THE SOCIAL NATURE OF MAN
AS
THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS FOR A WORLD STATE
by
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INTRODUCTION

. . . the war-drum throbbed no longer,
and the battle-flags were furled
In the Parliament of man,
the Federation of the world. 1

A romantic poet's dream in 1842, at a period when
his native Britain was not in violent social upheavals like
the European continent - the federation of the world has
become within one century the subject of respectable and
calm discussion in the halls of the political scientists.
Scarcely does any modern textbook on political science or
on international relations fail to discuss, often at
length, sometimes for and sometimes against, the question
of world federal government. In the minds of many it is
simply an appealing and noble ideal; to others it is seen
merely as the most extensive form that modern government
can have in the ultimate stages of its development. To
still many others it is a creeping colossus that may engulf
us at any moment. Setting aside all emotionalism, pro and
con, we shall seek to study the nature and foundations of
this potential political community on the world level.

1 Alfred Lord Tennyson, "Locksley Hall", The Complete Poetical Works of Tennyson, W. J. Rolfe, editor,
Any general study of world state has necessarily many ramifications. To the political philosopher no subject should appear more important than one which examines any phase of the state at its very foundations. Thus, the sociality, or social nature of man, as the basis for a world state has been chosen as the central thesis of this study, indeed, a subject not likely to go obsolete before the readers finish with the manuscript. The specific purpose, however, of this treatise is, first of all, to examine critically all of the available literature on this topic of world state and more at length those authors who approach the problem philosophically; and secondly, with the aid of the better current writings on the subject, we shall seek to show how man's sociality is a necessary, even if not a sufficient condition, for the sound establishment of an enduring world state capable of affording the much desired world peace.

Most authors who write on the topic of world state are simply satisfied to endorse some few traditional arguments for the establishment of the universal government. Comparatively few are philosophical about the question; many imply that a world state is a necessary condition
for world peace, but very few make a serious attempt to
prove it, although most of these arguments that writers
offer can be, upon careful consideration, regarded as
immediately derivable from man's social nature. On the
other hand, a fairly small number of the arguments found
in the available literature would have to be regarded as
only incidental to man's sociality. However, it does re­
main to be proven that man's social nature is the ultimate
and indispensable philosophical foundation for any world
state that has hopes of affording world distributive justice,
whose greatest blessing surely is, in the minds of scho­
lastic political philosophers, world peace in freedom.

While the concept of a state embracing the whole
known world is an old one, the implementation of the idea
has been left largely to modern times. In the contemporary
world many who favor the idea regard its fulfillment as
next to impossible for the present and the near future.
Some writers who regard themselves as practical insist that
the world state is an immediate necessity for world peace,
but unfortunately not available for the world of the present.

Like other social movements, successful and un­
successful alike, the world state movement is passing or
perhaps has passed through the sentimental stage, that is,
one of simple sentimental attachment to the idea; from an
optimistic viewpoint it can be said that it is passing into the philosophical stage. Such phenomena are usually reflected in the literature concerning the subject - whether the arguments favoring the concept are deeply impassioned appeals or whether they are carefully arranged philosophical reasonings concerning the ideal. Typical of the former is a majority of the world state literature; typical of the latter are such books as Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn's monumental volume, World Peace Through World Law and Mortimer Adler's politico-philosophical work, How To Think About War And Peace. These are perhaps the best but certainly not the only examples of scholarship that have helped to add "respectability" to the movement, as well as to place it on a more solidly intellectual foundation. It goes almost without saying that the majority of authors in this field as in others do not discuss the philosophical basis of what they advocate; nor does one really expect this, especially in view of the fact that much of the literature is in pamphlet form as well as in short and popularized magazine articles, a good part of which is currently "world federalist" in its attitude.


3 New York, Simon and Schuster, 1944.
The approach to the problem of world state will be handled in both an indirect and a direct manner; indirectly, in so far as current concepts are to be evaluated and criticized in view of scholastic political principles; directly, in so far as an attempt will be made to set up a scholastic philosophy of world state. All writings, those from scholastic sources as well as those of non-scholastic origin, must be viewed in the light of the historical period that produced them. Every effort was made to take proper cognizance of all those who on the subject of world state or government have written for publication. In many cases it becomes necessary to cite a typical argument for or against the world state, and then simply to make general references to other authors, sometimes a large number of them, who share the ideas of the one cited.

Those authors who have prepared volumes on the subject generally seek to give their opinions on the various historical and philosophical phases of the development of the world state, as well as to propose, often in detail, their own plans of how the world state should be set up. Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd have cataloged these theoretical and practical plans and proposals in their Search-light on Peace Plans. Likewise, in 1923 there was a

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contests conducted for peace plans; this contest brought in some twenty-two thousand entries, only some of which advocated world government, submitted to the $100,000 Bok Peace Award. These, in turn, have been classified and analysed by Esther Everett Lape.\(^5\)

Generalities about the beauties of peace and the horrors of war are easily discussed without controversy. International cooperation and planning are also postwar favorites for discussion. But unless these words lead to action, we have few or no worthwhile proposals to evaluate, nor to see put into practice. Unless well reasoned and substantiated plans are made, there is little hope for a world state in practice.

In the process of evaluating arguments, reasons, motives, and foundations for the establishment of a world state, those plans will be regarded as most acceptable which are immediately derivable from, and are not simply incidental to man's social nature. Much of the literature available in the English language is produced by Protestants,\(^6\) who, if they tend to follow consistently their theological

\(^5\) *Ways to Peace*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924.

thinking concerning the state, will set the fallen nature of man as the ultimate reason for the existence of any state, world or national, and not man's social nature as such, although this is usually not carefully spelled out. Reasonings even more incidental to man's social nature and thus farther removed from our central thesis are those creating a pseudomythicism concerning the state, endowing the state with rights and privileges quite removed from the population that dwells therein. One of our chief problems shall be to show that no matter how attractive and apparently helpful these pseudomythic state concepts are upon first sight, these theories are quite untenable and really unworthy of the exalted cause of their proponents.

3. Definitions

Of the terminology requiring definition there stand out the concepts of "sociality" and of "world state". Some clarification is also in order for the idea of "ontological basis". There is, however, no thought of deviating from commonly accepted meanings for all these terms.

"World state" alone might conjure up some doubts as to the exact significance and scope of the term.

By "sociality" is meant simply the social nature of man - the fact, that, since man is composed of body and soul, he belongs essentially to society with varying
degrees and levels of association according to his advancement as a social being. As a social being man is a "political animal." Man's sociality in the present world order is considered as essential to him as is his rationality, and any concept of man that omits these essentials is an incomplete and thus an unacceptable one. Therefore, man is not to be seen in the light of his utility, nor treated merely with expediency.

By "world state" is meant first and foremost a real state, and not simply the government or administrative office of a perpetual alliance, league or even that of a confederation of many, most, or even all, of the nations of the world. A world state must have the traditional characteristics found in any state: people and territory, preferably the whole world, as well as supreme political authority and government to exercise this authority. About the foregoing there is little discussion. However, many will justifiably ask how small may the world state be, or how few nations could it embrace and still be rightfully called a world state. The minimal world state must embrace at least some few nations or countries, banded together in

7 Cf. Heinrich Rommen, op. cit., p. 89.
8 Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Chapter I.
a legislative union, or more probably a federal one, with a world constitution, that is, a document framed expressly for a world state, with express provisions for the easy-and equitable-accession of other states on fair terms.

It may be argued by some that this "minimal concept" of world state could apply not only to some states, or few states, but even conceivably to one state alone that would prepare also a world constitution for itself, besides its national constitution, and make express provisions for other states of the world to join the world state on fair and equitable terms. While proponents of such an idea may be accused of being unrealistic, it could just happen that some state with a crusading spirit or the awareness of a "messianic political mission" could in this unique fashion prepare the way for a world state. Consequently, the political scientist should consider the problem.

Since much, if not most, of the literature in favor of a world state is "world federalist" in tone, the concept of federation must be clearly understood to evaluate philosophically this literature. While it must be admitted that a federation does not have to be a state in the strict use of that word, all modern federations are states. For example, any province of Canada or so-called
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states of the United States could be a federation of its counties. In such case it would be a non-state federation. Thus for all practical purposes one can define a federation as a constitutionally organized political unit, normally a non-terminable union of commonwealths, which divides the overall total authority between a general or central government on the one hand and the local commonwealth governments on the other, both levels of government operating directly upon the people through a dual citizenship. Members of a federation are politically mutually independent of one another, but dependent upon the central government of which they are the constituents. Thus there is an essential and noteworthy difference between a federation and a confederation, even though the words are upon occasions used interchangeably. Accordingly a confederation acts not upon its citizens, except perhaps indirectly, for it is only a "... league or compact for mutual support, particularly of princes, nations, or states". In a confederation the central "government" is dependent upon the members and in no wise dominates them, since the members always

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9Cf. Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government, London, Oxford University Press, 1953, 3rd edition, which is probably the definitive work to date.

have the basic right to secede and thereby destroy the "central government" itself.

In discussions of world government there is frequently employed the word "superstate", more often than not in literature that is adverse to the world government ideal. The word etymologically could mean simply world state, even of the federal sort; however, it usually carries overtones of world dictatorship. In its best sense it could mean a world state that is not a federation but a legislative union of its component political units. Very few proponents of world government advocate this setup. Since they are usually proposing the federal type of world government, they consequently avoid the word "superstate".

An area of confused thinking is often found in connection with the concept of the "international". To many, international government and world government are the same thing, likewise, international law and world law. The only correct frame of reference for the idea of "international" is that of national sovereign states, dealing, vying and sometimes fighting with one another. A synonym for international would be "interstatal". A world confederation might rightly be referred to as an "international government" but it cannot rightly be called a world state or government, which has to be at least equal, if not superior to, the
member nations, and not merely the subordinate creature of the members, as was the weak and short-lived American confederation between 1777 and 1789. A somewhat strengthened United Nations might result in an international government or world confederation, especially if it should have more to say about the foreign affairs of the constituent states. Some advocates of a world state feel that a world confederation may be the historical prologue to the actual world federal state. That remains to be seen. Both the United States and Germany were true confederations before becoming federal states. Canada has been called a confederation, but in the strict use of the term, Canada has been a real federation, even if not the world's most centralized one, since the enactment of the British North American Act of 1867.

Since the proper frame of reference for international law is a world of sovereign states, the only correct reference to world law is in the context of world state. World law without a world state would be, first of all, an abuse of the term "world law", and secondly, a concept as anarchy-laden as international law is. With this use of terms, "international state" would be a contradiction in terms. This further implies a contradiction in terminology that is very sacred to many people: international law.
One might as well go all the way and consider the idea of "anarchic law".

In this same context consideration should be given to the concept of "mundialization". It simply refers to the process of coming to a world government, and perhaps activities on the part of an established world state in bringing about certain aspects of world conformity. Mundialization, on the other hand, finds its correct frame of reference in the organized community on the world level, just as internationalization has meaning in the context of political community on the international level. Internationalism presumes national states; mundialism presumes a world state.

A word is in order concerning the use of the terms, state and government, and more often, world state and world government. While every political scientist draws the distinction between state and government, in the interest of avoiding monotony, and following the pattern already set by so many who discuss the topic under consideration, we shall employ world state and world government as synonymous unless it is otherwise indicated. It should, of course, always be remembered that world government, world law, etc. have no real meaning apart from a world state. Nor shall we employ the world government terminology even in reference
to a world confederation which would have a government or administrative agency. That we shall continue to designate rightly as international or interstatal government, as long as the member nations, retain their basic sovereignty.

The last chief definition or consideration, and perhaps the most important from the philosophical standpoint, concerns the meaning of "basis" in reference to a world state. Basis here signifies "ontological basis", that is, the ultimate terrestrial foundation for the existence of any state, with reference to its very being and its rights as a political entity. In scholastic philosophy man is the terminus ad quem and the terminus a quo of the state. Thus the state is regarded as so essentially connected with man that it will never wither away, unless man withers away. To the scholastics the origin of the state is therefore not so much an historical as a philosophical question. On this problem the scholastics are good humanists, insisting that the state has no theological basis, say in original sin, or in the needs of a fallen nature, although scholastics admit there are many ethico-moral considerations in connection with the state.

The overall plan of this study includes an historical résumé of the world state movement from earliest times down to the more recent proposals for world federation and
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the methods of implementing them. Then consideration will be given to the opinions of those who for diverse reasons oppose the concept of world state. Most of the study, however, is dedicated to an evaluation of the more prominent proposals for a world state, classifying them in so far as they are immediately derivable from man's social nature or merely incidental to it. Lastly, an effort has been made to establish a philosophy of world state showing how man's sociality must in practice be given consideration as an essential condition for the fruitful establishment of an enduring world state. Therefore, this is not in any sense a treatise on world peace plans except in so far as they envision a world state as a means to achieve this end.
But we must not become victims of history, or allow ourselves to be overturned by it. Rather we must dominate it, and direct it towards the salvation, and not towards the destruction and shipwreck of the world.1

Of all those who seek to influence history the advocates of world state form a vanguard. These people are labeled by some as idealists; in their own eyes however, they are the true realists. The twentieth century's most prominent Protestant theologian-political philosopher, Reinhold Niebuhr, insists that the world organization must be attempted from the standpoint of historical realism. With others he would hold that a world government is a strict necessity at present for world peace, but unfortunately not available. He writes:

In the present situation the idealists rightly insist that the economic interdependence of the world demands new international political organization . . . some kind of world government which will make our economic interdependence sufferable . . . the realistic and historical school does not deny these new necessities and possibilities. But it views the task of realizing them in the light of its knowledge of the stubborn inertia of human history. It wants to know how nations are

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1Guiseppe Angelo Cardinal Roncalli (Pope John XXIII), "Catholics and UNESCO", Catholic Mind, June, 1953, p. 322. This is from a sermon preached to the delegates of the 7th General UNESCO Conference, November 12, 1952 in Paris.
to be beguiled into a limitation of their sovereign rights, considering that national pride and parochial self-sufficiency are something more than the mere fruit of ignorance but recurring forces in all efforts at social cohesion.\(^2\)

Thus Niebuhr insists that no historical process has ever conformed to the pattern that the "idealists" have mapped out for it.

A. Prior to the Peace of Westphalia

Plans for a world political organization have fascinated man almost since the beginnings of written history. Less interest, however, has been shown in the establishing of a universal state. Ancient plans for interstatal organization seem almost modern in their principles, even if not so in their detail. From the earliest times down to the Peace of Westphalia there is one political philosopher who stands out above the rest - Dante Alighieri, who lived at the end of the medieval scholastic period.

The term "world state" as applied to the peoples of antiquity is obviously subject to the spacial limitations of the world as it was known at any given period of history.

\(^2\)Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good (editors), Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960, p. 244.
To the Babylonians or to the Persians the world was coextensive with their empires and the territories adjacent to them. To the Greeks, it embraced less territory, until the time of Alexander the Great. Yet to the Romans the world was much larger, embracing the Europe, Asia and Africa known to them. After the growth of Christianity, Christians thought in terms of a Christian commonwealth with a real political significance and thus most medieval philosophers and political thinkers saw no special reason to be interested in a world state. The world state problem is then not one primarily of spatial extension, but rather of a unifying principle of authority bringing peoples together in some type of truly unified political community.

The earliest concepts of universal state were based on the concept of personal aggrandizement, inspired largely by the desire to subject and conquer. These world empires of the East have been rightly described as "empires of power" in contradistinction to the later Roman Empire, which was an "empire of government". The rulers of these early "power empires" considered it their mission to conquer and to regard the conquered not as citizens but merely as subjects of their brand of world state. Here it is impossible

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to find anything like a community of free, even if not politically independent, peoples.\footnote{Walther Schücking, Die Organisation der Welt, Leipzig, Alfred Kröner, 1909, p. 11.}

The situation of the Greeks presents a somewhat different picture. The internationalism of the free and independent city-states promoted a trend that was still to be found in Greek thought when Alexander the Great began his conquering expeditions. Alexander's world state was an external expression of the Greek philosophy of cosmopolitanism, even though his teacher, Aristotle, regarded the city-state as being the perfect political community.\footnote{Aristotle, Politics, Benjamin Jowett, translator, The Modern Library, New York, Random House, 1943, 1261a.} Nor did Alexander follow Aristotle's advice

\begin{quote}
\ldots to treat the Greeks as if he were their leader, and other peoples as if he were their master. \ldots But, as he believed that he came as a heaven-sent governor to all, and as a mediator for the whole world \ldots he bade them all consider as their fatherland, the whole inhabited earth.
\end{quote}

Fortunately or unfortunately Alexander's world state was too short-lived to have much lasting result.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Plutarch, "On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander", Moralia, Vol. 4, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936, p. 397f. Others may disagree with this Plutarchian semi-glorification of Alexander the Great and his motives and methods.}
\end{footnotes}
The intellectual predecessors of the cosmopolitanism practically exemplified by Alexander the Great were such Greeks as held to the concept of universal human solidarity, so necessary for the foundation of any workable world society, be it municipal or international. Socrates is regarded as the first to proclaim himself "a citizen of the World". The Cynics made a similar proclamation, but largely as a reaction against the nationalistic narrowness and racism and slavery found in the Greek city-states. The Stoics on the other hand, propounded a more positive form of cosmopolitanism. In Zeno's world state all men would form one great community in which order, peace, and unity would prevail. Of him, Plutarch writes:

The much admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, may be summed up in this main principle: that all the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity and that we should have a common life and order common to us all, even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field. This Zeno wrote, giving shape to a dream, or as it were, shadowy picture of a well-ordered and philosophic commonwealth.

The Roman Stoics manifest no less a cosmopolitan attitude

7 Walther Schücking, op.cit., p. 20.
8 Plutarch, op.cit., p. 397.
than do the Greek, of whose heritage they are a part.

Cicero, perhaps one of the greatest of the Roman political philosophers and statesmen, gives evidence of a universalism when he wrote that "the unanimity of the races of the world must be regarded as a law of nature". Cicero's thought is continued in other works:

\[
\text{... it is our duty to respect, defend, and maintain the common bonds of union and fellowship subsisting between all members of the human race.} \]

But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man.

About one century later, another Stoic, a more prominent member of the Stoic school, Seneca, regarded mankind as belonging to a world commonwealth which excels in its importance the local commonwealth.

Let us grasp the idea that there are two commonwealths, the one, a vast and truly common state which embraces alike gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner

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9\text{Marcus Tullius Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, Book I, Chapter XIII, 30, Loeb Classical Library, New York, Putnam's, 1917, p. 37.}
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10\text{Cicero, De Officiis, Book I, Chapter XLI, 149, Loeb Classical Library, New York, Macmillan Company, 1913, p. 153.}
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11\text{Cicero, De Finibus, Book V, Chapter XXIII, 65, Loeb Classical Library, New York, Macmillan Company, 1914, p. 171.}
\]
of earth nor to that, but measure the bounds of our citizenship by the path of the sun; the other, the one which we have been assigned by the accident of birth.12

The famous Roman philosopher-emperor, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, brought the concept of cosmopolitanism to its zenith, for in his conception every man was a citizen of the universe, "the highest state, of which all other states are but households".13 This imperial cosmopolite continues the same trend of thought when he writes:

If the intellectual capacity is common to us all, common too is the reason, which makes us rational creatures. If so, that reason also is common which tells us to do nor not to do. If so, law also is common. If so, we are citizens. If so, we are fellow-members of an organized community. If so, the Universe is as it were a state - for of what other single polity can the whole race of mankind be said to be fellow-members?14

The philosopher-emperor continues as he speaks of a sort of dual citizenship, one, that of his own city and country, the other, that of the world.

But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus,

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14 Ibid., Book IV, Chapter IV, p. 71f.
is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. These things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me.

In the following century another emperor, Caracalla in 312 A.D. granted to all free men living in the empire the privileges of Roman citizenship. In this way the Roman state was considered to be almost coextensive with the boundaries of the "civilized world". And within the very framework of this world state the community of mankind was given official recognition as well as legal status, realizing in some measure Zeno's dream of the universal commonwealth.\textsuperscript{16}

By the fourth and fifth centuries Roman cosmopolitanism and its advantages were seen and spoken of and even praised by Christian writers. The Christian poet, Prudentius (348-404?) leaves us his account of the beneficial effects of the universal rule of the Roman Empire:

\begin{quote}
Hitherto the whole earth from east to west had been rent asunder by continual strife. To curb this madness God has taught the nations to be obedient to the same laws and all to become Romans. Now we see mankind living as citizens of one city and members of a common household. Men come from distant lands across the seas to one common forum, and the peoples are united by commerce and culture and intermarriage. From the intermingling of peoples a single race is born. This is the meaning of all the victories and
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., Book VI, Chapter XLIV, p. 156f.
\textsuperscript{16}Cf. Walther Schücking, \textit{op.eit.}, p. 15.
\end{flushright}
triumphs of the Roman Empire: the Roman peace has prepared the road for the coming of Christ.\textsuperscript{17}

St. Augustine (354-430) a contemporary of Prudentius but in a different part of the Roman Empire, did in no wise escape being influenced by the ideals of universal empire. While he may or may not have agreed with this tradition, he was definitely a part of it. In fact St. Augustine seems to concentrate on the undesirable features of what he designates as the "third circle" of the world state in which he lived. In his \textit{City of God} he writes:

After the state or city comes the world, the third circle of human society - the first being, the house, the second, the city. And the world, as it is larger, so it is fuller of dangers, as the greater sea is more dangerous. And here, in the first place, man is separated from man by the difference of languages . . . But the imperial city has endeavored to impose on subject nations not only her yoke but her language, as a bond of peace. . . . True, it is; but how many great wars, how much slaughter and bloodshed have provided this unity!\textsuperscript{18}

Perhaps St. Augustine was referring only to an ideal instead of a real world empire in which he lived, when he wrote:


This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however serious these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace.19

By the time Augustine was approaching death the great empire that had won its unity by wars and bloodshed was itself beginning to disintegrate at the frontiers, for the Vandals were besieging the imperial forces at Hippo the very month that he died, August, 430. Yet in its greatest days the empire was not at all a society of autonomous and coordinate states, but a single world state and while it may have tended to destroy some of the originality of mankind, it still remains without parallel even in modern history.20 Long after its dissolution, the Empire continued to live on in the minds of men as a symbol of human unity and as an exemplar of universal political organization, remaining a political ideal for such men as Charlemagne, Otto the Great, and Napoleon. Yet the world had to wait until the


late Middle Ages for another specific proposal of the ideal of a world state, for in no sense could the Holy Roman Empire be regarded in practice as a world state even if it was considered as a state superior to other states, prior to the Peace of Westphalia. Doubtless Christendom as both a symbol and a cause of medieval political unity and cooperation\(^{21}\) precluded any serious discussion on the details of a real universal state, which is not to be found even in the numerous writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.\(^{22}\)

It must be remembered that in such an historical review universal organization falls into two categories: the one, that of universal rule or empire in which all the nations are held together by a municipal law; the other, that of an international organization of sovereign states.\(^{23}\) Prior to the Peace of Westphalia the apogee of all these historic proposals was the one explained by Dante Alighieri


\(^{23}\) For a list of these proposals during a five-hundred year period, cf. Jacob Ter Meulen, *Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung, I: 1300-1800*, Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1917, pp. 50-97. A similar work but more general in its scope has been prepared by Sylvester J. Hemleben, *Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943.
in his *De Monarchia*, which contains three books, the first of which evolves Dante's theory that there is a need for a world rule of all peoples, if mankind is to enjoy the peace desired by all. This world rule is called by Dante "*unicus principatus*", the single rule for all people that is necessary to attain universal peace for mankind. To prove his thesis Dante sets forth an array of arguments, some of which are philosophical, some theological, some poetical. Dante's predecessors, in their purveying the idea of universal state, were never so explicit as he in their writings. The concept was usually idealized without many details or philosophical considerations. By Dante's time the Church had developed to the point of having tremendous power and prestige. Thus he was able simply to secularize this idea of Universal Church and have the idea of universal state, adducing at times the same reasons but on the natural instead of the supernatural level.

Dante's first direct argument for a world rule is based on the supposition that for the universal common welfare a single world government is necessary. He writes:

> Or take finally a state or kingdom, whose aim is the same as that of a city, save that it takes more responsibility for peace - there must be a single government which both rules and governs; otherwise the end of the state is lost sight of, or the state itself falls to pieces, according to the infallible truth: 'Every kingdom directed against itself shall
be laid waste.' If therefore, these things are true among individuals and particular communities which have a unified goal, what we proposed above must be true. Since it appears that the whole of mankind is ordained to one end, as we proved above, it should therefore have a single rule and government, and this power should be called the Monarch or Emperor. And thus it is plain that for the well-being of the world there must be a single world rule or empire. 24

Dante continues by showing that every institution needs a unified direction, be it the family, the city, the kingdom, or even the world itself, which means mankind as a whole.

