FAITH AS TRANSFORMATION:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DYNAMICS OF
HUMAN GROWTH AND THE CHRISTIAN ACT OF FAITH

by

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Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa, as Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Religious Studies

Ottawa, Ontario
1972

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was written under the direction of Dr. Timothy Hogan, Ph.D., of the Royal Ottawa Hospital and the Department of Religious Studies, University of Ottawa. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Hogan, to his colleagues and students in the Department of Religious Studies for their helpful suggestions, and to the staffs of the libraries of the University of Ottawa and St. Paul's University.
CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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INTRODUCTION

The present psychological study of the Christian act of faith situates itself within one of the central themes of the psychology of religion—the relationship of religious growth to human personality growth. As such, it represents an abstract, theoretical study of what is a very real and concrete problem in the related areas of pastoral psychology and religious education. It is a frequently repeated principle, for example, that the aim of religious education is not merely the imparting of information or doctrine but the religious formation of the student. More specifically, the aim of Christian education is to lead the student to the commitment of faith. Those engaged, however, in the religious education of adolescents realize that, to a great extent, the preoccupation of the adolescent is his own personality. He is interested in his own growth and fulfillment as a person. He wants to be someone worthwhile and to do something worthwhile with his life. He wants to discover his identity and realize his potential, to find out who he is and what he can do. He is moving towards the goals of personality growth—self-awareness, self-acceptance, self-realization and self-determination.

In view of this preoccupation of the adolescent, the religious educator is confronted with the question of the relationship between faith and personality growth. Although
he usually does not articulate the question, the adolescent wants to know whether the commitment of faith, which is the aim of religious education, contributes anything to the growth of personality and to human fulfillment which is the concern of the adolescent. Moreover, the problem is often compounded by the fact that the adolescent, sometimes a victim of false religious orientation, not only fails to see any connection between religion and life, but often sees religion as an obstacle to human fulfillment and commitment to the world of human values.

Admittedly, the demand that religion be relevant to one's human life can often degenerate into a prostitution of religion, i.e., the reduction of religion to the level of a problem-solving agent in one's life--the turning of religion into that *deus ex machina* of which Bonhoeffer spoke,¹ and in which he saw the paradox of making God less relevant by trying to make him more relevant, since such an attempt removes the "problem-solving" God and religion from the centre of life to the borders or extremities of life as man gradually learns to solve his own human problems. Authentic religion does not stand before man offering him its services in the pursuit of purely human values; it is something which confronts him in such a way as to challenge him to a decision about his existence, and a genuine commitment of his

life to the transcendent ground of that existence. On the other hand, the attempt to demonstrate such relevance, to demonstrate that faith existence is authentic human existence, does not necessarily reduce religious faith to something having a merely humanistic value. It merely attempts to restate, in a contemporary existentialist way, the traditional theological theme of the relationship of nature and grace.

The dilemma of the religious educator, faced with the adolescent's demand for relevance, merely serves to highlight a more general problem. It is a manifestation of the basic dichotomy that exists in the minds of many between faith and human values. Is the man of faith open to human values? Does faith impede the pursuit of legitimate human values? Is the commitment of faith conducive to the attainment of authentic human selfhood? It is with this more general problem that the present work deals. It does not do so in an apologetic way, i.e., as defending religious faith against the claims of the militant atheist. It is rather an examination of a problem which is the concern of both the humanist and the Christian. Erich Fromm, for example, sees the revelation of the "nameless God" (Yahweh) to Moses as the beginning of a process in which God finally disappears so that man may cease projecting his human powers onto God and be able to realize and transcend himself in a "non
theistic" way. But Fromm's concern that man liberate himself from an authoritarian God is reflected in the thought of many modern Christian thinkers who speak of transcending the God of traditional theism--of discovering (to use Paul Tillich's phrase) the "God beyond God"--and who therefore consider it appropriate to speak of the "death of God" or "religionless Christianity."

It will be the contention of the present study that authentic faith involves a transcending of a certain way of understanding God and religion and therefore the same kind of self-transcendence which the humanist and psychologist see as necessary to man's human growth. Authentic human existence, therefore, will be seen as something achieved not in spite of or apart from the commitment of faith but precisely because of that commitment. In other words, faith calls the believer to a life and commitment through which he achieves authentic human existence.

In discovering the possible relationship between human growth and Christian faith, there are at least three possible approaches to the problem.

1) The first possibility would be to present personal maturity as a necessary preliminary to faith, i.e., to show that the commitment of faith demands a degree of

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personal maturity. Aquinas maintained that there is not a complete discontinuity between nature and grace; that man can prepare or dispose himself for habitual grace, and therefore the gift of grace can be greater in one than in another. More contemporary authors such as Bernard Haring, Charles Curran, and Ignace Lepp in the field of moral theology, as well as Marc Oraison and Pierre Babin in the field of religious education, have, by their insights into the real meaning of the Christian commitment, elaborated on this Thomistic principle by demonstrating the importance of maturity, freedom, and responsibility in the area of human personality as a natural foundation for Christian moral commitment, i.e., for the life of faith. Conversely, they have shown the detrimental effect of human maladjustment, of immaturity, narcissism, and over-dependence on the possibility of a genuine commitment of faith. As St. Paul

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3 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 112, a. 2 & a. 4.
remarked (Hebrews V: 12-14), one must be mature adult to receive the solid food of the Christian message.

2) Another possible approach to this problem would consist of a comparison of modern psychology's understanding of human nature with Christian theology's understanding of man. The purpose of such a study would be to demonstrate that there is no contradiction between human personality growth and the life of faith. It could be pointed out, for example, that both theology and psychology have as their object the study of man and are therefore overlapping disciplines. The result is that psychology and theology cannot abstract from each other's findings. If theology ignores the insights of modern psychology as a science of man and relies on an exclusively theological source for its understanding of man, then it studies divine revelation without sufficient attention to the human conditions under which revelation is received. On the other hand, if psychology attempts to study man and account for his behaviour without reference to the individual's philosophical and theological frame of orientation, it distorts the data it is studying, and psychology becomes "psychologism."

As the study of man becomes increasingly interdisciplinary, both the theologian and the psychologist are realizing that they can share each other's insights into the
human condition. David Roberts, for example, tries to show a correlation between the therapist's description of inner conflict and the Christian doctrine of sin; between the therapist's description of healing through interpersonal relatedness involving trust and acceptance and the Christian doctrine of grace. In the same vein, Albert Outler has pointed out that modern psychotherapy has been an ally of Christian theology by counteracting the body-soul dualism which resulted from a hellenistic or Gnostic conception of personality which has afflicted much of Christian tradition. On the other hand, he suggests that Christian theology, by its insistence on the individual's unique faith relationship with God, offers psychology a basis for an understanding of human selfhood, because it insists that the human self finds itself by transcending itself. In the divine-human encounter, man transcends himself and resists being reduced to a product of biological or social forces.

3) The positions or approaches outlined above, though valid within their own limitations, do not fully answer the dichotomy implied in the question of the relationship between faith and human personality growth. It is true that the commitment of faith demands a degree of personal maturity, but this contention leaves open the further

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question as to the direction and orientation which this commitment gives to further personality growth. In other words, grace presupposes a certain natural foundation or predisposition, but in what sense does it perfect human nature? How does the believer experience his faith humanly? Does it merely give a "supernatural" value to his human activity or does it perfect it in some human sense? Again, it is true to say that there is no inherent contradiction between psychology and theology, between the pursuit of authentic human existence and the commitment of faith, but such a position, while correctly assuming that psychology and theology are distinct intellectual disciplines, may unwittingly give the impression that, on the existential level, faith and human growth are two separate though related pursuits. It will be the contention of the present study that, rightly understood, the believer's pursuit of union with God through the commitment of faith is, in itself, experienced as human growth and authentic human existence. Such an approach to the question of the relationship of faith to human growth follows naturally from the first two positions outlined above, and is a necessary part of the answer to the dichotomy between faith and human values.

Modern man, as he gradually conquers the threats to his existence from without--disease, hunger, the elements of nature--is becoming increasingly aware of the threats to his authentically human existence from within his own psyche--anxiety, frustration, insecurity and guilt. If faith is to
be relevant to him, it must be for him the means by which he conquers these threats and achieves authentic existence, just as the faith of the ancient Israelites was the means by which they conquered the physical threats to their existence, in the waters of the Red Sea and the privations of the desert. And this is precisely the question asked by the present study: Does the believer experience his faith as the overcoming of the threats to, and the achieving of authentic existence and personal growth? If this question may be answered in the affirmative, it is thereby implied that the believer does not arrive at maturity and then make the commitment of faith; nor does he pursue faith-existence and human growth as separate though compatible goals. It implies, rather, that he arrives at authentic human existence precisely through the commitment of faith. Such a conclusion would be consistent with the view of contemporary psychologists that, existentially, one does not arrive at maturity by consciously pursuing it but by going out of oneself and transcending oneself through self-commitment. Likewise, one does not become a Christian for a purely humanistic reason—to find human fulfillment. Indeed, the act of faith may be made contrary to all considerations of human wisdom; but paradoxically, it is through such a self-transcending commitment that the believer achieves authentic human existence—a paradox which is expressed in the New Testament in such images as losing one's life in order to find it, the seed which dies in order to bear fruit,
forsaking human goals for the sake of the kingdom, and thereby receiving the very things one has forsaken.

Of the three possible approaches outlined above, the third position represents the hypothesis of the present study. It addresses itself to the hypothesis that Christian faith-existence, by its very nature, involves growth towards human maturity and fulfillment. In doing so, it attempts to provide some kind of scientific basis for the claim which is frequently advanced in contemporary Christian thought, viz., that the call to faith experienced by the Christian believer is a call to human growth, and that, therefore, wherever men grow humanly and come together in love, redemption and reconciliation are taking place. Father Gregory Baum, for example, in a recently published interview\(^{11}\) speaks of God as the mystery present in human life "summoning men to self-knowledge and growth" and who calls men (through his Word) and graces them (through his Spirit) "to become more fully human." He applies this to the sphere of morality by proposing that man acts morally when he acts in accordance with that orientation of man's development which is revealed in Christ and which is an orientation towards man's growth and reconciliation, i.e., towards "the widening area of man's responsibility for himself and the greater unity of his personality," as well as "the creation of human

fellowship."

The present study, using the method of the psychology of religion, will attempt to demonstrate to what degree the Christian act of faith, rightly understood, involves the human growth of the believer, as that process of human growth is understood by contemporary psychological theories. The author is aware that to speak of a method in psychology of religion is itself problematic, since there are conflicting opinions as to what constitutes a valid methodology, for the psychological study of religion. Nevertheless he feels that it is legitimate to refer to the method used in this study as a psychological method since it consists of what is essentially a psychological study of the phenomenon of Christian faith, i.e., a study of the human dynamics underlying the act of faith. Although theological sources will be used to describe the dynamics of faith, it is not primarily a theological study since it abstracts from, remains neutral about, and draws no conclusions about the content or object of that act of faith. Theological sources are used, not to substantiate the claims of faith, but to explicitate the human experience involved in making the act and commitment of faith.

The method to be used in this study may also be described as comparative since its purpose is to demonstrate that the human dynamics underlying the act of faith are the same as those underlying human growth. The word "transformation" has been chosen to describe the dynamics at work in
both cases. Thus the hypothesis is: The life of faith is experienced by the believer as authentic human existence because the act of faith involves the same transformation of personality as does human growth. It must be made clear at this point that such a comparative study is possible only because both human growth and faith are human experiences, and it is only at this level that the comparison can be made. Thus the hypothesis is not that faith and human growth are the same reality, but that each involves the same experience of transformation. To speak of faith and human growth as the same reality would be to account for human growth in terms of the divine-human encounter, or, as Baum does, in terms of that God who is the mystery present in human life—a conviction of faith which is inaccessible to psychological investigation and verification. What psychology can study, however, is the dynamic of transformation and self-transcendence which characterizes the human experience of the believer.

The present study, therefore, will attempt to apply the criteria of transformation, transcendence and discontinuity to both psychology's description of human growth and theology's description of the act of faith, and will proceed in the following way.

In Chapter I, an examination and synthesis of a representative group of personality theorists (Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, Gordon Allport and Viktor Frankl) will attempt to show that human growth from
immaturity to maturity involves a radical transformation of motives, and therefore a radical discontinuity between immature and mature motivation, and a transcending of that kind of ego-centred motivation which characterizes immature behaviour. Such a view of human growth is consistent with the view of contemporary developmental psychology which, generally speaking, seems to view man's growth in three basic stages: from the outer-directed behaviour of the child, to the inner-directed, introspective behaviour of early adolescence, and finally to the stage of adult maturity which transcends and integrates the incompleteness and extremes of the two previous stages. An example of this would be in the area of social development where one grows from dependence, to independence, and finally to interdependence. The object of the first chapter of this study will be to demonstrate, through an examination of the personality theories mentioned above, that the achieving of this stage of adult maturity requires, according to each theory, a radical transformation of motives. The psychologists to be studied were chosen because, in the author's opinion, they are a representative group both from the thematic and the chronological point of view. They represent, in the first place, the major schools of thought in personality theory: the psychoanalytic (Freud, Jung, Adler); the "humanistic" (Fromm, Allport); and the existentialist (Frankl). Secondly, they represent the chronological development of personality theory beginning with Freud and
ending with Frankl. In this chronological series, it will be discovered that there is an increasing emphasis on the aspect of transformation and self-transcendence in personality growth.

In Chapter II, the same criteria of transformation, transcendence, and discontinuity will be applied to the dynamics of faith as described by a representative group of Christian theologians (St. Paul, Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich). It will be seen from this analysis that each of the above mentioned theologians describes the dynamics of faith in terms of a radical transformation of motives, i.e., a transformation from self-justifying to self-transcending motives which makes possible a psychological analysis of the liberating (self-transcending) quality of faith. The theologians whose descriptions of faith are examined in the present study were chosen, again, because they are representative, i.e., representative of that theological tradition which emphasizes the aspect of trust in the act of faith, for it is primarily this radical act of trust which accounts for the transforming and self-transcending quality of faith. Again it will be noted that, in the theologians studied, there is a chronological development of the theology of faith, and as with the personality theorists, an increasing emphasis on the aspect of self-transcendence in the act of faith.

In Chapter III of this study, an attempt will be made, based on the conclusion that the same dynamic of
transformation and self-transcendence obtains in both human
growth and in faith, to describe the transforming dynamic
of faith from a psychological perspective. This will be
done in two ways. First, the dynamics of faith explicated
by the theologians discussed in Chapter II will be illus-
trated through a psychological analysis of the faith exper-
ience of Martin Luther and of St. Augustine. Secondly, the
transforming dynamic of faith will be described within the
context of and using the terminology of each of the person-
ality theorists studied in Chapter I. Thus the act of faith
will be seen in terms of a transformation from death
instinct to life instinct (Freud); from the ego to the self
(Jung); from self-enhancement to social interest (Adler);
from decay to growth, regression to progression (Fromm);
from unconscious, infantile motives to functionally autono-
mous motives (Allport); and from self-actualization to
self-transcendence (Frankl).
CHAPTER I

HUMAN GROWTH AS TRANSFORMATION

The purpose of the present chapter is to describe human growth in terms of transformation. To support the hypothesis that growth of personality towards maturity involves a radical transformation of motives, six leading theories of personality will be analyzed: those of Sigmund Freud, C. G. Jung, Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, Gordon Allport and Viktor Frankl.

The Oxford Dictionary defines the verb "to transform" as "to change the form or appearance or character or disposition of." The word "disposition" perhaps expresses most accurately the kind of transformation with which the present study concerns itself, for it deals with that transformation which takes place in the area of motivation. The above mentioned theories of personality represent a broad spectrum of thought concerning human motivation, but it is hoped that a comparison of all six will highlight a theme which seems to be common to all, namely, that the passage from immaturity to maturity involves a radical transformation of motives. Each of these personality theories, even the strict Freudian theory, can be interpreted as insisting on a radical discontinuity between the motivation of the child and that of the adult. The adult is not merely the child fully grown, nor are the motives which explain his behaviour merely the
perfection of those drives and needs which motivate the behaviour of the child. Rather, the adult is the child transformed, for what he is now cannot be fully explained in terms of what he was as a child; adulthood does not represent only the perfection or completion of childhood, but also a transcending of childhood.

In the present context, therefore, "transformation" refers to that growth which takes place from one state to another and which involves a radical discontinuity (i.e., the second state is not the perfection of the first but something substantially different) and therefore a transcending of the first state in the achieving of the second. Moreover, since the six theorists chosen for this study are representative not only of various schools of thought but also of a certain chronological development of personality theory, it will be seen that, in the chronological span beginning with Freud and ending with Frankl, there has been an increasing emphasis on the element of transformation and self-transcendence in the growth of personality. The inference to be drawn from this is that, in this area of human knowledge which is directly concerned with man's understanding of himself, there has been a growing awareness on man's part that the fullness of human life demands a kind of transformation or self-transcendence which is analogous to the Christian experience of redemption.
1. Sigmund Freud: From Death to Life

The concept of instinct is basic to Freud's theory of personality in the sense that instincts are conceived of as the starting point or basis of human behaviour. According to Freud the object of all human activity, even the most cultural and artistic, is ultimately the satisfaction of instinctual impulses, such as the sexual or aggressive instincts, i.e., the discharge of psychic energy in order to remove or reduce the tension or excitation of the organism caused by some bodily or somatic need. This bodily need gives rise to the psychological wish, i.e., the instinct which is the inborn psychological representation of the somatic need or excitation. The aim of the instinctual impulse is the removal of the bodily excitation, or more accurately, the reduction of the tension which results from it. Because its source is an excitation within the body, Freud distinguishes an instinct from a stimulus:

An instinct, then, is distinguished from a stimulus by the fact that it arises from sources of stimulation within the body, that it operates as a constant force, and that the subject cannot avoid it by flight as is possible with an external stimulus. We can distinguish an instinct's source, object and aim. Its source is a state of excitation in the body; its aim is the removal of that excitation; on its path from its source to its aim, the instinct becomes operative psychically.¹

In other words, Freud saw the instinctual aim as conservative, i.e., to maintain a state of equilibrium or to continually restore the organism to a tensionless or quiescent state by finding suitable objects upon which to expand the psychic energy represented by the instincts:

Though they [the instincts] are the ultimate cause of all activity, they are of a conservative nature; the state, whatever it may be, which an organism has reached, gives rise to a tendency to re-establish that state as soon as it has been abandoned.\(^2\)

Thus life is a continuous cycle of need—tension—effort—quiescence—need, etc.

The object of the instincts is defined by Freud as "that in or through which it can achieve its aim."\(^3\) The finding of a suitable object for the satisfaction of instinctual impulses is the work of the psychic apparatus—id, ego, and superego. The id is that unconscious reservoir of psychic energy or instinctual need which seeks direct satisfaction in the world of fantasy—through dreams or wish-fulfillment—since the id does not distinguish between fantasy and reality. The id is unaffected by considerations of reality, logic or morality; it is the mental expression of instinctual need, or, as Freud described it, "instinctual


cathexes seeking discharge. But real satisfaction cannot be found in the realm of fantasy, and so it becomes the task of the ego—that part of the psychic apparatus which is closest to the external world of reality and includes man's conscious, thinking processes—to find an object in the real world. The ego decides how an instinct is to be realistically satisfied:

No such purpose as that of keeping itself alive or of protecting itself from dangers by means of anxiety can be attributed to the id. That is the task of the ego, whose business it also is to discover the most favourable and least perilous method of obtaining satisfaction, taking the external world into account.

But even the ego has an unconscious function—that of repression. For there are certain possibilities of satisfaction or impulses towards certain objects which are repressed by the ego, i.e., not permitted to become conscious because of realistic, social or moral considerations.

Originally, to be sure, everything was id; the ego was developed out of the id by the continual influence of the external world. In the course of this slow development, certain of the contents of the id were transformed into the preconscious state and so taken into the ego. Other of its contents remained in the id unchanged, as its scarcely accessible nucleus. During this development, however, the young and feeble ego put back into the unconscious state some of the material it had already taken in, dropped it, and behaved in the same way to some fresh impressions which it might

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have taken in, so that these, having been rejected, could leave a trace only in the id. In consideration of its origin, we speak of this latter portion of the id as "the repressed."6

When repression occurs, a substitute object must be found, i.e., the energy of the instinct must be "displaced" from one object to a substitute object. If the substitute object is considered morally or culturally superior to the primary (repressed) object, we speak of "sublimation" rather than displacement. For Freud, this process accounts for the variety of interests among men, as well as advances in science, culture, art and religion, for these pursuits represent sublimations of more primitive instincts. Thus we do not speak of a "religious instinct," for the religious sentiment is not an instinct in its own right. An instinct which is directed towards a substitute object and is thereby partially satisfied and partially frustrated is described as "aim-inhibited."

The aim of the instinct is, in every instance, satisfaction, which can only be obtained by abolishing the condition of stimulation in the source of the instinct. But, although this remains invariably the final goal of every instinct, there may yet be different ways of leading to the same goal, so that an instinct may be found to have various nearer or intermediate aims, capable of continuation or interchange. Experience permits us also to speak of instincts which are inhibited in respect of their aim, in cases where a certain advance has been permitted in the direction of satisfaction and then an inhibition or depletion has occurred. We

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may suppose that even in such cases, a partial satisfaction is achieved.\(^7\)

The multiplicity of objects to which the instincts attach themselves would lead one to conclude that there is a multiplicity of separate instincts. But the concepts of displacement and sublimation enabled Freud to explain such multiplicity of impulses as endless variations of certain basic and primary instincts. But what are the primary instincts?

In attempting to classify the primary instincts, Freud originally identified two groups—the sex instincts, which represented that psychic energy or impulse which Freud termed "libido," and the ego instincts, i.e., those involving self-preservation, self-affirmation and aggression. For a time, he modified this distinction by introducing the idea of an all-pervasive libido which was narcissistic in nature, so that all instinctual impulses were variations of a primary narcissism. Finally, however, he returned to a dualistic conception of the instincts, but based on a more fundamental distinction—the distinction between the instinct for life (Eros) and the instinct for death.

After long hesitancies and vacillations, we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, \textit{Eros} and the \textit{destructive instinct}.\(^8\)

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These two basic instincts correspond to the two basic instincts of his earlier formulation, i.e., the sex instincts (which manifest Eros) and the ego instincts (which manifest the instinct for death).

In its development, the sex instinct passes through several stages, in infancy and childhood. Freud identified these preliminary stages as the oral, the anal-sadistic and the phallic. Each represents a stage whose instinctual aim is associated with a particular "erogenous zone" of one's body and is therefore essentially auto-erotic, but each remains as a component part of the mature, "genital" sex instinct. Maturity is achieved when the infantile, auto-erotic, egocentric sex impulses become fused into one "genital" impulse which is not auto-erotic but directed towards an external love object; not egocentric, but altruistic. Mature sexuality is identified with "genital" sexuality, i.e., sexuality oriented towards love and procreation. Gregory Zilboorg sees this fusion and refinement of the sex instinct as Freud's concept of maturity.

The conclusion which imposed itself on Freud was that man cannot be considered grown-up or normal unless all the component infantile drives become fused into one genital constellation. Only then does the libido acquire the capacity and quality of turning toward the outside world, toward people and things. Only then, in other words, does man become capable of true love. The term "love" from now on loses its narrow, selfish, sensual meaning.9

And Herbert Marcuse identifies this outgoing, procreative character of genital sexuality with the life instinct of Freud.

The predominant role of sexuality is rooted in the very nature of the mental apparatus as Freud conceived: if the primary mental processes are governed by the pleasure principle, then that instinct which, in operating under this principle, sustains life itself must be the life instinct.¹⁰

Freud himself saw in the ambivalent feelings of love and hate which are sometimes experienced towards a love object an indication that this complete fusion of all the component elements of the sex instinct into genital sexuality had not taken place. The admixture of hate in love is the result of not fully outgrowing an earlier stage of the sex instinct such as the anal stage, which reveals itself in an impulse to master the love object, or the oral stage which denies the love object any separate existence. For Freud, "only when the genital organization is established does love become the antithesis of hate."¹¹ In other words, as the sex instinct moves towards the maturity of the genital stage, it becomes a more clearly defined expression of love, free from ambivalent feelings of hate. Behind the antithesis of love and hate stands the corresponding antithesis of the sex and ego instincts. It is the presence of the ego

instincts (self-preservation, narcissism, mastery) in the component elements of the sex instinct which accounts for the admixture of hate in love.

When the sexual function is governed by the ego instincts, as at the stage of the sadistic-anal organization, they impart the qualities of hate to the instincts' aim as well [...] the admixture of hate may be traced to the source of the self-preservation instincts.12

But what is the source of these self-preservation instincts? For Freud, the ego or self-preservation instincts are manifestations of the instinct for death. The existence of such a death instinct was postulated upon clinical observations which led him to suspect that there was something "beyond the pleasure principle" at work in man's psychic mechanism motivating his behaviour. The pleasure principle (seek pleasure--avoid pain) according to which the instincts are supposed to function was unable to explain to Freud's satisfaction at least, certain mental phenomena, particularly the compulsion to repeat unpleasant experiences which seemed to be characteristic of children's play, dreams which repeat traumatic experiences, and the repeating of unpleasant experiences by a patient in the process of "transference."

This compulsion to repeat revealed to Freud the existence of a mental apparatus which:

[...] though it does not contradict the pleasure

12 S. Freud, "The Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," in Collected Papers, Vol. 4, p. 82.
principle is nevertheless independent of it and seems to be more primitive than the purpose of gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure.¹³

But what is this more primary or primitive principle? Freud's answer is that it consists in the tendency of all organic matter to return to an inorganic state—-to a state of final quiescence which would be the ultimate goal of the quiescence sought by every individual instinctual impulse. It is for this reason that Freud can maintain that the death instinct "does not contradict the pleasure principle;" indeed, it is the ultimate expression of the conservative characteristic of all instinctual impulses. The concept of the death instinct would then be a psychological representation of this urge or tendency inherent in every living organism, to return to an inorganic state:

"In the case of the destructive instinct, we may suppose that its final aim is to lead what is living into an inorganic state. For this reason we also call it the death instinct."¹⁴

And the operation of the ego instincts must be seen against the background of this underlying, fundamental tendency of the organism towards death. The self-preservative instincts represent protection against or resistance to sources of death which are extraneous to the organism itself, not to the organism's own tendency towards death:


Seen in this light, the theoretical importance of the instincts of self-preservation, of self-assertion and of mastery greatly diminishes. They are component instincts whose function is to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself.15

Freud thus explained human life as the mutually opposing action of these two primary instincts: the instinct of life or "Eros" and the death instinct. The most fundamental distinction between these two instincts consists in the fact that Eros is a unifying principle while the death instinct is divisive and destructive. The function of the death instinct is biologically to dissolve the unity of the multi-cellular organism so that it returns to its inorganic state, and psychologically to dissolve the unity between individuals through mechanisms of self-affirmation and mastery. This happens when true object love which is the object of the mature sex instinct is destroyed by the presence of the sadistic element in that instinct, i.e., when sexuality is controlled by the ego instincts.

Eros, or the life instinct, is, on the other hand, a unifying force. Biologically, it is represented by the tendency of cells to unite in order to form a living organism. Psychologically, it is manifested in the sex instinct which unites two people into a psychological unity and assures the

continuance of life in the species. The function of Eros is to "preserve living substances and to join it into larger units." As such, it is a process which is served by the corresponding process of civilization,

[...] whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples, and nations into one great unity, the unity of mankind.\(^1\)

There is then within the multiplicity of man's instinctual impulses a threefold polarity or dichotomy. The dichotomy of love and hate in man's feelings towards a love object is attributed by Freud to the dichotomy existing between the sex and the ego instincts which in turn is a manifestation of the dichotomy between man's most basic instincts, the instinct for life (Eros) and the death instinct.

It is possible, therefore, to speak of human growth in terms of transformation: the transformation of hate into love, which takes place when the individual transcends his ego instincts, i.e., the narcissistic tendency to defend and preserve oneself by mastering others. This transformation, in Freud's view, is the result of achieving mature sexuality; it takes place as the sex instinct becomes "genital," other directed, oriented towards love and procreation, rather than egocentric and auto-erotic. The sex instinct is mature to

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\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 122.
the degree that it liberates itself from the ego instincts which are present in its component elements, i.e., when love liberates itself from the ambivalent feelings of hate. Freud believed that "love originates in the capacity of the ego to satisfy some of its instincts auto-erotically."¹⁸

Love is at first narcissistic; it is directed towards objects which have been incorporated into the ego. As the sex instinct passes through its preliminary stages of development, it is dominated by the narcissism of the ego, which reveals itself in the tendency to devour or incorporate of the oral phase (thus denying the love object any separate existence) and in the impulsion to mastery of the anal-sadistic phase.

In these preliminary phases the sex instinct is governed by the ego instincts; correspondingly, therefore, feelings of love are accompanied by feelings of hate toward the same object. This is consistent with Freud's description of the ego as that part of the psychic apparatus which arises out of the need of the organism to protect itself against both the unbridled instincts of the id and the stimuli of the external world. Between these two sources of excitation, the ego acts as buffer zone or cortical layer. The original function of the ego is, therefore, self-preservative and narcissistic, and in this capacity it

imparts the qualities of mastery and aggressiveness to the sex instinct in its preliminary phases and correspondingly feelings of hate to the preliminary stages of love.

The relation of hate to its object is older than that of love. It is derived from the primal repudiation by the narcissistic ego of the external world whence flows the stream of stimuli. As an expression of painful reaction induced by objects, it remains in constant intimate relation with the instincts of self-preservation, so that sexual and ego instincts readily develop an antithesis which repeats that of love and hate. When the sexual function is governed by the ego instincts, as at the stage of the sadistic-anal organization, they impart the qualities of hate to the instincts' aim as well.19

When Freud therefore speaks of "genital" sexuality as a hallmark of maturity, he is referring not just to sexual maturity in the physiological sense but to the maturing of the instinct itself, i.e., the liberating of the sex instinct from the ego instincts so that "love becomes the antithesis of hate,"20 and love becomes true object love as distinct from narcissism. Implied in this description of maturity is a transformation of motives which involves transcending the narcissism of the ego instincts. In this connection Zilboorg writes:

Freud's conception of a normal person was (briefly) the person who in his growth and development from childhood reaches "genital" adulthood. By "genital" Freud meant not the physiological-sexual maturity which is commonly known as genital,

19S. Freud, "The Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," in Collected Papers, Vol. 4, p. 82.
20Ibid.
but that state of psychological development in which the various infantile, partial, hedonistic [...] impulses become synthesized in such a way that the sensual-egocentric (infantile-sexual) drives become adult-altruistic and the infantile exclusive love for the object outside oneself [...] becomes adult love for other people. The earlier infantile impulses are all characterized not only by an egocentric, narcissistic sensuality, but by a sort of utilitarian, mercenary love bestowed on others only if and when one gets something for it. This utilitarian love is also an unsteady love, which becomes hate rather easily at the first experience of frustration; it is a mixed ambivalent love in which anxiety and anger, aggressiveness, fear, and cowering passivity are all combined in unequal proportions and in a state of considerable lability.21

Freud saw the sex instinct as the vehicle by which an individual transcends his egoism and narcissism, for the mature sex instinct is oriented towards love and procreation. As such, it is a manifestation of Eros, the unifying principle on both the biological level (procreation) and the psychological level (love), whereas the egoism which is transcended is a manifestation of the devisive and destructive death instinct. Thus, if we are to speak in terms of transformation, then the transformation involved in growth towards maturity is a transformation in the basic motivating force in one's life—from a style of life motivated by the death instinct to one motivated by the life instinct.

This polarity of human existence is described by David Bakan in terms of "agency" and "communion"—terms 22

21 Gregory Zilboorg, Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 69.

which are parallel to and identified with Freud's death instinct and life instinct. Agency refers to the "existence of an organism as an individual" while communion refers to the "participation of the individual in some larger organism of which the individual is a part." Both are aspects of life and represent the basic "duality of human existence," but agency (individuality, self-preservation, self-affirmation) corresponds to what Freud called the ego instincts and, as such, manifests a tendency towards death, and, if unmilitated by communion, produces death.

We are now in a position to understand somewhat better why Freud should have identified the death instinct as being in the ego. He recognized the force toward death which was associated with the agentic [...].

The transformation, therefore, involved in human growth takes place as the sex instinct is liberated from the ego instincts; as egoism and narcissism give way to true object love; as the death instinct is mitigated by communion.

But to speak of transformation (as opposed to formation) implies a certain discontinuity from one stage to another. In the Freudian theory, this discontinuity appears to be between the stage of mature genital sexuality and the earlier preliminary stages of the sex instinct (oral, anal, phallic). While these preliminary impulses remain as component parts of the mature sex instinct, genital sexuality

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23 David Bakan, The Duality of Human Existence, p. 15.
24 Ibid., p. 169.
cannot be reduced to the sum total of those component parts. In order to achieve mature genital sexuality, the component impulses must, in Freud's view, undergo considerable refashioning so as to serve what is now the instinct's altruistic rather than egocentric or auto-erotic aims.

The sexual function, from its beginnings to the definitive form in which it is so familiar to us, undergoes a complicated development. It grows together from numerous component instincts with different aims, and passes through several phases of organization, till at last it comes into the service of reproduction. Not all the component instincts are equally serviceable for the final outcome; they must be diverted, remodelled, and in part suppressed. Such a far-reaching course of development is not always passed through without a flaw; inhibitions in development take place, partial fixations at early stages of development.25

Genital sexuality is neither the automatic and inevitable outgrowth nor the mere sum total of its preliminary stages; it is rather a successful fusion of the preliminary phases which remain as component parts of the mature instinct. But the whole is in some way greater than its parts. Just as Gestalt psychology insists that perception is more than the sum total of sensations which make it up, so Freud insisted that the mature sex instinct is something which cannot be explained in terms of its component-instinct parts. For this reason one feels justified in applying the word "transcendence" to this transformation, for the mature sex instinct represents a transcending of the egocentric and

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auto-erotic aims of the earlier phases. The mature instinct is not the perfection of the earlier phases but something which is substantially different in its aim and function. The "special aims" of the component instincts must be successfully fused if they are to be "in the service of reproduction." To the extent that this fusion is not complete—that an earlier stage has not been outgrown—to that extent the sex instinct will remain egocentric, love will be accompanied by an admixture of hate, and correspondingly, the drive towards life will be hampered by the death instinct.

Again, if we are to speak in terms of transformation rather than formation, then we must speak in terms of critical moments of transformation rather than steady, continuous growth or formation; of discontinuity rather than continuity; of what follows as substantially different rather than as explainable in terms of what preceded. For Freud, the most critical moment of transformation was the Oedipal phase of childhood, for the achieving of mature sexuality and therefore the orientation of one's life towards life, love and communion was seen as resulting in large part from a successful resolution of the Oedipus Complex. It is beyond the purpose of this study to enter into a discussion of the Oedipus Complex. It will suffice to say that Freud applied the word "complex" to that conflict of feelings experienced by the male child at about age four or five towards his parents; attraction to the mother as an object
of sexual love, and ambivalent feelings of love and hostility towards the father as a rival for the mother's love. In Freud's view, when this complex is successfully resolved, two things happen: the child renounces the mother as sexual object and sexual love becomes (aim inhibited) tender affection; secondly, the child identifies with the father, confirming his masculinity and introjecting the commands and prohibitions of the father into himself. This results in the formation of the superego and the beginnings of conscience, and in this way the child is able to overcome his hostility to the father by transferring the source of prohibitions and obstacles to instinctual impulses from an external source (father) to an internal source (superego). Through this complicated process of renouncing the mother as an object of the sex instinct and identifying with the father, the child turns towards others as love objects and towards the world of reality and otherness (symbolized by the father) and in this way transcends the narcissism of his desire for mother and the egoism and hostility of his feelings towards his father.

2. C. G. Jung: From Ego to Self

The word "teleological" has been used to describe the account of personality growth found in the analytical psychology of C. G. Jung. In this respect Jung is differentiated from Freud who saw the growth of personality as an endless repetition of instinctual themes. For Jung,
personality does not simply repeat the same cycle (need—satisfaction—need); it grows towards a goal or telos. Man is not just pushed by instinctual needs but pulled by the need to attain a goal. That goal, according to Jung, is the wholeness or complete integration of personality—the attainment of what Jung called the "self." Gebhard Frei points out that this point of view is not just a theoretical assumption but was based on Jung's clinical observations:

Jung is an empiricist. It has become increasingly clear to him, in the course of his many years of experience, that the inner happenings which have been shown to him through the dreams and fantasies of those people, both sick and healthy, who have undergone analysis, have not occurred in a meaningless or haphazard manner, but have manifested an inner purpose or telos. 26

For Jung, the symbols and images which appear, for instance in dreams, are "symbolic representations of the 'telos' towards which all inner growth and individuation tends." 27

The process by which the human psyche grows towards wholeness or selfhood is called by Jung the "individuation process," and this quest for wholeness is essentially a "religious" quest. For Jung this psychological need is identical with the religious desire for rebirth, or—to put it more accurately—the religious concept of rebirth is a


27 Ibid., p. 257.
conscious symbol of the unconscious quest for wholeness. It is in this context that one must understand the oft-quoted remark of Jung to the effect that he considered the vast majority of his patients to be suffering from a "religious" problem.28

Such a statement cannot be taken as an endorsement of religion in the institutional, denominational sense, as Jung himself has stated. Nevertheless, unlike Freud, who dismissed religion as an illusion, Jung considers religion to be a natural human function, if we consider religion as an inner, personal experience. For Jung, such an inner, personal, religious experience has the same goal as personality growth itself—the achievement of wholeness or selfhood. Ultimately, this difference in attitude towards religion between Freud and Jung is based on a different interpretation of the term "libido."

For Freud, the term libido or "psychic energy" is identified with the energy of the sex instinct and every other object of the libido is merely a substitute for the original sexual object. In this view, religion becomes a substitute for or sublimation of infantile sexuality, especially in the form of the prohibited incestuous wish for the parent of the opposite sex. The ultimate objective is satisfaction of an infantile sexual desire; religion is the

substitute. But for Jung the emphasis is on teleology rather than causality. Religion is not a substitute for a repressed sexual desire, but a goal towards which the individual is growing and of which the original desire is a symbol. Victor White, O.P., states that in the Jungian theory:

> It becomes possible to view religion no more as a tolerated but regressive substitute for the forbidden incest, but as the fine flower and fruit of psychic energy liberated from its confinement to infantile incestuous channels.\(^{29}\)

The incestuous wish is not ultimately incestuous. It is a symbol of the desire for rebirth:

> Impregnation of the mother for its own sake, or motivated by the pleasure principle, was not the ultimate object of the libido at all; what was really desired was the return to the womb--rebirth. The incest wish is no longer the ultimate "thing symbolized;" it is itself the symbol of a yet more fundamental need and desire.\(^{30}\)

At the risk of oversimplifying, we might summarize the above by saying that Freud viewed religion as a substitute for an original sexual objective, whereas Jung reversed this view by describing the infantile sexual desire as a symbol of a more ultimate "religious" objective. And this objective is rebirth or selfhood.

The goal of the individuation process which Jung described as wholeness or selfhood is characterized by a state of balance or equilibrium. The individual for example must achieve an equilibrium between the psychic attitudes of

\(^{29}\) Victor White, *God and the Unconscious*, p. 76.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 77.
extraversion and introversion; among the various psychic functions of thinking, feeling, sensing and intuition. In general it must be a balancing of the conscious and unconscious contents of the psyche. (Jung defines the "self" as the mid-point of personality, between the conscious ego and the unconscious.) Thus if personality is consciously over-developed in one area, there will be a form of compensation in the unconscious—a compensation which will perhaps reveal itself in the individual's dreams. Thus, to take a simple example, a person who is extremely introverted on the level of conscious life may become an equally extreme extravert in his dreams.

Jung agrees with Freud who looked upon dreams as a source of information about the contents of the unconscious. Jung's concept of the unconscious, however, differed from that of Freud. For Freud the unconscious was something personal to each individual; it consisted of thoughts, images, memories, etc., of which the individual had become unconscious through repression. In addition to this personal unconscious, Jung postulated the existence of a "collective unconscious" which is common to all men in the sense that every human being has in his unconscious psyche, besides those things he has personally repressed, a storehouse of latent memories, images, etc., which he inherits from the past history of the human race. To these structural components of the collective unconscious—the latent images—Jung gives the name "archetypes." The archetypes are not the
result of repression on the part of the individual, i.e.,
the repression of what was once conscious; they are pre-
existent to individual consciousness and trans-personal, the
common possession of mankind.

Jung was obliged to postulate this "collective unconscious" in addition to the "personal unconscious," owing to the fact that certain symbols—or, more precisely, dispositions to form certain symbols—are found uniformly all over the world, and that similar symbols emerge in dreams, in day-
dreams, in the phenomena of "second sight," in religious and magical figures and emblems, in myths and fairy stories, gnostic visions, in alchemy, and in automatic and "inspired" designs and utterances. 31

Thus, just as unconsciousness has its memory of individual past experiences, the unconscious also has a memory; but the contents of this unconscious memory store-
house are independent of individual experience. It is a racial memory containing:

[... ] an immense fund of accumulated inheritance—
factors left by one generation of men after another, whose mere existence marks a step in the differen-
tiation of the species. If it were permissible to personify the unconscious, we might call it a collective human being combining the characteristics of both sexes, transcending youth and age, birth and death, and, from having at his command a human experience of one or two million years, almost immortal. 32

The archetypes of the collective unconscious are not actual symbols or images; they are predispositions to form images or symbols, to perceive the world in a certain manner.


Thus we have made contact with or activated the unconscious archetype when the image or symbol is formed. The symbol is a conscious representation of an unconscious motif or archetype, the means by which the archetype penetrates into consciousness and by which the individual revives the experiences of past generations. A symbol representing God, for example, is a means of activating the archetype of the Supreme Being which we have inherited from past generations. Or, to put it another way, the archetype of the Supreme Being is "projected" onto the symbol of God. In the same way, the archetype "mother" is projected onto the figure of one's physical mother. What Jung is saying is that one is born with a predisposition to perceive one's physical mother in a way which is consistent with mankind's experience of motherhood. Likewise, a man has a predisposition to respond to and understand the opposite sex because of the presence of the anima archetype (the feminine principle in man) in his unconscious psyche.

The concept of "collective unconscious" and "archetypes" are important to an understanding of the individuation process since the impersonal character of the collective unconscious implies that the contents of the unconscious direct the process of individuation towards the goal of selfhood in a somewhat autonomous way. Indeed, one chapter of Jung's work *Psychology and Religion* is devoted to "The Autonomy of the Unconscious Mind." In it, Jung asks why it is that we feel victimized by physical illness and treat it
(rightly) as something beyond our control, whereas we feel somehow responsible and even guilty about psychic disturb­
ances. His answer is that we do not recognize the autono­
mous character of such disturbanc­es as easily as we recog­
nize the autonomous activity of the germ which infects us physically. The patient, whose case his is discussing, is obsessed with the idea (against all medical evidence) that he has cancer. Jung suggests that such a morbid idea does not originate in the patient's imagination but is an autono­
mous unconscious force. It is "a spontaneous growth,
originating in that part of the psyche which is not identical with consciousness." 33

Jung's clinical experience led him to conceive of the unconscious as the director of personality growth. The unconscious mind has a "religious" tendency, i.e., a tend­
cy towards the goal of wholeness and equilibrium, which is
autonomous or independent of the conscious ego. Thus, when the conscious side of personality becomes overdeveloped in one direction such as rational thought at the expense of intuition and feeling, or masculinity at the expense of feminine characteristics, or an extreme type of "spiritual­
ity" which neglects and represses the emotional, earthy, passionate side of personality (the "shadow" archetype), then the unconscious breaks through into consciousness,

usually in the form of dreams, in order to re-direct the growth of personality towards its proper goal. Such dreams then are not just the reappearance of material which the individual has repressed, they are sources of information about the autonomous tendencies of the unconscious mind. It is as if the unconscious mind were protesting the path of growth being followed by the conscious side of personality, a reminder that some aspect of personality is being neglected and the personality is thereby being deflect from the goal of wholeness. In Jung's words, the dream is "an impartial statement of the patient's spiritual condition."\(^{34}\)

The individuation process can be described in many ways: it is a "quest for wholeness" or the "finding of the God within" or the full experience of the archetype of "the self." Of all the archetypes in the collective unconscious the "self" represents the ultimate goal of the individuation process. Jung saw the self as representing a mid-point between consciousness and the unconscious or as a state of equilibrium among the various systems of personality. The ultimate centre of personality is not the conscious, rational ego. It is a point mid-way between the ego and the contents of the unconscious. As such, it embraces both the conscious and unconscious elements:

The self is not only the centre but also the whole circumference which embraces both conscious

and unconscious; it is the centre of this totality, just as the ego is the centre of consciousness.\textsuperscript{35}

The achieving of wholeness involves taking into account the contents of the unconscious psyche. Frieda Fordham states:

To be the whole means to become reconciled with those sides of personality which have not been taken into account.\textsuperscript{36}

The achievement of such wholeness or equilibrium involves the overcoming of the tension or polarity between the opposing tendencies of psychic life—a reconciliation of these opposites into some kind of harmonious relationship. The "I" must be a centre of personality in which "all contrasts are reconciled,"\textsuperscript{37} matter and spirit, thought and feeling, man and God. Gebhard Frei speaks of the necessity of finding this existential centre of personality which is in contact with the unconscious intuitive side of personality as well as the conscious, rational side, for only from this centre do we make contact with the cosmos and with God.

On his way toward the "self" man must not restrict himself by being solely a creature of instinct nor solely a disembodied mind, but seek to be a complete human being, combining both spirit and matter. He must accept the tension between mind


\textsuperscript{37}C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 88.
and flesh as his cross, and must endeavour through this Golgotha to attain to Easter Resurrection. Thought and feeling, mind and soul, conscious and unconscious, animus and anima, guilt and forgiveness, all need to be inwardly recognized and accepted. The shell of our small "I" must be broken and an existential link forged with God and the cosmos, in a union which emanates both from within and from without.\textsuperscript{38}

The "shell of our small 'I'" is the shell in which the individual finds himself when he identifies the self with only one side of personality at the expense of another. According to Jung's "Principle of Entropy" the psyche seeks a balanced distribution of psychic energy to all systems of the personality. The concept of the self represents such an ideal state of balance or equilibrium. But such a permanent balance can never be established. There is always a tendency for the psyche to invest too much energy in one system of personality at the expense of another; to invest, for example, too much psychic energy in thought at the expense of feeling and emotion, or vice-versa. In such a situation the weaker system will attempt to improve its status at the expense of the stronger and the result is tension. In other words, a one-sided development of personality results in tension within the psyche; the neglected side of the personality will then confront the individual through the archetypes of the unconscious and recall the personality to the goal of wholeness. Jung gives an example of how the psyche must continually strive to unite the opposite tendencies in

\textsuperscript{38} Gebhard Frei, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 259.
this way:

Whoever identifies with an intellectual standpoint will occasionally find his feelings confronting him like an enemy in the guise of the anima; conversely, an intellectual animus will make violent attacks on the feeling standpoint. Therefore, if one wants to bring off the trick not only intellectually but realize the feeling value as well, one must for better or worse come to grips with the anima-animus problem in order to open the way for a higher union, a *conjunctio oppositorum*. This is an indispensable prerequisite for wholeness.39

As with Freud, the growth of personality appears here as a matter of transformation and transcendence. There is a transcending of the ego in the sense that the centre of personality shifts from the ego to the self. The ego is identified with rational consciousness and Jung sees modern man as one who lives too exclusively in this realm of consciousness and therefore has lost touch with his unconscious, instinctive self. He is a man "in search of a soul," i.e., in search of the source of those flashes of intelligences, inspirations, enthusiasms, etc. which do not originate in the conscious rational part of the psyche. Primitive man experienced the unconscious aspect of his psyche and saw it as an objective reality—a soul. To the modern western mind, to speak of the soul is to refer to a world of subjectivity, something to be controlled by conscious thought and will, but to the primitive:

the psyche appears as the source of life, the prime mover; a ghost-like presence which has objective reality. Therefore, the primitive knows how to converse with his soul; it becomes vocal within him because it is not he himself and his consciousness. To primitive man, the psyche is not, as it is to us, the epitome of all that is subjective, and subject to the will; on the contrary, it is something objective, contained in itself, and living its own life.  

Jung feels that this view of the soul is justified for he was convinced from his clinical experience that man never has complete control over his thoughts, moods, emotions and memories; he is frequently at the mercy of unconscious forces which act in an autonomous fashion, i.e., independently of rational consciousness. He finds the idea of the soul as an objective and independent reality psychologically healthier than the naive belief that man's psyche is the equivalent of consciousness and that therefore he is in control of his psychic life.

We only believe that we are masters in our own house because we like to flatter ourselves. Actually, however, we are dependent to a startling degree upon the proper functioning of the unconscious psyche, and must trust that it does not fail us. [...] This being so, we shall do well to admit that there is justification for the old view of the soul as an objective reality—as something independent, and therefore capricious and dangerous.

For Jung, therefore, the way to psychic health, wholeness and maturity is through the discovery of one's

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40 C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 182.
41 Ibid., pp. 182-83.
"soul," i.e., through an openness to the unconscious side of personality and what it says to man; for it is the unconscious, acting in an autonomous manner, which directs the growth of personality towards the goal of selfhood. In this way, man transcends the narrow confines of the ego; he no longer lives exclusively on the level of rational consciousness. But, unlike Freud, Jung does not see the maturing sex instinct as the vehicle by which one transcends the ego. Rather, it is the unconscious, in the collective sense. Freud saw the growth of the individual towards mature sexuality as the antidote to egoism and narcissism. For Jung, one overcomes egoism and narcissism by a greater openness to the archetypal themes of the collective unconscious; by achieving a balance or equilibrium between the conscious and subconscious systems of personality.

Thus, while in both theories the necessity of transcending the ego is stressed, there is a different interpretation of how such transcendence takes place and therefore of what constitutes maturity. This difference between Freud and Jung is attributable not only to the well-known fact that Jung refused to accept Freud's emphasis on the all-pervasive role of the sex instinct in human motivation, but also to a basic difference in their respective attitudes towards the contents of the unconscious mind. Freud wanted to reveal the contents of the unconscious in order to release the psychic energy which was dissipated in the act of repression and allow the ego to appropriate this energy
and thereby control the impulses of the id. For Jung, the contents of the unconscious were to be revealed so that man may have access to the wisdom of the past. On this point, Erich Fromm suggests that Freud, as a rationalist, was interested in the unconscious in order to control and subdue it, while Jung, as a romantic, saw the unconscious as the deepest source of wisdom.

He [Jung] is suspicious of reason and intellect, and the unconscious, representing the non-rational, to him is the deepest source of wisdom; for him, analytic therapy has the function of helping the patient to get in touch with this source of non-rational wisdom, and to benefit from this contact. 42

But how is this contact made? It has already been pointed out that the archetypal themes of the unconscious are activated by the symbols which act as points of contact between consciousness and the contents (archetypes) of the unconscious. The archetypes are not apprehended directly but only through their conscious manifestations, i.e., through symbols. The symbol has what Jung calls a "transcendent function," i.e., the power to transmute psychic energy (libido) towards an archetypal value in a way that willpower cannot achieve. A simple example of this would be the fact that the feminine principle in man (the anima archetype) is activated more effectively by his contacts and dealings with woman than by any effort of the will to develop the "feminine" qualities of gentleness and compassion. The

42 Erich Fromm, Sigmund Freud's Mission, N.Y., Harper and Brothers, 1959, p. 54.
function then of the symbol consists in the fact that as an outer conscious event, it activates an inner unconscious event, i.e., the direction of psychic energy towards an archetypal value. Here we have the elements of transformation and transcendence. Psychic energy is transformed so as to be at the service of an archetypal value and thereby a transformation of personality takes place (from consciousness to the unconscious, from animus to anima, from ego to self, etc.) which results in greater balance, equilibrium, maturity. Moreover, this transformation takes place in a way which transcends the power of rational thought and will.

