed to Ossoliński and his supporters that the general course of events favoured such an undertaking. The Ottoman Empire at this time was plagued by serious internal problems. The chaotic state of affairs, on the one hand, encouraged the enemies of the Turks to attack them; on the other, the subjugated peoples, especially those of the Balkans, saw the time ripe to strike a blow for their liberty. As the result of these developments, plans were made for the formation of an anti-Turkish coalition of Christian states, in which the Commonwealth was to play a leading role. In this way Ossoliński was provided with an opportunity to steer the Cossacks once again to the shores of the Black Sea.

All seemed to go well. There were indications that one vassal of the sultan, the Khan of Crimea, wishing to free himself from his dependency on the Sublime Porte, was prepared to strike a blow against his suzerain. Another vassal, the ambitious ruler of Transylvania, was likewise prepared to rise against him. Moreover, there appeared in Warsaw, in January 1650, envoys from Bulgaria. They informed the royal court that an uprising was prepared in their country, as well as elsewhere in the Balkans, against the Turks and asked the king for military aid. All these developments gave rise to a very lively diplomatic intercourse throughout Europe. Republic of Venice, the most interested party, acting on the suggestion of Ossoliński -- who by this time was generally supported by even his former opponents --
sent her envoys to Ukraine in order to draw the Cossacks into the anti-Turkish league. In the summer of 1650, after the death of Ossoliński, however, this diplomatic activity began to slow down. This development indicated that plans for the formation of an anti-Turkish league were disintegrating.

In the meantime Kysil, who continued to woo Khmelnytskyi to the anti-Russian plans, gained positive replies from him. By June Kysil was led to believe that the Cossack hetman was willing to attack Russia in conjunction with the Tatars. Early in August, after conferring with Khmelnytskyi, Vykovskyi and Kosiv in Irkliiv, Kysil submitted a long report to the King. In analyzing various developments, he stressed two sources of danger: the undesirable activity of Turkish diplomatic agents in Chyhyryn; and belligerent moves of Crown Grand Hetman Potocki who, following his release from Tatar captivity, seemed to have taken great pains to antagonize Khmelnytskyi. Two weeks later, in another detailed report,

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9 He died on August 9, 1650: Kubala, Ossoliński, p. 496.

10 Ibid., pp. 376-380; and Eugenjusz Latacz, Ugoda zborowska a plany tureckie Jana Kazimierza (Kraków, 1933).


Kysil stressed that if Potocki continued to provoke Khmelnytskyi, the already-shaky peace structure would collapse and hostilities would resume.

While Khmelnytskyi worried Kysil by issuing belligerent threats of his own, he was unprepared at this time, Potocki's affronts notwithstanding, to challenge the Commonwealth openly. While quite aware that a new conflict would arise with her sooner or later, for the "war party", including such men as Potocki, Wiśniowiecki and Leszczyński, was rapidly gaining ground, he was still in a very difficult situation -- between the hammer and the anvil, so to speak. The Cossack hetman acted against the serfs with great reluctance. He demonstrated for the benefit of the government by various means, in order to show that he adhered to the terms of the treaty. In practice, however, he generally circumvented the terms whenever he could and accused the other side of failing to live in accordance with the agreement. In order to protect himself, Khmelnytskyi began to organize a new military state and arranged diplomatic alliances and political combinations with the neighbouring powers.

The autonomous state, which may be best described as a Cossack military republic, began to take shape out of the south-eastern palatinates already in 1648. Following the Treaty of Zboriv, Khmelnytskyi divided the palatinates within the boundaries delineated by the treaty into military-territorial units comprising sixteen regiments-areas, each of which was subdivided in turn into hundreds-districts. The colonel, in each regiment-area, and the prefect, in each hundred-district, were in charge of not only military affairs, but largely also of civilian administration, finances, justice and the like.

The highest popular representative body which to some degree shared legislative and executive powers with the hetman, was the Cossack general council. Its chief permanent representatives were the secretary-general, the quartermaster-general, the judge-general and the two adjutants-general. They comprised a "cabinet" and advised the hetman on all military-civilian matters. Each one of them was entrusted with specific functions: the secretary directed the hetman's chancery; the quartermaster maintained the register of the army and frequently acted as a census taker; the judge dealt with judicial matters; and the adjutants organized military functions and participated in the reception of foreign envoys.

The government consisted of a council of senior Cossack officers. It was this council that was frequently called into session by Khmelnytskyi, for he found it easier to work with — and to influence — rather than the unruly general council. These Cossack officers examined all major military, legislative, administrative, economic and general political matters. They also made pronouncements on war, peace, embassies and diplomatic contacts.

The office of the Cossack hetman was vested with great powers. Not only was Khmelnytskyi the commander-in-chief of the Cossack Army — a dictator during the time of war; but also a prime minister and minister of external affairs. In fact he was a ruler of a very large state. Kysil, the Commonwealth's "resident" in Kiev was, strictly speaking, her diplomatic agent accredited to the fledging Cossack polity.  

At the same time as Khmelnytskyi strengthened his position internally within the Cossack state, he sought to find a place for it within the frame-

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15 This topic is analyzed in great detail by Krypiakevych in his "Studi na derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmelnytskoho", ZNTSh, CXXVIII-CXL (1925), 67-81; CXLIV-CXLV (1926), 109-140; CXLVII (1927), 55-80; CLI (1931), 111-150; and Khmelnytskyi, pp. 199-410.
work of Eastern European states. One guarantee for the autonomy of Ukraine was the destruction of the political balance of power, which was based on understanding between the Commonwealth, Russia and Turkey. This the Cossack hetman sought to accomplish. Such an aim, however, was extremely difficult to achieve, as he was faced with new dangers and new complications. In 1650 he was pressed to wage war against Turkey and Russia.

Khmelnitskyi, however, was not prepared to throw all caution to the winds. One wrong move in this delicate international situation could wreck his aims and cost him all his gains. There were many disadvantages in becoming a member of this new "crusade" against the Crescent. Certainly, there would be reprisals from the Turks and even the Tatars. The latter were not to be trusted, for notwithstanding their emancipational plans, they would undoubtedly support the sultan in the final moment. Moreover, if the anti-Turkish league actually materialized, the Commonwealth stood to gain considerable influence over the Cossacks; while the defeat of the Tatars and Turks, would only encourage the ruling class to do away with the Cossack military organization and the autonomy of Ukraine. Thus, were Khmelnitskyi to support the "crusade", he had more to lose and less to gain.

For these reasons the Cossack hetman carefully avoided being entangled in the anti-Turkish net. For tactical reasons, he hinted to the royal court that he would support its anti-Turkish designs. In the Summer of 1650 he received in Chyhyryn the Venetian envoy, Alberto Vimina, but sent him back with a cleverly-worded answer: the Cossack participation in the campaign depended on the will of the Cossack Army, the permission of the Polish king
and on the attitude of the Crimean khan. Shortly thereafter Ossoliński died. With his death the plans of the anti-Turkish league slowly began to disintegrate.

At the same time Khmelnytskyi protected himself against being drawn into the conflicts with Turkey and Russia by establishing closer contacts with Constantinopole. In April 1650 the Cossack hetman requested that the sultan accept the Cossack Army under his protection. His request was very well received. Late in July — during the time when most lively preparations for war were made against the Turks in Warsaw — the envoy of Sultan Mehmed IV, Osman Aga, arrived in Chyhyryn. The envoy expressed the sultan's pleasure with the decision of the hetman and promised his aid to the Cossacks. Early in August Khmelnytskyi despatched his envoys to Constantinopole in order to establish the provision of Cossack "vassalage". By December this was accomplished. These diplomatic contacts and negotiations were culminated by the great Turkish embassy, which arrived in Ukraine in the Spring of 1651.


17 Behdash Aga and Murat Pasha to Khmelnytskyi, [Constantinopole, ca., early VII.1650]: VUR, II, 435-437.


The embassy brought rich gifts and the sultan's solemn charter. The Crimean khan, wrote the sultan, was ordered to assist the hetman against the Commonwealth. So long as the hetman would remain faithful and keep amicable relations with the khan, he would be assured of the sultan's protection. The hetman was required to send his envoys to Constantinople, to whom the sultan would issue a document, similar to that granted to other Christian rulers, which would contain in detail the conditions of their mutual obligations. Whatever were the intentions of the Turks, Ukraine never really became a vassal state of the Sublime Porte. Khmelnytskyi, however, accomplished his aim: he managed to check the Commonwealth and Crimea and to create serious problems and obstacles for the alliance of the Commonwealth and Russia.

In the meantime, Khmelnytskyi faced another serious problem: his restless Tatar allies insisted on drawing him into a new conflict. This time Russia, not the Commonwealth, was destined to become the victim. The Commonwealth, especially when relations with Russia deteriorated, took this opportunity to encourage the Tatars in their new anti-Russian enterprise. This kind of an undertaking, however, was contrary to Khmelnytskyi's

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intentions, as he desired to maintain good relations with Russia, in case he had to appeal for her aid against the Commonwealth.

For some time Khmelnytskyi kept the king and the khan at bay with promises of co-operation. Eventually, in order to avoid this undesirable war with Russia, the Cossack hetman -- knowing quite well that the Tatars were only interested in plunder -- proposed to the khan a joint campaign against Moldavia. This campaign gave him an opportunity to settle some old accounts with the Moldavian ruler, Hospodar Vasile Lupu, and to further his dynastic plans in the Danubian principalities. The Tatars did not protest; on the contrary, they quickly accepted Khmelnytskyi's invitation.

This campaign, pursued in the Autumn of 1650, proved to be very successful. The Cossack-Tatar allies quickly overran Moldavia, crushed all opposition and captured Iași. Lupu was forced to flee to Suceava and then to sue for peace. To save himself and his throne he had to pay a considerable ransom to the victor; moreover, to contract an alliance with Khmelnytskyi and to give his younger daughter in marriage to the hetman's son, Tymofii. Khmelnytskyi placed great hopes on this marriage. Since the Lithuanian hetman, Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, was Lupu's son-in-law, the Cossack hetman thus hoped to assure the Grand Duchy's neutrality or support in his future war against the Crown. Moreover, he hoped to secure a firm foothold in the Danubian area and eventually to place his son on the Mol-

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davian throne. Another significant result of the Moldavian campaign was that an ally of the Commonwealth, not her enemy, was immobilized.

In the preparation for the inevitable war with the Commonwealth — or if his plans worked out only against the Crown — Khmelnytskyi also approached Russia, Sweden and Transylvania for aid. Russia again failed to give a definite answer. Eventually she decided to renew her alliance with the Commonwealth and continued to bide her time, watching closely all the developments in Ukraine. Sweden preferred not to engage directly in the conflict. Transylvania, on the contrary, was prepared to lend her support to Khmelnytskyi if the Cossacks, in turn, agreed to support Zsigmond Rákóczi's attempts to gain the Polish crown.

The Cossack hetman, moreover, searched for supporters within the Crown and the Grand Duchy. His agents appeared in the palaces of the kinglets who plotted to dethrone Jan Kazimierz — their "king-tyrant". His emissaries also found their ways into the manors of the nobles, homes of the townspeople and the huts of the serfs. They urged all persons to rise against the unjust order once the war started.

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25 See the various documents in VUR, II, 318-476; and Lyzlov, "Polsko-russkie otnosheniiia v period ot Zborovskogo mira", p. 60.


28 Lubomirski to Rákóczi, Wieliczka, 5.V.1651: MHHD, XXIII, 54-58; Erdély I, 130-131; and DKhmel., pp. 191-192, 210-211.

29 Kersten, Napierski, pp. 119-134.
At the same time, however, Khmelnytskyi's enemies were hardly idle. The effects of their influence were already evident by the time supplemental instructions were published for the dietines. The gentry of the Commonwealth, for the most part, falling under the spell of the intransigents, added their voices to the chorus of war cries. The same men gained ascendency in the court. Kysil had virtually no support for his policy of peace and concessions in Warsaw. While continuing to justify his policy, Kysil realized that his influence was declining and that he was estranged from the chief policymakers in Warsaw. Moreover, by this time Khmelnytskyi distrusted him as well. Thus, Kysil found himself in a very weak position prior to the opening of the Diet.

At the Diet of 1650, which began its deliberations on December 5, there emerged no opposition of significance to the policy of fire and sword. The deputies, concerned about "saving the Commonwealth from danger", agreed to call to arms over 50,000 men, as well as to mobilize all the gentry in time of need. The gentry, once informed about the extraordinary military

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30 Supplement to Instructions, Warsaw, ca., 23.X.1650: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 580-582.
31 As example, the resolution of the Dietine of Lublin, 7.XI.1650: Czart., Ms. 395, pp. 138-140.
32 Kysil to Jan Kazimierz, Kiev, 26.X.1650: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 583-589.
33 Kysil to Jan Kazimierz, [Kiev, early XI.1650]: Dokumenty, pp. 357-358.
34 Khmelnytskyi to Volynian Nobles, Chyhyryn, 1./11.XI.1650: DKhmel., pp. 192-195.
35 On the activity of this Diet see AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/134, fos. 357-393; Czart., Ms. 417, pp. 199-218; and Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 185-191.
preparations and the decisions of the Diet voted, in a rather unusual example of solidarity, for very heavy taxes in their own districts to support the war effort of the Commonwealth.\footnote{This is quite evident, for example, in the resolutions of the Report Dietines of Zator-Oświęcim and Kraków on 16.I.1651: \textit{ASKr.}, II, 399-406.}

At the sessions of this Diet the "Ukrainian question" was most prominent. The causes for poor relations between the Commonwealth and Ukraine was raised by a lengthy in absentia "votum" of Kysil.\footnote{Dokumenty, pp. 361-367.} There is no reason to disbelieve Kochowski, who described the atmosphere as very hostile, with regard to suggestions of compromise and peace with the Cossacks, during the proceedings of the Diet: Kysil's advice was greeted with cries of mockery.\footnote{Kochowski, \textit{Climacter I}, 209-211.} When the Cossack envoys D. Markovych, V. Hurovskyi and D. Doro-

\shenko\footnote{VUR, II, 510, n. 213.} submitted the "Supplication" of the Zaporozhian Army to the Diet,\footnote{"Supplication", [Chyhyryn, ca., middle of XI.1650]: \textit{DKhmel.}, pp. 199-201.} most members in both chambers could hardly contain their tempers. They considered it simply as a provocation on Khmelnytskyi's part. Regarding its reception, Radziwiłł wrote as follows: "impossibles ab omnibus habitae conditiones ita fere ad nonam noctis agitata consilia".\footnote{Radziwiłł, \textit{op. cit.}, IV, 190.}
Notwithstanding "impossible conditions", even the "war party" acted with restraint. After lengthy discussions it was decided to appoint new commissioners to deal with "certain requests" of the Cossack Army. Members from the Senate included the Bishop of Kiev, Stanisław Zareba; the Palatine of Kiev, Adam Kysil; — even the intransigents did not dare to exclude him — the Palatine of Mstsislau, Hrehory Drucki-Horski; and the Palatine of Bratslav, Stanisław Lanckoroński. The Chamber of Deputies supplied four members as well: the Chamberlin of Kiev, Yurii Nemyrych; the Chamberlin of Lutsk, Hryhorii Chetvertynskyi; the Prefect of Zhytomyr, Krzysztof Tyszkwic; and the Under-Justice of Bratslav, Mikołaj Kossakowski. The Commissioners, most of whom held offices in Ukraine and who represented Roman Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants (Socinians), were deemed to be satisfactory both for Khmelnytskyi and for the noble "exiles" from Ukraine. They were to arrange a meeting with Khmelnytskyi's delegates and to give "satisfaction" to the Zaporozhian Army. 42

There is little doubt that most of the men who voted for the setting up of this commission regarded it only as a camouflage for war preparations. How could it accomplish anything of significance? How could it solve the thorny religious question, which was so emphasized in the Cossack "Supplication"? In the secret Senate sessions a decision was reached to carry on with negotiations, but only from a position of power; if negotiations failed, however, war would be waged.

Kysil, who earlier received a letter expressing only sentiments of peace, 43 was soon informed of this decision both by Jan Kazimierz 44 and

42 Volumina Legum, IV, 332.
43 Jan Kazimierz to Kysil, Warsaw, 20.XII.1650: Czart., Ms. 417, p. 194.
Leszczyński. Both maintained that they were truly interested in securing a negotiated settlement. He was to await the arrival of Lanckoroński before taking any steps to begin parleys and to adhere to secret instructions which were being prepared for the commissioners.

Since neither "public" nor "secret" instructions are available, it is difficult to say what new concessions were to be made to Khmelnytskyi. Some light is shed on this matter by nuncio's report to Rome and king's letter to Kysil. Apparently, Khmelnytskyi was to be made a palatine; his son was to inherit the District of Chyhyryn. Out of the 40,000 registered Cossacks, 12,000 were to be ennobled and the most-deserving out of the latter were to be given various palatinal offices and dignities. All religious questions were to be solved by a council comprising Roman Catholic and Orthodox hierarchy and theologians — there was some talk about the possibility of transferring the Uniates to the Latin rite. The Cossack Army was to serve the king in the event of any war. At this time half of it was to be prepared to attack Turkey by sea — there was, once again, feverish activity regarding anti-Turkish "crusade"; the other half, by land, as part of the royal army. Khmelnytskyi was to agree to cease diplomatic relations with foreign powers hostile to the Commonwealth and to break all treaties concluded with them.

47 Jan Kazimierz to Kysil: see n. 44 above.
Khmelnitskyi, who was contacted by the messengers of Kysil, the
envoys of the newly-appointed Crown Vice Chancellor Hieronim Radziejowski
and Sebastjan Machowski, who was sent to Chyhyryn and Kiev with letters
of Jan Kazimierz and the new Crown Grand Chancellor Andrzej Leszczyński,
appeared to be ready to negotiate with the commissioners. Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, Chyhyryn, 4.I.1651; to Radziejowski, [Chyhyryn], 27.I.1651; to Kysil, Chyhyryn, 10.II.1651: DKhmel., pp. 205-207, 210-212.

Kysil, who pressed the royal court to be permitted to negotiate without the full
complement of members of the commission, in order to take advantage of what
he imagined to be, favourable circumstances, was not permitted to do so.
Apparently he was distrusted by the most powerful policymakers. Kysil to NN, Warsaw, 21.II.1651: AKr., Rus., Ms. 41, pp. 143-144.

Moreover, all his efforts put into the search for new equally powerful political
allies -- particularly Radziejowski and Kalinowski -- came to naught.

Kysil realized that if any border clashes started, his efforts for
the cause of peace would be in vain. In February, when serious clashes
began to take place in the Palatinate of Bratslav, Kysil made an effort
to halt them and to find a peaceful solution for problems causing them.
The Palatine of Kiev, Hoshcha, 23.II.1651; and to Kosiv, Hoshcha,

He was unsuccessful. Next month he received a personal blow: death of
his only brother, Mykola, during the operations at Vinnytsia. Even

49Khmelnitskyi to Jan Kazimierz, Chyhyryn, 4.I.1651; to Radziejowski, [Chyhyryn], 27.I.1651; to Kysil, Chyhyryn, 10.II.1651: DKhmel., pp. 205-207, 210-212.
50NN to NN, Warsaw, 21.II.1651: AKr., Rus., Ms. 41, pp. 143-144.
52Kysil to Radziejowski, Hoshcha, 23.II.1651; and to Kosiv, Hoshcha,
though the loss of his brother crushed him, Kysil toiled and persevered at his task. By April, however, even Khmelnytskyi lost his confidence in him. The issue between the Commonwealth and Ukraine would have to be decided, once more, on a field of battle.

By this time both sides were mobilizing their main armies. While Khmelnytskyi awaited the arrival of the Tatars, the Crown troops were concentrating near Sokal and those of Lithuania were poised to invade Ukraine from the north. On June 27 the two hostile armies, after protracted marches and counter-marches, confronted each other near Berestechko. The three days' battle -- 28th to 30th -- ended with the defeat of the Cossack-Tatar forces. The fortified Cossack camp, after holding out ten days of attacks and siege, also fell into the hands of the Crown troops. During the same period Janusz Radziwiłł defeated the Cossacks guarding the Lithuanian-Ukrainian border, marched south and occupied Kiev. Eventually Radziwiłł's troops joined those of Potocki and a joint campaign was launched against the Cossacks.

The pursuit of a joint campaign, however, turned out to be a very complicated undertaking. The Crown and the Grand Ducal forces were not exactly in an advantageous position. Most of the nobles returned -- as one contemporary put it -- to their "wives, estates and feather beds" shortly

54 Kysil to NN, Hniino, 14.IV.1651; and Kosiv to Radziejowski, [Kiev, ca., early IV.1651]: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 631-632, 634-635.

The strength of the combined armies as a whole was sapped by desertions, disease and hunger. Moreover, Khmelnytskyi again supported by the Tatars, managed by herculean efforts to muster a new strong Cossack Army.

Hostilities resumed anew, but by September both sides were weary of fighting. Thus, when Khmelnytskyi appealed to Potocki for peace, the latter was already convinced that he could accomplish little by prolonging the conflict. Under such circumstances negotiations were started between the two sides and eventually peace was concluded.

Some two months before serious parleys began between the representatives of both parties, Jan Kazimierz and several senators, meeting in Lviv, designed instructions for the commissioners. The terms offered to the Cossacks, comprising seven items, were extremely severe:

1. All rights liberties and privileges hitherto enjoyed by the registered Cossacks were to be suspended. Persons enlisted under the new quota as registered Cossacks were to be satisfied with the final decision of the commissioners regarding this matter.

2. The registered Cossacks were to pledge strict obedience to their "Elder". It was left to the discretion of the king whether this office

56 Kubala, Szkice, p. 198.
57 Kersten, Czarniecki, pp. 161-165.
58 On negotiations see Starożytności, I, 290-314, 343-354; DKhmel., pp. 220-223; Dokumenty, pp. 617-620. For a very detailed analysis of diplomatic contacts and negotiations see Hrushevskiy, op. cit., IX, pt. 1, 343-371. Three letters of Khmelnytskyi to Kysil -- one dated 23.VIII., and two dated 7.IX. -- hitherto unknown to historians, are found in AKr., Pin., Ms. 363, pp. 635-637.
would be filled by a candidate from the ranks of the Zaporozhian Army, or whether it would be filled by the appointment of some suitable noble.

3. The strength of the Zaporozhian Army was not to exceed 8,000 registered Cossacks. These troops were to be employed in the service of the Commonwealth.

4. Cossacks were not permitted to settle on private estates of the nobles in Ukraine. Non-Cossacks living on such estates were to be neither encouraged to join, nor to be eligible for enlistment in the Zaporozhian Army. All fugitive serfs were to be returned to their former masters.

5. All cannon-pieces captured by the Cossacks since 1648 were to be returned to the Crown Army.

6. Cossack officers were to swear oaths that they would not support Khmelnytskyi in any way.

7. All other ranks of the Zaporozhian Army were to take oaths, prepared by the commissioners, by which they were to declare to be faithful to the king, his successors and the Commonwealth.

8. The concluding paragraph stated that the commissioners were authorized to make additional concessions to the Cossacks. They were cautioned, however, always to keep in mind the interests of the king and of the Commonwealth during the negotiations. 59

Following initial diplomatic contacts late in August and early in September, which were interrupted by hostilities, four men were appointed to negotiate peace terms with the Cossacks in Bila Tserkva. They were the Palatine of Kiev, Adam Kysil; the Palatine of Smolensk, Jerzy Chlebowicz;

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59 Instructions, Lviv, [after 21.]VII.1651: Dokumenty, pp. 561-562. For the missing fragment see AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/135, fo. 423r.
the Lithuanian Grand Dapifer, Wincenty Gosiewski; and the Under-Judge of Bratslav, Kazimierz Kossakowski. They left the camp on September 14 with a modified instruction: this one contained twenty-four articles. On the 19th they returned to Potocki's camp. Due to unstable conditions they were robbed of their goods and at times feared for their lives; however, they felt that peace was possible due to the good will demonstrated by Khmelnytskyi and his officers.

During the next week there was a great deal of diplomatic activity due to the pressure of Khmelnytskyi to gain better terms. After gaining some concessions Khmelnytskyi was prevailed upon to accept the new arrangement. On September 28, 1651, near Bila Tserkva, this agreement was signed and sworn by representatives of both parties.

The Treaty of Bila Tserkva contained the following provisions:

1. Khmelnytskyi was responsible for the preparation of a new 20,000-man register by Christmas day.

2. As few Cossacks as possible were to be registered from the City of Kiev, and none at all from the territories belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

3. Once the register was prepared, all registered Cossacks were to move to the Crown lands within the Palatinate of Kiev.

4. The Crown Army was to have no access to the areas within which Cossack regiments were stationed.

5. Chyhyryn was granted to Khmelnytskyi. Following his death it was to pass to those who occupied the office of hetman. Khmelnytskyi was to swear an oath of fealty to the king and remain under the jurisdiction of the Crown hetman. All senior and junior officers of the Cossack Army were
to be appointed by its hetman and to remain under his command.

6. The Cossack hetman was to terminate the alliance with the Tatars. He was forbidden to establish diplomatic relations with foreign powers. He and the Cossack Army were to be prepared to serve the Commonwealth.

7. Amnesty was granted to all Catholic and Orthodox nobles, as well as Kievan burgesses, who served in the Cossack Army.

8. The rights and privileges, heretofore enjoyed by the Orthodox Church, were to be guaranteed for it.

9. All nobles were granted the right to return to and to reclaim their estates in the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv without obstruction, but only after the compilation of the new register.

10. Jews were permitted to live and to work on Crown lands and estates of the nobles. 60

The Treaty of Bila Tserkva was an emasculated version of the Treaty of Zboriv. The terms of the former treaty represented a compromise between the demands of the ruling order of the Commonwealth and the advantages won by the Cossacks by the terms of the latter. Of course, if the agreement of 1649 failed to satisfy both parties and to bring about peace within the Commonwealth, then that of 1651 could have that effect even less. The Treaty of Bila Tserkva was therefore a serious obstacle on that road which eventually ended in Hadiach in 1658.

II

The victory at Berestechko and the Treaty of Bila Tserkva was used by

60 See Appendix III.
the royal court for propaganda purposes at home and abroad: both were glorified in prose and verse. The first royal instruction to the dietines was worded in very optimistic terms. Khmelnytskyi, the gentry was told, really wanted peace; he would, without a doubt, keep his oath. Thus, at first, the gentry received the news with a certain amount of satisfaction.

To brighter minds, however, it was obvious that the treaty with the Cossacks would not change the state of affairs for the better. The treaty, in their estimation, would only serve as an armistice. Early in December the supplemental instructions of the king, which painted the state of affairs in dark colors, only confirmed their fears. Thus, all sorts of questions were being asked regarding Berestechko and Bila Tserkva; all sorts of accusations were levelled at those in charge. Even Jan Kazimierz was blamed for all sorts of mistakes and misfortunes. Adding fuel to the fire was Crown Vice-Chancellor Hieronim Radziejowski. Feuding with the king over personal matters, he began to spread all kinds of malicious rumors. The pre-diet dietines held unusually stormy sessions. During this period the

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61 As, for example, Relatio Gloriosissimae Victoriae Serenissimi Principis et Domini, Domini Ioannis Casimiri Poloniae et Sveciae Regis potentissimi, de Hamo Crimensi rebellibusque Cosaccis et foederatis die 30.VI.1651 apud Beresteczko obtenate (Warsaw, 1651).

62 Instruction, Warsaw, 16.XI.1651: AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/136, fos. 38v-40r.

63 Oświęcim, op. cit., pp. 374-376.


oligarchic opposition even initiated action among the Crown troops, stationed in the south-eastern palatinates, aimed at influencing them to mutiny against the king. 67

The Diet began its deliberations on January 26, 1652 in Warsaw. 68 Due to serious strife among the various factions, its sessions became extremely stormy. Great hostility was expressed to Khmelnytskyi -- who was compared to Lucifer -- and generally to the terms of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. On March 7 the delegates of the Cossack Army 69 appeared before this hostile assembly. After presenting to it various matters for consideration, 70 they awaited the ratification of the treaty.

At the same session a motion was introduced to prolong the set time-limit for the Diet in order to finish the business at hand. The deputy from Lithuania, Władysław Siciński, however, cast a vote against the prolongation and left the chamber. Siciński's action -- the application of the notorious liberum veto by a single member -- disrupted the proceedings. Thus, after a few days of confusion, the Diet ended its deliberations on March 11 without accomplishing anything. Of course, one of the more im-

68 On this Diet see AGd., RSZF, Ms. 300/29/136, fos. 99r-175v. Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 226-242; Czapliński, Dwa sejmy, pp. 67-130; and Kubala, Szkice, pp. 267-298.
70 Khmelnytskyi to Chamber of Deputies and Senate, Chyhyryn, 29.I.1652: DKhmel., pp. 246-249.
important items on the agenda, the Treaty of Bila Tserkva, was not ratified.

At this point, all the burdens of state were placed on the shoulders of the king and the senators. Confronted with the fait accompli, they thought it wise to approve the treaty provisionally. The task of its ratification was to be handled by the next Diet. Moreover, they authorized the formation of a new commission which was empowered, in co-operation with the representatives of the Cossack hetman, to settle all disputes arising from both sides in Ukraine. Of course, this sort of remedy was hardly sufficient to solve problems in Ukraine by this time.

Problems, of very serious nature, developed there almost immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. The concessions which Khmelnytskyi had been compelled to make created a great deal of resentment and unrest among the Cossacks and serfs. Fuel to the fire was added when nobles began to return to their estates and when military garrisons of the Crown Army began to be established in Ukraine. In certain districts the populace simply abandoned their settlements and migrated to Russia. In many localities Cossacks and serfs took up arms not only against the newly-arrived landowners or Crown troops, but also against Khmelnytskyi, who was cursed and blamed for all their difficulties. The Cossack hetman had to send, once again, units loyal to him in order to co-operate with military authorities of the Crown in suppressing the rebels.


72 Rudawski, op. cit., I, 183.

73 Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 1, 391-393.
During this time Adam Kysil resided in Kiev and acted as an inter­mediary between Warsaw and Chyhyryn. His task was to insure that Khmel­nytskyi complied with the terms of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva; at the same time, he was to ascertain that the terms were also observed by Crown and Grand Ducal troops. As usual, Kysil managed to function very effectively: on the one hand, he established close contacts with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Janusz Radziwiłł and Marcin Kalinowski; on the other, he made regular reports to the Crown chancery.

While the Crown Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki still lived, he indicated that he was willing to give the Cossack hetman some leeway to implement

74 Initially Kysil was to reside in Bohuslav: Khmelnytskyi to Potocki, Korsun, 9.X.1651: DKhmel., p. 227. Potocki acted as a commissioner in charge of military affairs. Following his death (see n. 17 below), Kal­inowski assumed this role, as it is evident from Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Chyhyryn, 10.I.1652: Kór., Ms. 1286, pp. 375-376.

75 The feverish activity of Kysil and his contacts with various persons are clearly revealed by a fragment of Janusz Radziwiłł's chancery records (November 1651 to January 1652), which contain original letters and copies of letters: 1) Kysil to Radziwiłł, Kiev, 10.XI.1651; 2) to Radziwiłł, Kiev, 20.XI.1651; 3) to Khmelnytskyi, Kiev, 29.XII.1651; 4) to Kalinowski, Kiev, 1.I.1652; 5) to Kalinowski, Kiev, 3.I.1652; 6) to Khmelnytskyi, Kiev, 5.I.1652; 7) to Leszczyński, Kiev, 11.I.1652; 8) to Kalinowski, Kiev, 13.I.1652; 9) to Kalinowski, Kiev, 14.I.1652; 10) to Kalinowski, Kiev, 15.I.1652; 11) to Kalinowski, Kiev, 16.I.1652; 12) to Leszczyński, Kiev, 16.I.1652; 13) to Kalinowski, Kiev, 19.I.1652; 14) to Khmelnytskyi, Kiev, 19.I.1652; and to Radziwiłł, Kiev, 20.I.1652. See Kór., Ms. 1286, pp. 354-359, 366-372, 376-403. These letters were copied from Radziwill's chancery records, which at present are located in AGAD, AR, VI, Ms. 36. For the sharing with me of this information, as well as Xerox copies of the above-listed letters in the AR, I express my sincere thanks to Prof. F. Sysyn of Harvard University.
the articles of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. Following his death, however, the command of the Crown Army passed into the hands of Kalinowski. This individual, suspecting Khmelnytskyi of all sorts of machinations and failing to recognize his difficulties with regard to unrest in Ukraine, insisted on strict compliance to the terms of agreement. Finding out about Khmelnytskyi's contacts with Crimea and Turkey, Kalinowski and his colleagues sounded the alarm bell against the "perfidious" Cossack hetman prior to the opening and during the sessions of the Diet and demanded additional appropriations for defense. Kysil, basing his judgement on the friendly letters of Khmelnytskyi, reported more favourably on his activities. These different views of the two commissioners of the Commonwealth began a paper war, which was fought in the Crown chancery:

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76 See Khmelnytskyi's letters to Potocki, Korsun, 9.X.1651; Chyhyryn, 22.X.1651; and Chyhyryn, late X. or early XI.1651: DKhmel., pp. 227-231; as well as Potocki to Leszczyński, [Khmilnyk], 2.XI.1651: Arkhiv YuZR, pt. 3, vol. IV, 623-627; and Oświęcim, op. cit., pp. 376-377.


78 Apparently they managed to obtain a copy of the letter of Khmelnytskyi to Mehmed IV, sent from Chyhyryn, on 27.XI./7.XII.1651: DKhmel., pp. 233-234.

79 Lanckoroński to Jan Kazimierz, Vyshnia, 13.XII.1651: Dokumenty, pp. 627-628.

80 Kalinowski to Diet, Bratslav, 23.II.1652: Ibid., pp. 634-635.

81 See, for example, Khmelnytskyi to Kysil, Chyhyryn, 14,27. and 30.XII.1651: Kór., Ms. 1286, pp. 359-365; and DKhmel., pp. 238-240.
Kysil's letters from Kiev, characterized by optimism with regard to the possibility of peaceful solutions of various difficulties, were contradicted by those of Kalinowski from Bratslav, who was pessimistic that peace could be brought about without the use of arms.  

The views of the pessimists prevailed, at least for a while, in Warsaw. Acting on the reports of the bearers of bad news that Khmelnytskyi, contrary to the articles of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva, re-established diplomatic relations and re-activated alliances with the Muslim world, Jan Kazimierz composed a harshly-worded letter to the Cossack hetman, accusing him of perfidy and perjury. Khmelnytskyi's response to this letter took the form of a complaint to Kysil: he was served "bitter and indigestible dishes" by the king; what he needed was a prescription of healthy advice. While threatening to take appropriate measures -- i.e., to recall the Tatars -- if pushed hard enough, Khmelnytskyi also mentioned that he would await the decision of the Diet, regarding the ratification of the treaty and his additional requests, before taking any decisive step.

Kysil, alarmed by this outburst, soothed Khmelnytskyi's anger by various arguments. Shocked and resentful that he was not consulted before

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82 This is best illustrated in Torres' letter to the Holy See, Warsaw, 25.V.1652: LNA, VIII, 29.


84 Khmelnytskyi to Kysil, Chyhyryn, [21].I.1652: DKhmel., p. 243. Judging from the date of king's letter (n.83 above) and Kysil's letter (n. 85 below), the correct date of Khmelnytskyi's letter is 21.I., not 8./18.I., as accepted by the editors of DKhmel. Cf. Dokumenty, p. 633.
such a letter, which he considered to be a serious blunder, was sent to the Cossack hetman, Kysil could not refrain from writing caustic sentences to the king. He explained that if Khmelnytskyi failed to heed his advice, the Commonwealth would experience additional wounds from Cossack-Tatar alliance against her. A month later Kysil could boast that his policy of peace produced desired results: Khmelnytskyi listened to his advice, made efforts to suppress the masses, co-operated with military commanders, permitted nobles to return to their estates, completed the new register, despatched his envoys to the Diet and issued statements of loyalty. Moreover, his interest in the Muslim world would be beneficial for the Commonwealth this time, as he showed no desire to initiate hostilities against her; on the contrary, he showed desire to wage war in the dominions of the sultan. Khmelnytskyi's letter to the king confirmed the statements of the Palatine of Kiev.

The anti-Turkish war plans were thus revived once again. This time, due to the willingness of the Venetian Republic to provide a substantial subsidy to the Cossacks for the launching of a land and sea campaign against the Turks, to the willingness of the Commonwealth's government to give its blessing to Khmelnytskyi to undertake such a project and to the willingness of the Cossack hetman to participate in such an endeavour, it seemed that

the anti-Turkish plans had an excellent chance of being realized. In the month of March, while Count Girolamo Cavazza, the minister of the Venetian Republic in Warsaw, continued to send despatches to his principals regarding latest developments and the nuncio, Giovanni de Torres, also in the capital, reported on the same matter to Rome, Kysil met the Colonel of Kaniv, Semen Savych, in order to discuss the terms under which Khmelnytskyi was prepared to commit the Zaporozhian Army to undertake a campaign against the Turks.

Moreover, during the same month steps were taken in Warsaw to resolve the many bitter conflicts in Ukraine between the Cossacks and serfs, on the one hand, and the Crown troops and nobles, on the other, by the formation of a joint judicial commission. In April it sat in Korsun and, judging by the letter of Kysil, it contributed somewhat to the relaxation of tensions.

Neither of the two endeavours, described above, produced results expected by policymakers in Warsaw: Khmelnytskyi kept postponing the anti-

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88 See the reports of nuncios to the Holy See from November 1651 to April 1652 in LNA, VII and VIII regarding this matter.

89 Instructions to Savych: BUJ, Ms. 3595, fos. [7r-8]; and ZDIH, Teki Rzyskie, Ms. 76 (Encl., pp. 1-5). See also Khmelnytskyi to Kysil, Chyhyryn, 12.III.1652: DKhmel., pp. 256-257.

90 According to Rudawski, op. cit., I, 183-184, the Commonwealth was represented by Adam Kysil, Michał Aksak, Hieronim Zawisza and Jan -- perhaps Sebastjan -- Machowski; while Antin Zhdanovych represented Khmelnytskyi. Other sources indicate that Khmelnytskyi was also present. See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 1, 419.

91 Kysil to Leszczyński, Kiev, 1.V.1652: Dokumenty, pp. 640-642.
Turkish campaign; moreover, the judicial commission failed to arrange cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. At the same time these policymakers were troubled by the vigorous diplomacy of Khmelnytskyi and his concentration of troops. It soon became apparent that the Cossack hetman, before dealing with the Commonwealth, decided to settle some unfinished business with her ally -- Moldavia. Complications arising from Khmelnytskyi's involvement in Moldavian affairs, however, soon proved to be responsible for his resumption of hostilities with the Commonwealth.

To justify his actions, the Cossack hetman insisted that the only purpose for his campaign against Moldavia was to enforce the agreement he made regarding giving of Hospodar Vasile Lupu's daughter in marriage to his eldest son Tymofii. Lupu, who was coerced into such an arrangement, attempted by all sorts of devious ways to prevent its realization. Various magnates of the Commonwealth, who established close relations with him, decided to block such an "undesirable" union. Eventually Kalinowski decided to concentrate the Crown Army near Batih, in order to bar Tymofii from Moldavia. The Cossack troops, however, assisted by the Tatars, managed to surround the Crown Army, to storm its camp and eventually to defeat it. On June 2 several thousand soldiers, many able officers, including Kalinowski himself, fell on the field of battle. The victorious Cossacks eventually

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93 This matter was decided upon during the meeting of the Cossack general council in Chyhyryn (after the Orthodox Feast of Easter). Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 1, 425-430.

entered Moldavia and Tymofii Khmelnytskyi was wed to Lupu's daughter.

Prior to these events, Jan Kazimierz summoned the second Diet into session on July 23. In the instruction which convoked the pre-Diet palatinal and district dietines, the king outlined the important matters which were to be considered by the Diet and stressed the necessity for the ratification of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. The king, moreover, in his private letters to the senators also requested their support for the approval of the treaty. By the time the nobles began to assemble at the dietines, they were aware of the rout of the Crown Army at Batih. The general situation, as outlined in the king's manifestoes, letters and instructions, appeared extremely grave. The gentry likewise expressed fears about the general situation of the Commonwealth, as evidenced by their instructions to the deputies elected to represent them at the Diet. Of course, they were more interested in voting for adequate defence measures, than ratifying the Treaty of Bila Tserkva.

As the Diet began its deliberations, more unfavourable news reached Warsaw. Then the members learned that Khmelnytskyi lifted the siege of Kamianets, retired to Mohyliv and contemplated to march to Vinnytsia.

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95 Instructions to the Diętine of Malbork, Warsaw, 28.VI.1652: AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/137, fos. 40v-41r.

96 Jan Kazimierz to Wejher, Warsaw, 11.V.1652: Czart., TN, Ms. 146, pp. 177-179.


98 Czapliński, Dwa sejmy, pp. 137-143; and Kersten, Czarniecki, p. 177.

99 On proceedings of the second Diet of 1652 see: AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/137, fos. 172r-224r; as well as Czapliński, Dwa sejmy, pp. 149-177.
There was a great deal of apprehension with regard to his next move. If
he decided to march into the interior of the Commonwealth, only Lviv and
Zamość were in a position to resist him. Since there was serf unrest in
various regions, the members feared that Khmelnytskyi's penetration into
Polish ethnographic territories would spark a general rising of serfs
throughout the country. The atmosphere in Warsaw was therefore very
tense.

By the beginning of July Khmelnytskyi's letters arrived in the capital.
The Cossack hetman blamed the Crown troops and officials for starting the
conflict. Their conduct was later brought to the attention of the Diet.
Moreover, he asked not to be denied royal "grace"; otherwise, he warned,
there will be "shedding of Christian blood" and the Cossacks will have
no other recourse but to seek the protection of another ruler.

By the end of the month, however, the atmosphere of fear and panic
in the capital somewhat subsided. The expected Cossack-Tatar invasion
failed to materialize. Khmelnytskyi, it was learned, despatched some
units to Moldavia; while the bulk of his troops was ravaged by the raging
epidemic. The Diet, finding the new developments advantageous, acted by
voting to raise a 50,000-man army, including a force of 14,000 mercenaries.
The hostility of the deputies with regard to Cossack affairs was reinforced

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100 Czapliński, Dwa sejmy, pp. 149-150.
101 Reports of the Gdańsk representative: Warsaw, 15. and 20.VII.1652:
AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/137, fos. 96r-100r.
266-267.
in a sensational manner. During the closing session, on August 17, they were presented with intercepted letters of Radziejowski. The exiled ex-Crown Vice-Chancellor, writing from Stockholm urged Khmelnytskyi to establish contacts with Queen Christina of Sweden, since she was prepared to attack the Commonwealth. Radziejowski also wrote to Vyhovskyi, asking him to induce the Cossack hetman to wage war with the Commonwealth. 103

The Diet once more prolonged the ratification of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. Of course, little sympathy was shown to the Cossack delegates, who arrived in Warsaw with plans to revise the treaty. The Diet, using the pretext that the delegates arrived too late to be heard, resolved to create a special committee to consider their proposals. 104 This committee prolonged matters again by recommending the creation of a special mission for the purpose of holding exploratory talks with Khmelnytskyi; then, on the basis of its findings, a formal commission should be set up to negotiate with the Cossack hetman. Two men, well-known to Khmelnytskyi, were chosen for this task: the Seneschal of Vinnytsia, Mikołaj Zaświłichowski, and the Sub-Prefect of Bila Tserkva, Zygmunt Czerny.

For the most part, the instructions prepared for them comprised a litany of Khmelnytskyi's "sins". The following were items of importance:

1. Amnesty was promised to Khmelnytskyi, to all members of his family and generally to all his supporters.

2. Suitable time and place was to be determined for the holding of

103 Radziejowski to Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi, Stockholm, 30.V.1652: AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/137, fos. 144°-145°.
104 *Volumina Legum*, IV, 373-374.
negotiations.

3. There was to be no objection raised to the Hospodar of Moldavia acting as a mediator.

4. Hostages were required from Khmelnytskyi -- his younger son Yurii -- and from Zaporozhian Army -- some suitable persons -- until such time as the terms of the negotiated settlement were realized.

5. The Cossacks were to give some evidence that they intended to keep their promises, which were made by their envoys in Warsaw.  

The two envoys, after reaching Chyhyryn, soon found out that Khmelnytskyi was more interested in waging war than starting negotiations. The Poles, as far as he was concerned, simply played for time in order to mobilize troops against him. Thus, neither party placed any faith on negotiations.

By this time Adam Kysil's views carried little weight in Warsaw. His decline of influence among the policymakers paralleled the successes of Khmelnytskyi's diplomacy. Alarming reports were submitted to the Crown chancery. One such report revealed that Khmelnytskyi endeavoured "not to have any monarch over him" but, on the contrary, "to rule absolutely and independently" over the vast territory stretching "from the Dniester ... to the Muscovite border". If threatened by the Commonwealth, he would "accept the protection of the Muscovite". The tsar, by an arrangement with the Cossack hetman, would regain from the Commonwealth the conquests

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107 Zarudny to Posolskii Prikaz, Moscow, 17./27.XII.1652: VUR, III, 245.
of Władysław IV; the hetman, with tsarist aid, would rule over his own dominions. 108

In the meantime Bohdan once again became involved in the affairs of the Danubian principalities. Following Tymofii's wedding, he decided to acquire the Moldavian throne for his son. The unhappy father-in-law, Lupu, eventually agreed to the following arrangement: he would step down from the Moldavian throne and with Cossack help acquire Transylvania for himself and Wallachia for his brother. In order to achieve his aim Lupu schemed in Constantinopole and even approached Ferdinand III for aid; moreover, to insure that Khmelnytskyi had his hands free to give him the needed support, Lupu also offered to Jan Kazimierz to act as a mediator in the Commonwealth-Cossack conflict. Lupu's offer was accepted by the king. Khmelnytskyi likewise agreed to accept such an arrangement. Even the tsar was willing, he informed the king, to act as a mediator as well.

When the rulers of Transylvania and Wallachia learned about Lupu's machinations, they formed a coalition against him. Included in it was Lupu's chancellor, Gheorghe Ştefan. Eventually, working hard, they also managed to conclude an alliance with Jan Kazimierz against Khmelnytskyi. Lupu was deposed and Gheorghe Ştefan was declared the new hospodar of Moldavia. This was hardly the end of the struggle, however, for within a short time after the palace revolution in Iaşi, Lupu's new son-in-law became involved in the conflict.

Tymofii Khmelnytskyi managed to enter Moldavia with Cossack troops

and defeated Gheorghe Ștefan at Popricani near Iași. Attempting to take advantage of Tymofii's victory, Lupu invaded Wallachia. In May 1653, however, Matei Basarab, the Hospodar of Wallachia, frustrated the aims of Lupu by repulsing the invaders at Finta, on the Jalomița River. This victory enabled Gheorghe Ștefan to re-enter Moldavia and in July, at Sîrca, near Tîrgu Fumrmos, to defeat the troops of Lupu. Vasile, loosing all hope, fled to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi; then, leaving him, passed through Crimea to find shelter in Constantinopole, where he died without regaining his throne. His family, together with Tymofii, was besieged in Suceava by Gheorghe Ștefan, assisted by his Polish, Transylvanian and Wallachian allies. Tymofii was mortally wounded during the siege. Upon his death the Cossack garrison capitulated. Thus, in October 1653 the far-reaching plans of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi ended with a tragedy. 109

In the meantime, already in December 1652, Jan Kazimierz decided to launch an attack against Ukraine. 110 This decision remained firm, notwithstanding the attempts made by Khmelnytskyi to reach an understanding. Of course, the Cossack hetman was promised that a new commission would be sent to him as soon as possible, but this promise was not carried out. 111 The short Diet held at Brest-Litovsk dealt primarily with the raising of troops

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110 Jan Kazimierz to NN, Hrodna, 22.XII.1652: Czart., Ms. 400, p. 196.

and new taxes. In order to take advantage of Cossack "weakness", a decision was made to send to Ukraine, not negotiators, but a strong force and to occupy the enemy with the tactics of fire and sword. Already in January 1653 some units under Piotr Potocki were active in this way. But the real test came in the middle of March, when Stefan Czarniecki and Sebastian Machowski, at the head of their "flying army", penetrated into the Cossack-held territory. While Khmelnytskyi awaited the arrival of Tatars and only later on despatched Bohun against the new intruders, Czarniecki and Machowski burnt, plundered and executed. Apart from causing great devastation, the military accomplishments of these two men were of negligible significance.

By this time preparations for war were made in earnest. Kysil, the chief restraining influence, was dead. Thus, Jan Kazimierz, influenced by the political situation, by his promise of aid to Rakoczi and generally by his desire to strike a decisive blow against the Cossack forces, ordered

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112 On this Diet see: AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/139, fos. 15r-35v.
113 Kersten, Czarniecki, pp. 180-185.
114 "The Beginning of the Cossack Rebellions by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi": Ossol., Ms. 1583/II, fo. 2v; Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 266.
115 Jan Kazimierz to NN, By Krzemieniec, 24.VIII.1653: Czart., TN, Ms. 147, pp. 249-252.
116 He died on 3.V.1653: Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 282.
a general mobilization of the gentry. The Crown Army began to concentrate near Hlyniyany. 117

At such a time Khmelnytskyi decided to send Colonel Antin Zhdanovych to Jan Kazimierz and the senators with Cossack "supplications". These concentrated on the following matters: agreement between the two sides was to be reached on the basis of the articles of the Treaty of Zboriv; the Cossacks were to retain their traditional "faith and liberties"; the rights of the Orthodox Church were to be guaranteed and the Uniate Church was to be abolished within the Commonwealth. The Cossacks were prepared to negotiate all matters. They had no desire to fight the Crown Army, but should it continue to advance, they were left with no choice but to block its progress. 118 Khmelnytskyi also appealed to the Crown Field Hetman, Stanislaw Potocki, the Crown Quartermaster, Stefan Czarniecki, and most likely to other influential magnates for their intercession on Cossack behalf to the king. 119

At approximately the same time Russian envoys, headed by Prince Boris Repnin-Obolenskii, entered Ukraine. Repnin-Obolenskii's mission, apart from settling various matters of contention between the Commonwealth and Russia, was also to announce that the tsar agreed to mediate all the differences between Jan Kazimierz and Khmelnytskyi. The chief Russian rep-

117 Regarding this campaign see Kubala, Szkice, pp. 339-388; Kersten, Czarniecki, pp. 187-191; and Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 609-711.


resentative also, in the name of the tsar, spoke up on behalf of the Cossacks requesting for them the change of the terms of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. Both of these attempts, however, brought no results: Zhdanovych was placed under custody; the tsar’s offer of mediation was refused.

In August the Crown Army marched to Kamianets. Khmelnytskyi, in the words of one participant, again sent "very humble [-worded] letters in which he begged [the king] for mercy". These letters caused lively debates. Some individuals believed that he really wanted peace, while others argued that this was just another example of his tricks.

The uncertainty of the military situation caused some opposition to the continuation of the campaign. Eventually the king and his supporters prevailed, especially when they learned that the Tatars would not support the Cossacks. The Crown Army then marched south and entrenched itself in a camp near Zhvanets. Here, after a considerable period of non-action news was received indicating that previous information was false: the Tatars were indeed joining the Cossacks. The situation of the Crown Army became critical: already it suffered from cold, disease, hunger, lack of discipline and desertions; now, it faced the danger of being surrounded by the enemy. Some individuals consoled others with the news that a joint Cossack-Tatar action would not come about, because great disagreements developed between Islam Giray and Khmelnytskyi. Most of them, however, had more faith in the direct contact with the Tatars and anxiously awaited news regarding a reply from the Horde.

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120 Kubala, Szkice, pp. 367-371.

121 Camp diary, 19.IX.1653: Kór., Ms. 353; and Khmelnytskyi to Jan Koryciński and Potocki, Borok, 8.IX.1653: DKh., pp. 301-304.
At the beginning of December letters arrived from Sefer Ghazi Aga in the Zhvanets camp. Shortly thereafter Tatar envoys were sent to Kamianets. By this time all were in agreement that negotiations had to be carried on with the Tatars; thus, parleys were started and continued with interruptions for over two weeks. Finally, on December 17, 1653 peace was concluded between the commissioners and the representatives of the Horde.  

The so-called Treaty of Zhvanets was a verbal agreement. For this reason it is difficult to determine its exact nature. All sources indicate that one of the main provisions was the reconfirmation of the terms of the Treaty of Zboriv. Jan Kazimierz was to have agreed to pay 200,000 thalers to the khan and to contribute to him "presents" annually valued at 30,000 thalers. The king was also supposed to have agreed that the Tatars take captives on their return to Crimea, but various reports are in disagreement regarding this matter.

The agreement between Jan Kazimierz and Islam Giray III at Zhvanets also concerned the Cossacks, even though Cossack representatives were not allowed to be present during the negotiations. Khmelnytskyi once again was faced with a fait accompli. On his return to Ukraine he lost all his confidence in his Tatar "allies". Moreover, he had no intention of abiding by the Zhvanets arrangements between the Commonwealth and Crimea, for he already made arrangements of his own with Russia.


123 Kubala, Szkice, pp. 386, 398-399; nn. 227-229.
III

There were many reasons for Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's turn to Russia. It must be remembered that as the Cossack hetman began to lay the foundations for the Cossack-Ruthenian state, he first attempted to find a place for it within the organism of the Commonwealth. In order to achieve this aim, Bohdan had to transform her dual confederative structure, established in 1569, into a trialist one. In the new trialist confederative state, he visualized an autonomous Ruthenia, equal in all respects to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In Khmelnytskyi's view, such a transformation was possible only if the position of the monarch were changed from a mere *primus inter pares* among the nobles to that of an absolute ruler. A strong monarch would have to be obeyed by all his subjects, regardless of rank. Moreover, he would be able to protect the political and religious rights of his Ruthenian subjects and to guarantee for them autonomy within the Commonwealth. During the years 1648-1653, however, Khmelnytskyi found out that such a task was impossible to carry out. He did not even manage to accomplish it during his lifetime. After 1653 it required additional five years of bloody strife before such a transformation finally was affected at Hadiach.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Khmelnytskyi began gradually to cut ties with the Commonwealth and to look to the neighbouring powers for aid against her. The Cossack hetman resorted to the usual expedient of political manipulations; that is, playing off the threatening powers against one another and forming alliances with those which seemed to him the least dangerous. Right from the outset Khmelnytskyi managed to gain support of the Muslim world. He concluded a military alliance with the
Tatars, an alliance which soon proved to be costly, dangerous and unpopular. The Tatars proved to be unreliable allies. They were of doubtful utility for the future, for the Crimean khan had his own designs regarding Ukraine. At the same time he did not wish to weaken the Commonwealth too much, since her deterioration would create an imbalance of power in Eastern Europe and, as a consequence, contribute to the undesirable growth of strength of Russia. A strong Russia threatened the very existence of Crimea. For such reasons, the Cossacks, with the half-hearted Tatar support, were unable to deliver a decisive blow to the Commonwealth.

The "aid" and "protection" of Turkey proved to be of little practical value. It is highly questionable whether Khmelnytskyi treated this whole matter seriously. Of course, he did take advantage of the "protection" of the sultan by checking the aggressive actions of the Commonwealth. Moreover, by becoming his "vassal", the Cossack hetman managed to secure a firmer foothold on the Danubian principalities, which he planned to use for the establishment of a dynasty and the strengthening of the Cossack state.

The arrangements Khmelnytskyi made with Transylvania, the strongest of the three Danubian principalities, resulted in little consequence for his plans. Since the ambitions of Rákóczi rivalled those of Khmelnytskyi, the former was willing to give support only when he felt that he could utilize the latter for his projects. When Rákóczi found himself endangered by the aims of the Cossack hetman, he concluded an alliance with the Commonwealth and together with Matei Basarab and Gheorghe Ţeştefan took up arms against the Khmelnytskyi-Lupu coalition. With the death of Tymofii Khmelnytskyi in Moldavia in 1653, the Cossack hetman's ambitious plans collapsed. Under such circumstances he turned to Russia.
It should be remembered that Bohdan was motivated to take this step not only by political considerations, but also by cultural and religious ones, which were inherited from Constantinopole both by Kiev and Moscow. Moreover, great many Ruthenians saw Russia as a natural defender of the Orthodox Church, as well as of their interests against the Polish or Polonized gentry and against the dangers from the Muslim world. These were some of the reasons -- not only Khmelnytskyi's military difficulties in the struggle against the Commonwealth -- that convinced him to cast his lot with Russia in 1653.

The Cossack hetman, it should be recalled, had already in 1648 requested the tsar to take Ukraine under his protection. In that year, however, the Russian government showed a certain lack of interest and even adopted a rather negative attitude to Khmelnytskyi's requests. There were several reasons for such a stand: the Russian government looked at the conflict as just one more in the series of Cossack rebellions, which the Poles would eventually suppress; its fear of the consequences of the Cossack-Tatar alliance, which was just as dangerous to the Commonwealth as it was to Russia; its fear of the consequences of the social aspect of the conflict, which could easily spill into Russia, also troubled by internal disorder; its desire to maintain the "eternal peace" with Poland, which existed since 1634 and which was re-confirmed again by a special treaty in 1647; and its support of the dynastic plans in the Commonwealth, whereby a Romanov would gain the Polish crown. These were some reasons for Khmelnytskyi's failure to gain Russian support in the war against the Commonwealth.

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As the conflict continued within the Commonwealth, however, relations between the Commonwealth and Russia began to deteriorate. The tsarist government began to realize that the weakening of the Commonwealth created an advantageous situation for Russian armed intervention, in order to carry out long-standing religious and political aims, perhaps best expressed by the terms the "Third Rome" and the "testament" of Tsar Ivan I Kalita. The mission of Pushkin in Warsaw in 1650 is a good example of the growth of tensions between these two states.

In March 1651 Khmelnytskyi's new petition to the tsar was put before the Zemskii Sobor in Moscow. It is uncertain what decision was reached by this body for its resolutions were not published, but it is quite likely that it gave an affirmative answer. There is little doubt that the tsarist government was prepared to intervene into the conflict within the Commonwealth. Yet, the Russian intervention on Khmelnytskyi's side did not come about. This was largely due to the rout of the Cossacks at Berestechko in 1651, the many unfriendly statements against Russia made by Khmelnytskyi and especially because the Ankudinov affair was not settled.

However, additional pleas of Khmelnytskyi and the military misfortunes of Poland in 1652 and 1653, eventually compelled the Russian government to act. Already in July 1653 the tsar informed Khmelnytskyi that he agreed to take Ukraine under his protection. The tsar's decision was approved

125 On this individual, another pretender to the tsarist throne, who was given shelter by the Cossack hetman, see Jan Kazimierz to Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, 4.V.1650: Dokumenty, pp. 343-344.

126 See reports of Pronchishchev and Ivanov (1652): VUR, III, 164-182.

127 Alexei Mikhailovich to Khmelnytskyi, Moscow, 22.VI./2/VII.1653: Ibid., pp. 322-323.
by the Zemskii Sobor in October. Following this event a grand embassy, headed by the boyar Vasili Vasilievich Buturlin, was sent to Khmelnytskyi to finalize the agreement of Ukraine's passing under the control of the tsar.

The tsar's embassy reached Pereiaslav on January 10, 1654. It was met informally there on the 17th by Khmelnytskyi, who arrived a day before. On the 18th the Cossack hetman consulted his senior officers, who, after a deliberation, approved his decision to recognize the tsar as their suzerain. Later on in the day Bohdan ordered the drums sounded — a signal for a general council to assemble. Once the Cossacks and the townspeople gathered, Khmelnytskyi addressed them. In the course of his speech he reminded them that they had lived without a sovereign for six years and pointed out the urgency of selecting a protector from among the following four: the Turkish sultan, the Crimean khan, the Polish king or the Russian tsar. The general council chose the "Orthodox" tsar.

Following this meeting Khmelnytskyi and his officers proceeded to the town's hall, where the official audience took place. The tsar's letter was accepted by the Cossack hetman and then it was read aloud by the Secretary of the Army, Ivan Vyshovskyi. An exchange of speeches by Buturlin and Khmelnytskyi followed. The speeches being over, the whole party then proceeded to the cathedral for an oath-taking ceremony.

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129. On the activities of Buturlin and others, from 9./19.X.1653 to 5./15.II.1654, see Ibid., pp. 423-490.
At this point a crisis developed. Khmelnytskyi, turning to Buturlin and his colleagues, demanded that they first swear an oath in the name of the tsar that he would not betray the Cossacks to the Poles, would not violate their liberties and that he would confirm to all Ruthenians their rights to landed estates by charters. Buturlin refused. The tsar never swore to his subjects, he answered; as an autocrat, his word alone was sufficient. After some confusion as to the solution of this problem, an acceptable formula was found for both parties and Khmelnytskyi and his officers solemnly swore their allegiance to the tsar. On the 19th other Cossacks and townspeople took the oath in the same church. Those absent were made to take the oath a few days later.

The following days were devoted to meetings and negotiations. By January 23 all business was completed. On the following day, after despatching his emissaries to various Ukrainian cities and towns for oath-taking, Buturlin and his associates headed for Kiev. In February, after completing his mission, Buturlin proceeded to Moscow.

Following the departure of the Russians, Khmelnytskyi held several conferences with his officers in Chyhyryn. During these conferences certain points in the formulation of earlier demands were revised and new demands were added. At their conclusion, envoys were selected to the tsar, the leading figures being Samiilo Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria. These Cossack envoys were given Khmelnytskyi's letter to the tsar in which the hetman petitioned for the confirmation of the rights, privileges and liberties of the Cossacks, churchmen and laymen of Ukraine; they also received his

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130 Khmelnytskyi to Alexei Mikhailovich, Chyhyryn, 17./27.II.2654: DKhmel1, pp. 320-322.
written instruction regarding specific demands which were to be presented to the tsar and the Boyar Duma.\textsuperscript{131} To support their case, the envoys also brought with them copies of various charters issued in 1646, 1649, 1650 and 1652 by Kings Władysław IV and Jan Kazimierz.\textsuperscript{132}

Zarudny, Teteria and their colleagues arrived in Moscow on March 22. On the following day the Cossack envoys were received in audience by the tsar. For the next few days they held negotiations with a special committee of the Boyar Duma, to which they submitted a draft treaty — the so-called twenty-three articles.\textsuperscript{133} The draft was then passed to the plenum of the Boyar Duma, which discussed each article. The Duma accepted most of the articles of the draft treaty; some of them, however, — articles 14, 15, 16 and 21 — were either modified or rejected. In the end the Duma produced a summary comprising eleven articles for tsar's consideration. On April 6 Alexei Mikhailovich approved this summary.\textsuperscript{134} Seven items, included in the twenty-three articles, but purposely omitted in the eleven, were confirmed by tsar's special charters.\textsuperscript{135} In this manner evolved the Treaty of Pereiaslav or, as it should be correctly called, the Treaty of

\textsuperscript{131} This instruction has perished. It is mentioned in Khmelnytskyi's letter to Zarudny and Teteria, Chyhyryn, 21./31.III.1654: \textit{Ibid.}, p. 333.

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Akty YuZR}, X, 453-470.

\textsuperscript{133} For the text of the twenty-three articles see: \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 466-452. For the earlier proposals see: \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 437-446 and Hrushevskyi, \textit{op. cit.}, IX, part 2, 802-807.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{VUR}, III, 560-565.

\textsuperscript{135} Tsar's Charters to Khmelnytskyi, the Cossack Army and the Nobles: \textit{VUR}, III, 567-571 and \textit{Akty YuZR}, X, 494-496; to Metropolitan and the Cities of Kiev and Pereiaslav: \textit{Akty YuZR}, X, 513-538, 647-654, 761-764. The first three charters were dated on 27.III./6.IV.1654; the others, at later dates.
The following is a summary of the conditions under which Ukraine was to receive protection of "the exalted sovereign arm" of the tsar:

1. The people of Ukraine, as a whole, recognized the tsar as their sovereign and in accordance swore oaths of allegiance to him.

2. The tsar confirmed the traditional rights, privileges and liberties of Orthodox nobles, churchmen and townspeople.

3. The tsar confirmed all former rights, privileges and liberties of the 60,000-man Cossack Army, including the independence of Cossack courts, inviolability of landed estates and fixed annual salaries. He also assumed the obligation of providing winter quarters and food supplies for the cannoneers and military supplies and maintenance for the garrisons of Kodak and Sich.

To this day there is no agreement among historians with regard to the nature of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, for it is regarded as an alliance, personal union, genuine union, vassalage, protectorate, quasi-protectorate, autonomy, incorporation and so on. See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, pt. 2, 865-869; Pritsak and Roshetar, op. cit., pp. 239-240; H. Fleischhacker, "Aleksej Michailovič und Bogdan Chmel'nickij", Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven, XI (1935), 11-52; Aleksander Ohloblyn, Treaty of Pereyaslav 1654 (Toronto, 1954), pp. 59-76; and Andrii Yakuoliiv, Dohovir Hetmana Bohdana Khmelnyts'koho z moskovskym tsarem Oleksiem Mykhailovychem 1654 r. Istorychno-pravnycha studiiia z nahody 300-littia dohovoru (1654-1954) (New York, 1954), pp. 64-69. Andrij Moskalenko lists the contributions of Soviet historiography, which emphasizes the "reunion" of Ukraine and Russia, published on the tercentenary of Pereiaslav in 1954: Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Treaty of Pereyaslav in Soviet Historiography (New York, 1955). (Research Program on the U.S.S.R., Mimeographed Series, No. 73). For documents on this topic see Akty YuZR, X; and VUR, III.
4. Khmelnytskyi was to retain his office and command of the Cossack Army for life. Upon his death, the Army was to elect his successor, who was to take oath of allegiance to the tsar. The District of Chyhyryn was assigned to the hetman's office. The hetman was free to exchange envoys with all foreign countries, with the exception of the Commonwealth and Turkey, unless specifically directed by the tsar. He was to make to the tsar reports on all diplomatic activity. Moreover, he was to insure that the Tatars were not provoked to war by the Cossacks.

5. The tsar undertook the obligation to defend Ukraine and to send his troops against the Commonwealth in the spring.137

During the life-time of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi the Treaty of Pereiaslav remained an insurmountable barrier on that road which led to an understanding between the Commonwealth and the Cossacks. Yet, curiously enough, following his death, it proved to be an extremely useful instrument for Ivan Vyhovskyi to gain concessions from the Commonwealth's government.

137 After the summary of George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, 5 vols. (New Haven, 1943-1969). V. part 1, 478-479. See also Appendix IV.
CHAPTER III

THE RUPTURE:
FROM PEREIASLAV TO VILNIUS (1654-1656)

I

Two days after the conclusion of the Zhvanets Agreement, a group of mounted couriers departed from the tent sheltering the mobile chancery, trotted their steeds through the encampment of troops and then galloped to their destinations. Each one of them carried several manifestoes signed by Jan Kazimierz and stamped with the great seal of the Crown.¹

The manifestoes announced to the king's subjects in Ukraine the appointment of four new commissioners: the Crown Field Hetman and the Palatine of Kiev, Stanisław Potocki; the Palatine of Ruthenia, Stanisław Lanckoroński; the Palatine of Chernihiv, Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz; and the Seneschal of Bratslav, Mikołaj Zańwilichowski. These commissioners, revealed the manifestoes, were instructed and empowered to regulate, in co-operation with the Zaporozhian Army, the affairs in Ukraine. Specifically, they had to carry out the following three important tasks: to insure that the gentry regained their estates, hereditary and leased, in the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv; that the serfs carried out the customary obligations for their masters; and that the Cossacks, who were promised that

¹Camp by Zhvanets, 19.XII.1653: Czart., TN, Ms. 147, pp. 295-297.
their rights, privileges and possessions would be restored to them, were
to be molested neither by the nobles nor the Crown troops.

What incredible documents! They suggested that hostilities were over;
that the commissioners were competent to find a solution to problems which
plagued the state since 1648; and, most interestingly, that the status quo
ante bellum would be restored in Ukraine. Of course, that the commissi­
ners were to accomplish this herculean task without a binding commitment of
the Cossack hetman, was not revealed in the manifestoes.

There is no doubt that Jan Kazimierz, who considered the Zhvanets
Agreement meaningless, was induced to issue such unrealistic manifestoes
because he desired to camouflage the failures of the recent campaign, to
pacify and to raise hopes of the many noble "exiles" from the south-eastern
palatinates and, above all, to gain time in order to prepare a more realistic
plan for the regaining of Ukraine. However, he did not even have the time
to stage a convincing play of pretense with the appointed actors-commission­
ers. Events moved too swiftly for him: on January 18, 1654, in Pereiaslav,
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi swore an oath of allegiance to Alexei Mikhailovich.
Thus, shortly after the publication of the manifestoes, this "subject" of
the king chose, as one individual put it, to become not only "the vassal of
the Tsar of Muscovy", but also to submit "all of Ukraine to him".

News regarding Khmelnytskyi's fait accompli in Pereiaslav, while shock­
ing, did not come as a complete surprise to the royal court. On the con-

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3 Gheorghe Ștefan to Jan Kazimierz, Iași, 14.II.1654: Dokumenty, p. 737.
trary, being aware for some time about diplomatic contacts between Ukraine and Russia, Jan Kazimierz and his advisers anticipated that the representatives of the hetman and the tsar were negotiating some sort of an agreement aimed against the Commonwealth. At the termination of the Zhvanets fiasco, which once again exposed the weakness of the state, they realized that the time was ripe for the Cossacks and the Russians to act. This was one of the main reasons for the king's great haste — even before the close of the campaign — to convocate the Diet\(^5\) and to begin drawing up a plan by which he hoped to check effectively the expected danger from the East. One major phase of this plan was to be accomplished by diplomatic means.

Even prior to the king’s return to Warsaw, on January 1, 1654,\(^6\) this plan was set into motion by the mission of Mikołaj Bieganowski to Constantinople. Bieganowski was instructed to reveal to Mehmed IV the treachery and duplicity of this "common menial" Khmelnytskyi who aimed to seize, with the aid of the tsar, Moldavia and Wallachia and from there eventually to expand into the Ottoman dominions populated by the Orthodox Greeks, Macedonians, Serbs and Bulgarians. The envoy was advised, moreover, to take all the necessary steps in order to renew the treaties between the two states and to secure from the sultan a firm commitment that his Tatar vassals neither invaded the Commonwealth on their own account nor in support of the

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\(^4\) Wójcik, "Feudalna Rzeczpospolita", pp. 82-83.

\(^5\) The king’s manifestoes, dated in camp by Zhvanets, on 12.XI.1653, announced the convocation of the Diet in Warsaw on 11.II.1654: ASKr., II, 477.

\(^6\) Gazette de France (1654), p. 142.
Cossacks. It is quite clear from the wording of the instructions issued to Bieganowski that he was not expected to arrange a military alliance with the Turks. That the Turks turn against Russia and Ukraine, at a time when they were involved in a war with Venice, was obviously out of the question. Thus, the envoy was required to deal with other priorities.

The first of these — the intent of instructions — called on Bieganowski to secure the sultan’s permission for the formation of an alliance against Russia and Ukraine comprising Crimea, Moldavia, Transylvania and Wallachia; moreover, to use the full weight of his office to exert pressure on any vassal state — at this time the main concern was over Crimea — which showed reluctance to take part in this undertaking. The envoy was in a position to argue quite convincingly that, while such a combination benefitted the Commonwealth, it also safeguarded the integrity of the sultan’s dominions.

If the envoy failed to secure such a consent, however, it was up to him to demand that the sultan commit himself formally to honour the agreements regarding Crimea, as stipulated in the treaties between the two states. Thus, the sultan’s reconfirmation of strict adherence to his obligations, which amounted to bearing the responsibility for the neutrality of Crimea, was the second priority of the envoy. It was quite significant for, in the event of war between the Commonwealth and Russia-Ukraine, the Tatars would be prohibited from supplying aid to their Cossack allies. For various reasons, however, the neutrality of Crimea was not the best cure for the ills of the Commonwealth.

7Instruction to Bieganowski, Lviv, 2.I.1654: Zherela, XII, pt. 5, 277-278. For details regarding his mission see Wójcik, "Feudalna Rzeczpospolita", pp. 94-97 and Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, pp. 121-135.
Jan Kazimierz and the senators-resident, meeting in Warsaw early in January, were confident that the sultan would acquiesce to the request for the alliance comprising his vassal states. Since Gheorghe Ştefan of Moldavia, György Rákóczi II of Transylvania and Matei Basarab of Wallachia allied themselves with the king against the Khmelnytskyi-Lupu coalition in 1653, he expected to induce them to turn, without great difficulty, against Russia and Ukraine as well. Thus, in order to prepare ground for this undertaking, envoys were sent to the capitals of these three Danubian principalities even before the outcome of Bieganowski's mission in Constantinople was known in Warsaw. 8

As far as Crimea was concerned, there existed only one course of action: "to come to an understanding with the Khan of Crimea", as one individual put it. 9 In the view of the king and the senators-resident, coming to terms with the khan was the only reasonable course of action to pursue under the circumstances. They were certain that in the event of an armed conflict with Russia the khan would not need a great deal of persuasion to march at the head of the Horde to assist the Commonwealth, for he proposed a campaign against Russia in 1650 and 1653. They were uncertain, however, how he would react to the Russo-Ukrainian alliance. Would he take up arms against the Cossacks, the Tatar allies?

The king and his advisers, assuming that the Tatars hated the Russians intensely, -- indeed, there was little love for them in Crimea since the

8 Instructions to Jan Szumowski (sent to Transylvania), Warsaw, 28.I.1654; and to Wojciech Bieniewski (sent to Moldavia), Warsaw, 31.I.1654: Zherela, XII, pt. 5, 280–284. It is uncertain who was despatched to Wallachia. For details relating to these missions see Wójcik, "Feudalna Rzeczpospolita", pp. 103–104.

9 Gheorghe Ştefan to Jan Kazimierz, Iaşi, 14.II.1654: Dokumenty, p. 738.
conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan by Ivan IV — expected that the Tatars would extend this feeling to the Cossack as well. In this way the political leaders in Warsaw hoped to influence the khan to turn against both Russia and Ukraine. The khan, of course, was to be helped in reaching this decision by the aid of large sums of money and by suggestions that he would recover the territories lost to Russia. This task was assigned to an expert on Tatar affairs, Mariusz Jaskólski.

Jaskólski was instructed to paint Khmelnytskyi in the darkest colours possible before the khan and the Tatar nobles in Bakhchysarai. He was to stress that the Cossack hetman had no intention to abide by the terms of "friendship agreed to [at Zhvanets] by the Grand Vizier of His Highness the Khan and the Grand Chancellor of His Majesty the King"; in fact, this "frivolous" individual demonstrated his "contempt" for it by renewing hostilities, harbouring rebel serfs, molesting the gentry and refusing to permit the nobles to regain their estates in Ukraine. Moreover, the envoy was to reveal that this "perfidious" man was not only deceiving the king, but the khan as well, for "not being content with the favours of His Highness the Khan, he sought lately the protection of the Tsar of Muscovy, the great enemy of the Khan".

Jaskólski was to urge the khan not to support the Cossack in any way and since "former treaties" specified that he was to be "the friend of [all king's] friends and the enemy of [his] enemies", to send Tatar troops against Russia. It is obvious that this instruction was prepared before

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news reached Warsaw about the submission of Khmelnytskyi to Alexei Mikhailovich. Once this was ascertained, Jaskólski was ordered to come to the point: to draw the Tatars on the side of the Commonwealth and to turn them against Russia and Ukraine. The envoy was also given a copy of Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the officers of the Zaporozhian Army, which he was to use as proof of the Cossack hetman's "treachery".

During the January meetings, the king and the senators-resident also designed a course of "internal" action which aimed at causing a rift between Russia and Ukraine and prepared the ground for the recovery of the latter. In order to gather first-hand information about Ukraine and in order to strengthen the opposition there against Khmelnytskyi, they decided to enlist the aid of spies and agents and to provide for them sufficient funds for carrying on with their work. Some money, as well, was earmarked for bribes. The Crown and Grand Ducal hetmans were assigned to co-ordinate all such activities.

11 Perhaps Młocki, who arrived in Warsaw on February 16 from Moscow, was the first bearer of the news. On the 21st he made a report on his mission to the Senate. (Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, p. 100). On the same day Jan Kazimierz issued a manifesto to the Cossack Army. (Akty YuZR, X, 549-552). The nuncio, Pietro Vidoni, mentioned that the king received news about Khmelnytskyi's submission to the tsar on the 22nd. (LNA, VIII, 146-147). Perhaps the king referred to reconfirmation of Młocki's account from some other source.

12 Some advice was sought, no doubt, from Mehmed Mirza, the Crimean representative, who arrived in Warsaw on January 21. See AGAD, ASK, II, RS, Ms. 52, fo. 21.