Therefore, the relations among parts exist for the sake of the unifying structure, not vice versa. Hence, if the form of this structure is found among the partial associations of men, much more should it be found in the society of men as a totality, on the strength of the preceding syllogism, since the total structure or its form is the greater good; but as we have seen sufficiently clearly in the preceding chapter, this unifying structure is found or should be found in mankind as a whole; and as those societies that are partial in a state and the state itself, as we saw, should be composed of a structure unified by a governor or government, so there must be a single world-ruler or world-government. 25

Here Dante injects a religious note into his argument for a single world administration or world-government


which has its unity in God. Individual governments are merely portions of the entire world order:

But its parts are well ordered only on the basis of a single principle (this follows from all we have said), and hence it too must be well ordered on the basis of a single principle, namely, through its governor, God, who is the absolute world-government. Hence we conclude that a single world-government is necessary for the well being of the world.

Not at all exhausting in this historical survey the political philosophy of Dante, one notices in this last citation how Dante seeks to ground his world-government concept also in the natural moral law. He explains:

World Government, on the other hand, must be understood in the sense that it governs mankind on the basis of what all have in common and that by a common law it leads all toward peace. This common norm or law should be received by local governments in the same way that practical intelligence in action receives its major premises from the speculative intellect.

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26 Herbert W. Schneider, the translator of this English edition of De Monarchia, writes that the "term 'prince' and cognate terms are used by writers in the classical tradition as a technical term for sovereign government and may be translated impersonally". Op.cit., p. 10, footnote.


Finally, Dante regards the birth of Christ, taking place as it did, within the world empire of Caesar Augustus as a stamp of divine approval upon the idea of a world government for the whole human race. Like other writers of the scholastic train of thought, Dante prepares his arguments in a logical fashion and does not hesitate to intermingle the theological with the philosophical. The mere quantity of Dante's writings place him above both his predecessors and his successors who have proposed directly or indirectly the concept of a world state or world rule, prior of course, to the time of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

Well over two centuries pass before the world again has the proposal that might hint at a universal state. Really the following brief items of Montaigne and Bacon, respectively speaking, could be taken in an ideal sense strictly. They are, however, worth mention in passing. Montaigne says that "I look upon all men as my compatriots, and embrace a Polander as a Frenchman, preferring the

\[29\text{Ibid., p. 23. Cf. Etienne Gilson, Dante the Philosopher, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1949, p. 200f, especially on man's twofold beatitude.}\]

universal and common tie to all national ties whatever".  
Francis Bacon is even less definite in his ideas than Montaigne, his contemporary. Bacon writes: "Even so likewise the nature of this great city of the world and the policy thereof, must be first sought in mean concordances and small portions".

Perhaps mention should be made of the Memoirs of Maximilian de Béthune, Duc de Sully, written between 1617 and 1638, which contain the "Grand dessein" attributed to Henry IV, Bourbon king of France. The plan was designed primarily to unite Europe into a federation and after settling Europe's basic problems, the conquest of areas of Asia and Africa was to be undertaken, but the new territories acquired were to be formed into new kingdoms and admitted into the Federation instead of being parceled out among the original members. Sully claims that Queen


Elizabeth favored and supported this plan. This plan is accused of having the ultimate aim of humbling the Habsburgs, which, ironically enough, if carried to its logical conclusion of a world federation, may have humbled also the Bourbons.

Emeric Crucé is a contemporary of Duc de Sully, although a rather obscure one, a simple French Carmelite friar. He published in 1623 during the great age of mercantilism, Le Nouveau Cynée, as an "indictment of war and a plan for perpetual peace . . . the chairmanship of the assembly would rotate among the Great Powers, all of whom would agree to wage war against any defiant prince". Membership in the organization is to be universal including the Pope, the Sultan of the Turks, the Kings of India, Persia, China, the Grand Duke of Muscovy and even African monarchs. Such proposals are certainly bold for his day and age. He advocates also a universal police force, universal religious toleration. Venice is suggested as the meeting place for the representatives of this federation.

During the long and devastating Thirty Years' War we find apparently the last of the pre-Westphalian proposals

34 Frederick Schuman, op.cit., p. 345f.

35 For a complete study of the writings of Crucé cf. Thomas Willing Balch, editor and translator, Introduction to Emeric Crucé, the New Cynées, Philadelphia, Allan Lane and Scott, 1900, especially pp. 104-140.
of a world order in the form of world state. Campanella, an Italian, in 1633 possibly motivated by the havoc wrought by the Thirty Years' War advocates in his Monarchia Messiae:

... a universal monarchy to eliminate enmity, rivalry, and famine by relief of drought-stricken areas from the surplus of fertile regions, which would be possible if all stood united under one monarch. 36

In this case the chief reason, the common welfare of the people, is given as the very motive which this world state should formally have.

Except perhaps for the Stoics of Imperial Rome there is found no concentrated practical and philosophical movement for the formation of a world state. This must await more modern times. Yet of all those who have called for the formation of a world state, Dante Alighieri stands out as the most prominent, the most exact and the most reasoned and explicit in his comparatively elaborate proposals for the formation, not simply of an international organization of sovereign states, but of a true world state which he conceived as a world monarchy. And even before the time of Hugo Grotius, it was becoming a common opinion of many European advocates of world peace that if peace were to be had at all, it would have to be on an international level through the cooperation of sovereign states and not through

a proposed world state.

B. After the Peace of Westphalia

1. The Westphalian Tradition

The Peace of Westphalia ushers in a new tradition for interstate relationships. Prior to this time there is some faint hope that the world might be somehow associated with the Holy Roman Empire, the supposed successor to the old Roman World State. The Holy Roman Empire is viewed as a superior sort of state, theoretically speaking, that is. In this same tradition writes the Moravian bishop, Johann Amos Comenius (Komensky), who maintains that all men are citizens of this world and should be united under a system of universal law. 37

The Peace of Westphalia inculcated a new concept of equal and sovereign nations into the minds of many, a concept of which they were no doubt proud, as it facilitated the cause of the growing and new nationalism, at least in many places. This new tradition now also of internationalism causes such men as Hugo Grotius 38 and


Francisco de Vitoria\textsuperscript{39} to write on international law, the "law" that should be observed among sovereign states, a voluntaristic "law", yet a code of conduct for both peace and war, a code more honored in the breach than in the observance. Admitting the status quo of equal but sovereign states, no one could seriously discuss the question of universal state, and apparently no one did for some centuries; at least, posterity fails to inherit the authors' written testimony.

2. French Revolutionary Tradition

By the end of the 18th century political thinking is completely disturbed, for weal or woe, both in theory and in practice; the French Revolution ensued, and in the maze of new and old ideas some reconceive the plans of a universal state. Such a plan is proposed to and rejected by the revolutionary French National Assembly by Baron de Clootz, Jean-Baptiste du Val de Grâce. Advocating the supremacy of human rights over states' rights, he promotes the idea of a world republic with cultural autonomy for all. All men are to be called brothers instead of by their

At this same period of history, when Europe is fiercely torn by despotism on the one hand and the fiery principles of the French revolution on the other, and it is thought that republican constitutions might end wars by depriving rulers of their arbitrary powers of making war, Immanuel Kant published (1795) his tractate Zum ewigen Frieden, yet even he is unable to break himself away sufficiently from the concept of internationalism and national sovereignty to advocate a true world state.

Another German, a friend of the French Revolution, Joseph Görres, hopes that as France liberated (sic) other nations, a world republic is to be established under the leadership of Napoleon, to include also the United States. He proposes the summoning of a popular convention to draw up a world constitution.

Still in the same historical period, Karl Salomo Zacharia in his Janus advocates a world state organization to start with Europe, but to develop to include ultimately the whole world; its basis is to be the freedom and

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42 Cf. Jacob Ter Meulen, op.cit., Vol. II, part I, pp. 51ff; also p. 93.
equality of all peoples of the world.\textsuperscript{43}

Still another author in the Napoleonic period, Karl Friedrich Christian Krause, in his \textit{Was Welt der Herrschaft}, urges a world federation of local federations. He feels for a while that Napoleon can unify Europe. Closer examination of his plans indicates that it resembles more a confederation than a federation.\textsuperscript{44}

Napoleon's exile and the return to a more conservative internationalism under Metternich causes a waning in the world state proposals. It seems that troubled times chiefly cause people to give serious consideration to this world state problem. Thus between the period of the Napoleonic wars and the first world war there is only one noteworthy world state proposal, that of the Englishman, William Stead, at the turn of the century. Perhaps he was motivated by the horrors of the Boer War in which his country was involved and which he eagerly wanted terminated. Like other Europeans before him he wants the world state to start with a united Europe, beginning with England and Germany and finally embracing the entire world.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., pp. 73-79.

\textsuperscript{44} English translation edited by W. Hastie, \textit{The Ideal of Humanity and Universal Federation}, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1900, especially pp. 66-112.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{The United States of Europe}, New York, Doubleday and McClure, 1899.
3. Tradition of the First Two World Wars

Nearly all of the following advocates of a world state are in some fashion or other under the spell or influence of the horrors and waste connected with war. They advocate a world state on the premise that civil peace comes from government and not from leagues or treaties. Consequently, they are at times impatient with internationalism, even forgetting on occasions that historical events evolve slowly and not by leaps.

It is interesting to note that from time to time one finds the title "United Nations" as a name for a federation of the nations of the world. As there are with the United Nations, so there were also plans to convert the League of Nations into a world federal government.

The first noteworthy wartime plan is that of an American attorney, Alfred Owen Crozier, who aims at the establishment of a Nation of Nations. He wants America to take the lead in this world federation modeled on the Canadian and Australian constitutions. The immediate aim however is to bring about a cessation of hostilities (1915).46

Another American, Theodore Harris, proposes a world constitution patterned on the United States federal plan.46

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46 A Nation of Nations, Cincinnati, Stewart and Kidd, 1915.
for all those nations which possessed the capacity of self-government. Other portions of the plan appear to have been copied from the American Constitution. Those areas unable to govern themselves should be treated as "federal territories" until they evidence ability for self-government. 47

In connection with the establishment of the League of Nations there was a Swiss Committee of thirty-four members which planned a constitution for a universal league, based on the pattern of the Swiss federation. This committee published in 1918 its own proposals in Bern, Switzerland. 48

Another American wartime plan (1918) for a United Nations comes from a constitutional and international law professor, Raleigh Colston Minor, who, due to the great differences he sees among the nations, advocates a more loosely constructed federation than the ones known today; however, he puts an unfortunate and disagreeable provision in his "Republic of Nations" - white supremacy in the counting of the world's population, the non-whites, Japanese excepted, being counted as "one-third of all others". Such is reminiscent of Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the United

47 A Proposed Constitution for the United Nations of the World, New York, C. F. Ruckstuhl, Inc., 1918. This is only a pamphlet.

The period between the wars continued to produce plans for a world state. An Englishman, H. J. Paintin*, proposes a Federation of Man (1926) with universal membership in the organization. It is suggested that this federation should be an outgrowth of the League of Nations.

Federalism appears to be an essential in practically all of the proposals of the twentieth century. W. L. Walton, an American, proposes (1939) a federation of all the nations of the world to be adopted when ratified by responsible governments representing two-thirds of the people of the world. Representative advantage is given to the literate nations; English is named as the official language.

From the year 1940 to the present it is not unusual to find organizational backing for the world state proposals. In such cases the organization, after a period of existence, sponsors many an author of world state proposals. Such has been the case with the Campaign for World Government, World Government Crusade, United World Federalist,


50 League of Nations at the Bar of Public Opinion, no city given, Paintin and Simpson, 1926.

51 Workable World Peace, Grafton, South Dakota, no publisher listed for this pamphlet, 1939.
Double sponsorship is given to the Federation of Nations plan of the feminist leaders, Lola Maverick Lloyd and Rosika Schwimmer - sponsorship of the Campaign for World Government and of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Their plan (1942) like others stresses true world federation with emphasis upon women's rights in government and elsewhere. They want to begin with a provisional world government which would formulate and publicize a world constitution.52

Another organization-sponsored and originated plan (1943) comes from the Women's Organization for World Order. Their world government is more unitary than federal, with the unusual provisions of having psychiatrists observe and report on the sessions of parliament composed of an equal number of women and men. The organization proposes some very morally objectionable police powers for the world state such as euthanasia, abortion, birth control, death for defective infants, and sterilization.53

In the "world federalist" tradition an American attorney, William C. Brewer, proposes a federal world alliance modeled on the Swiss and American constitutions.

52 Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd, _op.cit._, pp.107-112.

53 Ibid., pp. 116-120.
The world alliance is a minimal but real world federation, with a full federal government to handle the single delegated power of maintaining peace. The world alliance would have to be ratified by three-fourths of the world's nations.

In the same "world federalist" tradition is Oscar Newfang, a long-time advocate of world government, having written a number of books on the subject. His aim is realistic enough to seek to develop such organizations as the League of Nations and the United Nations into a federal world government with membership open to all nations. The type of federation he offers is not very closely knit. He might even be accused of advocating confederation instead of federation.

Those authors who wrote during the second World War echo often some sentiment against the enemy nations, along with their world state proposals. The first of these is an American, Ruth Bryan Owen, who proposes a universal federation based on the plan of the American constitution. The United Nations must win the war over the Axis powers. It is


interesting to note that she calls for a declaration of interdependence of all nations. 56

Another American, Leslie Balogh Bain, in the proposal to make a federation of regional federations, sets up as one of the aims the elimination of fascism and imperialism. Force if necessary should be used to establish regional federations. 57

An American lawyer, Percy Bordwell, in 1943 presenting a world federation plan based on the American constitution and thus not greatly differing from the plans of others, is of the opinion that the ratification of a world constitution is a power reserved to the American people and can be lawfully ratified only by a constitutional conven-

Another federation of federations plan is that of the Englishman, Edward J. Byng, (1943) but it is colored by a definitely anti-German sentiment. The proper functioning of the federation is to be achieved within a five year

56 Look Forward Warrior, New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1942.

57 Chaos or Peace, New York, M.S. Mill Co., Inc., 1943, especially pp. 88ff.

In the same year John B. Corliss, Jr., an American, suggests that the Axis powers should be put under the supervision of the World Congress, yet in time should have fair representation in the world congress.  

Another wartime plan (1943) for a world state is that of Eldon Griffin, who advocates a world federation, but does so with anti-German sentiments. He has the unique proposal of a board of roving critics to criticize publicly those holding public office.  

A former League of Nations employee, Max Habicht, proposes (1943) a universal federation initiated by the big powers which would serve as a moral "force" to bring into it the smaller nations. A program of education on the indispensability of world government must be inaugurated immediately. The author of this plan, a Swiss, wants the headquarters to be in the old location of the League of Nations.  

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60 The Greatest Project of All Time, Detroit, privately published, 1943.  
61 Clinching the Victory, Seattle, Wilberlilla Publishers, 1943.  
62 Is An Enduring Peace Possible?, Manuscript, 1943, private correspondence with the author.
Richard Burton Johnson, an American, and leader of a small interracial group on the west coast of the United States proposes a federal world state with special stress on equal rights for all races in the world, by transferring certain police powers from the nations to the world federation. 63

Another advocate of the idea of a federation of regional federations is the American, Abe Rogow, yet his anti-German sentiment is the most pronounced of all, and he has plans for a Jewish homeland, preferably in Palestine, elsewhere if need be. 64

Organizational backing for the socialist plans of John H. Rosser, an Australian, calls for a simple world federation with industry held by common ownership. Rosser insists that his plan should be ratified by the peoples of the world. 65

A world federation with class A, B, and C membership is proposed by the American, Wallace Speers. The class is based on the nation’s ability to sustain itself

63 Armistice Terms: Emergency World Legislative Assembly, Seattle, privately published, 1943.

64 A Plan for Immediate and Lasting Peace, Bayonne, New Jersey, privately published, 1943.

65 World Charter, Brisbane, Australia, Morcoms Pty., 1943.
economically. The economically backward nations would have no parliamentary representation, and class B nations would have no vote in the parliament. The establishment of a world state is to take the place of peace treaties. The world state capital is to be rotated among the nations in the highest economic class.  

Still another not unusual wartime suggestion (1943) for a world federation comes from Jennie McMullin Turner, an American. She advocates minor changes in the American constitution suitable for responsible parliamentary government. Stress is put upon active citizenship which presupposes four years' college education or its equivalent.

The last individual wartime plan to be considered is that of the Britisher, Michael Young, who proposes with much anti-German bias, a world federation, yet retaining much of the imperialism of the past. Free world representatives should meet at the Vatican to organize the "World Association of Free People".

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66 Coorder Nations, private publication, no city given, 1943.


Shortly after the second World War the various organizations began publishing regularly their magazines: the World Federalists published *World Government News* and later, *The World Federalist*; Union Now published *Freedom and Union*; and a University of Chicago group published *Common Cause*. Besides these magazines various World Federalists organized in chapters and branches have their bulletins. In the late 1940's and early 1950's the output of literature on the subject increased greatly. One of better known evangelistic type of book is Emery Reves' *The Anatomy of Peace*, published in 1946. Mortimer Adler's *How To Think About War and Peace*, came out in 1944. Since then several shelves would be needed to hold the books, pamphlets, and articles on the subject. World Federalists in the United States hold yearly conventions besides the yearly meetings of the World Movement for World Federal Government. Vernon Nash and Julis Johnson have both published:

69. *New York, Harper and Brothers.*

70. *New York, Simon and Schuster.*


written several volumes on the subject; the latter devotes three volumes in the Reference Shelf series to the problem of world organization and world government, with ample bibliographies for each. As early as 1947 Helen F. Conover prepared a short bibliography for the Library of Congress on the topic of world government.

Finally, a survey of publications on this subject shows by the year over a twenty-year period (1938-1958) the following tally: in the five year period from 1938 to 1942 there appear each year fewer than twenty publications of varying lengths on the subject of world state. But the following six years - 1943 to 1948 inclusive - see a very definite increase in the yearly number of publications, besides, of course, the articles in such propaganda magazines as the Federalist. During 1948 there were about one-hundred publications on the subject of world state. But after that date up to the present time, 1961, there are fewer than twenty publications each year on the subject. And while some of the writings have been classed as utopian or sentimentalist, the monumental work of attorney Grenville Clark and Harvard Professor Louis Sohn, World Peace Through World Law still attracts wide attention and favorable comment in intellectual circles. The labels, sentimentalist or utopian, could be applied in this case only with the greatest reluctance.
But every movement, be it political, religious, or philosophical, has its sentimental stage before it crystalizes into something acceptable and "respectable". Perhaps the aforementioned work of Clark and Sohn has rendered this service to the world state movement.

One final word on the history of the world state movement comes from the World Federalists, who think they have an unusual perspective of history founded on the fact that the modern age does not progress only accidentally; it makes progress also on purpose, and deliberately. A World Federalist editorial entitled "Clocks and Calendars" imagines squeezing fifty-thousand years of history into a fifty-year capsule, and then viewing only the last ten of these fifty years:

A decade ago we would have emerged from the cave man era. Two years ago Christianity would have appeared on the human scene. Gutenberg would have invented the printing press 15 months ago and the Wright Brothers would have made their epic flight 18 days ago. Radio would be ten days old, and four days ago TV would have first blinked its eye at the world.

Then in the final few seconds of our compressed 50 years came the acceleration that shot progress to the very heavens . . . jet planes, nuclear development, orbital missiles and antibiotics; each happening so fast that man had scarcely time to realize that time, as he once knew it, has collapsed. It is now a dimension.73

73 George Ghetia, editor, One World or None, Washington, United World Federalists, 1960, p. 3.
CHAPTER II

OPPOSITION TO A WORLD STATE

The most vocal adversaries of a world state fall into four general classifications: first of all, those who for various and sundry reasons do not want a world state; then there are those who say that a world state is presently impossible to achieve, and most probably impossible for the future also; and thirdly, those who declare that we do not need a world state, because there are or will be agencies and institutions adequate to achieve peace or at least the best means available in the practical order to maintain world peace; lastly, there are those who reject a world state for some reason that seems connected with religious motives.

Most opponents of a world state are in one way or another strong advocates of nationalism or at least of the advantages of economic nationalism in the more affluent nations. Those who regard a world state as being impossible generally muster fairly good arguments in their favor; they sometimes even regret that a world state is impossible or at least so remote. The third category of people usually comprises many friends of the United Nations, advocates of the status quo, and those who have a strong faith in what can be achieved by further development of traditional diplomacy. Only a few oppose a world state on religious grounds. Of all the argumentation against mundialization, that of
nationalism is the most loaded with emotion and generally even with prejudice against foreigners. This is especially true in the isolationist areas of various nations. Not all of the following adverse arguments were found in writing; many were given verbally to the author in the course of numerous discussions on this topic.

A. Nationalistic Reasons Against Union With Others

Since much of the modern world has been exposed to nationalism of the old or new variety, it is not at all difficult to write in a popular fashion against almost any form of political union with other peoples, especially when they are regarded as inferior. Any vigorous opponent of a world state, or even of world cooperation, might dub the proponents of a world government as " Appeasers Anonymous".¹ Manifold are the rationalizations that are made to protect the last iota of sovereign authority and complete independence from any other authority.² The helping of a poorer neighbor is


quite tolerable as long as it can be safely done at a distance and is not too expensive.

To the thrifty conservative who is an opponent of a world state, the factor of economics looms ominously as an objection. Representative Lawrence Smith of Wisconsin in 1952 testified before the United States House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee:

The world government would have the power to tax directly every individual over and above the present, federal, state and local taxes. It would not be denied under this kind of organization that Americans would be paying the bulk of taxes that were necessary to support a world government just as we are certainly paying the bulk of the cost of the United Nations. It certainly would have the right to regulate commerce, eliminate tariffs, and flood our country with slave-labor commodities...

It could transfer to public ownership major industries, institutions, and properties that are now owned by private individuals and thus bring an end to capitalism or private enterprise as we have known it and which has made this country the envy of all the others.

Precisely as I see it, world government would establish a world welfare state with power to control the destiny of every American from the cradle to the grave.\^3

Similar classic opposition can be found emanating from

\[\text{\cite{Smith}}\]

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patriotic American societies of women, who in this case had
John Trevor testify for them before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee. His testimony in part is:

The inevitable result of our submergence in
the world government would be the reapportion-
ment of our wealth and the destruction of our
immigration barriers . . . Finally, we con-
sider the power to tax which it is proposed
to confer upon the superstate, which the
world federalists envisage . . . it is no
answer to assert the taxing power would be
limited under the constitution of the world
government, but once our country entered
the arms of this Frankenstein, our power
to resist unjust impositions would be gone,
and our right to secede is specifically
denied in the program.4

Mrs. Myra Hacker, of the New Jersey Federation of Women's
Clubs also testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, opposing all resolutions favoring world govern-
ment:

Economically we are so far ahead that we
would have to give up all the gains of
labor in the last hundred years. This
plan would drag our laboring classes to
a low standard of living that they could
not and would not accept. This would mean
unending labor strife.5

4 John Trevor, "Should the U.S. Support a Federal
Union of All Nations", Congressional Digest, Vol. 31,
August-September, 1952, pp. 209-213. Similar opposition
may be seen in W. W. Kamp, "World Government or Else",
in Merle Kling's 'World Government-A World of False Pre-
mises', Social Education, April, 1950, pp. 166-170.

5 Myra C. Hacker's testimony on the U. N. Charter
People of this same mentality feel, of course, that
the United States would have to carry a tremendous tax bur­
den over which it would have little or no control. Or to
make this even worse, the lowering of the American living
standard would make this tax load even more intolerable.
These same people, however, give little or no thought to
the tremendous burden placed on the American populace by
the armaments programs that produce nothing constructive.

Not only is opposition to union with one's fellow
man found in the economic field; many have social reasons
for not wanting to merge their "popular sovereignty" with
that of some foreign neighbor, be he distant or close. This
problem is taken from the realm of the theoretical when
those who oppose world government think of the repeal of
immigration laws that would, in their opinion, certainly be
inflicted upon the more cultured and affluent peoples of
the world. They look at the Puerto Rican "immigration"
into New York and express horror at the social problems
with which so small a minority could "burden" the rest of

Revision before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
"Should the U.S. Support a Federal Union of All Nations",
Congressional Digest, Vol. 31, August-September, 1952,
pp. 213-215. In a similar vein, Charles T. Sprading assails
the world state concept in his book dedicated to patriotic
societies and patriotic congressmen, The World State Craze,
Los Angeles, Wetzel Publishing Company, 1954, especially
pp. 43-62.
the population. It is felt that man's basic distrust of those who in some way or other differ from the original group could not be wiped out by a world state. The fact that Europe, small as it is in comparison to the world, has been unable to form a united state despite the horrors of two recent wars is still further proof to those of the opposition that a world state is scarcely possible. Distrust of neighbor to them seems greater than the fear of annihilation. Governments are regarded as having limited capabilities in integrating a community, since a community must do its own integrating.