In the context of motivation, this transformation is conceived as a moving away from reliance, on conscious rational motives to a greater openness to unconscious motivation. If one relies on rational consciousness alone (the ego) in the conduct of life, then one remains incomplete--lacking in wholeness--for rational consciousness does not give the individual a true picture of himself. Jung sees modern man as relying too exclusively on consciousness, and therefore limiting himself to the knowledge which comes from the external world. By doing so, he impoverishes himself by neglecting unconscious sources of knowledge.

A high regard for the unconscious psyche as a source of knowledge is by no means such a delusion as our western rationalism likes to suppose. We are inclined to assume that, in the last resort, all knowledge comes from without. Yet today we know for certain that the unconscious contains
contents which would mean an immeasurable increase of knowledge if they could only be made conscious.  

In Jung's view this one-sided reliance on rational consciousness to the exclusion of the unconscious has three tragic results: First, it deprives man's psychic life of its historical, unconscious foundations.

Man's unconscious likewise contains all the patterns of life and behaviour inherited from his ancestors, so that every human child, prior to consciousness, is possessed of a potential system of adopted psychic functioning. In the conscious life of the adult, as well, this unconscious instinctive functioning is always present and active [...]. The unconscious perceives, has purposes and intuitions, feels and thinks as does the conscious mind.

Consciousness is something which is derived from or grows out of the unconscious life of the child in a gradual way. But if man ignores these unconscious origins of psychic life and relies solely on conscious thoughts, motives and knowledge, he has lost contact with his living past, and this is the reason for modern man's psychic distress. Jung compares the psyche to a sky-scraper in which the upper stories (consciousness) cannot exist except on the foundation of the lower stories (the unconscious). The modern attitude, says Jung,

[...], entirely forgets that it carries the whole living part in the lower stories of the sky-scraper of rational consciousness. Without the lower

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43 C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 185.
44 Ibid.
stories our mind is suspended in mid-air. No wonder that it gets nervous.45

Secondly, excessive reliance on rational consciousness deprives man of true self-knowledge. The conscious ego harbours an idealized image of itself. As man becomes more civilized and comes to regulate his behaviour in terms of conscious knowledge and intentions, he becomes progressively alienated from his instinctive foundation. He identifies himself with his conscious knowledge of himself; the ego becomes the centre of personality and usurps the place of one's true self.

The result is that modern man can know himself only insofar as he can become conscious of himself—a capacity largely dependent on environmental conditions, the drive for knowledge and control of which necessitated or suggested certain modifications of his original instinctive tendencies [...]. This task is so exacting, and its fulfillment so advantageous that he forgets himself in the process, losing sight of his instinctual nature and putting his own conception of himself in place of his real being.46

The third result of exclusively conscious motivation is that man, through his lack of self-knowledge, is deprived of the capacity to deal with evil. Since the rational conscious ego operates on an idealized image of itself, it is preoccupied with preserving that image—with preserving self-esteem. Accordingly, it protects itself from all attacks on its self-esteem by indulging in self-justifying projections.

45 C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 41.

Evil is not attributed to oneself; it is always projected on to others. Having closed his eyes to that source of knowledge which, alone, can reveal the tendency to evil within himself—the unconscious—man believes that his true self coincides with the ideal self manufactured by the ego, and thus fails to recognize the evil in himself.

Since it is universally believed that man is merely what his consciousness knows of itself, he regards himself as harmless and so adds stupidity to his iniquity. He does not deny that terrible things have happened and still go on happening, but it is always "the others" who do them [...]. It would be an insufferable thought that we had to take personal responsibility for so much guiltiness. We therefore prefer to localize the evil with individual criminals or groups of criminals, while washing our hands in innocence and ignoring the general proclivity to evil.47

For Jung, the transcending of this kind of ego—defensiveness—can only come about through a recognition of the "shadow" archetype, i.e., the dark, evil, passionate, earthy side of personality. When one recognizes that the evil in the world is also within himself, then defensiveness and self-justifying projections are given up. Moreover, the ego is transcended in another sense; for, with the recognition of the "shadow" in oneself, the need for projection disappears and one is able to relate to others as equals rather than from a position of superiority or defensiveness. Intersubjectivity becomes possible and not only egoism, but also narcissism and isolation are transcended. Jung

47C. G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self, pp. 107-08 and 110.
contends that genuine human relationships become possible when individuals achieve the modesty and ability to acknowledge imperfection which comes with recognition of the "shadow" archetype.

Recognition of the shadow, on the other hand, leads to the modesty we need in order to acknowledge imperfection [...]. The perfect has no need of the other, but weakness has, for it seeks support and does not confront its partner with anything that might force him into an inferior position and even humiliate him. This humiliation may happen only too easily where idealism plays too prominent a role.48

Again, this transformation of personality can be seen as having the element of discontinuity. The movement from ego to self is not automatic and inevitable; the resources of rational consciousness are not sufficient in themselves to bring about this transformation. The meaning of discontinuity within the context of Jung's theory of personality growth is perhaps better understood if we remember the following points. First, Jung's clinical experience indicated that the impetus for growth towards selfhood often occurs at times of considerable tension, of "psychic disorientation or reorientation." It is at such times, when an individual is dissatisfied with his style of life and looking for a new meaning to life that, according to Jung, symbols relating to the self archetype (e.g., mandala symbols) begin to appear in his dreams and phantasies. Secondly, the achieving of equilibrium between

consciousness and unconscious systems of personality is beyond the power or control of rational consciousness; it is something which, in Jung's view, results from the autonomous activity of the collective unconscious. Thirdly, the movement towards selfhood involves the release of psychic energy for that purpose; this release of energy is a "transcendent function" of symbol and archetype which accomplishes what conscious willpower cannot accomplish. Wholeness or selfhood is not the result of the continued growth of ego-consciousness—a growth which, as Jung points out, alienates man from his true self; it is rather the result of transcending ego-consciousness.

3. Alfred Adler: From Self-Enhancement to Social Interest

The phrase "will to power" is often invoked as a description of the theory of personality found in the Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, just as the "will to pleasure" is attributed to the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and the "will to meaning" to Viktor Frankl's existential approach. However, the phrase "will to power" fails to express the dynamic force in personality growth as seen by Adler, for, in the final formation of his theory, personality growth has nothing to do with the pursuit of raw power except in the case of the neurotic. In the normal personality, Adler believed that the prime motivating force was the striving for superiority or perfection, but with a
social dimension. The mature personality strives not for a purely personal perfection, unrelated to others; he strives for the perfection of society, and his maturity is proportionate to the degree of this "social interest" present in his striving. It is important, for our purposes, to trace the development of this idea in Adler's thought.

Adler's theory of personality moved gradually away from the Freudian view of personality as the result of the objective causality of physiological drives to a more "subjective" psychology, i.e., a psychology which makes personality more of a creation of the individual in pursuit of goals. It was not just over the question of the primacy of the sex drive among all physiological drives that Adler broke with Freud; it was a more fundamental rejection of the primacy of physiological drives as such.

Adler's interest in "drive" psychology was the result of his early studies in "organ inferiority." He proposed that disease infects one particular organ of the body rather than another because of an original weakness or inferiority in that organ. This led him to formulate a theory of compensation and overcompensation. According to this theory, in the case of an inferior organ the individual tries to compensate for the inferiority by strengthening the inferior organ, or another organ by way of compensation. But Adler was led to a further conclusion—that compensation can take place on a psychological level when nature fails to compensate or the possibilities of physical compensation are
exhausted. In this case, compensation takes place in the "psychological superstructure" of the organ. If the drive associated with the organ is frustrated, it may lead to some kind of pathological overcompensation. Thus inferiority in the digestive tract which frustrates the drive for food may lead to overcompensation in the form of avarice.

Inferiority is seen here as resulting from the frustration of a drive associated with a physical organ. But Adler noticed that drives are not isolated from each other. Several drives may seek the same object. Thus hunger is the result of such a "confluence" of drives—the drive to eat (the primary or dominant drive) also includes the drives to see and to smell. These observations led Adler to postulate the existence of one "superordinated" drive which would direct the confluence of all other drives and thus become the main driving or dynamic force of personality. This dominant or all-pervading drive was identified by Adler as aggression, which becomes a psychological force directing and connecting the primary drives. At this point in the development of Adler's theory, aggression assumes that dominant role in personality which Freud had assigned to the sex instinct. In neurotics, the aggressive drive finds expression in temper-tantrums, defiance, paranoia, etc. It may also be turned against oneself as in hypochondria or suicide or turned into its opposite as in the messianic ideas of some psychotics.

Eventually, Adler recognized the aggressive drive as
a neurotic form of a more general striving to overcome
inferiority, which now becomes the basic dynamic force of
personality growth. Pure aggression remains as the patholog-
ical or neurotic form of this striving and results when a
child's sense of inferiority is heightened by any denial of
his need for affection. Aggression then is the result of a
combination of two things: the child's sense of inferiority
and the frustration of his need for affection:

Every unsatisfied drive ultimately orients the
organism toward aggression against the environment.
The rough characters and the unbridled, incorrig-
ible children can instruct us in the way the con-
tinuously unsatisfied drive for affection stimu-
lates the paths of aggression.49

In this latter formulation, the physiological drives
become subordinate to a more subjective factor—the feelings
of inferiority. The striving to overcome feelings of infer-
iority becomes the prime motivating force of personality and
was originally formulated by Adler as the "masculine pro-
test," i.e., the striving to be strong and powerful as com-
pensation for feeling unmanly. Adler sees the male neurotic
as escaping from undesirable feminine traits:

The structure of the neuroses [...] shows the
often ramified feminine traits carefully hidden by
hypertrophical masculine wishes and efforts. This
is the masculine protest. It follows necessarily

49 A. Adler, "Zärtlichkeitsbedürfnis," quoted in
H. & R. Ansbacher, The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler,
as overcompensation, because the feminine tendency is evaluated negatively [...].

The concept of masculine protest is, however, a negative and incomplete idea. It identifies the individual's basic desire to escape from feelings of inferiority. But is there a positive goal to his strivings? Adler's answer was that the goal of this striving is one of superiority or perfection. But this goal is a "fictional" one. In this, Adler was greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hans Vaihinger who suggested that men live by "fictions," i.e., by ideas and ideals which cannot be proved but are effective in helping them to deal with reality. Many, for example, orient themselves obviously by thinking of a "heaven above" and a "hell below." In dealing with one's fellow man, it was necessary to think in terms of the "average man" or the "average family." But such a construct may not correspond to any real man or family.

Adler incorporated this idea into his theory by proposing that the individual is motivated (subjectively and unconsciously) by fictional goals of superiority. This is not an objective goal which determines his life in some fatalistic way; it is a subjective goal created by the individual himself as compensation for feelings of inferiority. Moreover, it is a largely unconscious goal and can be detected only by observation of the individual's style of

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life. This fictional goal is for Adler, the root of the individuality and unity of personality:

Thus the aim of the mental life of man becomes its governing principle, its \textit{causa finalis} [...]. Here we have the root of the unity of the personality, the individuality. It matters not what may have been the source of its energies: not their origin but their end, their ultimate goal, constitutes their individual character.\footnote{A. Adler, "Progress in Individual Psychology," in \textit{British Journal of Medical Psychology}, Vol. 4, 1924, p. 23.}

The starting point for this upward thrust of personality growth is the feeling of inferiority. The fictional goal of superiority is for each individual the ultimate compensation for feelings of inferiority. It is the thought of this future success which makes present difficulties bearable:

In each mind there is the conception of a goal or ideal to get beyond the present state and to overcome the present deficiencies and difficulties by postulating a concrete goal for the future. By means of this concrete goal, the individual can think and feel himself superior to the difficulties of the present because he has in mind his success of the future [...]. Thus the individual mitigates his sense of weakness in the anticipation of his redemption.\footnote{A. Adler, \textit{The Science of Living}, N.Y., Greenberg, 1929, p. 34.}

If the striving for superiority is something characteristic of all men, how does one distinguish the normal individual from the neurotic? For Adler the distinction lies in the degree of "social feeling" or "social interest" present in the individual's striving for superiority. The
neurotic striving is self-centred—without social feeling. So is the striving of a person who has given a "private meaning" to life. Adler calls this a striving not for superiority or perfection but for "self-enhancement." What motivates such a person is the desire to avoid defeat and the loss of self-esteem. In his case, the feelings of inferiority have become so great that he is afraid to pursue a goal of superiority in some socially useful way. His concern is not for others but for himself; he is not so much concerned with being superior as with feeling superior.

His goal is still "to be superior to difficulties," but instead of overcoming obstacles he will try to hypnotize himself, or auto-intoxicate himself, into feeling superior. Meanwhile his feelings of inferiority will accumulate, because the situation which produces them remains unaltered [...]. He does not train to be stronger, to be more adequate; he trains to appear stronger in his own eyes.53

Such striving for self-enhancement represents an abnormal adjustment to reality. It is a neurotic solution to the problem of inferiority. Feelings of inferiority, however, are, in themselves, in no way abnormal. In fact, Adler sees the feeling of inferiority as the basis and starting point for all human, cultural achievement.

We have seen that Adler, in the development of his theory, gradually refined his concept of the goal of personality growth. At first this goal was the satisfaction of physiological drives; then it was an egotistical

self-enhancement; finally it was the striving for perfection which, because of the presence of social feeling, becomes the perfection of society. Not only do these represent stages in Adler's thought, he also seems to consider them the stages of personality growth in each individual. Normal development means to pass from drive satisfaction, to self-enhancement, to striving for perfection. Development can be arrested at one of the two earlier stages if it is not adequately satisfied. Maladjustment means that one's growth toward a selfless type of striving for perfection is blocked so that one remains at the level of selfish striving for security and self-enhancement.\footnote{Cf. Ansbacher, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 124.}

What then is the measure of the mature personality? It is the degree of "social interest" in his striving for perfection. The mature personality strives for a perfection or superiority which is useful to society. For Adler, social interest was an "innate potentiality" which must be consciously developed. Every man must arrive at some idea of what life means. The meaning which an individual gives to life will be either a private or a social meaning, and this will be reflected in his striving for superiority by the absence or presence of social interest. He adds further that the meaning an individual gives to his life is indicated in the response he makes to the three social ties --the demands of occupation, of his fellow men, and of love.
and marriage:

These three ties, therefore, set three problems: how to find an occupation which will enable us to survive under the limitations set by the nature of the earth; how to find a position among our fellows, so that we may co-operate and share the benefits of co-operation; how to accommodate ourselves to the fact that we live in two sexes and that the continuance and furtherance of mankind depends upon our love life.

Individual Psychology has found no problems in life which cannot be grouped under these three main problems—occupational, social and sexual. It is in his response to these three problems that every individual human being unfailingly reveals his own deep sense of the meaning of life.55

An individual whose striving for superiority is characterized by social interest will give a social meaning to life. He will choose a goal which, in Adler's words, is "on the useful side of life," i.e., a goal which is useful to mankind and human society. He will think of life in terms of service and contribution to the community. The ultimate reason for striving for superiority is to equip oneself to make some meaningful contribution to society. Without this social goal superiority is meaningless.

If we think that we must develop personality "in vacuo," without a goal of contribution, we shall merely make ourselves domineering and unpleasant.56

To contribute to society, however, does not necessarily mean to actively participate in society. The artist or philosopher may appear to withdraw from society.

55 A. Adler, What Life Should Mean to You, p. 7.
56 Ibid., p. 10.
Nevertheless, they may be contributing to the advancement of society. For them, society is seen in the light of an ideal future society. To assist mankind towards a goal of perfection does not necessarily involve concrete participation in the circle of one's own time:

Social interest means much more. It means particularly the interest in, or feeling with, the community sub specie aeternitatis. It means the striving for community which must be thought of as everlasting, as one could think of it if mankind has reached the goal of perfection. It is never (only) a present day community or society, a specific political or religious formation. It is rather the goal which is best suited for perfection, a goal which would have to signify the ideal community of all mankind, the ultimate fulfillment of evolution.57

Normal feelings of inferiority, therefore, lead to normal adjustment because they act as a spur to the striving for superiority which becomes the desire to contribute to society. If, however, the feelings of inferiority are too great or if they are increased by environmental influences (Adler mentions as examples neglected, pampered, and handicapped children) then the individual's striving for superiority is deflected not to a social goal but to the useless side of life because of the fear of failure on the useful side.

There is only one reason for an individual to side-step to the useless side: the fear of a defeat on the useful side. [...] Only those are

able to muster the courage to advance on the useful side who consider themselves a part of the whole, who are at home on this earth and in this mankind.58

Individual Psychology therefore sees human growth as a transformation from drive satisfaction to self-enhancement and finally to social interest. This transformation involves the transcending of the egotistical drive towards self-enhancement. All growth, in Adler's view, begins with and compensates for original feelings of inferiority. But if the growing child is to overcome inferiority, it cannot be by concentrating on himself--on merely becoming a superior; he is to become superior by concentrating on the achieving of a goal outside of himself.

If a child is to draw together his powers and overcome his difficulties, there must be a goal for his movements outside of himself, a goal based on interest in reality, interest in others and interest in co-operation.59

In this view, personal superiority or perfection becomes a by-product of some other self-transcending goal, not an objective to be pursued for its own sake. Self-conscious preoccupation with one's own personality growth is self-defeating. On the other hand, commitment to a life of contribution and co-operation provides the motive power one needs to achieve some degree of personal perfection.

If an individual, in the meaning he gives to life, wishes to make a contribution, and if his

59 A. Adler, What Life Should Mean to You, p. 37.
emotions are all directed to this goal, he will naturally be bound to bring himself into the best shape. He will begin to equip himself to solve the three problems of life (behaviour towards others, occupation and love) and to develop his abilities.

The mature person, in Adler's view, is no longer motivated by the egocentric desire to overcome inferiority, to feel superior, to protect his self-esteem, but rather by the self-transcending desire to be perfect in order to contribute to the welfare of the community or of the society.

The neurotic strives toward personal superiority and, in doing so, expects a contribution from the group in which he lives, while the normal individual strives toward the perfection which benefits all. 61

Social feeling or social interest replaces the desire for self-enhancement, the "will to power" and the uselessness of a private meaning of life. This is the transformation demanded by growth.

The views of Individual Psychology demand the unconditional reduction of striving for power and the development of social interest. 62

In Adler's description of the transformation of personality, the element of discontinuity appears in the transition from self-enhancement to social interest. In Adler's view, this transition is not automatic or accounted for merely in terms of the innate capacity for growth. To

60 A. Adler, What Life Should Mean to You, p. 10.
be sure, social interest is seen by Adler as an innate capacity and represents man's true self, but its development depends on external factors. It is not an instinct which will develop spontaneously but depends on the social conditioning of the child; but, given the proper social conditioning, it represents the goal of normal growth. In this respect it differs from the striving to overcome or striving for superiority which is not only an innate potentiality but an innate instinct in the motive power behind all growth, normal and abnormal.

Social interest is innate just as the striving for overcoming is innate, with the important difference, however, that social interest must be developed, and that it can be developed only when the child is already in the midst of life. At the present stage of man's psychological and possibly also physical development, we must consider the innate substratum of the social interest as too small, as not strong enough, to become effective or to develop without the benefit of social understanding. This is in contrast to abilities and functions which succeed almost all on their own, such as breathing.63

But while social interest is something that must be developed, it does represent man's true self--the self from which neurotic striving on the useless side of life alienates him. Adler believes that it is impossible for a man to seriously claim to be devoid of all social interest. On the contrary, even the man who acts in a self-centred way will often feel it necessary to justify his actions in terms of

social interest, to make excuses for his lack of social interest.

We can never find anyone who could say truly, "I am not interested in others." He may act this way—he may act as if he were not interested in the world—but he cannot justify himself. Rather does he claim to be interested in others, in order to hide his lack of social adjustment. This is mute testimony to the universality of the social feeling.64

Social interest, then, represents the goal of normal growth, the normal compensation for the feeling of inferiority. It is when the feeling of inferiority is exaggerated, i.e., becomes an inferiority complex, that a child's growth is deflected towards the useless side of life.

As long as the feeling of inferiority is not too great, a child will always strive to be worthwhile and on the useful side of life. Such a child, in pursuing his end, is interested in others. Social feeling and social adjustment are the right and normal adjustments.65

How, then, can the term "discontinuity" and therefore "transformation" be applied to Adler's description of human growth? What is clear is that Adler sees the human condition as a conflict arising from a two-fold striving: the striving for personal superiority and the striving towards social interest. The latter is innate and represents the goal of normal growth and man's true self; the former is something learned—the product of educational, environmental and social factors which deflect growth toward the useless

64 A. Adler, The Science of Living, p. 216.
65 Ibid., p. 104.
side of life and a useless "private meaning" of life. Together, they represent the abnormal and normal paths taken by that striving which is inborn—the striving for perfection.

But how does this basic striving for perfection which originally takes the form of personal superiority become a striving towards social interest? It is in reference to this transition that one may use the word "discontinuity," for self-enhancement of itself does not lead to social interest. It depends on an external, environmental factor—the satisfaction of one's need for affection. The child's desire for self-enhancement becomes social interest only when his need for affection is satisfied in a healthy way. If it is frustrated by pampering or neglect, the feeling of inferiority becomes an inferiority complex and the child continues to be motivated by the desire to escape from his feelings of inferiority, i.e., by the desire for self-enhancement.

The first critical phase in the transition from self-enhancement to social interest is the mother-child relationship. Adler sees the mother's role as leading the child towards the goal of social interest by developing the child's innate potentiality for social co-operation.

The development of the innate potentiality for co-operation occurs first in the relationship of the child and mother. The mother is the first other person whom the child experiences. Here is the
first opportunity for the cultivation of the innate social potentiality.\textsuperscript{66}

The hazard in this relationship is that the mother might consciously or unconsciously restrict the social development of the child through pampering or neglect or by keeping the child dependent on herself.

For instance, the mother is often satisfied with a restricted social development for the child, and does not concern herself with the fact that he must go from her care into a much wider circle of human contacts. In such a case, the mother concentrates the child's social potentialities upon herself. She does not help the child to extend his interest to others besides herself.\textsuperscript{67}

The need for that type of affection which fosters growth toward social interest is frustrated by both neglect and pampering. Neglect prevents the child from developing an attitude of trust towards the world and others; pampering keeps the child at the level of self-enhancement, for he solves all difficulties by making demands on others and exercising power over them. It was for this reason that Adler, like Freud, saw the Oedipal phase of growth as critical, although his interpretation of the Oedipus Complex is more in terms of the "will to power" than the will to pleasure or the sex instinct. For Adler, the child at this point in life takes a decisive step in the direction of either self-enhancement or social interest. The Oedipus Complex was, in


\textsuperscript{67}Ibid.
Adler's view, the result of pampering; it is the conflict within the child who does not want to give up his mother—not as an object of the sex instinct but as one over whom he has power, or, more accurately, one over whom he has been given power through pampering. In such a case, mother becomes the one at whose expense the child escapes all his feelings of inferiority and satisfies his need for self esteem.

[...] the complex characterizes a pampered child who does not want to give up his mother. According to Freud, the Oedipus Complex is supposed to be the foundation of the development of the mental life, but Individual Psychology has shown that it is an error of upbringing.68

Adler saw the Oedipus Complex as an instance of the "narrow stable" of the neurotic, i.e., a restricting of one's efforts to solve the problems of love and relatedness to the family circle because of the fear of meeting such problems in the world at large. If his striving for superiority is restricted in this way, then his sexual striving will also be restricted to the family circle. Thus Adler saw Freud's sexual interpretation of the complex as only one aspect of a much more fundamental striving—the striving to overcome inferiority.

But in clinging to mother, and his power over mother, the pampered child is seeking to overcome inferiority and

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achieve self-esteem in an unhealthy way, for he is seeking the illusion of superiority, rather than superiority itself. On the other hand, to resolve the complex successfully means to give up the will to power over mother, and this in turn creates the possibility of openness to others as objects of love. Thus the Oedipal situation becomes the paradigm of the basic choice that man must make—the choice between the useless and the useful side of life, between a private or social meaning of life, between self-enhancement and social interest—a paradigm also of the transformation which must take place if man is to achieve the fullness and maturity of human growth.

4. Erich Fromm: From Regression to Progression

According to Erich Fromm, man's nature cannot be adequately defined as a quality or substance. The real essence of man consists in the contradiction inherent in human existence. In other words, it is not sufficient to say that man is body and soul; the essence of man consists precisely in the conflict or dichotomy between body and soul, between man's animal and spiritual nature; in the dichotomy implied in the fact that he is an animal and yet has intelligence, that he is part of nature and yet transcends it.

Man transcends all other life because he is, for the first time, life aware of itself. Man is in nature, subject to its dictates and accidents, yet
he transcends nature because he lacks the unawareness which makes the animal a part of nature—as one with it. Man is confronted with the frightening conflict of being the prisoner of nature, yet being free in his thoughts; being part of nature, and yet to be, as it were, a freak of nature; being neither here nor there. Human self-awareness has made man a stranger in the world, separate, lonely and frightened.69

Fromm points out that what separates man from animal existence is the fact that man is less instinctively determined or regulated in adapting himself to his environment. The animal, through the process of evolution, adapts to its surroundings by changing itself to fit the changing conditions. Thus the animal remains a part of its world; it is tied instinctively to nature. The animal adapts to changing conditions by changing itself, not by changing its environment. Man, on the other hand, is the most helpless of all animals from the instinctive point of view. But the less complete his instinctual equipment, the more developed his brain, i.e., his ability to learn. Man is an intelligent being. He therefore transcends nature and is separated from nature. He does not have the animals' instinctive tie and harmony with nature.

Man is aware of his own existence and can reflect on it. His adaptation, therefore, is not instinctively determined. He must relate himself to the world through his human powers of reason and love. The primary tie and

harmony of the animal with nature has been broken. Man must learn to relate himself to his environment. He can choose between different courses of action, i.e., he thinks rather than being determined by instinct. He does not adapt passively to nature but masters it and uses it. Because man is thus part of nature and yet self-determining, his existence is a problem to be solved.

Man is the only animal for whom his own existence is a problem which he has to solve and from which he cannot escape. He cannot go back to the prehuman state of harmony with nature; he must proceed to develop his reason until he becomes the master of nature and of himself.70

This basic dichotomy in man's nature, the tension that arises from the fact that he is at one and the same time part of nature by reason of his animal nature and yet transcending nature by reason of his specifically human faculties of reason and love, gives rise to the need to consciously relate himself to his environment, to nature and his fellow men, to learn to relate himself rather than being instinctively related to the world. Man's primary, i.e., instinctive ties with nature have been broken and man must find new ties with which to relate himself to his world. Man is existentially aware of this need because the breaking of his instinctive ties with nature gives him a sense of self-awareness. But self-awareness is, as it were, a two-sided coin. On the one hand it means that man is aware of

himself as a unique and self-determining individual; on the other hand, it means that man is also aware of his aloneness and separation from nature and his fellow man. He is aware of how powerless and helpless he is as an individual in relation to the universe as a whole.

This awareness of his aloneness and separation is, for man, a source of anxiety, and, in Fromm's view, the need to overcome his isolation is man's greatest need. In The Art of Loving, he interprets the biblical story of Adam and Eve in this light. The eating of the fruit from the "tree of knowledge of good and evil" for Fromm represents the dawning of human self-awareness, and the shame of Adam and Eve at each other's nakedness represents the fact that they are now aware of themselves as being separate individuals but remaining strangers because they have not yet learned to love each other, and thus they are ashamed. Fromm concludes:

The awareness of human separation, without reunion by love, is the source of shame. It is at the same time the source of guilt and anxiety.71

So great is man's need to relate himself to his environment that Fromm considers it necessary for man's sanity.

The necessity to unite with other beings, to be related to them, is an imperative need on the fulfillment of which man's sanity depends.72

In Fromm's view, this deep-seated need for relatedness


accounts for the fact that men have shown themselves capable of adapting to almost any kind of society or religion.

The kind of relatedness to the world may be noble or trivial, but even being related to the basest kind of pattern is immensely preferable to being alone. Religion and nationalism as well as any custom and any belief, however absurd and degrading, if it only connects the individual with others, are refuges from what man most dreads: isolation.73

How, then, is this need for relatedness to be satisfied? More precisely, how is man to achieve relatedness in a way that will be conducive to his maturity, to his growth as a person? There are two values here which must be balanced against each other. One is relatedness to the world and the other is awareness of one's individuality and integrity. It is precisely his awareness of his individuality which arouses in man the need for relatedness, but, in seeking relatedness he must not do so at the expense of his individuality. In other words, the kind of relatedness which is conducive to the growth of the whole personality is that form of relatedness in which one preserves the sense of his own individuality and integrity and identity; a relatedness by which an individual not only contributes to the welfare of his fellow man but, in doing so, realizes his own potential as a human person.

So great, however, is man's need to be related in some way to his fellow man and thereby overcome his aloneness

and isolation, that he will often unite himself to his environment in a "non-productive" way, i.e., in such a way that he loses his individuality and integrity. For such a person, the freedom which accompanies growing self-awareness and individuality is unbearable because of the isolation and fear it produces, and so he trades his freedom and integrity for the security of a sense of belonging. 74

Fromm lists three types of non-productive relatedness. They are: authoritarianism (which includes both the sadistic and masochistic orientations), destructiveness and conformity.

All of these non-productive forms of relatedness have one thing in common—they achieve relatedness at the expense of individuality and integrity, and therefore at the expense of genuine human growth which is in the direction of self-awareness and transcendence. To achieve genuine maturity and authentic personality, the individual must find a productive way of relating to his environment, i.e., he must relate in such a way that his individuality is not forfeited; in a way which helps him to realize his human potential.

Fromm accepts the principle of self-preservation as the first

74 This is the theme of Fromm's book, Escape from Freedom. In it, he accounts for the appeal of totalitarian systems such as Nazism and Fascism by pointing out that they offered the individual an "escape from freedom," i.e., an opportunity to escape from the insecurity of being an individual by finding a sense of belonging and relatedness in abject submission to a strong leader but at the price of his individuality and integrity.
principle of existence, but, following Spinoza, he believes that man's natural desire is not just to live but to live productively, i.e., to realize, in his life, his essential nature, to come nearer and nearer to the model of human nature, to become as fully human as possible. This productiveness must be achieved in every area of life, in the area of thought, action and feeling.

In the area of thought, productive thinking refers to the power to grasp the world by reason, to understand the real meaning of things and their relation to oneself, to see hidden relationships and hidden meanings. Productive thought breaks down the barriers between myself and the material world. According to Fromm, it has two qualities: concern and objectivity. In productive thinking, the subject is not coldly detached and indifferent to the object of his study. He is affected by it and concerned with it. It is his interest in the object in the first place which stimulates his thinking. It is an object of thought because it is an object of interest. The physician, the psychologist, the philosopher, and the theologian all direct their thought towards some aspect of man's existence, but to be productive thought (in the sense of promoting self-realization) it must be motivated by concern for the problems of man's existence.

To him, a person or any phenomenon becomes an object of thought because it is an object of
interest, relevant from the standpoint of his individual life, or that of human existence.75

Productive thinking is also objective, which refers to the ability not to distort or falsify reality. The objective person sees things as they are in themselves and sees himself as he is, i.e., sees his real relationship to things and persons. Objectivity is opposed to prejudice, wishful thinking and fantasy.

In the area of action, productive work would refer to that type of work by which a person realizes his creative potential, work which the individual plans, produces and of which he sees the results.

In the area of feeling, productive relatedness is expressed by love. Productive love is defined by Fromm as:

[...J union with somebody or something outside of oneself, under the condition of retaining the separateness and integrity of one's own self [...]. In the experience of love, the paradox happens that two people become one, and remain two at the same time.76

This kind of love is the only answer to man's sense of isolation and his need for relatedness.

There is only one passion which satisfies man's need to unite himself with the world and to acquire at the same time, a sense of integrity and individuality, and this is love.77

Productive love, according to Fromm's description, is

75 E. Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 109.
76 E. Fromm, The Sane Society, p. 37.
77 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
characterized by care and responsibility, respect and knowledge. These qualities denote that love is an activity and an achievement; it is not just something that happens to us.

1) Care and responsibility -- From this point of view Fromm describes love as the "active concern for the life and growth of that which we love." To love is to labour for something and to make it grow. It is easy to see that motherly love is full of care and responsibility and involves labour both at the time of birth and afterwards, care to make the child grow. For Fromm, these qualities apply also to love between equals, to brotherly love or the love of friendship. To love means to be my brother's keeper, to feel responsible for the growth and welfare of the other. Responsibility is not a duty imposed from without, it is my response to something I feel to be my concern. To love another productively implies care and feeling responsible for his life, not only for his physical existence but for the growth and development of all his human powers.

To love productively is incompatible with being passive, with being an onlooker at the beloved person's life; it implies labour and care and the responsibility for his growth.

2) Respect and knowledge -- Without respect for and knowledge of the beloved, love can degenerate into domination and possessiveness. To respect is to see a person as

78 E. Fromm, The Art of Loving, p. 22.
79 E. Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 107.
he is, to be aware of his individuality and uniqueness and allow him to be himself. Care and responsibility would be blind if not guided by knowledge of and respect for another's individuality. Productive love leads to self-realization, to the realization of one's capacity to love because it is active, not passive, because it consists essentially in giving rather than receiving, and, as Fromm says:

Giving is more joyous than receiving, not because it is a deprivation, but because in the act of giving lies the expression of my aliveness [...]. Whoever is capable of giving of himself is rich. 80

To summarize, man is a unique individual aware of his separateness but unable to bear being unrelated to his fellow man. He can try to escape this contradiction by losing himself in submission, dependence, destructiveness or conformity, but there is only one solution which is:

[...] to face the truth, to acknowledge his fundamental aloneness and solitude in a universe indifferent to his fate, to recognize that there is no power transcending him which can solve his problem for him. Man must accept the responsibility for himself and the fact that only by using his own powers can he give meaning to his life. But meaning does not imply certainty; indeed, the quest for certainty blocks the search for meaning [...] there is no meaning to life except the meaning man gives his life by the unfolding of his powers, by living productively. 81

It is against the background of this basic dichotomy


81 E. Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 53.
inherent in human nature resulting from human self-awareness (i.e., the awareness of both individuality and isolation) and the corresponding need for relatedness that we must examine Fromm's view of human growth; for growth, like relatedness, will be either productive or non-productive, either conducive to or destructive of man's integrity and individuality, the realization of his potential and the development of his powers.

Fromm sees non-productive development as regression in the direction of an infantile orientation to reality and to a type of existence which represents a withdrawal or retreat from the full development of human self-awareness, which is seen as a threat. Productive growth, on the other hand, is a progression in the direction of the full development of self-awareness. Progression represents the development of that transcending of the animal's instinctive ties with nature which characterizes human existence. Thus, in Fromm's view, the question of human growth is the question of whether man will become fully human by continuing to progress in the way of transcendence, "until he becomes the master of nature and of himself:" or will he retreat from his humanity--"escape from his freedom"--and regress to the "pre-human state of harmony with nature"?82

Fromm identifies the symptoms of progression as: biophilia (the love of life), relatedness, and independence

82E. Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 49.
or freedom. These three characteristics combine to produce what Fromm calls the "syndrome of growth." Regression, on the other hand, is revealed in the three opposite symptoms: necrophilia (the love of death), narcissism and incestuous fixation. These negative symptoms, taken together, form the "syndrome of decay." In reference, then, to human growth, one may speak of a threefold dichotomy or polarity: necrophilia vs. biophilia; narcissism vs. relatedness; and incestuous fixation vs. freedom and independence.83

1) Necrophilia and Biophilia: Fromm believes that the most fundamental distinction that can be made between men is the distinction between those who love death (necrophilia), and those who love life (biophilia). Necrophilia is used here to refer to not only the sexual perversion of that name, but to a much more general orientation of character. Such an orientation is seen in those who are preoccupied with sickness and death; in those who live in the past, rather than the present or future; in those whose personalities are cold and distant, who are lovers of "law and order" and force. The necrophile wants to make life certain, orderly and mechanical; to make life inorganic rather than organic. These symptoms represent a desire to return to the womb; to inorganic, animal existence. It represents an attempt to reverse the process of transcendence occasioned

83 E. Fromm, The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil, Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
by human self-awareness and to return to the prehuman state of instinctual harmony with nature. As such, it is rightly called a "love of death." In Fromm's view, the necrophile, [...] wants to return to the darkness of the womb, and to the past of inorganic or animal existence. He is essentially oriented to the past, not to the future which he hates and is afraid of. Related to this is his craving for certainty. But life is never certain, never predictable, never controllable; in order to make life controllable, it must be transformed into death; death, indeed, is the only certainty in life.\[84\]

Biophilia, on the other hand, represents an orientation towards life. It represents an acceptance of one's humanity with all that that implies: self-awareness, transcendence of animal existence, and the adventure, risk, responsibility and uncertainty of life which is organic, rather than mechanical.

The person who fully loves life is attracted by the process of life and growth in all spheres. He prefers to construct rather than retain. He is capable of wondering, and he prefers to see something new to the security of finding confirmation of the old. He loves the adventure of living more than he does certainty. His approach to life is functional rather than mechanical. He sees the whole rather than only the parts, structures rather than summations. He wants to mould and influence by love, reason, by his example; not by force, by cutting things apart, by the bureaucratic manner of administering people as if they were things. He enjoys life in all its manifestations, rather than mere excitement.\[85\]

2) Narcissism and Relatedness: If necrophilia can

\[84\] E. Fromm, The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil, p. 42.

\[85\] Ibid., p. 47.
be regarded as an orientation towards death, or a reversal of the process of growth and a return to a condition which is inorganic and "pre-human," it is related to narcissism, which represents a regression to an infantile state. The narcissistic person is recognized by the characteristics of self-satisfaction, sensitivity to any form of criticism, and a lack of growing interest in the outside world. The term was used by Freud to describe the person whose "libido" or power to love is turned towards his own ego as object, whereas normal development demands the turning of the libido towards others as love objects. It will be recalled that this is characteristic of Freud's "genital" sexuality.

Fromm finds no essential difference between the narcissism of the infant for whom the outside world has not yet emerged as real, and the insane person and psychotic, for whom the outside world has ceased to be real. But between these two extremes, we find intermediate levels of narcissism which are either benign (normal) or malignant (neurotic). The benign form of narcissism results from the individual's effort (e.g., satisfaction taken in one's work, as artist, scientist, artisan, etc.). It is, thus, self-correcting, since pre-occupation with oneself is balanced by interest in the work itself. In its malignant form, however, narcissism results not from what one does but what one has (e.g., body, appearance, wealth) and thus represents a more total preoccupation with oneself and a correspondingly greater divorce from reality.
In the case of malignant narcissism, the object of narcissism is not anything the person does or produces, but something he has; for instance, his body, his looks, his health, his wealth, etc. The malignant nature of this type of narcissism lies in the fact that it lacks the corrective element which we find in the benign form. If I am "great" because of some quality I have, and not because of something I achieve, I do not need to be related to anybody or anything; I need not make any effort. In maintaining the picture of my greatness, I remove myself more and more from reality.86

Narcissism is an obstacle to growth since it restricts the growth of both reason and love. It impedes the objectivity which should characterize reason, since the narcissistic person is oriented towards seeing and judging reality only in reference to or as part of his own ego. It restricts love, since the narcissistic person loves another only as an extension of his own ego and not as a distinct and separate personality.

For the narcissistic person, the partner is never a person in his own right or in his full reality; he exists only as a shadow of the partner's narcissistically inflated ego.87

Narcissism thus becomes the antithesis of that kind of "productive relatedness" which, as has been seen above, is characterized by objective and concerned thinking, and love which displays care, responsibility, respect and knowledge.

3) Incestuous Fixation and Independence: Fromm's views on this polarity represent a development of Freud's


87 Ibid., p. 88.
original discovery of the phenomenon of "mother-fixation."
In Freud's view the child tends to be fixated in his attach­
ment to mother and restricts his affective life to her love
because she is the object of his sexual libido. For Fromm,
what lies behind the child's fixation to mother is not the
sex instinct but the human condition itself, i.e., the basic
human desire for security, love, warmth, protection and
unconditional love which the child finds in mother's love.
It is, therefore, related to both narcissism, which it
nourishes and satisfies, and necrophilia, which also repre­
sents a return to the womb and to the pre-human condition
and a reversal of the process of self-awareness and trans­
cendence.

The clinical grounds for this application of Freud's
Oedipal theory is found primarily in the presence of the
mother attachment of the pre-Oedipal phase in girls as well
as boys, which led Fromm to see in it something more than a
"genital" impulse. Correspondingly, renunciation of the
mother attachment is attributed to something more than the
presence of the father-rival; the attachment is given up (in
normal growth) because it is inconsistent with the main
thrust of human growth which is away from security and
dependence and in the direction of independence and the risk,
responsibility and insecurity which accompanies freedom. In
this context, incestuous fixation appears as the clinging to
a state which represents a paradise which has been lost and
must be given up if man is to achieve genuine freedom and
independence. But while the dynamics of human growth impel man towards independence and insecurity, there remains a tendency towards the warmth and security of his former condition. It is the basic dichotomy of his existence to be:

[...] torn between two tendencies since the moment of his birth; one, to emerge to the light and the other to regress to the womb; one for adventure and the other for certainty; one for the risk of independence and the other for protection and dependence.88

Just as individual narcissism can become "social narcissism" (i.e., narcissistic identification with one's own race, nation, church, political party, etc.) so the fixation to mother can become a fixation to a mother substitute which might be one's own wife, church, political party, clan, family, race, etc. From these mother substitutes, one will expect the same reassurance, warmth, security and unconditional love as the infant expects from his mother. Such transference of the mother fixation from one's physical mother to a substitute mother, such as the race or church, has a two-fold advantage: it gives one a mother who, unlike one's physical mother, is "immortal," and it provides an identification with others who share the same mother-figure. This kind of mother-fixation represents, as does narcissism, an obstacle to reason and love. One can only approve of what "mother" approves and love only those whom "mother" loves, i.e., those who share the same fixation.

The question now becomes: in this context of the symptoms of progressive and regressive development, is it possible to speak of personality growth as a transformation from the symptoms of regression to the symptoms of progression; from necrophilia to biophilia; from narcissism to relatedness; from incest to independence? Fromm has related his concept of biophilia and necrophilia to the life instinct (Eros) and the death instinct of Freud, with this difference: that he sees the death instinct or necrophilous orientation not as normal biology but as a psychopathology and a "secondary potentiality." The life instinct, the tendency to persevere in life, is considered as normal and primary; the necrophilous orientation takes over only if the appropriate conditions for life are not present.

Is it possible, therefore (if necrophilia is merely a pathological condition) to speak of growth as a transformation from necrophilia to biophilia? In other words, is this pathological condition present from the beginning as something to be overcome, or transcended, through the development of a biophilous orientation? In answering this question, it is important to remember that necrophilia is closely related, in Fromm's view, to the other symptoms of regression--narcissism and incestuous fixation. Each contributes to the growth of the other two. Thus, one may surmise that if the narcissism and mother-fixation which characterize infancy and early childhood are not transcended through relatedness and independence, then a necrophilous
orientation to life can be expected.

Thus, while the symptoms of progression are primary tendencies in the sense that they represent the true goals of normal growth, nevertheless, if one views growth in a lineal or chronological way, the symptoms of regression appear as primary, in the sense that they are the strongest early influences, and must be transcended if one is to grow towards life, relatedness and freedom. This transcendence becomes possible, in Fromm's view, when environmental conditions are favourable to such growth. Indeed, for Fromm, growth is essentially a process of transcendence: the evolution of the human race represents a transcending of the passive, creaturely condition, and of the pre-human state of harmony with nature; and the growth of the individual human being represents a transcending of the tendency to return or regress to that original state.

Human growth, therefore, involves a transformation from one type of motivation (necrophilous, narcissistic, incestuous) to a radically different kind of motivation (biophilous, out-going, independent). Moreover, it is authentic transformation, because the second type of motivation represents a transcending of the first since there is a radical discontinuity between necrophilia and biophilia, between narcissism and relatedness, between incestuous fixation and independence. If the symptoms of regression are characteristic of infancy and childhood, then the achieving of the true goals of human growth demands the transcending
of those symptoms, not the development or perfection of them. The seeds of life cannot be found in death, nor the potential for growth in decay.

5. Gordon Allport: From Opportunistic to Propriate Striving

The basic question asked by every theory of personality is: What are the dynamics of human behaviour? What is the basic motivating force behind the conduct of the individual? A theory of personality is primarily a theory of motivation, and in this respect Gordon Allport represents a departure from earlier theories which might be broadly categorized as "psychoanalytic" theories and "stimulus-response" theories. In Allport's view, modern dynamic psychology has developed two characteristics which limit the comprehensiveness of its motivational theory. The first of these is irrationalism, i.e., the emphasis on the unconscious sources of much of the individual's motivation at the expense of conscious values and intentions as motivating forces. Allport sees the beginning of this trend towards irrationalism in motivational theory in Schopenhauer's doctrine of the primacy of the blind will and continued in Darwin's theory of the primordial struggle for survival, McDougall's emphasis on instincts, and Freud's "libido."

All these theories were reactions against the intellectualism of previous philosophies and against the rationalizations by which men justified their conduct. Among them, Freud represents the most explicit theory of unconscious motivation. But, while acknowledging the value of Freud's discovery that much of our real motivation is hidden from the light of consciousness, Allport, along with other modern "ego-psychologists," insists on the role of conscious values and intentions. Ego-psychology seeks to locate more of the dynamic motivation of personality in the conscious ego rather than the unconscious id. In doing so, it tries to correct Freud's overemphasis on unconscious motivation and the incompleteness of his psychology of the ego.

Freud was a specialist in precisely those motives that cannot be taken at their face value. To him, motivation resided in the id. The conscious, accessible region of personality that carries on direct transactions with the world—that is, the ego—he regarded as devoid of dynamic power.90

In addition to irrationalism, modern dynamic psychology is also characterized by geneticism, i.e., a type of theory which assigns a crucial role to innate instincts or early childhood experiences in determining even adult behaviour. The "stimulus-response" type of theory tends to reduce behaviour to a set of learned responses to external

90G. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter, p. 103.
stimuli. Such theories join forces with the Freudian tendency to downgrade the role of consciously motivated and self-propelled behaviour in the adult.

Stimulus-response theorists agree with instinct psychologists and psychoanalysts in viewing adult motives as conditioned, reinforced, sublimated, or otherwise elaborated editions of instincts or drives, or of an id whose structure, Freud said, "never changes." 91

There are then, in Allport's view, two fundamental positions in regard to motivational theory: that of Freudian psychoanalysis and stimulus-response psychology which stress the unconscious nature of human motivation, and that of "ego-psychology" which emphasizes the importance of conscious, self-determining motivation. These, in turn, correspond to what Allport considers the two basic traditions in psychology: the Lockean tradition and the Leibnitzian. 92 Locke saw the mind as a passive receptor of sense impressions—a tabula rasa. Moreover, the earlier and simpler these impressions were, the more fundamental and decisive they were in the development of personality. Leibnitz, on the other hand, saw the intellect as something active, creative, and self-propelled which manipulates sensory data according to its own nature and purposes. The person thus becomes the source of acts, not just their locus.

91 G. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter, p. 96.
92 G. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955, Chapters 1, 2 and 3 (hereafter referred to as Becoming).
The theory of motivation proposed by Allport derives from the Leibnitzian tradition and emphasizes the "ego-structure" of personality as opposed to the various forms of geneticism-instinct psychology, orthodox Freudianism and stimulus-response psychology. All of these have a basic similarity of approach to motivation, i.e., an emphasis on what is innate in human nature or learned at an early age. Such theories insist that what motivates an adult is merely a modified, sublimated, or refined version of some primary instinct or infantile wish. The hunter, for example, is "displacing his aggressive instinct; the religious person is satisfying his infantile need for a loving, forgiving father through his belief and worship; the teacher or nurse has "sublimated" a maternal instinct.

This view of human motivation insists on a "functional continuity" between infantile and adult behaviour. Allport's critique of geneticism centres around the following points.

1) It does not do justice to the diversity of adult motivation.

Of course, we gladly grant that adult motives often reflect sex and aggression, and that some traces of infantile motivation may be found in some (especially neurotic) adult conduct; yet we cannot believe that Freud does justice to the diversity, uniqueness, and contemporaneity of most adult motivation.93

2) It does not explain the uniqueness of personality. Uniqueness is undermined when motivation is reduced to certain basic instincts which are common to all men. Allport believes that besides these instincts which demand satisfaction, an individual also has certain inborn dispositions or latent capacities towards self-regulating and self-maintaining uniqueness. They are really "potentialities for adulthood," by which the personality becomes a unique structure with a unique style of life. It is a capacity for growth beyond the instinctual level.

What we call instincts are primarily means for ensuring survival: the capacities I speak of are of the sort to ensure growth and orderly structure.

3) It does not take into consideration the "becoming" aspect of personality growth. Genetic theories see all behaviour as having the objective of satisfying a need or reducing tension. Thus growth takes place in a sort of circular movement, endlessly reproducing the cycle of need—effort—satisfaction—rest—need. Allport sees the individual as someone who is always in the process of becoming. The object of his growth is not merely to find new ways of reducing tension or maintaining equilibrium but to grow towards the realization of his capacities—to become what he potentially is. The goal of human growth is self-perfection

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95 Ibid.
rather than homeostasis. Such a goal requires what Allport calls "propriate striving" towards a unique style of life, i.e., striving which includes such ego-functions as self-identity, ego-extension and the realization of the ego-ideal.

Human growth, seen in this light, demands the presence of activity in which one engages, not because it represents a way of satisfying a primary instinct or drive, but rather a means towards self-perfection. This is "propriate striving" and is characteristic of adult behaviour.

At low levels of behaviour the familiar formula of drives and their conditioning appears to suffice. But as soon as the personality enters the stage of ego-extension, and develops a self-image with visions of self-perfection, we are, I think, forced to postulate motives of a different order, motives that reflect propriate striving.96

Such striving is the opposite of instinctual striving for it maintains tension rather than reducing it.

Propriate striving confers unity upon personality, but it is never the unity of fulfillment, or repose, or of reduced tension.97

Thus the activity by which an individual moves toward the goal of self-perfection and a unique style of life must be to some degree independent of instinctual and infantile needs, because the goal of propriate striving transcends the reduction of tension which the instincts seek. To return to our previous examples: if the activity of the hunter is to be considered "propriate" it must be something

96G. Allport, Becoming, p. 48.
97Ibid., p. 67.
valued and indulged in for its own sake, as part of one's unique life-style rather than as a socially acceptable way of satisfying a primitive instinct. Likewise, the worship of the believer and the labour of the nurse or teacher must be values in themselves, rather than sublimations of instinctual or infantile needs.

Allport suggests that a person is mature to the extent that his motives are thus independent of instinctual drives and infantile needs. The mature individual acts according to motives which are "functionally autonomous."

