CUBBERLEY'S EDUCATIONAL PRINCIPLES

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy
of the University of Ottawa

for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by

Stephen L. Wessel, L.L.B., Ph.D., M.P., L.A.
During the past quarter of our century few subjects have received the amount of attention which education has attracted. A variety and multiplicity of books, magazines and articles have been devoted to the education of young America as never before. And this flow is by no means abated today. Educators and educationists are still exerting themselves to improve our schools and educational systems. New plans or modifications of old plans are steadily suggested. Some writers receive considerable attention, others very little. Among those who received such attention is Dr. Ellwood Patterson Cubberley. Because of this attention and Cubberley's prominence in educational circles, the writer of this essay decided to make a critical study of Cubberley's educational doctrine in order to evaluate it in the light of Thomistic philosophy and Catholic doctrine especially as manifested in encyclical of Pope Pius XI on Christian Education of Youth.

The writer does not pretend to discuss all the varied aspects of Cubberley's doctrine as contained in his voluminous writings. The study will be limited to fundamentals. That is, Cubberley's fundamental principles which form the philosophical basis for practical suggestions will be presented. This will be done in Chapter II of this essay. This chapter will be divided into four paragraphs devoted respectively and in order to: 1) Cubberley's Objectives and Aims
of Education; 2) Cubberley's Conception of Education; 3) Cubberley's Administrative Suggestions; 4) Cubberley's Doctrine on Rights and Duties. The third chapter will be devoted to the evaluation of Cubberley's thought in the order of presentation of the preceding chapter with the exception that administration and rights and duties will be dealt with jointly because of their close and necessary relation.

However, before discussing Cubberley's doctrine, a brief biographical sketch will be presented to give an idea of the man and his far ranging influence in American public school circles. The purpose of this study is not to contest the fact of his fame, but to determine whether the quality of his doctrine is such as to merit the attention of students of education. In other words, does Cubberley expose a sound doctrine which will be a safe guide for teachers and officers of education? Will his doctrine if put into practice result in an improvement of education as its author pretends it would? In finding the correct answer to these questions lies the entire value of this study. In as much as the author succeeds in answering these questions this essay will be a contribution to the study of education and an aid to those who might want to study Cubberley's writings and adopt his doctrine. Due precisely to the fact that Cubberley is widely known, it is important that the student have available a study which critically evaluates his doctrine in the light of sound
philosophical principles and the teachings of the greatest educator on earth, the Catholic Church.

The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness and express his gratitude to all who have in any way contributed to this study and especially to Reverend Father Roméo Trudel, O.M.I., Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa, for his advice and helpful suggestions as well as for the careful reading of the manuscript.

The writer also wishes to thank his Provincial, Very Reverend Father Alphonse Simon, O.P.I., for the opportunity to make this study and for the encouragement generously given during the course of the study.

Thanks, are likewise extended to other Brothers-Oblates for their encouragement and for their willingness to shoulder extra work while the writer was devoting himself to this study.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ........................................................................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iv

CHAPTER I

CUBBERLEY’S LIFE AND INFLUENCE .............................................................. 1

CHAPTER II

CUBBERLEY’S DOCTRINE .................................................................................. 11
   A- Cubberley’s Objectives and Aims ............................................................. 12
   B- Cubberley’s Conception of Education ..................................................... 33
   C- Administration of Education ................................................................... 47
       Early School Administration .................................................................. 48
       The District System ................................................................................. 52
       The Township System ............................................................................. 57
       The County System ................................................................................ 59
       The City System ...................................................................................... 61
       The State System ..................................................................................... 64
       The Community System ......................................................................... 67
   D- Rights in Education ................................................................................. 89

CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF CUBBERLEY’S DOCTRINE .................................................. 103
   A- True Objectives and Aims of Education ................................................. 103
   B- True Conception of Education ............................................................... 134
   C- Criticism of Cubberley’s Centralization and
       Doctrine of Rights .................................................................................. 161

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 184

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................. 188
CHAPTER I
Cubberley's Life and Influence.

The life of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley is the story of a small town boy rapidly rising to positions of influence in the field of Education in the early years of manhood. It is also the story of a young man who would not settle down to attractive and lucrative positions until he found one in which there was limitless opportunity for work and influence in a relatively undeveloped field, the field of educational administration.

Cubberley was born in Andrews, Indiana, in 1868. His father, a druggist, wanted Ellwood to prepare himself to take over the thriving business. But the boy was interested in larger fields than the buying, neatly arranging on shelves and the selling of drug store items. When only seventeen the young man refused the opportunity to join a relative in a prospering Chicago business. Although he accepted executive positions in his early manhood, he soon left them to engage in scholarly and scientific pursuits.

At the age of twenty he accepted the position of county school teacher in rural school in Indiana but left this a year later to go to college. During his senior year at Indiana State University he became a close associate and

---

1 Information for this chapter except where stated otherwise, was drawn from W.R. Benjamin, "Ellwood Patterson Cubberley - A Biographical Sketch", Modern School Administration. John C. Almack, Editor.
friend of the president of the University, Dr. David Starr Jordan. Dr. Jordan chose Ellwood Cubberley to accompany him on his weekly week-end lecture tours. This intimate association with the great university president seems to have definitely influenced Cubberley to orientate his efforts toward scholarly pursuits in university teaching and administration.

After obtaining his bachelor's degree he spent only a few months as instructor at a small college. In 1891 he began his university career at Vincennes University and after only two years of professorship was asked to accept the presidency of that institution. He was recommended for the position by his friend Dr. Jordan because Vincennes University was in need of a capable, vigorous, enterprising man. Its finances showed a deficit; it needed educational reorganization as well as improvement in administration. In three years Cubberley accomplished his task of putting the University on a sound financial basis showing no deficit. He had reorganized the administration and enlarged the scope of the institution.

Cubberley could have settled down to a relatively carefree life, but once the job for which he had been called was done, he again looked for a larger field of action. This time his desire for bigger things carried him to the Pacific Coast. Again it was Dr. Jordan, now president of Stanford University, who was responsible. He personally asked Cubberley to accept the superintendency of the San Diego public
schools. 'This was not an attractive offering. Many capable men with less courage would have refused the position. Cubberley saw in it an opportunity to improve an educational system dominated by a political faction which was trying to bully the school board into appointing a political favorite not at all qualified for the position. The school trustees refused and appointed Cubberley. Immediately he was in the midst of a legal fight. The political faction claimed the school trustees had no power to appoint a superintendent and had Cubberley's salary tied up. Nothing daunted, he proceeded with his work of reorganization, which was badly needed, and in the end defeated the politicians in court. This is the first instance in which Dr. Cubberley openly challenged political control of education. His experience in San Diego probably gives us the reason for his lifelong insistence on the independence of education from civil government as a fundamental principle for good education. In most of his books he insists on the need of freedom from all politics to safeguard the true interests of education.

Once Cubberley had won his fight with the political faction of San Diego and had established a smooth running administrative machinery he again felt his energy cramped. To keep the machinery running was not enough to satisfy him. It was in the next position offered to him that he found the opportunity for scholarly pursuit and a wide field of influence.
This time it was Stanford University that was having trouble. It had able professors in its department of education but organization and co-ordination of courses were lacking.

Again, Dr. Jordan, president of Stanford, called on Cubberley to become professor of education and acting head of the department. Two months later he became executive head. This was in 1898. Cubberley was just thirty years old. Dr. Jordan gave him three years to put order into the department and to "make education respectable". He accomplished the task but this time he did not desire to move on to a new post. For thirty five years he stayed at Stanford as professor and administrator in the field of education. When the department of education was made a school of education in 1917, Cubberley became its dean and held that office until his resignation in 1933.

When Dr. Cubberley took his position at Stanford the field of education was still undeveloped. Columbia was the only university in the world offering graduate training in education. To be more effective in developing the new field, Cubberley obtained a leave of absence from Stanford to obtain his master's and doctor's degrees at Columbia. There he was recognized as an outstanding man in education and given an honorary fellowship in his second year of graduate study.

Many courses in education owe their origin or development to Dr. Cubberley. Almost every one of his books is an
outcome of the courses that he taught at Stanford. In 1896 he started a course called "Theory and Practice of Teaching" and continued it until 1920. In 1925 Cubberley published the course under the title Introduction to the Study of Education. His courses in the history of education resulted in Syllabus of Lectures on the History of Education, Changing Conception of Education, Public Education in the United States, A History of Education, as well as two source books of Readings.

Though he devoted much time to these courses, a far greater amount was given to administration courses. His books on administration attest to his work in that field. But teaching at Stanford and directing its School of Education are only a part of his extensive work. While holding the office of dean at Stanford he also taught at Harvard, University of Chicago and at Columbia. In 1913, 1914 and 1915 he directed the school surveys in Portland, Butte and Salt Lake City. In 1915 he worked on the Oakland financial survey, in 1921 he was secretary of the California special legislative committee; from 1920-25 he was member of the advisory committee of the Commonwealth Fund; in 1924 along with Professor Jesse E. Sears, he issued a report on the Cost of Education in California. All this activity shows Cubberley was considered an outstanding leader in education and accordingly in great demand. Offers of superintendencies, deanships and presiden-
cies came to him from all parts of the country but he never left his post at Stanford because he found a boundless opportunity for scientific and scholarly work in the field of education. Literally hundreds of future teachers and school administrators received training from him. Clyde Hill says of him: "He more than any one else, through his scholarly research, his extensive and effective writing and his brilliant teaching, has determined the standard of preparation for school administrators throughout the country". And John J. Norton says: "His publications in the field of school administration have served as educational bibles for hundreds of school executives".

Besides his own publications which form an imposing list, Cubberley was also responsible for the editing of many more volumes: The Riverside Textbooks in Education. These books were written by professors all over the United States. As would be expected the basic doctrine in these books is in agreement with Cubberley's writings. Though Cubberley was the editor of these books it is remarkable that the authors do not cite Cubberley to corroborate their statements. Furthermore one will look in vain in books of education for citations. Authors do include his books in their lists of selected read-

---

ings but they do not quote them. This seems to be a strange phenomenon when we know that he was held in high esteem in educational circles. This fact does not seem to correspond to his fame. However, an adequate answer to the problem lies in the fact that Dr. Cubberley himself held the copyright to his books and did not allow others to quote him. This seems to be the only reasonable and at the same time satisfactory answer.

A search for critical evaluation of Cubberley's writings reveals almost nothing. No one has apparently made a serious attempt at doing so. Besides Harold Benjamin's biographical sketch from which most of the details for this chapter were drawn, School Executives Magazine gives a brief portrait of Cubberley as a noted "administrator, teacher, author, editor and educational statesman".

William G. Carr has made a very general resume of Cubberley's writings. He says Cubberley taught us three great lessons: 1) that uneducated citizens are a public peril; 2) that the needs of the twentieth century are such that an education which was thoroughly adequate in the sixties or eighties would be utterly inadequate today; 3) that teaching is a productive occupation. In this resume we find no

---

4 This explanation has only the value of hearsay. The writer of this essay mentioned this strange fact to a professor in an American university and received from him the explanation as stated here.

5 School Executives Magazine, 52 (1932), 92.

critical evaluation of basic principles.

Norman Woelfel has devoted a few pages to Cubberley. In those pages he presents not so much a study but some conclusions of a study. After an analysis of Cubberley's viewpoint he concludes that Cubberley places his ultimate faith in Christian religion to safeguard our ideals and to promote prosperity in the increasing complexity of modern society. At the same time Woelfel asserts that Cubberley puts his faith in the public school system to assure social progress. How these two faiths can be reconciled is not evident nor does Woelfel offer any explanation how faith in Christian religion agrees with faith in the public schools from which religion is banished or at best holds a minor secondary place. He mentions Cubberley's ultimate aims in education as social efficiency and the welfare of the state. Demand for more and better qualified experts and for greater centralization of administration, rejection of mental discipline and memoriter learning, demand for training in attention and guidance of thinking, faith in standardized intelligence and achievement tests to make teaching more definite and to check efficiency, all these Woelfel mentions as belonging to Cubberley. Woelfel also pretends to present

---

7 Cf. N. Woelfel, "Calders of the American Mind", 63.
8 Cf. Ibid., 65
an "Interpretive Criticism" which is largely not a criticism but merely a repetition of ideas expressed in the analysis. He offers no criticism of Cubberley's objectives or of his centralization tendencies. Throughout there is nothing constructive and no adverse criticism based on fundamental principles. So in all that has been written about Cubberley and his doctrine there is nothing really pertinent to the study which will be attempted in the following pages.

No adherent to Catholic principles of education has attempted a discussion of Cubberley's doctrine. At a time when there is considerable discussion about the efficiency of education in America and much agitation for better schools through reorganization of administration it is important to examine the works of a writer who has a national reputation as a school administrator. It is particularly important to determine the basic principles which are prompting the organization or reorganization proposed by such an author, namely, Dr. Cubberley. If his philosophy is sound, the proposals which logically flow from them will ultimately lead to better and more efficient schools and therefore his ideas should be commended. Faulty basic principles, on the other hand, will certainly lead to bad results sooner or later. Possible errors in fundamentals should be pointed out especially when

---

9 Cf. Ibid., 168-171.
they occur in the writings with the influence such as Cubberley's. It is hoped that this study will be of some aid to anyone seeking an evaluation of the fundamental tenets of Cubberley's doctrine which influenced his practical suggestions.
CHAPTER II

Cubberley's Doctrine

The purpose of this chapter is to point out and to bring together the more important parts of Cubberley's doctrine on education. His more fundamental views which logically form a basis for other ideas and suggestions will be presented first. Thus, it is hoped, a fairly complete picture of Cubberley's doctrine and its various parts will be obtained, as well as the logical connection of these parts, as far as logic there may be.

When a person attempts to define or describe something, very often he finds that he cannot do this to satisfaction without reference to other things. Thus, for instance, we cannot give a complete definition of the eye without referring to the purpose of that organ. We cannot fully define a fish-hook without reference to fish, to its purpose of catching fish.

This fact becomes even more apparent in the case of actions or a group of actions, a process. Every act or process necessarily has a purpose, necessarily tends toward an end. Or, to use more modern and educational terminology: every act or process has an objective or aim. Now, education or educating is a process, a long series of acts. Therefore, to state a platitude, education has an objective or objectives. We cannot fully define the educating process without including
these objectives or aims.

For this reason, we shall first treat about Cubberley's objectives and aims of education before we try to explain his conception of the process of education. The present chapter will be divided into three sections: 1) Cubberley's objectives and aims of education, 2) his conception of the educating process, which is the primary means to achieve the objectives, and 3) the organizational and administrational means which he suggests to achieve his objectives and aims.

A - Cubberley's Objectives and Aims.

The most significant change in education in the United States is probably the change of purpose. The change that has taken place was, as will be seen later, to a large extent a change for the worse.

Early educational efforts were dominated almost exclusively by religious purposes. To a large extent early settlers came to America to enjoy religious liberty. From the very outset the individual sects were concerned about educating youth in the belief of their parents. "Indeed, at the beginning of our educational history in the United States, all our common schools were denominational, and our colleges were practically seminaries for training of candid-
ates for the ministry". 1 The chief purpose of teaching children to read was to enable them to read the Bible. "The Old Deluder, Satan, Act", a Massachusetts law of 1647, shows this quite clearly. 2 Four years earlier Harvard College, now Harvard University, was founded. One of the main reasons for its foundation was "to advance Learning and perpetuate it to Posterity, dreading to leave an illiterate Ministry to the Churches, when our present Ministers shall lie in the Dust" 3.

This concern about educating of the young for membership in the Church and the perpetuation of a learned ministry was very much the same in all colonies, in New England, in the Dutch colonies, in the German Lutheran settlements in Pennsylvania, in the Anglican colonies of the South and in the Catholic colony of Maryland. 4 For the New England Puritans and Calvinists education was an affair both of the church and of the state as servant of the church, while in most of the settlements interference by civil authority was resented 5. The first general laws regarding education, the Massachusetts laws of 1642 and 1647, were enacted by the state

2 Cf. E. P. Cubberley, Readings in History of Education 299.
3 Ibid. 290.
5 Cf. Ibid., 364 and 373.
as servant of the Church 6. Whether civil government entered the educational realm or not, the chief objective of education in Protestant colonies was to enable everyone "to read the Catechism and the Bible, and to know the will of the Heavenly Father" 7.

Both the instruction in and the supervision of them (the early schools) was religious in nature and their purpose was almost wholly to teach young people how to read the word of God and to fit them for a religious life within the church under whose control the school was maintained 8.

Elementary education sought primarily to insure the intelligent reading of the Bible by all; the grammar schools and colleges, going a step further, aimed at providing learned ministers in church and state.

Not until the second half of the eighteenth century did these prevailing conditions change. By that time religious interest had waned throughout Protestantism but especially in America. The religious purpose of education ceded ground to new purpose of "preparation for life in the world here" 9. Social, political and economic factors more and more came to the fore and demanded greater secular learning than America had known. Commercial and industrial demands paved the way for a distinctively American institution, the

---

6 Cf. Ibid., 365-366 and E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 5-6.
7 Ibid., 374.
8 E.P. Cubberley, "The College Education and the Superintendent of Schools", School and Society, 17 (1923), 539.
Academy, with a curriculum designed to meet practical secular needs. Though the Academy was still deeply religious, such subjects as algebra, geometry, history, geography, music and other liberal arts and sciences held a prominent place. The Academy movement grew in momentum throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century. As time went on they increasingly devoted themselves to studies preparing for business life and the rising professions. They continued in favor and prominence until the appearance of free, public state supported high school. The academy marks especially the transition from the religious ecclesiasticism of the early colonial schools to the secularized school of the present day. Running parallel to this transition is the transition from the private or church-control idea of schools to the State-control and State-support idea. The change in interest and aim from religious education to secular education brought about this second transition.

Besides the growth of industry and business, and the ever growing population of cities, the extension of full manhood suffrage was of special significance in changing objectives and aims of education. "General education" for all and "civic virtue" were looked upon as an absolute necessity for

---

10 Cf. Ibid., 463-464 and 697.
11 Cf. E.F. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 250.
12 Cf. Ibid., 230-251.
true civil and political freedom under our democratic form of government. Public men and workingmen alike voiced this need and clamored for free education as a natural right. Less and less interest was taken in religious sectarian education. Horace Mann, as Secretary of the Board of Education in Massachusetts precipitated a fight on the question of sectarian education by advocating the complete exclusion of any sectarian teaching from tax supported schools. "This battle to control the educational system" as it is called, started in 1838, was finally ended in 1855 by an amendment to the State constitution. By this amendment only regularly organized public schools in which no sectarian doctrine was taught became eligible for any share of state school funds. The State of New York had settled the question earlier, in 1842, by a similar law. But the battle in Massachusetts started earlier and the name of Horace Mann has gone down in American educational history as that of the man who gave the coup de grace to religious education in state supported schools. To Dr. Cubberley and other devotees of public education, Mann is the great pioneer in the work of adapting general education to the social, industrial, and political needs of our great American democracy. Mann proclaimed that the aim of education... should be social efficiency, civic

14 Cf. Ibid., 670-671.
15 For further details on this question see C.P. Cubberley, *History of Education*, 689-693 and *Public Education in the United States*, 230-240.
virtue, and character..." 16

About the waning of religious interest and secular-
ization of public school, Cubberley writes:

Fortunately for the cause of general education a
new theory as to the purpose of the school arose about
the middle of the eighteenth century.... the theory
that schools ought to be essentially civil affairs,
the purpose of which should be to promote the interest
and to advance the welfare of the state rather than of
the church, and that their aim should be to prepare
for life here rather than for life hereafter. 17

Here we see quite clearly what the final purpose,
the aim of education is according to Cubberley. The aim is
entirely temporal. Nowhere do we find in his writings any
indication that he might be interested in something beyond
this world. The aim of the schools should be to prepare for
life in this world, not for life eternal in heaven.

Furthermore, his aim is a state aim; the welfare of
the state. He mentions it clearly in the text just cited,
and in almost every instance where he speaks of the purpose
of the schools we can see something of this state aim as his
final goal of all our schools. They are the instruments of
our American democracy and their worth depends entirely on
how well they serve that purpose. According to Cubberley,
they will do this if they succeed to train young people to
take an active, intelligent part in the complex social,
political, and commercial life of our democratic nation.

17 E.P. Cubberley, "The College Education and the
Superintendent of Schools", School and Society, 17 (1923),
The objective of the school, therefore, is social and civic usefulness, and the final aim is the welfare of our democratic state. In this aim and objective we have Cubberley's purpose of education in its entirety. In his judgment, knowledge of the past and mental discipline are of little use as a means toward that purpose.

Following are some Cubberley's statements relating to the immediate purpose or objectives of education:

(1) Its (the school's) aim is not mere knowledge, except as knowledge will be useful; not mental discipline of the drill sort, but a discipline of the whole life: not a head full of facts, but a head full of ideas; not rules of conduct learned, but the ability to conduct one's self properly; not a pupil knowing civics, but one who can think over civic questions; and not so much a learned as a well-trained output.

(2) During the past half-century the school has been transformed from a disciplinary institution into an instrument of democracy calculated to train young people for intelligent living in the complex and difficult world in which they now find themselves. Its efficiency as an instrument of democracy is determined by how well it fulfills this function.

(3) ... the modern school aims to train pupils for greater social usefulness and to give them a more intelligent grasp of the social and industrial, as well as the moral and civic, structure of our modern democratic life.

(4) The purpose of instruction is changed from the memorization of facts, to that of fitting pupils for personal responsibilities; from that of accumulating information,
Cubberley's Doctrine

to that of training young people to stand on their own feet; from that of transmitting to them the inherited knowledge of the past, to that of preparing them for social efficiency in the life of to-morrow 22.

(5) The school must grasp the significance of its social connections and relations and must come to realize that its real worth and its' adequate reward lies in its social efficiency 23.

Everywhere we see Cubberley insisting on social efficiency in our complex modern life. He is entirely taken up with the social function of the school: to give children a sense of membership in the community, in the State, the Nation and the world; and then, to awaken guiding moral impulses, to impart a spirit of service and a sense of responsibility and to train for effective self-direction 24. Armed with these the product of the school is considered by Cubberley to be social efficient and a guarantee for the welfare of the state. This latter is the final purpose and aim of the school: to promote the interest and to advance the welfare of the state. Besides the quotation given above, there is another which expresses the state aim perhaps even more forcefully. In an article published in School and Society, our author expounds the supremacy of the state over all others concerned. He says explicitly:

22 E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 413.
24 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 517.
Cubberley's Doctrine

... the schools are state schools established to carry out a state purpose; ... the rights of the parent over his child are limited, and cannot be exercised if in conflict with what the state has determined by law to be the rights of the children or the larger needs of the state.

This statement seems to be the crown of all his pronouncements. There can be no doubt about Cubberley's ideas as to the purpose of the school. He is consistent throughout his various books, from Changing Conceptions of Education published in 1909, to his revised and enlarged edition of Public Education in the United States which appeared in 1934. The ideas as expressed in his theoretical works we find applied in his recommendations to the Board of Education of the City of Portland when he directed a survey of schools in that city in 1915.

Nowhere can we detect any interest in the child as an individual or in the perfection of man as an individual. The only virtue to which he refers as an objective of education is "civic virtue." Such virtues as obedience, docility and submission he terms negative qualities and "... poor preparation for social and industrial efficiency, or for democratic life and government." Implied is the rejection of authority and of the place of intelligent, reverential fear.

