THE LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER

AND

ITS RELEVANCE TO HISTORICAL THOUGHT

ACCORDING TO

R.G. COLLINGWOOD

by

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Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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INTRODUCTION

R.G. Collingwood is perhaps the most outstanding thinker of the English speaking world in recent years to draw attention to the determining role of history in human affairs today, and to make the point that as "the chief business of seventeenth-century philosophy was to reckon with seventeenth-century natural science" so "(t)he chief business of twentieth-century philosophy is to reckon with twentieth-century history". Collingwood's emphasis on the importance of history both for harmonious management of human affairs and as the activity which demands first priority attention of the philosopher today, no doubt is ultimately traceable to his own innate predisposition towards history and its method of thinking and proceeding just as Descartes had gravitated towards the mathematical mode of thinking by a sort of innate predisposition. "Philosophy" for Collingwood "is reflective", by which he means that "(t)he philosophising mind never simply thinks about an


2 In his An Autobiography (p. 90) he attributes the contrast between the war of 1914 as "an unprecedented triumph for natural science" and at the same time "an unprecedented disgrace to the human intellect" to neglect of history, whose proper function, according to Collingwood, is to provide "more understanding of human affairs and more knowledge of how to control them" (p. 92) just as natural science has made possible "the success of modern European minds in controlling almost any situation in which the elements are physical bodies and the forces physical forces..."

object" but "always, while thinking about any object, thinks also about its own thought about that object", and is therefore "thought of the second degree, thought about thought." Furthermore, "(p)hilosophy is never concerned with thought by itself; it is always concerned with its relation to its object, and is therefore concerned with the object just as much as with the thought." Now, the thoughts which are the relevant consideration of the philosopher are the predominating considerations which determine the character of any given historical period. Greek philosophy is characterized by a preoccupation with mathematics, according to Collingwood.

Now, our philosophical tradition goes back in a continuous line to sixth-century Greece, and at that time the special problem of thought was the task of laying the foundations of mathematics. Greek philosophy therefore placed mathematics in the centre of its picture, and when it discussed the theory of knowledge it understood by it first and foremost the theory of mathematical knowledge.

Collingwood then distinguishes "down to a century ago, two great constructive ages of European history", namely, the Middle Ages and The Renaissance periods, each having its own characteristic thought occupation which in turn gave to the philosophy of the period its characteristic form.

In the Middle Ages the central problems of thought were concerned with theology, and the problems of philosophy therefore arose out of reflection on theology and

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4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 4; see also Speculum Mentis, London, Oxford University Press, 1924, pp. 164 et. seq.
were concerned with the relations of God and man. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries the main effort of thought was concerned with laying the foundations of natural science, and philosophy took as its main theme the relation of the human mind as subject to the natural world of things around it in space as object.  

During these periods, people thought historically but their historical thought was simple and rudimentary. But from the eighteenth century onwards there developed a growing concern with history.

...in the eighteenth century people began thinking critically about history, as they had already learnt to think critically about the external world, because history began to be regarded as a special form of thought, not quite like mathematics or theology or science.

The result of this reflection was that a theory of knowledge proceeding on the assumption that mathematics or theology or science, or all three together, could exhaust the problems of knowledge in general, was no longer satisfactory. Historical thought has an object with peculiarities of its own.

Collingwood tells us that "(t)heories of knowledge designed to account for mathematical and theological and scientific knowledge thus do not touch on the special problems of historical knowledge" and furthermore if such theories of knowledge "offer themselves as complete accounts of knowledge they actually imply that historical knowledge is impossible." Collingwood regarded his life's work as "in the main an attempt to bring about a rapprochement between philosophy and history."  

8 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
9 Ibid., p. 5.
10 See An Autobiography, p. 77.
As a consequence of this change of preoccupation characteristic of contemporary Western thought, of this awakening of the historical consciousness in the eighteenth century, the logical types of reasoning which were developed to facilitate mathematical and scientific reasoning are no longer adequate to deal with the mode of reasoning characteristic of historical inquiry. The deductive syllogism, according to Collingwood, was developed by the Greeks as the method of reasoning adequate to mathematics, and the method of induction was developed at the time of the Renaissance, when deductive reasoning proved no longer adequate to handle the new types of problems dealt with by Renaissance science. And just as the ancient syllogistic-deductive logic was found to be inadequate to deal with Renaissance experimental and observational science, so likewise neither is deductive nor inductive reasoning adequate to guide the type of investigation and inference employed by the historian in his attempts to reveal the past.

Thus, according to Collingwood, just as the awakening of the scientific consciousness of Western European man in the sixteenth century demanded a new logic to supersede the syllogistic deductive logic as an adequate logical instrument to handle scientific problems, so today the awakening of the historical consciousness of Western man demands that

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12 See Ibid., p. 254.
13 See Ibid.
logicians give attention to developing the type of inference which is proper and peculiar to historical investigation, which is neither deductive nor inductive.

The main scientific achievement of the ancient Greeks lay in mathematics; their main work on the logic of inference was naturally, therefore, devoted to that form of inference which occurs in exact science. When at the end of the Middle Ages the modern natural sciences of observation and experiment began to take shape, a revolt against Aristotelian logic was inevitable; in particular, a revolt against the Aristotelian theory of demonstration, which could by no manner of means be made to cover the technique actually used in the new natural sciences. The text-books of logic in use today still bear the marks of this revolt in the distinction they draw between two kinds of inference, 'deductive' and 'inductive.' It was not until late in the nineteenth century that historical thought reached a stage of development comparable with that reached by natural science about the beginning of the seventeenth; but this event has not yet begun to interest those philosophers who write text-books of logic.\footnote{14}

According to Collingwood, the logic proper to historical reasoning is characteristically a logic of question and answer\footnote{15} in which every statement is meaningful only as the answer to a definite question,\footnote{16} and the mode of inference, as contrasted with inductive and deductive

\begin{footnotes}
\item[14]\textit{Ibid}, p. 253-254. See also H.I. Marrou, \textit{De la connaissance historique}, Paris, Edns du Seuil, 1966, p. 85. (English translation, \textit{The Meaning of History}, p. 89). "If we try to account for this understanding process (characteristic of history), we cannot make use of any transposition of the methods of the sciences of nature. Properly speaking, the historian does not proceed by way of deduction or induction."


\end{footnotes}
reasoning, is by way of an ordered series of questions and answers. Collingwood contrasts this logic of question and answer with what he calls the traditional propositional logic in which propositions have meaning and truth in themselves independently of any questions to which they might be the answer, and whose traditional modes of inference are induction and deduction. The ultimate difference between the two logics, according to Collingwood, is the basis of the difference between abstract thinking and concrete thinking, namely, the difference between the abstract universal and the concrete universal. Propositional logic is the logic proper to abstract thought; the logic of question and answer is the logic proper to concrete, or historical thought, whose proper mode of reasoning is a process of explicating the implicit through ordered questioning. "The concrete universal is the daily bread of every historian and the logic of history is the logic of the concrete universal."  

It was noted above that Collingwood declared his life's work to be that of bringing about a rapprochement between history and philosophy. In the Prologue to Speculum Mentis he shows at great length

19 See Speculum Mentis, pp. 163-169; 176-180, especially p. 179.
21 See above, pp. 3-4.
that the scientific mentality, based as it is on abstract thinking, has resulted in the sundering of our way of life since the Renaissance into mutually exclusive and conflicting activities; artistic, religious and scientific pursuits which are alien to each other and result in a divided and inhuman way of life. Collingwood's call for a rapprochement between history and philosophy is also a call for a rapprochement between the various forms of human activity and a harmonious human life which has been impossible since the Middle Ages. History is the science of human affairs and the study of history will enable us to regulate human affairs as natural science enables us to control the world of nature. The instrument of this twofold rapprochement is the logic of question and answer, which may also be called rapprochement logic, as contrasted with inductive and deductive propositional logic whose abstractive mode divides and alienates the various human disciplines and the very mode of daily human living.

It is therefore fitting to examine Collingwood's claim regarding the existence of this unexploited logic, to determine whether this claim can be substantiated, and to determine as far as possible the nature and implications of such a logic. To this end the following work is offered as a contribution.  

22 According to Louis O. Mink in his Mind, History and Dialectic, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1969, p. 151, "the logic of question and answer is not a theory of logic at all, in any ordinary sense of that term, nor is it even a theory of semantics; it is a hermeneutics and as such it supplements but does not replace formal logic." This may be true, but it seems to weaken Collingwood's very
The method of procedure will be as follows. Firstly, Collingwood's theory of the logic of questioning as proper to history will be expounded as far as his published works permit; this will be done in chapters 1 to 6 inclusive. Then, the remaining chapters will attempt to evaluate Collingwood's theory.

As regards the first, expository, part, the chapters will be divided according to the main line headings delineated by Collingwood himself in regard to his theory of questioning. Chapter 1 will present Collingwood's call for the development of an interrogative logic proper to history and quite distinct from deductive and inductive logic which

emphatic insistence on the need to develop the logic appropriate to historical inquiry as something for which inductive and deductive logic cannot supply. Alan Donagan, in his The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 56, goes so far as to say that "Collingwood's forays into logic resemble Caesar's invasions of Britain: their execution was bungled, and his account of them, which unlike Caesar's was given in advance, did not accord with his actions. Although in his Autobiography he proclaimed himself 'in logic...a revolutionary' (A.52), his revolutionary manifesto turned out to be an embarrassment, and in what he afterwards wrote about logic he more and more ignored it." David Rynin remarks in his "Donagan on Collingwood: Absolute Presuppositions, Truth and Metaphysics," The Review of Metaphysics, XVIII (1964-1965), p. 307: "Collingwood could, of course, be as poor a thinker as Donagan makes him out to be on the subject here under discussion (Metaphysics as historical study of absolute presuppositions), but one wonders then what point there is in writing a book about these inconsistencies and confusions. In any case, I wish to read Collingwood on the assumption that he is not an intellectual dolt, and the least I can do is to seek out, if possible, some interpretation of his thought that leaves it not actually ridiculous and obviously mistaken, to see whether what he seems to be saying may not be worth saying and even listening to." This present investigation into Collingwood's theory of the logic of questioning is undertaken in the same spirit as that expressed by David Rynin.
logical systems according to Collingwood, are appropriate to exact (mathematical) and empirical science respectively. The principal documentary source of this subject matter will be Collingwood's post-humously published "Historical Evidence" found in the Epilegomena (part 5) of The Idea of History, pp. 205-282.

Chapter 2 will expose Collingwood's epistemology of questioning, in which knowledge is understood in terms of a question and answer complex, and propositional meaning is to be taken in reference to the question which the proposition is intended to answer. The essentially historical meaning of propositions will appear, since every question is asked by a conscious subject historically situated and conditioned. Collingwood's Autobiography will be the main source of this embryonic epistemology identifying knowledge with the process of asking and answering questions.

The third chapter will elaborate on Collingwood's emphasis on the active aspect of knowledge. Questioning, inasmuch as it involves the activity of supposing, requires that the questioning mind confront the objects of its knowledge in an active, dominating way, not, as Positivists would have it, as a mere compresence with already existing objects or "hard facts." Supposing involves consideration of the as yet non-existent, and any question involves supposed alternatives, the actualization of one or another of which will provide the answer to the question. Chapter three will therefore expose Collingwood's theory of questioning as supposing or "the cutting edge of the mind". Speculum
Mentis will provide much of the material of this section. The questioning activity of the mind considered precisely as an exercise of creativity, which is the proper function of art, whose activity is characteristically that of supposal, will be deferred from chapter 3 to an appendix at the end of the work, since its presence as an integral part of chapter 3 would disturb the flow and continuity of thought, as its material, drawn from an analysis of Collingwood's Principles of Art, is somewhat voluminous in detail and turgid in treatment.

The central core of Collingwood's logic of questioning, his theory of the concrete universal, which is "the daily bread of every historian," will be exposed in chapter 4. The concrete thought of the historian, if it has logical value, must somehow have about it the character of universality. The universal import of concrete fact with which the historian trades is shown to be a universal as concrete and fully determinate as the facts which it proposes to make intelligibly meaningful. This concrete unity in diversity, and the logic of history which it founds, will be presented mainly by drawing on Collingwood's Speculum Mentis and his Essay on Philosophical Method, the former work being mainly concerned with the concrete and dialectical character of this universal, the latter with its intelligible structure as an overlap of classes in a scale of forms, which structure, being at each point internally affected by a temporal before-and-after relationship, is essentially historical in nature, so that the before part is related questioningly to the after part and the after part is related answeringly to the before part.
Chapter 5 deals with Collingwood's important point that relevant questions have their logical efficacy in presuppositions, ultimately in absolute presuppositions, which are characteristic of the thought patterns which determine and historically situate a particular culture. Collingwood advances his well known theory that the proper subject matter of metaphysics (not sufficiently recognized by traditional metaphysicians) is the study of these absolute presuppositions and of the manner in which one constellation of presuppositions gives way to another constellation and consequently to another way of viewing and questioning the world of experience. In doing so, Collingwood denies the traditional notion of metaphysics as being concerned with eternal problems and regards it as a historical investigation of particular thought-principles (that is, absolute presuppositions) held by particular peoples at a particular time and a particular place and which are subject to historical development from one period to another.

Chapter 6 examines Collingwood's notion of history, since he has insisted that a logic of questioning is at the basis of historical thought. Here, Collingwood's notion of history is presented as the account of self developing, self creating mind in accordance with his insistence throughout all his works that "mind is what it does." Mind, as self creating activity, acts and constructs itself as an overlap of classes in a scale of forms by the process of "raising and solving problems," or asking and answering questions. The activity which mind is therefore together radically historical and radically interrogative.
Chapter 7 begins the work of evaluating Collingwood's theory of interrogative logic proper to history. This chapter criticises and evaluates Collingwood's theory of knowledge as identical with the questioning and answering process which was exposed in chapter 2. Collingwood's theory that propositions are meaningful only as answers to questions is evaluated partially in this chapter and more completely in chapter 9. Chapter 8 continues the critical work and takes Collingwood to task for neglecting to recognise an already well developed logic of interrogation in the Aristotelian tradition. An attempt is made to give the main outlines of this theory of questioning as found in Aristotle's Topics and Posterior Analytics and developed by certain Aristotelian commentators. An attempt is then made to see Collingwood in relation to this Aristotelian interrogative theory.

Chapter 9 faces the crucial question as to whether Collingwood is correct or not in asserting that historical thought operates by a logic of questioning distinct from the deductive logic of strict science or the inductive logic of empirical science. An attempt is made to separate out what is acceptable in Collingwood's thought and making a genuine contribution to the philosophy of history from what is unacceptable or requiring emendation.

Having taken an affirmative position, subject to certain important qualifications, regarding Collingwood's theory of the existence of a logic of questioning proper to history, the 10th and concluding chapter will endeavour to indicate along what lines such a logic might be developed as far as documentary sources available permit such indications to be made.
CHAPTER ONE

THE NEED FOR A NEW LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER

A. The Logic of Question and Answer in the Works of R.G. Collingwood.

Perhaps the most explicit statement of the need for a new logic of question and answer, and of its particular relevance to historical thought, is to be found in the third section of part 5 of the posthumously published (1946) Idea of History. This part of The Idea of History is an edited collection, made by T.M. Knox, of various works, some previously published, others not, such as the section headed "Historical Evidence", which, according to Knox, was written in the spring of 1939 as part of a projected work, The Principles of History. It is in this previously unpublished fragment that we find Collingwood's expressed view of the need for a new logic, a logic of question and answer, as the appropriate mode of inference in historical research, as induction is the appropriate mode of inference in the experimental sciences and deduction the appropriate mode of inference in the exact, mathematical sciences.

Collingwood's Autobiography details the genesis and development of his original thinking on question and answer, and provides an embryonic epistemology of the activity of questioning. In this work we see how this theory of questioning arose as a result of his increasing dis-

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2 It is well to note that Alan Donagan in his The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 1, takes seriously T.M. Knox's warning that Collingwood's own narrative of his development is not trustworthy.
satisfaction with the realism of Cook Wilson and the Oxford 'realists,' and how this growing opposition to realist methods of thinking inevitably led him to develop a critical mode of thinking more and more in line with his archaeological practice of proceeding according to definite questions.

Chapters 4 through 7 of The Essay on Metaphysics deal explicitly with the theory of questioning, and specifically with the presuppositions from which relevant questions arise. A novel account of metaphysics as the historical study of absolute presuppositions is presented. This alignment of metaphysics with historically predetermined presuppositions to scientific questions has occasioned rival interpretations of Collingwood's thought. Shalom and Donagan follow Knox's radical conversion theory according to which, some time after 1936 Collingwood changed from thinking that Philosophy was distinct from History to a train of thought which culminated in The Essay on Metaphysics, which, according to these commentators, ended in radical historicism, identifying philosophy with history.³ On the other hand, Lionel Rubinoff

argues convincingly for an internally coherent system throughout the whole of Collingwood's works, and explicitly refutes the radical conversion hypothesis and that Collingwood's final thought identifies philosophy with history.  

The works mentioned: Historical Evidence, The Autobiography and The Essay on Metaphysics, all written during the period 1936-1939, contain Collingwood's most direct treatment of his thought on question and answer. Important references, however, are made to it in other works.

The earlier Speculum Mentis (1924) contains basic information for the understanding and interpretation of Collingwood's thought on questioning. In the third section, on Art, there is inserted (p. 76, subsection 5) a treatment of 'Knowledge as Question and Answer' in which an intimate connection is established between the activity of supposal and both art and questioning. In addition to this special reference the work generally is a manifestation of the mind as a questioning and problem solving activity.

Collingwood's final work, The New Leviathan, being an ethico-political work, emphasizes the practical aspect of the activity of the mind rather than the epistemological, however reference is made to knowledge as the asking and answering of questions in the context of appetite (pp. 74-79); brief reference is also made to question and answer

in the first chapter, pp. 6-7.

An early publication, 1920, *Ruskin's Philosophy*,\(^5\) which was an address delivered, August 8th, 1919, at the Ruskin Centenary Conference, Coniston, needs mentioning, for "Ruskin's Philosophy" must...be regarded as representing an important stage in the development of Collingwood's thought. Not only does it appear to support Collingwood's own claim in the *Autobiography* to have arrived at the theory of presuppositions and the logic of question and answer early in his philosophical career but it is also probably the closest record we have of the actual views of "Truth and Contradiction."\(^6\)

The work "Truth and Contradiction", referred to here by Lionel Rubinoff, concerns an early work which Collingwood tells us, in his *Autobiography*, (p. 42; p. 99), he wrote in 1917 but was unable to have published owing to prevailing wartime conditions. This work, Collingwood says in the *Autobiography* (p. 42), contained a 'writing out' of his thoughts until that time on questioning activity as a philosophical alternative to the realist's correspondence-passivity theory of knowledge. Rubinoff argues convincingly\(^7\) that "Truth and Contradiction" was an

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earlier version of what later became *An Essay on Metaphysics* (a conclusion detrimental to the Knox-Donagan radical conversion hypothesis previously referred to).

In addition to the aforesaid works more or less directly referring to question and answer logic, *The Essay on Philosophical Method*, although not explicitly mentioning questioning, will be seen to be the logical theory of the concrete universal which is the basis of the dialectical logic of questioning.\(^8\) This work proceeds by comparing the elements of traditional (i.e. genus-species abstract propositional, inductive-deductive logic) with the elements of dialectical or interrogative logic.

Having outlined the various sources in Collingwood of more or less explicit reference to questioning and the logic of questioning, we may fittingly begin with "Historical Evidence" (section 3 of part 5 of *The Idea of History*) in presenting Collingwood's theory that there is a distinct, as yet undeveloped logic proper to historical thought, a logic of question and answer which is distinct from what Collingwood calls the traditional propositional logic, whose familiar modes of inference are deduction and induction.

**B. The Status of History as a Science**

In the Epilegomena (part V) of *The Idea of History*, section 3, entitled "Historical Evidence"\(^9\) Collingwood deals with history as a

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\(^8\) See Lionel Rubinoff, *Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics*, p. 160.

\(^9\) Written during 1939 as part of a projected *Principles of History*; see Knox's preface to *Idea of History*, p. v.
unique human discipline, and shows that it operates according to a logic quite different from the traditional logic of inductive and deductive inference.

In what sense is it legitimate to call history a science? It is not a science in the sense in which the principle of intelligibility and meaning is ultimately derived from abstract universal laws and principles. In this sense history is not a science, whereas biology, physics and meteorology are sciences. But history, like biology, physics and meteorology, is an organized and systematized body of knowledge, which, Collingwood says, is a traditionally accepted meaning of the term science. 10

But, every science, understood as an organized body of knowledge is organized in its own special way. History as an organized body of knowledge is organized quite differently from the ways meteorology and chemistry are organized. The body of knowledge which is meteorology is organized by collecting observations concerned with certain kinds of events which can be watched as they occur though they cannot be produced at will by the scientist. And meteorologists like astronomers will undertake costly and difficult journeys to observe the kind of event they are interested in, which cannot be trusted to

10 See The Idea of History, p. 249. See also H.I. Marrou The Meaning of History, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1966, p. 34-35; "...we must say specifically that when we use the word "science" with reference to history it is not the Greek word for knowledge—ἐπιστήμη—that we have in mind but rather the idea of τέχνη, an art—or technical method. In other words, as opposed to the ordinary knowledge of daily experience we have reference to an elaborate knowledge set forth in terms of a systematic and rigorous method which has proved to be productive of the optimum measure of truth."
inexpert witnesses. Wars and revolutions, events in which the historian is concerned, are not observed in the way meteorological or astronomical events are observed. Nor does the historian make such events happen under strictly controlled conditions as does the chemist with regard to the events which he observes and records. This is not because historians are less energetic or that such means are too costly but simply because the facts which might be learnt through large costly expeditions or by deliberately fomenting revolutions at home would not teach historians what, as historians, they want to know.  

Observational and experimental sciences are alike in that they seek to find the constant or recurring features in all events of a certain kind. A meteorologist studies one cyclone but only in its relation to others so as to find out what belongs to cyclones as such. But the historian does not study, say, the Hundred Years War or the Revolution of 1688 to reach conclusions about wars as such. This is because history is organized in a way differently from the ways in which the observational and experimental sciences are ordered.

In the organization of history, the ulterior value of what is known about the hundred years war is conditioned, not by its relation to what is known about other wars, but by its relation to what is known about other things that people did in the Middle Ages.


12 Ibid., p. 250.
History likewise differs from the exact (mathematical, deductive) sciences in its method of organization. Both agree in that they are inferential, going from a certain starting point through a process of inference to what that starting point proves. But the starting points, the intervening process and the resulting conclusions are diverse in each case. The starting points of the exact sciences are assumptions, traditionally expressed in the form 'Let ABC be a triangle, and let \( AB = BC \).' But in history the starting points are not assumptions but facts coming under the historian's observation, such as that which is open before him is what purports to be a charter by which a certain king grants certain lands to a certain monastery. The conclusions in exact science are about things which are not restricted in space or time; if they are anywhere they are everywhere; if they are at any time they are at all times. But in history the conclusions are about events each of which has a place and date of its own; the exactitude with which these are known may vary, but the historian knows that there is such a definite time and place and within limits he knows what it is.  

These differences in starting point and conclusion imply difference in the entire organization of the respective sciences. When a mathematician has made up his mind what the problem is which he desires to solve, the next step before him is to make assumptions which will enable him to solve it; and this involves an appeal to his powers of invention. When an historian has similarly made up his mind, his next business is to place himself in a position where he can say: 'The facts which

13 See Ibid., pp. 250-251.
I am now observing are the facts from which I can infer the solution of my problem.' His business is not to invent anything, it is to discover something. And the finished products, too, are differently organized. The scheme upon which the exact sciences have been traditionally arranged depends on relations of logical priority and posteriority: one proposition is placed before a second, if understanding of the first is needed in order that the second should be understood; the traditional scheme of arrangement in history is a chronological scheme, in which one event is placed before a second if it happened at an earlier time. History, then, is a science, but a science of a special kind. It is a science whose business is to study events not accessible to our observation, and to study these events inferentially, arguing to them from something else which is accessible to our observation, and which the historian calls 'evidence' for the events in which he is interested.\textsuperscript{14}

History, then, according to Collingwood is a science not only inasmuch as it is an organized body of knowledge, but also inasmuch as it is inferential; that is, it consists of (not merely propositions inferentially related, as does both exact and observational science, as will appear later, but) knowledges (which, as will be shown later, according to Collingwood include not merely propositions but the questions to which such propositions are answers) ordered among themselves so that one item of knowledge (a question and its answer) is related to another in such a way that one conditions the other, and itself is yet conditioned by a prior, together forming a systematic and organized whole.

According to Collingwood, this organization through inference differentiates history from memory which is not organized, not inferential

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 251-252.
To say that I remember writing a letter to someone last week is not an historical statement, only a statement of memory. However, if I add that my memory is not deceiving me because here is my correspondent's reply, then I am talking history because my statement about a past event is based on evidence.  

To say that history is inferential is to say that it is grounded in evidence which is available to oneself and to anyone else willing and able to follow the demonstration of such evidence.

The knowledge in virtue of which a man is an historian is a knowledge of what the evidence at his disposal proves about certain events.  

...the historian is not allowed to claim any single piece of knowledge, except where he can justify his claim by exhibiting to himself in the first place, and, secondly, to anyone else who is both able and willing to follow his demonstration, the grounds upon which it is based. This is what is meant...by describing history as inferential.

But, different kinds of knowledge are related in different ways to the grounds upon which they are inferentially based. Collingwood criticises the conviction, which he alleges to have originated with Aristotle, that a study of the general nature of inference as such will

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15 See Ibid., p. 252.

16 See Ibid., pp. 252-253. However, see later in The Idea of History, pp. 293 et seq., for identification of history with memory "but a peculiar case of memory...that special case of memory where the object of present thought is past thought..."

17 The Idea of History, p. 252.

18 Ibid.
enable one to correctly evaluate the inferential capacity of any piece of evidence solely by inspecting its form without considering the relevant subject matter.¹⁹ He then proceeds to distinguish deductive inference and inductive inference as modes of inference differentiated by reason of the diverse subject matters to which each is appropriate.

As the main scientific achievement of the ancient Greeks was in mathematics so also their main contribution to the logic of inference was the development of deductive demonstration in the form of syllogistic rules.²⁰ According to Collingwood, the chief characteristic of inference in the exact (i.e., mathematical) sciences is "a kind of logical compulsion whereby a person who makes certain assumptions is forced, simply by so doing, to make others."²¹ "When a mathematician has made up his mind what the problem is which he intends to solve, the next step before him is to make assumptions which will enable him to solve it; and this involves an appeal to his powers of invention."²² Having made his original

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 253. Correlate with p. 49 of Speculum Mentis on the logical result of classifying religion and science as species of a genus as giving to logic the status of a master-science having jurisdiction over the whole field of knowledge.


²¹ Ibid., p. 254. The assumptions refer to Plato's 'hypotheticals' from which, as principles, the mind goes to conclusions implied by those principles; correlate with Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 13-14.

²² The Idea of History, p. 251. This activity of 'supposal' which dominates mathematics in principle, Collingwood identifies with imaginative activity (see Speculum Mentis, pp. 76-80), which activity, absolutised (abstractively) by disassociating it from the world of fact into a self enclosed world is the activity of art (Speculum Mentis, pp. 80-91).
assumptions (e.g., 'Let ABC be a triangle in which AB = BC') if he is to go on thinking he is under a compulsion to arrive at definite conclusions resulting from that assumption. He is free either to refrain at the beginning from making such assumptions, or, having made them, to stop thinking at any time, but "(w)hat he cannot do is to make the initial assumption, to go on thinking, and to arrive at a conclusion different from that which is scientifically correct."  

But the development of the modern natural sciences at the close of the Middle Ages precipitated a revolt against Aristotelian syllogistic-deductive science as inappropriate to the subject matter of those sciences. As the Aristotelian theory of demonstration increasingly manifested its unadaptibility to the techniques of the new sciences, "by degrees, there came into existence a new logic of inference, based on analysis of the procedure used in the new natural sciences."  

Inductive thinking, according to Collingwood, differs from deductive in that there is no sustained compulsion from some initial assumption. The essence of the process is that a pattern is found to be made by several observations taken together which pattern is then extrapolated indefinitely. A few points on squared paper suggest a parabola, which can then be drawn, as much as one likes, in either direction. This is the meaning of what is technically described as

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23 The Idea of History, p. 254; see also Speculum Mentis, pp. 163-169 for further elaboration of the mode of proceeding in deductive science; see also, below, chapter 4, pp. 114-124.


25 Ibid., p. 254.
'proceeding from the known to the unknown' or 'from the particular to the universal.' Collingwood insists that the extrapolating step is essentially taken without any logical compulsion; the thinker who takes such a step is free to take it or not to take it; there is nothing about the suggested pattern formed by his (or someone else's) observations which obliges him in that particular way, or indeed obliges him to extrapolate at all; he freely follows a suggestion, that is all. Hypnotization by the prestige of Aristotelian logic has led people to see a closer resemblance between inductive and deductive thinking than really exists, and consequently between sciences of experiment and observation and exact science. In both cases there is an initial starting point and a terminal point, called the premises and the conclusion, and in both cases the premises 'prove' the conclusion. "But whereas in exact science this means that they enforce the conclusion, or make it logically obligatory, in the sciences of observation and experiment it means only that they justify it, that is, authorize anybody to think it who wishes to do so. What they provide, when they are said to 'prove' a certain conclusion, is not compulsion to embrace it, but only permission; a perfectly legitimate sense of the work 'prove' (approver, probare), as there should be no need to show."

26 However, if this 'extrapolation' is as free as Collingwood asserts it to be, it would seem that the astronomer Percival Lowell was fully justified in his inferring from the observed markings on the surface of the planet Mars that these markings represent canals constructed by intelligent beings to irrigate the surface of the planet, in spite of the almost universal opposition to this interpretation by equally competent observers.

Collingwood says that there is a feeling of compulsion which seemingly attaches to this permission to extrapolate freely, so that one feels not free but under obligation to do so and to do so in certain ways: "obligations which, when we inquire into their history, we find to have their roots in certain religious beliefs about nature and its creator God." The motivation impelling (obligating) scientists is basically a religious one: "Take away Christian theology, and the scientist has no longer any motive for doing what inductive thought gives him permission to do. If he goes on doing it at all, that is only because he is blindly following the conventions of the professional society to which he belongs." The point Collingwood is here making is that any compulsion to extrapolate from observed instances is not a logical compulsion, as is the

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28 Ibid. In Speculum Mentis, pp. 160-161, Collingwood explains that the historical reason for the transition from exact science to observational science is the Christian religion. Collingwood maintains that natural laws presuppose the concept of a creator-God; see The Idea of Nature, pp. 8-9, 102-3; An Essay on Metaphysics pp. 217-227. See also, Alan Donagan's commentary on this in his Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, pp. 297-304. Collingwood's attitude in this matter is probably influenced by what Kant says regarding the understanding of particular empirical laws in his third Critique (see J.H. Bernard's translation of Kant's Critique of Judgement, MacMillan, London, 2nd revised edition 1931, p. 19) "...particular empirical laws...must be considered...as...if an Understanding (although not our Understanding) had furnished them to our cognitive faculties, so as to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature."

compulsion to follow through from the hypotheses in demonstration in exact sciences. He seems to mean by this that in demonstrative inference the mind imposes on itself conditions according to which it must think and, after having freely submitted to such hypotheses or assumptions it is no longer free as to how it will think or to what it will conclude, whereas, on the other hand, in inductive inference the mind retains autonomy over its thinking processes and thinks not as it is forced to think but only as it is justified or authorized or 'given a clearance' to think.

With the development of historical thought in the nineteenth century another logical crisis was felt similar to the crisis felt in the sixteenth century with the rise of the observational sciences. History, as a mode of thinking with its own subject matter quite diverse from that of the exact or experimental sciences, gave rise to the felt need for the development of a mode of inference proper to itself.

Before discussing the positive characteristics of historical inference, Collingwood discusses various counterfeits of the historical method and consequently of what he calls 'bogus history.'

30 For further elaboration of Collingwood's views on inductive reasoning and experimental science, see Speculum Mentis, pp. 176-180. See also Chapter 4, below, pp. 114-124.

31 See The Idea of History, p. 256. This method of arriving at a statement as to what something is, derived through a consideration of what it is not, is essential to Collingwood's method of procedure and is in effect an exercise in his proposed dialectical logic of question and answer, according to which questioning, criticising of imperfect forms reveals their deficiency and therefore brings to a knowledge of the more perfect form. The procedure of Speculum Mentis is also an example of Collingwood's dialectical, questioning procedure.
The first type of bogus history considered by Collingwood is that which he calls 'scissors-and-paste' history, in which "(h)istory (is) constructed by excerpting and combining the testimonies of different authorities."\(^32\) In this type of history the historian is at the mercy of the testimony of others; in principle he cannot go beyond what others have told him in their records; his historical account will therefore be a selection made and compiled from various previous testimonies. The historian is passive with respect to his sources. "Scissors and paste history," Collingwood says, "was the only historical method known to the later Greco-Roman world or the Middle Ages."\(^33\)

The second type of bogus history is what Collingwood calls 'critical history' "as it was worked out from the seventeenth century onwards, and officially acclaimed in the nineteenth as the apotheosis of the historical consciousness."\(^34\) Collingwood says that only when the

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33 The Idea of History, p. 258. "Collingwood, who does not hide his contempt for such a conception of "pre-fabricated historical knowledge needing only to be gulped down and then disgorged," calls it "history compiled with scissors and paste." (I.H. 246, 257). The irony of his remark is fully deserved for nothing could be less accurate than an analysis or enquiry that completely overlooks the actual proceedings of the historians' mind." H.I. Marrou, The Meaning of History, p. 56.

34 The Idea of History, p. 259.
post-mediaeval reform of natural science was completed in the seventeenth century did historians begin to feel the need also to set in order their own house. As a result two new movements in historical method began: One, "a systematic examination of authorities, in order to determine their relative credibility, and in particular to establish principles according to which this determination should be carried out," the other "a movement to broaden the basis of history by making use of non-literary sources, such as coins and inscriptions and suchlike relics of antiquity which hitherto had been of interest not to historians but only to collectors of curiosities."

The first of these movements resulted in documents being referred to as sources rather than authorities, indicating that it contains statements but without a commitment as to their value until a systematic enquiry into the credibility of the author had been inquired into. 'Critical History' recognizes that it is the historian who judges. To that extent the historian is not merely passive to his documents; he has to make the value-judgment as to the veracity of the statements contained therein in terms of the trustworthiness and competence of those who made and recorded such statements.

Collingwood makes two observations about critical history:

35 Ibid., p. 258.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 259.
first, "it is still only a form of scissors-and-paste history" for, ultimately, after his evaluative work, the work of the historian will be restricted to repeating what he has critically extracted from the documents as trustworthy statements. The only improvement introduced by critical history, from this point of view, is that some form of test is made to decide whether a recorded statement is to be accepted or rejected. This having been done, the result is simply to "pass (it) as fit for the scrap-book" or to "consign (it) to the waste paper basket." Thus, the final result of the historian's work gives us no more than previously made statements which are accepted or rejected. The point is that for all his critical activity the critical historian is still tied in principle to ready made statements of others; there are no statements in his historical account which are properly his own made on his own authority.

The second point is that critical history had already (in the nineteenth century) "in principle, been superseded by something very different." Collingwood says that many nineteenth century historians, and even some eighteenth century historians recognized 'as a commonplace' that "if in some source you found a statement which for some reason could not be accepted as literally true, you must not on that account reject

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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
it as worthless. It might be a way, perhaps a well established way according to the custom of the time when it is written, of saying something which you, through ignorance of that custom, did not recognize its meaning."41

Collingwood credits Vico as being the first to point this out at the beginning of the eighteenth century.42 According to Vico "the important question about any statement contained in a source is not whether it is true or false, but what it means."43 "And to ask," Collingwood continues, "what it means is to step right outside the world of scissors-and-paste history into a world where history is not written by copying out the testimony of the best sources, but by coming to your own conclusions."44

41 Ibid., p. 259. H.I. Marrou (The Meaning of History, p. 108) provides an illustration of what Collingwood means here: "When I was a young man I wrote a whole chapter trying to show that Saint Augustine was unable to write well. This judgment merely revealed my incompetence as a young barbarian, both ignorant and presumptuous. When I was a little better informed about classical rhetoric (that subtle and refined technique of which St. Augustine was an incomparable master) I realized that what I had regarded as decadent unskilfulness was really the refinement of an art so perfectly sure of itself that it avoided quick impressions and was not reluctant to take the risk of deformed expression. With greater discernment I gradually perceived the vain pride of up-to-dateness, that pride of the barbarian who scorns whatever he does not know - and I understood a little better."


43 Ibid., p. 260, emphasis added.

44 Ibid. Emphasis added.
Thus the movement of critical history, notwithstanding that it was unable to successfully transcend the limitations of scissors-and-paste history, yet in principle transcends it inasmuch as it introduces the notion that the sources are questionable.\(^{45}\)

The other movement which Collingwood says gave new life to history is the archaeological movement which "was totally hostile to the principles of scissors-and-paste history, and could have arisen only when those principles were moribund."\(^{46}\) Collingwood explains the transcendence of scissors and paste methods as follows:

No very profound knowledge of coins and inscriptions is needed in order to realize that the assertions they make are by no means uniformly trustworthy, and indeed are to be judged more as propaganda than as statements of fact. Yet this gives them an historical value of their own; for propaganda, too, has a history.\(^{47}\)

The next instance of 'bogus history' is that attempt found mainly in the nineteenth century, although also spilling over into the twentieth, to 'raise history to the rank of a science' modelled after the methods of the observational sciences. Reacting against the mere transshipment of ready-made information from one mind into another which characterized all forms of scissors-and-paste history, and feeling that history might be something more than this, the analogy of natural sciences came to the aid of historians and suggested what this 'something more' might be. Just as natural science since Bacon was commonly seen to begin

\(^{45}\) See Ibid., pp. 260, 258, 259.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. 260.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.
by collecting facts, then going on to construct theories, to extrapolate the discernable patterns in the already collected facts, so the historians sought to "put together all the facts that are known to historians, look for patterns in them, and then extrapolate these patterns into a theory of universal history." 48

Collingwood says that the acceptance of any "of these pigeon-holing schemes...as a means for discovering historical truths not ascertainable by the interpretation of evidence" was due not to their intrinsic value but because it became an orthodoxy among what was in fact though not necessarily in name a religious community, such as was the case to some extent by Comptism and to a much greater extent by Marxism. Such historical schemes "proved to have an important magical value, as providing a focus for emotions and in consequence an incentive to action." 49

C. Positive Description of Historical Inference

"The hope that scissors-and-paste history would one day be replaced by a new kind of history that should be genuinely scientific without attempting to mimic the observational sciences "was a well grounded hope, which, says Collingwood, "has in fact been realized." 50

48 Ibid., pp. 264-265.

49 Ibid., pp. 265-266. For Collingwood's understanding of magic as a ritual procedure to evoke certain kinds of emotive response, see his Principles of Art, pp. 57-77, especially, pp. 65-69.

50 The Idea of History, p. 266.
This new kind of history also fulfilled the historian's hope for a kind of history which "would enable the historian to know things that his authorities could not or would not tell him:" that is, the hope for a history whose method would enable the historian to make genuine discoveries and so progress in historical knowledge beyond what his authorities could tell him.

Collingwood describes the method of reasoning proper to historical inference by comparing it to the procedures of crime detection. "The methods of criminal detection are not at every point identical with those of scientific history..." "...in criminal detection probability is required, of a degree sufficient for the conduct of daily life, whereas in history we demand certainty. Apart from that, the parallel is complete." Whereas the rules of evidence recognized in courts of law are affected by pragmatic needs so that "a jury has to content itself with something less than scientific (historical) proof, namely with that degree of assurance or belief which would satisfy it in any of the practical affairs of daily life,". On the other hand "the historian is under no obligation to make up his mind within any stated time. Nothing matters to him except that his decision, when he reaches it, shall be right: which means, for him, that it shall follow inevitably

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 268.
53 Ibid., p. 270.
54 Ibid., p. 268.
from the evidence." Thus, the manner of inferring in crime detection and in history is exactly the same, except that in court proceedings in establishing guilt there are ab extra restrictions on the manner of usage of evidence and on what may be admitted as evidence.

To illustrate this distinctive mode of reasoning, Collingwood invents 'a fable' of crime detection: 'Who killed John Doe?' What is distinctive about the mode of reasoning is that a conclusion is reached as to who is the murderer by a process of ordered questioning. The facts and investigation are as follows: Early one Sunday morning John Doe was found lying across his desk with a dagger through his back. There was

55 Ibid., Italics added. Charles Rescher and Carey B. Joynt have made a close analysis of "Evidence in History and in the Law", The Journal of Philosophy, LVI, 1959, pp. 561-578. They discuss, among other things, restrictions courts put on admissible evidence for the safeguarding of the rights of the accused; such a safeguard is not needed in the historian's handling of evidence; he looks merely to logical requirements of inference and need not have an eye to safeguarding rights.

56 See The Idea of History, p. 270, 266-268, 270-273. H.I. Marrou (The Meaning of History, p. 140) is unjustly unkind to Collingwood when he refers to Collingwood's crime-detection illustration as "history of a very elementary kind, almost crude-because the event to be reconstituted (in this instance, a dagger stab) is so simple factually, easily recognizable and "understandable""; he forgets that the work of an example is to illustrate, not to prove anything, and that an example is a good one according as it well or ill does its work of illustrating or manifesting the point, and in doing this simplicity is essential and crudity may well be an advantage. See also Robin W. Winks, editor, The Historian as Detective, N.Y., Harper and Row, 1968, pp. 39-60.

57 See The Idea of History, p. 266.
a public outcry that the murderer be brought to justice; the police were hopeful of succeeding, though the only evidence they had was the little fresh green paint on the knife handle similar to that on the iron gate between the (neighboring) rector's and the murdered man's gardens.

No one entertained the possibility that a witness would enter a police station and denounce the murderer, nor that the murderer would denounce himself (the allusion is to the scissors-and-paste historian's passive dependence on witnesses' testimony presupposed). When accusers and self-denouncers did in fact present themselves, elementary common sense was enough to discredit their testimony: an elderly neighborly spinster claiming that she killed John Doe herself because he attempted to violate her; the local village poacher who said that he saw the squire's gamekeeper climbing into John Doe's study through the window. Then, the rector's daughter eventually, in great agitation, made the statement that she did it herself; upon which the village constable merely rang the local inspector reminding him that the girl's fiance, Richard Roe, was a medical student, presumably knowing well where to find a man's heart, and that he had spent the night at the rectory within a stone's throw from the murdered man's house. Upon subsequent questioning, the rectory parlormaid told the Inspector that Richard Roe's shoes were very wet that morning (there had been a heavy rainstorm between midnight and 1.00 a.m. that night). Questioned, Roe admitted going out, but refused

58 See Ibid., p. 266.
to say where and why.\textsuperscript{59}

The questioning procedure, which resulted in the disclosure of the murderer, takes place as follows:

The village constable (not exceptionally bright, but nevertheless) a scientific thinker (for which he need not be clever; all he needs is merely to know how to do his job, that is, to know what questions to ask)\textsuperscript{60}, starts with the rector's daughter's statement that she killed John Doe. He begins by using the methods of 'critical history', torturing (that is, 'putting to the question') not her body but her statement that she killed John Doe. He rejects her story, because whoever did the murder requires greater strength than she has together with some knowledge of anatomy; she is known not to have attended ambulance classes.

With the rejection of her statement as untrue, the critical historian has no further interest in it; but it is precisely there that the scientific historian begins to be interested. He subjects the fact that she made that statement to tests for reactions; and he does this by subjecting it to questions. Why does she lie thus? Because she is shielding someone? Who? Her father?...or her young man? Certainly not her father (after all, the rector!); therefore her young man. Are her suspicions well founded? Possibly; he was there at the time; he is strong enough; as a medical student he knows enough anatomy.

\textsuperscript{59} See Ibid., p. 270.

\textsuperscript{60} See Ibid.
Being not as thorough in his job as a more experienced man, the village constable stops his questioning there. In doing so, his mistake was that he lost sight of the original question 'Who killed John Doe?' stopping short at the question 'Whom does this girl suspect?' Inspector Jenkins, not necessarily a more clever man, but one who has learned his job more thoroughly, goes about the interrogation as follows: Why does the rector's daughter suspect Richard Roe? Most likely she knows that he was involved in something queer which happened at the rectory that night; he was out in the storm, which fact alone would be sufficient to arouse the girl's suspicions. Did he kill John Doe? If so, when? After the thunderstorm broke?...or before? Not before; his tracks go both ways in the mud of the rectory garden path; they begin a few yards from the garden door, going away from the house, so that is where he was, and the direction in which he was going when the downpour began. Did he carry mud into John Doe's study? No; none there. Did he take off his shoes before entering the study? Impossible. What position was John Doe in when he was stabbed? He could only have been leaning right forward, either asleep or awake; if asleep, the murderer need only step forward and plunge in the dagger; if awake, only a little more caution needed. So, in either case, no time for removing shoes before entering the study. So, absence of mud in the study lets Richard Roe out as murderer.

61 See Ibid., p. 271.
But, then, why did he go out into the garden? Something must have been going on out there; something queer that we do not yet know about. What could it have been? If the murderer came from the rectory (the paint on the dagger like the fresh paint on the garden fence suggests he did), and if Richard Roe saw him from his window (the murderer got to John Doe's house before the rain fell, whereas Richard was caught in it ten yards from the garden door) what would follow? He probably returned to the rectory afterwards. But no tracks; why? Because he was sufficiently familiar with the garden, and the path, to stay on the grass all the way, even in the darkness. If so, he knew the rectory very well and spent the night there.

Was it the rector himself? 62

Why does Richard refuse to say why he went into the garden? It can only be to shield someone from trouble, and almost certainly trouble connected with the murder. Not himself, so who else? Might it be the rector? If so, how would the rector have done it? Quite easily: go out about midnight in tennis shoes and gloves; no gravel on the rectory paths to make noise while walking; reach the iron gate; does he know there is wet paint on it? Probably not, since it was painted only after tea. So he grabs it, gets paint on the glove, probably on the jacket too. Then he walks on the grass to Doe's study window. Doe is leaning forward in his chair, maybe asleep. No difficulty for a good tennis player to place his left foot inside the study window, right foot

to the right, grab the nearby dagger-like instrument, left foot forward, then plunge it in.

What was John Doe doing at his desk? There was nothing on it when the murder was discovered. Does a man sit at an empty desk? There must have been something there. What was it?

What do we know about Doe from Scotland Yard records? He is a blackmailer. Was he blackmailing the rector?...and perhaps gloating over the letters, or whatever they were, he had? Did the rector not possibly find him asleep on top of them?

But this line of questioning is taking us away from our main concern, namely, 'Who killed John Doe?' so let us return to it. Given that the rector is in there, in Doe's study, what does he do to get out? It is now raining heavily; he has to go back through it; more paint picked up off the gate; walking on the grass avoids bringing mud into the house. Inside, he is all soaked, and with paint on his gloves also. He wipes any paint off the door-knob and locks the door. He puts the letters (or whatever it was that he removed from Doe's study desk) and the stained gloves in the hot-water furnace; the ashes may still be in the dustbin. He puts all clothes in the bathroom cupboard (they will be dry in the morning), but the jacket will be hopelessly out of shape when dry; if it has paint on it nothing else to do but to destroy it (a difficult task in a house overrun with women). If no paint on it, he could quietly give it to a poor man.63

But, is this story true or not? Two questions have to be answered to decide: first, can the ashes of the gloves, and their metal buttons, be found? This would confirm the story; and finding a lot of writing-paper ash would confirm the blackmail aspect also. Secondly, where is that jacket? If there is the tiniest speck of John Doe's paint on it the case is closed.

In the rectory dustbin there were a lot of ashes, mostly from writing paper, but also including some from leather, probably from a pair of gloves. Among the ashes were also found metal buttons bearing the name of a famous Oxford glove-maker. The jacket, which the rector gave to a deserving parishioner on Monday morning, had John Doe's paint on the right cuff, and was hopelessly out of shape by a recent wetting. (The Detective-Inspector was later severely reprimanded for permitting the rector to see the direction in which his enquiries were leading him, thus giving the rector the opportunity to evade custody by suicide).  

The papers in front of John Doe at the time of the murder bore the address John Doe, Esq. in the rector's wife's handwriting. Doe had been blackmailing the rector on the ground that the rector's daughter was born six months after the marriage; only then did the rector know who his wife's seducer was, and who was the father of his supposed daughter.

Having presented this illustration of the process of questioning

64 See Ibid., p. 268.
65 See Ibid., p. 267.
by his analysis of the John Doe murder case fable, Collingwood then proceeds to emphasise two points about this process which, he says, "is the dominant factor in history, as it is in all scientific work."  

The first point: Every step in the argument (i.e., inference; remembering that Collingwood has said that it is neither inductive nor deductive) depends on asking a question.  

The question is the charge of gas, exploded in the cylinder head, which is the motive force of every piston-stroke. But the metaphor is not adequate, because each new piston-stroke is produced not by exploding another charge of the same old mixture but by exploding a charge of a new kind. No one with any grasp of method will go on asking the same question all the time, 'Who killed John Doe?' He asks a new question every time. And it is not enough to cover the ground by having a catalogue of all the questions that have been asked, and asking every one of them sooner or later; they must be asked in the right order.  

Collingwood here refers to "Descartes, one of the three great masters of the Logic of Questioning (the other two being Socrates and Bacon)" as having insisted on this cardinal point of ordered inter-
rogation in scientific method, which, Collingwood repeats, has so far
the parts in such an order that what is said about each prepares the way
for what is said in the next; and to say about each not all we know but
only what need be said for the sake of that preparation." This commit­
tment echoes Descartes' summary of his Regulae as this appears in his
Discourse on Method, Pt 2 (p. 92 of Vol 1 of Haldane-Ross edition of
Descartes' Philosophical Works): "...the four [rules] which I shall
state (to be) quite sufficient, provided that I adhered to a firm and
constant resolve never on any single occasion to fail in their obser­
vance. The first of these was to accept no thing as true which I did
not clearly recognize to be so [the critical questioning character]:
that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in
judgments, and to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to
my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt
it. The second was to divide up each of the difficulties [read questions
for difficulties for Collingwood's position] which I examined into as
many parts as possible, and as seemed requisite in order that it might
be resolved in the best manner possible. The third was to carry on my
reflections in due order, commencing with objects that were the most
simple and easy to understand, in order to rise little by little, or by
degrees, to knowledge of the most complex, assuming an order even if a
fictitious one, among those which do not follow a natural sequence rela­
tively to one another [for reflections and objects read questioning and
questions for Collingwood's position; also Descartes' allowance of a
fictitious order aligns with Collingwood's right although false answer
which allows the questioning process to get ahead]. The last was in all
cases to make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I
should be certain of having omitted nothing [for Collingwood the seried
questioning is seen as an ordered body of knowledge in retrospect, when
all the questions have been asked and answered in their due order]."
Further basis in Descartes' works for Collingwood's acknowledgement of
him as an authority on questioning may be found in the last part of Rule
12 of the Regulae (p. 48 of Haldane-Ross edition, Vol. 1) in which
Descartes gives the projected plan of this (uncompleted) work. The first
(and completed) twelve rules concern simple propositions. "But as to
'questions' some of them can be perfectly well comprehended, even though
we are ignorant of their solution; these we shall treat by themselves
in the next twelve rules. Finally there are others (i.e. other questions)
whose meaning is not quite clear, and these we reserve for the last twelve
(rules)." Again in regard to questions (Rule 13, see p. 52, Vol 1 of
Haldane-Ross edition of Descartes' works) Descartes says: "However,
though, in every 'question' something must be unknown otherwise there is
no need to raise it, we should nevertheless so define this unknown element
by means of specific conditions that we shall be determined towards the
been ignored by modern works of logic. He accuses modern logicians of investigation of one thing rather than another." Descartes then proceeds to detail how the specific conditions of the unknown element are to be defined, and to warn of the pitfalls to be avoided in doing this. Collingwood's reference to Bacon as one of the three masters in questioning doubtless refers to the rules of induction (later perfected by J.S. Mill) of his new organon, intended to displace the Aristotelian logic as the genuine method of the new science of the Renaissance. The negative moment, the expurgation of the mind of its four idols parallels Descartes' methodic doubt as the preliminary step to the positive constructive work. The three tables, and the fourth step, the process of exclusion, are the rules according to which nature is to be 'put to the question' for the purpose of controlling nature and its forces. Bacon was a lawyer by profession and it could be asked how far he conceived the scientific questioning of nature in terms of the lawyer's cross-examining of a recalcitrant witness. The role of separating positive and negative instances, of recognizing alternatives, is central both to the Baconian method and to Collingwood's notion of questioning (See Speculum Mentis, p. 78; the New Leviathan, p. 74, paragraph 11.12). Negative instances assume a positive value in dialectical thought such as Collingwood's. See Bernard Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic (London, MacMillan, 1897)ch. 8, for the role of negation in thought, especially, p. 136 et seq, for the defining function of the negative, and for the highly positive value of the negative moment of the crucial experiment (just when x ceases, just then y begins), p. 133-135. For a good treatment of the positive function of negation in dialectical thinking, see Otis Lee, "Dialectic and Negation", The Review of Metaphysics, I (1947), pp. 3-23. The inclusion of Socrates as one of the masters of questioning needs no explaining. But it is surprising that Collingwood omits reference to Aristotle's treatment of the order of Scientific Interrogation in his Posterior Analytics, Bk. 2, Chapters 1 and 2 (see L.-M Regis, Epistemology, New York, MacMillan, 1959, pp. 128-137, for an exposition of the Aristotelian scientific interrogation). This omission is doubly inexcusable in Collingwood's writing, not only as a philosopher but as one insisting on the basic requirement of historical accuracy in philosophy. See below, chapter 8, pp. 514 et seq.
conspiring "to pretend that a scientist's business is to 'make judgments', or 'assert propositions', or 'apprehend facts', and also to 'assert' or 'apprehend' the relations between them," which suggests that "they have no experience whatever of scientific thinking, and wish to palm off, as an account of science, an account of their own haphazard, unsystematic consciousness."69

The second point to be noted about this procedure is that "these questions are not put to one man by another man, in the hope that the second man will enlighten the first man's ignorance by answering them. They are put, like all scientific questions, to the scientist by himself."70 Collingwood says that this is Plato's designation of the Socratic idea of thought, defined as 'the dialogue of the soul with itself,' and adds that the Platonic context makes it clear that the dialogue referred to was a process of question and answer. When Socrates taught his pupils by asking them questions he was teaching them how to ask questions of themselves and showing them how the most obscure subjects can be amazingly illuminated by asking oneself intelligent questions about them instead of simply gaping at them after the fashion of modern anti-scientific expistemologists who advocate that our minds should be made 'a perfect blank' so as to 'apprehend the facts'. The allusion is to the positivistic passive approach of the mind to 'ready-

70 Ibid., p. 274.
D. The Autonomy proper to History as a Science:
The Historian as his Own Authority.

Collingwood has pointed out that 'scissors-and-paste' history, even in its most refined form as critical history, depends on the statements of others, that is, that what has not been said by someone previously can never be said by the historian. Witnesses are required, and the critical work is to apply criteria to determine whether their ready-made statements are to be accepted as trustworthy or rejected as untrustworthy. So, at its best, 'scissors-and-paste' history is merely a restatement of the statements of others; there being no room for statements arising from the historian's own initiative, that is, for statements that would be authentically his own.

On the contrary, scientific history contains no ready-made statements at all. Confronted with the ready-made statement of an authority, the scientific historian does not ask himself 'Is his statement true or false?', and consequently 'Shall I incorporate it into my historical account of this or that subject, or not?' The question he asks himself is 'What does it mean that this statement is made?' This is not the same as the question 'What does the one who made the statement mean by making it?', although this latter question will not be without relevance to the inquiry. When he asks 'What does it mean that so-and-so makes this statement?' he is asking 'What light is thrown on

71 See Ibid.
the subject in which I am interested by the fact that this person made this statement, meaning by it what he did mean? This is equivalent to saying that the scientific historian is interested in statements that are made, not precisely as they are statements, but precisely as they are evidence. The scientific historian thus takes ready-made statements not as true or false accounts of what has happened but "as other facts which, if he knows the right questions to ask about them, may throw light on those facts." 72

Thus, whereas the explanation of facts in the observational and experimental sciences, by the process of inductive inference, in terms of some trans-factual (universal, ideal) order of which the explained facts are more or less irrelevant instances, the explanation of facts in historical reasoning is by means of other facts which are uncovered by means of the question and answer process, which discloses these other facts precisely as they are the explanation of the facts under question. History as a science does not merely chronologically catalogue facts (that is, tell that they happened and when and where they happened) but must explain them, that is, tell why they happened. Thus, the historian in dealing with facts, deals with other facts as their explanation. And the procedure of going from facts to other facts as their explanation is the work of historical inference. History has to

72 Ibid., p. 275.
be able to infer if it is to merit the title of scientific, and to infer is to disclose the fact or facts which explain the fact with which we are concerned.

Thus, applying this to the John Doe murder fable, the rector's daughter makes the statement that she killed John Doe. The critical historian discards the statement when he knows that it is false. But the scientific historian begins his proper work precisely where he stops considering the statement as a true or false account of what the rector's daughter did, and begins treating it as a fact that she did make that statement (whether true or false), which fact is vouched for on his own authority, as "ear-witness", and which he may be able to use to throw light on 'Who killed John Doe?' It is a fact useful to him because he knows what questions to ask about it, beginning with the question 'Why does she tell this story?' It is the question he puts to it that turns it into evidence, that is, makes it able to illuminate the point of interest. A 'scissors-and-paste' historian is interested only in the content of the statement, that is, 'what is said' in the statement. The scientific historian is interested in the fact that the statement is made, that is, he regards it as a fact in its own right calling for explanation which explanation can be found by questioning that fact correctly.

When a historian reads, or hears a statement being made, he is simply receptive of what is said, and in no way the author of it. But when he makes the statement to himself that 'I am now reading (or
hearing) a statement to such and such effect' he is himself the author of that statement, making it on his own authority. This autonomous statement is the point of departure for the scientific historian. The evidence from which the constable infers that the rector's daughter suspects Richard Roe is not her statement that she killed John Doe but his own statement that 'The rector's daughter tells me that she killed John Doe.'

Collingwood says that not only does the historian get conclusions from his own autonomous statements of the fact that statements have been made but also that he can get conclusions even when no statements at all are made to him. This is because, being autonomous, he is not dependent on ready-made statements; the premisses from which he argues are his own autonomous statements, and it is not necessary that his own autonomous statements be themselves statements about other statements. Thus, the premisses from which the Detective Inspector argued to conclude to Richard Roe's innocence were all premisses which consisted of the Detective Inspector's own statements, autonomous statements, resting on no authority but his own, not one of them being a statement about statements made by anyone else. The essential points in his inferential argumentation were as follows: First, Richard Roe got his shoes muddied while going away from the rectory, second, no mud was found in John Doe's study, and

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73 See Ibid., pp. 275-276.
thirdly, the circumstances were such as not to have allowed him to stop to clean or to remove his shoes. Each of these three points is itself the conclusion of an inference, and the statements which made these points evident were no more statements about other people's statements than are the three points themselves.

Furthermore, the ultimate case against the rector did not depend upon the Detective Inspector's statements about statements made by other persons, but depended solely upon the presence of certain objects in a certain dustbin, and a smear of paint on the cuff of a clerically styled jacket shrunk by wetting. All these facts, from which it was inferred that the rector killed John Doe, were vouched for, or authorized by, his own observations. 74

Collingwood then corrects a possible misunderstanding. It is not being denied that ready made statements are useful to the scientific historian, but only that he depends on such statements. This settles the controversy between those who maintain that history is ultimately dependent on written sources and those who maintained that it can be constructed from unwritten sources. He adds that historians schooled to regard history as a scissor-and-paste affair began timidly to see the possibility of something quite different. 75

74 See Ibid., p. 276; 280.
75 See Ibid., pp. 276-280.
E. Evidence which is the basis of Scientific History is always in Relation to a Definite Question.

In scientific history, sources are valuable only inasmuch as they can be made to function as evidence. "If history means scientific history, for 'source' we must read 'evidence'." But it is not easy to say exactly what evidence is. "(W)hen we try to define 'evidence' in the same spirit in which we defined 'sources', we find it very difficult."

There seems to be no a priori criterion to decide whether, say, a certain book will or will not provide evidence about a given subject; indeed there is no reason why evidence should be restricted to books or written sources. Collingwood says that indexes and bibliographies of sources are records not of evidence but of previous discussion on a topic which the historian may or may not take as a starting point for his own investigations. If they do function as evidence this will derive from what the historian himself does in regard to them, or, more exactly, what, by reason of his skill in questioning them, he can make them do for him as regards illuminating a given subject.

In the John Doe fable there is only one obvious characteristic common to all the items of evidence used by the Detective-Inspector in his investigations: they are all things which he observed by himself. But, if we ask what kind of things are they, it is not easy to give the answer. They include such things as the existence of certain footprints in certain mud, their number, position, direction, their resemblance to

76 Ibid., p. 279.

77 Ibid.
prints produced by a certain pair of shoes and the absence of any others, the absence of mud on the floor of a certain room, the position of a dead body, the position of a dagger in its back, the shape of the chair in which the body was sitting, and so on; a most variegated collection. Thus, it can be safely said, says Collingwood, that no one could possibly know what could or could not find a place in that list "until he had got all his questions not only formulated but answered." That is, the list of items constituting the evidence is a posteriori or post factum in relation to the process of interrogation, inasmuch as it is the very process of interrogation which makes such items function as evidence; they are not evidence in themselves but only in relation to the process of inquiry, and to the manner in which that inquiry makes use of them. "In scientific history anything is evidence which is used as evidence, and no one can know what is going to be useful as evidence until he has had occasion to use it." 

According to 'scissors-and-paste' history, all extant statements about a given subject constitute potential evidence, and actual evidence is that selection of those statements which the historian decides, after critical inquiry as to trustworthiness, etc., to incorporate into his account. But, "in scientific history the idea of potential evidence disappears; or, if we like to put the same fact in these other words,

78 Ibid., p. 280.
79 Ibid.
everything in the world is potential evidence for any subject whatever." \(^{80}\)
The mentality of the 'scissors-and-paste' historian is to think that before one can know which facts are actually to be of service one needs to have already some inventory of facts which might possibly be of service. But one who understands the nature of scientific thinking, whether historical or not, will not regard this as a difficulty. For, when a historian asks a question he already has some provisional idea of what he wants as evidence.

...every time the historian asks a question, he asks it because he thinks he can answer it; that is to say, he has already in his mind a preliminary and tentative idea of the evidence he will be able to use. Not a definite idea about potential evidence, but an indefinite idea about actual evidence. \(^{81}\)

Collingwood adds that "To ask questions which you see no prospect of answering is the fundamental sin in science." \(^{82}\) He says further that "Question and evidence, in history, are correlative. Anything is evidence which enables you to answer your question - the question you are asking now." \(^{83}\) Note that Collingwood is here saying that the actual criterion as to whether something is evidence or not is its ability to enable you to answer your question. A question which you think you will, now or

\(^{80}\) Ibid., p. 280.

\(^{81}\) Ibid., p. 281.

\(^{82}\) Ibid.

\(^{83}\) Ibid. Emphasis added.
later, have evidence for answering is a sensible question, the only type of question a scientifically competent man should ask. If you think you have the evidence here and now the question is an actual one, such as 'What position was John Doe in when he was stabbed?'. But, if you think you will have it sooner or later, the question is a deferred question, such as 'Who killed John Doe?'

Following through on the analogy of historical inquiry with crime detection, Collingwood has severe criticism for the Sherlock Holmes approach of 'fact-grubbing', "the 'human blood-hound' who crawls about the floor trying to collect everything, no matter what, which might conceivably turn out to be a clue." On the other hand, he admires Monsieur Hercule Poirot who insists that "the secret of detection was to use what...he called 'the little grey cells.'" Poirot means that "(y)ou can't collect your evidence before you begin thinking...because thinking means asking questions (logicians please note), and nothing is evidence except in relation to some definite question."

According to Collingwood, the difference between Poirot and Holmes reflects the changed mentality in regard to the understanding of historical method in the last forty years (writing in 1939), and the revolutionary principles which overturned 'scissors-and-paste' history had by now become common property.

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., p. 282.
F. Summary and Comment on the Foregoing.

Collingwood has insisted on the scientific character of history, by which he means that it is an organized body of knowledge, that is, that one thing follows inferentially from another, that facts are connected with other facts in a serial order of explaining to explained, and that the explaining fact is inferred from the fact to be explained by a process of reasoning which consists in a seried order of questions and answers. 88

In this process of serial questioning, the mind actively confronts a subject or topic, not to simply 'gape' at it and passively receive impressions from it or to merely 'apprehend' what is there to apprehend (against Positivism), but in the way in which a crime detective, or judge and jury, confronts a crime suspect, that is, in a questioning manner, by 'putting him to the question', and by such activity of questioning to draw from him the evidence whereby the fact is explained. Active questioning turns the statements made by others, and even physical objects, into evidence whereby a question is answered and a fact explained. This question-answer type of inference, according to Collingwood, differs from the traditionally recognized forms of induction and deduction.

88 H.-I. Marrou in The Meaning of History, p. 63, likewise speaks of the "logical priority of the "question" which the historian poses in the presence of the documents." He says that "To lay hold of (the mysterious Past) the historian must encompass it tightly within a network of questions...compelling it to reveal itself frankly... Logically, the process of the elaboration of history is set in motion not by the existence of documents but by an initial step, the "posed question" inscribed in the choice, deliberation and conception of the subject."
Deduction proceeds from a trans-factual, hypothetical principle and concludes to the implications contained in the hypothesis; the principle, the process and the conclusion are therefore only incidentally referred to fact if they are at all referred to fact. Induction begins from fact but proceeds to find the explanation of the fact in a trans-factual, universal, abstract entity, of which the fact is merely illustrative. But in historical inference, facts are inferentially explained by other equally factual things or events. The explanation of, or answer to the question 'Who killed John Doe?' is the factual implementation of the rector's intention to rid himself of a troublesome blackmailer together with all the factual details of such implementation.

There seems to be no doubt that Collingwood recognizes an as yet undeveloped logic of question and answer proper to historical inquiry. Louis O. Mink says\(^89\) that Collingwood's "logic of question and answer is not a substitute for propositional logic but rather a theory of the process of inquiry; its locus is, so to speak, not logic but reflection on logic." This statement, though difficult to deny, seems at odds with Collingwood's obvious reprimand to the text book logicians for neglecting this special mode of inference.

CHAPTER TWO

COLLINGWOOD'S IDENTIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE WITH QUESTION AND ANSWER

In his Autobiography, published 1939, Collingwood treats extensively of his theory of questioning, and of his position that knowledge is essentially a matter of question and answer. He shows the fundamental character of the theory of questioning in his thought and gives an account of the genesis and evolution of his thought on the matter.

A. Collingwood's Question and Answer Theory of Knowledge Rooted in his Opposition to the Oxford Realists.

Collingwood's initiation into philosophy was through the lectures and tutorship of his Oxford professors, E.F. Carritt, John Cook Wilson, etc., who were members of the movement known as English neo-realism. He was thoroughly indoctrinated in their methods and principles, though from the start his adherence was not without reservations. His dissatisfaction with the movement was precipitated by G.E. Moore's article 'The Refutation of Idealism'. Moore, in Collingwood's estimation, was the Cambridge equivalent of the Oxford realist type. In this article, Moore in criticising Berkeley attributes to Berkeley a position which in fact, according to Collingwood, is the very position Berkeley himself opposes. All one has to do to verify this is to place the two texts,

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2 See An Autobiography, p. 22.
Berkeley's and Moore's version of it, together and compare them. And he says that the same thing happened in Cook Wilson's attacks in his lectures on positions he alleges to have been Bradley's. A comparison of Cook Wilson's statement of Bradley's position with Bradley's statement itself would show that the two did not square up.

In his early student days Collingwood tells us that he preferred to distinguish and qualify rather than, as he says he would have done at a more mature stage, to break his attachment to the school convicted of such gross errors on such important matters. He argued that the 'realists' were professing philosophy and not history, and that their business as philosophical critics was to show whether a certain doctrine was sound or not and that this could be done without regard to their historical inaccuracies as to whether a certain author did or did not hold such a doctrine. The philosophical issue was thus one thing and the historical issue another.  

Collingwood says that he felt logically bound to remain a realist until he had satisfied himself either that the positive doctrines of the school were false, or that its critical methods were unsound. He did not answer these questions until he took his degree and commenced working as a philosophy teacher. Then it became clear to him that Cook Wilson's positive teaching could not stand up beside his (Cook Wilson's) own critical methods.

3 See An Autobiography, pp. 22-23.
In 1914, when his academic life was interrupted by the war, Collingwood faced the three following alternatives: (1) If there was a logical connection between the positive doctrine and the critical methods this was fatal for both of them. But, if there was no such logical connection, then, either (2) the positive teaching might be mistaken and the critical methods valid, or (3) vice versa, the positive teaching might be sound but the critical methods invalid.  

B. Origin of Collingwood's Theory of Questioning in his Archaeological Practice

When he became a teacher of philosophy, Collingwood spent his summers studying history and archaeology. From 1913 onwards, he was directing his own excavations. In his archaeological work he says that he found himself conducting thought experiments in the knowledge laboratory. The following is his account of his method of procedure in archaeological work:

...I found myself...at first asking myself a quite vague question, such as: 'was there a Flavian occupation on this site?' then dividing that question into various heads, and putting the first in some such form as this: 'are these Flavian sherds and coins mere strays, or were they deposited in the period to which they belong?' and then considering all the possible ways in which light could be thrown on this new question,

4 See Ibid., p. 23.

5 See Ibid., pp. 23-24. E. Gilson, in his Being and Some Philosophers, (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949, p. 6) defends the usage of the term "experiment" with respect to ideas. This is intimately tied up with the theory of supposal which plays a large part in Collingwood's questioning theory, as will be shown later.
and putting them into practice one by one, until at last I could say, 'There was a Flavian occupation; an earth and timber fort of such and such a plan was built here in the year a plus or minus b and abandoned for such and such reasons in the year x plus or minus y. Experience soon taught me that under these laboratory conditions one found out nothing at all except in answer to a question; and not a vague question either, but a definite one.... What one learned depended not merely on what questions one was asking; so that a man who was asking questions of one kind learned one kind of thing from a piece of digging which to another man revealed something different, to a third something illusory, and to a fourth nothing at all.  

Collingwood says that in these reflections on his activity as an archaeologist he merely rediscovered for himself, in the practice of historical research, principles which Bacon and Descartes had stated three hundred years earlier in regard to the natural sciences. Each had clearly showed (i) that knowledge comes only by answering questions, and (ii) these questions must be the right questions, and (iii) they must be asked in the right order.  

C. Confrontation with the Oxford Realists: 
Active Questioning versus Passive Comprcense 

Collingwood criticises the Oxford realists for talking as if knowing were simple intuiting or simple apprehending of some 'datum' confronting the mind, to which the mind must submit itself when it knows. 

6 An Autobiography, pp. 24-25. Emphasis added. Note the formalizing function of the question. "The same data...can yield a variety of different kinds of information depending upon the questions one asks. More importantly, if one asks no questions, it does not seem that the data can yield any information." L. Armour, The Concept of Truth, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1969, p. 213. 

7 See An Autobiography, p. 25.
He also criticises Moore at Cambridge for speaking of 'the transparency' of the act of knowing, and likewise Alexander at Manchester for describing knowledge as the simple 'compresence' of two things, one of which is a mind. All these positions regarded knowledge as a simple condition or situation, devoid of diversities and complexes, 'nothing except just the act of knowing.' They conceded that there was activity in knowledge, inasmuch as a man might have to work in very complicated ways to put himself 'in the position' in which something could be 'apprehended.' But once having attained that position there was nothing more to do but simply 'to apprehend' it, or perhaps to fail to apprehend it.8

In opposition to this realist attitude Collingwood says:

The questioning activity, as I called it, was not an activity of achieving compresence with, or apprehension of something; it was not preliminary to the act of knowing; it was one half (the other half being answering the question) of an act which in its totality was knowing.9

From these reflections, and from his estimation of Moore's 'refutation' of Berkeley and Cook Wilson's 'refutation' of Bradley, he concluded that Oxford philosophy stood in need of a background of scholarship which would form in its students such habits of mind as would safeguard them from such falsifications of the positions of other thinkers.10

10 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
The first rule to be followed in reading, expounding or commenting on a text is: 'never accept criticism of any author before satisfying yourself of its relevance.' Collingwood insisted that his pupils satisfy themselves, by first hand study of what is said or written, just what the speaker's or writer's philosophy is before criticising it, or before accepting anyone else's criticism of it. In his first lectures on Aristotle's De Anima, he concentrated on the question 'What is Aristotle saying and what does he mean by it?', foregoing, however alluring it may be, the question 'Is it true?', and leaving for other teachers the further business of criticising its doctrine. By this approach, he intended to train his pupils in a scholarly approach to a philosophical text.

Collingwood tells us that, with the outbreak of the 1914 war, he had not yet answered the three questions regarding the conflict between the doctrine and the method of the realist, but he felt that he had made a significant step in that direction since he recognized that he had made himself proficient in a certain kind of research and found out how to use it as a laboratory testing ground for epistemological theories. This perfected technique, together with what he says might be called his 'early manner' of philosophical teaching, tended towards an attack on realism as a philosophy which erred through

11 See Ibid., pp. 27, 74.
12 See above, p. 59 et seq.
13 See An Autobiography, p. 28.
neglecting history. A foreshadowing of this coming attack appeared in the form of such statements as the following:

You must pay more attention to history. Your positive doctrines about knowledge are incompatible with what happens, according to my own experience, in historical research; and your critical methods are misused on doctrines which in historical fact were never held by those to whom you ascribe them.  

Collingwood remarks that the interruption of his academic life by the war served to focus his attention on the, as yet, confused issues so as to further clarify them; which brings us to his meditations on the Albert Memorial.  

D. Meditations on the Albert Memorial

Collingwood's war work with the Admiralty intelligence during the 1914-1918 war required him to walk daily across the Kensington gardens past the Albert Memorial. He says that by degrees it began to obsess him. He likened it to Wordsworth's leechgatherer, and, for him, it took on a strange air of significance. "Everything about it was visibly mis-shapen, corrupt, crawling, verminous;" he says that "for a time I could not bear to look at it, and passed with averted eyes." Recovering from this nausea, he forced himself to look at it, and "to face day by day the question: a thing so obviously, so incontrovertibly

14 Ibid., p. 28.
15 See Ibid., p. 29.
16 Ibid.
bad, why had Scott done it?" It proceeded to grope for possible answers. It would be mere tautology to say that Scott was a bad architect and an evasion by a *suggestio falsi* to say that there is no accounting for tastes. The question then subdivides into other questions. "What relation was there...between what he had done and what he had tried to do? Had he tried to produce a beautiful thing; a thing...which we should have thought beautiful?" If so he had of course failed. "But had he perhaps been trying to produce something different?" If this is the case he may well have succeeded. Again "If I found the monument merely loathsome, was that perhaps my fault? Was I looking in it for qualities it did not possess, and either ignoring or despising those it did?"

Collingwood says that his daily communings with the Albert Memorial, together with his work in Archaeology, impressed upon him the importance of the activity of questioning in knowledge. It further resulted in his impossibility of being contented with the realist's intuitionist theory of knowledge (a simple inspection of a datum already there before the mind simply to be contemplated). He says that the effect of these considerations brought about a revolt in his mind against the current logical theories similar to the reaction against the scholastic

17 Ibid., p. 29.

18 Ibid., p. 30. I think that here is an early instance of Collingwood's later notion of history as a rethinking of the thoughts of another. Also, perhaps, there is the influence of Vico's insistence on the need to penetrate from inside the mentality of other cultures, and a foreshadowing of Collingwood's later doctrine regarding history as knowledge by 'insight'.

logic produced in the minds of Bacon and Descartes when they reflected on the experience of scientific research as this began to take shape in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Bacon's Novum Organum and Descartes' Discours de la Méthode began to have a new significance for him in the light of these considerations.

They (Bacon's and Descartes' works referred to) were the classical expressions of a principle in logic which I found it necessary to restate: the principle that a body of knowledge consists not of 'propositions', 'statements', 'judgments', or whatever name logicians use in order to designate assertive acts of thought (or what in those acts is asserted: for 'knowledge' means both the activity of knowing and what is known) but of these together with the questions they are meant to answer; and that a logic in which the answers are attended to and the questions neglected is a false logic.

Collingwood then gives an account of how his thought on the relevance of questioning in the theory of knowledge developed as his meditations on the Albert Memorial continued. Firstly, however, he interrupts to clarify terminology. He says that he proposes to use the word 'proposition' for the 'entity' which the idealistic logicians call 'judgment' and the realists call 'statement', and that it will denote a logical, not a linguistic, entity. Collingwood's biographical account of his evolving thought is as follows:

I began by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or written with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to find out his meaning you must also know what the question was (a

19 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer.\footnote{An Autobiography, p. 31. See also Collingwood's The Principles of Art, pp. 265-266, for the need to know even the tone of voice in which a speaker utters a proposition in order to know its meaning.}

Collingwood stresses that in his understanding of the matter there is a strict correlation between question and answer\footnote{A similar statement by the Historian-Philosopher E. Gilson, may be worth noting (The Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, London, Gollancz, 1961, p. 223): "If we want the Thomistic solution of the problem of knowledge, it must come first from St. Thomas. If it is to come really from him and not from Descartes or Kant, we must not approach it with a Cartesian or Kantian question on our lips, because philosophers' questions are one with their replies." (Emphasis added)\footnote{An Autobiography, p. 32.}}\footnote{20} so that a proposition is not an answer, or, at any rate, not the right answer, to any question that might have been answered otherwise. He explains by stating that "a highly detailed and particularized proposition must be an answer, not to a vague and generalized question, but to a question as detailed and particularized as itself."\footnote{An Autobiography, p. 32.} A question such as 'Why won't my car go?' must be broken down into detailed and particularized questions of which it is really only a summary, such as: 'Is it because No 1 plug is not sparking?'...or No 2 plug?, etc. And when it can be said that No 1 plug is functioning, this is not recording failure to answer the sustained question 'Why won't my car go?' but success in answering the question 'Is the stoppage of my car due to failure in No 1 plug?'
This 'principle of correlativity between question and answer' results in clarity which disposes of a good deal of claptrap, such as speaking of "a savage as 'confronted by the eternal problem of obtaining food'. What really confronts him is the problem, quite transitory like all things human, of spearing this fish, or digging up this root, or finding blackberries in this wood."\(^23\)

Collingwood says that his next step was to apply this to the idea of contradiction. The current logic accepts that two propositions, simply as propositions, might contradict one another, so that, by simply examining them as propositions one could determine whether in fact they did contradict each other or not. Collingwood opposes this position on the ground that in order to know whether two propositions are in contradiction with each other one needs to know their meaning, but one does not know the meaning of each without together knowing the question to which each is intended to be the answer.

If you cannot tell what a proposition means unless you know what the question is it is meant to answer, you will mistake its meaning if you make a mistake about that question.\(^24\)

A symptom of mistaking the meaning of a proposition is mistaking it to contradict another proposition which in fact it does not

\(^23\) Ibid., pp. 32-33. See Alan Donagan's Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, pp. 60-61 for his criticism of Collingwood's strict correlation of a definite answer to a definite question.

\(^24\) An Autobiography, p. 33.
No two propositions, I saw, can contradict one another unless they are answers to the same question. It is therefore impossible to say of a man 'I do not know what the question is which he is trying to answer, but I can see that he is contradicting himself.'

Collingwood applies his principle of the correlativity of question and answer to the idea of truth. If the meaning of a proposition is relative to the question it answers, so also is its truth. Neither (i) meaning, nor (ii) agreement and contradiction, nor (iii) truth and falsehood belong to propositions by themselves, but only inasmuch as they are answers to questions, each proposition being strictly correlative as answer to its relevant question.

Collingwood then criticises what he calls 'propositional logic', under which classification he groups the so-called traditional logic, the idealistic logic of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the symbolic logic of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All of these logics are in agreement in treating truth and falsehood, which, says Collingwood, is the chief concern of logic, as belonging to propositions as such. In such a doctrine the proposition is regarded as the unit of thought, the smallest 'entity' about which truth and falsity can be said, which cannot be said of its parts, subject, predicate and copula taken separately.

25 Ibid.

26 See An Autobiography, p. 34. In Speculum Mentis (pp. 114-116) Collingwood attributes to Religion the discovery of truth and its expression in propositions asserted to be true which are contradictorily opposed to their denial, recognized to be thereby false.
Collingwood attributes this position of propositional logic to the early liaison of logic and grammar, according to which the logician's proposition was regarded as a kind of ghostly double of the grammarian's sentence, much in the same way as primitive views regarded minds as ghostly doubles of bodies. Among the various kinds of verbal expressions (of command, of wishes, etc.) grammarians recognize that special kind, the indicative sentence whose function it is to express statements. Collingwood says that "logicians have almost always tried to conceive the 'unit of thought', or that which is either true or false, as a kind of logical 'soul' whose linguistic 'body' is the indicative sentence." 27

This correlation of the logical proposition with the grammatical indicative sentence was never entirely satisfactory. Bacon and Descartes, Plato and Kant, are examples of those who saw that the true unit of thought was not the proposition but something more complex in which the proposition functioned as answer to a question. 28

When Plato described thinking as a 'dialogue of the soul with itself', he meant (as we know from his own dialogues) that it was a process of question and answer, and that of these two elements the primacy belongs to the questioning activity, the Socrates within us. When Kant said that it takes a wise man to know what questions he can reasonably ask, he was in effect repudiating a merely propositional logic and


28 See Autobiography, p. 34.
demanding a logic of question and answer.29

Collingwood says that the one sentence expressive of one proposition, as maintained by propositional logic, does not accord with the way words are actually used in certain situations, as when expressions of thought are 'elliptical' or 'pleonastic.' Again, it is generally held that the indicative sentences in a work which is no more than a work of fiction do not express propositions. The central doctrine of propositional logic is that "there is, or ought to be, or in a well constructed and well used language would be, a one-one correspondence between propositions and indicative sentences expressing a proposition, and a proposition being defined as the unit of thought, or that which is true or false."30

Collingwood says that all the well known theories of truth presuppose this one-one correspondence. One school maintains that truth and falsity are qualities of propositions in themselves. Another school maintains that to call a proposition true is to assert a relation of 'correspondence' or 'non-correspondence' between the proposition and something which is not a proposition, some 'state of things' or 'fact'. A third school holds that truth or falsity asserts a relationship of a proposition to other propositions with which it 'coheres' or 'fails to cohere.' According to pragmatists, to call a proposition true or false is to assert the utility or inutility of believing the proposition.

29 Ibid., p. 35.
30 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
Collingwood rejected all these theories because they presupposed the principle of propositional logic which he denied altogether. 31

For a logic of propositions he wanted to substitute what he called a logic of question and answer. For Collingwood, truth in its proper sense, truth as he was familiar with it, was truth taken in the sense in which a philosophical theory or historical narrative is called true, and this "was something that belonged not to any single proposition, nor even as the coherence theorists maintained, to a complex of propositions taken together; but to a complex consisting of questions and answers." 32

Collingwood accuses propositional logic of completely ignoring the structure of such a complex, but, he says, with a little help from Bacon, Descartes and others, he found himself able to hazard a few statements about it. He gives the following as characteristics of the structure of his interrogative logic: First, the characteristics of Context and Relevance: "Each question and each answer in a given com-

31 See Ibid., p. 36.

32 Ibid., pp. 36-37. The identifications Collingwood makes here, of truth in its proper sense with truth as he was familiar with it (and his archaeological practice is to be kept in mind here) and with philosophical and especially historical truth, are important in evaluating Collingwood's theory. As for Descartes the paradigm of knowledge was mathematics, and for Kant, Newtonian Physics, so for Collingwood the paradigm of knowledge, and truth, is historical knowledge and truth (to which philosophy is assimilated, rather than to science). "...exclusive reliance on history as the type of all knowledge is the exact counterpart of the positivist reliance on natural science and is open to much the same objections." W.H. Walsh, "R.G. Collingwood's Philosophy of History," Philosophy, XXII (1947), p. 153.
plex had to be relevant or appropriate, had to 'belong' both to the whole and to the place it occupied in the whole;" second, the characteristic of 'arising' that accompanies a relevant question: "Each question had to 'arise'; there must be that about it whose absence we condemn when we refuse to answer a question on the ground that it 'doesn't arise;'" thirdly, the characteristic of 'rightness of the answer:' "Each answer must be 'the right' answer to the question it professes to answer."

Collingwood insists that by 'right' (answer) he does not mean 'true.' The right answer, according to him, is the one which enables you "to get ahead with the process of questioning and answering." Cases are common, he says, in which the 'right' answer to a question is 'false.' As examples, he cites cases in which a thinker is following a false scent, either inadvertently, or in order to construct a reductio ad absurdum. Again, Polemarchus' answer to Socrates' question in the Republic (333B), Whether in a draughts game he would prefer as partner a just man or one able to play draughts? The answer, 'a man able to play draughts' is false, since it presupposes that justice and the ability to play draughts are incompatible, but it is nevertheless 'right' because it is a link, and a sound one, in the chain of questions and answers by which the falseness of the aforesaid presupposition is manifested.

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Collingwood appeals to what he regards as the **ordinary meaning** of calling a proposition true as he understands it. Its characteristics are: (i) that the proposition belongs to a question-and-answer complex which as a whole is 'true' in the proper sense of the word; (ii) within this complex the proposition functions as an answer to a certain question; (iii) the question to which it is the answer is what would commonly be referred to as a sensible or intelligent question, that is, it is a question which 'arises' in Collingwood's terminology, to which is contrasted a silly question; (iv) the proposition is the 'right' answer to that question. From this it follows that you cannot tell whether a proposition is true or false until you first find out the question it was intended to answer. Furthermore, Collingwood adds, a proposition which in fact is true can always be thought to be false by anyone who goes to the trouble to think out a question to which it would have been the wrong answer, but convinces himself that it is the question which it is intended to answer. And again, a proposition which is in fact significant can always be thought to be meaningless by any one who convinces himself that it was intended to answer a question when in fact

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35 It is questionable whether this is what is commonly meant by 'true' as Collingwood claims that it is; it seems that 'ordinary usage' would rather endorse the position Collingwood is opposing, namely that statements are true or false as such.

36 See An Autobiography, p. 38.
it does not either rightly or wrongly answer the question, in spite of the intention of the one who offers it to be such answer. 37

Whether a given proposition is true or false, significant or meaningless, depends on what question it was meant to answer; and any one who wishes to know whether a given proposition is true or false, significant or meaningless, must find out what question it was meant to answer. 38

37 See Ibid., pp. 38-39. It is unfortunate that Collingwood does not clarify these cases with examples; his meaning is not clear. What he says seems to argue for his position in one respect and against it in another respect. If one can mistakenly think that a proposition answers a certain question when in fact it really answers another, this seems to argue that the proposition from itself has some innate meaning whereby from its own resources it can contribute to the answering of more than one question. It seems to argue that the source of meaning to a proposition is not totally borne by the question. On the other hand, differentiation in meaning as the proposition is applied to answer now one now another question certainly argues to the derivation of meaning to the proposition from the question. What seems to follow from this, and it is generally the position which will be taken in evaluating Collingwood's theory, is that propositions are able to draw meaning from the question to which they are the answer provided that from themselves, as propositions, they have (at least some) meaning of their own. In other words, Collingwood seems to exaggerate the contextual meaning of the proposition into its only meaning, its meaning in use into its meaning absolutely. In regard to terms, logicians from mediaeval times distinguished the meaning a term has in its propositional context, which they called the supposition of the term, from the meaning it has in itself, which they called the signification of the term (see Maritain, Formal Logic, N.Y., Sheed and Ward, 1946, pp. 59-72). It would seem that a similar distinction should be maintained between the meaning of propositions in themselves and their meaning in use. Collingwood, like Wittgenstein in this respect, seems to reduce meaning to usage, but, further, unlike Wittgenstein, to reduce usage (and therefore meaning in usage) to usage in answering a question. See in this respect, Donagan's discussion (The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, pp. 60-61,) on the statement 'That is the Bodleian' as able to function as answer to more than one question.

E. First Consequence: The Historicity of Propositional Meanings.

Collingwood draws a far reaching consequence from his reduction of propositional meaning to its function in answering a question. The consequence is that the meaningfulness of propositions can only be determined by historical methods. History, therefore, is going to acquire a commanding position in any epistemological theory. For, the question 'To what question did So-and-so intend this proposition for an answer?' (to which question reduces the question 'What does So-and-so mean by this proposition?) is an historical question, and, as such, cannot be settled without recourse to historical methods. Collingwood maintains that this is not an easy question to answer, since past writers always write for their contemporaries about questions that 'everyone is asking,' and so do not go to the trouble of explicitly stating what is the question that their propositions are intended to answer. But subsequently, when the writer has become a 'classic' the question has become forgotten since the contemporaries who asked it are long since dead, and especially is this so in regard to a question which was 'rightly' answered, for then the writer's contemporaries would have ceased asking it and began asking the next question which 'arose'. So that "the question asked by the original writer can only be reconstructed historically,
often not without the exercise of considerable historical skill." 39

Collingwood illustrates by comparing the work of understanding Plato's *Parmenides* with the archaeological work of distinguishing the various periods of construction in the remains at the south gate of Househeads. Just as that archaeological reconstruction requires penetration into the purpose the builders had in mind at each period, so the *Parmenides* can only be understood by understanding the questions asked at that period and understanding the statements of the *Parmenides* precisely as they are answers to those questions. 40

It forcibly struck Collingwood at the time that "whereas no two propositions can be in themselves mutually contradictory, there are many cases in which one and the same pair of propositions are capable of being thought either that or the opposite, according as the questions they were meant to answer are reconstructed in one way or in another." 41

Collingwood accuses critics, who regard such metaphysical statements as "The world is both one and many" as self contradictions, of ignorance of the question which it was intended to answer by those who made it, just as a critic of the statement 'The contents of this box are both one thing and many things', accusing the one who made it of contradiction,


40 See Ibid., pp. 39-40. The analogy is very illuminating regarding Collingwood's thought. Archaeological interpretation is by the very nature of the case highly contextually conditioned, and the analogy is therefore likely to maximize this aspect at the expense of other aspects which in a different context might have a greater significance than from context alone.

thinking that two incompatible answers are being given to one question, 'Are the contents of this box one x or many x's?', whereas, in fact, there are two questions being asked: (i) 'Are the contents of this box one set of chessmen or many sets?' and (ii) 'Are the contents of this box one chessman or many chessmen?' According to Collingwood, there is no contradiction between saying that something, whether it be the world or the contents of a box, is one and saying that it is many. There would be contradiction only if it were said that something was both one x and many x's; but in the original statement nothing is said about one x or many x's; this was foisted on the statement by the critic, and the contradiction he protests about never existed in his victim's philosophy until the critic himself planted it there, like planting treasonable correspondence in his coat pockets, with the intention of obtaining a reward by denouncing him. 42

Thus, if a given doctrine D is criticized as self-contradictory because it is divisible into two parts E and F, where E contradicts F, the criticism is valid only if the critic has correctly reconstructed the questions to which E and F were given as answers. A critic who is aware of this condition will of course 'show his working' by stating to his readers the evidence on which he has concluded that the author criticised really did formulate his questions in such a way that E and F in his mouth were mutually contradictory. Failing that, a reader disinclined to work the problem out for himself will naturally assume the criticism to be sound or unsound according as he has found the critic to be, in a general way, a good historian.

42 See Ibid., p. 41. No doubt the allusion is to the criticism of Berkeley by Moore and that of Bradley by Cook Wilson referred to above, pp. 57-58.
This realization enabled Collingwood to answer the question left unanswered since 1914, namely 'Whether the realists' critical methods were sound?' His only answer could be that they were not, since their method consisted only in analysing the position being criticized into various propositions between which they detected contradictions. "Following the rules of propositional logic, it never occurred to them that those contradictions might be the fruit of their own historical errors as to the questions which their victims had been trying to answer." And he was far from being favorably impressed by the realists' attitude towards history.

Collingwood wrote out the fruits of his meditations at considerable length and with many illustrations in a book called Truth and Contradiction. War conditions, however, discouraged its publication and Collingwood tells us later in his Autobiography that he destroyed the manuscript of this work.

F. Second Consequence: Philosophical Problems reduced to Historical Problems to be solved by Historical Methods.

Collingwood insisted that in any philosophical discussion it was necessary to get into the mind of the speaker to understand what was

43 An Autobiography, p. 42.
44 Ibid.
45 See Ibid., pp. 42-43; 99.
the problem or the question which was in his mind. Only then could the position he advocated be understood, for his position was his answer to his question. Before criticising an opponent's position, then, it is necessary to actively attempt to understand the opponent's position in terms of his question to which his exposition is intended to be the answer. 46

According to my own 'logic of question and answer,' a philosopher's doctrines are his answers to certain questions he has asked himself, and no one who does not understand what the questions are can hope to understand the doctrines. The same logic committed me to the view that any one can understand any philosopher's doctrines if he can grasp the questions which they are intended to answer. These questions need not be his own; they may belong to a thought-complex very different from any that is spontaneously going on in his mind; but this ought not to prevent him from understanding them and judging whether the persons interested in them are answering them rightly or wrongly. 47

Collingwood found it extremely valuable to habitually follow and take part in discussions concerning subjects and methods which were not his own but other people's. For "...developing their positions and applying them to topics they had not dealt with, to reconstruct their problems in my own mind..." was "a delightful task" and "a magnificent exercise." 48 Which evoked Pritchard's exasperated comment "I wish you'd get off the fence."

46 See Ibid., pp. 53-55.
47 Ibid., p. 55.
48 Ibid., p. 57.
Collingwood says that this way of dealing with other people's thoughts had already become a fixed habit before he realized that it is formally deducible from his 'logic of question and answer.' Thinking this way about the philosophies of others is to think about them historically, and he tells us that as early as the age of six or seven he saw that the only way to tackle any historical question was to see what the different people involved were trying to do. As an example, he refers to the Battle of Trafalgar, since "naval history was a childish passion of mine, and Trafalgar my pet battle."

49 "He had... supreme intellectual self-confidence which prevented him from being taken by surprise, shocked or rattled by anything that might be said. He rarely contradicted or engaged in emphatic dissent. He would not rudely dismiss a statement made to him, but would usually deal with it in the Socratic manner by asking questions often very embarrassing to the person who had raised the subject. This was not always agreeable to the rash and self opinionated." R.B. McCallum, "Robin George Collingwood 1889-1943" (accompanying obituary notice), Proceedings of the British Academy, XXIX, 1943, p. 467.

50 See An Autobiography, p. 58. Collingwood thus acknowledges an innate predisposition to think in this way, just as Descartes was innately disposed to think mathematically.

51 An Autobiography, p. 58. H.I. Marrou in his Meaning of History, p. 37; 103-111, insists on the need for a sympathetic connaturality between a historian and his subject of inquiry which enables the historian to appreciate his subject 'interiorly'. This is important for understanding Collingwood's theory of 'insight' into the 'inner' (i.e. 'thought') dimension of an event which he regards as proper to history. But such sympathetic connaturality is very much in opposition to Collingwood's 'Baconian attitude', that the subject studied be treated as an unwilling witness whose testimony has to be extracted by torture in the process of scientific interrogation. It may be well to remember that Bacon was a lawyer, and, like Collingwood, may have carried over attitudes proper to his profession into other fields in an illegitimate universalizing
History did not mean knowing what events followed what. It meant getting inside other people's heads, looking at their situation through their eyes, and thinking for yourself whether the way in which they tackled it was the right way. Unless you can see the battle through the eyes of a man brought up in sailing ships armed with broadsides of short-range muzzle-loading guns, you are not even a beginner in naval history, you are right outside it. If you allow yourself to think for a moment about the tactics of Trafalgar as if the ships were driven by steam and armed with long-range breech-loading guns, you have for that moment allowed yourself to drift outside the region of history altogether.52

Collingwood again takes up his quarrel with the realists, for whom the problems of history are unchanging problems.53 In thinking that Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, The Stoics, The Schoolmen, The Cartesians, etc., were each giving different answers to the same recurring perennial question, so that the question somehow remained outside the flux of time and therefore of history, they implied that the question itself had no history, that the problem discussed did not itself change from thinker to thinker who successively took it up. He accused the realists of thinking that the problems discussed in modern ethical theory are the same problems as those discussed in Plato's Republic or Aristotle's Ethics, and that the philosopher's task is to ask himself whether, for example, Aristotle or Kant gives 'the right answer' to the problems of duty.54 They re-

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52 An Autobiography, p. 58.
54 See Ibid.
garded the history of philosophy as a mere cataloguing, in order and
date, of the various answers given by successive philosophers to the
eternal (i.e. non-historical) questions of philosophy. For them, there­
fore, the question 'What was Aristotle's theory of duty?' is a historical
question wholly separate from the question 'is what Aristotle said true?'
which was a philosophical question. Collingwood severely criticizes
Oxford philosophical training for which "the history of philosophy was
a subject without philosophical interest," inasmuch as Oxford philo­
sophy was then under the influence of the realists.

One of the problems Collingwood had set himself to reconsider
during the war and in the course of his Albert Memorial meditations was
this attitude of the realists towards the history of philosophy.

Was it really true, I asked myself, that the problems
of philosophy were, even in the loosest sense of that
word, eternal? Was it really true that different philo­
sophies were different attempts to answer the same
questions? I soon discovered it was not true; it was
merely a vulgar error, consequent on a kind of historical
myopia which, deceived by superficial resemblances, failed
to detect profound differences.

Collingwood compares Hobbes' treatment of the nature of the
state in The Leviathan with Plato's in the Republic. They are obviously
two different political theories, but are they two different theories
about the same thing? If you pressed for a definition of the state by

55 See Ibid.

56 An Autobiography, p. 60.

57 Ibid., pp. 60-61. For a discussion of "Collingwood on
Eternal Problems" see Errol Harris, The Philosophical Quarterly, 1
(1951), pp. 228-241.
each, you would find that the differences between the two widely
separated thinkers went down to essentials and beyond mere superficialties.
Collingwood allows that you can call the two things the same if you so
wish, but you must admit that it got diablement changé en route, so much
so that the nature of the state in Plato's time was genuinely different
from the nature of the state in Hobbes' time. Collingwood stresses that
he does not merely mean the empirical nature of the state, but the very
ideal nature; Plato's Republic is an attempt at a theory of one thing
and Hobbes' Leviathan is an attempt at a theory of something else. "What
even the best and wisest of those who are engaged in Politics are trying
to do has altered."58

Collingwood does not deny that there is some connection
between these two things called by the same name, the State, by these
two thinkers, but he wants to insist that the connection is not the one
maintained by the realists. He agrees that no one would dispute that
what Hobbes' Leviathan and Plato's Republic is about is in some way the
same but in another way different. The dispute is precisely about the
kind of sameness and the kind of difference. Whereas for the realists
the sameness is that of a universal and the difference that between two
instances of that universal, Collingwood maintains that "the sameness
is the sameness of a historical process and the difference is the
difference between one thing which in the course of that process has

turned into something else, and that other thing into which it has
turned."\textsuperscript{59} A traceable historical process relates Plato's Polis to
Hobbes' Absolutist state, a process by which one is turned into the other.
Anyone who argues that the two political theories are contradictorily
related, and that therefore one must be right and the other wrong,
egnors that process and denies that difference between them which
results from that process.

Thinking along these lines forced Collingwood to the conclusion
that the history of political theory is not the history of different
answers to the one same question, but is rather the history of a more
or less changing problem whose solution was likewise changing along with
the problem. Thus, the form of the Polis is not one unchanging ideal
of human society eternally laid up in heaven and the eternal goal of the
efforts of all good statesmen of every age. It was the ideal of human
society as conceived by the Greeks of Plato's time. But, by Hobbes'
time people had changed their minds as to what they regarded as the ideal
of social organization. The ideals in each case were different.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 62.

\textsuperscript{60} See Ibid., p. 62-63. Notwithstanding that Collingwood
presents his thinking here in his Autobiography as the fruits of his
own labouring mind, it is difficult not to see reflected in them what
Croce had written in his Logica come Scienza del Concetto Puro first
published in 1905: "Every definition is the answer to a question, the
solution to a problem; and there would be no need to enunciate it if we
did not put questions to ourselves, and did not propose problems. Why
otherwise give ourselves this inconvenience? What need would constrain
us? Definition arises, as does every mental work, from a contrast, a
Likewise, what the Greeks meant by 'ought' in Ethics is not the same as what Kant means when he is discussing moral obligation.

The ideals of personal conduct are as impermanent as the ideals of social organization and so have to be approached from the historical point of view; and even what is meant by calling them ideals is subject to similar change. The realists erred in thinking 'ought to behave' has an eternal, unchanging, unique meaning about which different peoples at different times and places held differing views, some wrong, some right. But, if struggle, a war which seeks a peace, from a darkness which seeks light, ...it is a question which demands an answer. Not only does the answer suppose a question, but such an answer supposes such a question. The answer must be proportioned to the question, otherwise it would not be an answer but the illusion of an answer...But the question, the problem, the doubt is always individually conditioned: the doubt of the child is not the doubt of the adult; the doubt of the uncultured man is not the doubt of the cultured man; the doubt of the novice is not the doubt of the indoctrinated; the doubt of an Italian is not the doubt of a German, and the doubt of a German of 1800 is not the doubt of a German of 1900. In fact, the doubt formulated by an individual at a determinate moment is not the same as that formulated by that same individual a moment later. By way of simplification one tends (suole) to affirm that the same question has been posed as such by many men in many centuries and varying times. But in saying this, one makes a simplification which amounts to an abstraction. In reality every question is different from every other, and every definition, however constant it may sound, and however circumscribed by certain determinate words, in reality is different from every other, because the words, even when they seem to be materially the same, are effectively different, according to the spiritual diversity of those who pronounce them, these being individuals who find themselves, therefore, in new and individual circumstances." Translated from the work cited, appearing as Vol II, Logica, Philosophia come Scienza dello Spirito, Bari, Gius, Laterza and Figli, 1964; see pp. 133-134.

they had merely consulted the texts on their shelves as to the meaning therein they would have been alerted to this, instead of systematically mistranslating passages in the light of their mistaken preconceptions. An acquaintance with the history of science should show anyone that, when Einstein introduced discussion about relativity into philosophy, any convictions about the eternity of problems and conceptions were as unfounded as a young girl's conviction that this year's hats are the only ones any sane woman would wear. Collingwood thus became convinced that Metaphysics, rather than being a futile attempt to know what lies beyond the limits of experience is primarily an attempt to discover what the people of a given time believe about the general nature of the world, such beliefs being the presuppositions of all their physics, and therefore of all their (relevant) questionings into detail. In addition, he recognized that Metaphysics is an attempt to discover the corresponding presuppositions of other peoples at other times and to show the historical process by which one set of presuppositions has turned into another. 62

Collingwood recognizes that discovering what presuppositions underlie the physics of a given people at a certain time, which is the question metaphysicians have to answer, is a purely historical question. He denies that it is their business to raise the further question whether among the various beliefs so held at different times and places, this

62 See An Autobiography, p. 66. The question of Metaphysics as being concerned about the presuppositions to questions will be taken up later (in Chapter 5).
or that one is true and opposed to the others as false. Such a question, according to Collingwood has consistently been found to be unanswerable.

...if there is anything in my 'logic of question and answer' that is not to be wondered at, for the beliefs whose history the metaphysician has to study are not answers to questions but only presuppositions to questions, and therefore the distinction between what is true and what is false does not apply to them, but only the distinction between what is presupposed and what is not presupposed.63

Collingwood clarifies this by distinguishing what he calls relative presuppositions from absolute presuppositions which, latter, is the proper concern of the metaphysician. Some presuppositions to questions are themselves answers to prior questions. But "(t)he beliefs which a metaphysician tries to study and codify are presuppositions of the questions asked by natural scientists, but are not answers to any questions at all," which "might be expressed by calling them 'absolute presuppositions.'"64

Collingwood does not deny that the statements made by metaphysicians are true or false, for their statements (about absolute presuppositions) are answers to questions about the history of these presuppositions. Metaphysics can rightly lay claim to being a science, not in the same way as a naturalistic science, but as an organized body of knowledge in which:

63 Ibid., p. 66.

on the one hand, the beliefs of a given set of people at a given time concerning the nature of the world are exhibited as a single complex contemporaneous fact...and on the other hand the origin of these beliefs is enquired into, and it is found that during a certain space of time they have come into existence by certain changes out of certain others.