We have seen that geneticism insists on a functional continuity between infantile and adult behaviour, i.e., adult behaviour serves the same function as infantile behaviour (satisfaction of instinctual needs) but in a more refined, modified, or sublimated manner. Allport replies that "historical continuity does not mean functional continuity."98

Functional autonomy means that a particular activity or form of behaviour may become an end or goal in itself in spite of the fact that it was originally engaged in for some further reason. Thus, a young man might enter the same profession as his father largely motivated by an infantile identification with the father. What Allport insists upon is that it is entirely possible (and indeed, actually

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98 G. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter, p. 137.
happens in most cases) that the young man will develop an interest in his profession for its own sake so that his activity in this sphere is no longer dependent on unconscious motivation. He has outgrown his infantile motivation. There is certainly an historical continuity in his motivation; it evolved from an original need to identify with his father. But there is no functional continuity; his present behaviour does not serve the same purpose or function as his earlier behaviour. In Allport's view: "Just as we learn new skills, so also we learn new motives."^99

Allport explains the principle of functional autonomy in this way:

Just as a child gradually repudiates his dependence on his parents, develops a will of his own, becomes self-active and self-determining, and outlives his parents, so it is with motives. Each motive has a definite point of origin which may lie in the hypothetical instincts or, more likely, in the organic tension. [...] Theoretically, all adult purposes can be traced back to these seed-forms in infancy. But as the individual matures the bond is broken. The tie is historical, not functional [...] The life of a tree is continuous with that of its seed, but the seed no longer sustains and nourishes the full grown tree. Earlier purposes lead into later purposes, but are abandoned in their favour.^100

It is obvious that the principle of functional autonomy allows for great emphasis on conscious motivation as opposed to unconscious motives. In Allport's view, much


more importance must be given to the conscious intentions, purposes and goals which are contemporary rather than to the unconscious influence of the past history of the individual. The normal man's behaviour is not just a reaction to the past; it is the result of his intentions and plans for the future determined by his present ego-structure.

Thus it is clear that many authors reject the "reactive" view of man. Man has energies to use that reach way beyond the need to react. For one thing, he has an expanding image of himself (a conception of what he would like to be), and the pursuit of this goal directs much, if not most of his conduct.101

The achieving of functional autonomy or "propriate striving" represents, for Allport, one aspect of the "proprium"--a word used by Allport to designate the sum total of propriate functions or systems of personality. The concept of proprium appears in Allport's psychology of personality as something of a compromise solution to the question of whether psychology should resort to a concept of "self" or "soul" to explain the growth, integration and organization of personality. Is there, at the core of personality, some "mysterious central agency" which directs the growth and integration of personality? Allport points out that modern psychology, since the time of Wundt, has tended to reject such a postulate and to see the individual personality in terms of a stream of experiences and adjustments.

101 G. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 251.
Man was identified with his psychological functions rather than a self which was the transcendent subject of those functions, because Wundt and his followers believed that the concept of a substantive self or soul was a philosophical or theological postulate which was inaccessible to the investigations of an empirical psychology.

In recent years, however, the concept of the self has revived. Allport attributes this resurgence in part to Freud's discussion of the ego. For Freud, the ego was the rational executor of personality, but its role was a passive and restricted one, reconciling the instinctual demand of the id with the demands of conscience and the external world. Later, psychologists, including Allport, saw personality as less instinctually motivated and therefore, were able to assign a more active and creative role to the ego. This "emancipated" ego became the self.

But, in reviving the concept of the self, the problem is to arrive at an understanding of the self which makes it accessible to psychological analysis and, therefore really explains the integration of personality, rather than a self which is a postulate beyond empirical investigation, which directs the growth of personality in some mysterious autonomous way, and therefore explains the integration of personality without really explaining it in a psychologically satisfying way. Allport believed that to revert to such a concept of the self would be, for psychology at least, to retard scientific progress.
What is unnecessary and inadmissable is a self (or soul) that is said to perform acts, to solve problems, to steer conduct, in a trans-psychological manner, inaccessible to psychological analysis.\textsuperscript{102}

But what kind of self is "accessible" to psychological analysis? Allport believed that the answer was to be found, in germ at least, in what Adler had called the individual's "life style." The self which psychology can deal with is that self which is revealed in an individual's unique style of life, and, for Allport, this unique lifestyle is revealed in that kind of activity which can be called "propriate striving" or "oriented becoming."

It is here that Allport introduces an important distinction. We must distinguish, he says, between what are matters of importance to an individual, i.e., vital and central to his growth and functioning as a person, and what are really matters of fact, i.e., mere circumstances which do not touch the core of personality. In terms of human growth, the distinction is between those modes of adjustment (or, as Allport would say, modes of "becoming") which are "opportunistic," such as the learning and use of one's native tongue, or the innumerable habits into which one falls in the routine of life, which are not central to one's existence, and those which are propriate, i.e., central and important to one's existence, and which, therefore, belong to one's unique style of life. It is to the sum total of

\textsuperscript{102} G. Allport, \textit{Becoming}, p. 55.
these central or propriate modes of becoming that Allport applies the term "proprium"--a term used to convey a new understanding of the self, a concept of the self deduced from the observations of man's "propriate striving," rather than a philosophical postulate to explain what otherwise could not be explained.

For Allport, the key to personality is uniqueness, and this uniqueness is revealed in the propriate striving and functions of personality, for these are the aspects of each man's personality which are uniquely his own. Any account of personality must include hereditary and environmental factors, such as conditioned reflexes, habits, skills, language, culture, etc., which a man has in common with others. These elements become "second nature" to the individual; they seldom seem central and important to him. But the uniqueness of personality can only be accounted for in terms of what is central and important to the individual--what is "propriate."

But personality includes what is warm and important also--all the regions of our life that we regard as peculiarly ours, and which for the time being I suggest we call the "proprium." The proprium includes all aspects of personality that make for inward unity.103

Such an interpretation of the self, i.e., in terms of the proprium or aggregate of propriate functions, enables Allport to arrive at a concept of the self, which, on purely

103 G. Allport, Becoming, p. 40.
psychological grounds, accounts for the unity and integration of personality, without resorting to a self which is a homunculus or mysterious inner agent. If the self is identified with man's propriate striving, then we have a self which account for the growth, maturity and unification of personality, for it is precisely man's propriate striving which accounts for those conscious plans, intentions and long-range goals which give purpose, meaning and direction to life and, therefore, unity to personality. Integrity is achieved when man's strivings and adjustments are given unity and direction by a central mode of adjustment or becoming, i.e., by set of conscious plans and intentions at the centre of personality--Allport sees the presence of such "propriate" long-range goals as the mark of maturity and mental health, whereas motivation whose aim is the mere reduction of tension through opportunistic satisfaction of instinctual drive results in that fragmented type of personality associated with mental illness.

Propriate striving distinguishes itself from other forms of motivation in that, however beset by conflicts, it makes for unification of personality [...]. When the individual is dominated by segmental drives, by compulsions or by the winds of circumstance, he has lost the integrity that comes only from maintenance of major directions of striving. The possession of long-range goals, regarded as central to one's existence, distinguishes the human being from the animal, the adult from the child, and, in many cases, the healthy personality from the sick.104

104 G. Allport, Becoming, pp. 50-51.
Having identified the self with man's propriate functions, Allport is able to describe the growth of personality in terms of the gradual development by the individual of the various aspects of the proprium. He identifies eight such aspects, which may be understood as levels or stages of growth not in any rigidly chronological and exclusive way but in the sense that they represent increasingly higher levels of maturity and integrity. Allport identifies these aspects of the proprium as follows:  \(^{105}\)

1) Bodily sense (crenesthesia): This refers to the infant's growing awareness of his body and bodily sensations as his own, and represents the first step towards a sense of uniqueness and individuality.

2) Self-identity: the growing realization that one is a being in one's own right, distinct from others.

3) Ego-enhancement: that property of the proprium associated with affirmation and preservation of the ego through selfishness, self-esteem, self-seeking and narcissism.

4) Ego-extension: refers to the extension of the ego to whatever can be called "mine," including identification with loved objects, parents, and in time, causes, ideals and values.

5) Rational agent: that function of the ego which not only protects itself inwardly (ego-enhancement), but turns towards the external world to solve problems, make and carry

\(^{105}\) G. Allport, *Becoming*, pp. 41-54.
out plans and intentions, and make adjustments.

6) Self-image: refers to the self as seen by the self. It includes one's view of both his present abilities and his aspirations for the future.

7) Propriate striving: refers to the transformation of motives implied in mature growth by which motivation becomes "functionally autonomous."

8) The Knower: refers to the fullness of self-consciousness, i.e., the individual has an awareness of himself as the subject of all the above mentioned functions. There is a knower who is the subject of and distinct from the knowing process.

This outline of the growth of personality indicates that Allport sees human growth as the growth of the proprium, i.e., a growth towards striving and activity which can be called "propriate" or uniquely one's own, an expression of conscious plans, objectives and values, and therefore of one's unique life-style. As such, it is produced by motives which are functionally autonomous, i.e., independent of instinctual drives and infantile wishes.

Allport finds a specific example of the functional autonomy of propriate activity in the growth of conscience. Freud believed conscience to be the interiorized voice of authority which one obeyed out of fear of punishment, whether the punishment came from the authority figure or the superego. But for Allport, such a conscience would be an example of "opportunistic becoming," a question of surface
conformity which does not touch the core of personality which is concerned with propriate striving or "oriented becoming," i.e., the conscious pursuit of goals which are seen as meaningful and valuable for their own sake, and vital to one's existence. Thus, in the realm of conscience, the mature adult does not merely adjust his behaviour in an opportunistic way to an interiorized voice of authority (as the child does); he consciously pursues goals which are consistent with his values, his self-image and his ego-ideal. Allport points to the fact that adults often discard the codes of conduct imposed by parents or culture in favour of a private code of virtue.

We conclude, therefore, that conscience somehow shifts its centre from ad hoc habits of obedience to the proprium—that is to say, from opportunistic becoming to oriented becoming.106

According to Allport, three important changes occur when the conscience becomes functionally autonomous.107

1) External sanctions give way to internal. This refers to the Freudian concept of the "introjection" of prohibitions and commands through identification with the authority figure.

2) "Must" gives way to "ought," i.e., the emphasis is away from obedience to commands and prohibitions, and towards the pursuit of values and the self-image.

106 G. Allport, Becoming, p. 72.
107 Ibid., p. 73.
3) Specific habits of obedience give way to generic self-guidance, i.e., conduct is directed not by specific rules but by a broad scheme of values.

This description of the growth of conscience illustrates what is basic to Allport's theory of human growth—the fact that growth and maturity involve a transformation. Indeed, Allport's theory of personality offers the most explicit description of human growth as a transformation of motives. Growth is seen as a transformation from unconscious to conscious motivation. The mature personality is no longer driven by primitive instincts and infantile needs; he is pulled by his conscious plans, intentions and ideals. And it is precisely his motives that have been transformed; for the same activity pursued for unconscious, infantile motives may, through growth and maturity, be pursued no longer for the satisfaction of primitive instinct or infantile need, but for its own sake, i.e., as a goal consistent with one's conscious values. Such motivation has become functionally autonomous—liberated from its unconscious and infantile origins. It is in this way that man transcends himself, for he is no longer the passive victim of unconscious drives and infantile needs but the creator of a unique style of life through the free and conscious pursuit of values and objectives. Allport is also explicit in describing this transition in terms of a radical discontinuity. Adult behaviour may be historically continuous with infantile
behaviour (i.e., may have its origins in infantile needs and drives), but it is not functionally continuous because it no longer serves the same function, i.e., the satisfaction of those needs and drives. It is functionally autonomous. Thus there is, between the motivation of infantile or immature behaviour and that of mature adult behaviour, that radical discontinuity which is essential to the idea of transformation.

6. Viktor Frankl: From Self-Actualization to Self-Transcendence

Viktor Frankl, through his efforts to develop both the theory and practice of a new form of psychotherapy—"logotherapy"—has become known as the leader of the "third Viennese School of Psychotherapy." What is of interest to the present study is not so much the psychotherapeutic techniques of logotherapy as the personality theory or view of man, which accounts for its basic presuppositions—the rationale behind the practice. From this point of view, logotherapy differs from its predecessors—the psychoanalytic school of Freud and the individual psychology of Adler—in that it identifies the basic motivating force or tendency of the unconscious as neither the will to pleasure (Freud) nor the will to power (Adler), but as the "will to meaning." As a psychotherapist, Frankl found himself dealing with patients whose anxiety was not the neurotic type of anxiety Freud had encountered, but could more properly be
called "existential" anxiety. That is to say, it was not the anxiety caused by the inner conflict of id, ego and superego, by the unconscious repression of threatening impulses, memories, etc., but rather an anxiety which was inherent in human existence itself. Frankl's patients were not suffering from neurotic repression, but from a sense of meaninglessness in their lives.

Frankl's hypothesis is that this type of neurosis "noogenic neurosis," to use Frankl's terminology) demands a different kind of treatment, the object of which is not to release the energy of inhibiting and repressing forces, and therefore reduce tension, but to help the patient discover the meaning of his unique human existence. Such a project may run counter to the objective of traditional psychotherapy, which is to reduce tension or achieve a tensionless state. The man who tries to pursue a goal and fulfil a meaning of life will often maintain rather than reduce tension. But tension, in Frankl's view, is an essential part of a life that is fully human. Man's objective is not to achieve a tensionless state but to fulfil the meaning of his life in spite of tension.

What man actually needs is not a tensionless state but rather the striving and struggling for some goal worthy of him. What he needs is not the discharge of tension at any cost, but the call of a particular and potential meaning waiting to be fulfilled by him.108

It is this sense of meaning and purpose in life which makes tension and, indeed, every other type of suffering, bearable. Frankl quotes the words of Nietzsche on this point: "He who has a WHY to live for can bear with almost any HOW." \(^{109}\)

To speak of man in this way—as motivated by the will to meaning and made anxious by the absence of meaning—reveals an understanding of man which can be described as existential. It is the view of man one finds in the philosophy of Heidegger which sees man as existing through the concrete choices and commitments he makes and analyzes man in terms of possible ways of being human, as a choice between inauthentic and authentic ways of being in the world. It is also the view of man which one finds in an existentialist type of theology such as that of Rudolf Bultmann which sees the message of the New Testament as giving man a new understanding of his existence and its possibilities, as offering man a particular choice (faith in Jesus Christ) by which the authentic existence described by existentialist philosophy becomes realizable. With Frankl, we find this existentialist view of man used as a basis for psychotherapy. The understanding of man, which is evident in Frankl's discussion of the principles of logotherapy reveal at least three themes which can be called characteristic of existentialism. These are:

\(^{109}\)V. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning*, p. 121.
1) The priority of existence over essence: Existentialist thinking finds the value of man not in abstract and static definitions of man but in the unique concrete existence of the individual. To define man in abstract terms does not do justice to or exhaust the meaning of the individual's existence, for it abstracts from his particularity and therefore from his uniqueness. But the value and dignity of the individual is to be found precisely in this uniqueness, for each man is constantly in a state of becoming, and he himself determines what he is to become through his own choice and commitment. It is not predetermined by a philosophical system or definition. Frankl insists on this unique value of the individual.

This uniqueness and singleness which distinguishes each individual and gives a meaning to his existence has a bearing on creative work as much as it does on human love. When the impossibility of replacing a person is realized, it allows the responsibility which man has for his existence and its continuance to appear in all its magnitude.\(^{110}\)

When man assumes this responsibility for his existence, he makes decisions and commitments and it is through these decisions that he becomes what he potentially is. This is the meaning of self-determination.

A human being is not one thing among others; things determine each other, but man is ultimately self-determining. What he becomes--within the limits of endowment and environment--he has made

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out of himself. [...] [what he becomes] depends on decisions but not on conditions.\textsuperscript{111}

2) Freedom: To say that a man becomes what he decides to become presupposes the ability to choose freely. This represents another basic existentialist theme—man's awareness of himself as a free being in the world. Freedom of choice is not thought of as something which can be philosophically demonstrated, but as a matter of immediate awareness, even though it is balanced by an equally immediate awareness of the limitations of human existence, even and especially of death. But in the face of life's limitations, one is still free in regard to the attitude he adopts to those circumstances and conditions which restrict freedom. Frankl would refer to this as realizing or fulfilling "attitudinal valves."

To be sure, a human being is a finite being, and his freedom is restricted. It is not freedom from conditions, but freedom to take a stand toward the conditions.\textsuperscript{112}

This means that one is never relieved of the responsibility which accompanies freedom for even in the most restricted circumstances, one is responsible for the attitude one adopts. The awareness of freedom, then, involves an awareness of responsibility since one is free only to commit oneself to various alternatives, not to remain uncommitted.

\textsuperscript{111}V. Frankl, \textit{Man's Search for Meaning}, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., p. 205.
In a word, each man is questioned by life; and he can only answer to life by answering for his own life; to life he can only respond by being responsible. Thus, logotherapy sees in responsibleness the very essence of human existence.113

3) Subjectivity: Existentialist thinkers, beginning with Kierkegaard, have insisted that truth must be subjectively as well as objectively true, i.e., truth must be stated in such a way that it has meaning for the individual. Truth must be such that the individual reacts with concern and decision rather than objective detachment. Kierkegaard, as a religious writer, insisted that Christianity must be presented to the individual in such a way that it challenges him to a decision and a commitment. Thus it is less important to ask "What is Christianity?" than to ask "How does one become a Christian?". In the same vein, Frankl, as a psychotherapist, insists that man's will to meaning is not satisfied by describing the meaning of life in general or abstract terms, but in discovering the meaning of one's unique, individual existence.

These tasks, and therefore the meaning of life, differ from man to man, and from moment to moment. Thus it is impossible to define the meaning of life in a general way. Questions about the meaning of life can never be answered by sweeping statements. "Life" does not mean something vague, but something very real and concrete, just as life's task are also very real and concrete.114

Logotherapy is directed to the treatment of

113V. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, pp. 172-73.
114Ibid., pp. 122-23.
"existential frustration," i.e., the frustration of this very will to meaning, the striving to find a concrete meaning in personal existence. This type of frustration often results in what Frankl calls "noogenic neurosis" as distinct from psychogenic neurosis, i.e., a neurosis which arises not from conflicts between drives and instincts in the psychological dimension of man but from conflicts between various values in the spiritual dimension of personality. Logotherapy, therefore, goes beyond the Freudian explanation of abnormal and normal behaviour because it "dares to enter the spiritual dimension of human existence." 115 It deals with spiritual issues, i.e., "man's aspirations for a meaningful existence, as well as the frustration of this aspiration." 116

This reference to the spiritual core or dimension of human personality serves to illustrate the fact that Frankl's method of logotherapy differs from the traditional psychoanalytic method because it is based on a different understanding of man. For Frankl, human personality is a three-dimensional reality; the individual functions on three levels—physical, psychological, and spiritual. The physical dimension refers to the operation of the nervous system and glands; the psychological to the operation of the instincts and drives; and the spiritual to the striving for meaningful existence. Freud had attributed man's conscious

115 V. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 160.
116 Ibid.
"spiritual" activity, whether religious or artistic, to the sublimation of the sexual instinct or the projection of infantile fears and desires. In other words, what was consciously spiritual was explained as originating on the unconscious psychological level, thus denying the reality of any distinct spiritual dimension to personality. Frankl rejects the Freudian explanation of man's spiritual activity as originating in an instinctive unconscious, i.e., as a means of gratifying an instinctual drive or wish. In its place, he advances the theory that man has, in addition to an instinctive unconscious, another and more fundamental source of motivation, which he calls the "spiritual unconscious." The instinctive unconscious acts according to the pleasure principle; the spiritual unconscious operates according to the "will to meaning" which Frankl sees as the basic tendency of the unconscious. It is this unconscious tendency which accounts for all man's conscious attempts to discover a meaning and direction for his existence.

Unconscious spirituality is the origin and root of all consciousness. In other words, we know and acknowledge, not only an instinctive unconscious, but rather, also a spiritual unconscious, and in it we see the supporting ground of all conscious spirituality.117

It is because of the presence of this spiritual dimension in man that Frankl refuses to identify man with

his biological and instinctive drives. Man has such drives, but he is more than the sum total of them. The critics of Freudian psychoanalysis, while admitting its value in the treatment of neurotic anxiety, are almost unanimous in pointing out its limitations as a theory of personality; they point to its failure to account for the richness and uniqueness of human personality by explaining it in terms of a set of primitive instincts. In Frankl's terminology, this limitation consists in taking into account only the first two dimensions of human personality—the physical and the psychological—and ignoring the spiritual dimension as a basic motivating force. Frankl thus attempts to make up for Freud's narrow and restricted view of human personality by introducing the concept of the spiritual unconscious. In doing so, he follows in the footsteps of Jung and Adler, who tried to enhance the Freudian theory by attributing man's unconscious tendencies to something more fundamental than the sex instinct. For Adler, it was the desire for superiority or perfection; for Jung, it was the quest for wholeness which was directed in a somewhat autonomous fashion by the "collective unconscious"—a construct not unlike Frankl's spiritual unconscious. For other personality theorists, such as Fromm and Allport, the corrective was found to be a more rational, self-determining and creative role for the ego in personality growth.

In Frankl's view, then, what is lacking in the Freudian theory is a recognition of the spiritual dimension
of personality on the unconscious level, i.e., a recognition of the "will to meaning" as the basic motivating tendency of the unconscious, a tendency which is more fundamental to human growth than the tendency to gratify instinctual impulses. According to this view, a man is acting according to his true nature, when he endures the tension of unsatisfied instinctual drives, for the sake of a more meaningful existence. Thus, the instinctual renunciation" of which Freud spoke is not merely the result of the repressive force of the superego or society, but is endured by the individual because the will to meaning is a more fundamental tendency than instinctual drives—not a sublimation of those drives.

Man's search for meaning is a primary force in his life and not a "secondary rationalization" of instinctual drives. [...] There are some authors who contend that meanings and values are "nothing but defense mechanisms, reaction formations and sublimations." But as for myself, I would not be willing to live merely for the sake of my "defense mechanisms," nor would I be willing to die merely for the sake of my "reaction formations." Man, however, is able to live and even to die for the sake of his ideals and values.118

To be sure, man's search for meaning and values may arouse inner tension rather than inner equilibrium. However, precisely this tension is an indispensable prerequisite of mental health. There is nothing in the world, I venture to say, that would so effectively help one to survive even the worst conditions, as the knowledge that there is a meaning in one's life.119

This "spiritual" unconscious which is the origin of

118V. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, pp. 154-55.
119Ibid., p. 164.
man's will to meaning, is not, in itself, accessible to study or analysis. Like the instinctive unconscious, it is a construct offered as an explanation of observable behaviour; and, like the instinctive unconscious, it is revealed only in man's conscious, observable behaviour. What reveals this spiritual dimension in man is his freedom and responsibility. By using both these words, Frankl makes it clear that man's spirituality (will to meaning) is revealed not only in the fact that, in choosing what he will be, man is not only free from his instinctual drives (i.e., able to affirm or deny them) and (at least attitudinally) from environmental conditions, but he is free for something, i.e., he is free to commit himself to meanings and values, for freedom always implies responsibility. Thus, man's freedom is limited, or conditioned, not only by physical, hereditary and environmental factors, but also by the fact of responsibility. Freedom reveals man's human mode of existence; responsibility reveals man's transcendence. And it is the objective of logotherapy to lead man to an awareness of responsibility and thereby to self-transcendence.

The concept of self-transcendence is, in the present writer's opinion, the key concept in Frankl's understanding of man, of human motivation, and of the transformation of motives implied in human growth. In Frankl's view, man realizes the will to meaning, and so achieves authentic human existence when he transcends himself by responding to an objective world of meaning and value. In this respect,
he is careful to disassociate himself from the kind of existentialist thinking represented by Jean-Paul Sartre, which sees man as the inventor of his own values and ideals. For Frankl, meaning and value are not expressions of man's own self and existence; they are discovered by man as objective realities which confront and challenge him.

We have to beware of the tendency to deal with values in terms of the mere self-expression of man himself. For Logos or "meaning" is not only an emergence from existence itself but rather something confronting existence. If the meaning that is waiting to be fulfilled by man were nothing "but a mere expression of self," or no more than a projection of his wishful thinking, it would immediately lose its demanding and challenging character; it could no longer call man forth or summon him [...]. I think that the meaning of our existence is not invented by ourselves, but rather detected.

In terms of motivation, this means that man is not driven from within—neither by his instinctual drives nor by his ego-ideal or the values which he creates for himself. Rather, he transcends himself by responding to meanings to be fulfilled and values to be realized, which he discovers in the objective world of reality outside of himself, i.e., by daring to carry out the task which life assigns to him. Frankl applies this idea to the realm of morality. Man, he says, does not behave morally in order to satisfy a moral drive but for the self-transcending motive of commitment to a cause or to another person or to God. This is the difference between a saint and a perfectionist.

\[120\] V. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning*, pp. 156-57.
I think that even the saints did not care for anything other than simply to serve God, and I doubt that they ever had it in mind to become saints. If that were the case, they would have become only perfectionists rather than saints.\footnote{121}

Frankl does not deny that the goal of personality growth is self-actualization, i.e., man is to become what he potentially is. What he insists upon, however, is that when self-actualization becomes the conscious aim of the individual, it is self-defeating. Man can only actualize himself by transcending himself; in the words of the New Testament, he can only "find himself" by "losing himself," i.e., through response and commitment to something or someone outside of himself. Self-actualization is, as it were, the by-product of this self-transcending commitment.

By declaring that man is a responsible creature, and must actualize the potential meaning of his life, I wish to stress that the true meaning of life is to be found in the world, rather than within man or his own psyche, as though it were a closed system. By the same token, the real aim of human existence cannot be found in what is called self-actualization. Human existence is essentially self-transcendence rather than self-actualization. Self-actualization is not a possible aim at all, for the simple reason that the more a man would strive for it, the more he would miss it [...]. In other words, self-actualization cannot be attained if it is made an end in itself, but only as a side effect of self-transcendence.\footnote{122}

How does man achieve this kind of transcendence? Frankl mentions two ways:

\footnote{121}{V. Frankl, \textit{Man's Search for Meaning}, p. 158.}
\footnote{122}{Ibid., p. 175.}
1) Man transcends himself in "height" by realizing or fulfilling values. The meaning of man's life is not fulfilled by merely reproducing himself biologically. This represents life transcending itself in "length," but the individual must also transcend the limitations of his existence "in height" by fulfilling values. Frankl speaks of three types of values to be fulfilled by man. These are:

i) Creative values which are realized by artistic creation or the fulfillment of an assigned task for which one feels responsible;

ii) Experiential values which arise from emotional experiences such as the appreciation of beauty in art or nature or the love of another person;

iii) Attitudinal values, which arise from the attitude one adopts towards those limitations or conditions in life which limit freedom and which man cannot avoid, such as suffering. This last bastion of freedom—the freedom to assume an attitude towards one's sufferings—prevents these sufferings from completely tyrannizing man. Frankl summarizes these three types of values when he says:

According to logotherapy, we can discover this meaning in life in three different ways: (1) by doing a deed; (2) by experiencing a value; and (3) by suffering.123

2) Man transcends himself "in breadth" through community, i.e., by relating to a community in which his individuality

123V. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 176.
finds its true meaning. The unique value of the individual's concrete existence, which is a theme central to existentialism, is, in Frankl's view, always related to community. The individual has a unique value because of the unique role he has to play and the unique contribution he has to make to a community; and in fulfilling that role in the community, he transcends himself.

Thus, the meaning of a human person as a personality points beyond its own limits, towards community; in being directed toward community, the meaning of the individual transcends itself.124

Thus, there is a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the community. The community is dependent on the unique value and contribution of the individual; and the individual finds his true value by transcending himself in community.

Logotherapy, as a theory of motivation, goes beyond both the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Allport's ego-psychology. In Freudian psychoanalysis, man is driven by instinctual necessity, so that his motivation is best described by the word "must." Allport's ego-psychology stresses man's ability to realize himself through conscious intention and this ability is conveyed in the word "can." Frankl wants an understanding of human existence, and therefore, of motivation, which goes beyond the "I must" of

psychoanalysis and the "I can" of ego-psychology and arrives at the "I ought" of man who sees himself responsible for the fulfilling of those objective values and meanings which challenge him from without. He wants to interpret existence as obligation. In this way the subjective side of human existence, i.e., being, is complemented by what Frankl considers its objective counterpart, i.e., meaning.

The whole phenomenon of human existence, however, is ineffable and cannot be circumscribed except by a sentence, the sentence, "I am." This "I am" had first been interpreted in terms of "I must" (i.e. I am forced by certain conditions and determinants, drives and instincts, hereditary and environmental factors and impacts), whereas in the following period the "I am" was understood in terms of an "I can" (i.e. I am able to actualize this or that aspect of myself).

There is still lacking, however, a third concept; for if we want to obtain an appropriate view of the human reality in its full dimensionality we would have to go beyond both necessities and possibilities insofar as we have to bring in—in addition to the "I must" and "I can" aspects of the total "I am" phenomenon—that dimension which would have to be referred to as the "I ought."¹²⁵

It must be remembered that Frankl does not deny the existence of instinctual drives or the possibility of self-actualization. What he insists upon, as was pointed out above, is the necessity of self-transcendence in order to achieve self-actualization, and this requires a recognition of the spiritual dimension of man (will to meaning).

Frankl's insistence on a psychology which goes beyond the

instincts and even the creative self, reveals perhaps his view of human growth, and the transformation which takes place in human growth. For these three types of psychology reveal three levels of maturity: man driven by instincts; man striving for self-actualization; man responding to meaning and value. The attaining of this third level of maturity, i.e., the discovery and response to the meaning of one's existence involves a transformation of motives, for one passes from the "I must" of instinctual demands to the "I can" of self-actualization, and finally to the "I ought" of the fulfillment of meaning and value.

This transformation, moreover, implies transcendence, for the man who is motivated by the "spiritual" unconscious or will to meaning responds freely to something outside of himself, such as meaning, value and community, rather than being driven by internal necessity. And self-transcendence, in turn, implies discontinuity. All man's attempts to satisfy instinctual demands or achieve self-actualization do not lead naturally and automatically to the kind of self-transcending motivation implied in the will to meaning. Rather, self-transcendence becomes possible when attempts at self-actualization in some real sense "break down." Man does not transcend himself by trying to actualize himself; he transcends himself when he abandons his attempts at self-actualization, and, in a self-forgetting way, commits himself to a value, meaning or person outside of himself. In this way, he finds the actualization of his
potential which he previously looked for in himself. In "losing himself," he "finds himself."

7. Conclusion

Within the context of the transformation of personality the foregoing personality theories may be summarized as follows:

(1) FREUD: Man's growth towards maturity is closely associated with the development of the sex instinct, i.e., he grows towards maturity as the sex instinct liberates itself from the ego instincts or as love liberates itself from hate. At a more fundamental level, one may say that man grows towards maturity as he moves by behaviour motivated by the death instinct (aggressive, self-assertive, defensive) to behaviour which is motivated by the life instinct (Eros).

(2) JUNG: Man grows towards maturity as he moves from reliance on conscious rational motives and self-justifying projections to a greater openness to unconscious motivation and the unconscious systems of personality, including the recognition of the "shadow" side of personality. Man transcends himself through openness to motives of the "collective unconscious."

(3) ADLER: Man grows towards maturity as he moves from motives of self-enhancement to motives of social interest, i.e., by transcending the "will to power" which takes the
form of defensiveness, and an interpretation of life which is private and "useless," and moving towards a will to power or superiority or perfection which is directed towards the socially useful side of life.

(4) FROMM: Man grows towards maturity as he moves from narcissism to relatedness, from love of death to love of life, and from incestuous ties to independence. Transcendence here involves overcoming the desire for the warmth, comfort and security which accompany a state of dependence and accepting the risk and uncertainty which accompany independence and autonomy.

(5) ALLPORT: Man grows towards maturity as he moves from unconscious infantile motives to functionally autonomous motivation. There is an historical continuity but not a functional continuity between the motivation of the child and the adult. Transcendence, therefore, would have reference to breaking out of the cycle or prison of functional continuity.

(6) FRANKL: Man grows towards maturity as he moves from self-actualizing motivation to self-transcending motivation. Man transcends himself by responding, not to his own needs but to something outside of himself, i.e., to the meanings and values to be fulfilled in the world around him. He transcends the desire for self-realization.

In each of the above theories human growth and
maturity are described as requiring a transformation of motives and therefore a radical discontinuity with immature motivation and a transcending of some previous state. There is, for example, no continuity between Freud's mature "genital" sex instinct and its preliminary phases (oral, anal, phallic), nor can the sum total of these preliminary phases, considered as component parts of the mature instinct, account for the altruistic function of that instinct. The mature instinct is something substantially different from the sum of its component parts. A transformation has taken place, and, as has been seen, the successful resolution of the Oedipus complex is critical to that transformation, for it is at this stage that the egocentric striving of the instinct is reversed and transformed into a more altruistic striving towards true love objects in the external world of reality. A similar transformation obtains in the other theories discussed: self-acceptance replaces self-justification (Jung); social interest replaces self-enhancement (Adler); growth replaces decay (Fromm); functional autonomy of motives replaces functional continuity (Allport); and self-transcendence replaces self-actualization (Frankl). In each of these polarities, it is obvious that the final stage is not the normal, predictable outgrowth of the preliminary state. Man does not arrive, for example, at self-transcendence by continuing in his striving for self-actualization. Self-transcendence can only take place when self-actualization "breaks down" i.e., when the striving for
self-actualization is abandoned through commitment to some value or meaning outside of oneself.

It is also interesting to note the manner in which the concept of self-transcendence evolves in personality theory. There is a progressively greater emphasis on man's ability to freely choose self-transcendence which corresponds to the evolution of the concepts of "ego" and "self." In Freud's psychoanalytic theory, man is driven by instinctual necessity; the ego's function is merely to channel the energy of the instincts towards suitable objects. Nevertheless, there is still an element of transcendence in human growth since the life instinct transcends the egocentric striving of the death instinct. In Jung, the ego retains the same function but is balanced by the concept of the self which represents a balance of conscious and unconscious motivation. Thus, it is the ego itself (in the sense of exclusively conscious rational motivation) which is transcended. Other theorists such as Adler and Fromm considered men less instinctually determined and more socially determined, and assign a more independent and creative role to the ego. As has been seen, this "emancipated" ego becomes the self. For Adler, this creative self manifests itself in an individual's life style.

But Adler's life style is still, to a great extent, unconsciously motivated and a reaction against feelings of inferiority. Nevertheless, it accounts for an individual's uniqueness, and Allport, using the uniqueness of personality
as a starting point, developed a theory in which uniqueness is explained in terms of "propriate striving." Propriate striving, in Allport's view, gives evidence of a "self" at the core of personality, and explains man's ability to achieve self-realization through his conscious plans and intentions. At this level of maturity, man pursues self-actualizing goals for their own sake and not as sublimations of primitive or infantile instincts. Thus, in this case, it is the enclosed circle of instinctual determinism which is transcended. Man's motives are no longer in the serve of primitive and unconscious drives; they are "functionally autonomous." It remained for Frankl to explicitly advance the concept of self-transcendence, i.e., to point out that human completeness demands that even Allport's autonomous self must be transcended. Frankl insists that, while the self is free to pursue self-actualization through conscious plans and intentions, nevertheless self-actualization cannot be achieved by pursuing it as an end in itself. Self-actualization takes place only as the by-product of self-transcendence, i.e., as the result of man's efforts to fulfill meaning and value and to respond to something or someone outside of himself rather than being driven by internal necessity (whether that internal necessity is instinctual drive or the drive towards self-actualization).

Finally, it is possible to see in man's growing understanding of himself, a reflection of the basic pattern of growth indicated in the Introduction to this study.
1) Man's first state is one of un-selfconsciousness (man instinctively driven and determined—unaware of his true motives).

2) Man becomes gradually aware of himself, self-conscious and inward looking (man striving for self-actualization through conscious plans and motives).

3) Man transcends and integrates both these preliminary stages and becomes outer-directed again, not through unself-consciousness but through self-forgetfulness (man transcending himself).
CHAPTER II

FAITH AS TRANSFORMATION:
THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

1. The Elements of Faith

Thomas Aquinas defined faith as: "the act of the intellect when it assents to divine truth under the influence of the will moved by God through grace."¹ In order to emphasize the differences between the two traditions which have arisen within western Christianity, i.e., the difference between the "believing faith" of Catholicism and the "trusting faith" of Protestantism, one need only compare the above definition with the following more existential description of faith offered by Luther:

There are two ways of believing. The first consists in believing of God, i.e. believing as true what is said of God [...]. The other way is to believe in God; not only do I believe as true what is said of God, but I place my trust in him, I resolve to enter into relations with him, I believe without doubt that he will be and will act with me according to what is said of him [...]. Only a faith which trusts absolutely in God, in life and unto death, makes the Christian and obtains all from God, [...]. This little word "in" is so true. Observe that we do not say "I believe God the Father" or "of God the Father" but in God the Father, in Jesus Christ, and this fact is due to God alone.²

¹Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 9 (hereafter referred to as S.T.).
In these two descriptions of faith, are reflected two conflicting traditions on the meaning of Christian faith: the Thomist-Catholic tradition which emphasizes the aspect of belief or assent of the mind to the God who reveals truth, and the Lutheran-Protestant tradition which emphasizes the aspect of trust or confidence in the God who redeems and justifies. The survey of the various opinions and traditions on the nature of Christian faith which follows, though necessarily brief, will attempt to show that differences of opinion on the nature of faith can be explained as differences in emphasis among the three elements of faith—the elements of belief, trust and commitment, and that these differences in emphasis reflect and correspond to different orientations of the more general area of Christian thought itself.

A. The Biblical Understanding of Faith

John L. McKenzie, commenting on Aquinas' definition and the intellectual understanding of faith found in much of Catholic theology—a view of faith promoted by the intellectualism of medieval theology and the reaction of post-reformation Catholic theology to the "fiducianism" of the Reformers—suggests that we return to scriptural sources for

a balanced view of faith.

The biblical understanding of faith which is antecedent to these movements, is not so severely intellectual; it has some intellectual content, but biblical faith viewed as a whole is a more comprehensive psychic act than the faith defined by St. Thomas.3

An examination of the biblical use of the word indicates that this "comprehensive psychic act," while it involves an assent of the mind to revealed truth, goes much further. It is a response of one's total personality to God's saving act, and as such includes an act of radical trust and a total commitment of one's life. Faith then describes the totality of the divine human relationship. A. Weiser has pointed out that the Old Testament word for faith "applies to the whole of man's relationship to God"4 for it is the recognition and acknowledgment of "the relationship into which God enters with man, i.e., to put oneself into this relationship."5

There is, to be sure, an intellectual content or cognitive aspect to faith, but as John Hick has indicated, this aspect is something which is implicit in faith, i.e., implied in man's immediate response of trust and obedience; and something of which the believer becomes aware only after reflection on his act of faith.


5 Ibid., p. 11.
It is only when the religious believer comes to reflect upon his religion, in the capacity of philosopher or theologian, that he is obliged to concern himself with the noetic status of his faith. When he does so concern himself, it emerges that faith as trust (fiducia) presupposes faith (fides) as cognition of the object of that trust. For in order to worship God and commit ourselves to his providence, we must first have faith that he exists.\(^6\)

Hick concludes that the cognitive element of faith is logically but not temporally prior to its effective and voluntary aspects. For, as Weiser points out again,\(^7\) what the man of the Old Testament responded to was not, in the first instance, a revealed truth but either a promise or a command. In the case of a promise, man's response of faith is a trusting acknowledgment of God's power to fulfill the promise; in the case of a command, the response of faith is one of obedience. W. Morgan concurs when he remarks that, in the Old Testament, "the Word of God was not something to be believed but a command to be obeyed."\(^8\) And Rudolf Bultmann sees trust as the formal or fundamental element in the faith of the Old Testament believer.

In the OT to believe in God means also to acknowledge him to be God; this includes both trust and hope as well as fear and obedience. But these two together form a unity, because trust is given a


\(^7\)R. Bultmann and A. Weiser, *Faith*, p. 12.

fundamental sense and embraces both the conquest of fear as well as of self-confidence. To believe is the daring decision for God when a man renounces the threatening world as well as his own strength. 9

The word used by Greek authors of the New Testament to describe Christian faith is PISTIS. But this word is also found in the Greek version of the Old Testament. There, as M. A. McBride points out, 10 it is used to translate five different Hebrew words: 1) Aymun--trusting, faithfulness; 2) Emunah--firmness, steadfastness, fidelity; 3) Amahnah--faith, support; 4) Emeth--firmness, faithfulness, truth; 5) Ahman--to confirm, support. All of these words indicate a trusting faith, a willingness to commit oneself and one's security to God as to one who is sure and dependable and therefore worthy of one's trust. Such an attitude on the part of the Israelites is inspired by the saving activity of God on their behalf. The result of the miraculous intervention at the Red Sea was that "the people learned to fear the Lord, putting their trust in him and in his servant Moses" (Exodus XIV: 31). Moses chides the Israelites for their lack of trust and confidence in Yahweh in spite of his saving deeds (Deut. I: 32-33). Yahweh himself complains, "Will they never learn to trust in me for all the marvelous deeds of mine they have witnessed?" (Numbers XIV: 11). The

9 R. Bultmann and A. Weiser, Faith, p. 43.
Psalmist too complains of the lack of faith shown by his ancestors in the desert: "Had they no faith in God" he asks, "no trust in his power to save?" (Psalm LXXVII: 22). Bultmann sees this remembrance of God's saving deeds as the foundation for the Old Testament believer's trusting faith.

Such faith in God is not a general "trust in God," but is founded on what God has done in the past. It is, therefore, always closely related to the past and thus is at the same time loyalty.11

It is this kind of trust in and loyalty to Yahweh as opposed to the seeking of security in political alliances which Isaiah (Chapter XXVIII) demands of the people. Commenting on this passage, McKenzie writes:

The scope of faith demanded by Isaiah shows that faith was a total commitment to Yahweh, a renunciation of secular and material resources, a seeking security in the saving will of God alone. This is indeed to accept Him as faithful and genuine.12

In the New Testament we encounter the noun PISTIS (assurance, confidence, belief) and the verb PISTEUEIN (to trust, show confidence, accept as true). What is expressed by these words can never be reduced to mere acceptance of intellectual propositions because it always involves the acceptance of and trust in a person—in the New Testament context, the acceptance of Jesus Christ and what he claims to be. McKenzie states:

11 R. Bultmann and A. Weiser, Faith, p. 44.
The faith of the gospels, like the Old Testament faith, is not simply trust and confidence; it is trust and confidence which arise from faith, which in turn is the acceptance of a person and his claims.\textsuperscript{13}

But this acceptance of Christ is not just an act of trust, a mere sentiment. It involves an assent of the mind to the content of the apostolic preaching (the kerygma) and imposes an obligation to action. The kerygma is the foundation of the faith of the Christian, and, in this respect, it differs from the faith of the Old Testament believer, in whose faith, as has been seen, the element of belief or assent was very implicit. As Bultmann has pointed out, the promise or command to which the Old Testament believer responded came from a God whose existence was always taken for granted. The Christian, however, perceives and acknowledges the existence of Christ (the object of his trust and commitment) only through his assent to the kerygma.

For this Lord first meets him only in the kerygma, and he believes on the strength of the kerygma, and in the future he can always only believe on the strength of this message. This never becomes a mere instructive piece of information which might be dispensed with once it has become known, but always remains the foundation of the faith [...] Therefore, faith in the kerygma and in the person mediated by it are inseparable, and faith always remains a "bold venture" in the sense that it is based on the kerygma.\textsuperscript{14}

This basic connection between acceptance of the kerygma and faith is reflected in the New Testament writings

\textsuperscript{13} J. L. McKenzie, \textit{Dictionary of the Bible}, p. 268.

\textsuperscript{14} R. Bultmann and A. Weiser, \textit{Faith}, pp. 75-76.
where Christians are described as "believers" (Acts IV: 4; XIII: 12; XIV; XV: 7), i.e., those who accept the preaching of the apostles and join the Christian community. "PISTIS" is sometimes used in the sense of "good doctrine" (I Timothy IV: 6; Jude III: 20; II Peter I: 1) and departing from the faith is understood as succumbing to false doctrine (I Timothy IV: 1; I: 19; VI: 21). The deposit of faith held by the Christian community holds that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God (Matthew XVI: 16), that he delivered men through his death from sin (I Corinthians XV: 17), that he rose from the dead for man's justification (Romans VIII: 10-11), and that he communicates a new life to baptized believers (Romans VI: 4-5). Christian faith moreover involves an obedience or commitment; it carries with it work and obligations. McKenzie writes of the apostle Paul's treatment of faith:

C. H. Dodd points out that an analysis of the sermons of Peter in Acts (II: 14-36; II: 38-39; III: 12-26; IV: 8-12) gives a comprehensive view of the content of the early kerygma, which includes the following points:

(1) The messianic age has dawned, the climax of God's dealings with his people is in history.
(2) This has taken place through the ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus.
(3) By reason of the resurrection Jesus has been exalted at the right hand of God as messianic head of the new Israel.
(4) The presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church is a sign of Christ's present power and glory.
(5) The messianic age will shortly reach its conclusion in the return of Christ.
(6) Forgiveness of sin and the gift of the Spirit are given to those who repent.

Paul never professed faith which was a mere inoperative sentiment. He who believes in the heart must also confess with the mouth (Romans X: 9); faith must be externalized at least by public profession. Paul twice sums up all the obligations of the law in the single commandment to love one's neighbour, (Romans XIII: 8-10; Galatians V: 6-14).\footnote{16}{J. L. McKenzie, Dictionary of the Bible, p. 269.}

McBride points out\footnote{17}{M. A. McBride, op. cit., pp. 25-26.} that in the fourth gospel the verb PISTEUEIN is used almost one hundred times while the noun PISTIS is not found at all. He interprets this use of the verb and avoidance of the noun as an attempt to emphasize the dynamic or active quality of faith, i.e., to emphasize "faith" rather than "the faith." He sees it as an "attempt to dissociate Christianity from an understanding of faith as purely noetic."\footnote{18}{Ibid., p. 26.} He also interprets the noun PISTIS as used by St. Paul as indicating not "the faith," i.e., an objective body of beliefs but as the relationship which results from man's response of faith.

Faith is the means whereby the new life is made possible. That life is lived not by works but by faith. [...] The confident trust that exists between God and man is able to free the latter from the nagging anxiety of uneasiness and frustrated attempts to establish his own position. [...] This assurance permitted man to proceed to his human destiny [...] to live a life in love. In I Cor. XIII Paul leaves little doubt that love is the greatest of these spiritual gifts. Faith however must exist between man and God before man can participate in the life of love. In this sense faith is a means to an end. It is a means to the end that Christ may live in our lives. As this
ultimate life of love the covenant relationship is renewed in a new and dynamic way. ¹⁹

The biblical description of faith then, indicates that faith is man's total response to God's saving action, a response which involves the elements of belief (assent of the mind), trust, and commitment, and which results in a new and dynamic relationship between God and man. Differences of theological opinion regarding the nature of Christian faith, therefore, would seem to result from a difference in the degree of emphasis placed on each of these basic elements of faith. These differences result, in this writer's opinion, not so much from divergent interpretations of the Biblical message as from differing "philosophies of religion" or orientations of Christian thought in general. It is to be expected that different theological orientations or traditions will be reflected in the different ways of understanding the nature of faith, i.e., in the differences of emphasis among its three basic elements of belief, trust, and commitment.

B. Theological Opinions on the Nature of Faith

Paul Tillich has distinguished two such philosophies of religion or basic orientations by which man approaches God. ²⁰ ¹⁹ M. A. McBride, op. cit., p. 27.

²⁰ Cf. Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, N.Y., Oxford University Press, 1964, c 1959, Chapter II.
approach. Its prototype might be the five cosmological proofs for God's existence offered by Aquinas\textsuperscript{21} and, in such an approach, the divine human encounter is compared to the experience of meeting a stranger. In the cosmological method man's knowledge of God is mediated, i.e., he passes from his knowledge of the material universe to a knowledge of God as the cause of that universe (as Aquinas did in his five proofs). In such an approach man meets God as subject meets object, as the knower encounters the object of his knowledge. It follows, then, that God is seen as a distinct and separate being and man is separated and excluded from that being. Man can only arrive at a knowledge of this supreme being through a process of discursive reasoning. God becomes the supreme being, but nevertheless a being among others; he becomes accessible to rational thought through the category of being. When men approach God in this cosmological way, i.e., when they try to prove the existence of this supreme being who is the cause of all other beings and make objective and rational statements about his nature, there is always the hazard that faith in this Supreme Being will be reduced to assent of the mind to the truth of propositions about God, i.e., an emphasis on the element of belief in faith. This indeed is what happened, to some extent, in the patristic and medieval eras of Christian thought.

The second type of philosophy of religion or approach

\textsuperscript{21}S.T., I, q. 2, a. 3.
to God is what Tillich calls the "ontological" method. This method is less objective and more subjective and, by it, man encounters God not through a process of reasoning but by an immediate awareness of him. Tillich compares this approach to the experience of overcoming estrangement, i.e., reunion with someone who was always present. In this way, says Tillich,

[...] man discovers himself when he discovers God, he discovers something that is identical with himself although it transcends him infinitely, something from which he is estranged, but from which he never has been and never can be separated.\(^{22}\)

In the ontological method man discovers God—to use Tillich's phrase—as the "Ground of Being." God is identified with the principle of being; the religious absolute \textit{deus} is identified with the philosophical absolute \textit{esse}. Thus God becomes not the object of man's question about God, but its basis; he is not the \textit{ens realissimum} (the highest being among all beings) but the \textit{primum esse} (that ground of being in which all particular beings participate). God is not the object discovered by the subject man; he is that which transcends the distinction between subject and object, the principle of being in which both subject and object participate. The cosmological method tries to establish the objective truth of God's existence over against man through a process of reasoning from the knowledge he has through sense perception. But the God we discover in this scientific

\(^{22}\)P. Tillich, \textit{Theology of Culture}, p. 10.
way is not, in Tillich's view, the real God. It is necessary to discover the God "beyond" this God, i.e., the God who is "the presupposition of the question of God" and who is the "truth which is presupposed in every question and in every doubt." This is the God whose existence is self-evident and who is known through immediate awareness, who is known intuitively rather than through a process of reasoning. For Tillich God is identified with the "unconditional" or "ultimate concern" of which man is immediately aware. When this ontological approach to God prevails, one may expect faith to be understood primarily as an act of trust, i.e., as reliance on God as the unconditioned Ground of Being in the face of the threats to man's conditioned being. It is this view of faith which we find in Augustine and the Reformers.

In contemporary times the theology of secularity and "death of God" theologies have attempted to offer a third alternative to the two basic philosophies of religion as described by Tillich. Both the search for God as an explanation of the universe (cosmological method) and as the fulfillment of man's personal existence and answer to his ultimate concerns (ontological method) are abandoned in a

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25 This is the basis for St. Anselm's "ontological proof" for the existence of God. Cf. *Proslogium*, Chapter 2.
"world come of age" i.e., a world which is becoming increasingly less dependent on God as a problem solver and in which men are increasingly capable of solving their own problems and answering their own questions, and men are encouraged to adopt a secular or "religionless" form of Christianity. Dietrich Bonhoeffer raised the question of whether some day Christianity might become religionless in view of the fact that it was being gradually deprived of its religious premises, viz. that man needs God as the answer to the mystery of the physical universe or of his own existence. When God is not present in this way, as the fulfiller of human needs, he is experienced as absent. Subsequent theologians, using Bonhoeffer's question as a starting point, have invited contemporary man to accept God's absence and hold out to him the hope of discovering God in a new way through commitment to the "secular" task at hand and the "secular" needs of one's fellow man. In this type of theology, the orientation of the Christian is not towards the God who reveals himself and justifies men in Christ, but towards the man Jesus in whom this revelation takes place. Man's religion is no longer a relationship with the Supreme Being but an experiencing of that new life "for others" which is revealed in Christ. The focus of attention is the "secular" Jesus, for in him man discovers a new way of living, a way of

self-commitment, of being "for others." Thus the element of faith which is emphasized is that of commitment.