What is politically equitable is shown as very objectionable from a social viewpoint. Ludwig von Mises points out:

A world parliament elected by the universal and equal suffrage of all adults would obviously never acquiesce in migration and trade barriers. It is absurd to assume that the peoples of Asia would be prepared to tolerate the immigration laws of Australia and New Zealand, or that the predominantly industrial nations of Europe would agree to a policy of protectionism for the countries producing raw materials and foodstuffs.  

Nationalism has so colored our thought that what we know to be fair from the standpoint of democracy is, from

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an economically and socially selfish viewpoint, quite unacceptable. Nicholas Doman describes this vicious circle:

Far more important are the material objections of economic groups, the aspirations of which are incompatible with an egalitarian system of world democracy. There is ample indication that some economic groups, many times themselves the victims of exploitation or rather of unfair treatment in the national orbit, would vigorously combat the abolition of this system. These groups look askance at those who according to their views are the possessors of undue privileges based on property. But at the same time they maintain a system of discrimination among themselves.

Again, from the social standpoint man is held up to be basically individualistic, seeking first his own advancement and then that of his family and friends, and lastly, that of the community. It is pointed out likewise that he has less interest in the community, the larger it is, and what interest he does have is maintained only by constant persuasion. Thus, the amount of persuasion needed to provoke interest in the world community would be either unattainable or would be proportionately excessive as compared to the good achieved. In such a case a world community would be at a distinct disadvantage. Most people, it is alleged, would not or perhaps could not partake in it actively, and without this popular participation in the world

community, a world state would be impossible. On the other hand, some merely feel patriotism is too national and too strong and cannot be transferred to a world state, because of the race prejudice against so many other peoples, Asians especially, who would be members of this world state.

From the political standpoint the opposition sees numerous objections against the formation of a world state. Some presuppose the preposterous union of the large nations to the severe discontent of the small ones. Or others seem to think that in order to form a world state, each nation at present in existence would have to surrender its local form of government. Still others presuppose that the world state would be a welfare state, and thus opposed to man's self-sufficiency and self-reliance. In such a case, J. D. Hickerson among others, testified at the American Congressional hearings against a world state.

Human political timidity is another objection alleged against the formation of a world state. It is said that a democratic world state has never been tried, and

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consequently we have no political experience in how it might be managed. Any nation now with a stable political setup could scarcely be expected to "abandon" what has been won at the cost of many years experience, even if a world federal government is, on paper, certainly the more logical way in modern times to maintain peace.

When the discussion of a world state turns to the question of national sovereignty, the controversy becomes highly emotional, often heated and almost endless. Controversalists wax eloquent when they defend their own national state from meddling by a "pack" of foreigners. The world state becomes even more horrible when it is described as one huge, tyrannical, arbitrary sovereignty. Naturally, not even the most ardent advocates of world federation would campaign for such a monstrosity. In fact, if they were sure this evil would befall the world, they would join with the opposition.

However, a well considered non-emotional political objection comes from Reinhold Niebuhr when he shows that governments have only limited efficacy in integrating a community. This means that the integration in a world


community should have to be achieved by interested groups, often apart from local governments.

Another objection to world government from the political standpoint is that of getting sufficient ratification in the United Nations to convert it into a world state, especially in view of the difficulty and subsequent failure in calling the scheduled 1955 Charter Review Conference in the United Nations, which aimed not at converting the United Nations, but merely at strengthening it.

Some Americans in the United States are also of the opinion that the Constitution would need an amendment to enable the United States to join a world federation, declaring that the treaty clauses of the Constitution are insufficient. Nor does anyone seeking political objections against a world state fail to cite the alleged intransigence of Russia on the matter of surrendering political authority to a world state. Warren Austin, quondam U. S. representative to the United Nations is among these. He presents an a fortiori argument:

The enthusiasts of world government ask how we know that Russia would not give up all of its sovereignty in security matters just because she has refused to give up a fraction. There are few certainties in this world, but after a few years of experience in dealing with the USSR around the council tables of the U. N., I would consider it the ultimate in improbabilities. In all of the cases
where some small modification of sovereignty or even of the veto has been discussed, I do not remember any instance when the Soviets suggested that they might be willing to cooperate if the modification were more thorough-going.11

The better instructed advocates of a world state are painfully aware of the difficulties that Russia would most likely present. They are, however, especially if they live in a large nation, not much more hopeful about their own government's attitude on sovereignty. All realize that many factors will be needed to effect any type of basic change. The world federalists are charged with being their weakest in their "obvious unconcern" for the lessons of history. It is said that they have apparently forgotten that national states are the product of the deepest, most fundamental struggles of mankind. It is the play of economic forces, the evolution of the vernacular languages, the development of national psychologies and the geo-political conflicts of the ages which have produced the modern national state. All these factors provide a barrier for world government. These factors, products of a thousand years, cannot, it is averred, be wiped aside through the good intentions of

the modern blueprint makers. Some Duke University social scientists summarize this argument against world government as follows:

In any particular state of social development, laws are reduced to the fatuity of a Kellogg Pact or to the corruption of a Prohibition Amendment unless they have roots in a community of such social and political realities, habits, skills, moral and religious conceptions and political and economic ideologies. Such roots for world government are as yet non-existent.\(^{12}\)

It is further insisted that there are other minor factors which attest to the impossibility of world government; one of these concerns loyalty. National loyalties contain norms of "exclusiveness" which are difficult to modify. Loyalties to be changed often must be modified at their roots. But such modifications are expensive and demand widespread control over the citizenry. The proponent of the world community, they say, is trying to develop loyalty to a remote object, one which is not well symbolized and one which has no outgroup.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{12}\) Elmer Davis, "Objections to World Government", New Republic, February 27, 1950, p. 18. Cf. also N.A. Pelcouits, "World Government Now?", Harpers, November, 1946, p. 396. He challenges the three "great errors" of world government advocates: that man creates a government by setting up a constitution; that clashing sovereignties are responsible for war; and that nations fight because they lack means of peaceful settlement.

\(^{13}\) Cf. Harold Guetskow, Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approaches to a Problem in International Organization, Princeton, Princeton University Press, Publication No. 4 of
No thoughtful advocate of a world state, however, has his eyes closed to the political and historical problems that stand in the way of the formation of a world state. He does not note on the one hand that history is being made much faster in the second half of the twentieth century than it was in the first half. Thus, he does not see his goal as being so remote as some writers are wont.

Again, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives, Russia is held up as the downfall of any world state whether it is inside or outside that organization. Republican Representative Lawrence Smith of Wisconsin testified in 1952:

Would world government mean peace? It seems to me that any world government without Russia would create two antagonistic worlds preparing for war to a finish. The blueprint for world communism calls for war to wipe out capitalism. Any world government with Russia would eventually develop into oblivion and with it civilization. Obviously any world government would promote war, not peace.

What would world government mean? It would mean, as I see it, scrapping our American Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and ending forever our personal freedom, as we know it in this country. Then, too, world government calls for the establishment of a world law and a world court. If you as an individual

should break a world law, you could be called before a world court in central government headquarters in Berlin, Moscow, or Nanking. It would also replace our entire defense system. The United States Army, Navy, and Air Force would be replaced by a gigantic international army composed largely of aliens or at least by those who might outnumber us ten to one.14

Another political blast against world government has been written expressly for Bower Aly's debate handbook by a midwestern lawyer, Charles W. Phillips, who sees in a world state a real threat to our national sovereignty as well as to our personal freedom. The unpleasant things he has to say are made more unpalatable by their association with the Communist movement. He writes:

Much has been said and written about the necessity of world government as the only means of eliminating wars and fashioning an orderly world. No one will take issue regarding the worth of such noble objectives . . . our question for the moment, however, is what will World Government do to human freedom? Are we in America more interested in World Government than in being free people? . . . We owe it to future generations to exercise the same common sense in deciding whether to trade our form of

government for a World Government that will have to hand over unlimited personal power to fallible human beings . . . There you have it . . . It is now being proposed to us as the only means of insuring world peace . . . It provides for a global system of compulsory collectivism . . . a subversive doctrine. 15

Much of the opposition to a world organization is launched against a world state that really nobody would want to see exist. The future world state is portrayed as a totalitarian regime. Some would go so far as to say that to be effective it would have to be totalitarian, and if it would not be such, it would be as weak as the United Nations of the 1950 sort. Naturally, if the new world government is totalitarian as it would have to be in the minds of the opposition, it would wipe out the freedom, independence, and all standing whatsoever of the member nations, and after the loss of freedom, life would become scarcely worth living.

Finally, a political dilemma concerning sovereignty is presented by Herman Beukema who insists that a world state would ultimately cause us to lose the ideals we so fondly cherish today. He writes:

A world government could be formed in two ways - by force or by compulsion and common consent on the part of the nations of the world. No single nation is able today to form a world state by force. Perhaps one could be formed by a coalition of states, but it is worthy to note that no coalition of recent times has been able to exact an unconditional surrender of sovereignty from its own members. A government strong enough to coerce on a world-wide scale is strong enough to oppress on a similar scale. It is doubtful that the values we esteem could be maintained in such a world.¹⁶

B. Practical Impossibility of a World State

Of those who oppose world government, some speak out against it because they regard it as impossible to achieve for the present or near future. Others say it is simply impossible at any time in this world; or perhaps it is so far in the future, it would be worthless even to consider the question, except from the academic viewpoint. Of course, all thinking political scientists will in general admit that it cannot come about until both the opposition becomes too weak to prevent it, and the proponents are sufficiently prepared to sell their idea, i.e., when political

OPPOSITION TO A WORLD STATE

integration moves from the local and international level up to the world level. However, not all opposition to a world state is created by ill will. Some of it exists because of the extreme difference in political and cultural levels of the peoples who would form the world state. The classical exposition of this problem is given by Mortimer Adler:

Taken together, these moral and cultural factors comprise the spiritual difficulties in the way of world peace. They more than overbalance the physical conditions which promote the coming of a world community. To the extent to which they postpone it, they render world peace improbable in the near future. Its probability within five hundred years amounts to a calculation of the time it will take to bring about the necessary spiritual changes.

With one exception, the cultural obstacles are of almost negligible importance. Of these, only the existing inequality in the level of civilization presents a real impediment to the formation of a world community. By itself it is sufficient to bar the way for many centuries. As for the rest, the plurality of races and cultures, the diversity of languages and religions, do not seriously matter.

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17 This is the whole argument developed by Crane Brinton and Cord Meyer, Jr. in their pamphlet, World Government - Necessity or Utopia, Toronto, Canadian Association for Adult Education, 1947, pp. 9-14.


19 Ibid., p. 235. Kenneth C. Wheare subscribes to
Thus Mortimer Adler stresses simply the inequality in levels of civilization as a real impediment to world peace. He sees in diversity of religion no greater political difficulty for a world state than for a national state, even though he admits that "to the devout, religious differences sometimes represent schism and heresy, or worse, the pagan worship of idols or false gods".  

Mauricio Nabuco broaches the formidable question of educating a sufficient number of people to make world government function. To some, his requirements may seem excessive, while to others, they loom as a permanent or nearly permanent impediment to the formation of a world state. He writes:

"It is evident that we cannot have national government without education, and we shall not be able to have world government without education; and there are several billion people who would have to be educated before we could have real world government."  

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This problem is envisioned as being a never ending job. "It is a task of which we have not yet seen the beginning and therefore we do not know when we shall see the end of it." Meanwhile the world goes on. Conflicts, rebellions and perhaps even a war might break out giving countries nothing but setbacks.

Reasons for further delay in the arrival of a democratic world community are noted by Gerard Mangone, who is scarcely an opponent of the world state ideal:

A democratic world government is unthinkable except in terms of a democratic community constantly nourished by a vigorous belief in the freedom of individual choice, the toleration of minorities, and devices which permit critical opposition in government. On the presumption that rough equivalents to this kind of thinking presently exist among groups of men, how is such a culture of life to be diffused universally?

Mortimer Adler also discusses the difficulties in connection with a world democracy. These difficulties he regards as serious obstacles to the formation of a world state, which in his thinking is a necessary condition for world political peace. He writes:

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22 Ibid., p. 4.

This brings us to one cultural factor which makes world peace improbable in our century. A federal government of the world requires political homogeneity among its component states. A world federation would have to be constitutional. In consequence, all the federated states would have to be republics. None could be dictatorships or absolute monarchies. Despotisms and constitutions cannot federate. To this extent at least, political uniformity is required in a set of federated states, even if all are not equally democratic in their constitutions.

But all the peoples of the world are not yet prepared by tradition or experience for constitutional government. There are nations in which constitutional government has never been tried; and others where it has been a papier-mâché affair, concealing a series of dictatorships. The backward nations of the world will have to remedy their own defects. They can be helped by others to the extent that imperialism is renounced; and, perhaps, by advice and example. But in the main task of achieving political maturity, they will have to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.

The other difficulties that retard the coming of the world community, Mortimer Adler feels can be overcome by education. The equalization of educational opportunities becomes indispensable in raising the level of civilization, for "equal

educational opportunity is usually inseparable from political equality. 25 From the standpoint of political philosophy the only permanent obstacles to the formation of a world state would be those founded on some unchangeable feature of human nature as such. For example, if to form a world state men were required to become angels, we would have to say that a world state is philosophically impossible, and all thought of it should be abandoned. However, many of the temporary impediments to world government and peace are emotional. A typical example of such an outbreak is found in an issue of the Detroit Free Press, in an editorial some years ago, putting to the reader the following series of "patriotic" questions:

1. Are you willing to exchange our Stars and Stripes for any other flag?
2. Are you willing to have the United States of America lose its rights as an independent nation?
3. Are you willing to have any man world ruler, for life, with unlimited powers?
4. Are you willing to have unrestricted immigration from all countries?
5. Are you willing to risk bringing down the American standard of living to the average of the rest of the world?
6. Are you willing to encourage the transfer of our great industries to foreign

Of course, anyone who opposes a movement words his questions in such a way that the answers will be as objectionable and odious as possible. No doubt the author of the editorial regards some or perhaps all of these questions as rhetorical. An advocate of a world state would not view them all in that light, and probably he would also have some answers a bit different from those of the hyperpatriot.

Naturally, the present day advocate of a world state seeks only the minimum of power for this world government lest any proposed large grants of political power further alienate the public at large. Everett L. Millard remarks that all world federalists are minimalists, the only problem being just exactly what constitutes the minimum? Of course, some world federalists hold that it will not be necessary to begin a world government with as many of the delegated federal powers as the Australian or United States federal governments began with. They see, for example, no need to permit mass migrations, at first, nor to have a universal currency.


28 Ibid., p. 88-89.
"The crux of the matter for world government is the minimum superstate order to be observed and the alternatives open to the nationalities which the union embraces." But whether the enthusiasts of a world state are maximalists or minimalists, they must agree that

... as there can be no state without a society willing and able to support it, so there can be no world state without a world community willing and able to support it.  

It has been said that there have been so many wars over such a long period of history that war rather than peace seems more according to human nature. If such is the case, then the proponents of world federation are surely searching for a goal that is in itself unattainable — world peace. F. J. P. Veale regards this whole human setup as barbarous. He declares:

Between the year 1500 B.C. and the year 1860 A.D., more than 8,000 treaties of peace, each intended to remain in force forever, were concluded. The average time they remained in force was two years.

From the practical standpoint this study seems to offer only discouragement. Yet perhaps, on the other hand,

29 Gerard J. Mangone, op. cit., p. 42.


it should encourage those in power to try something besides treaties as a way to "perpetual peace". World government might produce more lasting results.

Finally, one prominent group that opposes world government at present, but definitely holds it as an ultimate goal is Federal Union, Inc., which advocates an Atlantic federal union of the free, lead by Clarence K. Streit. Declaring that the more primitive a people is, the fewer important external problems it has with other peoples, they formulate their fundamental principle which follows:

It seems safe to formulate the rule that the poorer, weaker, remoter, and more backward generally a people is, the more self-sufficient it therefore is, the higher the ratio of its internal to its external problems and the less urgent the problem of world government to it. Conversely, the richer, stronger, the faster in communication and generally the more developed mechanically and more educated and civilized a people is, the less self-sufficient it therefore is, the more dependent on all mankind, the higher the ratio of its external to its internal problems and the more urgent its need of world government.32

With general principles such groups as the World Federalists would be in agreement. The disagreement commences when its application begins, since the Federal Union

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group of Clarence K. Streit regards the World Federalist or universalist approach as fallacious. There are listed ten fallacies or untenable propositions which are to them plausible perhaps at first glance, but lead only to frustration and disillusionment.33 Clarence Streit deplores the fact that even some of his own followers have been fascinated by the universalist approach to world government. He writes:

By 1945 many Americans, under the impact of the atomic infernal machine, jumped to the conclusion that the U. N. must be changed at once into a world government. Not a few readers of Union Now were among them. They had been most impressed by the book's exposure of the unworkability of leagues, by its proof of the effectiveness of the union, and by its ultimate goal, universal world government. They had not been so impressed by its recognition of the impracticality of universal federation now, by its nuclear approach to that goal, and by the primary importance it attached to individual freedoms as the basis and purpose of government. They made peace the purpose of government.34

It is, however, quite clear that the Federal Union group does have universal world government as their ultimate goal, but they insist that the present is not the time to seek it by the universalists' approach. They continue by answering one of the most common objections that the World Federalists or any other group favoring the universalist approach would

33 Ibid., p. 259-262.
34 Ibid., p. 259.
proffer against the Federal Union's nuclear approach. Their spokesman, Clarence Streit writes:

Many good people are so impressed by the dangers they find in 'excluding' any nation from the constitutional convention that they do not see the graver danger they run by inviting all comers - that of excluding all possibility of establishing an effective government, let alone a sound, free, federal constitution. The latter danger is much the worse, for any offense given or injustice done by not inviting a nation to the convention is temporary. Granted the convention results in the establishment of a strong and sound union, any offense given in the process can be safely left to it to remove. To start with an unsound constitution, however, is to incur a permanent danger, and begin world government as a hopeless congenital cripple.

John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's first Secretary of State, testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 12, 1948, agreeing substantially with the Federal Union policy by making such a statement as this:

I think it is quite impractical to organize all nations of the world except the Soviet bloc into a federation. That is just as impossible as proceeding under 109.


36 The Culbertson group would aim at this if Russia rejects their quota force plan. Culbertson's big difficulty is that his world federation is not really a federation but only a league. Cf. his own work, Ely Culbertson, Is a World Government Desirable and Possible Now?, Columbus, Ohio, American Education Press, 1944.

37 109 refers to the article with that number in the
The number of nations that you can draw together on a basis that would be acceptable to us is a relatively few. They are what I might call the free societies which have long established conditions of democratic practice and have among themselves the machinery and procedure for establishing and carrying out law. . . . I do not think you will get universality all at one jump. You will get it piecemeal by the nations which think alike, and believe alike, coming closely together. . . . I do not believe that there are any people who treat peace as the ultimate end. Permanent freedoms, rights and liberties are the ultimate ends. 38

Hence, it is seen that the Federal Union group, while it certainly advocates world federation as an ultimate goal, does now oppose it as a matter of poor or even ruinous policy. However, some time of cooperation and compromise may lead into one large group all of the organizations which in some way or another sponsor a world state.

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38 John Foster Dulles, testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 12, 1948, in Clarence K. Streit's Union Now, p. 302. This is somewhat at variance with St. Thomas Aquinas, who says that the "ultimate thing that must be sought is peace". Cf. his In Evangelia S. Matthaei Commentaria, Ch. xii. For a further discussion on this point concerning peace as the ultimate end, cf. Robert M. Hutchins, St. Thomas and the World State, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1949, p. 46. Cf. also Frank E. Holman, "World Government, No Answer to America's Desire for Peace", American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 32, October, 1948, pp. 642-644.
One of the final examples of opposition against traditional "one worlders" is the tempered opposition of impatience manifested by Crane Brinton against world federalists. He writes:

As I have already said, I cannot understand the idealist in a hurry; indeed I probably cannot understand the idealist . . . to me, Plato was all his life trying to grow oranges outdoors in a sub-freezing temperature. To me, the world federalists are trying to do the same thing. . . . In hardly any other kind of human activity do men behave as do the perfectionists in their dealing with moral, political, social, economic problems with human relations, in short . . . only in human relations do we frankly, virtuously, and a bit monotonously attempt the impossible or at any rate, try to persuade others to let us attempt it.39

C. Adequacy of International Leagues

Many oppose a world state because they think that there are other more easily available means for obtaining world peace and freedom. Of such are those who figure that

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a strengthened, though not essentially changed, United Nations is the answer, and those who feel that a better use and great improvement of the diplomatic service will enable the world to stay at peace, all of the nations cooperating but remaining sovereign.

Those who support the United Nations, essentially as it is today, as the ultimate solution for international political problems become as impatient with those who would convert the United Nations into a world federation as with those who would destroy the U. N. by weakening it or abolishing it. These supporters feel sure that an effort to convert it into a world federation would in fact produce its disintegration, without, of course, ever achieving world federation. This opinion is shared by many persons affiliated with the American Association for the United Nations.

V. K. Wellington Koo, delegate to the United Nations, declares that the U. N. is our last and only hope for peace. He writes:

After seeing what the world suffered in two disastrous wars within a quarter of a century, it seems clear to me that the U. N. is the only sound and feasible experiment for us left to try. We must make it a success, or we shall have to face the unimaginable consequences of its failure. There is really no sound or effective alternative. 40

40 V. K. Wellington Koo, "Basic Problems of the U. N.
N.", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
In a questionnaire submitted to a goodly number of writers and experts on the United Nations and world government, the second question asked was: would you favor a plan in which the United States should take the initiative in forming a federal union of all of the nations of the world?

This questionnaire was submitted by the editors of *Debate Handbook* of the Mid-West Debate Bureau of Normal, Illinois. While only nine out of the forty-seven who replied declared themselves in favor of world government for sometime in the future, five of these felt that some serious effort should be made almost immediately to seek a world government, preferably through the United Nations.

An interesting contrast may be found in the writings of Clark K. Eichelberger, of the American Association of the United Nations. He declares:

> If you examine the Charter carefully, you will find that the U. N. is a sovereign body in itself, and that its principal organs and the Secretary General may create such additional staff and bodies as are necessary to perform the functions of the organization. The nations, at a considerable sacrifice of sovereignty, are constantly building up a sovereign body in the U. N. The U. N. is far from a league - it is the beginning of a world government. If it were not for the veto, the Security Council would contain all the aspects of

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executive authority that the World Federalists have advocated.41

However, this same author within two years, when asked if he favored the U. S. taking the initiative in the formation of a world federation, replied in the negative:

The U. N. has shown a capacity for evolution through a liberal interpretation of the Charter. The Uniting for Peace resolution shifted the center of gravity from the Security Council to the General Assembly and thus provided a legal way around the veto. . . . The time will come when the Charter can be revised and the U. N. strengthened. It may well be that a stronger U. N. will not follow the pattern of the American 'federal union'.42

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, whose U. N. interest is proverbial, was polled by the same questionnaire and she gave the simple, short reply: "Make what we have work".43


43 Ibid., p. 226. However, as early as 1911 H. LaFontaine, a member of the Belgian legislature, prepared a brochure, "The Existing Elements of a Constitution of United States of the World", for International Conciliation, October 11, 1911, No. 47.
Senator Lester C. Hunt of Wyoming gave a negative reply likewise with the following comment:

It appears that no more constructive action towards World Peace would or could be taken under such a federation of nations than is now possible under the United Nations.  

Richard L. Strout, a political writer for the Christian Science Monitor gave also a negative reply to the same question on world federation, showing that he, too, is satisfied that the U. N. is the answer. He comments briefly: "Why have a Federal Union when we have the U. N.?"  

Inis Claude, Jr., after distinguishing between governmental institutions and governmental results, asserts that "to say that the world needs to be governed is not the same as saying that a world government must be erected." He claims that the functional test should be the deciding factor; he writes:

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The world requires methods and agencies adequate for performing reasonably well on a global scale the functions which governments have undertaken to perform and have occasionally managed to perform with great success in independent states; yet world government is not the only conceivable or necessarily the best possible means for meeting the requirement. To put it differently, the benefits which governments ideally and sometimes actually confer upon the societies in which they operate are desperately needed by the global society, but it is not certain that those advantages are most likely to be provided by institutions patterned after or closely analogous to the so-called 'governmental' institutions of states. The instrumentalities appropriate to the solution of the world's problems may or may not constitute a system which looks like government, sounds like government, or acts like government. The test is functional performance, not institutional resemblance.

