THE NOTION OF HISTORICITY
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL

by
Rowland Collinge Marshall

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THE NOTION OF HISTORICITY
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL
Preface

"Man is implicitly rational, but he must also become explicitly so by struggling to create himself, not only by going forth from himself but also by building himself up within." P. of Right, f 10, Zus.

In setting out to reveal and make meaningful the underlying notion of historicity in Hegel's philosophy, it was realized that the writings of a number of philosophers of this century reveal quite explicit conceptions of historicity. Ortega y Gasset, Collingwood, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre and others have attempted to recast the more or less traditional concept of a permanent and somewhat static human nature in terms of the historicity of man. Scholars like Albert Dondeyne and Emil Fackenheim have helped to elucidate the characteristic features of this theme in contemporary philosophical thought. Fackenheim has provided an admirable essay on the relation of historicity to metaphysics, and in the course of his clear and compact analysis, he reveals the kind of metaphysical assumptions which underlie the doctrine of historicity. Before Fackenheim, Karl Löwith had indicated that it was Hegel who had given this turn of thought to German philosophy, and Dondeyne had stated that the notion of historicity made its first appearance with Hegel. In short, it seemed that Hegel's notion of historicity as essentially or otherwise involving the nature
of man and man's search for timeless truth, needed greater and more specific attention than had hitherto been provided.

In this study it is argued that there is an implicit notion of historicity in the philosophy of Hegel (implicit in the sense that Hegel does not use the word 'historicity') and that some of the fundamental principles of his philosophy require a notion of historicity. It is shown that his philosophy reveals the connotations which, in contemporary expressions of the doctrine, characteristically attach to the word historicity. More significantly, it is shown that he provides a deeply thought out philosophical foundation which effectively supports the conceptions or presuppositions necessary for the doctrine of historicity. It is also argued that although Hegel recognizes the limitations imposed on human thought by history, he nevertheless attempts to retain for man, through philosophy, the capacity to transcend history. Furthermore, it is contended that Hegel is not a historicist, because in his philosophy, philosophical questions are not supplanted by historical questions. In the course of introducing the theme of this study, the parameters and some of the ramifications of the problem area are outlined, the meaning of the word 'historicity' is discussed, the presuppositions of the doctrine of historicity are examined, and finally both historical truth and metaphysical truth are considered within the context of this doctrine.
The second chapter is concerned with Hegel's showing of historicity in concrete human life in his *Early Theological Writings*. Here it is shown that in these writings, some of the characteristics of a notion of historicity are present, and that because he wanted to effect a reconciliation between some of the 'contradictions' in concrete human life which drew his attention, such as the lack of harmony between the sphere of religious and intellectual culture and the sphere of social, civil and political life, that he had to develop a notion of historicity to satisfactorily encompass human life in its dynamic wholeness. It is here that Hegel is found to be unmistakedly critical of general concepts of human nature, which he thinks suffer from abstraction and lack of content. He finds it necessary to distinguish between an ideal of human nature and such general concepts.

The third chapter concentrates on the first half of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but proceeds to its analysis by way of an examination of parts of some of Hegel's Jena writings. His efforts to systematically articulate the thought of human life and human consciousness results in the development of his dialectical logic, a logic of the life of thought, and subsequently of his 'Science of the experience of consciousness'. Hegel's conceptions of 'subject' and 'true infinity' emerge in his first system and help to make human historicity a comprehensible notion. The aim of the detailed analysis
of the sections of the Phenomenology, which lead to the emergence of Spirit, is to bring out Hegel's showing of the self-constitutionality of man's being and to show that he conceives and exhibits human nature as process and result, as opposed to the tendency of the philosophers of the Enlightenment to regard human nature as fixed. This is done by making manifest the role of mediation in the development of self-consciousness and by close study of the various forms of the dialectic involved in man's realization of his self-hood. It is shown that in defining man qua human, in terms of spirit, a dynamic conception of man's consciousness and its processes is implied, and that this in turn implies a notion of historicity. For Hegel, man ultimately realizes his self-hood as spirit, and in defining man as Spirit, Hegel intends by way of meaning, a multitude of predicates which together describe man within the dynamics of a self-determining, self-constituting being situated in nature, society and history. Hegel's dynamic conception of man's consciousness and its processes, in which the wholeness of experience is assimilated and preserved and carried forward including the history of the individual and of the society of which he is a member, implies a notion of historicity. Again, it is contended and shown that, because for Hegel, human consciousness is essentially self-constituting, then man's nature must be regarded as other than fixed, i.e. it must be regarded as open to historical development. The conclusion is drawn
at this point that for Hegel, man is essentially a historical being and history is the medium or field of his self-development.

The fourth chapter follows the dialectic of the system proper, by examining Infinity, Substance and the Notion in the Logic, Time and Eternity, principally in the Philosophy of Nature, and Subject, Spirit, and Thought in the Philosophy of Spirit, and in the corresponding lecture collections. Spirit's realization of knowledge and freedom is pursued, starting with mind's initial formation and continuing through to history and to spirit's absolute realization in art, religion and philosophy. The aim here is to show that some of the key notions of his system provide the philosophical foundation for and require a notion of historicity, and to show the continuity and the ongoing realization of man's self-constituting activity in the system. In addition to arguments and evidence proffered in support of Hegel's avoidance of historicism and historical relativism, it is contended that the nature of his idealism requires a notion of historicity. More specifically there is found in the meaning of the Notion itself, the requirement of a notion of historicity. Because the Notion realizes itself explicitly in man's self-conscious, thinking processes, the Notion's moments of self-negation and reconciliation permeate the self-constituting process of man's being, permeate man's historical life, his evolving self-consciousness
within his societal and historical world. In short, it is shown that the Notion's realization in human spirit is intimately linked with the historicity of man, so that it can be said that the Notion individualized in man necessitates a notion of historicity. It is shown that man's freedom follows from man's self-constitutionality and the infinite character of his mind. In the process of freely constituting himself, he continuously assimilates and re-assimilates elements of the past. It is shown that Hegel strove to bring about a synthesis of history and eternity, which allows for a growth of historical knowledge and for a deepening of the comprehension of eternal truth. Man is situated in nature and history, but in history, spirit's development in time is seen as its realization of increasing freedom, so that man gradually frees himself from nature and advances toward a form of freedom which transcends history itself. Man has the capacity, according to Hegel, of overcoming and transcending his finitude absolutely, and so of his own situation and self-hood, although such an attainment is a precarious and hard wrought gain as shown in his remarkable explication of man's relation between the finite and the infinite, where man is described as comprising both finite consciousness and infinite consciousness and as the struggle between them. Man is a self-constituting being who, in freely realizing himself, is comprised of both finite and infinite aspects, but because he is also the struggle between
them, in ascending to Absolute Spirit he can sublate the finite in the infinite.

In the final chapter, it is concluded that in his history man makes explicit what is implicit in his notion, he realizes his potentialities through time. It is through the contextual situations of history that the otherwise empty concept of human nature is made concrete, i.e. the setting of history provides both the limitations and possibilities of human development. The historical setting for man's historicity should be seen in a genuinely ontological sense, because man is essentially a historical being. Man makes himself what he becomes, or becomes what he is. As spirit man is only that which he makes of himself, but he makes of himself what he is implicitly. He is essentially the result of his own activity. Hegel endeavours to maintain both a) a human self-making, and b) a self-realized human nature; and c) he does not totally historicize human nature. (Hegel's notion of man includes revelations of 'the stamp of the divine', so that historicity does not comprise the whole of what man has become and is.) Man has a nature 'in himself', but not 'for himself' until he acquires it for himself. By showing the intimate relation of inner and outer, Hegel is able to argue that a man's nature is not an unrealized inner disposition; rather a man's actual thoughts, work and deeds constitute his nature. Hegel endeavours to maintain a timeless metaphysics, but encompassing
history. Because the unfolding of spirit occurs in history and substantially through the thought and actions of men, he is committed to a doctrine of historicity. It is concluded that Hegel's work does contain a notion of historicity which is in part made explicit through his conceptions of self-constituting spirit, of man as a naturally and historically situated being constituting himself freely in a process of self-realization, and of the part history plays in man's realization, as the field for the attainment of greater freedom. His notion of historicity is qualified by his ultimate allowance for a human transcendence of situation in which temporality, historicality and the finite side of self are sublated in the infinite. Hegel allows for historical relativism to the extent appropriate to the reality of the historical growth of the human spirit and of the cultural and societal creations which accompany this development, but he does not succumb to an exaggerated historical relativism, and he does not surrender philosophy's claim to truth which is eternal. He avoided historicism because he did not subordinate philosophy to history, and he did not engage in or think philosophy provided the means of predicting the future.

Grateful acknowledgement is made to all those who assisted through helpful encouragement, suggestions and criticism, particularly Dr. Jean-Louis Allard, the very patient director of this dissertation, and Dr. Jacques Croteau, the
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R. C. M.

Halifax, Nova Scotia
31 August, 1972
Abbreviations

The following abbreviations have been used for works and translations cited more frequently:

KRD

ETW
Early Theological Writings, tr. T.M. Knox

HtJ
Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. H. Nohl.

Ency., Logic
The Logic of Hegel, tr. W. Wallace.

P. of N.

P. of M.
The Philosophy of Mind, tr. W. Wallace; Zusätze A.V. Miller.

Enzy.
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundriss (1830) Neu hrsg. von Nicoll und Pöggeler.

H. of P.
The History of Philosophy, tr. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simpson.

Phen.
The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. Baillie.

Phän.
Phänomenologie des Geistes, hrsg. Hoffmeister.

P. of A.
The Philosophy of Fine Art, tr. F.P.B. Osmaston.

Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, hrsg. von F. Bassenge.

P. of H.
The Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree.


P. of Religion
The Philosophy of Religion, tr. E.B. Spiers and J.B. Sanderson.

S. of L.
Science of Logic, tr. A. V. Miller.

W. der L.
Wissenschaft der Logik, hrsg. Lasson, 2 Band.

P. of R.
The Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox.

P. des Rechts
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, hrsg. Hoffmeister.

S. Werke
Sämtliche Werke: Jubiläumsausgabe in 20 Bänden, hrsg. von H. Glockner.
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<tr>
<td>WK 1</td>
<td>Walter Kaufmann, translations in <em>Hegel, Re-interpretation, Texts and Commentary</em>.</td>
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<td>WK 2</td>
<td>Walter Kaufmann, translations in <em>The Owl and the Nightingale</em>.</td>
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<td>Zus.</td>
<td>Zusätze.</td>
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<td>Jenenser Logik</td>
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"All that is essential in history is that in it men are able to remember, and thereby to preserve what has been as a factor in what will be. For man, time acquires the unique meaning of historicity, whereas the nature of existence is the perpetual repetition of the same, which changes over very long periods of time, but only unconsciously - for what reason, we have only an inkling or no idea at all." Karl Jaspers

Subject of inquiry, central thesis and argument

The passage above by Karl Jaspers is suggestive of the problem area set by the title of this study. The subject of inquiry is the notion of historicity in the philosophy of Hegel, and this will involve an examination of historicity, human nature, historical and metaphysical truth in his philosophy. In this study, it is intended to argue that there is an implicit notion of historicity in the philosophy of Hegel, and furthermore, that some of the fundamental principles of his philosophy necessarily require a notion of historicity. It will be shown that his philosophy provides the connotations which characteristically attach to the word historicity. In

addition, it will be shown that he provides a deeply thought out philosophical foundation which effectively supports the conceptions or presuppositions necessary to a doctrine of historicity.

The third sentence in the paragraph above represents the central thesis of this study, the correctness of which will be shown by way of extended argument, textual evidence and textual analysis, which will in general, follow the order of the actual production of Hegel's works. Nevertheless, formal arguments will be framed using the propositions included in the sentence. A number of ancillary arguments will be formulated in support of these arguments. (Part of the value to be gained in framing some of the pertinent arguments formally is in their succinct presentation of the chief elements involved in the philosophical issues in question.) In turn much of the material of subsequent chapters will be used to explicate the propositions of the central and ancillary arguments, and to provide evidence in support of their respective conclusions.

The word "implicit" used in connection with the words: "notion of historicity", is meant to indicate that Hegel does not set out to explicitly articulate a doctrine of historicity, and to indicate that historicity is not Hegel's word; it is in the writings of philosophers who have done much of
their work in this present century, that examples of fairly intensive use of the word itself can be found. In short, it is to such more or less contemporary philosophers that we must grant a kind of philosophical ownership of the word per se.

But it was Hegel who introduced history into philosophy with such thoroughness that subsequent philosophers have found it difficult to avoid at least some of the implications of his thought, particularly in respect to the nature of man. If Kant, in some sense, placed the validity of traditional metaphysical concepts in question, Hegel, in a sense to be determined, perhaps unintentionally, placed the validity of traditional concepts of human nature in question.

1. Historicity

A. The word 'historicity' and its meaning

The term 'historicity' has in the past, and is sometimes currently used, to suggest historic sense, character or quality. Current use of the word 'historicity' centers on man and not on things. It is man who is referred to, man as a doer and maker in and of history, man who must always choose,

2 It is to men like Samuel Alexander (1859-1938); R.G. Collingwood (1891-1943); José Ortega Y Gasset (1883-1955); Karl Jaspers (1883-69); Martin Heidegger (1889- ); Jean-Paul Sartre (1905- ), that one can turn for examples of the use of the word historicity.

3 In contrast to Samuel Alexander's use of this word in his paper "The Historicity of Things".
man free in his choices but not free 'not to choose'. Man not only makes tools and uses them in the 'making over' of his surroundings but also makes himself, makes himself this and that in the process of making, doing and choosing.

Among the several meanings which the term 'historicity' may denote or signify, is being-in-history, and by the latter, what is meant primarily, is that man is being-in-history. A 'thing' may have a history, but it is man who must take note of 'the thing' and record the events that affect 'the thing' and relate such events to some time measure.

B. Man: being-in-history

In some contemporary philosophical literature, it is said that man is a historical being, who projects through his activity a human environment. Hegel, who beyond doubt, was possessed of a historic sense, would agree. He would also agree that man as a historical being, is a being-in-history.

For some existentialists man's being is seen "as a presence-to-the-world" (italics mine) manifesting "itself in

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4 "history, n. Continuous methodical record of public events; study of growth of nations; whole train of events connected with nation, person, thing, etc.; ... aggregate of past events, course of human affairs; ... systematic account of natural phenomena etc." (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1954.)

5 'Historic sense' has a somewhat different meaning in the context above, i.e. in para one, 1 A.
a temporal and intersubjective manner.\(^6\) They also associate man's liberty with history, since in liberty man has the capacity to separate himself from the past so that he may see it as it was and so that he may take up a position in regard to it. They say that man knows his existence to be his own, and to this existence he finds he must give meaning and direction; and thus his liberty is in addition, the capacity to project himself into the future and give things a sense.\(^7\) Hegel, in general, studiously avoided discussion of the future. However, contemporary philosophers often appear to have only a limited future horizon in mind when they use the word 'future' in this way. It appears to be a way of explaining man's creative endeavours to mould while assimilating 'the other' of 'the situation' in which he finds himself. Now if what is meant is the overcoming of self-estrangement in one's society and culture, then Hegel's notion of the 'historicity' of man: being-in-history would include the connotation of man projecting himself into the future. More obviously, Hegel's notion of man-in-history includes the connotation of 'assimilation', i.e. man assimilates 'the in-itself' (\(an\ \text{sich}\)) for himself. Man-in-history, endeavouring to overcome 'Self-Estrangement', in

\(^6\) A. Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, p. 48. See also p. 46-47.

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 44.
society and culture, "comprehends everything, extinguishes all objectiveness, and converts ... everything which has a being in itself into what is for itself."\(^8\)

C. The historicity of man

Among the ways in which one might speak of the 'historicity of man' are the following:

1) that he has a history,
2) that he can comprehend history (his own personal history, that of others, his 'own time', and 'other times'),
3) that he is situated in a historical 'context' or situation,
4) that man's positive progress in history can only be maintained by maintaining his historical outlook, i.e., only thus can man's attainments be retained, and only thus can his sacrifices be 'humanly' justified,
5) that man develops historically, adding new experiences and knowledge, continually modifying self by experience and comprehension in and of the historical world, yet retaining each experience/comprehension modification in his self-developing (self-constituting) selfhood.

In all of the above ways, Hegel concerns himself with man in and of history. Points 1) and 2) are simply experiential fact, but still Hegel put in writing and lecture notes much of the then known history of mankind. By working up studies of 1) 'history': philosophical, cultural, religious and political, he thereby 2) comprehended 'history' to his time, and 3) he made manifest the development of man's 'concrete'

\[^8\] Phenomenology, p. 512. "... sie begreift alles, tilgt alle Gegenständlichkeit und verwandelt alles Anschöhen in ein Fürsichsein." Phän., p. 349.
historico-situational context through the ages. In so doing he was able to show that the progressive dialectical development of great cultures is accomplished and maintained in large part through the thought and thought-filled actions of men. The actions and tasks of some men are more crucial than others.

Such are all great historical men - whose own particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the World-Spirit. . . . Such individuals had no consciousness of the general Idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs; on the contrary, they were practical, political men. But at the same time they were thinking men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time - what was ripe for development. This was the very Truth for their age, for their world; the species next in order, so to speak, and which was already formed in the womb of time.9

Their accomplishments are crucial in at least two important ways:

1) In varying degrees, they are conscious of their situation in history,

2) and are thus able to know that the 'time' is appropriate for certain advances, and are also

9 Philosophy of History, p. 30. "Dies sind die groszen Menschen in der Geschichte, deren eigne partikulare Zwecke das Substantielle enthalten, welches Wille des Weltgeistes ist. . . . Solche Individuen hatten in diesen ihren Zwecken nicht das Bewusstsein der Idee überhaupt, sondern sie waren praktische und politische Menschen. Aber zugleich waren sie denkende, die Einsicht hatten von dem, was not und was an der Zeit ist. Das ist eben die Wahrheit ihrer Zeit und ihrer Welt, sozusagen die n{"a}chste Gattung, die im Innern bereits vorhanden war." Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 75.
able to influence the movement of history, to some extent. (They accomplish Reason's work.)

Such 'fateful' roles are made the more possible by the dint of 'overcoming' the past and bringing it into the present. If there is to be genuine forward movement, the good, true and the real must not be lost, but must be continually re-absorbed by thoughtful assimilation and so carried forward to the present. In the Phenomenology, following a discussion on the necessity of spirit appearing in time, 'completing itself as a world-spirit' in order to "reach its completion as self-conscious spirit". Hegel notes that "The process of carrying forward this form of knowledge of itself is the task which spirit accomplishes as actual history." In order to give some suggestion of Hegel's conception of the self-constitut-

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ional and assimilative character of the human mind, attention is directed to his discussion of What Mind (or Spirit) is, in the Encyclopaedia, in which he explains how mind "distinguishes itself from Nature":

This triumph over externality which belongs to the Notion of mind, is what we have called the ideality of mind. Every activity of mind is nothing but a distinct mode of reducing what is external to the inwardness which mind itself is, and it is only by

10 p. 801. "Die Bewegung, die Form seines Wissens von sich hervorzutreiben, ist die Arbeit, die er als wirkliche Geschichte vollbringt." Phän., p. 559.
this reduction, by this idealization or assimilation, of what is external that it becomes and is mind.\textsuperscript{11}

(Suffice to say for the present that points iv) and v) above\textsuperscript{12} are indicative of Hegel's views.)

2. Human Nature and Historicity

A. The metaphysical thesis that 'man has no nature; what he has is history'

Ortega y Gasset at least as early as the mid-thirties expressed very clearly concepts which often form part of the foundation of the contemporary notion of 'the historicity of man'. His essay "History as a System" in The Ernst Cassirer Festschrift, is an interesting example of philosophical writing in which a twentieth century philosopher makes quite clear that he is opposed to the traditional concept of human nature as stable and constant.

Man is what has happened to him, what he has done. ... Man is a substantial emigrant on a pilgrimage of being, and it is accordingly meaningless to set limits to what he is capable of being. In this initial illimitableness of possibilities that

\textsuperscript{11} Philosophy of Mind, \textsuperscript{1381}, Zus. "Diese zum Begriff des Geistes gehörende Aufhebung der Äusserlichkeit ist Das, was wir die Idealität desselben genannt haben. Alle Thätigkeiten des Geistes sind nichts als verschiedene Weisen der Zurückführung des Äusserlichen zu der Innerlichkeit, welche der Geist selbst ist, und nur durch diese Zurückführung, durch diese Idealisierung oder Assimilation des Äusserlichen wird und ist er Geist.---" S. Werke, 10, p. 24. Regarding "selfhood" see Enz. \textsuperscript{1435}.

\textsuperscript{12} Supra, p. 6.
characterizes one who has no nature there stands out only one fixed, pre-established, and given line by which he may chart his course, only one limit: the past. The experiments already made with life narrow man's future. If we do not know what he is going to be, we know what he is not going to be. Man lives in view of the past. Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history, res gestae, is to man.¹³

It is to be noted that whereas man has no nature, he has history, which in effect determines what he is as man at a particular time. It cannot be argued that Hegel is the only root source for this contemporary metaphysical perspective of man, but as a working hypothesis it can be presumed that Hegel helped to initiate this revision of a concept long held in the main stream of philosophical thinking. Albert Dondeyne in a brief comment, states flatly that "The notion of historicity made its first appearance in philosophy with Hegel."¹⁴

Ortega y Gasset appears satisfied to use terms like being, existence and nature in Aristotelian fashion to a

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¹³ Philosophy and History, New York, Harper & Row, 1963, p. 312-313, (also p. 216-217) José Ortega y Gasset, Toward a Philosophy of History, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Chicago, 1941). He continues with an observation which is similar to observations made by Fackenheim and Alexander and for that matter Hegel himself. "Once again we become aware of the possible application of theological concepts to human reality. Deus, cui hoc est nature quod fecerit ..., says St. Augustine. Man, likewise, finds that he has no nature other than what he has himself done." De Genesi ad litteram, vi. 13.24 (Patrologia Latina, vol. xxxiv).

certain level of things, a level which includes man as animal but not as human strictly considered. He thinks that "Physical science can throw no clear light on the human element.," and because of this fact "we must shake ourselves free, radically free, from the physical, the natural, approach to the human element. Let us instead accept this in all its spontaneity, just as we see it and come upon it. In other words the collapse of physical reason leaves the way clear for vital, historical reason." To return to Ortega's use of traditional philosophical terms, it is important to locate as precisely as possible where his usage of such terms are confined and where he searches for other terms to denote his conception of that which characterizes the truly human element in man. In his discussion of 'things' which follows the above, he observes that,

whatever be the differences between things, they all have one basic feature in common, which consists simply in the fact that things are, they have their being. And this signifies not only that they exist, that there they are, in front of us, but also that they possess a given, fixed structure or consistency. Given a stone, there exists forthwith, for all to see, what a stone is. Its every change and mutation, world without end, will be in specific combinations of its fundamental consistency. The stone can never be something new and different. This consistency, given and fixed once and for all, is what we customarily understand when we speak of the being of a thing. An alternative expression is the word 'nature'. And the task of natural science is to penetrate beneath changing appearances to that permanent nature or texture.\textsuperscript{15} \textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} op.cit., p. 293.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 293-294.
Ortega surveys the attempts of the natural sciences during the last three centuries to reveal man's nature, and concludes that the "prodigious achievement of natural science in the direction of the knowledge of things contrasts brutally with the collapse of this same natural science when faced with the strictly human element. The human element escapes physico-mathematical reason as water runs from a sieve."\textsuperscript{17} He thinks that it is 'the strange reality of human life' which brings the natural sciences to a full stop, and the reason is "that man is not a thing ... it is false to talk of human nature ... man has no nature". Because human life is not a thing and has not a nature, the consequence is that it is necessary to "think of it in terms of categories and concepts that will be radically different from such as shed light on the phenomena of matter."\textsuperscript{18}

Hegel was beyond doubt fully alert to the limitations of the natural sciences in respect to the deeper understanding of the human spirit. While discussing the 'Shortcomings of Empirical Science' in the \textit{Logic} of his \textit{Encyclopaedia}, Hegel points out that,

In its own field this empirical knowledge may at first give satisfaction; but in two ways it is seen to come short. In the first place there is another

\textsuperscript{17} "History as a System", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 294.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 295.
circle of objects which it does not embrace. These are Freedom, Spirit, and God. ... But in the second place in point of form the subjective reason desires a further satisfaction than empirical knowledge gives; this form is, in the widest sense of the term, Necessity. 19

His reasons for dissatisfaction with science are not quite the same as those of Ortega's; the failure of natural science to parallel its progress in its understanding of the natural world with progress in understanding man, was not so strikingly evident in Hegel's time. However, the more important question for the present task is whether or not Hegel would have agreed that the difficulties encountered by the natural sciences in trying to comprehend man arise out of the human element precisely as such. A passage in his Preface to the Phenomenology suggests that he would agree.

While the embryo is surely in itself human, it still is not human for itself; human for itself is only the educated reason which has made itself that which it is in itself. Only this is its actuality. 20

Although he does use the expression human nature from time to

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19 Encyclopaedia, Logic, #8 and #9. "So befriedigend zunächst diese Erkenntnis in ihrem Felde ist, so zeigt fürs erste noch ein anderer Kreis von Gegenständen, die darin nicht befasst sind, - Freiheit, Geist, Gott. ... Fürs andere verlangt die Subjektive Vernunft der Form nach ihre weitere Befriedigung; diese Form ist die Nothwendigkeit überhaupt." Enz., p. 41, 42. S. Werke, 8, p. 52.

20 WK, 1, p. 392; Phen., p. 83. "Wenn der Embryo wohl an sich Mensch ist, so ist er es aber nicht für sich; für sich ist er es nur als gebildete Vernunft, die sich zu dem gemacht hat, was sie an sich ist. Dies erst ist ihre Wirklichkeit." Phän., p. 22.
time, it will be necessary to ascertain what this expression meant for Hegel. In subsequent chapters, it will be necessary to search out Hegel's 'Philosophy of Man' in many of its ramifications, and no doubt the "circle of objects" (above) which escape empirical science will turn out to be realities which most intimately involve Hegel's conception of man as human.

B. The presuppositions of the doctrine of historicity

... such a conception implies that human nature is not a constant but a variable. ... a genuine history of man would have to be a history of how man came to be what he is, and this would imply thinking of human nature, ... as the product of an historical process, whereas it was regarded as the unchanging presupposition of any such process. - R. G. Collingwood

The notion of the historicity of man is somewhat differently understood by different contemporary thinkers. The latter continue to grapple with this notion, attempting to trace out, deductively and phenomenologically, its ramifications in concepts of truth, the 'nature' of man, God, morality and so on. They continue to inductively gather supporting evidence for this notion's greater credibility. For this reason it can be said that the ramifications of this notion are not yet fully understood, and that its full impact on traditional philosophical concepts has not yet been felt.

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Notwithstanding the above, the meaning of the doctrine of historicity is reasonably clear in respect to many of our contemporaries, and it is clear to some scholars that Hegel is one of the sources from which the doctrine emerged.

In regard to the philosophical status of 'historicity', Fackenheim observes that historicity "is a doctrine difficult to cope with. It cannot ... be regarded as obviously true because proved by empirical history. History may show that man is subject to historical change; it does not prove that his very being is involved in this change. The doctrine of historicity is not an empirical generalization but a metaphysical thesis."\(^{22}\) He goes on to elucidate the metaphysical assumptions without which the doctrine of historicity cannot arise. According to Fackenheim, the doctrine of historicity requires two assumptions, taken in conjunction:

(a) Historicity is qualitatively distinct from nature because there are actions performed by man, as well as events which happen to him or in him; and

(b) (i) the distinction between human being and human acting cannot in the end be maintained. (ii) Man is not endowed with a permanent nature capable of acting. (iii) a) His "nature" is itself the product of his acting, and b) hence not a proper nature at all. (iv) In acting, man makes or constitutes himself.\(^{23}\)


\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 26.
He contends that the crucial assumption is that human being is a self-making or self-constituting process, and that "this assumption alone can explain why the ontologist, inquiring into human being qua being and qua human should turn historian: whether speculative historian in the fashion of Hegel, or historian pure and simple in the fashion of Croce and Collingwood." He contends that if human being is a self-constituting process, the ontological study of man simply cannot be separated from the study of human history.²⁴ Fackenheim goes on to elucidate the logic of the concept of self-making, and to explain that only such a process can be historical "in its ontological constitution". However, he adds that, "not every such process is necessarily historical." He has in mind certain conceptions of the Deity which can be comprised within what he calls "the meontological concept of God," and which include "a process which is at least quasi-historical." The discussion which follows allows him to distinguish historicity proper from temporality through the concept of self-making, but requires him to introduce the concept of situation (which he considers "second in importance for the doctrine of

²⁴ To support this conclusion, he notes that if the ontological study of man were "Divorced from history, it would arrive not at a determinate human nature but at a mere abstract and empty possibility; or, if arriving at a determinate human nature, it would mistake for a permanent nature what is in fact a specific historical product." op.cit., p. 27-28.
historicity only to that of self-making itself") in order to distinguish historicity proper from quasi-historical eternity. "Only a being which is self-making-in-a-situation can be, in its ontological constitution, historical." He finds that there are two kinds of situation which are pertinent to historicity proper: i) the natural situation: "All historical acting occurs in a natural situation; otherwise it would not be historical at all." ii) the historical situation: "The concept of historical situation must be ... an ontological as well as an historical concept"; and "Unlike the natural situation ... the historical situation both limits and augments what it situates".25

C. Human Nature

Collingwood contends that Hume's assault "on spiritual substance" was the philosophical precursor "of scientific history because it destroyed the last vestiges of the substantialism in Greco-Roman thought." He says that in the eighteenth century, "Berkeley jettisoned the conception of material substance, and Hume the conception of spiritual substance."26

25 op.cit., p. 28-53.
26 p. 81; p. 47. It is interesting to note some of his remarks on Christian Philosophy in relation to the concept of substance in this same paragraph (of p. 47): "The metaphysical doctrine of substance in Greco-Roman philosophy was challenged by the Christian doctrine of creation. ... nothing is eternal except God, and all else has been created by God. ... The human soul is still called a substance, but it is now
In another section dealing with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, Collingwood had attempted to show how Locke and his followers had reoriented philosophy toward history without being fully aware of this. However, he thinks that "an unnoticed relic of substantialism implicit in the Enlightenment's quest for a science of human nature" prevented eighteenth century history from becoming scientific through a full utilization of the results of the philosophical revolution:

The eighteenth century historians, who recognized that all true history is the history of mankind, assumed that human nature had existed ever since the creation of the world exactly as it existed among themselves. Human nature was conceived substantially as something static and permanent, an unvarying substratum underlying the course of historical changes and all human activities. History never repeated itself but human nature remained eternally unaltered.²⁷

Collingwood had earlier suggested that even so sceptical a thinker as Hume had accepted this assumption, and here he supports this point by drawing attention to Hume's

²⁷ The Idea of History, p. 82.
Introduction to his *Treatise of Human Nature* in which he argues that the "science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences", that "all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature." Collingwood observes that Hume gives no indication that "the human nature he is analysing in his philosophical work is the nature of a western European in the early eighteenth century, and that the very same enterprise if undertaken at a widely different time or place might have yielded widely different results." Here Collingwood, by implication, reveals something of his conception of what constitutes man. Clearly, he does not agree with Hume's belief in a permanent human nature, whereas he does agree with Hume's attack on the concept of substance.

He thinks that Hume's attack on the concept of spiritual substance should have put an end to the conception of human nature as something permanent; but it did not, because "Hume substituted for the idea of spiritual substance the idea of constant tendencies to associate ideas in particular ways, and these laws of association were just as uniform and unchanging as any substance." Collingwood views Hume as on the right

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29 Collingwood, *opcit.*, p. 83. (Hume) "always assumes that our reasoning faculty, our tastes and sentiments, and so forth, are something perfectly uniform and invariable, underlying and conditioning all historical changes."
track, when, in effect, he resolved the concept of mental substance into the concept of mental process, for by abolishing spiritual substance, he established "the principle that we must never separate what a mind is from what it does, and that therefore a mind's nature is nothing but the ways in which it thinks and acts." 30

This principle concerning a mind's nature, which Collingwood thinks was, in effect, established by Hume, when he abolished spiritual substance, is of such a kind that it draws attention to a number of passages in the works of Hegel, for example:

The history of mind is its own act. Mind is only what it does, and its act is to make itself the object of its own consciousness. In history its act is to gain consciousness of itself as mind, to apprehend itself in its interpretation of itself to itself. This apprehension is its being and its principle, and the completion of apprehension at one stage is at the same time the rejection of that stage and its transition to a higher. 31

When man is considered as possessed of a permanent human nature, he has a historical past, certainly, but this latter

30 Collingwood, op. cit., p. 83.
31 Philosophy of Right, §343. "Die Geschichte des Geistes ist seine Tat, denn er ist nur, was er tut, und seine Tat ist, sich, und zwar hier, als Geist sich zum Gegenstande seines Bewusstseins zu machen, sich für sich selbst auslegend zu erfassen. Dies Erfassen ist sein Sein und Prinzip, und die Vollendung eines Erfassens ist zugleich seine Entäußerung und sein Übergang." Philosophie des Rechts, p. 289. S. Werke, 7, p. 447. See also Phän., p. 74, and Enz., §378 Zus.
does not make his nature historical. On the other hand, when man is considered as self-constituting process, the historical past must enter into his present being. Such a process can continuously constitute itself only by continuous appropriation of at least some of the past.

Passages are readily found to show the self-constituting character of human spirit in Hegel's philosophy. Nevertheless, he does use the expression 'human nature' at various places in his writings, so that there remains the possibility that he sought, in some way, to retain a conception of human nature. Was human nature, as conceived by Hegel, essentially permanent although subject to accidental historical changes? Does he distinguish between permanent human nature and man as subject to historical change? For example, in his historical studies both of history as such and of philosophy, how far does Hegel go in showing man as subject to historical change? The fact that he may do so from empirical grounds will not prove that he conceives of man's being as essentially involved in this change. It will be necessary to ascertain whether Hegel rejects the more or less traditional conception of a permanent human nature in favour

\[\text{If he did so, one might think that in consequence he should have been led from viewing human being as subject to fundamental change through history to viewing metaphysical truth as subject to a parallel process? If Hegel were to conceive man's very being as inseparable from his history, would not man's attainment of metaphysical truth be subject to the same limitation? Would he then not have to say that what is}\]
of a different conception of human nature which, nevertheless, incorporates the essential constituents of a notion of historicity, or whether he rejects the very idea of man having a nature, replacing man's 'nature' by man's history, his essence being what he has done, his deeds and actions. Again there are passages which seem to confirm the latter possibility, such as found in his discussions on the unity of man's inner and outer aspects:

There certainly may be individual cases, where the malice of outward circumstances frustrates well-meant designs, and disturbs the execution of the best-laid plans. But in general even here the essential unity between inward and outward is maintained. We are thus justified in saying that a man is what he does, (italics here mine) ... We may seek to rob men's great actions of their grandeur, by the insinuation of hypocrisy; but, though it is possible that men in an instance now and then may dissemble and disguise a good deal, they cannot conceal the whole of their inner self, which infallibly betrays itself in the decursus vitae. Even here it is true that a man is nothing but the series of his actions.33

metaphysically true in one particular period of history differs from what is metaphysically true in another period?

33 Enc., Logic, f140 Zus. "Es mag immerhin im Einzelnen der Fall seyn, dass durch die Ungunst äuszerer Umstände wohlgemeinte Abstichten vereitelt, dass zweckmässige Pläne in der Ausführung verkümmert werden; im Allgemeinen gilt jedoch auch hier die wesentliche Einheit des Innern und des Äusseren dargestalt, dass gesagt werden muss: was der Mensch thut, das ist er ... Wenn dann weiter bei lüblichen Leistungen Anderer, um dieselben zu verkümmern, von Heuchelei gesprochen wird, so ist dawider zu bemerken, dass der Mensch sich zwar im Einzelnen verstellen und Manches verbergen kann, nicht aber sein Inneres überhaupt, welches im decursus vitae unselhbar sich kund giebt, dargestalt dass auch in dieser Beziehung gesagt werden musz, dass der Mensch nichts Anderes ist als die Reihe seiner Thaten." S. Werke, 8, p. 316-317; 317-318.
Hegel uses this Inner-Outer relation in a variety of problems, but in applying this relation to the actions of men, he gives a clear indication of his rather dynamic concept of the being of man. His concept of man's being includes the connotation that 'a man is what he does'. He saw that an abstract human 'nature' could not do justice to the historically situated man. Although he does indeed speak of natures, it is not clear that he views such natures as permanent. In his early theological writings he directly examines the question of human nature, and at one point he makes the remark that as criteria for the necessarily richly complex needs of religious feeling, the universal concepts of human nature fail because they are too empty.34

Hegel does indeed labour mightily to avoid a human nature of bare abstract possibility,35 so that it is in his concrete dialectical analyses of man (more often: human spirit) living in a historical situation, engaged in a continuing interaction and participation in his society's religious, cultural, economic and political life, that Hegel's conception of concrete 'human nature' will be found. Because the accomplishment of his task extended over most of his life's work, the task of this present research will be to follow him, as far as possible, in this endeavour.

34 See Ch. II, p. 78.
35 See Ch. II (ETW) & III (Jena writings, Phenomenology of Mind), for some of the results of this labour.
3. Historical and Metaphysical Truth

To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason. Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes. - *Philosophy of Right*, Preface.36

In this well known passage, Hegel is often interpreted as meaning that philosophy is constrained by its own time, that it cannot speak of the future, and that philosophy is concerned to comprehend the present. However, the first sentence needs more attention, because when certain other passages, from his writings, are taken into account, Hegel can be interpreted to mean that philosophy can in studying the present (in conjunction with a deep understanding of the past, which he does not say here) discover the "Truth" which "is eternal," that in its most profound work, "occupying itself with the True," it "has to do with the eternally present."37

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36 "Das was ist zu begreifen, ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie, denn das, was ist, ist die Vernunft. Was das Individuum betrifft, so ist ohnehin jedes ein Sohn seiner Zeit; so ist auch die Philosophie, ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfasst. Es ist ebenso töricht zu wühnen, irgendeine Philosophie gehe über ihre gegenwärtige Welt hinaus, als, ein Individuum überspringe seine Zeit, springe über Rhodus hinaus." *P. des Rechts*, p. 16.

The result of this additional interpretation is that on the one hand the philosopher is limited by the historical circumstances of his age, and yet on the other he can attain to truth that is eternal. These two claims, prima facie, appear at odds with one another. When account is taken of the notion of historicity implicit in Hegel's philosophy, the importance of this difficulty is made more marked. Furthermore, when historicity is considered, the problem of ascertaining whether or not Hegel can legitimately make both claims becomes more complex. Nevertheless, because Hegel's thought on truth, both historical and metaphysical, is so intimately related to the historicity in his philosophy, this dual claim will be explored.

A. Historical Truth

Hegel took history more seriously than any other major philosopher has ever done, not only in the sense that he was one of the very few to deal at length with what a historian calls historical facts, but in the deeper sense that process, the succession of events, is the core of all his teaching. - Pardon E. Tillinghast

Hegel introduced history into philosophy and philosophy into history. He introduced the conception of continuous and continuing "development" to a number of the sciences, including many of the disciplines within philosophy, logic, metaphysics, and

epistemology, philosophy of history, religion, and art, political and moral philosophy, and the history of philosophy itself. Historians of philosophy, and philosophers who have a reasonably good appreciation of Hegel's arguments, can never again view the history of philosophy in quite the way that it was possible to view it before him, i.e. as a series of noble attempts, followed by refutations, collapse and renewed attempts. The studies of history, economics and political science similarly were placed in a different light. Whether or not practitioners of such disciplines are sympathetic or antagonistic to Hegel's ideas, they cannot but admit in justice that whole categories or ways of viewing man and his works have needed recasting because of the Hegelian perspective. Hegel helped to prepare 'man' for the more rapid and obvious historical changes about to commence in a world which prior to his time gave a greater appearance of stability.

History is written by men, historical records are maintained and retained by men, and the surviving artifacts and architecture of the past are monuments to the work, skill and sacrifice of men. It is not inappropriate to speak of men as the possessors of history, and as the actors in and of history. History then, concerns men and their acts; it also involves time and space and the environment within which events and acts occur. Moreover, it concerns language, thought and
truth. Aside from the many technical difficulties of the historian, the individual trying to understand his own history, or attempting to situate his own life in respect to the past and present, recognizes some obvious difficulties. Statements expressed and recorded in the past, may possess or seem to possess only minimal relevance to the present. Knowledge gained vary arduously in and of the proximate present, very often quickly loses its relevance.

Now it has been shown (S.1 C. p. 7), that for Hegel, man helps to initiate historical movements, that he plays his part in them, but at best, he only discerns the general tendencies and the approximate shape and direction of the forces at work, so that he may know what change is ripe for the time. It is not at all unreasonable to say, in effect, that man in struggling to comprehend his present historical situation, is limited to a rather dim and uncertain perception of the direction the World-Spirit is about to take. However, in respect to the actual present historical situation, it will be necessary to ascertain:

a) whether or not Hegel was a historical relativist, and if he was, in some sense, in what way and to what extent, and

b) whether or not Hegel so conceives of man and his world, that there continues sufficient enduring structure in both to allow man to make valid judgments about his present historical situation, and furthermore to allow him to relate his present to his past. (This latter problem leads to the question of how philosophical truth can transcend history.)
B. Metaphysical Truth

Man has become increasingly historically self-conscious, and the more he does so, the more he may tend to doubt the timelessness of religious and moral principles, as well as of customs, laws and the institutions of society, the more he may see in them a relevance only relative to their proximate times and places. As Hegel helped to develop modern man's historical self-consciousness, it is important to show how he conceived man as having a capacity to transcend its limitations. To put it another way, man lives and acts in history, and yet to act wisely in history, as opposed to practically, efficiently or successfully, it would seem that he must endeavour to reflectively rise above history from time to time. Because Hegel appears to allow man, as philosopher, this capacity, it will be necessary to discover whether he does succeed in showing that it is the case that he has this capacity.

If, for Hegel, man is only what he has been, what he is at a particular time and what he is just about to become, it will be necessary to ascertain whether man as man is just as much a product of historical development as the historical

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39 Man as actor and observer, records and interprets while helping to fashion history, and in this sense is history. Collingwood states that the object of history is "actions of human beings that have been done in the past". op.cit., p. 9.
products of his work and other activities. In other words, if man were through and through imbued with a total historicity, there would seem to follow from such a hypothetical position, a fundamental denial of the possibility of discovering truth that is eternal.

C. In philosophy, the predicament of history is not wholly beyond human solution.

No philosopher has excelled Hegel in historical consciousness and imbuing philosophy with history and a kind of historicity which has yet to be determined. Yet, it seems probable that he also saw the problem, the predicament that followed, and he certainly argued the case that men could in certain instances attain through philosophy truth that is eternal. Fackenheim, for example, thinks that Hegel does belong to the main stream of metaphysical thought, in so far as he did hold that man, in metaphysics at least, can absolutely attain to timeless truth surmounting or going beyond history. He makes the interesting observation that

in its long and eventful career, metaphysics has made one claim without hesitation and with the utmost

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40 Fackenheim notes that "Such a metaphysician as St. Thomas Aquinas may have disagreed with Plato or Avicenna. But he agreed with them that metaphysical truth was timeless. Were the angelic doctor alive today, he would no doubt argue against Descartes, Kant and Hegel. But such an argument across the ages could itself presuppose the common conviction that metaphysical truth is independent of any age." op.cit., p. 9.
consistency: that the predicament of history ... is not wholly beyond human remedy; that at least when engaged in metaphysical discourse, man can rise above history to a grasp of timeless truth.41

On this important point, Hegel stands firmly with some of his great predecessors, in that he does argue that the philosopher at least can gain timeless truth. So then metaphysical truth is timeless for Hegel, albeit in a certain Hegelian precariousness, with at least an apparent fragility. Then, if metaphysical truth does go beyond the limitations of history, it must be ascertained how Hegel is able to show that man is capable of attaining it or is capable of being cognizant of it.

Argument Resumed

In addition to the central argument with which this chapter began, it will be argued that although Hegel fully recognizes the limitations imposed on human thought by history, he nevertheless attempts to retain for man, through philosophy, the capacity to transcend history. This argument ties in closely with the central thesis, and will require a secondary argument contending that Hegel is not a historicist because he does not think that all philosophical questions are supplanted by historical questions.

41 Fackenheim, op.cit., p. 9.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICITY IN CONCRETE HUMAN LIFE

Argument

The intention in this chapter is to provide support for the contention that even in Hegel's early writings, some of the characteristics of a notion of historicity are present. It is intended to provide evidence for and to begin to explicate the premisses of the argument, that if Hegel wanted to effect a reconciliation between some of the 'contradictions' in concrete human life which drew his attention, such as the lack of harmony between the religious and intellectual culture of men and their social, civil and political life, then he had to develop a notion of historicity to satisfactorily encompass human life in its dynamic wholeness. It is clearly the case that he did want to effect a reconciliation of 'contradictions' in concrete human life.

1 G.R.G. Mure, writing of the years at Tübingen and the six years spent by Hegel in Bern and Frankfurt at the end of the eighteenth century, states that, "He was trying throughout these years to make sense of human life in concrete terms, in the history of nations and, more particularly, in the history of national religions. ... At this embryonic stage, influenced more by Herder than by the old-fashioned dons of Tübingen or the professional philosophers except Kant, he found his problems in the spirit of the Greeks or the Romans, the spirit of Judaism or Christianity." The Philosophy of Hegel. London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 43.

2 There is ample evidence that Hegel wanted to achieve a reconciliation between some of the "contradictions" found in concrete human life in his theologische
In his early writings, there are to be found a number of the problem areas with which Hegel will persistently engage his thinking during the whole of the remainder of his life. There are also suggestions of and early formulations of solutions and conceptions which will emerge in his later writing.

It is proposed to examine some of the early showings of some conceptions which are pertinent to his later philosophy, and which within the context of this present study, are pertinent to his conception of the historicity of man. Hegel treats of concrete human life in terms of historical, religious and national cultures, and in the process he engages his thought in a continuing endeavour to comprehend the contradictions and oppositions he discovers there. He finds cleavages between the particular individual and himself, between the former and the religious life of his community, and between the latter and the national and political life of the community.

1. Critique of Christianity

It was while Hegel was living in Bern that his fragments contrasting "Folk Religion and Christianity", his "Life of Jesus" and the first two parts of "The Positivity of the Christian Religion" were written. He seems to have begun by attempting to view Christianity as fundamentally one with the moral law of reason as formulated by Kant. Hegel also appears to have begun with a somewhat critical attitude toward Christianity coupled with a deep sympathy for and appreciation of the quality of Greek civilization. This appreciation extended to Greek religion which he tended to see as an integral part of Greek culture and civil society. Whereas the Christian religion throughout history often seemed in conflict with the culture and state structure in which it grew, Greek religion seemed to Hegel to be more in harmony with the whole life of the Greeks, adding to the nobility and beauty of their way of life. Karl Löwith remarks that

Hegel went through the same course of progress in his relationship to the Christian religion as he did in

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his relationship to the state. The philosophical justification of the doctrines of Christianity is preceded by a criticism of theology and of Christianity which is matched only by Hegel's pupils.4

He refers to Hegel's early sharply critical attitude to the state, which as Hegel developed, gradually progressed to the time when he could be found justifying the place and structures of the state. Kaufmann calls Hegel's Early Theological Writings, "The antitheological essays". In reply to his own question as to whether these early papers are really theological, he says, "Only insofar as Webster defines one meaning of theology as 'the critical, historical, and psychological study of religion and religious ideas'" Kaufmann contends that the essays "are not antireligious but consistently depreciate theology in any customary sense of that word."5

Certainly, the dictionary definition Kaufmann cites does concisely but reasonably outline the broad parameter of much of Hegel's work in these essays. There is, however, a deeper level in his analyses where Hegel works to comprehend very fundamental theological and philosophical problems.


A. Folk (or National) Religion and Christianity

In the five fragments, which the editor of these unpublished manuscripts entitled "Folk (or National) Religion and Christianity", Hegel contrasts objective religion with subjective religion. He notes that whereas the former "can be systematized, presented in a book or a lecture", the latter "expresses itself only in feelings and acts." Hegel observes that "Subjective religion is all that matters ... let the theologians quarrel about dogmas, about that which belongs to objective religion." He thinks that subjective religion is much the same in all good human beings, but their objective religion may be of almost any shade. Hegel reveals a theme which will run throughout all of his work and career, the opposed categories, objectives: subjective, which


7 WK2, p. 122. "Aus subjektive Religion kommt alles an ... die Theologen mögen sich über die Dogmen, über das, was zur objektiven Religion gehört ..." theologische Jugendschriften, p. 8.

8 HtJ, p. 10. Hegel cites Lessing's Nathan der weise (1779) which urges toleration and respect for other religions, and first and foremost, that men should be moral.
probably derive chiefly from Kant. Another theme found here, which will remain with him, is that of the limitations of the understanding, which necessitates some other capacity of man to bring about a reconciliation of moral and other conflict; in these early writings it is "love"9 and later it will be "Reason". Even at this stage of his development he had begun to part company with Kant on some important philosophical issues. Certainly moral principles need be "authorized by the universal reason of man"; in addition, they need be "so human that they correspond to that stage of morality which a people has attained".10 This latter observation typifies Hegel's appreciation of the historical factor in the development, application and extension of moral principles in society. This type of remark crops up again and again in his work, and aside from his Science of Logic, with more frequency as time goes on. In short, this brief passage can be cited as an early example of Hegel's cognizance of the historicity of civilizational advance.

9 HtJ, p. 11, 18.

10 WK2, p. 124. "Die Lehren müssen notwendig, ... so beschaffen sein, dass sie eigentlich durch die allgemeine Vernunft der Menschen autorisiert sind, ...". "Diese allgemeinen Lehren müssen zugleich menschlich sein ... und zwar so menschlich, dass sie der Geisteskultur - und der Stufe von Moralität angemessen sind, auf der ein Volk steht". HtJ, p. 21.
Hegel then takes up the central theme in these fragments, which is to compare "The Folk Religion" of the Greeks with Christianity. He finds that "the popular feasts of the Greeks were all religious feasts" and that "even the excesses of the bacchanals, was sacred to some god". On the other hand, he finds that communion, which ought to be a feast of universal brotherhood, is often a good deal less than this. He makes a rather caustic comparison of Christ's teachings and method of presentation with that of Socrates, somewhat in the tone of some of Russell's observations about Christ and Christianity. In the following seven or eight pages Hegel does include an attempt to redress the imbalance of his negative and critical remarks about Christ and Christianity with a more positive consideration of Christ and of the good effects of Christianity.

Nevertheless, Hegel returns to the difficulties and contradictions which arise when for example Christ's prohibitions are set against the need of laws and oaths in civil society. He thinks, at this stage of his development, that

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12 HtJ, p. 27.

13 For example, compare the three short sections: The Character of Christ; Defects in Christ's Teaching; The Moral Problem, in Russell's Why I am Not a Christian, p 13-18.
"the teachings and the principles of Jesus were really suitable only for the education of single human beings, and intended only for this." He sees difficulties following any attempt to extend Christ's command to the young man to distribute his money to the poor, from the individual to a large group of people. Even when, as in the case of the early Christians, a group constitutes itself in order to live together with property and possessions held in common, "the spirit of such a command disappears precisely at the moment when such institutions are established". The reasons he offers for this observation are that "not only does it awaken, by introducing compulsion, the desire for concealing something ... but it also restricts the benefits of this renunciation to the members of the group"; he concludes that it thus "stands opposed to the spirit of love".

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15 WK2, p. 126. "So ist der Geist eines solchen Gesetzes gerade im Augenblick der Einrichtung selbst verschwunden, die durch eine Art Zwang nicht nur die Luft zu Verheimlichungen, ... veranlaszt (sondern auch), die Wohltatigkeit einer solchen Resignation nur auf ihre Mitglieder, ... und dem Geist der Menschenliebe entgegen ist," HtJ, p. 41-42.
Besides theology Hegel's criticism includes the institutions of Christianity. Speaking of the "Reformers" he notes that "The establishment of church power as the champion of the freedom of conscience against the powers of the princes never occurred to them: they subjected Christianity to worldly power". His range of attack also includes some of the leaders of the reformation. While Luther "took from the clergy the power to rule by force, over man's purses, too, ... he himself still wanted to rule over their opinions."\(^{16}\)

Earlier he had found Kantian reason insufficient for the task of lifting mankind to a new and superior level of morality; he now also seems to find the institutions of Christianity inadequate for this task. "Institutions and laws of a small society, where each citizen retains the freedom to be, or not to be, a member, are in no way admissible when extended to a large civil society and cannot coexist with civil liberty."\(^{17}\) He finds intolerable, "publicly

\(^{16}\) WK2, p. 127. "- denn eine Kirchengewalt als Stütze der Gewissensfreiheit zum Gegengewicht gegen Fürsten­gewalt aufzustellen, daran dachten sie nicht, denn sie unter­warfen das Christentum der weltlichen Macht - ... er benahm den Geistlichen die Macht durch Gewalt und über die Beutel zu herrschen - aber er wollte es noch über die Meinungen -", HtJ, p. 42.

\(^{17}\) WK2, p. 127. "dasz Einrichtungen, Gesetze einer kleinen Gesellschaft, wo jedem Bürger die Freiheit Mitglied zu sein oder nicht - wenn sie auf die grosse bürgerliche Gesellschaft ausgedehnt werden, nimmer schicklich sind und mit der bürgerlichen Freiheit nicht bestehen können."HtJ, p.44.
employed guardians of morals" and that "the first to be mis-
understood" is always the one who "acts with a pure heart."

His position at this period of his young manhood
seems to be that a form of folk religion is required for the
above undertaking. Concerning this religion Hegel thinks it
essential that "it does not force its teachings upon anyone,
nor does violence to any human conscience." Hegel's stand
is positive in respect of the place and importance of morality
and reason. This folk religion "must not contain anything
that universal human reason does not recognize - no certain
or dogmatic claims which transcend the limits of reason ...".

It is also positive toward religion, at least of a non-
institutionalized form. "The highest end of man is morality,
and among his dispositions for promoting this end, his

18 WK2, p. 127. "Jeder findet es unerträglich,
wenn Fremde sich in seine Sachen, besonders in seine Handlungs-
weise, mischen; am unerträglichsten sind öffentlich aufgestell-
te Sittenwächter. Wer mit lauterem Herzen handelt, wird
am ersten miszverstanden ...". HtJ., p. 45.

19 WK2, p. 128. "dasz sie ihre Lehren nicht
aufdringe, keines Menschen Gewissen Zwang leide -", p. 50.

20 WK2, p. 128. "dasz sie so einfach als möglich
sein, nichts enthalten sollen, was nicht die allgemeine
Menschenvernunft anerkennt - nichts wodurch etwas bestimmt,
etwas dogmatisch behauptet würde, das die Grenzen der Vern
unft übersteigt -". Ibid., p. 50.
disposition for religion is one of the most outstanding." 21

Kant, Herder and Lessing have clearly influenced
Hegel in this series of fragments on folk religion. No less
evident, considering the times, is the influence of Rousseau
and Montesquieu. The latter's L'Esprit des Lois provides an
insightful analysis of the government and laws of ancient and
European states, in which he tried to take account of climate,
religion, population and customs, in addition to political
liberty, taxation, and the nature of laws. If consideration
is given to one of Hegel's explanatory comments on his con­
ception of the Volksgeist, a similarity with Montesquieu's
esprit général can be noted: "The Spirit of a nation, its
history, religion and the degree of political freedom it has
reached cannot be separated one from the other, neither as
regards their influence nor as regards their quality; they are
interwoven in one bond ...". 22 Marcuse states quite flatly
that there is a similarity between the two terms:

Hegel's use of the Volksgeist is closely related to
Montesquieu's use of the esprit général of a nation

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21 WK2, p. 128. "- aber der höchste Zweck des Men­
schen ist Moral und unter seinen Anlagen diesen zu beförder­
nt ist seine Anlage zur Religion eine der vorzäglichsten -",
EJ, p. 48.

22 "Geist des Volks, Geschichte, Religion, Grad der
politischen Freiheit desselben - lassen sich weder nach ihrem
Einfluss aufeinander, noch nach ihrer Beschaffenheit abgeson­
der betrachten - sie sind in ein Band zusammenverflochten -". 
ETJ., p. 27.
as the basis for its social and political laws. The 'national spirit' is not conceived as a mystical or metaphysical entity, but represents the whole of the natural, technical, economic, moral and intellectual conditions that determine the nation's historical development. Montesquieu's emphasis on this historical basis was directed against the unjustifiable retention of outmoded political forms. Hegel's concept of the Volksgeist kept these critical implications.23

In the passage by Hegel, there is, besides an early use of the word "spirit" in its connection with national history and religion, the further connection of "the spirit of a nation" with "the degree of political freedom it has reached" (italics mine). This use of these terms has relevance to the development of Hegel's notion of historicity. Spirit and Freedom are two central themes throughout most of his work. Spirit is perhaps the central theme, but freedom belongs with it. So far as human spirit is concerned, history is the medium of its development, because its degree of realization and attainment of freedom are gained in time through work and struggle. Maturation of man and his culture is needed; freedom is not "a given".

B. The Life of Jesus

Hegel, using a historical approach, wrote a life of Jesus in which he endeavoured to interpret the gospels in a Kantian light. This essay was probably written between the years 1793 and 1795 (Kaufmann gives the year 1795).

The life of Christ is described in almost purely natural terms: Jesus is depicted as the son of Joseph and Mary, the miracles of the gospels are neglected or treated naturalistically. Hegel portrays Jesus as asking men to honour "the eternal law of morality and Him whose holy will cannot be affected by anything but by the law." This sentence is made clearer by a sentence found near the beginning of the essay, where he contends that "Pure Reason, entirely without any limitation, is the deity itself." Later, somewhat more Christ-like, he has Jesus saying to the Jews, "You were commanded to love your friends and your nation, but you were permitted to hate your enemies - I say however unto you: Respect mankind even in your enemy, if you cannot

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24 *HtJ*, p. 75.


love him." He also has Jesus explain that the ideas he offers them, are not his ideas as such, that he is not asking that they be accepted on his authority, because what he says, he subjects "to the judgment of universal reason".

Jesus teaches a morality based on reason and duty to the universal moral law of reason, in opposition to (what Hegel sees as) meticulous rules and rigid prescriptions of the Jewish religion: "Act according to the maxim which you can will to be a universal law among men, valid also against you. This is the fundamental law of ethics - the content of all legislation and of the sacred books of all peoples." Hegel's essay ends with the burial of Jesus.

Various explanations have been suggested as to Hegel's motivation in writing this somewhat strange essay. It does not seem to have been designed for publication. But, at the same time, it does seem an attempt to provide a kind of folk


29 "Was ihr wollen könnt, dass als allgemeine Gesetz unter den Menschen, auch gegen euch gelte, nach einer solchen Maxime handelt - dies ist das Grundgesetz der Sittlichkeit - der Inhalt aller Gesetzgebungen, und der heilgen Bücher aller Völker." Ibid., p. 87.

30 Ibid., p. 136.
religion, the need for which his previous writing had made a case. Kaufmann thinks this to be "the motivation of this tour de force":

Hegel's attempt to write the scripture of his folk religion. Moral demands are strengthened psychologically by the thoroughly humanized figure and story of Jesus. The strange result should be compared not only with the Gospels but also with Kant, who is here made readable and palatable for the people. Theology is still rejected, and Jesus is employed to propagate Kant's ethics.31

Another explanation, not unrelated and more or less complementary to the one above, suggests that Hegel wrote the essay to work out for himself in a concrete way, the meaning and implications of Kantian ethics. Kroner takes this view of the matter:

he was writing not for publication but to probe the doctrines and principles he found in the movements of his day. Since he was educated in a theological seminary, it was natural for him to interpret the teachings of Jesus through Kant's ideas and ideals. This was his way of appropriating Kantian philosophy to himself. In writing a life of Jesus with the conceptual tools of Kantian ethics, Hegel did not intend to commit himself to this interpretation.32

The explanations offered by Kaufmann and Kroner concerning Hegel's writing this essay in the manner he did, seem

31 Kaufmann, The Owl and the Nightingale, p. 131. He points out that there have been, quite literally, thousands of attempts to present 'the life of Jesus' since Hegel. However, such was not the case when Hegel wrote his "Life of Jesus".

32 Kroner, Introduction, Early Theological Writings, p. 6.
appropriate to his way of working and to his stage of development. Jesus as portrayed by Hegel is concerned to ask of men that they take up "the service of reason and virtue". The flavour is Kantian; the concepts are Kantian. The good will gives "the moral law to itself and does not accept it as the command of any external authority", as Mure notes of Kant's ethical doctrine when discussing Hegel's 'Early Writings'. "Though he greatly modified it, this Kantian doctrine persists throughout Hegel's philosophy as the basis of his concept of freedom." Hegel's concept of freedom will become more complex as he begins to develop his own philosophy, but by keeping in mind the Kantian element, his later emphasis on "necessity" may be kept in perspective.

C. The Positivity of the Christian Religion

'The Positivity of the Christian Religion' produced later in his first tutorship, is a more significant work. In this essay he undertook to show how Christianity had evolved through historical forces and circumstance into a "positive"

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33 "der Dienst der Vernunft und der Tugend", *HtJ*, p. 122.

34 G.R.G. Mure, *The Philosophy of Hegel*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 144. Here Mure is specifically concerned with the next essay to be discussed, "The Positivity of the Christian Religion" but the apply equally well to the "Life of Jesus".
religion, when, it appeared to him to be the case that the teachings of Christ were not 'positive' or authoritarian, but rather were fundamentally rationalistic. "He undertook to raise religion and virtue to morality and to restore to morality the freedom which is its essence."35

There is an improvement of quality in this work, as compared to his earlier 'Life of Jesus', because although it is still dependent on Kantian ethics it is less so, and there are signs that his close historical study of Judaism, Christ and Christianity was beginning to work a recasting of his thought. This essay seems much more his own thought, when comparison is made with the two previous essays.

In the version of the introductory or prefatory pages written at this time,36 Hegel gives clear expression of the principle or presupposition which he will employ to separate the factual, historical and positive elements of the Christian religion from the rational and natural elements.

Wholly and entirely in reference to the topic itself, I remark here that the general principle to be laid down as a foundation for all judgments on the varying modification, forms, and spirit of the Christian

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36 Thirteen pages of material, revising the beginning sections, were written by Hegel in Frankfurt, probably about the year 1800.
religion is this - that the aim and essence of all true religion, our religion included, is human morality, and that all the more detailed doctrines of Christianity, all means of propagating them, and all its obligations (whether obligations to believe or obligations to perform actions in themselves otherwise arbitrary) have their worth and their sanctity appraised according to their close or distant connection with that aim.37

It must be admitted that Kaufmann is correct when he points out38 that Hegel shares with Kant the assumption "that the aim and essence of all true religion, our religion included, is human morality". But Hegel's skilful use of the "principle" in connection with a close consideration of the historical context within which Christ lived and developed and within which Christianity emerged and began its early development, is something different. What is found here is a solid showing of Hegel the reflective historian, or the philosopher with a strong sense of history, as well as the theologian. His


38 W. Kaufmann, Hegel, Reinterpretation, p. 62.
concern to explore certain problems of concrete human life within the appropriate historical setting is well illustrated in this essay.

Hegel appears unwilling to assign responsibility for the 'positivity' of Christianity to Christ. He endeavours to bring out the emphasis in the teaching of Jesus on the value of personal virtue over outward form and exaggerated attention to external observances.

so morality had sunk from the freedom which is its proper character to a system of like usages. Jesus recalled to the memory of his people the moral principles in their sacred books and estimated by them the Jewish ceremonies, the mass of expedients they had devised for evading the law, and the peace which conscience found in observing the letter of the law, in sacrifices and other sacred customs, instead of in obedience to the moral law. To the latter alone, not to the descent from Abraham, did Jesus ascribe value in the eyes of God; in it alone did he acknowledge the merit which deserved a share of blessedness in another life.39

'Positivity' as exemplified in the Christian emphasis on unique historical events and a personal God-man and Saviour,

39 ETW, p. 69-70. "so war Moralität von der ihr eigentümlichen Freiheit zu einem System solcher Gebrauche herabgesunken; er rief die moralischen Prinzipien, die in den heiligen Büchern seines Volkes lagen, demselben ins Gedächtnis zurück, ... würdigte nach denselben die Zeremonien und die Menge Ausflüchte, die man gefunden hatte, das Gesetz zu eludiern, - die Beruhigung, die das Gewissen in Befolgung des Buchstabens des Gesetzes, in den Opfern und andern heiligen Gebrauchen statt in dem Gehorsam gegen das Sittengesetz fand, - nur diesem, nicht der Abstammung von Abraham, legte er einen Wert in den Augen der Gottheit bei, nur ihm gestand er Würdigung, in einem andern Leben der Seligkeit teilhaftig zu werden zu -", HTJ, p. 154.
he considered to have developed out of the limitations of the
times and to certain failings of the Jewish people.

How could we have expected a teacher like Jesus
to afford any inducement to the creation of a positive
religion, i.e., a religion which is grounded in
authority and puts man's worth not at all, or at
least not wholly, in morals? Jesus never spoke
against the established religion itself, but only
against the moral superstition that the demands of
the moral law were satisfied by observances of the
usages which that religion ordained. He urged not a
virtue grounded on authority (which is either mean­ing­
less or a direct contradiction in terms), but a free
virtue springing from man's own being.*

In the passage above Hegel provides a definition of what he
means by a positive religion: "a religion which is grounded
in authority and puts man's worth not at all, or at least not
wholly, in morals". If it were not for the qualifying phrase
at the end of this definition, the label "positive" would
probably have been difficult to apply to Christianity or
other religions.

He wondered whether there were occurrences in the
life of Christ which had made necessary the expressing of the

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40 ETW, p. 71. "Wie hätte man erwarten sollen,
daz ein solcher Lehrer, der sich nicht gegen die eingeführte
Religion selbst, sondern nur gegen den moralischen Aberglau­
en, durch die Beobachtung ihrer Gebrauche den Forderungen
des Sittengesetzes Genüge geleistet zu haben, erklärt - der
nicht auf eine auf Autorität gegründete Tugend (welches ent­
weder ohne Sinn oder unmittelbar ein Widerspruch ist) sondern
auf eigne freie Tugend drang, - dass ein solcher Lehrer Ver­
anlassung zu einer positiven (auf Autorität gegründeten, und
den Wert des Menschen gar nicht oder wenigstens nicht allein
law of reason in a form which appeared to deviate from reason and in so doing became 'positive'. As Hegel saw it then, pure religion is rational and moral, while the Christian religion has many of the 'positive' characteristics which Judaism and other institutional religions possess, such as creeds, rites, regulations, and dogmas from which Jesus had attempted to free religion. Whence came the positive element in Christianity? It is here in his early writings that Hegel's notion of 'historicity' begins to emerge. That his conception of 'positivity' is related to 'historicity' is made evident in his showing of historical facts as being 'positive' by their being conditioned and enclosed by the historical situation.

We must therefore be allowed, in explaining the origin of the Christian religion, to assume that external circumstances and the spirit of the times have also had an influence on the development of its form; the study of this influence is the aim of church history, or more strictly the history of dogma.

In the present inquiry there is no intention of following the guiding hand of history and studying the more detailed development of the doctrinal course taken by the church. We are to search, partly in the original shape of Jesus' own religion, partly in the spirit of the epoch, for certain general reasons which made it possible for the character of the Christian religion as a virtue religion to be misconceived in early times and turned at first into a sect and later into a positive faith.

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41 ETW, p. 73. "so musz es erlaubt sein, um die Entstehung des Gebäudes der christlichen Religion zu erklären, anzunehmen, dass auch äussere Umstände, der Geist der Zeiten Einfluss auf die Bildung ihrer Form gehabt haben; welches der Zweck der Kirchen --, noch eigentlicher der Zweck der Dogmengeschichte - Die Absicht gegenwärtiger Untersuchung soll nicht diese speziellere Entwicklung des Ganges, den die Kirche dabei
Kroner remarks upon the connection of Hegel's discussion of positivity with historicity, when he attempts to elucidate Hegel's extended reply to the question of how the religion of Jesus became "transformed into the 'positive' Christian religion".

Positivity, he wrote, is in a certain sense nothing else than historicity. Every historical fact is positive in that it is not purely and merely rational but conditioned and encompassed by historical circumstances. A religion is a historical reality; as such, it cannot be as abstract and definite as the law of reason. In this sense Greek religion was as positive as Judaism or Christianity.42

Even so, Kroner adds, Greek religion is more in agreement with moral freedom, "in spite of its historically positive character". Hegel viewed Greek religion as being without dogma, creed and theology; because the Greeks were masters of both their inner and outer life, "they developed neither theological systems nor ecclesiastic institutions", suggests Kroner. More important though, within the perspective of the present undertaking, is Hegel's early appreciation of the historicity of religious development.


Hegel observed that Jesus was born, grew up and taught, among a people without political freedom, who had drawn within the 'complex' of formal and rather rigid rules and laws of their religion. Early Christianity could not but be affected by the religious culture of the Jewish community of that time, thus acquiring 'positivity'.

When Christianity was adopted by the various peoples making up the Roman Empire, the development of 'positivity' was accelerated, so he thought. Toward the end of the manuscript, Hegel seeks to explain this tendency. "Thus the despotism of the Roman emperors had chased the human spirit from the earth and spread a misery which compelled men to seek and expect happiness in heaven, robbed of freedom, their spirit, their eternal and absolute element, was forced to take flight to the deity."\textsuperscript{43} He seeks to explain the concern for "the metaphysical or transcendental side of the idea of God."\textsuperscript{44} "The doctrine of God's objectivity is a counterpart to the corruption and slavery of man, and it is strictly only a


\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 161. "... der metaphysischen oder transzendentalen Seite der Idee von der Gottheit ....". Ibid., p. 226.
revelation, only a manifestation of the spirit of the age."45

The passage above ends with an expression which in later years will seem to typify one aspect of Hegel's philosophy of history: 'the spirit of the age (or time). It now seems a commonplace piece of language, but in Hegel's writing it often carries considerable freight. Here it carries the complex of connotations having to do with the range of values, useages, customs and conceptions, more or less commonly held, which go to make up the concrete life of the people of the historical period in question. One could reasonably use the word 'historicity' here, in one of its senses, and write of the historicity of man of the period being revealed in the descriptions of the spirit of the time:

The spirit of the age was revealed in its objective conception of God when he was no longer regarded as like ourselves, though infinitely greater, but was put into another world in whose confines we had no part, to which we contributed nothing by our activity, but into which, at best, we could beg or conjure our way. It was revealed again when man himself became a non-ego and his God another non-ego.46


This theme of a chasm developing between man and God will reappear in the *Phenomenology*. He goes on to write of the "clearest revelation" of the spirit of the age, "the mass of miracles which it engendered" and of the "most dreadful revelation ... when on this God's behalf men fought, murdered ..." and did so many dreadful things. Interestingly, from the perspective of this inquiry into Hegel's conception of the historicity of man, Hegel remarks of this period, "God must have ceased altogether to be something subjective and have entirely become an object, and the perversion of the maxims of morality is then easily and logically justified in theory."\(^{47}\) Here he gives a paradigm case of the mass of men standing in isolated separation from God, a God who appears foreign to the inward spirit of men. This is perhaps the paradigm case of ruptured harmony for Hegel, and the condition of man which most needs mediation and reconciliation.

To conclude this section, Hegel contended that whereas Jesus worked toward a purely moral religion free of positivety, he also united respect for the sacredness of moral law with respect for the sacredness of his own person. Through His

\(^{47}\) *ETW*, p. 163. "- In einer solchen Periode musste die Gottheit völlig aufgehört haben, etwas Subjectives zu sein, sondern ganz zum Objekt geworden sein; und jene Verkehrtheit der moralischen Maximenward dann ganz leicht und konsequent durch die Theorie gerechtfertigt -*. *HtJ*, p. 228.
apostles, this joining of moral law with historical personages led to the development of ecclesiastical authority and to subsequent institutional religious positivity.

2. Harmony in life through love

It is appropriate now to turn to the particular early writings in which Hegel attempts to show that for man, the means of achieving harmony with other men and within himself, is the spirit of love. This latter he finds to be the essence of the good tidings and the bidding which Jesus proclaimed, gave to, and urged upon the world, as the way to man regaining the unity and integrity of life. The Kantian ethic is found wanting: with man's practical reason contesting with inclination, self-mastery may be achieved but not true freedom, and certainly not a full restoration of the harmony of duty and reason with inclination.

The writings referred to were written in Frankfurt-am-Main between 1797 and 1800. These years were productive, both in terms of intense study and continued writing. "The

48 "Le Christ a été un sage, comme Socrate. Les disciples ont transformé sa doctrine en une foi d'autorité et en une secte religieuse. Hegel explique cette transformation par une série de facteurs qui se rattachent au Christ, à son milieu et au caractère de ses apôtres." Paul Asveld, op. cit., p. 59-60.

Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" was written here in the period 1798-1799. The Third Part of "The Positivity of the Christian Religion", intended as a partial revision of Part I, was also written here about the year 1800. Hegel thought more deeply upon the significance of Christ and Christianity. The improvement in the quality of his work that was noticeable in "The Positivity of the Christian Religion" over his earlier "Life of Jesus", becomes more evident in the writings mentioned in the paragraph above.49 In effect he freed himself from Kant's influence sufficient to approach and think through problems connected with Christianity's origin and development from a different point of view.