These three basic theological orientations of Christian thought in general—the cosmological, the ontological, and the secular—are reflected in three corresponding theological views of faith in particular, each of which emphasizes one of the basic elements included in the Biblical descriptions of faith—the elements of belief, trust, and commitment. What remains now is to investigate briefly each of these theological views of faith in their theological and historical setting.

(i) Faith as Belief. It was seen that the New Testament describes faith as that radical act of trust by which the believer appropriates the free gift of salvation offered to him in Christ, but that in addition to this affective element, there is also present in the faith of the first Christians a cognitive element (faith as belief) in the form of assent to or acceptance of the apostolic preaching. Nevertheless, one can certainly agree with the statement of W. Morgan to the effect that, in the New Testament writings, there was no "serious intellectualizing of the notion of faith."27 The doctrinal construction by which the Christian community expressed its faith was the basic kerygma contained in the apostolic preaching, and implied a belief in

27 W. Morgan, op. cit., p. 690.
Jesus as Lord and Messiah and the redemptive reality of his death and resurrection.

The first trend towards an "intellectualizing" of the faith appears in the Patristic era of Christian thought. The great doctrinal controversies of this era tended to focus attention on the element of belief or assent; on the \textit{fides qua creditur} rather than the \textit{fides qua creditur}. Faith becomes, to a large extent, an intellectual submission to the authoritative doctrinal norms or "rule of faith" (creeds) established by the Church. As Morgan has pointed out,\(^{28}\) such preoccupation with the fixing of doctrinal norms in the face of heretical teaching, leads to an overshadowing of the simplicity of the New Testament kerygma, as well as the affective element of faith. The "faithful" are now those who adhere to the authoritative rules of faith established by the Church. Understood as intellectual assent, faith now loses, to some extent, its connection with what Morgan calls "the goods of the Christian life,"\(^ {29}\) i.e., justification and moral commitment. Whether or not Morgan's assessment of this era of Christian thought is accurate, it is reasonable to contend that when faith is seen primarily as a radical act of trust, it becomes the root principle of the Christian life; it is the cause of that justification to

\(^{28}\) W. Morgan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 690.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.
which the Christian's moral life is a grateful response. When, however, faith is "intellectualized," whenever it has been reduced to a question of assent of the mind to right doctrine, the tendency has been to isolate such "believing faith" from the existential dimension of Christian life, so that justification becomes the result of good works, and love is introduced as the principle of those good works.

When faith is thus "intellectualized" its opposite is no longer complacency or despair but heresy. Heresies, said Tertullian, "are produced for the weakening and the extinction of faith, [...] are strong in those persons who are not strong in faith" and have no strength "whenever they encounter a really powerful faith." 30

It is beyond the scope of this brief survey to inquire into the causes of this intellectualizing of faith and the consequent isolation of faith from the existential dimension of the Christian life. However, two points, at least, seem worthy of mention. The first of these refers to the preoccupation with doctrinal controversy (the Trinitation and Christological controversies) which characterized this period of Church history and the resulting tendency to reduce faith to the assent of the mind to correct doctrine as defined by the teaching Church. Is it sufficient, one

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might ask, to simply attribute such an interpretation of faith to the doctrinal controversies of the times, or must we ask further why such doctrinal questions preoccupied the Christian community? Whatever the historical exigencies may have been, it is helpful, in this context, to recall the remark of John Courtney Murray\textsuperscript{31} to the effect that the doctrinal preoccupations of this era were, to some extent, inevitable because of the inherent dynamism of the human intellect. The Arian controversy, he contends, was inevitable since the human mind moves inevitably from the question of what things are for us (the functional—existential—phenomenological question) to what things are in themselves (the ontological question); it moves from description to definition. Thus to the functional-existential description of Christ given in the New Testament (Jesus is Son of God, Lord, and Saviour), the Nicene fathers added the ontological definition of the term "Son of God" as meaning "of one substance with the Father." Seen from this point of view, the significance of the "intellectualizing" of faith which took place in the Patristic era is largely psychological. It indicates (if Murray is correct) that the existential question inevitably gives way to the ontological, that the believer inevitably reflects upon his act of faith, that the cognitive element of faith is implicit in the affective,

that theology and theologizing follow inevitably upon faith. It indicates, perhaps, that, when the medieval theologians spoke of *fides quaerens intellectum* they were enunciating a psychological truth about the dynamics of the human mind and not merely giving a definition of theology.

The second question that arises in regard to the intellectualizing of faith, refers to the resulting isolation of faith from the existential dimension of the Christian life. It is argued that when faith is thought of as merely the assent of the mind to doctrinal truth, it no longer acts as the source of justification and moral commitment. With faith thus restricted to and isolated in its cognitive aspect, it becomes necessary to introduce "good works" as the new principle of justification and love as the principle of good works or moral commitment. But if, as indicated above, the reasons for the intellectualizing of faith were not merely historical (doctrinal controversies) but also psychological, it must also be pointed out, conversely, that the resulting introduction of good works as a principle of justification must be seen not merely as a psychological phenomenon (i.e., as the inevitable result of understanding faith in a certain way) but also as the result of certain historical forces.

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In this latter regard, Robert F. Wilken\textsuperscript{33} sees the tendency towards a theology of justification by works as resulting not only from the intellectualizing of faith but also from concern of Christian apologists such as Justin and Origen with defending the freedom of man's will and therefore his moral responsibility against the fatalistic and deterministic teachings of the stoics and astrologers. Given such a concern, the apologist will make use of every available rational argument and scriptural text to assert the freedom of man's will. It is understandable that future generations of Christians, more concerned with reconciling man's free will with God's grace than with defending it against fatalism, might see in such arguments a theology of justification by works rather than by grace and faith.

Consider the following statement by Justin the martyr:

\begin{quote}
We have learned from the prophets, and we hold it to be true, that punishments and chastisements and good rewards are rendered according to the merit of each man's actions.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

Origen speaks in the same vein:

\begin{quote}
[... ] a general judgment is announced to come in which the wicked are to be punished according to
\end{quote}


their desserts, and the righteous to be duly rewarded.35

With Origen, however, there is a greater awareness of the need to reconcile the freedom of man's will with the Christian doctrine of grace. In the De Principiis he takes up the objection that man does not have free will since St. Paul declares that "both to will and to do are of God" (Phil. II: 13). In his reply he distinguishes between the general power to will and act which comes from the Creator and the use of that power to will or do particular good or evil acts which belongs to man's freedom.36 Origen did not solve the problem of grace and free will. His contribution seems to consist in the fact that, by insisting that the moral transformation of man was the result of both man's free will and the grace of God, he established the fact that grace and providence are compatible with man's freedom and, therefore, not to be identified with stoic fatalism which denied man's freedom. If, therefore, Origen's arguments are put into this historical context, it is possible to conclude, as Wilken does, that,

What may have appeared to later Christian thinkers as a gospel of works was, in the Greco-Roman world, a gospel of freedom. For if man's will were not

free, God's goodness and grace and power made no sense.37

It is probably fair to say that the narrowing of the idea of faith which took place in the Patristic era represents a tendency rather than any explicit theology of faith. If faith was thought of as orthodox belief, it was not because faith was defined as such but because the aforementioned preoccupation with doctrinal issues tended to eclipse the affective aspect of faith. Thus when James Parker38 speaks of the theological trend of the medieval period as a "refinement" of the theological trends of the Patristic era, he refers to the fact that there is now an explicit theology of faith which describes faith as "credence" or as an assent of the mind to revealed truth.

It is only when one understands faith as an assent of the mind to truth that the distinction introduced by Peter Lombard39 between fides informis and fides caritate formata becomes intelligible. The former refers to bare orthodoxy of mind stripped of all affective and volitional elements, and only when one accepts such a concept as adequately describing faith, does it become necessary to introduce charity (love) as that which forms faith into a working

39 Peter Lombard, Libri Sententiarum, Lib. III, Dist. 23, caps. 2 and 5.
principle of good works or moral commitment. However, fides informis can hardly be a principle of justification, and thus the way is opened to the idea of salvation by works or merit since bare orthodoxy merely admits one to the Church and, therefore, to the sacramental aids to justification which is now seen as a goal to be achieved rather than a gift (grace) of reconciliation already offered and appropriated through faith.

Faith becomes further isolated from the existential dimension of Christian life (justification and moral commitment) by the scholastic distinction between explicit and implicit faith. Both refer to intellectual assent, but in explicit faith the believer knows the object of his faith, while implicit faith is an uncomprehending assent to whatever the Church teaches. Parker contends that such a "vote of confidence" in the Church is far removed from the biblical notion of faith, and obviously cannot maintain the vital and fundamental connection with justification which the New Testament assigns to faith.

It remained for the council of Trent to incorporate this theological understanding of faith into its doctrinal formulations. Since faith was understood in this restricted sense of credence or assent to truth, it was logical for the Council fathers to decree that such faith was only the

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40 Cf. Aquinas, S.T., IIa, IIae, q. 5, a. 4.
41 J. I. Parker, op. cit., p. 211.
beginning of justification. Accordingly, they interpreted Paul's doctrine of justification through faith in this way:

But when the apostle says that man is justified "through faith" and "freely" (Rom. II, 22-24), those words must be understood in the sense that the Catholic Church has always continuously held and declared. We may then be said to be justified through faith, in the sense that "faith is the beginning of man's salvation," the foundation and source of all justification, "without which it is impossible to please God" (Heb. XI, 6) and to be counted as his sons. We may be said to be justified freely, in the sense that nothing that precedes justification, neither faith nor works, merits the grace of justification [...].

Therefore, to complete the work of justification, the Christian is obliged to good works; nor can he look upon faith as the sole principle of justification.

Therefore, no one should take pride in faith alone, thinking that faith alone makes him an heir and that he will come into the inheritance, even if he does not suffer with Christ that he may also be glorified with him.

Even this brief reflection on the history of the Christian understanding of faith would seem to indicate that, while the cognitive aspect of faith is essential to the faith described in the New Testament, nevertheless an over-emphasis on that cognitive element results in a type of faith which cannot serve as a root principle of justification and moral commitment.

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42 Session VI, Ch. 8 (Denziger, 801). English trans. from The Church Teaches, St. Louis, Herder, 1955, par. 565.

43 Session VI, Ch. 11 (Denziger, 804). English trans. from The Church Teaches, par. 568.
(ii) Faith as Trust. The intellectualizing of faith which characterized much of the theology of the Middle Ages reflects what Tillich would call a "cosmological" orientation of Christian thought, an orientation which is perhaps best exemplified by the five "ways" of Aquinas. These five proofs of the existence of God are sometimes referred to as "cosmological" proofs since they attempt to establish the objective reality of God as the supreme being, proceeding by way of rational argumentation from the observable features of the cosmos such as order, harmony, perfection, causality and movement. But, as has already been noted, such an approach to the question of God involves the hazard of reducing faith to an assent of the mind to propositions (doctrine) about God--his existence, nature, attributes, etc.--since one is approaching God as the knowing subject approaches the object of knowledge.

It must not be overlooked, however, that another basic orientation of Christian thought--an orientation which Tillich calls "ontological"--also existed in the Middle Ages. It is to be found in the more intuitive and mystical approach of the Franciscan theologians, and is the basis for Anselm's

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44 Cf. Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, Ch. 2.
45 Cf. Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 2, a. 3.
"ontological proof" for the existence of God. Anselm argues that the existence of God is really self-evident since man has an immediate awareness of "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." Tillich agrees with Aquinas and Kant in rejecting the form of this argument, i.e., in saying that one cannot derive the existence of God from the concept of God. What he finds valid in Anselm's argument is its description of the human mind as being immediately aware of something unconditional or absolute before that mind ever turns to the world of external reality. The ontological approach identifies God with this immediate awareness of the unconditional. Anselm erred, in Tillich's view, by going a step further and trying to demonstrate rationally that this absolute exists as a highest being in the world of objective reality. In so doing, he defeats his own purpose which was "to make the certainty of God independent of any encounter with our world, and to link it entirely with our self-consciousness."

In the ontological approach of Anselm and the Franciscan school, man is aware of God not as another, albeit Supreme Being, but as the unconditional ground of all being,
of all that exists. Faith in such a God is more likely to be a radical act of trust in the face of all that threatens man's finite being than mere intellectual assent to the truth of God. It is a theological orientation and a view of faith which the Franciscan theologians derived from Augustine and which was restated by Luther and the Reformation theology.

Tillich's partial explanation for Augustine's "ontological" orientation in the historical and philosophical climate in which he lived. By the time of Augustine, the attempt of classical Greek philosophy to build an objectively rational world had collapsed and given way to skepticism. Augustine is seen as part of the Neo-Platonic movement which was a response to this prevailing skepticism. Neo-Platonism offered a new epistemology, the innermost soul as the source of truth and certainty rather than the world of objective reality. For Augustine, the theologian, this means that it is in his innermost soul, in his human self-consciousness that man has an immediate awareness of God. It is an epistemology and a theology which starts with the inner man rather than the external world, which is—to use Tillich's terminology—ontological rather than cosmological. As a response to the kind of skepticism which had rejected the objective, logical, cosmological approach, it is

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analogous to the attempts of theologians of the modern era such as Kierkegaard, Schleiermacher and Bultmann to find a new subjective, existential foundation for faith in the face of modern science's rejection of the traditional rational arguments by which Christians supported their belief.

For Augustine, God is not that which we discover at the end of a rational enquiry or argumentation; he is that which is presupposed in any search for truth. A sick man, he says, would not endure painful remedies if he did not believe in his eventual recovery. Likewise, a man's search for God is based on an immediate, intuitive awareness of the existence of the object of his search.

When then will you give yourself to this burdensome and laborious investigation? When will you venture to impose on yourself as much care and concern as the matter deserves, if you do not believe that the object of your search exists.\footnote{Augustine, De Utilitate Credendi, Chapter 13. English trans. from The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 4, ed. by R. J. Defarrari, N.Y., Fathers of the Church Inc., 1947, pp. 430-31.}

It is in the light of this "ontological" orientation of Augustine's thought that we must view his understanding of faith. The God of whom man is immediately aware in his own self-consciousness before any rational investigation or separation of subject and object is not an object of knowledge but the foundation of one's being, and therefore, the object of trust or confidence. It is this radical act of trust, the \textit{fides qua creditur}, which makes each believer's
act of faith something personal and unique, as distinct from *fides quae creditur*, that objective body of doctrine which he shares in common with all other believers.

We say most truly that the faith is indeed [...] from one doctrine on the hearts of the faithful who believe this same thing. But those things that are believed [*fides quae creditur*] are one thing, but the faith by which they are believed [*fides qua creditur*] is another thing. For the former are in the things of which it is said that they either are, or have been, or shall be, but the latter is in the mind of the believer, and is visible only to him of whom it is; although it is also in others, yet it is not the same but similar. 52

Such an understanding of faith makes it possible for Augustine to re-establish the vital connection between faith and the existential dimension of the Christian life (justification and moral commitment) and therefore to return to the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith and grace. Thus, in the Pelagian controversy, Augustine stands on the side of grace as opposed to free will or good works as the cause of salvation; or, to use Tillich's rephrasing of the issue, grace is the cause of the Christian's moral effort, not its effect; ethics depends on religion, not vice-versa.

In Augustine, therefore, we have a return to the affective side of faith (faith as trust) and therefore a return to the Pauline doctrine of justification after the intellectualizing of faith which took place in the earlier

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J. G. Simpson, however, refers to the Augustinian doctrine as only a "partial reaffirmation" of Paul's teaching on justification since grace is seen in terms of a supernatural life infused through sacramental channels and thereby gradually bringing about a state of righteousness or justification. Grace was not seen in terms of the re-establishment of a personal relationship with God through Christ. Augustine emphasized the necessity of grace but saw grace as an agent which gradually brought about a state of righteousness which justified, rather than an outright gift of justification, which one appropriates by faith. Thus the way was opened for a doctrine of salvation by merit rather than faith. It remained for Martin Luther to reaffirm the Pauline doctrine of justification through faith in such a way that faith becomes the root principle of both justification and good works.

Luther's teaching on faith appears as a revival of the Augustinian tradition, coming as it does as a reaction against the scholastic theology of the Middle Ages which tended to reduce faith to credence and isolate it from the affective and voluntary aspects of Christian life. But if Augustine's theology of grace represents only a "partial reaffirmation" of the Pauline doctrine of justification, it has also been suggested that Luther's doctrine of

justification by faith assigns a greater role to faith than was intended even by Paul. Morgan points out that in Luther's theology, faith is not just the principle of justification but of the whole Christian life; it replaces love as a principle of moral commitment. Tillich offers essentially the same criticism when he observes that Luther, while emphasizing Paul's doctrine of justification through faith, did not pay sufficient attention to his doctrine of the Spirit.

Whatever justification may be offered for this alleged overemphasis on faith as trust on the grounds of the historical situation of the Christian Church in Luther's time, it is fair to say that his understanding of faith involves at least the following three characteristics:

1) It rejects the *fides informis* of the medieval scholastics. For Luther, there is only one kind of faith—the faith that justifies. He contends that even the scholastics recognized that *fides informis* (which Luther described as "acquired faith") does not justify. But Paul says nothing about any kind of faith which does not justify:

   Since Paul certainly treats justification of faith at great length, it is necessary to conclude that he says nothing of these kinds of faith, so to speak, as acquired, infused, unformed, formed, explicit, implicit, general or special faith. [...] Accordingly, he is necessarily speaking of another

54 W. Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 691.

kind of faith which shall make Christ effective in us against death, sin and the law. [...] Acquired faith has, as the end or use of Christ's passion mere speculation. True faith has as the end and use of Christ's passion life and salvation.56

2) It is the principle of man's justification. Faith is the act by which the Christian appropriates the justice of God. He cannot in any way justify himself through his own good works:

All who boast of works to justify themselves in the eyes of God show that they understand nothing about Christ or faith.57

3) It is the principle of good works. Good works or moral commitment are the effect of justification, not its cause:

Man is justified through grace and faith without works of the law, but works follow spontaneously for true faith is the principle of good works not vice versa. [...] Just as good fruits do not make the tree good, so good works do not justify the person. But good works come from a person who has already been justified beforehand by faith, just as good fruits come from a tree which is already good beforehand by nature.58

The faith of Luther, therefore, is not merely the assent of the mind; he rejected the faith which leads only to speculation. The faith which leads to "life and


57 Ibid., Art. 33.

58 Ibid., Art. 29, 35 and 36.
salvation" has as its formal element a radical act of trust or confidence (fiducia). Only a faith understood in this way can be the root principle of the Christian life. God offers the free gift of reconciliation (grace). Man's act of faith (trust) is his acceptance of this grace which justifies him and his moral effort in a grateful response to this gift of justification, not a means of earning it. Thus trust or confidence becomes the foundation of the Christian life. It is also, as J. G. Simpson points out, the central theme of Luther's theology:

Confidence in God became the work alike of Luther's own teaching and of Reformation theology, and confidence is nothing else but faith aware of itself. It is the subjective aspect of the restored personal relations, or reconciliation with God, by which it is inspired, and which constitutes what Protestants have always meant by justification.59

From the time of Luther, therefore, we have two more or less well-defined traditions on faith and therefore on the doctrine of justification in Western Christendom. The "trusting faith" of Protestantism makes faith the root principle of the Christian life for it is the acceptance of the grace of justification which includes reconciliation (restored personal relations with God) and the gift of the Spirit. The Christian's moral commitment is a response to this gift which brings the assurance of reconciliation fully won.60 The "believing faith" of Catholicism tends to isolate

60 Ibid.
faith itself from justification and moral commitment. The act of faith does not, in itself, produce the assurance of reconciliation fully won. Reconciliation and justification are goals to be attained through sacramental aids to which one is admitted through faith. Grace is no longer simply identified with justification and reconciliation; it is reified—a "created gift" imparted through the sacraments.

To the Lutheran position which tends to attribute the whole of the Christian life to a single principle (faith), the Catholic position adds three principles: holiness (moral commitment) as the principle of justification; love as the principle of moral commitment; and the reified understanding of grace as the principle of holiness and love.

It has been suggested here that these two theologies of faith reflect two different philosophies of religion or orientations of Christian thought: the cosmological, objective, "God as Supreme being" which is reflected in "believing faith," and the ontological, subjective, "God as Ground of being" approach which is reflected in "trusting faith."

The former finds its roots in the attempt of classical Greek philosophy, particularly Aristotle, to build an objectively rational world, and is represented in Western Christian thought by what Hick calls (in a somewhat unfortunate phrase) the "Thomist-Catholic" tradition. The latter traces its philosophical origins to Neo-Platonic idealism and is

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61 John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, Ch. 1.
represented in Christian thought by Augustine, the Francis-
can school, and Luther.

(iii) Faith as Commitment. As mentioned above, to some
contemporary theologians, both the cosmological and the
ontological orientations of Christian thought have one thing
in common: both seek to discover God on the premise that
man needs God either as the answer to the mystery of the
universe (cosmological) or as the answer to the mystery of
human existence and the answer to man's ultimate concerns
(ontological). The trend towards a theology of secularity
offers a third alternative which begins with a rejection of
the religious premise that man needs God. It is the God who
is seen as the solver of man's problems who is "dead," it is
claimed; therefore, man must give up the inner search for
this God and the meaning of life, and turn outward in
commitment to the secular task involved in being part of the
human community. The Christian is to become "worldly" in
the sense that he recognizes that there is only one reality,
the "secular," and that, if God is to be found, it will only
be in the midst of "secular" concerns and activity, not by
turning away from this life in order to seek God in the
realm of the "sacred." Negatively, the theology of secularity
rejects the traditional notions of God as transcendent
and as the solver of man's ultimate problems, as well as the

\[62\text{ Cf. pp. 127-29.}\]
traditional distinction between the "sacred" and "secular." Positively it emphasizes the autonomy of the secular order and human values and views the Christian life as a commitment to the secular needs and concerns of the human community. In the present context, this means that faith is viewed primarily under the aspect of commitment.

It is generally agreed that Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) represents the single greatest impetus to the development of a theology of secularity and the "death of God" movement, at least in the sense that he was the first to raise those questions to which the theology of secularity addresses itself. In his *Letters and Papers from Prison* Bonhoeffer contends that Christianity is in the process of losing the "religious premises" upon which its theology and preaching have been built. Christianity, he maintains, can no longer be built on metaphysics (i.e., the premise that God is necessary to explain the universe) since man himself, through science and technology, is gradually solving the riddle of the universe; nor can it rest on the premise of "inwardness" (i.e., the premise that God is necessary for man's personal fulfillment, or as the answer to his ultimate concerns such as guilt and death) because man is simply not asking these ultimate questions as he used to.

If one can accept this appraisal of the present human situation, Bonhoeffer's position is clear and logical. If man no longer experiences a need for God, then Christianity must stop preaching a God who is the answer to needs
which no longer exist, or are felt only in life's boundary situations. If God is nothing more than the fulfiller of man's needs, the deus ex machina when all else has failed, then he disappears as a vital force in man's life precisely to the extent that man learns to solve his own problems. And if man someday learns to cope successfully with even the "ultimate" problems, such as death and guilt, then God will be edged out of man's life completely.

Man has learned to cope with all questions of importance without recourse to God as a working hypothesis [...] As in the scientific field, so in human affairs generally, what we call "God" is being more and more edged out of life, losing more and more ground. [...] Efforts are made to prove to a world thus come of age that it cannot live without the tutelage of "God." Even though there has been surrender on all secular problems, there still remains the so called ultimate questions—death, guilt—on which only "God" can furnish an answer, and which are the reasons why God and the Church and the pastor are needed. Thus we live, to some extent, by these ultimate questions of humanity. But what if one day they no longer exist as such, if they too can be answered without "God"?

The possibility which this question raises is that of a "religionless Christianity," i.e., a Christianity which must express itself in a secular or religionless way in a world "come of age," a world, that is, which has outgrown the religious premises. What would happen, asks Bonhoeffer, if it became evident that the religious premise (man needs God) was merely a temporary and historically conditioned form in which Christianity expressed itself.

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Our whole nineteen-hundred-year-old Christian preaching and theology rests upon the "religious premise" of man. [...] But if one day it becomes apparent that this a priori premise simply does not exist, but was a historical and temporary form of human self-expression, i.e. if we reach the stage of being radically without religion [...] what does that mean for "Christianity"?64

Whatever else it might mean for Christianity, for some contemporary theologians it means a new Christology in which Christ is seen not as the incarnate God but as the man who, by being so completely open to and concerned about his fellow man, that he most perfectly reveals that Love (God) which is the Ground of all being. It is in this sense that he is God's final revelation. It is not in the power of his miracles but in the total self-surrender of himself to others of which the cross is the most complete expression, that he most effectively reveals God. For Bonhoeffer, Jesus is the "man for others." For Bishop John A. T. Robinson, Jesus "never claims to be God, personally; yet he always claims to bring God completely,"65 and he does so through "his utter self-surrender to others in love" which "discloses and lays bare the Ground of man's being as Love."66 Consequently the new theology focuses on the "secular Jesus" and the new life for others which is revealed in him. In

64 D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 91.
66 Ibid., p. 75.
Jesus, man does not seek to discover the transcendent God but to participate in this new life. The seed of this kind of Christology is found in Bonhoeffer's remark that, "Our relation to God [is] not a religious relation to a Supreme Being [...] but a new life for others." Whatever this may have meant to Bonhoeffer, to more radical "death of God" theologians such as William Hamilton and Paul Van Buren it means that God has "disappeared" in Christ, we are only aware of Jesus and the life he reveals, and that is all we need.

In the context of faith this means that man abandons his self-conscious attempts to find or experience God, so that faith becomes, in the words of W. R. Comstock, "a religious orientation towards Christ 'without God'." For Harvey Cox this means that "God wants man to be interested not in Him but in his fellow man." This abandoning of the search for God makes room for a "Christian atheism" which rejects the assumption that man needs God and rejects therefore the God of traditional theism who is the fulfiller of man's needs. This is the God who is "dead" or "absent."


William Hamilton\textsuperscript{70} distinguishes this kind of "atheism" from classical atheism by describing it as a "waiting for God." What he is waiting for, in reality, is a new role for God other than that of problem solver:

Really to travel along this road means that we trust the world, not God, to be our need fulfiller and problem solver, and God, if he is to be for us at all, must come in some other role.\textsuperscript{71}

This new role that God is to play is not clear to Hamilton—we are "waiting" to discover it—but he distinguishes it from the problem solver role of traditional theism by employing the Latin verbs \textit{uti} and \textit{frui}. God is not to be used (\textit{uti}) to solve our problems, but to be enjoyed or delighted in (\textit{frui}). To wait for God is, in part, to "attempt to understand what delighting in him might mean."\textsuperscript{72} In the meantime, man commits himself to the secular task of building a truly human community and of responding to the secular needs and concerns of his fellow man. It is only in living and participating in this new life for others that man can experience God in a new way.

In the time of waiting we have a place to be. It is not before an altar, it is in the world, in the city, with both the needy neighbour and the enemy. This place really defines our faith, for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., p. 40. \\
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 41.
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faith and love come together in the interim of waiting.\textsuperscript{73}

The same emphasis on the moral commitment aspect of faith is revealed in the statement of Harvey Cox that "in Jesus of Nazareth, the religious quest is ended for good and man is free to serve and love his neighbour."\textsuperscript{74} The understanding of faith which issues from secular and "death of God" theologies emphasizes almost exclusively the element of commitment—commitment to the secular task at hand; commitment to the secular needs of one's neighbour; commitment to the new life for others which is revealed in Christ. Unlike the believing faith of Catholicism which isolates faith from the moral commitment, and the trusting faith of Protestantism which makes faith the principle of moral commitment, the "loving" faith of secular theology identifies faith with moral commitment.

To conclude this brief resumé of the theology of faith, it was seen that the New Testament understanding of faith involved the three elements of belief, trust and commitment. It was further noted that subsequent theologizing on the nature of faith resulted in interpretations of faith which emphasized one or another of these elements, giving rise to conflicting theological traditions on faith.

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{73} W. Hamilton, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 41-42.
\item \textsuperscript{74} H. Cox, \textit{The Secular City}, p. 265.
\end{footnotes}
In the context of Western Christendom we have loosely identified these as the "believing faith" of Cathicism, the "trusting faith" of Reformation Protestantism, and the "loving faith" of contemporary secular theology. Finally, an attempt has been made to see these three theological traditions on the meaning of faith as issuing respectively from three basic orientations of Christian thought—the cosmological, the ontological and the secular.

In the second part of this chapter, an attempt will be made to describe the dynamics of Christian faith with a view to eventually relating those dynamics to the psychological understanding of human growth arrived at in Chapter I. To this end, it will be necessary to restrict our attention to the element of trust in the act of faith. Not surprisingly, therefore, our sources for this study will be largely confined to those Christian writers who emphasize this aspect of faith and who therefore represent what has been referred to thus far as the "ontological" approach. This restriction will be observed for two reasons:

1) The element of trust reveals faith as a "religious experience" and is the aspect of faith which is most relevant to the primary concern of this study, i.e., the psychological implications of faith, and the most accessible to psychological investigation.

2) The psychological dynamics involved in the radical act of trust which results in faith are the most relevant, in the author's opinion, to the question of human growth and
2. The Dynamics of Faith

A. St. Paul: From Law to Grace

Since the present study is concerned primarily with faith as an act of radical trust, the dynamics of faith refers to the question of how man arrives at such a radical act of trust. What are the psychological dynamics involved in making the act of faith? To answer this question, a preliminary distinction must be made between what takes place within man in making the act of faith, i.e., the psychological states through which he passes in arriving at faith, and the dynamics of faith, in the sense of the total divine-human encounter. The latter refers, for example, to the interaction of God and man which the Bible generally describes as evolving in three stages--God's initiative (in speaking to man, revealing himself, etc.); man's response of faith; and the "covenant" or special relationship between God and man which results from that encounter and dialogue.

The present study, however, concerns itself with the dynamics of faith in the former sense, i.e., with a psychological study of man's response of faith. The most explicit New Testament description of the dynamics of faith in this sense is to be found in Romans VII. Here the Apostle Paul speaks of the three stages of man's religious history as he
understood it, i.e., from Adam to Moses, from Moses to Christ and the period after Christ. It soon becomes evident, however, that Paul is speaking not just of the history of mankind but of the stages that every man passes through in arriving at faith. The man of faith, living under grace, sees himself in retrospect as having reached that level of existence by first passing through psychological states which correspond to Paul's period of nature (Adam to Moses) and a period of Law (Moses to Christ).

It should further be pointed out that Paul's description of this dynamic may be referred to as a "prototype" because it represents one concrete example of the general dynamic of self-transcendence and therefore transformation associated with faith. Paul's treatment of this problem occurs within the context of his doctrine of justification through faith, particularly in Romans and Galatians, and the concrete pastoral problems dealt with in those Epistles. Among those problems were the extremes of legalism (justification earned through observance of the Mosaic Law) and libertinism (abrogation of all Law). Thus, Paul presents faith as that by which man transcends these extremes through the gift of the Spirit. Faith, for Paul, was that by which the believer transcended the inner moral, religious and psychological conflicts occasioned by the Mosaic Law. But the Mosaic Law represents only one means of self-justification. There are other types of "law" which, when men try to fulfill, they discover another frustrating law "in their
members." The Mosaic Law becomes, therefore, a prototype for all man's efforts to live a self-justifying or self-authenticating existence through reliance on his own human resources. Thus, if faith was for Paul a way of transcending the Law, it was for Luther a way of transcending moralism and for Augustine a way of transcending the drive towards self-realization. 75

In Romans VII Paul analyzes the human condition by dividing human history into three stages, 76 which represent three possible existential conditions of man: man without law; man under the Law; and man under grace (and therefore freed from the Law). An exegetical problem arises due to the fact that in verses 7-25 Paul speaks in the first person. Is Paul, therefore, speaking only of his own personal experience, or that of all men under the Mosaic Law, or all men under any kind of "law"? Again, if Paul speaks of his personal experience, does the conflict he describes within himself refer to his present situation as a Christian or to his situation before his conversion? While there are differing shades of opinion among exegetes on these questions, what is

75 In the same way, Abraham's willingness to leave his homeland, to go to a strange country etc. is a prototype of the risk and uncertainty involved in every act of faith.

important for the present context is that there seems to be a fairly general agreement that while St. Paul speaks in the first person, he nevertheless intends to universalize his experience. Fitzmeyer refers to the use of the first person as "dramatizing in an intimate personal way the experience common to all who were faced with the Mosaic Law and who relied on their own resources to meet its obligations." 77 For Lucien Cerfaux, the first person is a "rhetorical method":

Paul is putting himself in the place of a group of men. The "I" who is presumed to be the subject of the experience is in fact abstract humanity, man as such, under the law. 78

The three stages of human history, therefore, may be interpreted as the three ages of the religious man, or the three psychological states through which one passes in coming to the commitment of faith. The three stages are:

(i) Man without Law (from Adam to Moses). This is the period preceding the positive divine law, the period of the natural law. In a sense, it is a period of "blissful ignorance" in which man is not aware of his sinfulness. It was only with the giving of the Law through Moses that man became more conscious of his guilt.


I was once alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin revived and I died; the very commandment which promised life proved to be death to me.

(Romans VII: 9-10)

Fitzmeyer refers to the above passage as "an ironic reference to the life led by every man who is ignorant of his real situation and of the real nature of evil."  

The phrase "ignorant of his real situation" is the key to this first stage in the dynamics of faith. It is essentially a condition of illusion and ignorance. For Paul, sin came into the world with Adam and was therefore operative in the world from that time, but man is not fully conscious of his sin and guilt except through transgressing a law.

Sin indeed was in the world before the law was given, but sin is not counted where there is no law.

(Romans V: 13)

The condition which reigned "from Adam to Moses" is the condition which obtains in every man who remains uncommitted to any kind of ethical or moral values. He remains unaware of his real situation, of his basic self-centredness.

(ii) Man Under the Law (Moses to Christ). With the giving of the law, man becomes painfully aware of his guilt, his inadequacy, his incompleteness. The law was good in itself but it served to make man aware of his basic sinfulness.

79 This and all subsequent biblical quotations are taken from the Revised Standard Version, c 1952.

80 J. Fitzmeyer, Jerome Biblical Commentary, 53:77.
through his transgressions of the law.

What then shall we say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet, if it had not been for the law, I should not have known sin. I should not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, "You shall not covet." (Romans VII: 7)

The ultimate effect of the law is to produce anxiety in man because his failure to observe it makes him aware of the existential gap between himself as he knows he should be and himself as he actually exists when he grounds his existence in his own human resources. In other words, man's anxiety results from the dichotomy he experiences between his knowledge and his will, i.e., he knows the good to be done through his knowledge of the law but his will is often powerless to act on this knowledge. Paul describes this conflict graphically:

We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good. So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.

(Romans VII: 14-20)

Fitzmeyer describes the conflict experienced by Paul— and by every man who seeks justification through observance of a "law"—as "the cleavage between his reason dominated desire and his actual performance," and this

81 J. Fitzmeyer, Jerome Biblical Commentary, 53:77.
awareness or consciousness of sin is occasioned by the law. The law is just and good (Romans VII: 12) and therefore is not the direct cause of sin in man. But the law, by making man aware of transgressions, makes him aware of the basic condition which lies behind every individual transgression—sin, the tendency to self-centredness which Paul refers to as the "flesh" (cf. Romans VII: 14). The result is that

What was grasped by the conscience as being vaguely evil came to be regarded as formal rebellion and transgression through the law.82

But the law not only makes man aware of the sinful condition in which he already exists; it aggravates that condition by stimulating man to greater transgressions, through the lure of what is forbidden, and sin thereby becomes "sinful beyond measure" (Romans VII: 13). Again, however, in Paul's teaching, it is not the law which stimulates man to further transgressions but sin itself which uses the law to bring man under its domination, thus "working death in me through what is good" (Romans VII: 13).

This twofold effect of the giving of the law is referred to by Paul as "bondage" or "death." It is a bondage or slavery to sin, which as G. B. Cragg points out83 is experienced at the same time as a bondage to the law, for without the law there would be no awareness of the bondage

82 J. Fitzmeyer, Jerome Biblical Commentary, 53:73
to sin, and without sin there would be no awareness of bondage to the law, for the law would be observable and therefore deprived of its oppressive and threatening character. Consequently, if redemption is a liberation from sin it will also be in some sense a liberation from the law. But why was man put under this bondage in the first place? What was the purpose of the law if its observance did not have the power to justify man before God, and, indeed, only served to make him aware of and increase his alienation from God (cf. Galatians III: 21-22)?

In the passage under discussion (Romans VII: 7-25) as well as in Galatians III: 19-29, Paul infers that the law was given to man precisely to frustrate him by showing him his sinfulness; to show him, through his failure to keep the law, that he cannot save himself, that salvation must be a gift (grace) from God. Man's transgressions of the law make him aware of his sinful condition, of his basic self-centredness. The result is anxiety which results from this experience of bondage to sin, and the answer to this anxiety and bondage is faith in God's gift of salvation in Christ.

For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members. Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord!

(Romans VII: 22-25)

This dichotomy between man's knowledge of the good and his failure to carry it out (Romans VII: 14-23) causes anxiety and guilt, and it is faith in God's acceptance of him in
spite of his guilt, which delivers man from this anxiety.

Fr. Lyonnet describes the function of the law in these words:

Let us note that, properly speaking, law does not provoke sin but transgression. St. Paul looks upon transgression as the outward expression of a far more deeply rooted evil, hamartia, not merely carnal concupiscence, but an evil power personified, corresponding to that deeply rooted egoism by which man, since original sin, orientates everything to himself instead of opening himself to God and to others. It is this "sin" that must be destroyed in us; and left to itself, law is incapable of the task. But by permitting "transgressions," law makes sin unfold itself and helps man through his painful experience, to seek his saviour. [...] It is from the "rule of law" as such that St. Paul declares the Christian freed.84

Thus the law is seen by St. Paul as having a preparatory function in reference to man's act of faith. But this does not mean that observance of the law leads naturally to faith, for it is only when man's attempts at self-justification before God through obedience to the law "break down" in the face of the frustration and anxiety occasioned by the law that man is ready to accept through faith the justification which the New Testament message offers him as a free gift of grace. The law does not produce faith directly; faith is born out of the despair and anxiety occasioned by the law. G. B. Cragg remarks:

He [St. Paul] means that the Law is necessary to produce that utter despair of self which must precede one's acceptance in faith of the salvation

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which only God's grace can bestow.  

(iii) Man under Grace (Period after Christ). The law causes anxiety in man only as long as he feels that he must justify himself before God by keeping the law. But faith delivers him from this anxiety because it tells him that justification is a free gift of God (grace). Thus relieved of the necessity of justifying himself through moralistic striving, the man of faith enters into a personal relationship with God—a relationship which transcends a merely ethical and legalistic relationship.

At the basis of this relationship is the psychological truth that a man cannot fulfill himself or realize his potential through his own isolated effort. Self-realization comes as a gift from without; it is the result of being accepted by another. For the Christian, this means that the transformation he tries unsuccessfully to bring about in himself through moralistic striving or legal observance, is ultimately achieved only through God's act of forgiveness and acceptance in Christ. When he believes this, he is accepted by God in spite of his guilt and forgiven, he is liberated from the necessity of self-justification and is free to serve God out of love and gratitude resulting from a personal relationship. David Roberts suggests that we must first experience the failure, anxiety and frustration of

moralism and legalism in order to arrive at the confidence of faith.

[...] only one who has been awakened to the full seriousness of his guilt, and his own inability to overcome it, is in a position to look for and to accept the only adequate remedy—namely, the saving power of God's love and forgiveness in Jesus Christ, whereby he does something for us which we cannot do for ourselves. God alone could create us in the first place, and he alone can "recreate" (regenerate) us. Thus an awareness of the radical character of the problem goes hand in hand with an awareness of the radical character of the remedy.86

St. Paul, then, sees the act of faith as making possible the transition from despair and anxiety to trust and confidence; from a legalistic to a personal relationship; from the bondages of sin to the freedom of grace; and, psychologically, from self-justifying motives to self-transcending motives. In Chapter VIII of Romans, Paul discusses the vital principle of this transformation, of this new life and new type of relationship which man enjoys with God. That vital and dynamic principle is the "gift of the Spirit." For Paul, a Christian is one who has received the Spirit of God or of Christ, and this in-dwelling of the Spirit is the basis of his personal relationship with God.

It is this personal relationship, considered as the Covenant resulting from faith, which distinguishes Christian faith from that of Abraham, for example, whose covenant with God was in the form of a formal contract (cf. Genesis XV);

or the faith of the Israelites whose Covenant with God was a legal relationship between God and his people (cf. Exodus XIX). But Christian faith implies a transcending of this legalistic relationship in favour of a personal relationship with God in Christ. This is indicated already in the prologue to the fourth gospel which speaks of the different ways in which God has revealed himself: in nature (I: 3); in the written law given to Moses (I: 17); and finally in the most adequate human way—as a person. The Word, the principle of God's self-revelation, became flesh (I: 14). God's ultimate self-revelation is in the form of a person--Jesus Christ--for, in Christ, man is called to a personal relationship with God.

St. Paul, particularly in Galatians and Romans, speaks of this new relationship with God arising from Christian faith as resulting from the gift of God's Spirit upon the believer. But if to be given the Spirit of God means to be given in some way the third person of the Trinity who is the bond between Father and Son and the substantial love of God, then the gift of the Spirit may be thought of as having a twofold effect on the believer which is a twofold liberation and the basis of the transforming power of faith.

1) Since the Holy Spirit is the bond between Father and Son, the believer's possession of the Spirit gives him a

87 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 37 and q. 38.
sharing in this bond or relationship. He shares in Christ's relationship with the Father; he shares in the intersubjective life of the Trinity. Through the gift of the Spirit, therefore the believer has bestowed upon him the character of adopted son and heir of God. He is, therefore, given as a free gift the kind of justifying relationship with his God which previously he had tried to fashion and earn through his human attempts to keep the law. This involves a certain freedom from the law since he no longer depends on his success in keeping the law for winning God's acceptance and favour. That acceptance has been given freely, and since the believer no longer has to use the law to "prove himself" the law loses its threatening and oppressive character. The man of faith is liberated to keep the law for more altruistic self-transcending motives; to keep the law not in order to earn a reward but out of gratitude for a gift already bestowed.

2) Since the Holy Spirit is the substantial love of the Father and Son, the believer possesses through faith the Spirit of Love. He possesses, therefore, an inner capacity for love. In this respect, also, it transcends the Old Covenant which gave man the Law but not the inner power or capacity to keep the Law. The Christian believes that through the Gift of the Spirit he has received not only the Christian law of love but a dynamic principle of life which gives him the inner capacity to do what he is commanded. He experiences therefore a liberation from what Paul calls "the
flesh," i.e., the spirit of self-centredness and self-seeking into which man inevitably falls without the saving encounter with Christ and the gift of his Spirit. It is precisely this gift of the Spirit which liberates man from the bondage of his own self-centredness (the flesh) and allows him to transcend his human condition.

The Law proposed an ideal but did not enable man to arrive at it. Now all this is changed. Man has the Spirit that enables him to surmount the flesh and arrive at the goal that the Law once proposed.

Thus, the basic Christian imperative is the Pauline injunction to follow the Spirit rather than the flesh (Galatians V: 16-18).

To summarize: the gift of the Spirit involves a sharing in a personal relationship with God in Christ and receiving an inner power or capacity to love. Consequently, it involves:

1) A twofold transcendence: it is a transcending of legalism (through the personal relationship of faith) and a transcending of the human condition (through the power to love); and

2) A twofold liberation: faith involves liberation from the bondage of law since the believer's relationship with God is personal rather than legal. It also involves

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89 J. Fitzmeyer, Jerome Biblical Commentary, 53:82.
liberation from the bondage of "flesh" since the believer is
given the inner capacity to love.

But it will be recalled that bondage to law and bond-
age to sin are to a great extent experienced as one and the
same bondage since the bondage of sin would not be experi-
enced as such without law. Thus we may locate the liberat-
ing, transcending and transforming power of faith in the
Christian experience of freedom from the Law.

Likewise, my brethren, you have died to the law
through the body of Christ, so that you may belong
to another, to him who has been raised from the
dead in order that we may bear fruit for God.
While we were living in the flesh, our sinful
passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our
members to bear fruit for death. But now we are
discharged from the law, dead to that which held us
captive, so that we serve not under the old written
code but in the new life of the spirit.
(Romans VII: 4-6)

It is obvious that the Christian is not bound by the
ritual and disciplinary laws of Judaism which he believes
have been abrogated for him. But in what sense is he liber-
ated from the moral law? Certainly not in the sense that
the moral law has been abrogated for the commandments still
express valid moral principles. What the Christian is
liberated from, however, is the "oppression" of the law,
i.e., the necessity of justifying himself by observing and
fulfilling the law. Thus, the believer is liberated from
the law, not objectively, for the law is still objectively
valid and expresses valid moral values (Romans VII: 12) but
rather subjectively in that he acquires a new attitude to
the law.
This new attitude to the law is based on three basic premises which therefore appear as the foundation for the self-transcending and transforming quality of faith.\(^{90}\)

1) The law is transcended by the believer's personal relationship with God. Law is, by its very nature, limiting. It defines exactly what one must do or not do. It creates, therefore, a legalistic relationship with the lawgiver. But a personal relationship can not be expressed in law, cannot be codified. Because it is personal it is unlimited and "open-ended," i.e., subject to growth and change. There are no artificial limits to the love and service rendered to a friend as there is to the obedience due to an authority. Thus, the Christian, while recognizing the objective validity of the law, does not make the mistake of thinking that a written law could ever adequately express his relationship with God in Christ which is personal. For this reason, there is no room for complacency in his life, since the mere keeping of the law does not exhaust the possibilities for love and service in a personal relationship. Having kept the law, he still considers himself an "unprofitable servant" (Luke XVII: 10).

2) Because he is justified by the free gift of God and his faith in that gift, the Christian no longer depends on keeping the law to justify himself before God. The New

Testament message is that salvation is never the result of keeping the law. It must be a gift. Justification is the result of God's acceptance of man in spite of his sinfulness. St. Paul points out that Abraham was justified (Genesis XV: 6) solely by his faith in God's promise for he lived before the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai, and the giving of the law does not annul the justifying power of God's promise or Abraham's faith. The Christian believer, like Abraham, is justified by his faith in God's promise.

[...for if a law had been given which could make alive, then righteousness would indeed be by the law. But the scripture consigned all things to sin, that what was promised to faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe. (Galatians III: 21-22)]

3) Finally, since justification is a free gift of God, then the moral effort of the Christian is not the cause of his friendship with God but its effect. The personal relationship which he enjoys through faith is not the result of morality; rather his moral effort is the result of his personal relationship with God. The moral law becomes the framework within which he tries to express his love and gratitude for the gift of justification and salvation.
Likewise, his moral failures are looked upon not so much as the breaking of the law imposed from without, but as a failure to live up to the demands of a personal relationship to which he has freely committed himself--as a failure to love. It is only within the context of such a commitment and relationship that one may legitimately reduce all of Christian
morality to Augustine's injunction: "Love and do what you will."  

B. Soren Kierkegaard: From Ethical to Religious Existence

In the Pauline understanding of faith two characteristics are prominent: (1) It is existential: faith is not merely an assent of the mind but a new mode of existence arrived at through trust, decision and commitment. (2) It is dialectical: because the assent and decision of faith embraces and accepts the paradox of law and grace. Later, Christian thinkers such as Luther, Kierkegaard and Karl Barth will speak more explicitly of this paradoxical element of Christian faith, but it is already there in Paul's thought since for him, the man justified by God's free grace is not liberated from the law in an absolute sense but is still confronted by its still valid moral demands (though his justification no longer depends on their fulfillment). The law is still "holy, and just, and good" and, therefore, man must still measure himself against it. In the light of the law he sees himself—that self justified by grace—as still being a sinner. In Luther's phrase he is "simul justus et peccator." This is the paradox which faith must accept.

The thought of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) displays

91St. Augustine, In Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos Tractatus, VII, 8; Migne, Patrologia Latina, 35, 2033.
the same existential-dialectical thrust. It is customary for commentators to divide Kierkegaard's thought into two streams or phases; to describe him as both an existentialist philosopher and a dialectical theologian. In reality, the philosopher and the theologian cannot be separated for, as G. E. and G. B. Arbaugh have pointed out, these two streams of thought are interwoven throughout his writings.

For Kierkegaard the philosopher, reality cannot be reached by the manipulation of abstract concepts but by immediate experience. To exist is to have an awareness of one's unique, individual, existence for which one is responsible. This awareness is most acute in moments of extreme tension and anxiety. It is at such times that one must assume responsibility for his existence, that one must decide to live or to die. Existence, in this context, refers to that form of being which is proper to a human being; but it is not a "given," it is something to be achieved. In other words, a man does not become human simply by being born; he achieves authentic human existence only through his free decisions and commitments. Thus man's becoming as an individual is not accounted for by abstract concepts of the meaning of life or of human nature or by abstract philosophical systems. He becomes what he is through his choices and decisions which transform

possibilities into concrete realities. It is only by facing and accepting the anxiety and dread which accompany his freedom of choice and, therefore, responsibility, that man can truly arrive at authentic human existence.

This emphasis on the value and autonomy of the individual in his concrete human existence was, in part, a reaction against the idealism of Hegel, according to which the structure of being was identified with the structure of thought and man's becoming was merely a stage in the dialectical unfolding of the absolute Idea or Concept. For Kierkegaard the individual was not merely the result of universal and necessary laws but of his own personal decisions and commitments. The individual is not merely the manifestation of a universal definition of man or human nature; on the contrary, the individual defines himself through the existential decisions he makes.

In this latter regard, Kierkegaard appears as the forerunner of contemporary existentialist thought, but, as Arbaugh points out, the religious existentialism of Kierkegaard differs from the atheistic existentialism of some contemporary thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, in that man does not "create himself" in an absolute sense, but through free choice and commitment seeks the essence or objective pattern of his being established by God and

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93 Arbaugh and Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship, pp. 23-24 and 399-400.
rejected by man through sin and rebellion. Thus, for Kierkegaard, there is an objective meaning to existence (which Sartre denies) but that objective pattern or meaning is not a matter of necessity or natural unfolding (as Hegel had maintained) but is rather accepted or rejected by the free decisions of the individual.

As a religious thinker, Kierkegaard's existentialist approach is evident in his insistence on "inwardness" or subjectivity. Truth may be stated in objective propositions, but it becomes truth for the individual only when it is subjectively appropriated—when it becomes truth for him. What is important, therefore, is not to know the meaning of Christianity in itself (since Christianity is not a philosophy) but to understand how one can become a Christian (since Christianity is an event confronting man and challenging him to make an existential decision). An individual enters into or appropriates Christianity, not by the force of rational arguments, but by his own free decision.