---

28 Cf. Ibid.
in education or, again, that the rights of the individual entail no obligation.

Evidently Cubberley is not interested in traditional­ly respected virtues or knowledge or discipline. His objectives are less tangible things: appreciation, expression, widened horizons of ambition, personal responsibility, larger ideals for life and for service to society. But even in these he is interested only because he thinks they will make man socially efficient and thereby promote the welfare of the state. Woelfel, in Molders of the American Mind, refers to social efficiency and state welfare as the keynotes in Cubberley's theory of education. True, Cubberley mentions "moral uplift of the people" as a contribution of public education. This could be interpreted to indicate solicitude about personal individual perfection of man, but this lonely mention is weakened by the fact that Cubberley replaces rules of conduct and morals by moral impulses. And it is also eclipsed by the frequent emphatic mention of social efficiency and the welfare of the state as the real purposes of education. To all appearances moral uplift is just another aspect of social efficiency, based on the "moros" of the day, not on sound principles of morality. The lack of consideration for

29 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 413.
man as an individual is still further emphasized by the utter disregard for the teachings of the Church and man's eternal destiny. We took the schools away from the Church, Cubberley states, in order to make of them constructive institutions for our democratic life. He very clearly implies that he considers the influence of priest and religious instruction as strong supports of autocratic government. He discredits them completely as wholesome influences for democracy.

Moral or religious instruction for him is not an answer to produce national morality, because, as he says, this instruction usually does not get beneath the problem. Upon the public school, devoid of all religious training, Cubberley places the whole burden of moulding and unifying our heterogeneous national life. In it alone does he place his entire faith as the agency which will promote national welfare. Any other agencies will do so only in so far as they have been influenced by the public school. Religion has no place in Cubberley's school system. He grants it no quarter and puts no reliance on religious moral teachings as a wholesome means to help safeguard national morality. Apparently he does not even want a basic code of moral laws based on the essentials

32 Cf. Ibid., 765.
33 Cf. Ibid., 762.
34 Cf. Ibid., 761
of Christianity. He would simply awaken "guiding moral impulses" and develop ability to conduct oneself, but not teach rules of conduct. Norman Woelfel states that Cubberley places his ultimate faith in Christian religion to safeguard our ideals and promote prosperity in the increasing complexity of modern society. There seems to be absolutely no foundation for this in Cubberley's writings. Rather there is good reason to say that he does not place faith in Christian religion, certainly not in religious instruction, as we have just seen. Nowhere do we find an indication of such a faith in religion as Woelfel mentions. If Cubberley relied on Christian religion he could not be so inflexible in urging and demanding that no tax money be used to support a school conducted under the auspices of a religious group, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish 35. He specifically mentions the public school system as "the one great common constructive and integrating force in our national life" 36. He mentions this precisely in a chapter where he treats the religious question. There he also expressly questions the efficacy of sectarian religious instructions for moral and civic training, and adds that the work the public school is doing, measured in moral and religious values, is by no means inconsiderable 37. He does not elaborate on this, nor do we

36 Ibid., 729
37 Cf. Ibid., 727.
see how the public school, which is irreligious ex professo, can be doing anything that has considerable religious value. A little later he seems to contradict himself as to the religious value of the school. There he says: "The schools and the churches each have their proper work to do, and each must do it in its own best way" \(^{38}\). That would seem to imply that they do not work for any common goal. The churches work for religious ends, the schools for social efficiency and the welfare of the state.

At present we do not wish to discuss the question of what the churches, in particular the Catholic Church, do or should do for the welfare of our democratic state. We merely wish to point out that Cubberley's objectives and aims of education do not include the objectives and aims of religion and religious education, and specifically, that he does not include the perfection of man as an individual and as a creature of God with an eternal destiny. The public school cannot be bothered with such an aim. According to Cubberley public education seems to consider the individual only in as much as he enters the social realm. It makes him socially efficient and so looks for the improvement of society and the welfare of the state. Nothing in Cubberley's mind can replace the public school in American democracy. They are his fetish. Private and parochial schools, he concedes, are useful and

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 730.
meritorious if they are better than the public schools and if they provide a spirit of friendly competition. Even then he sees a danger in too large a development of private schools. The danger appears when the social, political and professional leaders send their children to private schools. For, then it will be still harder to obtain sufficient tax money for public education. The public school might disappear. In substance this means that no matter how good private schools are and even though they can accommodate all children, we still need public schools. The greater need of the state demands it.

Apparently according to Cubberley nothing can replace the public school to take care of our national welfare.

The attitude that he takes toward religion and religious instruction is quite logical once he has rejected preparation for life after death as an aim of education. Religion and religious instruction essentially treats of man's relation to his Creator with a view to order and direct human thought, volition and activity so that man may realize the wish of God regarding man's eternal destiny. True, religion concerns itself with every phase of human activity in this life but always and only in as much as the activity of this life has a relation to eternal life. Hence, if we do not include preparation for life hereafter in the aims of education,
we must logically greatly minimize or entirely exclude the role of religion in education.

To make a resume of Dr. Cubberley's thought relating to objectives and aims in education we may divide them in three categories. First, those which he explicitly proposes; secondly, those which he rejects; and thirdly, those which he neglects to mention though held by Catholic educators and educationists.

The objectives which Cubberley proposes are: knowledge of social, industrial, moral and civic structure of our democratic life and a sense of membership in society; knowledge that is useful, which according to the general trend of his thought, probably means knowledge that is socially useful; a sense of responsibility and better ideals for life and service to society; ability to think for oneself or effective self-direction; ability to conduct oneself by guiding moral impulses. All these are expected to produce the great objective of social usefulness. And that in turn Cubberley thinks will assure the final aim of public education: the welfare of our democratic nation.

Objectives rejected by Cubberley are: knowledge except such as explained above; knowledge of the past or possession of the social heritage; knowledge of rules of conduct or code of morality; mental discipline; such virtues as obedience, docility and submission as poor preparation for
democratic life; knowledge of religious doctrine and religious training. Along with these objectives, he discards the ultimate aim of Catholic education, preparation for life everlasting. Logically this rejection entails the rejection of any intermediate objectives which wholly and entirely lead exclusively to this final aim. It is not necessary to go into detail about these because they are included in religious doctrine and training.

The third category of objectives and aims, those which Cubberley does not mention, we shall reserve to a later section of this study. They will be brought out when we evaluate Cubberley's doctrine and explain the true objectives of education according to sane philosophy and the teachings of the Church.

Ellwood Patterson Cubberley was not professionally a philosopher. He was not nor intended to be a philosopher of education, and therefore, did not try to establish his suggestions and ideas on ultimate basic principles. He does not, for instance, tell us why public education has primarily a state purpose. He gives us no sociological explanation of this theory. In his writings we would search in vain for an explanation on the nature of man before announcing the objectives of education. This a philosopher would do. Cubberley's writings reveal him chiefly as an administrator trying to work out a practical program in which his general
ideas are applied. This, however, does not prevent us from peering beneath the surface to find the fundamental assumptions which would logically lead to the ideas which he has expressed. This is a question of interpreting a person's views in terms of more basic principles. If, for instance, a person says that the final aim of education is life everlasting we may rightly assume that such a person is not a materialist. To make a statement, that person must believe in the spirituality and immortality of the soul. The inference in this case is very simple.

In examining Cubberley's objectives and aims, no such clear and simple inference present themselves. Still, it is not impossible to attach appropriate labels to some of his ideas. Let us take first the most evident case: his ideas on ethics or morality. He discredits the value of religious moral instruction and excludes religion from the public school. Now any morality that is not grounded on a religious basis is at best a naturalistic morality. Naturalism in ethics is based on the doctrine of Rousseau, on the theory of the essential goodness of human nature. It neglects the doctrine of original sin and likewise the elevation of human nature to a supernatural status and end. It discards the idea of any supernatural aid, grace, to achieve the ultimate destiny of man. Whether Cubberley consciously admitted these tenets of naturalism we cannot say. But it
is certain that anyone who proposes education without religion, adopts a practice which is the logical consequence of Naturalism. If Cubberley did not believe in the essential goodness of human nature, he should have realized that he would have to appeal to other than purely natural and temporal motives to achieve correct and sound personal as well as social ethics. "Naturalism in morals" is, therefore, the first label that we may rightly attach to Cubberley's pronouncements.

Again, referring to morals, we have seen that he does not believe in teaching rules of conduct. He would simply develop ability to conduct oneself and would awaken guiding moral impulses. But if we do not have rules of conduct, if we do not follow a code of moral rules, what criterion shall we use in judging whether a person has or does not have the ability to conduct himself? How shall we know whether a so-called guiding moral impulse is good or bad? Which impulses shall we awaken and which shall we suppress? Morality that is not based on a code of morals approved by reason, directly or indirectly, is left at the mercy of social environment and individual good-pleasure. We have seen that Cubberley is particularly insistent on social conditioning for social efficiency. Since he does not rely on a code of morality, the logical assumption is that he bases morals on social environment. This leads to the theory that morals are social
and actions are good or bad, right or wrong in as much as they conform or do not conform to the prevalent custom of the community. Thus social environment forms our morals. If the majority of any community do a certain thing then that thing is morally right. This is the doctrine of John Dewey. Since Cubberley approves of Dewey's educational philosophy there is an added reason to believe that Cubberley bases morality on social environment. With Maritain we might call theory this "Sociologism". It... "derives the supreme rule and standard of education from social conditioning" 40.

This term, "Sociologism", applies not only to Cubberley's ideas regarding morals, but also to his objectives in the realm of knowledge. There too he is primarily concerned with knowledge obtained through social conditioning by introducing the educand into society and to the social problems of his community, state and nation. Here again he refers to Dewey and invokes him as an authority on the matter. He quotes from Schools of Tomorrow in which Dewey says:

"Knowledge that is worthy of being called knowledge, training of the intellect that is sure to amount to anything, is obtained only by participating intimately and actively in activities of social life" 41.

40 J. Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, 15.
41 Cf. E. P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 516.
By accepting this statement, Cubberley makes it clear that even in the field of knowledge, he considers social conditioning the supreme rule and standard.

Again, in reference to knowledge as an objective of education, Cubberley is evidently addicted to "utilitarianism". He frowns upon teaching the traditional knowledge of the past, that is, on handing down the spiritual and social heritage. His purpose is to teach only knowledge that is useful. Taken by itself this statement would be most sensible. Anyone who would propose to communicate knowledge that is useless would be considered foolish, if not slightly insane. If, however, we take Cubberley's proposition in conjunction with his other proposals and as part of his whole program we see that it implies the utilitarian concept of knowledge. It implies minimizing the value of abstract or speculative thought, and in general it judges as useless any knowledge that cannot be put to use in some activity. By Cubberley's approval of Dewey's statement about knowledge, we see that the only knowledge which he deems worthy is knowledge that is obtained through social activities. Whatever a person may learn is worthless unless it is put to use, in fact only when put to use in social activity does it become knowledge worthy of the name. Here we have sociologism and utilitarianism combined, a sociological utilitarianism.

There is still another trait that seems to shine forth
from Cubberley's objectives. This is a certain individualistic rationalism. He does not want the teacher to be an instructor, does not want him to hand down knowledge, wants rather ability to think and effective self-direction in the educand. He discards obedience, docility and submission. In such a combination we have definitely the trait just mentioned. If the teacher is not regarded as an authority but merely as a stimulus and guide, the educand will almost inevitably get the impression that everything depends on his own reasoning power, especially if he is not expected to obey or to be docile. Perhaps the teacher could guide the student's thought into the right channels. But why should the student submit to such guidance, and what will lead him to such submission if he is not to be obedient, docile or submissive? Without such virtues he is well prepared to resent guidance. If he does not actually resent, what motive will he have to follow the guiding hand, when emphasis is placed on his reasoning and his own effective self-direction? He is being formed for individual rationalism. There would seem to be a contradiction between this rationalism and sociolomism. The latter does not encourage rationalism; it is based on the influence of social environment. But a reconciliation may be possible. True, the educand is to be developed and trained chiefly by the social atmosphere, but while coming in contact with society he should also see the present and future needs of
our democratic society. For these needs he is to find a solution by his own thinking. The crux of the matter will be to bring the educand out of his lethargy of following the social trends whence he has most of his knowledge and training. What preparation will he have to see the social needs? Recognizing the needs would seem to be a reaction and rebellion against the training received, in as much as he realizes that following the social trends is not always the right thing.

To effect a full reconciliation if that is possible we would need more information about Cubberley's thought than he has expressed in his writings. His statements as they stand do not offer a solution.

B - Cubberley's Conception of Education.

Dr. Cubberley speaks about two older conceptions of education, both of which he rejects. They are the "information or knowledge conception" and the "mental discipline conception". His condemnation of these can be found in most of his books: in Introduction to the Study of Education, in Public Education in the United States, in Public School Administration, in Changing Conceptions of Education, as well as in articles published in educational magazines.

About the knowledge conception and the courses of
study which it used, he says:

The pedagogical conceptions as to the purpose of education which lies back of the construction of this type of courses of study are that it is the mission of the school to pass on the accumulated knowledge of the past to the next generation; that the mere process of acquiring such knowledge gives good mental discipline; and that knowledge is synonymous with power 42.

Cubberley further describes the conception as insisting on factual knowledge and tool subjects as ends in themselves without relating them to practical purposes in life, that is, without asking whether they would be used by pupils in life outside of the school. Hence much time was wasted on problems that are of no use to anyone except a teacher. The simple mastery of book knowledge was the objective and this knowledge was conceived of as giving power and as the surest road to virtue 43. Knowledge and civic virtue were considered as somewhat the same thing. A natural corollary of this was that all children had to learn the same things and at least a certain minimum amount. Uniformity for all became the rule.

The following are the characteristics which Cubberley ascribes to the knowledge conception of education: addicted to textbooks and instruction, and to memorization; over-emphasis on arithmetic and formal grammar; neglect of content subjects and constructional activities, that is, expression

42 E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 405.
43 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 513.
subjects; abstract and unproductive; wasting time on tool subjects that are of no use outside the classroom; absence of adaptation to varying needs and, therefore, injurious to a large minority of children; no correlation between closely related subjects. Officers of education simply assign so much work to be done in a given amount of time. They act as inspectors, to check up on the work of the teachers and pupils. Proof that the work is being done is found in periodical written tests and reports of progress based on the acquisition of test-book material. The teacher is almost exclusively an instructor and his instruction is dominated by anticipation of forthcoming examinations. He follows his text in a routine way, without any personal thinking or initiative. The principal inspects, keeps records, and hands out school supplies. Professional death is the result for the whole teaching body. And as to the children, many are retarded or eliminated due to lack of interest and absence of differentiation in studies according to individual ability and needs. Retarded children lose self-confidence and finally leave school with scanty book knowledge and less preparation for life.

---

44 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 406-411. We have largely paraphrased from these pages. Cf. also, Introduction to the Study of Education, 155; Public School Administration, 434-440; Public Education in the United States, 513-514.
In *Introduction to the Study of Education* he seems to imply that the knowledge conception considers the mind of a child simply as a reservoir or container to be filled with facts. He does not say this expressly but he rejects the idea of the mind as a container to be filled with knowledge of facts and the mental discipline conception of the mind as a bundle of faculties to be trained by means of mental gymnastics. This seems a direct allusion to the knowledge conception as regarding the mind as a container of facts.

Such, then, is Cubberley's description of the knowledge or information conception of education, of the school operating under it, and of the courses of study constructed under its domination. Because of the idea of the mind which he ascribes to it and because of the various characteristics that he attributes to it in operation, he rejects it.

The mental discipline conception of education is somewhat similar to the knowledge conception. Cubberley says it "... was based on the assumption that the mind could be trained by a uniform procedure of mental discipline and drill." It also insisted on definite, selected subject matter but it added a psychological organization and presentation of this matter. Insistence on information is also one

46 Cf. Public Education in the United States, 513.
of its qualities. But it does not maintain that the mere acquisition of information or mastery of a certain amount of book knowledge leads to power and virtue. Rather the mental activity and drill, the mental gymnastics necessary to master selected subject-matter were thought to train the faculties or powers of the mind.

By means of selected subject-matter, now psychologically organized and presented, teachers would be able to drill the attention, will, memory, imagination, feelings, judgment, reasoning, ability in observation and sense discrimination, and other "powers of the mind", and thus awaken the egoistic and social feelings, stimulate the higher sentiments, and develop the moral character of children so taught. By such means the citizenship-aim of education would be realized 47.

This quotation from Cubberley is perhaps somewhat misleading. The purposes that he mentions here are not the immediate objectives of the mental discipline conception. The fundamental doctrine underlying it is the doctrine that human nature is endowed with a number of distinct faculties: intellect, will, imagination, etc. Still, this doctrine is not specially characteristic of the mental discipline conception. What is specifically meant by this conception attaches itself to the theory of "transfer of training" 48.

Taking for granted that man has distinct faculties or

---

47 Ibid., 514.
48 Cf. J. S. Lurssell, Educational Psychology, 238.
powers, the advocates of mental discipline maintain each of these faculties can be trained by means of exercise and drill in certain subjects. This exercise and drill is thought to produce permanent training or discipline, something akin to, if not actually, a habit in each faculty. The discipline, as a permanent position, would then enable a person to cope successfully with problems other than those actually met in school work. That is to say, the training would transfer or carry over from class work to other kinds of work 49.

Uniformity of both subject matter and method of procedure for all students was introduced because not all subjects were considered apt to give the mind the exercise needed to discipline its powers. Thus, for instance, mathematics has long held and still holds favor with many because they consider it specially adapted to develop the habit of precision in thinking.

About the work of the school operating under this conception, Cubberley says:

The mind of the child was conceived of as consisting of a number of more or less water-tight compartments, or "faculties," the drilling of which was the business of the school. Imparting information, drilling for mastery, and controlling the school are the work of the teacher; the work of the supervisor consisted largely in testing the pupils to see that the teaching had been well done. . . . the work for each grade was quite

definitely laid down; the kind, amount, and order of subject-matter to be learned, by all pupils in all parts of the city, and regardless of age, past experience, future prospects, or physical or mental condition, was uniformly prescribed for all; ...  

Cubberley's objections to the mental discipline conception are much the same as for the knowledge conception: too much instruction and drill, too great uniformity, etc. But besides all this, he claims that it had a faulty psychological basis. He calls it "a now abandoned psychology known as a faculty psychology". If faculty psychology is false, then the mental discipline theory also is false because it is based on the assumption that man has various faculties or powers.

Apparently Cubberley has aligned himself with the many mononistic psychologists. They deny the existence of the soul and along with it its faculties. Mind, they assert, is merely a phase of our bodily organism; there are no spiritual faculties. Dewey, for instance, admits no duality of mind and matter. In fact, he does not even admit that mind is a faculty. "Mind", he says, "is an organization of original capacities". "Mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the ways in which we deal consciously

50 Public Education in the United States, 514.
52 Cf. H.A. Kelly, Educational Psychology, 314.
53 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, 368.
and expressly with situations in which we find ourselves" 54. "Mind... is a body of organized meanings by which events of the present have significance for us..." 55.

These definitions by Dewey are of interest to us here, because Cubberley approves of Dewey's philosophy 56. Cubberley conceives of the mind not as a container to be filled with knowledge nor as a bundle of faculties to be trained by mental discipline. Rather, he says, "... each child is regarded as a bundle of possibilities to be developed, or repressed" 57. And hence he adheres to "... the more recent conception of education as a process of developing the inborn capacities of children" 58. The type of courses which conform to this conception he calls "the developmental type of courses" 59.

The chief characteristics which Dr. Cubberley assigns to this newer conception of education are essentially the same both in his older books, such as Public School Administration published in 1916, and in his most recent book, Public Education in the United States, published in 1934.

54 John Dewey, Art as Experience, 263.
55 Ibid., 273.
56 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 506-507, and 693.
57 E.P. Cubberley, Introduction to the Study of Education, 156.
58 Cf. Ibid., 155.
59 Cf. Public School Administration, 285; also Public Education In the United States, 514.
The development conception, first of all, implies a changed conception of the child. It rejects the knowledge conception and the mental discipline conception of the child and the mind of the child. The mind is a bundle of inborn capacities or possibilities. To develop these or to repress them is the chief function of the school. Knowledge is no longer thought of as memorization of accumulated knowledge of the past but as a life experience and inner conviction, not as a finished product in itself, but as a tool to do something with. The school is not thought of so much as a preparation for life but as a place where children are brought into contact with real life experiences.

The whole conception of the school... changed from a place where children prepare for life by learning certain traditional things, to a place where children are daily brought into contact with such real life experiences as will best prepare them for the larger problems of life that lie just ahead.

Excessive drill was replaced by lessons in subjects involving expression and appreciation. It is to be noted here that Cubberley speaks only of eliminating excessive drill, not all drill. He explicitly states that drill where drill is needed is to be kept. Furthermore, when he says that

---

60 In the exposition of the develop conception we are paraphrasing Cubberley's text. Cf. Public School Administration, 283-290, and Public Education in the United States, 514-519.

61 E.P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 515.

62 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 517.
the school has changed from a place where children prepare for life by learning certain traditional things he does not exclude the traditional subjects: arithmetic, geography, language study, literature, history 63. He includes them in the studies of the modern school, but through reorganization and redirection of the work in these subjects they are to be adapted to present day needs, to local conditions and differentiated student abilities and destinies. He also states that there is room for elimination of some traditional subject matter as wasteful of time and of no practical value to the student in life outside of the school. In short, some matter in older subjects must be eliminated; what is kept should be reorganized and redirected; there should be adjustments and differentiations in instruction to meet individual and community needs 64. While some things are discarded, new things are also added. Such as advocated by Cubberley are community civics, studies in science and industry, studies of community life, study of community health problems, studies of home needs, domestic science, manual training, drawing, music, thrift training, manners and conduct, play and games. For Cubberley, all these are subjects that belong to the modern school program. And the

63 Cf. Ibid., 518.
64 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 290.
subjects in which the student expresses himself, music, drawing, manual arts, etc., are those which Cubberley considers especially characteristic of the modern elementary school. While he retains the traditional subjects we cannot avoid the impression that they hold a very minor place in his curriculum. In fact, how would it be possible to introduce all the new subjects that he suggests and still leave a worthwhile place for reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, and grammar? Nowhere does he give us an exact idea of the importance he attaches to these subjects. Still there is no doubt in our minds that he attaches greater importance to expression subjects. This has already appeared previously when we examined his aims and objectives of the education process.

Principals and teachers under the development conception of education hold a new position. Teachers are no longer essentially drill masters, hearers of recitation or disciplinarians, nor are they chiefly instructors.

The main duty of the teacher, under these newer courses, came to be that of guiding and directing the normal processes of thought and action on the part of the pupils, of extending their appreciation in new directions, of connecting the work of the school with life in a better way, of widening the horizons of the thinking and the ambitious among the children, and of stimulating them to develop for themselves larger and better ideals for life and service.

---

65 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 518-519.
66 Ibid., 516.
Yet, Cubberley retains both the functions of drill master and instructor, but not as the principal functions of the teacher. The principal function was to propose problems to the pupils and then to guide them in examining and studying them. At all times the solving was the main thing, not learning by memory someone else's solution 67.

The teachers stand as stimuli to individual activity, as whetstones upon which those stimulated could sharpen their thinking, and as critics who would help children to develop their ability to reason accurately and well 68.