A. The Spirit of Christianity

It appears that it was during these years in Frankfurt that many of Hegel's most fundamental conceptions were

49 There is also a noteworthy change of style in his Frankfurt writings, more like his later Phenomenology of Mind than his earlier writings. Kroner remarks, "The change of style from The Positivity of the Christian Religion ... to The Spirit of Christianity is so radical as to be almost alarming. The author of the first essay might have been a contemporary of Moses Mendelssohn, Lessing, Sulzer or Kant; the author of the second was evidently a contemporary of Jacobi, Herder, Schleiermacher, Fichte, Schelling and Hölderlin. A century seems to separate these two essays, which are the work of one man, writing in successive years." Kroner adds the further observation that "Hegel's thinking was as strikingly altered as his style." Hegel's Early Theological Writings, p. 8.
initially developed, and it cannot be emphasized enough that many of these conceptions developed out of reflection on the Christian religion. Some of his most basic notions seem to derive from Christian concepts. One of these is his notion of 'Spirit'. "Faith is a knowledge of spirit through spirit." Another is the continuum and interaction between the objective and the subjective. It would probably be an error to suppose that its source was only to be found in his analysis of Christian love; contemporary philosophical ideas played their part in his thinking. Still his insightful discussion of the 'Last Supper' seems to refer forward to some of the remarkable passages in his Phenomenology of Spirit: "The spirit of Jesus, in which his disciples are one, has become a present object, a reality, for external feeling. Yet the love made objective, this subjective element become a thing, reverts once more to its nature, becomes subjective again in the eating." Other Christian ideas which he appears to have absorbed into his thinking and returned in his writing are:


a) The son of God is also son of man; the divine in a particular shape appears as a man. The connection of infinite and finite is of course a "holy mystery," because this connection is life itself. Reflective thinking, which partitions life, can distinguish it into infinite and finite, and then it is only the restriction, the finite regarded by itself, which affords the concept of man as opposed to the divine. But outside reflective thinking, and in truth, there is no such restriction.

In this rather significant passage, Hegel's life long interest and struggle with the problem of the relation of the infinite to the finite is shown to have well begun; it gives a hint of the synthesis that will be forged in his *Phenomenology* and subsequent works. How he attempts to resolve this problem will have a bearing on his notion of historicity because it concerns man and God, and relates to questions of time and

52 As Nohl and Knox indicate in their respective footnotes, Hegel here is quoting and criticising Kant.


54 See H.S. Harris, "The Young Hegel and the Postulates of Practical Reason". In the concluding pages of his paper, Harris connects Hegel's conception of human immortality with "the life of spirit (which) is strictly a function of life in this world. It is, quite simply, the immortal aspect of life in this world, the aspect which makes human history eternally available." In the course of his discussion of this issue, Harris makes an observation which is relevant to Hegel's notion of historicity: "The great advance of the Christian
the timeless, history and the eternal. 55

b) Beauty of soul has as its negative attribute the highest freedom, i.e., the potentiality of renouncing everything in order to maintain one's self. 56

This passage utilizes a concept which will assume increasing importance in his writings, that of negativity, which in this instance, he couples with freedom. Hegel, in the several pages before and after the page containing the above, writes in a manner reminiscent or prescient of the pages containing his analysis of the Master-Slave relationship in the Phenomenology. Fate, the beautiful soul, justice and Christian Love are the themes considered.

religion over Greek religion when, after more than a decade of reflection, Hegel was at last able to identify it, lies in the fact that in the Christian God this dependence of the divine life upon human life, the dependence of the immortal spirit on the finite historical individual, is made explicit. Athena was never a real woman; but Jesus was a real man. And the record of his life, ... shows us a man who was deliberately and consciously trying to make clear to his fellows just what the divine or immortal aspect of humanity is. Thus his apotheosis is not, like that of Hercules, the revelation of a natural power in its immortal aspect, but the revelation of the divinity of the human spirit as such." Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion, The Wofford Symposium, Edited by Darrel E. Christensen, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, p. 75. cf. ETW, p. 292-93; HTJ, p. 335.


56 ETW, p. 236. "Die höchste Freiheit ist das negative Attribut der Schönheit der Seele, d.h. die Möglichkeit auf alles Verzicht zu tun, um sich zu erhalten." HTJ, p. 286.
Opposition is the possibility of reunification, and the extent to which in affliction life is felt as an opposite is also the extent of the possibility of resuming it again. It is in the fact that even the enemy is felt as life that there lies the possibility of reconciling fate. This reconciliation is thus neither the destruction or subjugation of something alien, nor a contradiction between consciousness of one's self and the hoped-for difference in another's idea of one's self, nor a contradiction between desert in the eyes of the law and the actualization of the same, or between man as concept and man as reality. This sensing of life, a sensing which finds itself again, is love, and in love fate is reconciled.57

Hegel conceives the new ethics taught by Jesus as an ethics of love. What reason cannot do, love does by bringing about a harmony both between man and man and within individual man himself. Life is beset by division and disruption; Jesus sought to restore human life to its original harmony through love, the higher law; this was his fulfillment of the law. Through the spiritual inclination of love, man is given the power to conform to the law freely. Love overcomes the conflict of duty and ordinary inclination; it is also the means of reconciling man with his fate.

In this essay, Hegel supplements his idea of the spirit of a people, or in this case, spirit of a religion, with his conception of its 'fate' or 'destiny'. This idea is probably drawn in the first instance from Greek tragedy, but as Mure suggests, it is not "the fate of the Greek tragedians, the blind necessity against which men struggle till they are broken ... it is rather the romantic idea of destiny as an inner development of character. It is what a man is, his own life and 'pathos', but it appears to him as foreign."58

Hegel discusses the fate both of Jesus and his church. In fact, he also writes of the "fate of his nation", "fate of his people" and the "fate of the world".59 Important elements in the fate of Jesus, he finds in the historical situation and the cultural milieu of the time and place in which Jesus lived and worked. Hegel states that Jesus "had to repel his nation's fate from himself,"60 but this is not entirely possible, in that his origin, development and history, and his life's successes and failures occur within the context of his people and their land. The other elements of his fate


derive from his character, teaching and aims. In respect to the fate of his church, one passage which sums it up well, while bringing out the contradiction in the early church's efforts to avoid its fate, is the following:

This is the point at which the group is caught in the toils of fate, even though, on the strength of the love which maintained itself in its purity outside every tie with the world, it seemed to have evaded fate altogether. Its fate, however, was centered in the fact that the love which shunned all ties was extended over a group; and this fate was all the more developed the more the group expanded and, owing to this expansion, continually coincided more and more with the world's fate both by unconsciously adopting many of that fate's aspects and also by continually becoming sullied itself in the course of its struggle against that fate.61

The fate of the church is connected with the world's fate. Here may be seen an example of an early formulation of an aspect of the historical dimension in the philosophy of Hegel, that of 'the necessity' found in historical development.

Hegel is evidently more sympathetic to Christianity in this essay; when it is compared to the other essays so far

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discussed, this difference stands out. He was critical of Judaism in the others, but here, Judaism seems to take the place of ecclesiastical Christianity as the culprit. Hegel depicts the Jews as having contributed significantly to the cleavage in the soul of man and to the 'positivity' of Christianity. He thought the Jews were wrong in their excessive insularity and in their attempts to remain an exclusive people for an exclusive God. The Greeks seemed more amicably oriented toward nature. Hegel saw Jesus as introducing an element of the Greek spirit into the religious life he advocated.

"The faith he created was a synthesis of Judaism and Hellenism" observes Kroner, and "Since there is a certain spiritual kinship between Judaism and Kantianism, the new faith of Jesus may also be conceived of as the synthesis of Hellenism and Kantianism."  However, so far as there is Kantianism present here, it plays a decidedly secondary role to the words reported of Jesus. This essay is Christian in spirit, while still critical in the technical sense.

It is not only the ethics of the Jews which come under criticism, for as indicated at the start of this section,

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62 Kroner supports his contention about the kinship between Judaism and Kantianism in this way: "Both the Old Testament and Kantian ethics exalt the idea of moral law and the relentless transcendence of the Absolute. Both are utterly remote from any personal mysticism and gnosticism and rigidly separate the spheres of God and the world." 'Introduction', ETW, p. 10. The second clause of the second sentence is surely not a fair or balanced characterization of Judaism.
Kantian ethics are found wanting also. Hegel had become dissatisfied with Kant's choosing and acting for duty's sake alone. While in such a principle, subjective freedom is nobly proclaimed and upheld, it remains a law, an 'ought' much as in the Judaic tradition. It is "not an 'is'. It cannot dictate a matter or content of duties to be performed. ...

Moral man, on this view, is at best self-mastering, not truly free" comments Mure. He thinks that the predominant source of Hegel's dissatisfaction is

his passionate, un-Kantian, interest in human life as displayed in history. He feels that in 'life', a term to which he now attaches something approaching the wider sense which he later gave to 'spirit', reason must be somehow much less merely subjective, much more deeply immanent, than Kant with his unhistorical and rationalist eighteenth-century background could grasp. Positive historical circumstance accordingly becomes less the outward accretion tending to encumber and pervert the subjective moral law, more the necessary medium for its concrete objective embodiment.  

In these very apt observations, Mure throws some light on the connection between Hegel's early theological thought and his later and mature philosophy. Even at this stage of his thinking, the concreteness of historico-cultural contexts does not represent an awkward difficulty to be side-stepped, but represents the very field and focus for his studies of human development. Hegel comes to see that the fate or destiny of Christianity, the 'positivity' of its Church, is part and

63 Mure, op. cit., p. 46-47.
parcel of its historical development. "And it is its fate that church and state, worship and life, piety and virtue, spiritual and worldly action, can never dissolve into one."\textsuperscript{64}

B. Fragment on Love

Some attention should be made to the fragment on "Love" which Hegel wrote a year or so before "The Spirit of Christianity", i.e. late in 1797 or early in 1798. The recurrent theme and problem is once again human oppositions, separation and isolation: the conflicts within man, the alienation between man and nature and the estrangement between man and man; and he thinks that the needed reconciliation of these oppositions is only attainable through love.

True union, or love proper, exists only between living beings who are alike in power and thus in one another's eyes living beings from every point of view; in no respect is either dead for the other. This genuine love excludes all oppositions. It is not the understanding, whose relations always leave the manifold of related terms as a manifold and whose unity is always a unity of opposites \textsuperscript{left as opposites}\textsuperscript{7}. It is not reason, either, because reason sharply opposes its determining power to what is determined. Love neither restricts nor is restricted; it is not finite at all.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{64 ETW, p. 301.} "und es ist ihr Schicksal, dass Kirche und Staat, Gottesdienst und Leben, Frömmigkeit und Tugend, geistliches und weltliches Tun nie in Eins zusammenschmelzen können." 

\textsuperscript{65 ETW, p. 304.} "Wahre Vereinigung, eigentliche Liebe findet nur unter Lebendigen statt, die an Macht sich gleich, und also durchaus für einander Lebendige, von keiner Seite gegen einander Tote sind; sie schliesst alle Entgegensetzungen aus, sie ist nicht Verstand, dessen Beziehungen
The love that Hegel has in mind here is that whole and unifying love he considered Jesus to have urged upon man, which would bring about an authentic living unity of opposites. It can be seen here that Hegel is still struggling with the roles and limitations of human understanding and reason in coming to grips with the problem of alienation. In wrestling with the relations of man with self, the world, man, and God, Hegel is concerned with the nature of man. Because it is on the stage of history that human alienation develops and is displayed, a sense of human historicity begins to emerge in Hegel's writings, through his efforts to work his way into the minds of men of different historical periods and situations.

Hegel also connects love with life, and he does so in a manner which foreshadows his later dialectical analyses of life, experience and human reason's way of knowing. He contends that in 'love',

1. life is present as a duplicate of itself and as a single and unified self.
2. Here life has run through the circle of development from an immature to a completely mature unity;
3. when the unity was immature, there still stood over against it the world and the possibility of a cleavage between itself and the world;

"das Mannigfaltige immer als Mannigfaltiges lassen und dessen Einheit selbst Entgegensetzungen sind; sie ist nicht Vernunft, die ihr Bestimmen dem Bestimmten schlechthin entgegenseetzt; sie ist nichts Begrenzendes, nichts Begrenztes, nichts Endliches;" HtJ, p. 379.
(4) as development proceeded, reflection produced more and more oppositions (unified by satisfied impulses) until it set the whole of man's life in opposition to objectivity;

(5) finally, love completely destroys objectivity and thereby annuls and transcends reflection, deprives man's opposite of all foreign character, and discovers life itself without any further defect.

(6) In love the separate does still remain, but as something united and no longer as something separate; life in the subject senses life in the object. 66

Even in this relatively early and unpublished fragment, he begins to conceive life as mind, and as subject, that in which different states and conditions are brought together into an enduring unity. Here, external, determinate and opposed conditions are finally harmoniously united by love, with life brought into full contact with life. The self-constitutional character of man's being begins to emerge, which is an essential characteristic needed for a comprehensive grasp of any adequate conception of man's historicity. 67

66 ETW, p. 305. "In ihr findet sich das Leben selbst, als eine Verdoppelung seiner Selbst, und Einigkeit desselben; das Leben hat von der unentwickelten Einigkeit aus, durch die Bildung den Kreis zu einer vollendeten Einigkeit durchlaufen; die unentwickelten Einigkeit stand die Möglichkeit der Trennung und die Welt gegenüber; in der Entwicklung produzierte die Reflexion immer mehr Entgegengesetztes, das im befriedigten Triebe vereinigt wurde, bis sie das Ganze des Menschen selbst ihm entgegensetzte, bis die Liebe die Reflexion in völliger Objektlosigkeit aufhebt, dem Entgegengesetzten allen Charakter eines Fremden raubt, un das Leben sich selbst ohne weiteren Mangel findet. In der Liebe ist das Getrennte noch, aber nicht mehr als Getrenntes - als Einiges und das Lebendige fühlt das Lebendige." 67

C. Fragment of a System

During these years at Frankfurt he produced another manuscript dealing with problems and themes similar to those of *The Spirit of Christianity*. Apparently there were forty-seven sheets in the original, but only two have survived (34 and 47). Nohl gave the somewhat misleading title "Fragment of a System (1800)" to the surviving pages. Knox remarks that, "It contains some of the seeds of the later system, but there is nothing to indicate that Hegel was writing the sketch of a system rather than a theological essay."68

He is still determined that thought, because of its nature and mode of operation, cannot adequately comprehend the wholeness of life and reality. Hegel continues to place religion, in its purest and highest form, ahead of philosophy:

> Philosophy therefore has to stop short of religion because it is a process of thinking and, as such a process, implies an opposition with nonthinking processes as well as the opposition between the thinking mind and the object of thought. Philosophy has to disclose the finiteness in all finite things and require their integration by means of reason. In particular, it has to recognize the illusions generated by its own infinite and thus to place the true infinite outside its confines.69

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68 ETW, p. 309, footnote 1.
69 Ibid., p. 313. "Die Philosophie musz eben darum mit der Religion aufhören, weil jene ein Denken ist, also einen Gegensatz teils des Richtdenkens hat, teils des Denken-dend und des Gedachten; sie hat in allem Endlichen die Endlich-keit aufzuzeigen, und durch Vernunft die Vervollständigung desselben ((zu)) fordern, besonders die Täuschungen durch ihr
In this passage there is clear indication that Hegel has not yet found a way of going beyond the limitations set by Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. He seeks a solution in a form of mystical religion. To keep a perspective appropriate to this stage of the development of Hegel's thought, it should be noted that this fragment is more philosophical than the balance of his 'theological writings'.

In this fragment there is also a suggestion of criticism in respect to Schelling's philosophy of nature, which may anticipate some of the things he has to say a little later in *The Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*.

Now because life, as an infinity of living beings or as an infinity of figures, is thus, as nature, an infinitely finite, an unrestricted restrictedness, and because this union and this separation of the finite and the infinite are within nature, nature is not itself life but is only a life crystallized by reflection, even though it be treated by reflection in the worthiest manner.

Hegel was attracted to a number of Schelling's ideas, and was

sympathetically disposed to his conception of nature as a creative organism, but here he seems to see difficulties in his attempt to unite the finite and the infinite. Hegel's criticism of Schelling on this point will become more pronounced in his *Phenomenology*, although, again, he will refrain from referring to Schelling by name. There is also more than a hint of criticism of Fichte to be found in this "fragment of a system". For example when discussing the separation of God from man, within his discussion of the relationship between man and God, he notes that,

> the blessedness enjoyed by the Ego which opposes itself to everything and has thus brought everything under its feet is a phenomenon of the time, at bottom equivalent to the phenomenon of dependence on an absolutely alien being which cannot become man, or if it did become man (namely, at a point in time) would, even in this union between eternal and temporal, infinite and finite, remain something absolutely specialized, i.e., would remain just an absolute unit.71

The initial reference seems to be that of Fichte's philosophy of the absolute ego, which Hegel depicts not as truth eternal, but as "a phenomenon of the time". Hegel appears to imply that this philosophy's total separation of Ego from the world, is

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similar to the theism of Judaism. Knox provides explication of the words above which evidently refer to Christ: "The overcoming of this separation by the Incarnation is confined to the historical Jesus and fails to achieve the absolute union of time and eternity."72 As with the passage referring to Schelling, Hegel closes with a complimentary remark, that "(this blessedness may be man's) worthiest and noblest achievement if the union of the eternal with the temporal were ignoble and ignominious."73 Already Hegel is found to be struggling with the concept of a speculative system, hopefully sufficiently encompassing to bring about "the union of union and nonunion."74 If such a system is not possible, then Fichte's system would be "man's worthiest and noblest achievement."

Before leaving this fragment, attention should be drawn to the similarity between the language dealing with "the elevation of the finite to the infinite"75 here, and that used

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72 ETW, p. 319, footnote 19.
73 Ibid. "- das Würdigste, Edelste, wenn die Vereinigung mit der Zeit unedel und niederträchtig wäre." HTJ, p. 351.
74 "Life is the union of union and non-union" is the complete expression of the clause above. ETW, p. 312. "das Leben sei die Verbindung der Verbindung und der Nichtverbindung." HTJ, p. 348.
75 Ibid., p. 313. "Die Erhebung des Endlichen zum Unendlichen ...". Ibid.
in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*\(^7\)\(^6\) dealing with much the same problem. This is noteworthy not only because it shows once again that Hegel was deeply concerned with the problem of man's relation to God, and more specifically with the closely related problem of distinguishing between man's finite and infinite aspects, as he continued to be throughout his working life,\(^7\)\(^7\) but because these closely related problems bear on Hegel's success, partial success or failure in replacing the more traditional view of a permanent human nature with a conception of man as a self-constituting being. To put it a different way, the second of the two problems is particularly pertinent to Hegel's notion of historicity, because the finite and infinite aspects of man comprise both what man is and what he has become. The last four words refer to man's self-development and by implication to man's historicity. In the process of exposing some of Hegel's attempts at articulation and solution of this problem, of man's finite and infinite aspects, in another chapter, important elements of his conception of human historicity should be revealed.


\(^7\)\(^8\) Indeed, he may never have fully satisfied himself that he had adequately and properly expressed his solution of this crucial and nagging issue, i.e. man's relation to God. That there is some ambiguity in this area of his work is suggested by the serious disagreements among and divergent paths taken by his followers on this point.
From the standpoint of this inquiry, Hegel's view of the nature of man demands persistent attention. It is possible to write of the historicity of things,79 and it is eminently reasonable to write of the historicity of institutions, cultures and civilizations, but the latter are products of man's work and creativity. Hegel well understood and expounded insightfully on this level of human historicity. He also understood the need to soundly ground and comprehend well the development of the self-hood80 of the individual human being. In this fragment there is a passage which perhaps presages his analysis of self-hood in the Phenomenology.

The concept of individuality includes opposition to infinite variety and also inner association with it. A human being is an individual life in so far as he is to be distinguished from all the elements and from the infinity of individual beings outside himself. But he is only an individual life in so far as he is at one with all the elements, with the infinity of lives outside himself.81

In this fragment there is also to be found a passage which is somewhat dialectical in form and which, in essence,

81 ETW, p. 310. "Der Begriff der Individualität schlieszt Entgegenseitung gegen unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit, und Verbindung mit demselben in sich; ein Mensch ist ein individuelles Leben, insofern er ein anderes ist, als alle Elemente, und als die Unendlichkeit der individuellen Leben auszer ihm, er ist nur ein individuelles Leben, insofern er eins ist mit allen Elementen, aller Unendlichkeit der Leben auszer ihm;" *HTJ*, p. 346.
expresses in clear language, how he himself will subsequently employ his dialectical method. (See below)\textsuperscript{82} Of more direct interest is another passage in which Hegel connects Infinite Life with Mind or Spirit. While writing of the 'self-elevation of man from finite life to infinite life' and having directly equated this activity with 'religion', he goes on to make the observation that, "We may call infinite life a spirit in contrast with the abstract multiplicity, for spirit is the living unity of the manifold ... The spirit is an animating law in union with the manifold which is then itself animated."\textsuperscript{83} Here, spirit (or mind) and life are represented as essentially the same unifying power, and even though the former does not

\textsuperscript{82} "every expression whatsoever is a product of reflection, and therefore it is possible to demonstrate in the case of every expression that, when reflection propounds it, another expression, not propounded, is excluded. Reflection is thus driven on and on without rest; but this process must be checked once and for all by keeping in mind that, for example, what has been called a union of synthesis and antithesis is not something propounded by the understanding or by reflection but has a character of its own, namely, that of being a reality beyond all reflection. Within the living whole there are posited at the same time death, opposition, and understanding, because there is posited a manifold that is alive itself and that is, as alive, can posit itself as a whole." \textit{ETW}, p. 312. \textit{HtJ}, p. 348. Hegel still strives to discover and formulate, but without adequate success, "a method which would understand life by both positing and uniting opposites. Nowhere else can the fountainhead of Hegel's dialectic be better studied in the intellectual struggle reflected in this paper." Knox, \textit{ETW}, footnote 6, p. 313.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{ETW}, p. 311. "das unendliche Leben kann man einen Geist nennen, im Gegensatz zu der abstrakten Vielheit, denn Geist ist die lebendige Einigkeit des Mannigfaltigen ... Der Geist ist belebendes Gesetz in Vereinigung mit dem Mannigfaltigen, das als dann ein belebtes ist." \textit{HtJ}, p. 347.
appear here as superior to the latter, Hegel by introducing spirit or mind at this stage, gives weight to "the fact that the unity of life is, in the last analysis, the work of the subject's free comprehension and activity, and not of some blind natural force." In short, Hegel is found here to introduce his fundamental philosophical concept 'Spirit', within a context which is sufficiently philosophical to allow this identification, i.e., the connotations carried by his concept 'Spirit' in this passage are identifiable with those carried by 'Spirit' in his mature works. The philosopher Hegel is beginning to emerge in such expressions, expressions in which the philosophical significance of the oppositional dichotomies, in which he is so deeply concerned, receive more definite delineation.

3. Empty Concept of Pure Human Nature

It was probably in 1800, while still at Frankfurt, that Hegel produced a revised version of the pages beginning the first part of The Positivity of the Christian Religion. Special attention will be given to these pages, because in them there is to be found an explicit examination of "the concept of human nature". Hegel notes that "before a religion or any part of it can be set down as positive, the concept of human nature, and therefore man's relation to God, must first be defined." Fichte's book The Vocation of Man, published in

84 Marcuse, op.cit., p. 39.
the spring of 1800, seems to have played a part in causing Hegel to reflect on this matter. "In recent times there has been much preoccupation with this concept; some have believed that with the concept of man's vocation as their standard they had a tolerably clear field for proceeding to sift religion itself."85

In the pertinent passages in these pages having to do with the nature of man, Hegel is concerned to take account of the "stages in cultural development"86 when considering the concept or concepts of human nature. He thinks that "the general concept of human nature is no longer adequate"87 as a criterion for assessing the positivity of religion.

A. Abstract Concept of Human Nature

Whereas Hegel does not appear to have been willing to wholly cast aside the general concept of human nature, he does

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86 Ibid., p. 168. "Stufengang von Bildung". Ibid., 139-140.

87 Ibid., p. 169. "Der allgemeine Begriff der menschlichen Natur wird nicht mehr hindreichend sein;" Ibid., 141.
appear to have sought to overcome the deficiencies inherent in the purely abstract concept as such, and in the "universal concepts of human nature" which "are too empty to afford a criterion for the special and necessarily multiplex needs of religious feeling." The difficulties which arise when general concepts are applied to the individual and to the concrete situation, which Hegel never relents from showing, seem to arise with respect to the concept of human nature in a distinctly crucial way.

In his revision of the first sections of 'The Positivity of the Christian Religion', Hegel notes that "A positive religion is contrasted with natural religion, since human nature is one and single, while there may be many positive

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90 As previously mentioned, 'The Positivity of the Christian Religion', was written in 1795-96; the revision was written about 1800, after 'The Spirit of Christianity' (1798-99).
religions." He thinks it clear from this contrast "that a positive religion is a contranatural or a supernatural one, containing concepts and information transcending understanding and reason and requiring feelings and actions which would not come naturally to men", but from this general explanation, he thinks that it is also clear that before a religion can be considered positive, 'the concept of human nature must first be defined'.

At this point, it might be thought that Hegel was about to set down some explication of a more or less traditional concept of human nature. However, even at this comparatively early date in his philosophical career, his historical consciousness was well developed. Furthermore, his sense of the dialectical nature of knowledge and of the inadequacies and incompleteness of otherwise true statements, is shown in these significant pages. He thinks that,

A long series of stages in cultural development, extending over centuries, must have been traversed.

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92 Ibid. HtJ, p. 139. Supra, footnote 85, p. 77.
before a period could arrive in which concepts had become abstract enough to allow of the conviction that the infinite multiplicity of manifestations of human nature had been comprised in the unity of a few universal concepts.93

This reference to the temporal factor in cultural and conceptual development points forward to his contention in the Philosophy of History that human civilizations needed centuries and various stages of historical development before men generally could become conscious that all men are free. A long maturation process is often necessary before the implications and ramifications of a rich concept can be comprehended, and longer yet before the concept is realized through changes in laws, institutions and social attitudes. Hegel's sense of the historicity of cultures and civilizations is revealed in the passage above, as of course in the later work.

Hegel continues with a paragraph which shows more clearly the effort he was making to re-set his essay in a setting of somewhat greater sympathy and understanding for Christianity as an institution. "Because these simple concepts are universal, they also become necessary concepts and characteristics of humanity as a whole." With fixed and

overly abstract concepts of human nature in mind, "The variations in national or individual manners, customs, and opinions become accidents, prejudices, and errors," i.e., 'particularities' and variations in religious practice naturally tend to make a religion appear positive; "thus the religion consistent with any of these variations is a positive religion because its bearing on accidental things is itself an accident, though as part of the religion it is also a sacred command."

A short discussion follows concerning the fact that the Christian religion has been both reproved and praised for its capacity to make itself consistent "with the most varied manners, characters, and institutions". Interestingly, while

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94 Paul Asveld accurately depicts Hegel's position on human nature at this time: "La nature humaine de l'Aufklärung n'a jamais existé, réplique Hegel. La nature vivante et concrète a toujours été infiniment plus riche que ce pauvre concept général. Il s'en suit que ce concept n'est pas suffisant pour juger, du caractère positif d'une religion." La Pensée Religieuse du Jeune Hegel, p. 193.

noting that the Christian religion "was cradled in the corruption of the Roman state" and "became dominant when that empire was in the throes of its decline", he adds "we cannot see how Christianity could have stayed its downfall."\footnote{ETW, p. 168. "Die Verdorbenkeit des römischen Staats war ihre Wiege; die christliche Religion wird herrschend, als dies Reich in seinem Sinken begriffen war, und man sieht nicht, dass sein Sturz durch dieselbe aufgehalten worden wäre;" \textit{HtJ}, p. 140.} This insightful remark is interesting because not all of the historians of the eighteenth\footnote{Cf. Edward Gibbon (1737-94), \textit{History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire}, Volume 1, chapters 15 & 16. The first volume appeared in 1776; the 2nd and 3rd in 1781 and the last three in 1788. Perhaps it was this work that Hegel was thinking of as he penned the above remark.} and nineteenth centuries were of similar opinion. Even during this present century the myth that Christianity was somehow responsible for the 'decline and fall of the Roman Empire' has persisted. Hegel concludes his historical sketch with two memorable sentences, "In all climates the tree of the Cross has grown, taken root, and fructified. Every joy in life has been linked with this faith, while the most miserable gloom has found in it its nourishment and its justification."\footnote{ETW, p. 168-69. "Unter alien klimaten ist der Baum des Kreuzes gediehen, hat Wurzeln geschlagen, und Früchte gebracht. Alle Freuden des Lebens haben Völker an sie geknüpft, und der unglücklichste Trübsinn hat in ihr seine Nahrung und Rechtfertigung gefunden." \textit{HtJ}, p. 140.}
B. Human Nature in its Purity

Hegel next takes up the question of 'human nature in its purity'. Before proceeding further with his reply to this question, it should be remarked that Hegel's sustained hard thinking on the very notion of Christ's historical uniqueness, of the temporal intervention of God-in-Man-in-the-World, and the subsequent role of Christianity in history, played a distinct part in his thinking it important to reconsider the concept or concepts of human nature. History became important with the advent of Christ and the development of His Church. The history of the Jewish people gained historical and world significance because of the unique events involved in the birth, life and death of Jesus, the Jew. The world could not longer be regarded as an endless repetition of like events. The world now had a before, an after, a moving present and future, (and an end). The Roman Empire and Jewish society were 'this' before Jesus began His teaching, and were 'that' when He completed His task. His disciples and their followers went out into the world to carry out His commands. Their work took time and took different shape among different peoples. The world did not return to what it was; it could not; time's arrow followed the success and failure of Christ's followers in their endeavours to see His "will be done on earth as it is in Heaven".
Prophets, saints and holy men of other religions, although part of their respective histories, do not appear to have significantly altered the sense of time for mankind. Christ as God and Man did just this. At least in the long view, the world was now to develop in a certain direction, that is toward God, and men were directed to become more Christ-like, that is, more God-like. Surely, even for the orthodox, and certainly for Hegel, this would mean advancing in freedom in the spirit of love and truth for "God and neighbour". Each of the italicized words is of great significance to Hegel's philosophy and for his notion of 'historicity'.

The self-making in Christ's image required henceforth of men, admittedly not an unassisted self-making, will take time. The re-making of society as a reflection and result of man's self-making in Christ's image must be a process of development in time. Henceforth, 'time and history must be taken seriously'. And for Hegel, truth must be considered not only outside of time but also within time. Furthermore, for Hegel, the meaning of Spirit and its activity must be taken and considered very seriously. Aside from the fairly obvious help from Kant and contemporaries like Hölderlin, Schelling, Fichte and Goethe, Hegel must lean most heavily upon the Gospels and Aristotle for the evolving of his concept of 'Spirit'. 
However, before Hegel's concept of spirit as it applies to man, can be taken up, we have first to continue the pursuit of some of his early considerations concerning human nature. He tells us that, "The general concept of human nature admits of infinite modifications; and there is no need of the makeshift of calling experience to witness that modifications are necessary and that human nature has never been present in its purity." As Hegel sees it, "A strict proof of this is possible" but "all that is necessary is to settle the question: 'What is human nature in its purity'?" While it might appear that, "This expression, 'human nature in its purity', should imply no more than accordance with the general concept" it is really the case, in Hegel's view, that

the living nature of man is always other than the concept of the same, and hence what for the concept is a bare modification, a pure accident, a superfluity, becomes a necessity, something living, perhaps the only thing which is natural and beautiful.99

99 ETW, p. 169. "Unendliche Modifikationen lässt der allgemeine Begriff der menschlichen Natur zu, und es ist nicht ein Notbehelf, sich auf die Erfahrung zu berufen, dass Modifikationen notwendig sind, dass die menschliche Natur niemals rein vorhanden war, sondern es lässt sich streng erweisen; es ist hinreichend, nur zu fixiren, was denn die reine menschliche Natur wäre? Dieser Ausdruck soll nichts in sich fassen, als die Angemessenheit an den allgemeinen Begriff. Aber die lebendige Natur ist ewig anderes als der Begriff derselben, und damit wird dasjenige, was für den Begriff bloße Modifikation, reine Zufälligkeit, ein Ueberflüssiges war, zum Notwendigen, zum Lebendigen, vielleicht zum einzig Natürlichen und Schönen." HtJ, p. 140-41.
At this point, Hegel concludes that, "this gives a different appearance to the criterion for the positivity of religion which was set up at the start. The general concept of human nature is no longer adequate."\textsuperscript{100}

Among the observations made in the subsequent discussion are the following:

1) Religion is not originally positive;

2) Religion may become positive at a certain stage of the development of cultural life;

3) "Religion has to become positive at this stage, or there would be no religion at all."\textsuperscript{101}

4) Nevertheless, religion which, on many counts, is deplorable, is not necessarily positive,
   a) "because it would accord with the nature of its time.
   b) A nature demanded by such a religion would doubtless be a deplorable one;
   c) but the religion would have fulfilled its purpose by giving this nature the only higher Being in which it found satisfaction and with which it was compatible. ...

5) when this nature begins to have a sense of itself and thereby to demand freedom in and for itself instead of placing it in its supreme Being, then and only then can its former religion begin to appear a positive one."\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{100} ETW, p. 169. "Damit erhält nun der anfangs ausgestellte Maszstab für die Positivität der Religion ein ganz anderes Aussehen. Der allgemeine Begriff der menschlichen Natur wird nicht mehr hinreichend sein;" HtJ, p. 141.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid. "Freilich ist nun die Religion positiv geworden, aber sie ist es auch nur geworden, sie war es ursprünglich nicht; die Religion muss nun positiv sein, weil es sonst gar keine geben würde." Ibid.

It is here that Hegel draws the conclusion with which this section's discussion began, to the effect that the emptiness of the universal concepts of human nature precludes their being made a criterion for the various and complex needs of religious feeling. Paul Asveld sees clearly that Hegel realized full well that what is needed is an appreciation of the concrete and historical human nature before a judgment can be made of the positive character of a religion. "Hegel affirme simplement qu'il faut juger du caractère positif d'une religion d'après la nature humaine concrète et historique, et non d'après le concept général intemporel de la nature humaine qu'a utilisé l'Aufklärung." 

C. An Ideal of Human Nature

Hegel does not wish his readers to understand his argument as containing "a justification of all the pretensions
of established religions, for all superstition, all church despotism" etc. But he wishes his readers to see that to the judgment of the observer, "the superstition is of necessity positive all the time, simply because he could not make his judgment at all unless an ideal of humanity hovered before his mind." A distinction important for an understanding of his later work and, more specifically, for his concept of human nature, is made at this point by Hegel, between an ideal of human nature and general concepts of man's relation to God.

An ideal of human nature, however, is quite different from general concepts of man's vocation or of man's relation to God. The ideal does permit of particularization, of determination in detail, and therefore it demands appropriate religious actions, feelings, usages, demands an excess of these, a mass of excessiveness which in the lamplight of general concepts seems only ice and stone. Only if this excess annuls freedom does it become positive, i.e., if it has pretensions against understanding and reason and contradicts their necessary laws.

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106 ETW, p. 170. "Man würde das Bisherige schlecht verstanden haben, wenn man darin eine Rechtfertigung aller Anmaszungen festgesetzter Religionen, alles Aberglaubens, alles kirchlichen Despotismus, ... schen wollte. ... für den Beurteiler aber ist er notwendig ein Positives, eben weil diesem als Beurteiler ein Ideal von Menschheit vorschweben musz." HTJ, p. 142.

107 Ibid. "Ein Ideal der menschlichen Natur ist aber ganz etwas anderes, als allgemeine Begriffe über die menschliche Bestimmung, und über das Verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott. Das Ideal lässt sehr wohl Besonderheit, Bestimmtheit zu, und fordert sogar eigentümliche religiöse Handlungen, Gefühle, Gebräuche, einen Ueberfluss, eine Menge von Ueberflüssigem, was vor dem Laternenlicht der allgemeinen Begriffe nur als Eis und Stein erscheint. Nur wenn das Ueberflüssige die Freiheit aufhebt, wird es positiv, das heiszt, wenn es Prätension gegen den Verstand und die Vernunft macht, und deren notwendigen Gesetzen widerspricht." Ibid.
Once again, and in this case, at an early stage of his philosophically productive years, Hegel draws attention to the importance of the 'concrete universal', the necessity of linking the universal with concrete determinations. In very near all of his writings, he endeavours to show the development of the Idea, and of specific concepts, as a process from the abstract to the concrete, from one-sided affirmations to the unity of the whole, wherein a number of partial affirmations are brought together and more perfectly articulated or realized. Apart from any cosmic considerations, these 'realizations' of the more perfect and complete truth are the results of human thought activity.

**Summary of findings and conclusion**

1) It has been shown that, in these early writings, Hegel endeavoured to develop a meaningful perspective of concrete human life, particularly in the history of religions.

2) He was mindful of, and attuned to, human life as manifested in history.

3) It has been shown that Hegel had an early appreciation of the historicity of religious development. That his conception of 'positivity' is related to 'historicity', he makes evident by showing historical facts as being made positive by their being conditioned and enclosed by the historical situation.

4) The historical situation, with its positive historical events and circumstances, he comes to see not so much as an accumulation of features which burden and distort the subjective moral law, but rather as the necessary means for its concrete objective realization.

5) His descriptions of 'the spirit of the time' can be seen to reveal the historicity of man, of the period under
vi) The concreteness of historico-cultural contexts does not represent an awkward difficulty to be side-stepped, but represents the very field and focus for his studies of human development.

vii) He gives early expression to an aspect of the historical dimension in his mature philosophy, that of 'the necessity' perceived in historical development.

viii) As Hegel enlarged his perspective, the subjective and objective element or character of historical occurrences, of human acts, ritual, and customs, of life, love and spirit, began to reveal a deepening mutual implication and interconnection.

ix) He sought mightily to comprehend life both as the vivifying spirit of individual human beings and as an infinite organic whole.

x) Hegel was found to conceive of spirit in terms of life.

xi) He comes to represent spirit (or mind) and life as essentially the same unifying power.

xii) In attempting to conceive life as the living unity of opposites, Hegel begins to conceive life as mind, and as subject, that in which different states and conditions are brought together in an enduring unity.

xiii) Although for a time he came close to accepting 'love' as the adequate means and necessary condition for achieving a reconciling unity between man and man, man and his national life, and man and God, in the end, 'love' did not represent a satisfactory solution for him. Hegel appreciated that to extend love beyond a relatively small circle is not easily accomplished, and as love is extended, its vigour and power are reduced. Also, humanity, when conceived abstractly, is an unsatisfactory object of such extended love.

xiv) The general concept of human nature is not an adequate criterion when attempting to assess the positivity of religion. 'Universal concepts of human nature are too empty to afford a criterion' for the varieties and complexity of religious feeling'. 'The living nature of man is always other than the concept of the same.' The stages in cultural and religious development must be considered when attempting to assess the positivity of religion.
xv) Hegel takes account of the temporal factor in cultural and conceptual development; and he finds it necessary to distinguish between an ideal of human nature and general concepts.

xvi) Hegel gradually came to see contingency as a necessary moment of spirit.

xvii) History is the medium of human spirit's development because the latter's degree of realization and attainment of freedom are gained in time through work and struggle.

xviii) The self-constitutional character of man's being begins to emerge, (which is an essential characteristic needed for a comprehensive grasp of any adequate conception of man's historicity).

xix) Hegel gives early expression to the idea that finite and infinite aspects comprise what man is and what he has become, that both are involved in man's self-development or self-realization, (and by implication, in man's historicity).

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Without actually using the word historicity, Hegel elicits from his early study, work and reflection, some of the essential characteristics needed to form the ground of a notion of historicity. His sense of the historicity of religions, nations and cultures is amply evident in his appreciation of, and attention given to the concrete living determinations within the historical situation. The conclusion of the
conditional, with which this chapter began, can fairly be drawn, i.e., that Hegel had to develop a notion of historicity to satisfactorily encompass human life in its dynamic wholeness.\footnote{Ernesto de Gueremu, states that "Die Geschichte des Hegelschen Gedankens ist Geschichte des Gedankens der Einheit; ..." \textit{Das Gottesbild des Jungen Hegel}, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg/München, 1969, p. 108. See his discussion following this statement, where he connects the "Gedanken der Einheit" with the "Grundproblematik Hegelscher Religionsphilosophie".}
CHAPTER III

HUMAN NATURE, HUMAN SPIRIT AND HISTORICITY

Argument

The preceding chapter closed with Hegel's critical considerations in respect to abstract concepts of human nature. He appears to have been unsatisfied with the 'Enlightenment's' static and abstract concepts of humanity. At the same time, the shape of his fundamental and central conception of 'spirit' had begun to emerge. In his early writings Hegel seemed more interested in describing man within the appropriate historical context, than in defining man, but in so far as he did define man, he did so in terms of life, spirit and history.

Furthermore, an essential element of the ground for any adequate conception of human historicity, that of the self-constitutional character of human consciousness and human being, was found to have been given early expression in these writings. In his subsequent writings, Hegel continues his efforts to comprehend human life philosophically, but he does so through reflections on, and analyses of, consciousness, self-consciousness, and thought processes, and by progressing his comprehension of human spirit at all levels.

This chapter therefore, will be concerned with Hegel's thinking in respect to life, consciousness, and human spirit, with the object of bringing to light his
conception of human nature and his implicit notion of historicity. The elucidation of these themes will be worked out, bearing in mind the attention Hegel gives to the 'temporal element' and to the 'historical situation' when dealing with these spheres of thought and being.

By pulling together some of these categories and considerations, it is possible to utilize them meaningfully in the formulation of several arguments pertinent to the objectives of this chapter, and to the central thesis of the entire work, i.e. that there is an implicit notion of historicity in the philosophy of Hegel.

If man as human is defined as spirit, then a dynamic conception of man's consciousness and its processes is implied. If a dynamic conception of man's consciousness and processes is implied, then an implicit notion of historicity is implied. Therefore, if man as human is defined as spirit, then an implicit notion of historicity is implied. Again, if human consciousness is essentially self-constituting then man's nature must be regarded as other than fixed. For Hegel, human consciousness is essentially self-constituting. Therefore, for Hegel, man's nature must be regarded as other than fixed. Either human nature is open to historical growth or human nature is permanent and fixed. It is not the case that for Hegel, human nature is permanent and fixed. Therefore, for Hegel, human nature is open to historical growth.
In the succeeding sections of this chapter, the bare skeletons of the first two arguments will be given flesh and substance, i.e. their premisses will be given more meaning through textual examples and analyses, and evidence will be cited in support of their respective conclusions. The appropriateness and value of the form and content of the third argument will be assessed in the chapter's conclusion, and a judgment will be made on the extent of its bearing on the central thesis.

1. Philosophy, system and the thought of human life and consciousness

A. Historical view of philosophical systems

During the summer of 1801 Hegel produced the significant work: *The Difference between the Philosophical Systems*

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1 In his study "The Concept of Life and Consciousness of Life in Hegel's Jena Philosophy", Jean Hyppolite makes the observation: "If one were to characterize Hegel's philosophy as a whole, to express its origin and basic intuition, one would have to say that it seeks to be the thought of human life. "To think life, that is the problem," Hegel remarks in an early fragment, adding that 'the consciousness of life in itself would be the same thing as the consciousness of what is man.' " *Studies on Marx and Hegel*, tr. John O'Neill, London, Heinemann, 1969, p. 4. In context, Hegel writes: "Reines Leben zu denken ist die Aufgabe, alle Taten, alles zu entfernen, was der Mensch war oder sein wird; Charakter abstrahiert nur von der Tätigkeit, er drückt das Allgemeine der bestimmten Handlungen aus; Bewusstsein reinen Lebens wäre Bewusstsein dessen, was der Mensch ist - "... Selbst - bewusstsein; *reines Selbstbewusstsein*. HtJ, p. 302. ETW, p. 254. Hegel's deletions b and c are interesting because they show how close in his mind were: 'life' and 'self-consciousness'.
of Fichte and Schelling. Its 1801 publication date followed that of Schelling's book: *The Presentation of my System of Philosophy*, also published that year. This may explain, in part, the inclusion of the word "system" in the title. No doubt he did set out to show the differences between the two systems, but over and above the requirement of this theme, it is evident that he was seeking the system of philosophy, the outcome of all previous philosophy, toward which philosophy had been developing, and in which particular philosophies would have made their contributions. Something of the nature of Hegel's historical orientation is revealed in the title of the first section of the first chapter: "Historical view of philosophical systems" and by observations such as the following: "The living spirit that dwells in a philosophy demands, in order to reveal itself, to be born /again/ by a kindred

2 *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie in Beziehung auf Reinhold's Beyträge zur leichtern Übersicht des Zustands der Philosophie zu Anfang des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 1stes Heft, Jena, in der akademischen Buchhandlung bey Seidler, 1801. The full title makes reference to "Reinhold's contributions"; in effect Hegel provides a lengthy review of a book by Reinhold. The latter's reputation grew out of his development of Kant's philosophy along novel lines. After Reinhold had departed Jena for Kiel in 1794, Fichte had been appointed to the vacated chair.

spirit." He does not see the history of philosophy as a succession of noble endeavours with each individual philosophy overcome in turn by the criticism and work of succeeding philosophers. Hegel views the flowerings of philosophy as manifestations of speculative reason, each peculiar to a particular age in the sense that the materials used are appropriate to that time. He thinks that, when rightly perceived, each one is found to be complete in itself.

The true peculiarity of a philosophy is the interesting individuality in which reason has organized a form for itself out of the building materials of a particular age; in this the individual, speculative reason finds spirit of its own spirit, flesh of its own flesh; it beholds itself in this as /both/ one and the same and as another living being. Every philosophy is complete in itself and, like a genuine work of art, contains the totality.

However, Hegel's deeper concern is with Fichte and Schelling. He used this project and format to comprehend and assimilate their philosophies, perhaps hoping to find a way of going beyond them by overcoming the limitations and incompleteness.

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4 WKL, p. 73, "Der lebendige Geist, der in einer Philosophie wohnt, verlangt, um sich zu entfalten, durch einen verwandten Geist geboren zu werden;" S. Werke, 1, p. 40; G. Werke, 4, p. 9.

5 Ibid., p. 73-74. "Das wahre Eigenthümliche einer Philosophie ist die interessante Individualität, in welcher die Vernunft aus dem Bauzeug eines besonderen Zeitalters sich eine Gestalt organisiert hat; die besondere spekulative Vernunft findet darin Geist von ihrem Geist, Fleisch von ihrem Fleisch, sie schaut sich in ihm als ein und dasselbe, und als ein anderes lebendiges Wesen an. Jede Philosophie ist in sich vollendet, und hat, wie ein echtes Kunstwerk, die Totalität in sich." S. Werke, 1, p. 43-44; G. Werke, 4, p. 12.
of their respective systems. At any rate, it is evident that he was also trying to work out his own philosophical difficulties.

Hegel supports his friend Schelling against Fichte when he thinks such support is warranted, but he also gives praise to some aspects of Fichte's system, not included in Schelling's philosophy. Hegel is sympathetic and fair to both men, but his approach to his task is also rigorous. In the "Fragment of a System", on the crucial issue of the relation of the Ego to Nature, he did not in the end take a stand decidedly in favour of one philosopher over the other. He hesitated to accept, with Fichte, that there is no reconciliation between Ego and Nature and he hesitated to accept the solution provided by Schelling. Schelling did not appreciate the profundity of the problem of the relation between the divine spirit and the human mind, to the extent of Fichte and

6 Writing about Hegel's 'Comprehensive System' and its claim to comprehend all philosophy', Fackenheim refers to the "Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems ..." when he states, "One of his earliest published writings seeks to unite the thought of his immediate predecessors - Fichte and Schelling - in a larger whole." The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, p. 15.

Although Schelling recognized that the logic of the understanding could not overcome the antinomies which result from its own distinctions, he turned to 'intellectual' intuition for a solution. Hegel regarded the latter as 'no solution', but he does not explicitly say so in this work. (He is more explicit in the Phenomenology.) In this, his first philosophical publication, he does show that the systems of Fichte and Schelling are different, and he does show the ways in which they differ. He also shows the ways in which they complement one another. This kind of careful comparative study of their systems helped to form and to direct his thinking, toward a system which would incorporate the true principles of each.

Hegel sees philosophy arising from the need for reconciling discord and division encountered in the realm of experience. "Division is the origin of the need of philosophy." It is its basic purpose. The particular shape that

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9 "Entzweiung ist der Quell des Bedürfnisses der Philosophie," S. Werke, 1, p. 44. G. Werke, 4, p. 12. Entzwehung could also be translated as discord, estrangement, or perhaps disharmony. See also Hegel's remarks about "the need for philosophy" originating "when the power of unification disappears from the life of men, and opposites have lost their living relation and reciprocity and gain independence". "Wenn die Macht der Vereinigung aus dem Leben der Menschen verschwindet, und die Gegensätze ihre lebendige Beziehung und Wechselwirkung verloren haben, und Selbstständigkeit gewinnen, entsteht das Bedürfnisz der Philosophie." S. Werke, 1, p. 46. G. Werke, 4, p. 14.
a philosophy takes depends on "the living originality of the spirit"\(^{10}\) who manages to restore the shattered harmony through his own work, and on the particular form of the discord from which the system originates. Discord and opposition appear in different forms in different periods of history and culture.

As has been pointed out, Hegel had earlier thought that some form of religion might be the source and means of overcoming disharmony, but now philosophy is seen as the way of reconciling divisions and separations. Reason is to be the source of unity and the means of transcending rigid oppositions. "To sublimate such oppositions that have become fixed is the only \((\text{single, unified})\) interest of reason." However, Hegel immediately adds: "This interest does not mean that reason is against opposition and limitation in general." He explains that "necessary dihemption is one of the factors of life, which constitutes itself by eternally opposing itself, and totality in its highest vitality is possible only through restoration out of the highest separation."\(^{11}\) The succeeding sentence provides a clear showing of the important distinction

\(^{10}\) "der Lebendigen Originalität des Geistes", Ibid.

\(^{11}\) "Solche festgewordene Gegensätze aufzuheben, ist das einzige Interesse der Vernunft. Diesz ihr Interesse hat nicht den Sinn, als ob sie sich gegen die Entgegengesetzung und Beschränkung überhaupt setzte; denn die notwendige Entzweigung ist Ein Faktor des Lebens, das ewig entgegengesetzend sich bildet; und die Totalität ist, der höchsten Lebendigkeit, nur durch Wiederherstellung aus der höchsten Trennung möglich." S. Werke, 1, p. 46; G. Werke, 4, p. 13-14.
which he makes throughout his mature philosophy, that between
Reason and the understanding. "Reason is only against the
absolute fixation of diremption ([division]) by the understand-
ing." 12

There are a number of other indications that features
of his mature philosophy were taking firm shape in his mind.
Before taking up certain of these, attention should be drawn
to his discussion of necessary diremption or division (Entz-
weiung) above. Later it will be shown that for Hegel, man's
consciousness forms or constitutes itself in a similar process
involving a succession of negations in which it first opposes
itself, and then reconciles this other to itself in sublation
or double negation. Self-alienation will be shown to be a
continuing dynamic process of reciprocity between subject and
object. In principle the alien objects and elements of the
world can be gradually reconciled to and with the subject, but
for man this is a temporal and historical process.

To return to some of Hegel's expressions of some of
the principles which will form his mature philosophy, it is
important to take heed of his discussions of reflection and of
the absolute, and of 'the emergence of consciousness out of
totality'. Hegel equates the expressed need for philosophy

12 "Sondern die Vernunft setzt sich gegen das
absolute Fixiren der Entzweiung durch den Verstand, ..."
with its presupposition, and because the need is for reflection, /which always bifurcates/, ¹³ "there have to be two presuppositions."

The first is the absolute; this is the goal that is sought. It is already there; how else could it be sought? Reason merely produces it by liberating consciousness from limitations; this sublimation of limitations is conditioned by the presupposed unconditionality. The other presupposition would be the emergence of consciousness out of totality, the bifurcation into being and not-being, into concept and being, into finitude and infinity. ¹⁴

The unifying synthesis, the aim of reason, must be advanced to comprehend the whole of reality. This synthesis will have to transcend or reconcile the fundamental opposition between the finite and the infinite; the problem which he had sought to overcome in his early work is still very much with him. "The Absolute is to be constructed for consciousness, such is the task (problem) of philosophy." ¹⁵

¹³ WK 1, p. 74.

¹⁵ "Das Absolute soll fürs Bewusstseyn Konstruiert werden, ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie;" S. Werke, 1, p. 50; G. Werke, 4, p. 16.
Intuition must be united with reflection and itself become reflective, but the intellect must transcend itself by more than intuition, i.e. by rationally and systematically overcoming its own fragmenting divisions, by returning the fragmented and separated to the life of the original identity. Reflection must be raised above the level of understanding and brought to that of reason, to speculative knowledge. Here the reciprocal penetration of concept and being, subject and object, and finite and infinite will be found.

Having examined reflection as the instrument for philosophizing, Hegel turns to a discussion of the relation of speculation to common sense. Although here he characterizes the Absolute largely in negative terms, he thinks the world attained by Speculation is not unlike that of common sense, in that there is found a fundamental identity beneath all divisions and separations. The common man, he thinks, tends to have a feeling for this basic unity, and this sense of unity of the totality finds expression in some of the language of common sense. However, "as soon as such truths of common sense are taken by themselves and isolated, as knowledge in general, they appear slanted and as half truths."
Speculation can regain the basic identity underlying the ruptured totality of human experience, but its articulated formulations cannot be understood by common sense. "Speculation therefore well understands common sense, but common sense does not understand what speculation does (executes)." Insofar as common sense's reality is that of the understanding, Speculation's absolute reality is markedly different. Reason transforms opposed and separated entities and concepts, in a continuing process by raising and preserving them in newunities until finally all are organized, with each part existing and holding its meaning only in relation to the whole. Thus, the need for the system of philosophy wherein this totality will be comprised and unified in an absolute synthesis. The upshot of Hegel's work in respect to his comparative analysis of the systems of Fichte and Schelling is that he does show Schelling's advance over Fichte, especially in the problem areas of particular concern to himself. He does not make his recognition of the weaknesses in Schelling's


18 "Die Spekulation versteht deswegen den gesunden Menschenverstand wohl, aber der gesunde Menschenverstand nicht das Thun der Spekulation." S. Werke, 1, p. 56; G. Werke, 4, p. 20.

solutions too explicit. Hegel is fairly even-handed in according praise to the work of each man. It is evident that he respected Fichte's efforts to overcome the dualisms left unreconciled in Kant's philosophy, and he concurs in Fichte's rejection and exclusion of the unknowable thing-in-itself. In Hegel's view, Fichte was essentially correct also in maintaining the Ego's ascendancy over Nature, such that the Absolute was conceived as absolute Ego and the principle of subjectivity was seen as the synthesis of itself with that of objectivity. However, even though Fichte recognizes an ultimate unity and so commences his speculative system with the principle of identity, Hegel thinks that the latter 'is not the principle of Fichte's system'. ("Das Prinzip der Identität wird nicht Princip des Systems;") The reason being that immediately 'the shaping of the system begins, identity vanishes' ("so wie das System sich zu bilden anfängt, wird die Identität aufgegeben,"). In deducing consciousness, it is not the objective world which is deduced but the idea of it, resulting in a continuing containment in abstract subjectivity.


21 Garaudy says in respect to one part of Hegel's critique, "Fichte ne parvient pas à réaliser une véritable déduction, une véritable construction, parce qu'il s'est enfermé, au départ, dans une subjectivité abstraite. C'est là le principal reproche que lui adresse Hegel." op.cit., p. 145-46.
On the other hand, Schelling was right in holding that reconciliation of Ego and Nature was possible through an absolute principle. 'The principle of identity is the absolute principle of the whole Schellingian System.' ("Das Prinzip der Identität ist absolutes Prinzip des ganzen Schelling'schen Systems;") 'Philosophy and system converge (coincide). (Philosophie und System fallen zusammen;) 'Identity is not lost in the parts, still less in the result.' ("die Identität verliert sich nicht in den Theilen, noch weniger im Resultate.")

However, his absolute synthesis achieved an absolute identity in which all differences were absorbed and fused in and by the One. Hegel could not accept this solution which failed to take account of the reality of the oppositions in life and spirit and the universe as a whole. In this Fichte was more right than Schelling, as Hegel saw it. Both men are credited with attaining the absolute principle and foundation of philosophy, "intellectual intuition or, in the language of reflection, the identity of subject and object." In this publication Hegel does more than show the differences between the systems of Fichte and Schelling, in

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23 "Das absolute Prinzip, der einzige Realgrund, und feste Standpunkt der Philosophie ist, sowohl in Fichte's, als in Schelling's Philosophie, die intellektuelle Anschauung; — für die Reflexion ausgedrückt: Identität des Subjekts und Objekts." S. Werke, 1, p. 143; G. Werke, 4, p. 76-77.
passages like those examined just prior to the above, Hegel reveals that the system of philosophy is beginning to take form in his mind. There are clear signs also, of Hegel the dialectical logician.²⁴

B. The initial system; dialectical logic, a logic of the life of thought.²⁵

It is likely that one draft of what has been called the Jenenser system was written between the autumn of 1801 and 1802,²⁶ and that one or more drafts of some of its parts, including Philosophy of Mind added later, were written for


²⁵ Jean Hyppolite, while drawing attention to "the concrete significance of the Hegelian principle of negativity" notes that "Hegel's system, far from being a logomachy, is a logic of the life of thought." Studies on Marx and Hegel, f.n. 52, p. 21.


With regard to his teaching, during the 1801-02 and 1802-03 university years, Hegel lectured in logic and metaphysics. In terms of his writing, the years 1801-03 were very productive for Hegel. In 1801: Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen ...; "Dissertatio philosophica De orbitis Planetarum ..." and other items and drafts on various subjects, such as The German Constitution. During 1802 and 1803, Schelling and Hegel co-edited a philosophical journal, Kritisches Journal der Philosophie. Besides articles for the above and for Litteratur-Zeitung of Erlangen, he produced a further draft on The German Constitution, and drafts on what have since been titled System der Sittlichkeit and Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie. (Hegel-Studien 4, p. 140-143) None of the latter were published during his lifetime. However, they are all important as indicators and evidence of the development in and firming up of his thought.
his lectures at the university between 1802 and 1806. The term "system" can be applied legitimately to these Jena writings in their earlier and later formulations, considered separately or together.

In the initial draft, which most properly deserves the title of Hegel's first system, he does provide the logic which he had implied was needed in his publication on The Difference between the ... Systems of Fichte and Schelling. Second and third, he provides two other major divisions entitled Metaphysics and Philosophy of Nature. (His system is not yet complete at this time: the philosophy of mind is not present and the philosophy of nature is fragmentary.) Some parts of the Metaphysics will reappear in his Science of Logic of 1812, 1813 and 1816, and again in the logic of the

Encyclopaedia of 1817 and in its subsequent editions in 1827 and 1830. This observation supports the frequently made remark that Hegel's Logic stands in his system where Metaphysics stands in the systems of other philosophers. More important are the reasons for the apparent displacement of one science by the other.

Among the explanations and suggestions which are found in discussions of this question by various Hegelian scholars, there are three points which seem particularly relevant. 1. Kant in the "Transcendental Logic" of his Critique of Pure Reason, dealt with ontology in addition to formal logic. In short there was at least this one important precedent for doing likewise. 2. For Kant's transcendental idealism, and Fichte's idealism too, at least, in so far as he was a follower of Kant, the traditional distinction between

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29 Along with his theory of judgment, Kant takes up the categories of substantiality, causality and community.
formal logic and ontology had little meaning. While Hegel criticized aspects of the philosophies of both men, he also agreed with and accepted much of their thought into his own form of idealism. Like Kant he too held for the unity of thought and being, but he conceived of this unity differently. Hegel wished to avoid the difficulties which followed from assuming the existence of "things-in-themselves" beyond phenomena, which were therefore out of reach of the understanding. He wanted to close the gap between subject and object, by showing the thorough universality of being's structure. During the course of his struggles with the contradictions which had emerged from the metaphysical investigations of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, which he sought to overcome by the development of a dialectical logic, Hegel became increasingly confident that this form of logic was the key to their resolution.

Hegel had struggled long and hard with the problem of how life was to be encompassed by concepts within a philosophical system. Was Kant right in the limits which he endeavoured to establish for logical knowledge, for science and metaphysics? Schelling went beyond these limits, but the Absolute was to be known through metaphysical intuition, not

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30 In Kant's philosophy, the forms of being are the result of the activity of the human understanding, so that the principles of thought are also the principles of the objects of thought, i.e. of the phenomena.
conceptually, at least according to his position in his philosophy to that time. Hegel saw that authentic knowledge of the Absolute was not to be gained this way. Kant was right to show the limits of human thought at the level of understanding, and to reveal the contradictions which arise when thought, with the principles of pure formal logic, seeks to press beyond these limits. Fichte in effect had suggested a way of overcoming these limits through his own form of dialectical reasoning and by seeking to deduce all the diversity of forms of knowledge from one absolute subject, the absolute Ego. He had been right in seeing that Kant's work called for others to continue where the Critique had left off. The 'Antinomies' did not close the case for Reason, rather suggested its real nature and its mode of development.\(^3\)

Hegel also thought that Schelling had been right in his confidence that the Absolute was open to philosophical penetration.

\(^3\) Wilhelm Windelband expresses this same point in this manner. "If Kant had maintained the necessity of insoluble problems of reason for his explanation and criticism of metaphysics, the idealistic metaphysics now makes this thought a positive principle. By this means the reason's world becomes an infinity of self-production, and the contradiction between the task and the actual doing is declared to be the real nature of the reason itself. This contradiction is necessary and cannot be abolished. It belongs to the essential nature of the reason; and since only the reason is real, the contradiction is thus declared to be real. Thus the dialectical method, this metaphysical transformation of Kant's transcendental logic, came into stronger and stronger opposition to formal logic." A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, New York, Harper & Row, 1958, p. 591.
Hegel saw that this problem of the limits of human knowledge demanded a radical departure in philosophic science. (Hyppolite states that, "Hegel's Logic develops Kant's discovery in the Transcendental Logic of the identity of the conditions of the objects of experience with the very conditions of the knowledge of experience.") Its task would be to explore and analyze all categories and to manifest the way in which rational thought is led beyond the limits and rigidities of the understanding through the very contradictions which result from the work of the understanding.

But Hegel pushes to the limit Kant's conception of the identity of nature and the thought of nature, and seizes upon the categories not just as schematized concepts of phenomena but as expressions of the Absolute. There is nothing beyond the categories through which the Absolute is expressed as at once an object and the thought of the object.

This science would not only bring out the full range of contradictions which arise from a comprehensive analysis of principles and categories, which would be to extend Kant's study of the antinomies, but would show how these contradictions were to be overcome.

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32 *op.cit.*, "On the Logic of Hegel", p. 177. Hyppolite directly adds this remark: "Kant, however, refused to turn the Transcendental Logic into a logic of philosophy and left the phantom of the thing-in-itself floating beyond possible experience."

The objects of Hegel's logic are concepts, but concepts which are simultaneously form and content; they are not simply subjective ideas; in these concepts the nature of things is expressed in being thought. Hegel sees an identity between concept and thing; the 'nature' of a thing thought is also operative in the thing concerned. What he means by 'nature' is "what Plato meant by Idea and what Aristotle meant by Eidos or Essence. Hegel renews, on the level of Kant and with his reflective insight, the ontology and metaphysics of Aristotle."\textsuperscript{34}

Das Erkennen ist das Allgemeine als Totalität, indem in ihm der ganze Inhalt des Allgemeine sich entwickelt darstellt.\textsuperscript{35}

An extremely important relation is involved in Hegel's conception of the notion and the object comprehended in and by it. From the standpoint of the knower, the nature of an object, or what the thing is in itself, is made clear by the attainment of the correct notion. On the one hand truth has become evident to the knower, but on the other, the knower is made aware that the thing does not exist in its truth: its

\textsuperscript{34} Kroner, op. cit., p. 32. Marcuse explains what is meant when it is said of Hegel's Logic that it "presupposes an identity of thought and existence. The statement has meaning only in so far as it declares that the movement of thought reproduces the movement of being and brings it to its true form. ... The interplay and motility of the notions reproduces the concrete process of reality." Reason and Revolution, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{35} Jenenser Logik, p. 126.
potentialities are limited by the determinate conditions in which it exists. The thing will attain its truth only if it negates its determinate conditions, but the negation will in turn be a determination, brought about by the unraveling or evolving of former conditions. Such a conception of the truth of things cannot help but bear upon Hegel's notion of historicity. This conception, when applied to the development of human consciousness and human societies and institutions, as distinguished from plant and purely animal growth processes, provides an important part of the logical and ontological foundations of Hegel's conception of human historicity. In contrast to the plant and its growth, in the growth of its consciousness, the human being, "the 'subject' of this process," may "act on knowledge and fulfill its potentialities on the basis of its own comprehending power." Hegel thinks that

37 Marcuse uses the plant, a typically Hegelian example, to illustrate Hegel's position: "In its growth, the plant, the 'subject' of this process, does not act on knowledge and fulfill its potentialities on the basis of its own comprehending power. It rather endures the process of fulfillment passively. Our notion of the plant, on the other hand, comprehends that the plant's existence is an intrinsic process of development ... The notion thus represents, in Hegel's view, the real form of the object, for the notion gives us the truth about the process, which, in the objective world, is blind and contingent." op.cit., p. 64-65.
38 Parts of this sentence are drawn from the passage in footnote 37 above, but are applied differently to man, as thinking subject.
the beings in the world of nature, differ essentially from their notions, and that this difference may be overcome only in the thinking subject, through its power of actualizing its notion in its existence.

In the Naturphilosophie, in his first attempt to construct a system, Hegel states that: "The spirit of nature is a concealed (latent) spirit." His reason for saying so is that, "it does not develop itself in the same form as spirit; it is only spirit for the spirit who is conscious of it," and he adds, very significantly from the standpoint of research into Hegel's notion of historicity, "it is spirit in-itself, but not for-itself." Although Hegel writes here of nature, some of these remarks apply or could apply to the spirit or nature of man. 'The spirit (nature) of man is a revealed spirit; it develops itself in the form of spirit's development, certainly it is spirit for the spirit who is conscious of it; but also it is spirit in-itself and for-itself, in so far as it self-consciously realizes itself,' while aware of its inter-relation to the totality. Here, there is suggested the ground of the historicity of man.

39 "Der Geist der Natur ist ein verborgener Geist, er tritt nicht in Geistesgestalt hervor; er ist nur Geist für den erkennenden Geist, oder er ist Geist an ihm selbst, aber nicht für sich selbst. Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie, p. 193.

40 (second nature is perhaps a more accurate specification of Hegel's conception)
Particular existents differ essentially from what they could be if their potentialities were actualized. It is this discrepancy between realization and potentiality which initiates the dialectical process in respect to each concept of his logic. Negativity is an essential characteristic of finite things: their state of existence is such that their potentialities are never fully realized. In virtue of the finite thing's power to transcend itself, to become other than itself, he finds "the true nature of the Finite" to be "that it is infinite." Furthermore, "the determinate particular as such has no other essence than (is essentially) this absolute unrest, not to be, what it is."\(^{41}\)

In the first part (Simple Relation) of this first draft of his logic, Hegel analyses in turn, Quality, Quantity and Infinity.\(^{42}\) He starts with concepts in which reality is conceived as a profusion of objective things, which have 'being', which simply 'are', without involving subjectivity. He analyzes the qualitative and quantitative relations between

\(^{41}\) "Dies ist allein die wahrhafte Natur des Endlich­en, dass es unendlich ist, in seinem Sein sich aufhebt. Das Bestimmte hat als solches kein anderes Wesen als diese absolute Unruhe, nicht zu sein, was es ist;" *Jenenser Logik*, p. 31.

\(^{42}\) Hyppolite sees the importance of the concepts with which Hegel begins this work in this way: "As he remarked in 1800 Hegel was to think through 'the bond between relation and non-relation'. The key concept which enables him to think through the relation (Beziehung) and not simply to live it in an unreflected way is the concept of Infinity. It is the concept which provides the foundation of the dialectical logic of 1802 in which we have the genetic framework of the Hegelian system." *op.cit.*, p. 8.
them. As noted above, finite things never achieve an identity between existence and their concepts, so that negativity is always present in their modes of being. These conditions of privation are the sources of the 'unrest', the need to overcome the negativity. From the standpoint of the human understanding, particular qualities or quantities appear to be 'negations' of the things possessing them. One thing is distinguished from another by the qualities each possesses. But the things concerned are not their qualities, nor the aggregates of their respective qualities. Thus the being of this or that thing seems other than itself; it exists in its 'otherness'. Hegel contends, furthermore, that a thing can be understood through its qualities only by referring to other qualities, which are excluded by the former. He states that the quality "is related to what it excludes; for it does not exist as an absolute, for itself, but exists in such a way that it is for itself only in so far as some other does not exist."\(^4^3\) The endeavour to distinguish one thing from another by determining qualities leads beyond the thing to an indefinitely extended complex of relations. Things can be comprehended

\(^{4^3}\) In context: "aber diese Qualität ist nicht mehr der Begriff der Qualität, denn die Negation ist in ihrem sich nur auf sich selbst Beziehen bezogen auf das, welches sie ausschliesst; denn sie ist nicht absolut für sich, sondern so, dass sie für sich ist, insofern ein anderes nicht ist;" *Jenenser Logik*, p. 4.
only in relation to other things.

The recognition of this situation leads into Hegel's analysis of 'infinity', both bad or spurious and real or true. The nature of Spurious Infinity is revealed in one's adding relations or connections in a vain attempt to circumscribe the object's essential relations. The latter must be comprehended in a different manner, that is, the object in effect must be regarded as subject, because the object "itself puts forth (expresses) the necessary relation of itself to its opposite." Hegel endeavours to show that the object, to some degree, constitutes its relations in its own self-development, such that it continues to be itself in its otherness, sublating the negations of itself into something positive, i.e. its own unity. The object in preserving itself throughout its relations with other objects exemplifies true infinity. "The decomposing unrest of the infinite is realized only through the existence which it dissolves; the transcended (sublated) is just as absolute, when it is transcended (sublated): it produces itself in its dissolution, because the dissolution requires something that is dissolved." In Hegel's

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44 Jenenser Logik, p. 28 and 29.
45 "... ihnen selbst die notwendige Beziehung auf ihr Entgegengesetztes ausdrückten," Ibid., p. 32.
46 "Die vernichtende Unruhe des Unendlichen ist ebenso nur durch das Sein dessen, das es vernicht; das aufgehobene ist ebenso absolut, als es aufgehoben ist; es entsteht in seinem Vergehen; denn das Vergehen ist nur, indem etwas ist, das vergeht." Ibid., p. 33-34.
showing, infinity is not something which transcends finite things, rather it is their true reality.47

But in this first part of this Logic, the categories of simple connection are shown by Hegel to be overly abstract and to be external ways of conceiving objects. Here there is no explicit cognizance of substance as subject. The second part, entitled Relation, advances his analysis a further stage toward the fulfillment of his aim of revealing the true form of the ultimate reality in which all potentialities are realized. He considers first the Relation of Being and then the Relation of Thought. Within his consideration of the first he analyses Substantiality, Causality, and Reciprocity. These categories denote real relations between things, as opposed to the abstract and incomplete beings with which the first part commenced. Hegel shows the intrinsic connections involved in substance, which is what it is only in relation to its accidents, in cause, which exists only in relation to its effects, and in reciprocity, wherein interdependent substances exist only in their mutual relationship. Intrinsic as substance's power is, exercised through its accidents and effects, developing its potentialities, and constituting its relations to

47 Hyppolite makes a similar point: "The infinite does not lie beyond finite oppositions; on the contrary, the latter are conceived as infinite. In Hegel's conception the infinite is no less 'restless' than the finite." op.cit., p. 7.
other things, it lacks self-knowledge of its own work, and thus also the freedom of self-actualization.

To proceed beyond substantiality's relation of being, Hegel makes his transition to The Relation of Thought, wherein it will be possible to comprehend the world in its very being, because, as he attempts to show, this can be accomplished only in the sphere of the thinking subject with its categories of freedom. Within his consideration of the Relation of Thought he analyses the role played by the universal and the particular in the Concept, the Judgment and the Syllogism. The relation between the particular and the universal is more than a relation of logic, in his view, it is ontological in character. The universal realizes itself through species and individuals, in both nature and history. Through the universal to which they belong individual events and circumstances gain their meaning. Similarly the determinate features of the individual person follow from his universal qualities rather than from the particular, i.e. from his culture, citizenship, trade or profession, strata of society, and so on. Universality, as a relation of thought, is to be conceived, according to Hegel, as the subject's self-development.


49 Cf. J. Logik, p. 79, 85 and 97-98. In passing, it can be noted that in the Science of Logic, these topics are treated within his Subjective Logic.
The third part of the *Jenenser Logik* is entitled *Proportion*: in it he treats of Definition, Division (or Classification), and Cognition. Of interest for this research, is his conception of definition, which, as might be expected, further opens out the notion of the self-actualization of the object-subject. The definition can express the relation of thought in which the object's essential and distinguishing characteristics are attained, insofar as it reflects the actual differentiating process of the object itself, the process whereby it preserves its identity through the negation of its situation. Hegel expresses this thought strikingly: "In the definition of living things it is necessary that their determinations be drawn from (include) the weapons of attack or defense with which they preserve themselves from other particular things."50 (Here can be discovered the logical and ontological ground for Hegel's emphasis on the place of history in any endeavour to adequately comprehend the world.) Isolated propositions fail to function as real definitions; required instead is the history of the object, in which the object is shown in its self-constituting interactions with its environment. Once such a conception is applied to human

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50 "In der Definition der Lebendigen Dinge ist daher notwendige die Bestimmung von den Vassen des Angriffs oder der Verteidigung genommen worden als demjenigen, wodurch sie gegen anderes Besondere sich selbst erhalten;" *J. Logik*, p. 109.
beings, the requirement for a notion of historicity is present.