Kierkegaard the theologian found himself in a religious atmosphere which was, in some sense, similar to that which St. Paul had encountered. As Paul had maintained the paradox of law and grace in opposition to the extremes of the legalism of those who wanted to retain the law (the Galatian Judaizers) and the libertinism of those who wanted to use their freedom under grace as "an opportunity for the flesh" (Galatians V: 13), in the same way Kierkegaard tried to maintain the paradox of faith and works (imitation) in
opposition to what he considered to be the legalism and misplaced asceticism of the Catholic Church and the "worldliness" of the Lutheran Church of his native Denmark which he looked upon as having used Luther's doctrine of justification through faith as a means of avoiding the asceticism and suffering which accompany any serious attempt to imitate Christ. The reason for this, in Kierkegaard's opinion, was the shift from subjectivity to objectivity. What Luther had subjectively experienced through his inner spiritual struggle (justification through faith) was turned into an objective doctrine or principle and applied to all Christians.  

Luther arrived at the experience of justification through faith by personally experiencing the futility of works (in the form of monastic asceticism). But succeeding generations simply applied Luther's hard-won victory to themselves without going through the same inner struggle; they tried to imitate the faith of Luther without experiencing the anxiety and despair-producing conflict which is its necessary precondition. Thus they "transformed the Lutheran passion into a doctrine, and with this they diminished the vital power of faith.  

But if both these lines of thought--the existential


and the dialectical—are to be found in Kierkegaard, at what point do they intersect? What is the common ground on which they meet? Is Kierkegaard a dialectical theologian because he is an existentialist philosopher or vice-versa? James Collins seems to suggest\(^{96}\) that Kierkegaard's dialectical theology is the result of his existential philosophy, i.e., of his opposition to Hegel's idealism. He sees the real dialectical problem in Kierkegaard's thought as the tension between the aesthetic and religious modes of existence, between the world and the cloister, humanism and Christianity. In order to differentiate his existential dialectic from the absolutist dialectic of Hegel, Kierkegaard avoids speaking of faith or religious existence as the synthesis of other incomplete modes of existence. Each rather is a total way of life which demands of the individual a choice of one and, correspondingly, a rejection of the other.

According to this view, therefore, Kierkegaard is dialectical (i.e., stresses the complete antithesis between different modes of existence) because he is existential, i.e., because he sees the antithesis as being resolved not by a synthesis of two incomplete ideas but by the free choice made by the individual between two concrete modes of existence. Arbaugh,\(^{97}\) on the other hand, sees Kierkegaard's


\(^{97}\) Arbaugh and Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship, p. 23.
existentialism as resulting from his dialectical theology. Why is man's becoming viewed in terms of decision and commitment? Ultimately, because God confronts the individual with a paradox which demands an existential response, which he must accept or reject.

This paradox originates in the Incarnation, in the union of the eternal logos and the temporal Jesus. This would seem to indicate that Kierkegaard's dialectical theology is more fundamental to his thought than his existentialism. It is not that human existence and the world and God are paradoxical or absurd in themselves; but existence is made paradoxical because God has done the absurd and confronts man with it. The absurdity with which God confronts man is the event of the God-man, not a piece of pantheistic philosophy which speaks of the unity of God and man, but the concrete absurdity of a man who claims to be God. Man can react to such a paradox, not by "mediating" it, by making it plausible through rational reflection; he can only respond with either faith or by being "offended" or scandalized.

The God-man (and by this, as has been said, Christianity does not mean that fantastic speculation about the unity of God and man, but an individual man who is God)—the God-man exists only for faith; but the possibility of offence is just the repellent force by which faith comes into existence—if one does not choose instead to be offended.  

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Thus both the deed of God in Christ and man's response of faith are paradoxical. Faith accepts and lives with the paradox; it cannot revoke the paradox through speculation.

Faith, therefore, is the inward accepting or grasping of the paradox with which God confronts man.

Faith is the objective uncertainty due to the repulsion of the absurd held fast by the passion of inwardness, which, in this instance, is intensified to the utmost degree.\(^{99}\)

It is precisely this "objective uncertainty" which makes faith necessary. For Kierkegaard, faith is belief in one's eternal happiness. But there is an infinite qualitative difference between the temporal and the eternal, and therefore, man's assurance of his eternal happiness cannot be founded on anything temporal such as philosophical or historical proofs. Faith does not result from nor is it based on historical facts, such as the life and miracles of Christ, no matter how certainly established, for no historical fact can assure my eternal happiness. Faith results from man's free personal decision to believe; it results not because the historical fact of Jesus can be objectively established but because the individual believer has subjectively decided that this historical fact means everything to him and he is willing to stake his eternal happiness on it. Risk is of the essence of such faith.

And so I say to myself: I choose; that historical fact means so much to me that I decide to stake my whole life upon that "if." Then he lives; lives entirely full of the idea, risking his life for it: and his life is the proof that he believes. He did not have a few proofs, and so believed, and then began to live. No, the very reverse.
That is called risking; and without risk faith is an impossibility.\textsuperscript{100}

In the context of Kierkegaard's existential thought, dialectical theology refers to the dialectic of existence involved in becoming a Christian. The path to faith is made up of what Collins calls a series of "basic choices which confront the individual in his search for mature self-possession."\textsuperscript{101} In this process Kierkegaard identifies three principal stages or levels or spheres of existence through which the individual passes--the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. These spheres or modes of existence are analogous to the three stages of human history spoken of by St. Paul through which both mankind and the individual man pass--the periods of nature, law and grace. Each mode of existence, the aesthetic, ethical and religious, represent a philosophy or total orientation of one's life. Therefore, the transition from one mode to the next takes place only when one has reached the limit and realized the futility of his present mode of existence. Thus, there is not a natural evolution from one level to the next; the


\textsuperscript{101} J. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, pp. 42-43.
aesthetic does not lead naturally into the ethical, nor the ethical into the religious. The transition is accomplished only by a "leap" or free decision on the part of the individual, and can be made only when the possibilities of the inferior mode of life have been exhausted and a new choice in the total orientation of one's life is made. If, therefore, the religious sphere is the level of faith, one may speak of the aesthetic and ethical spheres as being necessary preconditions for faith, and of the passing through these stages as being a "psychological preamble" to the act of faith.

(i) The Aesthetic Sphere. This level of existence is characterized by the fact that the individual looks for answers and fulfillment outside of himself. He is at the mercy of external events. His speculation about the meaning of life has not reached the point of ethical decision. Kierkegaard begins with the fact of man's freedom. Man is characterized by the freedom of his unique individual existence; he must assume responsibilities for his existence by choosing what he will be, by freely giving his life meaning, direction, and commitment. Freedom means freedom to decide, to commit oneself. The man who lives on the aesthetic level of life is precisely the one who has not made this decision or commitment. Reduced to its simplest terms, the difference between the aesthetic and the ethical man is the difference between the uncommitted and the committed man. The
aesthetic life is not a choice of evil over good; it is no choice at all. Thus, in Vol. II of Kierkegaard's Either/Or, Judge William, who is representative of the ethical way of life, pronounces the following judgment on the aesthetic.

You will perceive also in what I have just been saying how essentially my view of choice differs from yours (if you can properly be said to have any view), for yours differs precisely in the fact that it prevents you from choosing. [...] your choice is an aesthetic choice, but an aesthetic choice is no choice.102

The aesthetic tries to enjoy life as it comes to him. He may simply enjoy life on the sensual level or enjoy it by speculating about it, by taking refuge in metaphysical abstractions. But in both cases he is retreating from the necessity of ethical decision. He is shirking the responsibility to give meaning to his individual existence. For Kierkegaard, such evasion of responsibility results in mediocrity and a failure to achieve authentic human existence. The aesthetic sphere is a world of possibilities never actualized by decisiveness.

[...] it is therefore not existence, but an existential possibility tending toward existence, and brought so close to it that you feel how every moment is wasted as long as it has not yet come to a decision. But the existential possibility in the existing "A" refuses to become aware of this, and keeps existence away by the most subtle of all

deceptions, by thinking; he has thought everything possible, and yet he has not existed at all.103

(ii) The Ethical Sphere. Man cannot continue to simply enjoy life or speculate about it without assuming the responsibility of structuring his life through some kind of ethical decision. Consequently, the aesthetic life ends in despair when the individual perceives the irony of his situation, viz., that his pursuit of pleasure has brought him unhappiness; that his self-seeking is the very antithesis of that choosing of oneself which Kierkegaard identifies with ethical choice or decision; for the aesthetic chooses himself only for the moment and "in his immediacy" and "as this fortuitous individual," while the ethical man "chooses himself in his eternal validity."104 But the despair in which the aesthetic ends, makes possible a transition to a higher form of existence.

So it appears that every aesthetic view of life is despair, and that every one who lives aesthetically is in despair, whether he knows it or not. But when one knows it, a higher form of existence is an imperative requirement.105

That higher form of existence is the ethical in which the individual ceases to merely enjoy life or speculate about

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103 S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 226. "The existing A" is an allusion to the pseudonymous author of Either/Or, Vol. 1, who represents the aesthetic mode of existence.


105 Ibid., p. 162.
it, and makes a decision about it. He now accepts the responsibility which accompanies freedom. He makes decisions about how life is to be lived and, accordingly, commits himself to ethical norms and principles. For Kierkegaard, this is the first step on the road to authentic selfhood for in structuring his life in this way, the individual chooses and finds himself. To assume one's responsibility before God is to give expression in one's life to universal and eternal values and thus to choose one's eternal value rather than one's temporal enjoyment. Kierkegaard describes the choice in these words:

The heavens part, as it were, and the I chooses itself—or rather receives itself. [...] even the richest personality is nothing before he has chosen himself, and, on the other hand, even what one might call the poorest personality is everything when he has chosen himself; for the great thing is not to be this or that but to be oneself, and this everyone can be if he wills it.106

But the ethical, like the aesthetic, ends in despair when the individual discovers his inability to adhere to ethical norms; and as the aesthetic life ends in the pathos of perceiving the irony of one's despair-producing pursuit of pleasure, so the ethical life ends in the pathos of perceiving the essential humour of one's pathetic attempts to achieve the good commanded by ethical norms. Just as the Mosaic Law served the purpose of giving the people of Israel a greater sense of their sinfulness revealed in their

transgressions, so does every man's effort to organize his life along ethical lines result in a greater awareness of his lack of rectitude, his lack of self-sufficiency, and his need for forgiveness. Moreover, ethical existence does not meet the demands of individual existence (of "inwardness"), for it means that the universal takes precedence over the individual. Universal ethical norms reduce everyone to the same level and subject everyone to the same demands. This is opposed to the uniqueness of the individual's concrete existence to which one can give expression in the personal relationship into which one enters by faith.

The despair, therefore, which one experiences at the dead-end of ethical striving is based on a twofold realization. In the first place, one realizes his inability to live up to his ethical ideals, a realization which Arbaugh describes as being "cognizant of the good which, however desired, cannot be personally grasped." 107 Secondly, one realizes that even if he were to perfectly realize his ethical ideals, nevertheless, as David Roberts remarks, "even the most exalted ethical heroism falls short of a religious relationship because it leaves the personal subordinate to the social and the legal." 108

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107 Arbaugh and Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship, p. 85.

(iii) The Religious Sphere. This is the level of faith. Just as for St. Paul, "the law has been our tutor unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith" (Galatians III: 24), so for Kierkegaard ethical existence is a necessary prelude to the "leap of faith" by which the believer transcends ethical existence and achieves authentic religious life. When man fails to achieve fulfillment in philosophical theory or ethical effort, he faces in Kierkegaard's view an "either/or" situation. He is faced with a choice between despair and faith, between radical despair and radical trust. The decision of faith is the decision to accept the salvation and forgiveness offered by God in Christ, and it is based on the realization that man cannot save himself.

For Kierkegaard, man enters the religious sphere of existence when, through the act of faith, he accepts by his free choice and decision the seeming paradox and absurdity of the event of the God-man, and stakes his eternal happiness on it. The following points should be noted about Kierkegaard's understanding of faith.

1) Faith begins with that consciousness of sin which occurs at the dead-end of ethical existence. Ethical striving is a necessary pre-condition for faith. Speaking of religious existence, Kierkegaard remarks that "it is an essential requirement that it should have passed through the ethical."\(^{109}\) Faith is based on the realization that man

cannot find fulfillment in himself. He must commit himself
to a transcendent source. The "leap" of faith is a decision
to commit oneself to the God from whom man has been estranged
through the abuse of his freedom. It is in the restoration
of this broken fellowship that man finds fulfillment. It is
a decision one makes in the face of one's incompleteness and
the failure of attempts at self-sufficiency; a decision to
commit oneself to God as the transcendent source outside man
which will complete and satisfy human existence. The des­
pair in which ethical life ends is a stepping-stone to that
radical act of trust which is faith because it leads man to
repentance which Arbaugh describes as "the final negative
element in the unsuccessful human quest for the eternal."110
Kierkegaard describes this consciousness of sin as the only
way to faith:

[... ] for the terrible language of the Law is so
terrifying because it seems as if it were left to
man to hold fast to Christ by his own power,
whereas in the language of love it is Christ that
holds him fast [... ] only the consciousness of sin
can force one into this dreadful situation—the
power on the other side being grace [... ] only
through the consciousness of sin is there entrance
to it, and the wish to enter in by any other way is
the crime of "lèse-majesté" against Christianity.111

It is, therefore, only through "the torments of a contrite
heart"112 that one learns to accept as gift what one failed

110 Arbaugh and Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship,
p. 87.


112 Ibid., p. 72.
to earn through ethical effort, i.e., that one enters into the religious sphere of faith.

2) Faith is a "leap" because it is not a natural and logical conclusion to man's ethical efforts; for there is a radical discontinuity between ethical and religious existence. Rather it is a radical act of trust and commitment made in the face of the "dead-end" of ethical effort. To speak of the act of faith then as a "leap" does not reduce it to the level of the compulsive or irrational; it merely emphasizes the fact that one does not naturally evolve from the ethical sphere into the religious but must do so by a free choice and decision which involves not the rejection of ethical values (which are still valid as universal norms) but a recognition of the insufficiency of ethical existence to achieve the desired religious relationship with the eternal.

3) Faith, because it transcends the ethical, involves a paradoxical suspension of the ethical. If, by the commitment of faith, a man transcends the anxiety associated with self-sufficiency and moral effort, at the same time he takes on himself the risk and adventure of faith. While the universal ethical norms remain objectively valid, nevertheless, within the context of the demands of the personal relationship of faith, the believer must be prepared to suspend those universal norms of ethics on any given occasion; to consider himself, on the grounds of faith, an exception. Kierkegaard sees an example of this in Abraham's
willingness to sacrifice Isaac, an instance in which the obedience of faith demanded a suspension of the ethical imperative.

The ethical expression for what Abraham did is, that he would murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he would sacrifice Isaac; but precisely in this contradiction consists the dread which can well make a man sleepless, and yet Abraham is not what he is without this dread.\textsuperscript{113}

Nor is the Christian a man of faith unless he is willing to do what Abraham did--to transgress the universal ethical law by going beyond it in obedience to a higher obligation, the obligation arising out of the personal relationship of faith. In such terms did Kierkegaard describe the paradox of faith.

The paradox of faith is this, that the individual is higher than the universal, that the individual [...] determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute by his relation to the universal. [...] From this however it does not follow that the ethical is to be abolished, but it acquires an entirely different expression, the paradoxical expression--that, for example, love to God may cause the knight of faith to give his love to his neighbour the opposite expression to that which, ethically speaking, is required by duty.\textsuperscript{114}

Understood in this way, therefore, faith can be said to bring about a transformation in the personality of the believer, since through the suspension (but not the abrogation) of the ethical, he transcends the conflict between the demands of universal moral principles and the unique needs and


\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 80.
responsibilities of his individual existence which are no longer subordinated to and frustrated by the universal norm but expressed in his unique relationship to the absolute.\textsuperscript{115}

C. Karl Barth: From Religion to Faith

Karl Barth (1886-1968) appears as the twentieth century heir to the nineteenth century dialectical theology of Soren Kierkegaard. Beginning with the same theological premise— the infinite qualitative difference between God and man—Barth developed a dialectical theology which was a reaction against the liberal Protestant theology of his day, just as Kierkegaard had reacted against the rationalism of

\textsuperscript{115}In the above discussion, for the sake of brevity, no reference has been made to what is, for Kierkegaard, an important further distinction. It should at least be mentioned in passing, however, that within the religious sphere of existence, Kierkegaard distinguishes between a preliminary type of religious existence ("Religiousness A") and true Christian existence ("Religiousness B"). Religion A is the religion of immanence and is typified by the tragic hero or the "knight of infinite resignation," i.e., the man who in self-annihilation before God, renounces himself in order to express in his life universal ethical values. This is the man who, striving to attain the eternal through his own efforts, succeeds only in increasing the pathos of his consciousness of sin. As such it is a preparatory phase to Religion B or Christian existence, in which man accepts the paradox that the transcendent God accepts him in his now clearly recognized sinful condition and offers him what he was unable to achieve by his own efforts. Religion A is the religion of immanence, i.e., the human quest of the divine, while Religion B is transcendent, i.e., the recognition that man cannot attain to God but God has reached out to man. Religion A gives up all for God; Religion B or faith hopes to regain what it has given up, as Abraham hoped to regain Isaac. (Cf. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 493-98 and Fear and Trembling, p. 70.)
nineteenth century Christianity. In his first major publication, his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Barth abandoned what had been the preoccupation of liberal Protestantism up to that point—historical criticism of the Bible (quest of the "historical Jesus") and the justification of religious experience and belief in a scientific age—and called for a return to the kind of orthodox Christian thought which begins with God and not with man. God, said Barth, could not be discovered through human reasoning or human experience or human history; the God discovered in this way would be a reflection of man, a God made after the image of man. Left to his own resources, man, because his intellect as well as his will is in bondage to sin and therefore self-seeking, will find the God he wants to find.

At the bottom of Barth's attacks on both the natural theology of Catholic Scholastic theology and Protestant liberal theology is his desire to defend the absolute sovereignty of God and therefore his freedom and initiative in regard to man's salvation. For Barth, there could be no question of any kind of continuity between God and man which would make it possible for man to know God by knowing himself. Thus, he rejects the presuppositions of both natural theology (an analogy of being between God and man) which would allow man to discover God through an objective reasoning and of the liberal theology of Schleiermacher (continuity from matter to life, from life to mind and from man to God) which would allow man to discover God in his own human
experience of dependence. "One can not speak of God" Barth contended, "simply by speaking of man in a loud voice."¹¹⁶ Not that God is not immanent in the life of man, but his presence is not discoverable by man apart from God's gracious act of revealing himself. To think otherwise would be to make man, not God, the measure of all things. In this regard, H. R. Mackintosh remarks that Barth's insistence on the sovereignty and transcendence of God is not in opposition to his authentic immanence which is known through revelation, but rather to the "Immanentism" of liberal theology which makes man's discovery of God's immanence "a product of the autonomous human reason untaught by revelation."¹¹⁷

Man, therefore, cannot know God unless God chooses to reveal Himself. For Barth, this means that there is no knowledge of God apart from the Christian revelation, i.e., the revelation of God in the person and work of Jesus Christ. But this revelation can only be expressed by man in a series of dialectical statements: Jesus is both God and man; God is both hidden and revealed; He is the God of wrath and the God of grace; man is both sinner and just; he stands under God's wrath and condemnation, but also under his grace and


forgiveness. (As Barth would say, under the NO and the YES of God's judgment.)

This paradoxical juxtaposition of seemingly contradictory statements, of affirmation and negation, is the only way in which man can speak about God and of himself in the light of God. Barth stands in the tradition of the reformation theology of Luther which maintained that man was simul justus et peccator because he was the object of both the unconditional demand of God (Law) and the unconditional acceptance of God (Gospel). Such a theology resists any attempt to dissolve the paradox by synthesizing the YES and the NO of God (i.e., by turning it into a Hegelian type of dialectic) or by turning the unconditional YES and NO into a conditional YES and NO (i.e., by making the demands of God observable through the exercise of free will and the aid of sacramental grace, indulgences, etc., and the acceptance of God conditional on such observance). The truth about God can only be approached by maintaining what appears on the finite level as the contradiction of affirmation and negation, for God is a Truth which cannot be apprehended by man; the mystery in which affirmation and negation are reconciled.

Since man cannot penetrate the mystery of the "wholly other" God, the activity and judgment of God in man's regard will appear paradoxical, and man's situation before God will have to be described in this paradoxical fashion, through the method of statement and counter-statement. This is so, as Mackintosh remarks, because man is using finite terms to
deal with the Infinite, and therefore, when man speaks of his situation in the light of God "every assertion of what we are must and does contain, as a constituent opposite, the thought of what we are not." It is faith which enables man to transcend this apparent contradiction; which enables man to see the opposites as belonging together. In faith, the believer accepts the YES of God as God's final verdict on him. Barth sees the believer as one who has come to see the unworthiness and futility of all his moral and religious attempts to justify himself before God and accepts God's election or acceptance of him in spite of that unworthiness. The believer who knows that in himself he is a sinner and rejected also knows that in Christ he is justified and accepted. Through his faith in God's revelation the believer transcends his condition as sinner standing under God's condemnation, because he accepts the forgiveness and acceptance which are revealed in Christ. (Indeed, it is only in the light of this forgiveness that man is fully aware of himself as sinner.) In the words of Barth, God deals with man, "not with a natural 'therefore' but with a miraculous 'nevertheless'." Man is not unworthy and therefore rejected; he is unworthy (and remains so) but is nevertheless elected.

118 H. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 255.
For Barth then, man is moved to the act of faith by a realization of God's election of him in Christ in spite of his unworthiness. But man must first become aware of his sinfulness and unworthiness and this is the function of "religion." Man is a sinner, prone to self-centredness. Through religion, i.e., the human attempt to live a self-justifying life before God, man becomes aware of his sinfulness. This awareness leads him to the act of faith in the grace of God which accomplishes what he cannot accomplish by any human possibility. It has been pointed out that both St. Paul and Kierkegaard describe the dynamics of faith in terms of three distinct levels of existence through which man passes in his progress towards faith. The same stages or levels of existence can be discerned in Barth's treatment of faith and justification. For purposes of discussion these stages will be referred to as the man of sin ("the old Adam"), the man of religion, and the man of faith.

(i) The Man of Sin. This refers to man in his fallen condition, man who has not experienced a saving encounter with Christ. The unredeemed human condition is such that man, left to his own resources, is essentially self-centred and tends inevitably to make himself the centre of reality, thus

120 A distinction must be made between the words "religion" and "religious" as used by Barth and by Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, the religious man is the man of faith. For Barth, the term "religion" refers to the necessary preamble to faith, i.e., it refers to what Kierkegaard calls the ethical stage of existence.
usurping the place of God. Barth describes man's sin in these words:

Sin is a robbing of God; a robbery which becomes apparent in our arrogant endeavour to cross the line of death by which we are bounded; in our drunken blurring of the distance which separates us from God; in our forgetfulness of his invisibility; in our investing of men with the form of God and of God with the form of man.\textsuperscript{121}

Barth refers to man in this fallen condition as the "old Adam," i.e., unredeemed man. But the fallen state is not the result of one isolated historical act, not the result of a single transgression by the first man. Original sin is the finite, helpless state of human nature which inevitably falls into sin apart from the saving encounter with Christ. The Adam of Scripture is a symbol of this condition, not its historical cause. Barth is anxious to defend the eternal, sovereign, predestining will of God against the relativities of human history. Man's situation before God is not accounted for by any event in human history but by the saving actions of God from above, the focal point of which is the revelation of the reconciliation of man and God in Christ, in which the believer—the man under grace—comes to realize his former fallen condition of which Adam is the symbol.

The fall is not occasioned by the transgression of Adam; but the transgression was presumably its

first manifest operation [...] predestination unto rejection precedes the "historical fall." Only insofar as Adam first did what we all do, is it legitimate for us to call and define by his name the shadow in which we all stand. By the first Adam we mean the natural, earthy, historical man; and it is this man who must be overcome. 122

(ii) The Man of Religion. But how is this natural man to be overcome? Man tries to accomplish this first by his own efforts, i.e., by trying to live according to the ethical norms and observances of religion. But this only makes more evident the dichotomy of knowledge and will of which St. Paul speaks. 123 But Paul does not speak disparagingly of "the Law" which was good and necessary, and likewise, Barth, although he speaks within the context of the dialectic of revelation and religion, nevertheless sees "religion" (i.e., all man's ethical and moral striving) as something good in itself and as performing a positive function in regard to the life of faith.

To understand this function of religion in the dynamics of faith, it will be helpful to make use of the

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122 K. Barth, Epistle to the Romans, p. 172. It should be pointed out that it could be misleading to understand "the man of sin" as a stage in man's progress towards faith in any strictly chronological sense, i.e., in the sense that it gives way and completely disappears when man achieves a further stage or level of existence. To preserve the dialectical nature of Barth's thought it must be remembered that the redeemed man is, in Christ, the man in whom sin dies, but, in himself, he remains the "natural, earthy, historical" man and, therefore, the man of sin.

123 Cf. Romans, VII.
distinction which J. A. Veitch\textsuperscript{124} (in discussing the dialectic of revelation and religion in Barth) suggests between "religion" and "religiosity." In its most positive sense, religion is man's response to God's revelation, his attempt (through observances, moral effort, ritual, etc.) to give expression to his encounter with the divine. As such, Barth refers to it as the "human, historical subjective side" of revelation and the resulting divine-human relationship. It is the "conscious and creative human activity" which gives "visible expression to the transformation of the old into the new man."\textsuperscript{125}

Understood in this positive sense, religion functions as a sign of the divine presence, for it presupposes the relationship with man established and revealed by God, rather than attempting to create or produce that relationship. In true religion, says Barth, the divine-human relationship "is presupposed by the concrete reality of religion."\textsuperscript{126} It becomes "religiosity" or false religion, however, when it loses its character of sign and takes on an absolute character or becomes an end in itself. True religion points to something beyond itself; it is the subjective impression and expression of an objective revelation.


\textsuperscript{125}K. Barth, \textit{Epistle to the Romans}, pp. 183-84.

\textsuperscript{126}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.
"Religiosity" attempts to elevate this human, subjective expression into an absolute, and consequently leads to idolatry. Commenting on Romans I: 23 and 24, Barth contends that when the qualitative difference between God and man is ignored, men try to find and experience God in their human creations and institutions. The result is that "the NO-God is set up, idols are created, and God, who dwells beyond all this is 'given up'."¹²⁷

Religion becomes "religiosity," therefore, when it is changed from a way of responding to God's freely given grace and revelation to a means by which man tries to discover God and justify himself through his ethical effort and religious observances. But even this distortion of religion has a function in leading man to faith, since this effort to discover God in religion represents for Barth the frontier, the high point of human achievement and possibility. But man's arrival at this point only serves to remind him of the infinite gap that still separates him from God and divine possibility. In the final analysis, man's moral striving serves to bring into sharper focus the underlying self-centredness at the root of all his individual transgressions.

Sin is power-sovereign power. By it men are controlled. The actual sins of the individual man are the means by which the general situation is more or less clearly made known. Particular sins do not

¹²⁷K. Barth, Epistle to the Romans, pp. 50-51.
alter the status of man; they merely show how heavily the general dominion of sin presses upon him.\textsuperscript{128}

Religion, conceived as man's moral striving, represents the limit of human possibility; it represents the extent to which man can progress in his attempts to justify himself before God. It is a sign of his good will but it brings him ultimately to a realization of his need for redemption. It reinforces the concept of man as a sinner. In other words, in trying to be a saint, man proves to himself that he is a sinner. Man's visible achievements in the realm of "religion" merely serve to make visible what was previously invisible--his fallen condition, his situation before God as sinner.

The invisible possibility of religion operates and must operate as a visible possibility, in order that the fall of man may be made visible, and the necessity of his turning unto righteousness may be made manifest in his visible attainments. In the religious man we are able to perceive most clearly that men are flesh, sinful, hindrances to God, under his wrath, arrogant, restless, incapable of knowledge, and weak of will.\textsuperscript{129}

But this effort at self-justification is a necessary step towards faith, for only when we have experienced the futility of self-justification are we prepared for justification through faith. Only by arriving at the frontier of human possibility are we prepared to accept the divine

\begin{footnotes}
\item[128] K. Barth, Epistle to the Romans, p. 167.
\item[129] Ibid., p. 185. This situation is the same as that described by St. Paul for whom man's futile attempts to keep the Law demonstrated his need for grace.
\end{footnotes}
possibility of grace.

Religion compels us to the perception that God is not to be found in religion. Religion makes us to know that we are competent to advance no single step. Religion, as the final human possibility, commands us to halt. Religion brings us to the place where we must wait, in order that God may confront us—on the other side of the frontier of religion.130

Religion, for Barth, is what the Law was to St. Paul, a crisis producing agent, i.e., a frustration and anxiety-ridden human endeavour at the dead-end of which man is faced with the critical decision to despair or to believe. At the dead-end of self-justifying moralism man makes that leap of faith by which he transcends religion and lives on the level of grace and revelation.

(iii) The Man of Faith. Faith, therefore, is the means by which man bridges the gap between human possibility and divine possibility.

Faith is the incomparable and irrevocable step over the frontier separating the old from the new man and the old from the new world. [...] Faith is the possibility which belongs to men in God, in God Himself, and only in God, when all human possibilities have been exhausted.131

When man, through faith, accepts and believes in the divine forgiveness and acceptance as manifested in Christ, he is relieved of the necessity of justifying himself before God, for the divine forgiveness has made him acceptable to God

130 K. Barth, Epistle to the Romans, p. 242.
131 Ibid., pp. 201-02.
independently of his own efforts in that direction.

"I believe" means "I trust." No more must I dream of trusting myself, and no longer require to justify myself, to excuse myself, to attempt to save and preserve myself. This most profound effort of man to trust to himself, to see himself as in the right, has become pointless. I believe—not in myself—I believe in God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.132

In Barth's treatment of the doctrine of reconciliation (Church Dogmatics, Vol. IV, 1) the act of faith is the act by which the believer subjectively appropriates that reconciliation with God which was objectively achieved in the death and resurrection of Christ. In Christ God holds out to man, as it were, the verdict of justification, the discipline of sanctification, and the promise of vocation to eternal life. The believer, for his part, appropriates justification by his faith, sanctification by his love, and his eternal vocation by his hope.133 Faith then is the human act which corresponds to the act of divine justification. It is not an act "by which" man is justified in the sense of an efficient cause; it is a recognition and acceptance of the grace which justifies him. Faith cannot bring about man's justification but only recognize that it has been accomplished.

In faith the believer accepts the justifying verdict


pronounced by God on Christ (who is justified and revealed as justified) as being valid and efficacious for him. In Christ, therefore, he believes that he sees the overcoming of his fallen state—an overcoming he was not able to achieve through his own efforts. Barth speaks of the believer as seeing in Christ the overcoming of his own pride and fall—"the overcoming of that which I myself had not overcome and could not overcome." But this overcoming in Christ is for the believer neither a complete victory (as if Christ and the believer were identical) nor is it a mere pre-tense or external imputation of Christ's victory (as if the believer were not in some real sense made just). Hence the basic attitude of the believer is one of trust and confidence that the justifying verdict of God which was revealed in Christ will be fully revealed and fulfilled in the believer. In other words, through faith, the salvation he hopes for is recognized as a present reality. The believer, therefore, is relieved of the anxiety which accompanies his efforts to realize or earn his justification. For Barth, the result is:

I can regard myself as secure in my heart. I can think my few thoughts in peace, say my few words in peace, do my few works in peace.135

In transcending the moralism of "religion," therefore, what has the believer, in fact, transcended? Barth's

134 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV, 1, p. 770.
135 Ibid., p. 774.
answer is the "distaste, negation, and despair"\textsuperscript{136} of the legalist in regard to his moral striving. In the man of faith despair over his "works" is changed to humility about his works, since his justification is assured on other grounds and he need not be concerned, much less despair, about the justifying power of his works. Hence he can "do his few works in peace." It is precisely at this point that one may speak of self-transcendence in regard to faith. The believer achieves self-transcendence through his faith in the transcendent action of God in reconciling man to himself. If faith is the assurance of justification as an accomplished fact, then the possibility is created for a radical transformation of motives in the believer since his "works" are no longer burdened with the task of bringing about justification, of serving the needs of the believer himself. Barth speaks of this transformation as permitting man's love to be what it should be, occupied with the object of one's love and not with one's own needs.

It amounts to this, that in love man is occupied with something else, and he ought always to be so. It would completely destroy the essential character of Christian love as the freedom given to man and to be kept by man if we tried to burden it with the, in itself, impossible and superfluous task of accomplishing or actualizing or even completing the justification of man. No one can and will love God who does not believe. [...] Christian love does not will anything from God. It starts from the point that there is nothing to will, which has not already been given. [...] The love

\textsuperscript{136}K. Barth, \textit{Church Dogmatics}, IV, 1, p. 627.
in which man thinks that he can justify himself before God is not, as such, a love which derives from faith. It is not a free and pure love, which derives from faith. It is not a free and pure love, which loves God for His own sake, because he is God. It is rather a work of the old mercenary spirit, of the man who at bottom hates the grace of God instead of praising and honouring it.¹³⁷

There is a place for moral effort, good works, sanctification, or what Barth called the "obedience of love" in the Christian life; but its task is not to bring about man's justification, but to respond to and confirm that justification which has been freely given. The relationship between faith and love in the Christian life, from a psychological point of view, seems to consist precisely in this: that the love of the Christian for God and man is free, spontaneous and altruistic ("functionally autonomous" to use Allport's phrase) to the extent that his life is built on faith. The love of the man of faith is given freely and disinterestedly --concerned with its object and not with self--because his justification before God is accepted in faith as a free gift. His obedience of love is an obedience to the command of Christ, "you have received without pay, give without pay" (Matthew X: 8). The Christian cannot separate faith and love since the freedom he enjoys through faith is ultimately the freedom to love.

¹³⁷K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV, 1, p. 105.
D. Rudolf Bultmann: From Philosophy to Faith

For Søren Kierkegaard, the introspective existential philosopher and Christian "prophet," the problem which pre-occupied him was the problem of how one is to become a Christian; for Karl Barth, the Christian preacher, the problem was how the word of God was to be preached. For Rudolf Bultmann (1884- ) the Biblical exegete, the problem is the interpretation or exegesis of the Word of God. In carrying out the task of interpreting the biblical text, Bultmann makes use of the philosophical categories of the existentialist philosophy of Martin Heidegger. It was Heidegger's book Sein und Zeit which, by Bultmann's own admission, was most influential in the development of his "existential hermeneutics."

Instructed by this book, I attained a deeper understanding of the historical character of human existence, and thereby at the same time the conceptual framework in which theology too can operate in order to bring faith to appropriate expression as an existential attitude.138

For Bultmann, every interpretation of Scripture is based on philosophical or psychological presuppositions. The man who interprets the biblical text has his own relationship to the subject matter of the text which prompts the questions he brings to the text and elicits the answers he

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obtains from it. But the basic question which the reader of the biblical text brings with him is the religious question, which, for Bultmann, is the question of human existence. The reader brings to the Bible the question: How is man's existence, i.e., my existence, understood in the Bible? Therefore, if one is going to interpret the Bible correctly, i.e., in terms of what it says about human existence, one must do so by using philosophical concepts and categories which adequately describe human existence; and in Bultmann's view, this means making use of the conceptions of existentialist philosophy since it is this philosophical school which makes human existence "directly the object of attention."

The "existence" to which existentialist philosophy addresses itself has the meaning which was given to it by Kierkegaard, i.e., it is the mode of being which is proper to man. Man's being is existence because it is historical, brought about by a series of freely-made decisions and commitments, and therefore to be distinguished from the being of all worldly beings which are merely "extant."

Bultmann agrees with the existentialists that human existence

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140 Ibid., p. 53.
141 Ibid., p. 55.
142 Ibid., p. 56.
is different from all other worldly existence in that human becoming is not determined by fate or nature but by man's free decision; and this freedom implies a responsibility for one's existence which each man must face individually and in loneliness.

Always his present comes out of his past and leads into his future. He realizes his existence if he is aware that each "now" is the moment of free decision. [...] No one can take another's place, since every man must die his own death. In his loneliness every man realizes his existence.143

Existentialism, therefore, by insisting that the individual take responsibility for his own existence, helps him to be open to the word of the Bible, a word which reveals to him a new understanding of his existence and challenges him to live according to that understanding of himself.

For the Christian believer, Jesus is the bearer of this word which confronts him with a new understanding of himself, places him under decision, and opens up to him the possibility of authentic existence. For this reason faith can be thought of as knowledge since "ultimately 'faith' and 'knowledge' are identical as a new understanding of one's self."144 When the believer is confronted with the word of Jesus, that word is not merely the report of historical events; it is the kerygma--i.e., a personal "address, demand,

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143 R. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 56.

and promise" to which he must respond with "obedience, acknowledgement and confession."\textsuperscript{145} What is important for Bultmann is not so much the historical event of Jesus, but the word of Jesus confronting man and challenging him to a decision about his existence here and now.

It [the kerygma] is not teaching about external matters which could simply be regarded as true without any transformation of the hearer's own existence.\textsuperscript{146}

Besides knowledge, faith involves surrender and trust for the hearer of the word is enjoined to surrender the previous understanding he had of himself including the security he saw himself as having in the tangible, visible world of things, and to find his security in that which is invisible and not under his control, i.e., the grace and promise of God. It involves

[...] accepting completely different standards as to what is to be called death and what life. It means accepting the life that Jesus gives and is, —a life that, to the world's point of view, cannot be proved to exist.\textsuperscript{147}

Faith, therefore, for Bultmann, is man's response to the New Testament kerygma; a response by which man achieves authentic human existence. Bultmann's concept of faith is existential because he describes it primarily in terms of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{146}Ibid.
\end{flushright}
obedience, will and decision. What the New Testament offers man is "an understanding of himself which will challenge him to a genuine existential decision;"\textsuperscript{148} and that decision involves the "surrender of his previous understanding of himself" and "the reversal of the direction his will had previously had."\textsuperscript{149}

It is just this existential understanding of faith which necessitates the method of "demythologizing" so closely associated with Bultmann's biblical scholarship. To make such an existential response to the message of the New Testament, one must first discover what that message is; and to do this it is necessary to separate the essential kerygma which is proclaimed in the New Testament, and which is permanently true and valid, from the first century world view, mythological in character, in the context of which that kerygma is expressed. It is this mythological element in the New Testament (e.g., the three-tiered world view--heaven, earth, hell; the existence of supra-human angelic and demonic beings; miracles, etc.) which modern man cannot accept and which are not specifically Christian. To make the New Testament, therefore, relevant to modern man, whose world view is not mythical but scientific, these mythological


elements must be removed from having any necessary connection with the essential Christian message. The New Testament must be "demythologized." By demythologizing, however, Bultmann does not mean eliminating the mythology but interpreting it existentially, i.e., in terms of man's understanding of his own existence and its possibilities.

It would be wrong, however, to see in the attempt to demythologize the New Testament, merely an attempt to accommodate the New Testament to modern man's scientific world-view or to make that world view some sort of criterion for interpreting the Christian message. Bultmann insists, on the contrary, that demythologizing has as its purpose to protect faith from the temptation which is inherent in the modern scientific world view. For the danger of modern science and technology is that by it man strives for "mastery over the world and over his own life," whereas faith "calls man out of all man-made security." Thus, in removing the mythical world view as a stumbling block, the real stumbling block is revealed--man's tendency to place his security in human resources (including a scientific world view) and even to rest his faith on some kind of objective, historical or scientific evidence; but to have faith is, for Bultmann, to place one's security in that which is not scientifically demonstrable, historical or objective. Here Bultmann is in

151 Ibid.
agreement with Kierkegaard who maintained that faith was not
based on objective (historical, scientific) knowledge but on
subjective knowledge of one's own existence. For Bultmann,
likewise, faith does not rest on empirical evidence or on
empirical world view for, "nothing of God or of his action
is visible or can be visible to men who seek security in the
world."\textsuperscript{152}

Faith, therefore, must be self-authenticating, i.e.,
it must rely on nothing but God, and be independent of all
external security. To the extent that faith is made to
depend on external evidence, it ceases to be faith, and,
therefore, for Bultmann, it is necessary to "demythologize"
all those statements about God and faith which seem to
objectify God's action on man. George E. Ladd, interpreting
this aspect of Bultmann's thought remarks:

Demythologizing is a demand of faith itself. For
faith needs to be emancipated from its association
with a world view expressed in objective terms,
whether it be a mythical or a scientific one.\textsuperscript{153}

Bultmann has remarked that faith is not to be de-
scribed as a state of soul or a psychological process.\textsuperscript{154}
This is true in the sense that faith is not the result of
introspection or reflection but is a response to the object

\textsuperscript{152}R. Bultmann, \textit{Jesus Christ and Mythology}, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{153}George E. Ladd, "The Role of Jesus in Bultmann's
Theology," in \textit{Scottish Journal of Theology}, Vol. 18, March
1965, pp. 57-58.

1, p. 319.
of faith; an acknowledgment of God's "prevenient deed of grace." Nevertheless, if it is true that faith is the acceptance of the kerygma, not in a purely rational way but as "that genuine obedience to it which includes a new understanding of oneself," then we may, perhaps, speak of a "psychology" of faith to be found in Bultmann's thought by examining the various ways in which man understands his own existence as he moves towards faith. In this connection Bultmann speaks of three types of men: the man who is enslaved to the world of things; the man who has achieved self-understanding through philosophy; and the man who has achieved self-understanding through faith. These can be understood as the stages through which man passes in arriving at faith and are analogous, once again, to the dynamic of nature-law-grace described by St. Paul.

(i) Man Enslaved to the World. In the New Testament, man's enslavement to the world is attributed to supra-human demonic forces, to "principalities and powers" (Romans VIII: 38; Ephesians VI: 12; Colossians II: 15) which control man and his destiny. It is just such a mythological view of the world and of man's place in it which Bultmann believes makes the Christian message unintelligible to modern man whose world view is scientific and historical. One "solution" to


\[156\] Ibid., p. 324.
this problem is to simply reject those parts of the New Testament kerygma which are expressed in such mythical language. Those who reject the idea of demonic forces point out that this is probably a Gnostic interpretation of the Christian message. Bultmann himself, while pointing out the very real difference between Gnostic myth and philosophy and Christianity,\textsuperscript{157} nevertheless sees the influence of Gnosticism in much of the New Testament thought and language.\textsuperscript{158}

Such New Testament ideas as the eschatological dualism of the New Testament; the differentiation between this age or world and the age or world to come; the designation of Satan as the "ruler of this world" (John XII: 31; XIV: 30; XVI: 11); the "principalities and powers" against which the Christian must struggle (Romans VIII: 38; Ephesians VI: 12; Colossians II: 15); the idea of Christ as a cosmic figure—a pre-existent divine being who descended from heaven and is exalted again to heavenly glory and wrests sovereignty over the demonic forces to himself (Philippians II: 6-11; Ephesians IV: 8-10; Colossians II: 15); the corresponding notion of redemption as the emancipation of the believer from demonic world rulers, from sin and death and a personal ascent into heaven after the manner of Christ; the description of conversion to Christ as a coming "to the knowledge


\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., pp. 172-82.
of the truth" (Galatians IV: 9; John VIII: 32); --all these are in Bultmann's opinion evidence that "to express convincingly to Hellenistic ears his (Christ's) eschatological meaning [...] Gnosticism and its myth offered a stock of terms that were intelligible to great numbers of people."\textsuperscript{159}

Bultmann, however, does not simply accept or reject the Gnostic myth; he interprets it, as he claims St. Paul does, existentially, by introducing the element of human will. St. Paul considers the world as God's creation; it becomes the rival of God, and therefore demonic, when man chooses to worship the creation rather than the creator. Such an existential interpretation of the Gnostic, mythical elements in the New Testament is demanded by a consideration of the basic differences between Gnosticism and Christianity. Both recognize what Bultmann calls "the utter difference of human existence from all worldly existence"\textsuperscript{160} and that the world is thus "foreign soil to the human self."\textsuperscript{161} For both systems the situation of man in the world is one of bondage from which he must be liberated; but whereas Christianity offers man liberty within his actual existence in the world, Gnosticism offers man liberty by escaping from his real

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p. 165.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
existence. Thus the paradoxical nature of Christian liberty is preserved for while the Gnostic sees himself as a "man of the spirit through a quality of nature (the pneuma), the Christian is a man of the spirit only through his decision of faith—a decision which must be continually repeated and renewed because of the ever-present danger of becoming a "man of the flesh."

For the Christian, both his bondage and his freedom involve his free will and decision. Thus, it is ultimately from man himself that the demonic beings derive their power. The tragedy of the human situation derives from the fact that the demonic powers, having been given their power by man's decision, then proceed to enslave that same human will, when the individual chooses to worship the creature rather than the creator. He loses control over his own self and is alienated from his true self. Bultmann, using the categories of Martin Heidegger's existentialist philosophy, would describe this enslaved or "fallen" state of man as an absorption in the world of things and in immediate concerns in which the possibilities for existence are decided for him. The result is an "inauthentic existence" since the self cannot choose among the various possibilities for its

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Thus, the enslavement of man to the world of which the New Testament speaks is real but it is brought about not by demonic forces but by man's own decision. This decision fundamentally is to live for this world and find one's security in it; in St. Paul's words, to "live after the flesh." The essential quality of this level of existence is the pursuit of one's security through some human creation or achievement. For the Galatian Judaizers it was the fulfilling of the Law; for Luther, it was the monastic observance. But whatever form it takes, Bultmann concludes:

Such a pursuit is, however, incongruous with man's real situation, for the fact is that he is not secure at all. Indeed, this is the way in which he loses his true life and becomes the slave of that very sphere which he had hoped to master, and which he hoped would give him security. Whereas hitherto he might have enjoyed the world as God's creation, it has now become "this world," the world in revolt against God. This is the way in which the "powers" which dominate human life, come into being, and as such they acquire the character of mythical entities. Since the visible and tangible sphere is essentially transitory, the man who bases his life on it becomes the prisoner and slave of corruption.165

But,

To believe in the Word of God means to abandon all merely human security and thus to overcome the


despair which arises from the attempt to find security, an attempt which is always in vain. Deliverance, therefore, from enslavement comes when a man decides for Christ, when he decides to find his security not in material things or in his own achievements, but in the salvation which God gives him in Christ.

(ii) Self-understanding Through Philosophy. Man is "fallen" because he has enslaved himself to the world. He is not living the life for which he was originally created, and, therefore, he must arrive at a new understanding of his existence. Bultmann maintains that such an understanding of what constitutes authentic human existence is possible to man's unaided reason, i.e., outside of the Christian revelation. The philosopher, for example, is capable of arriving at the realization that authentic human existence consists in self-commitment rather than egocentric self-affirmation. The man who studies human nature can come to some conclusions as to what is necessary in order to fulfill and realize that nature. Some philosophers, he points out, have arrived at what is basically a Christian understanding of man.

Martin Heidegger, for example, claims that man has lost his individuality and must recover his true selfhood through unreserved self-commitment as an alternative to immersing oneself in the concrete world of nature. For

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166 R. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 40.
Heidegger, authentic existence occurs when man, in response to his conscience, assumes responsibility for his existence, opens himself to the possibilities of existence which confront him in the world, and chooses among them. Bultmann uses the existentialist categories of Heidegger's philosophy to interpret the new possibility for existence which is offered to man in the New Testament kerygma. The concept of inauthentic existence finds its biblical counterpart in the notions of the "natural man," "the flesh" and "sin," with the added dimension that the result of such inauthentic existence is not just alienation from one's true self but alienation from God. The concept of authentic existence finds it biblical counterpart in the notions of the "man of the spirit" and "faith." Man must choose to exist and to the extent that he does, he exists authentically. Likewise, the believer must choose to accept the existence God offers him in Christ, and, to the extent that he does, he lives on the level of faith.

The resoluteness which, in Heidegger's view, brings a man into authentic existence, has its counterpart in the New Testament concept of "faith." Here Bultmann stresses the elements of decision for and commitment to the new life which God offers to men in Christ.167

The question then arises: "Can we have a Christian understanding of being without Christ?"168


(iii) **Self-understanding Through Faith.** To the above question, Bultmann answers in the affirmative. Yes, man can understand what is necessary for authentic existence. But, for the theologian, this is not really the crucial question.

The question is not whether the nature of man can be discovered apart from the New Testament. [...] No, the question is whether the nature of man is realizable. Is it enough simply to show man what he ought to be? Can he achieve his authentic being by a mere act of reflection?169

Bultmann's contention is that philosophy can show man what he ought to be, can point out the ideal of authentic existence, can encourage him to become what he really is, but cannot give him the ability to achieve authentic existence. Thus Macquarrie170 speaks of Bultmann as assigning a preliminary function to philosophy. The self-understanding achieved through philosophy helps one to understand what the kerygma is about. It leads one to the kerygma which is addressed to human existence but comes from beyond it. Bultmann's philosopher, therefore, is in the same frustrated state as Paul's man under the Law, Kierkegaard's ethical man and Barth's religious man. All have been enlightened as to what man must become, but the realization of that ideal is beyond their grasp, beyond the realm of human possibility. Release from man's fallen state must come as a gift of God. In the context of Bultmann's thought this means that the

170 J. Macquarrie, op. cit., p. 139.
authentic human existence which the philosopher analyzes and sees as desirable, becomes possible only when God offers it freely to man in Christ.

In Bultmann's view, philosophy must be content with this "propaedeutic function."\textsuperscript{171} If it attempts to go beyond this preliminary function philosophy becomes the sin of self-sufficiency, and in the obedience of faith all such self-sufficiency is renounced. Just as for Kierkegaard the ethical life ended not only in the consciousness of sin but also the realization of the insufficiency of even the best of one's ethical efforts, so for Bultmann the self-understanding of philosophy ends not only in repentance for sin but in the renunciation of human accomplishment, "the sacrifice of all that had been his pride and gain in "existence under the Law."\textsuperscript{172} In faith man gives up the self-assertion of accomplishments and lives in "obedient submission to the God-determined way of salvation."\textsuperscript{173}

For (the New Testament) affirms the total incapacity of man to release himself from his fallen state. That deliverance can come only by an act of God. The New Testament does not give us [...] a doctrine of the authentic nature of man; it proclaims the event of redemption which was wrought in Christ.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{171} J. Macquarrie, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p. 316.
What then does faith add to the insights of philosophy? It offers man not only a vision of authentic existence, but the possibility of attaining that existence, not through man's own efforts but through the grace of God. The New Testament tells man two things:

1) That he is a "self-assertive rebel" who knows from bitter experience that the life he actually lives is not his authentic life, and that he is totally incapable of achieving that life by his own efforts.175

2) That God accepts him in spite of this. Bultmann speaks of God as "a power which embraces and sustains [man] even in his fallen self-assertive state." Man is thus liberated from what he is because God treats him as if he were otherwise.176

It is the experience of this loving acceptance of God as revealed in Christ which liberates man to be his true self and to live a life of generous self-commitment. To receive love from another releases in man the capacity to love others. Thus what the man of faith believes in is the love of God as revealed in Christ.

The event of Jesus Christ is therefore the revelation of the love of God. It makes a man free from himself and free to be himself, free to live a

176 Ibid., p. 31.
life of self-commitment in faith and love. [...] Only those who are loved are capable of loving. 177

For Bultmann, therefore, the transformation of the existence of the believer takes place because in faith the self-understanding of philosophy is transcended. Whereas faith for St. Paul was the transcending of the works of the Law, and for Kierkegaard and Barth the transcending of the moralism of ethics and "religion," for Bultmann it is the transcending of man's attempts at self-realization through self-understanding.