Of course, there is no need to say immediately what will be the source of these governmental benefits if they do not come from government itself. The world federalists would counter that this is like expecting an effect without a sufficient cause. Perhaps some will say that these benefits are to be derived from the observance of international law. Such is

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Ibid., p. 434-5. In chapter 17 Claude writes at length about the serious and nearly impossible problems to be faced by a world government if it should ever come into existence, although he, himself, admits the theoretical correctness of the world federalists' position. Stringfellow Barr, an ardent world federalist, envisions the same serious problems for the foundation of a world state. See his Citizens of the World, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1952, pp. 160f.
the central idea found in The International Law of the Future, which in no wise pretends to plan for a world state, but simply to prepare the best possible solution in international organization. This volume lists several postulates, principles and proposals. The first three postulates follow:

**Postulate 1**
The States of the world form a community and the protection and advancement of the common interest of their peoples require effective organization of the Community of States.

**Postulate 2**
The law of the Community of States is international law. The development of an adequate system of international law depends upon continuous collaboration by States to promote the common welfare of all peoples and to maintain just and peaceful relations between all States.

**Postulate 3**
The conduct of each State in its relations with other States and with the Community of States is subject to international law, and the sovereignty of a state is subject to the limitations of international law.

The author and compiler of these concepts regards international law as the solution to the problem for he, himself, comments that "it is to be assumed that the State system which has grown up over a period of several centuries will continue to exist in the future". Yet in another passage

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49 Ibid., p. 20. Wallace McClure also seeks to show how the greatest possible degree of world order can be achieved through existing law, the United Nations, and other legal
Law cannot exist in a vacuum. It must be related to the society which it serves. Nor can public law be divorced from political and social movements. International law depends upon, is conditioned by, the general character of international relations. . . . It therefore seems essential to the 'revitalizing and strengthening of international law' that States collaborate continuously to promote the common welfare of all peoples . . . 50

World state advocates insist strenuously on the first statement of the above cited passage and would likewise agree on the need of promoting the common world welfare. Yet they would just as vigorously assert that the modern concept of international law is not the answer.

A similar concept, not concerning international law by name, but the moral law itself, is proposed by Heinrich Rommen. He would have the moral law stand in about the same relation to the nations as others consider international law. He writes:

The strife among nations can be best settled if the universal law of morality, the principles of natural law as the unwritten constitution of the international community, are commonly accepted. For then power is put in the service of

institutions short of world government. This is the central theme of his World Legal Order: Possible Contributions by the People of the United States, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 1960.

50 Ibid., p. 27.
fundamental moral ideas. And there is no evasion of the principle that the greater the power, influence, and prestige of a nation, the greater is the responsibility for peace and justice.\(^{51}\)

Such an idea is equivalent to saying that morality is a substitute for politics in the world arena. It returns us to the concept of law in a vacuum, albeit a moral law in a political vacuum.\(^{52}\)

Still another aspect of the milder and more reasoned opposition to a world state is found in the idea that world problems of peace can be solved at present by the furtherance of diplomacy. This comes from one who is on record\(^{53}\) as favoring a world state, Frederick L. Schuman:

But the alternative to world government is not necessarily world disorder, world war, and world annihilation. If men are wise, the alternative is a new balance of power and a new diplomacy designed to prevent violence and promote order by settling conflicts through bargaining. Yet if men were wise, they would perhaps have long since found means of giving political expression to the age-old vision of the unity of mankind. For this today's generation is obviously not yet ready.\(^{54}\)

\(^{51}\)Heinrich Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought, St. Louis, B. Herder Company, 1945, p. 735.


D. Pseudo-religious Opposition

One fairly easy way to be opposed to the world state ideal is to say that one's religion is against it, or at least, that one's religion in no wise favors the ideal. The latter is the approach of Heinrich Rommen in The State in Catholic Thought. He writes:

Thus the first question is either a plurality of states or a civitas maxima with paramount world sovereignty. Such a world sovereignty is not implied in the idea of the unity of the human conscience, of the natural and moral law; nor does it follow from the designation of God as the supreme and universal ruler. For sovereignty includes the power to decide, without appeal, an actual juridical problem, to effect a decision by application of the general rule or norm. . . . It is a fact that Catholic political philosophy in general does not propound such a universal world monarchy or empire of a civitas maxima. But the temptation to do so was strong, especially during the time of the medieval orbis christianus. The legists, the court jurists of the emperor, tried to prove that the emperor is the universal monarch, while the curialists, as late as 1595, declared the pope is the sovereign of the orbis christianus with absolute and unlimited power in temporalia.55

Francisco Suárez is reputed to reject the idea of a world monarchy or republic56 and St. Thomas is said to presuppose

55 Heinrich Rommen, op.cit., p. 650-651.
a plurality of states, independent and free, for "the notion of a World State . . . is foreign to the Thomistic concept of the social and political order". 57 St. Thomas certainly does not treat specifically of a world state, as does Dante in his De Monarchia, but his political principles, if one examines his concepts of a "perfect political society", can lead almost "irresistibly in our day to world law, world government, and a world state". 58

A less reasoned approach to the problem of world state with a "religious" opposition is found in Myra Hacker's testimony before the Senate Sub-Committee on the Revision of the U. N. Charter. She says in part:

The law and morality of Western civilization is in the Christian tradition. A world government would have to include conflicting moral codes – Moslem, Brahmin, Shinto, Voodoo, Hebrew, and so forth. With a superstate we would have to have superreligion and would be back to union of church and state. Today, as it was 1900 years ago, it is the conquest of the soul rather than the earth that is important. The living forces of religion can make material forces immaterial. 59


With the unwarranted assumption that religious uniformity is inevitable in a world state, religious fears can be easily aroused. Nicholas Doman writes:

Both the Christian and the non-Christian world would resent being forced into the acceptance of a religious uniformity representing an alien, unfamiliar faith. For the sake of creating common loyalties and breaking down disrupting spiritual influences it would be desirable to have religious uniformity. However, efforts to universalize Christian or non-Christian creeds, instead of uniting mankind into one family, would widen the cleavage between different creeds.60

Of all the Protestant theologians who have taken a stand on the question of world state Reinhold Niebuhr stands out perhaps as the most prominent among them. His prominence is due maybe to the fact that he is on the side of the opposition, and in this sense he can in no wise be said to represent Protestantism. Others, such as Rev. Rodney Shaw, former midwestern field worker for the United World Federalists, and Rev. Donald Harrington, twice national president of the same organization, have much constructive to offer. However, Niebuhr's opposition to the world state is always reasoned and tempered. He writes:

Our precarious situation is unfortunately no proof either of the ability of mankind to create a world government by an act of the will, nor of the political ability of

60 Nicholas Doman, *op. cit.*, p. 282.
of such a government to integrate a world community in advance of a more gradual growth of the 'social tissue' which every community requires more than government. . . . mutual respect for each others' rights in particular communities is older than any code of laws, and that machinery (e.g. World Government) for the enforcement of law can be efficacious only when a community as a whole obeys its laws implicitly; so that coercive enforcement may be limited to a recalcitrant minority. 61

On the question of a world state many writers are primarily humanists, and thus feel no special need to consider the question of religion in a world state. The Rev. Donald Harrington, himself the Unitarian minister of Community Church in New York City, has no doubt had a tremendous influence on those of the same religious persuasion as he. Of course, the question of "church and state" in a world state raises several problems which are not to be studied here. No doubt Dante obtained his idea of universal or world state simply by secularizing the concept of universal or world church.

A final reasoned objection to a world state is one suggested by the problem of political ethics. Again, the opinion of Nicholas Doman is seen:

The issue of leadership is not only one problem of political ethics, but the problem of political ethics. Those within the gates of power will jealously safeguard their privileges; they will be driven to claim superiority for the interests they represent and deny the existence of a supranational morality.62

Two anticlimax objections to a world state from a pseudo-religious viewpoint were presented personally to the author. The "logic" of the first is the following: God in His just anger at the Tower of Babel changed the languages of the peoples of the earth so that it became necessary for them to form nations. This is a good thing and the world should be kept that way; thus God's work should not be spoiled by a world state. Secondly, the Bible says that there shall always be wars. But a world state should logically prevent wars. Therefore, a world state is not possible, since this would indirectly contradict the Bible!

In Catholic thought there is no theology of the state, even though ethical questions are treated in moral theology. The Catholic concept of the state sets human nature as the ultimate earthly basis of any state or lawful authority residing in government on any level. A fortiori these concepts

62 Nicholas Doman, op.cit., p. 229. General Von Moltke told Professor Bluntschli that "perpetual peace is a dream and it is not even a beautiful dream. War is an element in the order of the world ordained by God . . . without war the world would stagnate and lose itself in materialism". Cf. Thorston Kallisjarvi & Associates, Modern World Politics, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1945, 2nd edition, p. 695.
should apply likewise to a world state should it come into existence.
CHAPTER III

PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS FAVORING A WORLD STATE

Every generation has its own problems; our is transcending the limits of the nation state.1

Of the many popular authors in the twentieth century who favor a world state, only a few approach the question from the philosophical viewpoint. Not that the arguments "of the many" have no philosophical value or basis, but it must be said that most writers approach this important question simply from the practical viewpoint. Some authors stress one argument to the exclusion of others, while those who have prepared whole volumes on this topic touch in some way or other on all of the current arguments offered in favor of a world state, usually the world federal state. Even if one were to confine his study to writings in the English language, one could find hundreds of authors who by the middle of the twentieth century would have professed their allegiance to the idea of a world state, some giving unusually cogent arguments, but most following in the footsteps of those who merely presume but do not prove that world government is necessary to obtain world peace. Taken numerically, it can be asserted that the vast preponderance

of those who have committed themselves to arguing for the idea of a world state do so from the motive of fear of atomic destruction, presuming usually that the world state is the best if not the only way to avoid such a disaster. The prime purpose of this study is not to prove that world peace will come exclusively by means of a world state nor simply to catalogue arguments and authors in favor of a world state; but it will be important to investigate and evaluate the ideas and the logic of at least the most prominent authors in each school of thought on the subject of world state. An attempt to cite all the authors on this subject would result in much repetition. The stress is rather on the arguments themselves.

A. Arguments Immediately Derivable From Man's Social Nature

While few authors specifically connect their proposals with man's sociality, because they do not approach the question with a philosophical bent, most do have arguments that are in themselves derivable from man's social nature because they stress in one way or another the unity of mankind, like the ideas allied to the common welfare of all peoples.
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1. Trends of Economic Interdependence and Social Communication

a. World Common Good

Scholastic philosophers, ethicists, and political scientists universally state that the common temporal weal of man is the prime purpose for the existence of political authority on any level. Applying this general principle to the world level as well as to the national and local level, one discovers an army of authors who do stress the need of caring for the common good of the world. Foremost among these is Stringfellow Barr, who insists that this world problem must be handled by the people of this world, and not solely by isolated groups. He writes:

The people of the world are alone able to take what is the main economic problem of every single national group: the problem of rebuilding their common world economy. They can hope to do it only by the massive use of public funds. America cannot do it for them. It might, of course, be done under Communist leadership, but that would come only through a Communist revolution. . . . A common government would be the proper agency, just as the common government of the forty-eight American states is the proper agency for the American people when they have to construct irrigation systems, or take flood control measures that cross state boundaries, or cost too much for a single state to tackle. There are Americans who get angry whenever government is used that way, but most Americans agree with that well-known Republican, Abraham Lincoln, who said: 'The legitimate
object of government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done, but cannot do for themselves.²

Thus on a world level Stringfellow Barr spells out the scholastic principle of subsidiarity. Presuming this same principle, Clark and Sohn in their comprehensive book seek to solve the basic world economic problems by a World Development Authority whose purpose would be to aid in the social and economic evolution of the lesser developed areas of the world, chiefly through grants-in-aid and interest-free loans. It is expected that the countries with the highest gross national incomes would furnish a goodly portion of the funds besides those of the general revenues of a strengthened United Nations.³

On this question concerning the world common good they give the following revision of Article 59 of the United Nations Charter:

1. There is established a World Development Authority which shall function in accordance with the annexed statute which forms an integral part of this revised Charter as Annex IV.


2. The United Nations, shall, where appropriate, establish such new specialized agencies as may be required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55. The constitutions of such agencies shall be prepared by the Economic and Social Council and shall be approved by the General Assembly. They shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by a majority of the member nations but shall bind only those nations which have ratified them or thereafter accede to them.4

The authors have as the aim of this proposed revision of the United Nations Charter a greater fulfillment of the "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" as found in the preamble to the present United Nations Charter. In this way, the new U. N. could "deal with the vast problem of mitigating the differences in economic status between various regions of the world".5 In addition to the revised charter, these authors have prepared several annexes, number IV dealing with the World Development Authority and number V with the implementation of number IV - the revenue system of the United Nations.6

Looking a bit beyond the economics of the world common good, Vernon Nash declares the following:

The proper organizing of such a world authority is essentially a political problem, no

4Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, op. cit., p. 131.
5Ibid., p. 131.
6Ibid., p. 331-343.
matter how high the degree of economic content in the issues handled by it. Many are blinded to the significance of this consideration by their prejudices against government as such. . . . We can no longer expect to have even a tolerable order in our village world without all the essentials of a fully organized community. The poison of international anarchy - the absence of enforced law in the relations among peoples - seeps down into national regimes and impairs the vigor of all our separate economic orders.

Thus Vernon Nash, while he does not minimize the importance of the economic growth of the political structure, does see political authority as being essential for the real stability of any equitable and lasting economic order. Thus his chief argument for a world state is found in the very title of his book - the need for a government wherever there is a community of interdependent peoples. This same train of thought concerning the foundations for the common good of the world is echoed by Basil Buller-Murphy, who writes:

Our aim is not negative, but positive, the establishment of world order by means of world government. So we do not seek the employment of any abnormal means of ending

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7Vernon Nash, The World Must Be Governed, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1949, p. 124-125. T. D. Weldon continues the idea of Vernon Nash when he lays stress on the moral aspects of the world state; cf. his States and Morals, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1947, p. 297: "The superstate, we have said, must govern. It can do so only if one set of moral standards is generally accepted, and therefore it must see to it that this condition is fulfilled." See likewise the interesting observation of Martin O. Olson, World Peace Ideology, New York, The William Frederick Press, 1951, p. 26.
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war in anarchy, but the employment of the normal means of ending that abnormal state of things, the substitution of order under government for disorder under anarchy - and not merely order and the peace of order, but all the manifold benefits which follow in its train. The insane disorder of world anarchy will naturally cease on the institution of world government. In a properly regulated community order is taken for granted, and government is looked to for more than that.⁸

Accordingly Buller-Murphy insists that a world political order is prerequisite for a true world economic order. And while today's world common good is tied closely to world economics, the latter does not count for everything.

Stuart Chase, with an eye on the economic aspects of the world's common good, insists in his Tomorrow's Trade that a world state must be a real one and not a facsimile. He writes:

... it follows that nations can no longer be sovereign, either in theory or in practice, and the era of nationalism comes to an end. The most vital right of nationalism, the right to arm to protect oneself, to make war, is abandoned.⁹

Taken from a negative standpoint, some advocates of a world state deplore the waste of manpower used in the

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production of armaments, which bring even more disastrous economic results if they are used. Such are the sentiments of World Parliamentarians.

If so much of the world's resources are diverted each year to the sterile, unproductive and inflationary purpose of armaments, the result even without war will be social revolt and economic exhaustion. If these new weapons are used, then it is the physical destruction of the world which faces us. We call upon peoples and governments throughout the world to recognize that the choice is now between some form of world government or world ruin. It is a matter of the arms race or the human race.10

Approaching this whole question from a more philosophical outlook, Jacques Maritain stresses the modern economic solidarity of the human race, deploring its political fragmentation. He writes:

The basic fact is the henceforth unquestionable interdependence of nations, a fact which is not a token of peace, as people for a moment believed in their wishful thinking, but rather a token of war: why? Because that interdependence of nations is essentially an economic interdependence, not a politically agreed-upon, willed and

built up interdependence, in other words, because it has come to exist by virtue of a merely technical or material process, not by virtue of a simultaneous genuinely political or rational process . . . an essentially economic interdependence, without any corresponding fundamental recasting of the moral and political structures of human existence, can but impose by material necessity a partial and fragmentary, growing bit by bit, political interdependence which is reluctantly and hatefully accepted, because it runs against the grain of nature as long as nations live on the assumption of their full political autonomy. In the framework and against the background of that assumed full political autonomy of nations, an essentially economic interdependence can but exasperate the rival needs and pride of nations; and the industrial progress only accelerates the process . . .

Justification for the long citation from Maritain is seen in the logical and coherent presentation of the problem of and dangers in achieving the world common good. He thus shows that what can and should be a motive for uniting the world more closely is also the very cause, at least indirect cause, for the dividedness found in the modern world. Material growth simply has gone ahead of intellectual and moral advancement, leaving in its wake an economic interdependence, that is, the story of political autonomy or fragmentation with an ever-growing economic unification.

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amidst conflict. 12

In his appeal for world justice according to the "mind of St. Thomas", Robert Hutchins stresses the purity of appeal in the concept of world state. He writes:

The motion towards world government is that motion in our time which carries with most purity an appeal to the aspirations of men for peace and justice. It is the best means by which the divinely sanctioned institutions of law and government can be used to improve the temporal lot of mankind. According to the mind of St. Thomas, only the world state can be a perfect community. 13

Hutchins is one who regards the world state as a necessary condition for a lasting world peace. Thus in a true scholastic fashion he considers the world state as the only "modern" state that can be a perfect society, since in these days no national state is any longer in a position to achieve with surety world peace either for itself or for its neighbors.

From the other side of the earth, India, N. P. Ranga voices a fear in connection with some factors of the


world common good which he figures will be forgotten in the
East-West struggle. He refers specifically to colonial peo-
pies and colored peoples who may be forced to suffer social
indignities in the name of "non-interference" in internal
matters of any given nation in a world federation. He
states:

There is active fear that the present U.N.
doctrine of non-interference in the internal
affairs of any nation and its dependencies
is likely to militate against the liberation
of colonial peoples and the emancipation of
the coloured peoples in the Western countries
from their various disabilities and enforced
social inequalities. It must be realized
that as long as racial, colour, and religi-
ous discriminations and disabilities are
allowed to prevail in many countries under
the cover of sovereignty, they will always
be forces and movements in many other coun-
tries who will be anxious to go to their
rescue and any world government based on
the rock of non-interference in the internal
affairs of countries will be confronted by
the irresistible and irrepressible pressure
from all such forces of social revolution.
There are unresolved conflicts of interests
between the developed and under-developed
peoples and countries. It is true that a
humanitarian approach is being made by the
One-World conscious nations towards their
problems but so far not even the fringe of
the issue has come to be touched. 

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14 N. G. Ranga, Statement of the K.L.P. of India
submitted to the Conference of Parliamentarians on World
Government to be held in London in 1954, New Delhi, Bharat
Krishihar Lok Party, 1954, p. 1-2. See also another Indian
S. Radhakrishnan, Is This Peace?, Bombay, Hind Kitabs, 1945.
Fremont Rider voices on the contrary a fear of interference
in national affairs, yet making allowance for freedom from
colonialism. Cf. his The Great Dilemma of World Organization,
To those peoples of the world who have a personal and not merely a history book acquaintance with colonialism the prime factor of the common good appears to be their own freedom and autonomy. Even from a purely philosophical viewpoint it is quite understandable why colonial areas may wish to see their freedom granted prior to the formation of some type of world federation, lest this very world state, into which the "mother country" had entered, be a cause or excuse for delaying or even denying freedom to colonial areas. It is certainly more desirable to enter the world state as an equal partner with the rest of the federants than to come into the world organization as an appendage of a larger country, which perhaps has left much undone in the way of granting equal suffrage or proportionate and just representation in the national legislature or assembly. For these reasons the prominent citizens of colonial areas may use delaying tactics against the formation of a world state, or at least insist that no world state worthy of the name can be formed until colonialism has been completely obliterated.

New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1946, p. 77.
b. Geographical Considerations

To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.15

This classical statement of Alexander Hamilton was made at a period of history when these "unconnected sovereignties" were several days apart on horseback or stagecoach. Yet even in his day they were still so close to one another as to be on the verge of war at times. In the twentieth century the ideas of Alexander Hamilton are even more applicable to current situations than they were in the eighteenth century. Leland Goodrich comments:

It seems evident a world which can be circumnavigated by a jet-propelled plane in two days ... and which according to scientists has in the atomic bomb an instrument of destruction against which there is no defense, should be subject to one common government possessing the authority to deal effectively with the one common good ... 16

Actually, mid-twentieth century technological changes in transportation and communication "have transformed the

15 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Papers, No. 6, New York, Modern Library, 1941, p. 27.

world from relatively independent, discrete localities into a congeries of interacting regional communities and a single world community. Each new edition of the world-serving airlines' timetable puts further emphasis on the fact that we are living in a real world community and each few months gives indication of a greater closeness of any one part of the world with the rest of the world. Transportationwise the world is actually or at least potentially one community at the present writing (1961). Yet despite this new "geographic" solidarity men continue to try to get along without any one law to cover this "newly resulted" world neighborhood. One can call it "newly resulted" community for little if anything has been done deliberately to create a world community. It has been simply the outgrowth of technical progress in the fields of communication and transportation and not a designedly planned procedure. This fact prevents some people from recognizing its existence and continuing to talk and act as though the world were a community of truly sovereign and independent nations in practice as well as in theory.


Philip S. Moore, Catholic priest, professor, academic dean at the University of Notre Dame, considers the danger of unconnected sovereignties in one neighborhood as a serious problem to be seen in the light of a sound political philosophy. He writes:

I believe in world federalism because I know that sound political philosophy requires that whenever an autonomous political unity is no longer able to maintain the peace of its citizens because of equally autonomous political unities coming into conflict with it, then it must join in a larger unity which reduces or removes the causes of conflict. I know, furthermore, that historically this principle of sound political philosophy has been applied in practice. Today the autonomous political unities are the nations or nation states. No one of them can assure the peace of its citizens as long as all cling jealously to the so-called right to settle differences among them by resort to war, and therefore, the nation states must enter into a world-wide political unity. I know moreover that insisting on this so-called right to wage war in the name of national sovereignty is a false and perverted concept of the sovereignty of an autonomous political unity. 19

Emery Reves, an ardent advocate of a world state, literally attacks the idea of what he calls the nation-feudalism of modern times. He insists that the world in which we now live is Copernican, but the political and social systems according to which we live are Ptolemaic.

his The Great Rehearsal, New York, The Viking Press, pp. vii-x.

He rails against the "narrow-minded nationalism" whereby each separate area of the world regards itself in practice as the geographical center of the entire earth, with all the vicious social implications of reducing the world as a whole to a sort of hopelessness and helplessness. Reves writes with such vigor that he is impatient with those who fail to agree with him. His own words of condemnation of the nation-centric concept of the world are as follows:

There is not the slightest hope that we can possibly solve any of the vital problems of our generation until we rise above dogmatic nation-centric conceptions and realize that, in order to understand the political, economic, and social problems of this highly integrated and industrialized world, we have to shift our standpoint and see all the nations and national matters in motion, in their interrelated functions, rotating according to the same laws without any fixed points created by our own imagination for our own convenience.

With far more patience, but with no less vigor

Norman Cousins addressed himself to the "geographical problem of the shrinking world". He writes:

One might have supposed that the sudden liberation of the greatest and potentially


\[\text{21 Ibid., p. 29. Cf. also Alfred C. Ewing, The Individual, the State and World Government, New York, Macmillan, 1947, passim.}\]
most cataclysmic force known on earth would have touched off a great awakening of the human will and conscience in the cause of survival. One might have supposed that the need for a world federation would have risen over the earth like the sun itself, for nothing short of a world federation could have kept expanding nations from colliding inside a shrinking world.22

Mr. Cousins is among those who regard a world federation as a necessary condition for a safe and lasting world peace. He regards the federal plan as the one which should make the world "safe for diversity".