The consciousness of life is quite different from life itself. It constitutes the truth of life, but a truth that can only be realized in human experience. The moments of life, when integrated in human consciousness, develop in the form of History and human consciousness is the Absolute Subject which discovers its identity in the course of time.51

The Jenenser Metaphysik is also divided into three parts: Cognition as a System of Fundamental Principles (or Categories), Metaphysics of Objectivity and Metaphysics of Subjectivity.52 Within the second he treats of subjects from the older metaphysical systems: the Soul, the World and the Supreme Being. More interestingly, (for this study) in the third part he treats of the 'Theoretical Ego', the 'Practical Ego', and 'The Absolute Spirit'. The first two section titles may have been drawn from Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, but the third introduces his own term "Spirit" which is richer in connotation than Ego or Consciousness. Hegel endeavours to show the unity of the theoretical and practical Egos within the Absolute Spirit. "The theoretical Ego finds itself as the Supreme Being. ... It finds its own opposite therefore as


52 Some of the subject matter of the Metaphysics also will be located in his Logic, as well as in other parts of his mature system.
itself, as in itself. "53 The task of philosophy, as Hegel conceives it, is to construct (conceptualize and organize in a dialectical-logical system) the life of the Absolute. He had shown that the finite is more than finite, the finite is a moment in the life of the Absolute. This task then, will be to construct the life of the Absolute in and through the finite, and in the process to reveal how the Absolute necessarily expresses and manifests itself as Spirit, which is to say, in part at least, as self-consciousness in and through the human mind. In considering Absolute Spirit, he makes a distinction, which he will make more evident in his mature system, between the Idea of Absolute Spirit and Absolute Spirit in its living, concrete and historical reality. "The Spirit as it has become manifest, is thus far only Idea. "54 However, he also introduces his conception of how Idea, nature55 and spirit are unified in Absolute Spirit returning

53 "Das theoretische Ich findet sich als das höchste Wesen, ... Es findet das ihm in sich Entgegengesetzte ebendari- um als sich selbst, als an sich;" J. Metaphysik, p. 178.
"Diese Idee des Ansich realisiert sich in der Metaphysik, indem das Erkennen sein eigener Inhalt wird ..." Ibid., p. 175.

54 "Der Geist, wie er aufgezeigt worden ist, ist darum nur Idee,". Ibid., p. 185.

55 The Jenenser Naturphilosophie is comprised of two parts: the 'System of the Sun' and the 'Earthly System'. The first treats of the 'Concept of Motion', 'The Apparent Motion' and the 'Reality of Motion'. The second treats of 'Mechanics', the 'Process of Matter' and 'Physics'. 
to itself:

This totality of the return exists in itself and does not pass over into another. The Spirit is the Absolute and it, its Idea is absolutely realized first, in that the Moment the Spirit itself becomes this Spirit, - there is no longer any transition into a beyond.56

C. Science of the experience of consciousness57

It was during the years at Jena that Hegel had developed beyond the romanticism of his contemporaries. As has been shown, he had become opposed to Schelling's elevation of aesthetic experience as the pre-eminent approach to the Absolute, and to his vague notions concerning an Absolute Identity in the natural and subjective spheres. Hegel had become unwilling to accept the position that the great fundamental insights of philosophy could be attained in feeling and intuition. His own thought on the problems connected with

56 "Ernst diese Totalität der Rückkehr ist an sich und geht nicht in anderes mehr über. Der Geist is das Absolute, und es, seine Idee ist absolut realisiert erst, indem die Moment des Geistes selbst dieser Geist sind, - aber dann ist auch kein Darüberhinausgehen mehr." J. Metaphysik, p. 186.

57 Infra note 62. Fackenheim writing about the Introduction, states that "the Phenomenology will not judge consciousness in the light of presupposed standards ... it will watch 'consciousness examine itself,' a process in which each finite standpoint, which is fragmentary because it is finite, will point to one higher because it is less fragmentary, until finally, at the standpoint of absolute knowledge, all fragmentariness is transcended." The Religious Dimension in Hegel's thought, p. 34.
life, consciousness and spirit, in which he endeavoured to transcend the concepts of 'the understanding' and the limitations imposed on knowledge and metaphysics by Kant, and the vagueness of the Romantics, he had slowly worked up into the important work that the Phenomenology is.

In this work Hegel brings together and develops many of the problems and themes which he had treated earlier in both his published and unpublished writings. (Some of which have been discussed.  

He also includes material on certain significant historical events and on various philosophical positions from the history of that subject, and of course, social and political developments and philosophical concepts from his own times. However, the Phenomenology is not history or a history of philosophy. It is not history, except in Hyppolite's sense, that it "is the history of human consciousness in its progression to Absolute Knowledge." He goes on to say that, "This history is much more a description than a

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58 Various articles and items of Hegel's writing of the Jena period can contribute to an understanding of his 'philosophy of spirit', the part missing from his initial 'first system', just discussed. These include the System der Sittlichkeit, the article's "Glauben und Wissen" and "Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" and the 'Geistesphilosophie' material in the Jenaer Realphilosophie. It would also be possible to consider some of this writing as a kind of introduction to his Phenomenology of Spirit, the first major piece of his mature system. In any case, some passages can be used to illustrate themes in the Phenomenology.
construction of the experiences of consciousness." These events, philosophical concepts and standpoints are used more to illustrate or make concrete the forms of mind's ascent and development from simple sense knowledge, from one-sided or incomplete moral standpoints, and from less adequate forms of art and religion, to superior forms of comprehension and understanding, to more complete moral positions, to more adequate forms of art and religion, and finally to the highest stage of consciousness: absolute spirit. Hegel ends his Introduction with a paragraph in which he says, "The experience which consciousness makes of itself can, according to its Concept comprehend in itself nothing less than the whole system of consciousness or the whole realm of the truth of Spirit." Consciousness, in advancing itself, will eventually arrive at a point where it will leave aside the appearance of being encumbered or hindered by something foreign to it, 'or, in other words',

at that point where its appearance becomes equal to its essence, consciousness' presentation of itself will therefore converge with this very same point in the authentic science of Spirit. And, finally, when

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59 op.cit., "The Concept of Existence in the Hegelian Phenomenology", p. 23. In an earlier work, in a similar comment, Hyppolite also drew attention to the spontaneous development of the experience of consciousness: "Ce caractère de la phénoménoologie hégélienne, qui décrit au lieu de construire, présente le développement spontané d'une expérience telle qu'elle se donne à la conscience et comme elle se donne a elle, à beaucoup frappé les commentateurs." Genèse et Structure de la Phénoménoologie de l'Esprit de Hegel, Tome I, Paris, Aubier, 1946, p. 15.
consciousness itself grasps this its essence, it will indicate the nature of Absolute knowledge itself. 60

Like most philosophers before him, what distinguished man from animal, and indeed from nature in general, for Hegel, was man's reason, and this, as manifested in the process of his reflective self-consciousness, 'overcoming' the immediacy of the world in mediation with it. 'Reason' as an activity of the human mind, is distinctly a developmental process, is both mediate and immediate, and does not stand outside of its content, but encompasses its content within itself. "This dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself - on its knowledge as well as on its object - in so far as the new true object emerges to consciousness out of it, is precisely that which is called Experience." 61 This passage from his Introduction to his 'Science of the

60 Phen., p. 144, 145; KRD, p. 136, 137. "Die Erfahrung, welche das Bewusstsein über sich macht, kann ihrem Begriffe nach nichts weniger in sich begreifen als das ganze System desselben, oder das ganze Reich der Wahrheit des Geistes," ... "oder wo die Erscheinung dem Wesen gleich wird, seine Darstellung hiemit mit eben diesem Punkte der eigentlichen Wissenschaft des Geistes zusammenfällt; und endlich, indem es selbst dies sein Wesen erfaszt, wird es die Natur des absoluten Wissens selbst bezeichnen." Phän., p. 74, 75.

61 KRD, p. 112; Phen., p. 142. "Diese dialektische Bewegung, welche das Bewusstsein an ihm selbst, sowohl an seinem Wissen als an seinem Gegenstande ausübt, insofern ihm der neue wahre Gegenstand daraus entspringt, ist eigentlich dasjenige, was Erfahrung genannt wird." Phän., p. 73.
Experience of Consciousness'\textsuperscript{62} extends Kant's notion of experience so that the boundary between knowledge and the Absolute no longer 'cuts off the one from the other'. In this work, Hegel undertakes "the description (presentation) of knowledge as it appears, as a phenomenon"\textsuperscript{63} but "because this presentation has for its object only phenomenal knowledge" the reader, Hegel insists, should not conclude that this philosophical undertaking is therefore something less than science. This study, he says,

\begin{quote}
can be regarded ... as the pathway of the natural consciousness which is striving toward true knowledge, or as the path of the soul which is making its way through the series of its own transformations as through waystations prescribed to it by its very nature, that it may, by purifying itself, lift itself to the level of Spirit and through the completed experience of its own self, attain cognizance of what it is in itself.\textsuperscript{64}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{63} Phen., p. 135; KRD, p. 43. "... die Darstellung des erscheinenden Wissens vorgenommen werden." Phän., p. 66.

\textsuperscript{64} Phen., p. 135; KRD, p. 48-49. "Weil nun diese Darstellung nur das erscheinende Wissen zum Gegenstande hat, ... sondern sie kann ... aus als der Weg des natürlichen Bewusstseins, das zum wahren Wissen dringt, genommen werden, oder als der Weg der Seele, welche die Reihe ihrer Gestaltungen, als durch ihre Natur ihr vorgesteckter Stationen, durchwandert, dass sie sich zum Geiste läutere, indem sie durch die vollständige Erfahrung ihrer selbst zur Kenntnis desjenigen gelangt, was sie an sich selbst ist." Phän., p. 66-67.

However, the road of the "natural consciousness" is not without serious difficulties, it "will show itself to be merely the Concept of knowledge, or unreal knowledge". Its mistake is in taking itself to be real knowledge so that "what is actually the realization of the Concept" becomes its ruin, for on the way it has lost its truth. The way of the natural consciousness therefore "may be regarded as the way of doubt, or more properly, the way of despair." The doubt mentioned here is no fictitious doubt, but, "on the contrary, this road is the conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge, a knowledge for which that is most real which is, in truth, only the unrealized Concept."65

Hegel has in mind a pathway, or approach, to Absolute knowledge, which will in fact take the ongoing form of a critique of the shapes and forms of knowledge, and which will be carried out by the experiencing consciousness itself in the progressive unfolding of its own experience. This path, that the Phenomenology will follow, will allow the 'other' of consciousness to unfold in the forms of consciousness's own

65 Phen., p. 135-136; KRD, p. 53-54. "Das natürliche Bewusstsein wird sich erweisen, nur Begriff des Wissens oder nicht reales Wissen zu sein. ... was die Realisierung des Begriffs ist; ... Er kann deswegen als der Weg des Zweifels angesehen werden, oder eigentlicher als der Weg der Verzweiflung; ... Sondern er ist die bewusste Einsicht in die Unwahrheit des erscheinen Wissens, dem dasjenige das Reellste ist, was in Wahrheit vielmehr nur der nichtrealisierte Begriff ist." Phän., p. 67.
reconstitution of 'otherness'. The criterion of criticism will not be derived from external sources, nor will it be imposed from an external standpoint; it will arise from and develop along with the successive moments and levels of the experience of consciousness.

Hegel examines the counter argument that because, "the essence or standard" thus established, "would lie in us, and that which was to be compared with this standard and decided upon as a result of this comparison would not necessarily have to recognize that standard." Here it would be contended that the interiority of this criterion, would be precisely its limitation in treating of the objects of knowledge. However, his apt response is formulated in such a way that the very distinction made between "the in-itself of the object ... (and) its being for us", is neatly comprised within it:

But this distinction, or this semblance of a distinction, is overcome, together with the attendant presupposition, by the nature of the object which we are investigating. Since consciousness provides itself with its own standard, the investigation will be a comparison of consciousness with its own self; for the distinction just made falls in it.

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67 Phen., p. 140; KRD, p. 91. "Das Wesen oder der Maßstab fiele in uns, und dasjenige, was mit ihm verglichen und über welches durch diese Vergleichung entschieden werden sollte, hätte ihm nicht notwendig anzuerkennen." Phän., p. 71.
The way of the *Phenomenology*, that of the immanent criticism of knowledge through the process of consciousness's examination of itself, is of special interest from the standpoint of the aims and tasks of this present research: 1) Hegel's notion of historicity, chiefly as it concerns man's being: The self-constitutionality of consciousness is prefigured in the Introduction, in Hegel's characterization of the development of consciousness on its path to the Absolute. 2) The claim that the philosopher, at least, can attain truth that transcends history's limitations: Hegel's criterion, or standard, of consciousness's criticism of itself, insofar as it is able to accomplish its work in this form would seem to avoid 'presupposed standards'.

Absolute knowledge is to be the result of this process, of this 'voyage of discovery', - this is the promise. Furthermore, Hegel does state "that the absolute alone is true or that the true alone is absolute." In his promise and in the latter assertion, there are definite indications that he will go some way in showing how he can make such a claim for

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69 See Fackenheim, *op.cit.*, p. 34; *Infra* p. 124, f.n. 57.
philosophy. Apropos the goal for knowledge, Hegel states that "it is that point where knowledge no longer has need to go out beyond itself, where it finds itself and where the Concept corresponds to the object and the object to the Concept."\(^{71}\) The road to this goal is a long and arduous one he suggests, with no satisfaction or rest to be had at earlier stages. He also connects this paradigm of human consciousness in its dynamic process of self-development with the 'history' of its education of itself.\(^{72}\) "The sequence of Shapes through which consciousness passes on this road is rather the detailed history of consciousness' own education to the level of science."\(^{73}\)


\(^{72}\) G.A. Kelly makes the observation that "The Phenomenology is his profound, vigorous testament to the comprehensiveness of Bildung - a word that means not only education, but maturation, fulfillment, joy, suffering, a drenching in the stream of time and an emergence to the plateau of judgment. This occult, fascinating treatise is Hegel's ... paradigm for the acquisition of all worthwhile knowledge." Idealism, Politics and History, Sources of Hegelian Thought, Cambridge, U.P., 1969, p. 342.

\(^{73}\) Phen., p. 136; KRD, p. 54. "Die Reihe seiner Gestaltungen, welche das Bewusstsein auf diesem Wege durchläuft, ist vielmehr die ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewusstseins selbst zur Wissenschaft." Phän., p. 67.
2. Human nature, process and result, as opposed to the fixed human nature of the Enlightenment.

The Phenomenology of Spirit is succinctly characterized by G.R.G. Mure as "the spiritual biography of modern individual man", but more interesting, from the standpoint of this chapter, is his alternative characterization of the work as "the story of human nature as process and result, not as the fixed essence conceived by the men of the Enlightenment." Such remarks are indicative that this work evolves within a focus (which no doubt, in some sense, becomes all encompassing in its result) of guiding themes which are pertinent to the question of how historicity enters into his conception of man's being. Hyppolite argues that "Hegel wanted to analyze the very foundations of historical action", that "he inquired into the general conditions of human existence that constitute the possibility of the human act as such." Fackenheim draws attention to and carefully examines Hegel's

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74 This sentence closes with this qualifying clause: "though there are many chapters in it which he (modern individual man) could not write himself, and these have to be elicited from history." The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 63-64.

75 Ibid., p. 64.

76 Studies on Marx and Hegel, "The Human Situation in the Hegelian Phenomenology", p. 154. He notes that "Quite rightly, Marx comments that in the Phenomenology Hegel occasionally describes 'the true features of the human condition'. But Marx himself did not understand the necessity of penetrating to the ground of the historical event and of the human act itself. ... he neglected to deal with the problem at its very source." p. 155.
strenuous effort to fully ground his philosophical inquiry into modern freedom and how it has arisen, through the dialectic of individual selfhood. "For whereas the self makes and has made itself, it 'forgets' that it has done so, mistaking its selfhood for a substance, ready-made by some force other than itself - and therefore fixed and unalterable." 77

The specific issues which Hyppolite and Fackenheim direct their analyses are not precisely the same, but like Mure they recognize a fundamental characteristic of Hegel's philosophy: the self-constitutionality of man's being. It is not an 'analysis of essence' which Hyppolite has in mind, because "it would leave the impression that there exists a human nature or an essence of man, such as Spinoza and even Hume supposed. But Hegel had no intention of discovering such an essence in which he seems to have no belief and whose conception he criticizes in his early works." 78 Certainly the general sense of some the texts and some of the conclusions of the preceding chapter are compatible with Hyppolite's position here. Hegel does seem to wish to show that what constitutes man as human, as spirit, is an ongoing, self-originating process. Hyppolite expresses what he does have in mind by

77 The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, 'The "Ladder" to the Absolute Standpoint', p. 38.
78 op.cit., p. 154.
connecting this process with history:

For Hegel man is spirit, that is to say, history and collective development; the truth to which he may aspire appears in and through that history. The question which Hegel set himself, we believe, is the problem of how to ground human history and a possible truth, or reason, within the development of history so conceived.\(^7^9\)

Fackenheim also connects Hegel's concern to show the development of human self-hood with history, "A true philosophic inquiry into the nature of modern freedom, however, is inseparable from an inquiry into its genesis, and it is not thorough unless it inquires into the being of the modern self even as it inquires into its self-knowledge."\(^8^0\)

Hegel's human world is essentially historical\(^8^1\) and man within that world is radically if not essentially, historical, for at the very least man's culture, religion, science,

\(^7^9\) op.cit., p. 154.

\(^8^0\) op.cit., p. 38. Fackenheim explains how this inquiry must proceed: "Since ... the self is a self-constituting process the self's recognition of its freedom and its production of that freedom are mutually inseparable. Such an inquiry must remain incomplete unless it pursues the double process of self-making and self-knowing back to its pristine origins. Were it to stop with a self already made it could not but take this self for a ready-made substance, thus showing the inadequacy of the perspective from which it has done its taking. The inquiry must go back to a point at which there is as yet no made self but only a pure power of self-making." Ibid., p. 38-39.

political institutions and law are shown as present products of historical development. More than this, the development of man's consciousness both at the pre-reflective and reflective levels is historical; his way of thinking is historical; his personal development is historical, even at the natural level insofar as it is comprised within the more truly human level; and his most fundamental spiritual development is historical. Still, regardless of various preliminary indications, from the standpoint of this research, it is appropriate to refrain at this stage, from making the judgment that Hegel's man is essentially historical. Hegel's philosophy is complex, multi-faceted, and yet so balanced, that it is not possible to be readily certain that man as human, that man's being, that human nature is essentially the product of historical development, that man in his very essence is undergoing continuous and continuing historical evolution.

A. Consciousness, mediation and the self-identity that moves itself.

a. Sense-certainty

The importance of 'mediation' to Hegel's thought becomes evident from the very beginning of the *Phenomenology*, where he begins with an analysis of 'knowledge of the immediate'. He also defines mediation in the Preface, in a way which makes it clear why mediation makes an important contribution to the process of man's self-making activity.
For mediation is nothing else than self-identity that moves itself; or it is reflection into itself, the moment of the ego which is for itself, pure negativity or, reduced to its pure abstraction, simple becoming. The ego or becoming in general - this mediation is on account of its simplicity precisely growing immediacy and the immediate itself.\textsuperscript{82}

Consciousness manifests three stages or levels of cognitive awareness, which Hegel leads his reader through: sensuous consciousness (sense-certainty), sense perception, and understanding. The experience of consciousness, more broadly taken, continues to show its depth, structure and process in Self-Consciousness and Reason, which in turn manifest their further stages of development. Confining attention to Consciousness, narrowly taken, i.e. consciousness not yet explicitly self-conscious, for this present undertaking of revealing Hegel's meaning in respect to 'mediation', the limitations of sense-certainty soon appear when what is given in sense-certainty is delimited.

The path to Absolute knowledge begins with sense experience of ordinary life, with the apparently extra mental physical thing, the sensible thing, standing over against the

\textsuperscript{82 Phän., p. 82; WK l, p. 390, 392. "Denn die Vermittlung ist nichts anders als die sich bewegende Sichselbstgleichheit, oder sie ist die Reflexion in sich selbst, das Moment des fürsichseinden Ich, die reine Negativität oder, auf ihre reine Abstraktion herabgesetzt, das einfache Werden. Das Ich oder das Werden überhaupt, dieses Vermitteln ist um seiner Einfachheit willen eben die werdende Unmittelbarkeit und das Unmittelbare selbst." Phän., p. 21.}
subject. The object appears in sensuous consciousness as independent, as something other and external, in short, as immediate. No mediating link is revealed at this stage.

The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to proceed, too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension (Begreifen).^{83}

The immediate uncritical apprehension of sense-certainty appears to give knowledge of a very solid kind, an indubitable datum with abundant content. The kind of "concrete content, which sensuous certainty provides", at first thought, "makes this immediately given appear to be the richest kind of knowledge, to be even a knowledge of endless wealth."^{84} There seems to be no limit to be found, either in the vast reaches of time and space, or in the repetitive division of some fragment of the latter's abundance. Furthermore, "it seems to be the truest, the most authentic knowledge: for it has not as yet dropped anything from the object; it has the object

^{83} Phän., p. 149. "Das Wissen, welches zuerst oder unmittelbar unser Gegenstand ist, kann kein anderes sein als dasjenige, welches selbst unmittelbares Wissen, Wissen des Unmittelbaren oder Seienden ist. Wir haben uns ebenso unmittelbar oder aufnehmend zu verhalten, also nichts an ihm, wie es sich darbietet, zu verändern und von dem Auffassen das Begreifen abzuhalten." Phän., p. 79.

^{84} Ibid. "Der konkrete Inhalt der sinnlichen Gewissheit lässt sie unmittelbar als die reichste Erkenntnis, ja als eine Erkenntnis von unendlichem Reichtum erscheinen." Ibid.
before itself in its entirety and completeness." That the ascent to knowledge may begin, Hegel proceeds to demolish this characterization of sense knowledge: "this bare fact of certainty, however, is really and admittedly the abstractest and the poorest kind of truth. It merely says regarding what it knows: it is; and its truth contains solely the being of the fact it knows." At this level, consciousness is aware of a mere 'thereeness', it is formless knowledge, sheer sensation, and in fact, such isolated experience is only an abstraction because the simplest conscious experience is more complex than this.

It is at this initial stage that it can be seen that Hegel does indeed commence at 'a point at which there is yet no made self but only a pure power of self-making'. The double process of self-making and self-knowing have not really begun.

Consciousness, on its part, in the case of this form of certainty, takes the shape merely of pure Ego. In other words, I in such a case am merely qua pure this. and the object likewise is merely qua pure this. I, this particular conscious I, am certain of this fact before me, not because I qua consciousness have developed myself in connection with it and in manifold ways set thought to work about it: ...

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85 Phēn., p. 149. "Die erscheint auszerdem als die wahrhafteste; denn sie hat von dem Gegenstände noch nichts weggelassen, sondern ihn in seiner ganzen Vollständigkeit vor sich. Diese Gewissheit aber gibt in der Tat sich selbst für die abstrakteste und ärmste Wahrheit aus. Sie sagt von dem, was sie weiss, nur dies aus: es ist; und ihre Wahrheit enthält allein das Sein der Sache." Phän., p. 79.

86 Ibid., "Das Bewusstsein seinerseits ist in dieser Gewissheit nur als reines Ich; oder Ich bin darin nur als
The words to note are "consciousness ... merely ... pure Ego", and the last clause with its words "developed myself" and "set thought to work"; the two processes of self-development and self-knowing have not yet begun, only the minimum pure ego with its pure undifferentiated, immediate awareness is present at this initial stage. The Ego's certainty of the datum before it does not derive from the thing being complete with relations and connections with other things. In fact, and this is where the need of mediation in knowing, truth and the constituting of the self-itself is shown, "Neither has anything to do with the truth sensuous certainty contains: neither the I nor the thing has here the meaning of a manifold relation with a variety of other things, of mediation in a variety of ways." \(^8^7\)

Thinking has yet to commence, the Ego has not yet a manifold of ideas, and the thing is not yet a multiplicity of qualities. The object, in its immediacy, constitutes itself as an individual 'this', it simply is, and is directly apprehended as such. "It is - that is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and that bare fact of being, that simple immediacy, constitutes

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87 Phen., p. 150. "Beides geht die Wahrheit der sinnlichen Gewissheit nichts an; weder Ich noch die Sache hat darin die Bedeutung einer mannigfaltigen Vermittlung," Phän., p. 80.
its truth." The object is an immediacy, and the relation of
experiencing subject to object is an immediate relation: "the
certainty qua relation, the certainty 'of' something, is an
immediate pure relation; consciousness is I - nothing more, a
pure this; the individual consciousness knows a pure this, or
knows what is individual."88 Being is attributed to object,
without further distinction and without relation to other
objects.

It is thus the case that sense-certainty provides
only a rather empty and abstract form of knowledge, a simple
awareness of the object's presence, without further articula-
tion. Even so, through analysis, Hegel finds that there is
enough in the relation between subject and object, to allow
the dialectic to advance. "But, when we look closely, there
is a good deal more implied in that bare pure being, which
constitutes the kernel of this form of certainty, and is given
out by it as its truth."89 He uncovers the third element in

88 Phen., p. 150. "sie ist, dies ist dem sinnlichen
Wissen das Wesentliche, und dieses reine Sein oder diese ein-
fache Unmittelbarkeit macht ihre Wahrheit aus. Ebenso ist
die Gewissheit als Beziehung unmittelbare reine Beziehung;
das Bewusstsein ist Ich, weiter nichts, ein reiner Dieser;
der Einzelne weiss reines Dieses, oder das Einzelne." Phän., p. 80.

89 Ibid. "An dem reinen Sein aber, welches das
Wesen dieser Gewissheit ausmacht und welches sie als ihre
Wahrheit aussagt, spielt, wenn wir zusehen, noch vieles and-
eres beider." Ibid.
the subject-object interrelation - that which he calls mediation. Among the distinctions which emerge from his analysis there is

the fundamental difference - viz. that in sense-experience pure being at once breaks up into the two 'thises' ... one this as I, and one as object. When we reflect on this distinction it is seen that neither the one nor the other is merely immediate, merely is in sense-c certainty but is at the same time mediated; I have the certainty through the other ... and this, again, exists in that certainty through another, viz. through the I.\textsuperscript{90}

No doubt such sense-c certainty is the basis of higher levels of knowledge, but even at this level, according to Hegel, experience is more than pure immediacy. The distinction between "essence and instance, immediacy and mediation",\textsuperscript{91} he finds in sense-certainty itself. On the one hand there is the object existing in simple immediacy, seeming to be the essential reality. On the other hand, there is the mediated, a state of knowledge, something which is not per se in the certainty, but is through the ego, seemingly the

\textsuperscript{90} Phen., p. 150. "... die Hauptverschiedenheit, dasz nämlich in ihr sogleich aus dem reinen Sein die beiden schon genannten Diesen, ein Dieser als Ich, und ein Dieses als Gegenstand herausfallen. Reflektieren wir über diesen Unterschied, so ergibt sich, dass weder das eine noch das andere nur unmittelbar, in der sinnlichen Gewissheit ist, sondern zugleich als vermittelt; Ich habe die Gewissheit durch ein anderes, ... und diese ist ebenso in der Gewissheit durch ein anderes, nämlich durch Ich." Phän., p. 80.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid. "Diesen Unterschied des Wesens und des Beispiels, der Unmittelbarkeit und der Vermittlung," Ibid.
non-essential. However, he thinks it important to ascertain of the object "whether its meaning and notion, which is to be essential reality corresponds to the way it is present in that certainty."\textsuperscript{92}

He asks of sense-certainty: 'What is the this?' and proceeds to show that if one utilizes 'the two-fold form of its existence', \textit{Now} and \textit{Here}, by way of reply, one is involved at once with applying universals, so that the result is just the opposite to what was intended or meant. In attempts to express what it is that is known, to describe the thing of immediate awareness, the subject is forced to use universals, applicable to other things. "Language, however, as we see, is the more truthful; in it we ourselves refute directly and at once our own 'meaning'; and since universality is the real truth of sense-certainty, and language merely expresses \textit{this} truth, it is not possible at all for us even to express in words any sensuous existence which we 'mean'."\textsuperscript{93} The apparent

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Phen.}, p. 151. "ob dieser sein Begriff, Wesen zu sein, dem entspricht, wie er in ihr vorhanden ist."
\textit{Phän.}, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 152. "Die Sprache aber ist, wie wir sehen, das Wahrhaftere; in ihr widerlegen wir selbst unmittelbar unsere Meinung, und da das Allgemeine das Wahre der sinnlichen Gewissheit ist und die Sprache nur dieses Wahre ausdrückt, so ist es gar nicht möglich, dass wir ein sinnliches Sein, das wir meinen, je sagen können." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 82.
recourse to using words like 'here' and 'now' in order to 'fix' the object, fails to mean what is intended, just as in the case of the word 'this'. "The This is shown thus again to be mediated simplicity, in other words, to be universality." Having tried to locate and confine the essential in and to sense-certainty, through the use of variations on the word 'this' possibly accompanied with gestures, the result is to confirm 'this' 'now' and 'here' as universals, so that the true content of experience is the universal. Hegel's discussion of language in connection with sense-certainty is directed primarily to the task of showing that the excessive claims made on behalf of sense knowledge are hollow and spurious. In respect to what remains as the essential element of sense-certainty, pure being does remain, he admits, but this pure being is not in the form of something immediate, but of something in which the process of negation and mediation is essential. Consequently it is not what we intend or 'mean' by being, but being with the characteristic that it is an abstraction, the purely universal; and our intended 'meaning', which takes the truth of sense-certainty to be not something universal, is alone left standing in contrast to this empty, indifferent Now and Here.95

94 _Phen._, p. 153. "Das Dieses zeigt sich also wieder als vermittelte Einfachheit, oder als Allgemeinheit." _Phän._, p. 82.

95 Ibid. "... das reine Sein ... aber nicht als Unmittelbares, sondern (als) ein solches, dem die Negation und Vermittlung wesentlich ist, hiermit nicht als das, was wir unter dem Sein meinen, sondern das Sein mit der Bestimmung, dass es die Abstraktion oder das rein Allgemeine ist; und unsere Meinung, für welche das Wahre der sinnlichen Gewissheit nicht das Allgemeine ist, bleibt allein diesem leeren
Here he clearly states that the pure being that remains is in the form 'of something in which the process of negation and mediation is essential.' The essential role of mediation is well marked here, and in this whole early section of the Phenomenology, but in fact it is a concept underlying most of his philosophy. In the larger perspective it is through mediation that the dialectic advances; within a narrower focus, the concept of mediation helps to explain why it makes sense to talk of the historicity of man, of an implicit notion of historicity, in the philosophy of Hegel. Mediation both allows and brings in, the content of the human and historical situation into the dynamic process of man's self-making.

To return to Hegel's analysis of sense knowledge, it is the case that the stage reached in the passage above, has

oder gleichgültigen Jetzt und Hier gegenüber noch übrig."
Phän., p. 82.

96 Henri Niel, in concluding his Introduction to his very comprehensive study of mediation, states: "Ainsi, dans sa première forme, la médiation est acte d'amour; elle apparaît sous les traits du Christ, médiateur parfait, réunissant en lui le point de vue des hommes et le point de vue de Dieu. Après avoir, dans la Phénoménologie, ouvert la voie à la médiation psychologique en montrant que la prise de conscience du moi comme sujet enveloppe la présence de l'autre, Hegel conçoit la médiation comme la relation idéale reliant entre eux les différents moments d'un tout. Finalement, il reconnaît en elle l'expression de l'identité entre la logique et l'histoire." De la Médiation dans la Philosophie de Hegel, Paris, Aubier, 1945, p. 16-17.
resulted in a reversal of the way knowledge and the object were related when the analysis was commenced. "The certainty is now found to lie in the opposite element, namely in knowledge, which formerly was the non-essential factor." He now turns to the Ego, and subjects it to analysis; in brief, the ego is mediated by the same dialectical process as the object, such that it too is revealed as something universal. But initially, the ego appears to be the only stable point in consciousness's manifold of sensation.

Its truth lies in the object as my (meinem) object, or lies in the "meaning" (Meinen), in what I "mean"; it is, because I know it. Sense-certainty is thus indeed banished from the object, but it is not yet thereby done away with; it is merely forced back into the I. We have still to see what experience reveals regarding its reality in this sense.

In effect the common sense-certainty of ordinary life retreats begrudgingly. The locus of its defence is now the ego, where it may seem impregnable. Hegel begins to examine the credentials of the 'I' or the ego to hold the truth of experience.

97 Phen., p. 153. Phän., p. 82-83.
98 Ibid. "... sinnlichen Gewissheit ... sondern sie ist jetzt in dem Gegenengesetzten, nämlich in dem Wissen, das vorker das Universentliche war, vorhanden." Ibid., p. 83.
99 Ibid. "Ihre Wahrheit ist in dem Gegenstands als meinem Gegenstände, oder im Meinen; er ist, weil Ich von ihm weisz. Die sinnliche Gewissheit ist also zwar aus dem Gegenstande vertrieben, aber dadurch noch nicht aufgehoben, sondern nur in das Ich zurückgedrängt; es ist zu sehen, was uns die Erfahrung über diese ihre Realität zeigt." Ibid.
The object exists now for me because I know it as instanced, fixed and held in my subjective certainty; the essential truth seems to be contained in the immediacy of my consciously seeing and hearing.

The force of its truth thus lies now in the I, in the immediate fact of my seeing, hearing and so on; the disappearance of the particular Now and Here that we "mean" is prevented by the fact that I keep hold on them. The Now is daytime, because I see it; the Here is a tree for a similar reason.\(^{100}\)

However, even if I record these truths, as I utter the words, another person reading the words at another time can mean 'house' for the 'here', instead of 'tree', and 'day' for the 'now' instead of 'night'. "Both truths have the same authenticity - the immediacy of seeing and the certainty and assurance both have as to their specific way of knowing; but the one certainty disappears in the other."\(^{101}\) The ego's 'here' and 'now' suffers from the same difficulty as the this 'here' and 'now'. The ego specifies and sustains itself solely by not being another. When the ego uses the word 'I', intending


to mean its unique individuality, it manages only to allow the substitution of any other 'I', in short, its language reveals the universality of the ego.

Consciousness has discovered that the real content of sense-experience is not the particular but the universal. Furthermore it has discovered that the essential truth of sense-experience cannot be one-sided; it cannot lie in the immediacy of the object or in that of the ego. "Sense-certainty discovers by experience, therefore, that its essential nature lies neither in the object nor in the I; and that the immediacy peculiar to it is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other."\(^{102}\) By way of a process of double negation Hegel arrives at the result that the essential truth of this level of experience is the whole of sense-certainty. "Thus it is only the whole sense-certainty itself which persists therein as immediacy, and in consequence excludes from itself all the opposition which in the foregoing had a place there."\(^{103}\) By a process of double mediation, objectivity is comprised by and in consciousness; and sense-certainty is

\(^{102}\) Phen., p. 154-155. "Die sinnliche Gewissheit erfährt also, dass ihr Wesen weder in dem Gegenstande noch in dem Ich, und die Unmittelbarkeit weder eine Unmittelbarkeit des einen noch des anderen ist," Phen., p. 84.

\(^{103}\) Ibid. "Es ist also nur die ganze sinnliche Gewissheit selbst, welche an ihr als Unmittelbarkeit festhält und hiedurch alle Entgegensetzung, die im vorherigen stattfand aus sich ausschliesst." Ibid.
shown to be a dialectical process and result. "It is clear from all this that the dialectic process involved in sense-certainty is nothing else than the mere history of its process - of its experience; and sense-certainty itself is nothing else than simply this history."104 This important passage manifests clearly that historicity is introduced in the lowest level of the self-constituting activity of consciousness, and that it is drawn in and carried forward by the dialectical process of mediation. In the process of sublation, the latter simultaneously comprises and constitutes the objective world in the self-development of consciousness. In this can be seen the initial formation of the ground for the self and for its historicity.

b. Perception

By way of the above analysis of sense-certainty, Hegel makes the transition from simple sense awareness to sense perception. "Immediate certainty does not make the truth its own, for its truth is something universal, whereas certainty wants to deal with the This." The new level of knowledge directs itself to the universal. "Perception, on the other hand, takes what exists for it to be a universal." Out of his analysis of sense-certainty, he carries forward universality

104 Phen., p. 158. "Es erhellt, dass die Dialektik der sinnlichen Gewissheit nichts anderes als die einfache Geschichte ihrer Bewegung oder ihrer Erfahrung, und die sinnliche Gewissheit selbst nichts anderes als nur diese Geschichte ist." Phän., p. 86.
as perception's principle. "Universality being its principle in general, its moments immediately distinguished within it are also universal; I is a universal, and the object is a universal."\textsuperscript{105} His analysis of sense-certainty showed its inadequacy, that the barest of sensation has mediation in it, and led dialectically to this new level of conscious experience, i.e. sense perception wherein the object is seen pregnant with universality, and wherein the universal is attained, but attained clothed in sense qualities. "The wealth of sense-knowledge belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, ... for it is only perception that has negation, distinction, multiplicity in its very nature."\textsuperscript{106}

A somewhat similar analysis to that of sense-certainty is employed to show the self-contradictoriness of sense-perception wherein what is perceived, the 'thing', is both individual and not an individual. By considering the 'thing' in abstraction from its 'properties', the 'thing' appears to be isolated and to possess immediacy.

\textsuperscript{105} Phen., p. 162. "Die unmittelbare Gewisheit nimmt sich nicht das Wahre, denn ihre Wahrheit ist das Allgemeine; sie aber will das Diese nehmen. Die Wahrnehmung nimmt hingegen das, was ihr das Seiende ist, als Allgemeines. Wie die Allgemeinheit ihr Prinzip überhaupt, so sind auch ihre in ihr unmittelbar sich unterscheidenden Momente, Ich ein allgemeines und der Gegenstand ein allgemeiner." Phän., p. 89.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 163. "Der Reichtum des sinnlichen Wissens gehört der Wahrnehmung, ... denn nur jene hat die Negation, den Unterschied oder die Mannigfaltigkeit an ihrem Wesen." Ibid., p. 90.
"The one characterized as the simple fact, the object, is the essence, quite indifferent as to whether it is perceived or not: perceiving, on the other hand, being the process, is the insubstantial, the inconstant factor, which can be as well as not be, is the non-essential moment."¹⁰⁷ This is how the relation between the two moments, that which is perceived and that which perceives is distinguished, as the dialectic of perception begins. The above followed once the question had been raised as to which is the essential and which the non-essential side of the perceptual process. Hegel proceeds to examine the object by way of a discussion of 'Thinghood'; he uses the simple physical substance salt as an example:

This salt is a simple Here and at the same time manifold: it is white, and also pungent, also cubical in shape, also of a specific weight and so on. All these many properties exist in a simple Here, where they interpenetrate each other. ... And at the same time, without being divided by different Heres, they do not affect each other in their interpenetration; its being white does not affect or alter the cubical shape it has, and neither affects its tart taste, and so on.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Phen., p. 163. "Das eine als das Einfache bestimmt, der Gegenstand, ist das Wesen, gleichgültig dagegen, ob er wahrgenommen wird oder nicht; das Wahrnehmen aber als die Bewegung ist das Unbeständige, das sein kann oder auch nicht, und das Unwesentliche." Phän., p. 90.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 164-65. "Dies Salz ist ein faches Hier und zugleich vielfach; es ist weisz und auch scharf, auch kubisch gestaltet, auch von bestimmter Schwere usw. Alle diese vielen Eigenschaften sind in Einen einfachen Hier, worin sie sich also durchdringen; ... und zugleich, ohne durch verschiedene Hier geschieden zu sein, affizieren sie sich in dieser Durchdringung nicht, das Weisze affiziert oder verändert das Kubische nicht, beide nicht das Scharfe usw.," Ibid., p. 91.
The perceiving subject seeks to apprehend a single and unitary thing, which as it turns out, is on the one hand "a simple togetherness of many heres and nows" and on the other "the many" which (in the present case) "are in their determinations themselves simply universals". The 'thinghood' of the cube of salt seems to be found in its unity of sensible properties, but its properties can be used to refer to many other things, which is to say, the properties are universals. "Since each (property) is simple relation to self, it leaves the others alone and is related to these merely by being also along with them, a relation of mere indifference. This 'Also' is thus the pure universal itself, the 'medium', the 'Thinghood' keeping them together." Although the thing's properties are merely together, its properties are not arbitrary and interchangeable. "If the many determinate properties were utterly indifferent to each other, and were entirely related to themselves alone, they would not be determinate." In part, the salt defines itself by what properties it excludes or negates: the perennial


problem of 'the one and the many' emerges at this point, for
the 'thing' as object is one and as possessed of properties
is many. Emphasis on the one or the many, to the exclusion
of the other cannot be accomplished and leads to the recogni-
tion that the thing is both. "And this, (medium, thinghood)
consequently, is not merely an 'also', an unity indifferent
to what is in it, but a 'one' as well, an excluding repelling
unity."\footnote{111}

It is at this point that the dialectical analysis
begins to shift to the perceiving subject. Up until now it
has attended to the objective side of perceiving, the stage
wherein perception seems to gain its object as a definite one
through a passive acceptance: "it has merely to 'take' the
object and assume the attitude of pure apprehension, and what
comes its way in so doing is truth."\footnote{112} There still remains
the perceiving subject; consideration has to be given to its
role in order to confirm or otherwise the objectivity of per-
ceiving, and to ascertain the effect on perception that the
subject (the second of perceptions two opposed elements)

\footnote{111} Phen., p. 165. "Namlich wenn die vielen best-
immten Eigenschaften schlechterdings gleichgültig wären und
sich durchaus nur auf sich selbst bezögen, so wären sie keine
bestimmte \Ih; ... und dieses ist daher nicht nur ein \Auch,
gleichgültig Einheit, sondern auch \Eine, ausschlieszende

\footnote{112} Ibid., p. 166. "es hat ihn nur zu nehmen, und
sich als reines Auffassen zu verhalten; was sich ihm dadurch
ergibt, ist das Wahre." Ibid., p. 92-93.
would have if it constitutes the objectivity of the thing.

If it did something when taking the given, it would by such supplementation or elimination alter the truth. Since the object is the true and universal, the self-same, while consciousness is the variable and non-essential, it may happen that consciousness apprehends the object wrongly and deceives itself. The percipient is aware of the possibility of deception; for, in the universality forming the principle here, the percipient is directly aware of otherness, but aware of it as null and nought, as what is superseded.113

The percipient's criterion of truth 'is self-sameness', but because 'diversity is a fact for him', his procedure consists of relating 'the diverse moments of his apprehension to one another'. But in doing so, should there be something found wanting in the comparison, a question arises as to the adequacy of the perception. "If, however, in this comparison a want of sameness comes out, this is not an untruth on the part of the object (for the object is the self-same), but on the part of perception."


114 Ibid., p. 167. "Wenn sich aber in dieser Vergleichung eine Ungleichheit hervortut, so ist dies nicht eine Unwahrheit des Gegenstandes, denn er ist das sich selbst Gleiche, sondern des Wahrnehmens." Ibid.
Hegel proceeds to describe the experience consciousness forms in the course of its actual perception, in order to show how the contradictions develop in it. "For it (consciousness) has found out, regarding perception, that the truth and outcome of perception is its dissolution, is reflection out of and away from the truth into itself."

Conscious experience as perceiving subject begins to become aware of itself as a process in which it has been reflected back into itself from the object perceived.

In this way consciousness becomes definitely aware of how its perceptual process is essentially constituted, viz. that this is not a simple bare apprehension, but in its apprehension (it) is at the same time reflected out of the true content back into itself. This return of consciousness into itself, which is immediately involved and implicated in that pure apprehension ... alters the true content. Consciousness is aware that this aspect is at the same time its own, and takes it upon itself; and by so doing consciousness will thus get the true object bare and naked.

Hegel notes in respect to the above, that 'this return to

115 Phen., p. 168. "Es hat nämlich die Erfahrung über das Wahrnehmen gemacht, dass das Resultat und das Wahre desselben seine Auflösung oder die Reflexion in sich selbst aus dem Wahren ist." Phän., p. 94.

116 Ibid., p. 168-169. "Es hat sich hiermit für das Bewusstsein bestimmt, wie sein Wahrnehmen wesentlich beschaffen ist, nämlich nicht ein einfaches reines Auffassen, sondern in seinem Auffassen zugleich aus dem Wahren heraus in sich reflektiert zu sein. Diese Rückkehr des Bewusstseins in sich selbst, die sich in das reine Auffassen unmittelbar, ... einmischt, verändert das Wahre. Das Bewusstsein erkennt diese Seite zugleich als die seinige und nimmt sie auf sich, wodurch es also den wahren Gegenstand rein erhalten wird." Ibid.
self has proved to be essential to perception." Hegel had earlier shown that the variety of distinctions often accorded to sense experience actually belong to perception. To the present stage of his analysis, a certain progress had been made, in that the 'thing' was identified as the medium of the pattern of properties which constantly characterize its self-sameness. However, in the passage above, the possibility of error and doubt arises. In cases of variance between object and object perceived in this perceiving experience, the perceiver may assign the variation to himself, choosing to view such as illusory. In this way, somewhat as in the case of sense-certainty, consciousness is 'forced back upon itself', but unlike the former, the truth of perception does not directly fall within it, rather it is untruth that falls within it, - at least initially. "By knowing this, however, consciousness is able to cancel and supersede this untruth. It distinguishes its apprehension of the truth from the untruth of its perception, corrects this untruth." But, insofar as it is able to make this correction, "the truth, qua truth of perception, certainly falls within its own consciousness."


The result here is that the truth seems to be found in the content of its own subjective perceiving. Furthermore, the possibility emerges that the thing as medium with its properties may come to appear as subjective. In short 'essentiality' begins to fall on the side of the subject.

The opposition between the thing's unity and its multiplicity, already discussed in connection with Hegel's previous analysis of the object perceived, returns again as a problem in connection with the perceiving subject. In perception, the subject is initially aware of the 'thing' as a 'one', and strives to hold it fixed in this unitary character. However, Hegel points out that "if in the course of perceiving, something crops up contradicting that, then I must take it to be due to my reflection."¹¹⁹ Various properties do appear, and these seem to belong to the thing, which is a "one"; but the perceiving subject is aware in himself that this multiplicity of properties, 'by which the thing ceases to be a unity', falls within him. Hegel again takes up the cube of salt to illustrate his point:

This thing, then, is, in point of fact, merely white to our eyes, also tart to our tongue, and also cubical to our feeling, and so on. The entire diversity of these aspects comes not from the thing, but from us.

and we find them falling apart thus from one another, because the organs they affect are quite distinct inter se, the eye is entirely distinct from the tongue, and so on. We are, consequently, the universal medium where such elements get dissociated, and exist each by itself. By the fact, then, that we regard the characteristic of being a universal medium as our reflection, we preserve and maintain the self-sameness and truth of the one thing, its being a "one".

One of the difficulties which emerges here, as it had in an earlier perceptual standpoint, is the lack of intelligible interrelation in the properties. It does not seem possible to reconcile 'these diverse aspects, which consciousness puts to its side of the account' with the need of the thing as a "one" to exclude other things, by way of the specificity of its properties. The thing "excludes (distinguishes) through the determinate characteristic. Things themselves are thus determinate in and for themselves; they have properties by which they distinguish themselves from one another."

The analysis which directly follows finds that 'the thing has several properties': 1) it is a true being, a being in itself;

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120 Phän., p. 169-170. "Dies Ding ist also in der Tat nur weisz, an unser Auge gebracht, scharf auch, an unser Zunge, auch kubisch, an unser Gefühl usf. Die gänzliche Verschiedenheit dieser Seiten nehmen wir nicht aus dem Dinge, sondern aus uns; sie fallen uns an unserem von der Zunge ganz unterschiedenen Auge usf. so auseinander. Wir sind somit das allgemeine Medium, worin solche Momente sich absondern und für sich sind. Hiedurch also, dasz wir die Bestimmtheit, allgemeines Medium zu sein, als unser Reflexion betrachten, erhalten. wir die Sichselbstgleichheit und Wahrheit des Dinges, Eins zu sein." Phän., p. 95.

121 Ibid., p. 170. "sondern durch die Bestimmtheit. Die Dinge selbst also sind an und für sich bestimmte; sie haben Eigenschaften, wodurch sie sich von andern unterscheiden. Ibid., p. 96."
2) the determinate properties are 'inherent in that thing itself', but they are such only because they are more than one and 'maintain their distinction from one another'; 3) "since they are thus within 'thinghood', they are (self-contained) each in and for itself, and are indifferent to one another." The result is that "the thing is the 'also', the general medium, wherein the many properties subsist externally to one another." In other words, should the exclusiveness and universality of the properties be pressed too far, the thing's unity becomes indefinite and obscure, merely an also in which its properties are related only externally.

Consciousness may endeavour to take upon itself the unity of the thing; "for the thing as such is the subsistence of many different and independent properties. ... Putting these properties into a 'one' belongs solely to consciousness, which, therefore, has to avoid letting them coincide and be one (i.e. one and the same property) in the thing. For that purpose it introduces the idea of 'in-so-far' to meet the difficulty; and by this means it keeps the qualities apart, and preserves the thing in the sense of the 'also'." But

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122 Phen., p. 171. "indem sie so in der Dingheit sind, sind sie an und für sich und gleichgültig gegeneinander." Phän., p. 96.

123 Ibid. "... das Ding ist das Auch, oder das allgemeine Medium, worin die vielen Eigenschaften auszereinander bestehen, ..." Ibid.

124 Ibid. "denn das Dinge selbst ist das Bestehen der vielen verschiedenen und unabhängigen Eigenschaften. ...
the contradiction involved in the thing, at the same time, being both a unity and a multiplicity, cannot be evaded by allotting these two features to the two poles of perception, unity to the subject's consciousness and multiplicity to the object, for new contradictions arise. Looking back at the different standpoints adopted by consciousness and what it took upon itself and what it ascribed to the thing, no matter how it is regarded "the truth itself, the thing, manifests itself in this twofold manner. ... the thing contains within it opposite aspects of truth, a truth whose elements are in antithesis to one another."125 In other words, recourse to subjectivity in one form or another, like the attempts to grasp the thing purely objectively, reveals the same difficulty: the need for reconciliation of concrete unity with the multiplicity of sensuous properties shows up in each instance. Consciousness may attempt to take the standpoint that:

Its object is now the entire process, which was previously shared between the object and consciousness. The thing is a "one", reflected into self; it is for itself; but it is also for another; and, further, it is an other for itself as it is for another. The


125 Phen., p. 172. "... das Wahre selbst, das Ding, sich auf diese gedoppelte Weise zeigt. ... an ihm selbst eine entgegengesetzte Wahrheit hat." Phän., p. 97.
thing is, hence, for itself and also for another, a being that has difference of a twofold kind. But it is also "one".126

This tack by itself is not adequate to the need either, for the thing "being 'one', however, contradicts the diversity it has." Responsibility for placing the diversity in the 'one' would reside with consciousness; furthermore it 'would have to keep this apart from the thing.' The result would be that consciousness "would thus be compelled to say that the thing 'in-so-far as' it is for itself is not for another."127 The various vain attempts to avoid contradiction show its inevitability, that perception's content is so constituted, and in itself, the thing is both unity and difference.

There remains the possibility of drawing a distinction between what the thing may be in itself, with its stable nucleus of essential properties, and the profusion of unessential, changeable qualities which it takes on in its relations with other things. "Now, although the contradiction in the object is in this way allotted to different things, yet the

126 Phen., p. 172. "... der Gegenstand ist ihm jetzt diese ganze Bewegung, welche vorher an den Gegenstand und an das Bewusstsein verteilt war. Das Dinge ist Eins, in sich reflektiert; es ist für sich, aber es ist auch für ein anderes; und zwar ist es ebenso ein Anderes für sich, als es für anderes ist. Das Ding ist hienach für sich und auch für ein Anderes, ein gedoppeltes verschiedenes Sein, aber es ist auch Eins;" Phen., p. 97.

127 Ibid. "das Einssein aber widerspricht dieser seiner Verschiedenheit; ... Es müsste also sagen, dasz das Ding, insofern es für sich ist, nicht für anderes ist." Ibid.
isolated individual thing will still be affected with dis­
tinction."128 The move involving the assumption that the
thing is in reality a unity and that the multiplicity results
from its relations to other things is no more successful than
the others. The fluctuating qualities of the thing would seem
to require some ground in its stable essence, but this stable
essence must itself be contrasted with and so related to
external things.

This determinate characteristic, which constitutes
the essential character of the thing and distinguishes
it from all others, is now so defined that thereby the
thing stands in opposition to others, but must therein
preserve itself for itself. It is, however, a thing,
a self-existent "one", only so far as it does not
stand in relation to others.129

Hegel notes here that the 'connection with another' means sur­
rendering independent self-existence. By this stage of con­
sciousness's development, confidence in the adequacy of per­
ception, by itself, for attaining true knowledge has been
decidely shaken. The analysis of the relation between the
thing and others points to a further level and determination

128 Phän., p. 173. "Ob nun zwar so der Widerspruch
des gegenständlichen Wesens an verschiedene Dinge verteilt
ist, so wird darum doch an das abgesonderte einzelne Ding
selbst der Unterschied kommen." Phän., p. 98.

129 Ibid., p. 174. "Diese Bestimmtheit, welche den
wesentlichen Charakter des Dinges ausmacht und es von allen
andern unterscheidet, ist nun so bestimmt, dass das Ding dad­
urch im Gegensatze mit andern ist, aber sich darin für sich
erhalten soll. Ding aber, oder für sich seieltes Eins ist
es nur, insofern es nicht dieser Beziehung auf andere steht;
Ibid.
of universality. "It is precisely through the absolute character and its opposition that the thing relates itself to others, and is essentially this process of relation, and only this. The relation, however, is the negation of its independence, and the thing collapses through its own essential property."

With the collapse of this last attempt at the level of sense perception to achieve a harmony between the unity of the thing with a multiplicity of properties it now begins to emerge that the thing's unity is both determined and constituted by its relation to other things. "The thing is set up as having a being of its own, as existing for itself, or as an absolute negation of all otherness; hence it is absolute negation merely relating itself to itself. But this kind of negation is the cancelling and superseding of itself, or means that it has its essential reality in another." So it is that consciousness leaves the level of sense perception, which at the beginning had seemed to give as an object the thing, which was both a 'one' and the specific locus of


131 Ibid. "Das Ding ist gesetzt als Fürsich sein, oder als absolute Negation alles Andersseins, daher absolute, nur sich auf sich beziehende Negation; aber die sich auf sich beziehende Negation ist Aufheben seiner selbst, oder /dies/ sein Wesen in einem Andern zu haben." Ibid.
distinct properties. "By this process the object in its pure characteristics, in those features which were to constitute its essential nature, is superseded, just as the object in its sensible mode of existence became transcended. From being sensible it passed into being a universal." When the dialectic of consciousness passed beyond sense certainty to perception, the universal was seen as its truth, but the universal at this level manifested itself in the contradictory shape or form of 'thinghood'. "But" as Hegel sums up the advance thus far, "this universal, because derived from sense, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is, in general, not a genuine self-identical universality, but one affected with an opposition."132 It is through its opposition to other things that the thing becomes itself. The thing is, or so it has come to be seen, the unity of itself with its opposite. The universal of perception is still particularized in a diversity of sensible things, and because affected with opposition it is not yet an authentic self-identical universal.

For that reason this universality breaks up into the extremes of singleness and universality, of the "one" of the properties and the "also" of the free

constituents or "matters". These pure determinations appear to express the essential nature itself; but they are merely a self-existence which is fettered at the same time with existence for an other. Since, however, both essentially exist in a single unity, we have before us now unconditioned absolute universality.\textsuperscript{133}

Now consciousness has for its object the unconditioned universal, which aims to grasp unity in difference. By unconditioned Hegel means to indicate and to connote the unity of the thing which affirms itself regardless of and through the states and conditions which circumscribe it. The universal has to particularize itself in its own vehicle of thought, and by doing so transcend but subsume the contradictions which are involved in particular things, things which maintain themselves through and in being for others. Consciousness now enters the sphere of the scientific understanding where it will posit unobservable entities in its endeavour to explain the phenomena provided by the senses. Its explanatory entities, although non-phenomenal, will seem to be genuine realities to the Understanding. "This unconditioned universal, which henceforward is the true object of consciousness, is still object of consciousness; consciousness has not yet

\textsuperscript{133} Phen., p. 175. "welche sich darum in die Extrem der Einzelheit und Allgemeinheit, des Eins der Eigenschaften und des Anderes behaftet ist; indem aber beide wesentlich in einer Einheit sind, so ist jetzt die unbedingte absolute Allgemeinheit vorhanden," Phän., p. 100.
grasped its notion as notion." At the level of the understand-
ing, the subject continues to experience the world as an
object, because the understanding has still to attain self-
consciousness, wherein the subject will recognize itself in and
as the object. Hegel thinks that it is essential to disting-
uish between the two forms of consciousness. "To the conscious-
ness the object has passed from its relation to an other back
into itself, and thereby become in itself notion; but, the con-
sciousness is not yet the notion for itself, and consequently
it does not know itself in that reflected object."\textsuperscript{134}

c. Force and understanding

By passing beyond sensuous universals to universals
of a kind, exemplified by that of 'force', Hegel attains the
level of understanding. It is the Scientific Understanding
which concerns itself with bringing the phenomena of nature
under various scientific laws. It is also the understanding
which strives to determine the substance or nature of inor-
ganic and organic things: non-living materials, plants and
animals. However, in this section, Hegel is more particularly

\textsuperscript{134} Phen., p. 180. "- Diese unbedingte Allgemeine,
das nunmehr der wahre Gegenstand des Bewusstseins ist, ist
noch als Gegenstand desselben; es hat seinen Begriff als
Begriff noch nicht erfasst. Beides ist wesentlich zu unter-
scheiden; dem Bewusstsein ist der Gegenstand aus dem Verhältni-
isse zu einem andern in sich zurück gegangen, und hiemit an
sich Begriff geworden; aber das Bewusstsein ist noch nicht
für sich selbst der Begriff, und deswegen erkennt es in jenem
reflektierten Gegenstande nicht sich." Phän., p. 105.
concerned with the concepts and laws of the 'physics' of nature, so that in his analyses he uses electricity, gravity, motion, space, hydrogen and oxygen, for his examples. Man as a 'physical' being is a part of this side of nature, and, is from some points of view, a source of knowledge for the scientific understanding. Within the perspective of the study of historicity in Hegel's philosophy, the pathway of the Phenomenology thus far, has begun to show the self-moving and self-constituting activity of consciousness in its process of coming to know its world. Furthermore, with the Scientific Understanding's efforts to deal with the substance of things, it can be expected that some intimations of the limitations of such a concept will be made evident. Hegel, however, is not concerned here to specifically treat of the limitations of the concept of substance as it applies to man's being. He will treat of this question in subsequent sections.

Hegel's unconditioned universal shows itself first as 'force'. He examines, or rather follows and analyses the understanding's efforts to think of phenomena as the showing of concealed forces. He had shown that perception in seeking to apprehend the essential content of its object, discovered finally that the thing is a self-determining unity in a multiplicity of relations to other things. Now the concept of force is brought forward as a possible source of explanation for this 'holding together' process.
the elements set as independent pass directly over into their unity, and their unity directly into its explicit diversity, and the latter back once again into the reduction to unity. This process is what is called Force. One of its moments, where force takes the form of a dispersion of the independent elements each with a being of its own, is the Expression of Force; when, however, force takes the form of that wherein they disappear and vanish, it is Force proper, force withdrawn from expressing itself and driven back into itself.\(^\text{135}\)

Force must be accorded a twofold existence: 1) the revealed, manifest or expressive aspect found in a range and variety of external sensible manifestations; and 2) the hidden and withdrawn aspect, which though not manifest, is force, (perhaps more properly so than its expression). Whereas at first the two sides of force may appear independent of one another, (except that the concealed 'power' is used to explain the manifest) but it soon becomes evident that both are intimately interdependent. The outer showings of a force are of such kind as to demand 'such and such' force for their explanation. Just as essential is the reverse of this relation, where the force is of such kind as to necessarily express itself in specific kinds of manifestation.

\(^{135}\) Phen., p. 183. "... die selbständig gesetzten gehen unmittelbar in ihre Einheit, und ihre Einheit unmittelbar in die Entfaltung über, und diese wieder zurück in die Reduktion. Diese Bewegung ist aber dasjenige, was Kraft genannt wird: das eine Moment derselben, nämlich sie als Ausbreitung der selbständigen Materien in ihrem Sein /;/ ist ihre Auszerung; sie aber als das Verschwundensein derselben ist die aus ihrer Auszerung in sich zurückgedrängte, oder die eigentliche Kraft." Phän., p. 105.
So it is, that both moments: outward dispersive expression and the withdrawn state, are required to comprise the essential characteristics of force. It can be seen in this early stage of the analysis of immediate force, that force involves a duality, and that it is itself a relation. Although the sense world is still present, it is gradually being taken up into the sphere of thought. "When we thus keep both moments in this immediate unity, it is Understanding, to which the conception of force belongs, that is, properly speaking, the principle which carries the different moments qua different. For per se they are not to be different; the distinction consequently exists only in thought."  

The situation at this point, for the understanding, is that "only the mere conception of force has been put forward in the above, not its realization." This does not seem satisfactory to the understanding. "In point of fact, however, force is the unconditioned universal, which is in itself just what it is for something else, or which holds difference within itself - for difference is nothing else than existence-for-an-other."  

Force is to be understood as determining

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136 Phan., p. 183. "-Indem wir so beide Momente in ihrer unmittelbaren Einheit erhalten, so ist eigentlich der Verstand, dem der Begriff der Kraft angehört, der Begriff, welcher die unterschiedenen Momente als unterschiedene trägt; denn an ihr selbst sollen sie nicht unterschieden seine; der Unterschied ist hiermit nur im Gedanken." Phän., p. 105.

137 Ibid. "Oder es ist im Obigen nur erst der Begriff der Kraft, nicht ihre Realität gesetzt worden. In
itself in all circumstances; its aspects are distinct but not separate. In the endeavour to understand force, the intent is to understand the substance of the thing. Force is somehow to be taken (if possible) as the inner essence of things, such that the world of appearances will be seen as its outer phenomenal manifestation. "Hence for force to be what it truly is, it has to be completely free from thought, and put forward as the substantial reality of these differences, that is, first the substance qua the entire force remaining essentially self-contained (in-and-for-itself), and then its differences as substantial entities, or as moments subsisting each on its own account.\textsuperscript{138} The contradiction or opposition in force emerges more clearly here. There are two sides which seem both distinct and independent, "but force is also the whole." Force has to be both the withdrawn element, force proper, and force opened out into independent elements. Each side has to be accorded subsistence, ", i.e., force would have no being if it did not really exist in these opposite ways."

\begin{quote}
der Tat aber ist die Kraft das unbedingt Allgemeine, welches, was es dafür ein Anderes, eben so an sich selbst ist; oder welches den Unterschied - denn er ist nichts anderes als das für ein Anderes Sein - an ihm selbst hat." \textit{Phän.}, p. 105.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Phen.}, p. 183-184. "Dasz also die Kraft in ihrer Wahrheit sei, muss, sie ganz vom Gedanken frei gelassen und als die Substanz dieser Unterschiede gesetzt werden, d.h. einmal, sie als diese ganze Kraft wesentlich an und für sich bleibend, und dann ihre Unterschiede als substantiell, oder als für sich bestehende Momente." \textit{Ibid.}
\end{quote}
The result is that at the same time both moments are independent. Hegel then proceeds to treat of "this process by which both moments get themselves fixed as independent and then cancel their independence again."\textsuperscript{139}

Consciousness in its dialectical advance gains a deeper understanding of 'force', and an additional complication, when it realizes that there are two forces present at the same time. "Instead of the opposition continuing to be entirely and essentially a mere moment, it appears to have escaped from the control of the unity and to have become, owing to this diremption, two quite independent forces."\textsuperscript{140}

Hegel examines the relation between one force and another; the latter incites the former into outward expression, or restrains it from expressing itself. It develops that while Force requires external incitement, via another force, the relation between the two forces is entirely reciprocal. "As a result, this distinction, which took place between one force regarded as inciting and the other as incited, turns also into one and the same reciprocal interchange of

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\textsuperscript{139} Phen., p. 184. "Aber die Kraft ist auch das Ganze, ... oder die Kraft wäre nicht, wenn sie nicht auf diese entgegengesetzte Weise existierte; ... - Diese Bewegung des sich beständig Verselbständigens der beiden Momente und ihres sich wieder Aufhebens ist es also, was zu betrachten ist." Phän., p. 106.

\end{flushright}
characteristics. This in turn results in a new appreciation of the opposed forces. The inciting and incited interchange their roles in the transition from being repressed to expressed force. Each of the opposed forces contains within it the other force as another self. The passive force, for example, "gives the inciting agency this character just because it is really its own self." Force both solicits and impedes or inhibits itself. The two moments, force inciting and force being incited, have their being solely through the other.

They have thus, in point of fact, no substances of their own which could support and maintain them. The notion of force rather maintains itself as the essence in its very actuality: force when actual exists wholly and only in its expression; and this, at the same time, is nothing else than a process of cancelling itself. This actual force, when represented as detached from its expression and existing by itself, is force driven back into itself; but this feature is itself, in point of fact, as appears from the foregoing, merely a moment in the expression of force. The true nature of force thus remains merely the thought or idea of force;

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142 Ibid., p. 187. "sie setzt das Sollizitierende so, darum weil diese andere Bestimmung ihr wesentliche, d.h. weil sie vielmehr sie selbst ist." Ibid., p. 108.

143 Ibid., p. 189. "Sie haben hiemit in der Tat keine eigenen Substanzen, welche sie trugen und erhielten. Der Begriff der Kraft erhält sich vielmehr als das Wesen in seiner Wirklichkeit selbst; die Kraft als wirkliche ist schlechthin nur in der Auszerung, welche zugleich nichts anders als ein
Although Hegel seems deliberately to play on the German word *Auszerung* (expression, utterance, manifestation) in the above, he nevertheless manages to convey his meaning that consciousness comes to realize that force, at least as understood, is the product of understanding, is, thought, and what it is in the process of acquiring, is the concept of force. Here he uses *Auszerung* to connote force manifest immediately, force expressing itself in its duality of outer showing and as returning into itself to its repressed state, and finally to suggest the conveying of meaning, in this case of the concept force. The moments in force's realization are attained in a unity which is its 'Begriff als Begriff'. "The realization of force is, then, at the same time dissipation or loss of reality; it has thereby become something quite different, viz. this universality, which understanding knows from the start or immediately to be its essential nature."\(^{144}\)

Hegel considers the two aspects of force as universals and shows the difficulty in gaining a satisfactory concept of force, when it is conceived as the inner being of

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things. "This true being of things has here the character­istic that it does not exist immediately for consciousness; rather, consciousness takes up a mediated relation to the inner." Force is only perceived in its effects. Apart from its effects, force appears to have no being. The being of force seems to consist wholly in the expressing and dis­sipating of itself. Hegel's dialectical analysis pauses to unravel the meaning of Appearance.

Consciousness, in the form of understanding looks through the intervening play of forces into the real and true background of things. The middle term com­bining the two extremes, understanding and the inner of things, is the explicitly evolved being of force, which is now and henceforth a vanishing process for understanding itself. Hence it is called Appearance (Erscheinung); for being which is per se straightway non-being we call a show, a semblance (Schein). The terms 'Appearance' and 'semblance' are given a significa­nce and meaning in this section which will, in general, attend them throughout Hegel's philosophy. Much of what seems so substantial in the world of nature to the ordinary man, to common sense, is for Hegel, appearance. However, care has to

145 Phen., p. 190. "Diese wahrhafte Wesen der Dinge hat sich jetzt so bestimmt, dass es nicht unmittelbar für das Bewusstsein ist, sondern dass dieses ein mittelbares Verhält­nis zu dem Innern hat..." Phän., p. 110.

146 Ibid. "... und als Verstand durch diese Mitte des Spiels des Kräfte in den wahren Hintergrund der Dinge blickt. Die Mitte, welche die beiden Extreme, dem Verstand und das Innere, zusammenschlieszt, ist das entwickelte Sein der Kraft, das für den Verstand selbst nummehr ein Versch­winden ist. Es heiszt darum Erscheinung; denn Schein nennen wir das Sein, das unmittelbar an ihm selbst ein Nichtsein ist." Ibid.
be taken not to think of appearance as mere appearance. Sometimes of course, he does mean, mere appearance, but the word 'appearance' does have a more technical meaning for Hegel. This latter has to be kept in mind, when considering some of his characteristic observations about the being of man. In the above passage, he indicates that when the substance of things is conceived in terms of force, the resulting way of existing for things is that of appearance. But appearance is more than show. "It is, however, not merely a show, but appearance, a totality of seeming (Schein)."\textsuperscript{147} By totality he means the universal or the 'totality as totality'. It is the universal which comprises the inner world with its interplay of forces. Marcuse points out that for Hegel the term appearance or semblance has a twofold meaning:

1. It means that a thing exists in such a way that its existence is different from its essence;

2. it means that that which appears is not mere seeming (bloßer Schein), but is the expression of an essence that exists only as appearing. In other words, the appearance is not a non-being but is the appearance of the essence.\textsuperscript{148}

The situation for consciousness in respect to the knowing of its object can be summed up in this way: a) The being of the object for consciousness is mediated through appearance, but the mediating process is for it still an objective process.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Phen.}, p. 190. "Es ist aber nicht nur ein Schein, sondern Erscheinung, ein Ganzes des Scheins." \textit{Phän.}, p. 110.

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Reason and Revolution}, p. 109-110.
b) The inner is taken to be notion, but consciousness does not yet know the nature of the notion. c) The object has the form of a syllogistic inference, whose extremes are the inner being of things and understanding, and its middle term the sphere of appearance. d) The inner world is for consciousness a bare and simple beyond, because consciousness does not as yet find itself in it. e) The inner world, or the supersensible comes to consciousness out of the sphere of appearance, and appearance is its essential nature and out of the sphere of appearance, its filling. f) The supersensible is the established truth of the sensible and perceptual, but the truth of the sensible and the perceptual lies in being appearance, so that the supersensible is then appearance qua appearance. g) Appearance is more than the world of sense-knowledge and perception as positively being, it is this world as superseded or established in truth as an inner world.\[149\]

The dialectic has advanced from forces and forces to the concept of force. It has come to seem, with the essence of things conceived as force, that the constancy of the objective realm had disintegrated into a world of flux. However, the concept of force gives rise to the possibility of a different approach. Because a force has a specific efficacy in respect to its effects and maintains itself through its

oscillations, it is conceived now as acting in accordance with an intrinsic law. In the flux of change it is "difference as universal difference", which is discovered, "or difference into which the various opposites have been resolved. This difference as universal, consequently, is what constitutes the ultimate simple element in that play of forces, and is the resultant truth of that process. It is the Law of Force."^\textsuperscript{150}

The conclusion that the essence of force is law leads to consciousness taking up the standpoint that the supersensible world is better explained and understood as a kingdom of laws. Hegel explains again that, "negation is an essential moment of the universal; and negation or mediation in what is universal is universal difference. This difference is expressed in the law, which is the stable presentment or image of unstable appearance. The supersensible world is in this way a quiescent 'kingdom of laws' ..."^\textsuperscript{151} Hegel notes that although these laws are beyond the world of perception (which reveals the law only through constant change) they are nevertheless

\textsuperscript{150} Phen., p. 195. "... ist nur der Unterschied als allgemeiner oder als ein solcher, in welchen sich die vielen Gegensätze reduziert haben. Dieser Unterschied als allgemeiner ist daher das Einfache an dem Spiele der Kraft selbst, und das Wahre desselben; er ist das Gesetz der Kraft." Phän., p. 114.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid. "(Oder) die Negation ist wesentliches Moment des Allgemeinen, und sie oder die Vermittlung also im Allgemeine ist allgemeiner Unterschied. Er ist im Gesetze ausgedrückt als dem beständigen Bilde der unsteten Erscheinung. Die übersinnliche Welt ist hiemit ein ruhiges Reich von Gesetzen, ..." Ibid., p. 114-115.
present in it. So it turns out at this stage, that the sphere of essence is not, after all, an aimless interplay of forces, but a kingdom of stable laws which seem to determine the shape of the physical world.