13 Khmelnytskyi to Cossack officers, Pereiaslav, 7./17.1.1654: ĐKhmel., p. 315.
The hetmans were also instructed to issue manifestoes promising "the clemency of His Majesty" to the populace. At the same time they were to apply pressure by invading Ukraine from the north and west. If all this proved to be successful, there was to be no bloodshed; however, even under such circumstances the hetmans were to insure that the population was disarmed. Then it was their task to preserve peace in order that negotiations could take place between the Cossacks and the recently-appointed commissioners.

Of course, the possibility of a conflict was not excluded. If, due to the "obstinacy of the serfs" conflicts developed, the hetmans were not to cast away the olive branch. On the contrary, they were to continue to offer royal "clemency". However, that these gestures be not interpreted as signs of weakness, both by intransigents and sympathizers, the hetmans were also to make use of the sword. Specifically, they were instructed to insure that all borderland fortresses, strategically located vis-à-vis Ukraine, were adequately provisioned and garrisoned. These fortresses were to serve two purposes: firstly, in the event that the Cossacks' resistance became too strong in the field, the main body of hetmans' troops could retire and find shelter in them; secondly, they were also to serve as bases from which strong units of garrisoned troops could make frequent sorties into Ukraine to harass the population into submission.

It was hoped that the offers of "clemency" would attract great many people to abandon Khmelnytskyi, while the repeated raids would compel others to fall on their knees to sue for peace. In time their numbers would grow. Given the support of units garrisoned in the fortresses, they could effectively challenge Khmelnytskyi's control. Thus, the men in Warsaw made

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plans for the initiation of a civil war, by which they hoped to cause
the downfall of the Cossack hetman, deal a death blow to the Russian al­
liance and to recover Ukraine on their own terms.

The success of any plan, however, is largely determined by the swiftness
of its execution during the period of an adversary's weakness. The first
three months of 1654 was precisely such a period for Khmelnytskyi. He was
quite aware that he had taken quite a dangerous step. He had no guarantee
that Alexei Mikhailovich would answer positively to his petition, in which
he sought the confirmation of the existing rights, privileges and liberties
of Cossacks, Orthodox churchmen, nobles and burgesses in Ukraine.15 Mor­
ever, he was not sure that the tsar would acquiesce to the specific demands
which were outlined in the instructions to Samiilo Zarudny and Pavlo Te­
teria, the envoys sent to Moscow.16 Yet, all this he needed to insure the
support of each social stratum in Ukraine.

Moreover, time seemed to work against him. At the close of March, as
more and more people began to repeat that the "Poles" were ready to invade
Ukraine, he still had no idea what his envoys managed to accomplish in the
Russian capital. Could he rely on the support of the people if the "Ortho­
dox tsar" refused to make to them certain significant concessions, or if
the Crown Army appeared in Ukraine before the arrival of tsarist military
aid? These were grave problems indeed. Khmelnytskyi was fortunate, how­
ever, that his adversaries acted phlegmatically.

The plan regarding the recovery of Ukraine by direct intervention,

15 Khmelnytskyi to Alexei Mikhailovich, Chyhyryn, 17./27.II.1654: DKhmel.,
pp. 320-322.

16 This instruction has perished. Mention of it is made by Khmelnytskyi
in his letter to Zarudny and Teteria, Chyhyryn, 21./31.III.1654: Ibid.,
p. 333.
designed by the king and the senate council early in January, was put into motion too late to be effective. The main cause for this delay was the lack of proper intelligence regarding the affairs in Ukraine. Various letters and reports from the south-eastern palatinates built a false sense of security, if not over-confidence, in Warsaw. They indicated that neither the Cossack hetman nor the Russian tsar was yet the master of Ukraine and emphasized, as well, that most of the people expressed a strong opposition to the deed in Pereiaslav and great hatred for the Russians. Typical of the many reports of this nature, that began to circulate in Warsaw, was the one made by Makarii Krynytskyi.

Krynytskyi, an Orthodox monk from Kiev, claimed that the Orthodox metropolitan, the archimandrite and other churchmen were subject to "unjust demands" from the newly-arrived Russian officials in Kiev, who sought to compel them to take oaths of allegiance to the tsar. These ecclesiastics, however, pleading their loyalty to the king, resisted all such demands. They sent Krynytskyi to register officially their protests in the court records of Lutsk. Father Szpakowski, a Bernardine from the Kievan convent, was entrusted by them to register a similar protest in Lithuania. Moreover, the report of Protopop Atanasii's bitter complaint that "Khmelnytskyi delivered us all into a bondage of the Muscovite tsar", as well as others, which re-confirmed that "the clergy did not desire to take the oath", as-

18 Krynytskyi's report was sent by Vidoni to Rome from Warsaw on 2.III. 1654: LNA, VIII, 150-151.
20 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 23.II.1654: LNA, VIII, 147.
sured the king and the council that the Orthodox clergy could be relied upon for support.

Not only the clergy -- according to the information received in the capital -- opposed the new order in Ukraine, but a great many Cossacks, townspeople and commoners as well. "Among the Cossacks themselves," wrote the nuncio to Rome, "there is a considerable number of those who do not agree with such a solution [i.e., the Pereiaslav Agreement]; the Cossack officers, he claimed, were also questioning it.\textsuperscript{21} Another diplomatic representative reported that the Cossacks, "as a consequence [of a very severe regime established by the Russians and their desire to introduce many unbearable laws] being very recalcitrant and mutinous, are trying to leave the Russian side in favour of the Polish".\textsuperscript{22}

The influx of Russian officials and troops into urban areas, as various sources indicated, caused discontent in them and, in some instances, considerable turmoil among the townspeople. "A great fear...[of the Russians developed] among the commoners" as well. The royal court learned, moreover, that Khmelnytskyi was denounced by some individuals in Pereiaslav: "We shall not sell our souls for [the price of Russian] sables", he was told by them, "as you sold [yours] for them and betrayed your lord [the king]."\textsuperscript{23}

As the volume of such "encouraging" news grew,\textsuperscript{24} it postponed the execution of the plan. Thus, the first step was only taken late in February,

\textsuperscript{21}Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 2.III.1654: \textit{Ibid.}, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{22}Pels to States-General, [Gdańsk], 28.III.1654: Hans de Weerd, "Netherlands Ambassador to the Polish Court on Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1654", \textit{Ukrainian Review}, XII (1957), 57.

\textsuperscript{23}Cited by Hrushevskyi, \textit{op. cit.}, IX, pt. 2, 771.

\textsuperscript{24}See particularly the reports sent to France by a correspondent in Warsaw on 26.II., 6., 12. and 19.III.1654: \textit{Gazette de France} (1654), pp. 298, 345, 369, 393.
with the publication of the king's manifestoes to the Cossack Army and to the urban population of Ukraine.

In the manifestoes addressed to the Cossacks, Jan Kazimierz stated that he received news that Khmelnytskyi, who apparently was not satisfied with all the Christian blood spilled up to this time, decided to shed some more, for he surrendered them to the Russian tsar and even compelled many of them to swear oaths of allegiance to him. Many Cossacks, maintained the king, refused to swear such oaths and vowed to remain faithful to him and the Commonwealth. All of his faithful subjects were required to take up arms against the traitor Khmelnytskyi and his Russian allies; however, rather than starting hostilities on their own, they were urged to wait until the Crown troops entered Ukraine. Finally, the king pledged to reunite Ukraine with the Commonwealth and to reaffirm to all loyal Cossacks their former rights, liberties and privileges. Similar in content were the manifestoes, issued a week later, to the urban population of Ukraine. The townspeople were encouraged to remain loyal, to await the arrival of the Crown Army and to join it at their first opportunity.

Other manifestoes were issued by various military commanders. In the manifesto addressed to the Cossacks, the Field Hetman of Lithuania and the Palatine of Vilnius, Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, expressed similar sentiments to those of the king. He warned them that, as subject of autocratic tsar, they would ultimately become his bondsmen. Radziwiłł encouraged them to

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desert to the closest Crown or Grand Ducal military formations, individually or by whole units, and in the king's name promised, to those who heeded his advice, various rewards. The Palatine of Bratslav, Piotr Potocki, promised clemency in the king's name to any individual who abandoned Khmelnytskyi. The Crown Quartermaster, Stefan Czarniecki, in encouraging to Cossacks and other persons to surrender, assured them that no individual would be harmed. Hetman Stanisław Potocki contacted the Orthodox Metropolitan and members of the city council of Kiev. He must have made similar promises to them.

A great deal of effort was made to induce Colonel Ivan Bohun to deflect. Earlier it was rumored that Bohun killed Khmelnytskyi. At this time it was known that he refused to take the oath of allegiance to the tsar. In the hope of persuading Bohun to abandon Khmelnytskyi, Hetman Potocki promised him a patent of a noble, a land grant of his choice and even the mace of the Zaporozhian Army. Moreover, if he induced his officers


29 Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, [Shelpakhivka?], 5.IV.1654: Czart., TN, Ms. 147, pp. 307-311.

30 AGAD, ASK, III, RK, Ms. 5, fo. 684.


and the rank and file Cossacks to deflect, all of them were to reap various benefits as well.\textsuperscript{33}

The letters of Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi\textsuperscript{34} reveal that the manifestoes of the king and various military commanders, as well as the activities of their agents, who penetrated into Ukraine and attempted to gain adherents by means of promises and bribes, did make a significant impact both on individuals and on certain groups of persons. The Orthodox hierarchy, led by Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosiv, needed little inducement, for these men faced the unpleasant prospect of absorption by the Muscovite patriarchate. Even though Bohun refused the tempting offers of Potocki, there were several high-ranking Cossack officers, Khmelnytskyi's rivals for the mace, who were quite capable of causing mutinies. There were other men, too, who sold their loyalty to the highest bidder. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Cossack hetman was quite vulnerable at this time. He awaited news from Moscow anxiously. However, since his opponents were not in a position of great strength, — many of the reports on the "Polonophiles" sent to Warsaw were grossly exaggerated, while others were simply fabricated\textsuperscript{35} — he was able to stifle them without much difficulty.

Moreover, even if the burgesses and the rural population initially

\textsuperscript{33} Potocki to Bohun, Pidhirtsi, 10.III.1654 and Oleksych to Bohun, Medzhybizh, 16.III.1654: \textit{Akty YuZR}, X, 555-558, 561-562.

\textsuperscript{34} Khmelnytskyi to Zarudny and Teteria, Chyhyryn, 21./31.III.1654: \textit{DKhmel.}, pp. 333-334 and Vyhovskyi to Teteria, Chyhyryn, 12./22.III.1654: \textit{Akty YuZR}, X, 557-560.

\textsuperscript{35} Pels to States-General, [Gdańsk], 28.III.1654: De Weerd, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 57.
did pay some attention to the manifestoes, they quickly lost interest in them after the invasion of Ukraine by the Crown and Grand Ducal troops. In the northern theatre of operations, conducted by Janusz Radziwiłł, there was relatively little bloodshed. In the southern theatre, on the contrary, the troops under Stanisław Potocki took part in "a bloody promenade from Vinnytsia to Uman and back". One participant of this terrible "promenade" wrote as follows: "The serfs were put to the sword ... [and thus] great many of these locusts perished ... [while] fires gutted ... the towns, villages and settlements". He complained that the soldiers' "arms grew too weary from cutting down" those who chose to resist.

By committing such atrocities -- the wholesale slaughter of men, razing of the land and turning of towns and villages was not part of the plan formulated in Warsaw -- Potocki's troops only fanned the flames of hate against the "Poles". Since Potocki was neither able to conquer the heartland of Ukraine nor to deal a decisive blow to Khmelnytskyi, his bloody "promenade" only contributed to the cementing of the Cossack-Russian alliance. Many influential individuals, in the capital and elsewhere, quite aware of this sad state of affairs, became very critical of the whole unfortunate undertaking.

Many persons even lamented that, at least in the near future, there

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37 Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, p. 169.


39 Leszczyński to Chamberlin of Kalisz, Goślina, 13.V.1654 and to Wituski, Goślina, 15.V.1654: Czart., Ms. 384, pp. 67-70; Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 301-302; and Jemiłowski, op. cit., p. 46.
was no hope for the recovery of Ukraine. Their wails ceased, however, when
the Crown chancery received news from Captain Mogilnicki in Chyhyryn,
that he managed to arrange a provisional agreement — unfortunately, its
terms are shrouded by a mystery — with some influential anti-Khmelnitskyi
Cossack faction. Thus, an opportunity presented itself once more for the
gaining a firm foothold in Ukraine.

Some light is shed on this new development by one letter of the Palatine of Łęczyca, Jan Leszczyński. After having been informed about
Mogilnicki's accomplishment, he responded by warning his colleagues to
exercise a great deal of caution before taking any action. He was certainly
not overjoyed about the recent "good news" communicated to him. On the
contrary, he was quite pessimistic for, as far as he was concerned, this
was yet another good example of Khmelnitskyi's machinations.

Leszczyński maintained that this "perfidious" agreement was arranged
with full knowledge and consent of Khmelnitskyi. As one may gather from
the comments of the palatine, he instructed certain trusted officers to act
out the role of his opponents. They were to convince Mogilnicki, the het-
man's captive in Chyhyryn, that he was dealing with a bona fide opposition.
So far Khmelnitsky was successful, argued Leszczyński; his aim at this
time was to gain credibility through the medium of the gullible Mogilnicki,

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40 This was undoubtedly Olbrycht Mogilnicki, who was captured by the
Cossacks during the siege of Suceava. He was brought to Chyhyryn, where
he remained in captivity for some time for, still in September 1654, Janusz
Radziwiłł pressed Khmelnitskyi to release him. Under the circumstances,
Mogilnicki was hardly a "royal envoy", as one Russian diplomat referred to
him. See Diet Accounts (1658): Ossol., Ms. 9532/II, p. 24 ff; Kochowski,
Climacter I, 389; Akty YuZR, X, 679; and Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, pt. 2, 950.

41 Leszczyński to W. Koryciński, Goślina, 22.IV.1654: Czart., Ms. 384,
pp. 61-62.
for his so-called opponents in Warsaw. Should he succeed again, the palatine warned his colleagues in the chancery, he would undoubtedly demand, through his Cossack representatives, the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine; then, having achieved this, he would employ them in useless and time-consuming negotiations. In this way, claimed Leszczyński, Khmelnytskyi hoped to gain time until the Russians invaded the Commonwealth in full force.

Should Khmelnytsky be unmasked at this time? Not at all, advised Leszczyński; this game should be played according to his rules. If the whole matter could be kept in strict secrecy, valuable time could be gained for a similar purpose. Obviously, Leszczyński wanted to gain time in order to secure Tatar military aid against the Cossacks and the Russians.

It was up to Potocki, continued Leszczyński, to insure that the pretense be kept up. The Crown hetman was to take special precautions to safeguard all Cossack officers and their followers that were mentioned in Mogilnicki's report. They were, however, not to be trusted by him, even if they expressed a desire to join the Crown Army. The only way that these Cossacks could prove themselves trustworthy, and this Leszczyński obviously considered most unlikely to happen, was by taking up arms against the Russians, routing them and surrendering their high-ranking officers to Potocki. Only then could they be permitted to gain "everything they desired, even [such concessions as were made to them by] the Treaty of Zboriv".

Leszczyński, who was obviously dissatisfied with certain aspects of the policy pursued up to this time, made a number of interesting suggestions how to lure the Cossacks, as well as the people of Ukraine, from Khmelnytskyi and Alexei Mikhailovich. He felt that a new series of positively-worded manifestoes should be issued by the king in order to attract them.

In his view these manifestoes should contain information about the appoint-
ment of new commissioners, men who were more acceptable to the Cossacks, in order to begin negotiations; as well as a statement expressing the king's willingness to offer certain guarantees, such as amnesty, even to Khmelnytskyi, preservation of religious liberties for the Orthodox and a settlement based on the terms of the Treaties of 1649 or 1651. Leszczyński believed sincerely that Khmelnytskyi's arrangement with Russia was accomplished against the will of the majority of people in Ukraine and that they were tired of war. He also believed that, if they had the opportunity to choose -- without coercion -- between the rule of the king and that of the tsar, they would choose the former, for they would equate the king with liberties and the tsar with bondage. Moreover, if negotiations were handled diligently and entrusted to experienced diplomats, Leszczyński had no doubt that not only Ukraine would be won back, but also that a more acceptable individual would be elected in place of Khmelnytskyi as hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. In Leszczyński's view, the best candidate, this "pacis et belli arbiter" who could accomplish all this, was Janusz Radziwiłł.

Unfortunately, the policymakers in Warsaw decided not to follow Leszczyński's recommendations. Their confidence that Tatar military aid would be secured, since the sultan agreed to permit the khan to decide for himself the role he would play in the armed confrontation between the Commonwealth and Russia – Ukraine, and the difficulty of changing orders for plans already in motion, were two of the many reasons which caused them to reach such a decision. Of course, the enmity between Jan Kazimierz and Janusz Radziwiłł was also one of the more important causes.

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42Gheorghe Ștefan to Potocki, Iași, 8.V.1654: Zherela, XII, pt. 5, 312.
The feud between the King of Poland and the "Kinglet" of Lithuania was a long-standing one. While Jan Kazimierz may have tolerated Leszczyński's efforts to bring about a reconciliation, the king regarded the palatine's recommendation of Radziwiłł as undue interference, if not as a personal insult. These two men were the protagonists at the first Diet of 1654. Their dispute centered on the grand hetman's mace of Lithuania. The king swore that he would rather lose his crown than to grant the mace to Radziwiłł, a man whom he suspected of all sorts of machinations, if not of treason. When this very issue caused an uproar among the deputies, so incensed was Jan Kazimierz to have his way, that he instructed one of the "royalists" to terminate the Diet by a veto. In this way the Diet was dissolved without making an enactment. The king continued to hold on to the mace.

The king's victory, however, was short lived for, due to great pressure of various influential individuals and certain unfavourable develop-

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43 Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, pp. 239-266.
45 On the first Diet of 1654 (from 11.II. to 28.III.) see AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/140, fos. 61r-215v.
46 Franciszek Mincer, "O sprawie przysięgi hetmańskiej na pierwszym sejmie 1654 r.", in O naprawę Rzplitej, pp. 125-136.
48 Leszczyński to B. Leszczyński, Kaszki, 4.IV.1654: Czart., 384, pp. 46-47.
ments, he was compelled to relinquish the mace to his enemy at the second Diet of 1654. Yet, in order to show his displeasure, Jan Kazimierz acted in an unprecedented fashion: Radziwiłł was given the mace not with the customary congratulations, but "cum protestatione" of the king. These being the circumstances, it is inconceivable that Jan Kazimierz would even consider to place Leszczyński's candidate in charge of negotiations with Khmelnytskyi. Yet, curiously enough, Radziwiłł did play an important role in such a diplomatic function.

Radziwiłł decided to act on his own -- there is no doubt that he did not receive any formal authorization, apart from permission to issue manifestoes, to engage in negotiations -- because he concluded that the "papists" and "royalists" in Warsaw were pursuing a policy which would eventually result in the fragmentation of the Commonwealth. He formulated a radically different plan how to save the state and how to induce Khmelnytskyi to abandon the tsar: to take the crown away from the Catholic Jan Kazimierz and to offer it to the Protestant György Rákóczi II. If this failed, there existed other possibilities involving Karl X Gustav of Sweden, Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg and even Bohdan Khmelnytskyi of Ukraine. In all fairness he did, in a curious way, love his "Fatherland"; moreover, he did imagine himself to be the most suitable candidate for the

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49 On the second Diet of 1654 (from 9.VI. to 22.VII.) see AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/141, fos. 92r-169r.
50 "Remanifestation" (late 1654): Ossol., Ms. 206/II, fo. 126r.
51 His "Manifestation" (Late 1654) must be taken with a grain of salt. Ibid., fos. 116v-117r.
52 Radziwiłł's proposals to Rákóczi (ca., IV.1654): Erdély, I, 310.
53 Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, p. 257.
role of pater patriae. Of course, apart from being motivated by such lofty ideals, his actions stemmed from baser ones as well, chiefly from his fears that the Russians would confiscate his vast estates in Lithuania.

Radziwiłł decided that it was far easier for him to come to an understanding with Khmelnytskyi, who, as far as he was concerned, was pushed into the arms of the tsar by the incompetence of the king and his creatures, rather than with autocratic Alexei Mikhailovich. Radziwiłł was convinced that, if the Cossack hetman were offered suitable concessions and an agreement with iron-clad guarantees, he would have no use for the Russians. For these reasons he established contact with Khmelnytskyi as soon as he learned about the Pereiaslav agreement.

After the termination of the first Diet of 1654, Radziwiłł secured the release of the Colonel of Kiev Regiment, Antin Zhdanovych, and his staff, under the pretext that he required him for advice how to cause a break between Ukraine and Russia. Since it appeared that the Lithuanian field hetman endeavoured to implement the guidelines of official policy, even the king agreed to release Zhdanovych. Actually, however, the Cossack colonel

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54 "Manifestation": Ossol., Ms. 206/II, fo. 116v.
57 Radziwiłł, op. cit., IV, 300.
58 Il Re per ultimo per far apparire il candore della sua bonità appresso tutti e per disporre il Radzivil al publico servitio, havendole questo chiesto in gratia un certo Antonio, il più caro Cosacco c'habbia il Kmielnisch, c'havendolo mandato con altri l'anno passato per trattare con Sua Maesta fù ritenuto, glie l'ha concesso, mentre con questa gratia dava speranza di poter introdursi trattati d'aggiustamento co'Cosacchi. Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 22.XI.1654: LNA, VIII, 202.
-- who must have convinced Radziwiłł that he was willing to play a part in his machinations⁵⁹ -- was selected by the Lithuanian hetman for the purpose of acting as his agent in bargaining with Khmelnytskyi.

In May 1654 Radziwiłł set his plan in motion by sending Zhdanovych's regimental secretary, Ivan Yakymovych, to Chyhyryn. In order to conceal the real purpose of his mission, Yakymovych was instructed to make it known that he was to arrange an exchange of captives.⁶⁰ Upon meeting Khmelnytskyi, he was to convince the Cossack hetman that Radziwiłł planned no tricks; moreover, to act at once on the exhortations contained in Radziwiłł's letter. It appears that Radziwiłł introduced himself to Khmelnytskyi as the official representative of the Commonwealth and invited the Cossack hetman to send his personal representative to him in order to begin negotiations. He must have hinted, no doubt, at some very attractive conditions in order to induce Khmelnytskyi to take such a step. At the same time, however, Radziwiłł was firm on one issue: Khmelnytskyi had to break any arrangement made with the tsar.⁶¹

If Radziwiłł hoped to score a diplomatic coup on the basis that he was more acceptable than the "royalists", he soon found out that this was not the case at all. The addressee in Chyhyryn knew him too well to rely on his promises. His politely-worded excuses as to reasons for his inability to comply with the wishes of the "Illustrious Prince", contained in a letter

⁵⁹ Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX. pt. 2, 885.


⁶¹ This is evident from Radziwiłł's letter of June 25 and from his instructions to Kunitskyi and Zhdanovych in September.
delivered by Yakymovych to Orsha late in June, were regarded by Radziwiłł as severe setbacks to his plans. Yet, all was not lost, for Khmelnytskyi also suggested that, if Zhdanovych be given charge of negotiations, undoubtedly some sort of an arrangement would be worked out between them. Of course, this suggestion was designed by the Cossack hetman as a bait to secure the release of Zhdanovych. Radziwiłł, considering it "not adverse" to his "undertaking", decided to take advantage of this offer.

At the close of June he sent Yakymovych back to Chyhyryn with new proposals. Radziwiłł explained to the Cossack hetman that he was sending Yakymovych to him with an announcement that he was preparing the groundwork for negotiations between them. Expressing the need for acting swiftly and decisively, Radziwiłł asked Khmelnytskyi to dispatch, along with Yakymovych, a Cossack delegate who was empowered to negotiate on his behalf. In answering Khmelnytskyi's comments and requests regarding Zhdanovych, Radziwiłł assured him that his gaining the custody of the Colonel of the Kiev Regiment was for a much loftier purpose than incarcerating him again.

Since Zhdanovych was away from Orsha at this time and since there existed an urgent need for speeding up the negotiations proceedings, explained Radziwiłł, he decided to sent Yakymovych to Chyhyryn in his place; however, he assured Khmelnytskyi that Zhdanovych would proceed there as soon as possible. He would arrive in Chyhyryn, depending on circumstances, either before Khmelnytskyi's delegate reached Lithuania or, together with this delegate, after his sojourn there.

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62 This is obvious from Radziwiłł's reply of June 25.

63 "Manifestation": Ossol., Ms. 206/II, fo. 116v.
In order to induce Khmelnytskyi to follow his advice, Radziwiłł appealed to his correspondent's nationalistic-religious and "patriotic" feelings. The Cossack hetman was urged to act quickly in order to prevent the shedding of "Christian" blood in vain; to return to the service of his "Mother" - Commonwealth; and to break with the tsar, for in time his rule would become "worse than the infidels' bondage". Insisting again that he was the official representative of the king and the Diet, Radziwiłł assured Khmelnytskyi that any agreement reached between them will become permanent. In concluding his letter Radziwiłł stated that, if Khmelnytskyi's hands were bound so tightly with the new arrangement he made with the Russians, the least he could do was to act as an arbiter between "us and them".64

In order to score a diplomatic success, Radziwiłł also turned to two influential Cossack officers: the Secretary-General, Ivan Vyhovskyi and the Colonel of Nizhyn. The latter, Ivan Zolotarenko, at this time commanded Cossack troops in White Ruthenia. Both of them, tempted with great rewards, were asked to induce Khmelnytskyi, who could ask for anything he desired, to break with Russia and to return to the service of the Commonwealth.65

Even if Khmelnytskyi agreed to follow Radziwiłł's advice, two significant events at this time would have frustrated the negotiations: the invasion of Lithuania by a huge Russian army; and the formation of a military alliance, against Russia and Ukraine, by the Commonwealth and Crimea.

64 Radziwiłł to Khmelnytskyi, Orsha, 25.VI.1654: Akty YuZR, XIV, 131-136.

Yet, even under these adverse circumstances, Radziwiłł refused to concede a diplomatic defeat. Either prior or after his first major encounter with the Russians in August, he contacted Khmelnytskyi and announced that, within a short time, he was sending to Chyhyryn the Cupbear of Starodub, Hryhorii Kunitskyi, along with Antin Zhdanovych in order to begin negotiations. In his letter to Khmelnytskyi and in his written and oral instructions to Kunitskyi and Zhdanovych, Radziwiłł finally revealed what he had on his mind all along.

Calling himself a "friend" of long-standing of the Zaporozhian Army, Radziwiłł made several interesting proposals which were aimed, so he claimed, at "the pacification of the Fatherland". The Treaty of Bila Tserkva (1651) was to serve as the basis for the expected negotiated settlement. Since hitherto unsatisfactory safeguards were made for the keeping and enforcing of treaties, as their confirmation and ratification by oaths failed each time, Radziwiłł suggested that, in addition to oaths, both parties should endeavour to select mutually acceptable guarantors for the new agreement. In his view, out of all the neighbouring states, the most suitable ones were Crimea and Transylvania, since both were the allies of the Commonwealth and the "friends" of Ukraine. Of course, due to the latest developments, the agreement of Crimea had to be secured for this kind of arrangement. The advantage of this course of action, maintained Radziwiłł, was that the guarantors would safeguard the integrity of the new agreement and, should any dispute arise, support the wronged party. Moreover, Radzi-

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66 In his instruction to Zhanovych in September, Radziwiłł mentioned that he failed to get answers to his two letters and to his verbal instructions to Yakymovych. See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, pt. 2, 950. The first of his two letters was the one dated June 25; the second, judging by the course of events, must have been sent in August.
will pledged that he and his brother Bogusław would act in the capacity of spokesmen for Cossack affairs in general and matters relating the Orthodox Church in particular. They also volunteered to look after all of the personal interests of Khmelnytskyi. Russia was to be excluded from playing any part in the agreement.

Radziwiłł also revealed that a new understanding had been reached between the Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire; as a result of it, a possibility existed for the opening up of Turkish-Russian hostilities. If a war were to be waged, he cautioned Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine, serving as a battleground between these two great powers, would suffer total ruin. In order to escape this terrible fate, Khmelnytskyi was advised to place Ukraine under the protection of the sceptre of the Polish king. Moreover, argued Radziwiłł, the king would treat his subjects much better than the Russian tsar. While the former would take great pains to preserve their rights and liberties, the latter would endeavour to reduce them to the status of bondsmen. Finally, in order to gain military assistance in time of need, Khmelnytskyi was asked to order Cossack regiments to penetrate deeper into White Ruthenia.

The real aim of Radziwiłł, his loyal utterances regarding Jan Kazimierz and the Commonwealth having been designed as a smoke screen, was to cut off all ties between Ukraine and Russia, to create out of the former a buffer state against the latter and to gain Khmelnytskyi's support for the interests

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67 Radziwiłł's instructions to Kunitskyi and Zhdanovych and his letters to Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi were dated from Minsk on 10.IX.1654. Along the way the envoys picked up letters from Bogusław Radziwiłł to Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi (from Slutsk, dated on 18.IX.1654). On the contents of these instructions see Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, pt. 2, 949-950.
of the Radziwiłłs within the Commonwealth. If he succeeded, not only would his vast possessions be safe from the Russians, but also he would be able to dictate his terms to the king and even remove the hated man from his throne.

It is difficult to say why he was so optimistic about the success of his "undertaking", especially at the time when others believed that "Khmelnytskyi ... must dance [to such tune] as will be played to him by the Muscovites." Could he offer more to Khmelnytskyi than was gained by him in Moscow? Did he expect to scare Khmelnytskyi into submission by his threat that, if Russian aggression continued, he would place himself under the protection of Karl X Gustav and with Swedish military aid wage war against Russia and Ukraine? Surely, Radziwiłł could hardly expect any great concessions from Khmelnytskyi by reminding him that they were related!

Radziwiłł was so confident that his latest diplomatic move would result in the attainment of goals desired by him, that he chose to reveal his

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68 A. Leszczyński to Mierzyński, Uniejów, 8.XI.1654: Czart., Ms. 417, p. 299.

69 This was revealed by Zhdanovych to Russian authorities. See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, pt. 2, 951.

70 In 1645 Janusz Radziwiłł married Maria Lupu of Moldavia. In 1652 her younger sister, Rozanda, married Tymofii Khmelnytskyi. See Włodzimierz Dworzaczek, Genealogia: Tablice (Warsaw, 1959), plate 89. Radziwiłł's enemies even accused him that Zhdanovych was "the faithful intermediary ... of the brother-in-law [Tymofii]". NN to Radziwiłł, [n.p.], 5.V. [more likely X or after] 1654: Czart., TN, Ms. 147, p. 161.
hitherto secret diplomatic contacts with Khmelnytsky to the king and the senators and even had the audacity to pressure them for the approval of his unauthorized actions. While certain influential individuals were prepared to overlook this high-handed personal diplomacy of the Lithuanian grand hetman, the king was not willing to do so. These arbitrary actions, as well as his other demands of Radziwill, infuriated the king to such a degree, that he issued an open "protest" in which he accused Radziwill of insubordination and blamed him for the many ills of the state.

As rumors began to circulate that Radziwill was to be charged with high treason, he began to defend himself by levelling all sorts of accusations against the king and his supporters. In the bitter polemics that followed, Radziwill maintained that, during the session of the second Diet of 1654, he informed the king about his contacts with Khmelnytsky, submitted various documents as proof of the Cossack hetman's desire to negotiate and requested that the Diet appoint commissioners to negotiate with him. His request was turned down by the king, — claimed Radziwill — who was not interested in winning back the Cossacks, for the Tatars were prepared to supply sufficient military aid against the enemy. See "Manifestation": Ossol. 206/II, fos. 116-117. This is just as true as his statement that he sent Zhdanovych to Khmelnytsky "with the knowledge and permission of His Majesty". See Radziwill to A. Leszczyński, Minsk, 2.XII.1654: Kotrubaj, op. cit., p. 396. Cf., A. Leszczyński to Radziwill, Piątek, 8.XI.1654: Ossol., Ms. 206/II, fo. 104 and "Remanifestation": Ibid., fos. 126-127.

Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, pp. 257-258.


The best examples are Radziwill's "Manifestation" and anti-Radziwill "Remanifestation": Ossol., Ms. 206/II, fos. 114.-130.
Radziwiłł lost a great deal of credibility. Even his sympathizers, such as Jan Leszczyński, became critical of his actions and methods. Thus, Radziwiłł's attempt to confront the king with a fait accompli failed completely.

Even if Radziwiłł had managed to obtain official sanction for his "undertaking", he was not in a position to make any gains from it, for Khmelnytskyi's answer was negative. Since he was already allied with the tsar, wrote the Cossack hetman, it was too late for negotiations. He ordered Kunitskyi to return to his master with "nothing", as he explained to the tsar, for the prince's envoy "said nothing good and came only with allurement". Moreover, Khmelnytskyi sent Zhdanovych to Moscow with all the papers pertaining to Radziwiłł's mission and instructed him to reveal to the tsar "all Polish duplicity and falsehood" and to ask him to supply additional military aid for Ukraine. Thus, it was resolved that Ukraine was to remain in the Russian camp.

II

At the close of 1654 certain individuals were convinced that "Ruthenia and Lithuania shall perish" under the onslaught of Russia, unless military aid against her was secured by the Commonwealth from Sweden and Ukraine.

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76 J. Leszczyński to A. Leszczyński, Goślina, 6.XII.1654: Czart., Ms. 384, p. 165.

77 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 6.XII.1654: LNA, VIII, 203.


79 J. Leszczyński to A. Leszczyński, Goślina, 10.XII.1654: Czart., Ms. 384, p. 172.
The task of arranging an alliance with the Swedes was given to the experienced diplomat, Andrzej Morstin. Other ways and means were to be used, since diplomatic efforts proved to be unfruitful, to induce the Cossacks to turn against the Russians.

The vast majority of nobles agreed with the policy of reliance "on the hosts of the Crimean Tatars". They were led to believe that it was possible, as one correspondent put it, "ranger à leur [the Tatars] devoir ces sujets Rebelles [the Cossacks], qui seront bientost réduits à imploiter la clémence de Sa Majesté Polonoise". In other words, Ukraine was to be recovered by force of arms. Once a firm foothold was gained there, the Cossacks were to be induced to wage war, together with the Crown, Grand Ducal, Tatar and possibly Swedish armies, against the Russians. Following the clearing of the enemy out of Ukraine and Lithuania, the allies were to invade Russia. It goes without saying that the success of this plan depended a great deal on Cossack co-operation and participation.

By the close of October the Crown Army began to vacate its concentration area between Zboriv and Ternopil. In launching a winter offensive, it

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80 See Ludwik Kubala, Wojna szwecka w roku 1655 i 1656 (Lviv, [1914]), pp. 28-29; and Zbigniew Wójcik ed., "Akta poselstw Morstina oraz Leszczyńskiego i Naruszewicza do Szwecji w roku 1655", Teki Archiwalne, V (1957), 68. His instructions were dated in Hradna on 14.XI.1654.


82 Gazette de France (1654), p. 817.

aimed to clear the Palatinates of Podolia and Bratslav, to hold on to these territories until the arrival of the Horde and then, with the Tatar aid, to deal a crushing blow to the main Cossack forces.

In the march from Bar south-eastward the Crown Army, resembling a lava destroyed almost everything on its path. The local inhabitants either surrendered, hid in the forests, fled beyond the Dnieper or perished defending their fortresses and towns. Early in 1655 the Crown and Tatar armies established contact and began joint operations. On January 29 the allied armies encountered the main Cossack-Russian formations near Okhmativ, engaged them in battle and, on February 2, defeated the enemy. The Crown-Tatar victory proved to be indecisive, however, for the bulk of the Cossack and Russian troops, suffering only relatively small losses, managed to retire from the battlefield. Thus, with the enemy's back still not broken, the whole complicated plan was in jeopardy.

Following the Battle of Okhmativ military operations continued on small scale only. The Crown Army managed to capture a number of small fortresses; the Tatars began a systematic plunder of the countryside, during which hundreds of villages were put to the torch and thousands of people were taken captive. One participant of these operations summarized the terrible harvest of the Horde as follows: "I believe that the Cossacks will withdraw beyond the Dnieper and this area will remain a desert". By March it was obvious to all that the allied campaign failed to gain the desired military objectives.

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84 Tyszkiewicz to Jewyaszewski, [n.p.], 18.III.1655: Czart., TN, Ms. 148, pp. 75-84.
In the meantime Jan Kazimierz, most likely without the knowledge and consent of the majority of the senators, took an unprecedented step in order to solve the "problem" of Ukraine. He was prompted to act not only because of the utter failure of the fire and sword policy in Ukraine, but also because of the following significant negative and positive developments at home and abroad.

Jan Kazimierz was aware that the Swedes were making preparations to invade the Commonwealth. He was informed that diplomatic contacts between Sweden and Ukraine were intensified. The meaning of these contacts, as interpreted by him, was clear: the Swedes and the Cossacks were in the process of concluding a military alliance against the Commonwealth. On the positive side, the king was encouraged by the friendly attitudes of Crimea and Turkey. He believed that the two experienced diplomats, Wojciech Bieczynski and Mariusz Jaskólski, -- the former sent to Constantinople and the latter to Bakhchysarai -- were not only capable of wrecking Khmelnytskyi's undertakings in the Muslim world, but also of securing Turkish diplomatic intervention and Tatar military aid. Finally, after reading various despatches, letters and reports regarding the "Polonophiles" among the Cossack officers, their "disagreements" with the Cossack hetman and his

85 Kubala claims (Wojna moskiewska, p. 295) that the king acted "without the knowledge of the senators". This was hardly possible, as he needed the support of some influential senators.


87 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 8.III.1655: LNA, VIII, 221.

88 Instructions to Bieczynski, [Warsaw], 16.II.1655: Czart., TN, Ms. 148, pp. 35-37.

89 NN to Wielowiejski, Janów, 29.IV.1655: Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 753-755.
"virtual abandonment by the Muscovites",\textsuperscript{90} the king decided to strike the iron while it was hot.

Of course, realizing that he could win the loyalties of neither the Cossack officers, the Cossack rank and file nor the population of Ukraine as a whole by empty phrases, Jan Kazimierz decided to lure them to his side by specific offers of concessions which, he imagined, they would find quite attractive. These offers the king revealed to his "subjects" in a series of lengthy manifestoes:\textsuperscript{91}

At the beginning of Our reign, -- reads one such manifesto -- desiring that no [more] blood be shed among Our subjects, We employed all [sorts of] means to pacify the domestic strife [within the Commonwealth], of which, as evidence, were the Commissions of Zboriv and Bila Tserkva, as well as Our frequent missions, manifestoes and letters [directed to you]. Similarly, at present, when We perceive the total ruin of the Ruthenian lands, the eternal Muscovite bondage and tyranny over [Our] subjects and weigh [the consequences of] the daily shedding of blood and the taking into captivity of Our subjects, We [wish to] declare before God and the whole world [the following solution]: That We, like a father, desire your self-constraint; being prepared [in return], not only to consign all that which took place into eternal oblivion, but also to guarantee [you] by Our Royal word, law and constitution of the Diet and, in any manner you desire to secure [such a] guarantee whatsoever [as well], so that no one in the future, under the pain of infamy and the loss of his estates, will dare to seek revenge on any one of you or to remind of your [former] excesses. Moreover, when We shall witness your sincere pacification and submission [to Us], we pledge to all of you knightly men [i.e., the Cossacks] to grant you liberties and prerogatives [enjoyed by] the nobility [of the Commonwealth] and to provide for you [land] from the estates of the Commonwealth.

These concessions to the Cossacks were conditional on their participation, alongside the Tatars, in any war waged against the enemies of the Commonwealth. Likewise, for their loyalty and full co-operation in the war effort, the manifestoes revealed that the rural and urban population of Ukraine were to reap the following benefits:

\textsuperscript{90}Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 8.III., 2.V. and 15.V.1655: LNA, VIII, 221, 234, 236, 237.

\textsuperscript{91}These manifestoes, issued in Warsaw, are dated on 26.IV., 4.V. and 7.V.1655: \textit{VMPL, III, 485; Księga pamiętnicza, pp. 756-757 and Akty YuZR, XIV. 623-624.}
We have [also] decided that the townspeople and the villagers living on farms be free forever from labour services and conscriptions, to subject them only to light taxes after the expiry of the periods of free-settlement and to grant them the right to [manage] the taverns, [to brew] beer and [to distill] spirits.

The attractiveness of these manifestoes was based on two offers: the first, that the Cossacks were promised, if not the actual patents of nobility, all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the gentry, as well as grants of land; the second, that the townspeople and the serfs were to gain personal freedom and, with it, all the lucrative profits from the taverns. The message of the manifestoes was clear: the king intended to convince his "subjects" that he was prepared to settle their grievances of long-standing and to offer them better concessions than had the tsar.

The very appearance of the royal manifestoes, which were to be read and displayed in Orthodox churches and at marketplaces throughout Ukraine, indicated that Jan Kazimierz intended to follow a more rational and realistic policy with regard to the recovery of Ukraine. No doubt, apart from taking a radical step in order to solve the Orthodox-Uniate religious problem, the king must have decided in favour of granting seats in the Senate to the Orthodox hierarchy, greater territorial autonomy to the Cossack Army, at least a quota of 60,000 men and the like. In order to thwart the opposition -- obviously, he expected vociferous criticism, such as, that he was selling out to the rabble the golden liberties of the gentry, that he

92 Jan Kazimierz was prepared to settle the religious issues between the Orthodox and the Uniates by restituting to the former all churches, dignities and benefices. See the interesting reports of Vidoni to the Holy See, Warsaw, 5. and II.VII.1655: LNA, VIII, 244-246, 247-248.
was setting a precedent which would lead to disastrous social and economic consequences or that he was capitulating to the Schismatics — the king purposely gave no hint of his plans in his instructions to the dietines which preceded the opening of a new Diet. He hoped, by using the danger of the Swedish invasion as a pretext, to face the deputies with a fait accompli.

The king soon found out, as the Diet began its first session on May 19, that the majority of the deputies refused to be coerced into supporting plans which they opposed. However, even the intransigents realized that, due to the precarious position of the Commonwealth, they had to attract the support of the Cossacks by making them some considerable concessions. Thus, neither the minority supporting the king nor the majority opposed to his plans managed to gain its aims. When both sides agreed to seek a solution by means of a compromise, it was obvious to all concerned that the original plans of the king would be radically modified.

To reach this compromise solution, the Diet voted to form two bodies: a committee, comprising ministers of state, senators and thirty-four deputies; and a commission, comprising twenty members. It was decided that the former body would compose suitable instructions. The members of the latter body, following these instructions, were to open negotiations and eventually to conclude an agreement with the Cossacks. Finally, this agreement was to be ratified by the Diet.

The deliberations over the exact wording of the text of the instruc-

93 See, for example, the instructions directed to the Dietine of Zator and Oświęcim, Warsaw, 3.IV.1655: ASKr., II, 534-536.
94 On the Diet of 1655 (19.V. to 20.VI.) see AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/142, fos. 232r–266r.
95 Volumina Legum, IV, 498-500.
tions were held in camera. Both the members who prepared the text of the
instructions and those who were to act upon them, took oaths to keep the
whole matter secret. All questions, in what manner, by what means and
under what conditions the negotiations were to be carried out and what
were the maximum concessions to be made to the opposite party. were solved
in minute details by the instructions.

The commissioners were obliged not to give in to any demands of the
Cossacks, reads the preamble, which were not specified in the instructions.
They were always to negotiate as a group, never individually; they were to
parlay with Khmelnytskyi and his officers only, never with any envoys of
the tsar; and they were to make clear to the other party that they always
represented the king and the state jointly, never separately. The Cossacks
were to be made to understand as well, that the Crimean khan was to play a
prominent role between the two parties, for negotiations were to be held
with his full knowledge and the final agreement required his approval. Since
the khan was directly involved, the commissioners were required to make
representations to him, in order that he use his influence on Khmelnytskyi
to come to terms with the Commonwealth. It was also to their advantage to
find out first what demands the Cossacks would make; for then they could
"bargain", starting from the least important item and ending with the most
important one.

The authors of the instructions also recommended that a suitable person
be found for the purpose of establishing clear guidelines before the actual
negotiations commenced. This individual was to proceed to Kiev in order to
sound out the Orthodox hierarchy and clergy and to gain their support. Once
he accomplished this initial task, he was then to establish contact with
Khmelnytskyi, reveal to him the general outline of the proposals and to secure from him a commitment regarding the negotiations. Once this fact-finding mission was successfully completed, then the real negotiations were to commence between the two parties.

The following were the main proposals as outlined in the instructions to the commissioners:

1. Amnesty was to be extended to all participants in the conflict within the Commonwealth since 1648.

2. The rights of both the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches were to be safeguarded and guaranteed. The Uniate Church was not to be abolished. If the Cossacks objected to the existence of certain Catholic or Uniate religious orders in the territories assigned to them, the commissioners were to propose the following solution: the lands of these orders were to be returned to the original founders; the churches and monasteries on them, however, were to be left to the disposition of the Catholic Bishop of Kiev.

3. The Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev was to be granted a seat in the Senate and ranked before the lay senators. Upon his death, the king was to have the right to appoint his successor.

4. Khmelnytskyi was to be re-confirmed in his office as the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. He was also to be appointed to the office -- newly-created for him -- of the Palatine of Zaporozhe and to be given a seat in the Senate by other palatines. The king reserved the right to select and to appoint all future Zaporozhian hetmans-palatines.

5. Six thousand Cossacks were to receive the rights and privileges of the nobility, provided that they fulfilled the following conditions: each individual was required to obtain a letter of patent from the king and to insure that it was confirmed by the Diet.
6. If the Cossacks desired to secure the reconfirmation of all of their charters relating to their liberties, rights and privileges by the Diet and published as one of its constitutions, they were obliged to hand over all such charters, or copies of charters, to the commissioners.

7. The commissioners were to endeavour to restrict the quota of the registered Cossacks to 20,000; if, however, too much opposition was raised that the quota was too small, they were authorized to increase it to the maximum of 40,000 men. The registered Cossacks were to be permitted to live on crown lands only in the districts of the Palatine of Kiev, within the boundaries agreed to by the Treaty of Zboriv. On no account were they to be allowed to live on the estates of the gentry; moreover, they were to be discouraged from taking up residence in the City of Kiev. The commissioners were to bargain as follows: first, they were to offer the District of Chyhyryn only; if it was unacceptable to the Cossacks, they were to add to it the Districts of Korsun and Cherkasy and the Town of Kremenchuk with its hinterland; if this was rejected, the final offer was to include, additionally, the Districts of Kaniv and Bohuslav. All registered Cossacks were required to move into the above-mentioned districts and divide all the lands among themselves. Instead of drawing pay for his military service, each Cossack was to be granted, for life, a title to the land from the royal chancery. Each Cossack, moreover, was to be free to pursue all normal economic activities and to have the right to make for his own consumption mead, beer and spirits. In return for these concessions and privileges each registered Cossack was obligated to perform military service for the king and the Commonwealth and to pay taxes to her treasury.

8. The Khan of Crimea and the Prince of Transylvania were to be entrusted with the task of maintaining the agreement between the two parties
9. In order to prevent and to clear any future misunderstandings, a special standing commission was to be set up in Kiev. It was to function in the interval when the Diet was not in session and to be empowered to deal with a great variety of matters. Half of its members were to be selected from the Zaporozhian Army.

10. Should the Cossacks insist that the agreement be safeguarded by swearing of oaths of certain individuals representing the Commonwealth, the commissioners were to agree to this arrangement, provided that the Cossacks reciprocated. Even if the Cossacks chose the king for that purpose, the commissioners were not to object; however, they were to stress that the king will take an oath voluntarily, for he cared about the cause of peace and loved his subjects.

11. The commissioners were to arrange for suitable Cossack hostages. Should the Cossacks insist on reciprocal action, the commissioners were to attempt to convince them that there was no need for it, since in their ranks they had many nobles already. If the Cossacks refused to be swayed by such an argument, the commissioners were to give consent to their original demand under the following condition: that hostages of both parties be placed in the hands of the third party -- either the rulers of Crimea or Transylvania.

12. The agreement signed with the Cossacks was to pertain to all allies of the Commonwealth as well.

13. The commissioners were to work diligently in order to cause an immediate rupture between Ukraine and Russia. Should this task prove to be impossible to carry out, they were to secure at least Khmelnytskyi's consent to the following: unobstructed passage of Crown and Tatar troops through Ukraine to Russia; permission for voluntary enlistments of Cos-
sacks to the Crown colours; and removal of Russian garrisons from Ukraine and surrender of Russian commanders to the officials of the Crown.

14. The commissioners were appropriated a sum of 300,000 zł. for their expenses. They were to use appropriate amounts as "presents" to Khmelnytskyi, the khan and the Cossack and Tatar officers. 96

It is difficult to agree with Rawita-Gawronski that "the conditions proposed by the Commonwealth could satisfy the wildest dreams of Khmelnytskyi". 97 On the contrary, why should Khmelnytskyi be satisfied with the offer of five districts in one palatinate, when he already controlled more than three palatinates? Was there any reason for him to enter into negotiations and to open the thorny Catholic-Uniate-Orthodox question regarding benefices, churches, monasteries and religious liberties, when the Orthodox Church already enjoyed predominance in Ukraine? Why should he be satisfied with the reduction of his troops, when in fact he could enlist as many men as he wanted in the Zaporozhian Army? Even the tsar allowed him more — 60,000 men. What benefits could he gain for Ukraine by waging war against the Russians or the Swedes? Would the office of the Palatine of Zaporozhe substantially increase the strength of a man who already wielded almost absolute power? Would the 6,000 Cossacks, who were destined to be transformed into nobles, enthusiastically exchange the villages and estates they occupied and considered their own, for charters and coats of arms? Kubala is closer to the truth. Khmelnytskyi, he maintains, could hardly desire terms which were far worse than those offered him by Russia;

96 Instructions to Commissioners, Warsaw, 30.VI.1655: Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 51-60.

97 Bohdan Chmielnicki, II, 392.
moreover, he was not in a position to accept them, even if he wanted to do so. 98

One positive aspect of the instructions prepared for the commissioners was that diplomats, not troops, were to appear in Ukraine. Sometime in July Fedir Vyhovskyi — it was not an accident that a close relative of the Secretary General of the Zaporozhian Army, Ivan Vyhovskyi, was entrusted with such a mission 99 — was selected and sent to Ukraine in order to prepare the groundwork for the planned negotiations with Khmelnytskyi. Vyhovskyi appeared in Klevan on August 8, 100 and reached Kiev ten days later. Even though Vyhovskyi's stay in Kiev aroused the apprehensions of the tsarist officials and his movements were carefully watched, he must have had an opportunity to confer with the Orthodox clergy. On August 27 he departed from the city, accompanying the Pavlo Khmelnytskyi's regiment westward. 101 At the close of September, probably before the Battle of Grodok, he met the Cossack hetman. 102

By this time Vyhovskyi could do very little. He could hardly influence the hetman to negotiate at a time when the Commonwealth seemed to crumble like a deck of cards. On the south-eastern theatre of war the powerful Cossack-Russian army defeated (near Grodok, on September 29) the Crown

98. Wojna moskiewska, p. 297.


100. Tarnowski to NN, Hradkovyche, 13.VIII.1655: Czart., TN, Ms. 148, p. 484.


102. He was in the Cossack camp, during the siege of Lviv, on October 6, and was referred to as the royal envoy. "Diary of Siege of Lviv": Czart., TN, Ms. 148, p. 860.
troops under Stanisław Potocki, besieged Lviv and overran the country as far as the River San. 103

In the meantime the Poles were also humiliated on the western theatre of war. In July, as Vyhovskyi prepared for his mission to Ukraine, a Swedish army commanded by Field Marshal Arvid Wittenberg crossed the frontier of Great Poland. On July 28 the gentry capitulated to the Swedes at Ujście; by the 31 they took Poznań; and by September 8 Warsaw was in their hands. After routing other Polish troops at Nowy Dwór on September 30 and at Wojnicz on October 3, the Swedish army marched south and besieged Kraków. On October 17 the city capitulated. By the end of the month most magnates and nobles of many palatinates, as well as the regular army and its commanders, surrendered themselves to the Swedish invaders. 104 Moreover, Jan Kazimierz, accompanied by a small group of senators, fled to Silesia. 105

In the north-eastern theatre of war, following the capture of some territory and several strategic fortresses within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Russian army began to experience a new series of military successes. On June 13 it captured Minsk; on August 8 it pushed the Lithuanian troops out of Vilnius; by the 16 it reached Kaunas; by the first half of September it advanced to Hrodna; and then it began to march rapidly in the direction

103 Regarding the south-eastern theatre of war see Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1102-1132; and Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, pp. 298-322.


105 Władysław Czapliński, "Emigracja polska na Śląsku w latach 1655-1660", Sobótka, X (1955), 556-610.
of Brest.

In the meantime, a second Swedish army under the command of Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie, invaded Lithuania as well. Unable and unwilling to cope with both the Russians and the Swedes, Grand Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł and various magnates decided to capitulate to the latter. The act of capitulation to the Swedes, signed in Kedainai on August 20, and the formal agreement on October 20, while guaranteeing rights and liberties for the ruling class, also provided for the separation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the Commonwealth and even for its eventual union with Sweden.

At the same time, their counterparts of Great and Little Poland were busy negotiating terms for their surrender and submission to the Swedish king. These magnates chose to follow this course of action not so much because they decided that the cause of the Commonwealth was hopeless, but primarily because they believed that the victorious armies of Karl X Gustav would regain for them the eastern borderlands which were lost to the Cossacks since 1648 and the Russians since 1654. Not only was this the attitude of the owners of the vast latifundiae in Ukraine and White Ruthenia, but of all the magnates as well, for the eastern borderlands provided for all of them a good opportunity of acquiring wealth and political power. Moreover, this was a matter of great concern not only of the magnates who surrendered to the Swedes in the period from July to October and who remained within the

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106 On the north-eastern theatre of war see A. N. Maltsev, "Boevoe soderzhestvo russkogo, ukrainskogo i belaruskogo marodow v borbe za osvobozhdenie Ukrainy i Belarussii (1654-1655 gg)", VUR (Sbornik), pp. 264-306; and Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, pp. 267-291.

country, but also of those who emigrated to Silesia and elsewhere. The latter, the alleged supporters of Jan Kazimierz, bargained as well, being prepared to offer their services to the Swedish king at the moment he assured them that he was willing to reconquer Ukraine and White Ruthenia and to restore the status quo. 108

That the issue of the lost eastern provinces played an extremely significant role in decisions to capitulate to the Swedes, is clearly shown in the report of Daniel Żytkiewicz, who described his conversations and debates with the magnates and wealthy nobles serving in the ranks of the Crown Army. 109 It is hardly surprising to find that the same issue was raised in the instructions to the representatives of the Crown Army, who were sent to negotiate its terms of surrender to Karl X Gustav. Article nine contains the following passage: that "His [Swedish] Majesty recover, as soon as possible, the provinces taken away [from the Commonwealth] as the result of war [with the Cossacks and the Muscovites]: namely, the Palatinates of Ruthenia, Podolia, Volynia, Bratslav, Kiev and Chernihiv [of the Crown] and others of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania". Moreover, once these provinces were "recovered and liberated from the hands of the enemy", the king would agree that all "offices, hereditary as well as public, shall be restituted to their possessors".

Moreover, it is hardly surprising to find that these instructions were signed by the following borderland "kinglets" and magnates: Aleksander

108 Władysław Czapliński, "Rola magnaterii i szlachty w pierwszych latach wojny szwedzkiej", Polska 1655-1660, I, 169-170; and Adam Kersten Chłopi polscy w walce z najazdem szwedzkim 1655-1656 (Warsaw, 1958), pp. 73-77.

Koniecpolski, Jan Sobieski, Jan Sapieha, Dymitr Wiśniowiecki, Krzysztof Korycki and three Piaseczyńskis — Jan, Stefan and Kazimierz. They were the representatives of families who owned, according to the census of 1629, 80% of households in the Palatinate of Bratslav; and the census of 1640, 68% of households in the Palatinate of Kiev. Thus, the chief reason for the acts of submissions, throughout Great and Little Poland, was obvious: the magnates and the gentry expected that "they will regain [their] estates taken away from the Cossacks [and the Muscovites] by the king of Sweden".

Due to the state of affairs described above, even though Khmelnytskyi appeared not to reject negotiations, the mission of Fedir Vyhovskyi had no chance to succeed. The Cossack hetman would have been utterly foolish if he did not look after his own interests at a time when it appeared that the Commonwealth was on the verge of dismemberment and, especially when the self-styled "Protector Regni Poloniae", the victorious Karl X Gustav, promised him a share in the spoils.

Vyhovskyi may have informed Jan Kazimierz, directly by a letter himself or indirectly by a letter of another individual, about the difficulties relating to his mission. It is even possible that he may have communicated

110. Instructions, Kazimierz, 6.X.1655: BUWar., Ms. 50, fo. 290T; AGAD, APP, Ms. 45/I, p. 46; and AGAD, AKW, Dział: Szwedzie [Hereafter cited as Szw.], 11A, no. 19.


some sort of encouraging news to the king. In any case, even if the king did not hear from Vyshovskyi, he had no intention of breaking contact with Khmelnytskyi.

Early in September Jan Kazimierz ordered the release of a certain Cossack captive, for whom Khmelnytskyi had a great affection. This move of the king was calculated to gain the hetman’s favour and a positive reply to requests such as breaking off relations with the tsar or at least declaring neutrality regarding the hostilities within the Commonwealth.115 Continuing to woo Khmelnytskyi,116 the king eventually received some sort of a favourable reply — most likely an indirect one — from the hetman.117 Due to the calamitous state of affairs, the king had to grasp any straw of help offered to him.

Needing military aid urgently against the Swedes, Jan Kazimierz sent on October 1, from Nowy Sacz, the Crown Attorney-General, Daniel Zytkiewicz,118 to gain it from Khmelnytskyi. It is uncertain whether this envoy was instructed to deliver the king’s letter personally to the Cossack hetman or whether he was to entrust it to the Crown Grand Hetman’s care, who was to be responsible for ensuring that it was delivered forthwith to the addressee. Moreover, the contents of the king’s letter are unknown. It would be interesting to know the offers of Jan Kazimierz at the time when he was preparing to flee the country.

115 Vidoni to Holy See, Kraków, 11.IX.1655: LNA, VIII, 257.
118 Zytkiewicz to Jan Kazimierz, Stará Ľubovňa, 15.X.1655: Pisma, I, part 1, 135.
By the middle of October Żytkiewicz informed the king that he revealed the nature of his mission to and sought the advice of Stanisław Potocki. The Crown Grand Hetman, claimed the envoy, felt that it was useless to approach Khmelnytskyi, for not only was he "hardened by the recent victory [at Grodok]", but demonstrated his utter contempt for Jan Kazimierz as well, by ordering that "the letters of His Majesty, written earlier to him, be nailed to the gallows". The Crown Quartermaster, Andrzej Potocki, was more co-operative, however, promising to influence the Crown Grand Hetman to write to Khmelnytskyi, notifying him that "if he refused to reach an agreement with us and to pacify the Muscovites (from whom it is impossible to separate him), we shall come to terms with the Swedes and, having surrendered to them, we shall attach [together with them], him as well as the Muscovites." It is uncertain whether a letter containing such sentiments was written by Potocki and sent to Khmelnytskyi, or even whether the king's letter was delivered to him.

It is certain, however, that Żytkiewicz played no part in this matter for, shortly after writing his report to Jan Kazimierz, he followed the king into exile in Silesia. He did not remain there too long. Following the important conference of the king and the senators, at which they decided to issue an order for a general insurrection against the Swedes, he was given instructions and plenipotentiary powers to negotiate an agreement with Khmelnytskyi. Żytkiewicz departed from Opole most likely on or shortly after

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119 Ibid., pp. 142-143.

120 Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, p. 319, assumes that Potocki did write to Khmelnytskyi.

121 Jan Kazimierz to the nobles of the Commonwealth, Opole, 20.XI.1655: Plebański, op. cit., 306-312, doc. no. 3.
November 20. Apparently not sharing the optimism of the king and the senators and fearing the vengeance of the former Crown Vice Chancellor Hieronim Radziejowski, who was on the side of Karl X Gustav, Zytkiewicz decided to look after his own safety. Thus, rather than journeying eastward to Khmelnytskyi, he proceeded northward to the camp of the Swedish king. Having blank papers with the signatures of Jan Kazimierz, (most diplomats were given such papers and used them for emergency cases) he proved to be valuable to his new master. His first act of importance was to trick the burgesses of Toruń to capitulate to the Swedes early in December.

The deflection of Zytkiewicz did not seriously undermine the aims of Jan Kazimierz, for his earlier plan was being put into effect by another envoy. Since this envoy was despatched from Silesia, he must have de-

122 Jan Kazimierz arrived in Opole late at night on November 13. During the following days an important conference was held, which culminated with the king's manifesto to the gentry on the 20th. Plans were made to secure military aid from Ferdinand III and letters were written to influential persons (J. Weyher, Jan Zamoyski and P. Potocki) who remained loyal to the king. Plans were also made for the king's return to the Commonwealth. See Czapliński, "Emigracja", pp. 587-595.

The main mission of Zytkiewicz was to secure military aid from Khmelnytskyi against the Swedes. Unfortunately, nothing is known with regard to the content of his instructions. If Zytkiewicz left Opole on or shortly after November 20, he had plenty of time to catch up with Karl X Gustav who marched northward. See Wimmer, op. cit., pp. 152-153 and Herbst, op. cit., 64-66.


124 Grądzki, op. cit., p. 238.
parted on or shortly after October 17, from Głogówek. Once again the king chose a man well-known to Khmelnytskyi: the Dapifer of Ciechanów, Jan Franciszek Lubowicki (Lubowidzki). He seems to have beenentrusted

Jan Kazimierz departed from Nowy Sącz to Czorsztyn at the beginning of October. From there he proceeded to Żywiec. Leaving it on October 5 (Nowak, op. cit., p. 216), he crossed the border over to Silesia, reaching Żony on the 15th and arriving in Głogówek on the 17th. See Czapliński, "Emigracja", p. 579. Here, for the first time in two and a half weeks, he was safe. Here, as well, he had more time to devote to the problem of choosing a suitable envoy and preparing instructions for him. If the envoy departed from Głogówek on or shortly after the 17th, he was given enough time — some ten days — to reach Lviv.

Grądzki refers to him as "Stanislaus Luborvitzki [also as Luborwicki], Dapifero Ciehanoviensi". Op. cit., pp. 38,238. Writing his Historia Belli Cosacco-Polonici some time after meeting Lubowicki in 1655, Grądzki confused him with some other person, for at this time the office of the Dapifer of Ciechanów was filled not by Stanisław, but by Jan Franciszek Lubowicki. The following documents may be used to establish his true identity.

The manifesto published in Warsaw during the interregnum, on 9.VI.1648, bears the following signature: "Ian Franciscek na Lubowicach Lubowicki, Stolnik Ciehanowski". (Ossol., Ms. 189/II, p. 98 — printed copy). The same individual was appointed a member of a commission, which was to negotiate with Khmelnytskyi in 1656. The instructions are addressed, among others, to "Iego Mci Panu Ianowi Franciszkowi Lubowickiemu, Stolnikowi Ciechanowskiemu, secret. I.K.M." (Instructions, 26.I.1656: Sbornik YuZR, I, 26). At the Diet of 1658 he was appointed a committee member, from the Chamber of Deputies, to draw up instructions for Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski, who were to negotiate with Vyhovskyi. (Volumina Legum, IV, 529). He had a similar task at the Diet of 1659. This time, having gained the Castellany of Chelm, he was a Senate member. (Ibid., p. 606). The Diet Accounts, dated 30.V.1659, reveal that he was "sent to Khmelnytskyi" and was granted a sum of 4,000 zł. for expenses — i.e., in 1655 and 1656. (Ossol., Ms. 9532/II, fo. 64). In the Diet Accounts he is listed as Franciszek Lubowicki. His first name, Jan, must have been omitted as a result of clerical error.

The account of Grądzki was accepted without reservations even by such historians of high repute as Kubala and Hrushevskyi. The former does not only write about "Stanisław" Lubowicki, but also, for some inexplicable reason, about the "Cześnik" (Cup Bearer) rather than the Dapifer of Ciechanów. This is quite strange, because the manifesto of 9.VI.1648 was cited by him. (Ossoliński, pp. 252, 446 n. 27; and Wojna moskiewska, p. 315). Hrushevskyi, (op. cit., IX, part 2, 1132) who was noted for painstaking detail, also accepted the version of Grądzki. Again this is rather curious, because the instructions of 26.I.1656 were known to him.
with a double mission: to re-establish contacts with and to secure military aid from either Khmelnytskyi or Mehmed Giray. Lubowicki and his companion, Samuel Grądzki, appeared in the Cossack camp on October 28, still while Lviv was being besieged by the Cossack-Russian forces.

Khmelnytskyi welcomed his old friend and invited him to his own quarters. Here, the Cossack hetman examined Lubowicki's letter of credence, read the letter of Jan Kazimierz and listened to the pleas of the envoy on behalf of the king. Khmelnytskyi replied by reciting a litany of broken promises to and wrongs suffered by the Cossacks since 1648, and made it plain to Lubowicki that, under the circumstances, neither any agreement nor military aid against the Swedes was possible.


In this way, through the oversight of historians, "Stanisław" Lubowicki managed to live on the pages of history books for a considerable length of time.

127 His mission is described — although this description has to be taken with a grain of salt — by Grądzki, op. cit., pp. 238–249.

128 "Diary of the Siege of Lviv": Czart., TN, Ms. 148, p. 860.
Lubowicki spared no efforts to induce Khmelnytskyi to change his mind. He defended the king, arguing that he could hardly be held responsible for any broken promises or the actions of troops. The nobles, the ones that tied his hands anytime he wanted to do anything for the Cossacks, were responsible and they should be blamed. The king, he continued, no longer regarded those persons to be nobles who were merely content to rest on the laurels of their illustrious ancestors, but only those who were willing to shed their blood in defence of their monarch and their fatherland. Since precisely on this foundation rested the claim of the gentry to their privileged status within the social strata of the Commonwealth, the envoy, no doubt, tried to convey to Khmelnytskyi that the king was in favour of extending the "golden liberties", prerogatives and rights of the nobles to the Cossack "knights", if they supported his cause against the Swedes during this critical period of time.

At this point Khmelnytskyi became a spectator of a most curious scene: a quarrel between Grądzki and Lubowicki. Grądzki considered Lubowicki's praise of Jan Kazimierz unjustifiable and the condemnation of the gentry and the state derogatory. No doubt, as a Socinian, Grądzki had no special affection for the "papist" king, whom he regarded as a henchman of the Jesuits; as a noble, he felt that Lubowicki's remarks dishonoured him personally, the gentry generally and the Commonwealth as a whole. Thus, unable to restrain his temper, Grądzki expressed his objections to Lubowicki's remarks in no uncertain terms.

Lubowicki was shocked by Grądzki's outburst. Regarding it as a deliberate attempt to sabotage his mission, he also lost his temper and exclaimed that Grądzki was a typical example of those boorish and pompous nobles, whose only joy was to frustrate the plans of the king, time after time, at the
sessions of the Diet. Lubowicki then revealed to Khmelnytskyi that Grądzki was not assigned by the king to participate in this mission; on the contrary, he met Grądzki near Przeworsk and asked him to come along. Since he had no diplomatic status, argued Lubowicki, he should be arrested. Khmelnytskyi, having little choice in the matter, complied with the envoy's request.

Grądzki's arrest, however, soon proved to be a matter of inconvenience for all concerned. Khmelnytskyi did not wish to gain a reputation of an individual who broke one of the most important rules relating to diplomatic service: the immunity of diplomatic representatives. Moreover, the hetman did not wish the Russians to know that he was entertaining an envoy from the Polish king for, once they learned about the envoy's arrival, there would be persistent inquiries from Vasilii Buturlin and later on an official investigation by some tsarist appointee. As far as Grądzki was concerned, he had no desire to remain in detention in order to ponder over his uncertain future. Finally, when his temper cooled off, Lubowicki must have remembered that Grądzki was a dangerous man, for the incarcerated "colleague" knew too much about his mission. Thus, Grądzki was released and negotiations were resumed.

Khmelnytskyi's reply to Lubowicki's entreaties was made in the form of a fable involving a serf, his son and a snake. After explaining the significance of it to the envoy, the Cossack hetman came to the point: the price for military aid to support the collapsing Commonwealth was the conclusion of a treaty, which was to be ratified by the Diet, and in which it was clearly stipulated that all of the Ruthenian territories were to pass under the exclusive control of the Cossacks. He was pessimistic, however, that such an agreement could be signed, for the nobles, on the one hand, would never accept such an arrangement; the Cossacks, on the other, would
be satisfied with nothing less.

Lubowicki did his best to change Khmelnytskyi's mind regarding his uncompromising stand during his two week stay in the Cossack camp, under the battlements of Lviv. He even produced a letter and a present to Khmelnytskyi's wife from Queen Ludwika Maria. By his persistant arguments, the envoy eventually did manage to make some gains. Khmelnytskyi, while refusing to break with Sweden and Russia, expressed his willingness to cede to Jan Kazimierz the Palatinates of Lublin, Belz, Volynia and Ruthenia. Once the king returned from Silesia, he could use these palatinates as his base and thus he would be in a position to negotiate better peace terms with Karl X Gustav and Alexei Mikhailovich.\(^{129}\)

One wonders why the Cossack hetman swayed from his hard-line policy and exhibited such generosity towards Jan Kazimierz, especially at a time when his position was so insecure? Neither the persuasiveness of Lubowicki nor Khmelnytskyi's compassion for the king's plight are the satisfactory answers. A more reasonable answer for the motives of Khmelnytskyi may be found by examining the chaotic state of affairs within the Commonwealth. The Cossack hetman, no doubt, must have become convinced that the Commonwealth was destined to fall prey to the armies of the Russian tsar and the Swedish king. The dismemberment of that huge state between the victors would result in the emergence of two new super powers in East-Central Europe. As far as Khmelnytskyi was concerned, such a radical change of the balance of power was not in the best interests of the integrity of Cossack Ukraine. Her integrity would be safeguarded much more, if at least a part of the

Commonwealth passed under the rule of the Polish king, with whom peace terms could be arranged without any great difficulty. In this way Ukraine would have three "protectors". Perhaps this is the reason why Khmelnytskyi invited Jan Kazimierz to return from Silesia and declared that he would not contest the king for the possession of the four palatinates, even though they comprised, to a large extent, Ruthenian ethnic territories.\(^{130}\)

On November 10 the siege of Lviv was lifted. As the Cossack and Russian units began to depart, Khmelnytskyi notified Krzysztof Grodzicki, commandant of the Lviv garrison, that he would send Lubowicki back, presumably with a definite reply to the king's request, after completing a two-day march to the east of the city.\(^{131}\) Due to the rather sudden appearance of the Tatars, however, it seems that Lubowicki was compelled to remain in his company a while longer. The Tatars placed themselves solidly behind the exiled Polish king.

Why did the Tatars support the cause of Jan Kazimierz when an alliance with Karl X Gustav was much more practical? After all, they were primarily interested in creating a strong bloc against Russia and Ukraine. Who at this time was more suitable for such a task: the exiled Polish king, abandoned by most of his subjects; or the victorious Swedish monarch, who had at his disposal an excellent fighting force? The answer is obvious: the latter. However, the choice was hardly so simple for the Tatars. They chose to support the former king because they were afraid that once the Swedes managed to conquer the Commonwealth, they would become much dangerous enemies than the Poles. The Tatars must have considered, as well, the

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\(^{130}\) See also the interesting analysis of Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1136.

\(^{131}\) Grodzicki to Jan Kazimierz, Lviv, 18.XI.1655: Czart., Ms. 385, fo. 113v.
possibility of Khmelnytskyi seeking to place himself under the protection of the Swedish king. If such occurred, Khmelnytskyi would undoubtedly take advantage of the Swedish military superiority and create great havoc in Crimea. Another explanation for the Tatar stand may be, that in autumn of 1655 they did not realize how tragic the situation of the Polish king really was. In any case, Swedish victories in the Commonwealth threatened to upset the balance of power in Eastern Europe, which was very convenient for the Tatars.\footnote{Bohdan Baranowski, "Tatarszczyna wobec wojny polsko-szwedzkiej w latach 1655-1660", Polska 1655-1660, I, 470-471.}

Fearing the extension of Cossack-Russian power into the Palatinates of Podolia and Ruthenia and the possibility of Cossack-Swedish co-operation -- either one threatened to harm the interests of Crimea -- Mehmet Giray IV ordered the Horde to march northward and took charge of the military operations personally.\footnote{Regarding this campaign see Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1136-1142.} Within a short time the Tatars and the accompanying Crown units intercepted the main Cossack-Russian army near Ozirna and succeeded in surrounding it. Having achieved this, the Khan then used well-tested tactics: harassment and negotiations. Eventually, on November 22 or 23,\footnote{According to one participant, it was reached on the 22nd: Anonymous diary. Arkhiv YuZR, part 3, VI, 98. According to another, it was the 23rd: Jaskólski to Grodzicki, Bolshovitsia, 29.XI.1655: PAN, Kr., Ms. 367, fo. 78.} a settlement was reached between the Tatar khan and the Cossack hetman. This settlement was based on an old formula: each one will be the
friend of the other's friends and the enemy of his enemies.  

The khan, after coming to terms with Khmelnytskyi, ordered the Horde to encamp in the vicinity of Halych. From here he despatched messengers to Jan Kazimierz and various magnates with news regarding the recent developments. He informed the king that Khmelnytskyi had sued for peace. Consenting to the pleas of the Cossack hetman, the khan concluded an agreement with him, under the following conditions: "that he becomes ... the vassal of Your Majesty and acknowledges You as his King and Sovereign, and is prepared to destroy the enemies of Your Majesty, Our Brother, and Ours as well."  

The Crown Grand Marshal, Jerzy Lubomirski, and the Crown Court Marshal, Łukasz Opaliński, were congratulated by the khan for remaining steadfastly loyal to Jan Kazimierz. He informed the latter that Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks recognized Jan Kazimierz as their sovereign and "swore to Us an oath of fealty to the King, Our Brother, whom they called their master and lord; [moreover], they are ready to take up arms against Our and your enemies".  

The khan also informed Stanisław Potocki that "Khmelnytskyi, ... begging

\[135\] This is established, after careful analysis, by Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1143-1149. Obviously, the treaties found in Czart., TN, Ms. 148, p. 847; Czart., Ms. 385, fo. 124; and Rudawski, op. cit., II, 36-37, were fabricated for propaganda purposes. I am inclined to believe Jaskólski, however, that the khan secured a commitment from Khmelnytskyi to support Jan Kazimierz. Jaskólski to Grodzicki, Bolshovtsia, 29.XI.1655: PAN, Kr., Ms. 367, fo. 78.  

\[136\] Mehmed Giray IV to Jan Kazimierz, Halych, 27.XI.1655: Lettres, pp. 41-42.  

\[137\] Mehmed Giray IV to Opaliński, Halych, 27.XI.1655: Ibid., pp. 42-43; and Mehmed Giray IV to Lubomirski, Halych, 27.XI.1655: Arkhiv YuZR, part 3, VI, 102.
Our mercy after a few days of battle, humbled himself before Us and recognized the Most Illustrious King, Our Brother, as his lord, by taking an oath that he will remain His subject as [he was] formerly. The khan also accused the Crown Grand Hetman of treason and emphasized that if the troops under his command would not return to serve their own king, "we and the Cossacks shall turn our armies and swords against their perfidious and perverse heads".138

During this time a great many of the contemporaries regarded the promise of Tatar aid as the last chance for the survival of the Commonwealth. With the passage of time they came to the conclusion that it marked a turning point for the better, in the aftermath of a series of catastrophic misfortunes. Their attitudes and beliefs regarding the Tatar involvement played an extremely significant role in the "national awakening" -- the terminology used frequently in the Polish historiography -- during the closing weeks of 1655. That the contemporaries were motivated by the khan's declarations to take up arms against the Swedes, one needs only to examine individual letters139 and proclamations,140 pledges of the gentry,141 "confederations" of soldiers and nobles,142 or resolutions of the Diet.143

Jan Kazimierz and his supporters, who had to seek shelter in Silesia,

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138 Mehmed Giray IV to Potocki, Halych, 27.XI.1655: Lettres, pp. 43-44.
140 Wielopolski to Nobles of Kraków, Biecz, 19.XII.1655: ASKr., II, 557.
142 Statement of the Confederation, Tyszowice, 29.XII.1655: Księga pamiętnicza, p. 786.
143 Volumina Legum, IV, 613.
were overjoyed upon learning that not only the Tatars could be counted upon to provide troops against the Swedes, but the Cossacks as well. The joy of the king and his entourage is reflected in various letters and reports. "The Cossacks", wrote Vidoni, "[those] most obstinate and rebellious enemies of the Crown and the Commonwealth, ... will recognize [the king] and will acknowledge [him] proper obedience. The whole world is astounded that the Tatars took up upon themselves the defence of the Catholic King and Kingdom, while rulers professing the same holy faith, remained only as spectators of our ruin". 144

Similar statements were made by others. "The Cossacks ... joined [forces] with the Tatars and all together declared themselves on our side", wrote the secretary of Queen Ludwika Maria, Pierre des Noyers, adding that, on the whole, the military situation will improve, due to the involvement of the "Mahommetans". 145 The primate made the following announcement to the gentry: "The most merciful God, ... having punished us for our sins, desires at last to demonstrate graciously His mercy by means of the Tatars and the Cossacks, whom He at first called for our ruin, while at present He decided to save us [by means of their assistance] ... The Tatar Khan, having entered into our country with a great army, compelled Khmelnytskyi to swear an oath of allegiance to the Illustrious Jan Kazimierz ... and after uniting his armies with him, desires to march and fight against all of the enemies of His Majesty". 146

144 Vidoni to Holy See, Głogów, 13.XII.1655: LNA, VIII, 272.
From the letters cited above, it is obvious that Jan Kazimierz and his advisers must have interpreted the information gained from the khan -- before receiving any news to the contrary from Lubowicki or Khmelnytskyi -- in the following way: Khmelnytskyi suffered a major defeat; he swore an oath of allegiance to the king; and he committed himself to support the king militarily. Of course, not all of the senators wanted to believe in such a "miracle"; thus, both pessimistic and optimistic opinions were heard in the royal entourage.

