ERICH FROMM'S CONCEPT OF "FREEDOM FROM"
AN INTERNAL CRITIQUE

by

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Thesis presented to the Faculty of Philosophy
of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM

Introduction

In the first chapter of this thesis the problem or subject matter of the thesis will be explained. In the thesis the problem being investigated is Erich Fromm's concept of freedom from, in itself and as subject to an internal critique.

Before starting a direct investigation of the problem of the thesis, a number of other issues have to be considered. This is true because of the nature of Erich Fromm's writings. They deal with many sciences that are usually considered to be at least somewhat separate in subject matter and methodology, such as psychoanalysis, psychology, sociology and philosophy. In Erich Fromm's writings quite often two or more of these sciences are mixed together. Because of the complexity, then, of these writings, and because this thesis is in the area of the philosophy of science, i.e., the philosophy of psychological science, (this area of philosophy is itself complex and diffuse), there is need of a careful preliminary analysis of Fromm's writings and of the methodology of this thesis. Chapter One of the thesis will deal with these matters.
THE PROBLEM

To handle well the material necessary in Chapter One, the chapter will be divided into three parts, or sections. Section A, the first part, will survey the materials at hand for a discussion of the problem of the thesis. It will discuss the writings of Erich Fromm and the writings about him by other authors. It will point out the need for this thesis, and delineate the exact topic which makes up the problem of the thesis. Section B, the second part, will investigate and analyze the methodology needed to penetrate the thought of Erich Fromm. This methodology will have to be tailored to the type of writing that Fromm does. Section C, the third part, will outline the plan of the thesis development. It will give the exact outline of the consecutive topics under consideration in the thesis, and some reasons for the selection and arrangement of these topics.

Chapter I, A. - MATERIALS AND SUBJECT OF THESIS

Ch. I, A, 1. - Erich Fromm's Writings

Erich Fromm began writing with a short note in 1926-1927, entitled "Lasting Effect of a Mistake in Upbringing."

as of the date of the writing of this thesis, was *You Shall Be as Gods, A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition*, published in 1966. In between these works Erich Fromm has published or contributed to over twenty-five books and over forty articles.

After the publication of his first article referred to in the preceding paragraph, Erich Fromm continued to publish in German until 1937, with an article then published entitled "On the Feeling of Impotence." His publications in German were all articles with the exception of a part of a book, entitled *Studien über Autorität und Familie*; Fromm's part was entitled "Social Psychology Part." Fromm thus continued to publish in German after electing to settle in the United States in 1933, at which time he came to the United States to lecture at the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis. His first major writing in

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3 Cf. Bibliography at end of the thesis.

4 Cf. footnote 1.


English was an article published in 1939, entitled "The Social Philosophy of 'Will-Therapy'," while his first book in English was *Escape from Freedom*, published in 1941.

The great majority of Fromm's writings fall into three general classifications, psychoanalytic, social psychology (really social psychoanalysis in good part), and finally ethical and philosophical. As might be expected from a psychoanalyst who received a good training in Berlin in this art, his first works in German were used to interpret events and man's customs in psychoanalytic terms. His first major article in German, entitled "The Sabbath," dealt with the Sabbath prohibitions in terms of prohibitions of incest. This interest in psychoanalysis has shown through most of his major works. Some works have dealt specifically with psychoanalytic work, such as


9 Erich FROMM, *Escape from Freedom*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941, xii-305 p. (This hardcover edition will be referred to throughout the thesis unless otherwise noted.)


Sigmund Freud's Mission, An Analysis of His Personality and Influence.  

Even more marked in his writings is his interest in applying the theory of psychoanalysis to the findings of sociology and economics. This accounts in large part for Fromm's predominant interest in social psychology. This is shown by his second important article, "Psychoanalysis and Sociology," published in 1928-29, in Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik. Among other important articles along the same social psychology bent were the German articles "The Development of the Dogma of Christ. A Psychoanalytic Study of the Social-psychological Function of Religion," "Concerning the Method and Task of an Analytic Social Psychology," and "The Psychoanalytical Characterology and Its Meaning for Social


Among Fromm's writings in English, *The Sane Society* shows the same interest in welding together sociological and psychological themes, for the complete explanation of the ills of human society and the individuals therein.

Fromm's English publications, beginning chiefly with his first book, *Escape from Freedom*, mark a change in his thinking. From this work onwards his thought turns more towards the ethical and philosophical issues confronting man. Fromm begins more and more to try to reach a definition of man, through man's character and needs, and through the existential situation in which he finds himself in modern society. *Man for Himself, An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics* is just such a book. As Fromm says in the foreword to this book, "...in this book I discuss the problem of ethics, of norms and values leading to the

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18 Erich FROMM, *op. cit.*

THE PROBLEM

realization of man's self and of his potentialities." 20 

Even before Escape from Freedom Fromm, in an article ent- 
titled "Selfishness and Self-Love," treated of many theo- 
retical aspects of the nature of human love. 21 This 
theoretical work was much amplified and developed in a 
later work, The Art of Loving. 22 The theme of man's free-
dom was more fully treated than previously in his work, 
The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil. 23 Fromm's 
most recent book, at the time of the writing of this 
thesis, is his attempt to interpret the essential messages 
of the Old Testament and its subsequent Jewish commentaries 
in the light of his own humanism; this book is called You 
Shall Be as Gods, A Radical Interpretation of the Old 
Testament and Its Tradition. 24

In recent years Erich Fromm has turned more than 
previously to writings in the field of political science,

20 Ibid., p. vii.


22 Erich FROMM, The Art of Loving, New York, Bantam, 1956, x-112 p. (The copyright of this paperback edition is 1956, the date of the original Harper & Row edition. The first Bantam printing occurred in 1963.)


24 Erich FROMM, op. cit.
concerned as he is that the world today is in serious danger of destroying itself, as he notes in his "Afterword" to George Orwell's 1984.25 The same warning, anxious as he is for the fate of mankind, runs through his May Man Prevail? An Inquiry into the Facts and Fictions of Foreign Policy, in which Fromm develops his own views of the realities behind the confrontation of the United States of America and Russia.26 This application of his findings about the nature of man and of society quite probably flows from Fromm's concern about man's happiness, and his conviction that, as a humanistic socialist, he must help to get "things" out of the saddle and to get "...man, the total, creative, real man, back into the saddle." 27


Many books and articles have been written in which the thought of Erich Fromm has been discussed. These books and articles have covered all areas of his thought, the psychoanalytic, the sociological and the philosophical.

Among the best books written on Erich Fromm, and certainly the most complete is John H. Schaar's *Escape from Authority, the Perspectives of Erich Fromm*, written in 1961. Schaar's work is centered around the thought of Fromm, with large sections of the book being devoted to philosophical issues as they appear in Fromm. Another recent work, treating of many aspects of Erich Fromm's philosophy is Guyton B. Hammond's *Man in Estrangement, A Comparison of the Thought of Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm*. Another work treating Fromm's philosophical positions is Martin Birnbach's *Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy*, in which Fromm is treated at considerable length, along with other prominent Neo-Freudians such as Karen Horney and Harry

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Stack Sullivan. For treatment of Fromm's sociological thought both of these books, Schaar's and Birnbach's, are very useful. The most basic material for a treatment of Fromm's psychoanalytical thought is taken up in Ruth L. Munroe's *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought: An Exposition, Critique, and Attempt at Integration*. This work covers the basic thought of Sigmund Freud, as well as that of the chief of the Neo-Freudians, Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan. James C. Coleman, in his *Personality Dynamics and Effective Behavior*, also speaks competently in many places about Fromm's insights into man's needs and impulses.

There are a number of outstanding articles on Fromm's thought. Important among these for an understanding of Fromm's philosophical thinking are Walker Percy's article, "Coming Crisis in Psychiatry," in *America*,

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Henry S. Kariel's article, "Normative Pattern of Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom," in Journal of Politics,\(^{34}\) and Will Herberg's article in Commentary, entitled "Freud, Religion and Social Reality."\(^{35}\)

An important work for understanding Fromm's sociological thought is an article by Arnold W. Green in American Journal of Sociology, entitled "Sociological Analysis of Horney and Fromm."\(^{36}\) For Fromm's psychoanalytical and psychological thought basic articles would be those of Otto Fenichel, "Psychoanalytic Remarks on Fromm's Book "Escape from Freedom"," in Psychoanalytic Review,\(^{37}\) Silvano Arieti's article, "The Double Methodology in the Study of Personality and Its Disorders," in American Journal of Psychotherapy,\(^{38}\) and Ramon de la Fuente-Muniz'\(^{39}\)


article, "Fromm's Approach to the Study of Personality," in Psychiatric Research Reports. 39

Ch. I, A, 3. - Fromm and Philosophy

In this subsection of Chapter I of the thesis, there will be a twofold object of inquiry, the first dealing with Fromm's interest in philosophy, by which is meant the de facto concern Fromm shows discussing philosophical topics, and discussing these topics in a philosophical way. The second object of inquiry will single out Fromm's special interest in the topics of human freedom, and its allied topics of human existence and human essence. Enough examples will be given to show that Fromm's interest in these special topics is widespread and genuine.

Ch. I, A, 3, a - Fromm's Interest in Philosophy

In his choice of topics for investigation Fromm often selects those that might properly be called philosophical. Such topics would be, for instance, the questions of good and evil, human freedom, responsibility, authority, socialism, the universal nature of man. 40


40 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, passim.
his The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, Fromm centers his discussion on the psychological origins of good and evil in the world of man, and also describes these origins in terms of the values for man of the "good" and "evil" characteristics of man. "Human freedom" as a question of free-will vs. determinism is investigated in the same book in Fromm's fullest discussion of this topic, and discussed chiefly in philosophical terms of determinism and alternativism, with responsibility for one's actions forming another key point of the same discussion of free-will vs. determinism. 41 There is a constant checking of the problem, set in metaphysical terms, against experiential data, as occurs, e.g., in Joseph Donceel's traditional Scholastic approach in his Philosophical Anthropology. 42

In dealing with the question of authority Fromm relies a great deal on a psychoanalytic interpretation of the experience of authority, and of the effects of the different kinds of authority. 43 Yet he also injects value judgments in his discussion of authority, value judgments as to the usefulness or harmfulness of the various kinds

41 Ibid., p. 115-150.
43 Cf. Ch. II, C, 2, d-g, of this thesis.
of authority towards man's goal, and the necessity or lack of it for man's growing freedom. Fromm, in addition, sees in his version of socialism, not merely a set of prescriptions for practical economic, social and political organization, but a true solution for the dignity, the needs and the goal of man. In discussing his socialist solution to Man's problems by a "Humanistic Communitarian Socialism" Fromm builds his case in terms of values inherent in man's existence, and in terms of his vision of the good society, by reflecting upon the data of experience in the light of his vision of what man is meant to become.

Thus it is clear that Fromm's investigation of reality includes not only a probing of a number of issues common to the philosophical enterprise, such as the issue of free-will discussed in the philosophy of man, and ethical issues, both in the general and special field, such as the problem of "good" and "evil", and the problems of authority and of socialism. In addition Fromm's methods

44 Ibid.


are not those of science, but those proper to philosophy, such as reflection on the data of experience, and the data drawn from social science in terms of prescriptive values derived from a conception of man as striving for a goal proper to his nature, a common philosophical approach. 47

Ch. I, A, 3, b - Human Nature and Human Freedom

In this subsection there will be a brief discussion of Fromm's conception of human nature as it exists in this world and a brief discussion of Fromm's concept of human freedom; the purpose of this discussion is to indicate that Fromm discusses these subjects, that he discusses them in an interrelated manner, and in a philosophical manner. This thesis will center on an investigation of Fromm's conception of human freedom, particularly freedom from, and will frequently mention Fromm's ideas on human existence, human nature, and their relationship with human freedom. In addition, in the last chapter of this thesis, an attempt will be made to investigate more fully the relationship of human freedom with human existence and human nature, as Fromm sees it.

An important work of Fromm in which he pays concentrated and specific attention to the nature of man is his _Beyond the Chains of Illusion, My Encounter with Marx and Freud._ In this book, part of _The Credo Series_, Fromm gives his own intellectual biography, as he sees it. Many of his comments and topics in this book are directly related to his conception of human nature. One reality of both Marx' and Freud's humanism, according to Fromm, is their basic idea of a human nature which all men share. Fromm, a humanist, shares the conviction of Marx and Freud, and shows this when he asserts that "The whole concept of humanity and humanism is based on the idea of a human nature in which all men share."  

In _Man for Himself, an Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics_, Fromm himself mentions that the book is to

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49 Ibid., p. ii.

50 Ibid., p. 25-26.


52 Erich FROMM, _Beyond the Chains of Illusion_, p. 27.
emphasize "... the philosophical problems of psychology...". In this book is much magnificent material centered around the ethical problems of man. Man, for instance, is defined by Fromm as "...an entity charged with energy and structured in specific ways, which while adapting itself, reacts in specific and ascertainable ways to external conditions." The aim of the science of man, Fromm says, is to satisfactorily define man; this definition will be gotten by observing the reactions of man to certain, various types of situations, and from these reactions "...to make inferences about man's nature." Thus Fromm shows his focused attention at times on the problem of the nature of man.

Another case of philosophical thinking occurs when Fromm states that man both is a "...part of the natural world...", and yet emerges from nature. Fromm is here stating a constant theme of his work, that man hardly ever leaves his natural ties, his kinship with nature, and yet is separate from nature. In Fromm's words, it dawns upon man that "...his is a tragic fate; to be part of nature,

53 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. ix.
54 Ibid., p. 23.
55 Ibid., p. 23.
56 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35.
and yet transcend it. He becomes aware of death as his ultimate fate even if he tries to deny it in manifold fantasies. Thus it is that Fromm learns about what man is from a discussion of the conditions of his existence. Furthermore Fromm's notion of what man's freedom concretely means for him is closely tied to his humanistic and naturalistic conception of the origin of human nature and its destiny in death, for Fromm's description of human freedom is closely tied into the conditions of human existence.

In *Escape from Freedom* Erich Fromm concentrates on the character structure of modern man, in the age of individualism. Erich Fromm traces the history of individual freedom through the history of the West from its medieval background to the present day. But in two of his chapters, Chapter II, "The Emergence of the Individual and the Ambiguity of Freedom," and Chapter VII, 2, "Freedom and Spontaneity," Fromm directly deals with the meaning of human freedom and its relationship to the realization of one's own perfection on the part of the individual.

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57 Ibid., p. 33.
58 Cf. e.g., Ch. II, A, B, 3-5 of this thesis, passim.
60 Ibid., p. 24-39, and 256-276.
Not only does Fromm himself deal with philosophical problems, but he does so by injecting philosophical positions into otherwise scientific reasoning. Several writers on Fromm have commented on this procedure. Among them is John H. Schaar whose work on Fromm, *Escape from Authority*, *The Perspectives of Erich Fromm*, is the chief critical analysis of Fromm's complex thought. Schaar talks of Fromm's concept of human nature when he says:

Far from restricting himself to the empirical procedures of the sciences, Fromm is in fact rather impatient with them. He has a model of man, to be sure, but it is not a model built by scientific procedures. It is a picture drawn from the writings of certain philosophers, moralists, and religious teachers. Fromm's real answer to the questions, how do we know a common core of human qualities exists, and, if it does exist, what are its contents, is a philosophic position rather than a scientific conclusion.62

Thus Schaar sees Fromm as trying, at times at least, to solve the problem of man philosophically, not scientifically. Schaar confirms this later in his book when he says that "Fromm believes that there is a definable human nature. He further believes that each member of the race has a unique self, even though many members have lost touch

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61 John H. SCHAAR, *Escape from Authority*, *The Perspectives of Erich Fromm.*

62 Ibid., p. 35.
with theirs." This way of thinking, Schaar says, rests upon an "...essentialist conception of the self..." Another writer on Fromm and the Neo-Freudians, Martin Birnbach, has a critique of Fromm in terms of the methods he uses to arrive at his conclusions. Birnbach states that rather than conforming his methods to empirical psychoanalytic techniques, Fromm "...obtrudes his own philosophical preconceptions of human nature into an area that one would have thought should be reserved for a science uncommitted to speculative presuppositions." Birnbach points out that Fromm subtly shifts ground in the middle of his apparently psychoanalytic writings by referring "...to the view of human nature of such humanistic philosophers as Aristotle and Spinoza..." In Fromm's investigation of human freedom, not only is there a connection with human nature and the conditions of its existence, but moreover the general structure of the development of human freedom, though tied in closely to the growth of the person, as an individual and as a

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63 Ibid., p. 63-64.
64 Ibid., p. 63.
65 Martin Birnbach, Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy, p. 85-86.
66 Ibid., p. 86.
member of the human race, yet is set in terms of a dialectic development, an evolutionary process, involving man's new nature transcending animal nature. That this approach to freedom is not only that of a social psychologist and a psychoanalyst is suggested by the structure just mentioned, and will be seen more fully as the thesis progresses. The thesis will also include an investigation of the methods Fromm uses to develop his concept of human freedom, as well as of the philosophical implications and presuppositions of his concept of human freedom.

Ch. I, A, 4. - The Value and Need of the Thesis

A few facts will now be presented to indicate the influence and popularity of Erich Fromm. In a special article on Erich Fromm in 1964, Chandler Brossard, Look Senior Editor, asserted that "the ideas in his [Fromm's] books have helped shape the intellectual development of the educated throughout the world." Brossard sees in Fromm a "...psychoanalyst and philosopher, who writes down to no one," and "an authority without authoritarianism."

67 Cf. Chapter II and III of this thesis, passim.
69 Ibid.
Eighteen prominent Americans from all walks of life, from industry, from labor unions, from philosophy and the arts, to mention a few, were gathered together for a closed weekend discussion in 1948 by Life magazine to discuss one of the three "unalienable" rights which the Declaration of Independence asserted men were endowed with, "The Pursuit of Happiness". One of the participants was Erich Fromm, classified as both a philosopher and psychoanalyst by Life magazine, whose ideas on happiness, on human significance were approved by the members of the panel.

Not only has the thought of Erich Fromm, as a psychoanalyst and philosopher, been recognized as a serious contribution on the intellectual plane by the editors of Life and Look, but, despite attacks on Fromm's understanding of psychoanalysis by orthodox psychoanalysts such as Otto Fenichel and the mixed approval given him by the philosophers, Bertocci and Millard, the authority of Dr.

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71 Ibid., p. 97, 101, 102, 104, 110.


73 Peter A. BERTOCCI and Richard M. MILLARD, Personality and the Good, Psychological and Ethical Perspectives, New York, David McKay Co., 1963, p. 69-93.
Gregory Zilboorg, writing in 1959, testifies to the solid contribution and serious academic diligence of Erich Fromm. In Zilboorg's eyes the importance of Fromm's work, with its solid background in psychoanalytic training, lies in Fromm's "independent scientific road," in which Fromm has been pursuing the "...search for the essence of man, for the meaning of human struggles, and for the roots and growth and efflorescence of love in the deepest and universal, ethico-philosophical meaning of this word."75

In his article in *Look* magazine just mentioned, Chandler Brossard estimated that the works of Erich Fromm had sold in the hundreds of thousands.76 This would seem to be true; in one case, that of *Escape from Freedom*, the hard cover edition has been through twenty four printings since its publication in 1941, up to April, 1964.77 *The Art of Loving*, published in 1956, by 1962 had gone through


75 Ibid. (Emphasis in original.)

76 Chandler BROSSARD, op. cit., p. 50.

at least nineteen editions in its original Harper & Row edition, and in a Bantam paperback edition had been through at least eight printings.\textsuperscript{78} Man for Himself, An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics, published in 1947, by April, 1964 was in its seventeenth printing.\textsuperscript{79}

These citations of the esteem in which the writings of Erich Fromm are held give some indication of the influence he has had in the cultural life of the United States. Some of the reasons for this may be suggested here. They would not only include his striking way of presenting material, the scope and breadth of the topics he covers, but also the type of area of reality he investigates. In this era of change and uncertainty, Fromm presents certain insights with force and conviction, and with a synthesis of information educated people feel it helpful for them to know, e.g., from psychoanalysis, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, as will be seen in the course of the thesis. In addition people today are asking the serious questions of who they are and what the meaning of life is, what is true love, how can freedom and authority be reconciled (with freedom valued by many as of more value than

\textsuperscript{78} Erich FROMM, \textit{The Art of Loving}, New York, Bantam, 1956, p. iv.

\textsuperscript{79} Erich FROMM, \textit{Man for Himself}, p. iv.
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authority), and how can they be happy in lives of significant living. These are some of the main themes of Fromm's works, and to judge from the type of work he has done, and his influence and popularity, these themes meet the needs of modern man.

Because of the attractiveness and contact with real life, one test of any authentic philosophical position, it is worth while to investigate the topics that Erich Fromm presents, as he has investigated them. Fromm's early German writings are based in part on a Marxist view of reality, e.g., where he praises a book by Siegfried Bernfeld, dedicated to socialistic class struggle, for its attempt to present a social problem in the light of "...methods whose simultaneous application alone makes a full understanding possible: Marxian sociology and Freud's instinct theory."

In his first books in English, though, Fromm set the tone for much of his appeal to modern man, for the problem of man's freedom and of his nature emphasized, respectively, in Escape from Freedom, published in 1941,

and in Man for Himself, published in 1947. These themes of freedom and the nature of man are central to man's concerns when he wrote these books, and today, too. In 1942, Thomas Harvey Gill reviewed Fromm's Escape from Freedom in Psychiatry, and started off his review in these words:

Freedom. More blood has flowed in the real and fantastic service of this word than any other, except perhaps God.

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Freedom. Freiheit! Franchigia! - the call has raised the heads of countless millions and made their hearts beat faster and led them forth to add their pittance to the blood-soaked earth. But the word's meaning, and its dualistic implications, remain vague and amorphous.

In 1967, the word "freedom" is still a controversial term, with serious practical implications in theology and philosophy, as the recent controversy in America magazine testifies, in which the philosopher, John G. Milhaven, probes the basic philosophical and theological implications of "freedom" as a goal, as a vision.

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81 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, 1941, and Man for Himself, 1947.


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An inquiry, then, into the subject of freedom as it exists in Erich Fromm's writings should have a practical value, as being close to life today, and as coming from a respected psychoanalyst and philosopher, of wide influence and of a singular approach to reality. There exists no thorough study of this subject of freedom, as it exists in Erich Fromm's writings. This subject is a theme throughout his works in English, beginning with *Escape from Freedom* in 1941, and continuing on through his works up to *The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil* in 1964 and continued in his interview with Richard I. Evans in *Dialogue with Erich Fromm* of 1966.

There is a critique and explanation of Fromm's theory of freedom in Bertocci and Millard's work, *Personality and the Good*, but the investigation, containing many valid insights into Fromm's work on freedom and its relation to human nature, is not meant to be nor is it a complete analysis of the subject. In another recent work,

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87 Peter A. BERTOCCI and Richard M. MILLARD, *Personality and the Good*, Psychological and Ethical Perspectives, p. 69-93.
Man in Estrangement, A Comparison of the Thought of Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm, by Guyton B. Hammond, published in 1965, there are a number of references to Fromm's thought on freedom, and special chapters devoted to Fromm as a philosopher and a scientist, and to Fromm's concept of human nature, but no special concentrated attention however, to his concept of human freedom. In a work published in 1966, Erich Fromm: A Protestant Critique, J. Stanley Glen, its author, has many good insights into Fromm's concepts of alienation, the source of internal freedom and man's nature, yet does not thoroughly cover the subject of human freedom as Fromm sees it. Thus there is a lack of a serious, deep study of Fromm's concept of human freedom.

Ch. I, A, 5. - The Subject of the Thesis

The subject of human freedom, then, is a serious subject in itself, and is seriously investigated by Erich Fromm; no thorough study of this subject has yet been done. Part of the subject of this thesis will fill this lack, and


will consist of an investigation of Erich Fromm's concept of human freedom. The other part will consist of a critique of this concept.

In Erich Fromm's conception of human freedom there are two basic meanings, that of freedom as implicated in and connected with human psychological growth and individuation, and that of free will, or free choice. Free will is connected with the first type of freedom by Fromm, and would seem to be a capacity exercised by man in the stages between full freedom in the first sense or the full absence of freedom in the first sense; free will or free choice itself is explained by Fromm as "the capacity to make a choice between opposite alternatives." Free will for Fromm would seem to be a means to achieve freedom in the first sense, that belonging to the character structure of a person by which the person is loving, productive and independent. It is this first meaning of freedom that the thesis is concerned about, and not free will or free choice. It is what Bertocci and Millard would call

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91 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, p. 132.

92 Ibid.
ethical freedom, the freedom that comes from personal fulfillment, that the investigation of the thesis is concerned with. 93

In Fromm's writings this freedom coming from personal fulfillment is generally what he means when he uses the word "freedom". This type of freedom for Fromm is a dialectical process, present in individuals in their ontogenetic and phylogenetic growth, a process with two aspects, dialectically related, of "positive" freedom or "freedom to", and of "negative" freedom or "freedom from". 94

This thesis is chiefly concerned with "freedom from," the negative aspect of freedom, the aspect of freedom chiefly developed in Escape from Freedom 95, and sharing with "freedom to" Fromm's interest in other works of his. 96

However, because of the dialectical relationship of "freedom from" with "freedom to," during the thesis frequent mention will be made of "freedom to," to develop fully the

93 Peter A. BERTOCCI and Richard M. MILLARD, Personality and the Good, Psychological and Ethical Perspectives, p. 91.

94 Cf. Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, Ch. II, p. 24-39, for this description.

95 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 256.

96 Cf. e.g., Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 180-181.
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concept of "freedom from," as well as studying "freedom to" more compactly in the fifth chapter of the thesis.

"Alienation" in certain of its aspects will be found to closely resemble "freedom from" and it, too, will be investigated in the fifth chapter of the thesis, in order to bring out the meaning of "freedom from." The nature of man and of his concrete existence will be referred to frequently also in the thesis, for it will be found that Fromm closely connects these topics with "freedom from;" a closer investigation of these topics will be made in the sixth chapter, to disclose more fully possible relationships between these and "freedom from" in Fromm's conception of human freedom, and specifically "freedom from."

These references throughout the thesis to "freedom to," to human existence, to human nature, and in Chapter V to alienation are meant to bring out the nature of "freedom from." For it is the "essence" or the "meaning" of freedom from that is the chief interest of the thesis. What is meant here by "meaning" or "essence?" "Essence" here means what is constitutive of this concept, what is

97 From here on in the thesis, freedom from will be underlined, not put in quotation marks, unless clarity demands otherwise. This is done to bring out more the topic of the thesis.
indispensable to it. "Essence" or "meaning" here represents the intelligibility of freedom from, that which is contained in the concept and implied by it, i.e., the perfection of freedom from looked at objectively. What Fromm means by freedom from, in itself and in its implications, is what the thesis is considering, as he explains this concept in general terms and in particular cases, as this concept refers to what objectively occurs in men in themselves and as related to other men and to the world in which they are situated. The emphasis will be on the human individual, whether in his ontogenetic or phylogenetic growth in freedom from.

This search for Fromm's meaning of freedom from thus described will form the central concern of four chapters of this thesis, Chapters II - V, as freedom from is found to occur in the general and particular structure of growing freedom from in man's ontogenetic and phylogenetic growth. The various meanings of freedom from discovered in the course of these four chapters will be related to each other, if possible, in terms of analogy.


99 Cf. Bernard WUELLNER, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, 2nd ed., Milwaukee, Bruce, 1966, "essence" and "essential" on p. 95, and "ratio", 1, 2, 4 and 6 on p. 258.
Ch. I, A, 6. - The Critique of Freedom From

The second objective of the thesis is to institute a critique of the findings of the investigation into Fromm's meaning of freedom from, by a careful evaluation of these findings. This evaluation of the findings of the central four chapters of the thesis will be an "internal" critique.

Part of this internal critique will run through the central four chapters, and will consist in an evaluation of the logical coherence and clarity of Fromm's differing concepts of freedom from and the concepts implied in and allied to that of freedom from. This will mean an evaluation of these concepts in terms of possible contradictions or ambiguities. In addition, in these central four chapters, preliminary estimates will be made of the type of proof Fromm is using and of the properties of these proofs, as well as an estimate of the scientific validity of the scientific facts and scientific conclusions of Fromm's writings about freedom from by other experts in the fields of knowledge he happens to be investigating.

The last chapter of the thesis, the sixth chapter, will be a continued and deeper critique or evaluation of

100 Bernard WUELLNER, op. cit., "critique," 1, on p. 70.
Fromm's meaning of freedom from. This critique will center around the meaning of freedom from in relation to the fundamental philosophical thought of Erich Fromm, and will investigate the connections of freedom from with these fundamentals, in regard to internal coherence and clarity. In addition, the types of proof that Fromm has used to prove his meaning of freedom from will be investigated more fully in the light of the material already discussed in the central four chapters in a preliminary way. An evaluation of the validity and coherence of these proofs will be made. Finally an attempt will be made to explain more fully the reasons for the ambiguities and contradictions found in Fromm's concept of freedom from.

Chapter I, B. - THE METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS

Ch. I, B, 1. - Historical Development and Fromm's Philosophy

In the previous section, Section A, of this first chapter, the materials that will be investigated during this thesis have been surveyed. The need for the thesis, a need that grows out of a lack of complete analysis up to the present time of Erich Fromm's concept of human freedom. An attempt has been made to point out the exact problem of the thesis, the investigation of Erich Fromm's concept of freedom from, and a critique of this concept of freedom.
from in various ways in terms of its internal consistency as compared with sound principles of logic and metaphysics.

It is time now to inquire more fully into some of the problems of methodology connected with investigating the problem of the thesis. One of the first problems of methodology that comes to mind is that of the development of an author's thought, and of deciding how to treat this development, these changes, within an author's thought.

Ch. I, B, 1, a - Fromm and Other Philosophers

One way of treating an author's thought is by an historical account of his thought. This would consist in taking a theme of an author's thought, and tracing it back to its historical sources, and analyzing this theme's development in terms of these sources. Additions and developments in the thought of the author would also be analyzed in terms of these same sources. The sources mentioned here refer to other thinkers from whose thought the author in question derives ideas, judgments, and partial or total structures of thinking about problems. Such a procedure is part of an understanding of philosophy.¹⁰¹

Although Erich Fromm has not written in a vacuum, such a historical presentation of an author's thought is not the purpose of this thesis on Erich Fromm's concept of human freedom from. It is true that Erich Fromm's thought has been molded and shaped in good part by ideas and systems of thought that are very similar to those of Marx and Freud, as will be seen in the course of the thesis. It would be very possible to take such an author as Marx or Freud, and to try to construct a historical thesis on the similarities of Fromm's thought with one of these men. Such, however, is not the purpose of this thesis. Marx, Freud and other authors will be referred to in passing, where Fromm's thought is clearly parallel to theirs, if this reference is clearly useful for the analysis of Fromm's thought itself. Even this procedure will be a side issue, and one fraught with difficulties. Erich Fromm rarely finds it profitable to give credit to an author in this sense, that he, Fromm, states his own thought is directly derived from the author in the same sense as the author intends it. Fromm's interpretation itself, for

instance, of Marx's thought and Freud's thought is sometimes disputed. Bartlett and Shodell criticize Fromm's interpretation of Marx when they say, in referring to Fromm's use of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, that "...Fromm's tendentiousness leads him to minimize Marx's emphasis on revolutionary class struggle which was beginning to appear even in these early manuscripts, though not so clearly as it was later."103 In reference to Fromm's interpretation of Freud, there is a thorough analysis of Fromm's first book in English, *Escape from Freedom*, by Otto Fenichel.104 While admitting Fromm's contributions, Fenichel challenges on many points Fromm's interpretations of Freud.105 For instance, Fenichel states that Fromm "...cannot avoid falsifying Freud," when Fromm discusses the social origins of such drives as love and hatred.106


This thesis, then, will not discuss Fromm's concept of freedom from a mainly historical viewpoint, by a constant comparison between Fromm's thought in its development and the thought of his sources. Such a historical type of thesis would be sufficient for a thesis all by itself, and would have grave difficulties because of the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Ch. I, B, 1, b - Development within Fromm's Philosophy

What this thesis will try to do is to discuss Fromm's mature grasp of his concept of human freedom from. By maturity is meant the completed growth and development of Fromm's philosophical positions up to the present time. Whether or not the various component parts of his thought on the concept of human freedom have matured and remained relatively stable over the course of the years will be investigated.

To achieve an accurate estimate of what constitutes for Fromm a stable and finished perfection in the makeup of man's nature, it will be necessary to be familiar with many of his works, and to select those expressions of this stable perfection which represent the fulness of his development. This will involve a comparison of his works from different periods of his writing, from both his German and English works. Such a procedure will also mean
judging accurately how much seeming variations in his mature thought are really such, or are only accidental and inconsequential variations in content or form of expression.

Ch. I, B, 2. - Other Methods of Studying Fromm's Philosophy

Thus an assessment of Erich Fromm's thought in terms of its development is to some extent necessary, if proper judgment is to be passed on what his mature thought is on any definite subject. Such a temporal ordering of his thought is seen to be necessary. Yet, if this analysis of Fromm's temporal development were all that might be accomplished, little would be done beyond finding out how his thought on any particular matter changed and developed.

It is necessary therefore to discover other ways of investigating Fromm's thought besides the chronological one, if his ideas are to be investigated thoroughly. Fromm's ideas must be subjected to a thorough critical analysis. A comparison between his mature philosophical position and that leading up to it must be instituted. This comparison will have as its object the clear and accurate exposition of Fromm's thinking.

Not only will a chronological analysis such as just described be used in the thesis, but to fully understand Fromm's mature thought it will be necessary to study
carefully the internal coherence of his thought. Within any one point of his thinking there will be need to explore whether this one point's elements are a coherent, a consistent and logical whole, or whether there are inconsistencies and lack of logic within the structural and functional aspects of this one point. The clear explanation and exposition of Fromm's thinking will demand an internal critique of his consistency and inconsistency. This internal critique will examine Fromm's thinking in the light of sound metaphysical principles, such as the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.

Such a critique of the particular points of Fromm's thinking will be necessary to understand his concept of freedom from. But more than this is needed. Also necessary will be a synthesis of the various strands of his reflection on the nature of human freedom. It will be necessary to take all of the points he has in his concept of freedom from to put them together and to test for logical coherence, by seeing how these points fit into a logical whole. Through such a comparison and union of the various strands of Fromm's thought, the logical consistency will be thoroughly tested.

One other aspect of Fromm's thinking must be mentioned here, in the analysis of the logical coherence of
Fromm's philosophical position. It is the relevance of his total concept of freedom from to his basic philosophical presuppositions. During the course of the analysis and synthesis of Fromm's concept of human freedom, his basic philosophical presuppositions, his starting point for his philosophical speculations, will appear. This thesis will investigate the basic philosophical presuppositions underlying Fromm's concept of man's freedom and test his understanding of freedom from in view of these presuppositions. This comparison will show whether or not Fromm's philosophical ideas on human freedom can be integrated with his basic philosophical presuppositions. This work will be done chiefly in Chapter VI of this thesis.

What is being chiefly studied through this logical analysis and synthesis is the text of Erich Fromm's writings. It is the text itself, studied in its textual meaning, in its context with other similar meanings, and in the context, too, of allied concepts that is decisive in this analysis and synthesis of Fromm's meaning. The basic work of the thesis, then, is a study of Fromm's meaning as revealed in his language. Through an investigation of his use of language his meaning will be discovered.

Language itself, according to Bochenski, does not represent things directly, but rather objective concept
and objective propositions. It is what Fromm thinks about reality, not how reality is in itself, that is being looked into.

There is no inference here that Fromm is anything but a realist in his epistemology. There is little if any doubt about the fact that Fromm is convinced that he is talking directly about reality, as it exists objectively in the world and is man's reality.

Fromm actually regrets the fact that abstract language is used by man; he looks upon abstract language as a separation from the concrete, living experience that such language is meant to represent. Fromm does not go as far as some other Marxists, who, according to K. G. Ballestrom, find reflections of reality in both "the forms of thinking and the content of knowledge." But Fromm does see and recognize that abstract concepts are drawn from directly experienced, singular realities, and that man's knowledge tends to and does actually transcend mere


abstract knowledge. In general, Fromm's realism has not been seriously investigated, but must stand as a presupposition of this thesis; what has been said here is to indicate some of the reasons for this presupposition, a rather plausible one, given Fromm's familiarity with Marxism from his psychoanalytic training at Berlin, in the midst of Wilhelm Reich's "Freudo-Marxist" movement.

One quality of Fromm's assertions that will be investigated in the last chapter of the thesis, the certainty and universality of these assertions, or lack of these qualities, will also be anticipated during the thesis itself at the conclusions of chapters. In addition, during the thesis itself Fromm's assertions will be given as he himself gives them, whether of a factual or theoretical nature. The certainty or probability of Fromm's assertions will be presented as he himself qualifies them, or seems to qualify them. In the major issues of the thesis any uncertainty or lack of universality appearing in Fromm's assertions will be mentioned. In these major issues Fromm will be considered to be holding his theoretical assertions


to be certainly and universally true, and his factual assertions to be certainly true, unless the contrary is indicated in the thesis.

During the thesis an estimate will be made of the scientific validity of Fromm's factual and theoretical judgments in non-philosophic areas. Such judgment of the scientific validity of Fromm's work will be based on authorities in the specific areas of scientific fact or theory that Fromm happens to be discussing. The purpose of this assessment is twofold, to give some partial estimate of the validity of Fromm's scientific work, and to bring out information that will be of value to the central concerns of the thesis.

Ch. I, B, 3. - Fromm's Methods of Proof

It is appropriate now to indicate another type of critique of Fromm's thought on the nature of freedom from that will be used in the thesis. This type of critique will observe and judge Fromm's methods of proving his assertions. It will inquire into the logic of Fromm's demonstrations. It will investigate Fromm's use of deduction, of induction and of what may be called at this moment "intuition."

In first considering Erich Fromm's methods of induction the thesis will be mindful of the various problems
that induction poses, remembering, as Robert Kreyche points out, that "there is no such thing as a single method of induction to which all others are reducible." 112 Particularly should this be kept in mind when studying Fromm, whose reasoning involved many different sciences, such as philosophy, social psychology and psychoanalysis. 113 To investigate Fromm's concept of freedom from correctly it will be important to judge precisely just what his induction methods are.

In the use of induction it is important to notice whether or not complete or incomplete induction is being used. Particularly in incomplete induction will caution have to be used because of the various types of induction. William Meissner emphasizes this in his article entitled "The Status of Psychology as Constructural Knowledge." 114 In this article Meissner differentiates sharply between the ordinary type of philosophical induction and the selective abstraction behind much of the scientific method used in scientific psychology. 115 Several questions will

113 Cf. Ch. I, A, 3, a, of this thesis.
115 Ibid., p. 243-244.
THE PROBLEM

have to be asked: Does Fromm proceed entirely on the ontological level of being in his study of freedom from? Or does he work through constructural knowledge in this pursuit of the meaning of freedom from? Are Fromm's conclusions in the realm of ontological being or in the realm of constructural being?\textsuperscript{116}

Besides observing carefully Fromm's use of various types of inductive reasoning, it will also help for the purposes of the thesis to study Fromm's deductive procedures, as will be done in Chapter VI of this thesis. One way of doing this will be to notice Fromm's presuppositions, his hidden major premises, and the logic of his reasoning. Another way of studying Fromm's deductive procedures, and a necessary one because he writes in many different roles,\textsuperscript{117} will be to watch carefully Fromm's use of middle terms, to see whether or not they are used twice in the same sense, or used fallaciously because of ambiguity or analogy of meaning.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{116}For a careful analysis of the difference between ordinary ontological knowledge of being from a scholastic viewpoint and constructural knowledge from the same viewpoint cf. George P. KLUBERTANZ, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, p. 282-286.

\textsuperscript{117}Cf. Ch. I, A, 3, of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{118}Robert J. KREYCHE, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 180-184.
Besides a study of Fromm's use of induction and deduction in his investigation of the meaning of freedom from there will be a need to observe carefully the possible use by Fromm of what may be called "intuition." The word here is used in the sense in which it is defined in the Dictionary of Philosophy, as

The direct and immediate apprehension by a knowing subject of itself, of its conscious states, of other minds, of an external world, of universals, of values or of rational truths.119

As will be seen in the analysis of Erich Fromm's concept of freedom from there will often be a question as to whether or not Fromm is using as a sort of proof a direct and immediate apprehension of reality. In discussing one of Fromm's basic concepts of man, his basic needs, in the last chapter of the thesis, reference will be made to Fromm's treatment of these needs in The Sane Society.120 In commenting on these basic needs as given by Fromm John Schaar points out that Fromm does not base these needs on a science of man, but rather finds them in the pages of philosophers and moralists, and in Fromm's own analysis of the conditions of man.121 Schaar adds that these needs are

120 Erich FROMM, op. cit., p. 27-66.
121 John H. SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 52.
not empirical findings but rather are "philosophical postulates."\textsuperscript{122} In the last chapter of the thesis the origin of this type of postulate, asking whether or not its presence in Fromm's philosophical thinking is due to some sort of intuition, a sort of direct and immediate apprehension of reality. The same type of inquiry will be made in the last chapter about certain aspects of Fromm's concept of \textit{freedom from}. An additional reference will be made as to whether or not Fromm uses a phenomenological method, a type of intuitive approach, as Hammond suggests.\textsuperscript{123}

One additional way of proving his conclusions that may be used at times by Fromm would be the scientific method as such, not in the sense of attempting to reduce one's knowledge of reality to mathematical law or theory,\textsuperscript{124} but in the sense of scientific law or theory as used in the social sciences,\textsuperscript{125} or in the psychological sciences.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Guyton B. HAMMOND, \textit{Man in Estrangement}, p.43-44.
In explaining and examining Fromm's methods of finding out the meaning of freedom from these scientific methods of his will be kept in kind.

Ch. I, B, 4. - The Use of Fromm's Sources

The ways in which Erich Fromm's methods of proof will be investigated have just been explained. A further question arises here, as to how the sources that Fromm may draw one for his ideas will be used in the thesis. A complete list will not be given here, but some of the more pertinent sources, and the general way in which these will be used.

In discussing the historical development of Fromm's thought in the first section of this B part of Chapter I Fromm's thought has grown from many sources, among them the works of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. In addition to these two sources for his conceptions of reality Fromm himself admits to other sources, among them Zen Buddhism. For instance, in Fromm's "Foreword" to Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis Erich Fromm states that the stimulation

127 Cf. Ch. I, B, 1, passim of this thesis.

afforded by the conference on Zen Buddhism he attended led to "...a considerable enlargement and revision of his ideas," particularly of his psychoanalytic concepts.\textsuperscript{129}

Certain other sources will be used in the thesis, on Fromm's Marxism and comparison of Fromm with other philosophers. For instance, in comparing Fromm in his early days with the young Marx Donald C. Hodges, in \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, finds that the early Fromm is an open Marxist, and that Marx is in no sense of the word, "ethical," a humanist.\textsuperscript{130} J. Stanley Glen, on the other hand, finds that Fromm's vision of man presupposes a humanistic concept of man that flows from Marx's humanistic thought.\textsuperscript{131} Will Herberg, in \textit{Freud and the 20th Century}, compares Fromm with Rousseau on several points, among them their mutual interest in showing "...the many ways in which evil institutions have corrupted man in the past;" Herberg adds that Fromm's Rousseauism makes him believe in the possibility of redeeming human history through man's efforts alone, and that "sin" is not internal

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\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., p. viii.
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\textsuperscript{131} J. Stanley GLEN, \textit{Erich Fromm: A Protestant Critique}, p. 163.
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to man as its source, but proceeds from society.¹³² Hyman sees in Fromm a differing concept of man than Freud possessed, with Fromm being convinced that man is fundamentally "good, innocent, and unfallen," whereas Freud was convinced of just the opposite, making the sense of tragedy possible to modern man.¹³³

As indicated in Section B, 1, of this chapter, these sources from which Fromm probably drew much of his thought will not be used to study the historical development of Fromm's own thinking, both because of the uncertainty of the project, and because any serious, prolonged inquiry into these connections would be a thesis in itself.¹³⁴ The rule in practice will be this, that if these same sources are not pertinent and necessary to the accurate explanation and analysis of Fromm's conception of reality, then these sources will not be used in this thesis. They will be used if the opposite condition is believed to prevail, i.e., that these sources are pertinent and necessary.


¹³⁴ Cf. Ch. I, B, 1, of this thesis.
Besides the use of the sources just discussed the question of the proper use of commentators on Fromm needs a brief explanation. A number of commentators on Fromm were already mentioned in Section A, 2, and Section A, 3, b, (3) of this chapter. Among those mentioned were such critics of Fromm as John Schaar and Ruth Munroe. Besides these critics of Fromm, Bertocci and Millard analyze Fromm's concept of human freedom in Personality and the Good: Psychological and Ethical Perspectives. Other very useful and apt commentators on Fromm, already mentioned in the thesis, are Guyton Hammond, J. Stanley Glen, and Walter Weisskopf.

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135 Cf. Ch. I, A, 2 and Ch. I, A, 3, b, (3) of this thesis.
136 John H. SCHAAAR, op. cit.
137 Ruth L. MUNROE, op. cit.
138 Peter A. BERTOCCI and Richard M. MILLARD, Personality and the Good: Psychological and Ethical Perspectives, p. 69-93 and passim.
In their presentation of Fromm's ideas, these commentators will be treated with the respect due to their accuracy and scholarliness. This thesis will try to respect these scholarly credentials, giving each scholar the same assessment as their scholarly reputation deserves. In the final analysis, however, each commentator on Fromm's outlook on reality will be judged, and accepted or rejected, on the basis of whether or not their analysis of Fromm's ideas is considered to be correct by the author of this thesis. If the author of this thesis disagrees with these commentators on some point, then reasons will be given for this dissent.

Ch. I, B, 6. - The Use of Other Philosophical Writings

A number of other authors will be used in this thesis, when their own explanations of philosophy or of philosophical methodology can be used to clarify or analyze the meaning of what Erich Fromm says, or of the methods he uses. In general this type of author will not have written on Erich Fromm explicitly. But this type of author will have written on the type of philosophy found in Fromm's writings, or on the difficult area of the relationship between philosophy and psychology or psychoanalysis. Among philosophers whose work will be used in the thesis are
The work of P. Henry Van Laer on the philosophy of science will be used a great deal. Among psychologists whose writings will be of assistance will be Harry Guntrip.


143 William M. MEISSNER, op. cit.


IDEM, Philosophy of Science, Part Two, A Study of the Division and Nature of Various Groups of Sciences, Pittsburgh, Pa., Duquesne University Press, 1962, xiii-342 p. (Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series, Volume Fourteen.)

David Rapaport, as well as those psychoanalysts who contributed to a symposium edited by Sidney Hook, entitled *Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy*. The writings of these authors will be useful in distinguishing the area of science that Fromm is using at any particular time. The work of these authors, while judged in part on their scholarship, will be accepted or rejected chiefly on their own merits. Three points will be kept in mind in this task, (1) whether or not their estimate of Fromm, if they comment on him, is a valid one, (2) whether or not their thinking, as applied to Fromm's ideas, may be properly applied, and (3) whether or not their thinking is valid in itself, whether in the area of philosophy or in the area of the philosophy of science.

Chapter I, C. - THE CONTENTS OF THE THESIS

After finishing a description of the materials of the thesis, the subject of the thesis and of the methodology of the thesis, it remains to briefly state the contents of the thesis. This description will state what in general


is to be taken in the various chapters of the thesis, and why, in general, these topics are to be taken in their respective chapters.

The central section of the thesis, Chapters II-V, is meant to explore and find out the meaning of freedom from in the writings of Erich Fromm. Freedom from is described by Fromm in general and in concrete detail, both as regards the human individual and as regards the human race. This description of growing freedom from in the human individual and in the human race is supplemented by Fromm's description of the origins of freedom from both in the human individual and in the human race.

A decision was made to separate Fromm's treatment of freedom from in the individual from that of the human race. This decision was made because there was need of some division with the materials at hand, and, in addition, a preliminary estimate seemed to show that Fromm had somewhat different meanings for freedom from in the individual and in the human race. Such a division would make it easier to investigate these different meanings, and, in addition, to compare them and look for analogy between them.

If there were analogy present in Fromm's description of freedom from as found in the origins of and the development of this freedom, it seemed more likely that,
as explained later in the thesis, in the third chapter, that the primary analogue was freedom from as found in the human individual. It was thus decided to first of all take the origin and development of freedom from in the human individual, in his ontogenetic origin and growth, as the first subject of investigation. This is done in Chapter II of the thesis, entitled "Freedom From in the Individual."

The logical choice for the next topic of treatment was phylogenetic, growing freedom from, i.e., as found in the origin and growth of human freedom from in the human race. In treating this topic Fromm not only gives a general description of the structure of developing freedom from and of the origin of this freedom from, but he also gives specific historical details of this development. For the purposes of handling the material better, which is very extensive, and for the purpose of being able to compare Fromm's general structure with the concrete, historical description he gives, it was decided to divide the material on phylogenetic, growing freedom from into two chapters, the first of which would investigate the general structure and origin of phylogenetic freedom from, the second, the historical development of phylogenetic freedom from. As will be seen this follows Fromm's procedure, and seems a better way of comparing Fromm's general structure and its concrete description. This general structure will be
investigated in Chapter III, along with Fromm's explanation of the origin of \textit{freedom from} in the human race. Chapter IV will investigate Fromm's conception of the concrete, historical development of growing \textit{freedom from} in the human race.

As will be seen, positive freedom or "freedom to" is closely allied to \textit{freedom from}. "Alienation" is also close in meaning to certain aspects of \textit{freedom from}. Although "freedom to" is mentioned somewhat and investigated somewhat throughout the thesis, it is felt necessary to look at it more thoroughly in a separate section of the thesis. This is also true of "alienation," which in certain aspects resembles \textit{freedom from} closely. It was decided to investigate "freedom to" and "alienation" in a separate chapter, Chapter V, along with a comparison of the various meanings of \textit{freedom from} as found throughout the thesis. Certain additional reflections of the inmost nature or essence of \textit{freedom from} will conclude this fifth chapter.

Throughout the thesis, from Chapter II to Chapter V, references will be made to the possible connection of \textit{freedom from} with human existence and human nature. This investigation will be done more fully in the sixth chapter of the thesis. An attempt will be made to explain and tie together briefly the various ideas Fromm has on human
nature and human existence, and to relate these to what has been discovered about freedom from during the thesis. These inquiries will be preceded by a reflection on the general philosophical position of Erich Fromm, and its relation to Fromm's concept of freedom from. Throughout the thesis, too, reference is made to the types of proof Fromm uses to establish his meanings of freedom from and allied topics. There will be a further reflection in the sixth chapter on the validity and types of proof Fromm uses to establish his conceptions of freedom from. The last chapter will conclude with an attempt to explain the reasons for the ambiguities and seeming contradictions in Fromm's ideas, as disclosed during Chapters II-V.
CHAPTER II

FREEDOM FROM IN THE INDIVIDUAL

Introduction

The introductory chapter has just been concluded. The thought of the thesis now turns to an analysis of the concept of freedom from in the individual human being, as Erich Fromm sees it. In this chapter of the thesis the ontogenetic growth of the individual human being is the focal point of investigation, as contrasted with the phylogenetic growth of the human race in Chapters III and IV of this thesis. As indicated in Chapter I of this thesis, this present chapter is investigating Erich Fromm's conception of the development of the human individual, and doing so in his own terms of individuation and freedom, particularly freedom from.  

This chapter will be divided into four sections, the first section investigating Fromm's ideas of the origin and birth of the human individual as seen in terms of freedom from. The second and third sections of this chapter will be devoted to the ontogenetic development of the human individual, in terms of individuation and of freedom,

1 Cf. Chapter I, A, 5 and 6, p. 28-34 of this thesis.
particularly freedom from. This investigation will attempt to show why the process of individual human individuation is examined; the results will show that the processes of individual human individuation and of individual human freedom are very similar, if not identical, in Fromm's reflection on the nature of individual human development. The final section of the chapter will compare and summarize the points searched out in this second chapter.

In this searching for Fromm's thought, there will be kept in mind the viewpoint mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, that Fromm's outlook is that of realism in the sense that Fromm sees his described and evaluated events, both physical and mental, in human individual development, as belonging to the real extramental order, and known as being objectively true by the human mind.² It is also important to restate the fact that the investigation of the origin and development of freedom from in the individual will recognize Fromm's own setting for this origin and development, that of human nature and human existence.³

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3 Cf. Chapter I, A, 3, b, p. 19-20 of this thesis.
Ch. II, A. ORIGIN OF FREEDOM FROM IN THE INDIVIDUAL

According to Fromm the birth of the individual human being takes place when the child "...is no longer one with its mother and becomes a biological entity separate from her." This birth of the child has, in general, no special significance, for "in important aspects the life of the infant one week after birth is more like the intra-uterine existence than the existence of an adult man or woman." Thus the child in its beginnings continues its intra-uterine life of complete dependence on its mother. The independence the infant has from its mother, Fromm says, "...is only real in the crude sense of the separation of the two bodies. In a functional sense, the infant remains part of its mother." However, there is an important, a unique aspect of birth, according to Fromm. As he says, this unique aspect consists in this that "...the umbilical cord is severed, and the infant begins his first activity: breathing." This activity of breathing is the activity of the new individual, the first self-activity. This is

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4 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 25.
5 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 87.
7 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 87.
an important lesson in the functioning of the individual, for Fromm points out that "any severance of primary ties, from there on, is possible only to the extent to which this severance is accompanied by genuine activity." Thus Fromm points out that the first self-activity of the newborn organism is the way this organism is to function in the future if it is to go on separating itself from primary ties. As shall be seen later in this chapter this idea of self-activity as necessary for the further development of freedom from involves certain obscurities.

Thus is born the individual man. In Fromm's eyes this individual is "...the basic entity of the social process," with "...his desires and fears, his passions and reason, his propensities for good and evil." Only here at the beginning of his individual existence the child has a long growing process ahead of it for it to be able to carry on these activities in a mature way. The reason for this early helplessness is that self-awareness has not yet developed sufficiently. "The infant," Fromm says, "still feeling one with the mother, cannot yet say 'I', nor has he

8 Ibid., p. 87-88.
9 Cf. Chapter II, C, 1, c, p.102-104 of this thesis.
10 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. viii.
any need for it.\textsuperscript{11} Nor does the infant perceive things outside itself.\textsuperscript{12} Very probably the infant has very little awareness of what it means to be born.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore the newborn infant lacks a knowledge of itself, of its mother, of the outside world as separate entities. This birth is essentially a negative event, and a process.\textsuperscript{14} Fromm thus sees the birth of the human individual as the beginning of a process of a continual birth, that was preceded by an intra-uterine existence, and will continue through the life of the individual.

This is the human infant, shortly after birth, entirely dependent on its mother, needing to be taken care of by its mother in every vital aspect.\textsuperscript{15} The human infant at birth is "...the most helpless of all animals,"\textsuperscript{16} lacking physical strength and "...instinctive adaptation to nature."\textsuperscript{17} This infant, the basic entity of the social

\textsuperscript{11} Erich FROMM, \textit{The Sane Society}, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 26.


\textsuperscript{14} Erich FROMM, \textit{The Sane Society}, p. 27, and in \textit{Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis}, p. 83.


\textsuperscript{16} Erich FROMM, \textit{The Sane Society}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
process, has a great deal of growing to do before it is equipped to deal with mature problems.

For Fromm, then, the child at birth is physically separated from its mother. Psychologically the child's birth begins at the same time as physical birth but it is some time before the child is able to use the word 'I', in reference to itself, and then only after the child has learned to distinguish the outer world as "separate and different from himself," and only after the child becomes aware of himself as a distinct being.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus, in the origin of the individual human being, there is a severance of physical ties to the mother at birth, a physical freedom from. There is an act of freedom from the physical ties to mother, symbolized by the beginning of breathing on the part of the child. This act of physical separation is the beginning of a process and a continuing state of separation, of freedom from, symbolized in self-breathing, of needed future self-activity. This continued state or quality of separation is such that never can the child return physiologically to the womb of its mother. As yet there is probably no self-awareness or awareness of the objective separateness that the child de facto has; hence there are no feelings corresponding to

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 61.
FREEDOM FROM IN THE INDIVIDUAL

this objective separateness. In its mental life the child begins on a primitive level. Only much later is the child able to say 'I,' after realizing the difference and separateness of both the world and itself.

Ch. II, B. - DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUATION IN THE INDIVIDUAL

Ch. II, B, 1. - Introduction

In this part of Section B of Chapter II of the thesis, there will be a discussion of the growth of the human individual as Fromm conceives this growth. Section B is organized to discuss the growth of the individual human being in terms again of its freedom from, of its growing separation from all sorts of ties. The emphasis in the discussion will be on two points, the factual, step-by-step growth of freedom from in the human individual, and the explanation of this growth in terms of what Fromm calls "individuation."

Ch. II, B, 2. - Methodology

Before entering into the main development of Section B, it is necessary to first discuss several facets of the problem of methodology to be used in this part of Section B. First of all, the division of the growth of freedom from into that of the individual and that of the
human race in general presents certain problems of methodology and completeness of treatment of these two differing instances or types of freedom from. For instance, is it possible to really treat the growth of the individual apart from his social growth, when, according to Fromm's thinking, the individual is by his very nature a social being and primarily so?  

The growing child is certainly part of the family, which is the "psychic agent" of society for the growing child. By adjusting himself to his parents and their methods of training the child's character is formed. By "character" here is meant the "... (relatively permanent) form in which human energy is canalized in the process of assimilation and socialization." For the growing child his character is a "...human substitute for the instinctive apparatus of the animal." The individual's ideas, values, emotions and actions are channeled through his character, and influenced by it. His character, brought about through his parents' influence, makes the child share

19 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 290.
20 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 60.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 59.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 58-60.
in his parents' "social character," that character core they share with most members of their social class or culture. Thus the growing child is influenced by his family and through them by society.

In the discussion of the growth of the individual in freedom from there will be a precision from these socially determining influences on the growth of the child inasmuch as they are social. What is of interest here in Section B is not precisely the fact that the child (as well as the adult) is socially and culturally conditioned, and the extent of that conditioning in the formation of the individual. Rather attention is centered on the end product, the result and the effect of this conditioning, the individual in himself. What will be used are the de facto results of the conditioning of the growing individual by the family and society, the results within the growing individual.

Nor will there be a focus on the exact influence of the individual's physical, constitutional and temperamental factors on the psychic growth of the individual. Nor


26 This distinction follows Fromm's own analysis of the factors that go to make up personality. For he follows the American way of dividing personality into constitutional and character factors, with emphasis on character factors. Cf. e.g., Eich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 50-117.
will interest be centered on tracing the social and cultural effects of the environment on the individual's physical constitution and temperament, and the subsequent psychic results, nor on whether or not the social process operates in the individual "...behind the conscious mind," as Fromm avers.

It would seem that Fromm's theory of individual character and of social character is of considerable importance in itself; moreover his theory of social character is called by Fromm himself "...one of the key concepts" in all his writings. The value of Fromm's theory of personality growth, of his ideas on the influence of temperament, of constitution, of individual and social character on the growing individual may be admitted but there is no need to thoroughly explore these for correct information on the growth of freedom from in the individual.

27 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 51-54, 54-61.


29 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 54-61.

Use shall be made of the facts resulting from such social, constitutional and temperamental influence, and such influence shall be acknowledged where it is necessary to explain freedom from as it develops in the existence of the individual. But ordinarily a thorough explanation of these influences, which Fromm groups together under his theory of personality, is not needed to explain the growth of the individual's existence in freedom from, and shall not be used in this way in this thesis.

Ch. II, B, 3. - The Growth of the Individual

For Erich Fromm human birth is not just one act, but rather a process which continues on during life. The aim of human life, of living, is to be born every minute, to be "fully born." While physiologically the organic side of man, his cellular system, grows continually, is constantly being reborn, his psychological side, on the other hand, "...ceases to be born at a certain point." Some men never grow at all, they go on growing physiologically, yet mentally their longing is "...to return to the womb, to earth, darkness, death; they are insane or nearly so."

31 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 50-117.

32 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 88. The texts of the rest of this paragraph are from the same page.
For these men there is no success in cutting their ties to nature, to evil, and to death; there is no success in freeing themselves from these ties. On the other hand, however, many men do succeed in partially cutting the "umbilical cord" that has symbiotically tied them "...to mother, father, family, race, state, status, money, gods, etc." These men never "...become fully born;" the process of birth, of separation from these ties, is never fully accomplished in these men.

Fromm, in this same passage from Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis which has been used in the preceding paragraph, sees the growth of man as a continual birth, as a ridding oneself from ties that bind symbiotically. Fromm uses the term "symbiosis" to describe, in Escape from Freedom, an earlier work than Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, the union of two people that results in their loss of self-integrity and ends in complete dependence on each other. In this present text from Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, Fromm uses the term, symbiotic, to designate the loss of self-integrity and complete dependence of

33 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, 1941, p. 158.
34 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, 1960.
35 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 158.
the growing individual on persons such as father or mother, or on things, such as race, state and money. He thus uses an extended meaning of a term which was "...borrowed from biology," according to Ruth Munroe. Thus Fromm sees: the growth of the individual as a process, as an on-going series of connected events, both physiological and psychological. Especially does he see that the psychological part of this process, a separation from primary ties, is often halted and sometimes regresses in the individual.

Ch. II, B, 4. - The Process of Individuation

A specific description of the general outline of the process of individual growth now follows. It is felt necessary to go into Fromm's theory of "individuation" of the individual man in the discussion of freedom from, first of all, because of the close connection, if not identity between the process of individuation and the growing process of human freedom, including freedom from, and secondly, because of the intention to compare the relationship of freedom from with human nature in a later section. For individuation is the way that human nature develops, as

36 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 88.

37 Ruth L. MUNROE, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, p. 388.
will be seen shortly. Fromm sees in the process of individuation the general outline of how freedom from develops as well as freedom to. First of all there will be an exploration of the meaning of individuation and its essential qualities. After doing this a comparison of individuation with freedom will begin.

There are two passages which shall be concentrated on to compare individuation with freedom. Only the first of these passages shall be taken now, for it is the chief passage concerning individuation, which shall be investigated first before comparing individuation with freedom.

The complete text shall now be given and shall be called Passage I.

**Passage I**

The more the child grows and to the extent to which primary ties are cut off, the more it develops a quest for freedom and independence. But the fate of this quest can only be fully understood if we realize the dialectic quality in this process of growing individuation.

This process has two aspects: one is that the child grows (p. 29) stronger physically, emotionally, and mentally. In each of these spheres intensity and activity grow. At the same time, these spheres become more and more integrated. An organized structure guided by the individual's will and reason develops. If we call this organized and integrated whole of the personality the self, we can also say that the one side of the growing process of individuation is the growth of self-strength. The limits of the growth of individuation and the self are set, partly by individual conditions, but essentially by social conditions. For although the differences between individuals in this respect appear to be
great, every society is characterized by a certain level of individuation beyond which the normal individual cannot go.

The other aspect of the process of individuation is growing aloneness. The primary ties offer security and basic unity with the world outside of oneself. To the extent to which the child emerges from that world it becomes aware of being alone, of being an entity separate from all others. This separation from a world, which in comparison with one's own individual existence is overwhelmingly strong and powerful, and often threatening and dangerous, creates a feeling of powerlessness and anxiety. As long as one was an integral part of that world, unaware of the possibilities and responsibilities of individual actions, one did not need to be afraid of it. When one has become an individual, one stands alone and faces the world in all its perilous and overpowering aspects.

Impulses arise to give up one's individuality, to overcome the feeling of aloneness and powerlessness by completely submerging oneself in the world outside. These impulses, however, and the new ties arising from them, are not identical with the primary ties which have been cut off in the process of growth itself. Just as a child can never return to the mother's womb physically, so it can never reverse, psychically, the process of individuation. Attempts to do so necessarily assume the character of submission, in which the basic contradiction between the authority and the child who submits to it is never eliminated. Consciously the child may feel secure and satisfied, but unconsciously it realizes that the price it pays is giving up strength and the integrity of its self. Thus the result of submission is the very opposite of what it was to be: submission increases the child's insecurity and at the same time creates hostility and rebelliousness, which is the more frightening since it is directed against the very persons on whom the child has remained—or become—dependent.

However, submission is not the only way of avoiding aloneness and anxiety. The other way, the only one which is productive and does not end in an insoluble conflict, is that of spontaneous
relationship to man and nature, a relationship that connects the individual with the world without eliminating his individuality. This kind of relationship—the foremost expression of which are love and productive work—are rooted in the integration and strength of the total personality and are therefore subject to the very limits that exist for the growth of the self.38

There are two aspects, dialectically related, to Fromm's conception of human individuation, the first, that of the organized and integrated growth of the entire self, and the second, a growing aloneness, leading to a realization of this separateness, with consequent feelings of anxiety and powerlessness.39

There are two possible outcomes of this second aspect of individuation, of this aloneness, of this desolate isolation. First of all the individual may seek to reunite himself to the persons or the objects from which he has separated, by a complete submersion in them.40 This submersion would result from the impulse to "...give up one's individuality, to overcome the feeling of aloneness and powerlessness."41 Such a submission on the part of the child would be harmful, for both physical return to the mother's womb, and psychic return to primary ties is

38 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 28-30.
39 Ibid., p. 29.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
impossible, since, in Fromm's thought, the process of individuation is irreversible. The new ties resulting from such an attempt to reverse the process of individuation "are not identical with the primary ties which have been cut off in the process of growth itself." Unconsciously at least these new ties undermine the strength and integrity of the self, making the child more insecure, and creating hostility and rebelliousness against "the very persons on whom the child has remained—or become—dependent." In this paragraph Fromm seems to be postulating that any attachment to the parents on the part of the child through their authority is harmful to the child. He leaves no room in the child's life for authority.

The second possible outcome of the second aspect of the process of individuation is "...the only one which is productive and does not end in an insoluble conflict." In this second possible outcome a very positive relationship is inaugurated between the individual and other human beings and the world. This positive relationship is a "spontaneous relationship to man and nature, a relation-

42 Ibid., p. 30.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
ship that connects the individual to the world without eliminating his individuality. This productive, spontaneous relationship consists at least, and most importantly, in love and productive work. Since this spontaneous relationship is "...rooted in the integration and strength of the total personality," it is subject to the same limits as the self itself is subjected to. What productiveness or spontaneity mean Fromm does not say, except to state one result of this type of relationship, a preservation of the individual's individuality.

Thus it may be concluded that the total process of individuation consists of a twofold aspect, a positive one of growing strength, and a negative one of growing aloneness. To combat growing aloneness two ways are given, one a negative, unsatisfactory one of regression, an attempted regression, to primary ties, the other a positive one, of spontaneous, productive relationship to other men and to nature.

One unanswered question that appears from the analysis of this Passage I is the relationship between the

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46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
positive aspect of the process of individuation, the growth of self-strength, and the second possible outcome of the process of individuation, the spontaneous relationship to man and nature. This spontaneous relationship is said to be rooted in the integration and strength of the total personality, which is an obvious reference to the positive aspect of the process of individuation, the growth of self-strength. How is this rooted? Fromm does not say here. It will be seen later on that this question can only be answered by an investigation of the meaning of freedom to.

**Ch. II, B, 5. - Individuation as Irreversible**

There are two essential qualities of the process of individuation to which Fromm refers, firstly, that the process is irreversible, and secondly that it is dialectic. The first essential quality, the irreversibility of the process, will now be discussed. The process is irreversible, i.e., the child "...can never reverse, psychically, the process of individuation." The attempt to reverse the process of individuation cuts back the first aspect of individuation, the growth of the individual, and tries to

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49 *Cf. Chapter V, B, of this thesis.*

50 *Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 30.*
overcome aloneness by reverting to primary ties. Does an individual ever try to reverse his individuation? He does, in many ways, which ways Fromm describes in Chapter V of his book, *Escape from Freedom*, under the title of "Mechanisms of Escape." But such an attempt to reverse the process of individuation makes the individual realize, perhaps unconsciously, the loss of self-strength and integrity involved, and increased insecurity in the individual involved. What Fromm means here by irreversibility, then, is not an absolute, since he does say that the positive aspect of individuation, the growth of self-strength, can be lessened, i.e., reversed partially. What Fromm must mean, then, is that the second aspect, the growth of aloneness, cannot be reversed. In other words an attempt to restore a union with primary ties is impossible. From the text this is what he means, that growing aloneness cannot be overcome or really reversed, since any effort to do so simply increases insecurity. There is another principle implicit in Fromm's thinking here, too. Fromm in effect is saying that every man has a goal of spontaneous, productive relationships, the frustration of which leads

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inevitably to increased insecurity. This implies principle will be treated more fully in the analysis of Fromm's concept of human nature.

Ch. II, B, 6. - Individuation — A Dialectic Process

The second essential quality that Fromm ascribes to the process of individuation, i.e., that individuation is a dialectic process, will now be investigated. Fromm says that "the more a child grows and to the extent to which primary ties are cut off, the more it develops a quest for freedom and independence." But this quest and its result is only understandable, he says, "...if we realize the dialectic quality in this process of growing individuation." What is meant here by the word "dialectic"?

In the description of this dialectic process Fromm sees one process, consisting of two aspects, a positive one, and a negative one; these two aspects have differing, if not contradictory effects, with the positive effect or aspect, growing self-strength, opposed by the negative effect or aspect, growing aloneness, which causes anxiety and powerlessness. This process is resolved by a regressive

54 Ibid., p. 28.
55 Ibid.
movement to primary ties, or a positive, progressive movement towards increased self-strength through spontaneous relationships with others and with nature. Thus Fromm has one process, made up of two contradictory elements. The second of the two aspects, the negative element, leads to a resolution of the two aspects into a regression or a new birth, a new movement of spontaneous activity. 56

In summarizing Passage I Fromm refers to the general principle of growing individuation, i.e., "...the dialectic process which results from growing individuation and from growing freedom of the individual." 57 Here are two elements in this dialectic process, which Fromm now calls freedom to and freedom from. 58 In the same passage he also calls these two elements, growing strength of the individual and growing separateness, with a twofold outcome possible, a progressive one of a new kind of relatedness to the world, or a negative one of desolate isolation, anxiety and insecurity. 59 As in Passage I again there are two elements making up the one process, elements that have opposite or contradictory effects on the individual, with

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56 Ibid., p. 28-30.
57 Ibid., p. 30-31.
58 Ibid., p. 31.
59 Ibid.
two possible solutions, one negative of isolation, one positive, of a new relatedness to the world. As for freedom to and freedom from in Fromm's thought, they are linked together frequently by Fromm as together making up freedom. 60

There will be a comparison shortly of the notions of individuation and freedom, and it will be seen that they are closely connected, if not identical. The use of the word "dialectic" in the summary of Passage I just described to refer to both the process of individuation and to the process of growing freedom indicates that. At the moment one more text from Fromm's work, in which he uses the word, "dialectic," will be analyzed. In discussing the effect of capitalism on the whole character structure of modern man, Fromm refers to one aspect of the general problem as being "...the dialectic character of the process of growing freedom." 61 Fromm explains this as meaning that the structure of modern society "...affects man in two ways simultaneously," 62 with more independence, self-reliance, and use of critical ability as one way, and the other way


61 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 104.

62 Ibid.
consisting of more isolation, aloneness and fear. Fromm adds that the whole problem of freedom means seeing both sides of the process, and not losing "...track of one side while following the other." In this concept of "dialectic" Fromm states that both sides of the process must be simultaneous, and both must be kept in mind when studying the process.

To keep both of these elements in mind at once, and to understand them as simultaneously coming from one cause, though these elements are contradictory, is difficult for us, Fromm states, because conventionally "...we think in non-dialectical terms." So that in this passage on freedom's dialectical process Fromm infers that thinking in dialectical terms means that from one cause come two simultaneous and contradictory trends or elements.

If a synthesis is made of the different notes of the word, "dialectic," as seen in various passages in Fromm (and this may be done since the word "dialectic" is used in very similar if not identical texts regarding both individuation and freedom), then it is noticed that the word "dialectic" in Fromm's thought refers to a process,
made up of two contradictory elements or aspects. The elements of this process are simultaneous, and refer to one cause. What the one cause is Fromm does not say. It might be recalled here that Fromm's concept of human nature is that human nature is essentially "...a contradiction which is rooted in the very conditions of human existence," a contradiction seeking a solution. Later in Chapter VI there will be an investigation of the connection between Fromm's concept of human nature and his concept of freedom. It will be found that there is a close connection between them.