E. Paul Tillich: From Autonomy to Theonomy

Paul Tillich (1886-1965), as a Christian apologist and philosopher of religion, faced a twofold challenge. It was necessary, first of all, to meet the challenge to Christian belief represented by the spirit of science and scientific philosophy which had come to the fore during the nineteenth century. How was the Christian apologist to establish a basis or foundation of belief in a world which applied the word "truth" only to that which could be discovered through the scientific method of observation of measurable data and phenomena, and in the resulting atmosphere of "scientism" which gave credence only to that which could be discovered by science? The traditional grounds for

Christian belief had been revelation and reason. In a world in which human reason was increasingly rejected as a foundation for religious belief, the apologist was left with two alternatives: to emphasize revelation as the only source of man's knowledge of God (as Barth did) or to find other grounds for belief, to establish faith on a kind of "truth" which was not the same kind of truth which science and philosophy dealt with.\(^{178}\) Thus, for Kierkegaard, faith is not based on rational argument or historical truth but on "subjective knowledge" or "inwardness," i.e., man's immediate awareness of his existence and his existential situation. For Bultmann, faith is not the result of the kind of empirical experience with which science deals and which can be analyzed scientifically; it is the result of man's "existential experience" since faith gives man a new understanding of his existence which transcends or goes beyond the possibilities of the closed world view of science.\(^{179}\)

For Tillich also, Christian faith is not grounded in scientific or rational argument, for God is not the supreme being whose existence is known by rational argument but the Ground or Power of being which is presupposed in every question about being, and in whom every particular being participates. Knowledge of God, therefore, is not the result of


\(^{179}\) Ibid., Chapter 3.
rational reflection but of direct awareness. Existentially, this awareness—which is direct and immediate and not arrived at by discursive reasoning—is an awareness of something unconditional or ultimate in one's scale of values, i.e., an object of "ultimate concern" which demands total surrender and commitment and promises total fulfillment. When man's ultimate concern--the questions he asks with ultimate seriousness--correlates with the Christian understanding of God, then there is an existential awareness of God.¹⁸⁰

The second challenge which confronted Tillich came from within the Christian community itself and was basically the same problem which confronted the Apostle Paul and the other theologians studied in this chapter. As Paul tried to state the Christian message in a way which would transcend the extremes of legalism and libertinism, so Tillich attempted to transcend what for him were the extremes of neo-orthodoxy and liberalism, of supranaturalism and naturalism, of heteronomy and autonomy. As J. A. T. Robinson has pointed out¹⁸¹ this was for Tillich the problem of giving a new meaning to the traditional Christian concept of transcendence. For Tillich the God of traditional theism (of supranaturalism)--the God who was "up there" or "out there"

¹⁸¹J. A. T. Robinson, Honest to God, Chapter 3.
no longer had meaning for contemporary man, because such a God is divorced from man's human life and its concerns. Nor is the God of liberalism (of naturalism)—the God who is merely a symbol for what is best in human nature and experience—an adequate substitute; for such a God has no separate reality apart from human existence.

What was necessary was to go "beyond naturalism and supranaturalism,"182 to find a way of speaking of God which would neither reduce God to a symbol of the human nor divorce him completely from human experience; to preserve the reality of God without excluding him from human life. Tillich found his solution to this problem in the terms "depth" and "self-transcendence." The latter term refers to the fact that the finite world of man's experience transcends itself or points beyond itself. Consequently, man does not discover God by looking away from the world and his own human existence; on the contrary, he discovers God precisely as the ultimate depth dimension of his human experience. God, therefore, is not transcendent in the sense of being "above" the finite; he is transcendent in the sense that he is the transcendent depth or ground of all human experience.

To call God transcendent in this sense does not mean that one must establish a "superworld" of

That to which reality or being points is its ultimate depth or ground. Man discovers God not by looking up and away from reality but by looking into the depths of reality and his own human experience. When he does so, man encounters his own finitude; and only by discovering the boundary or limit of his own finitude, i.e., of human possibility, can he discover what is unconditional or infinite.

This point at which man discovers the infinite in the depths of his finite being, at which the infinite touches the finite, is called by Tillich the "boundary situation." What man discovers at this boundary point is the nothingness which threatens his finite existence. It is at this point, where man, realizing the finite, limited nature of all human activity and fulfillment, is threatened by non-being, that genuine faith becomes possible. For to have faith means "to be grasped by the power of being itself;" it means to be able to affirm one's existence because at the depths of that existence one has encountered the ground and power of being in which all particular beings participate and which constitutes the "YES" which sustains man in the face of the "NO" he experiences as the result of the

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limitations of his finite being. But the affirmation can be experienced only by experiencing the negation; the reality only by experiencing the nothingness; the unconditioned only by experiencing the conditioned; the YES only by experiencing the NO:

Religion is an experience of the Unconditioned and that means an experience of absolute reality on the ground of the experience of absolute nothingness; it will experience the nothingness of all existing things, the nothingness of values, the nothingness of the personal life; where this experience has led to the absolute, radical NO, there it shifts into an equally absolute experience of reality, into a radical YES.185

Tillich's insistence that man must find God in the depths of his own human experience gives his theology an "apologetic" character as opposed to the "kerygmatic" theology of Karl Barth. For Barth, the function of the theologian or preacher is to present the unchangeable truth of the Christian message as applicable to man's ever-changing human situation. The emphasis here is on the unchanging character of the message or kerygma, and not on the accommodating of that message to man's current needs. For Barth, the Christian message does not answer the questions which man asks; it teaches man, by confronting him with the eternal word of God, what questions he should ask.

Tillich, however, sees Barth's position as leaning

too far in the direction of "supranaturalism" in which revel-
ation is seen as a "bundle of truth" dropped from heaven, as
a series of answers from which the human questions are manu-
factured. He criticizes Barth's theology on the grounds that
it does not establish any common ground between God's revela-
tion and man's situation.\textsuperscript{186} In his own theological method,
Tillich tries to avoid what he considers to be the extremes
of Barth's supranaturalistic method and the naturalistic
(humanistic) method which begins with man's human existence
and situation but does not go beyond it--a method which
seeks to extract the answers from the human questions them-
selves.\textsuperscript{187}

The theological method which Tillich proposes to
avoid these extremes is the method of "correlation." This
method is "apologetic" in the sense that it begins with the
human situation, listens to the questions asked by man in a
temporal situation and responds by stating the eternal
Christian message in terms relevant to that situation.
Tillich insists that there must be a correlation between the
questions which man asks about his existence and the answers
given by theology.

The method of correlation explains the contents of
the Christian faith through existential questions

\textsuperscript{186}For a discussion of this debate cf. Carl
Armbruster, S.J., The Vision of Paul Tillich, N.Y., Sheed

\textsuperscript{187}Ibid., pp. 30-31.
and theological answers in mutual interdependence. 188

Thus, for example, if man's anxiety is seen as resulting from the threat of non-being which is implied in human existence, then theology will speak of God as the infinite Power of Being which resists non-being. Theology, therefore, derives its content from revelation but its form from existential questions, i.e., the type of questions which contemporary man asks about his existence.

In respect to content the Christian answers are dependent on the revelatory events in which they appear; in respect to form they are dependent on the structure of the questions which they answer. 189

If Tillich differs from Barth with respect to theological method, it is because he differs with him with respect to an understanding of the divine-human relationship. The correlation of which Tillich speaks refers not only to the logical interdependence of human questions and divine answers, but also to the real interdependence of God and man, of the infinite and the finite. 190 This does not mean that God, in his essential nature is dependent on man, but that "God in his self-manifestation to man is dependent on the way man receives his manifestation." 191 Barth, following Kierkegaard, maintained the "infinite qualitative difference"

189 Ibid., p. 64.
190 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
191 Ibid., p. 61.
between God and man, so that there is no correspondence between the infinite and the finite except through God's initiative. For Tillich, however, man has an immediate awareness of "something ultimate in value and being of which one can become intuitively aware."\textsuperscript{192} This intuitive awareness is man's point of contact with the infinite. But while he is one with the infinite man is, at the same time, estranged from it. Tillich sees in man's ability to question the meaning of his existence an evidence of his essential unity with the infinite, and in the fact that he has to question the meaning of his existence an evidence of his existential estrangement from the infinite.\textsuperscript{193}

It would seem, therefore, that Barth's description of faith and the divine human encounter, applies more accurately to the religious man consciously seeking justification before God and is best described as a transcending of moralism. Tillich's description of faith, on the other hand, would seem to apply also to the irreligious man seeking self-realization without conscious reference to God, and is best described as the transcending of self-actualization. For Barth, the preamble of faith is "religion," the self-conscious attempt on man's part to reach God, an attempt which prepares him for faith by reinforcing his consciousness of sin. Tillich, however, holds that where this kind

\textsuperscript{193}C. Armbruster, \textit{The Vision of Paul Tillich}, p. 30.
of material Christian faith is absent, one may still have faith in the formal sense that one is grasped and driven by ultimate concern to transcend oneself, for faith means "being grasped by that toward which self-transcendence aspires, the ultimate in being and meaning."

In this sense every man has faith precisely to the extent that he is human, to the extent that he is driven to transcend himself through concern for that which is ultimate and unconditioned for "he who is not able to perceive something ultimate, something infinitely significant, is not a man." In this way, Tillich is able to apply the principle of justification through faith not only to the religious man who sees himself as a sinner, but also the "irreligious" man, who sees himself as a doubter as far as material faith (i.e., the content of Christian faith) is concerned. Even the doubter is saved by his faith, i.e., by his ultimate concern, for even his doubt and despair reflect concern for the meaning of life.

This unconditional seriousness is the expression of the presence of the divine in the experience of utter separation from it.

Tillich believes that where the doubt of the

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supposedly irreligious man reflects a concern for the ultimate meaning of life, then this ultimate concern fulfills what Tillich calls the "Protestant principle" of justification through faith for "there is faith in every serious doubt, namely, the faith in the truth as such, even if the only truth we can express is our lack of truth."\textsuperscript{197} What is fundamental to the Protestant principle is the protest "which gives God alone absoluteness and sanctity and denies every claim of human pride."\textsuperscript{198} The Protestant protest maintains that only God can be considered absolute and sacred and therefore an object of ultimate concern. Every symbol of ultimate concern including religion and the church must therefore negate itself, i.e., proclaim its non-ultimate.\textsuperscript{199} The "non-believer" fulfills this condition, therefore, when he passes beyond the surface concerns of life to concern for what is truly ultimate and unconditional. Faith, therefore, in Tillich's view is not belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, but belief in the reality of something ultimate and unconditioned, of an ultimate ground of being and meaning. Atheism can exist, therefore, only where there is a complete lack of ultimate concern, i.e., a total indifference to the meaning of one's existence.

\textsuperscript{197} P. Tillich, \textit{The Protestant Era}, p. x.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., p. 226.
\textsuperscript{199} Cf. C. Armbruster, \textit{The Vision of Paul Tillich}, pp. 59-60.
Faith therefore means to be grasped by concern for the ultimate and unconditioned. Ultimate concern is that which makes an unconditional claim on man, demands his total surrender, promises total fulfillment, and reduces all other concerns to a preliminary significance.

The religious concern is ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from ultimate significance; it makes them preliminary. The ultimate concern is unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or circumstance. The unconditional concern is total: no part of ourselves or of our world is excluded from it. [...] The total concern is infinite: no moment of relaxation and rest is possible in the face of a religious concern which is ultimate, unconditional, total and infinite. Theology deals with reality only insofar as it is an object of ultimate concern to man. The realm of preliminary concerns—the realm of aesthetic, scientific, political values—is the realm of culture. It is at this point—in his discussion of the relationship of culture and theology, of preliminary and ultimate concerns—that one must begin in order to understand Tillich's description of the dynamics of faith, of the stages through which one passes in arriving at faith.

Tillich states that there are three possible ways in which preliminary (conditional, partial, finite) concerns can be related to ultimate concern. First, preliminary concern can become demonic by usurping the place of ultimate concern.

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201 Ibid., p. 13.
Secondly, preliminary concern and ultimate concern can exist in mutual indifference. In this situation, man oscillates between his ordinary preoccupation with preliminary concerns and moments of ultimate concern, in such a way that ultimate concern is brought down to the level of preliminary concerns and deprived of its ultimacy. Thirdly, preliminary concern can be a vehicle of ultimate concern by pointing beyond itself, by transcending itself, in such a way that "in and through it, the infinite becomes real." As such, it becomes an object of theology but "only insofar as it is a medium, a vehicle, pointing beyond itself."\textsuperscript{202}

These three possible relationships between preliminary and ultimate concern find expression in different historical eras in the relationship that exists between religion and culture. The three possible ways in which religion and culture can be related are described by Tillich as heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy.

(i) **Heteronomy.** If culture is related to religion as form to substance, i.e., if preliminary concerns are the forms in which ultimate concern finds expression, then the heteronomous relationship of religion and culture is one in which preliminary concerns are made absolute and thereby usurp the place of ultimate concern and in this way become demonic. In a heteronomous situation an institution or personality

arrogates to itself "the claim to speak in the name of the ground of being and therefore is an unconditional and ultimate way." In heteronomy, religion which should be the substance and ground of cultural forms and concerns (this would be a theonomous situation) first reduces itself to the status of a preliminary concern—a section of culture—and as such seeks to dominate all other sections of culture; it is the domination of culture (form) by religion (substance); but a religion which is no longer capable of being the substance of culture because it claims ultimacy for itself.

Heteronomy imposes an alien law, religious or secular on man's mind. [...] It undermines creative freedom and the humanity of man. Its symbol is the "terror" exercised by absolute churches or absolute states. Religion, if it acts heteronomously, has ceased to be the substance and life-blood of a culture and has itself become a section of it, which, forgetting its theonomous greatness, betrays a mixture of arrogance and defeatism.

Heteronomy, therefore, is a situation in which man is ruled not by his own autonomous reason from within but by a law imposed from without. Heteronomous religion emphasizes obedience and orthodoxy. In Tillich's view such a heteronomous relationship between religion and culture existed in the late Middle Ages—the period of Catholic orthodoxy—and in the late Reformation period—the period of Protestant orthodoxy.

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203 P. Tillich, S.T., Vol. 1, p. 84.
204 P. Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 46.
(ii) **Autonomy.** Tillich describes an autonomous culture as:

[...] the attempt to create the forms of personal and social life without any reference to something ultimate and unconditional following only the demands of theoretical and practical rationality.  

An autonomous culture is a "secular" culture, which, for Tillich, means the absence of ultimacy (as "holy" represents the presence of ultimacy). It is a culture which lives without reference to a transcendent depth or substance; a culture in which preliminary concerns are in a relationship of "mutual indifference" to ultimate concern, i.e., where, in effect, ultimate concern is brought down to the level of preliminary concern and deprived of its ultimacy. An autonomous culture "profanizes" life because it denies and resists the self-transcending quality of finite reality, its ability to point beyond itself to its ultimate ground and meaning. Autonomy is "the obedience of the individual to the law of reason which he finds in himself as a rational being." In an autonomous situation, therefore, form (culture) dominates substance (religion). Autonomy is usually a reaction against heteronomy; thus, periods of strict religious orthodoxy are usually followed by a rebellion on the part of man's autonomous reason against such heteronomous imposition. Tillich sees examples of this in

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the Renaissance (a reaction against the heteronomy of the late Middle Ages), and the Enlightenment (a reaction against the Protestant orthodoxy of the late Reformation period).

(iii) Theonomy. A theonomous culture rejects both the imposition of divine law by an outside authority and the self-sufficiency of reason divorced from its depth.\(^{208}\) Theonomy implies a relationship between religion and culture in which "religion is the substance of culture and culture is the form of religion,"\(^{209}\) i.e., cultural forms or creations (preliminary concerns) express ultimate concern and the transcendent meaning of culture "not as something strange but as its own spiritual ground."\(^{210}\) In a theonomous situation man is recalled to his true and essential nature from which he is estranged.\(^{211}\) Man always moves toward theonomy because in his essential nature he is one with the infinite, but his achievement of theonomy is always incomplete because of his existential estrangement from the infinite.\(^{212}\) In theonomy, man lives according to the structure of his autonomous reason, but reason is united with its own ground and depth. Thus, in a theonomous situation, man

\(^{208}\) Cf. C. Armbruster, The Vision of Paul Tillich, p. 97.

\(^{209}\) P. Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 57.

\(^{210}\) Ibid.


is obedient to God, but a God who is seen as the ground of his own reason so that the law imposed upon him is at the same time the law of his own growth and fulfillment.

Since God (theos) is the law (nomos) for both the structure and ground of reason, they are united in him, and their unity is manifest in a theonomous situation.\(^{213}\)

This unity is experienced culturally as the unity of substance (religion) and form (culture), and psychologically in the unity of obedience and freedom.

Corresponding to the three possible relationships between ultimate concern and preliminary concern and between religion and culture, there are three possible ways in which the individual may relate to himself and the world, which Tillich describes as three types of courage: the courage to be as part; the courage to be as oneself; and the courage "to accept acceptance" which is the courage of faith. These three types of courage represent the stages through which one passes in arriving at faith.

(i) **The Courage to Be as Part.** This is the type of courage which man achieves in a heteronomous situation. It is the security which comes from identifying with and submitting to a strong authority figure; but it is a security purchased at the price of one's own identity and individuality. As Erich

Fromm has pointed out,\textsuperscript{214} in this type of abject submission one hopes to overcome his own sense of isolation and powerlessness by identifying with the strength of the authority figure. The conformist seeks the same security and the same courage to be as a part of something greater than himself.

Tillich uses the word "courage" in an ontological sense. Courage is the "ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation."\textsuperscript{215} Courage is the courage to be, because man's basic anxiety is an existential anxiety, i.e., "the anxiety of a finite being about the threat of non-being."\textsuperscript{216} In a heteronomous situation or relationship the individual finds the courage to affirm his own existence only by making that existence part of something or someone greater than himself through abject submission, submerging one's individuality in some kind of collectivity, or through social conformity.

(ii) The Courage to Be as Oneself. This is the courage which derives from an autonomous situation. It is the affirmation of the self as a self, and this type of self-affirmation together with the affirmation of one's self as a part reveal, for Tillich, man's existential condition, for


\textsuperscript{215}P. Tillich, \textit{The Courage to Be}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{216}Ibid., p. 48.
both are aspects of man's self-affirmation. There is a correlation between the self and the world and also between individualization (courage to be as oneself) and participation (courage to be as part). Man's twofold self-affirmation—as an individual and as a part or participant—reflects an existential split in man's being. As a self, he is part of the world but at the same time separated from it. Because of this split between individuality and participation man has lost the essential unity between self-affirmation as an individual and self-affirmation as a part. Just as his existence is torn between individuality and participation so his self-affirmation oscillates between the courage to be as oneself and the courage to be as part. This loss of unity leads to anxiety.

The courage to be as a part is an integral element of the courage to be as oneself, and the courage to be as oneself is an integral element of the courage to be as a part. But under the conditions of human finitude and estrangement that which is essentially united becomes existentially split. The courage to be as a part separates itself from unity with the courage to be as oneself, and conversely; and both disintegrate in their isolation. The anxiety they had taken into themselves is unloosed and becomes destructive.217

(iii) **The Courage to Accept Acceptance.** This is the courage which results from a theonomous relationship between God and man and which Tillich describes as the courage which is based on the confidence of faith, a courage which results

from the believer's radical act of trust in God. The existential split which exists between the courage of individualization and the courage of participation demands a form of courage which transcends both, and thereby overcomes the existential split in man's finite being and the accompanying anxiety. When man affirms himself as a part he is alienated from his individual self, and, in his rebellion against such loss of self, he affirms his individuality in an autonomous way. But by thus asserting his freedom and individuality he merely increases his insecurity by reinforcing his sense of isolation and alienation from the world. In other words, both types of self-affirmation lead man to a situation in which he suffers from the anxiety of Tillich's "boundary situation," i.e., the awareness of the insecurity and threat of non-being or nothingness inherent in his finite being.

Since, therefore, man cannot find the basis of self-affirmation in himself or in the world, he must transcend both himself and his world. He must discover a courage which is "rooted in a power of being that is greater than the power of oneself and the power of one's world."\footnote{P. Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 152.} For Tillich, this courage is the courage of faith which is the courage to accept acceptance. Faith is confidence in the divine acceptance and forgiveness; therefore, the courage which results from faith is based neither on oneself or one's world. Faith involves the renunciation of all such
finite sources of security. But to derive one's courage from this transcendent source is an act of faith since if man cannot base his self-affirmation on confidence in himself it is because of the existential split in his being, the awareness of which also involves an awareness of sin or unacceptability before the divine. Hence, Tillich defines faith as "the courage to accept oneself as accepted in spite of being unacceptable." But the source of this forgiveness and acceptance is the ground and power of being itself and therefore it permits man to affirm his own being in a way which transcends individualization and participation, in a way which transcends oneself and one's world.

Faith is not an opinion but a state. It is the state of being grasped by the power of being which transcends everything that is and in which everything that is participates. He who is grasped by this power is able to affirm himself because he knows that he is affirmed by the power of being itself.220

Theonomy, as we have seen, is a divine-human relationship in which man recognizes God's law as the law of his own being. Therefore, in submitting to that law he is submitting neither to an alien law (heteronomy) nor to a superficial law (autonomy). In the same way the courage of faith can be seen as a theonomous experience, since in faith the courage to affirm one's own existence is derived neither from an alien source (one's world) nor from a shallow source (one's

220 Ibid., p. 168.
self), but from a source which transcends both, but transcends them as their ultimate depth and meaning. In this self-transcendence is to be found the transforming power of faith.

3. Conclusion

The purpose of the present chapter was to study the psychological dynamic underlying the Christian act of faith, with a view to comparing that dynamic with the dynamics of human growth studied in Chapter One. There it was seen that human growth, as it is understood by a representative group of personality theorists, involves a transformation of motives which in turn implies a general dynamic of self-transcendence and, therefore, a radical discontinuity between immature and mature motivation.

In attempting to verify whether that same dynamic of self-transcendence is present in the Christian act of faith, it was necessary to enter into some preliminary discussion of the nature or elements of that act of faith. From this discussion, it appeared that the act of faith could be described as being made up of three basic elements: belief, trust, and commitment. Since, however, the dynamics of self-transcendence appears most explicitly when faith is seen as a radical act of trust, the investigation into the dynamics of faith concentrated on this aspect, and on those theologians who most explicitly describe faith in terms of such a radical act of trust.
In this context, the theological descriptions of the Christian act of faith which have been examined in this chapter describe that act as a response of trusting confidence in the living person of Jesus Christ, and the relationship which results from that faith response as a personal rather than a legalistic relationship. As such, it is for the believer a healing and liberating relationship since what he believes in is the loving acceptance and forgiveness of God as it is expressed and proclaimed in the person of Christ. This acceptance and forgiveness liberates the believer from the necessity of justifying himself before his God since justification is not something he must earn, but something he believes. This faith allows him to be himself and to freely commit himself to this faith relationship with God from motives of love and gratitude rather than from fear or coercion, and brings about a transformation that makes possible a way of life which is beyond what is possible to man by sheer ethical effort.

This transformation of motives is a reality which is capable of being described in different ways. For St. Paul it was a transition from ignorance and illusion to a radical act of trust and commitment by way of the frustration and anxiety-producing self-knowledge which results from man's attempts at self-justification through legal observance. But each of the theologians studied has described the same transforming effect of faith in different words. What for St. Paul is a transition from law to grace, is for
Kierkegaard a "leap" from the ethical to the religious level of existence; for Barth it is a bridging of the gap between the human possibility of "religion" and the divine possibility of grace; for Bultmann, it is a transition from the frustrating self-knowledge of philosophy to the transforming realization of authentic existence made possible by faith; and for Tillich it is a movement from a false sense of autonomy to the self-transcending state of theonomy.

A review of each of these theological descriptions of the act of faith will reveal that each describes in its own way the general dynamic of self-transcendence which is characteristic of human growth and maturity—a dynamic which involves a transformation of motives and, therefore, a radical discontinuity between the two types of motivation in question. In each case, faith is described as the act by which the believer subjectively appropriates the "righteousness of God," i.e., the justifying act of God by which man is made just or righteous. It is an act by which man accepts justification as a free gift or grace and, therefore, transcends all those means by which he had previously attempted to justify himself. Thus the transformation of motives which takes place through the act of faith is a transition from self-justifying motives to self-transcending motives. For St. Paul, what the believer transcends is his anxiety-producing attempts at self-justification through observance of the Mosaic law. But it was seen that, in a more general way, faith is the act by which may transcends all anxiety
producing efforts to live a self-justifying or self-authenticating existence through his own human resources. Thus what is transcended in faith is that anxiety-producing preoccupation with self which psychology calls ego instincts (Freud), narcissism (Fromm), self-enhancement (Adler), etc. and which theology calls "ethics" (Kierkegaard), "religion" (Barth), "philosophy" (Bultmann) and "autonomy" (Tillich). Thus it was seen in the present study that theology, in trying to interpret faith according to man's understanding of himself, has described the self-transcending dynamic of faith not only in the Pauline terminology of transcending the oppressive burden of the Mosaic Law but also in terms of all those self-imposed burdens by which man attempts to justify his existence. These include all forms of moralism or moralistic striving which represent the self-consciously religious man's attempts at self-justification (e.g., Kierkegaard's ethical man and Barth's religious man) as well as all forms of self-actualization by which man--religious and non-religious--attempts to authenticate his existence (e.g., Bultmann's "philosopher" and Tillich's autonomous or self-affirming man).

In each case, it was also seen that such self-transcendence involves a radical discontinuity, for self-justifying motivation in all its forms (law, ethics, religion, etc.) does not lead of itself to self-transcending motivation but must be abandoned in favour of self-transcending motives. Self-transcendence occurs only at the "dead
end" of legalistic, ethical and moralistic striving.

Finally, it will be noted that, as in the case of theories of human growth, the theological descriptions of faith studied reflect the basic pattern of growth postulated in the present study.

1) Man's first state is one of outward-looking unself-consciousness. Similarly, in his growth towards faith his first state is one of unreflective, unselfconsciousness represented by such words as nature, aesthetic existence, heteronomy, etc.

2) Man's second state is one of inward-looking self-consciousness. In the religious man this takes the form of moral and religious striving by which the religious man tries to structure his life ethically and justify his existence.

3) Finally man achieves what we have called a state of self-forgetfulness in which the first two states are transcended. This corresponds to the self-transcending motivation of the man of faith, in which the self is actualized but only through forgetting (or transcending) the self in commitment to the other. "He who loses his life will find it." According to Tillich faith transcends these two preliminary stages of growth for, in faith, man finds the "courage to be," i.e., to affirm his existence and individuality neither in his world (unselfconsciousness) nor in himself (selfconsciousness) but in that which transcends both man's world and man's self.
CHAPTER III
FAITH AS TRANSFORMATION:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

In the introduction to the present study the hypothesis was advanced that human growth takes place in three basic stages. The first stage is one of outer-directed, unselfconscious growth; the second stage is one of inner-directed, selfconscious growth; and the third stage is one in which these two previous extremes are transcended and integrated. Ontogenetically these stages are reflected in the dependence and reality testing of the infant and child; in the independence and introspection of the adolescent; and, finally, in the achieving of interdependence, or--to use Erich Fromm's expression--"productive relatedness," i.e., interpersonal relatedness without the loss of individuality and integrity, by the mature adult. Phylogenetically, this same process of growth might be reflected in mankind's intellectual growth from interest in the physical world around him (cosmology) to interest in the inner world of his own psyche (psychology) to a concern for the meaning of his concrete, individual existence in the total scheme of things, i.e., as a "being-in-the-world" (existentialism).

In examining the dynamics of the Christian act of faith, it was further seen that, according to the theological descriptions of faith studied, there are three stages
or existential states which the believer passes through in arriving at the act and commitment of faith, and which are analogous to the three stages of human growth described above. First, there is an outer-directed unselfconscious state; unselfconscious in the sense that the individual is unaware of his true inner condition. It is a state of illusion and ignorance. The man of faith realizes, in retrospect, that at this first stage he was unaware of that lack of authenticity and self-sufficiency which the New Testament calls "sin," i.e., that basic egoism or self-seeking which characterizes the unredeemed man. It is the condition of Paul's man without law, Kierkegaard's aesthetic man and Bultmann's enslaved man. In each case what is lacking is the anxiety-producing self-knowledge which comes with commitment to moral or ethical principles or, indeed, the attempt to fulfill any ideal of authentic human existence.

The second stage is one of inner-directed, self-conscious, ethical or moral striving. In it, man is inner-directed or preoccupied with self because his concern is to live a self-justifying or self-authenticating life. This is the condition of Paul's man under the law, of Kierkegaard's ethical man, of Barth's man of "religion," of Bultmann's "philosopher" and of Tillich's "autonomous" man seeking the courage to be in his individuality. In each case, man becomes aware of his lack of authenticity by the very fact of striving to be authentic in a religious way (moralism) or a non-religious way (self-actualization). He feels powerless
and frustrated because of his awareness of what Tillich would call the split between his essential self and his existential self, that dichotomy of knowledge and will which St. Paul, as a man of the law, experienced. Again, the existential split or dichotomy which is experienced at this stage is the gap which separates ethical existence from religious existence (Kierkegaard); which separates the human possibility of religion from the divine possibility of faith (Barth); which separates what is knowable through philosophy from what is realizable through faith (Bultmann).

Finally, there is the stage or level of faith which may be described not as unselfconscious or selfconsciousness but as "self-forgetfulness." Each of the descriptions of faith studied, describes faith as an act of radical trust by which the aforementioned "existential split" is transcended. Tillich, for example, describes it as the transcending of that dichotomy which man experiences between seeking "courage to be as part," i.e., in someone or something greater than oneself, and the courage to be as oneself, i.e., in one's own individuality and inner resources. It is the dichotomy of finding one's security in one's world or in oneself. In faith, the believer seeks his security in that which is the "Ground of Being" in which all particular beings participate, and which is a source of security which transcends one's self and one's world. Hence, the dichotomy between the courage to be as part and as oneself, between heteronomy and autonomy, is overcome.
This same dynamic of self-transcendence appears in all the above descriptions of faith which have been examined in this study. In each instance the selfconscious, inner-directed pursuit of moral perfection or human authenticity which is characteristic of the second stage of the dynamic of faith, serves only to bring to light that lack of moral rectitude and authentic human existence which was present but unrecognized in the first unselfconscious, outer-directed phase; and it is faith which is described as transcending the existential split which is thus revealed.

Faith, therefore, is that which transcends the existential split or dichotomy which is revealed when man commits himself to a norm of moral perfection (law, ethics, religion) or a vision of authentic human existence provided by philosophy or the human drive towards autonomy. In each instance, faith is seen as liberating man from the anxiety and frustration occasioned by this dichotomy of knowledge and will by relieving him of the necessity of self-justification, and allows him to act out of self-transcending motives.

Hence, the use of the word "self-forgetfulness" to describe this third stage of the dynamics; for whether one describes that which brings about this liberation and self-transcendence as "grace" (St. Paul) or as a "divine possibility" (Barth) or as "acceptance" (Tillich), the effect is that the believer is enabled to transcend that preoccupation with self which characterized his attempts at
self-justification or self-authentication. The object of the Christian believer's faith is an objective event of redemption—the Christian kerygma which proclaims an event of salvation, forgiveness, and acceptance, and which, therefore, relieves the believer of the necessity of self-justification. Faith existence, therefore, is a level of existence in which the dichotomy between the preliminary levels of existence, between the essential self and the existential self, is transcended. The first part of this final chapter will concern itself with this self-transcending quality of faith, by examining the faith experience of Martin Luther and of St. Augustine. It is hoped that the faith experience of Luther will provide an illustration of that transcending of moralism (law, ethics, religion) in terms of which both Kierkegaard and Barth describe the dynamics of faith; while the faith experience of Augustine will illustrate the transcending of self-actualization which is integral to the descriptions of faith given by Bultmann and Tillich, whether that self-actualization is seen in terms of self-understanding (Bultmann) or the drive towards human autonomy (Tillich).

1. Transcendence

A. Faith as Transcending Moralism: Martin Luther

Both Kierkegaard and Barth emphasize the paradoxical
nature of Christian faith; both describe the situation of the believer as standing under the NO and the YES of God, i.e., as being the object of both God's unconditional demands (Law) and his unconditional acceptance (Grace). Both men tried to maintain this central paradox of Christianity against what they considered to be the error of those theological positions which attempted to eliminate the paradox by synthesizing the affirmation and negation contained within the paradox by making God's Law observable and therefore his acceptance conditional upon such observance. Both likewise insist that faith becomes possible only when man experiences the futility and anxiety produced by his attempts at self-justification; that faith appears as a divine possibility when the human possibilities of what Kierkegaard calls "ethical existence" and Barth "religion" are exhausted. For both men, faith appears as a radical self-transcending alternative to the frustration and anxiety produced by the moralism of all legalistic types of religion. In the context, therefore, of the dynamics of faith, this frustration and anxiety appears as a necessary predisposition or psychological preamble to faith. What is important to note here is that both men, in speaking of this state of frustration and and anxiety, are describing the state of the self-consciously

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ethical or religious man seeking a self-justifying existence before God. The religious experience, therefore, of Martin Luther seems to be a singularly apt illustration of this dynamic, since Luther was a scrupulously religious man who discovered what was for him an authentic faith only by transcending the moralism and legalism of his religious observances, especially the observances of the monastic life.

For Luther, the paradox of Christian existence is stated in terms of Law and Gospel. Because the Christian stands at one and the same time under the Law (God's unconditional demand) and the Gospel (God's unconditional acceptance or grace), his religious self-consciousness consists of a twofold awareness—an awareness that he is simul justus et peccator." Law and Gospel are sharply distinguished and separated in Luther's thought; they cannot be synthesized by converting the unconditional grace of the gospel into a grace conditioned by human achievement.

Corresponding, therefore, to the paradox of God's YES and NO, of his wrath and grace, demand and acceptance, condemnation and promise, there is in the believer an awareness of guilt and sin (since he agrees with the verdict of condemnation which God's law pronounces on him) and an awareness of justification (since through faith he accepts God's revelation and promise of acceptance). The opposition of law and gospel in God corresponds to the opposition of despair and faith in man, and if, for Luther, man is justified before God sola fide it is because only faith is
capable of transcending this paradox; only faith is capable
of believing in God's acceptance in opposition to the awareness
of guilt and condemnation which the law reinforces in
man's conscience. "When I believe" said Luther, "God saves
me in opposition to the Law."² Paul Althaus describes this
paradox of faith as believing not only in spite of earthly
reality but also in spite of God's own word (Law):

Faith exists in tension between law and gospel. Because the law and Gospel are contrary to each other, whenever we believe the gospel, we must do so in opposition to our own heart and conscience which are so determined by the law that our awareness of the law makes us doubt and despair of God's grace.³

The foundation of this teaching on the paradoxical
nature of Christian faith and justification through faith is
to be found not only in Luther's exegesis of the Biblical
text and theological reflection, but also in his subjective
religious experience. While Luther's greatness as a theo-
logian and biblical scholar must be defended against the
contention of Preserved Smith that Luther's theological
teachings "were attained not by logical deduction from
Biblical or any other premises, but merely as an

²Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische
Gesamtausgabe, Weimar ed., 39-1, p. 219. English transla-
tion quoted in Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther,
trans. by Robert C. Schultz, Philadelphia, Fortress Press,
1966, p. 58.

³Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 58.
interpretation of his own subjective life," it is nevertheless true that in men such as Luther, who are more prophet than theologian, more religious genius and leader than abstract religious thinker, there is a much closer connection between religious thought and personal religious experience. One may therefore speak of the great Lutheran doctrines of the bondage of the will, justification through faith, the paradox of law and gospel, as having not only a theological and biblical foundation, but also a "psychological" foundation in the personal and religious experience of Luther's life and times. Applying this premise to the doctrine of the paradox of law and gospel, it is possible to speak of at least three psychological roots of this doctrine: Luther's childhood experience of religion; his experience of the divine-human encounter; and the tension in Luther's life between self-negation and self-affirmation which reflect the tension of his times between the religious and humanistic ideals.

(i) **Childhood Experience.** Though Roland Bainton tends to minimize the effects of the harsh discipline and severe religious upbringing of Luther's childhood years, both Smith

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and Erikson\textsuperscript{7} speak of the continuing influence in Luther's adult life of the severe corporal punishment at home and school and strict moral and religious training of his childhood years. Luther's childhood world was to a great extent a world of corporal punishment and spiritual terrors (fear of demons). Smith accounts for Luther's spiritual orientation in terms of an unresolved Oedipus Complex and therefore an overdeveloped superego which manifested itself in adult life in an obsession with the devil and with concupiscence as obstacles to salvation and enemies to be crushed. Behind this harsh superego was the figure of a wrathful God—the transposed image of the harsh authoritarianism of Luther's father—a God who was a cruel and capricious tyrant "who seemed to delight in the tortures of the wretched and to be more deserving of hatred than of love."\textsuperscript{8}

Whatever the merits of such a psychoanalytic interpretation of Luther's religious formation, the accounts of Luther's early religious training (including his own) seem to substantiate Erikson's conclusion that

\begin{quote}
[... ] when little Martin left the house of his parents, he was heavily weighed down by an overweening superego, which would give him the leeway of a sense of identity only in the obedient employment of his superior gifts and only as long as he
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{7}Erik Erikson, \textit{Young Man Luther}, N.Y., Norton and Co., 1962, c 1958, pp. 68 and 77.

\textsuperscript{8}M. Luther, \textit{The Bondage of the Will}, c 1525, quoted in P. Smith, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 373.
was more Martin than Luther, more son than man, more follower than leader.⁹

For Erikson, the unresolved Oedipus Complex with its accompanying ambivalent feelings of love and hate towards the father—feelings which are then transposed to God, the father surrogate—resulted in a severe "identity crisis" for Luther which continued into adult life. If Luther could establish his identity only in terms of an obedient son, it is not surprising that he retained in his personal relationship with God and in his theology the image of a wrathful, demanding God and, therefore, the paradox of law and gospel.

Erikson finds evidence of this identity crisis and ambivalent relationship with his father in the fact that:

1) Even after consciously defying his father by choosing a way of life (the monastery) contrary to his father's wishes, Luther still felt the need of obedience to and approval from his father. Thus, in Erikson's view, the famous incident of the "fit in the choir" in which Luther says of his monastic life "it isn't me," represents an "unconscious obedience to the father and implied rebellion against the monastery."¹⁰ Again, the chance remark of the father after Martin's first mass, casting doubt on the genuineness of Martin's religious vocation, throws Martin

⁹E. Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 77.
¹⁰Ibid., p. 38.
into a state of doubt and melancholy. The result was that Martin's monastic life which at first had been (in Erikson's view) "a life of obedience to God which would eventually come to count also as obedience to a reconciled father" became an "ambivalent form of overobedience," i.e., a consciously scrupulous observance of monastic rules which unconsciously was an attempt to make monastic life look absurd in agreement with his father's views. Finally, when Martin leaves the monastery, he speaks of his marriage as something that would please his father.

2) Behind Luther's attempts to please his father, there lies an unconscious hostility which cannot be expressed openly and directly. Erikson sees the repressed hostility of Luther for his father (and God) as expressing itself in his opposition to the Pope, and in his ability in later life to "hate quickly and persistently, justifiably and unjustifiably, with pungent dignity and with utter vulgarity" (e.g., his punitive attitude towards the rebellious peasants).

There seems to be, therefore, some justification for interpreting the law-gospel paradox in Luther's teaching as

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11 E. Erikson, *Young Man Luther*, Chapter 5.
being, at least in part, an expression of his own ambivalent religious experience of God which in turn evolves from the ambivalent feelings towards his own father originating in the childhood Oedipal experience. The ambivalence of this experience finds its counterpart in the juxtaposition of the wrathful God of the law and the merciful God of the gospel. Luther the man, even as an adult, needed obedience to and approval from his father; Luther the Christian, even after his discovery of justification through faith, still saw himself as standing under God's unconditional demand. The God of Luther's early school years was such a forbidding figure that "I would be terrified and grow pale at even the mention of Christ's name, because I was persuaded that he was a judge." But, in Erikson's view, because of his psychological conditioning, Luther never achieved a real transcendence of this kind of legalism:

Luther all his life felt like some sort of criminal, and had to keep on justifying himself even after his revelation of the universal justification through faith had led him to strength, peace and leadership.17

(ii) Luther's Experience of the Divine-Human Encounter.
Another psychological foundation for Luther's teaching on the paradox of law and gospel is the problem of what John

17 E. Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 68.
Dunne calls "unmediated existence."\(^{18}\) The spiritual problem of modern man is the lack of spiritual mediation. The religious life of the medieval world which preceded Luther was based on the premise of spiritual mediation, i.e., man did not stand alone before God but his path to God and salvation was facilitated by a whole system of mediation—by church, priesthood and sacraments—which dispensed or mediated salvation in God's name.

Luther's attack was not only against the obvious abuses of this system of mediation (e.g., indulgences) but ultimately an attack on the whole system of spiritual mediation as such. Luther was preoccupied with the question of the "justice" or "righteousness" of God, and his spiritual problem was precisely the problem of how man was to satisfy or appease the justice of God and thereby justify himself in God's eyes. Erikson remarks:

To be justified became his stumbling block as a believer, his obsession as a neurotic sufferer, and his preoccupation as a theologian.\(^{19}\)

Luther saw the Catholic system of spiritual mediation as something which put limits on what he saw as the unconditional demand of God's justice—the law of God—by turning the law into something observable through the exercise of free will and the assistance of the sacramental aids of the


\(^{19}\) E. Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 145.
church. Luther's quarrel, therefore, was with the very
premise of the system of spiritual mediation since for him
the demands of God's justice were unconditional and impos­
ible of fulfillment by any human achievement.

For Luther, the wrath of God was the wrath of a
demanding God who could not be satisfied no matter
what a man did, since everything a man did would
inevitably lack the whole-heartedness, the whole-
mindedness, and the whole-souledness that God
demanded.20

In the same way, the system of spiritual mediation
was seen as limiting and humanizing the other side of the
paradox--God's unconditional acceptance of man (grace)--by
destroying its unconditional character, i.e., by making it
conditional upon man's spiritual performance, his moral and
religious observance. Luther could not accept any system of
mediation which destroyed the unconditional character of
either God's demand or God's acceptance. But by rejecting
mediation, Luther put man in a spiritual situation in which
he was, as Dunne points out, too close to God and at the
same time too remote from God. The situation of the believer
is now similar to that of Christ who had no mediator between
himself and God; no mediating system or agency which might
mitigate the demands of God or restrict his grace.

Christ, the mediator between God and man, had no
further mediator to stand between himself and God,
and so was exposed to the naked wrath of God, as
well as the boundless graciousness of God.

20 J. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory,
p. 86.
Ironically, therefore, as Luther saw, it could be that it is not by having a spiritual mediator a lord spiritual, standing between himself and God that a man comes into relation with Christ but rather by not having a mediator and by being exposed to the hell, the purgatory, and the heaven that Christ experienced.21

But again, the paradox of law and gospel was not maintained by Luther merely through theological speculation but through his own personal experience as well. Luther refused to place any limitations on either the demand or the acceptance of God because in his own life he discovered that it was impossible. Therefore, he rejected the system of spiritual mediation as reflecting a lack of trust in God and a desire to introduce a human element or agent between man and God.

But, as Dunne also points out,22 Luther's own spiritual odyssey begins with a lack of trust and confidence before his conversion. We have seen that Luther's preoccupation was the justice or righteousness of God; not merely the speculative problem but the personal problem of how, in his own life, he might satisfy the righteousness of God, which at first he understood to mean the demanding justice of God. To satisfy that justice, he entered the monastery only to discover that the unconditional demands of God's righteousness are impossible of human fulfillment. Luther's

21 J. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory, pp. 80-81.

22 Ibid., p. 79.
experience as a monk was the experience of Kierkegaard's ethical man and Barth's man of religion; the experience of frustration and anxiety which is the necessary predisposition for the act of faith. In Luther's case the frustration was such that it issued in a blasphemous hatred of God.

Though I lived as a monk without reproach, I felt that I was a sinner before God with an extremely disturbed conscience. I could not believe that he was placated by my satisfaction. I did not love, yes, I hated the righteous God who punishes sinners, and secretly, if not blasphemously, certainly murmuring greatly, I was angry with God.23

Luther's conversion was occasioned by his meditations on Romans I: 17, for, in so doing, he discovered what he believed to be the true meaning of the "righteousness of God." This term no longer referred merely to God's unconditional demands but to his unconditional acceptance. The righteousness of God and his grace are identified. Grace therefore is no longer that which enables man to be righteous before God, i.e., to achieve his own active righteousness; it is rather the righteousness of God himself which is imputed to man (passive righteousness). Hence, the righteous man, who is righteous through faith, reveals the righteousness of God. Luther describes his moment of conversion in these words:

At last, by the mercy of God, meditating day and night, I gave heed to the context of the words,

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23 Martin Luther, "Preface to Latin Writings," English trans. from Martin Luther; Selections from His Writings, ed. by John Dillenberger, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1961, c 1545, p. 11.
namely, "In it the righteousness of God is revealed as it is written, 'He who through faith is righteous shall live.'" Then I began to understand that the righteousness of God is that by which the righteous lives by a gift of God, namely by faith. And this is the meaning: the righteousness of God is revealed by the gospel, namely the passive righteousness with which the merciful God justifies us by faith as it is written, "He who through faith is righteous shall live." Here I felt that I was altogether born again and had entered paradise itself through open gates. There a totally other face of the entire scripture showed itself to me. Thereupon I ran through the scriptures from memory. I also found in other terms an analogy, as, the work of God, that is what he does in us, the power of God, with which he makes us strong, the wisdom of God with which he makes us wise, the strength of God, the salvation of God, the glory of God.24

This understanding of the righteousness of God as "passive righteousness" permitted Luther to define the two-fold relationship between law and gospel. In the first place, law and gospel must be distinguished and kept separate. If the righteousness which justifies man is passive, i.e., God's own righteousness imputed to him so that subjectively man's role in his own justification is accepting that imputed righteousness in faith, then there is no need to turn God's absolute, unconditional law into something observable since man's justification does not depend on such observance; nor is it possible to make God's unconditional grace conditional upon man's moral observance for grace is identified with that imputation of righteousness which is a free gift and not something to be earned. Hence law and gospel retain their unconditional character and paradoxical

relationship. Luther attributes his earlier error to a failure to distinguish between law and gospel.

Previously I lacked nothing except that I made no distinction between the Law and the Gospel; I held them to be one and the same and contended that there was no difference between Christ and Moses except for the element of time and degree of perfection. But when I discovered the true difference, namely, that the Law is one thing and the Gospel another, then I broke through into the clear.25

But if law and gospel are to be maintained in paradoxical opposition, they are also intimately related since existence under the law is the necessary preliminary for existence under the gospel. As for Paul, law must precede grace and for Kierkegaard, ethical existence must precede religious, and for Barth, "religion" must precede faith, so for Luther law must precede gospel. Man is ready for faith and grace when he has experienced the frustration and anxiety of moralism; he is ready to accept justification as a free gift when he has experienced the futility of trying to earn it through moralistic striving. As Kierkegaard pointed out,26 what is important about Luther is not that he taught this truth as an abstract doctrine but that he experienced it in his own religious life; and every Christian, he believed, had to transcend moralism in the same way


that Luther did, by experiencing its futility. Only by following the way of law is one prepared to receive the gospel with faith. This, according to Bainton, is the meaning of Luther's monastic life.

The meaning of Luther's entry into the monastery is simply this, that the great revolt against the medieval Church arose from a desperate attempt to follow the way by her prescribed. Just as Abraham overcame human sacrifice only through his willingness to lift the sacrificial knife against Isaac, just as Paul was emancipated from Jewish legalism only because as a Hebrew of the Hebrews he had sought to fulfill all righteousness, so Luther rebelled out of a more than ordinary devotion.  

Luther expresses this truth when he says that Scripture contains commandments and promises and that man must prepare himself to accept God's free promises by learning from the commandments "his inability to do good and may despair of his own ability."  

Thus the promises of God give what the commandments of God demand and fulfill what the law prescribes, so that all things may be God's alone, both the commandments and the fulfilling of the commandments.  

And in terms of law and gospel:

The gospel [...] most beautifully follows the law. The law introduces us to sin and overwhelms us with the knowledge of it. It does this so that we may seek to be freed and desire grace.  

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27 R. Bainton, _Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther_, p. 27.
29 Ibid.
(iii) **The Tensions Within Luther's Personality.** A third psychological foundation for Luther's paradox of law and gospel is to be found in what Karl Holl\(^{31}\) refers to as the tension within Luther's personality between self-negation and self-affirmation. In this respect Luther reflects the tension of his times which were torn between the ideals of self-rejection or self-sacrifice as exemplified by the monk and the self-affirmation of the Renaissance man. Once again, one may point to a parallel between this tension within Luther's personality and the paradox of law (man's self-affirmation through reliance on his religious "works") and the gospel (man's surrender in faith to God's saving initiative). In Holl's view, it was precisely this tension within Luther which permitted him to maintain both his self-confidence as a reformer and religious leader (self-affirmation) and at the same time, his basic religious consciousness before God (self-negation).

What is important, however, in the present context, is that, for Luther, faith meant the transcending of this tension within one's personality of the twofold awareness of sin and justification without diminishing either.

Since he knew how to bind together self-negation and self-affirmation, Luther transcended the inner contradiction which dominated contemporary feelings of personality. In the waning Middle Ages the

ideals of humanity were either the absolute self-rejection of the monk or the equally absolute self-affirmation of the strong man of the Renaissance. There was no bridge between them. Luther was able to unite the truth of both because his faith in God encompassed them both. From his certainty of forgiveness came a self-confidence of the highest sort; but it was only a gift of which he could not feel worthy.32

And this, Holl concludes, is what faith is supposed to be for every believer—a state in which one transcends the tension between "humility before God and self-confidence in God."33

Now it is precisely in such transcendence that the transforming power of faith lies. For Luther both self-affirmation and self-negation, taken separately, can represent different forms of the bondage of man's will for both represent an enslaving type of response to God's law. To the will of God arbitrarily imposed on man from without, the self-assertive man reacts by rebellion; the self-negating man, on the other hand, obeys but in a calculating way, i.e., in order to achieve a reward or escape punishment.34 Both men are motivated by egoism and hence their conduct is voluntary by not free, for true freedom means to act out of pure love rather than egoism. When Luther, therefore, speaks of the "bondage of the will" he is in no way

33Ibid., p. 31.
contradicting the philosophical arguments for freedom of choice. What he maintains is that when man is pursuing his "free" choices, those choices do not represent true freedom if they are motivated by egoism or self-seeking.

And this applies to man's moral and religious life; even his good works are evil and man not truly free if those good works have a self-justifying motive. The function of faith is to transform man's personality by transforming his motives; to transcend the egoism of both moralistic striving for rewards (self-negation) and rebellious rejection of law (self-affirmation). In faith, the man whose justification is a free gift of God is liberated from self-justifying motives and is free to act out of pure love and gratitude. Justification sola fide therefore does not imply a rejection of love and good works but rather stresses the truth that since justification rests solely on faith and not on love and good works, then man's good works can proceed freely and spontaneously from a love which is not burdened with the task of earning man's justification and is therefore not self-seeking.