Such a conflict of opinions is reflected in the reports of Vidoni. "Even though hope is entertained [by some persons] that Khmelnytskyi may [again] become a subject of His Majesty", writes the nuncio, "nevertheless, anyone who has any idea about his [capability for] tricks, is afraid that the promises he made [to the khan and the king] will be kept [by him] only to the moment of his escape from the Tatar hands; and, having [eventually] eluded the danger, he will wage war [on us] again".  

The report of Vidoni ends, however, on an optimistic note: "If an envoy is sent to him [i.e., Khmelnytskyi], in order that he may reveal -- if this is possible -- his thoughts [on this matter], and even if he is to ask for aid, then from Khmelnytskyi's reply it will be possible to learn what can be expected from him. In any case, I believe that some kind of an arrangement will be reached with him".

It is not unreasonable to expect that there was more optimism than

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148 Ibid.
pessimism among those close to the king, as preparations were made to return to the Commonwealth at the close of 1655. He was invited to return both by the loyal senators, who urged him to join the Crown Army and the Tatar allies,\textsuperscript{149} as well as many other individuals, who "promised to perform miracles" upon his return.\textsuperscript{150} Jan Kazimierz imagined, no doubt, that once new contacts were established with Bohdan Khmelnitskyi, he would reap great benefits from them.

III

At the close of April 1656 Jan Kazimierz instructed Jan Szumowski, his envoy in Crimea,\textsuperscript{151} to reveal to Mehmed Giray IV the following pattern of diplomatic contacts, since January 1656, between himself and Bohdan Khmelnitskyi:

1. The king was led to believe, on the basis of the information communicated to him by the khan,\textsuperscript{152} that the Ozirna agreement contained, among others, the following provisions: that Khmelnitskyi swear an oath of fealty

\begin{footnotes}
\item[149] Lubomirski to Ludwika Maria, Stará Ľubovňa, 12.XII.1655: Lettres, p. 45.
\item[150] Des Noyers to Boulliau, Głogów, 19.XII.1655: Ibid., p. 34.
\item[151] He arrived in Bakhchysarai on February 12, 1656. See Baranowski, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 471.
\item[152] The king referred not only to the letter of the khan dated on 27.XI.1655 (see part II, n. 57), but also to the recent correspondence received by him from Crimea. See Mehmed Giray IV and Sefer Ghazi Aga to Jan Kazimierz, Bakhchysarai, 27.II. [1656]: Czart. Ms. 402, pp. 37, 73. N.B. The letters of the khan and his vizier are mistakenly dated -- 27.II.1655.
\end{footnotes}
to the king and the Commonwealth; and that he agree to cut off all ties with Russia.

2. Acting on the information received from the khan, the king sent letters to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Ivan Vyhovskyi and to all Cossack colonels, in which he commended them for their renewal of friendship with the khan and for their act of submission to him. Expressing joy at their decision to become his faithful subjects, the king assured them that, by this act, they merited his clemency.

3. In order to demonstrate his good will to the Cossacks, the king appointed a commission comprising four members: the Palatine of Chernihiv, Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz; the Dapifer of Ciechanów, Jan Franciszek Lubowicki; the Seneschal of Vinnytsia, Mikołaj Zańwilichowski; and the Palatine of Ruthenia and the Crown Field Hetman, Stanisław Lanckoroński. They received plenipotentiary powers to conclude an agreement that would satisfy not only Khmelnytskyi or his officers, but also the rank and file of the Cossack Army. The first three commissioners proceeded to Chyhyryn; the fourth one, remained behind. He was, however, prepared to join his colleagues as soon as he was notified that negotiations were to begin.

4. Tyszkiewicz, Lubowicki and Zańwilichowski, upon meeting Khmelnytskyi, attempted to concentrate on the following three aims: to conclude, in the shortest time possible, an agreement with the Cossack hetman; to secure his consent for the immediate despatch of 10,000 Cossacks to the king against the Swedes; and to secure a commitment from him for a joint Cossack–Tatar campaign in the spring against either Sweden or Russia.

5. Khmelnytskyi maintained, however, that due to various difficulties, he was unable to commit himself or his officers and men to any such under-
takings at this time. First of all, he claimed that he was unable to supply military aid to the king because, due to the bad season of the year and the devastation of the land by war, there would be insufficient supplies of forage for the horses and provisions for the troops. Then, maintaining that even if he wanted to risk such an undertaking, he was not in a position to do so before a formal agreement was concluded between the two parties. Finally, he pointed out that, in order to conclude an agreement, he needed the advice and the consent of all his colonels. Since they were stationed with their regiments in various parts of the country, he was unable to call them in to Chyhyryn at short notice, especially when large tracts of land were inundated by floods due to the spring thaw. Khmelnytskyi assured the commissioners, however, that he would assemble them by Easter.

6. Szumowski was to convey the king's apprehension regarding the motives of Khmelnytskyi. The king found it strange that the Cossack hetman dismissed the commissioners and postponed negotiations to some time in the future. Could he have not detained the commissioners, completed the preliminaries with them, held his conference with the Cossack officers and then, ironing out various difficulties, concluded an agreement? It was to the Cossack hetman's credit, however, that he was prepared to come to terms with the king. 153

Another source reveals the course of diplomatic contacts in the following month. Some time prior to the close of April, Lubowicki returned to Jan Kazimierz with the following answer from Khmelnytskyi: he was prepared to do anything for the king, if he and the Diet consented to grant to the

Ruthenians liberties similar to those granted to the Dutch by the King of Spain some ten years hence. This unusual declaration prompted the king to send Lanckcroński to Chyhyryn in May. The new envoy was informed by Khmelnytskyi that he was not interested in concluding any agreement unless the Poles first granted freedom to all Ruthenians, acknowledged and treated them as equals and gave up all claims to the territories inhabited by them. If these basic demands were not met, declared the Cossack hetman, no agreement was possible, for neither peace nor Poles could exist within the Ruthenian ethnographic territories. Unable to sway Khmelnytskyi, Lanckorroński departed from Chyhyryn without fulfilling his mission. 154

At quick glance, the first account seems concise, clear and convincing. A close scrutiny of it, however, will reveal that its authors, in order to gain advantage, deliberately conveyed misleading information by mixing facts, half-truths and lies with faulty chronology. 155 They must be given credit, nevertheless, for designing a series of cleverly-constructed interlocking arguments, which undoubtedly aided Szumowski in making a logical and forceful presentation at the court in Bakhchysarai and spurred Mehmed Giray IV into action. The mission of the envoy was twofold: to secure the Tatar ruler's binding commitment that he would induce the procrastinating Cossack hetman to come to terms with Jan Kazimierz — of course, the khan was to insure that Khmelnytskyi did "not require unjust things of His Majesty and the Commonwealth"; and to supply the king with Cossack troops, who were to be employed, alongside the Horde, against the Russians and the Swedes. 156

155 See the critical remarks of Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1193-1194.
156 Instructions to Szumowski, Lviv, 26.IV.1656: Zherela, XII, part 5, 376-380.
As far as the account of Rudawski is concerned, its substance was based on either some sort of rumor or, quite possibly, on the colouring of the author himself.\textsuperscript{157} For these reasons, in order to reconstruct diplomatic contacts between the two parties from November 1655 on, it is necessary to rely on better primary sources.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Cossack-Tatar agreement near Ozirna, Ivan Vykovskyi handed over letters addressed to Jan Kazimierz to Jan Franciszek Lubowicki and, prior to his departure from the Cossack camp, gave him a final briefing. The letters and the briefing contained important information regarding "all matters [of concern] to His Majesty".\textsuperscript{158}

The letters of Khmelnytskyi and Vykovskyi -- which, unfortunately, have perished, -- must have contained some general statement of their intention to support the cause of the king, providing that he acquiesced to the terms of the recent agreement with the khan. The briefing, however, was much more explicit, for it outlined the following conditions and suggestions:

1. Khmelnytskyi was prepared to acknowledge Jan Kazimierz as his sovereign and to negotiate with the commissioners of the Commonwealth either in Kamianets or Lviv. The king was to play the role of an intermediary between the two parties; therefore, it was imperative for him to the Commonwealth from Silesia as quickly as possible.

2. The Cossack hetman was not prepared to supply troops to the aid of the Crown Army against the Swedes, until such time as all matters relating to his "personal safety" were settled to his satisfaction personally with the king.

\textsuperscript{157}See the critical remarks of Hrushevskyi, \textit{op. cit.}, IX, part 2, 1199-1200.

\textsuperscript{158}Vykovskyi to Grodzicki, Chyhyry, l./[11].II.1656: Czart., Ms. 394, p. 99.
3. The envoy, who was to proceed to Bakhchysarai to arrange for Tatar military aid, should be instructed to appear in Chyhyryn first, in order to consult the Cossack hetman about this matter. Khmelnytskyi, on his part, expressed willingness to "commit himself to summon the Horde [to the aid of the king], in accordance to the agreement sworn [with the khan]".

4. Jan Kazimierz was requested to write letters, keeping in mind that their contents were to reflect "the unfortunate times", to Khmelnytskyi, the general staff, the colonels and the Cossack rank-and-file.

5. Khmelnytskyi also requested that a suitably-composed message, which was to be utilized as a gesture of esteem and an expression of good-will for Alexei Mikhailovich, be dispatched to Moscow to camouflage, no doubt, at least the initial steps of the rapprochement.

6. He warned Jan Kazimierz about the machinations of Hieronim Radziejowski and György Rákóczi II. He advised the king that the former, sent on a mission to him by the King of Sweden, be captured and arrested.

7. Finally, he informed the king that there were still pro-Swedish sympathizers in Lviv. This was another warning to him to take immediate steps in order to insure that the city did not fall into the hands of the Swedes.\footnote{Gradzki, op. cit., p. 255.}

Due to Lubowicki's illness and his convalescence in Lviv,\footnote{"Contents of the Instruction", [n.p., n.d.], Ossol., Ms. 1905/II, fos. 61r-62r. This document was prepared after the arrival of Lubowicki in Łańcut. See the comments of Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, n. 99, pp. 441-442 and those of Hrushevskiy, op. cit., IX, part 2, n. 4, 1170.} a delay occurred in communicating the information outlined above to Jan Kazimierz. Becoming impatient with Lubowicki's silence and thirsting news, the king
decided, approximately in the second week of November, to despatch to
Khmelnytskyi two new envoys: the Castellan of Sandomierz, Stanisław Witow-
ski, and the Crown Sword-bearer, Michał Zebrzydowski. Since shortly
after making this selection he received news from the khan and other per-
sons regarding the developments at Ozirna, he decided against sending
these high-ranking individuals to Ukraine, for there was no longer a press­
ing need for them to go there.

Shortly before his departure from Głogów on December 18, the king
despatched, by a courier, letters to Khmelnytskyi, Vyhashy to and to Cossack
colonels. These letters contained the king's commendations for their ac­
tions, expressions of his willingness to resolve all differences by means
of negotiations and his desire to conclude an agreement as quickly as
possible. These letters were sent to Lviv. The courier must have been
instructed to deliver them to Krzysztof Grodzicki; he, in turn, was respon­sible for ensuring that they reached the addressees. To accomplish this
task, Grodzicki selected Teodosii Tomkovych, a Lviv merchant trusted by
Khmelnytskyi, and sent him to Chyhyryn.

161 Olszewski to B. Radziwiłł, [Warsaw, ca., 15.XI.1655]: AGAD, AR, V, Ms. 10816, pp. 227-228.
162 Des Noyers to Orsini, Głogów, 5.XII.1655: Wanda Wyhowska de
Andreis ed., Repertorium rerum Polonicarum ex Archivo Orsini in Archivo
Capitolino Romae: Vol. VII, part 2 of Elementa ad Fontium Editiones [Here­
163 Des Noyers to Boulliau, Głogów, 19XII.1655: Lettres, p. 37.
164 Instructions to Szumowski, Lviv, 26.IV.1656: Zherela, XII, part 5, 375.
165 Vyhashy to Grodzicki, Chyhyryn, 1/[11].II.1656: Czart., Ms. 394, p. 100.
While the royal courier was on his way to Lviv, Jan Kazimierz and his retinue departed from Głogów. Since the Palatinate of Kraków was occupied by the Swedes, the king chose to return to the Commonwealth by means of a long and winding route through a mountainous terrain. Heading south, the king was led through Racibórz, Fryštát, Cieszyn, Jablunkov and Jablonka Pass to the Váh River valley; then, eastward along it; and finally, northward along that of the Poprad River. The retinue halted and spent the Christmas Day in Vel'ka Ves. Here Jan Kazimierz must have received some sort of important news with regard to the Cossacks, — perhaps the letters of Khmelnytskyi and Vyshovskyi mentioned above and possibly even a written report of Lubowicki finally had reached him — for, according to sources at the court of Ludwika Maria in Silesia, "il avait envoyé ses ordres ... à Chmielnicki".\(^{166}\) It is difficult to believe, however, that the king, taking into account the circumstances, would send "orders" to Chyhyryn. It seems more likely that he acquiesced to the advice and terms of the Cossack hetman, informed him that he was returning and, at the same time, no doubt, took the opportunity to ask him for military aid against the Swedes.

From Vel'ka Ves the royal party continued to travel, passing Kežmarok and reaching Podolinec at the close of 1655. Here Jan Kazimierz met and conferred with the Crown Grand Marshal Jerzy Lubomirski and several senators. These individuals were in a position to supply to the king first-hand information about the state of affairs within the realm. From Podolinec the enlarged retinue proceeded to Stará Lubovňa and soon crossed the boundary into the Commonwealth. On January 3 or 4, 1656, Jan Kazimierz entered

\(^{166}\)Des Noyers to Boulliau, Głogów, 3.I.1656: Lettres, p. 49.
Within a few days after his arrival, the king summoned all available senators to a conference.

The main problem confronting the king and the senators was how to save the Commonwealth from total ruin. After lengthy deliberations over ways and means how to solve such a problem, this body decided, on January 11, to adopt eight measures. Three of these measures, however, were contradictory: the winning-over of the Cossacks or, in other words, the recovery of Ukraine; the conclusion of peace with Russia; and the call for and the use of military aid from Crimea.

Final plans regarding diplomacy, peace and war were made at the Łańcut conference, which was held in the second half of January. Even though all of the participants of this conference must have fully realized that the policies formulated in Krosno were contradictory, they nevertheless, once again, insisted in pursuing precisely the same course of action. Within a short time various envoys sped to the neighbouring states in order to implement these policies.

During this time Jan Kazimierz redoubled his efforts to lure Khmelnytskyi to his side. He was confident that, it was only a matter of time, before he would prevail over the Cossack hetman. The letters of the king reveal a great deal of optimism: he informed his followers that "Khmelnytskyi

167 With regard to the king's itinerary see Kersten, Crarniecki, pp. 248-254.

168 Rudawski, op. cit., II, 77-78.

already swore an oath of his allegiance to Us" and that the Cossack rank-and-file acquiesced to the submission;\(^{170}\) that considerable number of Cossack troops will be sent to him,\(^{171}\) even though this may require some pressure from the Tatars;\(^{172}\) and that any day now he expected envoys from Chyhyryn.\(^{173}\)

With the appearance of Lubowicki in Łańcut, sometime in the second half of January, the king was reassured that the Cossack leader would indeed comply with all his wishes. Lubowicki "racontait merveille de Chmielnicki, qui jurait d'être toute sa vie fidèle au roi, et qu'il mourrait, ou le remettrait glorieusement sur son trône". Moreover, he apparently claimed that "Chmielnicki doit venir au plus tôt trouver le roi avec 20,000 Kozaks".\(^{174}\)

The revelations of Lubowicki during the Łańcut conference exercised a profound influence on the senators. The willingness of Khmelnytskyi to play a vital role in the war effort softened the hearts of even the intransigents. For this reason, most individuals, in Łańcut and elsewhere, were prepared to make significant concessions and sacrifices to accommodate the Cossacks.

Their attitudes may be illustrated by the proposals drawn up by the Bishop of Kraków. This prelate suggested that Khmelnytskyi, his officers

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\(^{170}\) Jan Kazimierz to Weyher, Krosno, 4.I.1656: Czart., TN, Ms. 149, p. 15.


\(^{172}\) Jan Kazimierz to A. Leszczyński, Krosno, 8.I.1656: Ojczyste spominki, II, 88.

\(^{173}\) Jan Kazimierz to Weyher, Krosno, 10.I.1656: Czart., TN, Ms. 149, p. 32.

and the Zaporozhian Army rank-and-file be invited to participate in the anti-Swedish "confederation" comprising the Crown Army and the gentry. Moreover, for the part the Cossacks were expected to play during the war against the Swedes, they were to be rewarded by the conferment upon them of all honours and prerogatives hitherto enjoyed only by the nobles. Even the primate, who advised Jan Kazimierz to exercise extreme caution in dealing with Khmelnytskyi, urged the king to reward Khmelnytskyi with the Palatinacy of Zaporozhe and a seat in the Senate, as well as to ignore "the scruples [expressed by some persons] with regard to granting him [such] a title".

The declaration of loyalty by Khmelnytskyi, on the one hand, and the conciliatory spirit of the magnates, on the other, enabled the king to appoint new commissioners, whose task became the seeking of reconciliation with the Cossacks. The aims they were to pursue and the functions they were to perform were outlined in a hastily-prepared instruction. Its preamble referred to the commissioners and their over-all tactics during the negotiations.

The following four persons were named plenipotentiary commissioners of the "Most Illustrious His Majesty the King" and the "estates of the whole Commonwealth": the Palatine of Ruthenia and the Crown Field Hetman, Stanis-

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175"Project" of Gebicki [ Łańcut, ca., third week of January 1656]: Czart., Ms. 2576, fo. 397.


177A. Leszczyński to Jan Kazimierz, Grodów, 19.II.1656: BN, BOZ, Ms. 1218, fo. 8.

Mikołaj Zaźwilichowski.

The commissioners were instructed to negotiate always as a group, never individually; and to identify themselves as representatives of both the king and the state. It was imperative that they negotiate only with their Cossack counterparts, never with any representative of the tsar, for their ultimate aim was as follows: to cause a rift between Ukraine and Russia. The quarrels between the Cossacks and the Russians would facilitate for the former an alliance with the Tatars — obviously against the latter.

At the initial session the commissioners were to show to their counterparts the printed constitutions of the Diet of 1655. This was to serve them as proof of sincerity of the king and the gentry to secure peace and their desire to reach a negotiated settlement. The commissioners were also to find out, as soon as possible, the demands of the other side for, only by this way, could they adequately prepare themselves for the difficult task ahead of them.

At this point the authors of the instruction directed the commissioners to focus their attention on the following particular items of information:

1. General amnesty was to be extended to all persons, who participated in the conflict since 1648. The provisions of amnesty was also to cover the serfs.

2. The Orthodox Church was to retain all of its rights and privileges throughout the Commonwealth. If the Cossacks stood fast by their demand that all former benefices, monasteries, churches and the like be returned to the Orthodox, the commissioners, after face-saving arguments, were to yield to it. They were, however, to salvage as much as possible for the Uniates in
the near-by lands" — i.e., outside of Ukraine. Under no circumstances were they to involve themselves in any discussions regarding the abolition of the Uniate Church. Moreover, they were to take great pains to insure that the rights of the Catholic Church were properly safeguarded in Ukraine.

3. Should the Cossacks insist that some or all non-Orthodox religious orders be moved out of the Palatinate of Kiev, the commissioners, only after their arguments failed to change the Cossacks' mind, were to acquiesce to it, but only under the following condition: that the benefices vacated by orders were to pass into the hands of the Catholics.

If one had a complete instruction, rather than only its fragment, dated in Łańcut on 26.I.1656, one could compare it to the one dated in Warsaw on 30.VI.1655 and determine precisely the new concessions made to the Cossacks. Unfortunately, this is not possible. There can be no doubt that some sort of concessions had to be made to attract Cossack support. Obviously, however, these did not impress Khmelnytskyi, as was later evidenced. If they had, the negotiations would have resulted in a settlement. This, of course, did not happen.

Due to fragmentary sources, it is difficult to reconstruct properly the diplomatic contacts during this period. One of the earliest reports regarding this matter came from the nuncio. On January 17 he wrote that "il Sig. Palatino di Czernikowa [Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz] vien spedito a i Cosacchi per intender la loro disposizione verso la Maestà del Re e della Republicae per animarli al beneficio commune della patria". Since

Tyszkiewicz signed the document of the țańcut "Confederation", it was not he who was sent to Chyhyryn. Having been authorized by the king to lay the groundwork for negotiations with Khmelnytskyi, — this is clear from Vidoni's report — but unable to undertake the mission himself, due to his involvement in the țańcut conference, he sent another person in his place. It seems that Tysza, who is mentioned in the report of the Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosiv and the letter of Khmelnytskyi, was entrusted to carry out this task. There is no reason to doubt that he carried Potocki's letters as well.

At approximately the same time Grodzicki's messenger, Bajbuza, was despatched from Lviv. Judging from the letter of Vykovskyi, Grodzicki endeavoured to convince the Cossack hetman and the secretary-general to supply military aid to Jan Kazimierz as soon as possible.

Two days after the instruction was prepared for the commissioners, "il Generale Campestre [Stanislaw Lanckoroński] suo compagno vien mandato a trattare col Kmelnisch insieme con altro Senatore, e partiranno quanto prima". In this report Vidoni most likely referred to Holub, who is

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182 Khmelnytskyi to Hetmans and Commissioners, Chyhyryn, 5./[15].II.1656: Kór., Ms. 1558, no. 20.
185 Vidoni to Holy See, Țańcut, 28.I.1656: LNA, VIII, 278.
named in the letters of Vyshovskyi and Khmelnytskyi. As to the un-
named senator, -- there is no other evidence that any senator was appointed
to participate in this mission -- he must have simply accompanied Holub to
Lviv, in order to announce to the city council to make preparations for
the arrival of Jan Kazimierz. One of the reasons for the king's decision
to travel to Lviv was his expectation that he would play the role of a
mediator during the negotiations between the commissioners and Khmelnytskyi.

When the king was on his way to Lviv, he informed the primate that he
had prevailed upon Lanckoroński and Tyszkiewicz to take up the duties of
commissioners. Moreover, once news reached him that 20,000 Cossack troops
were stationed near Sharhorod, prepared to serve him, he sent Lubowicki
with his orders to that corps. Depending on what Khmelnytskyi would do
with the Russians in Ukraine and how willingly he would carry out his orders,
remarked the king, it will soon be obvious whether he may or may not be
trusted.

Finally, most likely before the king's arrival in Lviv, one learns that

186 Vyshovskyi to Grodzicki, Chyhyryn, 1./[11].II.1656: Czart., Ms. 394, p. 100.
187 Khmelnytskyi to Hetmans and Commissioners, Chyhyryn, 5./[15].II.1656:
Kór., Ms. 1558, no. 20. The report of Leshkovskii, -- he stayed in Kiev
until 9/19.II.1656 -- which was submitted by the tsarist officials to Moscow,
undoubtedly refers to Tysza and Holub. See Akty YuZR, III, 518.
188 Notes of Goliński: Ossol., Ms. 189/II, p. 813.
189 Jan Kazimierz to A. Leszczyński, Sambor, 4.II.1656: BN, BOZ, Ms.
1218, fos. 3r−v and 6r.
"Palatinus Czerniechovia [Tyszkieiicz] ad firmannda ... pacta discessit." 190

Thus, from approximately the middle of January to the second week of February, there existed a great deal of diplomatic activity.

By early March Tysza, Holub and Bajbuza delivered Khmelnytskyi's and Vyhovskyi's letters to the addressees and made detailed reports relating their diplomatic missions in Chyhyryn. Various individuals, in the process of disseminating news regarding the activities of these individuals, reveal a curious mixture of fact and fiction in letters to their correspondents.

For example, Des Noyers informed his friend that "Chmielnicki a envoyé son serment par écrit, qu' il doit venir faire à Léopol; il envoie encore 6,000 hommes, en attendant le printemps qu' il viendra avec le reste"; 191 that the Cossack hetman "a envoyé un prêtre grec (could it be Tomkovych?) au roi, auquel il écrit qu' il était prêt à marcher, et qu' il n' attendait que M. Lubowicki qui lui porte les ordres de Sa Majesté;" 192 and finally, that "les lettres de Varsovie du 2 de ce mois nous assurent que le traité d' entre les Polonois et les Kozaks est signé et juré". 193

Vidoni reported to Rome as follows: "Persona tornata da Kmielnischi riferisce la buona disposizione, che ha del suo servito di Sua Maestà e della Republica e c' havesse ordinato a tutta la sua militia, che stasse pronta con armi e monizioni per poter marchiar al primo aviso riceveranno". 194

190 Wielopolski to Rákóczi, Kobylanka, 11.II.1656: MHHD, XXIII, 318.
191 Des Noyers to Boulliau, Głogów, 10.II.1656: Lettres, p. 79.
Five days later he included some very interesting bits of information:

"Per quando s'è discorso", he writes, "il Kmielnischi s'è lasciato intendere, che quando Sua Maestà si portasse a Kamenez [Kamianets] con poco seguito, egli si portarebbe a piedi di Sua Maestà per implorar il perdono et l'aggiustamento della sua militia". After a great deal of consultation regarding this proposal, it was decided to communicate to Khmelnytskyi reasons justifying the king's inability to proceed to Kamianets. Instead, the Cossack hetman was to be urged to negotiate with the commissioners. Obviously, there were still many individuals who did not trust the Cossack hetman.

Much of the above information is highly questionable in the light of the letters of Vyhovskyi and Khmelnytskyi. They reveal that the Cos-

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195 Vidoni to Holy See, Lviv, 25.II.1656: Ibid., He writes as follows: S'è doppo inteso, che si sia risoluto far rappresentar per Commissari spediti al Kmielnisch l'impossibilità, che per hora Sua Maestà possa trasferirsì a Kamenez in riguardo che non sarebbe ben inteso dalla nobilità, che Sua Maestà s'allontanasse tanto, mentre deve accudire più da vicino che sia possibile ai preparamenti per la nova campagna et a non lasciar avvicinar maggiormente il ne mico a questa parte; che però portà conferire con i medesimi Commissarii, e che Sua Maestà gradira che se le presenti tempo opportuno di poterlo vedere.


Niepoiednokroć przed tym, wysyłaliśmy Posłów swych do Jego Krolew: Mći i wszystkiego Senatu, aby iż krew Chrześcijańska nie lała się więcej, a nieprzyjaciele postronni niecieszyli się, tego niemogliśmy otrzymać, co nie z woli Jego Krolewskiej Mći; lecz za radą niektórych gniewem zaiętrzonych Rządów directorow działa się, którzy nieoglądając się na przyszły upadek, a miłości i przyjaźni nie życząc, do tego i Jego Krolewską Mość przywodziły,
sack hetman was not anxious to supply his troops for the king against the Swedes. Moreover, he did his best, by using various excuses, to put off negotiations with the commissioners as long as possible.

Czego Bog sam jest świadkiem i cokolwiek teraz w Rzpltey stało się nie z naszey przyczyny; gdyż ktokolwiek, iasnie w to weyrzy, prawdę miłującą, musi przyznać, że nie my korone Panu z głowy zdągli, ieno Ci o których WMCi MP. sami dobrze raczycie wiedzieć, iż teraz Pan Oyczysty, musi przez radę i nieobacznosc ich exilium pati. Nicodzącywaliszmy się nigdy siłami naszemi, ufając w łasce Jego Krolewskiego Mści i Rzpltey, aż do tych czas spodziewała się że w amnestia wszystkie rzeczy opuściwszy, zobopólnemi rękami nieprzyjaściem opor dawać bedziemy. Ale wiedząc o radach niekt Orchynych Mościowych Panów, a umysle takim ze nieodpuszczać ale racze extirpować bđną Ukrainię, ktora zawsze tarczą Koronie Polskiej była, Musieliszy P. Boga wziąwszy na pomoc o sobie i o posiłki się starać, iakoż iawno to P. Boga i wszystkim Narodom, że lubo P. Bog nam z miłości i przyczynenia swego Bożkiego wszystkie rzeczy woienne w ręce podawat, niechąc jednak do ostatku Oyczynzy zniszczyć zawsze z woyskami powracaliśmy, i teraz upadkiem wszelkiego na Rzpltą żałowiemy. Tę Braterstwo zawzięte z Chanem Je Mścią Krymskim, nie na to się zawarło, abyśmy bez utwierdzenia rzeczy wiecznych posiłki iaikie dawać mieli, tylko dla tego, kto przyiaicielem nam to i Chanu Je Mści, a kto nieprzyiaicielem Chanu JMcści to i nam, jednak wszystkie rzeczy mogą za pomocą Bożą przyjść do skutku swego, tylko żeby jedna miłość i Confidentia w sercach naszych wkorzeniła się, a te dawne zawody z serc naszych uż wyrzucić.

Zrozumielismy z listów W Mosciow Naszych Miłosciowych Panów do nas pisanych, ze WMC MMP: poprzysiężoną Confederatię z sobą, uczynili, jest to rzecz świątobliwa i dobra. Tylko day Boże aby iemiesze i między woyskami naszemi stanela. Lubobysmy szerzej do WWH. MP. pisali; lepiej powierzywszy wszystko Je Mći P. Houbowi I P. Tyszii, ustną relaćią do WMCiów Miłosciw: P. referować zleciliśmy, ktrzym racznie WMC M. P. cokolwiek będą referować od nas zlecone wiąć dąć, a my tym czasem z swą starszyzną i Czernią radę o tym uczynimy, a teraz trudno pod czas zimy WMCiów MMP ubeszczać mamy. U nas gotowość wszelaka tylko pewnych rzeczy patrzmy. Na ten czas powolne usługi nasze pilno zalecamy łasce WMCiów Mił: Państwa.

Z Czehiryna 5

Februarij: 1656.

WMciów Naszych Miłosciwych Panów
Życzliwy Prtż i Sługa

Bohdan Chmielnicki
Hetman Woysk Zaporozkich.
For Potocki, Lanckoroński and Tyszkiewicz, Khmelnytskyi's response must have been a bitter pill to swallow. In the first part of his letter the Cossack hetman played the role of a devil's advocate: he bitterly denounced and indicted unnamed magnates for giving bad advice to Jan Kazimierz, for compelling him to pursue policies which resulted in a series of disasters for the state and for betraying the king during a time of crisis. "We were not the ones", Khmelnytskyi reminded his addressees, "who removed the crown from the head of the Lord [king]."

The same individuals were responsible for the separation of Ukraine from the Commonwealth. Despite his many attempts to bring about a reconciliation, maintained Khmelnytskyi, these "directors of the Commonwealth", were so "exacerbated by anger" against the Cossacks that they frustrated all his attempts, even though they knew that by such actions there was the unnecessary "shedding of Christian blood" and the weakening of the power of the state. Blinded by hate, these men sought "to extirpate poor Ukraine, which always served as a shield for the Polish Crown".

Furthermore, Khmelnytskyi pointed out that his addressees were rather naive if they expected him to send Cossack troops to aid their cause against the Swedes before an agreement was signed and ratified with the Commonwealth. He explained that their interpretation or understanding of the recent Cossack-Tatar agreement, on which basis the request for military aid was made, was a faulty one. The "Brotherhood" with "His Highness the Khan of Crimea" was based on the following formula: the friends of the khan were to be his friends; the enemies of the khan were to be his enemies as well. Moreover, Vyhovskyi added that without the advice and consent of Khmelnytskyi, the khan would not even contemplate to undertake a campaign. Thus, this was an entirely different version than was received by the khan.
The Cossack secretary-general also provided additional reasons regarding this matter. He stated that no one in Chyhyryn was sure what to expect from the king. No reply came to the hetman following the departure of Lubowicki. Would the terms, once they are known, warrant negotiations to take place? Even if an agreement was reached by the plenipotentiaries of both parties, no certainty existed that it would be ratified: on the one hand, there existed great dissension among the nobles; on the other, approval was needed by the Cossack general council. Furthermore, all the difficulties of a winter campaign, in territories already devastated by war, had to be considered. The nobles, argued Vyhovskyi, were hardly in a position to participate in any such campaign. Finally, he pointed out that, at least for the time being, there was no pressing need for Cossack military aid, for the Swedes, according to the arrangement made with the hetman, pledged themselves not to invade the palatinates east of the Vistula River.

Following the exposure of the sin-stained souls of the magnate intransigents and the justification of the stand taken by him with regard to the request for military aid, Khmelnytskyi did not fail to hold out an olive branch to his addressees. Everything was possible, he maintained, once mutual affection and confidence was restored. He commended them on forming a confederation, stating it was a "holy and good deed". He expressed hope that a similar arrangement could be worked out, in the near future, "between our armies". He promised to summon a general council and to seek its approval of the requests of the king and other officials. At the same time he warned them, that due to the winter season all this would take some time to organize and accomplish. Finally, Khmelnytskyi indicated that, if his
demands were met, there would be no great obstacles to the rapprochement between the two sides.

The Cossack hetman applied similar delaying tactics to the Tatar diplomatic pressure. He emphasized that it was his intention to stand by the "Brotherhood" completely. However, due to the failure of the Poles to send him concrete proposals, due to his decision, once he received the terms, to negotiate and to conclude a just agreement, and due to the custom that all major agreements had to be ratified by the Cossack general council, he was in no position to send troops to their aid at this time. 198

It is quite evident, from the letters referred to above, that even though Khmelnytskyi may have taken some pains to demonstrate his "good disposition" towards Jan Kazimierz, he neither intended to dispatch nor did dispatch Cossack troops to the aid of the king. Any information to the contrary must be regarded only as pious wishes.

Early in March, Lubowicki prepared to depart from Chyhyryn. 199 He learned that the Cossack corps, supposedly stationed near Sharhorod, did not exist. With regard to military assistance, Khmelnytskyi gave him the

198 Apart from Khmelnytskyi's letter to the khan referred to above (n. 197) see his letter to the Kalga, Czyhyryn, 22.I./1.II.1656: DKhmel., pp. 469-470 and Szumowski to Koryciński, Bakhchysarai, 27.II.1656: Kubala, Wojna szwecka, p. 478, n. 20.

199 I. Vasylyevych to K. Vasylyevych, Myrhorod, 15./25.III.1656: Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1166. Other information relating to Tyszkiewicz, Lanckoroński and Czarniecki is, obviously, false.
already-known evasive answer. Meanwhile another of the king's messengers, Sokalski,\textsuperscript{200} was already on his way to Khmelnytskyi. As it is evident from Vidoni's letter of January 25, Jan Kazimierz declined to accept Khmelnytskyi's offer to meet him in Kamianets. He also appealed for "several thousand" picked Cossack troops, which were to be used against the Swedes. Finally, he must have urged the Cossack hetman to set the date for negotiations, in Kamianets or in another place to his liking.

At approximately the same time that Sokalski reached the Cossack capital, Jan Piasoczyński\textsuperscript{201} appeared there as well. Perhaps Piasoczyński was sent to Khmelnytskyi by Tyszkiewicz, who earlier was authorized to establish diplomatic contacts with the Cossack hetman.

Khmelnytskyi's reply to the king contained his old excuses: he was unable to commit his men to any military undertaking without the formal authorization of the Cossack general council. However, due to his desire to fulfill the wishes of the king, he issued orders summoning the regimental commanders to a conference. He implied that once this formality was over, the king would have his troops. Finally, he advised the king to be patient and assured him that he had nothing to fear from the Swedes, since they were in no position to wage war in the territories east of the Vistula River.\textsuperscript{202}

Vyhovskyi's letter, containing similar flattering phrases of affection

\textsuperscript{200} He is mentioned in Vyhovskyi's letter to the King. See below n. 203. . .

\textsuperscript{201} This is evident by Khmelnytskyi's safe conduct pass to Piaseczyński, Chyhyryn, 9./19.III.1656: DKhmel., p. 476.

\textsuperscript{202} Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, Chyhyryn, 7./17.III.1656: BN, BOZ, Ms. 1218, fo. 1.
and loyalty, gives the impression that no effort was spared to satisfy the king. The secretary-general insisted that all matters raised by the king were duly considered. Sokolski was to reveal to Jan Kazimierz certain important information. 203

Thus, once more Khmelnytskyi showed a great deal of reluctance — his polite language and promises were used for the purpose of setting up a camouflage — to send military aid. Moreover, even though he committed himself to begin negotiations, — the date is uncertain, but judging from the expectations of various persons, these were scheduled to begin sometime in April — uncertainty prevailed, with regard to this matter within the royal court. This mood is revealed by the queen: "J' ai encore peur de ce Kmielniski", she wrote to her friend, "qui ne veus toujours point traiter si le roi ne va à Kamines, ne voulant se fier à pas un commissaire polonois; il dit qu' il[ s] l' on[ t] trompé". 204

On the same day as Ludwika Maria penned such a pessimistic note to Mme. de Choisy, Vidoni sent a very optimistic report to Rome. In it he revealed that Jan Kazimierz received, most likely before the arrival of Sokolski in Lviv, some very encouraging news: the Cossacks, who assembled


204 Ludwika Maria to Mme. de Choisy, [Głogów] 22.III.1656: Czart, Ms. 1971, p. 47.
in Chyhyryn, voted to recognize the king as their sovereign.  

The Cossacks must have ended their deliberations on this question at the latest by March 19, as news regarding the outcome of their votes reached Lviv, via Tyszkiewicz, by the 22nd. Obviously, some members of the royal court suspected that Khmelnytskyi simply orchestrated this Cossack assembly for the benefit of the gullible. This was not, however, the feeling of the majority; on the contrary, most senators, including the king, interpreted the news very positively. They considered that the diplomats finally achieved a very important breakthrough. Vidoni's comments reflect precisely such an atmosphere within the court: "Onde non si lascia de sperare", he writes, "che si trovi modo d'accordo seco e che somministri considerabili aiuti per li presenti bisgoni".

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205 Vidoni to Holy See, Lviv, 22.III.1656: LNA, VIII, 286-287. He writes as follows:

Si sono ricevute lettere del Sig. Palatino di Czerniakova [Tyszkiewicz], che giunto in vicinanza del Kmielniski gli n' era pervenuto l'avviso per mezzo d' un gentilhuomo speditole, che era stato ricevuto con molta cortesia e banchettato alla grande con brindisi alla salute di Sua Maestà e dettale in risposta, ch' il Sig. Palatino si trattenesse qualche giorno, mentre doveva spedire l'Ambasciatori Moscoviti e Tartari, ...

Haveva anco lo stesso Kmielniski chiamati li suoi officiali con altri del paese e propostole, che già che Dio le haveva concessa la libertà guadagnata con le loro armi, che desiderava d'intendere da loro, chi volessero per Re, e che gli proponesse il Turco, il Moscovita, il Re di Svezia e Sua Maestà, e che dando eccettione a tutti li primi, dicessero di volere il Re Giovanni Casimiro.

206 Ibid., p. 287.
Shortly after receiving such welcome information, Jan Kazimiercz must have despatched another messenger to Chyhyryn with letters to Khmelnytskyi and Vyhwoskyi. The king must have praised them for their demonstration of loyalty to him, expressed joy with regard to the latest development, renewed his call for Cossack troops and urged them to meet with the commissioners as soon as possible. He must have also instructed Lanckoroński and Tyszkiewicz to make all the necessary preparations for negotiations, commended their efforts and recommended to them to keep up the diplomatic pressure. Finally, he must have, as well, encouraged high-ranking officials to keep contact with Chyhyryn, in order to remind the Cossack hetman and the secretary-general of their commitments and obligations.

It is from Khmelnytskyi’s and Vyhwoskyi’s replies — hitherto these letters were unknown to historians — to one such official, the Crown Grand Hetman Stanisław Potocki, that one may learn about certain changes in their plans. In the first place, no Cossack troops were to march to the assistance of the Crown Army. Both men explained that this was not their decision but that of the Cossack officers, which they were obliged to observe.

Earlier, apparently on the initiative of Lanckoroński, the Orthodox Bishop of Lutsk Dyonisii Balaban, was sent to Khmelnytskyi. Jerlicz, op. cit., I, 181. He was instructed, undoubtedly, to use his influence on the Cossack hetman in order to induce him to provide the much-sought aid and to begin negotiations with the commissioners. Balaban’s mission, as well, was to convince the Orthodox hierarchy to take the same steps. In his conversation with the Russian envoy, Balaban was obviously camouflaging his aims. Report of Lopukhin, 11.IV.1654: Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1211. Balaban received 500 zł. from the treasury for the expenses relating to his mission: Diet Accounts: Ossol., Ms. 9532/II, p. 131.
The Cossack officers, claimed Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi, being concerned about the lack of provisions at this time of the year and the dangers connected with river-crossing during the spring thaw, voted against any military undertakings.

Moreover, the Cossack hetman and the secretary-general informed their addressee that negotiations would be postponed until the advent of summer. Apart from referring to the bad time of the year, which would cause discomforts and difficulties for the commissioners, they did not give reasons for their decision to postpone the proceedings once again. Finally, both of them expressed their loyalty to Jan Kazimierz, assured Potocki that they were prepared to work for the cause of rapprochement and peace and advised him that he should fear no danger from the Swedes.208

The royal court soon learned about the reluctance of Khmelnytskyi to supply military aid and to begin negotiations. The following reasons were advanced for his behaviour: "Con la venuta de Tatari par che non si revochi in dubbio", writes the nuncio, "ch'i Cosacchi sian per far il medesimo, mentre dubiterano, che rimanendo vitoriose quest' armi non venisse poi repressa la loro ribellione con la forza".209 Moreover, certain persons held the view that "Chiminischi usa i soliti artifiti e si crede vorrà prima stare a vedere a che si mettano le cose per regolar le risolutioni".210

208Khmelnytskyi to Potocki, Chyhyryn, 22.III./[1.IV].1656; and Vyhovskyi to Potocki, [Chyhyryn, 22.III./1.IV.1656]: Czart., Ms. 1656, pp. 211-212. Opposite the signature of Vyhovskyi there is also the following curious signature of Khmelnytskyi: "Bohdan Chmielnicki, Hetman Woyska Zaporoskoho, Wieliczezwa Carskohu".


When Tyszkiewicz arrived in Lviv, he provided additional information for the court about Khmelnytskyi's policies. Vidoni noted: "Il Sig. Palatino di Czernikowia, che fu spedito al Kmielnisch per trattare l'accordo se n'è ritornato, e la conferenza si è differita alli 3 del sequente, non havendo potuto scoprir il certo delle di lui intentioni". Tyszkiewicz also made reference to a meeting of a Cossack general council: "Riferisce si bene, che m/20 e più di quella militia si fuesse unita verso il Boristene con i loro capi e dichiaratisi di voler onnimamente la pace, onde s'affacticava il Kmielnischi per quietarli, ma l'evento era molto dubioso".

It is quite possible that after the arrival of Tyszkiewicz in Lviv, or even earlier, Lanckoronski was given some special instructions which were designed to bring Khmelnytskyi to a conference table. Lanckoronski could not have had much success. The Cossack hetman, undoubtedly aware of the aims of Commonwealth's diplomatic contacts with Russia, cleverly avoided any entanglements. On the one hand he kept the hopes alive that a rapprochement was possible; on the other, he made it impossible by insisting that any arrangement had to have prior knowledge and approval of the tsar.

As April drew to a close, it became quite obvious to all concerned that the much-desired rapprochement with the Cossacks would not be arranged.

211 According to another source, it was to be held on May 1 in Bila Tserkva: Radziejowski to Karl X Gustav, Elblag, 3.V.1656: Arkhiv YuZR, pt. 3, VI, 116.


The king decided, as Vidoni reveals, to pursue the following course of action: "Vedendosi ch' il Kmielnischi differisce le risolutioni sue, non si pensa qui di farle altr' istanza, ma solo s' invieranno il Deputati per la coerenza, che si deve tenere, e se le anderà avvisando li progressi di queste armi, mente il Tartaro non lascierà di fare le sue parti per indurlo alla dovuta obbedienza".\footnote{Vidoni to Holy See, Lviv, 24.IV.1656: Ibid., pp. 293-294.} \footnote{Instructions to Szumowski, Lviv, 26.IV.1656: Zherela, XII, pt. 5, 374-380.} It is uncertain who was designated to carry out the first part; the second, however, was to be carried out by Szumowski.\footnote{This is evident from the letter of Tyszkiewicz to Khmelnytskyi, Krutok, 25.V.1656: Hrushevskyi, \textit{op. cit.}, IX, pt. 2, 1219.}

By the middle of May diplomatic contacts virtually ceased between the two sides.\footnote{Ludwika Maria to Mme. de Choisy, [Głogów], 7.VI.1656: Czart., Ms. 1971, p. 39.} The queen stated bluntly, that "Kmielniski n' apoins encore rendu la reponse".\footnote{Vidoni to Holy See, Lwów, 23.V.1656: \textit{LNA}, VIII, 296.} Khmelnytskyi's diplomatic relations with Karl X Gustav, György Rákóczi II and Vasile Lupu were watched by the king and the senators with a great deal of apprehension. "Delli andamenti del Kmielnischi", reported the nuncio, "s' ha sempre più che dubitare, stimandosi, che miri di farsi pardone di tutta Russia \[i.e., Ruthenia\] e sino al fiume Vistola".\footnote{Vidoni to Holy See, Lublin, 19.V.1656: \textit{LNA}, VIII, 296.}
Such fears, as well as other significant military and political developments, induced Jan Kazimierz to re-establish close diplomatic links with the Cossack hetman. In the second week of May the king named the influential newly-appointed Palatine of Poznań, Jan Leszczyński, to take charge of business relating to Cossack affairs. Leszczyński, in beginning his correspondence with Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi, endeavoured to plant the seeds of doubt in their minds regarding the invincibility of Swedish arms and sought, in one way and another, to bring about a rupture in the existing Cossack-Swedish bonds. The palatine spared no efforts to gain their approval of himself: he reminded them of his personal affection for the Cossacks and his continual support of Cossack causes; appealed to the memory of the late Adam Kysil; agreed to begin negotiations at once, even though this would endanger his health; and expressed hope that the newly-appointed commission, of which he was a member, would eventually be able to produce satisfactory results for both parties. Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi most likely reacted to Leszczyński's appeals by responding with letters full of polite-sounding phrases. Leszczyński was unable to score a quick diplomatic success. The queen summed up his efforts as follows: "Le traite avec les Cosaques n'est poins fais."

In the following weeks, however, new developments created good opportunities for the continuation of diplomatic contacts with Khmelnytskyi. In June, while the army of Jan Kazimierz was attempting to recapture Warsaw


from the Swedes, a Russian envoy arrived in the king's camp. He brought the news that the tsar had agreed to accept the Habsburg emperor's offer of mediating the conflict between the Commonwealth and Russia. The tsar's envoy was accompanied by four Cossacks, who delivered to the king Khmelnytskyi's letter, in which he expressed joy at the prospect of peace between the two monarchs. Taking this opportunity, Jan Kazimierz replied to Khmelnytskyi, urging him to spare no effort towards the attainment of an agreement and permanent peace.

Shortly after, Jan Kazimierz contacted the Orthodox Bishop of Lutsk, Dyonysii Balaban, appointed him a mediator and directed him to proceed to Chyhyryn. Practically nothing is known about the diplomatic activities

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222 This was Fedor Tikhovich. He was granted audience on June 20. Diet Accounts: Ossol., Ms. 9532/II, p. 124; Vidoni to Holy See, Camp by Warsaw, 20.VI.1656: LNA, VIII, 299; and Fragstein to Ferdinand III, Camp by Warsaw, 25.VI.1656: Zherela, XII, pt. 5, 391.


224 The "provisions" for them and Tikhovich cost the treasury 1,376 zł. They were also granted audience on June 20. Diet Accounts: Ossol., Ms. 9532/II, p. 124; Vidoni to Holy See, Camp by Warsaw, 20.VI.1656: LNA, VIII, 299; and Fragstein to Ferdinand III, Camp by Warsaw, 25.VI.1656: Zherela, XII, pt. 5, 391.

225 Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, [Chyhyryn, early VI.1656]: DKhmel., pp. 495-496. The editors suggest that this letter was written on June 7/17. This date is obviously incorrect, since they would have had to travel the distance between Chyhyryn and Warsaw in two days. I assume that they arrived on the 19th, a day before they were granted audience by the king.


227 According to Jerlicz, op. cit., I, 184, on 2.VII.1656. The above letter was delivered by Balaban. Ibid., n. 2.
of this churchman.\textsuperscript{228} Judging by the letter of the king\textsuperscript{229} and the instruction of the Cossack hetman,\textsuperscript{230} one may conclude that his mission could not have been very successful.

During this period other developments caught the interest of the royal court. In the months of June and July it received all sorts of information regarding internal strife within Ukraine. According to one report, a certain group of Cossacks took up arms against Khmelnytskyi because he refused to negotiate with the king; while another one, also describing the conflict among the Cossacks, emphasized that the anti-Khmelnitsky faction sent its representatives to the king in order to declare loyalty to him. The name of Bohun resurfaced once again and was associated with the malcontents.\textsuperscript{231} News began to circulate among the manors of the gentry that the king met certain "Cossack envoys", who expressed the desire of those whom they represented to serve him faithfully, on condition that he reconfirm the articles of the Treaty of Zboriv.\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{228} He is briefly mentioned by Paul of Aleppo: "On Sunday by his [Khmelnitskiy's] invitation, we performed Mass with one of the Bishops [i.e., Balaban], who was lately come as Ambassador from the Poles." Paul of Aleppo, op. cit., II, 313.

\textsuperscript{229} Jan Kazimierz to Commissioners, Lublin, 18.VIII.1656: Czart., Ms. 386, pp. 35-36.

\textsuperscript{230} Khmelnytskyi's instructions to Haponenko et al., Chyhyryn, 26.VI./5.VIII.1656: DKhmel., pp. 521-522.

\textsuperscript{231} Fragstein to Ferdinand III, Camp by Warsaw, 8.VI.1656: Zherela, XII, pt. 5, 391; Vidoni to Holy See, Camp by Warsaw, 15., 20. and 27.VI.1656: LNA, VIII, 297-299; and des Noyers to Boulliau, Čzęstochowa, 3.VII.1656: Lettres, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{232} "Manuscript" of Z. Koniecpolski, 15.IX.1656: PAN, Kr., Ms. 1056, fo. 53r.
All such reports were encouraging, especially to those who considered the application of *divide et impera* during the period of Cossack unrest. Before taking any step in this direction, for on previous occasions reports of this nature often proved to be exaggerated and incorrect, Jan Kazimierz decided first to gain some more reliable information. A special messenger Szczuka, was sent by him to Chyhyryn and instructed to gather first-hand information about the actual state of affairs in Ukraine and, as well, to gain some insight into the attitude of the Cossack hetman with regard to the rapprochement. Shortly after the departure of Szczuka, another messenger was despatched to Chyhyryn. This time, his mission was to acquaint Khmelnytskyi with the latest developments in the campaign against Sweden and her new ally, Brandenburg.

The reports of Szczuka from Chyhyryn proved to be encouraging. Encouraging as well were the replies of Khmelnytskyi. For example, his letter to the Crown Vice-Chancellor was filled with polite and friendly phrases. He even mentioned that he was favourably inclined regarding the attempted reconciliation between the king and the tsar. Moreover, he said to Szczuka that even if the Poles failed to come to terms with the Russians,

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235 "Manuscript" of Z. Koniecpolski: from a letter, Lublin, 7.IX.1656: PAN, Kr., Ms. 1056, fo. 53r.

236 Khmelnytskyi to Trzebicki, Chyhyryn, 20./30.VIII.1656: DKhmel., pp. 529-530.
he would not initiate hostilities against them, as long as they did not attack him. Szczuka, who gave an account of his activities to Jan Kazimierz on September 19, revealed that he found a favourable atmosphere among the Cossacks for the designs and interests of the king. He must have also separated fact from fancy, such as persistent rumors about the death of Khmelnytskyi.

The friendly attitude of Khmelnytskyi, which he also exhibited in his letters to various individuals, as well as other factors, were the causes for the willingness of the king and the senators to make substantial concessions to the Cossacks. It was imperative that they be pacified, wrote the king to the commissioners negotiating with the Russians, even at the cost of permitting them to set up an independent state beyond the Dnieper. He also informed them that he and his advisors were engaged in drawing up another set of instructions for the expected negotiations with the Cossacks in the near future.

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239 "Manuscript" of Z. Konicpolski, 20.IX.1656: PAN, Kr., Ms. 1056, fo. 53v.
240 Khmelnytskyi to Gross and Sapieha, Chyhyryn, 20./30.VIII., and 7./17.IX.1656: DKhmel., pp. 527-528, 537-538. Similar, in tone, is the letter of Vyhovskyi to Sapieha, Chyhyryn, 7./17.IX.1656: Racz., Ms. 88 p. 163.
241 Jan Kazimierz to Commissioners, Łęczyca, 5.X.1656: Czart., Ms. 386, pp. 85-88.
Two months before such a radical policy was adopted and announced in the king's "categorical resolution", however, it was the intention of the policymakers in Warsaw to utilize the services of the tsar in putting pressure on the Cossack hetman in order to compel him to yield to the demands of the Commonwealth. Curious, but true! They did not give up the hope of the recovery of Ukraine.

In the written instructions, as well as in the supplementary information on the current state of affairs, which were supplied to the commissioners before the beginning of negotiations in Nemezis (near Vilnius), among the many grievances, which they were to point out to their Russian counterparts, at the head were listed those pertaining to the Cossacks and Ukraine. The tsar, they were to say, supported the Cossacks and facilitated their entry into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by opening the borders of Russia. Moreover, even though the tsar offered to act as an intermediary between the king and the Cossacks, he acted only after a lengthy struggle -- for some reason eight years are mentioned -- and even then he presented conditions to the king which were totally unacceptable to him. The commissioners were to spare no efforts, as well, to discredit Khmelnytskyi in the eyes of the Russian diplomats. The tsar should order him, they were to say,


243 On the Nemezis negotiations and the so-called Treaty of Vilnius between the Commonwealth and Russia see Mieczysław Gawlik, "Projekt unii rosyjsko-polskiej w drugiej połowie XVII w.", KH, XXIII (1909), 78-99; Ludwik Kubala, Wojna brandenburska i najazd Rakoczego w r. 1656 i 1657 (Lviv, [1918]), pp. 28-65; and Wójcik, "Polska i Rosja", pp. 331-369. For primary sources see AGAD, AKW, Ros.55C; and Czart., Mss. 386, 2111 and 2113. Additional sources: HHSA and TsGADA.
neither to receive nor to negotiate with the envoys of the King of Sweden or the Prince of Transylvania; and to supply military aid to the Commonwealth. If, for some reason Khmelnytskyi marched against the Commonwealth, the tsar should command him to halt all hostilities. The commissioners, therefore, were to endeavour to carry out a task which was quite different from that entrusted to the envoy in Crimea. Szumowski, as it was mentioned above, was to do everything in his power to turn the Cossacks, with the aid of Tatars, against Russia. 244

The commissioners were also instructed to inform their Russian colleagues that Jan Kazimierz, through the intercession of the tsar, was prepared to forgive the Cossacks all their offences and to establish a modus vivendi with them on the basis of the Treaty of Zboriv. If the Cossack representatives, who were expected to participate in the parleys, decided to stand firmly by the Treaty of Pereiaslav, the commissioners were obliged to seek additional instructions on this matter from their principals.

Initially the commissioners were to press for territorial restitution to the Commonwealth on the basis of status quo ante bellum. If this claim for complete territorial restitution was rejected by the Russians, the commissioners were authorized -- of course, only after all arguments failed, -- to cede to them the former Duchy of Smolensk. Such was to be the extent of the maximum territorial cession within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. If the Russians demanded, in addition, the cession of any lands belonging to the Crown, -- here, no doubt, was a vague reference to Ukraine, -- the commissioners were obliged to refer this matter to the king and to await for his decision.

244 This is strongly emphasized by Wójcik, "Polska i Rosja", p. 349.
It is quite evident from the instructions to the commissioners that the men who drew up this document were prepared to cede only certain White Ruthenian territories of the Grand Duchy — territories which were already under the Russian control. The same men were strongly opposed to any such arrangement involving part or all of Ukraine. Since these men fully realized that Russia would not voluntarily release her hold over Ukraine, they regarded the reaching of an understanding with that state, more or less, as a necessary evil. It should be pointed out that even though these men realized that an agreement with Russia against Sweden was both desirable and necessary, they still did not look at such an agreement as the only, or even the best solution out of the difficult situation, but only as one — and not even the best — possibility to solve the problems of the state.  

On August 22, as the diplomats began the first round of negotiations, the question whether the Commonwealth should or should not seek an arrangement with Russia was hotly debated among the gentry. There is evidence, however, that the majority of nobles held the view that, due to the precarious position of the Commonwealth, the policy which advocated the conclusion of peace and the formation of an alliance with Russia against Sweden was the right one for the country.

A clear picture of this view is found in the correspondence of the contemporaries. Jan Leszczyński, for example, stated bluntly to the Primate that "if the Muscovites shall not conclude an agreement with us, then we shall perish".  

Some days later on he explained his stand as follows: "If the

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245 Ibid., pp. 351-352.
246 J. Leszczyński to A. Leszczyński, Wrocław, 22.IX.1656: Czart., Ms. 384, p. 477.
Swedes shall conclude an agreement with the Muscovites before [us], then we shall perish. The Muscovites shall take Lithuania and Ukraine; the Elector [of Brandenburg], Great Poland; the Swedes, Prussia; and the Prince of Transylvania, Kraków [and Little Poland], and we shall remain without hope of [regaining] freedom and [aid for] liberation. In short, he visualized the partition of the Commonwealth. Thus, he argued that anyone who loved his "Fatherland" could not in conscience oppose even the tsar's succession to the Polish crown.

Various other arguments in favour of this policy were outlined in the letter of the Crown Treasurer to the Crown Grand Chancellor. Bogusław Leszczyński stressed that an alliance with Russia, even if it necessitated the placement of a Romanov on the Polish throne, would be greatly beneficial to the Commonwealth. The following were some of the advantages: return of the lost territories without the necessity of having to wage war for them; union of the Commonwealth and Russia; rise in power of the state; effective protection from the Tatars; payment of debts to soldiers; and, finally, "the pacification of the Cossacks". He argued, as well, that it was imperative to conclude peace and alliance with Russia rather than Sweden, not only because the former would be more generous, but also because peace and alliance with the latter would undoubtedly lead the Commonwealth to another disastrous war with Russia and Ukraine.

Bogusław Leszczyński expressed the conviction of the majority of the nobles. This was the feeling of the whole Leszczyński family; as well as

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of the Crown Grand Marshal, Jerzy Lubomirski; the Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Prince Albrecht Radziwiłł; the Grand Ducal Field Hetman, Wincenty Gosiewski; the Grand Ducal Ensign, Krzysztof Pac; and a host of others. The Lithuanian gentry, hoping to regain their estates, pressed especially hard for peace with Russia. Finally, even the commissioners themselves were decidedly on the side of reaching a rapprochement with Russia. 249

This policy was opposed by a small group of nobles led by the Crown Grand Chancellor, Stefan Koryciński. Some time early in October he prepared a long and a detailed statement, in which he analyzed the relations between the Commonwealth and Russia, examined the issue of alliance between the two states and refuted the arguments of the pro-Russian majority.

He maintained that this policy provided no guarantees for the recovery of Ukraine and the pacification of the Cossacks. "The Cossacks will not aid the Muscovites if we leave them alone", argued Koryciński; "in the meantime, [we must] negotiate with them". If there were to be any territorial cessions, "it is better to lose something to the Cossacks than to the Muscovites". If the pro-Russian policy were to be implemented, he warned, Ukraine would either be lost or transformed into a new enemy; moreover, this policy would be offensive to the allies of the Commonwealth — Crimea, Austria, Denmark and Holland. After an exhaustive analysis of the international situation, the Crown Grand Chancellor concluded that peace and alliance with Russia was unnecessary; indeed, on the contrary, peace should be sought with Sweden instead. 250

It may seem strange that there existed such a wide difference of views

249 Kubala, Wojna brandenburska, pp. 47-51.

regarding the eastern policy, among the members of the ruling class. In reality, however, the difference hardly existed, because both Leszczyński and Koryciński defended the same issue. They only differed in the tactical aspect of the defence. Both of them sought to regain the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian lands: the former, by means of an alliance with Russia and war against Sweden; the latter, by an alliance with Sweden and war against Russia.251

In the end the view of the majority prevailed. On November 3, 1656, the so-called Treaty of Vilnius was signed; thus, the hostilities between the Commonwealth and Russia, since 1654, came to an end. This treaty also created an alliance between the two states. It stipulated that Alexei Mikhailovich was to be elected the king of Poland at the next session of the Diet. This election, however, was to be an exceptional one: the tsar was to be crowned only after the death of Jan Kazimierz; moreover, during the king's lifetime he was not to interfere into the affairs of the Commonwealth. Once the tsar was crowned, he was to swear an oath to abide by the pacta conventa; rule the state himself, not by some viceroy; uphold all the right and privileges of the Catholic Church; and maintain good relations with the allies of the Commonwealth. As far as the military alliance was concerned, the troops of both states were to be employed against Sweden, as well as against Brandenburg, if the Elector refused to acknowledge his obligations and the territorial status quo ante bellum. Neither party was to conclude peace with Sweden without the consent and knowledge of the other.252

252 See Appendix V.
Issues which could not be resolved were postponed to the decision of the next Diet. Judging from the proposals of the commissioners, the unresolved questions comprised matters dealing with the Cossacks, the Orthodox Church and Ukraine in general.\footnote{Proposals of the Commissioners: Czart., Ms. 2113, pp. 165-173.}

The agreement between the Commonwealth and Russia was a setback to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's plans. He was, for various reasons, opposed to the rapprochement between these two powers; therefore, time and again, he used many arguments to convince the tsar and his officials that they were taking risky steps.\footnote{Khmelnytskyi to Alexei Mikhailovich and Instructions to Skoro-bahaty and Fedkovich, Hadiach, 7./17.VI.1656; to Alexei Mikhailovich, Buturlin and Morozov, Myrhorod and Chyhyryn, 12./22.VI. and 26.VII./5.VIII.1656: DKhmel., pp. 497-503, 511, 522-523.} In the end he submitted to the decision of the tsar and sent Cossack delegates, headed by Roman Haponenko, to the congress in Nemezis. They were to work in conjunction with the Russian diplomats. The Cossack diplomats were instructed to seek certain concessions from the commissioners of the Commonwealth. It is interesting to note that similar concessions were sought by the Cossacks two years later during the Hadiach negotiations.\footnote{Khmelnytskyi's instructions to Haponenko et al., Chhyryn, 26.VII./5.VIII.1656: Ibid., pp. 520-522.}

Even though the tsar promised that Cossack interests would be supported, they were generally ignored during the parleys.\footnote{Hrushevsky, op. cit., I, pt. 2, 1238-1239.} The Cossack delegation was not admitted to the parley as an independent representation. For this reason, Khmelnytskyi and his officers, who resented the co-operation between
the two states, began to spread rumors that the tsar betrayed Ukraine.  

This feeling was clearly expressed in a manifesto two years later. The most serious charge against the Russian statesmen contained in it was that they had betrayed the Cossacks by entering into an alliance with the Commonwealth.  

Yet, while fanning the flames of the "Muscovite treason" among the rank-and-file Cossacks, Khmelnytskyi still informed the tsar that he, as a loyal servitor, was pleased to learn about the new convention; nevertheless, he warned the tsar of the duplicity of the "Poles" and implored him not to trust them.  

His letter was a smokescreen for already by this time he had concluded an alliance with Transylvania and was negotiating another one with Sweden and, together with Karl X Gustav, Friedrich Wilhelm, György Rákóczi II and Bogusław Radziwiłł, participated in the partition of the Commonwealth.  

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261 See particularly the following documents: Arkhiv YuZR, pt. 3, VI, 140-153, 167-171; and DKhmel., pp. 543-545.  

CHAPTER IV

THE RAPPROCHEMENT:
FROM VILNIUS TO HADIACH (1656–1658)

I

Shortly after the agreement with Russia was signed, the policy-makers of the Commonwealth adopted a new course of action in order to regain Ukraine; it could be argued, as well, that they merely pursued the old policy by adapting it to the new military and political developments. While it comprised many complicated and intricate parts, its basic aims were the following ones: to prevent the formation and, if this proved to be unsuccessful, to dismantle the dangerous anti-Commonwealth coalition consisting of Sweden, Brandenburg, Transylvania and Ukraine; and to cause a rift between the Russian tsar and the Cossack hetman, the step which was deemed essential for regaining Ukraine. The success or failure of these projects depended on the ability of diplomats, who were sent to various capitals. The task of those who proceeded to Moscow was to turn the Russians against the Cossacks; of those despatched to Bakhychysarai and Constantinopole, to secure military aid and diplomatic assistance from the Muslim world to exert pressure on the Cossacks to abandon Russia; of those sent to, and
permanently representing the Commonwealth in Vienna, to gain troops against the Swedes and to secure the services of Habsburg mediators, whose task was to induce Khmelnytskyi to settle his differences with the Commonwealth over a conference table; and finally, of those instructed to appear in Chyhyryn, to lure Khmelnytskyi, by certain concessions, once more to the side of the Commonwealth.

After the agreement of November 3, the relations between the Commonwealth and Russia, rather than improving, began to deteriorate. The nobles of the Commonwealth, after examining the terms of this agreement, began to have second thoughts about it. The centralized Russian state and the despotic tsar was hardly acceptable to the supporters of the Polish "golden liberties". They feared that once a Romanov gained the Polish throne he would extend the dreaded absolute rule over them. For this reason, with the passage of time, the pro-Russian policy lost more and more support of the gentry.¹

It should also be remembered that the war-weary Commonwealth was being dominated at this time by the intrigues of Austria and France. By their influence, these two powers caused the Commonwealth to gravitate towards an alliance with Brandenburg first, and finally towards peace with Sweden.² These were the significant causes, among others, resonsible

¹Wójcik, op. cit., p. 373.
for the termination of the arrangement with Russia.

The chief cause for the deterioration and eventually for the rupture of relations between the Commonwealth and Russia, however, was the desire of the former to regain Ukraine. Even though Jan Kazimierz and his advisers were fully aware of the dangerous consequences of such a design, they nevertheless cast their votes for the pursual of the policy designed to recover this region. They counted that disagreements which arose between Khmelnytskyi and his officers, on the one hand, over the Russian agreement with the Commonwealth, and the tsarist government, on the other, over Cossack contacts with Sweden and Transylvania, could be used in widening the rift between Russia and Ukraine. Once this was accomplished, so they believed, Khmelnytskyi could be persuaded to abandon the Tsar of Russia and induced, by certain concessions, to acknowledge the King of Poland as his sovereign. ³

In January 1657 Ignacy Bąkowski was sent to Moscow. Having the intercepted reports of Swedish envoys from Transylvania in his possession, Bąkowski was instructed to convince Alexei Mikhailovich that Karl X Gustav induced Rákóczi and Khmelnytskyi to initiate hostilities against both the Commonwealth and Russia. Since the tsar, by the 1656 agreement guaranteed peace also on the part of the Cossacks, the envoy was to press him to forbid Khmelnytskyi any such undertaking. If the Cossack hetman refused to obey, the tsar, Bąkowski was to insist, was to treat him

³Wójcik, op. cit., pp. 373-374.
as an enemy. 4

To discredit Khmelnytskyi in the eyes of the tsarist government was also the task of Jan Szumowski, who appeared in the Russian capital later, in June. He arrived with complaints that Khmelnytskyi aided Rákóczi militarily. In order to make his case stronger against Khmelnytskyi, he showed to the boyars Welling's letter written to Karl X Gustav, dated from Chyhyryn on January 28 O.S., which fell into Polish hands. Not only did this letter contain proof that Cossack troops were sent to Rákóczi, argued the envoy, but also that some sort of an arrangement was reached between the Cossacks and the Swedes. Since all this was contrary to the recently-signed agreement, maintained Szumowski, the tsarist government was compelled to take appropriate steps immediately in order to rectify this intolerable situation. 5

This kind of pressure was kept up. In August Stefan Medeksza was instructed "to open the eyes" of the boyars regarding the actions of the Cossacks. Following the conclusion of the treaty between the two states, reads the instruction, the Cossacks, realizing that they remained in a disadvantageous position,

4 Instructions to Bąkowski, Gdańsk, 20.I.1657: Zherela, XII, part 5, 434-435. It is quite evident from the text that these instructions were prepared at an earlier date, most likely in December 1656.

5 Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1379-1380.
soon joined Rákóczi and [by starting fresh hostilities] prevented [the convoking of] the Diet [which was to ratify the treaty]. Furthermore, when [the feathers from] Rákóczi's wings were already plucked, desirous to set the [Polish and Muscovite] monarchs at one another, they pretended to come over to Poland, [their aim being] only to give rise to war [of Muscovy] with Poland and so that they emerge out of it as [had] the Dutch [who], having raised a rebellion against the King of Spain, allegedly for [the cause of] religion, [also] instigated the German States on the Spaniards and as a result of this quarrel between them, at present they are subject to no one.

As even a stronger argument, Medeksza was to draw a parallel between the activities of the "Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland", who was hated by the tsar, and the "Hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Army". Oliver Cromwell, he was to argue,

after having fomented the commoners, [ordered], in a shameful way, to cut off the head of his own Lord, the King of England, and, after expelling out of the country the crowned son, [heir] to his father's kingdom, he is following the example of Khmelnytskyi by stirring up the German States and, at present, only he together with the King of France are supporting the Swedes.

Thus, it was the mission of the envoy to ensure that Khmelnytskyi, "this tempestuous head", whose only desire was "to instigate [the countries of] the world [into conflict] even more", did not deceive "His Tsarist Majesty" about his real intentions. At present this man was "supporting the Swedes by allowing [them] to recruit troops in his own

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lands and sending [them military] aid [to be used] against the tsar as well as Poland". 7

Obviously, the tsarist government could ignore neither such evidence nor such arguments. At the same time, however, well aware of the Commonwealth's desire to regain Ukraine, it decided to thoroughly investigate all claims and charges of the envoys before taking any drastic steps against Khmelnytskyi. While Russia continued to play the role of an ally of the Commonwealth, certain groups within the country prevailed on the tsar to distrust the Poles. 8

At the same time Khmelnytskyi was hardly idle. He was peculiarly gifted for making a lie sound credible; and if he did tell the truth, he did not reveal the whole truth. After being informed by the tsar about the new arrangement with the Commonwealth, he replied that, as a loyal servitor of the tsar he was pleased to learn about the Polish-Russian convention, but warned him of the duplicity of the Poles and implored him not to trust them. He sent the tsar detailed report regarding the current military and diplomatic activity, i.e., the most obvious information, but conveniently failed to mention about his own dealings with György Rakóczi II and Karl X Gustav. 9 When he could no

7 Ibid., p. 158.
longer hide that he supplied troops to the former, he excused his ac-
tion on grounds that he supported the Transylvanian Prince in order to
destroy his enemies. Certainly, he assured the tsar, he had not the
slightest intention of supporting Rákóczi as a candidate for the Polish
throne.\footnote{Khmelnitsky to Alexei Mikhailovich, Chyhyryn, 13./23.III.1657: 
\textit{Ibid.}, p. 556.}

In his report dealing with the activities of the Imperial and Common-
wealth's envoys, Partsevich and Bieniewski, the Cossack hetman stated
that both of them endeavoured to convince him to break with Russia. If
the Cossacks returned under the protection of Jan Kazimierz, the envoys
promised him, he maintained, that they would gain all the rights and
liberties they craved for and that no nobles would take up residence in
Ukraine.\footnote{Khmelnitsky to Alexei Mikhailovich, Chyhyryn, 13./23.III. and
23.IV./3.V.1657. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 556-557, 581.} As will be shown below, the reports of the above-mentioned
envoys, however, reveal an entirely different version of this story.

Thus, the Cossack hetman employed tactics by which he aimed to dis-
credit the "Poles" in Moscow and to create, once more, a rift between the
Commonwealth and Russia. He showed no desire to be pushed into the arms
of Jan Kazimierz by Alexei Mikhailovich's military might. On the contrary,
he endeavoured to be in such a position that he would be able to gravitate
on his own terms, to the party that offered him most advantages. In this
respect, the aims of the Commonwealth's policymakers remained unfulfilled.

While these events were taking place, other envoys sped to two
destinations within the Muslim world: Romaszkiewicz, to Bakhchysarai; and Jaskólski, to Constantinople. It was the mission of both envoys to secure military and diplomatic support for the Commonwealth from Khan Mehmed Giray IV of Crimea and Sultan Mehmed IV of Turkey.

Romaszkiewicz was instructed to acquaint the khan about the state of affairs of the military situation within the Commonwealth, the war effort against Sweden and the results of negotiations with Russia. With regard to the last item, the envoy was to say that a draft treaty was ready, but an agreement was not yet concluded. This was due to the great demands of the Russians, who wanted either the cession of all of Ukraine and part of Lithuania, or the Polish throne for the tsar. Romaszkiewicz was to emphasize that the Russians were demanding so much from the Commonwealth, primarily because they felt safe by the support of the Cossacks. In order to humble the Russians, he was to insist, it was necessary for the khan to take some steps by which their ties with the Cossacks would be cut, or to compell them by the force of arms to do so.

As far as the Cossacks were concerned, Romaszkiewicz was to stress, only one solution remained: that the khan, their ally and protector, force them to accept the Treaty of Zboriv as the basis for reconciliation with the king. He was to inform the khan that the king sincerely desired to arrange peace with the Cossacks; moreover, he was even prepared to grant them greater concessions than those of the Treaty of

Zboriv. Of course, the Cossacks would have to agree to admit the nobles into Ukraine and to restore their estates. If a reconciliation would be realized under such conditions, the khan could seek peace with the Cossacks, while the Poles could deal with the Russians. The envoy was to lay most of the blame on the Russians for their interference in the affairs of the Commonwealth. They pretended, he was to say, that only they were able to mediate a reconciliation between the Commonwealth and Ukraine. Such a pompous claim, however, offended the dignity of the khan, since the Cossacks owed all of their good fortunes to the kindness of the late Islam Giray III.