Ch. II, C. - DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM FROM IN THE INDIVIDUAL

Ch. II, C, 1. - In General

Ch. II, C, 1, a. - Introduction

The discussion now turns to the question, not yet treated in detail, of the connection in Fromm's thought between the process of individuation and the process of growing freedom. As we have stated above such a comparison is necessary, firstly, because of the close connection between

66 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, p. 120.

67 CfChapter II, B, 4, p. 72-73 of this thesis.
or possibly the identity between the process of individuation and the process of growing freedom, including freedom from, and secondly, because of the relationship to be explored more fully in the last chapter of the thesis between freedom from and human nature as Fromm conceives them. And individuation, as shall be seen in the last chapter, is the way individual human nature develops.

The chief development of the theory of the process of individuation and freedom of the individual is contained in Erich Fromm's first book in English, Escape from Freedom. The chief passage dealing with the process of individuation has already been fully given in this thesis, and has been called Passage I. The chief passage dealing with the growth, the dialectic growth, of freedom in general outline occurs in the same text, Escape from Freedom, beginning with the words "The problem of submission..." and ending with the words "...relatedness to the world."

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68 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom.

69 Cf. Chapter II, B, 4, p. 73-75 of this thesis.

Passage I has already been carefully analyzed to investigate the meaning of individuation. It shall now be looked at to find out what light it sheds on the relationship between individuation and freedom. Special attention shall be paid to the introductory part of the passage, which will then be summarized briefly, since it has already been given a thorough analysis.

Passage I is introduced by the statement that "the more the child grows and to the extent to which primary ties are cut off, the more it develops a quest for freedom and independence." Two movements are shown here, one of growing and one of separation. Their result is a developing quest for freedom and independence. How will this quest turn out? The answer to this question, Fromm says, depends on our understanding of the dialectic quality in "...this process of growing individuation." What does "individuation" mean here? It refers back to the twofold process just described in the previous sentence, the process of the growing child and the cutting off of primary ties. This is confirmed by the immediate description in the following two paragraphs of the twofold process. In addition somehow or other the search for "freedom and independence" grows along with this twofold dialectic
process of individuation. This phrase, "freedom and inde­
pendence," seems to be either a result of this twofold
process of individuation or to be identical with it. The
text itself does not say, nor does the context offer any
certain solution. A text in the same chapter previous to
Passage I offers another instance of the connection of
individuation and freedom: "Once the stage of complete
individuation is reached and the individual is free from
these primary ties, he is confronted with a new task." 71
This text links freedom and individuation and freedom but
does not disclose the exact nature of this relationship.

Passage I shows individuation as a dialectic
process consisting of two aspects and two possible outcomes.
In brief summary it can be said that these two aspects of
the process of individuation are, firstly, "...the child
grows stronger physically, emotionally, and mentally. In
each of these spheres intensity and activity grow. At the
same time these spheres become more and more integrated." 72
With this integrated and organized whole of the personality
being called the self, this first phase of the dialectic
process of individuation of the individual can be called
"... the growth of self-strength." 73 The other aspect of

71 Ibid., p. 25.
72 Ibid., p. 28-29.
73 Ibid., p. 29.
the process of individuation of the individual, Fromm says, is "...growing aloneness." As the primary ties with the world outside of the individual are broken, so is security and basic unity with the world. The individual becomes aware of the extent of its emergence from these primary ties with the world, thus becoming aware of being alone, of "...being an entity separate from all others." Before an overwhelmingly strong world the individual feels powerless, anxious and afraid.

The two possible outcomes of this "aloneness", of the second aspect of this process of individual individuation, are, firstly, an attempt to return to the primary ties, to submit oneself to authority, which is bound to make the child even more insecure, and at the same time hostile and rebellious towards the persons on whom the child tries to depend again, or to continue depending; this ends in an insoluble conflict. The second possible outcome of this aloneness would be a productive "...spontaneous relationship to man and nature, a relationship that connects the individual with the world without eliminating

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
his individuality. This type of relationship, with love and productive work as the foremost examples, is rooted in the integration and strength of the total personality. This diagram may help to illustrate the process of growing individuation of the individual.

![Diagram]

Ch. II, C, 1, c. - Individuation and Freedom From -
Analysis of Passage II

The second passage referred to in this discussion is one from the same book, Escape from Freedom, and immediately follows the long passage which was called Passage I. This passage of Escape from Freedom shall be called Passage II. The complete text of Passage II, consisting of two paragraphs, follows.

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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., p. 30-31.
The problem of submission and of spontaneous activity as two possible results of growing individuation will be discussed later on in great detail; here I only wish to point to the general principle, the dialectic process which results from growing individuation and from growing freedom of the individual. The child becomes more free to develop and express its own individual self unhampered by those ties which were limiting it. But the child also becomes more free from a world which gave it security and reassurance. The process of individuation is one of growing strength and integration of its individual personality, but it is at the same time a process in which the original identity with others is lost and in which the child becomes more separate from them. This growing separation may result in an isolation that has the quality of desolation and creates intense anxiety and insecurity; it may result in a new kind of closeness and solidarity with others if the child has been able to develop the inner strength and productivity which are the premise of this new kind of relatedness to the world.

If every step in the direction of separation and individuation were matched by the corresponding growth of the self, the development of the child would be harmonious. This does not occur, however. While the process of individuation takes place automatically, the growth of the self is hampered for a number of individual and social reasons. The lag between these two trends results in an unbearable feeling of isolation and powerlessness, and this in turn leads to psychic mechanisms, which later on are described as mechanisms of escape.\footnote{Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 30-31.}

The first thing to point out about Passage II is that it is an explanation of the dialectical principle found in the preceding pages of Passage I. The first sentence of Passage II says in effect: "Let us look again
at the general principle behind these two possible results or outcomes of growing individuation." And Passage II then goes on to discuss this general principle in terms now of "individuation" and "freedom" rather than just in terms of "individuation" as in Passage I.

This passage, it is seen, refers to growing freedom and individuation as giving origin to the dialectic process. Here the words, "individuation" and "freedom" are paired to describe the antecedent, the "cause," of the result, i.e., of "freedom from" and "freedom to." Individuation and freedom, both growing, give as their result a dialectic process of "freedom to" and "freedom from." "Freedom to" means a freedom for the child to "...develop and express its own individual self unhampered by the ties which were limiting it." "Freedom from" means that the child becomes "...more free from a world which gave it security and reassurance." Immediately after this description of the dialectic process in terms of freedom comes the statement that "the process of individuation is one of growing strength and integration of its individual personality, but it is at the same time a process in which

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., p. 31.
84 Ibid.
the original identity with others is lost and in which the child becomes more separate from them."85 This growing separation, this text goes on to say, may have two outcomes, one of isolation, linked with desolation, and creating "...intense anxiety and insecurity," or the other of new closeness and solidarity, providing the child has enough inner strength and productivity for this new kind of relationship to the world.86

The text puts the dialectic process as resulting from both "individuation" and "freedom." Are these two the same? One way is to look at the text as just described in the preceding paragraph. There it will be noted that this dialectic process is described in two ways, as a process of growing "freedom," and as a process of growing "individuation." The process of individuation is seen in the same general way as in Passage I, with, in general, the same two aspects, one the growing strength and integration of the individual, and the other, a process in which identity with others is lost and the child becomes more separate from them. What is called aloneness in Passage I is called here loss of identity or separateness. The two possible outcomes are in general the same in both passages.

85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
In the first passage the first outcome of aloneness is powerlessness, anxiety and fear; in the second passage the first outcome of loss of identity and separateness is desolate isolation, with intense anxiety and insecurity. In the first passage the second possible outcome of aloneness is described as a productive, spontaneous relationship to man and to nature, which is rooted in the strength and integration of the entire personality; in the second passage the second possible outcome of loss of identity and separateness is described as a new kind of closeness and solidarity depending on the inner strength and productivity of the child.

One element in Passage II not contained in Passage I is this, that if both sides of the process of growing individuation were equally matched, then the child's development would be harmonious. Actually the positive aspect is always frustrated, and hence the negative aspect gets out of hand, and increases isolation to the unbearable point, leading to escape mechanisms.

There are certain obscurities in these two passages from Escape from Freedom, which will be discussed later in this part of the thesis. At present general conclusions will be given on the relationship between individuation and freedom drawn from the comparison of these two passages just mentioned. Fromm uses Passage II as a way of
summarizing Passage I. In Passage I the entire discussion centers around a dialectic process called "individuation," with one reference to "freedom and independence" as in some way connected with this dialectic process of individuation. Passage II does summarize well Passage I in this respect, that the descriptions of the process of individuation are identical in structure and very similar in the wordings of the contents of these structures.

However, Passage II is described as a dialectic process resulting from both individuation and freedom. And in this same passage freedom is described dialectically immediately prior to the dialectic description of individuation. In addition in Passage I, at its beginning, freedom is described as related to individuation. Just how it is related is not stated. The question might be raised then, "Just how are individuation and freedom related?" Are they two separate realities, but connected somehow within the growing individual? Or are they really one and the same reality but this reality looked at under two different aspects? If this last statement is true, then what kind of a relationship exists between them? Which is prior conceptually? Based on the evidence seen so far it seems highly probable that both individuation and freedom are one and the same reality, looked at under two different aspects, with freedom looked at as intrinsic to
If individuation and freedom are one and the same process, viewed differently, then it can be concluded that growing freedom from, the negative aspect of the dialectic of freedom, is not only certainly what it is claimed to be in Passage II, a process by which "...the child also becomes more free from a world which gave it security and reassurance," but is also probably the negative aspect of growing individuation, i.e. "...a process in which the original identity with others is lost and in which the child becomes more separate from them." Actually these two formulations, one of growing freedom from, the other of the negative aspect of growing individuation are practically the same. These texts mentioned here give rise to the conclusion that these texts, set in the context of the dialectic process which results from growing individuation and growing freedom, prove that quite probably growing freedom from and the negative aspect of growing individuation are one and the same process, although conceptually different. The probability of this identity is confirmed by the fact that both freedom from and the negative aspect of individuation in these texts from Passage II are said

87 Ibid., p. 31.

88 Ibid.
to proceed from "...growing individuation and from growing freedom"\textsuperscript{89} without distinction, and are parallel passages from, respectively, the description of the dialectic growth of freedom, and the description of the dialectic process of individuation.

Before going on to discuss the development of freedom from in the individual human being in more specific detail, one obscurity shall be discussed which was mentioned earlier in this text,\textsuperscript{90} which is connected with the comparison of individuation and freedom from just seen from Passage II. In this passage it is said that from "...growing individuation and from growing freedom" results a dialectic process.\textsuperscript{91} What is this dialectic process? It is the twofold way Fromm has of describing this process, first freedom by freedom to and freedom from, and secondly individuation by positive individuation, growing strength, etc., and negative individuation, loss of identity with others, etc.\textsuperscript{92} But the "...growing individuation and growing freedom,"\textsuperscript{93} from which the dialectic process of

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 30-31.
\textsuperscript{90} Cf. Chapter II, C, 1, c, p. 93-94 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{91} Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 30-31.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., p. 31.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 30-31.
individuation and freedom comes, is itself a dialectic process, a summary of the dialectic process described in Passage I. 94 What Fromm seems to be saying here is this, that from the dialectic process of growing individuation and freedom result the dialectic process of growing individuation and freedom. This is rather an awkward way, it would seem, of saying that this dialectic process of growing individuation and growing freedom, as a process, continues to develop as the same process.

There is one other obscurity in this comparison of Passage I and Passage II that should be mentioned just now. It is this, that the word "individuation," as used in connection with the treatment of the growth of individuation of the individual human being in Chapter II of Escape from Freedom, 95 as seen above in Passages I and II, has sometimes a different meaning than the total dialectic process of individuation. On two occasions at least the word "individuation" refers to the negative aspect of individuation only. The first occasion of this happening is in Chapter II of Escape from Freedom, where it is said that

94 Ibid., p. 28-30.
95 Ibid., p. 24-39.
Once the stage of complete individuation is reached and the individual is free from these primary ties, he is confronted with a new task: to orient and root himself in the world and to find security in other ways than those which were characteristic of his preindividualistic existence. Freedom then has a different meaning from the one it had before this stage of evolution is reached. 96

In this passage a contrast is made between a stage where "...complete individuation is reached and the individual is free from these primary ties," 97 and the new task of reunion with the world in a new way. 98 This new task means a new concept of freedom. What is said here is that a new orientation is needed once complete individuation is reached. If "individuation" here means the complete dialectical process as referred to in Passage I 99 and Passage II, 100 then the new orientation referred to would already have been completely accomplished. Rather what is said here is a contrast, contrasting complete "individuation" in a negative sense, a freedom from primary ties, with a rooting oneself in the world, a new orientation, bringing a new meaning to freedom. This new orientation is later described in approximately the same terms as the positive

96 Ibid., p. 25.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 28-30.
100 Ibid., p. 30-31.
aspect of individuation in Passage I and Passage II.\textsuperscript{101}

Therefore the "complete individuation" referred to here means a negative individuation, a separation from primary ties. This is confirmed by the parallel way of describing this complete individuation in the words that immediately follow, "...and the individual is free from these primary ties." It is worth noting here that this total passage confirms the relationship between the negative aspect of individuation and \textit{freedom from} as being a close relationship, with \textit{freedom from} being either the same as negative individuation or the result of it.

The meaning of "individuation" in this passage of \textit{Escape from Freedom} is further confirmed as meaning negative individuation by the preceding text in the same Chapter II, "The growing process...his social caste."\textsuperscript{102}

Referring to "individuation" as it is in the human race, "individuation" is explained as "the growing process of the emergence of the individual from his original ties."\textsuperscript{103}

This is a definition in negative terms; nothing is said about any positive aspect of individuation, of any positive growth of the self as was explained earlier in the

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{101}] Ibid., p. 28-30, 30-31.
\item [\textsuperscript{102}] Ibid., p. 24-25.
\item [\textsuperscript{103}] Ibid., p. 24.
\end{itemize}
thesis in Passage I and Passage II. Furthermore, in this same preceding text, the word "individuation" is now referred to the growth of the individual; Fromm states that "in the life history of an individual we find the same process," i.e., individuation. The passage chiefly discussed in these last several paragraphs, "Once the stage... evolution is reached," refers to this usage of "individuation" in the sense of what is happening in the life of the human individual. Thus it is presupposed, unless other indications intervene, that "individuation" is used in this text of Escape from Freedom in the same sense as it has been used in the preceding paragraphs, with which it forms one total context of explanation. And there are no indications that "individuation" has anything but a negative meaning in these pages of Escape from Freedom. Therefore it can with confidence be asserted that "individuation" here is used in the negative sense alone, of the emergence of an individual from primary ties, i.e., from "...ties that exist before the process of individuation

104 Ibid., p. 28-30, 30-31.
105 Ibid., p. 24-25.
106 Ibid., p. 25.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., p. 24-25.
has resulted in the complete emergence of an individual. 109

The other place in this discussion of the relationship of individuation and freedom where the word "individuation" is used in a negative case only is in Escape from Freedom, in the second paragraph of Passage II. 110

The text is as follows:

If every step in the direction of separation and individuation were matched by the corresponding growth of the self, the development of the child would be harmonious. This does not occur however. While the process of individuation takes place automatically, the growth of the self is hampered for a number of individual and social reasons. 111

Here in this text, in the first sentence, a conditional one, the antecedent compares two things that are going on in the process of individual change, first, steps "...in the direction of separation and individuation," and secondly, a "...corresponding growth of the self." 112

These two contrasting events in the growing life of the individual are drawn from the preceding passage, Passage II, where "individuation" is used to describe both aspects of the growing strength and integration of the individual, and the negative one of identity lost and separation from

109 Ibid., p. 25.
110 Ibid., p. 30-31.
111 Ibid., p. 31.
112 Ibid., p. 31.
Here in the text being discussed now, these same two contrasting events are put into the antecedent clause of the conditional sentence. In this antecedent clause the phrase, "separation and individuation" is used to describe the negative aspect of this growth only, and not the positive aspect of "corresponding growth of the self." Furthermore, in the same paragraph, in the third sentence "While the process...and social reasons," the contrast is made again. In the dependent temporal clause of this third sentence, "While the process...takes place automatically," it is said that "...the process of individuation takes place automatically," whereas in the independent clause of this third sentence, the "growth of the self" is discussed. Again, there is a contrast, with "individuation" taking place automatically, and referring back to its usage in the first sentence of this paragraph, where it means "separation and individuation," and is used negatively as we have just seen. The independent clause of this third sentence, describing the growth of the self,

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113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
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says that this growth of the self is hampered, referring to the consequent clause of the first sentence of this paragraph. Here then in the third sentence of this paragraph, "individuation" is contrasted with a positive growth of self. One process, "individuation," grows automatically, whereas "the growth of the self" is hampered. This contrast is referred back to the first sentence of this paragraph, where the same contrast occurs. Thus "individuation" in this paragraph is not used in the complete sense of a dialectic twofold process, but is used to describe only the negative aspect of this individuation.

The preceding sections have shown that, with high probability, if not certainty, "individuation" in a negative sense of separation and "freedom from" have one and the same meaning.\(^{117}\) In addition it has just been stated that the negative aspect of individuation takes place automatically.\(^{118}\) Thus freedom from in the developing individual may be said to occur automatically. This conclusion seems to clash with the idea presented in the first part of this chapter, that self-activity will characterize the process of freedom from in the growing human individual.\(^{119}\)

\(^{117}\) Cf. Chapter II, C, 1, c, p.95-96 of this thesis.

\(^{118}\) Cf. Chapter II, C, 1, c, p.102-103 of this thesis.

How is this difficulty to be resolved?

An automatic process is not a self-active process, for a self-active process in Fromm's thought involves spontaneity and active, creative participation of the self in the process. Even if one were to note that Fromm's later ideas on the activity involved in freeing from primary ties disclose much struggle and effort, as well as fear in the individual human being, still this is not to deny that developing freedom from is automatic. Furthermore Fromm avers that freedom from actually proceeds apart from freedom to, the latter's development depending on environmental possibilities, whereas freedom from (individuation) proceeding by its own law apparently, is "automatic." Thus the contradiction seems to remain.

Before concluding this part of Chapter II on the general lines of development of individuation and freedom in the individual human being, it might be wise to pause in order to ask the question: Why does Erich Fromm use both words, "individuation" and "freedom" to describe the same dialectic process? A tentative answer follows.

120 Cf. Chapter V, B, 2, b, passim, of this thesis.
121 Cf. Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 27.
122 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 31.
First of all it is necessary to explore more fully the possible uses of the word "individuation." In a biological sense James Drever in *A Dictionary of Psychology* defines "individuation" as "the emergence, in the course of development, of individual structures, parts, and organs, together with specific functions, out of homogeneity and mass activity." It is this biological sense and in addition an evolutionary sense, that Ruth Munroe sees as dominating Fromm's conception of individuation, and as leading to a new kind of individuation, "man's basic problem and opportunity," the need "...to seek new, independent, and reasoned solutions to the problems of his existence." Thus Munroe sees a shift of meaning in Fromm's use, from a biological sense of the word to a new, psychic, human sense. She sees in Fromm's thoughts biological individuation leading to a search for the meaning of man's life. That individuation can refer to man's conscious development, too, must have been clear from

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125 Ibid., p. 351.

126 Ibid., p. 353.

127 Ibid.
Fromm's knowledge of Jung's use of the concept.\textsuperscript{128} The word "freedom" itself has many meanings, but Fromm uses it in this analysis of the basic texts from \textit{Escape from Freedom} as equivalent to "individuation."\textsuperscript{129} One can see why Fromm would choose this word to describe the newness of man in nature, showing as it does the new kind of indeterminacy resulting in man from minimum instinctual coercion, a separation almost entire from the coercion of instinct, as well as the resulting openness to varied, necessarily self-active growth through a new self-awareness.

As shall be seen, Fromm actually uses freedom in its positive aspect as a means of describing the process of striving towards man's goal, and the description of the achieved goal.\textsuperscript{130} This involves a new reality in nature, values to be achieved by man. What seems to happen is this, that Fromm turns from the word, "individuation," apt to describe more particularly biological or psychological processes, to the word "freedom," a word more properly


\textsuperscript{129} Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, Chapter II, passim.

\textsuperscript{130} Cf. Chapter V, B, passim, of this thesis.
found in human experience, involving as it does the value system man builds up, and by which he guides his life. If to this conjecture is added Fromm's Marxism, and Marx's description of man as in search of freedom and independence, a fulfillment of his potentiality, a "freedom to" and a "freedom from" as Fromm says, then it is a probable conjecture that Fromm shifted his viewpoint, so that he might look upon man, dialectically developing, as developing in terms of a value, "freedom," rather than as a biological entity in terms of "individuation." This would be a shift, then, from a biological viewpoint, or even a psychological viewpoint, to a philosophical viewpoint.

Before proceeding on to Section C, 2, of this Chapter, it may be wise to pause a moment, to briefly reflect on Fromm's procedure in developing his general picture of the growth of the individual in freedom and individuation, particularly their negative aspects. What will be stated here are simply indicated lines of Fromm's way of proving the position explained in Sections B and C, 1, of this Chapter, and of the certainty he has of these positions.

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131 Cf. Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, passim.

132 Erich FROMM, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 37-38.
First of all, what he has done is to give a general picture, seemingly universal, a description of the processes of human individual growth. Although obscure and ambiguous points are present in this general picture, yet the broad framework is presented as universally true for all cases, for all human individuals. And this process as conceived by Fromm, is universally operative in the reality of individual human growth, is asserted without any sign or indication of doubt or probability, i.e., as certain. These notes of universality and certainty are evident from a perusal of Fromm's texts as developed in Sections B and C, 1, of this thesis. 133

Is this universality and certainty due, in Fromm, to an induction from particular cases? He does not say so, nor does he try to prove these assertions by actually giving specific cases from which he might try to prove the universal. Yet these universal statements do seem to represent Fromm's conception of the particularized development of the individual which will be described in Section C, 2, of this chapter. It does seem likely that the universal statement of the development of the individual in freedom and individuation does depend on the evidence as

133 Cf. Sections B and C, 1, of this Chapter, particularly the form of Passages I and II.
presented in Section C, 2, of this chapter. Yet there is
no clear textual evidence in this part, although Fromm
himself asserts in general his findings to be backed up by
data drawn from his clinical experience. To answer this
question fully, though, it would be necessary to inquire
more fully into the possibility that Fromm is using some
sort of supposition, e.g., of dialectical growth, that
would explain the certainty and universality of this gen-
eral position. For this reason, further discussion of the
problem of how Fromm tries to prove this general assertion
will be reserved for Chapter VI of this thesis, where an
attempt will be made to tie in Fromm's methods and results
of proof with his general philosophical estimate of the
nature of reality.

Ch. II, C. 2.- Development of Freedom From in the
Individual — In Concrete Detail

Ch. II, C. 2, a. - Introduction

The description and comparison of the general
structure of growing individuation and growing freedom from
in the individual human being has been just concluded.

134 Cf. Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, Its Genius
for Good and Evil, p. 15; Richard I. EVANS, Dialogue with
Erich Fromm, p. 74-84.

135 Cf. Chapter VI, D, of this thesis.
Certain properties of the process of individuation in the individual human being, and certain ambiguities in the use of the word "individuation" have also been discussed. Fromm's ideas of how the individual human being develops in concrete detail, from after birth to adulthood, will now be investigated. In this explanation of Fromm's ideas there will be an emphasis on the development of freedom from, and therefore it will not be necessary to go thoroughly into his conception of the varied structures and functions of the individual human being, unless these conceptions will help to describe the growth of freedom from in the growing individual.

Ch. II, C, 2, b. - Basic Structure of Individual Development

The key to Erich Fromm's ideas on the development of the child is twofold, it is a developing individuation and it is a developing freedom. Primarily of interest here is in the growth in freedom from, in the continuance of what Fromm saw at the birth of a child as the separation from its mother, a physical separation. There must also be, in addition, an emphasis on the inseparability of human existence and freedom, which, in Fromm's thought, are

136 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 25.
"...from the beginning inseparable,"\textsuperscript{137} where freedom means a freedom from instinctual determinations of one's actions.\textsuperscript{138} This conception in this passage of the inseparability of freedom from and human existence as such, is applied primarily by Fromm to the human race as such, to the phylogenetic growth of human beings. Fromm, before this passage has been discussing the phylogenetic history of man.\textsuperscript{139} But since he is talking in this passage about human existence as such, and not human existence as conditioned by the social environment, then this passage can also be applied to each human being individually.

Ch. II, C, 2, c. - Separation from Primary Ties

The general development of freedom from, as one aspect of the dialectic process of growing freedom, in which the child "...becomes more free from a world which gave it security and reassurance,"\textsuperscript{140} is of interest here. This discussion centers about the growth of freedom, whose lack means that "...the individual, figuratively speaking, has not yet completely severed the umbilical cord which

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p. 32.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Ibid., p. 31-32.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 31.
\end{itemize}
fastens him to the outside world."\textsuperscript{141} The child is fastened to the world by "primary ties," which "...give him security and a feeling of belonging and of being rooted somewhere," and which exist "...before the process of individualization has resulted in the complete emergence of the individual." These ties, Fromm says, are "...organic in the sense that they are part of normal human development," and ties that connect the child with its mother, the member of a primitive community with its clan and nature, or the medieval man with the Church and his social caste." In this section, discussing the growth of the individual in freedom from, then, it will be shown that Fromm's thought on the gradual separation of the individual from these primary ties.

Every one of these ties will not be discussed in detail, nor will there be a discussion of all of the possible ties, but an effort will be made to trace the growing separation of the individual from the ties common to all individuals, in their growth from birth to adulthood. Nor will there be an inquiry into the specific, detailed questions as to how much and in what ways the environment influences the development of the growing individual. As Fromm says, individual human beings have the "...same

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p. 25. The texts in the rest of this paragraph are from the same page.
fundamental human qualities;"¹⁴² they have "...certain inherent mechanisms and laws,"¹⁴³ they are "...charged with energy and structured in specific ways,"¹⁴⁴ they adapt themselves yet react "...in specific and ascertainable ways to external conditions."¹⁴⁵ It is this fundamental human nature, and not with the conditions to which it must adapt itself that is going to primarily be discussed here, with its growth in freedom from. What is the basic growth in freedom from is the main question.

For Erich Fromm, man's being born, and being cut off forever physically from its mother, means "...that the process of birth is by no means an easy one."¹⁴⁶ At each stage of birth, each new stage, the subject of two conflicting tendencies, the first, to emerge "...from an animal form of existence into a more human existence, from bondage to freedom, another to return to the womb, to nature, to certainty and security."¹⁴⁷ Each new act of

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 264.
¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 15.
¹⁴⁴ Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 23.
¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
¹⁴⁶ Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 27.
¹⁴⁷ Ibid.
birth is accompanied by an intense struggle, by fear or the next step. Each new step into his growing human existence means giving up a secure state, "...which was relatively known, for one which is new, which one has not yet mastered." In these texts Fromm sees each human being as endowed with a tendency to free oneself from what remains of the animal kingdom, to give up security, to pass from being bound by ties into a state of freedom, i.e., from these ties. Thus the whole life of an individual is seen by Fromm as a process, as a struggle, urged on by the innate tendency to do so, to free oneself, to become born ever more, with the result that each man should be fully born by the time of death, a success only a minority attain.

What are these ties that bind a child? Let there first be a discussion of the ties an infant finds in the first stages of its growth. The ties that bind a child, and limit its freedom, are manifold, but "the most elementary of the natural ties is the tie of the child to the mother." The child is physically helpless and dependent

148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
151 Ibid., p. 38.
on its mother; all of its physiological needs are met by its mother, who is "food" and the "fountain of life" to the child.\textsuperscript{152} The child as an infant only experiences his own body and his own needs, physiological among them.\textsuperscript{153} Not only are the infant's physiological needs met, but also its psychological needs, too, by its mother. The infant's "...vital need for warmth and affection depend on her."\textsuperscript{154} Mother is love and warmth for the infant.\textsuperscript{155} Psychologically, too, the infant is bound by its lack of knowledge. Oneness with the world belongs to the infant, a oneness before any realistic or objective recognition of other people or other things.\textsuperscript{156}

As infancy passes, gradually the child comes to awareness of reality outside, to know itself as an "I" differentiated from a "thou,"\textsuperscript{157} through the growth of sensory perception, leading up to the naming of objects, which presupposes knowing them as separate from others.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 38-39.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p. 34.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., p. 34.
The process of education enters, with a number of frustrations and prohibitions, and further sharpens the distinction between the child and those around him. It is not however, until the age of seven or eight that the child is able to lay aside its narcissistic state emotionally, and is able to consider the needs of others as important as his own.

In these last two paragraphs the growing child has been talked about as it gradually frees itself from its primary ties. It has been noted that there is an inherent tendency in the child to do just this; the process, according to Fromm, of individuation in the negative sense, or freedom from, takes place automatically. By this process of continual birth the child gradually separates itself from others psychologically. The child becomes aware of itself as a separate entity, as an "I." In many ways the child grows, including overcoming itself from "...the seduction of the senses for the sake of an integrated life." Objective love of others begins to develop around the age of seven or eight.

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159 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 35.
160 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 31.
However, the process of separation from primary ties is a long drawn out process. Whereas from birth to puberty the child leans on the power of its parents and fears this power, around the time of puberty the child, in some cases, is able to fend for itself economically.\textsuperscript{162} "Sexual desire," Fromm says, "and sexual satisfaction bind a person to those outside of his family."\textsuperscript{163} Independence, in the sense of freedom from, from authorities, whether parental or social, is only acquired years after puberty, and even then leaves the adult helpless in many ways, and therefore striving to find powers that will "...protect him and give him certainty."\textsuperscript{164} The adult lives under the illusion that he is thinking, feeling and deciding for himself, whereas generally he is borrowing his thoughts, his


\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., p. 155-156.
feelings, his goals and values from protecting powers. This is a dependence on these powers, a loss of freedom, a stunting of growth. This is a loss of the positive aspect of the dialectic process of individuation, a loss in "freedom to," as shall be seen in Chapter V of this thesis. The only way complete, full freedom can be reached is when "...the individual thinks, feels, and decides for himself." In such a freedom a complete separation from primary ties and other non-productive ties is involved, as well as "...a productive relatedness to the world outside" on the part of the individual. The adult, even though mature in age, continues to need help, warmth and protection, "...in many ways differing and yet in many ways similar to the child." This indicates a refusal "...to leave the all-enveloping orbit of the mother."

165 Ibid., p. 156.
166 Ibid.
167 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 31.
168 Erich FROMM, The Dogma of Christ, p. 156.
170 Erich FROMM, The Dogma of Christ, p. 156.
171 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 39.
172 Ibid.
Before reviewing and synthesizing the concept of freedom from as it is seen in the development of the individual from birth to adulthood, it will be well to develop more fully one particular aspect of freedom from that occurs in childhood and continues on into adult life. There is reference here to the relationship of the growing child to authority just mentioned in the last paragraph. In Fromm's thinking this is a very involved subject, as shall be seen. There will be a study of it only as a possible manifestation of one aspect of growing individuation, of growing freedom from in the life of the growing child.

For the child, leaning on authority in the first years is a different thing than "...leaning on authority later on." The reason for this is that the authority the child leans on in its first years is not realized as being different than the child itself; this authority, parents' or somebody else's, is not yet realized as fundamentally separate from the child. Once this separation is realized, then submission to authority takes on a

174 Ibid., p. 27.
different aspect. This is the aspect now to be discussed, the superior-inferior, or authority-subject relationship in the growing child.

Before the child's relationship to authority is discussed, however, it is important to discuss as background three basic Frommian concepts, the difference between rational and irrational authority, the difference between internal and external authority, and the difference between authoritarian and humanistic conscience. First there is a discussion of what Fromm means by the difference between rational and irrational authority.

For Fromm the essential difference between rational and irrational authority is in their sources. For him the source of rational authority is the competence of the task performed by the person to whom others have entrusted this task. This person, functioning as authority, has as his task to help competently, not exploit those he is helping; only as long as the authority is competently

175 Ibid.

177 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 9.
helping does the authority last. The relationship of authority to those he is helping tends to dissolve itself, since the one being helped by the authority tends to become more and more equal to the authority. The condition for helping is the superiority of the one helping; as the inferior, subject to authority, becomes more and more like the superior, the authority, through identification, then the differences between them disappear, and so does the authority relationship. This means a disappearance of dependence, of helplessness. The inferior frees himself from this objective helplessness, by becoming and growing stronger and more worthwhile.

The opposite is true of what Fromm calls "irrational authority" in Man for Himself, and "inhibiting authority" in his earlier book, Escape from Freedom. The source of the irrational authority of one person or institution over another is always "...power over

178 Ibid.
179 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 165.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 9-10.
183 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 164-166.
people.\textsuperscript{184} This power may be physical or mental, realistic or relative in terms of the helplessness of the inferior.\textsuperscript{185} Inequality, implying difference in fundamental value of the superior and inferior, is the basis for this irrational authority;\textsuperscript{186} in irrational authority the inferior has his freedom limited and is exploited.\textsuperscript{187} Fromm points out that actually in reality the two types of authority, rational and irrational, though essentially different, are blended together.\textsuperscript{188}

In addition to these distinctions between rational and irrational authority, Fromm sees another division in authority, between authority from without, or external authority, and authority from within, or internal authority. External authority would be "...a person or institution which says: you have to do this, or you are not allowed to do that."\textsuperscript{189} The conduct following from conforming to these commands is a matter of expediency; such conduct is "...regulated by fear of punishment and hope for reward,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 184 Erich FROMM, \textit{Man for Himself}, p. 9.
  \item 185 Ibid.
  \item 186 Ibid., p. 9-10.
  \item 187 Erich FROMM, in \textit{Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis}, p. 120; cf. Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 165.
  \item 188 Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 166.
  \item 189 Ibid.
\end{itemize}
always dependent on the presence of these authorities, on their knowledge of what one is doing, and their alleged or real ability to punish or reward."\textsuperscript{190} Let, however, these commands and prohibitions, whether of the parents, the Church, the state, or public opinion be accepted as one's own as "...ethical and moral legislators whose laws and sanctions one adopts,"\textsuperscript{191} and the authority thus becomes internalized. The result of this is that the person who has internalized these ethical and moral principles now feels responsible to himself, "...to something inside, to one's conscience."\textsuperscript{192} This is an internal authority now, called conscience, and is called by Fromm an "authoritarian conscience."\textsuperscript{193}

Fromm's ideas on the difference between internal and external authority have just been investigated. It has also been seen that the presence of internal authority, called conscience, is of a type called by Fromm "authoritarian" conscience, if the person has interiorized external ethical, moral and ethical authorities, and now feels responsible to himself. There ought to be a

\textsuperscript{190} Erich FROMM, \textit{Man for Himself}, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., p. 143-144.
comparison of this "authoritarian" conscience with what Fromm calls "humanistic" conscience, for an understanding of these two is essential to his conception of the moral growth of the child, in the child's struggle to be free from authority, and in its struggle to be completely itself.  

For Fromm the "humanistic" conscience is "...our own voice, present in every human being and independent of external sanctions and rewards." It is "...the reaction of our total personalities...to the totality of capacities which constitute our human and our individual existence." Its goal is "...productiveness and, therefore, happiness, since happiness is the necessary concomitant of productive living." Humanistic conscience is "...a reaction of ourselves to ourselves. It is the voice of our true selves which summons us back to ourselves, to live productively, to develop fully and harmoniously — that is, to become what we potentially are." Actually what Fromm is saying here, according to Bertocci and Millard, is that "...human

194 Ibid., p. 157; cf. also ibid., p. 143-160, passim.
195 Ibid., p. 158.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid., p. 160.
198 Ibid., p. 159.
nature is so constituted that it sets up its own demand, namely that its own potentialities be realized totally and harmoniously." Humanistic conscience is the internal voice calling us to be our own full and complete selves, it is the voice that meets with inner approval "actions, thoughts, and feelings which are conducive to the proper functioning and unfolding of our total personality," and with disapproval those actions, thoughts and feelings that are injurious to our total personality. Here again Fromm reinforces the concept that the goal of humanistic conscience is to be a norm for the goal of human existence as such, i.e., the total unfolding of our own personality or full productive living. Fromm here is suggesting implicitly his idea of the meaning of human existence, i.e., to be able to live fully and harmoniously. In the fifth chapter of this thesis it will be brought out that that is the goal, too, of freedom, a full productive life; this will imply a fulness of freedom to and freedom from, the dialectic opposites in the development of freedom in the individual.

199 Peter A. BERTOCCI and Richard M. MILLARD, Personality and the Good: Psychological and Ethical Perspectives, p. 83.

200 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 159.

201 Ibid.
What has all of this, the differences between authoritarian and humanistic conscience, to do with the development of the child in freedom from? It is simply that the child meets irrational authority in the family, inside and outside of it, internalizes such irrational authority, and develops an "authoritarian" conscience, from which it must free itself to acquire a "humanistic" conscience, if it is to live productively. We shall now explain this.

The child, in its growth before puberty, passes through various interconnected levels of functioning of the human personality, known as the Id, the Ego, and the Super-Ego. Fromm's concept of the Super-Ego is somewhat different than Freud's. Fromm quotes Freud in Freud's "New Series of Lectures" as looking upon "...self-observation, conscience and ideal-formation as the three functions

202 Erich FROMM, "Sozialpsychologischer Teil," in Max HORKHEIMER, ed., Studien über Autorität und Familie, Paris, Alcan, 1936, p. 81. In this monograph Fromm develops his psychological theory, somewhat similar to Freud's, but differing from him, of how authority develops in the individual, of the relationship of authority to the family and to repression, and last of all of the components of the authoritarian character. Many of the insights of this work are issued again in Fromm's later work in English.

203 Ibid., p. 82-83.
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of the Super-Ego." Fromm questions, however, whether the first of these three functions really belongs to the Super-Ego. Fromm does agree with Freud in general that in the development of the child's relationship to authority the Super-Ego has the decisive part to play. Referring to the force and power of the external social forces, including the family, on the child, Fromm says that

By the Super-Ego the external force is transformed and this indeed because it is changed from an external to an inner force. The authorities as representatives of the external force are internalized, and the individual treats their orders and prohibitions correspondingly, now no longer alone out of fear of external punishment but out of fear of the psychic court it has erected within itself. Thus it is the Super-Ego which handles the problem of the internalization of authority in the child. As Fromm adds later in the same article:

204 Ibid., p. 82: "...Selbstbeobachtung, Gewissen und Idealbildung als die drei Funktionen des 'Über-Ichs'."

205 Ibid., p. 83.

206 Ibid., p. 84: "Durch das Über-Ich wird die äußere Gewalt transformiert und zwar, indem sie aus einer äußeren in eine innere Gewalt verwandelt wird. Die Autoritäten als die Vertreter der äußeren Gewalt werden verinnerlicht, und das Individuum handelt ihren Geboten und Verboten entsprechend nun nicht mehr allein aus Furcht vor äußeren Strafen, sondern aus Furcht vor der psychischen Instanz, die es in sich selbst aufgerichtet hat."
The relationship Super-Ego: Authority is dialectic. The Super-Ego is an interiorization of authority. Authority is, by projection of Super-Ego qualities on itself, transfigured, and in this transfigured form is again interiorized. Authority and the Super-Ego are, above all, not to be separated from each other.\(^{207}\)

For Fromm, then, the Super-Ego and authority are indissolubly connected.

One of the functions of the Super-Ego, according to Freud, is the handling of the Oedipus Complex, in which the child transforms his fear of castration by the father because of the child's sexual wishes towards his mother into an inner fear.\(^{208}\) Fromm agrees with Freud that the Super-Ego is indeed concerned with the handling of the Oedipus Complex, but he denies that the father alone need be the sexual rival of the child; Fromm adds that the sexual rivalry in any case between the father and the son "...is colored at any given time by the social situation."\(^{209}\)


\(^{208}\) Ibid., p. 88.

\(^{209}\) Ibid.: "Die sexuelle Rivalität im Verhältnis Vater: Sohn ist durch die soziale Situation jeweils gefärbt."
Fromm, in his later English writings, builds upon this earlier work of his and now definitely states that the conflict of the child with its parents "...is not brought about primarily by the sexual rivalry but results from the child's reaction to the pressure of parental authority, which in itself is an intrinsic part of patriarchal society."210 This rebellion of the child, according to Fromm, against parental authority, "...is of the essence of Freud's 'OEdipus Complex'."211 Why should the child rebel, one might ask, against parental authority? Fromm answers that this authority, in part at least, is always irrational authority.212 Why is this? Fromm answers that the child meets society through its parents, who are the "...psychological agent of society, as it were."213 These parents represent the society in which they have lived, their character is formed by it, as well as their methods of education.214

210 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 157.
211 Ibid.
213 Ibid., p. 381.
214 Ibid.
What kind of societies exist? All societies, Fromm points out, have to preserve themselves, and to do this, the members of the society have to give up "...part of their own will, their originality and spontaneity." For the proper functioning of society the members must come to "...want to act in the way they have to act as members of the society or of a special class within it." Thus Fromm asserts that the members of a society internalize the wishes of the society, through fear of the power of the society in which they exist; this is irrational authority. Are there any societies in which the interests of mankind and that of the individual are identical? There have been none, Fromm adds, nor are there any. He says that "Although societies differ with regard to the extent to which the child must be impressed with irrational authority, it is always part of the function of child training to have this happen," i.e., to reduce the child's "...independence and freedom to the level necessary for the existence of that particular society."

Thus the child, according to Fromm, in its efforts to achieve freedom and independence, meets social power through the agency of its parents, and through fear of this power, internalizes the restrictions to its efforts

215 Ibid. The quotations in the rest of this paragraph are from the same source.
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to achieve freedom and independence. Thus the child forms an "authoritarian" conscience, "...the voice of an internalized external authority," which Freud has called the Super-Ego, and which Fromm, as we have seen, would say is one of the functions of the Super-Ego. What is the child's reaction to this restriction we may ask. Fromm answers:

But man is not born to be broken, so the child fights against the authority represented by his parents; he fights for his freedom not only from pressure but also for his freedom to be himself, a full-fledged human being, not an automaton.

Thus the child's growth in freedom, in freedom from and freedom to, is imperiled by his "authoritarian" conscience. His conscience, his "Super-Ego," prevents the child from freeing himself from this internal pressure which is always reinforced by continual demands and prohibitions. To be sure, this "authoritarian" conscience

216 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 143.
217 Ibid., p. 144.
is always united in reality in any person, child or adult, with his "humanistic" conscience. As Fromm continues "...actually everybody has both 'consciences'." Is it ever possible for a child to develop a "humanistic" conscience without going through an "authoritarian" conscience? Fromm believes that it is possible, but says regarding this belief, that "...only the future development of mankind can prove or disprove the validity of this assumption."

Ch. II, C, 2, f. - The Intrinsic Need of Authority

In one of his more recent works Fromm has modified his estimate as to whether or not it is possible for an adult human being to be completely free, and therefore, by implication, free from irrational authority. This work is his essay on "the revolutionary character," contained in The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on Religion, Psychology and Culture, published in 1963. This essay has been modified in minor details from the form in which it was originally given as an address in Mexico City in 1961. For Fromm, the revolutionary character is "...the

221 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 165.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid., p. 167.
224 Erich FROMM, The Dogma of Christ, p. 147-166.
225 Ibid., p. vi, ix.
man who has emancipated himself from the ties of blood and
soil, from his father and mother, from special loyalties
to state, class, race, party, or religion." This
revolutionary character is the person who is sane, fully
developed, and fully awake. Thus the revolutionary
class character is the person not bound by any ties, but fully
developed, and fully awake. Such a man is truly free
because "...he can live authentically — his own self being
the source of his life." He is free because he "...thinks, feels, and decides for himself." He is thus
free of any irrational authority, of any "authoritarian"
conscience.

Do such revolutionary characters exist? Fromm
lists a number of them, from all fields of life, from
politics, art, religion, philosophy and other fields.
"Budda, the Prophets, Jesus, Giordano Bruno, Meister
Eckhart, Galileo, Marx and Engels, Einstein, Schweitzer,
Russell — they are all revolutionary characters," Fromm

226 Ibid., p. 165.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid., p. 157.
229 Ibid., p. 156.
230 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 9, 143-144.
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says. He attempts no real proof of this statement. Thus Fromm, by implication in this recent work of his, has changed his mind from the works of the 1940's, Escape from Freedom, "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis," and Man for Himself, referred to earlier in this section on authority and the individual. In doing so he seems to have lost sight of his analysis of the human condition, of the existential dichotomies, of the necessary finiteness and anxiety of man referred to in his works of the 1940's and the 1950's. Or else he possibly sees this type of man as the climax of an evolution in human progress, the peak of the dialectic process of freedom to/freedom from, of positive individuation/negative individuation.

In these passages on the universality of the "authoritarian" conscience, on the decisive role of society in its formation, on the belief that future society will see the elimination of the "authoritarian" conscience in the development of the child, are possibly contained various presuppositions of Fromm. Does not Fromm, for

232 Ibid.


instance, presuppose that what is wrong with the individual man is not his fault, but society's? Does he not also see individual man as capable of complete perfection and happiness on this earth? Is it not true, as John Schaar asserts in Escape from Authority, that Fromm, while admitting man's finitude, hurries on "...to say that man can escape his fate and overcome his finitude?" These seem to be some of the implications of Fromm's picture of man's true destiny, which is to develop in such a way that never will he be subject to and frustrated by irrational authority, but in the future, when society changes, man will be, from childhood on, guided alone by the internal voice of himself, by his "humanistic" conscience. For, as has been pointed out, Fromm implies that man is marked with finality, that he has a true goal, and that this goal is the total and harmonious development of his total personality, which means the total fulfillment of productive living.

Ch. II, C, 2, g. - Authority and Freedom From; Secondary Ties

There are other implications in this treatment of Erich Fromm's concept of authority, i.e., implications for his idea of freedom from as seen in its development in the

236 John H. SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 321.
individual human being. As just seen, the development of
the child towards full productivity, and towards a complete
freeing from bonds, runs into a roadblock when the child
comes to face social commands or prohibitions coming from
his parents or other social authorities. For Fromm, man
is primarily a social being, and hence at least essen-
tially conditioned by society. That society should impose
on every child and every adult an authoritarian conscience,
Fromm surmises to be an accident of society and not neces-
sarily of its essence. For he believes (assumes) that the
day will come when the child will develop a humanistic
conscience in the first place. For Fromm, then, the pro-
cess of a child freeing himself from the pressure of his
authoritarian conscience is not eternally necessary to its
growth on freedom from. That de facto every child has
formed an authoritarian conscience through fear of external
authority, Fromm does not deny. What he believes may turn
out to be true is that this is not essential to true human
growth, as it may turn out in the future. For this Fromm
gives no proof; it is only an assumption, possibly a hope.
For the child, then, irrational authority is an obstacle
at present time, that can never at present be completely
overcome. At present, then, some freedom from in moral

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237 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 290.
achievement may be achieved by adults, but rarely will there be a complete separation from all ties, including that of authoritarian conscience, as happens in Buddha and Einstein. Possibly Fromm sees in these few rare examples of complete freedom the end product striven for through the dialectic process of freedom in the human individual. Possibly there is an assumption here that these few exceptional people who became truly free had also from the beginning of their moral development a humanistic conscience, and never an authoritarian conscience.

Freedom from has been as a separation from primary ties in an earlier part of this chapter. In the last three subsections, d, e, and f, of this chapter the problem of authority in the growth of freedom from in the individual has been studied. It has been seen that the child has a need to free itself from irrational authority, and that commonly the authority that the child meets is imposed on it by power causing fear; the child resists this authority, struggling to be free from it, and to become itself.

That this is one used element of a child's growth is certain, according to Fromm. What is not so certain is whether this separation from irrational authority is a genuine separation from a "primary" tie. It would seem

238 Cf. Section A, C, 2, c, of this chapter.
that the almost helpless child, realizing its separateness from its father and mother, and feeling this aloneness, is made anxious by this aloneness, as it struggles to free itself from primary ties of dependence on father and mother. Inevitably, due to said conditions, it partly loses this struggle for independence due to the power of parental authority, and ends up by having to submit to this authority. This submission is indeed a reinforcement of the primary tie of dependence on parents, but in itself would possibly be an escape from freedom, a "secondary" tie. 239

If this be true, then the child's growth in freedom from does not only involve separation from "primary" ties, but its biggest struggle, that of separation from authority, is to free itself from a "secondary" tie. The consequences of this would be that "primary" ties play a part in this critical area of growth, being possibly reinforced by this conflict with authority, but there is also need to conceive growth in individual freedom from as being more than a separation from "primary" ties.

This conclusion, that the freedom from found in freeing from irrational authority, is a freeing from an escape from freedom, or a "secondary" tie is the work of

Fromm's early *Escape from Freedom*. In his later work on incestuous ties and primary ties such as developed in a later section of this chapter. Fromm does not bring out the distinction between primary and secondary ties, but rather talks freely about separation from emotional ties to mother, father, society, clan, relation, etc., as all being of one piece, i.e., a separation from mother, father, or their substitutes. Nevertheless, Fromm does not contradict his earlier implication that submission to authority is by way of an escape from freedom, resulting in a "secondary" tie.

What probably happens is this, that the freeing from irrational authority that is one of the struggle of the child (and the adult) is a freeing from both bonds, "primary" and "secondary," inasmuch as the "secondary" bond is an escape, an attempt to return to pre-human unity, of which the "primary" bonds are a reminder and which a person must dissolve if a higher "human" unity is to be achieved.

240 Ibid.

241 Cf. Chapter II, C, 2, h, of this thesis.

242 Cf. Chapter II, C, 2, d, e, and h, and Chapter V, B, of this thesis, passim.
One other comment should be added, that although Fromm does see the influence of irrational authority as inevitable in societies of the present and the past, he also stresses that in practice most people, in reaction to a combination of rational and irrational authority, have a mixture of "humanistic" and "authoritarian" conscience. One implication of this mixture is that the child's reaction to authority probably involves only in part an escape from freedom, in reaction to irrational authority; his reaction to rational authority would involve a genuine freeing from primary ties to father and mother, with true growth in "freedom to."

Fromm's escapes from freedom may well be looked at as an attempt to preserve psychic life, to prevent the aloneness that leads to insanity, to dissolution of psychic integrity. These escapes then would be a way of preserving some sort of relatedness based on the need for such relatedness, a basic human need for survival.

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243 Cf. Chapter II, C, 2, c, p.131-132 of this thesis.

244 Cf. Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 29, 31, 36-37, and 140-141, as well as The Sane Society, p. 30-31.

During this chapter of the thesis primary ties have been referred to frequently, both in the description Fromm gives of the general nature of the development of freedom and individuation, and in the concrete details of the individual human being's development; it was from these primary ties that individual men had to free themselves before they could grow in positive freedom. Does Fromm consider these primary ties to be of the same nature? What is his concept of them?

Fromm sees these primary ties to be those that belong to normal individual human beings in their ontogenetic development. Among all of them the most elementary is the tie to mother; because of the child's need for sustenance and affection, "mother" becomes food, love, warmth, earth, life for the infant in its first years of life; "mother" is experienced as "...the fountain of life, as an all-enveloping, protective, nourishing power." Through

246 Cf. Chapter II, A, p. 62-63; Ch. II, B, p. 70-72, 74, 75-76, 78-79; Ch. II, C, 1, p. 87-88, 90, 98-100; Ch. II, C, 2, p. 111-118.
247 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 25, 29.
248 Ibid., p. 25.
these ties to mother, the child remains secure and pro-
tected; the child is bound to the comfort of nature as re-
presented by mother. In Fromm's view, these ties are "incestuous" ties, not directly of a sexual nature, but of an "affective" nature, binding man to his pre-individualis-
tic existence; these emotional ties are extended to
mother substitutes, to family, to clan, to state, nation
and church as the child meets these elements in his
life. These ties are strengthened by every individual's
inborn tendency to return to "mother," to security and
warmth, as difficulties in life occur. This intense
longing to return to mother occurs even in the normal adult
unless "human" ties replace these "natural" ties.

What Fromm is doing here is to link "primary ties"
with the development of freedom from in the individual.
Just as the physical separation of the child from its
mother is accomplished by cutting the umbilical cord, so
figuratively speaking, Fromm states, the growing child is
to be separated emotionally. The primary analogate

250 Ibid., p. 40-41.
251 Ibid., p. 41.
252 Ibid., p. 27.
254 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 25.
here is the physical act of severing the umbilical cord; this is a complete physical separation. Yet physical needs are supplied by the mother for a while. So too, in Fromm’s conception, does the psychological separation take place; psychological, affective unity replaces physical unity, yet it, too, must be gradually broken if the child is to become independent. Hence the analogy of physical separation and psychological separation is not completely adequate. The goal of each is similar, independence and freedom, but there is no sudden, complete, psychological separation in the very beginning of the child’s life, Fromm assumes.255

As the individual matures through physiological growth and education, then, it is up to the individual to achieve psychologically what is presaged physiologically, a complete independence from nature and natural ties, so that he might fully humanize his relationships to nature and to men in a new unity, and thus complete his transcendence of nature in a new, human harmony.256

Another word that Fromm uses to describe primary ties, binding the individual to security, is the word


256 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 27-30; You Shall Be as Gods, p. 126.
"incestuous." The meaning here is not primarily sexual, but rather does this word for Fromm mean "...essentially an affective tie to mother and nature." Hence the word "incestuous" is a metaphor, suggesting the analogy of the ties of sexual relationship between those of close blood kinship of different sex. What Fromm here is doing is to transfer the word "incestuous" with its primary meaning of sexual relationship, as Fromm sees Freud using it (and as Ruth Munroe avers), to a meaning of emotional or affective attachment, apart from any essential sexual connotation. For Fromm the word "incestuous" primarily means a way of relating to reality, to people, i.e., as a mode of socialization. This mode of relationship is an emotional one for Fromm, involving feelings of intimacy, warmth, security, unity, etc. to be overcome by genuine love. The fully adult, productive person will not be

258 Erich FROMM, You Shall Be as Gods, p. 70, footnote.
259 James DREVER, A Dictionary of Psychology, p.130.
261 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 58; The Heart of Man, p. 112-113.
262 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 27-30; The Art of Loving, p. 6-32.
bound by these emotional ties, since they prevent proper growth; rather will the person come to owe his emotional existence to himself.\textsuperscript{263}

Hence we may ask whether or not Fromm's use of the word "incestuous" is an apt one? Both Fromm and Freud see the extreme importance of the emotional attachment of the growing child to mother.\textsuperscript{264} But Freud puts this attachment into the framework of his sexually oriented OEdipus complex;\textsuperscript{265} Fromm puts this emotional attachment into the framework of his theory of human psychic growth in freedom, confronting the fundamental problems of existence.\textsuperscript{266}

Therefore both Fromm and Freud refer to the same facts, the existence and degree of the child's emotional attachment to mother, but the meaning, however, given to these events in the child's life differs considerably. Quite probably the primary meanings just explained differ so considerably that Fromm's fundamental use of the word "incest" is not analogous to Freud's meaning. It would rather seem to be

\textsuperscript{263}Richard I. EVANS, Dialogue with Erich Fromm, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{264}Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 41-42.

\textsuperscript{265}Ibid.; cf. also Ruth MUNROE, Schools of Psycho-
analytic Thought, p. 202-207.

\textsuperscript{266}Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 28-36.
an equivocation, demanding a new word, rather than the word "incestuous."

Fromm's own use of the word "incestuous" does not seem to be either analogous or equivocal. As has been seen, the word "incestuous" refers to affective ties with mother or any replacement for mother, for, in Fromm's conception of these primary, "incestuous" ties, family, clan, nation, church may fulfill the same function as mother, giving the child rootedness, security and strength, and a share of their own identity.267 This differentiation of the object giving security to the child does not change the meaning of these ties for Fromm. For Fromm, the most fundamental primary tie is to mother, but the shift to other objects does not seem to change the nature of the primary, "incestuous" tie.

Ch. II, C, 2, i. - The Method of Proof — A Brief Appraisal

Before summarizing the findings of Sections B and C of this chapter, it would be appropriate to introduce here certain observations on the methods of proof used by Fromm in his theory of the development of the individual, and to observe in general the certainty he attaches to his conclusions or convictions about the human individual.

267 Ibid., p. 38-43, particularly, p. 41.
This is an attempt to estimate briefly the scientific achievement of Erich Fromm in this area of his thought. There will be a further discussion of his theory of the development of the individual in freedom, in relationship to his fundamental philosophy, in Chapter VI of this thesis.

First of all there is a large controversy centered around the validity of his central conceptions of individual human development. He has been both praised and condemned by eminent scholars for his viewpoints on human development and growth. For example, James C. Coleman in *Personality Dynamics and Effective Behavior* frequently uses Fromm's findings as a basis for his own explanation of human behavior and growth, and acknowledges his debt to Fromm openly. Among those writing on Neo-Freudians, (a term Fromm rejects as properly describing himself), Ruth Munroe, in *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought*, spends considerable time in explaining Fromm's conception of individual human development and defends a great deal of


269 Ibid., preface.


it, while nevertheless pointing out what she considers as flaws in his positions.\textsuperscript{272} Fromm's ideas of personality development are well enough thought of to be included in Hall and Lindzey's \textit{Theories of Personality}, in Chapter IV on "Social Psychological Theories."\textsuperscript{273}

On the other hand, Hall and Lindzey in this same book find Fromm's theories of development of personality to give "...little evidence of accompanying investigation,"\textsuperscript{274} and thus to have generated little scientific research, the best norm Hall and Lindzey have of evaluating different theories of personality.\textsuperscript{275} Patrick Mullaly, though of an empiricist mode of thinking himself, questions seriously whether Fromm presents enough evidence, e.g., in \textit{The Sane Society}, to prove his ideas on the nature of man; Mullaly thinks Fromm is drawing his conclusions from largely unproved and at present unprovable philosophical positions.\textsuperscript{276} Fromm oftens explains his own position by building on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{272} Ibid., p. 362-363, 365, 396-398, 474-477.
\item \textsuperscript{273} Calvin S. HALL and Gardner LINDZEY, \textit{Theories of Personality}, p. 114-116, 127-130, 151-155.
\item \textsuperscript{274} Ibid., p. 550.
\item \textsuperscript{275} Ibid., p. 547.
\end{itemize}
Freud's positions on the development of the individual human being, though disagreeing with him on certain basic problems, such as the meaning and influence of sexuality and the extent to which social factors influence the development of the individual human being. Yet the prominent orthodox Freudian, Otto Fenichel, in a long review of Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*, criticizes Fromm severely for misunderstanding Freud and for misinterpreting him on these very points, as well as many others.

These points of difference among commentators on Fromm show that by no means is his understanding of individual human development universally accepted and praised. Writing in 1957, Hall and Lindzey point out that no present theory of personality is even "minimally adequate" as far as formal criteria, "...such as explicitness of statement and adequacy of definition." Suppose one were to grant that part of the difficulty of approving Fromm's work is his use of the idiographic approach to behavior, with its


279 Calvin S. HALL and Gardner LINDZEY, *Theories of Personality*, p. 539.
emphasis on a scientific study of individuals as individuals with the methods proper to this type of study. 280 Grant, in addition, that the idiographic method is a method approved by all psychologists and scientists (which it is not). 281 There still would be something lacking in Fromm's psychological work, perhaps a stimulus to research, as Hall and Lindzey point out, 282 or a searching for answers from a speculative philosophical anthropology rather than a scientific psychology, as Patrick Mullaly believes Fromm to do in Fromm's idea that the contradictions in man's existence are the source of all psychic forces motivating man. 283

Fromm himself seems to admit at least the inadequacy of the documentation for his conclusions in The Heart of Man, written in 1964, especially the documentations for his clinical work as a psychoanalyst, and promises a larger work "...which will deal with the theory and


281 Ibid., p. 536-540.

282 Calvin S. HALL and Gardner LINDZEEY, Theories of Personality, p. 547.

therapy of humanist psychoanalysis." And this documentation is extremely important for a person whose efforts depend on the idiographic method. In addition, Fromm of a purpose admits philosophical principles into his total thought structure about individual human beings, convinced as he is that this is the only way to get the complete truth about human beings.

From this brief study of Fromm's scientific position on the development of the individual human being, it may then be concluded that Fromm's position is by no means unanimously accepted by other psychologists and psychoanalysts as to its content and methodology. This, of course, seems to be true of any prominent scientist in these fields. Fromm himself gives his fullest explanation of his own scientific method in Richard I. Evans' Dialogue with Erich Fromm; this, however, should be

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284 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, p. 15.
286 Cf. for instance Gordon W. ALLPORT's description of the need for and problems of the idiographic method in his Pattern and Growth in Personality, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, p. 8-21; cf. Hall and Lindzey's query on the feasibility of Allport's use of the idiographic method in their Theories of Personality, p. 278.
287 Cf. Richard I. EVANS, Dialogue with Erich Fromm, p. 73-84.
investigated in Chapter VI of this thesis, because of its philosophical connections.

It may also be concluded that, granted the truth of Fromm's conclusions and his theory of individual human development, Fromm's ideas nevertheless lack the probative force of thorough analysis of concrete events, of further research. In addition, the close ties of Fromm's scientific ideas with integrated philosophical positions obscure his scientific positions, and may, in addition, give his scientific conclusions a seeming certainty and universality that they owe to these philosophical positions, rather than to scientific procedure.

Ch. II, D. - SUMMARY OF THE GROWTH OF FREEDOM FROM IN THE INDIVIDUAL

The various aspects that have been discovered in studying the growth of freedom from in the individual in general and in concrete detail will now be summarized. Any full internal critique of this aspect of freedom from, in itself, and in comparison with other aspects of freedom from, will be reserved for the final chapter of this thesis, the discussion of the full meaning of freedom from in its many aspects is reserved for Chapter V, C, of this thesis, where the essence of freedom from will be examined. There are other aspects of freedom from, e.g., its
relationship to the growth of human thinking, and the separation of the individual from his illusions,288 which will be dealt with later on in the fifth chapter because it is judged they more properly belong to the concept of alienation, which will be discussed there.289

The first discussion at the beginning of Sections B and C of this chapter concerned the method that would be used in tracing the history of the growth of the individual in freedom from. It was decided to concentrate on the development of freedom from in the individual as such, and not to concentrate on the social conditioning as such of the individual unless it was essential to the understanding of the problem of the individual. It was also determined to omit consideration of the development of the individual as constitutionally and temperamentally conditioned.

It was also perceived that the span of human life is considered by Erich Fromm as a continual birth involving a separation from primary ties. An investigation was then made of the meaning of individuation as essential to the understanding of freedom. Next an inquiry was made into the growing meaning of individuation, seeing that it meant


a dialectic process, with a growing integrated self as one result, and growing aloneness as the other result. Then freedom was investigated seeing that this too is a dialectic process, with a growth in freedom to develop and a freedom from security and reassurance. Probably both processes of growing freedom and growing individuation are really the same process, it was found, with a mental distinction between them. Both processes are dialectic. Dialectic was found to be a process consisting of one cause with two simultaneous contradictory results. A further investigation of the similarity of freedom from and the negative part of the process of individuation was then investigated, with the conclusion that quite probably they are one and the same process, while conceptually distinct from each other, or that freedom from is a result of this negative individuation.

In next describing the growth of the individual in freedom from in more specific detail, Fromm is seen to look upon the gradual process of freeing from primary ties as a life-long process, which is a continual birth, and which results from a tendency innate in human nature. At first the child is bound to its mother physically and psychologically. Gradually the child realizes its separateness from those around him, including its mother. This process of separation is automatic, Fromm avers.
The process of separation from authorities, Fromm says, is usually incomplete by adult life even though sexual and economic independence has been achieved. It is only when the individual "thinks, feels and decides for himself" that complete freedom from has been attained. Along with this goes necessarily a productive living on the part of the individual. Then the growth of the individual in relationship to authority was examined. It was seen that, in Fromm's thought, every human being goes through a stage of what he calls "authoritarian" conscience during his childhood. This is a product of irrational authority coming from parents and others, an internalized set of moral commands and prohibitions. The goal of any human being, Fromm says, is to have a "humanistic" conscience. Only through such a conscience, in which the person thinks, feels and acts for himself, is the goal of true productive living achieved. Only in this way can a person be truly freed from irrational authority, and be free to be productive.

For Fromm, it was discovered, the Super-Ego function of personality is closely related to the handling of authority by the human person. The child internalizes through fear the irrational authority it meets in its parents, the agent of society; society demands, lest it itself be imperiled, a surrender of spontaneity and
productivity on the part of the individual. Perhaps in the future some children will escape this "authoritarian" conscience, but Fromm has no proof for what he calls this assumption. Some of the assumptions behind these conclusions were then discussed. Notice was then taken of the fact that in recent years Fromm has asserted, without adequate proof, that certain adult human beings have de facto achieved a complete freedom from authority and a complete productiveness. It was also discovered that freeing from irrational authority meant a blockage of true freedom from, and instead an escape from freedom, a "secondary" tie. Apparently for most people there is at the same time a mixture of true growth and a blocking of freedom from in their relationship to authority.

A final note was added on the nature of primary ties, to better understand freedom from in relationship to one of its objects. Primary ties were found to bind the individual to nature, to mother, and to be emotional attachments to all objects giving the child security, warmth, strength at a purely natural level; such ties prohibited true human growth. These primary ties are aided by the tendency to return to nature, to refuse the separation and aloneness that occur at breakage. Calling these primary ties "incestuous" was discovered to be probably an equivocal use of the word "incestuous," in comparison with
Freud's use of the word. In any event, freedom from primary ties in the development of the child has a univocal meaning for Fromm, since apparently the change of objects of this primary, emotional attachment does not change the nature of the attachment itself, or the meaning of the separation, of freedom from this attachment. Freeing from the irrational ties of authority involves freeing from both "primary" and "secondary" ties, quite probably.

In these last two sections of Chapter II the development of the individual human being, in terms of individuation, has been examined. This way of approaching Fromm's ideas on human development, as has been seen, is closely connected in Fromm's conception, with fundamental human problems, with the meaning of human existence. This approach does not attempt to minimize the broad sweep of Fromm's theory of personality development, nor does it deny Fromm's considerable work as a theorist of personality development. If consideration were to be given to the material, the contents of Fromm's ideas as found in this chapter purely in terms, say, of Hall and Lindzey's dimensional comparison of theories, the contents of this chapter would very likely back up Hall and Lindzey's

290 Calvin S. HALL and Gardner LINDZEY, *Theories of Personality*, p. 548 and Chapter 14, passim.
estimate that Fromm's theory of personality development emphasizes man as a purposive, striving creature, as heavily influenced by the social structures in which he lives.\textsuperscript{291} Fromm's de-emphasis of the influence of association factors, and on instinctive influence and on multiplicity of motivation, as described by these same authors, Hall and Lindzey, would also be backed up by the analysis of human personality development as described in Sections B and C of this chapter.\textsuperscript{292}

What this chapter has emphasized is Fromm's central concern with seeing the developing human individual in terms chiefly of freedom, of a dialectic process of growing human freedom, with the two aspects of a freedom to and a freedom from. This is one way Fromm looks at the growing human individual, and quite probably the chief way. This way of looking at human development, in terms of freedom, may be called his central insight as he faces the complexity and multiplicity of data on human personality development.

At the end of the analysis of Fromm's thought on the "Origin of Freedom From in the Individual" in Section A of this chapter, it was concluded that there was a

\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., p. 548, 539, 546.

\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., p. 548, 540-541, 546-547.
physical freedom from the mother, as an act and as a resultant state of freedom from, symbolized as an act by the beginning of self-breathing, and as a state by the continuance of this self-breathing as a process. Is there anything similar in Fromm's thought concerning the development of freedom from in the individual? We wish here to suggest a synthesis of what has been found, and leave a deeper synthesis and analysis for the fifth chapter, where the essence of freedom from will be examined.

It might be suggested that freedom from in this section on its development in the individual human being is one aspect of a continuing dialectic process of the development of individual human freedom. Fromm sees this dialectic process as automatic. Through the mediation of the growth of the nervous system, and subsequent self-awareness and awareness of others as distinct from oneself, freedom from others as an objective fact, as a state, is realized by the growing individual. The feelings that result from this objective separateness in itself are not emphasized by Fromm in direct reference to freedom from, but rather as feelings coming from the negative aspect of individuation, with which freedom from is probably to be identified.

293 Cf. Chapter II, A, p. 65 of this thesis.
in reality. One type of feeling that all children pass through is the fear of power held by irrational authority, from which no one but a favored few free themselves.
CHAPTER III

FREEDOM FROM IN THE HUMAN RACE — IN GENERAL

Introduction

After concluding an inquiry into Erich Fromm's conception of the development of the human individual in terms of individuation and freedom, this thesis will discuss in this chapter Fromm's similar analysis of the development of the human race. This chapter is restricted to Fromm's ideas on the origin and general plan of development of freedom, particularly freedom from, in the human race; this restriction is made because this is the purpose of the thesis, and because this also happens to be the chief way in which Fromm approaches the history of the human race.

One point worth raising here in the Introduction is the question of just how and why Fromm happens to discuss the history of the human race in terms of developing freedom. His analysis of individual human growth and development in terms of individuation and particularly freedom raises the question of the connection in Fromm's mind between freedom in individual human growth and freedom in the development of the human race.

As will be seen in the course of this chapter, particularly in Section A, there is a great likeness in
Fromm's description of the dialectic process of growing human freedom in the human race and in his description of the dialectic process of growing human freedom in the individual. There is consequently some sort of an analogy of meaning possible between these different human, growing processes. This assertion of possible analogy of meaning will be more evident, once the material from this chapter has been developed.

Granted the possibility that there is a similarity of likeness here, a further question about these likenesses may be asked: Which is the primary analogue in the comparison of these two examples of growing freedom in the human individual and in the human race? Which is it, the growing human individual, or the growing human race? Both Leon J. Saul in Psychoanalytic Quarterly, and Walter T. James in Individual Psychology Bulletin are convinced that Fromm does use analogy in his understanding of the growth of human society, and that the primary analogue is the growth of the individual. Their views will be discussed more


fully later in this chapter.\(^3\)

Before beginning this third chapter it will be good to state once again that the data presented in this chapter are taken from Fromm's work as he has presented them, in regard to the certainty or uncertainty about both theoretical and factual statements, or universality or non-universality in regard to theoretical positions, as described in Chapter I of this thesis; in major points of the thesis, a lack of qualification by the author of the thesis indicates that Fromm holds both theoretical or factual positions or both to be certainly true, and, in regard to theoretical positions, to be universally true.\(^4\)

Ch. III, A. - THE ORIGIN OF FREEDOM FROM IN THE HUMAN RACE

To discuss adequately the origin of freedom from in the human race it is necessary to discuss at the same time the origin of man himself as he is differentiated from animals, and to see how this first beginning of human existence was accompanied by freedom, by freedom from. It will be necessary, then, to state Fromm's position on human

\(^3\) Cf. Chapter III, B, 3, f, p. 250-254 of this thesis.

\(^4\) Cf. Chapter I, B, 2, p. 43-44 of this thesis.
pre-history, on the beginnings of truly human existence, and on the beginnings of human freedom.

Ch. III, A, 1. - Human Pre-History

For Erich Fromm man's pre-history is of considerable importance, for he sees in the animal kingdom an evolutionary preparation for the beginnings of human existence. For Fromm "The lower an animal is in the scale of development, the more are its adaptation to nature and all its activities controlled by instinctive and reflex action mechanisms." Fromm adds that "...the higher an animal is in the scale of development, the more flexibility of action pattern and the less completeness of structural adjustment do we find at birth. This development reaches its peak with man." So we see that previous to human existence we find a gradual change in the adaptability of animals to their environment. As Fromm adds, in a later writing, *The Sane Society*, "at a certain point of animal evolution, there occurred a unique break, comparable to the first emergence of matter, to the first emergence of life, and to the first emergence of animal existence." Fromm goes

5 Erich FROMM, *Escape from Freedom*, p. 32.

6 Ibid.

7 Erich FROMM, *The Sane Society*, p. 23.
on to say that this new event occurred when "...in the evolutionary process, action ceases to be essentially determined by instinct; when the adaptation of nature loses its coercive character; when action is no longer fixed by hereditarily given mechanisms." 8

Fromm thus pictures human pre-history as the culmination of a long preparation, perhaps lasting "...for hundreds of thousands of years," 9 an evolutionary preparation looking back to the first emergence of matter, all the way up to the final separation from the coercion of nature. Man's predecessor, the animal, gradually became more and more free from rigid action patterns, and from complete structural adjustment at birth.