Bertrand Russell, a well known advocate of a world state, maintains that the arguments against a world state today are the same as would have been used against the creation of the national state centuries past. Along with the human need to unite with fellow men, there seems to be an almost innate conservatism about union of one's political authority with that of the neighbors living in the next geographical area. Russell declares:

The very same reasons which existed for the creation of national governments exists now for the creation of an international government, and all the arguments against international government are the very same that could have been urged by turbulent barons in the fifteenth century against

the power of centralized national government. 23

The problem of union with a neighboring sovereign has been bandied about in modern times by both the forces of opposition to world authority and those who advocated a world state. It is essentially the same problem faced by the founding fathers of the United States, Canada, Australia or any other modern federation of formerly independent or semi-independent political units. A world filled with nationalists or those with similar attitudes makes it excessively easy to discover reasons why this political unit should not unite with the one next to it. An acute political observer capable of prescinding in his own considerations from the prejudices of nationalism and other similar attitudes can easily see the folly of this frequent popular type of reasoning. Rarely is there found a given population which is not eager for peace with the next-door national populace, but they are often, due to these popular nationalistic attitudes, confused as to how this peace is to be achieved. Rarely is the majority willing to take the steps that will actually secure peace in a lasting fashion. Limited dealings with a neighboring nation-state is often

viewed with deep pride and sense of major achievement, when in reality the accomplishment is all too little. In the economic field, this is often popular. Wynner and Lloyd comment:

One assumption of the present period is that the world does not need political organization, but merely economic bureaus or controls. This is the economic approach to peace, advanced by many because it looks easier of accomplishment. Economic unions, bureaus and agreements, negotiated through international conventions, adhered to by various groups of nations, are already functioning. The most successful of these is the Universal Postal Union. These international bodies, however, are not coordinated. . . Those who oppose the exclusively economic approach to peace insist that popular consent is necessary to set up even these economic unions or controls. The exercise of such popular control requires political machinery. 24

Many political thinkers, however, are convinced that economic union and controls will in very many instances lead to political union and political controls.

In acquiescing to the merging of two or more sovereignties into one political authority it is becoming less and less important from the geographical standpoint to say what two or what groups will merge. While some have favored regional unions within a world union or in preparation for a world union, the most vigorous proponents of

grouped unions have stressed ideological factors. Such is the plan of Federal Union, Inc., Clarence Streit's plan, which has primarily an ideological basis. In practice, however, the Communist bloc of nations has approached such a union, although with no real thought of democracy nor actually with any regular government over the whole Communist group of nations. Regional planners also often insist that regional problems, not easily handled by a central government, are the justification for their regional groupings. Others find in regional planning a means of keeping out the politically immature nations. Still others, usually white people, fear ultimate domination by the non-white races if the nations were brought into a universal federation in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, some planners of world peace fear the omission of any nation. Wynner and Lloyd offer the following argument:

Some planners insist, whenever world organization is established, that all nations must be eligible to membership on equal terms. They are convinced that in a world technically and scientifically integrated, any nation potentially dangerous within the organization would be infinitely more dangerous if left outside of it. Disruptive and peace-menacing tendencies would be counteracted more easily within the world organization where grievances could be aired and constructive solutions sought.

The current argument of many who now favor bringing into the United Nations the present non-members (1961) is similar to this one cited by Wynner and Lloyd for a universal world political organization. It is notably like the reasonings of the leaders of India (1961) for the entrance of Communist China into the U. N. It seems to the minds of many people to be a nullification of the principle of "international punishment" meted out to those nations that have caused a recent disturbance to world peace. The whole line of argumentation runs counter to those who contend that nations as such can effectively be punished. The universalist in world politics, on the other hand, will insistently maintain that no nation, as a nation, can be effectively punished; nor even if this punishment were truly possible could it be done morally, since many innocent persons would suffer, and the guilty ones, who are usually not many more than the rulers, in most cases can hide and escape.

Thus a problem that began with the growing "geographic proximity" of everywhere in the world with everywhere else in the world brings us, especially in modern times, to the problem of the legal connection of everywhere with everywhere else in the world. The crux of the whole problem is not merely the absence of law in the world, for there is plenty of law within every nation of this earth, but instead,
the absence of law among the nations of this earth. Placing
the whole world in the legal control of all the people of
the world - in about the same sense the whole United States
or Canada is in the limited legal control of the whole pop­
ulation - will bring the world positively no closer to uto­
pia but certainly a bit closer to world peace. Thus a legal
question that may have been rather impractical and surely
labeled utopian in past generations, has become eminently
practical today and the world's "number one" legal problem.

2. A Fear of Common Destruction

Prophets of doom were saying at the conclusion of
the first World War that the next war would most likely be
the one that would end the then-known western civilization
due to the ever increasing destructiveness of the weapons.
This was said even though most of them had not even dreams
of an absolute weapon such as the hydrogen bomb or whatever
worse weapon the ensuing generation is able to produce.
The same scare tactics are being repeated today, with per­
haps more success, and certainly with more reasonableness
in the threat. In fact, the fear tactics have become one
of the most usual procedures to alert people to the impend­
ing and almost certain danger that lies before us all. Thus
with the thought of a humanitarian interest in others as
well as that of self-preservation, the advocates of world government present their arguments to the world with the solution of a world state to which, they usually say, there is no alternative.

a. A Humanitarian Interest in Mankind

It seems unfortunate at times that man will be touched by fear, when all other motives seem to leave him unmoved. Nearly every religious-orientated mind is aware of how the fear of hell has on occasions procured activity or caused people to refrain from acting when the love of God in a given instance proved to be an insufficient motive, although in itself, it should be much greater. The recitation of the fear motive is so tempting that nearly every advocate of world organization of any sort uses it, and some seem to use little else. In fact it is refreshing to find an author advocating the world state who puts most of his stress on other motives. However, these have already been considered in the section dealing with the World Common Good.

Since at the present writing (1961) only one nation has suffered the tremendous horrors with all the aftermath of nuclear destruction, it is fair to let speak first a representative of that nation, a Japanese advocate of world
PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS FAVORING A WORLD STATE

federation. He writes:

Could we prohibit practically certain kinds of arms only through inter-state or inter-national agreements? Could we assure that no nation-state will take out of the shelves all the destructive arms even if we could agree to use only less destructive weapons? The only way to abolish certain arms is to abolish wars themselves. The status of world anarchy should be abolished at this historical moment when weapons have reached their utmost degree of development; the use thereof must also cause self-destruction. The question is not a mere declaration against war or destructive arms but to find the means and carry it out.

It is interesting to note Morikatsu Inagaki's stress on the historical moment for the abolition of war by abolishing international anarchy. Regardless of the scientific knowledge this author may or may not have, scientists now declare that we have reached that historical moment when the nuclear weapons that exterminate one nation by fire and disintegration will shortly afterwards exterminate also the users by poisoning them. Thus, such weapons are self-destroying even if their victims have neither plans nor a chance for revenge. Consequently, common plans for massive retaliation are brought to the level of academic discussion.

From the September 8, 1959 meeting of the Parliamentarians at Royan, France we have the Charter of Versailles, which is reported in the *World Federalist* and begins as follows:

The point has been reached in human history when the peoples, parliaments, and governments of the world, must abolish the evil of war, fraught as that evil is with the possibility of the total extinction of the human race.

The peoples, parliaments, and governments of the world must decide to set up a World Authority charged with the responsibility of maintaining permanent peace. 27

Of course, to these parliamentarians world authority really means world government and all the things implied in this concept, which should prevent the mononuclear World War III that promises to exterminate most, perhaps even all, human beings and annihilate civilization as we know it. Many world federalists feel that this limitless disaster is almost upon us and that the clock of human destiny stands near the zero hour. 28 Most world federalists also feel


there is little time to dally with palliatives such as the United Nations, any longer than is absolutely necessary, because as long as the present nation-state system is left basically untouched, anarchy, the only negative cause of war, also remains basically untouched, even if on occasions slightly altered.

In a chapter called "Death Unlimited" the businessman world federalist, Maxwell Stanley writes:

The destructiveness of the war in the Nuclear Age as compared to that of World War II is so great as to elude the comprehension of our finite minds. It is as if the flood waters of the Mississippi River were compared to the flow of a fire hose. Nuclear weapons are so powerful that responsible political and scientific leaders candidly admit wholesale use of them would destroy much of the civilized world. . . . The power of thermonuclear weapons is so great that new yardsticks are needed to measure their destruction. 29


C. Maxwell Stanley, Waging Peace, New York,
With a complicated listing of numbers and charts Stanley goes on to show that the destructive power of one modern hydrogen bomb (1956) would have greater destroying power than ten times the total TNT load in bombs dropped on Germany during the Second World War.\(^3^0\)

Substantially the same concept is reiterated by an American public official, Thomas K. Finletter, former United States Air Force Secretary:

There seems to be almost no doubt but that the known weapons of today and the future may well, unless controlled, destroy the United States. Applied science for destruction is wholly out of hand, it is like a wild tiger running about the city streets.\(^3^1\)

In every case these authors conclude their arguments by declaring the necessity of a world federation to control these forces of destruction. Sometimes language less formidable that "world state" or "world federation" is employed, like "international authority", "world law", or "international..."
peace organization).

The impatient and logical crusader for world government, Emery Reves, draws a useful distinction concerning the attitudes or approach to these terribly lethal weapons. He fears not the weapon but the one who possesses it. Reves declares:

> What does this mean? It means that no atomic bomb, no weapon that the genius of man can conceive is dangerous in itself. Weapons only become "dangerous" when they are in the hands of sovereign states other than one's own. It follows that the ultimate source of danger is not atomic energy, but the sovereign nation-state. The problem is not technical, it is purely political.\(^{32}\)

Reves's ideas harken back to the danger of "unconnected sovereignties" living in the same neighborhood, that is, the shrinking world of today (1961).

Resorting again to calculations concerning destructiveness of hydrogen bombs and nerve gases, a man of the legal profession, Louis Nizer, declares before an assemblage of the Bronx Bar Association:

> Indeed, we have had to coin the word megaton to measure a million tons of TNT power. The fallout of one such ten megaton bomb could extend to 100,000 square miles - twice the area of the state of New York. We have no alternative! . . . Even this is only the

beginning of the obliterating power which now exists. There are . . . nerve gases, which can destroy anything they touch in forty-five seconds and they are invisible and unstoppable. 33

Thus, the lawyer’s approach differs not much from that of the interested businessman or the crusader.

Also in agreement with the basic proposition of world government advocates is the professor and political scientist who regards the world state as a necessary condition for world peace. Frederick L. Schuman writes:

The only other available means of achieving a goal which now deserves to be regarded as the sine qua non of survival is the application to the world community of those unique principles of governance formulated most impressively by the Founding Fathers of the United States and long since applied in many areas of the British Commonwealth . . . More recent pleas for federalism . . . have been followed . . . by widespread appeals from physicists, publicists, political scientists and even a few rare politicians, for steps to establish a world federal government as the only visible alternative to mass suicide. 34

The political scientist and philosopher par excellence of world government, Mortimer J. Adler, takes pains


to show why the world state is a *sine qua non* for true and lasting world peace. While many political scientists assume that the world state is a necessary condition for world peace, few make any elaborate attempt to prove it. Dr. Adler explains:

Individual men cannot live without living together, and they cannot live together in a state of war, actual or potential. States or nations, because each is much more self-sufficing than any individual man, can manage to live - even for fairly long periods - without living together in peace. But they are never so self-sufficient that they can manage to live without living together at war.

'Living together at war!' That strange and wonderful phrase tells the whole of the tensions and frustrations which anarchy and sovereignty have bestowed upon man's corporate life. It also reveals anarchy - and with it sovereignty - to be the only cause of war among men who must try to live together.\(^3^5\)

Of course, when referring to anarchy as the only cause of war, Adler means the only negative cause of war - negative insofar as anarchy means the absence of a government including under itself all of a given area desirous of being at peace with all other portions of the same given area. This, of course, makes government to be the cause of peace for the world. The positive causes of war are numerous and it is of no special purpose here to enumerate them, even the very

common ones. Suffice it to say that these are generally controlled, not abolished, by civil government. Selfishness will exist as long as men exist, and certain phases of it will have to be controlled by government as long as there are men, and this includes even international selfishness. For these reasons Adler regards world government as a necessary condition for world political peace.

Less philosophical and more popular in his approach Josué de Castro holds that we are in history at the "point of no return". He declares:

At the present moment in history, there is no longer any alternative to peace, said a contemporary philosopher, and he was right. Peace today is a true historical imperative, which no one can escape. This is equally true whether peace among men is achieved by the definitive elimination of war, or imposed upon men by war with its arms of mass destruction - the peace of a gigantic cemetery which may be the final state of our planet, depopulated and swathed in the mortal silence of eternity. . . . and I firmly believe that peace among men is an objective within the scope of human resources, and not an impossible utopia.36

These world federalist authors write with a sincerity and conviction about the lack of further alternatives outside of totally destructive war and total peace, total in the extensive sense of including all nations, and not total in

the intensive sense of seeking the millenium or a utopia.

Again from the legal profession we hear from the former dean of the Law School of Syracuse University (New York), Paul Shipman Andrews, who is seeking to enlist the support of all neutrals for peace from the president of Ireland to Pope John XXIII. Andrews writes a truism heard periodically:

... almost certainly the present arms race, unless stopped, will, like all other arms races in history, end in the war it seeks to postpone, or avert. Misjudgment of a leader or subordinate, a small war exploding into the unwanted great one, sheer accident, or when many nations possess nuclear weapons, the recklessness of some small dictator could touch off a Great War. 37

Like other eager world federalists, Paul S. Andrews feels we have little time for experimentation. He continues:

We cannot choose today between reasonable security and an experiment in strengthening the United Nations. No such choice is open. No nation, however strong, has any security against war. Our choice, rather, is between almost total danger and total peace. If we choose to drift, the drift is towards war. 38

Thus, even the sedate members of the legal profession can be impatient in regard to the most prominent question today facing political scientists: the question of world

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38 Ibid. p. 5.
peace in view of absolute weapons. If the impatient ones are to be the true prophets, there will not be anyone around even to listen to the words, "I told you so". If there is an alternative to total war and total peace, these would-be prophets may either be cheerfully forgotten or labeled "starry-eyed, impatient internationalists". In any case, the conviction that there is no choice between total peace and total war is sufficient to motivate Paul Shipman Andrews into spending the years of his retirement in working eagerly for world peace.

Not all, however, who are truly convinced of the tremendous danger in which the world lives, are at every moment crusaders for a world government. Pope Pius XII who spoke calmly and philosophically to the Rome assembly of the World Movement for World Federal Government on April 6, 1951 in favor of a world federation to maintain peace, does not in his Easter message of 1954 call for the formation of a world state, even though he sees no peace in reciprocal terror.

Here, in place of serene joy, whose secret was revealed by Christ Himself, there is year by year a mounting anxiety and, one might say, trepidation on the part of the peoples of the world by reason of their fear of a third world conflict and of a dreadful future, placed at the mercy of
new destructive arms of unprecedented violence... capable of bringing about... the total extermination of all animal and vegetable life and of all the works of man over vaster regions... 39

Thus men from all walks of life are convinced of the grave and constant danger in which the entire population of the world now lives, and many are sufficiently convinced that they take action toward the formation of a world state. And the list of those who tell in various ways of the horrors of total war is legion; consequently that alone could be the subject matter of an entire study. However, our aim is to get[ samplings ] of each of the arguments offered in favor of the world state, and not merely to catalogue all the arguments available.

The last argument to be cited here is from a lawyer and author, a prominent world federalist, who addressed the members of the American Philosophical Society in April, 1953. Grenville Clark in speaking of armaments costs for that year begins:

The annual cost is some 110 billion dollars, which represents nearly one-eighth of the world's gross product. There is no pause in the creation of new and appalling weapons. In these conditions, mutual fears and tensions are naturally so great as to render negotiation on specific issues almost impossible... effective plans for disarmament.

must be the fundamental feature. All else I contend, must be subordinate to and dependent upon the achievement of disarmament. When this is generally realized, we shall, I believe, progress rapidly to a world settlement and a world of law and order.40

In this same discourse to the philosophers Clark goes on to show how the contemplated bomb supply of the United States would be capable of killing hundreds of millions of people. Although this speech does not conclude by asserting that the world state is a necessary condition for world peace, Clark in practice holds that, as can be seen in the whole theme of World Peace Through World Law41 of which he is the coauthor with Louis Sohn.

Those advocates of world government who indulge in the use of discussing impending disaster from the hydrogen bomb always stress the real possibility of having it controlled by a world government. The whole problem is sometimes approached with the stress on world law and little mention of world government, yet they all know there will be no world law without world government. Here we turn to study the arguments and attitudes of those who give the necessity of having world law as their chief reason for their advocacy of world government.

40Grenville Clark, "Disarmament and Genuine Peace", The Federalist, June, 1953, p. 11.
b. World Law

The discussion of world law is inexorably bound up with the problems of world order, justice, and government. In the case of many authors, it is only a question of which receives the greater stress. In most world federalist literature dealing with the question of world law there is the persistent concept that world law must be directly applicable and enforceable upon individuals. This may be due in part to the thesis that states are intrinsically uncoercible. Of course, if the world state or even an international organization needs to enforce its laws or decrees only against individuals instead of against states, the enforcement problem certainly becomes less. In the thinking of most federalists the practical political scientist is faced with the stiff task of arranging for a tremendous exchange - substituting the control of individuals for that of the internationalists' fumbling control of states, even if the future world state has in some way to depend upon the competent political entities within the federation for the successful operation of world government. The task is


43 Inis Claude, Jr. discusses this problem from an internationalist's viewpoint in his Swords into Plowshares, New York, Random House, 1959, pp. 430-431.
gigantic, but the advocates of world government see no escape, especially in view of the thesis that the world state is a necessary condition for a lasting world peace enforced by a world law.

Vernon Nash, an organizational pioneer in the world federalist movement in the United States, writes:

The logical brief for world government can be summed up in the length of a night-letter telegram: Our need for government on the world level is exactly the same as our need for government in cities, counties, states and nations . . .

The two words, law and order, are commonly tied together so closely in one phrase as almost to constitute a single compound word. Without enforced law anarchy prevails, and anarchy chronically produces mass violence. We have ended general lawlessness in human relationships except at the international level.  

Like other world federalists Nash sees world law as being necessary for world order and peace. Of course, he does not subscribe to the thesis that world law can be had without a world government. The two are inextricably bound up in his thinking as well as in that of all other world federalists.  

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45Cf. J. L. Duncan, "World Federation as a Basis For
The "final word" among world federalists (1961) on the question of obtaining world peace by means of world law has been prepared by two prominent and dedicated attorneys in the movement, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, who have taken the United Nations Charter paragraph by paragraph and have with parallel columns shown how it would have to be revised, if at all, to read as a world constitution with commentaries on the legal implications of the given section of the Charter as well as the legal implications of their proposed revision. In the section on "underlying principles" Grenville Clark writes:

It is futile to expect genuine peace until there is put into effect an effective system of enforceable world law in the limited field of war prevention, this implies the adoption of a world-wide basis of the measures and institutions which the experience of centuries has shown to be essential for the maintenance of law and order, namely, clearly stated law against violence, courts to interpret and apply that law and police to enforce it. All else, we conceive, depends upon the acceptance of this approach. . . . World law against international violence must be explicitly stated in constitutional and statutory form and must, under appropriate penalties, forbid the use of force by any nation against any other for any cause whatever, save only in self defense. . . . World law. . . . should apply to all individual persons in the world as well as to all the nations - to the end that in case

Enduring Peace", Saturday Night, 59, November 13, 1943, pp. 16-17; also I. Beverly Lake, "World Peace and World Government", Congressional Record, 93, November 20, 1947, A4583-86.
of violations by individuals the world law could be invoked directly against them without the necessity of indicting a whole nation or group of nations. Clark continues to speak of the world legislature and a world executive authority to enforce and administer the world law. He regards his whole program as moderately realistic and not in any case as being futile. Being a practicing attorney, he centers all his concepts around the one concept of law, and in this case, world law.

The businessman advocate of a rule of world law places a little less stress on law itself; instead he stresses the anarchy aspect, or the absence of law and government. In a chapter called "World Facts", Maxwell Stanley writes:

We live in a world of anarchy; that is, a situation in which there is no rule of law with respect to affairs between nations. In a condition of anarchy, each nation attempts to exert complete control over its affairs and claims the right to make final decisions in all matters respecting its contracts with other nations.

Anarchy has long since been eliminated in cities, states, and nations - in short, in every community except the world community. Within nations, individuals and states are no longer allowed to settle their disputes by force. Without exception, all

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46 Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, op. cit., p. xi-xii; a very similar volume has been prepared by John Mac Laurin, The United Nations and Power Politics, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1952.

nations have established a legal framework for enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws which are binding on their citizens. Even the most backward and tyrannical nations have some machinery for maintaining law and order within their borders... Nevertheless we have world anarchy, for a rule of law has not been created on an international basis.48

Nearly all world government advocates who write at any length have a few paragraphs and sometimes many pages on the question of world anarchy. But Emery Reves, the impatient logician of world government, seeks to give some explanation on this topic. He writes:

Human society and human evolution, a dynamic phenomenon par excellence, can never be mastered by static means. Treaties are essentially static instruments. Law is essentially a dynamic instrument. Whenever we have applied the method of law to human relationships, it has resulted in peace.49

Opponents of world government in general and of Reves in particular will cite the excessively large number of casualties in civil wars, and compare this number to international wars, and then proceed to declare the near uselessness of uniting political units of diverse interests.

49 Emery Reves, op.cit., p. 148-149.
However, a careful glance at history will show that casualty lists of civil wars while often excessively large are not always so. Then, a further look at history will show the great civil wars to be the exception and not the rule in the history of wars in general. Minor civil wars of frequent occurrence in the "banana areas" certainly might outnumber international wars, but certainly not exceed them in overall damage. Furthermore, the careful advocate of world government merely insists that the world state is only a necessary condition for world peace; it is certainly not the sufficient condition for it. Yet many of the opposition camp who pretend to be philosophical about the problem are quick to accuse the world governmentalists of being unrealistic, when in reality the opposition camp itself is the one in error by presuming the truth of the converse of the proposition held by the careful world federalists, which again is simply: the world state is a necessary condition for world peace.

Jacques Maritain, probably more noted as a philosopher than as a political writer, takes up also the philosophical problem of the necessity of a world political society. He declares:

As concerns the second main obstacle to the establishment of a lasting peace, namely the present state of inorganization of the world, well, here we are getting
to the core of the problem we have to discuss.

If we place ourselves in the perspective of national necessities, neglecting for a moment the factual entanglements of history, and if we transfer ourselves to the final conclusions made clear by the logical requirements of the issue, then we shall see how cogently the advocates of World Government, or of a one world politically organized, make out their case.

Suffice it briefly to recall the arguments they have developed to substantiate their contention. 50

Like other political philosophers, Maritain, stresses the danger of not having law, or inorganization, as he labels it. Stringfellow Barr continues in the same vein of thought:

... clearly the oldest political problem of all: how to find government for a community that lacked it, even if each fraction of the community already lived under a government of its own... Now it was nation-states, not villages, that were governed fractions of an ungoverned community. What was terribly new about the problem was that this time, the community was world-wide, bound together for weal or woe by modern science, modern technology, and the clamoring needs of modern industry. 51


Barr puts an interesting and necessary stress on the "gov­erned fractions of the ungoverned community", for often people will retort that the world is full of law and we cer­tainly have so many unkept ones now that it is useless to add new laws. Georges Clemenceau is accused of having made a remark in this vein about Wilson's Fourteen Points: "God gave us the Ten Commandments and man has broken all of them; Wilson gives us the Fourteen Points. We shall see," While such quips may smack of being clever, they can often mislead the unthinking. In the same trend of thought and empha­sizing the distinction made by Stringfellow Barr, Sir Adrian Boult writes:

It is inconceivable to me that people who accept quite naturally the rule of law within their own national frontiers and who would not dream of disobeying it, should offer so much derision to the idea that this world is one and indivisible, and that a rule of law is just as essential between nations as within it. The world has known the law of the jungle far too long. This has always been a blot on the human race, but today when science has the power to send our great globe itself into total ruin, the situation is fantastic, deplorable, and cries aloud for a remedy. Unfortunately, science has not only outstripped man's moral sense but also man's political thinking. 52

52 Sir Adrian Boult, "No Greater Cause", World Fed­eralist, Vol. 6, No. 4, November, 1959, p. 55. Emery Reves in op.cit., p. 121, puts this same idea very succinctly: There exists potential war whenever non-integrated social units of equal sovereignty come into contact.
Sir Adrian blames the shortsightedness of governments for preventing a world government from coming into existence.

Again on the question of comparing national and world laws, Wynner and Lloyd write:

At present, whenever local laws are broken by the individual, enforcement is exercised by local authorities; whenever national laws are broken, enforcement is carried out by the nation; in the same way whenever world laws are broken, the world government could proceed directly against the guilty individual without the interference of national governments.