There was another major problem. Romaszkiewicz was to reveal to the khan that the nobles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as those of Ukraine, were very anxious to regain their estates. These nobles may be led to believe by the assurances of the tsar; that only he was in a position to restore their estates. Therefore, if the business at hand would not be quickly dealt with by the khan, these nobles, who were impatient to return to their estates, would clamour at the next session of the Diet to ratify the agreement with Russia. Obviously, the khan did not wish to see a Romanov on the Polish throne. For this reason he had to take immediate steps which could affect the Cossack break with Russia; or, failing to achieve this, he had to insure that they remained neutral, especially in a time of war between the Commonwealth and Russia. Under such circumstances the Poles could ally themselves with the Swedes; after all, Romaszkiewicz was to stress, this was precisely the recommendation of the khan. Thus the Poles could tackle the Russians with ease.
In order to achieve these objectives, the envoy was to suggest the following course of action. The khan and the sultan—who was to be influenced by the former—were to send envoys to Khmelnytskyi, threatening him with war, as long as he adhered to Russia against the Commonwealth. Being assured of the neutrality of Ukraine, the Commonwealth would arrange an alliance with Sweden against Russia. At the same time the khan was to endeavour to obtain the sultan's permission for the involvement of Moldavia, Wallachia and part of the Horde, together with the Commonwealth, against Russia. The other part of the Horde, or together with Moldavian and Wallachian troops, if these were not granted permission to march against Russia, were to guard the borders of Ukraine and to insure that the Cossacks did not take part in a conflict on the side of Russia. Finally, the khan was to secure, as well, an order from the sultan that the Prince of Transylvania aided neither Sweden, Ukraine nor Russia against the Commonwealth.

Once the court learned about the warlike plans of Rákóczi, the envoy's instructions were supplemented with additional information. Romaszkiewicz was to reveal to the khan that Rákóczi decided to invade the Commonwealth. He was to be aided by troops from Moldavia and Wallachia. Moreover, he was to suggest to the khan a plan of counter-action. Once Rákóczi began hostilities, one part of the Horde, assisted by troops from the frontier pashas, were to invade the three Danubian principalities. The other part of the Horde, under the command of the khan himself, was to concentrate on Ukraine. If the Cossacks marched against the Commonwealth, the Tatars were to retaliate by invading Ukraine. By following this plan, the envoy was to insist, both the Commonwealth and Crimea
would be able to rout their common enemies.

The other envoy, Mariusz Jaskólski, had a similar task to accomplish. He was instructed to deny all accusations, particularly that the Commonwealth, through the suppression of the Cossacks, was responsible for their submission to the sultan, which had been levelled at the Commonwealth during the earlier mission of Wojciech Bieganowski. On the contrary, he was to insist that the main cause for the Cossacks uprising was the disciplinary action of the king who, in the interest of keeping peace with Turkey, had forbidden them to carry out their piratical raids into the dominions of the sultan. Even though the khan endeavoured to reconcile the Cossacks with the king and even though he sincerely wished such an arrangement, the Cossacks, deaf to all appeals, surrendered themselves to the tsar. Moreover, at the time when Russia agreed to conclude a peace treaty with the Commonwealth, the Cossacks formed an alliance with Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia, all of them vassal states of the sultan, and Sweden against her.

It was Jaskólski's task to press the sultan and his officials to take appropriate action immediately against this coalition, which was not only a threat to the Commonwealth, but also to Turkey. Since the Commonwealth will have to fight against many foes, it might be compelled to carry out the demands of the tsar, including the one which called for the election of a Romanov as the king of Poland. Would the existence of

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13 Instructions to Jaskólski, [Gdańsk, 7.II.] 1657: Zherela, XII, part 5, 422-426. Later on these instructions were supplemented by various letters. AGAD, AKW, Tur. 75, files 417-419, nos. 718-720.
such a kingdom, the envoy was to enquire, best serve the interests of Turkey? Did the Porte, which extended its sway over so many people of the Orthodox faith, desire to have such a powerful Orthodox neighbour? Would not the Orthodox subjects of the sultan desire to pass under the protection of an Orthodox ruler? The sultan, the envoy was to emphasize, was compelled to take action in order to destroy the anti-Commonwealth league, not only out of obligation for his treaty commitments to the Commonwealth, which were already violated by the actions of his vassals, but also for the sake of the interests of his realm.

Moreover, Jaskólski was to suggest to the Turks that they communicate to Khmelnytskyi that it was their desire that he seek reconciliation with the king. It should be obvious, he was to say, that the king and all his loyal subjects earnestly desired to live in peace with the Cossacks. Then, he was to offer the following plan of counteraction against Rákóczi and the two hospodars: if they marched against the Commonwealth, the khan at the head of part of the Horde, with the support of troops under the command of the Pashas of Silistria and Budapest, was to attack and to defeat them.

The Commonwealth, the envoy was to insist, had the intention of attacking neither the three vassals of the sultan nor Khmelnytskyi. On the contrary, she only desired to defend herself if they attacked, in order to prevent them from giving rise to new turbulence and possibly even to another war. If neither the Cossacks nor their allies interfered in the conflict with Sweden, as well as in possible hostilities with Russia, the king pledged to come to terms with them amicably. Finally, Jaskólski was to point out to the sultan the various reasons why it was
to the advantage of both Khmelnytskyi and Rakoczi to live on good terms with the king.

During the same period the envoys of Khmelnytskyi and his Transylvanian and Swedish allies were also very active in Bakhchysarai and Constantinople. The chief aim of the Cossack diplomacy in Crimea was to prevent the khan from supporting the Commonwealth militarily. Just as the Polish envoys had tried, by every possible way, to induce the khan to restrain the Cossacks from participating in any coalition against the Commonwealth, so too, had the Cossack envoys, in order to insure that the Tatars remained neutral and did not create havoc in the rear of the allied armies.

For some time, due to various developments, the Tatar officials pursued a vacillating policy. However, after Rakoczi invaded the Commonwealth, the khan decided to support the Commonwealth once again.\(^\text{14}\)

The khan, his vizier, as well as other Tatar notables duly informed the king and his officials about their preparation to march north in March.\(^\text{15}\) The actions of the Cossacks delayed the campaign, however. Finally in June the Horde was on the move; in July it reached Kamianets.

\(^{14}\) Baranowski, op. cit., pp. 482-484; and Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1356-1358.

\(^{15}\) Mehmed Giray IV to Jan Kazimierz, Koryciński and Potocki, [Bakhchysarai, 4.III.1657]: Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 43-44; AGAD, AKW, Tat. 62 files 43, 63, nos. 375, 395. For letters of Tatar officials see AGAD, AKW, Tat. 62, files 61-62, nos. 393-394; Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 241, 259; and Lettres, p. 314.
The khan and his military commanders then informed his allies that they were prepared to cut off Rákóczi's return to Transylvania. After signing an agreement with the Poles, Rákóczi managed to escape home; his army, however, was decimated by the Tatars. In this way the feathers from "Rákóczi's wings were...plucked". A great deal of credit for this development must be given to the work of the diplomats in Bakhchysarai.

The diplomatic counter-offensive of Khmelnytskyi's representatives, as well as those of his allies, in Constantinople, during the same time, also proved to be most difficult to carry out. The court of the sultan was the stage upon which the protagonists, comprising two warring groups, performed scenes of spectacular diplomatic battles.

The first group consisted of the Polish envoy, Jaskólski; the Habsburg representative, Renniger; the staff of the khan; and the deputies of two Turkish pashas. This group accused Rákóczi of invading the Commonwealth contrary to the orders of the sultan. They argued that


18. Mehmed Giray IV to Jan Kazimierz, Bakhchysarai, ca., early VIII.1657: AGAD, AKW, Tat. 62, file 102, no. 434. Other letters: Ibid., file 27, no. 358 (Original in Czart., Ms. 615, fo. 155); and file 103, no. 435.
the prince was guilty of disobedience; thus, for his act of deliber­
ate insubordination, he merited a suitable punishment. At this time
Jaskólski and Renniger also revealed to the Turkish officials that
the Russians, with the aid of the Cossacks, with whom Rákóczi was
associated, were active in hatching a rebellion of the sultan's Ortho­
dox subjects.

The other group comprised of the Cossack, Transylvanian, and
Swedish envoys, agents of the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, as
well as the diplomatic representatives of England and France. The
chief task of this group was to justify the actions of Khmelnytskyi
and Rákóczi, as well as to secure from the sultan diplomatic aid both
against the Commonwealth and Russia.

On June 5 all of the envoys were granted audience by the sultan.
Khmelnytskyi was to be informed that, since the Cossacks observed good
relations with the Tatars, they were to receive the sultan's protec­
tion. Rákóczi was ordered to return to Transylvania; if he refused to
obey, his envoys were told, he would be visited soon by the Horde and
the frontier Turkish troops. Karl X Gustav was to be told that the
sultan was pleased to accept his offer of friendship; however, the king
was to be urged to negotiate a peace treaty with the Poles, for they
were old friends of the Turks.

When the Turkish officials received exaggerated reports about
Rákóczi's military successes within the Commonwealth, they influenced
the sultan to rescind the former harsh order. Soon, however, the new
order was changed again. On August 17 a report of the khan was received
by the sultan about the capitulation of Rákóczi to the Poles and, shortly
after, about the Tatar pogrom of his army. The sultan acted swiftly: Rákóczi's envoys were arrested; Jaskólski received a promise that the prince would be punished. Shortly after the Swedish envoys were detained. Thus, the Swedish-Transylvanian-Ukrainian diplomatic counter-offensive suffered a serious setback in the Muslim world. 19 By this time Khmelnytskyi indicated that he was prepared to seek reconciliation with the Commonwealth by means of Habsburg mediation. 20 The foundations for such an arrangement were laid already in 1655.

During the period of phenomenal successes of Swedish arms within the Commonwealth, in the second half of 1655, Jan Kazimierz approached Emperor Ferdinand III with a request to act either as a mediator once negotiations resumed with Khmelnytskyi, or as a guarantor of any agreement concluded with him. 21 The emperor's positive reply to the king was induced by very practical reasons. Relying on the reports of Franz von Lisola, he and his ministers were led to believe that it was only a matter of time, unless preventative steps were taken, before a dangerous Cossack-

19 Khmelnytskyi to Kiaha Bey, Chyhyryn, [late] III.1657: DKhmel., pp. 572-573; Reports of Jaskólski: AGAD, AKW, Tur. 76, file 421, nos. 724-725; and reports of Renniger: Zherela, XII, part 5, 479-483 and Walewski, op. cit., II, i-iv, docs. no. i-ii.


21 Korduba, op. cit., p. 8.
Swedish alliance would be formed. Such an arrangement was not only dangerous to the Commonwealth but also to the Habsburgs. The wounds inflicted by the Swedes during the Thirty Years' War were still not healed; there was, therefore, still a fear of the rapid rise of Swedish power. Moreover, no one was sure that the conflict which raged in the Commonwealth might not spill into the Habsburg dominions. For these very reasons Imperial diplomats already worked feverishly to prevent the reaching of an understanding between Sweden and Russia, as well as to draw the latter to the side of the Commonwealth. For the same reasons Ukraine had to be won over to the Commonwealth side.

Following more urgings of Lisola, the council of ministers decided at a meeting held on October 9, 1656 to initiate steps which would lead to negotiations by Imperial diplomats directly with the Cossack hetman. All this was to be accomplished with the full co-operation of the Polish court. On November 3, the "Chancellor of Hungary", Bishop György Szelepcsényi, who was chosen to head the mission to Khmelnytskyi, attended a meeting during which he was briefed as to the objectives of the task he was to undertake. Szelepcsényi's chief aim was to win the confidence of Khmelnytskyi and to learn about conditions under which he

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23 Korduba, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
24 Lisola to Ferdinand III, Sonnenberg, 27.IX.1656: Zherela, XII, part 5, 396-397.
was prepared to negotiate a settlement with the Commonwealth. The bishop was given by the ministers full descretion to handle the whole matter. Since they believed that the root of the problem lay in Khmelnytskyi's disbelief that the Commonwealth's government would carry out its obligation, the envoy was to assure him that this time the emperor himself guaranteed that all treaty obligations would be kept.

The Commonwealth's representatives in Vienna, to whom all this information was revealed, found no objections to the envoy's instructions being worded in these terms. The Polish court was also informed. Ferdinand III asked Jan Kazimierz, through his representative Fragstein, whether the king wished to send additional instructions to Szelepcsényi. The king was satisfied with the arrangement made in Vienna to influence Khmelnytskyi. He only urged that the Imperial envoy meet with the Commonwealth's representatives in the shortest time possible. The Crown Grand Chancellor was displeased, however, because in the credentials of the envoy and the letter of the emperor he was not referred to as 'the "Hetman of His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army"', as well as, because he was entitled "illustriissimus" rather than "generosus", which was the proper form of address of a noble.26 This was, however, a minor matter. At this time, the Polish court was more interested in haste, rather than wasting time quibbling over correct forms of address. This feeling was conveyed to Vienna. Finally, on December 1, a new treaty was signed between the two countries. One of its articles committed Ferdinand III to arrange a rapprochement between the Commonwealth and Ukraine.27


In the meantime, Ferdinand III and his ministers, upon learning that Rákóczi was preparing to invade the Commonwealth, decided to send Szelepcsényi to the prince in order to dissuade him from embarking on such an adventure.\(^{28}\) A new candidate, therefore, had to be found for the mission to Ukraine. They eventually selected Peter Parchevich, the Archbishop of Martianopole and the Apostolic Vicar and Administrator in Moldavia. His letters of credence and instructions were prepared for him in January 1657.\(^{29}\) The Polish court, once informed about the circumstances for the substitution, gave its approval of the new envoy.

On January 17 Parchevich departed from Vienna. After a long and dangerous trip, he arrived in Chyhyryn on March 1. A week later he was received by the Cossack hetman in Subotiv. Due to the illness of the archbishop, Marianovich, his secretary, conferred several times with Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi, but each time he failed to receive a categorical answer from them. They explained to him that in such important policy matters, as were revealed in the requests of the emperor, a hasty answer could hardly be given; moreover, all such matters required the approval of the Cossack general council. Eventually the council assembled and deliberated a whole week on various issues. By the council's unanimous choice, the sixteen-year-old Yurii Khmelnytskyi became the hetman's successor.


\(^{29}\) All documents were dated in Vienna, on 10.1.1657: Julian Pejacsevich, "Peter Freiherr von Parchevich, Erzbishof von Martianopel, Apostolischer Vicar und Administrator der Moldau, Bulgarischer Internuntius am Kaiserlichen Hofe und Kaiserlicher Gesandter bei dem Kosaken-Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki (1612-1674)", *AÖG*, LIX (1880), 519-523.
Two days later Marianovich learned that the Cossack hetman agreed to accept the services of Ferdinand III to mediate between the Commonwealth and Ukraine; to abide by his judgment, as long as he agreed to take action against all those who did not abide by his decisions; and even to recall the Cossack troops sent to aid Rakóczi.30 In his letter to the emperor Khmelnytskyi emphasized that a rapprochement between the Commonwealth and Ukraine was possible only under the following condition: "si tamen securitati integritatique status nostri nullam inueratur inuria".31

Thus ended the mission of the Imperial envoy. At least he secured Khmelnytskyi's assurance that he was satisfied with the offer of Ferdinand III to mediate the difference between the Cossack hetman and the Polish king.

On his return journey Parchevich, becoming ill, was compelled to remain in Lviv to recuperate. At this point Marianovich took charge of the mission, proceeded on, and eventually reached Jan Kazimierz in Kraków. On July 11 he departed from that city, reaching Vienna on the 16th. Unable to find the emperor there, he was forced to go to Prague where, on August 5 he submitted a written report about the activities of Parchevich and himself.

In the meantime, not knowing the results of negotiations with Khmelnytskyi, but learning about his death, the successor of Ferdinand III, Leopold I, provided new letters of credence and new instructions for

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31 Khmelnytskyi to Ferdinand III, Chyhyryn, 18./28.IV.1657: DKhmel., pp. 577-578.
Parchevich, which empowered him to continue negotiations with Yurii Khmelnytskyi. The new emperor gave the same guarantees as his predecessor with regard to an agreement between the Commonwealth and Ukraine. By this time, however, there was no further need for the services of the Imperial envoy, because the whole matter was being handled by an extremely capable diplomat, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski.

II

It may seem curious that Jan Kazimierz appointed a comparatively young man of no great distinction and of no proven experience in the diplomatic service to such a responsible position as the representative of "His Majesty and the Commonwealth". Moreover, one may wonder whether the king was justified in entrusting to this individual such an important and difficult task, at a time when the whole state seemed to be on the verge of collapse and especially when the more prominent and experienced persons had little success in similar diplomatic missions. By examining more closely the background of the Notary of Lutsk, however, one will conclude that the king made a very wise choice, for Bieniewski had excellent credentials and qualifications for the task assigned to him.

Bieniewski came from Volynia. Even though he was a Catholic, he

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32 All documents were dated in Vienna, on 19.V. and 4.VI.1657: AÖG, LIX (1880), 530-537.
33 See Appendix I.
was elected a deputy to the Diet by Orthodox nobles who comprised a majority in that palatinate. True, these so-called "genti Rutheni, natione Poloni" were, to a large degree, Polonized; nevertheless, these men clung tenaciously to their Orthodox faith. While most of these country squires were too timid, for various reasons, to join the Cossack ranks, they were not too timid to clamour for the restoration of the rights to the Orthodox Church. Like Adam Kysil, most of them hated Khmelnytskyi for opening the dikes to the "flood of the serfs"; they were, however, very sympathetic to his efforts to win concessions for the Orthodox Church. The Cossack hetman, in turn, tried to gain their support by appealing to their religious feelings. 34

Torn between the loyalty to the king and the "Fatherland" and to the Orthodox church, what policy was this element to follow? There was only one policy favoured by the gentry of Volynia: the policy of reconciliation. This was also the feeling of the Orthodox prelates and most of the clergy. The noble "exiles" from Ukraine, many of whom found shelter in Volynia, were of the same mind. In short, the policy of fire and sword was bankrupt, while the policy of rapprochement with the Cossacks was overwhelmingly supported. Such were the views of the men represented by Bieniewski, who shared their views.

Since he was already involved in Cossack affairs at the Diet of 1655, 35 Bieniewski must have been marked as an individual who had a good knowledge of, as it was said at this time, "Cossack humors". He

34 Khmelnytskyi to Volynian Nobles, Chyhyryn, 1./11.XI.1650: DKhmel., pp. 192-195.

35 Volumina Legum, IV, 499.
was fortunate to know the "right" persons on both sides: the Bishop of Lutsk, Dyonysii Balaban, who was soon to be elevated to the throne of the Metropolitan of Kiev, was his friend; as were the Secretary of the Zaporozhian Army, Ivan Vyhovskyi, the alter ego of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, who gained the hetman's office after his death, and the Colonel of the Pereiaslav Regiment, Pavlo Teteria. Bieniewski could even expect favours, through "family" connections, from another person, who lately began to acquire a great deal of authority and prestige among the Cossacks. This was Yurii Nemyrych.

Moreover, he also had the backing of various magnates who, at one time, belonged to a group that hatched plots to dethrone Jan Kazimierz. After the death of their leaders—the Palatine of Poznań, Krzysztof Opaliński, in Great Poland; and the Palatine of Vilnius and the Grand Hetman, Janusz Radziwiłł, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—these Catholic and Protestant anti-royalists disintegrated. As the victorious star of Karl X Gustav began to shine less brightly, they saw the need to support the king they once despised. Moreover, they threw their weight in support of the plans of Jan Kazimierz and Ludwika Maria to hold a vivente rege election and to place a French prince on the Polish throne. Obviously, the "French party" expected a great deal of opposition from the gentry. They were confident, however, if a serious crisis arose, the backs of their opponents would be broken by their new allies the Cossacks!36 Thus, there was another important reason for the pursuance of

the policy of rapprochement. The new modus vivendi had to be built on significant concessions to the Cossacks. Bieniewski realized this quite well.

There was still another reason why the magnates decided to support the rapprochement. If one glances at the census of the Palatinate of Kiev (1640) and that of the Palatinate of Bratslav (1629), one will understand why the magnates had a great stake in Ukraine. In Kiev, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki possessed 7,603 households; Yurii Nemyrych, 4,907; Stanisław Lubomirski, 4,726; Konstanty Wiśniowiecki, 3,800; Janusz Ostrogski-Zaślawski, 2,861; Jakub Sobieski, 2,023; Stanisław Koniecpolski, 1,499; and Samuel Korecki, 1,373, to mention only a few. In Bratslav, Stanisław Koniecpolski possessed 18,548 households; Tomasz Zamoyski, 3,986; Władysław Ostrogski-Zaślawski, 3,305; and Karol Korecki, 3,292. The policy of rapprochement meant to these men, or to their heirs, that they had a chance to recover the vast latifundiae in Ukraine.

It should be noted that many of the "kinglets" who owned great tracts of land in Ukraine also held the highest and most lucrative offices of the Commonwealth. Moreover, they were bound to one another by "family" ties.  

37 Krypiakevych, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

38 The Palatine of Ruthenia, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (d.1651), was married to Gryzelda Zamoyska. Their son, Michał, became the King of Poland (1669-1673). The Palatine of Ruthenia, Konstanty Wiśniowiecki (d.1641) was the father of Janusz (d.1636), Marianna—by his first wife, Anna Zahorowska—and Jerzy (d.1641)—by his second wife, Urszula Mniszchówna. Dymitr, the son of Janusz and Eugenia Tyszkiewiczówna,
Bieniewski managed to become a member of this elite group by his marriage to Anna Konstancja Leszczyńska, daughter of Władysław, the Chamberlin of Brest (1649). The Leszczyński family almost monopolized became the Sheriff of Lutsk (1657), Crown Guardian (1658), Palatine of Belz (1660), Crown Field Hetman (1667), Crown Grand Hetman (1676) and Castellan of Kraków (1680). He was first married to Marianna Zamoyska; then, to Teofilia Załawska. Konstanty's daughter, Marianna, married Jakub Sobieski. Konstanty's son, Jerzy, married Eufrozyna Tarnowska. Their only daughter, Konstancja, married Samuel Leszczyński.

The Palatine of Kraków, Stanisław Lubomirski (d.1649) was married to Zofia Ostrog ska. Their son, Aleksander, was married to Helena Ossolińska; their daughter, Krystyna, to the Lithuanian Grand Chancellor, Albrecht Radziwiłł (d.1656). One of Stanisław's sisters, Katarzyna, was married to the Palatine of Volynia (1585) and Castellan of Kraków (1593), Janusz Ostrogski; the other, Krystyna, to Stanisław Koniecpolski. The son of Stanisław and Zofia, Jerzy Lubomirski, first married to Konstancja Ligęzianka, then to Barbara Tarłówna, became the Sheriff of Kraków (1647), Crown Court Marshal (1650), Crown Grand Marshal (1650) and Crown Field Hetman (1658).

Janusz Ostrogski-Zasławski (d.1649) was the brother of the Palatine of Kraków, Władysław (d.1656), whose second wife was Katarzyna Sobieska. Their daughter, Teofilia, was married twice. Her first husband was Dymitr Wiśniowiecki; the next one, was Józef Lubomirski.

The Palatine of Belz (1658) and Ruthenia (1641) and the Castellan of Kraków (1646), Jakub Sobieski (d.1646), was married to Marianna Wiśniowiecka and, upon her death in 1624, to Teofilia Daniłowiczówna. Teofilia bore him three children: Marek, Jan and Katarzyna. Marek died in 1652. Jan became the Crown Grand Ensign (1656), Crown Field Hetman (1665), Crown Grand Marshal (1665), Crown Grand Hetman (1667) and eventually the King of Poland (1674–1696). Katarzyna's first husband was Władysław Ostrogski-Zasławski. In 1658 she married Michał Radziwiłł, the Castellan of Vilnius (1661), Palatine of Vilnius (1667), Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor (1668) and Lithuanian Field Hetman (1668).

The Crown Field Hetman (1619), Palatine of Sandomierz (1625), Crown Grand Hetman (1632) and Castellan of Kraków, Stanisław Koniecpolski (d.1646), was married three times: to Katarzyna Żółkiewska, Krystyna Lubomirska and Zofia Opalińska. His second wife bore him Alexander (d.1659), the Crown Grand Ensign (1641) and Palatine of Sandomierz (1656). He married, in 1642, Joanna Zamoyska. Their only son, Stanisław, married Eugenia Wiśniowiecka.

The Korecki fortune of Samuel (d.1622), father of Anna, and his brother Karol, who died in 1651 without issue, passed to Anna (who married Andrzej Leszczyński) and eventually to Samuel Leszczyński, even though his grand-aunt, Izabella (née Korecka) Czartoryska tried to claim some of it.
the highest offices of the Church and State. Andrzej (d.1658) became Crown Vice Chancellor (1645), Bishop of Chełmno (1646), Crown Grand Chancellor (1650) and Archbishop of Gniezno and Primate (1652). Bogusław (d.1659) served as Crown Treasurer from 1650–1658 and as Crown Vice-Chancellor from 1658–1659. Wacław (d.1666) rose from the Bishopric of Warmia (1644) to the Archbishops of Gniezno (1658). Jan (d.1678) became the Palatine of Łęczyca (1653), Palatine of Poznań (1656), Crown Vice-Chancellor (1659), Crown Grand Chancellor (1666) and Palatine of Kraków (1678). Anna was a distant cousin of Samuel Leszczyński (d.1676) who was married to Konstancja Wiśniowiecka. He inherited vast estates in Volynia. Samuel's father, the Palatine of Dorpat, Andrzej (d.1651) was married to Anna Korecka (Samuel's mother). Following her death, Andrzej married Katarzyna Niemirczówna, the sister of another magnate, Yurii Nemyrych.

Bieniewski must have been held in high regard by the magnates. His work in the Crown Chancery was diligent. He had the support of

The Palatine of Podolia (1618) and Kiev (1619), Sheriff-General of Kraków (1628), Crown Vice-Chancellor (1628) Crown Grand Chancellor (1635), Tomasz Zamoyski (d.1638), was married to Katarzyna Ostrogska. Their son Jan (d.1665), the Palatine of Kiev (1658) and of Sandomierz (1659) was married to Maria Kazimiera de la Grange d'Arquien, who subsequently became the wife of Jan Sobieski. Jan died without issue. His sisters, Gryzelda and Joanna, were married to powerful men: the former to Jeremi Wiśniowiecki; the latter, to Aleksander Koniecpolski.


39 Ibid., plate 119.

40 AGAD, MK, LI, Ms. 200.
such notables as Jerzy Lubomirski and Aleksander Koniecpolski. In 1656 he became, along with Jan Sobieski and Stanisław Jabłonowski, the guardian of Aleksander Ostrogski-Zasławski. In 1665 he was named, along with the Archbishop of Lviv, Jan Tarnowski; the Bishop of Kujawy, Kazimierz Czartoryski; the Bishop of Chełm, Tomasz Łężenski; the Palatine of Volynia, Michał Czartoryski; the Crown Equerry, Aleksander Lubomirski, and the Crown Grand Marshal, Jerzy Lubomirski, to be the executor of the testament of Jan Zamoyski. In 1666 Jan Sobieski advised his wife to make use of the services and to heed the advice of the Palatine of Chernihiv—i.e., Bieniewski.

It seems that Jan Kazimierz had chosen Bieniewski for yet another reason: he did not believe that the soldier-diplomats were capable of making headway with the Cossack hetman any longer. Fresh blood was needed. It had to be someone that Khmelnytskyi trusted. The following circumstances brought Bieniewski into the limelight.

42 Koniecpolski to Bieniewski, By Malbork [late] X.1658: Ibid., Ms. 3257/II, fo. 52.
44 Testament, Zamość, 2.IV.1665: Czart, Ms. 1657, p. 187.
45 Sobieski to Maria Kazimiera Sobieska, Żółkiew, late III.1666: Listy Sobieskiego, p. 97.
In the period during which the diplomats of the Commonwealth and Russia were engaged in negotiations in Nemezis, the Palatine of Chernihiv, Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, was authorized to resume negotiations with Khmelnytskyi. It seems most likely that new instructions, those referred to by the king, were prepared for him. Tyszkiewicz soon informed the king, however, that Khmelnytskyi, after being contacted by him, replied that he would not begin to hold any talks until such time as he would learn about the terms of the agreement between the Commonwealth and Russia. Since the king and many of the senators distrusted the Russians, even after the treaty was signed, and since they learned that Khmelnytskyi concluded an agreement with the Transylvanian prince against the Commonwealth, they decided on a course of action which would not only lead Khmelnytskyi to break with Alexei Mikhailovich and György Rákóczi II, but also to come to terms with Jan Kazimierz. This, in essence, was to be the mission of Bieniewski.

In January 1657 Khmelnytskyi responded to some official contact by despatching Branytskyi "on a certain mission" to Jan Kazimierz. He was contacted, in turn, by the Palatine of Poznan and the queen.

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46 On 22.VIII.1657 the first session began. On 3.XI.1657 the agreement was reached.

47 Jan Kazimierz to the Commissioners (negotiating with the Russians), Nęczyca, 5.X.1656: Czart., Ms. 386, pp. 85-88.

48 Instructions to Bieniewski, [Gdańsk, early 1.1657]: AGAD, MK, LL, Ms. 33, fos. 99'-100'. (Zherela, XII, part 5, does not have this part).

49 "Manuscript" of Z. Koniecpolski, 16.I.1657: PAN Kr., Ms. 1056, fo. 57r.

50 J. Leszczyński to Vyhovskyi, Kalisz, 31.I.1657: Czart., Ms. 384, p. 36

both of whom urged him to establish a modus vivendi with the Commonwealth. Approximately in the middle of the month, a messenger was despatched from Gdańsk, with letters of the king and the chancellor, letters of credit and instructions addressed to the Notary of Lutsk. Bieniewski, who was attending the funeral of Władysław Ostrogski-Zasławski in Tarnów, received all these documents at the close of the month.

Bieniewski's difficult task was outlined in a long written instruction. In the first place, the envoy was to convince Khmelnytskyi that his policy of switching alliances and protectors, in the hope of gaining autonomy for Ukraine, failed completely. In the beginning the Cossack hetman formed an alliance with Crimea, but as soon as the Tatars abandoned him and began to support the Commonwealth, he placed himself under the protection of the Russian tsar. This was hardly a wise move, he was to say, for once the Russians will gain full control of Ukraine the Cossacks soon thereafter will feel upon them the full weight of the tsarist yoke. Then, lately, considering the possibility

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52 Jan Kazimierz resided in Gdańsk from 15.XI.1656 to 10.II.1657.

53 Katarzyna Ostrogska-Zasławski to Chetvertynskyi, Łaka, 16.XII.1656: (She invited him to the funeral of her husband, which was to be held in Tarnów on January 29, 1657): Czart., Ms. 2446, p. 22; Bieniewski to D. Wiśniowiecki, [after departing from Tarnów, middle II.1657]: Ibid., p. 47; and "Information" of Peretjakowicz: Pamiątki, (new ed.), III, part 3, 342.

54 Instructions to Bieniewski, [Gdańsk, early I.1657]: AGAD, MK, LL, Ms. 33, fos. 99v-101r. Zherela, XII, part 5, 420-422 (fragment).
of an agreement between the Commonwealth and Russia, Khmelnytskyi allied himself with Transylvania. He certainly had to be aware that Rákóczi's military successes were only of temporary duration; these will end as soon as the Commonwealth will conclude alliances with the neighbouring powers. Moreover, the prince was in no position to regain from Sweden and Russia their territorial conquests within the Commonwealth. He will be compelled, therefore, after overrunning certain palatines of Little Poland, to take over Ukraine, for without Ukraine as a base, possessing neither Great Poland, Prussia nor Lithuania, the prince will be unable to defend himself effectively. Khmelnytskyi's connections with Rákóczi, therefore, will eventually lead to Ukraine's ruin.

Bieniewski was to stress, in the second place, that the best solution for Khmelnytskyi's aspirations was an agreement with the Commonwealth on the basis of the instructions prepared in 1655. The envoy was also to point out to the Cossack hetman that peace negotiations with Sweden were in progress. Should peace be concluded with the Swedes, as well as an agreement be signed with the Cossacks, then Russia also would be compelled to seek peace with the Commonwealth based on just and honourable conditions. The Commonwealth had no intention to turn against Ukraine, if this was what Khmelnytskyi feared, once alliances and peace treaties were signed with the neighbouring powers. As a sign of good faith the Commonwealth even will agree that the Cossack hetman, if he so wishes, maintain defensive alliances with Sweden and Transylvania. He cannot, however, provide them with military aid against the Commonwealth.

The king and the senators desired that an agreement be reached with Khmelnytskyi before the next session of the Diet, at which the tsar was to be formally elected to the Polish throne. This Diet was also to solve
all unresolved problems between the Commonwealth and Russia, particular-
ly the thorny question of Ukraine. For this reason Bieniewski was in-
structed as follows:

May Khmelnytskyi consider whether it is expedient [for the Diet to
agree] that the tsar be designated the successor of His Majesty
[of Poland],...or that Ukraine and greater part of Lithuania be
ceded to him. Both [of these conditions for peace with Russia]
are difficult and unacceptable, since one would draw [the Cossacks]
into servitude, which we do not wish [to happen]; the other, all
of us. [Therefore,] why is it not better for the Cossacks to come
to terms with us before [the next session of] the Diet, in order to
...dissuade the Muscovites from their pretensions, and who, follow-
ing the pacification of the Cossacks, would be compelled to seek
a [just and honourable] peace with us.

Finally, if Bieniewski failed to secure Khmelnytskyi's consent to
turn against Russia, "due to the oath which he swore to the Muscovites",
the envoy was to insure that he at least remained neutral in any conflict
between the Commonwealth and Russia.

Bieniewski, due to various reasons, but particularly due to the
invasion of the Palatinate of Ruthenia by Győrgy Rákóczi II at the close
of January, was unable to proceed to Chyhyryn directly. Moreover, before
departing on his mission, he wanted to gather first-hand information about
the latest developments in Ukraine and to investigate how he would be re-
ceived by the Cossack hetman, since all such intelligence would aid him
in his negotiations. For these and other reasons he sent Krzysztof
Peretjakiewicz, his secretary, to the Cossack capital with letters to
Khmelnytskyi, Vyhovskyi and Teteria. When Peretjakowicz, after a trip
full of adventure and danger, reached Chyhyryn and after contacting
Bieniewski's addressees, sent back an answer that Khmelnytskyi invited
his master to come, Bieniewski immediately despatched one of his aides,
Adam Radliński, back to Chyhyryn with an announcement that he would arrive there himself in a short time.  

Bieniewski appeared in Chyhyryn on March 3, shortly after the arrival of the Imperial envoy, Archbishop Parchevich. Since his report concerning this mission has probably perished or, due to circumstances, was a verbal one, it is necessary to reconstruct the whole proceeding from fragmentary sources.

Bieniewski, utilizing the services of Teteria as a go-between himself and Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi, and eventually managing to hold long talks with them, established a basis for the rapprochement. Apparently most of the provisions agreed to by the envoy and the Cossack hetman were revealed at the council of Cossack officers. This council, which held its deliberations from the middle of April, approved the provisions presented to it.

The following were the highlights of the new modus vivendi: Ukraine, which henceforth was to become the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, would comprise the third autonomous part of the Commonwealth. The new Grand Duchy was to be organized on the model of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; it was to have its own ministers of state; and it was to comprise the Palatinate of Kiev and Chyhyryn, the Palatine of Bratslav remaining part

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55"Information" of Peretjakowicz: Pamiętniki (new ed.), III, part 3, 442-444; and Bieniewski to D. Wiśniowiecki, [after departing from Tarnow, middle II.1657]: Czart., Ms. 2446, p. 48.

56Lisola to Leopold I, Danków, 3.VI.1657: Zherela, XII, part 5, 475; and Report of Marianovich, Prague, 7.VIII.1657: AOG, LIX, 545.
of the Crown. All the nobles could return, if they so wished, to the estates they owned within the boundaries of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. Its crown lands were to be used for the maintenance of the army. Regarding religious matters, the council approved a plan whereby a patriarch (all thought that the Patriarch of Antioch was most suitable)\textsuperscript{57} sent by the pope would find a solution how to reunite the Orthodox and the Uniate Churches. Thus, Bieniewski committed the Commonwealth to far-reaching concessions. Since there is no hint in his instruction that he was authorized to do this, Bieniewski must have been given some sort of additional confidential instructions.

Concerning other matters, Khmelnytskyi wanted that his son Yurii, who was elected as his successor, be confirmed at the hetman's office by the king. In replying to Bieniewski's request for military aid, he stated that at this time, due to his obligations to the tsar, he was unable to send Cossack troops to aid the Commonwealth against Sweden and Transylvania. His son, however, who did not take an oath of allegiance to the tsar, would be able to carry out the wishes of the king. It was, obviously, a good tactic not to commit the Cossack Army before a formal agreement was signed and ratified. Khmelnytskyi also advised the envoy that the Commonwealth should not expect any support from Lithuania, primarily because her troops would be utilized waging war against Russia. He did promise to recall Cossack troops from Rákóczi's side. Moreover, the Cossack hetman was even supposed to have requested the king to join him in an expedition against the

\textsuperscript{57}Nahaievskyi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 76.
Turks. 58

The new modus vivendi between the Commonwealth and Ukraine must have been based on a conditional agreement only. Bieniewski needed special authorization to conclude a permanent treaty. He must have made a brief written report to the king regarding his activities. He evaluated, no doubt, the results of his negotiations in very optimistic terms, and described the friendly attitudes of Khmelnytskyi and his officers, particularly of Vyshovskyi and Teteria. With the latter, who was shortly to be sent to Moscow, the envoy arranged a scheme to sow the seeds of distrust between the Cossacks and the tsarist government. 59 For the part these individuals played, they received, most likely at the suggestion of Bieniewski, letters of thanks and appreciation from the king. 60

On April 28 Bieniewski received his final briefing and was handed letters addressed to the king and the chancellor. Khmelnytskyi informed the king that he "carried on familiar conversations" with Beiniewski, "regarding matters confided [to him] by Your Majesty, searching for the way by which neither the kingship of Your Majesty shall be degraded, nor our liberties shall be reduced". The envoy was to report verbally why all of the wishes of the king were not acted upon. He was also to give


59 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 19.IX.1657: LNA, IX, 79.

60 Jan Kazimierz to Vyshovskyi, Danków 28.V.1658: Akty YuZR, XI, 815-816. Similar letters must have been sent to other Cossack officers.
an account of the negotiations. The Cossack hetman concluded his letter by asking the king to return Bieniewski to Chyhyryń to conclude negotiations. 61 Lengthy letters, containing assurances of his commitment to the cause of rapprochement, were also written by Vyhovskyi to the king 62 and the chancellor. 63

Already on his return trip, Bieniewski confided to individuals that he would be able to gain anything he wanted from Khmelnytskyi, as long as the Cossack Army was appeased by significant concessions. 64 That he disseminated such news and all sort of other bits of optimistic information, may be seen by examining the contents of the letters of the senators, 65 the Crown Grand Hetman 66 and Volynian nobles. 67 Generally, the reports of Bieniewski, as well as those of Marianovich, Parchevich and the Queen's envoy, Krzysztof Słowieński, 68 were greeted with great pleasure throughout the Commonwealth. "Peace with the Cossacks is certain",

65 Senators to Khmelnytskyi, Sokal, 17.V.1657: Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 197-198.
66 Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, Sokal, 23.V.1657: Pamiętniki (old ed.). III, part 3, 142-144.
67 Volynian Nobles to Khmelnytskyi, Olyka, 7.VI.1657: Czart., Ms. 2446, p. 64.
68 AGAD, ASK, RS, Ms. 54, fo. 55r.
wrote the Palatine of Poznań to his friend. "The decision of Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks, that they desire to submit themselves to the king, is quite certain", reported the Archbishop of Pisa to Rome.

"Bieniewski confirmed", stated the apostolic delegate, "the excellent attitude [of Khmelnytskyi] towards the final agreement with His Majesty". Apart from the raising of a few voices, not to trust Khmelnytskyi and to exercise caution, the general mood within the country was one which favoured the rapprochement.

Bieniewski arrived in Danków on June 3, in order to make a full report on his mission to the king and the senators. He was not detained for long, particularly because news was received about the ill-health of Khmelnytskyi and even rumors about his death. One group of individuals was afraid that with the death of Khmelnytskyi the expected rapprochement-agreement with the Cossacks would also be buried; the other, that

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69 J. Leszczyński to Master of the Pantry of Kraków, Wrocław, 16.VI.1657: Czart., Ms. 388, p. 155.

70 Pannochieschi to Rospigliosi, Vienna, 9.VI.1657: LNA, IX, 49.

71 Vidoni to Holy See, Krzepice, 13.VI.1657: Ibid.

72 Wielopolski to Jan Kazimierz, By Przemysl, 9.VI.1657: Ossol., Ms. 5808/III, p. 47; and Vidoni to Holy See, Częstochowa and Krzepice, 8.III., 29.V. and 6.VI.1657: LNA, IX, 22, 45, 47.

73 Lisola to Leopold I, Danków, 3.VI.1657: Zherela, XII, part 5, 475; and Vidoni to Holy See, Krzepice, 6.VI.1657: LNA, IX, 47-48.

74 Already on May 23 Vidoni reported the death of Khmelnytskyi. See LNA, IX, 41.

75 Vidoni to Holy See, Krzepice, 6.VI.1657: Ibid., p. 47.
after his death a rift would emerge among the Cossacks, and this in itself would aid the negotiations to conclude favourably. Thus, both groups clamoured to send back Bieniewski as soon as possible. In the meantime Khmelnytskyi was informed that an envoy would be sent to him shortly. The king also declared that he approved the passing of the hetman's mace to Yurii Khmelnytskyi. Eventually Bieniewski received final briefing on June 15. He departed from Danków with plenipotentiary powers to negotiate and to conclude an agreement with Khmelnytskyi. His letters of credence were worded masterfully.

The envoy was instructed to point out to the Cossack hetman that he was in a precarious position, because he had lost the confidence of Russia and angered Turkey. The Turks, together with the Tatars, were planning to restore the influence of the sultan within the Danubian principalities; moreover, they were also planning to subjugate Ukraine. It was therefore in Khmelnytskyi's interest to act on the following advice: to conclude peace with the Commonwealth as soon as possible, to

76 Vidoni to Holy See, Krzepice, 16.VI.1657: Ibid., p. 52.
77 Vidoni to Holy See, Krzepice, 13.VI.1657: Ibid.
78 Vidoni to Holy See, Krzepice, 6.VI.1657: Ibid., p. 47.
79 Vidoni to Holy See, Częstochowa, 17.VI.1657: Ibid., p. 53.
80 Jan Kazimierz to Vyhovskyi, Danków, 13.VI.1657: Samiilo Velychko, Skazaniie o voine kozatskoj z poliakamy (Kiev, 1926), p. 162. (Similar letter must have been prepared for Khmelnytskyi).
recall Cossack units from Rákóczi's camp, to send 10,000 troops to
the king against the Swedes, to order other regiments to march with
the khan into Transylvania, and for himself to remain in Ukraine for
the sake of safety and to watch carefully the turn of events.

Bieniewski was to be on guard during the period of negotiations.
Khmelnytskyi might attempt to avert the danger threatening him by
shielding himself with the parleys. The envoy was to watch for the
following signs: the unnecessary prolongation of negotiations, any
attempt to pass information about the proceedings to Moscow and any
attempt to send confidential letters of the king to Crimea or Turkey.
In case difficulties would arise, the envoy was to approach his Tatar
counter-part and inform him whether Khmelnytskyi should be treated as
an ally or an enemy.

The authors of the instruction emphasized to Bieniewski that it
was imperative to conclude the agreement in the shortest time possible,
to secure Khmelnytskyi's confirmation of it by oath and to ensure that
the whole matter was accomplished in secrecy; then the envoy was to re­
turn to the king without delay. The chief reason for secrecy was to
score a coup in the parleys with Russia. Faced with a fait accompli,
The Russians would have no choice but to agree to greater concessions.
Afterwards, if Khmelnytskyi wished, he may inform the tsar that he be­
came a subject of the king and request to act as a mediator between the
Commonwealth and Russia.

Finally, Bieniewski was to convey the following sentiments to Khmel­
nytskyi:

His Majesty declares before God the following: that He, as well as
all the Estates of the Commonwealth, desire an honest, true and
never-ending union with the noble-born Hetman and the whole
Zaporozhian Army; that whatever was committed by both sides
through sin [during the conflict since 1648] will be offered
up to God's justice and will pass into eternal oblivion; and
that this [declaration] is sincere truth and honesty on Our
part, we call upon the Almighty as witness and judge.81

Notwithstanding the assurance of good reception in Chyhyryn 82 and
the urgency of arranging a quick settlement with Khmelnytskyi, Bieniew-
ski did not proceed directly to Chyhyryn. There were several reasons for
this delay. The Cossack hetman did not recall the troops under the com-
mand of Antin Zhdanovych;83 made private deals with magnates84 and nobles85
regarding their properties and, along with his secretary, issued threats
to others.86 Moreover, Khmelnytskyi extended his sway over the Pinsk
Districts of the Palatinate of Brest.87 Bieniewski was alarmed that all
such actions, particularly the last one, indicated the Cossack hetman's
change of mind regarding "his earlier favourable inclination towards

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81 Instructions to Bieniewski, Danków, 13.VI.1657: Pamiatniki (old

82 Vyhovskyi to Bieniewski, Chyhyryn, 20./ [30].VI.1657: Czart.,
Ms. 2446, p. 66.

83 Zhdanovych to Sapieha, By Turbina, 28.VI./8.VII.1657: Racz.,
Ms. 88, p. 179.

84 Khmelnytskyi to K. Radziwiłł, Chyhyryn, 24.IV./4.V.1657: Racz.,
Ms, 76, p. 232.

85 Khmelnytskyi to Chetvertynskyi, Chyhyryn, 17./27.I.1657: DKhmel.
pp. 556-557.

86 Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi to Sapieha, Chyhyryn, 11./21., 17./27.I.,
24.IV./4.V., and 25.IV./5.V.1657: DKhmel., pp. 554-555, 583-584, 587; and

87 For the background see Lipiński, op. cit., pp. 571-577. The repre-
sentatives of the Pinsk gentry, Tukasz Jelski and Adam Brzeski, swore
oaths to Khmelnytskyi in Chyhyryn on 20.VI.1657: Ibid., 514-516. Khmel-
nytskyi's guarantees to them were issued in Chyhyryn on 28.VI./8.VII.1657:
Ibid., pp. 517-519.
peace". While somewhat discouraged by these unfavourable developments, Bieniewski did not give up hope of being able to carry out his mission. He stopped in Dubno and, by writing letters to the king, chancellor, Crown Hetman and the khan, attempted to prevent hostilities from taking place between the two parties. He wanted to see the Cossack hetman first.

In writing to Khmelnytskyi and Vyshovskyi, Bieniewski remarked that the king and senators: "having accepted gratefully the combination" of the hetman, urged him "ad continuandum opus" as quickly as possible. Giving various reasons why the negotiations should proceed as planned, he also asked for their cooperation and support. After arriving in Dubno, he wrote, he heard all sorts of conflicting news. Did they still want to negotiate with him? If they did, where was he to come? His letters ended with a plea for a quick response. It is quite possible that he may have included his instruction to his addressees, so that they would believe him. Bieniewski's boast, later on, that "he presented to them such [convincing arguments] that they [had no choice but to] agree to allow him to come", however, must be taken with a grain of salt.

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88 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 19.IX.1657: LNA, IX, 78.
89 Ibid.
90 This is revealed by the letters of the king and the Chancellor. Jan Kazimierz and Koryciński, By Kraków, 8. and 9.VIII.1657: Akty YuZR., XI, 816-818.
91 Bieniewski to Vyshovskyi, Dubno, 4.VII.1657: Czart., Ms. 2446, pp. 66-68. He must have written a similar letter to Khmelnytskyi.
92 Hrushevskyi, op. cit., IX, part 2, 1454-1455.
93 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 19.IX.1657: LNA, IX 78.
By the month of July, obviously, there were other reasons than only the envoy's charm and talents responsible for the Cossack hetman's decision to resume negotiations. Khmelnytskyi, being threatened from all sides, found it desirable to conclude an agreement with the Commonwealth. It was most likely because of this danger that he issued a safe conduct pass to Bieniewski, his main link with the Commonwealth's government, and extended to him a cordial invitation to come as soon as possible. Bieniewski wasted no time: on August 3rd he left Dubno.

94 According to one historian, the magnates Stanisław Potocki, Jerzy Lubomirski, Stefan Czarniecki and Jan Sapieha, conceived the following diabolical plan in July 1657:

1. Their agent was to proceed to Chyhyryn and to endeavour to detach the Cossacks from Russia by offers, in the king's name, of an autonomous duchy to Khmelnytskyi, of various districts to the Cossack officers and of patents of nobility, as well as confirmation of liberties, to the Cossack rank-and-file. If the Cossacks accepted these offers, they were, moreover, to be permitted to invade Russia—if they so wished—within one or two years; if they refused, they were to be threatened with reprisals from the Poles and the Tatars.

2. This envoy-agent was also to attempt to create a rift between the officers and the common Cossacks, and to convince the people that they were worse off under the rule of the Cossacks than under that of the Poles.

3. He was to spare no effort to explain to the Cossacks why the oath sworn to the tsar did not bind them any more—i.e., his task was to bring to a rupture the relations established at Pereiaslav-Moscow.

4. If he failed to bring back the Cossacks on the side of the Commonwealth, the magnates were determined to eliminate the most influential individuals in Russia and Ukraine by means of poison.

See Dmytro Bantysh-Kamenskyi, Istoriia Maloi Rossii at vodvoreniiia Slavian v sei stranie do unichtozhenia Getmanstva, 4th ed. (Kiev, 1903), p. 223. (The author refers to "Diplom. Sob. diel. mezh. Ros. i Polsk. Gos. ch. 4". This account is, without a doubt, the product of some individual's wild imagination).

95 Khmelnytskyi and Vyhovskyi to Bieniewski, Chyhyryn, 9./19.VII.1657: Kubala, Wojna brandenburska, pp. 436-437, doc. no. xxviii.
Unfortunately, he arrived too late to confer with the Cossack hetman, for on August 6th Bohdan Khmelnytskyi died.97 Bieniewski was informed about the death of Khmelnytskyi even before he reached Chyhyryn. Once he arrived there, due to the very unsettled state of affairs, he found himself having to account for his presence to various individuals and even to seek permission to be allowed to stay.98 Due to the general confusion and because the senior officers were busy with funeral arrangements for Khmelnytskyi, the envoy could hardly accomplish his mission. This did not mean, however, that he remained idle. On the contrary, he established contacts with various Cossack officers, and by making far-reaching promises, he attempted to draw them into the "Polonophile camp".99

After the burial of Khmelnytskyi in Subotiv, on September 2,100 a general council was held in Chyhyryn. On the 5th the council approved the formula, whereby Vyhovskyi would act as the hetman until Yurii Khmelnytskyi came of age.101 At this time Bieniewski pressed Vyhovskyi for a hearing, but he was secretly told that nothing could be done until the foreign representatives departed, especially the Russian envoy Vasilii Jerlicz, op. cit., II, 5.

96 Jerlicz, op. cit., II, 5.
97 Diary of Sebesi, 6.VIII.1657: MHHD, XXIII, 518; Lilliecrona to Karl X Gustav, Chyhyryn, 28.VII./7.VIII.1657: Arkhiv YuZR, part 3, VI, 706; and Vyhovskyi to Ziuzin, Chyhyryn, 6./16.VIII.1657: Akty YuZR, IV, 3.
98 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 19.IX.1657: LNA, IX, 78.
99 Lilliecrona to Karl X. Gustav, Chyhyryn, 17./27.VIII.1657: MHHD, XXIII,566.
100 Ibid., and the Report of Rokolov: Akty YuZR, IV, 12.
101 See the letters of Vyhovskyi to various persons: Akty YuZR, IV, 9 12; and XI, 813–815.
Kokin. On the 13th Kokin departed; but soon after him appeared another important visitor: the head of the Muscovite streltsii, the alter ego of Alexei Mikhailovich—Artamon Matveev.103

Apparently Matveev brought certain orders from the tsar, which "angered the Cossacks greatly". Fuel to this fire of Cossack discontent was also added by another recent arrival from Moscow, Pavlo Teteria. Acting on the instigation of Bieniewski, Teteria began to agitate the Cossacks by spreading ill-will towards Russia. He reported that he was "badly received in Moscow" and claimed that "nothing [good] can be expected from there, except unbearable yoke". By this time many Cossacks expressed a desire for an understanding with the Commonwealth. Thus, according to Bieniewski, Teteria's anti-Russian statements, "resulted in a great benefit for us".104 No doubt the 13,000 zr.105 which he received also helped him to win some new friends.

Of course, there also existed Russian and Swedish supporters among the Cossacks. According to the envoy, the "Russophiles" were calling on the Cossacks to remain loyal to the tsar simply because they intended not to lose "the confiscated estates of the nobles". The magnate Yurii Nemyrych, heretofore in the service of Karl X Gustav, also "worked a great deal against our king".106 Nemyrych, no doubt, attempted to influence

102 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 19.IX.1657: LNA, IX, 78.
103 Akty YuZR, IV, 21-26, VII, 233; and Hrushevskyi, op. cit., X, 46.
104 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 19.IX.1657: LNA, IX, 79; and Jerlicz, op. cit., II, 6.
105 RS (1659): BOssol., Ms. 9532/II, fo. 64V.
106 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 19.IX.1657: LNA, IX, 79.
Vykovskyi to cast his lot with the Swedes. Moreover, there were signs of a growing power struggle. Opposition was already forming against Vykovskyi, under the leadership of the head of the Zaporozhians, Yakiv Barabash, and the Colonel of the Potlava Regiment, Martyn Pushkar.

Approximately in the middle of October, before his recall from Chyhyryn, Bieniewski and Vykovskyi concluded a temporary agreement. The following were the main terms:

1. Armistice was to come in force between the two parties and was to last until Whitsuntide—April 21, 1658.

2. A line of demarcation was drawn through Volynia: the Cossacks, were not to cross the River Sluch; the Poles, the River Horyn. The territory between the two rivers was to be neutral.

3. The District of Pinsk, since it accepted Cossack protection, was to remain temporarily under Cossack control.

4. The Crown Army was to be stationed along the demarcation line. On a call from Vykovskyi it was to join the Cossacks and to march against Russia.

5. The Poles were to insure that the Tatars ceased hostilities against the Cossacks, and that upon the request of Vykovskyi, aid the Cossacks militarily.

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107 He was designated to negotiate with Lilliecrona: Arkhiv YuZR, part 3, VI, 332.


109 Vykovskyi to Bieniewski, Kiev, 19./29.XI.1657 and Bieniewski to Vykovskyi, [Dubno, 5.I.1658]: AGAD, AKW, Koz. 42, nos. 65, 74. See also Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 19.IX.1657: LNA, IX, 79.
At this point Bieniewski departed from Chyhyryn, arriving in Dubno on October 22. After completing some tasks pertaining to his mission, he left for Warsaw.

III

Approximately at the same time as the Castellan of Volynia arrived in Warsaw in November, the Treasurer of Kiev, Danylo Voronych, reached Chyhyryn. Voronych delivered to the Cossack hetman letters from Jan Kazimierz, Andrzej Leszczyński and Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski.

The king, expecting that the majority of the Cossacks favoured a reunion with the Commonwealth, congratulated Vykovskyi on securing the hetman's mace, expressed hope that he favoured the conclusion of an agreement as quickly as possible and urged him to send Cossack representatives to the next Diet, in order to settle permanently all existing differences and to ratify the agreement formally.

Vykovskyi was also urged by the primate, who deplored the needless shedding of Christian blood, to seek a speedy reconciliation. It was much more advantageous for the freedom-loving Cossacks, he maintained, to reunite themselves with the Poles, who likewise greatly valued their liberties, rather than to suffer under the intolerable yoke of the des-

\[ \text{Jerlicz, op. cit., III, 6.} \]

\[ \text{RS (1659): Ossol., Ms. 9532/II, p. 131. Vykovskyi informed the Russian envoy Ragozin, on November 30, 1657, that Voronych was sent to him by Jan Kazimierz. See Akty YuZR, IV, 66-67.} \]
The Cossack hetman replied in figurative and flowery language, so characteristic of his style. He was delighted, he wrote, to hear from the king and greatly flattered by his kind remarks and good wishes. He emphasized that he endeavoured to find a solution to this terrible conflict even during the lifetime of his predecessor, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi; while at present, wielding the command over the Cossack Army, he redoubled his efforts to find some effective means in order to extinguish the flames of this destructive internal fire. Yet, before this "combination" so much desired by the king could be realized, he had to have iron-clad guarantees that the arrangements which he made with Bieniewski were to be maintained: i.e., the armistice and the territorial status quo.

Vyhovskyi also remarked that he deeply regretted that at the present time he was unable to act on all the wishes of the king. In particular, he could not send his representatives to the next session of the Diet. He asked Jan Kazimierz to be patient and to wait "until Heaven shall grant us a more opportune occasion for such plans".113

In reply to the primate, the Cossack hetman reiterated, more or less, the same thoughts. He also stressed that without satisfactory guarantees, the Cossacks will not sanction any agreement with the Commonwealth, because they found no great need for it. Thus, both of these letters of

112. These letters perished, but their contents are evident from Vyhovskyi's replies to the king and the primate. See nn.113 and 114 below.

Vyhovskyi, while politely worded, revealed neither any great enthusiasm for negotiations, nor for the conclusion of a speedy agreement.\textsuperscript{114}

The Cossack hetman's position, however, was not one of strength.\textsuperscript{115} With the passage of time, due to various developments, his position deteriorated even more. As the leader of the "aristocratic" group, comprising many Cossack officers, nobles and Orthodox prelates, he was attempting to consolidate power into his own hands and to make his rule permanent. In order to gain autonomy for Ukraine, he also endeavoured to assert his independence from the tsar. Facing internal and external


pressure, on the one hand, from some Cossack officers, the masses of Cossack rank-and-file and the Zaporozhians; on the other, from the Russians, Vykovskyi had to seek outside aid. The alliance with the Swedes soon proved to be of very little practical value. The only alternative was Crimea, but it was impossible to conclude a stable alliance with the Tatars without first agreeing to return under the rule of the Polish king. The real significance of Vykovskyi's letters was that he did not wish to commit himself at this time. A brighter star might yet appear for him.

The court circles in Warsaw, no doubt, were quite aware of Vykovskyi's predicaments and motives. His letters signified to them a tactical move on his part in order to gain greater concessions. Voronych, upon returning from his mission in January 1658, not only confirmed this, but also expressed faith in the favourable outcome of Polish-Cossack contacts. The Cossacks, he wrote to his Orthodox colleague, were "inclined to penance". Expecting, within a short period of time the convocation of the Diet, to which Vykovskyi would send his envoys, Voronych expressed sincere desire that its sessions would produce "eternal peace" with the Cossacks.

Another person who was generally optimistic about the possibility of concluding an agreement with the Cossacks, even though he did have

116 Perhaps the document from Chhyryn, dated 1.I.1658, was the report of Voronych to Jan Kazimierz. See AGAD, Inwentarz Nowickiego, Koz., no. 16, fo. 3v.

117 Voronych to Chetvertynskyi, Kuchitska Volia, 6/[16].I.1658: Czart., Ms. 2446, p. 90.
some reservations about the trustworthiness of Vyhovskyi,118 was Bieniewski. After arriving in Warsaw on November 16, 1657,119 he learned that the king had left the capital for Bydgoszcz and then departed from that city to Poznań.120 Wasting no time, Bieniewski sped to Poznań and reached it in time for the important war conference on November 26.121 Here, before the king and the senators, he made a full report on his activities and on the general state of affairs in Ukraine. To them he also outlined his plan of action.

Bieniewski urged Jan Kazimierz "not to waste time, but to march immediately [at the head of the army], in order to take advantage of these favourable circumstances" that he mentioned in his report. He argued that such a move would be successful in the following manner:

When His Majesty and His troops will draw near, the whole [Cossack Army] will join Him. This is one of the greatest incentives towards an alliance and peace; as well as the following: that [the Cossacks] are aware that they do not have aid from any one at present, while danger exists [for them] of falling into the bondage of the Prince of Muscovy, who desires to hold in his hands all the towns of Ukraine.122

It appears, therefore, that Bieniewski had little faith in Vyhovskyi's ability to retain power. He was more sure of Teteria and saw

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118. Bieniewski's "Supplement" to his first report to Koryciński, [Polonne, 31.I.1658]: AGAD, MK, LL, Ms. 33, fo. 82.
120. Kubala, Wojna brandenburska, pp. 225, 258.
121. His signature appears on a document which ratified the treaty with the Elector Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg, Poznań, [26].XI.1657: Czart., Ms. 388, p. 334.
the need of supporting the plan of the Khan, who clamoured for war against the Cossacks during the period of political instability in Ukraine. Bieniewski even offered to take command of the troops himself.

Jan Kazimierz and the senators, however, voted against Bieniewski's plans. They pointed out that most of the military units were already allocated to the various theatres of war with Sweden. They saw no need to place Vyhopoldkyi in a desperate position. Moreover, no one desired at this time to deteriorate further relations with Russia. Direct and obvious involvement in Ukraine, it was feared by them, would only lead to a rupture between the Commonwealth and Russia. For these reasons Bieniewski's advice and plans were unacceptable. He was instructed to return to Volynia and to carry on negotiations with Vyhopoldkyi in secrecy. Once there, he was to inscribe, as well, that the armistice and the territorial status quo were respected by the troops of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

By the beginning of the second week of December, Bieniewski departed from Poznań. After delivering certain letters and messages, relating to the conduct of the Grand Ducal troops, to the Sheriff of Łuków, Stanisław Domaszewski, who was requested to pass them to several addressees,
including the Bishop of Lutsk, Jan Wydżga,\textsuperscript{125} Bieniewski began to busy himself with his main task.

In the middle of December, not yet at his destination, he made his first report to the king and the vice-chancellor. Enclosing Vyhovskyi's latest letter, Bieniewski pleaded that it, as well as other original pieces of correspondence that he would submit in future for the purpose of informing the king and the chancellors on the progress of negotiations, be put in a safe place and their contents be kept in strict confidence. This letter, emphasized Bieniewski, confirmed the accuracy of the report he made in Poznań; however, care should be taken, he warned, not to believe the Cossack hetman completely, for he raised the hopes too high with regard to speedy reconciliation. Promising to work diligently, Bieniewski explained that he intended "to provoke the Zaporozhian Hetman to conclude negotiations" and to send an able individual to him, who would gather intelligence about "what is happening there [in Ukraine] among them". Finally, he expressed his views on the handling of the Tatar envoy. Since his own plan, with regard to the movement of the Crown troops was not accepted, he was particularly anxious that Tatar troops enter Ukraine. The khan, he insisted, should be asked to be prepared to march at the head of the Horde by February at the latest.\textsuperscript{126}

Three days later, upon learning that Cossack envoys were on their way to the king, Bieniewski wrote again to the king and the vice-chancellor.

\textsuperscript{125} Wydżga to Jan Kazimierz, [Lutsk, late XII.] 1657: Ossol., Ms. 208/II, fos. 89'-90'; and Wydżga to Bieniewski, Lutsk, 28.XII.1657: AGAD, AKW, Koz. 42, no. 73.

\textsuperscript{126} Bieniewski to Jan Kazimierz and Trzebicki, Kijany, 15.XII.1657: AGAD, AKW, Koz. 42, nos. 66-67.
He advised them to expedite the envoys as quickly as possible, not to reveal any matters to them and to answer Vykovskyyi's letters in rather general terms. Bieniewski anxious to handle the negotiations himself, did not fail to point out that both the late Khmelnytskyi and Vykovskyyi expressed confidence in him and desired "that negotiations be concluded by me". He was concerned, as well, that there be no leaks of information, for these, he argued, would endanger Vykovskyyi's position among the Cossacks and, in turn, lead to the collapse of negotiations. 127

Within a short time after his arrival in Volynia, Bieniewski established himself in Dubno and reported that he was in contact, once again, with the Cossack hetman. 128 Out of four letters written to him by Vykovskyyi since his departure from Ukraine, two failed to reach him; one of them he received on his way from Poznań; finally, the fourth one, was delivered to him on January 5, 1658 in Dubno.

Vykovskyyi's letters contained many complaints. In the letter dated November 29, 1657, he informed Bieniewski that he learned about the crossing of the Horyn River by the Crown Army and its seizure of certain posts garrisoned by Cossack troops. This sort of action, he pointed out, was a direct violation of the armistice agreement. Since, however, he did not

127 Bieniewski to Jan Kazimierz and Trzebicki, Horodło, 18.XII.1657: Ibid., nos. 69-70.

128 For the background see Bieniewski's reports to Koryciński, Polonne, 27.I.1658 and [Polonne, 31.I.1658]; and to [Trzebicki, Dubno, 9.] I.1658: Pamiątki (old ed.), III, part 3, 188-197, 201-206; and AGAD, MK, LL, Ms. 33, fos. 82v-83v. Bieniewski also submitted a report (contents unknown) to Prażmowski from Polonne, on 27.I.1658: BOK, Ms. 4023/III. fo. 25 (Opis, p. 281).
wish to break the truce, he ordered all Cossack units to ignore this provocation and, under no circumstances, to cross "the border agreed between us, that is, Horyn River". Vyhovskyi pressed Bieniewski to take pains to insure that no further incidents of this nature occurred in the future. Moreover, he asked, what was he to make of rumors circulating among the Cossacks that the Crown Army intended to invade Ukraine? Finally, he requested that the Orthodox bishops be permitted to come to Kiev in order to participate in the election of a new metropolitan. 129

The letter of December 29 was even more bitter. Vyhovskyi made his feeling plain to his addressee: if Bieniewski failed to stop the infractions of the armistice, he might be forced to repay in kind, for "bella irritantur bellis". The Cossack hetman was particularly disturbed about the actions of Sapieha's troops, who pushed out Cossack garrisons from the Pinsk District. Moreover, he was very angry at the mistreatment of Łukasz Jelski, the Marshal of Pinsk, demanding justice for him and restoration of his honour. At the same time, however, Vyhovskyi served notice that he did not intend to back down on this issue for, he revealed to Bieniewski, he sent out troops to garrison that area once again. He justified his step by claiming that the nobles there requested Cossack "protection". He had authentic documents to prove this. In any case, Vyhovskyi claimed, there was no reason why the appearance of Cossacks in Pinsk District should have any repercussions on negotia-

129 Vyhovskyi to Bieniewski, Kiev, 19./ [29].XI.1657: AGAD, AKW, Koz. 42, no. 65.
At the close of January Bieniewski received another letter, in which the Cossack hetman advised him to spare no effort in order to insure that his side observed the conditions of the armistice and maintained good relations with the Cossacks until a new "combination shall be arranged between us". He assured Bieniewski that he would carry out all obligations on his part and that he would prepare for the re-opening of negotiations as soon as possible. As far as the lines of demarcation were concerned, he pointed out that they both agreed that "the territory between [the Rivers] Horyn and Sluch...be free from the passage of [Cossack], as well as Polish armies". Vyhovskyi did not deny—this was an earlier complaint of Bieniewski—that Cossack garrisons occupied and were stationed on the neutral territory; he argued, however, that this did not violate their agreement, because nobles in those areas actually requested the Cossack garrisons for their protection. Again the Cossack hetman reminded Bieniewski about the arrangement they made regarding the Pinsk District. The nobles of Pinsk, he stressed, "accepted, under certain conditions, our protection" out of their own free will. He demanded, therefore, that the Ducal grand hetman be clearly instructed not to penetrate with his troops into Pinsk and not to cause harm to anyone there.  

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In order to ascertain that there be no resumption of hostilities through misunderstandings or minor violations of armistice, Bieniewski assured Vyhovskyi that he took great pains to insure the inviolability of all arrangements. Strict orders were issued to the troops along the Horyn not to cross it. Moreover, he was in constant touch with the Sapieha and his field commanders. Bieniewski promised to refer the issue of Pinsk and the case of Jelski to the king for his decision. He asked Vyhovskyi, however, to supply him all the necessary documents. It was his turn to charge that the Cossacks had violated the agreement, since they penetrated beyond Horyn River and established garrisons on neutral territory. In order to protect his credibility and not to jeopardize the negotiations, Vyhovskyi was compelled, insisted Bieniewski, to withdraw the garrisons as soon as possible.132

The Castellan of Volynia, indeed, had his hands full. In his reports he stressed that the main problem—Pinsk and Volynia—arose through the irresponsible actions of local nobles, who had invited Cossack garrisons for their protection. Thus, within a short period of time the Cossacks controlled most of the neutral territory, starting from Stepan, in the north,—Mezhyrych, Korets, Hoshcha, Ostoroh, Zaslav, Polonne, Kostiantyniv—to Mezhybizh, in the south. Even though private individuals were at fault, these Cossack garrisons had to be withdrawn. They created, among others, the following problems: the gentry were burdened with money payments and forced to provide provisions and quarters; less space was left for the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, also occupying winter quarters along the Horyn; the close proximity of

132 Bieniewski to Vyhovskyi, [Dubno, 5.1.1658]: AGAD, AKW, Koz. 42, no. 74.
Cossack and Grand Ducal troops only led to conflicts; and finally, Vyhovskyi established "listening posts" through which he was able to gather information about the affairs of the Commonwealth.

Of course, in the interest of peace, Bieniewski wrote to the Crown and the Ducal grand Hetmans asking them to insure that none of their units crossed the Horyn River. He also informed the Lithuanian grand hetman that Vyhovskyi considered the penetration of his army into Pinsk a violation of the armistice agreement. Sapieha denied that his soldiers broke the armistice; on the contrary, he maintained, the Cossacks were at fault by occupying the neutral territory. He promised, however, to issue strict orders to his army and to pull it back considerably from the Horyn, in order to avoid future clashes. Yet, he emphasized that the Cossack occupation of the Pinsk District "cannot be accepted"; it had to be "totally free from this [Cossack] protection". 133 Potocki was more co-operative. 134

Bieniewski also contacted various Cossack garrison commanders, insisting that they violated the armistice agreement. He complained that they harmed the nobles and charged that they abused their authority. The replies he received from them were polite. The commanders denied all


charges and laid all the blame on Ducal troops. Bieniewski noted that they had no intention of withdrawing. The nobles whom he instructed to demand the withdrawal of Cossack garrisons, quickly found out that it was much easier to invite the Cossack "protectors" than to ask them to leave.

Turning to the recent developments in Ukraine, Bieniewski stressed that he did not guarantee that Vyhovskiyi would honour the agreement they made. His own letters, full of contradictory promises and statements, served as best evidence of his untrustworthiness. Moreover, the Russians also suspected him of "treason"; the Tatars continued to be hostile to him; and finally, there emerged dissention within the Cossack ranks against his policies. Thus, in general, the affairs of Ukraine were in a "state of confusion". All these developments, claimed Bieniewski, were, "by the will of God, the fruits of my labour".

Vyhovskiyi attempted to save himself from this predicament by gravitating among the Commonwealth, Crimea and Russia. He was quite aware that the Russians suspected him of "treachery". His many attempts to camouflage the reality brought little benefit: day by day relations with Russia worsened. Vyhovskiyi had enough of "the Muscovite oppression", but he had to tolerate it because he was uncertain what to expect from the Polish-Tatar quarter. This was the main reason, explained Bieniewski, why Vyhovskiyi repeated in every letter that he had to have a guarantee that the Poles would honour the armistice agreement.

It was quite obvious, continued Bieniewski, that at this time Vyhovskyi could not have both the Russians and the Tatars as allies. He did establish contacts with the Bey of Perekop and he did send his envoys to Mehmed Giray IV with a proposal for concluding an alliance. His "intrigues" with the Tatars should be watched carefully, advised Bieniewski, but as far as he was concerned, Vyhovskyi could gain Tatar support only if he concluded an agreement with the Commonwealth and consented to attack Russia.

Most of the Cossacks preferred the Tatars as allies; the Zaporozhians, on the contrary, preferred to cast their lot with the Commonwealth, and if this proved to be impossible to achieve, to maintain the existing relationship with Russia. Vyhovskyi had to make a choice eventually, but no matter which side he would choose, there would be conflicts. The information sent to Bieniewski by such "friends" as Hrusha, particularly details of Vyhovskyi's conflict with Barabash, clearly indicated that many Cossacks disliked Vyhovskyi. Bieniewski expected, therefore, that within a short time an open rebellion would begin against Vyhovskyi.

In concluding his reports, Bieniewski mentioned that he had received a communication from the king to report to Warsaw by February 11. He was asked, no doubt, to attend the planned pre-Diet congress. He asked to be excused from this duty, because his presence in Volynia was much more needed than in the capital. He was especially worried about the possibility of eruption of new conflicts during his absence, which could prove fatal to his negotiations with the Cossack hetman.

While Bieniewski wrote his reports, Vyhovskyi acted against Pushkar and Barabash and despatched to him a new emissary, Feodosii Tomkovych.
He was sent on January 19 from Chyhyryn with Vyshovskyi's letters which announced that his envoy had the task of clearing up misunderstandings and to prepare the way for the conclusion of an agreement. Tomkovych, commonly called "the Greek", was a Lviv merchant. Previously he had served Bohdan Khmelnytskyi; during this time, completely trusted by Vyshovskyi, he carried important functions for the Cossack hetman. Even Bieniewski trusted Tomkovych and appointed him as his agent in Chyhyryn.

It is not certain for whom he worked faithfully, for he gained the reputation of being willing to sell his services to the highest bidder. On February 10 he finally reached Bieniewski. Tomkovych confirmed that "Ukrainian affairs were in a state of confusion". He told Bieniewski that Vyshovskyi decided to sue for peace and sent his "submission to His Majesty". The envoy also revealed that he proceeded to Warsaw for the purpose of ascertaining whether Vyshovskyi could rely on the promises made by Bieniewski and to insure that he would not be deceived in any way during the negotiations.

Tomkovych assured Bieniewski that, for various reasons, Vyshovskyi could not come to terms with Russia. The following ones were the most significant: Vyshovskyi's envoys were treated with disregard in Moscow; the actions of the tsarist envoys sent to Ukraine clearly revealed that he was suspected of treason; moreover, it was quite obvious to him, by the demands sent from Moscow, that the tsar intended to extend his auto-


137 Vidoni to Holy See, By Toruń, 18.X.1658: LNA, IX, 161.

cratic rule over all of Ukraine. Internally, within Ukraine, the Cossack hetman was also in a very weak position. The Zaporozhians were still against him; many Cossack officers and most of the rank-and-file had little confidence in him; and he even made enemies of the Khmelnytskyi family, especially of Yurii.

For these reasons, being surrounded by enemies, Vykovskyi appealed to the Turks and the Tatars for aid. Through the Turkish envoy he learned that the sultan had no objection to the formation of a new Cossack-Tatar alliance, as long as the Cossacks became his vassals. The Cossack hetman also established close contacts with the Tatars, but so far he was unable to come to terms with them. The rapprochement with the Muslim world, however, was greatly disliked and feared by all in Ukraine. The Cossack officers were especially concerned about Vykovskyi's pro-Tatar policy. Once the hetman would gain the Tatar support, so they believed, he would remove all those who opposed him from their posts and introduce absolute rule, simply because he would be unable to remain in power any other way. "In short," commented Bieniewski, "I came to the conclusion that Vykovskyi is disliked by all, and for this reason they are inclining to the Polish side". One prominent individual, the newly-elected Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Dyonysii Balaban, already declared his readiness to serve the Commonwealth in any way he could.

Bieniewski advised the king "to strike [the iron] while it is hot". He himself already despatched an able individual to Vykovskyi and to certain Cossack officers in order to influence them to act. He advised them to appoint envoys, grant them plenipotentiary powers and to send them to the king in order that an agreement be concluded within a short
time. Bieniewski was confident that his plan would bear fruit. "I trust in God that I shall not be wrong", he wrote in his concluding paragraph, "especially since I became familiar with the breadth and width of this Monarchy of the Serfs".