Ch. III, A, 2. - Man is Born

This unique break from the animal kingdom came when man was "...biologically speaking, the most helpless animal." 10 At this point man was born, human existence began. "The emergence of man," Fromm says, "can be defined as occurring at the point in the process of evolution where instinctive adaptation has reached its minimum." 11

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 39.
A new species arose, transcending nature," in which "life became aware of itself." The harmony of animal existence was disrupted, with self-awareness, reason and imagination characterizing the new species that had arisen. Man became an "anomaly," "the freak of the universe." When man is born, Fromm says, the human race as well as the individual, "he is thrown out of a situation which was definite, as definite as the instincts, into a situation which is indefinite, uncertain and open." Man still has his physiological needs such as hunger, thirst, and sexual needs, which must be satisfied. Fromm however "denies any directive instinctive structure." From now on, man will adapt essentially to nature, not by instinctual determination, but by the process of learning. Thus, for Fromm, man arises at the end of a long chain of

12 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 23.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
16 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 25.
17 Peter A. BERTOCCI and Richard M. MILLARD, Personality and the Good, Psychological and Ethical Perspectives, p. 77.
18 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 32.
evolution, at a point where instinctive and fixed modes of behavior have reached a minimum.

In this last paragraph it has been said that Fromm avers both a minimum of instinctive coercion and a total lack of instinctive coercion to be present at man's birth. Actually he seems to be wavering in his thought on this point. If there is a "minimum" of instinctive adaptation present, then it is a contradiction to assert that a situation which for animals was determinate now becomes indeterminate, uncertain and open for man. Actually on this point it seems that the wavering in Fromm's ideas between being born with no instinctive coercion or a minimum of such coercion in Escape from Freedom, written in 1941, is resolved in one later work, The Sane Society, written in 1955, which asserts without distinction that man is born when "...action is no longer fixed by hereditarily given mechanisms." Yet in The Art of Loving, published in 1956, Fromm asserts both that man has emerged from "instinctive adaptation," and that, referring to animal's instinctively directed emotional attachments, "...remnants of this instinctual equipment can be seen operating in

20 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 31-33.
21 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 23.
man." The ambiguity, if not contradiction, remains in Fromm's thought.

Ch. III, A, 3. - Birth of Human Freedom From

It is at this precise moment of freedom from instinctual coercion that human existence truly begins, that man becomes free from. As Fromm says, "...human existence and freedom are from the beginning inseparable." By freedom in this passage, Fromm says, is not meant freedom in its positive sense of "freedom to," but "...in its negative sense of 'freedom from,' namely freedom from instinctual determination of his actions." Thus it is at the very beginning of human history that freedom arises, in the sense of freedom from instinctual determination. For man, this is "...the beginning of emergence from his natural home, the beginning of the severance of his natural ties." Thus freedom begins, in the sense of freedom from. At the very beginning of human existence freedom from is seen as at least a necessary condition for human existence.

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23 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 32.
24 Ibid.
Ch. III, A, 4. - The Biblical Myth of Man's Expulsion from Paradise

Another way that Fromm has of approaching the same relationship between the beginnings of human existence and human freedom is through his explanation of the biblical myth, as he calls it, of man in the Garden of Eden. Fromm believes that the biblical myth of paradise and man's expulsion from paradise is a condensation of some profound truths about the beginnings of human nature and human freedom. There in the Garden of Eden man finds himself "...in a state of undifferentiated unity." Actually man knows nothing about himself, because he has not yet become truly human, man. For, as Fromm says, in the Garden of Eden, "there is no consciousness, no differentiation, no choice, no freedom, no sin." Man "...is part of nature, and he is not aware of any distance between himself and nature." "Man and woman," Fromm states, "live in the Garden of Eden in complete harmony with each other and with nature. There is peace and no necessity to work; there is not choice, no freedom, no thinking either." Actually

26 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 128.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 34.
man is in the highest stage of animal development, ready for the beginnings of entrance into humanity.

There is some question as to whether Fromm really means to deny all consciousness to animals in the beginning of the human race. The consciousness he asserts as proper to man is a "self-consciousness." Why does he deny any preceding simpler form of consciousness in animals? What Fromm does do, writing in 1960, in his essay, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," is to say that man, still part of nature, and ready for the first act of freedom, has "no consciousness." Man is not yet man, he is still on the animal level. Yet, in the same essay, Fromm describes animals as having a simple form of consciousness, making them aware of things around them. He does not say that the animal that was ready to be man, before the first act of freedom occurred, was conscious. His description of animal consciousness may refer to animals as they are today. Hence there is no evident contradiction here, but rather a deficiency in his evolutionary theory, in his explanation of how mind or consciousness develops.

30 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 128-129.

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Ch. III, A, 4, a - The Myth

This biblical myth, as Fromm sees it, is a "...particularly telling representation of the fundamental relation between man and freedom." 32 For man "acting against God's orders means freeing himself from coercion, emerging from the unconscious existence of prehuman life to the level of man." 33 This is the beginning of freedom for man, from "...the sweet bondage of paradise;" 34 man "...has taken the first step toward becoming human by becoming an 'individual.'" 35 True, in the eyes of the Church, this freeing himself from coercion for man is really a rebellion against the command of authority, of God, but in its positive human aspect, from the human standpoint, this freeing himself from the coercion of nature is for man "...the first act of freedom, that is, the first human act." 36

This first human act, Fromm says, was an act of "...disobedience to a command," 37 a sin, according to the

32 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 33.
33 Ibid., p. 34.
34 Ibid., p. 35.
35 Ibid., p. 34.
36 Ibid.
eyes of the Church. But, in Fromm's eyes, there is no sin involved here, for this first act of disobedience is the condition for and "...the beginning of human history." Only through this act of disobedience can man begin to develop, to evolve, to emerge in human history. This act of disobedience was necessary, Fromm says, if man were to become capable of free decision and responsibility, for these two human qualities depended on man's knowledge of good and evil; the only way man could acquire this knowledge was through this disobedience, this first act of freedom. This knowledge of good and evil, Fromm asserts, is "...the most essential human trait."

Just why Fromm calls the knowledge of good and evil "the most essential human trait" is open to question. Implied in this statement is what Fromm means by good and evil. This is a complex question, but John Schaar's estimate of what this means may be taken as reliable. Good is that which enhances life, or "...aids in the

38 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 33-34.
39 Erich FROMM, The Dogma of Christ, p. 204.
40 Ibid., p. 204-205.
41 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 234.
42 Ibid.
43 John H. Schaar, Escape from Authority, p. 28-29.
unfolding of one's powers," while "...evil is that which cripples one's powers."\(^{44}\) Without this knowledge of good and evil obviously man, now set apart from instinct's control, would be helpless in what he should do to fulfill his true human existence, which is precisely "the unfolding of the specific powers of an organism."\(^{45}\) Why should this be called the "most essential" human trait? Possibly because this knowledge is an absolutely necessary condition for that which is "most essential" in man, his striving for and achievement of his goal. The phrase "most essential" then would be derived from that for which this knowledge is a necessary condition.

In the several past paragraphs we have seen that the ideas of Erich Fromm link the first act of freedom and man's first act of disobedience. How are these two concepts linked in Fromm's thought? Fromm gives a definite answer: "The act of disobedience as an act of freedom is the beginning of reason."\(^{46}\) In some way the act of disobedience to the command of authority is the same as the first act of freedom. The text implies that the act of disobedience is

\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 29.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., p. 28, quoting Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 19-20.

\(^{46}\) Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 34.
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only one way of looking at the first human act, and that another equally good way is looking at this first human act as the first free act. This interpretation is confirmed by a text from the same passage of Escape from Freedom which says that "acting against the command of authority, committing a sin, is in its positive human aspect, the first act of freedom, that is the first human act." \(^{47}\) Here it is stated that one and the same act, the first human act, can be looked at in two ways, firstly, in its positive human aspect, and then it is the first act of freedom, and secondly, in a negative, religious setting, as an act of disobedience. \(^{48}\)

Ch. III, A, 4, b. - Freedom From and Free Choice

Another difficulty that arises in the understanding of this first act of freedom is its relationship to what Fromm calls "...an act of choice." \(^{49}\) In his explanation of the biblical myth of man's expulsion from paradise, Fromm refers to the myth's description of the beginning of human history as an "...act of choice", where this "act of

\(^{47}\) Ibid.

\(^{48}\) Cf. also Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 128, "This state of...and of freedom."

\(^{49}\) Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 24.
choice" is the "...first act of freedom."\textsuperscript{50} We have already seen that the freedom referred to here is a freedom from instinctual coercion.\textsuperscript{51} There is a connection of identity between the first act of choice and the first act of freedom, Fromm avers, in his part of \textit{Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis},\textsuperscript{52} written nineteen years after his first discussion of these matters in \textit{Escape from Freedom}.\textsuperscript{53}

Fromm states that "this state of primordial, pre-individual, unity is disrupted by the first act of choice, which is at the same time the first act of disobedience and of freedom."\textsuperscript{54} "Freedom" in this later text may be compared with the freedom mentioned in his earlier work, \textit{Escape from Freedom},\textsuperscript{55} and is found to have the same meaning as freedom from in the earlier text, since both are juxtaposed to and identified with the first act of disobedience. From this textual comparison, and from the context, i.e., the biblical myth of the Garden of Eden, "freedom" in this text from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 32.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Erich FROMM, in \textit{Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis}, p. 128.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 33-34.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Erich FROMM, in \textit{Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis}, p. 128.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 33-34.
\end{itemize}
Ordinarily freedom of choice would imply some sort of decision between two alternatives. Is not Fromm stretching the use of language when he identified "freedom of choice" with "freedom from"? He seems to be saying that the first act of mankind is at the same time a freeing of man from instinctual coercion and an act of free choice, that the same act can be looked at in two different ways. This seems to be what he means, but there are further questions that could be asked about the relationship of "freedom of choice" and "freedom from." Which aspect of this one act is prior, what conceptual relationships exist between these two concepts? Fromm does not ask these questions, but he does discuss the meaning of freedom of choice in two of his major works. In Man for Himself, published in 1947, he does discuss the nature of freedom of choice to some extent and in so doing explains some of the basic constituents of it. In his last major work,

56 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 128.


58 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 231-237.
as of 1964, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, Fromm develops his ideas on free choice more fully in a theory he calls "alternativism." By "free choice" in both of these works Fromm means a choice, a decision, based in part, at least, on conscious realization of subjective wishes, although our true motivation may remain obscure to us or unknown to us, and in the second work, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, Fromm adds that the conscious awareness of the true alternatives and the role of unconscious motivation is even more perfectly brought out. In the last analysis Fromm possibly denies any real power in man to say "Yes" or "No."

As another facet of the beginnings of freedom in man, Fromm so stresses the absolute priority of freedom from and free choice in these beginnings that the first free human act is prior to any consciousness, to any self-awareness. This first act of choice, Fromm says, "...brings about the emergence of consciousness."

59 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, p. 115-150.
61 Peter A. BERTOCCI and Richard M. MILLARD, Personality and the Good: Psychological and Ethical Perspectives, p. 90-93.
62 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 128-129.
he says in *Escape from Freedom*, "The act of disobedience as an act of freedom is the beginning of reason." Since consciousness and reason are posterior to freedom, whether of choice or from instinctual coercion, then this means that the beginning of human existence was not a conscious act, but an unconscious one. Whatever choice was made was not made with any awareness of any personal wishes, or any alternatives, nor was freedom from instinctual awareness acquired with any awareness of such freedom or any choice of it that was conscious. This is Erich Fromm's picture of the beginnings of human existence, a "free choice," a "freedom from," without the light of reason. Freedom came first, then awareness of what had happened. Human existence, too, "...inseparable from freedom," began together with an act of free choice, an act of freedom from, which was unconscious. This conclusion may seem to disagree with the role given by Fromm to "self-awareness, reason, and imagination" in the origin of man from a purely animal existence. These three mental qualities are said to

63 Erich FROMM, *Escape from Freedom*, p. 34. Cf. also these two books by Erich FROMM, *The Dogma of Christ*, p. 204, "The first act...his fellow man," and *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, p. 167, "Only when they...strange and hostile."

64 Erich FROMM, *Escape from Freedom*, p. 32.

65 Erich FROMM, *The Sane Society*, p. 23.
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I disrupt animal existence and distinguish man from the animal. Yet they may be looked upon as the result of the first act of choice, the first act of disobedience, the first act of freedom from, the first human act, and not necessarily as the first or prime cause of this disruption.

Ch. III, A, 5. - Consequences of Man's Origin

Consideration will now be given to the immediate consequences of this unconscious beginning of human history and of freedom from. The first consequence is the rise of consciousness, of self-awareness; at this moment of radical change in nature "...life became aware of itself." From "...a state of oneness with the natural world," man emerged "...to an awareness of himself as an entity separate from surrounding nature and men." Reason begins with the first act of disobedience, of freedom from. With this advent of "self-awareness, reason and imagination" the harmony of animal existence is shattered. These mental powers give rise to a recognition of himself, of nature, of other men as they actually are, i.e., separate from one

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p. 34.
70 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 23.
another. Because of this "...reason and imagination" 71 man becomes aware of his "...aloneness and separateness," of his "...powerlessness and ignorance," of "...the accidentalness of his birth and of his death." 72 Man recognizes that "he is part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change them, yet he transcends the rest of nature." 73 "Being aware of himself," Fromm states about man in his origin, "he realizes his powerlessness and the limitations of his existence." 74.

One effect of the new presence of reason is man's forced recognition of his transcendence of nature and the meaning of this transcendence. Man, "...the product of natural evolution," 75 "...is part of nature and yet transcends it, being endowed with reason and self-awareness." 76 Man, because of reason, must "...cope everlastingly with the task of an insoluble dichotomy." 77 The problem of man's existence is "...unique in the whole of nature; he has fallen out of nature, as it were, and is still in it;

71 Ibid., p. 30.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 23.
74 Ibid., p. 23-24.
75 Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 174.
76 Ibid.
he is partly divine, partly animal; partly infinite, partly finite."\textsuperscript{78} This transcendence of nature, this separation from nature must be solved; man "...cannot go back to the prehuman state of harmony with nature,"\textsuperscript{79} man "...is driven to overcome this inner split, tormented by a craving for 'absoluteness,' for another kind of harmony which can lift the curse by which he was separated from nature, from his fellow man, and from himself."\textsuperscript{80} Man, the "anomaly," the "freak of the universe,"\textsuperscript{81} is driven to overcome this transcendence, this separateness.

Thus it is with the beginnings of human existence. Knowledge of what he is and of his relationships to himself, to nature and to his fellow man torments man, for man knows he is separate, and therefore helpless, unable to use actively his human powers.\textsuperscript{82} Because of this man experiences "intense anxiety," for the world can invade man without his being able to react to it.\textsuperscript{83} This separateness is also the course of shame and guilt.\textsuperscript{84}

\begin{thebibliography}{84}
\bibitem{78} Ibid., p. 25.
\bibitem{79} Erich FROMM, \textit{Man for Himself}, p. 40.
\bibitem{80} Ibid., p. 41.
\bibitem{81} Ibid., p. 40.
\bibitem{82} Erich FROMM, \textit{The Art of Loving}, p. 7.
\bibitem{83} Ibid.
\bibitem{84} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
instinctual ties, through awareness of what his state actually was, brought to man isolation, and thereby anxiety and powerlessness. 85

Ch. III, A, 6. - Summary

A short summary now follows of what freedom from means at the birth of man, of human existence, of human history. It has been seen that freedom from means an unconscious act of separation from the bonds of nature. Freedom from next was seen as a necessary condition for the emergence of reason, of self-awareness, of mental life. This self-awareness and reason took cognizance of the fundamental disunity within man between what was specifically human and his continuing animal nature, and the disunity or separation of man from nature and from his neighbor. From this realized separateness arose anxiety, guilt, shame, a sense of helplessness, of powerlessness, and a drive to overcome this lack of harmony.

Thus in the beginning of human existence freedom from instinctual ties arose, with four effects. One effect was an objective disunity, a separation from all else outside of the knowing subject, and an internal disunity within the knowing subject, along with an objective helplessness.

85 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. viii.
before the forces of nature and society. The second effect, or at least, consequent of the original freedom from of the human race was the arrival, the birth of human self-awareness, of reason and imagination. The third effect of freedom from was a psychological one, an affective one, i.e., the arousal of emotions, of feelings of anxiety, helplessness, guilt and shame. The fourth effect was a drive to overcome this inner split, a craving for absoluteness. Thus freedom from was an act of separation, a resulting state of separation, an antecedent, perhaps a cause, of self-awareness. Through the mediation of this self-awareness resulted the awareness of objective separateness and feelings corresponding to this separateness. A drive to overcome this separation then resulted.

Ch. III, A, 7. - Analogy with Origin of Freedom from in the Individual

After summarizing the results of this inquiry into the nature of Erich Fromm's idea of the origin of freedom from in the human race, a brief comparison will now be instituted between this idea and the idea of the origin of freedom from in the human individual. This comparison is necessary to understand the nature of the proof Fromm is using, and certain obscurities in his thought. Both of these ideas refer directly to real, ontological events in
Fromm's way of thinking about reality.

In both origins, that of the individual and of the human race, one fundamental concept that Fromm uses is that of "birth." He looks upon both origins as being a separation from definite, instinct-directed situations, into a situation that is "indefinite, uncertain and open." Thus Fromm sees both origins, of the individual in terms of a birth, of a freeing from. The use of the same terminology suggests that there may be some sort of an analogy present in these two types of reality, of origins, in Fromm's conception.

Fromm's description of the origin of the individual states that there are both a physical separation from the mother, not of much importance in itself, and the potentialities for a psychological separation, but probably not yet actuated at birth because of lack of development of the nervous system and lack of human experience. This birth of the human individual is of little immediate importance, then, either physiologically or psychologically, except this, that the self-breeding of the child points to future,

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86 Erich FROMM, The Art of Loving, p. 6.
87 Ibid.
needed self-activity, and as a preparation for future psychological growth. Similarly in the birth of the human race Fromm describes little of importance from a physiological or biological viewpoint. It is a freeing from instincts, complete or almost complete, which enables the human species to be born, to bring about the specific notes of self-awareness, of reason and imagination. In Fromm's way of looking at human origins this is an event of maximum importance. Present in developing nature for the first time is one end-product of the preceding evolutionary growth, an animal with mental qualities that transcend all of nature, including animality, enabling the new man to assume responsibility for its new, puzzling human existence.

Thus it would seem that Fromm's use of the words "freedom from" and "birth" is about realities that are somewhat the same and somewhat different. If it may be conjectured that the words "freedom from" and "birth" refer primarily to human individual birth, then the birth of the human race is somewhat similar to it. Both are parts of processes of growth, of separation, leading to greater growth and separation. Yet there are significant differences between the origins, as Fromm sees them. In the

case of the individual human child birth means probably nothing in its actual psychological significance. It would seem that Fromm conceives the human infant at birth as not having any self-awareness, yet capable of growing into it. Whereas the birth of the human race is of immense importance for Fromm, because for the first time in nature self-awareness in individual men becomes present and the knowledge of good and evil arises in nature, in individual men. Human birth, of the individual and of the race, are both processes of birth, of separation, of freedom from, from instinctual ties, leading to self-awareness. Yet the child, though yet just beginning its non-reflective conscious life at birth, would seem in Fromm's idea to be human. For Fromm never talks about the immature child before it is able to say "I" as being less than human, whereas before the arrival of self-reflective life, the human race for Fromm is animal. Fromm sees the origin of the human race as human as part of a long evolutionary process, whereas the origin, the birth of the human individual is not conceived of in the same way.

Thus Fromm does see the two processes as related, as being somewhat same, and somewhat different, with the differences predominating. Granted that the birth, the origin, both physiological and psychological, of the human infant is the primary analogue, then there is an analogy
of meaning between human individual birth and the birth of
the first members of the human race.90

Ch. III, A, 8. - Proof by Analogy, A Preliminary Question

A further question may be asked here: Does Fromm
try to prove by analogy his assertions about the beginning
of the human race? Is he perhaps trying to prove the
presence of freedom in the human race's beginning by some
application of Haeckel's law, "...that the ontogenesis of
the individual is a repetition of its phylogenesis?"91 Is
he arguing from the various stages of ontogenesis to the
necessary stages of phylogenesis by way of evolution?92
It does seem likely that this is what Fromm is doing,
although he transposes these events into the implied value
terms of freedom, and furthermore refers these origins to
the continuance of or the beginnings of a process that is
dialectical.93 That Fromm is nevertheless using Haeckel's

90 Cf. Bernard WUELLNER, A Dictionary of Scholastic
Philosophy, p. 12, under "Analogy," metaphysical meanings,
3.

91 P. Henry VAN LAER, Philosophy of Science, Part
One, p. 142.

92 Ibid.

93 Cf. Chapter II, B, 6, p. 80-84 and C, 1, c,
p. 90-97 of this thesis, as well as Chapter III, B, 3,
b, (2), (f), p. 219-220 of this thesis.
law, set in a dialectical, evolutionary conception of human reality, does seem likely, from the resemblance pointed out in the discussion of analogy in the preceding paragraphs. Yet the certainty and firmness with which he states his assertions about the origin of the human race would indicate that another source of certitude than analogy is entering here, unless Fromm mistakenly thinks analogical reasoning, in this rare case, gives certitude, a mistake because of the real differences in the two differing origins. 94 It would seem more likely that Fromm's certitude comes from some general philosophical position, such as evolutionism. A further discussion of this point will occur in the last Chapter of the thesis, when Fromm's methods and types of proof will be considered more fully. 95

Ch. III, A, 9. - Origin of Man by Spontaneity

There is one further question to be raised here, whose more complete solution will be taken in Chapter VI. It is this: How does Fromm justify the emergence of man, transcending animal nature by his self-awareness, reason and imagination, from the animal kingdom? Does nature, as

94 P. Henry VAN LAER, Philosophy of Science, Part One, p. 138-142.

95 Cf. Chapter VI, D of this thesis.
represented in the animals from which the first men came, contain within itself the potentialities for man's new specific perfection? Is Fromm accounting for man's superior perfections by some sort of spontaneity, by some sort of "leap?" Fromm does not directly ask this question, for he is talking descriptively of a process, yet a process concerning apparently different essential levels of animals and men. This general question will be discussed more fully in the last chapter, for its solution depends on Fromm's conception of evolution and of the essence of individual men.

Ch. III, A, 10. - Scientific Assessment

It might well be appropriate here to make a comment on Fromm's interpretation of the Old Testament, and in particular on his interpretation of the Biblical Myth of the origin of man in the Garden of Eden, in Paradise, as narrated in the first books of Genesis. One of Fromm's latest books, You Shall Be as Gods, is an attempt to find the true meaning of the Old Testament as seen in itself and in the eyes of Jewish commentators. In this new book Fromm looks for the essential human meaning in terms of a radical humanism, an outlook searching for complete

96 Erich FROMM, You Shall Be as Gods, 1966.
independence on the part of man. In this same book is Fromm's interpretation of the creation of man and of his fall, an interpretation which is quite the same as that given earlier in his English writings, and which has been mentioned already in this thesis.

What Fromm is doing, then, is to interpret Genesis in terms of a radical humanism. Professional biblical scholars have spoken severely about Fromm's interpretation of the Bible. Bruce Vawter, for instance, in reviewing this book of Fromm's, You Shall Be as Gods, does not hesitate to say that, while a writer of great talents, Fromm totally lacks concern for "...any notion of historical truth that was central to the biblical kerygma." He further states that rarely does Fromm take even indirect notice of professional biblical scholarship. Roland E. Murphy's estimate is quite the same, for, speaking of Fromm's goal of radical humanism in Fromm's interpretation of the Bible in You Shall Be as Gods, Murphy says that

97 Ibid., p. 13-14.
100 Ibid.
"...the difficulty is that these goals are imposed upon the biblical text; the author does not struggle with the text to discover what it has to say, or to see how it provides a starting point for development." Murphy adds that this book, You Shall Be as Gods, is not an interpretation of the Old Testament at all; rather is it "...doctrinaire humanism served up with biblical garnish."

Fromm's use of the story of man's creation and fall would come under the indictment of both Vawter and Murphy, since it is a significant part of Fromm's book, You Shall Be as Gods. Actually, Bruce Vawter, in the review of his just cited, says that Fromm's story of the "fall" is a simple caricature of the real meaning of the event. One reason for Fromm's explanation being a caricature is not hard to find. H. Renckens, in Israel's Concept of the Beginning, states that the first principle of all exegesis, including that of the paradise narrative, is the acceptance of the author's point of view as one's own, i.e., looking


102 Ibid., p. 266.

103 Cf. footnote 98 directly above, p. 190.

104 Bruce VAWTER, op. cit., p. 82.
at what is written to see first of all what the author of
the text intends to say, to which principle Roland
Murphy, as just seen, assents.

To understand the author's viewpoint in the Book of
Genesis, there are elementary principles needed, e.g. that
the author is writing religious history, based on a belief
in God's immanence and transcendence, as well as His per-
sonal character, and that men are entirely dependent upon
God as creator. For Fromm the God-concept in the Bible
does not refer to a transcendent and immanent, personal
Being, but rather refers to a human reality behind this
concept, a reality expressible "...only in poetic and
visual symbols." The last logical step in the Jewish
religion, in Fromm's view, would be to give up "God," and
to realize a concept of man alone in the world, yet able to
feel at home with other men and with nature by a full,
truly human union with them. One other point of Fromm's

105 H. Renckens, Israel's Concept of the Beginning,
New York, 1964, p. 291, as quoted in "New Thinking on Ori-
ginal Sin," Herder Correspondence, A Monthly Review of the

106 Roland E. Murphy, op. cit., p. 266.

107 Jean de Fraine, The Bible and the Origin of Man,

108 Erich Fromm, You Shall Be as Gods, p. 226 and
passim.

109 Ibid., p. 226. Cf. also Chapter V, B, 2, b,
In this section of Chapter III of this thesis the meaning of freedom from as it occurs in the development of the human race will be explored. For Erich Fromm this is a very extensive subject, covering the whole of human history, from its origin, which already has been explored, up to and including the twentieth century. Fromm's account of this development of the human race will be treated, and with it the development of freedom from, for as shall be seen, the two, human existence and freedom from are inseparably united, according to Fromm. To properly handle this section of Chapter III, after a brief introduction this section will be divided into two parts. The first part will discuss one of Fromm's concepts as a necessary preliminary for understanding his thought on the development of freedom from, Fromm's concept of "social character," as explaining Fromm's concept of the mutual interrelationship

110 Bruce VAWTER, op. cit., p. 82.
of external, social factors, such as economic and religious factors, with changes within the individual human being who is subject to these social factors. The second part of this section will discuss the broad outlines of Fromm's theory of how freedom from does develop during the course of human history.

Wherever you find human existence as such, Fromm thinks, you find freedom, and a freedom whose meaning "...changes according to the degree of man's awareness and conception of himself as an independent and separate being." Freedom from at least is implied here, since an actual separateness is the basis of the awareness of such separateness. Fromm, then, is talking of a freedom from that always exists wherever human nature is found, and that changes in meaning as man's awareness of himself as separate changes. Fromm's entire account of the meaning of freedom from in the course of human history, in the social history of man, depends in part on this postulate of his. The details of Fromm's account of the changes in freedom from in the course of the development of the human race depend on this hypothesis, and are meant as a proof of such a hypothesis.

Another hypothesis implicit in the development of freedom from is the development of human existence as such. Actually Fromm sees human existence as the product of evolution,\textsuperscript{112} as a subject to a growth that is "...a process of continuous birth, of continuous awakening."\textsuperscript{113} Since Fromm thinks of freedom from as inseparably united to human existence,\textsuperscript{114} one would expect that the growth in one would have some effect on the other. In the last chapter of this thesis there will be a closer discussion of the relationship between freedom from and human nature or human existence in Fromm's thought. It is sufficient to call attention to the relationship as of now and pointed out in this section as there is need or utility to call attention to it.

The freedom, and especially freedom from discussed here is possibly connected analogously in Fromm's conception of reality with the freedom already discussed in the theory of freedom's development in the human individual as individual, in Chapter III of this thesis. At the end of this section of Chapter III an inquiry into Fromm's analogous use of freedom will be made. Such an inquiry is

\textsuperscript{112} Erich FROMM, \textit{Beyond the Chains of Illusion}, p. 174.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p. 178.
demanded by the assertion of Leon Saul, reviewing Fromm's Escape from Freedom in Psychoanalytic Quarterly, that in this book Fromm applies his knowledge of "...individual reactions to the reactions of whole sections of the population as units," just as Saul says Fromm had done previously in his Transformation of the Christ Dogma. \(^\text{115}\) Walter T. James, in Individual Psychology Bulletin, calls attention to the same transference by Fromm of knowledge of the individual's interaction with his environment to certain historical movements, such as the Reformation. \(^\text{116}\)

Ch. III, B, 2. - Social Character

Ch. III, B, 2, a. - Introduction

In this part of this section on the "Development of Freedom From in the Human Race," discussion will center about the nature of Fromm's concept of social character, and also thus explain his ideas on how external cultural factors, be they economic, religious or otherwise, interact

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with internal factors within a human being, such as his concept of freedom and his activity concerning freedom.

In the discussion of "character" and "social character" in the development of freedom from in the individual a thorough discussion of these topics did not occur, since the individual in himself was being discussed. 117 Facts from social conditioning of the individual were used, but there was no discussion of social conditioning in itself, nor a thorough exploration of these issues. 118 Actually, in discussing the development of freedom from in the individual, much time was spent in discussing the influence of social factors such as irrational authority on the individual. 119

Ch. III, B, 2, b. - Fromm's New Method: Analytic Social Psychology

In discussing the development of the human race, and its development in freedom from, in contrast to the development of the individual, Fromm has to treat of large groups of people engaged in various social institutions,

117 Cf. Chapter II, B, 2, p. 66-70 of this thesis.
118 Ibid.
119 Cf. Chapter II, C, 2, d-g, passim, of this thesis.
people who are formed by these institutions, and who in turn form them.\textsuperscript{120} To handle significant data Fromm devised early in his career a method which united historical materialism with a dynamic psychoanalytic insight.\textsuperscript{121}

According to Fromm, in psychoanalysis of individuals the key concept is "...the active and passive adaptability of biological states of affairs, of instincts, to social factors."\textsuperscript{122} What Fromm did was to take this procedure and apply it to groups. Instead of studying the relationship of the instinct-structure of the individual in terms of what he called their "total life-experience," or their "life destiny" in the sense of their destiny or lot in life,\textsuperscript{123} Fromm would study a group of people, e.g., a class or a nation, by correlating their common instinct-structure to the actual socio-economic structure of the group, to

\textsuperscript{120} Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{121} Martin BIRNBACH, Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy, p. 80. Much of the material discussed in these pages is derived in part from p. 77-88.

\textsuperscript{122} Erich FROMM, "Über Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie," in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Vol. 1, 1932, p. 31. "...Die aktive und passive Anpassung biologischer Tatbestände, der Triebe, an soziale ..." (Emphasis removed)

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid. "Lebensschicksal" is the word Fromm uses. Bertocci and Millard, in Personality and the Good, Psychological and Ethical Perspectives, p. 78, translate this word as "total life-experience;" perhaps it would be better to give the concept of destiny, of fate, of lot in life, a greater share in the translated force of this word, since "Schicksal" has this last-mentioned emphasis.
achieve an understanding of the psychic apparatus of the group.\textsuperscript{124} Fromm accepted as true historical materialism's revelation of "...the dependence on economic conditions not only of the social and political but also of the ideologic-

al facts of the case."\textsuperscript{125} Thus Fromm had his method of studying the psychic features common to a group, from their common life-destinies, from the socio-economic situation of the group.\textsuperscript{126} As Fromm sums it up: "Thus analytical social psychology means: the instinct-structure, the libidinous and to a great part unconscious attitude of a group, to be understood from the group's socio-economic structure."\textsuperscript{127}

Thus it is that Fromm sees the field of his work as an analytic social psychologist in his early German writings in the 1930's. The common psychic attitudes of a

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 34, cf. also Erich FROMM, "Politik und Psychoanalyse," (Politics and Psychoanalysis), in Die Psychoanalytische Bewegung, III, 1931, p. 444.

\textsuperscript{125} Erich FROMM, "Politik und Psychoanalyse," in Die Psychoanalytische Bewegung, III, 1931, p. 444. "...die Abhängigkeit nicht nur der sozialen und politischen, sondern auch der ideologischen Tatbestände von der ökonomischen Bedingungen."


\textsuperscript{127} Ibid. "Analytische Sozialpsychologie heisst also; die Triebstruktur, die libidinöse, zum grossen Teil unbewusste Haltung einer Gruppe aus ihrer sozialökonomischen Struktur heraus zu verstehen." (Emphasis removed.)
group are understandable because they are formed by the interaction of the group's common socio-economic environment with the libidinal structure common to the group.

Closely connected with this concept of analytic social psychology in Fromm's early writings is his concept of character formation in these same writings. For Fromm, definite character traits should be conceived as a sublimation or reaction formation of definite sex impulses, sexual in a broad Freudian sense, or as a continuation of definite sex impulses, conceived as definite object relationships which were coordinated in childhood with these sex impulses.\textsuperscript{128} These character traits are connected with the psychosexual development of the individual;\textsuperscript{129} for example, connected with the anal character would be such traits as love for order, frugality and obstinacy.\textsuperscript{130} For Fromm, then, character traits in his German writings had


\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., passim.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., p. 255. "Ordnungsliebe, Sparsamkeit und Eigensinn."
definitely a sexual or libidinous base.\footnote{131} Added to this base he stated that "...the character features average and typical for a society are conditioned by the peculiarity or characteristic of that society."\footnote{132} These character traits average and typical for a society and its members form what Fromm later in his first major English work, \textit{Escape from Freedom} is to call the "social character" of a society and its members.\footnote{133}

What Fromm means by "social character" is discussed in a number of places in his works written in English. The latest thorough development of his concept of "social character" is in \textit{Beyond the Chains of Illusion, My Encounter with Marx and Freud}, written in 1962.\footnote{134} The earliest discussion was in Fromm's analysis of the development of the dogma of Christ, published in German as, in English translation, "The Development of the Dogma of Christ" in 1930.\footnote{135}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{131} Ibid., p. 267.
\footnote{132} Ibid., p. 267. "...die für Gesellschaft typischen, durchschnittlichen Charakterzüge ihrerseits durch die Eigenart dieser Gesellschaft bedingt sind."
\footnote{133} Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 211-213, 277 ff.
\footnote{134} Erich FROMM, \textit{Beyond the Chains of Illusion}, p. 77 ff.
\end{footnotes}
and translated by James Adams, with minor corrections of the translation by Fromm, as The Dogma of Christ in 1963. Other important places, the first two of which Fromm himself refers to in Beyond the Chains of Illusion, are his continued study in German in 1932 of the problem in "Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its Significance for Social Psychology," his essay in Culture and Personality, entitled "Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its Application to the Understanding of Culture," as well as his development of the subject in Escape from Freedom and in Man for Himself. Especially good in this area are Martin Birnbach’s reflections on the subject of social


137 Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 78, note 1.


141 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 56 ff.
character in Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy. In this brief discussion of "social character" the analysis will follow Fromm's latest discussion in Beyond the Chains of Illusion, which, he says, is based on his essay, referred to in this paragraph, "Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its Application to the Understanding of Culture."

Ch. III, B, 2, d. - Definition and Explanation of "Social Character"

Fromm's idea of "social character" and its significance in his system of thought regarding the interpretation of man's nature and socio-economic forces will now be investigated. For Fromm "social character" is "...the nucleus of the character structure which is shared by most members of the same culture, in contradiction to the individual character in which people belonging to the same culture differ from each other." Such a concept, Fromm

142 Martin BIRNBACH, Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy, p. 77-88, 149-153, 221, 250.

143 Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 77 ff.

144 Ibid., p. 78, note 1.


146 Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 78.
adds, is not a statistical one in the sense of being the sum total of character traits of the majority of people in a given culture, but rather "social character" is meant in a dynamic sense, a functional sense. For Fromm, the "social character" is connected with the way basic human energy is canalized, it is the specific way, the same direction, in which the energy of most people in a given society is expended. Granted this specific way in which the given society's energy is canalized, then the motivations, the ideas, the ideals of this same majority of the people will be the same. For Fromm the "social character" is essential in a society's functioning, and the intermediary between "...the economic structure of society and the prevailing ideas."

The social systems in any society, according to Fromm, must operate in such a way that the members of the society spontaneously, gladly and without conscious decision follow the direction demanded by the social systems of that society; this is the function of the "social character," to ensure the smooth, coherent and automatic fulfillment of

147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., p. 77.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid., p. 78.
the society's demands. What happens if the external conditions of a given society change, e.g., in economic or social patterns? Then a lag arises, Fromm says, in which the "social character," ordinarily a stabilizing force, becomes an element more of disintegration and revolution.

Is it possible to change man's nature in such a way by socio-economic conditions that man's "social character" is indefinitely malleable? Fromm answers that it is not, for in his thinking there are needs inherent in man, basic human needs, such as happiness, love and freedom, which are "...dynamic factors in the historical process." These needs, dynamic factors influencing the environmental factors, can only be frustrated up to a certain point; after that the society will probably collapse. In addition Fromm is sure that man need not be passive in the face of influences from either the human situation or from the contradictions of history. To the first he can bravely adjust to some extent; the second type of contradiction, the historical, can be annulled by man's activity. Fromm approves of the principle he finds in the Old

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151 Ibid., p. 79.
152 Ibid., p. 81.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 40-45.
Testament that man makes his own history, without the aid of any Supreme Being.\textsuperscript{156}

Another function of "social character," pertinent to our discussion, is that it is the basis of the attractiveness of certain ideas and ideals.\textsuperscript{157} For instance, the idea and ideal of private property differed in feudalism and in modern capitalism; the security and sense of strength of a person in feudal society depended on the person's status, not on their possession of private property, but in modern capitalism a man without private property rates as nothing.\textsuperscript{158} Hence the attractiveness of ideas and ideals changed in the men of a given society, depending on that society's evaluation of these ideas and ideals. For Fromm, however, this did not mean that ideas and ideals were a mere reflex of the socio-economic condition of a given society, that these ideas and ideals had no value of their own.\textsuperscript{159} Actually, he points out, the ideal of freedom, for instance, is "...deeply rooted in the nature of man."\textsuperscript{160} Ideas such as freedom, and authority and order, transcend the necessities of a given social order, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{156} Erich FROMM, \textit{You Shall Be as Gods}, p. 115-116.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Erich FROMM, \textit{Beyond the Chains of Illusion}, p. 83.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Ibid., p. 84.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 86.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
hence are appealing to the human heart, although their actual popularity at any given period depends on the social character produced by the environment.\footnote{161}{Ibid.}

Are these ideas and ideals produced by a given social order through the "social character" passive in regard to this order? Actually, Fromm thinks, they are not. These ideas and ideals, once created, in turn are dynamic forces, influencing the social and economic milieu, through an intermediary, the "social character."\footnote{162}{Ibid., p. 86-87.} Fromm concludes his treatment of this reciprocal influence of ideas and ideals, and the socio-economic conditions of the milieu by this diagram, reproduced here:\footnote{163}{Ibid., p. 87.}

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ECONOMIC BASIS} & \downarrow \quad \text{SOCIAL CHARACTER} \\
& \uparrow \quad \text{IDEAS AND IDEALS}
\end{align*}
\]

What has been seen, then, in this discussion of the "social character" is Fromm's method of explaining how society influences the majority of the individuals in it, and how they in turn influence the society in which they live. It is a reciprocal influence, without conscious...
decision; it is molded by the forces of human nature meeting, through the medium of social character, the forces of society, and the social milieu in turn being influenced by the ideas and ideals produced by it. Some ideas and ideals, such as freedom, because they are inherent in human nature are not entirely a social product, Fromm would say, although these ideas and ideals do depend on the socio-economic structure of society for their importance and popularity at any given time.

One thing that has not been mentioned in this description is that Fromm changes his description of the formation of character once he started to write in English on this topic. Fromm rejected the instinctive, libidinous root of character formation, mentioned earlier in this section as found in his earlier German writings. Fromm borrows for his character types heavily from Freud and Abraham, but, as Ruth Munroe says, Fromm "...rejects the bio-psychological theory that gives these 'types' some sort of intrinsic dynamic basis." 164 Ruth Munroe is writing with reference to Fromm's work in English preceding her date of publication, 1955, and with reference to one work in German,

164 Ruth MUNROE, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, p. 475; cf. also P.A. BERTOCCI and Richard M. MILLARD, Personality and the Good, Psychological and Ethical Perspectives, p. 77.

What Fromm means by "social character" has been discussed and studied in order to see what he means by the development of freedom, and especially freedom from in the human race. Underlying all of his general and specific description of what freedom from means to human society at any given period is this idea of "social character." This concept explains the means a society has of influencing the members of a society, and explains the growth, development, and changes in the psychic attitudes, the character traits, the ideas and ideals prevalent in a majority of the members of a society.

Ch. III, B, 3. - General Theory of the Development of the Human Race in Freedom From

Ch. III, B, 3, a. - Introduction

The general theory that Fromm puts forth of the development of the human race in freedom from will now be discussed. Fromm's conception of the development of the human race in freedom from is closely allied to his concept of human nature, as will be seen. Thus references will be

165 Ruth MUNROE, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, p. 349.

made to Fromm's concept of human nature as such reference will clarify the conception of freedom from.

In this part, dealing with Fromm's general theory of the development of the human race in freedom from, first Fromm's general theory in itself will be dealt with, a theory linking the growth in individuation in the human race with growth in freedom from. This discussion of Fromm's general theory of individuation and freedom from will be prefaced by several comments on his conception of the place of the individual human being in the social process. Then, after the discussion of his theory of the growth of individuation and freedom from, several lines of development of the human race in freedom from will be explained.

Ch. III, B, 3, b. - The Growth of Individuation and Freedom From in the Human Race

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (1) - The Individual, Basic Entity of the Social Process

For Erich Fromm the individual is the basic entity of the social process; it is the individual with "...his desires and fears, his passions and reason, his propensities for good and evil," that leads to an understanding of what Fromm calls "the dynamics of the social process."167

167 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. viii.
Not only must the individual be studied in his psychological make-up, but he must be understood as structured in specific ways, as possessing certain indestructible qualities, as constantly searching for conditions better suited for his intrinsic needs. As observed in the preceding part of this section, the individual is also formed through his social character by the society surrounding him. Yet this formation is not that of a piece of machinery, of a robot, but of a man who dynamically adjusts to the social environment surrounding him, fighting strenuously against a culture pattern when it is contradictory to his nature, and eventually changing this contradictory cultural pattern. It is in Man for Himself, published in 1947, that Fromm seems to definitely make up his mind that there is a definite, "...basic human nature which is the same always and everywhere," with "...basic needs rooted in the conditions of human existence." In Escape from Freedom, published in 1941, from which the development

168 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 23.
169 Cf. Chapter III, B, 2, passim, of this thesis.
170 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 22-23.
171 Ibid.
172 John H. SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 45.
173 Ibid., p. 46.
174 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, op. cit.
of freedom from will shortly be taken, Fromm vacillates between social determinism and the concept of a basic human nature. 175

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2) - Analysis of Passage III

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (a) - Introduction

The origin of freedom from in the human race has already been discussed. Fromm's thinking on the general development of freedom from in the human race will now be explained. His thinking on this subject is contained chiefly in Chapter II of his book, Escape from Freedom, published in 1941. 176 The process of developing human freedom from will be elucidated chiefly from texts in this chapter.

The chief text to which reference will be made in this discussion is contained in Escape from Freedom. This text shall be called Passage III. In this same section of Escape from Freedom on the growth of the individual in freedom from two passages from Escape from Freedom were given which were closely studied, and which were referred

175 John H. SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 45, and footnote on p. 46-47.

to as Passage I and Passage II. This Passage III, which is now given, is primarily concerned, not with the growth of individuation and freedom in the individual human being, but rather with the growth of individuation and freedom in the human race. This passage, and the paragraph after it, constitute, according to M.F. Ashley Montagu, "the whole of Dr. Fromm's thesis" in Escape from Freedom. Montagu further says that this thesis is "...most successfully carried out in its analysis and demonstration."

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (b)- Passage III

This is Passage III:

Passage III

We see that the process of growing human freedom has the same dialectic character that we have noticed in the process of individual growth. On the one hand it is a process of growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, growing power of human reason, and growing solidarity with other human beings. But on the other hand this growing individuation means growing isolation, insecurity, and thereby growing doubt concerning one's own role in the universe, the meaning of one's life.

177 Cf. Chapter II, B, 4, and Chapter II, C, 1, b and c, passim, of this thesis.
178 M.F. Ashley MONTAGU, op. cit., p. 122.
179 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, op. cit.
180 M.F. Ashley MONTAGU, op. cit., p. 122.
and with all that a growing feeling of one's own powerlessness and insignificance as an individual.

If the process of the development of mankind had been harmonious, if it had followed a certain plan, then both sides of the development—the growing strength and the growing individuation—would have been exactly balanced. As it is, the history of mankind is one of conflict and strife. Each step in the direction of growing individuation threatened people with new insecurities. Primary bonds once severed cannot be mended; once paradise is lost, man cannot return to it. There is only one possible, productive solution for the relationship of individualized man with the world: his active solidarity with all men and his spontaneous activity, love and work, which unite him again with the world, not by primary ties but as a free and independent individual.

However, if the economic, social and political conditions on which the whole process of human individuation depends, do not offer a basis for the realization of individuality in the sense just mentioned, while at the same time people have lost those ties which gave them security, this lag makes freedom an unbearable burden. It then becomes identical with doubt, with a kind of life which lacks meaning and direction. Powerful tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission or some kind of relationship to man and the world which promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of his freedom. 181

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181 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35-37.
discussed "...in the process of individual growth." 182
This passage infers that what is about to be discussed is
not the process of individual growth, but rather the growth
of a collectivity of some sort. This interpretation is
confirmed as correct by the development of the passage as
referring to "mankind," 183 and by the total preceding sec­
tions which discuss the phylogenetic history of man under
the aspect of "growing individuation and growing free­
dom." 184 This Passage III refers to a summary of what has
been just discussed in Escape from Freedom. The words "we
see," referring to the dialectic character of growing human
freedom, are to be taken as a summary of something just
seen. 185 And what has just been seen is a phylogenetic
history of man's growing individuation and freedom, com­
pleted in a discussion of the relationship between growing
"freedom to" and "freedom from." 186

What then is the central point of this complete
passage? It is this, that growing human freedom is a dia­
lectic process with two aspects, "growing strength and
integration, etc." on the one hand and "growing isolation,

182 Ibid., p. 35.
183 Ibid., p. 36.
184 Ibid., p. 31.
185 Ibid., p. 35.
186 Ibid.
insecurity, etc." on the other hand. Confronted by this growing isolation, and lack of an equal growth in growing strength, there are two solutions possible, one a productive solution, man's "active solidarity with all men, etc." or another kind of solution, giving in to tendencies to submit to something which will take away this isolation even at the expense of loss of freedom. If man's history actually developed as it was meant to be, both aspects, self-growth and isolation, would have exactly balanced. However it did not, isolation was greater than self-growth, and hence Fromm infers the inevitability of the solution of escaping unbearable isolation by submission.

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (d)- Comparison with Passages I and II

The first thing to notice about the passage dealing with growing freedom is that it is remarkably similar, if not identical with the description of growing individuation in the individual found in Passage I, and the description of the process of growing individuation and freedom in the individual found in Passage II. These two

187 Ibid., p. 35-36.
188 Ibid., p. 36-37.
189 Ibid., p. 36.
190 Ibid., p. 28-30.
191 Ibid., p. 30-31.
passages have the same general structure as Passage III, a dialectic process of growth, with one aspect of growing strength on the one hand and an aspect of growing isolation on the other; if these two aspects were matched there would be a harmonious development of these two aspects; there is no such harmonious development. To the growing isolation there are two possible solutions, a productive one or a new submission of some sort. Since there is no harmonious development of the two aspects, it is implied that submission, the non-productive answer to isolation, is almost inevitable.

This close similarity of the two processes of growth of the individual and of the human race, would tend to arouse the question of whether or not Fromm is applying to the problem of the growth in freedom of the human race the structure and functioning he has previously described as explaining the growth in freedom of the human individual. Actually Fromm's own words seem to indicate this transference. Just after describing the growth in freedom of the individual in *Escape from Freedom* he turns to a description of growth in freedom of the human race, and introduces this new discussion by the words: "Phylogenetically, too, the history of man can be characterized by growing individuation and growing freedom."192 The order of Fromm's

192 Ibid., p. 31.
development of these two freedoms is clear, then. The first one fully explained is individual freedom, the second one is the freedom of the human race. This quote just given, and the order of the development in Escape from Freedom, suggest a transference of meaning of "freedom" to the human race, with "freedom" in the individual as the primary analogue.

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (e)- Emphasis on Freedom

The second thing to notice is that Passage III, about the development of the human race, concerns freedom, not individuation, as its main process. Passage I was chiefly concerned with individuation of the individual human being, as was Passage II. What was looked at as chiefly individuation in dealing with the human individual is looked at as freedom in dealing with the human race. No explanation of the change in emphasis by Fromm is given. One could conjecture that he actually sees the growth of the human race and of the individual in the same way; this may be inferred by the identity of both structures, and by the use of the two words "individuation" and "freedom" interchangeably. This implies that both "individuation" and "freedom" refer to the same actuality in his thought, with only a mental distinction between the two.

193 Ibid., p. 28-31.
Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (f) - A Dialectic Process

It is appropriate to look more closely now at the text of Passage III itself, to determine the exact meaning of it. First of all, what is being described, as belonging to the human race, is a process which is dialectic; by dialectic here is meant the same characteristic as was seen in the process of individual growth, Fromm says.  

The investigation of the meaning of the word "dialectic" in the process of individual growth found that the word "dialectic" refers to a process containing two contradictory and simultaneous aspects proceeding from one cause. Here in Passage III there are had two elements, a positive one of growing strength, etc., and a negative one of growing isolation, etc. Both elements or aspects are stated to make up the same process, at least as parts of the same process. They are not said to proceed from the same cause. This is the same way that "dialectic" is used in Passage I, in which the two aspects of individuation which make up the dialectic process, are not considered to be caused by the process as they are in Passage II. This has clearly been noticed in the discussion of the meaning of "dialectic" in 

194 Ibid., p. 35.

195 Cf. Chapter II, B, 6, p. 80-84 and Chapter II, C, 1, c, p. 96-97 of this thesis.
the section on the growth of the individual in freedom from. 196

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (g) - Positive Freedom

The process itself of growing freedom has two aspects. The aspect which may be called a "positive" one consists of "...growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, growing power of human reason, and growing solidarity with other human beings." 197 Here, then, this aspect of freedom is identified with several aspects of human growth that seem to have little connection with freedom. The growth and integration of the self, along with growth of the mastery of nature, of human reason, of solidarity with fellow human beings — all of these are said to make up this aspect of growing freedom.

This text being discussed is preceded by two paragraphs which are a discussion of freedom from and freedom to. 198 Freedom to in these two paragraphs is contrasted with freedom from. Freedom to is called "positive" freedom. 199 Primary ties are said to block man's full human development, to block the development of his critical

196 Ibid.
197 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35-36.
198 Ibid., p. 35.
199 Ibid.
capacities and reason, and to prevent being human by letting him see himself and others only through the medium of some social group to which he belongs. If these primary ties were dissolved then man could be a "...free, self-determining, productive individual." This becoming fully human, with the development of what it means to be human, with reason and critical capacities developed, with seeing oneself as really separate from others, and others as separate also, is the mark of, the same as being free, self-determining, productive. This process of human development seems to be that by whose possession a man is called free, self-determining, productive. In the same book, Escape from Freedom, Fromm, in connection with the cultural history of the human race, discusses positive freedom, which, he says, "...is identical with the full realization of the individual's potentialities, together with his ability to live actively and spontaneously." 202

As shall be seen later in the analysis of freedom to, of positive freedom, Fromm often equates freedom to, or positive freedom, with productivity, or with spontaneity, i.e., self-determination. This development of human nature, as being free, self-determining, productive, is in

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200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid., p. 270.
general the same as mentioned in the first paragraph of Passage III. a "positive" aspect of growing freedom, i.e. a process of growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, etc. Hence it may be concluded that one aspect of growing freedom is a positive freedom, a freedom to. It is identified here with self-growth, with realization of one's potentialities and is equivalent to Fromm's description of freedom in "Selfishness and Self-Love," in Psychiatry, of November, 1939, where he says in connection with man as a member of certain societies that freedom is "...the integration of the whole personality and the factual expression of this integrated personality."

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (h) - Negative Freedom

The other aspect of the dialectic process of growing freedom will now be investigated. Erich Fromm states it this way:

But on the other hand this growing individuation means growing isolation, insecurity, and thereby growing doubt concerning one's own role in the universe, the meaning of one's life, and with all that a growing feeling of one's own powerlessness and insignificance as an individual.

203 Ibid., p. 35-36.
205 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 36.
The first thing to be noticed in this text is that it represents another aspect of growing freedom in the human race. It may be called a "negative" aspect for the time being, since it consists of negative effects, of isolation, powerlessness, etc. Fromm does use the words "negative freedom" to describe, later in Escape from Freedom, the state of isolation, powerlessness, doubt, resulting from freedom from all bonds in modern society. It is contrasted with self-growth, growing mastery of nature, etc., which is the first, the "positive" aspect of growing freedom. These negative effects consist of isolation, insecurity, doubt concerning the meaning of life for the individual, and a growing feeling of powerlessness and insignificance. Is the isolation mentioned here meant as an objective state or a psychological feeling of isolation? Fromm does not say in this particular text. The rest of his attributes of this "negative" aspect of freedom are psychological attributes of the person, with the possible exception of insecurity. It is through realized insecurity, the text says, that doubt arises about...
the meaning of one's life. The word "thereby" may not only refer back to "insecurity" as it certainly does, but also back to "isolation." From the text it is not clear whether or not the word "thereby" refers back to "isolation" also. It seems plausible that the "insecurity" referred to here comes from a realized "isolation," but the text does not make this clear.

This text obviously means some sort of separation from other persons or things or both. To get the significance of it, it is necessary to refer back to the pages it is meant to summarize in part from Escape from Freedom.²¹⁰ These pages speak in part of man's growth from the beginning of human existence, and the accompanying separation from unity with the natural world. Man starts to choose, to think, to actively master nature, and while doing this, to separate himself more and more from nature.²¹¹ Man becomes aware that the group to which he belongs is not part of nature, that his group transcends nature, and is born to die.²¹² The relationship between man's nature and freedom is symbolized in the Garden of Eden myth, in which man suffers from his first act of freedom, becoming "...alone

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 31-35.
²¹¹ Ibid., p. 33.
²¹² Ibid.
and free, yet powerless and afraid." Man is not free to govern himself, although "...free from the sweet bondage of paradise." Fromm then discusses the growth of freedom from, of man's emergence from nature as a long-drawn-out process. In this long-drawn-out process man finds security in remaining in part one with nature, with the inanimate world, the world of animals and his blood relatives.

If this description is compared not with man's growth, but with his growing separation, there is found in it the same qualities as are described in the "negative" aspect of growing freedom in the human race, aloneness, powerlessness, being afraid, a gradual emergence from nature. This gradual emergence from nature is called a "freedom from." Because the events, the process described are the same, they may be called then the "negative" aspect of growing freedom, which is being chiefly discussed here, a "freedom from."

This growing freedom from in the growth of the human race is seen as a necessary complement of human freedom.

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213 Ibid., p. 33-34.
214 Ibid., p. 35.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid., p. 36.
existence by Fromm. To point this out, and reflect upon it for a moment, it will be appropriate to look at Fromm's statement, in discussing the growth of freedom in the human race, that "...human existence and freedom are from the beginning inseparable." This statement refers, Fromm says, to freedom in "...its negative sense of 'freedom from,' namely freedom from instinctual determination of his actions." In this statement "freedom from" refers to freedom from instinctual determination. The phrase "from the beginning" implies that this inseparability of human existence and "freedom from" is a necessary part of human existence, that it belongs to human existence wherever and whenever found, that this inseparability will continue on because of the necessity of such a union. This point will be brought up again in the last chapter on the critique of freedom from in view of Fromm's theory of human nature.

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (i)- Primary Ties

To understand better this concept of freedom from the meaning of primary ties will now be investigated. When man becomes free from certain attachments in the course of growing human freedom, he is freeing himself from what

218 Ibid., p. 32.
219 Ibid.
Fromm calls "primary ties." The ties, the bonds mentioned in discussing freedom from, are those of the world from which he emerged, those of nature, of the animal kingdom, of blood ties. It is some of these ties from which, e.g., medieval society did not deprive its members, because medieval men were still "...related to the world by primary ties," such as still considering themselves to be only social, and not yet "individuals."

What kind of ties are these primary ties? Describing man's separation from nature in a later writing, The Sane Society, published in 1955, Fromm speaks of man's need to find new ties to "...replace the old ones, regulated by instincts." In the work mainly being studied right now, Escape from Freedom, Fromm speaks of freedom from as being in its beginning at least a freedom from "instinctual determination of his actions." Does Fromm mean to say that these ties, to earth, to the animal, to blood, these primary ties from which man gradually emerges, are instinct directed and dominated in human beings until

220 Ibid., p. 35.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid., p. 43.
223 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 30.
224 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 32.
225 Ibid., p. 35.
separation from them is accomplished? Apparently this is what Fromm means. If so, what does he mean then by "instinct" in these English writings of his?

Fromm defines "instinct" in Escape from Freedom as "...a specific action pattern which is determined by inherited neurological structures." 226 Apparently what Fromm means then is that although human existence and freedom from begin together, when "...the lack of fixation of action by instincts exceeds a certain point," 227 nevertheless he sees human existence and freedom from gradually growing, as instinctual ties to nature, to the animal kingdom, to blood, gradually broken. 228 Fromm thus, by inference, sees these continued primary ties to be instinctual, to be "...specific action patterns, determined by inherited neurological structures." 229 This means that human existence, during the many thousands of years it has taken to gradually break its ties (as shall be noted in the next part of this section), in its relationships to nature, to the animal kingdom, to blood ties like father and mother, was determined by "inherited neurological structures."

This is rather hard to believe. No real proof of this is

226 Ibid., p. 31-32.
227 Ibid., p. 32.
228 Ibid., p. 35.
229 Ibid., p. 31-32.
given, nor is any attempt made to specify, to explain what such inherited neurological structures would be or how they would develop to the point where they would no longer determine action patterns, i.e., where man would be free from this instinctual determination.

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (j) - The Results of the Dialectic Process of Freedom

The discussion now returns to an analysis of the rest of Passage III, contained in Escape from Freedom, beginning with the words "If the process..." and ending with "of his freedom." This passage consists of two paragraphs. An inquiry shall now be made into the meaning of both paragraphs together, since they are connected closely, the second paragraph being a continuation of the first paragraph by way of contrast, as the first word of the second paragraph, "However," indicates.

The thought of these two paragraphs indicates the results of the dialectic process of growing freedom in the human race. The first sentence of the first paragraph of these two indicates a hypothetical result, that if man had developed harmoniously, according to a certain plan, both sides of freedom, the freedom to and freedom from, (here freedom from is called "individuation"), would have been

230 Ibid., p. 36.
The second sentence asserts that such did not happen, since strife and conflict were part of the history of mankind. Fromm might mean here that if man's freedom, both the positive and negative aspects, had developed harmoniously, no strife or conflict would have resulted among men, i.e., that lack of harmony in these two aspects may have caused external conflict and strife. Or he may mean that the cause of man's freedom not developing harmoniously was conflict and strife in some area of external reality that affected man's freedom. From the text itself either explanation is plausible.

To further understand the meaning of these first two sentences, it is necessary to try to find some contextual meaning. Such a contextual meaning seems to be in the first sentence, a conditional sentence, of the second paragraph of these two being discussed from Passage III, which begins with "However, if the..." and ends with these words, "...meaning and direction." This sentence gives one way that harmonious development would not occur between the two freedoms, e.g., if individuality cannot be realized because of "economic, social and political conditions on which the whole process of human individuation depends." By

231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
"individuality" here is meant the solution, the only possible productive solution, of men to freedom from mentioned in the preceding paragraph, i.e., the solution of "...active solidarity with all men and his spontaneous activity, love and work, which unite him again with the world, not by primary ties, but as a free and independent individual." Furthermore it should be stated that the "realization of individuality" means "freedom to" because this productive solution is the same process as is described in the first paragraph's description of "freedom to" in Passage III, i.e., "...a process of growing strength and integration, mastery of nature...growing solidarity with other human beings." By the word "individuation" here is meant "freedom," and by the word "whole," is meant "complete," or "whole freedom in the sense of both freedom to and freedom from," for the word "individuation" is used here as a summary of what follows, "the realization of individuality," and the "losing of ties that gave them security," in other words, "freedom to" and "freedom from."

This inquiry returns now to the first two sentences of the second paragraph of Passage III. An attempt is being made to find out the relationship between "conflict

234 Ibid.
235 Ibid., p. 35-36.
236 Ibid.
and strife" in the history of mankind and the lack of harmonious development in freedom. From the analysis in the preceding paragraph it can now be said that economic, social and political conditions do act as a necessary condition for the development of "freedom to." If these are not sufficiently favorable then "freedom to" will not develop. Are these conditions, besides being a necessary condition, also a "cause" of some sort of the development of freedom? Fromm does not say this. There is a necessary dependence. That is all that is clear from this text. Fromm's thought on the effect of specific cultural settings on human freedom will be inquired into later on in the next chapter of this thesis.

The rest of Passage III is concerned with the results of the dialectic process of growing human freedom. By "result" here is not meant the effect of a cause, but rather the sequence of the process as it works out. By "result" is meant one stage of the process of growing freedom as compared with the preceding stages. One result according to Fromm is this, that "each step in the direction of growing individuation threatened people with new insecurities."237 By "individuation" here is meant "freedom from," since "individuation" in this sentence refers
back to the word "individuation" in the first sentence of the same paragraph, where it is used to denote the negative side of the growing process of individuation, i.e., "freedom from." One result, then, of this growing process of freedom is growing insecurity. This insecurity must be matched by the other result, the only possible, productive solution to "...the relationship of individualized man with the world; his active solidarity with all men and his spontaneous activity, love and work, which unite him again with the world, not by primary ties but as a free and independent individual." 238 If this result does not match the growing insecurity, then what will happen as a result of insecurity unmet by positive growth will be that freedom "...becomes identical with doubt, with a kind of life that lacks meaning and direction." 239 The result of this doubt, this lack of meaning, will be the arousal of powerful tendencies to enter a submissive or other type of relationship with the world that may well relieve doubt but at the same time cause a freedom, i.e., freedom from, to be lost.

238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.
In the last paragraph, attention was called to the only productive solution to the world for men who have become individualized, i.e., separate from primary ties. This solution, the only productive one, would be a reestablishment of union with the world and other men "...as a free and independent individual." Such a reestablishment of union would mean an "...active solidarity with all men and...spontaneous activity, love and work." Is this productive solution a continuation of the positive aspect of freedom, freedom to, as it sounds like, or is it some new aspect of the dialectic process of freedom? "Freedom to" has been described in the first paragraph of Passage III as "...a process of growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, growing power of human reason, and growing solidarity with other human beings." "Freedom to" here has five attributes, four of them described as growing, i.e., growing strength, growing integration, growing power of human reason and growing solidarity with other human beings; it has one other attribute, mastery of

240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid., p. 35-36.
nature. Whereas the description of the productive solution to separation from primary ties is not described in terms of growth directly, but rather in terms of self-active activity, as "active" and as "spontaneous." From such activity and spontaneity one might expect growth to take place, but such is not stated directly in this text.

Actually Fromm's definition of "freedom to," of positive freedom, later in this same book, Escape from Freedom, contains elements from both of these two texts; Fromm says that "...positive freedom consists in the spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality." The definition of "freedom to" just given from Passage III refers to "integration" while the definition of the productive solution to negative individuation is described as "spontaneous," both elements in this definition of "freedom to" from Escape from Freedom. Thus it is clear that both texts from Passage III contribute a part of the later definition of "positive" freedom, both say something about "solidarity" with all men; "spontaneous work" in the description of the productive solution might well be what is described as "mastery of nature" in the "freedom to" text, with the "spontaneous" left out. But nothing is said in the text on the "productive solution"

243 Ibid., p. 258.
about these attributes of "freedom to," "growing strength and integration" and "growing power of human reason." Nor is "love" from the "productive solution" text mentioned in the "freedom to" text. The only positive productive solution to negative individuation would seem to have to be "freedom to," and the description of this "productive solution" is similar to the description of "freedom to." More light on this matter in general will appear in the analysis of "freedom to" later in this thesis, but for the moment, there is not enough evidence to say that "productive solution" and "freedom to" are identical.

Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (1)- Freedom and Individuation

Before summarizing the content of Fromm's thought on the general structure of the dialectic process of growing freedom in the human race, it will be helpful to first review the use of the word "individuation" in Passage III, since the words "individuation" and "freedom" seem to be interchangeable in this passage. In the first paragraph, the word "individuation" is used in the phrase "But on the other hand this growing individuation..." The word "this" refers to what has preceded, in this case to either the preceding sentence or the one before that. It cannot
refer to the preceding sentence, since the phrase "on the other hand," denotes a contrast to the thought of the preceding sentence. What the phrase "individuation" refers to then, in the context of this sentence in which it is incorporated, is the subject "it," of the preceding sentence. The word, "it," refers back to the previous sentence, to the subject of the dependent clause, "the process of growing human freedom." Hence the word "individuation" in the first paragraph of Passage III means "the process of growing human freedom."

In paragraph two of Passage III this word, "individuation," means freedom from, for it refers to the negative side of "the process of the development of mankind." And this "process of mankind's development" refers back in its context to the preceding paragraph, for (1) it refers to a process with two aspects, one positive, growing strength, and one negative, growing individuation, which is the structure mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and (2) the preceding paragraph is talking about growing freedom, and growing individuation (in the sense of growing freedom, as explained in the preceding paragraph), and no

245 Ibid., p. 35.
246 Ibid.
indication is given that the thought of paragraph 2 of Passage III is anything but a continuation of paragraph 1 of Passage III. Hence in paragraph 2 of Passage III, the "process of the development of mankind" really means the "process of the development of freedom in mankind." The word "individuation" in this paragraph really means "freedom from" since it refers to the negative aspect of this growing freedom, and is compared with a positive aspect, "growing strength."

The word "individuation" is also used in the third paragraph of Passage III in the phrase "the whole process of human individuation." This has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs; there it was found that "individuation" in this phrase means "freedom," both "freedom to" and "freedom from." Hence it is possible to summarize the use of the word "individuation" in Passage III by stating that it means negative freedom, or "freedom from," in paragraph 2 of this passage, and in paragraphs 1 and 3 it means the whole process of individuation, i.e., both "freedom to" and "freedom from."

In summary, then, the word "freedom" in Passage III concerns the process of growing freedom in the human race, with a dialectic character the same as was noticed in Fromm's preceding treatment of "freedom" in the process of the growth of the individual. This dialectic process of growing freedom in the human race has two aspects, a positive one, a "freedom to," and a negative one, a "freedom from." Growing "freedom to" refers to "...growing strength, mastery of nature, growing power of human reason, and growing solidarity with other human beings." Growing "freedom from" means a growing "individuation" in the negative sense, a growing severance of primary bonds, a growing isolation, insecurity, and thereby growing doubt about one's own role in the universe and the meaning of one's life, resulting in increasing feelings of powerlessness and insignificance as an individual.

These two aspects develop together dialectically; if, however, the severance of primary ties in "freedom

249 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35.
250 Ibid., p. 35-36.
251 Cf. Chapter III, B, 3, b, (2), (1), p. 236-238 of this thesis.
252 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 36.
from," continues and there is no real chance for the development of the one, possible productive solution, because of inadequate cultural conditions, then "freedom from" becomes unbearable, becomes doubt about the meaning and direction of life, and powerful tendencies arise to take a freedom-destroying way out. Freedom, then, as it develops in the human race, is described essentially in terms of a dialectic process, with two aspects growing harmoniously, if a certain plan had been followed. What plan that would have been, Fromm does not say. De facto, because of a social factor, conflict and strife, there was not this balance, this harmony, between these two aspects. This left man faced by separation from primary ties, by "freedom from," and in need of one, only possible productive solution. Fromm then returns to the hypothetical order, saying that if various cultural factors would not give an adequate basis for this one, only possible productive solution, then freedom from would become unbearable, reducible to doubt, and lack of meaning in one's own life; subsequent imperious tendencies to escape in some way would then enter the picture, to escape even though freedom would be lost.

As far as growing freedom from is concerned, Fromm sees it as part of a process, dialectically related to freedom to, the other aspect of this process. Freedom from Fromm thinks is a growing separation from primary ties,
with resulting (subsequent) perceived isolation, felt insecurity. From these results follow doubt about one's role in the universe and the meaning of one's life, and accompanying feelings of one's own powerlessness and insignificance as an individual. If this process of freedom from is not met by a corresponding productive solution, then urgent tendencies will arise to escape somehow, even with the loss of freedom.

Ch. III, B, 3, c- Freedom From - Irreversibility

There are certain other general notions that should be briefly referred to before concluding this section of Chapter III. One is the reverse way of expressing what has been implied in the entire discussion of Passage III, i.e., that freedom from is part of a growing process, whose tendency forward is necessary and determined. The reverse of this is to say that freedom from is irreversible in the growth of freedom in the human race. Actually in Passage III this is explicitly stated: "Primary bonds once severed cannot be mended; once paradise is lost, man cannot return to it." Once primary bonds are severed, once moreover

253 Ibid.
254 Ibid., p. 36-37.
255 Ibid., p. 36.
man becomes human by the first act of freedom, as explained in Section A of this Chapter, there is no going back. Each act of separation from primary ties, including the first such act, by which man becomes free and transcends nature, establishes human nature in an irreversible position. Referring to these first acts in his analysis of the Garden of Eden account in Genesis, Fromm reiterates in You Shall Be as Gods, twenty-five years after Escape from Freedom, that man "...cannot go back. The acts of disobedience, the knowledge of good and evil, self-awareness, are irreversible." This means, then, that the course of developing freedom from is always either constant or forward. Never can it be reversed, and never can there be a return to its origin or an annulment of its origin, by a successful return to animal nature with consequent annulment of self-consciousness.

Is there any reason for seeing in growing freedom from in the human race this particular quality of irreversibility? Fromm does not give any series of reasons or proofs for this position, but simply expresses this as though it were certainly true; it has to happen this way,

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as Fromm sees it. Are there any proven psychological or physiological reasons in Fromm's idea of reality why successive generations of human beings could not have resumed primary ties? Are there any ontological or logical reasons in Fromm's idea of reality why part of or the whole of the human race could not have returned to the animal kingdom, thus reversing its transcendence? Fromm does not give any reasons, physiological, psychological, ontological or logical why this reversal could not take place, why the human race could not gradually degenerate or die out, except the chance occurrence of self-destruction by atomic weapons. 258

What seems to be happening here is this, that Fromm is deriving his certainty of statement from a presupposition of some sort; to see human reality as necessarily developing in a progressive, evolutionary and dialectic manner is an implied and unproven major here, whose logical and particular alternative would be this irreversibility of freedom from. Implied further here is that any fundamental qualitative change in cosmic reality, such as the

appearance of self-consciousness, i.e. of one aspect of freedom to, through the mediation of freedom from, is irreversible. In other words Fromm may have a general picture of cosmic reality as so unable to lose the fundamental upward steps it takes, that new fundamental qualities cannot be lost; human freedom, including freedom from, would be one particular kind of reality fitted into this general presupposition.

Ch. III, B, 3, d- Freedom From as Changing

Before concluding the discussion of the general structure of freedom as Fromm sees it, it is important to discuss one last point, i.e., that the meaning of freedom changes during the course of the history of the human race.