The principal or supervisor holds very much the same position as the teachers but in a more indirect way. He does not come into contact with the pupils as do the teachers. His predominant duty is to help and guide the classroom teacher. He, along with the teacher, studies over the problems of instruction, suggests methods of procedure with a view to adjust and adapt the school work to the needs and capacities of the children in the school 69.

The courses... will be regarded as dynamic rather than static, in the sense that year by year they will be subject to change to meet changing needs, or to bring them more into harmony with the best results of the best experience within or without the city. The needs of the community are ever changing and growing

67 Cf. Ibid., 517.
68 Cf. Ibid.
69 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 283-284.
while the needs of the children vary much, and the adaptation of schools, teaching, and subject matter to meet these changing needs is one of the most important problems connected with the supervision of instruction 70.

These varying needs of children and the changing needs of the community imply according to Cubberley that "... nothing can be very fixed or final in the courses of instruction..." Only the normal children will be "more or less generally" 71 required to take certain constants in instruction. There will be alternative and optional courses. Which courses a child will take cannot be said beforehand. It all depends on which particular child in which particular community we are dealing with. The giving child in a giving setting, not subject matter, is the real center of gravity, the real educational problem. All courses must be plastic to meet the forever varying and changing needs. Instruction, therefore, must not only be differentiated according to groups of pupils but even individualized for pupils within the groups 72. By this differentiation and individualization Cubberley hopes to avoid the retardation and elimination that he considered characteristic of the older conceptions of education 73. At the same time the brighter child, above

70 Ibid., 235.
71 Ibid.
72 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 534.
73 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 296-297.
normal, would be given a chance to work according to its ability and to advance more rapidly through school.  

Since, according to Dr. Cubberley, the school must forever be on the lookout for varying and changing needs in order to meet them, it would seem that logically the immediate objectives of the school must also be forever changing.

It must not be thought that all of the characteristics or practices which Cubberley has associated with the development conception have any necessary link with that particular conception. The things that have a logical bond with his conception are: 1- less insistence on knowledge and drill; 2- teachers acting less as instructors or drill masters and more as stimuli and guides; 3- the child being the center of gravity. The vast enrichment of the program is partly due to the fact that not all children can be developed by the same courses but even in Cubberley's mind the expanded curriculum is largely due to the objectives and aims which he proposes to attain. The same must be said of his program of differentiation. Nor does elimination or retardation hinge closely to the development conception. It is simply a result of differentiation according to children's capacities.

Other practices, such as introducing the kindergarten spirit, rich in activity and happy expression, into the first grades of the elementary school, insisting chiefly on

74 Cf. Ib. 299-300.
expression subjects throughout 76, introduction of the "project" idea 77, do not necessarily follow the developmental conception, as Cubberley might seem to imply. All these may dovetail with that conception but they are not necessarily corollaries of the general principles involved.

C - Administration of Education.

In the foregoing sections of this study Cubberley's thought on the purposes of education and its meaning have been exposed. The next logical question is: How does Cubberley propose to achieve the objectives and aims set forth? What means will he employ so that the schools will attain the end he has set for them? This question was already answered in part when Cubberley's suggestions about the work of the teacher and about the curriculum were mentioned. But in order to see that the work in the school and in the classroom proceed according to the norms laid down there must be a system of control, of organization and administration. Nowhere in the United States do we find a school that is an isolated or autonomous unit. Each school is part of a system, a part of a unit of administration and organization.

76 Cf. E. F. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 518-519.
77 Cf. Ibid., 542.
This raises a new question: what according to Cubberley is the ideal unit of organization and administration? Does he favor centralization or decentralization of the school system? Does he favor one particular unit of organization and administration? And, what are the reasons for his preferences?

An attempt to answer these questions will be made in this section of our study. But first let us determine what are the prevalent conditions in school organization and administration in the United States.

**Early School Administration.**

In earlier colonial days there were no public school systems. There were only the schools of the community. Local communities established town grammar schools or town elementary schools and later the dame schools sprang into prominence to supply the rudiments of elementary training. Each community determined the kind and extent of education to be offered as well as the means of supporting teacher and school. The first legislation concerning education and applying to an entire colony, the famous Massachusetts Law of 1642, merely directed the councilmen of each town to ascertain from time to time whether parents were providing

---

their children with training in reading, writing and religious principles. This law provided neither for schools nor for teachers. By a subsequent law, the law of 1647, Massachusetts made the first attempt to establish a school system for an entire colony. This legislation required every town of fifty householders to appoint a teacher of reading and writing for all children who might apply to him. A town having one hundred householders also had to establish a grammar school as a university-preparatory institution. Here again the colonial legislature left everything to the town except the choice of providing these schools. The territory designated as a town in colonial days was rather a township - twenty to forty square miles - with a meeting house and town school as the center. The law provided that all citizens must live within a half-mile radius of the school. Gradually, however, this law lost its vigor and other settlements sprang up within the territory designated as the town. These settlements, also called parishes, began to demand the same rights possessed by the original town. Gradually they also became autonomous units. Their becoming self-governing was the beginning of the still prevalent district system in school organization and administration. It spread to

79 Cf. Ibid., 365-364
81 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States, 41.
New York and thence to the west and northwestern states.

Moehlman gives a good brief account of the history of our district system.

The early New England school district definitely was the community, an integration of urban and neighboring rural interests. As the New England States to grow in population, these small communities gradually evolved into separate districts, and for a long period these more artificial districts, sometimes a dozen within a single corporate area, were carried on. The neighboring rural territory originally included in those early community districts gradually developed into independent districts. Thus in time the original New England community school district evolved into the small district.

The influence of the New England district system, prior to its return to the original community idea, was carried over into New York in 1812 and into New Jersey, and was extensively copied by the states carved out of the Northwest Territory. It seemed to be ideally adapted to frontier conditions. As a group of families settled in new areas, they organized a simple school district to meet their needs, and these districts, frequently heavily gerrymandered in the course of time, have continued to the present time.

Some states organized their schools on a township basis, others again used the county as a unit. And all states, regardless of the predominant system, have allowed their larger cities to organize and administer their own independent system. In the course of time, some states have changed the original district system for a larger unit of organization. Iowa, North Dakota, and Michigan have both the district and township system. Illinois uses the district as unit for

---

elementary schools, and a superimposed township system for high schools. To understand the apparent confusion of educational organization, control, and support in the United States, it must be remembered that each state is autonomous in respect to public school organization. Under the present federal constitution there can be no federal school system. The constitution does not state this explicitly. The tenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, also known as the tenth article of the Bill of Rights, provided that all powers not delegated to the Federal Government nor prohibited to the individual States, are reserved to the States or to the people. Since the constitution remained silent on education, the right to look after public education in the separate states remains one of the non-mentioned state rights. This accounts for that fact that there is so great a diver-

---

83 Cf. H.B. Deffenbaugh and T. Covent, School Administrative Unit, United States Office of Education, Pamphlet No. 34, 4.
84 Cf. A.B. Moehlman, School Administration, 15-16.
85 Although education is legally a function of the state, the Federal Government, through the United States Supreme Court, has intervened at various times by reviewing state educational legislation or court decisions which involved freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equality of rights or the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. Cf. A.B. Moehlman, School Administration, 18-21.
sity of school systems in the various states. A study of each individual system will reveal better the general status of public school organization and administration in the United States, as well as some trends toward changing present conditions. There are at present five principal types of school administrative units in the United States. They are: the district system, the town or township system, the county unit, the city or urban district, and the state system.

The District System 86.

According to the United States Office of Education twenty-six states still operate predominantly under the district administrative system, although some of these states have partial or optional township or county units. These district units number 115,355. They employ a total of 516,223 teachers and 387,455 school board members or trustees, less than two teachers for every trustee. In many districts there is only a one-room one-teacher school. Even for these there are three or more board members 87. The average size of the districts is 18 square miles, but the range of size is anywhere between 413 square miles in Nevada to 5 square miles in New York or Illinois. The number of districts per state ranges from 12,070 in Illinois to 269 in Nevada, and the

86 Figures in this section, unless otherwise stated, are taken from H. J. Deffenbaugh & T. Covert, loc. cit.
87 Cf. E. P. Cubberley, The Improvement of Rural Schools, 34.
number of units per county varies from 152 in New York to 17 in Nevada. Illinois has an average of 115 districts per county and averages only 4 teachers per unit. This state tops all others in the number of one-room schools. Of its 12,070 districts, 10,333 have only one independent one-room school, while Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York and Wisconsin, each reports more than 5,000 one-room, one-teacher schools. Illinois has 38,635 school board members and 47,766 teaching positions; Mississippi, 18,322 board members and only 15,138 teachers; Missouri, 29,310 members and 24,200 teaching positions. New York has the smallest number of directors in comparison to the teaching position: 15,000 directors and 74,961 teaching jobs. Ohio has 10,938 board members to 41,432 teachers. All in all the board members are extremely numerous in comparison to the number of teachers. No accurate description of the shape of the districts can be made. In this they present as much variety as they do in size. They present the most grotesque and peculiar shapes imaginable.

Generally trustees are selected by popular election from among the residents of the school districts. The board is a body corporate, representing the corporate school district which is distinct from any civil district, town or

88 Cf. Luther H. Gulick, *Education for American Life*, 83
township, though it may be territorily coterminous with any such civil corporation. There is little uniformity in regard to the powers of district boards in the various states. This is especially true with respect to the permissive powers the boards of Education are privileged to exercise.

Ordinarily they are given power to manage the school on behalf of the district, and for the State (as an agent of the State to see that the minimum requirements of the State are met); to employ teachers, and to fix their compensation; to contract for necessary supplies and equipment; to admit and to suspend pupils; to levy local taxes, or at least to propose them to the district for a vote; sometimes to receive and to manage the district funds; to keep the schoolhouse in repair; to visit the school and to examine into condition, management and the quality of its instruction; to take, or have taken, an annual school census; to make an annual report to the proper county authorities; to prosecute litigation in which the district may be involved; and, if desired, to call a district meeting for instruction and advice.

Whatever powers or duties a district board of education, or any board of education for that matter, has, they are granted to the board by the state. The state is legally supreme in matters of education. Throughout the course of the twentieth century a tendency to restrict the powers and duties of local districts is apparent. Today in no state do their district trustees wield/powers unlimited. Some form of town-

90 Ibid., 166.
ship or county supervision has been imposed on the districts. State laws also frequently provide for planning and appraisal by state educational authorities. Some of the rights once held by local directors have been assigned to county or state superintendents or to county or state boards.

The actual work of educational administration is commonly divided into three functions: legislation or planning, execution or operation, and appraisal or evaluation. Legislation or planning in its broader aspects is almost universally a function of the state legislature or the state educational authorities, except in certain cases where the state by permissive legislation has granted complete autonomy in educational matters to a city. Ordinarily the state authorities determine the general policies; the amount and kind of education that must be offered throughout the state, the length of the academic year, the minimum age at which a pupil may quit school, the sanitary and safety conditions of the schoolhouse, the equipment requirements, the training required in the teacher, the number of board members, the method of raising funds to carry on the educational program in the district, and in many cases the state selects the textbooks.

The execution or putting into practice the laws or plans is usually left entirely to the local district trustees.

92 Twenty-five states have statutes requiring state uniformity of textbooks selected by state authorities. Cf. A.B. Moehlman, op. cit., 434.
But not so the appraisal or evaluation of the work being done in the district, although even in this some states are rather lax. More often the state through its educational authorities sends an inspector or provides that a county inspector or superintendent visit the district schools to determine whether the state program and policies are being carried out.

This is a rough approximation of the practices today existant in the practice of planning, execution and appraisal. There is almost an infinity of variations in the twenty-six states that have the district system. There is a constant tendency toward curtailment of district board powers. Hardly a district has survived in the original pure form. Instead of possessing the original powers, the board of directors has only those powers which are explicitly granted or such as may be prerequisite to the exercise of a granted power or duty. Statutes granting powers are usually interpreted strictly and narrowly and frequently permit no deviation although some states accord the general power to do anything not inconsistent with the written statutes and thus provide considerable flexibility and freedom in fields of action not predetermined.

93 Cf. E.L. Cubberley, State School Administration, 167-168. An example of limiting original district powers can be seen in the fact that several states using the district system levy a county-wide school tax instead of leaving this to the district. Cf. W.S. Deffenbaugh and T. Covert, op. cit., 8-9.
The Township System:

The township unit of school administration does not differ greatly from the district system. The chief difference lies in the larger territory covered by the township and consequently in a greater number of children per administrative unit and hence less one-room one-teacher schools. The average size of the school township is 28 square miles as compared to the 18 square miles of the districts. As to the size of the township a great variation is noticeable between states and even within the same state. In Vermont the average size is 97 square miles, in New Jersey 14 and in Pennsylvania 17 square miles. Due to this variation in size and partially to the total square miles of the individual states the number of townships also ranges extremely. So also does the number of board members. In the nine states that use this school system the total number of units is 5,342, with 26,723 board members and 156,858 teaching positions.

Usually the school township is coterminous with the civil township, but, like the district, a separate corporation distinct from the civil governing unit of the township or the

94 Cf. A.B. Moehlman, School Administration, 206.
95 Figures in foregoing paragraph are taken from Walter S. Deffenbaugh and T. Covert, op. cit. 4.
town which may form the nucleus of the civil township. The entire territory forms one taxation unit and one board of trustees is in charge of all schools within it 96. The duties and powers of the board are very similar to the original powers of district boards and there has been no marked tendency to curtail its powers or to interpret them narrowly. Five to nine members are elected at large by the people. For purposes of planning and appraisal, a state officer and state board of education is over the township board, which is the executive of the state to put into operation the school laws and see that the minimum requirements for the state are fulfilled 97.

An immense difference exists between the township of New England and that of the Middle West. The former is usually a natural unit, centered about a town and incorporating the interests of the town as well as the rural districts surrounding it. For this reason it might be called the community unit 98. In the Middle West the township is a surveyor's unit of 36 square miles. It is laid off without reference to locations of towns, and therefore is an arbitrary unit hardly satisfactory as a unit of school administration.

97 Cf. A. B. Moehlman, op. cit., 208.
98 The New England township will be referred to again in relation to a current trend toward adopting the community as the administrative unit.
The County System.

Although only twelve states actually have a highly centralized county unit system, since the beginning of the present century the county has gained in prominence as the school administrative unit. Several states have enacted mandatory or permissive legislation which tend in a general way to promote the county administrative unit in educational affairs. The chief reasons for this trend are the alleged fiscal and educational inefficiency of smaller units. The most recent case of change from district to county system took place in 1933 when West Virginia abandoned the district system. In place of the 398 original districts it now has only 55 county units.

The variations in size of county units, in number of board members, per state, is comparable to the variations noted in the smaller units. But the average size is much larger than the average township, and the total of trustees is much smaller both per state and in comparison to the number of teachers. The average size is 377 square miles; there are 8,629 board members and 163,378 teaching positions.

---

99 Cf. A.B. Moehlman, op. cit. 166.
102 Data are taken from A.B. Moehlman, op. cit. 166-168 and 208-209.
The educational officials of the county are the board members, ranging from five to fifteen in the various states, and a county superintendent as chief executive officer and professional adviser of the board. The qualifications required to be a board member vary and some are very low. Kentucky law stipulates 24 years of age and an eight-grade education. About county board members, Counts writes:

The typical county board of education in the United States is composed of six members. These members are elected by the people for a term of four years. One of the six members is a woman, who follows the occupation of housewife. Of the five men, three are farmers; one is a merchant, and one is a physician.... From the standpoint of formal education, they reflect somewhat favorably the attainments of the citizens of the community. Three of the members are the products of the elementary school only; one has attended the secondary school; and two have enjoyed college or university privileges.

Methods of selecting board members are diversified but 62.1 per cent are elected directly by popular vote. Other methods are appointment by various state or county officials. In most states the county superintendent is likewise chosen by popular election. His is a political office. About superintendents Cubberley writes:

105 Cf. Ibid., p. 15, Table 111.
106 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 209.
... the average popularly elected county superintendent of schools today represents a very average member of the teaching body. He is seldom one of the best educated men of his county, either from an academic or a professional standpoint; is usually a routing worker who makes a good clerk, but is lacking in imagination, initiative, and insight; and is at best a practical "rule-of-thumb" worker rather than a professional leader 107.

The county superintendent and board are responsible to state officers of education for management of the schools but they enjoy considerable autonomy and freedom in selecting and employing the entire personnel, in fixing salaries, in collecting and administrating funds, some planning powers beyond minimum state requirements, and greater supervisory powers than district or township boards in evaluating all public educational work being done in the county, except that which may be carried on in a city operating as an independent unit 108.

The City System

While it is quite correct to speak about a state having a district or township or county system of schools, it must not be supposed that any state has a given system exclusively. The first two systems described so far, are

107 Ibid., 218.
108 The description of the county system given here pertains to the twelve states having no smaller administrative unit. 14 other states having smaller units also have some sort of county supervision. Cf. E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 210, Fig. 37.
used chiefly and almost exclusively in rural areas. The county system also applies more to rural schools but may also include the schools of smaller cities. All 48 states of the Union have besides the predominant system, independent city districts. These cities form units of administration just as the district or township or county, and are not subject to the educational officers of these units. Like these units, the cities hold authority from the state to administer to the educational needs of the city. They must, of course, meet the minimum requirements of the state, but beyond that often enjoy considerable autonomy. The degree of autonomy varies with states and also for individual cities within the state. Chicago, for instance, is almost entirely independent in all educational matters. In 1933 there were some 7,000 cities which through general custom and state laws were allowed to organize as independent school districts and to control all the public schools within the municipalities[^109]. There is very little uniformity in the various states as to the size in population or taxable wealth required before a city is authorized to function as a distinct administrative unit[^110]. The city has its own superintendent and a board of trustees or board of education to administrate the city's schools. In theory, at least, the majority of city school units are distinct from civil municipal government and as such

should not be implicated in city politics. The great majority of board members are elected by the people, 72.4 per cent by the people at large and another 10.8 per cent by wards 111. Nine other methods are recorded by Counts 112.

All powers of the city district reside in the board of trustees. Usually larger and additional powers have been conceded to municipal boards over and above those held by district or township trustees, and in some respects greater also than county boards possess, although in general the city and county units are very similar as far as local autonomy is concerned. Though other customs may prevail in a state for other administrative units, the city board selects textbooks and outlines the courses of study; levies taxes and manages its own funds, selects supervisory officers and decides on the establishment of special or additional types of schools 113. In a few states some cities even certificate their own teachers 114. The city board elects the superintendent and delegates its executive power to him. He is the executive officer of the board, directly responsible to the board of education for the administration of the entire city school system 115.

111 Cf. G.S. Counts, op. cit., Table IV, 16.
112 Cf. Ibid.
113 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 179.
114 Cf. A.B. Moehlman, op. cit., 702.
115 Cf. W.C. McGinnis, School Administration and Supervisory Organization in Cities of 20,000 to 50,000 Population, 28.
The board itself, except in a few completely autonomous cities, is responsible to state educational officers in carrying out at least the minimal requirements.

The number of members per board ranges from three to sixteen but the tendency is toward smaller boards. Counts describes the typical city board as follows:

The typical city board of education in the United States is composed of six members. These members are elected at large for a term of three years. One of six members is a woman, who follows the occupation of housewife. Of the five men, one is a merchant; one, a lawyer; one, a physician; one, a banker, manufacturer, or business executive; and one, a salesman, clerk, or laborer... From a standpoint of formal education, they constitute, in comparison with the city population, as a whole, a highly selected group. But one of the members is a product of the elementary school only; two have attended the secondary school; and three have enjoyed college or university privileges... On the average, these members devote approximately fifty-one hours a year to board duties.

The city superintendent is in most cases a professional educationist who has both college training in school administration and practical experience obtained as principal of schools before reaching the position of superintendent.

The State System

While it may be said and is true that every state of the Union has its educational system, it is not correct to say that there are states which have a state school system in the

---

116 Cf. G.S. Counts, op. cit. 12.
117 Ibid., 79.
same way that we speak about states having district or township or county systems. Only one state, the small state of Delaware, has a state system, that is, having the entire public school system, except the two city districts of Wilmington and Dover, organized as one administrative unit \textsuperscript{118}. This is the only case of a highly centralized state educational organization. Legally any state could introduce such centralization, but thus far all other states have provided for education by creating (by permission or mandate) local administrative units and by delegating executive power to these smaller units. At the same time, however, every state has its board of education and a state superintendent of public instruction or commissioner of education. Their functions have evolved from almost purely clerical and exhortatory duties to supervisory, executive and even legislative powers. In the last function, legislative or planning, the state superintendent and board are, of course, subject to the state legislature whenever there is question of imposing something not already provided for explicitly or implicitly in a statute. Increasingly, today the state is taking greater interest in education by supervision, by planning curricula, by prescribing text-books, and by reserving to itself the right to grant or to revoke

\textsuperscript{118} Cf. A.B. Moehlman, op. cit. 163.
teachers' certificates. Still, local control is very prominent and if we except the minimum state requirements, each local administrative unit provides for the educational needs of its people as the people and the local authorities recognize these needs and are financially able to fulfill them. To a large extent the schools are still considered as local affairs and education of the young as a matter of direct interest to the people of the immediate vicinity and subject to their control rather than to the control of the state or professional educationists. Popular interest is, of course, more manifest in the realms of elementary education than in secondary and higher learning. This is equally true of the control of schools. The district system is most extensively used in rural areas. Many districts have none but an elementary school and could not possibly establish a high school because of the sparse population of the district, or in sections where Catholics are numerous, because so few parents send their children to public schools either elementary or high. In such cases there may be only one public high school per township or even per county depending on the population who would patronize the public schools. In reference to high schools, therefore, we notice greater centralization and less popular interest or control. This is even more true of public colleges and universities and normal schools. With the exception of the larger city districts, having their own college,
university and normal institutes, these are entirely in the hands of state officials and almost entirely removed from any popular control.

The Community System

In describing the district system, we saw that it was a result of the original town system of the New England States. This town system was truly a community system "... an integration of urban and neighboring rural interests" 119. The division of the town into smaller districts was occasioned by the fact that small community-like clusters sprang up within the territory originally designated as the town. These small communities, as well as adjacent rural areas, each developed into independent and often artificial districts 120. By 1890 a trend away from these artificial units and back to the original unit was in progress. This trend was prompted by a desire to establish a natural school administrative unit on the basis of the natural community, that is, the town and the rural areas lying around it. Today this movement is attracting attention and sympathetic interest in many parts of the nation. Moehlman thinks that "... the dominant new local district unit will be the natural community,

119 A.B. Moehlman, op. cit., 169.
120 Cf. Ibid.
expressed as a relation of social, economic and educational interests, varying in size with geographical conditions and basic land use." 121.