However consciousness discovers that while this network of laws is 'the truth for the understanding', there is a defect in an indefinite plurality of laws. The great diversity of the shapes and forms of the perceptible world would seem to require an appropriately large number of laws, but this plurality is rather itself a defect; it contradicts the principle of understanding, for which, since it is consciousness of the simple inner being, truth is the inherently universal unity. It must, therefore, let the many laws coalesce into a single law, just as, e.g., the law by which a stone falls, and that by which the heavenly bodies move have been conceived as one law. When the laws thus coincide, however, they lose their specific character.\textsuperscript{152}

Laws when they become too numerous, through their own fragmentation, fragment the world, and so lack unity. When attempts are made to group and subsume laws under more and more general laws, these latter become less and less capable of accomplishing the task expected of them by the Understanding, i.e. providing genuine explanation of the perceptible \textsuperscript{152}Phen., p. 196. "Allein diese Vielheit ist viel­mehr selbst ein Mangel; sie widerspricht nämlich dem Prinzip des Verstandes, welchem als Bewusstsein des einfachen Innern die an sich allgemeine \underline{Einheit} das Wahre ist. Die vielen Gesetze muss er darum vielmehr in \underline{Ein} Gesetz zusammenfallen lassen, wie z.B. das Gesetz, nach welchem der Stein fällt, und das Gesetz, nach welchem die himmlischen Sphären sich bewegen, als Ein Gesetz begriffen worden ist. Mit diesem \underline{Ein} einander­fallen aber verlieren die Gesetze ihre Bestimmtheit;" Phän., p. 115.
world. "The law becomes more and more abstract and superfi-
cial, and in consequence we find as a fact, not the unity of
these various determinate laws, but a law which leaves out
their specific character."\footnote{Phen., p. 196. "das Gesetz wird immer ober-
flächlicher, und es ist damit in der Tat nicht die Einheit
dieser bestimmten Gesetze, sondern ein ihre Bestimmtheit
weglassendes Gesetz gefunden:" Phen., p. 115.}

Some of the scientific laws connected with universal
gravitation, with electricity, and with motion are considered
in turn. At one stage the aim is to focus on law as law, to
grasp the necessity involved in law, and this leads to the
examination of the kind of law which will cover the plurality
of laws. This attempt is only partly successful in that in
its very general form, it leaves behind the determinations
which help to comprise the relations between things, and it
do not really give the inner necessity sought, the necessity
turns out to be 'just an empty phrase'. Understanding finds
no real satisfaction when more particular laws are considered.
The latter simply describe some pattern of regularity dis-
covered to occur empirically. Such laws provide succinct
re-descriptions of phenomena. It is not that natural laws are
not useful, but they fail to be authentically explicative of
sense-phenomena. Some of the forms of scientific 'explana-
tion' are examined and are found to be tautologous, i.e. they
do not really manage to explain anything.

In this tautological process understanding ... holds fast to the changeless unity of its object, and the process takes effect solely within understanding itself, not in the object. It is an explanation that not only explains nothing, but is so clear that, while it makes as if it would say something different from what is already said, it really says nothing at all, but merely repeats the same thing over again. 154

The laws of the scientific understanding are used reasonably successfully to order and describe phenomena, but they fail to explain sense phenomena in the sense of showing the intelligible inner necessity of things, they do not go beyond their external interdependence and interconnection. When the universal of the understanding withdrew its moment of particularity into itself, (exemplified in the general covering law) it was unable to provide it any determinate content. Some of the tautologous formulations, which Hegel has in mind, did help to reveal the indissoluble or inseparable identity of essence and its appearance, but these same laws were unable to fulfill the task which consciousness first set for them, to penetrate the curtain of appearance, 'hanging before the inner world'.

154 Phen., p. 201. "In dieser &autologischen Bewegung beharrt, wie sich ergibt, der Verstand bei der ruhigen Einheit seines Gegenstandes, und die Bewegung fällt nur in ihn selbst, nicht in den Gegenstand; sie ist ein Erklären, das nicht nur nichts erklärt, sondern so klar ist, dass es, indem es Anstalten macht, etwas Unterschiedenes von dem schon Gesagten zu sagen, vielmehr nichts sagt, sondern nur dasselbe wiederholt." Phän., p. 119-120.
In the end the transcendent realism of the Scientific Understanding is shown to fail in the task set for itself. By taking the substance of the things of the physical world to be force, it divided this reality into two levels. It sought to penetrate beneath the sensible and perceptible properties in order to discover the inner essence of the thing. "To understanding the process, as it is found in experience, is here an event that happens, and selfsame and the unlike are predicates, whose reality is an underlying substratum." But this supersensible reality beneath appearance is not found; what consciousness discovers is itself.

What is for understanding an object in a covering veil of sense, now comes before us in its essential form as pure notion. This apprehension of distinction as it truly is, or the apprehension of infinitude as such, is for us, or in itself. ... Consciousness is for itself, it is a distinguishing of what is undistinguished, or Self-consciousness.155

The non-phenomenal or supersensible level with its concealed forces and laws turned out to be the work of the Understanding. The latter had evolved laws in its attempt to explain sense-phenomena and to get behind appearance. But it had come

155 Phen., p. 211. "die Bewegung, wie sie in der Erfahrung ist, ist ihm hier ein Geschehen, und das Gleichnamige und das Ungleiches Prädikate, deren Wesen ein seidendes Substrat ist, Dasselbe, was ihm in sinnlicher Hülle Gegenstand ist, ist es uns in seiner wesentlichen Gestalt, als reiner Begriff. Dies Aufassen des Unterschieds, wie er in Wahrheit ist, oder das Auffassen der Unendlichkeit als solcher, ist für uns, oder an sich. ... es ist für sich selbst, es ist Unterscheiden des Ununterschiedenen, oder Selbstbewusstsein." Phän., p. 127-128.
to seem that the veil concealed merely a barren emptiness
until consciousness pierced the veil and discovered itself.

It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen. But it is clear at the same time that we cannot without more ado go straightway behind there.\textsuperscript{156}

Having discovered the self-consciousness subject, the subject as self-aware, it is recognized that this 'self' is still to be known, in that it is, so far, merely reflected back on itself from the perceptible world of appearance. In this way Hegel makes the transition from consciousness into the sphere of self-consciousness.

B. Self-consciousness: selfhood realized through other 'selves'

Although consciousness did make some progress in 'understanding' the inorganic physical world, it was not able to discover the kind of knowledge sought. Nevertheless, an advance has been made, the subject has become aware that his own self-consciousness is to be found beneath the phenomenal

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{156} Phen., p. 212-213. "Es zeigt sich, dasz hinter dem sogenannten Vorhange, welcher das Innre verdecken soll, nichts zu sehen ist, wenn wir nicht selbst dahintergehen, ebensosehr damit gesehen werde, als dasz etwas dahinter sei, das gesehen werden kann. Aber es ergibt sich zugleich, dasz nicht ohne alle Umstände geradezu dahinter gegangen werden könne;" Phän., p. 129.}
appearance of things. But living things and their interrelations have not yet been brought under examination, and of more immediate importance to the development of selfhood, the self only just encountered, is initially barren of content. However, it is claimed that, "with self-consciousness, then, we have now passed into the native land of truth, into that kingdom where it is at home." But this, though true of the bare attainment of self-consciousness, is hardly more than a promise of more adequate knowledge. The more complex forms of knowledge remain ahead: human relations, life and nature, human institutions, and the realms of art, religion and philosophy. When this new form of knowledge, 'the knowledge of self', is considered in relation to the earlier form, 'the knowledge of an other', it is found "that this latter has vanished, but that its moments have, at the same time, been preserved; and the loss consists in this, that those moments are here present as they are in themselves."¹⁵⁷ That which perception and the understanding treated are present "as moments of self-consciousness, i.e. as abstractions or differences, which are, at the same time, of no account for consciousness itself, or are not differences at all, and are

¹⁵⁷ **Phän.**, p. 219. "Mit dem Selbstbewusstsein sind wir also nun in das einheimische Reich der Wahrheit einge­re­ten ... so ist dies zwar verschwunden; aber seine Momente haben sich zugleich ebenso aufbewahrt, und der Verlust besteht darin, dass sie hier vorhanden sind, wie sie an sich sind." **Phän.**, p. 134.
purely vanishing entities."¹⁵⁸ So it is that the thing's 'independent subsistence for consciousness' seems to have been lost, but as shown, self-consciousness is 'reflection out of the bare being' of the thing, " and is essentially the return out of otherness."¹⁵⁹

Hegel's dialectical showing of the pathway to science, continues to advance the aims of this research in two ways, in two ways because knowledge and self develop side by side, from consciousness's simple sense awareness, perception and understanding to higher and more adequate forms of knowledge and selfhood. 1) More adequate standpoints emerge out of less adequate standpoints. As each standpoint emerges and is identified, its meaning unfolded and its limitations exposed, what Hegel means by Absolute knowledge and what he means by truth will become more evident. 2) Hegel continues to explore and make manifest the meaning of the really concrete human nature in the process of its development. This nature, man is not simply endowed with at birth, without further ado, but something which he must constitute for

¹⁵⁸ Phen., p. 219. "... als Momente des Selbstbewusstseins, d.h. als Abstraktionen oder Unterschiede, welche für das Bewusstsein selbst zugleich nichtig oder keine Unterschiede und rein verschwindende Wesen sind." Phen., p. 134.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. "... und wesentlich die Rückkehr aus dem Anderssein." Ibid.
himself through his own labours to know his immediate environment, to know and form himself through interaction with others, to know and form himself in the world of human institutions, to comprehend reality as a whole, and to sustain himself throughout. Although the natural situation, in which the subject finds himself, may be transcended in higher standpoints of knowledge, it is not lost, but is carried forward as part of the whole of the present. Man, is of course, imbedded in a historical context or situation, which must be comprised in the higher standpoints. Furthermore, with self-consciousness, history explicitly enters the dual process indicated above. Not only does he find himself in a historical situation, in which he takes part, he also has a history. The latter is not to be disconnected from the former, nor it from the natural situation.

However, the limited form of self-consciousness so far uncovered has to comprise more than its bare self, if it is to advance beyond the limitations encountered with the scientific understanding. Self-consciousness as self-consciousness is movement,

But when it distinguishes only its self as such from itself, distinction is straightforward taken to be superseded* in the sense of involving otherness. The distinction is not, and self-consciousness is only motionless tautology, I am I. When for

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* Usually the meaning of aufgehoben is better rendered by "sublated", but in this case, 'superseded' seems appropriate.
self-consciousness the distinction does not also have the shape of being, it is not self-consciousness. For self-consciousness, then, otherness is a fact; it does exist as a distinct moment; but the unity of itself with this difference is also a fact for self-consciousness, and is a second distinct moment.¹⁶⁹

The immediate unity gained is empty, a tautology. The ego is reflected back upon itself from an object which remains alien, in the sense of 'having a subsistence which is, however, only appearance'. A further mediation is required to realize this unity concretely, to go beyond the understanding's negation of sense certainty, to transcend the understanding which continues to regard the object as alien and apart, and to find a world that is its own and in which it is at home. Hegel here begins the transition from the sphere of abstract scientific knowing to the more concrete social sphere, in order that the unity of self-consciousness may be mediated at the level of life. His sustained effort to find the way to think life, which began with his earliest writings, as shown in Chapter II, now begins to bear fruit. The approach to

thinking life now commences with desire.


a.a. Desire and life

Life is the object of desire, and desire is the subject's impetus to live by endeavouring to fill the void of the bare consciousness of 'self' with a component of the sensible experience of his environment. Having discovered 'self' behind the appearance of things, the subject directs itself toward realizing this new awareness by subduing or gaining ascendancy over his world. In respect to 'the unity of self-consciousness with itself', Hegel states that,

This unity must become essential to self-consciousness i.e. self-consciousness is the state of Desire in general. ... Self-consciousness presents itself here as the process in which this opposition is removed, and oneness or identity with itself established. For us, the object, which is the negative element for self-consciousness, has on its side returned into itself, just as on the other side consciousness has done. Through this reflexion into self, the object has become Life. ... it is a being reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is something living.\footnote{Phän., p. 220. "die Einheit des Selbstbewusstseins mit sich selbst, ... diese muss ihm wesentlich werden, d.h. es ist Begierde überhaupt. ... Das Selbstbewusstsein stellt sich hierin als die Bewegung dar, worin dieser Gegensatz aufgehoben und ihm die Gleichheit seiner selbst mit sich wird. Der Gegenstand, welcher für das Selbstbewusstsein das Negative ist, ist aber seinerseits für uns oder an sich ebenso in sich zurückgegangen als das Bewusstsein anderseits. Er ist durch diese Reflexion in sich Leben geworden. ... sondern es ist in sich reflektiertes Sein, und der Gegenstand der unmittelbaren Begierde ist ein Lebendiges." Phän., p. 135.}
In becoming aware of 'self' he comes to desire the objects of his world, to desire to make them his own and to make use of them. Instead of directing itself, as with consciousness, to the form of apprehension which was basically theoretical, self-consciousness takes up the practical disposition in which the subject seeks to transform its world into itself. In desire, the subject strives to bring external things into conformity with its needs. More particularly, desire seeks as the more adequate object, a living thing.

a.b. Life and process

There is in the thing which lives, something akin to the self-conscious subject, i.e. in its self-sustaining continuous return upon itself. In his examination of 'the principle of life', Hegel takes pains to characterize its moments; he begins by observing that its essence is

infinity as the supersession of all differences, the pure rotation on its own axis, itself at rest while being absolutely restless infinitude, the very self-sufficiency in which the differences of movement are dissolved, the simple essence of time, which in this self-identity has the solid form of space. The differences, however, all the same hold as differences in this simple universal medium; for this universal flux exercises its negative nature merely in that it is the sublation of them; but it could not transcend the differences unless they had a subsistence of their own.\[162\]

\[162\] Phen., p. 221. "Das Wesen ist die Unendlichkeit als das Aufgehobensein aller Unterschiede, die reine achsendrehende Bewegung, die Ruhe ihrer selbst als absolut unruhiger Unendlichkeit; die Selbständigkeit selbst, in welcher die
The essential characteristic of a living thing is its capacity to hold plurality and a continuum of variability in unity. The living thing is made up of parts which have their being only in relation to other parts, and by virtue of and in subservience to the life of the whole. Its parts constitute a plurality, the essence of which consists in being combined in its unity, as 'moments of infinitude, or of the mere movement itself'. The unity per se has its existence in the plurality of its parts. Life as such, is self-constitutive and intro-reflected: "it is the whole which develops itself, resolves its own development, and in this movement simply preserves itself." 163

The above passage comes at the end of an analysis of 'the process of life', within the dialectic of 'reflexion into self', wherein 'the object has become Life'. (This whole section is directed to the task of revealing the extent and limitations of 'The Truth of Self-Certainty', at this early

Unterschiede der Bewegung aufgelöst sind; das einfache Wesen der Zeit, das in dieser Sichselbstgleichheit die gediegene Gestalt des Raumes hat. Die Unterschiede sind aber an diesem einfachen allgemeinen Medium ebensosehr, als Unterschiede, denn diese allgemeine Flüssigkeit hat ihre negative Natur, nur indem sie ein Aufheben derselben ist; aber sie kann die Unterschieden nicht aufheben, wenn sie nicht ein Bestehen haben." Phän., p. 136.

stage of the development of self-consciousness.) Hegel in this particular phase of the dialectic, phenomenologically describes Life in terms of process:

Life in the universal fluid medium, quietly, silently shaping and moulding and distributing the forms in all their manifold detail, becomes by that very activity the movement of those forms, or passes into life qua Process. The simple universal flux is the in-itself and the distinction of the forms assumed the other.\footnote{Phen., p. 223. "Das Leben in dem allgemeinen flüssigen Medium, ein ruhiges Auseinanderlegen der Gestalten, wird eben dadurch zur Bewegung derselben, oder zum Leben als Prozess. Die einfache allgemeine Flüssigkeit ist das Ansich und der Unterschied der Gestalten das Andere/" Phän., p. 137.}

Hegel puts a lot of weight on the word \textit{process} in various parts of his system of philosophy; he finds it applicable in consciousness, logic, nature and history.\footnote{Cf. Encyclopaedia, paras 215-221 and 225 of the Logic: paras 285-289; 325-350 of the Philosophy of Nature.} It is therefore reasonable to pause briefly to consider Hegel's use of the word, in connection with some remarks about the word by a twentieth century idealist. For Hegel, 'process' is a descriptive word used to denote both the timeless movement of the Idea and the movement within things in the timefulness of nature. This being so, the reality or realities, referred to and the meaning conveyed by the word will be involved in the historicity of human thought and action. Man, situated in nature and history is also situated in time, but in thought,
he may also attain, in some sense, a timeless grasp of truth. Absolute truth is that which is sought in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and if and when attained in this work or in the whole system, it must surely be timeless in some sense, if it is to deserve the name.

Hegel finds process constitutive of the reality of nature and history; he also claims its presence in the abiding world of the Idea. Like Hegel, Collingwood does not confine process to nature; it has a place in mind, and furthermore in history. As indicated in Chapter I, Collingwood was concerned to critically examine examples of the eighteenth century tendency to continue to conceive of a science of human nature in terms of an unchanging human nature. He suggests that Hume, by abolishing spiritual substance, implied that one should never separate what a mind is from what it does, and so resolved the concept of mental substance into the concept of mental process. Collingwood goes on to say that this resolving mental substance into mental process, "did not in itself necessitate an historical conception of mind, because all process is not historical process."

The meaning of the word 'process' is obviously as significant here for Collingwood as it is for Hegel. Collingwood puts forward the thesis that "a process is historical only when it creates its own laws;" and he thinks that Hume's mistake consisted in his conceiving "the laws of mental process" as "ready-made and unchanging from
their beginning. He did not think of mind as learning to think and act in new ways as the process of its activity developed."¹⁶⁶ There are similarities in the thinking of Collingwood and Hegel on these and other questions, so that there is value in bringing them together from time to time, which is by way of saying that the thought of the former draws attention to certain features of the latter's thought, particularly those connected with human nature and historicity.

a.c. The Ego

Hegel's dialectical analysis of self-certainty to this point reveals that life provides an analogous reality in which self-consciousness may see mirrored there its own characteristics.* An example would be the assimilative capacity of living things, the capacity to transform elements of their environment into themselves. This is paralleled by man's struggle to acquire and assimilate his world through the knowing process. Life has also shown itself as a genus which expresses itself in the multitude of particular living things which differ not only in species and between themselves, but also comprise within themselves parts which differ in function

¹⁶⁶ The Idea of History, p. 83.

* The connection between life and self-consciousness is of course fundamental, as well as expressive of an analogous affinity.
and in other ways. The 'universal unity' which emerges from
the dialectic now, and 'which holds (the earlier) moments sub-

lated within itself' is

the simple genus, which in the movement of life
itself does not exist in this simplicity for itself;
but in this result points life toward what is other
than itself, namely, towards Consciousness for which
life exists as this unity or as genus.167

Consideration and examination of the pure Ego at this stage
brings out the failure of self-consciousness to find adequate
satisfaction for its desire in the objects so far brought
under the subject's purview. Self-consciousness as desire
thinks to affirm "the certainty of its own self as true cer-
tainty a certainty which it has become aware of in objective
form", through annulling "the independent object".168 However
although this certainty is gained by sublating or annulling
the other, there must continue to be this other so 'that this
sublating or annulling may be effected'.

Self-consciousness is thus unable by its negative
relation to the object to abolish it; because of
that relation it rather produces it again, as well
as the desire. The object desired is, in fact,
something other than self-consciousness, the essence

167 Phen., p. 224. "Sie ist die einfache Gattung,
welche in der Bewegung des Lebens selbst nicht für sich als
dies Einfache existiert; sondern in diesem Resultate verweist
das Leben auf ein Anderes, als es ist, nämlich auf das Bewusst-
tsein, für welches es als diese Einheit, oder als Gattung

168 Ibid., p. 225. "... vernichtet den selbständ-
igen Gegenstand und gibt sich dadurch die Gewissheit seiner
selbst, als wahre Gewissheit, als solche, welche ihm selbst
auf gegenüberliche Weise geworden ist." Ibid., p. 139.
of desire; and through this experience this truth has become realized. 169

The satisfaction gained at this level of practical knowing, which does allow the subject to realize a certainty of self which is true, turns out to be a fleeting satisfaction. It is fleeting in two senses: 1) in the obvious sense exemplified by the transitory satisfaction of the appetites: once the thing is consumed or used, satisfaction is soon replaced by the same wants reappearing; 2) in the less obvious sense involved in the search for the truth of self-certainty: the subject simply seeks to confirm the certainty of himself as objectively true, i.e. in his general desire to affirm his own life, he seeks to assimilate objects of his world to himself in a knowing process, but he fails to find any lasting satisfaction in objects which do not adequately reflect his practical processes of negating and transforming objects into himself. In so far as they do, they do so in an unconscious or at best in a non-self-conscious manner, at lower levels of assimilation or assimilative awareness. In effect, the non-intelligent 'other' offers no self-recognition and gives no self-recognition; and the subject cannot rest satisfied with less than a self-conscious 'other'.

169 Phen., p. 225. "Das Selbstbewusstsein vermag also durch seine negative Beziehung ihn nicht aufzuheben: es erzeugt ihn darum vielmehr wieder, so wie die Begierde. Es ist in der Tat ein Anderes als das Selbstbewusstsein, das Wesen der Begierde; und durch diese Erfahrung ist ihm selbst diese Wahrheit geworden." Phän., p. 139.
Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness. ... Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual fact; for here first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness. Ego which is the object of its notion, is in point of fact not "object". ... When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just as much ego as object. With this we already have before us the notion of Spirit. 170

It is when the relation of self and other becomes one of reciprocity and inter-relation of two self-conscious subjects that the stage of true self-consciousness is gained. Self-consciousness can properly develop only when selfhood is recognized in the other, and in the first by the latter. In fact, the world which self-consciousness is about to enter is one where self-consciousness is distributed among a plurality of discernible loci, and furthermore, one in which self-consciousness recognizes itself in each and all of them.

What consciousness has further to become aware of, is the experience of what spirit is - this absolute substance, which is the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousness in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance: Ego that is "we", a plurality of Egos, and "we" that is a single Ego. 171

170 Phen., p. 226-227. "Das Selbstbewusstsein err- eicht seine Befriedigung nur in einem andern Selbstbewusst- sein. ... Erst hiedurch ist es in der Tat; denn erst hierin wird für es die Einheit seiner selbst in seinem Anderssein; Ich, das der Gegenstand seines Begriffs ist, ist in der Tat nicht Gegenstand; ... Indem ein Selbstbewusstsein der Gegen- stand ist, ist er ebensowohl Ich wie Gegenstand. - Hiemit ist schon der Begriff des Geistes für uns vorhanden." Phän., 139-140.

171 Ibid. "Was für das Bewusstsein weiter wird, ist die Erfahrung, was der Geist ist, diese absolute Substanz, welche in der vollkommen Freiheit und Selbstständigkeit ihres
The above passage, to some extent, presages more advanced standpoints, but at the same time it tells the philosopher observer of the phenomenological voyage of discovery, as opposed to the participant in it, the direction in which the dialectic is moving. It will be when self-conscious Spirit is able to transcend the distinction of persons, that it will know itself for what it is: 'absolute substance', constituted by and constitutive of the elements succinctly indicated in this passage. Hegel closes this section with the promising and well phrased observation that: "Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness, as the notion of spirit, its turning point, where it leaves the coloured semblance of the sensuous immediate, and the empty night of the supersensible beyond, and enters into the spiritual daylight of the present."\(^{172}\)

b. Independence, dependence: interdependence; mastery and slavery.

This section of the Phenomenology is probably the best known, or at least the most discussed, and it has been much studied, but because it is integral to the development

\[\text{Gegensatzes, n"amlich verschiedener f"ur sich seiernder Selbstbewusstsein /e/, die Einheit derselben ist: Ich, das Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist.} \] \textbf{Ph"an.}, p. 140.

of selfhood, it must not be side-stepped. The dialectic now properly opens into the social sphere, but the first social relations encountered are in an important philosophical sense primitive because they are so fundamental to development of self-consciousness and human selfhood. They are also primitive in their sharply drawn lines of struggle and conflict between individuals seeking self-certainty, self-recognition and self-mastery through the mastery of the other.

In the section just examined, self-consciousness in the form of desire, the self continued to be heedful of and to be concerned with the external object, but the self sought to appropriate and to assimilate the object to itself. However, when the self encounters another self, a more complex situation develops. This other is not amenable to simple appropriation or assimilation. Hegel sets out to show how fundamental, how essential the presence of the other is to self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness exists in and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another in and for itself; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or 'recognized'. The concept of this its unity in duplication, of infinitude realizing itself in self-consciousness, ... This double meaning of what is distinguished lies in the nature of self-consciousness, - its being infinite or directly the contrary of the determinateness, in which it is established.\[173\]
Having clearly indicated the importance for self-consciousness, that it be recognized or acknowledged by another self-consciousness, Hegel connects self-consciousness with infinitude. It is of the nature of self-consciousness to be infinite, and it is through its infinitude that the subject includes or comprises its other as explicitly an other self. He also introduces the dialectic of the double process of self-consciousness, "of duplication of self-consciousness within its unity"\textsuperscript{174} the meaning of which he proceeds to unravel, through an analysis of the doubling of the 'double meaning' mentioned above.

b.a. The pure conception of recognition

Before considering the actions and self-activity involved in 'the trial by death' and the interrelation and interdependence of mastery and slavery, Hegel proceeds to work out the moments in the dialectical relation between self-consciousnesses. Above Hegel was concerned to explain that the unity and the distinction of self as subject and as object are direct opposites, within self-consciousness. The task now is to make manifest the process of Recognition by

\textsuperscript{174} Phen., p. 231. "... der Verdopplung des Selbstbewusstseins in seiner Einheit, ..." Ibid., p. 143.
bringing out the meaning of 'the notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication'. This dialectic begins with the single self-consciousness which finds before it another self-consciousness. "This has double significance. First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other." By cancelling its other the self-consciousness sublates 'that first double meaning', which results in 'a second double meaning'. It seeks to sublate the independent being of the other, so that it may 'become certain of itself as true being', but in doing so it sublates 'its own self, for this other is itself.' Self-consciousness strives to attain self-certainty, to assert and to affirm itself as truly self-subsistent, but the affirmation which it desires cannot be achieved by itself alone, nor can it be achieved one-sidedly, when in the presence of another self-consciousness. While it desires recognition from the other, it also desires to recognize itself in the other by negating and subsuming the other to itself. Hegel explains the triple doubling movement or process he has in mind in this way:

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This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense is at the same time a return in a double sense back into its self. For, firstly through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with itself again through the cancelling of its otherness; but secondly, it likewise gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets the other go free.176

It is pointed out at this stage that this whole process is duplicated in the other self-consciousness, which is also 'independent' and 'shut up within itself'. Two self-consciousnesses stand facing each other, each with its abstract and empty independence, and each desirous of gaining a self-certainty above the satisfaction gained at the level of mere life and the appetites. The objects now encountered by each are not found 'in the passive form characteristic primarily of the object of desire': they exist independently for themselves. If a satisfactory response is to be drawn from the object, it must come from within the object itself, i.e. the demand of one upon the other must remain powerless, "if (the object) itself does not in itself do what (the first) does to it. The process then is absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses. ... Action from one side

176 *Phen.*, p. 229-230. "Dies doppelsinnige Aufheben seines doppelsinnigen Andersseins ist ebenso eine doppelsinnige Rückkehr in sich selbst; denn erstmlich erhält es durch das Aufheben sich selbst zurück, denn es wird sich wieder gleich durch das Aufheben seines Andersseins; zweitens aber gibt es das andere Selbstbewusstsein ihm wieder ebenso zurück, denn es war sich im anderen, es hebt dies sein Sein im andern auf, entlässt also das andere wieder frei." *Phän.*, p. 142.
only would be useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both."177

Hegel suggests that this complex process is analogous to "the play of forces" previously studied within the perspective of the understanding; however, here the interplay is between individual human subjects, where 'it is found in consciousness'. The forces here are of a different kind, but very much as real. In the former case, the understanding gained of certain forces effected only the experience of the observer, but in the present case, the rather limited understanding so far achieved by self-consciousness of another independent self-consciousness which is also aware of its opposite, 'holds ... for the terms themselves'. He characterizes self-consciousness as the middle term which divides or breaks itself up into the two extremes:

Each is the mediating term to the other, through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.178

177 Phen., p. 230. "... wenn er nicht an sich selbst dies tut, was es an ihm tut. Die Bewegung ist also schlechthin die gedoppelte beider Selbstbewusstsein /e/. ... das einseitige Tun wäre unnütz, weil, was geschehen soll, nur durch beide zu Stande kommen kann." Phen., p. 142.

178 Ibid., p. 231. "Jedes ist dem andern die Mitte, durch welche jedes sich mit sich selbst vermittelt und zusammenschliesst, und jedes sich und dem andern unmittelbares für sich seidens Wesen, welches zugleich nur durch diese Vermittlung so für sich ist. Sie anerkennen sich, als gegenseitig sich anerkennend." Ibid., p. 143.
What has been considered to this point, the 'pure conception of recognition', must now be examined from the standpoint of how 'its process appears for self-consciousness'. What follows are Hegel's analyses of two human paradigms: first, the life and death struggle for recognition and self-certainty, and second, the master-slave interdependence, which develops out of the first. Through them he is able to show that self-consciousness cannot properly develop its selfhood without mutual recognition developing between and among selves.

b.b. The trial by death: prestige lost in its attainment.

The word 'primitive' was used at the beginning of this sub-section, when opening discussion on the independence and dependence of self-consciousness. Among the reasons for using this word is that such a word is necessary to adequately catch the spirit of Hegel's deep, stark and dramatic presentations of these truly paradigmatic human struggles. The stakes are high, and so are the risks which may be necessary in the life and death struggles depicted, particularly in the first phase which takes the form of individual combat. Alexandre Kojève recognises the primitive quality in the desire to achieve recognition through a life and death contest; he also perceives in the action an attempt to negate or transcend nature.
Si l'homme meurt en réalisant sa Begierde primitive, c'est-à-dire le simple désir d'une réalité naturelle, il ne se nie pas, ne se libère pas, mais reste dépendant de la Nature: il meurt en animal.

Il doit risquer sa vie pour forcer la conscience de l'autre. Il doit engager une lutte pour la reconnaissance. En risquant ainsi sa vie, il prouve à l'autre qu'il n'est pas un animal; en cherchant la mort d'autre, il prouve à l'autre qu'il le reconnaît comme homme. 179

Fackenheim credits Kojève with rightly laying stress on this struggle as a prestige-battle, although he thinks that his overemphasis on this point has contributed to unjustified charges of fascism being levelled against Hegel. Nevertheless both scholars agree in general on the way this prestige-battle is to be understood, except that Fackenheim places more emphasis on its relation to the development of selfhood.

In his consideration of this section of the Phenomenology, he pursues his inquiry into 'the pristine origins' of 'the double process of self-making and self-knowing'. He writes of man's 'uncovered desire' which has been unable to obtain 'direct satisfaction'. To do this would require the negation of physical nature as a whole, and no more than the animal, can man accomplish this.

The human power of self-making would be doomed to eternal frustration were it not for the possibility of indirect satisfaction. The desire can be satisfied, not by the negation of nature as a whole, but by the negation of another desire to negate nature as a whole, i.e., another man. Thus even in its pristine origins the human self is dependent for selfhood on other selves. It is dependence which it will never transcend.  

The negating, then, is of another man's desire to negate nature, but indirectly, 'it is of nature itself, for each seeks to take the life of the other while risking his own'. Unlike the killing for the sake of food and life, which can be seen to arise out of nature itself, this taking risk and taking life, is done for the sake of risk and killing, and thus is an indirect negating 'of nature as a whole'.  

Hegel moves from the more abstract consideration of the process of recognition to the more concrete embodiment of this process. The analysis of the latter begins at a stage where the needed mutual recognition is deficient, where, in fact, it has hardly begun. "Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own certainty of itself is still without truth." Bringing out the meaning of the recognitional process involves a twofold action on the

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180 The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, p. 40. In a footnote to this paragraph he adds that: "It ceases to be mere dependence, however, by virtue of Spirit."

181 Ibid.

part of each of the participants, i.e. each acts the part of another for the other, and each acts 'on the part of itself'.

The following passage sets the stage of the mortal combat, the battle for self-recognition:

In so far as it is the other's action, each aims at the destruction and death of the other. But in this there is implicated also the second kind of action, self-activity; for the former implies that it risks its own life. The relation of both self-consciousnesses is in this way so constituted that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle.\(^\text{183}\)

In the confrontation between the two self-conscious subjects, each initially seeks to assert itself, to assert its own existence as a self, above the level of nature: of mere life and satisfaction of the natural appetites. Each participant desires to put his own self-consciousness and self-certainty ahead of the others, to the point of downgrading the opponent's claim and presumption to selfhood and freedom, this even to the extent of being prepared to negate or annul the other's claim by extinguishing the other's life. Each is prepared to sacrifice his life in this struggle for prestige and recognition. Essential to the desired recognition is

\(^{183}\) Phän., p. 232. "Insofern es Tun des andern ist, geht also jeder auf den Tod des andern. Darin aber ist auch das zweite, das Tun durch sich selbst, vorhanden; denn jenes schlieszt das Daransetzen des eignen Lebens in sich. Das Verhältnis beider Selbstbewusztsein \(\zeta\) ist also so bestimmt, dass sie sich selbst und einander durch den Kampf auf Leben und Tod bewähren." Phän., p. 144.
that each combatant receive from the other acknowledgement for the risk taken precisely for the sake of recognition. As Fackenheim expresses this point, "the two selves are selves torn loose from nature - only if each actually risks his life for the sake of prestige. They know themselves as selves and have the prestige, only if each is recognized by the other as in fact risking his life for the sake of prestige."¹⁸⁴ One aspect of the recognitional struggle which requires attention is human freedom, and this for three reasons: first, because it's attainment is requisite to the attainment of selfhood; second, through the range of his work Hegel consistently regards man's attainment of freedom as essential to the full development and realization of his nature; and, third, Hegel specifically connects it with risk, life and recognition as a person.

And it is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance, is not its mere absorption in the expanse of life. ... The individual, who has not staked his life, may no doubt, be recognized as a Person; but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ op. cit., p. 40-41. Fackenheim ends this paragraph with the observation: "So Savage, according to Hegel, are the primitive origins of human selfhood."

¹⁸⁵ Phen., p. 233. "Und ist allein das Daransetzen des Lebens, wodurch die Freiheit, wodurch es bewährt wird, dassz dem Selbstbewusstsein nicht das Sein, nicht die unmittelbare Weise, wie es auftritt, nicht sein Versenktsein in die Ausbreitung des Lebens das Wesen, - ... Das Individuum,
In Hegel's later work, a similar position will be taken in respect to the nation-state, i.e. that the nation-state as a cohesive organization of people with its history, institutions and values, must be prepared to defend its rights, freedoms and way of life, if it is to deserve the title. This means that its people must be willing to risk their lives in defense of the nation-state. 186

From the above passage it can be seen that the combatant thinks that to prove himself truly free, he must show that his self-consciousness is not limited to the unfreedom of nature. In this he grasps the truth, but the action or means chosen to prove his freedom, i.e. the destruction of the other self in order to victoriously assert his selfhood, is doomed to failure. The actual destruction of the other, would result in the loss of the necessary condition for recognition and selfhood.

This trial by death, however, cancels both the truth which was to result from it, and therewith the certainty of self altogether. For just as life is the

welches das Leben nicht gewagt hat, kann wohl als Person anerkannt werden aber es hat die Wahrheit dieses Anerkanntseins als eines selbständigen Selbstbewusstseins nicht erreicht." Phän., p. 144.

186 For example, in writing about war in the P. of Right, Hegel remarks, "their freedom has died from the fear of dying;" 324. In passing note can be taken of the parallel in his thinking about recognition in the case of relations between nations: he makes the observation that the significance of wars and disputes to world history is found in "the fact that they are struggles for recognition in connexion with something of specific intrinsic worth." 351; see also 338.
natural "position" of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the natural "negation" of consciousness, negation without independence, which thus remains without the requisite significance of actual recognition.\textsuperscript{187}

If in fact the struggle ends in death for one or both combatants, the only certainty left is that each did stake his life, while holding life lightly in his own case and that of the other. The end and purpose for which such risks were taken, recognition of selfhood by another self, is lost in the action chosen to gain it. During the conflict itself there was mutual recognition, and in and through this recognition, self-recognition. However, "both vanish when the combat is ended. The slain can neither recognize nor be recognized. And the surviving victor is a mere survivor once the flush of the moment of victory has passed."\textsuperscript{188} It can be said of both combatants that their understanding of their relationship one to another was fundamentally deficient: they had vainly and

\textsuperscript{187} Phen., p. 233. "Diese Bewährung aber durch den Tod hebt eben so die Wahrheit, welche daraus hervorgehen sollte, als damit auch die Gewissheit seiner selbst überhaupt auf; denn wie das Leben die natürliche Position des Bewusstseins, die Selbständigkeit ohne die absolute Negativität ist, so ist er die natürliche Negation desselben, die Negation ohne die geforderte Bedeutung des Anerkennens bleibt." Phän., p. 145.

\textsuperscript{188} Packenheimer, op. cit., p. 41. He adds the following sentence, suggestive of a possible influence from Goethe's Faust: "If incapable of rising above so primitive a selfhood, the self would forever alternate like some barbaric prehistoric Faust, between actual battles in which selfhood is achieved and times between battles in which selfhood, having been lost without result, would be dissolved into a dark longing for renewed battle."
contradictorily tried to regard and treat one another like things; they failed to appreciate the necessity of preserving the condition for recognition and for the subsequent development of self-consciousness and selfhood.

And the two do not mutually give and receive one another back from each other through consciousness; they let one another go quite indifferently, like things. Their act is abstract negation, not the negation characteristic of consciousness, which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated.\textsuperscript{189}

While indicating the deficiencies, outlined above, Hegel clearly identifies the essential characteristic of consciousness, its capacity to negate while preserving what has been negated. He also illuminates the interdependence, and in contemporary phenomenological language, the intersubjectivity, of the two self-conscious subjects.

Although man takes upon himself the negativity of death in order to transcend every limited situation, "he can never completely renounce his being-in-the-world ... The renunciation of life in order to prove that one is a pure being-for-itself simply results in being removed from the scene like an animal. It is necessary at once to conserve life ... and

\textsuperscript{189} Phän., p. 234. "und die beiden geben und empfangen sich nicht gegenseitig voneinander durch das Bewusstsein zurück, sondern lassen einander nur gleichgültig, als Dinge, frei. Ihre Tat ist die abstrakte Negation, nicht die Negation des Bewusstseins, welches so aufhebt, dass es das Aufgehobene aufbewahrt und erhält, und hiemit sein Aufgehobenwerden überlebt." Phän., p. 145.
yet to negate the latter. Another death than biological death must be discovered through the internalization of death." Should the struggle end differently, such that one combatant accepts domination rather than risk his life further, or should one opponent choose to avoid combat and risk of death altogether by accepting the superiority of the other, the result in its extreme form is mastery and slavery.

b.c. Mastery and slavery

Freedom becomes even more an issue in this phase of the dialectic of self-consciousness. Somewhat similar to the struggles for leadership within herds of some species of animals, men often endeavour to dominate without actually killing the opponent, and the vanquished are the less strong or the less determined of purpose, or in starker terms, the conquered may well be the opponent less willing to risk death. As the relationship has developed to this stage, the situation

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190 J. Hyppolite, "The Concept of Existence in the Hegelian Phenomenology", in Studies ..., p. 29. In examining this fight to the death, which he claims is a 'condition of history', Hyppolite brings out a number of aspects involved in the confrontation and struggle which help to explain why it results 'in an impasse'. "What is insupportable is to be both one-self or pure being-for-itself and at the same time an Other, ... a living object ... unavoidably a determinate object for another in whom it is reflected as an object. This condition of being-for-another is unbearable and yet it is the condition of the self's being-in-the-world at all ... Each seeks the death of the other because each one wants to suppress his limited representation for the other and demands to be recognized by the other as pure being-for-itself. ... proving to the other and to itself that it is not merely a living ... organism." Ibid., p. 28.
is simply one (or so it seems) in which a man has given up
his freedom for servitude rather than risk death, while the
other man, the master, retains and exercises his freedom while
dominating the other. The master appears to be the independ­
ent consciousness 'that exists for itself', while the slave
appears to be the dependent consciousness that exists for
another. "The one is independent, and its essential nature
is to be for itself; the other is dependent, and its essence
is life or existence for another. The former is the Master,
or Lord, the latter the Bondsman."191

There are relations between the master and the slave,
and through the slave to the thing being made, by the slave
for the master, but this over simple outline misses the com­
plexity of the continuing 'recognitional' roles and contri­
butions of one to the other. One of the reasons, and really
the most fundamental reason for conserving the life of the
opponent, now the slave, is the continuing need of the master
for the recognition of his selfhood192 given now through the

191 Phen., p. 234. "die eine das selbständige,
welchem das Fürsichsein, die andere das unselbständige, dem
Leben oder das Sein für ein Anderes, das Wesen ist: jenes ist
der Herr, dies der Knecht." Phän., p. 146.

192 Ivan Soll draws attention to the passage which
began Hegel's section A of part (5) Selbstbewusstsein, (Supra
p. 197) where Hegel says in part that self-consciousness
'exists only by being recognized'. Soll states that this
asserts that the second self-conscious is "necessary for the
assurance and autonomy of the first ... because this assurance
and autonomy require a witness ... The other suddenly becomes,
not a threat and obstacle to self-realization ... but an
slave's acknowledgment of his dependency upon the master.
(Even here it can be seen that dependency, albeit a different form of dependency, is not one-sided.) Mediation$^{193}$ enters into this relationship between the master and slave, and simply from the standpoint of the master, it does so in a twofold manner. (The situation vis-à-vis mediation becomes more complex, when it is also viewed from the standpoint of the slave.) The master, as the consciousness that exists for itself, now has an extended sphere of consciousness and content; it is mediated with itself through an other consciousness which is in turn tied to thinghood in general.

The master brings himself into relation to both these moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness whose essential character is thinghood. And since the master, is (a) qua notion of self-consciousness, an immediate relation of self-existence, but (b) is now moreover at the same time mediation, or a being-for-self which is for itself only through an other - he /the master/ stands in relation (a) immediately to both (b) mediately to each through the other.$^{194}$

accomplice to be preserved. . . . a way must be found to negate the other while preserving his ability to witness. So the victor makes the vanquished his vassal instead of his victim."


193 See Henri Niel's discussions of the "Utilisation de l'Idée de Mediation" in both 'La lutte' and 'Le Maître et l'Esclave', op. cit., p. 129-130; 130-131.

194 Phen., p. 234-235. "Der Herr bezieht sich auf diese beiden Momente, auf ein Ding, als solches, den Gegenstand der Begierde, und auf das Bewusstsein, dem die Dingheit das Wesentliche ist; und indem er a) als Begriff des Selbstbewusstseins unmittelbare Beziehung des Fürsichseins ist, aber b) nunmehr zugleich als Vermittlung oder als ein Fürsichsein, welches nur durch ein Anderes für sich ist, so bezieht er sich a)
Already there is a subtle shift of focus taking place away from the power, freedom and independence of the Master, toward things physical. Certainly the slave depends on the Master for his life, work, living conditions and even values, and can be said to live through the Master, but it is to physical things that he is chained: there is the material to be worked, and there is the material means used to prevent his escape. The relationship is, in an important sense, mediated by material objects. "The master relates himself to the slave medially through independent existence; ... it is (the slave's) chain, from which he could not in the struggle get away, and for that reason he proved himself to be dependent, to have his independence in the shape of thinghood." The superior position of the Master was gained through his capacity to regard existence, life and nature as 'merely something negative'. The slave "also takes up a negative attitude to things and cancels them; but the thing is, at the same time independent for him, and, in consequence, he cannot, with all his negating, get so far as to annihilate it outright and be

unmittelbar auf beide und b) mittelbar auf jedes durch das andere." Phän., p. 146.

195 Phän., p. 235. "Der Herr bezieht sich auf den Knecht mittelbar das selbständige Sein; ... es ist seine Kette, von der er im Kampfe nicht abstrahlen konnte, und darum sich als unselbständig, seine Selbständigheit in der Dingheit zu haben, erwies." Phän., p. 146.
done with it; that is to say, he merely works on it." 196

The master 'gets the enjoyment' of the thing made. With the slave interposed between the thing and himself, he 'relates himself merely to the dependence of the thing', and "the aspect of its independence he leaves to the slave, who labours upon it." 197

However, all has not turned out as the master might have presumed it would, because hidden within the situation there are contradictions which now emerge, such that his aspirations for recognition as a free self-consciousness and for freedom itself, cannot be fully realized. 1) It is true that the master has achieved recognition from the slave. "The master's selfhood is the actual process of being recognized. As such it extends over the slave, whose being is his activity of recognizing the master. It extends, as well, over nature; for, belabored by the slave at the master's behest, nature is reduced to an object of his enjoyment." 198 However this recognition is deficient, in that the recognition is received

196 Phen., p. 235. "auf das Ding auch negativ und hebt es auf; aber es ist zugleich selbständig für ihn, und er kann darum durch sein Negieren nicht bis zur Vernichtung mit ihm fertig werden, oder er bearbeitet es nur." Phän., p. 146.

197 Ibid., p. 236. "die Seite der Selbständigkeit aber überlässt er dem Knechte, der es bearbeitet." Ibid., p. 147.

198 Fackenheim, op. cit., p. 41-42.
from a conscious living being whom the master himself has reduced to a non-person, an unessential, mere living thing. In the moment of recognition, "the other consciousness cancels itself as self-existent, and, ipso facto, itself does what the first does to it." 199 2) It is true that the master has achieved a kind of freedom. "The latter exists only for himself, that is his essential nature; he is the pure negative power, a power to which the thing is nothing." 200 However, this freedom is deficient because, paradoxically, the master is chained to his slave, who is, in his servitude, an extension of the master, "for what is done by the slave is properly an action on the part of the master." 201 Similarly, his freedom from nature is thereby made deficient; also, through the slave's dependence on material things. 202 He cannot get real satisfaction from an unfree consciousness, who may indeed genuinely regard the master as the noble free self-consciousness, but who unconsciously reflects the deficiencies of the master's freedom. 'For recognition proper' there is needed a more equal and reciprocal interrelation and

199 Phen., p. 236. "... dasz das andere Bewusztsein sich als Fürsichsein aufhebt, und hiemit selbst das tat, was das erste gegen es tut." Phen., p. 147.
200 Ibid. "diesem ist nur das Fürsichsein, das Wesen; er ist die reine negative Macht, der das Ding nichts ist." Ibid.
201 Ibid. "denn was der Knecht tut, ist eigentlich Tun des Herrn;" Ibid.
202 Ibid.
interdependence. "On that account a form of recognition has arisen that is one-sided and unequal." Furthermore, there are the plain moral and psychological defects involved in the master trying to build his freedom and enlarge his ego, through taking away the freedom of another man less courageous or less able to protect himself, - these defects are implied by, but are not explicitly drawn and filled out in Hegel's analysis of the situation.

Although the slave has affirmed himself as unessential and likewise his activity, no doubt confirmed by the master, and although the master is essential to the situation, no doubt, confirmed by the slave, yet, "in all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, the object which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that this object does not correspond to its notion." Unfortunately for the master, just when he had thought he had achieved real mastery, he discovers that his seemingly independent consciousness is, in fact, a dependent consciousness. "He is thus not assured of self-existence as his truth; he

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204 G.R.G. Mure, having remarked on the "purely selfish freedom" of the master, and on the fact that the latter "is still far from truly free" makes this point: "As if to refute in advance critics who see in Hegel the father of Nazism and Fascism, the dialectic now carries the development of self-consciousness through the slave rather than the master." The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 76.
finds that his truth is rather the unessential consciousness, and the fortuitous unessential action of that consciousness."²⁰⁵

The dialectic having revealed what bondage is in relation to Lordship, now shifts attention to what it is, 'in and for itself'. The slave in that bondage is a self-consciousness, who although repressed within himself, will ultimately transform himself (through his own work) into 'true independence'. At first, the slave, naturally enough, takes the master to be 'the essential reality' for his own state of bondage, and thinks that 'the truth is the independent consciousness existing for itself'. This is by way of saying that the slave regards the master as truly deserving of recognition as a self-conscious person because of his obvious power, superiority, self-mastery and authentic freedom, and regards himself as unessential in relation to the essentiality of the master, inferior, if for no other reason than his fear of death, and obviously unfree, and therefore not deserving of recognition. The above describes the reflected images cast one upon another, in the state of bondage, as the situation is

²⁰⁵ Phen., p. 236-237. "Das unwesentliche Bewusstsein ist hierin für den Herrn der Gegenstand, welcher die Wahrheit der Gewissheit seiner selbst ausmacht. Aber er erhellt, dass dieser Gegenstand seinem Begriffe nicht entspricht, ... er ist also nicht des Fürsichseins, als der Wahrheit gewiss, sondern seine Wahrheit ist vielmehr das unwesentliche Bewusstsein, und das unwesentliche Tun desselben." Phän., p. 147.
seen by the slave. However the slave does in fact contain within himself the 'truth of pure negativity and self-existence', having devastatingly experienced this reality within himself to the very core of his being.

That is, this consciousness has not experienced dread (anxiety) for this or that, nor for this or that moment, but for its entire being; because it has felt the fear of death, the absolute Master. It has been therein dissolved inwardly, it has trembled throughout itself, and all that was fixed has trembled within it. This pure universal movement, this absolute dissolution of all its stability, is however, the simple essence of self-consciousness, the absolute negativity, the pure being-for-itself, which herewith is in this consciousness. This moment of pure being-for-itself is also for it, because in the master is this its object.

This dissolution of the slave's consciousness is actually continued and extended in serving and toiling in his labour upon the materials involved in his tasks. Through his labour he gradually realizes a superior and more authentic overcoming of nature's externality, superior in relation to that of the master's successive but transitory enjoyment of the fruit of the slave's labour. "By serving he cancels in every particular

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aspect his attachment to natural existence, and by his work removes the latter away.\textsuperscript{207}

Hegel's analyses of human work provides important support for his conception of man as self-making, in that he shows that man develops himself in the process of transforming the natural world through his own labour. During the opening phase of his analysis of the slave's labour, he states that at first the slave's "consciousness is therein for its self, not the being-for-itself (self-existent)", but "through work however, it comes to itself".\textsuperscript{208} The desire of the Master for the thing to be made is 'only a state of evanescence' but the labour of the slave in making the thing gives a more substantial and objective satisfaction to the slave because in working to form the thing, his desire is 'restrained and checked'. The slave discovers something of himself, through the mediating activity of his work and the use of his tools upon the apparently independent thing.

The negative relation to the object passes into the form of the object, and into the enduring (permanent), because it is just for the labourer that the object

\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Phän.}, p. 238, "es hebt darin in allen einzelnen Momenten seine Anhänglichkeit an natürliches Dasein auf; und arbeitet dasselbe hinweg." \textit{Phän.}, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{208} \textit{Ibid.} "so ist das Bewusstsein darin für es selbst, nicht das Fürsichsein. Durch die Arbeit kommt es aber zu sich selbst," \textit{Ibid.} In this paragraph, Hegel goes on to explain that "Labour ... is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed;".
has independence. This negative mediating agency, or this form giving activity, is at the same time individuality or the pure being-for-itself of that consciousness, which now in the work it does is externalized and passes into the condition of permanence. The working consciousness accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehension of that independent being as its self.209

The result of his form giving work remains, and in it he re-discovers characteristics of himself; he has sublated the original alien and external form confronting him, and enlarged his cognizance of himself, so that his own proper self-existence is explicitly realized by himself.210 From the standpoint of concern for Hegel's conception of the historicity of man's being, this remarkable dialectical analysis of one type of human self-constituting activity, provides a clear illustration of this latter process, which must be regarded as the core of his notion of historicity.

209 Phen., p. 238. "Die negative Beziehung auf den Gegenstand wird zur Form desselben und zu einem Bleibenden, weil eben dem Arbeitenden der Gegenstand Selbständigkeit hat. Diese negative Mitte oder das formierende Tun ist zugleich die Eingelheit oder das reine Fürsichsein des Bewusstseins, welches nun in der Arbeit ausser es in das Element des Bleibens tritt; das arbeitende Bewusstsein kommt also hiedurch zur Anschauung des selbständigen Seins als seiner selbst." Phän., p. 149.

210 W. Shearson, in an unpublished study of The Concept of Labour in Hegel's Phenomenology when discussing 'The Labour of the Slave', provides an insightful footnote: "Hegel here is attempting to solve the dilemma of selfhood that if only a self can make itself a self, how is this possible if the self is not a self to begin with? For this should have to be a sort of creatio ex nihilo." He goes on to consider Hegel's showing of "how the self becomes a self, and the necessary conditions of that possibility".
It is by working with his materials in accordance with the will of his master, that the slave begins to re-form and re-constitute his consciousness which had suffered such dissolution through the fear of the Lord.\textsuperscript{211} His actions are preserved in the products of his work. He learns as he works on the thing which he does not fear;\textsuperscript{212} he learns how to form his own mind and his own self-consciousness through his labour.\textsuperscript{213} In forming himself, he raises himself to the level of true self-existence, to being-for-itself. As the slave labours he comes to see himself in the independent being, in the material thing that he shapes and fashions:

in the shaping, the being-for-itself becomes for him his own proper being, and he attains the consciousness that he himself is in and for itself. By the fact that the form is objectified, it does not become something other than the latter; for just that form is his pure self-existence, which therein becomes truly realized. Thus precisely in labour where there seemed to be merely some outsider's mind involved, the slave becomes aware, through this re-discovery of himself by himself, (having) a "mind of his own".\textsuperscript{214}

\textsuperscript{211} Hegel's pun: "... the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," Phen., p. 238. "... die Furcht des Herrn der Anfang der Weisheit ist," Phän., p. 148.

\textsuperscript{212} Except that the material thing to be worked is part of nature, to which he is doubly chained by his work within chains and by his fear of death. See Fackenheim, op. cit., p. 42.

\textsuperscript{213} Kaufmann briefly and too simply construes the master and slave, or servant, relationship thus: "The servant comes to live by his own work and thus becomes self-reliant and independent, while the master comes to rely on the servant's labor and thus becomes dependent." Hegel, Reinterpretation, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{214} Phen., p. 239. "In dem Bilden wird das Fürsich-sein als sein eignes für es, und es kommt zum Bewusstsein,
Through labour and the transformation of things, the slave objectifies himself and constitutes his self-consciousness, and as Marcuse points out, "creates self-consciousness ... in the master as well". This is an interesting point which deserves emphasis. Through the work of his slave, the Master avoids working on the objects he desires and commands, he avoids "the 'negative-side' of things, that on which they become fetters on man. The lord receives all things as products of labor, not as dead objects, but as things that bear the hallmark of the subject who worked on them." It is at this point that Marcuse provides an additional connotation to the deficiency in the Master's freedom and self-sufficiency: "When he handles these things as his property, the lord is really handling another self-consciousness, that of the laborer, the being through whom he attains his satisfaction."215

In this way, as in other ways previously discussed, the Master discovers his essential dependency on another being.

The slave, - in transforming his small confined world of material things, constitutes himself in interaction with it, and by accomplishing both helps to constitute the self-consciousness of another, - represents a modest exemplar of
dasz es selbst an und für sich ist. Die Form wird dadurch, dass sie hinausgesetzt wird, ihm nichtein Anderes als es; denn eben sie ist seine reines Fürsichsein, das ihm darin zur Wahrheit wird. Es wird also durch dies Wiederfinden seiner durch sich selbst eigner Sinn, gerade in der Arbeit, worin es nur fremder Sinn zu sein schein." Phän., p. 149.

215 Reason and Revolution, p. 117.
the self-making being who is situated in nature and history, i.e. man. For Hegel, man constitutes himself (his selfhood) through interaction with nature and interrelation and interdependence with other selves. He shares in the making of the human world and human history. Marx grasps clearly some of these characteristic features of the historicity in Hegel's philosophy of man. He connects the dialectic of negativity with the self-genesis of man and this in turn with man's labour:

The outstanding thing in Hegel's Phenomenology and its final outcome - that is, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle - is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-genesis of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man - true, because real man - as the outcome of man's own labour. 216

Of course, he goes on to criticize Hegel for seeing only the positive side of labour, for recognizing only abstract mental labour, and for dealing only with "the abstraction of man-self-consciousness." 217 Fackenheim thinks that Marx was 'correct in taking the Phenomenology as viewing: The self-genesis of man as process ... [and hence] objective man ... as the outcome of man's own labour'. He goes on to say that 'this can

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217 Ibid., p. 152 and 155.
be made into the final significance' only by turning left, away from Hegel himself. Furthermore, he notes that meaning of labour depends on the context, and that in fact, Hegel considers different kinds of labour.\textsuperscript{218} If this be true, and from the evidence it certainly seems so, then Marx is wrong in respect of one of his criticisms, at least.

Another way to regard the \textit{Phenomenology}, is to see in it part of Hegel's attempt to fill the empty concept of human nature, to make the concept more concrete. The point is that he really is dealing with universal characteristics of man, paradigmatic experiences that are necessary stages in the development from the species 'man' to the \textit{hu-man}, to human spirit.

Of course, not every man must actually risk his life while risking an others through individual combat, for the sake of recognition, prestige, and the development of his selfhood, - fortunately. Of course, not every man must actually and precisely experience the role of slave or servant in order to attain selfhood. However, every human person must go through analogous struggles, tensions and partial resolutions in the process of gaining self-certainty and ultimately selfhood. The fundamental importance of experiencing recognitional struggles and of experiencing the roles of both

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{op. cit.}, footnote, p. 43.  
\textsuperscript{*} See \textit{Phen.}, p. 239. \textit{Phän.}, p. 149.
master and servant, lies not in the mere experience of them, which men do in some form, whether they wish it or not, but in the necessity of passing through these stages on the way to selfhood and self-mastery. (Actually, recognitional and dominance struggles occur in a variety of contexts and in a variety of ways throughout human life.) Man exercises mature selfhood by giving and receiving recognition, by acknowledging the interdependence of self-consciousness, by sharing service and leadership, by achieving self-mastery, and finally mastering his world through the comprehension of it. Although Hegel does not give the life and death struggle, or the master and slave relationship, specific historical settings, he could have, because not only do individuals pass through analogous stages in their self-development, so do nations and civilizations, both in their internal development and transformation, and in their external relations. In other words, it is not inappropriate to think of the struggles for recognition and freedom in terms of human-history, because history itself manifests the suffering and labour of spirit in its development toward its realization, which is freedom.

219 In following this particular phase of the Phenomenology, the tendency is probably to think of such situations as belonging to distant history. In such case, the really serious error would be invested in any implications that denied the universality and timelessness of the human paradigm considered.
c. Freedom of self-consciousness

c.a. Stoicism

The freedom attained through the master-slave relationship turned out to be split between the master and slave, and in each case it was deficient, though for different reasons. These roles are brought together in 'the Stoic'. This time freedom is studied within a general historical setting, i.e. Hegel seems primarily to have in mind the historical period of Greek and Roman Stoicism, although history, as such, is not at all emphasized, and historical detail is entirely lacking. The stage of Stoicism represents a kind of freedom which transcends the limitations of the kinds of freedom attained by master and slave.

This new stage can also be looked upon as a development out of the form of freedom gained by the slave. There is a slight difficulty here, because consideration is given in the previous stage to 1) the slave who has gained being-for-itself and a form of freedom, and 2) to the slave who relapses into mere skill and stubbornness. Hegel appears to make the transition to stoicism by recognizing the deficient features in the (second) slave's very limited progress toward freedom. Should the slave in forming the thing do so "without the initial absolute fear, then it is merely a vain 'mind of its own'; for its form or negativity is not negativity per se; and hence its formative activity cannot give the consciousness
of itself as essentially real." What results from "'the mind of its own' is stubborness, a freedom, which remains still within bondage". What is definitely lacking is "universal formative activity, absolute notion". What is left "is rather a dexterity (skill, aptitude), which has mastery over a limited range (some) but not over the universal power and the whole objective reality". 220

On the other hand, the above can be regarded as not so much the transition to Stoicism as the last move in the Master-Slave Relationship phase of the dialectic, made to show that the more typical slave fails to find any really meaningful escape from bondage, and that the next standpoint must be such that while it incorporates the advances made, it will transcend the typical limits of the previous phase. Then the transition can be regarded as following from the slave who successfully turns the master and nature into inessential-ities, whose freedom does not devolve upon mere stubbornness and aptitude, but rises out of his having overcome absolute fear by discovering the embodiment of his own self-

220 Phen., p. 239-240. "Formiert das Bewusstsein ohne die erste absolute Furcht, so ist es nur ein eitler eigener Sinn; denn seine Form oder Negativität an sich; und sein Formieren kann ihm daher nicht das Bewusstsein seiner als des Wesens geben. ... der eigene Sinn ist Eigensinn, eine Freiheit, welche noch innerhalb der Knechtschaft stehen bleibt. ... allgemeines Bilden, absoluter Begriff, sondern eine Geschicklichkeit, welche nur über Einiges, nicht über die allgemeine Macht und das ganze gegenständliche Wesen mächtig ist." Phän., p. 150.
consciousness in the products of his labour. "In this way, we have a new attitude or mode of consciousness brought about: a type of consciousness which takes on the form of infinitude, or one whose essence consists in unimpeded (pure) movement of consciousness. It is one which thinks or is free self-consciousness."\textsuperscript{221}

It should be noted that the dialectic continues to advance the development of self-hood, the development of more adequate forms of freedom and the development of more and more adequate forms of knowing and knowledge, together. Hegel explains that 'thinking' involves and means "not an abstract ego, but an ego which has at the same time the meaning being-in-itself, being object to itself or relating itself to objective reality, such that it has the connotation of being-for-itself of that consciousness for which it is an object."\textsuperscript{222} It is conceptual or notional thinking not presentational or representational thinking, which arises here. "Thinking itself generates the object not in presentations or figures,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{221} Phen., p. 242. "und es ist uns eine neue Gestalt des Selbstbewusstseins geworden; ein Bewusstsein, welches sich als die Unendlichkeit, oder reine Bewegung des Bewusstseins das Wesen ist; welches denkt oder freies Selbstbewusstsein ist." Phen., p. 151.
\item \textsuperscript{222} Ibid., p. 242-243. "Denn nicht als abstraktes Ich, sondern als Ich, welches zugleich die Bedeutung des Ansichseins hat, sich Gegenstand sein, oder zum gegenständlichen Wesen sich so verhalten, dass es die Bedeutung des Fürsichseins des Bewusstseins hat, für welches es ist, heiszt denken." Ibid., p. 151-152.
\end{itemize}
but in notions, i.e. in a differentiated being-in-itself, which, being immediate for consciousness is nothing distinct from it."\textsuperscript{223}

If for a moment, the slave with his work before him, is considered as being involved in presentational or figurative thinking, the thing worked upon with thought and hand, and now a presentation or sensuous idea, is an existent and 'has the form of being something other than consciousness'. However, were the slave to become engaged in notional or conceptual thinking, 'the notion is also an existent' but as such and as so distinguished within the content of consciousness, it is a comprehended content of that consciousness, which continues to be 'immediately aware' within itself of its unity with it. When he was involved in figurative thinking, he had to take particular note that the idea was his, but in the case of notional thinking, the notion is to him immediately his notion.

In turning attention to the Stoical consciousness, Hegel is concerned to explore the freedom in thought found therein. This quite ordinary expression should be taken to suggest, for Hegel's thinking, a deeper meaning than is

\textsuperscript{223} Phen., p. 243. "Dem Denken bewegt sich der Gegenstand nicht in Vorstellungen oder Gestalten sondern in Begriffen, d.h. in einem unterschieden Ansichsein, welches unmittelbar für das Bewusstsein kein unterschiedenes von ihm ist." Phän., p. 152.
commonly connoted by it. His thinking is better indicated by freedom in thought than by the expression freedom of thought, because Hegel is concerned to reveal the autonomy found in thinking. This becomes clear in the definite mode of existence revealed in his explication of the meaning and reality of thinking:

In thinking, I am free, because I am not in an other, but remain simply and solely in touch with myself; and the object which for me is my essential reality, is in undivided unity my being-for-myself; and my procedure in comprehending is a process within myself.²²⁴

There is possible a kind of self-sufficiency to be gained in thinking in this way, but it is thinking united with a definite disposition toward self in relation to the world, for there is a disposition on the part of the stoic to withdraw into himself while regarding the world, all that is not himself, as ultimately of no account. This standpoint is adopted to gain some repose, some peace, some freedom in times of adversity and turmoil. "This freedom of self-consciousness, as is well known, has been called Stoicism, in so far as it has appeared as a phenomenon conscious of itself in the course of the history of man's spirit." Everything that is not wholly his, not in and of himself, is regarded as limiting his

freedom, so that the way to freedom can only be through thinking. "Its principle is that consciousness is a thinking reality, and that anything is really essential for consciousness, or is true and good for it, only when consciousness in dealing with it adopts the attitude of a thinking being."^225

In the Stoical consciousness, there at first seems the possibility of developing an attitude through which the limitations of the master-slave relationship can be transcended. This relationship is taken up into a level of thought and disposition of thought in which the contradictory elements of that relation are negated altogether, i.e. in self-contained thought. Stoicism is a freedom "which can arise as a general form of the world's spirit only in a time of universal fear and bondage, a time, too, when mental cultivation is universal, and has elevated culture to the level of thought."^226 It is a time of slavery coupled with a time of cultural achievement. Regardless of their social and economic station, Stoics like Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, Emperor and slave, can withdraw


into the universality of thought. Each man can be a Stoic in his particular situation; each can be free "on the throne as well as in fetters". The stoic seems to be able to overcome the limitations that follow from being part of nature and the restrictions imposed by human society. "The essence of this consciousness is to be free ... throughout all the dependence that attaches to its individual existence." The stoic is able to bring out this seeming victory over the chains of nature and of other men by maintaining "that stolid lifeless unconcern which persistently withdraws from the movement of existence, from effective activity as well as from endurance (pain, suffering), into the simple essentiality of thought." 227

Yet the stoic does not satisfactorily overcome the contradictions found in the master-slave situation or those found in whatever condition he finds himself when he adopts this standpoint, this stoical attitude toward the world that involves the withdrawing into an interior freedom. Whereas this self-consciousness discovers its essential reality in the 'ego which has within it otherness', as opposed to 'the pure abstraction of ego' or 'something other than itself', what it has actually attained is only an abstract self-sufficiency,

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freedom and selfhood. "Yet this essential being is, at the same time, only an abstract nature."\textsuperscript{228} This short passage draws attention to the fact that the problem raised in Hegel's \textit{Early Writings} concerning the empty concept of human nature is still his concern, but now at a deeper philosophical level. He is in the process of responding to his own challenge by unfolding and revealing through the dialectic of consciousness and self-consciousness (and eventually through Spirit) the self-constituting development of man's being. So far as it is appropriate to use the expression \textit{human nature} in the context of Hegel's philosophy, it can be said that Hegel is in the process of showing the concept, to which the words refer, becoming concrete.

In its indifference to "natural existence", the freedom of the stoic self-consciousness is achieved by cutting itself free from nature and society, letting "this latter go free", and the result is that "the reflexion is thus duplicated."\textsuperscript{229} It may seem strange that Hegel should write of allowing natural existence to go free, but his meaning seems to be that the natural world will be without (free of) the full-blooded, living and meaningful activities that the stoic might otherwise have contributed. Furthermore by releasing natural existence from itself, the stoical self-consciousness

\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Phän.}, p. 245. "so ist dies sein Wesen zugleich nur ein \textit{abstraktes Wesen}.

\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Ibid.} "Die Freiheit des Selbstbewusstsein ist
leaves the natural world's content an uncomprehended alien '
given'. The emptiness of this self-sufficiency of Stoicism
is revealed in the abstract nature of its freedom. "Freedom
of thought takes only pure thought as its truth, and this
lacks the concrete filling of life. It is, therefore, merely
the concept (idea) of freedom, not living freedom itself."230

What follows now is an examination of the range of
the defects in the standpoint of the stoic. In turning away
from 'the independence of things' and returning into itself,
the essence of the stoic's freedom of thought is 'only think-
ing in general', but "when thinking (it) should grasp the
living world as a system of thought."231 Here again, there is
the recurrence of an earlier theme, an early aim, which Hegel
intends to realize in the Phenomenology and in his whole
system. In these words, there is a forecast of where the
dialectic is heading. 'In thought itself', there is needed
'a content to supply the sphere of the ego'. Stoicism was
embarrassed when it was asked to provide "the criterion of

\[ \text{gleichgültig gegen das natürliche Dasein, hat darum dieses}
\text{ebenso frei entlassen, und die Reflexion ist eine gedoppelte.} \]
\[ \text{Phän.}, \ p. 153. \]

230 \[ \text{Phän.}, \ p. 245. \] "Die Freiheit im Gedanken hat nur
den reinen Gedanken zu ihrer Wahrheit, die ohne die Erfüllung
des Lebens ist; und ist also auch nur der Begriff der Frei-
heit, nicht die lebendige Freiheit selbst." \text{Ibid.}

231 \[ \text{Ibid.}: ".. als denkend die lebendige Welt als}
ein System des Gedankens fassen sollte," \text{Ibid.}, \ p. 154."
truth in general, i.e. properly speaking, for a content of thought itself." In reply it had, indeed, words and ideas which were noble and elevating, but without content, they soon become wearisome. "To the question what is good and true, it responded by giving again the abstract, contentless thought; the true and good are to consist in reasonableness." The criterion of what is good and what is truth, is what is formally reasonable and satisfactory to the thinking self, without reference to concrete living relationships and to how the good and true are to be realized in them.

c.b. Scepticism

Hegel's analysis of the Master-Slave relationship, led to a consideration of the Stoical consciousness, and the latter in turn leads to an examination of the Sceptical consciousness. Whereas it has been shown that freedom is to be found in thought, it has also been shown that the freedom gained in thought by the stoic was deficient because it was not living freedom, or to put it differently, thought and freedom have to encompass a good deal more of life and the world than the inwardly turned self-consciousness with its

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232 Phen., p. 246. "... nach dem Kriterium der Wahrheit überhaupt gefragt wurde, d.h. eigentlich nach einem Inhalte des Gedankend selbst. Auf die Frage an ihn, was gut und wahr ist, hat er wieder das inhaltlose Denken selbst zur Antwort gegeben: in der Vernunftigkeit soll das Wahre und Gute bestehen." Phän., p. 154.
limited content, if freedom is to be realized. "This thinking consciousness, in the way in which it is thus constituted, as abstract freedom, is therefore only incomplete negation of otherness. Withdrawn from existence solely into itself, it has not there fully vindicated itself as the absolute negation of this existence."\(^{233}\) The transition from Stoicism to Scepticism is to be found here. Because Stoicism's form of freedom has not proved itself 'as the absolute negation of this existence', in that it achieved 'only incomplete negation of otherness', scepticism is the logical outcome of this position, if it pushed to its extreme. Scepticism's capacity for thoroughgoing negativity would seem to enable it to achieve an absolute negation of otherness. "Scepticism is the realisation of that of which Stoicism is merely the notion, and is the actual experience of what freedom of thought is; it is in itself the negative, and must so exhibit itself."\(^{234}\)

It is not readily evident from the text that Hegel had any particular historical period in mind although he was probably thinking of 'the older Scepticism', which he later

\(^{233}\) Phen., p. 246. "Dieses denkende Bewusstsein so, wie es sich bestimmt hat, als die abstrakte Freiheit, ist also nur die unvollendete Negation des Andersseins; aus dem Dasein nur in sich zurückgezogen, hat es sich nicht als absolute Negation desselben an ihm vollbracht." Phen., p. 154.

\(^{234}\) Ibid. "Der Skeptizismus ist die Realisierung desjenigen, wovon der Stoizismus nur der Begriff, - und die wirkliche Erfahrung, was die Freiheit des Gedankens ist; sie ist an sich das Negative und musz sich so darstellen." Ibid., p. 154-155.
discussed in his lectures on the History of Philosophy, which more or less followed Stoicism, but because scepticism is a recurrent historical and philosophical phenomenon, he may also have been thinking of more recent scepticism, including one or two of his contemporaries. But whether or not this analysis of scepticism was aimed partly at current scepticism, it is clear that he was concerned primarily to show the inadequacies of this particular phase of developing self-consciousness. Hegel takes up Scepticism in order to show that in it can be found the explicit realization of what was merely implicit in Stoicism. In the form of Scepticism he describes, consciousness turns to the external world disdained in Stoicism. "In Scepticism, the entire unessentiality and unsubstantiality of this 'other' becomes a reality for consciousness." However, in turning to the world, it does so with a kind of cynicism which grants little value to it, so little value that its destruction for self-consciousness can be easily countenanced. "Thought becomes thinking which wholly annihilates the being of the world with its manifold determinateness, and the negativity of free-self-consciousness becomes aware of attaining, in these manifold forms which life assumes, real negativity." Clearly this turning to the world is not

235 Phen., p. 246. "im Skeptizismus wird nun für das Bewusstsein die gänzliche Unwesentlichkeit und Unselbständig-

236 Ibid. "der Gedanke wird zu dem vollständigen, das Sein der vielfach bestimmten Welt vernichtenden Denken,
a positive affirmation, it is essentially a negative disposition toward the world. Whereas Stoicism endeavoured to hold positive ideals of truth, of the good and of virtue, while holding a negative perspective in respect to content and concrete relationships, Scepticism pushes the latter negativity to its logical conclusion, and rejects the positive affirmations of the former.

What could not be successfully accomplished for self-consciousness by the desire of the master or by the work of the slave, or by the introverted, independent consciousness of the stoic, i.e. the absolute overcoming of the world including its particularity, will be brought about (or so it seems) through the sceptic's process of negation: "This polemical attitude towards the manifold substantiality of things ... will be successful, because it turns against them as a free self-consciousness." 237 Everything falls and vanishes before it from the certainties of sense, the objects of perception and the concepts and laws of the scientific understanding to the relationships between men, the rules of society and the laws of morality. Its moment of self-consciousness is not

und die Negativität des freien Selbstbewusstseins wird sich an dieser mannigfaltigen Gestaltung des Lebens zur realen Negativität." Phän., p. 155.