After a three-day stay at Bieniewski's residence, Tomkovych left for Lviv. From there he departed carrying letters to the Crown Grand Hetman, who was stationed in Sokal; then to the Palatine of Kiev, in Zamosć; and finally from there, to the king and the chancellor, in Warsaw. He arrived in the capital on March 3, while the special pre-Diet assembly was still in session. 139

Tomkovych informed the king, the ministers and the senators that most of the Cossacks were "favourably inclined...towards submission to His Majesty". At the same time he outlined the conditions under which Vyhovskyi was prepared to negotiate. To the surprise of many, the envoy revealed that the Cossack hetman requested Crown troops to be moved to and stationed along the Horyn River. Tomkovych apparently made other significant promises on the behalf of Vyhovskyi, including the one, that the Cossacks were prepared to campaign against the Turks, once agreement was reached. 140

The rapprochement with the Cossacks was supported by many individuals, including several influential magnates. The most outstanding among the

139 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 4.III.1658: LNA, IX, 87.
latter were the Palatine of Poznań, Jan Leszczyński, and the Crown Grand Marshal, Jerzy Lubomirski. The former, for example, was quite prepared to support and to accept such Cossack demands as the grant of general amnesty; the restoration of the prestige and rights of the Orthodox Church; the return of property to all participants of the conflict, or to all those who were charged with treason; the granting to Cossacks the status of freemen; the conferment upon some of them the honours of ennoblement, and the like. However, the palatine referred to the Cossack aspirations to become like "the Dutch or the Swiss"—i.e., to build up their own independent state— as "chimeras and fairy tales". Believing that it was impossible for the Cossacks to create such a state, he advocated the following alternative: an autonomous Ukraine within the framework of the Polish-Lithuanian State. He was a very staunch supporter of the rapprochement. "The foundation of our happiness", he wrote to his colleague, "is peace with the Cossacks".\footnote{Leszczyński to Lubomirski, Berlin, 11.II. and Kaszki, 25.III.1658: Czart., Ms. 388, pp. 353-355, 383-388. See also his remarks to B. Leszczyński, Berlin, 3.II.1658: \textit{Ibid.}, p. 337.}

When Leszczyński returned from Berlin, he attempted to induce others, in Warsaw as well as in Chyhyryn,\footnote{Leszczyński to Nemyrych, Warsaw, 13. and 23.III.1658: \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 362-365, 380-383.} to give support to his policy. Upon conferring with Lubominski on the whole matter,\footnote{Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 11.III.1658: \textit{LNA}, IX, 89.} they pressed the assembly to accept their proposals. Jan Kazimierz and Maria Ludwika were of the same mind: the king, on the one hand, hoped that with Cossack support


he would be able to strengthen his own power and to carry out the reform of the Diet; the queen, on the other, to introduce the French succession into the Commonwealth and to dismiss the burdensome Habsburg military aid. 144

Eventually the assembly, which ended its deliberations on March 15, voted for an agreement with the Cossacks. Once a set of conditions were formulated, an instruction was to be drawn up for the commissioners, who would then be sent to negotiate with Vyhoisky. Since at this time some military leaders clamoured for action, 145 it was decided to despatch, against the objections of the king, 146 troops to the demarcation line. The commanders were ordered, however, not to attack the Cossacks, unless it was absolutely necessary. 147 By this time Tomkovych accomplished his mission. In the middle of March he departed from Warsaw ladened with rich gifts. He received assurances that greater honours were to be bestowed on him once the agreement was successfully concluded. 148

144 Kubala, Wojny duńskie, pp. 62-63.
145 Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, Ropczyce, 15. and 22.II.1658: Ossol., Ms. 5808/II, fo. 29, and Czart., Ms. 402, p. 269.
146 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 11.III.1658: LNA, IX, 89. The passage about Vyhoisky is not very clear. It reads as follows: Lubomirski "esibisce al Re cinquanta milla soldati purche gli comandi lui, ma questo ho detto, che non è bene palesarlo, che si turberia la pace, il Viochi [i.e., Vyhoisky] vorria esser Gran Chancelliere d'Ukraine e provincie vicine".
147 Cieciszewski to [Leopold I, Warsaw], 14.III.1658: HHSA, Polen I, kart.70.
As Tomkovych headed for Chyhyryn, Vyshovskyi's personal intermediary, Pavlo Teteria, was already engaged in detailed negotiations with Bieniewski. He was sent to Bieniewski, at the close of the Pereiaslav General Council and the departure of the Russian envoy Bogdan Khitrovo, on the pretext of keeping watch over the diplomatic contacts between the Commonwealth and Sweden. Arriving in Volynia early in March, he selected Mezhyrych for his place of stay. He was thus within a short distance from Bieniewski. Both of them keeping close contact, were able to lay groundwork for the agreement and each was in a position to effectively check any violations of the armistice.

Teteria assured Bieniewski that Vyshovskyi desired Ukraine's reunion with Poland, but at the same time warned him not to expect immediate results, for the whole matter required considerable time before it would be finally settled. Teteria emphasized that the Cossack hetman was extremely concerned about the preservation of the armistice agreement, and non-belligerancy along the demarcation line and within the neutral territory. Teteria gave Bieniewski to understand that he would do everything in his power to insure that there be no incidents from the Cossack side which could lead to the break-down of negotiations. He even agreed, as a sign of good faith, to withdraw all the Cossack garrisons from the neutral territory and to punish all wrongdoers.

As is evident from the account of Bieniewski's secretary, Peretjakowicz, there was a great deal of activity as a result of Bieniewski-

149 Teteria to Vyshovskyi, Mezhyrych, 16./26.III.1658; and Buturlin to Alexei Mikhailovich, [Kiev], 20./30.III.1658: Akty YuZR, IV, 103-104.

Teteria conferences.\textsuperscript{151} While very little is known regarding these conferences from the Cossack point-of-view, there exists a long report made by Bieniewski, to illustrate the point-of-view of the Commonwealth's representative.\textsuperscript{152} Vyhovskyi, wrote Bieniewski, agreed to accept the suzerainty of the king. At this time, through Teteria, he insisted that the following five conditions be met:

1. The Poles were to negotiate a peace settlement, even a disadvantageous one, with Sweden, as soon as possible, in order to wreck the designs of the Russians. They already drew plans for a partition of the Commonwealth: the Swedes were to receive all the territory west of the Vistula River; the Russians, all to the east of it. It was the intention of the tsar to first take over Ukraine, and then to send his troops for the occupation of the Polish-Lithuanian prize. His envoy in Ukraine already announced that a new war will soon be waged against the Commonwealth. Were the Russians to succeed in concluding an agreement with the Swedes first, the tsar would appear invincible in the eyes of the Cossacks and they would be therefore compelled to accept his tyranny. If the Russian-Swedish agreement materialized, then Vyhovskyi was unable to guarantee that the reunion of Ukraine with the Commonwealth was possible.

2. Requests were to be sent to the khan that he order the Horde to march immediately to the aid of the Cossacks.

3. Orders were to be issued to the Crown and Grand Ducal armies to be in a state of preparedness. No troops, however, were to be concentrated along, or to cross the demarcation line.

\textsuperscript{151}"Information"of Peretjakowicz: Pamiętniki (new ed.), III, part 3, 344. 
\textsuperscript{152}Bieniewski to Jan Kazimierz, [Polonne, ca., late 111.1658]: Kubala, Wojny dunskie, pp. 538-40, doc. no. xiv.
4. The frontiers of both the Commonwealth and Ukraine were to be sealed, in order that negotiations could be carried out in secrecy. No unauthorized couriers, and above all, merchants, were to be admitted.

5. Orders were to be issued for the general mobilization of the gentry, in order that additional aid could be supplied to the Cossacks in case of need against the Russians.

Bieniewski informed the king that he had already acted on four of these conditions: with regard to the first and second, he previously proposed to the king a similar course of action; with regard to the third, he informed the Crown and the Grand Ducal hetmans; with regard to the fourth, he issued manifestoes in the king's name that no one, under the pain of death, could make unauthorized trips into Ukraine, and requested the Crown hetman to guard the demarcation line; and with regard to the fifth, he urged the king to act immediately, because, he maintained, there was no doubt that the Cossacks would have to be supported militarily against Russia.

Since Bieniewski still harboured some reservations regarding Vyhovskyi, particularly because he was worried that by gaining military successes, the Cossack hetman might not keep his promises, he asked Teteria, in confidence, whether Vyhovskyi could be trusted. Teteria assured Bieniewski that Vyhovskyi, due to the following developments, was compelled to keep his promises: Yurii Khmelnytskyi turned against him and openly sought supporters for his own cause; the Zaporozhians, who hated him, were hatching a new rebellion; most of the Cossack colonels were ill-disposed towards him; and finally, the tsar, while seemingly supporting the hetman, actually manipulated to bring about his ruin.
At this point Bieniewski pressed his guest to reveal to him what course of action he would take, should Vyhoverksyi fail to keep his word. In that case, Teteria assured Bieniewski, he and his supporters would abandon Vyhoverksyi to his own devices and deflect to the king's side. This was the promise of "the unmistakably faithful [subject] of Your Majesty", Bieniewski informed the king. Teteria's sincerity and trustworthiness, he continued, could not be doubted for the following reasons: he took a solemn oath and signed a statement to the effect that he would keep the above-mentioned promise; he left his only nephew in the hands of Bieniewski as a hostage; and he also made preparations for acquiring of land in Volynia, where he intended to settle down. Since he was a widower, Bieniewski took upon himself the task of a matchmaker, in order to find for him a suitable wife. Moreover, there were other signs that Teteria would support the king loyally: his confidence in Bieniewski and his expectation of great rewards from the king for the part he played and was still to play among the Cossacks. Teteria promised to return to Volynia by April 21, as Vyhoverksyi's envoy-plenipotentiary, in order to complete the negotiations.

Bieniewski ended his report by pleading for funds. His expenses were great. He gave Teteria a promissory note for 6,000 zł., as well as a written guarantee, in the king's name, that he would be reimbursed for all his expenses met in propagating the cause of the Commonwealth among the Cossacks. He issued a similar guarantee to Vyhoverksyi, for the same purpose, for a maximum of 20,000 zł. Bieniewski, moreover, gave assurances to the Cossack hetman that all Cossacks, whose names he would submit to the king, would be granted patents of nobility.
Following Teteria's departure, another crisis developed. Due to the eagerness of the Crown and the Grand Ducal hetmans to take advantage of the chaos in Ukraine, and no doubt due to some misunderstanding of orders, large troop movements began to take place on the west bank of the Horyn and some units were designated to march to a concentration area near Dubno. This new development alarmed Bieniewski. He acted quickly to prevent the troops from marching across the demarcation line.

Bieniewski wrote to the hetmans and various senior field commanders warning them that Vyhovskyi would consider their action a violation of the armistice agreement. He argued that if they received orders to move troops from Warsaw, then the obvious happened: Tomkovych was misunderstood in the capital. Vyhovskyi, he claimed, instructed Tomkovych to request that the Crown and the Grand Ducal armies be kept in a state of readiness; they were to advance eastward only upon his specific request. So far, the Cossack hetman did not request any aid. Since Tomkovych was still in Lviv, moreover, Vyhovskyi had no report on what his envoy accomplished in Warsaw. Upon receiving news about the eastward march of the Crown and the Grand Ducal troops, the Cossack hetman would most likely regard it as an invasion of Ukraine and take counter steps against them. Thus, argued Bieniewski, through such a misunderstanding, hostilities could resume and the agreement with the Cossacks would be wrecked. Pleading for the withdrawal of the troops to the west bank of

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153 It is not certain when he left, but he was still expected in the middle of April to appear in Warsaw. Ludwika-Maria to Friedrich Wilhelm, Warsaw, 13.IV.1658: UA, VIII, 284.
the Horyn, Bieniewski assured the hetmans that precisely such orders would reach them shortly from Warsaw.154

The army commanders reluctantly complied and established contacts with Vyhovskyi.155 But, as the time passed, and Teteria failed to return to Volynia by Whitsuntide, Bieniewski began to be criticised by them. There were speculations, on the one hand, that Vyhovskyi, lacking sufficient strength, was deceived by his supporters; on the other, that he was purposely deceiving those who were credulous,156 a remark directed primarily against Bieniewski.

At the same time Bieniewski received, as well, bitter remarks from Vyhovskyi. The Cossack hetman issued warnings. The Cossacks, he wrote were hardly in such a predicament as the Poles desired or imagined; therefore, they did not have to rely solely on the aid from the Commonwealth. Moreover, he lashed out at the efforts of some Polish statesmen, who advocated the policy of reconciliation with Russia. They were greatly mistaken in their view, he insisted, that once this was accomplished, the Cossacks would have no choice but to seek the protection of the Commonwealth.157 After learning about the movement of the troops, which Vyhovskyi considered a provocation, he protested in a very strong language.


155 Sapieha and Gosiewski to Vykovskyi, [n.p.], 23.IV.1658: BOK, Ms. 312, p. 84 (Opis, p. 473).


157 Vyhovskyi to Bieniewski, Chyhyryn, 5./15.V.1658: Ibid., 248-250. The contents of his earlier letter to Bieniewski, from Chyhyryn, dated 1./11.V.1658, are unknown: BOK, Ms. 312, p. 199 (Opis, p. 475).
against it.\textsuperscript{158} Shortly after, hardly hiding his anger, he denounced the nobles who declared that they will become masters of Ukraine as soon as the Crown Army penetrated there. Again he warned against the movement of troops, for such actions would bring about dire consequences.\textsuperscript{159}

At the same time Vykovskyi's position was far from enviable. He did not wish to break with the Commonwealth, through the assistance of which he gained Tatar support,\textsuperscript{160} at the time he decided to deal with Pushkar, his rival. Thus, he announced that he was sending Tomkovych on another mission and remarked that the time was ripe "for negotiating further matters" of consequence to both parties.\textsuperscript{161} Other Cossack notables also spoke of their "goodwill towards the Fatherland"\textsuperscript{162} and pointed out that favourable conditions existed for the conclusion of an agreement.\textsuperscript{163} In his letter of May 30 Vykovskyi finally came to the point. He announced that he and many of his officers were in favour of concluding an agreement. For this reason he instructed Teteria, who received

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{158} Vykovskyi to Bieniewski, By Holotva, 15./25.V.1658: Pamiatniki (old ed.), III, part 3, 261-263.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Vykovskyi to Pottoki, By Poltava, 20./30.V.1658: Ibid., pp. 261-263.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Mehmed Giray IV to Jan Kazimierz, Bakhchysarai, 14.V.1658: AGAD, AKW, Tat. 62, file 75, no. 407.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Vykovskyi to Bieniewski, Chyhyryn, 5./15.V.1658: Pamiatniki (old ed.), III, part 3, 249.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Nosach to Bieniewski, Korsun, 29.IV./9.V.1658: Ibid., pp. 244-245.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Hrusha to Jan Kazimierz, Chyhyryn, 10.V.1658: Czart., Ms. 402, p. 273.
\end{itemize}
plenipotentiary powers, to work towards that goal. Vyhovskiy declared that he was prepared to stand by Teteria, as long as all of his own requests, i.e., those pertaining to him personally, would be met and guaranteed by the king, the queen and the senators. Finally, he announced that he was ready to attack Russia. A week later he generally reiterated his remarks made in the previous letter, pledged his loyalty, requested that the negotiations be carried out in secrecy and emphasized that he purposely did not give Teteria a written statement with regard to his full powers. Vyhovskiy gave assurances that he will "receive gratefully" any agreement negotiated by Teteria. He also inquired about the proposed new round of negotiations between the Commonwealth and Russia, expressing hope that Cossack interests would not be sacrificed.

Bieniewski, through whose hands all the letters of the Cossack hetman passed, analyzed and interpreted his statements and then advised the king and the vice-chancellor on the course of action they should pursue. Announcing the arrival of Tomkovych at his residence, Bieniewski joyously reported to the king that negotiations will proceed favourably, because the envoy possessed "a genuine declaration of Vyhovskiy's faithful submission". Tomkovych was also sent by the Cossack hetman to "the king of Sweden, in order to persuade Him to seek peace with the Crown [of Poland]". Should Karl X Gustav refuse, Tomkovych was to inform him that "the Zaporozhian Army will strongly support Your Majesty,...against all [your] enemies". This was, in Bieniewski's opinion, a very good move. He

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164 Vyhovskiy to Bieniewski, By Poltava, 20./30.V.1658: Biblioteka Narodowa (Warsaw) [Hereafter cited as BN], Ms. IV/4282, fo. 48.

165 Vyhovskiy to Bieniewski, By Poltava, 27.V./6.VI.1658: Bok, Ms. 312, p. 200 (Opis, p. 475). For its contents see Hrushevskyi, op. cit., X, 296 and Herasymchuk, "Vyhovshchyna", ZHTSh, LXXXIX (1909), 66.
urged Jan Kazimierz to send Tomkovych on his Swedish mission without delay. 166 Bieniewski also must have informed other influential individuals about the current developments. 167

Shortly after, Bieniewski submitted to the king Vyholovskyi's letter of May 30, together with interesting comments of his own, no doubt with triumph, for it served to vindicate the policy he pursued. He pointed out to him that special attention should be paid to the following statements of the Cossack hetman:

1. Vyholovskyi requested that an agreement be negotiated as quickly as possible.

2. He appointed the "absolutely loyal" Teteria as his personal representative and invested him with full powers.

3. By stating "only this is necessary", Vyholovskyi indicated that he chiefly cared for his own well-being and security. It should be noted that he did not refer to the needs of the Cossacks in general. This also meant that he refuted "the heretical figments" of Yurii Nemrych, who pressed for great overall concessions.

4. By mentioning that he desired satisfaction for "others",—he did not write "all"—the Cossack hetman meant that he expected some kind of rewards for the officers that supported him.

5. He was prepared to break with the tsar.

6. He was prepared to wage war against Russia together with the Poles and the Tatars.

166 Bieniewski to Jan Kazimierz, Izba and Polonne, 7.VI.1658: Pamiatniki (old ed.), III, part 3, 267-269; and BOK, Ms. 4023/III, fo.37 (Opis, p. 280).

167 Bieniewski to NN, Polonne, 15.VI.1658: BOK, Ms. 4023/III, fo.38. (Opis, p. 280).
Bieniewski, after interpreting the significance of Vyhovskyi's statements, requested Jan Kazimierz to keep the whole matter in secrecy; it was especially important that no information leaked out about the recent letter of Vyhovskyi and about Teteria's new mission. He proposed that the king and the queen compose complimentary letters to Vyhovskyi and pass them to him for suitable expedition to the hetman. The king, moreover, was asked to copy, with his own hand, the text composed by Bieniewski and on the paper provided by him. This was to be the king's "personal note" to Vyhovskyi, which expressed joy regarding the recent commitment made by him to the king and assurances that the king would approve whatever would be negotiated by Bieniewski. The texts of any letters written to Vyhovskyi or to his officers, further counselled Bieniewski, had to be composed with great care, so that they did not reveal too much information, should they fall into the wrong hands. In his closing remarks Bieniewski again urged the king to send Tomkovych, as soon as possible, to Karl X Gustav.\footnote{Bieniewski to Jan Kazimierz, [Polonne, ca., 21.VI.1658]: Pamiatniki (old ed.), III, part 3, 270-275. This date is suggested by BOK, Ms. 4023/III, fo. 39 (Opis, p. 280).}

After receiving fresh letters from both Teteria and Vyhovskyi, Bieniewski submitted them to the king and the vice-chancellor, along with his new report. Once more he pleaded for secrecy. Once more he pleaded for the ending of war with Sweden. Valuable time was lost, he argued, by listening to the advocates of peace with Russia. He informed them that several days ago he had sent Strzałkowski with letters from himself and Potocki to Vyhovskyi and to all influential Cossack officers.
He decided, moreover, to expedite courriers every three days or so, assuring the hetman that he enjoyed the king's favour. Bieniewski requested the king to convene the Diet either in Lviv or Lublin and promised to be present at its sessions together with Teteria.

Again Bieniewski asked for two letters to be written to Vykovskyi: one from the king, the other from the Senate. Both were to contain assurances that any matter negotiated by Bieniewski would be regarded as binding. Bieniewski wanted moreover, twenty letters written to Cossack officers, with the usual salutation, but without addresses. He obviously desired to address the letters himself and then to distribute them to each individual he selected. Finally, he informed the king and the vice-chancellor that his newly-appointed colleague, the Castellan of Smolensk, Kazimierz Jewlaszewski, had arrived in Volynia and started to share with him the work-load. In the conclusion of his report Bieniewski emphasized that the success of their work would depend on the following factors: if secrecy be kept regarding the whole proceedings; an imaginative policy be followed with regard to Russia; negotiations and agreement be completed in the shortest time possible; and most of the supporters of Russia among the Cossacks be swayed to the Commonwealth's side.169

Shortly after making this report, Bieniewski received news from Teteria.170 His letter did reveal too much; it was obvious, however, that he sought new friends—particularly Nechai.171 Jan Kazimierz was

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170 Teteria to Bieniewski, Chernihiv, 16.VI.1658: BN, Ms. IV/4828, fo. 50.
171 Senate Council, 31.VIII.–12.XI.1658, deals with rewards to Ivan Nechai and his supporters for the promise to attack Russia. Czart., 401, p. 143.
immediately notified by Jewłaszewski that neither he nor Bieniewski would proceed to Warsaw at this time, because they learned that Teteria was a few days ride away from them. The long-awaited envoy finally reached Mezhyrych on June 30. Bieniewski, in his short letters to the king and the vice-chancellor, informed them that he would proceed to meet Teteria immediately. He enclosed the latest letter of Teteria and a report of Vykovskyi's victory (May 31-June 1) over Pushkar.

In the meantime, Jan Kazimierz and many of the senators were already familiar with the general conditions of Vykovskyi. These were revealed to them by Tomkovich. In his report to Rome the apostolic nuncio isolated the following three, which, no doubt, he considered to be most significant: Vykovskyi was to be guaranteed "sufficient incomes for life"; the Uniate Church was to be abolished; and several seats in the Senate were to be granted to the Orthodox hierarchy. Jan Leszczyński made comments on several conditions, but concentrated primarily on the autonomy of Ukraine. Judging from his remarks, many individuals felt that Vykovskyi's demands were "not as difficult as they appeared [at first]". This is an indication, that after some soul-searching, most knowledgeable

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174 Report: BKr., Ms. 1056. This report was published soon for propaganda purposes: Glaubhaftere Relation Von dem Haupt Treffen und Victoria So der Feld-Haupt Mann Wyhosky wieder den Rebellischen Cosaken Puszkorenko Neulicher Zeit in der Ukraina glücklich erhalten Dem den auch bey gefügt was für wenig Tage zwischen den Churfürstl. Schwed. v. Polen in Preussen Notables fürgefallen ([n.p.], 1658).

individuals concluded that it was desirable to come to terms with the Cossacks.176

Of course, due to the extremely complicated international situation, which had a direct bearing on the personal interests of these and other men, a dispute arose among them with regard to priorities. Before the opening of the new Diet a heated debate started on the question with whom peace should be concluded first. Some individuals, like Bieniewski, Andrzej Leszczyński177 and Jerzy Lubomirski,178 argued for peace with the Swedes; others, like Krzysztof Pac179 and his Grand Ducal colleagues, with the Russians; still others, like Jan Leszczyński and the court circles, with the Cossacks.

The dispute can be summarized as follows: all factions concluded that an agreement with the Cossacks was necessary; they held different views, however, whether it should be concluded before those with Sweden and Russia, after that with Sweden but before the one with Russia, after that with Russia but before the one with Sweden, after those with Sweden and Russia, and so on. There were many formulas and combinations. During the debate loud voices were heard in support of the Cossacks. Lubomirski, for example, campaigned so hard for this cause that some senators suspected him of "machinations" against the state. Rumors began to circulate that he arranged a secret agreement with the Cossack leaders in order to further

179 Pac to Brzostowski, By Toruń, 20.X.1658: Czart., Ms. 387, pp. 233-235.
his own interests. Jan Leszczyński also prepared a long memorandum for the same purpose. In it he argued that "neither their liberties can be maintained without us, nor ours, without them". He urged, therefore, that negotiations with the Cossacks be carried out "with exceptional zeal and in good faith". He advocated various concessions to them, pointing out that past mistakes should serve as good lessons for the future. As far as he was concerned, no great objections should be raised to the formation of a new "union", as long as it was "similar to that of Lithuania".

During the same period, while Bieniewski kept in touch with Vyhovskyi and other persons, he and Teteria met secretly in various places and negotiated an agreement. Unfortunately, no documents exist which could shed some light on the bargaining between the two men. This agreement took the form of a memorandum signed by Teteria, which clearly stipulated that it was to serve only as a basis for future negotiations with Vyhovskyi. In no way was it to infringe on the rights of the commissioners to bargain with the Cossack hetman, or to bind them completely. Having won this concession from Teteria, Bieniewski agreed to submit it for the consideration of the king and the government.

Teteria's memorandum contained the following main points:

1. Full amnesty was to be proclaimed for all participants in the conflict since 1648. Individuals from both sides were to be guaranteed

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180 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 15.IV.1658: LNA, IX, 100.
182 Vyhovskyi to Bieniewski and Potocki, 20./30.V. and 4./14.VI.1658; and Bieniewski to Potocki, Polonne, 10.VII.1658: BOK, Ms. 312, pp. 201, 204 (Opis, p. 475).
that following the proclamation of the amnesty, they will not be subject to any accusation, ridicules or difficulties. Revenge-seeking was also to be expressly forbidden.

2. All confiscations from the Cossacks, or the nobles who served in the Cossack Army, were to be declared null and void.

3. All legal action initiated in the courts against the serfs accused of crimes, during the same period, especially those of the Palatines of Kiev, Bratslav, Chernihiv and Volynia, was to be dropped.

4. All former rights and privileges of the Orthodox Church were to be reinstated. The Orthodox nobles were no longer to be obstructed from service in the diets and the tribunals. The Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev and the Bishops of Lutsk and Lviv were to be granted seats in the Senate. Moreover, one Orthodox ecclesiastical representative each, chosen from the Dioceses of Kiev, Lutsk and Lviv, was to be admitted to the Crown Tribunal; similarly, ecclesiastical members from the dioceses of Lithuania, were to be admitted to the Grand Ducal Tribunal.

5. The Orthodox townspeople, particularly the burgesses of Lviv, Przemyśl, Lublin and Vilnius, were to be accorded all rights and privileges—especially in trade, commerce and in holding of municipal offices—equal to those enjoyed by the Roman Catholic burgesses.

6. All churches, schools and church lands, seized from the Orthodox by the Uniates in all the palatinates of the Crown and the Grand Duchy, were to be returned to the former. A special commission was to be created by the Diet and empowered to carry out this task effectively.

7. The Cossack Army was to be retained for the service of the Commonwealth in such numbers as will be required by it. All former right, privileges and liberties of this Army were to be confirmed by the Diet.
8. The Cossack Army, as in former times, was to be quartered in and draw its provisions from, various towns, villages and farms in Ukraine.

9. The Cossack Army was to be placed under the jurisdiction of its hetman.

10. Heretofore, all offices and dignities, within the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, were to be distributed only among the Orthodox nobles.

11. In order to insure that the agreement was maintained by both parties, oaths were to be sworn by the representatives of each one: on the one hand, for the Crown and the Grand Duchy, by the Archbishop of Gniezno, the Bishop of Vilnius and the two Crown and the two Grand Ducal hetmans; on the other, for the Cossack Army, by the Cossack hetman, quartermaster, esauls, justices-general and all the colonels. Then the agreement was to be formally ratified by the Diet. Finally, its text was to be published as one of the Diet's "constitutions" and henceforth regarded by all as an "unbreakable" law.

12. The present Cossack hetman was to pledge for himself and for his successors to abandon, once and for all, all the foreign protectors and to declare loyalty to the king and the Commonwealth.

13. Individuals, from both sides, were to be given free access to their estates and possessions. The Cossack hetman was responsible for maintaining law and order in Ukraine. To insure that this agreement was not violated by the nobles, a special commission was to be created by the Diet, comprising members from the Crown and the Grand Duchy, which was to have powers to try and pass sentences on the offenders. There were to be no appeals on criminal sentences. Procedures for such trials were to be
worked out and then published by the Diet as its "constitution".

14. One institution of higher learning—"academy"—was to be founded in Kiev. It was to enjoy the same privileges and immunities as that of Krakow. No other schools were to be established in Kiev. The Jesuits were to be forbidden to teach in that city.

15. Another "academy", endowed with the same rights and immunities as that of Kiev, was to be established in the near future within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It was to be established, however, in some town or city other than Vilnius.

16. The king was to confirm the Cossack hetman at his post and assign to him the District of Chyhyryn.183

The document above is, without a doubt, the best evidence of the bargaining talents of Bieniewski and of the pro-Commonwealth sympathies of Teteria. After analysing it, one historian remarked that by this "auction sale" Ukraine gained less than she did from the 1649 Treaty of Zboriv.184 Certainly, one finds it incredible that Teteria agreed to exclude from the memorandum such important items as provisions for the political autonomy of Ukraine or for the abolition of the Uniate Church. If the following two points are considered, however, the contents of this document will be easier to understand.

183 Memorandum ot Teteria, Hoshcha, 5.VII.1658: BN, Ms. III/6640, fo. 221. Formerly in BOK, Ms. 312, p. 207. The text of this memorandum is cited in full by Hrushevskyi, op. cit., X, 306-308.

184 Hrushevskyi, op. cit., X. 309.
First of all, strictly speaking, this memorandum bound Teteria more than it did Vykovskyi. It was the Colonel of the Pereiaslav Regiment, not the Cossack hetman, as it was reported by the Imperial envoys, who was prepared, more or less, to restore the old status quo ante bellum in Ukraine, if the latter failed to live up to his commitments.

In the second place, Bieniewski had to prepare such a draft of an agreement that would satisfy even the greatest opponents to the rapprochement with the Cossacks. Once vested with plenipotentiary powers, he could deal with the crucial issues on the spot. Neither he nor any knowledgeable person was prepared to stand fast by the memorandum. On the contrary, all such individuals agreed that some greater concessions had to be made. For example, by this time, there was a general agreement among them that Ukraine was to link with "the Commonwealth" in the same way as in 1569 the Grand Duchy of Lithuania united with the Kingdom of Poland. Similar to the Lithuanians, the upper strata of Ukraine were to gain special rights, privileges and liberties. Ukraine, then, was "to constitute a special and separate body within the organism of the Commonwealth." 186

Moreover, the same people were prepared to yield on another issue—the fate of the Uniate Church. When Jewlaszewski returned to Warsaw, on July 22, following the termination of negotiations with Teteria, he did not hide the information that agreement with the Cossacks was "impossible" to conclude without "the liquidation of the [church] Union". He even in-
formed the nuncio, probably at the instigation of the "Cossack Party", for he worked exceptionally hard to save the Uniate Church, that "an agreement was [already] signed... containing this article". Vidoni soon discovered that, for various reasons, certain bishops, senators and deputies were prepared to sacrifice the Uniate Church. This was also the feeling of the queen. Moreover, no different was the attitude of the king. Jan Kazimiercz informed him that he "did not wish to bring about his own destruction and that of the whole kingdom, for the sake of the [Church] Union".  

At the extraordinary Diet, which began its first session on July 10, very little opposition emerged to the policy of rapprochement with the Cossacks. A special committee from "the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies for the Approbation of a certain Commission", was set up to take charge of this whole matter. This committee began to work quickly. Influenced by the pressure of the "Cossack party", optimistic news from all sources and particularly by the letters of Vykovskiy, it generally approved all the items in Teteria's memorandum. In the instructions, being prepared for Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski, the committee made certain reservations with regard to such matters—well aware that these would be discussed—as the Uniate Church, autonomy of Ukraine, the quota of the Cossack Army, and the like. By the close of July the written document

187 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 23.VII.1658: LNA, IX, 120-123, 125.
188 This Diet concluded its deliberations on August 30th. See AGd., RSZP, Ms. 300/29/147, fos. 16r-19v. (Fragment, August 1st-5th).
189 Volumina Legum, IV, 528-529.
was ready. At this time Jewłaszewski departed with it from Warsaw to join Bieniewski in Volynia. From here they were to proceed to Vyhovskyyi for the final round of negotiations.  

Following the departure of Jewłaszewski, on the last day of the session of the Diet, the brother of the Orthodox Bishop of Lviv, Adam Zhelyborskyi, brought new letters from Vyhovskyyi to the king and the queen. Vyhovskyyi wrote that he endeavoured, by many ways, to return Ukraine under the rule of its rightful sovereign. This aim he would accomplish, given the king's support and guarantees. He called upon the Orthodox Bishop of Lviv as his witness, that he acted loyally. In order to safeguard the passage of Ukraine under the sceptre of the king, Vyhovskyyi decided to wage war against the tsar. Once the war began, he would invite the king to enter Ukraine, in order to rouse the populace against the Russians. He warned the king and the queen that the Russians intended to gain control of Ukraine by deceit. If Ukraine did not pass under the king's rule during the time the hetman wielded control over all, it would be much more difficult to accomplish when he was not in charge. Within a short time another letter from Vyhovskyyi arrived, containing basically the same information.

It was most likely through his conversation with Zhelyborskyi, that

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190 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 30.VII.1658: LNA, IX, 131-132.

191 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 3.IX.1658: Ibid., p. 141; and Jan Kazimierz to Commissioners negotiating with the Russians, Warsaw, 30.VIII.1658: Czart., Ms. 387, pp. 111-112.

192 Vyhovskyyi to Jan Kazimierz and Ludwika-Maria, Chyhyryn, 29.VII./7. VIII.1658: HHSA, Polen I, Kar. 72; and Hrushevskyi, op. cit., X, 310-311.

the king learned that Vyhosvkyi would indeed demand much more than was outlined in Teteria's memorandum. The Cossack hetman wanted political autonomy for Ukraine, similar to that enjoyed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; a separate army, in addition to the Cossack Army, composed of mercenaries; the right to collect taxes from the crown lands for the upkeep of the mercenary army, and some others. Vyhosvkyi's demands are evident from the reply of Jan Leszczyński to the king, whom he must have asked for advice. Of course, Leszczyński was not too pleased with the news. It was obvious to him that the additional demands were the result of the work of Yurii Nemyrych. Nevertheless, he advised the king to consent to the new demands. He also pointed out that Bieniewski should be instructed that his dislike of Nemyrych or distrust of Vyhosvkyi was to play no part during the negotiations. He was to swallow his pride for the good of the state. His main task was to conclude an agreement as soon as possible. Finally, Leszczyński counselled Jan Kazimierz to win over Nemyrych, Vyhosvkyi and other influential individuals by various promises. Leszczyński campaigned very hard to influence as many individuals as possible to support his views.

The king followed Leszczyński's advice. He, as well as other notables, contacted Nemyrych, Vyhosvkyi, the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, the Bishop

194 Leszczyński to Jan Kazimierz, Warsaw, 5.IX.1658: Czart., Ms. 388, pp. 488-493.

of Lviv and many more other persons. Bieniewski, most likely, also received appropriate additional instructions. The agreement with the Cossacks was even more desirable due to the complicated international situation.

In the meantime Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski reached Lviv. Here they were present at the wedding reception and party of Prince Michał Radziwiłł. Of course, the main purpose of their sojourn in the city was to borrow a large sum of money from the Lviv bankers, in order to cover the many expenses of their mission. The commissioners finally departed from Lviv on August 22. They headed for Chyhyryn, but upon learning that Vyhovskyi had marched with his troops towards the Russian border, they changed their course and crossed the Dnieper River. On September 9 they sighted the Cossack camp situated by Komyshna, on the Khorol, between Myrohorod and Hadiach.

196 Jan Kazimierz and Ludwika-Maria to Zhelyborskyi (Bishop of Lviv), Nieporęt, 6. and 7.IX.1658: Dopolnienia k aktam istoricheskim, otnosiashchimsia k Rossii. Sobrany v inostrannykh arkhivakh i bibliotekakh i izdany arkhheograficheskoiu kommissieiu, Ioann Grigorovich and V. Komovskii eds. (St. Petersburg, 1848), pp. 487-488; Leszczyński to Vyhovskyi and Nemyrych, Warsaw 3. and 5.IX.1658: Czart., Ms. 388, pp. 487-488, 493-495.

197 One short letter survived: Jan Kazimierz to Bieniewski, Warsaw, 2.IX.1658: Ossol., Ms. 2280/I, fo. 277.

198 Jerlicz, op. cit., II, 10; "Information" of Peretjakowicz; Pamiętniki (new ed.), III, part 3, 345.

199 The sum of 40,000 zł. was approportioned to Bieniewski by the Diet of 1658 in order to finalize the negotiations with the Cossacks. See AGAD, ASK II, RS, Ms. 54, fo. 54.


Upon announcing their arrival, the commissioners were met, outside the camp, by several units of cavalry and infantry, which greeted them with courteous volleys of rifle fire. Once this ceremony was over the whole group entered the camp. As the commissioners reached the esplanade, they were again welcomed by drawn-up units of infantry, which lowered their regimental standards and then discharged volleys of rifle fire. Finally, as they dismounted before Vykovskyi's quarters, they were ceremoniously greeted by the salvoes of a ten-gun salute.

From their first formal audience with Vykovskyi on September 11, to their departure from the Cossack camp on the 18th, Bieniewski and Jewlanszewski conducted negotiations under the most unusual circumstances. The commissioners and their assistants were confined to quarters and guarded day and night. Whenever they were permitted to leave their quarters, they were always accompanied by armed escorts, who insured that they made no unauthorized contacts with either the Cossacks, the Russian envoys or the Tatars. Moreover, they were threatened by most of their guards and by some of their visitors. Soon after their arrival they began to fear for their lives. In the first few days they also became pessimistic about being able to complete their mission. While they were greatly concerned about the intrigues of the Swedes, they considered the labours of the Russian envoy to be much more dangerous. Kikin, from the information they received, seemed to be quite successful in convincing the Cossacks to remain faithful to the tsar.

Of course, the commissioners had no way of knowing that they were part of the play staged by Vykovskyi. It was he who staged the negotiation schedule on a "shift" basis. It was therefore impossible for the Poles and the Russians to meet. The former were unaware of the het-
man's stormy sessions with Kikin and the game he played with the Russian envoy. Under this arrangement it was quite easy for the hetman to leak certain information about the diplomatic successes of the Russians, or the Swedes, to the Poles and thus to intimidate them to grant him greater concessions. Under this arrangement Vyhovskyi was also assured that very little information would be sent by Kikin to Moscow about his involvement with the Poles.

During their stay in the Cossack camp, Bieniewski and Jewfaszewski believed that they were up against insurmountable barriers. They visited and conducted talks with Vyhovskyi and other Cossack leaders, as well as with Karash Bey, the commander of the Tatar troops; in turn, they were visited by and negotiated with the hetman's representatives. Teteria proved to be "the only friend" among the Cossacks.

At the initial session Bieniewski delivered a long speech to a gathering, largely comprised of picked officer-deputies from each regiment, in which he stressed the disadvantages of the tsarist rule and the advantages of reunion with the Commonwealth. When he finished, shouts of approval were heard. Vyhovskyi followed, replying that the Zaporozhian Army was in favour of accepting the suzerainty of Jan Kazimierz. At this

\[202\] Oratio Bienievii Deputati Polonici and Cosacos, ut excusso Moscorum iugo, ad pristinum et legitimum redire velint dominium([n.p.], 1658). See also Kochowski, Climacter II, 311-315; and Johann Christian Lûnig ed., Orationes Procerum Europae, Eorundemque Ministrorum ac Legatorum, ut Viorum Celeberrimorum, in multifariis, tam Laetitiae, quam Tristitiae casibus, nec non Belli ac Pacis negotiis, itemque Religionis causa, Ab aliquot Seculis, usque ad Annum 1713. Latina Lingua habitae, ... 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1713), II, 125-127. I do not share the view of Hrushevskyi (op. cit., X, 331) that this speech was a literary fiction.

\[203\] I do agree with Hrushevskyi that there was no general council held. Ibid.
point negotiations began. The commissioners soon discovered that the memorandum of July 5 was an insufficient foundation upon which to build a permanent agreement. The regimental representatives demanded from them "impossible" concessions. They also found Yurii Nemyrych most difficult to deal with. Later on, Jewlaszewski revealed: "We could not accept his conditions". No doubt, one of the demands rejected by them was his insistence on the formation of an autonomous "Duchy of Ruthenia" comprising all "Ruthenian" ethnic territories within the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Thus, an impasse developed in the proceedings.

Since Teteria aided the commissioners and since the Tatar leaders exerted pressure on Vykovskyi, negotiations were not broken off. Eventually, after a great deal of bargaining and compromising, an agreement was worked out on September 6/16, 1658. Oathtaking and oath signing ceremonies by Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski, Vykovskyi and

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204 This is quite obvious once the texts of Teteria's memorandum of July 5th and of the treaty of September 16th are examined. See also Vykovskyi's secret written declaration, signed, most likely, on September 17th: Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 245-246. PAN Kr., Ms. 2254/IV, fo. 486; Ossol., Ms. 189/11, pp. 1044-1046; Kochowski, Climacter II, 317; and Jerlicz, op. cit., II, 12-13.

205 Only one original document with Vykovskyi's signature was preserved. See Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 281-290. At least two other documents must have been prepared: one, with the signatures of Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski; the other, with the signature of all three. According to Rudawski, op. cit., II, 364, the treaty of September 18, 1638 (sic.) was signed by the following: Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniecki (sic.), Ludwik Kazimierz Zeblazewski (sic.), Daniel Wykowski (sic.) and Mikołaj Treter (sic.). There is no other evidence that Pavlo Teteria — not some Mikołaj Treter — signed the treaty.

206 This is revealed by the text of the treaty.

207 Text of Vykovskyi's oath with his signature, most likely on September 7/17: Czart., Ms. 402, p. 317.
the Cossack deputies\textsuperscript{208} followed. Finally, this ceremony was concluded by the salvoes of gunfire, which announced to all the Cossacks that an agreement had been formally concluded. On the 18th, the commissioners departed from the Cossack camp. On the same day Vykovskyi sent Yurii Papara to the king to announce that the treaty was signed.\textsuperscript{209} A few days later Bieniewski submitted his own reports as well. By October 8 Jan Kazimierz learned about the agreement.\textsuperscript{210} The good news was celebrated by feasts, fireworks and salvoes of gunfire.\textsuperscript{211}

IV

The treaty, officially called "Commission", which was concluded in the Cossack military camp by the Town of Hadiach, near the Russian border, on September 6/16, 1658, created the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia and guaranteed for it specific rights and privileges within the confederative state known as the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{208} Text of deputies' oaths with their signatures, September 7/17th: \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 236-238.

\textsuperscript{209} Jan Kazimierz and Prażmowski to Commissioners (negotiating with the Russians), By Toruń, 8. and 9.X.1658: \textit{Ibid.}, Ms. 387, fos. 125, 225.

\textsuperscript{210} Vykovskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Hadiach, 18.IX.1658: BOK, Ms. 105, fo. 156\textsuperscript{r} (Opis., p. 470); and Bieniewski to Jan Kazimierz, Pavoloch, 23.IX.1658: \textit{Ibid.}, fo. 157\textsuperscript{r} (\textit{Ibid.}).

\textsuperscript{211} Des Noyers to Boulliau, By Toruń, 8.X.1658: \textit{Lettres}, p. 41; and Vidoni to Holy See, Nieszowa, 11.X.1658: \textit{LNA}, IX, 154.

\textsuperscript{212} Original text, bearing the signature of Ivan Vykovskyi and the seal of the Zaporozhian Army, is to be found in Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 281-290.
Hitherto, the Commonwealth had been a dual state or, as the current term ran, Respublica utrisque gentis. It was established on July 1, 1569 and comprised the Crown (Kingdom of Poland) and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. On September 16, 1658 these two autonomous parts of the Commonwealth were united with a third part: the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, comprising former Little Poland's three south-eastern Palatinates: Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, or Ukraine as a country. Thus, after the passage of almost eighty-nine years, the Commonwealth was transformed from a dual to a triune state.

There is no doubt that the authors of the treaty kept in mind the Union of Lublin. They declared that henceforth "the whole Commonwealth" was to be regarded as "the common Fatherland" of three "nations"; Polish, Lithuanian and Ruthenian, for they decided to form a voluntary union on the principle of co-existence of "freemen with freemen, equals with equals [and] honourable with honourable". Three separate organisms were to compose "the body of one and indivisible Commonwealth".

Unity, on the one hand, was to be achieved by the joint election of a common monarch, the common participation in the Diet, the pursual of a

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213 See Akta Unji Polski z Litwa 1385-1791, Eds. Stanisław Kutrzeba and Władysław Semkowicz (Kraków, 1932).

214 "Nations" or "Peoples", as used in the text, refers only to the privileged class—the nobles of the Commonwealth.

215 Note how similar this passage is to that which was used in the text of the Union of Poland and Lithuania: Akta Unji, p. 331.
common foreign policy and the use of a common system of currency. Diversity, on the other hand, was to be maintained in full: Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia each were to have its own officials, laws, administration, justice, treasury and army.

Several articles of the treaty emphasize that the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia was an integral part of one Commonwealth. At its head stood a monarch who was to be continued to be chosen in common by means of a "free election". He was to be at the same time the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania and Ruthenia. His portrait was to appear on the obverse of all coins. He was to distribute among individuals crown lands and appoint individuals to lay and church offices. He was to carry on in the role of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He was to pronounce on foreign policy. He was to remain as the source of justice and was to be empowered to issue letters of safe conduct to the defendants. Moreover, the king was to continue to act as one of the three "Estates" comprising the Diet, alongside the other two---deputies and senators.

The Diet, holding its ordinary and extraordinary sessions in Warsaw, was to continue to act as the central organ legislating for the whole Commonwealth. Elected and appointed members from Ruthenia were to be sent to the Diet to occupy their proper seats: the former, in the Chamber of Deputies; the later, in the Senate. While in the articles

216 From the palatinates comprising the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia sixteen members were elected, prior to 1658, to sit in the Chamber of Deputies (six each from Kiev and Bratslav and four from Chernihiv); and seven members sat in the Senate (the palatines and castellans of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, as well as the Catholic Bishop of Kiev). See Zygmunt Gloger, Geografia historyczna ziem dawnej Polski (Kraków, 1900), pp. 254, 262, 269. With the addition of the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, the number of senators from Ruthenia was increased by one.
of the treaty there was only a hint regarding the elected representatives from Ruthenia, great stress was made regarding lay and ecclesiastical appointments.

The king was to retain the right to appoint the various officials in all three parts of the Commonwealth. Certain appointees, by virtue of their temporal or spiritual rank, were automatically to occupy a seat in the Senate. The lay members of the Senate were to continue to represent the highest palatinal offices, such as those of palatines and castellans; while the ecclesiastical members, those of the Church, for the first time including both the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches, such as archbishops and bishops.

The temporal senatorial rank in Ruthenia, in contrast to Poland and Lithuania, was to be restricted to nobles of the Orthodox faith only, who could be classified as "bene natis et possessionatis". It was stipulated, however, that these religious and socio-economic requirements were to be applied "without infraction to the rights of the present possessors [of senatorial offices]"—i.e., Roman Catholics. Another requirement for senatorial rank in Ruthenia was that once an individual assumed his office he was obliged to swear an oath according to the formula used by a similar official in Poland.

The treaty introduced a great change in the ecclesiastical membership of the Senate. Hitherto only Roman Catholic hierarchy sat in the Senate and managed to defend its privileged position by keeping out the prelates of other rites. On certain occasions the Uniate and the Orthodox bishops were promised seats in the Senate, but these promises had never been kept. It was for this reason that there was, therefore, a great stress in the treaty that "in the common Fatherland" both the Catholics and the Orthodox were to share all "prerogatives in common". According to this formula
five Orthodox prelates were finally to be admitted and seated in the Senate, on the basis of equality with the hierarchy of the Latin rite. The Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev was to occupy the third highest place, after the Catholic Archbishops of Griezno and Lviv; while the Orthodox Bishops of Lutsk, Lviv, Przemysł and Chełm, were ranked after the Catholic bishops of the same dioceses.

Ruthenia, as part of one Commonwealth, was to pursue a foreign policy in common with Poland and Lithuania. It was stipulated in the treaty that henceforth "common counsel [shall prevail] and common forces of these three nations [i.e., Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia] shall be [employed] against each [and all] enemies". Another specific aim was that "these three nations shall endeavour in common by all means" to secure for the state as a whole unrestricted rights to navigation on the Balck Sea.

Moreover, hereafter all obstacles, which prevented the pursuance of a uniform foreign policy, were to be removed. Thus, the Cossack hetman and the representatives of the Army pledged that they and their successors shall forever remain loyal and obedient subjects of the king, his successors and the government of the Commonwealth. They agreed to abandon all foreign alliances, ties and protectors and declared never again to seek such arrangements. There were, however, to be two exceptions: first, that the existing Cossack-Tatar "brotherhood" was to be maintained; and second, that if it were possible to solve the current difficulties with Russia, without causing damage to the integrity and interests of the Commonwealth, then the relations with Russia need not be brought to rupture.
Due to prevailing danger from Russia, a special relationship was to exist between that state and Ruthenia. This relationship was clarified in the treaty. If, on the one hand, Poland and Lithuania acted as aggressors against Russia, then Ruthenia had the option of not participating in the resulting conflict. If, on the other hand, Russia refused to surrender all of the Commonwealth's territories which it occupied since 1654, then Ruthenia was obliged to enter into the hostilities against Russia. Finally, should the problems with Russia be settled by peaceful means, both the position of the Cossack hetman and the legal status of Ruthenia, as guaranteed by the treaty, were to be upheld in an agreement with Russia by Poland and Lithuania.

In several other articles of the treaty there are specific references to the autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia within the Commonwealth. Many of these articles deal with the officials and their functions.

By far the most important, most influential and most powerful official of Ruthenia was the hetman. He was to be the commander of a large army composed of Cossacks and mercenaries. As such, he was actually the minister of defence and the co-ordinator of foreign policy. Moreover, he was also promised the offices of the Palatine of Kiev, "generalship" of the same palatinate and Sheriff of Chyhyryn. Due to his rank, he was to be the senior senator from Ruthenia, but it was stipulated that he was freed from the duties of a senator-resident.

Ivan Vyhovskyi became the Palatine of Kiev in 1659, after Jan Zamoyski relinquished this office for the Palatinacy of Sandomierz. For the time being, the hetman was to assume the jurisdiction of Kiev and to appoint the vice-palatine and other officials. This was to be a temporary measure, until he was appointed the palatine. The Palatine of Kiev also held the title of "The General of Kiev".

Senators-resident stayed continuously by the king's side during the interval between one Ordinary Diet and the next. The king was thus furnished with a permanent council in the period when the Diet was not in session.
His tenure of office, as hetman, was for life. After his death the "estates" of Ruthenia were to elect four candidates for that office, one of whom was to be eventually selected and appointed by the king.

Because the hetman wielded such great power, he was explicitly forbidden to make diplomatic contacts with foreign powers and to engage foreign troops in Ruthenia, unless advised to do so by the king. Furthermore, if any ambassadors, envoys or messengers were sent to him, he was obliged to re-direct them to the king.

While the ministerial officials, such as marshals and treasurers, were merely mentioned in the treaty, the chancellors of Ruthenia received a great deal of attention. The latter, in addition to their taking the regular oath of office, were required also to swear an oath that they would never set their seals on any documents which contained clauses in any way contradictory to the articles of the treaty. On the contrary, they were to be on constant guard in order to insure that nothing of the sort appeared in any "constitution" or decree of the Diet; as well as rescript of the royal court, manifesto or charter.

The chancellors were also responsible for countersigning all charters issued by the king to the Orthodox clergy for metropolises, bishoprics, abbeys and benefices within the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, as well as extra-territorially—in Poland—within the Palatinates of Volynia, Podolia and Ruthenia.

They were, moreover, to deal with various matters pertaining to all

219 Following the union of Poland and Lithuania, there existed three important ministries: marshalcy,—comparable to modern ministry of interior and justice—chancery and treasury. The Crown and the Grand Duchy each had its own ministers, two members per ministry. With the addition of Ruthenia, the number of ministries would increase by three, and the number of ministers, from twelve to eighteen.
grants and benefices, for laymen and churchmen alike, as well as with courts of justice in royal towns and all decrees originating either from the Diet or the royal court. In this case, however, the chancellors' area of competence was restricted only to the palatinates comprising the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. Furthermore, were the Crown or Lithuanian chanceries to issue charters to individuals which were contrary to this article of the treaty, all such charters were invalid and the individuals, for receiving them, were liable to a fine of 10,000 Lithuanian kopy. A special writ was to be issued to such persons, summoning them to appear in the royal court of justice, where they were to be tried for this infraction.

The Grand Duchy of Ruthenia was to have its own tribunal, treasury, mint, assembly and army. Its tribunal, the highest court of appeal, was to hear civil and criminal cases. Other lower courts were to sit in Ovruch and Zhytomyr. Nothing specific was mentioned in the treaty about the treasury or the system of taxation. The mint was to be located in Kiev or, if necessary, in another town. The coins struck there were to be of equal nominal value to those struck in Poland and Lithuania and they were to bear the portrait of the king on the obverse. The assembly of Ruthenia, to which members were to be summoned by the king's manifesto, was to hold its first session as soon as possible after the termination of the next Diet in Warsaw.

The army of Ruthenia was to pass under the direct command and jurisdiction of the hetman. The Zaporozhian Army, comprising 60,000 men, was

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220 One kopa equalled 60 silver groszy or two silver zloty.
to be quartered and provisioned in various locations of the same palatines as it had been before 1648. The mercenaries, whose strength in numbers was to be determined at a later date, were also to be stationed in Ruthenia. They were to be supplied with provisions from royal and church lands in accordance to special articles of the hetman's ordinance. Neither Poland nor Lithuania had the right to sent its troops, or foreign mercenaries at its employ, into Ruthenia. If, in the judgment of the hetman, additional military aid was necessary to cope with some conflict in or near Ruthenia, then he would request it. Once any troops entered Ruthenia, they were to be placed under his command.

Other articles of the treaty dealt with the following matters: the position of the Orthodox Church, spread of education, social structure, general amnesty, confiscations of property, return of landlords to their estates, treatment of the serfs and the legal status of the treaty.

A great emphasis was made on the position of the Orthodox Church within the Commonwealth. It was stated unequivocally that "the old Greek [Orthodox] Religion...the same [one] as [had been at the time] when Ruthenia joined with the Polish Crown" was to retain all of its former rights "as far as the language of the Ruthenian nation reached" within the "Commonwealth". This meant that the Orthodox faithful were given the freedom of public worship, such as that hitherto only enjoyed by the Catholics, in all cities, towns and villages: in churches, diets, armies, tribunals, processions, visits to the sick and burial of the dead.

All confiscated churches and church lands were to be returned to the Orthodox. Moreover, the treaty stipulated that a special commission was to be formed, with members representing both parties, in order to examine this problem close at hand. All confiscations were to be listed in
a special register and then presented to the commission for consideration. All this was to take place within six months after the colonels and other officers had sworn their oaths of fealty to the king and the Commonwealth.

Furthermore, Catholic lay lords and officials were forbidden to exercise any power over the Orthodox clergy. Heretofore, the rights of such jurisdiction was to be accorded only to their spiritual superiors. The Orthodox hierarchy received equal rights with the Catholic hierarchy. Senatorial rank was restricted to the Orthodox nobles only. The Orthodox burgesses were granted similar rights to those held by the Catholics, in all towns and cities of the Commonwealth—as far as "the churches of the Greek rite reached". Their religion was no longer to be an obstacle for membership in the municipal councils.

Finally, one of the most controversial questions was solved. It was stated clearly in the treaty that "the Union [i.e., the Greek Catholic Church] which hitherto caused disturbances within the Commonwealth", was definitely abolished. The faithful who supported the church union were thus left with two choices: either to return to Orthodoxy, or to embrace Catholicism.

Wide perspectives opened for education and learning in Ruthenia, since various gymnasia, schools and colleges were to be founded. Printing-houses were also to be established, as many as were needed. These were free to publish books and pamphlets on religious controversies, but were to refrain from publishing any offensive or libellous material against the king.

For the needs of higher learning two "academies" were to be founded: one in Kiev; the other, in a town which was to be designated in the near
future. Both of them were to enjoy university "prerogatives and liberties", similar to those possessed by the "Academy of Krakow".221 Both institutions were to be forbidden to employ "professors [and] masters" and to enrol "students [of] any Socinian,222 Calvinist or Lutheran sects". All other schools in Kiev were to close their doors. No new schools were to be founded in the town where the second "academy" was to be founded.

The social structure of Ruthenia was to differ from that in existence in Poland and Lithuania. This was due to the Cossacks. The treaty finally legalized the status of the former anomalous fourth class. The Cossacks who served in the Zaporozhian Army were not given credit for being "knights", and thus deserving to retain all their former "old liberties and customs". Obliged only to perform military service, the Cossacks were freed from the payment of taxes and from "all the heaviest and lightest burdens". Various officials were unable to exercise any jurisdiction over them, for this right belonged solely to the hetman. The Cossacks were permitted to make alcoholic beverages, to fish and hunt, and generally to engage in all other activities "according to old customs". Finally, on the recommendation of the hetman, one hundred Cossacks from each regiment were to receive the patents of nobility.

A full amnesty for all the deeds that "God allowed [for] on both sides...during the "war" of the past decade was to be proclaimed. The amnesty was to embrace "people of all conditions, from the highest to

221 Founded in 1364, today this institution is called the Jagiellonian University.

222 This sect was banished from the Commonwealth by the Diet of 1658.
the lowest, excluding no one". It was extended not only to the Cossacks and the serfs, but also to all "nobles, officials and private persons" -- all those who at one time served or remained serving in the Zaporozhian Army. They received forgiveness for their deeds because, after suffering "various oppressions" for some time, they were compelled -- "not out of free will, but out of necessity" -- to take up arms for their defence. Even such individuals as those who supported the Swedish cause against their own monarch were also granted amnesty.

Such conditions and practices, as those which existed prior to 1648 -- i.e., "unity, concord, love, law [and] king" -- were to be restored again. If, as the result of the prolonged conflict, any changes were instituted which would at this time adversely affect the boundaries of the territories inhabited by the "three nations", or their liberties, then all such changes were to be declared null and void. Severe penalties were to be imposed, after a careful investigation, upon persons guilty of making private or public utterances against this "holy union".

There were also two items which were closely related to the proclamation of general amnesty. The first, primarily concerned all individuals who supported either the Cossacks or the Swedes or, as it happened in many cases, both of them. If during the past decade they served in the Crown or Lithuanian armies, then they were to be adequately compensated for all such military service. All escheats or confiscations during the years 1648 - 1658, for which such persons possessed valid claims, were to be returned to them. All resolutions made to the contrary were to be declared invalid and stricken from the court records. Anyone found guilty of infringing this article was to be charged with infamy. Furthermore, all

\[223\] Kaduki.
other personal and landed property, as well as crown land and even pecuniary bequests, which were confiscated from them for one reason or another, were also to be returned to the rightful owners of heirs.

The second item dealt primarily with the return of the refugee landowners to their estates which were situated in the territories at this time occupied by the Cossacks. It was clearly stipulated that "all private persons from both sides" were free to return to their possessions located in Ruthenia (Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv), Poland (Podolia) and Lithuania (While Ruthenia and Severia). The Catholic secular clergy was able to proceed to their "bishoprics, parishes, canoneries, presbyteries and estates belonging to them"; the religious clergy, to their "churches, convents, estates and foundations"; while the laity, to their "inheritances, starotships, lease-holds, life estates, lien estates and other contracted possessions". In due course, a special manifesto, stating the date for the return of the landowners and others, was to be issued after the mutual consultation regarding this matter, by the king and the hetman.

The third item concerned the treatment of the serfs. In order not to provoke the serfs into another rebellion, especially in the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, Chernihiv and Volynia, all legal proceedings regarding their "armed raids, murders and damages" during the years 1648-1658 were to be discontinued, all charges dropped and all court decrees abrogated.

Finally, certain steps were to be taken in order to ascertain that the treaty would indeed be maintained and that it would bring about "eternal" peace and establish a durable union. Oaths were to be sworn, on the one hand, by the king, the Archbishop of Gniezno, the Bishop of Vilnius, the two grand and field hetmans of the Crown and Lithuania and the marshal of the Chamber of Deputies, in the presence of the envoys from
the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia sent by the hetman. Oaths were also to be taken, for the same purpose, on the other hand, by the colonels and senior officers of the Zaporozhian Army in the presence of the commissioners appointed by the Diet. Following the oath-swearing ceremony, the treaty was to be formally ratified by the Diet and published as one of its "constitutions". Henceforth, the "Commission of Hadiach" was to be considered by all the citizens of the "Commonwealth" as "the eternal and unbreakable law".

Such were the provisions of the treaty, or the act of union of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia with the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In order to appreciate and to comprehend the Union of Hadiach properly, it must be realized that the final draft of the text of the treaty was completed under the most unusual circumstances. Both contractual parties were under great pressure from internal and external forces. The short period set for negotiations, the heated debates, the many compromises, the frequent revisions and the hasty re-writing — all these left permanent marks on the text of the treaty: its articles were unnumbered, specific topics were not treated in a logical sequence and wording of many passages was left insufficiently clear.

Perhaps the best example of this lack of clarity, is the absence of a statement that the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv heretofore comprised the autonomous Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, the third
part of the Commonwealth. Yet, there can be no doubt that those who drafted the text intended to have precisely this kind of arrangement. They were more concerned about stressing certain questions of controversy; they were, likewise, concerned about outlining in detail certain privileges. They did not pay a great deal of attention to other matters, being satisfied, no doubt, that the general statement regarding the restoration of the system which existed prior to 1648 covered them adequately. Certainly, if one interprets this statement — "they revert to that unity, harmony, affection, law and the [rule of the] Lord [king], which existed before the war" — as a negation of the treaty or as a deliberate attempt of the commissioners to restore the exact status quo ante bellum, as some historians had done, one simply shows a lack of understanding of the whole issue.

Of course, it cannot be denied that notwithstanding this interpretation, there are still many vague points in the text of the treaty. What precisely was the status of the "Convocation" of Ruthenia in the constitutional and legal arrangement of the Commonwealth? What was the compe-

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224 The following passages may be used for proof: "The Commonwealth of the Polish Nation and of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Ruthenia"; and "their Lords, the Polish Kings and the Lithuanian and Ruthenian Grand Dukes". The treaty was signed by Vylovskyi, who entitled himself as the "Grand Hetman of the Armies of the Duchies of Ruthenia"—in plural for some reason. His signatures on other documents read as follows: "Grand Hetman of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia". As far as the three palatinates are concerned, they are always treated as a unit. For example, one passage reads as follows: "In the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv", the senatorial office shall be granted to the Orthodox nobles only. Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 246, 282, 284, 285, 291, 317.
tance of the Ruthenian chancellors in the sphere of foreign affairs?
Did the number of Cossacks, who were to receive the patents of nobility from each regiment, represent a minimum or a maximum number? How was the treasury to be organized? What system of taxation was to be adopted? Were the Cossacks to be included in or excluded from the "Estates" of the Grand Duchy? These are only some of the vague points.

Furthermore, it is also necessary to be aware that it was agreed that this treaty would be considered null and void by the Cossack side, unless certain guarantees, which were not specified in the text, were met by the Commonwealth's government; moreover, that the text of the treaty was altered substantially by secret agreements.

Bieniewski and Jewlanszewski bound the Commonwealth, by written guarantees and sworn oaths, among others, to the following commitments: the interests of the Cossack colonels were to be protected; certain persons, like Nemyrych, were to be covered by amnesty, while others, like Hulevych, were to obtain safe conduct passes; great many individuals, among them Teteria, Zarundny, Lesnytskyi and Kovalevskyi, were to be reinstated as nobles, were to receive confirmation that their estates were to be restored or that they were to be granted titles to

225 Guarantees to Cossack Colonels, By Toruń, 14.XI.1658: AGAD, MK, Sigillata, Ms. 1, p. 98.
227 Confirmation of Guarantees, By Toruń, 13.XI.1658: AGAD, MK, Sigillata, Ms. 1, p. 98.
228 Ennoblement of and Land Grant to Teteria, [By Toruń, ca. 16.XI.1658] Ibid., p. 97.
229 Land grant to Zarudny, By Toruń, 19.XI.1658: Ibid., p. 98.
231 Land Grant to Kovalevskyi, By Toruń, 18.XI.1658: Ibid., p. 98.
new land, towns or villages. Ivan Vyhovskyi was guaranteed to be reinstated as a noble,\textsuperscript{232} to be appointed the Palatine of Kiev\textsuperscript{233} and to be granted the Districts of Bar\textsuperscript{234}, Bratslav and Liuboml in Volynia.\textsuperscript{235} Moreover, he was to be given the right to nominate persons to fill vacancies in all dignities and offices within the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia.\textsuperscript{236} Additional requests were to be presented in the form of a petition to the Diet.\textsuperscript{237}

Of course, similar guarantees were required by the commissioners, on certain points, from Vyhovskyi. The Cossack hetman bound himself to reduce the strength of the Cossack Army to 30,000 men, as soon as the conflict with Russia was over. Immediate quota reductions, he feared, would cause dissention among the "degraded" common Cossacks. This, in turn, could create new complications with regard to the establishment of sound foundations for the union. He also sought permission to recruit 10,000 mercenaries. In the meantime, he required some 5,000 men from the king. They were to be used for the operations against the Russians in Kiev.

\textsuperscript{232}Ennoblement of Vyhovskyi, By Toruń, 13.XI.1658: \textit{Ibid.}, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{233}Guarantees regarding Pal. of Kiev, By Toruń, 16.XI.58: \textit{Ibid.}, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{234}Rescript for Bar, By Toruń, 17.XI.1658: AGAD, MK, LI, Ms. 201, fos. 103v-104r.
\textsuperscript{235}Rescript for Liuboml, By Toruń, 26.XI.1658: AGAD, MK, Sigillata, Ms. 1, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{236}Petition to the Diet of 1659: \textit{Pamiatniki} (old ed.), III, part 3, \textsuperscript{237}Ibid., pp. 315-328.
As far as the existing Cossack garrisons and troops were concerned, he promised to recall all units stationed between the Rivers Sluch and Horyn. All Cossack troops would also be withdrawn by him from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as soon as war with Russia ended. Again he asked for time, because he was afraid that a hasty recall of Cossack units from Lithuania might lead to desertions to the Russian side.

Finally, Vyshovskiy gave assurances that the restoration of churches and church lands to the Orthodox would take place not any earlier than six months after the Catholic clergy and laymen reclaimed their abandoned properties. 238

The labours of the diplomats being over, it was the turn of the Commonwealth's Diet to ratify the treaty of union.

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238 Kubala, Wojny duńskie, pp. 551–552, doc. no. xxiv. (Prepared, most likely on 18.IX.1658).
CHAPTER V

"MATRIMONIUM RATUM SED NON CONSUMMATUM":
THE UNION OF HADIACH (1658-1659)

I

After departing from the Cossack Camp on September 18, 1658, Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski passed through Lokhvitysa, Bila Tserkva, Pavoloch, Mezhrych, Olyka to Lutsk. Here they awaited the arrival of the Cossack delegation, headed by Pavlo Teteria, Ivan Kovalevskyi and Herasm Kaplonskyi. Upon its arrival on October 7, both groups left Lutsk, with Jewlaszewski leading the way, and proceeded via Lublin and Warsaw, to Torun. Along the way the commissioners continued to inform the king, the chancellors and other prominent persons that the much-desired "peace" with the Cossacks was finally realized. In the last week of October they reached their destination. Torun was still in the hands of the Swedes. At this time the city was besieged by the Crown, Grand Ducal and allied Habsburg troops.

1Letters of Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski to various persons, from Pavoloch, 23.IX., Mezhrych, 28.IX., Olyka, 2.X. and Lublin, 13.X.1658: BOK, Ms. 105, fo. 105 (Opis, p. 470), and Czart., Ms. 387, fos. 211, 213, 245-248. See also the reports of Kikin and Serbyn: Akty YuZR, IV, 165-166; and XV, 277-278.

2Des Noyers to Boulliau, By Torun, 29.X.1658: Lettres, p. 460; and Vidoni to Holy See, Nieszawa, 1.XI.1658: LNA, IX, 178.

3Tadeusz Nowak, Oblężenie Torunia w roku 1658 (Toruń, 1936).
Shortly after their arrival, Bieniewski and Jewłaszewski met in camera with the king, ministers of state and various senators, in order to give them full account of their activities relating to the negotiations with Vyhovskyi. At this initial meeting, as well as subsequent ones, a great deal of discussion centered on the implications of the terms of the treaty. Not all the participants of these meetings were happy with the work of the commissioners. They were criticised for being "too generous" and for granting too many concessions. Voices were raised against them for disregarding specific instructions regarding various matters. Complaints were made that they had gone "too far" by agreeing to accept the abolition of the Uniate Church, or to acquiesce to the office-holding monopoly of the Orthodox nobles.5

As the information began to leak out of the council of the senators about the outcome of the negotiations and the terms of the newly-concluded treaty of union, the very active nuncio began to add fuel to the fire.6 Concerned very much about the "liquidation" of the Uniate Church, Pietro Vidoni lodged official protests against the

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4. Resolutions of Senate Council, By Toruń, 12.XI.1658: Czart., Ms. 401, p.149.
6. Already, by November 1, he obtained a copy of the treaty. See LNA, IX, 174, 176-178.
"disgraceful" treaty, leaving no stone unturned in the influential circles. Earlier he induced Pope Alexander VII to put pressure on the king, the queen, the hierarchy and the senators. As far as he was concerned, "peace" with the Cossacks was bought at too great a price. He also advocated that their "insolent demands" be wholly rejected.

Even though many senators shared the views of the nuncio, nevertheless, for political considerations, they were unwilling to throw all caution to the winds. The position of the Commonwealth, as a whole, was still in a very precarious position. For this very reason, they were unprepared, for emotional, practical or religious reasons, to reject even an unpopular agreement with Vykovskiyi. Since the commissioners revealed that the Cossacks were not completely satisfied with the treaty as well, the senators decided upon the following course of action: the treaty of union was to be accepted in principle; its various articles, however, were to be renegotiated.

7 "Manifestation" of Vidoni and his protests are dated 25.X.1658: Ibid., pp.167-169, and AGAD, MK, LI, Ms. 201, fos. 91-94.
8 Vidoni to Jan Kazimierz and to Roman Catholic Bishops, Nieszawa, 5. and 7. XI.1658: LNA, IX, 178-180. See also his letters in October and November. Ibid., pp.146-211.
10 Vidoni to Holy See, Nieszawa, 1.XI.1658: LNA, IX, 174.
12 Vidoni to Holy See, By Toruń, 23.XI.1658: LNA, IX, 196.
In order to create new problems, the council's decision was not communicated to the Cossack delegates. They were granted audiences, entertained, given special honours and assured that the treaty would be ratified by the next Diet. Perhaps the letters written to Vykovskyi contained hints that re-negotiation or, in milder terms, clarification, of certain articles should be anticipated by him. Having been granted the District of Bar, and having been promised other honours, the king and the senators felt that Vykovskyi would not object to some changes too strongly. The Cossack delegation departed on November 18. The commissioners were detained a day longer. Following more discussion, the senate council acquainted them with their new task. Finally, on November 19 Bieniewski left for Volynia, in order to lay the groundwork for his new mission.

Upon receiving detailed instructions designed "for the reform" of certain articles which "the Commonwealth could not accept", as well
as the methods he was to use, 18 Bieniewski proceeded from Polonne, on January 16, 1659, 19 to meet Vyhovskyi. No doubt he was confident of success, since the hetman, as it was revealed by Tomkovich and other Cossack messengers, was hard-pressed by the dissident Cossacks and the Russians, and sought military aid. 20 Judging from the brief comment of Bieniewski's secretary, however, the Castellan of Volhynia experienced serious difficulties and was not too successful in accomplishing his task. 21 Precisely what he managed to accomplish is uncertain. On February 19 he returned to Polonne 22 and shortly after he submitted a revised version of the treaty to the king. According to the nuncio, its text differed "very little from the former one " 23

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19 Jerlicz, op. cit., II, 15.
20 Vyhovskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Zhyshchiv, 5./15. XII.1658: Czart., Ms. 402, p.309; and Vidoni to Holy See, By Torun, 29.XI. and 7.XII.1658: LNA, IX, 200, 203.
22 Jerlicz, op. cit., II, 16. On the 24th he informed K. Vyhovskyi that he returned from Ukraine. Since the treaty was concluded and awaited ratification by the Diet, Bieniewski requested him to heed the manifesto of the hetman and to withdraw the Cossack garrisons from Volynia. Bieniewski to K. Vyhovskyi, Polonne, 24.II.1659: Czart., Ms. 2446, pp.193-194. Vyhovskyi's manifesto, calling for the withdrawal of Cossack troops garrisoned between Sluch and Horyn Rivers was dated on 26.I./ 5.II.1659: Ibid., p.194.
Jan Kazimierz received this information from Bieniewski shortly before the opening of the new session of the Crown General Diet in Warsaw. He had already distributed the customary instructions to the nobles throughout the Commonwealth, who were assembled by the close of February at the various pre-diet dietines. Among the many items of business on the long agenda, which was to be dealt with by the Diet, the one dealing with "the agreement of Messrs. Commissioners with the Zaporozhian Army" figured quite prominently. The king requested that the elected deputies from each dietine to the Diet be given clear instructions to ratify the treaty, in order that "the long-awaited...union be realized".

Judging from the instructions received by the deputies who proceeded to Warsaw, the king's appeal was supported by the majority of the nobles of the Commonwealth. Some dietines approved the

24 The pre-diet dietines were to assemble on February 28; the Crown General Diet was to be convoked on March 17: Royal Manifesto, By Toruń, I.I.1659: Lauda sejmików ziemi Dobrzynskiej, ed. Franciszek Kluczyński (Kraków, 1887), p. 5.


26 See the resolutions of various dietines: Zakład Dokumentacji Instytutu Historycznego (Kraków), Teki Pawińskiego [Hereafter cited as ZDIH, TP], Mss. 2, 7, 10, 14, 21, 25, 33, 35.
ratification without any reservations; others, while showing no objections to the ratification, urged their deputies to consult their colleagues from other palatinates on this matter before casting their votes; still others, claiming that the terms of the treaty were not revealed to them, granted conditional approval. Thus, for example, the deputies from the Palatinate of Kraków were to insist, among other matters, on "salvis iuribus et praerogativis Ecclesiae Catholicae Romanae"; those from the Palatinate of Masovia, on the restitution of all hereditary and leased estates to the nobles; while those from the Palatinate of Ruthenia, on the return of all fugitive serfs to their rightful owners. Of course, for obvious reasons, the exiled gentry from the Palatinates of Kiev and Chernihiv had more complaints and reservations than other nobles. Even they, however, were quite prepared to vote for the ratification of the treaty.

27 Dietine of Łomża Territory (Mazovia), Łomża, 28.II.1659: Ibid., Ms. 4, I, fo. 169; and Dietine of Halych Territory (Ruthenia), Halych 25.II.1658: AGZ, XXIV, 154.


30 Dietine of Kraków, Proszowice, 28.II.1659: ASKr., II, 665.

31 Dietine of Wizna Territory (Masovia), Wizna, 28.II.1659: ZDIH, TP, Ms. 33, I, 220.

32 Dietine of Lviv, Przemyśl and Sanok Territories (Ruthenia), Vyshnia, 28.II.1659: AGZ, XXI, 273.

In the meantime, although managing to hold out against the Russian corps commanded by Prince Grigorii Romodanovskii and his Cossack supporters, Vyhovskyi was still in great danger. In his answers to the king's and the chancellor's letters, he continued to appeal for military aid. The Cossack hetman concluded, from the information he received, that some party at the court misrepresented his true intentions. Surely, he argued, the commissioners were in the best position to vouch for his unwavering loyalty. He also complained that the Cossack delegates were detained too long; following their return, he was quite unhappy that they were unable to secure a signed declaration regarding the treaty. As far as he was concerned, the prolongation of the ratification was extremely dangerous, as it undermined his position. Upon being informed about the date of the first session of the Diet, he again complained that he was not given sufficient time to prepare for it "these matters which are the foundations of eternal peace", and requested that the Diet be held in Lviv instead of Warsaw. Eventually, upon receiving fresh information and all sorts of assurances through Tomkovych, and later on by a special courier Minowski, he thanked the king for all his considerations, assured him of his loyalty and announced that he was sending Soltskyi and Olshanskyi to him with special requests.

Following the meeting with Bieniewski, the king and the chancellor exerted pressure on the Cossack hetman to act on their requests. Vyhovskyi, having little choice, soon announced that in compliance with their wishes he was dispatching Popkovych and Lisovskyi to the opening of the Diet. The task of these envoys was to prepare
the ground for Nosach, who would head a large delegation later on with two deputies from each regiment. The hetman emphasized that the treaty was not to be ratified before the arrival of this delegation. Earlier he also disclosed that Yurii Nemyrych, whom he designated for the post of chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, was to take charge of all business in Warsaw and was to bear the responsibility for the whole proceedings. At this time Vyhoffskyi took the opportunity to ask for the fashioning of the great and small seals for the chancellors of the Grand Duchy. Both seals were to bear St. George's design, which was to be encircled by "the titles of His Majesty ... in Ruthenian letters".

In order to give Vyhovskyi more time to prepare his case and to allow more deputies and senators to assemble in Warsaw, the first session of the Diet was rescheduled from March 17 to the 22nd. Through the months of March, April and May several hundred representatives in the delegation from the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia and the Cossack Army — chief among whom were Yurii Nemyrych, Prokop Vereshchanka, Konstantii and Fedor Vyhoffskyi, Hryhory Lesnytskyi, Tymish Nosach and Ivan Hrusha — appeared in Warsaw. Other distinguished individuals, unofficially connected with the delegation, also

34 Vyhovskyi to Jan Kazimierz, Prażmowski and B. Leszczyński, By Zhyshchiv, 5./15. and 17./27.XII.1658; Pereiaslav, 16./26.I.1659; By Zinkiv, 3./13., 7./17. and 9./19.III.1659; and Chyhyryn, 9./19.IV.1659: Pamiatniki (old ed.), III, part 3, 290-314; Dssol., Ms. 189/II, p.1073; Czart., Ms. 402, p.309; and AGAD, IN, Koz., no. 23, fo. 4v.