The community district owes its growing popularity to two factors. The first is the increasing evidence of the arbitrary nature and inefficiency of the small districts with their numerous one-room schools. The second factor is the traditional attitude of opposition to any form of centralization which might lessen the local popular influence in matters of school control. This opposition is apparent in regard to both larger administrative units such as the county and to attempts at establishing consolidation or central schools in which children of distinct districts and even distinct communities have at times been grouped. The central or consolidated school had its period of vogue during the first thirty years of the present century but now has fallen into ill-repute 122. It was not a natural unit. The community district on the contrary would be entirely natural devoid of any arbitrary boundaries. The basis for mapping it would be the community of social, economic and educational interests. This basis, of course, admits of great range in size of administrative units. One might have only a few square miles, another a few hundred square miles. Once this new community

122 Cf. A.B. Zoehlman, School Administration, 177.
system is worked out in its final form, other districts and their educational officers disappear. A new community board of education elected at large and a community superintendent as professional officer of the board will be in charge. They will work out the annual school budget, determine the school tax, select teachers and principals, fix their salaries, provide new buildings and high-school advantages for all children of the community district. In general, the organization and the powers possessed by the community educational officers are intended to be very similar to those under the city system.

**Cubberley's Administrative Suggestions**

To the topic of school administrative units, Cubberley devoted a large proportion of his writings. Not only did he describe these units. He voiced both favorable and adverse criticism to existing practices in school administration and likewise made his suggestions for the improvement of educational efforts by reorganization of present administrative systems. In fact, such reorganization may be said to be the basic means that Cubberley suggests for aligning the work of the schools with his conception and purposes of education. For him reorganization of school administration by establishing

123 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 255-258. As early as 1916 Illinois provided, by permissive legislation, for forming community high-school districts in which all district, township and even county boundaries might be disregarded. Cf. Ibid. 255.
larger units of control in most states is a fundamental and essential need for true and lasting improvement of education.

According to Cubberley, the district system has seen its day of usefulness and should by all means be replaced by a larger unit, preferably by the county system, except in a few sparsely settled, isolated areas with poor transportation facilities. The district system was well adapted to pioneer days because communication was difficult between rural settlements and state or county seats. Furthermore, local district control made people conscious of the need of education. By that each locality was allowed to handle its own school problems people showed interest and initiative. For the purely educational values of the district school Cubberley has nothing favorable to mention. Along with the benefits just mentioned, he says:

Perhaps one of the chief merits of the early district system, ... was that the district meeting served as a forensic center for the developing democratic life of the time... In training the people in the simple forms of parliamentary procedure; in the ability to speak and defend their rights; and in awakening a conception in the minds of the common people of the needs and benefits of education, and this at a time when general education at public expense hung in the balance - the district system doubtless rendered a very valuable service.

124 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 170, and The Improvement of Rural Schools, 32.
125 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 34.
126 E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 171.
For the purpose of keeping local interest Cubberley would consent to some aspects of district control in such matters which can be efficiently handled by the district. But the district as the administrative unit must disappear because it is not adapted to the educational needs of the present or the future. The district system, he maintains, is educationally inefficient because on the one hand the education it offers is not functional in terms of intelligent participation in rural life and gives little training for the vocations of country people, and, on the other hand, it provides only the minimum essentials of an education which is functionally dead in respect to broader life interests and to the changing economic and social problems of nation and state.

The chief reasons for this alleged educational inefficiency are: 1) the lack of intelligent professional direction and supervision; 2) the lack of sufficient funds; and 3) the difficulty of introducing anything new whether in school work or in equipment or buildings. The district trustees are generally laymen and, in Cubberley's opinion, entirely incompetent in school matters, yet they have the

127 Cf. E.F. Cubberley, The Improvement of Rural Schools, 37.
128 Cf. Ibid., 36-37.
129 Cf. Ibid., 35 and 37.
control of the district school and frequently assume authority where only a professionally trained person should have a voice; they are ultra-conservative, penurious and short-sighted. They do not understand that the educational needs of the present are not the same as fifty years ago. If they do see present needs, they must still convince the people at the annual district meeting so that the people will be willing to be taxed for improvements. Very often the trustees are afraid or unwilling to spend more for anything except the bare essentials and in other instances they have so little available money that it is impossible to make worthwhile improvements. The taxable wealth of a district is often so small that a well-equipped, hygienic school-building is a financial impossibility.

Again often the teachers in the district schools are incompetent, because the services of an experienced and competent teacher are too costly. If taxes are levied on a district basis, the tax rate must be higher than under the city or county system, and still the district provides lesser educational benefits. As a means to eliminate the

130 Cf. Ibid., 36, and E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 52.
131 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 175.
132 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, The Improvement of Rural Schools, 37.
district inefficiencies, Cubberley suggests the abolition of the district in favor of the county system and consolidation of small rural schools. This would eliminate poorly equipped one-room schools; there would be fewer schools and in turn fewer teachers with only a handful of pupils and especially, since the teacher demand would be lessened, it would be easier to obtain only well-trained, competent teachers. Fewer teachers, though they could and should be better paid, would still be more economical. And, of course, the educational value of better teachers is self-evident. The county system with consolidated schools would also equalize educational advantages because the same standards would apply throughout the county. Taxes would be levied on a county-wide basis and apportioned according to need, thereby lessening the burden on the districts.

From a business point of view the county system presents a better unit of administration, because it is unified and simplified. Instead of several boards, one more competent board elected at large would represent the people.

133 Cf. Ibid., 39; also E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 25C, and "Desirable Reorganization in American Education", School and Society, 2 (1915), 401.
134 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, "Rural School Administration", School and Society, 1 (1914), 158.
135 Cf. Ibid., 230-233.
136 Cf. Ibid., 233.
of the entire county and administer the entire educational effort of the county. The county superintendent, chief executive officer of the board, should be appointed by the county board. He should be the best trained professional educator available, one who understands educational needs and functions. Well-qualified assistant superintendents and supervisors should help him in his work. With better teachers and competent supervision instruction would improve, with an expert at the top of the system the school program would be broadened and redirected to make education functional for a rural populace.

Cubberley has outlined the powers which he thinks the county board of education should have.

The county board of education to have control of all schools within the county, outside of independent city school districts, with power to establish and consolidate schools, make all repairs, buy and sell buildings and real estate, erect new school buildings, establish high schools and special schools, determine and change as needed the attendance-district lines within the county school district, furnish all supplies and janitor service, employ all teachers and principals for the schools, employ supervisors of instruction, fix salaries of all employees, approve of courses of study and adopt textbooks for the schools of the county, and in general to have the control and management of all the school of the county, just as a city board of education does today for a city, acting in most matters only on the recommendation of the county superintendent of schools.

137 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Improvement of Rural Schools, 42, and "Desirable Reorganization in American Education", School and Society, 2 (1915), 400.
The county board of education to approve an annual budget of expenditures for maintenance and outlays for the schools of the county, and to notify the county tax-levying authorities of the amount of county school tax, as well as any special or sub-district taxes, to be levied 138.

In regard to any powers that might be left in the hands of the people of a locality, Cubberley says these powers should be centered in local subdistrict directors, appointed by the county board, and acting as its agent and as a means of communication between the people of a sub-district and the board 139.

If the suggestions of his plan for county organization all followed, Cubberley feels that there will be an administrative entity capable of rendering effective educational service. The county superintendent would no longer waste much of his time in dealing with and trying to educate incompetent district trustees or in mass of clerical work for each district. Instead he could now work directly "with the teachers to provide good education for the children of the districts" 140. Furthermore, and this is very important for Cubberley, his plan "would professionalize county school administration and supervision as well" 141. By "professionalizing" he means that the control of education would be

139 Cf. Ibid., 232.
140 Cf. Ibid., 232-233.
141 Ibid., 232.
placed in the hands of men specially trained to understand education, its functions and the particular needs of various groups of children as well as the needs of the state and nation. The county board of education is to be entirely free from any residence or salary restrictions in hiring the superintendent or other professionally trained employees who may be necessary. They should get the best men in the state or from another state and have no restrictions placed on them as to salary. The board is to fix the salary according to the professional worth of the persons they choose. Cubberley attributes the educational progress, which the city school systems have made during the last fifty years, chiefly to the fact that they have been free to pick their leaders from any part of the nation, unhampered by any residential, political or salary restrictions. Here Cubberley wants the county board to enjoy complete liberty. But in any other educational matter they should act only upon the recommendation of the superintendent. In this way Cubberley wants to make sure that all educational measures have the sanction of the professional educationist.

The county superintendent must, by all means, be
appointed by the board, not elected by popular vote, because if he is thus elected he is like any political candidate.

Cubberley considers nomination by political parties and election by popular vote and from among the electorate, as practically the worst method of obtaining a really good professionally trained person for the superintendency. He says:

"What is needed for the work is educational preparation, professional insight, executive skill, and that personal power which comes from wide knowledge, and the method of selection by popular election does not tend to secure any of these."

Cubberley’s plan for school administration is largely patterned on business. There we find a well-trained person in the executive position. It is the duty to manage the entire business and to make it a financial success. He is assisted by specialized assistants and experts. High salaries are paid to obtain the best professionally trained personnel in managerial positions. Business always is watchful for greater efficiency and that we may say is the keynote of business philosophy. Efficiency is also the keynote in Cubberley’s school administration. In Public Education in the United States he speaks of the schools of the nation as "manufacturing establishment" and as such it must "reduce waste, speed up the rate of production, and increase the value of the output". We must revise, reorganize, re-direct our

145 Cf. Ibid., 216.
146 Cf. Ibid.
147 Cf. 527-528.
"manufacturing specification" and apply to education "the same principles of specialized production and manufacturing efficiency which control in other parts of the manufacturing world". In order to obtain this efficiency, he wants a more centralized administrative unit, the county, and the services of efficiency experts, the professionally trained educationists as superintendents and supervisors. He says:

To increase the power of the county school authorities at the expense of the smaller subdivisions beneath, and to make the county the unit for administration, supervision, finance, and general educational control, is merely to apply to educational affairs the same common-sense principles which have been put into practice, in whole or in part, in many branches of the public service, and which prevail generally in the business world 148.

In thus taking school control out of the hands of the people and the school farther from the home, he sees no violation of any right.

About the only "rights" the people of the districts would give up would be the right to elect a horde of unnecessary school trustees, and often in addition to mismanage the education of their children 149.

Cubberley's ideas on "rights" to control education will be explained in the following paragraph. For the moment it is sufficient to realize that the question of rights hardly seems to enter his mind when he is dealing with centralization by county control. His guiding principles are profession-

148 E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 227.
149 Ibid., 233.
alizing, efficiency and economy. Any unit of administration smaller than the county he judges economically wasteful and financially unable to procure the right leadership. In speaking about the trend of transferring district and township powers to the county, he says:

So beneficial have been the results of this change that the standing of a state, educationally, is today in large part to be determined by the degree to which this transference has been effected 150.

Although Cubberley concedes that the benefits accruing from a switch-over from district to county control would be attained partially by establishing the township system, still the township system would be educationally and financially inefficient. Whatever the township unit may offer in educational values can be obtained more fully and more efficiently by the county system. Furthermore, the township, he says, is an arbitrary surveyor's unit and as such does not adapt itself to natural geographical features. Hence also it takes no cognizance of natural community boundaries and interests. Communities usually are founded and developed with reference to geographical formations 151.

Cubberley says "... a good unit for school organization must be one that adapts itself to natural community boundaries

---

150 Ibid., 211.
151 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 47-49, and State School Administration, 196-199. This disregard for community interests and boundaries cannot be alleged in New England. There the township is the town with its surrounding rural area. Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 46.
and interest..." This statement might lead one to believe that he is interested in the community district unit. This, however, is not the case. While he admits that the community unit would remove some of the bad features of the township because it is usually larger and has a natural unity, he still insists that

... the same and better educational advantages, and the same adaptation to natural community boundaries, can ordinarily be secured in improved form at once to a county-unit plan for educational organization and administration... 153

Ordinarily he would consider it merely as an intermediary stage, a stepping stone to the county unit 154. The adaptation to community interest and boundaries he intends to secure by community consolidated schools, established and controlled by the county 155. How this adaptation will be effected better or even as well under the county system is not at all evident and Cubberley does not offer an explanation. But probably he expects the professional leaders of the county system to have the knowledge and insight necessary to achieve this.

Cubberley has no fundamental objection to the city system. In fact, it is his opinion that our cities have

152 E. F. Cubberley, *State School Administration*, 199.
153 Ibid., 203.
154 Cf. Ibid., 255.
155 Cf. Ibid., 232.

and more rapidly by passing
made "... the greatest contribution to educational organiza-
tion, administration, equipment, instruction and the extension
of educational advantages" 156. Moreover, he says that the
county system as he would have it is nothing else, in its
essential features, than "... the application of the best
experiences of our cities ..." 157 The progress that the
cities have made he attributes chiefly to their freedom to
undertake new things, to go beyond state demands, to set high
standards, but likewise, to unified organization, administra-
tion, supervision and finance, and to elimination of small-
unit waste. Their greater wealth makes it easier to offer
more and better educational facilities, and to obtain the
services of abler administrators and superior teachers 158.

To insure all the educational advantages of which the city
is capable, Cubberley insists that the city board be elected
at large, not by wards, that the board have few members. As
in the case of the county, the board should appoint, as super-
intendent, the best man available and then is should allow
him to handle all technical and professional matters 159.
The city school unit should not be entirely independent in

156 E.P. Cubberley, Introduction to the Study of
Education, 71-72 and 374.
157 Cf. Ibid., 409.
158 Cf. Ibid., 72.
159 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, "Desirable Reorganization in
American Education", School and Society, 37, (1933), 397-402.
the matter of school taxes. For general education offered throughout the county the taxes should be fixed by the county board. But at the same time the city board ought to be free to levy additional taxes for special schools and special educational facilities not offered in rural areas. In every way and especially in the matter of school taxes, Cubberley wants it entirely independent from the civil administration of the city. The city board of education should not be obliged to appear before the city council to petition for funds. In short, all city politics should be vigorously ruled out of the school system because

... public education is too important for the future of our national life to trust it to the whims and trades and logrolling of a political body, elected with no reference to and with no interest in school administration.

Cubberley has consistently urged reorganization of school management by establishing the county and city units of administration along the lines which he has suggested. Nowhere has he openly favored that a whole state be made the unit of control. In most states, he says, the county is the best unit, but in speaking about the North Atlantic States and Delaware he seems to be sympathetic toward the state as

162 Ibid., 269.
unit of supervision and administration. In most cases he does favor centralization beyond the county. It is his belief that the county unit will be educationally and financially efficient. It is worthy of note that beyond this efficiency he does not offer any fundamental principle on which he bases his suggestions, except the diplomatic reason that too great centralization will introduce unnecessary uniformity and stifle local interest and community activity. This, however, does not mean that Cubberley would have the state assume a disinterested attitude. In fact, he wants it to be vitally concerned about education. Legally, the state has the authority to control education and while it delegates this authority to smaller units, it should supervise the activity of these units, encourage them and provide by legislation for the maintenance of the highest possible standards. Cubberley wants a medium sized state board of education, appointed by the governor, or preferably, elected by the people. Members of this board are the representatives of the people and as such should be lay, not professional educators. But they, like the county board members, should appoint a professional superintendent or commissioner of education and whatever other experts they consider necessary for efficiency in the state educational pro-

164 Cf. Ibid., 300.
gram. The board should try to find the best men for the money the state feels it can spend. The state board and its executive personal should gather up any functions which the smaller school units cannot perform efficiently. On the other hand, Cubberley says:

"... a wise state policy would be to relinquish to communities, as agents, any functions which they can control well and will be interested in handling."  

In essential matters the state should require uniformity and unity. For Cubberley such essentials are: methods of bookkeeping and accounting, uniform fiscal year, uniform statistical returns, kinds of schools which may or must be provided, the minimum length of school term, the general nature of instruction, standards of certification of teachers, school supervision to be required, sanitary standards, equipment, minimum rates and forms of taxation, minimum salaries to be paid, tenure and pensions, compulsory attendance, and child labor laws. In all these the state educational authorities should set minimum standards but at the same time they should permit local units to exceed the minima. At all times it should encourage them to do so and might even require higher minima from some units that are financially capable of greater educational services.

165 Ibid., 301.
166 Cf. Ibid., 288-289.
To maintain set standards it may be necessary for the state to subsidize poorer localities with extra funds 167. These funds are to be raised by general taxation over the whole state besides the taxes which the county or city collects for school support. Such state taxation, Cubberley maintains, should not be levied only to help poorer sections. He wants state aid for all public schools of the state. The money is to be raised by corporation taxes and a personal income tax. The county taxes, on the other hand, should be real estate taxes and as little as possible personal property tax. The purpose of such a plan of taxation, says Cubberley, is to oblige all the wealth of the state to contribute toward the education of all the children of the state. The effect of this plan will be to equalize educational advantages throughout the state and lessen the burden of those areas where there is less wealth 168. This is a question of great import for Cubberley. He insists on a reform in taxation methods along the lines which he proposes in order to give all children a fair opportunity to obtain the education they need or want without unfairly burdening the less wealthy sections of a state.

From all that has been said thus far about Cubberley's

167 Cf. Ibid., Ch. XVII.
168 Cf. Ibid., 425-ët-sqq.
state and county program we can easily detect a tendency toward centralization. Worthy of repetition is the fact that he favors county and city control because of their alleged efficiency and because over-centralization would tend to create unnecessary uniformity stifling local initiative and interest. State support is needed because local units would not be efficient and sufficient of themselves without it. It may be objected that Cubberley has a more fundamental reason besides efficiency and the diplomatic reason of stimulating local interest for favoring the city unit. The basis for this objection would be that Cubberley says cities have special problems, interests and needs to provide for, and again that a good unit of school organization must take cognizance of natural community boundaries and interests. From these statements one might argue that the author shows definite interest in the city or the community as the natural sociological unit. This argument, however, loses its weight if we consider his whole plan. He shows interest in the community, that is true. But at the same time he definitely opposes community control in all rural areas. He wants to bring the children of the community together in the community consoli-

169 Cf. Ibid., 500-301.
170 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 60-61, and State School Administration, 178.
171 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 199.
dated school, but the control is to be in the hands of the county board and officials. As far as having schools consolidated with reference to natural community boundaries and interests without community control, that can be had even under state or federally centralized control. It would appear, therefore, that Cubberley places very little real importance on the natural sociological unit. Whether the rural community is a natural sociological unit or not, efficiency demands the county unit. It will provide better educational advantages, and this more rapidly. And as to the cities having special problems and interests, this also does not hold great importance for our author. He does not say they should have control of their schools. He permits this because they have shown educational and financial efficiency and progress, but he also wants the way left open for any city to surrender its powers and become subject to county control. So in final analysis Cubberley's interest in sociological units seems to be very slight. So again it appears that his guiding principles are educational and financial efficiency.

It is important to remember this because with these principles as the guiding light any unit of administration which shows such efficiency may be favored, and any unit

172 Cf. Ibid., 203.
173 Cf. Ibid., 231.
that does not answer that demand may be abolished. Therefore, also, Cubberley can make no logical and fundamental objection to centralized control, either state or even federal, if and when efficiency required it. Greater efficiency might demand Federal control of education. Should this contingency materialize, the constitutional rights of the states to provide for education within their respective limits could be abrogated by amendment. Although Cubberley does not advocate Federal control he is insistent on the Nation's interest in education. He says "... its (the school's) proper maintenance has become a prime essential to good government and national progress." 174 He outlines certain points that he considers essential in any forward looking American educational program, primarily national in scope and importance. Among his proposals the following seem to be significant: 1) to reorganize our school curricula for better adaptation to modern conditions and new needs in our national life; 2) to reorganize and redirect rural education; 3) to provide every classroom in the United States with an adequately educated and adequately trained teacher 175. To achieve these stipulations, he requests a National Department of Education "... which can both encourage


175 Cf. Ibid., 186-187.
and compel progressive improvement in local schools" 176. In other words he would have a national agency, a Federal department, with the power to impose improvements by reorganization and redirection as he suggests. Such power, as is evident, would be very extensive and comprehensive, and armed with it, the Federal Department might invade almost any part of the educational field. For the purpose of safeguarding national needs the Federal Department might prescribe the textbooks to be used; to assure good teachers, it might control certification of teachers. This type of federal intervention is not Cubberley's intention, but he opens wide the flood-gate and in embryo gives a nihil obstat to almost any and all kinds of federal meddling. If his request were fulfilled a very definite step toward complete centralization of education would be taken.

To sum up the discussion of Cubberley's ideas on school administrative units it may be said that he is indeed solicitous about obtaining an efficient unit, one in which education will be placed on a professional basis by placing well-trained professional educators at the head of each unit; a school system that will have better teachers. To achieve this he resorts to partial centralization and consolidation in order to reduce the number of administrative

176 Ibid., 187.
units with a corresponding reduction of professional men needed to head them, as well as a reduction in the number of schools with a corresponding reduction in the number of teachers needed. Furthermore, this centralization will assure a professionally trained man at the head of every unit, which was not the case for many of the smaller administrative units of district and township. The reductions in professional and teaching personnel make it easier to obtain better prepared persons, and likewise decrease the outlay for salaries and yet improve education. Consolidation will bring less schools but these will be larger and better and therefore in the long run educationally more economical. Centralization of taxation along with state support will equalize both the burden and the educational facilities.

If we make a final synthesis of all this we find Cubberley's guiding principle to be the principle of efficiency: to adopt a school system under which the school will produce a better product, the best possible project, and to make every dollar set aside for education count for the most possible in the process of production. This principle Cubberley believes applied in the city and county administrative units. While he advocates no greater centralization, except perhaps for small North Atlantic seaboard states, he proposes no fundamental principle to preclude such centralization, but rather plants the seed for full centralization of public
school control by a Federal Department of Education.

Objectives and Centralization

If we place side by side Cubberley's objectives of education and his suggestions leading toward greater centralization of control it is not difficult to see their logical connection. His chief and final objectives as we have seen are social efficiency and the welfare of the state. With this in mind it is not at all surprising that Cubberley shows a tendency toward centralized control. In fact, if he did not he would be proceeding illogically. If welfare of the state is the final aim of education, then it is undoubtedly true, as he says, that the proper maintenance of schools is the prime essential to national progress. With that premise it is also quite logical to establish a Federal Department of Education which will compel reorganization and redirection to adapt education to the needs in our national life.

D - Rights in Education

After we have discussed at some length Cubberley's thought on objectives and aims of education and the administrative reorganization and its consequent professionalizing of education, it is logical to continue our scrutiny of his writings for a theoretical background to bolster the position he has taken, in particular his tendency toward
centralization. Specifically our inquiry here will be about the rights to control education. In other words the question to which we seek an answer is: Who has a right to control education according to Cubberley?

In the encyclical on Christian Education, Pope Pius XI divides the rights to supervise education between three societies: the family, the Church, and the State. These three, also, are the only agencies referred to by writers who discuss this question. In the present inquiry we shall try to find what rights Cubberley concedes to each of these societies.

In one of his early books, Cubberley asserted the right of parents to educate their children: "In all that relates to proper care, kindness, education and advantages, the child belongs to the parent." But immediately he adds a restriction on this parental right. If parental neglect or abuse sets in he says... "the child belongs to the state." The full significance of this phrase "the child belongs to the state" should be carefully noted. It means that the child no longer belongs to the parents, the parents have lost their right, and the state now supplants the parents. That would be the literal meaning of the phrase.

There could, however, be an attenuated meaning, namely, that

178 E.P. Cubberley, Changing Conception of Education, 63.
179 Ibid., 63.
the state takes measures to assure the child of proper care and a fitting education, without truly acquiring the right previously and ordinarily held by the parents. As reasons for the state to insure the child's education he mentions 'the child's right to an education and the welfare of society.' Here again, the welfare of society seems to be his first preoccupation. This insistence on the welfare of society, the state, might be an indication that he uses the words "belongs to the state" in their literal sense. But this is not a necessary logical implication.