237 Phän., p. 247. "... so wird dagegen diese polemische Richtung gegen die vielfache Selbständigkeit der Dinge von Erfolg sein, weil sie als in sich vorher vollendetes freies Selbstbewusstsein sich gegen sie kehrt;" Ibid.
one in which 'its truth and its reality vanish', without its 'knowing how'; on the contrary, it brings about the vanishing of 'this other' which claims to be real. "By means of this self-consciousness negation, self-consciousness procures for itself the certainty of its own freedom, brings about the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it into the truth." 238

No doubt, a certain measure of fragile tranquility is achieved, by the sceptic, through suspension of judgment in respect to opposing views, and by regarding positive assertions as purely relative, and so on. Perhaps, more than this, the Greek sceptics may have achieved an unconcerned calm through the certainty of their own freedom in the midst of this universal dissolution of their own making. "Sceptical self-consciousness thus discovers, in the flux and alternation of all that would stand secure in its presence, its own freedom, as given by and received from its own self." 239

Initially the Sceptical consciousness appeared to have overcome the inadequacy of the Stoical consciousness which had merely left master and slave sufficient unto

238 Phen., p. 248. "durch welche selbstbewuszte Negation es die Gewissheit seiner Freiheit sich für sich selbst verschaft, die Erfahrung derselben hervorbringt und sie dadurch zur Wahrheit erhebt." Phärn., p. 156.

239 Ibid. "Das skeptische Selbstbewusstsein erfährt also in dem Wandel alles dessen, was sich für es befestigen will, seine eigne Freiheit als durch es selbst sich gegeben und erhalten;" Ibid.
themselves, without overcoming the fundamental alienation between them. However, contradictions are shown to develop in the Sceptical 'personality', for the Sceptic is both master and slave without genuine unity having been achieved.

This form of consciousness is, therefore, the aimless fickleness and instability of going back and forth from one extreme of self-same self-consciousness to the other contingent, confused and confusing consciousness. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together.\textsuperscript{240}

The Sceptical consciousness can question but cannot successfully annul the natural consciousness which insistingly persists beside it. The contradiction between the master and slave within, the contradiction between the sceptic's free and infinite self and his contingent and finite, particularity, has not been sublated.

Its deeds and its words belie each other continually; and itself, too, has the doubled contradictory consciousness of immutability and sameness, and of utter contingency and non-identity with itself. But it keeps asunder the poles of this contradiction with itself.\textsuperscript{241}

The 'otherness' of the world has been negated, but this


negation in turn has not been negated as his authentic other self. For the sceptic, there remains only the immediacy of pleasure and pain, and the certainty of his own unstable and aimless freedom, as given by and received from the sceptic's own self, which unfortunately has turned out to include two consciousnesses. He is doomed therefore, to oscillate between the infinitely free consciousness and the natural consciousness, as long as he is content to remain at this standpoint. It is possible to regard this scepticism\(^\text{242}\) as belonging to a particular time period but even so, it characterizes a timeless paradigm of one form of the alienated human consciousness.

c.c. The unhappy consciousness

Scepticism, therefore fails to provide an adequate response to the problem of man's alienation within himself and his world. This ceaseless self-contradiction is inherent in, but not explicitly recognized in the form of scepticism described. This transition is then made by Hegel, to a type of consciousness which does explicitly and openly recognize the contradiction within itself. This 'unhappy consciousness'

\(^{242}\) In his Journal, Encyclopaedia, History of Philosophy, Hegel also critically examines scepticism and finds it wanting, but nevertheless, instructive in respect to the role of "negativity" in philosophy. For the reader, it is also instructive, through his criticism of it, of the role of negativity in his philosophy.
is well exemplified by the Christian of the Middle Ages, in Hegel's view. The Christian of this period, intuitively at least, knows that he is one consciousness which is however in continuous opposition between two worlds, the perfect and immutable world of God and the imperfect and mutable world of nature. Thus, 'scepticism' in Hegel's Phenomenology leads to a new and higher phase of consciousness which he calls "the Unhappy Consciousness, (which) is the consciousness of self as (a) doubled, merely contradictory being."²⁴³

The unhappy consciousness does represent a higher and more complete development of the human self-consciousness, but it is beset with an internal contradictory condition which follows from the way it regards the world, God and its own relations to both. Divisions were found between the master and the slave, between the Stoic and his world, and also within the Sceptic's own consciousness; now a fundamental division within the soul of the Mediaeval Christian is revealed.²⁴⁴

²⁴³ Phen. p. 251. "... das unglückliche Bewusstsein ist das Bewusstsein seiner als des gedoppelten, nur widersprechenden Wesens." Phän., p. 158.

The alternative renderings for 'das unglückliche Bewusstsein' and 'des gedoppelten ... Wesen' provided by Baillie: 'the Alienated Soul' and 'a divided nature', do help to indicate the kind of human consciousness that is to be studied.

²⁴⁴ Jean Wahl finds illustrated in these pages in a smaller frame a theme (a characteristic feature of Hegel's thought) which he finds in the larger frame of much of Hegel's life work ranging from the Early Writings to the Philosophy of Religion. "Si l'on étudie un passage de Hegel, par exemple les pages de la Phénoménologie sur la conscience malheureuse, on ne peut pas ne pas être frappé de ce perpétuel renversement
The unhappy consciousness cannot attain 'the victory and rest of unity', because being 'a divided consciousness at variance within itself', which it nevertheless feels 'to be a single consciousness', it always has 'in the one consciousness the other also', which results in it being directly 'driven out of each in turn'. Once again Hegel gives a forecast of where his voyage of discovery is leading, in that he indicates that should this consciousness achieve a reconciliation with itself, it would then manifest the notion of spirit itself:

Its true return into itself, or reconciliation with itself, will, however, display the notion of spirit endowed with a life and existence of its own, because it implicitly involves the fact that, while being an undivided consciousness, it is a double-consciousness. 245

If the unhappy consciousness could rise to a higher level of thinking above feeling and Vorstellung, it would discover the true essence of self-consciousness wherein, "it is itself the
gazing of one self-consciousness into one another, and itself is both, and the unity of both is also its own essence; but objectively and consciously it is not yet the unity of both."

It can be noted that Hegel appears to begin with the pre-Christian believer in the one God, for he introduces the event of the God-man after first examining the relation of the believer to God, without mention of the other persons of the Christian Trinity. The dialectic incorporates consideration of the persons of the Trinity subsequently. Presumably, then, as in his Early Writings, he had the Jews in mind. In any case the initial analysis applies to the religious man of both faiths, at least as Hegel conceives them for the period envisaged. The religious man strives to bring about a synthesis of his doubled self-consciousness: one, 'the simple unalterable' is regarded 'as essential', while the other, 'the changeable', is regarded 'as the unessential', with both 'foreign to each other'. Conscious of the contradiction, the unhappy consciousness is disposed to regard itself as the 'changeable consciousness', and so, 'the unessential'. However, there is a third aspect to its discomfort, in that while regarding the unchangeable as alien to itself, "yet itself is simple and therefore

\[\text{Phen., p. 251. } \ldots \text{ es selbst ist das Schauen eines Selbstbewusstseins in ein anderes, und es selbst ist beide, und die Einheit beider ist ihm auch das Wesen; aber es für sich ist sich noch nicht dieses Wesen selbst, noch nicht die Einheit beider." Phän., p. 159.}\]
unchangeable consciousness, of which consequently it is conscious as its essence, however, in such a way, that itself is, again for itself, not this essence."\footnote{\textit{Phen.}, p. 252. "so ist es selbst einfaches und hiemit unwandelbares Bewusztsein, dessen hiemit als seines Wesens sich bewuszt, jedoch so, dass es selbst für sich wieder nicht dies Wesen ist." \textit{Phän.}, p. 159.}

Lacking its realization of this its essence, it thinks it must endeavour to 'liberate itself from itself', by overcoming or cancelling the non-essential side. However both sides "are equally essential and contradictory", with the result that the unhappy consciousness "is only the conflicting contradictory process in which opposite does not come to rest in its own opposite, but produces itself therein afresh merely as an opposite."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} "aber indem ihm beide gleich wesentlich und widersprechend sind, ist es nur die widersprechende Bewegung, in welcher das Gegenteil nicht in seinem Gegenteil zur Ruhe kommt, sondern in ihm nur als Gegenteil sich neu erzeugt." \textit{Ibid.}}

Gradually the dialectic advances man's development of human selfhood and human knowing into richer human contexts. 'The Unhappy Consciousness' involves a specific historical period perhaps more obviously than the two previous situations, but more significant than this, is the fact that here man is found both in a historical and a religious situation. It is a full-fledged human situation. Here man is shown to be trying to establish a harmonious relation with a transcendent God, trying to live in accordance with the principles of his
religious belief, which however seem to be in continuous ten­sion with his natural consciousness.

Here, then, there is a struggle against an enemy, victory over whom really means being worsted, where to have attained one result is really to lose it in the opposite. Consciousness of life, of its exist­ence and action, is merely pain (sorrow) over this existence and activity; for therein consciousness finds only consciousness of its opposite as its essence - and of its own nothingness. Elevating itself beyond this, it passes to the unchangeable. But this elevation is itself this same consciousness. In this passage there is expressed in somewhat similar lang­uage a theme discovered in his early writings which he will take up again in his lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, that of man's struggles to unite his finite aspect with his infinite aspect. Furthermore, he follows up the above passage with remarks about how the two aspects are related, which foreshadow the nucleus of the solution to be provided by his proposed system of philosophy as a whole, a solution which must comprise particularity within a unity which will give particularity its due, i.e. it must do so, if within it, a reconciliation is to be achieved between man, nature, society and God.

The unchangeable, which comes to consciousness, is in that very fact at the same time affected by particularity, and is only present with this latter. Instead of particularity having been abolished in the consciousness of immutability, it only continues to appear there still. In this process, however, consciousness experiences just this appearance of particularity in the unchangeable, and of the unchangeable in particularity.\(^{250}\)

In this passage there emerge some indications of Hegel's doctrine of unity in difference. This theme is continued in a discussion of the threefold way in which particularity is connected with unchangeableness in the experience of the unhappy consciousness, which Hegel now ties in with the persons of the Trinity. In this Christian concept, here in the Phenomenology and in other works, Hegel finds profound philosophical meaning as well as deep religious meaning. (In his own philosophical comprehension of the Trinity he seems to have found suggested or implicitly contained, the principle component spheres of his system and moreover, as he conceived it, the true relationship between God, nature and human spirit.)

In the present instance, besides revealing three facets of the Mediaeval Christian consciousness, Hegel also gives a sense of

\(^{250}\) Phen., p. 252-253. "Das Unwandelbare, das in das Bewusstsein tritt, ist ebendurch zugleich von der Einzelheit berührt und nur mit dieser gegenwärtig; statt diese im Bewusstsein des Unwandelbaren vertilgt zu haben, geht sie darin immer nur hervor. In dieser Bewegung aber erfährt es eben dieses Hervortreten der Einzelheit am Unwandelbaren und des Unwandelbaren am der Einzelheit." Phän., p. 160.
the role that spirit will play in man's developing selfhood
and comprehension of his world.

The first unchangeable is taken to be merely the
alien, external Being, which passes sentence on
particular existence; since the second unchangeable
is a form (or mode) of particularity like itself, it,
i.e. the consciousness, becomes in the third place
spirit, has the joy of finding itself therein, and
becomes aware within itself that its particularity
has been reconciled with the universal.251

In the phase of the unhappy consciousness previously examined,
the pious man tried to bring about a unity between the two
worlds within which he lived, but the union was one which re­
peatedly dissolved, thus increasing the desolation of separa­
tion. As seen previously, and suggested again in the above
passage, to begin with, the unhappy consciousness regarded
itself as the mutable and unessential particular as opposed to
the unchangeable, alien and transcendent being. (However,
here there is the clear additional note that God the Father is
regarded as judge.) Furthermore, the pious man was also aware
that the unchangeable was also of his own essence, and so he
struggled to free himself from his finite natural self, from
his natural condition. Now, the unchangeable is found in the
incarnation of Christ; the immutable is particularized in God

251 Phen., p. 253. "Das erste Unwandelbare ist ihm
nur das fremde die Einzelheit verurteilende Wesen; indem das
andre eine Gestalt der Einzelheit wie es selbst ist, so wird
es drittens zum Geiste, hat sich selbst darin zu finden die
Freude, und wird sich /,/ seine Einzelheit mit dem Allgemeinen
versöhnt zu sein /,/ bewusst." Phän., p. 160.
the Son. This second person is born into the world and his birth thereby becomes a historical event. In this person, in his example and in his words there was provided for his followers, for a brief time, the possibility of reconciliation with the immutable embodied in a mutable form. Insofar as the disciples of Jesus recognized God in Him, and were aware of themselves as recognized by Him, they still failed to comprehend fully the meaning of this relationship, so that the unity achieved was deficient. More directly, in Hegel's analysis, the very particularity assumed by the unchangeable was a hindrance in the way of reconciliation. "In fact, through the unchangeable assuming a definite form, the 'beyond',* as a moment, has not only remained, but is really more securely established." But as a particular being, God incarnate had to die. "By the nature of this existent one, through the actuality it has assumed, it comes about necessarily, that it disappear from time and space and that it become remote, and absolutely remote it remains." 253

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* the other world, the other side.


Nevertheless, the events surrounding his life, his actions and words, his personality, continued in the minds of his followers and of the faithful in general, and this fact in conjunction with the third person, God the Spirit who remains with the Christian community, provides the continuing possibility of reconciling the two sides of the unhappy consciousness.

However, in the dialectic that develops from this phase of this stage of the Phenomenology, Hegel is concerned to bring out the deficiencies in the reconciliations gained by the unhappy consciousness. The tendency in the Mediaeval Christian community, as depicted here, was to attempt to unite the immutable with the mutable in the historical Christ, represented in the imaginative consciousness, as a particular individual with enhanced human physical characteristics.

If, at the beginning, the bare notion of the sundered consciousness involved the characteristic of seeking to cancel it, qua particular consciousness, and become the unchangeable consciousness, the direction its effort henceforth takes is rather that of cancelling its relation to the pure unchangeable, without shape or embodied form, and of adopting only the relation to the unchangeable which has form and shape.254

As Hegel views the matter, the Christians of this period, in

their efforts to find reconciliation through Christ, by keeping him close in embodied form through the imagination, tended to make him more and more remote, in relation to the unity sought, by these very efforts. They failed to see that the way best befitting the reconciliation sought was to be found in self-consciousness as such. The result was that the reconciliation which they so longed for and believed in came to suffer from a frustrating distance as deficient in its own way as the former abstract remoteness of the Unchangeable One.

The dialectic now follows the threefold process by which the unessential consciousness attempts to attain oneness by transmuting and raising to the level of complete fusion the external relation adopted to the embodied unchangeable. "In one it is a pure consciousness; at another time a particular individual who takes up towards actuality the attitude characteristic of desire and labour; and in the third place it is consciousness of its being-for-itself."255 Included in the first of the three modes of its being is a discussion of the state of Devotion. Here there is still present the disposition to regard worldly existence as unimportant and as lacking reality. In this sense, this mode of Christian life still carries the negating-of-the-world tendency of the stoic

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255 Phän., p. 256. "... einmal als reines Bewusstsein, das andremal als einzelnes Wesen, welches sich als Begierde und Arbeit gegen die Wirklichkeit verhält; und zum dritten als Bewusstsein seines Fürsichseins." Phän., p. 162.
and the skeptic, except that in recognizing the fact of its own existence in the world, the Christian looks to the after-life for the attainment of its goal and release from, and thereby independence, of the natural world. In the devotion of the Christian of this time, as Hegel sees it, the attitude taken towards its object is not that of thought strictly speaking, but of inward feeling. "Its thinking as such is no more than the formless rush of ringing bells, or a cloud of warm incense, a musical thought that does not get to the level of notions, which would be the sole, immanent, objective mode of thought." The object of this inward feeling is not found in conceptual form but rather it appears as something external and foreign. "Hence we have here the inward movement of pure emotion which feels itself, but feels itself in the bitterness of soul-diremption." In this movement of infinite yearning, the unattainable 'beyond' has already escaped, and consciousness in merely feeling has fallen back upon itself.

The Crusades and the Crusaders are now alluded to through an observation concerning the hopeless struggle to

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257 Ibid. "Es ist hiedurch die innerliche Bewegung des reinen Gemüts vorhanden, welches sich selbst, aber als die Entzweiung schmerzhaft fühlt;" Ibid.
gain possession of the tomb of Christ. The struggle was hope­less not in the sense of the great difficulties standing in the way of gaining physical possession of it, but in the sense that the tomb represented a false hope, a hope involved in the continuing desire for the incarnate Christ. Theirs was 'a fight which must be lost' in this latter sense, also in the sense that this search for the unchangeable particular (or at least physical signs of Him) was not the true way to reconcil­iation with the unchangeable, and in the sense that their unhappy experience in such fore­doomed sacrifice was an experience necessary to bring them back to the struggle for salvation through labour in this world.

But since consciousness has found out by experience that the grave of its actual unchangeable Being has no concrete actuality, that the vanished particular­ity qua vanished is not true particularity, it will give up looking for the unchangeable particular existence as something actual, or will cease trying to hold on to what has thus vanished. Only so is it capable of finding particularity in a true form, a form that is universal.258

The discussion of the devotional disposition revealed the Christian's failure to achieve a union with the Immutable

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258 Phen., p. 258-259. "Allein indem es diese Erf­ahrung gemucht, dass das Grab seines wirklichen unwandelbaren Wesens keine Wirklichkeit hat, dass die verschwundene Einzel­keit als verschwundne nicht die wahre Einzalheit ist, wird es die unwandelbare Einzelheit als wirkliche aufzusuchen oder als verschwundne festzuhalten aufgeben, und erst hiedurch ist es fähig, die Einzelheit als wahrhafte oder als allgemeine zu finden." PhÄn., p. 164.
Being, and there followed the collapse of feeling upon itself. According to Hegel, this 'withdrawal of the emotional life', has an actuality of its own; this pure emotion in itself 'is self-feeling'. The second of the three attitudes outlined previously, now emerges in this return into self: "that of desire and labour, which ensures for consciousness the inner certainty of its own self (which, as we saw, it has obtained) by the process of cancelling and enjoying the alien external reality, - existence in the form of independent things."\textsuperscript{259}

The theme of desire with which the division on Self-Consciousness began continues to play a part in the ongoing dialectic of self-consciousness. Similarly labour which helped to give the slave a measure of freedom and self-certainty, or in other words, which made possible a start in 'the formative process of self-enfranchisement', is once again shown to be the source of a possible solution open to the Christian of the time. In Hegel's concept of labour, rich in meaning and application, aspects of his notion of historicity continue to be revealed.\textsuperscript{260} Not only does it help to

\textsuperscript{259} Phen., p. 259. "... das der Begierde und Arbeit, welche dem Bewusstsein die innerliche Gewissheit seiner selbst, die es für uns erlangt hat, durch Aufheben und Genieszen des fremden Wesens, nämlich desselben in der Form der selbständigen Dinge bewährt." Phän., p. 165.

\textsuperscript{260} Among the many insightful remarks that Kojève makes about the place of work in Hegel's Phenomenology, are the following: "Man who works transforms given Nature. Hence, if he repeats his act, he repeats it in different conditions, and thus his act itself will be different. ... Where there is
support and explain i) the self-constituting process of selfhood, it also connects this latter with ii) time and history, i.e. a) the ascent toward self-mastery and absolute knowledge occurs within the temporal and historical world; b) the advance is achieved in terms of gaining superior forms of knowledge, broadly conceived, but c) this latter is accomplished through work: the labour of hand, mind and spirit. Similarly the development of the comprehension and realization of freedom advances through the labour involved in gaining historical awareness on the part of men, and the labour involved in the historical development of superior human institutions.

The possible solution offered by labour (the possibility of achieving a reconciliation between self-consciousness, the world and God through labour in the world) unfortunately for the Mediaeval Christian, proves only partially successful. "The unhappy consciousness, however, finds itself merely desiring and toiling; it is not consciously and directly aware that so to find itself rests upon the inner certainty of its self, and that its feeling of real being is this self-feeling."\textsuperscript{261} The Christian fails to realize the possibilities

\textsuperscript{261} Phen., p. 259. "Das unglückliche Bewusstsein
to be found in labour in the world for the healing of his divided consciousness. All the things which he consumes, fashions and enjoys have been made holy through the Incarnation of the Unchangeable; things and the capacities to consume, work and enjoy them are God's gifts to man. Somewhat like the unhappy consciousness itself, the world is divided, it suffers from a cleavage, for in one sense it is essentially null, something to be transformed and consumed, while in another sense it is 'a consecrated world'. "It is a form and embodiment of the unchangeable, for the latter has in itself preserved particularity; and because, qua unchangeable, it is a universal, its particularity as a whole has the significance of all actuality." 262 Man in such a condition can have no expectation of self-fulfillment in the natural world. He offers thanks for the fruits of this world, but he sees in them only generous gifts for his physical sustenance while in his temporary abode, aid given him on his tortuous path of return to the Unchangeable Being.

There now arises the third attitude where the world

aber findet sich nur als begehrend und arbeitend; es ist für es nicht vorhanden, dass sich so zu finden, die innre Gewissheit seiner selbst zum Grunde liegt, und sein Gefühl des Wesens dies Selbstgefühl ist." Phän., p. 165.

is regarded as the source of man's difficulty and unhappiness; insofar as one side of him is embedded in the natural world, he is endangered. The animal side of him needs to be subdued through mortification. The natural side of him, before of no account, now assumes great importance. In this third situation the opposition between the absolute universal Being and particular is accentuated, the opposition emphasizes the nothingness of man's own being, such that a mediator is sought in the priest and the sacrament of Absolution. This self-conscious being performs a function which Hegel likens to the middle term of a syllogism: through its mediating agency the universal and particular are brought into relation:

In (the middle term), then, this consciousness gets freed from action and enjoyment, in the sense of its own action and enjoyment. It puts from itself, qua self-existent extreme, the substance of its will, and throws on to the middle (term), or the ministering agency, its own proper freedom of decision, and hereby the guilt of its own act. This mediator, being in direct relation with the unchangeable Being, serves through his advice about the right.

To the extent that the Christian achieves the self-renunciation the negating of his particularity, of his finite self which he seeks, he also accomplishes something positive. There are two

\[\text{\cite{263}}\] Phän., p. 265. "In ihr also befreit dieses sich von dem Tun und Genusse als dem seinen; es stößt von sich als fürsichseiendem Extreme das Wesen seines Willens ab, und wirft auf die Mitte oder den Diener die Eigenheit und Freiheit des Entschlusses, und damit die Schuld seines Tuns. Dieser Vermittler, als mit dem unwandelbaren Wesen in unmittelbarer Beziehung, dient mit seinem Rate über das Rechte." Phän., p. 169.
levels to this positive accomplishment: 1) there is a kind of emotional reconciliation achieved with the unchangeable Being which although not wholly satisfactory anticipates the superior solution to be achieved at the level of Reason 2) without fully realizing the positive gain achieved, the Christian discovers in the universal and unchangeable, his own essence. "For giving up one's will is only in one aspect negative; in principle, or in itself, it is at the same time positive, positing and affirming the will as an other, and, specifically, affirming the will as not a particular, but universal."264 The union achieved with the immutable Being here, looks forward to a reconciliation between the universal and the particular, between the infinite and the finite to be realized through Reason.

C. Reason, man and spirit

a. Reason

The halting steps made by the unhappy consciousness toward the freedom to realize itself in the world and thereby toward a higher level of mastery, marks for Hegel the transition to Reason. Although for itself, 'its own concrete action' continues to seem insignificant and its enjoyment to give

pain, such that its sublation of these 'remains a mere beyond',
there has been a genuine advance.

But in this object, where it finds its own action and
existence, qua this particular consciousness, to be in
itself existence and action, there has arisen the idea
of Reason, of the certainty that consciousness is, in
its particularity, in itself absolute, or is all
reality.265

The master-slave relationship was still present to a degree in
the various attitudes adopted by the unhappy consciousness in
its relationship to God, although in the last disposition adop-
ted, in which there was a mediating link involved, it came
nearest to overcoming its inner divisions and to achieving a
unity of its mutable self with the Immutable Being. In advanc-
ing to a higher form of self-consciousness, consciousness
gains a form of mastery wherein neither its unifying propen-
sities nor the particularities of the situation within which
it acts and with which it labours are regarded as foreign or
as alienated from itself. Man as finite and as subject gains
the level of universal self-consciousness, and begins to know
himself as essentially universal. The various forms of self-
consciousness so far studied, have presented man as conscious
of himself as in opposition to other selves, to the natural

265 Phän., p. 267. "Aber in diesem Gegenstande,
worin ihm sein Tun und Sein, als dieses einzelnen Bewusst-
seins, Sein und Tun an sich ist, ist ihm die Vorstellung der
Vernunft geworden, der Gewissheit des Bewusstseins, in seiner
Einzelheit absolut an sich, oder alle Realität zu sein."
Phän., p. 171.
world, to the laws of and beliefs held by society, and to the Unchangeable Being, but in Reason, self-consciousness takes up a positive disposition toward otherness:

So far it has been concerned merely with its independence and freedom; it has sought to save and keep itself for itself at the expense of the world or its actuality, both of which appeared to it to involve the denial of its essential nature. But qua reason, assured of itself, it is at peace so far as they are concerned, and is able to endure them; for it is certain its self is reality, certain that all concrete actuality is nothing else but it. Its thought is itself eo ipso concrete reality; its attitude towards the latter is thus that of Idealism.266

Now these 'other' realities are no longer viewed as opposed in the sense of being alien, intrusive and oppressive and standing against it from without. And in the case of the unhappy consciousness, its other-worldliness has been overcome so that it is free to begin to realize itself in the world, which is seen as its world. The relation to what is other than self 'its hitherto negative attitude towards otherness' has become 'a positive attitude'. Self-conscious man has come to an awareness that the world is his home and the sphere for his activity; he has arrived at the position of idealism, objective

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266 Phen., p. 272-273. "Bisher ist es ihm nur um seine Selbständigkeit und Freiheit zu tun gewesen, um sich für sich selbst auf Kosten der Welt oder seiner eignen Wirklichkeit, welche ihm beide als das Negative seines Wesens erscheinen, zu retten und zu erhalten. Aber als Vernunft, seiner selbst versichert, hat es die Ruhe gegen sie empfangen und kann sie ertragen; denn es ist seiner selbst als der Realität gewiss, oder dassz alle Wirklichkeit nichts anders ist als es; sein Denken ist unmittelbar selbst die Wirklichkeit; es verhält sich also als Idealismus zu ihr." Phän., p. 176.
idealism. He is free to begin the long and arduous undertaking of comprehending this world through the thought activity of reason and of refashioning or transforming it in terms of the concepts of reason. The apparent cleavage between the self and the world will be revealed to be only apparent through these theoretical and practical activities. "Reason is the conscious certainty of being all reality. This is how Idealism expresses the principle of Reason." 267

But as Reason begins its labours, it has 'forgotten' the very difficult dialectical path that had to be followed in order that Reason's Certainty be justified. Reason's Truth is only implicit at the beginning; its content and process must be articulated and made explicit; it has to be discovered and realized in the world for the consciousness making this voyage of self-discovery. In the process of the long dialectic so far travelled, two distinctive aspects of essential reality appeared 'one after the other': i) where the truly real had the character of existence for consciousness; and ii) where it had the character of only being for consciousness.

But both were reduced to one truth, that what is or the in itself only is, so far as it is for consciousness, and that what is for consciousness is also in itself. The consciousness, which is this truth, has forgotten the process by which this result has been

reached; the pathway thereto lies behind it. This consciousness comes on the scene directly in the form of reason; in other words, this reason, appearing thus immediately, comes before us merely as the certainty of that truth.²⁶⁸

Consciousness in reason finds 'the assurance of being all reality' but it does not, to begin with, 'itself comprehend this fact'. If the process of comprehending the moments of the dialectic which led to this result has not been followed, or has been 'forgotten', the abstract form of this assertion may well seem unintelligible. "It only becomes intelligible when one grasps the phenomenological history sublated in it."²⁶⁹ Nevertheless, this assertion is affirmed unself-consciously in concrete form by the assured way that men proceed in their scientific and practical activities in their work and life in the world, Hegel suggests.

Hegel proceeds to bring modern²⁷⁰ forms of idealism under critical scrutiny, and one basic reproach that he directs at them is their failure to trace the path to the result above,

²⁶⁸ Phen., p. 274. "Aber beide reduzierten sich in Eine Wahrheit, dasz, was ist, oder das Ansich nur ist, insofern es fÜr das Bewusztsein, und was füR es ist, auch ansich ist. Das Bewusztsein, welches diese Wahrheit ist, hat diesen Weg im Rücken und vergessen, indem es unmittelbar als Vernunft auftritt, oder diese unmittelbar auftretende Vernunft tritt nur als die Gewissheit jener Wahrheit auf." Phän., p. 177.
²⁶⁹ Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 81.
²⁷⁰ Fichte, Kant, Berkeley.
i.e. 'Reason is the conscious certainty of being all reality'. Another basic criticism involves an abstract and one-sided interpretation of idealism. "It is only a onesided, unsound idealism which lets this unity again appear on one side as consciousness, with a reality per se over against it on the other."271 Other criticisms involve: a) the positing of a determinate number of categories while failing to show their necessary connections with one another and their rational development from 'the pure category'; b) the failure to see the power and role of the negative in the development of thought and being.

Hegel ends his critical examination of different forms of Idealism with sharp criticism of Kant's conception of Pure Reason, which, he thinks, 'condemns itself knowingly and voluntarily to being an untrue kind of knowledge.' This idealism, in asserting that 'the real has a twofold nature', falls into a direct contradiction by establishing a dichotomy between the 'unity of apperception and a thing'. This contradiction follows from Kant's mistake in asserting 'the abstract notion of reason to be the truth'. Hegel regards the latter very seriously; this fault in the Kantian philosophy

271 Phen., p. 276. "Nur der einseitige schlechte Idealismus lässt diese Einheit wieder als Bewusstsein auf die eine Seite, und ihr gegenüber ein Anschich treten." Phän., p. 178. The unity he has in mind is found in the truth that 'existence and self-consciousness are the same being ... in and for themselves'. Ibid.
he knows must be overcome in his own philosophy in order to
resolve the problem of knowing things as they are in them­

selves.\textsuperscript{272}

But actual concrete reason is not so inconsequent as
this. Being at first merely the certainty that it
is all reality, it is this notion well aware that qua
certainty, qua ego, it is not yet in truth all reality;
and thus reason is driven on to raise its formal cer­
tainty into actual truth, and give concrete filling
to the empty "mine".\textsuperscript{273}

His own affirmation of the viability and power of reason, of
its capacity for actual truth, serves as the transition to
the sections dealing with the discovery of Reason's functions,
activities and truth. The somewhat metaphorical expression
concerning the necessity of giving 'concrete filling to the
empty mine' contributes quite directly to the comprehension
of Hegel's notion of historicity because in this expression
can be seen the demand for and the necessity of including
philosophically the content of human history in the advance
of self-consciousness toward Absolute Knowledge. The Notion
itself realizes itself in the development of the human
spirit, and the history of that development sublated in the

\textsuperscript{272} See Ivan Soll's \textit{An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics}, Ch. 2 - The Problem of the Thing-in-itself, particularly p. 48-49, 53-56, 75, 77, 79-80.

\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Phän.}, p. 280. "So inkonsequent aber ist die
derliche Vernunft nicht; sondern, nur erst die Gewissheit,
alle Realität zu sein, ist sie in diesem Begriffe sich bewu­
tszt /, als Gewissheit, als Ich, noch nicht die Realität in
Wahrheit zu sein, und ist getrieben, ihre Gewissheit zur
Wahrheit zu erheben und das leere Mein zu erfüllen." \textit{Phän.},
p. 182.
growth of human self-consciousness provides its content. "Consciousness will determine its relation to otherness or its object in various ways, according as it is at one or other stage in the development of the world-spirit into self-consciousness," Hegel states earlier in this same section. The sentence which follows also contributes directly to the meaning of his notion of historicity. "How the world-spirit immediately finds and determines itself and its object at any given time, or how it appears for itself, depends on what it has already come to be, or on what it already in itself is." This anticipatory passage supports the remarks above concerning the role of history in the process of rising to Absolute Knowledge, its role in the growth of human spirit and its role in the life and realization of the Notion. Furthermore, by implication it gives further meaning to Hegel's conception of the being of man and of the historicity of man. Man is what he has 'come to be', and any effort to define the nature of man must take man's radical openness to historical development into account. Man assimilates the world in his thought activities in a way vastly superior to the way in which he

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274 Phen., p. 275-276. "Das Bewusstsein wird sein Verhältnis zum Anderssein oder seinem Gegenstande auf verschiedene Weise bestimmen, je nachdem es gerade auf einer Stufe des sich bewusstwerdenden Weltgeistes steht. Wie er sich und seinen Gegenstand jedesmal unmittelbar findet und bestimmt, oder wie es für sich ist, hängt davon ab, was er schon geworden oder was er schon an sich ist." Phän., p. 178.
assimilates some of the fruits of nature biologically. In assimilating his world, in the process of comprehending the world through Reason, he grows in scientific, social, historical and self-awareness. In this process he transforms the world and himself, but nevertheless, these possibilities were in a sense implicit in the nature of self-consciousness and its world. One cannot say in advance which way man and his world will develop, but in comprehending the history of human spirit, one can comprehend the Present, and the necessity of the process which led to this result. It is appropriate now to turn to one of the phases of the dialectic of Reason, so that an additional facet of Hegel's conception of man's being and of his notion of historicity may be revealed.

b. Man

Although it is true that for Hegel, man qua man is self-consciousness, and all that this implies, nevertheless the word "consciousness" per se is used in general within the *Phenomenology* to denote man, so that throughout the sections of this work so far examined, where the word "consciousness" was used, one could usually have inserted the word "man". In other words throughout the foregoing, man has been the principle subject of inquiry. Kojève indicates this point quite specifically: "Since 'Consciousness' (Bewusstsein) is the general term for man in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel indicates
that he is giving a phenomenological description when he says he is describing the attitude in question as it exists 'for Consciousness itself' (für das Bewusstsein selbst).” In short, this sub-section title: "Man" is not meant to indicate that only now does man appear on the scene, but simply to affirm and highlight that it is man and his self-constituting activities that have been followed from the beginning of the Phenomenology. It is also meant to indicate that by an examination of a particular concept found in Reason's dialectic, this small sub-section will add a characteristic feature of Hegel's conception of man's being.

In the first section* of this dialectic which deals with the Observation as a Function of Reason, the dialectic of Reason first traverses, in the Observation of Nature, some of the same ground already covered at lower levels of consciousness, but here the stance adopted is one of Reason actively seeking its rationality in the object. Reason moves from the descriptive stage to an explanatory stage (scientific laws and

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275 "The Structure of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'," Introduction to the Readings of Hegel, p. 261. "The Phenomenology is a phenomenological description of human existence. That is to say, it describes human existence as it 'appears' (erscheint) or 'manifests' itself to the very one who experiences it. In other words, Hegel describes the content of the self-consciousness of man, whose existence is dominated either by one of the typical existential attitudes that are found everywhere and at all times (First Part), or by an attitude characterizing an outstanding historical epoch (Second Part)." Ibid.

* The subsequent sections are: B. Realization of self-consciousness through itself C. Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself.
hypotheses), and from the study of inorganic to organic nature. Descriptive and classificatory activities grasp some essential properties along with some which are or may be unessential, so that the classifications which result turn out to be relatively arbitrary, i.e. 'the lines of demarcation' tend to overlap in awkward ways or they leave out characteristics or member types which might have been or should have been, included. The ambivalence in classification leads toward attempts to establish laws, the explanatory stage, in which there is a progressive advance from sensuously given properties to generalizations comprising summarizations of observable properties and behaviour to concepts of non-sensuous and non-observable relations and processes. With the more or less endless repetition of members, usually it is possible to comprise only some of them in verification procedures, i.e. laws are open to refutation by fact, and degrees of probability are recognized as a kind of lower order truth. In so far as 'pure laws' are discovered 'freed from sensuous elements' which 'while enveloped in sense' are 'detached from it', they are 'concept(s) bare and simple'. The result is that this concept comes before consciousness itself as an object and the relation to it 'takes the form of another kind of observation'.

Pure Aspect, Hegel summarizes the advance to this point:
"Observation of nature finds the notion realized in inorganic nature, laws, whose moments are things which at the same time are in the position of abstractions. But this notion is not a simplicity reflected into self. The life of organic nature, on the other hand, is only this self-reflected simplicity."\(^{277}\)

The process of the simple activity of the notion is discovered in the organism. Whereas inorganic things 'involve determinateness' essentially, in the 'fluid condition' of organic existence, determinateness, which would relate it to an other, 'is dissolved'. Hegel begins The Observation of Organic Nature then, by noting that,

In the case of an organic being, ... all determinate characteristics, by means of which it is palpable to another, are held under the simple organic unity; none of them comes forward as essential and capable of detaching itself from the rest and relating itself to an other being. What is organic, therefore, preserves itself in its very relation.\(^{278}\)

Through observation the biologist has great difficulty in forming laws to cover the essential characteristics of living


\(^{278}\) Ibid., p. 293. "an dem ... organischen Wesen alle Bestimmtheiten, durch welche es für anderes offen ist, unter die organische einfache Einheit gebunden; es tritt keine als wesentlich auf, welche sich frei auf anderes bezöge, und das Organische erhält sich daher in seiner Beziehung selbst." Phän., p. 193.
things. First it directs its observation to the relation between organic nature and inorganic nature. The environmental factors including water, soil and climate play their part in the emergence of the diversities of living species, but the relation is both one of 'essential relation' and 'mutual indifference'. Such laws that are formulated fail to show in a meaningful way the connection between the environment and the multiplicity of species which 'everywhere presents of necessity exceptions to such laws or rules'. The "laws" are as superficial as the relation comprised by it, and amount to little more than talk of the 'great influence' of environment on the organism. The biologist is found conceiving the development of genera and species and of individual members within species in teleological terms, but on the other hand, trying to treat of their particular properties and of the relation of the organic to the inorganic in somewhat mechanical terms. In turning to the observation of activity, it is found that the unity of universality and activity 'is essentially the inner movement of what is organic, and can only be apprehended conceptually'.

It is here that Hegel introduces the conception of the unity of the inner and outer, (which in the case of man, will be of special interest to this research, as Reason moves

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279 Phen., p. 300. Phän., p. 198.
to the observation of self-consciousness). Here he uses this concept to explain the nature of the organism. He finds that the organic being must be conceived as 'undivided oneness and as a whole', so that 'it is the content of inner and outer, and is the same for both'. However, as each is a distinct being for the observer, they each seem 'to have a peculiar content of their own'. But Hegel is quick to point out that, "This peculiar content, since it consists of the same substance, or the same organic unity, can, however, in point of fact, be only a different form of that unity, of that substance; and this is indicated by observation when it says that the outer is merely the expression of the inner." At this stage, however, Reason does not grasp the unity of the inner and outer (inner purposeful development and outer self-maintaining activity).

Such organic functions that are distinguished from one another only very imperfectly reveal the Notion. Basically the various biological functions (sensitivity, irritability and reproduction are considered here) amount to a capacity of the organism for self-maintenance in the changing circumstances of its environment, because they dialectically pass into each other. The problem for the observer, though, is that

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280 Phen., p. 301. "Dieser eigentümliche Inhalt, der dieselbe Substanz oder organische Einheit ist, kann aber in der Tat nur eine verschiedene Form derselben sein; und dies wird von dem beobachtenden Bewusstsein darin angedeutet, dass das Auszere nur Ausdruck des Innern ist." Phän., p. 199.
he is still caught between trying to conceive of living things organically where 'the idea of law slips altogether from (his) grasp' (living processes and functions 'permeate' one another), - and trying to treat with the properties of the organism, where there is a lack of necessary connection between them, so that he tends toward treating living things as if they were only inorganic. At this stage it is not possible to satisfactorily achieve an identity of the self-maintaining function of the organism and Reason's telelogical interpretation. In summarizing the situation with respect to observation of the life of organic nature, Hegel states that, "Its essential nature is not the genus, self-sundered and self-moving in its undifferentiated element, and remaining at the same time for itself undifferentiated in its opposition." Reason does not succeed in constituting purely organic life as the individual proper, which is to be found in the concrete universal. The differentiation of organic genera and species occurs in large part because of the accidents of geography, Hegel suggests, and for this reason, among others already cited, organic nature does not measure up to a fully rational self-developing system. Furthermore, the significant

\[281\] Phen., p. 310. Phän., p. 207.

observation is made that 'organic nature has no history'. To have history, an articulated self-consciousness must be operant, and this is found only in man, so far as the world is concerned. In short, the implication is that, man has history, and this remark thereby looks forward to the dialectic of human spirit.

Reason finds only an obscure reflection of itself in nature, so that it finds that it is forced to search for a better reflection of itself introspectively in the content of consciousness itself. It seeks to observe the individual human mind. "Observation finds this free notion, whose universality has just as absolutely within it developed individuality, only in the notion which itself exists as notion, i.e. in self-consciousness." In the 'Observation of Self-Consciousness in its Pure Aspect' Hegel examines its relation to external reality, through a study of logical and psychological laws.

He first examines 'the laws of thought' of formal logic, and although they are supposed to be without any particular content, it is not lack of content or matter which Hegel criticizes, which he thinks they do possess, but rather

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the lack of form. The formal logician does discover a plurality of principles which do possess a certain formal truth, but as he fails to show their necessary interconnection and development within the unity of thought, he leaves them rigidly separated from one another as existent things.

In turning to psychology, the observations of the empirical psychologists are shown to result in the positing of a variety of inward faculties, emotions, feelings and dispositions. But there is difficulty in formulating laws which will connect the faculties of the mind with the 'outer' observation of man acting and being acted upon in the world. In some way these inner characteristics are supposed to be determined or affected by the outer world's environmental and social forces, but the psychologist is not able to establish authentic laws connecting the outer with the inner, and vice versa, nor is he adequately able to relate and connect the structures of the mind one with another. This latter becomes the more crucial 'when they are seen to be not lifeless inert things, but restless active processes'.

This phase of Reason's dialectic leads to a critical analysis of the pseudo-sciences: 'Physiognomy and Phrenology.'* In such a context Hegel is able to display the fruitfulness of

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* Observation of the Relation of Self-Consciousness to its Immediate Actuality -
his notion of the intimate relationship between the outer and inner of any phenomenal entity or manifestation. Words spoken or written, things made, and deeds done, can all be viewed as outward expressions of the inner essence of the man or men being considered. However, Hegel is always at pains to stress the unity of outer and inner. Through and in this concept a further facet of Hegel's notion of historicity will be uncovered.

Because psychological observation failed to discover a law for the relation of self-consciousness to actuality, 'individuality is the object to which observation now passes'. The pseudo-sciences of Physiognomy and Phrenology represent naive attempts to bring together the outer bodily showing with the inner disposition and character of men. In other words, their attempts involve trying to connect up particular individual physical characteristics perceived in facial expression and body type in the case of the first and in the configuration of the skull in the second, with what are purported to be universal traits of human nature, for example types of character.

Whereas Psychology had attempted to bring objective reality into relation with determinate individuality; "here, however, it is the whole determinate individuality that is the object for observation, and each aspect of the opposition it
entails is itself this whole." Here Hegel is active in setting the stage for the problem to be pursued in this section. In the introductory pages he examines philosophically the issues and elements involved in the relation of self-consciousness to its immediate actuality. His preamble allows him to indicate the appropriate way of viewing the body's relation to the activity and process of self-consciousness. "Thus, to the outer whole belongs not merely the original primordial being, the connate body, but the formation of the body as well, which is due to activity from the inner side." Hegel is contending that there is a unity in the relationship of the inner self to the outer bodily showing, somewhat like the unity adduced earlier in the dialectic of the Understanding and as he shows in his Logic and Philosophy of Nature in respect to force and its manifestation (electricity and lightning), cause and effect, etc. The above passage continues: "the body is a unity of unformed and formed existence, and is the actuality of the individual permeated by his being-for-itself." Hegel wishes to show here, as elsewhere in his

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287 Ibid. "Zu dem auszern Ganzen gehört also nicht nur das ursprüngliche Sein, der angeborene Leib, sondern ebenso die Formation desselben, die der Tätigkeit des Innern gehört; er ist Einheit des ungebildeten und des gebildeten Seins und die von dem Fürsichsein durchdrungne Wirklichkeit des Individualiums." Phän., p. 228.
writings, that the distinction between inner and outer is an empty distinction, one which collapses to unity. "This whole embraces the definite parts fixed originally and from the first, and also the lineaments which arise only as the result of action, in itself, so comprised it is, and this being is an expression of what is inner, of the individual constituted as a consciousness and as a process."288 This seems a reasonably clear example of Hegel's position that the inner being of man is identical with his outer being. (He generally does not wish to give a purely spatial connotation to the words 'inner' and 'outer', although in this particular example it is reasonable to retain a spatial connotation in connection with the body, precisely as such.) Inner and outer completely involve each other; one depends on the other; and in the example above, that which is inward necessarily becomes outward, i.e. in the multiple determinations of the body.

The importance that Hegel gives to labour in the self-development of man has been encountered. Here he connects labour and language with the concept of the unity of the outer and inner. "Language and labour are outer expressions in which the individual no longer retains possession of himself per se.

but lets the inner get right outside him, and surrenders it to something else."\(^{289}\) Of such outer expressions, Hegel thinks that they can be said to both express too much and too little: (i) "too much" because "they (do) not merely give an expression of the inner, they give the inner itself directly and immediately; (ii) too little, - because in speech and action the inner turns itself into something else, into an other, and thereby puts itself at the mercy of the element of change."\(^{290}\)

Here the inner becomes public, open to the possible misrepresentation of others, i.e. they may make something different out of the spoken word and the accomplished act, 'than they are in and for themselves as actions of a particular determinate individual.'\(^{*}\) Hegel is concerned in this context to advance toward a position in which he can show the absurdity of reading too much into the posture, configuration, and etc. of


\(^{290}\) Ibid. "zu sehr, ... sie geben nicht nur einen Ausdruck des Innern, sondern es selbst unmittelbar; zu wenig, - weil das Innere in Sprache und Handlung sich zu einem Andern macht, so gibt es sich damit dem Elemente der Verwandlung preis," Ibid.

* In opening discussion on this phase of Reason's dialectic, Hegel had defined 'individual' for the context of the problem: "The individual exists in himself and for himself. He is for himself, or is a free activity; he is, however, also in himself, or has himself an original determinate being of his own - a character which is in principle the same as what psychology sought to find outside him. ... This being, the 'body' of the determinate individuality, is its original source, that in the making of which it has had nothing to do." Ibid., p. 338; Ibid., p. 227.
body and skull. Nevertheless, he continues to think at the same time, that the individual 'is what he has done'.

Hegel turns next to Physiognomy, the art or 'science' which claims to be able to make judgments concerning human character from the study of features of face or form of the body. It looks for characteristic expressions of man's particular individuality in types of facial expression, in the body type, and it may extend its observations to the pattern of body movement, etc. When treating of Physiognomy, Hegel says that "the so-called 'laws', this kind of science sets out to find, are relations holding between these two presumed or supposed aspects, and hence can amount to no more than an empty 'fancying'." In criticism of Physiognomy he draws attention to the fact that a man's facial expression, bodily demeanour and even words, reveal at best, only his intention and present state of feeling and emotion. Furthermore, expression, gesture and words may be used to deceive the observer. In the 'laws' of Physiognomy, the inward and the outward aspects of man are not truly united, the former are problematically inferred from the latter.

Hegel repeats with approval a somewhat sarcastic remark made by Lichtenberg to the effect that one is very ill

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advised to say to a man that although he is acting honestly, his face shows that he is really 'a rogue at heart', (ein Schelm im Herzen). Hegel thinks that "this retort is to the point because it is the refutation of the fundamental assumption of such a 'science' of conjecture, viz. that the reality of a man is his face, etc." On the contrary, man's character and man's nature are more truly manifested outwardly (externalized) in the quality of his deeds. The individual's nature is realized and revealed in his thought filled work, in his acts, in what he has actually done and does.

The true being of a man is, on the contrary, his act; individuality is actual in the deed, and a deed it is which cancels both the aspects of what is 'meant' or 'presumed' to be. ... the act does away with the inexpressibleness of what self-conscious individuality really 'means'; in regard to such 'meaning', individuality is endlessly determined and determinable. This false infinite, this endless determining, is abolished in the completed act.

In this passage, a very important aspect of Hegel's notion of historicity is revealed quite clearly: man's 'nature' is the


293 Ibid. "Das wahre Sein des Menschen ist vielmehr seine Tat; in ihr ist die Individualität wirklich, und sie ist es, welche das Gemeinte in seinen beiden Seiten aufhebt. ... hebt die Tat die Unaussprechlichkeit der Meinung ebenso in Ansehung der selbstbewussten Individualität auf, welche in der Meinung eine unendlich bestimmte und bestimmbare ist. In der vollbrachten Tat ist diese schlechte Unendlichkeit vernichtet." Ibid.
result of his acting, and this aspect connected with man's self-constitutionality shown throughout the examination of the Phenomenology up to this point, allows it to be rightly said, that in acting he constitutes himself. "The individual man (human being) is what the act is; in the simple fact that the act is, he is for others what he really is and with a certain general nature..." As in the Early Theological Writings, Hegel continues to be disinclined to put much weight on a fixed human nature; he can speak of a general nature in such a context as this, as he did in the early writings, but he knows that a great many propositions are needed to reveal and show human nature as process and result, which his Phenomenology is in the course of doing.

c. Spirit

It is thus that consciousness takes as the middle term between universal spirit and its individuation or sense consciousness, the system of forms assumed by consciousness, as an orderly self-constituted whole of the life of spirit, - the system of forms of conscious life which is dealt with in this treatise, and which finds its objective existential expression as the history of the world. 295

294 Phen., p. 350. "... der individuelle Mensch ist, was sie ist; in der Einfachheit dieses Seins ist er für andere seielendes, allgemeines Wesen, ...

The above is one of Hegel's internal notes which he includes from time to time to indicate the direction and scope of the *Phenomenology* which is, as has been said, the history or biography of consciousness, and for Hegel, the science of the experience of consciousness. By revealing mind or spirit as essentially related to an object, external or internal, he centered his study on consciousness, and in consequence, on man's self-conscious efforts to comprehend and realize himself in his world and in history. In this passage Hegel was contrasting that which was being sought in embodied organic existence with what could actually be discovered. Reason in the sense of 'life in general' would be encountered, but 'in its differentiating process', it would be found to lack 'rational sequence and organization' in that 'it is not an immanent grounded system of forms'. If the middle term in the logical process of the moments involved had had within it 'the two extremes of inner universality and universal individuality', then it 'would be self-systematizing development', which is to say, that the observer would find himself in the sphere of spirit.

Following the analysis of Physiognomy and Phrenology, Reason's dialectic advanced to the stage of the Realization of rational self-consciousness through its own activity. It moved to the sphere of the Ethical Order and assumed the form of Practical Reason. By turning to the study of man in
society and considering some of the ethical problems and ethical positions involved he is able to show rational self-consciousness - vaguely aware that it is a particular individual in one aspect, while in the other, universal - progressing in its social education toward an unqualified ethical self-consciousness in which the two aspects, individuality and universality, will be united. Eventually this latter will be realized in the nation-state, but before this comes about, Reason's dialectic will work its way through a succession of ethical dispositions in which there is conflict experienced between the individual and the universal.

First, the dialectic brings out the insufficiencies of three forms of individualist attitude, attitudes which have been adopted by man toward the values and fruits of life while living in community with other men. They are attitudes which have their historical exemplifications in the past, but which can be found in the more recent past, and no doubt in the present as well. The first of the three types of individualism is called by Hegel, 'Pleasure and Necessity' (which in its more general, and perhaps, more acceptable form, might be called 'The Pursuit of Happiness').

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* Pleasure and Necessity; The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit; Virtue and the Course of the World.

296 As Findlay does in Hegel, A Re-Examination, p. 109.
risen from out of the ethical substance and the quiescent state of thought and attained its being-for-itself, it has left behind it the law of custom and substantial existence, the knowledge acquired through observation and theory as a gray shadow that is just vanishing."\(^{297}\) Although the dialectic is advancing toward the substantial life of the responsible citizen within the nation-state, Hegel clearly recognizes the limitations in theories purporting to explain how man emerged from an original state of nature, and from which human society followed subsequently. As opposed to theories which contend that societies were first formed by way of contracts, in order to escape the conditions of universal warfare,\(^{298}\) Hegel thinks that man and some form of social community appear together and evolve together. "Hegel assumes that the social organism is coeval with individual organisms."\(^{299}\)


\(^{298}\) To interpret 'the struggle to-the-death', the struggle for prestige (or recognition), as depicting the original state of nature and of universal warfare would be to misinterpret Hegel's paradigm, which is a phase in the dialectic of self-hood's realization.

While the hedonist depicted does recognize independent self-consciousness in others, as of course, he does in himself, he sets out to gain happiness by taking pleasure where and when he finds it available, without much concern for the needs of others. On the other hand in plunging 'into life' this individualist seeks to find himself and only himself in another self-conscious being, i.e. he 'knows the other as (his) own proper self-hood'. Hegel appears to have in mind as an instance of pleasure seeking, the seeking of sexual pleasure in a manner which is fundamentally selfish, precisely because of the one-sided attitude adopted toward the other self-conscious person. "It attains therefore to the enjoyment of Pleasure, to the consciousness of its actualization in a consciousness which appears as independent, or to the intuition of the unity of both independent self-consciousnesses."300 In succeeding in his purpose, he learns what the real truth of that purpose is, which 'is just the cancelling of the purpose', for he had sought to universalize his own particular, individual self-existent being or being-for-itself, but he succeeds only in gaining the consciousness of the object 'as cancelled and transcended individual, i.e. as universal.' This enjoyment of pleasure has both positive and negative significance: 1) the

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300 *Phen.*, p. 385. "Es gelangt also zum Genusse der Lust, zum Bewusstsein seiner Verwirklichung in einem als selbständig erscheinenden Bewusstsein oder zur Anschauung der Einheit beider selbständigen Selbstbewusstsein /e/." *Phän.*, p. 263.
self has become aware of itself as objective self-consciousness and ii) it is aware of having cancelled itself. The hedonist begins to conceive of himself as in an unhappy contradictory situation, and he fails to see that 'this negative element is nothing else than the notion of what this individuality inherently is'. Although this first form of individualism is 'the poorest form of self-realizing mind', it can become the prevailing or predominant attitude in a society so that the conflict between the individual and the universal becomes furiously abrasive in the multiplication of collisions and failures among the contending pleasure or happiness seekers. One or many, Necessity is certain to make its appearance. The necessity experienced follows from the single-minded attempt of this self-consciousness 'to take and possess its life'; the result is that instead, it '(lays) hold on death'. The hedonist experiences the death of his intended purpose, and if he persists in his purpose, the successive first negations of this ideal, will take the life of other ideals in society. His pure individualism cannot be sustained. He cannot function in such a way that only his individuality's realization is of concern, while neglecting and taking life from the values of the society out of which his own self-hood has arisen. "The abstract necessity thus gets the significance of the merely negative uncomprehended power of universality, on which
individuality is broken in pieces."301 Because he fails to comprehend the necessity of the authentic universal which lives in the minds of the individuals who comprise society, he is frustrated and mystified by the dark forces which turn his efforts back upon him.

The Necessity or Law of human social existence cancelled the value sought in the pleasure which was sought solely for the realization of the singular individual. Reason's dialectic advances to the attitude of the Law of the Heart, where this Necessity is conceived as part of itself, as an inner Necessity. (The external Necessity is internalized.) The Romantic whole-heartedly and freely follows this law which is taken to flow naturally and freely from his own nature. Ordinary laws and customs of society are subordinated to this primary law, such that these laws are accorded value or otherwise, and are to be followed, ignored or opposed, in light of this law of the heart. It is this latter law which the self proceeds to realize. ('Whether its realization corresponds to its notion' remains to be seen, Hegel remarks as this phase of individualism begins.)

Standing against this law is the reality of the existing society, which appears to the Romantic as the very

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301 Phen., p. 388. "Die abstrakte Notwendigkeit gilt also für die nur negative unbegriffene Macht der Allgemeinheit, an welcher die Individualität zerschmettert wird." Phän., p. 266.
antithesis of what is to be realized. This other is the contradiction of both the law of the heart and this individual. The opposed reality is made up of the laws and customs of the society and by the people oppressed by them, but the people have not yet grasped the law of the heart, nor its right; they are therefore 'subjected to an alien necessity'. The ambition of the romantic is uninhibited in scope. "The aim and object of this individuality is thus to cancel and transcend this necessity which contradicts the law of the heart, as also to do away with the suffering thereby arising."³⁰² When however, he is in part successful, and the change which he had sought 'becomes a universal ordinance', this new law, which has come into actual being, is no longer his own. In due course, he may find himself entangled in this 'alien' law, which is now applied universally.

This above is only one of the ways in which the Romantic's best intentions are frustrated. The romantic sentimentalist generously wishes to accord the same freedom to all men of good heart, which he presumes most men to be basically. However, even if all men were of noble and uncorrupted nature, it is apparent that if free rein were given to the law of the heart, the result would be a multitude of personal,

particular 'laws' flow from feeling, and no matter how earnestly and honestly held would lead to anarchy. Previously it was merely rigid laws which had to be contended with, now the romantic individual finds 'the hearts of men themselves opposed to his excellent intentions', and so it is for other individuals following and recommending their own laws of the heart.

In the end the law of the heart is shown to be as self-destructive, if not more so, than the individual selfishness of the lowly pleasure-seeker. The romantic self-consciousness finds itself divided against itself. He has learned through the realization of his heart's law, wherein reality is now 'animated by the consciousness of all, and a law for all hearts', that the opposed reality is 'endowed with life'. However he does not recognize himself in the universality of the new ordinance. He continues to wish to take himself to be 'this individual heart'. The result is that he regards the universal ordinance 'as an utter distortion of the law of (his) heart and (his) happiness', and in his 'frenzy he proclaims individuality to be deranging, mad and perverted'.

The frenzy of self-conceit leads to the third phase of individualism, to the recognition that disaster can only be averted by the individual becoming a man of virtue, by his accepting the universal within himself as law, and by his

being willing to surrender and sacrifice individualism of consciousness to law, in which he now finds his true self. "For the virtuous consciousness law is the essential element, and individuality the one to be superseded and cancelled both in the case of its own conscious life, as well as in that of the course of the world." The way of the world which he regards not so much as standing against himself, but rather the field of his work, he also regards as fundamentally good, although severely misdirected. He would like to right this perverted world, 'and bring out its true inner nature', but his actions are limited to high-minded talk and empty gestures. The man of pure-virtue and inaction would bring the individuals of the world under the discipline of law, and so free the good in them, but edification is not enough, and the Way of the World continues to assert itself.

The transition to 'Individuality, which takes itself to be real in and for itself', the last phase before Spirit appears explicitly on the scene, involves the appreciation that the stubborn individuality found in the Way of the World 'is better than it thinks' for although to itself its action may appear selfishly directed, it is 'also universal with an inherent being of its own'. In other words, in acting for

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itself, it plays a contributory part in the growth and life of society. The one-sided ways of individualist self-realization are transcended by the individual who seeks to realize himself wholly and concretely in a world in no way alien to himself. The principle phase is concerned with 'The spiritual animal kingdom and humbug or the matter-at-hand itself'. The individual involved in this higher phase is wholly absorbed in proceeding with his work or the matter-at-hand. To realize his particular nature he must make his implicit qualities and capacities explicit through his work, tasks or projects. It is in acts and work-in-hand and resulting accomplishment, that his individual reality is and will be found, rather than in his intentions. "Hence it is that an individual cannot know what he is till he has made himself actual by action."\textsuperscript{305} In having become aware that through the matter-on-hand, the work-in-hand, he achieves in such action, a unity of self and object, he is becoming aware of what he is as an individual \textit{in} and \textit{for-himself}.

However, he somewhat over-emphasizes the independence and privacy of his tasks, and when the product or result of his labour turns out differently than he had expected, and this becomes a public fact, he tends to resort to a degree of

\textsuperscript{305} \textit{Phän.}, p. 422. "Das Individuum kann daher nicht wissen, was es ist, eh es sich durch das Tun zur Wirklichkeit gebracht hat." \textit{Phän.}, p. 287.
deceit or 'humbug', to excuse or protect himself. When he is aided by others, he is unhappy about it, and when he rejects their offer of aid, they are unhappy about it. Gradually a better social awareness emerges: the concern for credit for the work achieved has obscured the fact that the matter-on-hand cannot be purely a private affair, it is the concern of society. The achievement is the result of individual purpose, but it receives its value in a social context. The interdependence of men had not been properly appreciated, so that the individual had failed to notice the more or less hidden co-operative contributions made by others and by society generally. From one standpoint it is "I" at my work, from another, it is "we" paying heed to the work-in-hand: the kind, quality, success or failure 'matters' to both the "we" and the "I", and each individual is both. Man's work and accomplishments grows out of the living fabric of society, the ethical substance.

The dialectic advances to an examination of Reason as Lawgiver and Reason as Testing Laws. The first is a dialectical analysis of Reason in the role of legislative faculty in moral decision-making. It reveals the difficulties involved in abstractly and formally laying down laws true for all, and then attempting to proceed from general moral principles to their detailed application in concrete ethical life. The second reveals the difficulties involved in striving for consistency
in moral decision making by having recourse to formal criteria for the testing there of. Although these last phases are certainly critical, there is a gain for ethical self-consciousness, because there is the realization that ethical problems are not adequately resolveable within the sphere of personal morality, but must be viewed within the sphere of Sittlichkeit, within the social and cultural context which also has its historical dimension.

So it is that through the dialectic of Theoretical Reason (observation of nature and man) and Practical Reason (individual human action in community with others) that Reason's truth, which is spirit, is attained. "Reason is spirit, when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to the level of truth, and reason is consciously aware of itself as its own world, and of the world itself."306 In Reason's practical dialectic, the individual self-consciousness experienced, in its educational process, standpoints, which separately did not bring about a proper unity of the individual with the universal, but this experience when sublated led finally to man aware of himself in his interdependent world which comprises individual purpose and universality in the unity of 'ethical substance', which is spirit. While

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realizing the predicament involved in acting rightly within a concrete situation using only abstract principles and criteria, he is also consciously aware that he is essentially a social being, so that these problems must be resolved within the 'concrete ethical actuality' of spirit.

While spirit as ethical substance is social, the very life of human society, it is also divine, and, very important from the point of departure and standpoint of this present study, it is the substance of man himself.

Qua substance, spirit is unbending righteous self-awareness, self-identity; but qua being-for-itself, its continuity is resolved into discreet elements, it is the self-sacrificing soul of goodness, the ben­evolent essential nature in which each fulfils his own special work, rends the continuum of the universal substance, and takes his own share of it.307

It is appropriate now to turn to the balance of Hegel's system to follow the course of the realization of spirit's truth, for 'the living ethical world is spirit in its truth."308

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307 Phen., p. 458. "Als die Substanz ist der Geist die unwankende, gerechte Sichselbstgleichheit; aber als Für­sichsein ist sie das aufgelöste, das sich aufopfernde gütige Wesen, an dem Jeder sein eignes Werke vollbringt, das allgemeine Sein zerreiszt und sich seinen Teil davon nimmt." Phän., p. 314.

THE NOTION OF HISTORICITY
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL

by

Rowland Collinge Marshall

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Summary of findings and conclusions

1) In the early formulations of his philosophy per se, Hegel endeavours to develop its notions in the form of 'the thought of life', and although he subsequently develops his dialectic to capture the movement of the moments of consciousness within the perspective of a self-developing subject, the thrust of the original intention continues, because life and self-consciousness are very close in his thought.

ii) Hegel sees philosophy arising from the need for reconciling discord and division encountered in human experience. However, he insists that reason is not 'against opposition and limitation', because 'necessary diremption is one of the factors of life, which it constitutes itself by eternally opposing itself, and totality in its highest vitality is possible only through restoration out of the highest separation.' Clearly, at this point his basic insight into Reason's mode of working is present.

iii) Intuition must be united with reflection and itself become reflective, but the intellect must transcend itself by more than intuition, i.e. by rationally and systematically overcoming its own fragmenting divisions, by returning the fragmented and separated to the life of the original identity. Reflection must be raised above the level of the understanding and brought to that of reason.

iv) Hegel begins the development of a logic which will bring out the full range of contradictions which arise from a comprehensive analysis of principles and categories, which is to extend Kant's study of the antinomies, but will also show how these contradictions are to be overcome in the self-development of the Notion and the Idea.

v) The objects of Hegel's logic are concepts, but concepts which are simultaneously form and content; in these concepts the nature of things is expressed in being thought.

vi) In Hegel's conception of the notion and the object comprehended in and by it, the knower becomes aware that the thing does not exist in its truth. The thing will attain its truth only if it negates its determinate conditions, but the negation will in turn be a determination, brought about by the unraveling or evolving of former conditions. Such a conception bears upon Hegel's notion of historicity. It has application to the development of human consciousness and human societies.
vii) Hegel thinks that the beings in the world of nature, differ essentially from their notions, and that this difference may be overcome only in the thinking subject, through its power of actualizing its notion in its existence.

viii) The nature of man is realized in the development of spirit. He is spirit in-itself and for-itself, insofar as he self-consciously realizes his 'spiritual' nature. Here there is suggested part of the ground of the historicity of man.

ix) Negativity is an essential characteristic of finite things; their state of existence is such that their potentialities are never fully realized. In virtue of the finite thing's power to transcend itself (which is seen most clearly in human thought) to become other than itself, he finds 'the true nature of the finite' to be 'that it is infinite'. Furthermore, 'the determinate particular as such is essentially this absolute unrest, not to be, what it is'.

x) Hegel brings out his conception of the role of sublation clearly in his notion of the true infinite. The object in preserving itself throughout its own development and in its relations with other objects exemplifies true infinity. This is a key notion in the grounding of his notion of man's historicity.

xi) In the development of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel avoids presupposed standards, the criterion of criticism arises from and develops along with the successive moments and levels of the experience of consciousness. The immanent criticism of knowledge develops through the process of consciousness's examination of its own contents.

xii) The self-constitutionality of consciousness is prefigured in the Introduction, in Hegel's characterization of the development of consciousness on its path to the Absolute.

xiii) He also connects this paradigm of human consciousness in its dynamic process of self-development with the 'history' of its education of itself.

xiv) Hyppolite is seen to be correct in arguing that 'Hegel wanted to analyze the very foundations of historical action'.

xv) 'Mediation is nothing else than self-identity that moves itself.' This is clearly another key conception for the appreciation of man's self-constitutionality.
xvi) In the dialectic of self-consciousness, selfhood is realized through other selves. Desire is the subject's impetus to begin its transformation of its world into itself, but the contents of nature fail to give self-certainty and the subject turns to 'other' subjects.

xvii) Hegel's analyses of work provide support for his notion of self-making; man develops himself in the process of transforming the thing into his own.

xviii) Self-alienation is shown to be a continuing dynamic process of reciprocity between subject and object, in which the reconciliation achieved is a temporal and historical process.

Three formal arguments were posed at the beginning of this chapter. 1) With respect to the first, it has been shown that for Hegel man ultimately realizes his self-hood as spirit. Of the notions which Hegel employs in connection with man, spirit is the richest in meaning comprising the notion of subject, self-consciousness, thought, freedom and the whole of the life of mind in fact, including its experienced world. Therefore, to define man as spirit is to intend by way of meaning, a multitude of predicates which together describe man within the dynamics of a self-determining, self-constituting, being situated in nature, society and history. The conclusion can be fairly drawn, then that a dynamic conception of man's consciousness and its processes is implied, in which the wholeness of experience is assimilated and preserved and carried forward including the history of the individual and of the society of which he is a member. This conception, in turn implies a notion of historicity. 2) It has been shown that for Hegel, human consciousness is essentially self-constituting, that man is the process and realization of this activity, so that man's nature must be regarded as other than fixed. 3) If the disjunctive posed, grasps the only alternatives, then from 2) above, one disjunct can be denied, and the conclusion can be drawn that, for Hegel, human nature is open to historical growth. But regardless of the form of the argument, it is clear from the evidence that Hegel does not regard human nature as fixed or given. Furthermore, man is conceived of as a self-constituting being, which is open to historical growth, and in fact, history is the medium of its development. In short, man is essentially historical, so that the contention that there is an implicit notion of historicity in the philosophy of Hegel and that this notion is required by some of its principles is confirmed.
CHAPTER IV

HISTORY, HISTORICITY
AND INFINITE THOUGHT

Argument

The preceding chapter showed the self-constituting character of human consciousness in Hegel's philosophy and showed Hegel's phenomenological grounding and development of human selfhood, which advanced together with more and more adequate forms of knowledge and freedom. Human selfhood is in fact realized in richer social and historical contexts than found in the divisions of the Phenomenology examined in Chapter III. Hegel is at pains to show this in the balance of that work, in the Philosophy of Spirit of his Encyclopaedia and in his writing and lectures which expand on topics treated in both. As Fackenheim has noted "only a self-constituting process can be in its ontological constitution historical"; it has been shown that man for Hegel is a self-constituting being, and it is argued here that man qua man is in his ontological constitution historical. The evidence for the former is found in the whole of the detailed study of the first half of the Phenomenology; the latter is in general, largely implicit in the divisions of the Phenomenology studied, but in some passages this came out clearly and explicitly. Chapter III showed that for Hegel, man is what he freely makes of himself,
within a natural, social and historical situation. However, it is necessary to show this more strongly, particularly the latter aspect, by examining other works and other parts of his system.

In order then to bring out more fully Hegel's conception of man and his notion of historicity, it is proposed for this chapter to selectively examine topics within his system. In so doing, the questions raised in Chapter I concerning historical truth and metaphysical truth can be pursued. In few words, it needs to be ascertained what kind of truth is open to man who is a self-constituting being and is described in terms of an implicit notion of historicity. By bringing history into philosophy and by recognizing it as an essential part of man's being, there follows the definite possibility that philosophy and metaphysical truth will be 'historicized' in such a way that both will suffer from the limitations of historicism. If in the end, metaphysical truth is not superior to, or no more than historical truth, that is, metaphysical truth does not transcend the limitations of historical truth, then, in so far as historical truth is open to the criticism of historical relativism, so will be metaphysical truth. In respect to Hegel's philosophy as a whole, the basic argument above can be formulated in this way: 1) If it could be correctly said of Hegel's philosophy that "the fundamental distinction between philosophical and historical questions
cannot in the last analysis be maintained”, 1 then a charge of historicism could be sustained against Hegel’s philosophy.

2) If a charge of historicism could be sustained against Hegel’s philosophy, then to the degree that History’s truth is subject to relativism, so would Philosophy’s truth be. 3) Therefore, if the antecedent of 1) was established as the case, as true, then the consequent of 2) would follow, would be established as the case and would be true.

However, this chapter will provide evidence in support of the arguments:

i) that although Hegel fully recognizes the limitations imposed on human thought by history, and on truth, by the historicity of man’s being, nevertheless attempts to retain for man, through philosophy, the capacity to transcend history’s limitations.

ii) that Hegel is not a historicist, because a) he argues that philosophical questions are not supplanted or superseded by historical questions, and b) he contends that in the last analysis, the fundamental distinction between the purely philosophical and purely historical questions can be maintained.

iii) that although Hegel did acknowledge a form of historical relativism, which is consistent with his recognition of an historical human world with its evolving social, economic, political and cultural institutions developing in conjunction and interaction with evolving human consciousness, he still maintained that philosophical truth per se, does escape historical relativism, because:

a) philosophy qua philosophy can attain Absolute Knowledge, as opposed to: aa) historical knowledge

per se, and ab) relative knowledge;
b) philosophy can attain 'Truth which is eternal'
because: ba) philosophy, in its most profound
form, attains 'the eternally present'; and bb)
the eternally present is 'the True'.

In this chapter, furthermore it is proposed to provide
evidence for, and to make meaningful the argument that Hegel
having shown that a) man in acting, constitutes himself, and
that b) man *qua* man is a self-constituting process, also **must hold** and **must show** that c) 'the historical past' enters into
man's present being, because ca) such a process can continu­
ously constitute itself cb) only by continuously assimilating
and re-assimilating 'at least some of the past'.

Finally this chapter will show, building on the basis
of Chapter III, that the nature of Hegel's objective or absol­
ute idealism **requires** a notion of historicity. The word
"objective", in this context, is indicative that this idealist
philosophy aims to comprehend the objective world, which means
not only the natural world of physical things (inorganic and
organic) but also the historical world of human society and
human culture. The word "absolute" is indicative that the

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2 Fackenheim, *op. cit.*, p. 38. This argument could
be expressed formally in this way: A self-constituting being is
a self-constituting process. Man in acting is a self-constit­
uting being. Man in acting is a self-constituting process. A
self-constituting process is a continuously self-constituting
process. Man in acting is a continuously self-constituting
process. A continuously self-constituting process is a history
assimilating and re-assimilating process. Man in acting is a
history assimilating and re-assimilating process. In other
words, man *qua* man is in his ontological constitution, histori­
cal.
aim and attainment claimed for this philosophy is the absolute or unconditioned truth. It is also indicative that the totality of the universe with all that is comprised therein, including the development of human spirit within history, is to be comprehended in this philosophy's system of categories, which is to be shown as one concrete, self-developing system, a process culminating in a result which contains its process. More specifically there can be found in the meaning of the Begriff itself - the "Notion", as it is usually translated - the requirement of a notion of historicity. "The Notion, when it has developed into a concrete existence that is itself free, is none other than the I or pure self-consciousness." The technical term "Notion" is rich in connotation and application, but its connotation includes the thinking subject in its thought activity, in which the unity of thought and being is explicitly articulated. "The object therefore has its objectivity in the Notion and this is the unity of self-consciousness into which it has been received; consequently its objectivity, or the Notion, is itself none other than the nature of self-consciousness, has no other moments or determinations than the I itself." 1) If the Notion realizes


4 Ibid., p. 585. "Diese Objektivität hat der
itself explicitly in man's self-conscious, thinking processes, then the Notion's moments of self-negation and reconciliation permeate the self-constituting process of man's being. 2) If the latter is the case, then the Notion permeates man's historical life, his evolving self-consciousness within his societal and historical world. 3) Therefore if the antecedent of the first hypothetical is the case, then the consequent of the second follows. In other words, the Notion's realization in human spirit is intimately linked with the historicity of man, so that it can be said that the Notion individualized in man necessitates a notion of historicity.