35 On this Diet see particularly the summaries and the letters of Fabricius to the Gdansk City Council: AGd, RSZP, Ms. 300/29/149, fos. 8'-29r, 30'-35r, 116'-165r. See also the reports of Vidoni to Holy See: LNA, IX, 228-295; and the speeches of B. Leszczyński, Gniński and others: Kór., Ms. 975, pp.60-64, 348-351, 355-356, 366, 370-371; and Czart., Ms. 1656, pp.527-534, 538-541.
arrived in the capital: Pavlo Teteria; the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Balaban; the Bishop of Lviv, Zhelyborskyi; the Bishop of Przemysl, Vynnytskyi; and the Archmandrite of Chernyhiv, Mereshchyn.

The ratification of the treaty of union did not prove to be such an easy task. Much time was consumed in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, as heated debates raged over some of the articles. Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski were blamed and attacked for allowing for the creation of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia and then manipulating for it an "union" with the "Fatherland", when they knew perfectly well that such acts violated not only the treaties of Kazimierz the Great, but also the constitutional arrangements of Zygmunt II August. There was a great deal of opposition to the article which abolished the Uniate Church. Could anyone vote for it with a clear conscience, they were asked, knowing that all sorts of heretics and infidels were allowed to exist? Voices were raised against the commissioners for making it easy for the "serfs" to pack the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies; and for the granting of important offices, as well as the precious patents of nobility, to all sorts of wild people, illiterates, murderers, thieves, highwaymen and incendiaries. It was argued that the Cossack hetman wielded almost autocratic power. Many persons pointed out that it was unfair to restrict office-holding within the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia to the Orthodox nobles only. What would be the fate of the Catholic Church and its faithful within Ruthenia? Many other questions were asked. Many other objections were raised.

Bieniewski attempted to convince his colleagues that the whole
issue was far less complicated and dangerous than they imagined. He reminded them that due to the precarious position of the state, which was pressed by the Swedes, on the one side, and the Russians, on the other, they would be extremely foolish were they to reject the treaty. Regarding other questions or objections, he told them what they wanted to hear. In the case of one of the chief problems, the abolition of the Uniate Church, he remarked that they should understand that the Cossacks were neither fanatical apostles not learned theologians. They will be satisfied by a statement that the Uniate Church will be abolished, particularly if church lands and buildings will be restored to the Orthodox. Later on a proclamation can be issued with regard to the freedom of conscience, and thus the Uniates will be safe. The autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia will not last too long either, he maintained. The Cossacks who clamoured for it will eventually die; their successors, on the contrary, will have little use for it in the future; thus, the old order will be restored within the passage of time. Moreover, he assured them, that a suitable compromise will be arranged to satisfy both sides.

In defence of his work of nearly two years and in an attempt to arrange a compromise, Bieniewski gravitated between the hostile Diet and the stubborn Cossack delegation. The Cossack vanguard, received in audience by the king and the senators on April 4 and by the queen of the 6th, pressed for the ratification of the treaty. Working hard, Bieniewski eventually managed to muster such arguments as to convince the Cossacks not to press for the abolition of the Uniate Church. By
this time efforts were already made to solve this thorny religious question by the calling of a special council to reconcile the differences between the Orthodox and the Uniates. No matter what settlement might be eventually reached, the Orthodox were to be guaranteed the return of all their former church lands, churches, monasteries and the like. The Diet, moreover, was to set up a special commission within six months to look into the whole matter of restitution. Since this major point of controversy was settled, Bieniewski was confident that other problems would prove less difficult to solve. He advocated the policy of putting pressure on Vykovskyi, in order that he accept other changes determined by the Senate as well. Of course, the hetman would have to be humoured. This could be accomplished by granting him additional honours, as well as some profitable district from which he could draw a large revenue.

The amendments to the treaty and related matters were taken up at a meeting of the Senate of April 9. Eventually, even intransigents like Paweł Sapieha, after pleas from the king and the queen, accepted the formula worked out by the Senate. By April 11 the Cossack delegates also agreed to accept them. One more step was necessary: to secure the approval of Vykovskyi. Thus, on the same day the king wrote to the Cossack hetman, informing him about the decisions of the Senate. He also added, that the ratification of the treaty will be delayed due to the absence of many senators; moreover, a papal decision was also awaited with regard to the religious problem.36

Since neither Bieniewski nor Jędraszewski wanted to be charged with this new dangerous and unpleasant mission, and since none of their senatorial colleagues showed any desire to relieve them of it, eventually the secretary of the commissioners, Krzysztof Peretjatkowicz, was persuaded to undertake it. He departed from Warsaw on April 12, carrying with him, for the "contentment" of Vyshovskyi a newly-issued charter confirming him at the post of the Palatine of Kiev, as well as letters which promised him the District of Liuboml, which was relinquished especially for him by the queen. After crossing the Vistula, Peretjatkowicz spent the night in Praga. On the following day, in the company of Yurii Khmelnytskyi's uncle, Yakym Samchenko, who recently received a patent of nobility and a land grant, departed for Chyhyryn. Two weeks later, on the 26th, he reached the Cossack capital.

While Vyshovskyi received the letters and charters with "gratitude", he remarked to Peretjatkowicz that the decisions of the Senate regarding the changes of the original treaty amounted to a warrant for his death. Yet, he did promise to do his best to carry out the wishes of the Senate. In the evening Peretjatkowicz was invited to a dinner by Kovalevskyi, who was very pessimistic about the possibility of changes, especially if it involved the "Union". On the following day he was the guest at lunch at Kaplonskyi's; on the next, he was present during the expedition of the Turkish envoy.

On the 29th, Vyshovskyi summoned his colonels and senior officers and revealed to them the purpose of Peretjatkowicz's mission. They were not very pleased with what they heard, but declined to give a
firm answer, for or against, before having time to ponder over the new developments. While Vykovskyyi took a positive stand, many officers did not. Even the members of Vykovskyyi's family agitated the officers and common Cossacks against the changes. On April 30, as the council reassembled, Vykovskyyi made a speech urging the officers to accept the changes, threatening to resign if they refused. Faced with this ultimatum the officers grudgingly agreed. They still pleaded, however, that the hetman insure "that there be no [church] Union in Chyhyryn, Pereiaslav, Korsun and Bila Tserkva". Following the meeting dinner was served and toasts were raised to "His Majesty and the Commonwealth". Late in the evening the Cossack hetman summoned his secretaries and ordered them to prepare two texts "ad mentem Reipublicae". Once the secretaries completed their task, he signed the new texts and set on them the seal of the Cossack Army.

Early in the morning of May 1, Peretjatkowicz, assisted by Vykovskyyi's orderly Branytskyi, departed from Chyhyryn. Hardly stopping for rest, they passed through Smila, Korsun, Boshuslav, Bila Tserkva, Ostoroh and Lublin. On May 8, at 2 p.m., they reached Warsaw. After locating Bieniewski, Peretjatkowicz handed to him various letters from Vykovskyyi as well as the two texts of the revised treaty. 37

37 "Information" of Peretjatkowicz: Pamiatniki (new ed.), III, part 3, 348-351. According to my calculations, the revised treaty was signed by Vykovskyyi on April 30, 1659. Cf., Hrushevskyi, op. cit., X, 344, who dates it on April 29. The following was the itinerary of Peretjatkowicz. Estimated dates and distances are marked by asterixes.
The first major change in the revised text of the treaty concerned the Uniate Church. As evident by the rather strange wording of the passage, while the Uniate Church was not abolished, it was left to die a natural death:

Saturday, April 12: Expedited by B. Leszczyński; crossed the Vistula River to Praga.
Sunday, April 13: Easter. Departed in company of Yakym Somchenko
Monday, April 14: * Warka – Kazimierz.
Tuesday, April 15: * Kazimierz – Lublin.
Wednesday, April 16: * Lublin – Cheřm.
Thursday, April 17: * Cheřm – Volodymyr.
Friday, April 18: * Volodymyr – Lutsk.
Saturday, April 19: * Lutsk – Dubno – Ostoroh.
Monday, April 21: * Polonne – Liubar – Beredichiv.
Tuesday, April 22: * Beredichiv – Pavoloch – Bila Tserkva.
Wednesday, April 23: * Bila Tserkva (spent day and a half here).
Thursday, April 24: * Bila Tserkva – Bohuslav – Korsun.
Friday, April 25: * Korsun – Smila.
Saturday, April 26: Reached Chyhyryn; dinner at Kovalevskyi’s.
Sunday, April 27: Lunch at Kaplonskiy’s.
Monday, April 28: Expedition of Turkish envoy.
Tuesday, April 29: Meeting of Cossack officers.
Wednesday, April 30: Re-copying of the treaty. Signed by Vyhovskiyi.
Thursday, May 1: Left Chyhyryn at 2 a.m., reached Smila early in the morning and Korsun early in the evening.
Friday, May 2: Reached Bohuslav early in the morning and Bila Tserkva, still in the morning.
Saturday, May 3: After riding all night and morning, reached Ostoroh in the afternoon.
Sunday, May 4: Departed from Ostoroh in the morning.
Monday, May 5: * Most likely passed through Dubno to Lutsk.
Tuesday, May 6: * Most likely passed through Volodymyr to Cheřm.
Wednesday, May 7: Reached Lublin in the afternoon.
Thursday, May 8: Reached Warsaw, 2 p.m.
[For] this [Uniate] faith, which is contrary to the Greek Orthodox faith and which causes dissent between the Roman and Old Greek faithful, no one of the spiritual or lay, senatorial or noble estates, is permitted in any manner whatever, to fund or erect churches and monasteries, as in the ecclesiastical so too in those of His Majesty and personal hereditary estates, and on the strength of this Commission shall not do it forever.

It was emphasized, however, that the Roman Catholics were to enjoy all their religious liberties within the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia.

One change in the favour of the Orthodox was that a fifth bishop, the Bishop of Mscislau from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was granted a seat in the Senate. Another change was not. In the first text the senatorial rank was restricted only to nobles of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. The new passage read as follows:

In the Palatinate of Kiev Senatorial Dignities shall be conferred only on nobles of the Greek rite, [who are] fit to hold these offices; whereas, in the Palatinates of Bratslav and Chernihiv these Senatorial offices shall be conferred on the alternative [basis]: thus, after the death of a Senator of the Greek rite, a Senator of the Roman rite shall succeed him.

The autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia was curtailed by the elimination from the revised text of the passage which stated that if the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania acted as aggressors against Russia, Ruthenia had the option of not participating in the conflict. Much of Vykovskyi's power was taken away from him, as well. While his "Brotherhood" with the Crimean khan was to be tolerated, he was forbidden, as it is evident by the stricken passage, to remain on good terms with the Russian tsar. He was compensated for this loss of power by an additional phrase, which indicated that the hetman's mace would remain in the hands of the Vykovskyi family.
The quota of the registered Cossacks was reduced from 60,000 to 30,000 men. To conceal the obvious, the following phrase was added: "or [the quota] as the Honourable Zaporozhian Hetman shall list in the register". The number of mercenaries under his command was not to exceed 10,000 men. Of course, these two items were already decided upon at Hadiach and were agreed to by Vyhovskyi. All these troops were no longer to be supported only from the coffers of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, for taxes were to be levied by the Diet on "other" palatinates as well.

The final change concerned individuals who supported either the Cossacks or the Swedes, or both of them. In the original text they were granted amnesty and promised back pay for their services in the Crown or Lithuanian armies, as well as their confiscated estates or properties. In the revised text the reference to those who supported the Swedes was omitted. 38

In the meantime, the Diet anxiously awaited for the arrival of the main delegation from the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia and the Zaporozhian Army. Finally, on April 20 this delegation appeared in the capital. 39 Two days later, its chief leaders, who were granted an audience by the king and the Senate, asked for the ratification of the treaty and consideration for their additional petitions. 40

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38 On the differences between the original text, dated September 6/16, 1658, and the revised text, also dated September 6/16, 1658, but actually prepared and signed by Vyhovskyi on April 30, 1659, see Appendix VI.
39 Vidoni to Holy See, Warsaw, 26.IV.1659: LNA., IX, 253
40 Caraffa to Holy See, Vienna, 10.V.1659: Ibid., p.263
April 23, as all the delegates assembled before the Diet, Yurii Nemyrych delivered a long speech. The speech, filled with many allegorical and biblical references, emphasized the future historical significance of the union for both the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia and the Commonwealth as a whole. It also made reference to "the certain ... requests" of the delegation. These were presented in the form of a petition.

The petition "to His Majesty ... and the whole Commonwealth", called for "the execution of the Hadiach Pacts". Comprising four parts, it also contained various "requests", which were designed to amend the revised text of the treaty.

41 There are Polish, Latin and German versions. For the last one, undoubtedly published for propaganda purposes, see the bibliography.

The first part may be called the petition of the Orthodox clergy:

1. That a commission be created by a special "constitution" of the Diet and empowered to investigate fully the claims of the Orthodox with regard to all their former church lands and buildings — a great many of these were enumerated — which were confiscated throughout the Commonwealth either by the Uniates of the Jesuits.

2. That in this commission be included members from the Crown and the Grand Duchies of Lithuania and Ruthenia, who, with the assistance of the Attorney General or Vice Attorney General of Ruthenia, were to be empowered to reclaim all confiscations and to restitute them to the Orthodox, prior to the convening of the General Assembly at Bratslav, and eventually to submit a full report on their findings and activities to that body.

3. Furthermore, that the commission be empowered, as well, to act effectively against all offenders; i.e., all those who refused to return former Orthodox churches or church lands, concealed information about them or created any unnecessary difficulties.

4. That, unless all confiscations were restored to the Orthodox, the Zaporozhian Army will not allow any individual to return to his estate located in the territory controlled by the Army.

5. That the Roman Catholic churchmen have no jurisdiction over the Orthodox clergy.

6. That the Jesuits be expelled from the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia.

7. That the Uniates be not nominated to ecclesiastical offices, highest to lowest, or granted benefices within the Commonwealth,
wherever Ruthenian language was spoken.

8. That all confiscations within White Ruthenia, accomplished by the ius caducum, be declared null and void.

9. That only Orthodox nobles be eligible for the offices of the chancellors of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. They were to be responsible for counter-signing and sealing of all charters of Orthodox ecclesiastical benefices throughout the Commonwealth, as well as those of laymen within the Grand Duchy. Town courts within the Grand Duchy were also to be placed under their jurisdiction.

10. That infamy, placed on the Orthodox Bishop of Przemyśl and on the nobles of that area, be lifted; moreover, that the decree of Bishop Tukalskyi be reconfirmed as valid.

The second part of the petition contained the following requests of the Cossack army:

1. That the Ordinance of 1638 be formally abrogated and a document to that effect be deposited in the Crown Archive.

2. That the rank-and-file Cossacks be permitted to enjoy their rights and liberties, as outlined in the text of the treaty, and the officers to remain on the land they lived.

3. That charters be issued reconfirming Cossack rights and privileges, as well as one for Trekhtemyriv and its hinterland.

4. That the quota of registered Cossacks be maintained at 60,000 men.

5. That the widows of Cossacks be given fair treatment.

6. That the quartermaster-general of the Cossack Army, as well as all justices, colonels, centurions, asauls and other officers, be
approportioned annual payments, similar to those promised by the tsar.

7. That the quartermaster-general be assigned one-quarter of all the revenue collected from the District of Zhytomyr, as well as a foundry, for the needs of the Army's artillery; moreover, after the death of the present owners, revenue from all that District as well as that from salt throughout the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia.

The third part of the petition dealt largely with the needs of the nobles:

1. That the Palatinates of Volynia, Ruthenia and Podolia be incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia.

2. That specific districts be allocated for all palatinates and castellanies of the Grand Duchy.

3. That a special "constitution" be drawn up by the Diet, in order to compell the sheriffs to reside in their districts.

4. That in the Grand Duchy all officers be conferred upon, and all dignities granted to, only the Orthodox "natis et bene possessionatis".

5. That the nominations for these offices and dignities be based on the guarantee made by the commissioners.

6. That a tribunal be established for the Grand Duchy, as well as Diet and royal courts.

7. That a date be fixed for the convening of the Assembly at Bratslav.

8. That the deputies from the Grand Duchy at the Diet be granted seats by those from the Palatine of Sandomierz.

9. That a principle of alternation be adopted at the Diet, so that the representatives from the Grand Duchy will have a turn at the marshalcy of the Diet and its various committees.
10. That the hereditary princes of the Grand Duchy be granted no special prerogatives at the expense of the nobles.

11. That all legal actions against those nobles who first supported the Swedes and then joined the Cossack Army be dropped, and all court judgements, as well, be declared null and void.

12. That the Hetman of the Grand Duchy be granted complete jurisdiction over all troops with the Grand Duchy.

13. That the Hetman be succeeded by the Field Hetman of the Grand Duchy.

The fourth part of the petition contained the personal requests of Vyhovskyi:

1. That he was not to be subject to the jurisdiction of any court.

2. That no benefices, dignities or offices within the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia be granted to persons without his recommendations.

3. That Roman Catholic office-holders in the Grand Duchy be transferred to the Crown, as soon as suitable vacancies occur.

4. That proper legal procedures be followed in granting him the Districts of Bar and Liuboml.

5. That his father and brothers be granted adequate lands and appointed to suitable offices.

6. That the guarantee issued by the commissioners with regard to Yuri Nemyrych be honoured.

7. That his requests concerning Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł, Yuri Khmelnytskyi, Hulianytskyi, Lesnytskyi, Vereshchanka, Hunashevskyi, Popiel, Hulevych, Chaplitsa, Olivenberg, as well as others, who had
his letters of recommendation, be given special consideration. 43

If some senators and deputies were only angered by the speech of Nemyrych, 44 then the above petition aroused the indignation of most of them. Loud accusations were heard again. Heated debates flared anew. There was even talk about the termination of the Diet by vetoes. Eventually, however, various "hotheads" were calmed by the advice of wiser minds and the Diet got to other business. At the same time the Diet prolonged its sessions and anxiously awaited for the arrival of Peretjatkowicz. Another messenger was dispatched, during this time, to Vykovskyi. The Cossack hetman was asked to supply a categorical declaration to the Diet concerning the new demands of his delegation. He acted quickly. His courier, travelling day and night, appeared in Warsaw on May 15, a week after Peretjatkowicz, with a statement clarifying certain controversial points. He agreed, moreover, to abide by the revised text of the treaty. No doubt, he also must have instructed Nemyrych and his colleagues to withdraw all the demands which were unacceptable to the Diet. Finally, Vykovskyi requested that there be no further delay in the ratification of the treaty and that the Cossack-Ruthenian delegates be sent back as soon as possible. 45

Upon the receipt of this information, Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski were instructed to counter-sign the two texts of the treaty, one of which was sent to Vyhovskyi. After some additional discussion regarding the various items of the petition, as well as after obtaining secret guarantees from the members of the delegation regarding certain articles of the treaty, the Diet was prepared to ratify the new instrument of union.

At 9 a.m., on May 22, 1659, the Feast of the Ascension of Our Lord, bells pealed and guns roared throughout Warsaw. It was the day of the ratification of the Union of Hadiach. The king and his retinue, the queen and the ladies of the court, the senators, the deputies, various dignitaries, foreign representatives and great many spectators filled the Senate Chamber to the limit. In front of the throne an altar was erected, on which a crucifix and a book of Gospels were placed. Upon the entry and the seating of the royal couple, the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Dyonsii Balaban, accompanied by the Bishops of L'viv and Przemysl, the Arch-mandrite of Chernihiv and lesser clergy, ushered in the huge delegation from the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia and the Cossack Army.

Oath-taking ceremonies followed. King Jan Kazimierz was the first to swear an oath, binding himself and his successors to adhere to all the

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46 Diary of the envoys of the Elector of Brandenburg, Warsaw, 16.V.1659: UA, VIII, 701.
47 One such guarantee was signed by K. Vyhovskyi, [Warsaw, ca., 22.V.1659]: CzaTt., Ms. 402, p.357.
48 According to des Noyers, at 10:30 a.m.: Warsaw, 28.V.1659: Lettres, p.519.
articles of the union. The representatives of the Senate followed:
for the Crown, the Archbishop of Gniezno, Wacław Leszczyński; for
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Bishop of Vilnius, Jan Zawisza. The
military were next: the Crown Grand and Field Hetmans, Stanisław
Potocki and Jerzy Lubomirski; and the Lithuanian Grand Hetman, Paweł
Sapieha. The chief ministers of the Commonwealth, the Crown and
Ducal Grand and Vice Chancellors, then took their turn: Mikołaj
Prażmowski, Bogusław Leszczyński, Krzysztof Pac and Aleksander Naruszewicz. Finally, Marshal Jan Gniński swore an oath in the name of
the Chamber of Deputies.

It was then the turn of the delegation from the Grand Duchy of
Ruthenia and the Cossack Army. Falling on their knees, they swore
on a special book of "Ruthenian Gospels" to abide by the treaty. There
was one exception: Yurii Nemyrych, claiming he was ill, did not partici-
pate in the ceremonies. Since all sorts of rumors began to circulate
about the reason for his absence, he eventually followed the example
of other delegates. On the 24th he swore an oath, to the text of which
were added clauses that he also abandoned all foreign protectors, in-
cluding the Russian tsar and the Swedish king. This magnificent ceremony

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49 The Lithuanian Field Hetman, Wincenty Gosiewski, did not partici-
pate. He was held captive by the Russians.
50 Form of oaths: Volumina Legum, IV, 653-658.
51 Form of oaths: Ibid., pp.657-658.
52 Des Noyers to Boulliau, Warsaw, 28.V.1659: Lettres, p.519; and Diary of the envoys of the Elector of Brandenburg, Warsaw,
11.VI.1659: UA, VIII, 703-704.
was concluded by a solemn mass and the singing of *Te Deum laudamus* in St. Jan's Church.\(^5\)

The Diet proved to be very generous to the supporters of the Union of Hadiach. The Crown chancery became the horn of plenty as far as rewards were concerned: charters for ennoblement; land grants; ennoblement and land grants; reconfirmation of the noble status and property ownership; special privileges; various honours and profitable offices.\(^5\) The Diet also passed the following "constitutions":

1. The "Commission of Hadiach" was ratified, besworn and made binding in all its "articles, paragraphs and declarations, *...salvis pactis with His Highness, the Elector of Brandenburg*".\(^5\) All laws which infringed the rights and liberties of the Cossacks, especially the Ordinance of 1638, were abrogated.

2. A commission was established and its members were appointed from the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, in order to deal with the restitution to the Orthodox of all their former "churches, monasteries and church lands".

3. The Orthodox clergy was freed from various burdens and placed exclusively under the jurisdiction of its own spiritual superiors.

4. The Cossack Army was retained in the service of the Commonwealth. Its former "liberties and privileges" were reconfirmed.

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\(^{53}\) Czart., TN, Ms. 151, pp.390-395.

\(^{54}\) *Volumina Legum*, IV, 647-653, 681-683; and AGAD, MK, Sigillata, Ms. 1.

\(^{55}\) With regard to this matter see Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, pp. 482-483, n. 16.
General staff and regimental officers were guaranteed fixed annual payments.

5. Patents of nobility were to be issued to more Cossacks, whose names were to be submitted in a register by the hetman.

6. Terekhtemyriv, with its monastery and villages, was to return to the possession of the Cossack Army.\(^56\)

With the distribution of the many charters by the Crown chancery early in June, the magnificent festivities came to an end.

II

The diplomats, who participated in the ratification proceedings of the treaty of union in the Diet in Warsaw, must have viewed the closing ceremonies with a great deal of satisfaction. They, as well as a great many of those who were present in the capital at this time, sincerely hoped that the union would inaugurate a new era in the evolution of the Commonwealth and, at the same time, mark a turning point in the history of Europe as well. It turned out otherwise, however, for the Union of Hadiach proved to be very difficult to maintain. Shortly after the ratification of the instrument of the union by the Diet cracks appeared in the foundations of the edifice of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia; several months later, the whole edifice began to crumble. In the end, no "Imperium magnum", to use the words of Nemyrych, was possible: the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia was destined to remain in ruins;

\(^{56}\) Volumina Legum, IV, 644-647.
the Commonwealth, never to be transformed into a triune state. "Thus", remarked one historian, "the Union of Hadiach remained a matrimonium ratum sed non consummatum, one of those historical turning points at which history refused to turn".

The fate of the Union of Hadiach was decided by a number of developments. Both sides were guilty of mutual suspicion, hatred and intolerance. Many nobles and clergymen from the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, on the one hand, were opposed to the union or supported it reluctantly. Being primarily concerned about their class interest, these men were hardly capable of farsightedness or generosity. Moreover, while the Commonwealth waged wars against Sweden and Russia, she was plagued by mutinies of troops and eventually by the rebellion of Lubomirski. Under such circumstances she could not aid Vyhovskyi militarily in an effective manner, so that the issue with the hetman's opponents could be decided in his favour by the force of arms.

On the other hand, as the union was the work of a "Westernized" Ruthenian group, comprising chiefly the gentry, it did not have sufficient support of most of the common Cossacks. The latter cared only about the practical, not the ideological, consequence of the union: the return of the landlords, "the Poles", to Ukraine. Jealous of their officers and comrades who, as the rank-and-file claimed, "sold" them


58 Lipiński, op. cit., pp.581-584.
to "the Poles" for the king's titles to land and patents of nobility, they made common cause with the serfs against Vykovskyi and his supporters. With the aid of Russia, a stage was set for a bloody fratrical struggle. A sea of blood began to flow as the Polonophile and the Russophile groups fought each other. The country entered a period known as the "Ruin". It was being devastated by their actions, as well as by those of the Poles, Tatars and Russians. Those who cared little about the issues, only wanting peace, eventually joined the group they imagined to be the stronger of the two. Late in 1659 the following report was made to the king:

At present [the Cossacks] are already set one against another; the townspeople fight other townspeople, the sons rob their fathers; the fathers their sons. [Ukraine resembles] a ruthless Tower of Babel. For this reason the sensible old Cossacks pray to God that [He send] someone to keep a tight hold over them, either Your Majesty or the Tsar, in order that the lawlessness of the disorderly masses be not allowed [to continue].

Some individuals pointed out, late in 1658, that seeds for such a state of affairs were already sown. One such observer noted that Vykovskyi's position was extremely precarious: even a minor misfortune might cost him his office or, worse still, his life. For this reason the hetman surrounded himself with nobles and his Tatar allies, both of whom he trusted more than the Cossacks.


60 Commissioners to Jan Kazimierz, Bezdziez, 29.XII.1658: AGAD, AKW, Ros., 55c, no. 39.
For a short time, however, Vykovskyi's star shone brightly. On June 28, 1659 he routed a large Russian army near Konotop. Even this spectacular victory, however, proved to be insufficient to save neither his position nor the Union of Hadiach, for the spirit of faction and anarchy still prevailed among the Cossacks. Thus, some three months later Ivan Vykovskyi was compelled to give up, as he put it, "this troublesome office". Yurii Khmelnytskyi was elected in his place.

The new Cossack hetman did not remain a "faithful subject" of the king very long. On October 27, coerced into accepting the so-called second Treaty of Pereiaslav, he reaffirmed the tsar's protection over Ukraine, and thereby destroyed the Union of Hadiach. Shortly after, hostilities opened between the Commonwealth and Russia. At the start the latter suffered military reverses in White Ruthenia. In the Ukrainian theatre of war the Russians fared no better. When the army of Sheremetev was surrounded, Khmelnytskyi capitulated to the Crown Hetmans Potocki and Lubomirski near Chudniv. A new agreement, fashioned after that ratified

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61 Gründliche und Warhaffte Relation von dem glücklichen Siege und herrlichen Victoria, welche der hochste Gott Königl. Maj. zu Polen und Schweden etc. durch den Dienst. der getrewen Kosakischen Armee bey der Stadt Konotop gegen die Moscoviten verlichen hat... [n.p.], 1659.
63 Khmelnytskyi to Jan Kazimierz, By Fastiv, 4./14.X.1659: Ibid., p.319.
64 Yakovliv, op. cit., pp.71-92, 111-115.
65 [Jerzy Lubomirski], Wojna polsko-moskiewska pod Cudnowem..., ed. & tr. Antoni Hniłko, (Warsaw, 1922); and Antoni Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku (Warsaw, 1931).
by the Diet of 1659, was signed on October 17, 1660. While the new agreement guaranteed autonomy for Ukraine, all clauses relating to the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia were struck out. This indicated that even the former supporters of the union were unwilling to support the experiment of 1659. The whole issue was settled by a statement that it was up to the king to decide whether the Grand Duchy be restored or not. Eventually, the Diet of 1661 decided on this matter. While ratifying the Treaty of Chudniv, this Diet abolished "The Title of the Duchy of Ruthenia and the prerogatives belonging to that Duchy", on the grounds that the Cossacks themselves found them "unnecessary". The Diet of 1662 attempted to obliterate all traces of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia and to introduce the status quo prior to 1648 by passing a resolution entitled "Restitution of the Estates [to the nobles] within the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, Podolia and Czernihiv". Thus, the "Cossacks", who had received land grants in 1659 were to forfeit them.68

The main reason for such regressive steps taken by the Diet, was the chaos in Ukraine. By this time the former Grand Duchy of Ruthenia was divided, for all practical purposes, by the Dnieper River, into two spheres of influence: the Right Bank, of the Commonwealth; the Left Bank, of Russia. Even within these spheres there was no unity

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66 AGAD, MK, LL, Ms. 33, fos. 12-14; and Czart., Ms. 402, pp.351-354.
67 Volumina Legum, IV, 762, 764.
68 Ibid., pp.831-832. On other implications see Lipiński, op. cit., pp.613-615.
among the Cossacks, especially as the Tatars also endeavoured to annex Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine remained a pawn in the conflicts of three powers and experienced internal strife. By 1663 the two principal rivals strengthened their positions: the Commonwealth, by the deposing of Yurii Khmelnytskyi as the hetman of the Right Bank and the elevation to that office of her trusted supporter, Pavlo Teteria; Russia, by the removal of the undesirable Somko and Zolotarenko, and, by the engineering for the election of her candidate for the hetman of the Left Bank, Ivan Briukhovetskyi.

At the close of 1663 Jan Kazimierz attempted to regain all of Ukraine and to force peace conditions on Russia by force of arms. He failed, however, to achieve both of his aims. The following year proved to be a tragic one for the Commonwealth: she suffered military disasters, diplomatic sebacks and domestic upheavals. Her position was greatly weakened in relation to that of Russia. Eventually the Commonwealth decided to settle her differences with Russia by means of negotiations. After arranging the preliminaries in 1665, parleys began between the two states in May 1666.

During these negotiations another crisis developed. Petro Doroshenko, the new hetman of the Right Bank, attempted to gain autonomy for Ukraine by establishing her as a vassal state under the suzerainty of the sultan. With the military aid obtained from Crimea, Doroshenko attacked and annihilated the Crown troops stationed in Ukraine. For the Commonwealth this was a very severe blow, for she was faced with the possibility of a new Cossack-Tatar-Turkish war and the loss of the
Right Bank. At the close of 1666 the Senate Council decided to salvage what was yet possible; thus, it instructed the commissioners at Andrusovo to accept the demands of the Russians and to conclude with them an alliance against Crimea and Turkey. On January 30, 1667 a treaty was signed to that effect. It was to last for thirteen and a half years. 69

The Treaty of Andrusovo merely sanctioned the partition of the already de facto partitioned Ukraine between the Commonwealth and Russia. The latter also obtained the City of Kiev and its hinterland on the Right Bank. This was to be a temporary arrangement; it proved, however, to be permanent as far as Ukraine was concerned, and in 1683 this arrangement was confirmed by the "eternal peace" signed by the two states. These boundaries remained unchanged, save for the brief period of Turkish occupation of Podolia, until the second partition of the Commonwealth (1793), at which time the remainder of Ukraine was annexed by Russia. Thus, so it seemed to many contemporaries, the Union of Hadiach was dealt a death blow, already in 1667 by the Treaty of Andrusovo.

III

Did the efforts of the diplomats, during the years 1657-1659, bear any fruit for their contemporaries as well as for the future generations?

69 For the background see Zbigniew Wojcik, Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza (Warsaw, 1959).
What is the historical significance of the instrument of the Union of Hadiach? Did it remain "a lifeless paper document"? Various answers are given to these questions by Polish and Ukrainian historiography.

The short life of the Union of Hadiach was largely responsible for exercising a profoundly negative influence upon the historiography. The brevity of its existence was the cause for the Union being evaluated as an achievement of no consequence, severely criticised and even condemned, together with its architects, both by many contemporary and later historians and writers.

Wawrzyniec Rudawski (1617-1690), for example, regarded the Union of Hadiach merely as "an agreement" between the Poles and Vyhovskyi, whom he considered a schemer, a selfish individual and one who was responsible for "this whole comedy". Not very complimentary were the remarks of Stanislaw Lubieniecki (1673-1675), as well, about another architect of the Union—Yurii Nemyrych. A good representative of country squires, Mikolaj Jemilowski (d. ca., 1693), equated the Union with "burdensome conditions" thrust upon the state, which had to be accepted due to adverse circumstances. He noted with a degree of satisfaction, later on, that these soon proved to be "of no consequence".

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70 Historia polska od śmierci Władysława IV aż do pokoju oliwskiego, czyli dzieje panowania Jana Kazimierza od 1648 do 1660 r., Włodzimierz Spasowicz ed., 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1855), II, 364, 394.

71 Historia Reformationis Polonicae, In qua Tum Reformatorum, tum Antitrinitariorum origio et progressus in Polonia et finitimis Provinciis narrantur (Freistadii, 1685), p.256.

To the squire Joachim Jerlicz, a typical gentle Ruthenus natione Polonus, the ratification of the Union signified only that "peace" was finally concluded with "those [Cossack] ruffians". He justified the execution of Ivan Vylovskyi in 1664 on the grounds of "treason".  

A few years after the ratification of the treaty of Union, the editor of the newspaper Merkuriusz referred to it merely as "Cosaci ad obsequium reversi". Jan Wydzga (d. 1682), in his description of the events during the years 1655–1660, did not see fit to elaborate on this "pact" between "the Cossacks" and "the Commonwealth". To Roman Rakushka (1623–1703) the only significance of the Union was that all business could be transacted in Kiev, rather than in Warsaw or Lublin. Finally in the various memoirs from this period, chiefly of petty squire-soldiers, the Union was only mentioned by name—as by Jan Tuszyński (1640–1707), or not mentioned at all—as by Jan

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74 Merkuriusz Polski, Dzieje wszystkiego światę w sobie zamykający dla Informacyei pospolitej (Kraków, January 3, 1661), p.8.


Cedrowski (1617-1688), 78 Maciej Vorbek-Lettow (1593-ca., 1668), 79 Stanisław Druszkiewicz (1621-1690), 80 Jan Pasek (ca., 1636-1701), 81 or Jakub Łoś (d. after 1682). 82

Of course, there were other individuals who regarded the Union of Hadiach as a positive achievement. Associated with the court of King Jan III Sobieski, the "royal historiographer" Wespazjan Kochowski (1633-1700) praised the Union. Although Kochowski laid the blame for its failure on both sides, he nevertheless held the Cossack masses more responsible for wrecking "this memorable work". 83 This was also largely the view of the historian and poet Samuel Twardowski (ca., 1600-1660). He was greatly critical about the ignorance, jealousy and hostility of the "rabble". Their action prevented the sounder Cossack minds to form the "Third [part of the] Commonwealth". 84

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78 "Pamiętnik Jana Cedrowskiego", Ibid.
80 "Pamiętniki Stanisława Zygmunta Druszkiewicza, stolnika Parnawskiego", Dziennik Literacki, II (1856), 124-125, 132-134, 141-143, 149-150.
82 Pamiętniki Łośia, towarzysza chorągwi pancernej Władysława Myszkowskiego, wojewody krakowskiego, obejmujące wydarzenia od r. 1646 do 1667, z rękopisu współczesnego, dochowanego w zamku podhoredeckim, wydane, Żegota Pauli ed. (Kraków, 1858).
84 Wojna Domowa Z-Kozaki i Tatary, Moskwą, potem Szwedami i z-Węgry, Przez lat Dwanaście Za Panowania Najjaśniejszego Jana Kazimierza, Króla Polskiego, Tocząca się (Kalisz, 1681), pp.263-273.
Later, from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries many Polish and Ukrainian historians and writers had shown a considerable interest in the Union or, as some prefer to call it, the "Treaty", "Compact" or "Agreement" of Hadiach. Their interest in the Union varied: some examined it for scholarly reasons; others, for political reasons; still others, for religious reasons. There were even those who examined it for patriotic or, in some cases, hyper-nationalistic reasons. It goes without saying, therefore, that their evaluation of and conclusions about the Union can hardly be objective or uniform.

As far as the Polish historians are concerned, most of them consider the Union of Hadiach as a valuable and a wise political experiment, greatly praise its esthetic qualities and to a great degree express regret that it was unable to come into force.

To Antoni Prochaska (1852-1930), the Union of Hadiach was fashioned "in the likeness of the former Unions of Horodlo [1413] and Lublin [1569]." 85 Wacław Sobieski (1872-1935) maintained that while the Union bore some resemblance to the former, it was unquestionably patterned after the latter. Other historians expressed similar views. Józef Szujski (1835-1883) referred to the architects of the Union as being "infused by the spirit emanating from the Union of Lublin". 87

85 "Wykowski, twórca unji hadjackiej i jego rodzina", Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki, XLVIII (1920), 115.
87 Dzieje Polski podług ostatnich badań, 4 vols. (Lviv, 1862-1866), III, 414.
To Oskar Halecki, the Union was purposely designed "to complement the Union of Lublin"; while to Anatol Lewicki (1841-1899), it "renewed and expanded the Union of Lublin". Franciszek Rawita-Gawronski (1845-1930) had the event of 1659 in mind, when he wrote about "a certain type of federation" comprising Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia. Walerian Kwiatkowski considered the enlarged Polish "Commonwealth", to be a prototype of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Union of Hadiach, which Michał Bobrzyński (1849-1935) described as being "a significant and wise accomplishment", was considered by him to be the most outstanding achievement "since the time of the Union of Horodło". Władysław Konopczyński (1880-1952) regarded the Union "a wise and just compromise" and attributed it to the efforts of "the king, the queen and the few exceptional and far-sighted minds". The programme of the Union, to Stanisław Kot was "bold and far-reaching,

89 Dzieje narodu polskiego w zarysie, new ed. (Warsaw, 1904), p.297.
90 Kozaczynna ukraїnna w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do koїca XVII wieku (Warsaw, [1920]), p.121.
just and wise".\textsuperscript{94} Antoni Walewski (1805-1876) saw it as "a monument of glory of the Commonwealth", since, in his opinion, "historical justice" was dispensed "to the Ruthenian people".\textsuperscript{95} Aleksander Czołowski (1865-1944) emphasized that the Union "will forever remain as one of the paramount political acts in Polish history".\textsuperscript{96}

\textit{Władysław Tomkiewicz}, author of several articles on this topic, wrote of a de facto "Union", which "changed the political system of the Commonwealth". It was to him "a deed of great moral significance".\textsuperscript{97} This "great idea" emerged from "the spirit of the best traditions of the Jagiellonian Poland".\textsuperscript{98} It should never be regarded "only as a political move, or a manoeuvre dictated by circumstances"; for, on the contrary, it was "also a reflection of the feelings prevailing beyond the Cossack spheres, the spheres of Ukrainian intellectuals", whose desires Vyhovskyi had to take into account. True, the document which came into existence at the camp by Hadiach "was signed by the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{94} Jerzy Niemirycz w 300-lecie ugody hadziackiej (Paris, 1960), p.43.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Historya wyzwolonej Rzeczypospolitej wpadajacej pod jarzmo domowe za panowania Jana Kaźmierza (1655-1660), 2 vols. (Kraków, 1870-1872), I, 27.
\item \textsuperscript{96} "Udostojnienie herbu Jana Wyhowskiego, hetmana wojsk zaporoskich, z r. 1659", Miesięcznik Heraldyczny, II (1909), 165.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Kozaczyna ukrainna (Lviv, 1939), p.71.
\item \textsuperscript{98} "Unia hadziacka", Sprawy Narodościowe, XI (1937), 29.
\end{itemize}
hetman of the Cossacks, but it was inspired by the Kievan clergy and the Ukrainian nobles". 99

Those historians who look favourably on the Union of Hadiach give various reasons for its failure to become operative. To Sobieski, even if the Union did come to force, it contained three dangerous provisions: those dealing with the Uniate Church, the power of the Cossack hetman and the restoration of the estates to the nobles in Ukraine, which threatened to undermine "the idea of the federation". 100 To Kot, in order to be implemented, the programme of the Union required favourable conditions and military strength. Unfortunately, it took shape just at the time when "enmity and distrust" still existed between the contractual parties and when each one had its hands tied militarily; Poland waged war against Sweden; Ukraine, in internal turmoil, against Russia. 101 Szujski maintained that the Union came too late. Only "during the times of [Bohdan] Khmelnytskyi and [Adam] Kysil it could have been carried conscientiously into effect". 102 Tomkiewicz also argued that it was concluded at a wrong time; either too early, by one or two years; or too late, by about one generation. 103

99"Ukraina między Wschodem i Zachodem", Ibid., XII (1938), 38.
100Loc. cit.
101Loc. cit.
102Loc. cit.
103"Unia", op. cit., pp.29, 31.
Some historians blame one side, more than the other, for the failure of the Union of Hadiach; others, lay the blame equally on both sides. Jan Józefowicz (1662-1728) sarcastically pointed out, that the Cossacks remained loyal long enough so that the Poles could hear the official speech of submission by their envoy, Yurii Nemyrych, at the Diet of 1659. Gawroński saw the cause of the whole problem within "the contemporary Ruthenian society". Apart from the clergy, he maintained, the Ruthenians did not possess "sufficient politically mature intellectuals" who were either capable of comprehending "the significance" of the Union, or to take advantage of it "for the interest of [the Ruthenian] national evolution". This was also the view of Konopczynski. At the Diet of 1659, he wrote, "the Poles...passed their examination of political maturity". The Ukrainians were much less concerned with the defence of the Union than the Poles. Szujski, however, pointed out two causes for the collapse of the Union: on the one hand, the Cossacks were unable to comprehend its significance; on the other, the Polish nobles and the Roman Catholic clergy were against it right from the beginning.

104 Kronika miasta Lwowa od roku 1634 obejmująca w ogólności dzieje dawnej Rusi Czerwonej a zwłaszcza Historia Arcybiskupstwa lwowskiego w tejże epoce, M. Piwocki ed. and tr. (Lviv, 1854), p.236.
105 Loc. cit.
106 Loc. cit.
107 Loc. cit.
What was the significance or the potential of the Union of Hadiach? Alexander Jabłonowski (1829-1913) answered this question by stating that had the Union come into force, not only the Slavs in Eastern Europe, but all the Slavs would have experienced an entirely different fate. In the view of Tomkiewicz, the history of Eastern Europe would have taken a different course, "had the Union of Hadiach not remained only a document of healthy political thought". To Kot, the programme espoused by the Union "could have created the basis for the regulation of coexistence between Poland and Ukraine". In the estimation of Kwiatkowski, it is still an extremely useful "source for a thorough study of the psyche" of the Poles and the Ukrainians.

Jabłonowski was one of the few Polish historians who pointed out the significance of the Union of Hadiach to the Ukrainians. Its "ideals", he wrote, were drawn up "by the most enlightened representatives of the contemporary intellectuals of Ukraine, the nobles within the Cossack camp and the Greek Orthodox clergy". These ideals did not disappear following the collapse of the Union. "On the contrary", he maintained, "from the higher spheres they permeated slowly and more

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108 Historya Rusi południowej do upadku Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Kraków, 1912), p.259.
109 "Unia", op. cit., p.29.
110 Loc. cit.
deeply [to the masses].\footnote{Pisma Aleksandra Jabłonowskiego, 7 vols. (Warsaw, 1910-1913), II, 221. See also his comments in Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilańska. Zarys historyczny na tle rozwoju ogólnego cywilizacji zachodniej na Rusi (Kraków, 1899-1900), pp.135-136.}

More critical, however, were the views of others on the Union of Hadiach. A representative of the old historians, Dymitr Michał Krajewski (1746-1817), bluntly stated that the Union was a worthless endeavour, because it was "of no advantage whatever to Poland".\footnote{Dzieje panowania Jana Kazimierza od roku 1656 do jego abdykacji w roku 1668, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1846), I, 101.}

Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861), the admirer of the Cossack "republican spirit", considered that the Cossacks abhorred the "aristocratic" innovations of the "deceptive" Union, imposed upon them by the "nobleman" Ivan Vyshovskyi. The Cossacks, who already constituted "a separate nation", saw no need for any ties with Poland and therefore rose in rebellion against their hetman. When Vyshovskyi, the highest-ranking lay senator from the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia was shot by the Poles in 1664 on a charge of treason, the Union "perished with him" as well. Moreover, after comparing the agreements of Hadiach and Pereiaslav, Lelewel concluded that the former, of 1658, was much less beneficial to the Cossacks than the latter, of 1654.\footnote{Polska, dzieje i rzeczy jej rospotrYWane przez Joachima Lelewela, 20 vols. (Poznań, 1853-1864), III [VIII], 385-386.}
The follower of Lelewel's "school", Jędrzej Moraczewski (1802-1855), was also extremely critical about the Union of Hadiach. He accused the Polish side—"the pupils of Jesuits"—of "colusion with the fomentors of the Ukrainian people against [the interests of] the Ukrainian people", of bribing these Cossack "fomentors" with grants of land and patents of nobility and finally of committing premeditated perjury. To Moraczewski the Union was, therefore, bought for "a very cheap price". 115

Ludwik Kubala (1838-1918) explained that the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian Union failed to become operative because right from the beginning it lacked the strong foundations necessary for its existence. Moreover, according to him, "it was not needed". "Both sides did not want it... The Cossacks did not wish [even] to hear about the Ruthenian Duchy. ... The Poles, likewise, did not desire such an union." The Union of Hadiach passed on to the posterity only as a symbol of goodwill. It remained a reminder that at one time the Poles sought an agreement with the Ruthenians. Perhaps even this "reminder" will prove of value in time to come, concluded Kubala. 116

Other Polish historians, mostly contemporaries, are also very critical of the Union of Hadiach. Janusz Tazbir refers to the Union

116 Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski, 1657-1660 (Lviv, 1922), pp. 250, 257.
as "the pact" which was "politically overdue for twenty years, while socially, imposed upon the Cossack masses in the interest of some of the officers and the borderland magnates". To him, it was an attempt "to restore, at a price of some concessions, the status quo of 1648" and "to Polonize" another generation of the Ukrainian "social elite".

Kazimierz Piwarski explains the Union in the following terms. "Polish latifundiae owners" had no desire to give up their estates in Ukraine. They therefore laboured to win over for their cause "rich Cossacks and landowners, and among others, the nobleman Ivan Vyhovskyi". Eventually they succeeded and concluded an agreement which basically was only an "expansion of the Treaty of Zboriv". This is also the view of Leszek Podhorodecki. To him, the Union of Hadiach did not possess sound basis for its future existence. Andrzej Wyczański calls the Union "an un-workable idea". Its "only result" was that it provoked another uprising in Ukraine and contributed to the renewal of the Polish-Russian war.

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Another historian, Zbigniew Wójcik, points out that from the Polish point of view the Union of Hadiach is often regarded as a great political achievement, particularly because it seemed to pave the way for the solution of the thorny Cossack-Ruthenian problem within the Commonwealth. Moreover, had it become operative, the future of both the Poles and the Ukrainians would have taken, undoubtedly, a different course from that which they actually experienced. Wójcik, however, cannot accept such a simple evaluation, without also considering "its historical effects, its strength of influence upon the contemporary and future generations". This lack of impact was its main weakness. "The Union of Hadiach did have a chance of making a historical career in 1638"; by 1658, however, it was already too late. The Union did not initiate a new era in the Polish-Ukrainian relations; on the contrary, "it only remained a lifeless paper document" for the posterity.123

Finally, very severe were the judgments of the following Polish "emigré" historians. Stanisław Kosciałkowski (1881-1960) concluded that the Union of Hadiach had the potential of becoming "one of the most important events in our history" and perhaps "the turning point in the history of the whole Eastern Europe" in the relations of Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Actually, however, it remained "an unresolved attempt to solve the most grave and peculiar Cossack question" and

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brought no "positive results". Czesław Chowaniec sings a similar requiem: the Union of Hadiach became "a dead letter" and did not achieve "any practical results".

Much more interesting, for obvious reasons, is the treatment of the Union of Hadiach by Ukrainian historians, particularly those engaged in scholarly work in the rival historical centres of two empires: Kiev (Russian) and Lviv (Austro-Hungarian), late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries. They searched for and published many new sources concerning the Union, wrote a number of interesting articles and monographs about it or relating to it and carried on bitter polemics, in which they expressed all sorts of points of view regarding it.

The Ukrainian historiography of the eighteenth century was dominated by various expressions of the "patriotic" Russian point of view,

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126 A good outline of that treatment, to 1930, is found in the article of Symon Narizhnyi. See his "Hadiatska umova v svitli ukrainskoj istoriografii", Naukovyi Žuvyleinyi Zbirnyk Ukrajinskoj Universytetu v Prazi, prysvuachenyi Panovi Prezidentovi Cheskoslovenskoj Respubliky Prof. Dr. T. G. Masarykovi dla vshanuvannia 80-tykh rokovyn ioho narodzhennia (Prague, 1930), part 2, pp. 124-139.
condemning the Union of Hadiach and its architects. To Samiilo Velychko (d. after 1728), Petro Symonovskyi (1717–1809), Aleksander Rigelman (1720–1789), for example, as well as to other anonymous authors-chroniclers, such as those of Istoriia Rusov and Lietopisets, the Union was achieved by the machinations of crafty Poles in conjunction with the ambitious Ivan Vyhovskyi and his creatures, purposely designed to enserf the Cossacks. They referred to the Cossack Hetman, with contempt, as a "Pole", and accused him of treason against his lawful sovereign, Alexei Mikhailovich. Vyhovskyi, moreover, was described as a corrupt person. He was an individual who was capable, by his very nature, of conceiving anything that was base, deceitful or fraudulent.

127 Skazanie o voine kozatskoi z poliakamy, M. Hrushevskyi et al., eds., (Kiev, 1926).

128 "Kratkoe Opisanie o Kozatskom Malorossiiskom narodie i o voennykh ego dielakh", Chteniiia v Imperatorskom Obshchestva Istoriia I Drevnosti Rossiiskikh Pri Moskovskom Universitette [Hereafter cited as Chteniiia], III (September 1847), 1-159.

129 "Lietopisoe Poviestovanie o Maloi Rossi i eia narodie i kozakakh voobshe... "Ibid., II (December, 1846- April, 1847), 1-100, 101-219; 1-108, 109-201; 1-42, 43-146; 1-101.

130 "Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rosii", Ibid., II (June - November, 1846), 1-24, 25-80; 1-45, 81-144, 145-257.

131 "Lietopisets ili opisanie kratkoe znatnieishikh dieistv i sluchaev, khto v kotorom godu dieialosia v Ukraini malorossiiskoi obieikh stron Dniepra i kto imenno kogda getmanom byl kozatskim", Sbornik Lietopisei otnosiashchiksa k istoriyi Yuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi, izdannyi kommis-sieiu dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, sostoiashchei pri Kievskom, Podol'skom i Volynskom General-Gubernatorie, V. Antonovych ed. (Kiev, 1888), 3-69.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, even though great strides were taken in the scholarly research of the "Little Russian" past, the historians of this period evaluated the Union of Hadiach and its creators still very negatively. This period, which was characterized, especially from 1832, by official "denominationalism, authoritarianism and intellectual and cultural conservatism", can be best illustrated by the works of Dmytro Bantysh-Kamenskyi (1788-1850), the contemporary of S. S. Uvarov.

This historian traced the genesis of the Union of Hadiach from the meeting, in July 1657, of Potocki, Lubomirski, Czarniecki and Sapieha, at which they agreed to adopt Machiavellian methods in order to regain Ukraine for Poland. It was impossible for them to achieve this aim during the lifetime of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. After his death, however, another opportunity appeared for them, when the ambitious and perfidious Vyhovskyi seized power. This newcomer, according to Bantysh-Kamenskyi, cared little for the welfare of Ukraine, to which he could not get used to; therefore, it was quite easy for the Poles to seduce him with bribes, gifts and various promises, including the one that he will become "the prince of Little Russia". Eventually Vyhovskyi betrayed his sovereign, "the Russian Autocrat".

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133 See Chapter IV, n. 94.
Bantysh-Kamenskyi outlined the terms of the Union briefly and inadequately, although he outlined other Cossack treaties in much more detail. Judging by his detailed description of the aims of the Polish magnates and his long attack on the "traitor" Vyhovskiy, he considered it the result of their plot engineered purposely to bring about the ruin of Ukraine. In the work of this historian, dedicated to "Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich, Autocrat of all Russia", the picture of the Union of Hadiach was therefore painted in very dark colours, obviously with a strong bias.  

Less critical about the Union were the remarks of Mykola Kostomarov (1817-1885), in his detailed analysis of the times of Vyhovskiy. While this historian regarded the Union of Hadiach as a valuable experiment, he expressed, for various reasons, serious disbelief that it could ever have been realized. He doubted, for example, the sincerity of both parties, particularly of the Poles, arguing that this was demonstrated during the negotiations at Hadiach and even clearer during the ratification and oath-taking ceremonies at Warsaw. Kostomarov claimed that even during the oath-swearing the king and other dignitaries were aware that they would eventually break their oaths. As far as the Cossacks were concerned, he maintained that they were unable to comprehend the complexities and the magnitude of the agreement; moreover, some of their demands were wholly unrealistic. In concluding his monograph on Vyhovskiy's times, Kostomarov blamed

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\[134\] Istoriia Maloi Rosii ot vodvoreniia Slavian v sei stranie do unichtozheniia Getmanstva, 4th ed. (Kiev, 1903), 223-224.
both sides for wrecking the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia: the Ukrainians, for failing to appreciate the Union, which was the work of superior minds; the Poles, for failing to abide by their oaths. Kostomarov therefore accused the former of ignorance; the latter, of premeditated perjury. 135

Many different points of view were expressed by other historians. Panteleimon Kulish (1819-1897), who pictured the Cossacks only as a destructive element, 136 regarded the Union of Hadiach merely as another example of opportunistic schemes of Vyhovsky and his Cossack supporters. 137 To Dmytro Evarnytskyi (1855-1940), the Union represented a plan by the king to destroy everything that Bohdan Khmelnytskyi accomplished for Ukraine. 138 Vasyl Vovk-Karachevskyi (1834-1893) was also hardly an enthusiastic supporter of the Union. He contended that Vyhovskyi's greatest mistake was the setting up of an "aristocratic" state, modelled after Poland-Lithuania, with a privileged upper Cossack stratum. The hetman failed to take into account the deeply-rooted "democratic spirit" of the common people, who despised class distinction

135 Hetmanovanie Ivana Vyhovskoho i Yuriia Khmelnytskoho (Ternopil, 1891), p. 112.
137 "Vyhovshchyna", Tvory (Lviv, 1910), IV. See Narizhnyi, op. cit., p. 131.
138 Istoriia Zaporozhskikh kozakov, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1892-1897), II, 297.
and hated all overlords. To this historian, the main weakness of the Union was the lack of reference in its text to the common people in general; in particular, to the betterment of their economic burdens and social conditions. It was this omission which ultimately led to its ruin. Vovk-Karachevskyi acknowledged, however, that Vyhoverkyi should be praised for realizing at least that there was need "to create some kind of autonomy for Ukraine". 139

The most famous of Ukrainian historians, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (1866-1934) devoted many critical remarks to this "union of the gentry". He did consider it to be of some value, at least as a temporary arrangement; however, due to various circumstances, its fate was sealed right from the beginning. The main cause for the doom of this hastily-prepared and vaguely-worded Union, was that its architects removed themselves too far from the masses and sought foreign aid for their plans rather than that of their own people. The masses, unaware of the provisions of the Union and fearing the return of Polish landlords, rebelled against Vyhoveryi and his associates. 140

The most severe critic of the Union of Hadiach, among the old historians, was M. Stadnyk. He considered it as a de facto "incorporation of Ukrainian territories into Poland". The federal autonomy of the

139 "Borba Polsky s kozachestvom vo vtoroi polovinie XVII i nachalie XVIII vieka", Kievskii Universitetskiia Izviiestiiia [Hereafter cited as KUI], XXXVIII (November, 1898), 38.

Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, according to him, was a farce, for it was destined to be gradually limited and eventually, with the passage of time, to disappear altogether. For the time being this "Ostmark", which "Poland consciously created for itself", would serve the Poles as a sally port against Russia and, of course, bear all the consequences associated with warfare. The Union, moreover, this historian maintained, was based on "aristocratic foundations", and as such was totally unacceptable to the common people, who desired "democratic equality and liberty". Evaluating the Union of Hadiach from various points of view, Stadnyk finally concluded that it was one of the worst examples of the Ukrainian political thought.¹⁴¹

Stadnyk's views were repeated and applauded, curiously enough, by the Ukrainian emigré historian living in the United States, S. Mishko. Rather angry at the Poles for insisting to hold on to "the Jagiellonian idea", which he considers nothing less than incorporation of Ukraine into Poland, Mishko claims that, apart from some historians, the Ukrainian people as a whole were never interested in the Union. It is his view that the Union was concluded "against the interests of the Ukrainian people and against their "existence as a nation"; moreover, its aim was to destroy "the Ukrainian statehood".¹⁴²

¹⁴¹"Hadiatska unia", Zapysky Ukraїnskoho Naukovoho Tovarystva v Kyivі, VIII (1911), 21-25.
¹⁴²Hadiatskyi Dohovіr (Detroit, 1959), 2-3, 27.
Much more critical is the historiography of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Its evaluation of the Union of Hadiach and of Ivan Vyshovskyi is very severe, resembling that of the tsarist times. The "traitor" Vyshovskyi is accused of "sacrificing" Ukraine to Poland, placing "Ukraine under the aristocratic rule of Poland" and selling the Ukrainian people "into the bondage of Polish nobles". Even though the Polish nobles consented to grant concessions to Cossack officers, it was their aim eventually to reduce all Cossacks to serfs. The Union, had it managed to survive, would have introduced new conditions of bondage for the Ukrainian people under the Polish lords.  

K. I. Stetsiuk's statements may be used to summarize the views of the past and present Ukrainian historians, the followers of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of history. Ivan Vyshovskyi, whom Stetsiuk describes as "the hangman of the Ukrainian people", conspired with "a group of traitors" and succeeded in placing Ukraine under "the Polish rule". The Ukrainians were destined, therefore, once again, to suffer "social, national and religious oppression". He lashes out against

"the Ukrainian bourgeoise nationalists", who praised "the base traitor Vyhovskyi" and the Union of Hadiach, which he helped to formulate. Of course, they failed to prove that the Union was beneficial to the Ukrainian people. "Historical facts", concludes this historian, prove to the contrary the claims of these "enemies of the people". 144

Indeed, these "Ukrainian bourgeoise nationalists" did have a different point of view. Of the old historians, Orest Levytskyi (1849-1922), for example, described the Union of Hadiach as "a magnificent political plan". It was, however, in his view, too advanced for the times; therefore, it met the fate similar to any endeavour which was beyond the comprehension of the contemporaries, or which proved beyond their capabilities to carry out. If one cause must be chosen for the failure of the Union, it has to be, in Levytskyi's opinion, Vyhovskyi's ambitions—his lust for power and self-interest. Thus preoccupied with himself, Vyhovskyi failed to support the chief architect of the Union, Yurii Nemyrych, who laboured for the realization of new political and social programmes for his Fatherland. 145

In Vasyl Herasymchuk's (1880-1944) view, the weak link in the chain of the initial "political combination" with Poland, was that the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia made insufficient gains for itself. Of course, he maintained, that Vyhovskyi can hardly be blamed for con-

145 "Ocherk vnutennei istorii Malorossii, vo vtoroi polovinie XVII v'", KUI (May, 1874), 381; and "Socyanie na Rusi", Reformacja w Polsce, II (1922), 232.
cluding such "a union with Poland", as he acted under most adverse circumstances. The Union of 1658-1659, argued Herasymchuk, "was to be a transitional episode only"; it was to serve, for the time being, as hetman's "means" in order, at a later date, to reach the desired "end", no doubt, full independence for Ukraine. Therefore, precisely for this reason, Herasymchuk admired the Union of Hadiach and called it a "great Cossack monument".  

Viacheslav Budzynovskyi (1868-1935) also saw the Union in a positive light. He took a very strong stand in the support of "the Hadiach postulates". Budzynovskyi argued that all those historians who labelled the Union as "undemocratic", or criticised it for lacking clauses regarding economic and social changes for the common people, failed to comprehend its true nature. Since the treaty of union was an "international" agreement, it could not, he claimed, contain articles dealing with any domestic reforms. All such internal matters were to be decided by the diet of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. To Budzynovskyi, the Union of Hadiach contained many admirable qualities; for example, it laid down the foundations for "the Ukrainian national programme". Extremely significant were the "Hadiach postulates", for they, he pointed out, clearly indicated the integrity of all Ukrainian ethnographic territories".  

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146 "Vyhovshchyna i Hadiatskyi Traktat", Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka, LXXIX (1909), 47, 82.  
147 Hadiatski Postuliaty i Hetman Vyhovskyi (Anketa) (Lviv, 1907).
Symon Narizhnyi, who wrote in 1930, also concluded that the Union of Hadiach was important, particularly because it guaranteed for Ukraine, under the name of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, such a degree of political integrity that it did not enjoy to his own day, for nearly three hundred years. Yet, to Narizhnyi, the official text of the treaty of Union was less important than the "postulates" raised by the Cossacks during the negotiations in their camp near Hadiach. 148

To Viacheslav Lypynskyi (1882-1931), the Union of Hadiach was certainly not above criticism. Yet, in spite of all its faults, it was still the first act of official and international sanction of a new constitutional and legal position of Ukraine as a state in Europe. This, to Lypynskyi, was "a fact of immense significance", for it "atoned, to a considerable extent, for the [political] errors of these Ukrainian statesmen who negotiated the Compact of Hadiach". Overall, he concluded, this was a very important episode "in the evolution of Ukrainian political thought and Ukrainian legitimism". 149

Other Ukrainian historians and writers also agree that the Union of Hadiach was a positive accomplishment. Tymko Padurra (1801-1871) generally praised it and expressed satisfaction that finally "the Ukrainian became [part of] the Commonwealth". 150

149 Z dziejów Ukrainy. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Włodzimierza Antonowicza, Paulina Święcickiego i Tadeusza Rylskiego (Kiev [Kraków], 1912), pp. 616-617.
150 Pyśma Tymka Padurry (Lviv, 1874), p. 309.
(1834-1908) concluded that, from the national point of view, it pro-
vided great gains for Ukraine. Very positive was also the evalua-
tion of Dmytro Doroshenko (1882-1951). He even saw the possibility of
Russia joining "the Commonwealth" and thus becoming a fourth member of
the great Slavic federation. An anonymous author also emphasized
its value. He concluded, however, that the negative position taken by
both parties with regard to the Uniate Church was their greatest mistake.

Such were the verdicts passed on the Union of Hadiach by prominent
Polish and Ukrainian historians. One cannot deny that the architects
of the Union failed to attain their aim: the creation of the Grand
Duchy of Ruthenia and the transformation of the dualistic structure
of the Commonwealth into a trialistic one. This fact notwithstanding,
one still finds it difficult to accept and to justify the conclusions
reached by some of the above-mentioned historians, for the ideals of the
Union of Hadiach were very much alive. The following are just a few
examples.

Early in 1674 the men in Warsaw finally realized that only by
restoring the Union of Hadiach could the Cossacks be enticed to support
the Commonwealth. The "Articles" submitted by Hetman Petro Doroshenko

151 Besidy pro chasy kozatski na Ukraini (Chernivtsi, 1912), pp.99-100.
153 Hadiatskyi dohovir mizh Ukrainu i Polscheiu, 1658 (Lviv, 1933),
p. 50.
154 Janusz Wołinski, Król Jan III a sprawa Ukrainy, 1674-1675 (Warsaw,
to Jan III made this quite clear. In 1708 the Union was used as the basis for an agreement between Ivan Mazepa and Stanisław Leszczyński. In 1863 a manifesto called upon the "people of Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia" to take up arms against Russia. The stamp of the "National Government" (1863-1864) contained the coat-of-arms of Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia, as did the silver medal issued to commemorate the emancipation of the serfs. Finally, even the Piłsudski Petlura agreement of 1920, in the view of one historian, was "a continuation of the policy initiated by the Union of Hadiach".

Thus, the ideals of the Union of Hadiach have not perished. As evident by the examples above, those ideals reappeared, in one form or another, during the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They could become manifest in future history.

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155 Ibid., pp. 24-27, doc. no. 3.
158 Wasyl Luciw, Ukrainians and the Polish Revolt of 1863 (New Haven, 1961), p. 27 (illustration).
CONCLUSION

I

In this thesis the author has described the process by which the Zaporozhian Hetman and Cossacks were transformed from an internal factor in the foreign policy of the Polish Commonwealth to her external partner in diplomatic negotiations. The Treaty of Hadiach, designed to re-integrate Cossack Ukraine as the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia into the Commonwealth's framework, represented the acceptance by her government and diplomats of Ukraine as a partner in diplomatic negotiations.

The author has emphasized that even prior to 1648 Cossacks' diplomacy was not an anomaly in the Commonwealth's system of diplomacy. On the contrary, he has shown evidence that the Cossacks were granted the right of diplomacy, internally and externally, similarly as were certain individuals, institutions, corporate bodies and vassal states, by the government of the Commonwealth, for it based this right on a broad interpretation of ius legationis. Therefore, it is quite correct to refer to diplomatic relations, to describe the process of negotiations or to outline the terms of treaties between Ukraine and the Commonwealth or Ukraine and some vassal or sovereign state.

Several months after the outbreak of hostilities in 1648 Ukraine's competence in this area was strengthened by two significant developments. The first of these was the acquisition by her of far-reaching autonomy -- some historians are not too timid to call it independence. In reality Ukraine was less fettered than Ducal Prussia and Kurland, the vassal states of the Commonwealth; or Crimea, Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia, the
vassal states of Turkey. Thus, the new martial Cossack "republic", whose links with the Commonwealth were very weak, gained, at the least, the status of a quasi-vassal state.

The conflict in 1648 was unlike all previous Cossack rebellions against the Commonwealth, for right from the outset it became an international issue which led to a change in the balance of power in Eastern and Southern Europe. This was the second development, to which the neighbouring states reacted immediately. Accepting the de facto situation, their diplomatic missions were directed to the Cossack hetman rather than to the Polish king. If not all, at least some of them, must have regarded the Cossacks not as insurgents or revolutionaries, but as belligerents, who possessed certain recognized rights and duties under the accepted international arrangements of the times.

The Commonwealth, soon becoming aware of the diplomatic skills of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, endeavoured to tie the hands of this "Zaporozhian Machiavelli". She was not strong enough to include an article in the Treaty of Zboriv, which was an international agreement involving the Commonwealth, Crimea and Ukraine, to prohibit or curtail his diplomatic relations with foreign powers. As soon as she gained upper hand over the Cossacks in 1651, however, Khmelnytskyi was compelled to agree that he "shall never entertain any relations ... with them [Tatars] or any foreign rulers in the future".

Even though this article could not be enforced, Khmelnytskyi attached

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1 See Appendix III: Treaty of Bila Tserkva (1651), Article 9.
a great deal of importance to the right of being able to maintain diplo-
matic relations with foreign states. For this reason he explicitly re-
quested the tsar in 1654 that he be "free to receive envoys ... from
foreign countries". Khmelnytskyi gained from the tsar, at least on paper,
more than he managed to gain from the king. Notwithstanding this arrange-
ment, the Cossack hetman soon found the full weight of the "exalted arm"
of the Russian autocrat not to his liking.

Ukraine's ties with Russia, as her quasi-protectorate, lasted till
1658. In the same year was signed the Hadiach Treaty of Union. During
the interval, from the signing to the ratification of this treaty in 1659,
Ukraine may be described as a sui generis vassal state of the Commonwealth.
It was only after the ratification of the Treaty of Union by the Diet that
Ukraine, renamed the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, became the third integral
member of "the body of one and indivisible Commonwealth". This new member,
however, had to relinquish some of its powers for the welfare of the whole
"Fatherland". One of the articles stipulated that the "Hetman of the Grand
Duchy of Ruthenia"

shall not receive any legations from foreign states, and if any should
arrive, he shall send them on to His Majesty. Also, ... he shall
[not] enter into any agreement, to the detriment of the Commonwealth,
with foreign states."

Thus, for Ukraine the price of admission to the Commonwealth was the
renouncement of her wide competence in diplomacy.

The preceeding pages have shown that diplomatic contacts between the

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2See Appendix IV: Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654), Article 5.

3See Appendix VI: The Hadiach Treaty of Union (1658).
Commonwealth and Ukraine were extensive. That these diplomatic contacts were expensive, can be shown by detailed figures. The accounts of the Crown Treasury presented to the Diet of 1659, for example, reveal that 44,800 zł. was spent on diplomatic missions despatched to Ukraine, while 5,588 zł. was spent for the maintenance of missions received from Ukraine — i.e., respectively 35.75% and 32.43% of total budget assigned for the Commonwealth's diplomatic service in the years 1658-1659.  

In the period under discussion the great frequency of diplomatic intercourse between the Commonwealth and Ukraine, as well as enormous sums of money spent by the Crown Treasury on financing missions to and from Ukraine, in both cases directly, or indirectly, by using good offices of other states, clearly indicate that a revolutionary change had taken place in the course of the Commonwealth's diplomacy. Ukraine, playing a prominent role in the international arena, became the center of the Commonwealth's attention. She had to deploy her most able diplomats, her professionals, in Ukraine and other states. Only in this way it was possible to recover her.

Contacts between the Commonwealth and Ukraine did not necessitate the introduction of any major innovations in diplomatic practice. While certain modifications were made, the overall established forms of procedure were followed. Thus, for example, both the Crown Chancery and the Secretariat-General of the Zaporozhian Army, taking into consideration the purposes of diplomatic missions, prepared for their envoys letters of credence, full powers and introduction, as well as written instructions. At their reception and dismissal certain ceremonies were followed both at the

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4See Appendix VII: Diet Accounts Relating to Expenditures of the Crown Treasury on Diplomatic Service (1649-1661), Tables 1 and 2.
court of the king (Cossack envoys were treated with less pomp than envoys of vassal or sovereign rulers) and the residence or headquarters of the Cossack hetman (diplomatic representatives of "His Majesty and the Commonwealth" were treated befitting their rank). Precise forms of etiquette were observed regarding such matters as titles and wording in all diplomatic correspondence.

The Commonwealth despatched three main categories of diplomats to Ukraine: commissioners of the king and Commonwealth; envoys of the king and Commonwealth; and envoys of the king. There existed yet another, more-or-less unofficial category: that of permanent diplomatic agent. Kysil is the best example of a diplomat employed in this fourth category. While officially appearing in Ukraine to take up his duties of a Palatine of Kiev, he was, in fact, the Commonwealth's "guardian of peace", or her "resident", to use the terminology of the times. Śmiarowski, until his death, carried on in the same capacity during Kysil's absence from Kiev. No analogous Cossack diplomat appeared in Warsaw.

Diplomats from Ukraine despatched to Warsaw performed their duties chiefly in rank of envoys of the Cossack hetman and the Zaporozhian Army. Obviously, at this time there was no need for the establishment of Cossack diplomatic hierarchy. The only significant exception to this general rule occurred in 1659 when a large contingent of diplomats, which was sent to Warsaw to take part in the ratification of the Union of Hadiach, represented the Cossack Hetman, the Zaporozhian Army and the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. Most of them were nobles. Many of them gained experience in diplomatic field by working in the Secretariat-General under the direction of Ivan Vyhoverksyi.

One example regarding the modification of diplomatic practice during contacts between the Commonwealth and Ukraine was the preparation of fewer
documents for envoys by the Crown Chancery. Frequently one document served three purposes: credence and introduction for an envoy, as well as a personal message from the king to the Cossack hetman. The other example concerns envoys' instructions. Judging from the paucity of instructions preserved to this day, the latter seems to have preferred oral rather than written instructions.

Jan Kazimierz always addressed the Cossack hetman as his inferior, i.e. by the title befitting a noble: "Urodzony Wiernie Nam Miły". It must be remembered that in this period the idea of dynastic legitimacy prevailed; thus, there was no other way of addressing a person who was not a member of some ruling dynasty or princely house. Moreover, the king regarded him still as his subject, even after the fait accompli in 1654, for it was explained as unilateral rupture. When the Viennese Court addressed Khmelnytsky as "illustissimus", rather than "generosus", this was hardly acceptable to the Crown Chancery.

Khmelnytsky also followed certain forms of etiquette. After 1654 he signed his letters, addressed to the king or to the chancellors, as "Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army"; never as "Hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Army", a form which would be unacceptable to the Polish court. Additional information on Cossack diplomatic service is contained in the article of Shevchenko.

The three main agreements between the Commonwealth and Ukraine took the form of commissions. These were meetings of the representatives of the directly interested parties, at which peace terms were eventually reached. The agreements of 1649 and 1651 were negotiated within a relatively short time on the field of battle; that of 1658, however, was preceded by long, drawn out negotiations in neutral territory assigned by an armistice and
concluded in the Cossack military camp, near the Russian border, by the Town of Hadiach.

II

During the turbulent reign of Jan Kazimierz, due to the dispersal of responsibility for the formulation and execution of foreign policy, the diplomacy of the Commonwealth was characterized by a near anarchy. While in Chyhyryn commands were issued by a single voice, in Warsaw there were delivered commands by a chorus of discordant voices.

For this very reason, especially during the years 1648-1654, the Commonwealth pursued inflexible, unimaginative, shortsighted and unrealistic policies with regard to Ukraine. Even though she could not be brought down to her knees by means of fire and sword, the ruling class was unwilling to grant her concessions which would lead to the cessation of destruction and bloodshed and to the establishment of permanent peace.

The diplomats, whose tasks were to execute these policies, were aware that they were merely negotiating for time, for they were hardly in a position to resolve difficulties between the Commonwealth and Ukraine peacefully. The principal diplomat, Adam Kysil, was in an untenable position: on the one hand, he lost the confidence of the magnates and their creatures simply because he had enough courage to point out their mistakes; on the other, he lost the confidence of the Cossacks because he "became a Pole". Thus, his efforts to arrange a mutually acceptable settlement between the
two sides by "negotiations and peace", came to naught. The Treaties of Zboriv (1649) and Bila Tserkva (1651) proved to be unsatisfactory to both sides. The curious Zhvanets arrangement (1653) simply speeded up the rift between the Commonwealth and Ukraine.

Early in 1654, when Ukraine deflected to Russia, the Commonwealth made many attempts to destroy the deed of Pereiaslav. The diplomats were successful in gaining Crimea as an ally of the Commonwealth, but by this time she was forced to wage war against Russia and Ukraine. This new development caused serious international complications: in 1655 began the "Swedish Deluge"; early in 1657 Transylvania invaded the Commonwealth. Ukraine co-operated with all these three powers.

The enemies of the Commonwealth made great gains. By this time she was ruined economically, her position as a great power was undermined and attempts were made to partition her. These catastrophes resulted in the formulation of new policies, which sought to find a modus vivendi with Ukraine. Since the Diet did not function during this turbulent period, it was possible for the king and the senate council to pursue a more reasonable policy; thus, there was a marked change in the policy directed to Ukraine.

At the same time certain developments, such as the Polish-Russian agreement late in 1656 and the unreliability of the Swedes and the Magyars, pressed Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and his successor, Ivan Vykovskyi, to secure a rapprochement with the Commonwealth. Prior to Khmelnytskyi's death negotiations began over the matter of Ukraine's re-entry into the Commonwealth. In 1658 Ukraine, called the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, became the third part of the Commonwealth.
Ordinarily, diplomats do not make foreign policy. It is their task to execute the policy once it is established by the government. They do, sometimes, especially the exceptional individuals, help to shape a policy. In this instance two exceptionally talented men, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski and Pavlo Teteria-Worzhkovskyi, both anxious to affect a rapprochement, helped shape the new policy by providing information to their principals in such a way that it influenced their decisions. Thus, these two men, who proved to be skillful diplomats, were greatly responsible for the historic arrangement between the Commonwealth and Ukraine, which emerged as the Union of Hadiach.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES *

A. Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski.