While it remains doubtful, therefore, what the precise meaning of this early pronouncement is, Cubberley seriously restricted parental rights in Public School Administration. There he lists some of the powers once held or still held in some places by smaller units of administration. He advocates the transference of these powers to larger units "... in the interests of greater efficiency in school administration." Among the powers, which he says have been transferred, are: "the right of parents to make individual contracts with teachers: ... and the right of parents assembled in district meeting to dictate the choice of the teacher." In a de facto statement he says that these powers have now been completely taken over by the State. He does not say openly that he approves this transfer of rights "originally possess-

180 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, Public School Administration, 24.
181 Cf. Ibid.
ed by the parents". He is stating a fact. But the general impression of the context is that he approves those restrictions of parental rights. A few pages later he favors considerable state control and explicitly refers to obligatory attendance, length of terms and certification of teachers as functions residing with the state. He does not again refer to the rights of parents mentioned above. But in State School Administration, published in 1929, two years after Public School Administration, he quite clearly advocates the appointment of teachers by larger units of administration, larger than the district or township, that is, by the county or community supervision unit. Appointment and dismissal of teachers should be "in the hands of professional school officers". Neither the lay members of the school board nor the parents should have anything to say in these matters. Here then, Cubberley quite clearly denies the parents any right in the choice of those to whom they confide one of their most sacred duties: education of their offspring. However, he makes one exception for:

children who are being properly instructed by a private tutor, or at home by a competent person, in subjects taught in the public schools to pupils of such age and advancement, or satisfactory equivalents, and who produce satisfactory evidence to that effect.

182 Cf. Ibid., 27.
183 Cf. E.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 643.
184 Ibid., 691.
This is the only case he would allow the parents their choice of teacher, and of course there are not many parents who are competent to act as instructor themselves or financially able to hire a tutor. So all parents who send their children to public school are to have no voice in teacher selection. It is evident that under this plan parental supervision of instruction is reduced to almost nothing. Parents could supplement the school by personal instruction but as a matter of fact we know that most parents due to lack of interest or because of preoccupation with material worries do not take time to check on what the child is learning. And since the public schools are professedly non-religious the children receive no religious training.

Let us here suppose that in a certain area the people are predominantly or entirely Catholic, though not financially able to have a parochial or other private Catholic school. The parent would have to send their children to a public school. Since they have no voice in the appointment of the teachers, they cannot be sure to obtain a teacher with a thoroughly Christian outlook, much less a Catholic minded teacher. He or she might be an atheist and the parents could do nothing about dismissing the teacher because that function is held by the professional school officers. Cubberley's ideas on teacher appointment are, therefore, a clear denial of parental right to insure a school education which is in
conformity with their own religious beliefs and one that may feel in conscience bound to give their children. The parents might feel in conscience bound not to send their children to a school with an atheistic teacher, and at the same time state attendance laws would oblige them to do so. Furthermore, Cubberley would not allow the dismissal of a teacher on the ground that we are here supposing. He lists the causes for which a teacher might be dismissed. They are: immorality, insubordination, willful neglect of duty, clearly defined cases of unprofessional conduct, and incompetency or unfitness for the teaching service 185. These he would have fixed by law as the only causes for which a teacher might be dismissed. Religious belief or absence of such belief could in no way be used as a reason for dismissing a teacher. The law would protect the teacher, the law would oblige the parents to send their children to the school; quite evidently in such a case the parental right to assure an education that their conscience tells them must be given to their children, entirely disappears.

But then we should not be too surprised at Cubberley's ideas in reference to this. According to Cubberley we are out of line as soon as we mention the religious question in reference to public schools. In State School Administration,

185 Cf. Ibid., 648.
Cubberley's Doctrine

he writes:

There is no possibility of forcing religious instruction into the public schools. If it is to be given, the churches themselves must do the work by providing teachers and an overhead organization capable of real service 186.

This is quite clearly a denial of the right of parents, not privileged to have parochial schools or other private Catholic schools, to provide their children an education based on religious principles and thoroughly impregnated with a religious viewpoint. Certainly, Cubberley allows the churches to give children a religious education, but only if they provide the teachers and an overhead organization. But the point we wish to emphasize is that he does not allow the whole education to be given a religious background. while he grants the right to give religious instruction by an organization which is not part of the public school, he still is denying the right to give a Catholic education. Religious instruction is not a Catholic education. The only place that can be had, according to Cubberley's plans, is in a Catholic school supported by private funds, not by taxes. "At all costs", he says, "the unity of the American public school must be preserved; its funds must be kept safe... The Americans... everywhere decided against sectarian instruction in any way supported by the State" 187. And again:

186 J.P. Cubberley, State School Administration, 725.
187 Ibid., 728-729.
"A share in the school money they (the private and parochial schools) cannot have..." 188 At the same time he insists that all sectarian groups, though they furnish their own schools, must pay taxes to the support of the public schools. These groups, he says, have no more reason to be excused from public school support because they have their own school, than a citizen, from paying taxes for maintenance of the fire department because he lives in a fire proof house 189.

The question of rights in this matter of taxation reverts back to the question of priority of right to control education. The question is who has the priority: the family, the Church or the State. For Cubberley the State has the priority of right. As he says explicitly: "... today we conceive of education in theory at least, as something maintained by the State and as maintained as an exercise of the State's inherent right to preservation and improvement" 190. Let it be noticed that here he does not speak of public schools, but about education in general. His conception of state priority becomes even more clear when he speaks about non-public schools. In reference to them he says that they should be made subject to state approval and a license granted to them.

188 Ibid., 717.
189 Cf. Ibid.
by the State Department of Education on condition that they meet state demands. Such a demand on Cubberley's part, clearly indicates his conception of state priority. For him the State comes before the family and the Church in educational control. Private efforts to offer education he considers merely as a favor which private or parochial schools do for the State, not strictly as a function of the Church.

His conception of state priority, of its primary right to educate, is also a necessary logical conclusion of his positioning the welfare of the state as the primary objective of education. By making the schools "essentially civil affairs" Cubberley implies that the state has the right to control education.

In the light of this conception of state priority we can see his stand in reference to taxation, and his comparison between education and the fire department. No doubt, maintaining the latter is a civil affair. But so is maintaining the schools, according to Cubberley. And just as we don't ask whether a citizen lives in a fire proof house or whether he has his own fire-fighting equipment, so also Cubberley would not have us ask whether the Catholics or other religions maintain their own schools.

---
192 Cf. Ibid.
Again, therefore, we have a denial of parental right to provide for education in their own way and also of the right to determine whether they will pay taxes for public education although they already carry the full burden of supporting their own schools. If they want parochial schools, Cubberley does not object, but then they are voluntarily shouldering a burden besides the public school burden which they cannot shirk. And for Cubberley, they have no right to expect the State to help support their parochial schools.

There is another instance in which Cubberley speaks about parental rights. It is his most recent mention of those rights and also the most sweeping statement under cover of which all such rights could be restricted to insignificance. In an article published in 1933 in *School and Society*, he says:

... the rights of the parent over his child are limited, and cannot be exercised if in conflict with what the state has determined by law to be the rights of the children or the larger needs of the state... 194

If this statement is accepted in principle, the State becomes the sole judge as to what the rights of the parents are. The state can limit the exercise of these rights to such an extent that for practical purposes the restrictions amount to destroying them.

194 E.P. Cubberley, "The Independence of School Administration a Necessity", *School and Society*, 37 (1933), 268.
Thus far we have limited our discussion chiefly to comparison of parental and state rights. But in mentioning religious instruction we have already touched on the right of the Church. What has been said about Cubberley's denial of parental rights applies equally as well to Church rights. By giving the state a primary right, by making the schools essentially civil affairs, by excluding religious instruction from the public schools, he places the state above the Church. He denies her not only the right to safeguard religious instruction, but as well the right to supervise the teaching of other branches of learning in order to safeguard religion and morality. By extending the divorce of Church and State to the divorce of religion and public education, he denies her the right to promote her interests and to minister to her needs by efforts which are not wholly and exclusively her own. This divorce is also a denial of any obligation of the state to safeguard Christianity or to recognize and fulfill any social obligation of acknowledging and rendering homage to God.

To summarize Cubberley's thought: the State is supreme. What is accomplished by private and denominational efforts is allowed in as much as it meets state approval. His position on rights is logical in view of his placing welfare of the state at the top of the list of the aims of education. It likewise dovetails perfectly with his suggestions and demands.
regarding centralization of school administration. He could not logically ask for control by the state and a Federal Department of Education and then deny the right to do this by subordinating the state to parental and Church rights.
CHAPTER III

Criticism of Cubberley's Doctrine.

In the foregoing chapter we have tried to bring together the principal elements of Cubberley's doctrine. It has been our purpose to discuss fairly and accurately his thought without in any way showing agreement or disagreement with his tenets. Now, however, it is incumbent on us to evaluate critically his principles and suggestions. It is time to cast off the reserve exercised in the preceding chapter, to ask ourselves whether we will agree or disagree with the various aspects of his teaching and then to state the reasons for our stand. This is the purpose of the present chapter. Therefore, in the same order as in the preceding chapter, once more Cubberley's doctrine on the objectives and aims of education, on the conception of education, on administration and on the rights to control education, will come to our consideration. To pick out the true and the false in Cubberley's doctrine we shall rely on a triple criterion: the teachings of Christ and of the Church especially as contained in the encyclicals of the Popes; the principles of Thomistic philosophy; and Catholic authorities writing on educational matters.

A - True Objectives and Aims of Education.

In the attempt to determine the purpose of education,
we can hope to succeed with any degree of certainty only if
first we have an accurate and clear idea of the nature of
man. Education deals with human beings not with a machine
or a brute animal. No one in his sane mind ever tried to
teach a motor the alphabet or a dog algebra. In fact we can­
not rightly speak of educating a dog or any other brute
animal. But we daily read or speak about educating human
beings. why the difference? Simply because we realize that
a dog and a child have different natures. The one is not
susceptible to education, the other is. To educate a child,
a human being, rightly then, it is of primary importance to
know what the make-up of a child is. what is its nature?
what are its capacities, its powers? Does man have an in­
telligence which can understand ultimate realities, immaterial
truths? when man knows something, does he or can he get
beneath the surface, the exterior appearances? If he cannot
pierce through the outer crust of things it is evidently use­
less to try to develop his mind as if it could. Is he endow­
ed with a will that is free? If the determinists are right,
what a waste of time to train the will as if it could make
a free choice. Does man possess other faculties besides in­
tellect and will? what are they? what is the purpose of all
these powers and what is the purpose of man? why is he here
on earth? Is he here merely to live a certain number of
years in what happiness he can procure for himself? Or will
he live on after death, and what sort of life is that supposed to be?

The answers to all these questions are of supreme importance for a sound theory of education because they give us the true nature of man and the purpose of his earthly existence. These answers can be found partly in Divine Revelation and partly through our own efforts of careful logical reasoning from the known to the unknown, from the phenomena that are subject to observation, to facts and truths that can be attained only through the process of reasoning.

From rational psychology we know with certainty that man is not merely matter, that he has an immortal, spiritual soul and that this soul is equipped with spiritual faculties. He also has faculties that belong to the material world, sense faculties. One of the spiritual faculties, the intellect enables man to know not merely facts, not merely the appearance of things, but the very core of substances: essences of things and immaterial truths beyond the grasp of the senses. This faculty, further, judges and reasons, passing from one truth to another. Depending on the intellect is the will, by which man chooses freely between one thing and another, between action and non-action. Reason tells us we have these faculties, and others, the exterior and interior sense faculties.

Now in a new-born child and to certain degrees in any child or anyone who is not educated, we notice what seems to
be a lack of operation in many of the various faculties, or if they operate, they do so in a deficient manner. That is, they do not act as we expect them to do in an educated adult. There is something missing in the child or any uneducated person. Now what is it that we find in the educated person, and what do we find in the uneducated?

That which characterizes the educated person may be resumed in three words: knowledge, ability and ideals. Where these are absent we find in their place: ignorance, capacity, and impulses. Hence Cunningham says education tries to produce three changes in the individual: from ignorance to knowledge, from capacity to ability, from impulses to ideals.

The first change is so evident if we think of the ignorance of a new-born child, that it seems even ridiculous to mention it. Before the child receives that primary informal education in the home it knows nothing and until it comes to school for formal education it has very little of the store knowledge that the school seeks to impart. The same is true of abilities. Although the child is equipped with all faculties of human nature it can do very little with them. Apart from uncontrolled movements of the limbs and organic functions proceeding mechanically, the child shows no ability. It has only capacities, capacities to do all those things which the educated adult has the ability of doing. Coming to the third change, we notice a marked contrast between the child and adult

---

in motivation. The child is dominated by impulses, impulse to eat, impulse to possess. It is not guided by anything except its own irrational desires that consider none but its own personal gratification, the exaltation of the ego. Education attempts not to eradicate impulses because that is not possible. It tries to give the educand ideals as the guides for action.

The three changes mentioned here, must not be thought of as occurring independently. Abilities and ideals are dependent on knowledge, and by the mere fact that knowledge is imparted, abilities appear where before was only capacity. By teaching the child the alphabet, words, and meaning of words, we develop the ability to read. Ideals do not always appear along with knowledge and ability, but neither are they developed without knowledge and the ability to think. Too often their development lags behind and sometimes the right ideals are never developed, or not sufficiently. The result is a social misfit, in spite of any amount of knowledge and ability.

While knowledge is not ability and ideals, it is important to recognize its primary role. Even the highest ability that man can have, the ability to think and reason, is dependent on it. Man does not think without something to think about. Man thinks, reasons about things he already knows and in doing so advances his knowledge about them or
There are two knowledges and three abilities which are so closely connected that they are inseparable. They are contained in the three R's of the school curriculum: reading, writing, and reckoning. The knowledges are the knowledge of letters or language, and the knowledge of number. The three abilities are already expressed in the very words: ability to read, ability to write, ability to reckon or to figure. These are the first thing on any school program. They are the tools necessary to proceed farther with the process of education. Any person not proficient in them is not considered educated. Grave danger for true education lurks in reducing knowledge of and ability with letter and number. This danger is contained in Cubberley's suggestion pertaining to the curriculum, about which we made mention in the two first paragraphs of the preceding chapter. The Progressives have tried to develop ability to use a language well without teaching either alphabet or formal grammar. They have already repented their attempt. Now they realize their mistake, which is also Cubberley's mistake. Proficiency in a language, they now admit, demands a knowledge of formal grammar, of the rules of grammar and sentence analysis. Minimizing formal grammar, as Cubberley did, has resulted in the inability to speak or write grammatically correct sentences as well as inability to judge correctly about the grammatical correctness or incorrect-
ness of pieces of literature and oratory. Further, it has resulted in severely handicapping students who wish to learn a foreign language in which word endings change according to case. Students who have not been taught when a noun is in the nominative case and when in the objective are bewildered with the use of various case endings in foreign languages. Without formal grammar students never can learn why one thing is right and another wrong. Language study becomes mere memorization, a thing that Cubberley wanted to avoid. Cubberley's reduction of formal grammar, therefore, is in danger of being doubly illogical. It will not succeed in developing language ability based on understanding as a sound ability must be; it will result in memorization, contrary to his wishes.

What the results of minimizing arithmetic and mathematics, in accordance with Cubberley's ideas, are, is clearly evidenced by the present day students' lack of knowledge and ability in this field. Nowhere has this been felt more than in the armed services. Army and navy instructors, preparing men for specialized warfare, have had to struggle with this deficiency. But even in high-school mathematics and science classes a lack of knowledge of processes, once considered elemental, has delayed advance in classwork and forced instructors to teach simple arithmetical processes.

The fact that knowledge and ability in language and numbers is required seems incontestable. That there may have
been excessive stress on formalism in grammar and too many impractical problems in arithmetic books is quite possible. But it is quite clear that the movement away from these, in favor of expression subjects, appreciation and numerous activity subjects, has resulted in real lack of proficiency in the tools of education. There is no objection to imparting knowledge of and ability in tool subjects by the use of problems from actual life, wherever that is possible. This is often not too difficult in arithmetic work. But in activity programs the main purpose may also very easily be eclipsed by too many side issues. And life situations by which grammar rules are learned, and the ability to spell correctly and to read well are developed, are extremely rare, if not totally lacking. Life situations have value only insofar as they make work more interesting and show the student the application of what he is learning and thus help him to learn better. The interest in the situation must never become such that it impedes the objectives, that is, knowledge and ability.

Passing now from knowledge and ability concerning the tool subjects, we come to another objective of education rejected by Cubberley: knowledge of facts or information. He wants not a head full of facts, but a head full of ideas.\(^2\)

Now, it seems quite clear that a man who has merely a store of factual information is not an educated man. But neither do we consider a man educated unless he has a considerable store of such information, no matter how bright he may be. In fact, even an interesting conversation cannot be carried on without it. Moreover, it is needed to make thought possible. Intellectual knowledge, originating in the sense, begins with knowledge of facts. And the richer the store of facts, the greater the possibility to think. Of course, the factual knowledge must be accompanied by an understanding of the facts. The mere information of events having taken place is of little value in itself. The same is true for the mere knowledge of the existence of things. To know that wheat grows in large quantities in Kansas is of little value except to the man who wants to buy wheat in large quantities. Simply to know that the United States is a democracy without knowing what democracy means is useless. If such is the factual knowledge to which Cubberley is opposed, then we are in accord with him, in as much as that is not enough. It must be food for thought; it must generate ideas. In this Cubberley is right in asking for a "head full of ideas". But what else are ideas but knowledge and understanding of facts? All important knowledge is based on facts, on things, on actual truth. That is the very essence of knowledge: *adequatio intellectus cum re*.

The change from ignorance to knowledge holds a priority both of time and of importance in education. All our deliberate actions must be based on knowledge; our abilities,
our ideals are rooted in knowledge. If they are not, they are aimless. Our mental habits in the natural order, both intellectual and moral, are based on knowledge and can be acquired only through the acquisition of knowledge. One does not acquire the habit of logic without learning the rules of logic. One does not acquire a habit of science without acquiring knowledge in the particular field of learning to which the habit belongs. This will be more fully explained in the succeeding section on the Conception of Education.

The priority of importance that knowledge holds arises from the nature of man. Man is an intellectual being. Among his faculties the intellect is the most perfect. It is more perfect than corporeal faculties because their objects are material and temporal. It is more perfect than the will, because the will only desires an absent good or delights in a present good or an end already attained. Therefore on the intellectual level the intellect has already attained its good, its perfection, before the will can delight in that good. Now the good or perfection of the intellect consists in the possession of knowledge, in the possession of truth. The final perfection of the intellect consists in the possession of Truth Itself, that is, God. This priority of knowledge must never be forgotten. The various intellectual abilities or habits have meaning and value for the perfection of man in as much as they aid the intellect to seize truth.
But Cubberley, as we have seen, has lost sight of the individual and is not interested in the perfection of man as man, in the perfection of human nature. He wants knowledge that is useful, knowledge that can be put to immediate use in the business of earning a living, in everyday social life to procure social welfare. Such knowledge is good and indispensable, a worthy objective of education. The trouble is that mere utilitarian knowledge will not achieve social welfare. It is impossible to work for the improvement of society without improving the members of society. Furthermore, the whole purpose of society, of the State, is to afford its members the maximum opportunity to develop all their faculties to the utmost, in short, to perfect themselves. True, civil society looks after the temporal welfare of man, but this has meaning and purpose only in as much as that is a means toward greater things, the spiritual welfare of an intellectual being. If man were not spirit as well as body there would be no purpose in looking after his welfare anymore than after the welfare of brute animals. If, therefore, we want to have true social welfare, society must be such that man will have an opportunity to achieve perfection as an intellectual being. We must, therefore, first understand the nature of man both as an individual and social being. Hence we see the usefulness of such non-utilitarian fields of learning as rational psychology and
sociology.

Once a person realizes that man is more important than the society to which he belongs, then he must admit that all fields of learning which perfect his intellectual nature become useful. Knowledge is the perfection of the intellect. And the more universal that knowledge is, the greater is the perfection of the intellect. Philosophy, especially metaphysics which is more universal than any other branch of learning because it takes in all being, takes on an eminently useful aspect, although a utilitarian like Cubberley would not look at it that way.

Because he wants knowledge that measures up to his idea of usefulness, he discredits knowledge of the past. Still knowledge of the past is extremely useful. Liberal education centers chiefly on studying what the great minds of the past have handed down to us. Studying this has a double purpose. To the undeveloped mind it provides an opportunity to exercise its powers on best products of human mental endeavor so that the untrained mind may function as the great minds of the past have functioned. At the same time it puts the mind in possession of the knowledge that was painstakingly discovered with the progress of civilization and which itself represents the greatest achievements of civilization. But if one supposes, with Cubberley, that knowledge perfecting man is not worthwhile, then it is logical to discredit liberal education and knowledge
of the past.

Not only from the individual but also from the social point of view knowledge of the past is important. Education, it must be understood, is not merely a concern about the individual. It is a concern of society. All society that is not decadent, strives to perpetuate itself and to improve itself. One of the supreme functions of education is to perpetuate the culture and civilization that has been accumulated over the centuries. It must pass on the spiritual and social heritage. Each generation seeks to perpetuate itself by preserving its cultural heritage and by transmitting this heritage to succeeding generations. The old try to pass on their knowledge and wisdom to the young. This is largely done by the schools. Each generation likewise tries to improve itself by adding something to the existing heritage. To do this minds must already be in possession of what others before them possessed in knowledge and wisdom and art and build onto that. This, of course, presupposes that members of society are put into possession of the existing social heritage. Society, therefore, perpetuates itself by transmitting its heritage to its members. Society improves itself by improving its members.

To outlaw the knowledge of the past is to say that every generation should begin at the bottom of the ladder and by its own efforts and mental acumen start in search of truth
Criticism of Cubberley's Doctrine

just as if all previous efforts at this task had resulted in complete failure. Cubberley would seem to want the modern age to declare bankruptcy and start anew to solve all human problems. This is, to say the very least, a very unreasonable attitude unless one contends that our problems are entirely new and have never been solved. This is not true because human nature has not changed and if we look back we find that centuries ago men grappled with the same problems that confront us. Solutions that were given then may still be the best ones, the only true ones. While the past can show us much that is right, it can also show us mistakes that have been made and which we should avoid. Human history is largely a history of trial and error. The present should understand the past both to take from it what is good and to avoid what is wrong. The fool learns by his own mistakes, the wise man learns by the mistakes of others. From the past we can learn much: what is erroneous and doomed to failure, what is right and likely to succeed. Of course, each generation is faced with new problems to be solved but many of these can be solved more easily in the light of experience of the past, and in the light of principles enunciated by the great intelligences of foregoing centuries. If the knowledge accumulated in the past is of no value, then each generation ought to burn the books of the preceding generations instead of filling libraries with them.
Knowledge, therefore, is an important objective of education and specifically knowledge of fact and knowledge of the past which Cubberley rejects. Knowledge is essential for the perfection of the intellectual being that man is; not only utilitarian knowledge, but abstract and speculative knowledge is important for social welfare.