Hence the man of faith without being driven, willingly and gladly seeks to do good to everyone, serve everyone, suffer all kinds of hardships, for the sake of the love and glory of the God who has shown him such grace. It is impossible, indeed, to separate works from faith, just as it is impossible to separate heat and light from fire.35

Thus Luther speaks of two kinds of righteousness in the believer. Besides the righteousness which is imputed to him and involves the forgiveness of sins ("the righteousness which faith is") there is also the creation of a new being by which man is made righteous in himself ("the righteousness which faith gives"). This latter refers to the above-mentioned transformation of motives by which man achieves a new obedience free of self-seeking. But he has such freedom only through the power of the original forgiveness and imputed righteousness, and only insofar as it is based on and springs from "the righteousness which faith is," for man cannot act freely unless he has been liberated.\(^\text{36}\)

B. Faith as Transcending Self-Actualization: St. Augustine

As the religious experience of Martin Luther illustrates the dynamics of Christian faith as described by Kierkegaard and Barth, so the conversion of St. Augustine will perhaps provide an illustration of the dynamics of faith as described by Bultmann and Tillich. Kierkegaard and Barth describe the situation of the self-consciously ethical or religious man and authentic faith as the transcending of the moralism of such ethical or religious striving. Luther's acceptance of justification through faith at the "dead-end" of the most scrupulous monastic observance—

\(^{36}\text{Cf. P. Althaus, op. cit., p. 235.}\)
extreme example of ethical and religious striving—appears as an example of the transcending of such self-justifying moralism.

Bultmann and Tillich, on the other hand, describe the situation not of the man driven to justify himself before God (as was Luther), but of the man driven to transcend himself through what Bultmann would call a new understanding of his existence and what Tillich would call "ultimate concern." For the consciously religious man, striving to reach God, the precondition for the act of faith (according to Kierkegaard and Barth) is the failure of his ethical or religious striving which reinforces his consciousness of sin and prepares him for faith. For the "irreligious man," striving for self-realization or fulfillment, i.e., striving for authentic human existence, the precondition of faith is the failure to achieve self-realization through self-knowledge (Bultmann) or through autonomy (Tillich) both of which reinforce man's awareness of the split between his essential self and his existential self and prepare him for self-transcendence.

For Bultmann, self-transcendence means transcending self-knowledge by accepting the understanding of his existence which the New Testament offers him, and thereby achieving the authentic human existence which was impossible of realization through mere philosophical reflection. For Tillich self-transcendence means transcending the dichotomy between heteronomy and autonomy by finding the courage to be
not in one's self or one's world, not in individuality or participation, but in the eternal ground of being (God) which transcends one's self and one's world. Luther found authentic faith by transcending moralism (self-justifying ethical and religious striving); Augustine found authentic faith by transcending self-realization (self-knowledge and autonomy, i.e., the search for truth and freedom). Both of these elements can be found in Augustine's life and conversion experience. His experience of faith represents:

(1) the culmination of his search for truth and the transcending of the self-knowledge he achieved through Neo-Platonic philosophy; and
(2) the transcending of the conflict within his own personality between dependency (heteronomy) and autonomy.

(i) Augustine's Faith as the Transcending of Self-knowledge. In the Confessions Augustine tells us that as a young student at Carthage he read Cicero's *Hortensius* and, as a result, decided to dedicate himself to the pursuit of wisdom.

Suddenly all the vanity I had hoped in I saw as worthless, and with an incredible intensity of desire I longed after immortal wisdom.37

This reading of Cicero gave to Augustine's life its most fundamental orientation which was to "love, and seek, and win, and hold, and embrace," not any particular philosophical

37 Augustine, Confessions, 3, IV. This and all subsequent English translations from that of F. J. Sheed, London, Sheed and Ward, 1948.
school or position, "but Wisdom itself, whatever it might be." The pursuit of wisdom, therefore, is the context in which Augustine's conversion takes place. In retrospect, Augustine himself sees his youthful commitment to the pursuit of wisdom as the beginning of his journey towards God. "I had begun" he says, "that journey upwards by which I was to return to You." 39

But, for Augustine, the search for truth is identical with the search for Christ, not only for him but for every man. Father Coppleston remarks:

Augustine himself sought for truth because he felt a need for it, and looking back on his development in the light of attainment, he interpreted this as a search for Christ and Christian wisdom, as the attraction of the divine beauty and this experience he universalized. 40

Thus John Dunne 41 sees Augustine's confessions as the recollections of a man standing before God (as distinct from the Soliloquies, written ten years earlier, and in which Augustine dialogues with his own reason). In retrospect, Augustine sees his life as a series of "existential states," a series of successive changes in the orientation of one's life rather than a mere succession of deeds and events.

38 Augustine, Confessions, 3, IV.
39 Ibid.
41 Cf. J. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory, pp. 45-57.
Dunne identifies these existential states as: childhood Christianity, manicheeism, skepticism, neoplatonism, philosophical Christianity and ecclesiastical Christianity. Each of these transitions is seen in Augustine's recollections as a "conversion," i.e., one phase in the general movement of conversion towards the God of Christianity which began with his determination to pursue wisdom as a young student. Indeed, in Dunne's view, it was only many years later, when he wrote the Confessions, that Augustine saw his conversion to Christianity as something transcending his philosophical quest.

Indeed his ultimate conversion to Christianity at the age of 32 was seen and described by him as a conversion to philosophy. Only later, when he wrote the Confessions in his forties, from the standpoint of a more ecclesiastical Christianity, did he see it as a conversion to something transcending philosophy.42

But any man's search for truth and wisdom takes place within the philosophical context of his times; hence, the critical role of Neo-Platonism in the life of Augustine. Tillich43 sees Augustine's position in the history of philosophy as being part of the Neo-Platonic movement which was a response to the skepticism which followed the collapse of classical Greek philosophy and its attempt to build an objectively rational world. The skepticism which followed

42 Cf. J. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory, pp. 53-54.

this collapse denied the possibility of attaining objective philosophical certainty. As a reaction against skepticism, Neo-Platonism proposed a new epistemology: the basis for truth was not objective but subjective; man was not to look at external reality as a source of truth but within himself, and through the elevation of his soul to the ultimate and universal truth.

This meant that, in his religious orientation, Augustine countered the skepticism about attaining objective truth about God with the Neo-Platonic notion of man's immediate inner awareness of God. Platonic idealism identified the truth with the impersonal, immaterial, universal essences. With Neo-Platonism, this ancient philosophy, in the words of R. L. Ottley, "virtually passed over into theology" since it represents a rather mystical version of this Platonic notion of the origin of the Eternal Ideas of which the visible world is only an imperfect manifestation. For Neo-Platonism, eternal ideas are the thoughts of God in the NOUS or divine mind which emanates from "the One."  

As James Dittes has pointed out, this Neo-Platonic version of the structure of the universe in which all beings


are seen as emanations from the One or the supreme being undoubtedly influenced Augustine's theology, in which men are seen as expressions of God and utterly dependent on God's creative and sovereign functions (predestination). What is more important, however, in the present context, is the influence of this Neo-Platonic orientation on Augustine's personal search for God. It meant that in his search for truth, and therefore for God, Augustine looked ultimately into his own soul; for while, as a Christian, he eventually rejected the Neo-Platonic notion that all creatures are manifestations of the Archetypal form and emanations of the One, and the pre-existence of the soul which therefore has direct knowledge of universal forms or essences, in favour of the Christian doctrine of creation, he nevertheless believed that the way to truth and therefore to God was away from visible creation and into the depths of one's soul. God is not to be found in the world of objective reality but as the ultimate depth of one's existence.

Thus, Augustine's approach to the question of God is "ontological" rather than "cosmological." God is discovered as the ultimate ground of one's being and existence; He is not the object apprehended by the knowing subject but that which precedes every distinction between subject and object, the absolute which is presupposed in every relativity. Thus, Augustine's desire is expressed in the phrase "Noverim me, noverim Te." Augustine wanted to know himself and, thereby, to know God; to find God in the depths of his own soul.
Tillich explains this statement of Augustine in these words:

This means that the soul is the place where God appears to man. He wants to know the soul because only there can he know God, and in no other place. This implies, of course, that God is not an object beside other objects. God is seen in the soul. He is in the center of man, before the split into subjectivity and objectivity. [...] God is given to the subject as nearer to itself than it is to itself.

In the Augustinian tradition the source of all philosophy of religion is the immediacy of the presence of God in the soul. [...] This is the prīus of everything.47

Augustine himself describes this inner search for God in the Confessions:

Being admonished by all this to return to myself, I entered into my own depths, with you as guide; and I was able to do it because you were my helper. I entered, and with the eye of my soul, such as it was, I saw your unchangeable Light shining over that same eye of my soul, over my mind.48

In another passage,49 Augustine speaks of his passing from knowledge of sensible things to the knowing faculty, the soul, and from the knowing and reasoning power which is mutable to that which is immutable, i.e., God—"That which is." By this process the mind arrives at an intuition or direct awareness of that which is being. God is being (esse); all other things merely have being. When the mind becomes aware of necessary and eternal truths, it thereby has an awareness of an eternal and changeless standard which


48 Augustine, Confessions, 7, X.

49 Ibid., 7, XVII.
is the ground of that truth. In Augustine's theory the mind at that moment encounters the Immutable Truth because it is illuminated by Truth Itself ("your unchangeable Light"), in recognizing necessary and eternal truths.50

By entering into the depths of his soul Augustine heard his God speak to him "as one hears in the heart"51 and the God he discovered was the ground of all beauty and truth and being so that "there was from that moment no ground of doubt in me; I would more easily have doubted my own life than have doubted that truth is [...] 52 Augustine's philosophical or intellectual "conversion" took place when he abandoned his manicheean dualism and no longer doubted the existence of "an incorruptible substance from which every substance has its being." 53 To discover this God, man must transcend the beauty of the visible creation by looking into his own depths to discover the immutable ground of beauty.

Late have I loved thee, O Beauty so ancient and so new; late have I loved Thee! For behold Thou wert within me, and I outside; and I sought Thee outside and in my loneliness fell upon those lovely things that Thou hast made. Thou wert with me and I was not with Thee, I was kept from Thee by those things, yet had they not been in Thee, they would not have been at all.54

51 Augustine, Confessions, 7, XVII.
52 Ibid., 7, X.
53 Ibid., 8, I.
54 Ibid., 10, XXVII.
Ottley, in commenting on Book VII of the Confessions, after pointing out that Augustine discovered God not by the contemplation of the universe but by "penetrating into the recesses of his own personality," concludes:

Thus his own experience harmonized with the doctrine of Platonism in suggesting that human nature by its very constitution bears testimony to the true light, and that only by searching into his own soul can man attain to belief in a transcendent spiritual being akin to himself: a being who is at once the immutable light of reason [...] the fountain of the soul's life [...] the supreme good towards which human nature aspires, and the final cause of its upward movement.

Thus the philosophical tenets of Neo-Platonism served for Augustine the preliminary or propaedeutic function which Bultmann assigns to philosophy in general in the dynamics of faith. But it also means that Augustine's "philosophical" conversion was not sufficient in itself for, by it, he achieved only the self-understanding of philosophy, not the self-understanding of faith by which authentic existence becomes realizable. For the self-understanding of faith, Augustine had to turn to the authority of the Church and its message of salvation, particularly as it was proclaimed in the sermons of Ambrose. As Tillich has remarked, Augustine found the solutions to the problem of the philosophical skepticism which characterized his times, not only in the works of the Neo-Platonists but also in the authority of

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55 R. L. Ottley, Studies in the Confessions of St. Augustine, p. 94.

56 Ibid., pp. 94-95.
the Church.

Augustine himself indicates in retrospect that his philosophical conversion was only a preliminary and incomplete step. In Neo-Platonism he found a doctrine similar to that of the Christian doctrine of the Logos but not the message that the Word became flesh, that He emptied himself, took the form of a servant, and became obedient to death on a cross for man's redemption.\(^{57}\) It was necessary, therefore, for Augustine to transcend his philosophical discovery of the God who is the immutable ground of truth and being. But in what way does the famous conversion experience in the garden which is described in Book VIII of the Confessions transcend Augustine's philosophical conversion? How are the two experiences related?

Coppleston\(^{58}\) distinguishes between an intellectual conversion and a moral conversion. O'Connell, however, rejects the notion that Book VII of the Confessions describes the intellectual phase of Augustine's conversion while Book VIII describes the moral phase or the conversion to Christianity proper.

Such a view forgets that he very likely considered himself an enlightened sort of "Christian" while a Manichee. [...]. He now considers himself as

\(^{57}\) Augustine, Confessions, 7, IX.

having returned to a specific type of Christianity, as a "catholic Christian."

Perhaps the difficulties inherent in the words "intellectual" and "moral" can be overcome by having recourse to John Dunne's description of the relationship of the two experiences as a transition from philosophical Christianity to ecclesiastical Christianity. Such a distinction takes two important aspects into consideration:

1) The importance of Neo-Platonism as Augustine's philosophical preamble to faith.

2) The importance of the Church and its authority in Augustine's attaining the self-understanding of faith. For Augustine, the Church and submission to its authority was the forerunner of wisdom and the answer to skepticism. Authority cures man of pride, and is one of the earthly realities through which the soul is admonished to return to God and to pass from belief to vision.

However, the transition is described, it is possible to see in Augustine's passing from philosophical to ecclesiastical Christianity an illustration of the transition from the self-understanding of philosophy to the self-understanding


60 J. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory, p. 53.

of faith. In this transition, philosophy, like the law, religion and ethics, serves to reinforce man's sense of insufficiency and his need for redemption. Positively, it makes him humble and prepares him for grace. In the words of Jean-Marie LeBlond, the humility which Augustine learned was

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\text{[...]} \text{l'humilité du penseur qui doit avouer que, malgré ses speculations, sa pensée est impuissante à emporter la pratique et qu'il se laisse engluer dans la chair [...].}^\text{62}
\]

Self-knowledge without the transformation wrought by grace merely heightens man's frustrations:

\[
\text{La lumière seule, comme la loi, ne ferait qu'accoître le péché, tandis que la grâce est ce qui permet de le vaincre.}^\text{63}
\]

Augustine the Neo-Platonist, the philosophical Christian, was Bultmann's man understanding himself through philosophy. Augustine the ecclesiastical Christian was Bultmann's man understanding himself through his faith in the event of redemption accomplished in Christ.

(ii) **Augustine's Conversion as the Transcending of Autonomy.** If on the level of conscious rational reflection, Augustine's conversion took place within the context of his search for truth, on the unconscious and affective level it took place within the context of the struggle between two conflicting

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^63 Ibid.
tendencies within his personality: the struggle between the
tendency to submission (heteronomy) and the thrust towards
autonomy. Augustine's faith, therefore, can be seen as an
act by which he transcended this conflict, and, therefore,
in terms of Tillich's description of faith as transcending
self and world, individuality and participation, the courage
to be as oneself and the courage to be as part.

Psychological interpretations of Augustine's life
and conversion seem to agree on the presence of strong
oedipal elements in his personality. Philip Woolcott Jr.
remarks:

There is evidence in the Confessions that Augustine
did not succeed in resolving his "oedipal complex"
satisfactorily. He was extremely close to his
mother, idealizing her as the "handmaiden of God,"
and seemed to identify her with God and the
church.64

There is little need to belabour the obvious by amassing
evidence for such an interpretation. The Confessions offer
ample evidence of the dominant place of and prolonged attach­
ment to Monica in Augustine's life, together with a certain
repudiation of the father. The Christian mother is praised,
the pagan father tolerated (I: 11). The mother sabotages
the son's wedding plans with no protest from Augustine (II:
3; VI: 15). Augustine's mistress is driven from his home by
Monica, and Augustine's resultant preoccupation with his own

64 Philip Woolcott Jr., "Some Considerations of
Creativity and Religious Experience in Saint Augustine of
feelings of deprivation and apparent lack of concern for the dismissed woman reveals the narcissism characteristic of a mother-fixation (VI: 15).

But if there is evidence of dependency on Monica and alienation from the father, there is also evidence of displaced and disguised hostility and rebellion against Monica. There is bitterness towards teachers and adults generally in his childhood (I: 9), as well as rebellion against Monica in his early manhood by the adoption of a philosophy (Manicheeism) and life style (sensual indulgence) which were contrary to her preferences. The same rebellion is evident, according to Charles Kligerman, in Augustine's sudden departure from Carthage to Rome which was in fact a flight from Monica who wished to detain him, and which Kligerman sees as "almost a direct re-enactment of the Aeneas and Dido legend" which seems to have had a continuing fascination for Augustine during his boyhood.

The conflict within Augustine's personality, therefore, seems to have been the basic oedipal conflict between attachment to the mother and repudiation of the father on the one hand and rebellion against the mother's dominance


67 Ibid., p. 478.
and identification with the masculine father image on the other. Kligerman, therefore, sees the mother and father as symbolic. Monica represents the feminine passivity, Africa the mother country, and the submission demanded by Christianity. The masculine, pagan father represents Rome, power, masculine aggressiveness, paganism and instinctual heterosexual strivings. In its most fundamental terms this was a conflict between heteronomy and autonomy, between the feminine urge to submit and the masculine urge to dominate. Woolcott describes the conflict as "a conflict between an urge to dominate and an urge to submit," and Dittes sees this conflict as the source of an identity crisis for Augustine.

He had to find an identity which was true to the several and conflicting strivings within himself, including those to submit passively to the comfortable authority and the striving to fight submission and insist on autonomy.

Both Dittes and Kligerman interpret Augustine's religious conflict in this context of heteronomy versus autonomy. The conflict was between the heteronomy or dependence of Christianity (submission to the church as to a mother figure) and the autonomy and masculinity of paganism. In this view, Augustine is torn between submission to Monica and, by extension, to the authority of the church, and identification with the father and, therefore, with the masculine

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68 P. Woolcott Jr., op. cit., p. 275.
69 J. E. Dittes, op. cit., p. 135.
autonomy of Roman paganism. Both the above-mentioned authors see Augustine's conversion in terms of a surrender and sub-
mission to the church after the failure of his attempts to assert his autonomy.

Dittes, for example, sees in most of Augustine's strivings towards autonomy secondary strivings towards sub-
mission and dependence, and his conversion takes place when these secondary strivings become dominant. In Augustine's sexual indulgences, for example, there is an attempt "to deny the passive, feminine, dependent element of his nature and to assert his identity as a vigorous, assertive, active male." But his failure to marry is seen as a failure to fully assume the active, masculine role of husband and father. Again, his attachment to Manicheeism is a form of rebellion against Monica, but the "affiliative nature of the sect" satisfied his need to belong and submit. With his conversion, Augustine's dependency strivings become dominant: he surrenders to his mother and to the church; he abandons masculine sexuality through a life of celibacy; he abandons the efforts to be a father and becomes an obedient son. The victory of Augustine's dependency striving is reflected also in his theological teachings. Dittes sees his defence of the faith as reactions against threatening autonomy strivings inherent in the three heresies against

\[70\] J. E. Dittes, op. cit., p. 136.

\[71\] Ibid., p. 137.
which Augustine fought and which assert the relative independence of the human agent in the matter of his salvation. These are: Pelagianism, which emphasized the freedom of man's will; Donatism, which emphasized the necessity of worthiness in the human minister of the sacraments; and Manicheeism, which emphasized the dualism of good and evil and therefore the importance of human choice. Kligerman agrees substantially with Dittes when he says of Augustine's conversion:

Actually, I believe the end result of this conversion experience was an identification with the mother and a passive feminine attitude to the father displaced to God.\footnote{C. Kligerman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 483.}

In these interpretations, Augustine's conversion appears as a victory of heteronomy over autonomy, because as Dittes suggests, "this assertion of autonomy proved too precarious to maintain."\footnote{J. E. Dittes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 136.} Woolcott, however, is more disposed to see the conversion as a transcending of the conflict, in which the inner tension of the conflict is replaced by unity, harmony and certitude—a liberation and release of energy made possible by the abandoning of the preoccupation with self implied in this inner conflict.

Following his conversion a sense of inner unity and certainty coupled with greater ethical sensitivity and diminished self-concern were evident in Augustine. His thoughts became more directed outwardly towards others.\footnote{P. Woolcott Jr., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 280.}
This latter description of Augustine's conversion experience agrees with that of Tillich who maintains that his conversion was for Augustine "the answer to the question implied in ancient skepticism" and therefore "he did not experience it as heteronomy but as theonomy."\(^\text{75}\) Theonomy, as noted above,\(^\text{76}\) is the situation in which man recognizes that to which he submits—the law of God—as the law of his own nature. It is the situation in which culture is the form of religion and religion the content of culture and in which the existential gap between world and self, between heteronomy (the courage to be as part) and autonomy (the courage to be as oneself) is transcended by the courage of confidence in which man's self-affirmation is grounded in a source which transcends one's self and one's world.

If, therefore, Augustine's conversion was not a heteronomous but a theonomous experience, it is perhaps because his submission to the Church constituted a transition from philosophical Christianity to ecclesiastical Christianity, and that Augustine's discovery of God within the context of Neo-Platonic philosophy was the preamble and precondition for his discovery of the God of salvation presented in the teaching authority of the Church. It must be kept in mind that Augustine found what were for him two


\(^{76}\) Cf. Chapter II, pp. 240-41.
answers to the problem of skepticism: Neo-Platonism and the authority of the Church. One may therefore legitimately ask whether Augustine perhaps experienced the authority of the Church not as heteronomy but as theonomy because the God presented to him by the Church was the God he had discovered within himself in his Neo-Platonic speculations. For Augustine, the authority of the Church was a means to the vision of that God of whom he was already aware as the ground of his own being.

It must further be kept in mind that Augustine's anti-Pelagian stance and belief in man's total dependence on God is the result of viewing his life in retrospect through the eyes of faith, and therefore seeing his life as a pattern of vocation and conversion. It does not necessarily mean that in the actual living of his life, Augustine was passive and dependent in his relationship with God; it does mean that in retrospect (as in the Confessions), the man of faith is much more apt to see the action of God in his life and attribute his salvation to God's prevenient grace.

It is possible, therefore, to view Augustine's conversion experience as an act of faith by which he transcended the existential split between individuality (courage to be as oneself) and participation (courage to be as part). But it will be recalled that such an act of self-transcendence occurs in what Tillich calls a "boundary situation," i.e., a situation in which all human possibility and human resources are exhausted and man is confronted by the finitude
of his existence. It is in such a situation that man's awareness of the existential split in his nature becomes most acute and he must ground his self-affirmation not in himself or his world but in what is ultimate and unconditioned. For Augustine, therefore, the Christian doctrine of creation from nothing was critical, for it enabled him to overcome the Neo-Platonic belief in an existence prior to his present life in a world of forms or ideas. It enabled him, in other words, to reach that boundary situation which is the precondition of faith by confronting his own nothingness. It meant that in recollecting his life, as he did in the Confessions, he would reach a point at which he did not exist. Dunne points out that when Augustine overcame the Neo-Platonic illusion of pre-existence, he was able to confront the nothingness from which he came and therefore experience fully the contingency of his human condition and encounter God as a creative power.

The recollection of nothingness, the full realization of the contingency of his own existence, was apparently the thing that brought Augustine into the presence of God as a creative power—[...] The nothingness out of which he came was the same nothingness out of which his world came, and in recollecting it, he found himself in some real sense contemporaneous with the beginning of time.  

When Augustine confronted the nothingness out of which both he and his world came, he was able to transcend both himself and his world and ground his existence and his

77 J. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory, pp. 56-57.
self-affirmation in Him who created both out of nothing. 78

2. Transformation

It was also pointed out in the preceding chapter that the element of self-transcendence which theology ascribes to faith existence implies a transformation of motives—a transformation from self-justifying to self-transcending motives. When St. Paul, for example, speaks of the man liberated from the law, he is speaking of the man whose moral striving is the result of a freely made commitment to a freely given and justifying personal relationship with God. It is not the moral striving of a man who must measure up to a moral standard in order to earn or be worthy of that justifying relationship through his good works. From the point of view of motivation, as Barth has pointed out, the latter is preoccupied with himself, i.e., with his own justification, while the former is free to be concerned solely with the object of his love and good works—his God and his fellow man.

Authentic faith, therefore, seems to involve the same kind of transformation of motives which psychology associates with maturity or authentic human existence. It should be possible, therefore, to describe the transformation of motives achieved in faith in terms of each of the

78 For Augustine's own discourse on memory and his search for God through recollection, cf. Confessions, Book 10.
psychological theories discussed in Chapter I. It was seen there that each psychological theory studied reiterated a common theme: that authentic human growth from childhood to adulthood involves a radical transformation of motives and is, therefore, experienced as self-transcendence. Faith is also experienced as self-transcendence because it involves the same kind of transformation of motives. The present study has concerned itself only with pointing out this common element in both psychology’s understanding of human growth and theology’s understanding of the Christian act of faith. Its only legitimate conclusion therefore—that the same dynamic is at work in both experiences, and that there is, therefore, a basic similarity in the way in which faith and human growth are experienced—is contingent upon the validity of those psychological descriptions of human growth and theological descriptions of faith which have been used as the basis for this comparison. A critical evaluation of each psychological or theological position discussed is obviously beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, if this obvious limitation is kept in mind, one may legitimately propose the conclusion that authentic faith is experienced as authentic human existence because it involves that transformation of motives which is essential to human growth. If one, therefore, wishes to describe psychologically the transformation of motives effected by faith, it will be possible to do so in terms of the description of that transformation given by each of the psychologists studied above.
Thus, without affirming the validity of any of these personality theories, but merely taking them as widely accepted ways of describing the dynamics of human growth, one may describe the transformation of faith variously as: a transformation from death to life (Freud); from ego to self (Jung); from self-enhancement to social interest (Adler); from regression to progression (Fromm); from opportunistic to appropriate striving (Allport); or from self-actualization to self-transcendence (Frankl).

A. Faith as Life (Freud)

In asking the question as to whether the transformation of motives achieved in faith can be described in the Freudian terms of the instincts for life (Eros) and death, it must first be noted that the New Testament itself abounds in references to human existence as characterized by the duality of life and death, and to the faith experience of the Christian as a passing from death to life. While the "life" in question is seen as eschatological, as a future inheritance, it is also a present reality and becomes so through the faith and love of the believer. Jesus is the one who "gives life to whom he will" (John V: 21); who has come that man "may have life, and have it abundantly" (John X: 10). Jesus describes the man of faith as one who has passed "from death to life" (John V: 24) and himself as the "bread of life" (John VI: 48). Again, in the parable of the
last judgment (Matt. XXV) life is promised to those who have practised the works of love (feeding the hungry, etc.) which flow from faith and, as with Freud's life instinct, bring about a unity among men, families and nations, while death is the fate of those who have neglected such works of love and whose life therefore is an expression of that egoism which is divisive, which creates barriers between men, and which manifests what Freud calls the destructive or death instinct. Hence the biblical identification of "life" with the kingdom of God. If the kingdom refers to that unity among men which for the Christian is the result of those works of love which spring from faith, and for Freud is a victory of and manifestation of that unifying principle of the life instinct, then even according to the Freudian understanding, to be admitted to the kingdom is to "enter into life" (Matt. XVIII: 8; XIX: 17; XXV: 46).

Freud himself, however, seems to have interpreted religious faith as a manifestation of the death instinct rather than in terms of the "life" which the New Testament promises to the believer. This Freudian interpretation of religion as death can be inferred from his twofold description of religion as an "illusion" and as an "obsessional neurosis."

1) Religion as an illusion: In Freud's view, it is because he is still subject to the whims of nature and fate that even the grown man retains some of the sense of helplessness which he experienced as an infant and child. And if he still feels helpless and impotent, then he still experiences the need for a father to love and protect him. Having outgrown his dependence on his original father, he finds in God a substitute father. For Freud, then, belief in a personal God is a revival of the infantile state of helplessness, and such a belief is based not on objective evidence, but on the wish for a father-figure to protect the individual against the dangers of fate and nature. Consequently, he refers to such a belief as an "illusion" because its principal motive is wish fulfillment.

Thus we call a belief an illusion when a wish fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relation to reality just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification.80

2) Religion as an "obsessional neurosis": Freud described the ontogenesis of religion in terms of the relationship of the child to its father—a relationship characterized at first by dependence, but later, during the oedipal phase, by ambivalent feelings of love and hate, trust and fear. It was pointed out above81 that in the

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81 Cf. Chapter I, part 1.
normal resolution of the Oedipus complex the child gives up his sexual attraction to the mother and establishes instead a tender, affectionate relationship with her. In Freudian terms, his love for her becomes "aim-inhibited," i.e., loses its strictly sexual quality. At the same time, the child identifies with the father which consolidates his masculinity.

What results from this identification with the father is the mental apparatus known as the superego. This identification is twofold: it consists of an ego-ideal, i.e., a desire to be like the father, and a "conscience," i.e., a series of prohibitions which remind the child that he must not do what is the prerogative of the father. Thus the father is both an ideal and an obstacle to instinctual wishes, and the child is therefore torn by ambivalent feelings of love and hostility. The device used by the child to assist him in the repression of these hostile feelings is that of introjection, i.e., instead of associating the obstacle to his instincts with the father, he reconstructs the obstacle within his own psychic apparatus in the form of the superego which represents the paternal prohibitions incorporated within the child's own mind. The father obstacle is internalized in such a way that the prohibitions come from within—from conscience.

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82 Again, for purposes of discussion, attention is restricted to the case of the male child.
The parents, and especially the father, were perceived as obstacles to realization of the Oedipus wishes, so that the child's ego brought in a reinforcement to help in carrying out the repression by erecting this same obstacle within himself.83

Because it results from repression of hostile feelings towards one's father, Freud came to the conclusion that the severity of one's superego is proportionate not to the severity of the original paternal prohibitions which have been internalized, but to the severity of the individual's original feelings of hostility and aggression towards the father; it is these repressed feelings which assert themselves through the agency of the superego.84

In most cases this childhood neurosis is outgrown spontaneously. But, in Freud's opinion, failure to outgrow these ambivalent feelings towards one's father results in a lingering sense of guilt which is the basis for religious beliefs and practices. If God is a substitute for one's father, then these ambivalent feelings are transferred to God. An obsessional neurosis develops in the form of endless ritualistic efforts to cover up or atone for the feelings of hate towards God. Y. Masih interprets Freud's view in these words:

If God at bottom is an exalted father of one's infancy, then forever he would remain an object of love and hate. Therefore, every attempt will be made to cover the hate impulses by means of ritualistic acts, and this is what we find in religion. Religion is characterized by the rituals of prayers, fastings, observances of certain days and months, etc. [...] For these reasons, Freud calls religion the universal obsessional neurosis of mankind, and conversely regards obsessional neurosis as a distorted private religion of the individual neurotic person.85

On both counts, therefore—both as an "illusion" and as an "obsessional neurosis"—religion appears as a manifestation of the death instinct. If Freud is correct, i.e., if God is not more than a father substitute whose function is to protect man through his love and protection from the harsh vicissitudes of the endless cycle of instinctual need—tension—effort—satisfaction—need—tension, etc.—from the tensions and conflicts of life—and to hold out to man an eternity of ultimate quiescence in which all such conflict ends, then faith in such a God is, as R. S. Lee has pointed out,86 a surrender to the death instinct.

Moreover, if such a God is a father substitute and therefore the object of transferred feelings of hostility and guilt arising from an unresolved Oedipus complex, then religion is dependent for its existence on the presence of such guilt and hostility, and therefore on the presence of


the aggressive, destructive ego instincts in man which in
turn are manifestations of the death instincts. Freud im-
plies as much:

Whether one has killed one's father or has ab-
stained from doing so is not really the decisive
thing. One is bound to feel guilty in either case,
for the sense of guilt is an expression of the con-
flict due to ambivalence, of the eternal struggle
between Eros and the instinct of destruction and
death. 87

In this view, religion is an obsessional neurosis by which
man seeks to control feelings of guilt which arise from
repressed feelings of hostility, which have their origin in
the self-assertive, ego instincts, which in turn are a mani-
festation of the death instinct.

That faith, therefore, which the believer sees as
"life" is seen by Freud as a manifestation of or surrender
to the death instinct. This contradiction is revealed, how-
ever, as a contradiction which is more apparent than real
when one considers the radical differences between religion
as understood by Freud and that authentic faith-existence
which the believer sees as the source of life.

In this regard the analysis of the Freudian notion
of "transcendence" offered by Peter Homans 88 is helpful.
Homans stresses the understanding of transference as an

87 S. Freud, "Civilization and its Discontents," in

88 Cf. Peter Homans, "Toward a Psychology of Reli-
"intrapsychic" reality as well as an interpersonal one. That is to say, it describes the general process by which unconscious material is brought into consciousness. Thus, transference refers not only to the directing of a patient's unconscious attitudes to the analyst in the process of psychotherapy, but also to the carrying over into conscious life of unconscious forces and energies through dreams, slips of the tongue and symptoms of conversion hysteria. The process therefore by which, in the Freudian view, man creates for himself a God who is a father substitute and towards whom he directs his repressed feelings of hostility and guilt, may aptly be referred to as transference. Hence, Homans refers to the God of whom Freud speaks as the "transference God."¹⁸⁹

Such a God is a projection of unresolved psychic conflicts and, as Homans suggests, this God must be "worked through" just as the transference between patient and analyst must be worked through. Freud, in offering such a psychological interpretation of religion, looked for a psychological transformation of the person, i.e., a liberation from the transference God. But this liberation or self-transcendence is precisely what the believer feels he has achieved through faith, for he has discovered what Tillich calls "the God beyond God," i.e., he has discovered in the Gospel of grace a God beyond the transference God.

¹⁸⁹ P. Homans, op. cit., p. 106.
This was the God, for example, whom Luther discovered when he came to realize that the "righteousness of God" was not the righteousness He demands of man but his own righteousness which he attributes to man and which man accepts in faith.

It is not difficult to find an analogy between Freud's transference God and the God before whom a man in the second stage of the dynamic of faith feels obliged to justify himself. The transference God of Freud is analogous to the God of Law, ethics and "religion"--the God of moralism--and it is this God and this moralism which are transcended in faith. But in the present discussion of the dynamics of faith it was seen that this moralistic striving for self-justification before the transference God is a necessary psychological preamble to faith; for only when the attempt at self-justification fails is one open to the divine possibility of justification as a gift or grace. This attempt at self-justification is what Barth called "religion," and Homans suggests that Barth's description of revelation as the "abolition of religion" could be paraphrased as the "abolition of the transference God."  

Within the context of the Freudian theory, therefore, the dynamics of faith involves a transcending of the transference God or the superego God, for the moralistic striving by which one attempts to serve such a God is a manifestation

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90 P. Homans, op. cit., p. 109.
of the death instinct, since it is an attempt to control or atone for the guilt feelings which arise from repressed hostility. If, therefore, the believer is to "enter into life," he must discover the God beyond the superego God. As Homans remarks, Freud himself saw the necessity of a moral courage which lies beyond the superego, a transcending of the superego. For the believer, that courage, as Tillich has pointed out, is to be found in faith existence, for by faith the believer achieves the courage of confidence, i.e., the courage to affirm one's existence because it has been affirmed and accepted by the "Ground of Being." It is a courage based neither on oneself or on one's world but on the love and acceptance which the man of faith believes are proclaimed in the event of Jesus Christ. Faith, in Tillich's view, is "the courage to accept oneself as accepted in spite of being unacceptable." 93

It is this experience of acceptance (justification) which relieves man of the necessity of egoistic self-justification, i.e., in Freudian terms, of acting on motives inspired by the ego instincts or (ultimately) the death instinct, and liberates him to live on the level of the life instinct, since he may now be concerned with the object of

91 P. Homans, op. cit., p. 108.


93 Ibid., p. 160.
love and "good works" rather than being preoccupied with his own justification and salvation. Liberated from such self-preoccupation, he is free to commit himself to the personal relationship of faith which involves that openness to life, risk, and uncertainty which is characteristic of the life instinct. Freud described religious faith as regressive, but, in the context of the Christian understanding of faith, it is a regression which is a necessary preamble to genuine faith, for one can transcend the superego God only by experiencing the futility of the moralistic striving for self-justification by which that God is served. The believer is one who has discovered the God beyond the superego God—a God, the revelation of whose love, forgiveness and acceptance makes possible a faith relationship based on love rather than fear, guilt and hostility, i.e., on life rather than death.

B. Faith as Selfhood (Jung)

The polarity which characterizes human existence, which Freud speaks of in terms of the conflicting instincts for life and death, is described by Jung as the polarity which exists between the ego and the self. It was noted above\(^9^4\) that for Jung the goal of human growth is that state of wholeness or "selfhood" which implies an integration of the conscious and unconscious elements of personality. This

\(^9^4\)Cf. Chapter I, part 2.
involves a recognition and acceptance not only of the conscious rational processes of the psyche but also of the unconscious, instinctive, "irrational" side of personality.

Maturity, therefore, is seen in terms of balance, equilibrium, integration; of what Jung would call a "coniunctio oppositorum." Man must find the existential centre of personality in a union of the conscious, and the unconscious, of thought and feeling, spirit and matter, reason and intuition, animus and anima, or, in religious language, of God and man. That existential centre of personality is what Jung calls the "self." Man errs, in Jung's opinion, when he identifies the self exclusively with the conscious rational ego, when he believes that he is merely what rational thought tells him he is; for to do so is to separate oneself from the unconscious, instinctive foundation of man's psyche out of which rational consciousness grew.

Thus, in the context of the concern of the present study, human growth involves a necessary transcending of the ego, of the kind of knowledge and motivation provided by rational consciousness. A transformation of motives is required, i.e., a moving away from a naive reliance on conscious rational motives and the type of self-justifying projections and ego-defensiveness which are characteristic of such motivation, and a moving towards a greater openness to unconscious motivation, to the archetypal themes and values of the collective unconscious. And since the collective unconscious is a transpersonal phenomenon which directs
man's growth in an autonomous way, it is, therefore, not something purely subjective such as a storehouse of repressed material, but something having an objective reality; something analogous to the traditional religious concept of the soul.

Thus, for Jung, when man lives solely on the level of rational consciousness to the neglect of this unconscious, instinctive foundation of his psyche, he loses contact with his true self—with his "soul." Hence the quest for true selfhood is man's quest to rediscover that "soul." But in order to find his true self, he must abandon his false notion of selfhood; he must stop identifying self with ego-consciousness; he must achieve a self-awareness which is not limited to what his rational consciousness knows of himself, but is also open to what the unconscious instinctive side of his personality tells him about himself. Again, there is to be found a parallel in the pages of the New Testament where the believer is commanded to lose his life (self) if he wishes to find it (Matt. X: 39). This Christian paradox is reflected in the psychological paradox proposed by Jung, i.e., that true selfhood is to be found only by abandoning (losing) the false selfhood of ego-consciousness and ego-defensiveness and self-justifying projections, and discovering and accepting the unconscious side of personality. Again, the paradox may be stated in terms of surrendering to a collective phenomenon (the collective unconscious) in order to find one's true individuality.
It will also be remembered that an archetypal theme such as the self is apprehended and activated only in an indirect way, i.e., through symbols which have a "transcendent function," i.e., they release psychic energy towards an archetypal value in a way that mere will-power cannot achieve. Here again one notes the aspect of transformation and self-transcendence. Jung sees the figure of Jesus Christ as fulfilling for the Christian the function of a symbol, for it directs his psychic energy towards the realization of a goal of wholeness which cannot be more exactly formulated or articulated than in the symbol itself.

Jung proposes that, from a human point of view, there is something missing in the Christian symbol of the Trinity, and therefore, the unconscious mind transforms it into a quaternity (this being a natural four-fold symbol representing the four elements of creation and therefore wholeness). The quaternity symbols, therefore, represent the Trinity plus a fourth element, and that element is an earthly, bodily, feminine element. In the person of Christ, however, this quarternity archetype in the unconscious becomes, for the believer, an objective reality. In the person of Christ, the "Son of man," "born of a woman" this earthly physical element is added to the Trinity to form a quaternity, so that Christ becomes a symbol of

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wholeness or selfhood. Gebhard Frei sees Christ as the
mediator between God and man, God and his kingdom, and thus
a symbol of the wholeness that is achieved through the union
of God and man:

Above is the Trinity, the lightsome male prin­
ciple, below is matter, woman; the Kingdom between
them is the mediator, the Son, the Intercessor.
Completion or fulfillment exists only when the
fourth principle is brought into the Trinity; thus
Mary is assumed into heaven even in her material
form, bodily. The King of Heaven and the Queen of
Heaven unite themselves through the act of their
Son. [...] Christ is the mediator who links God
with his Kingdom. He is himself the divine Bride­
groom, and his Kingdom, the Church, is the Bride,
and their full "coniunctio" is the end or denoue­
ment of the whole process. Matter has not been
eliminated or excluded; on the contrary "there
will be a new heaven and a new earth; spiritual­
ized matter and embodied spirit: wholeness.96

For Jung, then, Christ "exemplifies the archetype of
the self."97 Nevertheless he also sees the figure of Christ
as lacking something which is necessary in order to be a
perfect symbol of wholeness. And that something is the
"dark side" of human personality--the primitive, earthy,
animal side of man, including his propensity for evil. This
element Jung sees as being dogmatically excluded from the
sinless personality of Christ and projected onto another
symbol, that of Satan or Antichrist. The Christ-Antichrist

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96 Gebhard Frei, "The Method and Teaching of C. G.
Jung," appendix to Victor White, God and the Unconscious,

97 C. G. Jung, "Aion: Contributions to the Symbolism
of the Self," in Psyche and Symbol, ed. by Violet S. de
Laszlo, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1958, c 1951, p. 36.
polarity corresponds to the clash of spiritual and earthly elements in the Christian personality. It is with the coming of Christ that these opposites become manifest and objectified. In this view, Christ represents only half of the archetype of the self. Antichrist represents the other side—the "shadow" archetype or dimension of personality.

[...] looked at from the psychological angle, he [Christ] corresponds to only one half of the archetype [of the self]. The other half appears in the Antichrist. The latter is equally a manifestation of the self, representing, however, its dark aspect.98

Jung believes that this "dark aspect" of personality must be reintegrated into the figure of Christ if it is to serve as a perfect symbol of the self.

Psychologically the case is clear, since the dogmatic figure of Christ is so sublime and spotless that everything else turns dark beside it. It is, in fact, so one-sidedly perfect that it demands a psychic complement to restore the balance. [...] The coming of the Antichrist is not just a prophetic prediction—it is an inexorable psychological law [...].99

Jung then accepts the image of Christ as a symbol of the self but with reservations; for he believes that the dogmatic view of Christ as a sinless figure prevents it from being a complete symbol of wholeness on the psychological level. This sinless figure of Christ in which the dark side of personality is not integrated becomes a symbol of


99 Ibid., p. 40.
perfection rather than wholeness or completeness. Hence the complete Christian symbol for Jung would be not merely the sinless Christ but the Christ who is crucified and who rises from the dead. The crucifixion of Christ represents the crucifixion of the ego seeking completeness, i.e., the ego torn between perfection and completeness. It is this ego which needs redemption, i.e., acceptance in spite of its lack of perfection. Such a redemption constitutes a rebirth of self in which completeness replaces perfection and is symbolized by the death and resurrection of Christ.

In this context, Christ is, for the Christian believer, a unique symbol of the self precisely because he is a real historical figure. As Victor White points out, pagan mythology is characterized by rituals and myths which deal with gods who die and rise from the dead. Such rituals represent a mythologizing of history and nature. But with Christ, the cycle of death and resurrection (rebirth) is not just a myth; it is an historical event.

All this reverses the normal process of faith-memory which, we know, tends to mythologize history; now it is rather the mythological pattern that is realized in historical fact. [...] The inner reality which the ancient rituals had expressed is now lived through.100

But the original mythological theme of death and rebirth which the Christ event makes historical was a projection of an archetypal theme in the human psyche—a symbol related to

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100 Victor White, God and the Unconscious, p. 239.
and giving expression to the archetype of the self. Thus it is not just the myth, but the archetypal theme of selfhood which the Christ event actualizes.

Jesus had incarnated in his death and resurrection an inner experience that had existed potentially for centuries in the human soul, but that had never passed beyond the sphere of the dream. He translated into life the secular dreams of the peoples.101

Seen in this light, i.e., as crucified and risen, the figure of Jesus who in theological language is the incarnate son of God, becomes, psychologically, the incarnation of the archetypal theme of rebirth to wholeness existing in the collective unconscious of mankind. Thus he is not only the fulfillment of the written prophecies of the Old Testament, but for the man of faith, the fulfillment of the deepest aspirations of the human heart.

It will be further noted that the figure of Christ thus understood, i.e., as undergoing the crucifixion of the ego torn between completeness and perfection and experiencing a rebirth or resurrection, is a symbol of that kind of transformation of personality which is associated with faith. This "crucifixion of the ego" is analogous to the inner conflict and frustration experienced by the man who seeks self-justification through the pursuit of that "perfection" represented by legal, ethical or religious observance. The figure of the sinless Christ is a symbol of the type of

Christian life which is the pursuit of self-justifying moral and religious perfection and which, as has been seen in the present discussion of faith, is the preliminary phase or preamble to genuine faith existence.

Just as for Jung, the figure of Christ must integrate antichrist or the dark side of personality (i.e., for the believer must be seen as undergoing death and rebirth), in the same way, in the faith experience of the believer, the anxiety-producing (crucifying) pursuit of moral and religious perfection must give way to genuine faith which is that radical act of trust in God's acceptance of that ego which inevitably fails to achieve the required perfection. And it is precisely this failure which leads man to acknowledge his lack of rectitude or self-sufficiency; to acknowledge what the New Testament calls sin, and what Jung calls the dark, earthy side of personality or the "shadow" archetype.

This kind of anxiety-producing self-knowledge is analogous to that experienced by St. Paul in his pursuit of the perfection demanded by the Law, and by every man who pursues a moral, ethical or religious ideal of perfection. It is the conscious recognition of the futility of this pursuit of self-justifying perfection which makes faith possible, and therefore the transformation from self-justifying to self-transcending motives. In the context of Jung's view of human growth one would describe this dynamic of faith as the transcending of ego-consciousness and the self-justifying
projections of the ego through the recognition and acceptance of the "shadow" archetype, i.e., through the recognition of the evil within oneself, thereby achieving a transformation from perfection to wholeness or completeness.

Just as faith begins with repentance for the sin which is revealed by man's striving for moral perfection, in the same way genuine human growth towards selfhood begins, in Jung's view, with the recognition of that dark side of personality or "shadow" archetype. It is only when man recognizes and accepts this proclivity to evil within himself that he is able to withdraw these projections by which he attributes all evil to others and to forces outside of himself, and is therefore able to enter into human relationships with others. Human relationships become possible when a man realizes that the evil he sees in others is also in himself and he is thereby relieved of the necessity of justifying himself before others or protecting himself from them. This kind of humility, which involves the recognition of imperfection and dependence is, in Jung's view, the basis of human relationships.\textsuperscript{102} It is the same for the man of faith; the acknowledgement of his sinfulness, of his inability to justify himself, relieves him of the necessity of self-justification, and makes it possible for him to enter into the personal relationship of faith which is offered to him as a gift or

grace. If the man of faith achieves wholeness or selfhood it is because he finds, in the Christian message of God's acceptance and forgiveness of man, the courage to accept and integrate the "dark side" of his own personality.

C. Faith as Social Interest (Adler)

In attempting to describe the transformation of motives which is associated with the act of faith within the context of Alfred Adler's theory of personality and understanding of human nature, it will be recalled that Adler speaks of individual perfection or superiority as the goal of personality growth. But in Adler's view such perfection expresses mature growth only to the degree that it includes "social interest;" only if it leads the individual to see his life in terms of a contribution to be made to his fellow man. Self-realization comes about only through this commitment to others. Adler, like Jung, offers a secular version of the Christian paradox: "He who loses his life will find it" (Matt. X: 39). In the Christian view, perfection is achieved not merely through self-awareness and self-actualization, but through self-transcendence. In other words, man achieves perfection not by self-consciously pursuing it but by transcending that very pursuit through commitment to a cause or person. By "losing" himself in such a commitment, he "finds" himself. In the context of faith, it will be recalled that the believer finds the justification or authentication of his life only when he
transcends the self-conscious attempt to achieve it through his moral and ethical striving.

For Adler, social interest is the quality of one who has given life a social meaning rather than a private meaning, and expresses itself in the form of a contribution to society. For the mature person life means "to contribute to the whole." A genius is, therefore, defined as one who is "supremely useful" to mankind. In Adler's view, one whose life is characterized by social interest achieves a certain "immortality" in the sense that his life takes on a lasting value. It has meaning not just for himself but also for his fellow man, both contemporaries and posterity. This corresponds to the Christian belief that to love one's neighbour (social interest) leads to eternal life, while to turn in upon oneself and become egocentric (i.e., to give a "private" meaning to life) leads to eternal death.

Hence St. Paul describes the vocation of the individual Christian in terms of social interest. The task of the Christian is described as contributing to that community of believers of which he is a member, and thereby building up the "body of Christ." The intensely personal nature of the faith relationship, which allows the believer to transcend the merely moral or ethical level of existence, does not imply that it is to be lived out in isolation--in the

context of an individualistic pursuit of perfection. It is precisely this kind of egoistic individualism from which, in the Pauline view, the man of faith is liberated in order that he might express his authentic individuality by contributing to the perfection of the community according to the unique gifts God has given him.

For as in one body we have many members, and all the members do not have the same function, so we, though many, are one body in Christ, and individually members one of another. Having gifts that differ according to the grace given to us, let us use them: if prophecy, in proportion to our faith; if service, in our serving; he who teaches in our teaching; he who exhorts, in his exhortation; he who contributes, in liberality; he who gives aid, with zeal; he who does acts of mercy, with cheerfulness. (Romans XII: 4-8)

If this is the vocation of the individual Christian, it is in this context that he will finally be judged. In the words of Jesus, in the parable of the Last Judgment (Matt. XXV), those who will "enter into life" are those who have practiced what Christians refer to as the "works of mercy"--feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, caring for the sick, etc. In Adlerian terms, eternal life is for those who have become "perfect" through "social interest." On the other hand those who are condemned or excluded from eternal life are those who have given a private meaning to life, who have neglected the needs of their fellow man which in the context of the church as the "body of Christ" are the needs of Christ. They are condemned on the Adlerian grounds of "uselessness;" they have no part in the eternal kingdom since they contributed nothing to it.
Then he will say to those at his left hand, "Depart from me you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me no drink, I was a stranger and you did not welcome me, naked and you did not clothe me, sick and in prison and you did not visit me." [...] and they will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life.

(Matt. XXV: 41-43, 46)

This passage bears a striking resemblance to a passage in Adler's *What Life Should Mean to You* in which he describes the harsh judgment which life itself will mete out to those who give a private meaning to life and fail to see life in terms of co-operation with and contribution to others, a judgment similar to that of Jesus on the self-centred. After describing the heritage left by those who have contributed to human welfare, in philosophy, science, art, etc., and thereby pointing out the lasting value of such lives, he then speaks of those who have lived only for their own personal advantage, and of the judgment which life itself pronounces on them.

These result have been left by men who contributed to human welfare. What has happened to others? What has happened to those who never cooperated, who gave life a different meaning, who asked only, "What can I get out of life?" They have left no trace behind them. Not only are they dead; their whole lives were futile. It is as if our earth itself had spoken to them and said, "We don't need you. You are not fitted for life. There is no future for your aims and strivings, for the values you have held dear, for your minds and souls. Be off with you! You are not wanted. Die out and disappear!" The last judgment for people who give any other meaning to life than cooperation is always, "You are useless. Nobody wants you. Go!"

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104 A. Adler, *What Life Should Mean to You*, p. 11.
Thus the self-transcending quality of faith which makes possible a genuine and spontaneous love of one's neighbour (i.e., a love liberated from egoistic, self-justifying motives) and which leads to "eternal life" as opposed to the egoistic love of oneself which leads to eternal death, finds a parallel in the Adlerian concept of the self-transcending quality of social interest which gives a lasting value to life as opposed to the egoistic tendency to give a private meaning to life which renders life "useless."