Collingwood came by degrees to recognize that no branch of philosophy was exempt from the historical conditioning of its problems and solutions; the only sense in which he would admit the eternity of an historical fact was in the sense that it had happened once and for all.

Collingwood then grappled with the realist's distinction between the 'historical' question 'What was So-and so's theory on such and such a matter?' and the 'philosophical' question 'Was he right?' He rejected this distinction since it depended on the presupposition that there are permanent and eternal problems in history.

If there were a permanent problem P, we could ask 'what did Kant, or Leibnitz, or Berkeley, think about P?' and if that question could be answered, we could then go on to ask 'was Kant, or Leibnitz, or Berkeley, right in what he thought about P?' But what is thought to be a permanent problem P is really a number of transitory problems p₁, p₂, p₃...whose individual peculiarities are blurred by the historical myopia of the person who lumps them together under one name P. It follows that we cannot fish the problem P out of the hyperuranian bag, hold it up, and say, 'what does So-and-so think about this?' we have to begin as poor devils of historians begin, from the other end. We have to study documents and interpret them. We have to say 'here is a passage of Leibnitz; what is it about? what is the problem with which it deals?' Perhaps we could label that problem p₁₄.

65 Ibid., p. 67.
66 Ibid., p. 69.
The next question is 'Does Leibnitz deal rightly or wrongly with his problem?' The answer to this question is not as easy as the realists think. If in writing the relevant passage Leibnitz happened to be so confused in his own thinking as to completely mess up the job of solving his problem he would have thereby so mixed up his own tracks that no reader would be able clearly to unravel exactly what his problem was.

For one and the same passage states his solution and serves as evidence of what the problem was. The fact that we can identify his problem is proof that he has solved it; for we only know what the problem was by arguing back from the solution.67

We can only discover what tactical problem Nelson set himself at Trafalgar by studying the tactics he pursued in the battle and argue back from the solution to the problem. Even if we had the original typescript of the coded orders to his captains a few hours before the beginning of the battle this would not tell us that he had not changed his mind at the last moment and thought out a new plan, trusting to his captains to understand what he was doing and back him up. Collingwood alleges that it is for this reason that Naval historians give much consideration to Nelson's tactical plan, but not to Villeneuve's. Because Nelson won the battle, we can reconstruct what his plan was, but no one will ever know what Villeneuve's plan was because he did not succeed in carrying it out; one may hazard a guess at it, but guessing is not history.68

67 Ibid., p. 70.
68 Ibid.
Collingwood draws the far reaching conclusion that "there are not two separate sets of questions to be asked, one historical and one philosophical, about a given passage in a given historical author. There is one set only, historical."\(^{69}\)

From this it follows that Plato is to be studied in exactly the same way as Thucydides. The study of Greek philosophy is a historical study just as is the study of Greek warfare. Collingwood does not reject the question 'Was Plato right to think as he did on such or such question?', but he points out that it is to be answered in the same way as the question 'Was Phormio right to row round the Corinthian's circle?' It is just as much history that he beat the Corinthians by doing it in the way he did it. Collingwood warns against 'the ghost of Ranke' gibbering about 'what exactly happened?', for he alleges that such an attitude ignores that victories as well as tactical manoeuvres are things that happen.

G. Collingwood's Conclusion from these Considerations.

Collingwood tells us that these ideas which were only partially worked out before his return to Oxford after the (1914-18) war became clear to him on his return there. Rather than discuss them with his Oxford colleagues, he put them into practice with his pupils in accordance with an ancient Oxford tradition of reading, expounding and commenting on philosophical texts. He held that the best way of teaching undergraduates exactly how the subject under consideration has been revolutionized is

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\(^{69}\) Ibid., p. 72.
by lecturing on the old classics, whose authors in their day may have revolutionized the subject, and showing in one's commentary how their doctrine has been modified. He observes that this was a field of activity exactly suited to him inasmuch as his inclinations led him towards detail rather than towards generalization.\(^{70}\)

Collingwood insisted that his students obey two rules governing the procedure of textual analysis before going on to the further task of criticising its doctrine. The first rule was that criticism of an author was not to be accepted before satisfactorily establishing that the criticism is relevant. The second rule (from his meditations on the Albert Memorial) was to "reconstruct the problem", or to "never think you understand any statement made by a philosopher until you have decided, with the utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he means it for an answer."\(^{71}\)

Thus the history of philosophy...was no longer a 'closed' subject. It was no longer a body of facts which a very, very learned man might know, or a very, very big book enumerate, in their completeness. It was an 'open' subject, an inexhaustible fountain of problems, old problems re-opened and new problems formulated that had not been formulated until now. Above all it was a constant warfare against the...dogmas of that putrefying corpse of historical thought, the 'information' to be found in text-books. For, in the history of philosophy, as in every other kind, nothing capable of being memorized, is history.\(^{72}\)

\(^{70}\) See Ibid., p. 74. This admission alerts us to ask how far native temperament and acquired inclinations have played a determining (and perhaps unexamined) part in his judgments concerning philosophical procedure, just as Descartes' natural mathematical bent is material in assessing his verdict on the nature of philosophical method.

\(^{71}\) Ibid.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., pp. 75-76.
CHAPTER THREE

SUPPOSAL AND QUESTIONING

A. Questioning as Supposing, the Cutting Edge of the Mind.

The activity of questioning presents itself in two ways in Collingwood's earlier work, Speculum Mentis (1924), in which he distinguishes five forms of human experience in dynamic evolution: Art, Religion, Science, History and Philosophy. The evolutionary transformation of one life form into the next (in the order given above) is by way of a question and answer process, the lower form (e.g., Art) being related to its next higher (e.g., Religion) as a question to its answer. Each lower form, as it tends to its own fulfillment tends simultaneously to its own disintegration and transformation, inasmuch as it is in dynamic disequilibrium with itself in such a way that its fulfillment is in another, higher life form to which it gives way. Each life form is a system which makes a promise it cannot fulfill; the system thus breaks down under increasing strain of internal contradiction which precipitates criticism (i.e. questioning) of the validity of that form. The answer to the question thus internally provoked is provided by transition to the next higher life form.

Thus, "(a)rt by its own dialectic gives rise, over against itself, to criticism, which is science."¹ "The point at which a child begins to ask whether stories are true, and passes through the crisis of learning to disbelieve in fairies...indicates the emergence of religion

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from art."² "It (i.e. art) is pregnant with a message it cannot deliver."³ "When (language is seen to express not itself but thought as its meaning) art and religion cease to exist as self-contained and autonomous forms of experience and give way to a life no longer of expression but of thought."⁴ "This revolution in the use of language (from the metaphorical, as in art and religion, to the literal) is the birth of science."⁵ Then "(t)he discovery of the abstractness of science is...the birth of history."⁶ "Science is a question whose answer is history."⁷ "Science is explicit to itself as thought, but it turns out on enquiry to be identical with the questioning activity; that is, it realizes the contradiction of a type of thought which is not thought precisely because it is thought's opposite, intuition."⁸ "...history solves the question which science asks but cannot answer."⁹ "The discovery (that science presupposes history and can never go behind history)...implicitly resolves science into history."¹⁰ "History is an unstable attitude which leads

² Ibid., p. 113.
³ Ibid., p. 110.
⁴ Ibid., p. 155.
⁵ Ibid., p. 157.
⁶ Ibid., p. 180.
⁷ Ibid., p. 186.
⁸ Ibid., p. 188.
⁹ Ibid., p. 193.
either back into science or forward into philosophy.  "The transition... effected from history to philosophy is...merely the making explicit of what was implicit already," namely "that in the last resort nothing but the knower can be known."

Generally speaking, then, Speculum Mentis is a phenomenology of human experience in which the dynamism throughout is a raising and solving of problems, a constant raising and answering of questions.  

...the life of the mind consists of raising and solving problems, problems in art, religion, science, commerce, politics, and so forth. The solution of these problems does not leave behind it a sediment of ascertained fact, which grows and solidifies as the mind's work goes on. Such a sediment is nothing but the externality of a half-solved problem: when the problem is fully solved the sediment of information disappears and the mind is left at liberty to go on. Philosophy therefore, is not a prerogative kind of knowledge immune from this reabsorption into the mind's being: it is nothing but the recognition that this reabsorption is necessary and is indeed the end and crown of all knowledge, the self-recognition of the mind in its own mirror.

But, in addition to this general identification of the activity of the mind with a questioning and answering process, Collingwood identifies questioning in a special way with the aesthetic activity characteristic of that life form which is the artistic, which, according to Collingwood, is

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11 Ibid., p. 230.
12 Ibid., pp. 245-246.
14 Speculum Mentis, p. 317.
the first and basic form of human experience. In the section of Speculum
Mentis\textsuperscript{15} entitled 'Knowledge as Question and Answer', Collingwood makes
an intimate tie-up of the mind's questioning activity with the imaginative
activity characteristic of art.

What characterizes the life form of art is that "the aesthetic
experience is imaginative not in the sense that its objects are fictitious
but in the sense that it treats them indifferently, whether they are
fictitious or real."\textsuperscript{16} So, according to Collingwood, what is characteristic
of imaginative activity is its attitude of indifference to the reality
or non-reality of its objects. The objects may in fact be real, or they
may be unreal, but this aspect is of no concern to the imagination as
such. It is the attitude "which neither asserts reality truly or falsely,
nor denies it, but merely imagines."\textsuperscript{17} Shakespeare's Hamlet, as a work
of art, may or may not conform to real characters and incidents; this
argues neither for nor against its merits as a work of art. Collingwood
notes that this mental attitude, which neither asserts nor denies reality,
truth or falsity, has been given a great deal of attention by recent
philosophers "under the name of hypothesis, intuition, supposal, re-
presentation and so forth."\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} Section 5 of Ch. 3, pp. 76-86.

\textsuperscript{16} Speculum Mentis, p. 76.

\textsuperscript{17} Speculum Mentis, pp. 60-61; p. 76. See also Principles of

\textsuperscript{18} Speculum Mentis, p. 76. The 'philosophers' referred to no
Collingwood criticises those philosophers who err by isolating this mental attitude from the general context of human experience, thereby regarding it as a self-contained and autonomous phase of experience which would then require some sort of a bridge to make the transition to other phases, principally those of assertion and denial. If the mind in fact succeeded in achieving that condition in which it neither asserts nor denies but merely intuitively represents its object to itself it could never acquire the ability, nor would it ever have a reason to pass out of that condition. It is useless to appeal to intervention of the concept to bridge this unbridgeable gulf from supposal to assertion, for this would be merely to postulate (suppose) that the problem had been solved without facing the difficulty as to how the concept would be able to intervene


19 See Speculum Mentis, p. 76. The aesthetic life, according
in such a situation. But, says Collingwood, this is a pseudo-problem, since the mind never operates in a vacuum of pure imagination or supposal. There is no bridge because there is solid ground all the way between supposal and assertion.

Supposal and assertion are not two independent chapters in the history of mind; they are two opposite and correlative activities which form as it were the systole and diastole of knowledge itself.  

Collingwood criticises "a crude empiricism" which regards knowledge to be only a matter of assertion, for it is only in retrospect, by looking back over the traversed road, that a knower identifies knowledge with assertion. Knowledge as a past, accomplished fact, such as one finds in encyclopaedias and textbooks is indeed assertion. But first hand acquaintance with knowledge, as it is an activity of the mind, as it is something the mind does, not just something it 'apprehends',

to Collingwood, is a self contradicting attempt to live out this attitude of supposal, which breaks down, and gives way to religious experience as the contradiction becomes felt and apparent. Aesthetic activity creates a world in which it is possible to live as an artist. But life-experience intrudes many things that cannot be meaningfully included in that world. Witness the struggle many artists have lived with all their life namely, how to live the artistic life and make a living. The artistic world is not therefore an all inclusive world; the world horizon of meaning has to give way and become expanded if certain experiences are to be meaningfully accounted for.

20 Speculum Mentis, p. 77. This, in substance, would be Collingwood's answer to the question which tormented Bradley, whether there are any Floating Ideas? "In the end and taken absolutely...there can be no mere idea. Reality is always before us, and every idea in some sense qualifies the real. So far as excluded it is excluded only from some limited region, and beyond that region has its world. To float in the absolute sense is impossible. Flotation means attachment
shows that knowledge is a matter of voyage and discovery in which assertions are only answers to questions. Thus it was for such as Plato, Bacon and Kant,

So, Plato described true knowledge as 'dialectic' the interplay of question and answer in the soul's dialogue with itself; so Bacon pointed out once for all that the scientist's real work was to interrogate nature, to put her, if need be, to the torture as a reluctant witness; So Kant mildly remarked that the test of an intelligent man was to know what question to ask...

Collingwood calls questioning "the cutting edge of knowledge" and assertion "the dead weight behind the edge that gives driving force." Questioning apart from information and information apart from questioning are valueless.

Questions undirected by positive information, random questions, cut nothing; they fall in the void and yield no knowledge. Information, when it is not ground to the keen edge of inquiry, is not knowledge but mere pedantry,

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to another world, a world other than that sphere which for any purpose we take here as solid ground and as fact." Bradley, "On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary", Mind, LX (1906), p. 451 (pp. 35-36 of Truth and Reality). For Collingwood, supposal and assertion are two sides of the one entity which is knowledge of reality. Ernst Cassirer, The Logic of The Humanities, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960, pp. 56-56 says that "(a)ll concrete spiritual events, all genuine "history" is only the reflection...of this continually renewing process, this "systole" and "diastole", this separation and reintegration."

21 Speculum Mentis, p. 77.

22 Speculum Mentis, p. 78. Compare p. 237, The Idea of History (on Historical Evidence) "The question is the charge of gas, exploded in the cylinder head, which is the motive force of every piston-stroke." See above, Chapter 1, pp. 42-43.
the talent buried in the earth. 23

Collingwood allows that textbooks and encyclopaedias are invaluable as a body of information which directs further questioning, but he regards them as contemptible if considered to constitute and exhaust knowledge. "Information may be the body of knowledge, but questioning is its soul." 24

Collingwood then identifies questioning with the activity of supposal, which is the activity characteristic of the imagination and aesthetic activity.

Supposal and questioning are at bottom the same thing; or rather, supposal when seen in its proper perspective as an integral element in knowledge turns out to be questioning. 25

This questioning aspect of knowledge, inasmuch as it is an activity other than asserting, since it is supposing, is a puzzle to empiricists, for whom something has to really exist, and therefore be an object of assertion, if it is to be an object of knowledge, for they

23 Speculum Mentis, p. 78. See also B. Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality, p. 36: "The guide of research is the body of existing knowledge, and it is this that endows the will to observe which in ignorance must be the servant of caprice, with aims properly subordinated to the discovery of truth."

24 Speculum Mentis, p. 78.

25 Speculum Mentis, p. 78. See also B. Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality, p. 36: "The differentia of supposal which it shares with experiment as such is the replacement of intellectual by arbitrary choice."
regard knowledge as the imprint forced on our mind by a really existing object demanding our attention. But, contrary to this, asking a question always means, to some extent at least, envisaging alternatives of which one only can exist. Because questioning thus always to some degree contemplates the non-existent it is essentially a suspension of the activity of asserting, and this is precisely how aesthetic experience or imagination is defined.

But, whereas for aesthetic experience this suspension of assertion seems to be an end in itself, not looking forward to its own negation in the renewal of assertion, true questioning on the other hand is a suspension of assertion which looks forward to a renewal of this asserting activity in the shape of an answer.

26 Applied to history, this means that for the positivist facts are "hard facts" with an identity of their own, independently of the mind's questioning activity, "out there" for the mind to apprehend.

27 See also, New Leviathan p. 74, pgph. 11.12: "Asking a question implies contemplating alternatives. A question that offers no alternatives is a bogus question;" pp. 74-75, pgph 11.22 "...a proposition is an answer to a question and a question offers alternatives." However, Herbert Butterfield in his Man on His Past (Cambridge University Press, 1955, pp. 171-201), shows that the historical problem of the Saint Bartholomew massacre was solved finally by admitting the coexistence of the alternatives. Whether Rome was to be considered guilty or not depended on whether there was premeditation or not. Both sides were vigorously defended by opponents, till finally it was agreed that the evident premeditation was not the precipitating cause of the uprising. And, similarly, Leslie Armour (The Concept of Truth, 1969, p. 181) writes: "If we are considering more general historical theses (than whether or not Charles I was beheaded), we may not be so sure that there is a single right answer or that two answers, which conflict in important ways may not be both right."
Art, as pure imagination, imagination without assertion, may be paradoxically defined as a question which expects no answer: that is, a supposal.\footnote{Speculum Mentis, p. 79. See also B. Bosanquet Knowledge and Reality, p. 36: "Supposal as such excludes the affirmation of what is supposed in the sense that an act which is supposal is not qua supposal, also affirmation."}

But, just as questioning looks beyond itself to assertion, having no end in itself, so neither does it have an absolute beginning in itself. The supposal, either of questioning or of aesthetic experience, both of which are acts of imagining, cannot be themselves absolute beginnings. There is no pure act of imagining and there is no pure questioning.\footnote{See Speculum Mentis, p. 79.}

Even the silliest or most irresponsible question prerequires some information already to hand, and therefore presupposes assertion as a condition of itself. A pure question would ask nothing; it would be no more than the empty form of questioning, a mere interrogation mark with nothing preceding it.\footnote{See also S. Lupasco, Du devenir logique et de l'affectivité, Paris, Vrin, 1935, t.2, pp. 83-85 on the impossibility of reduction of radical doubt to pure questioning activity. See also K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1968, pp. 57-77 for a discussion of the being of man as a questioning being. "...in human existence the question is that fact which absolutely refuses to be replaced by another fact, to be reduced back to another fact..." But, this questioning, identified with the being of man, is absolute as a fact, that is, only inasmuch as its own existence is presupposed-affirmed (i.e. asserted to be a fact) by and indeed in the very questioning itself.}

But even the empty form of questioning, signified by the question mark (?) implies that there is information (and therefore assertion) available.
Any act must start somewhere and a pure act of imagination just because it is completely divorced from fact, would have nowhere to start from and would therefore have no reason for determining itself in one way rather than any other.31

Collingwood is saying here that every question is a determinate question, a fully determined act. But it would not be so determined except by the existence of available information. A question, therefore, seems, according to Collingwood's explanation here, to be a form which (previously asserted) information can be given by the imaginative activity whereby that information is (imaginatively) made to implicate (imagined) alternatives, one or other of which alternatives will be determined by assertion and thereby become the answer to the question. The form in question, whereby past information becomes a question, the form which, when applied to that information, is the 'cutting-edge' of the mind, seems to be the form of the imagination (i.e., one of the forms which the mind's activity takes; for Collingwood the imagination is not a faculty, a department of a fixed entity, but a mode of the activity which is the mind) with a dynamic thrust pointing towards information to be had by way of an answer, something like an arrow directed to a target. Already possessed factual information (past assertions), knowledge of the textbook or encyclopaedia variety, is taken as a material by the mind and formed into a question.32 These previous assertions, congealed

31 Speculum Mentis, p. 79.

32 This 'available information' is nothing other than man's past. Thus history provides the mind with 'the weight' on which the
(incapsulated?) as available information, are then given an imaginative non-assertive form by being given imaginative implicatory reference to possible alternatives, neither of which is presently asserted to be the real or true state of affairs, the mind being simultaneously under dynamic tension to resolve the alternative possibilities one way or another. But, which of the visualized alternatives is to be asserted, and thus function (not just as an abstract proposition, but) as answer to the question, is to be decided and determined by reference to further facts to be sought precisely in order to answer the question (e.g., the clues for which the detective looks). Thus, already available factual information provokes questions, and these questions in turn call forth the ascertainment of further information (asserted fact) in order that they may be answered.

Thus, questioning, and artistic, activity, being all imaginative activity, is itself embedded in a matrix of concrete fact; it begins from there; it thrives there and in concrete fact asserted it results.

\[\text{mind will 'grind' the cutting edge of inquiry and thrust forward to hitherto unknown information; the future would seem to be nothing other than 'the dynamic direction' of this activity to be brought into the present (and subsequently into the past, to become itself part of history) by this dynamism of questioning. Questioning therefore is the very dynamism of history, the activity of the mind, and the mind is what it does.}\]

33 This is how I read Collingwood's alignment of questioning with desire in his \textit{New Leviathan}, chapter 11.
Even if art is pure imagination it must spring from a soil of concrete fact; the artist must really exist in a real world, and his works of art are necessarily a kind of sublimated version of his experience as a real person, however unconscious of this fact he may be.\(^{34}\)

Even though the imaginative work, as imaginative, is indifferent to reality and to truth, nevertheless it is not just imaginatively imagined; it is really imagined, and therefore by a real person in a real situation.\(^{35}\) The artist, engrossed in his artistic, imaginative work as such knows nothing of the reality of that work or of the reality of the situation in which he works. Everything is imagined to be put into the work expressed, even his whole self and his whole world of reality. Nevertheless that very all-absorption presupposes the reality of that activity and the reality of the artist situated in the world of fact quite distinct from the artistic work.

The work of art is an imaginative cutting edge to a mind whose solid backing of factual experience may be forgotten for the moment, but is none the less very real; or rather, it is not forgotten but distilled into the work of art, present to the mind in this form and no other.\(^{36}\)

That is, the artist, in the act of imagining, has imaginatively translated his whole world of lived experience into that one activity

\(^{34}\) Speculum Mentis, p. 79.

\(^{35}\) See K. Rahner quote, p. 101 note 30 above.

\(^{36}\) Speculum Mentis, p. 79.
which, for him, presents to him the whole meaning of the world and of
himself as something not distinguishable from that world. This seems
to imply that the work of art is the concrete universal attained
obscurely and confusedly (a 'felt' identity in difference, prior to
mediation by thought in the concept), which, when the level of philo-
sophical reflection is attained, will be revealed distinctly as a whole
of identity in difference.

But that act of imagining would not be done if the artist did
not draw on his lived experience and the concrete facts of his daily life.

Thus the imaginative activity of art is itself supported
and surrounded by a medium of fact; but the essence of the
purely aesthetic frame of mind is that this medium or back-
ground is overlooked.37

But, if the artist, in his artistic activity, may overlook
this real matrix of fact, the philosopher is not excused from doing so.
A purely imaginal philosophy would be basically unsound. Whereas reality
and truth and fact is ignored by the artist, it belongs to the philo-
sopher's stock in trade. "Imagination does not exist in the free state,
and itself requires a basis of fact."38

But the other side of the picture is that:

This basis of fact in turn requires a basis of imagina-
tion, for no fact can be known until it has been sought

37 Ibid., p. 80.

38 Speculum Mentis, p. 80.
by the imaginative act of questioning, and this question itself requires a further basis of fact, and so on ad
infinitum.39

Thus, just as imagination is fact-based, so also fact is imagination-based; each mediates the other, and, in turn, is mediated by the other. Fact is not something 'out there' to be apprehended, as realist empiricists would have us believe.40 The very facticity of a fact already involves the stabilizing work of the imagination working on the flux of sensation, since it, that is, fact, is an object of consciousness and consciousness is always of something, of some definite object, never pure, undifferentiated, indeterminate sensation.41 The 'sense-data' of empiricists are already interpretations, not only of imagination, but even of the understanding, for the term involves their relationships to one another.42 The objects of imagination also are interpretations of sensation, not interpretations at the level of understanding, involving

39 Ibid.

40 That is, there are no "hard facts"; see G. Buchdahl, "Logic and History" (An Assessment of R.G. Collingwood's Idea of History), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XXVI (1948), p. 95.

41 See Principles of Art, p. 203 "The place which Hume's ideas inhabit is the empty room of Locke, progressively furnished with what 'the busy and boundless Fancy of man' provides. And it is imagination, not sensation, to which appeal is made when empiricists appeal to 'experience'". (Emphasis added).

42 See Principles of Art, p. 214.
conceptual and differentiation and interrelation, but imaginative interpretation. So, the work of imagination is involved in every fact.

But, conversely, the work of imagination is not only implied by, but itself implies a preexistent basis of fact. Collingwood asks 'Does this involve us in an infinite regress of fact dependent upon imagination and imagination dependent on fact, and so on?' His answer is 'No':

...only because the two moments, question and answer, are not actually separate. Their distinction is an ideal distinction only, and the presupposition of each by the other is only a way of stating their inseparability.\(^4\)

Collingwood then states that:

the process of knowledge is therefore, strictly speaking, not so much an alternation of question and answer as a perpetual restatement of the question, which is identical with a perpetual revision of the answer.\(^4\)

Anticipating the objection that this reduces all the diversity of knowledge to a bare identity in which there is only one judgment judging one truth, Collingwood replies: "Our answer - to be given in full later - will be that this identity contains all diversity within itself."\(^4\)

\(^4\) Speculum Mentis, p. 80.

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid. Collingwood's own thought has been followed here as closely as possible, for this, and his immediately preceding statements, are of the highest importance for the interpretation of his thought.
This 'identity which contains within itself all diversity' will be shown later to be the key concept of Collingwood's whole thought, especially in regard to the logic of question and answer; it is the notion of the concrete universal which Collingwood inherits from the British Idealists, especially Bradley and Bosanquet.  

The interpretation of Collingwood's treatment of the totality of the life of the mind in *Speculum Mentis* in the light of what he says in this particular section (pp. 76-80) of *Speculum Mentis* can be illustratively summarized by imagining the mind's activity as a moving hand on the face of a clock. If we imagine the full sweep of the hand around the face of the clock from 6 o'clock position back to 6 o'clock position through the 12 o'clock position and all the intervening positions, we may regard the beginning, 6 o'clock, position of the hand as representing ex-

46 This "identity" which "contains all diversity in itself" is "the absolute object (which) is individuality, for individuality is concreteness", that is, fully determined. (*Speculum Mentis*, p. 218). It is a 'concrete universal' which, in the tradition of British Idealism, is the basis of logic and intelligibility. The interpretation of Collingwood has therefore to be made against the background of Bradley's and Bosanquet's (especially the latter's) teaching on the concrete universal. Likewise, the identification of conscious awareness with one sustained judgment is necessary to understand what Collingwood says here; see B. Bosanquet, *The Essentials of Logic*, London, MacMillan, 1897, pp. 21-41, especially p. 33. Whereas, for Bosanquet, consciousness is identified with one sustained affirmative judgment, for Collingwood consciousness is a sustained ("restatement") answer to a sustained ("restated") question. This is how I read his insistence on philosophy as being a constant return to its beginnings; see his Essay on Philosophical Method, pp. 22-23; 168.
perience devoid as yet of any explanation, and the terminating 6 oclock position as representing fully explained experience, the intervening positions representing the various moments of the movement of the activity of explanation. The 12 oclock position of the hand would represent the greatest elongation (abstraction) of explanation from the experience it purports to explain. This would represent that of abstract mathematical or exact science in which pure explicative thought is maximally independent of experienced actuality. Art, then religion, would be located somewhere on the passage from 6 oclock to 12 oclock; experimental science and then history would be represented somewhere along the return sweep from 12 oclock back to 6 oclock according as greater and greater account is taken of fact. Philosophy may be regarded as the central position on the face from which the hand radiates in its sweep around the dial; it is concerned with all respective positions. History in its culmination at the 6 oclock position is at the same time the recognition of the clock as a clock, that is the fully explicit recognition of what the overall philosophical view manifests in regard to all particular aspects, the view of the whole as a whole in relation to all its parts.

If we, then, imagine ourselves seated somewhere at the pointing end of the moving hand we may imagine ourselves looking either in the backward direction from which the hand has travelled or in the forward direction towards which it is travelling. If we adopt the backward looking aspect what we will see has the aspect of available information,
or answers to questions. But if we take the forward looking aspect what we see takes on the aspect of questioning. Thus, any point indicated by the moving hand is both a questioning and an answering position (just as at any moment the hand is together moving away from the 6 o'clock position and back towards the 6 o'clock position); it all depends on whether you regard the one same concrete actuality of movement in relation to what it has left behind or in relation to what it is approaching. An anti-clockwise sweep of the mind's eye round the dial sees everything as answers, whereas a clockwise sweep of the mind's eye around the clock face will see everything as questions.

If this helpful illustration is kept in mind, many of the texts just analysed become extremely illuminating in their relation to Collingwood's global position and to many of its details. Reconsider, for instance, Collingwood's statement that supposal and assertion are not two independent chapters in the mind's history but two opposite and correlative activities forming the systole and diastole of knowledge, and, again, his statement that it is only in retrospect, by looking back over the road travelled, that knowledge comes to be identified with assertion, with accomplished past fact, such as encyclopaedia knowledge.

Collingwood's statement that "(t)he progressive alienation

47 See p. 97, this chapter, above.
of the mind from its object is in history complete" \(^{48}\) would seem to argue against locating mathematics and exact science at the 12 o'clock position of the above clock-face illustration as the position of greatest elongation of abstractive distancing from experience, located at the 6 o'clock position. But what Collingwood says repeatedly, (especially in *Speculum Mentis*, pp. 163-169) seems rather to qualify exact science for the occupancy of this position of abstractive extremity.

B. The Nature of Supposal as an Activity of the Imagination

As stated above \(^{49}\) Collingwood aligns the activity of questioning with the imaginative activity of supposal whose proper characteristic is that it treats objects indifferently as to whether they are real or not.

If absolutized as a distinct life form and thus lived for its own sake this imaginative activity of supposal is the same as the aesthetic activity of art. In order more fully to understand this activity of supposal so relevant to questioning it will be necessary to analyse what Collingwood says regarding the nature of art and try to disengage those aspects of his theory of art which throw light on the nature of supposal as this latter applies to the theory of questioning. This will

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48 See *Speculum Mentis*, p. 238.

49 This chapter, p. 95.
require an analysis of Collingwood's *Principles of Art* (1938). Since the relevant material is somewhat involved, it is considered advisable to move this whole section to an appendix, rather than disturb the continuity of thought in analysing Collingwood's theory of questioning. Having dealt with the nature of questioning as supposal or the active thrust of the mind in transforming experience into rationally meaningful experience, the next consideration, and the most basic consideration from the logical point of view, is that of the type of universal according to which experience is structured when it is the experience of a questioning mind. This is the concrete universal which is the basis of concrete and historical thinking as opposed to the abstract genus species logic based on the abstract universal proper to scientific thinking. The treatment of Collingwood's theory of art, as this bears on his theory of questioning will be found in an appendix at the end of this work.
A. The Concrete Universal vs the Abstract Universal.

According to R.G.C. Mure,¹ the doctrine of the concrete universal originates in Hegel's rejection of Kant's explanation of the moment of individual reality in human knowledge. Rejecting Kant's passive sense-intuition of an alien thing-in-itself "Hegel sets his own interpretation on the original unity of thought and being adumbrated in Kant's unity of apperception."² "...the Notion...contains within itself, and itself sets forth, the Negation which determines it. Inasmuch as its significant negation is its own activity, nothing outside it determines it. And that is to say that it is the Universal - the Universal determining itself as Individual."³ "Here...originates the doctrine of the concrete universal which has inspired British nineteenth century idealism and found perhaps its most consistent expression in Bosanquet's Gifford lectures."⁴


⁴ Ibid., p. 166. Bosanquet's most significant treatment of the concrete universal is his second lecture, The Gifford Lectures for 1911 at the University of Edinburgh, published as The Principle of Individuality and Value, London, MacMillan, 1927, pp. 31-81 (abstract of Lecture 2, pp. xix-xxi).
Lionel Rubinoff says⁵ that "Collingwood's conclusion...concerning the nature of historical explanation is clear and unequivocal" when he (Collingwood) asserts⁶ that "...the concrete universal is the daily bread of every historian, and the logic of history is the logic of the concrete universal." If, as Collingwood elsewhere argued,⁷ the logic of history is distinctively a logic of question and answer, it follows that this logic of question and answer is a logic of the concrete universal. This logic is quite distinct from the abstract, formal logic which characterises scientific thought.

Formal logic, whether in its scholastic or mathematical form is not only reflection upon thought in the special sense of scientific thought but in the special sense of scientific reflection and this is the fact which divides formal logic from that dialectical logic whose point of view is the point of view not of science but of philosophy, and whose object is not the abstract thought of science but the concrete thought of history and philosophy.⁸

A.i. The Abstractive Character of Science

Collingwood constantly contrasts the abstract universal, which is the basis of the logic operative in science, with the concrete univer-

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⁶ Speculum Mentis, p. 221. See this chapter, below, p. 136.

⁷ See "Historical Evidence," The Idea of History, pp. 249-282. See also chapter 1, above, pp. 34-54.

sal, which is the basis of the logic operative in history and philosophy.

The abstraction characteristic of science derives from its origin in religion.

In religion the mind is accustomed to regard the unity of God as standing in perfectly self-contained independence over against the plurality of empirical fact; the one and the many, the universal and its particulars are thrown outside one another and regarded not as correlative aspects of a single concrete whole but as independent concrete beings. This is a consequence of the imaginative nature of religion which inevitably personifies abstractions or presents ideal distinctions in the guise of concrete objects. 9

This abstraction, which characterizes science as a hangover from religious transcendence, results in the logic of science being a logic of external relations.

Once we have, by that relic of religious transcendence which infects all science, divorced the world of thought from the world of sensation, the mutual externality of these two worlds reproduces itself ad infinitum within science itself, and gives rise to that logic of external relations which is just the mark of science's failure to free itself altogether from the domination of a religious habit of mind. 10

Externality may thus be regarded as the a priori form of the objects of science, using Kant's terminology.

Abstraction, according to Collingwood, is the error (characteristic of the scientific mode of thought, subsequently resulting in its self transcendence) of separating in thought what is not

9 Ibid., p. 159.
10 Ibid., p. 166.
separated in reality.

To abstract is to consider separately things that are inseparable: to think of the universal, for instance, without reflecting that it is merely the universal of its particulars, and to assume that one can isolate it in thought and study it in this isolation. This assumption is an error. One cannot abstract without falsifying. To think of them as they are not and to plead that this initial severance makes no essential difference to their inner nature is only to erect falsification into a principle.11

Science is the affirmation of the abstract concept as real. As abstract it is apprehended by abstract thought without any aid from sensation. A scientist merely has to think; sensuous experience is unnecessary to him.12

Mathematics is a priori or deductive science par excellence;13 it is built up by simply drawing out the implications of a merely asserted abstract concept independently of all reference to sensuous experience.14 The only really a priori concept is the concept of class as such, since any difference between one class and another is empirical. Mathematics, as a pure science, is simply the theory of classificatory


12 See Speculum Mentis, pp. 163-164.

13 See Ibid., pp. 164-166.

14 See Ibid., p. 164.
order as such, that is, structure in its most abstract form.\footnote{15}{See Ibid., p. 165. See also A.J. Milne, The Social Philosophy of English Idealism, pp. 16-17.}

The assertion of the abstract concept, by which the scientific concept comes into being, marks all science with the three inseparable characters of mathematics, mechanism and materialism. These are products of the classificatory frame of mind, as corollaries of the fact that this frame of mind arbitrarily separates the universal and the particular in asserting the universal in its barren and rigid self-identity.\footnote{16}{See Speculum Mentis, p. 167; p. 293.}

\footnote{17}{See Ibid., p. 168.}

Materiality means abstractness and subjection to the formulae of mechanical determination and mathematical calculation, which subjection is imposed by the arbitrary act of abstraction which falsifies the object's nature by sundering what in fact is united.

As long as science remains rigidly \textit{a priori}, mathematics is the only possible science. But other sciences are possible if empirical elements are admitted into science, or if science is allowed to indulge in hypotheses. Thus, Euclidean geometry may be obtained either as a systematic account of actual empirical space, or as a pure deduction from the wholly \textit{a priori} hypothesis that Euclidean space exists. In the first case, science would not be pure (as admitting data from the world of sensation), and in the second case it would not be true (being based
on a hypothesis, not on concepts asserted as constituting the real world).  

But, the concept of reality, as a concept of pure, a priori science is absolutized externality, absolutized exclusiveness, and thus is a class with no members. It turns out to be thought thinking about nothing real.

The self-identity of the concept, in abstraction from the difference of the sensible world, collapses into nothingness and leaves us with the empty form of a thought which thinks nothing.

Thus, pure deductive science collapses under the strain of this internal contradiction.

Pure deductive science breaks down because its object turns out to be a chimera, a structure which is the structure of nothing, a law with no instances.

In opposition to the barrenness of pure a priorism, the Renaissance Scientists fought for the recognition of facts. They insisted that observation and experiment are the true process of scientific knowledge. They saw that the purely abstract or deductive ideal of science gives birth to mathematics and to nothing more. But they also saw that, in an atmosphere of pure deduction, mathematics cannot survive. Concrete reality can only be an element in the totality of science if the

19 Ibid., p. 169.
20 Ibid., p. 176.
deductive element is supplemented and reinforced by an inductive or empirical element. They did not seek to supplant mathematics by empirical elements, since mathematics represents the ideal of science, but they sought to give the ideal real content by supplementing it with empirical elements derived from observation and experiment.  

Greek biology, astronomy etc., were not purely mathematical, but their empirical element was implicit only. The Renaissance battle with Aristotle explicitated the implicitly empirical element in Greek thought. This had far-reaching results, both theoretical and practical.

The result was on the theoretical side the substitution of inductive logic for deductive; on the practical side, an immense expansion and consolidation of scientific thought, which, because freed from the false ideal of pure deduction, could now for the first time realize its true nature as based on the empirical study of fact.

But the emergence into explicitness of the empirical character does not make science cease to be science. Inductive logic stands over against deductive logic in an ambiguous relationship. On the one hand, observation and experiment are presupposed by a priori deduction.

Inductive logic does not really supersede deductive; it stands over against it as at once a friend and an enemy. Observation and experiment do not supersede a priori deduction; rather they

21 See Ibid., p. 177.
22 Ibid., p. 178.
are said to underlie and be presupposed by it, every deductive process resting on a previous induction. Thus the theory arose of which Mill is the great representative, that science proceeds by an alternating rhythmical process of which induction is the first moment and deduction the second.23

On the other hand, induction itself is found to presuppose the very same deductive principles which it is supposedly in search of.

This theory (of Mill, that induction and deduction are alternate moments of the scientific process) breaks down on discovering that induction itself rests on a principle, variously described as the uniformity of nature, the law of universal causation, and so forth, which, just because induction rests upon it, induction is powerless to establish. Thus the whole of induction falls to the ground because it is found to assume that of which it is ostensibly in search.

This principle of uniformity, which induction assumes, is also the principle which deduction assumes, namely the existence of abstract concepts in general; for uniformity is nothing but the abstractness of the concept, its indifference to the variations of its own instances. Thus induction does not overcome the fundamental abstractness of deduction but simply reasserts it, and this fundamental assertion in which both agree is nothing but the definition of the scientific consciousness. Both deductive and inductive logic are therefore developed out of the definition of science as such. 24

On account of its postulatory abstraction, science is caught in a vicious circle from which it cannot escape, save by denying the postulate that the universal and particular are not distinct things but merely two distinct elements of one whole. But such a recognition is

23 Ibid., pp. 178-179.

24 Ibid., p. 179.
the very denial of science itself. It therefore alternates between induction and deduction in an attempt to operate within its own arbitrarily self-imposed duality.

Therefore science is bound to maintain both at once, and to do what it can towards sandwiching the deductive and inductive accounts of itself in slices as thin as possible but never actually fused together. If this fusion took place, which is the only possible solution of the problem of logic, science would cease to exist, for the distinction between induction and deduction would have vanished, and this would imply the denial of any distinction between the process from particular to universal and that from universal to particular, and this again would involve the discovery that the universal and the particular are not separate things, but only distinct elements of a whole which even in thought is not divisible. This recognition is the death of science as such, because science is the assertion of the abstract concept.25

Collingwood says that the realization of this led scientists themselves away from the nineteenth century conviction that science discovered the laws of nature to the present day schools of thought, some of which maintain that the object of science is the possible, not the real, and others which maintain that science is not true but useful.26 A large number of eminent men, and apparently pragmatists maintaining the utility of science, hold the position which regards science as hypothesis.27 This means that science asserts not what is true but what

27 See Ibid., p. 182.
would be true if some condition were supposed. It remains in the hypothetical order, never dealing with the real order of actuality and fact. It is pure implication with nothing asserted.

Science asserts, not the actual truth, but what would be true if something were true which is laid down as an hypothesis. It asserts, never that $S$ is $P$, but that if there were an $S$ it would be $P$. Its procedure therefore consists, first, in making an assumption, secondly in deducing the consequences of that assumption. Throughout this process it never makes an assertion, in the sense of a categorical judgement, at all. Its judgements are hypothetical from beginning to end....Science is a pure tissue of implications, none of which are asserted as facts. The scientist may frame any hypothesis he likes; the freedom of untrammelled supposal is his; he must merely suppose something, and then work out the consequences - all equally matter of supposal, never of assertion - which it entails.  

Science never really grasps the individual, or historical fact, which is the concrete basis presupposed by all scientific abstraction. The Renaissance scientists explicitated this implicit presupposition in discovering that science is an abstraction from the concrete reality of history. Scientists recognize fact indeed, but "a scientific fact is a fact purged of its crude and scientifically scandalous concreteness", and isolated from its historical setting by being reduced to the mere instance of a rule. The concrete fact has been turned from an individual into a particular.

28 Ibid., p. 183.
29 Ibid., 186.
The facts with which empirical science concerns itself are facts thus de-individualized, de-factualized, and this is what distinguishes the sense in which even the most empirical science uses the word 'fact' from the sense it bears in history.

Collingwood concludes that science is therefore explicitly supposal, which is identical with questioning, the cutting edge of the mind, implying behind it a body of information or assertion. The body of science is therefore not in a scientific form but in the form of history. Every scientist knows this in acknowledging that only the possession of an ordered body of facts enables him to frame the hypotheses which are the very essence of the scientific life. Collingwood's conclusion, therefore, is that:

Science is the question whose answer is history. To ask that question implies that history is already in existence; and thus we get a process of history - science - history. But history on its first appearance is implicit; it is not known for what it is, and is indeed despised as the mere world of empirical or sensuous reality. It is only when it has been distilled into terms of science and then restored to itself in the form of concepts or laws that it is recognized for what it really is.31

The paradox of science may be expressed by calling it intuitive thought. Intuition is the questioning, immediate side of experience: thought is the asserting, explanatory side. Science is explicit to itself as thought, but it turns out on inquiry to be identical with the questioning activity; that is, it realizes the contradiction of a type of thought which is not thought precisely because it is thought's opposite, intuition.32

30 Ibid., p. 186.
31 Ibid., pp. 186-187.
32 Ibid., p. 188.
But, however erroneous science may be in abstracting the universal from its instances, it is a necessary stage in human development, firstly it has the character of a utilitarian good, as the Pragmatists well recognize, in providing us with the material needs of life, and, secondly, in freeing us from subjection to our mythologizing imagination.

As art and religion lift man above the level of the beasts, science lifts the civilized man above the level of the savage. The material utility of science, its service in feeding the clothing and sheltering us, carrying us from place to place and providing us with comforts, is the least part of its importance. Its real gift is simply the end of dreaming and the promise of a waking life. It sweeps aside with a ruthless hand all mythology, all symbols that are heavy with unrealized meanings and dark with the terrors of dreamland, and bids the mind face the world's mystery armed with nothing but its five senses and the sling of its wit.\(^33\)

A.ii. Distinction between Understanding and Reason.

Collingwood says that "...(t)he revolt against science...is summed up in the antithesis of understanding and reason. Understanding is abstract thought, the 'faculty of concepts', thought spontaneously originating concepts or categories out of itself with no assistance from the world of fact."\(^34\) Plato's concepts were postulated as self subsistent entities, and the Baconian concepts were allegedly the actual structure of the world of fact, discovered embedded in that world by the mind.

\(^33\) Ibid., p. 194.

\(^34\) Speculum Mentis, pp. 195-196.
Collingwood says that the Platonists and Baconians err in overlooking the original act of abstraction which severed the universal from its particulars. The universal, which is the object of the understanding, is the universal torn away from its particulars by an act of abstraction and not the universal in its true actuality.

But, whereas understanding is abstract thought, reason is concrete thought, whose object is a universal which deals with facts as they are, respecting the differences which are organic to that universal itself. Reason, therefore, deals with things in terms of their internal relations and their necessary mutual implication.

Reason is concrete thought, thought which does not arbitrarily create to itself, by abstraction, any object it pleases for the sake of ease in thinking it, but sets out to study facts as they are, and to conceive a universal which is truly the universal of its own particulars. Hence reason thinks the concrete universal, not the bare self-identity of science which leaves all difference outside itself, but the identity to which difference is organic and essential. Understanding hypostatizes the concept into an object of intuition by itself, outside its own particulars; and this object is nothing real, but simply the fruit of an error. Reason finds the concept in the particulars, forming with them an inseparable unity. 35

Reason, therefore, has as its object the concrete universal, which is the immanent structure of the world of experience, not an independent and isolated entity extrinsic to its particulars.

The concept is not something outside the world of sensuous experience: it is the very structure or order of that world itself. The arrangement and the material arranged are only distinguished by an abstract and arbitrary distinction within the indivisible whole. The universal is only real as exemplified in the particular, the particular as informed by the universal....The meaning (of a linguistic symbol) or concept or universal is not a separate object of consciousness other than the world of sense; not something seen through a veil of sense, but the structure of that veil itself. This is the point of view of concrete thought.  

Whereas the unity of the abstract universal is unity in spite of differences, a unity to which diversity is extrinsic, the unity of the concrete universal is a unity because of its differences, a unity to which the differences are relevant. It is a unity which demands diversity within it, a true unity of opposites, a unity in and through difference, a unity which essentially requires its differences. The concrete universal is thus a unity of universal and particular, it is the universal of its particulars and they are the particulars of their universal. The characteristic of reason is the unity of universal and particular, or in general the unity of opposites. The concrete reality of any one opposite is its union with the other; not a bare indistinguishable identity but a union in which the two sides can be distinguished but not separated.


The identity of the concrete universal is, therefore, not the abstract self-identity usually expressed by the formula A is A, which is identity in indistinction, but is coincident identity of opposites. Whereas the abstract principle of identity rules thought in the form of understanding, the concrete principle of identity, the principle of coincidence of opposites, rules thought in the form of reasoning.

The identity, in the sense of an indistinguishable identity, of opposites is not the principle of reason but a disease, endemic and mortal, of understanding. From the violent and arbitrary separation of two opposites, the assertion that A shall be only A and not-A only not-A, it necessarily results that A, now falsely asserted as a self-subsistent concrete reality, generates a not-A within itself and the not-A conversely generates an A. Thus each of the terms, A and not-A, produces its own opposite, and when that has happened they cannot be any longer distinguished. This is the coincidentia oppositorum which always dogs the footsteps of abstract or scientific thinking. Matter and mind, affirmation and negation, good and evil, truth and falsehood, universal and particular, are no sooner resolutely separated than they turn into each other. Hold up a stick, and distinguish its top and bottom: there you have a concrete synthesis of opposites in an individual whole. Take a knife and cut it in two in the middle, into a top half and a bottom half. You have now separated the opposites. But the instant the separation is complete, the top half has its own bottom and the bottom half its own top. The top half is no longer simply a top and the bottom half no longer simply a bottom; each is at once a top and a bottom, each is indistinguishable from the other. Your opposites have new coincided. Abstract thought fends off the coincidentia oppositorum by deliberately ignoring the bottom of the top half and the top of the bottom half, and in defiance of facts simply (that is, abstractly and falsely) calling the one half all top and the other half all bottom. Thus 'the universal' as such is a particular universal, and 'the particular' as such is nothing but the universal of particularity; but formal logic conceals this fact and makes its very living by
the pretence that it has not hypostatized (particularized) the universal.38

The antithesis or mutual externality of understanding and reason is the same as the antithesis of science and history, and is the work of the understanding and scientific thought. Reason repudiates this separation of reasoning from the understanding by repudiating the abstraction that sunders them and recognizes the concrete identity of understanding and reasoning itself. Understanding, the scientific consciousness, is committed to the error of denying its own identity with history, whereas history overcomes that error and sees itself as science transcending science, seeing itself (i.e. history) as a concrete universal of which science is one of its moments.39

38 Speculum Mentis, pp. 197-198. See also B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, pp. 36-38; 47-50; The objection of the British Idealists, mainly Bradley and Bosanquet, to the formulation of the law of identity as A is A is that it is unsuitable for expressing any judgment. Any assertion, to be meaningful at all beyond tautology requires that subject and predicate be in some way different. The formula A is A uses the same symbol for the predicate as it does for the subject, and, as such, fails to bring out the essential of any judgment which is the assertion of an identity in a diversity. See H.B. Acton, "The Theory of Concrete Universals," Mind, XLV, 1936, p. 427. "Identity without difference (which is called abstract identity) would make judgment impossible....If, then, judgment is possible there must be some other sort of identity, which is called identity in difference or concrete identity." (Ibid., p. 428). "The reason why, according to idealists, there can be no difference without identity, is that difference is a relation, and no terms can be related unless they are identical in some respects." (Ibid., p. 429).

39 See Speculum Mentis, p. 198.
A.iii. History as Concrete Thought.

Collingwood attributes the revelation that the hypotheses or abstractions of science rest on the knowledge of fact to Descartes' discovery that all science rests upon the one indubitable certainty that I think, therefore I exist. The thought and the existence spoken of by Descartes were not abstractions. What Descartes said, and meant, was that the concrete historical fact, the fact of my actual present awareness, is the root of science. Collingwood says that Descartes was only going a step beyond Bacon when he saw, more profoundly, that before a scientist can make use of any fact he must observe it, and his observing of it is the fact that really matters in the last resort. Descartes' formula is the deepest and most fruitful expression of the discovery that science presupposes history and can never go behind history. And this discovery implicitly resolves science into history.  

In perception there is found the identical process of reconstruction from data which constitutes the essence of history, namely, to grasp the object as a whole in a synthesis of front and back, top and bottom, past, present, and future. The historian's business is with fact; history is the affirmation of fact. The business of history is to state what happens and has happened, and that only. And the true


41 See Ibid., p. 212.
historian is not content with stating facts, but endeavours to understand them. He seeks to know not only what happened but why it happened.42

Fact is by definition concrete, and the historical fact in its full concreteness already contains its explicative causes and motives within itself; for the historian to know what happened is to know why it happened; its relations to its context of fact are not extrinsic but intrinsic to it. To know the fact is to know it in its relations to other facts. So, whereas science knows in terms of external relations, history knows in terms of internal relations, that is, relations that make the fact be the kind of fact it actually is.

To understand the facts is to affirm them not in arbitrary isolation but in their actual relation to their context. The reason why an event happened is sought by the historian not in an abstract scientific law but in facts, and facts again. The cause of an event in history is its intrinsic relation to other events in history, and the causal nexus is not external to them but lies in their very nature. The motives of historical personages are not psychical forces brooding above the flow of historical events: they are elements in these events, or rather, they are simply these events themselves as purposed and planned by the agents.43

42 See Ibid., p. 217.

43 Ibid., p. 218. It may be noted in passing the light that this throws on Collingwood's assertion that history gives 'insight' into events (See An Autobiography, p. 101). The scientist is external to the objects he studies, and they are external one to the other, and the abstract universal, the principle of unity and intelligibility in science, is external to its particulars. The form of externality rules the mode of knowing entirely; all that is known scientifically is known 'externally' and 'in its externals.' But the historian must penetrate to
CONCRETE LOGIC vs ABSTRACT LOGIC

Whereas art ignores reality and religion ignores thought and

the 'inside' of events, to know them not in their external relations to one another, but in their internal relations whereby they are essentially interrelated according to what they are. The historian is immanent to his facts and situates himself so that he sees events 'from the inside', that is, according to their internal relations. But the inner side of events is thought, namely human motives and purposes. To know the thought within the event is to know together what happened and why it happened. This is to have 'insight' into the event, to know it 'from the inside' according to its internal relations to contextual events. Thought has the mode of 'insidedness' or 'interiority to self' or concreteness, whereas science and its object, nature, have the mode of exteriority, which sets up the relationships of other to other, whose unity can then only be that of mere external relatedness. So, according to Collingwood, whereas science proceeds by way of induction based on observation and experiment which provide the facts, history proceeds by way of 'insight.' According to Bernard Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, pp. 74-77, the natural order, which is characterised by spatial exteriority, is subordinated to, and ultimately reduced to the inwardness of the spiritual order. External relations are to be explained ultimately in terms of internal relations, or science in terms of human consciousness. "Inwardness, when meant to be the equivalent of Individuality or the character of spirit, should be taken as a type of experience superior to externality and including it." (Ibid., p. 74). "Externality can subsist only as subordinated to inwardness, but inwardness can subsist only in the conquest of externality." (Ibid., p. 76). When scientific facts, derived from observation and experimentation, and their uniformities expressed in the different laws of nature, are systematised into the organic totality and seen as members of a world or cosmos, the external relations of the natural order are reduced to the internal relations of a conscious totality. Collingwood, contrary to Bosanquet, would say that the external relations according to which science totalises experience are ultimately to be reduced to the internal relations according to which the historical consciousness totalises by means of historical 'insight', rather than through scientific systematisation. For Bosanquet, on the contrary, concrete totality is found in scientific systematisation when science achieves a cosmic or world view of its object (Ibid., pp. 35-37.). But, given Collingwood's identification of historical knowledge with the inner side of events, and what he calls 'insight', the reduction of externality to spiritual inwardness of Bosanquet becomes Collingwood's reduction of abstract, scientific knowledge to concrete historical knowledge. Thus he says (Speculum Mentis, p. 293) that "(a)ll externality is imaginary, for
science ignores fact, there is no feature of experience nor attitude of
mind towards its object that history ignores. The recognition of fact
as fact is the recognition of whatever in any sense is real. And the
historically determined fact is the absolute object whose distinctive
mark is individuality, which is concreteness. That is, the meaning of
a fact as a fact is its implication of and implication by every other
fact. The world of meaning by which a fact is mediated to know the
meaning of that fact is the all inclusive world of everything that is,
including that fact itself. It is a systematic whole to which that
individual fact, together with every other individual fact, is essential,
or relevant.

externality - a mutual outsidedness in the abstract sense of the denial
of a mutual insidedness - is as such abstraction, and abstraction is
always intuition or imagination." Collingwood seems to be much more
logical than Bosanquet in accepting history as the science of concrete
individuality and universality par excellence. Bosanquet's depreciation
of history in this respect is found in his Principle of Individuality
and Value, pp. 32-33 and 78-81, where he alleges that the best examples
of a concrete universal are to be found in Art, Religion and Philosophy
which "take us far beyond the spatio-temporal externality of history." (p. 80). "History is a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any
considerable/being of trueness" (pp. 78-79). Collingwood remarks
(The Idea of History, p. 143) that "Dr. Inge...follows Bosanquet in
conceiving the proper object of knowledge Platonically as a timeless
world of pure universality." However see below, this chapter, p. 215, n. 228,
for implications within Bosanquet's/for amendment of his allegedly static
timeless notion of concrete totality in line with Collingwood's notion
of factual, historical concreteness. Correlate with the treatment of
'insight' in chapter 6, below, pp. 347-356 and no. 45 of p. 355.

44 See Speculum Mentis, p. 218.
The object as individual is the whole of what exists, and this is concretely articulated into parts each of which is again individual, and so to infinity. Within the cycle of this infinite articulation of the absolute object the historical spirit moves freely in all directions, never finding anything that is not individual and unique, never finding anything that is not, on the one hand, composed of individual and unique parts, and, on the other, itself a part of an individual and unique whole. The object, as a system of fact so organized, is objective throughout, for every part is a true microcosm, and is truly infinite.*•

The concreteness and individuality which is finally attained by the historical consciousness, was what the earlier forms of consciousness were searching for. But each grasped it in such a way

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45 Ibid., pp. 218-219. H.B. Acton says that, according to Bradley, the abstract universal is nothing but an adjective, a shadow which is nothing divorced from its body and, as such, cannot exist. "What Bradley...means by a concrete universal...(is) an individual, and the reason for holding that individuals are universal is that they are entities which preserve an identity amidst differences." H.B. Acton, "The Theory of Concrete Universals," Mind, XLV, 1936, p. 421. "Bradley's theory is that what exist or are real are individuals and individuals, being identities in difference, are universals." (Ibid., p. 422). "In (Idealists') terminology, 'individuals', 'concrete identities', and 'concrete universals', all stand for the same thing." (Ibid., Mind, XLVI, 1937, p. 1). Acton cites Bosanquet (Principle of Identity and Value, p. 40) as saying that the most convenient example of a universal is not a quality such as redness, but a person, such as Julius Caesar. "Julius Caesar is a universal because he is the same individual although engaged in different activities, such as fighting in Gaul, marching into Italy, and so on. Abstracted from his various activities he is nothing; they are the differences which are required to make him the identity he is." (Ibid., p. 1).
The aesthetic consciousness expresses itself in a single work of art. Here it finds a cosmos which like the world of history is individual and unique, whose organization is a systematic structure of parts each displaying the same individuality, the same uniqueness, in its indispensable contribution to the whole. But it is only by an abstraction that the single work of art is a cosmos. Outside it are other works of art, each a cosmos in itself, and these do not combine into a totality which is itself a single all-embracing work of art. Thus the aesthetic consciousness, instead of systematic, is monadic; and the monads, being windowless, are not so much reflections of the whole universe as rival claimants to be the whole universe. This rivalry is fatal to all the claims alike. Art is thus even within its own limits a false form of individuality.

Religion goes a step farther and finds exactly the same individuality in God. God is the monad of monads, a cosmos whose structure is that of the absolute object. But God always stands over against a world whose very nature is to be outside him, and thus God forfeits his own absoluteness. As long as the world stands over against him, his own individuality is unattained. And because religion is conscious of this, its search for objectivity is confessed to be vain.

In science the attempt is made to bridge the gulf between God and the world. Instead of God we find the concept of law, which because it is the law of the world no longer stands outside the world. Here what was transcedent has become immanent. But in this very success, failure is revealed; for it becomes plain that the immanence is a false immanence. The world is not a world of individuals but a world of particulars, and because the concept is indifferent to the various particulars in which it is embodied, their diversity remains meaningless and the world is to that extent a chaos. What is individual and organized as a system of individuals is not the world but only the concept, so that the failure of religion is repeated and the quest for immanence ends in transcendence, but an abstract transcendence more intolerable than the concrete transcendence of religion.

Thus the work of art, God, and the abstract concept are all attempts on the part of thought to reach the organized individuality of history. Art comes nearest
to success; religion fails more openly, and science most openly of all. But this order of relative failure is due to an inverse order of seriousness in facing the problem. Art ignores the real world altogether, and constructs an arbitrary cosmos of its own; religion contents itself with a cosmos outside the world; and science alone tries to bring the concrete world into the unity, but destroys its concreteness in the attempt. But because all are agreed that the real object must be an absolute individual, their failure is wholly redeemed by the success of history, which actually achieves the idea of an object beyond which there is nothing and within which every part truly represents the whole.  

Collingwood then gives a very clear description of what he means by the concrete universal and of its relevance to history and to the logic of history.

This absolute whole is the concrete universal; for concrete universality is individuality, the individual being simply the unity of the universal and the particular. The absolute individual is universal in that it is what it is throughout, and every part of it is as individual as itself. On the other hand it is no mere abstraction, the abstract quality of individualness, but an individual which includes all others. It is the system of systems, the world of worlds. Everything in it is determined by its place in the whole, but this is not determinism because every part determines the whole and therefore by implication every other part: so that each part taken separately may be regarded as the crucial determinant of everything else, just as every separate link bears the whole responsibility for keeping the chain together. Everything in it is as unique as the whole, and the uniqueness of every part is based upon the uniqueness of every other. The principle of its structure is not classification, the abstract con-

46 Speculum Mentis, pp. 219-220.
cept, but the concrete concept, which is relevance, or implication. The only reason why this notion of a concrete universal is thought puzzling or paradoxical is that our attempts at philosophical theory suffer from the obsession of regarding science as the only possible kind of knowledge. For the concrete universal is the daily bread of every historian, and the logic of history is the logic of the concrete universal.47

This identification of individuality with concrete universality by Collingwood was already well elaborated by Bernard Bosanquet in his The Principle of Individuality and Value, and Collingwood's thought is greatly illuminated by a brief consideration of what Bosanquet says.

Individuality, according to Bosanquet, means full determination, the determination whereby something not only 'is' but is fully 'what it is.' Whatever exists, exists as fully determinate; there is no meaning in 'it is' apart from 'it is what it is.' Both Plato and Hegel agree that this full determination of each thing involves somehow the unity of 'is' and 'is not', as for instance, what is when a man is is not the same as what is when a horse is; the 'being' of a man is the simultaneous 'not-being' of a horse. Anything which involves together 'is' and 'is not' so far fails to maintain itself, and its maintenance in being is therefore to be referred to some other, which fully maintains itself in being without together failing to do so. This is what is meant by a whole, by an individual, and especially by the primary instance of in-

dividual wholeness which one finds, according to Bosanquet, in a world or cosmos. A world or cosmos is that which contains all differences within itself, and itself is not differentiated from anything else which is not itself. That is, outside itself there is nothing; within itself is everything. It is that to which all things affected by otherness, relativity or negation in their being look for their maintenance and reason in being and in being what they are, that is, through their determinate differences. 48

...in as far as "is" affirms a certain determinate self-maintenance, and "is not" affirms a different one, or the character of otherness in general, so far to attach the two as predicates to the same point of being is to allege that in its self maintenance it fails to maintain itself. This is so far to destroy the character of being as an expression for any positive experience. It is to posit and to annul in the same act. In so far, then, as an experience presents an appearance of this kind, a combination of "is" and "is not" (or "is other") without any distinction in the subject of affirmations, it falls short of the character of being....It undoes itself, and fails to conserve itself in any actual character. In as far, on the other hand, as the appearance of hostility to itself is removed, by transforming the content of the experience in question into what is relatively a system, such as to accept both this and the other as cooperative and no longer conflicting members, the experience "is" in a higher degree; its self maintenance includes more reality; and is pro tanto less likely to be confronted with external facts beyond its power to assimilate. 49


49 Ibid., p. 45.
Dynamic self containment and self maintenance in being without essential reference to other, is therefore the mark of truth, individuality and wholeness. The more self-contained a whole is the truer it is, and the greater is its capacity to maintain and so account for itself and its members who are maintained through containment in it. This "appeal to the whole is not a detached or arbitrary procedure, but the same thing with the principle otherwise known as the principle of non-contradiction." Doubt presupposes this whole of "all that is", for itself, that is the activity of doubting, exists as something within that whole, and is unable to advance anything against it. Any attempt to advance a contrary is already to agree that "something is" and this "something which is" is already contained in the system against which the doubter reacts. In other words, the doubter, in doubting, locates himself within a system of totality which makes that activity of doubting meaningful. Truth cannot be contradicted because it leaves nothing outside itself (the whole of all that is) upon which a contradiction could be grounded.

Individuality is the ultimate completeness of that character of wholeness and non-contradiction which we first generalized under the name of logical stability.

50 Ibid., p. 44.
51 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
52 Ibid., p. 41.
53 Ibid., p. 68.
It makes no difference whether one says that the criterion of ultimate reality is wholeness, or individuality, or non-contradiction. Each is a name for "that which must stand...which has nothing without to set against it, and which is pure self-maintenance." The tendency of our fullest experience is to ultimate individuality, or the absolute.

The whole effort of rational experience is to unfold that experience so that it is the experience of a rational being, fully conscious of what its experience means, and able to give a full account to itself of its experience. It is the full manifestation of experience as an ordered totality, a passage from 'that it is' to 'what it is' made from within the resources of the experience itself, that is, by transforming the experience from being merely experienced, or felt, to an experience fully accounted for, that is, an experience explained. It is what Collingwood calls a passage from the implicit to the explicit as warranted by the logical potentiality of the concrete universal, whose logical potentiality consists in relevance or implication, as was said above.

When Collingwood says here that the principle of the structure

54 Ibid., p. 68.
55 Ibid., p. 69.
56 Refer to clockface illustration, chapter 3, pp. 108-110.
57 See above, this chapter, p. 130.
of the concrete universal is relevance or implication I understand him to be referring to the constitution of fact by internal relations whereby fact is related to fact essentially or internally, or 'relevantly or implicatively.' The logical operation, then, is explication of the implicit, and unfolding of those internal relations whereby fact implicating other facts together implicates the totality of fact in which each fact has its reason and intelligible meaning. This, according to Collingwood, is a logical operation quite distinct from either deduction or induction in which there is movement from something known to something other not previously known, not previously implicated, but added and related to prior knowledge by extrinsic relations. This latter type of inference is characteristic of abstract or classificatory logic.58

I understand the foregoing to mean the following. Science deals with units of intelligibility which have their intelligibility in themselves; their relations to concrete facts of experience are by means of extrinsic superadded relations which leave those unit intelligibilities unaffected in themselves. The universals which are the objects of science are intelligible in themselves, and their relations to the facts which they make intelligible are extrinsic to them. This is the doctrine of realism which Collingwood constantly combats.59

58 See this chapter, p. 130 n.43 above, and Speculum Mentis, p. 218.

59 "The theory of the concrete universal is presupposed throughout the whole of Collingwood's philosophy. It is...the basis
Positivistic history, or history proceeding according to the mode of science, regards historical facts as atomic units, intelligible absolutely in themselves, and contextualized with other facts by means of external relations. The whole, constituted by such externally related units, is something secondary to those related units themselves, the relation whereby they are related falling between them, not within them.

But the reason sees the parts as made intelligible through and in the whole. The whole and the parts are in mutual inter-implication; the relationship of the part to the whole defines the part, and it is intelligible only through its relationship to every other part and, with every other part, to the whole of which it is the part.  

Central to the understanding of Collingwood's rapprochement logic is the notion of system. Concreteness does not mean atomic unity, upon which he launched his lifelong attack on philosophical realism and the theory of the abstract universal." L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and The Reform of Metaphysics, p. 154.

L. Rubinoff, op.cit., p. 156, writes that "The important thing about the concrete universal is that it treats differences as essential. Each 'moment' of a concrete universal expresses a different yet identical aspect of the whole, and in so far as it is different contributes essentially to the unity of the whole." H.B. Acton, "The Theory of the Concrete Universal," Mind, XLV, 1936, p. 431, says that "Idealists believe literally that nothing can be identical with itself unless it is different from itself." Acton says that this is what Bosanquet calls the paradox at once of reality and of inference and that it is upon this contention that the theory of concrete universals rests.

See this chapter, below, pp. 219 et seq.
as it does for the Positivists, but systematic unity, the unity of a
system. And central to the notion of systematic unity is the notion of
a standard or criterion. Even the artist proceeds according to some
standard or criterion whereby he makes choices as he proceeds to the
completion of his artistic work. But this standard or criterion, which
is not explicit to the artist, refers to wholeness or integrity which
gives meaning to the artist's work and is the means whereby he judges
throughout the execution of his work. The artist grasps the concrete
universal of unity in diversity not in an intelligible, systematized
concept, but at the level of expressed feeling. 62

Likewise, the historian chooses his facts in accordance with
some criterion, so that "no historian, however innocent, can proceed
wholly without a system of Quellenkritik, because his very life as an
historian is the perpetual exercise of some such criterion." 63

62 See Speculum Mentis, p. 71; pp. 63-66; 94; and especially
pp. 98-102. According to A.J.M. Milne in The Social Philosophy of
English Idealism, the concrete universal, which is the central notion of
nineteenth century Idealism, is bound up with a theory of rational
activity and can only be understood in the light of that theory (p. 15).
It is neither an empirical nor a linguistic theory (p. 22) but precisely
"a theory of the rationality of rational activity, of what acting
rationally is. It is criteriological rather than logical in the technical
sense, being an attempt to give an account of the criterion or standard,
namely, rationality. It starts from the assumption that rational
activity is going on and that we have a working practical knowledge of
it...as a theory its aim is to take what we already have a working
knowledge of, and to try to get to know it better." (p. 22). This says
in other words that the logical operation in dealing with the concrete
universal is explicating the already implicit; see this chapter, above,
pp.130-131 and pp.139-141.

63 Speculum Mentis, p. 213.
The achievement of this concrete or historical point of view is together the recognition and transcendence of the abstractness of the scientific point of view. 64

The doctrine of the concrete universal is thus a necessary presupposition of every genuine theory of history. It is in fact one of the criteria which historiography must employ in order to distinguish history from nature; for the difference between historical and scientific thinking (in general) is precisely the difference between thinking about the concrete and thinking about the abstract universal.

Concrete thinking is contextual thinking, that is, thinking to which the context of the object is essential.

...history is nothing but conceiving the object as concrete fact, fact to which its context is not irrelevant but essential. 65

That is, everything, to the historical consciousness, is what it is precisely because of what everything else making up its context does to it, precisely through being its relevant context. This involves denial of the traditional doctrine of fixed substances implied in the dictum which states that "everything is what it is and not another thing" and in the Positivist doctrine of "hard facts."

64 See Ibid., p. 222.
65 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 159.
66 Speculum Mentis, p. 234.
For Collingwood, error is understood as a lapse from concreteness into abstraction, and all abstraction is dogmatism. Dogmatizing is the reason of error and it consists in failure to criticize our assumptions and consequent failure to recognize them as assumptions. "Our enemy is abstraction," and "abstract knowledge is the same as error."

Rejection of this synthesis of opposites, according to Collingwood, is at the heart of realism, whose logic is the logic of abstraction. The modern realism (i.e., of Cook Wilson, etc.,) is a confused running to and fro between two principles, the abstract concept and the concrete fact. Kant saw that these two opposites existed only by implicit assumption of the one by the other, but he erred in attributing the unity of sensation and thought to consciousness in general, which is a lapse into abstraction, being a failure on Kant's part to identify the empirical and transcendental ego, or mind in its immediacy with mind in

67 See Ibid., p. 288.
68 Ibid., p. 268.
69 Ibid., p. 313. For Collingwood, error plays an essential part in the mind's dynamic structuring of itself into a fully self-conscious, self consistent whole. It is error, through abstraction, that gives rise to the mind's immanent restlessness impelling it to transcend its present unsatisfactory condition and achieve self-equilibrium in a fuller and more integrated expression of itself.

70 See Speculum Mentis, p. 285. See also Speculum Mentis, p. 310: "The synthesis of opposites...is the life of concrete thought."
its ideal perfection.\textsuperscript{71}

B. Logic of the Concrete Universal as Logic of Overlap of Classes.

According to Lionel Rubinooff "the logic of the concrete universal, referred to in \textit{Speculum Mentis}, is no other than the logic of the overlap of classes which is systematically expounded in \textit{An Essay on Philosophical Method} (1933)."\textsuperscript{72} This logic, underlying the scale of forms displayed in \textit{Speculum Mentis}, is developed in \textit{The Essay on Philosophical Method} by way of contrasting the logic of the concrete universal, a logic of overlapping classes, with the classificatory logic of the abstract universal.

The classificatory logic of genus and species, which plays a useful and vital role within the boundaries of natural science, and is even a \textit{conditio sine qua non} of the validity of its methods,\textsuperscript{73} has for its object the abstract universal. Its aim is to guarantee the complete autonomy of each part of the classificatory whole, that is, each species of the genus.\textsuperscript{74}

Provided that the logical doctrine of classification and

\textsuperscript{71} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 285.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics}, p. 160.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 161.
division remains within the boundaries of the natural sciences no serious error is involved. Serious difficulties arise when this method is applied to deal with concepts belonging more properly to philosophy. The attempt to classify a song or an opera as either poetry or music considered as species of the genus art is frustrated from the start.\(^75\)

The essential difference between the logical structure of scientific concepts and the logical structure of philosophical concepts makes impossible, without contradiction, the application of classificatory division into genus and species to philosophical thought.\(^76\) Philosophical species are not mutually exclusive, they overlap.\(^77\)

The Essay on Philosophical Method, in which Collingwood unfolds the logical characteristics of the concrete universal, which is the object of philosophy as the abstract universal is the object of science,\(^78\) develops in the context of answering the question "What is Philosophy?"\(^79\) Collingwood shows throughout the course of this work that the answer to that question cannot be given, without destroying the very nature and distinctiveness of philosophy, by distinguishing thought, as a classificatory genus, into a number of species and subspecies and

\(^{75}\) See Ibid., p. 163.

\(^{76}\) Ibid.

\(^{77}\) Ibid.

\(^{78}\) Ibid., p. 161.

\(^{79}\) See An Essay on Philosophical Method, v; and pp. 1-2.
locating philosophy as an autonomous, exclusive species or sub-species of the common genus, thought. To proceed thus would be to absolutize logic "as a master science having jurisdiction over the whole field of science" and falsely absolutize abstract thought and the abstract universal which is the principle of all classificatory, hence scientific, thinking.

The doctrine of classificatory genus and species gets into difficulties and soon becomes unmanageable when applied to "the species of a philosophical concept such as the life of spirit or mind," "to the classification of the sciences in general," "to the explanation of ethical behaviour (as) provided in the New Leviathan" and to moral concepts, "to the solution of the problem of evil," and generally "(s)imilar difficulties arise when we attempt to apply this doctrine to those concepts pertaining to human nature and the human condition,"

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80 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 161; see also Speculum Mentis, p. 49.
81 L. Rubinoff, op.cit., p. 165.
82 Ibid., p. 161; 162.
83 Ibid., p. 168.
84 Ibid., p. 164.
85 Ibid., p. 172.
86 Ibid., p. 163.
including history, of which the view according to Collingwood87 "sees everything in that history as having its own raison d'être and coming into existence in order to serve the needs of the men whose minds have corporately created it." The principle whereby these entities are made intelligible is not the abstract universal, but a universal of another kind, a concrete universal of identity in difference in which the differentials are intimate to the common genus, and the members thereof are related, not by the external relations of mutually exclusive, self autonomous species, but by internal relations of mutual implication and dependence.

An Essay on Philosophical Method, develops the contrast of the logical aspects of philosophical thought with that of scientific thought within the framework of the traditional division of logic into the consideration of concepts, judgments and reasonings. He first contrasts the logic of concepts showing how the logical behaviour of concepts differs in their philosophical usage when compared with their scientific usage, which latter usage has been the exclusive concern of the traditional logical treatment of concepts.

B.i. The Logic of Concepts

Collingwood begins by contrasting the exclusivist characteristic of concepts in science with their mutual implicatoriness in philosophy,

87 The Idea of History, p. 77; see also L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, pp. 170-171.
and concludes by showing that philosophical concepts constitute an overlap of classes in a scale of forms, as contrasted with the isolationist classificatory nature of genus-species conceptualization which defines the scientific way of conceiving.


In regard to concepts, Collingwood first shows the exclusivist character of concepts as these are considered by traditional logicians in their doctrine of classification and division. A generic class is divided into species which is further subdivided into sub-species. Individual instances are then classified under the generic concept in such a way that each individual appears as a member of one specific class only. 88

Thus, every individual present in the generic class will be present in one and only one, of the specific classes which are thus exclusive in relation to each other and exhaustive in relation to the generic class. 89

In general, the concepts of the exact sciences conform to the rules of classification and division as laid down by logicians 90 and the same general conformity appears in the concepts of empirical science. 91

89 Ibid., p. 28.
90 Ibid., p. 29.
91 Ibid., p. 30.
At every stage in the division which Natural History makes of organisms into animals and vegetables, the animal kingdom into vertebrates and invertebrates, vertebrates into mammals, birds, reptiles and fishes, etc., there occurs a division of one concept, a logical genus, into others, its logical species, which are mutually exclusive and together exhaust the genus. Doubtful cases leave the classificatory system intact in principle.

B.i.b. Mutual Implication of the Species of Philosophical Concepts.

But this traditional theory of classification and division, though a true account of scientific concepts, whether of exact or empirical science, is found to be inapplicable without some modification to philosophical concepts. The mutual exclusiveness characteristic of the species of a generic class is not characteristic of philosophical concepts.

The specific classes of a philosophical genus do not exclude one another, they overlap one another. This overlap is not exceptional, it is normal; and it is not negligible in extent, it may reach formidable dimensions.92

The predicates unity, goodness and truth are assigned to every being, and if, with Aristotle, we reject their equivocity we must say that they are concepts of a peculiar kind which defy any classificatory system.

92 An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 31.
Just as Aristotle showed that the concept of good overlaps or transcends or diffuses itself across the divisions of the categories, so according to this traditional formula there is a similar overlap or transcendence or diffusion in the concepts of unity and reality. 93

Some terms admit of both a philosophical and scientific usage, but they undergo a change of meaning in passing from one sphere to another. The concept of matter is an instance of this.

The difference between the two phases of the concept is that in Newtonian physics matter is the name of a certain class of things separate from other classes of things, such as minds, and appearances like colours or sounds depending for their existence on the mind to which they appear; in materialistic metaphysics it is the name of reality as a whole, and every distinction like that between so-called matter and so-called mind is reduced to a distinction within matter itself. 94

Similarly, mind, for the scientific psychologist, is the name for something outside other things regarded as material, but for the spiritualistic philosopher it is a name for all reality. 95

It appears from these instances that when a concept has a dual significance, philosophical and non-philosophical, in its non-philosophical phase it qualifies a limited part of reality, whereas in its philosophical it leaks or escapes out of these limits and invades the neighbouring regions, tending at last to colour our thought of reality as a whole.

93 Ibid., p. 33.

94 Ibid., p. 34.

95 Ibid. Correlating with what has been noted elsewhere, scientific concepts conceive their object exclusively and in terms of external relations, philosophical concepts conceive their object inclusively and in terms of internal relations.
As a non-philosophical concept it observes the rules of classification, its instances forming a class separate from other classes; as a philosophical concept it breaks these rules and the class of its instances overlaps those of its coordinate species.  

Collingwood then shows that the attempt to deal logically with the concept "thought" as a genus divided into the species judgment and inference and the attempt to deal ethically with "good" as a genus divided into the species, the pleasant, the expedient and the right, soon breaks down. Judgments turn out to implicate inference, and inferences to implicate judgments, the useful can be pleasant, and the useful and pleasant can be right, and the right can be either useful or pleasant or both.

Then again, the attempt, in philosophy, to treat logic and ethics as two distinct wholes independent of one another also breaks down. We can consider thought (in logic) and action (in ethics) as distinct in essence as much as we like, but in their concrete existent instances they are so connected that an instance of one is an instance of the other. The same mutual implication is found in metaphysics, aesthetics and the other philosophical sciences.

...this type of structure in which specific classes overlap, is so deeply rooted in the subject-matters with which philosophy has always been concerned, that to set one's face against it means

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96 Ibid., p. 35.

97 See Ibid., pp. 36-43.

98 See Ibid., pp. 43-44.
abjuring any attempt to think seriously about matters of that kind.\textsuperscript{99}

If philosophical concepts have a peculiar type of logical structure in which the specific classes overlap, no method can be used in philosophy which presupposes that species as such are mutually exclusive. We cannot philosophically study the specific forms of the generic concept action the way a scientist collects instances of a generic concept (say roses) and sorts them into specific, mutually exclusive classes. If we thus sorted actions into those done from duty, those done from interest, those done from inclination, and then proceeded to examine each species in turn, before long we would find ourselves confronted by an overlap; certain actions done from interest would be right, certain actions done from duty would be pleasant, and so on. The mutual exclusiveness characteristic of the specific classes of a common genus would break down. The mutually exclusive external relationships of the different classes with respect to each other would surreptitiously give way to a system of internal relationships according to which instances of one kind would be found simultaneously to be instances of another kind.\textsuperscript{100}

We can begin to see that what is forcing itself upon our attention when we come to look at things philosophically, as distinct

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., pp. 44-45.

\textsuperscript{100} See Ibid., pp. 42-43; 46-48.
from looking at them scientifically, is that behind the diversity recognized by science there is a more fundamental and basic unity-in-diversity which is the object of philosophical thought. Scientific thought operates through dispersal and diversification of its objects whereas philosophical thought operates by bringing all things back to their fundamental unity. The movement of philosophy is thus a movement, not of dissipation in specialization, but of rapprochement or return to reestablished unity and harmony, the need for which Collingwood underscored heavily in his *Speculum Mentis*.  

Collingwood distinguishes two fallacies committed by anyone who persists in using classificatory, scientific logic beyond the domain of inquiry into the natural world in asserting the autonomy of co-ordinated species.

The first is the fallacy of precarious margins, which falsely supposes, owing to undue commitment to classificatory logic,  

101 Pp. 25-36. Thus, p. 36: "...we now recognize the nature of our disease. What is wrong with us is precisely the detachment of these forms of experience - art, religion, and the rest - from one another...".


103 See *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, pp. 48-49.
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that

The overlap which has already affected a certain area of the class in question can be trusted not to spread, and that beyond its limit there lies a marginal region in which the instances exhibit only one of the specific forms, uncontaminated by the presence of the other.104

This is precarious, Collingwood says, because, once admitting the overlap in principle, there is no reason to assume that it will stop at any given point.105

The second fallacy, which implicates and is mutually implicated by the first, is the fallacy of identified coincidents,106 which states that every instance of a concept belongs to that concept in exactly the same way; the essence of each instance will then be the same (abstract) characteristic, so that in the end the instances cannot really be separated.

I propose to call the fallacy of identified coincidents...the false principle...that where there is no difference in the extension of two concepts, there is no distinction between the concepts themselves.107

These two fallacies are alternative applications of one single

104 Ibid., p. 48.
105 Ibid.
106 See Ibid., pp. 48-49; see also L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 162.
107 An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 49.
principle which is false in philosophy, however true it may be in science, namely that when a generic concept is divided into its species there is a corresponding division of its instances into mutually exclusive classes.

I call this the fallacy of false disjunction, because it consists in the disjunctive proposition that any instance of a generic concept must fall either in one or in another of its specific classes; and this is false because since they overlap, it may fall in both.108

Collingwood then explains that this has a positive and a negative application.

Applied positively, this yields the fallacy of precarious margins: namely that, since there admittedly is a distinction between two concepts, there must be a difference between their instances. Applied negatively, it yields the fallacy of identified coincidents: namely that, since the instances can admittedly not be separated, there is no distinguishing the concepts.109

Collingwood summarizes this into "The first rule of philosophical method", which is:

...to beware of false disjunctions and to assume that the specific classes of a philosophical concept are always liable to overlap, so that two or more specifically differing concepts may be exemplified in the same instances....The rule may be put...by saying that any distinction in philosophy may be a distinction without a difference; or, alternatively, that where two philosophical concepts are distinguished Aristotle's formula (for the overlap of

108 Ibid., p. 49.
109 Ibid.
classes:...the two concepts 'are the same thing'...
the traditional way of referring to this principle
is to speak of 'a distinction without a difference',
that is, a distinction in the concepts without a
difference in the instances) may hold good, that
the two are the same thing but their being is
different.\textsuperscript{110}

Philosophy, therefore, cannot definitively classify its
subject matter the way a naturalist or botanist arranges species of
plants or animals. If the philosopher does employ classification of the
genus-species type it is only provisional and as looking forward to some­
thing more fundamental. We may indeed classify actions as those done
from duty and those done from inclination, but we must be ready to
recognize that instances of one may also be instances of the other.

We may use the classification merely as a means
to fixing our situation on the specific peculiarities
of acting from duty as such and acting from inclination
as such. The true work of philosophy will be the
distinguishing of concepts like these coexisting in
their instances.\textsuperscript{111}

But, this existential coexistence, on the other hand, will
not be simply enumerative, for there will be logical relations between
the members.

In an empirical concept like man, there is no
apparent connexion between such elements as having
ten toes and having the power of speech, but in a
philosophical concept there cannot be this looseness

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., pp. 49-50.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., p. 51.
of structure and the various elements must be somehow interrelated. Hence no object of philosophical thought can be rightly conceived as a mere aggregate, whether of logically distinguished elements or of spatial or temporal parts...either of these would imply that the connexions between the parts are accidental whereas they must in reality be essential.112

This means that, what, from the aspect of a classificatory system, is considered to be a collection of specifically distinguished elements, externally related and differentiated by differences extrinsic to their common, abstract genus, when philosophically considered as existentially realized, are seen to be internally connected, that is, connected by internal relations in the realization of a concrete universal to which they, as its participants or members are intrinsic, essential and relevant, there being no understanding of the universal apart from the instances, or of the instances apart from the universal.

A consequence of operating with such intrinsically related instances is that philosophy brings along with it its starting point which is constantly revised in the process of philosophizing.113 Philosophizing is simply the elaboration of that starting point in terms of

112 Ibid., pp. 51-52. That is, logical implications are intrinsic to the philosophical existent; as Bosanquet says in The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 44 "There is no meaning in "it is" apart from "it is what it is." That is, the philosophical existent is fully determined, and this as will be shown later, is through significant negation. See below, section D of this chapter, especially pp. 231-233.

113 Correlate with p.108, n.46 of chapter 3, above.
intelligible and meaning giving factors that are intrinsic to it, the work of philosophy being to bring that starting point (lived experience) from a state of implicit intelligibility to explicit intelligibility by etching into it the relevant distinctions which will bring it from mere experienced actuality to an unfolded actuality, seen in terms of the intelligible distinctions within it whereby it is an intelligible and rational experience without in any way stepping outside the experience, but rather, working within the experience and elaborating and clarifying it from within.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, in a sense, the starting point is never left (as science starts from experienced fact, but steps outside it, into the world of abstract, hypothetical, universals for its explanation, which explanation always remains extrinsic to the instances of the experience that it purports to explain).

Thinking philosophically, whatever else it means, means constantly revising one's starting point in the light of one's conclusions and never allowing oneself to be controlled by any cast-iron rule whatever.\textsuperscript{115}

\textbf{B.i.c. Distinction and Opposition of Philosophical Concepts.}

Collingwood then asks what is the kind of difference that exists between the species of a philosophical concept that makes such an overlap possible?\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Refer to clockface illustration, chapter 3, pp. 108-110.
\item \textsuperscript{115} An \textit{Essay on Philosophical Method}, p. 54.
\item \textsuperscript{116} See \textit{Ibid.}.
\end{enumerate}
Subdividing the question, by distinguishing differences into differences of degree and differences of kind, he asks whether one or other of these kinds of difference can explain the overlap.

Mere differences of degree are rejected, since the crucial point at which any specific class ended would be the point at which another began, hence mutually exclusive of each other reckoned from that point.\textsuperscript{117}

Mere differences of kind are also excluded as impotent to account for the overlap of classes typical of philosophical concepts. Sensation differentiated solely according to kind, as into seeing, hearing, smelling, etc., simply divides up the genus into the separate species, which are then allocated to different disciplines (Psychology, Physiology, etc.) for investigation. The species are thus diversified away from each other rather than seen as overlapping.\textsuperscript{118}

If, then, neither differences of degree nor differences of kind taken separately can explain the overlap of philosophical classes, can it be explained by some combination of difference of degree with difference of kind?\textsuperscript{119}

\textbf{B.i.d. The Scale of Forms}

In such a system of specifications, in which difference of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{117} See \textit{Ibid.}.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{118} See \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 55-56.
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\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{119} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 56.
\end{flushleft}
degree is compounded with difference of kind, the two sets of differences are so connected that whenever the variable, increasing or decreasing, reaches certain critical points on the scale, one specific form disappears and is replaced by another. A system of this kind I propose to call a scale of forms. 120

Instances of familiar experience are a breaking strain, freezing and boiling points, the maxima and minima of taxation brackets, etc.

Distinction is next made between a non-philosophical scale of forms, in which the variable is something extraneous to the generic essence 121 and a philosophical scale of forms, in which the variable is identical with the generic essence itself. 122

Thus, in the case of water, the various forms, solid, liquid, gaseous, form a non-philosophical scale of forms, since heat, the element differentiated in degree, is not included in the formula H₂O which expresses the essence of water and is applicable without differentiation to the different forms of water. Each of the three forms of water embodies the generic essence equally and unchanged; each is unqualifiedly water. There is here concurrence of difference of degree (in temperature) with difference in kind in the water that leaves the waterness of the water unchanged throughout the different forms which the water takes at different temperatures.

120 Ibid., p. 57.
121 See Ibid., p. 59.
122 See Ibid., p. 60.
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But, it is otherwise when, as for Plato, knowledge is presented as a scale of forms from nescience through opinion to knowledge, or again from conjecture, through opinion and understanding to reason, or again from poetry, through mathematics to dialectic, or when being is presented as a scale of forms extending from nothing, through half-being to true being, or pleasures are graduated through those of the body and those of the soul, or the forms of political institutions are graduated, or, again, when Aristotle recognizes the same type of logical structure, for example when he distinguishes the vegetable, animal, and human 'souls' as three forms of life arranged on a scale so that each includes its predecessor and adds to it something new.123

Here the variable (is) identified with the generic essence. The result of this identification is that every form, so far as it is low in the scale, is to that extent an imperfect or inadequate specification of the generic essence, which is realized with progressive adequacy as the scale is ascended.124

123 Ibid., pp. 58-59.

124 Ibid., p. 61. At this stage of the exposition, one familiar with the traditional moderate realist scholastic doctrine of the analogy of proper proportionality will immediately recognize that both are talking about the same thing. Yves Simon in The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space, New York, Majo, 1970, writing (p. 64) of "the great analogy, that did not acquire a distinct name until very late, the so called analogy of proper proportionality..." says (p. 65) "considering... being as divided into "being in act" and "being in potency," note that in the case of "being in act" the common ground, being, is purely asserted. In the second case, in the case of being in potency, the common ground, namely, being, is asserted, indeed, but also negated. This is the secret of analogical thinking. In the case of the second
Before answering whether such a scale of forms, in which the variable is identified with the differentiated generic essence, can explain the overlap characteristic of philosophical concepts, Collingwood faces the difficulty that such a conception "falls to the ground, condemned as a tissue of contradiction, a logician's nightmare," which difficulty "proceeds from the assumption that the doctrines concerning the structure of the concept, which are expressed in elementary textbooks of logic, must be accepted without question and applied without modification as principle of philosophical method."

analogue you have an assertion of the common ground coupled with a negation of the common ground...an association of assertion and negation which concerns the common ground. If the common ground were a genus, assertion and negation would concern only the differential factor...the association of assertion and negation concerns the differential. With analogates the association of assertion and negation concerns the common ground." Again (p. 82) "The general criterion which distinguishes a unity of analogy from univocicity is that when you move from one term to the other, there is in the first an assertion of the common ground which receives a qualified negation in the other term." And (p. 84) "In the positive sciences, and especially in mathematics, we are concerned with understanding, distinguishing and relating to each other various species of objects. Consequently, univocal concepts are best suited for these areas. Philosophy, however, since it is concerned with providing an overall synthetic view of reality, has to use terms in extended and analogous senses because it is only in this way that it can deal with the relative unity of essentially diverse kinds of things." For a full discussion of analogy of proper proportionality see Y. Simon's "On Order in Analogical Sets," The New Scholasticism, XXXIV (1960), pp. 1-42. See also chapter 7, below, pp. 481-485.

126 Ibid., p. 63.
Collingwood resolves this difficulty by a distinction deriving from Croce, between opposites and distincts, and to the question

127 William M. Johnston in The Formative Years of R.G. Collingwood, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1967, p. 74 says that "(i)n this work (Saggio sullo Hegel, 1906), Croce advances a notion which is crucial to his critique of Hegel and which will serve as the basis for the total revision of the Logica in its second edition of 1909. This notion is the distinction between two types of opposition: opposites and what Croce calls "distincts." Opposites are concepts which exclude each other, like hot and cold. Distincts are concepts, which though contrary, yet imply each other, like one and many or body and spirit. To use Collingwood's terms, the distincts are "distinct but not separate." Croce contends that Hegel erred in constructing his dialectic because he treated all forms of opposition as opposites. This led him to forced conclusions about the relationship of concepts which are really distincts. Hegel failed to see, says Croce, that the one and the many comprise a single whole, just as do the spirit and body. This notion of concepts which form distinct yet inseparable parts of a larger whole comprises the basic logical doctrine of Collingwood's Speculum Mentis" (see p. 170 for the phrase "distinct but not separate"). James Collins in "The Role of Monistic Idealism in Croce's Esthetic," The New Scholasticism, XVII (1943), pp. 34-35, writes: "Instead of the Hegelian triad of Logos, Nature and Spirit, Croce substituted the theoretical and the practical as the basic divisions in his Philosophy of the Spirit. This modification was made in the light of his criticism of the Hegelian dialectic, which so emphasized the opposition between thesis and antithesis that the resultant synthesis could unite these moments only by emptying them of all significance. To overcome this untenable dualism of opposites, Croce proposed a conjunction of distinct factors or aspects of the concrete concept. In this way philosophical investigation can be limited to the manifestations of the spirit alone, banishing from the provenance of true knowledge such a pseudo-concept as 'an external universe or objective reality'. When this is opposed to the notion of internal spiritual reality, both terms of the opposition are reduced to abstract concepts which can never be synthesised. The triadic scheme must be replaced by the doctrine of the grades of the Spirit, in which both movements are concrete and need not be overcome. "For those degrees, considered in their distinction, are the concept of the spirit in its determinations, and not the universal concept of spirit considered in its dialectic of synthesis of opposites." (What is Living and What is Dead in The Philosophy of Hegel, pp. 92-92). Within the theoretical sphere are found art and philosophy: the knowledge of individuals through images and the knowledge of the universal through the pure concept. The individual
"whether the idea of a scale of forms (in which lower and higher species are lesser and more perfect expressions of the generic essence) serves to explain the overlap between the species of a philosophical genus?" he answers "Yes, if these species are opposites: no, if they are distincts." 128

Actions, for example, may be divided into good actions and

spirit passes constantly from one manifestation to the other, although the dissatisfaction which engenders this oscillation does not spring from either form considered as distinct." It seems, however, that Collingwood, in The Essay on Philosophical Method, inverts the terminology while retaining the doctrine of Croce. In What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel (Douglas Ainslie's translation of Croce's Saggio sullo Hegel,) Croce (p. 11) says: "It is impossible to confuse the two series, distincts and opposites....Now, if distinction do not impede, if indeed it rather render possible the concrete unity of the philosophic concept, it does not seem possible that the same should be true of opposition. Opposition gives rise to deep fissures in the bosom of the philosophic universal and of each of its particular forms, and to irreconcilable dualisms. Instead of finding the concrete universal, the organic whole of reality which it seeks, thought seems everywhere to run against two universals, opposing and menacing each other." Clearly, for Croce opposites are the externalizing repellants and distincts the unifying concretisers, whereas for Collingwood it is just the reverse, distincts are mutually exclusive and non-philosophical concepts, whereas opposites are mutually implicatory and the proper object of concrete philosophical consideration. This is very clear when, following the citation above, Collingwood adds "It is not enough to show that these distinctions contain in themselves an element of aspect of opposition; that will not save them; the element of distinction must be completely eliminated and nothing except pure opposition allowed to remain." I can offer no explanation for Collingwood's apparent reversal of term usage.

bad actions, and, as so divided, are divided into opposites, that is, into opposite species, which can be arranged on a scale with infinity at one end and zero at the other and the variety of intermediate forms in between, partaking of both opposites, each being more and less good than another, more and less bad than another. The extremities, absolute good and absolute bad are pure abstractions falling outside the scale itself. But actions may be specified not only by division into opposites, good and bad, but also into distincts, such as just, generous and courageous actions.

Opposite species like good and bad, would then belong to the philosophical phase of their genus and provide the appropriate subject matter for philosophical thought, whereas distinct species would belong to the non-philosophical phase of the concept.\footnote{129}{See Ibid., p. 64.}

If this were the case, Collingwood says, we would have a straightforward and simple rule of philosophical method, namely:

\footnote{130}{Ibid., p. 65.}

...since philosophical specification is into opposites and non-philosophical into distincts, any distinctions found in a philosophical subject-matter must be either banished from it as alien to the sphere of philosophy or else interpreted so as to appear cases of oppositions.
But this simple, straightforward solution becomes threatened when it retroacts over the principle of the solution, namely the distinction of relations into distincts and opposites.

The solution, that "philosophical specification is into opposites and non-philosophical specification is into distincts" so that "any distinctions found in a philosophical subject matter must be either banished from it as alien to the sphere of philosophy or else interpreted so as to appear cases of opposition" immediately precipitates the question as to whether "the relation between philosophical specification by opposites and non-philosophical specification by distincts (is) itself a case of distinction or of opposition".

The critical moment of this question is immediately apparent. If the dichotomy between opposites and distincts is an ultimate and radical dichotomy, that is, if the distinction itself is an instance of distinction and not of opposition, as it is if opposites and distincts are two mutually exclusive species of a classificatory genus, then non-philosophical thinking predominates in human thought, and philosophical

\[131\] Ibid., p. 65.
\[132\] Ibid., p. 68.
thought becomes subordinated to non-philosophical thought as just another species of thought alongside and competing with other forms of thought, e.g. scientific and historical. On the other hand, if that distinction into opposites and distincts is an instance of opposition then "philosophical logic as the logic of opposites has triumphed over non-philosophical logic as the logic of distincts, and with this triumph it has destroyed the distinction between itself and its opponent."\textsuperscript{133}

This requires, quite consistently with Collingwood's notion of philosophical inquiry, that we go back and revise our starting point in the light of the conclusion reached,\textsuperscript{134} that the distinction between opposites and distincts has to account for both philosophical and non-philosophical thinking without absorption of one into the other, or obliterating of one by the other.

If, in order to avoid the absorption of either form of thought by the other, it is said that the relation between distinction and opposition is itself an instance neither of distinction nor of opposition but some third kind of relation, then, not only has the dualism been rejected, since a third term intervenes, but also the question is immediately raised as to whether philosophical specification is by pure opposition or by this postulated third principle.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., p. 68.
\textsuperscript{134} See Ibid., p. 69; p. 160.
\textsuperscript{135} See Ibid., pp. 68-69.
Preliminary to answering this crucial question, Collingwood asks us to reconsider the examples of differences of degree when we say that one action is better than another and when we say that one body is hotter than another. The difference between these two is that the heat in a body is measurable, whereas the goodness of a man or of an action is not, just as it is also impossible to measure the degrees of beauty, truth, pleasantness or any other philosophical concept. If one book is estimated to be higher than another by measurement, it can be said that it is twice or three times higher, or so many inches or feet higher. But it is meaningless to say of some pleasant experience, estimated to be more pleasant than another, that it is twice or ten times or so many inches or feet more pleasant. At the most, one is using quantitative terms to express something non-quantitative but qualitative when one says that a certain person is more intelligent than another. Measurements of intelligence, or of degrees of painfulness or pleasantness of some stimulus, and even of light intensity, where numbered scales of some kind are used, simply place the members according to more or less in an order with respect to each other. An increase of heat as felt is a change in the kind of experience, from a faint warmth felt through a decided warmth, first pleasant, then slightly painful, then noticeably painful, then sharply painful. The addition of each degree is also the addition of a different kind. Calling them differences of degree is using the physicist's thermometer language, but it is used meta-
All differences of degree among philosophical concepts are never merely differences of degree but imply concomitant differences of kind, they are at once differences of degree and differences of kind.

...this is the real basis of the distinction between a philosophical scale of forms and a non-philosophical: in a non-philosophical scale there are differences of degree, and coordinated with them differences of kind; in a philosophical scale there is only one set of differences having this peculiar double character.137

Collingwood draws attention to the fact that, though peculiar, this type of difference is quite familiar, both in its philosophical and non-philosophical phase. We familiarly speak of degrees of kindred and affinity, degrees of punishment, structural degrees in society such as those of nobility and gentry, university degrees, degrees of grammatical comparison and so forth. Such differences fuse differences of degree with differences in kind.

Differences of degree and differences of kind, non-philosophically considered, are mutually exclusive species of a genus, but philosophically considered they must overlap in a form of difference which shares the nature of both. In the case of water, there are two

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136 The question regarding the meaning of quantitative terms applied to qualities is considered by P. Hoenen in his Cosmologia, Rome, Gregorian University Press, 1936, Vol. 2, pp. 468-478.

137 An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 73.
concurrent types of difference, one in degree of heat, the other in physical structure which gives rise to mutually exclusive specifications coordinated with the varying degrees of heat. In its non-philosophical phase, opposition is a relation subsisting between a positive term and its own mere negation or absence; the physicist understands cold as a lack of heat. But cold as we feel it is not a mere lack of the feeling of heat, but another kind of feeling which has its own positive character. But the feeling of cold and the feeling of hot are not merely two distinct feelings but also two opposite feelings. Physical cold is related to physical heat of which it is the negation by a relationship of mere opposition. But felt cold is related to felt heat as at once opposed to it and distinct from it, opposition and distinction being fused into a single relation.

In general the kind of opposition which is found among philosophical terms is at once opposition and distinction, and subsists between terms each having a definite character of its own and yet forming together a true pair of opposites. 138

...Differences of degree and differences of kind, which in non-philosophical thought can be disentangled from one another, are in philosophy fused into a new type of difference uniting the characteristics of both. Distinction and opposition, which in non-philosophical thought are two mutually exclusive kinds of relation, in philosophy coalesce into one, so that what seems at first sight a mere opposition - the relation, that is, between a term and its own absence - turns out to be also a distinction between two terms, and vice versa. 139

138 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
139 Ibid., p. 76.
With this in mind, Collingwood returns to the difficulty encountered above (pp. 167-168) namely that a specific form must either embody the generic essence completely or be completely outside such essence. The difficulty arises from forcing upon the facts of philosophical thought an interpretation in which the terms difference of degree and difference of kind bore the special meanings proper to them in a non-philosophical context. A work of art said to be more beautiful than another is also beautiful in a different way; it is not merely an excess over the other in beauty but an excess which has its own peculiar kind of beauty. The same is true of pleasure, goodness and the other concepts belonging to the sphere of philosophy. Superficially these appear to obey the traditional rules of specification modified by an overlap of classes, but closely scrutinized they reveal the characteristic fusion of differences in degree with differences in kind. When we distinguish different kinds of goodness, as distinct from merely differentiating classes of good things, these kinds are more truly goodness than others.\(^\text{140}\)

I understand this solution of Collingwood in the following way. The principle that relations are divisible into opposites and distincts may be taken either non-philosophically or philosophically. If it is taken non-philosophically, then philosophy itself is a species of the classificatory genus, thought, alongside other species, such as

\(^{140}\) See Ibid., p. 78.
science and history. But it may also be taken, as it is taken in philosophy, as a philosophical distinction, in which case the division will be understood as a mode of opposition in which distincts and opposites overlap, and philosophical thinking is a mode of thinking which overlaps with other forms, such as science and history (as in Speculum Mentis). This means that, according to the philosophical understanding of the principle, distinction and opposition are not merely concurrent, and that specification and graduation by degrees are not merely together, but are together in such a way that the graduation of the generic term is intrinsically the reason of its division into species. Pleasure, as graduated, is itself different in definition and species according to the graduations. Knowledge, as graduated through conjecture, opinion and certitude is different in kind, and differently defined at each grade on the scale, whereas the definition of water remains unchanged throughout its different forms on the temperature scale.

When attempts are made not merely to differentiate classes of good things but to distinguish kinds of goodness, it is constantly found that some of these kinds are more truly goodness than others.141

That is, differentiation in those cases comes from inside the differentiated term, the common genus, not from outside, as in the case of the classificatory division of a common genus. The difference adds qualitatively and internally, not merely quantitatively and externally.

141 Ibid.
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Distinction and opposition are two species of relation; and where the term relation is applied to a philosophical subject-matter it acquires the special colouring proper to philosophical concepts, that is...it denotes a generic concept whose specific classes overlap. In philosophical thought, therefore, distinction and opposition will necessarily combine into a peculiar type of relation which is neither mere distinction nor mere opposition, but partakes of both these characters; a relation which subsists between terms at once opposed and distinct.142

The differences of degree found in philosophical concepts are therefore not of the same type as differences of degree found in non-philosophical concepts. The gradations of a scale of pleasures, and of intelligence by I.Q. tests, cannot be handled mathematically; to attempt to do so is to commit the fallacy of calculation. The fallacy of indifference is committed by attending to the degree of variation ignoring the built-in difference of kind. Both fallacies are based on the false disjunction that a difference of degree cannot also be a difference of kind.143

**B.i.f. Synthesis of difference of Degree and Difference of Kind in Regard to the Scale of Forms**

The fusion of distinction and opposition also modifies the corresponding idea of a scale of forms. If the variable is identical with the generic essence, the zero end forms no part of the scale, since at the zero end the generic essence would be altogether absent; the lower

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142 Ibid., p. 76.