It is easy enough to see why this must be so. If freedom is a dialectic process, an ongoing process of development of two aspects of the dialectic, then change must occur. If freedom from develops, with increased separation from primary ties, then obviously there is a change, a quantitative one in some respects, measured by the number of objects from whose primary ties one is freed. The increased insecurity and isolation of freedom from would be qualitative changes, changes of affectivity. The growing awareness of one's own separation, leading to these increased affective changes, would be caused objectively by
this increased separation and in turn would cause the increased affective response to the awareness of the increased objective separation. This growing awareness of one's separation changes for man the meaning of freedom from in this sense that he should become aware of the process, and of the goal of this process to some extent, i.e., a goal of complete freedom from.

Such growing awareness and its influence on the recognized meaning of freedom from seems to be at least part of the meaning of Fromm when he says, in Escape from Freedom, that freedom which characterizes human existence as such has changes in its meaning "...according to the degree of man's awareness and conception of himself as an independent and separate being." 259 Here in this text the concept of freedom is connected with the separateness man experiences, and separateness is the primary note of freedom from, as was seen in the discussion of Passage III above. 260 This passage of Fromm which is being discussed says that freedom, and here at least freedom from, changes its meaning according to the awareness man has of his separateness. What does Fromm signify by "change of meaning?" He seems to imply that the increasing separateness

man has from primary ties is a function of and dependent on the awareness of such separateness. He seems to imply that knowledge of such separateness is at least a necessary condition for freedom from to be really such. He might mean that freedom from is actually a psychological state, brought on by an awareness of a changing objective state of separation, that freedom from, in other words, is not an objective state of separation but the result of an awareness of such a changing state of separation. If this last meaning of freedom from is Fromm's actual meaning, then it would contradict his assessment of freedom from later in this chapter of Escape from Freedom in Passage III.261

Ch. III, B, 3, e- Freedom From and Suffering

In his latest work, You Shall Be as Gods, published in 1966, Erich Fromm interprets the Old Testament and the later Jewish tradition under the light of "radical humanism."262 For Fromm this represents interpreting the Old Testament and later Jewish tradition by means of a "...global philosophy which emphasize the oneness of the human race, the capacity of man to develop his own powers and to arrive at inner harmony and at the establishment of a

261 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35-37.
peaceful world." For Fromm the authors of the Old Testament described a historical unity, which reflected "...an evolutionary process whose contradictions are aspects of a whole." Thus Fromm brings a philosophical outlook to this interpretation and finds in this account of Jewish history certain basic tendencies, such as the evolutionary growth of human freedom and independence in man.

Fromm admits that to prove that radical humanism is the main aspect of the evolution of Jewish tradition would require a more thorough investigation than he can afford to give in this work. Fromm himself opts for the universalism, the radicalism and tolerance found "...in the progressive evolution of Jewish thought in its contribution to universal human values." It is these universal human values that he sees as part of the radical humanism he himself espouses.

One aspect of Fromm's humanistic thought developed in this book is the relationship of suffering to freedom.

263 Ibid., p. 13.
264 Ibid., p. 8.
265 Ibid., p. 11-12. Cf. also ibid., Index, p. 239, the idea of "Man, Freedom of."
266 Ibid., p. 12.
267 Ibid., p. 11-12.
from found in three passages in this book, from taken from the fourth chapter, entitled "The Concept of HISTORY." These ideas of Fromm on human suffering he finds in the Old Testament, are illustrative to him of genuine and seemingly general human experience; in these three passages about to be discussed Fromm seems to transpose his interpretation of biblical history to the frame of universal human experience.

The central point of these three passages is, firstly, that human freedom has no meaning to those who are enslaved, and yet, without this concept of freedom, freedom is not possible to those who are enslaved, and, secondly, only through suffering brought on by oppression, can the process of liberation begin. For Fromm the process, only a gradual one in terms of successive generations of liberation, or revolution, leads through these steps: enslavement — suffering — wish to end the suffering (new potentiality in man) — rebellion (through force) — freedom from enslavement — freedom to a new life.

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268 Ibid., p. 92, "Indeed, historical change... pattern of slavery;" p. 106-107, "If we try...impulse for liberation;" p. 113, "The death of...the promised land."

269 Ibid., p. 87-157, (Emphasis in title in Original).

270 Ibid., p. 92, 106-107, particularly 113.

271 Ibid.
only results through suffering and then not inevitably; freedom to may result later on, both are dependent on suffering leading to rebellion, and man's finding new potentialities in himself in the course of this rebellion, enabling him to eventually achieve freedom.

What Fromm might mean here is that enslavement of any sort in the course of human history is not easily overcome. The concept of freedom would not be enough to extricate people from such lack of freedom. Man's powers, sufficient to lead to freedom from at least, are actuated by external factors, i.e., various types of oppression or enslavements. Somehow or other through this rebellion against enslavement the value of freedom from at least becomes a significant factor in man's consciousness. What Fromm is doing here is to try to establish some type of universal explanation for the dawning of man's appreciation of freedom or, in terms of "social character," how the dynamism of freedom may become actualized in human enslaved society. In the examples given in You Shall Be as Gods, the Israelites obviously see the political freedom of the Egyptians and yet in general are unable to achieve appre-

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272 Ibid., p. 113-115.
273 Ibid., p. 92.
274 Cf. the first part of this section of Chapter III on "social character," p. 196-209.
ciation of this freedom, except through suffering, and even then lose this appreciation through renewed idolatry, with the exception of the men of vision, the prophets.  

It would seem then that the irreversibility of freedom from in the human race described in the preceding pages needs two qualifications, that sometimes political freedom from may be lost, or at least lost sight of, and necessarily secondly, that progress in freedom from, in Fromm's conception, is necessarily conditioned by previous suffering and rebellion.

Ch. III, B, 3, f- Analogy with Growth of Freedom From in the Individual

At the beginning of this chapter, the question was raised as to the possibility of Fromm's use of analogous terms in comparing the growth of individuation and freedom in the human individual and in the human race. Such a comparison was instituted in analyzing the origin of freedom from in the human race in terms of the origin of freedom from in the human individual; it was found that there was such an analogy, granted that the birth of the human individual were the primary analogue, a fact not certain.

275 Erich FROMM, You Shall Be as Gods, p. 113-115.
276 Cf. Chapter III, B, p. 241-244.
Is there such analogy between Fromm's description of the general development of freedom in the human individual and his description of the general development of freedom in the human race?

That there is such an analogous use of terms by Fromm is asserted by Leon J. Saul in his review of Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* in *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* and Walter T. James in *Individual Psychology Bulletin*. In Saul's view of Fromm's methodology in *Escape from Freedom* what Fromm does is to transfer his idea of individual reactions to "...the reactions of whole sections of the population as units," with emphasis on how social conditions have affected the ideology and social character of these large groups of men, bringing to the fore the individuality and freedom of individuals in these groups. Saul sees this method of Fromm, then, to imply an application of Fromm's understanding of the individual to an understanding of large groups. In Saul's eyes, this method is a general one, with particular applications to select groups, such as existed in Reformation times and in Nazi Germany.

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281 Ibid., p. 246.
In the light of what Leon J. Saul says, and in view of Fromm's own comparison of his general theory of the development of individuation and freedom in the human race with the preceding general theory of the development of individuation and freedom in the individual in *Escape from Freedom* as already developed in this chapter, it would seem safe to assert that Fromm quite probably does transfer the meaning of developing individual freedom to developing freedom in the human race.

There are differences here, as has already been seen. Developing freedom in the individual is in the individual as such, whereas its counterpart in the human race is in groups or units of individuals. Moreover, "social character" mediates these changes in groups, whereas there is no identical element in individuals. In addition, "social character" would seem to be an abstraction, although dynamic in character, of common elements in the dynamic makeup of large units or groups of individuals, whereas "individual" character in the individual, mediating dynamic

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284 Note that Fromm refers to "social character" as containing the nucleus of character structure of members of the group. Cf. Chapter III, p. 203-204.
changes in the individual as such, contains the differences between individuals. 285

Not only are there differences between Fromm's understanding of the development of freedom in the human race and in the individual, but there are likenesses, too. As already indicated in this chapter, the description of growing freedom in the human race in Passage III is remarkably similar, if not identical to the description of growing freedom in the individual found in Passages I and II, 286 although the words "freedom" and "individuation" are often used interchangeably. 287

The evidence accumulated in the last several pages of this chapter would indicate, then, that there are resemblances and differences in Fromm's use of freedom (individuation) in reference to this quality of growing individual human freedom and growing freedom in the human race. The word "freedom" may then be considered to be used analogously in these two cases. Both the differences and the likenesses exist in actual reality, in individuals as such, and in individuals within various groups, considered as subject to and reacting similarly to various cultural forces. The intermediary factor in discussing growing

287 Ibid., p. 218.
freedom in the human race, "social character," may well be a model or a construct of a dynamic nature, but the growing freedom it represents as one of its functions is itself a real, ontological process. As mentioned in Chapter I, this thesis takes Fromm's epistemological realism as a general postulate, derived from extensive reading in his works, and particularly applicable to the subject matter of this thesis.

One final question remains to be answered in this question of analogy of meaning in the use of the word "freedom." What is the primary analogue? It would seem that the estimate of Saul and James that Fromm's thought moves from the concrete individual's growing freedom to that of the human race is a valid one. The primary analogue, based on this evidence and evidence from Fromm's own use of his materials in Chapter II of Escape from Freedom as developed in this chapter, would seem to be developing human freedom in the individual as such.

288 "Social character" may well be a particular type of mental construct, of a dynamic nature. Although the knowledge of it may be constructual knowledge, its referent is ontological reality, i.e., real qualities in real individuals, subject to common influences within a group.


290 Leon J. SAUL, op. cit., p. 245-246; Walter T. JAMES, op. cit., p. 111.

291 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, Chapter II, p. 24-39

Ch. III, B, 3, g—Scientific Proof

One additional note may be added here in regards to Fromm's general position on the development of growing human freedom in the human race, as outlined in Passage III. It involves the question of the formal properties of Fromm's general position in Passage III, the seeming universality and certainty of his position therein. How does one account for these qualities of his general position?

In commenting on this particular passage and its applicability to the rest of *Escape from Freedom* M. F. Ashley Montagu sees Passage III, and the next paragraph in this text of Fromm, as constituting the whole of Erich Fromm's thesis, a thesis whose "analysis and demonstration" is "most successfully carried out." The point is this, that Montagu sees Fromm as setting up a thesis of some sort, and proceeding to demonstrate this thesis successfully by a successive examination of various societies. He sees Fromm as following an approved scientific procedure, from hypothesis to law through analysis of the evidence until clarity is reached. The reason Montagu would logically give, then, for the certitude and universality of

Fromm's general outline of developing human freedom in the human race in Passage III, would be that of a proven conclusion, or a hypothesis to be proven by the examination of the historical materials in the rest of the book. Ashley Montagu's explanation seems like a probable one, particularly in view of his assertion that Escape from Freedom is part of a larger work, with fuller presentation of basic materials, following Fromm's own assertion, in the Foreword of this book, that, "...the meaning of freedom can be fully understood only on the basis of an analysis of the whole character structure of modern man." Yet Fromm states that he is going to concentrate on this aspect of character structure, freedom, and it is this concentrated "essence" of his thought that Montagu finds so convincing.

Many other competent scholars are not so convinced. Ruth Benedict, for instance, questions seriously Fromm's position of preliterate man's being dominated by primal ties as a fact, and states that Fromm "...does not submit evidence" for this view, Anton T. Boisen raises serious

294 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
297 M.F. Ashley MONTAGU, op. cit., p. 122.
doubts about Fromm's idea that the Germans were eager to surrender their freedom, and about Fromm's understanding of the social process. Otto Fenichel's incisive critique of Fromm's correct understanding of Freud in *Escape from Freedom* already has been commented on.

These comments are meant to bring out the fact that if Fromm is trying to establish his general thesis in Passage III by the materials he offers in this book, very competent scholars say "unproven." Is it not possible that Fromm is using other sources besides scientific ones to establish this "thesis" which he states with such firmness and universality, that there is a dialectic of developing freedom in the human race, gradually progressing after its origins, through suffering into irreversible freedom from and as conditions are right, into freedom to? It would seem here that there are various presuppositions of a philosophical nature which might account for Fromm's confident scientific universal assertions; some of these presuppositions would be the dialectical nature of human reality, the necessity of progress up to at least the point

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300 Cf. Chapter II of this thesis, p. 49.
of freedom from, and, probably, social determinism, i.e., that men are conditioned by and necessitated by social conditions. Quite possibly another philosophical presupposition is a type of cultural evolutionism, founded on an acceptance of scientific evolution. These philosophical presuppositions, concerning the nature of man and of the world and society, and their connection with freedom, will be more fully dealt with in Chapter VI.
CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM FROM

Introduction

The investigation work of the thesis now turns to the theme of the historical development of freedom from in the human race, after finishing the origin and development of freedom from in the human individual, and the origin and general development of freedom from in the human race. This investigation discussed also Fromm's concept of "social character," and its relationship to human phylogenetic development.

In this chapter Fromm's position on the development of freedom from in the human race will be treated in greater detail, with attention paid to specific historical periods, and their relationship to the development of freedom from. There will be two sections to this chapter. The first section will discuss Fromm's concept of the earliest development of freedom from, as well as certain aspects of freedom from from the Middle Ages up to and including the Reformation. In analyzing the earliest development of freedom from in the human race special attention will be paid to Fromm's concept of the patriarchal and matriarchal structure of society and the influence of this structure on
religious practice. Incestuous fixation will be discussed also in its relationship to this theory of patriarchy and matriarchy. The second part of this first section will summarize briefly Fromm's ideas on the development of freedom from the Middle Ages until the Reformation, with emphasis on the influence of economic factors on freedom from.

The second section, Section B, of this chapter, will investigate Fromm's analysis of the development of freedom from in what Fromm calls the "modern" era. This era embraces the time period from after the days of the Reformation up to and including the twentieth century. Special emphasis will be put on the influence of present-day Capitalism on the functioning of freedom from.

There are considerable gaps in Fromm's ideas of this type of development, with the chief gap being the narrow area of history that Fromm has selected to consider. An example of such a gap would be the few details that Fromm offers for consideration from the time between the advent of the great patriarchal religions one thousand and more years before Christ and the Middle Ages. Obviously Fromm is not trying to write a complete cultural history of the human race, even within the narrow conception of the

1 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 50.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM FROM

development of freedom in the human race. This part of the
thesis will follow Fromm's own choice of material and em-
phasis, and will select the material considered essential
for understanding Fromm's conception of the development of
freedom from in the history of the human race.

Ch. IV, A.- PRE-MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM FROM

Ch. IV, A, 1.- Early Development of Freedom From

Ch. IV, A, 1, a- Introduction

The two chief courses for this section are Fromm's
works, The Sane Society\(^2\) and The Forgotten Language.\(^3\)
In The Sane Society\(^4\) Fromm's theories on matriarchy and
patriarchy, on incestuous fixation are chiefly developed,
in their relationship to rootedness.\(^5\) In The Forgotten
Language is centered Fromm's analysis of symbolic language,
such as dreams, myths and fairy tales.\(^6\) It is during

\(^2\) Ibid., especially p. 40-60.

\(^3\) Erich FROMM, The Forgotten Language, An Introduc-
tion to the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales and Myths,
New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951, Ch. VII,
p. 195-263.

\(^4\) Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 50.

\(^5\) Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 38-60. Cf. also
Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil,
Ch. V, "Incestuous Ties," p. 95-114. In this chapter
sensuous ties are discussed in their connection with what
Fromm calls the "Syndrome of Decay."

\(^6\) Erich FROMM, The Forgotten Language, passim.
Fromm's discussion of the Oedipus myth that he develops his theories of matriarchy and patriarchy. 

Ch. IV, A, 1, b- Incestuous Ties

Fromm sets his latest expression of matriarchy and patriarchy in the context of his discussion of rootedness in The Sane Society. Fromm centers his discussion around the concept of incestuous fixation and universality of the incest tabu even in the most primitive of human societies. According to Fromm, in the evolution of the human race, "Man, in order to be born, in order to progress, has to sever the umbilical cord; he has to overcome the deep craving to remain tied to mother." The incestuous desire to remain attached to mother, Fromm thinks, is not primarily sexual, but rather the "...deep-seated craving to remain in, or to return to the all-enveloping womb, or to the all-nourishing breasts." The tabu against such desires is to prevent man's return to the oneness with nature, which was his pre-individual existence. It is not just fixation to

7 Ibid., p. 196-231.
8 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 38-60.
9 Ibid., p. 40-41.
10 Ibid., p. 40.
11 Ibid., p. 40-41.
12 Ibid., p. 40.
mother that must be prevented, for all ties of blood, of which the tie to mother is the most fundamental, must be overcome, and indeed all other ties to "...the family or the clan, and later on the state, nation or church," for these ties are an extension of and fulfill the same function as the original ties to mother. Thus Fromm sees the central problem of the human race as freeing the human race from incestuous ties, ties of emotional dependence upon those to whom one is attached by blood-relationship or their substitutes. For man to be born, to make progress, these ties must be broken.

In one of his latest works, You Shall Be as Gods, Fromm further develops his own thought on incestuous fixation in the developing human race. Man's goal, "freedom and independence," means, says Fromm, "...the cutting of the umbilical cord and the ability to owe one's existence to oneself alone." There is literally no relationship, whether to others or to social groups, or to one's own possessions and achievements, which cannot be a source of incestuous fixation for man, Fromm avers. The reward of

13 Ibid.
14 Erich FROMM, You Shall Be as Gods, p. 70-73, 75-76.
15 Ibid., p. 75.
16 Ibid., p. 76.
holding onto these others, or one's own achievements or possessions, is security and certainty, lest he feel a stranger in the world. Fromm here seems to link incestuous fixation with alienation; incestuous fixation would be one way of overcoming alienation, the feeling of being a stranger that is part of it.

In addition to this linking of incestuous fixation with just about every type of relationship that a human being has, and linking it with the feeling of strangeness proper to alienation, Fromm has also an unusual outlook for him in dealing with one way of overcoming incestuous fixation, of freeing man from these emotional ties. In this same book, *You Shall Be as Gods*, Fromm asserts that obedience "to God and his laws" was probably needed in the history of the human race "...to help man liberate himself from the incestuous ties to nature and to clan." Fromm sees in the biblical system an example of this need to obey, because obedience to God and his laws, as to a father figure which represents "reason, conscience, law, moral and spiritual principles," frees man from submission to other men, and from "...incestuous fixation to preindividual archaic forces." One feature of these incestuous ties

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 73.
19 Ibid., p. 73.
that Fromm brings out here, in contrast to obedience to rational authority, which is a conscious development, is the "unconsciousness" of "incestuous, emotional ties;" there may well be conscious love or fear present, but unconsciously there is always a fear of rejection, of being lost, if the incestuous tie is broken. 20 Thus obedience, "a conscious act of submitting to authority," becomes in Fromm's conception of human phylogenetic development, a necessary stage in the growing up of the human race. In Fromm's idea, this obedience is to be superseded by the authority of the teacher, and eventually by a freedom from God. 21

There is thus a striking parallel between Fromm's picture of developing ontogenetic human conscience, explained in the second chapter of this thesis, 22 and his picture of developing phylogenetic human conscience. Obedience in both cases is a necessary stage, although Fromm is not completely sure of this; in the development of the child, obedience coming from the authoritarian conscience might not be necessary for the future child's development. 23

20 Ibid., p. 72.
21 Ibid., p. 75, 77-81.
22 Cf. Ch. II, C, 2, d-g of this thesis, passim.
23 Ibid., p. 131-132.
whereas obedience in the human race is considered by Fromm to be only "perhaps" necessary for freedom from incestuous ties.\textsuperscript{24} The goal of the individual human being in his ontogenetic growth is a complete self-activity;\textsuperscript{25} while the goal of the human race is to achieve this in all members of the human race.\textsuperscript{26}

Yet there are some differences, for in human society obedience is more of a cultural value, proper to certain groups at any given time, whereas obedience in the growing child is an experience, socially influenced it is true, yet proper and unique to this individual child.\textsuperscript{27} The obedience found in society, then, is primarily a cultural product in Fromm's idea, granted that his concept of "social character" is essential to all of his thought of phylogenetic development. There is some room for analogy here, then, for phylogenetically obedience does differ from and yet is similar to ontogenetic obedience. Which is primary here, the ontogenetic developing obedience of the growing child, or the phylogenetic developing obedience of the human race? It would seem that the primary analogue is the ontogenetic

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Erich FROMM, \textit{You Shall Be as Gods}, p. 73.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Cf. Ch. V, B, of this thesis, p. 396-399.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Erich FROMM, \textit{You Shall Be as Gods}, p. 75-76.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Cf. Ch. III, B, 2, "Social Character," p. 196-209.
\end{enumerate}
developing obedience of the human child, for this occupies Fromm's thought in both his early German works and his earlier English works, whereas his use of "obedience" to describe human phylogenetic development is only really brought out fully in You Shall Be as Gods, published in 1966.

Fromm is implicitly making a value judgment here, that it is good for man to be separate from these ties, and that it is necessary for his full development, a good in itself, to make this separation. This fits in well with Fromm's general theory of the development of freedom from in the human race, and represents one aspect of it, a freeing from emotionally binding ties, so that true brotherliness, one of man's basic needs, be developed, a passing from "freedom from" to "freedom to."

Ch. IV, A, I, c- Matriarchy and Patriarchy

Fromm finds in the works of Johann Jacob Bachofen, L.H. Morgan, and Robert Briffault evidence that gives

28 Cf. Ch. II, C, 2, d-g of this thesis, passim.
29 Erich FROMM, You Shall Be as Gods, p. 72-77.
30 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 60.
31 Ibid., p. 44-47, note 2, p. 44 and passim.
strength to and confirms his opinion that matriarchal social structure and matriarchal religion were the primitive, i.e., the earliest social structure and religion known to man. In Bachofen's theory, before the patriarchate, man went through a stage where the social relationships were chiefly formed by man's relatedness to mother, blood and soil. In this type of relationship, mother was predominant socially, in the family and in religion. It should be noted here that Fromm agrees with Bachofen's ideas of both the positive and the negative aspects of attachment to both mother and to father. Fromm summarizes Bachofen in stating that the positive aspect of attachment to the mother figure is "...a sense of affirmation of life, freedom, and equality which pervades the matriarchal structure," while the negative aspect would be man's being blocked from developing his individuality and his reason "...by being bound to nature, to blood and soil." Fromm, following Bachofen, sees the positive elements or aspects

34 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 44; cf. also Erich FROMM, The Art of Loving, p. 54-55.
35 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 44.
37 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 45, 47.
38 Ibid., p. 45. (Emphasis removed.)
of the attachment to father as being "...reason, discipline, conscience and individualism," while the negative aspects are "...hierarchy, oppression, inequality, submission." 39

The incestuous ties mentioned in the preceding paragraph were thus founded on and supported by the cultural structure of primitive society, blocking man "...from developing his individuality and reason." 40 In one such culture, religious structure, man, having just emerged from nature, makes natural things to be his gods. 41 Man progresses, through his economic activities, to the point of being an artisan, where his gods are his own artifacts, and then to the point where, feeling his own strength, man makes gods with the shape of human beings. 42 Immersed as man became in agriculture, his god became "Great Mother," all-protecting and all-nourishing. 43 The advent of patriarchal religions began, and with it a decisive turn away from nature and incestuous relationship to mother; man no longer thought of himself as mostly part of nature and soil, but now strove to be like God, to become fully born and fully

39 Ibid., p. 47. (Emphasis removed.)
40 Ibid., p. 45. (Emphasis removed.)
41 Ibid., p. 49-50.
42 Ibid., p. 50.
43 Ibid.
awake, in religions such as those of the biblical prophets, and reaching a new peak in early Christianity. Thus is seen a gradual progression away from the negative side of matriarchy to real patriarchy, from incestuous ties to freedom from these ties. Yet this patriarchal society and religion too, has its negative side, and is never quite free from this negative side.

As Fromm sees it, sometime between 1500 B.C. and 500 B.C., all over the world, whether in China, India, Palestine, etc., a new concept arose, of developing a new harmony with the world by developing reason and love, and not by curtailing awareness. This would seem to be a blend of the positive elements of both matriarchy (love) and of patriarchy (reason).

Fromm sees the God of the Jewish religion to belong to the patriarchal development of religion. It is the Catholic Church that combines both patriarchal and matriarchal elements of religion, as Fromm explains it. Fromm says that

44 Ibid., p. 50-51.
47 Ibid., p. 53.
The Catholic Church herself - the all-embracing mother - and the Virgin Mother, symbolize the maternal spirit of forgiveness and love, while God, the father, represented in the hierarchical principle the authority to which man had to submit without complaining or rebelling.48

The Catholic Church's function was not only this religious one, but it also transmitted Jewish and Greek culture to the peoples of Northern Europe, who assimilated it and began an explosive social and spiritual development.49

This, then, is Fromm's theory of the development of the human race during the patriarchal era, leading up to the Catholic Church's combination of the authority of the father figure, God, with the unconditioned love of the mother figure, the Church herself and the Virgin Mary. It was a combination that satisfied psychologically the people of the Middle Ages, giving the people courage and security in the midst of the Church's demand for an unquestioning support of herself as an institution.50

Ch. IV, A, 1, d - Summary

In summary form, the early history of the human race may be looked upon as the gradual emergence of man

48 Ibid., p. 55.
49 Ibid., p. 55-56.
50 Ibid., p. 54.
from the original ties to nature, to mother, blood and soil. Fromm never claims a complete eradication of these incestuous ties in any group, social, religious or economic up to the time of the Middle Ages, and there in the Middle Ages, matriarchal dependency on Mother Church and the Virgin Mary are prevalent among Christians. Fromm never claims a complete freedom from in any group up to the Middle Ages. Writing of modern man in The American Scholar, Winter, 1955-1956, Fromm sees modern man as still not fully human; only in building the sane society can man move past his "humanoid" history, and one of the essentials of this sane society man can create is that man relate to others, not by ties of blood and soil, but by bonds of brotherliness and solidarity. Fromm, then, does not look upon the men living in and affected by the negative aspect of matriarchal society as fully human, but "humanoid."

Two further questions about freedom from in this early stage of human history. The first is this: Is Fromm talking about freedom from when he talks about freedom from incestuous ties? It would seem that he is. For, first of all, in one of his most contemporary expositions of incestuous ties, already referred to as being present

in his book, The Sane Society, written in 1955, Fromm refers to the nationalism and state worship prevalent after the European revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as being a regression to incestuous fixation, a failing to overcome "freedom from" with "freedom to." This is surely to describe freedom from incestuous ties as a "freedom from" these ties, that meets insufficient "freedom to," and thus submits to a solution that means loss of freedom; this description fits the dialectic process of freedom and freedom from, as set out in his work Escape from Freedom, Passage III, as already explained in the preceding chapter. There freedom from was dealt with in terms of separation from primary ties, and here, as has been pointed out, the incestuous relationship to nature and mother ranks as one of the most primary ties of the human race. Thus Fromm, in discussing separation from incestuous ties, is indeed talking about freedom from.

52 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 40-60.
53 Ibid., p. 60.
54 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35-37.
55 Cf. supra, Chapter III, B, 3, passim.
56 Cf. supra, Ch. IV, A, 1, b, p. 262-263.
What exactly is the meaning of freedom from in this early history of the human race? This is a second question. Primarily it means a separation from, a release from, emotional ties to mother or to her substitutes. These ties are founded on the desire to return to nature, to preindividualistic existence. Fromm does not develop at any length the other attributes of freedom from seen in the preceding section of this chapter. He does not go into the insecurity, the doubt, etc., that marked his description of the general structure of freedom from. He does see this freedom from as changing in its meaning, inasmuch as the objects from which man frees himself change, at first mother and nature and then later on mother substitutes, such as family, clan, class, nation, etc. Does Fromm see any special qualitative change in freedom from in its changing in various human epochs? It does not seem so. There is a change in object from which separation is made, but it is the same act of or state of separation in all human epochs.

Ch. IV, A, 1, e - Scientific Validity

The point of this brief comment is to point out certain difficulties with Fromm's scientific assessment of

57 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (h), p. 222-226.
developing phylogenetic human freedom in its earliest stages. Fromm himself admits that the findings of Bachofen and Morgan, on which Fromm bases his own theory of matriarchy and patriarchy, have been rejected in most academic circles. It is interesting to note that, according to Horace L. Friess, the theories of matriarchal and patriarchal evolution of Bachofen and Morgan were adopted by Marx and Engels in their The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State of 1884. 

Ruth Benedict, reviewing Fromm's first major English work, Escape from Freedom, in Psychiatry, questions seriously Fromm's theory of "primal ties" in preliterate man, only recently outgrown in the human race by the development of individualism. Benedict asks Fromm for his evidence, of which, she asserts, he does not submit any, and furthermore, from the evidence of today's primitive tribes, questions the evolutionary


59 Erich FROMM, The Art of Loving, p. 54.


development of individualism. Petuchowski, although praising Fromm's *Art of Loving*, nevertheless sees in Fromm's description of the evolution of the concept of God in Jewish thought an inaccurate and short-sighted interpretation of the Old Testament and its commentators. While praising Fromm's endeavor to translate the message of the bible for modern man, Harvey Cox nevertheless believes in his review of *You Shall Be as Gods*, that Fromm uses this book "...as a take-off point for telling us his own religious ideas." 

These are serious objections to Fromm's scientific endeavor, if he is trying to use induction to prove his position by this means. It is his privilege to choose his authors in other fields of specialization, but there would be much merit in a more thorough discussion of the credentials of such authors as Bachofen, whose arguments and evidence nobody takes seriously, asserts V.F. Calverton, in editing in 1931 *The Making of Man, An Outline of*

62 Ibid.


It would seem that Fromm is justly accused by Benedict of no evidence, i.e., scientific evidence.

There is no intention here of fully entering into Fromm's way of proving this statement of his on the early development of freedom, and particularly freedom from, in the human race. This is reserved for the last chapter of this thesis. These paragraphs will only raise certain questions that seem to be indicated from this discussion.

The first question raised concerns the use of analogy by Fromm as a method of proof of his assertions about the early history of the human race. Does Fromm, starting from his theory of child development, from mother's care through the crisis of parental authority, attempt to apply this theory, mutatis mutandis, to the early development of the human race? Is Fromm using some sort of presupposition, such as Haeckel's law which affirms that "...the ontogenesis of the individual is a recapitulation of its phylogenesis," and arguing by way of analogy?


66 Cf. Ch. II, C, 2, of this thesis.

from the individual to the human race? Such a presupposition as Haeckel's law would help to account for the material content of Fromm's analysis of early phylogenetic human development, but would hardly give the certainty with which Fromm discusses this early human history. 68

This raises the second question: How account for the certainty with which Fromm asserts his interpretation of early human history? It may well be that the general plan of this development is simply in Fromm's eyes a particular application of his general theory of developing human freedom in the human race, as explained in the preceding chapter of this thesis. 69 Or various philosophical presuppositions may influence this early area of developing human freedom, such as the dialectic evolutionary nature of growing human cultural development. 70 This particular question will be investigated more fully in Chapter VI, where the nature of reality, including man, in Fromm's philosophy, will be more fully dealt with.

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68 P. Henry VAN LAER, Philosophy of Science, Part One, 2nd ed., p. 142, raises serious doubts about any biogenetic law having any value "...for the solution of the problem of evolution," much less Haeckel's formulation.

69 Cf. Ch. III, B, 2, a, of this thesis, passim.

70 Cf. Ch. III, B, 2, f, p. 257-258.
Ch. IV, A, 2 - Development of Freedom From in Pre-Modern Times

Ch. IV, A, 2, a - Introduction

In this section of Chapter IV Fromm's conception of developing human freedom, and especially freedom from, will be discussed as it covers the historical periods beginning with the Middle Ages up to and including the Reformation. Since most of the material Fromm uses in this area of history is centered in the book, Escape from Freedom, this section of Chapter IV will only contain a condensation of Fromm's statements. There are two parts, part a, elaborating on the development of human freedom during the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and part b, summing up the growth of freedom during the Reformation.

Certain clarifications need to be made before beginning this Section A, 2 of Chapter IV. Firstly, a brief critique will be developed at the end of this section: secondly, this section depends on Fromm's postulate in this book, Escape from Freedom, that human existence and freedom are inseparable, with human freedom characterizing human existence, and furthermore that the meaning of human freedom "...changes according to the degree of one's awareness

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Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, 1941.
and conception of himself as an independent and separate being." 72 This section forms a prelude to freedom in modern times, Fromm's main interest. 73

A third clarification should be made here, that Fromm develops this section A,2 in terms of what seems a social determinism, for Escape from Freedom throughout seems based on this presupposition. 74 This social determinism seems a sequel of what Fromm, in an earlier German article, "Politics and Psychoanalysis," conceived of as an apt method of explaining cultural influences on human beings, i.e., a combination of historical materialism and psychoanalysis, 75 and which combination Fromm would seem to use throughout Escape from Freedom. 76 As Fromm states it in the German article, "Politics and Psychoanalysis," "Historical materialism has revealed the dependence on economic conditions not only of the social and political facts of the case but also of the ideological evidence." 77

72 Ibid., p. 24.
73 Ibid., p. 37-38.
74 John H. SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 46, footnote.
76 Cf., e.g., Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 18 and p. 18-19, footnote, as well as p. 296-299.
Psychoanalysis can show on the other hand "...the how of the dependence of ideological evidence on economic facts conditioning it." 78

Ch. IV, A, 2, b - Freedom From in the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance

Fromm prefaces the discussion of freedom in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance by a discussion of freedom in the Middle Ages. 79 In Fromm's view, the men of the Middle Ages were not yet "individuals" in the modern sense of being free from primary political, economic and spiritual ties, for the role of man in the Middle Ages was identical with the role in society, where almost every aspect of the economic and political life was dominated by rules. 80 The man of the Middle Ages felt secure in the spiritual relationship to a loving God, and in the economic relationships, guided by guilds and ethical considerations as they were; in his personal relationships he felt a member of various groups - family, race, etc. 81

78 Ibid., p. 444. "...des W i e der Abhängigkeit ideologischer Tatbestände von den sie bedingenden Ökonomischen...


80 Ibid., p. 41-43.

81 Ibid., p. 41-43, 52-53.
In Italy, the first "modern" man arose, beginning a tide of economic changes in capital, competition and economic initiative, inducing personality changes in the direction of a growing freedom from economic and political shackles. Man became aware of these new freedoms, and hence felt isolated, alone, doubtful, helpless, anxious; only a favoured few rich people had a somewhat corresponding growth in freedom to. This new awareness of one's individuality was a cultural product, of social and economic change; by the sixteenth century all the decisive elements were present, affecting each man according to class.

Ch. IV, A, 2, c - Freedom From in the Reformation

Fromm's investigation of the growth of freedom in the Reformation, located in the second chapter of Escape from Freedom, centers around a psychological analysis of the character structure of Luther and Calvin and of their followers, for in this way Fromm believes he can find out the real meaning of the teachings of Luther and Calvin,

82 Ibid., p. 43-45.
83 Ibid., p. 44-45, 47-49, 55-60.
84 Ibid., p. 12-13, 61.
85 Ibid., p. 63-102.
rather than the mere logical analysis of these teachings. 86

As seen in the preceding sub-section of Section A of this chapter, the character structure of man on the eve of the Reformation was one of anxiety, helplessness, insecurity and aloneness, due to the breakage of political and economic primary ties, thus becoming an "individual." 87 Religion, an ideological tie, was next, for these ties, built on a confidence of an all-loving God and on the authority of the Church, were affected by the anxiety and helplessness found already in man's heart. 88 The need to have religion meet man's anxiety conditioned the acceptance of religious doctrines which emphasized man's depravity and helplessness as those of Luther and Calvin did. 89 Thus the tie to their former religion was broken, resulting in increased anxiety and helplessness. To escape this suffering Luther proposed for himself and his followers an utter self-humiliation and a subjective faith and certainty in salvation, while the Calvinists, overwhelmed by the doctrine of predestination and their own utter helplessness,

86 Ibid., p. 63-68.
87 Cf. Ch. IV, A, 2, b, p. 282.
88 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 73-76, 84, 86.
89 Ibid.
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nevertheless tried to reassure themselves by a minute ob­
servance of God's will and compulsive activity and work,
as a possible sign of their own predestination to heaven. 90

Thus the man of the Reformation was conditioned to
submit to such large forces as capitalism, and to work
doggedly at life's tasks. 91 The Reformation, building on
previous changes, thus freed man from one more primary tie,
that of religion, yet, in so doing left man in such anxiety
that a new escape from freedom was necessary in the ideo-
logical field and a readiness to bow down to the impersonal
force of Capitalism resulted.

Ch. IV, A, 2, d - Critique

While M. Ashley Montagu and Patrick Mullaly chiefly
extol Fromm's critique of Luther, Calvin and their followers,
Anton T. Boisen levels for the most part a severe criticism
against Fromm's interpretation of the Reformation period. 92
J. Stanley Glen, in his recent work, Erich Fromm: A Prot-
estant Critique, while admitting that Luther and Calvin

90 Ibid., p. 74-79, 84, 86-88, 91-94.
91 Ibid., p. 83-84, 94.
92 M. Ashley MONTAGU, Patrick MULLALY and Anton T.
BOISEN, in Ernest E. HADLEY, ed., "Escape from Freedom: A
Synoptic Series of Reviews," in Psychiatry, Vol. 5, 1942,
p. 122-124, 120-122, 114-117, respectively.
left themselves open to criticism, nevertheless insists that modern scholarship shows Fromm's assessment misunderstands their doctrines, that Fromm has omitted important passages from Calvin and Luther, and certain other important psychological factors, such as suffering from persecution, in Reformation man.  

Chapter IV, B. - MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM FROM

Ch. IV, B, 1. - Introduction

Freedom from as it existed in the human race in post-Reformation history will now be discussed. It is worth noting that Fromm's writings on the development of freedom from and other attributes of the human race adhere closely to how these developed in the West, broadly speaking. Fromm's discussion of the era from the Middle Ages to the Reformation centered in Europe. In this Section B the discussion will center on the United States as well as Europe. This follows Fromm's own emphasis. There is one notable exception to this in Fromm's work, his essay, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in the book, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis. In this book Fromm compares many of


his own conceptions of humanistic psychoanalysis with
similar conceptions from Zen Buddhism; this is Fromm's one
major treatment of a non-Western thought.

In the treatment of freedom from in modern times
an attempt will be made to single out and select the per-
tinent items that go to make up Fromm's essential ideas
on this subject. Much material will have to be omitted,
either because it is inconsequential or duplicating other
pertinent material, or because the material is ambiguous,
being closely allied to the concept of alienation. The
concept of alienation, its differences from and resem-
blances to freedom from, will be investigated in the first
part of Chapter V. In this chapter the selected texts will
help to show the development, the variations, the ambi-
guities and contradictions, such as they may be, of Fromm's
explanations.

In this section the material will be divided into
four parts, first, Fromm's analysis of the 17th, the 18th
and the 19th centuries, second, his ideas on what he calls
"modern" man, third, his treatment of 20th century man as
exemplified in Nazi Germany, and fourth, a summary of these
ideas along with added comment on certain difficulties and
the scientific validity of Fromm's treatment of modern
freedom from.
Ch. IV, B, 2. - Freedom From in the 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries

Ch. IV, B, 2, a - Introduction

One reason for the compression of the material from the 17th, the 18th and the 19th centuries is the fact that Fromm himself does not discuss these three centuries at any great length, with his main ideas on these centuries being developed in his book, *The Sane Society*, published in 1955. 95 This book is looked upon by Fromm as a continuation of the thought of *Escape from Freedom*, written fourteen years previously. 96 The main thought of *Escape from Freedom*, Fromm avers in *The Sane Society*, was man's endeavor to escape from freedom in the modern world by accepting totalitarian movements, that modern man, "...free from medieval ties, was not free to build a meaningful life based on freedom and love," thus looking for security by submission to a leader, race or state. 97 In *The Sane Society*, Fromm says, another escape from freedom by means of life in twentieth-century democracy is investigated, with the concept of alienation used as the tool of

96 Ibid., p. vii.
97 Ibid.
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investigation of this escape. Fromm does not apply the concept of alienation to his critique of these three centuries, the 17th, the 18th and the 19th, in The Sane Society; his use of this tool of criticism in this book begins with his analysis of the twentieth century.

Ch. IV, B, 2, b - The 17th and the 18th Centuries

Fromm has very little specifically about the development and the meaning of freedom from in the 17th and the 18th centuries in the West. Fromm mentions this, that 17th and 18th century Capitalism had not yet caused large character changes in man, and that medieval ideas and culture still had a large influence on economic practices of the period. Man was not yet looked upon as a means for society and economy, but rather man was the goal of society and economic practice, and hence social balance was to be preserved in these two centuries, the 17th and the 18th.

98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 110 ff.
100 Ibid., p. 83-85.
101 Ibid., p. 84.
102 Ibid., p. 85.
Ch. IV, B, 2, c - The 19th Century

It was in the nineteenth century that rapid changes took place in the economic structure of society, with the rapid rise of a ruthless Capitalism in which business and production became central to the economic facts of life, while man ceased to be "the measure of all things." Fromm's central thought about the nineteenth century follows the general pattern explained in the last sentence, i.e., the influence of Capitalism working on man, harmfully as described in the last sentence, and helpfully, too. Thus Fromm looks at the nineteenth century, through the eyes of an economist and an ethician, as well as the eyes of a psychologist, who observes how the changes in economic life of society affect the men in that society. This section will now investigate the nineteenth century from this viewpoint of Fromm's. The investigation will be brief, following Fromm's own brevity in this matter.

Central to Fromm's conception, as has been said in the last paragraph, is the influence of Capitalism on the worker. Between the workers and the owners of capital, Fromm says, practically all sense of solidarity has gone, with the same true of competitors in the business field.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid., p. 86.
Thus implicitly Fromm would say that the ties between the workers and the owners, and the ties between business competitors, would be broken. These ties between the workers and the owners of capital, between business competitors—what were they? Fromm does not say whether or not these ties were primary ties of solidarity with class, or productive ties of genuine human solidarity, or "secondary" submissive ties due to man's escape from freedom. Hence, when Fromm tells of the breaking of solidarity, that is as far as the evidence goes from the text and the immediate context of this passage from The Sane Society on the nineteenth century.\(^{105}\)

Another indication of the role of freedom from in the nineteenth century is the mixture of rational and irrational authority found in the social character of the men of that century.\(^{106}\) As has been noticed in the preceding pages of this thesis, irrational authority carries with it a limitation of freedom, a binding to ties, from which man must free himself.\(^{107}\) Fromm sees the picture of irrational authority in the social character of the men of the nineteenth century as binding those lacking capital to those


\(^{107}\) Cf. supra, Ch. II, C, 2, p. 120-122, 132-133.
who owned capital, as binding those subject to the state, especially to the monarchical state, to submission and obedience; in particular in the middle classes was obedience held in high honor.\textsuperscript{108} Thus it is seen that in general the people of the nineteenth century, especially the middle class, those living in a monarchical state, and those employed by owners of capital were not free from irrational authority, binding them to obedience out of fear.

However, although these classes of people just mentioned were bound by irrational authority, there were trends in the nineteenth century that were encouraging to the development of freedom from, according to Fromm. Man felt that he was finally becoming master of nature, that he had freed himself from "...domination by natural forces."\textsuperscript{109} In addition there was a new air of reason abroad, a confidence in one's own individuality, due in part to man's becoming aware that he had, according to Fromm, "...freed himself from the bonds of medieval superstition."\textsuperscript{110} Thus we see a blend of freedom to, of self-realization, of the mastery over nature and superstition, combined with a freedom from nature and superstitious ties.

\textsuperscript{108} Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 97-98.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p. 99.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
Ch. IV, B, 3. - Freedom From and "Modern" Man

Ch. IV, B, 3, a - Introduction

The sections of this chapter on the development of freedom from in the West from the late Middle Ages until the Reformation inclusively have been concluded, and just now the development of freedom from in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been studied. Now this section turns to the development of freedom from as Fromm sees it in what he calls "modern" times. It has been judged best to divide modern times into three sections, modern man in general, man under Nazism, and alienated man in the twentieth century. The reason for dividing this treatment into these three sections is that Fromm does so, specifically treating of the twentieth century in his work, The Sane Society, where he treats it under the concept of alienation. The treatment of alienation is reserved to the fifth chapter, along with its relationship with freedom from, and the use Fromm makes of alienation as a tool of analysis of twentieth century capitalistic society. In his other books written before The Sane Society, which was written in 1955, such as Escape from Freedom, written


in 1941, and Man for Himself, written in 1947, Fromm treats of freedom from as a concept which is very useful for analyzing the changes that man has undergone through capitalistic influences. Therefore, the treatment of alienation and its effects will be divorced from the treatment of freedom from and its effects in this chapter. The purpose of so doing is to clarify the two concepts, for, as will be seen, in the later parts of this thesis, Fromm's description of alienation resembles that of freedom from at least in part. Actually, in his works written after The Sane Society Fromm occasionally mentions the concept of freedom from. So that actually, as it were, the two concepts, "alienation" and "freedom from" are used side by side in Fromm's thought.

Ch. IV, B, 3, b - The Meaning of "Modern"

When Fromm is talking about "modern" society and "modern" man, what exactly is the meaning of the word "modern?" Does he mean the man of the twentieth century, of the nineteenth century, of those centuries put together,

113 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, op. cit.
114 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, op. cit.
115 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, op. cit.
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or some other span of time? In Escape from Freedom, Fromm has this to say: "We shall start our study of the meaning of freedom for modern man with an analysis of the cultural scene in Europe during the late Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era."\(^{117}\) Fromm goes on to say, relative to this same sentence and same paragraph, that at that time a new concept of freedom developed, finding its most significant expression ideologically in Reformation religious doctrines.\(^{118}\) Therefore Fromm means in this usage of "modern" that it refers to a period of time beginning with the late Middle Ages and occurring during the period of the Reformation, a time, therefore, that occurred some centuries ago. Certainly, therefore, the word "modern" in Fromm's usage refers to the religious doctrines of the time of the Reformation, which we have already discussed.\(^{119}\)

Yet another use of the word "modern" is found in the fourth chapter of the same book, Escape from Freedom, entitled "The Two Aspects of Freedom for Modern Man."\(^{120}\) In this fourth chapter of Escape from Freedom Fromm uses

\(^{117}\) Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 37.
\(^{118}\) Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 37.
\(^{119}\) Cf. supra, Ch. IV, A, 2, c.
\(^{120}\) Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, Ch. IV, p. 103-135.
the word "modern" not only to describe the doctrines of Protestantism, but even more and especially the influence of Capitalism on man. For instance, in this chapter Fromm talks about the role of capital and Capitalism in particular as influencing man "mentally, socially and politically." It is Capitalism that is given the credit for freeing man from traditional bonds and also enabling him to develop as an active, critical self. In addition to speaking of the development of capitalism's influence, Fromm also discusses the influence on modern man of certain philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche, in whose writings, Fromm thinks, the two aspects of freedom, i.e., freedom to and freedom from, remain interwoven as they had been in the theological doctrines of the Reformation. Thus Fromm is talking about the teachings of philosophers whom he lists as "modern," and who lived in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He thus uses the word "modern" to describe this time span.

121 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 103.
122 Ibid., p. 106-114, 120-122, 123-129.
123 Ibid., p. 106.
125 Ibid., p. 122.
Not only does Fromm use the term "modern" in his description of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries, but he also, in the same chapter on the aspects of freedom for modern man, speaks of certain traits of twentieth century civilization. For instance, Fromm talks about the situation of the gas station owner and his relationship to the merchandise that he sells.\textsuperscript{126} Fromm talks about "...acoustic bombardment by the radio;"\textsuperscript{127} he talks about the American financial crash of 1921;\textsuperscript{128} he talks about the threat of war and the fact that "...since the last war the possibilities of destruction have increased so tremendously."\textsuperscript{129} Fromm is writing this book in 1941, so he is referring to World War I as the last war, and referring to what was World War II, in the 1940's, as a threatened occurrence. In other words, Fromm in his treatment of "The Two Aspects of Freedom for Modern Man" is discussing man as he exists from post-Middle Ages time up to 1941, the time of his writing this book.

Therefore his use of the word "modern" is quite broad. The word "modern" is actually used not only to

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p. 125.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p. 131.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., p. 124.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., p. 131.
designate the changes that began to take place in society in the West in the late Middle Ages through the Reformation, which has already been discussed in the preceding part of this chapter,¹³⁰ but the word "modern" is also applied to political and economic events, and to corresponding concepts of freedom up to and practically including the first half of the twentieth century. This is the use of the word "modern" that shall be employed, following Fromm's usage, in analyzing the changes in freedom, and particularly freedom from, in and with "modern" man.

Ch. IV, B, 3, c - Modern Man in Capitalistic Society

Actually, apart from the late Middle Ages and the time of the Reformation, Fromm discusses the development of man and particularly the development of freedom in man chiefly in terms of the relationship of man to capitalistic society. For instance, in Chapter IV of Escape from Freedom, entitled "The Two Aspects of Freedom for Modern Man," Fromm's main concern is announced on the first page of this chapter.¹³¹ He says: "In this chapter, I wish to show that the further development of capitalistic society affected

¹³⁰ Cf. supra, Ch. IV, A, 2, b and c.

¹³¹ Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 103, (2nd sentence).
personality in the same direction which it has started to take in the period of the Reformation." Fromm uses this basic work of his, Escape from Freedom, as one means of explaining the effect of Capitalism on modern man; he explains the effect of Capitalism on modern man in terms of both "freedom" and in terms of certain "escapes from freedom" mentioned in this chapter, e.g., automaton conformity. In his next major work, Man for Himself, Fromm discusses the effects of the economic structure upon man more in terms of the "marketing orientation," as well as still discussing the relation between man and capitalist society in terms of freedom. In his third major work in this area, The Sane Society, Fromm discusses the relationship between man and capitalistic society, in the twentieth century especially, in terms of the concept of "alienation."

What is being done here in this particular section is to trace the concept of freedom and particularly

132 Ibid., p. 103.
133 Ibid., Ch. IV, passim, and Martin BIRNBACH, Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy, p. 149, 185-206.
134 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, passim and p. 67-82. Cf. also, M. BIRNBACH, Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy, p. 151-152.
"freedom from" in their development and changes in modern society. There will be no complete discussion of the escapes from freedom, such as one just mentioned, automaton conformity, or the effect of capitalist society on man in the "marketing orientation," nor will this chapter deal directly with alienation in the twentieth century. Rather this chapter will adhere strictly to the concept of freedom, particularly freedom from, as developed in Fromm's works. There will be no attempt made to give a complete explanation and critique of the other concepts that Fromm uses in explaining the relationship of man to society and vice versa, or of the mechanisms of escape that man may have developed as ways to escape from freedom from.

Ch. IV, B, 3, d - Freedom From in "Modern" Man

What is intended then in this section is to discuss the growth of freedom and particularly "freedom from" in modern man within the limits just described in the preceding paragraphs. Material will be taken for the most part from Fromm's book, Escape from Freedom, published in 1941.136 The reason this is being done is because there it is that Fromm lays down the groundwork, not only for his description of certain historical periods in which freedom

136 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, op. cit.
developed and changed but also for his description of the
general structure of changing dialectic human freedom in
the human race. That general structure has already been
seen to consist of a certain type of separation as a basic
attribute or essence of freedom from, as well as of iso-
lation and insecurity, of certain kinds of helplessness or
dependence, of a powerlessness, of a lack of meaning for
life. What is intended now is to look for the occur-
rence of these attributes of freedom from as well as the
basic attribute or essence, separation. Changes and devel-
opment in Fromm's work will be looked for, and an effort
will be made to make sure that the changes and development
are related to his concept of freedom from, or freedom, and
not to some other concept. In this general treatment of
"modern" man Fromm's idea of separation as applied to
modern man will be discussed first, and then the other
attributes of freedom from, isolation and insecurity
through which he describes the general structure of freedom
from. After that the other attributes of freedom from will
be treated, such as helplessness and dependence, powerless-
ness, lack of meaning in life, etc.

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137 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), passim.
138 Ibid.
Erich Fromm starts off the very first chapter of his book, Escape from Freedom, with this statement: "Modern European and American history is centered around the effort to gain freedom from the political, economic and spiritual shackles that have bound men."\textsuperscript{139} His book, Escape from Freedom, then, is going to discuss chiefly modern man's efforts to free himself, to separate himself from certain shackles that have bound men. These shackles that bind men could be either economic, political or spiritual, according to the text we have just read. In another section of the same book, Escape from Freedom, the introduction, Fromm says regarding the prospects of this book that "...modern man, freed from the bonds of pre-individualistic society, which simultaneously gave him security and limited him, did not gain freedom in the positive sense of the realization of the individual self."\textsuperscript{140} If these two texts in this paragraph are compared, it will be noticed that Fromm conceives man as changing from a pre-individualistic society, which, as he

\textsuperscript{139} Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{140} Erich FROMM, ibid., p. viii.
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says in the same place "...brought him independence and rationality," yet "...has made him isolated and, thereby, anxious and powerless," and has brought him to the state of freedom from intellectual, spiritual and economic shackles.\footnote{141} Therefore, in these two texts, Fromm looks upon modern man, existing in modern society, as endowed with a certain type of separation from ties that previously bound him. The result has been, to some extent at least, a certain type of independence and rationality. Yet the result has not been all of one kind. The result has been a certain type of freedom from or separation from the pre-individualistic shackles, but along with this freedom from comes a certain amount of isolation, and, as has been seen, with it anxiety and powerlessness. This description of freedom from in modern man and modern society fits in well with the description already given of growing human freedom and specifically growing freedom from in Passage III of Escape from Freedom.\footnote{142} There as here a certain type of individuation, the cutting off, or separating or freeing from is discovered, with the resulting isolation and insecurity, and a certain amount of anxiety. Basically what Fromm is establishing here in

\footnote{141}{Ibid.}

\footnote{142}{Ibid., p. 35-37.}
the beginning of the book about the meaning of the book is this, that freedom does change, that whatever its meaning was for the men preceding pre-individualistic society, i.e. for pre-modern man, at least for modern man freedom has grown, shackles have been thrown off, man has been separated from these shackles, and with it a certain amount of isolation and insecurity and other psychological effects.

Ch. IV, B, 3, e, (2) The Results of Separation-Isolation

One of the chief effects of this separation, this freedom from economic and spiritual shackles is isolation, as has already been seen. There in this preceding section it was discovered that isolation and some type of separation, which is at least dimly realized by the person or the section of the human race involved, are necessary components of freedom from. In discussing the "social unconscious" in Beyond the Chains of Illusion Fromm refers to those elements that a society cannot permit to come into the awareness of the members of that society, if the society is to operate successfully, if it is to keep those

143 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (h).

144 Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 88-134.

145 Ibid., p. 88.
elements which would destroy it from emerging. A social sanction is involved, i.e., the elements of thinking, say, by which a person would disagree with the society with which he is involved, would be repressed into unconsciousness, would become unconscious. Just what is the psychological force behind this repression? Fromm answers that in his opinion the most powerful motive for this repression is the fear of isolation and the fear of ostracism.\textsuperscript{146}

This isolation, then, is a dynamic force, the fear of isolation causes repression into the unconscious. What does it cause the repression of? It causes the repression of those thoughts and ideals which differ from what the vast majority held. How does Fromm explain this? Fromm says, in the same chapter on the "social unconscious," that for

\ldots man, inasmuch as he is man—that is to say, inasmuch as he transcends nature and is aware of himself and of death—the sense of complete aloneness and separateness is close to insanity... Man has to be related, he has to find union with others, in order to be sane... It is this fear of isolation and ostracism, rather than the 'castration fear,' that makes people repress the awareness of that which is taboo since such awareness would mean being different, separate, and hence, to be ostracized.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 126.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
Thus Fromm ties in man's fear of isolation with one of man's basic needs, the need to be united with others.

In his earliest major work on freedom, Escape from Freedom, Fromm gives somewhat the same answer. He says:

We have said that negative freedom by itself makes the individual an isolated being, whose relationship to the world is distant and distrustful and whose self is weak and constantly threatened. Spontaneous activity is the one way in which man can overcome the terror of aloneness without sacrificing the integrity of his self. 148

Thus for Fromm isolation results from negative freedom. It has previously been seen that by negative freedom Fromm means a "freedom from." 149 Isolation, then, results from freedom from and goes contrary to a basic need of man. As mentioned in this last quotation from Escape from Freedom, it is spontaneous activity that is the one way for man to overcome his isolation or aloneness without sacrificing the integrity of himself. 150

Ch. IV, B, 3, e, (3) The Results of Separation—Insecurity

It has also been observed, in the general description of growing human freedom for the human race given by Erich Fromm in Escape from Freedom, 151 that insecurity

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149 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (h).
150 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 260.
151 Ibid., p. 36.
plays a major part in the description of freedom from. Actually Fromm pays very little attention to this element of freedom from, insecurity, in the rest of his works. He stresses at times, the results or effects of insecurity as, e.g., when discussing the marketing orientation in Man for Himself, where he notes that insecurity results for a person imbued with a marketing orientation whenever he fails to succeed.\textsuperscript{152} Fromm also sees modern man as insecure, as endowed with a wish to escape insecurity and aloneness; but as this is developed in his section of Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis this insecurity results from man's alienation, from the automatization, the deadening of life for man.\textsuperscript{153} In these last two references insecurity is not directly connected with the concept of freedom from, but rather with the concept of alienation and therefore this will not be discussed at the present time. One place where Fromm does discuss insecurity in relationship to freedom is in his major work on freedom, Escape from Freedom, in which he analyzes the notion of insecurity and its relationship to one's concept of oneself as a self-willing individual.\textsuperscript{154} In this particular passage Fromm notes that for

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{152} Erich FROMM, \textit{Man for Himself}, p. 72. \\
\textsuperscript{153} Erich FROMM, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in \textit{Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis}, p. 79. \\
\textsuperscript{154} Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 253-255.
\end{flushleft}
modern man, living under anonymous authority of "...common sense and public opinion as instruments of conformity" the result is a weakening of self so that man "...feels powerless and extremely insecure."\textsuperscript{155}

Such a man with a weakened self becomes insecure, according to Fromm, and there is a need to conform all the more for such a man since this loss of self, he says, "...results in a profound doubt of one's own identity."\textsuperscript{156} Fromm goes on to say that such a man will then wish to conform with the expectations of others and will not want to be different. In this way, he says, "...doubts about one's own identity are silenced and a certain security is gained."\textsuperscript{157} Fromm goes on to say in the same passage that without the illusion that such a man has of being a self-willing individual man would be aware of this insecurity, that actually such an individual remains unaware of his insecurity.\textsuperscript{158} How does this notion of insecurity as developed in this passage relate to Fromm's notion of freedom from? This passage does not directly touch upon the state of insecurity as resulting from freedom from but rather

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 253.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., p. 254.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., p. 253.
portrays the state of automaton conformity, which as Fromm has pointed out earlier in this book, is a result of, an escape from freedom from.\textsuperscript{159} Actually what Fromm is implying here is that man must become truly active in his self-willing, in his own choosing, if he is to escape this defense of automaton conformity.

What therefore lies behind this automaton conformity is an escape from insecurity. Where does this insecurity come from? It comes from remaining in a state of separation, of freedom from, of isolation and aloneness, which have not been counterbalanced by a development and growth of the self. Therefore what Fromm is implying here is that man as a result of a separation from ties, naturally becomes insecure. There are two ways out, one of them being an escape by automaton conformity or other such mechanisms of escape. The other way to escape from this insecurity is by a true, active self, by a true self-development. As Fromm says, man, "...being an automaton, ...cannot experience life in the sense of spontaneous activity."\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 185-206.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p. 255.
One of the other attributes that Erich Fromm links with separation from primary ties is powerlessness or helplessness. What precisely does Erich Fromm mean by this powerlessness or helplessness? It has already been indicated that this attribute belongs with freedom from's general structure.161 In addition Fromm has this to say, regarding modern man:

The position in which the individual finds himself in our period has already been foreseen by visionary thinkers in the nineteenth century. Kierkegaard describes the helpless individual torn and tormented by doubts, overwhelmed by the feeling of aloneness and insignificance.162

In the same context Fromm refers to Franz Kafka's work; Fromm says that, for instance, in Kafka's Castle there is a description of a man who wants to get in touch with the mysterious inhabitants of a castle "...who are supposed to tell him what to do and show him his place in the world," but all of his life consists in futile efforts to contact these inhabitants, leaving this man with feelings of utter futility and helplessness.163 Fromm also refers to a work,

161 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (h).
162 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 132-133.
163 Ibid., p. 133.
Personal Record, by Julian Green, in which Green discusses the littleness of man, the fact that the dimensions of the universe are utterly overpowering, that outside of love everything else is nothingness, that man looks down into a huge abyss and is afraid. Fromm goes on to say that, except for the neurotic person, the average person is unaware of this feeling of helplessness, that the ordinary daily round of activity, the approval of himself from this or that source, is sufficient to take his mind away from this attribute of his, this powerlessness.

If these passages just quoted are compared with one another it will be noticed that all of them represent the same fundamental attribute under discussion here, the powerlessness, the helplessness of the individual in the society in which he lives. This helplessness, this powerlessness is described in different terms by these authors, but it is commonly ascribed to most every man by these authors. To what does Fromm attribute this helplessness, this feeling of powerlessness? Is it truly the result of freedom from, has it anything to do with the concept of human existence, of freedom? Fromm answers this in Man for Himself when he says that man, "Being aware of himself,...

164 Ibid.; cf. footnote on this page.
165 Ibid., p. 133-134.
realizes his powerlessness and the limitations of his existence." Fromm goes to say that man, realizing that death is his fate, cannot still his mind, even if he wanted to do so, and that his bodily life is driven to remain alive. In this passage Fromm points out that the condition for the feeling of man's powerlessness is the awareness of what he truly is. He realizes, for instance, the unavoidability of death; he realizes that he cannot escape realizing what he is. And what is man? In the same paragraph of Man for Himself Fromm describes man as an "anomaly," as "the freak of the universe." Fromm has said, in the same paragraph, that man, in relation to nature, to the rest of nature, "...is set apart, while being a part; he is homeless, yet chained to the home he shares with all creatures. Cast into this world at an accidental place and time, he is forced out of it, again accidentally." These dichotomies Fromm sees as the fundamental reasons why man feels powerless. What are the reasons that Fromm gives? It is man's realized separateness or aloneness in the universe, the fact that he is different than other creatures, the fact that the end of

166 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 40.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
man is the destruction of what he is, that there is no way of resolving this difference.

What man faces, then, is what Fromm calls "...the most fundamental existential dichotomy." In these passages of this paragraph and the preceding one, Fromm says that man realizes his helplessness, his powerlessness in the face of what he has become, in the face of what he is. Implicit in this is a realization of man's separation from nature. Therefore this powerlessness, for Fromm, comes truly from freedom from. It has already been seen that freedom from means a separation from primary ties, and that freedom changes for man according to his degree of awareness and "...conception of himself as an independent and separate being." Therefore what is had here is the condition for man's helplessness, for the feeling of powerlessness, and, to some extent, of insignificance. This condition is first of all a true separation from nature, a true inability of man to overcome the difficulties brought on by this separation, and the ultimate

170 Ibid., p. 41.
171 Ibid.
172 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (i).
difficulty such as death. And secondly the condition for man's helplessness is the realization that man is unable to overcome these difficulties, to regain the position that one once had in nature. From this true separation from nature, from this inability to become one with nature, from the accidentalness of one's life, along with a realization of these attributes of man's existence, from all of these comes a feeling of powerlessness, of helplessness and of insignificance. This then is the true basis for the feelings of powerlessness, of insignificance, of helplessness that man feels. These feelings are based on a real, existential condition, a way of being, a way of being free from nature and the ties of nature.

Ch. IV, B, 4, f - Capitalism and Freedom From

The effects of Capitalism on modern man's freedom from are the next subject of this chapter; in discussing this the fourth chapter of Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom will be given an adequate account, and will be used almost exclusively. Hence only a short condensation of the main points of this chapter will be given here. Fromm does also treat in this chapter of alienation, but this


175 Ibid., p. 116-120.
subject will be investigated in the next chapter of this thesis.

From Capitalism arose two sources of modern man's "freedom to" but more emphatically "freedom from," i.e., his isolation, his aloneness, his submissiveness; these two sources, both derived from the psychological effects of Protestantism, were the "principle of individualistic activity" and an attitude of asceticism and self-negation. 176 In economic activity man was subordinate to the goal of the capitalistic mode of production, the accumulation of capital; this goal was extra-personal, and thus added to man's feeling of insignificance and helplessness. 177

Writing in 1941 in the first printing of Escape from Freedom Fromm saw the recent decades preceding his book to have been an era of decreasing positive effects of "freedom to" from Capitalism, and from it increasing effects of freedom from, such as feelings of powerlessness, insignificance and helplessness; these increased effects of Capitalism were due to the increased power of monopolistic capital, and to the bigness of corporations, political organizations and trade unions. 178 In 1965 a paperback

176 Ibid., p. 108-111.
177 Ibid., p. 111-112.
178 Ibid., p. 123-130.
edition of the 1941 edition of Escape from Freedom was issued, with a new foreword, "Foreword II," by Erich Fromm. In this new foreword Erich Fromm reflects that new factors have entered man's environment, tending to make man's fear of freedom even more pressing; such factors are the destructive potentiality of atomic power, the "...almost self-regulating world of computers," and the population explosion. Despite certain advantages to positive freedom such as the liberation of the Negro, for Fromm in 1965 the pressure to escape from freedom was as great or greater than in 1941. Hence, logically, freedom from's effects were as great in 1965, or greater, than in 1941.

In summing up what Fromm thinks about Capitalism's effect on freedom from, Capitalism, due to its principles and increasing power during the last decades, has increased the effects of freedom from, man's feelings of insecurity, hopelessness, insignificance and powerlessness, without a corresponding development of "freedom to."

179 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, New York, Avon, 1965, i-xvi and 17-333 p., with a new foreword, "Foreword II," by Erich Fromm, p. xii-xvi. (This is the same text as the 1941 edition, with the exception of the new foreword, a new pagination, and phrases such as "World War," on p. 4 of the 1941 edition, becoming "First World War" on p. 18 of the 1965 edition.)

180 Ibid., p. xii-xiv.

181 Ibid., p. xiv.
Having just finished an analysis of the meaning of freedom from as found in "modern" man in Fromm's writings, this thesis now turns to a specific example of twentieth century said case history as Fromm develops it, the "Psychology of Nazism," as developed chiefly in Chapter VI of the same book, Escape from Freedom. In his treatment of Nazism Fromm concentrates on two aspects of it, the "authoritarian" character involved among those who were Nazis or promoted Nazism, and secondly, the "authoritarian" character of Hitler. There is no intention of

182 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 207-239. Besides this chief reference to the problem of Nazism in Fromm's thought, and its relationship to freedom from, there are other sources on these issues in Fromm's writings, such as:


These sources do little to add to the essentials of Fromm's analysis of Nazism and freedom from as developed in his work of 1941, Escape from Freedom.

183 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 207-239.
investigating here to any extent the concept of "authoritarian" character; it is beyond the scope and purpose of this thesis. What is intended is an investigation of the areas of freedom from that have already been discussed in preceding sections, and the application of this concept of freedom from and its attributes to Erich Fromm's discussion of Nazism. The "authoritarian" character is thoroughly discussed in Chapter V of this book, Escape from Freedom, and moreover in Chapter VI his concept of "authoritarian" character is applied to Nazism. The "authoritarian" character is described in these pages as one of the typical escapes from freedom.

Ch. IV, B, 4, b - Nazism and the Lower Middle Class

In his treatment of Nazism Fromm tries to explain how it was that Nazism was adopted by the Germans; for Fromm the reception of Hitler by the lower middle class, especially its youth, was one of the key points in Hitler's political success, the other being Hitler's alliance with the industrialists.

184 Cf. supra, Ch. IV, A, 2 and B, 1-3.
186 Ibid., p. 211-220.
By the 1930's the security of the lower middle class of the pre-World War I days, with its identification with the monarchy, and reception of and trust in the authority of the family, of religion and traditional morality, had been severely shaken.\textsuperscript{187} Thus the lower middle class felt anxious, isolated, powerless; the same feelings permeated the workers and the peasants, so that the vast majority of Germans felt powerless and insignificant, traits typical of monopolistic capitalism.\textsuperscript{188}

The lower middle class could identify with Hitler, as hating petty bourgeois; a class antagonistic to them, the industrialists in general prospered under Hitler, and thus were on his side, so that these two classes were used by Hitler, an advocate of Nazism's radical opportunism.\textsuperscript{189}

The impact of Nazism on the lower middle class and how it appealed to the social character of this class has just been explained. It was stated that before World War I this lower middle class felt secure and safe, because of a stability of social and cultural systems, because of a sub-

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., p. 211-216.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., p. 217.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p. 219-220.
mission to religion and to traditional morality. Fromm points out, concerning the individual in this lower middle class, that

His submission and loyalty to existing authorities were a satisfactory solution to his masochistic strivings, yet he did not go to the extreme of self-surrender and he retained a sense of the importance of his own personality. What he was lacking in security and aggressiveness as an individual, he was compensated for by the strength of the authorities to whom he submitted himself. Fromm then conceives this attitude of the lower middle class in terms of a submissiveness to authority, in terms of a masochism. In the chapter of Escape from Freedom preceding this one on Nazism, a chapter entitled "Mechanisms of Escape," with a section on "Authoritarianism," masochism is described by Fromm as one aspect of the authoritarian character, and as an escape from freedom from, one way of overcoming the isolation and insecurity proceeding from freedom from. Therefore, it is evident that Fromm's thought here infers the presence of freedom from, inasmuch as he has said that the lower middle class before World War I had solved the problem of its freedom from, not by a full freedom to but by means of a submission to authority for the sake of security. However this submission had

190 Ibid., p. 213.
191 Ibid., p. 141-179.
192 Ibid., p. 213.
not gone so far as to totally eliminate some development of freedom to, such as the development of the sense of importance of one's own personality. 193

Once the lower class was threatened by the development of monopolistic capitalism, 194 and threatened by the change in tradition after World War I, 195 once this all happened—the anxiety and therefore the hatred of this lower middle class was aroused; the lower middle class became full of panic, and true to its authoritarian character, was filled with cravings for submission as well as domination. 196 This lower middle class, then, due to a monopolistic capitalism and the changes in tradition, had lost its binding ties to tradition, those ties that had been an escape from freedom from. Yet this escape from freedom from, and submission to traditional authorities before World War I changed after World War I, up to and along with the advent of Nazism; this escape from freedom from continued, i.e., new ties were formed, but not ties of strength, of self-integration, and of perfection such as

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193 Ibid., p. 213. Cf. preceding passages on freedom to, supra, Ch. IV, B, 2, c, p. 291 and Ch. IV, B, 3, e, p. 301-303.

194 Ibid., p. 219.

195 Ibid., p. 213-216.

196 Ibid., p. 219.
it would have been if these had been ties formed which were human and which were free in the sense of freedom to. 197

These new ties were rather simply a continuation in a certain sense of the irrational ways already described in this thesis that people have of escaping from freedom from. 198

What Fromm has been talking about, then, in part in this section on Nazism, as has been analyzed, is a freedom from as well as the authoritarian escape from it. Freedom from, as has been observed in preceding sections, 199 consists in a separation from primary ties with a resulting isolation and feelings of insecurity, anxiety, fear, etc. It has also been seen that there are two ways of overcoming this freedom from, one a positive way, of a true growth of an integral, spontaneous approach to reality, the other of escaping from this freedom from. 200 This lower middle class, (according to Fromm in a later work, The Heart of Man, a "backward class") had no realistic hope of changing its situation, because it belonged to an older and dying

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197 Cf. preceding passages on freedom to, supra, Ch. IV, B, 2, c, p. 291 and Ch. IV, B, 3, e, p. 301-302.
198 Cf. preceding passages, supra, Ch. IV, B, 3, p. 299, 307-308.
199 Cf. preceding passages on freedom from, supra, Ch. IV, B, 4, p. 318-322.
200 Cf. preceding passages, supra, Ch. IV, B, 3, e, p. 307-308.
form of society. This hopelessness of changing its condition made the lower middle class, now separated from irrational authority and tradition due to economic and political changes, need a new authority to which it might submit. This new irrational authority to which it might submit with some ease, because of its identification with Hitler himself, was Nazism.