Another advantage that coercion of individuals has over coercion of nations as a whole is that the individual can be protected against abuse by the government through guarantees embodied in a World Bill of Rights and can appeal through federal courts against injustice. But what protection is there for the individual when collective punishment has been decreed and enforced against his nation? Moreover, what appeal is open to nations against possible injustice after their cities have been laid waste, and their populations slaughtered?  

More than anyone else, the political scientist should see the place of world law in its proper perspective, no matter from what period of history he views it. James Warburg, speaking of the responsibility of citizens towards their world obligations, say:

We cannot exercise effective leadership so long as we act as if there were a body of enforceable supranational law, when no such body of law exists and when the so-called

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laws that do exist are unenforceable. We do the United Nations a disservice by treating it as if it were a world government. The alternative is to dedicate ourselves openly to the transformation of the United Nations into an organization that can enact world law and enforce it, meanwhile recognizing its limitations.54

Like others, Warburg cites the danger of make-believe: thinking we have a world law or a world government when actually we do not. With such a false concept, those who favor world government would cease to work for it, thinking that we already have it. Those of the opposition would redouble their opposition to the United Nations, falsely accusing it of being a world government, and therefore work for its downfall when they otherwise might at least be indifferent.

Morikatsu Inagaki demonstrates how the very concept of "other nationality" as most understand it, really implies anarchy, which cannot be transformed into a law-governed society, solely by the natural moral law. With unusual clarity and succinctness on the subject of world law and government, he writes:

Laws are made in one part of matter of common concern. A gregarious life of men becomes a governed community if there exist established laws. The relationship between you and people having other nationality and living in their country is a lawless

status called anarchy. You can change this status of anarchy into a governed community if you organize them into institutions which establish common laws in matters of more-than-domestic (or national) common concern. The greater part of matters which need laws will be regulated by domestic laws. Wars are the most important matter of more-than-domestic common concern and are eliminated between or among states of which people have established a common parliament to enact common (federal) laws at least in this most important matter called war. Moral law alone cannot transform anarchy into governed society neither on domestic nor on more-than-domestic (international or universal) level.

Again, on the inadequacy of the divine and natural law, which of course are more universal than any other law, Robert Hutchins writes as he stresses the necessity of positive law:

Political organization requires positive law. The political organization of the world community would require positive law on a world scale. It would require legislative, judicial, and executive organs to adopt, declare, and enforce the positive law of the world. This law would be necessary to regulate and control the sovereigns of extant states, who are exempt from the operation of the positive law of their states and who cannot be regulated and controlled by divine and natural law alone. These extant states, in the absence of positive law of the world, may be expected to act toward one another as individuals may be expected to act in the absence of positive law; they may be expected to break the peace.

55 Morikatsu Inagaki, op.cit., p. 3.
56 Robert Hutchins, op.cit., p. 14. For a further
Thus from all walks of life we find advocates of a world state, usually a world federal state, who approach the question from the aspect of the world's need to be governed by a law universal and comprehensive enough to maintain world peace and prevent, at least, wholesale atomic war. Some, no doubt, stress "world law" so much because they feel that the words sound less offensive than world government. Yet any discussion of world law brings one necessarily to world government and vice versa.

There has been no attempt to gather all opinions that approach the question of world state by showing the need of world law. Otherwise, the catalogue of authors would have been longer than it actually is. However, every effort has been made to obtain the opinions and methods of approach of the more prominent authors on this subject and likewise, one or more representative author of each method of approach.


B. Arguments Incidental to Man's Social Nature

Not all advocacy of world government is founded even remotely in the social nature of man. In such arguments we naturally have the least interest, although they must be given some consideration, if for no other reason than to disassociate them clearly and definitely from arguments allied to man's social nature.

The first of these considerations is one of personal aggrandizement, based on the personal egoism of one seeking to establish a world state, usually, however, by conquest. Alexander the Great was accused of this. So also have been the Romans, along with Genghis Khan, and more recently Napoleon Bonaparte. It must be admitted, however, that a world state begun by personal aggrandizement as the driving force, and thus founded on a human perversity, could conceivably be converted into a state that gradually becomes more rational and human in its outlook and its foundations. Such has happened in the case of national governments.

Mostly the Communists in recent times have been accused of aiming to form a world state of their own variety. The advocates of a democratic world state will

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For a careful discussion of this topic see the 686 page doctoral thesis prepared by Elloit R. Goodman,
often cite the efforts of the Communists and offer the more palatable alternative of a democratic world state, which is, at least, the lesser of two evils, to those who are ill disposed towards a world state. Advocates of a world federation use further the frightening aspect of a Communist world state, declaring that unless the advocates of democracy and freedom have a plan at least as enterprising as that of the Communists, there is reason to believe that the Communist plan will win over enough of the world and will capture the minds of enough people to be the plan for the world, while the forces of democracy and freedom will suffer defeat by default, having done too little and done it too late. Such an argument, obviously removed fundamentally from man's social nature, is yet an argument that may motivate some people. 59

The more an argument is founded on religion as such the farther removed it is from the social nature of

man, although the argument may surely have its appeal, and
be a real motivating force for many people. If perhaps not
from an exclusively religious motive, Pope Pius XII, cer­
tainly seeing the advantages that world peace could furnish
the Catholic Church, took the occasion on April 6, 1951, to
address a group of delegates to the fourth congress of the
World Movement for World Federal Government, putting his
sanctions and blessing on the movement. Pius XII said in
part to these delegates:

The Church desires peace, and thus applies
herself to the promotion of everything which,
within the framework of the divine order,
both natural and supernatural, contributes
to the securing of peace. Your movement,
gentlemen, dedicates itself to realizing
an effective political organization of the
world. Nothing is more in conformity with
the traditional doctrines of the Church,
nor better adapted to her teaching concern­
ing legitimate and illegitimate war, above
all, in the present circumstances. 60

Of course, the Pope's statement heartened Catholics who all
along felt that the World Federalist program was in full
conformity with Catholic social doctrine. Those Catholics
who continue to disagree justify themselves by the fact

60 Pope Pius XII, "Address to the Delegates of the
World Movement for World Federal Government", in L'Osser­
vatore Romano, Ar. 91, Num. 80, April 7, 1951, p. 1.
Translation mine from the original French. For Catholic
endorsement, rejoicing and commentaries on the stand of Pope
Pius XII, see Edward J. Conway, "Pius XII and World Feder­
ation", America, April 28, 1951, pp. 93-95.
that this is not an infallible pronouncement, feeling themselves free to accept or reject the social teachings of the Church.

As can be expected, Catholics and sometimes members of other religious persuasions will give endorsement to what the Pope says, or to what they like to think their Church should say on a given social question. Monsignor J. R. Hillenbrand has done this very thing, encouraging priests to favor the World Federalist cause.  

Members of the Quaker church have long been known for their pacifist attitudes. Of this religious persuasion Benjamin Seaver writes after showing the connections between religion and world peace:

Inner peace, arising as it does from a true relationship between God and man, is certainly a central theme of worship . . . the world has never needed an active ministry of reconciliation as much as it does today . . . on a world scale this means that world peace is world order and security commanded by the laws of a world government.  

Although many religious-minded people, including the fanatics, have used the Scriptures to "prove" almost


62Cf. Three Definitions of Peace, Philadelphia, Friends Peace Committee, pp. 3-5. This is a leaflet reprinted from the Friend of April 17, 1952.
anything, apparently none as yet have resorted to using the Bible as a direct religious proof for a world state. At most, we find people who may accept or reject the mondialization idea as being in conformity or not in conformity with their religious philosophy as they interpret it. Prior to the April 6, 1951 pronouncement of Pope Pius XII, some Catholics were violently and openly opposed to the concept of a world federation. Yet at this same historical period, also in the eastern part of the United States, Thomas Mahoney, an attorney, sometime president of the Catholic Association for International Peace, issued a booklet entitled Parallel Thinking, Catholic and Federalist, Upon the Organization of the World for Peace. Without attempts at argumentation the author parallels the United World Federalist policy with that of leading Catholic thinkers such as the Fathers and Doctors and Popes of the Church. The similarities are both remarkable and sensational.

Obviously, in itself it should make no difference if the various religions speak out in favor of world federation or any other form of world state, or if they simply keep

63 Cf. the Baltimore edition of the Catholic Review, February 23, 1951, p.3.

64 Boston, private printing, 10 State Street, zone 9, 1950. Henrique de Pinheiro goes so far as to discuss the question of Church and State in a world state. He insists
silence on the subject. The question is a political one and has religious implications only in so far as morality is concerned. Religions, Catholicism especially, have, as they certainly should, spoken through the mouthpiece of their theologians on the morality problems of all political levels, whether it be the feudal, national, or international. Apparently many feel they have offered the final word to be given when they appear with a disquisition on the morality of the political community on the international level. Yet, because of its newness in political science and philosophy, little has been said by 1961 about moral problems of the political community on the world level. These problems will be diverse since the international community does not itself result in a state or a government, while the world community certainly should result in a state, given enough time. Moral theologians will surely have to consider these differences sometime in the future.

In practice, however, since many do see the world state problem, rightly or wrongly, in the light of their

There should be religious freedom, a secular state, and recognition of the Holy See. Cf. his The World State, Rio de Janeiro, Grafico Olimpic, 1944, pp. 203-205.

Cf. for example, Carlos P. Romulo, "The Natural Law and International Law", in Natural Law Institute Proceedings, Vol. 3, Edward F. Barrett, editor, South Bend, University of Notre Dame Press, 1952, or any of the other articles in the five volumes of this series.
religion, they are influenced by what they think their religion suggests or even dictates in these matters. Thus many Catholic world federalists were distressed at what they considered to be the reactionary attitude of their coreligionists. With a spirit of joy and relief Edward J. Conway, a Jesuit, of the Creighton University of Omaha, Nebraska, wrote shortly after the papal pronouncement of April 6, 1951 which seemed to approve the world federalist concept:

That solemn approbation should end once and for all the argument as to whether a Catholic can be a Federalist. Whether it inspires Catholics to work actively in the federalist movement, remains, as I remarked once before 'to be seen'. For my part, I cannot recall a more forthright papal endorsement of any movement, either Catholic, or, as this happens to be, non-sectarian.

Some Catholics, of course, are already saying that the Pope approved only the general idea of a far-in-the-future world state, not any concrete program for its proximate realization. None but the nationalist diehards would deny that he was talking on April 6 to a definite group with a definite, even though not detailed, program. The Pope implied clearly enough, it seems to me, that the world political organization must be realized as rapidly as possible 'if for no other reason than to put a stop to the armament race' - the current race, not one of the problematical future.66

As in all other phases of the attitudes of various groups, classes, and professions, an entire full length

66 "Pope Pius XII and World Federation", America, April 28, 1951, p. 94.
study could be prepared concerning the opinions and reasons of the spokesmen for various religions for and against a world state. While the author of this treatise regards the question as not being at all basically a religious one, he has allowed himself the indiscretion perhaps of being pragmatic about the whole matter to the extent of examining some opinions and discussions of prominent representatives of religions, which discussions, if not ultimately based on religion, are certainly connected with it.

This last citation is taken from a purveyor of high school civics textbooks. He compares the religious concept of death and resurrection to the "death" of a nation by loss of sovereignty, only to have new life in a world state.

Frank Abbott Magruder writes:

Every nation refused to surrender itself into a union of the whole. They saved their lives and they lost them. They ran against that law of the Kingdom deeply imbedded in the moral universe: 'Whosoever shall save his life, shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life . . . shall save it'. The only possible way to find life is to lose it in something higher than itself; then it comes back again.67

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CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL NATURE OF MAN AS THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS OF A WORLD STATE

To analyze world government is to analyze implicitly the nature of man and the purpose of society, for while universality in the sheer interest of large-scale coordination may provide more efficiency, it is a superficial end in itself.\(^1\)

Unless we wish to parade a "purposiveness without a purpose", it must be admitted that every human society must be truly and objectively rooted in the nature and end of man, for, apart from man, what meaning does any society have? This is surely a cardinal principle of all scholastic social and political thought. Local, national, international and therefore even a world political community must be based firmly and ultimately on the nature of man. This world political community is the logical terminus in the natural order of the basic social principle enunciated by both medieval and modern scholastic political philosophers. It is the purpose of the last chapter of this study to see this world political community in the light of its metaphysical foundations.

According to the principles of scholastic social philosophy the individual, the family, and all levels of political organization form a complete and unified social

structure. In each area of human endeavor, be it the social, political, or familial, the same fundamental human and social tendencies of mankind are in the process of development.

For this reason St. Thomas describes man as *animal naturaliter socialis*.

Therefore in the total social order of mankind we must include each and every natural society, beginning with the family up to the world state, each of these being a "manifestation of the same basic social tendencies intrinsic to human nature itself" and even to man's final destiny. Pope Pius XII insists that all forms of progress must be seen in the light of both man's nature and his destiny. He writes, discussing this same world community:

> And finally, perhaps it is precisely because of technological progress that this mingling of men of different nations has awakened the faith, implanted in the hearts and souls of individuals, in a higher community of men, willed by the Creator and rooted in the unity of their common origin, nature and final destiny. These and other similar considerations show that advance towards establishing a community of people does not look as to a unique and ultimate norm, to the will of the state, but rather to nature, to the Creator.

> The right to existence, the right to respect from others and to one's good name, the right to one's own culture and national character, the right to develop oneself . . .

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2 *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 96, a. 4.

and other rights are exigencies of the law of nations, dictated by nature itself.  

To complete this philosophy of the world state, it will be necessary to analyze the social and political nature of man, his place in society as such, and then in political society on all levels, especially the world level.

A. Socio-Political Content of Man's Nature

In himself man is a composite of both the material and the spiritual; that is, he is neither wholly matter nor wholly spirit but an organic union of both, endowed with an earthly body and a rational soul. This means that of all created earthly beings persons are the greatest of them all; this is defended by St. Thomas and others. This sets man above all the other animals in so far as man can and does strive consciously and freely to attain the very ends of his existence. As a rational creature man is capable of self-direction, having the ability to understand and the obligation to choose the means necessary for achieving any given end. Thus man has certain primary duties as well as basic rights which are indispensible conditions for achieving the

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5Summa Theologica, I, q. 29, a. 3. Persona significant id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura; scilicet, subsistens in rationali nature.
various personal, social, and political ends in this life. And as the scholastic philosophical system is, of course, teleological, it is no less so in its moral and political philosophy, as can be readily seen in St. Thomas's classical work on government. He writes:

In all things which are ordered towards some end, wherein this or that course may be adopted, some directive principle is needed through which the due end may be reached by the most direct route . . . Now, man has an end to which his whole life and all his actions are ordered; for man is an intellectual agent, and it is clearly the part of an intelligent agent to act in view of an end.  

Thus in all of the scholastic philosophers, and in St. Thomas especially, do we find due stress placed on man's end and purpose. This is the guiding principle of all scholastics, so much so, that it should be difficult to overemphasize this. From the end of man society itself takes its meaning, and in view of man's purpose in life can we find all the guiding principles for the settlement of man's chief problems.

According to scholastic philosophers man has a two-fold end: an ultimate end and an immediate end. Man's ultimate end is of course not in this world; it is found in God Himself, and is therefore not attainable in this life, yet

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6 De Regimine Principum, Book I, Ch. 1, English translation by Gerald Phelan, Toronto, St. Michael's College, 1935; New York, Sheed and Ward, 1938.
must be prepared for in this life. While man's ultimate end can never rightly be lost sight of, it may be necessary at present to give more attention to man's immediate end — his temporal happiness which should rightly be founded in a life of virtue. Yet this very life of virtue is procured not simply and solely by knowledge and effort to practice moral goodness, but also by the acquisition and holding of at least a limited amount of this world's goods,\(^7\) including what is lowest in the hierarchy of the world's goods — material possessions, which are also normally needed to maintain bodily health and integrity; in fact, minimum material possessions are needed even to acquire such spiritual blessings as knowledge and virtue.\(^8\) It is likewise in consideration of man's nature in relation to his fellow-man that the scholastics arrive at a fuller knowledge of man's sociability or social nature. It is obvious to all that the ordinary way of satisfying one's personal needs in nearly all cases is by relationships with others and by seeking their assistance as we associate with them. Most likely Aristotle had this in mind when he referred to man as "political animal"\(^9\) and St. Thomas when he insisted on the broader concept

\(^7\)Ibid., Book I, Ch. 15.

\(^8\)Cf. Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 73, ar. 3.

\(^9\)Politics, Book I, Ch. 2, 1253a.
of "social animal". As a matter of fact, it is quite difficult if not impossible to give an adequate explanation of man's sociality apart from man's rational nature and the very end or purpose of his existence. This sociality or social nature of man can be best and most explicitly demonstrated by showing the threefold interdependence of any one individual or even group of men on other human beings, since man attains the fullest development and perfection of his natural faculties by cooperating with others. These areas of interdependence are: the material, the intellectual, and the moral.

Man's material or physical interdependence is a fact of common everyday experience as well as one of history. Anthropological research into the peoples of the past as well as a study of both the modern primitive as well as the more sophisticated inhabitants of this earth show men living in social groups for the purpose of mutual assistance and satisfaction of their common needs. Neither history nor anthropology furnish any proof that man was a wolflike monster towards his fellow-man, as Hobbes would have it, nor the noble and contented animal that Rousseau speaks of.

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10Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, III, Ch. 85. For further study on the contrasting of the "political animal" and "social animal" see Hans Meyer, Thomas von Aquin, Bonn, Peter Hanstein, 1938, p. 473, note 1.
Even in modern times when the individual himself is better trained than in the past, man can provide only the most elementary products for himself without the cooperation of others. And human nature itself provides extremely few ready-made goods for the use of man. In fact, human beings forced into isolation or semi-isolation usually suffer because of the absence of what they might otherwise have through cooperation with others. Experience shows us that the greater the social cooperation in material matters, the greater the standard of living; thus, the greater the cooperation, the greater the benefits deriving from man's social nature itself.

Man's social nature is further stressed by the need of an intellectual interdependence upon his fellow-man. This basic concept underlies our entire educational system which could not possibly function and much less flourish without a most complicated program of cooperation of a fairly large and previously well trained group of personnel. The scholastic system of philosophy and education rejects completely the Platonic concept of innate ideas as one of the sources of knowledge in favor of the doctrine that the soul possesses the power of acquiring knowledge. And while much of our knowledge is from our own personal experience, much more of it is from the experiences of others and must be communicated to us by the teaching-learning process.
Had any man to rely solely on his own experiences, he should be miserably limited in his outlook. The cultured person pities the naïveté of those extremely unsophisticated persons, who are far removed from the culture even of their own immediate environment. Progress in knowledge, at least in the natural order, can be postulated solely on the principle of the intellectual interdependence of mankind. Articulate speech is the distinctive faculty which usually best communicates ideas from man to man. The modern invention of printing has likewise done much to diffuse the fund of knowledge.\textsuperscript{11} It is truly natural for human beings to communicate with one another.

The moral interdependence of men upon one another is a further indication of the essentially social nature of man. The very notion of a full education in the scholastic sense includes not only development of the intellectual virtues or the training of the intellect, but also the training of the will or the training in the moral virtues. This moral training presumes guidance, good example, correction and admonitions from others who have been properly prepared as leaders to aid others in their moral development. Even if we for a moment think in terms of extremes - of the recluse or the hermit, who seeks to remove himself as far as

\textsuperscript{11}Cf. Gerald Benkert, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 54-55.
possible from other human beings, there is still a true
case of social dependence on others in the way of his spirit­
ual, mental, and intellectual preparation for this type of
life. It took the help and training of many to bring him
to this unusual spirit of detachment.

If one is permitted to inject a few words concerning
the supernatural, it can still be seen how great is our
spiritual dependence upon one another for the religious train­
ing imparted and for the sacraments that come from the minis­
trations of a priest.

Thus it is easily seen that the interdependence of
mankind in things material, intellectual, and moral shows
that man's "social" life is a primary and immediate demand
of his rational nature. The sociality of man is something
entirely natural to man. To achieve any one of his ends,
immediate or remote, it is necessary for man to live and
develop in society. 12

B. Society and Its Ends

According to the scholastics a society is a group
of human beings banded together for the purpose of perform­
ing a common function or of attaining a certain end. 13  This

12Cf. Gerald Benkert, op.cit., p. 56.
13
Cf. St. Thomas, In Politicam, Book I, Ch. 2.
is the concept of society taken in its widest sense. It is important to remind ourselves of the two constituent factors: human beings and a real purpose to be achieved. Since human beings are the constitutive element in every society, the distinguishing element of one society from another is its purpose. On the basis of end or purpose St. Thomas makes his distinction between public and private, temporary and permanent societies. If many men are involved and concerned in its end, it is regarded as a public society, but if only a few, it is a private one; as to duration, if its end is quickly achieved, the society is temporary, but if the end to be achieved takes a lifetime or longer, it is a permanent society. The family and the state are, for example, permanent societies, while a business organization or a club are temporary societies by their nature. All Catholic philosophers and theologians likewise distinguish between the supernatural society of the Church and the natural political society which concerns itself with man's common temporal welfare on this earth.

In scholastic philosophy societies are not only distinguished according to their ends but also evaluated in terms of their ends or purposes. Thus is there set out the

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14 Cf. St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum, Book I, Ch. 14.
hierarchical order of the various societies, each society being seen in proper relation to all the rest according to the end or purpose which it is expected to fulfill. This hierarchy of societies is established by the ends to be attained by man—mediate ends, immediate ends, or the ultimate end.

While the family is a primary society in both time and nature, it is able of itself to provide only the basic needs of life although its purpose is the procreation and proper rearing of children. Thus there are many of its necessities which are obtained only by a grouping of families and facilities for the collective production and exchange of goods. This small grouping of families is known as the village. But with the further sophistication of men, even the village comes to be termed quite inadequate, especially in view of the growth of cities. To Aristotle this city or city-state would be the consummate unite of society. However, St. Thomas would suggest a larger unit—the province, as still more perfect an example of a political community. Commenting on St. Thomas's

15 For a further study on this topic see S. de Lestapis, "L'action familial dans le monde", L'action Populaire, No. 166, March, 1958, pp. 278-288.

16 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Ch. 2, 1252b.

17 Cf. St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum, Book I
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designation of the levels of political society, Benkert writes:

The city or civitas would evidently correspond to the Greek notion of the city-state, or to the free city-republics of the Middle Ages, whilst the province or provincia refers more to the modern idea of a larger territorial or national state.\(^\text{18}\)

Benkert continues to show how this gradation in civil society is based on each society's capability of satisfying more or less perfectly the needs of those who dwell within the limits of any given group. When St. Thomas tells of the "perfect political society", he means that its perfection is proportionate to its ability to provide as fully as possible for the intellectual, physical, and moral development of its members. Consequently, if world conditions change to such an extent that states grow very large - to a size that St. Thomas would not have imagined, it can be said that these same principles are applicable, even to the creation of a world state, because the very necessity and existence of such a society would be the logical conclusion from the basic principles laid down by St. Thomas.

\(^{18}\) Gerald Benkert, op.cit., p. 59.
Modern society has become sophisticated to the extent that the individual modern states, even the largest of them, are not totally self-sufficient, even though they usually strive mightily to be such. Do St. Thomas's political principles postulate the establishment of a society of states, or a world state itself, whether unitary or federal, to fulfill the ever growing needs of the common temporal welfare of the world? Benkert feels that the Thomistic principles call simply for an international society of states, while Robert Hutchins maintains that these principles call for the establishment of a world state. Perhaps it can be rightly said that the political principles of St. Thomas and the other scholastics call for both an international organization and a world state, yet at different periods of history. In each case there is a political organization set up presumably to serve these people who should benefit by it; consequently, each harkens back to the very social nature of man himself, otherwise these and other political organizations certainly would lose their raison d'être. It should be no source of disappointment to the modern generation that earlier scholastic writers did not always see

19 Gerald Benkert, op.cit., p. 172.
the fuller implications and application of the philosophico-political principles that they so ably propounded in their own day. Those one-worlders disappointed at the failure of St. Thomas, Suárez and Vitoria to carry their own political principles to their most universal application can take consolation in another great scholastic, Dante Alighieri, who used these same scholastic principles to arrive at his concept of the world state. 