1. Infinity, Substance and the Notion

A. Finite, the Spurious Infinite and the True Infinite

The need to directly examine Hegel's conception of infinity in the Science of Logic and in the Logic of the Encyclopaedia, arises because he frequently has recourse to this conception when considering questions of knowledge and truth,

Gegenstand somit im Begriffe, und dieser ist die Einheit des Selbstbewusstseins, in die er aufgenommen worden; seine Objektivität oder der Begriff ist daher selbst nichts anderes als die Natur des Selbstbewusstseins, hat keine andere Momente oder Bestimmungen als das Ich selbst." W. der L., II, p. 222.

5 Findlay states, in this connection that, "The Notion is accordingly one with man's thinking being, the same universal thinking nature in all, but individualized in this or that thinking person." Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 223.
on the one hand, and on the other, when considering the self-development and self-realization of man's self-hood and being. Hegel's conception of infinity was encountered in the examination of the logic of his First System. The need to examine it again arises because of the above and because of the pervasive part this conception plays in his whole philosophy. He uses this conception in a variety of contexts, other than the logic so that it can be appreciated that the meaning uncovered here will not bring out its full significance. This will be remedied to an extent appropriate to this chapter's tasks in the context of the further development of spirit in some of its stages. Hegel's steadfast interest in the relation between the finite and the infinite, particularly within the religious dimension, emerged in his early writings (Chapter II), and appeared in each item of writing examined in Chapter III. The reconciliation between the finite and the infinite continues to be a fundamental aim of his philosophy.

a. Finitude

Hegel treats of qualitative finitude and qualitative infinity within the category: Determinate Being, which is in turn found within the Doctrine of Being.\(^6\) Initially the

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\(^6\) Within the *Science of Logic*, under Determinate Being, the triad is: A. Determinate Being as Such; B. Finitude; and C. Infinity (Spurious and True Infinity). B. Comprises: a) Something and Other; b) Determination, Constitution and Limit; and c) Finitude. (Although Quality falls
meaning of what it is to be finite seems straightforward, what one might expect from the ordinary meaning of the word, that a determinate something is limited, or has a limit. "The being of something is determinate; something has a quality and in it is not only determined but limited; its quality is its limit, burdened with this, it remains in the first place an affirmative, stable being." To have a limit is to be limited by 'something other'. Ordinarily the 'something other' which does the limiting or provides the limit may be thought of as another thing, and 'the limit' in such case might be thought to be the boundary where one thing ends and another begins. Again, the meaning of the word "limit" may be thought to contain the implication that beyond the limit there is something else, or something other. However, because Hegel is concerned with qualitative limit, he endeavours to exclude spatial connotations. (When he examines Spurious Infinity the above connotations, including the spatial, are brought under review to some extent, more or less, unavoidably.) Again, and this is closer to Hegel's thought at this point, if one thinks

within A. above, it also comprises the whole of Section I, being the first part of the larger triad Quality, Quantity and Measure.) The pattern is somewhat different in the Encyclopædia Logic: under Determinate Being, the triad is Quality; Limit and True Infinite, while the Finite, Alteration and the Spurious Infinite are comprised within Limit.

of a thing having a determinate quality, then it may be thought to negate another thing of different quality, or to be negated, itself, by the other's quality. However, in the section from which the above passage is drawn, Hegel has in mind the 'immanent limit' of the something, its negation of itself. "But the development of this negation, so that the opposition between its determinate being and the negation as its immanent limit, is itself the being-within-self of the something, which is thus in its own self only a becoming, constitutes the finitude of something." The finitude of the something, consists in its continuous becoming arising from the opposition between its determinate being and the negation within it.

In the Encyclopaedia, Hegel makes a transition from quality to limit, and thence to its three sub-categories: The Finite, Alteration and the Spurious Infinite, out of which the True Infinite emerges. In that a quality is a determination of something ("Determinate Being is Being with a character or determinateness - which simply is; and such unmediated character is Quality.") and determination is

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negation ("The foundation of all determinateness is negation (as Spinoza says, Omnis determinatio est negatio)."\(^{10}\)) and to negate something is to limit it ("In determinate Being, the determinateness is one with Being; yet at the same time, when explicitly made a negation, it is a limit, a Barrier."\(^{11}\)) a quality is therefore, a limit. Something is characterized by certain qualities and these qualities constitute the thing that it is, and they also determine what it is not. "Hence the otherness is not something indifferent and outside it, but a function proper to it. Somewhat is by its quality, - firstly finite, - secondly alterable; so that finitude and variability appertain to its being."\(^{11}\)

In the Zusatz to his analysis of limit, Hegel explains that in determinate being the negation is one with the being. Because he has shown that this negation is a limit, he is able to state that a thing is what it is, only in and by reason of its limit'. He endeavours to make clear that it is not correct to regard the limit as only external to the determinate being, for the limit imbues the whole of the...

\(^{10}\) Ency. Logic, \^91, Zus. "Die Grundlage aller Bestimmtheit ist die Negation (omnis determinatio est negatio - wie Spinoza sagt)." S. Werke, 8, p. 218.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., \^92. "Im Dasein ist die Bestimmtheit eins mit dem Sein, welche zugleich als Negation gesetzt, Grenze, Schranke ist. Daher ist das Anderssein nicht ein Gleichgültiges ausser ihm, sondern sein eigenes Moment. Etwas ist durch seine Qualität erstlich endlich und zweitens veränderlich, so dass die Endlichkeit und Veränderlichkeit seinem Sein angehört." Enzy., p. 112.
existent. Such a view arises from confusing quantitative with qualitative limit, he says, and in this phase of the logic, he is concerned 'primarily' with 'the qualitative limit'. To illustrate the difference, he draws on the example of a piece of land of a particular size. Its perimeter or acreage is its quantitative limit. But this same land may be a meadow as opposed to a wood or pond, and this is its qualitative limit. In this its character, its positive quality is likewise its negation or limit, i.e. in having the characteristics of a meadow it is prevented from being a wood.

At this point he makes a remark which at first seems merely a bit of sound advice, which has come to mind while considering qualitative limit. "Man, insofar he wills to be actual, must be determinate being, and to this end he must set a limit to himself. People who are too fastidious towards the finite never reach actuality, but linger lost in abstraction, and their light dies away." However, this is more than a kind of wisdom arising from the experience of life, it is philosophically interesting and philosophically relevant. It is a concrete illustration of the value and significance of the finite, as such. This rather existential sounding observation is also relevant to his notion of historicity, for

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12 Encyc. Logic, 92, Zus. "Der Mensch, insofern er wirklich seyn will, muss er daseyn, und zu dem Ende muss er sich begrundyn. Wer gegen das Endliche zu ekel ist, der koomt zu gar keiner Wirklichkeit, sondern er verbleibt im Abstrakten und verglimt in sich selbst." S. Werke, 8, p. 220.
Hegel is here once again emphasizing that man's work and life is to be found in the sphere of the finite. Man must realize himself through concrete deeds within the finite, interdependent social and historical world; abstract hopes and intentions tend to obscure this truth. His remark also looks forward to the True Infinite, inasmuch as it is through the finite, properly comprehended, that man will attain and achieve a reconciliation with the infinite, for the infinite is not something 'beyond' finitude.

Although, Hegel has shown that limit implies finitude, he in effect, brings out more of the meaning of finitude by advancing to the next sub-category: Alterability. To educe the alterable, he examines limit again to show that it involves 'a contradiction in itself', which reveals 'its dialectical nature'. Limit both constitutes the reality of a thing and is its negation. Furthermore, limit as the negation of something (or the somewhat) is an other; 'a something is implicitly the other of itself'. In other words, the finite is and it is also other. The nature of the finite is to be both somewhat and other, for it does not comprise its own whole nature, i.e. it is not being-for-itself. Its being-in-itself is opposed by its being-for-other. In its alterability, the finite is seen as both other-being and being-for-other. 'The somewhat sees its limit become objective to it in the other.' The other is also something, and the original something is its
other, so that something and other are identical, and this passing one into the other is the finite's alterability. "Alteration thus exhibits the inherent contradictions which originally attaches to determinate being, and which forces it out of its own bounds."¹³ The Spurious Infinity follows from the fact that the other, as also a somewhat, becomes an other and so on without termination.

In both versions of his logic, Hegel is at pains to bring out what seems a simple truth, a commonplace, that finite things are not only mutable, but that they perish, and that they must do so. It is the necessity of their so doing which he wishes to emphasize. He explains that 'non-being constitutes (the) nature and being' of finite things, and that the latter not only alter, but cease to be, "and (their) ceasing to be is not merely a possibility, so that (they) could be without ceasing to be, but the being as such of finite things is to have the germ of decease as their being-within-self: the hour of their birth is the hour of their death."¹⁴ Hegel's emphasis on the necessity of the finite perishing, is no mere


¹⁴ S. of L., p. 129. "... und es ist nicht bloß möglich, dass es vergeht, so dass es sein könnte, ohne zu vergehen, sondern das Sein der endlichen Dinge als solches ist, den Keim des Vergehens als ihr Insichsein zu haben: die Stunde ihrer Geburt ist die Stunde ihres Todes." W. der L., I, p. 117.
commonplace, it is part of a decided re-orientation of ways of conceiving the finite and the infinite and of the relationship between them. In the process of perishing finite things develop their potentialities, and of the latter, one potentiality which will be realized with certainty is death. Hegel is not disparaging the world because of this its finitude, for this is its nature, what it must be, in order that there be life, growth and continuing development. The same remarks apply to the finite aspect of man. The connection between Hegel's doctrine on the finite and historicity appears here. Human history assumes greater importance as the finite is accorded its due, as Hegel thinks, or more than its due, as his detractors might think. The appreciation that it is the destiny of finite things to perish brings sadness to the understanding because finitude is perpetually opposed to infinity, perishability to imperishability, i.e. the finite and infinite are held to be irreconcilable. However, Hegel will attempt to show that they are reconcilable, and to accomplish this, it is necessary first to comprehend in reason, the necessity of

15 In this connection, Marcuse states that "Marx later laid down the historical law that a social system can set free its productive forces only by perishing and passing into another form of social organization. Hegel saw this law of history operative in all being." Marcuse cites a passage from the chapter dealing with 'The Notion' in support: 'The stage which any Something can reach is that in which it begins to perish.' (S. of L., p. 611; W. der L., II, p. 252.) Reason and Revolution, p. 137.
finite things ceasing to be. Hyppolite makes a remark in a
different context which however has application here: "But
man is essentially the being who can transgress the limit by
internalizing it and who can bestow a spiritual meaning upon
death by means of his entire history, thus making something
positive out of a negative."16

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel places more stress on
the role of the 'ought' in the dialectic of the finite. He
shows that a determinate being is subject to both a barrier or
limit and to an obligation; both are moments of the finite and
both are finite. ('But only the limitation is *posited* as
finite; the ought is limited only in itself, that is, for us.')

There is a difference between the 'something' as it is in it­
self and as it is within the conditions in which it exists.
The latter oppose it in its process of developing 'its own
self.'

In order that the limit which is in something as such
should be a limitation, something must at the same time
in its own self transcend the limit, it must in its own
self be related to the limit as to something which is
not. ... And since the limit is in the *determination*
itself as a limitation, something transcends its own
self.17

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16 *Studies on Marx and Hegel*, "The Human Situation
in the Hegelian Phenomenology", p. 160.

17 p. 132. "Dasz die Grenze, die am Etwas Überhaupt
ist, Schranke sei, muss es zugleich in sich selbst über sie
hinausgehen, sich an ihm selbst auf sie als auf ein Nichtseien­
des beziehen. ... Und indem sie in der Bestimmung selbst als
Schranke ist, geht Etwas damit übersich selbst hinaus." *W. der
L.*, I, p. 120.
The contradiction within the determinate being prompts it to realize that which is not yet actual; this contradiction, which Hegel sometimes characterizes as a condition of unrest, or restlessness, within its limitation, he terms an 'Ought'. The something's transformation occurs in accordance with the needs and potentialities of its own self, and in the process, its external conditions are 'incorporated in its in-self'.

Hegel draws together the moments of the dialectic of the 'ought' in this way:

Hence as the ought, something is raised above its limitation, but conversely, it is only as the ought that it has its limitation. The two are inseparable. Something has a limitation in so far as it has negation in its determination, and the determination is also the accomplished sublation of the limitation.

The transition of something from one modification to another are the result of the urge of its own potentialities, so that external conditions are continuously assimilated in the thing itself. The determinate being ought to be something such, but in being so obligated it is subject to a limit in being this something, and it only has a limit in being this something because it ought to be something such. It can be the latter because it ought to be it, and it cannot be so because

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of its obligation to be so. 'What ought to be is, and at the same time is not. If it were, we could not say that it ought to be. The ought has, therefore, essentially a limitation.'

It is by encountering its limitation, its barrier, that it is obliged to overcome it, and in sublating it, just because of its finitude, its 'ought' re-emerges. In constituting itself through its relations to other things, the determinate being's actual qualities are limits through which its potentialities must pass beyond or break through. Mure explains that, "The finite is that which of its own nature passes beyond itself to find and possess its own nature in a Sollen, an ought to be." 

b. Spurious Infinity

As shown while examining the logic of Hegel's 'First System', Hegel's conception of Infinity is not the common one of an endless series, of an unending repetition of the same thing, as often conceived of in respect to infinite space or as in infinite numerical series. Hegel refers to such a

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20 S. of L., p. 132-133; W. der L., I, p. 120.

21 A Study of Hegel's Logic, p. 49. Mure's subsequent explication of this observation, provides general support for the interpretation of the above paragraph. "Qua Limit (Grenze) the Finite is also Barrier (Schranke): its finitude is a determinateness, but also a restraining limitation which of its own nature it breaks through and contradicts in further determining itself." See also Findlay, op.cit., p. 161-162.

22 "Infinity: An endless extent of space, time, or any series. Is usually conceived negatively, as having no
conception as "the spurious infinite". It is important, Hegel thinks, to distinguish between the infinite of the understanding and the infinite of reason, between the spurious infinity and the genuine Notion of infinity. The first is the finitized infinite. He intends to show that 'in the very act of keeping the infinite pure and aloof from the finite, the infinite is only made finite'. In order to set the stage for his detailed examination of infinity, he makes the distinctions necessary in a clear, concise outline which brings out the essential elements of both the spurious and the true infinite. He states,

The infinite is (a) in its simple determination, affirmative as negation of the finite; (b) but thus it is in alternating determination with the finite, and is the abstract, one-sided infinite; (c) the self-sublation of this infinite and of the finite, as a single process - this is the true or genuine infinite.²³

The advance of the true over the spurious infinite is brought out by Hegel's critical analysis of the second in which he shows how and why it is abstract and one-sided. This form of infinity may be thought 'to be absolute without qualification' just because it 'is determined expressly as negation of the

finite', but this attempt to express the infinite as the
sphere without limitedness fails in the very attempt to break
out of and leave behind the limitedness of the finite.

In the Logic of the Encyclopaedia, the Spurious In­
finite follows from the alterability of the finite, i.e. it is
the third sub-category of Limit, and the synthesis of the
finite and alterability. Hegel's analysis of the latter two
had in fact already led to this form of the infinite. "Some­
thing becomes an other, but this other is itself somewhat,
therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infin­
itum." The development of an endless series occurs because
the other is also a something, which also becomes an other,
and this sequence repeats itself indefinitely. "This Infin­
ity is the spurious or negative infinity, in that it in noth­
ing but the negation of the finite, which though rises again
just as before, accordingly, just as much is not sublated. In
other words, this infinite only expresses the ought-to-be
elimination of the finite." This progression to infinity,
this endeavour to proceed beyond the Finite is unending, yet
the Finite 'rises again the same as ever', because there is

24 Ency. Logic, 93. "Etwas wird ein Anderes, aber
das Andere ist selbst ein Etwas, also wird es gleichfalls ein
Anderes, und so fort ins Unendliche." Enzy., p. 112.

25 Ibid., 94. "Diese Unendlichkeit ist die schl­
echte oder negative Unendlichkeit, indem sie nichts ist als
die Negation des Endlichen, welches aber ebenso wieder ent­
steht, somit ebenssoehr nicht aufgehoben ist, - oder diese Un­
endlichkeit drückt nur das Sollen des Aufhebens des Endlichen
aus." Ibid.
an unresolved contradiction in the whole attempt. In short, Hegel contends that no matter how far this procedure is carried, - conceptually: through negations and affirmations; imaginatively: backward or forward in time, any direction in space; or as in the case of a numerical series where succeeding units are found to be finite and limited by further finite units, - it is simply not possible to go beyond the finite. The latter is not eliminated, not transcended and not sublated. "The progression to infinity never gets further than a statement of the contradiction involved in the finite, viz. that it is somewhat as well as its other." This endless repetition is not the true infinite because each of the terms in the alternation are themselves finite and pass over into or call up each other.

In his *Science of Logic*, having analyzed the category of Finitude, he reveals how there arises from it the category of Infinity, the latter necessarily arising as the negation of the former. "It is the very nature of the finite to transcend itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite." However, the form in which it first arises is spurious, i.e.


inadequate and false. The defectiveness of the Spurious Infinite is shown in the 'Alternating Determination of the Finite and the Infinite'. The latter, in its immediacy is also the negation of the finite, but in this 'form of simple being', it is also 'the non-being of an other', and so falls back into 'the category of something with a limit'. The finite and infinite "stand thus in a qualitative relation, each remaining external to the other; the immediate being of the infinite resuscitates the being of its negation, of the finite again which at first seemed to have vanished in the infinite."\(^{28}\) In this relation, the finite and the infinite are 'qualitatively distinct others'. The infinite involved here, the spurious infinite, is the infinite of the understanding, for which it is 'the absolute Truth'. However, it has not truly reconciled the two, because it is entangled in 'unresolved absolute contradiction', i.e. the finite standing opposed to the infinite, remains as a determinate being, "so that there are two determinatenesses; there are two worlds, one infinite and one finite, and in their relationship the infinite is only the limit of the finite and is thus only a determinate infinite, an infinite which is itself finite."\(^{29}\)


\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 139-140. "es sind damit zwei Bestimmtheiten; es gibt zwei Wel ten, eine unendliche und eine endliche,
c. True Infinity

There is to be found in Hegel's discussion above, a connection with one of the themes of this chapter, i.e. Infinite Thought. This passage suggests that the spurious or false infinite is not the direction to absolute Truth, as exemplified in the endeavour to surmount definitional inadequacy by proceeding to ever more related qualities with a view to reaching a terminal definition. This point is supported by some remarks Hegel made in respect to thought in an earlier chapter of the Encyclopaedia where he dealt with the 'First Attitude of Thought to Objectivity'. He explains that in using the term 'thought' it is important to keep in mind the difference between finite or discursive thinking and the thinking which is infinite and rational; and in his use of the word rational here, he means thinking at the level of Reason. Within discursive thinking the categories are held in isolation and so remain finite forms. "However, truth is in itself infinite, and cannot be expressed or presented to consciousness in finite terms. The phrase infinite thought may excite surprise, if we adhere to the conception of modern times, that thought is always limited. Now however, it is, in

fact, the very essence of thought to be infinite." Thought is infinite because in its interaction with anything, it is of its essence to form a universal from it or discover one in it, which is to say, thought assimilates the other to itself. At the level of understanding, following and adding entailed relations, fails to completely delimit the object. Certainly this procedure is not without a rational nucleus, that is, it has such to the extent that it assumes that the object's essence is constituted by its relations to other objects. But adding links via the false infinity will not properly attain these relations; such attainment is gained in another manner.

But thought is at home with itself, it relates itself with itself, has itself for object. In having a thought for object, I am at home with myself. Thought (the thinking power), the 'I', is therefore infinite, because, as thought, it relates itself to an object which is itself. ... Thought thinks itself, thus it has an object which is at the same time no object, \textit{viz.}, a sublated, idealized (objectivity). Thought as such, in its purity has therefore, no limits in itself.\textsuperscript{31}


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid. "Das Denken aber ist bei sich selbst, verhält sich zu sich selbst und hat sich selbst zum Gegenstand. Indem ich einen Gedanken zum Gegenstand habe, bin ich bei mir selbst. Ich, das Denken, ist demnach unendlich, darum, weil es sich im Denken zu einem Gegenstand verhält, der es selbst ist. ... Denkt das Denken sich selbst, so hat es einen Gegenstand, der zugleich keiner ist, d.h. ein aufgehobener, ideeller. Das Denken als solches, in seiner Reinheit hat also keine Schranke in sich." Ibid.
To recapitulate - the spurious infinity, in Hegel's view, is the process of transcending limits, which reassert themselves indefinitely. At the level of understanding, the finite and infinite seem irrevocably opposed: the finite is not infinite, nor the infinite the finite; each negates the other. No passage between them, no synthesis, appears possible. But Reason overcomes this absolute opposition, through its capacity to reveal the inadequacies of the above conception, and to show the inter-relationship between the finite and infinite. Having shown a) that the True Infinite is not merely the opposite, the negation of the finite, and cannot be, because this would be a simple contradiction, b) that the True Infinite cannot be the endless iteration of the alternate

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32 Cf. A. N. Whitehead, *The Interpretation of Science*, Selected Essays, editor A. H. Johnson, New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1961, "Mathematics and the Good", p. 195-197, 203, 248, 257-258. Whitehead is also critical of the usual concept of infinity, and he views the infinite as being dependent in a certain sense, on the finite. "We cannot understand the flux which constitutes our human experience, unless we realize that it is raised above the futility of infinitude by various successive types of modes of emphasis which generate the active energy of a finite assemblage. The superstitious awe of infinitude has been the bane of philosophy. The infinite has no properties. All value is the gift of finitude which is the necessary condition for activity. Also, activity means the origination of patterns of assemblage, and mathematics is the study of pattern." Cf. also, Whitehead's *Process and Reality, An Essay in Cosmology*, New York, Harper & Row, 1960, p. 500. "In mathematics, all phraseology about infinitesimals is merely disguised statement about a class of finites." See also, Whitehead's discussion of 'Infinite Abstractive Hierarchy', p. 208-214, in his *Science and the Modern World*, Cambridge, University Press, 1932.
determination of something and other, and c) that it cannot be regarded as 'the beyond' of the finite, because when it is, the infinite turns out to be finite, Hegel proceeds to show that the concept of the finite, even considered by itself, is not satisfied by connotations of isolation and containment:

As has already been shown, finitude is only as a transcending of itself; it therefore contains infinity, the other of itself. Similarly, infinity is only as a transcending of the finite; it therefore essentially contains its other and is, consequently, in its own self the other of itself. The finite is not sublated by the infinite as by a power existing outside it; on the contrary, its infinity consists in sublating its own self.33

(In the above, particularly the last sentence, 'The finite's infinity consists in sublating its own self' - there can be seen something of the dialectical logic underlying Hegel's remarks above, concerning the infinity of thought.) Here, he advances toward consideration of the negation of the negation. Hegel's contention that it is not possible to think the finite without also thinking the infinite is given further meaning and the reverse is also shown.34 Hegel thinks that it should

33 S. of L., p. 145, 146. "Wie früher gezeigt, ist die Endlichkeit nur als Hinausgehen über sich; es ist also in ihr die Unendlichkeit, das Andere ihrer selbst, enthalten. Ebenso ist die Unendlichkeit nur als Hinausgehen über das Endliche; sie enthält also wesentlich ihr Anderes, und ist somit an ihr das Andere ihrer selbst. Das Endliche wird nicht vom Unendlichen als einer ausser ihm vorhandenen Macht aufgehoben, sondern es ist seine Unendlichkeit, sich selbst aufzuheben." W. der L., I, p. 135.

34 "In each ... there lies the determinateness of the other," Ibid., p. 143; Ibid., I, p. 132.
be seen that the 'sublating', in the passage above, 'is not alteration or otherness as such, not the sublating of a something'. He is concerned with the sphere of the finite's relation to its infinity. Earlier, when Hegel considered Finitude he had shown that the finite is not only affected by negation, but is, so to speak, infected by negation; the importance of this point now becomes clearly manifest. "That in which the finite sublates itself is the infinite as the negating of finitude; but finitude itself has long since been determined as only the non-being of determinate being. It is therefore only negation which sublates itself in the negation."35 On the side of infinity there is also present and operant a double negation. Hegel develops both sides of this dialectic very carefully and in great detail, in order to show that the relation between the finite and the infinite and between the infinite and the finite is not an external relation but a self-relation which is a mediating process, and although he will show that it is the infinite which is real, the infinite lives in the finite, metaphorically speaking. "Thus infinity on its side is determined as the negative of finitude, and hence of determinateness in general, as the empty beyond; the sublating of itself in the finite is a return from an empty flight, a

negation of the beyond which is in its own self a negative." 36

Here Hegel is found working at the heart of the problem which emerged in his early writings: how to conceptualize the relation between the finite and the infinite, how to show a unity of the finite and infinite in which differences are preserved, how to show infinity as not simply bearing on the finite as an external relation but rather as a living relation functioning in interaction with and within the finite. To his mind, he has the solution to a very old and long-standing problem of religion and philosophy: how to explain the creative activity of the infinite in the finite or how to explain the creation of the finite out of the infinite, and how to explain the role of the finite in 'life of the infinite. Above he showed that the same negation of negation is present in both the finite and infinite. What is involved in this 'mediation which the negation of negation is', is self-relation and affirmation. The finite unites with itself, and 'has in its beyond only found itself again'. Likewise the infinite, in sublating the new limit, is not carried further from either the finite or from itself, because 'the finite is only this, to pass over into the infinite' and because the infinite 'has

arrived at its own self.

Thus, both finite and infinite are this movement in which each returns to itself through its negation; they are only as mediation within themselves, and the affirmative of each contains the negative of each and is the negation of the negation. They are thus a result, and consequently not what they are in the determination of their beginning;\textsuperscript{37}

Hegel continues to seek to show that the infinite is not something beyond the finite. Above he shows the finite and the infinite as identical in that they are both finite. However, the True Infinity sublates the contradiction and is the unity of the finite and infinite in such a way that the finite is raised and absorbed into the infinite without destroying difference, i.e. the unity involved is a concrete unity\textsuperscript{38} as distinguished from an abstract unity. Both moments are finite and both 'are equally together negated in (the process i.e. progressive development) and in the result' so that 'this result as negation of the finitude of both is called with truth the infinite'. Each term has the double meaning of being one of these two moments: the finite is 1) the finite opposed to the infinite and 2) the finite and simultaneously its opposed

\textsuperscript{37} S. of L., p. 147. "So ist beides, das Endliche und das Unendliche, diese Bewegung, zu sich durch seine Negation zurückzukehren; sie sind nur als Vermittlung in sich, und das Affirmative beider enthält die Negation beider und ist die Negation der Negation. - Sie sind so Resultat, hieinet nicht das, was sie in der Bestimmung ihres Angangs sind; -" W. der L. I, p. 136-137.

\textsuperscript{38} "for here it has acquired a concrete content." Ibid., p. 149; Ibid., I, p. 139.
infinite; the infinite is 1) the spurious infinite, and 2) the infinite in which 'the infinite and its other, are only moments'. (Implied in this analysis, although not stated here, is that the Affirmative Infinite is the truth of the finite.) "The infinite, therefore, as now before us is, in fact, the process in which it is deposed to being only one of its determinations, the opposite of the finite, and so to being itself only one of the finites, and then raising this its difference from itself into the affirmation of itself and through this mediation becoming the true infinite."39

In the Encyclopaedia the dialectic of the True Infinite is much compressed and is presented as the synthesis of the somewhat and other (Quality and Limit). As in the other work, he is able to show that the Genuine Infinite has the finite within it, or comprises or absorbs the finite within it; at the same time, because it comprises both terms and the process of their opposition, it can be said that the True Infinite lives or constitutes itself in the finite.40

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while discussing Hegel's characterization of mind states "The infinite is that which includes and sustains the finite; all bounds belong to it and are modes of its being, but it is confined by none of them. It is a whole system, leaving nothing outside it, but including everything as its own and as itself. In this sense the self is infinite." In such an observation, it can be seen that history must be included in the infinite so conceived. The whole system may be comprehended by man, but to do so, history must be comprised within it, and furthermore, so must his own historicity. However, this will be seen better at the levels of objective and absolute spirit. In the logic, the situation is less complex: the somewhat is essentially relative to an other, or to its other, "since what is passed into is quite the same as what passes over, since both have one and the same attribute, viz. to be an other, it follows that something in its passage into other only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and in the other, is the genuine Infinity." Hegel here

essentiellement relatif au fini, ce qui revient à dire aussi que le véritable infini est l'unité de l'infini et du fini (cercle)." p. 23.


42 Ency. Logic, / 95. "somit da das, in welches es übergangen, ganz dasselbe ist, was das, welches übergangen, - beide haben keine weitere als eine und dieselbe Bestimmung, ein Anderes zu sein, - so geht hiermit Etwas in seinem Übergang in Anderes nur mit sich selbst zusammen, und diese Beziehung im Übergang und im Andern auf sich selbst ist die wahrhaftige Unendlichkeit." Enzy., p. 113.
concludes that something in being determined or limited by its other, is actually only determined by itself, i.e. the true infinite means self-determined, self-limited and self-transcending. The true infinite is the unity of 'something' and 'other', the 'something' being the finite and its 'other', the (spurious) infinite; but 'as the unity of the finite and infinite',\(^{43}\) it is 'the self-sublation of this infinite and of the finite, as a single process', as Hegel defined the genuine infinite initially. In both of his works treating of the Logic, he is quick to point out that to simply define the True Infinite as the unity of the finite and the infinite is a little misleading and apt to be misunderstood. In the Encyclopaedia he notes that,

Such a statement would be to some extent correct; but is just as open to perversion, and falsehood as the unity of Being and Nothing already noticed. Besides it may very fairly be charged with reducing the infinite to finitude and making a finite infinite. ... The negation of negation is not a neutralization: the infinite is the affirmative, and it is only the finite which is absorbed.\(^ {44}\)

Thus, it is the infinite which absorbs the finite into itself; and furthermore, it is the infinite which is the real. "Das

\(^{43}\text{Ency. Logic, } \frac{95}{95}\text{ Zus.; Enzy., p. } 114.\)

\(^{44}\text{Ibid. } "\text{so enthält solcher Ausdruck zwar Richtiges, aber er ist ebensosehr schiefl und falsch, wie vorhin von der Einheit des Seins und Nichts bemerk't worden ist. Er führ't ferner auf den gerechten Vorwurf von der Verendlichung der Unendlichkeit, von einem endlichen Unendlichen. ... die Negation der Negation ist nicht eine Neutralisation; das Unendliche ist das Affirmative, und nur das Endliche das Aufgehobene."} \text{Ibid.}
As already noted, the true infinite, as the unity of the infinite and the finite, is the concrete unity of both and not simply an abstract unity. The distinction between one and the other is not abolished but is sublated, i.e. preserved within the unity. The true or affirmative infinity is the unity in difference of finite and infinite. He stresses that this unity is not abstract, inert self-sameness: "The infinite, however, like its two moments, is essentially only as a becoming, but a becoming now further determined in its moments." True infinity is found in the somewhat's capacity to transcend every limit and in its having such limits so that it may sublate them; it is found in its capacity for self-transcendence. Hegel calls the True Infinite "der Grundbegriff der Philosophie"; in this affirmative infinite 'the fundamental notion of philosophy' can be found part of the logical ground of his notion of alienation, particularly the positive connotation which is involved in it, i.e. alienation is essential to the development of Spirit. It is alienation which allows man to progress in a deepening self-consciousness awareness of

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45 W. der L., I, p. 139.


47 Enzy., 95 Zus. p. 114. See also W. der L., I, p. 142.
himself, while gradually acquiring his world for himself, which he does by positing limits or oppositions as objectively distinguished from himself which he then overcomes and assimilates, returning them to himself, and so to new alienations and further development. In this process of self-development and self-making the essential role of historicity in human spirit emerges.

Through the Affirmative Infinite Hegel makes the transition to Being-For-Self which 'is infinite being' and in which 'qualitative being finds its consummation'. So it is that, 'Being, but as negation of the negation, is restored again' in this next category of the Logic. However, this study will now be directed to The Absolute Relation at the end of the Doctrine of Essence.

B. Substantiality, Causality and Reciprocity

a. The Relation of Substantiality

According to my view, which must justify itself by the presentation of the system, everything depends on this, that we comprehend and express the true not as substance but just as much as subject. ... Comprehending God as the one substance outraged the age in which this definition was proclaimed. The reason lay partly in the instinctive recognition that self-consciousness was only drowned in it and not preserved.48

48 WK, 1, p. 388; Phen., p. 80. "Es kommt nach meiner Einsicht, welche sich nur durch die Darstellung des Systems selbst rechtfertigen muss, alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als Substanz, sondern eben so sehr als Subjekt aufzufassen und auszudrücken. ... Wenn, Gott als die Eine Substanz zu fassen,
In the first sentence, a well known passage from his much praised Preface to his Phenomenology, Hegel underlines one aspect of the problem area which he proposes to deal with in his system, and he succinctly suggests where the solution will be found. In following the development of some parts of Hegel’s system, characteristics of the justification are in fact gradually being uncovered. However the question he raises here is of special importance to the central thesis of this present study. The question of substance arose in connection with human nature vis-à-vis historicity.\(^9\) Spinoza, who is referred to in this passage, affirmed the absolute reality of one universal substance. Before him, Descartes, having meditated upon the very possibility of knowing, gave a new importance to the problem of knowledge, anchored his philosophy in the indubitability of the Cogito and posited two radically different substances - non-extended substance: mind, and extended substance: matter. How these two substances were to interact, he did not satisfactorily explain. Malebranche attempted to overcome the defects in Descartes’ form of dualism with his theory of Occasionalism, in which God Himself assures a correspondence between thought processes and bodily movement.

\(^{49}\) Supra, p. 17-23. See also p. 293-294.
by causing or enacting bodily movements 'on occasion' of corresponding mental processes.  

Man does not know external things directly, he knows their Ideas in God, i.e. through the mediation of God. The chasm remains between the two substances, however. Leibniz tried to harmonize various lines of thought which seemed to bear on this problem, drawing on his knowledge of science, his knowledge of and special gifts in mathematics and logic, and his considerable knowledge of the history of philosophy, which included the work of the mediaeval philosophers. He desired to reconcile the mechanical and teleological conceptions of the world, and with this in mind, he replaced the so-called 'corpuscles' of his day with something akin to the 'entelechies' of Aristotle. Because he sought to show the seeming mechanism of the physical universe as the phenomenal form through which the living content of the universe is realized or rather, realises itself, he had to re-think the concept of substance. He conceived of substance as force and called such force-substances 'Monads', which are conceived as immaterial points of force, psychical and not physical in nature. As a purely internal principle, the

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50 Malebranche thinks it "evident that there is no necessary connection between our will ... to move our arm and the arm's movement." While the arm does move as willed, so that "we are thus the natural cause of the movement ... natural causes are not at all true causes, they are only occasional causes, which act only by the power and efficacy of God's will." De la recherche de la vérité, 6, 2, 3.

51 Ibid., 3, 2, 6.
substance-monad is a force of immanent activity: each is its own source of activities, each has an inner tendency to activity and self-development,\textsuperscript{52} within each is contained the representation of the whole of the universe, each is different and distinct from every other, which results from the different degree of clearness and distinctness with which they 'represent' or perceive the universe,\textsuperscript{53} and each is active according to the degree it represents clearly and distinctly and passive according as it represents or perceives obscurely and confusedly. Those at the lower extreme are almost or entirely passive and form matter.\textsuperscript{54} The one highest monad, at the other extreme, represents the universe with perfect clearness and is pure activity. There is an innumerable\textsuperscript{55} multiplicity of monads ordered hierarchically according to the function of each in the system and to the degree of perception of each. Because they are simple substances they are not subject to dissolution (although the compound substances they form are) and can only come into existence through creation. The Supreme Monad is the creator of all the finite monads and

\textsuperscript{52} "The action of the internal principle which causes the change or the passage from one perception to another may be called appetite." \textit{Monadology}, 15, \textit{Die philosophischen Schriften}, Gerhardt edition, VI, p. 609.

\textsuperscript{53} Leibniz distinguishes perception ("the internal condition of the monad representing external things") from apperception ("consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this internal state") \textit{Schriften}, VI, p. 600.


\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, II, p. 304.
has pre-established that each monad will independently but harmoniously realize its own nature, i.e. without causal influence upon and interaction with one another. That they all do harmonize completely is, in brief, by reason of the sameness of their content. Finally there is a noteworthy connection between the metaphysics and the logic of Leibniz, in that monads are conceived as subjects which virtually contain all their predicates.

John Locke, with his 'historical plain method' as he described it, cast considerable doubt on both material and spiritual substance, although he retained a qualified place for both in his philosophy. He explains that the idea of an immaterial substance is put together much as we put together the idea of matter; and he endeavours to show that the idea of spiritual substances is as clear as that of bodily substances. "The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other: the idea of thinking and moving a body being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved. For our idea of substance is equally obscure, or

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56 Schriften, II, p. 136.
57 "Every predicate, necessary or contingent, past, present or future, is comprised in the notion of the subject." Ibid., II, p. 46. However, other factors are involved, i.e. the unique existence and final causality of the finite, force-substance with its degree of appetite and perception.
58 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXIII, Sections 2, 4, 22, and 29; (also First and Third Letters to the Bishop of Worcester).
none at all, in both; it is but a supposed I-know-not-what, to support those ideas we call 'accidents'.

Berkeley centered his critical attack on the concept of material substance. In turn, Hume found that the concept of spiritual substance was as open to serious objection as material substance, and in effect rejected both: "our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves when we give rise to animal motion or apply our limbs to their proper use and office. That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience, like other natural events; but the power or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable."

However, all three philosophers seemed to have assumed a permanent human nature, though with regard to Berkeley the evidence is more indirect.

Kant in distinguishing between the phenomenal world of conscious experience and the unexperienced and unknowable

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59 op. cit., Section 15.

60 A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Sections 16-24.

61 An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VII, Part I, Liberal Arts Press edition, p. 78. In his "An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature" he states: "We have no idea of substance of any kind since we have no idea but what is derived from some impression, and we have no impression of any substance either material or spiritual."

noumenal world, was so far Humean, but in distinguishing between the contents of sense perception and the a priori concepts of the understanding which together, according to him, can give necessary knowledge, he was attempting to go beyond Hume's scepticism. Within his Table of Categories, under Relation, he includes substance, causality and reciprocity. (Later Hegel will choose to examine this same sequence of categories in his Logic.) However, Kant shows that subject is more fundamental, and logically prior to the category of substance, through his analysis leading to 'the original unity of apperception'. Having distinguished the transcendental ego from the empirical self, he makes the former the fundamental principle of synthesis. "The supreme principle (of the possibility of all intuition) in its relation to understanding, is that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception."63 Fichte explores and develops Kant's 'original' or 'transcendental' unity of apperception, and attempts to show that the pure ego is the first principle of philosophy. The ego or 'I' principle is not discoverable by direct introspection of the

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63 Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N. K. Smith, B 136; See also A 105-108, A 119 and particularly B 139, where he explains that 'The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is therefore entitled objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of inner sense - through which the manifold of intuition for such /objective/ combination is empirically given."
contents of consciousness, nor is it attained in mystical experience, but is gained through an intellectual intuition. The latter is an awareness of the pure ego as an activity in consciousness, and in evidence of it, Fichte cites quite ordinary, everyday human actions. In the awareness of one's actions as one's own, one is aware of himself acting, one has "the intellectual intuition of (his) self-consciousness in these actions". However, one need not be reflectively aware of this intuition as a component element in self-consciousness, and, as Fichte insists, in all consciousness, for the reflection (transcendental reflection) in which attention is turned back or reflected on the pure ego, is a philosophical activity. The pure ego cannot be objectified like other objects of consciousness, but nevertheless, it is not an inferred entity existing beyond or behind consciousness. The pure ego reveals itself in the activity of objectification, but it is not something which acts, it "is a doing and absolutely nothing else." (In affirming the pure transcendental ego, Fichte showed that he had pursued the question of 'subject' more deeply than had Hume with his attempted reduction of the self to the mere succession of phenomena.) Out of the original activity of the pure ego arises the first fundamental

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64 Werke, ed. F. Medicus, III, p. 47.
65 Ibid., p. 24.
proposition of philosophy (A=A, the abstract undetermined identity). The pure ego, as spontaneous activity, is not itself conscious, it does not exist for itself, until through the philosopher's reflection on and "through an activity directed towards an activity ... the ego first comes to be originally for itself,"66 i.e. it simply posits its own being. Because consciousness would not arise unless the ego was opposed by the non-ego, the second fundamental proposition (Not-A is not A) is adduced: "a non-ego is simply posited opposed (opposited) to the ego"67 by the ego itself, within itself, i.e. the distinction of object from subject is expressed. The non-ego here is not a particular object but objectivity in general, and in this latter sense, is unlimited. However, it was the unlimited activity of the pure ego, which posited the non-ego within itself. Thus, each of the two propositions is made self-contradictory by the other: in positing the non-ego, the ego is negated, by itself; and the non-ego is negated by the ego. But they do not cancel one another completely, for to do so would make consciousness impossible. The third proposition resolves the contradiction by effecting a synthesis of the thesis and the antithesis. Since to negate is to determine or limit, and the pure ego both posits and

66 Werke, III, p. 43; see also Werke, I, p. 292.
67 Werke, I, p. 298.
negates itself, it posits itself as a determinable or limit-
able ego limited by a non-ego which is likewise determinable, i.e. they reciprocally determine and limit one another. In short, the pure ego posits a finite ego and a finite non-ego within itself. (Hegel is critical of the way this synthesis is achieved.) The third proposition divides again into two opposed propositions: the ego posits itself as determined by the non-ego, the beginning point of theoretical activity, and the ego posits the non-ego as determined by itself, the beginning point of practical activity.

Hegel was thoroughly immersed in and knowledgable of this whole evolution of thought; he considered that the problem of substance and subject needed reformulation, and thought that he had the solution, that he knew how substance and subject were related and could show this in his system. He recognized the contributions made by the above and other philosophers, such as Schelling, toward its solution. Besides his immediate predecessors, he appears particularly to have Spinoza

68 He writes of positing 'in the ego a divisible non-
ego opposed to a divisible one'. Werke, I, p. 305.

69 "Of this synthesis there is nothing, properly speaking, contained in the two earlier propositions. Even this first presentation of the three principles does away with the immanence of real knowledge. ... and we remain entirely in the ego." History of Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 490. In response to the question why consciousness should in fact arise or how the second proposition is deduced or produced from the first, Fichte turns to a practical deduction wherein the pure ego is viewed as an unlimited activity tending or opening towards consciousness of its own freedom through moral self-realization in the objective world of finite consciousnesses.
and Leibniz in mind when dealing with this problem area. In respect to Hegel's appreciation of Fichte's contribution, Mure states that,

Hegel held that though Fichte had recognized that in self-consciousness lay the means of reconciling subject and substance, yet he had failed to work out the solution. The non-ego upon which the activity of Fichte's ego breaks ... is to the ego an incomprehensible obstruction. Nevertheless this non-ego is treated by Fichte as produced by the ego. The contradiction is not reconciled. Fichte failed to get completely beyond the Kantian conception of thought as formal to the notion of thought as in its full nature a self-constituting theoretical activity containing, but absorbing and transcending, will.70

This sub-section began with an indication that Hegel stresses that the universe must be conceived in its ultimate reality not solely as substance but also as subject. While some advance was made into Hegel's meaning of subject in the previous chapter, and some indications of his meaning of substance appeared, it is clearly important to find out what he means by the terms 'substance' and 'subject' when related in this way. Here, the concern is more particularly with substance. In the Science of Logic, after treating of 'The Absolute', he makes some pertinent remarks concerning some of the principles of the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz, which cast some light on his own. Hegel notes that "the absolute principle of Spinoza's philosophy" is Indeterminateness

70 An Introduction to Hegel, p. 57-58. Mure adds: "Hence to Hegel the result of Fichte's philosophy seems still to be subjective idealism."
is negation" and that "this true and simple insight establishes the absolute unity of Substance."\(^7^1\) Hegel agrees with Spinoza's concept of substance, so far as Spinoza develops this conception, however Spinoza's insight into the role of negation is left relatively undeveloped. "But Spinoza stops short at negation as determinateness or quality; he does not advance to a cognition of negation as absolute, that is, self-negating negation; thus his substance does not itself contain absolute form, and cognition of it is not an immanent cognition."\(^7^2\)

Hegel wants to show that the Absolute is not a hidden and inscrutable reality existing behind or beyond its determinate showing, rather it is its self-revelation in its self-unfoldment. Philosophy for Hegel, aims to comprehend the Absolute, and this in its totality, the universe as a whole, in its process of self-development. This dynamic whole of the Absolute is not simply infinite Substance as with Spinoza, it is also Subject, and one of the formulations of the principle of development of the Absolute conceived as substance and Subject is the above 'self-negating negation'. While he


\(^7^2\) Ibid. "Aber Spinoza bleibt bei der Negation als Bestimmtheit oder Qualität stehen; er geht nicht zur Erkenntnis derselben als absoluter, d.h. sich negierender Negation fort; somit enthält seine Substanz nicht selbst die absolute Form, und das Erkennen derselben ist kein immanentes Erkennen." Ibid.
appreciates that for Spinoza, "substance is the absolute unity of thought and being or extension; therefore contains thought itself", which contributes heavily in favour of the truth of Spinoza's philosophy, it is nevertheless a defective philosophy in his view, because substance in containing thought itself, does so "only in its unity with extension, that is, not as separating itself from extension, hence in general not as a determinate and formative activity, nor as a movement which returns into and begins from itself." From this two consequences follow, which represent defects and two more of Hegel's critical differences with this philosophy; 1) as in the Phenomenology, he agrees with the general criticism of Spinoza, that 'Substance lacks the principle of personality' and 2) he adds the more specific criticism that 'cognition (in this case) is external reflection which does not comprehend and derive from substance that which appears as finite'. When, in other contexts, he discusses what he calls 'The Religion of Substance', he is critical of the perspective of reality wherein all particularity is swallowed up in the substance of a universal being, and this misconception results in part from

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failing to give adequate attention to subject. For Hegel as for Spinoza, substance is that which is self-necessitating, but because he thinks the Absolute must be subject as well as substance, and as the Notion has not yet been derived in the development of the logic of the Idea, he does not regard substance as such, as consciously self-necessitating.

The notions of substance given by Spinoza are the notions of 'cause of itself', and that substance is that whose essence includes existence - that the notion of the absolute does not require the notion of an other by which it must be formed. These notions, profound and correct as they are, are definitions, which are immediately assumed at the outset of the science.74

Hegel, in general, agrees with Spinoza's conception of substance as such, but he disagrees with the arbitrariness of beginning with it; more precisely, he concurs in the connotations given in these definitions, but he does not agree with beginning with such definitions. He appreciates that Mathematics and other sciences must begin with something presupposed, but this is not the case for philosophy, where "the absolute cannot be a first, an immediate; on the contrary, the

absolute is essentially its result."\textsuperscript{75} Hegel is also critical of other important features of Spinoza's philosophy: 1) Spinoza having determined the Absolute's attributes as of 'an infinite plurality', the two which appear, thought and extension, 'are adopted empirically'. 2) He failed to show a necessary transition from the Absolute Substance to its inessential modes, and he failed to see and show that it could not be Absolute unless it does so differentiate itself. 3) The succession absolute, attributes and mode is 'without any inner sequence of development' and is similar to the oriental conception of emanation in which the engendering of finite beings is a mere 'happening, the becoming only ... a progressive loss.'

He turns now to the notion of the Leibnizian monad wherein 'the lack of reflection-into-self', from which Hegel thinks Spinoza's 'exposition of the absolute' suffers, 'is made good'. Hegel credits Leibniz with 'the principle of individuality'\textsuperscript{76} provided by the self-conscious and self-determining monads, each with its self-contained 'totality of the content of the world', but each distinguished from all the


\textsuperscript{76} Ency. Logic, \# 151, Zus.; S. Werke, 8, p. 339. See also S. of L., p. 540; W. der L., II, p. 168. and The History of Philosophy, III. Findlay remarks that, "The comparative favour shown to Leibniz is extremely revealing: it shows how the Hegelian Absolute has no other seat or vehicle, no other location for its infinity or its absoluteness, beyond the experiences and decisions of particular conscious persons." Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 210.
other monads. Hegel sees the monads as essentially ideative, and although finite in nature, not passive: their determinations are manifestations within themselves of themselves, - their own acts. Hegel however is critical of the externality of the source of what he calls the predestination of the monads:

Consequently, the monad is in itself or according to its substance, the totality, but it is not so in its manifestation. This limitation of the monad necessarily falls, not in the self-positing or ideating monad, but in its in-itself; or it is absolute limit, a predestination which is posited by another being than itself.??

He is also critical of the externality of the means of relating monads to one another: the harmonizing of these 'limited entities' which are at the same time 'self-enclosed' and 'absolute', falls outside them, is 'pre-established by another being.' Again, what is lacking is 'the differentiating relation of the Notion', he remarks in his lectures on Leibniz.78

Hegel treats of the Relation of Substantiality at the end of the Doctrine of Essence within the section Actuality. Along with the categories Causality and Reciprocity, Substantiality serves as his transition to the Doctrine of the Notion.


78 History of Philosophy, III, p. 343; S. Werke, 19, p. 467.
Its very location is significant: Substance is Essence comprehended most deeply, and yet thought takes it up and advances to the more profound 'notion of the Notion'. In short, its position is indicative that 'The Relation of Substantiality', significant category that it is, in that it preserves the gains made by all the categories leading to it, by itself is not sufficient, or not adequate, to the task of unifying the world in a dynamic whole which has a living internal coherence. Nevertheless, Hegel's notion of Substance shows itself to be in no way static. It can be seen to comprise some of the connotations which attach to the concept over the history of philosophy and, at least in his view, to advance upon these. The analysis of Substantiality, follows immediately from the examination of contingency, possibility and necessity.

Absolute necessity is absolute relation because it is not being as such, but being that is because it is, being as absolute self-mediation. This being is substance; as the final unity of essence and being it is the being in all being; it is neither the unreflected immediate, nor an abstract being standing behind Existence and Appearance, but it is immediate actuality itself and this as absolute reflectedness-into-self, as a subsisting in and for itself.79

While substance is the being in all being, it is not an immediate 'given', nor an abstract something behind or underlying a thing's appearance. This substance is not the much criticized substratum in which accidents are presumed to adhere or inhere, or which is presumed to support the perceived sensible qualities, nor is it merely a collection of qualities experienced existing together - some of the kinds of meaning which were sometimes attached to the word "substance" in post-mediaeval philosophy. Hegel strives to bring out the meaning of substance in terms of identity and change together, by regarding 'the identity of substance' as 'form-activity'. (Formtätigkeit) Substance 'invests itself with actuality', reveals itself in a form or accident, then 'passes over into another actuality', i.e. the first is withdrawn by it and replaced by another actuality. The unity of substance involves a continual passing over from the possible to the actual, and withdrawal or return into itself, while retaining its identity in all of its changes. "This movement of accidentality is the actiosity of substance as a tranquil coming forth of itself." 

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80 Enzy., / 150. For Hegel's conception of Activity, Mure explains that "There is not activity where there is less than self-severance and self-reunion. Only that which has put and is putting itself forth from itself, and yet has remained and does remain one with itself is active." Study of Hegel's Logic, p. 34-35.


Like the other categories of essence, substance is a correlative notion, but unlike those preceding it, it is an absolute correlation, i.e. the Absolute Correlation in its immediate form is the relationship of Substance and Accident. Up until now, one could view the same content from one or other of the correlates as under a different form, but with the Absolute Correlation, to regard the same content with one or other of the correlates is to view it also in terms of the other. "Substance, as this identity of the showing (reflective movement) is the totality of the whole and embraces accidentality within it, and accidentality is the whole substance itself."

In putting forth itself as accidents, it is only itself, i.e. substance. Substance in its differentiating of itself into an outward diversity, puts forth only itself, and the differences put forth return to their source in their substance. These dependent modifications are the accidents of the substance, but they are of the substance, and are substance. Substance exists in its appearing and appears in its accidents as power or necessity "Substance is accordingly the totality of the Accidents, revealing itself in them as their absolute negativity, (that is to say, as absolute power) and at the same time as the wealth of all content." Of the meanings or definitions

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he gives for 'substance' the one that follows is particularly clear and explicit: "Substantiality is the absolute form activity and the power of necessity."^84

Hegel's notion of substance does have some of the connotations of Spinoza's substance, but in striving to unify the logical meanings of substance as subject with the meaning of Spinoza's one absolutely universal and independent substance (that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, and that which is self-caused or from itself) he has also drawn from the thought of Kant, Leibniz and Aristotle. However, in the case of the latter, his "distinction between substantial and accidental characters is not here preserved by Hegel, who conceives Substance as completely exhausted in its Accidents. So also does Kant."^85 Some items of Hegel's language used in connection with substance, words like: 'form-activity' and 'power', suggest Leibniz as much as any of the other philosophers mentioned above; and because Hegel often contrasts the views of Leibniz and Spinoza, the question arises whether Hegel's appreciation of Leibniz's principle of individuality is such as to counter his appreciation of Spinoza's

^84 Enzy. Logic, / 151. "Die Substanz ist hiemit die Totalität der Akzidenzen, in denen sie sich als deren absolute Negativität, d.i. als absolute Macht und zugleich als den Reichtum alles Inhalts offenbart. ... Die Substantialität ist die absolute Formtätigkeit und die Macht der Notwendigkeit." Enzy., p. 145.

^85 Mure, Study, Hegel's Logic, p. 146. However, Mure admits in a foot-note that it is possible to so interpret some passages in Aristotle.
conception of substance, to the extent that he might be disinclined to accept Spinoza's one Substance. In the Encyclopaedia, Hegel's discussion of Spinoza and Leibniz is provided in the Zusatz to his treatment of Substance and Accidents, and "This might lead one to think that Substance as here treated involves singleness in its notion, that there can be but one Substance of which all things are Accidents."

Findlay insists that, "To draw this inference would, however, be wrong. Hegel's treatment of Substance is quite neutral as regards the opposition between monism and pluralism. And the subsequent movement of the Dialectic is towards a world of interacting substantial units rather than to a Spinozistic unity." If this interpretation is correct, then Hegel is in a position to comprise, more consistently, within his philosophy a notion of historicity, while retaining a conception of human nature in some form. Hegel does use the term 'substance' in ways which support Findlay's interpretation.

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86 op. cit., p. 215-216. Findlay adds in support: "Hegel's use of the word 'substance' in other contexts has more over no all-comprehensive Spinozistic suggestions: he speaks of 'substance' in connection with the half-conscious ethical life of primitive society, which is certainly not thought of as all-inclusive." Compare Fackenheim, Infra subsection B. c.
b. The Relation of Causality

Hegel's thorough dialectical analysis of Substantiality leads on to the category of Causality, which in turn exemplifies Necessity with increased adequacy. Hegel conceives of negation as power, activity and productiveness; and substance, as absolute negative self-relation, shows such power in its production of its accidents, which negate it, and by negation again, are returned to itself. "Substance is power, and power that is reflected into itself and not merely transitory, but that posits determinations and distinguishes them from itself." Focus is now shifted more directly on the determinations posited and distinguished from Substance. As shown, positing itself as accidents, it is only itself, i.e. substance. Because substance produces itself in its accidents exhaustively, each accident is actual substance; the contradiction becomes explicit and the relation of substantiality passes over into the relation of causality. "As self-relating in its determining, it is itself that which it posits as a negative or makes it into a positedness. Thus this is in general sublated substantiality, that which is merely posited, or effect; but substance which is for itself is cause." In


\[88\] Ibid. "Als in ihrem Bestimmen sich auf sich selbst beziehend, ist sie selbst das, was sie als Negatives
conceiving of an active substance exercising power on or over another substance, there develops the conception of cause (active substance) and effect (passive substance).

In what Hegel calls Formal Causality, it first appears that 'Cause is primary (original) in relation to effect'. (Die Ursache ist das Ursprüngliche gegen die Wirkung.) However, he sets about to show that there is nothing in the effect which is not in the cause. While Kant had realized that if causality were to be made intelligible as an objective relation, Hume's assumption of the absolute independence of the causal elements would need to be relinquished, it remained for Hegel to show concretely the identity of cause and effect. He shows that the actuality which substance has as cause, it has only in its effect: "the cause is therefore truly actual and self-identical only in its effect. The effect is therefore necessary just because it is the manifestation of the cause or is this necessity which is cause. Only as this necessity is cause self-moving* ... Consequently, effect contains nothing whatever that cause does not contain."\(^8^9\) For

\(^8^9\) S. of L., p. 559. "die Ursache ist daher erst in ihrer Wirkung das wahrhaft Wirkliche und mit sich Identische. Die Wirkung ist daher notwendig, weil sie eben Manifestation
Hegel the converse also holds. At this stage, causality appears as a mere tautology of external reflection, for 'cause as such implies its effect, and effect implies cause', but by pursuing his analysis of the self-identity of cause in its effect through various examples, under the next sub-category, The Determinate Relation of Causality, he is able to show there is only one substance present in the causal relation as such, i.e. the cause determines itself, and in producing an effect, it is actually becoming itself. It may be presumed that there is more content in the cause than is requisite to be cause of this precise effect, but this does not warrant conceiving cause and effect as separate existents. His examples drawn from common experience support his contention: The rain as cause and the wetness as effect are the self-same water. Similarly, the same quantum of motion is communicated by the propulsive force to the body that is moved. He also takes up a typical objection involving a chain of more and more remote causal links, which may be thought to bring in other circumstances or content at each link: he shows that this objection involves an improper imposition of limits on the notion of Causality, i.e. by having recourse to the Spurious Infinite. The intermediate members may disguise the

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der Ursache oder diese Notwendigkeit ist, welche die Ursache ist. - Nur als diese Notwendigkeit ist die Ursache selbst bewegend, ... Die Wirkung enthält daher überhaupt nichts, was nicht die Ursache enthält." W. der L., II, p. 190-191.
identity contained therein, but the complete effect is contained not in the first causal term, but only in the 'plurality of causes together'.

c. Reciprocity

The sub-category Action and Reaction provides the transition to Reciprocity. In the former, Hegel brings together the formal identity of cause and effect and the unlimited progression of content of determinate causality, in a new synthesis. (The underlying movement of thought continues to direct itself toward categories which will more adequately comprise and preserve difference in unity.) In Determinate Causality, Hegel showed that although the effect is ordinarily thought of as passive and the cause as active, and ordinarily the causal sequence is traced back toward remoter causes, this results in a situation where the form and content of the two moments of the Cause and Effect correlation do not coincide. The content changes as specific causal terms oscillate from effect to cause and cause to effect forward and backward along a causal line which has no terminus. Hegel thinks that the causal relation is better conceived when both terms are viewed as active, at this stage, in the sense of action and reaction. He contends that the effect is not merely passive to its cause and thence active toward its own further effect, for it also reacts upon its cause. "As immediate, this substance is not a self-related negativity and active, but passive. Yet it is
a substance, and it is therefore active also; it therefore suspends the immediacy it was originally put forward with, and the effect which was put into it; it reacts, i.e. suspends the activity of the first substance." The first substance also suspends the activity of the other substance and reacts. The distinctions between cause and effect, and active and passive substances begins to break down. The pure passivity of the effect is shown to be an abstraction, for the passive substance is also active, and not merely in the sense of taking its turn as cause, i.e. as a link in a linear causal chain, but in the sense of reacting on the 'original' active substance. In conceiving of the action of a cause a response is presupposed (no matter how minimal) from that which it is to act on, if it is to be considered a cause. The form of the causal activity of one substance depends and varies with the other substance so that the new condition that emerges is the result of their mutual interaction. Each substance is cause and effect to and of the other. The new category takes shape in the form of the true infinite, "whereby the action, which in finite causality runs on into the spuriously infinite progress, is bent round and becomes an action that returns into itself, an infinite

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90 Enzy. Logic, f 154. "Diese ist, als unmittelbar, nicht sich auf sich beziehende Negativität und aktiv, sondern passiv. Aber als Substanz ist sie ebenso aktiv, hebt die vorausgesetzte Unmittelbarkeit und die in sie gesetzte Wirkung auf, reagiert, d.h. sie hebt die Aktivität der ersten Substanz auf, ..." Enzy. p. 147.
reciprocal action.\textsuperscript{91} What has been attained is not simply a reciprocity of cause and effect, but a reciprocity of substances, where both moments of the causal relation are on the same level. "At first, reciprocity displays itself as a reciprocal causality of presupposed, self-conditioning substances; each is alike active and passive substance in relation to the other."\textsuperscript{92} In this reciprocal relation, each substance is active and reactive and each turns back upon itself, having given and taken without totally coercing or destroying the other, so that each substance is in a wholly authentic self-relation. Substances can not be simply passive, they must also be active in the same relation, so that they can no longer be regarded as passively suffering the effects of foreign causal influences, but have become free\textsuperscript{93}


\textsuperscript{92} Ibid. "ZumAnchst stellt die Wechselwirkung sich sich dar als eine gegenseitige Kausalität von vorausgesetzten, sich bedingenden Substanzen; jede ist gegen die andere zugleich active und zugleich passive Substanz." Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93} Findlay has the following to say about Spinoza's contribution to Hegel's conception of freedom: "Hegel is here bringing into his Dialectic a vision undoubtedly borrowed from Spinoza, but he is bringing it in with a difference. While Spinoza sees Freedom merely in the realization of one's union with the necessity and infinity of the Universe, Hegel rather sees it in the extension of one's nature so as to take in all the influences and relationships that impinge on it from without. We are free for Spinoza by losing ourselves in the Universe: we are free for Hegel since the only Universe that can be is in us. This freedom is, however, only implicit at the present level." op. cit., p. 219.
through their capacity for self-development and for 'transmuting' the causal encounters with other substances. The kind of necessity shown as operant at this stage arises from within the substances themselves, so that their interaction with each other serves only to bring out their respective natures. Substance in its self-diremption and self-manifestation as substance is absolutely actual. "But this unity is also for itself in that this whole alternation is properly the cause in act of constituting itself and in such constitution lies its being."94

Although Reciprocity does realise 'the causal relation in its complete development' it is also a defective category, according to Hegel. He considers two examples to illustrate part of this defectiveness: 1) historical research and 2) the study of living organisms. In the first, the question may arise whether the constitution and laws of a particular people result from the character of a nation, or vice versa. The answer may appear to lie in reciprocal influence, just as it may in respect to the relation of animal organs and their functions. Although Reciprocity is 'the proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect', if the aim is a thoroughly comprehensive notion, then this category will not do. To study

a given content within the perspective of reciprocity, 'would leave matters utterly incomprehensible'. To regard a constitution as interacting with national character in a reciprocal relation amounts to not much more than looking at one side, then the other, while trying to keep the two together, so that what is required is that both must be thoroughly comprehended along with all other special aspects of national life and history, and all must be seen to be founded in a higher category, i.e. the Notion.

Before taking up the Notion, a few conclusions can be drawn from the preceding sections: 1) Spinoza's *causa sui* is very much to the forefront of Hegel's mind and is effectively used in re-thinking Aristotle's doctrine on efficient and material causality. (This is not to discount Hegel's appreciation of Kant's work on substance, cause and reciprocity.)

2) In respect to Spinoza's conception of freedom, Hegel uses it only in part, for in forming a notion appropriate to his system, he includes features of the thought of his immediate predecessors, particularly Kant, as noted in previous chapters, and from Aristotle (as will be shown) especially his conception of 'self-thinking thought'. 3) In respect to Spinoza's conception of Substance, as such, Hegel strives to transform it to give due place to the Leibnizian principle of individuality. This work is only partially accomplished and the task is carried forward to the Notion and Spirit. Fackenheim while writing of selfhood and the concept of a social whole, gives
Hegel's term "substance" for the latter, and then provides a footnote to explain Hegel's use of this term.

This term here applies to every relatively complete objective reality whether, like nature, it is what it is without reference to selfhood or, like the social whole presently considered, it requires reference to selfhood. Ultimately, only absolute, i.e., Spinozistic - Substance is Substance. And to understand it, like Spinoza, as Substance, and yet, unlike Spinoza, as neither divorced from nor destructive of selfhood - all forms of selfhood - is the ultimate goal of Hegel's philosophy.95

C. The Notion

The living substance is, further, that being which is in truth subject or to say the same thing in other words - which is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or the mediation between a self and its development into something different.96

The only possible refutation of Spinozism must therefore consist, in the first place, in recognizing its standpoint as essential and necessary and then going on to raise that standpoint to the higher one through its own immanent dialectic.97

In the first passage above, Hegel continues his substance-subject exposition in his Phenomenology Preface, part of which was cited when beginning the previous section. In it he

95 The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, p. 46.
96 WK 1, p. 388; Phen., p. 80. "Die lebendige Substanz ist ferner das Sein, welches in Wahrheit Subjekt, oder was dasselbe heiszt, welches in Wahrheit wirklich ist, nur insofern sie die Bewegung des Sichselbstsetzens, oder die Vermittlung des Sichanderswerdens mit sich selbst ist." PhAn., p. 20.
so intimately relates substance to subject, in compressed expression, that the notion of the former is effectively transformed. In the second passage, one can see why the dialectic of Substantiality, while indeed the culmination of the Doctrine of Essence, begins in the sense of being transition to, and is the immediate basis for the Doctrine of the Notion, because the immanent dialectic of Spinozism directs thought from substance to this higher standpoint. From the spheres of immediacy (Being) and mediation (Essence), the sphere of self-mediation (the Notion) arises. Being and Essence were comprised in Hegel's Objective Logic, the categories of which were objectively directed; Hegel entitles the third division Subjective Logic and its notions are both subjectively and objectively directed through the over-reaching or over-arching encompassing power of the Notion. (Subjective Logic comprises Subjectivity, Objectivity and the Idea.) Hegel tells his readers that the Notion is to be regarded as the absolute foundation, not merely as a subjective presupposition, 'yet it can be so only in so far as it has made itself the foundation ... through the sublation of mediation'. Being and essence are the moments of its becoming; but the Notion 'is their foundation and truth as the identity in which they are submerged and contained'; being and essence are contained in the Notion because the Notion is their result, 'but no longer as being and essence', except 'in so far as they have not withdrawn into this their unity'. So it is that Hegel's
Objective Logic 'constitutes properly the genetic exposition of the Notion'. Broadly speaking, the transition from Essence to the Notion is from substance to subject, and more specifically, the Notion arises from the last category of essence, that of reciprocity. Hegel's exposition of The Notion in General first centers on the immanent necessity of the actual transition from Substance (what is implicit in substance is manifested in the Notion) to the Notion. Because "the Notion is the truth of substance; and since substance has necessity for its specific mode of relationship, freedom reveals itself as the truth of necessity and as the mode of relationship proper to the Notion."  

Hegel summarizes the dialectic of substance (the Absolute Relation) in order to explicate the meaning of the transition from the sphere of necessity to that of freedom. Substance, as the simple identity of possibility and actuality, posits accidents from itself but as it is itself which it posits, the accident is also substance. In acting on the second substance the relation of causality develops, active substance is cause to the passive substance, which is effect to the original. However as the effect is a substance it is

99 Ibid., p. 577-578. "So ist der Begriff die Wahrheit der Substanz, und indem die bestimmtte Verhältnisweise der Substanz die Notwendigkeit ist, zeigt sich die Freiheit als die Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit und als die Verhältnisweise des Begriffs." Ibid., p. 214.
also active, so that it is also cause and therefore reacts on the original, with which the relation of reciprocity is attained, i.e. substance's complete expression. (The paired moments of Essence at this stage have at last developed into equivalent wholly substantial and actual totalities.) In each of the categories of substance there is a self-related substance which posits itself in an opposite as accident, effect and lastly reacting substance. In Reciprocity the substance and its opposite are identical, are one, so that the two contradictory moments have become reconciled and in place of the necessity of correlated moments, there is a correlation of moments of free activity; substance here passes into the sphere of self-mediation, to that of the Notion which in positing its opposite, remains identical with itself in its self-opposition.

The Notion, the totality resulting from the reciprocal relation, is the unity of the two substances standing in that relation; but in this unity they are now free, for they no longer possess their identity as something blind, that is to say, as something merely inner; on the contrary, the substances now have essentially the status of an illusory being, of being moments of reflection, whereby each is no less immediately united with its other or its positedness and each contains its positedness within itself, and consequently in its other is posited as simply and solely identical with itself.

S. of L., p. 581-582. "Dieser, die aus der Wechselwirkung resultierende Totalität, ist die Einheit der beiden Substanzen der Wechselwirkung, so dasz sie aber nunmehr der Freiheit angehören, indem sie nicht mehr ihr Identität als ein Blindes, das heiszt Innerliches, sondern dasz sie wesentlich die Bestimmung haben, als Schein oder Reflexionsmomente zu sein, wodurch jede mit ihrem Andern oder ihrem Gesetztssein ebenso unmittelbar zusammengegangen /ist/ und jede ihr Gesetztssein in sich selbst enthält, somit in ihrem Andern schlechthin
In Hegel's criticism of Reciprocity, he directed attention to the emergence of this new category, found in the recognition that there is something more present than a reciprocity of substances, there is the whole of the movement into externality and return into self, which is now seen as a self-articulating process which takes difference into itself, by negating the negation of its object within itself; it includes its opposition within itself. Through the notion's capacity for actively over-arching its content and actively comprising difference and externality within itself, thought has transcended substance which in effect presupposed its essence. The Notion is actively and truly self-determining. "With the Notion, therefore, we have entered the realm of freedom. Freedom belongs to the Notion because that identity which, as absolutely determined, constitutes the necessity of substance, is now also sublated or is a positedness, and this positedness as self-related is simply that identity."  

Although substance nur als identisch mit sich gesetzt ist." W. der L., II, p. 218.  

101 See Werner Becker's discussions of 'Identität' in connection with 'der Begriffe' in Hegels Begriff der Dialektik und das Prinzip des Idealismus, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1969, particularly p. 89.  

102 S. of L., p. 582. "Im Begriffe hat sich daher das Reich der Freiheit eröffnet. Er ist das freie, weil die an und für sich seielde Identität, welche die Notwendigkeit der Substance ausmacht, zugleich als aufgehoben oder als Gesetztsein ist, und dies Gesetztsein, als sich auf sich selbst beziehend, eben jene Identität ist." W. der L., II, p. 218-219.
could be conceived of as expressing its nature in its interaction with other substances, it could not do so for itself; it lacked the capacity of self-consciously knowing itself in its process of maintaining its identity while determining itself. It lacked the freedom to transmute all externality, all alien being into itself with the perfect freedom of self-conscious thought. "The mutual opacity of the substances standing in the causal relationship has vanished and become a self-transparent clarity, for the originality of their self-subsistence has passed into a positedness." The result of the movement of the Logic's dialectic is that thought has become self-conscious, and with the advent of the Notion, thought from this point will articulate itself from within itself and become a concrete system. The Notion will explicitly articulate its 'absolute unity of being and reflection'. The emphasis henceforth will be more on preservation than on contradiction as such, because in the Notion sublation is fully manifested. Thus, the Actuality in which Essence resulted is carried forward in the phases of the Notion, all of which are actual. In explicating the Notion of the Notion, Hegel shows the Notion to contain the three moments: universality, particularity

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104 Ibid., p. 578. Ibid., p. 214.
and individuality, but they are interdependent and cannot be separated from the whole of the universal Notion. "Each of them, the universal and the individual, is the totality, each contains within itself the determination of the other, and therefore these totalities are one and one only."\(^{105}\)

a. The Universal Notion

In the Notion's moment of Universality, the Notion is in free equality with itself in its specific character. The Notion as universal is an identity which has its opposite within itself. Although 'universality is the utterly simple determination', it is not an abstract universal, it is a concrete whole containing differences within itself because "the simplicity which constitutes the very nature of the universal is such that, through absolute negativity, it contains within itself difference and determinateness in the highest degree."\(^{106}\) The universal is a concrete identity but it is the first and least concrete of the categories of the Notion. The universal's simple relation to itself is only within itself. 'however, this identity is within itself absolute mediation, but it is not


something mediated", as in the case of the abstract universal. "The universal is therefore free power; it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but without doing violence to it; on the contrary, the universal is, in its other, in peaceful communion with itself." In determining itself freely, in its creative power, 'it makes itself finite', and in this determining, 'it differentiates itself internally'. In this free activity, particularity is posited.

b. The Particular Notion

The Notion's moment of Particularity is that in which the Notion gives itself specific character, but in which the universal remains identical with itself. In determining itself it gives itself determinateness, which is difference or particularity; its moment of opposition is the particular. The Notion, however, in exercising its power of self-particularizing itself through its own opposite, remains universal. "The particular contains universality, which constitutes its substance; the genus is unaltered in its species, and the species are not different from the universal but only from one another. The particular has one and the same universality as the other

particulars to which it is related."\textsuperscript{108} The particular is not to be conceived as an exclusive entity, it is specification which is also universal. The third moment of the Notion arises when it negates its opposite, and comprises in unity the universal and the particular.

c. The Individual

In the Notion's moment of Individuality it reflects or returns-into-self its moments of universality and particularity. The Individual is the unity of the universal and the particular, again retaining its self-identity in the process. "It is the self-mediation of the Notion in so far as its otherness has made itself into an other again, whereby the Notion has reinstated itself as self-identical, but in the determination of absolute negativity."\textsuperscript{109} The Individual is comprehended as such when the universal in its specification is grasped as one whole. This is thought at the level of Reason wherein the identity of the universal and particular is revealed and sustained, and what is comprehended is the concrete universal. Unity is revealed in the differences, and the differences have their meaning in the whole. Now the Notion must begin its "rise to the Idea which alone is the unity of the Notion and reality", and this is to be seen as "the spontaneous outcome of the nature of the Notion itself."\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{108} p. 605-606; p. 245. \textsuperscript{109} p. 618; p. 260. \textsuperscript{110} p. 587; p. 225.
2. Time, Eternity and History

As for time, ... it is the existing Notion itself.