Therefore in this section on Nazism there is a continuation of Fromm's central thought in *Escape from Freedom*, the role of freedom from in the developing individual and in the developing human race. There are no real contradictions here from Fromm's previous analysis, since, as has just been seen in this later work, *The Heart of Man*, he confirms this analysis. The question might well be raised of whether Fromm's proof for these statements is adequate or not. This will be gone into more thoroughly in the last sections of this chapter, where there will be a critique of freedom from. Suffice it to say now that Fromm seems to be looking at all of the facts he can master, he tries to make a synthesis of them of some

201 Erich FROMM, *The Heart of Man*, p. 79.


203 Erich FROMM, *The Heart of Man*, p. 79.
sort, and interpret them in terms of some sort of intuition, an intuition of growing human development and growing human freedom.

Ch. IV, B, 5. - Summary

Ch. IV, B, 5, a- Summary of "Modern" Freedom From

The thought of Erich Fromm on the meaning of and development of freedom from in post-Reformation history will now be summarized. This comparison will be made in terms of what the key attributes of freedom from are in Fromm's thought, indicating any particular lines of both continuity and development that are apparent in his thought. Since this part of the thesis concerns the development of the human race in history, there will be an attempt to show what continuity exists in Fromm's thought as the human race passes through and with time. There will be a brief comparison of Fromm's thought on freedom from in post-Reformation times with that of Reformation times, then an examination of his thought on post-Reformation freedom from in itself, and finally a discussion of two difficulties regarding his treatment of freedom from in post-Reformation centuries.

In the discussion of freedom from in the Reformation, it was seen that man, freed from the economic and
spiritual shackles of the medieval feudal system, nevertheless was oppressed by economic and spiritual forces, with the exception of the new capitalists. The economic forces at work were, in part, the forces of the beginnings of Capitalism; the spiritual forces were the doctrines of Luther and Calvin, with their emphasis on man's unworthiness, and stress on working for ends outside of man himself. There was in the Reformation a separation from primary ties, of family, of social class, and also of religion; man was free from these primary ties; his freedom from such external ties was complete. With this freedom from, for all but the successful capitalist class, was a way to insecurity, doubt, powerlessness and anxiety.

In the part just finished there may be noticed somewhat the same pattern in the meaning Fromm gives to the reality of freedom from. Fromm continues his analysis of the changes in freedom, and particularly freedom from, by the analysis of the effects of capitalism on freedom in the human race since Reformation days. There is a constant tension between growing freedom, freedom to and freedom from, in Western man and a growing power of capitalism.

204 Cf. supra, Ch. IV, A, 2, c, p. 283 and b, p. 282.
205 Cf. supra, Ch. IV, A, 2, c, p. 283-284.
Man continued to free himself from all ties during the
seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
and yet, freed from these ties found himself more than ever
incapable of handling the isolation, the insecurity, the
powerlessness resulting from this freedom from these ties.
Two principles of capitalism, that of individualistic
activity, and that of the accumulation of capital, accentu­
tuated this separation of man from the ties that gave them
security, by stressing aloneness rather than constructive
union with others and the accumulation of capital an
extra-personal goal, rather than the dignity, the self of
the persons involved in this accumulation. Capitalism is
seen here as the villain of this frustration of men. Men
are taught and helped to free themselves by capitalism, but
this is nothing positive to balance off this freedom from;
rather does it prevent such growth of positive freedom by
the principles just mentioned.

In addition to the influence of capitalism on the
growth and development of freedom, by separation from eco­
nomic ties, there were other factors at work in society,
such as the continued separation of man from religious ties
after the Reformation, and, in Nazi Germany, from irrational
ties of authority of the monarchy, of the family, and
traditional morality. The effect of these factors was to
free man from traditional ties, but to leave him little in the way of a constructive way of handling this separation, and resulting isolation, insecurity and powerlessness.

Is there a development of freedom from during these centuries after the Reformation up to the present times? In one sense there is not any, in the thought of Fromm, since at the end of the Reformation, Western man was for all practical purposes free from all primary ties, as has been seen. Yet in recent years Fromm sees an increase in insecurity, powerlessness and insignificance, due to lessening of economic opportunity; freedom to has been lessened, with the resultant imbalance between it and freedom from.

Has the meaning of freedom from changed during these post-Reformation centuries? Actually Fromm sees a startling likeness in the elements of personal freedom and the social situation, as they existed in Reformation times and as they exist today. In both periods was freedom "ambiguous," in the sense that man grew free from external authorities and yet was more isolated, and thereby filled with feelings of powerlessness and insignificance.

207 Cf. supra, Ch. IV, A, 2, c, p. 284.
209 Ibid., p. 38.
There does not seem to be any essential change in freedom from in these post-Reformation centuries; there is, in Fromm's thought, an increase of the results of separation, isolation, insecurity, powerlessness, etc., which might be called "qualitative," in the sense that these internal feelings have increased in intensity.

Fromm has said that the meaning of freedom changes according to the degree of man's awareness of himself as separate and independent. This awareness, of course, is changed from generation to generation in modern times in some small way, since, as has been seen, there are indeed variations in man's freedom vs. capitalism, and man's freedom vs. authority; furthermore, man's awakening of actual separation, in Fromm's thought, depends in part, at least, on objective, de facto conditions of actual separation, e.g., Fromm sees modern man as seeing himself with increasing objectivity and with fewer illusions. In general, it might be concluded, then, that freedom from in its general structure today is much the same as it was at the end of the Reformation, a separation from ties, with resulting isolation, insecurity and powerlessness.

210 Ibid., p. 24.
211 Ibid., p. 107.
Two difficulties will now be faced that need a fuller answer. The first is this: does Fromm refer to "primary" ties, when he tells of modern man freeing himself from ties? Fromm does not generally state whether or not the ties involved, such as those in Germany in the lower middle class before World War I, are primary ties or inadequate ties, that could be considered "secondary," in the sense that they are ties formed by escape from freedom from. His theory of what constitutes a "primary" tie, and a "secondary" tie seems to be inadequately applied to concrete cases.

The second difficulty is more major, and will be seriously considered in the critique of freedom from in the last chapter. It is this: what kind of proof, and how much proof occurs in Fromm's work for his various assertions? This difficulty is a very broad one; it applies to this part of this chapter and to practically all of Fromm's work. It seems that Fromm is working from a basic set of assumptions, regarding the nature of man, the nature of the world, the nature and goal of human development, that are largely unproven, with in addition little attempt to examine the logical connection between these assumptions and truths derived from them. Fromm seems to work from a certain type
of insight, in his assertion of truths about both the nature of man, as affected by society, and the nature of society as it affects man. Fromm seems to say to his readers: "See this, my explanation. It's true, isn't it?" He asks his reader to look at all reality as he does, and that is enough for Fromm.

Ch. IV, B, 5, c - Scientific Validity

As noted in the introductory chapter of this thesis, a brief attempt will be made here to assess what other co-workers in Fromm's fields of inquiry think of his works, and, more particularly why they think as they do. In addition a preliminary reflection will be made on the types of proof Fromm uses, etc.

As far as a critique of the entire content of section B of this chapter is concerned, only a few observations will be made. Various reviewers of Escape from Freedom have comments, laudatory and critical of its contents.

212 Cf. supra, Ch. I, B, 5, p. 52-53.


Thomas Harvey GILL (p. 109-111), Ruth BENEDICT (p. 111-113), Anton T. BOISEN (p. 113-117), Lewis B. HILL (p. 117-118), Patrick MULLALEY (sic) (p. 118-122), M.F. Ashley MONTAGU (p. 122-129), Louis WIRTH (p. 129-131) and
Karl Menninger praises Fromm's analysis in some respects, yet finds it much too subjective, singularly lacking in references to other psychoanalysts, and lacking in "empirical and experimental grounds" in his criticism of Freud. This last criticism might be pertinent, since Fromm himself says that he is trying to assay the meaning of freedom in the light of the interaction of scientific factors, i.e., psychological and sociological factors. Patrick Mullaly praises the entire thought of Escape from Freedom in his review of this book, yet finds that Fromm omits important data in his analysis of the unique role he ascribes to the capitalistic mode of production in determining social relations, i.e., Fromm omits the role of modern science in Western society as well as downgrading the importance of many other factors, political, psychological and religious, in the formation of freedom and escapes from freedom.


214 Karl MENNINGER, op. cit., p. 317.
216 Patrick MULLALY, op. cit., passim.
217 Ibid., p. 121.
In part 3 of this B section on Nazism, several scholars have serious reservations about Fromm's handling of the essential facts, i.e., that the lower middle class, the peasants, the workers were, because of their insecurity and loneliness, prepared to escape into Nazism. Karl Menninger sees in Fromm, e.g., the intent of proving too much, that Nazism, a brand of Fascism, arose from a religious preparation, and that every brand of Fascism, e.g., that in Japan, would have to arise in the same way. 219

Louis Wirth thinks that Fromm's idea of potential Nazis becoming supporters of Nazism out of a "yearning for submission" might have a much more simple explanation, a yearning for satisfaction. 220

These difficulties against Fromm's use of and interpretation of facts are not meant to prove a definitive case against his explanation, but simply indicate that they are unanswered difficulties against an explanation that many find very satisfactory, even in their objections to what amounts to Fromm's apparent satisfaction with his seemingly subjectively certain statements. These difficulties are serious, and raise the problem again of whether

219 Karl MENNINGER, op. cit., p. 317.
220 Louis WIRTH, op. cit., p. 130.
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or not Fromm is working out of presuppositions that give him a confidence and certainty not merited by the facts he presents.
ERICH FROMM'S CONCEPT OF "FREEDOM FROM"
AN INTERNAL CRITIQUE

by

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CHAPTER V

THE ESSENCE OF FREEDOM FROM

Introduction

An inquiry into the meaning of freedom from, as Fromm sees it, has just been concluded in his conception of freedom from in its origin and development in the individual human being and in the human race. In these last three chapters it was seen what freedom from meant in its general structure and its particular applications in both the lives of individuals and of society.

During these chapters frequent references were made to two concepts, alienation and freedom to. With regard to the first concept, alienation, it has already been referred to a number of times. The point of these references was this, that alienation was a concept which at times closely resembled freedom from in Fromm's thought. The first part of this chapter will investigate the concept of "alienation," to see its meaning, and to compare its meaning with that of freedom from.

With regard to the second concept, freedom to, a number of references were made which were necessary to

1 Cf. supra, Ch. I, C, p. 57 ; Ch. IV, B, 2, a, p. 287-288; Ch. IV, B, 3, a, p. 292-293.
explicate more thoroughly freedom from, with which freedom to is joined in a simultaneous dialectic process. Because of the close connection of freedom to with freedom from, in this chapter some time shall be spent on Fromm's concept of freedom to. Not every aspect of freedom to shall be discussed but only those general aspects of freedom to, both individual and historical, which are sufficient to make the notion of freedom from, the dialectic opposite of freedom to, stand out more clearly.

Finally, in the third section of this chapter, a summary of the meaning of freedom from, as Fromm sees it, shall be presented as it has been explicated in Chapter II on the origin and development of freedom from in the individual human being, and Chapters III and IV on the origin and development of freedom from in the human race. The information also from the first two parts, A and B, of this Chapter V shall be used to aid in the inquiry into the essence of freedom from, as Fromm sees it. It is preferable to have first discussed alienation before discussing the essence of freedom from, since the discussion of alienation might throw some light on the essence, the meaning of freedom from. In the next chapter a critique of freedom

2 Cf. supra, Ch. II, C, 1, p. 86-93; Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (g), p. 220-222 and (h), p. 222-226.
from, as Fromm sees it, shall be given both in itself, and in its connection with human nature.

Chapter V, A. - ALIENATION

Ch. V, A, l. - Introduction

Ch. V, A, l, a - Why Alienation?

As it has already been noted in the introduction to this fifth chapter, earlier parts of this thesis pointed to the close resemblance of alienation to freedom from in certain of Fromm's writings, and stated then that this resemblance would be treated in this chapter. Isolation, for instance, is said to be the result of alienation, as is aloneness. And isolation and aloneness have been seen to be the results of freedom from. Moreover peace, in Fromm's terms, "...is the overcoming of separateness and alienation;" "separateness" was seen in earlier parts of this thesis as the primary attribute of freedom from, and here in this text it is linked with alienation. These two texts just referred to are some of the reasons for investigating

3 Cf. supra, Ch. IV, B, 2, a, p. 287-288 and Ch. IV, B, 3, a, p. 292-293.
4 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 141.
5 Cf. supra, Ch. II, C, 1, c, p. 91-93 ; Ch. IV, B, 3, e, (2), p. 303-305.
alienation at this point in the thesis.

Ch. V, A, 1, b - Sources for Fromm's Concept of Alienation

To investigate alienation satisfactorily it is necessary to carefully study the sources, both Fromm and those commenting on his thought. In Fromm's work the basic book is his The Sane Society, published in 1955. This work has as one of its central topics the analysis of the "social character" of the twentieth century under the concept of alienation; Fromm chooses this concept of alienation because for him it represents the "...deepest level of human personality," as well as the most appropriate to explain the "...contemporary socio-economic structure and the character structure of the average individual." The Sane Society offers this analysis of alienation in depth by an extensive critique of modern twentieth century society in terms of alienation, as shall shortly be seen. Other important sources for his thought are his essay on "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, published in 1960, The Art of Loving, published in

7 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 110-208 and passim.
8 Ibid., p. 110-111.

There are two important works of Fromm referring to Karl Marx, Marx's Concept of Man, and Beyond the Chains of Illusion. My Encounter with Marx and Freud.

10 Erich FROMM, The Art of Loving, p. 72 ff.
12 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 72 ff.
14 Cf. especially the following items by Erich FROMM: Psychoanalysis and Religion, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950, p. 50 ff.
The first of these explains Marx's philosophy as it underlies Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, published in the same book. The second book of Fromm's outlines Fromm's debt to Marx. Both books of Fromm explain Marx's concept of alienation. As John Schaar points out, Fromm follows Marx's general outline of alienation closely. Yet as Schaar points out, too, Fromm's concept of alienation departs from Marx's clear, precise thought on the matter. In this thesis, it has been decided to omit a formal comparison of Fromm's thought on alienation with that of Marx's on alienation. First of all, such is not essential to Fromm's own ideas on alienation. Secondly, such a comparison would be large enough for a thesis topic on it itself. And thirdly, Fromm himself has few places in his writings where he himself directly compares his own with Marx's thought on alienation, or says that Marx's thought on alienation is his own.

Fromm's ideas on alienation have been analyzed by other authors, chief among them John Schaar in Escape from

17 Erich FROMM, Marx's Concept of Man, p. 87-260.
18 Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 43-70, and Marx's Concept of Man, p. 43-58.
19 John SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 192.
20 Ibid., p. 193.


This section of Chapter V now turns to Erich Fromm's definition of alienation. By analyzing his definition of alienation, by assaying its components, this section shall be in a better position to understand it, and to make a comparison with freedom from. Perhaps his chief definition of alienation is contained in The Sane Society, where Fromm has a paragraph that summarizes what he means by alienation and defines it. The paragraph shall be quoted in full.

By alienation is meant a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one might say, estranged from himself. He does not experience himself as the center of his world, as the creator of his own acts — but his acts and their consequences have become his masters, whom he obeys, or whom he may even worship. The alienated person is out of touch with himself as he is out of touch with any other person. He, like the others, are experienced as things are experienced; with the senses and the common sense, but at the same time without being related to oneself and to the world outside productively.26

From this explanation of Fromm of what he means by alienation, it is seen that the concept of alienation for Fromm is centered around what is happening to the person involved in alienation, around the experience of the alienated

26 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 120-121.
person. This alienated person lacks the experience of himself as the center of his own world, "...as the creator of his own acts." This means a lack of living productively, a lack of "freedom to," with which Fromm, as has been pointed out, identifies living productively, and which, in the next section of this chapter, shall be discussed more thoroughly.

Accompanying this sense of self-estrangement is estrangement from one's own acts and their consequences, i.e., the effects of the acts, e.g., the changes brought about by man's activity on the things of nature, by working on them or consuming them. Naturally a person experiences himself in his activity, and estrangement of one's activity from one's self involves the estrangement of oneself, too, providing one believes, as Fromm does implicitly, that a person's true way of acting should be a productive one and not an alienated one. There are two effects of one's acts, one on things and the other on persons. In The Sane Society Fromm sees alienation as affecting both one's work.

27 Ibid., p. 120.
28 Ibid., p. 121.
29 Cf. supra, Ch. II, C, 2, c, p. 118 and Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (g).
30 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 120, 124-125.
and one's relationship to one's fellow man and to society. So that Fromm sees alienation as affecting everything, the person, his acts, his relationships to other persons, and to the effect of his work; society also seems to be looked upon here as a creation of man, for Fromm refers to the "complicated social machine" man has built to administer man's technical machine.

Ch. V, A, 2, b - The Person, the Self and Alienation

In this analysis of what alienation means for Fromm, it is important to study more in detail what it is that happens to the person who is alienated. Alienation is a process, Fromm says, in which man "...does not experience himself as the active bearer of his own powers and richness." For Fromm, then, alienation is seen as a process, a becoming, a doing, an activity which is lacking an essential ingredient, the experience of self-activity, of creativity, of one's own acts. Alienation is thus seen as a deficiency of the person involved. There is activity, but activity lacking a sense of being one's own.

31 Ibid., p. 120-121, 124-125.
32 Ibid., p. 124-125.
33 Ibid., p. 124.
On the one hand this lack of a sense of being one's own in twentieth century man may be, in Fromm's outlook, an unconscious lack, leaving the alienated person consciously happy. Fromm conceives such people, however, as unhappy, unconsciously unhappy, so much so that some doubts may arise in their minds about their own happiness. Fromm thus conceives the alienated person is at times unaware of the alienation, and consciously happy and satisfied. In such people alienation is really there, but unconscious. On the other hand Fromm sees twentieth century man as being aware of alienation in himself, in relationship to the state, with accompanying isolation and aloneness, and therefore consciously unhappy. What Fromm is doing here then is to use alienation in two senses, one of explaining objectively "unfelt anxiety and discontent," and on the other hand, in the second sense, alienation is used as a description of subjective "felt human misery." This twofold sense of the term "alienation" would seem to come more from some sort of philosophic conviction on Fromm's

34 Ibid., p. 161 and Ch. V, passim. Cf. also John SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 204-205.


36 Ibid., p. 141 and Ch. V, passim.

37 John SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 204.
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part, than from empirical evidence. 38

Throughout the discussion of the alienation of
one's self from oneself, Fromm implies a concept of oneself. What does Fromm mean by the "self," from which a person is
alienated? Fromm refers, in the discussion of alienation
in The Sane Society, to a sense of self, of oneself "...as
a unique and induplicable entity." 39 Fromm means here then
that he considers man's self to be at least this, a unique
entity that cannot be any other reality than itself, and
that is necessarily different from all other reality. This
self is sensed, is known personally because it stems from
"...the experience of myself as the subject of my experi-
ences, my thought, my feeling, my decision, my judgement,
my action." 40 Here Fromm refers to the self as the subject of,
the owner of these inner and outer actions. If there
is added to this idea of "subject," of "owner" of actions
that are rational actions such as thinking, deciding, the
just mentioned attribute of uniqueness, the self is then
seen by Fromm as a unique, induplicable entity, of a
rational nature, that is the subject of, the owner of these
actions of a rational nature. Fromm adds that men who

38 Ibid., p. 204-205.
39 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 143.
40 Ibid.
become things, which have no self, themselves have no self. 41 It would seem that he should say that they have no sense of self, but Fromm does not say that. It would seem that Fromm identifies in this last passage the experience of selfhood with selfhood itself, as Fromm does in a later passage in The Sane Society, where it is stated that "...lack of inhibition of desires leads to ...the paralysis and eventually the destruction of the self." 42 Further evidence of the nature of Fromm's thought of the sense of self appears when he states that a true sense of self is not in the experience of holding on to oneself as a thing, a possession, but rather consists only in experiencing oneself in a creative response, as a true originator of one's own acts. 43 Here Fromm identifies the true self as a being experienced only in genuine self-activity, and not in the awareness of holding, of possessing oneself. Fromm adds that with the coming of this experience of genuine selfhood, of creative response, the boundaries of one's person are transcended, and at the moment when a person "...feels 'I am' he also feels 'I am you,' I am one with the whole world." 44

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 165.
44 Ibid.
Thus Fromm seems on the one hand to lay the groundwork for the presence of a true self, a substantial self which is alienated, and on the other hand, Fromm speaks of the self as a psychological awareness, a mental activity, a function that can grow and diminish. Both perhaps can be reconciled if a substantial self is looked upon as the basis, an implicit one, for the genuine, creative, self-activities of this self. Possibly this provides a correct answer to the seeming contradiction between a self that is ontologically real, a substance, and a self that is a psychological function. There does seem to be some obscurity here in Fromm's concept of the self, which is alienated. Patrick Mullaly denies that one can find "...an unambiguous and recognizable characterization" of the self in *The Sane Society*, and seems to be inclined to find in Fromm's thought what is called above in this paragraph, a functional, psychological self. It is one of these senses of the self, as an ontological reality, or as a psychological function, that Fromm uses in considering alienation as a "...loss of the sense of 'I,'" and as "...the sum and substance of human misery," as Paul Kecskemeti describes Fromm's concept of alienation in *Commentary*.

In his essay in *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis* Fromm sees a further explanation of precisely what the process of alienation is, and how it affects the self, and the self's realization of itself under the impact of alienation. Fromm conceives the self as passing through three stages in life, the first stage of immediacy of knowledge, of unrepressed, direct knowledge and experience of self and others as a child; this stage is followed necessarily by one of alienation, of the development of one's intellect; there is a return to the immediacy of the grasp of reality in the third stage, which is had only after the process of alienation has taken place; the third stage is that of "...the fully developed man who has become a child again, yet has outgrown being a child." In this conception of the process of alienation occurs an emphasis on the cognitive aspects of alienation for Fromm. Fromm in addition sees the overcoming of alienation as the overcoming of two aspects of alienation, both of them bearing on the cognitive aspects of experience, the two aspects of alienation being the subject-object split in cognition, and the separation between universal man represented in the

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49 Ibid., p. 128-129.
unconscious and social man represented by consciousness, i.e., between conscious and unconsciousness. 50 He adds that once consciousness has been trained to loosen the threefold filter of language, of logic and of content of experiences imposed by society, i.e., taboos, 51 the differences between consciousness and unconsciousness disappear, with resulting "...direct, unreflected, conscious experience, precisely the kind of experience which exists without intellection and reflection." 52

Fromm thus tries to describe more fully just what experience alienation is founded on, what aspects of experience give the sense of being alien from oneself. Fromm does so in terms of an analysis of knowledge or cognition. Alienation is seen as a stage of development of knowledge, through which a man ordinarily passes, and which Fromm actually states to be necessary if man is to become "...one again with himself, his fellow man, and with nature." 53 This alienation through growth in knowledge is seen as a necessary accompaniment of individual human existence,

50 Ibid., p. 132.
51 Ibid., p. 97-103.
52 Ibid., p. 132-133.
since the growth of intellect brings it on.\textsuperscript{54} Man is meant to work through this to the return to an intuitive, clear vision of all reality and oneself, which is not an intellectual act as such, but really a reaction of the total person, an affective experience.\textsuperscript{55} This is a special kind of experience, which Fromm links up with Spinoza's description of "intuition."\textsuperscript{56}

**Ch. V, A, 2, c - Alienation and the Non-Self**

Several topics have just been discussed, e.g., what alienation means, in itself, and then alienation as regards to the person alienated from himself, what the self means from which a person is alienated, and also what exactly happens in the person alienated from himself, as well as the remedy for this alienation, a return of the total person to himself through immediate intuition, an immediate, affective, way of knowing. This section now turns to the other side of alienation, the alienation of the self from the self's acts, from the consequences of one's acts, and from other persons.

\textsuperscript{54} Erich FROMM, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 110-111, 129-130.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 133.
Fromm, in his general explanation of alienation already referred to, has stated that alienation affects man's acts, their consequences and other persons. The acts, and consequences of these acts, as well as other persons, are experienced, not in their productive reality, but as things, dominating the alienated person as masters or idols. Man's own act, Fromm says, "...becomes to him an alien power, standing over and against him, instead of being ruled by him." Not only man's own act has become an alien power to man, but the consequences of these acts have dominated us, have now become more than ever in history "...an objective force above us, outgrowing our control, defeating our expectations, annihilating our calculations." For man today "his products, his machines, the state have become idols ...and these idols represent his own life forces in alienated form." And for the alienated person other people become things, too. Thus it is perceived that alienation affects all outside of the

57 Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society*, p. 120-121.
58 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society*, p. 120, 122.
alienated person. These other realities, whether other persons, or works, or society, or man's own acts, are things to the alienated person, unto which the alienated person "...has projected his living substance." Instead of man being the master, the creative originator of his acts, his work, the society he builds, other men — none of these are man's in the sense of man having a true productive relationship, a true personal becoming toward them. Rather, man is overcome by the thing-like world, that he, alienated man, a thing, has made into a lifeless monster opposed to him, before which he bows down.

Ch. V, A, 3. - Alienation and Capitalistic Society

In his "Afterword," written in 1961, to George Orwell's 1984, Erich Fromm quotes with approval the implication of George Orwell and two other authors of negative utopias, the Russian Zamyatin, who wrote We, and Aldous Huxley, who wrote Brave New World, that the present new form of managerial industrialism is a serious danger to man, inducing as it does complete alienation.

63 Ibid., p. 124.
65 Ibid., p. 259.
66 Ibid., p. 266-267.
Fromm sees this danger of complete alienation as "...a danger inherent in the modern mode of production;" men become things, "...appendices to the process of production and consumption." This theme of Fromm's is the other side of the coin in Fromm's analysis of alienation in The Sane Society, in which Fromm studies, pictures the character structure of the average alienated man as being conditioned by twentieth-century capitalism. Fromm is not only interested in what happens to the social character of man under the aspect of alienation, but particularly wants to know just what features of contemporary socio-economic structures and functions are conditioning this alienated social character of the average individual.

To adequately describe and analyze Fromm's negative criticism of modern capitalism and its effect on alienation is impossible in the short space of this section, for as John Schaar says, in Escape from Authority, concerning Fromm's usage of the concept of alienation, "...such an account would be as long as his critique of capitalist

67 Ibid., p. 267.
68 Ibid.
70 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 110-111.
It is only of interest here to point out enough features of his analysis of capitalist society's influence on modern man's alienation to show that such an influence exists. Fromm points out, for instance, that man's acquisition of money, his consumption and use of acquired things is alienated, since there is little concrete relatedness or concrete knowledge involved, and hence alienation. In business today, the worker, the manager, the bureaucrat, the stockholder, the owner, are all alienated, bowing down before the vast, impersonal forces of business, of capital that run their lives. Anonymous social forces, whose anonymity flows necessarily from the "...structure of the capitalist mode of production," govern men, who are helpless before these forces.

One wonders whether Erich Fromm really proves his case against twentieth-century capitalism as the genuine condition for and cause of alienation which, as Fromm says, is almost total in modern society. Alan Gewirth, in his

71 John SCHAAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 193.
72 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 131-135.
73 Ibid., p. 124-131.
74 Ibid., p. 138.
75 Ibid., p. 137-138.
76 Ibid., p. 124.
review of *The Sane Society* in *Ethics*, raises the question when it is said "...one might ask to what extent the phenomena of alienation are peculiar to and effects of modern capitalism." 77 Not only does Fromm paint his picture with a broad brush, caring little for a thorough empirical collection of and analysis of the available data, as John Schaar points out; 78 John Schaar states, in addition, that Fromm, in seeing capitalism as "the root of all evil," 79 pays a high price, since Fromm ignores other possible solutions to man's alienation than the dissolution of capitalism; 80 Schaar, for instance, comments that today's secular world, with its lack of faith and religion, might well be the cause of today's recourse to irrationalism, and that alienation is not necessarily its cause, as Fromm would aver. 81

Ch. V, A, 4. - Summary of Alienation, "Interior" and "Exterior"

It may thus be observed, in this brief analysis of Fromm's concept of alienation, that for Erich Fromm,

79 Ibid., p. 206.
80 Ibid., p. 206-208.
81 Ibid., p. 207-208, footnote.
alienation is essentially a process, a becoming, a mode of experiencing, whether conscious or unconscious, which is a deficient mode of experiencing. The chief part of reality that is alienated is the person's self, which has this alienated experience. The self referred to by Fromm may be some sort of substantial self, or merely a psychological function of the person. Possibly, both aspects are implied by his thought.

The experience of alienation itself is one of estrangement, of separateness, resulting in suffering brought on by isolation and aloneness. There is no sense of self-active, productive, creative experience, but rather a sense of acting as a thing, and of being related to one's own acts, other persons, one's work, and all else as a thing, and not as to something belonging to and sharing in the self-activity of the person who is alienated. For alienation, estrangement is chiefly experienced as being an alienation from one's own self, as experienced in one's own acts.

All other realities are experienced as estranged by the estranged person, one's own acts, one's work, other persons, and all aspects of one's social, economic and political milieu, in other words, one's total environment, to which a person is related in any way.
It has also been seen that Fromm considers alienation to be inevitable, a necessary, intermediary stage in individual human development, brought on by the development of intellect, with its subject-object split, and its concomitant conscious-unconscious functioning, with its use of deanimating logic and language. It also has been noted that alienation is to be reduced and eliminated by a process of true growth, of self-activity, of intuitive knowledge. It also has been observed that capitalistic society is held responsible by Fromm for its effect on the social character of men, by inducing, effecting alienation in man's activity, reducing it to a condition of alienation. Thus a twofold causality at work in the production of alienation in man is to be noticed. One is interior, brought on by the advent of intellect within men; the other is exterior, the cultural milieu that surrounds man. Just what proportions of each are at work in modern man Fromm does not say, nor does he really discuss both aspects at the same time. The interior aspect, within man himself, is discussed chiefly in his essay, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, written in 1960. The other, external aspect of alienation, the

influence of capitalistic society on alienation, is discussed chiefly in his work written five years earlier, The Sane Society. 83

One difficulty just mentioned in the analysis of the last paragraph is the ambiguity contained in the concept of the interior aspect of alienation. Here it is called "interior," a necessary development of each individual, brought on by the development of intellect. Further reflection shows that such a concept does not concern a purely interior alienation, for every aspect of it is socially conditioned, if not caused. The subject-object split is conditioned by there being an object, influencing the subject, thus setting up an external-internal dichotomy; in the conscious-unconscious area of experience, consciousness is said by Fromm to represent social man and along with unconsciousness said to be socially conditioned; 84 logic, language and taboos are all socially conditioned. 85 Therefore Fromm sees society as influencing every stage of what is called "interior" alienation. What is meant, then, by "interior" is not an absence of social


85 Ibid., p. 104.
conditioning but rather the presence of a stage of development, intrinsic to man, that is socially conditioned but yet seeming to be necessary in every kind of society.  

On the other hand, the concept of alienation developed in The Sane Society, the one called "exterior," would seem to be not only socially conditioned in Fromm's thought, but removable if the socio-economic structure of society were changed from that of capitalism to some more pertinent type of society, such as, in Fromm's thought, a type of humanistic communitarian socialism.  

There are a number of other issues implicit in this discussion. For instance, Fromm has an implicit ethics in his discussion, such as that man has a true goal, the fulfillment of himself by creative self-activity, and that this goal is preferable to its frustration by alienation. Fromm also conceives man as necessarily evolving from an infantile stage to adult self-activity through an intermediary process, alienation. Questions could be broached here, about the necessity of this evolution, the nature of the evolution. And the question could be raised as to whether or not human reality thus conceived is not thus necessarily conceived as having to pass through a stage of

86 Cf. Guyton HAMMOND, Man in Estrangement, p. 76.
87 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 270-352.
deficiency, alienation, to arrive at its perfection. Is this process, as Fromm conceives it, a process that is dialectic in some way, passing through a negation by a negation of the negation? It would seem as though Fromm has this in mind, since alienation is a negation of a childlike approach to reality, and productive self-active man is a negation of alienation. He does not develop alienation explicitly in the light of this dialectic development.

Ch. V, A, 5. - Alienation and "Freedom From"

Ch. V, A, 5, a - Introduction

This section of Chapter V now turns to a comparison of alienation with freedom from. This involves certain difficulties, because, as has just been seen, alienation itself involves two somewhat different realities, an "interior" type of alienation and an "exterior" type of reality, of alienation. Freedom from itself has its difficulties, as shall be seen, with obscurities about its meaning in its various applications.

Yet it is necessary to compare these two concepts, for, to some extent, they are used side by side and seem to have similar meaning. For instance, in Escape from Freedom, which is the major treatment of freedom from throughout its text, there are a number of texts, at least
seven, which refer to alienation, directly or indirectly. For instance, Fromm talks of estrangement, of man's bowing down before the "work of his own hands," which goes along at the same time with "...an increased strength of the individual self." Here Fromm is saying that along with this increased strength, "positive" strength, there is a loss taking place in man, an estrangement from the product of his work, which, he adds, is accompanied by feelings of insignificance and powerlessness. This description of alienation is couched in terms of a relationship to "freedom to," and seems to be an attitude towards the product of his work, to which man now submits, thus causing feelings of insignificance and powerlessness.

There thus is a real problem here, i.e., alienation closely parallels freedom from; there is a separation from nature, an implied recognition of this separation, and resulting insignificance and powerlessness. Why does this affective side of alienation take place? Because, it seems, man has lost control over what he has accomplished, his work-product, and this it stands opposite to him, over against him, out of his control, and hence more powerful.

88 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 117, 119, 120, 253, 270.
89 Ibid., p. 117-118.
90 Ibid., p. 118.
than he is. However, this is not really freedom from in its very essence, for freedom from is a separation essentially, as has been seen, but freedom from says nothing about insignificance coming from an estranged work-product. Hence, there is a similarity between freedom from here and alienation, but no identification, even though alienation is closely associated with "freedom to" here, i.e., with individual self-growth.

Actually in this text that has just been described, as in others in Escape from Freedom, e.g., the description of the alienated individual as the automaton, alienation seems to be a characteristic of the individual in society, brought out by and conditioned by interaction with the society. This is also one sense of alienation as explained above, as "exterior" to the alienated subject in the sense that such alienation is brought about by social influences, and may be described as a part of the "social character" of men in society, and as an "exterior" type of alienation.

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91 \text{Cf. supra, Ch. II, C, I, c, p. 91-96.}
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92 \text{Cf. Guyton B. HAMMOND's remark on this closeness in his book, Man in Estrangement, p. 127.}
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93 \text{Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 253.}
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94 \text{Cf. supra, Ch. V, A, 3, p. 351-352 and Ch. V, A, 4, p. 358.}
\]
If this "exterior" type of alienation is contrasted with freedom from, some important differences become evident. First of all it has been observed that freedom from is considered by Fromm to be inseparable from human existence as such. Wherever you have human existence therefore you also have freedom from, a separation from primary ties. But such is not true of the "exterior" type of alienation, which is socially conditioned to the extent that, with sufficient changes in society, this type of alienation would pass away. Freedom from, then, is essential to mankind; "exterior" alienation is not. Therefore they are not the same.

Ch. V, A, 5, b - Freedom From and "Interior" Alienation in the Human Individual as Individual

This conclusion leads logically to a further question: In Fromm's thought are freedom from and what we have called "interior" alienation identical? This question shall now be investigated. One aspect, perhaps the chief aspect of alienation in its "interior" conception is not the fact that it, too, is socially conditioned. Rather

96 Cf. supra, Ch. V, a, 4, p. 358.
97 Cf. ibid.
the chief aspect of this "interior" type of alienation is that it happens to man with the advent of intellect, 98 or what Guyton Hammond, in reference to Fromm's theory of alienation, calls the development of a "limited self-awareness." 99 Hence, since intellect or self-awareness is necessary to man in Fromm's thought, 100 it would seem that this "interior" type of alienation is necessary in man's life. Man's knowledge, in this theory of Fromm, would consist firstly in a direct immediacy of knowledge, then a passing into a stage of alienation, an alienation of oneself because of the subject-object split, and an alienation of oneself from others because of distortions brought on by the social filtering of consciousness, and finally, a return, on an adult level, to an immediacy of consciousness. 101 Alienation is the middle stage here, a stage which follows upon a stage of immediacy of knowledge, of union with nature and man, but is a negation of this immediacy, of this union. In turn alienation itself is negated through a higher, adult type of immediacy of:

98 Cf. supra, Ch. V, A, 2, b, p. 348-349.
99 Guyton B. HAMMOND, Man in Estrangement, p. 69.
101 Cf. supra, Ch. V, A, 2, b, p. 347-349.
conscious knowledge; this implies the possibility of alienation being in a dialectic process, as an antithesis, leading to a negation of a negation.\textsuperscript{102}

Is there anything comparable to this in Fromm's analysis of \textit{freedom from} in the individual as such? Here it may be stated that this "interior" alienation which is being compared to \textit{freedom from} concerns human individuals in both their ontogenetic and phylogenetic growth, as Guyton Hammond avers;\textsuperscript{103} hence \textit{freedom from} in the individual, as an individual, may be compared with this "interior" type of alienation. In summarizing the development of the individual human being in \textit{freedom from}, it was found out that \textit{freedom from} was one aspect, and a negative aspect, of a dialectical process of growing human freedom.\textsuperscript{104}

Fromm placed emphasis on the dialectic character of the \textit{freedom from}/\textit{freedom to} relationship, with this meaning, that "\textit{freedom from}" and "\textit{freedom to}" are contradictory, and proceed simultaneously from one cause.\textsuperscript{105} "\textit{Freedom from}" and the negative aspect of human individuation are with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} Cf. supra, Ch. V, A, 4, p. 357-358.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Guyton B. HAMMOND, \textit{Man in Estrangement}, p. 76. Hammond says on this page that this analysis is applied to both the human individual and the human species.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Cf. supra, Ch. II, D, p. 153-154.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 154.
\end{itemize}
real probability either one and the same, although conceptually different, or, as another alternative, "freedom from" and this negative aspect of individuation are to one another as result to cause. Thus "freedom from" is primarily a growth away from primary ties, as part of a dialectic process.

Is alienation in its "interior" sense, then, identical with "freedom from" as it appears in the growing individual? There are similarities, to be sure. "Freedom from" is part of a dialectic process, a negating part, while, as just mentioned, alienation also may be part of a dialectic process. "Freedom from" is preceded by the child's union with nature and is followed by a reunion with nature on the level of "freedom to." "Interior" alienation is preceded by a lack of self-awareness in the child, and followed by a reunion through knowledge and affection with objects external to man in a higher way. Moreover, "freedom from" and alienation in the "interior" sense of the word are both separations, realized separations, from nature and from others, and both "freedom from" and "interior" alienation are seen to be necessary to individual man's development.

106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
This similarity of description and function would lead one to conclude to the probable identity of "freedom from" and "interior" alienation. However, one difficulty at least stands in the way. "Interior" alienation is described by Fromm chiefly in terms of an alienation of awareness, in which the knowing subject is split from his object, in which the unconscious, representing universal man, is separated from the conscious, representing social man, and in which man knows reality through the threefold social filter of language, logic and taboos.108 "Freedom from" has not been described by Fromm in these terms. Actually, what Fromm seems to be doing in his "interior" concept of alienation is to explain more fully the cognitive and affective aspects of man's realized separateness from nature and his fellow man. It seems to be true that this explanation of what happens in the cognitive and affective aspects of man's life is reconcilable with Fromm's concept of "freedom from," and could be a more complete explicitation of how "freedom from" operates in awareness.

Another difficulty in making "interior" alienation and "freedom from" identical is the different emphasis put on various elements of their descriptions. For instance,

108 Cf. supra, Ch. V, A, 2, b, p. 347-349.
"interior" alienation puts its emphasis on the cognitive and affective aspects of the recognized separateness that is alienation, whereas "freedom from" puts its emphasis on the separateness, although admitting the presence of cognitive and affective elements. 109 "Freedom from" emphasizes more the actual, ontological separation, while "interior" alienation emphasizes the realisation of this ontological separation. Despite these differences it does seem quite probable, based on this rapid analysis of the evidence, that "freedom from" and "interior" alienation are one and the same.

Ch. V, A, 5, c - Freedom From and "Interior" Alienation in the Human Race

Discussion has thus centered around "interior" alienation and "freedom from" in the growing individual and it has been found that in many ways they are very similar, and that there are no contradictions between them. Is the same true of "interior" alienation and freedom from in the human race? Fromm does not give any general history of alienation, yet in several key works does give indications that "interior" alienation and freedom from in the human race are quite similar, if not identical.

109 Cf. supra, Ch. II, D, p. 154, 159.
Guyton Hammond asserts that in Fromm's essay on "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," Fromm does lump together man as an individual and man as a member of the human race, in discussing key aspects of "interior" alienation, such as awareness of the subject-object split, of oneself as separate. So that what essentially has been said about "interior" alienation in the individual's growth fits the human race, too. Hammond's evidence for this assertion is taken from this essay of Fromm's written in 1960.

In addition Fromm insists in a recent book, You Shall Be as Gods, that alienation begins in the human race in the very beginning, along with history; along with the cutting of primary ties and the beginning of individuation, once the knowledge of good and evil is acquired, alienation begins too. This is a positive step forward for now, it is not his "fall" but the beginning of man's awakening and of his rise. Fromm further asserts that this alienation is necessary to human historical existence, for it is the necessary step toward his goal of a new

110 Guyton HAMMOND, Man in Estrangement, p. 75-76.
112 Erich FROMM, You Shall Be as Gods, p. 70.
113 Ibid.
harmony with man and nature, the "inherent, logical answer" to man's existence.\textsuperscript{115} Man has to experience himself as a stranger to himself and to nature, he has to experience the subject-object split, i.e., the division between himself as subject and the world as object, "...in order to be able to become one again with himself, with his fellow man, and with nature, on a higher level."\textsuperscript{116} This entire process of alienation in human history is conceived by Fromm to be a necessary condition for the achievement of this later new harmony; alienation is thus necessary to human historical existence.\textsuperscript{117}

These recent texts of Fromm's on alienation show that for him alienation is essential to man's development towards being fully human. It is apparent that Fromm here is talking about a type of conscious functioning that involves man's interior, mental life, a quality of conscious relationship to oneself and to all else that is inescapable, is part actually of being no longer one with nature.\textsuperscript{118} Only by going forward can this existential dichotomy be solved, by gradually overcoming this state of alienation

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 88-89.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 88.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 87-88.
that brings with it conflict and suffering; the true solution to this existential alienation is neither escape from it nor self-destruction, but rather a new, human harmony of men with nature and with men.\[119\] Thus in the human race there is alienation, and from the beginning, an alienation that is interior to all men, and a necessary attribute of human existence in process of development, not of men who have completed this process.

If this "interior" alienation, in its origin and general structure for the human race, is compared with freedom from's origin and general structure for the human race, it will be seen that they are quite the same.\[120\] The setting is the same in the origin, the Garden of Eden; the same events occur — the first act of rebellion, separation, realized separation with its affective results, irreversibility of process, and a necessary condition for full human growth, as well as a connection with breaking of primary ties. The emphasis in alienation is on the nature of this new awareness, with a fuller development of it in terms of the content and qualities of this alienated human awareness.

\[119\] Ibid., p. 87-89.

\[120\] Cf. supra, Ch. III, A, 1-6 and Ch. III, B, 3, p. 209-250.
Fromm does not develop "interior" alienation in the human race in enough detail to be able to conclude to a certain conclusion that "interior" alienation and freedom from in the human race are one and the same. There is a close parallel, though, suggesting that Fromm is talking about the same reality under two somewhat different aspects, with the probability that "interior" alienation in the human race is a fuller development of one essential aspect of freedom from, man's self-awareness.

Chapter V, B. - THE MEANING OF FREEDOM TO

Introduction

During the discussion of freedom from in the earlier chapters of this thesis reference was made to the discussion of freedom to that would take place in this particular chapter. In addition, in several places in these preceding chapters to some extent the meaning of freedom to in Fromm's thought was sought, in order to more fully understand his particular meaning in those places of what freedom from actually meant. During this section

121 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (g), p. 221 and (h), p. 236.

of Chapter V there will be a fuller discussion of just what freedom to means. As Fromm has said, "the understanding of the whole problem of freedom depends on the very ability to see both sides of the process and not to lose track of one side while following the other." 123

In the inquiry into the meaning of freedom to the matter will be divided into three parts. In the first part the thesis will treat of the general structure of freedom to, as seen in passages I, II and III in the last several chapters, where freedom to has already been discussed to some extent. 124 In the second part other attributes of freedom to will be developed such as its relationship to productivity and spontaneity, and to capitalistic society. In the third part of this section B of this chapter freedom to will be compared with freedom from, in order to establish more fully just what freedom from means.

123 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 104.

124 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, Passage I, p. 28-30, "The more the...of the self."; Passage II, p. 30-31, "The problem of...mechanisms of escape." and Passage III, p. 35-37, "We see that...of his freedom."
Ch. V, B, 1. - "Freedom To" in Its General Structure

As just stated, the discussion of freedom to will be restricted as with freedom from, to the main passages of Fromm on the general structure of human individuation and human freedom, Passages I, II and III in Escape from Freedom. Passages I and II center around the growth and development of freedom and individuation in the individual, while Passage III centers around the growth of individuation and freedom in the human race. The first analysis will group the discussion of Passages I and II, as was done in Chapter II of this thesis, and then an analysis of Passage III will be done.

Ch. V, B, 1, a - Passages I and II

In Passage II freedom to is described in terms of a dialectic process; freedom to is described as coming from "growing individuation and growing freedom," as one aspect of such a process. The child who is developing is said to become "...more free to develop and express its individual self unhampered by those ties which were limiting it" as contrasted with becoming more free from a

125 Ibid.
126 Cf. supra, Ch. II, B and C, 1.
Thus freedom to is described as part of a dialectic process; from the previous investigation of the meaning of such a dialectic process, it was found out that "'dialectic' in Fromm's thought refers to a process, made up of two contradictory elements or aspects. The elements of this process are simultaneous, and refer to one cause. If this explanation of "dialectic" is applied to freedom to in Passage II, it fits rather well this pairing of freedom to with freedom from. Freedom to is paired with freedom from as belonging to the same dialectic process. Simultaneity of the two aspects is implied, but not stated explicitly. And both freedom from and freedom to are contrasted as a separation from a reassuring world (freedom from), and a capacity for self-development and self-expression (freedom to). Are these two really contradictory, in the sense of one aspect of the process canceling the other out? Fromm seems to look at them this way, but there is serious doubt that the word "contradictory" can really be applied to freedom to and freedom from in Passage II; perhaps the word "contrary" would be better, which may be defined as "that is opposite in position, nature, direction, etc." Freedom to and freedom from

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128 Ibid., p. 31.
129 Cf. supra, Ch. II, B, 6, p. 83-84.
are opposite in nature, but not necessarily contradictory; certainly Fromm does not prove them so.

In this dialectic relationship between freedom to and freedom from there ought to be a cause of both operating. Fromm gives a cause, growing individuation and growing freedom, from which this dialectic process results. What Fromm seems to be saying here is nothing but this, that from the process of growing freedom and individuation comes growing freedom and individuation. He refers to the child as the subject of this process, but does not explain just what it might be in the child's nature that gives rise to this dialectic process. Some clue might be afforded by the fact that, as has already been pointed out, Fromm sees human nature as consisting in a contradiction, seeking a solution. This would possibly mean that the dialectic process of freedom to and freedom from flow from the very nature of man, as one "contradiction" flowing from another.

In Chapter II of this thesis there was a discussion of the possible relationship between "freedom" and "individuation," and summary of the results there. It was

132 Cf. supra, Ch. II, B, 6, p. 83-84.
133 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, p. 120.
134 Cf. supra, Ch. II, C, 1, c, p. 93-96.
concluded that quite probably "freedom" and "individuation" are one and the same process although conceptually different with "freedom from" and the negative aspect of individuation quite probably one and the same process, or aspect of the same process. If this is true, then it is also true that "freedom to" and the positive aspect of individuation are probably one and the same aspect of the same process called "freedom" or "individuation." If this is true then "freedom to" would be equivalent to "growing strength and integration" of the individual personality, the growth of the self.\footnote{135} Or, to refer back to Passage I, which also refers to the growth of the individual human being, "freedom to" would be a "growth in self-strength,"\footnote{136} or the growth in the strength of the organized and integrated whole of the personality, as guided by the individual's will and reason.\footnote{137} These conclusions are true of "freedom to," if it is the same as the positive aspect of individuation as seems probably to be the case.

\footnote{135} Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 31. \\
\footnote{136} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 29. (Emphasis removed.) \\
\footnote{137} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 29.
Ch. V, B, 1, b - Passage III

A further study will now be made of Passage III, from *Escape from Freedom*, concerning the dialectic process of freedom in the human race; this was already taken in Chapter III. The chief interest here is in the meaning of "freedom to" in this passage, of the positive aspect of freedom as developed in this passage. This analysis will follow closely many of the details of the analysis of "freedom to" in this passage as developed in Chapter III.

In analyzing this passage it was seen that the passage is concerned with a "process of growing human freedom" with the "same dialectic character" as was developed in the process of individual growth. This process has two elements, a positive one, of growing strength, etc. and a negative, of growing isolation, etc. These two elements or aspects are implicitly said to occur simultaneously, but are not said to proceed from one cause. It might be conjectured that since Fromm in discussing the

138 Erich FROMM, *Escape from Freedom*, p. 35-37. "We see that...of his freedom."
139 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, p. 209-241.
140 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (g).
141 Erich FROMM, *Escape from Freedom*, p. 35.
individuals in that race as affected by their "social character," Fromm is actually discussing each such individual in the human race as the cause, the subject of such growing freedom.

The aspect of this dialectic process of freedom that may be called a "positive" one is a "...process of growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, growing power of human reason, and growing solidarity with other human beings." In this passage this aspect of growing freedom is said to consist of a number of items that seem to have little connection with freedom. Perhaps the preceding context will shed light on this sentence. As already seen, the description of freedom in Passage III is a resume of the preceding pages of this book, Escape from Freedom, which are a description of the process of growing individuation and freedom in the human race. In the first two words of Passage III, "we see," is contained a reference to something just seen, i.e. the same preceding five pages, and its division of freedom into a "freedom


143 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35-36.

THE ESSENCE OF FREEDOM FROM 379
to," called "positive" freedom, and a "freedom from." 145
This "freedom to" is a freedom to govern oneself, to re­
alize one's own individuality. As man is free from primary
ties, then he can develop as a "...free, self-determining,
productive individual." Hence it may be concluded from
these passages from the preceding five pages that "freedom
to" is a "positive" freedom, that it is linked with self­
determination and productivity in some fashion, that it is
called by Fromm "growing strength and integration, etc."

There are two more questions that should be raised
from Passage III about the meaning of "freedom to." The
first question asks about the relationship between "freedom
to," and the "...one possible, productive solution for the
relationship of individualized man with the world," men­
tioned in Escape from Freedom, as one of the two possible
reactions to the insecurity brought about by freedom
from. 146 There has already been a discussion of this one
possible, productive solution, i.e. man's "...active
solidarity with all men and his spontaneous activity, love
and work which unite him again with the world, not by pri­
mary ties but as a free and independent individual;" 147

145 Ibid., p. 35. The rest of the quotations in
this paragraph are also taken from this page.
146 Ibid., p. 36.
147 Ibid. Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (j),
p. 231.
in Chapter III of this thesis it was asserted that this one, possible productive solution is possibly equal to "positive" freedom, to "freedom to" as described in the first paragraph of this passage.\textsuperscript{148} There it was observed that, because of the differences in the description of "freedom to" in the first paragraph of Passage III, and the description of the "one possible, productive solution," discussed in the second paragraph of Passage III, that there was not an evident identity between these two concepts, "freedom to," and "the one possible, productive solution" to growing freedom from. The identity of the two probably cannot be proven from the text in Passage III, although it is very likely from this same passage. More evidence is needed on this particular subject.

The second question concerning "freedom to" in Passage III asks about one other possible comparison which should be mentioned here. It consists in the comparison of "freedom to" in the human race as has just been studied, and the positive aspect of individuation in the individual human being as seen in Passages I and II. In Passage I the positive aspect of growing individuation is described as a growing stronger, in intensity and activity,

physically, emotionally and mentally; these spheres achieve an increasing integration, with the individual's will and reason guiding a developing organized structure; the "growth of self-strength" summarizes this positive aspect of human individual individuation. In Passage III "freedom to" is described as a process of "growing strength and integration" also. The rest of the description of "freedom to" in Passage III, "mastery of nature, etc." may be looked upon as effects of this growing interior strength and integration upon nature and one's fellow men. Thus it may be said that "freedom to" in the development of the human race is described in the same terms as the positive aspect of growing individuation in the human individual.

The evidence from these texts is not conclusive, but gives enough evidence to say that the ideas are analogous, containing many similarities.

Ch. V, B, 2. - The Meaning of "Freedom to"

Ch. V, B, 2, a - Introduction

Other discussions by Erich Fromm of the meaning of "freedom to," of "positive" freedom, besides the fundamental ones from Passages I, II and III, will now be

149 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 28-29.
150 Ibid., p. 35.
integrated. In this section there will be a study of the other chief passages in Erich Fromm's discussion of "freedom to," in order to find out their meaning. In this section these additional passages will be studied to compare them with the meaning of "freedom to" as already known from our study of Passages I, II and III, and to draw conclusions about the nature, the meaning of "freedom to." To study fully "freedom to" in all of its ramifications is unnecessary in the context of this thesis. The highlights above of Fromm's thought on the matter will be selected. Throughout this discussion, the discussion will center chiefly about what Fromm calls "positive" freedom. "Positive" freedom is really "freedom to," but this point has been discussed already to some extent in Chapter III of this thesis. At the end of this discussion of "positive" freedom this identity of "positive" freedom and "freedom to" will be investigated more explicitly; it is preferable to first find out what "positive" freedom is, and then make the comparison.

151 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (g) and (j), p. 231.
In the introduction of his major work on freedom, *Escape from Freedom*, Erich Fromm states that "...modern man... has not gained freedom in the positive sense of the realization of his individual self; that is, the expression of his intellectual, emotional and sensuous potentialities." Here Fromm is discussing one of the major themes of his book, the meaning of freedom in the positive sense of the word. This exposition of Fromm's talks about an individual self, which is to be realized, operating within "the dynamics of the social process," i.e., as a member of a social group, within modern times. To be fully realized, the human being must be an individual and unique, Fromm adds, and Fromm states in addition that such positive freedom has not been a part of modern man, although modern man has been freed "from the bonds of pre-individualistic society." From the study of this text, set in its context, it becomes clear that Fromm is describing what he here calls "positive" freedom as a quality lacking in modern man who has been freed from various bonds. Such a quality

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152 Erich FROMM, *Escape from Freedom*, p. viii. The rest of the quotations in this paragraph are also taken from this same page.
would adorn an individual human being who expressed his intellectual, emotional and sensuous capacities. It is noteworthy here, as elsewhere for the most part, that Fromm spends little or no part of his analysis on physical or physiological constituents of the individual self.\footnote{On page 105 of his essay, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, Fromm speaks of man's "immanent, evolutionary goals" as being present in his "chromosomes," just as his "physical" characteristics are present therein. There is no real explanation of this in his work.} What he is interested in is the psychological self, the self that knows itself and develops.

In a later part of the same book, Chapter VII of \textit{Escape from Freedom}, Fromm discusses two definitions of positive freedom, of "freedom to."\footnote{Ibid., p. 256-276.} The first definition is this \footnote{Ibid., p. 258. (Emphasis is in text.)} \textit{...that positive freedom consists in the spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality.}\footnote{Ibid.} This definition, the last sentence of a paragraph, of what positive freedom is, is prefaced by the phrase "In other words," which phrase refers to this definition immediately following as an explanation of what preceded this phrase. The rest of the paragraph preceding this phrase...
is an explanation of just what is meant by true self-realization for man. The positive freedom that man can attain, Fromm explains, is attained by "...realization of his self, by being himself." Man can fulfill the process of growing freedom by "...the realization of man's total personality, by the active expression of his emotional and intellectual potentialities;" everybody has these potentialities, yet their expression gives them reality, Fromm adds.

Fromm says, a little later in the same Chapter VII of Escape from Freedom, that positive freedom "...is identical with the full realization of the individual's potentialities together with his ability to live actively and spontaneously." This is the second definition of "positive freedom" in this Chapter VII.

What then does Fromm mean by "positive" freedom? It is part of a process of growing freedom, a part that counterbalances freedom from. This process, as far as "positive" freedom is concerned, is a process of increased realization of self. This increased realization of self

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157 Ibid., p. 257-258. "We believe that...they are expressed." The rest of the quotations in this paragraph of the thesis are from the same paragraph of the text.

158 Ibid., p. 270.

159 Ibid., p. 257.
is looked upon as a realization of man's total personality, of his potentialities, both emotional and intellectual, and this realization must be an integrated one. This self about which Fromm talks here is the total personality, made up of two parts, reason and emotion, both of them potentialities to be actuated in the achievement of freedom. The "sensuous" potentialities to which Fromm refers in the introduction to Escape from Freedom\textsuperscript{160} are not mentioned in these texts, but are mentioned in stating the areas of activity for self-activity, soon to be discussed, where Fromm talks of "...emotional, intellectual and sensuous experiences," as well as about the "will" of a person, all four of which are areas for one's self-activity.\textsuperscript{161} These four types of experience are said to be within the orbit of the self and its activity. Just what integration is for Fromm, or precisely which of these areas of man's personality is to predominate, he does not enter into as a problem to be definitively solved. However, the main point of this integration, the spontaneity that must activate it, Fromm does discuss, and it is this spontaneity which must be discussed now.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p. viii.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p. 258.
Ch. V, B, 2, b, (2) Spontaneity

Spontaneity is mentioned in Fromm's description of positive freedom in the texts just mentioned, i.e., the activity of the total, integrated personality must be "spontaneous,"162 and the full realization of one's potentialities must be accompanied by a living actively and "spontaneously."163 Just what is meant by "spontaneity" in Fromm's thought? This problem is approached with certain reservations, for Fromm himself says, in Escape from Freedom, that an adequate discussion of the problem of spontaneity would require another volume.164 And as John Schaar points out, in Escape from Authority, Fromm himself finds it hard to describe.165

Fromm's own analysis of spontaneity in Escape from Freedom tries to get at the essential meaning of spontaneity in several ways, by contrast, by a direct analysis of the meaning of the word, by examples of human beings who are spontaneous, by an analysis of the two fundamental

162 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 258.
163 Ibid., p. 270.
165 John H. SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 304.
types of spontaneous activity, and by showing the relationship of spontaneity to man's goal in life. A brief summary of these essential points will suffice here. The next paragraph of this subsection will summarize Fromm's conception of spontaneity, from several pages of Escape from Freedom. 166

For Fromm spontaneous activity is not compulsive or automaton activity; it would also seem that neither internal nor external constraint on man gives "spontaneous" activity. Rather is "spontaneous" activity for Fromm able to operate in man's will life, and in his sensuous, emotional and intellectual experience; the quality that makes it "spontaneous" is its creativity, an ambiguous quality, but exemplified by those whose thinking, acting, feeling are genuine expressions of themselves, such as artists and small children, along with certain philosophers and scientists.

In a later writing, Erich Fromm enlarges on this idea of creativity that seems to be at the heart of spontaneity; 167 in this article, "The Creative Attitude," there

166 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 258-260. The next paragraph of this subsection is a summary of these pages.

are two key qualities that make an action "creative," the actual seeing (or being aware) and responding to reality.\textsuperscript{168} By the quality of "seeing" Fromm means a non-conceptualized awareness of the full uniqueness of the object or other person, without significant projection or distortion; by the quality of responding Fromm means a total response of the entire person that is fitted to the reality of the other object, or person to the reality as it really is.\textsuperscript{169} In other words, Fromm looks for a certain maturity, a certain waking up fully to, or full awareness of inner and external reality.\textsuperscript{170} This idea of "creative" or "spontaneous" response is hence more fully developed than the one mentioned in the previous paragraph.

This identification of "creative" and "spontaneous" receives a further confirmation from Fromm's reference in this article on creativity to certain distorting, personal qualities of greed, anger and folly mentioned in Buddhist ethics.\textsuperscript{171} Just at the time of the publishing of this article in 1959, Fromm was also publishing an article, "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in \textit{Psychologia},\textsuperscript{172} very

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 44.
\item \textsuperscript{169} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 44-48.
\item \textsuperscript{170} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 47.
\item \textsuperscript{171} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
similar to his section of the same name in a book published a year later under the title, *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis.* 173

Turning to the thought of Fromm's section of *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, one finds Fromm using freely and approvingly D.T. Suzuki's article in the same book, entitled "Lectures on Zen Buddhism," 174 to explain creativity and spontaneity. 175 Being aware of reality in a creative way means entering right into the object and seeing it from the inside; it is a "...creative or conative way of seeing reality." There is no reflection here; no intellection by conceptual knowledge; rather is there a type of intuition, a "life of freedom and spontaneity." Hence what Fromm has done is to describe what he calls "spontaneity," or creative response, in terms of an immediate, conative, unalienated grasp of reality. To be spontaneous, then, involves overcoming alienation and its effects, such as the subject-object split, described in the first section of this chapter. 176


175 Erich FROMM, op. cit., p. 132-133. The quotations in the rest of this paragraph are from p. 133.

Ch. V, B, 2, b, (3) "Freedom To" and Spontaneity

Fromm, then, is firmly convinced of the necessity of spontaneity for true positive freedom. Why must this be so? What is the connection between positive freedom, or "freedom to," and spontaneity? The answer to this will now be summarized in two paragraphs, synthesized from Chapter VII of Escape from Freedom. 177

Fromm sees aloneness and separation brought on by negative freedom. The only possible solution to this that maintains one's integrity is to achieve a new personal union with one's fellows and with the world by two types of action, a genuine love and creative work. It is this quality of spontaneity or creativity that makes love genuine and work creative, for in this quality doubt disappears, a sense of completeness, of integrity and satisfaction is achieved. In other words the fullness of positive freedom, of "freedom to" means, not a passive state of perfection, but an awareness of oneself as actively, spontaneously loving and working. It is in this very act of living, i.e., working and loving, that one's meaning is fulfilled.

It is then that Fromm sees man's goal as the fullness of spontaneity, of the active living of man's ways of relating to others, to nature, and, of course, to oneself. Not many have achieved this goal, due to the imperfect social structure of economic, social and political institutions. Fromm does not ever explain just how these few did achieve a fullness of "freedom to," in the face of never perfect, and developing social institutions, leaving a gap in his theory. There is no room, furthermore, in Fromm's theory, for any other goal for men besides their own spontaneous living of their potentialities, thus excluding any subordination to any binding norm of good superior to man's own good, the achievement of "freedom to." Thus it is that "spontaneity" is the key quality of man's activity that makes it achieve a positive freedom; it might be called, in an analogous sense, the formal perfection whose increasing perfection makes more perfect man's varied psychic activity.

Implicit in this position is a type of naturalism, holding as it does fundamentally that "...the natural world is the whole of reality." And implicit, too, is a universal norm for man's good that is founded on a universal

possession of all men, the need for a full "freedom to" to achieve man's meaning. Fromm's teaching can thus be classified, too, as "normative humanism," whose main tenet, John Schaar says, is that man's norms, though man-made, are objective and universal. 179

John Schaar in Escape from Authority raises a serious question about the validity of spontaneous living as the real goal of man, 180 and his question is worth mentioning here. His point is that spontaneity as a goal of man's actions, as a true and valid goal, may describe how an act should be done, but provides no guides for evaluating the ends of the act itself. 181 The connection of spontaneity in Fromm's thought, with his notion of productive orientation, 182 and with man's basic needs 183 should provide some answer to this problem Schaar raises. Schaar considers the problem of universal valid norms of good and evil incapable of solution within a naturalistic framework. 184


181 Ibid., p. 306.

182 Cf. Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 82-107.


Ch. V, B, 2, c - Identity of "Freedom To" and "Positive" Freedom

This investigation turns now to the question already broached in the earlier pages of this same part of B section of Chapter V, as to the identity of "positive" freedom and "freedom to" in Fromm's thought. The direct and indirect evidence bearing on this question will be examined, by direct evidence meaning Fromm's own identification of these two, and by indirect evidence meaning a comparison of the respective meanings of "positive" freedom and "freedom to."

Ch. V, B, 2, c, (1) Direct Evidence

In direct evidence of the identity of "positive" freedom and "freedom to" are Fromm's own words to this effect. Fromm says, for instance, that "freedom from" is not identical with positive freedom, with "freedom to." In this text Fromm is using positive freedom and "freedom to" as equivalent. He has just been discussing freedom from and freedom to in the preceding sentence, the last sentence of the preceding paragraph, and this sentence

185 Cf. supra, Ch. V, B, 1, b, p. 378-379.
186 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35.
187 Ibid., p. 34-35.
just quoted is a first sentence of a new paragraph, connecting the thought of the previous paragraph with the new paragraph just starting, whose thought develops the concept of freedom from. 188

Another text in which Fromm uses equivalently "positive" freedom, and "freedom to" is taken from the same book, Escape from Freedom, "But while in ... into complete indifference." 189 Fromm here speaks of the lag between "freedom from" and "freedom to" as growing with modern times, and then goes on to talk immediately about "the result of this disproportion between freedom from any tie and the lack of possibilities for the positive realization of freedom and individuality." 190 Here Fromm is using two comparisons, firstly, a "lag" between "freedom from" and "freedom to," and, secondly, "this disproportion" between "freedom from any tie" and "the lack of possibilities for the positive realization of freedom and individuality." 191 Fromm here is restating in the second comparison in a slightly fuller sense what he says in the first comparison. He is saying, in effect, that there has been a lag, a

188 Ibid., p. 35. "'Freedom from' is...the natural world."
189 Ibid., p. 37.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
disproportion between "freedom from" and "freedom to," with "freedom to" falling behind "freedom from," and by "freedom to" here as lagging behind he means a lack of possibility for "the positive realization of freedom and individuality." Here From, therefore, makes equivalent "freedom to" and "positive realization of freedom and individuality," another way of saying "positive" freedom. What has been seen here in the analysis of these two texts is an identification of "positive" freedom with "freedom to."

Ch. V, B, 2, c, (2) Indirect Evidence

The indirect evidence of the identity or lack of it of "freedom to" and "positive" freedom in the human race will now be considered. This has already been examined to some extent in Chapter III, and will now be entered into more fully. In these pages from Chapter III certain conclusions were reached from studying Passage III in Escape from Freedom and from collating briefly these texts from or associated with Passage III with two texts on positive freedom from Escape from Freedom, i.e., that

192 Cf. definitions of "positive" freedom contained in earlier pages of this section, p. 383-386.

193 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (g) and (k).

194 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35-37.
"...positive freedom consists in the spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality;" and from the same book, that positive freedom "...is identical with the full realization of the individual's potentialities together with his ability to live actively and spontaneously." 195

The conclusion was reached that "freedom to" and "positive" freedom were one and the same, based on direct evidence, 196 and that the conclusion that the first definition of positive freedom as just given, contained elements of the explanation of "freedom to" and productivity as given in Passage III and its context. 197

Passage III and its context, with its description of "freedom to," will now be analyzed again. 198 "Freedom to" here is described as one aspect of a process of growing human freedom; "a process of growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, growing power of human nature, and growing solidarity with other human beings." 199 It is also probably described, in terms of the only possible productive solution to human breaking of primary ties, as

195 Ibid., p. 258, 270.
196 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (g).
197 Cf. supra, Ch. III, B, 3, b, (2), (k), p. 235-236.
198 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 35-37.
199 Ibid., p. 35-36.
man's "...active solidarity with all men, and his spontaneous activity, love and work, which unite him again with the world, not by primary ties but as a free and independent being." Thus "freedom to" is looked upon as simultaneous with freedom from, and a response to freedom from.

If these descriptions of "freedom to" are compared with the descriptions of "positive" freedom given in the preceding paragraph of this thesis it will be seen that they are fundamentally the same, with the emphasis on positive freedom in the first definition from Escape from Freedom, on spontaneous activity, on a process, one might say, while the emphasis in the second definition from Escape from Freedom is rather on the fullness of this process, on its perfection.

There are many other texts which would show this identity in Fromm's thought between "positive" freedom and "freedom to." For instance, Fromm, in Man for Himself, published in 1947, talks about the child fighting against parental authority, and says about this child that "...he fights for his freedom not only from pressure, but also for

200 Ibid., p. 36.
201 Ibid., p. 258, 270.
his freedom to be himself, a full fledged human being, not an automaton." Here Fromm talks of a freedom contrasted to a freedom from, a freedom to become and to be a full-fledged, i.e., a fully realized human being, and in one of his most recent books, The Heart of Man, published in 1964, Fromm talks about freedom as a condition for biophilia, love of life. Fromm says that "freedom from" is not enough, but that there has to be a "freedom 'to', ... a freedom to create and to construct, to wonder and to venture," with a required individual activity and responsibility. Thus it may be concluded that "freedom to" is described in the same terms as "positive" freedom, a self-activity, i.e., spontaneous activity, a creative activity, a becoming and a being, a fully realized individual. If a comparison is made of "freedom to" as Fromm understands it, with "positive" freedom there are no significant differences between them.

Ch. V, B, 2, d - Productivity

Before resuming and summing up these findings on "freedom to" a possible difficulty about Fromm's use of

203 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 157.
204 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, p. 52.
205 Ibid.
the word "productive" in Passage III should be considered. Fromm uses the word twice, once where he says that man's primary ties "...block his development as a free, self-determining, productive individual" and again where he refers to the "...only one possible, productive solution for the relationship of individualized men with the world," i.e. "freedom to." The word "productive is not explained in either quotation, nor is it explained in the context of these passages. Fromm, in *Man for Himself*, his next major work after *Escape from Freedom*, goes into the concept of productivity, and notes that productivity as used in *Man for Himself* is an enlargement of the concept of spontaneity as developed in *Escape from Freedom*. For Fromm, in *Man for Himself*, "productiveness" is described as man's "...ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities in him." These powers are to be experienced as his own, as one with himself. Hence what Fromm might mean by "productive" in the passages

207 Ibid., p. 35-36.
208 Erich FROMM, *Man for Himself*, p. 82-107.
211 Erich FROMM, *Man for Himself*, p. 84.
212 Ibid.
in this paragraph of the thesis is self-initiated, self-active; in other words "productive" well might mean "spontaneous" as described in the earlier pages of this section of Chapter V, \(^{213}\) i.e., self-initiated, self-active, self-determining. Hence the word "productive" in the phrase "free, self-determining, productive individual" might simply be a paraphrase of "self-determining" or "spontaneous" for one meaning of spontaneous is "self-determining."

Ch. V, B, 2, e - "Freedom to" - Quality

Before summarizing the meanings found for "freedom to" it may be worthwhile to bring out a certain assertion of Erich Fromm that "freedom to" is a quality. On page 106 of Escape from Freedom, Fromm says that

the problem of freedom is not only a quantitative one; that we not only have to preserve and increase the traditional freedom, but that we have to gain a new kind of freedom, one which enables us to realize our own individual self, to have faith in this self and in life.\(^{214}\)

In this particular text, Fromm is talking about keeping free from traditional bonds, and in addition, about gaining a new kind of freedom. This new kind of freedom enables man to realize himself; this is "freedom to," self-

\(^{213}\) Cf. supra, Ch. V, B, 2, b, (2) and (3). Cf. also John SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 102-108, on "productivity."

\(^{214}\) Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 106.
realization, as explained in an earlier part of this section B of Chapter V;\(^\text{215}\) the word "qualitative" is matched with this new kind of freedom, "freedom to," whereas the word "quantitative" is matched with "traditional freedom," which is a type of "freedom from" external restraints, in the preceding context of this passage.\(^\text{216}\) This new kind of modern freedom for Fromm is to overcome internal difficulties and hindrances;\(^\text{217}\) freedom from these "inner restraints, compulsions, and fears" is to be achieved by "freedom to." Hence Fromm looks upon "freedom to" as being in a different type of reality than "freedom from." "Freedom to" is not measurable, in Fromm's eyes, by the number of ties one has escaped from, as is freedom from, but rather adds a new dimension to man.

Ch. V, B, 2, f - "Freedom To" - A Summary of Its Meaning

Ch. V, B, 2, f, (1) The Meaning of "Freedom To"

During the course of this section of Chapter V many facets of "freedom to" have been examined. The main points of the analysis will now be summarized, while pointing out at the same time certain difficulties and obscurities

\(^{215}\) Cf. supra., Ch. V, B, 2, a-d, p. 381-401.