143 See Ibid., pp. 80-81.
end of the scale is thus a unit of minimal realization of the generic essence.

The lowest member of the scale is a genuine realization of the generic essence, and as the limiting case at the lower extreme it is an opposite relatively to the other members on the scale. The badness of a bad moral act is nothing other than its low degree and kind of goodness in relation to the degrees and kinds above it. Even the minimal case of goodness, which in relation to higher kinds is bad, is good. There is no purely bad act that does not appear to the one who does it as somehow good. Considered in itself it is good, but all changes when it is related to higher cases. Pleasure is good in itself as far as it goes, but in relation to the pursuit of duty it is comparable as not merely less good but as positively evil. Thus, the lowest case in the scale of goodness compared with the next above it acquires the character of badness, and, as lowest on the scale, becomes identical with evil in general in which the abstract idea of evil finds concrete embodiment. And the same relation which obtains between the lowest member of the scale and the next above it reappears between any two adjacent forms. Each is good in itself, but bad in relation to that

144 See Ibid., p. 82.
145 See Ibid.
146 See Ibid., p. 83.
147 See Ibid., p. 84.
above it.\textsuperscript{148}

B.i.g. The Scale of Forms and the Overlap of Classes.

Collingwood then clarifies how the scale of forms thus understood accounts for the overlap of classes which characterizes philosophical concepts.\textsuperscript{149} The lower of any two adjacent terms is good in itself but bad in relation to its neighbour above it. The same is true of a scale of beauty and ugliness, true and false, simple and complex\textsuperscript{150} or any such pair of polar opposites.\textsuperscript{151}

The lower (good, or true, or simple, or beautiful) is not only such (good, etc.) \textsuperscript{in general} but \textsuperscript{is such \textit{in a specific way}.} When compared with its above neighbour it loses not only its goodness or truth in general but its \textsuperscript{specific kind of goodness or truth \textit{at that level}.} And the higher term in comparison with the lower possesses not only that kind of goodness belonging to it in its own right but also retains, though modified, the kind of goodness which belonged to the lower in itself in its own right. It not only surpasses its neighbor \textsuperscript{in degree (of goodness, beauty or truth)} but exceeds it on its \textsuperscript{own ground}. The lower promises more than it can perform; in professing to exhibit a certain kind of goodness it fails to do so save approximately and inadequately.

\textsuperscript{148} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{149} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{150} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 85.

\textsuperscript{151} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 86.
Thus, each term, which in itself is simply one specific form of goodness, has also a double relation to its neighbours: in comparison with the one below it is what that professes to be; in comparison with the one above, it professes to be what that is.152

The lower promises what the higher performs; the higher is the reality of which the lower is the appearance; the higher is the ideal to which the lower is the approximation; the higher is the truth of which the lower is a perversion or distortion. But these metaphors are intelligible only in the light of the presupposed relation which explains them.

It is a purely logical relation,...(as such) it is a synthesis of the four relations...difference of degree, difference of kind, relation of distinction, and relation of opposition. The higher term is a species of the same genus as the lower, but it differs in degree as a more adequate embodiment of the generic essence, as well as in kind as a specifically different embodiment; it follows from this that it must be not only distinct from it, as one specification from another; but opposed to it, as a higher specification to a lower, a relatively adequate to a relatively inadequate, a true embodiment of the generic essence to a false embodiment; as true, it possesses not only its own specific character but also that which its rival falsely claimed.153

The affirmational and negational relationship between the members on the scale, which Collingwood goes on to assert, is important

152 Ibid., p. 87. The relations obtaining between the forms of experience as explained in Speculum Mentis is a good instance of this.

for the understanding of the dynamic, dialectic nature of the genus of a scale of forms.

The higher thus negates the lower, and at the same time reaffirms it: negates it as a false embodiment of the generic essence, and reaffirms its content, that specific form of the essence, as part and parcel of itself.\textsuperscript{154}

This logical presentation of a scale of forms in which a higher beats the lower on its own ground is familiar in regard to a philosophical scale of forms. If justice and expediency are adjacent on a scale of moral values, expediency finds its fulfillment in going beyond mere expediency to the level of justice, so that justice is not merely justice but also expedient. This leads to the next important point in understanding the dialectical nature of the philosophical scale of forms: "Each term in the scale...sums up the whole scale to that point."\textsuperscript{155}

Just as the zero form was eliminated from the scale as also an elimination of the generic essence, so also the infinity form is eliminated since any concretely realized specific form is the generic concept itself so far as our thought has yet conceived it, always allowing for further self-transcendence in higher forms of embodiment of the generic essence.

All the lower stages, in the scale are telescoped into this presently achieved situation. They are in

\textsuperscript{154} An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 89.
fact summed up in it twice over: once falsely, in the proximate specification, which misinterprets their significance and combines them into a false unity, and once truly, in the culminating form. 156

The denial of absolute opposites at either end of a scale of forms is extremely important in Collingwood's theory. What is found at either end of a scale is not something that is first posited as something in itself and then the intermediate members constituted by a differential combination of these opposites. What is given concretely is this or that particular member, which, if analysed, analyses into two opposite respects, one respect towards a prior term or terms, another respect towards a subsequent term or terms, much in the same way as an astrophysicist analyses starlight by spraying it out into a band, along a graduated scale which points in two directions. What is given is starlight, and the polar opposites, red and blue colours, are the result of an analytical operation on that concrete entity analysed. This is true of a scale of forms since no member is considered as something absolutely in itself, for that would be precisely the position of classificatory species, rather each is what it is by reason of its position on the scale with respect to its neighbours in two opposite directions. This follows, as will be clear after the dynamic, dialectical consideration of a scale of forms is made, from the basically active,

156 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
rather than substantive or entitative nature of the members of a scale of forms. In other words, since, for Collingwood, becoming, or identity in difference, is more basic than being, whatever is conceived as becoming can only be conceived as doubly relative, once to a prior condition from which it comes, and secondly, although simultaneously, to a posterior condition towards which it is becoming. Historical events, which are more properly processes than events (which term savours rather of classificatory thought) are thus understood as overlapping classes on a scale of forms, for any member, that is any specific "event" dynamically considered in process, has to be understood relatively to what went before, namely its past, from which it came, and relatively to that into which it developed, namely its future. Thus, past and future are the opposites into which some "present" "spectroanalyses" when it is historically analysed and explained. Past and future are not things in themselves, as realist philosophy would say, but are aspects, relationships built into the very essence of some actuality.

Thus is explained the overlap of classes in a philosophical genus:

The higher of any two adjacent forms overlaps the lower because it includes the positive content of the lower as a constituent element within itself. It only fails to include the lower in its entirety because there is also a negative aspect of the lower, which is rejected by the higher: the lower, in addition to asserting its own content, denies that the generic essence contains anything more, and this denial contains its falsehood.157

Thus also appears the role of significant negation in dialectically relating the members on a philosophical scale of forms. The limitation intrinsic to the lower member is a negation of its own intrinsic fulfillment. The negation of this negation of the lower by the higher overcomes the limitation in the fulfillment of the lower by and in the higher form. Utilitarianism rightly affirms expediency as a form of moral goodness but falsely denies that there is anything in higher forms not explainable in terms of expediency. Duty rejects expediency inasmuch as expediency refuses to accept duty as a legitimate, let alone higher, form of goodness. But duty reaffirms expediency through subjecting it to its own principles as a constituent element of duty itself. Duty and expediency thus overlap, a dutiful action has its own kind of expediency, and an expedient action thus partakes of the nature of duty. Thus:

The lower overlaps the higher in a different sense than that in which the higher overlaps the lower: it does not include the higher as part of itself, it adopts part of the positive content of the higher while rejecting another part.\(^{158}\)

These explanations, says Collingwood, show "clearer than before what exactly this overlap is."\(^{159}\) The higher takes the lower up into itself adding something, the lower rejects this added element in the higher.

158 Ibid., p. 90.
159 Ibid., p. 91.
The overlap consists in this, that the lower is contained in the higher, the higher transcending the lower and adding to it something new, whereas the lower partially coincides with the higher, but differs from it in rejecting this increment.  

The overlap, says Collingwood, is not an overlap of extension between classes but an overlap of intension between concepts, each concept, in its own degree, being a specification of the generic essence, but embodying that generic essence more fully and adequately. That is, the differences, differentiating a higher from a lower, are "additions" obtained from within the generic essence, an intensification of that generic essence, not an addition of a difference extrinsically, from outside the generic essence. It is something like the growth of an organism from a single cell. A subsequent state arises from a prior state by division and resulting addition from within. Individuality is progressively acquired with increasing determination arising from self-constructive differentiation. And so it is with all dialectical activity; self identity is acquired by medium of self differentiation and simultaneous self reintegration. Such a process is explicable as an overlap of classes in a scale of forms. The same whole (generic essence) is

160 Ibid.

161 This point is developed at length in chapter 9, below, pp. 656 et seq.
present identically throughout; its identity is an identity in a differentiation of forms and its totality is the totality of its different forms, not juxtaposed one on top of the other from outside each other, but as overlapping in a mutually implicating, self transcending fashion, the final form gathering together within itself in a summary fashion all the previous forms that lead up to it, just as a man's life at any moment is the summation of all the self perfecting differentiation which took place since he first appeared as a fertilized ovum. Relating this to the process of question and answer we might say that the question is the differentiation, and bifurcation into alternatives, the internal opposition of self to self, and the answer the reintegration, or reestablishment of harmony at a higher level. And, if in adopting the Crocean theory of the distinction of opposites and distincts, Collingwood is also adopting the Crocean reason for making that distinction, namely the substitution of a two-term dialectic of opposites (which Croce however calls distincts; see n 127 p. 164 above) for the classical three term thesis, antithesis, synthesis dialectic, we may further say that a moment of present actuality, which in relation to its past has the aspect of information available, or answers to questions, is the answer, the synthesis of opposites arising from and in past questions, and together the question, the antitheses, the contemplated alternatives, with respect to future

162 See below, chapter 9, pp. 661 et seq.
answers or syntheses. The totality at any moment is present actuality. The understanding of this present actuality of lived experience consists in being able to see it as answeringly synthesising with respect to past questions and at the same time questioningly antithesising within itself its past (summarized in the present actuality) with respect to anticipated answers in the future. Thus, by medium of Croce's reason for distinguishing distincts from opposites, we can see how Collingwood can together identify the dialectical activity of the mind with the process of questioning and answering on the one hand, and with the historical bifurcation of present actuality into past and future respects on the other hand. 163

B.ii. The Logic of Judgments.

Having exposed the type of concept characteristic of philosophical thought, Collingwood goes on to consider judgments and then reasonings as these are found in philosophy.

B.ii.a. Abstract and Concrete Affirmation and Negation.

Judgments are traditionally divided into affirmative and negative. The relation between affirmation and negation is peculiarly intimate in regard to philosophical statements. Dissent from the statement of a philosophical position is not simply to deny it but to counteract it with our own view which "need not be on the tip of our tongue:

163 This point is brought out well by the clockface illustration in chapter 3, above, pp. 108-110.
it may be something with which our mind, as Socrates would say, is pregnant, and which needs both skill and pains to bring it forth."\footnote{164}{An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 103.}

Without this feeling of its being "quick within us" we should not meddle with the discussion in question. This is a corollary of the Socratic principle that philosophy is never a transition from sheer ignorance to sheer knowledge but a progress in which we come to know better what we already knew. In philosophy every negation implies an affirmation, which rule is "the principle of concrete negation" and its neglect is "the fallacy of abstract negation."\footnote{165}{Ibid., p. 106.}

Correlative to this there is "a principle of concrete affirmation" and a corresponding "fallacy of abstract affirmation."\footnote{166}{Ibid.} In a philosophical affirmative judgment there is a peculiar intimacy in the relation to the negative elements implicated by the affirmative. The negative elements make precise the affirmations by pointing out exactly what those affirmations, as affirmations, intend to deny. Every philosophical affirmation rejects some definite proposition regarded as erroneous. This is not necessarily the case regarding non-philosophical thought. The philosophical statement that the species of a philosophical genus overlap intends to deny the proposition that they are mutually ex-
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elusive.

...where the generic concept predicated by a judgment is philosophical, specified in a scale of forms of which the judgment is intended to affirm the highest..., its denial of all the inferior forms is summarized in one detail, namely that of the proximate form; since each summarizes the whole scale up to that point, and the denial of that involves the denial of all that it summarizes.167

The truth in the proximate lower form, and so in all the lower forms, is retained in the highest form, so, the contrast of the proximate form with the highest is a compendium of all the errors which the assertion of the highest form intends to deny. It is a principle of method, not merely a statement of observed fact in philosophy, that "a philosophical assertion whenever it affirms something definite also denies something definite."168

The principle of concrete affirmation may be applied to one's own, or another's, thought. Applied to one's own thought it means that if one wants to be clear about one's assertions one has to be clear about what one is denying. Applied to the comprehension of another's thought it means that one who is reading or listening to a philosopher must never be content to ask oneself what the philosopher intends to affirm, without together asking what he means to deny. If we do not

167 Ibid., p. 108.

168 Ibid., p. 108. This is the dialectical character found in all concrete thinking.
know the doctrines Plato or Parmenides meant to deny in their affirmations we can be sure we do not understand what they intend to affirm. 169

This is both difficult and of great importance, since the works of the great philosophers of the past have formed their own views by criticizing their predecessors whose works may not have come down to us except insofar as we can construct them from these same criticisms. The rejected view need not have been an actually maintained position, but need only seem plausible to the one who rejects it. The controversy of rejecting it is then one within the mind of a single philosopher, what Plato called a dialogue of the soul with itself. 170

Thus, whereas outside philosophy a judgment is either affirmative or negative, affirmation and negation being two distinct species of the classificatory genus, judgment, "in philosophy there is such a balance of the two that no properly weighed and considered judgment is more affirmative than negative, or more negative than affirmative." 171

169 Ibid., p. 109. The importance of this for questioning may be noted. Plato or Parmenides had certain questions in mind, which questions specified certain alternative positions on certain matters. Their position is understood as an answer which affirms one of the alternatives while rejecting the others. An understanding of the philosophers position, therefore, means understanding the alternatives affirmed and denied. But this means understanding his statements as determinative of alternatives, that is, understanding his statements not merely as statements, but as answers to questions.

170 In other words, the questioning of a position requires not that it be maintained as affirmed but only that it be supposed.

What makes a judgment properly philosophical is "the peculiar intimacy of the relation between its affirmative and negative elements." This relationship is such that where \( P \) and \( Q \) are equally definite and alternative specific answers to the question 'What is S?' \( P \) cannot be validly affirmed of \( S \) while \( Q \) is left indeterminate, nor can \( Q \) be validly denied of \( S \) while \( P \) is left indeterminate. A precise question details the alternative possibilities and a precise answer affirms one of the alternatives and together denies the other alternatives.

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172 Ibid., p. 110.

173 See An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 110. See also Collingwood's Speculum Mentis, p. 78 and The New Leviathan, p. 74, pgph., 11.12. Speaking of the disjunctive judgment as clearly delineating alternatives, B. Bosanquet, Essentials of Logic, London, MacMillan, 1897, p. 125 has the following to say: "The disjunction seems to complete the system of judgments, including all others in itself..." (emphasis added), and "...disjunction in itself implies a kind of individuality which is beyond mere fact and mere abstract truth, although allied to both; and all intelligible negation is under, not of, a disjunction." Again (p. 123) "The Disjunctive Judgment in its perfect form...is appropriate to the exposition of a content as a system..." And (p. 124) "The peculiar point of the Disjunctive is that it makes negation positively significant." (Emphasis added) If we are impatient at this stage and ask what does all this have to do with "Who killed John Doe?" we can foresee in some way what the result will be. The answer to that question will depend upon our ability to grasp a global situation, defined by the question, which divides a horizon of relevance from that which is irrelevant (that is, has no bearing on the case); the global situation will be in the nature of a concrete universal. The work will then be, by a process of discriminate questioning, to etch in the relevant disjunctions so as to see how the parts (the detailed facts of the case) clearly enmesh. The investigator continually asks himself 'How does this fact tie in with that fact in the overall picture?' An indication that further investigation (questioning) is called for is the observation that "this fact does not 'fit' with this fact or with these other facts, when we view the whole situation." Crime detection, as also historical research, is somewhat like solving a jigsaw puzzle; fitting together the pieces in
B.ii.b. Abstract and Concrete Universality.

In regard to the traditional logical division of judgments into universal, particular and singular, Collingwood next asks whether the term universal may not have a special shade of meaning in the judgments of philosophy.\(^{174}\)

The terms universal, particular and individual name three elements common to all judgments, which naturally overlap, rather than three species of judgment. The universal judgment 'all men are mortal' does not exclude but includes the judgment that some men are mortal and that this man (Socrates) is mortal. Even if we consider it as a universal judgment, the three elements of universality, particularity, singularity, introduce differentiations into its significance. The universal judgment, in relation to each of these three elements may be taken diversely. As a pure universal it means that man as such is mortal, as a universal of particulars it means that every kind of man is mortal, as a universal of singulars it means that every individual man is mortal.\(^{175}\)

But these three elements are related in different ways to the different types of universal judgment.

\(^\text{174}\) See An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 68.

\(^\text{175}\) Ibid., p. 111.
One kind of thought bears on the singular as its determining element. By an examination of each individual instance of an S we find it to be P, and, by necessity of thought, we reject this as mere coincidence and feel justified in thinking that all the S's are P because they are S. That is, S as such, is P. This is common sense generalization.

Here the singular element is primary, the universal secondary. A universal judgment of this kind is called a generalization.176

A second type of thought begins from particulars rather than singulars, and judges that each kind of S is P, from which it goes on to judge that S as such is P. The mind here bears on the specific difference between the instances.

This is the type of universal judgment which is normal in empirical science where the importance of the plurality of instances towards establishing a universal proposition lies not in their numerical difference, as in generalization proper, but in the specific differences between them.177

In a third type of thought the universal is of primary interest. From thinking that S as such is P we see that any specific kind of S is P and that each instance of S is P. "This is the type of universal judgment which obtains in exact mathematical science."178

176 Ibid., p. 112.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
assertion of the property of a triangle rests only on those features which belong to it as a triangle, and not on its individual or particular features.

In philosophical judgments these three elements are present but none of the above three types of structure are adequate to it. The framing of "a universal judgment in philosophy by generalization from instances is to commit the fallacy of identified coincidents." selection of the instances so as to avoid this results in "the fallacy of precarious margins."

Empirical science looks for a generic essence as something common to its variously distinguished species as indifferently present in them all. Collingwood says that philosophers instinctively avoid this way of proceeding since they feel that the full nature of what is being investigated is exemplified only in the highest forms of it and whatever there is in the lower forms is only a minimum form of the generic essence, not its completion.

Nor can they proceed as in exact science from a knowledge of the generic essence in itself as implicating certain properties, attempting to know the properties of its various particulars and individuals.

179 Ibid., p. 113. See also above, this chapter, p. 155.

180 See An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 113. See also above, this chapter, p. 156.
The difficulty is that "(a)ny statement about a generic concept which is true as applied to one of its specific forms is likely to require modification before it can be applied to any other."\(^{181}\) What is true of knowledge as intellectual will need modification before it can be applied to knowledge as sensitive.

B.ii.c. Mutual Implication of Universality, Particularity and Singularity of Concrete Concepts.

To avoid the above three fallacies we need not look for a fourth way of arranging the three elements but to find a method that uses all these three methods at once, by a process of checking each by means of the others. A philosophical judgment embodies all three types of structure. "Philosophy can and does generalize, or assert of the concept as such what is found in its single instances, but subject to the provision that, by itself, this is only a clue towards answering its question, and not a substantive answer."\(^{182}\) And, "like empirical science, philosophy can and does argue that if different species of a concept agree in a certain respect this should be a feature belonging to the generic essence; but...they must be checked by arranging the species in a scale and showing that the features of the generic essence shine out more clearly as the scale reaches its culmination."\(^{183}\) Furthermore,


\(^{182}\) Ibid., p. 115.

\(^{183}\) Ibid., pp. 116-117.
"philosophy like exact science aims at determining *a priori* the characteristics which belong of necessity to its concepts as such in their true universality."¹⁸⁴ But such statements in philosophy are tentative until verified by reference to facts. "(A) philosophical theory must show that what it claims as necessary in the concept is possible in every specification of the concept and actual in its instances."¹⁸⁵

To assert a proposition in mathematics does not require belief in the actual existence of the subject of discourse, all that is required is to suppose it. The mathematician frames a supposition and sees what follows from it. The body of mathematics is composed of this complex which logic calls the hypothetical proposition.¹⁸⁶

The empirical scientist deals with facts, not abstractions, but he ignores the facts in their multiform variety and is especially concerned to find a certain framework into which his facts can be fitted. Without such a framework which enables him to group the facts around fixed points, as *loci* for his thought, there is no science. The scientist studying the facts of tuberculosis, looks for what belongs in the tubercular character, treating the disease *itself* as an entity, ignoring the peculiarities of its instances which merely exemplify it. The empirical

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¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 117.
¹⁸⁵ Ibid.
¹⁸⁶ See Ibid., pp. 117-118.
scientist deals with the notion of a specific disease as he deals with the notion of a specific plant. It is the specificity that interests him primarily, and the instances are of interest to him only as they embody the specific character.

The universal propositions of empirical science therefore are somewhat like mathematics in that they have a hypothetical character. Statements about tuberculosis in medical textbooks refer only to the standard case from which it does not follow that the standard case exists.\footnote{187}

...the body of scientific knowledge is expressed in propositions that are logically intermediate between these two orders of categoricals, the statements of fact which are its data and the statements of fact which are its applications; and this body itself consists of hypothetical propositions.\footnote{188}

\textbf{B.ii.d. Universality of Concrete Universal Not Merely Hypothetical.}

Philosophical thought differs both from mathematics and empirical science in that its body or substance is composed of propositions which are not merely hypothetical but in essence and fundamental intention categorical.\footnote{189} By categorical Collingwood explains that he uses the word in the logician's sense\footnote{190} and that he means that a statement is

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\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{187}{See \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 118-121.}
\item \footnote{188}{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 121.}
\item \footnote{189}{\textit{Ibid.}}
\item \footnote{190}{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 122.}
\end{itemize}
categorical which itself actualizes an instance of what is asserted.\textsuperscript{191} One cannot study logic or ethics without a commitment to the view that the subject matter being studied actually exists.\textsuperscript{192} The body of geometrical science is heterogeneous with its subject matter, but in logic it is homogeneous and even identical therewith.

The propositions of which logic consists must conform to the rules which logic lays down, so that logic is actually about itself.\textsuperscript{193} It follows that logic cannot be in substance merely hypothetical.

Geometry can afford to be indifferent to the existence of its subject matter, it suffices that it merely supposes it. But logic is not thus indifferent. By thinking logically and propounding logical propositions logic generates an actually existing subject matter to itself. There are thus no logical propositions about a merely supposed object; if logic is being exercised its very object is thereby existentialized. In saying that 'all squares have equal diagonals' there is no assertion that any squares or diagonals exist. But to say that 'all universal propositions distribute their subject' is not only to talk about universal propositions but to produce an actual instance of the thing under discussion. Logic contains as well as discusses reasonings. A logician

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., pp. 123-134.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., p. 128.

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., p. 129.
cannot therefore deny the existence of any actual reasoning without thereby disowning himself as a logician. Logic, therefore, is such that the very conception of its subject matter, namely thought, is at the same time the existential instancing of that subject matter. The propositions constitutive of the subject matter of logic cannot be merely hypothetical, as likewise the subject matter of ethical thought must be conceived as something whose essence involves its existence. Ethics discusses not merely ideas about action divorced from the action itself but the moral consciousness. It is therefore both normative and descriptive, describing something that is already somewhat what it ought to be. This holds generally of the subject matter making up the body of any philosophical science. It consists of categorical propositions unlike that of the exact and empirical sciences whose subject matter consists merely of hypothetical propositions. 

194 Ibid., p. 130.
195 Ibid., p. 131.
196 Ibid., p. 133. Just as to the religious consciousness God cannot be believed except as existing, as the Anselmian argument expresses, so the philosophical consciousness in every philosophical science, logic, ethics and metaphysics "stands committed to maintaining that its subject-matter is no mere hypothesis, but something actually existing," that is philosophy is "a form of thought in which essence and existence...are conceived as inseparable"; see Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 127.
197 See Ibid., p. 132.
198 Ibid., p. 133.
empirical science categorical and hypothetical are mutually exclusive species of the genus 'proposition', in philosophy they overlap; the propositions of philosophy being together categorical and hypothetical. Thus, the universal judgments of science can be purely hypothetical whereas those forming the body of philosophy cannot be purely hypothetical but must be categorical at the same time. But, furthermore, the togetherness of these two characteristics in philosophical propositions is mutually implicatory, each demands the other for itself to be present.199

...in the case of philosophical judgments the overlap (is) peculiarly intimate; the categorical element is no longer something external to the hypothetical, even if necessary to it; both elements are alike of the essence of philosophy as such.200

Thus, whereas according to a classificatory system, hypothetical and categorical are names for two specifically distinct and mutually exclusive kinds of statement, in the concrete thought of philosophy they are two aspects of the one same kind of thought, the hypothetical aspect being the questioning aspect, the categorical aspect being the answering aspect, the "systole and diastole" of all knowledge, as Collingwood expresses it.201 Question and answer, therefore, according to classifi-

199 Ibid., p. 134.
200 Ibid.
201 See Speculum Mentis, p. 77. See also chapter 3, above, p. 97.
catory logic are two different species of mental activity, but according to the logic of overlap they are two forms in which the one same thing, knowledge, is realized; two modalities, as it were, that go together in the constitution of the one concrete activity which is knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, as concretely experienced, "spectro-analyses" in its explanation, into a questioning moment and an answering moment, neither existing as something in itself independently of the other, as classifica
tory logic would have it.

B.iii. The Logic of Reasoning.

Collingwood then goes on to enquire into the nature of reasoning in philosophy, which he does by comparing it with deductive and inductive reasoning.

In all inference there are three things, data from which we argue, principles according to which we argue and the conclusions to which we argue.

B.iii.a. Exact Science Ruled by Supposal.

The data of exact science consist of suppositions, namely the principles or axioms of the science. The conclusions are inferred demonstratively, as following with perfect logical rigor from those principles. There are two kinds of axioms in exact science. First, there are axioms

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belonging to logic, which are principles according to which demonstration as such must proceed; they are necessary to the exact science but not part of it; they are thus presuppositions of the science, although not mere suppositions in themselves absolutely. It is the work of logic to inquire into these principles, not that of the science itself. That is, they are not answers to questions which the science itself asks, although they are answers to questions asked elsewhere, namely in logic.

The second kind of axioms from part of the science, but in a distinctive way. The older view of exact science regards these axioms as self evident, not themselves requiring demonstration. Exact science, thus, has two kinds of certainly true propositions, the indemonstrable or special axioms and the demonstrated conclusions. Collingwood proceeds 'on the assumption' (?) that the special axioms of exact science are not known, but only assumed to be true. But, he says, the logical axioms cannot be merely assumed, since, being philosophical propositions they are always categorical, for one cannot proceed in thinking merely as if the principles of thinking were true; if they were not true one would not be thinking. But since we may regard the special axioms as mere assumptions we may also regard the whole science as consisting of mere assumptions, the axioms as primary or fundamental assumptions and the conclusions as secondary or derivative assumptions.

Characteristic of exact science, then, is a certain irreversibility, according to which all logical dependence is of conclusions
upon axioms, there being no reciprocal dependence of axioms on the conclusions. The results to which the axioms lead us have no effect on our attitude to these axioms; our acceptance of the conclusions is totally dominated by our commitment to the axioms. This irreversibility goes necessarily with exact science. There is only forward argument, from principles to conclusions, never backwards argument, from conclusions to principles.

B.iii.b. Philosophical Reasoning both Categorical and Rigidly Coherent.

Philosophical reasoning resembles that of exact science in its demand for close and cogent reasoning. Each demands valid and sufficient reason to be given for its conclusions. But philosophical reasoning does not entirely resemble that of mathematics.

Firstly, there is no division of axioms into those of the special science and those properly belonging to logic. Logic is a branch of philosophy not separable from its other branches; one cannot investigate an ethical problem entirely setting aside logical points; these must be faced sooner or later. So, whereas other sciences can neglect their own presuppositions, philosophy cannot do so. Philosophy has only one kind of axiom, that kind which forms part of its own body.

Secondly, because its axioms are philosophical propositions, they must be categorically asserted, never mere supposals or assumptions.

This second difference suggests that these axioms are self-evident propositions forming the first principles of an irreversible
deductive system of thought. Collingwood now asks whether this is true of philosophical reasoning.

If we turn to the great mathematician-philosophers of the seventeenth century, in whom we would expect to find such an attitude, for instance, Descartes, "when we forget his theory of method and turn to his practice," for "Descartes was far too good a philosopher to neglect the necessary differences between philosophical and mathematical reasoning," we will find that "(h)is first principle, 'I think, therefore I am', is neither a self-evident truth nor an assumption." Although this assertion is a starting point for his metaphysical reasoning it is established by a proof in the passage in which he enunciates it. But it is a peculiar kind of proof, one which Kant will later call a transcendental deduction.

In Kantian language, the principle cogito ergo sum is in this passage transcendently deduced, that is, shown to be the condition on which experience as it actually exists, in this case the experience of systematic doubt, is alone possible. If I did not exist as a thinking being, I could not doubt. Even doubt of my own existence is therefore a guarantee of my existence.

Here Descartes touches in practice on the difference between the mathematical and philosophical methods of inquiry, whatever his explicit theory may have been. Notwithstanding his advocacy of clear and

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204 Ibid., pp. 156-157.
distinct perception of the principles of the mathematical method, he rec-
ognizes that "(o)n the contrary, nothing in metaphysics causes more
trouble than the making the perception of its primary notions clear and
distinct."

Descartes' successors interpreted his precepts in the light of his practice. When Spinoza lays down what purports to be the first definition of his Ethics, "By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, and whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing", he is not merely defining terms more geometrico, for "(h)is statement is not a definition but a theorem: a philosophical position... an arguable and argued position." Leibnitz's Monadology begins with two clauses which taken together state the conception of an inextended and indivisible substance which appears to be an axiomatic definition. Collingwood says, however, that Leibnitz, like Spinoza, knew that he "was beginning his treatise not by defining his terms like a mathematician but by laying down a whole metaphysical system in a nutshell, and not by stating a self evident axiom but by affirming a higher controversial theorem."
Kant, subsequently, laid it down that there are no axioms in philosophy, for its first principles required proof, but proof of a special kind. Rigid adherence to the mathematical method in philosophy would lead to a 'house of cards,' and Hegel, following Kant, saw that philosophy was in the peculiar situation of having to justify its own starting point. But, if philosophy has to justify its own beginnings "(t)his can be done only if the arguments of philosophy, instead of having an irreversible direction from principles to conclusions, have a reversible one, the principles establishing the conclusions and the conclusions reciprocally establishing the principles." 208

The charge that there is a vicious circle in such a reasoning, in which there is reciprocal justification of principles by conclusions and conclusions by principles, is averted by noting a peculiar feature of philosophical thought, namely, "the Socratic principle that philosophical reasoning leads to no conclusions which we did not in some sense know already." 209 It has widely been recognized that philosophy, unlike exact or empirical science, does not bring us to know something of which we were previously simply ignorant, but rather brings us to know in a new and different way something we knew in some way already.

'systole-diastole' dynamic reciprocity of question and answer, this continually sustained beginning will be rationally and systematically unfolded in which the already implicit is explicitated.

209 Ibid., p. 161.
(I)f the species of a philosophical genus overlap, the distinction between the known and the unknown, which in a non-philosophical subject-matter involves a difference between two mutually exclusive classes of truths, in a philosophical subject-matter implies that we may both know and not know the same thing: a paradox which disappears in the light of the notion of a scale of forms of knowledge, where coming to know means coming to know in a different and better way. 210

The establishment of a proposition in philosophy, therefore, is not a transference from the unknown to the known, but from the known (in one way) to the same but known in a new way, or as Collingwood frequently puts it, a passage from the implicit to the explicit. Philosophical method is a method of explicating what is already known, but implicitly only. This is the case if we know that something happens, but do not know why it happens. It would be a better knowledge to know both that and why it happens together. In philosophical knowledge the facts are manifestations of principles and simultaneously principles render the facts understandable; the intelligible principles are manifested in the observation of facts at the same time as the observed facts are rendered understandable by the principles. The principles of understanding are implicated in the observed fact and the observation of fact implicates the understanding of its principles. This is simply repeating what was said above, 211 following Bernard Bosanquet, that individuality

210 Ibid. Philosophy thus begins 'from a question', or in wonder, for, in questioning, we both know and lack knowledge about that which we question or wonder.

211 See this chapter, above, pp. 136-139.
involves full determination, that whatever 'is' not only 'is' but also
'is what it is,' so that to say of something that 'it is' is to say
something meaningless if it is taken apart from 'what it is.' As
Collingwood expresses it:

(I)f by seeing certain facts in the light of certain
principles we come to understand the facts and at the
same time to have visible confirmation of the principles,
this is a gain to our knowledge both of the principles and
of the facts.\textsuperscript{212}

In this does philosophical knowledge differ from that of the
exact sciences. The truth of mathematical conclusions is totally de­
pendent on the proof. The conclusion of a philosophical proof is known
prior to the proof; the proof merely assures us, not that it is so, but
why it is so, thus enabling us to know it better.

...philosophical systems in general...exhibit
as a reasoned and ordered whole of interconnected
knowledge what was already in substance known before
the work of philosophizing began.\textsuperscript{213}

It follows from this that the conclusions of philosophy can
be checked by comparison with the anticipations of experience, so that
the direction of the argument regarding principles and conclusions is
reversible, each being able to be established by an appeal to the other.
This is not a vicious circle, since 'established' here means being

\textsuperscript{212} An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., p. 163.
raised to a higher grade of knowledge. What was mere observation has become an understood observation, an explained or explicated observation. And an otherwise merely abstract principle is no longer a merely abstract principle but a factually verified principle.

The chief implication of this for the theory of inference in philosophy is as follows:

If the substance of philosophical knowledge is known to us, however dimly and confusedly, before philosophical reasoning begins, the purpose of that reasoning can only be to present it in a new form, that is, the form of a system constructed according to certain principles. The philosopher who unfolds such a system is not spinning a web of ideas from the recesses of his own mind; he is expressing the results of his own experience and that of other people in a reasoned and orderly shape.\(^\text{214}\)

Collingwood says that this means that instead of asking himself only one question at every step in the argument, as in exact science, namely, 'What follows from the premisses?', the philosopher has also to ask another question as well, namely 'Does what follows from the premisses agree with what we find in actual experience?' Any philosophical argument that neglects the test of actual experience is defective. Thus, a philosophical argument does not hang with its whole weight on the starting-point; it is supported throughout its texture by cross-references to experience.\(^\text{215}\)

\(^{214}\) Ibid., p. 164.

\(^{215}\) See Ibid.
In this it resembles the inductive procedure of empirical science. Does this mean that philosophical theory is wholly based on observation and experience, and is therefore, an empirical science? 


The aim of inductive reasoning is to establish universal propositions from individual facts. Its starting point is the facts as data, the universal propositions are its conclusions; the data are known empirically, by perception or by the historical record of perceptions in the past; the conclusion must already be present at the beginning in the form of an hypothesis which is to be tested by bringing it into relation with the data. At first the hypothesis is a mere possibility and the aim of the inductive procedure is to convert that possibility into a probability. In empirical science to establish means to establish as probable, more or less. The data, however, are certain from the beginning and the inductive process leaves this certainty untouched, for that rests entirely on observation and in no way on the demonstration. The work of induction is to conform to the facts; it depends on them and they in no sense depend upon it. 

Just as in the case of exact science, the principles of in- 

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216 See Ibid.

217 See Ibid., pp. 165-66.
duction are of two kinds. First, logical principles which retain their own certainty throughout the inductive process and, as in exact demonstration, are logically presupposed by all induction, never being established by induction itself. The second kind of principles, those which belong properly to induction itself, such as the principle that the future will probably resemble the past, are assumptions that are necessary if there is going to be any argumentation at all. The successful conduct of the argument based on these principles in no way confirms them; their assumption is a necessary precondition of the very existence and possibility of inductive argumentation. We are conscious throughout the more or less successful progression of the induction that these assumptions are assumptions and nothing more. What increases in successful inductive inquiries is not the probability of such principles (as that the future will probably resemble the past) but the probability of hypotheses such as that fermentation is due to micro-organisms. The principles never appear as conclusions even in the modified sense in which inductive thinking has conclusions.

The logical movement of inductive thought is therefore irreversible in the same sense as that of exact science. The principles on which induction rests receive in return no support from the inductive process itself. Either they are certain from beginning to end, or from the beginning to end they are mere assumptions.

218 Ibid., p. 167.
Exact science admits of reversibility of its data (though not of its principles), whereas inductive argument is not reversible regarding its data, since the data are facts vouched for by perception. An as yet unobserved fact inferred by induction is merely inferred, that is, established as probable and not perceived. It becomes certain only by observation subsequent to the inductive argumentation.

B.iii.d. The Rapprochement, or Mutual Implication of Fact and Theory, Principles and Conclusions, Essence and Existence Experience and Explanation in Concrete Philosophical Reasoning.

Notwithstanding the resemblance between philosophical reasoning and scientific induction in that both possess knowledge prior to the reasoning process, there are notable differences.

The initial knowledge of philosophy forms the substance, the material out of which the final, systematized knowledge is constructed. The theory of cyclones does not include in it a statement of the individual barometric observations on which it depends, whereas, in philosophy the very same proposition first known to be true is reaffirmed in the conclusion with proofs in the body of a system. In empirical science the initial knowledge is individual facts; in philosophy, the initial knowledge, being homogeneous with the conclusion, must consist of universal propositions.

The data of philosophy are thus never mere facts in the sense of individual events, individual objects, in-
dividual actions or the like; they are always universal.²¹⁹

Again, whereas the individual facts dealt with by science are apprehended by perception, the facts of philosophy must be apprehended in another way.

...the data of philosophy, if they are universal propositions, cannot be apprehended in that way (by perception); they must be grasped by something in the nature of what we call, as distinct from perceiving, thinking.²²⁰

Therefore, the experience which provides the data of philosophy, is the experience not of a perceiver but of a thinker, or of an intellectual perception.

The initial knowledge of philosophy differs from that of empirical science not only in its relation to the reasoning process and in its own constitution and in the way we come to possess it but also in what happens to such data throughout the development of thought. In adding the theory purporting to explain the facts in empirical science, the theory is another knowledge in addition to the original facts which themselves are not known in any new way. The process is one of accumulation. But in philosophy the knowledge why things are so makes a difference to the knowledge that they are so.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 168.
²²⁰ Ibid., p. 169.
(In philosophy) the new knowledge imparts a new quality to the old; in seeing why things are thus, we are not merely adding one piece of knowledge to another, we are coming to know the old better. Our knowledge is not simply accumulating, it is developing; it is improving, as well as increasing; it is widening and strengthening itself at once.\textsuperscript{221}

There is a consequent difference in the conclusions of philosophy on the one hand, and science on the other. In empirical science the result of the induction is "an hypothesis standing, somewhat nebulously, outside the facts on which it depends..." whereas "in philosophy, the theory that emerges from consideration of the facts is no mere hypothesis, it is the facts themselves more thoroughly understood."\textsuperscript{222} So,

In philosophy there is continuity between the experience and the theory; the theory is nothing but the experience itself, with its universality further insisted upon, its latent connexions and contradictions brought into the light of consciousness.\textsuperscript{223}

In science there is a separation between the facts explained and the theory doing the explaining. But in philosophy experience as philosophically experienced is already found to be going over into theory, and theory, in explaining, remains an experience.

\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., pp. 169-170.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., p. 170. The hypothetical and the assertive are mutually implicated, the answer is (implicitly) in the question, and the question is (explicitly) in the answer.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., pp. 170-171.
...the separation between theory and fact... in philosophy is no separation at all, but only a distinction of the kind... between specific developments of the same genus... articulated in a scale of forms. 224

Thus, in accordance with such a distinction, the pre-philosophical knowledge from which the philosophical process begins is only in a relative sense non-philosophical; it is less philosophical than that into which it develops but is not absolutely non-philosophical. The knowledge from which philosophy begins is already full of philosophical elements, not at the zero end of the scale but at least at unity. Thus the 'conclusions' of philosophical thinking and the 'experience' on which they are based are names for any two successive stages in the scale of forms of philosophical knowledge. The rational element of any one stage on the scale of philosophical thought may be irrational relatively to the next stage above it.

One stage in the scale of forms of philosophical knowledge is related to the next higher as knowledge questioned to explicitation of that same knowledge by a knowledge which is an answer to a question provoked by the prior knowledge. The answer explicitates what is questioned, namely the prior experience. Questioning is experience seeking its order in the whole of experience; seeking to be experienced as whole with con-
stuitive parts.

...what is asked of the higher is not simply that it should agree with the lower, but rather that it should explain it: perpetuate its substance in a new form, related to the old somewhat as a fact plus the reasons for it is related to the bare fact.\textsuperscript{225}

Thus, every philosophical experience becomes the object of a question which requests that the experience be explained by a theory which consists in the explication of that experience, in which explication the original experience persists but with a new quality. The (relatively) bare experience goes over from within its own resources to becoming a rational experience, to becoming the experience of a rational being who knows not merely that he has an experience but why he has it, and knows why in terms of elements provided from within the original experience itself.\textsuperscript{226} The original experience, experienced as unexplained,

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid., p. 172. Thus, again, whether a certain content is question or answer depends not on there being two entities having those characters as mutually exclusive species, but precisely on the attitude the mind takes to the one same content. If the mind's attitude is one of supposal (although with reference to further assertion) then that content is the content of a question. But if the mind's attitude to that content is assertive, then the content is a proposition having the character of answer to the question which demanded that assertion. What may provide the answer to previous questions may also provide the supposal which causes further questioning to arise. John Doe has been murdered is assertive with respect to questions regarding John Doe's present whereabouts, but it is supposed with respect to the further question 'Who killed John Doe?'

\textsuperscript{226} According to B. Bosanquet in The Principle of Individuality and Value, pp. 31-41, all experience is characterised by a tendency to universality inasmuch as from itself it tends to go beyond partiality and manifest a wholeness which both illuminates different contexts and receives light from them. This tendency is towards an ideal of truth, that
as calling for rational explanation, is a question, or the experience of questioning, or a questioning experience, which, from within its own inner resources, resolves the conflicting alternatives which constitute the question, and passes over into the experience of explanation, or

is, an experience rationally accounted for through elimination from it of conflicting interpretations of the same facts in the same relations. General rules represent a step in the direction of the completion of knowledge as a coherent whole, but generalization pursues an identity apart from differences; its method is omission and is achieved by attending only to the common qualities of individuals while disregarding their differences. This procedure prohibits the consideration of any world structure of which the concrete individuals would be members and likewise prohibits the ascertainment of the full concrete nature of any individual itself. Whole areas of experience are thus left unaccounted for when identity is sought through exclusion of differences and individuals are taken merely as members of a class whose totality is by way of a whole of repetition. The generalisation method of totality thus rules out on principle any consideration of the differences within that common characteristic and those which constitute the individual in what he is distinctively. Bosanquet maintains that contradiction is most successfully removed from experience when experience is regarded as having that unity which is proper to a whole of parts, namely an organism, or more generally, that of a world or a cosmos. The unity implied by the terms world or cosmos is the most inclusive, and therefore the most effective, type of universal, and "a world or cosmos is a system of members, such that every member, being ex hypothesi distinct, nevertheless contributes to the unity of the whole in virtue of the peculiarities which constitute its distinctiveness." Bosanquet contrasts "the concrete universal...with the general rule as a centre of radii compared with a superficial area." He says that its test of universality does not consist in the number of subjects which share a common predicate but rather in the number of predicates which can be attached to a single subject. This, he says, "is the degree in which a systematic identity subordinates diversity to itself or, more truly, reveals itself as the spirit of communion and totality within which identity and difference are distinguishable but inseparable points of view." Thus, Bosanquet maintains, the power of the concrete universal, or of individuality which constitutes the true type of universality, is its capacity to unify experience.
providing the answer to the prior question. Thus, the question and answer process form one continuous whole analogous to a single cell which divides from within itself by a process of self differentiation to a final well distinguished equilibrium state.

At every stage in the scale, there is a datum or body of experience, the stage that has actually been reached; and there is a problem (question), the task of explaining this experience by constructing a theory of it, which is nothing but the same experience raised by intenser thought to a higher level of rationality. The accomplishment of this task is only the continuation of a process already begun; it was only by thinking that we reached the point at which we stand, for the experience upon which we philosophize is already a rational experience; so our reason for going on is that we already stand committed to the task. But the new and intenser thinking must be thinking of a new kind; new principles are appearing in it, and these give a criterion by which the principles involved in the last step are superseded. Thus the stage last reached, regarded as a theory, is now a theory criticized and refuted; what stands firm is not its truth as theory, but the fact that we have experienced it; and in criticizing and demolishing it as a theory.\footnote{An Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 173.}

This citation very well sums up the process of the unfolding of experience as it was presented in detail by Collingwood in his \textit{Speculum Mentis}. Note that it is not a matter of external addition, after the manner in which empirical science would explain, but rather of internal "addition", more exactly of self differentiating division from within; not the constructing of a system of external relations but the unfolding of a system of internal relations; not a quantitative addition but a
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qualitative addition, that is, not an extensification of thought coming to know more things, but an intensification of thought, by coming to know better and more fully what was already less well known. Since the different levels are different levels of actual experience, the earlier and later stages are not merely logically earlier and later but also temporally so. Time is thus intrinsic to the elaboration of the concrete universal, for which reason history and philosophy are related by intrinsic relations.

Whereas natural accumulation is the addition of something from outside according to spatial relations, experiential accumulation is by way of self differentiating addition from within, according to temporal relations de-

228 Notwithstanding that Collingwood accuses Bosanquet of "conceiving the proper object of knowledge Platonically as a timeless world of pure universality" (Idea of History, p. 143) and that Bosanquet himself says (The Principle of Individuality and Value, pp. 78-79) that "History is a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any considerable degree of 'being or trueness' " and (Ibid., p. 80) that Philosophy and Religion "take us far beyond the spatio-temporal externality of history," nevertheless Bosanquet himself seems to provide a jumping off ground for the amendment of his position more into Collingwood's line of thinking in which history and temporality are of the essence of individuality and concreteness. Thus, in the same Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 72, Bosanquet identifies individuality with spirituality and then states that memory is bound up with the spiritual being of the mind. "The Individual is one with the spiritual, and the characteristic of the spiritual in its proper nature is inwardness as opposed to externality... Memory is inward because its diversity is bound up with the being of the mind; you cannot take the one and leave the other. Inwardness is diversity without dissociation." Now, if memory is bound up intimately with mind and its inward respect it necessary follows that mind and its inward respect are intimately bound up with time since time is of the essence of memory. Again, if, as Bosanquet says (Ibid., p. 70) the uniqueness which marks individuality is the uniqueness of purpose, and purpose is meaningful only in the context of a forward-looking aspect into the future, then individuality, or concrete universality essentially implicates futurity, therefore temporality, therefore a historical dimension.
terminative of thought. The seeds of this notion are found in Kant and their elaboration also in Bergson for whom external spatial relations characterize the external world of material nature whereas internal temporal relations characterize the internal spiritual world of consciousness. The shadow of Descartes is also present, identifying the external world with its spatial dimensions, and the internal world of self-consciousness with thought. And when Collingwood, in the above citation, says that "our reason for going on is that we stand committed to the task" I interpret this to refer to the emotive dynamism already mentioned in regard to questioning; the restlessness of the mind to pass on from an inadequate experience to a more adequate experience, such inadequacy not merely known but also emotively felt.

This felt tension within the conscious experience of a rational agent to transform its given experience into a more fully rational, accounted for experience is well described by B. Bosanquet:

(Thought) presses beyond the given, following the "what" beyond the limits of the "that." But it is also true that in following the "what" it tends always to return to a fuller "that." If its impulse is away from the given it is towards the whole - the world. And as constituting a world it tends to return to the full depth and roundness of experience from which its first

229 See chapter 3, p. 102 above; see also Collingwood's New Leviathan, pp. 47-48 and pp. 50-53 on appetite as feeling-discomfort pointing to a 'there-and-then' satisfying state of feeling.

230 See this chapter, above, pp. 212-214.
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step was to depart. In a "world", or "concrete universal", we do not lose directness and significance as we depart from primary experience; on the contrary, every detail has gained incalculably in vividness and meaning, by reason of the intricate interpretation and interconnection, through which thought has developed its possibilities of being.\(^\text{231}\)

Bosanquet further says that the notion of reality, the concrete whole of individuality is essentially the notion of a spring of adjustment within the self,\(^\text{232}\) whereby the self seeks to bring the fragmentary elements of experience into a systematized whole. Experience such as the apprehension of beauty and those of the moral and religious consciousness are experiences in which the aspirations of all experience to be a unified whole at least partially comes into its own.\(^\text{233}\) The main point in the contrast between the relations of abstract generalization on the one hand and concrete thinking on the other is the capacity of the latter to give completeness and fulfillment to experience. By pursuing the overcoming of contradiction within itself, by seeing its multiple elements as contributing by their differences to the meaning of a whole, the mind arrives at an incomparably more vital and intense experience as well as at a more logical and rational experience than that of the unexamined life of every-day perception.\(^\text{234}\)

\(^{\text{231}}\) The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 56.

\(^{\text{232}}\) Ibid., p. 53.

\(^{\text{233}}\) Ibid., pp. 56-57.

\(^{\text{234}}\) Ibid., p. 58.
Form, interdependence, significance, self-completeness are characteristics of thought at its best, so of vitality at its highest. This is the general character by which the concrete universal gives us the clue to the individual.\footnote{Ibid., p. 59.}

The datum of philosophy does not therefore remain as a fixed point, it undergoes development as it undergoes analysis and finally vanishes in its old form to reappear in a new.\footnote{Ibid., p. 59.}

Philosophy embodies the systematizing function of deductive thought, since every phase in its development is at least ideally a complete system connected throughout by strict logical bonds. But the system of philosophy is something more than a deductive system since its principles of systematization are always open to criticism, that is to questioning, and stand or fall according to their success or failure in explaining our experience (as in \textit{Speculum Mentis}).

Likewise, philosophy embodies the inductive function of discerning the principles that permeate experience, making it a rational whole. But the experience on which it bases its theories is the theorizing experience of rational living. The theory of philosophy is thus an essential part of philosophy; the activity of philosophizing is a datum to philosophy; the data from which it begins are homogeneous with the theories by which, as conclusions, the data are explained.

\footnote{Thinking is thus not a fixed \textit{state} for Collingwood but an \textit{activity} of becoming.}
C. The Systematic Unity of the Concrete Universal According to Collingwood.

As said above,\(^{237}\) the notion of system is central to the understanding of Collingwood's concrete rapprochement logic, for the unity in diversity in which consists the concrete universal is systematic unity as opposed to isolated, self-contained, atomic units of abstract intelligibility such as Positivistic science trades in.

Collingwood's treatment of "The Idea of System"\(^{238}\) adapts Bosanquet's tendency to totality which characterises rational experience to his own systematisation of thought as an overlap of classes in a dynamically unfolding scale of forms.

Collingwood elaborates his idea of system in the context of explaining the constructive moment in philosophical thought which follows upon a period of scepticism.\(^{239}\) He says that the idea of a system implies finality, completeness, objectivity and unity.\(^{240}\) But, a problem arises as to whether any of these notes can properly be applied to any type of thought, such as philosophical thought, which constantly advances through new discoveries to new points of view.\(^{241}\)

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237 See this chapter, above, p. 141; see also Collingwood's *Speculum Mentis*, p. 221.

238 See *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, pp. 176-198.


Against the objection that any constantly changing branch of thought cannot have systematic finality, Collingwood replies that any advancement in knowledge requires that the student take stock from time to time as to where he stands at the point at which he has arrived. But this can be done only by stating his result systematically, showing by what devious routes he has reached his present position.\textsuperscript{242}

The philosopher...like every student, must sum up his progress from time to time, and express his conclusions in a systematic form, if progress is to continue.\textsuperscript{243}

To difficulties advanced against the possibility of systematizing the unwieldly mass of what constitutes modern philosophical knowledge Collingwood argues that systematic completion does not require an encyclopaedic summation of all available facts. An adequate survey is quite possible in order that philosophy may "deal with its own special problems in its own special way."\textsuperscript{244} No branch of knowledge, least of all philosophy is a mere unwieldly accumulation of ascertained facts. Any thinker, any problem solver, works within a well defined area which is in organic (or internal) relationship with the work of predecessors and contemporaries, in such a way that he "finds himself shepherded, as it were, into a particular line of study by the fact that others round

\textsuperscript{242} See Ibid., p. 179.  
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., p. 180.  
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., p. 181.
him are doing work which requires this as its complement.\textsuperscript{245} Thus, the completion proper to systematic philosophy is that the investigator stands at the term of intrinsic relations with past and with contemporary thinkers so that his special problems are determined for him by the context in which he is working.

To the objection that a personal contribution, which every thinker's contribution must be, cannot be objective and therefore cannot be systematic, Collingwood replies that the contribution, as a justification of making a genuine contribution to the body of human knowledge, must have a theory of the place that his contribution has in the whole; that is, he must be able, in his result, to show the internal relationships which his personal thought bears to that of his predecessors and contemporaries. This means that he must contribute his answer as to what philosophy is. In adding to the fund of human knowledge he does not just add another item to the inventory but reshapes in his own mind the idea of philosophy as a whole.\textsuperscript{246}

Systematic thought does not mean adherence to rigidly pre-established formulae, as if the diversity of philosophical problems re-

\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., p. 182.

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., pp. 182-184. The same might be said of the historian; that he rewrites the past as he has transformed it in his mind; it has changed inasmuch as now it is something he has come to know; it includes his knowledge of it with which subsequent historians have to reckon.
quired that they be kept separate and solved by their own special methods.\textsuperscript{247} The very concept itself of philosophy is a philosophical concept, so that its specific classes overlap.\textsuperscript{248}

This overlap of the various classes of the concept of philosophy takes place in three different ways. The so-called departments metaphysics, logic, ethics, etc., overlap, secondly, the work of an individual thinker and that of his contemporaries overlap, thirdly, the work of a contemporary thinker overlaps with that of his predecessors.

Just as the work of various individual thinkers, both past and present, does not accumulate aggregationally, by addition from outside one another, so neither do the various parts of philosophy, logic, ethics, etc., develop in isolation one from the other and add together merely aggregationally. Progress in one is intrinsically related to, and vitally affects, what is going on in every other part. Philosophy as a whole of parts is thus a concrete universal, not an abstract, classificatory universal. So, the various parts which together make up the content of a philosophy will occur as terms on an overlapping scale of forms, each expressing distinct aspects of the one same subject matter which, together will permit a more adequate expression of the nature of one substance.\textsuperscript{249}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[$\textsuperscript{247}$] See Ibid., p. 185.
\item[$\textsuperscript{248}$] See Ibid., p. 188.
\item[$\textsuperscript{249}$] See Ibid., p. 189.
\end{footnotes}
Each form in such a scale sums up the whole scale to that point; that is to say, each form is itself a system in which the topics and methods of the subordinate forms find a subordinate place.\textsuperscript{250}

Philosophizing as a system involves the responsibility of showing that theories otherwise true would have to be condemned as errors if considered as distinct and autonomous philosophies.\textsuperscript{251}

...the philosopher, in constructing a system, has his place in a scale whose structure is such that every term in it sums up the whole scale to that point...he is always (only) at a relative end...\textsuperscript{252}

Just as the various parts of philosophy stand in intrinsic relation to the whole, so also in regard to any philosophy in regard to its historical situation: "As one form in a scale, an individual philosophy is one among many, a single moment in the history of thought, which future philosophers will have to treat as such."\textsuperscript{253} Philosophy, as reaffirming the efforts of past philosophers as elements within itself, summarizes the whole previous course of its history, and is thus universal as well as individual,\textsuperscript{254} "...a new philosophy which is at the same time

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., p. 190.  
\textsuperscript{251} See Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., p. 191.  
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{254} See Ibid., pp. 191-192.
an improved version of the old."225

In a history of this kind all the philosophies of the past are telescoped into the present, and constitute a scale of forms, never beginning and never ending, which are different both in degree and in kind, distinct from each other and opposed to each other.256

A genuine philosophy arises in a concrete situation in which a philosopher finds himself, and this happens by an objective necessity. The situation, and problems confronted by any individual philosopher are unique to himself, so that if his thought is to become acceptable to another, it will require modification and reaffirmation as an element which the other incorporates into his own philosophy.

That each (philosopher) must reject the thoughts of others regarded as self contained philosophies, and at the same time reaffirm them as elements in his own philosophy, is due not to causes in tastes and temperament but to the logical structure of philosophical thought.257

Philosophy is not something rigidly predetermined as regards method or content and is not achieved by the application of rigid formulae. It is characterized by a methodical flexibility in which the method changes from one topic to another, since form and content undergo mutually interdependent development as thought traverses its scale of forms as it gradually approximates to the ideal of a perfectly philosophical subject-

255 Ibid., p. 195.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid., p. 192.
matter treated by a perfectly philosophical method.\footnote{258}{See Ibid., p. 192.}

The idea of a system is nowhere finally and completely realized; but it is always tending to realize itself wherever any diversity is recognized in the subject-matter and methods of thought.\footnote{259}{Ibid., p. 193.}

The tendency of philosophical experience to take on a systematic shape is expressed in an infinite variety of ways, a new way every time a new kind of diversity is encountered demanding to be organized into a whole.\footnote{260}{See Ibid.}

Regarding the systematization of (a) the various branches of philosophy, (b) the history of philosophy, (c) the varieties of contemporary philosophies, Collingwood comments as follows.

The various departments of philosophy are only minimally systematized, but systematization is to some extent realized for these differ both in kind and in degree as various ways of dealing philosophically with various topics.

It is only in a rough and approximate way that the conventional canon of philosophical sciences corresponds to the idea of system; but it is only in so far as it does correspond that it can claim philosophical importance; otherwise it represents a merely empirical grouping of philosophical topics.\footnote{261}{ Ibid., p. 194. This seems to suggest that this division of philosophy into parts is more a classificatory division than an overlap of classes.}
The history of philosophical thought is genuine only insofar as the events contained in it are seen to lead one to the other, that is, insofar as each philosopher derived his philosophy by studying the work of his predecessors.

A philosopher genuinely philosophizes only insofar as he does what his predecessors did in assimilating what is true and rejecting what is false, and thereby produces a new and improved version of the old.

In a history of this kind all the philosophies of the past are telescoped into the present, and constitute a scale of forms, never beginning and never ending, which are different both in degree and in kind, distinct from each other and opposed to each other.

Finally the philosophy of a philosopher's own time can only be set out by way of the various relations that subsist in and between the various apparently conflicting and opposing prevailing views. "These various relations are not given to their terms from without, by an arbitrary act of a systematizing intellect; they really subsist in and between the terms, and to apprehend the terms without apprehending these relations is to misapprehend them." If these relations are grasped,

262 See Ibid., pp. 194-195.
263 Ibid., p. 195.
264 Ibid., pp. 195-196.
interiorily, from within, the divergent views will reveal themselves as nodal points in a system of thought as a whole which may rightly be regarded as the philosophy of the present day.

Such a system is conceivable only as a scale of forms. On such a scale, ideally, the crudest and least philosophical view can be located at the lower end which tends towards zero without actually reaching it. The second phase of such a scale is reached when the chaos of conflicting views is sorted out, by consolidation and by criticism, into more or less definite and organized groups of theories called philosophy today. The third phase is reached when these conflicting theories are seen to participate in varying degrees and kinds in a single common spirit. 265

A philosopher proceeds in the same way in trying to think out his own philosophy. He begins with a welter of half-truths and quarter opinions which he allocates to the lower end of the scale of forms. These are sifted, diversified and consolidated so that, eventually, well defined interrelated groupings of views are recognizable. Then he tries at a higher level to see these various positions as parts of a connected whole, adjusting not only the parts to the idea of the whole but also adjusting the idea of the whole to meet the demand of the parts, so that the idea of the whole is itself undergoing transformation as the scale

265 Ibid., pp. 196-197.
of forms which constitutes the whole is traversed upwards.\textsuperscript{266}

Such a system is only an ideal in the sense that it regulates the procedure of a philosopher trying to answer the question at issue, and cannot be expected to present itself fully formed in his answer.\textsuperscript{267}

Collingwood thus develops more explicitly than Bosanquet the progressive characteristic of the individuality of the concrete universal, no doubt due to his predominating interest in historical thought. Collingwood's systematization of the concrete universal as a scale of forms is most likely intended to overcome the difficulties that H.H. Joachim found in developing the coherence notion of truth in line with Bosanquet's notion of the perfect whole as that of a world or cosmos.

A theory of truth as coherence, we may say must enable us to conceive the one significant whole so as to satisfy certain requirements. We must so conceive it that it is a timeless actuality, maintaining and fulfilling itself through the setting up within itself of modes, which yet are independent; and by creating an inner otherness or duality, which yet is continuously subdued to unity.\textsuperscript{268}

The overlap of classes in a scale of forms is a reaction to this need "to conceive the one significant whole "...as a timeless actuality..." The significant whole, which for Collingwood, is that at which rational experience aims, is not a timeless actuality but a his-

\textsuperscript{266} See Ibid., pp. 197-198.

\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., p. 197.

torically unfolding actuality which has the unity of a scale of forms intrinsically related by internal relations. Collingwood's rendering of the concrete universal as an overlap of classes in a scale of forms is more faithfully in line with Bosanquet's notion of mind as the active form of totality, which, in turn, is more faithful to Collingwood's notion of mind as self actualizing activity which both presupposes and is realized in a historical, temporalized process.

D. The Dialectical Dynamism of the Concrete Universal.

Collingwood's commitment to the theory of the concrete universal and the corresponding logic entailed thereby, is bound up with his rejection of substance in preference to action as the basic characteristic of all that is. And this repudiation of the category of substance and static essences is bound up with his rejection of the abstract universal.


270 Thus, the mind is not a substance underlying its different activities. "Hume was right to maintain that there is no such thing as 'spiritual substance', nothing a mind is, distinct from and underlying what it does." The Idea of History, p. 222.

271 Lionel Rubinoff, in Collingwood and The Reform of Metaphysics, p. 155, explains that the state for Collingwood is not, as is generally regarded, a substance having a fixed essence whose principles are deducible from the definition expressing that essence, but is a historically changing dynamic process. The question, for Collingwood, is not what are the attributes of the state, but what is political action.
In place of a plurality of abstract essences each constituting one species of knowledge, Collingwood proposes, on the side of the subject, a scale of historical activities, art, religion, natural science, political science, economic science, history, and so on, having as their objects a scale of corresponding activities: the relation of subject and object being in each case such as to constitute a fundamental 'unity', each of which is a concrete universal, and all of which together constitute the moments of concrete universality (i.e. activity) of mind.272

The concrete universal has no identity apart from the existence which it has in its members or instances which manifest it. Its essence does not in any way transcend the particularity of the existent instances. What makes the instances be what they are is precisely the membership which they have in that universal. They are connected among themselves and to the whole by essential relationships. The universality of the concrete universal is therefore not the universality of a substance sharing a common undifferentiated nature. Such an abstract substantialism is incompatible with historical knowledge, since distinction of the natural world from the historical world depends upon it.

A concrete universal is not a universal substance whose nature is shared in common by its instances. It is, on the contrary, a kind of synthesis which embraces differences as well as similarities. The instances of a concrete universal do not belong to that universal in the sense that they all possess, in precisely the same way, the same abstract characteristics which are the essence of that universal. If this were the case, then differences would be accidental and unimportant. And since differentiation and change are precisely those

272 Ibid., pp. 155-156.
features which distinguish history from nature, while there can be scientific, there cannot be historical, knowledge of abstract universals. The genuine universal, however, does not enjoy the separate existence of the abstract universal. Apart from its members, or instances (or, as Hegel preferred to call them, its 'moments'), it does not exist at all; its essence does not transcend the particularity of its instances like the essence of an abstract universal. One might almost say that the instances of a concrete universal, rather than sharing a common abstract characteristic, possess - to borrow Wittgenstein's phrase - "family resemblances"; and it is in virtue of these "family resemblances" that the various moments of the universal are recognized to belong to the same class.273

Reality, or that which is at the basis of everything that is, is an activity, or process, or an identity in difference of which polar opposites are the manifestation (as red and blue are the polar opposites of a spectroanalysed white light). More basic than the character of polar opposition, by which the dynamic process of dialectic activity is manifested, is creative or significant negation which is nothing other than the activity itself as generative of its polar opposites. As explained by Collingwood previously274 the polar opposites are not entities in themselves from which events or processes are derived by a combination thereof, rather the process or activity itself is what is basically given, and the opposites are aspects which one analyses out of this one concrete activity. But these aspects are dynamic entities, they are the opposite

273 Ibid., p. 156.

274 Where he clarifies the kind of opposition found in philosophical concepts, An Essay on Philosophical Method, pp. 68-77. See this chapter, above, pp. 167-171.
features that result from the process of negation which belongs to the very nature of the basic activity. "At the centre of dialectic is the notion of 'determinate negation'."  

'Otherness' is the first and simplest form of negation. Every other form presupposes it and implies it. Otherness, or difference, is the form of negation closest to common sense, which accepts plurality as a datum. But negation is more fundamental than a plurality of entities, for it also constitutes relationships between the entities of the plurality. These relationships may be regarded as a factor intrinsic to existence, or to our interpretation of it. That is, negation can be understood in terms either of thought or of existence or both. Facts, for every philosophy of opposites, include positive and negative aspects, and are understood both as regards what they are and as regards what they are not.

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276 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 176.


278 Ibid., p. 3.

279 Ibid., p. 4.
Dialectic is basically an existential aspect of things and is used in thinking about existence, as a factor in existence. The concept of dialectic may refer either to the dialectical process or operation of 'negating', or to the result of the negating activity, or to the relation intrinsic to the opposition of affirmation and negation. Dialectic regards the action or process as the most basic of these three aspects, the entity which results, and the relation (of opposition) is a derivative of it. The concept of substance, typical of preceding historical periods, put static existence before change, but absolute idealism places becoming before being and holds that the basic entity of all that is, namely spirit or mind, is an endless becoming.\textsuperscript{280}

Collingwood explains the meaning of a dialectical series in \textit{Speculum Mentis} in the context of the forms of experience understood as a dialectical series. "The terms of a dialectical series are not related to one another in terms of degree, but by the assertion in each term of something which in the previous term was wrongly denied."\textsuperscript{281} "A dialectical series means a series of terms, each one of which is an erroneous description of the next."\textsuperscript{282} Collingwood exemplifies this:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{280} Ibid., pp. 4-6.
  \item \textsuperscript{281} \textit{Speculum Mentis}, p. 208.
  \item \textsuperscript{282} Ibid., p. 206.
\end{itemize}
In a dialectical series A B C, the truth is C; B is a distorted account of it, and A is a distorted account of B. Now if C represents the true nature of mind, B is a mistake - partial of course; no mistake is a mere mistake - which C makes about itself. This mistake will recoil on C's own nature, for a mind which makes mistakes about its own nature will find its conduct, which is its nature, affected by these mistakes. Its nature will not be so far altered as to coincide with the false conception, but it will be disturbed by that conception. Thus we get B, what the mind now thinks it is, and C₁, what it actually is. The next downward step will be to fail even to get the notion B coherent, to distort and degrade it into A. This still further lapse from truth in the self-knowledge of the mind C is now an error of the second degree, and therefore reacts in the second degree on the conduct and nature of the mind. It no longer therefore behaves as C₁ but as B₁, which is equivalent to C₂. In a sense we may say that it still is C, though it does not know it; but because its self-ignorance affects its conduct, to call it C₂ is misleading, for it does not behave like C but like C₂.

Collingwood elaborates this by describing in full the condition of the mind in this activity. Implicitly it is C, but it is trying to conceive itself as B, although there is no such thing as B. But, in trying to conceive itself as B it confuses itself even in doing this and results in thinking of itself as A. The successive misconceptions B and A so retroact over the mind's true nature, C, that it comes out in the form C₂. C₂ is its actual form (i.e. C, its true nature after retroaction of misconceptions B and A), A is its explicit form, basically or ultimately it is C. Thus, the aesthetic mind (A = pure imagination) calls itself an artist, but will be basically historical (C = historical

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283 Ibid., pp. 206-207.
experience), but the historical nature (C) will be so affected by the
description of itself as aesthetic that it will not appear even to a
dispassionate observer, as pure or unqualified history. The distortion
in its nature disappears when it discovers its true nature through
discovering the error of its false conceptions. A mind ignorant of its
true nature does not in the fullest sense possess its nature. The true
nature of the mind is not something ready-made waiting to be discovered;
it exists only when it is discovered, yet, previous to its discovery.
it exists in a confused and distorted form (i.e. implicitly), for errors
are partial truths, and the dialectical work is to bring that true nature
into existence by clearing up the confusions which appear as inconsistencies
experienced as a conflict by the mind between what it is and what it ought
to be. 284

Another presentation of an instance of a dialectical series is
given by Collingwood in The Autobiography (pp. 97-99) illustrating that

the past which a historian studies is not a dead
past, but a past which in some sense is still living

284 See R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 207. See also
B. Bosanquet, "Contradiction and Reality," Mind, XV (1906), p. 2: "... the unrest of action and cognition seems to arise from the perpetual presence of implicit contradiction in the nature of actual fact, a presence which becomes explicit on the slightest reflection and forces us to go further in the hope of faring better. It must, I infer, be admitted that fact, as given in ordinary experience, is both actual and self-contradictory." This experienced conflict, which spurs the mind to reflect and explicate its implications, is appetite; See also Collingwood's New Leviathan, pp. 47-53. Felt contradiction thus drives the mind to develop itself into more perfect forms.
in the present...(which) I expressed...by saying that history is concerned not with 'events' but with 'proces­sses'...(which) are things which do not begin and end but turn into one another...285

Again, in the same work,286 as already explained above,287 the state is not a transcendent eternal entity exemplified in Plato's Republic or Hobbes' Leviathan, but an active process which changes from what Plato describes it to be to what Hobbes describes it to be.288 Again, as L. Rubinoff well explains,289 in his article entitled "Political Action"290 Collingwood develops the concept of the state in terms of dialectically dynamic political action rather than in terms of a static entity entailing properties as abstract deductive logic would treat it.

Each member of such a series occurs on a scale of forms and its place is determined by its internal relations with respect to its higher and lower members. The negation whereby it negates the limitation (negation, hence negation of negation) of the lower is not a static relation thereto but a dynamic, active relation thereto. The higher comes below.

285 An Autobiography, pp. 97-98; see Chapter 6, pp.349-353.

286 See An Autobiography, pp. 61-62.

287 See Chapter 2, above, pp. 82-85.

288 See also this chapter, above, p. 83-84.

289 See his Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 155.

out of the lower when the lower collapses under the strain of its built-in contradiction. This negation of the negation that occurs from within the lower member is at the same time the coming into being of the higher. The process then continues; as each member develops it gives way to something higher "beating it on its own ground" by active negation of its own limitations.

Thus, active negation is the dynamic differentiation of one form from another arranged on a dialectic scale of forms. The differences of species arrayed on a dynamic scale of forms are not static extrinsic differences, but differences intrinsic to the differentiated form, consisting in the active, dynamic, self-transcendence of that form. Thus, in a dialectic scale of forms, the 'otherness' whereby one form differs from another is a self-determining activity, an activity which is not other than the active self but of the very essence of that self. Thus, 'the other' comes from 'a self' inasmuch as that self actively distances itself from itself; it alienates itself from itself from within, by reason of the very activity which is nothing other than itself.

Hence the concrete universal, as an actively, dynamically developing entity, is an 'identity-in-difference'; it has itself actively by a self development which results in its giving way to something other than itself, in which other is found the fulfillment of the active strive with which it is identified.
E. The Concrete Universal and the Logic of Question and Answer.

Collingwood's explicit denial of the distinction between philosophy and history, as this distinction is understood by the realists, is the foundation of his logic of question and answer, and, therefore, his question and answer logic is the logic of the rapprochement he sought, as his life's work, to bring about between philosophy and history. And "when Collingwood...argues in The Autobiography that the history of all thought, including metaphysics, can be approached through the logic of question and answer (A, 58, 65, 67), he is implicitly declaring that the question and answer complexes revealed by applying the logic of question and answer to the history of thought assume a dialectical scale of forms" and is therefore, to be regarded as a concrete universal. We have already seen that Collingwood says that "the process of knowledge...is not so much an alternation of question and answer as a perpetual restatement of the question with a perpetual revision of the answer," but knowledge as a process, (as distinct from knowledge as a series of


293 R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 80; see also L. Rubinoff, R.G. Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 252. See also, above, chapter 3, pp. 107-108.
events or catalogue of facts such as abstractionist, classificatory logic would regard it, such as, for example, Positivism regards historical events when it seeks "hard facts," is rather a scale of forms consisting of a series of questions and answers arranged according to their mutual implications, or internal relations. The knowledge of "who killed John Doe?" for example, consists of a series of questions and answers, beginning with that question, ending with the answer that the rector killed John Doe, as was explained in Chapter 1, above. Inasmuch as one possesses this answer in an historically scientific way, one knows that the rector killed John Doe in terms of all the reasons, - in their proper order, as they form a coherent whole, - why one maintains that proposition. To know this scientifically one has to know the whole series of questions and answers as synthetically integrated. That is, one has to know that whole series of questions and answers as a concrete universal, as a scale of forms, each member being related to its prior and posterior members by necessary implication. The question "who killed John Doe?" lays down an area of inquiry, thereby delineating a certain intelligible whole which area is progressively elaborated as the inquiry proceeds. It is the focal point of attention, a whole within which some facts or events will be included as relevant, others excluded as irrelevant. The

294 Scientific here refers to the method of orderly procedure according to which history is called a science, as was explained in Chapter 1, above, pp. 18-19.
sorting of the irrelevant from the relevant by means of the questioning process is the building up of that scale of forms which constitutes a concrete universal. A scientific inquiry, therefore, consists in visualizing a certain whole from the beginning; the process will consist in seeing that whole as explicated in terms of its internal relations, the parts, which, with these relevant distinctions and interrelations, constitute that synthetic totality. It is the whole, first delineated by the dominating question, that gives meaning to the parts (dividing the relevant from the irrelevant) and reciprocally, the parts that give meaning to the whole. In other words, whole and part are not mutually exclusive, as if the parts were entities in themselves related merely by external relations, as classificatory genus-species logic would analyse a whole, but are rather themselves overlapping classes in a scale of forms, the whole being realized only in and through its parts, and other parts being what they are through constituting the whole.

Thus, crime detection consists in striving to grasp a situation, the experience of a number of facts, as a whole. The perpetually restated question that is restated in every different question the crime solver asks is 'How do all these things fit together?' It is this 'fitting together' of the 'pieces' that more and more explicates the insight into the whole picture in which everything is explained as interrelated. Those familiar with the Perry Mason type of inquiry will recognize how one well loaded question to an interrogated suspect almost precipitates its own answer so that 'everything falls into place'; so
much so that for the suspect to be faced with the question immediately
provides the answer merely by his behavioral response, without waiting
for him to supply an articulated verbal reply. The principle, the
criterion dominating the progress of the inquiry throughout, which
criterion places one always in the presence of an intelligible totality,
is that human events do not happen in isolation, but are intimately con­
nected by internal relations, so that any one event is not properly under­
stood until its place in the context of other events is appreciated. Con­
crete thinking is thus essentially contextual thinking, thinking of events
not as isolated units (which the term event itself unfortunately may
suggest) but as intertwined into the fabric of a whole which at the same
time takes its meaning from that whole and conveys meaning to that whole.
This grasping of a situation as a whole, in terms of its internal relations,
in terms of the 'inside' of events, is what Collingwood calls 'insight'.

But inward reality as distinct from outward manifestation, is spirit or
thought. It is through the inward human thoughts and purposes that
external human events are internally connected into a systematic unity in
diversity, that is, a concrete universal. By means of 'insight' into the
thoughts and purposes within human events a coherent, interconnected whole

chapter 6, below, pp. 355-356.

296 See B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and
Value, p. 72.
is constituted. Specifically human entities, such as a culture, or a city, or a war, are constituted by a web of factors, each external as far as appearance is concerned, but intrinsically and dynamically integrated by internal relations resulting from human thoughtful and purposeful activity. 297

Similarly, history in its concrete elaboration by the historian begins with a question, 298 and seeks to elaborate a series of events in

297 According to B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 70, the uniqueness which marks individuality, the concrete universal, is what is commonly regarded as the uniqueness of purpose. A purpose which is the practical element of a logical whole is nothing but a want, or a wanted object. Correlate this with Collingwood's "On the So-called Idea of Causation," Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, XXXVIII (1938), pp. 85-112, for Collingwood's understanding of the primary sense of the term cause to be that of purpose. See also Collingwood's Autobiography, p. 101, and ch. 6, pp. 355-356, below, for Collingwood's assertion that historical insight is concerned with purposive activity. See also his New Leviathan, pp. 47-60, 67-82; especially p. 72, pgph. 10.5 where he writes: "Shame...the critical point in the process, converting fear into anger, is...a critical point in the whole development of mind...The importance of anger as a bridge from the lower levels of consciousness where thought is at first merely apprehensive, capable of taking what is 'given' to it, and then merely conceptual, capable of framing abstractions from what is 'given,' to the higher levels of consciousness where thought is first 'propositional,' capable of discriminating good from evil and truth from error, and then 'rational,' capable of understanding both itself and other things, has been long expounded in many forms." Thus, the theory of the individual, of the concrete universal, is intimately tied up with the theory of the primacy of practical (i.e. purposive) knowledge. One's unique individuality is at one with one's life goals. As Aristotle said (Nicom. Ethics, 114a 30-35): "...the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character."

298 R.G. Collingwood, passim. See also H.I. Marrou, The Meaning of History, p. 131. See also, ch. 9, pp. 578-585 below, for a consideration of various historians' attitudes to history as proceeding according to an interrogative method.
such a way that there is no longer merely a series of disconnected facts, but a process in which the succeeding events are seen to give way one to the other by internal necessity, so that a coherent whole is presented in the form of an overlap of classes in a scale of forms. This explains why past facts change in meaning as their implications are developed throughout the course of history by being reassimilated by succeeding thoughts in the pursuit of new purposes. Thus, the tombs excavated by Flinders Petrie in Egypt now have as part of their history the fact that they were excavated by Petrie at that particular time and for the particular motives which Petrie had in undertaking such excavations.

Thus, in crime detection and in historical inquiry, the elements of the complex knowledge, consisting of seried questions and answers, fit together to form one complete picture somewhat in the way the parts of a jigsaw puzzle fit together. What guides the jigsaw puzzle-solver is the criterion of a whole picture which results from the fitting together of all the parts. But the illustration defaults, inasmuch as the picture, the whole, is superimposed on the parts as not entirely one with the reality of the parts, since the partial picture on each section can be rubbed off. But, in regard to human events, with which history, and crime detection, deal, the thoughts and purposes which constitute the 'inside' of such events, are embodied right into the fabric of the reality of the events themselves. "(T)he historian asks himself, 'Does this fit in with everything I know about the world of facts, the nature of the case,
CONCRETE LOGIC vs ABSTRACT LOGIC

the liability of the informant to error and mendacity, and so forth?"299

This means that (a) the facts, (b) the integration of the facts, that is, their "going together," or their "identity in difference," (c) their manifestness as facts to the investigator (historian or detective) which itself is one of the facts which internally affects the nature of all the other facts,300 and (d) the questioning mind,301 whose questioning activity makes the facts evident as facts, are all mutually implicated, that is, related to each other and to the totality, by internal relations. That is, the facts are not "hard facts" set over against the mind as something merely contemplated by it, but form, among themselves and with the mind that knows them, a concrete totality of mutual implication.

Finally, it may be noted that, in the question and answer complex which forms the knowledge element in crime detection and in history, we are dealing with truth as coherence. This coherence notion of truth finds perhaps its most explicit exposition in H.H. Joachim's The Nature of Truth,302 with which Collingwood was familiar.303 But,

300 See Ibid., pp. 218-221, p. 240.
301 See Ibid., pp. 244-246. See also Chapter 1, above, pp. 51-54.
whereas for Joachim truth is a coherence of judgments, for Collingwood truth is the coherence of a complex of questions and answers. 304

304 See Ibid., pp. 33-34.
THE LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER

AND

ITS RELEVANCE TO HISTORICAL THOUGHT

ACCORDING TO

R.G. COLLINGWOOD

by

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QUESTIONING, PRESUPPOSING AND METAPHYSICS

A consideration of Collingwood's theory of Metaphysics as the historical investigation of the absolute presuppositions of scientific enquiry is necessary in order to understand his theory of questioning, since science is an ordered body of knowledge,¹ that is, of questions and answers,² and what causes relevant and meaningful questions to arise are the presuppositions made by the questioner.³ "Furthermore, the doctrine of absolute presuppositions...is part of a wider doctrine... previously discussed under the heading of the 'concrete universal',"⁴ and "...the theory of presuppositions first expounded in Truth and Contra­diction was part of a general attempt to develop an alternative logic to the propositional logic of realism."⁵ And, again, "Metaphysics is an application of the logic of question and answer to the organization of the history of absolute presuppositions into a scale of forms (or con­crete universal)..."⁶

¹ See Chapter 1, above pp. 18-19.
² See Ibid., pp.21-22; also Chapter 2, above, pp.78-80.
⁴ L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Meta­physics, p. 248.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid., p. 262.
A different way of speaking in An Essay on Metaphysics from that of the earlier Speculum Mentis seems to indicate a change of doctrine in Collingwood regarding the nature of questioning. In Speculum Mentis, and even in An Essay on Philosophical Method, the concrete universal is explained solely in terms of experience polarized into questions and answers. But here, in An Essay on Metaphysics, there are three explanatory factors, namely questions, answers and presuppositions. Previously, as explicitly stated in Speculum Mentis, questions belonged to the order of suppositions, whereas here, in An Essay on Metaphysics, questions seem to be some sort of intermediary between presuppositions (whose logical efficacy provokes relevant questions and which are alleged to be spun out of the mind by itself) and answers. Presuppositions as determinants of world view meanings, appear now to have a recognizable distinctness from experience, so that coherence is no longer to be found only within experience itself but in experience under the influence of some experience-transcending a priori mind-stuff. In other words, the rational explanation of experience seems now no longer to be regarded in terms of relational coherence between parts and whole within that ex-

9 See Ibid., p. 197. See also, this chapter, below, pp. 250-251.
10 See below, this chapter, pp. 331 et seq.
experience itself, that is, the concrete universal of the earlier works, but to be understood in terms of a subsumption of experience under some transcendent mind-determinant in a quasi-Kantian fashion.

If this is so, then the rapprochement which Collingwood sought to establish as his life's work has already broken down in principle from within the system itself. Before attempting to take a position on this apparent discrepancy in Collingwood's theory of questioning, his treatment of presuppositions as presented in his Essay on Metaphysics will be considered, after which a return will be made to the problem highlighted above.

To avoid misapprehensions due to Collingwood's manner of expressing himself in the Essay on Metaphysics, L. Rubinoff points out that it is necessary to read the Essay, and the theory of absolute presuppositions found there, as a reply to logical Positivism, specifically to the challenge of A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic which appeared in 1936, in which Ayer maintains that experimental verifiability is the sole criterion of truth, apart from tautologies. Collingwood maintains against this that there is a class of statements ultimately involved in and therefore prior to the process of verification, and a condition of the possibility of verification. These statements Collingwood calls presuppositions. These statements are neither true nor false, and their acceptance before all enquiry is a necessary condition of enquiry from
which truth and falsity itself will arise. But, this denial of truth and falsity to presuppositions, Rubinoff warns, is due to Collingwood using a neutral language to endeavour to communicate with the Logical Positivists on their own ground. Dialectically, the truth or falsity of absolute presuppositions will be reckoned according to their place on a scale of forms of questions, answers and presuppositions. Collingwood himself says, speaking of a 'false' answer which is nevertheless 'right', "it is 'right', because it constitutes a link, and a sound one, in the chain of questions and answers by which the falseness of that presupposition is made manifest."

A. Presuppositions and the Logic of Question and Answer.

In the Autobiography Collingwood dealt with statements as being meaningful only as answers to questions. Such statements, made as answers to questions, are what are usually called propositions. But now Collingwood recognizes another type of statement involved in the question-answer process. Statements which are, not consequences of questions, as answers to questions, but necessary conditions of the arising of relevant questions, called presuppositions by Collingwood. Among this latter

type of statement there are relative and absolute presuppositions. Meta-
physics, according to Collingwood, is the historical investigation of
the latter.

Collingwood's doctrine of absolute presuppositions is tied to
his own experience of knowledge as an active interrogation, as opposed
to the realist doctrine of knowledge as 'compresence' with an object.
He contrasts his own personal experience of the activity of knowledge
with that of S. Alexander, who was reputed to be able to see the solutions
to problems intuitively with no apparent effort.\textsuperscript{14}

...with a slow and feeble thinker like myself there
is nothing when I am thinking hard and efficiently that
is like 'compresence' with any 'object' whatsoever.
There is at first a whole nest of problems all tangled
up together. Then by degrees the tangle is reduced to
order. Here and there in it one problem is seen to
depend for its solution upon the solution of another.
Given luck and great patience and strict attention to
the rule of never asking two questions together but
always separating them out and asking the first one
first, I can sometimes solve the whole lot. If I tried
to deal with them according to Alexander's presumption
I know by experience that I should never solve any.\textsuperscript{15}

For Collingwood, absolute presuppositions are \textit{a priori} in the
sense of not being derived from experience, and function in systematic
enquiry as "catalytic agents which the mind must bring out of its own
resources to the manipulation of what is called 'experience' and the

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 177-178.
conversion of it into science and civilization".  They are therefore self-made tools of knowledge according to which the mind thinks and systematizes experience into an intelligible experience. They therefore precede knowledge as preconditions of scientific inquiry, that is, systematic interrogation.

Collingwood says that his Essay on Metaphysics, was written "neither to expound my own metaphysical ideas, nor to criticize the metaphysical ideas of other people; but to explain what metaphysics is, why it is necessary to the wellbeing and advancement of knowledge, and how it is to be pursued."  

Collingwood holds that "Metaphysics is for us the name of a science, and has been for many centuries, because for many centuries it has been found necessary to think in a systematic or orderly fashion about the subjects that Aristotle discussed in the front of treatises collectively known by that name."  He rejects Aristotle's understanding of metaphysics as a science of pure being but accepts Aristotle's position that it is the science of first principles, which he, Collingwood, understands as the presuppositions which underlie all scientific thinking.

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16 Ibid., p. 197.

17 P. vii. Note departure from historical procedure.

18 See Ibid., p. 4.

19 See Ibid., pp. 11-16. See also L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 221-222.

20 See Essay on Metaphysics, p. 11; 20; 47.
that is, orderly interrogation of a subject matter.

To Kant's question, 'Under what conditions is Metaphysics a genuine science?', Collingwood's answer is that it is a science in the sense in which any organized body of knowledge is a science.\textsuperscript{21} It is concerned to discover what are the presuppositions which underlie scientific enquiry\textsuperscript{22} and it is possible only on condition that it is conducted as a historical investigation into the absolute presuppositions which were made at various historical periods, and the continuity existing between them.\textsuperscript{23}

L. Rubinoff argues convincingly that the substance of Collingwood's \textit{Essay on Metaphysics} "(which is treated (in the \textit{Autobiography}) as a part of the more general "logic of question and answer") was originally conceived during the first world war and first written out in the unpublished and subsequently destroyed "Truth and Contradiction"."\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, the substance of Collingwood's Metaphysics as the science of absolute presuppositions was foreshadowed in Collingwood's address at the Ruskin Centenary Conference in August of 1919,\textsuperscript{25} which, Rubinoff notes,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} See \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 34-48; esp. p. 40.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} See \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 49-77, esp. 55; 58-61, p. 77.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} L. Rubinoff, \textit{Collingwood and The Reform of Metaphysics}, p. 223.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} See \textit{Ibid.} Collingwood's Ruskin Centenary address, "Ruskins Philosophy", is republished in Alan Donagan's \textit{Essays in The Philosophy of}
is damaging to the Knox-Donagan radical conversion theory.

Rubinoff aligns the constellation of absolute presuppositions of the later Essay on Metaphysics with what is referred to in the Ruskin centenary address as the basic principles to which a man adheres, which define what is referred to as one's philosophy of life.

...there are certain central principles which a man takes as fundamental and incontrovertible, which he assumes as true in all his thinking and acting. These principles form, as it were, the nucleus of his whole mental life; they are the centre from which all his activities radiate. You may think of them as a kind or ring of solid thought - something infinitely tough and hard and resistant - to which everything the man does is attached.26

Collingwood seems to tie up this "constellation of absolute presuppositions" of the Essay, or "ring of solid thought" of the Ruskin centenary address, with the basic character determination of the moral personality,27 which concords well with his rapprochement of thought and

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27 See L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and The Reform of Metaphysics, p. 224.
action, and is reminiscent of the Chestertonian remark regarding a landlady interrogating a prospective tenant, that it is just as important that she know his philosophy as it is to find out what his income is.

As in his later thought, so in 1919 Collingwood regarded a man's philosophy as a function of his character. He therefore declares that a man "...is a great man or a little, a valuable man or a worthless, largely according as this ring is strong or weak in structure, good or bad in material" (RUP, 7). And since all of the acts and decisions which shape a man's life are suspended from this ring (one thinks immediately of Aristotle's notion of hexis) we may, according to Collingwood, regard a man whose ring is weak as having an unworthy character, while a man whose ring is composed of "unsound" and "untrue" principles may be regarded as "bad" and "foolish." And while Collingwood does not expressly say so, it is implied by what he does say that just as the character of an individual is bound up with the quality of his beliefs, so the character of an entire age is similarly to be regarded. This view clearly anticipates the attitude towards the dangers of first-level dogmatism in Speculum Mentis, the theory of the corrupt consciousness in the Principles of Art, and the critique of irrationalism in the Essay.28

The essentially historical character of the investigation of these primary thought determinants is already recognized in the Ruskin centenary address. Corresponding to the distinction made later in the Autobiography between "realism" and "the logic of question and answer"

28 Ibid. What Collingwood speaks of as absolute presuppositions or primary convictions seems to be what J. Maritain refers to as the primary self determination which results from "The Immanent Dialectic of The First Act of Freedom", see his Range of Reason, London, Bles, 1953, pp. 66-85. See also what Henry Veatch says in his Two Logics, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1969, pp. 242-245 regarding the logical import of character traits.
there is found in the Ruskin centenary address the distinction between
the logical method "which proceeds on the assumption that every in-
dividual is an instance of some eternal and unchanging principle" and
the historical method which differs from the logical method in that
"(w)here the logical mind looks for general laws, the historical mind
looks for individual facts, and it explains these facts by appealing not
to laws but to other facts."^{29} Rubinoff says, "(p)resupposed here is the
distinction drawn in Speculum Mentis between the logic of the abstract
universal and the logic of the concrete universal."^{30}

In the Ruskin centenary address Collingwood distinguishes the
logicist ('realist' of the Autobiography and Essay) and historicist
('question and answer' of the Autobiography and Essay) attitudes to
contradiction.

The old logic lays it down that of two contra-
dictory propositions one must be false and the other
true. To contradict yourself, on this view, is a
sign of mental confusion: the wise man never contra-
dicts himself. The alternative view starts from the
axiom that there are two sides to every question, and
that there is right on both sides; from this, the
inference is drawn that truth is many-sided and that
self-contradiction may easily be a mark not of weakness

^{29} See R.G. Collingwood "Ruskin's Philosophy" in Alan
Donagan's R.G. Collingwood's Essays in the Philosophy of Art, p. 12;
p. 14. Also see L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and The Reform of Meta-
physics, p. 225.

^{30} L. Rubinoff, op.cit., p. 225.
but of strength - not of confusion, but of a wide and comprehensive view which embraces much more truth than the one-sided consistency of the logicians.31

Commenting on this passage of Ruskin's Philosophy, Lionel Rubinoff says that the old logic, or logic of logicism, is the abstract logic of classification and division, the logic of genus and species. The new logic, or logic of historicism, is undoubtedly the basis of what Collingwood himself later describes in the Essay on Philosophical Method as the dialectical logic of the overlap of classes and as the logic of question and answer in the Autobiography. Rubinoff points out that Collingwood attributes this new historicist logic mainly to the efforts of Hegel and nineteenth century historical idealism and concludes therefore that Ruskin's Philosophy provides clear and unequivocal evidence that the logic of question and answer of the Autobiography is in fact Collingwood's development of the dialectical logic of Hegel, which conclusion, Rubinoff says, supports his claim that the logic of question and answer is part of the wider dialectical logic of the scale of forms and overlap of classes, sometimes referred to as the logic of the concrete universal.32

Rubinoff further concludes that the theory of truth referred to in the above passage, according to which truth is reached only through contradiction or determinate negation, presupposes the logic of question


and answer of the Autobiography and Speculum Mentis, and is virtually the same position defended in The Essay on Philosophical Method and in Collingwood's 1935 Correspondence with Gilbert Ryle in which Collingwood defends the position that philosophical arguments must proceed by means of systematic fallacies.33

33 See Ibid., pp. 226-227. Rubinoff further says, op.cit., pp. 230-231, that: "...Ruskin's Philosophy" must therefore be regarded as representing an important stage in the development of Collingwood's thought. Not only does it appear to support Collingwood's own claim in the Autobiography to have arrived at the theory of presuppositions and the logic of question and answer early in his philosophical career but it is also probably the closest record we have of the actual views of "Truth and Contradiction." If this is so then my earlier contention that "Truth and Contradiction" may be regarded as an early statement of the doctrines of the Essay on Metaphysics is given further support. At the same time, as I have tried to show, just as the Essay may be regarded as fulfilling the requirements of Speculum Mentis, so the latter may be regarded as a systematic exposition of some of the main points of the essay on Ruskin. It therefore follows that, contrary to Donagan's interpretation, far from experimenting with a different doctrine, Collingwood's activity from 1924-1936, as he himself declared in the Autobiography, consisted primarily in applying the new "historicist logic" to the solution of various philosophical problems; thus the actual theory of metaphysics expounded in the Essay may be regarded as the formal exposition of a doctrine which had been consistently applied since 1924. "I did not really feel," wrote Collingwood concerning the youthful period of Truth and Contradiction, "any great desire to expound the philosophical ideas I have been setting forth in these chapters (he is referring of course to the doctrine of presuppositions) whether to my colleagues or to the public." Instead he continues, "...I felt justified in turning to the more congenial task of applying them and thus testing them empirically" (A, 74). Speculum Mentis may therefore be regarded as an attempt to expound the presuppositions of consciousness in so far as the latter exists at the first ontological level. The Idea of Nature, the Idea of History, and the Principles of Art are attempts to expound the presuppositions of particular forms of experience, each of which has its own history and exists, as I have argued, on three distinct but related ontological levels. In practice, of course, Collingwood does more than merely describe these presuppositions; he criticizes them as well, by explaining how they arose in the first place,
B. Presuppositions and Questions.

In his Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood first reiterates what he has already said in the Autobiography concerning the meaning of propositions as functions of answering questions, and, in addition, introduces the role played in the question and answer process by presuppositions and especially what he calls the absolute presuppositions.

Whenever anyone makes a statement of his thought in words there are many more thoughts in his mind than are expressed in his verbal statement. Among these some stand in special relationship to the stated thought; they are not just its context but also its presuppositions. When I say 'that is a clothes-line' I mean that it was put there for the purpose of hanging clothes. In saying that, I am presupposing that it was put there for some purpose, otherwise the question for what purpose would never have arisen.

and in so doing 'vindicates' them from the absolute standpoint, which is precisely what the metaphysician of the Essay on Metaphysics is required to do. The metaphysician's business, he writes, is not only to identify several different constellations of presuppositions but also to find out on what occasions and by what historical processes one set has turned into another (EM, 73; A,66). Presupposed by these claims are a special set of presuppositions which the metaphysician discovers when he reflects on his own experience as metaphysician - which is precisely what Collingwood himself is doing in the main body of An Essay on Metaphysics, the Principles of Art, and the 'Epilegomena' of the Idea of History."

Presupposition means priority, not in time, but logical. We do not go from first thinking of purpose in general for which the clothes-line in question substitutes a determinate purpose, nor do we first think of the clothes-line as having some purpose and then go on to ask what is that purpose which it has. We first think 'that is a clothes line', then, by a kind of reflective analysis, come to see that this presupposition was made however little one was aware of it at the time.\footnote{See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 22.}

Here lies the difference between the desultory and casual thinking of our unscientific consciousness and the orderly and systematic thinking we call science. In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles; we fish up a thought out of our minds like an anchor foul of its own cable, hanging upside down and draped in seaweed with shellfish sticking to it, and dump the whole thing on deck quite pleased with ourselves for having got it up at all. Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess and reducing a knot of thoughts in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions between them.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 22-23.}

Collingwood says that logicians have paid a good deal of attention to some kinds of thought connections, but that they have neglected others, such as the theory of presupposition. He adds that perhaps this is responsible for the unsatisfactory condition of metaphysical theory, which depends upon the theory of presupposition. Collingwood then pro-
poses to deal summarily with the theory of presuppositions to the extent to which his present purpose deems necessary. He proceeds to expound his theory in a series of numbered propositions, after the manner of a Spinozistic a more geometrico. 37

Proposition one is that 'Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question.' He then explains that by statement he includes not only those spoken out loud to someone else but also statements made interiorly by one to himself in the course of solitary thinking. Likewise, questions include questions addressed to oneself. He appeals to familiarity with scientific procedure to back up the proposition that:

In proportion as a man is thinking scientifically when he makes a statement, he knows that his statement is the answer to a question and knows what that question is. 38

In our least scientific and reflective moments we scarcely know that the thoughts we have are answers to questions, let alone what the questions are. It is only by analyzing what is meant by saying that 'this is a clothes-line' that I realize it to have been the answer to the question 'What is that thing for?' 39 A question is logically prior to its own answer and, when thinking is ordered scientifically, this logical

37 See Ibid., p. 23.
38 Ibid., p. 24.
39 See Ibid.
priority is accompanied by temporal priority. But the fact that the question is formulated first in thinking scientifically does not mean that it ceases when the question begins to be answered; this is a special type of temporal priority in which the prior event or activity does not stop when the posterior begins.

The act of asking the question begins and takes a definite shape as the asking of a determinate question before the act of answering it begins; but it continues for the whole duration of this latter.40

This is so because, if a question did not endure during the answering of it, the questioner would have since lost interest in his subject, and the alleged answer would not be an answer at all, but a meaningless form of words. A question does not cease to be a question by being answered, but ceases only to be an unanswered question.41

By way of clarifying the meaning of his terms, Collingwood defines what he means by 'proposition.' Let that which is stated (i.e. that which can be true or false) be called a proposition, and let the stating of it be called propounding it.42 Collingwood warns that English usage refers to a question or a supposition also as a statement, and this jargon is customary among logicians.

40 Ibid.
41 See Ibid., pp. 24-25.
42 See Ibid., p. 25.
Then Collingwood lays down his second proposition: 'Every question involves a presupposition.'

Ordinarily, Collingwood explains, a question involves large numbers of presuppositions, but distinction must be made between direct and immediate presuppositions and indirect and mediate presuppositions.

Directly or immediately, any given question involves one presupposition and only one, namely that from which it directly and immediately arises.

But, this direct and immediate presupposition has in its turn other presuppositions which are indirectly presupposed by the original question. But if this immediate presupposition were not made, the question to which it is logically immediately prior could not be logically asked. The question 'have you stopped beating your wife?' could not be logically asked without the presupposition on the part of the questioner that the one questioned had been in the habit of beating his wife. In the absence of that presupposition the question 'does not arise.' It is not denied that such a question can be verbally asked but only that it can be logically asked.

To say that a question 'does not arise' is the ordinary English way of saying that it involves a presupposition which is not in fact being made. A question which 'does not arise' is a nonsensical question, not intrinsically nonsensical, but nonsensical in relation to its context, and

43 See Ibid.

44 Ibid.
specifically to its presuppositions. One asking a question which 'does not arise' is talking nonsense and inviting the one so questioned to join him in nonsense talk.\footnote{See Ibid., p. 26. See also L. Rubinoff, \textit{Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics}, p. 232.}

Collingwood says that just as one can ask questions without knowing it, and a fortiori without knowing what questions one is asking, so also one can make presuppositions without knowing it, and a fortiori without knowing what presuppositions one is making. Thus, in asking 'What is that for?' I need not necessarily be aware than I am presupposing that it is 'for' something. Only to the extent that I think scientifically am I aware of my presuppositions. Thus, in deciphering a worn and damaged inscription, I am aware that before asking 'What does that mark mean?' I must have first assured myself that the mark is part of the inscription, that is, I must first answer the question 'Does it mean anything?' An affirmative answer to the question 'Does it mean something?' causes the further question 'What does it mean?' to arise.\footnote{See R.G. Collingwood, \textit{An Essay on Metaphysics}, pp. 26-27.}

The causing of a question to arise is called the logical efficacy of whatever so causes it to arise. Mere assumption, or mere supposition for the sake of argumentation, is sufficient to make the question
'what does this mark mean?' arise in the mind of any epigraphist when he is not sure whether a certain mark is part of an inscription or not. The logical efficacy of the supposition that the mark means something is identical with the logical efficacy of the proposition that it means something.47

Collingwood then lays down that to assume is to suppose by an act of free choice,48 which is explained by saying that anyone who 'makes an assumption' is making a supposition about which he is aware that he might, if he so chose, make another. All assumptions are suppositions, but not all suppositions are assumptions, for some are made unawares and others of which one is aware of making may be made without the awareness of the possibility that other assumptions may have been made. When we use the word 'assumption' we always imply free choice, as for example when we say 'let us assume x equals ten'. It may be used, however, with malice aforethought to insult another, as when one says to another, 'you are assuming that no one will work except for payment', implying that only a fool would make such an assumption. It may also be used by one wishing to be insulting, as when one asks 'what do you mean by treading on my toe?' knowing well that the treader meant nothing by it.49

47 See Ibid., p. 27.
48 See Ibid.
The logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend upon the truth of what is supposed, or even on its being thought to be true, but only on its being supposed.\textsuperscript{50} Collingwood appeals first to practice in scientific reasoning, where the validity of an argument is in no way affected by making assumptions believed to be false, and then to the conduct of daily affairs, when a receipt is asked for, based on the assumption that the payee is capable of dishonesty notwithstanding the belief that he is not.\textsuperscript{51}

Collingwood says that a presupposition is either relative or absolute (here reference is not to the act of presupposing but to that which is presupposed). A relative presupposition is one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition and to another question as its answer. In using a tape measure, for example, I \textsuperscript{presuppose} that the answer to the question 'what is the distance between these two points?' will be right. The accuracy of the tape is thus a presupposition of the question 'what does this distance measure?' But its affirmation is the answer to the question 'Is this tape accurate in length?' One may use a tape measure without ever questioning its accuracy. In which case the assumption of its accuracy remains unquestioned, which might lead us to

\textsuperscript{50} But see this chapter, Section F, pp.311-330 , below.

suppose that it is not a relative presupposition. But, that certain presuppositions are open to being questioned is not disproved by the fact that someone who makes them fails to see their questionability, just as the necessary consequence of a conclusion from premisses is not disproved if someone who states the premisses fails to see the consequence. "The business of logical inquiries, like that on which we are now engaged, is a study of high-grade or scientific thinking: their conclusions are not impaired by the fact that low-grade or unscientific thinking also exists." 52

To question a presupposition is to ask for its verification, that is, to demand that a question should be asked which will have that presupposition itself as its answer, and so become a proposition. To speak of verifying a presupposition involves supposing that it is a relative presupposition. 53

But, "an absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer." 54

Thus, a pathologist if asked 'what is the cause of event E which sometimes happens in this disease?' will reply 'The cause of E is C.'