C. Political Organization or State

Many are the types of political organizations upon the face of the earth, yet each if it has a correct purpose which it is fulfilling, is founded ultimately on the social nature of man. Among scholastics it must be insisted that the concept of finality when dealing with the state cannot be overstressed. On the basis of this finality is determined the nature, functions, and the essential organizational elements of the state, which is a public, natural, permanent, perfect (in the scholastic sense) political society. This society is perfect in so far as it is capable of satisfying the needs of its inhabitants, i.e., of achieving for them their common temporal welfare. The state is something

21 Cf. Chapter I of this work, footnotes 22-28 inclusive.
natural to man in so far as it harmonizes with the natural inclinations and faculties of those who compose it, in accordance with the nature and dignity of man as a rational creature, and not in the deterministic sense. William Schwer indicates that the reason and free will of man are the efficient cause, under God, of the state. The state itself is not merely an extension of the family from which it differs not only in size but in its specific nature. Ethnic groups, race, and nation may in a way be an extension of the family, but the state is not since it differs from all of these in its specific purpose.

The end or purpose of the state may be seen from two different aspects - intrinsically, or the end of the state as it is in itself, and extrinsically, or the end of the state in relation to all other institutions of the social order. There is of course no contradiction or conflict between these two ends for the intrinsic is integrated with the extrinsic as the lower to the higher. It can thus be said that the intrinsic and immediate purpose of the state is the common temporal welfare of all its citizens, and not just of the privileged few or of some special group. The common good or common temporal welfare is not just a

\[22\text{Cf. Catholic Social Theory, St. Louis, B. Herder, 1940, pp. 242-244. Cf. also Gerald Benkert, op.cit., p. 61.}\]
collection of the individual goods of the various citizens any more than the state is a collection of all of the inhabitants who dwell within its confines. J. T. Delos has defined the common good as

... the totality of material and moral conditions which, in a natural and normal order permit persons so willing to endeavor to attain to temporal happiness, and the eternal happiness towards which this is ordained. 23

Yet the immediate good of man, which is the direct purpose of the state, must be subordinated to man's ultimate good, his eternal destiny. Thus the ultimate end of man, because of whose social nature the state exists, is at least the indirect concern of the state, although the direct concern of the Church. There is, however, a reciprocal relation between the private good of the individual and the common good of all, so much so that the good of the individual cannot be truly achieved apart from the common good. For this reason goods and institutions within any civil society have not only an individual value but also a social value. Thus man's talents, property, and wealth are ordained also to the end of the common good as well as to one's personal profit and benefit. In an individualistic society this is

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hard to realize, and even when once realized, harder to accept. However, if the state correctly performs its functions and achieves its intrinsic and immediate purpose of providing for the common good of all, it becomes a great blessing and benefit to all its inhabitants, since it aids them in the pursuit of happiness.

For any state, be it the tiniest principality or a world state embracing nearly all of the world's nations, to achieve its intrinsic and immediate end it must have within its boundaries a minimum of order and law in and among the groups forming the state. To maintain the correct "arrangement of parts within the whole" each person must first of all have the correct relationship between himself and each other individual and secondly, between himself and society at large. If this is not the case, each has the tendency, on the one hand, to seek his own individual good and forget his neighbor, and on the other hand, to be totally oblivious of the common good. In our somewhat individualistic society (1961) we often hear cries of socialism whenever the common good is given prior consideration over some individual good, or group good, especially if the group belongs to the affluent and propertied class of citizenry. The scholastics often compare the state to a living organism and point out how the parts of the "living being" function
for the good of the whole being. They are careful, however, not to identify the state with any real organism but to consider it only as comparable to one, for the state can be called at most a moral personality, and not a physical person. Unless this moral organism of the state is guided by a regulatory force, it is in real danger of disintegration, because the members are not led to their common end.²⁴

St. Thomas and other scholastics would hold that authority is an essential element in any society, and is just as natural to man as is society itself. So sure is St. Thomas that these social elements belong to the very nature of man, that he holds that man even in Paradise would have lived a "social life".²⁵ Since this authority is the coordination and direction of free agents towards their common good, and not the dominative power of a master over a slave, it is not extrinsic but intrinsic to political society, and is derived from the very nature of society itself, that is, one made up of rational creatures, with an intelligence and free will. In his Catholic Social Theory William Schwer summarizes St. Thomas's concept of

²⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum, Book I, Ch. 1: "... nisi esset aliqua vis regitiva communis in corpore quae ad bonum commune omnium membrorum intenderet".

²⁵ Cf. Summa Theologica, I, q. 96, ad 4: "... unde homines in statu innocentiae socialiter vivissent."
authority or political power in a state. He writes:

But this authority is not an outside power. It is demanded by the same will that desires and creates the state... the state develops because the care for the common welfare as the final cause, unites the people into a state, and the collation of authority makes the permanent existence of this state possible. The two processes take place in the same act and are derived from the group that forms the state.

Ordinarily the political power which is inherent in the political body or the state is exercised by one or more men whose task it is to direct all activities towards the common good. This person or persons constitutes the government, which is not something subjective or dependent solely on the will or caprice of the ruler; it is objectively founded on the end or purpose of the state, that is, the common temporal welfare of all its members. Governments must be evaluated by how well they achieve their purpose, and not merely by the form or machinery of organization.

Normally, authority or the regulative force in civil society is expressed in law - civil law specifically - which is also an objective notion solidly based on the social nature of man. Consequently, the value of every law is determined by its conformity or lack of conformity to the needs of the common temporal welfare of the society it

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26 St. Louis, B. Herder, 1940, p. 268.
serves. A correctly made civil law will be a specific determination of the natural moral law. Law is an essential element of every civil society. It is by means of unified authority or government and by law that singleness of purpose is achieved. The degree of unity in authority distinguishes one state or government from another, just as it will be an ultimate unified authority of one state and one government that will achieve that singleness of purpose - the world common good - in the world political community when it crystallizes into a true world state.

We have seen that the state is natural because it is based on the rational, and more specifically, social nature of man and that the state is needed for his complete development. The very "perfection" of any one state is determined by its ability to provide adequately for the common good of its members. When society develops to such an extent that any one given state is unable to provide properly for the common weal of its subjects, then there is question of the necessity of a higher type of society over the state, at first perhaps, an international treaty organization in so far as this can obtain the needed cooperation of all for the common good. When this proves inadequate, scholastic principles lead inexorably to a world state, which alone by its comprehensive character could approach the achievement
of the common good of the world. Nor must this situation be viewed as utopian or as a panacea; in no case do scholastic political principles lead to either of these.

The scholastic system of political philosophy is remarkable in so far as it never loses sight of the teleological aspects of the state, i.e., its being rooted in the social nature of man. From the very comprehensive nature of the well-studied scholastic principles, it can certainly be presumed that St. Thomas did not see perhaps the majority of instances where his principles would be applied. The common temporal welfare of mankind is, from the historian's viewpoint, expandible to the point of including all or morally all of the inhabitants of the earth in one single and unified totality. Consequently, at a given period of history the nation-states should become unable any longer to care for properly the common temporal welfare of their inhabitants and should need cooperation with the "outside" to achieve their end. This will be that period of history when the common good of one state is no longer achieved apart from the common good of all the rest of the states, or nearly all of them. At this given period the principles of scholastic political philosophy lead one to their logical conclusion; the necessity on the part of the national states to cease being sovereign states, and to elevate the supreme political authority from the national level to the
world level so that the very raison d'être of the state can continue to be achieved - the common temporal welfare of all in the world - and in a manner in which the national good is not separated from the temporal welfare of the whole world.

D. World Level Political Community

The principles of medieval scholastic political philosophy, if developed to their logical conclusions will lead to the concept of the necessity of an organized world political community in the form of a world state. Except for Dante Alighieri the medieval scholastics did not explicitly elaborate such a doctrine. These scholastics really did not expound theories of international societies and world states. Nor is this surprising, for in St. Thomas's time this would have been a pure anachronism in view of the fact that Europe was still dominated by the feudal system; and the national state, where it was beginning to exist, was in stages far too embryonic for the early scholastics to foresee the need of amicable international relations. Nor were the early scholastics aware of any need to give further stress to natural bonds of mutual relationships among the various political communities, as is necessary in modern times. The threefold bond of the Catholic religion,
a common culture and, to a certain extent, a universal language certainly made it less needful to think in terms of strictly political bonds with one's neighbor, be he far or even near. However, some centuries after the "golden age" of scholasticism the situation had radically changed. Christendom had been rent asunder, new and pagan lands with many peoples had come under Christian domination, and nation states were being quickly developed. In that case the political principles of the medieval scholastics were expanded and applied to a situation hitherto generally unknown - the relations between and among nation states - international relations. Here the pioneer was Francisco de Vitoria, who accepted the concept of rightful authority and independence for these new national states and then proceeded to use scholastic principles to show what the relations among these states should be.27

At this stage of development of our subject the question of nation and state arises. Would the topic of discussion be an international society or an interstatal society? The latter term may seem more correct, but due to the rise of nations and nationalism, custom seems to

favor a discussion of "international relations". In his Essays on Nationalism Carlton J.H. Hayes briefly summarizes this development:

As derived from the Latin 'natio' it (nation) meant birth or race and signified a tribe or social grouping based on real or fancied community of blood and possessed presumably unity of language. Later it was used in certain medieval universities to designate a division of students for voting purposes according to their places of birth... Since the seventeenth century 'nation' has been employed by jurists and publicists to describe the population of a sovereign political state, regardless of any racial or linguistic unity, and this description still enjoys general sanction.

1. The Role of the Common Good

While a nation is a group according to racial origins, the state is a grouping of persons for the achievement of the common good of all, irrespective of one's origin, through the medium of common authority and law.

Delos notes:

What marks the State, as distinct from the nation, is the presence of an authority, a power of Law which unifies the group, binding together by rules of law individuals and sections.

29 "Christian Principles and International Relations", in International Relations from a Catholic Viewpoint, op., cit., p. 31.
These terms are often fused into the current term "nation-state".

As we continue the application of scholastic social and philosophical principles, it becomes more and more evident that there must be a solid framework of peaceful, mutual relations among the various sovereign political units of this world, which in their unorganized form constitute certainly a natural society of nations or states; and when they are organized by conscious human effort first into an international society and ultimately into some form of world state, these nations of the world become a positive society of legally unified political entities. Our emphasis here must be placed on the naturalness of this society, the purpose being to show that the exigencies of human nature require such a universal political society. Its necessity can be reasoned out from a twofold source: 1) the fact that human nature itself has provided the foundation for such world societies in the unity and solidarity of the human race; 2) the principle of human sociality and the organic structure of society require a world society to fulfill the modern needs in the socio-political hierarchy.

In the natural order, scholastics see the unity of mankind as being based upon, first of all, the unity of man's origin ultimately in God Himself, as well as in the
same common human ancestors. Then is stressed the unity found in human nature: all the beings are composites of a body and a rational soul; all are persons, and to this extent, essentially the same and equal. The differences found in man are accidental ones of degree and not of kind, explained by factors of heredity, culture, and environment. This renders mythical the concept of an essentially superior race. Thirdly, the scholastics stress the fact of the "unity of dwelling place, the earth, of whose resources all men can by natural right avail themselves, to sustain and develop life".30 These very resources of the earth constitute the means in the natural order for man to achieve his immediate purpose in this world - to live virtuously - in which is implied the proper development of his physical, intellectual, and moral capabilities. Fourthly, the scholastics, whose opinions and teachings in this case are summarized and explained by Pope Pius XII in his encyclical letter, Summi Pontificatus, insist upon the unity of man's immediate end and mission in this world, to which is obviously added, the unity also of man's ultimate destiny in the next life - or simply the unity of man's supernatural end. Due to the acceptance of this supernatural truth concerning man's unity, along with the discussed four natural

30 Pope Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, October 20, 1939.
foundations of his unity by such a large segment of the world's population, the world of social and political thought, both Catholic and non-Catholic is confronted with a sociological fact that must be given due consideration. The scholastic political thinkers insist that facts of mankind's unity coupled with his sociality yield but one conclusion: in human nature there is potentially a society that embraces all mankind. There is a divergence of opinion, of course, concerning the precise political nature of such a society.

It is not at all surprising, in view of the position of prestige held by the modern national states, that political philosophers, ethicists, and theologians not only rightly seek to make moral judgments in the framework of the national state, but unfortunately they also at times fail to see that moral problems among the states - international morality - is in the framework of a political vacuum. There has been so much discussion of the moral problems of sovereignty, the question of a just war and the conditions under which it must be fought in order to be just, that many have forgotten to investigate into the morality of the causes of this strife and the moral obligations to search for and implement an adequate remedy against war; too, they sometimes fail to recognize the conditions needed for a just and lasting peace, in so far as this is humanly possible.
It is no wonder that codes of international ethics abound in an effort to apply the natural moral law to all phases of human activity including the international. This area of international affairs is an anarchic one and has only the naked moral law to govern its activity, plus some agreed-upon customs and traditions that go under the name of international law. It was in the framework of incipient national states, that the international law pioneer, Francisco de Vitoria, prepared his famous treatise, *De Indis recensere inventis relectio prior*. Scholastics subsequent to Vitoria have followed in his footsteps and have used the arguments of the social nature of man as their basis for the need of an international organization.\(^{31}\) Of course, none of these arguments can be safely denied, and if there is a complaint against any author, it will be that he has not carried the argument far enough, for perhaps the social nature of man requires more than what Vitoria and subsequent scholastic ethicists say that it does. If it can be argued that human needs are best fulfilled by overpassing national boundaries and by cooperation with other political groups, usually other

\(^{31}\)This is the very thesis of Gerald Benkert in chapter two of his doctoral dissertation. He shows how the Thomistic, specifically the Vitorian, concept of international society has its ultimate basis in the social nature of man. Cf. his work, *The Thomistic Conception of an International Society*, op. cit., especially, pp. 45-58.
states, it can be argued a fortiori that the social nature of human beings - a sociality deeply rooted in both the unity and solidarity of all human nature - demands that the complex reciprocal relations of these humans be handled in a framework of a real government that has the power, no matter with what restrictions or limitations, to enact true laws for the common temporal welfare not only of this or that group, or of one or the other areas of the world, but for the whole world. In other words, we may say that, given the proper political and social conditions, the social nature of man demands the existence of a world government to care adequately for his individual and collective needs, which form the very raison d'être of any state. By many internationalists as well as by one-worlders it has been very truly said that human needs no longer stop at the frontiers of national states, especially in modern times. Yet in so many instances, the national states find too many "logical reasons" why they should not cooperate with neighboring states, thereby setting new and restrictive limits on the common good, very often to the extent that they defeat their own very purpose for existence. By this extreme form of collective egoism and selfishness, which parades under the euphemistic-sounding name of nationalism, the social nature of man is deprived of its very right to satisfy
legitimate needs. To take a practical turn of thought, this unfortunate situation is more accentuated in the lesser developed nations of the world, which are often given a trickle of help by self-seeking bigger and richer national states, who ceaselessly compliment themselves for their generosity to the "lesser breeds".

Therefore if any complaint can be lodged against those scholastics who undertake a moral or philosophical discussion of interstatal affairs, it will not be because they overestimate the area and comprehension of their principles, but rather because they underestimate, including too little in the area of application. Yet the general principles they employ are more applicable in the cause of a world state than in that of an international organization. Take, for example, the Code of International Ethics:

... the 'full good of human life' which the state must give to its members cannot be thought of apart from a wide sharing in the material and spiritual life of the whole world, as well as in the varied resources which the Creator has scattered all over the globe ... it is evident that the same law of sociability which leads individuals to seek in mutual help the necessary support of their own weakness and indigence, obliges states to obtain by close and constant collaboration the means of fulfilling adequately their purpose in regard to their own subjects ... the bonds which spontaneously unite State to State are more than a passing phase; they correspond to an essential need of social life, and in consequence find their justification

The aims of the Code for the "full good of human life" are so broad that they can be achieved only by a world state, yet the Code calls only for something less - an international society, and thus falls short in its application of scholastic principles. Up to this point much stress has been placed on material and economic interdependence among both individuals and states. Yet these material considerations are only secondary and instrumental to the higher intellectual and spiritual goods. If man's material needs exceed political frontiers, it can be said \textit{a fortiori} that man's spiritual and intellectual needs pass beyond these boundaries. The progress made in intercommunications and transportation has greatly facilitated the diffusion of ideas, especially by the widespread use of radio and television and the shortening of travel time by jet planes. Thus the full human life of citizens can be provided for only by cooperating with other peoples of the world, beginning with the family and then with local and national groups and finally with the world community.\footnote{Cf. Taupenot d'Aeglio, \textit{Essai théorique de droit naturel}, Book VI, Paris, F. Casterman, 1857 especially chap.5.}
2. The Meaning of the World Common Good

It is only by conforming to the requirements of a natural society that a lasting world political community can exist at all. The world state, if it is to exist, must be an organic state in the same sense as any other rightly conceived and established state is. Its activities must be coordinated and directed by a central authority or regulative force for the common good of the whole human society. It may well be a difficult task for the people of our generation to realize that the world common good is not exclusively a collection of the individual or personal goods of all of the peoples of the world, nor even the collective goods of the various states and governments in this world. This faulty concept fails to take into account society, not only as a group of individuals, but also as a totality with reciprocal relations among the members. Nor on the other hand is the common good to be viewed as an abstraction with no relationship towards the individual goods, taken singly or collectively. 34 In the words of John J. Wright we read:

That which constitutes the 'common good' of political society . . . is not only the collection of public commodities and services - the roads, ports, schools, etc., which the organization of common life presupposes; it is not merely a sound fiscal condition of the

34 Cf. Gerald Benkert, op. cit., p. 63.
state and its military power; it includes also the body of just laws, good customs and wise institutions which provide the nation with its structure; the heritage of its great historical remembrances, its symbols and glories, its living traditions and cultural treasures. The 'common good' includes all of these and something more besides - something more profound, more concrete and more human . . . the common good so conceived is not only a collection of advantages and utilities; it is strongly moral and ethical in its content. It includes elements of rectitude and honor, of morality and justice. Only on condition that it embraces this is the 'common good' truly such . . . the good of the people living in a community, the good of an organized human city . . . included in it, as an essential element is the maximum possible development, here and now, of the persons making up the united multitude, to the end of forming a people organized not by force alone but by justice.

Thus it is clearly seen that the common good is not simply the collection of the individual goods. But perhaps it is even more important for the people of this generation and environment to understand why it is so much more than a collectivity of "bits of individualism". Consequently, the very content of the common good is all that the individualist says that it is plus so much more, as we have seen and shall see.

In this period of history where every man is for himself and many pay lip service at most to the common welfare, it must be clearly demonstrated that the common

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good includes especially the harmonious relations of every person with every other person, every group, and with the state and government itself. It includes also the harmonious ordering of groups among themselves, with all people and with the state. It includes also the state's relations in distributive justice to all its inhabitants and social groups as well as the harmonious relation of one state with another. Hence, with the growth of a unified world political, cultural, and economic community, the chance of procuring apart from the world common good the individual or even national good becomes less every day. All this is certainly far in excess of the sum total of individual goods of any community, even the world community. This truly reciprocal interdependence is demanded by man's social nature, and the amount is dependent upon the environment and the period of history where man finds himself.

Every society that merits the name must have a distinct common good or purpose. The international organization or the society of states, and especially the world state, are no exceptions. The connection between any society and its common good is certainly the relation of finality. In the light of this most important aspect of all

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social organization, must we see tremendousness of task before any international organization and even more so in the case of the world state.

If it is permissible to speak of a hierarchy of political societies, it can be said that this hierarchy is founded on the breadth or comprehension in the common good of the society under discussion. In the formation of any society the common good is the advance projection of the end to be achieved along with the means most suitable for attaining that end.\(^\text{37}\) Seen therefore in relation to the projected common good or common temporal welfare of the entire world each of the modern states is fostering only a particular good, or at least, what it rightly or wrongly considers to be its own common good. Thus on some occasions, what is regarded as the common national good is detrimental to the universal good of the whole world. Yet from both the very important but negative standpoint of avoiding war, most likely a total and nuclear world war, and from the positive standpoint of world trade of products, natural resources, culture and ideas, it is becoming increasingly evident that even the national happiness and common welfare will be best served only by achieving the world common good.

From the philosophical viewpoint the common good of humanity

\(^{37}\) *id.*, p. 25.
transcends the common good of one nation or state in the same fashion as the general welfare of a nation takes precedence over an individual or a family in that nation. Pope Pius XII in his first public audience, given to the International Union of Catholic Women, stresses this very point of how the local good is even best served by achieving the common good. "In working for the universal good, each of you will be working for the security of your fatherland and your family precisely because the order is one." In practice it can be said for the present (1961) that each state's good can be regarded as a particular good in relation to the common temporal welfare of the world. Thus the world common good is not only the sum total of all these particular or individual goods, but likewise their integration and unification into a newer and higher good. On the other hand this higher good or world common good is in no wise independent of the particular goods of the now existing states. This universal or world good is of paramount importance and is as intimately bound up with the rational nature of man as is the very existence of the state itself - and therefore with the social nature of man. This world common good as the ideal achievable goal of statehood

38 L'Osservatore Romano, April 15, 1939, p. 1. (Original in French, translation mine.)
itself exists prior to the foundation of any world society of states and likewise before the establishment of a world state. This universal good is the objective norm for the promotion of the general welfare of all peoples. The great Thomist political philosopher, Francisco de Vitoria, while he evidently did not advocate the establishment of a world state, did insist on the projection of the world common good as a driving force for world organization. 39 Heinrich Rommen calls this common good the "intentional object" or unifying element among the peoples of the world. He writes:

Here the individuals as a mere multitude are an amorphous aggregation constituting the matter element. The form element is the specific bond, the order among persons which is characterized by its intentional object, the common end or the common good as causa finalis, not only as causa formalis. 40

To bring the concept of the "common good" from the realm of the theoretical, it will be necessary to examine further the specific content of this much-discussed concept. It is generally thought of in connection with those things that bring peace to the world. Yet very many refuse to think of peace in any terms except the absence of war. To the scholastic political thinker, the "no-war" concept is


40 The State in Catholic Thought, St. Louis, B. Herder, 1945, p. 34.
extremely narrow, even if it is perhaps popular in many circles. The scholastics usually view the common good from two aspects. First of all, they see the prime benefit of the common good the preservation of order among peoples in any political unit as well as among the political units themselves. This is what many people regard as peace, and from the negative standpoint they are certainly correct. Secondly, the scholastic political thinkers regard also as an essential element of the common good the promotion of the economic, social, and cultural progress of mankind through collective institutions.  

In the minds of the scholastics peace and order do certainly stand at the top of the hierarchy of benefits in the common temporal welfare, because their absence denies to humanity so very many other blessings as is disastrously evidenced during modern total wars. It is St. Augustine, who more than any other writer, has united the concepts of peace and order by his famous definition of peace as the "tranquility of order", and order as the "distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place". Thus it can clearly be seen that peace is not

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42 De Civeitate Dei, Book, 19, Ch. 13. For a study
only the work of a policeman, but much more - the spontaneous collaboration of wills - the work of both justice and charity.

It is St. Thomas who shows the relation among charity and justice and peace. He writes:

... indirectly peace is the work of justice in so far as it removes obstacles that prevent peace; but peace is directly the work of charity, because according to its own nature, charity causes peace.43

In diplomatic circles international peace usually indicates merely a modus vivendi among states - not to violate one another's rights and to keep treaties until they are openly renounced. In the scholastic sense peace means very much more; it contains the other positive elements of the universal common welfare, elements procured only by both justice and charity, i.e., the promotion of economic, social and cultural well-being of all peoples in the world. Therefore peace, the greatest blessing of the common temporal welfare is not solely the work of a policeman, no matter how powerful, but also the spontaneous work of a sufficient number of wills in both justice and charity. Peace, then,

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43 Summa Theologiae, II-II, q.29, a. 3, ad 3.

Concerning how much confusion can be connected with the various concepts of peace in the world, cf. Carlos Santamaria, "In Search of a Concept of Peace", World Justice, Vol. II, No. 1, September, 1960, pp. 3-23.
according to St. Thomas, is the direct effect of charity or good will and benevolence, and it is the indirect result of that justice which seeks to remove the obstacles to peace, by working for the establishment, through government, of an equitable set of world laws. Consequently, it would be grossly insufficient to reduce world peace to police activity as those of the laissez-faire school of thought might wish. Since this is only one negative aspect of world peace, it is comparable to saying that peace is the absence of aggression. That, of course, it is, but more important - it is the generous spirit of charity and justice towards the welfare of humanity as a whole. In these days of a rapidly forming world community, the neglect of the world common good is tantamount to a renunciation of the world's destiny. The world common good surely takes precedence and priority over the local, and therefore restricted, common good of any given nation. This means that the world common good is now a condition ordinarily necessary for the lasting establishment of the local common good, the world now being so united that a political, economic, or social upheaval in any one area has its repercussions, sometimes even violent ones, in many other areas of the world. Many political scientists now feel that all future wars, no matter how restricted they are locally, will in some way be world
wars. This probable situation alone promises to cancel man's greatest social blessing of the common temporal welfare - local and world peace - and to thwart the normal social, economic, and intellectual development one expects to have in this world.