\(^{216}\) Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 105-106.

\(^{217}\) Ibid., p. 105.
connected with this concept. Most of the difficulties and obscurities will not be investigated until after the summary.

"Freedom to" has been found to be the same thing for Fromm as "positive" freedom. A comparison was instituted between these two meanings, by direct and indirect evidence, and their identity was confirmed. "Freedom to" was found to be a part of a dialectic process of freedom in the development of the human race, i.e., in the development of the members of the human race as influenced by their cultural environment through their social character. "Freedom to," or "positive" freedom, was matched by "negative" freedom or "freedom from." As a part of this dialectic process "freedom to" occurs simultaneously with "freedom from," and is a response to it on a higher plane. In the growth of the individual human being in addition "freedom to" was also seen to be matched by "freedom from," as two aspects of one and the same dialectic process. Probably this "freedom to" in the individual is identical with the positive aspect of individuation in the growing child.

What was discovered to be the meaning of "freedom to?" There were two general sources of information about this meaning. The first source of meaning was Fromm's discussion of the general structure of freedom in Escape
THE ESSENCE OF FREEDOM FROM

As for the meaning of "freedom to" in the growth of the individual child, it was seen to mean a freedom to "...develop and express its own individual self unhindered by those ties which were limiting it." "Freedom to" in human beings as members of the human race, in a phylogenetic sense, was found to mean a "...process of growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, growing power of human nature, and growing solidarity with other human beings." This growth in these qualities is equivalent to growth as a free, self-determining and productive individual; "free" here is equivalent to both self-determining and productive. "Freedom to" was found to probably be equal to the only possible productive solution to men whose primary ties are broken, i.e., active solidarity with all men, and spontaneous, active love and work. Actually, "freedom to" is identical to this productive solution, if "freedom to" is considered as identical to "positive" freedom.

The second source of information about the meaning of "freedom to" was an analysis of other texts explaining the meaning of "freedom to," particularly those texts

218 Ibid., p. 28-37.
219 Ibid., p. 31.
220 Ibid., p. 35-36.
explaining "positive" freedom, with which "freedom to" is identical. In these other texts "freedom to" was seen as a freedom to be oneself, to become and be a complete human being. This is the essential meaning of "positive" freedom, which is "...the spontaneous activity of the total integrated personality,"\(^{221}\) or, in the sense not of a process, but of a completion of a process, "...the full realization of the individual's potentialities, together with... (the) ability to live actively and spontaneously."\(^{222}\) "Positive" freedom was seen as a process, balancing off the threat of isolation, coming from "freedom from."

One element of "positive" freedom that is emphasized in Fromm's thought on this subject is the element of "spontaneity." Spontaneity was not fully explained by Fromm, but was seen as an attribute of activity, that made that activity truly human, because by it isolation from "freedom from" was overcome, without loss of self-integrity. It is the quality by which human activity and its effects, love and work, truly belong to the person acting, as his own; because of this spontaneity human activity is raised to a higher plane than it would simply have, if merely affected by the effects of "freedom from," isolation, fear,

\(^{221}\) Ibid., p. 258.
\(^{222}\) Ibid., p. 270.
etc. "Spontaneous" means creative, entering right into
the object by a conative, immediate, unalienated grasp of
reality.

This spontaneity was seen as a truly desirable
quality, because by it the true, only goal of human living
was achieved, i.e., the act itself of living spontaneously.
One criticism raised of this explanation of Fromm's was
this, that "spontaneity" in this case becomes merely instru-
mental, i.e., it tells man how to live, but not what he
must do to truly live.

Ch. V, B, 2, f, (2) Difficulties, Obscurities, Proof

Certain difficulties and obscurities remain, even
after a close analysis of Fromm's thought. Some of the
obscurities in Fromm's thought are centered around his
general structural picture of freedom. One such difficulty
is the lack of a clear picture of whether or not the two
aspects of the dialectic processes he develops, those of
individuation and freedom, are simultaneous or successive.
In some of Fromm's descriptions, such as that of the pro-
cess of individuation in Passage II, the two processes are
said to occur "at the same time."\footnote{Ibid., p. 31.} In Passage I, there
is an implication that the positive aspect of individuation

\footnote{Ibid., p. 31.}
follows upon the negative aspect, since the positive aspect, of spontaneous relationship to man and nature, is described as following upon and in response to the aloneness and anxiety brought on by the negative aspect of individuation.\textsuperscript{224} Freedom's two aspects are said to occur simultaneously in another passage of \textit{Escape from Freedom},\textsuperscript{225} but in Passage III of the same book, it looks as though primary bonds are severed (freedom from), and then "freedom to" occurs.\textsuperscript{226} These passages indicate an obscurity in Fromm's thought, if not a contradiction.

Another obscurity in Fromm's thought on the general structure of the process of individuation and freedom concerns his idea that the two aspects of these dialectic processes are truly contradictory, proceeding from one cause.\textsuperscript{227} Essentially the negative aspect of both individuation and freedom consists in a separation from ties that bind the individual, in his ontogenetic or phylogenetic growth, while the positive aspect of both individuation and freedom consists essentially in a reunion with man and nature on a higher plane. The two aspects do not cancel

\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{225} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 35-37.
\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 104.
one another out, either logically or really, which would be the case, if a true contradiction existed.

More particularly with regard to "freedom to" in itself, and not in its dialectic relationship to "freedom from," are certain obscurities. For instance, it was found that "freedom to" and "positive" freedom are one and the same. The first term, "freedom to" is used almost exclusively in describing the general dialectic structure of "freedom to" and "freedom from." The second term, "positive" freedom, is used almost exclusively in the fuller description of the positive aspect of freedom given in Chapter VII of *Escape from Freedom.* Why is this? It causes confusion. Possibly the reason is this, that the second term, "positive" freedom, is easier to handle in the sense that it is a more convenient expression than "freedom to." Or possibly "freedom to" conveys the possible meaning of a capacity, rather than of a process, and hence is avoided.

Actually the term "freedom to" in some instances does seem to indicate a capacity and not an active process, as in Passage II, where "freedom to," is freedom "to govern himself, etc.," and in *The Heart of Man,* where Fromm

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229 Ibid., p. 35.
talks of "...freedom 'to'; freedom to create and to construct, to wonder and venture." Thus there is or seems to be a multiple use of "freedom to," as part of a process or as a capacity, yet Fromm does not seem to intend this multiple meaning for "freedom to" in Passage II. There is a real obscurity here, if not definitely an ambiguity.

One other difficulty will be mentioned here, although it will be handled much more fully in Chapter VI on the critique of "freedom from." It is this, that Fromm has no clear-cut method of proving his assertions about "freedom to" in its general structure, or in its fuller explanation. His statements are universal, about man in general. He does have a set of particulars, drawn from concrete historical events, such as his study of "freedom to" in some, though not extensive, detail in modern man. But to say that sufficient detail, covering various civilizations, was used, for a valid induction to a perfectly universal statement, seems to be precarious and untrue. If Fromm was not using induction, then he was using some sort of insight, or what Leon H. Levy would call in Fromm "understanding," some sort of closeness to the subject, a feeling of all of

230 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, p. 52.

the parts falling together. This is a puzzling and inexplicable way of proving something, at least as a scientific way of proof, and one that is open to serious question when one significant part, such as the real or logical existence of contradiction in processes describes as dialectic, is open to serious question.

Ch. V, B, 3. - "Freedom To" and "Freedom From"

A preliminary analysis of the light that the understanding of "freedom to" can shed on "freedom from" will now be instituted. That light may be had was the presupposition for investigating "freedom to" at all, guided by Fromm's own assertion that freedom cannot be understood unless both sides or aspects are seen together. And it would be difficult to understand "freedom from" unless the whole process, of which it is one part, is also understood. There is no intention to discuss here the type of socio-economic and political structure and function in which man could thus fulfill himself, and which would influence man to achieve this self-perfection. Such a complete solution Fromm does discuss in detail in The Sane Society, 233 a

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232 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 104.

solution he calls "Humanistic Communitarian Socialism." The immediate relationship between "freedom to" and "freedom from" is said by Fromm to be a dialectic one as has been seen. This means that both "freedom to" and "freedom from" are partial aspects of one process, aspects that Fromm claims to be contradictory, proceeding from one cause. This has already been discussed in this section of this chapter, and there were found obscurities, if not contradictions, in Fromm's thought on this subject.

Resuming what was said there, there seems to be no contradiction between the two aspects of freedom, since the ideas, the meaning of both, are not contradictory, in the sense of negating each other. The reunion with nature and man brought into being by "freedom to" and its spontaneous activity replace on a higher plane the previous, forced, determined union dissolved by "freedom from." This involves no contradiction. Perhaps, then, the contradiction comes from this, that from one cause, striving for freedom, comes two contrary movements. There is no explanation on Fromm's part of the reason why one cause could not be the principle of several contrary movements; in this case it would be the

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234 Ibid., p. 363.
235 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 104.
236 Cf. supra, Ch. IV, B, 1, a, p. 373-375.
developing human being, either ontogenetically or as a member of society, phylogenetically, that would be the cause of these, for Fromm, contradictory movements, "freedom to" and "freedom from."

Thus there is a development of man, ontogenetically and phylogenetically, according to Fromm. "Freedom to" and "freedom from" both play a part, but probably not a contradictory one, as just mentioned. Is there any real connection between these two aspects of growing freedom, then? One connection that seems to leap forward is that "freedom from" is in some sense a preparation for "freedom to."

Certainly it is true that "freedom from" primary ties is a necessary condition for "freedom to," i.e., self-growth, spontaneous activity, to take place. Contained in Fromm's thought is the hypothesis of evolution, especially human evolution, for Fromm looks upon the achievement of "freedom to" in the human race as the goal of individual human beings, for "freedom to" will mean man's perfection.237

Man's meaning, says Fromm in The Heart of Man, published in 1964, is a contradiction looking for a solution;238 the right answer, he says, to this question which life poses is

238 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, p. 116-117.
"...that of man's becoming fully human and thus losing the terror of separateness."239 "Freedom to" for Fromm is the becoming fully human for man, as has been seen; this becoming fully human means overcoming separateness and its resulting terror. Hence Fromm looks upon "freedom to" as the goal, to achieve which man must pass through a stage of separateness. Here Fromm sees, then, an evolving, an evolution beginning with a break from nature, through a stage of separateness that results, to a new union, the fullness, the fullness of "freedom to."

Another aspect of the relationship between "freedom to" and "freedom from" is the comparative necessity of each. In the development of the individual child, negative individuation and separation ("freedom from") are not yet matched by a corresponding "freedom to," the growth of the self.240 The process of individuation, and hence, quite probably, of "freedom from" as has been seen,241 is said to take place automatically, while the growth of the self is restricted for both social and individual reasons.242 In the history of the human race the story is the same:

239 Ibid., p. 119.
240 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 31.
241 Cf. supra, Ch. II, C, I, c, p. 92-94.
242 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 31.
FROMM calls for today's man to actively mold social processes, to master society and subordinate the economic machine to the purpose of human happiness, for he sees in the many defects of the capitalistic society, and not in man himself, the cause of man's aloneness and of the lack of "freedom to."245

Hence Fromm may well see a dialectic process of freedom, but not one that is entirely necessary and automatic. Rather does he look for man's activity, based on a realization of the true forces at work, to be the cause of the advent, growth and perfection of "freedom to."246 Ultimately there is no guarantee, Fromm avers in one of his latest works, The Heart of Man, published in 1964, that man will make this effort to understand and act on the forces at work in himself and society, and thereby to achieve "freedom to."247 Indeed, Fromm says in the last paragraph of this book that it is possible that the entire

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243 Ibid., p. 36-37.
244 Ibid., p. 276.
human race may harden its heart and be unable to choose life. For Fromm the goal of life is freedom, or independence, as he now calls it in a recent interview given by him in 1965; these words that follow from this interview make explicit this point; Fromm says:

I really believe that the aim of life is freedom. Now, I don't like the word "freedom" any more, because it has been so misused these days. We call "free" any nation that is politically allied with us. This seems to be the only criterion, so I would rather use the word "independence," and would mean by independence, the capacity of a person to owe his existence to himself, to think himself, authentically, genuinely, and not to think feelings without having feelings, in all fields of life, in love, in art, in everything.

Here Fromm is talking about "freedom to," freedom in a positive sense, i.e., self-activity, activity that is one's own. It is this freedom that for Fromm is the goal of life, that need not be achieved, and hence is a moral imperative, but not necessarily a product of human evolution.

Hence "freedom from" is compelled to happen, in Fromm's thought, not only in the individual, but in the human race, too. Not only is "freedom from," as it were,
an "automatic" process, but it is also a necessary process, in the sense that it is a necessary condition for "freedom to." Without "freedom from," moreover, there will be no "freedom to." In addition, Fromm never condemns "freedom from" as useless, but rather warns of letting the escapes from "freedom from" be looked upon by man as the true result of "freedom from;"\textsuperscript{251} the only true solution to "freedom from," according to Fromm, is "freedom to." This "freedom to," or "independence," is for Fromm the true goal of life, but it need not be achieved, it is not inevitable. To assess the full causality for its not being achieved would be to investigate Fromm's thought on free will and responsibility in man; this inquiry is not necessary for the purpose of this thesis, the meaning of "freedom from."

Chapter V, C. - THE ESSENCE OF FREEDOM FROM

Ch. V, C, 1. - Introduction

In this section an attempt will be made to synthesize the information obtained throughout the analysis, found in Chapters II - IV and Chapter V, A and B, of the meaning of freedom from and allied notions, such as "freedom to" and alienation. In each of these chapters the

\textsuperscript{251} Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 30-31, 36-37.
results of the analysis were summarized in the chapter itself, so that this section C of Chapter V presupposes these results.

In this synthesis of the results of the analysis of freedom from special attention will be paid to the analogy of meaning within this concept itself. To discuss this analogy the elements of each meaning of freedom from will have to be summarized and compared, and the primary analogue brought out. In addition, certain other points of synthesis will be used, such as the comparative necessity and universality of the various aspects of freedom from and its allied notions of "freedom to" and alienation. This will mean in part an effort to synthesize the relationship of these ideas to human existence and to its meaning. Furthermore, the main ideas of the analysis of the last several chapters will be reviewed under the idea of relationships, with a special emphasis on the role of self-awareness.

In the comparison of the various meanings of freedom from it is presupposed that the primary analogue is freedom from as found in the human individual as such, and not in the human individual as a member of the human race. The decision to compare these two freedoms in this fashion was made earlier in this thesis, based on the evidence from Fromm's own work, and from commentators on his work; this
is true of both his description of the origins of freedom from in the individual and in the human race, and of this general theory of the development of freedom from in the individual and in the human race.252

Ch. V, C, 2. - The General Structure of the Development of Freedom From

In this part of Section C the structure of the general development of freedom from will be reviewed. During the thesis it was established, as just noted, that the primary analogue was the general structure of freedom from in the human individual, not the human race; therefore freedom from's general structural development in the human individual will be reviewed first. This is a review, then of the general structure of the ontogenetic development of the human individual, followed by the general structure of the phylogenetic development of freedom from in the human race.

The growth of freedom from in the individual is immanent to the individual, although influenced by the environment to which the individual belongs. The first stage in the process of growing freedom from is a separation from a reassuring world which has given security. This

separation is dialectically related to positive freedom, which is the goal of this separation. In Fromm's description of the general structure of this growing freedom from there is no mention of awareness nor affective factors. However, Fromm also develops a concept of growing freedom from as a continued birth; in this way of looking at growing freedom from the individual comes to know himself as an "I," with a tendency to emerge from bondage, or to return to "animal" existence.

If the identity, highly probable at that, of individual growing freedom from with negative individual individuation is maintained, then the elements of awareness of this separation would be had, a separation from ties of physical and emotional dependence. The affective response to this realized, personal separateness would include feelings of isolation, desolation, anxiety and insecurity.

In terms of an "interior" alienation, which seems to be identical with certain aspects of freedom from in the individual, each individual goes through a separation from a prereflective, childlike immediacy of awareness. Gradually there occurs a subject-object split in the content of consciousness, and a conscious-unconscious functioning that works through a threefold social filter of language, logic and social taboos. The goal of this separation from the childlike immediacy is a return on an adult level to a
THE ESSENCE OF FREEDOM FROM

new immediacy of awareness. This process is something intrinsic and necessary to human individual growth.

In summary, then, there are five essentials: constituents to the general structure of growing freedom from in the human individual. First of all there is a separation from physical and emotional ties, followed by an awareness of this separation. This awareness goes through a swing from conscious immediacy to a self-awareness founded on a realized separation from objects and on a growth from unconsciousness to a genuine open consciousness. This growing realized separation is dialectically related to a contradictory growth in "freedom to," which is the goal of freedom from. This realized separateness brings with it emotional reactions such as feelings of isolation, desolation, anxiety, etc. Thus the process of freedom from in the growing human individual is: separation — awareness of this separation by an alienated consciousness — affective response — "freedom to" or overcoming of alienation (the goal) and (the dialectical opposite of growing freedom from throughout this process).

The structure of this general growing freedom from in the human individual may be put into this diagram:
### Structure of Individual Growing Freedom From

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom From</th>
<th>Freedom To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Separation</td>
<td>(4) Dialectical opposite of <strong>freedom from</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Realized Separation</td>
<td>(5) The goal of <strong>freedom from</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Affective Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Freedom from** in the human race is described by Fromm in similar fashion. Fromm sees **freedom from** in the human race as one aspect, a negative aspect of a process, a dialectic process, of growing freedom among mankind. As far as this negative aspect goes, called "freedom from," it consists in the growing severance of primary ties or bonds, i.e., those ties that are instinct-directed and dominated, that tie to nature and hinder full human development. This severance is a separation. This separation from nature gives rise to affective reactions of isolation (possibly meant here by Fromm as an **objective state**), insecurity, doubt about the meaning of one's life, and insignificance and powerlessness. Fromm implies here, though he does not expressly say, that this affective reaction takes place because of man's awareness of this
The purpose of this freedom from is to lead to full human development, i.e., to a full "positive" freedom, to a full "freedom to." "Freedom from" is dialectically united with its contradictory, "freedom to," with which it is simultaneous and proceeds from the same cause, i.e., from evolving concrete human nature.

In addition, in more recent works Fromm applies his concept of what has been called "interior" alienation to the human race, so that he sees as a step forward the subject-object split in awareness, and man's estrangement from himself and from nature and other men. So that the gap in his explanation of freedom from, the gap of only implied awareness, is filled in by his application of "interior" alienation in man's awareness from the beginning of the human race.

Thus five elements are of necessity part of freedom from as it exists in the human race, separation, awareness, affective reaction, drive to lead to "freedom to," and a dialectic relationship to "freedom to." "Separation" seems to be the first and most essential element of freedom from, yet the most essential element may well be the belonging to a dialectic process with "freedom to." On the other hand the drive for the fullness of "freedom to" may well be the most important and essential element of freedom from, since this is the goal of the entire evolutionary,
dialectic process of growing human freedom. One saying of Fromm that freedom changes according to the degree of awareness as a constituent of freedom from need not change the conclusions just expressed.

This dialectic process of growing human freedom in the human race is a process which is immanent to the human race. The human race here is not to be construed as a collectivity which is separate and above the individual human beings in it, but rather as the sum total of the human beings who constitute it at any given time, with their individual nature and needs, along with the myriad social relationships as found in social institutions and as forming the individual men through their mutually shared "social character." Thus Fromm is concerned with changes in individual men, immanent in them through the social relationships just described, and through their "social character." For Fromm each human individual has a goal of what he should become, and these goals are immanent, evolutionary, and inherent in his very chromosomes.

As already seen in this thesis there quite probably is an analogy between the general structure of growing freedom from in the human individual's growth and the general structure of growing freedom from in the human race, with growing freedom from in the individual being the primary analogue in Fromm's conception of reality.
Ch. V, C, 3. - Freedom From in Particular Detail

This part of Section C will resume the details of particular instances of freedom from found in both the developing individual, the ontogenetic growth, and in the human race, the phylogenetic growth. As with the previous section, the particular details of growing freedom from in the individual will be first given, and then the details of growing freedom from in the human race.

In the human individual Fromm sees the most elementary tie to be that to mother, for warmth, protection and help, and that separation from this tie is necessary for adult growth. In explaining this he does not go into much detail as to the presence or influence of awareness, nor does he go into the affective result of separation from mother, except to imply that such leaves people insecure. Fromm sees the growing up of the individual as a separation from various ties, such as family, economic and sensual ties, with the purpose of achieving independence. He does not explain in detail the role of awareness or of the affective response in this quest for independence. Nor does Fromm place emphasis, nor does he develop the relationship between this separation and adult growth as a dialectic relationship, although he may imply this.
A particular instance of individual growth in freedom from that Fromm goes into at some length is connected with man's growth from irrational authority to rational authority. Here there is a separation from irrational authority as one sees oneself distinct from such authority. This knowledge of the irrationality of such authority is a spur to increased separation from it, with the goal of being able to think, feel and decide for oneself. Feelings of resentment and hostility and fear play a part in this development. All of the elements of freedom from seem to be here, with awareness playing a prominent part, along with an implied dialectical relationship between freeing from authority and the goal of being and acting independently for oneself. This development of freedom from irrational authority is the only one instance in the individual human being's development that satisfies fully the criteria of being an instance of such freedom from, although it seems likely that freeing from irrational authority involves a freeing from "secondary" ties as well as from "primary" ties.

If particular instances of cultural and social development of freedom from in the human race are considered, then Fromm would hold that all human cultures would tend to overcome incestuous ties, and to replace these ties by positive aspects of matriarchy and patriarchy.
The goal here would be true human development through brotherliness; the affective response to this separation from incestuous ties would be insecurity. The factor of awareness is only implicitly there in Fromm's description of this process. Freeing from incestuous ties thus fulfills Fromm's general pattern of what freedom from in the human race should be.

The other cultural instance of growing freedom from are those centering around the changes in man in Western society from the Middle Ages onwards. Beginning in the late Middle Ages, there is a radical change in man, as Fromm sees it, for man then began to free himself from economic, political and religious ties that previously bound him, gave him security and prevented his full, human development. This separation from these ties took place gradually, with recognition of this separateness leading to insecurity, anxiety and a loss of meaning in one's life, with consequent doubt about the meaning of oneself and one's own life. "Freedom to" is implied throughout this gradual freeing from ties as a goal, but poorly reached, and as a dialectically related aspect of this growing freedom from. Thus all of the elements descriptive of Fromm's general structure of growing freedom from are present in Western man's growing away from the ties that bound man in the Middle Ages.
Thus Fromm's particular instances of growing freedom from in the human race are genuine and valid instances of his general theory of such growth. The change in freedom from in these particular instances just discussed seems to be more of a quantitative type, than of a qualitative type. The emphasis seems to be on more and more ties being broken. However, the growing awareness of these changes and the growing affective changes would seem to be qualitative changes, with increased clarity of awareness and intensity of affect taking place. The striving for "freedom to" as an immediate and ultimate goal might well be a qualitative type of reality, since it seems to follow upon the previous cognitive and affective factors present in freedom from.

Ch. V, C, 4. - The Origins of Freedom From

As has been seen Fromm also applies his theory of freedom from to the origins of the human individual and of the human race. In the origin of the human individual, i.e., at birth, there is a freeing from a physical dependence on the mother, by separation from her. This type of freedom from is entirely on the physical level, implying neither awareness of separation nor consequent affective response to a non-existent mental content. There is a physical "freedom to" here, in the self-active process of
breathing, which, Fromm states, is a sign of the type of activity which will be truly human on the level of awareness later on, as the child comes to be aware of itself as separate. This physical separation and physical self-activity might be called two aspects of a dialectic process, a physical freedom from/freedom to relationship, in an extended sense of the word, freedom. Whether or not Fromm himself would use this framework, of a dialectical relationship of a physical freedom from to a physical "freedom to" is not certain. It looks as if this is what he is trying to do, to see a similarity on the physical level with what will occur later on a higher level, that of consciousness and self-awareness. The exact nature of this resemblance depends on whether or not Fromm would admit to real human nature being present before the presence of self-awareness. When does the individual human being begin to exist as human? Fromm does not treat of this difficult question, nor can an answer be given here until Fromm's concept of human nature is more fully treated in the last chapter of this thesis.

On the other hand, all of the necessary elements for a genuine freedom from would seem to be present in the beginning of the human race. There is separation from instinctual ties, concomitant awareness, reason and imagination, along with feelings of anxiety, helplessness,
THE ESSENCE OF FREEDOM FROM 429

guilt and shame. And there is a drive to overcome this separateness, implying a dialectic relationship between the separation from instinctual ties and this drive for overcoming separateness. However, there are some difficulties here, for this first act of separation, or freedom from, is said to be the first human act, an unconscious act at that, while self-awareness is said to constitute man in his essence. How can this act of separation be first, and human, unless it is at least logically posterior to self-awareness? The answer to this difficulty may well depend on Fromm's concept of evolutionary development. This first human act, that of freedom from, is part of the evolutionary development that culminated in man. Since this act involves a change in quality of nature, and is unconscious, it would seem that the meaning of freedom from here is somewhat different than the meaning of freedom from in the general development of the human race, which is already constituted in its fundamental dialectic process.

Ch. V, C, 5. - Summary of Meanings of Freedom From

Thus freedom from has several different meanings in Fromm's works. The basic meaning would seem to be that found in growing freedom from in the human individual as individual, as incorporating separation, affective consequences based on a realized separation, a dialectic
relationship to "freedom to" as an immediate and as an ultimate goal. That these five elements are part of growing freedom from is highly probable because of the probable identity of growing individual freedom from with negative individual individuation and with, in certain aspects, the process of "interior" alienation. Similar to this, but not identical, is a second meaning, that of developing human freedom from in the human race. Particular instances of growing freedom from both in the individual and in the human race tend to confirm these two different though similar meanings.

A third meaning of freedom from is to be found in the origin of freedom from in the human race, having all five elements, differing apparently in its analysis of separation, with this first human act, that of separation, being the link connecting animal and human reality. A fourth meaning of freedom from is found in the physical birth of the human individual, an act anticipating on the physiological level what is to occur later on the level of human self-awareness. This act on the physiological level might truly be called freedom from through analogy, possibly the analogy of proportionality.
CHAPTER VI

AN INTERNAL CRITIQUE

Introduction

During the preceding four chapters an inquiry was made into the meaning of freedom from, ontogenetically and phylogenetically, as this concept is found in the writings of Erich Fromm. The purpose of these four chapters, Chapters II-V of this thesis, was thus an inventio, a finding out of the meaning, the essence of freedom from. An analysis was made of this concept, this idea of freedom from, and through comparison by analogy the beginnings of a synthesis were instituted.

In the first chapter of the thesis the purpose of the thesis was said to include an investigation of both Erich Fromm's concept of human freedom, and particularly human freedom from, as well as a critique of this concept.¹ Not only is it important to study philosophically the development of one of these fundamental concepts, for this is a genuine part of a philosophical inquiry.² But it is

¹ Cf. supra, Chapter I, A, 5, p. 28-29 and Chapter I, C, p. 57.

just as important to ask the question: Why does an author hold this concept to be true? Not only will a philosophical inquiry ask what the particular meaning of a concept is but it will do well to inquire further, and ask the why of what John H. Randall calls the "intelligible structure of facts." What are the causes of these facts, e.g., the meaning of the essence of human freedom, as related to the premises, to the presuppositions of the author? What relationship does the quality of the assertions of the author have to the quality of said premises or presuppositions, e.g., the necessity or universality of the assertions about the essence of human freedom in relationship to the necessity or universality of the premises or presuppositions of these assertions?

The why of Fromm's concept of freedom from will then be discussed in this chapter, and will follow the general pattern mentioned briefly in the first chapter of this thesis. This general pattern is an attempt to understand more fully Fromm's conception of freedom from by an internal critique. Being a critique this chapter will look for an evaluation of the validity and certainty of Fromm's ideas. Because an internal critique, the internal

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4 Cf. supra, Chapter I, C, p. 57-58.
consistency and clarity of Fromm's position in freedom from will be investigated.

Three aspects of this internal consistency and clarity will be looked into in this chapter. The first aspect will be the relationship of freedom from to Fromm's general philosophical position, and, in particular, to his conception of the meaning of human existence and human nature. This fact of relationship has been noted many times during this thesis.\(^5\) To develop this comparison brief descriptions of Fromm's general philosophical position will first be given in Section A of this chapter; his ideas on human existence and human nature, along with the allied topics of basic human perfections and basic human needs, will be described in Section B of this chapter. In Section C of this chapter the concept of freedom from will be related to the findings of these first two sections, A and B, of this chapter.

There will be two other sections to this chapter, both inquiring into the internal consistency and clarity of

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\(^5\) Cf. e.g., Chapter III, A, 2, p. 163-165 about man as a product of evolution through the animal kingdom, and Chapter V, B, 2, a, (3), p. 392-393 concerning Fromm's general philosophical position. Cf. also an example of Fromm's relationship between human existence and freedom from in Chapter III, B, 3, b, (2), (i), p. 226-228, and the relation between "freedom to", the result of freedom from, and the goal of man, complete "freedom to" in Chapter V, B, 3, p. 413-416.
Fromm's conception of freedom from. In Section D an inquiry will be made into Fromm's methods of proving his ideas on freedom from, already frequently referred to in the thesis. This will follow logically from the preceding three sections, since the positions Fromm holds on general philosophical issues, and more particularly on human existence and human nature, may well have a bearing on his methods of proof for his varying conceptions of freedom from. The final part of the chapter, Section E, will review the seeming contradictions and ambiguities found in Fromm's idea of freedom from. A synthesis of these seeming contradictions and ambiguities will be attempted, and an explanation of them will be sought for, in terms of the previous findings of this chapter and this thesis.

A presupposition for the first four sections of this chapter is that of Fromm's epistemological realism, i.e., that Fromm is talking about a real physical, organic world of nature and man, which is independent of and prior to human knowledge. This realism further implies that what Fromm is saying about this world of nature and man is

6 Cf. e.g., Chapter II, C, 2, i, p. 146-152.

7 As one instance of such seeming contradictions and ambiguities cf. Chapter III, A, 2, p. 167-168, about the question of whether man is fully freed from instinct or not.
in some sense truly descriptive of this world. Fromm admits the distorting effect of certain socially conditioned factors, such as language and logic, or man's conscious knowledge, but only does this in the framework of man being able to and needing to know the real truth about himself, about nature and about other men. 

In the first chapter of the thesis reference was made to the use of various philosophers to clarify certain difficult areas of the relationship. One such difficult area of thought is the question of ontological versus constructive knowledge, as already pointed out in Chapter I of this thesis. This question will be discussed briefly in this chapter at the end of Section D, after Fromm's methods of proof have been taken.

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8 Cf. Bernard WUELLNER, A Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, p. 259, under "realism." Cf. also other implications of this realism of Fromm in Chapter I, B, 2, p. 41-43 of this thesis.

9 Cf. e.g., Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 95-113.

10 Cf. supra, Chapter I, B, 6, p. 53-54.

11 Cf. supra, Chapter I, B, 3, p. 45-46.
Ch. VI, A, 1. - Introduction

In this subsection of Section A it will be necessary to point out certain limitations in the treatment given to Fromm's general philosophical position, and a presupposition in the method of treating this general philosophical position of his. Furthermore an attempt will be made to understand these limitations and presuppositions of Section A of this chapter so that Fromm's "original" intuition may be developed during the rest of this Section A; as far as his general philosophical position goes there will be an effort made to find out just what aspects of reality Fromm uses to reduce to unity the "...complexity and plurality of what is immediately given." ¹²

One presupposition of this Section A is that it is possible to distinguish without denying the connection between Fromm's general philosophical position which will be taken in Section A and his philosophy of man (it may perhaps be called this) which is taken in Section B of this chapter. ¹³ Actually, as will be clear from Sections A and


¹³ The term "philosophy of man," is simply meant to denote that man is the subject of philosophical inquiry.
B of this chapter, there is no hard and fast line between these sections. For they all are about man. Section A will treat of man in terms of "isms", of abstract positions, such as humanism and evolutionism and will put man into terms of general philosophical positions. Section B will discuss more directly the meaning of concrete human existence, human nature and certain fundamental human perfections, as Fromm sees them. The evidence for the conclusions of the two sections will be the same sometimes; the conclusions will differ according to the viewpoint just stated. There is thus no contradiction between the viewpoints of Section A and Section B of this chapter; they supplement one another.

There are several limitations in the treatment of Fromm's general philosophical position. One of these limitations is simply this, that no general, complete work has been done on the whole of Fromm's philosophical position. This means that the subject needs a thorough

and that the various levels or ways of discoursing about man philosophically are unified in this, that they are about the subject, "man". Another way of describing the philosophy of man in the sense used here is as a "philosophical anthropology"; such a term is used by Robert Pollock in an article in Thought, entitled "The Basis of a Philosophical Anthropology", Vol. 25, June, 1950, p. 197-220.

14 Cf. supra, Chapter I, A, 2, p. 9-11 for books and articles that do go into Fromm's philosophy to some extent.
investigation. For the purposes of this thesis there is no need for such a thorough investigation. What will be done in this first section of Chapter VI is to give Fromm's general philosophical position, and give it as a hypothesis of what is quite likely true about this position. To state exactly, with full investigation, just what Fromm's general philosophical position is, then, beyond the scope of this thesis, and will be presented here tentatively and hypothetically.

Another limitation in treating of Fromm's general philosophical position is this, that a complete statement of every philosophical position Fromm holds is unnecessary within the scope of this thesis, and will not be attempted, even hypothetically. A selection will be made of a limited number of his philosophical positions. This selection will depend on two viewpoints, the first that of Fromm himself, in his own stated description of how he would name his fundamental general philosophical position. The second viewpoint on what to select as fundamental to Fromm's general philosophical position will be that of commentators on Fromm and that of the author of this thesis. There is no claim made that each and every fundamental or important philosophical position of Fromm will be stated here.
Ch. VI, A, 2. - Fromm's Naturalistic, Normative Humanism

In a recent description of his own basic philosophical position Erich Fromm stated clearly that his position is equivalent to what he calls "dialectic humanism."\(^{15}\) This is a good summary of his basic philosophical position, but needs amplification. If one were to add to this phrase a word, "naturalistic," to describe Fromm's "naturalism,"\(^{16}\) and another adjective, "normative," to describe the particular type of humanism Fromm holds,\(^{17}\) the phrase "dialectic humanism" would have an increased descriptive power. Since Fromm's idea of human development is not only "dialectic" in the sense already described in the thesis,\(^{18}\) but also "evolutionary" in a biological sense of the word,\(^{19}\) it would be appropriate to add the word "evolutionary," too, to the general description of Fromm's fundamental philosophical position. Thus Fromm's position would be described as a "dialectic, evolutionary, naturalistic, normative


\(^{16}\) John H. SCHAAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 13-19.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) Cf. e.g. supra, Chapter II, B, 6, p. 80-84, and Chapter III, B, 3, b, (2), (f), p. 219-220.

\(^{19}\) Ruth L. MUNROE, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, p. 349.
humanism." Each of these words will now be investigated. In this subsection "naturalistic, normative humanism" will be dealt with. In the following subsection Fromm's dialectic, evolutionary position will be the object of inquiry.

"Humanism" is the first aspect of Fromm's basic philosophy to be examined. By "humanism" here is meant, in a philosophical sense, as is pointed out in Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique, that

...1° l'homme est la valeur suprême, soit absolument (humanisme athée), soit du moins dans le domaine de l'expérience (humanisme qui peut être religieux, en partic. humanisme chrétien): 2° par suite, la moralité consiste à développer, en soi et dans les autres, ce qu'il y a de spécifiquement humain, et à faire son possible pour procurer à tous des conditions de vie vraiment humaines.20

That these qualities obtained in Fromm's thought is investigated and established by John Schaar in Escape from Authority.21 As Schaar points out, Fromm explicitly adheres to the view of humanistic ethics in his book, Man for Himself, that "the humanistic position is that there is nothing higher and nothing more dignified than human existence."22 For Fromm, then, man has the highest value.

20 Paul FOULQUIE avec la collaboration de Raymond SAINT-JEAN, Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique, p. 325.
as just explained in the first part of the definition of "humanism" in Foulquié. Just why Fromm believes this to be true will be developed in Section B of this chapter, where the meaning of man will be developed. One point may be made here that Fromm sees man's highest good to reside in man himself, in the unfolding of man's own powers, by affirming his own life. 23

Not only does man's highest good for Fromm consist in the unfolding of his own powers, but this is to be done by working with others in establishing the ideal social arrangement, an arrangement called by Fromm "Humanistic Communitarian Socialism." 24 This will be a society in which man's needs, rooted in the very conditions of his existence, are truly met, thus giving man a way to truly live. 25 These needs of man are specifically human,

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23 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 20. Recently, Erich Fromm outlines what he calls "Radical Humanism," which he accepts and uses to interpret the Old Testament. He does this on p. 13-14 of his book You Shall Be as Gods, A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition. In what he calls "Radical Humanism" Fromm lists the oneness of the human race, the complete independence of man as the goal of man, and man's capacity to solve all of his problems by himself as some of the constitutives of this type of humanism.


25 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 362. In this same book, p. 28, Fromm refers to his system as "humanistic psychoanalysis," referring to the fact that man's drives come chiefly from his basic human situation.
transcending the physiological needs of man. By this socialistic form of organization and practice Fromm means to restore man "...to his supreme place in society, never being a means, never a thing to be used by others or by himself." Thus socialism, as Fromm understands it, is believed by him to be a true solution for the social side of man, for man's dignity, for his needs and for his purpose in living.

Thus it is seen that one aspect of Fromm's philosophy is a humanism in which man is supreme, and in which man's goal consists in part at least of establishing for all men the conditions in which all men will truly be able to live as human beings. In addition, it may be further stated that Fromm's humanism is a "normative" humanism, to use his own words. By "normative" here is meant that the norms of ethical conduct for man, of what is right and wrong, are discovered by man himself through an analysis of his own human nature, thus basing what is right and

26 Ibid., p. 29.

27 Ibid., p. 361. Cf. also Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 229.


wrong on "...laws inherent in human nature and the inherent goals for its development and unfolding." For Fromm as for other philosophers of human action there has to be a norm of good and evil, for right and wrong; in Fromm good is that which "...serves life and enhances life" while evil is that which "...strangles life and tries to corrupt it or to kill it." The morally good person in this framework would love life, seek to increase it, while the morally evil person would have just the opposite tendency. These norms found within human nature, and based on human nature, are universal and objective, while made by man. This is normative humanism, as described by John H. Schaar. The relation between this normative humanism and Fromm's concept of human nature depends on a knowledge of his concept of human nature; this concept will be investigated in the next section of this chapter.

In the beginning of this section it was stated that Fromm's basic philosophical position of humanism was a "naturalistic" humanism. The word "naturalistic," of course implies a type of "naturalism," a word involving many possibilities, but reducible in this case to

metaphysical and ethical meanings, involving metaphysically the rejection of anything or any being superior to nature and man, of anything supernatural, as well as acceptance of the self-sufficiency of nature and man. The ethical meaning would be this, that true morality consists in a conformity to the laws of nature. 33

That Fromm accepts this metaphysical meaning of "naturalism" is found in his rejection of anything supernatural, in the sense of a real God, is clear from his own writings. 34 Meissner states it succinctly when he avers that Fromm "...does not admit the existence of any spiritual realm outside of or transcending man." 35 That Fromm's idea of the universe includes nothing but nature and man is clear from his theory of the origin of the human race, as developed in this thesis. 36 That the laws of morality for Fromm have no supernatural source, or source outside of man and nature, has been stated in the preceding


34 Cf. e.g., Erich FROMM, The Art of Loving, p. 60-61; cf. also Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 175-176.


What is involved here, concerning the exact relationship between man and nature, will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. There is a further question here, as to whether Fromm's naturalism contradicts his humanism, as John Schaar states. J. Stanley Glen disagrees with Schaar on this, and claims that Fromm's Marxist position on human creativity creating "nature," humanizing "nature," does away with this contradiction. For the purposes of this thesis it is not necessary to resolve this contradiction here.

Ch. VI, A, 3. - Fromm's Dialectic, Evolutionary Humanism

Two other characteristics of Fromm's humanism will now be investigated, its dialectical character and its evolutionary character. They have been mentioned in the thesis already, with the "dialectic" character of human freedom being developed at considerable length in various places in the thesis. Man's origin in an evolutionary

37 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, A, 2, p. 440-443.
39 J. Stanley GLEN, Man in Estrangement, p. 41-42.
40 Cf. e.g. supra, Chapter II, A, B, 6, p. 80-84, and Chapter III, B, 3, b, (2), (f), p. 219-220.
process was considered in the discussion of the origin of the human race.  

In discussing the term "dialectic" during the thesis emphasis was placed on the meaning of this term as it related to freedom found in both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic growth of individuals. Even in the development of freedom from in the human race as given in actual historical detail in Chapter IV, the emphasis was placed on what happened to the individuals in these historical phases.

Emphasis was not placed on the exact nature of economic conditioning of man's internal development of freedom, although this was brought out in some detail in the analysis of "modern" man and freedom from. Emphasis was placed on the individual as such, as the basic unity of society, and not upon the laws of society as such. The general structure, based on socio-economic factors, of society's influence on what Fromm calls "social character," was given at some length. The word "dialectic" could

41 Cf. supra, Chapter III, A, 1-6, p. 164-183.
42 Cf. supra, Chapter IV, B, passim, especially Section 3, c, p. 297-298 and Section 3, f, p. 313-315.
44 Cf. supra, Chapter III, B, 2, p. 196-209.
well have been used to describe this interaction of men and society in a sense approximating that of what may be called historical materialism of Marxist variety; Fromm's early acceptance of Marxist historical materialism was indicated.\textsuperscript{45} It was decided not to enter into a description and evaluation of what might be called Fromm's "historical materialism," since it was not necessary for the purpose of the thesis.\textsuperscript{46} The word "dialectic," then, if any reference to Marxist theory may be included, does not refer to Fromm's possible "historical materialism." That Fromm's use of the word "dialectic" does refer to a type of "dialectical materialism" will be seen later in this chapter.

Turning now to Fromm's own use of the word "dialectic," it was seen earlier in Chapter II of this thesis that "dialectic" means that quality of a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 198-199.
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process by which the process is made up of two contradictory aspects or elements both proceeding from one cause. This definition implies that Fromm sees the dialectic process as consisting in a type of change or movement which involves the clash of contradictories. In terms of the goals of such a movement as the process of growing ontogenetic and phylogenetic freedom in human beings, it has already been established that such a goal as complete positive freedom, the complete fulfilment of human psychic potentiality, is the desired term of a growth that is dialectically related to negative freedom, i.e., freedom from. This process of human growth, a dialectic one, is a clash of contradictories, freedom to and freedom from, as Fromm would describe them, leading to an evolution of human nature, ontogenetically and phylogenetically, from stages of primal, unreflective unity through a period of separation and self-awareness to a higher stage of unity. The final goal of human evolution, perfectly actualized or actualizing man, is, in addition, seen by Fromm as not necessitated by the actual logic of this dialectic.

47 Cf. supra, Chapter II, B, 6, p. 88-84.
48 Cf. supra, Chapter V, B, 3, p. 412-414.
49 Cf. supra, Chapter V, A, 5, b, p. 363-365, and Chapter V, B, 3, p. 412-413, and passim in both sections.
50 Cf. supra, Chapter V, B, 3, p. 414-415.
This dialectic of man in the area of freedom, of human growth, suggests a further question: Does Fromm have another trend represented in his thought about growth in man? Is man the product of biological and possibly cultural evolution? Both of these questions will be briefly answered here.

Fromm himself avers that man is the "...product of natural evolution; that he is part of nature and yet transcends it, being endowed with reason and self-awareness." In this passage, the first of his assertions in his "Credo" in Beyond the Chains of Illusion, Fromm points out that man is the product of what would seem to be a general evolutionary development in the framework of life. This would seem to fit in with Ruth Munroe's description of Fromm's imagination as being "...caught by the panorama of biological evolution," with Fromm seeing growing individuation in the organism up to man, with its summit in man. It is biological evolution that Fromm sees as leading up to man, through the world of nature, of the plant and animal kingdom, to the pre-self-conscious awareness, to the unity and

51 Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 174.
52 Ibid.
53 Ruth L. MUNROE, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, p. 349.
AN INTERNAL CRITIQUE

harmony of the Garden of Eden. Thus it is clear that Fromm does write with a conviction of the truth of biological evolution leading up to man.

It may not be amiss to point out that in this conviction Fromm shares what Dobzhansky calls "...an integral part of the intellectual equipment of modern mankind." That the living world, including man, is a product of an evolutionary development, is based on such strong scientific evidence for Dobzhansky that any contrary evidence would be invalid at the present time. Fromm would agree with this, judging from the unquestioned certainty of his statements on the matter.

That man changes in human freedom, and thus evolves in a dialectic way both ontogenetically and phylogenetically in his psychic life, is certainly Fromm's position from the preceding paragraphs and from the whole tenor of Chapters II-V of this thesis. Is there some sort of ongoing physiological evolution in man, that possibly conditions and accompanies his psychic evolution, in Fromm's view? John Schaar believes that for Fromm certain biological

56 Ibid., p. 6-7.
57 Cf. supra, Chapter II, III, IV, passim.
demands in man result from man's moral accomplishments; future generations become pathological if these morally induced biological imperatives go unheeded. Schaar offers little proof for this statement, but if one were to offer proof of something resembling Schaar's interpretation of Fromm, Fromm himself suggests it in a passage in his essay on "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism," in which he says that man's own chromosomes from which he develops contain "immanent evolutionary goals." In man's chromosomes, in his total structure deriving from these chromosomes, lies the foundation of man's knowledge of what his own goals really are, for man thus endowed in his total structure by these chromosomes senses the way he is to make true human progress. This position does imply that somehow man's chromosomes are involved in biological evolution, as well as a psychic evolution.

From these last several paragraphs it is clear that Fromm pictures man as developing in a biological sense.
from a previously developing nature and developing within himself. Fromm is talking about individual men within society: he sees individual men as developing through immanent evolutionary goals, sometimes in opposition to present socially conditioned cultural demands of their environment.\(^{62}\)

Does Fromm hold also for a cultural evolution, i.e., an evolution in social, political, religious and economic fields? From what has been said in the thesis it is clear that Fromm does certainly hold to a change in these institutions, and a change that follows definite patterns of development, e.g., in human freedom.\(^{63}\) Fromm does hold then to a type of cultural change that follows certain patterns, and moreover a change that is inclined towards a final state in which man's needs are perfectly and truly satisfied by the cultural institutions man himself helps to form.\(^{64}\) The goal of such institutions is capable of frustration, i.e., it need not be accomplished; thus there is no strict logical necessity for the achievement.\(^{65}\) Such a goal will only be achieved if man escapes nuclear

\(^{62}\) Ibid.

\(^{63}\) Cf. supra, Chapters III and IV, passim.

\(^{64}\) Ibid.

\(^{65}\) Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 180-182.
holocaust, and overcomes his stupidity in time to see reality as it is and to act upon this knowledge. 66

Chapter VI, B. - FROMM'S CONCEPT OF MAN

Ch. VI, B, 1. - Introduction

In this section, Section B of Chapter VI, it is proposed to discuss Erich Fromm's concept of man. As pointed out in the previous section of this chapter the concept of man was discussed there with the explanation given that there is no hard and fast rule for the separation of Section B from Section A, for both sections concern man, with Section A discussing Fromm's position in terms of "isms" and Section B dealing more concretely with man as he exists in this world. 67

In considering Fromm's basic philosophy of man there will be four points covered in this section, human existence, human nature, the specific perfections of man, and basic human needs. These four points are connected with Fromm's conception of freedom, and particularly freedom from, as developed in the thesis, and have been mentioned throughout the thesis. In discussing each of the four separately, reference will be made to their

66 Ibid.

67 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, A, 1, p. 436-437.
occurrence in the thesis. The material from these four sections will form the basis for the second part of the next section of the thesis, the connection between freedom from and Fromm's concept of man.

The first three points of discussion, human existence, human nature and the specific perfections of man are closely intertwined; the reasons for their separate discussion is for the sake of clarity of thought, and because it seems, as investigation will bear out, that each of the three is differently conceived by Erich Fromm himself. The fourth item to be discussed, human needs, will be seen to be an effect of human existence and related to freedom from. Its discussion will help to understand more fully the concept of freedom from in Erich Fromm's philosophy, for Fromm himself speaks on occasion of "freedom" as a basic, dynamic need of human beings.68

In discussing this fourfold aspect of human nature a question arises: How much certainty can be ascribed to the conclusions presented in this section? Perhaps only hypothetical certitude can be granted to the conclusions of Section B. Each of the four topics is deserving of much fuller consideration than can be given here. To the knowledge of the author of this thesis no full philosophical

68 Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 81.
investigation has been made of any of these topics, and until this is done, the conclusions here must be considered hypothetical.

This is not to deny that often Fromm's texts speak almost for themselves, especially as they are repeated throughout his works. An effort has been made to cover carefully all of his works and the commentaries on Fromm mentioned in the bibliography covering these four points, and to thereby propose carefully and exactly Fromm's concept of man along these four lines of investigation. So that most of the proposals covering Fromm's positions in this Section B are stated to be true with what might be considered a large amount of probability.

One further word of explanation may be needed here. Fromm is a psychoanalyst, and writes at times in this vein.⁶⁹ It is possible to compare his thought with that of Freud, for instance, or to match it against David Rapaport's brilliant monograph, condensing and synthesizing psychoanalytic theory in "The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory, A Systematizing Attempt" in Psychological Issues.⁷⁰ If one were to approach Fromm's theory of human nature on the level of psychoanalytic theory, it would be interesting to

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⁶⁹ Cf. Ruth MUNROE, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, p. 349-354, etc.

⁷⁰ David RAPAPORT, op. cit.
compare Fromm's psychoanalytic theory with the genetic model of human behaviour as used by Freud, \(^7\) or to contrast his theory of drives with that of Freud's, \(^7\) but this would be to look at Fromm in his psychoanalytic bent.

Ch. VI, B, 2. - Human Existence

Ch. VI, B, 2, a. - Introduction

The first point to be discussed here in this section is Fromm's concept of human existence. Fromm himself links this with freedom from, as mutually developing together. \(^7\) Moreover human existence plays a large part in Fromm's conception of reality, as already seen in the previous section, where man's evolution, biological, cultural, and psychological was developed. \(^7\) Most of the entire thesis has involved the evolution of man in freedom from which is, in part, a psychological development. \(^7\)

In Fromm's thought, furthermore, there is some distinction between essence and existence. For instance, in discussing the conditions of human existence in The Heart of Man, Fromm says that you have good when existence

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\(7\) Ibid., p. 22-23.

\(7\) Ibid., p. 47-49.

\(7\) Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 32.

\(7\) Cf. supra, Chapter VI, A, 3, p. 445-453.

\(7\) Cf. the résumé of the various meanings of freedom from in Chapter V, C, of this thesis.
approaches the essence of man.\textsuperscript{76} Thus it is Fromm sees some sort of distinction between these two concepts. By existence here he obviously means the concrete conditions of human existence, by essence he means some sort of goal to be reached. It is for this reason, (that Fromm here makes a distinction between the two, and that he often, in his writings, separates the two, as will be clear from this and the next subsection of Section B), that it has been decided to consider the two concepts of essence and existence separately.

Under human existence will be considered such topics as existential dichotomies and the conditions of human existence. In addition, this subsection will investigate what Fromm might consider as energy, or actuality. Besides these topics the goals of human existence will be briefly reviewed. The unity of man, his uniqueness, will be finally briefly considered.

In the next subsection, then, of this chapter human existence and existential dichotomies and the conditions of human existence will be considered inasmuch as there exists a unity of contradictions in human beings. In subsection C the topics, energy and actuality, as Fromm conceives them, will be briefly considered, inasmuch as

\textsuperscript{76} Erich FROMM, \textit{The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil}, p. 149.
these represent an explanation or cause of unity within human beings. In subsection D there will be a statement of Fromm's ideas of the goals of human existence; these give a unity to human beings, for all share these goals, as will be seen. In subsection E man will be considered in the type of unity his individuality and selfhood represent.

Ch. VI, B, 2, b. - The Human Condition and Existential Dichotomies

In discussing human existence Fromm is talking about nothing abstract, not a concept of being as such, but something very concrete, the way that man exists in the world. These ideas of Fromm about human existence, as will shortly be seen, do represent a certain "given," a certain intransigent state of reality, that came about necessarily. This is borne out by the conditions of human existence, as already described in this thesis, of man's spontaneous origin, with the advent of new psychic human qualities. These new psychic human qualities that Fromm conceives man to have, self-awareness, reason and imagination, have, as Fromm says "...disrupted the harmony which characterizes human existence. Their emergence has made man into an anomaly, into the freak of the universe." It is because

78 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 40.
of these new psychic qualities that man finds himself out of harmony with that from which he came, the animal; man is, in Fromm's eyes, not only a part of nature but now transcends it, he is a part of nature, and yet set apart, alone. Man is, as Fromm says, "...homeless, yet chained to the home he shares with all creatures." 79

For Fromm, then, man is essentially, at the very root of his existence, in conflict. He is the only animal that has a problem to solve, i.e., the problem of mastering himself and nature until he finally reaches a new type of harmony, to replace his former pre-human harmony. 80 The root cause for this conflict, this disequilibrium, in human existence, Fromm found, is the emergence of reason, of self-awareness; because of the presence of self-awareness man finds himself different from other animals, for he is unable to return to the state from which he came, and must move forward to an uncertain future which he himself must make through his own activity. 81 As is clear from the area of Fromm's conception of reality just discussed, there is a close tie between human individuation and human freedom; as will be seen in the next section of

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
this chapter the presence of reason, of self-awareness, as a part of freedom within the human being, is very similar to, if not identical with the description of the human condition as such, as just described.

Actually in Fromm's idea of the conditions of human existence, these conditions are seen not so much as something that can be gotten rid of, or passed over once and for all. Rather these conditions of human existence, with the essential disequilibrium at the heart of man, are something that lasts for the whole life of man, with each new level of his being living in another, new level of contradiction. 82 The dynamism behind man then is not, as Fromm would assert, inward "drive for progress," but rather is this fundamental disharmony at the very heart of man's existence. 83

Contrary to this assertion that there is no inward drive for progress is Fromm's assertion that in man like all living substance, in all levels of his life, there is a tendency, not only to persevere in life, but to grow and integrate; this is an internal tendency to make progress, the preferred way, the primary way; turning backwards

82 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, p. 120; cf. also Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 41.

83 Ibid.
towards death is a secondary potentiality, only when the tendency to life is frustrated. Fromm thus sees man as leading a tragic type of life. He is driven forward to seek he knows not what exactly, his goal is not clear. Actually then it would seem in Fromm's conception of the fundamental human condition that man is from the beginning in disarray.

This is confirmed further by Fromm's theory of alienation, which has been described in the fifth chapter of this thesis. There it was seen that alienation meant a lack of unity within man, a disharmony within himself, with others, with his work: there Fromm clearly stated that this alienation of man in the beginning of human existence was not only a necessary step in the development of man, but also actually a step forward. Furthermore, it would seem that this

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85 Cf. supra, Chapter V, A, 2, p. 340-351.

disharmony may be looked at in two ways, as something negative inasmuch as man becomes alienated at birth, and yet as something positive, as a necessary step towards the overcoming of this alienation. It would seem that this might fit a dialectical pattern, in part anyway, with man's condition at any given time containing both positive and negative aspects.

It may not be amiss to point out here that Fromm seems to find in man's existence, for the most part anyway, and in the indefinite future, as he himself would say, always new contradictions, new disequilibriums to be dissolved. It would seem then that man, from his beginnings long ago, would have to be partly unhappy by nature, that he has not been meant to achieve any complete happiness in any one man's lifetime. This means that nature, from which man evolved, has given to man that by which he has to be always somewhat unhappy.

Of course contrary to this statement that man's alienation can never be overcome, is the exception made in an earlier chapter, concerning the fact that certain revolutionary characters have achieved a full "freedom to"; this would, of course, imply that alienation in these individuals had been overcome. Actually the difficulty

87 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, p. 120-121.
88 Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, 2, f, p. 132-135.
may be that Fromm is trying to put together two conceptions of man, one man as immersed in his disequilibrium, in his finitude, the other man as striving for an achievable goal which would involve complete and perfect happiness. 89

Closely connected with this asserted human condition, this disequilibrium, are what Fromm calls the existential dichotomies. His discussion of these is centered chiefly around one work of his, Man for Himself. 90 The connection of these existential dichotomies with the basic human condition just described is perhaps more in need of explanation than Fromm gives it. There does seem to be some sort of distinction between them, for Fromm, for instance, would say that the split in man's nature, the human condition, does lead to the dichotomies; these existential dichotomies are said to be "...rooted in the very existence of man." 91

The first existential dichotomy that Fromm mentions, the first existential contradiction, is that between life and death. 92 Fromm sees that man must die, and he

89 Ibid., p. 65-66.
90 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 40-45.
91 Ibid., p. 41.
92 Ibid., p. 41-42. The rest of this paragraph is taken from these pages.
also sees that man must be aware that he must die. Fromm is convinced that, for a living being who is aware of his existence as man is, death is not just a mystery, but is a contradiction to this very life. It is actually incompatible with the experience of living and therefore lacks all meaning. Even such doctrines as Christian immortality, Fromm would say, would simply be alleviating this fact, that death and life are unalterably opposed and contradictory, and that if man actually looks at these facts squarely, this is what he must see.

Whether or not there are two more or only one more existential dichotomies, it is difficult to say. The second existential dichotomy that Fromm points out might well be a class of dichotomy with the third a subclass of this second existential dichotomy.93 The second existential dichotomy is this, that each human being possesses all human potentialities, that man is capable of indefinite growth, that only then would man fulfill himself if his existence were equal to the existence of the entire human species. Yet man sees also, looking at man as he actually is, that it is impossible for any one human being to fulfill all of his own potentialities. Man enters and leaves life at indeterminate times, leaving him relatively

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93 Ibid., p. 42-43. The rest of this paragraph is taken from these pages.
helpless about many of the conditions of his life. This is the second existential dichotomy, then, the contradiction between that which man could become, completely fulfilled, and that which he must become, not completely fulfilled. Fromm would say that those who postulate or claim fulfillment in a life after death or who seek to subordinate their fulfillment to some group larger than themselves are denying a truth that is personal and certain.

A third possible existential dichotomy is mentioned by Fromm as involving man's relationship to other human beings. In his relationship to other human beings man finds two things, firstly, that at times to make proper decisions man must be as if alone. This is based upon the fact of his uniqueness, of not being anybody else. And yet man is faced by the fact that he cannot bear to be alone, that he must be one with, "solid" with his fellow human beings. This then is possibly a third existential dichotomy, that in man's unique responsibility for his own decisions, and in his desire to be one with all men, there exists a contradiction. That there is a contradiction in this situation may be seen from the fact that it follows in Fromm's discussion immediately after the discussion of the second existential dichotomy, and is couched, moreover, in

94 Ibid., p. 43. The rest of this paragraph is taken from the same page.
terms of a contradiction, too, although never explicitly called such.

Is the so-called "existential dichotomy" reducible to the second type just mentioned? It could be so reduced to the second type, if one were to consider the need to be alone and the need for solidarity as contradictory inclinations, as one frustrating the other, in whichever order one wishes to put them. This is not clearly so. Nor is it clear that the third existential dichotomy involves death or accident as do the first two, or a conflict between new specific human perfections and man's animal origin that seems to be basic to the first and second existential dichotomy. Rather it would seem that the third existential dichotomy, the need to be alone and the need for solidarity, might be based on man's specific perfections, and not on his animal origin.

Ch. VI, B, 2, c. - The Dynamism of Human Existence

In this subsection there will be a discussion of the basic energy and activity underlying human existence, insofar as Fromm sees it. This topic is being taken here, because it is close to the meaning of human existence and will help to illustrate the relationship between human existence and freedom from in the next section of this chapter. This dynamism of human existence will also assist
in showing the causality at work in human existence.

The first topic to be summarized here is Fromm's concept of actuality. In *Dissent*, in 1955, Fromm says that the concept of human existence is not an idealistic concept, but rather is a real concept; moreover, this concept of human existence, Fromm asserts, should be placed "...in terms of activity and practice, rather than in terms of a specific physiological substance." 95 Actually this idea that human existence is to be described in terms of human activity is no stranger to Fromm's conception of reality. In an earlier work, *Man for Himself*, Fromm states that existence is exactly equal to the unfolding of the specific powers of an organism. 96 What Fromm is saying, then, is that existence is a dynamic concept, i.e., dynamic in content, because it insists on the real activity of the organism. Fromm, too, brings out the fact that man should use his powers actively and productively, or else possibly become neurotic. 97

This self-actualization that Fromm describes is seen by him in all organisms as coming from an inherent


tendency in all organisms to actualize all of their potentials. In the same way Fromm sees the human being, inasmuch as it is a self, having a purpose of self-actualization; this self is to be active within itself, in all spheres of its psychic activity. Thus it may be concluded that for Fromm all organisms, including man, fulfill themselves by self-actualization, by activity springing from within, resulting from this inherent tendency present in all of them.

In Fromm's conception of the energy active in man there is a twofold division into physical energy and psychic energy. Fromm's conception of this twofold energy appears in the context of man's adaptation to human society; an example of physical energy would be a man building a road; an example of psychic energy would be cooperating with others to resist violence. Fromm thus distinguishes a physiological energy from a mental or psychic energy. This would seem to correspond to a twofold distinction that Fromm makes of human needs into physiological


100 Erich FROMM, Socialist Humanism, p. 231-232.

101 Ibid.
and psychological. The physiological needs for Fromm would be, e.g., hunger and sex, while psychological needs would include the need to be related to others. Fromm does not make any further distinction between these two types of energy, based, e.g., on the distinction between the materiality of physiological energy and the possible immateriality of psychic or mental energy.

Fromm apparently does see in all living things an inherent tendency to grow and express themselves. As far as man is concerned there is only one meaning to his life, (and here Fromm is chiefly concerned with man's psychic life); the one meaning to man's life is the act of living itself, as a recent interview of Erich Fromm by Richard Heffner in McCall's brings out. What Fromm has to say in this interview is this; that people should not experience life as having or possessing something, but rather as "being." What Fromm seems to mean here is this, that true "being" is not a having, but a doing that

102 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 25, 30-31.
103 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 24; cf. supra, Chapter VI, note 96.
104 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 263.
106 Ibid., p. 133.
consists in man's case in a genuine experiencing of life, of a genuine "to be." Life, then, for Fromm, is not really life, (and particularly is this true of man's psychic life), if it is not an activity coming from the being itself. For Fromm, then, life is an activity, an ongoing process, involving continual growth and development. This is closely akin to what has been seen to be the meaning of "freedom to," developed earlier in the thesis; in this earlier development of "freedom to," or "positive" freedom, was a spontaneity, a creativity, a full ongoing self-actualization.

Fromm thus sees life, especially human psychic life, to consist in human energy always in activity that springs from an internal inner dynamism, leading to the perfection of the human being. Generally speaking, in talking about life in this particular way, Fromm refers to man's psychic life, and not his physiological life. Fromm is talking about life as it is experienced, as it is felt, enjoyed, willed, in short, as it is lived.

107 Ibid.
Ch. VI, B, 2, d. - The Goals of Human Existence

The goals of man have already been discussed briefly under humanism in an earlier part of this chapter. A few comments are added here. The goals of human existence as such are conceived by Erich Fromm as part of man's makeup, as an individual and as a member of society. Man is meant to live fully and harmoniously, involving a new human unity of all men, each of whom are capable of living this new unity because they themselves are fully alive. This is the answer to why man is born, why he is alive, an essential question of man's existence.

Another way Fromm has of answering the why of man's existence is the goal of independence, or freedom, not only involving the full realization of one's potentiality, but realizing this fullness through one's own efforts, so that a person owes his existence to himself, and expresses this authentically. It is evident that these goals of human

109 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, A, 2, p. 440-443.


existence are very similar to the goals of human freedom. This similarity will be investigated in the next section, Section C, of this thesis.

Ch. VI, B, 2, e. - The Unity of Man

One final point remains to be mentioned in this section on human existence, i.e., the nature of each individual man in regard to his own internal unity. Is each individual man one, and, if so, in what sense?

That each man, besides sharing a fundamental number of human perfections with others of his species, is a unique entity or individual, and induplicable, is affirmed by Fromm.113 Yet Fromm does not seek out a reason for the oneness of man, an ultimate reason for his uniqueness, except in a descriptive sense, in pointing to the need for each individual to become an integrated, and organized self, which needs each man's individual properties to be fully developed to reach this desired integration.114

One possible ultimate reason for the unity of the self might well be for Fromm his dialectical conception of man. Man's individual unity then would be that of two

113 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 20.
contradictories united with each other. 115 This would make sense from his general position, and from his view of human existence as the clash of contradictories. In the next subsection on "human nature" or "human essence" will be found further material for this suggestion. One text that will be used there does describe man's essence as a contradiction, seeking a solution. 116

Ch. VI, B, 3. - Human Essence

Ch. VI, B, 3, a. - Introduction

In this subsection on human essence an investigation will be made on the subject of human essence, in the sense that human essence here means for the time being the same thing as human nature. As this section progresses, what differences there might be between them will become more clear. What is of primary interest here is Fromm's conception of human nature, the subject of the "science of man" for him. 117 Writing in Man for Himself in 1947 Fromm seeks for a true model of human nature, while admitting


117 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 23.
that such a nature is not fully known yet; Schaar, commenting on this passage and others in Fromm, points out that ultimately Fromm departs from his avowed inductive procedure in looking for the nature of man, and that Fromm's way of getting this knowledge of human nature as well as the contents of this knowledge are, respectively, a philosophical procedure and a philosophical position.

One problem in looking for the essence of man has always been the relative importance of the qualities that can be said to define man, whether he, e.g., is an animal with the capability of promising, and how adequately these represent the essential features of man. It seemed in Fromm's earlier writings, where he listed essential human qualities, such as reason and self-awareness, that he might be content with accumulating these qualities in his effort to find out the science of man on which he could build his ethics. In The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, published in 1964, Fromm decided that the human essence was reducible to no single human quality or

119 John H. Schaar, Escape from Authority, p. 35.
121 Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom, p. 33-36.
122 Erich Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 29-30.
summary of them, however inadequate; rather in this book Fromm sees the essence of man as a "contradiction inherent in human existence," demanding a solution.123 This subsection of Section B will use this definition as a basis of the search for the meaning of Fromm's idea of human essence. The essential specific qualities of man, his reason, his self-awareness, will therefore not be discussed primarily here, but rather in the next subsection of this chapter.

In this subsection, then, the meaning of essence or nature of man according to Fromm will be inquired into. Certain allied questions will also be asked, as to man's universal sharing in the same human essence, and as to the immutability or mutability of human essence.

There are not very many philosophical commentaries on Fromm's concept of human nature. A recent doctoral thesis in 1966 by Isaac Franck at the University of Maryland in the State of Maryland deals, in part, with a philosophical analysis of Erich Fromm's concept of human nature.124 Guyton Hammond analyzes Fromm's concept of the


the science of man and Fromm's concept of human nature in Man in Estrangement, and John Schaar throughout his book, Escape from Authority, deals with Fromm's concept of human nature and allied topics, such as the science of human nature.

Ch. VI, B, 3, b. - Fromm's Definition of Human Nature

Fromm treats of the problem of the "essence or nature of man," as he calls it, most pertinently in The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil. It is with this work that the present part of the enquiry will deal.

Fromm sets his own solution to the "essence or nature of man" in the context of what seems to him the problem of the mutability or immutability of human essence. As Fromm sees it, there are two solutions to the problem of the "essence or nature of man," the first being that there is not such a thing as the essence of man, that man is entirely a product of his culture, and the second

125 Guyton B. HAMMOND, Man in Estrangement, p. 38-64.
128 Ibid., chiefly p. 115-122.
solution being that some type of **substance** is the essence of man, bringing with it a denial of any change in man's essence in the course of history or through the process of evolution.\(^{129}\)

Fromm rejects both of these views.\(^{130}\) In the first place, he says, any dynamic psychology holds to the presence of an essence in man, as a premise, and he himself presupposes that there is such a thing as the nature of man in discussing human destructiveness. In the second place, Fromm would say, holding to the view that there is no change in man's nature from the earliest ancestors of man to the man of the last several thousand years, is to ignore the obvious, vast differences between man in these two different periods. Yet if the "nature" or "essence" of man is constantly changing, as it would seem to be, what content is left for any definition of man? One may define man as did Aristotle to be a "political animal," or as did Nietzsche to be an "animal that can promise," or as did Marx with his concept of man as an "animal that produces with foresight and imagination." Yet these definitions do not express man's **essence**, Fromm says, rather do they "...express essential qualities of man."

\(^{129}\) Ibid., p. 115-116. In footnote 1, on p. 116, Fromm notes that Marx never solved this dilemma.

\(^{130}\) Ibid., p. 115-116. The view of the rest of this paragraph are taken from these pages.
What then is man's essence? Fromm states that man's essence can be defined as "...a contradiction inherent in human existence." 131 By essence here Fromm means "... that by virtue of which man is man." What Fromm sees then as the essence of man is a "contradiction," which Fromm finds in the meaning of two sets of facts. The two sets of facts are these: (1) Man remains an animal, yet inadequately equipped instinctively to survive, unless he produces to satisfy his material wants, and learns to make and use tools and speech, and (2) although like other animals in possessing a "practical" intelligence to solve immediate practical goals, yet man transcends all other life because he becomes "life aware of itself." Through this awareness, man is related to others, as friends, enemies or strangers, and man becomes aware of his true state, of his future as ending in death, of his "smallness and powerlessness."

The animal is one with nature because it is unaware of nature, and is subject to nature in its "dictates and accidents"; man, too, is subject to nature's "dictates and accidents," and is imprisoned by it, but yet becomes aware of these facts, and thereby transcends nature. Because of this awareness, man knows that he is "neither here nor

131 Ibid., p. 116-117. The views and quotes expressed in the following three paragraphs are all from these pages of The Heart of Man, unless otherwise indicated.
there;" man is afraid, lonely, separate; he is "a stranger in the world." In his transcendence man finds himself aware of all reality, including himself; he also transcends nature by a lack of what an animal has, i.e., instinctive determination of his actions, Fromm adds, in his essay in Socialist Humanism, An International Symposium.132

Another way of describing man's essence or nature would be to say, with Fromm, that "...man belongs to two worlds in conflict with each other." Fromm thus does not simply mean that man's essence is made up of two contradictory elements, but rather that there is a conflict between elements, a struggle between them. He does not try to fully prove that these two elements, his self-awareness and his animality, need be in conflict, but states this as a fact evident in itself. What this implies, of course, is that the very meaning of man, that which makes him man, involves a clash, a struggle of contradictories, (one could say of "opposites"). Thus the unity of man's essence is an imperfect unity, a unity lacking the harmony of the animal who lacks this self-awareness. The transcendence of man involves a loss, therefore, of harmony, as well as a gain.

There is an additional aspect to the concept of human nature as an inherent contradiction that Fromm mentions in *The Heart of Man*; it is this, that this conflict "demands a solution." Thus Fromm sees not only a conflict in man as his fundamental essence, but man's essence calls for, demands a solution to this conflict. What is there about this conflict in man that makes a solution to it imperative? It is this, that being a part of two worlds, man is inherently frightened and feels separate and alone. It is this affective recognition of his separateness that makes man feel this way, tortured and alone.

What is demanded then is a solution, an answer to this actual and experienced aloneness. It would seem that Fromm would claim that this demand is a real need of man. This demand for a solution, this need for a solution to this conflict, does constitute the essence of man along with the conflict (Fromm calls the conflict a "question"). The demand or need for an answer to this "question" is part, then, of man's essence. So that man might be more exactly defined as "a contradiction or conflict demanding a solution," to put it abstractly.

133 Erich FROMM, *The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil*, p. 117. The views and texts in the following three paragraphs are taken from p. 117 of the same book.
Concretely speaking, the conflict has been seen in the preceding paragraphs to be a struggle between man's being simultaneously in the animal world, in nature, and yet above and separate from nature through self-awareness, with fear and loneliness resulting from this struggle. Concretely speaking, the demand for an answer, for a solution, for a resolution of this conflict, means to strive to gain "...a sense of union, of oneness, of belonging," so that man might be "...at home in the world." Thus concretely speaking, man's essence, his nature or meaning involves struggles, a conflict between, on the one hand, man's animal nature, a nature that lacks the instinctual equipment of all other animals that ensures their survival, and, on the other hand, man's transcending self-awareness, the cause of separateness and the means of recognizing this separateness, leading to tortured aloneness. This conflict demands a return to unity, to oneness, to harmony, as a solution.