52 Ibid., p. 30.
53 See Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 31.
Questioned further, he might add that this was established by So-and-so in such and such experiment, now classical. Questioned further 'I suppose that before So-and-so found out what the cause of E was, he was quite sure it had a cause?' the answer would probably be 'Quite sure, of course'. If the further question 'Why?' were pressed, the answer would likely be 'because everything that happens has a cause.' If the further question 'how do you know that everything that happens has a cause?' is imprudently asked, the one questioned will probably blow up "because you have put your finger on one of his absolute presuppositions, and people are apt to be ticklish in their absolute presuppositions." 55

But one thus questioned, if he keeps his temper so as to be able to give a civil and candid answer, would probably reply that it is something he takes for granted in his job. It is not brought into question. It is not subjected to the process of verification. It is not something that anyone has discovered, but something everyone takes for granted. Such a one is saying that it is an absolute presupposition of the science which he pursues. The illustration was set in terms of a pathologist's science, which, Collingwood says, is one science which still maintains that it is an absolute presupposition that events have causes, whereas most other sciences in the past hundred years have abandoned that as an unquestioned

55 Ibid., p. 31.
presupposition.  

Collingwood says that the idea of verification does not apply to absolute presuppositions however much we might like to verify them. Verification presupposes that the presupposition in question is a relative presupposition. If anyone protests that if they are not verifiable they are useless in science, the answer is that their use in science is their logical efficacy and that this logical efficacy does not depend on its being verifiable, because it does not depend on its being true. It only depends on its being supposed.

Absolute presuppositions are not propositions because they are never answers to questions, whereas a proposition is that which is stated, and whatever is stated is stated in answer to a question.

The logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true, since the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all but only to propositions. This is the same as saying that absolute presuppositions are never propounded, not merely in the sense that no one ever propounds them but that they are unpropoundable, for "(t)o be propounded is not their business; their business is to be presupposed."

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56 See Ibid., p. 32.

57 See Ibid. But, see this chapter, section F below, regarding the truth and falsity of absolute presuppositions.


59 Ibid., p. 33.
The scientist's business is not to propound them but only to presuppose them. The metaphysician's business, as we shall see, is not to propound them but to propound the proposition that this or that one of them is presupposed. 60

From this Collingwood draws the conclusion that to question an absolute presupposition is to ask a nonsense question.

Hence any question involving the presupposition that an absolute presupposition is a proposition, such as the question 'Is it true?' 'What evidence is there for it?' 'How can it be demonstrated?' 'What right have we to presuppose it if it can't, is a nonsense question. 61

Collingwood adds that it is nonsense to say, as some modern logicians say, that 'supposing' is one of the several attitudes that one can take towards a proposition meaning by a proposition something that can be either true or false. Collingwood warns that this is a device for imposing on unwary readers the dogma that all presuppositions are relative, or, in other words, that there are no absolute presuppositions. 62

C. Metaphysics as the Science of Absolute Presuppositions.

Collingwood says that in low grade or unscientific thinking we are hardly aware of making presuppositions, since the tangled condition

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid. But see later regarding the question of the truth of absolute presuppositions. See L. Rubinoff, op. cit., p. 234-235.

of thoughts coming up from the bottom of our minds gives a deceptive appearance of 'immediacy.'\textsuperscript{63} If I merely reflect on the thought that 'this is a clothes line' without analysing it, I think that I have been confronted with something which in itself is a clothes line, quite apart from anyone's thoughts about it, and so I think that I have simply 'apprehended' or 'intuited' that clothes line for what it really is. If I never get beyond this casual way of thinking, Collingwood says, I will always remain satisfied that knowledge is no more than the simple apprehension or intuition of (or compresence with) what confronts us as being absolutely and in itself what we intuit or apprehend it to be.\textsuperscript{64} This attitude is what Collingwood means by realism, which is founded on nothing other than human stupidity. Any one can 'convince' himself of the truth of realism if only he will let his mind drift and think so casually and haphazardly that he is hardly thinking at all. When he succeeds in doing that, he will find that he does automatically what the realists say we always do whenever we think.\textsuperscript{65}

Collingwood will admit the legitimacy of realism as a study of the way anchors get fouled up and covered with seabed sediment. In calm weather and neap tides, he says, such an anchor is good enough to hold

\textsuperscript{63} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{64} See \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{65} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 35.
the ship. 66

But the danger of such realist thinking, according to Collingwood, is to rest satisfied with such assertions as 'That is a clothes line,' or 'What I am looking at is my hand,' or 'The bookcase is further away than the table.' The danger in accepting such statements as right in themselves is, in supposing that rectitude, to suppose also that this realism is achieving again, and better, what Kant and Descartes achieved in their theories of knowledge. But Kant and Descartes were concerned more with how to make anchors hang the right way and get the ship home during a storm rather than with merely considering how anchors fouled up. Collingwood accuses realists of not realizing that the best account of unscientific knowledge can never be preferable to even the worst account of scientific knowledge. 67

Collingwood says that in this low grade thinking, at its lowest, we are quite unaware that every thought is an answer to a question, and wholly unaware that the question arises from a presupposition. Such low grade thinking will never give rise to metaphysics and theories of knowledge. One who accepts such low grade thinking as the model of thought will never understand what metaphysics is about, or why it should be. 68

66 See Ibid.
67 See Ibid., p. 35.
68 See Ibid., pp. 35-36.
But, because man is capable not only of low grade thinking but also of high grade or scientific thinking, he has succeeded in dominating the natural forces within and around him, and thereby given himself the unique character of a self-made inhabitant of a world called civilization which he has made as an environment fit for himself to live in, the original nature, both of himself and his surroundings, serving only as the raw material of his craft. 69

High grade thinking means thinking energetically instead of idly: thinking hard instead of allowing your mind to drift. 70

Collingwood says that higher types of animal are higher because instead of functioning only at a low intensity they store energy for a future occasion which they meet by an expenditure of that stored energy, which elevates their mechanical effectiveness above its average level so as to be able to overcome the obstacle. What higher animals have succeeded to do with their bodies man has learned to do with his mind; he is the only animal who has learned to think hard enough so as to be able to transform the whole structure of his life by this means. "Everything that we call specifically human is due to man's power of thinking hard." 71

In addition to increase of effort, the increased effort requires to be well directed if its effectiveness is to be increased. "High

69 See Ibid., p. 36.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 37.
grade thinking, therefore, depends on two things: increase of mental effort, and skill in the direction of that effort."\(^7^2\)

Collingwood says that increase of mental effort brings about not only a difference of degree in the intensity of thinking but also a difference of kind in its quality. At its lowest level of intensity, one is conscious only of 'intuiting' or 'apprehending' what presents itself to the mind. To say that something presents itself to one's mind is only another way of saying that one thinks about it without noticeable effort. Collingwood says that when one becomes aware of effort one at the same time becomes aware of a hunger that is no longer satisfied by what swims into one's mouth; such a one wants what is not there and will not come of itself and such a one swims about hunting for it.\(^7^3\)

This ranging of the mind in search of its prey is called asking questions. To ask questions, knowing that you are asking them, is the first stage in high-grade thinking: the first thing that distinguishes the human mind from the sea-anemone mind of the 'realist' theory of knowledge. The second stage is not merely to hunt one's prey but to hunt it cunningly. To hunt it at all is to ask questions; to hunt it cunningly is to ask questions with skill, or scientifically.\(^7^4\)

Collingwood further subdistinguishes two stages in this second

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\(^7^2\) Ibid.

\(^7^3\) See Ibid., p. 37. Correlate with New Leviathan, Ch. 8, on hunger.

When a question first comes into one's mind it is generally...a confused mass of different questions all of which, because all must be answered before I can catch my dinner, and because I am hungry, I ask at once. But they cannot all be answered at once. Before they can be answered they must be distinguished, and the nest of questions resolved into a list of questions where each item is one question and only one.76

The question 'Have you stopped beating your wife yet?' is a stock logic text illustration of what is called the fallacy of many questions, which is a logical vice of grammatically confusing into one question what is logically many questions. Collingwood says that a skilful thinker, practised in disentangling knots, will quickly resolve it into four distinct questions:—

1. Have you a wife?
2. Were you ever in the habit of beating her?
3. Do you intend to manage in the future without doing so?
4. Have you begun carrying out that intention?

After the work of distinguishing, there follows the arranging, or ordering of the questions.

After disentangling comes arranging. The reason why questions have to be arranged is because one of them may be contingent upon a certain answer being given to another. The question whether you ever beat your wife does not arise...
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unless an affirmative answer has been given to the question whether you ever had one.77

Scientific or orderly thinking is orderly in the sense that it deals with things in their logical order, putting what is presupposed before what presupposes it. The resolution of the grammatically single question 'Have you stopped beating your wife?' into four questions also shows how these four questions have to be arranged in their logical order, so that each arises when, and only when, an affirmative answer has been given to the one next before it. The thought process from question to question does not depend on the truth of the answer but only on this that it answers; not upon the questioner's thinking the answers to be true but only on his accepting the answers given, or assuming them for the sake of argument. It was pointed out previously78 that the power of causing a question to arise, or the logical efficacy of a supposition, does not depend on the truth of what is supposed but only on its being supposed.

The work of disentangling and arranging questions, can also be described as the work of detecting presuppositions. The question whether a man has left off beating his wife yet presupposes that he has formed the intention of leaving off, which in turn presupposes that he used to

77 Ibid., p. 39. See also L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, pp. 235-236.

78 See page 265, above. See also below, chapter 7, pp. 453 et seq. on the criticism of this dialectical attitude.
beat her, which in turn presupposes that he has a wife. All these are relative presuppositions, each standing now as a presupposition to one question, now as an answer to another. Each is both presupposition and proposition. 79

But, in addition to relative presuppositions there are absolute presuppositions "and the analysis which detects absolute presuppositions I call metaphysics." 80

Before a presupposition can be called relative, one has to have asked whether it is relative or absolute if one is thinking scientifically. The question 'what does this presuppose?' itself presupposes an affirmative answer to the question 'does it presuppose anything?' But to ask that question is to consider the possibility that it may be an absolute presupposition, and to claim that you could identify one if you found it.

Collingwood says that the procedure and qualifications required to carry out this metaphysical analysis is in no way different from the pure and simple analysis as described above. In either case the question which is constantly being asked is 'is this presupposition relative or absolute?' The modus operandi is the same whichever answer is

80 Ibid.
given, so that the modus operandi of all analysis is metaphysical, and, since it is analysis which confers the scientific character on science, science and metaphysics are intimately united and stand or fall together. The establishment of orderly thinking is together the birth of science and the birth of metaphysics; each must live together and die together. 81

This is based on the assumption that metaphysics is the science of absolute presuppositions, which Collingwood says he assumes because he finds it in Aristotle, the inventor of metaphysics (after purging him of what has been shown to be nonsensical - Collingwood is referring to Aristotle's position that metaphysics, besides being the science of first principles, that is, absolute presuppositions for Collingwood, is also the science of pure being and of first being, or Theology, which Collingwood rejects as the nonsense element). 82 Collingwood visualises an objector saying that if he (Collingwood) wants to make such an assumption it is his business but that he (the objector) is not interested until such an assertion is proven. Collingwood replies that such an objector does not know what he is talking about or asking for, for the attitude of a reasonable man is simply to examine a few metaphysical problems and see whether or not they are concerned with absolute presuppositions.

Little analytical ability is needed to convince ourselves that we take a good many things for granted without asking whether they are

81 See Ibid., p. 40-41.
82 See Ibid., p. 41. See also Ibid., pp. 13-15 and 17-20.
true or not. But most often this analysis is not pressed far enough for one to decide whether these things are so taken for granted on account of lack of due, unprejudiced enquiry, or whether they are in fact principles which neither admit nor require verification. 83

At first glance it might seem as if the distinction between absolute and relative presuppositions is not so much a distinction between two kinds of presupposition as a distinction between two ways of presupposing, and that an ordinary intelligible and reasonably honest man could say exactly which of the two he was doing. But, the position is not so easy, for "(i)n modern Europe absolute presuppositions are unfashionable." 84 Collingwood then points out the obvious truism that when things are conventionally regarded with disapproval people will go to remarkable lengths to convince themselves and others that they do not engage in these things. Denying the existence of absolute presuppositions is regarded as the smart thing to do. Even those who recognise the ridiculousness of this fashion may be so affected by a kind of mass suggestion in this regard that at a critical moment, when every ounce of mental determination is required to decide whether a given presupposition is absolute or relative, they will be persuaded to decide in favour of its being relative,

83 See Ibid., pp. 41-42.
84 Ibid., p. 42.
even if in fact it is an absolute presupposition.  

Furthermore, honesty, candor and veracity, even in conjunction with intelligence, can do little to facilitate answering the question, because it is not the type of question that can be settled by introspection.

Introspection can do no more than bring into the focus of consciousness something of which we are already aware. But in our less scientific moments, when knowledge appears to us in the guise of mere apprehension, intuiting that which simply confronts us, we are not even aware that whatever we state to ourselves or others is stated in answer to a question, still less that every such question rests on presuppositions and least of all that among these presuppositions some are absolute presuppositions. In this kind of thinking, absolute presuppositions are certainly at work; but they are doing their work in darkness, the light of consciousness never falling on them. It is only by analysis that any one can ever come to know either that he is making any absolute presuppositions at all or what absolute presuppositions he is making.  

Collingwood then proceeds to outline the manner in which such an analysis proceeds. He says that the analysis may be conducted by one or another of two types of thought-experiment, either upon one well trained in a certain type of scientific work or upon oneself, the latter being the more preferable.  

85 See Ibid., pp. 42-43.
86 Ibid., p. 43.
87 See Ibid.
88 See Ibid., p. 45.
If the enquiror, says Collingwood, can find someone well trained in a certain type of work to which he is devoted, but not yet accustomed to metaphysics, and if the enquiror is skilful enough in questioning, and the subject questioned cooperative, at least as far as relative presuppositions are concerned it will be found that, as soon as one of his absolute presuppositions is touched, he will react violently at any attempt to bring them within the orbit of the questioning process. This rejection is a symptom that the subject, who has cooperated in the analysis, has been brought to seeing that the presupposition which he is being asked to justify is an absolute presupposition and that the kind of work to which he is devoted depends on that presupposition being unquestioningly accepted.

This is what...I called being 'ticklish in one's absolute presuppositions'; and the reader will see that this ticklishness is a sign of intellectual strength combined with a low degree of analytical skill. A man who is ticklish in that way is a man who knows 'instinctively' as they say, that absolute presuppositions do not need justification. In my own experience I have found that when natural scientists express hatred of 'metaphysics' they are usually expressing this dislike of having their absolute presuppositions touched.89

Collingwood regards this method of dialogue with another as somewhat precarious, owing to the delicacy of the qualifications it

89 Ibid., p. 44.
requires in the questioned subject, who, as soon as he understands what is happening to him, will likely lose that 'ticklishness' which gives the distinctive value to that untouchable area. It is a sort of violation of virginity in the reflective faculties. When Socrates is accused of corrupting the young men of his time, the word translated by corrupt is the same as the word for seduction.

The only altogether satisfactory method, says Collingwood, is for the analyst to experiment on himself. It is only in this case that the experiment is more rather than less valuable to the subject, but it requires great resolution, and the temptation to cheat is unexpectedly strong.

The process, simply as analytic, is the same as analysis found ordinarily in science, but its purpose is to find out what absolute presuppositions are in fact being made on certain occasions and certain kinds of occasions. In the scientific analysis the relative presuppositions are brought to the fore and subjected to verification, the absolute presuppositions being put to the side. But "(i)n metaphysics it is the relative presuppositions that are thrown back and the absolute presuppositions that are put into the basket; not in order to justify them, because to talk of justifying them is to talk nonsense; but in order to have them

90 See Ibid., p. 45.
91 See Ibid.
Collingwood says that Aristotle's identification of metaphysics with theology reminds us that these two opposite procedures of analysis are contemplated by people with quite different feelings with respect to them.

You may call it superstition or what you will, but hard names make no difference to the fact that there is something uncanny about absolute presuppositions. They give people more than a touch of the feeling which Rudolf Otto called numinous terror.\footnote{Ibid., p. 46.}

This terror used to be dealt with by the procedures of magic. Our time prides itself with having abolished superstitions, but in fact, there are as many as ever, the only difference is that we have lost the magical art of conquering them.

So it is a special characteristic of modern European civilization that metaphysics is habitually frowned upon and the existence of absolute presuppositions denied. This habit is neurotic. It is an attempt to overcome a superstitious dread by denying that there is any cause for it. If this neurosis ever achieves its ostensible object, the eradication of metaphysics from the European mind, the eradication of science and civilization will be accomplished at the same time.\footnote{Ibid.}

Collingwood says that the metaphysical enterprise of attempting to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by different

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.} \hfill \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 46.} \hfill \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.}
persons on different occasions will give rise to the further considerations whether absolute presuppositions are made singly or in groups; how such groups were organized; whether different races or classes made different absolute presuppositions; whether some have been made *semper, unique, ab omnibus*, or all differing on different occasions for different discussions.  

Pseudo-metaphysics is the kind of thought which questions what are in fact absolute presuppositions on the mistaken belief that they are relative presuppositions and, as propositions, susceptible to truth or error. As, for example, if one were to ask about an absolute presupposition AP, 'Is AP true?' 'Upon what evidence is AP accepted?' 'How can AP be demonstrated?' 'What right do we have to presuppose it if it is not demonstrable?' The answers to such questions are neither true nor false but nonsense and arise from thinking that supposing is one of the attitudes we can adopt towards a proposition, as some logicians think, as if what is supposed absolutely must be either true or false.

Collingwood adds a lengthy footnote which contains statements and implications highly relevant to his notion of the historical character of absolute presuppositions. He faces, in this footnote, the objection that since he (Collingwood) admits that absolute presuppositions change,


96 See *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48; see also this chapter, p. 269.

that he is saying that they are merely changes of fashion. To which objection Collingwood replies that a change of fashion is a superficial change symptomatic perhaps of deeper and more important changes, but itself is of little depth or importance. New superficial changes of fashion can be initiated simply because others do so, or salesmen or advertisers promote it. But absolute presuppositions are not dodges, and those who start one do not do so because they 'like' to start it. Usually people are not aware of their presuppositions and consequently are not aware of changes therein, so such a change is not a matter of choice.

Nor is it a superficial or frivolous change, for:

It is the most radical change a man can undergo, and entails the abandonment of all his most firmly established habits and standards for thought and action. Why...do such changes happen?...because the absolute presuppositions of any given society, at any given phase of its history, form a structure which is subject to 'strains'...of greater or less intensity, which are 'taken up'...in various ways, but never annihilated. If the strains are too great, the structure collapses and is replaced by another, which will be a modification of the old with the destructive strain removed; a modification not consciously devised but created by a process of unconscious thought.98

The last statement seems to be saying that absolute presuppositions are functions of a cultural nature, a resultant of socio-cultural

98 Ibid., p. 48. This reflects the fundamental character traits referred to above in comparing the absolute presuppositions of the Essay on Metaphysics with "The ring of solid thought" of the earlier "Ruskin's Philosophy."
forces which build up into tensions and strains until something in the nature of a socio cultural 'earthquake' happens in the social structure and finally an equilibrium is reached.

D. Metaphysics as an Historical Science.

Collingwood maintains that all metaphysical questions, that is, questions about absolute presuppositions, are historical questions, since they are about the absolute presuppositions certain people make on certain occasions. "All metaphysical questions are historical questions and all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions." 99

Every metaphysical question either is simply the question what absolute presuppositions were made on a certain occasion, or is capable of being resolved into a number of such questions together with a further question or further questions arising out of these. This is the central point of the present essay. 100

The various presuppositions regarding causation made by physicists during different historical periods illustrate the point at issue. Newtonian Physics presupposes that some events have causes, those not due to the operation of laws. Thus, the time at which a moving body passes a definite point on its trajectory is calculable in advance according to a law. But if a colliding body changes its course, this

100 Ibid.
The presupposition of nineteenth century physics was that all events have causes, which seems to originate with Kant.

The peculiarity of the Kantian metaphysics is that it uses the notion of cause and the notion of law, one might almost say, interchangeably: it regards all laws of nature as laws according to which causes in nature operate, and all causes in nature as operating according to law.\(^{101}\)

But for modern physics nothing happens according to causes; all happens according to laws. Cases of the impact of one body with another are no longer regarded as instances of interference rendering inoperative the Laws of Motion; they are regarded as cases of 'free' motion that is, motion not interfered with, under peculiar geometrical conditions with the straight line of Newton's first law substituted for by some other kind of line.

Collingwood says that we might be led to think from this that there are three schools of thought in physics, the Newtonian, for which some events have causes, the Kantian, for which all events have causes, the Einsteinian, for which no events have causes, and it might seem as if the metaphysician has to tell which of these three schools is based on a false foundation and which is not. The dogmatic metaphysician, 

\(^{101}\) Ibid., p. 50.
Collingwood says, will not hesitate to pronounce in favour of one or other of them as being 'self-evident'. But the conscientious metaphysician will be embarrassed, because he will see that there is no way in which that can be decided; it is a pseudometaphysical problem of the type previously discussed, 'is AP true?' The reason why that is not a metaphysical problem is that it is not a historical problem.

The sentences (Some events have causes, All events have causes, No events have causes), express absolute presuppositions made respectively in three different schools of physical science. Each is important, to the science that makes it, because it determines the entire structure of that science by determining the questions that arise in it, and therefore determining the possible answers.  \[102\]

So, every detail in these respective sciences depends on what absolute presuppositions each respectively makes.

But this does not mean that it depends on these presuppositions being thought true, or that the truth of the conclusions arrived at depends on the presuppositions being in fact true. For the logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend on its being true, nor even on its being thought to be true, but only in its being supposed...  \[103\]

Therefore, according to Collingwood, it is a mistake to think that the metaphysician can pronounce on the fundamental correctness of one school as against the others by investigating their absolute pre-

\[102\] Ibid., p. 52.

\[103\] Ibid.
suppositions from the aspect of their truth or falsity. To enquire into
the truth of a presupposition is to assume that it is not an absolute
but a relative presupposition. But, such an enquiry into the truth of
an absolute presupposition is nonsense and pseudometaphysics.104

Collingwood says that there are two things that can be done
about absolute presuppositions. You can suppose them, which is what the
ordinary scientist does, or you can investigate to find out what they are,
which is what the metaphysician does. The metaphysician's job is to find
out which absolute presuppositions are in fact being made; it is not his
job to find out what it is to be an absolute presupposition, for this is
the proper work of logic.

When I say that this is what metaphysicians do I mean
that this is what I find them doing when I read their
works from Aristotle onwards.105

Collingwood says that the business of the ordinary scientist
in his scientific work, if he is a Newtonian, is to presuppose that some
events have causes, if he is a Kantian, to presuppose that all events
have causes, and if he is an Einsteinian, that no events have causes,
whereas the business of the metaphysician is to find out that Newtonian
scientists presuppose that some events have causes, that Kantian scient-
ists presuppose that all events have causes, and that Einsteinian scient-

104 See Ibid., pp. 53-54.
105 Ibid., p. 54.
ists presuppose that no events have causes. These are true metaphysical propositions and their contradictories would be false metaphysical propositions.

It will be clear that the true metaphysical propositions are true historical propositions, and the false metaphysical propositions false historical propositions. It is the proper business of a metaphysician to answer the question what absolute presuppositions are or were made by Newtonians, Kantians, Einsteinians and so forth. These are historical questions.

The historical nature of the metaphysician's inquiries is at once evident when the propositions he makes are stated as they are above....What makes it evident is that the wording of each statement includes the formula 'so-and-so presupposes (or presupposed) that...'. Since the presupposition alleged to be made is an absolute presupposition, and since the question whether it is made is not a personal one but one concerning the peculiarities of a certain phase of scientific thought, the formula would be more accurately rendered: 'in such and such a phase of scientific thought it is (or was) absolutely presupposed that...'. This formula I call the 'metaphysical rubric.'

According to Collingwood, history has its own rubric, namely, 'the evidence at our disposal obliges us to conclude that' such and such an event happened. The rubric customarily used by legendary literature is 'the story says that...', or 'the story goes on to say that...'. But just as in these cases the reader is left to supply these rubrics for himself, since he is supposed to know the ropes, so also the metaphysical rubric is most often left to the reader to be put in for himself, on the presumption that he is intelligent enough, and accustomed

106 Ibid., p. 55.
enough to this kind of literature.

Another reason, Collingwood tells us, for omitting these rubrics is that the writer himself does not see their necessity.

It is only when a man's historical consciousness has reached a certain point of maturity that he realizes how very different have been the ways in which different sets of people have thought. When a man first begins looking into absolute presuppositions it is likely that he will begin by looking into those which are made in his own time by his own countrymen, or at any rate by persons belonging to some group of which he is a member. This of course, is already an historical enquiry. But various prejudices current at various times which I will not here enumerate have tended to deceive such enquirers into thinking that the conclusions they have reached will hold good far beyond the limits of that group and that time. They may even imagine that an absolute presupposition discovered within these limits can be more or less safely ascribed to all human beings everywhere and always. In that case, mistaking the characteristics of a certain historical milieu for characteristics of mankind at large, they will leave out the metaphysical rubric on purpose, and present a piece of purely historical research as if it were a research into the universal nature of understanding. But their mistaking it for something else does not alter the fact that it is history.  

Collingwood concludes, therefore, that metaphysics has to be rethought so as to take into account its own historical dimension as required by the demands of the recently developed historical consciousness. He then proceeds to outline his proposal for the reform of metaphysics as the historical science of absolute presuppositions.

107 Ibid., p. 57.
E. Collingwood's Proposed Reform of Metaphysics as a Historical Science.

Kant, living at the time when the Newtonian Physics was making its impression in the field of science, sought to reform metaphysics using as his model the highly successful method of Newtonian physics as the paradigm of genuine knowledge. Collingwood, impressed by the methods of history, sought to bring metaphysics into line with what he thought to be the acme of human thought, namely historical reasoning.

Collingwood says that the historical character of metaphysics has not always been evident to metaphysicians, since

it is only within the last half-century that the aims and methods of history have defined themselves with the sort of precision that those of natural science achieved around about the year 1600. Until that happened people did not understand that history is a kind of thinking whereby cogent inferences about the past are drawn from interpretation of the evidence it has left behind. 108

So, according to Collingwood, what obscured the historical character of metaphysics was a misunderstanding regarding the nature of history itself, which, until recently, had been regarded as a scissors-and-paste affair, in which historians use ready made statements in documents regarded as 'authorities.' According to Collingwood, the correct historical method proceeds by using documents not as 'authorities'

but as evidence. And Metaphysics, Collingwood says, is an historical science, not in the sense of scissors-and-paste history of accepting testimony, but in the sense that it proceeds according to a method called metaphysical analysis, by which the metaphysician discovers what absolute presuppositions have been made in a certain piece of scientific work by using the records of that work as evidence.

But, history today is no longer a scissors-and-paste affair in which the historian repeats statements accepted on the testimony of authorities. Instead of this, the historian of today makes his own statements on his own authority according to what he finds the evidence in his possession to prove when he analyses it with a certain question in his mind.

Collingwood says that anyone understanding the nature of present day historical thought needs no further convincing that metaphysics is an historical science; all they need to understand is that statement itself in order to see that it is true. The dissatisfaction felt with the state of metaphysics, especially since Kant's time, "can be removed by taking seriously the pro-

109 See Chapter 1, above, pp. 51-54.
111 Ibid. See also Chapter 1, above, pp. 46 et seq.
position that metaphysics is an historical science."\textsuperscript{112} Collingwood says that "the peculiar perplexities and obscurities that have always been felt to surround the work of the metaphysician will disappear" if "it be understood both by metaphysicians and by their critics that metaphysics is the science of absolute presuppositions," and that "the distinction between metaphysics and pseudo-metaphysics be firmly grasped," and "it be understood that the business of metaphysics is to find out what absolute presuppositions have actually been made by various persons at various times in doing various pieces of scientific thinking," and "it be understood that if a certain absolute presupposition has been made on one occasion by one person this fact makes it probable that the same presupposition has been made by other persons having in general what may be called the same cultural equipment as himself...but improbable that it has been made by persons whose cultural equipment was noticeably different."\textsuperscript{113}

Collingwood adds, however, that probabilities are not history, for history requires proof and the only proof that someone has made a certain absolute presupposition is by analysis of the records of his thoughts.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p. 60.
Two results will follow if this is done in regard to the metaphysician's work. Perplexities and obscurities will disappear, and the scope of metaphysical enquiry will be enlarged.

As regards the removal of perplexities, Collingwood says that this will take place in four areas of consideration: the subject of metaphysics, its method, its form, and its effect on the mind of its readers.

Concerning the perplexities regarding the subject of metaphysics, that is, what metaphysics is about, Collingwood says that clarification is achieved here if we recognise that Aristotle both knew well enough that metaphysics was a science of absolute presuppositions and also that he is together responsible for the notion of metaphysics as the barren search for pure being, as if to suggest that the science of pure being and that of absolute presuppositions were one and the same. 114

With the removal of this perplexity there is also removed, as Collingwood says, the perplexity as to how the metaphysician should train himself to do his work. The Middle Ages thought it was in logic, the seventeenth century, physics, and the nineteenth century, psychology. But having clarified that the subject matter about which metaphysics is concerned is absolute presuppositions, it follows that the metaphysician is a special kind of historian, so that his training should be first in general historical education, secondly in special attention to the history

114 See Ibid., p. 61.
of science, and finally in concentration on such problems as the light which documents providing evidence about the history of science throw on the question as to what absolute presuppositions have been made.\footnote{See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 62. This seems to make metaphysics a species of the genus \textit{history}.}

The removal of perplexities as to what metaphysics is about results in removal of perplexities as to how it should proceed. Collingwood maintains that, with the rejection of Aristotle's science of pure being, metaphysics no longer continues to be what it was as a result, namely a blind groping for something that in fact is not there, which in effect is to be doing something futile in regard to an inaccessible object. But, when it is clear that metaphysical problems are historical problems, it is likewise clear that its methods are historical methods. The metaphysician is then a man who has to get at facts; he must be clear about the facts he wants to get at and the evidence he proposes to use to get at them. There is no excuse in the twentieth century for not knowing the methods of history.

Collingwood faces the objection that, if metaphysics is the science that investigates presuppositions, then it itself must refrain from making any itself. But he refutes this on the grounds that it is a science and, like any science, its questions arise from presuppositions, ultimately from absolute presuppositions.
If metaphysics is a science at all it is an attempt to think systematically, that is, by answering questions intelligently disposed in order. The answer to any question presupposes whatever the question presupposes. And because all science begins with a question...all science begins with a presupposition. Metaphysics therefore either has presuppositions or is no science. 116

To attempt a metaphysics devoid of presuppositions, says Collingwood, can only result in an unscientific tangle of confused thoughts which glories in its confusion. Furthermore, not only is metaphysics a science having quite definite presuppositions, but everyone knows what some of them are, for, as a historical science, it shares in the presuppositions of all history with which everyone nowadays has some acquaintance. 117

As to form, two perplexities can be removed. The first concerns completeness, whether there is a set of problems which constitute 'the' problems of metaphysics, and the second concerns the mutual implication of the various solutions to metaphysical problems. 118

The systematization of the problems of metaphysics is not perplexing when it is realized that "Metaphysics aware of itself as an historical science will be systematic in the sense in which all historical thought is systematic and in no other," for "(t)he historian's work is never finished; every historical subject, like the course of historical

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117 See Ibid., pp. 63-64.
118 See Ibid., p. 65.
events itself, is open at the end, and however hard you work at the end it is still open." Thus "the idea that these problems form a closed repertory, or even a repertory with the door ajar, is the purest illusion," for

(p)eople who are said to 'make history' solve the problems they find confronting them but create others to be solved, if not by themselves, by their survivors. People who write it, if they write well, solve problems too; but every problem solved gives rise to a new problem.120

But, if there is a formal structure uniting the various problems of metaphysics, so that the answer to one problem implicates the answer to subsequent problems, the question immediately arises: "Is metaphysics a 'deductive' science?"121

A definite 'No' in answer to this question removes many perplexities that otherwise arise from it since "metaphysics is an historical science" and "the things which it studies namely absolute presuppositions, are historical facts."122 Anyone reasonably well acquainted with historical work knows that there is no such thing as an isolated historical fact,

119 Ibid., p. 65.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 See Ibid., p. 66.
for every historical fact forms a constellation or complex with other historical facts. As a consequence, the question as to what absolute presupposition is made by such and such a piece of thinking cannot be answered by reference to a single absolute presupposition. It must be given with reference to a constellation of absolute presuppositions. 123

This immediately raises the question regarding the logical relations subsisting between the presuppositions making up this constellation. The relationships are not those of logical entailment in the deductive sense of antecedents necessitating consequents. The different presuppositions, constituting one complex piece of thinking, are all made at once, in that one same piece of thinking. Their relationship, one to another, is a relationship of befittingness, in the same sense as when we are able to say that one item of clothing "goes with" another item.

The constellation, complex though it is, is still a single fact. The different presuppositions composing it are all made at once, in one and the same piece of thinking. They are not like a set of carpenter's tools, of which the carpenter uses one at a time; they are like a suit of clothes, of which every part is worn simultaneously with all the rest. That is to say that, since they are all suppositions, each must be consupponible with all the others; that is, it must be logically possible for a person who supposes any one of them to suppose concurrently all the rest. 124

123 See Ibid., p. 66.

124 Ibid., p. 66. L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 237, comments: "...instead of pointing out that the rules governing the relations among presuppositions are derived
Not only is the complex constellation of absolute presuppositions a single historical fact, but any constituent absolute presupposition within the constellation is also a single historical fact which the metaphysician is able to discover in the same way that any historian discovers any historical fact, by interpretation of the evidence. No single fact is deducible, a priori, from the constellation of which it is a constituent, it has to be uncovered by the historical method of interpreting facts from historical evidence.

If a given person in a given piece of thinking makes the absolute presuppositions AP₁, AP₂, AP₃, AP₄,..., each of these is a genuinely independent presupposition which can no more be deduced from the rest than waistcoat can be deduced from trousers or from trousers and coat together.¹²⁵

Collingwood says that the awareness of metaphysics as an historical science banishes once for all the hope of making it quasi deductive or mathematical. Thus, when a metaphysician sets himself to discuss the absolute presuppositions of the thought of his own time, the literary form in which he expresses his thought cannot be that of a continuous argument from point to point by way of quasi-mathematical demonstration, such as is not from propositional but from dialectical logic, Collingwood attempts, in his effort to avoid using the language of dialectical logic, to communicate the meaning of dialectical logic by means of a neutral language. He therefore declares that presuppositions are not related as parts of a deductive system but instead constitute a "constellation." The latter however is simply a new way of characterizing what has hitherto been described as a dialectical system. Finally, he declares, the logical relation holding among presuppositions making up a constellation is one of consupponibility:

found in the Ethics of Spinoza. It must be in the form of a catalogue raisonné, such as is found in the fourth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, or in the Quaestiones of a mediaeval metaphysician. 126

Furthermore, metaphysics aware of itself as an historical science will give up the idea of founding 'schools' or establishing doctrines.

When I accept what Spinoza says on this subject (that Nature is the same as God) I am no more going Spinozist in a war of metaphysical sects than I am going Tacitean in a war of historical sects when I accept Tacitus's statement that Agricola conquered southern and central Scotland. What I am doing in either case is to say: 'Here is a statement as to certain facts made by a contemporary writer. The evidence at my disposal proves that it is true.'127

Thus, to say today that 'all events have causes' would not be the assertion of a metaphysical doctrine, but a blunder, the mistake of saying that an absolute presupposition is being made when in fact it is not being made.

The discovery that metaphysics is a historical science, concerned with the absolute presuppositions of a period, greatly enlarges its scope of enquiry, according to Collingwood. Ignorance of this has led metaphysicians to confine their attention to the absolute presuppositions of the present, which, in fact, is not really a present but a relatively

126 See Ibid., pp. 67-68.

127 Ibid., p. 69.
recent past, whereas the so-called past is a more remote past. Realisation of the historical nature of the enquiry opens it up to the study of presuppositions not only of the so-called present, our immediate past, but of the more or less remote past, and to the study of the transition effected when the presuppositions of one period gave way, by historical change, to those of a succeeding period. Metaphysics then becomes the history of the absolute presuppositions made throughout the various periods of history. This, then, is an amplification of its scope of enquiry, it not now being restricted to the (so-called) present absolute presuppositions. Aristotle's metaphysics was confined to the absolute presuppositions of the Greek science of the 4th century BC and that of St. Thomas was confined to those of the central Middle Ages and that of Spinoza to those of European Science of the 17th century. 128

As a result, the metaphysician, instead of having before him only one constellation of absolute presuppositions, has before him an infinite number of them, and so has many worlds to conquer. He can study the presuppositions of European science at any phase of its history for which he has evidence. He can also study the absolute presuppositions of Arabic, Hindu or Chinese science in whatsoever phase he is able to find

128 See Ibid., pp. 70-71.
historical evidence for them. He can study the presuppositions of primitives and prehistoric peoples. All these belong not merely to an historical background of his work but to his own proper work itself, once the historical character of his science is revealed.129

When he has acquired knowledge about several different constellations of absolute presuppositions the metaphysician can begin to make comparisons. This study will convince the metaphysician that there are no eternal or crucial problems. It will get him out of the parish pump provincialism of thinking that the metaphysical problems of his own generation are those which all metaphysicians everywhere worried about and that they are the only ones there are to be worried about now or in the past or the future. He will then realize that different sets of absolute presuppositions correspond not only to differences in the structure of scientific thought but also to differences in the entire fabric of civilization.130

The metaphysician, when he uncovers the presuppositions of this or that period, must not think that they are something static which can be comparatively studied merely by noting likeness and differences. What is essential about phases of history is that each dynamically gives place to

129 See Ibid., p. 71.
130 See Ibid., pp. 72-73.
the succeeding, not by the violence of war from without or revolution from within, but simply because "each of them while it lives is working at turning itself into the next." Thus:

To trace the process by which one historical phase turns into the next is the business of every historian who concerns himself with that phase. The metaphysician's business therefore, when he has identified several different constellations of absolute presuppositions, is not only to study their likenesses and unlikenesses but also to find out on what occasions and by what processes one of them has turned into another. Collingwood refers to this as "the only legitimate (that is, historical) way in which he, or anybody else, can answer the question 'why did such and such people at such and such a time make such and such absolute presuppositions'?" He adds that that question, like all questions in metaphysics, is either a historical question or a nonsense question.

It is nonsense question if the answer it expects is one which identifies the cause of the historical fact in question with something outside history, like geographical or climatic environment of that fact or the psycho-physical characteristics of the human beings concerned in it. It is a significant question if it expects an answer in the form: 'Because they or the predecessors from whom they inherited their civilization had previously made such and such a different set of absolute presuppositions, and because such and such a process or change converted the one set into the other.' If any one is dissatisfied with this kind of answer his dissatisfaction shows that the

131 Ibid., p. 73.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
question, as he was asking it, was a nonsense question. 134

Collingwood adds that it is not enough to know that each phase in the dynamics of history is converted into the next but that it is further necessary to know the more intimate relation between one phase and the next according to which one phase, by reason of an unstable equilibrium within itself, had in itself the seeds of change, and indeed of that particular change which in fact took place. The fabric of any period is always under a strain. The world studied by history is one wherein tout passe, tout lasse, tout casse, and it is an important part of the historian's work to analyse the internal strains to which a given constellation of historical facts is subjected, and the means by which it takes up these strains and prevents them from breaking it to pieces. Collingwood criticises Gibbon for lack of sensitivity to the internal strains of the periods about which he writes, but lauds Hegel, because, for Hegel, historical study was primarily a study of such internal strains, thereby opening the way to Marx's brilliant feat of analysing 19th century economic society in terms of its internal strains. He criticises Spengler for historicising as if piecing together a jigsaw puzzle, with every piece placidly fitting together into the picture. Collingwood says that where there is no strain there is no history. A civilization works itself out by a dynamic logic,

134 Ibid., pp. 73-74.
in which different and at first sight incompatible formulae somehow contrive a precarious coexistence; one dominant here, another there; the recessive formula never ceasing to operate, but functioning as a kind of minority report which, though the superficial historian may ignore it, serves to a more acute eye as evidence of tendencies actually existing which may have been dominant in the past and may be dominant in the future. 135

The mediocre historian may in his study neglect these strains which a recessive element presents and the peculiar quality which it imparts to the whole, even though he may have sensitive enough feelings to detect it. But the man of action cannot neglect them, for his life may depend on his ability to see where they are and to correctly judge their strength. Cortez destroyed Montezuma not merely using gunpowder but using it to reinforce the strains already present and tending to break up Montezuma's power. 136

This same characteristic of internal stress and strain will be found in any constellation of absolute presuppositions, and a metaphysician with a general grounding in history will know to look for it.

He will expect the various presuppositions he is studying to be consupposable only under pressure, the constellation being subject to certain strains and kept together by dint of a certain compromise of mutual toleration having behind it a motive like that which causes parties to unite in the face of an enemy. 137

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135 Ibid., p. 75.
136 See Ibid., pp. 75-76.
137 Ibid., p. 76.
Collingwood adds that this is why the conception of metaphysics as a deductive science, the presenting of the constellation of absolute presuppositions as a strainless structure like a body of propositions in mathematics, is a pernicious error, because mathematical propositions are not historical propositions, whereas those of metaphysics are.  

A reformed metaphysics will conceive any given constellation of absolute propositions (sic) as having in its structure not the simplicity and calm that characterize the subject matter of mathematics but the intricacy and restlessness that characterize the subject matter, say, of legal or constitutional history.  

Collingwood concludes by adding that the only way that metaphysics can become a science is by becoming more completely and consciously what in fact it has always been, namely an historical science. He maintains that its much needed reform can only be brought about "by its adoption of principles and methods which are now common form among historians." By achieving such a reform, Collingwood feels that metaphysics will be able to withstand all the criticisms previously brought against it, which criticisms were justified by defects in its own practice.

138 See Ibid., pp. 76-77.
139 Ibid., p. 77.
140 Ibid.
141 See Ibid.
F. Presuppositions as Beliefs.

In his Ruskin's Centenary address, Collingwood referred to the fundamental principles of a man's philosophy as "uncontrovertible", as something "he assumes as true in all his thinking and acting," "the centre from which all his activities radiate" and "to which everything a man does is attached." In the Essay on Metaphysics, Collingwood identifies the absolute presuppositions with the religious beliefs of individuals and civilizations which it is the business of institutions to perpetuate.

In any civilization it is man's religious institutions that refresh in him from time to time the will...to retain the presuppositions by whose aid he reduces such experience as he enjoys to such science as he can compass; and it is by dint of these same religious institutions that he transmits these same presuppositions to his children.

Religion is concerned with expressing these presuppositions as basic convictions according to which we regulate our behaviour, whereas science is concerned to interpret and systematize our experience in terms of these general convictions which basically predetermine our view of the world.

...if science is 'experience' interpreted in the light of our general convictions as to the nature of

142 See "Ruskin's Philosophy" in Alan Donagan's R.G. Collingwood's Essays in the Philosophy of Art, p. 10.

the world, religion is what expresses these convictions in themselves and for their own sake and hands them on from generation to generation and it does this irrespectively of whether we know by means of metaphysical analysis what these convictions are.144

This holding firm by personal convictions, as an act of religious faith, to our absolute presuppositions is at the same time the belief of some attribute regarding God.

The act by which we hold such presuppositions...is religious faith; and God is that in which we believe by faith; therefore all our absolute presuppositions must be presuppositions in holding which we believe something about God.145

This, according to Collingwood, is why Aristotle's Metaphysics is alternatively called Theology. "The ordinary name for that which is

144 Ibid., p. 198. This, however, seems to involve a contradiction. In Speculum Mentis, Collingwood says (p. 110) that "Art asserts nothing; and truth as such is matter of assertion." (p. 113) "The point at which a child begins to ask whether stories are true, and passes through the crisis of learning to disbelieve in fairies, ...indicates the emergence of religion from art." (p. 114) "...the assertion is the transcendency of this monadism (of art), for to make any given assertion is to commit oneself to the denial of whatever contradicts it. Religion is essentially assertion, belief." (p. 115) "...religion by its very nature is pledged to selectiveness, to a discrimination between the utterances of the spirit, to a dualism between true vision and false vision." This means that what religion asserts is asserted as true. But Collingwood has insisted that truth and falsity do not apply to absolute presuppositions. The difficulty could be averted by saying that the error of religion is to assert as a proposition what is really a presupposition. But, then, why need institutions to perpetuate error? To express them as convictions without asserting them as true seems to involve a contradiction, which, I think, is a felt difficulty throughout Collingwood's whole discussion of absolute presuppositions.

the logical ground of everything else is God."\textsuperscript{146} And Collingwood explains that regarding Anselm's argument that 'God exists' "what it proves is not that because our idea of God is an idea of \textit{id quo maius cogitari nequit} therefore God exists, but that because our idea of God is an idea of \textit{id quo maius cogitari nequit} we stand committed to belief in God's existence."\textsuperscript{147} "That God exists is not a proposition, it is a presupposition,"\textsuperscript{148} and it is a presupposition upon which, since Aristotle, natural science depends.\textsuperscript{149} The Patristic writers, according to Collingwood, saw that the pagan world was collapsing due to its failure to keep alive its own fundamental convictions. Their remedy was a new analysis and formulation of these basic convictions codified in what they called the 'Catholic Faith'.\textsuperscript{150}

The presuppositions that go to make up this 'Catholic Faith' preserved for many centuries by the religious institutions of Christendom, have as a matter of historical fact been the main or fundamental presuppositions of natural science ever since. They have never been its only absolute presuppositions; there have always been others and these others have to some extent differed at different times. But from the fifth century down to the present day all these differences have played their changing parts against a background that has re-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 190.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Ibid., p. 188.
\item \textsuperscript{149} See Ibid., p. 206; also pp. 210-214.
\item \textsuperscript{150} See Ibid., p. 225.
\end{itemize}
mained unchanged: the constellation of absolute presuppositions originally sketched by Aristotle, and described more accurately, seven or eight centuries later, by the Patristic writers under the name of the 'Catholic Faith.'

Faith or belief is the commitment to fundamental convictions which will give meaning to our experience and which will constitute us as having a world view, a standpoint from which an ordered perspective can be had. Experience is the consequence of acting according to our basic convictions or presuppositions. Scientific experience is the result of thinking systematically according to any given set of presuppositions. Metaphysics is the act of thinking systematically about what presuppositions are actually in use.

Absolute presuppositions are historico-culturally conditioned a priori principles of thinking coherently. Kant discovered by analysis what he thought were the permanent immutable and eternal principles of science, conceiving mind as a fixed universal nature. But, they were no more permanent than the presuppositions of Newtonian, eighteenth century

151 Ibid., p. 227.
physics. An analysis of physics today, or of that of the Renaissance or that of Aristotle would give a different set. The mind's essence is not that of a static substance, but is dynamic and historical so that its determining categories have their own history, and are therefore related as members of a dialectical scale of forms.

...(absolute presuppositions) are a special kind of synthetic a priori. They derive from the categories of mind, and are entailed by the statement that mind exists. But since the essence of mind is historicity, each category has its own history which takes the form not of a random sequence but of a progressive or serial scale of forms.157

G. Truth and Falsity of Absolute Presuppositions.

Collingwood has expressed in his Essay on Metaphysics that truth and falsity do not apply to absolute presuppositions.158 But one of his principal commentators, Lionel Rubinoff, maintains that Collingwood is simply denying that they possess the truth or falsity of empirical verifiability. According to Rubinoff, Collingwood is arguing against A.J. Ayer, for whom truth consists in empirical verifiability, and that he (Collingwood) is using a neutral (rather than dialectic) language, and, instead of arguing in terms of the truth and falsity of absolute presuppo-

157 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 286.
158 See his Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 28-29 and especially pp. 32-33. See also, above, this chapter, pp.
sitions as they are serially related as a scale of forms in an overlap of classes, he takes his stand on Ayer's notion of truth as equivalent to verifiability and simply denies that they are true or false, that is, subject to an empirical verification process, since, in fact, they are prerequisites of that verifiability process itself. Rubinoff maintains that Collingwood's way of expressing himself is "a misleading consequence of his obsession with the need to cure positivism of its anti-metaphysical tendencies," and, more specifically, a consequence of Collingwood's growing concern to combat "The Elimination of Metaphysics", of Ayer's Language Truth and Logic (1936), whose "thesis is that, since metaphysical statements are neither tautologies nor empirical hypotheses subject to empirical verification, they are meaningless." Since we have here a case of a major commentator interpreting Collingwood in a sense quite other than that which Collingwood's own texts would seem to imply, it is necessary to examine Rubinoff's position on this point. Rubinoff maintains that the real point of Collingwood's discussion is to demonstrate that there are different ways of evaluating and justifying truth and falsity, but that the method of verification which is the only one admitted by the positivists, together with its implied propo-

159 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 234.

160 See Ibid., p. 241.
sitional logic, is inappropriate to the work of metaphysics in the same way that the methods of the natural sciences are inappropriate to history. 161

Rubinoff argues that metaphysics, like history, is a work of the a priori imagination, and that since this is a critical activity it seeks to establish not only what is the case but also whether it is true. The truth appropriate to an absolute presupposition is its consupponability, without introducing strain into the constellation, with other presuppositions, and its degree of truth or falsity is to be reckoned according to the integrity it maintains on the scale of forms to which it belongs. 162

Rubinoff states his position thus:

To show that a presupposition is indispensable is equivalent to showing that it is true only because its indispensability has survived the critique through which it has been elicited. The aim of such a critique is to show that it is consupponible with a variety of other presuppositions which together define the structure of a given form of life - in which case it would be better to speak of the "truthfulness" rather than truth of a presupposition. Truth is a property which belongs only to the whole, but a presupposition is "truthful" to the extent to which it contributes to the integrity of the whole - in the sense in which each form on a scale maintains the integrity of the whole scale to which it belongs. And since a scale may be internally consistent with itself and inconsistent with respect to other scales the very same presupposition may be "truthful" with respect to its place on the scale to which it most immediately belongs and false

161 See Ibid., p. 234.

162 See Ibid., pp. 234-235.
with respect to an entirely different scale. The purpose of metaphysics is therefore to expose both the implicit truthfulness (or falseness) of a presupposition with respect to its immediate form of life and its implicit falseness (or truthfulness) with respect to the world of knowledge as a whole.

The real point of the essay, then, is not simply to deny that absolute presuppositions are truth functional; its more important purpose is to outline the method whereby absolute presuppositions can be elicited and evaluated. The "reform of metaphysics" does not lie in banishing truth from the realm of presuppositions by means of a quibble; it lies rather in the development of a methodology which respects the notion of truth as a scale of forms. And this amounts virtually to an extension of the doctrines of An Essay on Philosophical Method to the problem of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{163}

Thus "instead of trying to explain the real basis of his new dialectical logic, which would have meant representing some metaphysical statements as a special type of synthetic \textit{a priori}, he (Collingwood) chose to emphasize only those statements that report historical facts about what so-and-so absolutely presupposed."\textsuperscript{164} But "...metaphysics, in addition to being a descriptive-historical science, is also an activity through which absolute presuppositions are critically evaluated according to the criteria of dialectical logic; in which case they are to be regarded as a special type of the class of synthetic \textit{a priori} statements."\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 235.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., pp. 245-246.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., p. 245.
Rubinoff maintains that Collingwood's doctrine of absolute presuppositions, with its implied rejection of eternal problems, is but part of the wider doctrine of the concrete universal. He rejects the historicist charges of Knox, who regards Collingwood's Essay as a total absorption of philosophy into history without remainder. According to Rubinoff, this identification of philosophy and history, affirmed by Collingwood since his earliest work, Religion and Philosophy, is to be understood in terms of the rapprochement of the dialectical logic of the overlap of classes in a scale of forms in a concrete universal.

...the rejection of the realist distinction between philosophy and history is a direct implication of the rapprochement of Speculum Mentis: thus committing myself to the further doctrine that so far as there is any implied identity of philosophy and history in the Essay it ought to be understood according to the terms of the same rapprochement. As we have seen, Collingwood himself declares in the Autobiography that the theory of presuppositions first expounded in "Truth and Contradiction" was part of a general attempt to develop an alternative logic to the propositional logic of realism. If, as I have already suggested, this alternative logic is the dialectical logic of Speculum Mentis and An Essay on Philosophical Method, then the identity of philosophy and history which is implied by the theory of presuppositions must be what follows from the rapprochement between philosophy and history which it is the purpose of dialectical logic to achieve.167

166 See Ibid., pp. 238-241. Knox's charges are accepted by Alan Donagan; see Donagan's The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, p. 12 "Knox's demonstration that between 1936 and 1938 Collingwood radically changed his mind about the relation of philosophy to history must be the foundation of any interpretation of his later works."

167 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood the the Reform of Meta-
Granted that absolute presuppositions are appropriately handled only by dialectical logic, Rubinoff says that certain things can be said about them.

Firstly, they are subject to two sorts of criteria, one dealing with meaning, the other dealing with truth.

As regards meaning, a statement is meaningful in one or another of two ways, either as the appropriate answer to a given question, in which case it is propositionally meaningful, or as logically presupposed as a sine qua non condition of the intelligibility of the question and answer complex as a whole.

In other words, there are some statements which are concerned with one's overall world view to which everything that is said and done is referred (either explicitly or implicitly) in regard to its meaningfulness. Absolute presuppositions, and the constellational whole which they form, constitute a horizon of meaning usually referred to as one's world view. This constellation of basic commitments is what is ultimately responsible for one's world being recognizable as a world, as a whole of meaning. The "Map of Knowledge" which Collingwood draws in his Speculum Mentis ends by presenting us with the external world as the mind's reflection of itself.

The mind is not one among a number of objects of knowledge...it is what is really known in the ostensible knowing of any object whatever...(but) it can only know itself through the mediation of an external world, know that what it sees in the external world is its own re-
flection. 168

(The true object (of the mind)...is the mind itself. And thus the external world is not a veil between it and its object, but a picture of itself, drawn to aid its own self vision; a picture which as it grows firmer and harder, takes surface and polish and steadiness, becomes the mirror of the mind; and all the detail in it is seen by the mind to be the reflection of its own face. 169

But, since the mind is what it does, the mind is nothing other than this construction of a world in which it deploys itself. Absolute presuppositions thus seem to be nothing other than the mind itself precisely as it is determinative of itself through the determination of its world which it determines in the very determination of its own view of the world. The absolute presuppositions thus seem to be the mind itself if we view the mind as possessing, from within its own resources, certain structural determinations which will function as the armature, so to speak, upon which the mind will weave its lived experience in the rational process of explanation. 170

169 Ibid., p. 313.
170 This conception of Collingwood's absolute presuppositions is not without its difficulties, however. There seems to be an internal tension within the theory between a Kantian type of dualism and a dialectical monism. If, as Rubinoff says (R.G. Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 286), Collingwood's absolute presuppositions "are a special kind of synthetic a priori... (which) derive from the categories of the mind," notwithstanding that they are admitted to be historically conditioned, their a priori character seems to set them apart from experience. On the other hand, identity of form and content is a fundamental tenet of dialectical thinking which does not lend itself readily to being understood in terms of an a priori (form) and a posteriori (ex-
This conception of absolute presuppositions as world view determinants finds a surprising reechoing in John Wild's article "Being, Meaning and the World,"¹⁷¹ in which Wild maintains that the world horizon is wider than that of being,¹⁷² that certain meanings of being presuppose that of a world view,¹⁷³ and that

being is not necessarily found with meaning, as the major streams of Western thought, and also Heidegger, have supposed. Contrary to these teachings, they may fall apart, and they have fallen apart in the world of our time.¹⁷⁴

This statement reflects Collingwood's strains in the constellation of meaning-giving absolute presuppositions, whose rupture and realignment (subsequent consupponability) results in the breakdown of a definite culture and its world view with the subsequent rise of a new culture and new world view in which a consistent whole is recognizable periential content) dichotomy. The above explanation takes its point of view from the dialectical identity of form and content and sees the mind's determinants as the mind itself so determined allowing for the further conception of the mind experienced as further determinable. It is the same mind (which is what it does) which, looked at one way is determined as regards how it thinks, looked at in another way it is subject to modification and further determinability. This tension within Collingwood's thinking between a sort of Kantian dualism and idealist, dialectical monism, already noted at the beginning of this chapter, will have to be faced in its own right later in the chapter; see below, pp. 331 et seq.

¹⁷² See Ibid., pp. 419-421.
¹⁷³ See Ibid., pp. 421-426.
¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 427.
and more or less provides for a harmonious way of life and thinking.

Wild further maintains that "(w)e are more concerned with being than with the world of meaning. So we seem to have closed ourselves off from the wonderful." This seems to echo Sartre's repugnance when faced with the actuality of meaningless being.

Wild then ruminates in a self-interrogating fashion as follows:

What do we feel when, after careful manoeuvering through the wreckage, a gleam of possible meaning breaks through the clouds and we gain a brief glimpse of the elements, the waves and the sea and the clouds all together? In this sudden dawn of a possible meaning, the disjointed becomes joined on an all encompassing ground, and the utterly alien now becomes strange. Is this not the feeling of thauma, or, as we say wonder with which philosophy begins? 176

If we read questioning for wonder and constellation of absolute presuppositions of Wild's world horizon of meaning, we seem to have Collingwood's position on absolute presuppositions as this is interpreted by Rubinoff. 177 Being, for Wild, seems to refer to experienced actuality, and meaning seems to refer to what is traditionally called essence. If I understand him rightly, for Collingwood, being refers to the totality of all that is, expressed by the formula 'identity in difference.' It is experience precisely as this is the experience of mind systematically organizing its experience into a rational totality. The organized totality

175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 See L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, pp. 249-250.
in the world of actual experience is possible only through the world view constituted by the constellation of absolute presuppositions, which is logically prior to the mind's organization of experience.

The second criterion to which, according to Rubinoff, a presupposition is subject is that of truthfulness, since every presupposition is part of a question and answer complex which occupies a place on a dialectical scale of overlapping forms. The theory of truth according to which absolute presuppositions are evaluated is more accurately a dialectical history of errors, according to which truth is the product of error proceeding and developing by means of contradiction, paradox and ambiguity, and arrangeable on a scale of forms in which they are related as opposite coincidents, whereas if taken singly, as propositional logic would take them, absolutely in themselves, they would be regarded as incompatible opposites. There would be no progress if successive absolute presuppositions did not overlap on a dialectically evolving scale of forms, for progress is possible only inasmuch as each succeeding age can reflect on the absolute presuppositions of its predecessors which formed the basis of the question-and-answer complex characteristic of their age. This means being able to answer the question as to how these absolute presuppositions came to be presupposed in the first place, which question is answerable in terms of the dynamic strains in the preceding constellation of absolute presuppositions of which the consequent absolute presuppositions are the resultant equilibrium state. To understand one's own age,
therefore, requires that one become the historian of one's past. History then becomes an essential ingredient in the very constitution of the described facts and not merely the distanced observation and recording of them. Metaphysics as the historical specialization in the analysis of absolute presuppositions is therefore vital to the preservation and perpetuation of culture and civilization, for the world, in the sense in which we can speak of it as a cultural determinant (as when we speak of the Greek or Roman or Renaissance world), is determined by its absolute presuppositions, or what the people of that age were basically committed to as their fundamental source of meaningful activity. The survival of a culture or civilization therefore requires institutional protection and propagation of its foundations, the absolute presuppositions which are the very catalytic agents by which the mind converts experience into science and civilization.  

Rubinoff further says that Collingwood's argument in the Autobiography, that the history of all thought, including metaphysics, can be approached through the logic of question and answer, implies that the question and answer complexes, which result from the application of the question and answer process to the history of thought, assume the intelligible pattern of a dialectical scale of forms. Rubinoff illustrates

178 See Ibid., p. 249.

179 See Ibid., p. 287.
this from Collingwood’s account of the rise of natural science in Greece as this is presented by Collingwood in his *Idea of Nature* and *An Essay on Metaphysics*.

Natural science, as practised by the Greeks, emerged from a context which was dominated by the attitude of magic. Suppose we were to compare the witch doctor’s account of nature with that of the Ionian philosophers. A realist would no doubt regard each as a different answer to the same question, What is nature? What is more, he would declare that in answering this question the Greeks were right and the witch doctors wrong. According to the logic of question and answer, however, the Greeks and the witch doctors were not really competing for the same prize; if we take into account the fact that every question rests on certain presuppositions we will become aware of hitherto unnoticed differences between the questions of magic and the questions of Ionian natural philosophy. Indeed, the logic of question and answer may be regarded as an effective antidote to the historical myopia of realism. For example, when the witch doctor asks, What is nature? (i.e., Why do things happen as they do?) he is presupposing absolutely ‘that all things are full of Gods’ (an attitude which for the sake of convenience I shall call ‘polytheistic animism’). His answer therefore takes a mythopoeic form while his actions take the form of magic. Given his presuppositions, his answer is the ‘right’ one in the sense that it is the only appropriate response to the question he is asking.180

These answers, which are mutually conflicting if considered (as the realists consider them) as propositions meaningful in themselves, and as different answers to the same question, are all right answers if understood in relation to the mentality dominated by different absolute presuppositions. Nevertheless, Rubinoff carefully points out that if the

The question-answer complex is placed in dialectical relation with other succeeding complexes, then the answers are wrong because, by virtue of such a complex in which the answers are meaningful (and right) in accordance with the absolute presuppositions vivifying that complex, those who are committed to such a complex are restricted in the questions they can put to their experience, and the answers which they can expect from it. But dialectical logic regards their presupposition in the first place as necessary to the manifestation of their falsity, which manifestation appears in lived experience when the explanation of that experience in accordance with those presuppositions is inadequate to the experience.

The magical world view of the witch doctor sooner or later comes up against experiences which it cannot handle and which demand a new attitude superseding the superstitious attitude of magic.  

The strains experienced through thinking in the context of such absolute presuppositions led to the transformation of the religious consciousness from polytheism to monotheism with a corresponding change of presuppositions and a corresponding change of world view. Instead of presupposing that all things are full of gods, and adopting a magical attitude to the world, the new outlook is determined by presupposing (1) that there are natural things (Idea of Nature, p. 29), (2) that natural

things make up one natural world (Ibid., p. 29), and (3) that all natural things in common are made up of a single material substance. (Ibid., p. 30). Rubinoff says that all this is implicit in the religious belief which expresses that 'God exists'.

In Speculum Mentis religion was shown to have its ground in the realization that the explicitly pluralistic monadology of art implicitly presupposes the monistic principle which lies at the basis of science. In the Essay on Metaphysics, this phenomenological transition is exemplified in the historical transition from the aesthetic religion of polytheism to the more "religious" religion of monism, which by virtue of its monistic character contains within it the seeds of science. Thales' achievement is therefore represented as one of the implications of the transition from a polytheistic to a monotheistic religious consciousness. And, as in Speculum Mentis, this transition is regarded as a progress from error to truth.

In declaring that the scientific world view supersedes the religious world view (which in turn has superseded the aesthetic) we are recognizing that science at the same time implicitly sums up the truth of the more primitive standpoints. From the magical world view is retained the wondering attitude of supposal and questioning; from the religious world view is retained not only the notion of unity but the attitude of faith with which the condition sine qua non of all science must ultimately be embraced. Magic, science, and religion, then, are not just different answers to different questions, they are, at the same time, internally related forms on an overlapping scale.

Rubinoff follows with a lengthy exposition as to how the same dialectical development took place within the history of science itself.

182 See Ibid.,

183 Ibid., p. 254.
Regarding the transition from Thales to Pythagoras he says:

The transition from Thales to Pythagoras is a dialectical transition from one set of presuppositions to another: a transition which both exposes the absurdity of Thales' presuppositions and preserves their truth. It was in other words, a rational (i.e., dialectical) transition in which a genuine progress through error can be detected. Indeed, it is only because the presuppositions underlying the question-and-answer complexes which make up the history of thought are so related that there can be historical progress at all.184

Rubinoff says that the historian in his critical function acts as a catalyst of the historical process, and brings about progress by means of his critical rejection of presuppositions and, consequently, of the complex of questions and answers whose presuppositions they are. This critical rejection of presuppositions comprises two functions, first a rejection of presuppositions arrived at irrationally, that is, by a dogmatic fixation which refuses the critical examination and by prejudices. Secondly there is critical rejection of presuppositions hitherto fruitful in a previous standpoint, but no longer adequate to present problems which they themselves have precipitated. Such rejected presuppositions are false, not as failing to conform to an abstract criterion of truth but for the historical reason that they are necessary forms of error on a developing scale of truth.185 It is in this way that past philosophical systems are accepted, rejected or modified, inasmuch as their presuppositions are

184 Ibid., pp. 255-256.
185 See Ibid., p. 260.
rated true or false through criticism operating by dialectically ordering them on a scale of forms. Rubinoff cites Collingwood's criticism of Aristotle in his Essay on Metaphysics as a good example of the evaluation of absolute presuppositions as regards their truth or falsity. 186

Rubinoff's conclusion regarding Collingwood's treatment of absolute presuppositions in his Essay is as follows:

Collingwood himself declares that precisely the same considerations which led him to his theory of the history of philosophy led him also to his view of the nature of metaphysics. I have already argued that the former - which Collingwood explicitly regards as an application of the logic of question and answer (A,58) - rests upon the doctrine of the concrete universal and constitutes, therefore, a dialectical history of errors. But if the logic of question and answer functions for metaphysics as it does for the history of philosophy, then my contention, based on the foregoing examples, that metaphysics is an application of the logic of question and answer to the organization of the history of absolute presuppositions into a scale of forms (or concrete universal), is given further support. 187

Rubinoff adds that, for Collingwood, metaphysics as the historical science of absolute presuppositions of questioning, may be regarded as a dialectical history of errors, and, as such, rests on two related sets of concepts. The first is the concept of logical efficacy, according to which presuppositions are judged to be 'right' but not judged to be 'true or false'. The second is the concept of historical change,

186 See Ibid.

187 Ibid., pp. 261-262.
according to which absolute presuppositions are aligned on a scale of
forms in which "(a) one set of presuppositions is replaced by another and
(b) there is exhibited in this change a gradual progress towards truth",\textsuperscript{188}
from which they are rated true or false.

The attitude to error of realist propositional thinking and of
dialectical thinking is thus quite opposite. Realist propositional logic
understands error in an absolute sense, and it therefore is to be detected
for the purpose of rejecting it. But in dialectical logic, error is
functional. It is a catalyst of the mind in forging out the truth, and
therefore a necessary means to the truth. The error of a given form on
a dialectical scale of forms is systematically related to the form which,
in relation to it, is seen to be true. In dialectical logic, therefore,
rightness and falseness can coexist as regards any particular proposition.

The same considerations apply to the dialectic of
standpoints in Speculum Mentis. Each standpoint is 'right'
and yet 'false'. For it is only by committing the errors
from which the differentiae of the separate standpoints
derive, that the abstract construction of art, religion, science, and history come into existence at all. Thus
Collingwood could easily have asserted, about the forms
of experience in general...that art looks at reality from
the point of view of the imagination; religion from the
point of view of faith; science from the point of view
of the abstract concept; history from the point of view
of the concrete fact. There is no point in asking which
is the 'right' point of view. Each is the only one possible
for the person who adopts it.\textsuperscript{189}

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., p. 264.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p. 267.
Collingwood's metaphysical analysis, which according to Rubinoff is modelled on Kant's transcendental analytic, and thus a regressive analysis into the conditions of scientific thought, is identified with history. For Kant, the mind's determining forms belong to the permanent and unchanging structure of the human mind. For Collingwood, the absolute determinants which condition all our thinking are a priori structures which are themselves subjected to historical change in accordace with Collingwood's position and the being of mind is historical, in contrast to the being of nature which is cyclical and repetitive.

For Kant the behaviour of mind derives from a permanent and unchanging structure and the principles derived from this structure are eternal truths. For Collingwood, the a priori is itself a product of historical change. Transcendental analytics is therefore history. The presuppositions according to which we think and to which we are (under certain conditions) obliged to commit ourselves, are likewise subject to historical change. In other words, the very a priori criteria according to which the objectivity of historical metaphysics is guaranteed are themselves not only historically grounded but historically relative.190

Rubinoff reconciles the a priori and transcendental character of the absolute presuppositions with their historical relativity by distinguishing the dialectical sense of these terms from that of propositional logic. They are the categories of the mind whose essence is historical, so that its categories are serially ordered according to a

190 Ibid., p. 286.
dynamically evolving scale of forms.

Their meaning and truth do not depend simply upon their correspondence with objectively existing facts. To apprehend the truth of such principles is not like apprehending the truth of the axioms and definitions of geometry. They are not analytic. Nor are they purely synthetic, being wholly derived from, and verifiable only by means of, experience. They are, as I have already suggested, a special kind of synthetic a priori. They derive from the categories of mind, and are entailed by the statement that mind exists. But, since the essence of mind is historicity, each category has its own history which takes the form not of a random sequence but of a progressive or serial scale of forms.\footnote{Ibid.}

The \textit{a priori} and transcendental character of absolute presuppositions must therefore be understood in terms of mind as a concrete universal and the existence of the mind as identical with its action.

Thus the essential meaning of the statement, Mind exists, changes as the scale develops. The statement, "All thought is for the sake of action," for example, which is an absolute presupposition of experience in general, can only be understood in terms of a concrete universal whose meaning and truth value, although it changes from age to age, is nevertheless connected in a coherent system. For this reason, the history of past thought is never final. Each generation must reconstruct the past for itself, and in so doing, reveal to itself the a priori principles which lie at the basis of experience.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 286-287.}

Becoming conscious of the logical inconsistency, that is, unconscupponability, of absolute presuppositions either results in, or is indicated by, corresponding felt strains in lived experience. The dialectic between presuppositions as implicated in lived experience and
as explicitated by thought gives rise to strains which constitute the
dialectical driving force of history.

Becoming conscious of the principles which are
implicit in experience leads in some cases to a
recognition that there is a basic inconsistency between
the implicit presuppositions of an experience and its
explicit presuppositions. The result is that the latter
are replaced by the former. Such changes are neither
random nor irrational. They are, on the contrary,
progressive, having the characteristics of a scale of
forms. The idea of the past is therefore a scale of
forms which takes shape in the course of the mind's own
discovery of itself. It is an innate idea which is at
once both the source of the activity of historical
thinking and the product of that activity; for it is
only by means of this activity itself that "we endeavour
to provide this innate idea with detailed content. And
this we do by using the present as evidence for its own
past" (IH, 247).193

As regards the rightness and the truthfulness of absolute pre-
suppositions Rubinoff says finally that:

The presuppositions according to which we think and
act are the product of this a priori imagination. We
can never subject them to any special kind of proof,
but the whole point of Collingwood's argument is to show
that this is not necessary. Their meaningfulness, in other
words, does not depend upon this kind of verification.
The very fact that they are absolute presuppositions is
proof that they are 'right'. As for their ultimate truth
when judged from the absolute standpoint, there is no way
of determining this except by continuing to use them until
we are obliged to abandon them.194

193 Ibid., p. 287.
194 Ibid.
H. A Problem of Consistency

By way of conclusion of the latter section on the truth and falsity of absolute presuppositions, and of this whole chapter on absolute presuppositions, a return is made to the difficulty highlighted at the beginning of the chapter. There it was remarked\textsuperscript{195} that the presuppositions of \textit{An Essay on Metaphysics} seemed to introduce a dichotomy into Collingwood's thought prejudicial to the identity of form and content essential to dialectical unity in diversity, and therefore into the \textit{rapprochement} which Collingwood sought as his life's work. The earlier doctrine of supposition as integral to the activity of questioning seems quite consistent with concrete unity in diversity whose intelligibility is in terms of internal relations within the concrete whole. But the presuppositions of the later \textit{Essay}, as a \textit{a priori} to the experience of questioning (notwithstanding that, unlike Kant's \textit{a priori} structures of the mind, these are historically conditioned and mutable) seem to introduce a rift between the experience which is to be (questioned and) explained and the explicative factors, namely these absolute presuppositions. Rather than internal relations between members of a whole we now seem to be dealing with a subsumption, in Kantian fashion, of experience under a quasi experience-transcending determinant.

\textsuperscript{195} See this chapter, above, pp. 247-248.
One way of interpreting Collingwood's position so as to maintain consistency with earlier works is to regard the absolute presuppositions, taken in their constellational unity, as a particular conception which consciousness has of itself at any stage of its development as regards the manner in which it sums up its past within itself precisely as this self-summation gives direction (articulated in the form of relevantly arising questions) to its own self-unfolding towards its future. They would thus be in the nature of "soundings" indicative of the determination of self developing consciousness at this or that particular stage of its development. Dogmatism would regard them as static entities, whereas dialectical thought would regard them as overlapping classes in a scale of forms.

Absolute presuppositions would thus seem to be embodied in the factual information which forms the body of the question, somewhat in the way in which Stephen Strasser explains that a "fact" embodies in its structure a methodic idea. Strasser's methodic idea would seem more or less to correspond to Collingwood's presuppositions, including his absolute presuppositions.

196 See Collingwood's *The New Leviathan*, pp. 63-64.

In this way, conscious experience can still be regarded as an all embracing totality of unity in diversity, and thus still be able to be understood consistently in terms of the concrete universal as elaborated in chapter 4, above.

But this favorable interpretation is not without its own internal strains. Why speak now of presuppositions rather than suppositions as previously? An obvious reply is that they are presuppositions with respect to this or that particular question, or this or that complex of questions and answers, whereas with respect to the activity of mind as a whole they are its suppositions. If we begin with this or that question, or this or that complex of questions and answers, and ask the Kantian question "What are its (or their) unconditioned conditions?" we would eventually come to its (or their) absolute presuppositions. They are absolute presuppositions, or unconditioned conditions with respect to this or to that particular question, or to this or that particular complex of questions and answers. They are thus absolute only in a restricted order and not simply absolute. For, if one looks at them in the total context of the mind's activity, they are not absolute but relative, and it is precisely as such that they have the truth or falsity which Rubinoff accords to them in the dialectical sense. Looked at from the life of the mind globally, from the absolute aspect, that of philosophy which views precisely in terms of the concrete universal, the concrete totality of all that is, the absolute presuppositions are not absolute but relative,
and this on two counts.

Firstly, these absolute presuppositions are conditioned (therefore not unconditioned) by their own retroactive feedback, inasmuch as the question and answer complex to which they effectively give rise and condition can retroact over these same absolute presuppositions so as to modify, or even displace them.

Secondly, they are conditioned (therefore not unconditioned, so not absolute) by reason of the life forms, together with their absolute presuppositions, which preceded them and which gave way to them.

If, therefore, one looks at the overall activity of the mind, rather than at the particular cluster of question and answer complexes, the absolute presuppositions are not really absolute but are just as conditioned as the question and answer complexes which they themselves condition.

It is submitted that, if one looks to the absoluteness of absolute presuppositions, rather than at their implication in this or that question and answer complex, there is really only one strictly absolute presupposition in the whole Collingwoodian enterprise, namely that of self positing mind. This ties up with what Collingwood said in his Essay on Philosophical Method regarding the object of philosophy as being one sustained and constantly recurring starting point, in which

198 See pp. 158-159 and 169-175, See also above, chapter 4, pp. 212-218.
the object cannot be posited in thought without at the same time being posited in actuality. In this radical, unique presupposition, expressed by the dictum "Mind is what it does" Collingwood is laying down his whole philosophical system in germ, in which act of positing supposal overlaps with assertion. The positing of this starting point is implicitly the positing of all that will develop into explicitness by the mind's questioning activity which is one with what the mind is. It may be further remarked, I think, that this ever recurring starting point, ever recurring according to different forms of itself, is the one eternal reality in Collingwood's thought, notwithstanding his aversion for eternal realities. It is eternally so that "Mind is what it does," notwithstanding that what it does is to continually transform itself.

Since history according to Collingwood is the unfolding of this self developing mind, the manifestation of creative mind in all its multifarious variety and concretions, whose logic of manifestation is by way of question and answer, it is fitting now to pass to a consideration of Collingwood's notion of history as the story of self developing mind.
HISTORY AS THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND

A. History as Knowledge of Concrete Fact.

The position of Speculum Mentis regarding history is that "the object of history is fact as such,"¹ and that "the historical consciousness asserts concrete fact."² The scientific consciousness denies the concreteness of this fact in regarding facts as mere instances of an abstract scientific law.³ Attempts to raise history to the rank of a science by extracting general laws from it end in bankruptcy.⁴ In science, the general law is the end and the facts merely the means to it. Whether Newton's apple really fell or not is of little moment as long as one grasps Newton's law of gravitation. But it is just the opposite in history, the individual fact is the end and the general law is important only to the extent that it enables us to determine the fact.⁵ The nineteenth century contributes

¹ R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 211.
² Ibid., p. 208.
³ See Ibid.
to the philosophy of history by emphasizing the individuality of the historian's object and the generality of the scientist's. 6

B. History as Knowledge of the Past.

Collingwood says that "(h)istory is the study of the past; to be an historian is to know how things came to be what they are." 7 But since a past is something which everything has, as the explanation as to how it came to be what it is, the historical aspect of things is a universal and necessary aspect of them. 8 Science studies the nature of selected parts of the world as a whole, whereas philosophy is thinking about the world as a whole. The biological scientist studies organisms as they are special parts of the world. But when Whitehead says that the world as a whole is an organism, he is talking as a philosopher, not as a biologist. Thus, whereas science studies the particular and contingent characteristics of things, philosophy studies the universal and necessary characteristics of things. 9 There can be a philosophy of something only if that something is not merely a fragment of the world "but...an aspect of the world as a whole - a universal and necessary characteristic of things." 10 The justification of our ability to speak of the philosophy

6 See Ibid.
7 See Ibid., p. 124.
8 See Ibid.
9 See Ibid., p. 121.
10 Ibid., p. 122.
of art, religion, history, etc., is that art or religion or history is somehow a universal and necessary characteristic of things and not merely a particular and contingent characteristic of a certain group of things. So, if we can legitimately speak of a philosophy of history, history must be not merely a trade or amusement but a universal and necessary human interest, that is, an interest in some universal and necessary aspect of the world. Since the time of Plato it has been regarded that genuine knowledge "must be universal, not particular; necessary, not contingent; of eternal truths, not of transitory facts." Since everything in the world has a past, "history as a study of the past is therefore a universal and necessary human interest - interesting to anybody who is interested in anything - and not the affair of a special professional group."  

C. Philosophy and the Method of History.

From the vantage point of his fiftieth year, when he was writing his Autobiography, Collingwood saw his life's work as that of effecting a rapprochement between philosophy and history. In addition to demanding

11 See Ibid.
12 See Ibid., p. 123.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 124.
15 See R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 77. See also L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, pp. 3-5.
that philosophers respect standards of historical thinking when they are dealing with the history of their own subject, Collingwood insists that a philosophy of history is required of them, in the sense of a special branch of philosophical inquiry which would investigate the special types of problems that are raised by historical thinking. But the realization of the need for a new branch of philosophy soon developed into a demand for a new kind of philosophy, a new way of philosophising.

From the seventeenth century onwards, the problems that since ancient Greek times have gone by the name of Physics, proved readily solvable by the new methods of mathematics and experiment. Man now had the means of discovering all nature's secrets; it was no longer merely a matter of gaping at the natural world; nature merely presented riddles which man had now learnt the trick of answering.\footnote{Descartes, whom Collingwood regards as one of the three masters on interrogation, regards the role of experience in Physics as that of providing problems which the intelligence will solve by its method of intuition and deduction. "Si l'expérience ne peut pas résoudre les questions, du moins, par elle-même elle ne trompe pas; ce qui lui permettra de jouer un rôle positif: celui de poser les problèmes que l'intelligence tentera de résoudre par l'analyse. Un problème est un ensemble de propositions obscures et complexes à rendre intelligibles par l'intuition et la déduction: ces propositions renferment des natures composées qu'il faut réduire en éléments simples. S'interroger sur l'origine des problèmes, c'est se demander quelle est la source des natures composées." J.-L. Allard, Le Mathématisme de Descartes, Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1963, p. 80. The same author, in an unpublished paper, "The Role of Experience in the Philosophy of Descartes," p. 12, writes: "Evidently, the problems concerning the material universe arise in the human mind through sense experience," and he cites A. Gewirtz, "Experience and the Non-Mathematical in the Cartesian Method," Journal of the History...}
putting nature to the torture until she gave him the answer to his questions.\(^1\)

But Collingwood became convinced that just as "the chief business of seventeenth-century philosophy was to reckon with seventeenth-century natural science" so "the chief business of twentieth-century philosophy is to reckon with twentieth-century history."\(^18\) Until the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, historical studies were much in the same state of development as were the natural sciences before Galileo. Just as from that time onwards in natural science something big happened which enormously increased the speed of its progress and enlargement of its vision, so likewise about the end of the nineteenth-century something similar was happening in history, perhaps not so spectacularly or rapidly, but none the less certainly.

The writer of history till the end of the nineteenth-century was restricted by scissors-and-paste methods to what the authorities said about a subject. Where there were no authorities nothing could be said. From early familiarity with archaeological procedures\(^19\) Collingwood learned

\(^1\) See R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, pp. 77-78.

\(^18\) Ibid., pp. 78-79.

\(^19\) "...since I was three weeks old" when he says that his father "took me in a carpenter's bag..." An Autobiography, p. 80.
another foundation for historical method than that of scissors-and-paste, which "would teach you, not indeed everything, but a great deal, about subjects whose very existence must remain permanently unknown to historians who believed in authorities," and which methods "might be used to correct the authorities themselves, where they had been mistaken or untruthful." Thus, the idea of the dependence of the historian on his authorities was exploded.

Collingwood says that the possibilities of such a new method could have been got from books written since Boucher de Perthes gravel pits investigations became known (although Collingwood puts it on record that it was never easy for him to learn from books and newspapers; a half hour with a student at an excavation site taught him more than a beautifully illustrated handbook or a friend's articles on an excavation in The Times).

I had learnt by first hand experience that history is not an affair of scissors-and-paste, but is much more like Bacon's notion of science. The historian has to decide exactly what he wants to know; and if there is no authority to tell him, as in fact (one learns in time) there never is, he has to find a piece of land or something that has got the answer hidden in it, and get the answer out by fair means or foul.

Collingwood says that this is as far as his philosophy of history got before he went up to Oxford where the revolution in historical


method was already making headway since Sir Arthur Evans earlier in the century well illustrated the new method by unearthing and reconstructing the history of the bronze age Knossos. These discoveries had a drastic effect on the rewriting of Oxford ancient history. Everything up till the first Olympiad was cut out. And Mommsen showed how the use of inscriptions could enable the historian to answer questions no one had hitherto dreamed of asking. Dragendorf classified and, with others, began to date Samian pottery. The excavator could reconstruct the history of Roman cities not mentioned by any authority, and establish events not mentioned previously in any books. Collingwood accredits Haverfield, with whom he worked in his (Collingwood's) early career, with embedding these new notions and techniques at Oxford which completely transformed the study of the Roman Empire. But although Roman history was making tremendous strides under the new methods, Greek history was still in the grip of scissors-and-paste methods.

According to a tradition going back to the seventeenth century the methods of natural science received from philosophers the most painstaking scrutiny. The books, lectures and conversations of these philosophers gave Collingwood the impression that they did not have the least awareness of what was happening in regard to historical method. This, Collingwood thought, was particularly odd in regard to Oxford philosophers, none of whom had any training in natural science whereas practically all

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of them had read 'Greats' and had undergone advanced study in ancient history. Joseph's Logic perhaps comes closest, with a chapter on the Historical Method, which, on examination, turns out to be no more than the method used in natural science. Collingwood regretted that not one of the thirty or forty professional philosophers at Oxford gave himself to the study of the method of history, since, however modest it may be in certainty, dignity and utility, history was still a respectable intellectual activity. This fact, together with the fact that obscure provences of Roman Britain interested him, presented Collingwood himself with a challenge which demanded the invention of new methods.

Obscure subjects, by forcing us to think harder and more systematically, sharpen our wits and thus enable us to dispel the fog of prejudice and superstition in which our minds are often wrapped when we think about what is familiar to us.23

Collingwood was thus led to believe that by concentrating on historical methodology he might discover truths in the theory of knowledge which were hidden from the realists because of their 'conventional and second-hand' ideas about the methods of natural science. Current theories of scientific method did indeed give recognition to the dependence of

23 Collingwood's statement here summarises in a very succinct way what is really the whole process of concrete dialectical thinking. The continuously sustained starting point (see chapter 4, above, pp. 202 et seq. is known first obscurely, then, by systematic interrogation, the object is increasingly clarified, much in the same way as a landscape obscured by fog becomes clearer and clearer as the fog is dissipated. In the case of knowledge, the fog arises by reason of low grade, that is, uncritical, unquestioned, thinking, such as is found in the dogmatic mode of thinking which, according to Collingwood characterizes realist, propositional thought. (See also this chapter, below, pp. 402 et seq.)
scientific knowledge on historical knowledge, but the expression of this was done in such a way as to suggest that it was hoped that the reader would not notice the fact.

No one, when he said that scientific knowledge depended on experiment, meant that a given scientific theory arose in the scientist's mind contemporaneously with the experiment (or rather, experiments) upon which it was based. He meant that a scientist, in framing a theory, made use of certain historical knowledge in his possession, as to what experiments had been tried and what their results had been. It was a commonplace, though a concealed one, that all 'scientific' knowledge in this way involves an historical element; and it was clear to me that any philosopher who offered a theory of 'scientific method', without being in a position to offer a theory of historical method, was defrauding his public by supporting his world on an elephant and hoping that nobody would ask what kept the elephant up. It was no mere question of adding a theory of historical method to the already existing theory of 'scientific' method. It was a question of making good a defect in current theories of 'scientific' method by attending to an element in 'scientific' knowledge about which there seemed to be a conspiracy of silence, namely the historical element.24

Collingwood foresaw the possibility of being on the threshold of a new age in which history would be as important to the world as natural science proved to be between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. He felt that "the wise philosopher would concentrate with all his might on the problems of history, at whatever cost, and so do his share

in laying the foundations of the future. 25

D. Socio-cultural Need for a Sound Theory of Historical Methodology.

Collingwood saw the 1914-1918 war as "an unprecedented triumph for natural science." The Baconian promise of power to control the forces of nature was fulfilled, but it turned out to be a power to destroy the bodies and souls of men more rapidly than any preceding human agency. Its triumph paved the way not only for others, such as improvements in transport, sanitation, medicine and commerce, but also, and above all, for the next war.

But the war (of 1914-1918) was also an unprecedented disgrace to the human intellect. Few of the combatants wanted it; things increasingly got out of hand; fighting ended without victory on either side. The contrast was glaring between the success of the modern European mind in controlling physical forces and natural realities and its utter inability to control human situations and mental forces.

It seemed almost as if man's power to control 'Nature' had been increasing pari passu with a decrease in his power to control human affairs.... But it was a plain fact that the gigantic increase since about 1600 in his power to control Nature had not been accompanied by a corresponding increase, or anything like it, in his power to control human situations. And it was also a plain fact

25 Ibid., pp. 87-88. One may wonder whether he might not be indulging in the kind of prediction he regards as out of bounds for the historian.
that the ill effects of any failure to control a human situation were more serious now than they had ever been before, in direct proportion to the magnitude of the new powers put by natural science...into the hands of the evil and the good, the fool and the wise man.26

Collingwood insists that the need of our time is progress in our ability to control human affairs similar to that made in the control of nature since the sixteenth century Baconian revolution.

Collingwood refused to consider the possibility that Psychology, the 'Science of Mind' being newly developed by Freud and others, could perhaps put into our hands an effective means of controlling human affairs as natural science had done in regard to the natural world. His reason is that "the mind, regarded in this way [that is, scientifically, by the methods of observation and experimentation appropriate to nature] ceases to be a mind at all."27 Collingwood recognises that psychology has its traditionally recognised legitimate study as the scientific investigation

26 R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 91. See also chapter 8, below, pp. 556-558 for a reconsideration of the problem expressed here as the problem of urgent personal concern which dominated the whole of Collingwood's thought.

27 Ibid., p. 93. See also Collingwood's The New Leviathan, chapter 1, pp. 5-7, paragraphs 1.7, 1.83, 1.84. In his Essay on Metaphysics, p. 114, Collingwood refers to "...the modern methods of psychology, the science of feeling." (Emphasis added). Alan Donagan, in his The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, p. 162, comments on Collingwood's latter statement as follows: "...Collingwood denounced as the besetting sin of psychology (its) attempt to study the processes of thought by the methods which are appropriate only to feeling." In his "On human Nature and Human History" in The Idea of History, p. 231, Collingwood says that "(t)hese irrational elements (in the mind, not as it is spirit but as it
of sensation, appetite and its connected emotions, the science of the
body in its psychological sense, that is, as identical with 'feeling'.
Collingwood acknowledges that Freud reached a high scientific level in
dealing with problems in psychotherapy, but he also says that he reached
an unprecedented low in dealing with ethics, politics, religion and social
structure.

Not to psychology, the 'pseudo-science of mind', but to
history Collingwood turned for "the help we need in diagnosing our moral
and political problems... precisely because history offered us something
altogether different from rules, namely insight". But "that man should
come to a better understanding of human affairs by studying history", that
history was "the thing which in future might play a part in civilized life
analogous to that of natural science in the past" could not be admitted

is soul, that is, as it is concerned with the body as feeling (see The New
Leviathan reference immediately above) are the subject matter of psycho-
logy."

3.13, 3.54, 3.6.
James' psychological study of religion, The Varieties of Religious Ex-
perience, is especially singled out for attack by Collingwood. See also
See also Alan Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, pp. 159-
168. See also Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 101-132.
if history were understood as a scissors-and-paste affair. However, it is quite otherwise "if the historian resembles the natural scientist in asking his own questions, and insisting on an answer," and provided he is not asking "questions whose answers, however interesting, were of no practical use."  

Two questions have to be settled before history's status as the science relevant to human situations can be admitted. The first concerns the status of the object of history, the human past, and the practicality of historical knowledge. How does knowledge of the human past enable us to control human situations, instead of letting them get out of control, as instanced by the 1914-1918 war?

Regarding the status of the object, Collingwood insists that the past which the historian questions is not a dead past but a living past, a past in some way persisting into the present. The historian can answer questions about the past only on condition that he has evidence about it, which evidence, if it is something the historian can be said to 'have', must be existing here and now in the historian's present world. An event which left no traces in the present world could not be known, since there would be no 'evidence' for it.

33 See Ibid., pp. 95-96.
34 Ibid., p. 96.
35 See Ibid., p. 96. See also Collingwood's Idea of History, p. 282: "When a man thinks historically, he has before him certain documents or relics of the past. His business is to discover what that past was which has left these relics behind it."
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But to leave 'a trace' of itself in the present world, a past event would have to be something more than a material body or state of a material body if it is to function as evidence. The middle ages can be studied by a modern historian only because they are not dead, which means that not only are their writings, etc., still in existence as material objects but also that their ways of thinking are still in existence as ways in which people still think; for example, the habit of reading and understanding Latin has survived. Indeed such ways of thinking can be resurrected from the dead after a long period of discontinuity, as, for example, the ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian languages. 36

Collingwood says that by about 1920 he arrived at his first principle of a philosophy of history, that "the past which an historian studies is not a dead past, but a past which in some sense is still living in the present," which he then expressed by saying that "history is concerned not with 'events' but with 'processes'." 37

This notion of 'process' is most important to understand Collingwood's dialectical line of thought in regard to history. Processes are not for him static identities having a well defined beginning and end, but entities which turn into one another. If we consider a process


P₁ which turns into process P₂ we cannot designate any dividing line at which P₁ stops and P₂ begins. P₁ does not stop but continues on in the changed form P₂. Likewise P₂ cannot be said to have a well defined beginning; it was previously going on in the earlier form P₁. In history there are no beginnings and no endings. History books may begin and end, but the events they describe do not.³⁸

Collingwood argues that if P₁ has left traces of itself in P₂ in such a way that an historian living in P₂ can interpret the evidence and see that what is now P₂ was once P₁ it follows that 'the traces' of P₁ persisting in the present are not, as it were, the corpse of a dead P₁ but the real P₁ itself living and active, although incapsulated in the other form of itself which is P₂.³⁹

³⁸ See Ibid., p. 98. This is in sharp contrast to Aristotle's notion of an event as something 'definite', as when Aristotle writes in the Posterior Analytics, Book 2, ch. 12, 95b (see p. 173 of Richard McKeon's edition of Aristotle's Basic Works, N.Y., Random House, 1941) that "...past events are limits and atomic...just as points are not 'contiguous' neither are past events, since both are indivisible." H.I. Marrou in his The Meaning of History, p. 48, says that because historical events do not abruptly begin or abruptly end the historian must "begin with an introduction which indicates the antecedents of the phenomenon that is studied. (The historical account) must also include an epilogue that aims to answer the question: What happened afterward? The study must not begin and end abruptly, like the movie screen that is lighted at the start of the film only to be darkened suddenly at the end."

³⁹ See R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 98. Compare with this description the unfolding of the life-forms from one to the other in Speculum Mentis. See also the evolution of the meaning of the State from Plato's Republic to Hobbes' Leviathan, chapter 2, above, pp.82-84. What we are involved with here is, not an abstract universal but a concrete universal which was dealt with in chapter 4, above. See also in this
So, if $P_1$ symbolizes a certain characteristic of a certain historical period (say, the polis of Plato's *Republic* in ancient Greece) and regard, L. Rubinoff's *Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics*, p. 155, "...the Republic is an account of the 'polis' of the fifth century B.C. while the *Leviathan* is an account of the absolute monarchy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England. It is true that both the 'polis' and the 'absolute monarchy' are 'states.' But the 'state' is not an eternal and unchanging substance; it is an historically changing dynamic process which recognizes profound and essential differences between one historical manifestation and another. As Collingwood puts it in *Speculum Mentis*, summing up the whole matter "The state is an historical, not a scientific conception - a concrete, not an abstract universal" (*Speculum Mentis*, p. 174). This conception of the state as a concrete universal is explored further in an article of 1929 entitled "Political Action." The state, Collingwood argues, is generally conceived as a substance having an essence and attributes. This is the concept of the state as an abstract universal. Following this concept, political theory conceives itself either as an attempt to deduce a priori the implications of this essence, or as an inductive inquiry about the various attitudes of sovereignty found to exist in various states. All such theories, deductive or inductive, are agreed in accepting the limitations of the category of substance and attribute ("Political Action", p. 155). Collingwood proposes to approach political theory from a different angle. Instead of putting the central issue in the form of the question "What are the attributes of the state?" he proposes to put it in the form of the question "What is political action?": "That is to say, I propose to take my stand, not on the category of substance and attribute, but on the category of action." For Collingwood, the mind is not a substance but pure activity: "The mind is what it does." In his *Idea of History*, p. 222, he says "Hume was therefore right to maintain that there is no such thing as 'spiritual substance,' nothing that a mind is, distinct from and underlying what it does." Again, in *Religion and Philosophy*, p. 34, Collingwood says that "(the) idea of the mind as a thing distinguished from its own activities does not seem to be really tenable; the mind is what it does; it is not a thing that thinks, but a consciousness; not a thing that wills, but an activity." This activist, anti-substantialist notion of mind is fundamental to Collingwood's thought and is maintained throughout his works. This means that the mind's activity, therefore the mind itself, is essentially historical. That is, for Collingwood, the activity which is the mind is an historically, dialectically unfolding activity in all its forms, namely, political, religious, artistic, scientific, historical and philosophical. And, as Otis Lee well puts it
P₂ symbolizes the corresponding although different (and, therefore, contradictory or incompatible) characteristic of a succeeding period (the absolute monarchy of Hobbes' *Leviathan* in Cromwellian England) the successor P₂ always contains a survival of P₁. P₂ is not an opaque self-contained 'atomic' unit, but is "transparent, so that P₁ shines through it and their colours combine into one." Collingwood warns of the dangers of too

in his "Dialectic and Negation," in *The Review of Metaphysics*, I (1947), p. 11 "(f)or dialectic, change is sheer creativity. There is only creation and generation, with no decay or passing out of existence.... The present includes the past, which has not really gone; and even the future is real, though it does not yet exist, for spirit is eternal." Correlate this with what is said later, in chapter 9, below, pp. 619-629, regarding the reality of past, present and future as modalities of human existence. It has been shown, in chapter 4, above, that Collingwood's Logic of Question and Answer is a dialectical logic based not on the abstract universal of Substance and Accident Propositional Logic which founds Science (in the sense of Exact (mathematical) and Experimental Science) but upon the concrete universal whose differentiations are internal to its identity, or 'identity in difference.' The object of history, as also of morality and political action is a concrete universal, a dialectical, dynamic, ongoing entity. Chapter 9, below, will take up the question of the logic of historical inquiry and of history as a concrete universal.

R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, p. 98. In *The New Leviathan*, p. 65, ppghs. 9.5, 9.51, Collingwood calls this persistence of the past in the present The Law of Primitive Survivals which "runs as follows: When A is modified into B there survives in any example of B, side by side with the function B which is the modified form of A, an element of A in its primitive or unmodified state." Once again, this is a case of a concrete universal, or unity in diversity, or identity in difference, or overlap of classes in a scale of dialectically developing forms which lies at the basis of Collingwood's logical theory. See also Alan Donagan, *The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood*, pp. 28-30, on The Law of Primitive Survivals. The blending compared to the combination of a variety of colours into one is no doubt the work of the creative imagination if one considers what Collingwood writes in "The Historical Imagination" in *The Idea of History*, pp. 231-249, together with his profound description of the way imagination operates creatively in his *Principles of Art*, pp. 142-144.
thoroughly delineating the characteristic features of this or that period, which is "to forget that the silk of the period is in reality always a shot silk, combining in itself contradictory colors." 41

Collingwood accuses the realists of inability to come up with a viable theory of history because they refuse to admit the reality of becoming, with the result that they inevitably reduce 'becoming' propositions into 'being' propositions. In such a reduction "the true proposition \( P_1 \) becomes \( P_2 \)" is made to analyse into "the complex of propositions \( P_1 \) is \( P_1 \), \( P_1 \) is not \( P_2 \), \( P_1 \) ends where \( P_2 \) begins, \( P_2 \) is \( P_2 \), and \( P_2 \) is not \( P_1 \), all of them either tautologous or false." 42

Returning to the question whether history could provide a school of moral and political wisdom, Collingwood rejects the old pragmatic idea, since it was based on the scissors-and-paste conception in which the past


42 Collingwood says that he wrote the substance of these thoughts in a short book and sent a typed copy to his friend Guido de Ruggiero, but that, upon writing his Autobiography he destroyed his own only copy together with the manuscript of the unpublished "Truth and Contradiction." See his Autobiography, p. 99. See also L. Rubinoff, R.G. Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 397, for further information on the "Truth and Contradiction" manuscript. Leslie Armour, in his The Concept of Truth, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1969, p. 210, n. 1 states that he feels that "[I]t seems unlikely that there was, originally, only one copy of Truth and Contradiction...and a copy may some day turn up."
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is a dead past about which nothing more can be known except what authorities have said about it. Such knowledge is useless as a guide to action, since history never exactly repeats itself, so that any problem before me now is never sufficiently like any problem described by my authorities to justify application of their solution to my problem. Collingwood insists that it is the historian's business to reveal the less obvious features hidden from a careless eye in the present situation. "What history can bring to moral and political life is a trained eye for the situation in which one has to act," just as the trained woodsman can say 'there is a tiger in this grass' whereas an ignorant traveller will see nothing but grass the trees. But, in addition, the historian must not merely be able to reveal the special features of the situation but also provide the rules for acting in such a situation, just as it is not much use detecting a tiger in the grass unless a rifle can be provided to shoot it. Collingwood felt that two things were necessary if history was to provide that guidance in action:

Firstly, if you are looking for ready-made rules for dealing with situations you should look to natural science for them, just as if


44 Such problems as these, which Collingwood says history is competent to diagnose and solve, are well discussed in the difficulties that arise in legal enactment and application of legal rules, in Gidon Gottlieb's _The Logic of Choice_, London, Allen and Unwin, 1968. It is especially revealing that the logical problems of legal procedure have similar characteristics to the difficulty of applying induction and deduction to historical thought. See especially chapter 2, pp. 14-32 of Gottlieb's _The Logic of Choice_.
you want a gun the place to go is to a gunsmith. The bankruptcy of civilization between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries was due to over reliance on natural science and its capacity to provide ready-made rules. The result was a neglect to acquire the insight needed to decide which rules apply not in a predefined situation but in the one which one found oneself.

It was precisely because history offered us something altogether different from rules, namely insight, that could afford us the help we needed in diagnosing our moral and political problems.\footnote{R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 101. The 'insight' which Collingwood repeatedly attributes to the historian seems to mean nothing other than 'thought knowing thought,' for 'thought' according to Collingwood is the 'inner' ('inside') dimension of an event whose physical characteristics are its 'outer' or 'external' dimension, about which the natural sciences are concerned. Whereas the natural scientist knows the outer face of the event, the historian knows its 'inner' side, because he knows the thought behind the event. 'Inner' knowledge, which is proper to the historian, is knowledge of 'the thought' behind or within a given event. See Collingwood's "The Subject-Matter of History" in The Idea of History, pp. 302-315, especially pp. 305-307. Granted this interpretation, Collingwood's Logic of Question and Answer, as proper to history, will be a means of discovering the thought content of an event or situation. See also H.I. Marrou, The Meaning of History, pp. 103-111, for what seems to be in substance a very similar, if not the same position as Collingwood's on this point. According to Marrou "History is an encounter with others" (p. 107), a "dialectical relationship of the Same with the Other...(which) presupposes the existence of a broad basis of fraternal communion between the subject and the object, between the historian and document" (p. 104). "In our encounter with Others in historical documents we must proceed as in daily life. Is it a good way to become acquainted with a new friend- or a document-if we subject either to a whole series of questions concerning our interests of the moment? Certainly not, for we must be open to the Other, quite forgetting ourselves. We must try to perceive the inner essence as something different and other than we are..." (p. 111, emphasis added). Marrou shows throughout his work that whatever obstructs or impedes sympathetic communion with the 'other', the subject of study, proportionally impedes historical understanding of that subject. See, for example, his...}
Secondly, there are situations which can be easily handled without any appeal to ready-made rules, provided you have insight into them. All you need in such cases is to see what the situation is, then you can straightway extemporize a satisfactory way of dealing with it. If you are sure that it is a tiger in the grass, and that tigers are things to be shot at, the thing to do is to take a rifle with you...but be sure it is not your own child which turns out to be playing in the grass.

Collingwood is not referring to actions which are spontaneous and unreflected responses to stimuli, but to the kind of action an agent performs because he knows or believes himself to be in a certain situation. And by acting according to rules Collingwood says he means acting because the rule is known and the agent decides to apply that rule, so that he excludes cases where an agent acts according to a rule but is unaware he is so acting. Most of our actions are successful because they are standard types whose rules we know and regularly apply. But action according to rules is not the only type of action. When in a situation not recognizable as belonging to any known types there is no ready rule to guide you; you have to improvise the method of acting. Again, when the referable rules inadequately apply to a given situation, since the typical situation to which the rule adequately refers does not exactly cover the present actual situation, you are thrown back on improvisation. Thus, there are rules for account of his changed attitude, and changed ability to comprehend, Augustine (op.cit., pp. 280-281). See also chapter 4, above, pp.130-132 and n 43 for correlation of 'insight', and the 'inside of events' with the internal relations constitutive of the concrete universal.
fair dealing with one's tailor inasmuch as he is a tailor, but the attempt to apply the rules to deal with one's tailor who is aged 60, with a weak heart and invalid daughter, becomes so complex and unwieldy that its practicality is impossible. The complexity of required modifications to apply the multiplex of known rules forces one back to improvisation.  

The situation in which we have to act apart from rules because the situation is not of a recognizable type most often arises from inexperience of life and is commonest among the young, or when for some reason or other (as travel in a foreign land) we encounter the unfamiliar. But the second case, where the situation involves multiple classification and application of a complexity of rules, is found only among mature people of experience and intelligence who treat the situation seriously, so seriously that they reject as an adequate guide not only desire and self interest but even that their conduct be right as measured by recognized rules. One who insists on guidance from prescribed rules is clinging to the low grade morality of custom and precept. Such an agent sees only the elements of the situation he already knows how to deal with but shuts his eyes to whatever in the situation would lead him to think that his ready-made rules are inadequate for the conduct of life. Collingwood regards dependence on rules of conduct as keeping action at a low potential, involving a certain blindness to the realities of the situation. To act at a higher potential the agent must see the situation in which he is to

act more clearly.