Eternity is not before or after time, not before the creation of the world, nor when it perishes; rather is eternity the absolute present, the Now, without before and after. The world is created, is now being created, and has eternally been created; this presents itself in the form of the preservation of the world. Creating is the activity of the absolute Idea; the Idea of Nature, like the Idea as such, is eternal.

The other aspect, however, in which Spirit comes into being, History, is the process of becoming in terms of knowledge, a conscious self-mediating process - Spirit externalized and emptied into Time.

Six words which occur in the passages above: The Notion, Spirit, Nature, History and eternal, Hegel uses in connection with his systematic revelation of what man is and has become, (and of what God is). In comprehending their notions Hegel comprehends the being, the becoming and the historicity of man, or more generally, the spirit of man. Within appropriate contexts, which allow for certain qualifications, i.e. that additional and
some significant things must be said about these notions: their reality and their application, Hegel says in effect, man is spirit and man is history. In a more restricted sense, it might be said that man is time\textsuperscript{114} because as man creates his human world, both he in his acting and the historical results of his acting must meet the demands of the negativity of time. He also says that man can, through Absolute Knowledge attain knowledge of the Eternal, that he can in crucial moments share in the eternal life of the Idea. At the end of the Logic, the absolute Idea 'freely releases itself' as Nature, in 'the externality of space and time'.

A. Time

In his Encyclopaedia, the one work which does include the whole system, Hegel opens his development of the Philosophy of Nature\textsuperscript{115} with a discussion of Time and Space. (He develops the categories within the Logic without reference to Time and Space, although he includes occasional remarks about them. In Hegel's view, Time and Space belong in the sphere of Nature.) Time and Space are not, properly speaking, categories, rather

\textsuperscript{114} See Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel, Paris, Gallimard, "Note Sur L' Eternité, Le Temps et Le Concept", p. 366, 370 and 371, where he gives this interpretation of Hegel's position, and may push this connection too far.

\textsuperscript{115} Hegel divides his Philosophy of Nature into three parts or 'Sections': i) Mechanics ii) Physics, and iii) Organics. He uses these titles to denote the three main stages which he thinks are exhibited by nature.
they are his first forms of Nature. Space and time together with matter and motion make up the first stage of nature. In the Logic, the sphere of pure thought, the Idea was internal to itself, 'independent or for itself', but in Nature the internality of the Idea passes into its opposite, the externality of nature, the complex of space, time and matter. Spirit as Idea freely opens itself to the particularity and contingency of spatial, temporal and material existence. "The passage is therefore to be understood here rather in this manner, that the Idea freely releases itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise. By reason of this freedom, the form of its determinateness is also utterly free - the externality of space and time existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity." 116

Contrary to any first impression which might suggest that Hegel thought of the mind, in Kantian terms, as imposing its space and time forms on the data of sense, in fact he clearly holds that space and time are the forms of external things, 117 and not only the forms in which the mind perceives


117 The forms of space and time are imposed on things in the world of nature only in the sense that the Idea might be said to impose them in its eternal activity of opening into the externality of nature, but this activity is not an imposing
them. While he recognizes that what is perceived through the senses does indeed have a spatial and temporal form, Hegel contends that it does not follow that Space and Time are only subjective forms. "But things are in truth themselves spatial and temporal; this double form of asunderness is not one-sidedly given to them by our intuition, but has been originally imparted to them by the intrinsically infinite mind, by the creative eternal Idea."\textsuperscript{118} This passage from the Philosophy of Spirit supports the point made above that for Hegel, space and time are properly 'the forms of external things'. It also supports the observation above, that he was not an idealist in the sense of his holding that the human mind imposes its forms on the data provided through sense experience, or that it constructs the world in its thought-imagination activities. On the other hand, for man to attain consciousness of something, the thing must in some way depart from its externality, from its existence in time and space, and from the denseness and particularity of sense. To accomplish this, sense perception and the activity of thought are required.\textsuperscript{119} In his initial


\textsuperscript{119} See P. of Mind, Sections 448 to 451.
discussion of space and time in the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel makes much the same points, in respect to Kant, i.e., he indicates his partial agreement with him. Space and Time are pure forms of perception; every possible perception is situated in space and time, but such forms are not to be regarded merely as forms of the perceiver's subjectivity. He makes mention of Kant while remarking upon theories concerning the nature of space. Aside from what belongs in the Kantian conception to subjective idealism, he notes that "there remains the correct definition that space is a mere form, i.e. an abstraction, that of immediate externality." While dealing with Time, he makes the remark that "Time, like space, is a pure form of sense or intuition, the non-sensuous sensuous; but, as in the case of space, the distinction of objectivity and a subjective consciousness confronting it, does not apply to time." Hegel's view seems to be that Kant's type of Idealism has marred an otherwise sound theory of space and time.

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120 Commenting on Kant's doctrine of the pure forms of space and time, in his lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel remarks, "As a priori, space and time are universal and necessary, that is to say we find this to be the case; but it does not follow that they must be previously present as conceptions. They are fundamental indeed, but they are likewise an external universal." Vol. III, p. 434; S. Werke, 19, p. 563.

121 P. of N., # 254, Remark. "so bleibt die richtige Bestimmung übrig, dass der Raum eine blosse Form, d.h. eine Abstraktion ist, und zwar die der unmittelbaren Ausserlichkeit." Enzy., p. 207.

122 Ibid., # 258. "Die Zeit ist wie der Raum eine reine Form der Sinnlichkeit oder des Anschauens, das unsinnliche Sinnliche - aber wie diesen, so geht auch die Zeit der
In fact Hegel needs and uses his notion of Space and Time to make his transition from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature. In the developmental analysis of the former, the concrete objects in which alone the categories of thought can be realized, are left behind, that is they are considered only as limits to thought, and not as things significant in their own right. However, in a philosophy of nature, Spirit must endeavour to comprehend this necessary extension of its own being yielding itself to the particularity and free contingency of existence in Time and Space. As initially indicated, Time for Hegel is the notion itself in the form of existence. "Time is the same principle as the I=I of pure self-consciousness, but this principle, or the simple Notion, still in its uttermost externality and abstraction - as intuited mere Becoming, pure being-within-self as sheer coming-out-of-self."¹²³ Space and time may be thought of as categories in the sense that they define the things of nature in terms of outsidedness and externality, one thing to another, either in juxtaposition or in succession; but they are not categories of logic.

¹²³ P. of N., # 258, Remark. "Die Zeit ist dasselbe Prinzip als das Ich=Ich des reinen Selbstbewusstseins; aber dasselbe oder der einfache Begriff noch in seiner gänzlichen Auszerlichkeit und Abstraktion, - als das angerschaute bloße Werden, das reine Insichsein als schlechthin ein Auszersichkommen." Enzy., p. 209.
Hegel appears to have had a conception of the Space-Time relationship which is remarkably similar to certain contemporary notions. For him, time and space are inseparable; time is the necessary complement of Space; and a position in space has meaning only when coupled with a moment of time. The closeness of their relationship and their difference is shown in the following concluding remark to his section devoted to making the transition from space to time: "The truth of space is time, and thus space becomes time; the transition to time is not made subjectively by us, but made by space itself. In pictorial thought, space and time are taken to be quite separate: we have space and also time; philosophy fights against this 'also'."\(^{124}\) Whereas Space is taken up first in Hegel's transition from Idea to Nature, it is Time rather than space which is the properly dividing element in the mutual outsideness of Nature, i.e. Space is determined by time in that every geometrical construction is possible only by moving points in temporal succession. Thus Space itself can only be divided into points by the dispersive action of Time, which is associated successively with different points of Space. "Since space, therefore, is only this inner negation of itself, the self-sublating of its moments is its truth. Now time is

\(^{124}\) P. of N., \(\text{\#257, Zus.}\). "Die Wahrheit des Raumes ist die Zeit, so wird der Raum zur Zeit; wir gehen nicht so subjectiv zur Zeit über, sondern der Raum selbst geht über. In der Vorstellung ist Raum und Zeit weit aus einander, da haben wir Raum und dann auch Zeit; dieses Auch bekämpft die Philosophie." S. Werke, 9, p. 79.
precisely the existence of this perpetual self-sublation; in
time, therefore, the point has actuality." On the other
hand, Hegel opposes any spatialized notion of time. Further­more pure mathematics does not deal with time as time, although
when mathematics is applied in the concrete, it does in some
manner treat of time and motion, etc. In doing so Mathematics
takes synthetic propositions from experience, he suggests in
the Phenomenology, and 'merely applies its formulas to these
assumptions'. One can see in Hegel's discussion of mathematics
and time a foreshadowing of Henri Bergson's brilliant study of
the limitations of mathematics in regard to its capacity for
treating of time, and his distinction between abstract, spa­
tialized time and real or concrete time. For Hegel, Time
is what is negative in itself, it is 'pure Quantity, as self­
existent difference'. Time 'is the negation of the negation,
the self-relating negation'.

Although Hegel does not regard either space or time
as containers in which material things have their existence,
nor does he regard time as 'flowing past' the experiencing

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125 P. of N., # 257, Zus. "Da der Raum also nur
diese innere Negation seiner selbst ist, so ist das Sich­
Aufheben seiner Momente seine Wahrheit; die Zeit ist nun eben
das Daseyn dieses beständigen Sich-Aufhebens, in der Zeit hat
der Punkt also Wirklichkeit." S. Werke, 9, p. 78.

126 See Bergson's Time and Free Will. See Hegel's
observations on Mathematics in P. of N., # 259, Remark and Zus.
also the Phen.: "The principle of magnitude, that difference
void of Notion, and the principle of equality, that abstract
and lifeless unity, are incapable of dealing with this pure
unrest of life and this absolute differentiation." WK 1, 422,
self-conscious subject, it can still be said, in the ordinary use of time language, that for him, man constitutes himself in or through time, i.e. he works and acts while directly intuiting the Becoming of himself and that of his world. That the experience of Time is had in the consciousness of his own becoming and the becoming of the things of his environment is implied in the following definition: "Time, as the negative unity of self-externality, is similarly an out-and-out abstract, ideal being. It is that being which, inasmuch as it is, is not, and inasmuch as it is not, is: it is Becoming directly intuited."¹²⁷ While the first part of the last sentence might be used in the course of describing man as he constitutes or defines himself, by itself the use of this definition of time for man would be misleading. The self-constituted being of man is not so precarious and fragile as this, because man has memory, he has history and he has the infinite power of thought, in which he can comprehend the work of the Notion; and 'Time has no power over the Notion' as will be shown when explicating the meaning of Eternity for Hegel.

The above paragraph suggests the need of giving attention to: 1) Hegel's explanation of how Time, becoming and

¹²⁷ P. of N., f. 258. "Die Zeit, als die negative Einheit des Ausziersichseins, ist gleichfalls ein schlechthin Abstraktes, Ideelles. - Sie ist das Sein, das, indem es ist, nicht ist, und indem es nicht ist, ist; das angeschaute Werden," Enzy., p. 209. See Jenenser Logik, p. 31, where the determinate particular is described as 'essentially the absolute restlessness of not being what it is'. Supra, p. 116.
things relate, and 2) his exposition of the meaning and significance of the Now or Present for the notion of time, and so far as he treats it here, for philosophy. While Space and Time are each continuous in their respective forms of self-externality, he seeks to oppose the idea that would give them an independence from things, 'as if they were for themselves'. In respect to time and things existing therein, he says: "But it is not in time that everything comes to be and passes away, rather time itself is the becoming, this coming-to-be and passing away, the actually existent abstraction, Chronos, from whom everything is born and by whom its offspring is destroyed."

By itself, this passage only opposes the receptacle view of time by insisting that time itself is the becoming, so that he has to go on to include the process of actual things to bring out his meaning more fully. "It is because things are finite that they are in time; it is not because they are in time that they perish; on the contrary, things themselves are the temporal, and to be so is their objective determination. It is therefore the process of actual things themselves which makes time; and though time is called omnipotent,

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it is also completely impotent."\(^{129}\) He also counters the independence of time from things position, expressed the other way, where time passes but things endure, by noting that while some do, others do not, and those that do endure have only a relative duration. Hegel's point is summed up in his statement:
"The real is certainly distinct from time (Das Reelle ist wohl von der Zeit verschieden,) but is also essentially identical with it." (aber ebenso wesentlich identisch mit ihr.)

Hegel's treatment of the Now or Present and its relation to the past and future, 'the dimensions of time', will be shown to have a bearing on his implicit notion of historicity. The present as such will point, somewhat enigmatically to Eternity. Hegel, not untypically, endeavours to bring out together the dual aspects of time, the continuity of the 'dimensions' on the one hand, and on the other, the exclusiveness of the Now, and to reach for an over-arching comprehension of the whole, in effect, to avoid the paucity of a 'knife-edge' view of the Now. The 'dimensions' are the becoming of externality as such, he says, and they are the resolution of becoming into the differences of being: "The immediate vanishing of these differences into singularity is the present as Now which,

\(^{129}\) P. of N., \#258 Zus. "Weil die Dinge endlich sind, darum sind sie in der Zeit: nicht weil sie in der Zeit sind, darum gehen sie unter; sondern die Dinge selbst sind das Zeitliche, so zu seyn ist ihre objective Bestimmung. Der Procesz der wirklichen Dinge selbst macht also die Zeit; und wenn die Zeit das Mächtigste genannt wird, so ist sie auch das Ohnmächtigste." S. Werke, 9, p. 81.
as singularity, is exclusive of the other moments, and at the
same time completely continuous in them, and is only this van­
ishing of its being into nothing and of nothing into its
being." Prior to this point, besides Kant the reader was
likely to think of Aristotle and Leibniz, and later in Hegel's
connecting of time and space with matter and motion, again he
will tend to recall the thought of Aristotle, but here he is
likely to think of St. Augustine. In so doing he is likely to
wonder whether Hegel will be able to improve upon Augustine's
analyses of time experience with its questions about the con­
nection, reality and unreality of time's dimensions. The
answer is that there is a modest clarification of the questions
raised by Augustine, arising chiefly from Hegel's systematic
treatment of time in connection with the other principles of
his system. First, he concentrates on the Now and appears to
grant it alone reality. "The finite present is the Now fixed
as being and distinguished as the concrete unity, and hence as
the affirmative, from what is negative, from the abstract
moments of past and future"; he immediately adds, "but this

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130 P. of N., # 259. "Das unmittelbare Verschwinden
dieser Unterschiede in die Einzelheit ist die Gegenwart als
jetzt, welches als die Einzelheit ausschließend und zugleich
schlechthin kontinuierlich in die andern Momente, selbst nur
dies Verschwinden seines Seins in Nichts und des Nichts in

131 Confessions, Bk. 11, Chapters XIV - XVIII; XXI -
XXVII.
being is itself only abstract vanishing into nothing."¹³²

Hegel says in other words, that it is incorrect to think of
time as extended, that is, as having past, present and future
as dimensions, and moreover, the present itself is only a
momentary Now. Time is the form of becoming intuited, but only
the present truly is. "Furthermore, in Nature where time is
a Now, being does not reach the existence of the difference of
these dimensions; they are, of necessity, only in subjective
imagination, in remembrance and fear or hope."¹³³ Only the
present moment is real in the time of the objective world; and
only in the time of Spirit can the past be unfolded and expan­
ded, through the agency of memory, or the future be projected
in expectation. It is here that the historicity of man emerges
clearly. It is man who remembers, fears and hopes and is rich
and diverse in character, because of it. Out of his memory,
fear and hope come the demands for work and creativity. Out
of the moments of experience, and facets of knowledge, he is
able to constitute a meaningful whole. Now, in this research
it has been said that the Notion itself grounds the notion of

¹³² P. of N., p. 259. "Die endliche Gegenwart ist
das Jetzt als seelend fixiert, von dem Negativen, den abstrak­
ten Momenten der Vergangenheit und Zukunft, als die konkrete
Einheit, somit als das Affirmative unterschieden; allein jenes
Sein ist selbst nur das abstrakte, in Nichts verschwindende." Enzy.
¹¹, p. 210-211.

¹³³ Ibid. "Übrigens kommt es in der Natur, wo die
Zeit Jetzt ist, nicht zum bestehenden Unterschiede von jenen
Dimensionen; sie sind notwendig nur in der subjektiven Vor­
stellung, in der Erinnerung und in der Furcht oder Hoffnung." Enzy.
¹¹, p. 211.
Historicity; in support of our contention Hegel himself has made the connections 1) that 'Time is the existing Notion itself' and 2) that between the Notion and Time and self-consciousness by saying that 'Time is the same principle as the I=I of pure self-consciousness', and 3) between the Notion, Time, Spirit and History, in the last pages of the *Phenomenology* and elsewhere. These connections together with the self-constituting character of man, in which man constitutes himself in nature, society and history, uncovered in the last chapter, provide the necessary presuppositions and characteristics of a notion of historicity, and they show that this notion is rooted in key notions of the system.

One side of the human spirit is the historical spirit. In comprehending the present of his world Man preserves the past in it, he restrains Chronos, he realizes that out of the old the new has come, finally he appreciates that out of the depths of the present the future will emerge. Hegel also recognizes in Nature a capacity for preserving its past: "But the past and future of time as being in Nature, are space, for space is negated time; just as sublated space is immediately the point, which developed for itself in time."\(^{134}\) This has

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\(^{134}\) *P. of N.*, # 259, Remark. "Die Vergangenheit aber und Zukunft der Zeit als in der Natur seilend ist der Raum, denn er ist die negierte Zeit, so ist der aufgehobene Raum zunächst der Punkt und für sich entwickelt die Zeit." *Enzy.*, p. 211.
its human connection too, which Hegel sees: it is not uncommon for men to try to utilize space to overcome time, in various ways, to extend their own duration through their works, not all of which Hegel finds praiseworthy, "e.g. the pyramids: their duration is no virtue." Time's destructive power is its negativity, so that although the present is, it is vanishing, and moments that have vanished or are to come, are merely what they have been and what they will be; but Time's creative power is also negativity. Hegel draws attention to the glory and beauty of things which endure only briefly. Furthermore, contrary to any facile interpretation of his emphasis on the Present, he shows how seriously he takes the Past and Future by comprising them within the Notion of time: "The dimensions of time complete the determinate content of intuition in that they posit for intuition the Notion of time, which is becoming, in its totality or reality; this consists in positing each of the abstract moments of the unity which becoming is, as the whole, but under opposite determinations." In the dialectic which follows, reminiscent of the dialectic of the True

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135 P. of N., f. 258. Zus.
136 Ibid., f. 259. "Die Dimensionen der Zeit machen das Bestimmte der Anschauung vollständig, indem sie den Begriff der Zeit, welcher das Werden ist, für die Anschauung in seiner Totalität oder Realität setzen, die darin besteht, dass die abstracten Momente der Einheit, welche das Werden ist, jedes für sich als das Ganze gesetzt sind, aber unter entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen." S. Werke, 9, p. 85-86.
Infinite, a number of propositions are expressed in connection with the 'dimensions' of time which have implications for Hegel's conception of history. These will be taken up under C. History and Time. The dialectic as such, supports and brings out the meaning and truth of the contention above that the dimensions of time complete the determinate content of the intuition by positing the Notion of time in its totality. Its conclusion is more than a summing up, it is a decisive articulation of Hegel's thought at the heart of his system. It is also an expression dealing with the very heart of the issue raised as this research began, and again at the beginning of this chapter: how is Hegel to show that thought can comprehend time and history and also the eternal:

In the positive meaning of time, it can be said that only the Present is, that Before and After are not. But the concrete Present is the result of the Past and is pregnant with the Future. The true Present, therefore, is eternity.137

Indeed the importance of the Present to his philosophy is evident, but this Present is the Present of thought standing in a peculiarly advantageous position: 1) it comprehends itself and its world as the result of the past, 2) it recognizes that its concrete present is rich with import for the future, that

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it preserves the past, and that out of the present patterns, tendencies and stresses, the future will emerge, and 3) in the True Present, thought can 'consider everything under the form of eternity, sub specie aeterni, that is, as it is in the absolute'.\(^{138}\) It is necessary, then to examine Hegel's notion of Eternity in its connection with time.

B. Eternity* and time

It is clear that from all that has gone before that Hegel does not advocate a doctrine of the unreality of Time. It has been shown that in fact, Hegel holds the position that it is only by attaining self-consciousness through a temporal process that self-conscious Spirit can actually be. It is significant, and consistent with the above remarks, that Hegel, when writing of Absolute Knowledge in the *Phenomenology*, chooses to deal with time at that point, to show its relation to history and to reveal that it is the existing Notion itself.

\(^{138}\) *S. of L.*, p. 538. "Spinoza macht die erhabene Forderung an das Denken, alles unter der Gestalt der Ewigkeit, sub specie aeterni, zu betrachten, das heiszt, wie es im Absolute ist." *W. der L.*, II, p. 166. In effect, Hegel thinks Spinoza is right, but failed to carry through his profound insight because he approached the whole from without: "But in the said absolute, which is only unmoved identity, the attribute, like the mode, is only as vanishing, not as becoming, so that here, too, the vanishing takes its positive beginning only from without." *Ibid.*

* According to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, among the meanings of "eternity" are: "Being eternal ... infinite time, esp. future; the future life."; and for "eternal", this dictionary gives, "That always (has existed &) will exist, ...".
in its externality. "Time is the pure self in external form, apprehended in intuition, and not grasped and understood by the self, it is the notion apprehended only through intui-
tion." It is also significant and consistent with the open-
ing remarks, that in the same paragraph he should write of spirit necessarily appearing in time, and that it should con-
tinue to do so long as time is not annulled. "Time is just the notion definitely existent, and presented to consciousness in the form of empty intuition. Hence spirit necessarily ap-
pears in time, and it appears in time so long as it does not grasp its pure notion, i.e. so long as it does not annul
time." Time, in no way unreal, is the form of that produc-
tive restlessness which exhibits Spirit as it becomes conscious of itself; but Time can be annulled in some sense (at least in principle) according to the above, when spirit grasps its pure Notion. To make the above passage more meaningful, it is nec-
essary to explore or give attention to what he means by annul
in connection with time and Spirit's grasp of the Notion.

Because Hegel connects absolute timelessness with eternity and

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139 Phen., p. 800. "Sie ist das auszere angeschaute vom Selbst nicht erfaszte reine Selbst, der nur angeschaute Begriff;" Phen., p. 558.

140 Ibid. "Die Zeit ist der Begriff selbst, der da ist, und als leere Anschauung sich dem Bewusstsein vorstellt; deswegen erscheint der Geist notwendig in der Zeit, und er erscheint so lange in der Zeit, als er nicht seinen reinen Begriff erfaszt, d.h. nicht die Zeit tilgt." Ibid.
the Notion with the eternal and eternity, and eternity with the infinite, Hegel's secret is to be found in the meanings he gives to these words and in the meaning that emerges from the way he relates these notions: "Absolute timelessness is distinct from duration; the former is eternity, from which natural time is absent. But in its Notion, time itself is eternal; for time as such - not any particular time, nor Now - is its Notion and this, like every Notion generally, is eternal, and therefore also absolute Presence." Among the insights into Hegel's thought on these notions are: a) absolute timelessness is eternity b) natural time is absent from eternity c) time itself is eternal in its Notion. Although eternity clearly is not time, time's Notion is eternal and in that way time is comprised in eternity. The eternity Hegel speaks of here then, is not the indefinite endlessness of the spurious infinite. Eternity is not the kind of temporal infinity wherein increments of time (or duration in time) are added or follow in a progression which is indefinite in extent, i.e. with respect to beginning and/or end. "Eternity will not come to be, nor was it, but it is." (Die Ewigkeit wird nicht seyn, noch war sie; sondern sie ist.) Hegel contends that questions like (a) Did

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the universe have a beginning in time and will it cease to exist in time or does it exist eternally? (b) What will the future life be like in eternity? are abstract and somewhat pointless because of a confusion about the meaning of eternity or because eternity is conceived as existing separate from and outside of time. "But the notion of eternity must not be grasped negatively as abstraction from time, as existing, as it were, outside of time; nor in a sense which makes eternity come after time, for this would turn eternity into futurity, one of the moments of time." ¹¹² In effect, attempts to conceive of eternity before the creation of the world make it a moment of time, a past; and attempts to conceive of eternity as after the end of the world, make it a future. Hegel makes similar remarks about some of the language used in connection with the concept of immortality.¹¹³ Again, if eternity is conceived of as absolutely transcendent of time, it becomes another world without meaningful relation to this world. So to this point it can be said that for Hegel, Eternity is not an abstraction, not something totally transcendent of time, nor


something before or after time, ('before' and 'after' are words used to denote temporal dimensions), and it is not duration in any ordinary sense. "The difference therefore between eternity and duration is that the latter is only a relative sublating of time, whereas eternity is infinite, i.e. not relative, duration but duration reflected into self. What is not in time is that in which there is no process." In this passage thought is turned back to the meaning of Hegel's True Infinity as revealed in the Logic, and to the meaning of sublation as it emerged concretely in the Phenomenology. The question of what Hegel means by his use of the word 'process' here also needs attention.

Insofar as Hegel's conception of the eternal can be represented figuratively, it will be described in terms of a circle, as for example in the Preface to Phenomenology where he so describes 'the process' of the True within the context of his showing that 'the living substance' is 'in truth subject'. There is also his 'circle of circles' description of the system of the Idea, which is also suggestive, though less directly.

There is Hegel's response to 'With what must the science
begin? - 'not so much ... a pure immediacy, but rather that 
the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which 
the first is also the last and the last is also the first.'

However more clearly helpful here is Hegel's statement: "The 
life of the ever present Spirit is a circle of progressive 
embodiments, which looked at in one aspect still exist beside 
each other, and only as looked at from another point of view 
appear as past. The moments which Spirit seems to have left 
behind it, it still possesses in the depths of its present."

Here his circle metaphor includes the connotation of rotation 
(Kreislauf) about its own axis, in effect sublating: taking up, 
causing to cease, but preserving difference, the content of 
history within itself while maintaining itself in perfect 
equilibrium. Here, once again, Spirit is shown as eternal, and 
yet encompassing the temporal and historical world. Now by 
tying in this passage with the previous paragraph and its 
question in respect to the words: 'process' and 'processless' 
(Proceszlose), it becomes evident that Spirit in its eternity 
must comprise within itself the time-process, without being 


147 Philosophy of History, p. 79. "Das Leben des 
gegenwärtigen Geistes ist ein Kreislauf von Stufen, die ein-
erseits noch nebeneinander bestehen und nur anderseits als 
vergangen erscheinen. Die Momente, die der Geist hinter sich 
zu haben scheint, hat er auch in seiner gegenwärtigen 
Tiefe. -" P. der Geschichte, p. 137. S. Werke, 11, p. 120.
subject to the process itself, for only the natural can be subject to time, 'in so far as it is finite'. Hegel responds to this question directly and clearly or at least as clearly as it can ever be expressed: "For we must distinguish between what is the whole process and what is only a moment of the process. The universal, as law, also has a process within it, and lives only as a process; but it is not a part of the process, is not in process, but contains its two sides, and is itself processless." Here Hegel opens out the meaning of Spirit's Eternity and its true Present, and he explains how it can comprise the time-process, and continue processless.

Maritain in his critical analysis of 'Hegel's God', writes of law, which "is founded and rooted in the real eternity of the transcendent God", however he observes that "with Hegel the eternity which is transcendent to time has vanished. What takes place in time is part of the very internal process of the divine eternity." This criticism does express correctly one side of Hegel's position on the notion of eternity, but it leaves unexpressed the depth of meaning held in the notion of the True Present of the Idea, of Spirit. Absolute Spirit is

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149 Moral Philosophy, p. 197.
eternal, but the eternity as attributed is not something outside or apart from its manifestation in its temporal and historical world. Eternal it is, but it expresses itself in Time. It freely develops itself in time (and space) but the whole of what it is, and what has been, is in its True Present. "The true abolition and transfiguration (sublation) of time is its timeless omniprescence or eternity."\textsuperscript{150}

C. History, time and eternity

L'éternel doit s'incarner dans le contingent. (J. D'Hondt, Hegel Philosophe de L'Histoire Vivant, 186)

Man lives in a natural and historical world, and he regards himself as finite in the ordinary sense of the word: short lived, limited in strength, power and knowledge; some of his works endure after him, but in general, they have only relative duration as Hegel says. Attention rightly should be turned to this human world where Chronos does seem to hold sway. It needs to be ascertained what import Hegel's dialectic of time has for human history. Similarly, Hegel's explanation of why man and finite things are subject to time calls for examination. Finally, because this chapter began with an argument which, in short, contended that Hegel has to show that

\textsuperscript{150} "Das wahre Aufheben der Zeit ist zeitlose Gegenwart, d.i. Ewigkeit;" S. Werke, 1, p. 97. (Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems).
man is not entirely subject to history's limitations, some further insight into how he will show this to be the case, should emerge.

Hegel's dialectic of time includes the 'dimensions' of time grasped as a whole, as the unity of becoming, but under opposite determinations, with each of the two determinations itself a unity of being and nothing, but also as distinguished, with the difference concerned, involving coming-to-be and passing away: "The Present \textit{is}, only because the Past \textit{is not}; conversely, the being of the Now is determined as not-being, and the non-being of its being \textit{is} the Future; the Present \textit{is} this negative unity. The non-being of the being which is replaced by the Now, \textit{is} the Past; the being of the non-being which is contained in the Present, \textit{is} the Future."\textsuperscript{151} The propositions of this dialectic are revealing taken separately: a) 'The Present \textit{is}, only because the Past \textit{is not}.' The living present can only be because, what was, shaped and formed itself into what is now. In other words, that living things, particularly self-conscious beings are subject to time, is not an evil, but a value, i.e. it is because the Idea freely releases itself in

\textsuperscript{151} P. of N., \$ 259, Zus. "Die Gegenwart ist nur dadurch, dass die Vergangenheit nicht \textit{is}: umgekehrt hat das Seyn des Jetzt die Bestimmung nicht zu seyn, und das Nichtseyn seines Seyns ist die Zukunft; die Gegenwart ist diese negative Einheit. Das Nichtseyn des Seyns, an dessen Stelle das Jetzt getreten ist, ist die Vergangenheit; das Seyn des Nichtseyns, was in der Gegenwart enthalten \textit{is}, ist die Zukunft." \textit{S. Werke}, 9, p. 86.
the forms of time and space, matter and motion, that life, consciousness and self-consciousness can arise. b) 'The non-being of the being which is replaced by the Now, is the Past.' Here the continuity of the Now with the Past is underlined. Man's present condition has its roots in his past. Furthermore, if his present awareness of his condition is to be a genuine awareness he must self-consciously know how his present society and culture was formed, i.e. he must assimilate, preserve, carry forward and utilize the past in the present. c) 'The being of the non-being which is contained in the Present, is the Future.' In general, it is true, that Hegel avoids speaking of the future, but when Hegel says that Philosophy has only to do with the Present, it is a shallow interpretation which does not recognize that even the future is, in a certain sense, contained in the present. Of course, Hegel says that the 'Before and After are not', but he also says that 'the concrete Present is the result of the Past and is pregnant with the future'. In this expression he recognizes the inner 'pull' of the non-being of the future,\^{152} as well as recognizing the more

\^{152} Even at the level of animal life, there is a temporal dialectic of this kind. Hegel provides a pattern for it in the Logic, in a different context. In discussing Kant's notion of Inner Design in connection with Aristotle's definition of life (within the category of Teleology) Hegel cites animal wants and appetites as example of End. "They are the felt contradiction, which exists within the living subject, and pass into the activity of negating this negation which mere subjectivity still is. The satisfaction of the want or appetite restores the peace between subject and object." Ency., \^{154}
obvious relation between the past and the shape of the future. It can also be seen that implied here is a relation from future to past to present arising out of a condition of the present which is a result of the past. This interpretation differs only slightly from Kojève.

En effet, ce Temps est caractérisé par le primat de l'Avenir. Dans le Temps que considérait la Philosophie pré-hégélienne, le mouvement allait du Passé vers l'Avenir, en passant par le Présent. Dans le temps dont parle Hegel, par contre le mouvement s'engendre dans l'Avenir et va vers le Présent en passant par le Passé: Avenir → Passé → Présent (→ Avenir). Et c'est bien là la structure spécifique du Temps proprement humain, c'est-à-dire historique.¹⁵³

On the role of the future within this relatively narrow context Kojève seems basically correct. He also correctly relates 'the primacy of the Future' to the dialectic of human desire and thence to the master-slave struggle for recognition, which together lead, through man's struggle to realize himself, to the engendering of History.¹⁵⁴ He may have over simplified the relation of Time to the Notion, which a close study of Time in the Philosophy of Nature would have corrected.¹⁵⁵ (As a matter of fact Hegel makes the needed distinction between the Notion as time and the pure Notion, in the last pages of the Phenomenology.)¹⁵⁶ Kojève's interpretation of Eternity, while

¹⁵³ op. cit., p. 367.
¹⁵⁵ Supra, this section, p. 384-385.
¹⁵⁶ See Klaus Hedwig, "Hegel: Time and Eternity". He disagrees with Kojève's over-simple identification of the
brilliant, leaves some of its characteristics unattended. For Kojève, Eternity is straightforwardly Absolute Knowledge, which is conceived as 'the result of a historical becoming'; and of this Knowledge, he says "il est l'Éternité engendrée par le Temps". Kojève by simply identifying the Notion and Time, without qualification, goes on to draw the inference, because of this, that the Notion has no relation with either time or eternity, i.e. because it is time, without qualification, and later simply and directly denies that the Notion is eternal. This seems to be flatly contradicted by what Hegel quite explicitly says, in various works. Here, having distinguished the Notion from the perishability and temporality of the finite, Hegel goes on to make his position perfectly clear:

Time, therefore, has no power over the Notion, nor is the Notion in time or temporal; on the contrary, it is the power over time, which is this negativity only qua externality. Only the natural, therefore, is subject to time in so far as it is finite; the True, on the other hand, the Idea, Spirit is eternal.

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157 op. cit., p. 380.
158 op. cit., p. 337, 338 and 379.
a) The notion is not in time; it is not temporal; it is the power over time. b) Time has no power over the Notion; it is the Notion's negativity only qua externality. c) Only the natural (including man) is subject to time in so far as it (including man) is finite. d) The Notion, the True, the Idea, Spirit is eternal. The Greeks in all truth could state, 'the Logos is' in their time, Hegel would say, just as in all truth he can state 'the Logos is' in his own time, meaning first, that the Logos is Eternal, in the sense that it is not in any way bound by time, and that time is only one of its forms of manifestation; second, this is always true regardless of time of utterance. The latter is only part of the meaning of Hegel's notion of timelessness, but even in its prosaic presentation here it is important for philosophy, and it is sufficient to make the point that the wise man does not have to wait until 'the End of History' to know that the Logos is eternal, and the Logos does not have to wait until 'the End of History' to enjoy its Eternity. It may be argued that man has to wait until 'the End of History' to properly comprehend and

160 See M. E. Williams, "Time in Hegel's Philosophy", with respect to Hegel's anulling of time; she takes issue with Findlay's reducing it to a "true but trivial" meaning of the timelessness of the philosopher's attainments: "'for the philosopher, concepts are universal and principles true, and that the precise moment at which any one appropriates them is completely unimportant.'" Dialogue, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1970, p. 163, f.n. 22.
share this Eternity, but this is another question, and it does not seem to be quite Kojève's interpretation, where eternity seems only to appear at 'the End of History' in the Wise Man's attainment of Absolute Knowledge. This is a common enough interpretation, which emerged among some of his pupils soon after Hegel's death. Aside from the end of history problem, Kojève's interpretations of Hegel's notions of time and the eternal as such, are defective. Finally, his extrapolation and pushing of the 'primacy of the future' interpretation into a general interpretation of Hegel's philosophy seems a distortion or an exaggeration of some elements found in it. The nucleus of the idea, however, provides a valuable insight into the self-constitutionality of man and into the development of self-hood and so into History. His fault lies in weakening the other side of Hegel's philosophy, the Idea as eternal, 'eternally creating' this world. (There is too much of the balance and thought of Plato and Aristotle in Hegel's philosophy, for Kojève to be correct in the direction taken in his overall interpretation of this philosophy.)

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161 See Karl Löwith's discussion of The Present as Eternity: "This concept of time was already surrendered by Hegel's pupils. At odds with their own time and the existing order of reality, they constructed their present according to the pattern of the future. In Hegel's speculation, they no longer saw philosophic theory, but only an apostasy from historical practice. The question of eternity is left to a theology which has seen its day, and philosophy is made over to the consciousness of the age. The relationship between the spirit and time is decided unambiguously in favor of time." From Hegel to Nietzsche: the Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 209.
Idea, Spirit, transcends time because it is itself the Notion of time; it is eternal, in and for itself, and is not dragged into the time-process because it does not lose itself in one side of the process."162

This passage turns thought to individual man, who usually thinks of himself very much in the time-process, and with little power over time. The present which he has to deal with, although somewhat elastic, appears to him quite definitely finite in duration. (For Hegel, the concrete identity of the eternal Present, is not the finite empirical duration of the present. Finite durations can be isolated in abstraction and regarded as objects, but they tend to be more spatial than temporal.) Hegel recognizes, of course, the truth that time has a destructive power for man and in history:

In the individual as such, it is otherwise, for on one side it is the genus; the most beautiful life is that in which the universal and its individuality are completely united in a single form. But the individual is then separated from the universal, and as such it is only one side of the process, and is subject to change.163

He is talking about great historical individuals who have had

162 P. of N., 258, Zus. "Die Idee, der Geist ist über der Zeit, weil Solches der Begriff der Zeit selbst ist; das ist ewig, an und für sich, wird nicht in die Zeit gerissen, weil es sich nicht in seiner einen Seite des Processes verliert." S. Werke, 9, p. 82.

163 Ibid. "Im Individuum als solchen ist es anders, es ist einerseits die Gattung; das schönste Leben ist das, welches das Allgemeine und seine Individualität vollkommen zu Einer Gestalt vereinigt. Dann ist das Individuum aber auch vom Allgemeinen geschieden, und so ist es Eine Seite des Processes, die Veränderlichkeit; nach diesem sterblichen Momente fällt es in die Zeit." Ibid.
substantial impact on human culture and society. (It is noteworthy that he talks about the two sides of the individual, and in this context, there is implied a connection with the Notion; through the notion of the latter, thought is led to the notion of human spirit and the potentially infinite power of thought, and so to the possibility of annulling time.) Here, however, the tone of his language takes on more the note of sadness occasionally found in the *Philosophy of History*, and elsewhere. "Achilles, the flower of Greek life, Alexander the Great, that infinitely powerful individuality, do not survive. Only their deeds, their effects remain, i.e. the world which they brought into being."164 Once again, the general historicity of man is brought out, as also the less direct connotation that man constitutes his being in his deeds and works. There is also the connotation of the spirit of the age finding its locus in the great historical individual who in turn, helps in forming it, focussing its tendencies and giving it some direction in decisive new turns and achievements. His spiritual work lives on in the human spirit of history, but he perishes, as over time do most if not all of his physical creations. Hegel explains why: "The finite is perishable and *temporal* because, unlike the Notion, it is not in its own self total negativity; true, this negativity is immanent in it as its universal essence, but the finite is

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164 P. of N., f 258, Zus.
not adequate to this essence: it is **one-sided**, and consequently it is related to negativity as to the power that dominates it."\textsuperscript{165} The abstraction of the finite's externality and the 'unrest of its contradiction is time itself', so that the power that dominates here is time. However, later at the level of Absolute Spirit, in the higher insights of Art, Religion and Philosophy, Hegel will claim that Time can be annulled. He will contend that when human spirit attains the wholly adequate comprehension of philosophical truth, when it knows absolutely, it will itself, in some sense possess eternity. The subject of eternity arises during his considerations of Absolute Religion. In taking up the question of the immortality of the soul, Hegel cautions against representing the soul as first entering the sphere of reality only at a future time or at a later stage because,

> it is the actual present quality of Spirit; Spirit is eternal, and for this reason is already present. Spirit, as possessed of freedom, does not belong to the sphere of things limited; it, as being what thinks and knows in an absolute way, has the Universal for its object; this is eternity, which is not simply duration, as duration can be predicated of mountains, but knowledge.\textsuperscript{166}


\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Philosophy of Religion}, Vol. III, p. 57. "es ist gegenwärtige Qualität, der Geist ist ewig, also deshalb schon gegenwärtig, der Geist in seiner Freiheit ist nicht im Kreise
In this passage, certain propositions stand out: a) Spirit is eternal. b) Spirit thinks and knows in an absolute way, and this is eternity. c) Eternity is not duration but knowledge. And 'the eternity of Spirit is here brought into consciousness', he tells us. Philosophical Truth, if it is to be timeless, requires a being with a power of cognizance and comprehension which is itself timeless. It is to man, who finds himself in the time-process, but, who is essentially spirit as well as animal, who is subject as well as substance, and has also the power of infinite thought, that this study now returns.

3. Man-in-history constitutes himself a free subject through the labour of thought and deeds.

As against Spinozism, again, it is to be noted that the spirit in the judgment by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego, as free subjectivity ... has emerged from substance, and that the philosophy, which gives this judgment as the absolute characteristic of spirit, has emerged from Spinozism.

When philosophy recognizes and affirms that the absolute characteristic of spirit is subject, a free self-constituting

der Beschränkteit, für ihn als denkend, rein wissend ist das Allgemeine Gegenstand, diesz ist die Ewigkeit, die nicht blosz Dauer ist, wie die Berge dauern, sondern Wissen." S. Werke, 16, p. 268.

167 Philosophy of Mind, 415. "In Beziehung auf Spinozismus ist dagegen zu bemerken, dass der Geist in dem Urteile, wodurch er sich als Ich, als freie Subjektivität gegen die Bestimmtheit konstituiert, aus der Substanz, und die Philosophie, indem ihr dies Urteil absolute Bestimmung des Geistes ist, aus dem Spinozismus heraustritt." Enzy., p. 345.
subjectivity, it emerges from Spinozism, it is free to develop itself in a form adequate to its Notion. As shown in the previous chapter, for Hegel, what specifically distinguishes man, what differentiates man from animals and other living things, is self-consciousness. What fundamentally characterizes human activity is the spiritual activity of thought. Man develops, realizes and constitutes himself through his own activity. The latter is primarily thought activity, thoughtful interaction with his social and natural environment. (Thought is conceived as labour, and physical labour or work and other physical activities are conceived as being permeated with thought.) This human interaction with his own kind and with nature is distinguished from the interaction of other forms of life with the environment, by the importance of human culture to this interaction, i.e. practical skills, systems of economy, art, religion, language, and the various institutions of society, all products of human history. Above all other characteristics which distinguish man from nature and from the purely animal and vegetative kingdoms, and comprising self-consciousness, is spirit. Hegel's conception of spirit incorporates life, self-consciousness, reason, will and freedom. Beyond his animal nature, man to be fully man must possess all of these characteristics. Spirit also comprises its objective forms in society and history and finally its absolute forms in art, religion and philosophy. In these, man participates, and
he shares in their formation in varying degrees. He can only realize his self-hood and his potentialities in society and history. In the course of introducing his Philosophy of Spirit\textsuperscript{168} he remarks on the significance and meaning of 'that absolute commandment, *Know thyself*. He suggests that it is not mere self-knowledge of *particular* capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the individual' that is commanded "but knowledge of man's genuine reality - of what is essentially and ultimately true and real - of spirit as the true and essential being."\textsuperscript{169} While explaining what spirit is, Hegel states that "the essential but formally essential feature of spirit is Liberty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity."\textsuperscript{170} The notions subject, spirit, thought, freedom and history are now examined as characteristic of man.

\textsuperscript{168} The Philosophy of Spirit he divides into Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit. In the first division, subjectivity arises out of Nature as 'soul' (Anthropology) and develops through consciousness (Phenomenology) to mind or concrete spirit.

\textsuperscript{169} P. of M., \$ 377. "sondern die Bedeutung der Erkenntnis des Wahrhaften des Menschen, wie des Wahrhaften an und für sich, - des Wesens selbst als Geistes." Enzy., p. 311.

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., \$ 382. "Das Wesen des Geistes ist des-wegen formell die Freiheit, die absolute Negativität des Begriffes als Identität mit sich." Ibid., p. 313.
A. Subject, Spirit and Thought

a. Subject and Self-realization

In philosophy, it is absolutely essential to grasp or comprehend things as subject, not just as substance, Hegel thinks. He is able to show that reality at all levels can and should be conceived as subject, but in different degrees of realization, so that even a rock can be conceived as sustaining itself in the process of its becoming and against the forces which act upon it. More often Hegel uses a plant as illustrative of his meaning, and in such case, the plant is conceived as constituting and preserving itself in its growth and development from seed to flower, but it is in man as self-consciously realizing himself that this notion is revealed most concretely. Within this 'subject' perspective the moments and phases of the Phenomenology and the categories of the Logic are developed. This fundamental perspective underlies the development of spirit in the Philosophy of Mind. "Just as in the living organism generally, everything is already contained, in an ideal manner, in the germ and is brought forth by the germ itself, not by an alien power, so too must all the particular forms of living mind grow out of its Notion as from their germ." 171 However the vegetative organism is not cognizant

or aware of its development and realization, as its own. It
is man who is the true subject, the self-realizing being who
can comprehend his own development as his own. Animals, as
sentient creatures of nature, are on a level higher than plant
life and so manifest the inwardization of subjectivity a
little more adequately, but still do not attain to true self-
awareness. "Nature as such in its inwardizing of itself does
not attain to this being-for-self, to the consciousness of
itself; the animal, the most perfect form of this inwardiza-
tion, represents only the non-spiritual dialectic of trans-
ition from one single sensation filling its whole soul to
another single sensation which equally exclusively dominates
it."\textsuperscript{172} But man does attain to consciousness of himself. Man,
like the animal and plant, is a self-developing unity; he pre-
serves himself through the ongoing contradictory relations
which constitute his existence. As with lesser creatures, the
structure giving factor of unity and end is provided by his
subjectivity, the power over his own development, such that he

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p. 381. "Die Natur als solche kommt in
ihrer Selbst verinnerlichung nicht zu diesem Fürsichseyn, zum
Bewusstseyn ihrer selbst; das Thier - die vollendetste Form
dieser Verinnerlichung - stellt nur die geistlose Dialektik
des Uebergehens von einer einzelnen, seine ganze Seele aus-
füllenden Empfindung zu einer anderen, ebenso ausschlies-
llich in ihm herrschenden einzelnen Empfindung dar;" \textit{Ibid.},
p. 30.
remains himself through the negations of his relations to his otherness, but there is the important difference contained in his capacity for self-knowledge: "it is man who first raises himself above the singleness of sensation to the universality of thought, to self-knowledge, to the grasp of his subjectivity, of his 'I' in a word, it is only man who is thinking mind and by this, and by this alone, is essentially distinguished from Nature." In brief, as Kaufmann explains, "What Hegel means by a subject is that which makes itself what it becomes." In addition, part of what Hegel means by subject is subject of experience. Subject can be abstractly distinguished from, but should not be separated from its conscious and self-conscious activities, when it is man as such, being considered, i.e. when man's soul has risen from its 'immediate, natural subjectivity' to 'become Consciousness'.


174 Hegel, Reinterpretation, p. 391. (Commentary to the Preface, II, 1. note 8.) Supra, p. 59, note 96, for one of the passages to which he refers.

175 Infra, 2 A b, next sub-section; Supra, Ch. III, 2 A.
b. Spirit's initial realization through the Soul*

The soul in its formation marks the transition from Nature to Spirit, or to put it differently, Spirit as it emerges from Nature, as its truth, manifests itself first as soul. Through the soul, Spirit begins the process of realizing the latent and unexpressed ideality of Nature. At this stage Spirit 'is not yet mind, but soul', and 'is only the sleep of mind'. With respect to some of the disputes in Modern Philosophy over the nature of the soul and its relation to the material body, Hegel's basic position is made distinctly clear at the beginning, that the soul is not to be conceived as a separate immaterial entity. "The Soul is not only for itself immaterial, but the universal immateriality of Nature, its simple ideal life."176 The Soul is not Descartes' spirit in the machine, but the ideality of the material body and inseparable from it, so that the community or interdependence of soul and body is no incomprehensible mystery for Hegel. He thinks that even Leibniz erred by treating soul as a thing

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* Hegel draws heavily upon Aristotle's doctrine on the soul, for this stage of Spirit, and for the philosophy of mind generally, because as he himself says, "The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the theory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books." P. of M., p. 378.

because of the particular form that his theory on monads took, which in the end, 'degraded' the soul to, 'rather than distinguisched' it 'from a matériel thing'.

177 In the case of Spinoza, besides the lack of immanent development, it has the further defect that 'the manifold is added to substance only in an external manner'. It is only in this earliest of the levels of mind or spirit, that Spinoza's substance, as such, is found, and even here its transformation begins. "Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought, and the soul remains the pervading, identical ideality of it all." 178 The soul is life self-developed out of nature; it is the least adequate form of mind, and included in its definition is also 'substance, as unity of thought and being'. Just as Nature rids itself of its externality in stages, spirit, as soul raises itself in stages:

(a) In its immediate natural mode - the natural soul, which only is.
(b) Secondly, it is a soul which feels, as individualized, enters into correlation with its immediate being, and, in the modes of that being, retains an abstract independence.
(c) Thirdly, its immediate being - or corporeity - is

177 F. 389, Zus.
178 P. of M., F. 389. "Sie ist die Substanz, so die absolute Grundlage aller Besonderung und Vereinzelung des Geistes, so dass er in ihr allen Stoff seiner Bestimmung hat und sie durchdringende, identische Idealität derselben bleibt." Enzy., p. 318.
moulded into it, and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. (/*390)

1) Out of the Natural Soul which pervades the levels of Nature wherein life is present, arise individual souls. "The soul universal" is not to be thought of "as a single subject; it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects." (/*391) 2) Initially the soul has a simple unity with nature, which is shown in its receptivity to natural influence and in its assimilation of these into its substance, which, however it accomplishes without awareness of its power to do so. 3) The conditions of its environment provide the soul's content; the soul's realization commences with natural influences being manifested in shades of mood which follow the variations in season and periods of the day. More specific qualitative variations in temperament accompany differences in geographical location. 4) The soul's embodiment provides 'the other' of the soul, such that it can feel at one in it; it allows the soul to draw together the body's multiplicity of processes into the simple unity of self-feeling. "The soul is virtually the totality of nature: as an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world - that world being included in it and filling it up, and to that world it stands but as to itself." (403) In the soul's obscure and somewhat formless mass of feeling, it is not really conscious of the differences as such, for mind has not yet developed its oppositions to give the soul's content definition. 5) In the soul's self-articulation, a gradual 'precising' in the form of its self-feeling is attained, i.e., in the patterns of its feeling experience a pale awareness of the self and not-self arises. 6) Mind begins its process of overcoming immediacy and its immersion in nature by idealizing its content in the development of habit, a second nature (410) which synthesizes immediate feeling and self-feeling. Although habit introduces automatic and as such, unfree behaviour, it also frees man for higher activity. "The soul has the contents in possession ... and moves in them without ... consciousness of the fact." (410) 7) Through the internalizing of natural self-externality, soul assumes complete possession of itself in its embodiment; its body is trained to express its range of feeling through the "identity of interior and exterior, the latter subject to the former", and the soul becomes actual, "in which it feels itself and makes itself felt" (411) and rises to consciousness.
c. Spirit's realization through its power of infinite thought

For the activity of spirit essentially consists just in raising itself above this entanglement in merely natural life, in grasping itself in its self-dependence, subduing the world to its thinking and creating it from the Notion.¹⁷⁹

Consciousness emerged at the end of the section Anthropology, which was concerned with the self-development of the soul. This is followed by the section Phenomenology which follows in outline the sections which treat of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Reason, in Hegel's work of that name. In its compact presentation the concrete content of the latter's phenomenological showing of the history of the individual consciousness growing in knowledge and freedom has perforce been left out. It attends to the form of the phases of development from sensuous consciousness to Reason. Hegel's section Psychology continues from this point, and deals with Theoretical and Practical Mind. Although in the former Spirit develops through Intuition, Representation and Thinking, attention here will be concerned simply with the notion of Thought as the infinite power of mind. At this stage 'spirit has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness' and consciousness in 'the

¹⁷⁹ P. of M., § 392, Zus. "Denn die Thätigkeit des Geistes besteht gerade wesentlich darin, sich über das Befangeneyn in dem bloszen Naturleben zu erheben, sich in seiner Selbstständigkeit zu erfassen, die Welt seinem Denken zu unterwerfen, dieselbe aus dem Begriffe zu erschaffen." S. Werke, 10, p. 64.
infinite form' of Reason, no longer stands 'in mere correlation' to its content 'as to its object', is 'neither subjective nor objective'. Reason is confident that its object will conform to itself. 'Mind, therefore, starts only from its own being and is in correlation only with its own determinations.'

Whereas the soul in its 'simple immediate totality' was subjective spirit in a condition of implicitness, which subsequently as consciousness experienced diremption, putting forth itself into otherness, as object in opposition to itself, spirit now returns into itself enriched from this experience, perfectly capable of functioning in its own world. Objects of experience have lost their foreign character and are raised up into the thinking life of the subject; the distinction between the subject and the object is within mind itself.

Free spirit is ... in conformity with its Notion perfect unity of subjectivity and objectivity, of form and content, consequently, absolute totality and therefore infinite, eternal. We have cognized it as a Knowing of Reason. Because it is this, because it has Reason for its object, it must be designated the infinite being-for-self of subjectivity.

Spirit, in one sense, is still finite at this level, in that

180 P. of M., 440.

its development in a sequence of formal modes, continues in
the subjective sphere, but mind or spirit as such, is essen­
tially infinite,\textsuperscript{182} in contrast to the things of the natural
world which are finite because they endure the necessity of
external determination. Mind determines itself in its growth
within the natural environment which it overcomes as it con­
stitutes its own environment, drawing upon its own resources
as well as those of nature and human society. "Hence the fini­
tude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of
knowledge to get hold of the full reality of its reason, or,
equally, in the (temporary) failure of reason to attain full
manifestation in knowledge."\textsuperscript{183} Spirit in its thought activity
overreaches nature and takes nature's determinate character in­
to itself, transforming the latter into the content of mind by
idealizing it. Reason's thought grasps the 'identity of the
subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universal­
ity.' In the unity of object and subject achieved, the mind's
rationality is attuned to or realizes the implicit rationality
of the object. The latter's determinate intelligibility is
made part of the determinate content of the subject.

The universality of reason, therefore, whilst it signi­
fies that the object, which was only given in consciousness

\textsuperscript{182} P. of M., / 441, Zus.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid. "Die Endlichkeit des Geistes besteht daher
darin, dass das Wissen das An-und Fursichsein seiner Vernunft
nicht erfaszt, oder ebensosehr, dass diese sich nicht zur vollen
Manifestation im Wissen gebracht hat." \textit{Enzy.}, p. 356.
qua consciousness, is now itself universal, permeating and encompassing the ego, also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form which overlaps the object, and encompasses it.\footnote{184}

What the object is, and the measure of its actuality with its notion are all part of the over-grasp of Reason's way of knowing. This over-arching power of thought in conjunction with its 'ideality' and its infinite power of overcoming every limit provide three essential keys to the showing of how Hegel's system can comprise within it a notion of human historicity, while showing that man can, nevertheless, comprehend the eternal. Out of nature, human culture and history, man constitutes himself and his world, and in the process he shares in their transformation. 'Mind is the infinite Idea' and in its levels of activity, finitude provides the 'steps in its liberation' - man 'finding a world presupposed before (him)' generates 'a world as (his) own creation', and gains 'freedom from it and in it.'\footnote{185}

\footnote{184} P. of M., \# 438. "Die Allgemeinheit der Vernunft hat daher ebensosehr die Bedeutung des im Bewusstsein als solchem nur gegebenen, aber nun selbst allgemeinen, das Ich durchdringenden und befassenden Objekts, als des reinen Ich, der über das Objekt übergreifenden und es in sich befassenden reinen Form." Enzy., p. 354.

\footnote{185} Ibid., \# 386. "Der Geist ist die unendliche Idee ... das Vorfinden einer Welt als einer vorausgesetzten, das Erzeu­gen derselben als eines von ihm Gesetzten und die Befrei­ung von ihr und in ihr eins und dasselbe sind, -". Enzy., p. 315.
of mind that is itself ideality, and it is therefore only in
mind that we find absolute unity of Notion and reality, and
hence true infinitude. The fact that we know a limitation is
evidence that we are beyond it, evidence of our freedom from
limitation."¹⁸⁶

When time-space events of nature and history
are assimilated or appropriated by mind they lose their part-
icular actuality in the idealized form of the mind’s content,
i.e. the limitations of time and space are overcome,¹⁸⁷ but
the content is preserved. "This struggling with the finite,
the overcoming of limitation, constitutes the stamp of the
divine in the human mind and forms a necessary stage of the
eternal mind. Therefore, to talk of the limitations of Reason
is worse than it would be to talk of wooden iron."¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ P. of M., 386, Zus. "Erst die Realität des
Geistes ist selber Idealität, erst im Geiste findet also absol-
ute Einheit des Begriffs und der Realität, somit die wahrhafte
Unendlichkeit statt. Schon, dass wir von einer Schranke wis-
sen, ist Beweis unseres Hinausseyns über dieselbe, unserer
Unbeschränktheit." S. Werke, 10, p. 44.

¹⁸⁷ See P. of M., 448, Zus.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 441, Zus. "Dies Ringen mit dem End-
lichen, das Ueberwinden der Schranke, macht das Gepräge des
Göttlichen im menschlichen Geiste aus und bildet eine notwend-
igkeist Stufe des ewigen Geistes. Wenn man daher von den
Schranken der Vernunft spricht, so ist Dies noch ärger, als
ein Sprechen von hülzernem Eisen seyn würde." Ibid., p. 299.
B. Man's initial realization of Spirit's freedom

The Philosophy of Spirit reaffirms the Phenomenology's showing that 'the essence of spirit is freedom', and the 'I' as denoting spirit, exercises this freedom through the absolute negativity of the notion. Man is free in himself, he can realize freedom for himself and ultimately he may labour to realize his freedom in and for himself. Abstractly speaking man is free, but he must realize this freedom concretely. This can be seen in Hegel's words that freedom is 'the essential, but formally essential characteristic of mind'. Indeed, Spirit's freedom arises out of (is grounded in) 'the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity' and the Notion's characteristics do reveal the fundamental character of man's freedom:

Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can endure the negation of its individual immediacy, the infinite anguish, i.e. it can preserve itself affirmatively in this negativity and be identical with self. It is through this anguish and struggle, and this capacity to take up, or drop, any and all thinkable determinations that the

189 P. of M., 382. "Nach dieser formellen Bestimmung kann er von allem Auszerlichen und seiner eigenen Ausserlichkeit, seinem Dasein selbst abstrahieren; er kann die Negation seiner individuellen Unmittelbarkeit, den unendlichen Schmerz ertragen, d.i. in dieser Negativität affirmativ sich erhalten und identisch für sich sein." Enzy., p. 313-314.
individual establishes his spiritual identity and affirms spirit's true infinity. However, Hegel adds the closing statement, 'All this is possible so long as (Spirit) is considered in its abstract self-contained universality' and this is the point, Spirit's direction must be toward more and more concrete expression and realization. In respect to the kind of 'negative' freedom suggested in the above passage, Reyburn makes the comment, "To withdraw into the privacy of one's abstract self-identity is to exclude from the scope of one's freedom all the forces that moves one's life; it is to pretend that one is a thing to which nature is external."\textsuperscript{190} This is one possibility open to man as shown in Hegel's analysis of the Stoic's inadequate freedom achieved through a similar withdrawing into himself.\textsuperscript{191} However, this turning in upon one-self, is not toward spirit's self-unfoldment in man's self-realizing thought and work, and in its extreme form, it would end in mental sickness. "The truth as Christ said, makes spirit free; freedom makes it true. But the freedom of mind or spirit is not merely an absence of dependence on an Other won outside of the Other, but won in it; it attains actuality not by fleeing from the Other but by overcoming it."\textsuperscript{192} In Hegel's view, one aspect of the reconciliation

\textsuperscript{190} \textit{The Ethical Theory of Hegel}, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Supra}, Ch. III, 2 B c a, p. 226-235.
\textsuperscript{192} \textit{P. of M.}, \textit{382}, Zus. "Die Wahrheit macht den Geist, - wie schon Christus gesagt hat - frei; die Freiheit
which he has long sought to show as open to man, i.e. that the world is his own, if he will but make it his own, he can now show that it is to be accomplished through the infinity and freedom of thought. Reyburn in writing of Hegel's conception of human mind and human freedom, notes that "The infinity of mind is its freedom. Freedom is not the mere absence of constraint but is active self-determination. In truth nothing can be free from constraint except by mastering the world, for the world is one connected whole."¹⁹³ The characteristics of mind and freedom revealed in the first and second sentences, emerged in the Logic, when Substance was sublated in the Notion and have been encountered frequently in Hegel's showing of spirit's self-realization. The third sentence seems at first sight an exaggeration, so far as the ordinary man is considered, and one can wonder if this is open only to the philosopher.

However when Hegel speaks of mind's freedom as the relating of self to self, and as 'the absence of dependence on an Other' he is concerned to show that it is a continuing or on-going process of transforming the other into self, so that it is neither a question of isolating one-self from the Other,

¹⁹³ op. cit., p. 87.
or trying to resist the influence of the Other as if it were an exterior force. Pain does not reach mind from outside, he remarks, "nor does evil, the negative of absolutely self-existent infinite mind, any more than pain, reach the mind from the outside; on the contrary, evil is nothing else than mind which puts its separate individuality before all else."¹⁹⁴ Even in this extreme disunity, this condition of complete self-contradiction, 'mind yet remains identical with itself and therefore free'. Mind's power to preserve itself continues in these conditions, not only to endure anguish and evil, but often to overcome them. The capacities by which man lives in, knows and enjoys his world are at bottom feeling, thought and will, and through these mind realizes its unity and self-identity, amid diversity and contradiction.

That man's world is beset with obstacles and difficulties is as it must be, so that he can grow in knowledge and freedom through the exercise of thought. Hegel writes of the "show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barrier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become conscious of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested."¹⁹⁵ The finitude is introduced in Mind, when


¹⁹⁵ Ibid., § 386. " - ein Schein, den an sich der Geist sich als eine Schranke setzt, um durch Aufheben derselben
Mind is in contradiction with itself,* that is, when it incorporates itself in forms which cannot truly actualize it; the content is foreign to it and stands opposed to it. However, in contrast to things of the world of nature, the mind can overcome all limits without losing its identity. The steps of this activity are the three stages of liberation: "finding a world presupposed before us, generating a world as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite form of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it." Here he indicates in a few simple lines the path of spirit in its course to absolute self-realization. Spirit or mind is the concrete unity of opposites, and in idealizing nature it retains its own dominance and self-mastery, while discovering its self immanent in its own world; in relation to its opposite, mind is in relation to what is its own. There is sometimes a tendency to view freedom abstractly in such a way that the intimate connection between mind and the world is minimized, with mind retaining its freedom

*für sich die Freiheit als sein Wesen zu haben und zu wissen, d.i. schlechthinmanifestiert zu sein." Enzy., p. 315.

* Hegel explains that 'the two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind', Ibid., § 386, and 'finitude here means the disproportion between the concept and the reality'.

196 Ibid., § 386. "... Vorfinden einer Welt als einer vorausgesetzten, das Ergeugen derselben als eines von ihm Gesetzten und die Befreiung von ihr und in ihr eins und dasselbe sind, - einer Wahrheit, zu deren unendlichen Form der Schein als zum Wissen derselben sich reinigt." Enzy., p. 315.
against nature's forces. But this is not Hegel's position, because he conceives the natural world and the fact that man is an embodied consciousness within it, as essential to freedom.197

The short sub-division 'Free Mind' provides Hegel's transition from subjective spirit to objective spirit. Leading to this moment of synthesis of theoretical and practical mind are considerations of practical feeling, The Impulses and Choice, and Happiness. Mind Practical originates in subjective content, which it strives to give outward actuality. Because it arises out of and presupposes the activity through which consciousness becomes aware of a content as its own, practical mind begins with and in thought. "The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought; hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a thinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks itself."198 Practical feeling, with which this dialectical phase commences, is an immediate but undeveloped form of the mind's autonomy. Here action is

197 Reyburn points out that "but for its relation to things mind would be isolated, empty, and impotent. It is by mastering the natural bond and making it a means to the final unity, the self, that mind develops its freedom. And the first step to mastery over nature is connexion with it." op cit., p. 88.

198 P. of M., f 469. "Dieser Begriff, die Freiheit, ist wesentlich nur als Denken; der Weg des Willens, sich zum objektiven Geiste zu machen, ist, sich zum denkenden Willen zu erheben, - sich den Inhalt zu geben, den er nur als sich Denkendes haben Kann." Enzy., p. 380.
brought about by its appetite, so that it is not at this stage a matter of forming ends for itself. "The feeling will is, therefore, the comparing of the immediate determinateness coming to it from outside, with the determinateness posited in it by its own nature. Since the latter has the significance of what ought to be, will demands that the affection shall agree with it." 199 Even at this simple level, the 'ought' arising from within mind reveals its inner propensity toward mastery of its world. Here, however, the agreement or disagreement involves only the elementary 'pleasant or agreeable' and 'unpleasant or disagreeable'. In dealing with 'Impulses and Choice', Hegel regards impulse as a form of volitional intelligence, which beginning from the sublated opposition of subjectivity and objectivity, 'embraces a series of satisfactions, hence is a whole, a universal'. Nevertheless, because it arises from the singleness of feeling, and forms only the first negation of it, it 'is still something particular', and any 'man who is controlled by impulses is manifestly unfree'. (§ 473, Zus.) He draws attention to one special mode of volitional impulse, passion, which is 'neither good nor bad'; this word simply denotes that a subject has thrown his whole being into one aim

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199 P. of M., § 472, Zus. "Der fühlende Wille ist daher das Vergleichen seines von auszen kommenden, unmittelbaren Bestimmteyn, mit seinem durch seine eigene Natur gesetzten Bestimmteyn. Da das Letztere die Bedeutung Dessen hat, was seyn soll; so macht der Wille an die Affection die Forderung, mit jenem übereinzustimmen." S. Werke, 10, p. 371.
and object. "Nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion." ("Es ist nichts Groszes ohne Leidenschaft vollbracht worden, noch kann es ohne solche vollbracht werden." / 474) This is a point which he will very much stress in the Philosophy of History. As particular impulses bring no satisfaction, the will seeks a universal satisfaction in happiness, but it discovers that happiness can only be gained by means of particular impulses, which are the content of the will: "as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action, it is on them that the decision turns, and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which must have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed."^{200} Subordinating one inclination or interest to another fails to give satisfaction. Happiness turns out to be only an abstract, imagined universality of things desired, 'which only ought to be'. Will therefore makes itself its own object, wherein it gains its universality and so its autonomy and this last, Hegel regards as essential to the free mind. "In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity, which is pure and concrete at once, by having for its contents and aim only that infinite mode of being - freedom itself. In this truth of its autonomy where notion and object are one, the will

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^{200} P. of M., / 479. "da die Glückseligkeit den affiramativen Inhalt allein in den Trieben hat, liegt in ihnen die Entscheidung, und es ist das subjektive Gefühl und Belieben, was den Ausschlag geben musz, worin es die Glückseligkeit setze." Enzy., p. 386.
is an actually free will." When will has itself for its object, it is free will; it knows itself as self-determined and self-limited. Its freedom consists in more than simply not being limited by another, because in willing the universal, it wills what transcends its mere subjectivity, i.e. it wills the objective. Man's free will now endeavours to bring about the conforming of the is with the ought to be, not only within his subjective self, but in the natural, social and historical worlds. In this way Subjective Spirit advances or passes over into Objective Spirit, where 'the product of will' becomes 'deed and action'.

C. Man's realization of Spirit's freedom in History

History is mind clothing itself with the forms of events or the immediate actuality of nature.

History in general is therefore the development of Spirit in Time, as Nature is the development of the Idea in Space.

201 P. of M., # 480. "Die Willkür ist auf diese Weise der Wille nur als die reine Subjektivität, welche dadurch rein und konkret zugleich ist, dass sie zu ihrem Inhalt und Zweck nur jene unendliche Bestimmtheit, die Freiheit selbst, hat. In dieser Wahrheit seiner Selbstbestimmung, worin Begriff und Gegenstand identisch ist, ist der Wille - wirklich freier Wille." Enzy., p. 386-387.


Hegel turns his dialectic to fathoming for manifestations of 'the presence' of Reason in the rich content of history, and in so doing he shows man attaining a growing historical consciousness, a consciousness that the present moment is related and in some way the effect of the past, and that actions in the present will affect subsequent events, that the future course of History will be influenced by present actions. The 'present' is thus given a dynamic significance at once unique and open, particularly so when united with a sense of progressive and expanding freedom. This notion of mankind in history gradually attaining to a greater consciousness of freedom is founded in his notion of man's historicity. This can be seen clearly in the following:

That man is free by Nature is quite correct in one sense; viz., that he is so according to the Notion of Humanity; but we imply thereby that he is such only in virtue of his destiny - that he has an undeveloped power to become such; for the "Nature" of an object is exactly synonymous with its "Notion".  

Hegel here contends against those who would say, that although man is free by nature, he must limit this natural freedom in society and in the State. In this passage, there are indications of the way he conceives and relates human nature and the self-constitutionality of man, and thereby characteristics of

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his notion of human historicity are revealed. By substituting in the above, the word "human" for the word 'free', meaning by the use of the word "human", man's distinctly human nature as opposed to his 'nature' as a certain kind of animal, this perspective begins to emerge: that man has a nature "in himself" but not "for himself" until he acquires it for himself. Part of that which man must realize of this human nature is freedom, and this must be won in time and history.

What we find such a state of Nature to be in actual experience, answers exactly to the notion of a merely natural condition. Freedom as the ideal of that which is original and natural, does not exist as original and natural. Rather must it be first sought out and won; and that by an incalculable medial discipline of the intellectual and moral powers.205

Here is shown Hegel's conception of the general historicity of man, and furthermore, implied in the language of its expression is the connotation of man's self-constitutionality, characteristic of his notion of historicity. Man has a nature, he is man according to the Notion of Humanity, but implied thereby is that he is such in virtue of his destiny, that he must develop and realize his human nature, his 'humanity', and make explicit what is implicit or potential. "Thus the organic individual

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produces itself: it makes of itself what it is implicitly \textit{an sich}; thus the spirit, too, is only that which it makes of itself, and it makes of itself what it is implicitly.\textsuperscript{206} Hegel's fruitful use of the words: 1) \textit{an sich}, also \textit{sich selbst}, or \textit{an ihr selbst}, usually meaning 'in itself' 'implicitly' or 'potentiality', as appropriate to the context,\textsuperscript{207} and 2) \textit{für sich}, meaning 'for itself', brings out the dynamic incremental character of spirit's self-unfolding development. "The spirit essentially acts; it makes of itself what it is implicitly - makes itself into its own deed, its own work." (Der Geist handelt wesentlich, er macht sich zu dem, was er \textit{an sich ist}, zu seiner Tat, zu seinem Werk; \textit{V.G.}, p. 67.)