This knowledge is gained not only through social conditioning, or by introducing the educand into social problems of community state and nation. Before the educand is introduced to these problems he should be acquire sufficient knowledge so that he may successfully grapple with them. In other words, knowledge should come first, and then action, because action must depend on knowledge, not vice versa. The very nature of knowledge, the possession of truth, adequant intellectus cum re, is some spiritual. Knowledge is obtained by an immanent action of the intellect, not formally by social activity or any other external activity. And truth, the object of this immanent action is eternal, in no way dependent on what anyone does. It can be acquired without any engaging in social life. Society, that is healthy, is based on truth, and social problems depend on truth for correct solutions. One does not learn rational psychology, or ethics, or sociology or metaphysics by tackling social problems. Only after the principles that govern man as an individual and as a social being have been mastered can we
hope to solve social problems with assurance of finding the right solutions.

The social conditioning which Cubberley, like Dewey, proposes may be useful to make the educand social minded, and to adapt him to his social environment. It cannot take the place of instruction and the mental activity which lead to the knowledge which man as man needs for his own personal perfection. And in the field of action, man must be governed by his highest faculty the intellect. The intellect, in turn, to govern man rightly must be in possession of truth, which is, as already stated independent of any social environment.

The second change which education tries to achieve is, as mentioned above, the change from capacities to abilities. The abilities connected with the three R's have already been dealt with. There are a host of other abilities which distinguish the educated person from the uneducated. In Thomistic philosophy abilities would be given the name of habits or virtues. One of these, the habit and art of logic, has been referred to. This habit makes a person able to reason correctly, certainly a valuable asset to any person. There are a number of habits of science, habits which enable us to draw conclusions with ease in various fields of learning, one mental habit for mathematics, another for positive sciences, another for natural philosophy. Over and above the habits of science is the habit of wisdom pertaining to the study of
being and absolutely ultimate causes. It enables us to penetrate to those things which are at the core of every being as being. It enables us to penetrate and to embrace all things and generates the most universal knowledge possible.

These habits are a worthy objective of education because they perfect man in his highest faculty, the intellect. They perfect it because they make it possible for man to arrive at truth. They are needed because of itself the intellect is not determined, for instance to reason logically, to draw conclusions from principles in the various sciences, or to consider things in their most universal character of being. In general we can say that wherever a faculty is not determined to proceed according to a certain mode of action there is a need for an ability, a habit. In the moral order prudence is needed so that man may act according to reason; justice is needed so that we may give each his due consistently; temperance is needed to curb the inclination to overdo things and overindulge in pleasures of the body; fortitude is needed to make us firm when difficulties threaten us. In short, wherever man does not by nature act well according to his nature and end, there a virtue is needed to perfect him in order that he may consistently act well.

That is the purpose of virtues and, therefore, we see that any ability or habit or virtue, whatever we wish to call it, is a good thing and a worthy objective of education.

What moral virtues Cubberley would be in favor of cultivating, if any, is uncertain. He refers to obedience as a negative virtue and undesirable. How he expects to achieve welfare of the state without obedience to lawful authority is an enigma. It cannot be done. The one ability that he refers to as an objective is the "ability to think".

We are entirely in accord with him and consider it an essential of the educated person: to think logically, to reason out solutions, to consider things in their true character. But we can hardly agree with him in asking for ability to think without knowledge. Specifically he asks for the ability to think over civic questions but rejects the knowledge of civics. How can anyone think over civic questions without knowing civics? Unless one knows something about civics he has nothing to think about nor anything to guide his thought. First the student must know the essentials of civics in a democratic nation. Without that knowledge he may come to solutions contrary to the essential rules of civics. More will be said later about the necessary union between the acquisition of knowledge and developing abilities.

A practical question demands consideration here. While it remains true that possession of truth is superior in itself to the pursuit of truth or the ability to pursue truth, and further that abilities are not developed independent of acquiring truth, the question remains as to where the school should place the emphasis. Should it place the emphasis primarily on communicating knowledge or truths, or should it rather aim at developing the mind for the logical pursuit of knowledge? The answer to this is that the more important thing is to develop the mind to be able to attain truths by its own efforts. The reason for this is that thus the mind will more surely attain truth. In all attainment of knowledge, the intellect of the educand or learner is the principal agent or cause, the teacher only an external agent. Therefore, the intellect must be developed in such a way that by its own ability it can form correct conclusions, formulate the truth for itself and arrive at certitude. While the school aims at this ability it may never forget the primacy of possession of truth over the quest unless it wants to become guilty of what Von Hildebrand called a formalistic blindness, "a form of metaphysical libertinism as in that terrible and notorious utterance of Lessing which places the endless search for truth above the possession of truth".

Criticism of Cubberley's Doctrine

In reference to this question Maritain explains that the purpose of education is not to make the youth a truly wise man but to equip and prepare his mind so that he will be able to advance toward wisdom in his manhood. This is correct and forms a good rule of action if we remember that it is impossible to equip and prepare the mind to advance toward wisdom without communicating a considerable amount of knowledge.

The third change that education must produce is the change from impulses to ideals. An ideal is a standard of perfection, or beauty, or excellence, according to Webster. Ideals may be of two kinds. Either they are standards of personal action by which a person governs his life, and thus represents something that a person proposes to attain. Thus a boy may have as his ideal to become a great football player. Or ideals may be standards of perfection which a person does not hope to achieve himself. Thus a man may form his ideal of a good mother although evidently he does not intend to be a good mother. The more important ideals are the personal ideals, ideals of personal conduct, by which a person guides himself and determines certain goals for his own perfection. In itself any ideal is intellectual in nature and depends on knowledge. No one can form a correct ideal of a good mother.

unless he knows what the duties and functions of motherhood are. No one can form a correct ideal for himself, for instance, the ideal of a good Christian, unless he knows what a good Christian is. But a personal ideal has something more. It involves a purpose and a will to realize in himself the idea that he has formed, for instance, the will to be a good Christian. Because of this disposition of the will ideals are closely connected with moral and intellectual virtues. They are not the virtues themselves but will lead to producing and developing virtues. The young man who forms the personal ideal of a just man or a charitable man will, by being loyal to that ideal, become a just or charitable man.

Ideals are important to make us act according to our human nature. With the ideal of being a good logician, a good mathematician, a good philosopher, a wise man, the student will more surely and more consistently exert himself to achieve these ideals in himself in the interest of his own intellectual perfection. Especially in the moral field are ideals important in order to generate moral virtues. The person who has only knowledge and intellectual ability may be a complete failure. His knowledge and ability may be a detriment to himself and society unless he also has the proper ideals. The expert orator or writer without proper moral ideals may use his knowledge and skill to pervert minds and undermine lawful authority. The expert accountant without
Criticism of Cubberley's Doctrine

An ideal of justice may use his skill to embezzle his employer.

Even ideals that we do not hope to achieve ourselves are important so that we may have a correct outlook on the better things of life and be able to enjoy them. We can and should have an ideal of good music and literature so we can enjoy them, although we may have no intention or opportunity to be musicians or writers. In general the impersonal ideals help us to appreciate the beautiful and good things of civilization and are therefore a worthy objective of education.

Cubberley recognized the need for ideals, but the few that he mentions are extremely limited, principally referring to the social realm. He speaks of better ideals for life and service, a spirit of service and a sense of responsibility. These are good and desirable ideals. The "ideal for better life" could be a broad and all inclusive ideal but because of his disinterest in personal perfection, it must be understood as something orientated toward social efficiency and welfare of the state.

Thus far we have spoken about objectives in education in the purely natural order. We have not yet considered the final aim of education. It is on this point that the big cleavage between Cubberley's thought and Catholic thought appears. Cubberley says the objective of education is preparation for life in this world; Catholics say the objective
is preparation for life hereafter. Because Cubberley has discarded preparation for life hereafter, he has excluded religion from the public school. Catholics, because they uphold this aim, insist on the necessity of religious instruction and religious moral training in all schools, public or private. Cubberley orientates education to efficient membership in the state; Catholics orientate it to worthy membership in the Kingdom of God. This is a big difference between Catholic doctrine and Cubberley's doctrine. His final aim is entirely temporal and social; the Catholic aim, while not discarding his aim as worthless, adds to it an aim that is eternal in character.

To prove that education has a purpose beyond the temporal we have stepped out of the realm of purely natural knowledge and into the realm of revealed truth. Revelation is an historical fact which any unbiased person can ascertain for himself. It will tell him that man has a purpose beyond this mortal life and that his mortal life should be a preparation for an eternal life of happiness. Anyone who does not make it such will fail to attain the purpose of his existence, the end for which God has created him.

God has revealed to us that our present condition is not a purely natural one. Human nature fell from its original state but was repaired and elevated and given a new supernatural status. To live according to this elevated status
purely natural forces are insufficient. And therefore, purely natural education, purely natural knowledge, abilities and ideals are insufficient. We stand in need of supernatural knowledge, that is, revealed knowledge; we need supernatural abilities and supernatural ideals. Since these are beyond the reach of our natural strength, God has revealed all we have to know and all we have to do in order to make them our own. He Himself gives us the supernatural abilities, the infused virtues; He shows us the ideals that we are to follow and at every step lends His helping hand of grace. The virtues which He willingly gives us must, however, be nursed along partly by our own efforts. Hence, we see the need of religious instruction and religious moral training. Instruction is needed that we may have the knowledge about our actual status, our end, the means granted us to achieve this end. Religious moral training is needed that we may act in such a way that we may be found worthy to attain that end, the eternal reward promised us, if we live the life that was outlined for us by God. That life is the Christian life.

Christian education does not presume to achieve this by itself. It knows that it must depend on Divine grace.

Hence Pius XI says:

The proper and immediate end of Christian education is to cooperate with Divine grace in forming the true and perfect Christian, that is to form Christ Himself in those regenerated by Baptism... 8

The Pope goes on to explain who is the true Christian:

... the true Christian, product of Christian education,
is the supernatural man who thinks, judges and acts constantly and consistently in accordance with right reason illuminated by the supernatural light of the example and teaching of Christ 9.

By analyzing this quotation we find in it the three things that we ask education to produce. The teachings of Christ give us the required knowledge. The word reason also infers knowledge. Constancy and consistency in thought and action presuppose abilities, that is, virtues. The examples of Christ give us the highest ideals for governing our lives.

All this goes to show that the school's real worth and adequate reward, to use Cubberley's words, does not lie in social efficiency, as he maintains, but rather in forming the true Christian. Only partly does its worth lie in social efficiency. Likewise, apparent now is Cubberley's error in saying that the school should advance the welfare of the state rather than that of the Church. And finally it shows that he has inverted the right order in placing preparation for life here in place of preparation for life hereafter. His objectives are not entirely wrong but he has exaggerated them and replaced them for more noble objectives which he rejects. Christian education has long ago adopted all the objectives that Cubberley proposed. They have been emphasized by the Church. But they have not been over-emphasized. Others that

9 Ibid.
he rejected properly received greater emphasis.

Having shown what is good and what is false in Cubberley's objectives, one more question remains to be answered. Can Cubberley logically hope to achieve his aims of education, social efficiency and state welfare, and at the same time eject religion from the schools?
The answer to this question is definitely negative. Here again we have the authority of the Holy See to fall back on.

For it is true, as Leo XIII has wisely pointed out, that without proper religious and moral instruction "every form of intellectual culture will be injurious; for young people not accustomed to respect God, will be unable to bear the restraint of a virtuous life, and not having learned to deny themselves anything, they will easily be incited to disturb the public order."

The reason for this is quite simple. Education, no matter how good, if it does not include religious and moral training, is not fully adapted and adequate for human nature weakened by Original Sin. Such education is at best naturalistic and rationalistic, that is, governed by what pure reason dictates. But reason alone cannot tell us our true status. It cannot arrive at the truth of Original Sin. Not to take this into account dooms education to failure. Such education must rely on the sole forces of nature. And "every method of education founded wholly or in part on the denial or forgetfulness of Original Sin and of grace, and

---

10 Pius XI, Christian Education of Youth, 7-9.
relying on the sole powers of nature, is unsound" 11. A purely natural morality is not an adequate morality. Morality based only on reason does not hold sufficient incentives to virtuous and truly socially efficient living. In his Farewell Address, George Washington already sounded the warning signal against this presumption.

And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience alike both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail to the exclusion of religious principle 12.

Without religion, therefore, we cannot expect to have law-abiding citizens, and citizens who do not obey the law certainly cannot be called socially efficient. They will harm rather than advance the welfare of the state.

Furthermore, neglect of religion inevitably leads to the fading of knowledge of God. To allow the recognition of God to fade is disastrous to democracy. Democracy is based on the theory of natural, inalienable rights which man has received from God. If there is no God, there are no inalienable rights. Parsons points out that adherence to or rejection of God-given rights is the touchstone by which we can tell whether a person adheres to or rejects democracy. At the basis of all talk about democracy and at the root of the

11 Ibid., 20.  
philosophy of democracy lies the truth of the existence of God, Creator of all, Author of man's rights. Hence Parsons writes:

It is not surprising, therefore, that the foundation sentence of the American political system should be a religious affirmation, an act of faith: "We hold these truths to be self-evident; that men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain Inalienable Rights; and that among these rights are Life, Liberty, and Pursuit of Happiness". That is the foundation sentence and it is also a test sentence. By asking a modern man concerning his adherence to it, we can judge if he is any longer an adherent of the American political system, for that system is built on it as on a first principle.

By ejecting religion from the public school, Cubberley is swelling the ranks of millions of Americans who never think about God as the author of our inalienable rights. The products of the irreligious public schools will know little about the basic truths of democracy and cannot defend it as preferable to any other political system, Communism, Nazism or Fascism.

We may well wonder about the future of our democratic nation in which by far the larger percentage of children attend the public schools and receive no religious training. Our supposedly intellectual elite of political and social theorists are a glaring example of the result of irreligious

---

13 Wilfrid Parsons, op. cit., p. 3.
education. Parsons estimates that ninety percent of them agree that the foundation sentence of the Constitution "is not true today, nor was true in George Washington's day"; that for those who made the American Revolution it was just "good propaganda"; and of course not based on reality 15.

By outlawing religion, therefore, Cubberley has rejected the best force, the only force, that can in the long run safeguard the welfare of the American state.

As already mentioned earlier, we do not reject any of the social objectives that Cubberley proposes to attain by education. In fact nowhere are they better exemplified than in the informed and virtuous Catholic. We say informed because we here refer to the citizen who takes an active part or wants to take an active part in social and national affairs. We are not speaking of those who have retired from all worldly affairs to consecrate themselves to God. They have probably done more for society by appeasing the anger of God and by calling down His blessings than all other men together. We are speaking about the active citizen. In him, personal virtue and holiness though of supreme value, is not sufficient. He should be an informed citizen. Besides knowing the basic doctrines of democracy, he must understand the ways of democracy, the needs of his community and nation

15 Parsons, Wilfrid, op. cit. 4.
so he can play his part. He needs civic training. There is need of more emphasis on this in our Catholic schools. They have often not fulfilled their duty. In a criticism of the Catholic school in this regard Father Goebel gives a fair idea of what is required.

A responsible citizen is not one who pays mere lip service to his community. No, he is one who answers the roll call of a law abiding citizen. He takes an interest in community projects. He seeks to understand the social structure and social processes. Are we educating the future citizen in our democracy to act thus? Frankly, there is little evidence that we are. We attach most of our training in citizenship to the age-worn axiom that "a good Catholic must be a good citizen". We do not translate the objectives of Catholic training into civic activities. Either we presume too much or we lack woefully interpretive powers 16.

Catholic educators have the duty to give citizenship training. If they fail to do this they expose themselves to the attacks of public school devotees and create the false impression that the Catholic school is not interested in active citizenship. Not only must children be taught civics, but, as Cubberley demands, they must be trained to think over civic problems. Likewise, they need training in practical civic activities if we want them to take an active part in community and national affairs. This is paramount if our hope of installing Catholic leaders in high positions of government is to be realized. The country needs such leadership. To

obtain such leadership we also need an educated and virtuous electorate. Father Cunningham has a few very good paragraphs on this matter. He brings out that the selection of leaders, training them in knowledge, ideals and abilities, and their election is all a matter of education. Election of good leaders, who will work for the best individual and social interests, is simply a question of educating the general public to recognize and want such men at the helm of the state. To obtain upright intelligent leadership, we first need an intelligent upright electorate who knows what is amiss, has the will to set it aright, and has sufficient civic training to proceed in true democratic fashion to apply the remedy by electing good leaders and then following their lead. A competent, bold, honest, dynamic leadership, an informed, bold, honest, dynamic citizenry - these are objectives of Catholic education.

Leo XIII expressly states that in general it is "fitting and salutary that Catholics ... give their attention to national politics". He continues to explain that it would be wrong to have no concern for the common good. This is all the more true, he says, because Catholics profess doctrines which teach them to be upright and faithful. While if they abstain from

18 Leo XIII, Christian Constitution of States, 446.
The reason for all of Cubberley's errors and exaggerations in the realm of objectives can be logically traced to his losing sight of the individual, of man. The nature of man and the nature of man in his actual fallen but elevated status is the only safe guide for education. When Cubberley lost sight of it, he had to replace it by something else. His choice fell on society. He decided, therefore, that education must make us socially efficient to advance the welfare of society, of the state.

B - True Conception of Education

If anyone accepts the general idea developed in the preceding paragraph, that is, that education strives to achieve three changes in the individual resulting in knowledge, abilities and ideals, then evidently, the process of education must take into account the special character of each of the three. While the three are interdependent, they are not identical with each other. In the process of acquisition all three may be developed by one activity of teacher but may depend on different mental activity of the pupil. A teacher instructing the pupils may communicate knowledge, doing it in such a way as to make the pupil think, make him use his reasoning power, thus developing the ability to think and at the same time the content of the instruction may be such that the pupil forms an ideal for himself. Such a case
could easily be when a teacher is explaining a lesson in Catechism, let us say a lesson on the virtue of charity toward our fellow-men. In such a lesson the teacher may well and should have all three purposes in mind. In the student there will be not only one activity provided the lesson succeeds in its threefold purpose. He will perform a threefold operation. The first is grasping, understanding what the teacher is saying. Secondly he follows the reasoning of the teacher and by that very fact reasons, thus developing his ability to think. Thirdly, upon recognizing or appreciating, let us say the good and beautiful in the virtue of charity, he will adopt the practice of that virtue as an ideal to be pursued. This last act is an act of the will.

Even in arithmetic lessons the three changes might take place: knowledge of a certain process, ability to execute this and the ideal of handling such problems with accuracy and rapidity. The ideal is, of course, of a much inferior kind, but an ideal it is. The same might occur in a simple grammar lesson, a reading lesson, a language class, a lesson in civics, etc.

It is important to realize that the three objectives do not always materialize. In some cases perhaps only one is achieved, in others two, and it may even be that the teacher’s efforts are entirely wasted. When purely factual knowledge is given to the pupil, it is likely to produce no knowledge in the student unless it is such as to arouse the will to
imitate, for instance, noble, heroic actions. Knowledge of such actions has the tendency to arouse the will and hence to help the formation of ideals. But this does not necessarily follow. This is an important point. No teacher can strictly speaking form the ideals of a student. The student does this through his own activity, through the activity of his free will on which no teacher can exercise any direct influence. The teacher can suggest ideals, examples of noble, praiseworthy conduct, of devotion to duty, of kindliness, of unselfishness; he can exemplify such conduct by his own life. He cannot implant such ideals in the student, like he can transfer his own knowledge to the mind of the student. No amount of instructing and no amount of knowledge will necessarily result in ideals. The world has known many clever learned men who did not have the right ideals, but were governed in their actions by selfish motives, by the inborn impulses for power, riches or pleasures. They may have had great knowledge and abilities, but they lacked proper ideals. This may have been the fault of their teachers but it is quite possible that it was not. The greatest teacher who ever lived, Our Lord, was not successful in instilling the proper ideals in one of His pupils, the traitor Judas. He received the same education as the other Apostles, but he did not respond to it as they did.

This all goes to prove the fallacy of the knowledge
conception of education. Knowledge in itself does not lead to virtue; by itself it does not produce good men, men with lofty ideals, or even ordinary mediocre ideals. Cubberley is perfectly right in rejecting this conception of education. We do not mean to say that it is wrong in its entirety and totality. Its central idea, however, is false, that is, the idea that knowledge is synonymous with virtue or of itself leads to virtue.

Not only is it faulty in this respect, but also because it fails to recognize the need of developing abilities. In some studies knowledge and ability go almost hand in hand. For instance, in arithmetic, the knowledge of numbers and of the processes of addition, subtraction, etc., necessarily gives the student the ability to add, subtract, etc. If a pupil has learned the multiplication tables well, and he is asked what three times five is, he certainly will give the correct answer. In language study, the ability to use what is learned does not follow so closely. A pupil may know the rules of grammar very well, still not put them to use when writing or speaking. To use those rules practice is needed. Too often, not so much today, teachers have insisted on memorized knowledge without giving children sufficient chance to use that knowledge in speaking or writing. As Cubberley pointed out, they have been too addicted to memorization, without enough expression to make that which was learned
something living. Unless the child is made to express himself in the correct idiom, he does not develop the ability to express himself correctly and moreover, will probably lose interest in the mere memory work. Cubberley is right in saying that there was too much insistence on memory, on formal grammar and on arithmetic and in general on the tool subjects. Teachers have slavishly followed their textbooks in arithmetic, problem after problem, often the driest problems that could be found, instead of problems relating to out-of-school life of the adult. Ability to read well has been insisted on often without reference to content and without ever opening the vistas of delightful and instructive literature in biography, history, travelogs, of which there is an abundance for almost all school levels. Of course, the tool subjects are necessary but they are not best imparted by mere instruction and memory work. The child must be made to do something with these tools. As Father Kane says:

> Instruction alone, above all to the immature, is a dead thing. Knowledge pumped into the mind of the student tends to disappear like a Western creek in the sands, unless the student does something with it. It is not what happens to a man that educates him, but what he does with what happens to him. To supply Tommy with knowledge of facts, laws, truths, is not to educate him. His education begins only when the teacher succeeds in getting Tommy to exert himself to use what is supplied to him, and guidos him in that use 20.

Let no one, however, think that instruction is not necessary. It is definitely indispensable and plays an important role in education. To instruct is the first function of the teacher in order to communicate knowledge to the student and this is especially true in reference to the tool subjects. But instruction must be followed by leading the student to use his knowledge and to guide him in that use. Memory work is necessary, memorizing rules and definitions is indispensable so that the students may know why one expression is right, another wrong. History and geography study require chiefly instructing on the part of the teacher or reading by the student and remembering on the part of the student.

So not all the practices of the knowledge conception can be dispensed with. Nor does Cubberley state or imply this. As we have seen he asks for instruction where instruction is needed. The practical question, of course, where is instruction needed and how much is needed. No very definite answer can be given. The amount of instruction needed varies with subjects taught and with student intelligence and previous learning or experience. It is to be feared that in Cubberley's program, extremely rich in expression or activity subjects, not enough time would be given to instruction in the traditional subjects, especially the tool subjects. The school may never forget that anything which endangers thorough familiar-
ity with the tools of education, endangers education itself. In the preceding section examples of deficiencies in knowledge and skill with these tools were given. Another example might be cited in reference to the ability to read, that is, ability to read with understanding. A frequent complaint is heard today, namely, that students do not grasp what they are reading, although they seem to read words and sentences with ease and rapidity. Certainly this ease and speed is of little avail. There is something wrong with their training in reading. It is a lack of knowledge of the exact meaning of words. In order that the students receive this knowledge, either the teacher must instruct them, or they must be familiar with a dictionary. Rather both are needed because the teacher cannot be expected to give the definition of every new word that students meet in their readings, or hear used by others. Especially in regard to words heard, does the difficulty arise when the dictionary must be consulted. Since many children no longer are taught the alphabet, they are as helpless as the student who was looking for a name in the telephone directory. They do not know where to look for the initial letter. The practice of not teaching the alphabet has also brought with it a noticeable decrease in the ability to spell correctly.