Fromm makes it clear that the possible solutions to this conflict in no way belong to the essence of man.\(^\text{134}\) The "good solution," "the progressive answer," consists in fulfilling man's potentialities, by the full growth of all

\(^{134}\) Ibid., p. 118. The views and texts in this paragraph are taken from p. 118-121 of The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil.
human forces in man, whereas the "regressive answer," the "evil solution," means an attempt to return to pre-human harmony. Actually, as man moves along towards a fuller participation in either the regressive or the progressive answer, new contradictions appear on the new levels of reality. This is at least true for the progressive answer; Fromm does not make it clear that new contradictions appear if man tries to return to the pre-human harmony.

Actually, in this same work, The Heart of Man, published in 1964, and in another work, War Within Man, published in 1963, Fromm points out that the "progressive" solution is preferred by man's nature; for, according to him, the tendency to grow, to integrate, is a primary, inherent potentiality in man, and represents the positive aspect of the most profound contradiction in man. 135

Is it possible that this clash of different and contradictory potentialities or possibilities in man ever is fully resolved so that only one is any longer possible? 136 Fromm believes that this is possible to this extent, that there is no choice left for the thoroughly

135 Cf. also ibid., p. 50 and Erich FROMM, War Within Man, p. 13-14.

136 Erich FROMM, Socialist Humanism, An International Symposium, p. 243, where he expresses human essence in this fashion.
"good" or the thoroughly "evil" person to return towards the opposite tendency. Yet Fromm says that there is a residue of "archaic forces" in everyone. It would seem, then, that even in the thoroughly "good" person, the "extreme," there is no real possibility to regress, although archaic forces, regressive forces are still there. Is this possible that a human being has lost the possibility of regression, even though real regressive forces are still there? There may be a dilemma here which Fromm does not solve.

Ch. VI, B, 3, c. - The Universality and Necessity of Human Essence

In this subsection certain attributes of human essence will be discussed. Certain essential qualities of human essence will be investigated in the next subsection, B, 4, of this chapter. Here the questions will be raised as to the universality of human essence, and as to its necessity, in the mind of Fromm.

That all men are one in this sense, that every man has within himself all of humanity, is asserted frequently by Fromm. "Every man represents humanity... we are all

137 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, p. 120-123.

138 Ibid., p. 122-123.
one," says Fromm in his "Credo" in _Beyond the Chains of Illusion_. One individual is an individual and yet 
"...representative of all characteristics of the human race"; "he is 'he' and he is 'all'," says Fromm. All 
men share, too, in the goals inherent in human nature for 
its development, and therefore in human nature itself. Men thus are all one, sharing all of the characteristics 
proper to being man; that all share, too, the very essence 
of man, the presence of contradictory possibilities, 
searching for a solution, is implicit in every page of 
_The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil_, and _The 
Sane Society_, in which man's nature is discussed. No 
exceptions are made to this general discussion; every man 
is implicitly included in this description by Fromm of that 
which makes man what he is.

Fromm stated in _Man for Himself_ in 1947 that man's 
knowledge of himself as universal was to proceed through a 

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139 Erich FROMM, _Beyond the Chains of Illusion_, p. 178; cf. Erich FROMM, _You Shall Be as Gods_, p. 81.

140 Erich FROMM, _Man for Himself_, p. 38; cf. also Erich FROMM, _Escape from Freedom_, p. 264.

141 Erich FROMM, _The Sane Society_, p. 13.

142 Erich FROMM, _The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil_, especially p. 115-123, and _The Sane Society_, 
especially p. 12-14, 22-30. Fromm asserts in footnote 2 on p. 116 of _The Heart of Man_, published in 1964, that the 
thoughts of these pages are taken from _The Sane Society_, 
published in 1955. Actually it would seem that the thoughts 
on human nature in _The Heart of Man_ are a further clarifi­
cation of the ideas expressed in _The Sane Society_.

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type of scientific inquiry into the manifestation of historically conditioned human activity, and draw out of the conclusions of the various human sciences the core common to human beings. 143 This core, this "model of human nature" is not directly observable, Fromm asserts, but a theoretical model drawn from observed data. 144

In his later writings Fromm finds another way of finding man's nature, and of knowing its universality. This way of knowing man seems to spring from Fromm's contact with Zen Buddhism, and begins in a clear way with his essay published in 1960 in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, and his understanding there of the meaning of the unconscious. 145 There is no need here to enter fully into this concept. It will enter more fully in the next subsection of Section B of this chapter, and into Section D of this chapter, where the role of "intuitive" methods of knowing will be discussed. It is sufficient here to say that Fromm finds that man may discover his own true nature, and its universality, i.e., that he shares this with all men by making the "unconscious" to be "conscious"; in doing this the "mere idea of the universality of man" is

143 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 20-24.
144 Ibid., p. 24.
145 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 106-111.
transformed, Fromm asserts, "into the living experience of this universality." 146

Fromm adds later in *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* that in experiencing myself fully I discover that "...the human substance is the same;" 147 Fromm adds that the result of experiencing myself fully is the discovery "...that I am everybody, and that I discover myself in discovering my fellow man, and vice versa. In this experience I discover what humanity is, I discover the One Man."

What Fromm seems to be asserting here in these last two paragraphs, is this, that man's discovery of his commonly shared human nature comes through the full experience of oneself, acquired through mutual self-discovery with one's fellow man. This experience both discovers one's true human nature, and its universality. It is an experience, Fromm asserts, of the total man, it is a way of affective knowing. 148

In this experience of the universality of man Fromm finds "true" humanity, the "One Man," while realizing each person's uniqueness. This phrase, "true" humanity, implies

146 Ibid., p. 107.
147 Erich FROMM, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, p. 172.
148 Erich FROMM, in *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, p. 110.
not merely an accidental universality, but also an essential, a necessary universality. Fromm uses the word "true" here without any restriction, and this type of immediate experience he is discussing here opens itself up to what is genuinely real, what is there, without fiction. So that Fromm is finding a genuine essence, some perfection concretely and individually realized in all men, yet transcending the individual, for all men share truly, possess truly this "true" humanity, this essence. Fromm thus "sees" a universal essence, man, by experiencing this universality. This is not merely an accidental universality but a look into what must be, into an essential, a necessary universality, into an essence that must be so, not merely is so. Thus man's essence is not only universal accidentally, but also necessarily universal, as Fromm sees it.

Another way of approaching this problem of necessity is to look at the source of human nature. In the analysis of the origin of human freedom in the human race in Chapter III of this thesis, it was discovered there that animal became man by his first unconscious act of freedom, bringing with it the qualities of self-awareness, reason,

149 Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 129-130.
"purpose," in a broad sense, of nature's evolutionary development.\textsuperscript{152} Guyton Hammond would incline to the opposite viewpoint that the origin of man was "...accidental, a product of chance."\textsuperscript{153} Fromm gives so few details of the transition from animal to man that it is difficult to do more than conjecture whether he sees any teleology at work other than the metaphorical teleology found in a description of changing functions.\textsuperscript{154}

Ch. VI, B, 4. - Human Knowing

Ch. VI, B, 4, a. - Introduction

In this subsection an inquiry will be made into human knowing, a specific perfection of man. This perfection, under the name of self-awareness, along with reason and imagination, as well as certain emotions of anxiety, helplessness and so forth were brought into existence with the advent of human nature and the coming of freedom from.\textsuperscript{155} Emotions such as helplessness and anxiety will

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{153} Guyton B. HAMMOND, Man in Estrangement, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{154} Cf. Ernest NAGEL, The Structure of Science, p. 401-406.

\textsuperscript{155} Cf. supra, Chapter II, D, p. 158-160; Chapter III, A, 5, p. 179-182, and A, 6, p. 182-183.
not be discussed here, as they have already been thoroughly discussed in earlier chapters. 156

Creative imagination, as Fromm uses it, will not be discussed here either. Its chief function might quite possibly be explained implicitly by Fromm in his discussion of symbolic language and dreams and myths in The Forgotten Language. 157 It is not necessary to describe this to explain freedom from. Fromm seems to have no theory of the function of imagination, whether imitative or creative, 158 in itself or in relation to other mental functions. It may be conjectured that "imagination," as a specific human function mentioned in The Sane Society, 159 simply means the function of imagination as self-initiated or self-organized, in the use of reason. 160

There are a number of other affective reactions, such as love, which will be only mentioned in passing here. For Fromm, man's happiness consists in not only being himself and for himself, but also in the full realization of

156 Cf. e.g., supra, Chapter IV, B, 3, e, (2)-(4), p. 303-313.
159 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 23.
160 James DREVER, op. cit.
faculties peculiar to him, reason, love, and productive work. There is no need to explore here the part that love and productive work have to play as potentialities specific to man. These qualities of man, love and productive work, have already been briefly described as two types of action necessary to maintain one's integrity, to relate spontaneously in full positive freedom to one's fellows and one's work. This investigation would be necessary to fully understand the meaning of man, but it is not considered necessary to understand freedom from adequately.

What is of chief interest is the analysis of the cognitive aspects of the new being in nature, man, and the analysis of the affective reactions just mentioned. Both these cognitive aspects and affective aspects of man have been closely connected with freedom from, and have been seen to represent essential parts of freedom from. Perhaps a further analysis of these aspects of freedom from will show whether or not Fromm's ideas on freedom from are clear and logical or the opposite.

For the time being a precision will be made from these further questions; are these perfections that are

161 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 45.
163 Cf. supra, Chapter V, C, passim.
essential to freedom from's meaning also essential qualities of human nature? In particular, is self-awareness, not only an essential quality of human nature,\textsuperscript{164} but of the very essence of man, as one of the two contradictories demanding a solution? These questions, helpful in understanding the meaning of freedom from in its relationship to human nature, will be investigated in the last subsection of this B section of Chapter VI.

Ch. VI, B, 4, b. - Self-Awareness and Reason

In this subsection on human knowing, an attempt will be made to summarize and synthesize the results of the thesis so far on Fromm's theory of human knowing; this synthesis will incorporate certain additional features of his conception of human knowing not previously mentioned. This section will concentrate on those aspects of human knowing connected with freedom from, and particularly man's self-awareness or consciousness of self. Fromm's use of the presence of reason in mankind as a distinguishing feature of man versus the animal will be dealt with only briefly here. Fromm himself concentrates on self-awareness as opposed to certain aspects of reason. The demonstrative functions of reason as Fromm uses them will be discussed in Section D of this chapter.

In describing awareness as a part of freedom from it was found out that it represented, in Fromm's mind, an essential part of freedom from.\textsuperscript{165} It was debated whether or not it was primary or whether actual separation or separateness was primary.\textsuperscript{166} In any event the advent of awareness to the human race was seen as a specific note proper to humans. Awareness here is understood as self-awareness or human consciousness.

Self-awareness or human consciousness in Fromm's view of it always carries the implication of awareness of reality which is not the self, other selves, the world of nature, the world of economic, political and social institutions.\textsuperscript{167} It is never represented by Fromm as a closed consciousness, but always as open, even though a distorted consciousness. In other words, intentionality is always present in Fromm's view of the nature of consciousness or awareness. Man is always aware of someone or something. Man thus is related to others by consciousness, and related to them in a way higher than that of animals. Man becomes an "I", and other human beings become an "I", after both phylogenetically and ontogenetically a "we" period is

\textsuperscript{165} Cf. supra, Chapter V, C, passim.

\textsuperscript{166} Cf. supra, Chapter III, A, 4, b, p. 177-179.

\textsuperscript{167} Cf. Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 60-63, and Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 171-172.
passed through, in which one's identity is not fully realized.\textsuperscript{168}

If alienation of the interior type is seen as the same as one property of \textit{freedom from}, then human consciousness is from the beginning a distorted consciousness.\textsuperscript{169}

Language, logic, functions of human knowing, and the content of consciousness with its social taboos, are all socially conditioned, and thus far in the human race represent a distortion, a lack of adequacy, in grasping reality, and in speaking of it as well as reasoning about it.\textsuperscript{170} In addition to this social conditioning, there would seem to be an interior lack, as indicated by the original subject-object split in consciousness, and lack of the direct, immediate, intuitive grasp of reality, in which the subject-object split is overcome, and in which the unconscious, representing the true nature of man, becomes fully conscious.

This immediacy of experience represents the true meaning, the full functioning of human knowing. It is the goal of human knowing, for all distortion, all inadequate conceptualization, all cerebration will be overcome. In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} Erich FROMM, \textit{The Sane Society}, p. 60-63.
\item \textsuperscript{169} Cf. supra, Chapter V, A, 5, p. 359-371.
\item \textsuperscript{170} Cf. supra, Chapter V, A, 2, b, p. 347-349, and Chapter V, A, 4, p. 355-358, for this and the next paragraph.
\end{itemize}
this state of perfect knowing man is spontaneous and creative, for he responds to reality as it really is, with full knowing activity, in a way that, being creative and spontaneous, means the involvement of the total being of man on all psychic levels. 171

It only remains to state briefly the meaning of "reason" as Fromm uses the word. In "reason" Fromm finds a fundamental human potentiality, a basic disposition whose use is necessary for productive living. 172 As contrasted with "intelligence," shared with animals as a way of manipulating objects, reason tries to get to the "essence of things and processes." 173 Reason tries to see things, others and oneself as they are, objectively, i.e., as both the subject and object determine the process and the result of "reason." 174 Speaking of Fromm's use of reason and objectivity, Singer sees in them "...the fulfillment of a primary potentiality for learning to know oneself and others in a basic, thorough, and profound way," a primary potentiality which Singer sees as backed up by contemporary research. 175

171 Cf. ibid., and in addition Chapter V, B, 2, b, (2), p. 388-390.
172 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 207-208.
173 Ibid., p. 102.
174 Ibid., p. 103-106.
It would seem, then, that "reason" in Fromm's sense of the word is a broad power for seeking out the meaning of reality by coming to know the essential aspects of reality. It involves a drive for understanding all of reality, each in its totality, and is motivated by the mysteries of human existence, as a way of solving the dichotomies of life. It works progressively towards a more profound knowledge of reality, by reconstructive interpretation of fundamental insights.

How is "reason" related to self-awareness? It would seem that it may be the primary function of this self-awareness. The distortions of consciousness, such as the exclusive use of traditional logic as opposed to paradoxical logic, and the thinking out of problems apart from other human psychic reactions, known as "cerebration," are distortions of "reason." Reason's goal is the goal of human self-awareness, the goal of grasping the essential nature of reality, the same as human self-awareness.

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176 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 103-105; cf. also Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 24.


Erich Fromm casts his theory of human needs in a relationship to existential dichotomies; human needs arise because of man's combined animal-human existence. These needs are logically close to human existence and human essence, and would seem to be connected with freedom from, possibly as one of its consequences. Hence their nature will be briefly discussed here; they are derived, John Schaar says, from a philosophical analysis.

In man, Fromm says in Man for Himself, are certain unchangeable qualities of his nature; these unchangeable qualities are one source of human evolution, and lead ineluctably to a pursuit of conditions that will allow these intrinsic needs to be met in some fashion. Fromm specifies only one need in this book, published in 1947, Man for Himself, the need for a framework of orientation and devotion. In The Sane Society, published in 1955, Fromm develops his full statement of these needs, intrinsic

179 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 28-30.

180 Cf. John SCHAAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 52; cf. ibid., p. 45-52, and passim for a discussion of the history of Fromm's ideas on basic human needs, and a critique of them.

181 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 23.

182 Ibid., p. 46-50.
to man because of the contradictions in his existence; these needs are a need for union with other living beings, the need of transcendence, the need for rootedness, the need for a sense of identity, and the need for a frame of orientation and devotion. These needs are bipolar as to their fulfillment; they can either be fulfilled in a way that enhances life, that leads to true humanity, or in a way that leads to frustration of true humanity.

It would seem then that these needs share the bipolarity of human nature itself with its contradictory tendencies, and its demand for a solution. Actually the positive side of these needs must be fulfilled, since this positive side, e.g., striving for love as a response to the need for union with other living beings, is an intrinsic dynamic need for man, Fromm says later in Beyond the Chains of Illusion, published in 1962. There Fromm says that if such a need as striving for love is frustrated beyond a certain threshold, members of society will force a change, even possibly to the collapse of society.

183 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 30-66.
184 Ibid.
185 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 3, b, p. 478-483.
186 Erich FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 81.
187 Ibid., p. 81 and 82.
Fromm seems to be saying here that the bipolarity of human needs is not a neutral one, that the conditions of human existence, leading to these strivings for the positive part of need satisfaction, tend to prefer the "positive" solution, and in fact will not allow the exclusion of the "positive" solution from human existence. It would seem, then, that there is not a true bipolarity here, for the negative solution is impossible. This would indicate a bias on the part of human nature to prefer, to be adamant on at least a partial fulfillment of the "human" part of its composition.

What these needs seem to represent in man is a reaction to the acknowledged separateness of man, with its feelings of aloneness and anxiety; these needs are strivings to be united with and related again in some fashion to oneself, to other humans, and to the world. These needs then do come from the demand for a solution of the fundamental contradiction in man, and may be thought of as five ways of being dynamically related to reality including one's own. They are all five ways, it would seem, of fulfilling an even more basic need, to be not alone.

Why, then, is freedom called a "need"? Quite likely because Fromm sees in it the cause, the antecedent...

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188 Ibid., p. 81.
to these expressed needs not to be alone. The cause here receives the name of the effects, the basic human needs.

It was said above that love and productive work, while faculties peculiar to man, would not be explored fully, although necessary for the full development of man's positive freedom. It may be said here, under the heading of human needs, that human love seems to be the outcome of the essential nature of man, as expressed in his essential human needs for relatedness. Human love, it would seem, while essential, is derivative in that it is a response to a human need, as a progressive response to the need for union with others.

Ch. VI, B, 6. - A Synthesis

A brief reflection is in order now on the elements of Erich Fromm's conception of man, of his existence, of his human needs, of his essential psychic qualities, and of his essential human needs. Before comparing Fromm's concept of freedom from with his concept of man, and evaluating his concept of freedom from in terms of this comparison, it will be good to synthesize these various descriptions of man given by Fromm in the preceding five

189 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 4, a, p. 490-491.

190 Cf. Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 31-36.
subsections of this B section of Chapter VI. This synthesis will be accomplished by comparing these various attributes of men disclosed during these five subsections.

The first thing that may be worth noticing is this, that both human existence and human essence are couched in dialectical terms. Both human existence and human essence are described as being a contradiction or a conflict. Human nature or essence was stated explicitly to have a demand for a solution as part of its makeup. Human existence in its human condition, or, more explicitly, in its existential dichotomies was described in terms of conflict. The basic conflict seeking a solution in both human existence and human essence was seen to be, concretely speaking, the painful, anxious, lonely, disequilibrium brought on by man being in two different levels of striving at once, the animal and the human. Thus Fromm sees as basic to human existence conflict, and an inner conflict in man. At the central core of man is a conflict, looking for a solution.

A question occurs here, based on the similar description Fromm gives to both human existence and human essence or nature. The question is this: What is the relationship in Fromm's writing between existence and essence? Both are described in similar if not identical terms. The answer will help to clarify Fromm's concept of
human nature. First of all Fromm's description of human existence is always in terms of what he considers to be the concrete reality of existing man. It is circumscribed in terms of space and time, and would seem to be always the actual existing man, along with his entire physiological and psychic reality, with his psychic reality consisting of the process of development at any given stage of man's relationships to himself, to other humans and to his work. Human existence for Fromm means what actually is here and now, developing, changing and, very importantly, approaching human essence.

Human essence itself, in Fromm's conception of it, is not an abstract, unchanging substance, nor something entirely relative; since neither unchanging nor entirely relative, it is in man, relatively fixed and permanent, yet developing; it is the reason why man is what he is. Fromm's definition of it in *The Heart of Man* seems abstract, as a contradiction seeking a solution. Yet he ties this definition in immediately with a relatively constant set

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of facts, that bring out that man is animal, that he is not animal, i.e., he is human, that the two are in conflict, that the conflict demands a solution, and that any solution leads to new contradictions. What Fromm is trying to do here, it seems, is to find, not the abstract essence of man, but rather "human nature in general" as opposed to "human nature as modified" with each historical period, as Fromm, in his work *Marx's Concept of Man* describes Marx's approach to human essence in Marx's earlier writing. Apparently, then, what Fromm finds as a constant in changing, conflictual acting human nature, i.e., existential man, is active conflict, seeking a solution, always and everywhere. That this nature of man is truly universal, known to be so by immediate experience of the "One Man," was seen to be true, and necessarily so, above.

One may ask: Is not "human nature in general" a universal nature, and, as universal, therefore abstract? It would seem so, since the same essence can be applied to each man in the same sense, since the description prescinds from the individual, concrete stage of development of each.

193 Ibid., p. 116-121.
194 Erich FROMM, *Marx's Concept of Man*, p. 25.
195 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 3, p. 486-487.
human being's conflictual situation. It does not seem as though Fromm would deny these facts but he would go on to point out, as he does in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, that abstract language is alienated and distorts reality.\footnote{196\textsuperscript{196} Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 98-101.}

For him any departure from concrete reality and concrete experience of it in oneself in relation to others and to self would seem to be a distortion, not a precision. Nevertheless Fromm would accept the abstraction and precision of the language of science as useful, providing a person realizes its distortions, and uses a method for avoiding those distortions.\footnote{197\textsuperscript{197} Erich FROMM, in Socialist Humanism, An International Symposium, p. 238-239. Cf. also Richard I. EVANS, Dialogue with Erich Fromm, p. 73-84.}

The question of whether or not human nature for Fromm is abstract or concrete leads to another question: What relation is there between the specific perfections proper to man, e.g., self-awareness and reason, and human essence? Are they part of this essence, as one pole of the contradictions, or do they flow from this essence, as an essential quality, attribute or perfection, necessary to this contradiction but one logical step removed from this dichotomy?
First of all, it must be said that if human essence is exclusively contradiction seeking a solution, and such human perfections as self-awareness and reason are not part of this essence, but flow from it, then there is nothing to differentiate man from the animal. Nothing, for there would be nothing in the essence to differentiate man from animal, no specific perfection, nor would they differ in this that man is a contradiction demanding a solution, whereas an animal is not. In Fromm's theory of man, already seen in this chapter, man is to be explained dialectically, and arises from nature, as a product of nature. 198

Implied here is the fact that man arose from a previous contradiction inhering in his animal ancestors, and as a product of a change of quantity to quality, a dialectical leap. Man's origin is logically due to a previous, dialectical situation in the animal kingdom.

There is no explanation of the existence of contradiction in man's essence, of a dialectical situation, without its origin from a previously existing dialectical situation. It would seem that Fromm would logically have to postulate this, and if this be true, then both animals and men would have a dialectical struggle demanding a solution for their essence, and would be different essentially:

198 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, A, 3, p. 445-453; B, 2, b, p. 458-466; B, 3, b, p. 476-483.
in nothing, if this type of essence is their total essence. In this matter Fromm's thought is not developed. Here an attempt has been made to think out the implications of his theory of human nature or essence.

Would Fromm accept this fact, that a definition of man as a contradiction demanding a solution is an adequate definition, adequately explaining man's activity? It would hardly seem so, for he sees man's specific properties of self-awareness and reason, as something quite different than anything in the animal kingdom, and the source of an opposition to the animal part of man, as well as giving man the power to overcome this opposition by self-actualizing his specific perfections of self-awareness and reason. These specific perfections, too, in Fromm's view, are the sources of the new anxiety and insecurity, the sense of aloneness and powerlessness that are found in man and not in animals; these perfections, too, open the way up to new possible modes of relatedness to others through love, and to nature by productive work. Thus men will arrive at a complete type of new union with themselves, with other men and nature. 199

199 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 2, p. 471-472; Chapter VI, B, 3, b, p. 478-479; Chapter VI, B, 4, a, p. 490-491 and Chapter VI, B, 5, p. 497-500.
In thus describing man Fromm would logically have to hold that the specific powers of man of self-awareness and reason are not merely essential qualities or attributes of man's essence, but are part of it, with the result that self-awareness and reason serve to define man's essence inasmuch as he transcends the animal. This means that man is essentially different than the animal. Perhaps Fromm's definition of man as "an animal...that can be aware of himself" serves to illustrate this point. Perhaps the definition of man, "rational animal," would serve to define man, if by "rational" were understood the perfection of self-awareness and reason, yet neither of these two definitions saves what Fromm considers to be of the essence of man, whatever else may be of the essence, i.e., that the total man is in his very meaning a contradiction, demanding a solution.

It would thus seem that man, in essence both animal and man, is also in essence a unity made up of these two perfections in opposition, in contradiction to each other, seeking a solution. Man is thus animal, and also human because of a new essentially different perfection, self-awareness and reason, and he is also the dialectical unity and conflict of these two within himself, a struggle

200 Erich FROMM, *The Sane Society*, p. 60.
pushing toward a solution. The progressive solution would not be a total denial of animality, representing nature as existing within man but a humanizing of man and animality, representing nature within man, through a transformation of this animality by new relationships within man founded on true love for oneself and others.\textsuperscript{201}

As said before in this chapter, there seems to be an ambiguity in Fromm's conception of the goal of man.\textsuperscript{202} According to him the progressive solution is the one in which the specific perfection of man, self-awareness and reason, as well as his specific modes of relatedness to reality, through love and productive work, lead to a complete self-actualizing, spontaneous, creative, total life; Fromm sees in all living things, including those living a life of self-awareness, an inherent tendency to not only persevere in life but to grow and to become more integrated.\textsuperscript{203} Yet Fromm holds that there is no intrinsic drive for perfection in man, and, as has been seen, this does not ring quite true, inasmuch as there is no real possibility of preferring and choosing the regressive solution to

\textsuperscript{201} Cf. supra, Chapter V, B, 2, f, (1), p. 403-406, and Chapter VI, B, 5, p. 498-499.

\textsuperscript{202} Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 3, b, p. 481-483.

\textsuperscript{203} Cf. supra, Chapter V, B, 2, b-f, p. 383-410, and Chapter VI, B, 5, p. 497-500; cf. also supra, Chapter VI, B, 2, c, p. 467-470.
man's inner contradiction. One reason already given is this, that, if man's origin is due to chance, then it would hardly do to see in man's essence some sort of purpose to be accomplished.

One other reason may be suggested here. From his experience in dealing with man and with history Fromm sees no certain outcome of this conflict within individual men and within the human race. If this drive for perfection can and may well be frustrated then it cannot legitimately be called an intrinsic drive for perfection, since an intrinsic drive would be one whose purpose had to be accomplished. What Fromm's conception of man may need in this particular instance is a theory of purpose, of good, that distinguishes between a goal intrinsic to man, built into his being, true human good, a goal that cannot be not willed, and the means towards this goal, which due to social conditions, and more particularly due to man's ineffable freedom of choice, need not be chosen in any particular details. What he may need even more is an analysis of man's final goal that opens up the way to man to transcend his own new human perfection. What Fromm may well


204a Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 3, c, p. 487-489.

205 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 2, b, p. 460-462.
need is to realize the implications of man striving for
good in general, that the very reason for his dissatisfac-
tion, for his anxiety, is a metaphysical one, that man is
open to passing beyond all human limits, and that his drive
is to become more than human by obtaining some sort of
absolute future.\textsuperscript{206} Fromm's naturalism here seems to be a
block to the implications of his philosophical analysis of
man.

In discussing human essence, human knowing and
human needs in the preceding sections of this chapter, it
was taken for granted that these perfections intrinsic to
man were intrinsic in this sense, that they belong to man,
individually, and are man's own ways of reacting to and
shaping his own destiny. Yet it may be asked if these are
truly intrinsic to individual man in this sense, that they
are not entirely the product of social influence. In other
words, is man's essence, as specifically human, entirely
the product of and the ensemble of his social relations,
as Marxists would have.\textsuperscript{207} This question could use a

\textsuperscript{206} Cf. Joseph DONCEEL, Philosophical Anthropology,
New York, Sheed and Ward, 1967, p. 365-367. Cf. also a
discussion of the importance of the concept of the "abso-
lute future," in an article "Death and Humanism," in Herder
(A summary of part of a lecture given by Karl Rahner at the
Christian Marxist meeting in 1966 at Herrenchiemsee,
Bavaria).

\textsuperscript{207} Cf. Richard T. DE GEORGE, "The Soviet Concept
serious investigation, but it would seem that the individ­
ual man's specific essence, although derived in many ways
from society, (as surely the animal part of his essence is),
is from the beginning an internal nature that is intrinsic
to man, a nature that is not "indefinitely malleable."

Furthermore Fromm says that as man makes his unconscious
to be conscious, he finds in himself all of reality, plant,
animal and man. It would seem that he would hold that
from the beginning of the human race, and in the individual
human being's ontogenetic growth, the potentialities are
there present, with society forming, influencing, distort­
ing, but not giving these specifically human potential­
ities.

Chapter VI, C. - FREEDOM FROM AND FROMM'S PHILOSOPHY

Ch. VI, C, 1. - Introduction

In this C section of Chapter VI an attempt will be
made to put together what has been discovered about freedom
from in the course of the thesis, and what has been at
least hypothetically established about the meaning of human

208 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 20-22.

209 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 4, p. 494-495, and

210 This seems to be the sense of these origins as
described in Chapter II, A, and particularly Chapter III,
A, of this thesis.
existence, human nature, the specific perfections of man and human needs, as Fromm sees them. Thus a comparison will be made between the findings of Chapters II-V of this thesis, and the findings of Sections A and B of this chapter.

This comparison will involve a synthesis, too, as its chief purpose. What is being looked for here, as part of an internal critique, is the internal consistency of Fromm’s position on freedom from, as seen in the light of his other philosophical positions developed earlier in this chapter. This inquiry will possibly meet with contradictions, or at least ambiguities in this comparison. These contradictions or ambiguities will be dealt with as they occur, but they will be synthesized in Section E of this chapter.

Actually what is being chiefly looked for in this synthesis is the actual intelligible connection of Fromm’s conception of freedom from with these other aspects of Fromm’s philosophy. Three questions will be asked here:

1. Is there an actual intelligible connection between freedom from and the other aspects of Fromm’s philosophy,
2. What is the nature of this intelligible connection, and
3. What is the quality of this connection, i.e., is the connection necessary, and with what kind of necessity?
It is necessary to put order into this inquiry, involving as it does the relationship between freedom from with its four different meanings, and the many aspects of Fromm's general philosophical position and his concept of man. What will be done then is to look at each of these four concepts of freedom from one at a time, and inquire into the questions suggested in the preceding paragraphs. This will be done twice in two separate subsections, the first involving a comparison of these concepts of freedom from with Fromm's concept of man, and the second a comparison of these concepts of freedom from with Fromm's general philosophical position. This final subsection will synthesize the results of these two subsections in terms of "isms." One reason for this synthesis is this, that as noted in the introduction to Section A of this chapter, there is no complete actual separation between Fromm's general philosophical position and his concept of man. Man's dialectic, evolutionary nature, for instance, was treated in both Sections A and B of this chapter. It is felt that here there will be greater clarity if Fromm's

211 Cf. supra, Chapter V, C, p. 429-430.
212 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, A, 1, p. 436.
concept of man is treated first, for Fromm's philosophical ideas on man are more concrete; going from the concrete to the more abstract "isms" will produce a better and clearer idea of the relationships involved.

Ch. VI, C, 2. - Freedom From and Fromm's Concept of Man

Ch. VI, C, 2, a. - Introduction

In this section the concept of **freedom from** will be compared with Fromm's concept of man as developed in Section B of this chapter. Since there are four concepts of **freedom from** developed in Chapters II-V of this thesis, the procedure here will be to compare each of these concepts with the pertinent points of Fromm's concept of man, in order to notice what, if any, intelligible relationship in terms of necessity and type of necessity, if applicable.

The approach will vary, depending on what aspect of man being compared with Fromm's concept of **freedom from**. With human existence the concept of **freedom from** will be compared with something actual and in process. With human essence the concept of **freedom from** will be compared with something carrying more necessity.

What will be done here, then, is to take each concept of **freedom from**, and make this comparison and synthesis. There are four concepts of **freedom from**, resembling
one another; they are freedom from in its origin in the
different human individual, freedom from in its origin in the
human race, freedom from in its general development in the
individual, i.e., its ontogenetic development, and finally,
freedom from in its general development in the human race,
i.e., in its phylogenetic development.214 The general develop­
ment of freedom from in the individual will be discussed
first. The origin of freedom from in the human individual
will be discussed briefly, but last, for it is of a dif­
ferent type than the other three meanings, involving more
of a physical meaning than a psychic meaning.215 Following
the discussion of the general development of freedom from
in the individual will be the origin, and then the general
development of freedom from in the human race. This will
follow for the most part the general plan of analogy of the
concepts, as discussed during the thesis.216 The following
subsections will take these four concepts in this order, as
they are related to Fromm's concept of man.

214 Cf. supra, Chapter V, C, p. 429-430.

215 Ibid.

216 Cf. supra, Chapter II, A, 7, and Chapter III,
B, 3, f, passim.
(1) Human Existence and Freedom From

Before comparing freedom from with human existence, the concept of freedom from as it applies here will be reviewed. Freedom from in its general development in the individual was seen to consist of one aspect of a growing dialectic process of human individuation, with the other dialectic aspect of this growing individuation a positive freedom, a "freedom to." Specifically, as the child develops physiologically and psychologically it becomes aware of itself as separate from others, and passes into feelings of aloneness, anxiety and fear. The relationship to authority involves for every child, at least as far as is known, a conflict with superior power, in which the child suffers temporary defeat, and to overcome which the child must develop a humanistic conscience. The main task of freedom from, which develops automatically, and is irreversible, is to separate the child from primary ties and

217 Freedom from in its general development in the individual was investigated in B and C sections of Chapter II of this thesis, and in Section C of Chapter V of this thesis. References throughout this subsection will refer to these chapter sections, unless otherwise indicated. References will only be made at the end of each paragraph unless otherwise needed.
secondary ties, too, so that the child may grow fully and in an integrated fashion. For the human individual, this general cutting off of all emotional, possibly somewhat instinct-directed, ties, is like a continual birth, a continual separation. There are five elements making up this general pattern of development in the growing individual, an actual separation from all others, a growing realization of this separation from mother and all others, an affective response of anxiety, aloneness and fear to this realized separateness, as well as a dialectic relationship to a contradictory movement of positive freedom and individuation, the goal of freedom from. 218

In addition to this development, something special occurs in the self-awareness of the growing individual. Alienation takes place of an interior type, consisting of a loss of the immediacy of the small child's awareness, and bringing with it a subject-object split in consciousness, and a distorted, alienated consciousness. Thus freedom from primary ties must be accompanied by freedom from the effects of alienation. It would seem that this alienation of an interior type is one aspect of freedom from in the growing individual. 219

218 Cf. supra, Chapter II, D, passim.
219 Cf. supra, Chapter V, A, 5, b, passim.
What connection does this have with the human existence of the individual? It would seem that what Fromm has done is to intertwine his description of human existence with the aspect of growing human freedom, freedom from, as he claims to do, saying they are inseparable.\footnote{Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 32.}

Granting the probable identity of human negative individuation and freedom from,\footnote{Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, 1, passim.} it seems that Fromm is looking at human existence in terms of freedom, both positive and negative, \textit{i.e.}, human existence as human. For both freedoms, negative and positive, describe the psychic growth of the human being, away from emotional ties and alienation toward full potentiality and spontaneity. These freedoms are not concerned about the physical side of man. They describe the growth of man's new specific, complex life of self-awareness and of his psychic powers, in an inherent, dynamic striving for human completion.\footnote{Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 2, c, p. 466-470.}

Is human existence, as human, totally described by Fromm in terms of freedom, then? It would seem not, for in the central passages descriptive of freedom from and freedom to in \textit{Escape from Freedom},\footnote{Cf. supra, Chapter II, V and C, 1, passim.} Fromm mentions...
another aspect of human existence that is the opposite of freedom, the tendency to try to return to the pre-human state through submission, a theory he develops later in his explanation of the human condition and of the existential dichotomies. In human existence, then, Fromm sees a contradiction, a clash, a dichotomy between two aspects of man, his new human nature, and his animal nature. Freedom, and with it freedom from, are on the human side of this contradiction. Fromm contrasts the meaning of freedom's growth with the impulse to return to nature.

Freedom from, as Fromm describes it, is truly human, because it involves an actual separation from all others due to a specific human property, self-awareness, which brings on the recognition of this separation, as well as accompanying human emotions, along with reason and creative imagination. Freedom from, then, is on the human plane, as distinct from the animal plane of simple consciousness and harmony. Freedom from then is something very positive, for it includes in its own meaning a

224 Ibid.
225 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 2, b, passim.
226 Cf. supra, Chapter II, V, and C, 1, passim.
227 Cf. ibid., as well as Erich FROMM, in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 98.
specific human perfection, self-awareness, as well as reason and imagination. Fromm's idea that human existence and freedom from are inseparable is seen in a new light because of this.

Freedom from, moreover, while a positive part of the human side of man's contradictory existence, itself is the condition for the negative side of man's existential dichotomy, the impulse to return to nature, to the animal state. For this impulse arises only consequent to and dependent upon one aspect of freedom from, the individual's awareness of his own separateness. In Fromm's account this aspect of freedom from, leading to the negative pole of man's existential contradiction, seems to be a necessary condition, for no exceptions are made in his account. This furthermore means that the essential psychic struggle in the individual's existential, contradictory situation, involves a movement of one aspect, freedom from, of the positive pole of this contradiction, before the negative tendency becomes operative.

Another comment should be made here, following upon this perceived relationship between freedom from and the negative pole of the human existential situation. It is this, that freedom from itself is involved as the negative aspect of a dialectic process with positive freedom. The presence of freedom from is seen as a necessary
condition for the positive aspect of freedom "freedom to," for freedom from takes place automatically while "freedom to" may be hampered for a number of reasons. The process of growth in freedom, with "freedom to" and freedom from as its positive and negative aspects, is a dialectic process made up of these two contradictories.

The result of this presence of a dialectic contradictory process in the positive human part of man's existential situation is that there seems to be a contradictory process within a contradictory process. It would seem that freedom from plays a double role, for its presence is a necessary condition for the impulse to return to nature, and also a necessary condition for the movement of "freedom to" towards man's self-actualization. This raises the question of how this is to be conceived, what kind of a process is this, in which an element can and does play this double role. To answer this adequately it will be better to compare freedom from and human nature as dialectical processes, which will be done in the next subsection.

In summary, then, of the relationship between human existence and freedom from, it has been discovered that freedom from is something positive, for it is an essential part of human existence's positive aspect, of the human

228 Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, I, c, p. 91, 101-102; cf. also supra, Chapter III, B, 3, c, passim.
part of the human fundamental dichotomy, for freedom from has as one of its fundamental components self-awareness. Moreover, while a necessary condition for "freedom to" to become operative, freedom from also is a necessary condition for the negative aspect of the human situation. Thus freedom from plays a double role, and is involved in a double contradictory process, the one as the negative aspect of "freedom to" in a dialectic process, the other as part of the positive aspect of the human existential dichotomy.

(2) Human Nature and Freedom From

In just investigating the relationship of developing freedom from in the human individual it would have been possible to raise several more questions, e.g., as just mentioned, the question of how freedom from's role as a member of two dialectical processes is to be conceived? Other questions could have been raised as to the necessity of the functions freedom from is seen to perform in the structure of Fromm's conception of man. In discussing the relationship of Fromm's concept of the general development of freedom from in the human individual to his concept of human nature, these questions will be able to be treated more adequately, and thus were postponed until later. For human existence describes what is, and human nature is
closer in Fromm's thinking, to what has to be.

In this subsection the same condensed summary of freedom from will be used as was used in the beginning of the last subsection, while the meaning of human nature will be the one developed in Section B of this chapter, and synthesized in the same section.

In defining human nature Fromm saw its inner meaning to be that by reason of which man is man, and this he holds firmly to be "...a contradiction inherent in human existence," demanding a solution, which, taken more explicitly means that the essence of man is at once an animal, and at once human, two forces united in conflict and struggle, and demanding a solution. This solution is demanded because the conflict brings on a realization of separateness that is frightening and produces feelings of aloneness. A return to oneness, to union is the need of man with this essence. After inquiry it was discovered that Fromm must mean that this internal contradiction must involve as its essential constituents, its two concrete poles, being aware of self and possessing reason and creative imagination on the one hand, and on the other

229 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, b, (1), p. 516-517.
230 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 3, p. 473-489, and Chapter VI, B, 6, p. 500-501. References throughout this subsection will be made to these sections mentioned in this footnote and the preceding one unless otherwise noted.
231 Ibid. for this and the rest of this paragraph.
remaining imprisoned as an animal whose life is no longer protected by instinctive responses.

It was also seen that all men shared this essence, possessed it, in varying degrees of actuality. If a being was an animal and possessed these further perfections of self-awareness, reason and creative imagination, then this being was, and is, human, and will be in the future, Fromm would seem to say, for he makes no exceptions, even finding in the extremes of "good" and "evil" men, the potentialities of the opposite solution to the one they possess to such a degree. Fromm does apparently claim that there is a genuine human knowledge that knows man's essence to be not only accidentally universal, but also essentially universal.

If this necessary universality be true, then the essential constituents of this essence share in this property of being necessary to all men, and freedom from, as containing one of those essentials, self-awareness, is also found in man universally and necessarily. Freedom from's inseparability from human existence, therefore, has its explanation in the fact that human nature demands this aspect of freedom from, as one of the ways nature expresses its own dynamic activity.

232 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, V, 3, b, p. 482-483.
233 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, V, 3, p. 486-487.
The whole concept of developing freedom from in the individual includes a cutting of primary ties, the realization of the ensuing separateness, with emotional reactions of anxiety and fear. These constituents of freedom from are part of an automatic and irreversible process. The result of this process is to tend towards positive psychic self-growth, the growth of one's integrated, spontaneous activity.234 What part do these elements have to play with Fromm's concept of human nature? The role of self-awareness, and its being an essential part of human nature, is discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Are the other elements of freedom from also part of human nature?

Granted that human individual individuation and human individual freedom are both the same, then the first aspect of freedom from, the separation from emotional ties, is a separation from ties that bind to a unity of warmth, affection, dependence, i.e., from the ties of nature, in this case, animality as it exists in individual man. This movement of separation then rejects animality as a source of unity and as a goal. In other words, this movement is one of non-animality, of rejection of instinct-directed activity, or of the effects in man of his animal ancestry, binding, unthinking emotional ties of dependence. Such a

movement could be a part of human nature; if the purpose of this movement, the self-actualization, full "freedom to," is also looked at, then the movement of separation from primary ties takes on its full meaning, as an essential and necessary condition of "freedom to," whose meaning, in turn, is a becoming fully human; this "freedom to" is dialectically related to freedom from. 235

The next question to be asked is this: How do the emotional reactions to realized separateness fit into Fromm's concept of human nature as a contradiction demanding a solution, as a struggle, demanding a solution between the specifically human and the animal in man? Fromm would say that the content of the emotions, the reasons why they exist, is specifically human. The feelings of aloneness, of helplessness and anxiety are due to a realized situation, that of objective separation, that never exists in animals, because they are unaware. 236 He might even say that these emotions in man are only analogous in nature to those of animals, because of the distinctly different situation in man. In any event, as just seen, these emotions of aloneness, helplessness and anxiety are prior to the actual negative or retrogressive part of man's funda-

235 Cf. supra, Chapter V, B, 3, passim.

236 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, Its Genius for Good and Evil, p. 117.
mental dichotomy, since the tendency to return to the unity of nature, of the animal, follows upon these emotions. There are no exceptions to this, as far as can be made out from Fromm's writings, and it is stated as part of his general theory, as universally true.\textsuperscript{237} Hence, it may be concluded that these emotions belong to the inner dynamic core of essential human nature as human, and furthermore, since obviously these emotions implicate and proceed through man's body, in some ways man's body contributes to, as a necessary instrument, the distinctly human side of man, and is therefore in some way united to man's psychic life.

Since freedom from in its relationship to "freedom to" is a necessary condition for it, and is united to it as a goal, then these attributes of freedom from are also an essential part of human nature, as human, in developing human freedom in the human individual. These elements in Fromm's thinking are universally present, and essential to freedom from's meaning.\textsuperscript{238} It may be pointed out here that earlier in the thesis Fromm's theory that freedom from and "freedom to" are related as true contradictories was seen to be not necessarily true; related as opposites, as

\textsuperscript{237} Cf. e.g., Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 28-31.

\textsuperscript{238} Cf. supra, Chapter V, B, 3, passim.
contraries of some sort, yes, but as contradictories, not proven. 239

It may be concluded, therefore, that in Fromm's conception of freedom from as an aspect of developing human freedom every part of this process of freedom from forms an essential part of human nature as human. Freedom from in this meaning is man as specifically human, inasmuch as he breaks away from nature and animality. There is nothing prior to freedom from temporarily or conceptually in human nature as human.

The relationship between the dialectic process of freedom and the dialectic process of human nature needs discussion, in terms of dialectical materialism in its general tenents. It will be better, however, to reserve this discussion until the next subsection on the comparison of the origin of freedom from in the human race; this is needed for an adequate comparison.

(3) Human Knowing and Freedom From

To point up the relationship between freedom from and human knowing, it will be well to pull together what has been seen about the nature of self-awareness as disclosed so far in relationship to freedom from and human

239 Ibid.
nature. First of all, this self-awareness is an instrument, a function by which man's contradictory state is known. Here self-awareness is a part of freedom from and human nature. Secondly, it is the psychic antecedent (the cause?) of subsequent emotional reactions which, in turn, activate the tendency to return to nature. This is self-awareness, as both a part of freedom from and human nature. Thirdly, self-awareness is the specific perfection of man, whose presence in man makes him to be different from, and transcend animality.

Fourthly, moreover, self-awareness, alienated from the beginning, and thus imperfect, needs growth through alienation into the new immediacy of consciousness, which will be had when the unconscious becomes fully conscious in the spontaneous, creative activity of knowing. This is one aspect of the fullness of "freedom to," spontaneous, creative knowing, and the goal of freedom from, inasmuch as freedom from is dialectically related to "freedom to" as its goal. Therefore, self-awareness in many ways belongs to freedom from, but inasmuch as its tendency is to grow through alienation towards a new immediacy of consciousness, it belongs to the positive aspect of human psychic growth, "freedom to."
(4) Human Needs and Freedom From

One other aspect of freedom from's relationship to human nature or human existence remains to be seen. What is the relationship of growing freedom from in the individual to human needs? Human needs have been said to arise from existential contradictions, from the need to be related to man and nature in a new way, with the positive way of being related really the preferred way. Since this most basic existential contradiction in man between human nature as human and animal, between life and death, demanding a solution, is essential to man, then the tendency to fulfill this solution, to restore unity, the basic property of human needs, follows necessarily from human nature.

Freedom from has been seen as a necessary condition for this recognition of man's essential existential contradiction, and is therefore a necessary condition for human needs, too. Freedom from is a logical antecedent to human needs, therefore. Moreover, whatever preference there is in human nature as human for the progressive solution for human needs does not proceed formally from freedom from, since the inclination to solve human needs progressively.

240 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 5, passim.
would belong to man's tendency to grow psychically in an integrated way, and belong therefore to "freedom to."

One comment may be added, i.e., that human needs and their fulfillment are posterior logically, and quite likely temporally to many other essentially human functions. Love and productive work, essential to man's nature as seen above,241 are essential movements if there is a preference for the progressive solution to human needs in man, and one solution to an essential craving, or need, in man, if there is no essential preference for the progressive solution in man. In either case love and productive activity are subsequent, in Fromm's analysis, to many other dynamic movements, or relationships in man. In the first case love and productive activity are essential powers of man; in the second case they are not essential to man.

Ch. VI, C, 2, c. - The Origin of Freedom From in the Human Race and Fromm's Concept of Man

In this subsection of Section C, 2 of this chapter, the origin of freedom from in the human race will be compared to and synthesized with Fromm's concept of man in its many ramifications. Much of the material of this section would be identical to the analysis and synthesis in the preceding subsection of this chapter, C, 2, a, of Fromm's

241 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 4, a, p. 490-491.
concept of man and his concept of developing freedom from in the human individual. It will not be repeated here; the differences will be pointed out, however. The chief emphasis in this subsection will be on the question of the explanation of why this origin took place. This question of why this origin took place will have two aspects, first, the logical possibility of it taking place, based upon a factual explanation of how it took place, and secondly, a possible general theory of why man originated from the animal.

It may be appropriate to first summarize the meaning of freedom from in the origin of the human race. Previous to man's existence were animals, having at the most a simple consciousness, not involving self-awareness or awareness of others in a human way. As dependence on instinctual control of action became a minimum or ceased altogether, man came into existence. The first "human" act was an unconscious act of freedom from, of "free choice," bringing with it self-awareness, emotions of anxiety, helplessness, etc., along with a dialectic relationship of "freedom to" as a positive aspect of this contradiction, and as a goal of this new freedom from.

242 The material about freedom from in this subsection is taken, unless otherwise noted, from supra, Chapter III, A, Chapter V, C and Chapter VI, A, 3, passim.
This self-awareness knows of this new separation from nature; the knowledge of this separation causes the emotions just mentioned.

(1) Human Existence and Freedom From

The account of the origins of human existence in the human race is not given in terms of simple statements of fact, but rather seen in terms of two ideas, that of freedom and that of birth. 243 “Birth” is obviously a metaphor, with the term describing something analogous to individual human birth. For the most part, however, Fromm’s description of man’s origin in terms of a comparison with preceding animals and in terms of the use of the myth of the Garden of Eden, is in terms of freedom, and chiefly freedom from. Human existence and freedom from are inseparable from the beginning, Fromm says, and the first human act is one of freedom from, albeit unconscious, bringing with it alienation from nature and from another human being; 244 this alienation, present in the beginning of the human race, is an “interior” alienation, and very likely the same thing as freedom from in the beginning of the human race. 245

244 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 32, 34.
245 Cf. supra, Chapter V, A, 5, c, passim.
So important is freedom from to human existence that the act of freedom from, albeit unconscious, is the first human act. Consequent upon this first human act are the specific perfections of man, self-awareness, etc., in one of Fromm's passages, whereas in another it would seem that man's existence begins with the advent of self-awareness. The solution to this seeming ambiguity was not forthcoming in an earlier discussion of it in this thesis, although it seemed that the opinion holding the advent of self-awareness as consequent upon freedom from would be a better one.\textsuperscript{246}

Whatever be the solution to this particular problem, it is clear that freedom from is antecedent in some sense to the existential dichotomy that follows upon its arrival on the scene of nature. Until this movement of separation from animal nature takes place along with the advent of self-awareness, no existential dichotomy exists between human and animal nature in man.

\textit{(2) Human Nature and Freedom From}

With the advent of the first "human" act, that of the beginning of freedom from instinctual ties, or "free choice," unconscious as it is, and the advent of self-

\textsuperscript{246} Cf. \textit{supra}, Chapter III, A, p. 177-179.
awareness and reason, a new species entered the world of nature, a species different from its animal predecessor; this was a unique event, comparable to the "...first emergence of matter, to the first emergence of life, and to the first emergence of animal existence." "Man" now existed, a new species, a "human" species, distinguished by self-awareness and reason, set in a situation of dichotomy; man is driven to seek a solution to this new state by his tortured desire for "absoluteness," to rid himself of this curse "...by which he was separated from nature, from his fellow man, and from himself." He is impelled to look forward, to become master of himself and of nature, as a solution to this dichotomy. This implies a striving for what is called positive freedom in describing the general plan of development of freedom in the human race. Thus all of the elements of human nature, and of freedom from, are present at the beginning of the human race.

(a) Man's Animal Origin — Its Logical Possibility

Two questions were raised above, firstly, about the logical possibility of man's origin from the animal,

247 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 23.


249 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 24-25.
and secondly, about the why and how of this happening in terms of a possible general theory. These two questions will now be investigated in the order given. It is necessary to investigate, at least to some extent, these questions since they both concern the origin of freedom from in the human race, part of human nature as it is.

The first question, about the logical possibility of man's origin from the animal, is based upon the fact that, according to Fromm, man did originate from the animal at a certain period, when the control of instinct in animal has ceased or reached a minimum; at this stage a new species arose, with new perfections of self-awareness and reason, and a new openness to reality. Man is now to operate through his awareness of self and others, and is to master himself and nature in a new way.

Something new occurred in the universe, a new way of acting, transcending all the rest of nature, with the advent of freedom from and its consequences. It is quite likely that a new essential difference occurred, if not an essential superiority. If these new perfections do not

250 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, b, p. 532.
251 Cf. supra, Chapter III, A, passim, and Chapter VI, C, 2, b, (1), passim.
252 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 6, p. 507-508.
mean an essential difference and superiority in man as compared to animals, then at least there exists a qualitative difference between men and animals. The existence of even a qualitative difference of this type would raise a serious question as to the existence of a new or superior essence in man, to adequately explain this new quality. In any event, a new perfection entered nature, transcending it and opposing it. The point here being emphasized is this: Is it logically possible that this new perfection of self-awareness arose from the powers of nature preceding it?

Fromm sets the line of his assertion of the animal origin of man in the setting of a gradual ascent of the forces of nature to a higher and higher level of reality, from pre-matter to matter, from matter to life, from life to animal, and from animal to man; this last, a unique break, it is said, is compared to all previous three changes; all three previous changes are called an "emergence." This change from animal to man took place when animals, gifted with an erect posture and a brain growth much larger than the animal brain of today, "...ceased to be essentially determined by instinct." This "birth" of

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253 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 23. The information in this paragraph is all taken from this page of The Sane Society. What matter emerged from, Fromm does not say.
man, Fromm says, may have taken hundreds of thousands of years. Thus Fromm sets the fact of man's emergence from animal, in the setting of increased physical complexity and an increasing loss of inner direction by fixed mechanisms of action. The emergence is prepared for gradually until the moment freedom from occurs and man, the freak of the universe, appears.

Does Fromm attempt to justify this change from animal to man philosophically? He does not do so, except to state that man's appearance would seem to be in some ways absurd, for the new event, man, is prey to the existential anxiety brought on by his belonging to two worlds, that of weakened animal and alienated mind. Man transcends nature, yet is now subject to death that will surely destroy him. Fromm thus gives a tone of absurdity, of astonishment at what nature has wrought, possibly accidentally. His philosophical position on the origin of man might seem to be this, that it did not make sense, that it was absurd. If this is his philosophical position, then the question of logical possibility is an idle one except in this sense, that it is possible for an absurd event to take place. This might well be Fromm's solution, that, in some ways the world is absurd, particularly the origins

254 Cf. ibid., p. 23-24. Cf. also Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 34.
of human existence. It is an answer given by evolutionary
humanists, at least as one aspect of the way the real world
seems to them, and Fromm's answer to the fact of
death.

Granted, however, that man's origin from animals
is open to rational inquiry in Fromm's thought, in the
sense that it may have some genuine meaning (as it does
for Fromm in some ways with the possibility of man achieving full positive freedom), then can there be any logical
justification for the origin of man from the animal, especially if it be granted that man transcends animal in
essence?

For Fromm, there is no possibility of such an ad-
vent as a special force from outside nature, as nothing
exists in his philosophy but nature and man. Any answer
must come from within nature, which preceded man. One
possible answer sometimes given is that from the beginning
all potentialities are truly present, including psychic
life. Fromm does not seem to include this in his explana-
tion of evolution, although he does not exclude it. But
for his idea of progress to make any sense, and not be a

255 Cf. Raymond J. NOGAR, The Lord of the Absurd,
256 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 40-41.
mere appearance of progress, then there has to be some sort of real essential change as the world developed. Can there be any logical justification for this?

In the article just cited, Robert O. Johann's "The Logic of Evolution," there can be a type of logical justification for the emergence of real essential change in the universe, in a progressive, ascending way, including man as essentially different from animals. To explain the existence, the "be-ing" of the spiritual, finite, subsistent soul, there is need ultimately of the idea of an immediate creation by an Infinite Being, Johann would say. But, as he points out, this is only one aspect of the philosophy of evolutionary process, with perhaps an even more important aspect being the explanation of the immanent progress of the beings of the universe within its own unity.

In Johann's article, the use of the traditional hylomorphic explanation of the universe to explain a genuine progress of essence in an evolutionary universe is

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259 Cf. ibid., p. 595-612, the total article.

260 Ibid., p. 611.

261 Ibid., p. 606-610.
impossible. For it he substitutes a theory of "act," by "act" meaning that which is active, that which asserts or affirms itself. Development, then, is viewed in terms of a progressive self-affirmation of act, with matter itself not being purely passive but a manifold of imperfect acts. Johann adds to this position, in a synthesis of many points of his article, that

The active sufficiency which is initially distributed over this manifold asserts itself through the interaction of the original elements and progressively expresses itself more and more synthetically. Finally in man, it completely overcomes its initial division from itself, and we have the birth of self-preservation and freedom. Henceforward, the question of progress is placed in man's hands. He is called upon to master the universe and shape it into an abode of love.

In Johann's explanation, centered in the dynamism of act, is one tentatively proffered philosophical explanation of the process of evolutionary development. In this explanation, Johann says, differences are not eliminated nor is something gotten from nothing.

It would seem that Johann's division of the problem of evolution into the problem of the immanent intercon-

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262 Ibid., p. 611-612.
263 Ibid., p. 599.
264 Ibid., p. 612. The rest of this paragraph is taken from this same page of Johann's article, except as otherwise noted.
nectedness of the various essential levels in the universe, and the problem of the finite existence of man's spiritual soul, is a valid one. Fromm does not really raise seriously the question of finiteness, or contingency, but he does raise the question for philosophers of whether or not his conception of evolutionary development, (if there is essential development), may be satisfactorily and logically explained. Johann's article is one way to give a philosophical explanation of Fromm's theory. There is no need to enter here into a thorough discussion of this point, except to point out that Fromm's desire for unity in the world, his idea of fundamental life energy as an expanding, developing, more complex reality, with greater mastery over the universe, and a greater openness to reality through the simple consciousness of animals, and man's self-awareness and awareness of others as others — all of these points would fit into Johann's idea, as would the gradual emergence of each new level of perfection, and Johann's idea that the total universe transcends, as of a different order, the different multiple entities of the world.
(b) The Why and How of the Origin of Freedom From — Dialectical Materialism

If Fromm's theory of the origin of freedom from in the universe, and consequently, of the origin of man, were entirely based on an evolutionary theory as such, perhaps Johann's theory of the universe as a multiplicity of developing acts would give a satisfactory logical explanation, as a philosophy of process, to this theory of Fromm's.

However there is more to Fromm's theory of the origin of freedom from and of man than evolutionary science and philosophy. There would seem to be explicitly in his philosophy of the origin of man and in his development in freedom a philosophical position of some type of dialectical materialism. That Fromm uses a dialectic explanation of freedom and of man's existence and of his human essence or nature is already clear from various parts of the thesis. 265 Just what the logical structure of the origins of freedom from and of human nature is, and the why of their interconnection as two dialectical processes, was, as previously stated, reserved to this section. 266

265 Cf. e.g., supra, Chapter II, B, 6; Chapter II, C, 1; Chapter III, B, 3, B, f-j; Chapter VI, A, 3; Chapter VI, B, 6, p. 505-506.

266 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, b, (2), p. 528.
attempt will be made here to show a possible logical connection between these two dialectical processes, and to pass judgment on their inner coherence.

Any attempt to interpret Fromm's thinking in terms of dialectic materialism runs up against certain difficulties. The name "dialectical materialism" itself is suggestive of various "laws" of dialectical development, various according to what era of Soviet thought you were in.267 What is intended here is to look at the evidence just mentioned that Fromm looks at human freedom and human existence and human nature in dialectical terms, and compare these explanations of his with what might be called the fundamental laws of dialectical materialism as first brought out clearly by Friedrich Engels and at present generally accepted as fundamental.268 These laws of developing reality may be considered as three: (1) the law of the unity and struggle of opposites, (2) the law of the transition from quantity to quality, and (3) the law of the negation of the negation.269 The first law is the

267 Cf. e.g., Richard T. DE GEORGE, Patterns of Soviet Thought, p. 2-5, 119-121, 180-185, etc.


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fundamental law of the materialistic dialectic, and treats of the nature and origin of development, the why of the development while the second law explains the form of development, the how of the development; the third law describes the tendency and direction of the development, giving the whither of the movement or development.270 These laws might well be considered as heuristic devices, or as intrinsic laws of developing material reality, as they seem to be for most Soviet philosophers,271 and, as shall be seen, for Fromm.

The first law of dialectical materialism, the law of the unity and struggle of opposites, means that the innermost essence of things is constituted by real contradictions; this is an ontological law of the "highest and most general kind."272 This law is used to explain the origin of development and of motion; all development comes from the clash of contradictions, as does all motion or change; in other words, change or motion or development is entirely caused by this internal contradiction: matter is

270 Ibid. Which law is first is disputed among philosophers, p. 311-319.


ultimately self-moving. As the old is dying away and
the new is being born, the internal cause is not harmonious
development but this internal contradiction, since there is
no external, "supernatural" cause.

In reviewing both the data on human existence and
its guiding inner essence, it is clear that Fromm sees them
as consisting of a contradiction, a struggle in the midst
of a unity, seeking a solution. It is clear that Fromm
sees human nature as following this first law of dialectical
materialism. The process of freedom, too, is de-
scribed in terms of a struggle of contradictories, with a
solution being sought. These are the actual concrete
facts for Fromm, that man and his freedom are both dialec-
tic in nature. This also means, of course, a contradic-
tion, i.e., freedom, as one pole of another contradiction,
human essence or nature. This means that man and freedom,
as the terminus of the change from animal to man, are
dialectically constituted.

273 Ibid., p. 333-341. Cf. also Charles J.
McFADDEN, The Philosophy of Communism, with a Preface by
Most Rev. Fulton J. Sheen, New York, Benzinger Bros., 1963,
p. 40-43. (A Bark Book). (This is a revised edition of
the original hardcover book published in 1939).


275 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 2 and 3 passim.

276 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, footnote 242, page 532.
Because of the new perfection of freedom from, involving self-awareness and reason, man transcends the animal. This transcendent new perfection is dialectically related to that from which it came, the animal, with only simple consciousness guided by determining instinct-structures. These new perfections of being human and of being free, do not leave aside the old, that of animality, but both humanity and animality are incorporated into the new being, man, as struggling contradictories. There are new qualities, freedom and self-awareness, to say the least, in man, as compared with animal, yet they are mixed with and struggle with the remnants of animal with the progressive solution, a new humanity, a new freedom, and a new unity with nature, held out to those who become aware of these factors and endeavor to realize them in practical life. 277

This is a transition from quantity to quality, it seems. The new quality in existence was preceded by a gradual change in the animal of its instinctual determination, and itself introduced an openness to reality that was absent in the animal. In particular terms this fits into the second law of dialectical materialism, the law of the transition from quantity to quality, except in this detail,

277 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 2 and 3, passim.
that preceding this qualitative change there would have been a struggle within the preceding reality.\textsuperscript{278} There is no sign in Fromm that there is a struggle within the animal kingdom before man was born. Rather he points to the harmony of pre-existing animals.\textsuperscript{279} Does this preclude a struggle in the animal essence? It does not seem so, for there could be a harmony, a relative harmony in comparison with the loss of equilibrium that was present in man, a loss due to the new presence of self-awareness. Fromm neither denies nor affirms dialectical development in the animal directly. He does set the stage for this inference with his dialectical description of the origin of man. It would seem that his description of the origin of man, and of freedom from, is in terms of this law of transformation from quantity to quality, except for this one point, that there is no explicit mention of a preceding internal struggle in the animal kingdom.

The third law of dialectical materialism, that of the negation of the negation, would bring home the point that the ascendancy of a new quality in things would mean the negation of the previous quality, but in such a way that all that is positive in the previous stage is retained:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{278} Gustav WETTER, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 319-331.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Erich FROMM, \textit{Escape from Freedom}, p. 33-34.
\end{itemize}
this new quality itself is a starting point for a new development, a new struggle, leading to a negation of this new quality. 280

The facts of the arrival of man and of freedom from their animal origins seem to fit this general law very well. What are the previous qualities in animals that are negated in man? They would seem to be the simple consciousness of animals and instinctual determination of their actions. What new qualities replace them? Self-awareness and some type of self-determination in a situation open to self-active development. Consciousness in animals is replaced by a higher perfection in man, self-awareness. Instinctual determination in animals is replaced by freedom from instinctual ties, which leads, through awareness and affect, to a higher range of self-activity in "freedom to."

Moreover, the requirement that the new quality be a starting point for a new struggle, a new development, leading to a negation of the new quality, is also fulfilled. What precisely is this new quality? It is freedom from, involving self-awareness and reason. This, as has been seen, is an alienated awareness and reason, and a process of freeing from which takes time in both the individual and in the human race. 281 A new struggle begins, in Fromm's

280 Gustav WETTER, op. cit., p. 355-356.
281 Cf. supra, Chapter V, A, 5, passim.
theory of the development of dialectic process of freedom, between two aspects of freedom, the positive and negative, whose resolution will end in a new type of cognitive and affective union with oneself, with others, and with nature.\textsuperscript{282} Thus there is a struggle in the new quality, leading to a further quality, and thus the third law of dialectical development.

It would seem, then, that it is highly probable, if not certain, that Fromm sees the origin of human nature and freedom from in terms of the three fundamental laws of dialectical materialism. There would seem to be no opposition between freedom from here and human nature, but an internal consistency of thought pattern between Fromm's conception of the beginning of human freedom and his conception of beginning, actually existing human nature.

It is also true that for many Marxist authors the second law of the transition from quantity to quality is an adequate explanation of the logical possibility of such a transition.\textsuperscript{283} This is the way reality is, and that is it. In terms of the intelligibility of a process, immanent to the universe, Johann's article just taken might provide the beginnings of an answer, so that, within this view-

\textsuperscript{282} Cf. e.g., supra, Chapter V, B, 2, b, (2), p. 389-390.
\textsuperscript{283} Gustav WETTER, op. cit., p. 332.
point, the presence of a new quality or even essence of a higher type is not logically impossible. In terms of an adequate explanation of the finitude and contingency found in this new quality or new partly spiritual essence, another type of answer is needed, based on the principles of efficient causality and of sufficient reason, and Fromm does not give an answer, or really ask the question.

(3) Human Knowing and Freedom From

The type of knowledge or of knowing present in the origins of man has already been discussed in the preceding section. There is no need to repeat here what has been said there, except to point out that human knowing, as part of freedom from and human nature, was alienated, in Fromm's conception of it, from the beginning, and part of the dialectical development of the human race.

(4) Human Needs and Freedom From

In the beginning of the human race, in contrast to the previous animal state, there was present, due to the new freedom, "to" and "from," a new openness to reality, and hence new existential conditions, based on the


essential dichotomy found in man. Given this new existen
tial condition, new needs arose, specifically human needs. These needs, proceeding from the new way of existence present in man, are the same needs discussed in a previous section of this chapter.\textsuperscript{286} And freedom from is a necessary condition for these needs, whereas the inclination to solve these needs progressively, e.g., the need for human unity through love, would come from "freedom to," as the result of the inclination to grow and integrate, part of "freedom to."\textsuperscript{287}

\textbf{Ch. VI, C, 2, d. - The General Development of Freedom From in the Human Race and Fromm's Concept of Man}\textsuperscript{288}

In this section, which discusses and compares two concepts of freedom from in the human race in its general development and Fromm's concept of man, there will be no attempt to analyse and compare as thoroughly as has been done in the preceding sections. The reasons for this decision chiefly centre upon the fact that the concept of

\textsuperscript{286} Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, b, (4), passim.

\textsuperscript{287} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{288} The material in this subsection relating to the general development of the human race is taken from Chapters III and IV of this thesis. Exceptions to this rule will be noted.
freedom from in the human race in its general development is analogous to the concept of freedom from in its development in the human individual.289 In this analogy in freedom from in the human individual, it was noted that the resemblances were so close that the notions were almost identical. Actually in freedom from as a development in the human race, all of the elements of freedom from in the individual are present. There is separation from primary ties, there is self-awareness of what this separation means; this awareness is alienated from the beginning in each member of the human race, and along with this there occurs the same emotional reactions of individuals as occur in growing freedom from in the individual human being. In addition, there is a dialectical relationship of growing freedom from in the human race with growing freedom to.

Fromm sees in the individual members of the human race, as members of the human race, the same individual human nature with the same immanent evolutionary goals that he sees in the individuals as such. It is true that in growing freedom from in the human race there are other elements present than in the individuals as such. Fromm, for instance, sees individual men, as members of the human race,
being subject to what has been described as "social character." However, this does not change Fromm's opinion nor his approach to the individuals even as members of the human race. The "social character" mediates the influence of the environment, cultural, economic, political, and social, upon the individual. Therefore, there are external forces being taken into consideration here which were not taken into consideration in treating the individuals in their growth as such.

However Fromm sees the individual men in the human race as individuals, with the growth of freedom from and "freedom to" immanent in them, and taking place within them, even though influenced by external cultural factors. Even though Fromm, then, sees men as they develop through human history when he talks about freedom from in the human race, he still looks upon these individual men in the human race as individuals. Fromm's apt use of "social character" is meant to illustrate how large groups of individuals in the human race at any given time are influenced to work together and to achieve a certain growth in human freedom, or how a large group of individuals in the human race may find obstacles to their growth in human freedom. What Fromm is doing then when he describes growing human freedom

290 Cf. supra, Chapter III, B, 2, p. 196-209.
in the human race is to describe the cultural influences inasmuch as they affect large groups of individuals at any particular time in the history of the human race, inasmuch as they influence growth in human freedom of these individuals.

Moreover, the assertions earlier in this chapter, concerning human existence, human nature, human knowing, and human needs, are applicable to individuals as such, whether looked at in their ontogenetic development, or phylogenetically, i.e., as members of the human race. 291 These aspects of human beings, their existence, their nature, etc., are discussed by Fromm without the distinction of ontogenetic vs. phylogenetic. Fromm, in this evidence presented earlier, was talking about individuals as such, wherever they might be found, and in whatever condition of cultural environment. Even in the subsection preceding this one, dealing with the origin of freedom from in the human race and Fromm's concept of man, the evidence presented did not indicate any significant distinction between the first individuals in the human race to possess individually freedom from and new human perfections and those human beings that would follow these first humans. 292 These were gifts, one

291 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 1-5, passim.
292 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, c, passim.
might say, which were to be passed down to the children of the first members of the human race, inasmuch as they belong to the same human species. So that the individuals that were to follow along through human history were to each of them be equipped with these perfections, of self-awareness, of reason, and of the inclination to live progressively. Therefore, to make any general comparison between growing freedom from in the human race, and human existence and other human qualities, would be superfluous.

A few remarks, however, will be made which will serve to increase the specific application of these points to men as they belong to the human race. Those particular applications of particular qualities, evident in growing freedom from in the individual, are in some ways especially applicable to growing freedom from in the human race, because of its greater historical character, and because of the greater lengths of time present in the growth of the human race.