Stanisław Kazimierz, the son of a relatively well-to-do country squire Adam Bieniewski, was born most likely in Volynia sometime before 1620. He may have been tutored at home before enrolled in one of the Jesuit schools, perhaps in Lutsk, or even in Jarosław. There is no doubt that, like other sons of the gentry, Stanisław Kazimierz received some sort of military training as well; unlike most of them, however, he chose to follow a non-military career.

*The following articles, studies and monographs provide a wealth of details for biographies of Bieniewski, Kysil, Nemyrych, Teteria-Morzhkovskyi and Vyhovskyi: Władysław Czapliński, "Bieniewski, Stanisław Kazimierz", Polski Słownik Biograficzny, II (1936), 70; Vasył Herasymchuk, "Vyhovskyi i Yuriii Khmelnytskyi. Istoriychni studyi," Zapytysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka, LIX (1904), 1-40, LX (1904), 41-70, "Vyhovshchyna i Hadiatskyi Traktat", Ibid., LXXXVII (1909), 5-36, LXXXVIII (1909), 23-50, LXXXIX (1909), 46-90; Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, new ed., 10 vols. (New York, 1954-1958), VIII-X. Mykola Kostomarov, Hetmanovanie Ivana Vyhovskyoho i Yurii Khmelnytskyoho (Ternopil, 1891); Stanisław Kot, Jerzy Niemirycz w 300-lecie ugody hadziackiej (Paris, 1960); Ludwik Kubala, Szkice historyczne, 1-2 ser., 5th ed. (Lviv, 1923); Wojna brandenburska i najazd Rakoczego w r. 1656 i 1657 (Lviv, 1918); Wojna moskiewska r. 1654-1655 (Warsaw, 1910); Wojna szwecka w r. 1655 i 1656 (Lviv, 1913); Wojny duniskie i pokój oliwski 1657-1660 (Lviv, 1922); Jerzy Ossoliński, 2nd rev. ed. (Lviv, 1924); Waclaw Lipiński, Z dziejów Ukrainy (Kiev [Kraków], 1912); Wiesław Majewski, "Machowski Sebastian", Polski Słownik Biograficzny, XVIII (1973), 637-639; V. Seniutowych-Berezhnyi, "Rid i rodyna Vyhovskykh (Istoriychno rodocidna rozvidka)", Ukrainskyi Istoriy, VII (1970), 149-167; F. P. Shevchenko, "Diplomatycha služba na Ukraini pid chas vyvolnoi viiny 1648-1654 rr.", Istoriychny dzherela ta ikh vykorystannia, I (1964), 81-113; M. Stadnyk, "Hadiatska unia", Zapytysky Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Tovarystva v Kyivi, VII (1910), 65-85; VIII (1911), 5-39; Frank Edward
His appointment as a notary of the judicial chancery in Lutsk, most likely in 1641, marked the beginning of his career in the public service. This appointment proved to be extremely useful to him in the future, for he became acquainted with two individuals who were destined to play a great role in the affairs of Ukraine: Pavlo Teteria and Ivan Vyhovskyi.

Bieniewski must have proven himself to be a capable official and must have gained the respect of both the Catholic and the Orthodox gentry, for in the following years he was chosen their deputy to the Diet. Here, as well, the diligence of the young deputy from Volynia attracted the attention of other members, and soon he was elected to serve on various committees of the Chamber of Deputies. With the passage of time he acquired a reputation of a man with a good knowledge of "Cossack humors". For this reason, in 1655, he served on a committee which drew up instructions to the commissioners who were to be sent to negotiate with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi.

In 1656, as it is evident by MK, LI, Ms. 200, Bieniewski served in the chancery of Grand Crown Chancellor Stefan Koryciński. Late in the same year he was selected by King Jan Kazimierz for a much more difficult assignment: to conclude an agreement with the Cossack hetman. Bieniewski

Michael Sysyn, "Adam Kysil, Statesman of Poland-Lithuania: A Study of the Commonwealth's Rule of the Ukraine from 1600 to 1653" (Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976); Zbigniew Wójcik, Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką: Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667-1672 (Warsaw, 1968); Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674-1679: Studium z dziejów polskiej polityki zagranicznej (Wrocław, 1976) and Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza (Warsaw, 1959). Additional details to the biography of Bieniewski are provided by Ossol, Ms. 1425/11. See also Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, Próba pojednania z Rusią. Poselstwo Bieniewskiego. Od śmierci B. Chmielnickiego do umowy hadziackiej (Kraków, 1907).
arrived in Chyhyryn early in March 1657 together with the Imperial envoy. By the time he departed, at the close of April, he was confident that a rapprochement could be arranged with the Cossack leader. Early in June he arrived in Danków and made a full report regarding the parleys to the king and the senators. Convinced that peace was possible, they instructed Bieniewski to return to Chyhyryn and empowered him to conclude a formal agreement. Due to various difficulties, however, Bieniewski was unable to proceed to the Cossack capital until the beginning of August. When he finally arrived there it was too late to carry out his mission, for the Cossack hetman died on August 6.

During the period of the Cossack "interregnum" Bieniewski contacted his former acquaintance, Pavlo Teteria, and by means of reasoning and gold gained a supporter for the cause of rapprochement with the Commonwealth. Teteria proved to be an invaluable ally to Bieniewski. Together they sounded out various Cossack officers and attempted to induce them to enter the "Polonophile camp". When another of Bieniewski's acquaintances, Ivan Vyhovskyi, became the new Cossack leader, their work was made much easier.

In the middle of October, before his recall from Chyhyryn, Bieniewski managed to work out a temporary agreement-armistice with Vyhovskyi. In November he arrived in Poznań. Here he briefed the king and the senators on the state of affairs in Ukraine and outlined to them a plan of action that he felt was necessary under the circumstances. While not all of his proposals were acceptable to them Bieniewski was instructed to carry on. He was to set up a permanent post in Volynia and to resume negotiations with Vyhovskyi's representatives.
In February 1658, Bieniewski conferred with Vykovskyi's emissary, Feodosii Tomkovych. In the following month he negotiated with the Cossack hetman's personal intermediary, Pavlo Teteria. At the close of June Teteria returned and on July 5 both of them concluded a preliminary agreement, which was to serve as a basis for the final round of negotiations with Vykovskyi. At the close of the month a committee of the Diet drew up instructions for the commissioners. On September 9 Bieniewski and his party arrived in the Cossack camp near Hadiach. After a great deal of bargaining and compromises an agreement was reached and the terms of union finalized. The most significant provision of the Treaty of Union, dated September 16, 1658, was the creation, out of the Palatines of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, the third autonomous part of the Commonwealth.

In the last week of October Bieniewski, accompanied by a group of Cossack representatives, reached the outskirts of Toruń and made a report on the negotiations to the king and the senators. While accepting the terms of the treaty in principle, many of them considered that several articles had to be re-negotiated. In January 1659, upon receiving instructions designed "for the reform" of certain articles "which the Commonwealth could not accept", Bieniewski set out on his new mission. One month later he returned and submitted to the king a revised version of the treaty; its text, however, differed very little from the former one.

At the Diet, which convened in March, Bieniewski defended the treaty both in the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies. Since the ratification of the treaty proved to be impossible, he suggested to the Diet and the Cossack delegation a number of reciprocal concessions. Once these were
accepted, Bieniewski's secretary, Peretjatkowicz, was sent to Chyhyryn and on April 30 he secured Vykovoskyi's approval. On May 22, 1659 the Treaty of Union was ratified by the Diet and signed by Bieniewski.

The Union of Hadiach proved to be extremely difficult to maintain. In September Vykovoskyi was compelled to relinquish the hetman's mace to Yurii Khmelnytskyi. In the following month the new Cossack hetman reaffirmed the tsar's protection over Ukraine. In this way the Union of Hadiach became inoperative. This new development necessitated Bieniewski to resume his efforts in order to win over the Cossacks to the side of the Commonwealth.

From the close of 1659 to his death in 1676, Bieniewski was actively involved in the Ukrainian and Russian affairs. In January 1660 he despatched Sielecki to Khmelnytskyi; however, neither Sielecki's mission nor Bieniewski's letters brought the desired results. In September Bieniewski took part in the campaign against the Cossacks and the Russians. After their defeat he was selected a member of a commission to negotiate with Sheremetev and participated in the oath-taking ceremonies of one group of Cossacks. At Korsun, in November, he was instrumental in the re-election of Khmelnytskyi and in securing the secretariatship for Teteria. The Diet of 1661 appointed Bieniewski to serve on two commissions: on one, whose members were given the task to negotiate with Russia; on the other, to insure that the agreement with the Cossacks was carried out. In 1670 he carried out negotiations with Petro Doroshenko. In 1672 he served on a committee which prepared a supplementary instruction to the envoys in Moscow.

Bieniewski's abilities attracted the attention of the royal court. His first promotion came in 1650, with his appointment as a secretary to
King Jan Kazimierz. In 1657, following his initial diplomatic successes, Bieniewski was rewarded with the Castellany of Volynia and thus a seat in the Senate. In 1660 he became the Palatine of Chernihiv and held this office until his death. During the same period he was also rewarded by several land grants. Undoubtedly, had he come from a magnate family, his exceptional service would have been rewarded by the highest offices and the most lucrative land grants.

Judging from Bieniewski's correspondence, he kept close contact with the most influential individuals of this period. He was on good terms with the Zasławski, Radziwiłł and Sobieski families. By his marriage to Anna Konstancja, he was related to the powerful Leszczyński clan. Although he was a staunch royalist, Bieniewski did not play a great role in any of the controversial plans of the court. He managed to gravitate between the royalist and anti-royalist camps in a role of a peacemaker.

Bieniewski was one of the most capable diplomats in the second half of the seventeenth century. He developed into a "specialist" in Ukrainian affairs. His lengthy and detailed reports to the king and the chancellor are quite accurate and indicate that he took great pains to familiarize himself with the state of affairs before advising them on a certain course of action. Many times he took the initiative to act before receiving formal instructions. He did not allow his personal conflicts to interfere with any project which he considered to be for the good of the state as a whole.

In examining Bieniewski's work and attitude, especially during the years 1657-1659, it can be concluded that he laboured for the preservation of the old order in Ukraine. He was hardly fond of the emerging Ukrainian "monarchy of the serfs". For this reason he fought against the "heretical figments" of Yurii Nemyrych, which aimed at autonomy of all
Ruthenian ethnic territories. He was suspicious of the vacillations of Ivan Vyhovskyi and for this reason he sought to elevate such "absolutely loyal" individuals as Pavlo Teteria to high leadership roles within the Cossack Army. Of course, he was not blind with regard to the past conflict. He understood clearly that the restoration of the status quo ante bellum was impossible and that the Ruthenian element had to be given a greater role to play in the affairs of the Commonwealth.

B. Adam Kysil

Adam of Brusyliv, the son of Hryhorii and Teresa (nee Ivanytskyi) Kysil, was born in 1600 into a prominent well-to-do family of Ruthenian origin, which had its roots in the Volynian soil for many centuries. He must have been tutored at home before being enrolled in the Academy of Zamość. After his graduation from this Academy, Adam began his military service. From 1617 until his death in 1653, he participated in most of the major campaigns, serving with distinction under such renowned commanders as Żółkiewski and Koniecpolski.

During the same period he was involved, as well, in public affairs. This involvement — not the battlefield — eventually brought him fame and fortune. In the 1620's he appeared in the role of a royal envoy at the Dietines of Lutsk (1622), Zhytomyr (1628) and at the Orthodox Synod in Kiev (1629). In 1630 he was elected a member from Volynia to the Chamber of Deputies in Warsaw. This young member from Volynia distinguished himself greatly during the interregnum following the death of Zygmunt III.

In 1632 a momentous event occurred in Kysil's life: he abondoned the Uniate Church and joined the Orthodox Church. At the Electoral Diet
he assumed the role of a defender of the Eastern Church. He was greatly responsible for influencing Władysław IV to restore to the Orthodox most of their rights. Particularly significant development at this time was the king's legalization of the Orthodox hierarchy and his designation for it a number of eparchies. Becoming greatly involved in religious matters, Kysil was extremely active and vociferous during the sessions of the Diets, especially those of 1635, 1637, 1638 and 1640. He continued this work after his appointment to the Senate.

In the 1630's and in the following years Kysil was also involved in Cossack affairs. For the war against Russia (1633-1634) he managed to recruit some 20,000 Cossacks and participated with them in the ravages of the south-western Russian borderlands. In 1634 he became a member of a commission. Its task was to halt the incursions of the Zaporozhians into Crimea and other Ottoman territories. During the Cossack uprisings of 1635-1637, he played the role of a peacemaker. It was Kysil who negotiated peace terms with Pavliuk, guaranteeing him mercy in the name of the state; however, notwithstanding the guarantees, the Cossack leader was executed. This turn of events impaired Kysil's credibility among the Cossacks to such a degree, that he resigned his appointment. Yet, this was hardly the end of his career, or his last contact with the Cossacks. He still retained a great deal of influence in Ukraine.

On a diplomatic level Kysil also made contacts with Russia. In 1634 he served on a commission which was empowered to delineate new boundaries between the Commonwealth and Russia; however, it failed in its task. Much more successful was the diplomatic mission to Moscow, which he headed in 1647, for Kysil successfully negotiated a defensive alliance between the two states against Crimea. Upon his return from Moscow, Kysil es-
tablished close ties with the tsarist borderland officials. In the following year, when the Tatars appeared within the Commonwealth in support of the Cossacks, he requested military aid from the tsar in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

Kysil was destined to play his most important role during the conflict which erupted within the Commonwealth. In May 1648 the Cossacks, under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, and their Tatar allies, annihilated the Crown Army in Ukraine after two engagements and captured its commanders. These victories set into motion the rising of the serfs. Moreover, during this time Władysław IV died. To Kysil all these events represented a "terrible rerum metamorphosis". Yet, while others panicked and threw up their arms in despair, he decided to find a remedy for this situation.

Early in June, even before receiving any official request or authorization to act, Kysil took the first steps to end the turmoil. Sending his messenger to Khmelnytskyi, Kysil informed him that he was prepared to intercede on his behalf in Warsaw, if he ended all hostilities, sent the Tatars back to Crimea and declared his loyalty to the state. Khmelnytskyi accepted Kysil's advice. Thus, within a short time an armistice was arranged and Cossack envoys sped to Warsaw to seek redress for their grievances. This almost instant success of Kysil's course of action gained him a great deal of popularity among the gentry; it did not last, however, for too long.

At the Convocational Diet (July 16 to August 1), working closely with the Crown Grand Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński, Kysil spared no effort to convince both the senators and the deputies that the policy of "negotiations
and peace", rather than war, was the only rational course of action under
the circumstances. In his spirited defence of the Cossacks, whom he
largely absolved from inciting the rising of the serfs, Kysil clashed with
the intransigents, who saw no other solution to the predicament of the
state than war. In the heated debates that followed, Kysil -- who was re­
ceived earlier almost as a "pater patriae" -- was accused of treason.
Eventually Ossoliński managed to pacify the opposition. Kysil continued
to spread his views and in the end the "peace party" attained most of
its immediate goals. For its representative, Kysil, a place was secured
on the commission which was to advise the three newly-appointed regiment­
aries, who took command of the army in the absence of the captive hetmans.

Even a more important victory for the pacifists was the selection of
Kysil to head a commission which was empowered to negotiate peace with
Khmelnytskyi; and that its written instruction, which was prepared on
July 29, was based largely on the brief which was presented earlier by
Kysil to the Diet. As soon as the diplomats departed from Warsaw they
began to experience various difficulties. These arose, on the one hand,
primarily from the irresponsible actions of such men as Wisniowiecki,
and on the other, by the roaming bands of the "riffraff" -- the serfs.
By the middle of September the two sides did not even meet. By this time
even the optimistic Kysil became skeptical of the whole business and con­
cluded that at least temporarily, the issue had to be resolved by the force
of arms.

Following the rout of the army of the gentry at Pyliavtsi (Septem­
ber 23) and in the next two months, during the sessions of the Electoral
Diet, Kysil became the favourite target for the opponents of the conciliatory
policy. Kysil, however, disregarding all sorts of vile accusations and
vicious attacks, continued to defend his course of action. He cast his vote for Jan Kazimierz, the candidate for the throne supported by the pacifists, who was elected eventually on November 20. Since by this time Khmelnytskyi expressed desire for the continuation of parleys and specifically requested that Kysil take part in them, the king-elect acted quickly. In December a new commission was formed and Kysil became its senior member.

In January 1649 Kysil and his colleagues began their journey. On February 19 they reached Pereiaslav and throughout the following days carried out negotiations with Khmelnytskyi. Since the demands of this "Zaporozhian Machiavelli" were far greater than Kysil imagined, no agreement could be reached. The only positive accomplishment was the arrangement of an armistice between the two sides, which was to last to May 22. On February 26 the commissioners departed from Pereiaslav. Their report, made on March 8, which was delivered to the king by Kysil's brother Mykhailo, painted the situation in very dark colours. Kysil resided in Volynia following his unsuccessful mission. Keeping contact with Khmelnytskyi, he acted in the role of an advisor to the king and the chancellor.

Since the diplomats failed to arrange a permanent settlement, hostilities resumed between the two sides even before the term of the armistice expired. Eventually, for the second time, the entire issue was to be resolved by the force of arms. Kysil participated in the Zboriv campaign, which nearly ended in a disaster for the king and his army. From August 16 to 18 he assisted Ossoliński in negotiating peace terms, first with the Tatar and later on with the Cossack delegations. Kysil administered the oath of allegiance to Khmelnytskyi and was also in charge of the closing ceremonies, during which the Cossack hetman sought pardon from the king.
In this way Kysil played a predominant part in the formulation of the Treaty of Zboriv — the "Declaration of His Majesty's Clemency" to the Cossack Army.

In November, acting in the capacity of a "guardian of peace" Kysil established his residence in Kiev. In December he attended the Diet which ratified the Treaty of Zboriv. It was Kysil who induced the Orthodox Metropolitan Kosiv to forego his seat in the Senate in the interest of peace. He managed to secure extensive privileges for the Orthodox, but failed in his efforts to achieve the abolition of the Uniate Church. Upon his return to Kiev, in March 1650, he found himself in a rather difficult position, particularly because the religious question remained unsettled. Remaining firm, Kysil continued to reside in Kiev and managed to become a liaison between Warsaw and Chyhyryn. Kysil was convinced that Khmelnytskyi wanted to abide by the agreement; to reestablish, as far as possible, the status quo in Ukraine; and that the Cossack leader could be induced to attack Russia and possibly even Ottoman Porte. For these reasons he advised the king and the chancellor that the terms of the Treaty of Zboriv be adhered to completely.

The Diet of 1650 appointed Kysil as one of the commissioners to deal with Cossack affairs. Due to various reasons, this body was unable to make any improvements in the deteriorating situation. With the passage of time skirmishes renewed; finally, for the third time, both sides resorted to war. Kysil participated in the Berestechko campaign which ended with the decisive rout of the Cossack-Tatar forces. He was one of the commissioners who negotiated a settlement with the Cossacks and in this capacity, on September 28, 1651, signed the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. In November he returned to Kiev and attempted to find a modus vivendi for
the two sides. Early in June 1652, following the annihilation of the Crown Army at Batih by the Cossacks, he fled from Kiev. Residing in Volynia, Kysil continued to play an active part in the public affairs. In 1653 he attended the Diet in Brest. There he died on May 3. He left no issue.

Kysil's ability and meritorious service brought him many rewards. During the period of war with Russia he became the Chamberlin of Chernihiv. On being granted the Castellany of Chernihiv, late in 1639, Kysil secured a seat in the Senate. In the following years he became the Castellan of Kiev (1646), the Palatine of Bratslav (1647) and finally the Palatine of Kiev (1649). At the same time he received extensive land grants. Thus, apart from Volynia, where he inherited large estates, Kysil possessed vast tracts of land, villages and towns in the Palatinates of Belz, Chernihiv and Smolensk.

Kysil was, without a doubt, the most influential lay representative of the Orthodox Ruthenian gentry within the Commonwealth. He was a deeply religious person. In his lifetime he founded and supported a number of Orthodox monasteries, churches and various institutions. He was the champion of the Orthodox Church. Knowing the meaning of toleration, Kysil was never a religious fanatic. In this way he gained prominence among the Orthodox clergy and laity and the respect of his religious opponents. In the reigns of Władysław IV and Jan Kazimierz he was entrusted with the most delicate tasks pertaining to religion.

Kysil's contemporaries must have admired his style in public speaking and letter writing, for many such oratories and letters were recorded in the various "silva rerum" or in "Spiszarnia rzeczy potrzebnych ludzkiej pamięci godnych", as one was entitled, which survived to this day. His
oratories and letters are, as a rule, lengthy, ponderous, full of allegorical, biblical and historical references, filled with detailed arguments and counter-arguments and heavily sprinkled with Latin words, phrases and sentences — so typical of the "macaronic" style of his day. All in all, the modern reader must take care not to perish in Kysil's jungle of verbiage. No printed work or monograph bearing his name has been found. It is quite certain, however, that Kysil was the author of several anonymous publications; among them, for example, of "Relatio przyjścia Alabowia pod Czernihów i odejścia". Some of his compositions, such as "Sententia o uspokojeniu wojska zaporoskiego przez jednego szlachcica polskiego", circulated among the nobles in a manuscript form.

Kysil was the chief representative — if the term symbol is too strong — of "the Ruthenian Nation of the Polish Commonwealth"; that is, of that ethnic group, comprising largely of the gentry, which attempted to cure the ills of the state by the policy of co-operation and conciliation. As a "Polish noble" and a "Senator", Kysil pledged his "love", "loyalty" and "faithful service" to the Commonwealth. Since the "rebels" threatened the integrity of his "Fatherland", Kysil felt no qualms about declaring that they should be "impaled", notwithstanding that they were his co-religionists and that "Ruthenian blood" flowed through their veins. To Kysil, Khmelnytskyi's aims for autonomy were incomprehensible. For this reason he declared that, no matter the consequences, he wished "to die by [the side of] Fatherland", — and unlike many nobles in the latter part of the conflict — "not by [that of] Khmelnytskyi".

This is not to say that he had no sympathy for the Cossack cause. Of course, he distinguished the Cossacks from the "riffraff" and "rabble": the former were men of "knightly" rank, worthy of his support: the latter had no business to take up arms and therefore should be put down and com-
pelled to till the soil. Kysil, moreover, could hardly keep silent when
the Cossacks clamoured for the restoration of the rights and privileges
for the Orthodox Church. This issue was a very dear one to his heart.

Kysil adopted a middle course: at the sessions of the Diets he
defended the Cossacks and the rights of the Orthodox Church; at the
conferences with Khmelnytskyi, the integrity of the "Fatherland". This
policy failed to pacify individuals on the opposing sides. Kysil was
accused of duplicity: the "Poles" called him a traitor; the "Ruthenians",
a renegade. Yet, he persisted in following this policy, which he con­sidered just, until his death. Kysil's comrades and followers adopted
other tactics in the years that followed.

C. **Yurii Nemyrych**

Yurii, the eldest son of Stefan Nemyrych (of the Cherniahiv line),
was born most likely in Volynia in 1612. Stefan owned vast estates —
within which were found some twelve towns and seventy-five villages —
and held the offices of the Chamberlain of Kiev and the Prefect of Ovruch.
After his studies at Altdorf (Nurnberg) and Basel, the two centers which
were prominent in disseminating the teachings of the Reformed Church, he
became an active propagator of the radical Socinian (Antitrinitarian or
"Arian") sect in the Commonwealth. Deeply religious and greatly concerned
about the spiritual and material welfare of his co-religionists, Stefan
Nemyrych used his wealth in order to support various Socinian religious,
educational and philanthropic projects. He founded, for example, a church
and a school in Cherniahiv for the Socinians. His wife Marta (nee
Voinarovskyi) was also a staunch Socinian.

Yurii Nemyrych received an extensive and a versatile education.
This he owed not only to his parents, who regarded the quest for knowledge to be a noble and a necessary mission of each man's life, but also to his very talented and devoted teacher-companion, Andrzej Rutkowic.

After completing his elementary education at home, Yurii was enrolled in the Academy of Raków. Under the direction of first-rate native and foreign scholars, this Academy became the educational, intellectual and religious center of the Socinians within the Polish Commonwealth. Moreover, by means of books and emissaries, this Socinian center exerted considerable influence on doctrinal thinking among the Protestants in Western Europe.

The young man from Ukraine soon proved himself to be a very capable and diligent student, winning praise for his efforts from his teachers. One of them, the mathematician Joachim Stegman, in his *Institutionem Mathematicum* published in 1630, dedicated the geometry section of his books to Yurii, praising his abilities and encouraging him to study this subject. Another scholar, Marcin Ruarus, recommended Yurii to Hugo Grotius, the author of the epochmaking work, *De jure belli et pacis* (1625). Yurii was described as an individual of "exceptional abilities" and "extraordinary knowledge", and one who was destined to play a prominent role in the public life of his country.

In 1630 the eighteen-year old youth, following his father's example, proceeded abroad in order to gain higher education. In the four-year period (1630-1634) abroad, he studied at the following centers of higher learning: Leiden, Paris, Padua and Basel. He also travelled extensively on the continent and even visited England. London, Oxford and Cambridge were, no doubt, on his itinerary. In this way he acquired an excellent education and mastered several languages. He also was able to gather
first-hand information relating to the various fields of interest: government, economy, politics, religion, armed forces and international relations.

In 1634, upon his return home, Nemyrych formed units of cavalry and infantry at his own expense and proceeded at their head to Smolensk against the Russians. Before he reached his destination, Nemyrych was ordered by Władysław IV to march south to the aid of the Crown Grand Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, who was concentrating troops along the Moldavian border against the Turks and the Tatars. In the following year he took part in the military demonstration in Pomerania against the Swedes. It was uncertain what role he played during the Cossack uprisings in the years 1637–38. In 1644 his unit participated in the rout of the Tatars.

After the arrangement of an armistice with the Swedes at Sztumska Wies (12.IX.1635), Nemyrych returned to Cherniahiv and devoted his energies for the cause of his co-religionists. The Catholic reaction, led by the Jesuits, brought about a steady persecution of the Socinians. In 1638 their center at Raków was broken up by a decree of the Diet: the academy, church and printing press were closed; the leaders and scholars were proscribed. Suppression became steadily harsher, especially in 1647 and 1648.

The Socinians were fortunate in securing Nemyrych as one of the "pillars" for the support of the movement. Possessing excellent education, having great wealth, being gifted with a lively mind and a magnetic temperament and wielding influence in the Senate and the royal court, Nemyrych gained the confidence of his co-religionists and became their best-known representative.

In 1638, on being elected a deputy to the Crown Tribunal, Nemyrych defended the Socinians; at the same time, hoping to publicise the ill-
treatment of his co-religionists, he arranged a debate between the Jesuits and the Socinian ministers. Two years later he arrived in Warsaw to attend the sessions of the Diet. As a member of the Chamber of Deputies, he submitted a formal protest against the decree relating to Raków, arguing that it violated the provisions of the Confederation of Warsaw (1573), which guaranteed religious freedom to all confessions. Unable to get sufficient support from the Protestant deputies, Nemyrych lost his battle. Shortly after the conclusion of the Diet, Nemyrych and a number of prominent Socinians expressed their grief at the disunity among the Protestants in a letter (28.X.1638) to Prince Krzysztof Radziwiłł. They warned him — the "head" of the Calvinists — that an attack against the Socinians was also an attack at the religious rights of all the "dissidents" within the Commonwealth.

In the years that followed Nemyrych became to be regarded, by friends and foes, as the champion of Socinianism. He was not only vociferous in the defence of this sect at all sessions of the Diet, but also sheltered and supported its banished ministers, theologians and scholars. A gifted organizer, Nemyrych attempted to create a replica of Raków in his vast estates in Ukraine. This was one of the reasons for his purchase of great tracts of land on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. By 1640 he already possessed 4,907 households; thus, he was the second largest landowner in the Palatinate of Kiev. These purchases brought him a great many problems, including suits and armed clashes.

The royal charted dated on 3.X.1641 confirmed to Nemyrych the highest elective office of the Palatinate — the Chamberlaincy of Kiev. He was successful in gaining this office particularly due to the support of Koniecpolski. His enemies, considering it a provocation, mounted a cam-
paign against him. Led by the Palatine of Kiev, Janusz Tyszkiewicz, the reactionary Catholics laid various charges against him in the Crown Tribunal. In 1645, when these charges were dropped, largely due to the efforts of the Catholic Bishop of Kiev, Aleksander Sokolowski, Tyszkiewicz and his supporters explained this in terms of machinations of the Leszczyńskis, to whom Nemyrych was related. Notwithstanding the victory, he still was prevented from carrying out the duties of his office. In other instances judgments went against him; for example, in 1646 he was ordered to close all Socinian churches on his properties and fined the sum of 10,000 zł. At the Diets of 1645, 1646 and 1647 Nemyrych and a handful of deputies from Kiev and Volynia clamoured for annulment of the one-sided verdicts of the courts.

In order to save the Socinian movement from annihilation, Nemyrych allied himself with Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, the powerful protector of Protestants in Lithuania. Radziwiłł initiated a far-reaching plan: to secure the Polish throne for Zsigmond, the younger son of György Rákóczi I of Transylvania, in return for a guarantee of religious toleration to all Protestants within the Commonwealth. In 1648, following the death of Władysław IV, they began to campaign openly for their candidate.

Nemyrych attended the Convocational Diet and endeavoured to secure for the Socinians similar rights as those granted to the Calvinists and the Lutherans. While the majority of the Catholic deputies tolerated his presence in an advisory body, formed to aid the Interrex, Primate Maciej Żubieński, they refused to allow this "heretic" to participate in the drawing up of the customary articles of the "confederation". For this reason Nemyrych signed the articles, dated 31.VII.1648, with the following comment: "subscriber cum protestatione, si quis forte velit extende jura
During the sessions of the Electoral Diet Nemyrych warded off attacks against himself, particularly from Tyszkiewicz, who sought to remove him from the Chamberlaincy. At the same time Nemyrych worked hard in order to gain broader support for his Transylvanian candidate; however, after the death of György Rákóczi, the resignation of the candidacy of Prince Karol Ferdynand and, above all, after the declaration of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's support of the "King of Sweden", Jan Kazimierz, Zsigmond had no chance to gain the throne. On 17.XI.1648 Nemyrych, as a representative of the Palatinate of Volynia, signed the document which declared the election of Jan Kazimierz.

The Cossack rout of the Crown Army and the rising of the serfs in Ukraine forced Nemyrych to flee westward. Greatly concerned about those "exiles" from Ukraine who lost all their possessions, he hoped that some provisions would be made for their benefit, for they would experience great difficulties having "to live in poverty and adversity". At first he called for the use of arms to extinguish this "fire", started by the Cossacks, which set a-flame "almost half of the Commonwealth". Yet, he was not a member of the "war party", for he supported the peace efforts of Adam Kysil and Jerzy Ossoliński.

Following the conclusion of the Coronation Diet, which he attended, Nemyrych returned to Volynia. In March 1649 the Dietine of Kiev, meeting in Lutsk, appointed him a colonel-general of palatinal troops. Since various ominous developments indicated to Nemyrych that another clash with the Cossacks was inevitable, he decided to take steps to safeguard himself and his family from the uncertain future. In June he appealed to György
Rákóczi II for permission to send his sons to Transylvania. At the same time he also sought — in the event that he would lose all his possessions — a land grant of sufficient size to support his family in that principality. Commanding a troop of cavalry, Nemyrych took part in the Zboriv campaign, which came to the close with the signing of the Treaty of Zboriv (18.VIII.1649).

In November 1649, induced by Adam Kysil, great many of the "exiles" — among them was Yurii Nemyrych — chose to return to their estates and holdings in Ukraine. On taking up residence in the north-western part of the Palatinate of Kiev, Nemyrych endeavoured to restore stable conditions of life and to shelter Socinians in his estates. Since Cossack-serf unrest still prevailed, many of the tasks he set out to accomplish were impossible to achieve. He found himself devoting a great deal of time to the organization of regional defence. This activity burdened him with additional problems and drained his financial resources.

In 1650 Nemyrych attended the sessions of the Diet as a deputy from the Palatinate of Kiev. At this Diet he was selected to serve on a commission, which was given the task of taking into consideration "certain requests" of the Cossacks and of resolving all difficulties in such a way that they would be "completely, thoroughly and perfectly pacified". In this herculean task Nemyrych and his colleagues failed. By February 1651 hostilities erupted once again.

Nemyrych, no doubt, took part in the campaign against the Cossacks and the Tatars, which resulted in their rout at Berestechko (30.VI.1651). Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva (28.IX.), which ended the campaign, Nemyrych returned to Ukraine and resumed the work he started at the close of 1649. He attended the sessions of the second Diet of 1652 — the first was terminated by the veto of one deputy — and was entrusted to serve of three important commissions: Tribunal of
Radom (treasury audits), payments to troops and expedition of Cossack envoys.

The Cossack annihilation of the Crown Army at Batih (2.VI.1652) started another mass exodus of the gentry from Ukraine. The continuance of unrest in Ukraine compelled Nemyrych to settle in Volynia. In the next three years he attended the sessions of three Diets as a member from the Palatinate of Kiev, taking an active part in its committees and commissions. In 1653 he became a member of a commission which dealt with the problem of distribution of funds to the military; in 1654 and 1655 he participated in the work of the treasury commissions; and in 1655 he served, as well, on a committee which prepared instructions "for the pacification of Ukraine" and was elected as one of the commissioners from the Chamber of Deputies who were to negotiate peace terms with Khmelnytskyi.

Yurii Nemyrych proved to be, for various reasons, one of the most active and vociferous members of the Chamber of Deputies. At many sessions in the Chamber his voice was heard in defence of the Socinians. To the Catholic majority, time after time, he attempted to explain that each individual had the right to the freedom of conscience. From 1648, as one of the most influential "exiles", Nemyrych spearheaded the drive for the cause of those who lost their possessions in Ukraine, and called on the government to make adequate compensations to them. He was greatly concerned that "Poland stands by disorder" at such a critical time. Quite frequently he pointed out, while discussing defence, treasury or some other topic, scores of errors which were repeated with a chronic regularity. He spoke against the use of the liberum veto, especially after he witnessed the first Diet of 1654 terminated. Nemyrych was in
favour of reaching a permanent agreement with Khmelnytskyi. With the passage of time he became disillusioned with the policy of Jan Kazimierz, especially from 1654, when Ukraine was lost to Russia and the tsarist armies invaded white Ruthenia.

In 1655, following the invasion of the Swedes, the Commonwealth seemed to crumble like a house built of cards: while the Cossack-Russian armies advanced westward, the Swedes rapidly took control of the north-western parts of the country; moreover, in October Jan Kazimierz fled to Silesia. Nemyrych believed that it was only a matter of time before Karl X Gustav would become the master of the Crown and the Grand Duchy. He was quite certain that the warlike Lutheran king could be persuaded to safeguard the religious rights of all the "dissidents", to reconquer the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian territories from the Cossacks and the Russians and to restore all the estates to the exiled gentry. For these reasons he decided to swear allegiance to the victorious Swedish ruler.

In October 1655 Nemyrych and his co-religionist Jan Moskorzewski prepared a text of a decree which announced full religious liberties to the Socinians, Calvinists, Lutherans and Orthodox. This text was given to Karl X Gustav to sign. While the Swedish king expressed his support of the principle of religious toleration, he would not sign it on the grounds that it would offend the Catholic majority. Neither would he commit himself to the reconquest of the eastern territories, claiming that the Cossacks and the Russians were his "confederates"; he could, however, begin negotiations with them. These initial setbacks did not change the position taken by Nemyrych. He called on his co-religionists to support the cause of Karl X Gustav whole-heartedly, for the "papists were planning the destruction of the Socinian movement". He was also
certain that the Swedish king would take care of the "exiles".

Nemyrych, admired and respected, soon "valet nimia confidentia et autoritate" of the king. He gained the rank of major-general and was entrusted in raising and commanding 5,000 cavalrymen. During the Battle of Golab (18.II.1656) Nemyrych's cavalry contributed greatly to the rout of the troops under Stefan Czarniecki. In the following months he served the Swedish king with distinction. For this reason, in the instructions to his envoys (October), the king requested that Khmelnytskyi restore to Nemyrych his estates in Ukraine.

Late in January 1657, when György Rakóczi II — the new ally of Karl X Gustav — invaded the Commonwealth, Nemyrych gravitated to his side. Some time later he established contacts with the third ally, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, and secured his agreement to act in the liaison capacity between Rákóczi and Antin Zhdanovych, who commanded the Cossack troops sent to the prince's aid. In April Nemyrych attempted to convince Jan Zamoyski to surrender Zamość to the allies. In this he failed. He succeeded, however, two months later in inducing the garrison of Warsaw to surrender. On 17.VI. he co-signed the document of capitulation.

When Karl X Gustav departed to Prussia, Rákóczi found himself in a dangerous situation, which grew critical with each passing day. As he marched southward mutiny broke out in the ranks. Prior to his capitulation to the Poles (22.VII.), his Cossack allies abandoned him. Among them was Nemyrych. Upon his arrival in Chyhyryn, Khmelnytskyi appointed him a colonel in the Zaporozhian Army and promised him to restore his estates.

Following the death of Khmelnytskyi (6.VIII.), Nemyrych established close ties with Ivan Vyhovskyi. The new Cossack hetman permitted him not
only to regain his estates, but also to introduce into them his own ad-
ministrators. This step, by which the estates were no longer subject
to Cossack military jurisdiction, created a great deal of dissatisfaction
among the Cossacks.

Having little sympathy for the autocratic Russia, being uncertain and
suspicious of the rapprochement policy of the Commonwealth, desiring to
preserve the autonomy and prestige of Ukraine and endeavouring to raise
the authority of Vyshovskiy, Nemyrych influenced the hetman to retain
close relations with Sweden. In this he succeeded. Serving in a capacity
of a diplomat representing the Zaporozhian Army, Nemyrych concluded a
treaty with the Swedish envoy (18.X.). Due to various developments, how­
ever, the new agreement proved to be of little practical value.

In the following year, when Vyshovskyi decided to negotiate a settle­
ment with the Commonwealth, it was Nemyrych who influenced the Cossack
hetman to include his ideas relating to religion, education, finances,
constitutional arrangements, armed forces and the like among the terms
prepared for the parleys. Most of these ideas, far-reaching in scope,
complicated the negotiations between the two parties. Yet, many of
these "heretical figments" of Nemyrych, which only he could have "con­
ceived in his mind", — so complained the plenipotentiary of the Common­
wealth, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski — were incorporated eventually,
in one form or another, into the articles of the treaty of union, which
was concluded near Hadiach on 16.IX.1658. Its most significant pro­
vision — which shows unmistakenly the influence of Nemyrych, who en­
couraged Vyshovskyi to imitate "the Dutch and the Swiss", — created the
Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, the third autonomous part of the Commonwealth.

As Vyshovskyi's choice for the office of grand chancellor of the
Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, Nemyrych was designated to head a delegation to Warsaw and to participate in the ratification proceedings of the Diet. On 23.IV.1659 he delivered a long speech before the king, the senators and the deputies. In it he emphasized the significance of the union both for the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia and for the Commonwealth as a whole. He also revealed that the delegates came with certain additional "requests". These, presented to the Diet in a form of a petition, once again reveal the influence of Nemyrych. One such "request" was extremely significant: the incorporation of other Ruthenian ethnic territories -- Volynia, Ruthenia and Podolia -- into the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. Even though this postulate was not realized, the treaty of union was ratified -- in an amended form -- on 22.V. Two days later Nemyrych swore the required oath. Since many individuals distrusted him, Nemyrych was required to swear that he abandoned all foreign protectors, including the tsar of Russia and the king of Sweden.

At this Diet Nemyrych secured a land grant, a confirmation of the chamberlain's office and a promise for reimbursement of 76,800 zł. which he spent on troops during the Russian invasion (1654-1655). Upon his return to the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia he made hasty preparations for and participated in the campaign against the Russians, which ended in their rout at Konotop (28.VI.1659). Even this spectacular victory failed to save the Union of Hadiach and many of its architects. The tsarist government continued to support the spirit of faction and anarchy among the Cossacks. Nemyrych was drawn into the fratrical struggle and was killed early in August 1659.

Yurii Nemyrych was married to Elżbieta, the daughter of the Castellan of Lublin, Stanisław, and Barbara (née Leszczyńska) Słupecki. His
sister became the second wife of the Palatine of Dorpat, Andrzej Leszczyński. In this way he was related to the Leszczyńskis, the family who monopolized the highest offices of the state and which owned vast tracts of land in Volynia and Ukraine. Barbara Słupecka's brother, Jan Leszczyński, was one of the most influential senators. He was in favour of a rapprochement with the Cossacks. Later on he supported the Union of Hadiach.

Nemyrych proved to be a gifted orator and writer. His first publication was *Discursus De Bello Moschovitico* (Paris, 1632). He was also, most likely, the author of the anonymous pamphlet "Braterska Declaratia" (n.p., ca., 1646). His various prayers, religious poems and hymns were published in a collection in 1653 or 1654. Of these only two survived: "Panoplia" and "Periphrasis i Paraphrasis". His *Skrypt or Wezwanie* (late 1658 or early 1659) to the Socinians also perished. Much of its contents may be determined from the *Responsio* of Samuel Przypkowski. Nemyrych's speech, delivered at the Diet of 1659, was translated into German and Latin and circulated throughout Europe.

One of the most difficult problems for a historian to solve is the motive for Nemyrych's conversion to Orthodoxy. He took this step sometime before 20.VII.1658, the date on which the Diet resolved to banish the Socinians from the Commonwealth. Was it opportunism — the chancellorship of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia or the desire to save his estates from confiscation — that motivated this man? One of his former co-religionists, Stanisław Lubieniecki, saw Nemyrych seduced by the world; for this reason, "in novo Magno Ducato Russiae primas dignitates affectantem et partes Russicas secutum illaqueavit".

Yet, by examining Nemyrych's arguments in his "Skrypt", by means of
which he justified his conversion to the Socinians and encouraged them to follow his example, one can hardly visualize an opportunist. On the contrary, one sees a sincere and deeply religious individual who obviously took some time to study and to think before taking such a step. In a letter of 5.IX.1658, Jan Leszczyński attributed this "casting off of former errors" of Nemyrych to "God's enlightenment".

Yurii Nemyrych remains a controversial figure. His contemporaries, for various reasons, both damned and praised him. The same can be said about the historiography to the present day.

D. Pavlo Teteria-Morzhkovskyi

Pavlo, most frequently referred to in the historiography by the patronymic Teteria, was born in Pereiaslav in the late 1610's or in the early 1620's. His father Ivan was typical of the half-noble half-Cossack well-to-do landowning officers, who served in "His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army". Ivan's son was brought up to respect a social stratum which was strongly bound by common ideals, language, religion, officer-noble solidarity and family ties.

Pavlo, too, was a very good example of that stratum. His godfather was Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, the future hetman. His first wife was the daughter of Ostap Vykovskyi and the sister of the future hetman, Ivan. Following her death in 1657, he married Kateryna Vykovskyi (née Khmelnytskyi), the widow of Ivan's brother, Danylo, who died in 1659.

Teteria received a good education. This is evident not only from his correspondence, but also from the comments of the contemporaries -- particularly of foreigners -- about him. One of his most influential teachers was the future Uniate bishop, Iakiv Sucha. This man's strong
personality, without a doubt, made an indelible impression on his pupil, for Teteria, although an Orthodox, was always sympathetic to the cause of the Uniate Church.

After completing his studies, Teteria secured a position in the household of the Prażmowski family. In the course of his service he became acquainted with Mikołaj Prażmowski -- the future Crown chancellor and primate -- and accompanied him, in the early 1640's, in his travels throughout Western Europe. Such travels, possible only to the wealthy, only added to the education and refinement of the young man from Ukraine. While in Rome, Teteria met the ex-Jesuit and the recently-elevated cardinal, Jan Kazimierz Waza -- the future king of Poland.

Some time after his return from his travels, Teteria left the service of the Prażmowskis and moved to Volynia. After settling down, he secured a post, as an assistant, in the judicial office of Lutsk. Later on he became a head of the office in Volodymyr. During this period he became acquainted with two individuals who were destined to play important roles in the affairs of the Commonwealth and Ukraine: the future diplomat, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, and the future secretary-general and hetman of the Cossack Army, Ivan Vykovskyi.

While living on good terms with the Volynian Catholic and Orthodox nobles and considering himself as one of them, Teteria found the cause of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi more dear to his heart. Thus, with the outbreak of hostilities in 1648, Teteria came to the support of the Cossack stratum. Khmelnytskyi, quite aware of the capabilities of his godson, appointed him to the post of the secretary in Pereiaslav Regiment. In the following years Teteria participated in all the major campaigns and battles. Eventually, in 1653, he took command of the Pereiaslav Regiment.
In the meantime, Teteria began to gain experience in the diplomatic field as well. On 29.XI.1649 he was sent to Transylvania by Khmelnytskyi and instructed to reveal to György Rákóczi II his lack of faith in the permanence of the Treaty of Zboriv. Teteria's main aim was to re-open negotiations with the Transylvanian ruler and to conclude a military alliance against the Commonwealth. Teteria's mission proved to be unsuccessful. At this time Rákóczi was more interested in utilizing for his own ends the magnate opposition against the king within the Commonwealth, rather than the Cossack Army. However, he did not reject Khmelnytskyi’s offers. Teteria was told that the prince's envoys will be sent to the Cossack hetman in due course and then matters of interest to both parties will be dealt with.

Teteria was much more successful in his next diplomatic endeavour. On January 10, 1654, he met, welcomed and escorted to Pereiaslav the Russian grand embassy, headed by Vašili Buturlin, and hosted it until the arrival of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, six days later. On the 17th Teteria, in the company of the Cossack hetman and Ivan Vyhovskyi, made a call on Buturlin. At a secret conference of senior Cossack officers, presided over by Khmelnytskyi, Teteria joined others and voted in favour of recognizing the tsar as the Cossack's suzerain. Following this conference, when Khmelnytskyi addressed the general assembly, Teteria moved about the crowd and exhorted individuals to shout their approval for the recognition of the "Orthodox" tsar. Later on in the day, when Khmelnytskyi interrupted the oath of allegiance ceremonies, due to Buturlin's refusal to take an oath in the name of the tsar, Teteria and his colleague managed to end the impasse by finding a formula that was acceptable to both parties. Then, Teteria along with the hetman and other officers, solemnly
swore their allegiance to the tsar. In the days that followed, Teteria participated, along with other officers, in a series of conferences with Buturlin.

After the departure of the Russian embassy from Pereiaslav, Khmelnytskyi held several meetings with his senior officers — among whom was Teteria — in Chyhyryn. During these meetings, which lasted to the close of February, certain points in the formulation of earlier demands to the tsarist government were revised and new ones added. These, along with other matters, were to be presented to Aleksei Mikhailovich and the Boiar Duma by a Cossack delegation, at the head of which were placed Pavlo Teteria and Samiilo Zarudny.

The Cossack delegation arrived in Moscow on March 22. On the following day Teteria and Zarudny were received in audience by the tsar. For the next few days they negotiated with a special committee of the Boiar Duma, to which, on the 24th, they submitted a draft of a treaty comprising twenty-three articles. The plenum of the Boiar Duma accepted most of these articles, which it eventually condensed to eleven and in this form presented them to the tsar. On April 6 the tsar approved this summary and issued, as well, special charters for seven items not included in the eleven articles. In this way evolved the Treaty of Pereiaslav or, as it should be more correctly called, the Treaty of Moscow.

By his very active participation in the negotiations, Teteria was responsible, to a great degree, for bringing Ukraine under the protection of "the exalted sovereign arm" of the tsar, who soon began to style himself as "the Autocrat of the Great, Little and White Rus". Teteria created an extremely favourable impression of himself in Moscow. In
recognition of his services, the Tsar issued to him a charter for a land grant in Ukraine. Moreover, since the tsar decided to attack the Commonwealth, he ordered Khmelnytskyi to place Teteria in charge of a Cossack contingent and to send it to the northern theatre of war. The Cossack hetman, however, preferred to make use of Teteria's services in Ukraine.

Teteria participated in the joint Cossack-Russian winter campaign, which terminated after the indecisive victory of the Crown and Tatar forces over the allies on 2.II.1655. On 29.IX. he took part in the rout of the Crown Army near Gorodok. During September and October he negotiated terms with the burgesses of Lviv for the lifting of siege of their city. He was present in the Cossack camp by Ozirna when Khmelnytskyi concluded, on 21.XI., an agreement with the Tatars. At the close of the year Teteria returned with his regiment to the left bank of the Dnieper. In 1656 he devoted most of his time to the administrative and regimental duties.

In January 1657 Teteria was contacted by Bieniewski, who informed him that he was being sent by the king on a special mission to Khmelnytskyi and expressed hope that Teteria would aid him in carrying it out. During Bieniewski's stay in Chyhyryn (early March to late April) the two old acquaintances conferred quite frequently. Teteria, having been won over by Bieniewski's arguments, promises and gold, declared his support for the cause of the rapprochement with the Commonwealth. He began to prepare ground for it by inciting the Cossacks against the Russians. The time was ripe for such an undertaking, for in the years 1655-1656 relations between Chyhyryn and Moscow became severely strained.

On 20.VII. Khmelnytskyi sent a delegation, headed by Teteria, to Moscow. Teteria's instructions — such as the request that the tsar
conclude peace with Poland and Sweden — served as a facade only: his real mission was to camouflage the aims of Khmelnytskyi and to quiet the apprehensions of the tsarist government. After being received by the tsar on 14.VIII., Teteria soon found out that it was not an easy task to deceive the Russians, who had their own sources of information. The boiars, during the meetings held on the 15th and 17th, resembled a court of inquisition, for they were by far more preoccupied with charging the Cossack hetman than with dealing with his requests. In their attempts to unmask him, they were openly hostile to Teteria. Not only were they dissatisfied with his explanations regarding the hetman's violations of the terms of the Pereiaslav agreement, but also with his answers to their questions in general.

Once news reached Moscow about the death of Khmelnytskyi (6.VIII.), the boiars saw no need of further talks with Teteria. After some delay — for instructions were drawn up for Kikin on the 21st and then he was sent to investigate the situation in Ukraine — a meeting was held on the 24th, during which Teteria was given a number of vague promises. These were re-echoed by the tsar at the parting audience on the 31st. This time, unlike three years ago, Teteria failed to make any substantial personal gains. Teteria, feeling bitter about his treatment — he felt humiliated and insulted — departed from Moscow as an enemy of Russia.

In the second half of September Teteria arrived in Chyhyryn. Here he met Bieniewski who, following the death of Khmelnytskyi, had been attempting to induce the Cossack officers to support the rapprochement with the Commonwealth. Both men redoubled their efforts to build a strong "Polonophile party" among the officers not only by using means which discredited the Russians and their Cossack supporters, but also those by which
the pro-Swedish influence of Yurii Nemyrych was combatted. While un­
able to conclude a formal treaty with the newly-elected Cossack hetman,
Ivan Vyhowksyi, Bieniewski did manage, with the help of Teteria, to
arrange a temporary agreement which provided for both parties an armis­
tice and a territorial status quo. After Bieniewski's departure, in the
middle of October, Teteria and his friends informed him about the policies
pursued by Vyhowksyi and supplied to him details relating to the most sig­
nificant developments in Ukraine.

Early in March 1658, acting in the capacity of Vyhowksyi's personal
representative, Teteria appeared in Volynia. During his negotiations
with Bieniewski, Teteria revealed that the Cossack hetman was prepared,
once he received guarantees that his own demands will be met, to recog­
nize the suzerainty of Jan Kazimierz. Teteria also assured Bieniewski
that, if Vyhowksyi failed to keep his word, he and other supporters of
the rapprochement would defect to the king's side. In his report to the
king Bieniewski praised Teteria and referred to him as a sincere and
trustworthy individual. Early in April Teteria departed to Ukraine.

At the close of May Vyhowksyi committed himself to the rapprochement
and instructed Teteria, to whom he gave plenipotentiary powers, to work
out articles of agreement with Bieniewski. Teteria, after some delay,
reached Bieniewski on June 30. After one month of negotiations, the two
men reached a compromise. Its articles, which were not to bind the bar­
gaining power of Bieniewski and his colleagues, were signed by Teteria
on July 5. At this point Teteria departed from Volynia.

When Bieniewski and Jewlaszewski arrived in the Cossack camp near
Hadiach on September 9, they were confident that the final agreement with
Vyhowksyi was merely a matter of carrying out of the usual formalities.
They soon found out that, due to the many concessions made by Teteria, the document of July 5 was hardly acceptable to Vyshovskyi. This meant that hard bargaining had to be resumed. At times they felt that they entered the lion's den. Were it not for their "only friend" — Teteria—agreement would not come about. Thus, with Teteria acting in the role of a mediator, agreement was finally reached on September 16. The "Commission of Hadiach" proclaimed the creation, out of Ukraine, of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. Ruthenia became the third member of the Commonwealth. On the 17th, following the speeches of Vyshovskyi and Bieniewski to the assembled Cossack rank and file, Teteria moved about those assembled and urged them to shout their approval for the new treaty.

Following the conclusion of the ceremonies by Hadiach, Teteria -- as a member of the hetman's delegation -- accompanied Bieniewski to the royal camp by Toruń, reaching it at the close of October. Teteria made a very favourable impression among the dignitaries. He was rewarded for his service by two charters: one, reconfirmed his status of a noble; the other, outlined his new estates. On November 18 Teteria departed with the Cossack delegation.

During the second mission of Bieniewski to Vyshovskyi (January - February 1659) for "the reform" of the articles which "the Commonwealth could not accept", Teteria aided his friend in many ways. Later on he appeared in an unofficial capacity during the sessions of the Diet, being present during the ratification ceremonies of the treaty of union (22.V.). He also witnessed his charters incorporated into the "consti­tu­tions" of the Diet. At this time he played, along with Yurii Nemyrych, a significant role in the attempt to find a formula for the unification of the Orthodox and the Uniate Churches in the Commonwealth. In June
Teteria returned to Ukraine and took part in the rout of the Russian forces near Konotop (8.VII.).

Following the resignation of Vyhovskyi and the passage of the mace to Yurii Khmelnytskyi (21.IX.), Teteria supported — most likely by the desire of the royal court — the new Cossack hetman. He took part in the Cossack general council held in Pereiaslav (27.X.), which re-elected Khmelnytskyi and re-affirmed the tsar's control over Ukraine. In the months that followed, Teteria secretly supported the efforts of Bieniewski to induce Khmelnytskyi to abandon the tsar.

Their goal was reached in 1660 when, during the Chudniv campaign, the Cossack-Russian forces suffered severe setbacks from the actions of the Crown Army and its Tatar allies. During this time, keeping contacts with his "friends" and exerting pressure on the weak-willed Cossack hetman, Teteria eventually convinced him to capitulate. After several rounds of negotiations a new treaty, fashioned after that ratified by the Diet in 1659, — the restoration of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, however, was left to the decision of the king — was signed on 17.X.

Ten days later Khmelnytskyi took an oath of allegiance to Jan Kazimierz.

The next scene of this drama was played by Bieniewski at the Cossack general council held in Korsun from 19 to 21.XI. With the aid of Teteria, this gifted diplomat managed to secure the confirmation of the new treaty; the re-election, as hetman, of the most incompetent individual — Khmelnytskyi — and the election as the secretary-general of the Cossack Army, in place of the pro-Russian Holiukhovskyi, of the "absolutely loyal" Teteria. In this way the trusted "watchdog" of the Commonwealth became the "guardian angel" of the weak and vacillating Cossack hetman. At this time plans were made to leave Bieniewski and Teteria in charge of the affairs of Ukraine.
Early in March 1661 Teteria appeared in Warsaw, ostensibly in place of Khmelnyskyi, who was unable to attend the conference planned at the close of February. In the days that followed, he met with the king and the key dignitaries of the state and advised them how to handle the affairs in the troubled Ukraine. During his stay in the capital he received a charter for a new land grant. Moreover, he induced the king to issue several manifestoes to the serfs of his villages to obey him alone. At the close of March he departed from Warsaw.

Teteria's influence was also felt at the Diet of 1661. The Diet did ratify the Treaty of Chudniv, but abolished "the Title of the Duchy of Ruthenia and the prerogatives belonging to that Duchy", on the grounds -- this was, no doubt, the formula worked out by Bieniewski and Teteria -- that the Cossacks found them "unnecessary". This Diet also reconfirmed the "constitutions" of 1659 relating to Teteria -- his noble status and land grants.

At the close of 1661 Teteria was recalled to Warsaw. On 8.II.1662 he was given special instructions to return to Ukraine. He was supposed to familiarize himself with the latest political developments and to press Khmelnyskyi to settle various problems of the socio-economic nature. By the middle of March the Dapifer of Polatsk -- this was Teteria's new title -- was at Khmelnyskyi's side. Already on 14.IV. Khmelnyskyi's manifestoes announced that all nobles could return to their estates in Ukraine. After several months of stay in Ukraine, Teteria returned to Warsaw with detailed information about the dangerous Russian and Tatar factions among the Cossacks.

The chaotic state of affairs, by the autumn of 1662, made the position of Khmelnyskyi untenable. For this reason, it was decided by the policy-
makers in Warsaw to replace him by an individual who was capable of re-
store order in Ukraine and who could be trusted in carrying out all 
the directives from the capital. In their view there was, at this time, 
only one candidate who possessed all the necessary qualifications: 
Teteria.

Having the backing of the government for his candidacy, Teteria 
appeared in the Cossack camp in the middle of September and proceeded to 
gather supporters. Since all major factions among the Cossacks declared 
themselves against Khmelnytskyi and since Teteria was quite liberal in 
spending gold, he did not have any great difficulty in securing support-
ers. On 16.I.1663, under pressure from various sides, Khmelnytskyi 
resigned. Following this act the Cossack general council assembled in 
Chyhyryn and elected -- as it was aptly put by a French correspondent -- 
the "Resident de sa Majesté Polonaise dans la dite Province [i.e., 
Ukraine]", to replace Khmelnytskyi as hetman. The Right Bank Ukraine 
was now controlled by the "faithful servant" of the king.

In the years that followed Teteria proved himself to be a staunch 
royalist and an individual who looked after the interests of the Common-
wealth in Ukraine. At the close of 1663 he supported Jan Kazimierz's 
campaign to regain all of Ukraine and to force peace conditions on 
Russia by the means of arms. He was prepared to support the dynastic-
absolutist plans of the court, even to the point of agreeing to send 
Cossack troops against the supporters of the anti-royalist forces led 
by Jerzy Lubomirski.

Similarly, he showed no sympathy for any anti-Commonwealth group-
ings among the Cossacks. Teteria was responsible, to a great degree, 
for the arrest of the Palatine of Kiev, Ivan Vyhovskyi, who was then
tried, found guilty of "treason", and executed by a firing squad on 26.
or 27. III. 1664. Other leaders of "opposition" — the controversially-
elected Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Iosyf Tukalskyi; the Archimand-
rite Hedeon (Yuri Khmelnytskyi); and the Colonel of the Nizhyn Regi-
ment, Hryhorii Hulianytskyi — were incarcerated.

By February 1664, as the military campaign led by Jan Kazimierz
had ground to a stop without achieving its aims, Teteria found himself
in a precarious position. There were a series of uprisings, frequent
defections to the side of his rival, Ivan Briukhovetskyi, and intrigues
among the Cossack officers. Feeling that he would lose control of the
Right Bank Ukraine, Teteria appealed to the king for help, advising him
to take one of the following steps immediately: to administer "the
medicine from Muscovy" — i.e., to follow the examples set by the Russians
on the Left Bank; to conclude peace with the tsar; or to send a strong
army to his support.

Jan Kazimierz decided on the third course of action. Following
the termination of the campaign his best general, Stefan Czarniecki,
came to Teteria's aid. From May 1664, after a series of military suc-
cesses, Teteria's position improved greatly. Becoming optimistic again,
at the close of the year Teteria drew up for the Diet elaborate plans,
through which the Commonwealth was to regain control over Ukraine.

Before this plan could be acted upon by the Diet, however, the
situation in Ukraine changed once again. Following the death of Czar-
iecki, in February 1665, Teteria began to lose ground rapidly. At the
close of May, Czarniecki's successor, Aleksander Jabłonowski, was de-
feated near Bila Tserkva. Shortly later on Teteria was routed near
Bratslav. More Crown troops were needed to cope with the turmoil, but
none could be spared, due to new developments within the interior of the state. In June a decision was reached to withdraw all the Crown troops from Ukraine. They were to be used against the anti-royalist rebels led by Lubomirski.

Under these circumstances, fearing for his life and considering that he could not cope with the opposition even with the aid of the Tatars, Teteria lost his nerve and fled from Ukraine. He was accused by Doroshenko of looting the Army's treasury. At his departure he was to have taken "cannon, treasure, jewels, maces, standards, banners" and charters. Teteria justified his departure in a lengthy letter to Prażmowski (24.VI.1665).

After settling down in Warsaw, Teteria hoped to lead a life of a normal noble. He became engaged in various profitable transactions. Above all, he endeavoured to establish firm control over his estates and to gain new ones. All such activities brought him into conflict with various magnates and nobles. Litigations began challenging his rights to certain estates. Charges were laid against him by the nobles of the south-eastern palatinates: he was accused of misusing his office of hetman by carrying out actions which enabled him to become rich at their expense. The whole matter came to a head in 1667. This time Teteria was saved from prosecution by a special resolution of the Diet.

Teteria's enemies, however, found new charges against him. These resulted in his conviction: he was sentenced to a loss of his rights as a noble and condemned to leave the country. On 10.IV.1670 Teteria secured from King Michał Wiśniowiecki a six-month letter of safe conduct and appealed his verdict to the Tribunal of Lublin. The appeal was to no avail, for this tribunal upheld the verdict of the lower court. Finally,
when Teteria turned for redress to the king and received instead a reply which offended him, he crossed the border to Moldavia in order to place himself under the "protection of the Sultan of Turkey". By this act of "desperation" — as the Crown Grand Hetman Jan Sobieski put it in his letter to his wife (29.VII.1670) — Teteria endangered the interests of the Commonwealth, "because he knows about everything that is happening among us".

After spending some time in Iași, Teteria proceeded to Adrianopole. On his way there, he met and conferred with the sultan. Upon his arrival in Adrianopole, he was contacted by Franciszek Wysocki who, on the instructions of Crown Vice-Chancellor Andrzej Olszowski, attempted to persuade him to return to the Commonwealth. During this time Teteria became ill. He died in the spring of 1671.

After laying down his mace, Teteria became engaged in educational, philanthropic and religious activities. In 1668 he became the patron of the Jesuit Order in Warsaw. From one of his portraits we learn that the "Illustrisimus Dominus Paulus Tetera Morzkowski, Capitaneus Braslaviensis & Nizynensis, Magnus Dux Cosacorum", was the "Fundator Collegii Varsovensis Societatis Jesu". It is maintained by some historians that, due to the influence of the Jesuits, he accepted Catholicism and died as a Catholic. Yet, in the same period (1688–89), he expressed desire to enter into an Orthodox Monastery in Kiev. Moreover, he became a member of the Lviv Brotherhood and pledged to support this organization, as well as the Orthodox Church, privately and publicly.

Teteria was a close collaborator of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and supporter of his policies. He favoured the ties — military alliance and quasi-protectorate — with Russia, because he, like many others, expected
better results with this arrangement in the struggle against the Commonwealth. Soon, however, Teteria became disillusioned with the autocratic rule: the "exalted arm" of the tsar proved to be too heavy for his liking. The looser system of the Commonwealth -- the gentry-democracy -- with which he was familiar, notwithstanding its faults, proved to be more attractive to him. For this reason, Teteria began to work for the rapprochement with the Commonwealth. No doubt, the personal gains he achieved, played a significant role in his choice.

Pavlo Teteria's picture, especially in Ukrainian historiography, is painted in dark colours. To certain historians he was selfish, covetous and cruel; to others, he was a traitor, overly-ambitious and an individual who displayed weak character. He is blamed for selling Ukraine to the Poles as well as for the execution of Ivan Vyhovskyi. The litany of his "sins" is almost endless. Unfortunately, many historians were judging the actions of a man who lived in the seventeenth century by the standards of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

E. Ivan Vyhovskyi

Ivan, the eldest son of Ostap Vyhovskyi and Olena (née Lasko), was born most likely in the first decade of the seventeenth century. His parents belonged to a stratum of quite prosperous Orthodox landed gentry, which had its roots in the Palatinates of Kiev and Volynia. His father, the heir of Horodev, established and maintained close contacts with influential laymen and churchmen in the city of Kiev, the religious and intellectual capital of the Orthodox world.

Ivan began his formal studies in the school of the Kievian Brotherhood. His father was a member of this organization. Judging from the
accomplishments of Ivan in later years, he must have been an exceptional student. After his graduation, already determined to pursue a career in law, the young man succeeded in gaining a post of a minor official in the Kievan judicial office. After a certain period of service he left Kiev for some reason -- as a punishment for malversation, if Kochowski is to be believed -- and moved to Volynia. There is some controversy among the historians whether he managed to secure a post in the Lutsk judicial office, similar to the one he left in Kiev; in any case, care should be taken not to confuse him with a relative of his, -- Ivan Vykovskyi -- one of the founders of the Lutsk Brotherhood. While living in Volynia, Ivan became acquainted with the future diplomat of the Commonwealth -- Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski.

In the early 1640's Vykovskyi returned to Ukraine. Serving at first as the secretary to the commissioners appointed by the Diet to regulate Cossack affairs, and later on, as a lieutenant in a cavalry unit of the Crown Army, he had many opportunities to establish contacts with Cossack officers and become acquainted with the adverse effects of the draconic Ordinance of 1638.

In 1648 Vykovskyi's unit, part of the land contingent commanded by Stefan Potocki, marched into Zaporozhe in order to crush the Cossack rebels under Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. During the battle, which began on 29.IV. by Zhovty Vody, Vykovskyi was taken captive by the Tatars. Following the annihilation of the Crown Army (Korsun, 24. - 26.V.) by the Cossack-Tatar forces, he was ransomed by Khmelnytskyi. Shortly thereafter the Cossack hetman assigned to him the post of the secretary-general of the Cossack Army. In this new capacity he signed a manifesto on 17., 27.VI.1648 (earliest document preserved).

That Vykovskyi was placed in charge of such an important office,
that he managed to head it for over nine years and that he succeeded in becoming an extremely influential individual in the Cossack Army, — one might say the alter ego of Khmelnytskyi — are good arguments for maintaining that he supported the Cossack cause before the outbreak of the hostilities. He must have been one of those "conspirators" — to use the term of Crown Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki — who were hatching a rebellion in the second half of 1647 and who became extremely active in Ukraine in the opening months of 1648. Moreover, it is quite possible that he reached some sort of an agreement with Khmelnytskyi, prior to the latter's flight to Zaporozhe at the close of 1647.

Of the several major accomplishments of Vyhovskyi, the following ones must be singled out, for they were, by far, the most significant: the transformation of the secretariat-general into an efficient chancery; and the effective shaping of Cossack foreign policy. Even for a person with Vyhovskyi's abilities and qualification, -- good education, legal training and fluency in several languages -- these were, indeed, herculean tasks.

Prior to 1648 the secretariat-general of the Cossack Army — which was operated more or less on an ad hoc basis — dealt primarily with military matters. While its military functions increased tremendously after the three Cossack victories in 1648, the secretariat-general also assumed a new role: it was in charge of providing guidelines for the administration of the territories under Cossack control. By this time it could hardly function on an ad hoc basis.

Under Vyhovskyi this office was transformed to a permanent chancery of the martial Cossack republic. Out of it flowed all sorts of documents signed by Khmelnytskyi and stamped by the seal of the Zaporozhian Army: confirmation of the rights and privileges issued to merchants, townspeople
or monks, or of the rights and liberties to the gentry; responses to the
grievances of various individuals; and orders to the colonels. The chan-
cery must have been operated very effectively for, within a short period,
it managed to compile a 670-page register of the Cossack Army (1649). It
was noted in 1651 that Vyhovskyi employed twelve secretaries -- all of
them nobles, fluent in several languages. No doubt, they were assisted
by many clerks or scribes as well. For the sake of comparison, it should
be remembered that in the chancery of the Crown worked anywhere from ten
to twenty secretary-notaries.

One of the most important functions of the chancery was to establish
and to maintain proper contacts with the neighbouring states for, with­
out exaggeration, on proper contracts, both with friends and enemies, hinged
the life or the death of the new Cossack state.

When one considers that diplomatic relations had to be established
with so many countries -- Polish Commonwealth, Russia, Turkey (including
Crimea, Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania), Sweden, the Empire, Branden­
burg and Venice; that diplomatic correspondence required fluency in
several languages -- particularly Polish, Latin, Russian and Turkish;
that official correspondence to emperors, kings, sultans, tsars, khans,
princes and other rulers, including ministers of state, as well as semi­
official correspondence to officials and persons of influence in various
countries, required the knowledge of correct titles and ranks in the
salutations, proper style or expression in the texts of letters and even
the precise form of address on the envelopes; that suitable persons had
to be found and trained for all the diplomatic missions; that certain
diplomatic ceremonies and rules of courtesy had to be observed during the
reception, stay and departure of foreign envoys; and that in the drawing
up of agreements, in order not to leave scope for future evasions or mis­
understandings, it was necessary to use precise wording, — when one considers this and remembers that no permanent chancery existed prior to 1648 — then one can appreciate that for the organization and the operation of the chancery it required the services of an exceptional individual. This individual was Vyhovskyi.

As a close collaborator of Khmelnytskyi, Vyhovskyi assumed great responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy, for he was generally in charge of negotiations — whether these were in the form of conversations, private interviews, secret talks or formal conferences, and whether these took place in a peaceful setting, during a lively feast or on a field of battle — and the drawing up of agreements. Following his mission to Transylvania (XI.1648 – I.1649), his only diplomatic mission abroad, he concentrated on building Cossack diplomatic service. The chancery served as a training center for individuals picked for this service. He was largely successful in his endeavours, not only because he possessed talents for harmonizing the chief interests of both parties, but also because he was a master of deception. To Khmelnytskyi, a man of choleric temperament, the legal-minded and cautious secretary-general, a man of pleasing personality, was indispensible.

In the decade of 1648-1658, of all the settlements negotiated by Vyhovskyi with the representatives of various states, the following treaties were the most significant: Pereiaslav (1654), Chyhyryn (1657) and Hadiach (1658). These treaties are historically significant because each one was an attempt to gain separate existence for the territorially united Ukraine.

The treaty of 1654, concluded with Russia signified that a complete break was made with the Polish Commonwealth. After the failure of Zboriv
(1649), Bila Tserkva (1651) and Zhvanets (1653) agreements to become operative and six years of strife, bloodshed and enmity, it became obvious that an autonomous, strong and energetic Ukraine, which arose out of the south-eastern palatinates of the Crown, could not be accommodated as an equal partner of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, within the organism of one Commonwealth. After the collapse of Khmelnytskyi's "Danubian" plans, Vyhovskyi supported the aims of the Cossack hetman, who endeavoured to establish some link with Russia.

During the negotiations with the tsarist representative in Pereiaslav (I.1654), however, Vyhovskyi encountered severe difficulties in establishing clear guidelines for a suitable link between Ukraine and Russia. There is little doubt — although, in all fairness, it should be pointed out that this is a very controversial issue in Ukrainian and Russian historiography to this day — that he sought to establish an arrangement based on military alliance, by which both parties would be obligated to wage war against the Commonwealth. Of course, it goes without saying, that Vyhovskyi was quite aware that such an arrangement required some act of "submission" from the Cossack hetman, — after all, he was not the tsar's equal — to satisfy the requirements of dynastic legitimacy.

This whole problem was discussed at length during the meetings held by Cossack officers in Chyhyryn (II.1654). Eventually they all agreed that Ukraine would be linked with Russia through the person of the tsar and thus would become his quasi-protectorate. For such a price, so imagined Vyhovskyi and his companions, it would be possible to preserve Ukraine as a separate Cossack state.

Not too long after the treaty was concluded in Moscow (6.IV.1654), however, misunderstandings began to develop between Ukraine and Russia.
These were largely due to the different interpretations of the agreement. That persons, who voluntarily placed themselves under the "protection" of "the exalted sovereign arm" of the tsar should at the same time lead a separate existence, was a concept that was self-contradicting and therefore incomprehensible to the Russian mind. Heretofore there was no precedent in Russia for such an arrangement between the "autocrat" and his "subjects". The aim of Russia, as it was later pointed out by Vyhovskyi, was to occupy Ukraine, to destroy the liberties of the Cossacks and the nobles, to prepare for them "the yoke of bondage" and finally to incorporate her into the Russian state.

For the reasons outlined above, conflicts were unavoidable. The climax came at the close of 1656, when Russia and the Commonwealth reached an agreement. Henceforth the tsar and the king were to decide on the fate of Ukraine and her inhabitants. Vyhovskyi and his colleagues decided that the Pereiaslav agreement lost its usefulness.

The "cunning and deception" of the Russians necessitated other ties. The most promising partner for Ukraine, after the "treason" of Russia, was Sweden. King Karl X Gustav, endeavouring to gain Cossack military aid in order to conquer the Commonwealth, was prepared to accommodate Ukraine as a separate state — his pseudo-protectorate — or as an autonomous part of the Commonwealth (Instructions, 5.X.1656). He was even prepared to negotiate the incorporation of all Ruthenian ethnic territories into the Cossack state (Draft Treaty, 10.X.1656). Eventually shortly after the death of Khmelnytskyi, the representatives of Vyhovskyi signed a treaty (18.X.1657) in Chyhyryn. One of its most significant provisions was that the Swedish king would recognize the Cossacks and the population of Ruthenian territories "pro libra gente et nulli subjecta".
The Treaty of Chyhyryn, however, proved to be of little practical value. By the close of the year it became obvious to Vyhovskyi that the Swedish king was in no position to hold on to the Commonwealth. This development led him to gravitate to the Commonwealth. The time was ripe for a rapprochement. The nobles were largely in favour of reaching some sort of an understanding, even for the price of considerable concessions. The first step in this direction was taken once an armistice was concluded between the two sides (late in 1657). Then, while Vyhovskyi coped with the Russian-backed opposition among the Cossacks, his plenipotentiary, Pavlo Teteria, met with the Commonwealth's counterpart, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, and both of them were able to negotiate a preliminary agreement (5.VII.1658). A month and a half later the terms of the union were finalized in the Cossack camp near Hadiach.

The Hadiach Treaty of Union, dated 16.IX.1658, amended on 30.IV.1659 and ratified by the Diet in Warsaw on 22.V., changed the structure of the Commonwealth. Hitherto, a dual confederation, comprising the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Commonwealth, with the addition of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, — as Ukraine became to be known — was transformed into a triune state.

The three "nations", which henceforth agreed to form "one body of one and indivisible Commonwealth", were to be bound to one another by the person of the jointly-elected monarch and by such ties as the common Diet, common foreign policy and common currency. Each one of them however, were to maintain separate ministries, administration, treasury, judiciary, armed forces and the like. In this way Ruthenia, comprising the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, gained political autonomy and impressive cultural concessions. Unfortunately, the Union of Hadiach,
"remained a matrimonium ratum sed non consummatum, one of those historical turning points at which history refused to turn".

Due to the prevailing spirit of faction among the Cossacks following the death of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (6.VIII.1657), Vyhoovskyi experienced a great deal of difficulty to secure the hetman's mace for himself. At first, acting in the capacity of a compromise candidate, Vyhoovskyi was elected, on 5.IX., by the Cossack general assembly in Chyhyryn, an acting hetman. He was to occupy this office until Bohdan's son Yurii Khmelnytskyi, came of age. Shortly thereafter Vyhoovskyi masterminded the resignation of Yurii and took proper steps to secure the mace for himself. On 22.X. he convoked in Korsun another general assembly -- taking care that it comprised largely his supporters -- and succeeded in manipulating it in electing him hetman in his own name. This election, declared illegal by his enemies, caused a great deal of turmoil and even bloodshed among the Cossacks. Eventually, however, Vyhoovskyi's claim to the hetman's office was settled at the general assembly in Pereiaslav (middle of II.1658). Here he was re-elected, took an oath of loyalty to Alexei Mikhailovich and received a charter, confirming him in office, from the tsarist representative. Of course, the tsarist approval of Vyhoovskyi neither silenced nor pacified Pushkar and Barabash, his most dangerous enemies.