Perhaps the day is not far off when modern-method-minded teachers will realize that there was much good in the
older methods. Progressives have already acknowledged their mistake in attempting to teach grammar incidentally, that is, by simply placing in the hands of the students literature in which grammar rules are correctly applied, without making the student learn those rules. Perhaps they will soon realize that what Cubberley refers to as "wasting time on tool subjects" was not so great a waste of time, rather to a large extent time well-used. The practices of the advocates of the knowledge conception may yet be recognized as having greater educational value than many of the newer practices of modern schools.

If, as Cubberley suggests, the knowledge conception considered the mind as a container to be filled with a certain amount of material, then certainly their conception of the mind was false as also their conception of knowledge. The mind, in its restricted sense, that is, the intellect is a spiritual faculty which spiritualizes the things that it receives, and makes them one with itself. It receives within itself the object known, and it is precisely by receiving within itself the objects known, that the intellect finds its perfection. Because in the act of knowing there is this vital operation of the intellect receiving and spiritualizing the object, any comparing of the intellect to a container to be filled is entirely false. The intellect is no fuller when it knows what is contained in ten books, that when it knows
what is on one page of a book. No number of finite objects or truths can exhaust its capacity. Only one object, the Infinite Being and Infinite Truth, compassing within Himself all that is, can exhaust the capacity of the human intellect. Because the intellect spiritualizes or intentionalizes what it knows, any conception of it as a container is false.

To resume now, it is evident that we must reject the central idea of the knowledge conception, that is, that knowledge is synonymous to virtue, and the idea of the mind as a container. Still we insist on considerable instruction, on memorization and a thorough knowledge and ability in the tool subjects: reading, writing, reckoning.

The second conception of education which Cubberley rejects is the mental discipline conception. Considered from the point of view of the objectives of education, a conception of the process of education as merely a process of disciplining the mind is faulty. Mental discipline or mental ability as we have seen, has value only insofar as it leads to knowledge, and, we may add, to action based on knowledge. Further, mental discipline does not of itself produce correct ideals. However, discipline of the mind is necessary as explained in the section on the objectives of education.

A crucial question in regard to this conception is whether certain subjects have any special advantage over other subjects to train the mind and to give it some special permanent
discipline or habit by means of drill and exercise in those subjects. The subject most often referred to in this connection is mathematics. It was long thought and is still thought by not a few today, that mathematics was especially adapted to develop a habit of precision and train the mind to make rigorous logical deductions, and that no other subject could replace mathematics. It is to be noticed that no study is available to date to bear out this opinion. Studies that have been made by comparing two groups of students, one of which had mathematics, the other had not, show no sufficient difference to place any special faith in mathematics as if it developed something in the students which could not be done otherwise. Cubberley has mentioned nothing detailed in reference to this question. His is a general rejection of the mental discipline theory. Those who oppose the mental discipline theory generally contend that precision and clarity can be developed as well with other subjects.

To dismiss the matter with the results of the experiments that have been reported would be very easy, but would hardly do justice to the advocates of mental discipline. That precision in thought can be developed by study of literature or history is quite possible, provided the teacher lays stress on following closely the reasoning of the writer, and the

21 Cf. J.S. Mursell, Educational Psychology, 233 sqq.
conclusion of the historian to see whether they are proceeding logically from an effect to a sufficient cause, or whether their inductions are made only after sufficient enumeration of data. Perhaps literature does not always lend itself to such a method, but certainly the sciences afford ample occasion to draw attention to deductions and inductions. Moreover, in the sciences precision is always at a premium. But what a subject may lack in itself, can often be made up by the manner of approach and method of study. That this is possible we will not deny, but the fact still remains that mathematics lends itself naturally to precision and accuracy and to training in logical reasoning. They are part and parcel of mathematics. In mathematics there is no room for guess work or loose reasoning or approximation. That part of mathematics which is especially replete with logical reasoning is geometry. But all branches of mathematics proceed with accuracy. No one says two times two is about four, or six times eight if about forty-eight. Every process in mathematics is characterized by precision, accuracy and necessary conclusions. To maintain that just any subject has the same adaptability to develop a habit of precision and vigorous reason, does not seem to agree with the psychology of habits. A habit is formed and developed by the activity of a faculty, not just any activity but an activity or action which has a specific object, provided of course the faculty is susceptible to acquiring a habit.
Not all faculties are susceptible to acquiring a habit but only those which have some indifference toward their object. Thus the will is indifferent toward choosing what is just or unjust. The virtue of justice removes this indifference in a varying degree according to the varying degree of the perfection of the virtue. The irascible sense appetite is indifferent toward the good-but-difficult-to-obtain. The virtue of fortitude removes this indifference and gives the appetite a disposition, not easily removed, to pursue what is good although that entails sacrifice or toil or danger. On the other hand, the eye or ear does not acquire a habit and needs no habit, because it is already determined toward its object which is color or sound respectively.

Now, the habit or virtue of justice is acquired not by acts of temperance or acts of fortitude but by just acts. Similarly fortitude is acquired not by an act of justice but by an act involving the pursuit of what is good but arduous.

Coming now to habits of the intellect, we find that several can be named: the habit of speculative principles "per se nota" which St. Thomas calls "intellectus" 22; synderesis, which is a natural habit, "habitus quidam naturalis principiorum operabilitum" 23, that is, a habit by which we grasp the first principles

---

22 Sum. Theol., I-II, 57, 2.
of action, namely: that good is to be done, evil is to be avoided. Both these habits are acquired by a single act of the intelligence in their respective fields. Other habits are acquired by a repetition of actions. Such are: the habit and art of logic, which facilitates correct of logical reasoning; the habit of science which is acquired by making deductions and inductions and, once acquired, facilitates the process of drawing conclusions. It is a habit of the "ratio inferior" which applies itself to natural and temporal phenomena or things \(^{24}\) as distinguished from the study of "being as such" and the eternal truths about being, irrespective of the various kinds of being that may exist. Although St. Thomas speaks in general of the habit of sciences, the habit of drawing conclusions from principles, he also says that there are various habits of science corresponding to the various genii of knowable things \(^{25}\). On the other hand there is a third acquired habit, the habit of wisdom, which is only one \(^{26}\). There can be only one habit of wisdom because it considers absolutely highest causes, enabling the intellect to judge about all things, to order all things. Such a judgment, a perfect and universal judgment, can be had only by reference to first causes, in contra-distinction to ultimate causes in a certain

\(^{24}\) Cf. Ibid., I, 79, 9.
\(^{25}\) Cf. Sum. Theol., I-II, q. 57, a. 2.
\(^{26}\) Cf. Ibid.
genus of knowable things whose consideration pertains to the habit of science 27. The habit of wisdom pertains to the "ratio superior" 28. It facilitates our penetration to the eternal realities of being itself; it judges both the principles and conclusions of the sciences 29. It gives an overall perspective of all sciences or fields of knowledge and thus shows the essential unity of all fields of learning. We are of course speaking of natural acquired wisdom as distinguished from supernatural wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost. This habit of natural wisdom is developed in the study of metaphysics, the study of being as such, of first causes, and properties of being.

Another intellectual habit or virtue, but in the practical order, is prudence, which is defined by the "webster dictionary as "the ability to regulate and discipline oneself through the exercise of the reason". In Latin it is called "recta ratio agibilium", that is correct reasoning about actions. It facilitates acting in accord with reason; it makes us weigh the reasons, pro and con, concerning any action, to think before we act; to repress impulsive actions.

27 Cf. Ibid. - As examples of various genii of knowable things, "genera cognoscibilium", we have the things studied by positive sciences, the things studied in geometry, the things studied in natural philosophy.
It extends itself to each and every human action whether intellectual or physical, whether strictly private or public. It opposes itself to foolish, indiscreet, rash or impulsive action.

That such intellectual virtues as we have described here actually exist or can exist in man is hardly questionable. S. Thomas explains their necessity by the fact that man can act in various ways regarding the objects of these virtues. To remove this indifference to think logically or illogically, to draw conclusions or not to draw conclusions, to regard all things in the light of first causes or not to do so, to act reasonably or impulsively, these virtues are required. Furthermore, it is quite evident that some persons habitually think logically, that others do not, and that by training in logical thinking many who did not think logically develop the habit of doing so. The same is true of the other habits or virtues. As S. Thomas points out, an intellectual habit which is not infused, is acquired by human effort. In every day life, the instances of prudent and imprudent actions are perhaps most apparent. And we can also readily observe the change in individuals from imprudence to prudence.

Let us return now to the question of whether one subject is as well adapted to developing a certain habit or

---

31 Sum. Theol., I-II, 45, 1.
virtue. This is really a very simple question to answer without going into detail. A habit or virtue is acquired by acts which correspond to that habit, unless we speak of infused virtues which we are not considering here. One acquires the habit of logic by thinking logically. One acquires a habit of science by drawing conclusions in a certain field of knowledge. And so on for other habits. Hence, it may be said that a subject, through whose study actions conforming to a certain habit are most frequently elicited, is better adapted to produce that habit, than another subject which gives only few occasions to elicit such acts. In practice it remains to be seen which subjects or which training makes an individual perform actions that correspond to the habits that are to be developed. In one case, at least, that case of the habit of wisdom, only one subject has the aptitude to produce and develop it, that is metaphysics.

The next crucial question which presents itself in respect to habits or virtues is the question of transfer. That is, do habits developed by study in one field or by exercise under certain conditions help us in solution of problems in another field of learning or in regulating our actions in new situations? To go into detail and to

32 Reference is here made principally to habits or virtues of the practical order.
determine which habits facilitate the study of a subject different from the one by whose study a habit was developed, would unduly lengthen this study and proceed beyond its scope. We have shown that there are intellectual habits and earlier we have also cited examples of moral virtues. It is enough for us to show now whether some of these habits have a transfer value. Let us take first the habit and art of logic. Of its very nature it extends itself to all thinking. It does not discriminate between one field of knowledge and another. The person who possesses it does not think logically when studying psychology and illogically when studying sociology or metaphysics or geometry. A propos here is the mention of a fact that has been proved by observation. Students who have studied mathematics show a greater facility to learn logic than those who have not had mathematics. To take another instance of a habit that is not restricted to one field, we have the virtue of prudence. The prudent man, one who really possesses this virtue to a fair degree of perfection, is inclined to act prudently at all times. All his actions are controlled by right reasoning. Objectively he may act imprudently in as much as his knowledge or reasoning is deficient. But anyone who can be said to act according to the best of his knowledge and reasoning ability, is considered a prudent man. It makes no difference under what conditions or in which situations a person acquires the habit of
prudence. When a new situation arises, the prudent man will act prudently. The very nature of prudence is such that it extends itself to all situations. Hence we already have two very definite cases of transfer value, which Dr. Cubberley might have done well to consider.

There is yet another reason about which he and other opponents of mental discipline and transfer have not thought. This is the necessary connection of moral virtues. They are so closely related that by developing one virtue the person is also preparing himself for the exercise of the other moral virtues. As S. Thomas says by developing one moral virtue to a fair degree of perfection the other moral virtues also exist in "potentia proxima" so that as soon as an occasion demanding their exercise arises, they immediately come into existence. In the case of acquired virtues, they do not actually exist until they are produced by action in conformity to them, but they exist in preparation in as much as a person is predisposed to elicit acts which conform to them.

Here we would seem to have as clear a case of transfer value from one kind of training to entirely new

33 "... potest aliquis habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habitus harum virtutum habeat actu, loquendo de virtutibus acquisitis; sed tamen, acquisitis alii virtutibus, habet istas virtutes in potentia propinqua. Sum. Theol., I-II, 65, 1."
situations which had never been met before. We do not presume to have shown that every kind of training has transfer value. At the same time we are equally certain that it is wrong to discard the whole theory of mental discipline and transfer of training. The question needs further study to determine in detail where transfer takes place and where it does not. Although such a study has not been made, it is evident that Cubberley's stand is false.

Only some of the habits and virtues that man can acquire have been mentioned. There is still a larger number of habits, virtues and arts all of which are a part of mental discipline. The important point here is that they are all habits, fairly permanent acquisitions which perfect man's faculties. Whether they be speculative intellectual habits or practical intellectual habits, whether moral virtues or liberal arts or fine arts, they are all qualities of the various faculties or, in educational parlance, they are disciplines of the powers of the mind, they are mental discipline. Those that are moral virtues dispose us to action which is morally right; the other habits, speculative habits and arts do not dispose us for action, they do not give us a propensity to act, but they make our faculties function well when we choose to act 34. Thus a person may be a great artist

34 "Sicut habitus speculativi, sic et ars, rationem virtutis eteunus tantum habet, quatenus facultatem bene operandi praestat; non autem quasi potentis seu habitu bene uti faciat". Sum. Theol. I-II, 57, 3. Cf. also I-II, 57, 1.
in the field of music or literary composition; he may possess these arts perfectly and still rarely exercise them because of laziness or pursuit of worldly pleasures or he may exercise his arts frequently but only for personal gain for pecuniary purposes so that he can enjoy the pleasures of this world to the detriment of his soul. Speculative intellectual habits and arts do not, therefore, incline a person to make good use of his faculties; for this something else is needed, that is, moral virtues. When these also are present to guide man in the use of his other habits then we have the perfectly disciplined man. That is to say, we would have, if man were living in a purely natural state. Since his state is actually an elevated state, religious knowledge and infused virtues are needed also, because purely natural virtues are inadequate as has been shown in the previous section.

Now we might ask whether the perfectly disciplined man is also an educated man. To a very large degree he is. The reason for this is that to acquire the habits, the discipline, of which we have been speaking, a person must go through the triple change that education tries to effect. The habits or disciplines are themselves the abilities at which education aims. The moral virtues, while being essentially abilities, include also ideals. No one can

have the virtue of justice, without at the same time having just actions as ideals; and so for the other moral virtues. All acquired virtues have right reason as their rule of action, and therefore cannot be acquired and developed without knowledge of the virtues and their ends. Knowledge necessarily enters into the acquisition of a virtue unless we speak of infused virtues which may be had without knowledge of them or of the acts that conform to them.

Knowledge likewise enters into the acquisition of speculative habits and practical intellectual habits. The habit of wisdom is acquired precisely by studying, by learning metaphysics. A habit of science is acquired by learning the particular field of knowledge to which the habit belongs. And so on with the other habits or arts. All habits presuppose knowledge. They are acquired simultaneously and to separate them is impossible. This goes to show that the well-disciplined person is at once an educated person, one in whom the three changes from ignorance to knowledge, from capacity to ability, from impulses to ideals have taken place. So that considering education as the acquisition of a person, education is mental discipline.

Considering mental discipline as abilities is one aspect, and considering it as including knowledge is another aspect. The two aspects show the difference between intensity and extension of habits. A habit may be acquired with a
certain minimum of knowledge without its extension to all the knowledge that belongs to it. Thus, for instance, a student may acquire the habit of science peculiar to the field of natural philosophy without acquiring all the knowledge belonging to that field. But having acquired the habit he is equipped to proceed successfully in those parts of the field which he has not yet considered. Since the fields of human knowledge is extremely extensive it is, as has been mentioned earlier, more important to develop the abilities intensively than extensively. The limited time that a student spends at the business of formal education does not permit full extension of various habits. Part of this must be left to the period of life after school days are over. In this connection Cubberley has expressed a valuable truth, when he suggests that the school aim rather at "ability to think" rather than extensive factual knowledge.

The next question that presents itself is the most important in this section. It is the question of process, namely: How will the teacher proceed in order to develop the desired habits in the pupils? Will the teacher be chiefly an instructor? Or chiefly a drill master? Or rather a stimulus and guide and director of the mental activity of the pupils? This question can be solved with success only in the light of the nature of acquired habits. Now, an
acquired habit is one that is produced by the exercise of the faculty to which it belongs, by exercise which conforms to the habit, as has been mentioned earlier. This acquiring by exercise is precisely what differentiates the acquired habits from infused habits. Now, no teacher would presume that he can infuse habits. He must depend on the pupil's exercising his own faculties. Therefore, the teacher's efforts must be so directed that he succeeds in making the student exercise his faculties in actions which will generate the habits or virtues.

Since all acquired habits depend on knowledge, it is evident that instruction, communication of knowledge, plays the initial role. This instruction, however, should be a mere communication of facts and truths. It should be instruction which stimulates the student to activity, stimulates his thought, and at the same time guides his thought. For instance, in showing the students a process in arithmetic the teacher should do so in such a way that the students solve the problem along with him and see the reason for every step. In geometry the students must not merely learn a theorem and perhaps even its proof by memory. They must be brought to reason out the proof for themselves. In literature study the student must be shown precisely why a piece of literature is good and what its shortcomings are, along with the reasons for adverse criticism.
Often the teacher may have to point out the flaws but as much as possible he should lead the students to find them as well as the reasons, if they have previously learned the rules pertaining to the case. History study should be not a simple learning that events took place. The teacher must lead the students to look for the causes and occasions of events and to distinguish between causes and occasions. Merely pointing out the temporal sequence of events is a poor way of teaching history and results not in understanding, nor in the habit particular to historians, but in memorization. Of course, instruction, communication of knowledge plays an important part. Yet, it can and should be done in such a way that the students are made to think, to be mentally active rather than passively absorbing what the teacher says.

Developing intellectual habits such as mentioned, and others also, is an easier task than to develop the moral virtues, including prudence which resides in the practical reason. Without compromising himself in any way, a person can accept truth, actively engage in search for it and develop mental habits. The case is not so with moral virtues, because they place a curb on human action. They make us act according to right reason. Unless the pupil is already favorably disposed toward practicing virtue or at least not ill-disposed, all the teacher's painting of glowing ideals,
all his exhortation and appealing to reason, all the dire woes that he may evoke as punishment to follow unvirtuous living, all the reward that he can promise to follow virtuous living may achieve nothing. Qualis unusquisque est, talis videtur ei finis. Still, the teacher must do all these things in an attempt to remove the ill-disposition. He must instruct and appeal to reason in order to stimulate the student to a vivid realization of the need and advantage of action in accord with moral virtues, so that by the student's own activity the virtues may be produced and developed.

No matter what habit or virtue is aimed at, instruction is necessary because knowledge is necessary; and because habits are developed by personal activity the teacher must instruct in such a way as to stimulate his students to activity and must guide their activity along the right lines. When a teacher does this he can be truly said to be educating. Such then is the conception of education, of the process of education, that we are forced to uphold.

Whether we call this the mental discipline conception or the developmental conception is of little import. Communicating knowledge and thereby producing habits may rightly be called development or developing the inborn capacities and possibilities of the pupil. Development is simply a vaguer, more general term and it permits Cubberley to avoid speaking of habits and faculties whose existence he denies. He uses
the term “ability to think”, to which we have no objection, but we determine the precise nature of abilities and call them habits and virtues. were it not for Cubberley’s denial of faculty psychology there would be no direct opposition between his development conception of education and our conception as explained.

Throughout this discussion, the truth of faculty psychology, which Cubberley rejects, has been taken for granted. He gives no argument for doing so. Nor do we intend to present extensive proof for the existence of the various faculties: intellect, will, sensus communis, memory, imagination, etc. That they are necessary parts of human nature can be learned from any book of sane rational psychology. The argument for them proceeds from the specific distinction of human actions or operations and these in turn are shown to be specifically distinct because of the specific distinction of the objects of these operations. Several faculties may elicit operations referring to the same material object but under different aspects. The eye sees a red-colored object, the intellect knows it to be an apple, the will desires it as good healthful food, the concupiscible sense appetite longs for it as good tasting, the irascible sense appetite regards it as good but hard to obtain because it is high up in a tree calling for dangerous climbing and danger of detection by a cranky farmer in whose orchard the tree stands. Here
are different aspects of one and the same material object, each aspect falling to a different operation and different faculty.

The various practices that Cubberley has suggested for the school in this connection mostly have no special bearing on the developmental conception of education. Differentiation according to student ability, for instance, does not depend on any one conception of education. It is a very good practice and should be attempted wherever possible so that the brighter pupils may advance more rapidly and the less intelligent ones receive instruction that is adapted to their mental acumen.

Cubberley's idea of the principal's chief role as helper and guide of the classroom teacher has a connection with the developmental conception. Since teachers must do more than impart knowledge, the inexperienced teacher especially may need the help and advice of a professional experienced educator to make instruction thought-stimulating. The young teacher is inclined to lecture too much without arousing the proper amount of mental activity on the part or the students. Likewise, the young teacher is inclined to adhere too closely to textbooks and not apply classroom work to life situations when this would be possible and would stir up student interest.

Cubberley has an exaggerated view of the need for
continual change in courses of instruction according to individual and community needs. On the lower level of education the needs of all pupils are very much the same. The same knowledge, abilities and ideals are needed by all. There may be variation in the method of instruction and especially in making applications to life situations. This will vary according to the background of experience and home life. Applications will be different for children in large cities, small cities or rural areas but most of their knowledge and habits will have to be the same. There may be some special courses for city children which country children would not need and vice versa. But the general structure of the school program will be the same because human nature does not change and with the exception of training for special jobs all need the same knowledge, abilities, and ideals to become educated citizens living in a civilized nation.

C - Criticism of Cubberley's Centralization and Doctrine of Rights.

In the exposition of Cubberley's doctrine, his ideas for administration of education and his ideas of rights over education were considered in two separate sections. Due to close interrelation and inter-dependence of these two aspects
of education the criticism of Cubberley's thought regarding both administration and rights will be undertaken jointly in one paragraph. It is impossible to treat the right kind of school control without reference to the question as to who has the right to exercise this control.

In the exposition of Cubberley's administrative suggestions, we saw that his unfavorable criticism of existent units of school administration could be expressed in one phrase: "lack of efficiency". And on the other hand his constructive suggestions were guided solely by the principle of efficiency. Two other points of insistence in Cubberley's plans are professionalization and economy, but these also were seen to reduce themselves to the one principle of efficiency. In the name of this principle he urged greater centralization of educational control.

What Cubberley says about the poor quality of education in numerous one-room, one-teacher school district schools is to a large degree true. It could hardly be otherwise. Where one teacher has to teach eight different grades in one room, not much time can be given to each grade. Only a small part of the day can be given to each. Most likely the chief pre-occupation of the teacher will be to cover enough textbook material so that the children may be able to pass examinations successfully and obtain a diploma after eight years of schooling. Furthermore, the financial status of independent districts
is usually very low and this, as Cubberley pointed out, is reflected in cheap poorly-equipped school buildings and low salaries for teachers. As a result of the low salaries usually only young and inexperienced teachers can be had or such teachers who failed to hold their positions in larger schools. Still this is not always the case. Some rural schools have very good teachers. At the same time the enrollment is frequently very small so that the teacher can give much more individual attention to pupils. But again in such a case the per capita cost of education is very high in comparison to per capita cost in larger schools. In general Cubberley's criticism of the district system as uneconomical and educationally inefficient is true.