Science may equip us with rules adequate to act in typical cases we already know, but history will equip us to handle concrete situations in all their actuality, provided its job is to inform us about the present insofar as that present is seen to incarnulate its past as a constitutive of that present, which may not be obvious to an untrained eye. Then only is history of the highest relevance for practical life, but not if it is confined to mere authoritative repetition of a past regarded as dead and gone. Scissors-and-paste history, with its passive dependence on the testimony of authorities regarding a dead past is inadequate to equip man with the control over human situations analogous to the control natural science provides him with in regard to natural forces.

E. Collingwood's Discovery of the New Historical Method.

Collingwood says that his conviction regarding the possibility of a new method of history took a decisive step forward in 1928 during a vacation at LeMartouret when he was able to reflect over his last nine years of historical research.

47 See Ibid., pp. 105-106.

48 See Ibid., p. 106. L. Rubinoff, in his Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 306, says that "(w)hile the historian cannot make scientific predictions concerning the future, he is nevertheless able to anticipate it, and his experience as an historian therefore enables him to cope more effectively with the crises of life." See appendix 2, below, pp.811-826 for a consideration of the way a researcher conducts himself in breaking new ground where there are no laws to guide him.
The first fruits of this "long and oppressive period of gestation" was to make the distinction between history proper and pseudo history. By pseudo history he means the *prima facie* appearance of history taken on in the early nineteenth century by such natural sciences as geology, palaeontology and astronomy. Reflection over his practice as an archaeologist enabled him to disengage the stratigraphical aspect of his procedure which resembled the methods of geology from aspects which differed from such methods. The use of potsherds by the archaeologist for purposes of correlation and dating no doubt resembles the geologist’s similar use of fossils, but the difference outweighs the superficial similarity.

For the archaeologist, these things are not stone and clay and metal, they are building stones and potsherds and coins; debris of a building, fragments of domestic utensils, and means of exchange, all belonging to a bygone age whose purposes they reveal to him.50

Whereas sedimentation and fossilization are remains of natural events, potsherds, building stones and domestic utensils are remains of human events. Only the latter are properly admissible as evidence according to properly historical method, and they can be used as evidence only insofar

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49 See R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, p. 107; see also H.I. Marrou, *The Meaning of History*, pp. 36-37 for prehistory as including both a non-historical consideration of man’s past and also a genuine historical consideration of that same past. See also chapter 9, below, pp. 709-710.

as the archaeologist understands what each one is for. If an object does not tell him that then he has no use for it as an archaeologist, although one more resourceful than himself may be able to detect human purposes in such an object. 51

Collingwood is recognizing that we have the ability to diagnose consciously intended purposes as distinct from mere natural happenings in the remains which are the results of such purposes. But consciously purposeful activity is thought, or activity done with a reason, or by one knowing both that and why he is acting. When Collingwood thus says that we can recognize in certain remains traces of purposeful activity he is at

51 H.I. Marrou in The Meaning of History, p. 37, writes: "(When) the...prehistorian studies objects that bear the marks or traces of man's voluntary action, (and) (w)hen he tries through them to gain understanding of the material or spiritual techniques (magic, religion) and to some extent of the feelings or ideas of their authors, he is really doing something that pertains to archaeology, which is a branch of history. In this sense prehistory becomes real history in the full meaning of the term. When Norbert Casteret, for example, discovered in the grotto of Montespan a small clay image representing a quadruped adorned with the skull of a bear cub, an image that was pierced by iron-tipped spears in several places, he encountered no difficulty in reconstructing the rite of "sympathetic" magic in which prehistoric hunters had participated. Eskimos of our own time have also practiced this same rite. We understand this type of behaviour interiorly. Direct comprehension of this kind is something quite different from that of the physicist who "understands" the disintegration of the atom. It is our interior knowledge of man and his potentialities that enables us to understand these prehistoric hunters. In this sense they are quite historical." (Emphasis added). See also Collingwood's criticism of Croce's advice to one who would want to understand the history of a blade of grass advising such a one to try to become a blade of grass in the same way that one trying to understand the history of a neolithic should try to become a neolithic; see Collingwood's Idea of History, pp. 199-200.
the same time well on his way to his notion of history as a rethinking of past thoughts. Collingwood says that pre-nineteenth century natural scientists thought that they were detecting purposes, not human purposes but divine purposes, in natural events, but no nineteenth century scientist conceives the world of nature anthropomorphically, as acting purposefully. Purpose is not now a scientist's working category.

You are thinking historically...when you say about anything, 'I see what the person who made this (wrote this, used this, designed this etc.,) was thinking.' Until you can say that, you may be trying to think historically but you are not succeeding. And there is nothing else except thought that can be the object of historical knowledge.\(^52\)

Thus, the historian of political history does not concern himself with the pitch of a man's speech but rather with what he is trying to say, that is, the thought expressed in his words and subsequently in the minds of his hearers and finally in written records for rethinking by future minds. And military history is not just a description of marches or battles but rather of plans and counterplans, that is, of thinking about strategy and tactics, and, finally of what the men in the battle ranks thought.

F. History as Rethinking Past Thoughts.

Whereas the scientist is concerned with observable events the

historian is concerned with events not as such but only inasmuch as they express thoughts. 53

Natural events are merely phenomena which the scientist contemplates from the outside, but historical events are penetrated by the historian discerning the thought within.

To the scientist, nature is always and merely a 'phenomenon', not in the sense of being defective in reality, but in the sense of being a spectacle presented to his intelligent observation; whereas the events of history are never mere phenomena, never mere spectacles for contemplation, but things which the historian looks, not at, but through, to discern the thought within them. 54

This means that when the historian investigates a past event he makes a distinction between the outside and the inside of the event. The outside of an event is whatever can be described in terms of bodies and their movements, that is, its externals, such as, for example, the passage of Caesar and certain men across a certain river, or the spilling of his blood on the floor of the senate house. But the inside of an event is that in it which can only be described in terms of thought, such as Caesar's defiance of Republican law, or the constitutional policy clash between himself and his assassins. But the historian is interested not merely in one of those aspects to the exclusion of the other. He is interested in actions which synthesize an outer aspect and an inner aspect.


54 Ibid., p. 214.
The outside of an event is the external manifestation of the thought within the agent's action.

The historian is investigating not mere events (where by a mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an action is the unity of the outside and inside of an event. His work may begin by discovering the outside of an event, but it can never end there; he must always remember that the event was an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action, to discern the thought of its agent.

In penetrating to the inside of events to detect the thought they express the historian is doing something the scientist cannot do. The historian's task is thus both simpler in one way and more complex than the scientist's in another way. The scientist's event is discovered when perceived, but its explanation has to be further sought in its causes. The historian's event is not available to perception, but has to be constructed (rather reconstructed). But when the thought within the event is discovered, the historian's work is done, there is no further search for causes, for, when he knows what is the thought within the event he already knows why it happened.

For science, the event is discovered by perceiving it, and the further search for its cause is conducted by assigning it to its class and determining the relation between that class and others. For history, the object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the thought expressed in it. To discover that thought is already to understand it. After the historian has ascertained the

55 Ibid., p. 213. This penetration to the inside of an event to know the thought therein I understand to be what Collingwood means by 'insight.' See this chapter, above, p. 355.
facts, there is no further process of inquiring into their causes. When he knows what happened, he already knows why it happened.\(^{56}\)

Thus, the processes studied by the historian are quite different from the process of natural events studied by the scientist.

It is now clear why historians habitually restrict the field of historical knowledge to human affairs. A natural process is a process of events, an historical process is a process of thoughts. Man is regarded as the only subject of historical process, because man is regarded as the only animal that thinks.\(^{57}\)

G. The Conditions of the Possibility of Historical Knowledge as Knowledge of Past Thought.

In order that past thought may be known, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the thought must be expressed, either linguistically, or in one or another of the ways in which activity is expressive of thought, as the outstretched arm expressive of a command, or running away as expressive of defeat. Secondly, the historian must be able to think again for himself the thought whose expression he must interpret. If for any reason he is incapable of doing this he should leave the problem alone. One who cannot think mathematically is incapable of writing a history of mathematics.\(^{58}\)

\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 214.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., p. 216.

\(^{58}\) R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, pp. 111-112. H.I. Marrou well explains that the encounter with the other involved in history is achieved only by a sympathetic attunement to that other. "...it is always sympathy, the source of understanding, which represents the
These two conditions are formulated in the following propositions: the first, 'all history is the history of thought,' the second, 'historical knowledge is the re-enactment in the historian's mind of the thought whose history he is studying.'

Thus, says Collingwood, for the historian to know what Nelson meant by saying 'in honor I won them, in honor I will die with them', and for the historian to know why he said that, is for the historian to know what thoughts Nelson thought in saying that, which means that the historian must think those same thoughts for himself, namely that 'this is not the time to remove the decorations of honor merely to save one's life.'

But this re-enactment, whereby the historian qua historian thinks the thoughts of another, involved Collingwood in the dilemma as to whether the thoughts of Nelson as rethought by the historian are Nelson's or the historian's thoughts. He adds that "(n)o question in my study of historical method gave me so much trouble; and the answer was not complete constructive phase. ...If Denifle made a positive contribution to our growing knowledge of Luther...it was not because of his criticism. On the contrary, it was rather to the extent that his personal competence as a mediaevalist and his own experience as a Catholic belonging to a Religious Order (and as a theologian) led this Dominican of the nineteenth century to sympathize with the Augustinian of the fifteenth, in spite of himself." The Meaning of History, pp. 105-106. A criticism to be noted later (chapter 7, below, pp.439-442 ) against Collingwood will be in regard to his excessive emphasis (under Bacon's influence) on the critical function of history to neglect of the essential sympathetic connaturality which Marrou decisively points out as an indispensable ingredient of a true historian. Criticism presupposes sympathetic attunement, as Collingwood admits regarding the history of mathematics above.

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until some years later," that is, after 1928, at LeMartouret. 60

The answer, when he finally had it, is that "(t)he difference
is one of context."61 That thought, as thought by Nelson, was a present
thought, whereas, as (re)thought by the historian it is a past thought,
not the past thought of a dead past but a past thought living in the
present, which Collingwood refers to as 'incapsulated' in the present.
He explains that by an 'incapsulated' thought he means "a thought which,
though perfectly alive, forms no part of the question-answer complex which
constitutes what people call the 'real' life, the superficial, or obvious
present, of the mind in question."62 Collingwood explains that, for him as
a historian thinking Nelson's thought, the question 'Shall I take off my
decorations' does not arise. The questions which do arise in his present
experience are: 'Shall I continue reading this book on the battle of
Trafalgar?' or 'What did the Victory's deck look like to someone con-
templating his chances of surviving the battle?' or 'What would I have
done in Nelson's situation?'

This possibility of historical knowledge as the reenactment of
past thoughts incapsulated in the present, requires that a distinction
be made between a primary series of questions which constitute 'real' life,

60 See Ibid., p. 112, also p. 107. See also Collingwood's
"History as a Reenactment of Past Experience" in his Idea of History, pp.
282-302.


62 Ibid., p. 113.
and a secondary series constitutive of a secondary life which is prevented from flowing over into the primary life by that condition of *incapsulation.*

No question that arises in that primary series, the series constituting my 'real' life, ever requires the answer 'in honor I won them, in honor I will die with them.' But a question arising in that primary series may act as a switch into another dimension. I plunge beneath the surface of my mind, and there live a life in which I not merely think about Nelson but am Nelson, and thus in thinking about Nelson think about myself. But this secondary life is prevented from overflowing into my primary life by being what I call incapsulated, that is, existing in a context of primary or surface knowledge which keeps it in its place and prevents it from overflowing.63

Thus, the knowledge I have when I know the question 'Will I remove my decorations?' together with its negative answer, exists as a thought in my mind, but the question and answer complex which is its context is not part of the question answer complex in which I think such thoughts as 'I am a little boy in Jersey', 'This is my father's study carpet, not the Atlantic', 'That is the study-fender, not the Spanish coast,' which later thoughts belong to the question and answer complex which I recognize as my 'real' life.64

63 Ibid.

64 See Ibid., pp. 113-114. Note that one's 'real' life is distinguished from whatever other lives one may live by a difference according to question answer complexes (and, following the theme of the previous chapter, we may add different fundamental life commitments, beliefs or absolute presuppositions, or, again different world-view horizons).
Collingwood therefore adds a third proposition definitive of historical knowledge: "Historical knowledge is the reenactment of a past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane different from theirs."  

This causes the further question to arise: "How to determine which of these planes is real?" To which Collingwood replies: "By watching the way in which historical problems arise." Contrary to the opinions of scissors-and-paste historians, Collingwood says that all historical problems arise out of real life. Scissors-and-paste people think that they arise because of the habit of reading which simply puts questions in their mind by way of mere curiosity without any serious bearing on the problems of human everyday living. But, the kind of history which Collingwood says he is discussing is something quite different. It is a kind of history which he has practised all his life in which historical problems

65 The first and second stated on pp. 86 and 88 of Collingwood's Autobiography.

66 See Ibid., p. 115. Note the determining factor of 'context.' The Concrete Universal, which is the very dynamic reality of the mind, actively constructs itself historically by contextualizing in the present thoughts enacted in a previous context. Context is not a superaddition to concrete reality but belongs to the very fabric of its being. This I understand to be of the essence of the concrete universal. The problem to which this gives rise is whether context can be absorbed into a thing's essential structure and retain any intelligible meaning as context.

67 Ibid., p. 114.
arose out of practical problems. He maintains that we study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called to act (the full force of which is realized if we recall that the type of problem Collingwood is basically concerned with, faced with the disasters of two world wars, "How are we to be delivered from these present distresses?"). It is on the plane of real life that all problems arise, and the plane to which they are referred for solution is history. History, therefore, is Collingwood's answer to the question raised by contemporary situation ethics, namely, 'What am I to do confronted as I am with this real-life problem which eludes decision being made through reference to ready made rules to hand?' It is by a grasp of the concrete situation as a concrete universal by the historical mind that I will know with certainty what is my duty in the concrete context in which my problem arises.

Self knowledge is essentially tied to one's ability to think another's thoughts.

In rethinking what somebody else thought, he thinks it himself. In knowing that somebody else thought it, he knows that he himself is able to think it. And finding out what he is able to do is finding out what kind of a man he is.\(^6\)

Thus, I am able to understand the Einsteinian theory of relativity if I can think the thoughts Einstein thought in thinking out his theory as the solution of the practical problem that drove him to think out that theory as the answer to his problem. If a man finds that

\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 114-115. See also Collingwood's Idea of History, p. 10, and see also chapter 9, below, p. 692.
he is capable of thinking the thoughts of a great many men he is thereby able to understand the thoughts of a great many different kinds of men by rethinking them. It follows that he must be a great many kinds of men, in fact, a microcosm of all that history can know. Thus, his own self-knowledge is at the same time his knowledge of the world of human affairs, or, in other words, a concrete universal. 69

Collingwood says that this train of thought was not complete until about 1930. But, with its completion, he was able to answer the question which had troubled him since the 1914-1918 war, namely, how can we construct a science of human affairs from which men could learn to deal with human situations as skillfully as natural science had taught them to deal with situations in the world of nature? It was now clear to him that the answer was that the science in question is history.

Collingwood says that such a discovery was not possible before the nineteenth century until history began to undergo a Baconian revolution and arise from its scissors-and-paste chrysalis of the eighteenth century to become a science in the full sense of that word. Men of the eighteenth century saw the need for a science of human affairs but were unable to see that history was that science. They erroneously tried to shape a science of human affairs after the manner of a natural science, such as Hume's 'Science of Human Nature'. The nineteenth century sought it in

69 See Ibid., p. 115.
the science of psychology, in which the mental became reduced to the psychical, with the result that the very distinction between truth and falsehood is jettisoned and the very idea of science thereby negated, psychology itself being bankrupted in the process.  

But, says Collingwood, the revolution in historical method which superseded scissors-and-paste history introduced a rapidly progressing form of knowledge which for the first time put man in a position "to obey the oracular precept 'know thyself', and reap the benefits that only such obedience can confer."  

Collingwood acknowledges that the work of thinking out these ideas was laborious work "because of the method used," for "every detail arose out of reflection on actual historical research in which I had therefore to be incessantly engaged, and was tested over and over again by fresh pieces of research devised to that end."

H. Historical Knowledge as Knowledge by the Mind of its Acts which are Identical with the Mind Itself.

Historical knowledge has for its proper object, thought, the

70 See Ibid., pp. 115-116.
71 Ibid., p. 116.
72 Ibid., p. 117.
The act of thinking itself, not merely things thought about.\(^\text{73}\) It is therefore a re-doing of what the mind has already done in the past.

Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has done in the past, and at the same time it is the re-doing of this, the perpetuation of past acts in the present. Its object is therefore not a mere object, something outside the mind which knows it; it is an activity of thought, which can be known only insofar as the knowing mind re-enacts it and knows itself as so doing.\(^\text{74}\)

Thought is not merely presupposed by the historical process and the knowledge of that process, it is an integral element in that process, and the knowledge of the process is not distanced from the process, but one with it. The historian knowing history is thereby making it.

Thought is therefore not the presupposition of an historical process which is in turn the presupposition of historical knowledge. It is only in the historical process, the process of thoughts, that thought exists at all; and it is only insofar as this process is known for a process of thoughts that it is one. The self-knowledge of reason is not an accident; it belongs to its essence.\(^\text{75}\)

In order to discover what was the thought constituting the inner dimension of some past event the historian has to make it his own thought by thinking that same thought again for himself as his own thought.\(^\text{76}\)

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\(^{74}\) Ibid., p. 218.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., p. 227.

\(^{76}\) See Ibid., p. 283 and p. 215.
The history of thought, which means all history, is the reenactment of past thought in the historian's own mind. The only way a historian of philosophy can know what Plato meant when he expressed himself in certain words is by thinking that thought (of Plato's) for himself, as his own (the historian's) thought. This is what is meant by 'understanding' what Plato wrote. The historian of politics or warfare will study Julius Caesar's actions by trying to discover the thoughts in Caesar's mind which determined him to do the actions of which documentary evidence remains. To do this the historian has to envisage for himself the situation in which Caesar stood by imaginatively reconstructing that situation and think for himself what Caesar thought about the situation and the possible ways of dealing with it.

Historical knowledge therefore is not thinking about something purely objective, for it is thinking about the very thought the historian is presently thinking in reenacting that thought. However, it is not on that account merely subjective, for that thought is something that can be thought about by anyone with the historical capacity to think it for himself.

To be able to be reenacted in a historian's mind it is not sufficient that something be merely an object of experience, it must be

77 See Ibid., p. 215.
79 See Ibid., p. 292.
an experience. There is thus no history of nature. 80

To the historian, the activities whose history he is studying are not spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived through in his own mind; they are objective, or known to him, only because they are also subjective, or activities of his own.81

Thus, the objectivity of historical knowledge is of a peculiar kind, different from the objectivity of a scientist's study of the natural world. The object is not something there before the mind with which the mind has to get acquainted; it has to be brought into existence as an object in the very act of studying it; the knowing of it is the (re) constructing of it. This means that knowledge of the historical object is at the same time knowledge of one's own knowledge. Historical knowledge is both objective and at the same time self-knowledge.

But, because (as I have already tried to show) it is never merely objective, it requires to be thought about in a peculiar way, a way only appropriate to itself. It cannot be set before the thinking mind as a ready-made object, discovered as something independent of that mind and studied as it is in itself, in that independence. It can never be studied 'objectively', in the sense in which 'objectively' excludes 'subjectively'. It has to be studied as it actually exists, that is to say, as an act. And because this act is subjectivity (though not mere subjectivity) or experience, it can be studied only in its own subjective being, that is, by the thinker whose activity or experience it is. This study is not mere experience or consciousness, not even mere self-consciousness;


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82 it is self-knowledge. It is not enough to merely think the thought of another to be thinking historically, one has to know what one is doing oneself when one thinks historically.

...unless he knows that he is thinking historically, he is not thinking historically. Historical thinking is an activity which is a function of self-consciousness, a form of thought possible only to a mind which knows itself to be thinking in that way.83

This means that "historical thinking is always reflection, for reflection is thinking about the act of thinking, and...all historical thinking is of that kind."84

This means that thought is transcendent in its own nature, in the sense that it is "not wholly engaged in the flow of experience", as is feeling, "so that we constantly reinterpret our past thoughts and assimilate them to those we are thinking now."85

But thought does not so transcend experience as to be a mere object set over against the thought which thinks it. The peculiar objectivity of thought consists in that it is able to be reenacted in a mind other than the mind actually presently thinking that thought, otherwise solipsism would prevail.

82 Ibid., p. 292.
83 Ibid., p. 289.
84 Ibid., p. 307.
85 Ibid., p. 296.
Thought can never be mere object. To know someone else's activity of thinking is possible only on the assumption that this same activity can be reenacted in one's own mind. In that sense, to know 'what someone is thinking' (or 'has thought') involves thinking for oneself. To reject this conclusion means denying that we have any right to speak of acts of thought at all, except such as take place in our own minds, and embracing the doctrine that my mind is the only one that exists. 

The conclusion, that historical thinking is rethinking past thoughts, leads to a certain precision regarding the statement that history studies the past. Historical thinking is the same kind of thinking as that by which we rethink and rediscover the thought of Hammurabi or Solon in the remote past and that by which we discover the thought of a friend who writes us a letter, or a stranger who crosses the street, that is, the immediate past.

Nor is it necessary that the past thought being rethought be the thought of another, for it is only by historical knowledge that I know what I thought in my own past.

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86 Ibid., p. 288.

87 See Ibid., p. 219. See also H.I. Marrou, The Meaning of History, p. 91: "...there is nothing unique in our understanding with regard to the past. It is definitely the same process that takes place in our understanding of other men in the present, and particularly in the understanding of articulated language." In regard to the fundamental role of language in history, and in the construction of the concrete universal proper to history, see chapter 9, below, pp. 657 et seq.

It is only by historical thinking that I can discover what I thought ten years ago, by reading what I then wrote, or what I thought five minutes ago, by reflecting on an action that I then did, which surprised me when I realized what I had done. In this sense, all knowledge of mind is historical.89

Thus rethinking of my own past thoughts is not merely remembering it, but a reliving of a past phase of my life. Memory merely objectivizes the past, as a spectacle. In historical thought the subject re-enacts that thought in his mind.

In thus rethinking my past thought I am not merely remembering it. I am constructing the history of a certain phase of my life: and the difference between memory and history is that whereas in memory the past is a mere spectacle, in history it is reenacted in present thought. So far as this thought is mere thought, the past is merely reenacted; so far as it is thought, the past is thought of as being reenacted, and my knowledge of myself is historical knowledge.90

The possibility of rethinking is based on the fact that thought, unlike feeling, can be disengaged from one context and given another. Thought in its immediacy is thought in a context of emotions and other thoughts. The thought has an identity in itself, independently of this context.

The self-identity of the act of thinking that these two angles are equal is not only independent of such matters as that a person performing it is hungry

89 Ibid., p. 219.

90 Ibid., p. 293. See also Collingwood's Autobiography, pp. 113-116; see also, this chapter, above, pp. 366-367.
and cold, and feels his chair hard beneath him, and is bored with his lesson; it is also independent of further thoughts, such as that the book says they are equal, or that the master believes them to be equal; or even thoughts more closely relevant to the subject in hand, as that their sum, plus the angle at the vertex, is 180 degrees.91

A thought is neither pure immediacy nor pure mediation. If it were pure immediacy it would be inextricably involved in the flow of consciousness in which it occurs and would then never become an object thought about. If it were pure mediation it would be utterly detached from the flow of consciousness, and thus outside the world of experience, and so non existent. But an act of thought is together something that actually happens in a context of experience and, as an act of thought, able to sustain itself.

Every act of thought, as it actually happens, happens in a context out of which it arises and in which it lives, like any other experience, as an organic part of the thinker's life. Its relations with its context are not those of an item in a collection, but those of a special function in the total activity of an organism. But an act of thought, in addition to actually happening, is capable of sustaining itself and being revived or repeated without loss of its identity. But it cannot repeat itself in vacuo, as the disembodied ghost of a past experience. However often it happens, it must always happen in some context, and the new context must be just as appropriate to it as the old. Thus, the mere fact that someone has expressed his thoughts in writing, and that we possess his works, does not enable

us to understand his thoughts. In order that we may be able to do so, we must come to the reading of them prepared with an experience sufficiently like his own to make those thoughts organic to it.92

Since an act of thought is knowledge and not mere sensation or feeling, it is something more than immediate consciousness and so not a mere flow of consciousness.93 "The positive peculiarity which distinguishes thought from mere consciousness is its power of recognizing the activity of the self as a single activity persisting through the diversity of its own acts."94 This self-sustaining and self-reviving power of thought is what distinguishes it from a mere event.

The peculiarity of thought is that, in addition to occurring here and now in this context, it can sustain itself through a change of context and revive in a different one. This power to sustain and revive itself is what makes an act of thought more than a mere 'event' or 'situation'.95

92 Ibid., p. 300.

93 See Ibid., p. 287.

94 Ibid., pp. 305-306. See H.B. Acton, "The Theory of Concrete Universals (II)", Mind, XLVI (1937), p. 1 for a consideration of "the most convenient example of a universal" to be "not a quality, such as redness, but a person, such as Julius Caesar" who "is a universal because he is the same individual, although engaged in different activities, such as fighting in Gaul, marching in Italy, and so on." Thus, thought, as distinct from mere consciousness recognizes the self (the person) as an identity in difference, that is, a concrete universal. See above, chapter 4, p. 133 n. 45. See also, F.H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, London, Oxford University Press, Vol. 1, corrected edn. of 1928, pp. 191 et seq.

95 Ibid., p. 297.
To reduce thought to its immediate experience is to deny its character as thought

...to say that because the theorem, as an act of thought, exists only in its context we cannot know it except in the context in which he actually thought it, is to restrict the being of thought to its own immediacy, to reduce it to a case of merely immediate experience, and so to deny it as thought.\(^6\)

The constituents of immediacy cannot be re-enacted, so cannot be objects of history.

The immediate, as such, cannot be re-enacted. Consequently, those elements in experience whose being is just their immediacy (sensations, feelings, &c. as such) cannot be re-enacted; not only that, but thought itself can never be re-enacted in its immediacy.\(^7\)

Plato's thought and my thinking that thought are two different thoughts in their immediacy but are identical in their mediation.\(^8\) Plato's argument as an experience of his own arose out of some discussion. Without knowing that context of discussion I can read and understand his argument, rearguing it with and for myself. The process of argumentation which I go through is identically Plato's, not merely similar to it. The argument in itself, from premisses to conclusion, can be developed in Plato's, mine, or anyone else's mind; and thus it is thought in its mediation.\(^9\)

\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 298-299.
\(^7\) Ibid., p. 297.
\(^8\) See Ibid., p. 301.
\(^9\) See Ibid., p. 300.
But the thought itself considered in its immediacy, as a unique act in the unique context of the life of the individual thinker cannot be re-enacted, and therefore cannot be the object of historical knowledge.

The historian cannot apprehend the individual act of thought in its individuality, just as it actually happened. What he apprehends of that individual is only something that it might have shared with other acts of thought and actually has shared with his own. But this something is not an abstraction, in the sense of a common characteristic shared by different individuals and considered apart from the individuals that share it. It is the act of thought itself, in its survival and revival at different times and in different persons: once in the historian's own life, once in the life of the person whose history he is narrating.100

To say, then, that history is knowledge of the individual is true only if individual is taken to include universal significance and not its exclusive uniqueness to a definite person at a definite time.

Thus the vague phrase that history is knowledge of the individual claims for it a field at once too wide and too narrow: too wide, because the individuality of perceived objects and natural facts and immediate experiences falls outside its sphere, and most of all because even the individuality of historical events and personages, if that means their uniqueness, falls equally outside it; too narrow, because it would exclude universality, and it is just the universality of an event or character that makes it a proper and possible object of historical study, if by universality we mean something that oversteps the limits of merely local and temporal existence and possesses a significance valid for all men at all times.101

100 Ibid., p. 303.

101 See the remark at the conclusion of chapter 5 above, pp. 334-335 that mind, which is identical with its activity, is the one eternal reality in the whole of Collingwood's philosophy.
What distinguishes the mere memorization of a past thought from historical re-enactment of it is that whereas mere memory is present thought of past experience as such "historical knowledge is that special case of memory where the object of present thought is past thought, the gap between present and past being bridged not only by the power of present thought to think the past, but also by the power of past thought to reawaken itself in the present."\textsuperscript{102} That is, if the past thought is presently thought of merely as an event it is merely remembered. But if it is thought as a thought it is present as an activity, that is, it is reactivating itself in the present. Then historical knowledge is had.

Thought which can survive the flow of experience is more than mere consciousness of self; it is self-consciousness, that is, a self-sustaining activity. Thinking implies some standing firm against the flow of immediate experience.

The peculiarity of thought, then, is that it is not mere consciousness but self-consciousness. The self, as merely conscious, is a flow of consciousness, a series of immediate sensations and feelings; but as merely conscious it is not aware of itself as such a flow; it is ignorant of its own continuity through the succession of experiences. The activity of becoming aware of this continuity is what is called thinking.\textsuperscript{103}

I. Historical Thinking as a Rapprochement between Thought and Action, Fact and Theory, History and Philosophy.

According to L. Rubinoff "the unity of thought and action is

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 294.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 306.
...a cardinal principle of Collingwood's philosophy." Collingwood says that he was first motivated to effect this rapprochement by reason of the moral corruption which he regarded as an essential consequence of the realist attitude that theorizing leaves is subject matter intact, that what we think about our actions makes no difference to them. To this he opposes what he regards as the familiar experience of every human being, who

...in his capacity as a moral, political, or economic agent...lives not in a world of 'hard facts' to which 'thoughts' make no difference, but in a world of 'thoughts'; (so) that if you change the moral, political and economic 'theories' generally accepted by the society in which he lives, you change the character of his world; and...if you change his own 'theories' you change his relation to that world; so that in either case you change the ways in which he acts.105

To admit this is to deny that a clear cut distinction can be maintained between philosophy and history, that is, between the facts of one's situation, knowledge of which is historical knowledge and undoubted-ly necessary for action, and philosophical thinking concerned with timeless 'universals' which is not necessary for action. The realist position collapses as soon as the distinction between 'facts' and 'theories' and so between 'history' and 'philosophy' is brought into question.106


106 See Ibid., pp. 147-148.
Although in 1919 his rapprochement between history and philosophy was incomplete, he saw already that the rapprochement between theory and practice was one of intimate and mutual dependence, thought depending on what the thinker learned by experience in action, and action depending upon how he thought of himself and the world. He recognized that scientific, historical and philosophical thinking depended as much on the moral qualities as upon the intellectual qualities of the thinker, and that "moral difficulties were to be overcome not by 'moral' force alone but by clear thinking."107

Historical knowledge of one's past renders the mind capable of acting with respect to projects to be realized in the future.

The past, insofar as it is appropriated into the present, is in that appropriation 'projected' into the future; a mind which has reconstructed its own past becomes a mind which is capable of behaving in new and unpredictable ways.108

Activity as such is both individual and universal (so, together, an object of both history and philosophy). Reflexive or deliberative activity is done having previously conceived in thought the universal plan or idea which is the criterion guiding the conscious realization of the act.

107 Ibid., p. 150.

108 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 306. See also chapter 9, below, pp. 691 et seq.
An act is more than a mere unique individual; it is something having a universal character; and in the case of a reflective or deliberate act (an act which we not only do, but intend to do before doing it) this universal character is the plan or idea of the act which we conceive in our thought before doing the act itself, and the criterion by reference to which, when we have done it, we know that we have done what we meant to do.\textsuperscript{109}

The universality, falsely absolutized by science, is preserved in the predicate of the individual historical judgment.

The individual judgment of history contains within itself, in the shape of its own predicate, the universality of science; and history is shown to be, not something that falls short of scientific accuracy and rationality and demonstrativeness, but something that possesses all this and, going beyond it, finds it exemplified in an individual fact.\textsuperscript{110}

The mental activity which is historical knowledge is not merely activity but is an activity which is together a self discovery and a self making, and the discovery is made in the making.

Historical thinking is therefore not just the discovery of mind but its actualization as well. All thought exists for the sake of action and it is only through such action that the mind's nature is created at all.\textsuperscript{111}


A man is what he knows himself to be capable of doing, and he
knows this through historical knowledge of what man has done in the
past. Man's being is therefore his history.

Knowing yourself means knowing, first, what it is to
be a man; secondly, knowing what it is to be the kind of
man you are; and thirdly, knowing what it is to be the
man you are and nobody else is. Knowing yourself means
knowing what you can do; and since nobody knows what he
can do until he tries, the only clue to what man can do
is what man has done. The value of history then is that
it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is.112

...since the questioning which is the mind's knowledge
of itself, and through which the pure state of speculum
speculi is achieved, is essentially an historical activity,
history is therefore the true science of mind and the true
medium of human self-making.113

This self making activity is an explication of the immanence
of the transcendental conditions of the possibility of all being and
knowing, which is what is religiously called God and philosophically
called the absolute. Historical activity is therefore immanent-tran­
scendent activity.

God or the absolute (or however else you wish to
describe the transcendental a priori ground of the
possibility of all being and knowing) is immanent as well
as transcendent. Thus the activity of finite mind consists
(when it raises itself to the level of science) of an
attempt to render explicit the implicit self-identity of

112 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 10. See also,
chapter 9, below, pp. 692 et seq.

113 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Meta-
physics, p. 301.
absolute knowledge. This activity is precisely what Collingwood means by self-making.114

The historical process therefore is radically different from all natural processes. It is a self making process "in which man creates for himself this or that kind of human nature by recreating in his own thought the past to which he is heir".115 Such an inheritance is possessed not by passive reception of natural transmission but by an active self-giving process which is identical with the very thought by which it is possessed.

There is not, first, a special kind of process, the historical process, and then a special way of knowing this, namely historical thought. The historical process is itself a process of thought, and it exists only insofar as the minds which are parts of it know themselves for parts of it. By historical thinking, the mind whose self-knowledge is history not only discovers within itself those powers of which historical thought reveals the possession, but actually develops those powers from a latent to an actual state, brings them into effective existence.116

This process of self creativity, identified with man's historical, self endowed nature, is not merely a barely factual self knowledge but a critical self knowledge. It consists in knowing also what one is to be in addition to knowing what one is.

114 Ibid., pp. 300-301.
116 Ibid., p. 226. See also pp. 215, 228; also L. Rubinoff, R.G. Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, pp. 303, 308.
Self-creation, moreover, is self-knowledge; not the self-knowledge of introspection, not the examination of the self that is, but an examination of the self that is to be - which is, of course, the very criterion according to which the self makes itself.117

Rubinoff points out that what makes the mind's acts historical according to Collingwood is not just that they happen in time but that they become known through a re-thinking of the thought which created the situation being investigated and thereby coming to understand the situation.118

The self making process of historical existence is thus the active and conscious appropriation of the past. The possibility of such appropriation, that is, the possibility of historical knowledge, makes creative self-making possible.119

Since mind is what it does, and human nature, if it is a name for anything real, is only a name for human activities, this acquisition or ability to perform determinate operations is the acquisition of a determinate human nature. Thus the historical process is a process in which man creates for himself this or that kind of human nature by recreating in his own thought the past to which he is heir.120

117 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 301.
119 See L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 301.
Mind is not something presupposed by history, for history is the very life which the mind is, and the mind is not a mind except in as much as it together lives the historical process and in the living of it knowing itself to be doing what it is doing. The mind is not a substance underlying its acts, to know its acts is to know what itself is. But any study of mind is a study of its activities; if we try to think of a mind absolutely at rest, we are compelled to admit that if it existed at all (which is more than doubtful) at least we should be quite unable to study it.

The difference between what we can and cannot know historically defines the power of a man's mind.

It may thus be said that historical inquiry reveals to the historian the powers of his own mind. Since all he can know historically is thoughts that he can re-think for himself, the fact of his coming to know them shows him that his mind is able (or by the very effort of studying them has become able) to think in these ways. And conversely, whenever he finds certain historical matters unintelligible, he has discovered a limitation of his own mind; he has discovered that there are certain ways in which he is not, or not yet, able to think.

How this knowledge of myself and my capabilities is achieved through historical inquiry is thus explained by Collingwood:

The only way in which I can know my own mind is by performing some mental act or other and then considering

122 Ibid., p. 221.
123 Ibid., p. 218.
what the act is that I have performed. If I want to know what I think about a certain subject, I try to put my ideas about it in order, on paper or otherwise; and then, having thus arranged and formulated them, I can study the result as an historical document and see what my ideas were when I did that piece of thinking: if I am dissatisfied with them, I can do it over again. If I want to know what powers my mind possesses as yet unexplored, for example, whether I can write poetry, I must try to write some and see whether it strikes me and others as being the real thing. If I want to know whether I am as good a man as I hope, or as bad as I fear, I must examine acts that I have done, and understand what they really were: or else go and do some fresh acts and then examine those. All these inquiries are historical. They proceed by studying accomplished facts, ideas that I have thought out and expressed, acts that I have done. On what I have only begun and am still doing, no judgement can as yet be passed.124

Historical rethinking is not merely rethinking but evaluative rethinking, that is, rethinking critically by passing a judgment upon it in terms of the new context of his own mind in which that thought is rethought.

The historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it, criticizes it, forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it. This criticism of the thought whose history he traces is not something secondary to tracing the history of it. It is an indispensable condition of the historical knowledge itself. Nothing could be a completer error concerning the history of thought than to suppose that the historian as such merely ascertains 'what so-and-so-thought', leaving it to some one else to decide 'whether it was true'. All thinking is critical thinking; the

124 Ibid., p. 219.
thought which re-enacts past thoughts, therefore, criticizes them in re-enacting them.\textsuperscript{125}

There is a standard operative in every creative activity by which a man strives to complete his human nature, which is never something fixed. This standard is, in philosophical terms, absolute truth or absolute self-knowledge, or self-knowledge of the absolute. This standard appears to the scientific consciousness under the form of reality and to the religious consciousness under the form of God or the Holy, and to the artistic consciousness under the form of the beautiful.\textsuperscript{126} This standard is made explicit when the self brings it into existence by questioning the grounds of its own being.\textsuperscript{127}

Reflective acts, that is, acts we do on purpose, which are the subject matter of history\textsuperscript{128}, are acts done with knowledge of what we are trying to do, and when done can be compared with their standard, the initial conception of the act, and evaluated according to their conformity with that standard pre-conception. Reflective activity is therefore activity we can perform by knowing in advance how to perform it.\textsuperscript{129} Historical judgment

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 215-216.
\item \textsuperscript{126} See L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 301. See also R.G. Collingwood, \textit{Speculum Mentis}, p. 66, p. 90, p. 120.
\item \textsuperscript{127} See Ibid., p. 301.
\item \textsuperscript{128} See R.G. Collingwood, \textit{The Idea of History}, p. 309.
\item \textsuperscript{129} See Ibid., p. 308.
\end{itemize}
is therefore self-judgment. "It is the historian himself who stands at the bar of judgment, and there reveals his own mind in its strength and weakness, its virtues and its vices."\textsuperscript{130}

Furthermore, the historian does not employ a criterion other than himself. His criterion is himself understood to include everything he knows.

The explicit criterion of mature historical thought is nothing but historical fact itself: the historian asks himself, "Does this fit in with everything I know about the world of facts, the nature of the case, the liability of the informant to error and mendacity, and so forth?\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., p. 219.

\textsuperscript{131} R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 214. H.I. Marrou in The Meaning of History, p. 161, states that the historian brings with him a philosophy of man and of life. "All our ideas about man are instruments whereby we strive to recapture the human past, and are related to a philosophy of man." Again (p. 246): "...there is no true history independent of a philosophy of man and of life.... The truth of history is a function of the truth of the philosophy used by the historian." In this context, W.H. Walsh, "R.G. Collingwood's Philosophy of History," Philosophy, XXII (1947), p. 160, writes: "...we can say with Collingwood that history does give us an understanding of what human beings are and can do. But it is questionable, all the same, whether we ought to see it as the science of human nature (or all that that science can be). The judgments of history, as Collingwood rightly insists, are individual judgments; but unless I am greatly mistaken, there are presupposed in the making of them, certain universal judgments, and it is these, only part of the raw material of which is provided by history, which constitute the science in question. In this connection, the view held at one time by Dilthey is of considerable interest, that behind all the human studies (history ... sociology, etc.) there lies a more fundamental study concerned with human nature." Theodore Litt, in "The Universal in the Structure of Historical Knowledge," in R. Klibansky's and H.J. Paton's Philosophy and History, p. 134, writes: "...in the...case of the investigator of the spiritual world, and in it alone what the thinking mind presupposes forms at the
Thus, to know Plato's philosophy I must re-think it in my own mind in which I am thinking also the thoughts which provide a context in which I can judge that thought of Plato which I re-think. In becoming recontextualized in the context of other thoughts which also exist in my mind I am able to judge it in the light of those other thoughts.  

But in becoming my thought, without losing its objectivity, it is also not merely a self-consciousness but a self-knowledge, that is, a critical study of my own thought, not merely an awareness that I am thinking.

Thus the act of thought in becoming subjective does not cease to be objective; it is the object of a self-knowledge which differs from mere consciousness in being self-consciousness or awareness, and differs from being mere self-consciousness in being self-knowledge: the critical study of one's own thought, not the mere awareness of that thought as one's own.  

J. The Three Ontological Levels of Consciousness and their Logical Correlatives.

Lionel Rubinoff, with profound insight into Collingwood's thought, explains how the dialectical development of the mind is a movement


133 Ibid., p. 292.
from the implicit to the explicit and how this progressive explicitation manifests itself in three distinct ontological levels which are correlated with distinct logical attitudes and therefore highly relevant to the understanding of Collingwood's logic of questioning.

J.i. The Mind's Dialectical Development as an Explication of the Implicit.

The dominating concept of Collingwood's rapprochement logic is that of identity in difference. In his first work, *Religion and Philosophy*, Collingwood argued for the identity between religion, philosophy and history because they are all about the same object, the real world, the totality of existence, or historical fact. *Speculum Mentis* reaffirms this same identity, but in a way which more adequately accounts for the differences between the various standpoints. Whereas *Religion and Philosophy* treated the various forms of experience in too abstract a manner, as univocal expressions of the single act of knowing, as differentials of a univocal genus, *Speculum Mentis* departs "from the more abstractly conceived system of univocal relations which tends to characterize the standpoint of *Religion and Philosophy*," and "gives way to a dialectical system according to which the various sciences form a logical hierarchy or scale of overlapping forms (which) reflects...the dialectical growth of consciousness itself." 134 Collingwood acknowledges that in *Religion

"the identity of the forms of experience is too 'abstract' and does not account for the important 'concrete' distinctions which exist between them."\textsuperscript{135}

This error is overcome by recognition of, and application of the principle of the distinction between the explicit and the implicit referred to above. If one is unable to give a rational account of one's own, or one's observation of another's, experience its principles are said to be implicit or "unconscious." Thus, the primitive world view is made explicit, or explained, when one finds out that for the primitive mind "all things are full of gods." However, before explication by scientific inquiry, this belief is already implicit in the experience in question. In terms of Collingwood's later philosophy this means that an historian or observer can give an account of a given form of experience only in terms of the absolute presuppositions which are implicit in that experience.\textsuperscript{136}

This means that the various standpoints of art, religion, science, history and philosophy are naturally ordered in such a way that each is the explicitation of the principles or presuppositions of the one prior to it on the scale, and implicitly embodies the principles or presuppositions of the one subsequent to it. Thus, religion explicates


\textsuperscript{136} See L. Rubinoff, \textit{Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics}, p. 52, See also chapter 5, above, pp. 322-324.
what is implicit in art, and history explicitates what is implicit in
science, etc. 137

Implicitly then, all of the sciences are about the
same object. In this sense they are identical. This
identity, however, becomes explicit only through the
logical and phenomenological development of consciousness
in the course of which philosophy gradually emerges.
Philosophy is therefore not just one among the variety
of sciences but the ground of the unity of this variety. 138

Rubinoff argues convincingly that Collingwood's works are
instances of the distinction between implicit and explicit. 139

For Collingwood, the answer to the question 'what is beauty?'
presupposes the answer to the question 'what is mind? ', and, granted
certain presuppositions about the nature of mind, such as that it is
identical with its acts, and that it makes itself through its acts, that
is, that it undergoes dialectical development, it follows that reality
and truth are subject to the same dialectical self-making. 140 Mind, is
thus not something distinct from its appearances, but rather it is those
appearances inasmuch as they are not univocally but dialectically related
according to a scale of forms which presents one form of knowledge as it
grows out of another as a result of internal strains deriving from innate

137 See L. Rubinoff, _Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics_, p. 53. Refer also to the clockface illustration of chapter 3, above, pp. 108-111, see also chapter 4, above, pp. 133-135.

138 L. Rubinoff, _Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics_, p. 53.

139 See Ibid., p. 53.

140 See Ibid., p. 54.
inconsistences in the earlier form.  

J.ii. The ab extra and ab intra Moments of Philosophy’s Criticism of Experience from the Absolute Standpoint.

Philosophy is an absolute standpoint which views all the standpoints as interrelated by internal, dialectical relations. Rubinoff explains that the philosophical master-criticism of experience is effected in two ways. One way is as a form of internal criticism, in which philosophy assumes the standpoint of a particular point of view, such as religion or art, and reveals and defends the presuppositions of, and thus justifies the validity of that standpoint. This is called ab intra criticism. The other form of philosophical criticism is ab extra, or from the absolute standpoint, that is, according to criteria that transcend every particular standpoint. Dogmatism is the

141 See Ibid., pp. 53-54.

142 See Ibid., pp. 53-54. See also above, chapter 3, the clockface illustration, pp. 108-111.

143 See his Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 60.

144 Ibid., pp. 60-61. See also p. 63: "The above distinction between ab intra and ab extra is offered in part as a more adequate rendering of a distinction, which Collingwood himself introduces in Speculum Mentis, between the crude but popular conception of dogmatic philosophy and the more sophisticated conception of critical philosophy (SM, 254; see also EPM, 217-20). Dogmatic philosophy, writes Collingwood, is generally regarded "as the procedure of thought without inquiry into its own powers", while critical philosophy is "the investigation by thought itself of the limitations of its capacity" (SM, 254)."
absolutization of any particular standpoint, and dogmatic philosophy is
philosophy degraded to the status of a particular standpoint among other
particular standpoints and thus conceived "as the science of criticism",
rather than a standpoint that transcends, and includes within its own,
all other standpoints. But this dogmatic "claim to truth of an
erroneous standpoint is a necessary stage in the therapeutic process which
begins with the discovery of an error and ends with its correction."

The critic has a double task. As historian he must disclose
the presuppositions lying at the basis of any particular standpoint. As
philosopher, at the same time, he must judge and reveal the error at the
basis of those presuppositions, which disclosure becomes the basis of a
new standpoint which will be more satisfactory in terms of its ability to
explain experience.

It is the very essence of a dialectical development
that each phase in it should contain the next implicitly,
and it is this implicit presence of elements which are,
as it were, submerged in the immediacy of a particular
phase. Every phase of experience is implicit in its
predecessor, and therefore it is not surprising that
science should be implicit in religion; but the scientific
content in tabu and the like is felt not as science but
as religion.

145 See L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Meta-
physics, p. 61.
146 Ibid.
147 See Ibid., p. 62.
Rubinoff points out that dialectical criticism, like metaphysics is both historical and the medium by which the mind makes itself. Thus, dialectical history is a dialectical drama manifesting a kind of dramatic inevitability, which is a form of creative rationality, and not to be confused with either logical deduction or metaphysical determinism. Dialectical history both recounts past errors and, in doing so, shows that each error has made its contribution to present day knowledge.  

J.iii. The Ontological Levels of ab intra Criticism and their Logical Correlatives.

Rubinoff shows that superimposed on the aforesaid methodological distinction of ab intra and ab extra inquiry is the distinction of the operation of the former on three distinct but related ontological levels, or "soundings" in the terminology of the New Leviathan.  

These levels are not simply three self-contained types like the co-ordinate species of a genus, nor are they three pigeon holes into which experiences may be conveniently sorted. They are, on the contrary, a scale of dynamically changing and overlapping forms, having a natural order of their own and subject to a special set of rules. Experience, in other words, undergoes a logical and dialectical development not only from one form of experience to another (from art to religion, for example) but also, within each of the five major forms of experience, from one level to another.  

150 See Ibid., p. 66.  
151 Ibid.
Each of these three ontological levels, on which each of the five forms of experience may exist, correlates with a definite logical attitude, and so is of great importance to understand Collingwood's dialectical logic of rapprochement.

The first ontological level on which any form of experience is realized is unequivocal and dogmatic regarding its interpretation of itself. Two presuppositions characterize first level dogmatism, the first is that each form is fixed and self identical, the second is that that particular viewpoint represents an absolute viewpoint.

At the first ontological level each of the particular forms makes an unequivocal and dogmatic interpretation of its own essential nature... First-level dogmatism rests on two fundamental presuppositions. The first is that each form has a fixed and given self-identical nature. The second is that the particular conception of reality implied by any given standpoint is the only true and valid one, which itself presupposes that there is only one true view of reality (SM, 41). The theoretical moment of each standpoint, in other words, presents itself not simply as a dogmatic Weltanschauung but as a Weltanschauungslehre. Thus, for example, not only does art assert itself as pure imagination, but the qualities which define the objects of imagination are extended to the entire world of reality. It is not surprising, then, that such philosophies as exist at this level tend to assume an attitude of total indifference, if not intolerance, to any other interpretation of reality.152

The logical attitude characteristic of first level dogmatism is that of equivocality. Each standpoint recognizes itself only and allows

152 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
nothing in common with any other standpoint. Two standpoints, as far as first level dogmatism is concerned, are related purely equivocally.

In second level dogmatism, which arises as a result of the dialectical interplay between ab intra and ab extra approaches, any particular standpoint relinquishes its exclusiveness, and recognizes that it is one among a number of different standpoints.

As a consequence of the dialectical interplay between the ab intra and ab extra approaches, however, consciousness is forced to the recognition that the absolute presuppositions of the first level of criticism are inconsistent. Once it is realized that each standpoint, as defined at the first level, rests upon a false distinction, consciousness is obliged to redefine the nature of each standpoint and start anew. Each standpoint will now conceive of itself as only one of a number of equally valid standpoints and proceed to define itself accordingly. Thus art, for example, which at the first level posits itself as the only fundamental mode of existence, co-exists at the second level with other forms whose validity and claims to knowledge it no longer denies. Likewise, each of the other forms conceives of itself as one of a number of equally valid and true standpoints, which arise as a result of the various ways in which mind views what is essentially the same object. At the same time each form recognizes that it has a history which to some extent exemplifies the influence which the other forms have had upon it. 153

Comparing this second with the subsequent, third ontological level of consciousness, there are two differences, namely, submission to

153 Ibid., p. 68.
the subject-object dichotomy, and acquiescence in abstract, propositional logic, in which a particular form of experience regards itself as one species among other species, united as diverse species of one abstract, univocal genus. **Genus-species, propositional logic is therefore correlated with Rubinoff's second ontological level of consciousness.**

But the philosophy or reflective-theoretical moment which seeks to justify this point of view is characterized by two peculiarities which set it apart from the third level. In the first place, at the second level, consciousness has not yet overcome the subject-object distinction - the negation of which is the differentia of absolute philosophy. It therefore continues to posit the object of each form as an independently existing entity. In the second place, second-level consciousness treats each form as though it were the species of a genus, and any overlap which exists is therefore treated as a mere overlap of extension between classes - that is, the forms are externally related through the simple mediation of the universal genus.154

Self-transcendence as a result of dialectical interplay between **ab intra and ab extra** consciousness results in the third ontological level of experience in which rapprochement between the forms is accomplished, and the subject-object dichotomy, characteristic of realism and propositional logic, is transcended. This is the truly philosophical level in which each form constituting the life of the mind is seen to be, not the species of a genus, but an overlap of intension between concepts in dialectical, internal relationship one with the others.

154 Ibid.
...again, as a result of the dialectical interplay between the ab intra and the ab extra, consciousness transcends itself. The relation between subject and object becomes one of dialectical identity while the relation among the forms becomes one of rapprochement. The result is the discovery of a new and higher level of existence in which philosophy treats each form not as the species of a genus, but as a member of a scale of forms whose overlap is an overlap of intension between concepts or categories rather than an overlap of extension between classes. As Collingwood himself puts it in An Essay on Philosophical Method, each category in its degree specifies its "generic" essence, but each embodies it more adequately than the one below. Or, to put it another way, according to the logic of the overlap of classes the generic essence is immanent in or identical with the variable element.155

Rubinoff cites Collingwood in describing this principle of rapprochement philosophy.

...our five forms of experience are not five abstractly self-identical types of event which, by their recurrence in a fixed or changing order, constitute human experience; but types whose recurrence perpetually modifies them, so that they shade off into one another and give rise to new determinations at every turn.156

It is only at this third level, says Rubinoff,157 that for the first time there is introduced the possibility of a genuine philosophy of history, mind, and nature, etc. And it is only at this level that are


156 R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 86.

transcended both the prejudice and intolerance of vicious (first level) dogmatism, and the pseudo liberal-humanism of "toleration", for genuine community of intersubjectivity.  

The logical attitude to which this third ontological level corresponds is that of analogical thinking. Thus, says Rubinoff, for Aristotle, being qua being is to be understood as being qua modes of being and the categories are consequently to be understood as the various modes through which being expresses itself. Substance, Aristotle's highest category, is itself a scale of forms which leads to the notion of a highest substance. Being thus is not a genus, not an abstract, univocal class concept.

Since being is not a genus, the categories are not species each of which expresses the genus in precisely the same way; nor is substance a genus, dispersing itself into a plurality of substances. On the contrary the categories are a scale of forms each of which expresses the essence of being more adequately than the one below.

The basic problem which Aristotle faces is the problem of relating the 'manyness' of being to its 'unity'. He solves it by speaking of the many as unified through relation, each in its own way, to one central point. The term being not only extensively includes the group of

158 See Ibid., p. 69.
159 See Ibid., p. 188.
160 Ibid.
beings as a whole, as does a univocal, abstract class concept, but also refers intensively to what each of the members of that group have in common. 161

Collingwood's solution to Aristotle's problem, following Hegel, is, according to Rubinoff, only through the realization that being or reality is not some permanent and eternal substance, but rather a constantly changing activity which, as Hegel said, is nothing other than mind knowing itself. Thus, Collingwood locates the object of knowledge (being) within the mind. Being remains, as it was for Aristotle, a plurality of activities related (each in its own way) to the highest being. But the highest being is not, as it was for Aristotle, a separately existing, eternal substance, but, on the contrary, an immanent-transcendent activity which Collingwood calls absolute mind, 162 whose absolute standpoint, having as its object all other standpoints together with its own, is the object of philosophy.

In his earlier Ruskin's Philosophy Collingwood contrasts the logicist method (the classificatory method of abstract science) with the synthesizing historicist method in terms of what he calls the technique

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161 See Ibid., p. 189.

162 In the clockface illustration of chapter 3, above, pp. 108-111, the absolute viewpoint of philosophy is represented by the view of one situated at the centre of radiation of the hands of the clock, and able to recognise the clock as a clock, together with all its hand positions at once.
of "analogy", which he regards as the only appropriate one for studying the relations between the various activities of mind.\(^{163}\)

This analogical method of reasoning...is a weapon of immense power, clearing the ground of unnecessary argument and accompanying a vast amount of varied work with the least possible waste of energy.\(^{164}\)

According to Rubinoff, Collingwood's method of analogy contrasts both with the univocal attitude towards the mind's activities, which attitude believes that there is no distinction between the faculties, and with the equivocal attitude towards them, which attitude believes, on the contrary, that the mind's activities are a set of equivocals proceeding from different faculties.\(^{165}\)

This distinction, implicit in Collingwood's works, and brought to explicitness by Rubinoff, is necessary to achieve rapprochement between Collingwood's earlier and later writings, which otherwise give the appearance of insoluble antinomies.

This three fold distinction - which is crucial not only for the purpose of reconstructing and understanding Collingwood's thought but also for establishing a continuity

\(^{163}\) See L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 228.


between his early and later writings - is not one which is explicitly formulated by Collingwood himself. It is justified, however, not only by implication but by certain distinctions which Collingwood does make in various places for the purpose of elucidating his subject matter. 166

K. The Archaeology of Roman Britain and the Development of Collingwood’s Logic of Questioning.

Collingwood's philosophical development was intimately tied to his constant engagement in historical studies, 167 and, conversely his philosophical convictions greatly influenced his methods of procedure in his historical researches, and, in the opinion of colleagues, not always to the best advantage. 168 He specialized in archaeology, specifically the archaeology of Roman Britain, and after the war of 1914-1918 he was the only surviving pupil of his master Haverfield and the only Oxford trained Roman Britain Specialist. In 1921 he wrote, in two days, a short elementary book on Roman Britain, about which he said that it served to lay down once for all my general attitude towards problems, and, even more important my general conception (due to Haverfield, but partly different from

166 L. Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics, p. 69.
167 R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 120.
168 See I.A. Richmond, "An Appreciation of R.G. Collingwood as an Archaeologist", (accompanying obituary notice), The Proceedings of the British Academy, XXIX (1943), p. 476: "Here...emerged in rather crude form a tendency, which marked and sometimes marred his work, to drive the evidence hard and to build upon it a series of conclusions whose very artistry disguised the inherent weakness of foundation."
his) of what the problems were; it gave me the first
to opportunity of finding out, more clearly than was
possible within the limits of a short article, how
my conception of historical research was developing...

An enlarged edition of this work appeared ten years later (1931)
which had to be revised again in 1934, the same year he wrote the British
section in Tenney Frank's Economic Survey of Ancient Rome. In 1935 he
wrote the sections on prehistoric Britain for the Oxford History of England.
The invitation to write these large scale volumes gave him the welcome and
timely opportunity to exchange the field laboratory for study, arrangement
and publication of what he had hitherto learned as a result of all this
archaeological and historical work regarding the philosophy of history.
He says that a full length book on Roman Britian "would serve to display
in a concrete form the principles of historical thinking as I now under-
stood them." Long practice in archaeology taught Collingwood that the
most important condition of success is that the person responsible for the
digging should know exactly why he is doing it. The central principle of
Collingwood's logic of question and answer as applicable to archaeology
is that the director of the digging "must first decide what he wants to
find out, and then decide what kind of digging will show it to him."

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170 Ibid., p. 121.
171 Ibid., p. 122. It was the implementation of this principle
which drew upon Collingwood the criticism of I.A. Richmond, as noted
immediately above (n.168 ). On pp. 478-479 of cit., Richmond comments
as follows: "...Collingwood's powers of analysis and appreciation outshone
Collingwood criticises early archaeology in which digging was done blindly with no definite question formulated whose answer was being sought. He severely criticized the choosing of excavation sites for purposes other than that it contains the solution to a burning problem, such as choices made which would attract financial contributions to finance digging operations. Historians themselves needed to be made aware of the fecundity of the Baconian revolution in their own field.

If historical studies were to pass through a Baconian revolution - the revolution which converts a blind and random study into one where definite questions are asked and definite answers insisted upon - the first thing to be done was to preach that revolution among historians themselves.172

Some, but very little, progress in this regard had been made when Collingwood began his study of Roman Britain, but Haverfield, under his ability in field work. His attitude to excavation was profoundly influenced by the selective method of excavation, introduced and perfected by F.G. Simpson on Hadrian's Wall: and the first lesson which he drew from these methods, that excavations should be conducted with specific problems in mind upon sites likely to provide an answer, was salutary and useful. But Collingwood's corollary, that to pose a problem permitted its answer to be predicted, was a product of the study rather than the field. For there are problems thus soluble, particularly those purely philosophical problems which it was Collingwood's daily task to consider. But to the field-worker excavation, no matter how carefully planned in advance, is always a plunge in the dark: and, while problems under consideration form a more regular pattern on Hadrian's Wall than on most Roman monuments, even there no excavation has ever followed a preconceived course: the expected is always accompanied, and often overshadowed, by the unexpected: and while Collingwood's favourite dictum, that 'what you are not looking for you do not see,' is of wide application, an excavator's first duty is to see everything without the blinkers, imposed by pre-arranged concentration of vision." Refer to chapter 7, below, pp. 501-502.

whose guidance Collingwood was trained, and his colleagues had fully implemented the Baconian method of systematic interrogation in their diggings with great success at comparatively little cost.

Haverfield and his colleagues of the Cumberland Excavation Committee in the eighteen nineties had been consciously and completely Baconian in their methods. They never dug a trench without knowing exactly what information they were looking for; they knew both that this information was the next thing they needed for the progress of their study, and also that this trench would give it them. That is why they could settle highly intricate and abstruse problems at a cost of never more, and often much less, than 30 or 40 pounds a year.173

Collingwood criticises excavations done according to the principles of General Pitt-Rivers during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. He acknowledges Pitt-Rivers as "a very great archaeologist and a supreme master in the technique of excavation" but severely criticises the pre-Baconian stage of his problem-solving methods, for "(h)e dug in order to see what he could find out. He had not applied to archaeology the famour advice of Lord Acton, 'study problems, not periods.'"174

In addition to this first principle which should guide historical and archaeological research, that the whole work should be the

173 Ibid.

solving of a definite problem guided by definite and methodical questioning. Collingwood adds a second, to the effect that history does not study events but actions which express an agent's intention.

(S)ince history proper is the history of thought, there are no mere 'events' in history: what is miscalled an 'event' is really an action, and expresses some thought (intention, purpose) of its agent; the historian's business is therefore to identify this thought. 175

Applied to archaeological work, this means that all objects must be interpreted in terms of purposes, and that the question to be asked about any object found is 'What is it for?' followed by the question 'Was it good or bad for that purpose?', that is, 'Does this object successfully or unsuccessfully embody that purpose?' Such questions, being historical questions, can be answered not by guesswork but only according to historical evidence, which means that anyone who offers an answer to those questions must be able to show that his answer is the one which the evidence demands. 176

In an article "The Purpose of the Roman Wall" 177 Collingwood opposed the currently accepted vague description of the wall as a frontier defense, maintaining that the more precise explanation is that it was an

176 See Ibid., p. 128.
177 In The Vasculum, VIII, 1, pp. 4-9.
elevated sentry-walk. He reached this conclusion by asking such questions as 'How did it work?' 'Was it intended to work like a town-wall from the top of which defenders could repel attacks?' The question-answer procedure involved is as follows:

A question answered causes another question to arise. If the Wall was a sentry-walk, elevated from the ground and provided (no doubt) with a parapet to protect the sentries against sniping, the same sentry-walk must have continued down the Cumberland coast, beyond Bowness-on-Solway, in order to keep watch on vessels moving in the estuary; for it would have been very easy for raiders to sail across and land at any unguarded point between Bowness and St. Bee's Head. But here the sentry walk need not be elevated, for sniping was not to be feared. There ought, therefore to be a chain of towers, not connected by a wall but otherwise resembling those on the Wall, stretching down that coast. The question was, did such towers exist? 178

The evidence with which Collingwood alleges he was able to supply that answer was provided by a "search in old archaeological publications" which "showed that towers of exactly the right kind had been found; but their existence had been forgotten, as generally happens with things whose purpose is not understood." 179

178 Ibid., p. 219.
179 Ibid. This evidence seems to be somewhat embarrassing to the very point Collingwood is making. For the very condition upon which the question is answerable, namely the existence of old archaeological records, which would not have existed unless the excavators, whose work was recorded in those publications, noted not only something they sought as answers to their own precise questions, but, contrary to Collingwood's advice, but also 'whatever may have been of interest.'
Not merely archaeology, but every kind of history operates on the principle of getting to the thought behind the deed and not merely stopping at the event. The event is the deed in its externals, that is, as described 'from the outside', whereas the thought is the 'inside' of the deed, the purposefulness of the activity which it is the historian's business to penetrate and disclose. Written sources testify to the invasion of Britain by Julius Caesar on two successive years. These are 'events.' Collingwood criticizes historians for scarcely asking 'Why did he do it?' which question relevantly arises given that information. Comparison of the strength of Caesar's expeditionary force with that sent over by Claudius nearly a century before settled for Collingwood that the answer to that question was that Caesar did not intend merely a punitive expedition but complete conquest of the country. Caesar's silence suggests that he intended concealment of his purpose since he failed to achieve it. Consistently with what he said earlier regarding Villeneuve's plan at the Battle of Trafalgar, that since he failed to implement it in action we had no way of knowing what it was, Collingwood admits that his answer to the question regarding Caesar's intention to send expeditionary forces to Britain may be mistaken, but "future historians will have to reckon with the question I have raised, and either accept my answer or come up with a better one,"¹⁸⁰ since this answer is the only answer to that question which the available evidence authorises one to give.

A third principle arises from Collingwood's reflections over his years of archaeological practice, namely, that "no historical problem should be studied without studying what I called its second-order history; that is, the history of historical thought about it,"\footnote{Ibid., p. 132.} and "(j)ust as philosophical criticism resolved itself into the history of philosophy, so historical criticism resolved itself into the history of history."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 123-133.}

Collingwood says that archaeology especially exemplifies his historical principles, since its sources are not pre-existing narratives which could function as 'authorities', but are what is usually referred to as 'unwritten sources', so that here, in archaeology, "the issue raised by the project of a Baconian revolution is unmistakable."\footnote{Ibid.}

When history is based on literary sources the difference between scissors-and-paste, or pre-Baconian history where the historian merely repeats what his 'authorities' tell him, and scientific or Baconian history, where he forces his 'authorities' to answer the questions he puts to them, is not always quite clear. It becomes clear enough on occasion; for example, when he tries to get out of his 'authorities' the answer to a question which they did not expect a reader to ask (as when we try to get out of an ancient writer answers to economic and demographic questions) or when he tries to get out of them facts which they wished to conceal. On other occasions it sometimes does not leap to the eye. In archaeology, however, it is obvious. Unless the archaeologist is content merely to describe what he or someone else has found, which it is almost impossible
to do without using some interpretative terms implying purpose, like 'wall', 'pottery', 'implement', 'hearth', he is practising Baconian history all the time: asking about everything he handles 'What is this for?' and trying to see how it fitted into the context of a peculiar kind of life. 184

Collingwood says that for this reason archaeology provides an extremely sensitive method for getting answers to questions which are not answerable by appeal to literary sources, even by the most ingenious interpretation of them. The modern historian wants to ask all kinds of questions which are basically statistical, but the sources from which he has to get his answer were written by men not statistically minded, and statistical evidence is required if you want to answer statistical questions. This kind of evidence is something the archaeologist can provide when his work has reached a certain volume. In England, where Roman archaeology has unceasingly progressed ever since the seventeenth century, there is a great bulk of material from which many questions of a statistical kind can be answered, if not conclusively, at least within a reasonable margin of error. 185

Collingwood says that, in order to get to the purpose underlying an event, the first thing is to ask oneself what can be expected as the normal development in such cases, but if the event is exceptional

184 Ibid., p. 133.
then exceptional conditions have to be sought.

If you want to know why a certain kind of thing happened in a certain kind of case, you must begin by asking, 'What did you expect?' You must consider what the normal development is in cases of that kind. Only then, if the thing that happened in this case was exceptional, should you try to explain it by appeal to exceptional conditions.\footnote{Ibid., p. 140. But a certain inconsistency seems to be involved here, if we take into consideration what Collingwood said earlier in the Autobiography, p. 106, that "(r)ules of conduct keep action at a low potential because they involved a certain blindness to the realities of the situation. If action was to be raised to a higher potential, the agent must open his eyes wider and see more clearly the situation in which he was acting." Now, hereabove, Collingwood tells us to organize questions in terms of the normal and in terms of the exceptional to the norm. This seems to suggest that high grade thinking presupposes low grade thinking, or thinking according to rules. For, how are we to recognize the exceptional, so as to ask what are its exceptional conditions, if presupposed to this line of questioning is not had the idea of the normal, or what is in accord with rules, which Collingwood himself has stigmatized as low grade thinking? This is an indication of what will be exposed later, in chapter 9 (see below, pp. 711 etseq) that natural law thinking, and its propositional logic, which is the principle of intelligibility in scientific thought, enjoys its own sui generis autonomy in relation to the dialectical unfolding of self developing consciousness, which is meaningful in relation to the personal interests of human freedom.}
of Roman tastes in these matters? Several theories prevailed; one, the
tradition never really died but survived and ran concurrently with the
Romanized tradition, another, some Celtic tribes escaped submission to
Roman rule and retransmitted the preserved culture after Roman withdrawal.
A third theory was to posit a Celtic temperament which required definite
conditions for its flowering, which conditions prevailed before and after
but not during the Roman period.

Against the first and second opinions Collingwood argued that
there was no evidence for such survival and "no historian is entitled to
draw cheques in his own favour on evidence that he does not possess,
however lively his hopes that it may hereafter be discovered." Against
the third opinion, Collingwood rejects the psychological invocation of
occult entities such as Celtic temperament as a substitute for historical
evidence. Collingwood concluded that difficulties in solving the problem
derived probably from a misconception of the nature of the historical
process. Recalling what he had discussed in his small work Libellus de
Generatione he said that "any process involving an historical change
from \( P_1 \) to \( P_2 \) leaves an unconverted residue of \( P_1 \) incapsulated within an
historical state of things which superficially is altogether \( P_2 \)."

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188 Ibid., pp. 140-141.
Anticipating a rebound from the psychologists, objecting that he himself is involved in the process of introducing occult entities in speaking of encapsulation, Collingwood replies that "(i)ncapsulation is not an 'occult entity'" but "my name for such facts as this...that a man who changes his habits, thoughts, etc., retains in the second phase some residue of the first." The desire to smoke in a man who gives up smoking survives, not in smoking, but in the form of an unsatisfied desire. If he later resumes smoking that does not prove that he never gave up smoking but perhaps that he never lost the desire, which may again be satisfied when the reasons against its satisfaction no longer prevail. Something similar happens in regard to the continuity of a tradition without implying a 'racial temperament' or 'racial unconscious' or other such 'occult entities.'

If the members of a certain society have been in the habit of acting or thinking in certain ways, and if at a certain time they try to stop acting and thinking in those ways, and do their best to act and think in different ways, the desire to go on acting and thinking in the old way will probably persist. It will certainly persist, and persist in a lively form, if they were accustomed to think and act in those ways very effectively and found great satisfaction in doing so. The tendency to revert to the old ways would in that case be very strong.

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189 Ibid., p. 141. This survival of an earlier stage in a later stage of development is what Collingwood calls The Law of Primitive Survivals in The New Leviathan, p. 65, pgph. 9.51. See also Alan Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, p. 28.

Collingwood faces the objection that such a tendency would not survive into a second generation unless there were something of the kind called an occult entity, like racial temperament or inheritance of acquired characteristics, and that he is therefore talking psychology. His reply is that "I am not talking psychology, and shall not ask help from its exponents; for I regard the kind of psychology that deals with this kind of question as a sham science. I am talking history." A warlike people at a certain historical crisis turns peaceful; its warlike tendencies survive in the first generation and are sternly repressed; the moral education of the children carefully points out that they must on no account indulge in the forbidden pleasures of war. The parent is asked 'What is War?' In explaining, emphasising the moral wrongness of war, the parent makes plain that war was a great thing while it lasted and that he would love to fight his neighbors again if only he did not know that he ought not. The children thus learn not only that war is wrong but that it was something grand and pass this on to their own children.

Thus the transmission by educational means of any moral ideal which involves the outlawry of an institution or custom, and the repression of a desire for it, entails the simultaneous transmission of that desire itself. The children of each generation are taught to want what they are taught they must not have.

191 Ibid., p., 143.
192 Ibid.
Where the new ways prove successful and satisfying the old ways will disappear more rapidly. But where the new ways are displayed with only a mediocre degree of success you can be sure that the discarded ways are remembered with regret and that "the tradition of their glories is being tenaciously kept alive." 193

Applying this to the then current problem of the revival of Celtic art he was able to establish that there was in fact a connection between two well known facts hitherto not thought to be connected, namely, the badness of Romanizing British art on the one hand and the Celtic revival on the other. The applied principle also unexpectedly threw light on another puzzling fact, namely, the recognized masterpiece of the degenerate period, the famous Bath Gorgon which was shown to be inspired, not by the 'classical' art, but by Celtic art, and was probably not the work of Briton but of Gaul. 194

While he recognizes that the "use of epigraphic material is a magnificent exercise for an historian just beginning to shake himself free from the scissors-and-paste mentality" 195 Collingwood says that "the

193 Ibid.
194 See Ibid., p. 144.
195 Ibid., p. 145.
epigraphic historian as such can never be wholly Baconian in spirit" for "regarded as documents, inscriptions tell you less, under critical scrutiny, than literary texts..."\textsuperscript{196} He says that inscriptions themselves were of little service to his Romano-British studies\textsuperscript{197} and "on the questions which I particularly wanted to ask it happened that inscriptions threw hardly any light."\textsuperscript{198} Such work he regarded as building a monument to the past rather than forging a weapon for the future of historical research.\textsuperscript{199}

L. Retrospect and Prospect.

The foregoing chapters have attempted to expose Collingwood's theory of the logic of question and answer as this is alleged by him to be the proper logical instrument of historical thought. Firstly, Collingwood's underscoring of the existence of such a logic hitherto neglected by logicians was considered (chapter 1) and then Collingwood's theory of knowledge as identical with the activity of question and answer was examined (chapter 2). Chapter 4 considered the concrete character of this logic and its concrete and logical basis, the concrete universal, which Collingwood alleges to be "the daily bread of every historian." Chapters 3 and 5 examined Collingwood's position regarding supposition as basic to

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., p. 146.
\textsuperscript{197} See Ibid., p. 145.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., p. 146.
\textsuperscript{199} See Ibid.
questioning inasmuch as it is an activity of the mind, and presupposing as providing the logical efficacy of the arising of relevant questions. Chapter 6 investigated Collingwood's notion of history as the unfolding of mind, which unfolds itself by a self creative activity, which activity, identical with the very existence of the mind, is a process of question and answer, a "raising and solving of problems."

It now remains to review Collingwood's theories exposed above, in order to critically evaluate them and endeavour to separate out what is acceptable from what is to be emended or rejected. Two major points form the basis of the following considerations. First, Collingwood's identification of the questioning and answering activity with knowledge will be critically evaluated and found to be not totally in accordance with facts, especially with the facts of scientific discovery. This will be the concern of chapter 7, which chapter will also partially deal with Collingwood's identification of propositional meaning with its role in answering a relevant question.

Chapter 8 will criticise Collingwood for neglecting to give due consideration to an already well developed logic of interrogation in the Aristotelian tradition, and, in terms of that logic, the criticism will be made that Collingwood himself proceeds by a defective order of questioning.

Chapter 9 will investigate the questioning methodology which many historians, in agreement with Collingwood, allege to be the proper
procedure of historical thought. An important correlation will be made between the concrete universal as exposed by Collingwood and the concrete unity in diversity in human consciousness effected by linguistic communication which operates basically by a question and answer process. It will be shown, in agreement with Collingwood, that man, inasmuch as he is a being who increasingly acquires command over his self development through free, creative, developing self consciousness, has a history which unfolds as a process of raising and solving problems. By historical knowledge, past achievements are constantly renewed in present consciousness as promise of future progress by a critical, questioning activity centred on the vestiges of the human past. But Collingwood will be criticised for absorbing all human activity and all human meaning into that which is created by unfolding consciousness. It will be shown that the natural world, including man's consciousness as this is part of the natural world, in addition to being meaningful in relation to freely posited human projects, has also a meaning in its own right, and that science, inasmuch as it is concerned about this natural world, enjoys its own autonomous domain of competence without being absorbed into history. Propositional meaning will be shown to be of two kinds, one in relation to freely posited human projects and interests, which meaning consists precisely in the proposition's function as answering a question, which question articulates the historically determined human interest of the questioner. But it will likewise be shown, in opposition to Collingwood, that propositions, as also saying something about the natural world, have a meaning in themselves,
quite distinct from their capacity to answer questions (though not necessarily separate from that capacity).

Chapter 10 will endeavour to come to grips with the logic of questioning at the basis of history in terms of trying to show how human progress in the raising and solving of problems, which basically characterises human history, is subject to rational and logical direction.
THE LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER

AND

ITS RELEVANCE TO HISTORICAL THOUGHT

ACCORDING TO

R.G. COLLINGWOOD

by

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KNOWLEDGE AS QUESTION AND ANSWER

A. Criticism of Collingwood's Attack on Realism.

Collingwood's reasons for identifying knowledge with the activity of raising and answering questions is, not surprisingly, historical in origin. On his own account in his Autobiography this identification is his reaction to Cook Wilson's position that "knowledge makes no difference to what is known."¹ He criticizes Alexander who recommends to metaphysicians to adopt "an attitude of natural piety"² consequent upon Alexander's description of knowledge "as the mere 'compresence' of a mind with an object."³ He criticizes the Positivists' attitude that "if the function of thought is to classify observed facts, there must be facts available for classification before thought can begin to operate." Thought, for them is basically a passive submission to facts "and once facts are available there is no need to presuppose anything. You just set to work and classify them."⁴ Throughout Collingwood's works there is the overriding presupposition of the pure activity of the mind, expressed in the statement that "the mind is what it does"⁵ which is

¹ R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 44.
³ Ibid., p. 177.
⁴ Ibid., p. 146.
⁵ R.G. Collingwood, Religion and Philosophy, p. 34; see also A. Shalom, R.G. Collingwood, Philosophe et historien, p. 7. See also chapter 6 above, pp. 371-382.
essentially tied up with the assertion that "thought is primarily practical; and only in the second place theoretical".\(^6\) "Man's mind is made of thought"\(^7\), and in this activity of thinking, the questioning activity, the mind determines itself to be the kind of thing that it is. Even though "for a man about to act, the situation is his master, his oracle, his god" nevertheless "the freedom that there is in history consists in the fact that this compulsion is imposed upon the activity of human reason not by anything else, but by itself."\(^8\)

Collingwood argues that realistic attitudes, according to which the mind in knowing would simply be submissive to an external object, which enjoys some identity in itself independently of its being known by the mind, and to which "knowledge makes no difference," spells bankruptcy in moral matters and political affairs.\(^9\)

But Collingwood's extreme reaction to the realists' position which maintains that "knowledge makes no difference to what is known" seems to be based on a naive and simplistic interpretation of that statement by Cook Wilson. For exactly the same reasons we could reject Col-


\[^7\] Ibid.


lingwood's own theory of conscious reflection.

Colour, or anger, which is no longer merely seen or felt but attended to, is still colour or anger, when we become conscious of it, it is still the very same colour and the very same anger. But the total experience of seeing or feeling it has undergone a change, and in that change what we see or feel is correspondingly changed... the change which Hume describes by speaking of the difference between an impression and an idea.10

Just as feelings attentively reflected upon remain feelings (although becoming conscious feelings) so also things known remain the things that they are although, in knowledge, they become known. It is in this sense that knowledge makes no difference to what is known, just as becoming conscious of our feelings makes no difference to feelings inasmuch as they still remain feelings. If realism is to be rejected because it asserts that knowledge makes no difference to what is known, so likewise Collingwood's various levels of conscious reflection are to be rejected. Collingwood takes the dictum "knowledge makes no difference to what is known" as if it meant that the situation of knowing leaves affairs just as they were if no knowing were done. If I know that arsenic is deadly poisonous, my knowledge is not going to make one bit of difference to the poisoning capacity of arsenic, but it will certainly make a great deal of difference to the way I behave in regard to arsenic. Thus, it will be restrained as regards its opportunities to poison, given that I know its poisoning potential.

So, knowledge both does and does not make a difference to what is known, just as the attention by which I become conscious of my feelings does and does not make a difference to those feelings. The feelings become conscious feelings and subjected to my control, but they do not thereby cease to be feelings. Arsenic still poisons just as much after I know this as it does before, but it ceases to have some opportunities of doing so. The Cook Wilson realists in asserting one aspect of knowledge are not thereby denying the other aspect, just as when Collingwood asserts that attention makes no difference to feelings (as feelings) he is not denying that consciousness makes a great deal of difference to feelings (which are transformed into domesticated, objectivized, regulated feelings). John Wild neatly expresses the matter as follows:

The act of knowing internally relates itself to the object known. To attain such knowledge makes an important difference to the knower. But this relation is wholly external to the entity known, which suffers no real internal change from being known.11

In his act of knowing a knower is really related to what he knows by that act. That is, being related to the object known belongs to what it is to be an act of knowing; it is constitutive of the act in its very being an act of knowledge. But, in being known, the thing known gets its relation to the act of knowledge in that act in the knower, not in its own entity. The moon is known to be a moon not in the moon itself

but in the mind of an observer. The manifestness which it acquires in becoming known is not a change internal to it. A known moon is not a different kind of moon from a real moon. Whatever change becoming known effects, it does not affect whatever internally constitutes the moon to be a moon. 12

B. Language Describing Sensations Presupposes Corresponding Physical Objects.

Again, in The Principles of Art, 13 Collingwood assumes the Berkeleyan principle "esse est sentiri" in regard to our sensations. But, when he attempts to explain the meaning of the statement "this is my hat", he inadvertently slips into physical-object language, describing that complex sensation not merely in terms of sensa and the relations between them, as a consistent phenomenalist should, but in terms of two physical objects, the hat and the peg in the hall on which it hangs.

...instead of identifying the class of sensa he meant without referring to physical objects he located them in physical space by reference to two physical objects. No phenomenalist reduction of objects of sensation to sensa whose esse is conceived as sentiri can escape this difficulty; the class of sensa to which the objects of sensation are reduced can only be identified by reference to physical objects. 14

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12 See this chapter, below, p. 430

13 P. 169.

Donagan explains that Collingwood confuses the inability of a sensum to be a sensum when it is not actually being sensed with its inability to be anything at all when it is not being sensed.

Collingwood seems to have confounded the obvious truth that only while it is sensed does a sensum exist as a sensum with the pleasantry that when it is not being sensed it cannot exist as anything whatever. While the former is compatible with the common-sense view that the moon is your sensum (i.e. what you see) whenever you see it, the latter is not; for although the moon ceases to exist as your sensum when you stop looking at it, it does not cease to exist as the moon.15

Donagan does not merely repel Collingwood's anti-realist phenomenalist attack, but advances positive evidence for maintaining that the esse of a sensum is not reduced without remainder to its sentiri.16 He says that the strongest argument for the realism of sensed objects is that every natural language speaks meaningfully of our sensations by referring them to a world of physical objects.

Can it be shown that such things as the moon are genuinely 'sensed'?... The strongest argument for asserting that most of our sensa are physical objects, and so can exist unsensed, is that every natural language in which men speak of what they see, hear, feel, taste, and smell is a physical object language. It does not seem to be possible to think in any sustained way about more than a fraction of what you 'sense' except in terms of physical objects. The reason for believing that the greater part of what you 'sense' consists of physical objects in a physical world is not that physical objects are data of sensation, but that the

15 Ibid., p. 33.
16 See Ibid.
only coherent general account of what you sense that
can be given is in terms of physical objects.
Berkeley was unable to forestall this argument, and
Collingwood fared no better.\textsuperscript{17}

In his last work, \textit{The New Leviathan},\textsuperscript{18} Collingwood asks "Are
there objects of feeling or not?" and answers "I do not know. Nobody
knows. Some have said there are, some have said there are not." He
denies that an answer is possible on positive grounds, but gives a
negative answer on methodological grounds. "The question is whether a
theory of feeling needs objects as well as modes. The Lockean theory
does, the Cartesian does not. By Occam's Razor the Cartesian theory is
preferable",\textsuperscript{19} so that "what is felt consists simply of modes of feeling,
and not of objects...".\textsuperscript{20}

But, for the reasons given immediately above, Donagan insists
that feeling has not merely modes,\textsuperscript{21} but also objects which can only be

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 34. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{18} P. 28.
\textsuperscript{19} R.G. Collingwood, \textit{The New Leviathan}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{20} A. Donagan, \textit{The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood}, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{21} "At the level of first-order consciousness, a man will be
conscious of how what is felt looks, sounds, feels, tastes and smells,
and of its corresponding emotional charges. So much appears to be
\end{flushleft}
physical realities.

Feeling has objects; and since it appears to be impossible to form any intelligible notion of what are most of the objects that anybody feels, except the common-sense one that they are parts of his body and its physical surroundings, it is reasonable to conclude that most of the objects of feeling are physical.\(^\text{22}\)

Although this may not suffice to set realism up as an established theory of knowledge in place of Collingwood's anti-realist phenomenalism, it does point out that Collingwood's reasons against realism retroact just as unfavourably against his own theory of conscious reflection, and that the natural language used by Collingwood to express his own convictions seems to be voided of meaning in the absence of the presupposition of an objective physical world to which it refers. Granted the fundamental role which Collingwood accords to language following Hobbes,\(^\text{23}\) and the importance he attaches to the ordinary usage of language\(^\text{24}\) this latter objection is especially serious.

C. Not all Scientific Discoveries are Answers to Questions.

Another serious objection to Collingwood's reduction of knowledge

\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) See R.G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan, Ch. 6, pp. 40-46. See also Collingwood's Principles of Art, Ch. 11, pp. 225-269 and Alan Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, pp. 40-46; 50-54.

to the activity of question and answer is the fact that many genuine discoveries in science are made either without there being any deliberate searching for what was found, or something quite unexpected turns up in the search for something quite different.

Norbert Hanson\textsuperscript{25} speaks of what he calls the 'trip-over' discovery. "What characterizes the 'trip-over' discovery is the absence of any expectation of such a happening ever turning up at all.\textsuperscript{26} He discusses cases "distinguished by their total lack of relevant anticipation - psychologically and theoretically" in which the discoverer "is totally unprepared for the totally unexpected - both in the psychological and in the theoretical sense."\textsuperscript{27} He cites as instances,\textsuperscript{28} firstly, the Coelacanth which "turned up in 1938 when fishermen threw their nets into the sea off Madagascar in search of their next meal, and then dredged up the remarkable 'living fossil' so much discussed since." And, secondly "the black swan Captain Cook is reputed to have encountered in Australia ...Cook was not searching for black swans; indeed...probably he would have denied the possibility of a swan being black." Hanson says\textsuperscript{29} that

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\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 334.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 335. Emphasis in original.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
"these two discoveries, of the Coelacanth and of the black swan, are 'trip-over' discoveries par excellence. There was no reason to expect objects of this kind to materialize." "It just happened that way." Again, "Becquerel wasn't opening his desk drawer looking for an example of radioactivity, for he hadn't an inkling that there ought be such a phenomenon. He was not in a 'set of expectation' psychologically or theoretically, with respect to such a happening." Similarly "Herschel ... was not searching the heavens for some as yet undetected object. (His) goal was only to map the sky in detail. Uranus just 'turned up' before his telescope."  

Perhaps the best example of the 'trip-over' discoverer is Galileo, whose "initial encounters with Jupiter's satellites, with Saturn's rings, and with our moon's craters, were unprepared for both psychologically and theoretically." Hanson maintains that all scientific theories prevailing at the time would have been hostile to the discovery of craters on the moon's surface, which "being a celestial object, ought not to be pock-marked and 'imperfect' as Galileo reported it to be." "Almost all discoveries of comets are 'trip-over' discoveries."  

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30 Ibid. Emphasis in original.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid., pp. 335-336. Emphasis in original.  
34 Ibid., p. 336.
Anderson's discovery of the positive electron in 1932 was made while he was engaged in work of a quite distinct kind which at no time included the discovery of a positively charged electron in his original project's formal expectations. And "(w)hen the remarkable trace of August 2 'materialized', Anderson and his associate Nedderweyer were stunned. It required four months of study and deliberation for these men to 'see' the particle properly." 35

'Trip-over' discoveries, "in which there is no theoretical posture at all with respect to the discovery in question", in which "(n)o antecedent theoretical or psychological expectations furrow the frontiers of inquiry," contrast with what Hanson calls 'back-into' discoveries in which there is not merely no pre-setting of the discoverer but rather "a strong resistance in the investigator against expecting such a discovery ever." 36 In these instances "(a)ll theoretical expectation is against coming up with this discovery...(but) (t)he facts won't let him do anything but discover the awkward thing in question - and so much the worse for his theories." 37 Thus "the negative effect of the Michelson-Morley experiment (which suggested the non-existence of aether) constituted an encounter of just this variety." 38 The response which Michelson and Morley got to

35 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 336.
38 Ibid., p. 337.
the question which their experiment directed towards reality, namely, how fast does the aether pass the earth as the earth travels through it, was a retroaction over the very conditions of the meaningfulness of the question (or over the presuppositions which made it a reasonable question in Collingwood's terminology).

The objective of setting up his ingenuously designed interferometer was just to check the so-called 'aether-wind' - its magnitude and precise physical effects. Michelson had no doubt that there was an aether and a resultant 'wind'. That his careful experiment generated a negative effect...was a theoretical disaster for classical electrodynamics. If one considers Michelson's research expectations and the theoretical framework within which he was working, the last thing he expected was a negative effect of this kind - this being tantamount to a discovery of the non-existence of the aether.39

Such a 'discovery,' if one can say that Michelson 'discovered' the non-existence of an aether, can only be, Hanson says, a 'back-into' discovery, a regression, on which a previously accepted standpoint (a presupposition in Collingwood's terminology) which formed the basis of the investigation had to be relinquished. So that the answer to the question, if answer it can be called, is to nullify one of the prerequisites of the validity of the question. Consequently "(h)is"negative effect" became the major observational datum in support of Einstein's theory of Special Relativity."40

39 Ibid., p. 337.
40 Ibid.
Other instances of the 'back-into' discovery cited by Hanson are the discovery of the positron by Dirac "who made every conceivable effort from 1928 until 1931 to 'cook-away' this awkward theoretical blemish within his otherwise spectacularly successful electron theory." After every attempt to explain the facts without recourse to 'positive electrons' he was forced finally to admit their existence, which gave rise to the question as to why they had not hitherto been observed. But within six months the hitherto unknown positrons showed their tracks in "a 'trip-over' discovery by Anderson in confirmation of a 'back-into' discovery."41

The inadequacy of any advance programming of scientific research in terms of predetermined questions is well stated by Michael Polanyi as follows:

The science of today serves as a heuristic guide for its own further development. It conveys a conception about the nature of things which suggests to the enquiring mind an inexhaustible range of surmises. The experience of Columbus, who so fatefully misjudged his own discovery, is inherent to some extent in all discovery. The implications of new knowledge can never be known at its birth. For it speaks of something real, and to attribute reality to something is to express the belief that its presence will yet show up in an indefinite number of unpredictable ways.42

41 Ibid., p. 338.
42 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, N.Y., Harper Torchbooks, 1964, p. 311. See also appendix 2 below, p. 804.
D. Even the Question Itself is not Purely an Activity of the Mind.

This is not by any means a substitution of 'expect the unexpected' for Collingwood's "revolution which converts a blind and random study into one where definite questions are asked and definite answers are insisted upon."\(^43\) Between the random study of searching "just to see what we can find out"\(^44\) and rigid adherence to the clear cut question formulated, there is a middle way more in accord with experience. All the while remaining "certain that you can satisfy an inquirer who asks you: What are you doing this piece of work for?"\(^45\) one can and must maintain a constant reservation, or questioning attitude, even with respect to the very question itself which dominates and motivates the investigation. Not only does the answer to a question depend on the question but the very question of the questioner has a certain dependence on the answer, and has to carry with it a certain abeyance or suspension with respect to the forthcoming, hoped-for answer. This is particularly true in historical investigation, as is well explained by Marrou:

The historian begins by posing a question to himself... The question which started the whole process in motion does not maintain its original identity, but in contact

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with the documentary data it is continuously changing. Suddenly the historian realizes, for instance, that the question was preposterous and anachronistic ("the problem does not even arise"). He learns to formulate it in more precise terms, better adapted to the nature of the object. This is the advantage to be derived from a provisional self-effacement. Instead of an impatient interrogation constantly interrupting the witness to tell him, "Get back to the question!" the historian asks the document "What are you? Help me to know you."46

E. Collingwood's Theory of Knowledge Based on Undue Absolutization of the Juridical Mode of Questioning.

It is here that we must take issue with what Collingwood calls his Baconian attitude to questioning. This attitude unduly inflates the autonomy of the questioner and the dominating activity of the mind to the depreciation of the positive activity on the part of the interrogated object or person in the contribution to the answer to the question.

Bacon, whose scientific method of interrogating nature is Collingwood's model for historical methodology, "wrote like a lawyer arguing a case, rather than like a scientist solving a problem; or, as was said of him, he wrote philosophy 'like a Lord Chancellor'. Well he might: He was Lord Chancellor."47 Since the time of Descartes, the fear

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47 T.W. Organ, The Art of Critical Thinking, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965, p. 110. It may also be noted that Vico, whose name stands at the fountainhead of the modern attempt to do justice to history and its methodology, the man whose New Science sought to do for historical methodology what Descartes sought to do for mathematical methodology,
of error has taken on the aspect of an obsessive neurosis in modern thought. Descartes second Meditation betrays this exaggerated fear in "setting aside all that in which the least doubt can be supposed to exist, just as if I had discovered that it was absolutely false."\(^{48}\) The same neurotic obsession with the danger of error, more exactly with the danger of being 'deceived', pervades Bacon's expurgation of the mind of its various idols.\(^{49}\) Bacon, the philosopher of scientific methodology, exorcising the mind of all its anticipations of nature, and putting nature to the question, is heavily under the influence of Bacon the jurist, the Lord Chancellor.\(^{50}\)

Collingwood's questioning theory of knowledge and of historical methodology, based as it is on Descartes and Bacon's radical mental


\(^{50}\) Bacon, however, allowed himself a moment of juridical forgetfulness when he more humanely said that "entrance into the human kingdom based on sciences is like entrance into the kingdom of heaven in that each proceeds with the simplicity of a child." See Vol. 4 of Spedding, Ellis and Heath edition of Bacon's Works, Aphorism LXVIII, p. 69.
hygiene, is both heir to and victim of this exaggerated fear of deception by a presumed untrustworthy witness. Even the existence of cheating documents is no excuse for the exaggerated mental hygiene of excessive precaution against likely deception. The sober, balanced attitude which the historian should maintain in regard to possibly deceptive documents is thus explained by A. Nevins:

The cheating document seldom imposes (at least for any length of time) upon any but the ignorant or careless. A combination of scholarly knowledge and common sense can in ninety-nine instances out of a hundred expose it but they must be reinforced with constant vigilance.

This constant vigilance advocated by Nevins is very different from treating as false anything one may have the least suspicion to doubt, as Descartes does.

The point to be made here, in criticizing Collingwood's theory of knowledge as questioning, is that fear of error arising from the possibility of deception by an untrustworthy witness, or witnesses telling conflicting stories about the same thing, is not the only reason we may

51 H.I. Marrou in his The Meaning of History, p. 103, remarks that "(m)ethodical distrust is the form that the Cartesian principle of methodical doubt will take when applied to history."


53 See for example L.W. Regis, Epistemology, New York, Macmillan, 1959, pp. 7 et seq. for the problem arising due to two storytellers in us regarding the external world, the senses testifying to movement and multiplicity, the intellect testifying to the unity and self-identity of reality.
have for questioning. That is, not all questioning is the questioning of a hostile witness suspected of intent to deceive.

F. Questioning not a Mere Extortion of Information Under Duress: Questioning from Wonder and from Sympathetic Connaturalism.

From the beginning of human inquiry, and throughout its history, there has always been recognized a more fundamental, more congenial motivation for questioning than that designed to expose a deceiver. There is that inquiry in which Plato and Aristotle consider philosophy to have had its beginning, namely the inquiry that starts from wonder.

...Wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder...54
...it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about greater matters, e.g., about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant ...; therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end.55

A striking instance of philosophical wonder closer to our own time is recorded by H. Spiegelberg in regard to Husserl.

55 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Ch. 2, 982b 10-25.
Phenomenology in general may be characterized as a philosophy which has learned to wonder again and to respect wonders for what they are in themselves, where others see only trivialities or occasions to employ the cleaning brush. But not all these wonders are of equal importance. To Husserl in particular there was one wonder which exceeded them all "the wonder of all wonders", as he called it: "the pure ego and pure consciousness." (Ideen III, Husseriana, Vol. 75). The wonder about this phenomenon seems to have been the focal and fundamental experience of Husserl's philosophical existence, and it became so increasingly as his phenomenology developed. The central mystery was to Husserl not Being as such, but the fact that there is such a thing in this world as a being that is aware of its own being and of other beings. This fascination accounts for Husserl's growing emphasis on the subjective aspect of phenomenology and for its shift from the 'object' to the subjectivity of the existing ego.  

At the beginning of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says that "(a)ll men by nature desire to know." Prior to any anxiety to take precautions against likely deception, there is the questioning which arises spontaneously upon the encounter with the presence of 'the other' in lived experience.  

Wonder is the expression of this spontaneous desire to get to know that 'other'. In wonder, there is knowledge (e.g. of an eclipse experienced to be taking place) plus ignorance (as to why the sun's light should be darkened) plus fear on account of that ignorance, not fear of being deceived, but fear simply of the unknown, since the


unknown is threatening.

In the experience of wonder the mind is split within itself, into the mind knowing and the (same) mind not knowing in regard to the same object. Knowing that it does not know, that is, knowing its ignorance, it is literally diseased within itself and consequently experiences a tendency to shake off that disquieting feeling by striving to know what it does not know. This striving within itself to overcome its own ignorance is expressed and articulated as a question. Because the mind is split into a duality of itself-knowing and itself knowing its lack of knowledge it can dialogue with itself. The strive to overcome ignorance thus takes the form of a self-interrogation.

Questioning, therefore, may arise simply from wonder, as a spontaneous response to a together known and unknown presence, and not exclusively from doubt caused by conflicting testimonies on the suspicion that one is being deceived.

L.M. Regis contrasts the ignorance at the basis of wonder with the ignorance of the basis of doubt.

The ignorance at the root of wonder is directly concerned with things; its object is the complex aspects of the same reality, a complexity that seems disordered and therefore unintelligible. The ignorance that is the wellspring of doubt is not concerned with things but bears directly upon the proofs of our causal knowledge of things. It has as its object the explanation or vindication of the truths we possess.\footnote{L.M. Regis, Epistemology, p. 26.}
Regis says, further, that wonder can result from our ignorance as is indicated by the infinite number of 'whys' asked by children "who wonder at everything because they know nothing." And then there is the wonder which accompanies us throughout our lives "whenever we embark upon a field of research new to us." Wonder is outgoing to things to be known, doubt is reflexive and concerned with the insecurity of our knowledge of things.

Doubt is not concerned with things, or with primary evidence, or with the immediate knowledge of contingent things, but solely with concluded truth whose cause is not evident when it should be. Strictly speaking doubt is the contrary of science, when the latter is taken in the formal sense of a conclusion known through the causality of premisses.

Skepticism is aligned with doubt but not with wonder, although skepticism is by no means identical with doubt. The opposite of wonder is an insensitivity to the presence of something exceeding our knowledge of it.

The scientific quest for knowledge takes us away from the immediacy of the wonder-producing encounter. The object of scientific thought is not a presence, a thou, or a mystery, but a problem to be solved.

60 Ibid., p. 27. Emphasis in original.
63 Ibid., p. 33.
The deficiency in Collingwood's theory of questioning should now be making its presence felt. Any philosophy which absorbs the whole of that which is into mind thinking about that which is, is going to maximize or inflate questioning arising from doubt and minimize or ignore questioning arising from wonder, or from concern with the objectively present as a genuine other. This is specially true in history in which the primary orientation of the historian's questioning is not to torture the truth from a hostile and deceptive witness but rather to get to know the other as another self. History puts the historian 'in the presence' of 'other peoples', with their thoughts, purposes and achievements, as objects 'to be wondered at' and whom the historian naturally wants 'to get to know'.

G. Historical Knowledge as Familiar Knowledge Attained by Friendly rather than Extortionate Questioning.

Marrou exploits the notion of sympathetic connaturality between the historian and the object of his inquiry. He explains that the basic attitude of the historian to the object of his investigation, whether a present document or past event known by means of the document, is that of a friend to a friend seeking familiarity one with the other. Speaking precisely of 'history as friendship', Marrou says:

Anyone who thinks too much, too soon or solely of using his friends can neither really love them nor know them; friendship and business relations are not to be confused. History furthermore assumes a centrifugal rather than an egocentric inner attitude, and an opening
out towards others which demands that we mute our existentialist preoccupations.  

The knowledge sought by the historian is familiar knowledge, familiarity with the object of his research, the type of knowledge by which the members of a family know, and desire to know one another. Marrou insists that the basic condition of historical knowledge of the past is that the historian, confronted with the document or other trace of the past event, or with the deciphered past event itself, sees in that 'other' something of 'self'. A basic connaturality, a basis for trustworthiness and familiarity, is the first condition of the possibility of historical knowledge of the past.

If (historical) understanding is really that dialectical relationship of the Same with the Other which we have described, it presupposes the existence of a broad basis of fraternal communion between the subject and the object, between historian and document (let us also say, more precisely, that it is presupposed between the historian and the man who is revealed through the document as by a sign or symbol). How can we understand unless we have that attitude of mind which makes us connatural with others? It is this that enables us to feel their passions and re-conceive their ideas in the very light in which they were experienced - in short it permits us to commune with them. Even the word 'sympathy' is insufficient in this respect. Between the historian and his object a friendship must be formed, or how else can a historian understand?  

65 Ibid., p. 104. Emphasis in original.
This, incidentally, hits quite hard against Collingwood's notion of history as a reliving of past thoughts as distinct from past feelings. But, if one will go to Grand Prè, Nova Scotia, to an inconspicuous iron cross which bears an inscription on which is written:

The dry bed of the creek which is in sight a few paces in the marsh is the SPOT where THE VICTIMS OF THE EXPULSION OF THE ACADIANS OF 1755 were embarked on the small boats to be rowed over to the transports lying at anchor in Minas Basin one relives not merely the past thoughts, but the anguished feelings of those people.

Another historical incident, in which the elements of feeling are relived just as much as the thoughts, is related by Colin Ronan. He tells how Sir William Huggins, when in 1908 found he no longer had the vitality to use his elaborate spectroscopic equipment, asked the Royal Society to see that it went to an institution which would carry on the spectrographic work he had pioneered. It was agreed, and arranged that the equipment be all removed to the Cambridge Department of Astrophysics. Howard Grubb came from Dublin to supervise the removal, and Ronan cites the following account from Grubb's notes:

The Equatorial had been partially dismounted; all the numerous parts and attachments had been removed and were scattered over the floor, which was encumbered and littered with axes and various parts of the instrument, some of which had been already placed in packing cases;

and in the midst of this litter, wrapped in a large cape and seated on a packing case, was Sir William himself, and his faithful collaboratrice who was flitting about watching the packing with keen interest and loving care.... Lady Huggins had asked me to let her know when I was ready to close the box (which contained the large object-glass from the telescope), and when I intimated that I had it safely in the case, she took Sir William by the hand and brought him across the room to have a last look at their very old friend... They gazed long and sadly before I closed the lid.  

Ronan concludes by saying that two years later Huggins died. In this historical account one relives not merely past thought decontextualized from its associated emotion, but, if anything the emotions rather than the thoughts.

Marrou says that when Norbert Casteret discovered the clay image of a quadruped pierced with iron-tipped spears he immediately recognized it as an instance of sympathetic magic practised by prehistoric hunters similar to that practised by Eskimos of our own time. Marrou says that we understand this type of behaviour quite differently from the way we understand the disintegration of an atom. We understand it interiorly; it is through our interior knowledge of man and his potentialities that we understand these prehistoric hunters.

67 Ibid., pp. 163-164.

68 H.I. Marrou, The Meaning of History, p. 37. Marrou thus agrees with Collingwood that we have an 'insight' into, or interior way of knowing, the human past, but Marrou's explanation in terms of sympathetic connaturality is quite diverse from Collingwood's overly intellectual explanation. Correlate with Collingwood's criticism of Croce's advice to try to become a blade of grass if one wants to know its history; see Idea of History, pp. 199-200.
However, we can only understand another by reason of his resemblance to ourselves. "If the Other were completely dissimilar and totally alien it is difficult to see how any understanding would be possible at all."69 But, paradoxically, if it is through self-knowledge that the historian knows the other, it is also through a certain self-forgetfulness, in which the Other is permitted to present its affiliation with the historian's self.