At the same time Vyhoovskyi attempted to put into effect that policy which became so pronounced in the closing period of Khmelnytskyi's hetmanate: the integration of all Ruthenian ethnic territories into a separate Cossack state. It was with this policy in mind that, by the close of 1657, Vyhoovskyi took great pains to ensure that the vacant throne of the Kievan metropolitans was occupied not by some creature of
Patriarch Nikon, but by a native of his own choice, — Balaban — who would continue to be the head of an autonomous Orthodox Church. It was for the sake of continuing this policy that Vykovskyi concluded an alliance with Sweden; re-established diplomatic contacts with Turkey, Crimea and Transylvania; negotiated an armistice and made a provision for the respect of the territorial status quo with the Commonwealth; and continued to call the Russian tsar his lord and master.

During this period Vykovskyi had no intention to break with Russia. It was the duplicity of the tsarist government — outwardly, it supported Vykovskyi; secretly, his Cossack opponents — which was largely responsible for the fanning of flames of civil war in Ukraine, that created for him a rift and eventually an impassible chasm. This development, coupled with the inability of Sweden and Transylvania to come to the support of Ukraine, brought about a sharp change in the policy hitherto pursued by Vykovskyi: he came to terms with the old enemy, the Commonwealth. Under such circumstances the Union of Hadiach came into existence.

The Union resulted from the efforts of the Cossack hetman, many of his officers and particularly of his supporters among the gentry. In the newly-created Grand Duchy of Ruthenia it was this element, not the Cossack Army, that was to assume control; thus, the new order signified the end of the Cossack state. To the Russian-backed demagogues this was a good opportunity to play on the ignorance and prejudice of the popular masses and the Cossack rank and file — individuals who cared more about the practical rather than the ideological consequences of the Union — and to turn them against Vykovskyi. A stage was set for a bloody fratrical conflict. The Commonwealth, waging war against Sweden, could not aid Vykovskyi in an effective manner; thus, even with Tatar military support, the hetman was unable to deal a death blow to the malcontents and settle
the whole issue in his favour by the force of arms. At the close of 1658 one observer of developments in Ukraine noted that Vykovskyi's position was extremely precarious: even a slightest misfortune would cost him "his life or the hetman's office". For this reason Vykovskyi "trusts both the nobles and the Tatars -- more than the Cossacks".

For a time, however, Vykovskyi's star shone brightly. On 8.VIII.1659 he routed a large Russian army near Konotop. Even this spectacular victory proved to be insufficient to save neither his position nor the Union of Hadiach, for the spirit of faction and anarchy still prevailed among the Cossacks.

In an attempt to quiet the apprehensions of the common Cossacks regarding the terms of the Union and in order to gain their support against the leaders of revolts, -- Tsiutsiura, Somko, Zolotarenko and Sirko -- Vykovskyi convoked a general assembly in Hermanivka (September). The assembly, however, was in no mood to listen to any explanations; eventually, as its mood became more and more hostile, Vykovskyi fled for safety to the nearest encampment of the Crown Army. Eventually, after some negotiations, by the beginning of the following month Vykovskyi gave up, as he put it, "this troublesome office". Yurii Khmelnytskyi was elected in his place.

Although the new hetman pledged his loyalty to Jan Kazimierz, events moved too swiftly for him to remain a "faithful subject". On 27.X., due to the pressure of Russian troops, he swore allegiance to the tsar in Pereiaslav. At the close of the year Vykovskyi and his supporters were forced out of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. During the winter of 1659-1660 the Russian troops were in charge of the whole country.

Even these setbacks, which could have caused many a man to sink into
oblivion, failed to break Vyhovskyi. True, he lost the mace of the Zaporozhian Army, but he still retained a great deal of authority by holding the office of the Palatine of Kiev -- he was thus a senator -- and even by owning large tracts of land in several palatinates. To the nobles, whether they were the "exiles" from Ukraine or those still living in the Orthodox strongholds (Volynia, Ruthenia and Podolia), he still merited their respect and support. To them he was the visible symbol of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia and the Union which they desired: the former, particularly because they would regain their estates; the latter, among others, because the Orthodox Church would reap great benefits. No doubt, both Vyhovskyi and the gentry supporting him, considered these setbacks as a temporary caprice of fate.

When the horizon darkened and it was obvious that another conflict was inevitable, Vyhovskyi offered his services to the king. He attended the important military conference in Lviv (VIII.1660) prior to the start of the campaign against the Cossacks and the Russians. Early in the following month he marched at the head of the troops from the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia -- fourteen squadrons of horse (some 1,000 men) plus 200 dragoons -- to the concentration area of the Crown Army. Serving with distinction in the division of Hetman Potocki, Vyhovskyi commanded his units of cavalry during the entire campaign. Eventually, with the rout of Sheremetyev's Russians (14.X.) and the capitulation of Khmelnytskyi three days later, the campaign came to an end.

Vyhovskyi also played an active -- although indirect -- part in the negotiations with the Cossacks. He endeavoured to convince both parties that, for the good of the state, the new agreement had to include all the terms of the Union of Hadiach. Unfortunately, by this time even to many
of those who supported the Union at the Diet of 1659, the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia represented an undesirable entity — a thorn in the flesh of the Commonwealth. Lacking foresight and generosity, the men in charge of negotiations were only prepared to grant a degree of autonomy to Ukraine. In order not to provoke the outburst of new passions, they avoided any reference in the text of the agreement to the life or death of the Grand Duchy. One of the articles of the Treaty of Chudniv, signed 17.X.1660, was very cleverly worded: the diplomats left this question to be decided by the king. This sort of postponement of such a vital issue signified that in the near future the Diet would strike out all clauses relating to the Grand Duchy. Vyhovskyi was quite familiar with such tactics. He was still optimistic nonetheless, that the damage could be repaired.

Vyhovskyi soon found out, however, that time was not on his side. In November he received three severe blows: the first was delivered by the Cossack general assembly's vote (Korsun, 19 - 21.XI) to accept the new treaty; the second, by the decision of the same body to re-elect Khmelnytskyi as hetman; the third, by the policymakers in Warsaw who, by sanctioning Bieniewski's actions in Korsun, indicated that they were not interested in the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the Grand Duchy. The fourth, the most painful blow, was delivered in the following year. The Diet of 1661, in ratifying the Treaty of Chudniv, declared that "the Title of the Duchy of Ruthenia and the prerogatives belonging to that Duchy" were abolished on grounds that the Cossacks themselves found them "unnecessary". Finally, the fifth blow came in the beginning of 1663, when he was humiliated by being rejected — for the second time — by the court as a candidate for the mace of the Zaporozhian Army.
Indeed, it must have been very painful for Vykovskyi to watch, day by day, the crumbling of the edifice he helped to build and to realize that, under the existing arrangement, no matter what he did, only ruins would remain. Having cut off himself from Russia and having lost faith in the Commonwealth, he began to search for a new way to raise this edifice -- Ukraine -- from its ruins. There was only one way open for him: to gain the support of Crimea and Turkey. It seems, as it is revealed by one source, that already early in 1662 Vykovskyi made plans to secure the mace with Tatar assistance and to rule reunited Ukraine as a protectorate of Turkey.

At the close of 1663, when Jan Kazimierz began a new campaign in order to wrest the Left Bank Ukraine from the Russians and their Cossack supporters, Vykovskyi decided that the time was ripe to act. For a time, in order not to appear completely "loyal", he appeared to co-operate with Colonel Sebastian Machowski and Teteria in their endeavours to keep the Right Bank "pacified" while the king's army was occupied on Left. Secretly, however, he began to sow seeds of revolt in the countryside. At the close of February 1664 an uprising started against "the Poles" on the Right Bank.

It seems that Vykovskyi instigated this uprising in order to dislodge Teteria -- with whom he had many personal and family scores to settle -- from power. He imagined that, during such turbulent times, no one would dare to oppose him for the office of the hetman -- at least on the Right Bank. Once the mace would be in his hands, the other part of the plan would be much easier to carry out. Unfortunately, due to various complications -- primarily the denunciation of Teteria and the quelling, in the middle of March, of the uprising -- this part of the plan did not work out. Then the climax came.
Up to this time there were only allegations that Vyhoavskyi was responsible for inciting the revolt. The interrogations of Cossack captives revealed that he indeed played a part in it. Having this proof, on 17.III. Machowski ordered Vyhoavskyi's arrest. When the Tatars began to clamour that he be surrendered to them, Machowski concluded that his prisoner was indeed the Tatar-supported pretender to the mace of the Zaporozhian Army. In order to prevent more unrest Machowski convened a court martial. Vyhoavskyi was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. On 26 or 27.III.1664 he was executed by a firing squad. While there is no doubt that Machowski had the power to carry out the execution, it must be remembered that there was no precedent for such an action. After all, Vyhoavskyi was a senator of the Commonwealth. This event created a great uproar of protests throughout the country.

In his last will and testament, prepared shortly before his execution, Vyhoavskyi denied all charges against him. It should be pointed out that this document is primarily used as a source for the vindication of Vyhoavskyi and the condemnation of Machowski and Teteria. (See Hrushevskyi, Herasymchuk, Lypynskyi, Prochaska and Wójcik; for another view, see Majewski).

Ivan Vyhoavskyi was married twice. Little is known about his first wife (née Yablonskyi), who died, apparently still in her youth, in the early 1650's. His second wife, Olena Stetkevych, was abducted — so claims Jemiłowski. In 1653 she gave birth to their only son Ostafii. Through his wife Vyhoavskyi was related to the most influential families in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Olena's father, Bohdan, held the office of the Castellan of Navahrudak; her mother, Olena, traced her ancestry from the Solomeretskyi princes. Through the wives of his two brothers,
Danylo and Kostiantyn, he was related to the Khmelnytskyi's and the Meshcherskyis (descendants of another princely house). In this way Vyhovskyi had important connections with the old princely families and the new Cossack "aristocracy". This was a useful ladder to reach power, fame and fortune.

Vyhovskyi was a strong supporter of the Orthodox Church — this Church which was aligned so strongly with the cause of self-determination of Ukraine. Publicly, as a high official, Vyhovskyi took great pains to ensure that the Orthodox Church was unmolested by neither the Commonwealth nor Russia; privately, as a faithful member, he contributed to her strength and growth by founding churches, contributing funds to monasteries and promoting Orthodox-oriented organizations (he joined the Lviv Brotherhood in 1662) and educational and cultural activities. Yet, he was never a religious fanatic. There is evidence that he endeavoured to find a fair compromise to heal the wounds of the Eastern Church, which existed on her body since 1596.

Ivan Vyhovskyi was a typical man of his times. Some of his contemporaries praised him; others, condemned him. To blame any man only for his "vices" or to point out only his "mistakes", and to forget his accomplishments, is tantamount to writing bad history. While Vyhovskyi's contemporaries may be given a dispensation for their passions, the same privilege cannot be extended to many of his historians who, even after having taken a vow of objectivity, still refer -- for reasons known best by themselves -- to him as "traitor", "adventurer" or the man who "sold Ukraine to the Poles".
APPENDIX II

THE TREATY OF ZBORIV (1649) *

A Declaration of His Majesty's Clemency

to the Zaporozhian Army, made [in response]
to the Articles of [its] Supplication.

1. His Majesty shall conserve all of the long-standing liberties for the
Zaporozhian Army, in accordance with former Charters [granted to it],
and [for the reconfirmation of them] He has issued His own Charter as
well.

2. His Majesty, desiring to acquiesce to the entreaties of His Subjects
[regarding] the strength of the Army and to attract them to His Service
and [that of] the Commonwealth, has permitted [them] to have [the strength
of] the Zaporozhian Army [increased to] Forty Thousand [men] and entrusted

*Original texts of the Treaty of Zboriv have not been preserved. Of the copies in existence, none are signed.

Great many manuscript books contain the text of the Treaty of Zboriv. The following ones may serve as examples: AGAD, MK, LL, Ms. 33, fos. 72'-73'; Ibid., LL, Ms. 35, fos. 26'-27'; AKr., Rus., Ms. 31, pp. 63-65; Czart., TN, Ms. 144, pp. 437-440, 443-446; Czart., Ms. 379, pp. 197-199; Czart., Ms. 398, pp. 19-21; Czart., Ms. 1657, pp. 452-463; Ossol., Ms. 189/II. PP. 276-288; Ossol., Ms. 3564, fos. 245'-248; and Kr., Ms. 1017, fos. 60'-61'.

the Hetman of His Zaporozhian Army with the preparation of the [Cossack] Register, [on condition that they comply] with the following declaration:
that the Cossacks be enrolled in the Register according to their rank;
[that is, only those shall be enrolled] who are qualified for this [enlistment, out of all the residents] on the Estates of the Nobles as well as on the Estates of His Majesty. [which comprise the area] designated by these [below-listed] towns. [Specifically], it is to be understood that [all] Cossacks shall be [eligible to be] admitted [for enrollment] in the Register [from the following area]: on this [western] side [of the bank] of the Dnieper [River], beginning [north] at Dymer [and proceeding south to] Hornostaipol, Korostyshiv, Pavoloch, Pohrebyshche, Pryluky, Vinnytsia and Bratslav, then from Bratslav towards the Dniester [River] to Iampil, as well as from the Dniester [eastward] to the Dnieper; and on the other [eastern] side [of the bank] of the Dnieper, [the area] from Oster [in the north to] Chernihiv, Nizhyn, Romny and the Muscovite border [in the east] and [along it southward to] the Dnieper. With regard to other Towns of His Majesty and the Nobility, [located in areas] beyond [the delineation] described in this Article: the Cossacks shall not live in them; however, any one of them [living in these towns at present], who desires to remain a Cossack and who is accepted [for enrollment] in the Register, shall be permitted to move into Ukraine with all his possession without any hindrance from the Nobility. The Register shall be drawn up by the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. It shall be completed, at the latest, by the Ruthenian [Orthodox] Feast of the New Year and prepared in the following way: the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army shall list in the Register the names of all those who shall be enrolled as Cossacks, [and upon its completion] shall subscribe it with his own hand
and [stamp it] with the Seal of the Army. This [procedure] is [to be carried out] in order [to ascertain] that all those who became [registered] Cossacks shall enjoy [all] Cossack liberties; while all others, [living on the Crown Lands] be subject to [the authority of officials of] His Majesty's Castles [or, those living] on the Estates of the Nobles, to their own Lords.

3. [The Town of] Chyhyryn, within its present boundaries, shall be always [possessed] by [the holder of] the Mace of the Zaporozhian Army; which [town], also has been granted by His Majesty to the present Elder of the Zaporozhian Army, the Noble Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, proclaiming him [to be] His faithful Servant and [that of] the Commonwealth.

4. Whatever [deeds] have taken place, by the disposition of God, during the recent turmoil, all of these shall pass into oblivion; [therefore,] no Lord shall seek revenge or punishment [of his serfs or anyone under his authority].

5. His Majesty, on account of His [desire to demonstrate the] Royal Clemency to the Nobles, both of the Greek [Orthodox] and the Roman [Catholic] Faith, who, in whatever capacity, served in the Zaporozhian Army during this [recent] turmoil, has forgiven and condoned their offences. If the Estates, Hereditary or Tenured, of any one [of them] were confiscated, or if anyone was outlawed, [then all such proceedings], because they occurred during the recent turmoil, shall be annulled by a [special] Constitution of the Diet.
6. The Crown Army shall not be garrisoned in those Towns which were assigned to the Cossack by the Register.

7. The Jews shall be [appointed] neither Tenants nor Leaseholders, nor [permitted to] reside, in the Towns where the Cossacks [shall] have their Regiments [stationed].

8. His Majesty is prepared to comply with the postulates of the Father Metropolitan [of Kiev] and the [Orthodox] Clergy dealing with the abolition of the [Church] Union, both in the Crown [of Poland] and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; also with the integrity of the Orthodox Church Lands and foundations formerly belonging to them; as well as with all the Rights of the Orthodox Church, in order that each one [of His Orthodox subjects] may enjoy his [religious] Rights and Liberties. [All the postulates outlined in the Articles] shall be discussed and resolved with [the participation of] the Father Metropolitan of Kiev and the [Orthodox] Clergy at the forthcoming Diet. [Moreover,] His Majesty has given permission to the Metropolitan of Kiev to have a Seat in the Senate.

9. His Majesty has promised to distribute all Dignities and Offices, in accordance with former Laws, among the Resident Nobility of the Greek [Orthodox] Faith in the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv.

10. Since there are Chartered Ruthenian [Orthodox] Schools in the City of Kiev, the Jesuit Fathers shall not be established there or in [any] other Town in Ukraine, but be transferred elsewhere. All other [non-Jesuit Roman Catholic] Schools, which have been [founded] there in former times,
shall be preserved in their entirety.

11. The Cossacks shall not deal in whiskey; [they may distill it] only [in such quantities] as to fill their own needs. The dealing in mead, beer and other [beverages], however, shall be [allowed them], in ac­ cordance with the [Cossack] customs.

These articles shall be ratified by the Diet. Heretofore all animosity [shall pass] into oblivion, and harmony and affection shall prevail among the [Nobles, the] Residents of Ukraine and [the members of] the Zaporoshian Army of His Majesty and the Commonwealth.
APPENDIX III

THE TREATY OF BILA TSEKRA (1651) *

Articles for the Regulation and Pacification of His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army, drawn up by Us, the Commissioners subscribed below, at the Commission by Bila Tserkva, on the 28th day of September, in the year 1651.

1. We give thanks due to God for the checking and removing of the domestic bloodshed, which lasted up to this time. Since His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army, along with its Hetman and all of its officers, submitted itself to His Majesty and the Commonwealth, we have permitted and assigned the enrollment of the Registered Army in the strength of 20,000 [men]. This Army shall be registered by the Hetman and the officers only on the [Crown] Lands of His Majesty in the Palatinate of Kiev, and shall not occupy any [territory] in [the Palatinates of] Bratslav and Chernihiv. All [private]
Estates of the Nobility in the Palatinate of Kiev. [however,] shall be exempted [from this regulation]: no one shall be admitted [for enrollment] into the Register anywhere from these [privately-owned estates], but whoever shall be retained as a Registered Cossack, as one of the 20,000 [men], he shall [have the opportunity to] move out of the Estates of the Nobility [located] in [the Palatinates of] Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv as well as out of the Lands of His Majesty [located in these three Palatinates] and move into the Lands of His Majesty in the Palatinate of Kiev, wherever His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army shall be stationed. Whoever shall move, who is a Registered Cossack, each such person shall be free to sell his property, without any hindrance from the Lords, as well as of Prefects or Sub-Prefects.

2. The enrollment of the 20,000 [-man] His Majesty's Registered Army shall begin within two weeks of the present date and shall be completed by Christmas [of the current year]. The Register of this Army, [once completed], shall be subscribed by the Hetman's hand, submitted to His Majesty and recorded in the Judicial Registers of Kiev, and in which, under [the entry for] every [regimental] town, Cossacks shall be listed clearly according to their first names and surnames. Their total number shall not exceed 20,000. Anyone enrolled [as a Registered Cossack] in the Register, shall retain his home [and all] Cossack rights and liberties; however, anyone not enrolled in the Register, shall remain in the customary subjection of [the Authorities of] His Majesty's Castles.

3. The Crown Army shall not perform military service in the towns of the Palatinate of Kiev in which the Registered Cossacks shall be stationed,
but [only] in the Palatinates of Bratslav and Chernihiv, in which the [Registered] Cossacks shall live no longer. However, in order not to provoke a [fresh] conflict, [the Crown Army] shall halt [its advance and operations] from the present time on until the date set for the completion of the Register at Christmas, -- [that is,] until [the Cos­sacks] shall occupy their [assigned] positions on the Lands of His Ma­jesty in the Palatinate of Kiev and shall be found [enrolled] in the strength of 20,000 in the Register -- and shall not advance [eastward] beyond Zhyvotiv in [the Palatinate of] Bratslav after the completion of the enrollment and of the Register.

4. The Nobles of the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, including the Prefects, shall [be permitted to] return to their Estates and to recover them, by themselves or by their officials; as well as to recover all incomes, taverns, mills and jurisdictions [formerly] belonging to them. They shall refrain, however, only from the collection of taxes from the serfs until the date set for the completion of the Register [has passed], so that those who shall be [enrolled as] Registered Cossacks may move by that date, leaving only those who shall remain serfs [on the Es­tates of the Nobles] as well as on the Lands of His Majesty. [In this way] it shall become evident who shall retain the Cossack liberties and who [shall remain] in obedience to and under the subordination of [Lords and officials of] the castles.

5. [The Town of] Chyhyryn, in accordance with the Charter of His Majesty, shall be retained by the Hetman [of His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army]. As the present Hetman, the Noble Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, has [secured his
office] by the permission and the Charter of His Majesty, so too all those [holding it] in the future shall be granted Charters [for it from His Majesty and His successors] and each one of them, upon becoming a Hetman, shall swear an oath of submission and fealty to His Majesty and the Commonwealth; and, [moreover], they shall be [placed] under the jurisdiction and command of the Crown Hetmans. All Colonels and all [other] Officers shall be appointed by and shall be under the command of the Zaporozhian Hetman of His Majesty.

6. The Greek [Orthodox] Faith, which is professed by His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army, [as well as all Orthodox] Cathedrals, Churches, Monasteries and the Kievan College, shall be preserved by their [rights and] liberties, in accordance to the laws. If, during the time of recent turmoil, anyone managed to acquire any lands belonging to the Orthodox Church or to any one of the [Orthodox] Clergy, [all] these [acquisitions] shall be [declared to be] invalid.

7. All of the Nobles, both of the Greek [Orthodox] and the Roman [Catholic] Faiths, as well as the Burgesses of Kiev, who served in His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army during the time of the recent turmoil, shall be granted amnesty and their lives, honours, ranks and properties shall be preserved. Should [any document be issued authorizing any person that] something be taken away from any one of them, it shall be revoked by a Constitution [of the Diet]. All of them shall enjoy the favour of His Majesty and the Commonwealth. All Cossacks, who served in His Majesty's Army, shall regain their possessions [and shall be free to return to their] wives and children.
8. The Jews, as they were the residents and lessees of the Land of His Majesty and [of the Estates] of the Nobles [in former times], so they shall be also at present.

9. The [Tatar] Horde, which is [found] at present [still] within the country, shall be sent away immediately [to Crimea by the Hetman of His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army, who shall ensure that] upon retiring [the Tatars] shall neither cause any damage to the Dominions of His Majesty nor make encampments on the territories of the Commonwealth. The Zaporozhian Hetman gives assurances [that he shall endeavour] to influence them to serve [as allies of] His Majesty and the Commonwealth; [however], should this be not accomplished [by him] by the time [of the convoking] of the next Diet, both he and His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army shall entertain neither relations nor friendships with them any more, but [considering them] enemies of His Majesty and the Commonwealth, shall protect the borders against them and wage war against them along with the Armies of His Majesty. Moreover, [the Hetman and his Army] shall never entertain any relations or conspiracies with them or any foreign rulers in the future, but shall remain, completely and permanently, in faithful subordination under His Majesty and the Commonwealth. The present Hetman together with all his Officers and the whole Army, as well as their successors in the future, shall render, faithfully and willingly, service for every need of His Majesty and the Commonwealth.

10. Since [in the past] His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army never extended its Registration to [the territories beyond] the [southern] borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it shall not [attempt to] extend [beyond them]
at present as well; on the contrary, [the Registration] shall be confined, as it is stipulated above, [only] to the Palatinate of Kiev.

11. From the City of Kiev, since it is a metropolis and a [center of] justice, as few Cossacks as possible shall be enrolled into the Register.

In order to gain greater faith and certainty that all of these Articles shall be inviolably fulfilled, oaths have been sworn by Us, the Commissioners, to His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army -- thus, for His Majesty and the entire Commonwealth -- and by the Zaporozhian Hetman to Us, [in the name of the Army] -- in the following manner: that [each party] shall adhere to all these Articles completely. [It has been agreed as well] that following [the signing of the Articles of] the Pacification and Regulation [of His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army], the Crown Army shall march at once to [and occupy] the positions assigned [for it] and await [there for] the completion of the Register; that the Horde shall retire immediately; that His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army shall be demobilized [in order to enable the Cossacks to return to] their homes; and that Envoys representing the Hetman and His Majesty's Zaporozhian Army shall be sent to the Diet [which shall be convoked] in the near future, with [expressions of] humble gratitude for [being granted] mercy and clemency by His Majesty and the Commonwealth.
APPENDIX IV

THE TREATY OF PEREIASLAV (1654) *

"His Tsarist Majesty's subjects, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Cossack Army, and the whole Cossack Army, and the whole Christian Russian world, most respectfully beg the Great Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich the Autocrat of the whole of Great and Little Russia and the Sovereign and Ruler of many states that His Tsarist Majesty may grant them what their envoys will petition, and they will serve His Tsarist Majesty, according to his sovereign orders, forever. His Tsarist Majesty's resolutions concerning each articles are written after each one.

1.

That in towns the officials be chosen among the natives who are worthy of it and they shall rule the subjects of His Tsarist Majesty

*There are two English translations of the "Eleven Articles" of March 27/April 6, 1654: one by B. Budurevych (used here) in Alexander Ohloblyn's, Treaty of Pereyaslav 1654 (Toronto, 1954), pp. 83-89; the other by George Vernadsky, in his Bohdan Hetman of Ukraine (New Haven, 1941), pp. 131-137. With regard to the date, the author has accepted the date above rather than March 21/31, 1654. See the arguments of Andrii Yakovliv, Dohovir Hetmana Bohdana Khmelnytskoho z moskovskym tsarem Oleksiem Mikhailovychem 1654 r. (New York, 1954), pp. 35-37. Texts of the "Eleven Articles" may be found in many documentary collections and monographs. The following are the best-known: VUR, III, 560-565; Akty YuZR, X, 477-484; and Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1st. ser. (1849-1829) (St. Petersburg, 1830), I, 311-314.

NB: The author of this monograph does not agree with the translation of the terms Rosii as "Russia" and rosiiskii as "Russian". Regarding this problem see Omelian Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, Jr., "Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building", Slavic Review, XXII (1963), 224-225.
and collect revenue for the Tsar's treasury honestly. (This is) for the reason that if a governon or His Tsarist Majesty should come and begin to violate their rights, it would be a great annoyance to them; and if the natives themselves should be officeholders, they would rule in accordance with their rights.

And concerning this article His Tsarist Majesty ordered that it should be according to their petition: there shall be officials in towns, mayors, burgomasters, councillors, assessors, and they shall collect for His Tsarist Majesty sundry taxes in money and grain and pass them over to his sovereign treasury through the persons sent by His Tsarist Majesty; and the persons sent by His Tsarist Majesty for receiving the money shall supervise the collectors so that they act honesty.

2.

The Secretary of the Army is to receive through the kindness of His Tsarist Majesty 1,000 Polish Zloty (gold coins) for his clerks, and 300 Polish Zloty for the justices of the Army, and 100 Polish Zloty for the secretary of the court, 50 Zloty for the secretary and for the standard bearer of (each) regiment, 30 Zloty for the standard bearer of each hundred, 50 Zloty for the master of the Hetman's insignia.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously ordered according to their petition; and the money should be appropriated from the local revenue.

3.

That a mill be assigned for the sustenance of the Secretary, the two justices of the Army, for each colonel, for the essauls of the Army and those of each regiment, because they have great expenditure.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously ordered according to their petition.
[4.]

That concerning the artillery of the Army His Tsarist Majesty would graciously provide for the winter quarters and food of the cannoneers and all the artillery workers; also 400 Zloty for the quartermaster of the artillery and 50 Zloty for the standard bearer of the artillery.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously ordered that this amount should be appropriated from local revenue.

5.

That the Hetman and the Cossack Army should be free to receive envoys who for many years have come to them from foreign countries in case they have good intentions; and that only in case there should be something adverse to His Tsarist Majesty should they notify His Tsarist Majesty.

Concerning this article His Tsarist Majesty has ordered that the envoys who come on right business should be received and dismissed and it should be written truly and immediately to His Tsarist Majesty on what business they came and with what they were dismissed; if the envoys should be sent by some (foreign ruler) on business detrimental to His Tsarist Majesty, those ambassadors and envoys should be detained by the Army and it should be written about them immediately to His Tsarist Majesty for his decree; and they should not be dismissed without His Tsarist Majesty's decree; and there should be no (diplomatic) relations with the Turkish Sultan and the Polish King without a decree of His Tsarist Majesty.

6.

Concerning the Metropolitan of Kiev the envoys were given an oral instruction; and the envoys begged in their speeches that His Tsarist
Majesty graciously grant a patent for his possessions.

His Tsarist Majesty graciously granted his patent to the Metropolitan and all clergy for the estates which they now possess.

7.

That His Tsarist Majesty deign to sed his army to Smolensk at once without any delay in order that the enemy should not prepare themselves and be joined by others because now the troops are ill-prepared. They should not believe any (enemy) blandishment of (the Poles) make recourse to such.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously decided to set forth personally against his enemy, the Polish King, and to send his boyars and voyevodas with many troops as soon as the roads will be dry and there will be forage for horses.

8.

That soldiers be hired, about 3,000 or even more, at His Tsarist Majesty's will, to protect the Polish frontier.

His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers are always on the frontier for the protection of the Ukraine and will be stationed (there) permanently.

9.

The custom used to exist for the Cossack Army always to receive a salary; and now they humbly beg His Tsarist Majesty that he should appropriate to the colonels 100 thalers each, to the regimental essauls, 200 Zloty, to the army essauls, 400 Zloty, to the captains, 100 Zloty, to the Cossacks 30 Zloty.

The following note follows after this article:

In previous years Hetman Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army had sent (envoys) to His Tsarist Majesty and begged many times that His
Tsarist Majesty show them favor for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God and intercede for them and accepted them under his exalted arm and help them against their enemies. And in that time our great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, was unable to accept you under his protection since there was a permanent peace between His Tsarist Majesty and the Polish Kings and the Grand Dukes of Lithuania. And whereas on the part of the Kings many insults and offences were committed with regard to the father of His Tsarist Majesty, the Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Duke Mikhail Fedorovich, autocrat of all Russia and ruler and possessor of many states, of blessed memory, and with regard to our Sovereign's grandfather, the Great Sovereign and holy Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Filaret Mikitich, of blessed memory, and with regard to our Great Sovereign, the Tsar and Duke Alexei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Russia, His Tsarist Majesty expected an apology for all (these insults) in accordance with the King's letters and the Diet's resolutions and constitution and the treaties; and (the Tsar) desired to reconcile Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army with the Polish King through his ambassadors in the following way: in case King Jan Kazimierz should make peace with them, according to the Zboriv treaty, and would not persecute the Orthodox Christian faith and would remove all the Uniates, in that case His Tsarist Majesty was ready to grant amnesty to those who, by insulting his sovereign honor, deserved capital punishment. And in this matter (the Tsar) sent to King Jan Kazimierz his great and plenipotentiary ambassadors, the boyar and Governor of Great Perm, Prince Boris Alexandrovich Repnin-Obolensky with associates. And those great plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty spoke to the King and his Lords in Council about that
peace and actions offering various ways (of settlement). And King Jan Kazimierz and his Lords in Council did not accept any proposal and thus brought this great thing to naught, and dismissed those great and pleni-
potentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty without any result. And our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, in view of such numerous in-
stances of incorrectness and rudeness and falsehood on the part of the King, and because of his desire to protect the Orthodox faith and all the Orthodox Christians from the persecutors aiming at the destruction of God's churches and the annihilation of the Christian faith, the Latins (Roman Catholics), has accepted you under his exalted arm.

And now Our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, having collected numerous Russian, Tartar and German troops for your protection, is setting forth in person against the enemies of Christianity, and is sending his boyars and voyevodas with many troops as well and for the organization of these armies, according to his sovereign decree, large sums have been distributed; therefore they, the enovys, seeing the graciousness of His Tsarist Majesty for the sake of their protection, should not now mention the matter of payments of the Cossack Army. And when the Sovereign’s privy boyar and Governor of Tver, Vasili Vasilyevich Buturlin, visited Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with his colleagues, the Hetman talked with him concerning the quota of the Cossack Army (and suggested) that it be set at 60,000; (he also said) that even if this number should be in-
creased, the Sovereign would not incur losses since they would not ask for pay from the Sovereign; and they, Samoylo and Pavel, and other per-
sons who at that time were with the Hetman, know about this; of what con-
cerns the revenue from the cities and towns of Little Russia, His Tsarist Majesty does not know anything, and our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Ma-
jesty, is sending his nobles to tabulate the revenue; after they have tabulated and computed various revenues, a decree will be promulgated as considered by His Tsarist Majesty concerning the salary to the Cossack Army. And now His Tsarist Majesty, showing his favor to the Hetman and the whole Cossack Army, intends to send a salary to the Hetman and the whole Cossack Army in gold coins, according to the old custom of his ancestors, the Great Sovereigns, Tsars, and Grand Dukes of Russia.

10. In case the Crimean Horde should invade (the Ukraine), it would be necessary to attack them from Astrakhan and Kazan; likewise the Don Cossacks should be ready; however, the peace with them should not yet be discontinued and they should not be provoked.

The decrees and order of His Tsarist Majesty have been sent to the Don Cossacks; if there should be no provocation on the part of the Crimean people, it is not allowed to attack them and provoke them; in case, however, the Crimean people should be stirred up, His Tsarist Majesty would then issue orders for a campaign against them.

11. That His Tsarist Majesty would now graciously supply food and powder for the guns at Kodak, a town on the Crimean frontier, where the Hetman permanently keeps a garrison of 400 men, providing them with everything; that, likewise, His Tsarist Majesty would graciously provide for those who guard the Cossacks' Headquarters (Kish) beyond the cataracts, since it cannot be left without a garrison.

With regard to this article His Tsarist Majesty's decree will be issued in the future after it is established what quantities of what supplies used to be sent to these localities, and how much revenue will be collected for His Tsarist Majesty.
And concerning (the matter) which has been mentioned in your petition: as soon as our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, will grant to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army his Sovereign charters of your liberties, you must muster your men (and determine) who will be (registered) as a Cossack and who will be (counted) as a peasant. And with regard to the 60,000 quota for the Cossack Army, the Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, has accepted and decreed it. As soon as you envoys come back to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, you are to inform him that he is to muster the Cossacks immediately and make the lists of their registration and send the lists certified by his signature to His Tsarist Majesty."
APPENDIX V

THE TREATY OF VILNIUS (1656)

The following are the sources for the Treaty of Vilnius: 1) Imprints — SGGD, III, doc. no. 1; Literae una cum protocollo Commissariorum Plenipotentiunm Regis Poloniae super tractatu, qui Mediato-ribus Sac. Caes. Majest. Ferdinandi III. Legatis Alegretti ab Alegrettis et Johannis Theodori de Lorbach, cum Moschorum Czari Commissariis Pleni-potentibus, habitus et conclusus est. Vilnae in Magno Ducatu Lithuaniae d. 3 Novembris 1656 interceptae a milite Suecico et e Polonico in Latinum Idiome translatae [n.p., 1657?]; A. Theiner ed., Monuments Historiques Relaties aux Règnes d'Alexis Michaelowitch, Fèdor III et Pierre le Grand, Czars de Russie (Rome, 1859), pp. 17-18; Rudawski, op. cit., II, 164-165; and Kubala, Wojna brandenburska, pp. 398-406, docs. nos. iv-vi; 2) Manuscripts — AGAD, APP, Ms. 45/I, fos. 118r-122r; Ibid., AR, II, Ms. 21, fos. 281-282, 284, 289; BN III. 6642, fos 18r-19v; Czart., TN, Ms. 149, pp. 735-750; Ibid., Mss. 2105, pp. 63-66; 2111, fos. 15r-17v; 2113, pp. 147-164; 2446, pp. 10-17; Ossol., 189/II, pp. 841-843 and many other copies.

This treaty between the Commonwealth and Russia was concluded in Nemezis, near Vilnius, on November 3, 1656. It consisted of two parts: in the first of these, the plenipotentiaries of both parties drew up detailed articles which covered the areas of agreement; in the second, they produced four documents containing a summary of the above. One of these documents, signed by the commissioners of the Commonwealth, was passed on
to the Russians; while the second one, countersigned by Russian diplomats, was handed to the commissioners. The two remaining documents were signed by the Habsburg mediators; however, both of them did not contain clauses regarding the election of Alexei Mikhailovich to the Polish throne during the lifetime of Jan Kazimierz. One such document was given to the representatives of the Commonwealth; the other, to the representatives of Russia.

The following is a summary of the terms of the Treaty of Vilnius:

1. Through the mediation of the representatives of Emperor Ferdinand III (Alegretti and Lorbach) "eternal peace" was concluded by the plenipotentiaries of King Jan Kazimierz and the Commonwealth (Krasinski, K. Zawisza, J. Zawisza, Brzostowski and Sarbiewski) and Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (Odoevskii, Lobanov-Rostovskii, Choglokov, Semenov and Yurev).

2. Jan Kazimierz agreed to convolve the Diet which would elect Alexei Mikhailovich as his successor on the Polish throne.

3. This was to be an extraordinary election, since the tsar would be elected during the life of a reigning monarch. This vivente rege election, however, would in no way set a precedent for the future by changing the elective character of the crown.

4. The tsar, as king-elect, was to be entitled as "The Most Illustrious Elected King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania".

5. He agreed not to interfere in any way in the affairs of the Commonwealth during the lifetime of Jan Kazimierz.

6. After the death of the king the tsar was to be crowned; however, he would ascend the throne only if he swore to abide by the stipulations of the pacta conventa.
7. He was to rule the Commonwealth by himself, not by his lieutenant or a viceroy.

8. While the Catholic Church was to continue to retain its privileged position within the Commonwealth, full rights were to be accorded to the Orthodox Church.

9. The tsar agreed to provide military aid to the Commonwealth for the recovery of territories, notably Livonia, lost by her as the result of war.

10. He was obligated to maintain good relations with the allies of the Commonwealth; similarly, the king was to keep friendly relations with the allies of Russia.

11. The tsar promised to supply military aid to the Commonwealth against Brandenburg and Sweden.

12. Neither the tsar nor the king were to negotiate separately or conclude a separate peace with Sweden without full knowledge and consent of each other.

13. The tsar agreed to return all plundered relics, charters, documents, records, guns and the like and to release all captives. In reciprocity, the king was to free all Russian captives and to take no action against the nobles who swore oaths of allegiance to the tsar.

14. All issues which were not resolved by the plenipotentiaries of both parties, such as those relating to Cossacks, Ukraine and Uniate Church, were to be settled by the Diet and tsarist representatives.
APPENDIX VI

THE HADIACH TREATY OF UNION (1658) *

In the Name of the Lord, Amen.

For the perpetual remembrance to the living and their successors.

A commission between the Estates of the Crown of Poland and the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania, for the first part, and the Honourable Hetman
and the Zaporozhian Army, for the second; concluded by the Honourable
Castellans, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski of Volynia and Kazimierz Ludwik
Jewraszewski of Smolensk, the Commissioners of the Diet, appointed by the
Illustrious JAN KAZIMIERZ, by the Grace of God the King of Poland and Sweden,

* The translation of the text above is taken from the official govern­
mental publication which contains all of the "Constitutions" passed by the
Diet of 1659 for the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania:
Constitucie Seymu Walnego Sześcienniedzielnego Extraordinarynego, przez
Constitucyq, przeszlego Seymu naznaczonego die XVII. Martij. W Warszawie
Anno praesenti 1659 odprawujacego się (Kraków, [1659]), pp. 49-54. These
"Constitutions" or acts of the Diet were published in two places: in
Warsaw, before July 16, 1659; and in Krakow, after July 23, 1659. See
Eugenia Triller,
Bibliografia konstytucji sejmowych XVII wieku w Polsce w
świetle badań archiwalnych (Wrocław, 1963), pp. 81-82. They were reprinted
first in 1683 (Ibid., p. 82); then in collections called Volumina Legum
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries -- IV (1737), 637-644; IV
(1859), 297-300.

Contemporary press published the text of the treaty in pamphlet form:
Commissarien von einer; und dem auch Wohlgeboren Feldt Herrn und Zaporowischen
Armes wie auch gantzen Grossfürstenthumbs Reusslandt, anderer Seiten, ver-
wicheren 1658-sten Jahres den Vollständinge und Eigentliche Friedens-Puncta,
Welche zwischen demen Wohlgeboren Ihro Königl. Mayest. und der gantze
Crohn, Polen, auch Gross-Fürstenthumbs Litthaven Herrn, Herrn abgefertigen
16 Septembr, unter Hadiasz berhamet und folgendts auff diesem gehaltenem
Reichstage zu Warschau den 22 May glücklich von beyden Seyten vollzogen
und mit einem Cöperlichen Eyde Solenniter beschworen und bekräftigt worden
([n.p.], 1659). Additional examples are listed in the bibliography.
the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Ruthenia, Prussia, Masovia, Samogitia, Livonia and Smolensk and the Hereditary KING of the Goths and the Vandals, and all the Estates of the Crown [of Poland] and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; with the Honourable Ivan Vyhovskyi and the whole Zaporozhian Army; in the Camp by Hadiach, on the 16th day Septembris, in the Year of Our Lord 1658. At the said place the Honourable Zaporozhian Hetman and his Army, having received Us, the Commissioners, as was due, in seemly fashion and gracefully, and having recognized the Commissioners' full powers, granted Us through the authority of the Diet, by His Majesty, Our Gracious Lord and the Estates of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, declared with the whole Army [as follows]:

That the Zaporozhian Army, being burdened by various oppressions, took up its defense not out of its own free will, but out of necessity; however, since His Majesty, Our Gracious Lord, has forgiven with His Fatherly

The text of the treaty also appeared in various monographs and documentary collections in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; for example, VMPL, III, 542-548; MUH, III, 30-38; and LNA, IX, 176-178. Ukrainian translation is found in Hrushevskyi, op. cit., X, 334-343.

Czart., Ms. 402, pp. 281-290, contains the original Polish text of the treaty dated September 6/16, 1658, as well as the text which was amended on April 30, 1659 and ratified by the Diet on May 22, 1659. This amended text, still dated September 6/16, 1658, was published as one of the "Constitutions" of the Diet of 1659 cited above.

Diplomatic records of the Crown Chancery contain an official copy of the amended text. See AGAD, MK, LL, Ms. 33, fos. 15-20. Other copies of it are found in many seventeenth and eighteenth century Mss. (inscription books).

N.B. The English translation above is of the amended text. Whenever two columns appear, the left-hand column contains the text of the original treaty; while the right-hand column, of the amended text. Latin words and phrases which are incorporated into the English translation are the same as those which appear in the original text of the treaty.
Heart all that which took place during the turmoil and calls for unity, they, not scorning the Lordly generosity of His Majesty and accepting humbly the Clemency of the kind-hearted Lord, take part in this Commission and afterwards in common counsel to achieve a sincere agreement, and out of mutual affection, calling on the Dread Hosts of God to witness, [they also declared] that all matters agreed upon shall be adhered to sincerely and truthfully for ever. In this manner we established [the following] eternal and indissoluble agreement.

That the Old Greek [Orthodox] Religion, the same as the one with which the Old Ruthenians joined the Crown of Poland, be retained by its own prerogatives and free exercise of church services, as far as the language of the Ruthenian nation extends: in all of the cities, towns and villages, both of the Crown of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; also within the Diets, Armies and Tribunals; and not only [privately] in the Orthodox Churches, but also publicly in processions, in the visiting of the sick cum Sacra Synaxi, in the burying of the dead and, in short, in every way the church services are conducted, libere et publice, by the Ritus Romanus.

To this Greek Religion is granted the authority of freely erecting new Churches, Chapels and Monasteries, as well as maintaining and repairing the old ones. Regarding [the question of] the Churches formerly founded for, and Properties [formerly donated to] the Church of the Old Greek Religion: these shall be retained by the Old Greeks, the Orthodox, and restored [to them] in spatio dimidij anni post praestitum publicum iuramentum fidelitatis of the Colonels and other Officers of the Zaporozhi-an Army, by the Commissioners appointed ab utrinque.
The [Church] Union, which up to the present caused dissent within the Commonwealth, shall be abolished both within the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in the following manner: that [individuals, belonging to the Uniate Church], if they so desire, may either return to the Greek, non-Uniate, Rite, or, if they so desire, to [accept] the Roman Rite.

No one of the Spiritual or Secular, and Senatorial or Noble Estates, professing that faith, which is contrary to the Greek Orthodox Faith and which has been sowing dissent between the Roman and the Old-Greek Nations, shall, in whatever manner, fund or erect Churches and Monasteries, or increase them by [donating] Funds, as in the Ecclesiastical, so too in those of His Majesty and personal hereditary estates, and vigore of this Commission shall not do so hereinafter.

In the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, however, liberum exercitum Romanae fidei conceditur.

The temporal Lords of the Roman Religion, however, both Hereditary and Officials of His Majesty, shall hold no jurisdiction over the secular and religious clergy of the Greek Religion, save their proper Pastor.

Since in the common Fatherland common privileges and honours shall be held by utrique ritui; therefore, the [Orthodox] Father Metropolitan of Kiev, the present one and his successors in the future, [together] with the four Orthodox Bishops [from the Crown], [those] of Lutsk, Lviv, Przemyśl and Chełm,

and the fifth from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, [that] of Mstsislau, [and their successors in the future] shall sit in the Senate, [ranked]
according to their own order [of seniority], [and shall be bestowed] with such privileges and libere vocis usw as are enjoyed in the Senate by the Most Reverend Spiritual Lords ritus Romani. The Most Reverend Father Metropolitan, however, shall be assigned a seat after that of the Most Reverend [Roman Catholic] Archbishop of Lviv; and the [above-mentioned] Orthodox Bishops, after those of the [Roman Catholic] Bishops of the same [palatinal] districts.

In the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv the Senatorial Dignities shall be conferred only upon the nobles Ritus Graeci, Capacibus possessionatis in these Palatinates, salvo iure of the present holders [of these offices]. In the interim, however, out of respect for the office of the Hetman, the prime Senator of these three Palatinates shall be the Hetman of the Ruthenian Armies and the whole jurisdiction of Kiev shall be placed under his disposition, [including the rights] such as the appointment of the Vice-Palatine and other Officials. To all this he shall be entitled et praecanetur pro hac Vice tantum,

In the Palatinate of Kiev, Senatorial Dignities shall be conferred only upon the Nobles ritus Graeci, capacibus these Offices; whereas, in the Palatinates of Bratslav and Chernihiv, these Senatorial honours shall be conferred by alteration: thus, post decessum of a Senator ritus Graeci, is succedere a Senator Ritus Romani. In all these three Palatinates, however, Offices shall be conferred upon the natis et bene possessionatis, salvo iure of the present holders [of these offices].
until he shall come ad Possessionem of the Palatinate of Kiev.

Also, in order that mutual affection may spread [among the burgesses] within [all of] the towns of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, wherever Churches of the Ritus Graeci are to be found, the Roman [Catholic] Burgesses shall enjoy, equally with those of the Greek Religion, common liberties and freedoms, and the Greek Religion shall be [no longer] a hindrance to anyone to [serve on] the Municipal Council.

His Majesty and the Estates of the Crown grant permission for the building of an Academy in Kiev, which is quadere the same prerogatives and liberties as the Academy of Krakow, only under the following conditions: that in this Academy there be no Professors, Masters [or] Students of the Unitarian, Calvinist [or] Lutheran sects. In order that [in the future] there be no occasion for altercation between the students and the schoolboys, His Majesty shall command that all other schools, which were [established] hitherto in Kiev, be transferred elsewhere.

His Majesty, Our Gracious Lord, and the Estates of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania also consent to [the founding of] another Academy, wherever a suitable place for it shall be found; which shall enjoy the same rights and liberties as the Kievan [Academy], and it shall be erected under the same condition as [the one] in Kiev: that in it there be no Professors, Masters or Students of the Unitarian, Calvinist or Lutheran Sects. Wherever this Academy shall be set up, no other schools shall be founded there for all times.

Grammar Schools, Colleges, [other] Schools and Printing Houses, as many as will [be deemed to] be necessary, shall be permitted to be established without difficulty, studies to be conducted libere and all sorts
of Books in Controversijs Religionum to be printed, sine laesione tamen Majestatis Regiae et absque scomatibus on His Majesty.

Since the Honourable Hetman and the Zaporozhian Army, [hitherto] separated from the Commonwealth, through affection to His Majesty, their Gracious Lord, and to their own Fatherland, rejoin [them at present], renouncing all foreign protection; therefore, His Majesty, Our Gracious Lord, and all the Estates of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, obliterare by eternal amnesty, that is, by eternal oblivion, -- mutually offering to His Holy Majesty for [the remission of] our sins -- whatever [misfortunes] God sent on both sides [during the conflict]. Security shall be provided [by the amnesty] to persons of all social positions, from the lowest to the highest [-ranking] and excluding no one: as [those] within the Zaporozhian Army, so too [those of] the Estate of the Nobility, as well as officials and private persons; in short, all those who served or are serving in any capacity under the Honourable Hetmans, both the former one and the one at present. Neither the Royal Majesty, the Senate, the entire Commonwealth nor, finally, any private person shall seek vengeance from or set up any claims against them [together] or each one separately; on the contrary, having forgiven one another completely, and wholeheartedly as Christians, -- calling on the Dread [Hosts of] God to witness -- all injuries and whatever else took place during the wars, [hereinafter] no person shall plot revenge or [be engaged in any] schemes, openly or covertly, against another. [Moreover, persons] shall not allow themselves to be deceived by any kind of absolution, releasing them from [the obligations of] their oaths, granted by anyone contriving [to carry out some] secret mischief.

Furthermore, all escheats, whether [appropriated] from those who are e corpore of the Zaporozhian Army, or from the nobles, who sided with the
Honourable Hetman and the Swedes, [irrespective] from whom they were obtained or [by whom] granted since the beginning of the war [in 1648], with penitus no exception, all of them in general and each one separately, cassantur and lege publica cassabuntur, in such a way that they be detrimental neither to the honour nor to [the right of] property ownership of anyone. Wherever they [decrees authorizing confiscations or forfeitures of property] are to be found, they shall be considered pro cassatis and eliminatis habentur out [all Court] Records; and to the rightful owners of these properties unobstructed apprehensio conceditur, which [the present acquirers] shall not prevent by [the use of] escheats, sub poena Infamiae.

As the substance of the Amnesty itself, as well as the name itself, should be sanctum, and as in pristinum statum res et personae of all social positions restituuntur, and they revert to that unity, harmony, affection, law and the [rule of the] Lord [King], which existed before the war [in 1648], [all this] praecavetur in the following way: that whosoever shall attempt to disrupt this sacred union, or shall dare publice or privatim, at a meeting, perduellionem exprobare against someone, such a person is subiacere poenis, as a violator Pactorum. [Moreover], should, in this matter, any occasion of avoidance of [punishment for] slander arise, a diligent investigation shall be carried out by [the representatives of] both parties. The entire Commonwealth of the Polish, Grand Ducal Lithuanian and Ruthenian nations, and the Provinces belonging to them, restituatur in integrum, as they existed before the war [of 1648]; that is, that these three nations shall retain, as before the war, their own intact Boundaries and liberties, and in accordance to the stipulation of the Law, [particularly their rights to participate] in the Councils, the Courts and the free Elections of their Lords, the Kings of Poland and the Grand Dukes
of Lithuania and Ruthenia. If, [as the result of a] necessitate belli with Foreign States any agreement be reached, detrimental to the boundaries or liberties of these Nations, it shall be regarded pro irrito et inani and the above-named Nations shall stand by their liberties bona fide, as one body of one and indivisible Commonwealth, without discord among themselves over the [differences between the two] faiths. On the contrary, whoever profitebatur et profitetur Religiorem Christianam Romanam et Graecam, shall be permitted to enjoy [religious] peace and liberties, unless some [court] verdicts or decrees were [issued], before the war or during tempore belli, [resulting] out of legal proceeding [which involved] conten­tions in person as well as [those] in Contumatiam.

The Zaporozhian Army shall number Sixty Thousand [men] and shall be, in accordance with its former liberties, commanded by the Ruthenian Hetman. As many mercenary Troops as shall be [stationed] in Ruthenia, shall be placed under the command of this same Hetman. [The funds raised by] the taxes, which the Commonwealth shall vote at the Diet, [levied] in the Pal­atinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, shall be appropriated for the mercenary Troops re­maining under the Command of the Hetman of Ruthenian Armies.

The Zaporozhian Army, [on the one hand], shall number thirty thou­sand [men], or whatever [figure] the Honourable Zaporozhian Hetman shall enter in the Register.

The Mercenary Army, on the other, [shall number] Ten Thousand [men], which, just as the Zaporozhian [Army], shall remain under the command of this same Hetman. [The funds] appropriated for these Troops shall come from the taxes voted at the Diet by the Commonwealth [and levied] in the Pal­atinates of Kiev, Bratslav, Chernihiv and others.
The Quarters for the Zaporozhian Army [hereby] are assigned in these [same] Palatinates and estates in which it was stationed before the War [of 1648]. All of the liberties granted to this Army by the Charters of the Most Illustrious Kings of Poland are confirmed [hereby]: they [the Cossacks] shall retain their former liberties and practices; these, not only shall not be disparaged against in any way, but also, on the contrary, be reconfirmed with grave dignity. Moreover, neither any Tenant of the Estates of His Majesty nor Prefect, neither any Hereditary nor Annuitant Lord, and neither their Sub-Prefects, Officials nor any other servants, shall collect, under any pretext whatsoever, any taxes from Cossack farms, Villages, Towns or homes. As [befits the] Knightly People, they shall be exempt from [the bearing of] the heaviest and the lightest burdens [of taxation], including [payments of] Duties and Tolls throughout the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Also, they shall be free [of the jurisdiction] of various Courts of the Prefects, Tenants, Lords and [those of] their deputies, and subject only to the Jurisdiction of their own Hetman of the Ruthenian Armies. Moreover, the Cossacks shall be permitted to retain [such rights as the making of] all kinds of beverages, hunting on the land, fishing in the rivers and [to enjoy] other benefits, according to [their] old customs.

Moreover, for [the purpose of] greatly encouraging individually [certain numbers of the Zaporozhian Army] to serve His Majesty [faithfully], whomever the Honourable Hetman of the Ruthenian Armies shall recommend to His Majesty as being worthy of [having conferred upon them] the Coats of Arms of Nobility, all of them, without [any] difficulty, shall be Ennobled and accorded all the liberties [which are enjoyed] the Nobility [of the Commonwealth], calculating, however, [the number of the recipients] in this way: that only one hundred [persons] shall be Ennobled from each Regi-
ment.

No one shall conduct any Polish, Lithuanian or Foreign Armies [without the consent of the Hetman] into the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv. The mercenary troops, however, being under the command of the Hetman of the Ruthenian Armies, shall be supplied with provisions from the Royal and Church Lands in the said Palatinates, on the [strength of a special] ordinance [issued for this purpose] by this same Ruthenian Hetman. In the event of any war along the Ruthenian Boundaries, should a need arise for the use of Reinforcements from the Crown, such Reinforcements shall be [placed] under the Command of the Hetman of the Ruthenian Armies for the duration of the war.

In order to gain greater strength and certainty for these Pacts, [it shall be deemed that] the Hetman of the Ruthenian Armies [retain the office of] the Hetman ad extremas vitae suae temporae, and [become, as well,] the prime Senator of the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv proc hac vice. Post his fata, however, there shall be [held] a free election for a [new] Hetman; that is, the status of the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv shall choose four candidates [for this office], out of whom, upon one [it] shall be conferred by His Majesty, not excluding from this Office the Honourable Ruthenian Hetman's Own Brothers.

A mint shall be established in Kiev, or wherever a commodius [location for it] shall be determined, for the striking of all coins of uniform title bearing the Royal Effigy.

Common Counsel and common forces of these three Nations shall be [employed] against all [their] Enemies.
These three united Nations shall endeavour, by all possible means, that there be [in the future] free navigation on the Black Sea for the Commonwealth.

Should His Majesty and the Estates of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania begin a bellum offensivum against His Tsarist Majesty of Muscovy, the Zaporozhian Armies shall not be compelled to take part in such a War.

Should, however, His Tsarist Majesty refuse to return to the Commonwealth the Provinces [He occupied] and, [moreover], invade the Commonwealth, then all the Forces of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as the Ruthenian Zaporozhian Armies under the Command of their Hetman, shall unite and wage war [against the Tsar].

Real Estates, Personal Properties, Crown Lands and Sums of Money confiscated from the Nobles of the Ruthenian Territories, even [from those] who served either

Should His Tsarist Majesty refuse to return to the Commonwealth the Provinces [He occupied] and, [moreover], invade the Commonwealth, then all the Forces of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as the Ruthenian Zaporozhian Armies under the Command of their Hetman, shall unite and wage war [against the Tsar].

Real Estates, Personal Properties, Crown Lands and Sums of Money confiscated from the Nobles of the Ruthenian Territories, even [from those] who served in the Zaporozhian
in the Swedish or the Army,
Zaporozhian Armies,
and who at present are rejoining the Fatherland, shall be returned [to them]; and they shall be, [moreover], compensated and paid for their [former] services in the Crown Army or [in that of] the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, on an equal basis with [those who were compensated and paid for their] services in the Armies of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Heretofore the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Army, the one at present and his successors [in this office], having abandoned all foreign protectors, [pledge that they] shall no longer adhere to them; on the contrary, he and they, is and shall be forever faithful, submissive and obedient to the Most Illustrious Majesty of the Kingdom of Poland, His successors and also to the entire Commonwealth; [at the same time], however, without derogating in any way the Brotherhood formed with His Highness, the Khan of Crimea, and if it is possible, Salva integritate Reipublicae, [also not to come to rupture] with the Tsar of Muscovy.

[The Hetman] shall not receive any legations from foreign states, and if any should arrive, he shall send them on to His Majesty. Also, except with the consent of His Majesty, he shall not conduct foreign Troops [into the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia]. Nor shall enter into any agreement, to the detriment of the Commonwealth, with foreign states.

To all privatis from both sides shall be afforded the possibility of
safe return to and repossession of [their former holdings]: including
the [right of the secular] Clergy Ritus Romanus to the Bishoprics, Parishes,
Canons, Rectories and Properties belonging to them located in the Palatinate of Kiev, Bratslav, Chernihiv and Podolia, as well as in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in White Ruthenia and Severia; also [the right of] all religious [clergy of the Roman Rite] to [their] Churches, monasteries,
Properties and foundations; as well as [the right of] all Laymen from both sides, to their Hereditary Estates, Districts, Leaseholds and their own holdings, [be they] gaged life estates or [those] belonging to them by [some] other Contracts, in the above-named Palatinates [of the Crown] and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in White Ruthenia and Severia. The [exact] date for [the beginning of] returns and repossessions shall be determined by His Majesty [in the near future], after a consultation with the Honourable Zaporozhian Hetman; the repossessions, however, shall be carried out in the following way [only]: no one shall recover his holdings unless [first authorized] by the manifestoes [issued for this purpose] by [both] His Majesty and the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Armies. There shall be a mutual conference of [the representatives of] both parties about this [matter]. In order to adjudicate upon both the Criminal and the Civil cases, they [the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia] shall possess in these three Palatinates their own special Tribunal, [set up] according to such an order as they desire to arrange [for it]; in addition, there shall be [established] separate Judicial Districts of Ovruch and Zhytomyr.
Since the Hetman, the Zaporozhian Army and the [hitherto] separated Palatinates [from the Commonwealth] are repudiating all protection of other foreign nations and are returning [to rejoin it] of their own free will, as freemen to freemen, equals to equals and honourable to honourable;
therefore, for better security [of the rights and liberties outlined herein] and for more certainty that this current agreement be adhered to, His Majesty and the Commonwealth shall permit this Ruthenian Nation [to have] separate [ministerial offices of] Chancellors, Marshals and Treasurers, \textit{cum dignitate Senatoria}, and other Offices of the Ruthenian Nation [as well, which exist in the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania]. They [the Chancellors] shall swear an oath according to the form [of oaths] taken by the Crown Officials, with the addition of the following Clause: that they shall not seal anything which is against this current agreement; on the contrary, they shall be on guard against this, so that consequently no harm shall come to this agreement by [some improper] Constitutions, Decrees of the Diet, rescripts of the [royal] court, manifestoes or Charters. To the Office and the Chancery of these Chancellors shall belong [the jurisdiction over] all ecclesiastical grants of metropolises, episcopates, abbacies and \textit{Beneficia} [to the Orthodox], the distribution of which belongs [solely] to His Majesty, Our Gracious Lord, only within the Palatinates of Ruthenia, Kiev, Volynia, Podolia, Bratslav and Chernihiv; also [over] all grants, not only ecclesiastical but also secular, within the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv only; as well as [over] the Courts in Royal Towns and all Decrees, both of the [royal] Court and the Diet, within the above-named three Palatinates only. No matter what [charter] shall be issued by the Chanceries of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, [if it is] \textit{in contrarium} of this agreement, it shall be [deemed] \textit{pro irrito}, and the \textit{imperator} of such a Charter shall not only forfeit the Charter, but also be subject to a \textit{penae} of Ten Thousand Lithuanian kopy, and [trials] about such [offences shall be held in] a \textit{forum} in the presence of His Majesty, \textit{ex speciali Regestro}. 
In order that occasiore litum regarding the Serfs accused of lawlessness not lead to further disorders, cassantur all legal proceedings regarding the handing over of the serfs [to their masters] ratione raids, pillages and destructions caused [by them] during the domestic strife, [initiated at] Land, Town or Tribunal [Courts], even if Tribunal Decrees were made ex personali in these cases, particularly in the Palatinates of Kiev, Volynia, Bratslav and Chernihiv.

Should Treaties be concluded [in the near future] between His Tsarist Majesty of Muscovy and His Majesty and the Estates of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, praecaveri indemnitas to the reputation and the current agreement of the Honourable Hetman and the Zaporozhian Army.

Both the Honourable Gentlemen, the Commissioners, and the Honourable Hetman of the Duchy of Ruthenia confirmed this Commission de facto by their oaths, as it is evident by the signatures of their own hands on the forms of oaths. This Commission shall be confirmed, moreover, by personal oaths: from the Senate, by the Most Reverend Archbishop of Gniezno, the Primate of the Crown, and the Most Reverend Archbishop of Vilnius, as well as by the four Honourable Gentlemen, the Hetmans of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Chancellors of both nations; as well as by the Marshal of the Chamber of Deputies; at the Diet, which shall be assembled as soon as possible, in prae­sentia of the Envoys sent [there] by the Honourable Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army.

[The following was agreed to] with regard to the oath of His Majesty, Our Gracious Lord: His Majesty, due to His [desire to reveal the] Lordly Clemency for the humble entreaties of the Zaporozhian Army, deigns to take it, and the Honourable Gentlemen Commissioners vouch for it.

The oaths of the Colonels, Captains and all Officers of the Zaporozhi-
an Army shall be taken, however, after the [conclusion of the ] Diet, at
which this resolution shall be adopted, in the presence of the Commissi-
ers appointed for this [function].

In order that this Commission may gain the eternal weight and force
[of law], it shall be incorporated [word by word] as its texts read, from
the beginning to the end, into the Common Law, that is, into the Constitu-
tions, shall be ratified by the Diet and shall be construed and kept
as eternal and irrevocable law.

The District of Chyhyryn shall belong to the Ruthenian [Hetman's]
Grand Mace, as continetur in the Charter of the late Noble Bohdan Khmel-
ytskyi, [which was] conferred upon [him] by His Majesty. The Hetman of
the Ruthenian Armies shall be released from [the senatorial duty] of
Residence by [the side of] His Majesty.

A Convocation of the A Convocation of the Palatinates
Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv shall be convened
by a manifesto of His Majesty,
Our Gracious Lord, following the [conclusion of] the next Diet,
which God willing, shall be
[called into session] as soon
as possible.

This [Commission] took place, ut supra, by Hadiach, on the above-
mentioned day, [month] and year.

Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, Castellan of Volynia,
Prefect of Bohuslav, Commissioner

Ivan Vyhovskyi, Hetman of the
Zaporozhian Armies, by his own hand,
in the name of the entire Army.
of His Majesty and the
Commonwealth.

Ludwik Kazimierz Jewłaszewski, Castellan of Smolensk,
Commissioner of His Majesty and the Commonwealth.
### APPENDIX VII

**Diet Accounts Relating to Expenditures of the Crown Treasury on Diplomatic Service (1649-1661)** *

#### Table 1

N.B. 1 zl. = 30 gr.; 1 gr. = 18 d.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diets 1650-1661</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Expenditures for all missions</td>
<td>Expenditures for Missions to Ukraine</td>
<td>B as % of A</td>
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<td>d.</td>
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<td>1658</td>
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<tr>
<td>1659</td>
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<tr>
<td>1661</td>
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<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,142,147</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
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*Sources: AGAD, ASK, II, RS, Ms. 47, fos. 87–90r; 48, fos. 50r–52r; 49, fos. 72–77; 50, fos. 7r–8; 51, fos. 62r–62v; 58; 52, fos. 20–21r, 24; 54, fos. 54–56v, 58v; 55, fos. 62r–68v, 70; Ibid., ASK, 2, RP, Ms. 22, fo. 32; and Ossol., Ms. 9532/II, pp. 119–132, 145.
<table>
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<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance costs of all foreign missions</td>
<td>Maintenance Costs of missions from Ukraine</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>zl. gr. d.</td>
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<td>Diets 1650-1661</td>
<td>G Additional Expenditures</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
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<th>Diets 1650-1661</th>
<th>H Total Expenditures (A + D + G)</th>
<th>I Total Expenditures (B + E)</th>
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Mann Wyhosky wieder den Rebellenischen Cosaken Puskorenko Neulicher Zeit
in der Ukraina glücklich erhalten Dem den auch bey gefügt was für wenig
Tage zwischen den Churfiirstl. Schwed. v. Polen in Preussen Notables
furgeon. Schwed. v. Polen in Preussen Notables
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Ihr. K. M. v. der Kron Pohlen den 17. dieses den Eydt Ihrer Trew u.
Gehorsamhs abgeleget, und was ferner auff diesem Reichs-Tage fürge-
fallen Wobey auch Die Rencontre so Neulicher Zeit bey Elbing, zwischen
den Schwed: und Chur-Brandenburgischen Volckern Passiret Imgleichen
was massen Der Hr. General Komorowsky in Churland einige Partheyen
seiner Völcker auff den Feind zu recognoscieren aus Commandiret, die
dann auff eine Schwedische Parthey getroffen und selbige glücklich
Chargiret haben. n. p., 1659.


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ABSTRACT
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THE POLISH COMMONWEALTH AND UKRAINE: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1648–1659

The topic of diplomatic relations between the Polish Commonwealth and Ukraine in the middle of the seventeenth century has been neglected both by Polish and Ukrainian historiography. This thesis reconstructs diplomatic relations between these two states during an extremely significant period in the history of Eastern Europe: from May 1648 to May 1659. It also describes the process by which the Cossack Ukraine, under the leadership of Hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (1648–1657) and Ivan Vyhovskyi (1657–1659), was transformed from an internal factor in the Commonwealth's foreign policy to her external partner in diplomatic relations.

The Introductory Chapter stresses that Cossacks' diplomacy, even prior to 1648, was not an anomaly in the Commonwealth's system of diplomacy. It also describes, in the decades prior to 1648, the causes leading to the conflict: the social, legal, economic and religious conditions of the Cossacks and the Ruthenians — as Ukrainians were then called — within the Commonwealth.

Chapter I covers primarily the period from the first Cossack military successes (16. and 26.V.1648) to the conclusion of the Treaty of Zboriv (18.VIII.1649). The annihilation of the Crown Army, capture of its commanders, rising of the serfs, death of King Władysław IV (20.V.1648) and internationalization of the conflict, left the Commonwealth in a very precarious position. During the interregnum Khmelnytskyi established diplo-
matic relations with neighbouring states. He also made contacts with the party of conciliation, headed by the Crown Grand Chancellor, Jerzy Ossolinski, and the Palatine of Bratslav, Adam Kysil, and eventually agreed to accept an armistice and to negotiate a settlement. The armistice, however, was soon violated both by the popular masses and the intransigent nobles, who were led by Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki. Due to various clashes, a negotiated settlement was impossible; thus, hostilities resumed once again. On 23.IX.1648 Khmelnytskyi and his Tatar allies routed another army of the Commonwealth. In November he reached Zamosc. Meanwhile, the election was won by the candidate of the "peace party", Jan Kazimierz. The king-elect promised to meet the demands of Khmelnytskyi. This served as a pretext for him to retire to Ukraine. In Kiev he was given a triumphant welcome. In February 1649 the newly-appointed Palatine of Kiev, Adam Kysil, arrived in Pereiaslav and attempted to negotiate a settlement with Khmelnytskyi. For certain concessions to the Cossacks and to the Orthodox Church, Khmelnytskyi was required to put down the serfs, break his alliance with the Tatars and to prepare for a campaign against the Turks. These terms were unacceptable to the "Zaporozhian Machiavelli", for he had other plans: to find a place for Ukraine in Eastern Europe by destroying the balance of power which was based on an arrangement made by the Commonwealth, Russia and Turkey. Kysil managed to secure only another armistice. Eventually the issue had to be settled by the force of arms. At Zboriv the king's army, after a two days' battle, was threatened with annihilation. Ossolinski, however, managed to win over the Crimean khan and induced him to agree to peace terms. He, in turn, forced Khmelnytskyi to accept a compromise. The Treaty of Zboriv (18.VIII.1649) proved to be an unsatisfactory arrangement both for the Com-
The uneasy period of co-existence from the close of 1649 to the opening of 1654, characterized by peace and war, is described in Chapter II. The Treaty of Zboriv remained a facade for an armistice. Khmelnytskyi, as well as his opponents, preparing for the inevitable war, began to lay foundations for the Ukrainian state — he created a martial Cossack "republic" — and from its capital, Chyhyryn, carried on wide diplomatic activity. The policymakers in Warsaw attempted to restore the status quo in Ukraine and to involve the Cossacks in hostilities against Russia or Turkey. The Cossack hetman, while pledging co-operation to the members of the royal court in the Polish capital and to the Commonwealth's diplomatic agent in Kiev, secretly laboured to frustrate these undertakings. He was successful in checkmating the aims of the policymakers: on the one hand, he enticed the Tatars to participate with the Cossacks in a campaign against Moldavia, not against Russia (autumn 1650); on the other, he became a "vassal" of the Turkish sultan (Charter of Mehmed IV, 22.II.-3.III.1651). In the spring of 1651 armed clashes between the Crown Army and Cossack troops led to open hostilities. In the chief battle, fought near Berestechko (28.-30.VI.1651), the Cossacks and their Tatar allies were defeated. On 28.IX.1651, near Bila Tserkva, Khmelnytskyi was compelled to accept very harsh terms. Finding himself in a very difficult position, Khmelnytskyi tried to keep up the appearances of peace, agreeing even to launch a campaign against the Turks. After regaining power he began, once more, to pursue broad anti-Commonwealth political plans. He aimed to use the Danubian principalities to establish a dynasty; moreover, to form a coalition of Orthodox
and Protestant elements within the Commonwealth as well as certain Protestant countries, to dethrone Jan Kazimierz and to transform the dual Commonwealth, under a new king, into a triune confederative state comprising Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. On 2.VI.1652 the Cossack forces annihilated the Crown Army near Batih. Khmelnytskyi took steps to secure Moldavia; however, the rulers of Moldavia (Lupu was deposed), Transylvania and Wallachia, feeling threatened, formed an alliance with the Commonwealth and waged war against the Khmelnytskyi-Lupu coalition. On 18.IX.1653 Tymofii, Khmelnytskyi's eldest son, died during the siege of Suceava. His death ended the ambitious plans of the Cossack hetman.

In the meantime the army of the Commonwealth, surrounded by Cossack-Tatar forces near Zhvanets, was saved once again by direct negotiations with the Tatar khan. On 17.XII.1653, without consulting Khmelnytskyi, the khan renewed the Treaty of Zboriv. This additional Tatar treachery convinced Khmelnytskyi to make a decisive change in his policy. In 1653 he already established close diplomatic contacts with Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. Early in the following year these contacts culminated in the Treaty of Pereiaslav, by which Ukraine became a quasi-protectorate of Russia.

Chapter III discusses diplomatic relations during the years 1654-1656. In 1654 the Commonwealth reacted to Khmelnytskyi's fait accompli by launching a great diplomatic-military campaign in order to recover Ukraine. The diplomats managed to gain the support of Crimea and to turn her against Russia and Ukraine; the soldiers, after some successes in Ukraine, suffered a defeat. In the meantime Russian troops penetrated deeply into Lithuania. In 1655 the Swedes invaded the Commonwealth.
After losing several battles, Jan Kazimierz fled to Silesia. The Swedish invasion, creating new complications in Eastern Europe, eventually led to the renewal of hostilities between Russia and Sweden. The Commonwealth, with the aid of Habsburg diplomacy, attempted to come to terms with Russia, to recover Ukraine and to create a military alliance against the Swedes in Western Europe. The first step was accomplished on 3.XI.1656, when an armistice was arranged between the Commonwealth and Russia as well as a military alliance against Sweden. This rapprochement was greatly resented by Khmelnytskyi, who maintained that the tsar betrayed Ukraine and sacrificed her interests for the sake of the Polish crown. While not severing ties with Russia, Khmelnytskyi began to develop independent policies. Fearing that Ukraine would lose her autonomy, he established close contacts with Sweden and Transylvania. Moreover, he participated, at the close of 1656, together with rulers of Sweden, Transylvania, Brandenburg and the magnate Boguslaw Radziwill in a plan designed to partition the Commonwealth. At the same time he resumed and maintained direct diplomatic relations with her. Jan Kazimierz attempted to gain from him Cossack military aid against the Swedes.

A period of intense diplomatic activity in the years 1656-1658, which resulted in the conclusion of the Hadiach Treaty of Union, is the subject matter of Chapter IV. Khmelnytskyi, having lost faith in Russia and gaining little from his alliances with Sweden and Transylvania, began to gravitate towards the Commonwealth. Shortly before his death (6.VIII.1657) preliminary negotiations were in progress aimed at facilitating the re-entry of Ukraine, under new conditions, into the Commonwealth. His successor, Ivan Vyhovskyi, convincing himself that the alliance which he concluded with Sweden was of little practical value also turned to the
Commonwealth. The time was ripe, for her ruling class was generally in favour of reaching an agreement, even at a price of great concessions, with the Cossacks. While openly not breaking with Russia, Vyhoverkyi despatched Pavlo Teteria-Morzhkovskyi to negotiate a settlement with the representative of the Commonwealth, Stanislaw Kazimierz Bieniewski. Eventually terms of Ukraine's union with the Commonwealth were decided upon in the Cossack military camp near Hadiach. The treaty of union, dated 16.IX.1658, was designed to complement the Union of Lublin (1569). Its most significant provision was the creation out of the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv (Ukraine), the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia. The new Grand Duchy was to become, alongside the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the third autonomous member of the Commonwealth.

Chapter V, comprising three parts, refers to the Union of Hadiach as a "matrimonium ratum sed non consummatum". The first part, tracing various developments at the close of 1658, describes reasons for the negative attitude on the part of some influential policymakers of the Commonwealth to certain articles of the treaty, their efforts to secure changes, amendments finally agreed upon by both parties (30.IV.1659) and their significance, battles fought during sessions of the Diet between the supporters and the opponents of the treaty and finally its ratification (22.V.1659). The second part analyses various negative developments which prevented the Union from becoming operative. Varied judgments, negative and positive, passed on the Union by contemporaries, as well as Polish and Ukrainian historians from eighteenth to twentieth centuries, are outlined in the third part.
Among the many factors relating to diplomatic service of the Commonwealth and Ukraine, diplomatic relations between them and the many characteristics of their diplomacy, the following are singled out and emphasized in the conclusion. The diplomacy of Cossack Ukraine was not an anomaly in the Commonwealth's system of diplomacy. Ukraine's diplomatic service, organized largely after 1648, was able to rival that of the Commonwealth. Diplomatic contacts between the Commonwealth and Ukraine were extensive. Finally, great sums of money were spent by the Crown Treasury to finance diplomatic missions to and from Ukraine.

In Appendicies are found biographical sketches of Stanislaw Kazimierz Bieniewski, Adam Kysil, Yurii Nemyrych, Pavlo Teteria-Morzhkovskyi and Ivan Vykhovskyi; texts of Treaties of Zboriv (1649), Bila Tserkva (1651), Pereiaslav (1654), Vilnius (1656) and Hadiach (original text of 1658 and its amended version of 1659); as well as three tables relating to expenditures on diplomatic service, based on accounts of the Crown Treasury, which were presented to the Diets from 1650 to 1661.