The same criticism holds true also, to a considerable degree, for the township system although the situation there is better than in the districts. The townships have more taxable wealth, hence can provide better buildings and since each teacher has more pupils, the per capita cost is less. However, a sizeable amount could be saved by substituting the county system with consolidated schools for the township system. Benjamin J. Burvis, Indiana State Superintendent of schools, estimated that his state could save $5,782,000.00 annually by changing the Indiana Township System over to the county system. 36

36 Cf. B.J. Burvis, "Necessity of the County Unit for Efficient Administration of Rural Schools", National Education Association Proceedings, 61 (1923), 783-784.
It may be prudently stated that a change from the district to the county system would save considerably more.

From the economical point of view there is no doubt that both district and township system are undesirable. If taxation is levied on the district or township basis, the burden of the taxpayers is considerably greater than in the larger units. If taxation is carried on on a county-wide basis the burden remains larger than it would be if district and township units were entirely abolished and consolidated schools established. At the same time better buildings, better equipment, better teachers, better professional supervision and guidance can be obtained under the county system. Thus the educational opportunity for all is both improved and equalized. Along with the poor economy and educational inefficiency of the smaller units there is the added unfavorable feature of arbitrary boundaries taking cognizance of neither natural boundaries nor of community limits or interests. So that from almost any point of view the district and township system is undesirable.

There is, however, one consideration which speaks strongly for the small districts. They keep the school close to the home both in a territorial sense and in an administrative way. This is an advantage which Cubberley does not consider an advantage, but which may not be overlooked in any discussion of school administrative units. To disregard this consider-
Criticism of Cubberley's Doctrine

A criticism is to disregard the nature and historic origin of the school. In this regard the words of Pius XI are very pertinent. He writes:

... let it be borne in mind that this institution (the school) owes its existence to the initiative of the family and of the Church, long before it was undertaken by the State. Hence, considered in its historic origin the school is by its very nature an institution subsidiary and complementary to the family and to the Church.

If such is the nature of the school how can we condone centralization of control which means taking it farther from the home. Placing the school under centralized professional control, as Cubberley wants, means taking the school away from the unit of society which was largely responsible for its appearance, that is, the family. It also means removing the child from parental control in education because in Cubberley's plan the only thing left for parents would be to elect county trustees who in turn appoint a superintendent and after that act only on his recommendation in all educational matters including appointment of principals, supervisors, and teachers. The parents would have no voice in the appointment of those who are performing a vicarious duty for the parents, educating their offspring, a duty which by nature was confided to parents. For, as St. Thomas explains, nature does not merely intend birth of the child but also its advancement to the perfect state of manhood.

For this education is needed. Since the child receives its existence through its parents, so must it receive its advancement to perfect manhood from its parents. Marriage was intended by nature not only for physical procreation of offspring but also for the education of the offspring. The child is by nature a part of the father, a part of the parents, and to remove the child from parental control until it has reached a sufficient degree of maturity, physically and morally, is to violate the ordinances of nature. To establish a centralized county system of control, leaving the parents only the right to elect school trustees is to violate a natural right, bestowed on parents by the very fact of their parentage. The right to educate their children is first of all a right of parents and an inviolable right which endures until the child is able to provide for itself.

Not only the Church has proclaimed this right but the Supreme Court in its decision in the Oregon Case proclaimed and defended it. This decision, as well as Canon Law,

---

35 non enim intendit natura solua generationem prolis, sed etiam traductionem et promotionem usque ad perfectum statum hominis, in quantum homo est, qui est virtutis status. Sum Theol., Suppl. 41, 1.

Iatrimonium a intentione naturae ordinatur ad educationem prolis, non solus ad aliquod tempus, sed per totam vitam prolis. Ibid., 47, 1.

40 Cf. Pius XI, op. cit. 10.
links with this right the sacred duty to exercise that right. No power on earth may infringe on this right in any way if parents are able and willing to fulfill the educational needs of children. Only in matters of religious training does the Church hold a superior right because she is divinely commissioned to teach religious doctrine: "Teach ye all nations." As to the duty, parents cannot fulfill it by simply sending their children to school and not further thinking about their education. This duty, conferred by nature, cannot be transferred to the state, or school or teachers. About this duty Leo XIII writes:

... it is the duty of parents to make every effort to prevent any invasion of their rights in this matter, and to make absolutely sure that the education of their children remain under their own control in keeping with their Christian duty... 

While parents have this duty, they are not, therefore, prohibited to confide a major portion of education to other agencies or persons. It merely obliges them, as Leo XIII states, to make sure that the education of their children remain under their own control. As a matter of fact, ut in pluribus, parents have neither the time nor sufficient training to fulfill their duty personally. Precisely because the

---

43 Matt. 28, 19.
44 Leo XIII, Sapientiae Christianae, cited by Pius XI, Christian Education of Youth, 11.
the parents realized their own inability have they resorted to creating a vicarious institution, the school. The school represents a step forward and outward taken by the home. As Moehlman says: "The American public school is an extension of the home..." 45

Now it was not the individual home that founded the school but that unit of society which primarily represents the interests of the home. This unit is the local community, an expression of social, economic, and educational interests. Parents united in a natural local community have made our schools. To quote Moehlman again:

The participation not only of parents but of the entire community in our democratic folk-made schools is an outstanding characteristic of the American educational system 46.

Centralization such as suggested by Cubberley is in disaccord with the historic origin of the school, as well as contrary to the laws of nature. To change the nature of the school as an extension of the home and as an institution representing the interests of families united in a community is impossible. To do this we would have to change the nature of the family, in other words, destroy the family. Centralization of control beyond the natural community boundaries is equivalent to changing the nature of the school, because that would mean supplanting parental control by civil or state control.

46 A. J. Moehlman, op. cit., 158.
Now the state cannot supplant the family. The family was the first society instituted by God, and families joined together to make the state. By the fact that families joined in civil society, for which they are naturally intended, the nature of the family, its rights and duties, are not changed or destroyed. The appearance of the state does not destroy or abrogate those rights and duties.

With Father Cohausz we may argue thus:

That which a divinely constituted society has received from God as its appointed task, and which that society is itself capable of performing, may not be usurped by the State, because the State is instituted by God only as a complementary society, which is to intervene only where other resources fail 47.

Therefore, only in so far as the family is insufficient by itself to care for the proper education of its children may the civil society intervene in educational matters in order to supplement family efforts, not to replace them. As a matter of fact the family is an imperfect society, that is, it does not possess all the means necessary for its own complete development. The family, therefore, needs the State, which is a perfect society possessing all the means to achieve its end, the common good. But this does not mean that the State should take over functions properly belonging to the family. Allowing the family to do what it can, the

State merely seconds these efforts and takes up where the family leaves off. Hence the school remains an extension of the home and is not, as Cubberley states, an essentially civil institution. It would be more correct to say that it is essentially a family institution.

Cubberley has understood neither the nature of the family and the inviolability of parental rights, nor the nature of the school. The child never belongs to the state, as he says, in spite of parental neglect or abuse. When such neglect or abuse sets in, the state has the right and duty to protect the rights of the child to see to it that the child receives fitting treatment and proper education. But the child does not, therefore, belong to the state as it belongs to parents when there is no abuse or neglect. In fact the child belongs no more to the state then than it did before. Nor is it true, as Cubberley says, that the rights of parents are limited or that they cannot be exercised if in conflict with that the state has determined by law to be the greater needs of the state. The rights of parents do not depend on civil laws; they are conferred by natural law which civil society must respect. If there is a conflict between civil law and natural law the civil law-makers are wrong, not the natural law and the author of natural law who is God. There is no possibility of conflict as long as the state observes natural law and stays within its supplementary
role, and does not assume the principal role in education. Civil society will play its proper role if it remembers that the parents have the first right to control education. This right is, of course, "not an absolute and despotic one, but dependent on the natural and Divine Law, and therefore subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the Church". Both parents and state are subject to natural and Divine law because both kind of laws stem from the same origin, God, to whom all individuals and societies must be subject.

In insisting on the priority of parental rights against Cubberley's encroachments, we do not wish to say that the state has no rights over education. It most certainly has rights as well as duties. First of all the state has the duty to look after the common good. To do this it must make provision for good administration of public affairs and to protect its peace and security against enemies within and without. "There are things", says Pius XI, "which directly concern the public good and call for special aptitudes and special preparation". And he continues:

The State may therefore reserve to itself the establishment and direction of schools intended to prepare for certain civic duties and especially military service, provided it be careful not to injure the rights of the Church or of the family in what pertains to them.

49 Pius XI, op. cit. 15.
50 Ibid.
Here is one field in which the state has a priority of right of control and in which it can declare a monopoly precisely because of the direct connection with the common good.

In the rest of the educational field no such monopoly may be declared. However civil society has an interest in education in general because, as Pius XI points out, a certain degree of intellectual, moral and physical culture as well as knowledge of civic and political duties are actually necessary for the common good. The manner in which the state should promote education was outlined by the late Pius XI. "The function... of the civil authority residing in the State is twofold, to protect and to foster, but by no means to absorb the family and the individual, or to substitute itself for them".

The Pope goes on to explain these two functions of the State: to protect and to foster. Its first duty is to protect the rights of parents in regard to the education of their children, and when necessary, to protect the rights of the child when parents fail to fulfill their duty. In general the State has the duty to protect the moral and religious education of youth by guarding education against all evil

51 Cf. Ibid.
52 Ibid. 13.
53 Ibid.
influences. All this the State has a right and duty to do in view of its mission to promote the common welfare which "consists in that peace and security in which families and individuals have the free exercise of their rights." 53.

Besides taking protective measures, which is chiefly a negative role, the State must take positive measures to promote education. This it does, not by substituting itself for the family, but "by encouraging and assisting, of its own accord, the initiative and activity of the Church and family" 54. In other words the State must respect the prior right of parents by allowing the family to take the initiative. Then because of family insufficiency it assists the family to achieve its end: the proper education of its offspring. When this is not sufficient to provide necessary education the State may and should found its own schools. As the Pope points out, it is a matter of justice that the State establish schools because it possesses the means. These means were contributed by the citizens so they should be used for the advantage of the citizens 55.

This program outlined by His Holiness is very different from Cubberley's. For Cubberley the State comes first. It has the mission to educate. If private individuals

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid. 14.
55 Cf. Ibid., 14.
or groups want to do something the State accepts this as a favor, but must by no means assist those efforts by granting tax money to them. Cubberley recognizes no state duty to foster the initiative taken by the family. For him the State is to set the requirements of all schools private or public, and when a private school does not or cannot meet those requirements, the State has the right to close it, and force the parents to send their children to a public school. Cubberley here proposes a kind of monopoly which physically and morally forces families to make use of public schools. Pius XI branded such a monopoly as unjust and unlawful, contrary to the dictates of their consciences and even to their lawful preferences. According to the letter of the law and Cubberley's theoretical principles, parents enjoy the liberty to send their children to private or parochial schools. In practice, however, this liberty disappears because often no private school is within reach or the parents or parish have not the means to provide such schools. Then all freedom of choice vanishes. Instead of civil society assisting parents to provide their own school, Cubberley wants the State to force the parents to use the public school. This is definitely a violation of parental rights, especially so in Cubberley's plan where the parents have no voice in

56 Cf. Ibid. 15.
the choice of teachers and where teachers are chosen by professional educationists without any regard to religious belief. If anything is needed, this is the voice of parents in the choice of teachers because teachers are taking the place of the parents. To deny this is to deny right of parental control.

The injustice in Cubberley's plan, and for that matter, in the whole American educational system, extends itself to all parents who send their children to parochial schools. He insists that no tax money be devoted to such schools. But at the same time he is adamant in his position that all must pay taxes for the support of public schools whether they send their children to them or not. Thus parents who feel it to be their duty to provide parochial schools where religion and morals are safeguarded, are forced to carry a double burden. In placing taxation for public schools on an even basis with taxation for the maintenance of a fire department, Cubberley shows that he has no conception of education as primarily a family function. He has inverted the natural order. For him it is not the State that has a duty to assist the family, but the family who has a prior duty to assist the State to do what it wants.

There is no doubt that civil society has a right to levy taxes for education. That is the only way in which it can foster education. The injustice appears when the State
refuses to use this money to assist families in an enterprise which is primarily theirs. If the State does not want to give such assistance by devoting part of the taxes to private and parochial schools, then it has no right to levy taxes for education on those who are already spending huge sums on education.

Cubberley's plan for school taxes is probably the best ever devised. It evens the burden for public school support as well as can be hoped. His mistake lies in refusing part of this to private schools. A larger unit of taxation is certainly desirable, larger than the district and township. Taxation may be done on any basis that the civil authority finds best so that all children of a nation profit as much as possible. But larger units of taxation do not and may not entail larger units of control. The community is the only system in which parental rights can be safeguarded properly. While the district system would safeguard these rights it is undesirable for the reason explained above. The township system does not represent the common interests of parents united in a community because it often disregards community boundaries.

Adopting the community system for local control does not mean that there should be no planning and appraisal by a larger unit of civil society. In fact it is the duty of the state to watch over education. It has a perfect right to lay
down the minimum requirements, to watch over teacher training and to see to it that only those who qualify are appointed. But the State is not qualified to judge about the religious qualifications that parents have a right to demand, hence the state may not take upon itself to appoint teachers. That must be left to the parents of the community or in the case of Catholic schools to the pastors and bishops who will certainly see that teachers have the proper religious qualifications. A system could be adopted in which the civil authority would propose a teacher for a post but at the same time would allow parents to voice their disapproval, if they can offer good reasons for their stand. The only valid reasons would be religious or moral if the teacher has the other qualifications laid down by the state.

In what pertains to superintendents, principals and supervisors the state may also determine the education and professional training that they must have. Their appointment can safely be left to the county board or state board except in the case of principals who are also teachers. Once the state recognizes the right of parents to have a voice in the kind of education their children are to have, it will not be difficult to prevent any adverse influence by the professional officers of education.

Thus far we have spoken of parental rights which Cubberley has neglected or denied. His suggestions are
equally opposed to the rights of the Church. He recognizes no right of the Church prior to the right of the state. But the Church must necessarily have a right to control education because she has received a divine mission to teach and safeguard religious and moral truth. Her mission is not to a select few, to those born in her fold, but to all men. This gives her a right to watch over the education of all men so that nothing contrary to divinely revealed truth may be taught. This mission and right were conferred to her by Christ when he sent out His apostles with the command: "Teach ye all nations." Any power on earth that limits the exercise of this right is acting against the will of God who conferred the right. Hence it is an injustice and an infraction of a divine wish to outlaw the Church from the school, yes, even the public school, as Cubberley does. Even under the impossible supposition that religious education is not an essential, the Church would still have a right to send her ministers into the public school because of the mission received from the Son of God.

Furthermore, the Church is a perfect society with its own proper end: the saving of souls. Being a perfect society she has a right to all the means that are necessary to achieve that end. No power has a right to deny her the use of

57 Matt. 28, 19.
whatever means she needs. Now education is one of her most potent means to bring her message of salvation to mankind. This means that she has a right not only to teach religion but to use all fields of learning as far as they are necessary or useful to promote her end. And as Pius XI pointed out, every branch of learning, even physical culture, may serve as a means or, if not properly regulated, may be a hindrance. Besides this positive use of secular learning the Church has also the right and duty of vigilant supervision over all education so that nothing contrary to religion or morality creep in.

Again it is the inalienable right as well as the indispensable duty of the Church, to watch over the entire education of her children, in all institutions, public or private, not merely in regard to the religious instruction there given, but in regard to every other branch of learning and every regulation insofar as religion and morality are concerned.

Cubberley has denied or violated all these rights in his suggestions for completely non-sectarian education conducted by the State. He has hoisted the civil society high above the divinely instituted Church. He completely ignores the fact that schools owe their origin to the initiative of the Church and the family and praises highly the

58 "... it is a society chartered as of right divine, perfect in its nature and its title, to possess in itself and by itself, through the will and loving kindness of its Founder, all needful provision for its maintenance and action". Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, 430.
59 Cf. Pius XI, op. cit. 6-7.
60 Ibid. 7.
fact that the Church was banished from the public school. Furthermore, just as he does an injustice to parents by refusing tax support to the schools they have founded, so also he does injustice to the Church by refusing state support of the Church's efforts in education.

Of course, all is quite logical as we pointed out earlier, in view of the fact that he makes the welfare of the state, not life everlasting, the final and highest aim of education. Just as this is wrong so also his ideas on state control are wrong. In spite of Cubberley's insistence on democracy, his principles according to which the State declares what the rights of children and parents are, that the welfare of the State comes first, strongly smack of totalitarianism. Those are principles which have been voiced and applied in Russia, Germany and Italy. Instead of protecting democracy, they form the foundation and springboard for complete state control of education.

Cubberley's plan for centralization would probably make a simplified, efficient, economical, smooth-working machine. But efficiency and economy are not the only or even primary considerations. The first consideration must be that of rights. Totalitarianism is probably the most efficient and can be the most economical and simplified form of government. That does not make it the best or even a good form of government, because it does not respect the divine rights
of the Church and the natural rights of man. Cubberley's disregard for these rights is similar to a dictator's.

Besides these considerations which make Cubberley's suggestions for centralization inherently wrong, his plan is in danger of failing to achieve one of his most cherished hopes, that is, to banish all partisan politics and pressure from influential groups. Centralization easily opens the door to these even if all school boards are elected on a non-party basis and the educational system is made fiscally independent from civil authority. It is always easier for political bosses and pressure groups to exert their influence on small centralized boards than on a large number of local boards. Publishers of textbooks cannot easily foist their books on the people if they have to contact a host of local boards. To rule out partisan politics from board elections is very desirable and almost essential for the best interests of education. But to do this we do not need central control.

Referring to this Moehlman, a strong supporter of public schools, says:

The need for freeing the education function from partisan political domination or control cannot be emphasized too strongly. The only way in which this aim may be achieved is through maintaining the corporate and political independence of the local school district 61.

And again he says:

61 A.B. Moehlman, School Administration, 158.
Experience has proved that the best means of protecting the education function from possible misuse by government or even by special minorities is decentralization of the execution of the program, with broad areas of powers delegated to the community itself 62.

So again we see the desirability of community control of education not only from the point of view of parental rights but from the point of view of preventing influences that are likely to be harmful to the best interest of education. Hoehlman, though not a Catholic and a devotee of the public school system without religion, vigorously defends parental control by means of the community system, built around a natural community of interrelated social, economic and educational interests 63. No other school system presents all the advantages that the community system has.

Cubberley's ideas and suggestions about rights in education and educational control would be almost a total failure. To outlaw religion from education is harmful rather than promotional to democracy and state welfare; it is a violation of the God-given rights of parents and Church. Centralization violates parental rights and would not effect elimination of influence from politics and pressure groups.

62 Ibid., The Educational Policies Commission also upholds this point of view. Cf. The Structure and Administration of Education in American Democracy, Chapter II.
as Cubberley hopes. His suggestions for a national bureau of education with the sweeping powers that he would grant it, all but destroys the American school system organized on a state basis and opens the way for complete centralization on a nation-wide basis and federal meddling in every schoolhouse and every schoolroom of the country.
CONCLUSION

In general Cubberley's doctrine on education presents a certain logical development of thought. While there is little direct relation between his objectives and aims and his conception of education there is a logical link between his purpose of education and the remainder of his ideas on the rights of the state as prior and more important than the rights of the Church and family. Likewise the step from the welfare of the state as the principal aim to centralization of administrative control is quite logical. But the mere fact of being logical is very slight praise for an exponent of doctrine and does not help to improve Cubberley's doctrine.

The adage says: Parvus error in initio, magnus error in fine. But Cubberley did not begin with a parvus error. His big error is at the outset, the error about the true objectives and aims of education. He forgot that man is man with a special dignity and worth as an individual, with an individual eternal destiny, before he is a member of society. Because of this oblivion he places man's role as a social being above his role as an individual. Likewise, for the same reason, he places the welfare of the state above the welfare of man. For him the welfare of the state is supreme. The logical consequence, as manifested in Cubberley's thought, is that the state declares what the rights of the individual are, what the rights of parents over their children are, in short that the state control education, and that non-state
schools can be tolerated only as long as they fulfill the requirements that the state determines. Because Cubberley considers the welfare of the state, a purely temporal aim, as supreme, he logically decides that religion and preparation for life eternal are of little importance in education. Although this is logical in one sense, nevertheless, as was pointed out, the welfare of the state cannot be secured without religion.

Throughout Cubberley's thought is evidence of a serious lack of true philosophy. His conception of human nature, of the human mind, does not correspond to the facts proven in rational psychology. Because of this he has not grasped the dignity of man as an intellectual being with an immortal soul. He has missed entirely the nature of the family and consequent parental rights. He failed to see that the state exists for the benefit of the individual and the family rather than they for it. He failed to see that the family and the Church entered the educational field before the state and that they hold a prior and superior right. The family holds a prior right by its very nature; the Church holds a prior right by divine commission.

Cubberley's developmental conception of education is quite different from ours although the terms that he uses in speaking about it can be applied to our conception although with a different meaning. The difference arises from the difference between his conception of the mind and ours. He
denies faculty psychology; we defend it. Hence our meaning of abilities as mental habits or mental discipline is quite another from his conception of abilities. Mental discipline together with knowledge, we have seen, constitute the development of the mind which education must effect in the educand.

However, it must be said that his writings seem to give the impression of sincerity. He seems sincere in his efforts to improve education in the United States. If he had a correct idea of the nature of man, of man's eternal destiny and the nature of the family, he would probably have become one of the greatest educators and educationists of all times. The number of his writings and extensive work in educational circles show him to be a tireless worker for the improvement of education. He fearlessly condemned political meddling in education in order to make our schools free institutions beneficial to the democracy of the nation. His efforts, however, and his suggestions, if adopted, are ill-fated because they rest on the shifting sands of erroneous principles. It is to be hoped that his writings will not have the influence which some have attributed to them. The writer hopes that this essay serve to warn those who might be inclined to adopt Cubberley's suggestions, to warn them that by adopting those suggestions they will harm rather than bring benefit to American schools and to the pupils who attend them; that the adoption of his doctrine will be far from constructive, but rather destructive of the welfare of our
democratic state. Let all educators and educationists remember that education must deal with the educand first of all as man, that is, it must first of all aim at perfecting his human nature, not human nature in the abstract, but human nature in its actual fallen, repaired and elevated state. To do this it must aim at implementing man with the knowledge, abilities and ideals commensurate with his actual state and the destiny that God Creator and Redeemer has outlined for him, that is, life hereafter. In so doing education will take a great stride toward and lay a solid and necessary foundation for an aim of secondary importance, social efficiency and welfare of the state.
BOOKS BY CUBBERLEY.


**ARTICLES BY CUBBERLEY.**


--- --- "College Education and the Superintendent of Schools", *School and Society*, 17 (May 19, 1923), pp. 538-545.


--- --- "Obstacles to Educational Progress", *Science n.s.* 45 (Apr. 20, 1917) pp. 369-376.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

OTHER AUTHORS

BOOKS


Codex Juris Canonici.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


McGinnis, William C. School Administrative and Supervisory Organizations in Cities of 20,000 to 50,000 Population, New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1929.


S. Thomas, Summa Theologica. Tourini, Marietti.


Adler, Mortimer, "God and the Professors", The Daily Maroon, Nov. 14, 1940, pp. 5-4.