The historian appears to us as a man who can transcend himself through epokhé, a real self-suspension in order to be outgoing in his encounter with the Other. We can give this Virtue a name: it is called sympathy.70

Marrou, on the other hand, is careful to point out that this connatural sympathy in "the dialectics of the Same and the Other"71 does not prejudice the critical spirit of the historian,72 but this critical part of the historian's work is always subordinate to the positive, constructive part.

...it is always sympathy, the source and condition of understanding which represents the constructive phase. Criticism demolishes the provisional edifice of imperfect knowledge and suggests requirements that are useful


70 Ibid., p. 103. Again, p. 267, he says, "History begins only where the historian forgets himself enough to come out of himself and go forward, openminded, toward the discovery and the encounter with the other."

71 Ibid., p. 93.

72 Ibid., p. 104.
in the latter reconstruction, but of itself it contributes little.\textsuperscript{73}

Historical knowledge is the same type of knowledge as is found in our everyday experience when we become acquainted with another.

We enter into possession of the human past on those psychological and metaphysical terms that in our daily life permit us to increase our knowledge of this other.... (H)istory comes before the bar of human reason with the same claims of credibility as all experience of the other.\textsuperscript{74}

H. Some Presuppositions to Questions are Genuine Insights into Reality: Intuitive Reason vs Constructive Reason.

N. Belnap, in an as yet unpublished report,\textsuperscript{75} says that prior to Harrah's work on the logic of questioning (that is, prior to 1961) "most attempts at analysing questions concentrated on the consideration that asking a question ordinarily articulates a state of doubt."\textsuperscript{76} But

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 105.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., pp. 241-242.

\textsuperscript{75} An Analysis of Questions. Preliminary Report, June 3, 1963. A document produced in connection with a research project sponsored by the independent research program of the System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California. (Copy of this report made available by courtesy of System Development Corporation).

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 8.
Belnap says that "Harrah's insight was that asking a question also articulates a state of information. That is, although asking a question is not the same thing as making an assertion, nevertheless, to ask a question is, partly, to make an assertion." Now, when Belnap wants to illustrate this, he uses the very same example Collingwood had used in his Essay on Metaphysics to illustrate his (Collingwood's) theory of presuppositions, namely, the question "Have you stopped beating your wife?" Belnap says that to ask Jones this question is to assert that Jones is married, and used to beat his wife. Collingwood had said that to ask Jones this question is to presuppose that Jones is married and used to beat his wife. And for Collingwood, to suppose is not the same as to assert. Assertion belongs to propositions as answers to questions, supposal belongs to questioning as such.

Belnap says that "(to) ask, "Did she wear the red hat or the green one?" is to assert that she wore one or the other but not (presumably) both." That questions have an information-bearing content is familiar to any examiner who has to be

77 Ibid. For David Harrah's position, that "(t)he question and answer process is interpreted as an information-matching game," see his "Logic of Questions and Answers," in The Philosophy of Science, XXVIII (1961), pp. 40-46.


79 Ibid.

80 See Speculum Mentis, pp. 76-80. See also Ch. 3 above, pp. 99 et seq.

81 N. Belnap, op.cit., p. 8.
careful to word his questions in such a way that the information content is not so great as to bear within it the answer to the question, or such information as would imply the answer.

It is true that to ask a question is not the same as to make a statement; nevertheless, since questions have presuppositions, it is clear that in asking a question we do also assert something...and that questions do, like statements have information content. The student of chemistry can learn something from being asked "What is the proportion of sodium to chlorine in common salt?" the student of human nature from overhearing "Who was the woman I saw you with last night?."82

The question we must ask here, crucial to the evaluation of Collingwood's theory of knowledge as questioning activity, is whether the presuppositions to questions are always merely supposal, or, whether at least some of these presuppositions, while remaining presuppositions as far as the question is concerned are not also necessarily insights into reality?

Francis H. Parker, in his article "Traditional Reason and Modern Reason,"83 draws attention to "two alternative conceptions of reason: the conception of reason as intuitive and the conception of reason as constructive."84

82 Ibid., pp. 129-130. Emphasis in original. Belnap, unlike Collingwood, seems to equate presuppositions to assertions here.

83 See Philosophy Today, VII (1963), pp. 235-244.

84 Ibid., p. 237.
The conception of reason as constructive is a modern conception dating from the time of Kant. For Kant, intuition is a prerogative of sense; understanding intuits nothing, only reflects.

Given a stock of intuited sensory particulars as materials, the understanding can set about its proper business of constructing orderly phenomenal objects according to its purely a priori blue-print.  

The universals which are the proper concern of the understanding are a priori and non-empirical. The understanding has no peculiar intuitions, no proper objects of its own.

Since all empirical data or intuitions are sensory and therefore particular and contingent, and since necessary propositions essentially involve universals, no necessary proposition can be empirical, a posteriori, or factual.

The conception of understanding, intelligence or reason which underlies this belief, the purely reflective or non-intuitive conception of reason is what Parker calls 'constructive reason'. But, according to Parker, there is "an alternative conception of reason which...is essentially foreign to modern thought. It is peculiarly classical and mediaeval, and it originates most clearly in Aristotle." This is "the conception of reason as an intuitive agency, a mode of cognition, distinct both from

85 Ibid., p. 236.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
sensation on the one hand and from reflective discursive reason on the other.\textsuperscript{88} Parker cites Aristotle as attributing to the thinking part of the soul a capacity for receiving the form of the object. The apprehensions of this thinking part of the soul give rise to the universal and necessary judgments which form the first principles of scientific knowledge. This apprehensive faculty Aristotle calls \textit{νοûς}, which Parker renders as 'intuitive reason'.\textsuperscript{89} This intuitive reason has its own proper objects,

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid. See also Aristotle's De Anima, Bk. 3, Ch. 8, 432a 4-6; Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. 6, Ch. 3, 1139b 31-1140a 8. See also Marjorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, London, Faber and Faber, 1963, pp. 241-247 for a discussion of Aristotle's \textit{nous}. Grene understands Aristotle to be saying that the \textit{nous} which discovers the first principles "is not the mind turned inward on itself...but the mind methodically and appropriately facing a suitable reality, a suitable specimen of the kind that is to be known. Things speak to the mind of their being-what-they-are and the mind, finding the universal in the perceived individual, putting its insight into words in the correct definition, thus comprehends the substance of the thing, and, as formal grasp of the formal, actual understanding of the actual, is identified with it. Knower and known are united because, being in nature suited to each other, they have never been wholly apart." Having thus clearly articulated Aristotle's position, Grene takes a characteristically modern attitude, for, to the question "...do things show us their being-what-they-are? Is the peculiar substance of each kind of thing there for us to grasp, vaguely in perception, step by step through induction, directly and luminously through rational and necessary intuition?" she replies emphatically in the negative and says that "the what of each kind of thing held the conjectures of the Aristotelian scientist firmly in check. For us, the strand of contingency is ultimate; we may transcend it, we must transcend it, but in peril. Both the source of nature's reality and nature itself have lost their radical determinacy, and so lost also the radical intelligibility of Aristotelian substances. And so when we understand one aspect or another of the world around us, that understanding becomes our venture, not the world's. If we succeed, that is our achievement; if we fail, our 'understanding' turns out to have been our dream. Aristotelian knowledge could be impersonal because things, including minds, were thoroughly determinate. The determination we impose
namely the forms, essences or characteristics of things which are given
as data embedded in the particular, contingent data of sensation.

Since...there is nothing outside and separate in
existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects
of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the
abstract objects and all the states and affections of
sensible things. \(^90\)

This means that the propositions which define these forms are
also a posteriori, factual and existential.

Consequently the assumption of rational intuition
of formal structures coeval with and immersed in
sensory data implies the possibility of propositions
which are both essential and a posteriori, both
necessarily and factually true. \(^91\)

Such propositions are certified in immediate experience since
they are true in virtue of their meanings alone. No further, subsequent
experience is thus required to verify them. Such meanings, which im-
mediately guarantee these necessary existential propositions are factually
real and, as proper objects of the intuitive reason, are embedded in ex-
perienced reality. \(^92\)

\(^90\) Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. 3, Ch. 8, 432a 2-5, cited from
Richard McKeon's edition of The Basic Works of Aristotle, New York,

\(^91\) F. Parker, art.cit., p. 236.

\(^92\) See Ibid., pp. 236-237.
Whereas the constructive reason reveals only our attitudes toward things the intuitive reason, on the other hand, is revelatory of factual reality, and "(t)he replacement of intuitive reason by constructive reason might be well regarded as a fundamental theme of the rise and development of modern philosophy." 93

Ancient philosophy is characterized by the struggle for the distinctness of reason from sensation, and thus the distinction of man from the brute. In mediaeval philosophy the struggle was of a different kind, namely, to justify the distinction of reason from revelation, and consequently to defend the distinctness of the specifically human from the purely spiritual, the angelic and the divine. 94 Man is thus between the purely animal and the purely spiritual. And it is man's reason, understood as man's natural faculty of discerning universals in and through particular sense experience, 95 which distinguishes him from either, and locates him in an intermediary position.

But, the basic characteristic of early modern philosophy is a revolt against this traditional concept of reason, which could go in one

93 Ibid., p. 237.
94 See Ibid., p. 238.
95 See Ibid., p. 237 and p. 238.
or other of two ways, either by way of a reduction of reason to sensation or of a reduction of reason to revelation. These two forms of revolt against traditional reason developed concurrently. The reduction of reason to sensation meant the substitution of empirical science for rational philosophy and thus the confusion of philosophy with science. The reduction of reason to revelation meant the substitution of religious faith for philosophy and resulted in the confusion of philosophy with religion. This double phased revolt continued down into and through modern times, and, as it proceeded, it led to the development of reason as constructive. The early stages of the reduction of reason to sensation occur mainly in William or Ockham and Nicholas of Autrecourt, and the early stages of the reduction of reason to revelation are found mainly in Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa. The next stage in the loss of the traditional intuitive reason and development of constructive reason is found in the intermediate conception of reason such as it is

96 See Ibid., p. 238. One immediately recalls, in this contexts, Collingwood's account of the Patristic codification of "fundamental convictions which would form the presuppositions of a new way of living, a new science and a new civilization, which codification was called the 'Catholic Faith'." See Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 225-227; see also above, chapter 5, pp. 309 et seq.

97 See F.H. Parker, art.cit., p. 238.

98 See Ibid.
found in Descartes and the continental rationalists, for whom reason was
the faculty of deducing universal truths a priori from innate ideas which
are wholly independent of sense experience. The revolution of Kant,
consequent upon the British empiricist discarding of the rationalist
conception of a priori reason and innate ideas, gave to modern philosophy
the fully developed conception of reason as constructive.\(^99\) Parker
summarizes the various conceptions as follows:

For the tradition the intelligence officer
(i.e. reason)...finds meaning in experience; for
continental 'rationalism' meaning is deduced from
innate ideas independently of experience; for British
'empiricism' meaning is imparted only by the subrational
faculties of passion and habit; and for Kant and his
voluntarist and pragmatist followers, utilizing the
conception of reason as constructive, meaning is created
out of the mind itself.\(^100\)

I. Distortion of the Nature of the Abstract
Universal Arising from Exaggerating the
Activity of Reason into Creative Activity.

From this constructive conception of reason in Kant, Hegel and
his followers, including Collingwood in this regard, passed to a creative
conception of reason, reason as the activity of a mind 'which is what it
does', which is nothing more nor less that what from its own activity it
forms itself to being. Human reason is defined and spoken of in ways

\(^99\) See Ibid., pp. 238-239.

\(^100\) Ibid., p. 239.
previously reserved for the thought and the being of God. Aristotle's self thinking thought and Aquinas' Pure Act are now characteristics of the human reason.\textsuperscript{101}

The theory of the concrete universal, exposed in Chapter 4, above, has its historical roots in this Kantian evacuation of real content from the abstract universal, which then becomes a mere classificatory device of the constructive reason.

The name 'horse' is the name of a certain class of individuals. But we also have a general idea or concept of a horse. This is an intellectual construction made by us out of attributes which we have abstracted from individuals. It might be described as a second order abstraction, being a construction out of abstractions. The name 'horse' thus applies to or denotes an aggregate of individuals. It also connotes an intellectual construction, namely an idea or concept formed by us of a type of individual.\textsuperscript{102}

A.J. Milne goes on to warn that failure to understand this may lead to a wild goose-chase in a search for a supposed essence embodied in the members of a class. This is a clear rejection of the traditional notion of the comprehension of the universal as the real object of intuitive reason. For Milne the connotation of the universal notion is

\begin{enumerate}
\item Not only is there achieved here a radical rapprochement between philosophy and religion, but the knowing (questioning in Collingwood) activity of the human mind is identified with what in Mediaeval Theology was understood as the (not merely productive, which presupposes pre-existing matter, but) creative activity of the divine mind (which presupposes no pre-existent material).
\end{enumerate}
a construction formed by the mind to typify the members of the class.


Disturbed by the consequences of the teaching of Bradley and Bosanquet regarding the abstract, and because he found himself unreflectingly adopting the prevailing opinion, thereby depreciating the abstract as merely abstract, Norman Kemp Smith submitted both the abstract universal and the concrete universal of Bradley and Bosanquet to a thorough scrutiny. He criticizes the identification of the abstract universal with the class-concept.

...it is by no means clear by what right Bosanquet should thus identify the abstract universal with the class-concept. In so far as the abstract universal is some one character, it is indeed applicable as a predicate to any and every concrete existence in which the character is found; and we may, if we please, describe this range of application as being a class. Our purpose in selecting the character need not, however, be classificatory; we may be investigating the character in and for itself; and it may be in the very variety and heterogeneity of its embodiments that we obtain the needful data.

Smith attacks Bosanquet's contrasting of the concrete universal with the abstract universal on the ground that one signifies a world and


the other a class, and whereas "it takes all sorts to make a world, a
class is essentially of one sort only." Smith remarks that examples
of universals which stand closest to concrete particulars, such as that
of the Death's Head beetle, represent, like a 1925 model Ford car, a
standardized type that repeats itself without notable change in the
infinite number of its instances. Here the feature of monotonous re­
petition is at a maximum. But, on the contrary, if we choose a class­
concept higher in the biological hierarchy, which is therefore more
abstract, we can no longer say that while it takes all sorts to make a
world a class is of one sort only. The universal 'beetle' covers some
half million different species that vary among themselves in colour and
shape and a variety of characteristics. Smith argues that just as a
world may or may not be a macrocosm of microcosms (traditional mechanistic
physics presents a world notable for its uniformity of structure) so also
a class may or may not be a type of types. Even if it were, it is not in
proportion to its abstractness but rather to its closeness to the concrete
that reduces it to a uniformity of simple recurrence.

Smith points out that Bosanquet himself admits that the

105 See Ibid., p. 150. See also B. Bosanquet, The Principle
of Individuality and Value, p. 37.

(1927), p. 150.

107 See B. Bosanquet, Logic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888,
66-67 (Smith erroneously cites pp. 58-59).
abstraction or notion which is to include both men and animals has to provide for a variable animality, for animality in man is different from animality in brutes. The concept animal is therefore not formed simply by the omission of certain qualities which differentiate man from the other animals. There is something corresponding to rationality in animals, namely (animal) intelligence. Accordingly, "we can neither merely omit the characters which vary in their instances nor proceed by simple inclusion of others that are strictly uniform." Far from being "little more than an unfortunate necessity due to the limitations in our powers of attention", abstraction is "a methodological device" enabling us to study partial features "with the ultimate purpose of so mastering the material, part by part, that through gradual reversal of this abstractive procedure, we may finally be in a position to grapple with the experienced in all its concreteness." Jacques Maritain says that there is no true knowledge of unity where there is not also knowledge of distinction. Any serious attempt, he says, at metaphysical synthesis must distinguish


in order to unite, especially when dealing with the complex riches of
to unite, especially when dealing with the complex riches of
knowledge and of the mind. A reflexive and critical philosophy must
above all discriminate and discern the various degrees of knowing with
its organization and internal differentiation. Maritain criticizes
contemporary idealism's refusal to recognize any nature or structure of
the mind, regarding it as pure freedom and pure movement. It thus
systematically neglects vast areas of knowledge and tends to reduce the
diversities of the life of the mind to a noetic monism.

Norman Kemp Smith attacks the negative attitude to abstraction
which sees in it only omission.

...abstraction is not merely omission. Indeed, it
is questionable whether the term omission has any
relevance. All that we are justified in asserting is
that the mind abstracts from certain factors, not that
it omits them. That, however, is a minor point. What
calls for special insistence is that the process mainly
at work is integrative, not separative in character.112

Collingwood regards abstraction as synonymous with error.
"Our enemy is abstraction"\textsuperscript{113} and "abstract knowledge is the same as
error."\textsuperscript{114}

N. Lobkowicz points out\textsuperscript{115} that, in response to the objection

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113} Speculum Mentis, p. 268. See above, chapter 4, p. 144.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Speculum Mentis, p. 313.
\item \textsuperscript{115} See his "Abstraction and Dialectics", in The Review of Metaphysics, XXI, (1967-1968), pp. 468-469.
\end{itemize}
that "since in reality the forms of material things do not exist in separation from particulars, our intellect must be wrong if it grasps such forms as abstract", Aquinas distinguishes between two meanings of abstraction, separative abstraction and abstraction through simple non-consideration. One may assert by a judgment that \( f \) does not inhere in \( x \), thereby abstracting \( f \) from \( x \). Thus, to say that the apple is not colored is to abstract color from the apple by denying its existence in the apple. If in fact the apple is colored, such abstraction is impossible without falsifying the whole factual situation. But, on the other hand, one may simply consider the color which in fact is in the apple without considering the apple in which it is and without considering any of the other characteristics (taste, weight, etc.) which are together with the color in the apple. There is no assertion here that the color is separated from the apple in fact, merely the non-consideration of all the characteristics other than the color which also are in fact in the apple. And "thus abstraction involves no falsity, so long as it remains a simplex et absoluta consideratio, i.e., does not involve a judgment."

Abstraction is rather a focusing of attention\(^{116}\) on a special

\(^{116}\) Questioning is concerned primarily with this focusing function. "Questions, of course, do not establish the answers - they merely establish the relevance of a range of answers. The 'right' answer must in some sense 'match' the world and this seems to commit us to the outlines of a correspondence theory as a component in the ultimate situation." Leslie Armour, The Concept of Truth, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1969, p. 211. The position to be taken here is that the question,
aspect of a concrete individual fact or event; it presents the mind with a definite content which can be examined in itself, without confusing it with the context in which it is realized. A red object can be examined and questioned precisely inasmuch as it is red. The fact that we do not attend to the object as being steel or heavy in no way invalidates what we can know of it through knowing that it is red.

Abstraction...is merely the more attentive apprehension of what has been antecedently known in some concrete setting; and it would thus seem to be simply the rendering of our initial awareness more definite and precise.**7

Smith criticizes the presumption that there is no problem regarding the apprehension of concrete particulars which are supposed to be apprehended in ordinary experience in all their concrete particularity. Having successfully done this, it is then asked how do we arrive at uni-

when directed at reality, aims at a 'docking' of the mind with its corresponding real object. The 'correspondence' of the mind with reality here is vastly different from a naıve correspondence theory, as if the mind merely ran parallel with the object without in any way engaging in a very definite type of docking arrangement. As will be shown later, the primary 'docking' of the mind with reality is through answer to the 'what' question, as is well explained by Aristotle (see chapter 8, below, pp.549 et seq).But, in order that this 'docking' be successfully achieved, the questioning of reality, prefaced by the questioning as to what past thinkers have thought of reality (which is all Collingwood allows), has to be carefully and correctly enacted.

versal concepts? These are said to be the outcome of abstraction, consisting in a comparison of particulars and arriving at a class-concept by disregarding the differences.

But, the uniqueness of the unique, the individuality of the individual, is just as much abstract and universal as is the redness or hardness. We cannot talk meaningfully about the individuality or uniqueness of the concrete if we do not abstract these universal characteristics as meaningful objects. "Indeed, may we not say that this is an ideal goal towards which we can only approximate?" Upon reflection, it seems rather that we know the generic before the individual peculiarities.

We start, in experience and knowledge, not with the individual, but with the vaguely generic, and advance in knowledge is to be measured quite as much by increased appreciation of differences as by capacity to generalize. The child can usually recognize trees before he can distinguish the different species of trees; and to the end all recognition, even of what is discriminated as being an individual distinct from all others, is by means not of absolutely unique features, but of types.

The fact that we frequently err in our identification of individuals indicates that the absolutely unique is a term of reference whose evidence consists in more than purely immediate experience.

Comparison according to similarities and dissimilarities is

118 See Ibid., pp. 207-208.
119 Ibid., p. 208.
not itself abstraction but a prerequisite facilitating and disposing for abstraction. "The individual is, indeed, initially known only in its relations within some complex context, and this context may be temporarily left out of account."\(^{120}\) For the completion of abstraction there must be not merely knowledge of like and unlike characters, but identification of what the common element is as \textit{itself} constituting a \textit{type} or \textit{kind}.

The abstracted factor is, therefore, abstracted in this sense only, that it is at once distinguished from the conflicting features that accompany it in the various instances, and at the same time identified, not \textit{qua} existent but in \textit{type} or \textit{kind}, as being the same in them all.\(^{121}\)

Knowing that something is a man is together a knowing of what man is and a re-cognizing \textit{that it is here in this individual}.

To cognize is to recognize, to recognize is to identify a recurrent type, and to identify a recurrent type is to have selected for special - i.e., abstractive - attention, in one or more instances of the type, the feature or features which go to make up the content of the type.\(^{122}\)

To successfully distinguish just acts from unjust acts is possible only if we are able \textit{infallibly} to recognize which acts are just and which are unjust. But, since justice is not a directly experienced quality or a sensible character, its \textit{recognition} presupposes possession

\(^{120}\) Ibid., p. 211.
\(^{122}\) Ibid.
of the concept we profess to be seeking in the comparison of instances.\textsuperscript{123}

Everything in our experience has a dual aspect; its thisness and its suchness.

As features of the particulars they share in the 'thisness' of the particulars: they are themselves particulars. On the other hand, as making up the content of the type, they are apprehended as 'suchnesses'; and thus, in their regard, as in regard to all else, we have to accept as ultimate the dual 'this-such' nature of everything experienced.\textsuperscript{124}

Corresponding to this dual character of what we experience, there are two kinds of recognition, and consequently two kinds of presupposed identity.

Identity, and consequently recognition, is found in two forms. There is recognition as ordinarily understood, namely, recognition of an individual as having been previously experienced. Secondly, there is the recognition which logic has mainly in view, but which is not ordinarily so called, namely, recognition of a particular as being in this or that regard of this and that kind. In other words, there is recognition of individuality, and there is recognition of type. The two forms of recognition are correlative to the two species of identity - the self-identity of a particular and the identity of a type in distinguishable particulars.\textsuperscript{125}

Smith insists that "it is important to discriminate the two species of identity as sharply as possible."\textsuperscript{126} He explains that identity

\textsuperscript{123} See Ibid., p. 209.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., pp. 210-211.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 211.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p. 212.
of type is what is meant by the universal and that this is representable by invariable symbols and persists unvaried with variation of differences.

(That is, it is a true identity-in-difference).

The identity of a type or kind I take as being precisely what is meant by a universal. It is that which can be asserted to be identically the same in one and all of a number of instances; and as such it is invariable. While allowing of (sic) combination with this and that other universal, it does not in any such combination admit of modification by these others. It is an identity that is found amidst differences, but which is never in any degree or fashion altered in its identity by these differences. It is, indeed, a condition of the combination of universals that together they are found to constitute a new type - that is, to constitute what is more than a mere combination of the simpler types. Otherwise we should not be conceiving a new type, but only conceiving simultaneously the previously conceived types. But into the conception of the new type the simpler universals enter without change of meaning. Thus the universal or type 'triangularity' enters into the more complex universals, 'equilateral' and 'scalene', and as a constituent of the two latter has a meaning that is uniform for both; though they are species of 'triangle', they are not species of 'triangularity'. Similarly, 'animality' has a uniform meaning as predicated of man and of the various species of brutes, and this is why they can all alike be said to be animal species. Universals, being thus fixed in meaning, can always be represented by symbols that are invariables.127

Individuals enjoy individual identity which persists through its variations. Its differences, unlike the differences of the universal

127 Ibid.
type are intrinsic to it.

Individual things, on the other hand, are admittedly variable; each is an identity that is compatible with, and indeed can be conceived at all only in and through the diversity of its distinguishable qualities, and in and through the changes whereby it responds to changes in its environment. It is not merely, like type, an identity amidst differences, it is an identity in and through its differences. The differences enter into its innermost being; and yet do so in a manner which allows of their own variation.128

Although universals are never found save as embodied in changing particulars they find a quite constant, not a variable embodiment. The individual differs from the universal in that it preserves its identity throughout its variations. Consequently, the universal has a definite identifiability, but the individual an indefinite identifiability. The universal can be expressed, the individual only indicated.

...whereas the universal, as being a type, consists in a definitely enumerable set of constituents, each of which can be abstractly considered, and in this manner exhaustively known, the individual can never be equated with any finitely exhaustible number of known characters ... (E)very individual, though apprehensible in terms of an indefinite variety of different types, according as it is regarded in this or that aspect, is never thereby exhausted.129

But, since "we cannot recognize what we do not apprehend" "though identity is of these two species, identity in and through dif-

128 Ibid., pp. 212-213.
129 Ibid., p. 213.
ference, i.e., identity of a continuant, and identity amidst difference, i.e., identity of type, the mode of their recognition is found, on closer examination to be the same."\textsuperscript{130} When the individual is recognized as identical "what we recognize as evidencing the continuing identity" of that which is elsewhere and otherwise experienced, "is the special manner in which the types...are combined with one another."\textsuperscript{131}

The special manner of their combination, that is, the special permutation of common factors, is our sole clue to the identity of the individual, as found at different times and in differing situations. In other words, identification of the individual is thus itself still a form of identification by type. It is capacity to recognize type, "suchness", that makes possible the capacity to apprehend the individual.\textsuperscript{132}

Smith says that this is the chief way in which the abstract manifests its fruitfulness, namely, as making possible the apprehension of its counterpart, the uniquely individual. No inferences are possible either from or to the unique as unique. Such inferences, are possible only in virtue of some identity, as defined by means of type. Accordingly, in apprehending the individual in terms of type, we bring it, notwithstanding its uniqueness, within the range of all those inferences which are relevant to the type.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., pp. 213-214.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., n. 214.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
The individual, as such, is outside the range of apprehension and reasoning, since the universal is a prerequisite of all inference.

...that apprehension of type is what can alone bring the individual within the province of reasoning. A universal is a prerequisite of all inference; and the fixity of the abstract type is what enables the concept of the type to supply this need.134

But, it is important to note, in order to avoid charges of the unreality of the abstract universal, that this universal, which is the medium of all our inferential knowledge, can be obtained only as supplied by experience and has its value only as referred back to experience.

If we are to arrive at knowledge of what is not itself experienced, the means of conceiving it must none the less still be supplied in experience. For just as the mind can only isolate what is actually given, so it can only synthesize what has already been apprehended.135

If disengagement from concreteness in particulars is necessary for knowledge of the universal, embodiment in concrete particulars is necessary for its reality. It is important not to confuse abstract knowledge with knowledge of the abstract as is often done.136

134 Ibid., p. 215.

135 Ibid., p. 217.

136 See J.H. Nicholas, Dieu connu comme inconnu, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1966, p. 36-37. Also p. 37-38: "...la distinction entre les deux manières dont une connaissance peut être dite universelle: "Connaître quelque chose universellement s'entend de deux manières. Ou bien il s'agit de la chose connue, et on parle alors de n'en connaître que la nature universelle. En ce sens connaître universellement est une imperfection; il connaîtrait l'homme imparfaitement celui qui saurait
K. Abstract Universal not Merely Classificatory
but also Penetrative of Reality.

The abstract universal, therefore, has a twofold relationship,
one to the mind as that which the mind immediately apprehends and the
other to reality, as the intelligible face which reality presents, as
object, to the mind. Now, if one considers the aspect of relation to
the mind, and the mind's requirements on account of this relation, we
find that genus-species classificatory logic has priority. But if we

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137 See this chapter, above, pp. 465-466.
138 See this chapter, above, pp. 455-457.
139 See Jean Petrin, "Univocité et analogie dans les lois de
la logique," Angelicum, XXVI (1949), pp. 233-242. See also L.B. Geiger,
76-77.
consider abstract knowledge as a penetration of reality, the logic, not of univocal genus and species, but that of analogy is required. 140

Human reason is both intelligence and reason. As intelligence it has access to being in all its intelligible clarity and absolute universality. As reason it progresses step by step in the acquisition of the most profound truths. 141

A profound antinomy is immanent to the laws of reason which the scientist and philosopher use in studying reality. On the one hand, they are characterized by an absolute rigour by reason of which logic is a genuine science and an absolutely sure art in the work of the intellect. On the other hand, they are characterized by a suppleness, flexibility and a variety of nuances which permits them to be adapted increasingly to the thousand and one forms of intelligible reality. 142 The rigorous and clear value which these laws possess depends upon an ensemble of univocal concepts which, consequently, enjoy a priority in the logical order. On the other hand, their suppleness and infinite variety in application depends upon an ensemble of analogical concepts which carries with it a certain primacy in the order of intelligibility. 143

140 See Jean Petrin, art.cit., pp. 242-249. See also L.B. Geiger, op.cit., pp. 77-86.
141 See Jean Petrin, art.cit., p. 233.
142 See Ibid., pp. 233-234.
143 See Ibid., p. 234.
L. Being as Class Concept and as Active Presence.

It will be recalled that in his _Essay on Metaphysics_, Collingwood rejected metaphysics as a science of abstract being, or "ontology...my name for a mistake which people have made, Aristotle first and foremost..." since "there can be no science nor even a quasi-science or pseudo-science of pure being." Collingwood's reason is that "(a)abstraction means taking out. But science investigates not what is left out but what is left in. To push abstraction to the limiting case is to take out everything, and when everything is taken out there is nothing for science to investigate." But this is to completely overlook the fact that the concept 'being' as it is the object of metaphysics "is not situated rigorously on the same level as other concepts, and that it is quite irrelevant (une manière toute matérielle) to treat what it presents simply as the most general class."

Because of the unique situation of the concept of being in the life of the mind, it has the unique function of presenting to our intelligence both the similarities and dissimilarities of beings.

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144 _An Essay on Metaphysics_, p. 17.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., p. 14.
147 L.B. Geiper, _Philosophie et spiritualité_, Vol. 1, p. 73.
148 See Ibid., pp. 73-74.
Our concepts are elaborated in two quite different but complementary climates. On the one hand we are preoccupied with analysing, defining and classifying, through noting likenesses and differences, when placed in the presence of things by our sensory equipment. This classification through differentiation and similitude is the principle of genus and species conceptualisation which is adopted essentially unchanged by the methods of science. Most certainly these concepts place us in the presence of being, but implicitly only. But "what we explicitly note and directly express by these concepts is the result of the relationships discovered between beings or between parts of beings, or even their relationship with our body, by sensible knowledge under all its forms."149 In this way we see being much in the way an explorer observes, registers and describes the particularities of a region he is investigating. He supposes that the country he is investigating exists, that he himself exists, that what he is doing is inserted in reality, but his geographical description does not attend to that aspect of his object, however fundamental it may be.150

The same is true of all our universal concepts... In effect it is by the work of comparison between different beings or their actions and thus by an ensemble of relative data which, in default of grasping the essence directly, we form generic and specific concepts.151

149 Ibid., p. 76.
150 See Ibid.
151 Ibid.
Such comparisons are made above all on the sensible plane. Thus it is in the structure of the sensible that we find the source of the univocal likenesses and diversities at the basis of our genus and species concepts. On this level, the likenesses of things exclude the differences, and it would be contradictory to base on the same principle both the likeness and the unlikeness between beings. At this level, our concepts do not grasp essences as such, that is as determinate ways of exercising the act of being. Beings are there, and we know that, but we do not attend to that aspect. We analyse, compare and classify beings, but not inasmuch as they are beings. We do not formally envisage the essences as essences but as quiddities. Rationalism excessively separates the work of reason elaborating quiddities from their ontological base which, in fact, it seeks to attain.

But, immediately when the mind focuses on the being of things as its direct object, everything changes. The mind interrupts its investigations to clearly perceive the reality of that which exists. Until then, it merely manipulates and names in function of its manipulations in terms of genus-species relationships. As soon as it adverts to the object of its manipulations as being, as something which is, the mind

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152 See Ibid., pp. 76-77.
153 See Ibid., p. 77.
154 And it may be added, the mode of questioning changes.
operates in an entirely new dimension. The definition is now not merely an ensemble of relations of similarity and dissimilarity but signifies a way of exercising the act of being, that is of formally comprehending an essence. 155

What I knew of man to that point, a differential knowledge, based on sensible representations and their rational elaboration, did not then appear in their own autonomy in being but only in the manner of their relationship to my knowledge.156

The term 'man' and the term 'being of man' both attain the one same reality; one attains it by a system of relations, the other in an absolute way, as a mode of being. In Kant's famous problem of the hundred thalers there are really two problems. On the one hand, there is the distinction made by Kant between the hundred possible thalers and the hundred actual thalers, that is, in Kant's thought, between essence and existence. On the other hand, and perhaps more subtly, there is the distinction between the knowledge of a hundred possible thalers in as much as their number can be placed in a series of possible numbers, that is, put in relationship with four hundred or a thousand thalers, and the knowledge of those same hundred thalers in as much as in some way they qualify real or possible existence, that is, in as much as they

155 See L.B. Geiger, op.cit., p. 78.
156 Ibid.
represent an essence of some sort. 157

A mathematician does not inquire regarding the being-value of his object. He is satisfied to construct, define, and demonstrate, operating all the while at the interior of a world populated, like our real world, by well determined beings, but resulting as the fruit of the constructive activity of the mind. 158 But if that same mathematician reflects so as to ask what is mathematical being he knows full well that he has altered his point of view. To deal with a fourth dimension as something seen in relationship to a first, second, third, or even fifth dimension, is properly mathematical. But to ask if a fourth dimension is as real as a third is to ask a non-mathematical question. 159

In passing from the world of mere intelligible consistency to that of reality one passes from the world of representation to that of presence. More exactly one enriches the world of representation with that of presence, real or intelligible presence. Representation and presence seem to be the best terms to characterize, from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, the relations between our univocal concepts and that of being. 160

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157 See Ibid., p. 78.
158 See Ibid., p. 79.
159 See Ibid., pp. 79-80.
160 See Ibid., p. 80.
Being, therefore, is not an abstract concept obtained by leaving out all the differences of being, as Collingwood says, \(^\text{161}\) a character which one finds in everything to the exclusion of differences. Being is found in everything which is, yet diversely. If it is something absolutely universal, it is because it is present in everything both as regards their likenesses and as regards their unlikenesses. This relative unity of being and the absolute diversity of beings does not imply a contradiction, since each belongs to two different points of view, the point of view of rational construction (de la ratio), on the one hand and, on the other hand, the order of penetration (de la saisie), or of presence, or of intellect (intellectus). \(^\text{162}\) Intellect and reason (or intuitive and constructive reason) are not two faculties but one only. Because the penetration of penetrating reason, or intellect, is always only partial, that is, abstractive, it is also relationally constructive (of its partial insights) in order to obtain a synthetic world view.

"To reason is proper to a human intellect." \(^\text{163}\)

M. Being as a Concrete Universal of Identity in Difference.

How beings are one as such and at the same time differ according to their being is the problem of analogical unity, as distinct from

\(^{161}\) See this chapter, above, pp. 476 et seq.

\(^{162}\) See L.B. Geiger, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 82. Correlate with F.H. Parker's intuitive reason and constructive reason, this chapter, above, pp.

\(^{163}\) L.B. Geiger, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 82.
the univocal unity of the generic universal. Here is realized a true
unity in diversity, identity in difference. What makes a horse a dif-
ferent kind of being from a man is itself being, the same as that which
makes them the same. The intelligible grasping of things is a grasping
of them in their very communication in diversity (communion dans l'alté-
rité). Thus, beings can manifest to one and the same intelligence that
they are, that they communicate in the act of being, and also that in
their essences and proper content they are diversified as beings.164

What this means is that, whereas the univocal genus, animal,
is differentiated into the species, man, the difference, extrinsic to
the common genus, bears the whole weight of the differentiation. And
man, differing from dog as rational from irrational, differs in as much
as there is affirmation and negation of rational, that is, of the dif-
ference, not of the common genus. But, when the common term, being, is
differentiated into (say) human being and vegetable being, the dif-
ferentiation does not at all take place outside the common term, but takes
place precisely through simultaneous affirmation and negation of the com-
mon term. Man is a being, and thus affirms being. But as his being is
not the being of a vegetable (cabbage) he simultaneously negates being,
the being that is distinctly that of the cabbage.

When I understand a chimpanzee, I posit something,
let us say, the characteristics of this particular

164 See Ibid., pp. 84-85.
species, and simultaneously I deny the characteristics of another species. But notice that the association of assertion and negation concerns the differential. With analogates the association of assertion and negation concerns the common ground.165

This is "the secret of analogical thinking," namely that you have an assertion of the common ground coupled with a negation of the common ground....You have here a togetherness of 'yes' and 'no' an association of assertion and negation which concerns the common ground. If the common ground were a genus, assertion and negation would concern only the differential factor.166

What immediately becomes clear at this stage is that what dialecticians such as Hegel and Collingwood are striving to do by means of auto-determination through significate negation in their philosophy of mind, in which the foundation of all that is is self-actuating, self-creating mind, actualizing itself through simultaneous affirmation and negation of itself, the proponents of the philosophy of being are striving to do by means of their theory of the analogical unity of being, as that which is simultaneously affirmed and negated in the very constitution of everything that is. Thus, the logical problem at the basis of both systems is the old Parmenidean problem, 'How can that which is basically at the root of all that is (mind for the Hegeleans, Being for realists)


166 Ibid., p. 65. Emphasis added.
be simultaneously both affirmatively and negatively the reason why each thing is what it is?

Whereas, Hegelians, accepting the Kantian critique, which concludes that understanding is always mediate and unable to reach things in their own reality, but rejecting Kant's impasse at the antinomies of reason, seek to find in reason, in constructive reason, the lost intuitive contact with the foundation of all that is, and thus elaborate the doctrine of the concrete universal as concrete unity in diversity attained by the self-creative activity of self-actuating reason, on the other hand, philosophers of Being, such as F.H. Parker, and Y. Simon regard the understanding as enjoying its own type of immediacy with the concrete world of experience, distinct from the immediacy of sense, so that, for them, the abstract universal is not merely abstract, but the intelligible face of present reality as being. Being as thus something present to the intelligence, or to intuitive reason, is the foundation both of its being present and of its being what it is as distinct from what it is not. This being of things, in as much as it is that which is universally pervasive and together the concrete determinant of the being


168 See above, this chapter, pp. 453 et seq.

169 See above, p. 483.

170 See above, this chapter, p. 473, and note 136.

171 See above, this chapter, p. 474, et seq.
of each thing is just as much a concrete unity in diversity as is the
concrete universal of Bradley, Bosanquet and Collingwood. It is "a
universal which determines its own particularization." And "(i)n this
sense the universal conceived by Aristotle was, in intention at least,
concrete..."\textsuperscript{172}

The movement of thought which began with Galileo
and which founded the natural sciences may be described
as the insurrection of matter against (Aristotle's)
imposed determination by form. It developed in conscious
opposition to the doctrine of 'substantial forms', and
its fundamental principle of efficient causation was
nothing less than the assertion that the existence of
things is determined by other principles than those
which determine their kind. The revolt was successful,
and destroyed forever after the claim of the Aristotelian
universal to be concrete.\textsuperscript{173}

N. Interim Summary.

The foregoing sections of this chapter have taken issue with
Collingwood's position that propositions are meaningful only as answers
to questions and that knowledge therefore is a matter of propositions
taken in union with the questions they propose to answer. Firstly,
Collingwood's reason for asserting his position was questioned, namely
his opposition to Cook Wilson and the Oxford Realists and their realist
principle that "knowledge makes no difference to what is known." It was
shown in what sense this principle is quite legitimate, and that, if this

\textsuperscript{172} M.B. Foster, "The Concrete Universal: Cook Wilson and

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p. 2.
legitimate sense is denied for the reasons alleged by Collingwood, then
Collingwood's own theory of conscious reflection over feelings is like­
wise prejudiced. Then, secondly, it was shown that, in regard to
scientific research, many discoveries have been made which were in­
dependent of, and sometimes quite opposed to, the questions in the minds
of the researchers. Thirdly, it was shown that the very questioning
activity of the mind is not solely a matter of an active domination of
the subject matter by the mind, as the Baconian and juridical method of
interrogating a recalcitrant witness suggests, but itself involves a
respectful receptivity towards that which is questioned, whether person
or document. And, furthermore, the questioning involved in historical
research was shown, following Marrou, to presuppose a basic sympathetic
connaturality with the questioned object, in which the basic attitude of
the questioner with respect to the questioned object is that found in
everyday life between members of a family, that is, of familiarity, in
which the other is sympathetically respected as a friend, and the inter­
rogation of the historical object is similar to that which takes place
between friends trying to get to know one another. Thus the questioning
traditionally associated with the attitude of wonder was shown to be
other than that associated with behaviour proceeding from suspicion and
doubt, where the predominating concern of the questioner is calculated
to avoid deception. Questioning is thus not merely the activity of
extorting information reluctantly given, but may be, and often is, a
cooperative activity in which the questioner and his interrogated object concur spontaneously and connaturally in an exercise of familiarity.

Fourthly, Collingwood's epistemology was questioned from the point of view that the content of the question carried by its presuppositions might not be merely presuppositions catalytically drawn out of the mind by its own activity of supposal, but might in fact be genuine intuitive penetrations into reality present to the mind. Collingwood was criticised as implicated in a theory of reason originating from Kant according to which thought is always reflexive and mediate, enjoying no intuitive immediacy with reality. Following F.H. Parker, it was shown that the Aristotelian theory of abstraction attained universals as the structures of concrete reality present to the mind and not merely as mental classificatory devices. Then, sixthly, it was shown that the abstract concepts of the mind are adapted both to the mind's demands for clarity and distinction, for which the mind requires univocal concepts of the genus-species variety, which form the stock in trade tools of the scientist, and also to the transcendent fulness of present reality, for which analogical concepts are required. The concept of being, was then shown not to be an empty class concept, as Collingwood would have it, but an analogical concept which is a genuine concrete universal whose differentiations are intrinsic to the common term itself. Metaphysics is thus concerned with being as an active presence of that which is to the mind, both as regards its common being and as regards its differentials in being and not merely with presuppositions which the mind actively presents to itself.
solely from within its own resources. Consequently, the natural world, as philosophically viewed, is therefore not merely an understanding of objects in terms of external, spatial relations, but an active presence of that which is to mind exercising its own distinctive way of being. This ontological dimension of the natural world will be of the highest importance, in chapter 9, below, in defending, against Collingwood, the meaningfulness of propositions in themselves, as expressive of penetrations into the natural world, in addition to the meaning which they have as answers to questions, in which function their meaning is in terms of human concerns.

0. Instance in which Knowledge Clearly Demands Relation to Question.

But, if the foregoing sections of this chapter tend to undermine Collingwood's theory that every meaningful statement is by way of an answer to a question and that knowledge is therefore an activity including both questions and their answers, there are instances which clearly favor Collingwood's position. Perhaps one of the clearest possible instances of the meaning of a proposition being missed because the correct question was not asked, is to be found in Hans Vaihinger's The Philosophy of 'As If', 174 in which Vaihinger records the interesting case of Berkeley who discovered the answer to a question he had never

asked, and, because he had not asked the question which he should have asked when he had its answer in his hands, he failed to appreciate exactly the knowledge he had within his grasp through not seeing what he did know as precisely the answer to a crucial question.

The context is that of the use of systematic errors, especially in mathematics. This methodical procedure consists in allowing a deviation or contradiction to enter one's system, provided that a compensating correction is admitted elsewhere into the system in order to cancel out the original deviation.

If, in fictions, thought contradicts reality, or if it even contradicts itself, and if in spite of this questionable procedure it nevertheless succeeds in corresponding to reality, then — and this is a necessary inference — this deviation must have been corrected and the contradiction must have been made good.175

Where the correction that must be made is that of aligning mental constructs with reality, the logical procedure is called the method of correcting deviations made arbitrarily. Where self contradiction is wholly within the logical construct itself, as when something is added to one side only of a mathematical equation and the correction must be made in the only way possible, namely, by an equivalent, cancelling error of an opposite nature (one is reminded of the Hegelian negation of the negation) the procedure is called the method of antithetic error.176

To the method of correcting deviations as between thought constructs and reality, and the method of antithetic error which remains wholly internal to the logical system, we may add a third type of systematic correction which is confined wholly to experienced reality. As an instance, a structural problem in the engineering complex of the 200 inch Mount Palomar telescope may be cited.\(^{177}\) The mirror and the observer's cage were to be located at opposite ends of a tube suspended pivotally at a gravitational centre between them. The problem was that of supporting the 40 ton mirror assembly in any desired position in mid-air, and sixty feet away at its focal point float a six-foot house full of mirrors and instruments and carrying an observer several tons in all—and at no time let the two elements slip out of line with each other by more than 8/100 of an inch. Such rigidity seemed an impossibility from an engineering point of view. Serrurier gave a brilliant solution to the problem by first agreeing with the engineers that such rigidity was impossible. Of whatever strength the tube may be those great weights suspended at both ends were bound to bend it. The solution was "very well, then let them bend it. Simply design the tube," he said, "so that the mirror and the observer's cage will move together, by the same amount and in the same direction, and thus in relation to each other stand still."\(^{178}\)


To define a circle as an ellipse is a self evident error, but, if one adds that the distance between the foci is zero, the assertion immediately becomes intelligible. One error has been made good by another. It is logically nonsensical that a distance equals zero; a distance equal to zero is no distance at all, but the non-occurrence is regarded as an occurrence in the negative sense. Two mistakes have been committed here: first, the assertion that the circle is an ellipse, which is compensated for by the second, namely, that a certain distance be allowed to equal zero, which, if literally taken is the same kind of contradiction as if to say that a circle is an ellipse. 179

Many problems in mathematics are solved by a procedure in which a discrepancy introduced into the data at the beginning is cancelled out when the process is finished. A problem for a long time insoluble was the determination of the conditions under which a line a divided into parts x and a - x shall have \( x^2(a - x) \) at a maximum. 180 Fermat solved it by an arbitrary substitution of \( x + e \) for \( x \). This transforms the original \( x^2(a - x) \) into \((x + e)^2\). \((a - x - e)\) and treats the latter as if equal to the former when in fact it is not. Thus, \( 6^2(9 - 6) = 108 \), whereas \( (6 - 1)^2 (9 - 6 - 1) = 50 \). The original and the transformed equations are then expanded as follows:


180 See Ibid., pp. 113-115.
\[ x^2(a - x) = x^2a - x^3 \quad \cdots \quad (1) \]
\[ (x + e)^2(a - x - e) = (x^2 + 2ex + e^2)(a - x - e) \quad \cdots \quad (2) \]
\[ = ax^2 + 2aex + ae^2 - x^3 - 2ex^2 \]
\[ - e^2x - ex^2 - 2e^2x - e^3 \]

Equating (1) and (2) gives:
\[ x^2a - x^3 = ax^2 + 2aex + ae^2 - x^3 - 2ex^2 \]
\[ - e^2x - ex^2 - 2e^2x - e^3 \quad \cdots \quad (3) \]

This (i.e. equation 3) reduces to the following:
\[ 2aex + ae^2 = 3ex^2 + 3e^2x + e^3 \]
...which in turn reduces to:
\[ 2ax + ae = 3x^2 + 3x^3 + e^2 \]

But, in the next step, Fermat simply cancels out the previously introduced error by saying that \( x + e \) was a catalytic fiction merely to facilitate the calculation. The equivalence of equation (1) and (2) is possible only if \( e = 0 \), and then all expressions containing \( e \) drop out, giving
\[ 2ax = 3x^2 \]
\[ 2a = 3x \]
\[ 2a = x \]
\[ \frac{3}{3} \]

This means that if a line \( a \) equals 12 inches, the only division in which a part \( x \) and the remaining part \( a - x \) will give a maximum value for \( x^2(a - x) \) will be when \( x = 8 \) and \( a - x = 4 \), and \( 8^2(4) = 256 \). Every other
Fermat's reasoning in obtaining this solution was that the fictitious quantity \( x + e \) is not equal to the quantity \( x \) if \( e \) is a real value, but is equal only if \( e = 0 \). The whole method is based on first assuming \( e \) to be real and then equating it to zero. Fermat called this an _adaequalitas_, that is, something approximating a complete equation being treated as if it were a complete equation although according to strict mathematical and logical code \( x \) can never be equal to \( x + e \).

Nevertheless, a correct result is obtained by interpolating the fiction \( x + e \) and equating it with \( x \). Fermat simply deliberately made one error and cancelled it in the course of the procedure by allowing the catalytic quantity \( e \) to drop out. The equality then ceases to be imaginary and becomes real in the end. By this antithetic operation an important, and hitherto unobtainable result was achieved.

Another somewhat similar procedure is adopted to solve second order equations, such as \( x^2 + px = q \), which are solved by introducing the auxiliary quantity \( (\frac{p}{2})^2 \) so that \( x^2 + px + (\frac{p}{2})^2 = q \). But, to correct the error of adding that quantity to one side of the equation, an antithetic operation is immediately performed by adding the same term to the other side, giving \( x^2 + px + (\frac{p}{2})^2 = q + (\frac{p}{2})^2 \).
The equation can now be solved thus:

\[
\left( x + \frac{p}{2} \right)^2 = q + \left( \frac{p}{2} \right)^2
\]

\[
x + \frac{p}{2} = \pm \sqrt{q + \left( \frac{p}{2} \right)^2}
\]

\[
x = \pm \sqrt{q + \left( \frac{p}{2} \right)^2} - \frac{p}{2}
\]

Mathematical thought arrived at this conclusion by adding \( \left( \frac{p}{2} \right)^2 \) to both sides of the equation, the addition to the right hand side being to correct the error of adding it to the left side.

The second procedure resembles that of Fermat in some respects, but whereas in the first case the methodology consists in the introduction of a mental fiction (an unreality), in the second case the methodology consists in the deliberate introduction of error into the reality of the case, requiring a corresponding balancing counter-error. Upon which Vaihinger makes the following comment:

I am not claiming to have reduced the logical functions to mathematical ones, but to have shown the formal identity of scientific methods in the various fields of scientific inquiry, and in particular of methods which attempt to attain their goal by an alteration of the given facts, by an arbitrary deviation from reality. The mathematical example given merely happens to be the most transparent and shows how it is conceivable that thought should be able to progress precisely because of such deviations from reality. The logical function finds itself faced by the stubborn data, the material of thought, but without allowing itself to be frightened thereby it arbitrarily alters the facts, sets the ideas in motion, and then quietly changes the
mistakes it first made. The formal identity of these logical devices is thus obvious.\textsuperscript{181}

Vaihinger then discusses how Berkeley showed that the differential calculus can be similarly explained by reduction to Fermat's schema. He concluded that a double error had been made and his objections were developed at great length in fifty sections of his neglected work, \textit{The Analyst}.

But, Vaihinger says that in manifesting the contradictions in the mathematical operations of the calculus, instead of recognizing that he had made a brilliant discovery regarding mathematical methodology, Berkeley rejected it as illogical. His conclusion was that mathematicians had no right to scoff at the incomprehensible mysteries of Christianity, since their own subject suffered from exactly the same illogicalities. Vaihinger maliciously adds that "(l)ike a good Englishman...the Bishop of Cloyne did not realize that he would then also have to reject the basic principles of Christian theology."\textsuperscript{182} Vaihinger comments that here "we have a strange spectacle, and one not likely to occur again in the history of science, of a thinker with a key to a problem in his hands - but without the problem itself."\textsuperscript{183}

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\textsuperscript{181} H. Vaihinger, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 116-117. Emphasis in original. \\
\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 117. \\
\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Ibid.} Emphasis added.
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The explanation Vaihinger offers is as follows. Irritated by mathematical 'free-thinkers' expressing themselves sceptically about the incomprehensible mysteries of Christian dogma, Berkeley tried to direct the mathematicians' attention to their own sorry plight and recognize that their fluxions were full of contradictions. In doing so, quite by chance he discovered and demonstrated that the method proceeds by cancelling one error with another and thereby arriving at the correct result.

But, Vaihinger carefully points out, "the real problem was and still remains this: - How comes it that in mathematics a correct result can be obtained by means of contradictions such as those involved in fluxions?" \(^{184}\) "The answer to the problem", Vaihinger says, \(^{185}\) "is that the correct result is obtained by the method of antithetic error."

Berkeley's effort was confined merely to showing the existence of contradictions in the operations of fluxions. He actually accomplished more than he intended, but because he did not have the relevant question in his mind he failed to see the discovery he had made, which discovery is seen for what it is only when seen as an answer to that question.

\(^{184}\) Ibid., p. 118.
\(^{185}\) Ibid.
(Berkeley) accomplished more than he intended for he also discovered the answer to a question that he had never asked. And yet this answer should have led him to the correct question. We certainly have here an unusual occurrence in the history of science.186

It is doubtful whether a more forceful example of Collingwood's thesis, that knowledge is by way of an answer to a question, could be found than the one recorded by Vaihinger. Had Berkeley seen the propositional data which he had as an answer to a question he would have seen what those propositional data meant. He knew that it was a fact that there were contradictions in the procedures of calculus (fluxions). He stopped there. Had he asked 'Why do such contradictory procedures lead to correct results?,' he would have seen those contradictions for what they really are in those mathematical operations, namely, the method of antithetic error, and not merely blatant illogicalities which is all that they appeared to be to him.187

P. General Conclusion Regarding Collingwood's Identification of Knowledge with the Mind's Questioning Activity.

What these arguments both for and against Collingwood's position manifest is that questions and their answers can exist quite

186 Ibid., p. 118.

independently of one another. Questions may be asked, which, perhaps quite by chance, may only be answered generations or perhaps centuries later.

...a knowledge that is incomplete in a thousand ways may still be the answer to a certain question. Someone may raise a question a few centuries before the answer is obtained, and one day when the answer to precisely this question is obtained, we do not yet know everything, we do not know the whole about anything, but we have nevertheless obtained a true answer, a true proposition.188

Then, again, as in the Berkeley case narrated by Hans Vaihinger above, a scholar may possess the answer to a question without possessing the question to which it is an answer. Collingwood himself recognizes this. During his archaeological investigation of the Cumberland Wall as a sentry walk, Collingwood theorized that if the wall was not a defense barrier but in fact a sentry walk "there ought...to be a chain of towers, not connected by a wall but otherwise resembling those on the wall, stretching down that coast."190 To the relevantly arising question "did such towers exist?" the answer in the affirmative was revealed by "(s)earch in old archaeological publications (which) showed that towers of exactly the right kind had been found; but their existence had been


189 See this chapter, pp. 488 et seq.

190 An Autobiography, p. 129.
forgotten, as generally happens with things whose purpose is not understood." Now, the crucial point here is that, had the contributors to the old archaeological publications merely recorded, in strict accordance with Collingwood's proposed Baconian method of rigidly adapting findings to a preconceived questionnaire, merely what answered their own questions, they may never have seen fit to record such information as was to prove crucial to the answering of questions raised later by Collingwood. They had the answer to Collingwood's question without having the question. But had they discarded that information as being irrelevant to their own investigations, Collingwood, later, would have had his question without having the answer to it. Again, Collingwood writes:

In England, where Roman archaeology has gone forward incessantly in most parts of the country ever since the seventeenth century, there is a gigantic bulk of material from which many questions of this kind (concerning Graeco-Roman population statistics) can be answered, if not conclusively at least within a reasonable margin of error.  

Had the collectors responsible for this gigantic bulk of material simply dealt with it as precise answers to their own questions it would not be subsequently available as a means of answering many newly arisen questions. This stock of information, in the form of statements,  

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191 Ibid.

192 Ibid., p. 135.
is valuable as such even before the questions arise to which it will provide the answer.  

193 Leslie Armour, The Concept of Truth, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1969, p. 213, agrees with Collingwood's criticism of the archaeologists who "were in the habit of ransacking historical sites, piling the loot neatly, and then trying to see what "natural kinds" the objects sorted themselves into. The main result, according to Collingwood (and he was probably right) was simply the destruction of a great deal of historical evidence.... The archaeologists were foolish because they failed to ask themselves such simple questions as "How many different sorts of people lived on this site and in what order?" - a question which would have readily suggested to them the fact that the order of the material in an ancient garbage heap might well be extremely important and that not all objects which looked more or less alike necessarily belonged together." Armour points out that "if one's interest in the objects is purely aesthetic, the classification of objects might well be very different than if one's interests were both aesthetic and historical or only historical. Again, if one's interests lay in the molecular structures of the garbage, one would get a still different set of classifications." He concludes that "the same data...can yield a variety of different kinds of information depending on the questions one asks. (And), if one asks no questions, it does not seem that the data could yield any information." Armour and Collingwood are certainly correct in maintaining that the yield, in terms of intelligible meaning content, of the excavation results depends on the direction of the excavator's questions, but exclusive insistence on the role of the excavator's questions, dominated as they will be by the excavator's interests in the 'dig', may result in the very thing which both Collingwood and Armour warn against, namely the destruction of evidence, for future investigators may well find in the same excavation yield answers to their questions which may be questions the original investigators never envisaged. The warning is that an excavator who approaches an excavation site with aesthetical questions in mind should also keep in mind the possibility that other investigators, now, or at some future time, may be interested in the results of the excavation from the optic of historical or chemical (scientific) questions. If he is not careful to preserve or record the results of his investigations in such a way as to be available to these other researchers he may well destroy forever the very evidence that these other investigators need to answer their questions provoked by their respective interests. Criticism of indiscriminate digging applies well to men like Belzoni (see C.W. Ceram, Gods, Graves and Scholars, N.Y., A. Knopf, 1968, rev. edn., pp. 117-120) who ransacked Egyptian tombs with no other motive than personal glory or
The conclusion of all the foregoing, therefore, is that propositions, besides being answers to questions, have a meaning in themselves in an absolute way. They not only relate to the questioning mind as answers to its questions, as the satisfaction of its inquiry, but they relate also to objective reality and have meaning as so related, as signifying reality. The Berkeley case as narrated above by Hans Vaihinger, clearly shows this. That is, the meaningful content of a proposition does not totally derive from the question to which it is the answer, but also from its relationship to objective reality which it is able to present to the mind and thereby answer the mind's questions addressed to reality. This means that statements made in any historical period are not restricted in their meaningfulness to the questions currently raised during that period. Collingwood's insistence on the matching of meaning and evidence exclusively to questions involved serious defects in his archaeological work, as is testified by I.A. Richmond. "(T)hat excavation should be conducted with specific problems in mind upon sites likely to provide an answer, was salutary and useful," but its "corol-

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194 See below, chapter 9, pp. 714 et seq.


196 Ibid., p. 478.
lary, that to pose a problem permitted its answer to be predicted was a product of study rather than the field, and involved Collingwood in prediction rather than discovery: "...at King Arthur's Round Table, near Penrith...he had made up his mind in advance what he was to find and found it with fatal precision." The attitude of natural piety, which Collingwood regarded as a vice in Alexander, but which is a virtue absolutely essential to any researcher, was completely lacking in Collingwood. "He had...supreme intellectual confidence which prevented him from being taken by surprise..." This exclusive attention to knowledge as active questioning, characterized by "a power of artistic criticism and draughtsmanship" stifled that sense of wonder and openness which recognizes that "the expected is always accompanied and often overshadowed by the unexpected" and that "an excavator's first duty is to see everything without the blinkers imposed by prearranged concentration of vision."

197 Ibid.
198 Ibid., p. 479.
202 Ibid., pp. 478-479.
A. The Awakening of Reason and the Birth of Logic.

Ernst Cassirer tells how the ancient Egyptians held in special reverence the moon-god Thoth, "the scribe among the gods", from whose hands writing came into being and who "allows gods and men to know what is their due; for he determines the measure of things."\(^1\) Speech and writing - the precondition of all human intercourse and community - "are valued as the origin and measure; for the capacity to fix the fleeting and changing, and thereby remove the accidental and capricious, inheres, above all, in them."\(^2\)

Cassirer says that already in myth and religion it is detected that human culture is not self evidently given, a mere datum to be accepted as such, but a miracle of some sort which has to be explained. This feeling generates the deeper self-awareness which not only drives man to pose the questions which ask for that explanation, but dares him to go further and to construct an authentic and independent method by which he can answer them. The Greeks first took this decisive step, and thereby revealed the new power which alone could lead to a science of nature and a science of human civilization. Thought awakened, strives

\(^1\) Ernst Cassirer, The Logic of the Humanities, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960, p. 44.

\(^2\) Ibid.
to grasp the unity that pervades the whole of reality.

In place of the unrestricted multiplicity of the mythical attempts at explanation, which focus on first one phenomenon and then another, there emerges the representation of a thoroughgoing unity of being, which must correspond to a similar unity of explanation. This unity is accessible only to pure thought. The diverse and numerous creations of the mythmaking imagination were henceforth rejected and eradicated by the critique of thought.3

Thus, intellectual awakening occurred with this awareness that a radical unity pervaded the hitherto discordant multiplicity. From its own resources critical thought had to supply the answers which would replace the destroyed multiplicity of mythical explanations. This task proceeded from the admirable consistency of the Pre-Socratics to the solution given in Plato's theory of ideas and Aristotle's metaphysics, which remained decisive and exemplary for centuries. Many apparently diametrically opposed tendencies contributed to the statement of the question and solution of the problem. The unifying concept in the diversity of the labour of Greek thought is that of *logos*.

...if we look at it in terms of its origin and goal, this whole colossal labor of thought in a certain measure, yields to being comprehended within one fundamental concept which Greek philosophy was the first to discover and which it worked out and perfected in all its factors. In the development of Greek thought the concept which played this role was *that of logos*.4

3 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
4 Ibid., p. 45. Emphasis in original.
By means of this concept, Heraclitus saw the world as a totality of materials which reciprocally metamorphose into one another. The Ionians were not satisfied to know merely "the what" of things, but demanded also to know their "how" and their "why." Heraclitus faced these questions with the realization that perception alone could not give a satisfying answer. The answer could be given only by thought, for thought alone permits a man to transcend subjective enclosure within his own private individuality. "He no longer pursues his 'subjective understanding' but comprehends one that is universal and divine. A universal law (of the world) replaces... 'private insight'." With the recognition of this logos, this 'universal law of the world', a man is first liberated from his mythical dream-world of imagination and narrow and limited world of private sense perception.

For just this is the character of being awake and of awakened being - that individuals possess a common world, whereas in dreams each lives only in his own world and remains mired and imprisoned in it.

5 These are three of the four questions which Aristotle later will systematize into the scientific interrogation of reality as distinct from dialectical interrogation of prevailing beliefs and convictions about reality. See later, this chapter, pp. 535 et seq.

6 E. Cassirer, The Logic of the Humanities, p. 46.

7 Ibid., p. 46. One recalls Collingwood's transcendence of art and religion and emergence of the scientific consciousness, as described in Speculum Mentis.
Western thought found it impossible ever to deviate from this new direction imparted to it by Greek thought.

From the time this thought first permeated the school of Greek philosophy, all knowledge of reality was bound, to a certain extent, by this basic concept of 'logos' - hence by 'logic' in the widest sense.8

Logic in its widest sense, therefore, is this acceptance of thought as bounded by a radical principle of unity and coherence at the basis of everything that is, and it is in terms of this principle that all meaning and intelligibility is to be found.

This newly awakened consciousness, searching for the explicative principle of all that is, soon became commercialized by the Greek sophists for whom "what they believed to be wisdom (because they confused wisdom and power) was but an act of seducing and persuading minds."9 For them the intellectual life was a sport, a contest, a battle of eloquence whose sole purpose was a public victory over their adversary's thesis, whether by fair means or by foul. The audience played the primary role, as the verdict of the bystanders was the final judgment. These men were professors of the 'successful' life through

8 E. Cassirer, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

the techniques of opportunism, especially in the political field. But by the dialectic of history "(t)hey made Socrates possible," whose "critical spirit (critical in the philosophical sense of the word) apprehends questions and tests ideas according to their intrinsic value, independently of the judgment of the crowd." What matters now is not the blows exchanged in the arena of public contestation but what is achieved in the workshop of trial and proof within the mind itself. "The passion for truth has taken the place of the passion for success." From this, the notion of science clearly emerged, the notion of authentically intellectual knowledge, established on the level of the intellect's own lights and proper demands. The first and most basic demand of authentically scientific knowledge is the search for what things are, their definitions. Scientific discussion regarding what is

10 See Ibid., p. 5.
11 See Ibid.
12 Ibid., Emphasis added.
13 Ibid., pp. 5-6. Aristotle will later distinguish in his Topics (VIII, 5, 159a 25-40) argument for the sake of investigation and teaching from the argument of those engaged in a competition. In the first case, there is a common seeking of a common aim, namely knowledge of some subject matter; in the second each contestant seeks to win over the other, not to achieve a common purpose. Bacon's scientific method of interrogating a recalcitrant and hostile witness is of the latter type.
14 J. Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 6.
just and what is not just all turns on our ability to answer the question what is justice. 15 This is extremely important in evaluating Collingwood’s theory of the logic of questioning, for, on the one hand he rejects the definitional ‘what’ question as vague and meaningless, and to be substituted for by the ‘which’ question, since the ‘what’ question offers no alternatives; 16 on the other hand, he frequently sets out from a ‘what’

15 See Ibid.

16 See Collingwood’s The New Leviathan, p. 74, ppgh. 11.12: "A question that offers no alternatives is a bogus question. The technique of knowing proper, or what is called scientific method, depends on replacing questions which, being vague or confused, are unanswerable, by real questions, or questions which have a precise answer. (11.13) The vague question 'What do I want?' is thus replaced by the precise or real question: 'Which do I want, a or b?" See also Collingwood’s depreciation of definition in his Speculum Mentis, p. 111: "Giving and collecting definitions is not philosophy but a parlour game." Louis O. Mink in his "Collingwood’s Dialectic of History," in History and Theory, VII (1968), p. 4, writes: He (Collingwood) did not ask or attempt to answer the question "What is History?" Elsewhere he specifically renounced all questions of the form "What is X?" Mink refers us to ppghs. 31.61 - 31.68 of Collingwood’s The New Leviathan where we read: "Ancient (Greek) sciences...defined their aims by asking questions like: 'What is Nature?' 'What is man?' 'What is Justice?' 'What is Virtue?' A question of this sort was to be answered by a definition of the thing. From this definition, which had to state the 'essence' of the thing defined, implications could be derived, each implication being the statement of some 'property.' ...To seek for x a single essence from which all the 'properties' of x are logically deducible is to propose a science of x with an unlimited objective. That is implied in any question of the form: 'What is x?' To a question in this form, for example: 'What is Nature?' modern science answers: 'I do not know. What the essence of Nature is nobody knows, and nobody need care. When they asked that question the Greeks were asking a question too vague to be precisely answered.' " Correlate this statement by Collingwood with Marjorie Grene’s comments on Aristotle’s nous, see chapter 7, above, pp. 455-456 n. 89. See also criticism of this position, this chapter, below, pp. 549-550 and pp. 566-570.
question, although, during the course of the investigation, he transforms it into a 'which' question, dealt with by 'the plain historical method.'

This transformation of 'what' questions (such as, what is art? what is...
religion? what is science?) into questions about the idea of art held by certain peoples at various historical periods, about the idea of religion, about the idea of science or about the idea of nature prevailing at certain periods, is the transformation of the scientific (in the strict sense; since science in the strict sense is dominated by knowledge of what the subject matter is in itself - a question out of bounds in European thought since the Kantian critiques) questioning and investigation of reality into dialectical questioning and investigation of what people think or have thought about reality. This is the core critique against the whole Collingwoodian enterprise, that the most basic scientific (in the strict sense) question is put out of bounds by exaggeration of the historical dimension in human knowledge and, hence, absorption of all inquiry into dialectical inquiry. The root cause of

from one's 'plain historical method.' A clue to the reason why Collingwood slips out of gear from one method into another, proceeding, as he does, as a dialectician, is given by what Aristotle says in the Topics, Bk. 8, ch. 2,158a 15-20: "Not every universal question can form a dialectical proposition as ordinarily understood, e.g., 'What is man?' or 'How many meanings has the good?' For a dialectical premiss must be of a form to which it is possible to reply 'Yes' or 'No', whereas to the aforesaid it is not possible. For this reason questions of this kind are not dialectical unless the questioner himself draws distinctions or divisions before expressing them, e.g., 'Good means this or this, does it not?' For questions of this sort are easily answered by a yes or a no." The straight 'what' question is a direct interrogation of reality, hence a scientific question; but 'is it this or this?' transforms it into a question about our knowledge of reality, that is, a dialectical question. See later in this chapter, pp. 570-571 below.
this is a historical cause, the rupture of viable contact of the understanding intellect with concrete reality in itself by the Kantian critique, and the Hegelian alleged restoration of rational contact with reality by historical dialectical self-creating, self-unfolding reason. To argue, as Collingwood does in his Autobiography, that 'what is the State?' is a different question for Plato and for Hobbes, is to presuppose that the only knowable object regarding the State is what Hobbes or Plato or Marx or somebody thought it to be, and to put out of play completely the vital scientific question 'what is the State?' which means 'what is the State really?' as distinct from what anybody thinks it to be. If one argues, with Collingwood, that the 'what' question such as 'what is the State?' is reducible without residue to what а, b, c, d...etc, thought it to be, then one thereby abandons the properly scientific and philosophical enterprise which began with the discovery by the Greeks of all pervading logos, and lapses into a new, though perhaps more refined sophism, which masks its sophistry behind historical respectability.

Jacques Maritain warns against misunderstanding the Socratic ignorance. It is an ignorance we are aware of, and one of which Socrates

18 See chapter 7 above, pp. 483-485.
19 Pp. 61-64.
took great pains to make us conscious. But, Maritain asks, "If the idea of science were not there, would I have the idea of my ignorance?"

For Socrates, ignorance is something pointing to something else. As blindness would be meaningless if sight were not a reality (trees lack sight but are not blind; the term is meaningless in their regard) so ignorance, known ignorance, would be meaningless if science were not a reality. Awareness of ignorance presupposes awareness of knowledge, of knowledge which dispels the ignorance, whose known absence constitutes that very ignorance. Maritain cites Aristotle as assuring us that Socrates strives in regard to the moral virtues to discover their definitions. "He (Socrates) is in search of what things are: because he applied himself to doing syllogisms, and the principle of syllogisms is what things are." Maritain comments as follows:

The whole Socratic enterprise bears witness to the fact that it must in the end be possible to define the virtues. And thus what matters above all is that the ideal of a knowledge which is firm and incontestable in itself, a science of moral matters, is now brought out.

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20 J. Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 6.

21 Ibid., p. 6. See also Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 13, ch. 4, 1078b 18-25.

With Socrates and Plato, the element of ignorance, and consciousness thereof, as is clear from the variety of opinions on different matters each ably defended by one school of sophistry or another, prevailed, and the search for definitions remained a protracted search rather than an achievement. But, with Aristotle, reaping the fruits of the constructive questioning of Socrates and Plato, a solid core of well defined scientific knowledge becomes available. The dialectic give and take between opinions culminates, at least to some extent, in the insight from which true science begins, the insight into what (e.g., movement or nature) is. Definitions, as expressing insights into the constitution of what things are, do not come out of the blue, but only after perhaps years, or even generations of discussion, sifting what the various schools of thought held on a question. The 'state of the question', that is, the ordered catalogue of opinions pro and con a given thesis, is still the normal and natural lead-up to the true beginning of any scientific inquiry. Having considered all the 'points of view' one is proximately disposed to 'see', to have 'insight', into 'what the thing is' which previous discussion has been about. But, once this insight is secured\textsuperscript{23} into what the subject matter is (expressed by

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{23} ...by intuitive reason, as explained in the previous chapter, see above, pp. 453-459.
\end{quote}
the real definition), the opinions drop out of the picture as no longer relevant. They were approaches to the principle or principles of the subject-matter itself which then dominate thought totally in the elaboration of genuine science. The clustering of the opinions pro and con a given question serves to focus the mind of the investigator on what exactly is the subject matter he is dealing with, so that he is made ready to have the insight into the definition which is going to function as medium in demonstration. The readiness to pass from the opinions to the insight into what will function as the demonstrative medium is what Aristotle calls 'quick wit'. "Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term instantaneously."25

B. The Aristotelian Contribution to the Logic of Questioning.

It has already been noted that Collingwood neglected to make any mention of Aristotle's contribution to the methodology of questioning. On the other hand, L.M. Regis goes so far as to accredit Aristotle with the invention of two techniques of interrogation.27 One such technique is designed for orderly and correct questioning of our own, or of another's knowledge.

24 And, as will appear later, all questioning is a search for a middle which will determine one way or another two possible alternative statements.

25 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. 1, ch. 34, 89b 10.

26 See chapter 1, above, p. 44, n. 68.

One (technique) is for the purpose of discussing knowledge that is already possessed with other philosophers and with his own mind, in order to classify and set in order, to defend it against opponents, to expose sophisms in argumentation, to dispose of adversaries whose contentions are irrational and contradictory. This first technique is called 'dialectics' and is set forth in the Topics as are its three functions concerning properly philosophical knowledge.\textsuperscript{28}

The other technique is for the direct interrogation of reality, and constitutes the basis of strictly scientific and philosophical investigation.

The other technique is the very backbone of scientific and philosophical knowledge and consists in the direct interrogation of reality by the intellect, an interrogation made up of a precise number of questions to be answered by the universe under the threat of remaining obscured by a heavy veil, hiding it from the intellect and leaving visible only its outer contours. This questionnaire is fully set forth, along with its vindication, in the second book of the Analytics.\textsuperscript{29}

In another work\textsuperscript{30} Regis notes that Aristotle uses the word logic only in connection with the dialectical treatise. Only in the Topics\textsuperscript{31} does Aristotle use the word Organon (\textit{ἀγγελατίς }), whereas for the theory of demonstration or science he uses the word analytics

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 127.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{30} L.M. Regis, L'opinion selon Aristote, Paris, J. Vrin, 1935, p. 208, n. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{31} As in 163b 11; 105a 21; 108b 32.
\end{itemize}
(ἀναλογικός) as in Prior and Posterior Analytics. Regis remarks that Descartes reverses this usage, understanding by the term logic the science of demonstration. For Aristotle, then, the Analytics is the method of proceeding scientifically and must be known before the scientific work begins, not learnt during the scientific procedure. In his Metaphysics Aristotle insists upon this necessity to have already been instructed on the way to proceed in each subject-matter, for it is absurd to seek at one and the same time a science and its method.

The syllogism is the foundation stone of the whole Aristotelian logical edifice, but there are two ways in which it operates, scientifically and demonstratively in the Analytics, dialectically and inventively in The Topics. In demonstration, the syllogism proceeds from established principles founded on the real definition of the subject-matter. In dialectic, the syllogism proceeds from generally held convictions about subject-matters, and one of its principal functions is to terminate in the discovery of real definitions which

32 As in On Interpretation, 19b 31 and Topics 162a 11.
33 See L.M. Regis, L'opinion selon Aristote, p. 211.
34 Bk 2, ch. 3, 995a 10-15: "...it is absurd to seek at the same time knowledge and the way of attaining knowledge; and it is not easy to get even one of the two." See R. McKeon's edition of Aristotle's Basic Works, New York, Random House, 1941, p. 715.
35 L.M. Regis, L'opinion selon Aristote, p. 213.
then become the principles of demonstration in science, opinions dropping completely out of the picture.\textsuperscript{36} Dialectical reasoning, operating as it does in the area of held convictions, is confined to the order of probable knowledge, or knowledge of what is generally 'approved' to be the case, as distinct from objectively certain scientific knowledge.\textsuperscript{37}

C. Aristotelian Dialectical Interrogation of Human Knowledge.

Aristotelian dialectic appears to be somewhat insignificant and second-rate if compared with that of Plato, for whom the dialectician is metaphysician, and dialectic the pathway to knowledge of the really real.\textsuperscript{38} This is because, for Plato, the forms definitive of things,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{37} However, as A. Gardeil has shown, probable knowledge has its own genuine type of certitude; see his "La 'Certitude Probable'" in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, L (1911), pp. 237-266 and pp. 441-485. This is extremely important in order to recognize that historical knowledge possesses a genuine certainty as distinct from opinion regarded as merely conjectural. Jean Danielou, in his \textit{Christ and Us} (English translation by Walter Roberts of \textit{Approches du Christ}), London, A.R. Mowbray, 1961, p. 2, writes that "...documents are the sole means of access to the historical realities. This does not mean that historical realities are not capable of a certainty as great as that of the realities of mathematics or physics. It would be a distortion of the reason to suppose that this is the case. Historical certainties are just as absolute in their own sphere as mathematical certainties. But they require to be securely established (by) the rigorous use of methods appropriate to their subject matter".
  \item \textsuperscript{38} See James Hogan, "The Dialectic of Aristotle," \textit{Philosophical Studies}, V (1955), p. 3.
\end{itemize}
what we mean when we talk about what things are, are self-subsistent; to reach the defining forms is to reach ultimate reality. Thus, dialectic has metaphysical value. But, for Aristotle, the defining forms are a constituent of experienced reality, and definition is through abstraction of that form from the contingency, mutability and multiplicity it has in experienced reality. Aristotle, like Plato, distinguishes knowledge from opinion, but, whereas for Plato knowledge is by way of reminiscence of previous direct vision of the subsistent forms as ultimate reality, and opinion is "a likely account of a likely thing"\(^{39}\), that is, merely a conjectural view of the fleeting appearances of reality, for Aristotle both knowledge, that is the certain knowledge of science, and opinion concern the reality of the mobile world of everyday experience. Scientific knowledge is knowledge of that experienced world in its necessary and determinate aspects, that is, its inherent forms. Opinion, on the other hand, is a personal conviction based on motives other than determinate reality. A pupil, for example, may be convinced because of the weight of authority of a teacher, that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles without seeing how the reality of triangle, or what a triangle is, imposes this

consequence. As soon as the pupil sees the implication of what being a triangle is he has no need of a master's authority as his motive for belief. Thus, the one same conviction may be either a scientific conviction, based on the compelling evidence of what the thing is, or on opinion, a personal conviction based on some other motive, the trustworthiness of an authority for instance. But, unlike Plato, Aristotle attaches dialectic to opinion rather than to knowledge. Distinguishing the Platonic tradition of seeking true knowledge in a sense-transcendent world from the earlier Socratic tradition, Aristotle regards himself as developing the earlier Socratic tradition.

(Aristotle) sees himself as developing the Socratic method of definition by means of inductive arguments, starting from the ground of probabilities, that is, from common or generally accepted opinions and cases such as were brought forward, mainly in ethical questions, in the Socratic interrogatories. In his first reaction against Plato's objective idealism Aristotle appears to have reverted to the dialectic of Socrates which had the advantage of providing a method of exploring, testing, and clarifying the currency of probable knowledge or opinion.

Whereas the scientific or demonstrative syllogism is based on the principle that we can only get manifestly true conclusions from premisses that are manifestly true, the dialectical syllogism, although

40 See James Hogan, art. cit., p. 3.
41 Ibid.
as syllogism, as a way of proceeding from premisses to conclusion, it is the same in all cases, nevertheless as dialectically operative it does not follow this principle, since the premisses of the dialectical syllogism are at most probably, at least possibly true, being based, as they are, on prevailing beliefs and opinions.

But a philosophy which takes an experiential basis seriously cannot ignore prevailing opinion. What may be scientifically evident to a scientist may be available to a non-scientist on a basis of trust in the competence and honesty of the scientist. Even the philosopher, in regard to immediately evident principles, quite frequently, in spite of every effort that he can arouse, is not able to see unwaveringly the full force of such intrinsic self evidence, and the more he tries the more it may just look like smoke. At such times he is believing on the strength of his own authority as having in the past seen the indubitable self evidence of such principles. If such is true of self-evident principles, how much more so must it be of demonstrated conclusions,

42 See L.M. Regis, L'opinion selon Aristote, p. 213.

43 See James Hogan, art.cit., p. 3. It will be shown later (see this chapter, below, pp.575-576) that Collingwood in assigning absolute presuppositions as basic convictions determining the questioning procedure, reduces scientific interrogation of reality directly to dialectical interrogation of what people basically think about reality.

scientific laws and even the facts of daily experience. Apart from these rare moments of clear vision in the presence of objectively evident and self compelling reality, we live out our daily lives, scientists as well as lay people, in the world of belief and opinion, trusting to our witness, and trusting in the witnessing of others. Aristotle and Hume have much in common in this respect.

Aristotle is well aware that exact or proven knowledge is possible for only a limited part of human activity, that the greater part of man's practical life lies within the vast debatable land of opinion. He is disposed to much the same view as David Hume, that philosophy originates in our attempts to systematise "the reflections of common life," though Aristotle would not have agreed that philosophy ends, as well as begins with them.

Aristotle is distinguished among philosophers for the respectful attention with which he collects and builds upon the beliefs prevailing among mankind. He reacts against Plato's intellectual absolutism which dismisses all that is not intelligible as mere appearance or illusion, and sees that the way to certainties may be through

45 See Ibid., pp. 258-259.
46 See M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, New York, Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1967, p. 64: "The acceptance of scientific statements by laymen is based on authority, and this is true to nearly the same extent for scientists using results from branches of science other than their own. Scientists must rely heavily for their facts on the authority of fellow scientists."
47 James Hogan, art.cit., p. 3.
48 Ibid., p. 4.
probabilities, beliefs and opinions. It is in Aristotle's dialectic that is to be found his counterpart of the modern free use of hypotheses, assumptions and postulates which may or may not prove to be tenable.49

An exhaustive study of Aristotle's dialectical method, mainly in the Topics, but interspersed throughout his scientific treatises, would require a lengthy separate treatment of its own. We are here concerned with it as an already well developed theory of discovery through questioning which was completely ignored by Collingwood. Short of a thorough going analysis, the following relevant points may be made in regard to it.

The first book programmes the treatise and indicates its relevance. Aristotle then defines what constitutes a dialectical proposition and a dialectical problem. Dialectical propositions exclude both what one holds and what is obvious to everyone, that is, what no one would doubt in his right senses.50 A dialectical proposition is to be found between these extremes.

49 See Ibid., p. 4. Dialectic is not concerned with the truth or falsity of its premisses or conclusions, but merely with internal consistency. See G. Grote, Aristotle, one volume edition edited by Alexander Bain and C. Groom Robertson, London, John Murray, 1880, p. 271. An exclusively dialectical procedure, as in Collingwood, will not require that the premisses of argumentation be true or false in themselves but only that they be held, believed or presupposed for sake of argument. Truth, then, in the last analysis, can be nothing more than internal coherence within the various propositions in the reasoning process.

50 See Aristotle's Topics, Bk 1, ch. 10, 104a 1-10.
A dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men, or by most men or by the philosophers, i.e. either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these, provided it be not contrary to the general opinion.... Dialectical propositions also include views which are like those generally accepted, also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted, and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts.\textsuperscript{51}

A dialectical proposition is therefore a statement ascertained from prevailing opinions and beliefs.\textsuperscript{52} A dialectical problem is that about which an inquiry is conducted, which will lead to action or to knowledge.

A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and that either by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem. It must, moreover, be something on which either people hold no opinion either way, or the masses hold a contrary opinion to the philosophers, or the philosophers to the masses, or each of them among themselves.\textsuperscript{53}

Problems also include questions in which there are reasons for holding contrary positions, or for which no definite reasons are available, that is, the doubtful.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 104a 5-15.

\textsuperscript{52} In other words, one which, in Collingwood terms, would reduce into prevailing presuppositions. If dialectic is the only mode of reasoning, ultimately we will end up talking about the foundations of beliefs, that is, some form of prevailing presupposition or another, as Collingwood does.

\textsuperscript{53} Aristotle, \textit{Topics}, Bk. 1, ch. 11, 104b 1-5.
Problems also include questions in regard to which reasonings conflict (...there being convincing arguments for both sides). Others also in regard to which we have no argument because they are so vast, and we find it difficult to give our reasons.54

Aristotle says that 'practically' all dialectical problems are now called 'theses', although, strictly, "a 'thesis' is a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion", and "a thesis is also a problem, although a problem is not always a thesis, inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about them either way."55

There are two kinds of dialectical argument, induction and reasoning.56 Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. Reasoning is demonstration (i.e. scientific) when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true. Reasoning is dialectical if it reasons from generally accepted opinions.57 Induction is a passage from individuals to uni-

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., 104b 15-20 and 25-35.
56 See Ibid., Bk. 1, ch. 12, 105a 10-15.
57 See Ibid., Bk. 1, ch. 1, 100a 25-31. Collingwood's doctrine of presuppositions is likewise a grounding of reasoning in prevailing convictions. He does not recognize demonstrative premisses
versals. Comparing the two, Aristotle says:

Induction is the more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men, though Reasoning is more forcible and effective against contradictory people.

Analysing the structure of an inquiry, Aristotle explains that arguments start with propositions, and the subjects on which reasonings take place, are problems. But every proposition, and every problem, turns around either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident, and differentia inasmuch as they are applicable to the genus. Neither of these four elements from itself constitutes a proposition or a problem but every proposition and every problem arises from one or other of these.

Aristotle explains the difference between a proposition and a problem:

which are primary and true. As Rubinoff showed, their truth is their serial arrangement on a scale of forms; it is relative to a preceding and succeeding stage of development, not a quality of the premisses in themselves. Scientific demonstration in the Aristotelian sense does not exist for Collingwood.

58 See Aristotle, Topics, Bk. 1, ch. 12, 105a 10-15. It is difficult to be precise about Induction in Aristotle's works. It is perhaps better to leave it in this wide sense in absence of special treatment in its own right.

59 Ibid., 105a 15-20.

60 See Ibid., Bk. 1, ch. 4, 101b 10-20.

61 See Ibid.
The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. For if it be put in this way, "'An animal that walks on two feet' is the definition of man, is it not?" or "'Animal' is the genus of man, is it not?" the result is a proposition: but if thus, 'Is "an animal that walks on two feet" a definition of man or no?' (or 'Is "animal" his genus or no?') the result is a problem.**

Aristotle says that it is clear from this that propositions and problems are the same in number and that a problem can be made out of every proposition if the phrasing is altered. 62

Generally, all propositions turn on identity and diversity, or sameness and difference. Definitions set a subject apart, distinguishing what it is from what it is not. Widely, every predicate defines a subject in a certain way. But since there is sameness and diversity in sameness and diversity itself, things are definable in a number of different ways.

The notion of Sameness or Identity occurs so often in dialectic debate, that Aristotle discriminates its three distinct senses or grades: (1) Numero; (2) Specie; (3) Genre. Water from the same spring is only idem specie, though the resemblance between two cups of water from the same spring is far greater than that between water from different sources. Even idem

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62 Ibid., 25-35. Both propositions and problems are interrogatives under dialectical consideration. A proposition asks a leading question giving the respondent a positive motivation to respond in one way; a problem proposes the alternatives indifferently.

63 See Aristotle, Topics, Bk. 1, ch. 4, 101b 35-102a.
numero has different significations: sometimes there are complete synonyms, sometimes an individual is called by its proprium, sometimes by its peculiar temporary accident.64

Something may be specifically the same as another though individually other; something may be specifically different from another but generically the same. Things the same in strict definition are not only generically but also specifically the same.

Aristotle explains that all disputes, whether of propositions or problems, turn on one or other of the four ways something can be said of a subject, either definitionally, or as property, or as genus, or as accident.

Aristotle takes the four heads - Accident, Genus, Proprium, and Definition, in the order here enumerated. The thesis of which the predicate is enunciated as accident, affirms the least, is easiest to defend, and hardest to upset. When we enunciate Genus or Proprium, we affirm, not merely that the predicate belongs to the subject (which is all that is affirmed in the case of accident), but, also something more - that it belongs to the subject in a certain manner and relation. And when we enumerate Definition, we affirm all this and something reaching yet farther - that it declares the whole essence of the definitum.

64 George Grote, Aristotle (one volume edition edited by A. Bain and C.G. Robertson), p. 277. The idealism of Bosanquet and Collingwood denies the validity of this distinction of identity in difference into these three species, identifying as it does, identity in difference with concrete identity in difference or individuality. It is therefore a partial denial of the full amplitude of the meaning of identity in difference.
and is convertible therewith. Accordingly, the thesis of Definition, affirming as it does so very much, presents the most points of attack, and is by far the hardest to defend. Next in point of difficulty for the respondent (to the questioner) comes the Proprium.\[65\]

Books 2 through 7 of the Topics deal with the problems arising from each of these modes of predicating. Book 8 deals with the interrogation rules to be respected by the questioner and by the respondent in the various types of dialectical situations which differ according to the purpose of the discussion. In a didactic situation (and didactic is not primarily a dialectical situation, but may use dialectical methodology) the questioner-respondent relationship is that of teacher-student. The purpose of the teacher as questioner is to teach what he knows and the respondent to learn what he does not know. In a contestational situation the questioner and respondent are duelling, each seeking only victory over the other. In purely investigative argumentation the aim of both parties is neither to teach, nor to conquer, but the common aim of testing the argumentative consequences of different admissions and to obtain proficiency in the chains of reasoning pro and con a certain topic.\[66\]

In the exercise of dialectical discourse two talkers are assumed, the respondent who sets up the thesis he undertakes to defend,


\[66\] See Ibid., p. 354.
and the questioner who interrogates with a view to impugn it, or to involve the proponent in self contradictory answers.  

The dialectician, being engaged in debate, must shape his questions and regulate his march as questioner according to the concessions obtained or likely to be obtained from his respondent; who if a question be asked having an obvious reference bearing on the thesis, will foresee the consequences of answering in the affirmative, and will refuse to grant what is asked.

This is quite other than what the philosopher does, for he does not face an opponent in a strategy estimating situation.

On the contrary, the philosopher, who pursues investigation with a view to his own satisfaction alone, is under no similar restriction. He looks at once for such premisses as conduct straight to a conclusion; and, the more obvious their bearing on the conclusion is, the more scientific will the syllogism be, and the better will he be pleased.

67 See Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 G. Grote, op.cit., p. 354. Collingwood, not admitting the type of interrogation which deals directly with experienced reality, transforms all interrogation into contestative interrogation with other thinkers, or the interrogation which takes place as a dialogue of the soul with itself, taking now one side, now another, and thus absorbs all philosophical and scientific interrogation into dialectical interrogation in which there is only interrogation regarding what is held or believed about a given topic, and never direct asking of experienced reality: What are you? How did you set to be this way?
The rules for correct interrogation and response differ according as the purpose of the dialogue is one or other of the three enumerated above. Aristotle claims to have been the first to distinguish the third purpose and investigate its particular rules of inquiry. Book 8 of the Topics then details rules of procedure for questioner and respondent in the different interrogation situations.

What is important in this regard, in evaluating Collingwood's position on interrogative logic, is that questioning, inasmuch as it is considered to be a procedure of logical reasoning, implies the syllogism, and sometimes induction, as an integral part of that process. In a contestational situation the respondent is maintaining a thesis. He must avoid, in his responses to his interrogator, not to concede anything from which the interrogator can deduce, as implied, the contrary or contradictory of his thesis. The questioner must interrogate in


71 For commentary on this see G. Grote, op.cit., pp. 353-375. See also Grote's commentary on the Sophistic Elenchi, op.cit., pp. 376-421, which contains a notable amount of material on orderly dialectical questioning.

72 In real life situations, this may be a matter of life and death. An F.B.I. agent, impersonating an espionage agent, has to be very careful in any of his responses not to supply those among whom he is an impersonator of one of their own with information from which they can deduce his real identity.
such a way that he does not put the respondent on guard by a too direct question, whose affirmative or negative response is too blatantly in opposition to the defendant's thesis.

...Aristotle administers counsel to the questioning as well as to the responding partner. You as questioner have to deal with a thesis set up by the respondent. You see at once what the syllogism is that is required to prove the contrary or contradictory of that thesis; and your business is so to shape your questions as to induce the respondent to concede the premisses necessary towards that syllogism. If you ask him at once and directly to concede these premisses, he sees your drift and answers in the negative. You must therefore begin your approaches from a greater distance. You must ask questions bearing only indirectly and remotely upon your ultimate conclusion.73

The exercise and practice of dialectic requires that one be accustomed to argumentation by converting the syllogisms of which the arguments consist, and of testing every thesis by first assuming it to be true, and then assuming it to be false, and following out the consequences on both sides. Having hunted out each train of argument, one ought to look for the counter-arguments against it. This strengthens one's position both as questioner and as respondent. The exercise is

73 G. Grote, op. cit., p. 355. Compare Collingwood's 'Who killed John Doe?' investigation; see above, chapter 1, p. 41 and Collingwood's Idea of History, p. 268. 'The Detective-Inspector was severely blamed later on, for allowing the rector to see in what direction his inquiries were tending, and thus giving him an opportunity to take cyanide and cheat the hangman.'
so valuable that one should go through the process with oneself if no companion is available. The different trains of argument bearing on the same thesis ought to be put side by side for comparison. A command of a large number of both affirmative and negative arguments serves well both for attack and defense. If this is so, Collingwood's argument that interrogative reasoning is specifically other than deductive, syllogistic reasoning, cannot be sustained, as interrogation as a form of reasoning necessarily implicates syllogistic reasoning. An analogy with the wave-transmission of light, as explained by physicists, may be helpful. In a travelling wave-front of light, from, say, a point source, each point on the wave front may be considered to emit a series of secondary waves. The waves so interfere with one another that the energy is transmitted along the perpendiculars to the original wave front, but completely cancelled in every other direction in the forward hemisphere. Diffraction involves the incomplete interference of secondary wavelets at the edge of the light beam. The analogy with dialectical argumentation is that every admission, concession or statement, together with the presuppositions of questions, are 'point sources' from which deductive inferences flow, and any statement made along the way could


be looked at as itself a 'point source' of implications. But the different implications of the progressing statements and presuppositions as the discourse continues have an interfering effect on each other, some not consistent with others, therefore requiring that some or another admission or presupposition be rejected, or that the argument go along this or that direction.

The business of Dialectic...is to find and apply the syllogizing process to any given thesis, with premisses the most probable that can be obtained bearing on the thesis...(The questioner's) purpose is to investigate and impart this syllogizing power - the power of questioning and cross examining a respondent who sets up a given thesis, so as to drive him into inconsistent answers.76

Another important point, for the purpose of evaluating Collingwood's position, is the indifference of dialectical reasoning to the truth or falsity of any of the statements involved. All that is of interest to the partners is consistency. The questioner attempts to attack the respondent's thesis by forcing from him admissions inconsistent with that thesis, and the defendant is concerned to guard himself against answering in a way inconsistent with his maintained position, all the more so if such a position is in itself false (such as that of a murderer in a trial trying to maintain his plead of innocence in the cross-examination).

76 G. Grote, _op.cit._, p. 417.
...neither the direct purpose of the debaters, nor the usual result of the debate, is to prove truth or to disprove falsehood. Such may indeed be the result occasionally; but the only certain result is that an inconsistency is exposed in the respondent's manner of defending his thesis, or that the assailant fails in his purpose of showing up such inconsistency. Whichever way the debate may turn, no certain inference can be drawn as to the thesis itself...77

If, as for Collingwood, dialectical reasoning is the paradigm form, the truth of the constituent premisses in themselves is meaningless, and the only allowable meaning of truth is coherence. And this is exactly the position of Collingwood, as also of Bosanquet. The absolutizing of dialectic and truth as correspondence necessarily go together.

Again, dialectic is an art, not a science, and one who reduces reasoning to dialectical reasoning will reduce science to art and mental activity to productive activity, as does Collingwood.

...Dialectic does not prove anything...Dialectic... is not a definite science or body of doctrine, but like rhetoric or medicine, a practical art or ability of dealing with the ever varying situations of the dialogue; of imagining and enunciating the question proper for attack, or the answer proper for defense, as the case may be.78

The last words of this quotation very aptly describe Collingwood's whole attitude to the process of knowledge. Because Col-

77 Ibid., p. 271.
78 Ibid., p. 273.
lingwood had no genuine appreciation of science as distinctively a knowing function, distinct from whatever pragmatic and creative functions it may associate with it, he was forced to subordinate science and scientific reasoning, erroneously understood as merely classificatory, to the self creative, artistic activity of the mind manifested by a dialectical question and answer discourse. Collingwood’s priority of the practical over the speculative, his theory of art as basis of all human activity, his theory of dialectical primacy of reasoning are all mutually implicatory, that is, dialectically justifiable provided the premisses be accepted and not questioned as to their truth or falsity. As Collingwood himself says:

We do not acquire absolute presuppositions by arguing; on the contrary, unless we have them already arguing is impossible to us... (W)e must insist on presupposing them in all our thinking without asking why they should be thus accepted.\(^{79}\)

D. Aristotelian Scientific Interrogation of Reality.

But, as noted above,\(^{80}\) Aristotle is credited with the elaboration of a second questioning technique, one designed for the direct interrogation of reality itself, which is properly the scientific investigation, as distinct from the interrogation of various opinions

\(^{79}\) An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 173.

\(^{80}\) See this chapter, p. 514.
and convictions held regarding reality. Here, man dialogues with the universe itself for the correct and successful conduct of which he must be equipped with the (not merely art, but) science of asking questions, "the technique of asking the questions the human mind must ask the universe if it would lay bare the latter's secrets and discover its mysteries." L.M. Regis commends Kant for modelling the inquiry of his first critique on the interrogation of the universe by man, but, at the same time criticizes Kant's method, whose "questioning is of the type to which a judge subjects a witness, whereas that of Aristotle and St. Thomas corresponds to the respectful but avid questions a pupil asks his teacher." But the requirements of the art of philosophical dialogue are imposed not by the demands of an overbearing, belligerent mind, but by the nature and complexity of the subject matter being investigated.

A question is defined in terms of wonder and the desire for that knowledge of which one knows one is ignorant. In every question there is involved both something known and something not known which is

81 L.M. Regis, Epistemology, p. 127.

82 Ibid. See also chapter 7, above, pp. 439-442, for criticism of the excessively juridical approach in investigation.

83 L.M. Regis, op. cit., p. 129.

84 See chapter 7, above, pp. 442-446.
sought. The subject of questioning is not what is evident but only what needs to be made evident. What is immediately evident is excluded from questioning by the very nature of the case. Questioning, therefore, bears only on what has to be made known through mediation, that is, through demonstration.

...science is knowledge acquired through demonstration. But we must acquire the knowledge by demonstration of those things which were unknown before, and we ask questions concerning those things (of which we are ignorant).86

Since there is no question about that which is evident, or known, and what is questionable is an admixture of something known and something not yet known, the question or problem must take its beginning from the knowledge-context of the problem.87 According to Aristotle:

The kinds of question we ask are as many as the kinds of things which we know. They are in fact four: (1) whether the connection of an attribute with a thing is a fact; (2) what is the reason of the connection; (3) whether a thing exists; (4) what is the nature of the thing.88

85 See L.M. Regis, op.cit., p. 128. See also Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. 7, lect. 17, n. 1669 (In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria, Taurini, Librarie Marietti, 1926).


87 See L.M. Regis, op.cit., p. 129.

Aristotle shows that these four questions can be ordered into two groups of two, each based on the simplicity or complexity of the interrogated subject. The subject is considered simply when either its existence or its nature is in question. It is considered as a complexity when the existence of one or other of its attributes, or the reason for the inherence of such attribute, is in question.

Concerning the questioning of a subject considered as a complex of thing and attribute, Aristotle explains the procedure thus:

(On the one hand) we ask whether the thing is thus or otherwise qualified - whether, e.g., the sun suffers eclipse or not - then we are asking as to the fact of a connection. That our inquiry ceases with the discovery that the sun does suffer eclipse is an indication of this; and if we know from the start that the sun suffers eclipse we do not inquire whether it does so or not. On the other hand, when we know the fact (of the connection) we ask the reason, as for example, when we know that the sun is being eclipsed and that an earthquake is in progress, it is the reason of eclipse or earthquake into which we inquire. 89

Thus 'whether?' (whether the sun is eclipsed?) and 'why?' (why is the sun eclipsed?) are the two questions that can be asked of a complex. But, for some objects of inquiry the questions asked are different. Aristotle explains:

(On the one hand) we ask whether there is or is not a centaur or a God. (By 'is' or 'is not' I mean

89 Ibid., 89b 25-30.
'is or is not' without further qualification; as opposed to 'is or is not' (e.g. 'white'). On the other hand, when we have ascertained the thing's existence we inquire as to its nature, asking, for instance, 'what, then, is God?' or 'What is man?'

Aristotle concludes by saying that "these...are the four questions we ask, and it is in answers to these questions that all our knowledge consists."

Aristotle then says that since all questioning is a search for evidence "(i)t is clear...that all questions are a search for a 'middle'" , that is for a medium to demonstrate, and make evident, what is not already, that is, immediately, evident. Every question is a request for a demonstration. So that "in all our inquiries we are asking either whether there is a 'middle' or, if so, what that 'middle' is."

A difficulty occurs in regarding the request for definition, the quid sit question, as a request for a demonstrative medium and demonstration therefrom. The difficulty comes from the fact that the definition is never the conclusion of a demonstration but a principle, a prerequisite to the very possibility of demonstration. And "...even

90 Ibid., 89b 30-35.
91 Ibid., 89b 35-38.
92 Ibid., Bk. 2, ch. 3, 90a 35.
93 Ibid., bk. 2, ch. 2, 90a 5-6.
94 See Ibid., Bk. 2, ch. 4, 91a 10-15. The parallel in
if division does demonstrate (the definition's) formula, definition at any rate does not turn out to be a conclusion of inference." 95 Again "...induction proves not what the essential nature of a thing is but that it has or has not some attribute." 96

The search for, and manifestation of, essential nature is tied intimately to the way in which we know its existence. What a thing is presupposes answered the question whether it is, for"...to search for a thing's essential nature when we are unaware that it exists is to search for nothing." 97 And, furthermore, "the degree of our knowledge of anything's essential nature is determined by the sense in which we are aware that it exists." 98 One or other, or several, of the elements of a thing's definition may be known, inductively or perceptively, as attributes of that known existent without it yet being known that they are in fact elements of its definition. The darkening of the moon is an attribute of the moon being eclipsed. When we know its darkening,

95 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. 2, ch. 5, 92a 5.
96 Ibid., Bk. 2, ch. 7, 92a 35-92b.
97 Ibid., Bk. 2, ch. 8, 93a 25-30.
98 Ibid.
we know that an eclipse is occurring, but, we may not know why this
darkening occurs, namely, by the interposition of an obscuring screen
between the sun and the moon. As soon as we ask why this happens, why
the moon has this attribute, we are asking for the defining conditions
of the attribute, namely, what is an eclipse? When we see that the
reason why the moon is eclipsed is that a screen (in this case the
earth) interposes between it and the sun's light, we know that an
eclipse is the interposition of an opaque body between sun and the body
illuminated by it. Thus, the definition of an eclipse is manifested
in the demonstration which demonstrates the cause why the moon is
eclipsed, although it itself is not demonstrated by that demonstration.
For "...while there is no syllogism - i.e. no demonstrative syllogism -
of essential nature, yet it is through syllogism, viz. demonstrative
syllogism, that essential nature is exhibited." 99 That is, the exp-
plicative reason why some factually experienced attribute is in a
given subject is ultimately the definition of that attribute. And the
definition becomes known precisely in knowing it as the reason why the
attribute inheres in the subject. That is, we co-know its essential
nature through knowing the causality of which that essential nature
is an unconditioned condition. That is, even though definitions cannot

99 Ibid., 93b 15-20.
be proved as conclusions of demonstrations, they are manifested (and in that sense demonstrated) precisely in the exercise of the causality which it is the job of the demonstration to manifest. In manifesting the causality of that which embodies the definition the definition itself is co-manifested. Therefore definitions, their goodness or badness, their completeness or incompleteness, are ultimately tied, as far as their manifestation (i.e. demonstration) goes, to the way in which we experience the realization of the defined essence. It follows, therefore, that however abstractly and decontextualized the formation of definitions may be presented in a logic treatise, in the concrete, in the actual implementation of definition and concept-formation, how we become aware of the existence of that which is to be defined is of vital importance and cannot be programmed in advance by any purely formalized rules. In the most general consideration, then, what the thing to be defined already means to the one seeking the

100 This intimate tie-up of definition formation with the way we experience the defined reality is brought out clearly if we consider the difficulties of trying to form the concept of a unicorn such as are considered by Leslie Armour in his The Concept of Truth, p. 91 et seq.