The first point that should be made here is this, that Fromm brings out clearly, in discussing the growth of freedom from in the human race that freedom from is irreversible; it is irreversible in this sense that it cannot be lost or go backwards. This irreversibility is not
explained or proved by Fromm, but rather it is suggested in the previous part of this thesis that the irreversibility is due to some type of preceding supposition, i.e., that the human race in general is not only evolving, and evolving dialectically, but also evolving progressively, or, at least not retrogressively. 294

Another point of interest that shows up in tracing the general development of freedom from in the human race is, according to Fromm, the role that human suffering plays in the growth of freedom from. Human suffering for Fromm is very often the real way to growth and freedom from. 295 In this more recent development of his thinking, it has been found out above in the thesis, that freedom from or any type of freedom may take a long time to develop in the human race. 296 Fromm sees freedom (although the human race is from the beginning endowed with a certain amount of freedom), as needing a preliminary preparation, of suffering, leading to revolt in the case of subjugation or exploitation. Thus it may be thousands of years before man begins to be aware of his freedom and therefore aware of his true nature. There does not seem to be any

294 Ibid.
295 Cf. supra, Chapter III, B, 3, e, p. 246-250.
296 Ibid.
contradiction here between the human race having freedom as part of its human essence from the beginning, and the actual development of that essence in the course of history. The freedom part of the human essence may be almost dormant in the very beginning; it must be remembered that for Fromm the growth of freedom in the human race took thousands of years of time, if not much longer.\textsuperscript{297} It was not until comparatively recent times that man began to really be free, even though he really is not free now in many ways, as Fromm says in \textit{The Sane Society}, speaking of the alienation of modern man.\textsuperscript{298}

Before closing this section on the general development of freedom from in the human race and Fromm's concept of man it would be well to briefly discuss several other aspects of this synthesis, among which the first will be to restate the conclusion discovered and evaluated in Chapter III of this thesis; it is this, that growing freedom from in the human race follows a dialectical development.\textsuperscript{299} There it was said that the general plan of development of growing freedom from in the human race is made up

\textsuperscript{297} Cf. e.g., \textit{supra}, Chapter IV, A, 1, and 2, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{298} Erich FROMM, \textit{The Sane Society}, p. 110-208, and \textit{supra}, Chapter IV, B, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{299} Cf. \textit{supra}, Chapter III, B, 3, b, (2), (f), (j) and (m), \textit{passim}. 
of two factors, a growing "freedom to" and a growing freedom from. These two are in a dialectical relationship. Freedom from means a long separation from primary ties followed by a growing feeling of insecurity and aloneness, whereas "freedom to" means a growing strength and integrity, a growing development of reason, and a growing solidarity with other human beings. This growing freedom from is said to be inseparable from human existence. The goal of growing freedom from is a certain type of freedom to which it has just been said it is dialectically related. In addition this growing freedom from is an alienated freedom from for human self-awareness from the beginning of the human race and in its continuance; the particular instances of growing freedom from fit into this general dialectical plan of development. Fromm sees it as describing what truly happens in the human race.

In the previous section of this chapter, a thorough investigation was made of the origin of freedom from in the human race in terms of dialectical materialism. Here in the growing freedom from, developed in the human race, there is a continuation of the dialectical processes seen in the human race's origin. There is the same contradic-

300 Cf. supra, Chapter V, C, 2, p. 421-423.
301 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, c, (2), (b), p. 543-551.
tion in human freedom, the same struggle between the two aspects of human freedom, with alienation present in human awareness, an awareness which is at least implicitly included in this negative aspect of freedom, freedom from. The goal of freedom from is a complete "freedom to."

Therefore there occurs here the struggle of opposites looking for a solution, which solution is a positive one, providing conditions are satisfactory. This positive solution is a transcendence of the present alienation in awareness and alienation in human affection, leading towards the time when men will be united together in genuine love and in true social arrangements through productive work. 302

Fromm adds that this condition of harmony and productivity will mark the end of "humanoid" history and the true state of man will begin; in the same place he comments that this does not mean that man will overcome his contradictions but rather means now he can truly serve with joy the cause of life and not serve death. 303 Thus it is seen that the laws of dialectical materialism are followed out not only in the origin of the human race but in its general line of development.


303 Erich FROMM, The Sane Society, p. 362.
The same statement may truly be said about the general plan of development of the individual in his ontogenetic growth. From what has already been seen in this thesis the general dialectical plan is followed out in particular details in the growth of the human individual; this general dialectical plan has been investigated and found to consist of elements of freedom from and "freedom to" in a dialectical relationship, along with subsequent affective results of aloneness and isolation, and with the tendency on the part of freedom from to seek "freedom to" as a goal. This means that a dialectical relationship obtains between freedom from and "freedom to" in the growing human individual. The full relationship of this growing freedom from to the human individual as such has already been thoroughly investigated in b section of this particular part of Chapter VI.

The point to be made here is this, that the laws of dialectical materialism are seen to apply equally well to the general development and particular development of the growing human individual; there is no need to fully investigate this particular application of these dialectic-


305 Cf. supra, Chapter VI,C,2,b, passim.
tical laws in any full fashion. It is sufficient to point out here that there is a dialectical relationship between freedom from and "freedom to," in which the goal of freedom from is "freedom to." The alienation of human self-awareness found in the child is meant to be gradually overcome so that the child may reach a new type of immediate apprehension of reality, in an intuitive type of grasp. The child is meant to separate himself completely from primary ties so that this new life of an intuitive grasping of reality, of the changing of the unconscious to the consciousness, may be finally attained by the growing human individual. Thus we see a struggle in growing freedom from in the human individual, a struggle with "freedom to." There is a goal of transcending this struggle. The laws, therefore, of reality being made up of a struggle of opposites, and of a transition of quantity to quality through a negation of a negation, are operative here. Thus the laws of dialectical materialism apply as a general framework for growing freedom from in the human individual, as they have done in growing freedom from in the human race and in the origin of the human race.

306 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, c, (2), (b), passim.
Ch. VI, C, 2, e. - The Origin of Freedom From in the Human Individual and Fromm's Concept of Man.

The origin of freedom from in the human individual has been found in earlier sections of the thesis to be of little, or no psychological significance. 307 The chief indication given in these texts of any importance is as a symbol of what is to be the keystone for developing freedom from in the individual, i.e., self-activity. Just as the human child is at the present time learning to breathe for itself and learning to perform physiologically, thus in the future the human child, once it begins to learn to say "I", will begin to grow in genuine freedom from.

Two comments may be made here that may have some significance for this thesis. The first is this, that the child, as a bearer of the specific nature of the human race inherited from its parents, will soon be faced in the process of normal development with the same type of growing dialectical freedom from that is present in each human individual in the human race. A second comment is this, that there is some sort of analogy between the time from the birth of the human individual until it begins functioning psychologically as a part of its family or a society, and

the time spent between the birth of the human race and the
beginning of the functioning of self-awareness and freedom from in the human race. The time normally needed for this
physiological development so that the child could begin to
function with self-awareness and freedom from is normally
within a few years of its birth. The time for the beginning
of the functioning of freedom from in the human race, it
is noted above, takes many thousands if not more years. 308
So that the human individual as an individual in the be­
ginning of his life, and the human race in the beginnings
of its life, and for long periods thereafter, are both
devoid totally or for the most part of any development of
freedom from. Furthermore, any growing individual human
child may expect, because of its position as a member of
the human race, to be limited in its own growth in freedom from and self-awareness because of the influence of the
environment in which it lives. Thus the little child at
birth, even though it grows physiologically, may, because
of the influence of its cultural environment, be deprived
either partially or totally of its growth in its own indi­
vidual freedom from and self-awareness, just as it may be
deprived because of its own physiological deficiency of the
same growth in freedom from and self-awareness.

308 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, d, p. 557-558.
In this particular section there will be a short summary and synthesis of what has been found out in Section C, 2 of this chapter. Fundamentally the role of freedom from has been investigated in its relationship to several facets of the human being, his existence, his nature, his knowing powers, and his needs. Freedom from has been found to be related to all of these both in its meaning as individual growing freedom from and its meaning as freedom from in the human race as well as in the origin of the human race. The meaning of freedom from in the origin of the human individual has been seen to be analogical. Freedom from has been seen to be part of a complex process, one aspect of freedom, with its own particular contribution to make to this process. It has been seen to be part of human nature, the progressive part of human nature and therefore essentially linked with human existence wherever one finds it. As part of human nature it establishes a link with the progressive aspirations of human nature, incorporated into "freedom to," and with the downward trend of human nature, signified by animality. As part, therefore, of human nature freedom from is seen to be a bridge between the lower part of man and the higher part of man. It resists the lower part of man and in doing so opens the way
up to freedom from alienation and a new type of human activity. It is therefore an essential part of every human being, as Erich Fromm sees it.

The concept of freedom from in its various meanings becomes intelligible in the light of Erich Fromm's dialectical materialism. Freedom from is seen as playing a prominent part in the fundamental three laws of this particular type of materialism. It plays its part in the unity and struggle of opposites inasmuch as it and "freedom to" resist and struggle with the animality in man. It plays its part inasmuch as it endows the human being with a new perfection, that of self-awareness, thus giving a new quality to a human being. And it plays its part, too, in the law of the negation of the negation inasmuch as it is in dialectical relationship and struggle with "freedom to." So that freedom from receives its intelligible meaning, in part at least, from its being fitted into the structure of motion and development in nature and man that is dialectical, and that seems to be the implicit philosophical structure that Fromm sees in the world of nature and of man.

There are no large inconsistencies in the intelligible relationship of freedom from to Fromm's concept of human nature, human existence, human needs and human knowing. The position is rather clear and concisely
expressed. So that the same trend of thought governs, it would seem, Fromm's thinking not only about the nature of human existence and the nature of human essence but also the nature or essence of freedom from.

There are obscurities and ambiguities in his discussion of freedom from, which come from certain sources in his thinking. These sources in his thinking will be more thoroughly investigated in E section of this chapter. It may not be amiss to mention here that one of his serious omissions, it would seem, is a metaphysical approach towards reality; Fromm's philosophy is a philosophy of process, of dialectical, evolutionary process. Within this immanent framework, i.e., applied within the universe, there is still room for asking certain types of metaphysical questions, such as the adequate explanation of the contingency and finitude of the universe. Fromm does not approach these particular questions in this way. Another obscurity in Fromm's thoughts, or at least a point that lacks adequate development, is the role of animality in the human being. The animal seems to be cut off from all instinct and from all biological structure, with the severance of primary ties, yet it seems to be in opposition to the power of self-awareness to freedom from and "freedom to" in human beings. Little evidence is given for this assertion.
Another area of Fromm's thought in this particular synthesis of freedom from and Fromm's concept of man which needs questioning is the apparent lack of theoretical developments of what happens truly in the future of humanity if "freedom to," as it were, wins out. Do the human contradictions still remain and without effect? Or, taking the same theory, how is it possible that at the other end, if animality is almost completely triumphant or if the environment is such that freedom, even freedom from, can hardly develop, if at all, then what happens to the supposed potentiality of freedom from in human beings? In other words, is it possible to have a true human nature in which there is, it would seem, no self-awareness in the real sense present? Fromm's theory, then, seems to fit the great central portion of mankind, but at the edges, at either extreme, the value seems to be rather dim.

One other difficulty that is found in Fromm's philosophy that, like the rest of these difficulties, will be discussed in Section E, but is merely pointed out here, is this, that there is no philosophy of death in his investigation of human nature and of the meaning of freedom. As a matter of fact death is rejected as meaningless and absurd, something one must learn to live with, but without real explanation in itself. This would seem to be rejecting an obvious fact of human life, without an adequate
explosion of the other possibilities of the meaning of death besides complete rejection as absurd. These difficulties just mentioned in this paragraph are not meant as a criticism of Erich Fromm as a philosopher in this sense that he has gone positively wrong in his thinking, but rather that there are gaps, serious gaps, in his philosophical structure.

Ch. VI, C, 3. - Freedom From and Fromm's General Philosophical Position

The development of Fromm's concept of man taken in Section B of this chapter, and the relationship of freedom from and Fromm's concept of man in Section C, 2 of this chapter, has brought out the fact that, for Fromm, man is a climax of an evolutionary, dialectic process going on within the universe. Man is the supreme being in the universe, the end point of an evolutionary process, and the beginning within himself of a new evolutionary progress, in dialectical opposition, leading to a new type of functioning of human nature individually and socially. Thus Fromm's philosophy, centered as it is around man, and with these particular qualities, may be called a genuine

humanism as outlined in the first part of this particular chapter. 310

Central to Fromm's humanism is the concept of freedom and freedom from. Freedom from, representing an essential part of the progressive part of human nature is closely linked therefore with the internal value that man has. Because of this it is impossible to understand Fromm's humanism without an adequate understanding of his idea on human freedom, and in particular an understanding of freedom from. Moreover, the investigation of freedom from and its dialectical opposite, "freedom to," has shown what the goal of human existence is. The norm of human activity lies within human nature and freedom themselves. The goal of human nature is, by overcoming animality, to reach the fulness of human freedom. To achieve this purpose it is necessary that freedom from be achieved as fully as possible, along with the fullest achievement possible of "freedom to." This then gives meaning to what was called in this earlier chapter "normative humanism." 311 There is a confirmation thereby in this investigation, and an enlargement of what this normative humanism means, for, after the investigation, it is seen that the perfection of human

311 Ibid.
beings may be represented by the fulfilment of the positive part of the human nature, that is of freedom, including freedom from. This then is the norm that is to be achieved, the fullness of freedom, i.e., the achievement of whole human potentiality, as operating spontaneously, actively, and creatively.

That the investigation of freedom from has shown more clearly the depth of what Fromm meant when he called his philosophy, "dialectic humanism," is clear from what has been seen particularly in the c subsection in Section C, 2, of this chapter.312 There was discovered that at the very root of human nature in its human existence lies a dialectical relationship between two aspects of freedom, "freedom to" and freedom from. It was also pointed out in the analysis in the preceding section of human existence and human nature or essence that the heart of human nature and human existence exists in an existential dichotomy that is a dialectical dichotomy.313 Fromm was correct, then, in calling his philosophy "dialectic," for in the very fundamental meaning of man and of his freedom exist dichotomies or contradictions looking for a solution; there exists a struggle and unity of opposites both in human

312 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, A, 2, p. 439, and Chapter VI, C, 2, C, (2), (b), passim.

313 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 2 and 3, passim.
nature as such and in the positive part of human nature. Therefore man is, one might say, an active dialectical process, which is human. Moreover, although the evolutionary aspect of man had been developed in the first part of this particular chapter, this aspect is nevertheless probed more deeply by the investigation in the preceding parts of Section C of the question of man's animal origin, and its logical possibility.\(^{314}\) The result of this is to confirm the original assertion in the first part of this chapter that man's existence and human nature, as well as the existence of human freedom, is to be put into an evolutionary context.\(^{315}\)

Fromm's description, then, of his own philosophical position as "dialectic humanism" is an apt one. The investigation of his concept of man and of his various concepts of human freedom bear out the fact that he is a humanist, for in his philosophy man is supreme and he finds in himself his own supreme value. Moreover, the fundamental meaning of human existence, of human nature, of human knowing and human needs, and of human freedom, including freedom from, is seen by Fromm in a framework of dialectical

\(^{314}\) Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, c, (2), (a), passim.

\(^{315}\) Cf. supra, Chapter VI, A, 3, p. 448-452 and Chapter VI, C, 2, c, (1), passim.
materialism. It would seem that therefore these two aspects of human reality as applied to man, the fact that he develops dialectically in his inmost being and in his freedom, and the fact that he is the supreme being in the universe and finds in himself his own values, are indications that the phrase "dialectical humanism" is an appropriate summary of Fromm's basic philosophical position.

Chapter VI, D. - FROMM'S PROOFS FOR FREEDOM FROM

Ch. VI, D, 1. - Introduction

Ch. VI, D, 1, a. - Purpose of the chapter

In the first chapter of the thesis it was pointed out that a critique of the proofs Fromm uses in his concept of freedom from would be done in this last chapter. In this first chapter the various types of proof that might be found in Fromm were mentioned, and brief indications were given as to what would be looked for in these proofs by way of a critique. This section of the sixth chapter will now investigate the proofs Fromm uses in his conception of freedom from. Various references were made throughout the thesis to this need to analyze Fromm's proofs.

316 Cf. supra, Chapter I, B, 3, p. 44-49.
317 Cf. e.g., supra, Chapter II, C, 1, c, p.107-109.
What will be concentrated on in this section are the proofs Fromm uses for his various conceptions of freedom from. There are other proofs he uses for such topics as alienation and "freedom to," as well as for concepts like human existence, human nature, and human needs. Very little formal attempt was made in the thesis to study the type of proof used for these particular aspects of Fromm's thinking, although there was an attempt made to understand and clarify these conceptions. If the information at hand needs the explicit study of the proofs for these secondary aspects of Fromm's thought, it will be used.

In discussion of proofs the chief tool is an application of logic; in this case the ordinary non-symbolic logic will be used. A difficulty arises here, from the fact that Fromm looks upon ordinary logic, the Aristotelian type, he says, as culturally conditioned, as not necessary to the human mind, and as quite likely not necessarily expressing the truth of reality validly. Fromm opts for the use of "paradoxical" logic as a means of correct thinking, and as a means of expressing extra-mental reality truly; "paradoxical" logic, with its denial of the universal truth of the principle of contradiction as a law of

the mind and quite likely as a law of reality, Fromm believes to speak truly. 319

Fromm does not try to fully prove these statements, but asserts them as being important to remember. How can a person discuss Fromm's proofs then, if language and reality can contain contradictions truthfully? Perhaps the best solution is to do what Fromm generally does, talk in terms of Aristotelian logic, confident that his ideas will be understood by his Aristotelian hearers; and it would be good to keep in mind that, if paradoxical logic be true, then nothing can be said and understood of reality in the ordinary sense, but reality is to be met and embraced rather than understood. 320 This section, then, will proceed as if Aristotelian logic were a valid and truthful instrument of the human mind.

Another aspect of Fromm's conception of reality that is of importance to this part of Chapter VI is Fromm's conception of science, his conception of how objective theoretical truth is achieved by the human mind, and on what levels it is achieved. This will be considered in this section, not fully, but in enough detail to make Fromm's proofs for freedom from more intelligible.

319 Ibid.

Fromm himself consciously treats of methods of proof at times, and of his own methods. His conception of how truth is reached in a psychoanalytic therapeutic setting is discussed at some length in Richard Evan's Dialogue with Erich Fromm. His own approach to finding out the nature of man, as he sees it, is contained in Man for Himself, with his ideas there on the differences between objective and absolute knowledge.

John Schaar claims that Fromm's system largely stems from philosophical convictions, thus implying that Fromm is arguing deductively; he also states that this is true of Fromm, even when Fromm is claiming to be deriving conclusions from empirical findings and "his own consulting room." Martin Birnbach states the same thing, that Fromm's concept of human nature derives from philosophical presuppositions, a shifting grounds from the scientific, empirical way his investigation seems to go. Thus Fromm's idea of just how his own method is being used is disputed by others who are very familiar with his works.

321 Richard I. EVANS, Dialogue with Erich Fromm, p. 73-84.
322 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. vii-ix, 20-37.
324 Martin BIRNBACH, Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy, p. 84-87.
Fromm himself seriously pursues his work, and claims to be proceeding scientifically. The assertions of Schaar and Birnbach in the preceding paragraph will have to be balanced by the intention of what Fromm is trying to do and on what level of reality he is approaching the particular subject matter.

Ch. VI, D, 1, b. - The Matter of this Section

To adequately cover these points just mentioned, the rest of this D section of Chapter VI will be divided into five parts. In subsection 2, the first part, various methods of proof as used by Fromm will be described. This will form a good preparation for the actual analysis of what his concept of science is, and an investigation of his proofs for freedom from, which two topics will form the fourth and fifth parts of Section D of this chapter. The third part will briefly investigate a possible difficulty, that Fromm in his proofs might be using constructive knowledge, and reasoning with this type of knowledge. It will be wise to consider this possibility so that the proofs he uses may be checked for their validity from this viewpoint as they are explained and analyzed. In the last subsection a synthesis of this Section D will be made.
Ch. VI, D, 2. - Methods of Proof in Fromm

In his writings Erich Fromm uses a variety of methods of investigating the various levels of reality. These will be briefly mentioned here, in order to prepare the way for a more detailed investigation of his concept of science and his concepts of freedom from.

Fromm, first of all, makes use of induction, in several forms. His chief approach to human personality, according to Silvano Arieti, combines an emotional intuitiveness with the idiographic method, with the emphasis upon the personal history, the mental content of the individual. Whether or not this idiographic approach merits the name of "science," in any usual sense of the word, is doubtful, is a subject of controversy. But being a historical method, it is not, its advocates say, only engaged in particularity; Freud, it is claimed, used this method, and thought it scientific. Fromm, in addition, has used on several occasions more objective techniques, such as a projective questionnaire, and computerized

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326 Ibid., p. 536-539.

327 Ibid., p. 536, 539.
statistical analysis of answers, to find out the incidence of, e.g., authoritarian versus antiauthoritarian characters among German workers. This type of inquiry would probably merit the name of "science," because of its quantitative analysis of response, although this procedure alone does not make the analysis of the tests to be "scientific." In Man for Himself Fromm sets out to find out the nature of man, by investigating the reactions of man to varying conditions, and by making inferences, depending on this information, about man's nature. From these inferences a "model" of human nature can be built up, like in any other science, Fromm asserts; this model can then be used to deduce the goals of man, as a premise of these goals. Fromm here seems to say in part that he is using an inductive technique to get the nature of man,


332 Ibid., p. 30.
with a "model" being gradually built up. This sounds like a theoretical construct, the result of scientific induction. Whether or not Fromm is trying to come to the essence of man by the analysis of his properties is not made clear here.

That Fromm often uses deduction, at least of a hypothetico-deductive nature, is clear from his own description of his method of analyzing a counselee's problems. Like any other analyst he comes to the counselee with a set of general categories and laws which form the background for his diagnosis of the particularized situation of his client. Does Fromm also work out of universal statements? It would seem so, for his judgement about individual men would often come from his idea of the universal essence of man, described in a previous section in this chapter.

In an article mentioned a few pages previously, Silvano Arieti speaks of the "emotional intuitiveness" of those using the idiographic method in psychology, among whose very frequent users Fromm is numbered. Fromm

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333 Richard I. EVANS, Dialogue with Erich Fromm, p. 73-84.

334 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 3, passim, and Richard I EVANS, Dialogue with Erich Fromm, p. 48.

335 Silvano ARIETI, op. cit., p. 540, 539.
himself seems to complement this statement of Arieti by describing his attempt to be one, emotionally and mentally, with his clients, as a means of understanding them, bringing to light his own unconscious along with that of the client. Along with this method of dealing with clients, Fromm combines a scientific, inductive approach of tentative hypotheses, along with their verification, along with, he claims, methods of verification proper to dynamic psychology and psychoanalysis.

In his work on Fromm, *Man in Estrangement*, Guyton Hammond suggests that Fromm's approach to consciousness, similar to the phenomenological method in focusing attention on the structures of conscious experience, is especially close to this method in dealing, as he does, with consciousness as an "acting" more than a "seeing." In an accompanying footnote Hammond points out that Fromm, unlike the radical empiricists of phenomenology, is rather Hegelian in stressing that full consciousness "...discovers the one world as it truly is." It may be that Fromm

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337 Ibid., p. 75.


339 Ibid., p. 57, footnote 31.
does reflect upon the "perceptual world of lived experience," and using this as his starting point, (the proper one for philosophy, according to Alden Fisher), and finds in it the essential meaning of man and of freedom.

Ch. VI, D, 3. - Constructural vs. Ontological Knowledge

During the main body of this thesis, there was an inquiry made into the meaning of Fromm's concept of freedom from. In this section of the thesis the point of inquiry is directed towards this concept of freedom from in its different meanings, as involved in Fromm's proofs. Thus the reality, freedom from, will be seen to be either the result of a proof of some sort, or the starting point for further connections with other realities or other concepts. With this in mind it was decided to inject a short few paragraphs here on the possibility that the concepts of freedom from, or of closely allied concepts such as human existence or human nature, might contain elements that are not directly intelligible in themselves, but rather are structures of ideas or substitute concepts that are not directly real. In such a case these substitute structures, if part of the concepts of freedom from or its allied

concepts, would make the concept not directly intelligible in reality, at least in part. It would be, therefore, a mental construct. 341

If the various concepts of freedom from, or of allied concepts, have elements that are not found in reality in experience, or not directly derived from reality by a reasoning process whose terms are ontological, and used in that sense, or if the proof is indirect, then a construct will be had, not a concept which is directly and totally applicable to reality. 342

The problem of this type of knowledge is this, that the author using constructural terms may be very satisfied with them, even when these terms are not such as can be verified by experience directly or verified through experience or in experience. Such are many psychoanalytic concepts, 343 and such are some of the concepts Fromm has,


343 William M. MEISSNER, op. cit., p. 245-250. Cf. also David RAPAPORT, op. cit., passim.
it would seem, since his concept of, e.g., the type of intuitive, conative knowledge claimed by him as the completion of self-awareness, is knowable directly, it would seem, only by those who are thus endowed, or by those who can directly prove, through ontological reasoning, the existence of such a reality. 344

This problem is raised here, because, as has been seen, Fromm uses different methods of proof, and, as will shortly be seen, some of these methods appear to bypass traditional reasoning, apparently derived directly from experience, such as his knowledge of the meaning of human essence. The question will be raised again in the summary at the end of this Section D, whether or not there are constructural elements in some of Fromm's concepts of freedom and of human essence and in his presuppositions.

Ch. VI, D, 4. - Fromm's Concept of Science

In his proofs and assertions during the thesis it was seen that Fromm expressed a certainty and a universality that seemed unexplained by the evidence presented. 345 Certainty and universality, whether unconditional or hypothetical, are quite often a sign of "scientific" knowledge,


345 Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, 2, i, p. 151-152.
and involve various types of demonstration or proof of such qualities as certainty and universality, implying as these qualities do, some type of necessity. Various methods of proof that Fromm uses have been received above. There will be an inquiry now into which would be considered "scientific." The word "scientific" here will mean that use of man's knowing powers, e.g., reason, that will get to the essence, to the goals of reality; in other words, the phrase, "scientific" knowledge, here will mean getting to know reality in its essence, in its inmost causes. This is not only a traditional way of using the word "scientific," as belonging to "science," but this is exactly the type of knowledge Fromm thinks alone is really important and adequate. The reasons for this will now be given. Only a short inquiry into the subject is merited here, as a preface to the investigation of Fromm's proof for his concepts of freedom from.

"Reason," by Fromm, is seen as a power transcending practical animal intelligence; it is a power that is meant to get to the essence of things, to the nature of things. The generic, the universal, the "most general and pervasive
traits of phenomena," these are the objects of reason, its goal, the essence of things. 348 This is the way reason is meant to function, but for its perfection it is not enough. Reason, in Fromm's view, must be productive. 349 What does this mean?

It means that, while remaining objective and thus seeing the object and the knower as he is, reason demands an active care and concern for the object, a genuine interest in it, as another aspect of objectivity. 350 Moreover, reason must see all objects, living and non-living, in their total reality; no part is to be separated in thought from the rest of the object unless the whole object is also seen.

Another way that Fromm, writing in the last eight years, has of obtaining universal, certain knowledge, of the human essence at least, is to experience this essence, through a conative, affective, non-intellectual, mutual self-discovery with other men. 351 This gives true universal knowledge, a knowledge of what humanity is, with an

348 Erich FROMM, Man for Himself, p. 102-103.
349 Ibid., p. 103.
350 Ibid., p. 104-106. This paragraph of the text as taken from pages 102-107 of Man for Himself.
essential universality, i.e., not only what man's nature is, but what it must be, and therefore necessarily so. This is a further development of the power of reason. It may be one of the discoveries for analyst and analysand in the therapeutic session, Fromm intimates.352

Contrasted to this is Fromm's opinion of how much completeness one could get from an inductive approach to a knowledge of human nature, when writing in Man for Himself in 1947.353 There Fromm saw this method, through the data of anthropology and psychology, to give only a tentative picture of man; this would be a "science" of man.354

It would also seem that Fromm is convinced, from his own experience as a therapist, that he can arrive at quite an exact and certain knowledge of a patient's problems, and for the most part, eliminate errors, by being one with the patient and using the ordinary scientific method, along with a sincere, persevering disposition to see reality as it is.355 Nevertheless, it would seem that even here Fromm finds no final statement about ultimate


355 Richard I. EVANS, op. cit., p. 73-83.
truth: errors are also possible, and may well pave the way to a deeper penetration of the truth; this is also "scientific," according to Fromm. 356

It would seem then, that Fromm would recognize two ways of getting "scientific" truth. The second way, in the preceding two paragraphs, working through hypotheses, trial and error, and leading to a greater and greater closeness to the truth, is what Fromm would call "scientific," i.e., knowledge that for him is closer and closer to completeness and certitude. This knowledge may be about the individual dispositions and causes of his counselee's life problems; it would be knowledge of the concrete, historical singular, and works through empathy, i.e., emotional identification with the counselee. Or it would be about a gradual approach to a full, objective knowledge of man's nature through induction.

The first way, which may be called "scientific" in the sense of certain and universal knowledge, and consisting of reason in the pursuit of knowledge through objectivity, would include taking various attitudes of respect, interest, etc., toward the object. What would seem the climax of this search for certain, universal knowledge is the essential universality of man's essence that

may be known as such by man, as mentioned a few paragraphs ago, and involves a conative type of union, through knowledge, with one's fellow man. This first way is not called "scientific" by Fromm, it would seem.

Ch. VI, D, 5. - Fromm's Proofs for the Meanings of Freedom From

Ch. VI, D, 5, a.-Introduction

In this part of D section of this chapter, an inquiry will be made into the validity, and in a secondary way, the truthfulness of Fromm's ways of establishing his concepts of freedom from to be true. The inquiry will try to find out the type of proof being used by Fromm, and whether or not he uses it validly, i.e., is evidence properly presented in correct form, and sufficient to back up the degree of certainty and necessity attached to his conclusions by Fromm? An attempt will be made to follow closely enough the procedure of Fromm's proofs, so that the question of constructural knowledge may have some light shed on it.

The procedure of this subsection 5 will be to analyze the three main proofs for freedom from in the human individual, contained in Chapter II of this thesis, the origin, the general development, and the development in particular detail of growing freedom from in the human
individual. Then the same plan will be followed for growing freedom from in the human race, from material contained in Chapters III and IV of this thesis. Other materials, on alienation and "freedom to," and other allied topics, will be taken as needed.

Ch. VI, D, 5, b. - Fromm's Proof for the Origin of Freedom From in the Individual357

In this proof Fromm uses ordinary knowledge available to all about the child's physiological separation from its mother, and the general tenor and development of its psychical life to the point where the child can say "I". Its physiological separation, shown by its own breathing, symbolizes its future need for self-activity to separate it from primary ties. The term "self-activity" here may be misleading, since, according to Fromm, primary ties later on will be broken automatically, and there is not a great deal of the "self" in an automatic process.358

It is not apparently Fromm's intent here to try to establish evidence to prove these assertions. He mentions a few facts, and points out their significance in terms of

357 The material being discussed directly here is in Chapter II, A and Chapter V, 4, and 5, p. 427-428, 430 of this thesis.

358 Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, 2, c, p. 116, and Chapter II, C, 1, c, p. 103-104.
his descriptions of the child's later life, when the self-awareness, and awareness of its separation will occur. Hence the meaning of freedom from here is derivative from this later development, in particular cases, and from the general plan of the individual's development.

Ch. VI, D, 5, c. - Fromm's Proof for the General Development of Freedom From in the Individual

In this proof Fromm closely identifies the processes of growing individuation and growing human freedom. In the second chapter, the identity of these two processes was seen to be very likely, if not certain.

Fromm sees these processes in terms of separation from primary ties, and concomitant awareness and emotional reactions of helplessness, anxiety, etc., a negative aspect, or freedom from, and in terms of genuine, integrated self-growth, looked upon as a positive aspect of individuation or as a "freedom to." A plausible explanation is given of why Fromm uses the terms "individuation" and "freedom" to describe these similar, if not identical processes. The word, freedom, indicates a growth in a truly human fashion.

359 The material for this section is taken for the most part from Chapter II, B, and C, 1, and Chapter V, C, 2, and 5, of this thesis.

360 Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, 1, c, p. 104-107.
Several questions can be asked about the proof. The first is this: Is the word "freedom" justifiable in terms of a process of this sort? Freedom from represents a whole series of different, yet successive, related activities. Fromm uses this name to designate, apparently, the psychic effect of physical separation, as well as the objective state of separation, causing this effect. "Freedom from," then, does not seem to be a construct in these aspects of reality, but is founded on two aspects of this process, physical separation, and conscious recognition and response to this separation, and represents the actual direction of the process and the goal of the process, too, therefore. "Freedom from," then, is an essential note of the meaning of the real process, and is therefore not entirely a construct, a "surrogate" essence representing the real essence. 361

Another question that can be asked about freedom from is its relationship to "freedom to." It is said to be dialectically related to "freedom to" as to its contradictory. And by "contradictory" here is apparently not meant contrary, which might mean something true. 362

361 Cf. George P. KLUBERTANZ, op. cit., p. 263.

362 Cf. supra, Chapter V, B, 1, a, p. 374-375, and B, 3, p. 411-412.
problem is this: If they are not contradictory, but said to be so, as actually existing in reality, then the concept of freedom from is partially false, containing in its complete concept an aspect that makes it untrue.

How is this possible? One answer may be that Fromm sees conflict and strife in man, and interprets this, not in terms of contraries, but of contradictories. This seems unlikely, though, unless there are further reasons for Fromm's seeing of contradictories where contraries would suffice. One reason that comes to mind is the relationship between freedom from in the general development of the individual and human nature, as investigated in the preceding section of this chapter.\(^{363}\) There it was seen that freedom from is part of the positive aspect of human nature, which itself is a contradiction seeking a solution. Moreover, if freedom from is represented as being in a relationship of contradiction to "freedom to," it will be in complete accord with the dialectical law of the negation of the negation, which calls for further dialectical development within a new quality.\(^{364}\) Hence, there may be a hidden major at work here, leading to an interpretation of

\(^{363}\) Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, b, (2), p. 522-528.

freedom from in dialectical terms, as one aspect of this concept.

This leads to a third question: How is it possible to account for the seeming universality and necessity of Fromm's account of the general development of freedom from in the human individual? Is his structure meant to be a hypothesis, suggested by and proven by the facts of particular growing freedom from in individuals? Is it, therefore, an inductive process that Fromm uses to set up this general explanation? This seems unlikely, since the general plan of development is not backed up by much material when it is explained in Escape from Freedom, neither in the immediate or remote context. 365

Another possibility that presents itself is this, that the general plan is an insight Fromm has into the meaning of human freedom; there is no suggestion of this in the text or context. Or it may be a composite of several insights about the nature of man's freedom. Or again, it may be derived from a reflective analysis on lived experience. If any of these were true, then this would account for the universality and necessity of this meaning of freedom from. But there is no evidence for this approach.

365 Erich FROMM, Escape from Freedom, p. 28-30, and passim.
A possible explanation, and probably the best of the explanations, is that Fromm's concepts of freedom and specifically of freedom from have a content that for the most part is drawn from reflection on direct experience of oneself and others living dynamically, e.g., the actual separation from others, the experience of this, and the consequent affective response. The conflict, as of contradictionary, between freedom from and "freedom to," seems hard to understand even as a conflict of contraries. The assertion of a relationship of contradictories does not seem to be a direct insight, or a reflected lived experience, but rather an insertion in the content of the concept of freedom from from some presupposition. This presupposition would be a dialectical outlook on reality, seeing in all development a strife of opposites, of contradictories.

This would explain the additional note of contradictory struggle in developing human freedom. This aspect would be the conclusion of a deductive syllogism, built upon the universal premise of all development being the result of the strife of contradictories. This would account for the universality and necessity that Fromm's general plan of developing human freedom seems to have. This same law would account for the universality and necessity of Fromm's definition of human essence as a contradiction.
seeking a solution. As a part of human essence, and the result of a negation of animality, individual human freedom from would also have to be in a contradictory relationship to some opposite movement, in this case, to "freedom to."

Granted the truth and communicability of such a major premise as all development is a clash of contradictions, then logically it would follow that freedom from would have a relationship of contradiction to some aspect of reality close to it. Granted, though, that there exists no contradiction between freedom from and "freedom to," and that there is a genuine development of freedom, then the major is wrong, that whatever develops, develops dialectically.

One further confirmation of the dialectical origin of freedom from as a contradictory to "freedom to" is the probable identity of "interior" alienation and freedom from. Little evidence is given for an "interior" alienation in man's cognitive life. And the idea of "interior" alienation fits in very well with the dialectical laws as representing one pole of a dialectical struggle that is meant to be overcome, to be negated by a new quality, that

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366 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 3, b, p. 475.
367 Cf. supra, Chapter V, A, 5, b, p. 362-367.
of a new kind of cognitive union with others. 368

Ch. VI, D, 5, d. - Fromm's Proof for the Particular Development of Freedom From in the Human Individual 369

The particular details of the child's growth in freedom from fit in well with the general plan of development given by Fromm. Particular attention is paid by Fromm to the problem of authority in the child, with this the only example given by Fromm that completely fulfills the criteria given by Fromm for the presence of freedom from, with the overcoming of irrational authority having the goal of acting and being for oneself. To no other aspect of child development does Fromm apply completely his theory of dialectic development of freedom from.

An estimate of what Fromm's peers in psychology think of his picture of how the child develops has already been given. 370 It was pointed out that there is no general agreement on these matters of child development; Hall and Lindzey saw in Fromm little evidence of investigation, and added that, scientifically speaking, no theory of personality was even "minimally adequate." 371 Yet Fromm speaks

369 The material from this section is taken from Chapter II, C, 2, and Chapter V, C, 3, p. 424-425 of this thesis.
370 Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, 2, i, p. 146-150.
371 Ibid., p. 148-150.
decisively about his theories of gradual separation from primary ties, and seems certain about the main lines of his explanation of the child's confrontation with authority; he does waver on one point, whether or not it would be possible in the future to have children avoid the formation of an "authoritarian" conscience, and develop only a "humanistic" conscience. 372 Authority of the irrational type may be an "accident" imposed by society; possibly in the future, as in a few great figures in the past, freedom from's growth, and consequent "freedom to's" growth, will not be prevented by irrational authority from a full development.

Granted that Hall and Lindzey are correct in saying that Fromm gives little evidence for his ideas of child development, (they themselves assert, mistakenly it would seem, that for Fromm and others anxiety is entirely a product of society), 373 and granted that his data are not on the same level and completeness of analysis, say, as David Ausubel would have concerning, e.g., conscience in his Theory and Problems of Child Development, 374 then the

372 Ibid., Chapter II, C, 2, p. 131-137.
373 Calvin S. HALL and Gardner LINDZEY, Theories of Personality, p. 153.
question remains: How does one explain the certainty and universality of Fromm's assertions about the development of the child?

There are certain guiding forces in his structure of personality development, including authority. One of them is certainly his general theory of development of individuation and freedom, for his explanations of these particular lines of development are couched in terms of freedom from primary ties, of escapes from this freedom from into secondary ties, (an attempt to meet anxiety by return to the animal state?), of the possibility perhaps in the future of children meeting rational authority from all agents of society and thus increasing their growth in "freedom to," as their separation from parents grows normally.

Another guiding force in Fromm's ideas of child development is the idea he shares with Freud of the existence of the Super-Ego, at least in its roles of conscience and the Ego-ideal, although he has changed Freud's ideas on the Super-Ego considerably, and Fromm owes a certain amount to his own analysis of typical authority situations such as were contained in his part of Studies on Authority

and the Family, published in German in 1936. Fromm writes with seeming certainty about his theory of authority, whether he accepts, in part anyway, the sexual component of his earlier German work or rejects the necessity of a sexual component in his English work. It would seem that Fromm generalizes too quickly, or at least gives that impression.

It would seem likely that Fromm's certitude in regard to his concept of the role of authority in the child's development comes in good part from his universal theory of growing freedom from in the human individual. This aspect of his theory would be logically necessitated by his general theory, held as universally true, and would therefore be logically consistent.

Fromm's theory of child development, inasmuch as it derives from his psychoanalytic theory as such, might simply be a theoretical generalization, subject to revision. It certainly lacks adequate proof, yet may not be logically incorrect. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to state whether Fromm here in this psychoanalytic part of his theory of child development is arguing from a universal


377 Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, 2, e, p. 126-129.
or general principle. That he is using a form of deduction seems clear.

Ruth Munroe claims that Fromm's theory of individuation is overgeneralized, and that Fromm's philosophical and sociological approach makes Fromm oversimplify problems. It might be more true to say that Fromm's theory of individuation, i.e., of human freedom, as has been seen, would be overgeneralized if Fromm were proceeding by way of scientific induction. Her second comment is an apt one, for Fromm does seem to be proceeding in his discussion of the growth of the child on either a universal plan, with this theory of dialectical growing freedom, or on at least the plane or level of highly speculative theoretical knowledge, in explaining the particular changes, including authority, that take place in a child's life.

Granted the truth of the three principles of dialectical materialism already discussed, then there must be development and conflict in the growing child. Any of the details of this development, including the clash with irrational authority, should be specified by direct observation and research. It would seem here that possibly the

378 Ruth L. MUNROE, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, p. 474, 477.
378a Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, 1, c, p. 92-96.
379 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, c, (2), (b), p. 543-551.
form of his assertions would tend to be universally stated, while the content, specific details, are not logically necessary, providing the general structure of growing freedom from is followed. This is of logical necessity, one may conjecture, that the particular laws of individual growth follow the general structure of dialectical, growing freedom from.

Ch. VI, D, 5, e. - Fromm's Proof for the Origin of Freedom From in the Human Race

There is no need to enter here into the backgrounds of this particular proof of Fromm's. Already in a previous section, discussing the origin of freedom from in the human race in relation to Fromm's concept of man, account was taken of certain difficulties that arose as to (1) the logical possibility of man's origin from the animal and (2) the framework or structure within which this origin took place. The origin of man from animals, as an essentially different and possibly superior being, was seen tentatively to be logically possible in a certain sense, and the laws governing the real change from animal

380 The material from this section is taken from this thesis, Chapter III, A and Chapter VI, C, 2, c, p. 531-552 as well as the previous work of this D section of this sixth chapter.

381 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, c, (2), passim.
to man were seen to be in accord with the three fundamental laws of development of dialectical materialism.

The question here will be as to what kind of proof Fromm uses, and as to what the validity of this proof might be. The proof centers around a change in specific perfection, at least a qualitative change, if not one in essence. It looks, from the materials just mentioned in the last paragraph, as if Fromm's theory of the origin of the human race was established chiefly, if not entirely, by a presupposed philosophical basis of dialectical materialism. This need not be necessarily true.

One proof ruled out is that of immediate lived experience as a source of proof. That there is an analogy between the birth of the human race and that of the individual has already been seen.\textsuperscript{382} The question of Fromm trying to prove his position on the origin of freedom from in the human race by an application of Haeckel's law seemed likely, set in an evolutionary, dialectical framework, and cast in human terms of freedom.\textsuperscript{383}

Yet the question was not considered to be definitively answered, inasmuch as a proof from analogy in this case gives at the most probability, and Fromm's position

\textsuperscript{382} Cf. supra, Chapter III, A, 7, passim.

\textsuperscript{383} Cf. supra, Chapter III, A, 8, passim.
was stated firmly; a fact one would trust Fromm would know. It was suggested that some type of evolutionism might be the answer.

In this chapter the question of man's origin from the animal as an evolutionary fact was investigated and found to be a conviction of Fromm's, as well as the origin of freedom from the animal. Fromm accepted the common intellectual tradition of today. He would consider this origin as scientifically proved.

Yet this proves the existence of a fact. The why of the fact, and the necessity of the fact remain as separate questions. From the discussion of the preceding section, explaining the origin of freedom from, as Fromm conceives it, in terms of dialectical materialism, it also seems very likely, if not certain, that Fromm combined a dialectical explanation of the origin of freedom from with the acceptance of the evolutionary fact, scientifically proven. Fromm's certainty of the fact came from evolutionary findings. In the three laws of dialectic development were explained why it had to happen, as well as the how and the whither.


385 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, c, (2), (b), passim.
Can the certainty of the occurrence of a dialectical process here face the assertion that Fromm makes in *The Sane Society* that man entered and leaves the universe accidentally?\textsuperscript{386} If this is meant about the origin of man, as it might have been,\textsuperscript{387} then possibly there is a contradiction here, for you would have a necessary event happening accidentally.

In Marxist thought, there is a problem here, of relating the accidental (the contingent) to the necessary.\textsuperscript{388} Yet there is a solution, too, for in the accidental, which is the contingent, is found a completion of necessity, and a becoming necessary. An endless series of accidents may happen in nature, and in human affairs, yet this is the way nature pursues her course.\textsuperscript{389} Thus it may be said that there is no obstacle in Marxist thought to an accidental origin of anything.

\textsuperscript{386} Erich FROMM, *The Sane Society*, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{387} Cf. supra, Chapter VI, B, 3, c, p. 488-489.

\textsuperscript{388} Gustav WETTER, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 384-385.

\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., p. 384.
Ch. VI, D, 5, f. - Fromm's Proof for the General Development of Freedom From in the Human Race

In the preceding sections of the thesis, the dialectical nature of Fromm's concept of developing freedom from in the human race has been discussed, as well as its relationship to Fromm's concept of man and to his general philosophical position. It has also been seen that freedom from in the human race is a dialectical continuation of the freedom from found in the origins of the human race. Freedom from represents an aspect of the positive, though alienated, part of human nature as it develops through this freedom in the course of history.

This résumé suggests that the concept of freedom from as it develops generally in the human race is proved by the three laws of development of dialectical materialism. Is this really what Fromm intends to say?

One answer to this question is that given by M. F. Ashley Montagu and others in their reviews of Escape from Freedom, in which the law of the general development of the human race in freedom from is exactly set out. According

390 The material of this section of the thesis will be taken chiefly from Chapter III, B, of this thesis, as well as from Chapter V, C of this thesis, as well as from Chapter VI, C, 2, d and Chapter VI, C, 3.

to Montagu, as well as Gill and Benedict, Fromm is engaged in proving a thesis, through a series of selected, meaningful facts.\textsuperscript{392} It is thus in their eyes a work of induction of some sort, of showing the value of the thesis, i.e., of the general development of human freedom, including freedom from, in the human race, with particular attention to Nazism and to its ancestor, the Protestant "character" of the time of Luther and Calvin. Both Gill and Montagu think that at least in the main lines Fromm's thesis is admirably demonstrated. Other scholars in the same series of reviews are not so convinced.\textsuperscript{393}

Earlier in the thesis it was suggested that, while Montagu's outlook on what Fromm is attempting to do may well be correct, nevertheless there are some philosophical presuppositions that may be operative here, such as cultural evolutionism and certain types of dialectical development; these presuppositions would give the certainty and universality that are present in Fromm's main outlines of his "thesis."\textsuperscript{394} This idea came from the conviction, shared by many scholars, that Fromm did not prove his "thesis," and that he entered this book with his general

\textsuperscript{392} Ibid., p. 122-123, 111.

\textsuperscript{393} Cf. supra, Chapter III, B, 3, g, p. 256-257.

\textsuperscript{394} Ibid., p. 257-258.
thesis already certain in his mind. Otherwise how explain
the omission or obscurity of important viewpoints, contrary
to his viewpoint, that this series of reviews by Montagu,
Gill, Benedict and others bring out. 395

In an earlier part of this section it was seen that
Fromm's concept of the general development of the human
race in freedom followed along with and could be considered
to be a logical continuation of the three dialectical laws
of development. 396 Is it possible that these same laws
represent not only a good framework for explaining what
happened, but actually caused it to happen? The answer
would tend to be "yes," since the same laws were operative
and causal in the beginning of the human race, there is no
reason to suspect that the dialectical framework of Fromm's
general developmental plan of freedom in the human race is
anything less.

If this is so, then one probable explanation of
the universality and necessity of Fromm's formulation of
general developmental freedom in the human race is because

395 Cf. e.g., Ernest E. Hadley's comment that
Fromm underestimates the biological and overestimates the
psychological, p. 132, and Louis Wirth's comment that
Fromm's thesis is "so cosmic in scope and so full of ambi-
quous terms" that even if the meaning of the thesis were
clear, it still would be hard to know whether it was
proven. (p. 129)

396 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, C, 2, d, p. 559-560.
of the presence of these necessary and universal laws of dialectical development, and the necessity and universality of these laws would be logically justified.

Ch. VI, D, 5, g. - Fromm's Proof for the Particular Development of Freedom From in the Human Race

The materials that Fromm covers in his history of certain parts and certain times of the human race are vast, even with his selectivity, as he applies his general concepts of growing human freedom to particular instances. It was concluded earlier in this chapter that Fromm does hold to one type of cultural evolution in the human race, i.e., freedom, an evolution aimed at a non-necessary goal. 398 The scientific evidence for his claims was seen to be seriously questioned by competent scholars, whether he was discussing the early history of the human race, the Nazi period or modern "man"; this was done by either rejecting the competence of the sources Fromm uses, such as Bachofen, or raising alternate explanations to a set of facts, as Wirth does, or questioning the emphasis he puts on selected causal factors as Mullaly does. 399

397 The materials for this section are chiefly taken from Chapter IV and Chapter V, C, of this thesis.
398 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, A, 3, p. 451-453.
399 Cf. supra, Chapter IV, A, 1, e and 2, d, and Chapter IV, B, 5, c, passim.
If Fromm were trying to prove the existence and nature of freedom, and its development, in these works, then many scholars would reject him on grounds of inadequacy of proof, and lack of balance in his use of sources. This they would do, and actually do, looking at his writings as a serious attempt to prove the points he is making.\textsuperscript{400} Other scholars are not so sure. Abram Kardiner's judgment that Fromm writes like a "minister," (and therefore not as a scholar, but as an exhortatory moralist, it would seem), is backed up by Ernest van der Haag.\textsuperscript{401} In his analysis of "modern" man, Fromm introduces philosophical presuppositions on the nature of man and the human situation, without validation, according to Gewirth and Mullaly.\textsuperscript{402}

From this group of critics certain facts stand out, (1) that Fromm does not possibly offer a complete enough analysis of empirical data to be judged as proceeding scientifically, and (2) he may well be operating from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{400} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{401} Cf. Abram KARDINER and Ernest VAN DER HAAG, in \textit{Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy}, ed. by Sidney Hook, p. 94 and 111.
\end{itemize}
philosophical "insights" or judgements, as a way of selecting and assessing historical data.

Fromm does interpret these selected phases of history in terms of the structure of developing human existence and developing dialectical freedom from. It is possible, and probable, that the certainty and confidence, with which he enters this field of particular applications of freedom from, come from a set of philosophical presuppositions about the nature of development, of man and of freedom, that he, therefore, is proceeding deductively from general principles to particular instances.

Granted the truth of his unspoken premises, the dialectical nature of all development, and the dialectical nature of man and of freedom, and the existence of cultural evolution, then any particular instances of cultural change, or of human change would fall under his general principles. Fromm could look for the application of these laws in particular instances and validly so. However, as Richard De George points out about the laws of dialectical development, they are so general and so imprecise, that they can be applied in just about any way possible. 403 And being general, abstract laws, they give no complete

403 Richard T. DE GEORGE, Patterns of Soviet Thought, p. 90, 213, 235.
account of the flow and interaction of concrete, individual events and persons, and hence lack adequate predictive power and adequate means of validation within themselves for assertions about concrete events.

Hence, if what Fromm is doing is applying general presuppositions to concrete, historical happenings, then, granted the validity of these presuppositions, the concrete events must fall within the structure and the limitations of these presuppositions. But to know these events in any adequate fashion, other scientific procedures are necessary. The validity, for instance, of the application of his theory of the development of freedom in Nazi Germany must proceed with caution, for the general laws will give a structure to facts, and question, on theoretical grounds, the interpretation of certain facts, but they will not give the facts themselves.

Ch. VI, D, 6. - Summary

One method suggested in this subsection for proving the concepts Fromm has of freedom is that of a series of insights that Fromm has of the nature of freedom; this was rejected as a probable explanation of the general plan of

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404 Cf. supra, Chapter IV, B, 5, c, p. 331-332, for alternate explanations to Fromm’s by Karl Menninger and Louis Wirth.
developing human freedom because of lack of evidence of
such an "insightful," or "phenomenological" approach, as
it also might be called. This is not to deny its exis-
tence, or even probability, but to deny that there is solid
evidence that Fromm uses this method as a proof.

In general it was seen that Fromm's dialectical
conception of reality, and particularly of human beings and
of human freedom, plays a prominent part in his philosophy.
One question was raised in an earlier section, about the
possibility of constructural knowledge here in this area
proofs, and applied in an incomplete fashion to the
proof for the general development of freedom from in the
individual.

It does seem quite probable that Fromm is using
proofs that involve constructural knowledge. In his eyes
contradictions do exist in reality, and are defended
as such. If he is wrong about this, that they do not exist
in reality, but he nevertheless puts them there, then part
of the content of such concepts as human essence and free-
dom is false, and his conceptions of the general laws of

405 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, D, 5, c, p. 594.
406 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, D, 3, passim.
407 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, D, 5, c, p. 592.
408 Cf. supra, Chapter VI, D, 1, b, p. 574-575.
reality are also wrong. His system would be a system of thought realities, partially applicable to reality and partially not. His system would involve substituting a mental method of inquiry, of progressing by contradictions and clarifications as an explanation for the actual clash of contraries in the real world, and thus possibly, may involve a number of constructs.

Chapter VI, E. - CONTRADICTIONS AND AMBIGUITIES, THEIR EXPLANATION

Ch. VI, E, 1. - Introduction

During the course of the thesis a number of seeming contradictions and ambiguities have been pointed out, with the intention of approaching them in this chapter, containing the critique of Erich Fromm's thought. There will not be an attempt to solve each and every contradiction or ambiguity, but rather an attempt will be made to point out the general areas of Fromm's conception of reality that are responsible to an important degree for the seeming contradictions and ambiguities in his conception of reality.

409 Cf. e.g., Chapter III, A, 2, p. 167-168, where man is found to be directed by no instinct and by some instinct, as an example of a contradiction. Cf. Chapter II, C, 2, g, p. 137-140, as a lack of clarity, in this case of the distinction between primary and secondary ties.
In this search there will be no attempt to criticize Fromm's thought as it developed in his writing; if his later thought changed then this is not considered as a contradiction or an ambiguity. Nor is there any attempt to criticize an author because his multiple interests and talents keep him from being a philosopher exclusively. In addition, every writer makes mistakes, through inadvertence or the complexity of the matter involved.

The intention, then, of this part of Chapter VI is to consider the ambiguities and contradictions as they appear in Fromm's work, inasmuch as these limitations of his thought proceed from his basic philosophy. An effort will be made to show, then, the philosophical causes of these limitations in terms of the inaccuracy, the incompleteness, or the falseness of certain basic philosophical positions on the part of Fromm.

Ch. VI, E, 2. - Primary Ties and Animality

During the thesis various sections of it were devoted to exploring the meaning of primary ties, playing an essential role as they do in their connection with freedom from. They were looked upon as emotional ties to nature, to mother, to family, to clan, that would give

410 Cf. e.g., supra, Chapter II, C, 2, h, passim.
warmth and security; these are ties that bound man to the
world from which he came; they may or may not be instinct-
directed (there are ambiguities in Fromm's thought on this
matter). 411

These ties were to be broken if true freedom is to
be achieved, and to be broken is part of the process of
freedom from. They tie man to nature, to animality, and
thus prevent man from growing in a human way — this is
Fromm's thought about them. This connection between prima-
ry ties and animality will be explored further in this sub-
section.

First of all, there does not seem to be any real
explanation of why primary ties manifest an opposition to
the new perfection of man, his reason and self-awareness.
Instinct is said to continue on in man, and to be respons­
able for the presence of primary ties, yet man is said to
arise when animals cease to be directed by instinct, either
entirely or almost entirely. (This is another ambiguity) 412

Granted that these biologically based instincts
lasted for thousands of years, as Fromm would indicate,

411 Cf. supra, Chapter II, C, 2, c and h, and
Chapter III, B, 3, b, (2), (i), passim. The rest of this
section will not have a documented reference for every
comment on primary ties, as the material here is all from
the thesis in its earlier parts.

412 Cf. supra, Chapter III, B, 3, b, (2), (i).
(both of these suppositions lack proof), then this would account for the connection of primary ties with man's animality, but it gives no reason why they must be severed.

As these bonds are severed, then in their place Fromm would see education and care replacing the self-preservation taken care of by these ties. Actually as education and human care replace these ties, the child becomes insecure because he becomes more self-aware. Reasons of feelings of security do not demand the abolition of primary ties, then.

Perhaps, then, the reason why they must be eliminated is this, that they bind us to our animality. And animality is pictured by Fromm as the negative pole of the human, dichotomous essence. And here lies the heart of the problem. For, there is no real reason given by Fromm for his statement that animality is, (and must be) opposed to reason and self-awareness.

Even granted that animality is the source of biologically based instincts, which in turn are the source of primary ties, why is it that these instincts and primary ties must be opposed to reason and self-awareness? Actually, in one of his most recent writings, *The Heart of Man*, Erich Fromm sees animality in man, as unable to take care of his basic, self-preserving needs through instinct, and he does this in the context of defining man as a
contradiction between self-awareness and animality. He thus sees instinct-directed actions as of little strength in man.

What Fromm seems to be doing here is to be aware of the fact that emotional ties of the child, and, by analogy, in primitive man, are strong to some extent, and impede man's recognition of himself as distinct from those to whom he is tied. Actually he gives no biological basis for this analysis, and overlooks the advantages of these ties for a sense of well-being, and the possibility that these ties do not need to be cut, but rather integrated into the life of awareness. He sees in these ties a meaning that prevents growth. An alternative explanation would be that they are necessary for true human growth, if properly integrated into man's scheme of values.

A root cause of the ambiguities here seems to be that Fromm conceives animality not only as operating according to different laws than rationality, but as operating in opposition to, yes, in contradiction to man's rationality, and this essentially so.

Is it not possible for two different levels of reality to exist in unity, without being involved in a contradiction? The unity of self-awareness and animality

413 Erich FROMM, The Heart of Man, p. 116.
in man need not be one of identity of these two perfections. Rather the facts call for a unity of two different levels of being.

A true knowledge of being would show Fromm that animality and self-awareness need not be, and cannot be, totally opposed to one another. A knowledge of the analogy of being, and of the principle of proportionality or of analogy, would prevent what seems to be a serious mistake, the imposition of a previous metaphysical structure upon a reality that does not fit this metaphysical structure, the dialectical nature of reality.

Because animality and rationality are similar they can be united and make a whole; this unity of essence is possible because animality is able to be enlarged into a higher perfection, that of self-awareness. Actually Fromm sees that animality is fundamentally open to combination with self-awareness, as instincts gradually lessen, and therefore is not in contradictory opposition to self-awareness.

Ch. VI, E, 3. - Dialectical Materialism and Human Freedom

In discussing the ambiguities and unproven and questionable assumptions of Fromm in regard to animal opposition to rationality, and in regard to primary ties, the imposition of a dialectical opposition appeared as one possible reason for these ambiguities. This general relationship of dialectical materialism to Fromm's discussion of human nature and human freedom needs further discussion.

It has already been seen that the relationship of freedom to:freedom from, as a dialectical relationship, is unproven and unnecessary. Freedom from might better be looked at, it was seen, as a necessary condition for "freedom to," and not as dialectically proceeding from one cause along with "freedom to."

The thinking behind this conception of human freedom, as well as behind the stated opposition of animality to reason and self-awareness, would seem to be a type of dialectical materialism, with its three fundamental laws of development. The fundamental of these three laws is the unity and struggle of contradictories or opposites. It is a postulate, a way of looking at reality, that has never been proven or even well-illustrated by Marxist

415 Cf. supra, Chapter V, B, 3, passim.
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philosophers; it has been used by Marxist philosophers as a means of making the universe self-sufficient. This law seems to be one of Fromm's fundamental approaches to reality, that is imposed as an explanatory principle of all reality in changes.

The purpose of such an explanatory law seems to have failed in these cases just mentioned, for the evidence presented not only is open to an alternative explanation, e.g., freedom from as a necessary condition, but seems to actually favor the alternative explanation.

Fromm's theory of the development and meaning of human freedom actually has very many fine elements, and raises anew the fundamental meaning of man. His thinking on freedom, apparently as the "specific" perfection of man, is not an attempt to solve the problem of free-will, but rather to express the fact that man's "being" is meant to be a "becoming," with self-activity, creative and spontaneous self-activity as the goal of man. This expresses the fact that human existence is meant to be an integrated activity of the self, in accordance with the values found in man and nature. It is a challenge to explore more fully the value of the existential aspect of being human,


417 Ibid., p. 334.
on the becoming of man as a goal in itself, if a self-actualized becoming. It puts stress on the value of existence, as becoming. Fromm's position suggests the greater importance of becoming as contrasted with becoming this or that. Human existence as act is more important than the "suchness" of human existence. These are some of the implications of Fromm's seeing man as being "free."

These implications of the meaning of freedom, "freedom to" and freedom from, receive no meaning from being phrased in terms of the laws of dialectical materialism. Freedom can stand apart from these laws, and as a developing aspect of man's essence could fit into another type of structure, the act-potency or actuality-possibility structure of Aristotle, and his theory of movement or development, along with such developments as were given by Johann in his article, "The Logic of Evolution."  

Ch. VI, E, 4. - The Ambiguity of Freedom

For Fromm the self-awareness that freedom from brings with it is an ambiguous gift of natural forces of nature. Man is supposed to be the climax of evolutionary...
forces, and man transcends all the rest of life, because of his reason and self-awareness. This transcendence, really in man, and able to be activated more and more by man, has only in a few cases, such as Jesus and Galileo, according to Fromm, actually reached a fullness. Only the few have managed to break all of their connections with nature, in circumstances that Fromm does not explain.

The rest of men for the most part, until very recent times, have never realized freedom from and much less "freedom to." Men were really "humanoid", not men, until recent times. The realization of their separateness, a separateness that had lasted tens of thousands of years, shattered the comfort and security of the pre-individual era, and taught men that they were, each of them, alone. For most of these men, due to the poor state of their socio-economical and other types of environment, this new freedom from (happening automatically, it is said by Fromm), was the occasion of a flight from itself into a futile attempt by men to escape their aloneness. Man may destroy himself by nuclear war.

Fromm has been said to be a Utopian. This is hardly the case, although his idea that man and men can

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and must become self-sufficient suggests this. Given his basic naturalism, and the little chance that men have for happiness, or possibly will have, and given man's conception of himself as facing a meaningless death and frustration of his powers, then it would seem that to be free means little hope, and little reason to relish freedom, for life is just about devoid of meaning for a person of Fromm's vision, except that of courageously facing a threatening future, which personally will end in the absurdity of personal death. 421

421 John H. SCHAAR, Escape from Authority, p. 287.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to make an inquiry into the concept of freedom from as it appears in the writings of Erich Fromm. The question, the problem, was precisely this: What is the meaning of this concept, freedom from, in the works of Erich Fromm, and how is it justified? Thus a double question, and a double answer; this double answer meant (1) an "invention", a discovery of what the meaning of freedom from is, and (2) a justification of this meaning, both in terms of the inner consistency and clarity of this answer, and even more in terms of the relationship of this concept of freedom from to other basic concepts of Erich Fromm's conception of reality: in terms of these relationships to these other aspects of Fromm's conception of reality Fromm's concept of freedom from was seen to occupy a central position in Fromm's reality structure, and to derive much of its validity and probative value from these other aspects of Fromm's thought structure.

The problem thus conceived and its answer were philosophical. The methods used were common to philosophical inquiry, an examination of texts, and developing thought, with attention paid to the sources of this thought as needed. A full inquiry was made into the meaning of certain central texts bearing on the problem, and the
meaning of these texts was co-ordinated with texts from many of Fromm's other works. Abundant use of texts was a part of the "inventio", because of the particular nuances of Fromm's use of language. Along with this main concern for the meaning of freedom from were inquiries into the meaning of the allied concepts of alienation and particularly of "freedom to." There were special efforts made to find out the meaning of these concepts as well as the meaning of the subconcepts of freedom from such as "primary ties." The critique of freedom from, in terms of its own inner consistency and relationship to other central concepts of Fromm's thought, and in terms of the proofs used by Fromm for this concept, concluded the thesis in the sixth chapter. This critique had its foundations laid in the first two parts of the sixth chapter and in the other preceding chapters.

The results of the thesis were such as to propose that freedom from was looked at in four different ways by Erich Fromm, with all four ways involving, with considerable probability the same five elements, except the concept of freedom from as represented in the origin of the human individual. The five elements were a separation from primary ties, an awareness of this separation, affective consequences of this separation, with a dialectic relationship to "freedom to" as an immediate and ultimate goal. This
process of growing freedom from was found to be an essential part of human nature as human, with the role of relating man's humanity, his new human possibilities, to his continued animal nature, serving as an intermediary between "freedom to" and animality in himself, by breaking the ties of animality as a necessary condition for the growth of "freedom to", and by an evolution of the limited, alienated self-awareness present in man's beginnings to a new type of cognitive and conative union with other men and with nature.

Central to Fromm's primary intuition as a philosopher is the worth and eminence of man, in a universe that may not make much sense. This humanism, a non-theistic one, is seen in terms of several key laws of developing reality, very similar to the way dialectical materialism would see these laws. This humanistic dialectical materialism would seem to be the key approach to reality by Erich Fromm, joined to a conviction of biological and cultural evolution shaping man's origin and development, opening up the possibilities of indefinite progress if man but would become aware of the inner and outer forces shaping his destiny. In turn, it is freedom, growing human freedom, that Fromm selects as his key concept to describe man's specifically human perfections. Man as man becomes free, free from and free to, in his entire psychic, human life.
During the thesis itself many topics had to be considered which merited further attention, a probe in depth, topics that were treated as secondary in the thesis and for the most part hypothetically. Such topics as alienation, and particularly "interior" alienation, as well as "freedom to", although discussed at considerable length, could use a further investigation, in terms of the development of these ideas in Fromm's thought, as subject to an internal critique. In addition such topics as Fromm's conception of human knowing, of "science", of good and evil, of emotions, of the human knowing taking place in the psychoanalytic interview, all of these would make good topics for thesis investigation. The special qualities of Fromm's humanism, of his idea on authority, of his a-theology or non-theism would also be good subjects for further research. Besides these topics other topics worthy of thesis investigation would be Fromm's concepts of human nature and of human existence; Fromm's Marxism or his existentialism would be interesting thesis topics, although his Marxism would be an exceedingly difficult topic. All of these various subjects represent areas of needed further research in the conception of reality had by Erich Fromm.
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ABSTRACT OF

Erich Fromm's Concept of "Freedom From",
An Internal Critique

by Joseph S. ROTH, S.J.

The problem the thesis seeks to solve is the meaning of the concept of freedom from in the writings of Erich Fromm, prominent contemporary American psychoanalyst and moral philosopher. The meaning of freedom is today in much dispute, and is looked upon as a subject of utmost importance. On the American scene Erich Fromm's works, one of whose main themes is freedom, have an immense circulation among the educated. The purpose of this thesis is to find out the meaning of freedom in Erich Fromm, but not in the one sense of free-will. For freedom, in Erich Fromm's works, is seen chiefly as a developing process within each human being, a single process consisting of two dialectically related aspects; one of these aspects is the increasing, organized growth of the total personality, called "freedom to," while the other aspect is the separation from ties that impede full humanity, and the consequences within the person of this separation, called "freedom from." The thesis is concerned chiefly with this second aspect,

1 Doctoral thesis presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, 1968, viii-649 p.
"freedom from," in its fundamental meanings, and with an internal critique of these meanings.

The evidence of Fromm's own works points to a division in the meanings of freedom from as understood by him, chiefly into freedom from as it develops in each human individual in his own life span, i.e., ontogenetically, and freedom from as it occurs in human individuals during the development of the human race, i.e., phylogenetically. Not only are these developments discussed by Erich Fromm in terms of general theory, but also in concrete individual and phylogenetic historical details. In addition, the origins of freedom from, ontogenetically and phylogenetically, are also discussed. Besides "freedom to" as one possible goal of freedom from, the concept Fromm has of alienation is closely connected with freedom from. Both of these concepts, "freedom to" and alienation, are especially investigated in the thesis.

The origin, general, and concrete development of freedom from in the human individual's own individual life are the subject of inquiry in the second chapter of the thesis, after the first chapter deals with the subject, background and methodology of the thesis. In the third chapter of the thesis the phylogenetic origin and general phylogenetic development of freedom from is discussed, while in the fourth chapter particular historical periods, with
their own development of freedom from, are investigated. The fifth chapter looks into the meanings of "freedom to" and alienation, ending with a summary and synthesis of the meanings of freedom from. The sixth chapter, the main body of the critique, is an inquiry into the internal consistency and clarity of the conclusions of the previous four chapters.

The inventio proper of the thesis, contained in Chapters II-V, consists in the interpretation of the texts of Fromm considered necessary for understanding Fromm's various meanings of freedom from and consists as well in the understanding shed by commentators on Fromm's work. The entire corpus of Fromm's work, including his earlier writings in German, is investigated. Where chronological development plays a part, then the later work of Fromm is considered to be his last thought on the subject. Earlier positions in Fromm's understanding of freedom from are taken into account, where of primary importance or helpful in comprehending his later works. Account is also taken of the possible analogy of meanings of freedom from, as well as of various experts who have commented on the scientific sources of Fromm's conclusions in various scientific fields such as psychology and psychoanalysis.

The second chapter of the thesis points out that the origin of freedom from in the human individual has
little actual significance, except as a symbol of a later psychological separation from primary ties. Key texts in Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* especially are used to understand his general theory of the development of freedom from in the growing individual, with particular attention paid to a comparison of these processes of freedom from and individuation. In pointing out the concrete details of individual growth in freedom from, emphasis is put on the meaning of separation from primary ties and the relationship of freedom from to the child's meeting of authority.

In the growing child freedom from is seen to be one aspect of a continuing dialectical process. Freedom from primary ties comes to be recognized by the individual as a fact, as an objective state. Freedom from irrational authority is accomplished only by the favored few, in Fromm's opinion.

In the third chapter of the thesis the concept of freedom from in the origin of the human race receives particular attention, as containing the elements that will be part of the future development of freedom from in the human race. Fromm develops his meaning of freedom from through the metaphor of birth and through the myth of man's expulsion from paradise. In this origin of the human race freedom from is found to represent a separation from instinctual ties, with four effects, an objective disunity with others, the origin of self-awareness, reason, and
imagination, with the third effect of consequent affective anxiety and helplessness. The fourth effect is a consequent drive to overcome this affective state. Following an investigation of the methodology proper to this part of the thesis, this chapter then investigates Fromm's general theory of the development of freedom from in the human race, with emphasis put on a key text in his book, Escape from Freedom. Freedom from in its development in the human race is found to contain most of the elements of its origin in the human race, except in the area of consciousness. A later development in Fromm's conception, that of the role of suffering in man's developing freedom, is also treated.

In the fourth chapter, this search for the meaning of freedom from in the human race is continued by investigating Fromm's own selected historical periods. There is a brief summary of his meaning of freedom from in the historical periods preceding modern man, with emphasis put on its meaning in "modern" man, and, in particular, in Nazism. In general the meaning of freedom from for "modern" man is seen to be the same as at the time of the Reformation, at which time man was for all practical purposes free from all primary ties. A critique of Erich Fromm's selection of significant facts in these historical periods is also given, with both praise and criticism by authorities leveled at this selection.
The fifth chapter searches for the meaning of alienation in Fromm's thought, because this concept, particularly what is called in the thesis "interior" alienation, is quite close to the meaning of freedom from. This "interior" alienation, an alienation of awareness, a subject-object split and a separation of the unconscious from the conscious, seems to be consistent with certain aspects of freedom from in the individual and in the human race, and may well be identical with these aspects. The chapter searches further for the relationship of freedom from to "freedom to," and, after inquiring into the exact meaning of "freedom to," finds in it the non-necessary goal of freedom from, which is a necessary condition for full "freedom to." The chapter concludes with a summary and synthesis of the various meanings of freedom from as found in Chapters II-V.

Although a partial critique of Fromm's ideas on freedom from and their validity and consistency is incorporated into Chapters II-V of the thesis, it is the last chapter, the sixth, which contains the predominant critique of the thesis. Throughout the thesis reference is frequently made to the relationship of Fromm's conception of freedom from and his concept of man. In this chapter an inquiry is made into Fromm's general philosophical position and in particular his concept of man, to prepare for a
comparison of these points with his concepts of freedom from. This comparison is then made, with the finding that freedom from in its various elements fits well with Fromm's dialectical understanding of man, with freedom from seen as a positive aspect of human nature, and an intermediary between man's animality and the possibility of man's achievement of full "freedom to." An inquiry is then made into the probative value of Fromm's proofs for the meanings of freedom from, with the finding that the certainty and universality of these proofs may well derive from his conception of man as being subject to laws closely resembling fundamental laws of dialectical materialism. The last chapter closes with an investigation of the why of the contradictions and ambiguities in Erich Fromm's meanings of freedom from; Fromm's conviction of the dialectical, contradictory nature of man is seen to be quite likely a key cause of these ambiguities and difficulties.