It must be remembered, however, that to speak of the self-transcending quality of social interest implies a transformation of motives. For Adler, this means that in the mature personality a transformation has taken place; it means that the striving for superiority which characterizes all human life-styles is now motivated by social interest rather than egocentric self-enhancement, by the desire to give a social rather than a private meaning to life. This transformation, it will be recalled, is essential to Adler's view of human growth from drive satisfaction, to self-enhancement, to social interest. But the growth from self-enhancement to social interest is not a transformation which takes place automatically or exclusively in terms of innate growth. Self-enhancement represents the individual's essential, authentic self, but the achieving of it depends on social conditioning, in particular, the satisfaction of one's need for affection, especially in childhood.

Again, therefore, one may observe a parallel between
the dynamics of human growth and the dynamics of faith; for in man's growth towards faith a similar growth through three phases, life-styles or levels of existence may be observed. To use, in this instance, Kierkegaard's terminology, these are: (1) aesthetic existence--the other-directed search for fulfillment which corresponds to Adler's drive satisfaction; (2) ethical existence--the inner-directed search for self-justification or self-authentication which corresponds to Adler's self-enhancement; and (3) religious existence--the self-transcendence achieved through grace and faith which corresponds to Adler's social interest. Moreover, the discontinuity between self-enhancement and social interest is reflected in the discontinuity between ethical and religious existence; for just as the achieving of social interest requires the external factor of social conditioning in the form of the satisfaction of the child's need for affection, in the same way, the achieving of religious existence is the result of man's response to an objective event and message of salvation and redemption.

As a final point of comparison, it may be pointed out that, for Adler, the striving for superiority or perfection which characterizes all human life-styles, which may be expressed in an egocentric way (self-enhancement) or a self-transcending way (social interest), just as the striving for a self-justifying life characterizes all religious life-styles may be expressed in an egocentric way (moralism) or a self-transcending way (faith)--this striving for superiority
is, in the final analysis, an unconscious attempt to compensate for those feelings of inferiority which are also common to all men. To overcome such feelings the individual creates a "fictional goal" of superiority which represents the ultimate compensation for his inferiority. Adler refers to this as "anticipating his redemption."\textsuperscript{105} Thus, feelings of inferiority are not something negative or a hindrance. Except when they are abnormally exaggerated, they represent a positive starting point for the growth of the individual towards maturity.

The New Testament makes a similar claim when it states that one can enter the kingdom of heaven only through metanoia—a conversion or change of heart. This conversion involves an admission of guilt, of "inferiority," the admission that one is a sinner. In the gospels it is called "repentance" or "poverty of spirit" (Matt. V: 3). John the Baptist prepares the people for the inauguration of the kingdom by preaching a baptism of repentance (Matt. III: 2); and Jesus preaches the same attitude of repentence (Matt. IV: 17). It will be recalled that in the context of the dynamics of faith this awareness of sin, or lack of self-sufficiency is the result of that anxiety-producing self-knowledge which is the product of man's vain attempts at

self-justification, and is, therefore, a necessary preliminary to the act of faith. Thus, if Individual Psychology sees the feelings of inferiority as the starting point of human development, Christianity sees a similar phenomenon as the starting point of "life" in the biblical sense.

This act of repentance, as a prerequisite for faith, implies both aspects of Adler's theory--inferiority and a compensating goal--but in each case goes a step further:

(1) It is not just a feeling of inferiority, but a conscious admission of inferiority, of insufficiency, of one's need for redemption. It is "poverty of spirit." (2) To the believer, faith is not just the creation of a compensating fictional goal, but an act of trust in an objective event of redemption.

It is also interesting to note that Adler insists that the fictional goal is created by the individual in his childhood years. The young child sets his goal (unconsciously) and thereby establishes a fixed, law of growth or movement for the rest of his life; the "life-style" is established. The adult does not have the same creative power over his life.

I am convinced of the free creative power of the individual in his earliest childhood and of his restricted power in later life, once the child has given himself a fixed law of movement for his life.106

In the light of the above, certain biblical descriptions of the faith experience of the Christian, in which that experience is described as being "born again" (John III: 5), and of "becoming a child" again (Matt. XVIII: 3-4), perhaps take on a new dimension. Within the context of Adler's theory such phrases could perhaps refer to the fact that in the self-transcendence of faith one achieves even in adulthood that which Adler sees as possible only in childhood; the ability to create a new goal and life-style; a new "law of movement," which Bultmann would call a new understanding of his existence.

D. Faith as Progression (Fromm)

In Erich Fromm's description of the transformation of personality, the key word is "productiveness." It will be recalled that Fromm sees the human condition in terms of that dichotomy which is inherent in human existence and which is based on the fact that man is part of nature and, at the same time, transcends nature through his human quality of self-awareness. Having lost his primary, instinctual ties with nature, it becomes man's developmental task to relate himself to his environment, no longer through instinctual adaptation, but through his specifically human powers of reason and love. This relatedness, however, must not be achieved at the expense of his individuality and integrity; he must relate "productively," i.e., in a way in which individuality and self-determination are preserved,
and one's human potential is realized. Those forms of relatedness in which individuality is sacrificed, such as authoritarianism, destructiveness, and conformity, are considered by Fromm to be "non-productive."

This analysis of the human condition highlights that tension between the need to relate to others and the need to affirm one's individual identity which characterizes human existence. It is the same dichotomy which Tillich describes in terms of individuality and participation, self and world, the courage to be as oneself and as part, autonomy and heteronomy. While Fromm does not offer Tillich's theological solution to this dichotomy—the courage of confidence which results from faith and which transcends one's self and one's world—he does agree that both of these existential needs are so fundamental that one cannot be pursued at the expense of the other. He would quite agree with Tillich that relatedness at the expense of individuality alienates man from his true self. But he would also agree that self-affirmation at the expense of relatedness to one's fellow man serves to accentuate and reinforce that awareness of one's isolation and aloneness which is a necessary part of man's self-awareness. It is the overcoming of this sense of aloneness and separation which Fromm sees as essential to man's sanity. Thus Fromm's position could be stated in terms of a paradox: man can only realize his individuality, freedom and autonomy through relating (productively) to his fellow man; a paradox which finds a parallel in the present
understanding of faith as an act in which a man discovers his true individuality or "courage to be" only by abandoning the false autonomy and self-affirmation of moralism and accepting the personal relationship of faith; a paradox which is reflected in the biblical injunction: "Whoever would be great among you must be your servant, and whoever would be first among you must be your slave" (Matt. XX: 26-27).

Within the context of human growth, therefore, the basic problem will be whether man's growth, like relatedness, will be productive or non-productive. Will man progress towards greater self-awareness, greater transcendence of that passive, instinctual harmony with nature through the development of reason and love; or will he regress towards a pre-human state of harmony with nature? Will he regress towards necrophilia, narcissism and incestuous fixation (the "syndrome of decay") or will he progress towards the goals of biophilia, relatedness and independence ("the syndrome of growth")?

As for the role of faith in the pursuit of these goals of productive growth, Fromm's position is that man needs faith; but a humanistic faith, not an authoritarian faith. 107 Authoritarian faith, i.e., faith which is based

on irrational submission to authority, alienates man from himself, since he projects all his productive powers onto God. Humanistic faith, on the other hand, is not based on irrational submission. Man is the end and object of humanistic faith for it seeks what is best for man's human self-realization, and not what is best for some external authority-figure, whether human or divine. Faith, therefore, for Fromm, is a humanistic faith which dispenses with God, revelation and external authority, in the sense that the ultimate criterion for evaluating faith is not the objective validity of such concepts but the human experience of the believer, i.e., whether his faith expresses itself in productive or non-productive living; whether it produces growth or decay; whether it helps him to become fully human or to retreat from his humanity. Fromm's faith is faith in man and his potentialities. The emphasis in humanistic faith is on man's strength, not on his powerlessness as in the Lutheran and Calvinistic traditions. It would also dispense with an infallible authority as in the Catholic tradition. All these are considered as a craving for certainty at the expense of independence and personal responsibility for one's life. In humanistic religion:

Virtue is self-realization, not obedience. Faith is certainty of conviction based on one's experiences of thought and feeling, not assent to propositions on credit of the proposer. [...] God is a symbol of man's own powers which he tries to realize in his life, and is not a symbol of force
and domination having power over man.\textsuperscript{108}

For Fromm, the concept of God is a conceptualization or symbol of a human experience or human value, and it is this experience or value which is important rather than the concept itself. Any human symbols or concepts such as the concepts of love, loyalty, faith, etc., permit man to communicate his experiences, but only if the concepts faithfully express the experience to which they refer. In Fromm's view, therefore, what is important is whether God is an "idol" which alienates man from himself, or a concept which represents a genuine human value or experience.

But what is the human experience referred to in the concept of God? For Fromm, the concept of God expresses the highest value in humanism, an experience of the fullness of growth and productiveness which Fromm designates as the "X" experience. The "X" experience is essentially a humanistic experience or value which may or may not be associated with a concept of God as its symbol. In his book \textit{You Shall Be as Gods}, Fromm lists some of the main aspects of this experience.\textsuperscript{109} Among these aspects he includes the experience of a "letting go of one's 'ego', one's greed, and with it, of one's fears."\textsuperscript{110} This refers to the willingness to forego


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 59.
the desire to maintain one's isolated ego as a separate entity for the sake of openness and relatedness to others. A further aspect of the "X" experience is what Fromm calls "transcending the ego, leaving the prison of one's selfishness and separateness." In other words the transcending of the ego involves the overcoming of narcissism, of incestuous fixation and of destructiveness--of all those "necrophilous tendencies" by which the ego protects itself.

The "X" experience, therefore, is one of transcending the ego, or self-transcendence. In the present discussion of the dynamics of faith it was seen that, as a human experience, faith involves that same experience of self-transcendence. For the believer, this experience of self-transcendence (transcending the ego-striving of moralism) takes place as a result of his faith relationship with and faith commitment to God. For Fromm, such reference to God is merely one way of conceptualizing a human experience, which may be described in theistic or non-theistic terms. It is the experience which is important. "The experience is essentially the same whether it refers to God or not.""113

The significance of this statement for the present study is clear; for the question under discussion is not

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111 E. Fromm, You Shall Be as Gods, p. 60.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
whether the object of faith (God and revelation) have any objective validity or reality (for this is a strictly theological question) but whether the faith response of the believer is experienced as human growth. In the context of Fromm's understanding of human growth then, the question would be: Is faith experienced as, and therefore can it be described in terms of growth rather than decay, biophilia rather than necrophilia, relatedness rather than narcissism, independence rather than incestuous fixation? In short, is faith, as a human experience, productive rather than non-productive? Is it progressive or regressive?

In answering this question, it should first be recalled that an authentic understanding of faith sees faith as an act of self-transcendence accomplished through the believer's response to God. In the context of faith, one would say that the transformation from self-justifying motives to self-transcending motives, which takes place on the psychological level, is the result of the believer's discovery of the "God beyond God" which takes place on the theological level of faith. For the believer, therefore, this transformation involves that transcending of the ego which Fromm sees as an integral aspect of the "X" experience of growth and productiveness, precisely because there is in authentic faith a transcending of the "superego God" or "transference God." In Frommian terms, genuine faith involves a transcending of the "authoritarian God," i.e., the God who is a projection of one's own superego. In the
faith-experience, the believer transcends the God of unconditional demand (Law) and encounters the God of unconditional acceptance (Grace). This means that, on the psychological level, a transformation from egoistic, self-justifying motives to outer-directed, self-forgetful and self-transcending motives become possible for the man who is no longer burdened with the task of justifying himself.

To describe such a dynamic, therefore, in the context of Fromm's understanding of human growth, one would say that faith involves a transformation from decay to growth or from non-productiveness to productiveness. More specifically, it is a transformation:

1) From necrophilia to biophilia since it involves a moving away from the desire for moral certainty and security represented by moralism and legalism to an openness to the risk and uncertainty of a personal relationship with God. For the man of faith life is organic, not mechanical; it is open to growth and change, never predictable and controllable.

2) From narcissism to relatedness since faith involves the transcending of that preoccupation with self and with one's moral perfection and personal salvation which, in turn, makes possible an authentic kind of personal relatedness with one's fellow man. The man of faith, liberated from the necessity of self-justification, is free to love others for their own sake, not in order to prove anything about himself, or win the favour of God (since that favour
has already been freely given). Thus liberated from the danger of using others for his own moral and spiritual advancement, he is able to relate to others with that genuine care, responsibility, respect and knowledge which Fromm considers essential to productive relatedness.

3) From incestuous fixation to freedom and independence, since the faith relationship, rightly understood, is not one of dependence and false security, but the result of a personal commitment freely made by the believer. Just as human growth is seen by Fromm as a growth from the security and protection of dependence to the insecurity and uncertainty of independence, in the same way the dynamics of faith describe a movement from the moral security of legalism to the moral insecurity of the faith relationship in which dependence on law and external authority is replaced by personal responsibility and commitment to the demands of a personal relationship with God, which at times may well involve what Kierkegaard called the "paradoxical suspension" of those universal ethical norms which are the source of security and certainty for the legalist and the Pharisee. In authentic faith, the believer does not experience ego-protecting certainty, but rather ego-transcending confidence. And, as for Fromm, man can experience his true individuality and autonomy only in assuming the care and responsibility of productive relatedness, in the same way the man of faith experiences his true confidence and freedom by exposing himself to the risk and adventure of the personal relationship of faith.
E. Faith as Propriate Striving (Allport)

If, as Allport maintains, the striving and behaviour of the mature adult are characterized by functional autonomy, i.e., liberated from unconscious or infantile motivation, then this must also be a characteristic of the mature religious sentiment. Allport uses the word "sentiment" to describe the religious orientation of life. By the use of this word he intends to describe both the motivation and the organization of the religious orientation. Motivation refers to the emotional force of the religious sentiment (what Allport calls the "go" of mental life), while organization refers to the cognitive force which organizes or patterns the life of the individual in accordance with his motives. The word "sentiment" includes both the emotional and cognitive aspects of the religious orientation.\footnote{Cf. Gordon Allport, The Individual and His Religion, N.Y., MacMillan, 1960, c 1950, pp. 62-65.}

But what is the source of the religious sentiment in man? Where does this particular kind of orientation of one's life begin? Looking at the question from the psychologist's point of view, Allport suggests a number of possibilities. He resists the temptation to explain religion by reference to one specific mental mechanism. It is too one-sided to dismiss religion as a sublimation of the aim-inhibited sex impulse, or God as the superego's projection of the image of one's own father. For Allport, the religious sentiment
finds its origin not in any one specific mechanism of the psyche but in a complex of needs experienced by the individual. These are:

1) Organic desire, i.e., fear of the perils of life and desire for love and companionship.

2) The temperamental needs of each individual which influence his unique mode of emotional response and, therefore, his unique expression of the religious sentiment.

3) Psychogenic desires such as the quest for the spiritual values of truth, goodness and beauty. Religion is an attempt to preserve such values. In Allport's view, the most universal spiritual value is the sense of individuality and uniqueness the supreme expression of which the religious man finds in God.

4) The pursuit of meaning, of a frame of orientation (to use Fromm's term), which will offer man an explanation of his world and of his own life, especially of his anxiety, unrest and unfulfilled needs.

5) The need to conform to the culture in which one lives, and therefore to the religious forms, dogmas, and rituals of that culture.

The above are some of the human needs to which religion answers. The question is: do these needs constitute the only rationale of religion? Is religion "nothing but"

\[115\] G. Allport, The Individual and His Religion, Chapter 1.
a way of fulfilling such needs? Allport would answer that, in the mature adult, the religious orientation, like any other motive, tends to become functionally autonomous, i.e., it becomes a value pursued for its own sake regardless of its origin as an answer to human or even selfish or neurotic needs. For Allport, the mature religious sentiment is "derivative yet dynamic;" though it may have originated as an answer to personal needs (derivative) it now supplies its own driving power (dynamic). It is now independent of its origins; it does not serve the same function as it originally did.

It is true [...] that the origins of religious life do lie, in part, in these organic cravings which, when blocked, give rise to a displaced type of longing and to transposed goals that are expressed in the language of religion. Is it then consistent to maintain, as I am now doing, that a mature religious sentiment supplies its own driving power, and becomes dynamic in its own right? Yes, I venture to assert that the most important of all distinctions between the immature and the mature religious sentiment lies in this basic difference in their dynamic character.116

In the Christian context, the functional autonomy of the religious sentiment simply means that the believer is approaching the ideal of loving and serving God "for His own sake" and not as a dispenser of rewards or as a source of comfort and security. Religion becomes what Adrian Van Kaam

would call the "central mode of existence"\textsuperscript{117} in one's personality. It is that faith relationship which gives meaning and direction to all other areas of life or modes of existence, and is not the slave of any other pursuit. Security, meaning, and value become by-products of the religious sentiment, not its goals. The mature religious sentiment does not follow; it leads and transforms.

A religious sentiment which has thus become largely independent of its origins, "functionally autonomous," cannot be regarded as a servant of other desires, even though its initial function may have been of this order. It behaves no longer like an iron filing, twisting to follow the magnet of self-centred motives; it behaves rather as a master motive, a magnet in its own right by which other cravings are bidden to order their course [...]. The power of religion to transform lives [...] is a consequence of the functional autonomy that marks the mature religious sentiment.\textsuperscript{118}

It will be recalled that Allport finds a specific example of the functional autonomy of the religious sentiment in the growth of conscience.\textsuperscript{119} He sees the growth of conscience from a surface obedience to the interiorized voice of authority to the conscious pursuit of goals which are consistent with one's values, self-image or ego-ideal (from "must" to "ought") as one dimension of that general


\textsuperscript{118}G. Allport, The Individual and His Religion, pp. 72-73.

\textsuperscript{119}Cf. G. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 68-74.
transformation of motives which characterizes authentic human growth, and which Allport describes as a growth from "opportunistic" striving or becoming to "propriate striving" or "oriented becoming."

The question which arises at this point is: can the faith experience of the Christian believer be described in terms of such a transformation and functional autonomy of motives? However one might answer this question on the basis of empirical evidence, the New Testament makes it abundantly clear that the life or existence to which the believer is called involves a kind of transformation of personality—a repentance, conversion or change of heart.

John the Baptist preaches a message of repentance in preparation for the kingdom of God (Matt. III: 2; Mark I: 1-4). Jesus speaks of this conversion in terms of becoming a child again (Matt. XVIII: 3) i.e., one must, in some way, become a different or new person. For St. Paul, conversion means to participate in the death and resurrection of Christ and to be transformed in this way (Romans VI: 2-4). It also means to pass from a life according to the "flesh" to a life according to the "spirit" (Romans VII: 5; VIII: 3), i.e., from the human condition of man left to his own resources and unable to avoid the egoism of sin to the life of one who is capable of love and commitment through the gift of God's spirit. Conversion is a "new creation" (II Cor. V: 17); it is the destruction of "the old man" and the creation of "the new man" (Col. III: 9-10).
This experience of conversion and faith results in a transformation of personality. In the New Testament, this transformation is described in a series of antitheses: darkness and light, death and life, flesh and spirit, the old man and the new man, Adam and Christ. It would seem legitimate to conclude, from this kind of language, that the transformation which takes place in the faith experience touches the very core of man's personality, and, therefore, includes the "transformation of motives" of which Allport speaks in his treatment of functional autonomy. Allport himself alludes to the transformation of attitudes which accompanies religious conversion.

Sometimes, as in the case of a religious or moral conversion, the majority of the previous habits and attitudes may have to be radically altered. As a result, the "new" personality seems utterly different from the old.120

Moreover, the transformation which takes place in the faith experience is described in the New Testament as a liberating experience. A Christian is one who has been liberated from the frustration and anxiety of moralistic striving for self-justification by the grace of God, i.e., by the fact that justification is now seen as a gift (grace) of God and not something he must earn.

It seems logical to infer from this that the faith experience is, for the Christian, a transformation which

120 G. Allport, Personality, A Psychological Interpretation, N.Y., Henry Holt and Co., 1937, p. 211.
involves the achieving of "functional autonomy" in his religious striving. The experience of faith and conversion is not just the abandoning of a sinful life; the call to repentance and faith is addressed not only to gross sinners, but even (and especially) to those already striving to live a morally good life. It is precisely to the man striving to justify himself before God through such moral and ethical striving that the call to faith is addressed. The man striving to love and serve God is enabled to do so with a purified, self-transcending motive. To the man justified by grace and faith, the goal he seeks in his moral striving, the object of his commitment, is God; it is not an infantile goal (comfort, security) nor a neurotic one (expiation of guilt feelings) nor a narcissistic one (self-justification). The doctrine of justification through faith reveals to the believer that acceptance, forgiveness, and justification are gifts from God, not prizes to be earned. Therefore, the religious sentiment is freed to direct itself to God directly; it does not have to serve the purpose of achieving these other goals. It is "functionally autonomous."

It will be recalled that Karl Barth describes faith as the means by which man bridges the gap between the human possibility of "religion" and the divine possibility of grace. Faith is a radical act of trust in this divine possibility; a belief that the divine possibility has become a reality in the forgiveness and acceptance proclaimed in the event of Jesus Christ and which therefore renders
man's attempts at self-justification pointless.

"I believe" means "I trust." No more must I dream of trusting in myself, I no longer require to justify myself, to excuse myself, to attempt to save and preserve myself. This most profound effort of man to trust to himself, to see himself as in the right, has become pointless. I believe—not in myself—I believe in God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.¹²¹

And this is precisely why the religious sentiment (faith) of the mature Christian is functionally autonomous: because all the self-seeking motives in which it might originate—security, self-justification, personal gratification—have become, in the view of faith, pointless.

The theological meaning of the Christian faith-experience is that man is justified by his faith in God's acceptance of him which is revealed in Christ. Psychologically, it means that the believer is liberated from the need to prove himself worthy or deserving of that acceptance through moralistic striving. This revelation from without is intended to free him from any inner compulsions to act out of self-preserving or self-justifying motives. The redeemed man's motives are functionally autonomous; they are directed towards their objects—God and his fellow man—not towards the satisfaction of his own needs. His relationship with God has become a value in itself, not a means to gratify some human need, for the most fundamental human need (love and acceptance) has been fulfilled for the man of

¹²¹ K. Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, N.Y., Harper Torchbook, 1959, p. 18.
faith. And it is because this deepest human yearning has been satisfied that the believer is warned that religion must not be put at the service of egoistic or narcissistic human needs. One must not seek to earn or achieve what has already been given freely. Accordingly, Jesus demands of the believer a "purity of heart" (i.e., a singleness of intention) which leads him to seek God alone and the good of his neighbour in his good works, and not the gratification of an infantile need for the approval of men; for the "Father who sees in secret" will reward him (Matt. VI: 18).

This Christian experience of transformation through faith in an objective event of redemption is analogous to the human experience of all men as Allport describes it. He draws the conclusion from modern industrial relations that all men have an "affiliative need," i.e., the need for warm, friendly relations with others through love and acceptance. When this need is frustrated, a man suffers indignity and humiliation, and becomes defensive; love turns into hate. Thus man's ability to forget himself and enter into loving and cooperative relationships with others depends, to a great extent, on the degree of love and acceptance he receives from others. Acceptance leads to what Allport calls an "inclusionist" attitude and way of life, an openness to others; rejection leads to an "exclusionist" attitude, the exclusion of segments of humanity from one's affiliative tendencies. Prejudice and bigotry are examples of this. Allport concludes:
Each person, through circumstances and training, develops an exclusionist, an inclusionist or mixed style of life that guides his own human relations.122

The Christian faith-experience is precisely (on the psychological level) this experience of love and acceptance which opens the individual to an affiliative style of life, but with a transcendent dimension; for what he experiences is the gratuitous love and acceptance (grace) of God which is at the heart of the Christian message.

F. Faith as Self-Transcendence (Frankl)

In the present study, the dynamic of faith has been described as a dynamic of self-transcendence. Faith was seen as a radical act of trust by which the believer transcends the anxiety and frustration involved in the pursuit of moral self-justification or self-realization. If, therefore, one wishes to describe that dynamic in psychological terms, the personality theory of Viktor Frankl lends itself admirably to this task since it describes human growth essentially in terms of self-transcendence. It will be recalled123 that, for Frankl, while self-actualization (i.e., the realization of one's human potential) is the goal of human growth, nevertheless the conscious pursuit of self-actualization must always be a by-product of self-transcendence.


i.e., of self-commitment to objective values and meanings, to something or someone outside of oneself.

Frankl himself applies this principle of self-transcendence to faith when he remarks that the truly religious man—the saint—does not directly seek moral perfection or a "good conscience" as an end in itself; such moral perfection is the result of a self-transcending commitment to God and his fellow man. Frankl's principle that human life must transcend itself, that man can actualize himself only by transcending himself, seems to be the most explicit psychological reflection of the biblical paradox that man must "lose himself" in order to "find himself" (Matt. X: 39). It is a paradox which is reflected not only in Frankl's psychological theory but also in his therapeutic technique of "paradoxical intention" which is based on the premise that "fear makes come true that which one is afraid of and that hyper-intention makes impossible what one wishes." In faith the same paradoxical intention is at work; for the believer must abandon the pursuit of what he intends or desires most—justification—in order to receive

124 V. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 158.

125 Jung makes a similar point when, in speaking of the religious notion of sacrifice in which the sacrifice of the victim represents the sacrifice of the offerer, he remarks that this apparent loss of oneself is in reality a gain since "if you can give yourself it proves that you possess yourself" (cf. "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass" in Psyche and Symbol), p. 207.

126 V. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, pp. 195-96.
it. There is certainly an analogy between Frankl's description of the man seeking a psychologically healthy or normal mode of adjustment and unable to achieve it because of his "hyper-intention," and St. Paul's man "under the Law," whose pursuit of justification through moral and legal observance not only serves to intensify and reinforce his awareness of his sinful condition through his transgressions of the law but also aggravates that condition by stimulating him to greater transgressions.

It is this self-defeating pursuit of self-actualization--religious or non-religious, with or without reference to God--which must be transcended. As a psychologist, Frankl would agree with Erich Fromm that whether or not this transcendence takes the form of a commitment to a God is psychologically irrelevant; what is important is the experience of self-transcendence. The question therefore again is: may one describe the dynamics of faith as an experience of self-transcendence (and therefore transformation) according to Frankl's understanding of self-transcendence? An affirmative answer to this question would be based on a threefold similarity between the self-transcendence which Frankl describes as necessary to human growth and the self-transcendence achieved in the faith experience. Each experience has the same dimensions, is based on the same basic view about man, and is arrived at through the same dynamic or transformation of motives.
(i) The Same Dimension. It will be recalled\(^{127}\) that Frankl speaks of a two-dimensional transcendence. Man transcends himself "in height" by fulfilling creative, experiential and attitudinal values; he transcends himself as well "in breadth" by relating himself to and fulfilling a unique role in a community. The same twofold transcendence obtains also in the faith experience, for faith has both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. Faith is, in the first place, an act of belief in the justifying gift of the Spirit by which the believer transcends moralistic and legalistic forms of religion and enters into a personal relationship with God. Through faith, therefore, man transcends himself "in height" by responding to the demands of that personal relationship, and fulfilling the values associated with that relationship. Again, those values are: creative, since the believer sees himself as having a unique task or vocation to fulfill;\(^{128}\) experiential, since it is primarily a relationship of love and gratitude rather than law and obedience; attitudinal, because faith is an attitude of trust or confidence, an attitude of "accepting acceptance" in the face of those limitations inherent in his existence and of which he has become painfully aware through his attempts to live a


\(^{128}\) Frankl himself speaks of the religious man as not only seeing life in terms of a task to be performed but as a task assigned to him by God. Cf. The Doctor and the Soul, pp. 46-77.
self-justifying life. Faith is an attitude of trust which transcends the existential conflict between man's awareness of freedom and responsibility and those limitations of his freedom which his moral striving has revealed and which the New Testament refers to as bondage or slavery. But faith also has a horizontal dimension by which the believer transcends himself "in breadth;" for that love and service which, through the transforming and self-transcending quality of faith, the believer is able to render to his fellow man for his own sake and not for egoistic motives of self-justification, is seen as having a meaning for and within the community of believers. In the view of St. Paul the gift of the Spirit which is associated with faith and allows man to transcend himself "in height" by transcending sin and law, also enables him to transcend himself "in breadth" since the same Spirit is given to each believer to enable him to perform a unique task within the community of believers for the purpose of building up the body of Christ. 129

(ii) The Same Basic View of Man. Frankl's understanding of the human condition contains two cardinal points. The first is that the most basic motivating force in human personality is the "will to meaning," i.e., the desire to live a meaningful existence; to discover the "why" of one's personal existence. The second is that this will to meaning reveals a

129 Cf. I Cor., XII.
spiritual dimension of human nature in addition to the physical and psychological (instinctive) dimensions. Hence man's conscious spiritual activity, i.e., his search for meaning, is not merely a sublimation of the instinctive unconscious but springs from the "spiritual unconscious"—that will to meaning which is more fundamental than the instinctive will to pleasure.

Self-transcendence, therefore, takes place when a man discovers the meaning of his existence and commits himself to it. Two aspects of this dynamic of self-transcendence are analogous to the self-transcendence achieved in faith. First, it is not the meaning of life in general which a man seeks through the will to meaning but the particular meaning of his own concrete existence. When man discovers the unique meaning of his individual existence he transcends all those dehumanizing forces which tend to rob him of his individuality such as abstract philosophical systems, mass movements, social pressures, or totalitarian or collectivist political systems. In the same way, in the faith-experience, the believer enters into a personal relationship with God in which he discovers his unique task and responsibility and by which he transcends the depersonalizing effects of basing one's religious life entirely on universal moral or ethical principles which fail to do justice to the individual's unique relationship to the absolute and his need to express his individuality within that relationship.
Secondly, the will to meaning leads man to endure

tension rather than to seek to reduce tension and seek

equilibrium or homeostasis through instinctual gratifica-
tion. According to Frankl, this is so because the desire

for a meaningful existence is more fundamental than the will
to pleasure. In the view of faith, the same tension-
maintaining dynamic obtains, since faith is seen as taking
place only where the enjoyment seeking motivation of the

aesthetic life (to use Kierkegaard's terminology) gives way
to the more fundamental desire to live a self-justifying,
self-authenticating life, and therefore, to ethical exis-
tence, and finally, when the tensions of the egocentric,
self-justifying efforts of ethical existence give way to
the tensions involved in the risk, adventure and uncertainty

of the faith commitment.

(iii) The Same Dynamic or Transformation of Motives. Frankl

speaks of three types of motivation represented by the words

"must," "can," and "ought." The\textsuperscript{130} These types of motivation
correspond respectively to three basic theories of motiva-
tion—the theories of psychoanalysis (Freud), ego-psychology
(Allport), and existential psychology (Frankl). They also
reflect Frankl's theory of human growth since they represent
three levels of existence or levels of maturity: the

\textsuperscript{130} Cf. V. Frankl, "Logotherapy and the Challenge of
instinctually driven man; the man seeking self-realization; and the man responding in a self-transcending way to meaning and value.

It will be easily recognized that in the dynamic of faith described in the present study, the man of faith sees himself, in retrospect, as having passed through three levels of existence characterized by these same three types of motivation. In other words, the dynamic of faith reflects the three types of motivation associated with human growth, for in the view of faith, man is seen as passing through three levels of existence: (1) a state in which he is enslaved or in bondage to that basic egoistic self-seeking which the New Testament calls "sin," and therefore in a condition analogous to Freud's instinctually determined man; (2) a state in which he commits himself to ethical or moral principles as a means of self-justification or self-authentication, and therefore analogous to Allport's self-actualizing man; and (3) a state (faith) in which he transcends the egoism and narcissism of his attempts at self-justification and responds to the demands of a justifying personal relationship which comes to him as a gift (grace) from a transcendent source, and therefore analogous to Frankl's self-transcending man, fulfilling not an egoistic and self-defeating desire for self-actualization but a value and a meaning that challenges him from without. Frankl's self-transcending man actualizes himself by transcending the desire for self-actualization; the man of faith, in the same
way, achieves justification by transcending the desire to justify himself.

3. Conclusion

It was indicated in the first two chapters of this study that the dynamics of self-transcendence, which involves a radical transformation of motives, is common to both the experience of authentic human growth and the authentic faith experience of the Christian believer. In order to avoid any kind of reductionism, it must be emphasized in conclusion that the point of comparison is not the reality of human growth and the reality of faith in themselves, but rather the manner in which these two realities are experienced. Thus the six descriptions of the Christian faith experience given above are not to be taken as descriptions of faith itself (for such a description would be a strictly theological enterprise), but as psychological descriptions of the way in which faith is experienced, i.e., of the transforming effect of faith. Thus to speak of faith as "life" or "social interest" or "self-transcendence" is not to reduce faith itself to a human reality which would be subject to psychological analysis, but rather to find various ways of describing the human experience of the believer which results from his act of faith. What the present study suggests, therefore, is that the psychologist may legitimately describe an authentic faith experience as an experience of self-transcendence, and therefore a radical
transformation of motives; it does not suggest that the experience of self-transcendence can be identified or described as faith.

If, therefore, one were to reduce the argumentation of the present study to the formula of the classic three-term syllogism, the common or middle term would be self-transcendence or transformation. Thus the argument would run: human growth may be described in terms of self-transcendence; the faith experience may also be described in terms of self-transcendence; therefore, the faith experience may be described in terms of human growth. The psychological descriptions of the faith experience which have been advanced in the present chapter become possible and legitimate only in the light of the findings of the two previous chapters, i.e., that in those disciplines which conceptualize and articulate the dynamics of human growth and of faith (psychology and theology) there has been a growing emphasis on the role of self-transcendence in both experiences. Self-transcendence, therefore, (and the transformation of motives it implies) becomes, in this case, the common ground of both disciplines, and the bridge over which dialogue may take place.

It was seen in the first two chapters of this study that, in the development of each discipline, there has been a growing emphasis on the necessity of self-transcendence. In the psychology of personality, authentic human growth was seen first in terms of the transcending of one instinct (death) by another (life or Eros); then in terms of the
transcending of instinctual determinism by functionally autonomous, self-actualizing motives; and finally as the transcending of self-actualization itself by self-transcending motives. Correspondingly, in the development of the theology of faith, the self-transcending quality of faith was gradually broadened, being described successively as the transcending of the Mosaic Law (St. Paul); then as the transcending of all religious moralism and ethical striving (Kierkegaard and Barth); and finally as the transcending of all religious or non-religious human attempts at self-authentication (Bultmann and Tillich).

This parallel development represents a convergence towards an understanding of the human condition as one requiring self-transcendence for its authentication. Peter Homans131 has suggested that this development opens up the possibility of a new methodological model for the psychological study of religion which he refers to as the "theology-psychology" model—a model which respects the distinct subject matter of each discipline, but makes possible a dialogue between them. The bridge over which this dialogue takes place is the concept of self-transcendence. The domain of psychology is the developmental process, while the domain of theology is what Homans calls "theological existence," or what has been referred to in this study as "faith existence;" but both realities are described in terms of

131 P. Homans, *op. cit.*
self-transcendence.

The function of theology, therefore, is to explicate that state of self-transcendence (which for the believer is faith existence) which psychology points to as the goal of human growth. Homans uses Paul Tillich as an example of a theologian who presents faith existence as a theological possibility lying beyond the developmental process described by psychology. Faith existence thus becomes the goal of self-transcendence, and is achieved when man discovers the "God beyond God," i.e., the God beyond that God which is merely the projection of man's superego which is the only God accessible to psychological analysis. One is now in the proper domain of theology; nevertheless the process of self-transcendence by which this state is achieved can also be the object of psychological inquiry without judging the validity of the object of the believer's faith. The present study has been an attempt to make this type of psychological study of the act of faith.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The present study, beginning with the hypothesis that the call to faith is at the same time a call to human growth and maturity—an hypothesis which much of popular contemporary Christian literature seems to presuppose, if not explicitly advance—has attempted to demonstrate to what degree the Christian act of faith, rightly understood, involves the human growth and maturity of the believer. To this end a comparative study was made of the human dynamics underlying both the process of man's growth towards authentic maturity and the Christian act of faith. The justification for such a comparison lies in the fact that both human growth and faith are human experiences, and the two disciplines used as the sources for this study—psychology and theology—both concern themselves with man and with his human experiences. It is true that each discipline uses its own methods, presuppositions and theoretical models to explain and interpret that human experience. The psychology of personality bases its view of man on empirical and clinical evidence; theology's view of man is based essentially on revelation, i.e., on what the theologian believes God to have said about man. Consequently, the question with which the present study has concerned itself is not the relative merits or objective validity of each discipline's explanation of a particular human experience, but the question of whether psychology's
description of the dynamics of human growth and theology's
description of the dynamics of the act of faith describe
what is, on the human level, the same experience. In other
words, the question under consideration was: Is the
Christian act and commitment of faith experienced as human
growth? It is not a question of whether faith and human
growth are the same reality; for an affirmative answer to
such a question would be considered reductionism by the
theologian and a scientifically unverifiable postulate by
the psychologist; the question, rather, is whether faith and human
growth involve the same experience, regardless of the
reality which is posited as an explanation of that experi­
ence.

The present study has attempted to answer this ques­
tion by applying the criteria of transformation, transcend­
ence and discontinuity to both psychology's description of
the dynamics of human growth and theology's description of
the dynamics of faith. It has attempted to demonstrate that
authentic human growth, as described by a representative
group of personality theorists, involves a radical trans­
formation of motives which implies a radical discontinuity
between immature and mature motivation and therefore a
transcending of that type of motivation which characterizes
immature or inauthentic human existence. The same criteria
were applied to the dynamics of Christian faith, considered
as a radical act of trust, and described by a representative
group of Christian theologians.
The results of this comparative study indicated that both human growth and the act of faith follow the same dynamic of self-transcendence, which involves a radical transformation of motives. Human growth was seen as a self-transcending transition from death to life (Freud); from ego to self, i.e., from self-justification to self-acceptance (Jung); from self-enhancement to social interest (Adler); from regression to progression, i.e., from dependence to independence, narcissism to relatedness, necrophilia to biophilia (Fromm); from opportunistic to propriate striving, i.e., from motives which are functionally continuous with infantile motives to those which are functionally autonomous (Allport); from self-actualization to self-transcendence (Frankl). In the same way faith was seen as a self-transcending transition from law to grace (Paul); from ethical to religious existence (Kierkegaard); from the human possibility of "religion" to the divine possibility of faith (Barth); from the frustrating self-knowledge of "philosophy" to the realization of authentic existence made possible by faith (Bultmann); from autonomy to theonomy (Tillich). In order to achieve faith, man must transcend all those anxiety-producing attempts to justify or authenticate his existence through such human achievements as moral rectitude, religious observance or the pursuit of autonomy. In the same way human growth demands the transcending of that same anxiety-producing preoccupation with self which expresses itself in egoism and narcissism. It was seen in the present
study that both faith and human growth demand the commitment of oneself to something or someone outside of oneself (which for the man of faith is God), and therefore a transcending of that type of motivation the aim of which is the narcissistic gratification of one's inner needs or drives such as the drive towards religious or moral self-justification or human self-actualization. It was further seen that the transformation implied in both faith and human growth involves a radical discontinuity between self-justifying and self-transcending motives. The principal conclusion, therefore, of the present study is that the human dynamics underlying the Christian act of faith are the same as those underlying authentic human growth, and that, for the Christian believer, an authentic faith-experience will be an experience of human growth and personality fulfillment, since the act of faith involves the same transformation from self-justifying to self-transcending motives, i.e., the same transformation of personality, as does human growth.

This conclusion, as stated above, refers to a very specific relationship: the relationship of the experience of faith and the experience of human growth. As corollaries to this principal conclusion it is possible to suggest certain tentative conclusions in two related areas. These are: the relationship of faith to man's self-understanding, and the relationship between psychology and theology.

1) The relationship of faith to man's self-understanding: The present study has concerned itself
exclusively with a comparative study of the experience of human growth and the Christian faith-experience, and concluded that both are experienced as transformation and self-transcendence. Such a conclusion, it was seen, refers only to the human dynamic underlying each experience as those dynamics are described by psychology and theology, and not to the more ultimate reality which each discipline posits as a conceptualization and interpretation of that experience, and which is expressed in terms of a theoretical model or construct which is advanced as a way of explaining the human condition.

Such a conclusion, however, merely reflects the limited scope of the present study and in no way implies a position which would tend to regard as of secondary importance man's attempts to conceptualize his experience of self-transcendence. While it is true that what is important is that man should have the experience of transformation and transcendence, the related question of whether man conceptualizes that experience in a theistic (theological) or non-theistic (psychological) way is vitally important to that basic frame of reference by which man relates himself to reality, i.e., to man's understanding of himself and his human condition.

The conclusion, therefore, of the present study raises the further question as to the relationship of the faith experience not only to man's human growth but to his self-understanding. Do the dynamics of faith and of
human growth refer to the same reality? Is the theistic or theological conceptualization of the dynamic of self-transcendence (faith) merely a symbolic way of describing what is essentially a human process rather than a divine-human encounter? In other words, does faith merely reflect man's psychological self-understanding or does it offer him a new self-understanding?

In suggesting an answer to this question, it will be recalled that faith, as described by Rudolf Bultmann, offers man a new understanding of his existence and its possibilities. But to do so, it must first make him aware of his real situation. The challenge of faith begins by making man aware that the life he is living is not the life he was intended to live; it does not represent authentic existence. Hence, one might say that, in reference to man's self-understanding, faith does two things:

a) It gives a religious interpretation to man's self-understanding as something to be transcended. The Christian message describes the human condition as something from which man must be liberated. In the context of the present study, it will be recalled that the schools of psychological theory surveyed offered three basic descriptions of the human condition. Man was described as: instinctually determined (the psychoanalytic view of Freud, Jung and Adler); as self-actualizing (the humanistic view of Fromm and Allport); as self-transcending (the existential view of Frankl). To each of these views of the human condition,
Christian theology gives a religious interpretation; each is seen as a form of bondage from which man must be liberated. The instinctually determined man might correspond to Paul's description of man enslaved by sin ("the law in his members") and by the moral law which aggravates that sinful condition. The self-actualizing man might correspond to the man engaged in the self-defeating pursuit of self-justification through moralistic striving as described by Kierkegaard (the ethical man) and Barth (the man of "religion"). Finally in Frankl's self-transcending man one finds a parallel with Bultmann's "philosopher" aware that authentic existence consists in self-commitment rather than self-actualization but unable to realize that existential goal apart from some objective event and message of redemption. It will be noticed that in both psychology and theology the trend has been away from the idea of objective causality as an explanation of the human condition. Thus Freud's instinctually determined man gives way to the self-determining man as later psychologists assigned a more autonomous and creative role to the ego. In the same way, St. Paul's description of the human condition as one of bondage to sin conceived of as some objective force--"the law of sin which dwells in my members" (Romans VII: 23)--becomes for later theologians, that characteristic of the human condition by which even the self-determining man enslaves himself by his existential decisions. Hence theology's view that even the man liberated from the cycle of instinctual determinism is still in bondage since he
inevitably uses his capacity for self-determinism to enslave himself.

b) Faith offers man a new self-understanding: in each of the above cases, faith challenges man to a new self-understanding which transcends the self-understanding articulated by psychological theories. The man of faith is one who has put his trust in an event and message of salvation and redemption. He sees himself—to use Tillich's phrase—as "accepted in spite of being unacceptable." It is this consciousness of gratuitous acceptance or justifying grace which enables the believer to transcend or be liberated from those attempts to justify or authenticate his own existence, which are basic to man's understanding of himself and which Christianity interprets as bondage or enslavement since they are inherently self-defeating. The present study has attempted to demonstrate that faith is experienced as self-transcendence or liberation from both the moralistic self-justifying attempts of the religious man and the humanistic self-actualizing attempts of the non-religious man.

2) The relationship between psychology and theology: These are the two disciplines whose conceptualizations of the experience of self-transcendence have been used in this study to compare the experience of human growth and the experience of Christian faith. From what has been said thus far, it is possible to suggest a threefold relationship between these two disciplines based on the aims of each
discipline. The psychology of personality, using clinical and experimental evidence, has as its aim: (a) to describe the actual human condition; (b) to describe man's authentic or essential nature, i.e., to describe the goals of human growth; (c) to describe the stages of that growth. In the same way, theology as an explicitation of revelation has a similar threefold aim: (a) to describe the actual human condition (man as sinner or in need of redemption); (b) to describe authentic human existence (the faith relationship with God); (c) to describe the stages in man's growth towards that faith relationship.

Tentatively, therefore, one might suggest a threefold relationship between psychology and theology: (a) Theology describes the human condition as sin or bondage by emphasizing the egoistic, narcissistic, self-defeating quality of the human condition as described by psychology. (b) Theology describes authentic human existence by describing faith as that state of self-transcendence which psychology sees as necessary for maturity. (c) Theology describes the stages of man's growth towards faith in terms of the various types of motivation described by psychology. In this context, the development of personality or motivational theory outlined in this study is reflected in the dynamics of the act of faith. Whereas psychology has seen man successively as instinctually determined, as self-actualizing, and finally as self-transcending; theology sees man as experiencing the same successive types of motivation
as he grows towards faith, i.e., (to use St. Paul's terms) as determined by nature, as self-actualizing through law, and finally as self-transcending through grace.

It remains to enumerate briefly some suggestions for further research which arise from the questions raised by the present study of the relationship of faith to human growth.

1) The first related study which suggests itself is the aforementioned question of the mutual relationship of psychology and theology, and therefore the more specific problem of the possibility of an adequate methodological model for the psychology of religion. In the conclusion of the third chapter of this study, it was pointed out that in both psychology and theology, there has been a growing emphasis on the necessity of self-transcendence and the transformation of motives for both authentic human existence and genuine faith existence. It was further pointed out that since both faith and human growth are described in terms of transformation and transcendence, then these criteria become the common ground and point of dialogue between theology and psychology. It becomes possible, therefore, while respecting the proper domain of each discipline, to make a psychological study of the religious phenomenon by applying these criteria which are common to both disciplines to the human experience of the religious man. The present study has attempted to apply these criteria of transformation and transcendence to
the Christian act of faith considered as a radical act of trust. It concluded that authentic faith-existence involved self-transcendence and a radical transformation of motives and, therefore, is experienced as authentic human growth. The same criteria, it would seem, could be employed in the psychological study of other aspects of man's religious life such as prayer, mysticism, sacrifice, or moral commitment.

2) The present psychological study of the act of faith has restricted itself to a discussion of the self-transcending and transforming effect of faith considered as the individual believer's radical act of trust in God. As such, it has, for the most part, abstracted from the social dimension of faith, i.e., the fact that the individual Christian believer is a member of a community of believers—the Church. It is within this community of believers that the individual lives out his faith response to that message and event of salvation which is the object of his faith. But Christian theology speaks of the Church not only as the community of faith but as the community of love. It is the community in which the gospel of God's unconditional love and acceptance is not only preached but also experienced. Theology speaks of the Church as the "sacrament of Christ," i.e., as the visible sign, existing in the world, of God's love and acceptance which was originally expressed in Christ. It is, therefore, the community in which that love and acceptance which is the object of faith is supposed to be made visible and experienced in a human way by the individual
believer. Thus the present study of the act of faith as a transforming act of self-transcendence suggests a further psychological study of the Church as a community of transformation and transcendence.

3) Finally, if the findings of the present study are valid, then the theologian and the moralist are provided with yet another criterion for evaluating what are popularly labelled "the new theology" and "the new morality;" for neither the secular or "death of God" theologies, nor the moral position of "situation ethics" seem to seriously take into account that aspect of self-transcendence which the present study sees as essential to genuine faith-existence. The theology of secularity suggests a Christology without reference to a transcendent God. Jesus becomes the revelation only of a new life "for others," and not also the revelation of a redeeming, justifying, forgiving God—a God whose love and acceptance makes possible that self-transcendence which a life "for others," i.e., a life free of self-preoccupation demands. Without reference to a transcendent God, and, therefore, self-transcendence on man's part, does the new life for others become merely an ideal impossible of fulfillment? Does it become one of those frustrating and anxiety-producing agents such as moral law, ethical ideals, or the search for human self-actualization, which are transcended in authentic faith? Is the theology of secularity which claims to be "religionless" a regression, in the final analysis, to what Barth calls the
"human possibility of religion"?

In the same vein, one might ask whether situation ethics, which claims to be a morality of love replacing the legalistic morality of the past, is merely a regression to the old legalism? Does Christian love or agape refer merely to a love of benevolence, i.e., a dutiful love of those we cannot love spontaneously, and therefore able to be enjoined upon Christians in the form of a command? Or is the ideal of Christian love something more spontaneous? The present study has described Christian love as the result of the self-transcending quality of faith, in view of which the believer is enabled to love spontaneously, i.e., for the sake of the object of his love, and not for egocentric motives of self-justification or self-authentication. In the context of situationism, therefore, it raises the question: Is it sufficient to reduce Christian morality to one absolute—-the law of love? Or does the transformation of motives effected by authentic faith, involve the transcending of law as such, including the law of love? In its simplest terms, the question becomes: Is love a law to be obeyed, or a power which is released in man through the faith-experience?


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preliminary to faith.


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APPENDIX I

ABSTRACT OF:

**Faith as Transformation: A Comparative Study of the Dynamics of Human Growth and the Christian Act of Faith**

The purpose of this study is to attempt a psychological study of the Christian act of faith, in order to demonstrate that the human dynamics underlying the act of faith are the same as the fundamental dynamics of human growth. The word "transformation" has been chosen to describe the dynamics at work in both cases. Thus the hypothesis is: Authentic Christian faith is experienced as authentic human growth because the act of faith involves the same transformation of personality as does human growth. In order to substantiate this hypothesis the threefold criterion of transformation, transcendence, and discontinuity are applied to both the phenomenon of human growth and the act of faith.

Chapter I consists of a study of the dynamics of human growth as described by six leading personality theorists: Sigmund Freud, C. G. Jung, Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, Gordon Allport, and Viktor Frankl. This analysis yields a twofold conclusion: first, that each of the personality theories discussed describes human growth in terms of a radical transformation of motives which involves
self-transcendence and a radical discontinuity between mature and immature motivation; secondly, that in the chronological series beginning with Freud and ending with Frankl, there is an increasing emphasis on the importance of self-transcendence in human growth.

Chapter II consists of a similar analysis of the Christian act of faith. After a preliminary discussion of the elements of faith (belief, trust, commitment), the dynamics of the act of faith are analyzed with reference to the descriptions of faith given by five theologians: St. Paul, Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich. A similar twofold conclusion is reached: first, that each theologian describes the act of faith in terms of a transformation of motives, i.e., a transformation from self-justifying to self-transcending motives; secondly, that in the development of the theology of faith the aspect of self-transcendence is gradually broadened, from St. Paul's description of faith as transcending the Mosaic Law, to that of Kierkegaard and Barth where faith is seen as transcending all religious and moral striving for self-justification, and finally, to that of Bultmann and Tillich who see faith as transcending all man's attempts at self-actualization and self-authentication.

Finally, in Chapter III, the self-transcending and transforming aspect of faith is described from a psychological perspective: first by illustrating the transcending of moralism with reference to the faith experience of
Martin Luther, and the transcending of self-actualization with reference to the faith experience of St. Augustine; secondly by describing the transforming quality of faith within the context of and using the terminology of each of the personality theories discussed in Chapter I.

The study concludes that the same dynamic is at work in authentic human growth and authentic faith existence. Faith, therefore, is experienced by the believer as human growth. Tentative conclusions are also advanced in the areas of faith and self-understanding, and the relationship of psychology and theology.