101 The implication of this is that a fully formalized logic, such as is sought by those designing a logic for computer purposes, is already a long way from base point and has a long chain of presuppositions preceding its own starting point. This attempt to decontextualize meaning from lived experience is never fully successful. As Collingwood well said: "...technical terms...are invented solely to serve the purpose of a particular scientific theory; but as they begin to pass current in the scientist's speech or writing they express to him and to
definition will be the starting point for his construction of the real definition. The normal starting point is, therefore, what the name means to the one who seeks to find out what the thing is, or its real definition. The search for real definitions begins in nominal definitions, or the way people generally designate things in everyday discourse. Dialectic, therefore, will play a large part in the passage from nominal definition, in which non-defining attributes are probably confused with defining elements, but its function is merely catalytic and directed to immediate confrontation with the reality in its essential attributes.

E. The Scientific Questionnaire for the Interrogation of Reality.

The four questions for the scientific interrogation of reality are therefore formulated as follows. First, Quia est? (Regis), or Quod? (Grote), which asks whether a fact or event is so and so, or whether a given subject possesses this or that attribute, or is in this or that condition (Grote), and thus deals with the existence of an

those who understand him the peculiar emotions which that theory yields." Principles of Art, p. 268. Most contemporary research on the theory of questioning is concerned with computer programming and thus is of little relevance in assessing Collingwood's theory of questioning.

102 The second book of Aristotle's Topics discusses the attribution of defining elements to a subject in an accidental way.

103 See G. Grote, op.cit., p. 238. See also L.M. Regis, Epistemology, p. 131.
accident in a substance or subject, such as: "Is God eternal?" (Regis). The second, *Propter quid?* (Regis), *Cur?* (Grote), which asks why is it that a certain attribute exists in a certain subject (why is the moon eclipsed?), or what is the cause or reason for such fact, or such conjunction of subject and attribute (Grote), and is thus concerned with the bond between accident and substance, as "Why is God Eternal?" (Regis). The third, *An sit?* (Grote and Regis) does the subject exist? (Regis), which deals with the predicate of the act of existence (Regis). The fourth, *Quid sit?* (Grote and Regis) asks what is the essence of the subject (Grote), and is thus concerned with the nature of the subject (Regis).

Two of these questions, therefore, bear on existence, one on the existence of the subject absolutely, the other on the existence of an attribute in the subject. The other two questions bear on the nature, one, of the subject absolutely, the other, of the connection of the attribute with the subject, which ultimately goes back to the nature of the attribute and the nature of the subject.

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104 E. Gilson in his *Being and Some Philosophers*, p. 192 et seq., refuses to allow that existential, as distinct from copulative propositions, predicate existence as an attribute of the subject; what he alleges to be asserted is the absolute positing of the subject, together with all its implied predicates, in existence. Regis' formulation would perhaps be better rendered as 'the question which deals with the unqualified existence of the subject'.
The two existential questions, the first and third above, that is, Quod and An (Grote's terminology), seek to find out whether or not a middle term exists which will demonstrate that the subject exists, or that the attribute exists in the subject. The second and fourth questions, Cur and Quid (Grote's terminology), assume that there is a middle, and one then tries to find out what that middle is.\(^{105}\)

The inquiry Cur is in the main analogous to the inquiry Quid; in both cases, we aim at ascertaining what the cause or middle term is. But, in the inquiry Cur, what we discover is perhaps some independent fact or event, which is the cause of the event quaesitum; while in the inquiry Quid, what we seek is the real essence or definition of the substance - the fundamental, immanent cause of its concomitant attributes.\(^{106}\)

The problem now arises as to the order of these four questions in a scientific interrogation of reality. According to Grote\(^ {107}\) there are two distinct pairs of questions, Quod and Cur forming one pair, and An sit and Quid sit forming the other,\(^ {108}\) and obviously, says Grote, the Cur question presupposes the answer to the Quod question, and the Quid sit question presupposes an affirmative answer to the An sit question.

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\(^{105}\) See G. Grote, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 239.

\(^{106}\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 239-240.

\(^{107}\) See \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 238-239.

\(^{108}\) Corresponding to the division in the previous paragraph above into two existential and two essential questions.
But Grote says that Themisticus and other expositors have proposed that a more suitable arrangement would be that the An sit, Quid sit couplet should precede the Quod and Cur couplet. The reason is given as follows:

...the third and fourth (An sit, Quid sit) are simpler, and come earlier in the order of philosophical exposition, while the first and second (Quod, Cur) are more complicated, and cannot be expounded philosophically until after the philosophical exposition of the others.109

But Grote maintains that this problem is cleared up by advert­ing to the Aristotelian distinction between what is first in the order of cognition relatively to us (nobis notiora), and what is first in the order of recognition by nature (natura notiora). He (Grote) explains this as follows, first dealing with the order of knowledge relatively to us.

To us (that is to men taken individually and in the course of actual growth) the phenomena of nature present themselves as particulars confused and complicated in every way, with attributes essential and accidental implicated together: we gradually learn first to see and compare them as particulars, next to resolve them into generalities, bundles, classes, and partially to explain the why of some by means of others. Here we start from facts embodied in propositions that include subjects clothed with their attributes.110

Then he deals with the order of knowledge relative to the

110 Ibid., p. 239.
subject matter.

But, in the order of nature (that is, in the order followed by those who know the scibile as a whole, and can experience it scientifically) that which comes first is the Universal or simple subject abstracted from its predicates or accompaniments: we have to inquire, first, whether a given subject exists; next, if it does exist, what is its real constituent essence or definition.\textsuperscript{111}

These two processes, therefore, correspond to the order of the acquisition of science by one who is as yet untrained and to the order of the seasoned scientist equipped with the habit of thinking scientifically, able to deal with the subject matter of the science on its terms rather than on terms of his own meagre knowledge.

We thus see the reason for the order in which Aristotle has arranged the two co-ordinate pairs of Quaesita or Problems, conformable to the different processes pursued, on the one hand, by the common intellect, growing and untrained - on the other, by the mature or disciplined intellect, already competent for philosophical exposition applying itself to new incognita.\textsuperscript{112}

In other words, there are two scientific questionnaires, one corresponding to science in its becoming, in its acquisition, the other corresponding to science in being, as a fully achieved habit of thought in the mature scientist.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Ibid.} Compare with Michael Polanyi's account of the probation of a scientific researcher, see appendix 2, below, pp. 796 et seq.
Regis explains the questionnaire of the mature scientist as follows. The first of the four questions, the An sit question, can only be asked when the existence of the subject in question escapes our immediate perception. I cannot ask if there is an eclipse of the moon going on if I am presently perceiving it. We can only ask this question regarding the causes or effects of what is immediately perceived to exist. The objects of astronomy and microphysics fall within the scope of this question as well as the existence of God and of spiritual realities other than the human soul. Thus, the answer to the An sit question may fall within the range of sense perception, as astronomy and microphysics endeavours to answer certain questions. The question of the existence of God is answerable as falling within the range of the cause-effect relationship immanent to sensibly perceived things, as the existence of fire is known from the existence of smoke. Only dialectical questions can be asked regarding what is immediately perceived to exist, but not properly scientific or philosophical questions. Again, to ask the question as to the existence of something, the nominal definition, or what the name means, has to be presupposed. To meaningfully ask whether or not unicorns or centaurs or flying saucers exist or not, I need at least to know what I mean by using those

113 See L.M. Regis, Epistemology, pp. 131-135.
Regis then says that the second, *Quid sit* question is the most important of all, since it is that which the human intellect naturally and spontaneously seeks to ask and answer in regard to the physical objects of daily experience. It is the most difficult to answer because what we immediately are aware of in regard to experienced realities are their accidental attributes, or perhaps more exactly, their obvious attributes without being able to detect whether they are essential or non-essential attributes. We can see straightway that snow is white, but not straightway whether its whiteness is of its essence and definition or not. As soon as we realize that things other than snow are white we then know that whiteness does not belong to its essence, but that it is an accident. Regis explains that this question falls primarily upon substances and on other things through relation to substances.

The reason substance has such exclusive rights over definition, in the proper sense, is that the definition, as its name indicates implies strict unity (i.e. undivision in itself and division from everything else), and only substance has a sufficiently rich mode of being to possess the unity that makes it intelligible. When the question *Quid?* is asked about non-substantial beings, it assumes a derivative and relative meaning, which must be clearly recognized if we would avoid impasses or pseudoproblems.}

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114 Ibid., p. 132. What Regis calls the most important question of all, Collingwood, on account of his anti-substantialist
This essence, which definition expresses to the mind as quiddity, in answer to the Quid sit, what is it, question, is not grasped by sense in perception, since sense only grasps sensible accidents (as snow being white, but not what snow is). But in perception the intellect, as the faculty of intuitive reason as explained previously,\textsuperscript{115} abstracts the essential from the non-essential and visualizes it in its own right, thereby answering to itself what the thing is. The essence of things which we do not immediately perceive are known as causes or effects of what we do perceive. What God is, for example, will be answerable only insofar as there is some resemblance, through causal connection, between what perceived objects are and what God is. What as yet unrealized artifacts are, as, for example, flying machines before they became realized achievements, are known in relation to the purposes for which they are intended.\textsuperscript{116}

The third question, Quia ita est? concerns, not the absolute actuality of the subject, the subject as a substance, but its actual attributes. Concrete questions of this kind are, "Is the soul immortal?"

\textsuperscript{115} See above, chapter 7, pp. 453 et seq.

\textsuperscript{116} This latter mode of defining is extremely important in regard to historical or cultural concepts; see later, ch. 9, pp. 585-609.
"Is knowledge true or false?" that is, "Is truth and falsity a property of knowledge?"

The fourth question, Propter quid ita sit?, is, according to Regis, the most important question in the order of demonstrative knowledge, since in it consists the very soul of demonstration. Having answered the previous question to the effect that certain attributes are inherent in the subject under question, the question next is in regard to the nature of the bond between the attribute and the subject, whether it is necessary or incidental. To answer this question, the reason of the inherence must be known. And this question is intimately connected with the answer to the second, Quid? question.

The propter quid that is the object of this last question is nothing but the quid of the second question, not in that it constitutes the nature of the thing, but that it causes this nature's properties as efficient cause, final cause, or, again as material cause in qua.117

Having considered each of these questions in its own right, the question of their order in a philosophical questionnaire then arises. Guided by Aquinas' commentary118 on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Regis119 explains that, firstly, in regard to Quia and


118 See Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Bk. 2, lect 7, n. 5. See Pierre Conway's translation, Québec, La Librairie Philosophique, 1956, p. 335.

119 See L.M. Regis, op.cit., p. 135.
Propter quid, sometimes we know that something is so, but do not yet know why it is so (as, for example, we may know that the moon is eclipsed, as when it is darkened, but not know why it is eclipsed). At other times, however, the answers to both questions are immediately apparent to us (a favorably placed observer could see together that and why the moon is eclipsed). But it is impossible to know why something is so without knowing that it is so. Regis summarizes this as follows.

(We can say) three things about the third and fourth question: first, that there is no question if the existence of the effect and the nature of the cause are known; second, that there can be no question about the nature of the cause as long as the existence of the effect is unknown; and, finally, that when the existence of an effect is known, the only question that can be asked is Propter quid?¹²⁰

Regarding the An sit and Quid sit questions, sometimes we know that something is but not perfectly what it is. Sometimes both that a thing is and what it is are known together, but one cannot know what something is without knowing whether it is.¹²¹ Regis summarizes this as follows:

...concerning the first two questions: As long as the existence of a being is not known (An sit?), the problem of its nature (Quid sit?) is unintelligible; when the existence and the nature of a being are known simultaneously, there is no question. Finally, the

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ On the dependence of the definition upon the existence of a thing, see above, this chapter, pp. 539-543.
question *Quid est?* presupposes that the existence of this being is known.\(^{122}\)

An overall summary of the order of the four questions is presented by Regis as follows:

Therefore, the normal and complete order of the four questions is as follows: The existence of a thing must be evident before we can ask questions about its nature; then, we must have evidence of the existence of accidents or effects in order to ask questions about the cause of these effects. The immediate conclusion to be drawn from these statements is that, chronologically speaking, the first object of the philosophical questionnaire is a being whose existence is immediately known by the human intellect, i.e., material things in their concrete and physical existence. If this existential starting point is not accepted, there can be no philosophy, since the questions *Quid?* and *Propter quid?* can never be asked.\(^{123}\)

F. Transition to Evaluation of Collingwood's Theory of the Logic of Questioning.

This lengthy analysis of Aristotle's theory of questioning methodology has been necessary to evaluate Collingwood's position regarding an allegedly as yet undeveloped logic of questioning. It is clear that Collingwood has neglected, both as philosopher and as historian, to take into consideration Aristotle's quite considerable contribution to the theory of questioning. Aristotle's *Topics* and


\(^{123}\) Ibid.
The Sophistical Refutations (regarded by most commentators as the last book of the Topics) contain a well articulated theory of the dialectical interrogation of opinions and convictions held about various subject matters. The second book of The Posterior Analytics contains a well articulated theory of the scientific interrogation of reality.

Furthermore, by applying the Aristotelian scientific questionnaire to Collingwood's problem of knowledge, and his subsequent identification of knowledge with the question and answer procedure characteristic of historical thought, one can regard this theory as the result of asking questions out of order, an especially relevant criticism, since it accuses his theory of being a violation of his own insistence on the primacy of orderly interrogation.

By reason of his own innate disposition, and of the historical situation in which he worked, Collingwood was led to pose the question regarding knowledge in a peculiar way, as also were Kant and Descartes before him.

G. Collingwood's Basic Problem and the Logical Order of Questioning.

How does Collingwood pose the problem regarding knowledge? What questions does he ask? and in what order does he ask them?

124 See G. Grote, op.cit., p. 262.
Collingwood's problem of ultimate concern, as has already been shown, arose out of the deep impression made on him by the 1914-1918 war as "an unprecedented triumph for natural science" and at the same time "an unprecedented disgrace to the human intellect." The Baconian promise of knowledge as power had been fulfilled in the "power to destroy the bodies and souls of men more rapidly than had ever been done by human agency before." From this culminating triumph others followed, such as improvements in transport, in surgery, medicine, psychiatry, commerce and industry "and above all, ...preparations for the next war."

The war broke out not because anyone wanted it but because a situation got out of hand, and continued to get more and more out of hand as it proceeded. Fighting ended not because control was regained but because one side was fought to a standstill. The situation was more out of hand than ever with the signing of the peace treaty.

This admixture of outstanding success combined with abysmal failure of the human intellect is Collingwood's central problem.

125 See R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 90. See also the introductory chapter, above, p.1 and chapter 6, pp.345 et seq.  
127 Ibid.  
128 See Ibid.
The contrast between the success of modern European minds in controlling almost any situation in which the elements are physical bodies and the forces physical forces, and their inability to control situations in which the elements are human beings and the forces mental forces, left an indelible mark on the memory of every one who was concerned with it....I seemed to see the reign of natural science within no very long time, converting Europe into a wilderness of Yahoos.129

Collingwood's problem, therefore, begins in wonder. He wonders why it is that the same human intellect which has achieved such outstanding success in the control of natural forces is such a colossal failure in its handling of human forces. Descartes had wondered why it is that the human intellect achieved such outstanding success in mathematics but such hopeless confusion in philosophy which had largely degenerated into scepticism.130 Kant wondered why it is that the same human intellect which achieved such success in natural science was so barren in metaphysics.131

129 Ibid., pp. 90-91.

130 See L.M. Regis, Epistemology, pp. 33-36.

131 Kant, indeed, in order to relegate logic to the status of propaeudetic of science, had said that "We do not enlarge but disfigure sciences, if we allow them to trespass upon one another's territory." (Norman Kemp Smith's translation of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London, Macmillan, 1933, p. 18). But, having said this, he proceeded to erect mathematics and, especially the newly developed Newtonian natural science, into the paradigm of true science, and to ask whether metaphysics can have what they have which makes them genuine science. "What then, is the reason why, in this field (of metaphysics), the sure road to science has not been hitherto found?" (Ibid., p. 21). "The examples of mathematics and natural science, which
Descartes moved from his problem thus posed to its solution by equating genuine knowledge with knowledge of the mathematical type by a single and sudden revolution have become what they now are, seem to me sufficiently remarkable to suggest our considering what may have been the essential features in the changed point of view by which they have so greatly benefitted. Their success should incline us, at least by way of experiment, to imitate their procedure, so far as the analogy which, as species of rational knowledge, they bear to metaphysics may permit?" (Ibid., pp. 21-22). "...we must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis." (Ibid., p. 22). Note the assumption of the experimental method of procedure, by hypothesis and verification. Again (Ibid., p. 22) "...we are brought to the conclusion that we can never transcend the limits of possible experience though that is precisely what this science (metaphysics) is concerned, above all else, to achieve. This situation yields, however, just the very experiment by which, indirectly, we are enabled to prove the truth of this first estimate of our a priori knowledge of reason, namely, that such knowledge has to do only with appearances, and must leave the thing in itself, as indeed real per se, but as not known by us." Later, ibid., p. 55, Kant writes: "Now the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?" Kant states (ibid., pp. 55-56) that "(i)n the solution of (this) problem we are at the same time deciding as to the possibility of the employment of pure reason in establishing and developing all those sciences which contain a theoretical a priori knowledge of objects, and have therefore to answer the questions: How is pure mathematics possible? How is pure science of nature possible? Since these sciences actually exist, it is quite proper to ask how they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved by the fact that they exist." See also L.M. Regis, Epistemology, pp. 36-38.

132 See Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind, end of Rule 2, in Vol. 1 of Haldane and Ross edition of The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Dover, 1955, p. 5: "...one conclusion now emerges out of these considerations, viz. not, indeed, that arithmetic and
and asked what does mathematics have, which, unless philosophy has it also, philosophy cannot be genuine knowledge. Kant moved from his problem thus posed to asking, what is it that natural science (i.e., Newtonian physics) has, that, unless metaphysics has it, metaphysics cannot be genuine knowledge. Now, how does Collingwood proceed in the development of his problem?

He cannot argue that since science is such an unprecedented success that its methods should be applied to human affairs and a science of human affairs developed analogous to physics as a science of nature, and biology as a science of life, and psychology as a science of mind. He is forestalled from this equation precisely because it is the unprecedented triumph of science as such that is at the same time the reason of the unprecedented disaster in human affairs. The trouble is in the very nature of science as adapted for successful control over nature. If there is a genuine science of human affairs, it is not a science analogous to the sciences of physics or biology or psychology.

Let us follow his thought further in this matter. Why is geometry are the sole sciences to be studied, but only that in our search for the direct road towards truth we should busy ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a certitude equal to that of the demonstrations of arithmetic and geometry."

133 See L.M. Regis, *Epistemology*, p. 139.

134 Ibid.
science, or, if you will, the mind thinking scientifically, so disastrous in human affairs in contrast to such success in natural matters?

The acceleration of scientific progress from the mediaeval windmills and water-wheels through Galileo's discoveries to the almost incredible power and delicacy of the modern machine contrasted with human dealings of man with fellow man which had remained much as it was in the middle ages. Whereas well meaning babblers talked of the need for a change of heart, Collingwood felt that the trouble was obviously in the head. "What was needed was not more goodwill and human affection, but more understanding of human affairs and more knowledge of how to handle them." 135

This progress of science went hand in hand with the departmentalization and resulting fragmentation of human life. The life forms, art, religion, etc., took on scientific forms in which "each tended to become a specialized activity pursued by specialists for the applause of specialists." 136 Mediaeval art, religion and philosophy were perhaps mediocre as art, as religion and as philosophy, but the men who practised them "were men, whole of heart and secure in their grasp on life." 137

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136 R.G. Collingwood, *Speculum Mentis*, p. 34.
137 Ibid., p. 35.
Today, art, religion and philosophy are fully developed in their own right, but a genuine human life is impossible.

Today we can be as artistic, we can be as philosophical, we can be as religious as we please, but we cannot even be men at all, we are wrecks and fragments of men, and we do not know where to take hold of life and how to begin looking for the happiness which we know we do not possess.138

It is this departmentalization which characterizes the scientific way of thinking which makes it so unsuitable for the study of human affairs. The integrity of a harmonious human existence is radically sundered by its departmentalization into specialized operations. Religion becomes one man's specialty, art another man's specialty, science another man's specialty and philosophy another man's specialty. A harmonious, well balanced life then gives way to the competition of, say, religion with science, science with philosophy, philosophy with history, and so on.139 The end result: the first world war, followed soon after by the second...and we may confidently add on Collingwood's behalf, followed immediately by the threat of a third.

But this departmentalized way of living is due to "the

138 Ibid.

139 "...we now recognize the nature of our disease. What is wrong with us is precisely the detachment of these forms of experience - art, religion, and the rest - from one another." Speculum Mentis, p. 36.
specific character of science, its abstractness."\textsuperscript{140} And to abstract is to consider separately things that are inseparable: to think of the universal, for instance, without reflecting that it is merely the universal of the particulars, and to assume that one can isolate it in thought and study it in isolation.\textsuperscript{141}

Now, the mode of proceeding of the mind which abstracts is by means of genus-species logic. But, "the five forms of experience - and whatever others there may be - are not species of a genus, which may be indifferently taken in any order; they have a natural order of their own."\textsuperscript{142} Absolutization of the scientific way of thinking results in the absolutization of formal logic and the maintenance of the five forms of life experience as coordinate species of a genus.

There is therefore only one form of knowledge, describable in terms of logic, which is directed indifferently upon five classes of objects. This is pure intellectualism, and leads us to look for syllogisms in music, inductions in religion, and so forth.\textsuperscript{143}

But this absorption of all forms of thought into logic as a supreme form of thought is together a result and a rejection of absolutized genus-species logic, or scientific method; it "precisely contradicts the thesis with which this view began, namely the in-

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 160.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p. 49.
dependence of these various fields of thought."\(^{144}\)

Science, therefore, with its abstractive mode of conceptualizing and genus-species mode of proceeding logically in induction and deduction, while quite legitimate as the proper way of controlling nature and natural forces, is inherently untenable in dealing with human affairs and the life forms of human experience. The attempt to deal with human experience and the affairs of men by the method of science and its genus-species logic breaks down under the strain of its own internal contradiction.

It is this segregational character of science which together facilitates knowledge of nature and at the same time frustrates knowledge appropriate to human affairs.

But, still following Collingwood's train of thought, why is the abstractive, separative character of scientific procedure so suitable for the investigation of nature and so unsuitable for the study of human affairs? Because the world of nature is characterized by external relations, whereas human affairs are characterized by internal relations.\(^{145}\) Human affairs have an inside as well as an outside, and what is needed in regard to knowledge of human affairs is

\(^{144}\) Ibid.

\(^{145}\) See chapter 4, above, pp. 130-131.
'insight' or knowledge of this distinctive 'inside' content which is alien to natural realities. But that which exists with the mode of interiority to self is thought, so that to know the thought within the event is to have 'insight' into the event and thereby to know the event in its internal relations with other events, for thought is characterized as purposive activity, and internal connectedness is through human purposes.

...all thought is for the sake of action and...

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every one who offers us a philosophy must answer the question "What shall we do to be saved from these present distresses?"

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But, is there any science or human discipline with which we are acquainted, which, (1) instead of proceeding abstractly proceeds concretely, and (2) instead of classifying diverse species, externally related with respect to each other, and externally unified under an external, abstract, classificatory genus, grasps its object as an unmutilated whole, as a concrete totality in terms of mutually implicatory internal relations within the one individual whole, and, (3) instead of explaining through recourse to external universal

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147 R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 35. And, p. 36, ibid: "...our cure can only be (the) reunion (of the forms of experience) in a complete and undivided life, our task is to seek for that life, to build up the conception of an activity which is at once art, and religion, and science, and the rest."
covering laws, explains from within the events themselves, so that to know what happened is at the same time to know why it happened?

Posed in this way, Collingwood has the answer ready at his finger tips. The answer is 'history'. If there is to be a science properly adapted to the knowledge and control of human affairs it is history. Science itself then becomes an aspect of human affairs when it is seen historically. And, historically, history itself comes into being with the collapse of science as an experienced self-contradictory, autonomous life-form. In the control of human affairs, then, science itself has to be dealt with otherwise than by its own methods, namely by the methods of history. The historical point of the conversion of science into history took place when Descartes saw that all science "rests upon one indubitable certainty I think therefore I exist." Collingwood says that Descartes meant what he said and that what he said was that concrete historical fact, the fact of one's present actual awareness was the root of science. Descartes saw that the scientist's act of observation preceded any natural fact and that the fact of his observing the event is the fact that really matters. The discovery of which Descartes' cogito is the deepest and most fruitful expression is that science presupposes history and can never go behind history and

148 Ibid., p. 202. See also above, chapter 4, pp. 129 et seq.
"(t)his discovery implicitly resolves science into history." ¹⁴⁹

What has been said in the expository chapters (1 through 6 above) then follows coherently from this central line of reasoning, and it stands or falls according as this line of reasoning stands or falls.

But what has happened here if we look at this line of thought as an exercise of orderly interrogation?

Collingwood does not first ask 'what is knowledge?' and then ask 'why does knowledge have the scientific and historical (and philosophical) modes?' His line of reasoning, as sketched above, leads him to answer the third question, Quia ita sit? without having asked it, by equating knowledge with its historical mode. Just as Descartes, by reason of the concrete situation in which his critical problem arose, equated genuine knowledge with one of its attributes, namely the mathematical mode, so Collingwood, by reason of the concrete situation in which he posed his problem of knowledge, equated genuine knowledge with its historical mode. In effect, by presupposing/answered as the third question independently of the second, each inadvertently converted the third question into the second and equated an attribute of knowledge with its essence or definition.¹⁵⁰ Genuine knowledge for


¹⁵⁰ We many recall that Book 2 of Aristotle's Topics concerns conflicting opinions which arise from confusing an attribute with the definition and essence, especially the generic essence of some subject matter.
Descartes' knowledge of the mathematical mode, and the criterion of true knowledge is the evidential character of mathematical clarity and distinction. All probable knowledge is thereby rejected as knowledge and common sense convictions are rejected as erroneous. Genuine knowledge for Kant is natural science (which for him is identified with Newtonian physics) and whatever does not measure up to the experiential criterion of Newtonian physics is not genuine knowledge. Metaphysics, failing as it does to take account of experience, and endeavouring to attain knowledge of things as they are in themselves without recourse to experience, is an impossible ideal. Metaphysics, therefore, as a claim to reach things as they are in themselves is not genuine knowledge. Similarly for Collingwood. Knowledge comes to be equated with one of its modes, namely historical knowledge. So that whatever does not meet the standards of historical knowledge is defective as knowledge.

In answering the third *Quia ita sit* question independently of the *Quid sit* question regarding knowledge, Collingwood equates an attribute of knowledge with its essence. Knowledge is had of concrete singular human events i.e., historical happenings. But this is known not as belonging to the essence of knowledge, as if that statement were an answer to the second, *Quid sit*, question regarding knowledge, rather than an answer to the third question 'by what modalities do we know?' or 'what properties does our knowledge have?' Answering this third question without answering the second inadvertently converts it into
the second, and its answer, which enunciates a property or modality of knowledge becomes the definition of knowledge as such and therefore the criterion which separates what will be diagnosed as true knowledge from its counterfeits. Scientific knowledge is, therefore, not a genuine mode of knowledge but an abstraction, which, consequently, is together a falsification of what it knows since it abstracts from concreteness and singularity which are of the essence of historical knowledge.

We have seen at the beginning of this chapter that the dominating question in philosophy is the what, quid sit, question, the search for definition. It was upon the ability to answer this question, to say what justice is, what nature is, what movement is, that genuine science, (in the ancient sense) as propter quid (answer to fourth question) knowledge, depends. We know why the moon is eclipsed scientifically when we know that 'why' in terms of 'what' an eclipse is, i.e., in terms of the answer to the second, quid sit, question asked regarding an eclipse. To circulate within the third and fourth questions, going from experienced attributes to explanations as to why the attributes are found in a subject without attacking head-on the definitional, quid sit, question is to remain within the order of empirical generalization through induction, and never to allow direct knowledge of the cause, the propter quid, in its causality, necessitating the attribute by reason of what is is. Because an eclipse is the inter-
position of an opaque body between an illuminating body and an illuminated body, the illuminated body is necessarily darkened whenever such an opaque body thus intervenes. As was shown above, sometimes the what and the why are known simultaneously, but sometimes the attribute is known without it being known why it is an attribute, because the definition of the attribute is not known.¹⁵¹

If one is to rise above mere inductive generalization to properly philosophical knowledge of the cause convertible with the effect, one has to rise above the merely experienced fact of attributes said of subjects, and inductive generalization therefrom, and reach knowledge of the Quid sit. When we know that an opaque body (the earth) is in fact between the sun and the moon we know not merely that the moon is darkened but also why it must be darkened. The Quid sit question is therefore the key question in any philosophical questionnaire. To short circuit it out is to run the risk of confusing essences with attributes and, however good or complete one's inductions may be, to fail, or to erroneously explain the facts calling for explanation.

Collingwood, like Kant and Descartes, did not ask what is

¹⁵¹ Ernst Cassirer notes that much of the scientific research concerning whether or not animals speak is questionable, if not quite worthless, because the researchers are without any precise defining concept of speech, that is, they have not asked or answered the question 'what is speech?' See Cassirer's Logic of the Humanities, pp. 133-135.
knowledge and, in the light of the answer to that question, go on to ask why does it have the attributes of scientific, mathematical and historical modes. But, worse than Kant and Descartes, Collingwood, by reason of the way he approached the question of knowledge, was forced to put out of play the very question upon which all other questions concerning knowledge depends. Because of his attitude to abstraction, and scientific knowledge as abstract knowledge, he rejected the validity of the Quid sit question, the properly philosophical question, transforming it, as he always insisted on doing, into a dialectical question with specified concrete alternative instances from which to answer.¹⁵²

Because he thus bypassed the Quid sit, definitional question regarding knowledge, his criterion as to what constitutes genuine knowledge had to come from another source than the very essence of knowledge itself. It came from his dialectical interrogation of the concrete problem in which he was historically situated. Knowledge in the genuine sense is then knowledge of the integral, concrete whole, namely historical knowledge. Sciences, abstract knowledges, are not genuine instances of knowledge but errors due to separating part of the concrete whole and treating it as if it were the whole, as does the artist: "...abstraction is always intuition or imagination."¹⁵³
But if the scientific order of interrogation as exposed above had been followed, the first question to settle would have been what is knowledge in itself, before inquiring into its modalities in this or that way in which it is in fact realized. In this way, scientific knowledge would have been explained as knowledge realized in a particular way, historical knowledge would have been explained as knowledge realized in another, but equally valid way. What knowledge is would be seen as realizable in its scientific form, in its mathematical form and in its historical form, each form being respected in its own right without illicit reduction of one to the other.

H. Collingwood's Key Theses as Result of his Order of Questioning.

But there are other far reaching consequences of Collingwood's equation of genuine knowledge with concrete historical knowledge.

Firstly, historical knowledge is constructive of its object; the historian has to reconstruct the past from present traces. Historical knowledge is also knowledge of events as embodying human purposes. It is knowledge of action and, according to Collingwood, for the sake of action. With the designation of historical knowledge as the paradigm of genuine knowledge, knowledge becomes essentially practical and constructive, there being no genuinely autonomous speculative science in its own right.

Secondly, historical knowledge is by way of interrogation of
documents as traces of the human past to discover the thought and purpose of which it is the trace. It is an interrogation of events and thought-expressions to discover the thought of which the event is the expression. Philosophical knowledge, inasmuch as it is genuine knowledge, conforming to the historical mode of knowing, is restricted to what has been thought about some particular question. The question 'what is the state?' is the same as the questions 'what did Socrates, Plato, Aristotle...Hobbes...Marx, etc., say the state is?' This means that the properly philosophical question, 'what is the state?' becomes converted into a dialectical question which always remains in the order of what someone or other considered something to be, without ever attaining the really (in ancient sense) scientific question regarding the reality as it is in itself. The properly scientific and philosophical questions about any subject matter then become stigmatized as dogmatisms with critical thought supreme, being a dialectical interrogation of the prevailing opinions throughout history on a given question. The knowledge of any subject matter then becomes a scale of forms in which a subsequent view is seen to be based on critical interrogation of a previous view, and itself subsequently critically interrogated.

154 The scientific question, in the fullest sense of the word, asking what the thing is in itself (that is, as distinct from what someone thinks it to be) has been out of bounds in modern and contemporary thought since Kant's first Critique. See chapter 7, above, pp. 454 et seq.
resulting in a subsequent view, and so on. What the state (or nature or history) is becomes converted into what it is thought to be at various periods in history and that thought regarded as an historical evolution through critical interrogation serially arranged in an overlap of classes in a scale of forms. All conceptions of thought are thus reduced to their historical equivalents without remainder.

Thirdly, the universal, the unity in diversity through which all rational explanation is made, must be a concrete unity in a concrete diversity. The whole is the concrete individual whole whose parts are intelligible as members contributing to that individual whole. This results in a contextual theory of meaning. Every thing is what is is, not by reason of some essence determining it in itself absolutely, but by reason of its relationship to everything else in the concrete whole. This is the absolutization of context, which, in effect, is also its

155 See Speculum Mentis, pp. 218-220. See also chapter 4, above, pp.130-141. This absorption of context into definition or, if you will, of progressive definition through widening of context so that the thing to be defined is presented in its relationship to everything else, is perhaps most clearly manifested in Collingwood's definition of religion, and his comments thereon in Speculum Mentis, pp. 111-112: "(...to assert what it imagines...to believe in the reality of the figments of its own imagination), this is the definition of religion, so to speak, from beneath: the purely abstract or formal definition whose purpose is to give the minimum account of the lowest and most rudimentary religious consciousness. It is the mere armature on which our concrete conception of religion is to be built up, and the reader need not trouble to point out its inadequacy as a description of the higher religions. Here and elsewhere, in fact, the reader is earnestly implored to resist the vice of collecting 'definitions' of this and that
destruction as context, since it then becomes converted into the essential determinant of each thing. There is, then, in effect, in a Spinozistic way of thinking, only one substance, one being in itself, one thing which really is, namely the whole, and all other beings are exhausted by their contextual relations in that whole, and their whole meaning-manifestative function is to manifest themselves as parts of that absolute individual whole. True unity in diversity is therefore ultimately lost, for we are left with the unity as absolute and the multiplicity a merely relational function in the context of the whole. A genuine unity in diversity is had only if there is admitted a diversity of substances, a diversity of absolute unities whose coexistence in the whole of the universe is without prejudice to their own intrinsic, essential and definitional unity. There are diversities of things in the universe of experience which have their definitions as exclusively their own, about which the what, Quid sit, question can

and the other, as if any one but a fool imagined that he could compress a thing like art or religion or science into an epigram which could be lifted from its context and, so lifted, continue to make sense. Giving and collecting definitions is not philosophy but a parlour game. The writer's definition of religion (as of art and so forth) is coextensive with this entire book, and will nowhere be found in smaller compass. Nor will it be found in its completeness there; for no book is wholly self-explanatory, but solicits the cooperation of a reasonably thoughtful and instructed reader." (Emphasis added).

156 And, ultimately, with Bradley, must confess the relational as such (whether internal or external) as mere appearance. See F.H. Bradley's *Collected Essays*, Vol. 2, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
be asked in their own right. The unity of the universe is not the
unity of one substance whose parts are merely relational parts in the
whole, but a unity through interaction, and consequent interpassion,
of each substantial whole on every other substantial whole. That is,
there is diversity in the world of experience, which is not merely
relational but at least absolute in some way. That is, each is what
it is in itself, expressed by its definition which says what it is in
answer to the Quid sit question, whatever else it may subsequently be
through its relationships with other things and with the whole of that
which is.

L'univers n'existe comme tel qu'en tant que ses
parties agissent et réagissent. Ainsi l'es
ee de
l'univers comme univers, ce n'est pas simplement
l'ensemble des esse de ses éléments, c'est l'ensemble
et des esse et des actions qui les expriment, en
actualisant leur mutuelle relativité. (Car tout
esse fini, de par sa finitude même, est relatif à
un autre, à un complément, à un 'remède' de cette
finitude). Dès lors, l'action apparaît comme l'acte
dernier de l'univers en tant qu'univers, sa forme,
et mieux encore, son existence.157

1935, pp. 635-650 and Bradley's Appearance and Reality, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 9th corrected impression 1930, pp. 21-29. See also
M.S. Gram, "The Reality of Relations," The New Scholasticism, XLIV

157 J. De Finance, Essai sur l'agir humain, Rome, Presses
de l'Université Grégorienne, 1962, pp. 10-11.
Fourthly, the function which properly should come from the definitions, manifesting the essence of the subject matter as they do, thereby illuminating the subsequent questions, is usurped by a thought-product, the absolute presuppositions which unconditionally condition any interrogation procedure, according to Collingwood. Instead of proceeding in the light of insights into the very constitution of the reality of a given subject matter, the mind proceeds under the domination of catalytic agents which it forms out of its own absolute dynamism, which catalytic agents are no more than prevailing beliefs or convictions about the world. The mind's questioning procedure is thus locked in dialectical reasoning, always tied at its roots to prevailing convictions and forestalled in principle from ever breaking out of self enclosure within prevailing viewpoints to direct confrontation with reality itself. Collingwood's theory of absolute presuppositions as some kind of commitment to a way of thinking is his counterpart to Aristotle's definition, and the principles dependent on definition which result from asking the *Quid sit* question of reality itself. Having outlined nine characteristics of Collingwood's absolute presuppositions, David Rynin states the following:

I may say at once that the above characteristics appear to me to be the very obvious properties of definitions themselves in at least one important sense of 'definition', namely, the sense in which they are decisions, commitments, acts, and as such
neither true nor false, although generally being expressed in declarative sentences that may be interpreted also as analytic truths.¹⁵⁸

Having put out of play the Quid sit question, the intellectual guide which should come from reality in answer to that question is now regarded as coming from some commitment or decision or belief as to the structure of lived experience, not from experience itself. When historical knowledge becomes the paradigm of knowledge, the directives of our thought processes are no longer definitions of real essences as explicative of their properties, but are personal or social or cultural historically determined beliefs or commitments. The thought-determinant is then from thought itself, as a catalytic agent formed out of its own radical dynamic self-forming activism. All discussion is locked radically in beliefs held about this or that subject matter, never achieving insight into what the subject matter is in its own right. All discourse is then dialectic discourse, never truly scientific or philosophical discourse.

It is important to stress here that the aforesaid four-point basic criticism of the Collingwoodian system is made precisely on the score of its resulting from the criticism made regarding an incorrect ordering of questions. The whole point at issue in this chapter is

Collingwood's theory of logic as ordered interrogation. Collingwood has been criticised for historical neglect in failing to take into consideration the head-on treatment Aristotle gave to questioning methodology. In the light of the scientific order of interrogation as explained by Aristotle, Collingwood's whole superstructure can be viewed as a result of neglecting, more, positively rejecting, the centrality of the *Quid sit* question, whose answer provides the basic criterion for all else that follows in the *Quia ita sit* and *Propter quid* questions in philosophy. What is said above has been said solely from the point of view of being a consequence of disordered interrogation, without considering whatever other reasons may be available for criticising Collingwood's basic position on other grounds.

But here we have been concentrating on questioning as an exercise of logic, forgetting for the time being Collingwood's assertion that questioning is properly the methodology of history. Apart from whether or not Collingwood absolutizes history (with its methodology) as the paradigm case of genuine knowledge, we can still ask whether or not he is right in regarding historical methodology as properly a logic of questioning. That is the concern of the next chapter.
LOGIC, QUESTIONING AND HISTORY

A. Questioning as the Method of Procedure Proper to History.

The answer to the question whether history is an organized body of knowledge proceeding by a distinctive logical method of question and answer cannot ignore a consideration of what historians do.

Henri I. Marrou probably comes closest to Collingwood in his direct assertion that "(p)roperly speaking, the historian does not proceed by way of deduction or induction,"\(^1\) but "begins by posing a question to himself," which "question which started the whole process in motion does not maintain its original identity, but in contact with the documentary data it is continuously changing."\(^2\) Again, "(a)ny knowledge the historian may acquire will obviously depend on the question or questions he chooses to investigate,"\(^3\) and "the copiousness of historical knowledge will depend directly on the skilfulness and ingenuity with which the initial questions are posed."\(^4\) Documentary sources are not complete in themselves "since their compilers did not have in mind (and could not have conceived as possible) all the questions which the documents themselves suggest to us, (and thus) they do not

\(^1\) H.I. Marrou, *The Meaning of History*, p. 89, also p. 124.


provide us with the means of discovering such questions."⁵ A source of information is entitled to be called a document in the broad sense "if the historian's mind can extract something from it to increase our knowledge of the human past considered with reference to the question that has been posed regarding it."⁶ Again, he says, "(t)he truth of the conclusions obtained will be the direct task of the historian's technique, and of the skill and judiciousness with which he formulates the questions and the answers."⁷ Referring to the perfected history of today Marrou says that "there is a history that now confronts the past with questions that are always new, more varied, more extensive or more penetrating. And there is a corresponding inquiry that is enlarged and extended in every direction."⁸

Regarding the logic of the elaboration of historical knowledge, Marrou says that "the fundamental logical operation in action... is the process of understanding," and "the understanding of history apparently consists in the interpretation of meaningful symbols" such as inscriptions, the ashes of a home and hearth or finger prints, by means of which immediately present remains "we succeed in perceiving

⁵ Ibid., p. 79.
⁶ Ibid., p. 81.
⁷ Ibid., p. 136.
⁸ Ibid., p. 84.
something about man in former times," which "includes his activity and behaviour, his ideas and inner self, or sometimes simply his presence - anything indicating that man has passed this way." \(^9\) This questioning procedure by which we understand the human past is not unique but "is definitely the same process that takes place in our understanding of other men in the present, and particularly in the understanding of articulated language," \(^10\) which is nothing other than what Marrou elaborates at length as a "dialectical [questioning] relationship of the same with the other...." \(^11\)

Louis Gottschalk\(^12\) explains that in any historical exposition or narrative "historical facts have to be (1) selected, (2) arranged, (3) emphasized or minimized, and (4) placed in some sort of causal sequence." \(^13\) Selection is determined by what is considered to be relevant. The problem, then, is the criterion of relevance about which Gottschalk suggests social means of determining, but "(u)sually the process can be simplified by converting propositions into queries" so that "the subject of any historical investigation may be expressed in

\(^9\) Ibid., p. 88.

\(^10\) Ibid., pp. 91-92.

\(^11\) Ibid., p. 104. See later, E. Cassirer's incisive explanation of language as establishing a concrete unity in diversity (of persons). See this chapter, below, pp. 657-658.

\(^12\) In his Understanding History, New York, Knopf, 2nd, edn. 1969.

\(^13\) Ibid., p. 207.
the form of an interrogative hypothesis."\textsuperscript{14} But Gottschalk feels that "(b)oth the unifying proposition and the interrogative hypothesis can be useful only for subjects so monographic in nature that their themes can be contained in a single proposition or interrogation," which "rules out all subjects that have no narrative, descriptive or causal synthesis but are held together only by association in time, place, or persons, or only by analogy," which would include such subjects as "the history of a given region at a given time, of a collectivity of leaders of parties or movements, of schools of art and thought, and of analogous movements and institutions." However, Gottschalk seems to weaken his exception of these from the interrogative process when he adds that "(f)or synthetic subjects like these, analysis by aspect key words nevertheless can be useful if each of the separate elements in the synthesis is regarded as a separate monograph whose theme can be stated as a proposition or an interrogative hypothesis."\textsuperscript{15} For Gottschalk, relevance is the overriding concern of the historian in any subject and "the decision of what is relevant is largely a matter of personal judgment" and, in the final analysis "the individual historian must be

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 208.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 211. This seems to come at least close to Collingwood's method of breaking the subject matter up into a series of questions and subquestions.
left to make his own selection of his data.\textsuperscript{16} But, if this is not to be purely capricious, and if his account is to have universal public interest, it seems that some definite determination by the historian, some definite question in his mind, has to be made explicit if there is to be any realistic criterion distinguishing the relevant from the irrelevant.

Wood Gray and his collaborators\textsuperscript{17} explain historical methodology as consisting of six steps: (1) selection of a topic, (2) search for evidence, (3) note-taking on evidence, (4) critical evaluation of evidence collected, (5) arrangement of material meaningfully, and (6) interesting presentation which will command readers attention and communicate the maximum of understanding.\textsuperscript{18} Regarding the pursuit of evidence, these authors have the following advice to give:

Your pursuit of evidence will have had much in common with a detective's search for clues. In the evaluation of the evidence which you uncover, you will follow rules of evidence comparable to those of a court of law. An obligation rests upon every historian as it does upon a member of a jury to render a verdict to the best of his ability solely in accordance with the evidence and with as full a sense of his responsibility.... You will have to weigh conflicting evidence, discount special pleading

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 211.

\textsuperscript{17} In their Historian's Handbook, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 2nd edn., 1964.

\textsuperscript{18} See Ibid., p. 9.
and bear in mind the fallibility of human observation and memory. And likewise your decision will be subject to review.\textsuperscript{19}

W.L. Lucey\textsuperscript{20} says, "(i)t is obvious that history is an inquiry and that the historical method of investigation easily qualifies as scientific."\textsuperscript{21} He maintains that history cannot be an exact science since "man is a free agent and his freedom of choice is the most important causal factor in human history."\textsuperscript{22} Lucey says that man's freedom remains the most important factor in regard to future events and is the reason why the future is not predictable,\textsuperscript{23} yet he admits that history qualifies as a science.

History is knowledge, systematized knowledge, arrived at by scientific procedure. If it is weak on the score of general laws and generalizations, one can only point out that the nature of its subject matter severely restricts the freedom to generalize.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 57.
\item \textsuperscript{20} In his History: Methods and Interpretation, Chicago, Loyola University Press, 1958.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid. This distinction, between history as the study of free causality and natural science as the study of laws and generalizations expressive of necessary causality, will be highly relevant later in this chapter when the analyses of R. Stover and E. Cassirer are exposed. See below, pp. 587-609 and pp. 630-684.
\end{itemize}
Marc Bloch,25 complaining of the oversimplified presentation of the historian's method, says that "even those texts or archaeological documents which seem the clearest and the most accommodating will speak only when they are properly questioned."26 He adds that "it is a prime necessity of a well conducted historical research to force the witnesses to speak against their will once we accept no longer to simply record the witnesses' word."27

It seems to be generally accepted among historians, then, that the materials functioning as documents and sources, as evidence of what happened in man's past, exercise this function of being evidence only as a result of an active, orderly interrogation by the historian. Collingwood's thesis would thus seem to be substantiated by being in agreement with what the above sampling of historians say about their method of procedure.

But does this interrogative uncovering of the human past differ significantly from the scientist's investigations which uncover the intelligible laws of the natural world? The affirmative answer to

26 Ibid., p. 64.
27 Ibid.
this question involves distinguishing the type of intelligibility which supplies meaning and explanation when we are dealing with man as a free being and free agent from the type of intelligibility which supplies meaning and explanation when we are dealing with the natural, unfree, deterministic world (including man to the extent that he also belongs to that world).

B. Two Ways in which the World of Experience is Intelligently Meaningful.

To evaluate Collingwood's assertion that history proceeds by a distinctive logic of question and answer, it is necessary to consider two fundamental ways in which, according to a number of recent authors, the world of lived experience can be made intelligibly meaningful and rationally accounted for. Collingwood has insisted that "scientific history contains no ready made statements at all," and that "...(c)on-fronted with a ready made statement about the subject he is studying the scientific historian...asks himself...'what does this statement mean?"28 Collingwood further insists that "the scientific historian does not treat statements as statements but as evidence..., as other facts which, if he knows the right questions to ask about them, may

throw light on these facts."²⁹ The following analysis is going to show that one of two distinguishable types of meaning is the proper concern of the historical investigation and that this type of meaning becomes disclosed in an interrogational dialogue of an intersubjective nature, or, as Collingwood expresses it, "by rethinking past thoughts."³⁰ The criticism to be made against Collingwood will be that he reduces both types of meaning to this one particular type which is the proper concern of the historian, and that, in doing so, he channels all investigations ultimately into investigations of an historical nature, thereby, effectively denying to science its own autonomous access to its proper type of meaning and explanation. This conclusion will be arrived at by drawing on the insights and conclusions of recent thinkers, principally Robert Stover, Ernst Cassirer and John Wild.

Robert Stover distinguishes natural order intelligibility and a distinctive type of intelligibility arising from man's ability to disclose the world in alternative ways according to greater or lesser suitability to human and personal needs. Ernst Cassirer distinguishes nature concepts, founded in what he calls "thing" perception, from

culture concepts, founded in what he calls "expression" perception. The ideal of objectivity aimed at by nature-concepts excludes every personal manifestation, whereas culture concepts, and the meaningfulness of the moral, cultural and historical world built up by means of them, are intelligible only as expressions of personal attitudes consciously adopted with respect to the encountered (natural and human) world, or, in Stover's terms, expressions of care and concern. John Wild's analysis of man as a "care-taking" being greatly illuminates Stover's analysis of meaning deriving from the attitude of careful confrontation of the world, and in doing so, throws light on the nature of what is historical being, which contributes greatly to our ability to answer questions about the object and methodology of the historian.

C. Natural Order Intelligibility and Intelligibility from the Standpoint of Living in the World.

Robert Stover's "thesis is that there are essential presuppositions and requirements which define what it is for an occurrence to be intelligible to us and that one set of such presuppositions and requirements defines natural order intelligibility" and another set


32 Ibid., p. 5. Emphasis in original.
defines what he calls the intelligibility of the standpoint of living in the world, which is the standpoint of confronting the world caringly, that is, "with an attitude of concern, which poses questions about the world-questions as to the relative preferability of one or another alternative states of affairs" which "is to presume that one or another alternative might be preferable."

These two ways of thinking about the world, inasmuch as they define two distinct ways of questioning, are called standpoints.

Confrontation of the world in such a way that a distinctive question arises is what we mean by a standpoint. The queries that give rise to critically differentiated lines of questioning develop from everyday encounters with the world.

33 See Ibid., p. xiii and p. 147.
34 See Ibid., p. 149.
35 Ibid. Note the interrogative character of this attitude of concern. Correlate with Collingwood's The New Leviathan, chapter 11, on questioning and desire, ppph. 11.39: "...the first part of knowing yourself is knowing what you want," (pp. 11.22) "...a proposition is an answer to a question; and a question offers alternatives...so desire asks and answers the question 'what do I want?' which it begins by converting into 'which do I want, a or b?' (which)...are put before you as alternatives..." (for) (11.11) "knowing involves asking questions and answering them...and...asking a question implies contemplating alternatives."

36 R. Stover, op.cit., p. 147. However, Stover's warning is not to be understood as if he sets everyday thinking in radical opposition to historical thinking. On p. 186 he writes: "The extraordinary interesting fact remains that we find the same historian sometimes adopting the standpoint of the agent and sometimes that of natural order. This is one way in which the historian's thinking
But Stover warns that "(a)t the outset of man's thinking it is not apparent that there are fundamentally distinct question-posing ways in which the world is there for us, let alone what these are," for "it is a philosophical error...to suppose that our everyday thinking has its own framework of intelligibility and provides the key to the intelligibility of the world," rather "differentiation of these stand-points from one another" parallels "refinement in conception of stand-points." This illuminates Collingwood's position on the primacy of the questioning activity in knowledge. It is by the taking of different standpoints in confrontation with the world by questioning from such standpoints that a definite type of meaningfulness and explanation is recognizable. Meaning and explanation are not explicated in our day to day encounters with the world until we confront the world with a definite type of question characteristic of a definite type of standpoint.

resembles our thinking in everyday life. In everyday life we are not specialists. We pass from one standpoint to the other a thousand times a day without any hesitation or sense of discontinuity. Like many an historian we use both." Thus, far from being in opposition to H. Marrou's position that historical knowledge resembles familiar day to day knowledge (see Marrou's The Meaning of History, pp. 89-91 and pp. 103-111; see also chapter 7, above, pp.446-451). Stover's position, as clarified by himself here, illuminates also Marrou's position.

A standpoint is therefore a definite position or situation taken up by an agent or observer confronting a world of events questioned as to their meaning and explanation. Questioning, therefore, implies a situated observer or agent, and a world of events which such observer, or agent, confronts as puzzling to him in some way. Situation and world are therefore mutually implicatory terms. A situation takes place only in and with reference to an environing world; a world is what situates by environing that which is situated in some meaningful way.  

Stover holds that there are two fundamentally, as distinct from derivatively, distinguishable ways in which the world of events can be confronted questioningly.

...we shall maintain that there are two fundamental lines of questioning, i.e., two ways in which we make occurrences intelligible, and, corresponding to them, two fundamentally distinct types of historical thinking: thinking from the standpoint of natural order and thinking from the standpoint of living in the world.

Natural order thinking is based on the observed uniformity in occurrences. Stover explains this as follows:

Roughly speaking, natural order is an orderliness manifested in occurrences: under the same circumstances the same things happen, either always or with the same frequency. To think about the world, to observe it, to

38 See R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 248 for the correlativity of the self and its world. See this chapter, below, p. 610. See also this chapter, below, pp.676-678 n.262 for John Wild's explanation of the meaning of the term 'world'.

form concepts, and to reason with a view to making judgments about the orderliness of happenings, is what we call thinking from the standpoint of natural order, and the objective of thinking from this standpoint is natural order intelligibility.  

Stover says that this standpoint "characterises much of what we call scientific thinking" although scientific thinking is not to be equated with this type of thinking, since, notwithstanding that "the quest for valid empirical generalizations, for unifying theories, for systematic knowledge, all can be carried on from this standpoint," nevertheless "(s)cientific thinking...is not always from the standpoint of natural order, and even when it is, specific objectives of the scientist are likely to be selective, narrower in scope than those of the standpoint itself."  

Just as the scientist may proceed not exclusively in his characteristic mode of natural order thinking, so the historian need not proceed by a distinctively historical type of thinking totally excluding natural order thinking which is characteristic of scientific thinking.

40 Ibid., pp. 3-4.  

41 Ibid., p. 4. Emphasis in original. For example finance may force a researcher to restrict the focus of his inquiry. His economic concern, a factor extraneous to scientific inquiry as such, may condition the type of inquiry beyond that of properly scientific considerations. The two standpoints though distinct, mutually condition each other in their use.
The causes and effects of human events and actions from the standpoint of natural order are of interest to historians. Stover cites Trevelyan\(^42\) as conceding that at least guessing about such things is part of the historian's business.\(^43\)

...natural order intelligibility is a plausible objective of thinking about particular occurrences of the human past.... (I)t is the principal objective of some historians on some occasions; ...it is among the objectives of many historians on many occasions. It constitutes one very common idea of what historical inquiry is all about: a quest for the order exhibited in world happenings.\(^44\)

Natural order intelligibility as an ideal\(^45\) aims at universal determinism; "...this idea is an important constituent of the scheme of natural order intelligibility:"\(^46\) "(w)e postulate universal determinism presuming that, pending evidence to the contrary, any given occurrence is an instance of natural order."\(^47\) It likewise aims at unrestricted


\(^{43}\) See R. Stover, op.cit., p. 4.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 4. Emphasis in original.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., ch. 2, pp. 15-53.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. 46.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 47. Emphasis in original.
universality of nomological laws; "our second requirement was that a nomological universal not be formulated in terms that entail a scope of predication restricted to a definite number of occurrences." But, notwithstanding these ideals of natural order intelligibility, those seeking such intelligibility frequently settle for something less, though approximating that ideal.

Natural order intelligibility is a way of thinking of which the historian can and sometimes does avail himself without precluding him from making use of other ways of thinking. But Stover warns that "sometimes the initial mistake is made of attributing a characteristic to a subject matter that should be attributed to a way of thinking." 

48 Ibid., p. 12.

49 See Ibid., pp. 16-40. As a deviation from natural order intelligibility, Stover notes, ibid., p. 48, that "the only available example of experimentally verifiable disorder...(is)...in the field of quantum mechanics."

50 See Ibid., p. 57.

51 Ibid. This is a point to be borne in mind in judging the Popper-Hempel theory of historical knowledge. This warning also removes the prima facie contradiction which may appear between Stover's recognition of the historian's use of natural order intelligibility and Ernst Cassirer's opposing of nature concepts to cultural and historical concepts; see later in this chapter, pp. 664-684 below.
Stover correctly points out that "rational actions can be descriptively understood and thought about from the natural order standpoint,"\(^{52}\) which means that "they can in principle be accounted for deterministically."\(^{53}\) Barbara Mertz noted that "(s)ooner or later, most historians succomb to the urge to discover causes in history,"\(^{54}\) and Robert Stover states that "...most 'causal' accounts of events to be found in historical works are a special form of natural order intelligibility."\(^{55}\) The historian, in having recourse to causality as essentially connoting a confirmed regular relation, is implicitly taking a stand on the meaning of causality in history. He is thereby subscribing to a "generality" interpretation of causality, in the sense that causal accounts imply a general proposition of the sort called nomological universals.\(^{56}\) The historian E.H. Carr seems to be in

\(^{52}\) R. Stover, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 93.

\(^{53}\) \textit{Ibid.} See also this chapter, below, pp. 595-596.


\(^{55}\) Robert Stover, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 93.

\(^{56}\) See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 9. I am not sure that I agree with Stover here. Actions based on care for the world are determined by free personal decisions. The free causality of human initiative is thus an alternative mode of causality to the "generality" (Stover's term) type of causality based on the necessity implied by nomological universals. Nevertheless, I think Stover is correct in saying that when historians do have recourse to causal explanation it is to the type of causality based on nomological universals that they have in mind.
agreement with this, and states that the historian constantly uses generalizations to test his evidence. If, for instance, it is not clear from the available evidence whether Richard murdered the princes in the Tower, the historian will, consciously or unconsciously, ask whether rulers of the particular period habitually liquidated rivals to their throne and his final judgment will be influenced by this generalization. 57

The explicative appeal of historians to deterministic causality has its parallel in psychology, and what F.J. Braceland and M. Stock say in that context is equally valid for the historian. Their position is that if we look along a series of events involving free decisions after the fact we can assign the actual causes which operated in the series, whereas if we look along the series "from the front end" so that at each stage we find ourselves confronted with alternatives "we cannot see whether or not it will occur, for while we see the motivations which are possible, we cannot predict which ones


will be freely chosen." Thus, "in psychology, a causal sequence explains what has happened, but it cannot foretell what will happen in the next similar event, and the difference lies in freedom of choice." If in the following we read 'historical' for 'psychological' we can easily see how the historian is justified in giving the deterministic natural law type of causal explanation for historical events, notwithstanding that the events are manifestations of the self-determinations of free agents:

In effect, then, we may and should accept scientific determinism when studying psychological data, accepting the principle that every psychological phenomenon which occurs comes from a cause. Simultaneously, we can accept free will, asserting that before they have occurred, many psychological phenomena are subject to free disposition by the human agent. And this seems to solve the dilemma.

The second fundamental standpoint of thinking distinguished by Stover is "the standpoint of living in the world," whose principle

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59 Ibid., p. 253.

60 Ibid., p. 254. See p. 594 n. 56 above, for question regarding the identification of causality with deterministic causality. I think that the determinative activity of free agents is itself a distinctive type of causality, namely free causality. That is, I object to identifying causality with predetermination.

61 F.J. Braceland and M. Stock, op. cit., p. 254. This is a very important insight and, if it is kept in mind throughout the remainder of this chapter, it will forestall many difficulties that might otherwise arise by reason of a presupposed freedom-determinism antinomy.

62 Robert Stover, The Nature of Historical Thinking, pp. 147 et seq.
of meaning and intelligibility is that of care or concern in regard to how the world is disposed with reference to a situated agent's preferences. "To confront the world as living in the world is to confront it caringly. How the world is matters."  

Caring, Stover explains, is a mental attitude of concern which questions the world as to the relative preferability of one or another recognizable states of affairs. Caring assumes that things might be otherwise than they are, and that the subject has a relation of preferability to one or another of these possible states. It may not always be apparent what is the preferable state of affairs, but the prevailing opinions about this will precipitate discussion and inquiry. The existence of recognizable alternatives as objects of preference is essential to this way of thinking. "Thinking from the standpoint of living in the world takes the form of ascertaining what is preferable."  

Stover distinguishes "between two sorts of judgments of preferability: evaluations and practical reasoning." By evaluations he means "judgments as to the comparative merits or shortcomings of a situation or aspect of a situation cared about." Thus, "(w)e may

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63 See Ibid., pp. 149-152.
64 Ibid., p. 149.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., p. 150.
evaluate the effects of certain events on our own human situation" and "(w)hat is evaluated can be past, present or future." Probably most evaluations are in connection with practical considerations such as deliberating whether to act, what course of action should be taken and what are the consequences of choices already acted upon, although evaluations are possible without essential connection with proposed rational action. 69

Contemplated alternatives relative to one involved in a decision-making situation are essential to this mode of thinking, and it is a fundamental note distinguishing it from natural order thinking. A question of preferability as to situations, institutions, courses of action, etc., is presupposed to evaluation and practical reasoning. Only a matter of concern can precipitate questions whose answers are evaluations and practical reasonings, culminating in decisions and action thereon. Whether or not someone in fact is concerned about such matters, there must at least be matters about which concern can be had in order that there be possible this distinctive intelligibility based on the world as lived in. There is always a personal reference of something judged as preferable to or for someone. 70

68 Ibid.
69 See Ibid. Again note the importance of alternatives, which, according to Collingwood, are made known by and in a question. See above, chapter 3 , pp. 99-100.
70 See Robert Stover, op.cit., pp. 151-152.
Many of the meanings by which events are intelligible from the standpoint of the suitability or unsuitability to human concern accompany the human situation as such. Consequently, it is possible to recognize the meaning that some past or distant object or event had for those confronting it in their situation of time and place. It is recognizably meaningful to us simply by consulting the orientation of our own preferences and value judgments.

Identifying understanding is descriptive understanding together with an awareness that the kinds of distinctively human meaning relations that characterize the subjective or objectivised manifestations we are understanding, are the same kinds of meaning relations that characterize our subjective experience and that are involved in meanings objectively manifested in our artifacts, institutions and behaviour. These kinds of meaning are correlates of human standpoints - common ways of confronting the world, of asking questions about what goes on, and of striving for intelligibility.\(^7\)

Thinking from this standpoint of living in the world is characterized by temporality, concreteness and particularity. The temporal character of our careful concern for the world is thus explained by Stover:

The questions we ask and answer from the standpoint of living in the world vary with the temporal perspective. We do not deliberate about an action already done; we do review and criticize past deliberations and compare the actual with the fore-

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 93.
seen consequences. On the other hand, we do not criticize ourselves for a decision not yet made nor do we compare envisioned consequences with actual consequences of a decision we have yet to execute. 72

The concreteness and particularity characteristic of our thinking from the standpoint of care for the world is then explained as follows:

The thinking we do from this standpoint reflects not only the particularity of situations but the multiplicity of ways in which a human being can fare well or poorly. It reflects the diverse kinds of interrelationships we have with things human and non-human: the precarious combination of environmental conditions upon which survival depends, the physiological complexity of our bodies, which exposes us to a diversity of stimuli and gives us the ability to do countless things as well as to extend the range of possible activities by manipulating our environment; our involvement in numerous and varied cultural systems and correlated social organizations; and so on. Whence questions arise: which of several possible actions or activities, which state affairs, which product of our own making is, in a particular situation or in general, the preferable one. 73

Both types of meaning, that deriving from natural order and that deriving from careful concern for the world, derive their meaning in relation to human beings, so that there is a general sense in which both meanings can be said to be human. But meaning based on care-for-

72 Ibid., p. 150. See this chapter, below, pp. 610-630 for John Wild's explanation of human temporality in this context.

73 R. Stover, op. cit., p. 150.
the-world is human in a very special way, inasmuch as this meaning is a relationship to the preferability of human persons in human situations. Natural order meaning is human in the sense that it is meaning for human beings, whereas "the personal reference essential to preferability is a reference to persons as human beings, as in the human situation." Since natural order meaning lacks this essential relation to human preferability, the meaning of the world in terms of natural order is a neutral type of meaning when contrasted with "the other distinctively human modes of meaning: being satisfactory for someone (evaluations), and being the appropriate thing for someone to do or the appropriate way for someone to proceed (practical judgments)."

Now, the historian is able to make past events intelligible in terms of their preferability with respect to the interests and concerns of persons contemporaneous with those events.

Judgments of preferability are personal in reference. For persons living in the past - past relative to the present in which the historian sets about making the past intelligible - there were questions of preferability.

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p. 152.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 153. Emphasis in original. It is important to keep in mind here the clarification which was borrowed from psychology in regard to human events seen from their standpoint facing their own indeterminate future. See this chapter pp. 595-596, above.
These questions of preferability may be questions of either satisfactoriness, that is, evaluations, or questions as to the correct way to proceed in decision and action. As regards the first:

Some questions of satisfactoriness for them (matters of evaluation) were actually posed by them. Some of these questions were posed thoughtfully, using generalization and judgment. An indefinite number of questions of satisfactoriness for them could have been posed. 78

As regards the second type of questions, questions of preferability which the historian may recognize in the past as making it intelligible, Stover has the following to say:

Similarly, there were an indefinite number of questions for these persons as to what to do and how to proceed (practical questions), of which some were actually posed and some were answered thoughtfully by them. Even when no question was explicitly asked or answered, they engaged in activities and viewed happenings with the understanding - sometimes resulting from previous thinking - that what was being done was appropriate, or that what was happening was satisfactory (or unsatisfactory). 79

Stover makes a further important distinction in regard to the ways in which the historian can deal with past happenings. The historian may deal with past events either by descriptive understanding or by identifying understanding. He explains descriptive understanding as follows:


79 Ibid.
The historian can describe the questions asked, the thinking done (or the manner in which the questions were resolved, whatever it may have been), and the temper of mind, mood, or outlook with which activities were carried on and happenings regarded. This is descriptive understanding, i.e., description of meaning relations; in this case, description of distinctively human meanings concretely experienced or objectified.80

Such descriptive understanding, notwithstanding that it is dealing with persons acting preferentially in their particular situation, deals with such person-involved happenings from the outside so to speak, as considered by an impartial observer.

But, contrarily, when the historian takes the viewpoint of the evaluating or deliberating agent, seeing the events from the agent's point of view, from within his personal evaluating and decision making situation, he is using what Stover calls identifying understanding.

...the historian can also identify with the standpoint of living in the world of those persons in the past; in so doing he regards the questions as universally human. It is this latter way of regarding the lived experience of the past which distinguishes identifying understanding from mere description, descriptive understanding.81

Identifying understanding presupposes descriptive understanding though this does not mean that they are exercised as two sequentially distinct operations. The value of the distinction, ac-

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80 Ibid. Emphasis in original.

81 Ibid. Emphasis in original. It is from this point of view that a past human act appears as a free decision-making act whose own future looks to that act as its determinant.
cording to Stover, lies in the fact that it allows for the recognition of another way of meaningfully objectifying lived experience, namely as manifesting natural order. Thus, "(a) historian's description can be auxiliary to both standpoints of thinking; it can serve two ultimate aims: identifying understanding or natural law thinking." 82

Descriptive understanding, then, considers an event simply as something which happened, with minimal, if any, penetration into the meaningful content of the happening. History written solely in this way would seem to be what is called mere chronicle, a mere statement of a sequence of happenings and their dates of occurrence with little or no regard to precisely what happened or why it happened. Natural order understanding would attempt to supply such meaning and explanation in terms of the intelligibility of what regularly happens according to some recognizable nomological universal law (as, for example, rulers levying heavy taxation are unpopular and provoke discontent). Identifying understanding, on the other hand, would seek to situate itself within the concern of the agent involved in his (the agent's) present (histo­rian's past) situation, and understand the situation, and what happened, in terms of the agent's action by reflecting the agent's interests and concerns.

82 Ibid., pp. 153-154.
Stover takes Collingwood to task for identifying (a) the descriptive understanding of person-oriented events and happenings with (b) identifying understanding when he (Collingwood) says that in history to know what happened is together to know why it happened by insight into the thoughts and motives of the agents concerned. Stover says that this identification forestalls allowing that actions initiated by purposive agents, and their effects, can be treated also from the standpoint of natural order deterministic intelligibility, which Collingwood does not allow. Collingwood correctly recognised the distinctiveness of the volitional attitude, the standpoint of the agent whose action involves thought, and he was correct to recognize that causal generalizations or nomological universals or their approximations are not implicitly contained in identifying understanding as such. But, due to his (Collingwood's) faulty conception of understanding "he failed to grasp clearly the difference between understanding the practical reasons or reasoning of others and thinking from the standpoint of natural order." Thus, Collingwood, "mistakenly supposed that when the historian understands, happenings (actions in this case) thereby become intelligible in the same way that deterministic accounts make them

83 See Ibid., pp. 77-79; 90-95; 104-107.
84 Ibid., p. 106.
Collingwood's error was to think that when the historian understands he thereby knows the determining conditions of the events in question; knowing the thoughts behind the agent's action is the same as knowing the determinate reasons why the action happened. This, Stover says, is to equate understanding with understanding the determinate reasons why an action occurred, and, therefore, in Stover's judgment, to regard understanding as an alternative of the same type of understanding as is found in natural order, deterministic thinking. Had Collingwood, in Stover's opinion, seen the difference between understanding which can be merely descriptive, and understanding by identification with the agent, he would have been able to allow for the possibility of understanding from the natural order standpoint making its own distinctive contribution to historical explanation.  

I am not sure that Collingwood's position is as easily disposed of as Stover makes it out to be here. Collingwood's identification of historical understanding with what Stover calls identifying understanding is hardly a mere slip or oversight on Collingwood's part. He has too clearly and consistently argued the impotence of thought in its scientific mode of procedure, that is, through abstract universals and general laws, to deal with the problems proper to history. I agree

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85 Ibid. Emphasis in original.

86 See Ibid., p. 106.
with Stover that the explanation of some historical event, the
satisfying answer to someone's question regarding a certain historical
happening, may well be of the type "tyrants do that sort of thing," or
"heavy taxes always breed discontent", or "kings of that period usually
were cruel." Consequently, I disagree with Collingwood's position not
allowing answers of a universal and general type as answers to specific
historical questions. But I likewise disagree with Stover's statement
that the trouble on Collingwood's part is his inability to distinguish
descriptive understanding from identifying understanding. Collingwood's
whole system of thought leads him to conclude that abstract thought, as
found in natural science, is erroneous, and that truth is had only in
thought which achieves concreteness and totality. Only historical
thought, of the type Stover calls identifying understanding, fulfils
the conditions of concrete and genuine thought for Collingwood. So,
it is in principle, rather than as a result of a negligent oversight,
that Collingwood identifies understanding in history and what Stover
calls identifying understanding. From his (Collingwood's) view
Collingwood saw only too clearly that natural order intelligibility
could not contribute to historical explanation. In effect, Stover here
is failing to take precisely that standpoint of identifying under­
standing in regard to Collingwood; he does not look at Collingwood's
denial of that distinction from the standpoint of the problem which
Collingwood faced in his own mind. Furthermore, historical thought for
Collingwood is conducted at a level of consciousness which transcends scientific thought. The historian is thinking about thought (i.e., past thought though not necessarily thinking about the activity itself of thinking about (past) thought, which, for Collingwood, is philosophical thought), whereas the scientist thinks, not about thought, but about spatialized, deterministic objects. The issue with Collingwood is rather with the fundamentals of his whole system which forbid him to even visualize the possibility of the distinction which Stover seems to regard as a de facto error which crept in as some sort of oversight.

But, Stover continues, had Collingwood distinguished descriptive understanding from identifying understanding, he would have seen that

descriptive understanding places rational activity at the disposal of the historian-scientist: what happened was purposive thinking, the solving of a particular problem (an emphasis repeatedly made by Collingwood), the historian-scientist's problem then is to find out the determining conditions of the fact that the agent reached the decision that he did reach, solved his problem as he did solve it, and acted on the basis of his decision as he did act.

87 See Collingwood's *Idea of History*, pp. 2-3. See also p. 2 of Introductory Chapter, above.

Identifying understanding is possible, and able to supply an intelligible account of past events, precisely because those living in the past, and ourselves in the present striving to understand that past, confront the world as fellow human beings.

It is intelligible to us having been intelligible to them, as having been thought about and judged by them as fellow human beings. The kind of intelligibility that the world had for them is recognized as one of the kinds of intelligibility that "our" world has for us, a kind we ourselves at least sometimes pursue, the goal of one form of our questioning. 89

D. Man as a Historical Being.

Robert Stover has well distinguished pre-determined causation (characteristic of scientific explanation) from self-determining causation characteristic of human decision-making in free choice. The basic distinction is between necessary causality and free causality, between what could have been otherwise and what could not have been otherwise, as everyday colloquialism expresses it. The reason why something happens may be due to the efficiency of preexisting actualities, or it may be due to the autonomous initiation of a free being on account of as yet unrealized but realizable foreseen eventualities that he seeks to bring into being by his free decisions. His determination of a

89 Ibid., p. 154. Emphasis in original. This is an important point to be developed later by Ernst Cassirer. The principle which gives care-concern concepts a logical value is the underlying unity of man. See this chapter, below, pp. 635-637.
foreseeable future is thus a reason for and explanation of the events resulting from his actions.

The recognition of man's free, self determining causality provides the key to distinguishing the historical being proper to man from that of natural being (which man shares with natural things as part of the world of nature). This character of man as a self-responding situated being is well explained by John Wild in his *Challenge of Existentialism*. 90

Man's situatedness and facticity is first made aware to him by certain emotive responses which disclose much more than any amount of theorizing. Mood and feeling disclose objects that threaten me in such a way that I am made aware, all together, of the object, the feeling itself, and myself as experiencing that modality of feeling. Such a mood is then not as a thing-object, to be looked at, but rather as a way I am, which reveals my being as a being situated in the world.

This revelation discloses the naked facticity of the situation. I feel myself oppressed by the situation into which I am thrown, and feel myself trying to disengage myself from that situation felt as something oppressing. 91


91 See Ibid., p. 8.
To a certain extent this clarifies what Collingwood explained regarding appetite as making us aware of a future as yet unrealized, harmonious state of wellbeing through making us presently aware of an unsatisfactoriness, or felt disquietude, in our present situation. But, I think Wild's explanation is more in accord with experience, inasmuch as he allows that these emotive moods themselves have revelative capacity, whereas, for Collingwood, the selective activity of conscious attention has to intervene to disengage the 'there-and-then' of feeling from the 'here-and-now'. Collingwood seems to exaggerate the active role of consciousness over feeling when he says that "(t)his practical directive or selective act (of attention) 'makes', as we say, the distinctions between what we attend to and what we attend 'from' or 'repress'." To the crucial questions 'Are there objects of feeling or not?' and 'Is feeling active or passive?' he answers that he does not know in both cases. But to the first he gives methodological reasons for preferring that what is felt are modes rather than

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93 See Ibid., pp. 21-23, pgphs. 4.4-4.6 and p. 51. pgph. 7.53.

94 Ibid., pp. 22-23, pgph. 4.52.

95 See Ibid., p. 28, pgph. 5.2.

96 See Ibid., p. 31, pgph. 5.4.
objects of the activity. To the second he says he cannot give even methodological reasons for answering one way or another. So, without being able to answer these crucial questions from positive grounds he already loads the issue heavily on the side of the activity, overriding the passivity and contribution from the object side, of consciousness.

If mood and feeling awaken me to the facticity of my situation, it is understanding which "focuses on my essential possibilities and projects - that part of me which is always ahead of itself in the future" which, according to Heidegger, is the central core of my being. Understanding is thus a kind of creation, the projection of new being.  

The whole world is ordered and understood with reference to the ultimate projects I set for myself. To judge something is to interpret it in the light of some project and, ultimately, in the light of my ultimate concern.

Our primitive insights are practical. If the hammer I am using is too big I look for another. But when I have leisure, and am freed from the demand on me to act, I can look at the hammer from a detached point of view and inquire what goes with hammers as such. From such contemplation theoretical science arises. Such activity presupposes leisurely detachment from pressing practical everyday needs and has its

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98 See Ibid., p. 89.
own distinctive mood of relaxation, detachment and concentration. Theoretical knowledge bears on something as a fixed entity of some sort, and is thus incapable of grasping human possibility. Practical knowledge grasping human possibilities does so from a situation of dynamic involvement in which these very possibilities arise. Inspired by Heidegger, Wild explains as follows:

Our primordial and true insight into the world is derived from our active projection of possibilities ahead of ourselves. This projection is the first act of understanding. This orders ourselves and all other entities into an intelligible world. Interpretation is the detailed development of this frame, and its application to concrete objects confronting us. To fit something into such a frame is to disclose its being. Such disclosure belongs to Dasein. He is the disclosure he makes. Some of them are true and reveal the entity itself.100

This remarkable quote clarifies and ties up much that has been said in the foregoing. The "interpretation" referred to here seems to be the same as Collingwood's "interpretation"101 or

99 So, it is clear why dialectical thought gives primacy to action rather than to substantiality in explaining.

100 John Wild., op.cit., p. 90.

101 See Collingwood's treatment of 'insight' into the meaning of law in his Speculum Mentis, p. 225, where he says that the important thing about legal rules is not their rigid formulation but their 'interpretation' whereby they are seen to dynamically illuminate a concrete situation. I think that what is said above, together with what is said by Collingwood regarding the role and function of law, would greatly clarify many of the issues raised by Gidon Gottlieb in his investigation into legal reasoning in his Logic of Choice. See,
"insight" into a situation needed to understand what one ought to do in that situation. It is clear that the understandability of the situation as described here by Wild is through nothing other than what has been previously explained at length as a concrete universal.  

For example, Gottlieb's two cases of the shooting of an elephant, one in a U.S. Central Park zoo, the other in Burma (op. cit., pp. 60-61). "All the circumstances, the nature of the offence, the motivations of the accused, were in all respects identical..., (t)he only difference between the two cases was that one arose in the U.S. and the other in Burma. There too a variety of facts was brought to the attention of the court but for the same two facts: the colour of the clothes of the accused and the colour of the elephant's skin. In both instances, however, the elephant was a white elephant. The colour of the elephant was of no special interest in the U.S...but it was of crucial importance in Burma, where white elephants are sacred and their slaughter sacriligious. To omit in Burma any reference to the colour of the elephant was tantamount to concealing from the court a most important fact." Gottlieb then makes his point in regard to the interpretation of laws about shooting elephants: "Facts and cows have this in common: they may be sacred in India but not in the U.S. The importance of cows and the relevance of what happens to them depends on their place and function in the community; what may be significant here may be - to enrich our metaphor - a red herring elsewhere." See also appendix 2 below, pp. 816-817 regarding judicial interpretation of law.

102 For Collingwood's discussion of the need for 'insight' into a given situation in order to decide how to act in the concrete circumstances see his Autobiography, pp. 101-106. See also chapter 6 above, pp. 354-355.

103 See chapter 4, above.
The development of the frame of reference in which we order our projects is the building up of a concrete universal which gives meaning to all those things brought together and related among themselves according to their necessary involvement in that overall framework. The relevance of all that Stover has said above regarding man's careful concern for the world as a source of distinctive meaning is also implicated here. The mutual clarification of Stover's treatment of intelligibility deriving from man's deliberated choice, Collingwood's treatment of insight into and interpretation of, a situation, and the elaboration of this meaning of the concrete universal by Bosanquet and Collingwood, all seem to be nicely summed up and articulated in the above quote of Wild. The progressive determination of our projects involves the elaboration of enmeshing relations which at the same time create and reveal the meanings of all that is thus related. Understanding in this context is thoroughly pragmatized, as it is also in Sartre and Heidegger.

The meaning of an event is the way it fits into a plan of action, and all understanding presupposes an ultimate end that has been chosen. Theory is assimilated to practice. My choice of myself and my world order is at the same time my discovery of the world. Awareness and choice are really one.

104 John Wild, op.cit., p. 95.
105 Ibid.
Wild, immediately after this, adds that "(t)his pragmatic conception determines the existentialist attitude towards the discipline of logic" which he proceeds to consider, and his consideration is of the highest importance in enlightening the verdict to be passed on Collingwood's theory of logic, especially as it is relevant to history. Like Collingwood, Wild criticises the formal or symbolic logic which prevails in many parts of the world inasmuch as "(c)onceptual meaning has been ignored and sometimes reduced to the instrumental symbols of language," and "(t)he syntactic structure of these symbols has been cut off from their referential functions." The result is that logic becomes sundered from reality and knowledge, and becomes the plaything of technicians, each playing his own game.

According to Heidegger, the judgment is logistically dissolved into a system of rules, and becomes the object of a sort of reckoning rather than the theme for ontological interpretation.

106 Ibid.
107 See, for instance, Collingwood's comments on symbolic logic in his Principles of Art, pp. 268-269.
108 John Wild, op.cit., p. 95.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., p. 96.
In opposition to this Wild insists on the intentionality of logic as a human discipline. "The logic of science and of all living discourse is referential." To reintroduce this classical notion, Heidegger, according to Wild, feels the need to regard the primordial insight into existence as achieved only in terms of our active projects. In Collingwood the same thing is found in his recognition of the primacy of the practical over the theoretical. Collingwood is obviously doing what Wild says Heidegger and the existentialists are doing in this respect, namely "rescue(ing) logic from the hands of minute technicians ...to restore it to the position it once had as the interpreter and guide of meaningful discourse." Whatever may be the interest and importance of turning logic into the theory of calculating machines, such "mathematical logic has certainly not shed much light on the Logos." Like Collingwood, Wild insists that "(i)nstead of becoming obsessed with minor details of mathematics, it is the function of logic to inquire

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Passim. See specifically his Autobiography, pp. 147-167, and his New Leviathan, p. 5, paragraphs 1.66. Collingwood's thesis, that 'mind is what it does', I think, seems to sum up this attitude in one sentence.

114 J. Wild, op. cit., p. 97.

115 Ibid. See also E. Cassirer on the meaning of Logos; see this chapter, below, pp. 635-640.
into the structure of human meaning as such." He reechoes Collingwood's need "to study the intentional structure of living discourse and to devise a human discipline for its guidance." As human awareness is primarily practical rather than theoretical and human awareness cannot be separated from human action, the revitalization of logic must be as a logic of human choices, decisions and action. Since this is the stuff history is made of, any distinctive logic of history will be a logic of human action and human awareness as it arises in and through action.

According to Wild, following Heidegger, it is the feeling of


117 Ibid., pp. 97-98. Chapters 1 and 2, above, expose Collingwood's call for this new logic.

118 John Wild, *op. cit.*, p. 97. This means that Collingwood's (and Wild's) call for a revitalized logic must be a logic of what Stover, above, called man's 'careful concern for the world,' or the logic of human decision-making. This aspect of logic is not as neglected today as it was in Collingwood's time. See, for example, Chapters 1, 13, 14 and 15 of W. Edgar Moore's *Creative and Critical Thinking*, Boston, Houghton, Mufflin Co., 1967. See also the first four chapters of Troy W. Organ's, *The Art of Critical Thinking*, Boston, Houghton Mufflin, 1965. The former work stresses the human decision-making dimension of logic, the latter its interrogative aspect. See also Henry S. Leonard's *Principles of Reasoning*, N.Y., Dover, 1967, pp. 22-86 on the recognition of problems and the methods of their solution.
dread that awakens me to that which distinguishes me as a historical being, namely a being who faces possibilities to be determined and actualized through choices.

Dread singles me out and leaves me alone to face what I still might be. It also touches the whole structure of my being in the world, but with a poignant emphasis on those real possibilities which I really am, though they be ahead of me.\textsuperscript{119}

Wild then rejoins Stover in singling out "that care or commitment which characterizes all specifically human action." The term 'care' expresses the conative structure characteristic of human existence as concrete and dynamic.\textsuperscript{120} Human existence does not just flow down like a stream from a past through a present to some unforeseeable future. As a historical being my past and future are together with me in any present now in my careful concerns.

...my activity is always to a future which I have already projected ahead of myself by understanding and mood.... (T)he past and future are not separated from each other by a punctual present. They are held together in a certain unity which can be clearly seen in the structure of care. This care is always ahead of itself and never confined to the present.... It is this envisaged future that directs my care.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{119} John Wild, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 99. The feeling of dread thus seems itself to delineate man in his factual situation from the environment in which he has to make choices. Therefore, before the conscious activity of selective attention, a well defined structure is presented at the level of feeling. See criticism of Collingwood on this point, above, pp. 611-612.

\textsuperscript{120} See John Wild, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
Wild distinguishes a "threefold order of human existing as the structure of care: (1) ahead of itself...(2) as already in the world...(3) as being with..." 122 If this is so, then we may regard this as the basic structure of a concrete universal, and so, is of the highest importance in explicating that notion. Care means more than active co-presence. One can act carelessly regarding a present object. Care is a special kind of co-presence peculiar to man. If that which is co-present is another man one does not merely act on him. This careful concern does not come and go but lies at the very core of man's concrete being. The care-taking agent is a centre of care (in its variety of forms, namely, of drive, urge, desire, wish or will), that is, a projective structure. Even the theoretical order is basically practical and embodies this structure when it is a question of the possibility of a truth I do not yet know and to be sought out by carefully chosen means. 123 This includes scientific research, and one may add all such investigations as Collingwood's 'who killed John Doe?' "(T)his possibility (of some as yet unknown truth) ahead of me arouses my concern, it takes over any factual existence and directs it to the

122 Ibid., p. 101.

123 See Ibid.
necessary procedures and acts."\textsuperscript{124}

The most significant differentiating factor in distinguishing the different levels of care is the weight of the futurity factor. Drives and urges are dominated by an object as present; they seem to flow out of the past, so that the image of the stream is more fittingly said of them. Desires and interests, at a higher level, are almost totally lost in what is present, with at best only a dim view of futurity. Wishes manifest a limited view of real possibilities. But "(t)he more authentic kinds of care are manifested in those acts of purposive choice where basic possibilities are clearly grasped. They take over the whole personality in decisive commitment."\textsuperscript{125}

This three fold structure of the all pervasive human phenomenon of care opens the way to the understanding of the problem of time and of the connections of past, present and future as these are historical characteristics.\textsuperscript{126}

\textbf{\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.\textsuperscript{.} Thus, the investigative stage, or way of discovery of some theoretical concern, is itself not merely theoretical but also practical, involving careful deliberation and decision. See below, appendix 2, pp. 811 et seq.\textsuperscript{.}}

\textbf{\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.\textsuperscript{, p. 102. I think that we may say that the degree of expectation of purpose here is at the same time the measure of a man's disengagement from the natural world and the constituting of himself as a free autonomous, and so historical being.}}

\textbf{\textsuperscript{126} See Ibid.\textsuperscript{, p. 103.}}
The more spatialized and familiar conception of time is that of a succession of 'now' moments. The present is real at any given moment. The past was once a (present) now and the future will be a now when it really is. Present nows seem to flow into the past, and be replenished from future nows flowing into the present. This goes on indefinitely, and all that happens, including myself, happens in this flow of time. The present can be examined as an object before my senses, the past I remember, the future I anticipate or predict.  

But, Wild asks, do not these characteristics belong to what is in time rather than to time itself? Is time itself divided into past present and future? or rather "(i)s not time itself dissolved with the dissolution of the past and future?"  

Following Heidegger, Wild says that "time lies at the root of the structure of human care." It "is an existential structure which pervades man's being in the world."  

Time is not a sort of space which things are in, nor is the human person, the historical being, a thing, or a set of events, in time. Time is rather a 'stretch' or 'intension' of man's being. His being is not first confined to a given moment and then stretched out  

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127 See Ibid., pp. 103-104.
128 Ibid., p. 105.
129 Ibid., p. 106.
into past and future; from its beginning to its end his being is thus characterized.

From the very beginning, his being is stretched out into possibilities ahead of himself, and a past which he must take over if he is to be with things at a factual present.

What Heidegger calls the three ecstasies of time are thus integrated into the unity of man's existential being. "He is not in time, but rather he is it, and exists it. To have time for something is to have self devotion to it. To lose time or to waste it, is to waste the self." Man's historic being is thus described:

I am not confined to a present moment nor to a specious present. I am the future I have projected ahead of myself, and I still am the past that I have been.

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130 Ibid., pp. 106-107. If this is so, we can see the relevance of Collingwood's explication of man's historical being as an overlap of classes in a scale of forms, each later form taking up and modifying the earlier. Rather than an ejection of his being into a dead past there is a constant retaking up of that past, an injecting of it into the present (Collingwood's reliving of past thoughts), and a directing of the whole present actuality (fertilized by its own revived past which it sums up in itself) into the as yet unrealized but realizable future. Any stage of its active development can be represented as the fulfilment (summation) of its past to that point and together its forward thrust to the self-realization of future projected possibilities.


132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.
Wild stresses that "it is the future that must take hold of the past, and guide it in present action." But this addition to my present is not an accidental addition to an already there substantial being. At no moment am I ever all there. Stationing myself in this projected future, from this vantage point I can direct and criticize my action. "It is from this being ahead of myself that I regard the flow of my being out of the past, through the present, towards where I am primarily, at my end in the future." Note what is implied here. My life is seen by me as a meaningful whole only if I see myself as a completed whole from some point of goal-achievement located in the as yet unrealized future.

But the being of man is not exclusively futuristic; it is stretched over the past which he has been and bears with concern on present things and actions. So, the present does not just come after the past nor the future after the present. These are inseparable phases of a single integrated structure whose "unity must be maintained by resolute choice that holds them tightly together with the future, not after but before the present." Laziness and irresolution may rupture

134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid. Emphasis in original. Again we have, in Wild's words, what may be taken as an excellent summary statement of Collingwood's explanation of history as a concrete universal constituted by a scale of forms in an overlap of classes.
this unity; then man passes from past to future through present in the way any physical object does so, as something which just happens to it, not as something he carries himself through by decisively and freely "taking himself in hand." As things observed scientifically, they are in time and their past, present and future are related by external relations. But as man is consciously aware of them, his past, present and future are not things but modalities of his (conscious) existence related by internal relations through human action in decisions and the realization of projects. In this threefold modality

the future is in the mode of possibility, (so that) no part of it can become actually present without altering its mode of existence. The past is already there; its factual content fixed, and not open to choice. The present moment is not yet there to be forgotten or taken over. It is still indeterminate and open to choice.

My past is not something over and done with. It is that which I have been so long as I am. It is unfinished because it never was all there. The future is more than a not-yet-now that will be, which would seem to imply that until then it is nothing. But even now I am this future which stretches ahead of me in the mode of possibility.

137 This lazy and irresolute attitude seems to correspond with Collingwood's identification of 'realist' thought with low grade and unscientific, inertial thinking. See his Essay on Metaphysics, p. 34. See also above, chapter 5, pp. 269-270.

It is what determines the meaning of my existence, and from whose vantage point I interpret the past and guide the present in action. The three modes of existence temporalize themselves each with respect to the other and each in its own way. 139

History is usually referred to as a succession of events in the past, the role of the past being regarded as so predominant as to define history as the study of the past. It is often thought of as a great stream flowing down from the past through the present to the future. Under the influence of naturalistic thinking the past is thought of as a fixed entity on whose sure basis we must build the future. 140

But this image of the stream is inaccurate, since at any designated moment the whole stream exists with all its parts from beginning to end. But men are not in a stream of history; they are

139 Ibid., pp. 108-109. Luiji Sturzo, in his The Inner Laws of Society, New York, P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1944, p. xxv, says: "The human present...is not something static and definitive; it is, on the contrary, dynamic. It projects itself into the future, which presses on to become present and lose itself in the past. The dynamism towards the future in human process translates itself into finalism, while the activity that in realizing the present loses itself in the past translates itself into causality. The past is the moment of causalities, the future that of purpose, while the present is the reality of existence. Past and future do not exist in themselves, but in the present, that is, in real human existence, which is in fact a continuous succession of presents."

140 See John Wild, op.cit., pp. 110-111.
their history. Social man, like individual man, exists with these modalities of past, present and future, no single one existing without the essential implication of the others. Social man, like individual man, is always ahead of himself. But if he is not to remain lost in mere possibilities, for their realization he must appropriate his factual past and put it to work in present action directed towards the realization of future projects.\footnote{See Ibid., p. 111. This is more or less what I understand Collingwood to mean when he says that questions, the cutting edge of the mind, determinative of future possibilities, are not the pure form of questioning, but are formed out of a preexisting, that is, past, body of fact. See his Speculum Mentis, pp. 78-79. See also, chapter 3, above, pp. 101-102.} From the point of view of the self constituting consciousness, therefore, the present is together an active appropriation of the past and at the same time an active construction of the as yet unrealized but realizable future.

Thus appears the concern for the historic past; it is not something dead and gone but something still with us. It is what we (who are now) have been. The past is not all gone because it never was all there in the first place. It never occurred as an event but as something ahead of itself in its (own) future.\footnote{See J. Wild, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 111-112.}

It is impossible, therefore, to understand a historic fact
without understanding its future. Possibility is at the very heart of human history as the guiding centre of human care. So, the past which is the object of human history is a past having a human future, a past whose fulfilment in reality is to be found in a future of its own.\textsuperscript{143}

The stream-image defects because its past, present and future parts are all in the same mode of being, namely 'being-there', or as 'events'. A historically past event was not a floating futurity, it also had its own past and its own future in the light of which that past was reappropriated in acts of self-determining choice. Thus, the past, as known historically, can disclose to us its own possibilities (in the light of what was future for it), some of these which became realities. Insight is required to resolve these possibilities now buried in the mists of ambiguity. The unity of history is not a completed fact already there waiting just to be accepted; it is a struggle to be won and to be maintained against the threat of being lost again.\textsuperscript{144}

Thus, men, their being in the world, and the world in which they are, are all historical. The things which go to make up the world were not once all there in a certain form; they have their history, so that the things we now have are different. The world itself, in which

\textsuperscript{143} See \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 112-113.

\textsuperscript{144} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 113.
men and things are said to be, was never fixedly all there, it was always
temporalizing itself by actively endowing itself with the realization
of future projects based on past achievements.145

It is the essential possibilities open to man which give
unity to history. Wild thus states the task of the professional histo­
rian:

He is studying the being of man. His duty is to
clarify such insights as we already possess, and to
show how those real possibilities have been won or
lost in the past. By helping us to understand more
clearly those that still remain to us, he is
participating in the actual process of history. This
understanding is the most primordial part of history.
Without the relating of real possibility to brute
fact, there would be no process of history. In this
sense, the science of 'history' is history itself,
and the single name is not only appropriate but
required.146

It is thus in the mind of the historian, or rather in the mind
of man as he is a historian, that past and future are integrated in an
intelligible present, which is thereby understandable. As both Col­
lingwood and Marrou insist, man the historian is one with his history
and cannot be intelligibly separated therefrom.

But our concern is mainly with the logic of this historical
being, specifically with that logic as it is a logic of questioning.

145 See Ibid., p. 114.
146 Ibid.
Ernst Cassirer has given considerable thought to the logic of the properly human world, including its history, and what he has to say is highly relevant to the evaluation of Collingwood's position on the interrogative logic proper to history. We now turn to consider Cassirer's account of the logical ordering of the human, cultural, moral and historical world. Here the optic is epistemo-logical, that is, the ordering of the phenomenal multiplicity into a recognizably intelligible unity of universality.

E. The Logos of the Physical Natural Order and of the Spiritual Moral Order.

Ernst Cassirer points out that, from the awakening of critical thought, two meaningful spheres of order and intelligibility confronted man. There is the world of nature which was most likely the first to be brought from chaos to ordered cosmos by the science of astronomy. But more intimate to man is his own human world, the world of custom, culture, civilization and morality. Primitive mythology explained both orders as gifts of the gods or superior beings. Even the tools produced by his own technology, including his intellectual tools, speech and writing, were attributed to the gods as gifts to man. Language, for example, was regarded by the Egyptians as a gift of the moon-god Thoth. 147

147 Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Humanities*, pp. 40-44.
Speaking of the mythico-theological climate of the priesthood of Memphis on the eve of the accession of Akhnaton to the throne of Egypt, James Breasted\(^1\) has the following to say:

Ptah had been from the remotest ages the god of the architect and craftsman, to whom he communicated plans and designs for architectural works and the products of the industrial arts. Contemplating this god, the Memphite priest, little used as his mind was to abstractions, found a tangible channel, moving along which he gained a rational, and with certain limitations, a philosophical conception of the world. The workshop of the Memphite temple, where, under Ptah's guidance, were wrought the splendid statues, utensils and offerings for the temple, expands into a world, and Ptah, its lord, grows into the master-workman of the universal workshop. As he furnishes all designs to the architect and craftsman, so now he does the same for all men in all that they do; he becomes the supreme mind; he is mind and all things proceed from him.

With the awakening of critical thought questioning the world of experience, both natural and human, man sought to explain such experience in terms of some recognizable unity in the phenomenal multiplicity. With this need to reduce the privately experienced phenomenal multiplicity to some commonly accessible rationale as principle of unity of order, logic in its widest sense is born.

The Ionians... are not... satisfied with mere knowledge of the "what"; they also ask for the "how" and the "why".... Only thought can give us the answer: for in it and in it alone, is man freed of the limitations of his own individuality. He no longer pursues his "subjective understanding" but comprehends one that is universal and divine. A universal law... replaces... "private insight." It is by so doing that man, according to Heraclitus, first frees himself from the mythical world of dream(s) and from the narrow and limited world of sense perception. For just this is the character of being awake and of awakened being - that individuals possess a common world, whereas in dream(s) each lives only in his own world and remains mired and imprisoned in it.\textsuperscript{149}

This ideal of bringing the world of experience under a universal reason, according to Cassirer, was unable to live harmoniously with the Christian revelation during the Middle Ages.

The attempt to bring the logos-concept and the Joannine gospel under one denomination... will always remain abortive. For within these two the manner of mediation between individual and universal, finite and infinite, man and God, is radically different.\textsuperscript{150}

Descartes sought to universalize experience in a world unified by the mathematical ideal of intelligibility.

This fundamental idea (of a unified world and unified knowledge thereof) of modern (scientific)

\textsuperscript{149} E. Cassirer, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 46. Emphasis in original.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 47. But see Sam Keen, \textit{Apology for Wonder}, New York, Harper and Row, 1961, p. 17, for an opposite opinion on this.
research found its decisive philosophical legitimation in Descartes' concept of mathesis universalis. The cosmos of universal mathematics, the cosmos of order and measure, comprehends and exhausts all knowledge. In itself it is completely autonomous; it requires no support and could recognize none, other than that it finds within itself. Now, for the first time reason comprehends the whole of being in its clear and distinct ideas, and now, for the first time, it is able to penetrate and dominate this whole by means of its own powers.\footnote{151}

Cassirer says that "\textit{(w)hat is decisive in Descartes' system of metaphysics is his original conception of a single all inclusive method of knowledge.}"\footnote{152} But the dualism of (spiritual and material) substances qualifies and limits the ideal of the Cartesian monistic method. The world of spirit and the world of nature retained their radical exclusive dualism. But, with Grotius, for whom there is a thorough analogy between knowledge of law and of mathematics, and Spinoza, for whom God is the one substance having two manifestations, "\textit{(t)he human spirit was to cease to be a 'state within a state'; it was to be known by the same principles, and the same lawfulness was to underlie it that underlies nature.}"\footnote{153} Consequently, "Spinoza creates a new form of ethics...by taking geometry as its pattern...."\footnote{154}

\footnote{151} E. Cassirer, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 49. Emphasis in original.
\footnote{152} Ibid.
\footnote{153} Ibid., p. 51.
\footnote{154} Ibid.
Radical unification of thought and methodology is now achieved.

Here for the first time, the sphere (of knowledge) appears to be complete; the circle of mathematical thought has been able to encompass, with the same method, the world of matter and the world of the soul, the being of nature and the being of history.*

But the unification of the outer, physical, and inner, spiritual, moral world under the one same mathesis universalis was short lived. Implicitly, Descartes' English contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, and explicitly the Italian, Vico, a century later, effected a Copernican revolution that was to subordinate the mathematical to the cultural in the paradigm position of universalizer. According to Hobbes, the meaning of the natural world is confined to the propositions which we are able to form in its regard. These propositions are intelligible to us because we are their authors. God alone knows the natural world itself, since he alone is its maker. Vico elevates this attitude into the status of a fundamental principle: Verum = Factum.156 According

155 Ibid., pp. 51-52.

156 See Bruce Mazlish, The Riddle of History, New York, Harper and Row, 1966, pp. 23-28. See also Collingwood's translation of Croce's The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, New York, Russell and Russell Inc., 1964, especially pp. 24-29. See also, above, chapter 1 p.23 et seq., for Collingwood's attitude to mathematics and deductive inference. The inferential compulsion in mathematical, deductive reasoning is a compulsion which the mathematician imposes on himself in virtue of the commitment to the original assumptions which he makes in order to solve the problem to hand.
to Vico, mathematics, as Descartes rightly says, gives clear and distinct knowledge. But this is so, says Vico, only because mathematical entities are the products of our own thought. Since we are their authors, we are able to have comprehensive knowledge of them. But, mathematics is confined to the sphere of concept-formation, and so remains in the ideal. It is only in the works of civilization that man has knowledge of an object which is both penetrated conceptually and concretely real. These objects are not only conceivable but are also fully determinate, concretely individual and historically existential.  

From then onwards, thinkers, such as Herder, looked to man's cultural products as the proper objects of man's knowledge.

(In) Herder's work (in) the philosophy of language, the theory of art, and the philosophy of history... we are able to study...the rise and ultimate breakthrough of a new form of knowledge, which...is not to be abstracted from its matter, but which becomes manifest only in the free shaping of this matter and in its spiritual domination and penetration.  

But, since the focal point of our inquiry is the logic of history, we must ask what is the logos, the one in the multiple, which enables us to deal rationally with such phenomena. The unity behind, or

157 E. Cassirer, op.cit., pp. 52-53.

158 Ibid., p. 54. Here is the seed of Hegel's later dialectical unity of form and content.
rather within, all such diversity, its principle of intelligibility and
meaningfulness, is the unity of man. The infinite varieties of human
manifestations in all their forms are unified inasmuch as they are the
manifestations of man, of the human spirit.

...whatever man is required to perform must
spring from the condensation and unbroken unity
of all his powers, all that is isolated is evil.159

This is the 'unity in diversity' which is the principle of
unity, and therefore of intelligibility, in the human sciences and in
history. It is Marrou's "same in the other which...presupposes a broad
basis of fraternal communion between the subject and the object, between
the historian and document."160 Speaking of the Ancient Egyptians,
Barbara Mertz161 well expresses this same-in-other, this unity in
diversity, as follows:

How richly grotesque - how bizarre - was the
spiritual world which these long-dead aliens
envisaged. And then we come upon a single sentence,
or an isolated phrase, and the mask of ceremonial

159 E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 55. This new outlook, which
sees isolation of what springs from the...unbroken unity of all of
man's powers as evil, is most likely the source of Collingwood's notion
of evil as outlined in chapter 4, above, pp.175-176 in which the same
act may be regarded as good or evil according as it is integrative of
all that preceded it, or, contrarily, as yet still divided away from
the fulfillment it will achieve at a higher level on a scale of forms.


161 See her Temples Tombs and Hieroglyphs, p. 338.
vanishes to expose the familiar poignancy of man's quest for immortality, with all its uncertainty and its aching desire. "No one has returned from thence to tell us how they fare." The lament for a dead child, the demand for justice, the lover's yearning for his beloved - before our recognition of the universality of human emotion, time and distance shrink, the barriers of language, color, and nationality go down; we look into the mind of a man three millenia dead and call him "brother."

Poetry, "the mother tongue of the human race" according to Vico and Hamann is the living expression of man's concrete unity.