In conclusion, such is the notion of the world common good which forms the end or purpose of the world state: the peaceful ordering of all governments and all peoples for the general welfare of mankind. For the achievement of this end it is necessary that present states (1961) in their relations with one another as members of the rapidly growing world community re-examine their position as "perfect societies" in the scholastic concept, to learn whether they are any longer rightfully claiming their traditionally supreme political authority in view of the needs of the world community. To this last question, the consideration of the fundamental requirements of every perfect society, we must finally devote our attention.

E. Man's Social Nature and the Perfect Society Concept.

Jacques Maritain very carefully and clearly summarizes the scholastic concept of man's relation to the state when he says:

... the state is but an agency entitled to use power and coercion, and made up of
experts and specialists in public order and welfare, an instrument in the service of man. Putting man at the service of that instrument is political perversion. The human person as an individual is for the body politic and the body politic is for the human person as a person. But man is by no means for the State. The State is for man. 44

The idea that the state must serve man and not man the state, except to fulfill his rightful social obligations, is the cornerstone of the scholastic concept of any state at any period of history. Seen with its full implications, the state in its service of man must seek to procure the common welfare of its citizens. To the extent that this is done, the state is technically known as a "perfect society".

It is the general consensus of opinion among scholastic political philosophers that all states which do exist should aim at being perfect societies, that is, in a position truly to procure the common temporal welfare of their subjects. Yet there often comes a time when a given state is unable to procure this common temporal welfare, and thus justifiable questions are raised as to whether or not it ceases to be a perfect society. On this subject Don Luigi Sturzo writes:

The concept of the State as a 'perfect society' is not absolute; it is relative to the functions of a society which is supposed to be able, by its own means, to achieve a specific end. But when a particular society is no longer able to attain this specific end, except in collaboration with other societies of the same kind, it becomes a duty to collaborate. And, consequently, there arises a mutual interdependence, and rights and duties are shifted to the new community. This is the case of the individual who can no longer, by himself, achieve his end. It is the same with families, with cities, with nations, with modern States. The society resulting from collaboration realizes the purposes of individual members, but at the same time, transcends them in the name of the common good.45

Thus Sturzo sets the philosophical basis for the shift of political power from one level to another in the interest of continuing to maintain the common good, and this time, that of the entire world. It is only on this basis that those scholastic political philosophers who favor the world state will found their arguments. If a state, in their concept, ceases to be a perfect society because it can no longer procure the common good of its inhabitants, it has an obligation to its own people to seek at least economic and social cooperation, or perhaps, even an actual political federation with other states in order to justify truly its continued political existence in any form. However, this

question of political federation with other governmental units always raises the traditional question of sovereignty. The more careful scholastic political thinker, with his mind on the social nature of man, would declare that the state itself is at most only legally sovereign, and would insist that the ultimate decisions lie in the people who are accountable to God in view of the natural moral law. Jacques Maritain, going so far as to insist that the state is not truly sovereign, declares that the body politic has the right to change the level of exercising political power. He writes:

If the state were sovereign, in the genuine sense of this word, it could never surrender its sovereignty, nor even have it restricted. Whereas the body politic which is not sovereign, but has a right to full autonomy, can freely surrender this right if it recognizes that it is no longer a perfect society, and decides to enter a larger, truly perfect political society.

Maritain adheres strongly to the idea that the body politic is not sovereign either, since his estimation of sovereignty includes the idea of being accountable to nobody. No matter how beautifully and fully elaborated the


47 Man and the State, op.cit., p. 195.
concept of man's social nature, no scholastic political philosopher would attribute to man, the characteristic of being accountable to no one; nor do they attribute this either to the body politic. And thus after depriving the state of that idolatrous honor that accompanies the common idea of sovereignty, Jacques Maritain does hold that the body politic, not to be identified with the state since the former is a more extensive concept, does have the right to surrender the traditionally full autonomy by lessening it through plighting its fortunes with those of other bodies politic so as to allow the intellectual and social nature of man to achieve its greatest spiritual and cultural, social and economic development in a broadened common good in a new and more "truly perfect" political society. Since so many men are enamored with the sovereignty fetish and at the same time ignorant of the true meaning of the common good, they put out of the immediate grasp of man any true and lasting world peace. Maritain writes:

From all that I have said it appears that the two main obstacles to the establishment of a lasting peace are, first, the so-called absolute sovereignty of modern states; second, the impact of the economic interdependence of all nations upon our present irrational state of political evolution, in which no world political organization corresponds to world material unification.48

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48 Ibid., p. 194.
Thus to reach this greatest blessing of world peace there is needed in the opinion of the scholastic political philosopher, Maritain, world political organization to correspond to the world's material unification. Heinrich Rommen, while he does not feel that the world state is either a necessary condition for world peace, or that a world state is a normal emanation of scholastic ethics, does in fact set the philosophical groundwork for the more "truly perfect" political society of the world state. He writes:

But all these natural communities and freely produced associations point to one form of association where all collective aims coincide, where all conflicts between them can be settled: the city-state that embraces all social activities and all coordinated groups, thus establishing moral, social, and economic self-sufficiency and duration. This community is therefore 'perfect'. The social acts of man here reach their intentional aims in final perfection.

When these nation-states or bodies politic grow incapable of achieving, morally speaking, self-sufficiency and of assuring peace to their inhabitants, they have certainly receded from the position of being perfect societies. This forces a change in the political picture; it will be

50 Ibid., p. 25.
the world political society which henceforth must become the
perfect political society, and function as such not only in
virtue of the natural law, but also through positive laws
which the politically organized society should enact and
which its world government should enforce. In the meantime,
however, prior to the establishment of this pluralist world
political society, the present day bodies politic remain
the only political units in which the concept of perfect
society has been put into effect, even though they are now
falling short of it, due to the fact that practically no
state of the modern world can be self-sufficient in view
of modern spiritual, cultural, and economic growth. Again,
Jacques Maritain emphasizes this question of self-sufficien-
cy in the perfect society with reference to the world state.
He writes:

... the concept of a pluralist world-wide
political society perfectly squares with
the basic principles of Thomas Aquinas'
political philosophy. For Thomas Aquinas
as well as for Aristotle, self-sufficiency
(I do not say total self-sufficiency, I say
real, if relative, self-sufficiency), self-
sufficiency is the essential property of
perfect society, which is the goal to which
the evolution of political forms in mankind
tends; and the primary good insured by a
perfect society - a good which is one in-
deed with its very unity and life - is its
own internal and external peace. As a re-
sult, when neither peace nor self-sufficiency
can be achieved by a particular form of
society, like the city, it is no longer that
particular form, but a broader one, for
instance, the kingdom, which is perfect society. Hence, we are entitled to conclude, following the same line of argumentation: when neither peace nor self-sufficiency can be achieved by particular kingdoms, nations, or states, they are no longer perfect societies, and it is a broader society, defined by its capacity to achieve self-sufficiency and peace—therefore, in actual fact, with reference to our historical age, the international community politically organized—which is to become perfect society. 51

Consequently, the crux of the whole world state problem in relation to the social nature of man is that any state which maintains its right to exist, must remain a perfect society. If it fails to do so, it no longer is the political organization which of necessity man's social nature requires for its full development, and thus man's social nature would call for its replacement by a political society which is perfect, that is, self-sufficient enough to enable man to have peace and the blessings that accompany autarky. There was a day when the city-state ceased to be a perfect society and thus, not self-sufficient even according to the less sophisticated standards of that earlier period of history. Now the nation-state, the commonly accepted and revered form of state in the twentieth century is fast becoming insufficient for keeping the peace and

51 Jacques Maritain, op.cit., pp. 197-198. This same concept, without reference, however, to the world state is expressed also by Heinrich Rommen, op.cit., pp. 25-26.
providing for the common good of the growing world community. Logically man's social nature calls for something greater that will bring peace and be self-sufficient for the world community - that is, it calls for a world state.

In this same connection Robert MacIver remarks that "anything less than a universal order is no order at all. Anything short of a universal order is doomed from the start." He thus approaches the problem with a universal outlook and sees that order itself to be true order must be universal.

Finally, Mortimer Adler shows that there is no excuse for thinking that the nation-state must be the ultimate stage of political development, even though it may actually be the latest stage of state development. The next advance should come to mankind just as surely as man's social nature caused him earlier in history to advance from the period of the city-state. Adler notes:

We should be able to understand the process well enough to perceive factors now at work which will eventually precipitate the next advance. At any rate, we should be able to see that the process will go on until the limit is reached.

The only limit to political expansion is the world-state. Nothing less than that can stop the process. The world-state

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is the natural limit of expansion, the last stage of political growth in which two fundamental unities coalesce: 1) the unity of the planet as the territorial basis for man's political life, and 2) the unity of human nature, underlying all racial and cultural differences, as the psychological basis for universal citizenship.

Thus Adler sees the human nature of man as the ultimate basis for universal citizenship in the world state, which is obviously the limit in which man's social nature will reach its fullest earthly political development. Thus he proposes and answers the question as to whether or not the social nature of man will be able to enjoy the fullest development of its political potentialities in the form of a world state, which would be the only perfect political community today since the world state alone would be self-sufficing.

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53 How To Think About War and Peace, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1944, p. 205.
The motion towards world government is that motion in our time which carries with most purity an appeal to the inspirations of men for peace and justice. It is the best means by which the divinely sanctioned institutions of law and government can be used to improve the temporal lot of mankind. . . . St. Thomas said that peace is the work of charity and justice, of charity directly and justice indirectly. The work of religion and the work of the church is charity. The work of the state and government is justice. Church and State - universal church and world state - must now work together for world peace founded on universal charity, which would realize the brotherhood of man, and universal democracy, which would bring justice to all mankind.

In an effort to understand more fully this motion with the greatest purity of appeal we have seen first, the efforts of antiquity favoring the concept of world state. Most prominent among these were the Stoics, both Greek and Roman, chiefly, Zeno, Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. St. Augustine, too, is a witness of the world state tradition, albeit a not very ardent one. In the Middle Ages there is one author and philosopher who surpasses both predecessors and successors, Dante Alighieri. Scarcely do modern writers excel him in clarity and reasoning. After the Middle Ages, we have the writings of Francis Bacon, King Henry IV of France, the Carmelite, Emeric Cruce and the Moravian bishop, Comenius.

54 Summa Theologiae, II-II, q.29, a. 3, ad 3.
55 Robert Hutchins, op.cit., pp. 43-44.
Subsequent writers are nearly all part of some wartime tradition, when people are searching consciously for ways to achieve world peace. Such was the situation at the time of the Napoleonic wars as well as the two World Wars. In the case with the League of Nations, as with the United Nations, there has not been lacking a goodly number of those seeking to convert it into a world state. Into this category fall most of the modern advocates of a democratic world state.

The opposition to a world state is generally connected to some form of nationalism or exaggerated patriotism. Leaders of patriotic groups can become almost violent at the prospects of a world state. They label its advocates traitorous, and compare it to a Communist plot or some other type of subversion. Some of these hyperpatriots cringe even at international cooperation. Many of these adherents of nationalism sincerely fear that a world state will come, and give as many reasons as possible why people should oppose it. However, the number of these people has greatly lessened in the past ten years. Other opposition to the world state is quite moderate, as it is based on the conviction that it is almost impossible or truly impractical, at least during the present time. They often feel that the very act of advocating a world state will deter man's mind from the United Nations, which they regard as the
world's best hope for keeping world peace. The number of these people is also becoming fewer, especially when they see the inexorable logic contained in the world state movement and are converted to its program. However, as in other movements of the social order, the bulk of opposition, even if only indirect, comes from the indifference of the masses, yet even this is surmounted when the number of world state advocates reaches that sufficient minimum to overcome both open opposition as well as the sluggishness of the multitude.

The modern advocates of a world state usually call for a world federal state. They are often given to placing more stress on the negative approach instead of the positive. Thus they usually stress the fear of destruction more than any other motive. However, fear is not the only motive, even if it is the most employed one. World federalists will also show how the earth is fast becoming united both economically and geographically. They argue that to handle this newly formed economic and geographic unity there should be some type of political union. Otherwise trouble is almost inevitable. It was the British-born American founding father, Alexander Hamilton, who decried the fact of unconnected sovereign entities in the same neighborhood. Modern day fear of the "death unlimited" that these sovereignties might mutually inflict upon one another has provoked another
group of people to call for the establishment of world law to control lethal weapons. The world law advocates are not always consistent in so far as some of them shy away from advocating a world state, the only agency that could effectively enact and enforce world law. Some equate in practice international law and world government and continue to advocate the former while inconsistently rejecting the latter. For the uninitiated there is always a danger of confusing internationalism, or the state of struggle among sovereign national states, with mundialism, or the movement toward a politically unified world community of nations which form one world state. Internationalism and mundialism are not really alike. Internationalism is no state, yet mundialism is the direct movement towards the establishment of a world state.

Although much time and space in this study is devoted to the history as well as the "pros" and "cons" of world government, it is all preparatory to showing how this world state concept is properly rooted in the social and political nature of man himself. It is only by authority, including political authority, that man's social and political nature comes to its true and fullest intellectual, cultural, moral and spiritual development. And with the world-wide increase of intercommunication in each
of these levels of development, man's social nature calls for a political authority truly commensurate with the level of development at that given period of history. The socio-political nature of man demands that. Anything less is insufficient and brings grief to human nature, usually in the form of periodic wars. It results also in the physical, cultural, and intellectual stagnation in many areas of the world. This means that the state, which should traditionally be a perfect society, ceases to be such because of its lessening ability to procure the common temporal welfare of its inhabitants. When the state no longer serves the common welfare of mankind, it loses its raison d'etre, and should be reformed or remade so as to continue the purpose of its existence. This anomalous situation arises when the common good of each nation actually becomes truly identified with the common good of the world, and still the nations refuse to recognize this situation, but continue to emphasize what is regarded as the local "common good" and ignore the universal common good of the world, which alone in modern times (1961) will procure the full intellectual, moral, cultural and material development of man's socio-political nature. Consequently, any plans for a world state which ignores the developmental needs of the socio-political nature of man are doomed to ultimate failure even if, like
other tyrannical plans, they do enjoy an initial period of success.

Finally, our conclusion, like that of any scholastic political scientist, must be that only an organic world state which is solidly founded on man's socio-political nature, can ever be that truly perfect society capable of procuring the universal common temporal welfare for all the inhabitants of the world.

To date this book might well be called the classic on the subject of philosophy of a world state, although it does not give definite plans for its establishment.


This pamphlet argues for world government as the only agency that can properly manage the staggering economic problems of the world community, especially the problem of obtaining the minimum necessities of life for the human race.


Barr stresses the economic approach to solving the problems of the international community, especially those of the western world.


A doctoral thesis in which the author concludes that St. Thomas would argue for an international society that has all the qualifications of a state. Benkert, himself does not call this international society a state.


Admitting the mere theory of world state, Berns declares himself to be an impartial moderate about the question, but also so practical about it that he needs to explain why Russia and other nations hyperconscious about sovereignty would in practice impede the formation of a world state.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Briggs’s approach to the world state is that of the legal expert. He sees a world state as the agency for the enactment of world law.


The world state must be evolutionary and not revolutionary, and thus it cannot be inaugurated overnight.


This is a scholarly thesis of a well-known political scientist and historian, who is impatient with eager world government advocates.


This is one of several proposed foundations or bases for a world constitution.


The work of a world federalist; he links the safety of the world to the foundation of a world federal state.

Chase, Stuart, Tomorrow’s Trade, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1945, x + 156p.

His chapter 9 deals with the world state question in relation to facilitating world trade. He sees the world state as a sine qua non for integrating world trade.

These authors take the United Nations Charter paragraph by paragraph and show what changes would be needed to convert it into the working charter or constitution of a federal world state.


Culbertson proposes what he calls a world federation, but careful examination will show that his program is more like a confederation.


While Dante advocates a world state in the strict sense, it would be of the monarchical type and with a religious basis. He considers the various philosophical and political aspects of the question and offers arguments surprisingly modern.


Doman emphasizes the fact that a world government is feasible and necessary even if very difficult to achieve.


In order for the moral law to be applied on a world level, there must be a lawful government to apply it with sanctions, i.e., a world government.


Advocates can attain world government more easily by strengthening the U. N. than by building anew.

Eaton shows the reasons why the world state, if it comes at all, will most likely be federal in character.


Finletter is one of the impatient world federalists who feel that world government must come soon; otherwise it will be too late.


Goodman sees in the whole Soviet system a plan for a world state, despite the Marxist idea of a stateless society, calculated to be in existence by 2000 A.D.


Goodrich in seeking to say how much world government there should be analyzes the whole world government movement.


The value of this volume lies in its summation and criticism of peace plans over the past several centuries.


Holman opposes the world state as not being connected with the true common good of the American nation.

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Hutchins and other world government advocates at the University of Chicago prepared a first draft of their proposed world constitution.


This small volume contains a long lecture in which the author argues for a world state, using the political philosophy of St. Thomas to establish his position. It is particularly valuable for its mustering and comparing source material from both Aristotle and St. Thomas.

Inagaki, Morikatsu, How To Achieve Peace, Tokyo, private publication, 1954, 4p.

This is a leaflet with a series of cartoons on the impossibility of maintaining peace as long as the possibility of war is not abolished. The accompanying text is surprisingly philosophical.


This volume is a compilation of the ideas of others who favor a world federal state.


Dr. McClure show how to achieve the greatest possible degree of world order through existing law, the United Nations, and other legal institutions short of immediate world government.


This is a revision of a doctoral thesis on the practical obstacles that must be overcome before the establishment of a world state.

The subject matter of this book deals with topics ranging from man's relation to the state to the problems of world government. This latter is dealt with in a most philosophical fashion.


This secondary source is valuable as a compilation and ready reference on the subject of world organization.


The author of this book is the founder of the American group of world federalists. His volume lists the minima necessary for a world federalists.


Morgenthau contends that a world community must be firmly established before one can logically plan for a world state.


Nabuco examines the various possible ways of coming to world government, but insists that a minimum of education is necessary for the successful establishment of any government, including world government.


This volume is professedly one of propaganda for the establishment of a world government. Its importance lies in the arguments that it gives for government itself and therefore for world government.

Newfang is a modern pioneer in advocating world federation. His approach is the traditional one of those who advocate democratic world government, as a requirement of man as a social being.


His world government plans to convert the League of Nations into a world state open to all nations of the world.


Niebuhr takes the side of the opposition against world government, stating that its advocates threaten the delicate political situation of today.

Nizer, Louis, We Have No Alternative, Cleveland, United World Federalists, 1957, 36p.

His argument is that world peace is now more imperative than ever because of the destructiveness of modern weapons possessed by several nations. He regards the means of maintaining peace as the only alternative to world destruction; the means are a strengthened United Nations to the point of world federation.


Patterson's approach to the problems of world government is definitely an economic approach. He sees the world state as necessary to achieve the world common good.

The discourse of the Holy Father to these world federalists put the official seal of approval of the Catholic Church on the world federalist movement. The Pope also warns against the dangers to be encountered in the formation of a world state.

**Pinheiro, Henrique de, The World State, Rio de Janiero, Grafico Olimpica, 1944, 243p.**

Although the author uses the word confederation, he actually advocates an ethical world federation and deals with the question of Church and State in a world state.


This short article is a scientist's plea for the establishment of a world state before it is too late.


This volume is an impassioned plea, sometimes not too well reasoned, for the overthrow of "national feudalism" and the establishment of a world state.


The author seeks to give plans for an equitable distribution of the representation in the parliament of the world, as well as other details in the various branches of the world government.

**Rommen, Heinrich, The State in Catholic Thought, St. Louis, B. Herder, 1945, viii + 747p.**

The author rigorously applies Catholic philosophy to the state itself as well as to the world community, yet he does not favor the establishment of a world state in this volume.

**Russell, Bertrand, "How World Government Can Be Achieved", New Leader, Volume 31, March 6, 1948, pp. 8-9.**
Russell is almost an extremist in favor of a world state for he declares that if the threat of force will not establish world government then the use of force should.


This volume gives in an historical fashion the various attempts to form international organizations.


Schuman discusses the various attempts and means that man has used in the search for world peace, including world government.


Representative Smith of Wisconsin is a classic example of the extreme nationalistic opposition to a world state.


Stanley has the businessman's approach to world peace and world government. He emphasizes the serious danger of world destruction as the only other alternative to world government.


While having universal federation as a goal, Streit regards as fallacious for the present the universalist approach. He maintains that freedom is the key to peace, and is the basic foundation for a world state.

Von Mises sees the rise of the world state in connection with his ideas of the total state of totalitarianism. His approach is unpalatable to democratic one-worlders.


The plans of this world federalist for achieving a world state are mapped in the present historical setup.


A republication of a 1939 doctoral thesis with no effort to bring bibliographies up to date. Of this work, the third section on international order has importance for this research. Wright insists that the very moral basis for national patriotism is identical with that which is the source of cohesion for all mankind.


A comprehensive reference book giving various plans for governmental unions throughout the centuries, with many good analyses of these plans, especially in the light of the world state movement.
ABSTRACT

THE SOCIAL NATURE OF MAN
AS
THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS FOR A WORLD STATE

by

Wm. Joseph Dooley

The overall plan of this study first defines the essential terms, such as, "world state", "internationalism", "mundialization", and even the purpose of the state itself.

An historical survey discusses both Greek and Roman cosmopolitanism, laying chief stress on the universalist attitudes of the Stoics. Coming to the Middle Ages, one sees an author and philosopher that towers above all others - Dante Alighieri. Subsequent writers are nearly all part of some wartime tradition, when people are searching consciously for ways to achieve world peace. Such was the situation at the time of the Napoleonic wars as well as the two World Wars. In the case with the League of Nations, as with the United Nations, there has not been lacking a goodly number of those seeking to convert it into a world state. Into this category fall most of the modern advocates of a democratic world state.

The opposition to a world state is generally connected to some form of nationalism or exaggerated patriotism. Leaders of patriotic groups can become almost violent at
the prospects of a world state. They label its advocates traitorous, and compare it to a Communist plot or some other type of subversion. Some of these hyperpatriots cringe even at international cooperation. Many of these adherents of nationalism sincerely fear that a world state will come, and give as many reasons as possible why people should oppose it. However, the number of these people has greatly lessened in the past ten years. Other opposition to the world state is quite moderate, as it is based on the conviction that it is almost impossible or truly impractical, at least during the present time. They often feel that the very act of advocating a world state will deter man's mind from the United Nations, which they regard as the world's best hope for keeping world peace. The number of these people is also becoming fewer, especially when they see the inexorable logic contained in the world state movement and are converted to its program. However, as in other movements of the social order, the bulk of opposition, even if only indirect, comes from the indifference of the masses, yet even this is surmounted when the number of world state advocates reaches that sufficient minimum to overcome both open opposition as well as the sluggishness of the multitude.
The modern advocates of a world state usually call for a world federal state. They are often given to placing more stress on the negative approach instead of the positive. Thus they usually stress the fear of destruction more than any other motive. However, fear is not the only motive, even if it is the most employed one. World federalists will also show how the earth is fast becoming united both economically and geographically. They argue that to handle this newly formed economic and geographic unity there should be some type of political union. Otherwise trouble is almost inevitable. It was the British-born American founding father, Alexander Hamilton, who decried the fact of unconnected sovereign entities in the same neighborhood. Modern day fear of the "death unlimited" that these sovereignties might mutually inflict upon one another has provoked another group of people to call for the establishment of world law to control lethal weapons. The world law advocates are not always consistent in so far as some of them shy away from advocating a world state, the only agency that could effectively enact and enforce world law. Some equate in practice international law and world government and continue to advocate the former while inconsistently rejecting the latter. For the uninitiated there is always a danger of confusing internationalism, or the state of struggle among sovereign
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lessening ability to procure the common temporal welfare of its inhabitants. When the state no longer serves the common welfare of mankind, it loses its raison d'être, and should be reformed or remade so as to continue the purpose of its existence. This anomalous situation arises when the common good of each nation actually becomes truly identified with the common good of the world, and still the nations refuse to recognize this situation, but continue to emphasize what is regarded as the local "common good" and ignore the universal common good of the world, which alone in modern times (1961) will procure the full intellectual, moral, cultural and material development of man's socio-political nature. Consequently, any plans for a world state which ignores the developmental needs of the socio-political nature of man are doomed to ultimate failure even if, like other tyrannical plans, they do enjoy an initial period of success.

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