One thing is clear here, Hegel is unmistakeably a thinker who found it necessary to become a speculative historian, because as ontologist, inquiring into human being as being and as human, and seeing human being as a self-making or a

\textsuperscript{206} WK 1, p. 391. "So produziert das organische Individuum sich selbst: es macht sich zu dem, was es \textit{an sich} ist; so auch der Geist ist nur dies, zu was er sich selbst macht, und er macht sich zu dem, was er \textit{an sich} ist." \textit{Die Vernunft in der Geschichte}, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{207} Kaufmann discusses Hegel's usage of this key term: "'In itself': \textit{an sich}. Often ... what is meant is implicitly or potentiality, but (on occasion) the meaning is almost the opposite: looked at superficially, without regard for entelechy, or, as Hegel says, ignoring its inner nature. The meaning here accords with both ordinary usage and Kant's precedent (the thing in itself, \textit{das Ding an sich}). \textit{An sich}, like in itself, often means: taken by itself, apart from its relations (* italics mine) to other matters, or, in effect, considered superficially. ... The term is often paired with 'for itself' (\textit{für sich}) which is meant to suggest individuality or, more specifically, both separate and self-conscious being." Hegel, Reinterpretation, p. 391.
self-constituting process, the ontological study of man could not be separated from the study of human history.\textsuperscript{208} There is a distinct parallel between Hegel and some contemporary Existentialists and other philosophers who argue that man fashions his essence by doing and acting (and living history) within history. However, it is not in spite of, but rather it follows from the nature of his 'logistico-ontologism', as his philosophy has been called, that Hegel strives to manifest and to comprehend fundamentally the 'historicity of man' within his system. It is because man is what he does and what he has been,\textsuperscript{209} what he has experienced, done and thought, that not only his natural environment, but also his history and his nation's culture and history are involved in his being what he has become. Man is an 'opening out' and a 'developing development' growing into the future toward greater freedom and knowledge. "The principle of Development involves also the

\textsuperscript{208} See Fackenheim, \textit{Metaphysics and Historicity}, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{209} Hegel's examination of the words \textit{sein}, \textit{Wesen} and \textit{gewesen} is instructive in this matter: "With respect to other meanings and uses of the category of Essence, we may note that in the German auxiliary verb 'sein' the past tense is expressed by the term for Essence (\textit{Wesen}): we designate past being as \textit{gewesen}. This anomaly of language implies to some extent a correct perception of the relation between Being and Essence. Essence we may certainly regard as past Being, remembering however that the past is not utterly denied, but only laid aside and thus at the same time preserved. Thus, to say, Caesar \textit{was} in Gaul, only denies the immediacy of the event, but not his sojourn in Gaul altogether." \textit{Ency.}, \textit{Logic}, \textit{112}, Zus. These important remarks show just how fundamentally the past and history are taken up into the system.
existence of a latent germ of being - a capacity or potentiality striving to realize itself. This formal determination finds actual existence in Spirit; which has the History of the World for its theatre, its possession, and the sphere of its realization."\textsuperscript{210} The present situation, as it has been shaped by history, could not be irrelevant to Hegel as ontologist. When man is conceived as a self-constituting process, the historical past must enter into his present being; as shown in the Phenomenology, in the Philosophy of Spirit, and here, man is so conceived by Hegel, then man \textit{qua} man \textit{is} in his ontological constitution, historical. "The history of mind is its own act. Mind is only what it does, and its act is to make itself the object of its own consciousness. In history its act is to gain consciousness of itself as mind, to apprehend itself in its interpretation of itself to itself."\textsuperscript{211} Such a process can continuously constitute itself only by continuous appropriation and re-appropriation of at least some of the past. "This apprehension is its being and its principle, and the completion

\textsuperscript{210} \textit{P. of \text{R.}}, p. 54. "Das Prinzip der Entwicklung enthält das weitere, dass eine innere Bestimmung, eine an sich vorhandene Voraussetzung zugrunde liege, die sich zur Existenz bringe. Diese formelle Bestimmung ist wesentlich der Geist, welcher die Weltgeschichte zu seinem Schauplatze, Eigentum und Felde seiner Verwirklichung hat." \textit{P. der G.}, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{211} \textit{P. of \text{R.}}, \textit{\^} 343. "Die Geschichte des Geistes ist seine \textit{Tat}, denn er ist nur, was er tut, und seine Tat ist, sich, und zwar hier, als Geist sich zum Gegenstande seines Bewusstseins zu machen, sich für sich selbst auslegend zu erfassen." \textit{P. des Rechts}, p. 289.
of apprehension at one stage is at the same time the rejection of that stage and its transition to a higher."\textsuperscript{212} Hegel, at the very beginning of his career saw that an abstract human nature could not do justice to the historically situated man. Now in his maturity, Hegel recognizes the importance of the historical 'situation' in which 'the acting of men is affected by other men as well as by their own', and in which great historical men have created possibilities of experience which but for their work would not exist. The gains of civilization and the accomplishments of national life now present, have been developed in history at great sacrifice. The requirements for ethical and productive life are at hand:

The State, its laws, its arrangements, constitute the rights of its members; its natural features, its mountains, air, and waters, are their country, their outward material property; the history of this State, their deeds; what their ancestors have produced, belongs to them and lives in their memory. All is their possession, just as they are possessed by it; for it constitutes their Substance, their being.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{212} P. of R., \textsuperscript{\textit{f}} 343. "Dies Erfassen ist Sein und Prinzip, und die Vollendung eines Erfassens ist zugleich seine Entäuszerung und sein Übergang." P. des Rechts, p. 289.

\textsuperscript{213} P. of H., p. 52. "Der Staat, seine Gesetze, seine Einrichtungen sind der Staatsindividuen Rechte; seine Natur, sein Boden, seine Berge, Luft und Gewässer sind ihr Land, ihr Vaterland, ihr Muserliches Eigentum; die Geschichte dieses Staates, ihr Taten, und das, was ihre Vorfahren hervorbrachten, gehört ihnen und lebt in ihrer Erinnerung. Alles ist ihr Besitz ebenso, wie sie von ihm besessen werden, denn es macht ihre Substanz, ihr Sein aus." P. der G., p. 103. S. Werke, 11, p. 87,
4. Infinite Thought and Man's Realization in and of Absolute Spirit

The 'second nature' realized in morality, ethical life, law, and the state within world history in the sphere of objective spirit forms the living matrix and community of spirit, the self-conscious ethical substance out of which Absolute Spirit arises. Absolute Spirit achieves an ultimate over-arching synthesis or unity of Subjective Spirit and Objective Spirit by elevating these finite forms of spirit to the all encompassing True infinity wherein Infinite Spirit knows itself as Infinite. It knows itself as infinite Truth and infinite Freedom; it is self-thinking Thought knowing itself as the totality. The ethical substance, infinite 'in itself', suffers from contingency, is limited and particular by being in space and time; Spirit therefore rises to Absolute Spirit where these limitations are overcome.

But the thinking Spirit of World History, in so far as it strips off these limitations of the particular National Spirits and its own worldliness, grasps its own concrete universality, and raises itself to the knowledge of Absolute Spirit, as the eternal actual truth, in which cognitive reason is free for itself, while necessity, nature and history merely minister to its revelation and are vessels of its honour.  

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Spirit knows itself as the absolute unity of Spirit and Nature, the forms and conditions for its concrete life as Absolute Spirit. Because the infinite exists in and through the finite, the results of spirit's labour in time are comprised within Absolute Spirit. Absolute Spirit actualizes itself as self-thinking Thought through civilization's highest forms of knowledge, Art, Religion and Philosophy. The Absolute, dialectically, is manifested first in Beauty, in the form of immediacy, in 'the showing' of sensuous objects in nature and Art.

A. Absolute Spirit realized in the Beauty of Art

The beauty of art is beauty born of the spirit and born again, and the higher the spirit and its products stand above nature and its phenomena, the higher too is the beauty of art above that of nature.215

Now art and works of art, as springing from and created by spirit, are themselves of a spiritual kind, even if their presentation assumes a show of sensuousness, and pervades the sensuous with spirit.216

Absolute Spirit discovers and comprehends itself in sensuous


form in the beauty of nature and in the different levels of artistic creation; but while nature does reveal the beautiful, it is Art, the creation of spirit, which reveals the beautiful most purely and truly, in the view of Hegel. The Ideal is the Idea existent in sensuous form; the Idea shines through the relative opacity of the sensible object as beauty. Hegel defines 'beauty' as 'the Idea of the beautiful' (das Schöne die Idee des Schönen) and says that this implies that we must conceive 'the beautiful as Idea' and 'moreover, as Idea in a determinate form, as Ideal' (und zwar als Idee in einer bestimmten Form, als Ideal).\textsuperscript{217} He finds that there are degrees of beauty in nature, and that the beauty of organic nature is higher than the relatively dull beauty of inert inorganic matter. In living things there is a beauty of greater clarity to be discovered. Animals, reveal beauty more wholly than vegetation, in that they express the Idea's living unity in difference, more adequately. However because the Idea, as such, is absolutely infinite and absolutely free, for the fullest expression of it, in terms of beauty, there must be comprised in the object's showing, true infinitude and freedom. Man himself carries this work of the spirit forward toward its fulfillment in his works of art.

The universal and absolute want from which art on its side of essential form arises, originates in the fact that man is a thinking consciousness, in other words

that he renders explicit to himself, and from his own substance, what he is and all in fact that exists. The objects of Nature exist exclusively in immediacy and once for all. Man, on the contrary, as spirit reduplicates himself.218

Spirit manifests itself as the Ideal in and through the range of works and presentations of man's Artistic creation. The artist need not be consciously aware that his work manifests the Ideal; he may wish merely to express a simple truth, seemingly as much feeling as thought, but because of what he is he imbues his creation with spirit. Man "is, to begin with, a natural thing too, but in addition, he exists for himself; he observes himself, makes himself present to his imagination and thought, and only through this active power of self-realization or being-for-itself is he spirit."219 Man acquires this consciousness of himself in a twofold way: 1) theoretically: In so far as he realizes the necessity of bringing 'his own inner life to consciousness', man can comprise within it 'the determinations of his essential being', as much from himself as from his world of experience, eventually to discover himself at home in his world, because in all of it he recognizes himself. 2)

218 P. of A., I, p. 41. "Das allgemeine und absolute Bedürfnis, aus dem die Kunst (nach ihrer formellen Seite) quillt, findet seinen Ursprung darin, dass der Mensch denkendes Bewusstsein ist, d.h. dass er, was er ist und was überhaupt ist, aus sich selbst für sich macht. Die Naturdinge sind nur unmittelbar und einmal, doch der Mensch als Geist verdoppelt sich, ..." "Ästhetik, I, p. 41; S. Werke, 12, p. 57.

219 Ibid. "... indem er zunächst wie die Naturdinge ist, sodann aber ebensoweit für sich ist, sich anschaut, sich vorstellt, denkt und nur durch dies tätige Fürsichsein Geist ist." Ibid.
practical activity: Man possesses an impulse to assert or project himself in that which is immediately 'at hand', and in the process of doing it, once more recognizes himself therein. In working upon such objects, he imprints the seal of his inner life, his spirit, and thereby rediscovers in them the characteristics of his own determinate nature. "Man does this, in order that he may as a free subject divest the external world of its stubborn alienation from himself - and in order that he may enjoy in the configuration of the object an external reality simply of himself." In the work of art as in work generally, man constitutes himself while producing an extension of himself in his work and in it recognizes himself.

Although the Idea as beauty is identical with the Idea as truth, in Art the Idea's truth is implicit in the shapes and forms of the sensible objects worked and formed. In other words, Absolute Spirit manifests and apprehends itself differently in Art than it does in Religion and in Philosophy, the modes of its manifestation are distinct, but its truth is the same in each. Art when used merely to afford recreation and entertainment, is 'not free but ancillary', Hegel says, but he notes, equally thought can serve other

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ends. Furthermore, just as thought 'can cut itself free of servitude in order to raise itself, in free independence, to the truth in which it fulfills itself' so art can in its own medium. Art is 'one way of bringing to consciousness and expressing the Divine, the deepest interests of mankind, and the most comprehensive truths of the spirit'. It shares this characteristic with religion and philosophy. However, it does so in a different way, it manifests 'even the highest sensuously, bringing it thereby nearer to the senses, to feeling, and to nature's mode of appearance'. Reminiscent of the Phenomenology he speaks of thought's first apprehending 'the supra-sensuous world' as a beyond, as opposed to its immediate consciousness. Both thought and art play their parts in spirit's work of healing this breach:

it is the freedom of intellectual reflection which rescues itself from the here and now, called sensuous actuality and finitude. But this breach, to which spirit proceeds, it is also able to heal. It generates out of itself works of fine art as the first reconciling middle term between the purely external, sensuous, transient, and pure thought, between nature's finite actuality, and the infinite freedom of notional thinking.

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Just as it is not necessary that the artist comprehend the philosophical significance of his notion permeated work, so in terms of the aesthetic experience of other men, it is enough that they have such experience, in order for spirit to bring about a degree of reconciliation between the finite and the infinite, appropriate to this level of Absolute Spirit. It is philosophy's task to comprehend the philosophical significance of art, both in respect to the objects created as such, and the notional role they play in the human consciousness.

"For the Notion is the universal which maintains itself in its particularizations, overreaches itself and its other, and so it is also the power and activity of canceling again the estrangement in which it gets involved."222 Art if it is to be free and infinite and so commensurate with Absolute Spirit, must in its special way be formed to manifest the Notion but in the form of beauty. In short, art is the work of spirit and in sensible form reveals spirit. "Thus the work of art, too, in which thought renounces itself, belongs to the sphere of notional thinking, and spirit, by subjecting it to philosophical treatment, is thereby merely satisfying the need of Spirit's inmost nature."223

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223 Ibid. "So gehört auch das Kunstwerk, in welchem
Hegel endeavoured to show the historical evolution of the Ideal in Art forms from the chiefly Symbolic art forms of the Eastern civilizations (Persia, India, Egypt) to the Classical forms of Greek civilization, and finally to the Romantic Art forms which in time arose from the Christian Religion and Christian culture. Architecture was an important contribution of the first but found its most harmonious expression in Greece, as did sculpture, which Hegel thinks was the special contribution of the Greeks, although they evolved other art forms, particularly drama. The Christian period had its impact on the development of Architecture and Sculpture, with its soaring cathedrals and sculptural representations of saints, and the kings, princes and knights of the age of chivalry, but its special contributions came in painting, music, poetry, and 'dramatic poetry'. With the less harmonious but richly human art forms of the Romantic phase, Spirit strives to free itself for a more adequate mode of realization. Spirit finds its fuller realization in religious revelation, worship and knowledge of God. "Thus the principle which gives the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence, and as 'absolute' spirit is for the Spirit." (als absoluter Geist für den Geist ist.)

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B. Absolute Spirit realized in the relation of Spirit to Spirit

Thus God is the beginning of all things, and the end of all things. As all things proceed from this point, so all return to it again.225

Spirit is for Spirit; that expresses its nature, and is thus its own presupposition. We start with Spirit as subject, it is identical with itself, it is the eternal perception of itself, and it is at the same time conceived of only as a result, as the end of a process.226

As a young man, Hegel saw the need of reconciliation between the religious life of men and other aspects of their lives as members of society. Even before going to Jena the resolution of this problem had begun to take shape. In the Phenomenology he described one arduous path to an absolute reconciliation between self-consciousness, as spirit, with all the forms of its world of experience including the religious. The whole process results in the attainment of absolute self-conscious spirit in absolute knowledge. However, this long phenomenological pilgrimage Hegel conceives, in another sense, as only a beginning, a way of preparation for entering into the pure


226 Ibid., II, p. 346. "Der Geist ist für den Geist; diesz ist er; er ist also seine Voraussetzung; wir fangen mit dem Geist als Subject an, er ist identisch mit sich, ist ewige Anschauung seiner selbst, er ist so zugleich nur als Resultat, als Ende gefaszt." Ibid., 16, p. 207-208.
thought of the Logic, which begins the system proper. Now at the end of the system, again Religion stands next to Philosophy, and midway between Art and this highest of the modes of Absolute Spirit. Because Absolute Spirit is infinite self-thinking thought, a contradiction develops in art between Spirit's nature and its manifestations in sensuous form, with the result that Spirit advances to its superior mode of manifestation and realization found in revealed religion, worship and knowledge of God. Religion is superior to Art for this task because here the religious consciousness thinks the Absolute, however it thinks with figurative or imaginative thoughts, with *vorstellung* as distinguished from the pure thought of Philosophy. However, Hegel's *Vorstellung* is not merely an image or mental picture; it is a universal wrapped in sensuous imagery. In religion then, the Absolute is apprehended at an intermediate level, which is to say, the Absolute is apprehended in a manner, not purely rational nor purely sensuous. Having shown that Religious feeling ordinarily extends or evolves beyond mere pious feeling to considerations of the nature and wisdom of God, and to man's relation to Him, and so ends

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227 Hegel's use of the word 'Vorstellung' in most contexts indicates a level of thought which is both sensuous and rational. It is pictorial while retaining a significance which is universal. *Vorstellung* "commonly stands in Hegel for something between sensuous intuition (Anschauung) or perception (Wahrnehmung) on the one hand, and Notion (Begriff) on the other." Translator's Note, *Science of Logic*, (Johnston and Struthers edition), Vol. I, p. 27.
in thought, Hegel turns to the notion of thought revealed in
the self-conscious subject:

And with this, the principle of selfness at once devel­
ops itself completely. 'I', as simple, universal, as
thought, am really relation; since I am for myself, am
self-consciousness, the relations too are to be for me.
To the thoughts, ideas which I make my own, I give the
character which I myself am. I am this simple point,
and that which is for me I seek to apprehend in this
unity. 228

The object of the philosophical examination of Religion is
knowledge of 'that which is, and the necessity of it'; and it
must do more than give it 'a necessary connection', it must go
on to give it an 'absolute connection'. This knowledge must
show that Religion, when properly comprehended, has in it much
more than 'simple feeling', that it is more than 'contentless
or empty elevation to the Eternal', and it must go on to show
that the principle of reconciliation is invested within Relig­
ion. More than in other religions, the need of this reconcil­
iation has come into prominence in the Christian religion,
because it begins in absolute division, from the sense of
suffering in which it sunders the natural unity of the spirit.

sich zugleich vollends das Princip des Selbstischen. Ich,
alser einfach, allgemein, als Denken, bin Beziehung überhaupt;
indem ich für mich, Selbstbewusstseyn, bin, sollen die Bezie-
hungen auch för mich seyn. Den Gedanken, Vorstellungen, die
ich mir zu eigen mache, denen gebe ich die Bestimmung, die
ich selber bin. Ich bin dieser einfache Punkt und das, was
für mich ist, will ich in dieser Einheit erkennen." S. Werke,
15, p. 31.
In it man finds himself 'separated from the infinite, absolute Essence'.

For the spirit has left its natural simplicity behind, and entered upon an internal conflict; it is, as sinful, an Other in opposition to the truth; it is withdrawn, estranged from it. "I", in this condition of schism, am not the truth, and this is therefore given as an independent content of ordinary thought, and the truth is in the first instance put forward upon authority.229

However, even though the truth is encountered first as dependent on the witness of others, this truth is referred into the interiority of the Christian subject's self-conscious thought, so that in reflecting upon this knowledge and his own inner conflicts, his freedom is revealed to him. Hegel thinks that there can be seen in the promise and expectation of Christianity the essential characteristic of rational knowledge, that it be free, because in Christianity man is to become free. Clearly he has in mind the freedom of autonomy which follows from the infinite power of thought, the capacity to overcome all otherness and to take all content into oneself as one's own. In the subject's potential infinity of thought and freedom, is to be found both man's historicity and his capability for attaining absolute knowledge. "In (Christianity) the subject, the salvation of the soul, the redemption of the

individual as an individual, and not only the species, is an essential end. This subjectivity, this selfness (not selfishness) is just the principle of rational knowledge itself. So it is that while the Christian religion brings out the antithesis between man's feeling and immediate perception, and man's capacity for reflection and knowledge, it also comprises within its doctrine the essential elements 'for developing itself to its full logical issue as Form and as a world of form'.

In treating of Philosophy's attitude to Religion, Hegel insists that philosophy and religion have the same content, need and interest. His subsequent development of this contention is pertinent to the subsidiary thesis of this study, that while his philosophy includes an implicit notion of historicity, it nevertheless retains the object of and has the capacity for attaining timeless truth. "The object of religion as well as philosophy is eternal truth in its objectivity, God and nothing but God, and the explication of God." Christianity, for Hegel, is the absolute religion, for rational


knowledge is a fundamental characteristic in it and it has for its content the absolute truth, just as has Philosophy. The content is identical but the form of its revelation is different. Philosophy's wisdom is concerned not with "empirical existence and life, but is knowledge of that which is eternal, of what God is, and what flows out of His nature. For this His nature must reveal and develop itself. Philosophy, therefore, only unfolds itself when it unfolds religion, and in unfolding itself it unfolds religion." Christianity as the absolute religion, Hegel, in effect, conceives as exoteric philosophy; and philosophy, he conceives as esoteric Christianity. The Absolute Spirit has as content, the Absolute, which is thought, and in thought Religion and Philosophy coincide.

As has been shown, to comprehend the life of the Absolute, according to Hegel, is to comprehend it in and through the finite. Because the Absolute necessarily expresses itself as Spirit, to comprehend the life of the Absolute Spirit, is to comprehend it in and through finite spirit. For Hegel, Spirit is that which differentiates man from the animal and from nature, and, in religious language, it is Spirit which reveals man to be made in the image of God. Mention has

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232 P. of Religion, I, p. 19. "... des empirischen Daseyns und Lebens, sondern Erkenntnisch dessen, was ewig ist, was Gott ist und was aus seiner Natur fließt. Denn diese Natur muss sich offenbaren und entwikeln. Die Philosophie explicirt daher nur sich, indem sie die Religion explicirt und indem sie sich explicirt, explicirt sie die Religion." S. Werke, 15, p. 37.
been made that Hegel was concerned with the relation between the infinite and the finite throughout his career as a philosopher. This concern very much included the relation between God and man. A further insight into Hegel's notion of man can be had by looking at this relationship from the side of man. It has been shown also, that thought is the exemplar of the true infinite for Hegel; he now explains that it is through thought that man attains or shares in the life of infinite spirit. He develops the theme of man's relation between the finite and the infinite in three remarkable paragraphs while discussing God's Moment of Particularity (the Sphere of Differentiation). Here he treats of man as subject in his immediacy, and with his needs, conditions, sins, in his wholly empirical and temporal character. In religion man is the relation of these two sides: the absolutely finite consciousness and being seemingly sharply opposed to the infinite.

In thinking I lift myself up to the Absolute above all that is finite, and am infinite consciousness, while I am at the same time finite consciousness, and indeed am such in accordance with my whole empirical character. Both sides, as well as their relation, exist for me. Both sides seek each other, and both flee from each other.\textsuperscript{233}

Hegel conceives of Spirit as being infinite-in-finitude, and from the above it can be seen that he also conceived of human spirit as in principle infinite-in-finitude, but not without a struggle. Man has a foot in each, like Hercules so to speak. There are many passages in Hegel's works where he says, in so many words, that although Spirit is infinite, it must pretend to itself to be finite, in order to overcome this pretence, but this seems to fit less well with human spirit, except when developing the epistemology of human thought processes. That Absolute Spirit (metaphorically speaking) pretend to itself to be finite in order to transcend it, and become fully aware of its own infinity, does have meaning especially when theisticly regarded. But in this passage, human spirit is regarded more reasonably as the 'middle term' which contains the characteristics of both extremes. It is true, that man may accentuate his 'empirical, finite consciousness', and so place himself in 'opposition to infiniteness'. At another time, he may endeavour to exclude himself from himself, and in so doing, accentuate the reality of the infinite consciousness'. However, "the middle term contains nothing else than the characteristics of both the extremes." (Die Mitte des Schlusses enthält nichts Anderes als die Bestimmung beider Extreme selbst.) The finite and the infinite, 'are not pillars of Hercules', which sharply confront each other. "I am, and it is in myself and for myself that this conflict and this conciliation take
place. In myself, I as infinite am against or in contrast with myself as finite, and as finite consciousness I stand over against my thought as infinite."^{234} Man is a restless movement within his identity of being, drawing away from the finite toward the infinite, and gaining something of the infinite, is again thrust up against the finite. He cannot rest in either. Of the two sides, "each is itself a totality" and "each of the two extremes is itself 'I'," which also relates the two. Man is both the unity and the conflict, and it is he who must put forth the effort of holding the conflicting elements together, and so 'attain mastery over this opposition'. He is not one of the combatants, but 'both the combatants' and 'the strife itself'.

Hegel devotes himself to the thoughtful study of the history of the world's religions. He begins with the Religion of Nature, which comprises the characteristics of the religions of magic, imagination, light, pain and mystery. From this phase, the Religion of Spiritual Individuality emerges, which in turn comprises the religions of sublimity, beauty, and utility. This second phase leads finally to the emergence of the Absolute Religion, i.e. the Christian. With this religion,

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God reveals His true nature; no longer is He a hidden God. through the utterances and the acts of Christ during His life, coupled with the theological conceptions subsequently developed by His followers around these words and events, God is made known to men in the form of religious Vorstellung. The doctrine on the Trinity is particularly important in Hegel's view. "Without this characteristic of Trinity, God would not be Spirit, and Spirit would be an empty word."\[235\] In connection with the Third Person, the Holy Spirit, Hegel frequently cites expressions concerning the Spirit from the New Testament. He finds, in such statements, explicit formulations of God's nature, formulations which are more than Vorstellung and which have great philosophical significance without further translation. In the doctrine of the Fall of man, Hegel finds expression of the estrangement of man from God, for the healing and overcoming of which Christ came into the world, and for this continuing reconciliation He sent the Holy Spirit to be present in His Church. However, neither in the religious or the philosophical perspective, is such reconciliation something automatic for individual men. Through the Spirit, particular men must strive to overcome their own sin or alienation. In his very being man is distinguished from God; he is

a particular spirit among particular spirits, alienated from
the Universal Spirit, who is God; and the evil in his nature,
results, according to Hegel, from his particularity. But
man's estrangement and lack of goodness is not final; man can
achieve reconciliation and return to God. Man is not only
finite, in Hegel's view, he also shares in the infinite spirit,
both in respect of his nature and to the extent that he actual-
izes the potentialities of his spirit. The Idea is operant in
his nature, and through self-consciousness, thought, and the
choosing of universal ends as opposed to particular ends, man
overcomes the estrangement.

We define God when we say, that He distinguishes Himself
from Himself, and is an object for Himself, but that in
this distinction He is purely identical with Himself,
is in fact Spirit. This notion or conception is now
realised, consciousness knows this content and knows
that it is itself absolutely interwoven with this con-
tent; in the Notion which is the process of God it is
itself a moment. Finite consciousness knows God only
to the extent to which God knows Himself in it; thus
God is Spirit, the Spirit of His Church in fact, i.e.
of those who worship Him.  

The distinction between God and Man remains; unity can be and
is achieved, but their respective identities are preserved in

236 P. of Religion, II, p. 327. "Gott ist diesz:
sich von sich selbst zu unterscheiden, sich Gegenstand zu
seyn, aber in diesem Unterschiede schlechthin mit sich ident-
isch zu seyn - der Geist. Dieser Begriff, ist nun realisirt,
das Bewusztseyn weisz diesen Inhalt und in diesem Inhalt
weisz es sich schlechthin verflochten; in dem Begriff, der der
Procesz Gottes ist, ist es selbst Moment. Das endliche Be-
wusztseyn weisz Gott nur insofern, als Gott sich in ihm
weisz; so ist Gott Geist und zwar der Geist seiner Gemeinde,
d.i. derer, die ihn verehren." S. Werke, 16, p. 191.
the interacting process. God is the eternally creative, infinite and universal spirit; man is temporal, finite and particular, but through his self-consciousness and his infinite power of thought he can attain the Absolute as eternal, i.e. share in the self-consciousness of God. Man's consciousness is a moment in God's creative self-consciousness. Man's consciousness of God is self-consciousness in which he achieves consciousness of himself as an indwelling moment in God as self-conscious. The end or purpose of the totality of the universe is the full realization of the mind of God in actuality, and a part of that totality is man, and part of the mind of God is the mind of man, and in eternally enjoying the fruit of His work, God enjoys the work of man, which in its highest forms and heights of attainment, in art, religion and philosophy, is Absolute Spirit.

C. Absolute Spirit realized in the Absolute Knowledge of Philosophy

This last embodiment of spirit - spirit which at once gives its complete and true content the form of self, and thereby realizes its notion, and in doing so remains within its own notion - this is Absolute Knowledge. 237

237 Phen., p. 797. "Diese letzte Gestalt des Geistes, der Geist, der seinem vollständigen und wahren Inhalte zugleich die Form des Selbsts gibt, und dadurch seinen Begriff ebenso realisiert, als er in dieser Realisierung in seinem Begriffe bleibt, ist das absolute Wissen;" Phän., p. 556.
This movement, which philosophy is, finds itself already accomplished, when at the close it seizes its own notion - i.e. only looks back on its knowledge.\footnote{238} Religion's figurative thought and language cannot always be in full accord with its philosophical content. Spirit therefore advances to the final phase of Absolute Spirit, to Philosophy whose mode of thought activity is reason, and its realization of Absolute Spirit is carried out in the medium of pure thought. Just as Hegel was concerned to follow out in thought the development of spirit in the history of Art and in the history of Religion, so too in Philosophy, Hegel follows the dialectical process of the development of spirit in the history of Philosophy. Philosophy is the history of that subject comprehended in thought in such way that its present form is known to be the necessary outcome, and to be the continuance and preservation of the earlier philosophical developments out of which it has arisen. "What we must represent to ourselves is the activity of free thought; we have to present the history of the world of thought as it has arisen and produced itself."\footnote{239} "The history of Philosophy is itself scientific, 


\footnote{239} \textit{History of Philosophy}, I, p. 4. "Sondern was vor unserer Vorstellung vorübergehen soll, sind die Thaten des freien Gedankens; es ist die Geschichte der Gedankenwelt, der intellectuellen Welt, wie sie entstand ist, sich hervorgebracht hat." \textit{S. Werke}, 17, p. 31.
Hegel was one of a small number of philosophers who first came to a cognizance of the 'historicity' of man, himself, his society and his culture. For Hegel, not only is it the case that most areas of human knowledge are subject to historical development, including much of the philosophical, it is also the case for Hegel, that man's being is subject to historical development. The difficulty which emerges when such a position is taken concerns the permanence or otherwise of truth attained by man. It was argued at the beginning of this chapter that

a) although Hegel fully recognizes the limitations imposed on human thought by history, and on truth, by the historicity of man's being, he nevertheless attempts to retain for man, through philosophy, the capacity to transcend history's limitations.

b) although Hegel did acknowledge a form of historical relativism, which is consistent with his recognition of a historical human world ... he still maintained that philosophical truth per se, does escape historical relativism.

It is necessary, therefore,

c) to explain now, (following from all that has gone before) how Hegel can comprise a form of historical relativism and a notion of historicity in his

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241 Fackenheim poses the question "If man's very being is inseparable from his history, must the same not be true of his grasp of metaphysical truth? And must not then what is metaphysically true in one period of history differ from what is metaphysically true in another?" Metaphysics and Historicity, p. 13.
philosophy, without destroying the timelessness of philosophical truth, admittedly attained in history.

a. Philosophy and Historical Relativism

There are some well known passages in Hegel's writings which may seem to assert that philosophy, if not metaphysics, is inseparable from history, and that what is true philosophically at one time, differs from what is true philosophically in another. While discussing the theme, "Philosophy as the thought of its time", Hegel says,

But men do not at certain epochs, merely philosophize in general, for there is a definite Philosophy which arises among a people, and the definite character of the standpoint of thought is the same character which permeates all the other historical sides of the spirit of the people, which is most intimately related to them, and which constitutes their foundation.\(^{242}\)

This passage is not as sharply drawn as the better known passage which includes the argument that as 'every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts'\(^{243}\) and therefore does not provide ready


\(^{243}\) P. of Right, Preface, p. 11. "To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason. Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes."
material for short, sharp misinterpretation of Hegel on this point. However, Hegel's historical consciousness and appreciation of man's historicity is very evident here. Moreover, it would be easy to place a construction of historical relativism on this sentence, in respect to its meaning and implications. Notwithstanding the above remark, it is usually rash to take such passage as presenting Hegel's unqualified position without first looking for another passage which may moderate or balance an apparently extreme stand. The reason for care in this respect, is simply that his procedure is always to attempt to achieve balanced explanations which do justice to all the authentic aspects of a problem. Furthermore, Reason is paramount in Hegel's system; he is always concerned to show that Reason is everywhere operative, even if only implicitly. It would have been strange indeed to have found Hegel surrendering Reason's capacity to attain truth which is eternal, regardless of his thoroughgoing historical consciousness and he was not found doing so in the works studied to this point. Hegel did see his philosophy as continuing and fulfilling the work of the great philosophers before him, but there were few of these who would deny philosophy the capacity to attain truth which was not in some sense timeless, and Hegel does not surrender Philosophy's task and claim to seek and attain absolute Truth. Clearly, he sees philosophy as being more fully developed in time, but he also
conceives of a deepening of metaphysical truth in that philosophy takes up and preserves truth gained in the past in a superior profundity. The ground for these assertions and for Hegel's confidence in Philosophy's capacity to achieve its aim is to be found in the notions of the True Infinite, the Notion, Time and Eternity, Subject, Spirit and Thought and the dialectical part played by them in man's endeavour to comprehend his world absolutely.

Hegel accepts the challenges of the modern world including that posed by History to Philosophy's eternal Truth and to man's 'essential personality', he examines them on their merits, and accords them their truth value while showing their one-sidedness, their incompleteness and partial truth. There is truth in the general standpoint, that time and history impose limitations on man's knowledge but this standpoint is not the whole of the truth. The necessary inadequacy of such a view (historical relativism with an implicit historicism) calls forth its own negation. The oft quoted passage about the absurdity of philosophy transcending its contemporary world (footnote overleaf) should be viewed in connection with another in the same Preface:

To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual, the reconciliation which philosophy affords to those in whom there has once arisen an inner voice bidding them to comprehend, not only to dwell in what is substantive while still retaining subjective freedom,
but also to possess subjective freedom while standing not in anything particular and accidental but in what exists absolutely.\(^\text{244}\)

Hegel's expression here is rich in meaning, but included in his meaning is the notion that there is a special freedom to be found in recognizing Reason's presence in the present and in comprehending that which exists absolutely. In other words, Hegel was not prepared to deny reason the capacity to attain absolute truth. The search for universal and timeless truth continued to have great meaning for Hegel. For example in his Heidelberg Inaugural Address, after remarking on the good fortune of the students of this particular time being able to devote their youth 'undisturbed to Science and to Truth' he states explicitly that "The love of truth, faith in the power of mind, is the first condition in Philosophy."\(^\text{245}\) Reason is very much a force in history, and not merely a product of history. Man's reason is open to and free in its historical development; Reason or the Absolute freely determines itself

\(^{\text{244}}\) P. of Right, p. 16. "Die Vernunft als die Rose im Kreuse der Gegenwart der zu erkennen und damit dieser sich zu erfreuen, diese vernünftige Einsicht ist die Versöhnung mit der Wirklichkeit, welche die Philosophie denen gewährt, an die einmal die innere Anforderung ergangen ist, zu begreifen, und in dem, was substantiell ist, ebenso die subjektive Freiheit zu erhalten, sowie mit der subjektiven Freiheit nicht in einem Besonderen und Zufälligen, sondern in dem, was an und für sich ist, zu stehen." P. des Rechts, p. 16.

in its historical development.

Thus Mind's thinking comprehension of self is at the same time the progression of the total actuality evolved. This progression is not one which takes its course through the thought of an individual and exhibits itself in a single consciousness, for it shows itself to be universal Spirit presenting itself in the history of the world in all the richness of its form.\(^{246}\)

Hegel's strong interest in the historical context and in the evolution of thought in the actual fabric of changing human society can easily give the impression that he was a historical relativist. Explicit statements in various works seem to confirm this impression. In fact this impression is not so far wrong, because in one sense he was a historical relativist, but he was also a rationalist, in the tradition of great philosophers back to Aristotle and Plato. His problem was to give due account to a universe in process, while accounting for its stable structure and Mind's capacity to know such structure.

Hegel had himself, of course, plunged the mind into the world of "becoming", giving it "being" there as a "becoming", and so accomplishing its assimilation to the flux of things. Yet even with him there remained a rational insight by the mind into its own processes. The process of Mind - its logical "moments" - could

thus still be said to have the static being of rational knowledge.\footnote{247}

Before turning up the rationalist and idealist side of the coin, examination of the historical relativist side of the coin is required. He does stress the point that the thinker is very much part of his time, and that he is subject to the influences and currents of thought prevailing in his place and period of growth and work. Furthermore, in being part of his time, he stands at a particular historical stage of thought development which has culminated in the particular present society in which he lives. Open to his comprehension is the wealth of such historical development, but closed to him is the future beyond the limits of present history. Within a different set of limits, concerned with the relevance of the known past to the present, he has the content of history with which to consider the present and its problems. Writing of the development of philosophical thought, he observes sensibly enough that,

We must not expect to find the questions of our consciousness and the interests of the present world responded to by the ancients; such questions presuppose a certain development in thought. Therefore every philosophy belongs to its own time and is

\footnote{247} Harry Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy, The Evolution of Thought from Copernicus to the Present, Garden City, Anchor Books, 1966, p. 333. Prosch adds this footnote to the above, "Just as Aristotle had found many natural processes which could be static enough parts of 'becoming' to make some knowledge of it possible, so Hegel found one Grand Process which made the whole of 'becoming' static enough to be the subject of knowledge."
Hegel is concerned to reveal the development of 'the one universal Mind' of which man is part. This latter can be understood in the straightforward sense that certain 'new' conceptions need time for their general acceptance, i.e. to become part of the spirit of the time. They are only properly understood when other supporting conceptions have been developed or have become more adequately expressed, and more generally understood. In short, new conceptions, new perspectives on the world, society or morality do not become accepted and institutionalized overnight. No doubt Hegel also has a more metaphysical meaning in mind, but he is also putting forward this straightforward and insightful observation about the temporal and historical maturation required for the development, acceptance and implementation of ideas. Some of these may well be perennial problems but nevertheless they arise in different historical contexts. Related and relevant problem aspects which were not appreciated in the past must now be taken into account. Other related and relevant problems are now

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recognized; some of these are new; and these also must be taken into account. Indeed 'old' questions are re-discovered but when such is the case, they are usually discovered within a cluster of new questions. Answers from the past cannot be completely satisfactory, not simply because the formulations seem archaic, but because their formulations are not sufficiently relevant. They are not sufficiently relevant, because they do not deal with the present concrete complexity of the problem, because the historical consciousness is richer having grown out of the past. However Hegel affirms the value of the study of the history of philosophy, in terms of its intimate relationship with living present philosophy. "The conquests made by Thought when constituted into Thought form the very Being of Spirit. Such knowledge is thus not learning merely, or a knowledge of what is dead, buried and corrupt: the history of Philosophy has not to do with what is gone, but with the living present." In affirming the value of the history of Philosophy, he affirms that certain principles and concepts attained in past philosophical achievements have a timeless value, are part of present philosophical thinking. The fact of

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the matter is that for Hegel the history of philosophy has truth value, which is eternal.

we must not regard the history of Philosophy as dealing with the past, even though it is history. The scientific products of reason form the content of this history, and these are not past. What is obtained in this field of labour is the True, and, as such, the Eternal; it is not what exists now, and not then; it is true not only today or tomorrow, but beyond all time, and in as far as it is in time, it is true always and for every time. 250

There are more passages of this type, where a timeless truth value is accorded the highest of philosophy's attainments, than there are passages confining the philosopher to his own time. Some interpreters of Hegel's philosophy seem to have missed this balance and tension. But those who have not missed this other side of the coin, the emphasis on the timelessness of Truth, have the difficulty of contending with the fact that both types of positional statement are found more or less side by side, apparently contradicting each other. Hegel resolves this apparent contradiction through his showing of what Philosophy is, including its relation to the Mind of God. In its superior form, Philosophy incorporates the principles of past

philosophies in its present activity of constituting a comprehensive system of the whole of reality. With reference to the variety of principles discovered over a long period of time, he remarks: "The manifold character of the principles which appear, is however, not accidental, but necessary: the different forms constitute an integral part of the whole form."\(^{251}\) Philosophers like other men are rooted in the finite, but some of their work has the character of the infinite, for "they do have Thought, Notion, and the eternal Being of Spirit, which moths cannot corrupt, nor thieves break through and steal."\(^{252}\)

Hegel is at great pains to continue the tradition of the great philosophers and uphold their claim for philosophy of timeless truth. At the same time he refuses to avoid the manifest difficulties which the recognition of man as a historical being brings to philosophy. He does not avoid, but meets head-on, the implication that the latest philosophy is superior to previous philosophical endeavour. He accepts that such an implication follows from his position, but he forthrightly shows that it is not just any philosophy which he has in mind when he speaks of the latest or newest philosophy as surpassing

\(^{251}\) H. of P., I, p. 35. "Die Mannigfaltigkeit der Bestimmungen, die hier erscheint, ist aber nicht unbestimmt, sondern nothwendig; die Formen integrieren sich zur ganzen Form." S. Werke, 17, p. 64.

\(^{252}\) Ibid., p. 39. "sondern das Denken (den Begriff), das unvergängliche Wesen des Geistes, wohin nicht Mot- ten noch Diebe dringen." Ibid., p. 69.
past philosophies. It has to be a fully blossomed philosophy which takes account of the currents and problems of the time while fully preserving and continuing the work of previous philosophers.

From this it follows - since the progress of development is equivalent to further determination, and this means further immersion in and a fuller grasp of the Idea itself - that the latest, most modern and newest philosophy is the most developed, richest and deepest. In that philosophy everything which at first seems to be past and gone must be preserved and retained, and it must itself be a mirror of the whole history.²⁵³

In the sense that he thinks that men in general, and philosophers in particular, through their labours in time, and intercommunication with one another in the present and in and through history, become increasingly and more deeply conscious of the eternal varities of Spirit which, so to speak, unfold in time, Hegel is a historical relativist. He is not, however, a relativist in the sense that what was true in past is no longer so, and what is true now, will not be so in the future. It is rather a question of more thoroughly knowing the True, or of uncovering previously hidden implications, or of discovering new

ramifications in the concrete inter-relationships of history.

Prior to Hegel, no great thinker dared so courageously to put philosophy into the stream of life. They all stood on the bank, thinking it their job to build a bridge across it, for eternity. The few who thought otherwise were not great thinkers, but skeptics or relativists. Hegel's true greatness rests on his break with Eleaticism, without even dipping his fingers into skepticism or relativism in the definitive sense of the word. ... His spirit was anchored so firmly to the absolute that his peculiar brand of relativism was a mere product of his great consciousness of absoluteness.

b. Philosophy and Historicism

At the beginning of this chapter it was also argued,

that Hegel is not a historicist, because a) he argues that philosophical questions are not supplanted or superseded by historical questions, and b) he contends that in the last analysis, the fundamental distinction between the purely philosophical and purely historical questions can be maintained.

To satisfactorily treat of this matter, it is first necessary to consider two meanings given for the word "historicism".

1) The more usual meaning accorded this word is that a full historical account of an event, development or process is sufficient an explanation of it, such that other explanations are redundant. 2) The other meaning which has been accorded this word in recent years, principally by Karl Popper, is that historical laws are discoverable which not only show a necessary

development but also allow predictions of future developments.

It is fact that Hegel rarely makes pronouncements on the future. One of the rare passages in which he does so, makes clear his position on the temporal limits of both history and philosophy. Hegel holds that the distinct and different natures of history and philosophy preclude extending their respective methods in a manner which would enable them to make pronouncements on the future. He speaks of America as the land of the future, but goes on to say,

and as a Land of the Future, it has no interest for us here, for, as regards History, our concern must be with that which has been and that which is. In regard to Philosophy, on the other hand, we have to do with that which (strictly speaking) is neither past nor future, but with that which is, which has an eternal existence — with Reason; and this is quite sufficient to occupy us.2\textsuperscript{55}

In this passage Hegel does not assert that all philosophical questions are superseded by historical questions. Hegel does not assert that the fundamental distinction between philosophical and historical questions has to be surrendered. He does not assert that the history of anything is sufficient explanation of it. Hegel does affirm a sphere for one and a sphere

\textsuperscript{255} P. of History, p. 86-87. "und als ein Land der Zukunft geht es uns überhaupt hier nichts an; denn wir haben es nach der Seite der Geschichte mit dem zu tun, was gewesen ist, und mit dem, was ist — in der Philosophie aber mit dem, was weder nur gewesen ist noch erst nur sein wird, sondern mit dem, was ist und ewig ist —, mit der Vernunft, und damit haben wir zur Genüge zu tun." P. der Geschichte, p. 147.
for the other by clearly distinguishing between the two disciplines: history has to do with what has been and with what is; philosophy has to do with what eternally is. The 'is' is the point of interaction between them, because that which 'eternally is', is revealed in that which no longer is, that which has been, as well as in that which actually is in the immediate present. This is so in two senses: First, Reason is eternally operant in the temporal world, and therefore past events, in their times, were manifestations of Reason's power, and thus provide data for reflection on Reason's work; Second, past events continue to operate in the present in three ways: 1. through their subsequent causal effects and ramifications, 2. through their preservation in the hearts and minds of men, constituting the present life of a human society, 3. through their renewed present life in the re-thinking of historical events in the minds of men. Philosophy finds manifested in History the working of Eternal Reason in the temporal sphere, but in the process Philosophy does not become subordinate to History. History does not supersede Philosophy as the science of Reason, rather it provides some of the data upon which Philosophy may work. In this enterprise, the thoughtful consideration of History, it is History which is the 'hand maiden' of Philosophy, and not the other way round. This interpretation is supported by the very fact that Hegel thought it necessary to develop a Philosophy of history; in short, he did not leave
the task of developing 'Universal History' to the historians. In carrying out this self-assigned task, Hegel believes that he is doing philosophy and not history, or at least not history pure and simple. Hegel states that his subject is 'the Philosophical History of the World', and he distinguishes Universal History from the kinds of history provided by the historian. He considers himself to be speaking primarily to philosophers as a philosopher. This is shown at the very outset when he states that,

The inquiry into the essential destiny of Reason - as far as it is considered in reference to the World - is identical with the question, what is the ultimate design of the World? ... the phenomenon we investigate - Universal History - belongs to the realm of Spirit. ... On the stage on which we are observing it - Universal Spirit - Spirit displays itself in its most concrete reality.

This is the metaphysician speaking, the philosopher who seeks to uncover the fundamental rationality of the universe. Hegel, the metaphysician, seeks to show through the thoughtful consideration of the empirical data of history, the development and power of this rationality, Spirit in its most concrete embodiment.

256 P. of History, p. 16. P. der Geschichte, p. 57-58. Hegel takes up questions concerning history and philosophy in various of his works. In the Preface to the Phenomenology, he deals with historical truth in a few lines: "Regarding historical truths - to mention these briefly - insofar as their purely historical aspect is concerned, it will be readily granted that they concern particular existence and the accidental and arbitrary side, the features that are not necessary. Philosophy has to do with the universal and necessary, History in its purely historical aspect has to do with particular existence and the accidental."
Finally Hegel distinguishes between the modes of spirit's presence in art, religion, philosophy and world history:

The element in which the universal spirit exists in art is intuition and imagery, in religion feeling and representative thinking, in philosophy pure freedom of thought. In world history this element is the actuality of mind in its whole compass of internality and externality alike.257

The common and essential element in these areas of human knowledge and concern is universal spirit and not history, although Hegel well recognizes and takes great pains to show the historical development in each area.

c. Philosophy and historicity

There is little doubt that Hegel's work played an important part in the development of nineteenth and twentieth century historicism. However, passages which can be cited as evidence of what might be called his peculiar brand of historicism, might better be cited in support of an explication of important elements in his notion of historicity. One of the reasons Hegel avoided speaking of the future is precisely because of man's freedom, which within his philosophy follows from man's self-constitutionality and the infinite character

of his mind. Imperfectly realized as it is, this freedom in man is sufficient to bring about developments which cannot be foreseen. Unfortunately, individual men are in no better position in respect to predicting the future consequences of their own actions. On the other hand, it is man's freedom and self-awareness, coupled with memory, which make it possible for him to have a history. In the process of freely constituting himself, he continuously assimilates and re-assimilates elements of the past. However, as has been shown, Hegel strove to bring about a synthesis of history and eternity, which allows for a growth of historical knowledge and for a deepening of the comprehension of eternal truth. Philosophy, itself, 'is developed consciousness' Hegel tell us, and what the great philosophers 'have done is to bring that which is implicitly rational out of the depths of Spirit' and thus 'to advance it into consciousness and knowledge. This forms a continuous awakening. 258

These remarks both reveal the historicity of the human consciousness in its growing knowledge in history, and indicate that such knowledge, gained in time though it is, does not preclude, in Hegel's view, an increasing profundity in comprehension of truly rational knowledge of Spirit. Man is situated in nature and history, but in history, spirit's development in time is seen as its realization of increasing freedom,

so that man gradually frees himself from nature and advances toward a form of freedom transcending history itself. Man has the capacity, according to Hegel, of overcoming and transcending his finitude absolutely, and so of his own situation and selfhood, although such an attainment is a precarious and hard wrought gain as shown in his remarkable explication of man's relation between the finite and the infinite, where man is described as comprising both finite consciousness and infinite consciousness and as the struggle between them. Man is a self-constituting being who, in freely realizing himself, is comprised of both finite and infinite aspects, but because he is also the struggle between them, in ascending to Absolute Spirit he can sublate the finite in the infinite. That this realization is open to man is supported by and shown in Hegel's system of philosophy which is conceived as concretely self-developing and turning back upon itself while encompassing the Idea, Nature and Spirit, and while preserving the unity of the subject throughout. This whole is made meaningful through the notions of infinity, subject, spirit and of the Notion itself.

Conclusions

Finally there are three arguments posed at the beginning of this chapter which have not been directly referred to in this last section:

1) with respect to the pure hypothetical involving the fundamental distinction between philosophical questions → historicism → relativism, it cannot be correctly said of Hegel's philosophy that it fails to
maintain this distinction, so that the charge of historicism cannot be sustained.

2) With respect to the argument if the self-constitutionality of man is to be held meaningfully then the historical past must enter man's present being, that he must assimilate and re-assimilate at least some of the past, the section on Time, Eternity and History, and the sub-section treating of man's realization in history show that Hegel is able successfully to show this to be the case.259

3) With respect to the pure hypothetical involving the Notion's explicit realization in man's self-conscious, thinking processes — the Notion's moments of self-negation and reconciliation permeate the self-constituting process of man's being — the Notion permeates man's historical life, his evolving self-consciousness within his societal and historical world, the sub-section on the Notion, followed by the showing of its realization in subsequent sections has made meaningful these connections. In other words, the Notion's realization in human spirit is intimately linked with the historicity of man, so that it can be said that the Notion individualized in man necessitates a notion of historicity.

259 See Jacques D'Hondt's important remarks on "Intériorization" in Hegel, Philosophie de L'Histoire Vivante, particularly p. 365-366, 405-407, 408-413.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

1. Historicity, self-constitutionality and human nature

A. Historicity

Throughout this study the continuing endeavour has been to provide evidence in support of the contention that there is an implicit notion of historicity in the philosophy of Hegel, that some of the fundamental principles of his philosophy necessarily require a notion of historicity, that his philosophy provides the connotations which characteristically attach to the word historicity and that he provides a deeply thought out philosophical foundation which effectively supports the conceptions or presuppositions necessary for a doctrine of historicity. In fact, all of the fundamental notions which have manifested themselves in this study, have separately helped to provide and together have provided the ontological and logical ground for the notion of historicity. Even Hegel's notion of eternity does not preclude a notion of historicity, because its notional characteristics aid Hegel's attempt to bring about a synthesis of history and eternity. His notion of man does comprise the connotations which characteristically attach to a notion of historicity, so that it can be correctly said that Hegel's dialectical analyses of the condition, and
experience, and self-realization of man reveal the historicity of man. However, his notion of man includes revelations of 'the stamp of the divine', so that historicity by itself does not comprise the whole of what man has become and is.

B. Self-constitutionality and human nature

For Hegel, human being is a self-constituting process, and because of this metaphysical conception, historical contexts or situations become his serious concern. Although he retains the notion of human nature, "permanent" is not a word which he directly couples with human nature. Only in Hegel's teleological perspective, can permanency in any way be regarded as part of his conception of human being,¹ i.e. in history man makes explicit what is implicit in his notion, he realizes his potentialities through time. It is through the contextual situations of history that the otherwise empty concept of human nature is made concrete, i.e. the setting of history provides both the limitations and possibilities of human development.²


The historical setting for man's historicity should be seen in a genuinely ontological sense, because man is essentially a historical being. Man makes himself what he becomes, or becomes what he is. As an organic individual, man produces himself, makes of himself what he is implicitly, and as spirit he is only that which he makes of himself, but again he makes of himself what he is implicitly. He is essentially the result of his own activity.

C. Human nature, self-making and historicity

Hegel endeavours to maintain both a) a human self-making; and b) a self-realizing human nature; and c) he does

3 Cf. Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, p. 31-32, 209-211 and 307-310.

4 J. Maritain writing of Hegel's basic intuition, remarks that it "has been described as the intuition of the mobility and disquiet which are essential to life, and especially to the being of man, who is never what he is and is always what he is not." On the Philosophy of History. London, Bles, 1959, p. 16.

5 See Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p. 151. Karl Löwith remarks that: "What appealed to Goethe about Hegel was nothing less than the principle of his spiritual activity: mediation between self-being (Selbstein) and being other (Anderssein)" and notes that: "The difference between their ways of mediation resides in the fact that Goethe sees the unity from the point of view of nature as it is perceived, but Hegel from the point of view of the historical spirit. ... When Hegel speaks of spirit, confident that it also speaks through him, he understands thereby nature as the otherness of the idea, while the spirit is a 'second nature'." Ibid., p. 6-9. See also Marcuses observation about the subject constituting itself in its predicates, in One Dimensional Man. Boston, B. Press, 1964, p. 96.

6 See Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p. 58, 72-73.
not totally historicize human nature. While Hegel has a dynamic conception of human nature, he nevertheless retains the notion of a nature which is human, just as he retains the notion of a nature which is divine. Such natures are in no sense static, but they have their respective implicit structures which become explicit in the process of their respective development. Man has a nature 'in himself', but not 'for himself' until he acquires it for himself. Like God, Man constitutes and knows himself in the same process, fulfilling his nature. Like God, Man is the result arising from the incorporating and realization of his own process. By showing the intimate relation of inner and outer, Hegel is able to argue that a man's nature is not an unrealized inner disposition; rather a man's actual thoughts, work and deeds constitute his nature.

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7 See Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p. 67; 151. Findlay says of Hegel, "Nothing, he holds, can significantly be said to be in a man's nature which is not effectively brought out of it." Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 208.

8 Cf. Kojève, Introduction a la lecture de Hegel, p. 89-90, where he contends that 'for Hegel there is no human nature'. This is not strictly correct.

9 Writing of Hegel's analysis of the laws of psychology, Mure interprets Hegel thus: "The individual's nature is not an unrealized inner disposition but his actual thoughts and deeds. He is his world. He makes it his substance, and he may on occasion shatter and remake it." The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 85.
2. Hegel endeavours to maintain a timeless metaphysics, but encompassing history.

A. Timeless metaphysics

It is important to note that in Hegel's metaphysics, because the unfolding of spirit occurs in history and substantially through the thought and actions of men, he is committed to a doctrine of historicity. To paraphrase Augustine in Hegelian terms, 'the fundamental principle for the pursuit of the Absolute is history'. Not withstanding these remarks, Hegel also affirms a timeless metaphysics, but a metaphysics which encompasses history. It is precisely because Hegel saw man's being as that which he has become, as that which he has freely constituted himself, that he found it necessary to search into man's history. It is because man's being is self-constituting that the particular historical situation is relevant to the task and interests of philosophy, in Hegel's view. Whether he is writing of the individual man, or man in general, of a certain historical period, he thinks that 'the present situation' of that time, by determining what man could experience and do in that historical situation, determined

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Reyburn closes his book with a remark that the state in its finitude, "points to that further truth in which mind is raised completely from under the dominion of necessity and externality, and contains time within it." The Ethical Theory of Hegel, p. 268.
profoundly what such a man was and could be. In short, the 'present situation' is relevant to what man is and can be.\textsuperscript{11}

However, this position makes it more difficult for him to continue to maintain a timeless metaphysics. Man, as historically situated, has to be able to embrace and comprehend the totality of what situates him, in principle at least, if the timelessness of metaphysics is to be preserved. This is just what Hegel attempted to show. He contended that man can rise above history in certain crucial cognitive experiences, those experiences in which he attains to Absolute Spirit. Such levels of thought are attained in art and religion, but most purely and adequately in philosophy.\textsuperscript{12}

B. Timeless or eternal truth and 'historical truth'.

Hegel did appreciate that man needs perspective in terms of which to understand his situation. He did understand that ultimately man needs some minimum of timeless truth and value in terms of which to act in his historical situation. At

\textsuperscript{11} For Hegel, the present is relevant in another sense, because as Karl Löwith notes, Hegel "represents the absolute as an ever-present spirit, imminent in reality." \textit{op. cit.}, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Fackenheim's observation that "Hegelianism..." asserts that, though naturally and historically situated, human being is at the same time capable of transcending all situatedness, - in art, religion and, above all, in philosophy." "Opening Statement on Metaphysics and Historicity" prepared for the discussion scheduled with Professor Dray at the 1962 Canadian Philosophical Association Conference, p. 2.
the same time, Hegel realized that the perspectives which man discovers within his situation often merely reflect his age, i.e. what he accepts, or is inclined to accept, as timelessly true, is apt to be merely the collective opinion which is in fashion at the time, or more positively, it may be a particular principle reflecting the spirit of his time. Hegel recognized the predicament of history, where man finds himself in the perplexing situation wherein he is able to inquire into history only while being part of history. He appreciated man's need for timeless or eternal truth which transcends mere 'historical truth', so that he can comprehend his own historical situation. Hegel thought that in philosophy at least, man can succeed in rising above his historical situation in certain crucial attainments of Absolute thought. While recognizing that history does disclose a variety of conflicting Weltanschauungen, he did think that his Weltanschauung was a true one, - one in which the truth of other systems was preserved.¹³ In respect to conflicting world views, the criteria for choice is the Notion. This did not mean that he regarded his system as forever complete and fully and perfectly articulated.¹⁴ It could not be forever complete on the basis of his

¹³ In respect to this point, Fackenheim remarks, "But, in his view, if the system, hugging itself, denied the world in order to save itself, it would not comprehend the world but rather be in flight from it. The system can be comprehensive of the world only by total self-exposure to it." The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, p. 17-18.

¹⁴ Mure concludes that Hegel "is doomed to accept in
own precepts and the principles of his system. His system is open to the concrete specification of history. In his own time, the shape of history was being transformed by some of the various forces which he detected and described, and by others which he did not. Hegel knew that great political and social changes were impending, and this would have to include the development and emergence of new political and social concepts. Philosophy after him would have to comprehend these conceptions and show them as rational developments of the one system. Nevertheless, Hegel did think that Spirit had revealed its essential moments in the histories of the world, art, religion and philosophy and that his system of philosophy comprehended the whole in Absolute Knowledge. On the other hand, the very fact that this comprehensiveness and kind of finality had been gained suggested to him that spirit had completed a series of significant phases of development in history, that one world was dying and that a new historical world was

his philosophic thinking the aid of what he knows to be a lower form of thought, and he is forced to confess implicitly at least that, because he cannot wholly free his vision of temporality, no system which he may propound can be final. If that be the substance of Hegel's claim to finality for the dialectical method, his attitude is more modest than some of his critics have believed. The best evidence for this conclusion, moreover, lies in the fact that it is really the nature of his own dialectical method which denies the finality of his system." The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 204.

15 See Findlay's concluding remarks on this problem: "Hegel expects no more permanence for his own system than to be preserved in such good systems as come after it." Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 346; and preceding page.
about to begin. This historical perspective does not and did not prevent him from holding the position that the Absolute is eternally present.

C. Historical relativism and historicism

Hegel's conception of man in and of history was not one of a total historization of man, which would have resulted in sheer historicism. His dialectical method in his *Phenomenology* brought historical types of human experience, attitude and outlook under critical review. In his other works, this same method applied to somewhat different material revealed the temporal limitations of social, political, aesthetic, religious and philosophical conceptions and institutions. This is the one side of his philosophy: the appreciation of the restless creativity and destructiveness of human development in history. The other side of his philosophy concerns the logical and timeless encompassment of the necessary patterns of universal development. Within his logical perspective the mutability of things in nature and of human creations in history become eternal moments in one rational whole. He did not succumb to absolute historical relativism, but a form of historical relativism clearly has an important place in his philosophy. He avoided an exaggerated historical relativism and accepted the difficult task of comprehending the implications which follow once history's place in human life is recognized. He did
this without surrendering philosophy's claim to truth which is eternal.

Hegel also avoided historicism: he did not subordinate philosophy to history: in philosophy he saw the capacity to situate the parts within the whole, and to situate history and temporality in relation to eternity. Furthermore, he did not engage in predictions concerning the future, and he did not pretend that his system provided the tools for such endeavours. For Hegel, in his Logic, in the form of pure thought, and in philosophy more generally, within the sphere of Absolute Spirit, for all the seriousness of the historical predicament, man can rise above history to a grasp of timeless truth. In its essential categories, metaphysical truth is independent of any age, and such truth, once attained, is immune to the ravages of time, i.e. in its timeless applicability to both past and present. A comprehension of these same truths attained through the arduous study of Reason in history, such that the concrete specificity of the historical world is subsumed in the overgrasp possible in the sphere of Absolute Spirit, is not essentially different from the timeless truth of the Logic, but it is eminently richer.

\[\text{Cf. Encyclopaedia } 577.\]
3. Finite and Infinite Consciousness and the attainment of Eternal Truth

Ultimately the religious dimension and the relation between religion and philosophy has to be taken account of to show how man's historicity can be transcended in a timeless metaphysics. Because Hegel asserts both a human nature and a human self-making, while retaining a history encompassing timeless metaphysics, human being has to be made up of both finite and infinite sides. Human being is situated, both naturally and historically; this 'situatedness' constitutes its finiteness and is the field or medium of its human self-constituting activity. But it has also a non-situated infinite side, which makes possible the transcending of his human limitations so that he can recognize his historical 'situatedness'. Hegel's central principle is spirit. The very term, and the notion of spirit itself to a considerable extent, he seems to have introduced into his philosophy from Christianity. It is spirit which makes man man, Hegel contends.\[^{17}\] Christianity is the Absolute Religion, and from its doctrine of the Incarnation came the true conception of man as universal, as of the spirit,

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\[^{17}\] Löwith states that "Hegel emphasizes that it is only the spirit that 'makes man man'. This sentence occurs on the first page of the philosophy of Religion, giving an external indication of the fact that Hegel's notion of the spirit is not intended anthropologically, but theologically, as the Christian Logos. It is thus 'superhuman'." *op. cit.*, p. 308.
as partaker in and of the infinite and as free. Christ as Son of God and Son of Man revealed to man his own nature, that he was more than purely finite and human, that he shares in Divine Spirit. Man is not merely an intelligent creature with physical and social needs, he is spirit. The source of unity in man, the possibility of overcoming human estrangement with self, with others, with society and with God, is found in spirit's mediating activity. Spirit cannot be separated from its conscious and self-conscious activities; spirit constitutes itself in them. Spirit is that which has its centre in itself; it has unity, but not a unity outside itself, for it discovers it within itself; it exists in and with itself. Hegel conceives spirit as one reality with two apparently opposed but actually complementary aspects: it is suprapersonal and it constitutes the unity of particular persons; it is infinite-in-finitude. He thinks that the finite cannot be adequately understood without reference to the infinite, and that the finite and the infinite are complementary aspects of the one reality. Hegel expressed the latter point in another way by saying that the

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18 Fackenheim observes in connection with an exposition of Hegel's 'Transfiguration of Faith into Philosophy' that "Christ is indeed a 'tremendous composition' of the Divine and the human. For here the Divine in the extreme of its infinity enters into the human in the extreme of its finitude and, what is more, into one contingent human in a contingent place and time. Yet this incursion into the finite redeems the finite: and it occurs when all history is ripe for it." The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, p. 202.
finite is a moment in the life of Absolute. To comprehend and reveal the Absolute in its fullness, it is necessary to do so through the finite, he thought. The Absolute is Infinite and it is Spirit. The Absolute manifests itself through finite human spirit. But finite human spirit transcends its own finiteness in the course of its activity, and in principle, human spirit can advance to the level at which it is the medium of the Absolute Spirit's knowledge of itself.

Hegel provides the philosophical path for making the ascent from the finite to the infinite. But in religious worship 'ascent' does not suggest his whole meaning, because in his Philosophy of Religion he describes man as finite consciousness raising itself to the infinite consciousness, falling back again, as both sides of this movement and as the

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19 Maritain's charge of "anthropo-theistic immanent-ism" is not without point. See Moral Philosophy, p. 186-187.

20 Robert C. Tucker concisely formulates Hegel's position on this point: "Spirit's self-realization through cognitive activity is for Hegel a process of the successive transcending of limits. It may therefore be called a self-infinitizing process. 'Finite self-conscious spirit' - Hegel's formula for man - is a contradiction in terms, and meant by him as such. In so far as spirit remains finite, bounded by the presence of an object, it is not fully itself. In so far as it becomes fully itself, it has ceased to be finite." Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge, University Press, 1961, p. 51.

For an acute and critical, but perhaps distorted account of the part played by the human self in Hegel's conception of God, see Tucker's chapters 'The Self as God in German Philosophy', 'History as God's Self-Realization' and 'The Dialectic of Aggrandizement'.
struggle between finite consciousness and the infinite consciousness of the Absolute. Human spirit is this activity.  
The individual human spirit is the struggle between the situatedness and temporality of finite consciousness and the limitlessness and timelessness of infinite consciousness.  
In the case of the philosopher, on occasions of full comprehension of the whole, at the level of reason, in the case of the religious person, on occasions of superior religious experience, and in the case of the artist on occasions of exceptional insight, the finite aspect is sublated in the infinite. The same timeless truth is open to them through their several approaches to the transcending of their finite situatedness; it differs only to the degree that the concept attained is free of sensuous or figurative qualities. Timeless truth in its scientific form and in its greatest purity is the prerogative of philosophy.

21 In this connection Hegel says, "Grace enlightens the heart of man, it is the Spirit of God in man, so that man can be regarded in relation to its work in him as passive, and in such a way that it is not his own activity which is manifested in his actions. In the Notion, however, this double activity is to be conceived as one." P. of Religion, II, p. 247. S. Werke, 16, p. 117.

22 Fackenheim explains how this relation, which in religion is regarded as double, becomes one single activity in Philosophy, as conceived by Hegel: "Religious spirit - the heart - exists on the human side of the divine-human relationship. Philosophical spirit speculative thought - rises to its divine side. What for Christian faith is free reception of the Divine by the human is for speculative thought divine activity in the human." op. cit., p. 190-191.
The mature Hegel considers that Philosophy presents the truths of religion in the form of pure thought, but Christianity is not thereby superseded by philosophy. The way of religion is open to the many, including philosophers. Eternal truth is not restricted to the philosophers who are few, but is universally open to man because he is spirit; truth is in the spirit and truth can make him free. On the last page of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, it can be seen that Hegel recognizes that philosophy is limited to the few, and that even if it represents a successful reconciliation, it cannot by itself heal the world:

But this reconciliation is itself merely a partial one without outward universality. Philosophy forms in this connection a sanctuary apart, and those who serve in it constitute an isolated order of priests, who must not mix with the world, and whose work is to protect the possessions of Truth. How the actual present-day world is to find its way out of this state of disruption, and what form it is to take, are questions which must be left to itself to settle, and to deal with them is not the immediate practical business and concern of philosophy. (Vol. III, p. 151. S. Werke, 16, p. 356.)

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It may be concluded finally, that Hegel's work does contain a notion of historicity which is in part made explicit

23 "The speculative thought which has risen to its divine side must preserve the heart, i.e. the human, in the divine-human relationship. This is the crucial task of the Philosophy of Religion. And on its successful execution depend both the peace between Christianity and the final philosophy, and the claim of the final philosophy to be final, i.e. to be a thought comprehensive of reality rather than just another
through his conceptions of Self-constituting Absolute Spirit, of man as a naturally and historically situated being constituting himself freely in a process of self-realization, and of the part that history plays in that realization, as the field for the attainment of greater freedom. His notion of historicity is qualified by his ultimate allowance for a human transcendence of situation in which temporality, historicality and the finite side of self are sublated in the infinite. This need not run counter to his assertion that man is the struggle between finite and infinite consciousness. Among the reasons for contending that man can attain to such transcendence, are his considerations in respect to the possibility of finally over-coming the many aspects of alienation in a true self-identity, and of gaining timeless philosophical truth in a trans-historical comprehension of the whole.

But one thing remains decisive: the grasp of historicity of spirit, a concept to which Hegel gave a peculiarly German development.24

flight from it." Fackenheim, op. cit., p. 191.

24 Löwith, op. cit., p. 130.
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von Hartmut Buchner und Otto Pöggeler, Hamburg, Felix

von Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Johann Heinrich Trede,

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In this study it is argued that there is an implicit notion of historicity in the philosophy of Hegel (implicit in the sense that Hegel does not use the word 'historicity') and that some of the fundamental principles of his philosophy require a notion of historicity. It is shown that his philosophy reveals the connotations which, in contemporary expressions of the doctrine, characteristically attach to the word historicity. More significantly, it is shown that he provides a deeply thought-out philosophical foundation which effectively supports the conceptions or presuppositions necessary for the doctrine of historicity. It is also argued that although Hegel recognizes the limitations imposed on human thought by history, he nevertheless attempts to retain for man, through philosophy, the capacity to transcend history. In the course of introducing the theme of this study, the parameters and some of the ramifications of the problem area are outlined, the meaning of the word 'historicity' is discussed, the presuppositions of the doctrine of historicity are examined, and finally both historical truth and metaphysical truth are considered within the context of this doctrine.

The second chapter is concerned with Hegel's showing of historicity in concrete human life in his *Early Theological Writings*. Here it is shown that in these writings, some of the characteristics of a notion of historicity are present, and that because he wanted to effect a reconciliation between some of the 'contradictions' in concrete human life which drew his attention, such as
the lack of harmony between the sphere of religious and intellectual culture and the sphere of social, civil and political life, that he had to develop a notion of historicity to satisfactorily encompass human life in its dynamic wholeness. It is here that Hegel is found to be unmistakably critical of general concepts of human nature, which he thinks suffer from abstraction and lack of content. He finds it necessary to distinguish between an ideal of human nature and such general concepts.

The third chapter concentrates on the first half of the Phenomenology of Spirit, but proceeds to its analysis by way of an examination of parts of some of Hegel's Jena writings. Hegel's conceptions of 'subject' and 'true infinity' emerge in his first system and help to make human historicity a comprehensible notion. The aim of the detailed analysis of the sections of the Phenomenology, which lead to the emergence of Spirit, is to bring out Hegel's showing of the self-constitutionality of man's being and to show that he conceives and exhibits human nature as process and result, as opposed to the tendency of the philosophers of the Enlightenment to regard human nature as fixed. This is done by making manifest the role of mediation in the development of self-consciousness and by close study of the various forms of the dialectic involved in man's realization of his self-hood. It is shown that in defining man qua human, in terms of spirit, a dynamic conception of man's consciousness and its processes is implied, and that this in turn implies a notion of historicity. For Hegel, man ultimately realizes his self-hood as spirit, and in defining man as Spirit, Hegel intends by way of meaning, a multitude of predicates which together describe man within the dynamics of a self-determining, self-constituting being situated in nature, society and history. Again, it is contended and shown that, because for Hegel, human consciousness is essentially self-constituting, then man's nature
must be regarded as other than fixed, i.e. it must be regarded as open to
historical development. The conclusion is drawn at this point that for Hegel,
man is essentially a historical being and history is the medium or field for
his self-development.

The fourth chapter follows the dialectic of the system proper, by examining
Infinity, Substance and the Notion in the Logic, Time and Eternity, principally
in the Philosophy of Nature, and Subject, Spirit, and Thought in the Philosophy
of Spirit, and in the corresponding lecture collections. Spirit's realization
of knowledge and freedom is pursued, starting with mind's initial formation and
continuing through to history and to spirit's absolute realization in art, religion
and philosophy. The aim here is to show that some of the key notions of his
system provide the philosophical foundation for and require a notion of historicity,
and to show the continuity and the ongoing realization of man's self-constituting
activity in the system. It is contended that the nature of his idealism requires
a notion of historicity. More specifically there is found in the meaning of the
Notion itself, the requirement of a notion of historicity. Because the Notion
realizes itself explicitly in man's self-conscious, thinking processes, the
Notion's moments of self-negation and reconciliation permeate the self-constituting
process of man's being, permeate man's historical life, his evolving self-conscious
ness within his societal and historical world. In short, it is shown that the
Notion's realization in human spirit is intimately linked with the historicity
of man, so that it can be said that the Notion individualized in man necessitates
a notion of historicity. It is shown that man's freedom follows from man's self-
constitutionality and the infinite character of his mind. In the process of
freely constituting himself, he continuously assimilates and re-assimilates ele-
ments of the past. It is shown that Hegel strove to bring about a synthesis
of history and eternity, which allows for a growth of historical knowledge and
for a deepening of the comprehension of eternal truth. Man is situated in nature and history, but in history, spirit's development in time is seen as its realization of increasing freedom, so that man gradually frees himself from nature and advances toward a form of freedom which transcends history itself. Man has the capacity, according to Hegel, of overcoming and transcending his finitude absolutely, and so of his own situation and self-hood, although such an attainment is a hard wrought gain. In freely constituting and realizing himself, man is comprised of both finite and infinite aspects, but because he is also the struggle between them, in ascending to Absolute Spirit he can sublate the finite in the infinite.

In the final chapter, it is concluded that in history man makes explicit what is implicit in his notion, he realizes his potentialities through time. It is through the contextual situations of history that the otherwise empty concept of human nature is made concrete, i.e. the setting of history provides both the limitations and possibilities of human development. The historical setting for man's historicity should be seen in a genuinely ontological sense, because man is essentially a historical being. He is essentially the result of his own activity. Hegel endeavours to maintain both a) a human self-making, and b) a self-realized human nature; and c) he does not totally historicize human nature. (Hegel's notion of man includes revelations of 'the stamp of the divine', so that historicity does not comprise the whole of what man has become and is.) Man has a nature 'in himself', but not 'for himself' until he acquires it for himself. By showing the intimate relation of inner and outer, Hegel is able to argue that a man's nature is not an unrealized inner disposition; rather a man's actual thoughts, work and deeds constitute his nature. Hegel endeavours to maintain a timeless metaphysics, but encompassing history. Because the
unfolding of spirit occurs in history and substantially through the thought and actions of men, he is committed to a doctrine of historicity. It is concluded that Hegel's work does contain a notion of historicity which is in part made explicit through his conceptions of self-constituting spirit, of man as a naturally and historically situated being constituting himself freely in a process of self-realization, and of the part history plays in man's realization, as the field for the attainment of greater freedom. His notion of historicity is qualified by his ultimate allowance for a human transcendence of situation in which temporality, historicality and the finite side of self are sublated in the infinite. Hegel allows for historical relativism to the extent appropriate to the reality of the historical growth of the human spirit and of the cultural and societal creations which accompany this development, but he does not succumb to an exaggerated historical relativism, and he does not surrender philosophy's claim to truth which is eternal. He avoided historicism because he did not subordinate philosophy to history, and he did not engage in or think philosophy provided the means of predicting the future.