It is in poetry that he seeks to realize and make live again that original unity which, in the beginnings of historical language and myth, had fashioned history and poetry into a genuine totality, into an unpartitioned whole.162

But the penetration of our knowledge into the human products of language, art, myth and history is impeded so long as physical objects remain the only goal of inquiry. As long as the ideals of natural science monopolize the methods of inquiry "this question is not only unsolved, but cannot even be stated in its true and full sense."163 Cassirer insists that we must come to recognize that universal natural science and the physical cosmos are only an instance of a much more

162 E. Cassirer, op. cit., p. 55. What is said here about poetry seems to be much the same as Collingwood says about art generally, that it is an expression of man as a whole, not of one or several of his faculties. The central role accorded here to language agrees with Collingwood's regarding linguistic activity as the basic form of art.

163 Ibid., p. 57.
general inquiry which is now more and more supplanting the pan-mathematical ideal which has dominated philosophical thought since Descartes. Cassirer concludes that the idea of a cosmos and universal order is not restricted to the mathematical and physico-astronomical world. The lawfulness of natural phenomena, of the world of matter, is not the exclusive type of order and intelligibility. Wherever unity in diversity is recognized there is order and intelligibility.

We encounter the idea of a cosmos, the idea of a thoroughgoing order wherever a determinate and unified lawful structure becomes apparent within multiplicity and diversity. This "holding good" of such lawful structure - this, in the fullest sense of the term, is the most general manifestation of what we mean by "objectivity." But, what is meant by a 'cosmos' in this wider and all-embracing sense? "A 'cosmos', an objective order and determination," Cassirer informs us "is present wherever individual persons relate themselves to and participate in a common world."

Now, where, first, do we find this breaking free of the bonds of isolated individuality so that a shared, public world is clearly observed? Cassirer says that this is found in the phenomenon of speech. The word is an intended meaning which exists only as constructed within

164 See Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
a whole of communication in which the word passes from one person to another, fusing both into one living dialogue. A dialogue, therefore, is a living unity in diversity which exists as a form established by the very activity itself of language and speech. 167

...understanding through linguistic communication becomes for Herder, as it had been for Heraclitus, the genuine and typical expression of our understanding of the world. Logos creates the bond between the individual and the whole; it gives assurance to the individual that, instead of being enclosed within the waywardness of his own ego...he is capable of a universal existence.... 168

The rationality of physical science is a derivative of the more fundamental "rationality invested in language and expressed in its concepts" from which "the path points to the rationality of science." 169 Language is not from itself able to generate science, yet it is an indispensable stage on the way thereto. Language "constitutes the only medium in which the knowledge of things can arise and progressively develop." 170

167 Ibid., p. 58. In Bosanquet's terminology, it is an "active form of totality", see above, chapter 4, p. 229.

168 E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 58.

169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.
The fundamental unity in diversity in human affairs is established by the act of naming. This harps back to Hobbes, as Collingwood notes. Following Hobbes, Collingwood says that "(f)rom being an indispensable means to the diffusion of knowledge, language has become the precondition and foundation of knowledge, so far as knowledge is science." Thus, "man becomes capable of reason because he has invented speech." Cassirer says that the act of naming is the indispensable first step and prerequired condition of the determinative act which constitutes the scientific task. He insists, consequently, that a theory of language is a necessary component in the development of epistemology.

172 Ibid., pg. 45, ppgh 6.53.
173 See E. Cassirer, The Logic of the Humanities, p. 58. Compare Collingwood, The Principles of Art pp. 264-266. A. Brunner, in his La Connaissance humaine, Paris, Aubier, (1943?), in regard to "Le problème de la connaissance; comment se pose-t-il?" (p. 7), after examining various traditional positions regarding "le point de départ de la critériologie" (p. 21, pp. 7-17) says "(n)ous prendrons notre point de départ dans un phénomène concret, réel, connu de tous les hommes, et nécessairement impliqué dans la recherche même qui nous occupe....(L)e phénomène qui nous paraît fournir, et seul fournir un point de départ, est le dialogue. La première raison de ce choix est précisément le fait que le langage est l'instrument indispensable de la vie intellectuelle et spirituelle de l'homme. Toute philosophie se constitue par l'intermédiaire du langage....En outre, le langage est un fait tellement évident que celui qui voudrait le nier, ne pourrait le faire qu'en l'employant, en s'infligeant par conséquent un démenti par son affirmation même." (pp. 22-23).
Cassirer, like Collingwood, \footnote{174 See Collingwood's \textit{The Principles of Art}, pp. 128-131; p. 275.} insists on the creative character of language. It is never a simple copy, registering only the contents and relations presented to us immediately by sensation. As creative, language is a self actualizing activity of the mind.

...language is a determinate and fundamental tendency of the mind's activity - an ensemble of psychological and intellectual acts; and it is in these acts that a new aspect of reality - the actuality of things - first discloses itself to us. \footnote{175 E. Cassirer, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 59.}

Cassirer's profound insights find striking confirmation in Louis Schökel's consideration of language in the context of biblical interpretation. Schökel attacks the naive realism of a positivistic attitude to language in underscoring the formative role that language has on our experience of reality.

...any explanation in terms of language necessarily involves a transformation of reality. Reality and our experience of it are stylized and expressed through the medium of language. Thus reality and experience are not deformed, but rather conformed through language. Language is a power which teaches us to understand and to order the world as well as to shape our own experiences. The great writers, while enriching the instrumentality of language, have likewise enriched our capacity for ordered perception. For the most part, therefore, the naive realism of language can no longer be maintained. \footnote{176 Luis Alonzo Schökel, \textit{Understanding Biblical Research}, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1963, p. 94.}
How the external, natural world is humanized in perception and given a distinctive meaning due to being humanly perceived is thus explained:

The external world confronts man and longs to be discovered. When man perceives this world, he humanizes it. This does not mean that man deforms or falsifies the world, but that their mutual relationship is actuated in a moment of plenitude, since knowing is the perfection of man and being known is the perfection of the external universe. The dawn which a man contemplates in a moment of sorrow is not the same dawn which is seen by a cow when it bellows toward the sky. Nor is the moon of which the romantic poet sings the same as the moon which prompts the dogs to bark during the night. Thus the world is humanized by our living encounters with it, and all the more so according to the intensity which we bring to this experience.177

This humanization of the world, already begun at the level of perception, is continued at the level of linguistic expression into the interpretative sphere.

These living experiences, however, possess a quality of totality or completeness and are presented to us as a formless or only half-formed continuum. It is the specific function of language to convert this continuum into discrete parts by applying a system of vocabulary, morphology, and syntax. In this way the experience is given a new and human form. This is the second stage of transformation or interpretation. It does not deform the things of the external universe, but rather gives them a human dimension.178

177 Ibid. Emphasis in original. Schökel here, and Cassirer later (see this chapter, below, p. 673) note that the stabilizing of the Heraclitean flux is already at work in perception.

178 Ibid., p. 95.
The social, interpersonal dimension essential to language contributes to the humanization and meaningful interpretation of human experience.

Further, the linguistic form by which I order my experience also has a social function, namely to communicate my interior life to other men, and thus to bring about a strictly personal encounter which is altogether superior to the mere knowledge of objects. This social and interpersonal orientation of language is an additional interpretative factor, one which raises language to all the grandeur of the human.179

Schökel notes the seriousness with which the Biblical account of man's origin treats man's activity of naming the things about him. It has something of the quality of God's creative activity exercised simply by "calling" (naming) a thing into being.

In the Garden of Paradise, man alone was able to give names to the animals. By doing this, he brought the human order into existence, an order over which he was lord and master. In this he resembled God, who went about giving names to His creatures, thus calling them into existence. Just as man is created in the image and likeness of God, so he creates the world of language according to his own image and likeness.180

179 Ibid.
180 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
The past comes down to us only as transformed by and into language but in such a way that the result is faithful to objective reality.

All language, in fact, consists in a transformation. The occurrences of the past come down to us transformed into linguistic terms, possessing a new, intermediate reality which faithfully, though inadequately, represents the objective reality. One must have this fundamental aspect of language as his point of departure if he is to go on in his study to the forms of literary language. 181

Even language itself, in metaphor, is subjected to its own transformative, meaning-giving, creative activity.

In literary language there is also another type of common transformation which can affect a word or group of words - the metaphor, the image, and the allegory. Not only is reality or experience transformed through linguistic expression, but even language itself can undergo a transformation. 182

Cassirer says that language-awareness brings with it an awakening to a life of 'meanings'. These meanings, as distinct from mere impulsive reactions, are something repeatable and recurring, not restricted to the momentary here and now but remaining "one-and-the-same in countless life-moments and in the appropriation and use of

181 Ibid., p. 96.
182 Ibid., p. 97.
countless other persons," that is, constituting a true universality and principle of intelligibility.

These two fundamentally diverse world-views, that of the natural world, and that of the moral and cultural world, with their corresponding diversities of meaning and explanation, have a common root in primary perception. To understand more clearly the nature of these two different spheres of meaning it is necessary to examine the structure of primary perception inasmuch as this concretely embodies within itself a double rationale which founds and gives rise to these two different ways of meaningfully interpreting experience. The analysis is furthermore decisive for the understanding of the nature of cultural phenomena, since it articulates very clearly the nature of cultural entities and how they arise through the creative activity of expression-perception, of which language is the primary instance. The analysis greatly illuminates Collingwood's position on the primacy of art and language in properly human activity. The diversification and complexity built up by personal, creative, expressive activity will be seen to realize the characteristics of what in chapter 4, above, was said of the concrete universal.

F. Expression-Perception and Thing-Perception.

The universality whereby particular phenomena are meaningful

183 E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 60.
and intelligible is not to be considered in isolation from its particulars. "Concepts without percepts are empty" and "the logical order must be tied throughout to the perceptual order." Consequently, "(a)nalysis of the form of concepts as such is not capable of bringing complete clarity to what specifically distinguishes the humanities from natural science." Cassirer resorts to a pre-logical phenomenology of perception to contribute to the solution of this problem.

Primitive perception is 'two-faced', fusing together two irreducibly distinct factors. Every perceptive act is that of a perceiving subject and that of a perceived object. Consequently, the world encountered in perceptual experience is a "thing", or "it", world on the one hand, and an "I" or a "you", that is a person-world, on the other hand. An "it" is something totally unlike "ourselves," totally alien, totally "the other", in no way "a self." A "you" is another that is "not totally other" for it is perceived as "another self."

184 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
185 Ibid., p. 93.
186 See Ibid., p. 93 and p. 118.
187 See Ibid., p. 93.
188 Ibid.
These two opposite characteristics, already apparent in primary perception, provide the foundation for two opposite directions in which the percipient subject can go in meaningfully elaborating and explicitating that original perceptual experience. If elaborated meaning is taken from the subjective side of perception then we are dealing with expression-perception or perception of expression. Myth-making is explanation exclusively in terms of expression perception. Thus, thunder and lightning as "meaning" that this or that god is angry is an explanation of this phenomenon in terms of personal expression-factors. The thunder and lightning are "expressions" of a personal disposition, that of anger. Theoretical explanation, on the other hand, such as is characteristic of science (and of philosophy inasmuch as it is like science) explains in terms of "objective", impersonal, "thing" factors; it seeks not only "to replace mythical explanations but to battle with and attack the whole mythical interpretation of reality at its root...which is nothing other than the perception of expression."\(^{189}\) The mythical world view gives primacy to expression-perception over "thing" perception. The scientific world view does just the opposite. The mythical world view recognizes no fixed world of cause, which, how-

\(^{189}\) Ibid., p. 94.
ever, is the very goal of all theoretical knowledge. Every feature of the experienced world can metamorphose at any time. In true Heraclitean fashion anything can give way to anything else. The world, both natural and human, is the expression of an emotion of the moment, the love or anger of a man or a god. The phenomenal world is thus a "face" which is the bearer of emotive expressions and the emotion expressed is the explanation of the phenomenon.

For (myth) the world can assume a new face at any moment; for it is the emotion of the moment which determines this facial expression. In love and hate, in hope and fear, in joy and terror the features of reality are transformed. Any one of these emotions can give rise to a God-of-the-moment in a new mythical configuration.190

The whole world of events, the natural as well as the human, is thus reduced, in meaning and explanation, to a god, a superman, or a man. Anthropomorphism interprets the happenings of nature as expressions of will, of emotions, of loves and hates, such as we have subjective and personal experience of them in ourselves. For myth, then, the phenomenal world is a face, or series of faces, which manifests the personal dispositions of their bearer.191

190 Ibid., p. 95.

191 It is a "face" not a "mask" for it expressively reveals the subject and the subjective state, whereas a mask hides and functions more as a "thing" interposed between the bearer and external observer.
Both science and philosophy collaborate in an active "endeavour to stop up the source from which myth forever takes its nourishment, by disputing every claim of the perception of expression." In opposing the mythical approach science proposes that all expression qualities in which we recognize such characteristics as the trustworthy, the friendly or the fearful, be replaced by pure sense qualities, such as colors, tones and such like. Even these are further reduced as secondary properties based on more primary properties whose essential feature is mathematical, that is, pure quantitative determination. This quantitative feature is all that remains of reality when the ideal of objectivity as sought by physics is achieved.

Within the framework of this ideal of physics, not only proofs for the existence of other selves but also the question of their existence is evacuated of all meaning. The very question itself is mythical and so not worthy of serious consideration.

The result is that the only language recognized to be subjectively meaningful is that of physics, whose meaning would be

192 E. Cassirer, op. cit., p. 95.

193 See Ibid. Correlate with Collingwood's explanation of deductive science in his Speculum Mentis, pp. 164-169. See also, above, chapter 4, pp. 114-124.

194 See E. Cassirer, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
universally translatable (into numerical pointer-readings - recall Eddington's scientific table)\(^{195}\) and would therefore be exactly the same unvariably for all (observing) subjects. The very meaning of language itself would be reduced to its physical characteristics, to phonetics and the physiology of sound. All 'meaningful expression,' as a manifestation or revelation of the psyche, the self, revealing its concerns, its loves and fears, would be put out of play.\(^{196}\) The scientific study of the domains of art, religion and all other cultural domains would fare likewise. They could not be dealt with as expressions of meaning. The holy could not be distinguished from the profane, nor the beautiful from the ugly, nor the morally approvable from the morally reprobable.

The illegitimacy of this physicalist and mathematicist reduction is that it renders impotent before it is asked the very vital question "what do these activities (i.e. linguistic, artistic, religious activities) mean?" for to ask this question is to ask what mental representation or thought or feeling do these phenomena express and manifest.\(^{197}\)


\(^{196}\) See E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 96.

\(^{197}\) See Ibid., pp. 96-97.
Cassirer concedes that physicalism does make one important contribution to the problem of understanding cultural phenomena, namely that of highlighting the important truth "that knowledge of physical things constitutes the foundation and substratum for every other construction of this kind." In the cultural world, the world of expression-meaning, "(t)here is no purely 'ideal entity'...(t)he ideal exists only insofar as it presents itself sensuously and materially in some manner and embodies itself in this presentation." Religious, linguistic and artistic meaning can be grasped only inasmuch as their embodiment in tokens, memorials, etc., constitutes the locus in which we come to know their meaning.

The cultural and historical object, a parchment, a stone monument, etc., is located in space and time and it comes to be and passes away just as does any physical object. But this physical object is recognized to have a new function other than any which is describable in terms of mere physical determinants. Something else besides the physical object emerges, and "what emerges is a 'meaning' which is not absorbed by what is merely physical, but is embodied upon and within it."
This 'meaning'-factor which arises is, according to Cassirer, what is common to that area and to its content which we recognize as "cultural." Cassirer illustrates this by pointing out that a Raphaelic painting of Plato and Aristotle includes the physical reality, such as colors, etc., through which we see the objective presentation, Plato and Aristotle in conversation. But, in addition to this objective presentation, there is also the subjective presentation of Raphael himself. Inasmuch as that painting is "a work" of Raphael it is an "expression" of himself, an expressive "face" whereby he is placed in our presence. Any genuine "work," Cassirer says, embodies all these three characteristics namely, a certain physical thereness, an object-presentation, and the evidence of a unique personality. Such a "work" is more than merely a "result", and belongs not only to the natural world but also to the world of culture.  

201 See Ibid.  

202 See Ibid., p. 99 and pp. 146-158. H.I. Marrou, in his The Meaning of History, p. 115, speaking of the Christian gospels, says that they "are not direct testimony concerning the life of Christ, but rather a primary document of incomparable value regarding the primitive Christian community. We can only approach Jesus through the image of himself that was formed by his disciples..." This means, in terms of what Cassirer has explained above, that the Christian gospels, as 'works' or 'expressions' of the first disciples of Christ, manifest immediately to us the beliefs of these first Christians, as a facial expression immediately manifests joy or sorrow. From these immediately manifested convictions we are led, mediately, to the person and teachings of Christ.
Because of its ideal of clarity and fear of becoming lost in obscurity, Positivism does not admit those three dimensions. Cassirer agrees with Positivism in that, when we compare expression-perception with thing-perception, expression-perception does seem to have an inherent extraordinary difficulty and inconceivability. But he points out that this difficulty and inconceivability does not exist for the native world view. Expression-perception is the noetic daily bread of everyday living, of our knowledge of the familiar world. No question of proofs for the existence of other selves even suggests itself and no theoretical arguments can shake it in its conviction. But the scandal Kant sought to remove "of being forced to accept the existence of external things merely on faith...becomes all the more violent when we (reflexively) turn from the question of external things to that of other subjects." But, Cassirer maintains that the testimony of that reflection cannot be regarded as the sole authority in the area of the really basic problems. Recourse must be had to sources of knowledge of a different and more original kind. The process of substantiation must be grounded on something itself not deductively demonstrable, but able only to be pointed out. Even Descartes' cogito, according to Cassirer, is no formal argument but a purely intuitive cognition.

204 Ibid., p. 100.
Phenomenological analysis does not substantiate the assumption that the entities immediately accessible to knowledge are determinate data, with the consequence that the sensuously given is alone capable of immediate experience, all else, especially spiritual existence, remaining uncertain. Neither observation of function nor of genesis justifies granting to sense perception primacy over expression-perception. The genetic account of the development of consciousness, both in the individual and in the species, shows that the supposed starting points of all knowledge of reality, the so-called sense data, are rather late products, and themselves results of lengthy processes of abstraction whereby they are extracted from the whole of human experience. From the functional point of view, unbiased psychological observation testifies to the fact that the first experiences of the child are experiences of expression. The perception of things and thing qualities comes only later. 206

It is to language primarily that Cassirer attributes the transition from expression-perception to thing perception since he maintains that capacity for objective representation grows in direct ratio as we begin to, and progress in giving linguistic expression to our experience of the world. It is by this linguistic expression that our experience of the world ceases to be merely a matter of passively

received impressions. 207

The theoretical world view, that of philosophy and science, did not begin by regarding the world as the sum total of merely physical things; "this is a terminus ad quem, not a terminus a quo - an end, not a beginning." 208 For Plato and Aristotle, the soul is the principle of motion without which the world would come to a standstill. Descartes for the first time gives us the notion of a strictly mathematical and mechanical universe. But this view is terminal, not initial, the product of abstraction. Here the innate tendency of theoretical science and philosophy to suppress the personal factor has been fully achieved. 209

Not only does it (natural science) seek increasingly to suppress all that is "personal" it strives toward a conception of the world from which the "personal" has been eliminated. It achieves its true aim only by disregarding the world of self and other. 210

Astronomy was probably the first to achieve this goal, and recent philosophy has gone further in the same direction demanding "the elimination of 'occult' psychic qualities, not only from astronomy and

207 See Ibid., p. 102. Correlate with Collingwood's The New Leviathan, p. 42, pgph. 6.26: "To name the feeling awakens... consciousness of it," and p. 43, pgph. 6.36: "The man who names his feeling thereby immediately becomes conscious of it."

208 See E. Cassirer, op.cit., pp. 102-103.

209 See Ibid., p. 103.

210 Ibid., pp. 103-104.
physics, but from all natural events." Even in biology the dominance of Vitalism has ended with life itself banished not only from the organism but from organic nature. The organism is explained by the laws of mechanics, of pressure and impact without residue or qualification.

But the true starting point for the understanding of cultural, as distinct from natural phenomena, Cassirer maintains, is the functional meaningfulness of "the self" as this is immediately manifest in the activity of language. "I" and "you" are never given as absolutes in themselves who would communicate by some process of action at a distance. "...the "I" and the "you" exist only in so far as they exist "for each other" only in so far as they stand in the functional relation of being reciprocally conditioned." Strict naturalism attempts to explain the forms of language, art and religion as a simple sum-total of individual effects. For it, language is something agreed upon by encountering individuals. But, there would be no agreement possible except in an already existing medium of speech. Society, togetherness of individuals, could not arise from a contract, since a contract is the product of individuals already united in their agreement to execute

211 Ibid., p. 104.
212 See Ibid.
213 Ibid., p. 107.
such a contract. Metaphysical theories, on the other hand, would trace language and society back to supra-personal powers such as a world-spirit. But this is to abandon scientific explanation and fall back into myth in which the cultural world is a kind of overworld working itself out in the physical world and in the lives of human beings. A critical philosophy of culture must steer a midway course, avoiding both of these extremes. The true starting point is thus indicated:

...if we no longer begin with the "I" and the "you" as two substantially separate entities, but locate them in the meeting point of that reciprocal transaction, which consummates itself in speech or any other culture-form, our perplexities dissipate. In the beginning is the act; always in the function of speech, in artistic creation, in the process of thought and inquiry there is expressed a specific activity. And only in this activity do the "I" and the "you" exist with the possibility of simultaneously distinguishing themselves from each other. They exist both within and next to each other as they preserve this unity within speech, thought and all manner of artistic expression.

For Cassirer, then, the "I" and the "you" do not exist as autonomous, atomic units externally related to each other by the external mediation of language. They exist, as "I" and as "you", only inasmuch as they communicate in linguistic discourse, that is, inasmuch as linguistic discourse relates them internally and essentially. Language

214 See Ibid., p. 108.

that is, language operative in discourse, is not some third thing falling between the two communicants, but, together with them, constitutes that concrete totality in which they are communicants. The linguistic, dialogical situation, is therefore a concrete whole in which the (multiple) participants are (no longer multiple, but) a concrete unity. So, language constitutes a concrete unity in diversity, a unity which demands the diversity of participants, and together, a diversity which demands that unity. The unity is meaningless without the diversity, and, conversely the diversity is meaningless outside the unity. That is, we have here that concrete unity in diversity which is constitutive of the concrete universal, as was explained in chapter 4, above.216

However, a difficulty presents itself at this point regarding Collingwood's understanding of the unity in diversity in linguistic discourse. On the one hand he seems to insist on the primacy of individual autonomy, and on the socially communicative function of language as being something secondary. This seems implied in the following:

In its most elementary form, language is not addressed to any audience. A child's first utterances are so completely unaddressed that one cannot even describe them as addressed to the world

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216 The point is perhaps well made by saying that not only is language something in us but equally so is it true to say that we are in our language. "We live within the words of language, the shapes of poetry and plastic art...." Ernst Cassirer, op.cit., p. 143. Emphasis in original. See also this chapter, below, pp. 676-677.
at large or to itself. The distinction between speaking to oneself, speaking to the world at large, and speaking to a particular person or group, is a later differentiation introduced into an original act which was simply the act of speaking. 217

On the other hand, in a succeeding passage, he seems to speak exactly in accordance with Cassirer's position. Thus, he says that "the child's discovery of itself as a person is also its discovery of itself as a member of a world of persons," and "as persons, they construct a new set of relations between themselves, arising out of their consciousness of themselves and one another; these are linguistic relations." 218 He then insists that my discovery of myself as a person is the discovery that I can speak, and in speaking I both speak and hear myself speaking, and "since the discovery of myself as a person is also the discovery of other persons around me, it is the discovery of speakers and hearers other than myself." 219

Cassirer says that, although it is recognizable that there is "expression of emotion" even in the animal world, this is passive and mere spontaneous reaction to environmental stimuli. But when we


218 Ibid., p. 248.

219 Ibid. Emphasis added. See also J. de Finance, Essai sur l'agir humain, Rome, Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1962, pp. 177-178, for language as primarily directed towards another and only secondarily directed towards oneself.
come to the sphere of human existence and human culture something new is encountered, for all culture-forms are active expression-forms, not mere reactions, like blushing, frowning, or doubling of the fist. They are genuine actions as distinct from mere events which play themselves out in our bodies. They are energies through the exercise of which the cultural world of language, art and religion form themselves. In addition to their sheer physical presence of which we are informed by sense experience, there is something symbolic, that is, something 'meant'.

Just as there is passive expression in animal behaviour so also there is passive speech which does not go beyond mere habit. True speech is never purely imitative but is also productive. It is only within this latent energy which becomes manifest in this productive function that the other energy called "thinking" is displayed.

The true relationship between "I" and "you" has its being in the act of sharing a common universe of discourse. It is continual daily engagement in this common language-world that gives rise to the "I-you" relationship.

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220 See E. Cassirer, The Logic of the Humanities, p. 110. This seems more or less the distinction Collingwood makes (Principles of Art, pp. 228-238) between psychic expression and linguistic expression. See appendix 1, below, pp. 774-777. See also Alan Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, p. 114.

221 See E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 112.

222 Ibid. This citation and what immediately follows, shows
The world of the "I" is never given as a finished, enduring, substantial entity, with words doing no more than transporting this givenness from one subject to another, the mere building of bridges between inner worlds of different subjects. The true relation is quite otherwise. Cassirer explains as follows:

In speech and art the individuals not only share what they already possess; it is only by virtue of this sharing process in speech and art that individuals have attained what they possess.223

This is observable in any living and meaningful conversation in which "(i)t is never simply a question of imparting information, but of statement and response."224 Thus:

In question and answer "I" and "you" must be distinguished not only that they may understand each other, but even if each is ever to know himself. Here both factors are in continual interplay. The thought of one partner is kindled by that of another. And by virtue of this interaction each constructs for himself a "shared world" of meaning within the medium of language. Wherever this medium

that Cassirer is thinking in terms of what in ch. 4 above was explained as a concrete universal. Whole and member-parts have their identity and meaning only in virtue of mutual implication and internal relation; whole mediates member-part and simultaneously member-part mediates whole. See pp.657-658 this chapter, above.

223 E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 113.

224 Ibid. Here Cassirer joins company with Collingwood's fundamental thesis of question and answer as the motor drive of knowledge as an active, self determining evolution.
fails us our own grasp becomes unsure and dubious.
All thought must prove itself in language.225

Language is therefore not merely an externalization of ourselves but, like art, also a pathway to the realization of ourselves. Consciousness and knowledge of ourselves is first achieved by its mediation. Even in a monologue, a "conversation of the soul with itself," the predominating function is division of self. In a dialogue it is reintegration that is central.

the "conversation of the soul with itself" is only possible by virtue of the fact that in the process the soul in a sense undergoes a division within itself. It must undertake both the function of speaking and that of hearing, of questioning and answering.226

This double function of division and reintegration appears also in artistic activity, in which "continual self-renewing flow of communication...the artist feels himself isolated and thrown back within

225 Ibid. This coincides with Collingwood's anti-substantialism and his understanding of spirit as active self-evolution. Not substance but action, indeed autoactivity, is the basic category of reality. It is only in the linguistic interaction situation that the selves are recognized as selves.

226 E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 114. This statement is fully in accord with Collingwood's position. In a monologue, the soul opposes itself to itself as a speaker and one spoken to, as questioner and respondent. In the monologue, dialectical opposition and subsequent reintegration takes place within the same mind by its dynamic self-differentiating, self-perfecting activity. In a dialogue the opposition of speaker and one spoken to takes place within the all embracing whole established by the very act of dialoguing itself. In both cases there is the building up of a concrete universal in terms of which the situation is intelligible.
the limits of his own ego."  The artist "continues to create, for he knows that it is only by doing so that he can discover and gain possession of his own self." The same duplexity appears in religion. The believer wants to "spurn the world and break all ties, all social realities binding man to man...(so that he) knows only himself and God and does not want to know anything else." But, at the same time, he must prove his belief in making it public. "He must communicate his belief to others, he must fill them with his own religious passion and fervor, in order to be certain of his belief." Cassirer adds that "the life of the spirit consists in this very act of severing what is whole in order that what has been severed may be even more securely united."  

Having seen the universality by which distinctively human phenomena are intelligible, we can now proceed to consider how, following Cassirer, we can distinguish cultural and historical concepts from nature concepts.

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227 Ibid., p. 115.

228 Ibid. This is the same dialectical self creative function of artistic expression as recognized by Collingwood.

229 Ibid.

230 Ibid., p. 116.
G. Distinction of Culture Concepts from Nature Concepts.

The foregoing has shown that cultural and specifically human concepts are distinguished from scientific, nature-concepts as "function" concepts from "thing" concepts. That is, the concept whereby we understand some cultural phenomenon is not the concept of a completed "thing" or characteristic thereof, but is the conception of an ongoing, self realizing activity (however static and 'thing'-like the physical conveyance - monument, parchment, etc., may appear). Thus, it is not by pointing out specific and distinguishing features that we understand the world of culture and the world of history (e.g., features that might serve to identify Baroque art or Renaissance man). When we pass from the animal to the human world all determinations undergo a change of function. The response of a man, precisely as he is a man, is the autonomous response of a self-initiating, free being, whereas the response of an animal (e.g. the cry of an animal in response to a painful stimulus) is always naturally determined and more or less

231 It is clear why dialectical thinking, which trades in this sort of concept (i.e. concrete universals), substitutes action as the basic category in place of substance. Self-creating activity is the root of meaning for this type of thought, not things (substances) having certain fixed properties, including that of acting in definite ways.
predictable. Within certain limits (man's freedom is not absolute, but conditioned, yet is nevertheless a genuine freedom), indeed by means of them, man can form a breadth and self sufficiency of movement accessible to him alone.232

The various symbolic [meaning-manifesting] forms - myth, language, art, and science (as a cultural form) - constitute the indispensable precondition for this process. They are the true media - which man himself has created - by virtue of which he has been able to separate himself from the world, and in this very separation, to bind himself all the closer to it. This feature of mediation characterizes all human knowledge. It is also distinctive and typical of all human action.233

Even plants and animals build themselves up by receiving stimuli from their environment and in a way answer (respond in their own way) to such stimuli. But their answer or response is fixed and unified, following always from the same conditions, that is, marked by deterministic response rather than by free self-initiating response. But this is radically altered the moment we find ourselves in the sphere of human actions. The change in the mode of behaviour is obvious in the

232 E. Cassirer, op.cit., pp. 73-74.

233 Ibid., p. 74. Note the dialectical separation and reintegration which is of the essence of these dynamic forms. This active self separation and self recovery is the means whereby the self acquires determination which in this case means increasing self identity.
use of tools. To invent a tool, attention has to be lifted, at least momentarily, from total immersion in the impulse and the necessity of the moment. The tool-user has to foresee some as yet unrealized but realizable goal for the attainment of which he fashions the means and orders them to the realization of that preconceived goal. Man, as \textit{homo faber} thus lives in the future. The future is already present for man acting humanly. Not that it is a present actuality, but that it is intentionally present in the agent's decision and consequent action to bring it into fully actual realization.\textsuperscript{234}

The purpose which the tool serves involves within itself a definite pre-vision. The impulse does not derive solely from the force of the present; instead, it belongs also to the future, which must be anticipated in some fashion in order to become effective in this way. This "pre-presentation" of the future characterizes all human action.\textsuperscript{235}

Cassirer says that the theoretical sphere resembles the practical in this regard. All theoretical concepts bear the character of instruments, tools fashioned for the solution of specific tasks.\textsuperscript{236}

\textsuperscript{234} E. Cassirer, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 74-75. Here we are dealing with what Robert Stover calls intelligibility deriving from careful concern for the world. See this chapter, above, pp. 587-609.

\textsuperscript{235} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 75. Concretely realizable alternatives, the objects of practical decisions and preference (Stover), presuppose the realm of the future as meaningfully recognizable, whatever problems may be raised regarding its reality-status.

\textsuperscript{236} Cassirer here reechoes Collingwood's primacy of the practical.
By tools in the practical sphere and concepts in the theoretical sphere man is able to go ahead of his experience in an anticipatory way. Instead of mere subjection to the environing world and total immersion in the facticity of brute experience, he dominates it and subordinates it, to some extent at least, to his own freely chosen goals. He is not merely situated by his situation but is able to face his situation and actively take a stand with respect to it. To know a situation as a situation, that is, to know what it means to be situated, is already to be liberated in some way from the situation; as we often say: "He has taken the situation in hand." In the choosing and realizing of self-appointed goals a man is master of himself and of his destiny.

All cultural phenomena are, thus, expressions of personal decisions, not explicable merely in terms of a deterministic, de-personalized, scientifically objectivised world. Thus, for example, the civilization of ancient Egypt is to be meaningfully appreciated inasmuch as its tombs, temples and hieroglyphs are expressions of (individual and collective) personal, self-set goals, and realizations thereof. These material entities (parchments, stone monuments, embalmed

237 All that was said earlier in this chapter regarding expression perception together with what was said in regard to careful concern for the world has to be kept in mind here and in all that follows.
corpses, etc.,) are "faces"\(^{238}\) by which the Egyptians' self-achieving dialectical activity is expressed and made manifest. Thus, for example, the concern to secure personal immortality is embodied in all their extant works. These monuments, etc., are intelligible only in reference, not merely to a future, but even to the future of a life after death. Remove this urgent concern to secure immortality in an afterlife from one's stock-in-trade of meaning-conveying factors then there would remain no way of understanding and intelligibly explaining these stone monuments and parchments other than that of the impersonal analysis of the chemist or physicist in terms of chemical substances, atoms, weights and measures, etc.

But what logical value can we find in the concepts and meanings of the cultural and historical world? The logical structure of a science is understandable when we are clear about the way in which it subsumes the particulars under the universal.\(^{239}\) Cassirer objects to the attitude which opposes the universal concepts of a natural science to the individual concepts of historical science, since the logical function of any concept is to achieve a unity of the manifold

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\(^{238}\) But see this chapter, below, pp. 687-688, for the consideration of these external physical media as also masks which hide the expression which they bear.

\(^{239}\) E. Cassirer, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 135.
a relation between individual and universal. To set either factor in isolation from the other is to destroy the synthesis aimed at by every concept. The universal must always accommodate itself to the particular, but the way in which this accommodation is achieved is what distinguishes one science from another. 240 Thus, the manner in which unity in diversity is achieved differs as "we compare the system of mathematical concepts with the empirical concepts of nature and the latter with historical concepts." 241

The simplest form of this relationship of universal to particular is the expression of the universal as the concept of law from which particular instances may be deduced. All concepts of empirical, natural science strive in some way for this ideal. 242

But the form and style concepts characteristic of the humanities do not accommodate particulars to a universal in this way. No one historical individual can be singled out as an instance of the concept "man of the Renaissance." 243

"(S)ubsumption' can never be taken here in the same sense in which we subsume a body given here and now, that is, a piece of metal,

240 Ibid.
241 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
242 Ibid., p. 136.
243 Ibid.
under the concept 'gold' after finding that it fulfills all the conditions of gold known to us." Cassirer explains the difference as follows:

When we characterize Leonardo da Vinci... Michaelangelo and Cesare Borgia as "men of the Renaissance", we do not mean to say that there is to be found in them a definite and inherently fixed distinguishing trait in which they all agree. We perceive them to be not only completely different, but even opposed. What we are asserting of them is that in spite of this opposition, perhaps just because of it, they stand to each other in a specific ideal connection: each in his own way is contributing to the making of what we call the "spirit" of the Renaissance or the civilization of the Renaissance.

Cassirer says that the universalizing unity which is striving to be expressed here is that of unity of direction not a unity of actualization.

The particular individuals belong together, not because they are alike or resemble each other, but because they are cooperating in a common task, which in contrast to the Middle Ages, we perceive to be new and to be the distinctive 'meaning' of the Renaissance.

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244 Ibid., p. 139.

245 Ibid. Compare this with Collingwood's explanation of the individual and the whole in the constitution of the concrete universal; see his Speculum Mentis, pp. 218-221. See also chapter 4, above, pp. 130-136.

246 See E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 139.

247 Ibid., pp. 139-140. Emphasis in original.
Cassirer remarks that "all concepts of style in the humanities reduce, when analysed more precisely, to such conceptions of meaning." Thus, the artistic style of a period can only be determined if we gather into a unity all its divergent and often

248 Ibid. Style concepts which characterize a definite historical period, then, in R. Stover's terminology, (see this chapter, above, pp. 587-609) are universal in terms of the unity of a common concern of some sort. The common concern of all is reflected in each individual, but each in his own way. The whole of that society is in each member in virtue of that common goal, and each member is in that whole as contributing to the achievement of the coordinated aim. The same can be said, for instance, of the concept of a collective experience such as the first World War. Thus, Luigi Sturzo, The Inner Laws of Society, New York, P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1944, pp. xviii-xix writes: "When we speak of collective experiences, we do not do so as a datum of experience specifically distinct from individual experience, but as an experience that is made in similar form at the same time and for the same reason, by a group of persons in some way bound together. Thus, that of the war of 1914 was a collective experience for whole peoples, on a wider and more general scale than had ever been known. But it was made up of innumerable personal experiences each of which was in no wise reducible to that of the other, although taken as a whole there were some outcomes for determined groups. Individual experience is relative, limited, circumscribed; so are collective experiences, so is the succession of experiences or processes. By this very fact it can take on the character now of progress now of regression, according to the points from which it is seen." (Emphasis added). Thus, if a bereaved mother wonders why her son should have died in the first World War, the answer would be to know what that war was precisely as he was related to that global event, and it to him, by intrinsic, essential relationship. His death is understandable through the intelligibility of a concrete unity (of totality) in diversity (of parts essentially diverse and essentially related to the whole) that is, in terms of the intelligibility of a concrete universal constituted ultimately by one common (care-concern) purpose diversely realized in many individuals.
patently disparate artistic expressions recognized to be expressions or manifestations of a specific "artistic will." Such expressions characterize but do not determine, for the particulars comprehended by that concept cannot be deduced from it, since there is as much dependence of it upon them as of them upon it. But there is true conceptualization here, not just intuitive description, since there is true unity in diversity. Thus, "we are dealing with a distinctive manner and direction of characterization, with a logico-intellectual activity which is sui generis."  

This distinction, between culture concepts of form and style and naturalistic, 'thing' concepts, manifests the same opposition which was encountered in the preceding analysis of perception. "It is the logical translation of a definite opposition in orientation, which as such is not encountered solely in the domain of concepts, but whose roots run deep into the subsoil of perception." Cassirer explains this further as follows:

Here conception expresses "discursively" what perception apprehends in the form of a purely

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249 I understand this to be the mutual implication that exists between form and content in dialectical thought and concrete universality.

250 E. Cassirer, op.cit., p. 140.

251 Ibid. In other words these concepts have to be taken in concrete continuity with their corresponding originating perceptual acts in order that this distinction between the concepts themselves be recognizable.
"intuitive" knowledge.... The "reality" which we apprehend in perception and direct intuition presents itself to us as a whole in which there are no abrupt separations. And yet it is both "one and twofold", for, on the one hand, we apprehend it as thing-like and, on the other hand, as "personal."252

Science and philosophy, by theoretical knowledge, seek the property-constants and law-constants as two essential features of the physical world whereby the Heraclitean flux of becoming is stabilized and the enduring distinctions discerned and an orderly cosmos re-ognized. This tendency to "fixing" is already at work in perception.253 Science is distinguished from perception in that it requires strict determination, whereas perception is merely estimative. This scientific determination involves that the "essences" of things be elaborated entirely in numerical concepts and physical and chemical constants which characterize every class of objects as things. These constants are then united through fixed functional relationships and expressed by equations which state the dependence of one magnitude on another. This is the pure way to "objective" reality by which the common (conceptual) world of things is constitutively realized.254

252 Ibid., p. 141. See also above, this chapter pp. 588-589 for Stover's statement that our everyday thinking does not distinguish the different standpoints.

253 See this chapter, above, p. 642 n 177.

254 E. Cassirer, op. cit., p. 142.
But this rigid objectivization of reality has its price. The resultant "thing-world" is inherently soulless; every reference to the "personal" experience of the ego is obliterated. Human culture is quite meaningless in such a deviscerated world. 255

But, the natural world, or cosmos, built up by scientific "thing-oriented" objectivity, is, at the same time an inter-subjective world, a world shared in common, that is, a world in which a multiplicity of subjects participate. But, likewise, the cultural world, the unity of many subjects as subjects, as expressing, jointly and severally, cares and concerns regarding the lived world, is an intersubjective world, a world in which I participate with other selves. But this participation, whereby I participate with them in the cultural world, is a different sort of participation from the participation whereby I, together with others, participate in the physical world of nature. 256 Cassirer explains this contrast as follows:

Instead of relating themselves to the selfsame spacio-temporal cosmos of things, they find and relate themselves within the medium of the various worlds (artistic, linguistic, religious, etc.) of form out of which culture comes into being. 257

255 See Ibid.

256 See Ibid., pp. 142-143.

257 Ibid., p. 142.
This seems to be the same distinction which some authors make between a "we" communion and an "I-thou" communion.

In an I-thou communion, we are, as it were, in front of the other person and we look at each other. In the "we communion", on the contrary, we look together with the other person at some object. 258

The commonly shared relationship to some third, an "it", is what constitutes participation in the natural world. The commonly shared relationship to each other, distinctive of the various cultural interactivities, is what constitutes participation in the cultural world.

This active relating of each of the selves to each of the other selves in the formation of the different cultural forms takes place already at the perceptual level, that is, at the level of expression-perception. But the expression-perception by which this is achieved is not the passive experience of expression, or perception as mere feeling (which is somewhat analogous to "impression" in the knowledge of object-things), but rather "this genuine 'synthesis' is first realized in the active exchange which we encounter directly in every verbal [act of imparting] "information"." 259


259 Ernst Cassirer, op.cit., p. 143. Square brackets in original.
Cassirer says that "(t)he constancy required for this [and hence for universality proper to the cultural area] is not that of properties or laws, but of meaning."\textsuperscript{260} He clarifies this as follows:

The more culture develops, and the more the particular areas into which it unfolds, the more richly and multifariously does this world of meanings shape itself. We live within the words of language, the shapes of poetry and plastic art, the structure of music, the framework of religious representation and religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{261}

The familiar notion of the concrete universal is once again appearing. The parts are mediated by the whole and simultaneously the whole is mediated by the parts. It is in this active, self-constituting, dialectical mediation that meanings characteristic of the human, cultural, spiritual world are created and recognized. Each member building up himself is together building up his world.

What Cassirer says here both illuminates and is illuminated by what Collingwood says in this regard in his Speculum Mentis.\textsuperscript{262}

\textsuperscript{260} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{261} Ibid. See also above, this chapter, pp. 658-659.
\textsuperscript{262} P. 248. John Wild's explicitation of the meaning of the term 'world' is quite illuminating also here. See his "Being, Meaning and the World," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XVIII (1965). On pp. 413-414 he says that "world...is a relatively recent term of Germanic origin with a temporal connotation. It is probably derived from wer (man) and ald (age), age of man.... (V)arious beings in the world are not instances of the universal concept, "World," nor are they portions of world in the sense of a collection... They are in the world rather as in a region of care, as we say that a doctor is in
We know each other only within the media of these cultural medicine, a soldier in the army, or that a kettle is in the kitchen, and a book in the study.... (The term) world is used derivatively for any ranging region of care, as the world of finance and the world of medicine. But in its strict sense, as the world, the ultimate horizon of meaning and care, it includes all such regions, and indeed, all beings, even those beyond the range of our knowledge but which we are concerned to know. In this sense the world, like being, is all inclusive, but in a different way. It includes them not as a concept 'includes' its instances, but as beings are included in a field of care. And when used in this way, the world is not a timeless, abstract universal term, but a spatio-temporal, concrete...singular term. However it is not a singular thing or collection of things. It is rather the horizon of real meaning within which any such thing or collection must occur, if it is really to be. Hence, if we consider actual usage, we find that the notion of world is quite distinct from that of being, and prior to it." Again (p. 417-418) he says: I am not in the world (as a drop of water contained in the jar). I am in it rather as in a field of care, as we say that a student is in medicine, or a salesman is in business. Similarly, I am in the world as in the widest horizon of my concern, as dwelling in it, and caring for it in a certain way.... All the beings I know, and even those I know that I do not know, are in the world.... Even beings of which I am totally ignorant are the objects of such care, namely the care to know them and find them out. This care has always been active in human history and is, in fact, its moving spring. There are now vast and conspicuous regions of industry and learning which are devoted exclusively to this care, like the research laboratories of a great university. Those engaged in such enterprises are trying to reveal things which are as yet unknown.... (T)hese beings are certainly in the world, though not as yet in any explicit version. This brings out the fact that every being in the world has some actual or potential meaning. In this horizon, beings are gathered together and separated in such ways as to bring out their real sense. This horizon, therefore, includes both the beings about which we know something, and those about which we know nothing except that we do not know .... (W)e may use the term being for things with only a minimum of meaning, just as we use the term meaning for imaginative schemes with only a minimum of being. The world is a union of the two, the field of beings actually gathered together in such a way as to make sense and to appear as what they really are.... Beings, as such, do not lie around any natural center. They simply are. There are no regions in
forms which constitute meaningful worlds. This (basically linguistic) being, and no distinct places for different things.... The world horizon may have no human center. But the beings in my version of the world lie around me, and those in the human world lie around man, and this centeredness is not arbitrary; for the germs of world meaning are found in his versions of the world. It is through him that beings are brought into meaningful relations with one another and allowed to appear as what they really are...." If this is so, the term world itself is to be understood as belonging to Stover's second type of intelligibility based on care and concern. The term care already seems to implicate the term world, and the very term 'meaning' itself would seem to be meaningless without reference to some center as agent of concern, within whose very concern, manifested by questioning, meanings arise, and a world of meaning is constituted. This notion of world has many similarities to the concrete universal discussed in chapter 4 above, in which, it will be recalled, R. Bosanquet says that a 'world' is the best illustration of what is meant by a universal. But this separation of being and meaning by Wild seems admissable if we say that to say that a thing is a being is merely to say that it is and in no way to say what it is. In other words, the essential, specifying determinant of the being of a thing, for Wild, seems extraneous to its being. But, in chapter 7, above, pp.481-485 the position was taken that the being of a thing refers not only to its active presence but also to its determinate mode of presence. That is, being is differentiated from within being itself, not by extrinsic superaddition of differences from without. Being has to account not only for the fact of the existence of each thing but also for its determinate way of existing. If this is so, then being as determinate of the being of each thing is also determinate of its meaning. And this meaning is ascertained by the abstractive capacity of intuitive reason (as explained in chapter 7, pp. 453-459 above), and expressed by the real definition which says what the thing is, or its quiddity. If this distinction between essence, or what the thing is, and its existence, is inflated into a separation, then being has to get meaning from some source other than its own determinations, from, say, presuppositions which determine the attitude of a conscious being, and therefrom the being itself, inasmuch as being is referred to the designs of a conscious and free being for its meaning. In true Kantian fashion, then, we do not know things as they have meanings in themselves, but only inasmuch as they have meanings for us.
medium operates and builds up the various cultural forms (art, religion, etc.) at a pre-scientific level beginning at the level of perception, as was explained above. We understand one another in speech without first acquiring technical knowledge of linguistics and grammar, just as we eat before acquiring a technical knowledge of dietetics. \(^\text{263}\) But this spontaneous, naive, pre-reflexive knowledge of each other soon reaches its limits and, due to strains that develop within it, demands that the work of science come in to clarify and explain it. \(^\text{264}\)

When natural science, in its penetration into the depths of cosmic space, raises itself to the knowledge of universal laws which do not differentiate between the near and the distant it becomes the master of the distant. Thus, when physical science universalizes to the extent of the universal law of gravitation its scope is the whole of cosmic space. \(^\text{265}\) It is thus extensively universalizing.

But this form of universality is out of bounds to the science of culture which cannot renounce anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. Its subject-matter is not the world as such but a particular region of it. But it strives to fully and completely penetrate this sphere defined


\(^\text{264}\) See E. Cassirer, *op.cit.*, pp. 143-144.

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by the limits of the human world. That is, it universalizes intensively, qualitatively and penetratingly, through progressively increasing determinate manifestations or expressions of the same abiding human reality. Cassirer further explains this type of universality:

Its goal is not the universality of laws; but neither is it the individuality of facts and phenomena. In contrast to both, it sets up an ideal of knowledge of its own. What it seeks to realize is the totality of the forms in which human life is realized. These forms are endlessly divergent and, yet, they are not without unified structure. For in the end it is "one and the same" human nature which meets us again and again in a thousand manifestations and in a thousand masks in the development of culture.266

This universalization of the multiplicity of cultural forms is based on the identity of the same human reality of which its various cultural forms are a manifestation and expression in an infinite variety of ways.267 This identity, that is, this 'remaining itself to and for itself' in its progressive self-determinations is not made known by watching, weighing and measuring, nor by some sort of psychological introspection or induction, but is "demonstrated", that is, manifested or expressed, only within the activity which is its very actualization and by which it is realized. A culture is meaningfully accessible to

266 Ibid., p. 144. Collingwood's Speculum Mentis can be considered as his attempt to realize the goal of this type of universality.

267 See this chapter, above, pp.636-637 for the citation from Barbara Mertz in which she well expresses this human solidarity with ourselves which we experience when we manage to penetrate to the meaning of the cultural remains of the ancient Egyptian civilization recognizing those remains as expressive of the distinctively human.
us only if we are actively involved in it. The translation of the Egyptian Rosetta Stone involved an active, vital penetration into the linguistic world of the Egyptians, that is, a forming of the translator as in some way one with the scribe, by setting up a dialogue with him, a union with him by medium of language. Egyptian culture and history thus "come alive" again in that unified, living dialogue into which the translator entered (and entered precisely by effecting it into existence) in the exercise of his translating activity. As Marrou nicely puts it 268 "if I knew Arabic as well as Massignon, the history of Arabia would also become a part of my past." A little further ahead in the same place he says what does it matter if some group of men as foreign as possible to me are not related to me by blood relationship for "if I write their history I too am descended from them henceforth," (emphasis in original) and "if I have shown that I am capable of understanding their past, it is because I feel the family relationship." The linguistic breakthrough which took place in deciphering the Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs immediately set up a dynamic, dialogical unity, a shared world, in which the expressions (surviving in and through the present parchment or monument) of the thoughts and concerns of the perhaps four thousand year old, long since dead scribe, come alive again in that

unified world constituted by language. The living, linguistic form is able actively to straddle that four thousand years of elapsed time and bring together the historian-archaeologist and the ancient scribe in one living, active dialogical unity. That linguistic form, expressed by the scribe (in stone or parchment) and possessed by the translator, is a true (formal) unity in diversity (of individuals). Language as the active unifying form operative here is not language considered analytically, as a set of grammatical rules and parts of speech such as a linguist would regard it, but language as a living, exercised activity in which expression is exercised and communication achieved. This seems to be equivalent to language in the sense of literature, a living whole, which precedes its analytic dismemberment into alphabet, dictionary meanings and grammatical rules. This also seems to correspond with what Collingwood says in his Essay on Philosophical Method where he treats "(p)hilosophy as a kind of literature," and says that "(t)he language of philosophy is therefore, as every careful reader of the great philosophers already knows, a literary language and not a technical,"

269 Pp. 199-220.

270 Ibid., p. 201.

271 Ibid., pp. 206-207.
so that "the reader of philosophical literature...is reading a language not a symbolism."\textsuperscript{272} Collingwood explains this as follows:

The duty of the philosopher as a writer is therefore to avoid the technical vocabulary proper to science, and to choose his words according to the rules of literature. His terminology must have that expressiveness, that flexibility, that dependence upon context, which are the hallmarks of a literary use of words as opposed to a technical use of symbols.\textsuperscript{273}

Language as literature has always been regarded as the vehicle of the expression of the spirit, that is, the living insights and concerns of a people which mark them with cultural and historical distinctiveness. However heavily the Egyptologist may depend on such analyses as Gardiner's \textit{Egyptian Grammar} or Champollion's techniques of decipherment of hieroglyphs, he is not yet functioning properly as a historian until he penetrates beyond this hieroglyphic symbolism to make the language hidden therein function as literature, as the vehicle of the expression of human concerns.

Man, therefore, as a linguistic being, is a unity in diversity. Dialogue, i.e., linguistic activity, is possible only within the human world and then only inasmuch as this is a world of multiplicity and diversity. Once again we may use the example of the process of cell division borrowed from the biological world to illustrate the linguistic,

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., p. 207.
\textsuperscript{273} Ibid.
dialogical question and answer activity. One single cell by its own internal dynamism is able to oppose itself to itself thus dividing itself within itself so as to repossess itself with greater and greater differentiation and self determination, so that, finally, a fully integrated, living organism results from that initial single cell. Likewise, when a man enters into dialogue with another the dialogue situation is, as it were, a single human "culture cell" which, by repeated position and opposition, by question and answer, finally ends up (although every such ending is a new beginning) in the manifestation of a more fully determined, more fully perfected humanity. But the bearer of this fulfilling determination is not abstract, objectively defined humanity, but humanity as concretely realized in the individuals who participate in it. But they are the bearers of such self-autonomous realization only by medium of their interaction one with the others, which interaction, as expressed and manifested, is nothing other than a (active dynamic) cultural form (as the form of language, the form of art, the form of religion, the form of science, etc.).

H. History as an Inquiry Proceeding According to a Logic of Question and Answer.

Robert Stover has shown the difference between the meaning and intelligibility of concepts based on careful concern for the world

274 See above, this chapter, pp. 587-609.
and of concepts based on the uniformity of behaviour observed in the natural world. John Wild elaborated\textsuperscript{275} on the nature of care, from which the meaningfulness of careful concern concepts is derived, and, in particular, clearly showed the distinctive meaning of the temporal dimensions of past, present and future in the human care-taking situation, thereby giving us an insight into historical time proper to human duration as distinct from the receptacle concept of physical time in which physical things are located. Ernst Cassirer explained\textsuperscript{276} at length the logical dimension, or properly conceptual value, of concepts based on careful concern for the world. He showed that the distinction in conceptualization, that is, in universalization, is not independent of the perceptual roots from which it arises and to which it continually refers. Expression-perception both precipitates and effects linguistic intercommunion in a dialogue situation, which dialogue situation is of the nature of a concrete universal, involving, as it does, a genuine unity in diversity in which the diversity is essential to the unity and vice versa. All cultural concepts, as concepts, that is, as logically significant, as unifying a multiplicity in thought, reduce

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{275} See above, this chapter, pp. 610-630.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{276} See above, this chapter, pp. 630-684.}
back to this *sui generis* type of universality. Whatever logic will be elaborated in the human disciplines will therefore have to be adapted in its methodology to this type of universal.

It is clear from what has been said in this chapter regarding this type of universal that it is not an abstract, stabilized object, like the universal law of gravitation in physics which enjoys a recognizability independently of its mobile instances. On the contrary, it is a concrete, active, on-going, self-developing process or (in Cassirer's term,) "function," which he (Cassirer) explicitly refers to as a process of dialogue involving question and answer. And, inasmuch as it has been shown that the historian in his proper function as a historian penetrates the world of the period or the subject or person or institution he is studying, forming with those of that time and place, a concrete living unity through dialogue, his method is one of question and answer. And this substantiates Collingwood's thesis that the logic of history is one of question and answer, and, in addition gives a deeper insight, by medium of Cassirer, into the precise nature of the concrete universal logically operative, and by medium of Robert

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277 See this chapter, above, pp.671-672.
278 See this chapter, above, pp.661-662.
279 See this chapter, above, pp.656-658 and pp.680-684.
Stover and John Wild, an insight into the properly human character of historical meaning, based, as it is, on the conceptual meaning deriving from man's free, self-creative activity and consequent careful concern for the world. Inasmuch as documents, monuments and such traces of the human past as artifacts, etc., can be made to function, by the use of historical techniques, as bearers of the expression of the interests and concerns of men of the past, Collingwood's position that history is a rethinking of past thought is correct, whatever criticism may be made of that position on other grounds. Furthermore, it is by a questioning technique that the historian is able to make these physical objects transcend their brute physicality (as stone, paper, etc.,) and function expressively, as media conveying expression meaning. In an immediate conversation of an everyday nature with one's contemporaries, the facial configurations, voice sounds, hand gestures (all of which Collingwood calls language in its widest sense) are the bearers of the expression of some sort of concern. In historical investigation a physical medium intervenes as bearer of such expressions of concern. Such a physically interposed medium functions not only as an expressive "face" but, precisely as physical, it functions also as a mask hiding the expressive manifestation. Work has to be done on the physical object

to remove the concealment function and allow full play to the manifestation function. The making of the physical object manifest the expression that it bears as something transcending its brute physicality, is the constituting of the physical object into evidence of the past human event. In crime detective jargon a physical object which does not yet manifest expressively the human interest of which it is a relic, yet suggests that, properly interpreted and understood, can be made to so function, is called a clue. A clue is turned into evidence by interrogation, either of itself, or of others functioning as witnesses.

So, to the question "Does history proceed by a distinctive logic of question and answer, as Collingwood maintains?" the answer, by way of summary of all that has been said so far in this chapter would seem to be simply "yes". But a simple "yes" would be an oversimplified reply. Certain reservations and qualifications must still be considered before a definitive answer is given. 281

It has already been mentioned 282 that Collingwood's questioning approach to his own archaeological researches was not always successful and fruitful and on certain occasions drew upon him the criticism of his colleagues. In explaining the questioning procedure in history 283 Coll-

281 See this chapter, below, p. 714 for a precise statement of the qualifications to be taken into account.


lingwood exaggerates the dominance of the questioner and the activity of questioning, as if the asking of the question is the sole active influence in the production of evidence. This is quite in accord with Collingwood's absolutizing of the activity of human consciousness, which activity, for him, is basically a questioning process.  

More soberly, H.I. Marrou, who agrees with Collingwood that the method of history is a questioning one, insists that this questioning procedure in history, as in an everyday conversation, is an attempt to get to know another as another self. The fact that "the other" is "a self" that one is trying to get to know must not be allowed to override the fact that this "self" is genuinely also "another." The ever present reduction to consciousness in Collingwood results in the correlative reduction of the "self" to the self-conscious self, culminating in absolute thought as the absolute self. There is then "only one judgment judging one truth."  

In such a context all dialogue becomes "a dialogue of the soul with itself" and any genuine otherness of another self is distorted and finally obliterated. But once one recognizes that "the self" one is in dialogue with and trying to get to know, is truly "another", one will also recognize its right, as another, to actively participate.

284 See Speculum Mentis, p. 317.
285 See Ibid., p. 80.
286 See Ibid., p. 245, and pp. 248-249.
in making its own distinctive contribution to the questioner's answers.\textsuperscript{287} The questioner has to be at least passive enough to allow the other to reply in his own right, otherwise the dialogue becomes a self sterilizing monologue.

The issue being taken with Collingwood here is that, in a postulatory,\textsuperscript{288} dogmatic way, he absolutizes the activity of human consciousness and identifies the questioning procedure with this absolutized, self-creating activity, leaving no room to recognize the contribution to the answering of questions from sources beyond the knower's questioning activity. This has already been criticized above\textsuperscript{289} in dealing with Collingwood's opposition to the realist's principle that "knowing makes no difference to what is known."\textsuperscript{290}

In this absolutization of the questioning activity of the mind in knowledge, all meaning becomes absorbed into what Robert Stover,\textsuperscript{291} has called care-for-the-world meaning. All meaning is then taken through relation to a consciousness capable of selecting from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{287} See, for example, Marrou's explanation of the development of the dialogue of the historian with the document as explained on pp. 131, et seq., of his Meaning of History.
\item \textsuperscript{289} See chapter 7 above, pp. 438-439.
\item \textsuperscript{290} See Collingwood's Autobiography, pp. 25-28.
\item \textsuperscript{291} See this chapter, above, pp. 587-609.
\end{itemize}
proposed contemplated alternatives a situation of wellbeing which the conscious subject can effectively bring about. As a consequence of this, even man's knowledge of what it is for himself to be a man becomes reduced to his knowledge of his history. Consequently, what he can do is the measure of what he is, and what he can do is determined by what he has done, that is by his past, his history. The achievements of the past create foreseeable possibilities realizable in the future. V2 rockets as achievements of Second World War science open the possibility to future realizable (and presently being realized) space travel. The alternatives for future realization are determined by "care-concern" questioning of what has been presently actualized. Man's being, taking it historically, is thus a careful and concerned questioning of past achievement with a view to alternative possibilities for the future (contained in the question according to Collingwood), the answer being the determination of the alternatives to one or another according to the estimated greater wellbeing offered by one or the other of such alternatives. This procedure of questioning the past with the view

292 See his The New Leviathan, p. 75, pgph 11.12. See also Speculum Mentis, p. 78.

293 This answers the question as to how a question contains its answer. A question contains its answer as one of a number of possible alternatives. As long as the alternatives are in the state of multiple possibility the question is an unanswered question. The answer is the determination of the multiple in possibility to one in actuality. On this point, see the illuminating article of G.F. Stout, "Truth and Falsity," Mind, XLI (1932), pp. 297-310. See especially pp. 301-302.
to its answer as the self determination of future wellbeing from specified alternative possibilities is the activity of taking one's life experience in hand, the assuming of authentic control over one's life, and the giving of meaning to one's life. But, to know one's possibilities is to know one's past, that is, as Collingwood expresses it, the measure of what man can do is what man has done as revealed to him by his history.

It is...of importance to man that he should know himself: where knowing himself means knowing not his merely personal peculiarities, the things that distinguish him from other men, but his nature as man. Knowing yourself means knowing, first, what it is to be a man; secondly knowing what it is to be the kind of man you are; and thirdly, knowing what it is to be the man you are and nobody else is. Knowing yourself means knowing what you can do, and since nobody knows what he can do until he tries, the only clue to what man can do is what man has done. The value of history, then, is that it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is.

Thus, if man is only what he does, which is what man is inasmuch as man is mind, for mind is what it does, then history

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294 For an interesting elaboration of this point see Robert Johann's *Building up the Human*, New York, Herder & Herder, 1968, especially pp. 37-53.


296 See *The New Leviathan*, pp. 5-7.

297 See *The Idea of History*, pp. 221-222.
is knowledge in the plenary sense of the word, and subordinates all
other forms (science, religion, etc.,) to itself as imperfect moments
of its plenary self. In taking this position, Collingwood is clearly
in the Vician 'Verum = Factum' tradition, by medium of Croce. When,
as noted above, Vico overturned the supremacy of Cartesian rationalism,
by reducing mathematical clarity and distinction to its alleged source
in man's productive activity, he made what man can do the measure of
what man can know, and located the source of speculative knowledge in
practical knowledge which now assumes the place of primacy, as Col­
lingwood repeatedly insists. Mathematical entities are clear and
distinct because we made them and we know what we make. Once that
position is taken, it inevitably follows that the order of the natural
world known by science is known precisely because the human productive
consciousness made that order. Theoretical science is practical in its
roots and the order previously accorded to the natural world becomes

298 See this chapter, above, pp. 634-635.
299 Ibid.
300 See the opening lines of The Prologue of Speculum Mentis,
p. 15: "All thought exists for the sake of action." See also The New
301 It is worth nothing here that the French philosopher
Maurice Blondel has elaborated a philosophy on the principle that the
speculative order is practically based. The speculative principle of
contradiction in logic is presented as having its roots in a more
more and more to be regarded as an order made by men in their practical knowledge and concern in regard to it. Collingwood's philosophy of nature is a clear instance of this. His Idea of Nature is reduced to a history of the ideas men have elaborated about the world of nature. It is a history of ideas, not an account of natural things.

But, just as Cassirer pointed out that absolutization of the object-pole of perception leads to absolutization of the "thing-ist," scientific, naturalistic type of explanation in which persons and


John Wild seems to some extent at least to be under this Vician influence. See above, this chapter for his way of expressing the primacy of the practical over the speculative. However, this is not necessarily his position but may be only his statement of the position of contemporary existentialism. But, as Cassirer well pointed out, see above, this chapter, p. 666, in order to invent a tool, attention has to be lifted, at least momentarily, from total immersion in the impulse and necessity of the moment. So the practical depends to that extent at least on the speculative.

This is pointed out by R.C. Cragg in his Ph.D. dissertation, Collingwood's Logic of Question and Answer, Toronto, University of Toronto, 1948, p. 279.

See this chapter above, pp. 649-650 and pp. 673-674.
personal concerns have no place, might it not also be the case that absolutization of the subjective pole and inflation of the personal concern type of meaning will blind one to the correct status of the natural order? If the perceptive act, following Cassirer, is to be taken as the focal point which radiates in two opposite meaningful directions, and therefore the phenomenological point of departure in assessing the validity of these two systems of meaning, the natural and the personal, it is of the utmost importance that this phenomenological investigation itself be conducted with its correct guide-questions in mind. That is, taking seriously Collingwood's advice in this matter regarding the importance of correct questioning in any investigation, we must ask whether the phenomenological description alone of the lived experience of perception is the absolute arbiter regarding the structure of perception as this is the source of two opposite systems of meaning, or whether the outcome of our phenomenological description is not perhaps in some way pre-determined by the questions with which we approach the subject asking it to give an account of itself. We are approaching the perceptive act with a specified purpose in the course of a specified investigation. The dominating guide-question with which we are approaching perception is "How is it that this fontal act of lived experiential immediacy is simultaneously the source of impersonal, thing, natural meanings and of personal, care and concern meanings?" We are approaching perception with that precise question in mind, precipitated
by our experience of the antinomy of two systems of meaning, which
question perception has to answer, and the phenomenological analysis
has to be tailored accordingly. If we were approaching it with another
question, say the question "How does perception appear as an act of
consciousness?" or the question "How does perception appear when it is
the perception of a scientist involved in behavioral observation?" its
reply would correspondingly differ. We are therefore not starting from
a mere primitive, brute experience simply to be described, but from a
question applied to an already distinctively recognizable type of
activity which has been experienced to precipitate two opposite kinds
of result. The phenomenological analysis, if it is to be meaningfully
revelative, must itself take account of its initiating guide questions,
which have their origin in the object of the inquirer's concern. The
phenomenological inquiry, like any inquiry, is a search for meaning,
and therefore presupposes the conditions under which the meaning-
searching question arises, and under which a meaningful answer will be
recognizable when found. The context giving rise to the phenomenological
analysis of perception here is our experience of perception as the
source of two opposite systems of meaning and of explaining, and our
question, resulting from that context, concerns the structure of per-
ception insofar as it has the virtuality of originating those two
meaning and explaining systems.

This being granted, might it not be the case that two worlds,
each enjoying its own proper autonomy are communicating in some way in the act of perception? Might it not be that in that *sui generis* type of act, the spiritual, subjective, interior world of consciousness is achieving some sort of unity with the physical, objective, exterior world of things. It is not merely a question of correspondence but of identity, an identity which remains consistent with a diversity of another order. Might it not be that the conscious subject, which is also a thing belonging to the natural world, precisely in that act of perception overcomes its physical duality with another physical object to enjoy an identification therewith, respecting all the while their natural, physical duality. If identity in difference is admissable in other contexts, why not here also? This at least is indicated, if not solidly established, by the fact that perception has the potential to "spectro-analyse", so to speak, and be elaborated in these two opposite ways, and has in fact been so elaborated. Might not the scientific way of explaining in terms of physical natures and things (including in this explanation the subject, not precisely and distinctively as a conscious subject but as something also found in the world of nature) be an autonomous and valid way of thinking alongside and distinct from, though not necessarily separate from, explanations of a cultural and historical sort in terms of human conscious concerns?

Robert Stover opts for a "radical pluralism" in answer

305 See his *The Nature of Historical Thinking*, p. x.
to this question. Speaking of the two ways he had distinguished of making the world intelligible, he writes:

Broadly speaking, the whole issue of universal determinism lies outside of the scheme of intelligibility of thinking from the standpoint of living in the world.... This allows for the compatability of the two schemes of intelligibility: the presumption of determinism being integral to the natural order schemes of thinking; indifference to the issue of universal determinism being an essential characteristic of the scheme of evaluation. But compatability, we must remind ourselves, is not equivalent to interrelatedness.306

What Stover calls "ordinary history" reflects this pluralism. Whereas "some historians will focus their efforts on giving natural order accounts on the plausible assumption that particular human events can be accounted for deterministically" and "others will concentrate on making judgments from the standpoint of living in the world," ordinary history "reflects the ambiguity of judgment characteristic of man's ordinary, everyday, unspecialized thinking", and "(w)hether the ordinary historian recognizes it or not, the vision of the world that moulds his work mirrors completely the pluralism painstakingly discerned and articulated through critical reflection."307

306 Ibid., p. 171.
307 Ibid., pp. 270-271.
The criticism directed against Collingwood here is that which is directed generally against those in the Vician tradition, namely that this line of thinking, dominated by the 'Verum = Factum' ideal, absorbs the natural into the historico-cultural, so that the world of nature ceases to be available to knowledge in its own right, and science as knowledge of nature is reduced to a mere subordinate member on a scale of forms, subordinated as error, to history which supersedes it, allegedly by overcoming its falsifying abstraction. The world of nature is then nothing more than the ideas which the scientific interests of a particular period of history have articulated about it. The unfolding of the natural world by science is then nothing more than a stage in man's unfolding consciousness of himself in which ultimately the idea of nature gives way to the idea of history. 308

Inasmuch as history both proceeds according to, and has as its object, human concerns and responses to human problems, it is a questioning and answer procedure. But if man is regarded solely as an active, self-determining agent, and this is precisely what history questioningly investigates, then history exercises an overriding autonomy, subordinating all else, including science, to itself. 309 Inasmuch as every science


309 If genus-species propositional thinking gives logic of the scientific type, that is, induction and deduction, an undue absoluteness (see Speculum Mentis, p. 49), might it not be equally so that absolutized 'overlap' logic accords to history an undue supremacy over science?
has its history of achievements, science can be regarded as a series of solutions to problems of personal concern to the particular scientists at particular periods of human development, and this series can be displayed meaningfully as an overlay of classes in a scale of forms. But this is not an absolute and overriding subordination of science to

310 Joseph de Finance, in his Essai sur l'agir humain, Rome, Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1962, pp. 176-177, very well illustrates how the meaning of both a human artifact, such as a watch, and a natural entity in its cultural signification, such as, for example, the sun, can be understood as a scale of forms. Regarding the latter illustration he writes: "Considérons, par exemple, le soleil. La connaissance scientifique que j'en ai ne fut possible que moyennant d'innombrables observations et calculs que d'autres ont exécutés au cours des âges et sur lesquels présentement je m'appuie. Aujourd'hui où les enfants, dès le premier éveil de leur raison, apprennent que la terre tourne, le système de Ptolémée nous paraît saugrenu et il en est de même pour d'autres théories, à présent périmées, mais considérées en leur temps comme vérités acquises: par exemple, la doctrine des quatre éléments. Mais si la rotation de la terre et maintes autres notions de ce genre se présentent maintenant comme familières et "allant de soi", c'est parce que d'autres les ont, au prix de beaucoup d'efforts et de luttes, apprivoisées, en quelque sorte, pour nous, comme furent domestiqués pour nous le chien, le bœuf et le cheval. Pour toute connaissance, si vulgaire soit-elle, nous sommes, pour la plus grande part, débiteurs des autres. Ces savoirs élémentaires, ces techniques de la vie quotidienne condensent le progrès de nombreux millénaires. Lire, écrire, compter nous semblent des opérations toute simples: tout cela cependant, comme les humbles et si longtemps immuables techniques agricoles et artisanales, a dû être conquis de haute lutte et représenter capitalisé l'acquis d'innombrables générations. Mais ce n'est pas tout. L'idée du soleil ne s'épuise ni dans la représentation vulgaire, ni dans celle que la science en fournit. Elle comporte un savoir confus de ce que le soleil est pour l'homme: pour le paysan, pour le promeneur, pour ceux qu'il écrase de sa chaleur et ceux qui saluent sa lumière comme une bénédiction, pour le poète et pour l'artiste... L'idée complète du soleil inclut le mythe de la caverne et les comparaisons des Ennéades; elle inclut les cultes solaires: Mithra,
its history, for it must allow for the equally valid subordination of
the history of science to the science of which it is the history,
inasmuch as scientific knowledge not only satisfies a question of
pressing concern but also aims at the natural world as something
enjoying some status independently of the concerned investigator and
his questions. This seems to be clear from the obvious fact that there
are books on, say, astronomy, which, notwithstanding any amount of
historical information, are properly scientific treatises dealing with
the natural, astronomical world itself. There are also books on
astronomy which are quite clearly histories of astronomy, notwith­
standing that they contain a large amount of properly scientific
information about the natural astronomical world.

The very fact of this dualism, both in our perception of
objects and in our explanations (scientific and historical) is a sign
that the two directions in which the perceptive act points (on the one
hand to a perceiving subject, whose perceptions both arise from and
result in personal cares and concerns, and, on the other hand, to a
natural world objectively present) point also to two foundations

le sol invictus etc. Ainsi, le monde où nous nous mouvons se présente
à nous comme un monde humanisé, socialisé. Notre rencontre avec lui
n'est pas une rencontre solitaire: les choses nous apparaissent en­
veloppées de signification humaine, de sorte que nous ne pouvons ni
les penser ni les nommer sans participer du même coup aux expériences,
aux intérêts, aux peines et aux joies de l'humanité."
essential to the perceptive act, the foundation of a natural world in which things, including percipient subjects, are naturally distinct, and another foundation, that of the world of conscious subjects, which, as such, and manifestly in the perceptive act are able to transcend their physical duality in the unity of the perceptual, knowing act. As Aristotle says "(t)he activity of the sensible object and that of the percipient sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains." Again, if concrete unity in diversity is an acceptable notion in other contexts, might we not also have here in perception a true unity (of the activity which is together a perceiving and a being perceived) in diversity (of man as a natural being and object-thing as likewise another natural being)?

It may be objected that this reintroduces the bogey of substantialism so odious to dialectical thought. The answer is that substantialism is rejected by that mode of thought on account of its own undue absolutization of self-unfolding activity, which absolutization in fact, is made in virtue of the equally odious process of abstraction. For self-creative activity is not only abstracted away from man, the agent of such activity, but it is then treated as if it were all that there was in man the agent. An abstraction is thus made and sub-

sequently ignored; precisely the situation in which abstraction involves error. But, opposed to this position, what man is seen to be more basic to man that what he does and is presupposed to what he does. Indeed, his actions are unfoldings and manifestations of what he is. If there is freedom in his doings there is presupposed freedom in his being. Whatever determines me to be a man at the same time constitutes me open to self-determination as regards whether I become an engineer, a carpenter or an accountant, etc. If this open possibility were not already a fact of man's being there would be no self-creative activity whereby man could take himself in hand and make something of himself. The moral order of self determination is thus built on a more fundamental order of being in which the conditions of the very possibility of acting freely and morally are already constituted.

Now, if we begin with conscious activity as the overriding absolute, then the concept of man as Dasein, man in his state of "thrown-ness", is perhaps the closest we can get to admitting the natural dimension of man's being. But, if we examine closely the implications of this notion, man as he finds himself, man in his state of "thrown-ness," are we not led to what it already supposes, namely man's natural being as something already constituted and "there" previous to critical, conscious reflection? Man "finds" himself "there" as already there

312 See chapter 7, above, pp. 464-465.
waiting to be so found. That is, he is not merely an autonomous consciousness but also a natural being. Collingwood's reticence regarding the existence of objects of feeling and regarding the activity or passivity of feeling has at least the suggestion of dishonesty about it; one almost feels that the prejudice against admitting a 'thing' world, which feeling comes up against and experiences a passivity thereto, stifles the asking of the question even before any attempt to answer it can be made. Dr. Johnson's response to Berkeley, by simply kicking the stone, seems much more honest and convincing in this regard.

But, is man in fact absolutized activity, or rather, do we not find men as both acting subjects and things who exercise their activity? Cassirer has insisted that the "I" and the "you" perceived in dialogue are constituted by the dialogical activity, as poles thereof. But, does the dialogue constitute the dialecticians simply and absolutely, or does it not rather presuppose them in a primordial way such that if there is no one already there to dialogue there is no dialogue? It is not denied that the self constructed personalities of the dialecticians are constructed only in the dialectical communication when it is asserted that these self constructing personalities, and their self

313 See Collingwood's The New Leviathan, p. 28 and p. 31.
314 See this chapter, above, pp. 656-658.
constructing communication, presuppose their constitution as natural members "of a natural world." It is submitted that the "I" and the "you" who communicate in dialogue are possibly not manifested to themselves except in and through the mediation of that communicating activity, but to admit that is not the same as to say that what that activity manifests is nothing more than the parties as constituted by that activity. It is submitted that what that activity manifests to the involved parties is precisely their distinct autonomy as things and as subjects, which distinctness they enjoy as a very precondition of that unifying dialogical activity. Cassirer in this respect, like Collingwood, is in the 'Verum = Factum' Vician line of thinking, so that, since a man knows only what he purposefully makes, the self he knows through self knowledge is nothing other than the self he makes, and the making of the self is in dialogical communication. But, discarding the commitment one makes as soon as one accepts the Vician principle 'Verum = Factum' as a presupposition, what is the true disclosure of the dialogical interaction situation? Does it not disclose two individual agents, two in what they are even if brought into a communicating unity by what they do? Just as the activity of sexual

315 This statement is not to be taken as if to imply that they are merely material entities, but that they are members of a world found to exist as preceding any human activity. See this chapter, below, pp. 706 et seq.
intercourse is one act done presupposing a duality of agents in the unity of that action so also does the activity of dialogue presuppose a dimension of being in which the dialoguing agents are not one but two. Notwithstanding that they are one in their dialoguing activity they are two in what they are, that is, as things which are, prior to, and as a precondition of, their unifying activity. Their individual duality may not be disclosed to them prior to their activity in dialogue, but they have to be and to be as two and to be as things-able-to-dialogue (unlike being a stone) before that self revelational activity takes place. Simply, this is to assert that, besides being dialogical, self-constituting beings, they are also natural beings. Prior to any of his actions, of consciousness, of artistic production, or whatever one will, and indeed as a determining condition of the existence of any of these distinctively human activities, man is found to have a well defined structure in his being and in his mode of acting. To say this is to say, in Aristotelian terms, that man exists 'by nature.' Distinguishing those things which exist 'by nature' from those which exist otherwise than by nature, Aristotle says that what characterizes them is that "each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness."316 Thus a bed and a coat, as such, are not natural, since, as

316 See his Physics, Bk. 2, ch 1, 192b 10-15.
such, they exist only as a result of human production.\textsuperscript{317} Furthermore, as such, that is, as artistic products as distinct from beings 'from nature,' they have no innate principle within them, "no innate impulse to change."\textsuperscript{318} Beings which are distinctively natural have a way of acting which has its reason within the acting being itself. Thus "man is born from man, but not bed from bed. This is why people say that the figure (of a bed) is not the nature of a bed, but the wood is - if the bed sprouted not a bed but wood would come up."\textsuperscript{319} Beds do not exist in the natural world but only in the human, cultural world, resulting from human transformation. But wood does so exist, and in the manner in which it is found prior to any human tampering, it has very definite inbuilt principles of acting. In trees, in which wood is found 'in nature', there is the capacity to grow and generate its own kind. Likewise in regard to man. There is a well defined region of his being which did not result from his own self development. He is already, in what he innately is, distinguished from the non human world. That some things exist 'by nature' "it would be absurd to try to prove; for it is obvious that there are many things of this kind, and to prove what is obvious by what is not is the mark of a man who is unable to

\textsuperscript{317} Ibid., 10-20.
\textsuperscript{318} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., 193b 5-15.
distinguish what is self evident from what is not."\textsuperscript{320} It is likewise obvious that man bears the marks of existing 'by nature' as well as existing 'by his own ingenuity.' That is, besides being a member of the cultural world, the world which results from man's free disposition of things, he also exists as a member of the natural world, the world which preexists all human cultivation and development. Man is 'by nature' intelligent and 'by nature' free. His intellectual and free activities come from inbuilt principles which enable him to so act, which principles precede him in an absolute way, as in no way resulting from his disposition of himself, but utterly presupposed to the very possibility of his activity of self dispositioning.

This in no way weakens the thesis that history is a human activity in which the historian, or if one prefers, man as historian, enters into active communication with past human beings and their thoughts and concerns, and, in so doing, moulds himself up into what he is. In fact, it enables us to maintain this thesis without the tortuous difficulties which Collingwood tried to solve by his theory of incapsulation\textsuperscript{321} that is, the problem as to how the same activity of thinking could be in a past historical figure and in the present historian's mind.

\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., 193a 1-10.

\textsuperscript{321} See his Autobiography, pp. 112-114. See also chapter 6, above, pp. 365 et seq.
There is no problem if the two (that is, the past and present) thinkers have some identity other than their activities of thinking and thought communication, that is, if the thinker and the thought he thinks are not entirely the same.

If the absolute in being is self-conscious, self-creative activity, then man is simply his history, and history as the story of what human consciousness has made of itself is the absolute in knowledge. But, if man is something more than self-conscious, self-creative activity, then there is room for other disciplines than history to make their own autonomous contribution to answering the question "What is man?" Man, as a natural being for instance can be investigated as something found at the terminal of a long period of biological evolution. His evolution to his place in the natural world is part of the explanation of what he is. Thus, H.I. Marrou distinguishes "between... two pasts of mankind," one pertaining "to biological evolution" and "the other to history." The prehistorian not only "examines the remains of human skeletons, analyses their physical characteristics,... concentrates...on the size of the cranial brainpan or the erect posture," which pertains to palaeontology, he also "studies objects that bear the marks or traces of man's voluntary action..." which "pertains to

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Self-consciousness, then, can be seen as something man has in addition to many other things which he has but of which perhaps he may never become conscious. It is by his activities of thinking and caring that he exercises self-conscious, self-creative activity, but he does not actively endow himself with the very ability to do these actions, rather he finds himself endowed with them. It is not by my free, self determining activity that I am able to act freely. If freedom were not something already in what I find that I am I could never take myself in hand in the exercise of free, self-determining activity. Man is free inasmuch as he is not fully determined to being one kind of thing, but is open, in what he is, to alternative possibilities. But he is not free about this that he is so open; as Sartre says man is condemned to freedom. But to call this openness a condemnation seems to suggest expression of displeasure and the will to punish, in a Platonic fashion, on the part of some personal being, and thus savors of myth-making. Is it not more in harmony with the facts of our experience of ourselves and of other human beings to say that man is 'by nature' free; that inasmuch as he belongs to the world of things which (as Aristotle says) exist 'by nature', as having within them

323 Ibid., pp. 36-37. See also ibid., pp. 43-45.
predetermined principles of acting, he is 'naturally', that is, un-freely, determinately (although not by condemnation, as Sartre says) endowed with the ability to assess his situation, make decisions and take his situation, his "thrown-ness", in hand. All this can be simply summarized by saying that Collingwood’s assertion that "man is what he does", understood, as it is by Collingwood, in an absolutized care-meaning context, has to be modified so as to allow also that "what a man does supposes what he is," which assertion recognizes man's membership in the world of things which exist 'by nature.' Inasmuch as man is a historical being he is what he makes of himself by his freedom. Inasmuch as he is a natural being he acts determinately, as his nature so determines him to act. And one of the ways his nature determines him to act is to act freely.

Ainsi la spontanéité de l'esprit n'est pas absolue. La science est bien une construction de l'esprit. C'est une construction partiellement au moins dirigée du dehors. Les choses sont compréhensibles, ce qui était pour Einstein, la plus incompréhensible des choses. Le progrès dans la connaissance de l'univers et de ses lois vérifie à sa manière la vieille thèse métaphysique de l'intelligibilité de l'être.324

If, consequently, we follow Cassirer and take perception as

the phenomenological point of departure in the analysis of the source of the two orders of meaning, are we in fact faced with an either/or situation; either objective, physical, natural, deterministic explanation, in which the subject of concern is obliterated by being absorbed into the natural, or subjective, personalist, spiritual, free, self-determining explanation in which the objective is merely a concern of the subject? It is submitted that the evidence of perception justifies the validity of both types of explanation, and that the inability of one or the other type of explanation to deal adequately with all areas of experience in supplying a rational account of experience is a warning against the validity of such a reduction. Science bears on the natural world as its object, and bears on it according to its determinate characteristics without however appropriating to itself the natural world as its own exclusive object. For philosophy also bears on the natural world, as also on the cultural world. Science bears on the natural world according to the determinate observable and measurable relations found therein, which it expresses as 'the laws of nature.' Philosophy, on the other hand, inquires as to the mode of being of that which exists 'by nature.'

325 Science, therefore, should

325 The point made here is that the natural world and the scientific world are not synonymous, as if thinking scientifically about an object is what entitles it to be called 'natural.' This latter position seems to be that of Collingwood. Thus, in The New Leviathan,
not attempt to impose its method of objectivising and proceeding: on
history, nor should history attempt to foist its way of objectivising
and proceeding onto science. Each discipline may borrow the methods
of the other, as Robert Stover showed, but each should honestly
recognize that the borrowing is in fact, a borrowing, and that what is
borrowed belongs to the other discipline by right. The Michelson-
Morley experiment in physics can be regarded from the point of view of
answering the question which manifested the personal interests and
concerns of the physicists involved. Explained in that way, that

p. 7, pgph. 1.83, he says: "Man as body is whatever the sciences of
body say that he is (emphasis in original), whereas (1.84) "Man as
mind is whatever he is conscious of being." Again, in Speculum Mentis,
p. 167, he says "Mathematics, mechanism and materialism are the three
marks of all science, a triad of which none can be separated from the
others, since in fact they all follow from the original act by which the
scientific consciousness comes into being, namely, the assertion of the
abstract concept. They are all, it may be said, products of the
classificatory frame of mind..." (Emphasis added). The notion of the
naturality of a thing as constituted by an inbuilt source of determinate
activity is foreign to the modern mentality dominated by the Cartesian
identification of the natural world with externality, understood
spatially in terms solely of extension. Kant's subsequent understanding
of the natural world as constituted by the a priori form of space,
followed by the Hegelian reduction of the 'given' characteristic of
experience to an activity of the mind which gives its object to itself,
eventually leads as in Collingwood, to the identification of the natural
with the 'spatial,' that is, that which is given according to the mode
of externality, and which is thus given by and in the mind thinking
scientifically. Such a reduction, widespread in modern thought, evacuates
from a natural world its very naturality, namely, that it is an auto-
nomous possessor of its own source of acting in a definite way.

326 See this chapter, above, pp.591-592.
experiment has its place in the history of physics and in the un­
folding of man's thinking about the world. Or, the answer which that 
same experiment supplied can be regarded also as a proposition which 
says something about the natural world. Thus taken, that experiment 
belongs to the domain of physics, not merely to the history of physics.

From this we can draw the conclusion which, in essence, is 
the necessary modification which must be borne in mind in agreeing 
with Collingwood that the method of history is one of questioning. 327
When propositions which are answers to questions are taken precisely 
as answers to questions they are taken precisely as satisfying some 
personal need or concern in a care-meaning context. But when these 
answers are taken, not precisely as answers, but precisely as propos­
itions, they are taken precisely as statements which say something 
about the natural world, and their meaning is therefore that of the 
natural order type. Collingwood strives to suppress the propositional 
character which bears natural order meaning to inflate and absolutize 
the answering character, which is the bearer of careful-concern meaning. 
This statement summarizes in a nutshell the core critique against the 
whole Collingwoodian enterprise.

One final point may be made which helps to drive home the 
above conclusion. Ernst Cassirer noted 328 that natural science, by its

327 See this chapter, above, p. 688.
328 See this chapter, above, p. 679.
manner of conceiving, extends itself to the whole of cosmic space, whereas, due to their way of universalizing, the cultural sciences, including history, are confined to a small region of that domain, namely the human region.  But this implies that man is a distinguishable part of that cosmic whole, capable of being recognized by defining characteristics, which presupposes genus-species logic. Thus, Dr. Leakey, looking for evidences of prehistoric man in East Africa, had to be able to recognize what were properly human artifacts from what was the result of natural forces. Man's conscious reappropriation of the cosmic totality within himself, and ability to bend it to his own satisfaction, is conditioned by, and presupposes his location as one among others forming part of the natural cosmic whole. Man is thus naturally a part of the whole before the whole becomes consciously part of man through man's investigative activity. The delineation of the area of self-creative, dialectical activity manifesting itself as a scale of forms in an overlap of classes thus supposes the availability of genus-species logic capable of recognizing man as specifically distinct from all other natural entities in the cosmos. Thus, even though the dialectical logic of the active self creating concrete universal may

329 See his Logic of the Humanities, p. 144.

locate genus-species thinking as a self transcended part within itself, nevertheless the very process itself is attached to the being of man which requires distinguishing him as a species from other species in the cosmos with whom he would be contained under some common genus. Thus there is mutual superiority and mutual subordination of one way of proceeding with respect to the other depending upon the standpoint from which one operates, namely, the scientific point of view\textsuperscript{331} or the historical point of view.

\textsuperscript{331} Or more widely than in Stover's perspective, the natural point of view, that is, the point of view which visualises a thing in its determinate mode of being, whether objectivised scientifically in terms of laws of nature, which consist in universal and necessary correlations of observable and measurable phenomena, or visualized philosophically, in terms of the mode of being involved in that which acts in a determinate way. The opposition Stover recognizes is that between the predetermined and the self determining. Stover restricts his inquiry to the predetermined as scientifically investigated.
THE LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER

AND

ITS RELEVANCE TO HISTORICAL THOUGHT

ACCORDING TO

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by

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A. Summary of Foregoing.

The foregoing has presented Collingwood's call for the development of a hitherto neglected logic of questioning which he alleges to be the logical procedure proper to history (chapter one). Chapter two investigated Collingwood's identification of knowledge with the activity of asking and answering questions, in which he takes the distinctive position that the meaning of any proposition can only be known in relation to the question which the proposition is intended to be the answer. This, in consequence, involved him in also taking the distinctive position that all statements are essentially historical in meaning, since every question (to which propositions are relative as regards their meaning) is asked by a definite person in a definite context of time, place and circumstances.

Chapter three investigated the suppositional character essential to the activity of questioning according to Collingwood. Questioning as supposing is important for Collingwood since it is this characteristic that marks knowledge as an activity, as distinct from the mere co-presence of the mind with an already given object simply to be contemplated. In the supposal of questioning, the mind takes an active stand with respect to its objects, and is able to consider the non-existent, the "supposed." Since Collingwood identifies this
particular feature of questioning with artistic activity it was necessary to examine Collingwood's position on the nature of art and its relevance to the questioning process which consists in this that in questioning as supposal the mind exercises its creative initiative in knowledge as distinct from mere contemplative co-presence with a datum, as Positivists maintain (this latter consideration being deferred to appendix one).

The key logical entity in Collingwood's proposed question and answer logic was shown, in chapter four, to be that of the concrete universal, which is the principle of concrete unity in diversity in history and "the daily bread of every historian" in contradistinction from the abstract universal, which is the principle of intelligibility in mathematical deduction and scientific induction. Whereas the abstract universal is the principle of genus-species, propositional logic most apt for scientific thought, the concrete universal is necessary for concrete, historical thinking, which, according to Collingwood, alone could provide mankind with the intellectual instrument for the harmonious management of human affairs. The application of Renaissance science to the solution of human problems had resulted in the sundering of the various life forms art, religion, science, history and philosophy, and Collingwood sought, through history and its properly human logic, to bring about a rapprochement of the now departmentalized human affairs which had culminated in the disaster of the first World
War. Collingwood's concrete question and answer logic was thus shown to be his answer to the problem of human ills as he saw them to flow from the practice of treating human affairs with the methods of science which are properly applicable only to the natural external world.

Chapter five exposed Collingwood's theory that relevant questions arise from historically determined presuppositions. According to him, Metaphysics is really the historical study of the absolute presuppositions which determine the relevant questions of this or that particular historical period. Whereas relative presuppositions are answers to previous questions, absolute presuppositions, which ultimately condition the meaning of all questions and their answers, are statements which are made not in answer to any question but are catalytic tools which the mind forms out of itself in order to question experience and thereby convert it into the experience of a rational being. They are simply presupposed for the purpose of interrogation.

Chapter six then dealt with Collingwood's theory of mind as the ultimate basis of all that is, and his position that mind is not a thing, or substance, but self-activating and self-creating activity. The totality of that which is, or reality, is thus understandable as reduced to the dialectical self-creativity of mind becoming progressively conscious of itself through the raising and solving of problems.

The remaining three previous chapters (seven, eight and nine) attempted to critically evaluate the various main aspects of Collingwood's
thought on the logic of questioning. Chapters seven and eight con-
cluded that although Collingwood was right in recognizing that pro-
positions have a distinctive meaning in the concrete situation in which
they function as answers to questions, he was wrong in denying that
they have a meaning in themselves distinct from their function as
answers to questions.

Chapter eight took Collingwood to task for neglecting to
recognize an already well developed logic of questioning in Aristotle.
In terms of the Aristotelian logic of questioning, Collingwood's theory
of knowledge as question and answer was criticized as being the result
of disorderly interrogation.

Chapter nine investigated Collingwood's claim that history
proceeded by a distinctive logic of questioning, and concluded by
agreeing that such a logic proper to history does exist. This chapter
also showed precisely how historical meaningfulness differs from
scientific meaningfulness, namely, that whereas science looks at the
world as intelligible in terms of impersonal deterministic laws, the
historian looks at events in their relation to human, free causality,
in which there is self determination of alternative possibilities.
When a proposition is taken precisely as an answer to a definite question,
it is taken precisely in relation to human freedom and its projects
and concerns, which the question articulates.
B. General Conclusion Regarding Collingwood's Logic of Question and Answer.

The conclusion of chapter nine, above, that history does in fact proceed, as Collingwood says, according to a logical method of question and answer, is also the answer to one of the basic questions which has dominated this whole investigation, namely, whether Collingwood's allegation of the existence of such an undeveloped logic is to be admitted.

Having agreed on this basic point with Collingwood, subject to the important reservations made in chapter nine in which Collingwood's undue subordination of induction and deduction to historical methodology was rejected, the second basic concern which has dominated this whole inquiry becomes relevant, namely, what can be said regarding the nature, structure and modes of procedure of this interrogative logic?

All that can be said in this regard, as far as the preceding investigation warrants, is that the rationale, or basis which gives the concrete inquiry of history (and of science precisely in its historical dimension, that is, precisely in its function of discovery and research, as distinct from its codification into established principles and laws) is the concrete universal which has been shown (in chapter four above) to have the character of an overlap of classes in a scale of forms in dialectical development, and (in chapter nine) to be constituted by a linguistic unity in diversity, a unity in diversity
of human consciousness in linguistic dialogue.

But, if this linguistic unity in diversity is the logical principle, the one in the many, at the basis of history and of research, what can be said regarding its principles.

Such an investigation would involve considerable research in its own right, and could scarcely be given adequate treatment in a mere concluding chapter. But an attempt is made, in appendix two, below, to give some idea of the direction in which such a research could be pursued. The principal authority followed is Michael Polanyi, whose main concern is with the logic of scientific discovery. Since the research and discovery aspect of science is properly historical, what Polanyi says is easily adaptable in giving an at least prima facie outline of the logic of interrogation.

C. Final Remarks: Collingwood's Contribution to the History of Philosophy.

The history of philosophy has provided us many times with visual aids disclosing the forms which philosophy takes when it takes its cue and inspiration from other disciplines. Pythagoras, Descartes and Spinoza show us philosophy under the spell of mathematics and its ideals and methods. The ancient atomists, Kant and A.J. Ayer show us philosophy dominated by one or other of the ideals of physical science. Bergson illustrates philosophy as elaborated from the view of evolutionary biology, and, apparently, to some extent at least, so does Aristotle,
who, according to E. Gilson, "exaggerated the scope of one science (biology) and the value of its method to the detriment of others,\(^1\) when "(c)omitting the opposite mistake to that of Descartes, Aristotle sets up biological method as a physical method."\(^2\) Gilson says that thus

> to biologize the inorganic as he and the mediaeval philosophers did was to condemn oneself to ignorance about those sciences of the inorganic world whose present popularity comes chiefly from the inexhaustible fertility which they display in things practical.\(^3\)

With Collingwood, following in the wake of Hegel and Croce, philosophy is presented to us as dominated by the thought patterns and modes of procedure proper to history, in which the explanation of the world of experience is in terms of an active striving of the conscious self in the overcoming of obstructions. If "in the cult of antinomies in modern philosophy...Kant comes up against them" and "Hegel lives by them"\(^4\) I think one may say that Collingwood in his theory of questioning, completely radicalizes them. In presenting us with this living, historically based philosophy, Collingwood has rendered a service to philo-

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2 Ibid., p. 72.
3 Ibid., p. 73.
4 Ibid., p. 68.
We can look at this living example, appraise its strengths, criticise its weaknesses and disengage its genuine contribution to the perennial philosophy.

Collingwood's most outstanding contribution to philosophy is perhaps his highlighting of philosophy in its multifarious forms as answers to pressing questions, an aspect of philosophy consistently overlooked, yet of the highest importance for the full understanding of any particular philosophy and indeed for that whole which is philosophy itself. Thus, Aristotle's hylomorphic theory is scarcely intelligible if it is not viewed against the background of problems grappled with by Parmenides, Heraclitus, the ancient Atomists, Pythagoras and Plato. His theory not only speaks to us about the changing world of experience, but also answers a definite question which was a matter of urgent personal concern in Aristotle's mind which arose as a result of his inheritance from his forerunners.

The philosophy of the future will have to reckon with Collingwood's contribution, and will perhaps show a greater concern for the dependence which philosophy or science, or any discipline for that matter, has upon its own history.
APPENDIX ONE

THE NATURE OF SUPPOSAL
AS AN ACTIVITY OF IMAGINATION

At the conclusion of chapter three, above, the treatment of supposal as imaginative activity, or artistic activity, was deferred to an appendix. This treatment is now to be taken up here.

Collingwood investigates the nature of the imagination in his 1938 publication The Principles of Art, which, as the title indicates, aims to answer the question "What is Art?" The imagination is, therefore, dealt with in that work inasmuch as its activity is an integral element in the answer to that question. The question, however, which is of relevance here is "What is the imagination inasmuch as imaginative activity is supposal or questioning?" Thus, a somewhat different viewpoint will be taken in this textual analysis of that work than the one adopted by the work itself.

Three main points will be the focus of attention of the present inquiry. Firstly, the imagination will be considered as the activity by which the objective order is most fundamentally constituted. By this activity the fleeting present here-and-now actuality of feeling, in which, previous to reflection, subject and object are indistinguishably blended, is primarily converted into a recognizable object for a conscious subject, and therefore the activity in which the subject-object dichotomy required for consciousness and thought is first established. That is, the activity of imagining is the activity in which
the conscious subject actively disengages itself from that which it opposes to itself as its object. The very possibility of meaningfully recognizing the present fleeting moment of actual experience as something having a past, and as pointing towards an as yet unrealized but realizable future, depends upon this fundamental objectivizing function of imagination as a presupposition thereof.¹ The work of thought in all its forms and at all its levels is to convert merely felt experience into the intelligible experience of a rational being. Foundational to this, and a presupposition of any explanation and mediation, is the objectivization of the actuality of present experience, the transformation of it from merely felt actuality to objectivity. This is basically the

¹ "The real is present, conceived not as a mathematical point between the present and the past, but as the union of the present and the past in a duration or permanence that is at the same time change: the possible parting with its unnecessariness and the necessary parting with its impossibility in an actuality which is at once possible [because open to an undetermined future] and necessary [because brought to actuality by a determined past], not (like the abstract mathematical point) neither. Within this present there are, as really as you like, two elements (necessity and possibility), each of which, taken singly or in isolation, characterizes a being which is not real but ideal - the past and future respectively. Thus the past as past and the future as future do not exist at all, but are purely ideal; the past as living in the present and the future as germinating in the present are wholly real and indeed are just the present itself. It is because of the presence of these two elements in the present...that the present is a concrete and changing reality and not an empty mathematical point." R.G. Collingwood, "Some Perplexities about Time," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol XXVI (1925-1926), p. 149. For a further consideration of the necessity of the past and the contingency of the future see Dominique Parodi, "Nécessité et contingence en histoire," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, LIV (1949), pp. 273-279.
work of the imagination.² It provides the primary instance of the recognition of an 'other' and the presupposition of all subsequent recognition of an 'other,' and, therefore, of all subsequent relating activity of thought, and of all subsequent disengagement from, and transcendence over, immediacy, and of the very possibility of establishing the alternatives which are a prerequisite condition for the activity of questioning. Imagining, as an objectivizing disengagement from actuality but yet as ordered back to the actuality of experience, is the activity of supposing, an essential constituent of the activity of questioning, according to Collingwood.

Secondly, imagination as expression correlates the theoretical aspect of knowledge, the apprehension of unity in diversity, with the dynamism of appetite, which is the forward strive of the mind which constitutes the open possibilities of the future and is not really distinct from the activity of questioning dynamically considered, that is, as the cutting edge of the mind in action.

² What Bosanquet says in his The Principle of Individuality and Value, pp. 57-58, well indicates this objectivizing function of the imagination: "...a work of art...is an object in which we can realize what the Greeks meant by Theoria. In its essence, as a thing of beauty, and neglecting its aspect as a physical object or movement, it is self-contained and a true whole, possessing its significance in itself, and not driving our thought beyond it to a detached meaning and explanation. Every point in it carries the burden, or lives with the life of the whole."
Thirdly, imaginative expression, as language, is concerned precisely with the process of the objectivizing of feeling, the very constituting of feeling into an object of imagination, that is, an idea. Language is the expressed embodiment of objective, therefore actually achieved, consciousness, which thus acquires the determinate characteristic of a past. Furthermore, as linguistically expressed, what is expressed is available not only to the speaker, but publicly. "In speech and art the individuals not only share what they already possess; it is only by virtue of this sharing process in speech and art that individuals have attained what they possess."  

The structure of the content of this appendix follows generally the order in which it appears in Collingwood's *The Principles of Art*. Section A exposes Collingwood's distinction between thinking, feeling and imagining. Section B deals with the problem of distinguishing imagination from sensation and section C with Collingwood's identification of the imagination with consciousness in its wide sense and with the distinction of imagination from thought in the strict sense of intellectual thought. Section D outlines Collingwood's summary of his general theory of the imagination, and section E presents Collingwood's theory of art as expression, and specifically with linguistic expression as the basic form of art.

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A. Imagination, Thinking and Feeling Distinguished.

Collingwood first appeals to the commonly recognized distinction between thinking and feeling. Whereas in our experience of feeling there is the experience of a perpetual flux, in that of thinking there is the experience of a genuine recurrence of something; something is recognized to stand firm amidst the flux, somewhat in the same way that in the flow of a river at least the soil and the rocks in which the river is channelled are recognized to stand firm, at least in relation to the flow of the water. In order that something be an object in the most minimal sense of the term it is necessary that it be taken out of the condition of radical flux. If feeling is to be an object, the flux which characterizes it in its own right has to be stabilized in some way.  

Collingwood distinguishes two recognizably distinct kinds of feeling. First there is the kind we refer to when we say we feel hot or cold, hard or soft. Then there is the kind we refer to when we say we feel pleasure, pain, anger or fear, etc. He accepts established custom in calling the first type sensations and the second type emotions.

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5 I understand this to mean that pure feeling as such would be too fleeting to be taken hold of and dealt with in any way; it could not be said to possess a recognizable identity, and would thus defy objectivization.
In our experience, every sensation has its corresponding distinctive emotional charge associated with it, or more correctly, with its object, its sensum, or that which is sensed as distinct from the act of sensing it. 6

From our experience of it "feeling appears to arise in us independently of all thinking, in a part of our nature which exists and functions below the level of thought and...unaffected by it." 7 This sensuous-emotional nature which we have as feeling-creatures, and independent of our thinking nature as rational creatures, constituting a level of experience below that of thought, presents itself as something basic, a foundation upon which the rational part is superstructured. This level of awareness, at which we merely feel, Collingwood calls the psychical level, which he says is the proper domain of the science of psychology.

Thought presents itself in our experience under two forms. Its primary form is exclusively occupied with its substratum of feeling, which gives to it (thought) its sole and universal subject-matter. When we think 'I am tired', or 'It is a hot day' or 'There is a patch of blue', we are thinking about our feelings.


...our experience of the world...the 'world of nature'...is an experience partly sensuous (strictly sensuous-emotional) and partly intellectual: sense being concerned with the colours we see, the sounds we hear, and so forth; and thought, with the relations between these things. 8

But, in its secondary form, thought thinks not about feelings and the relations between these, but rather about our thoughts themselves.

The propositions asserted by thought in this secondary form may be indifferently described as affirming relations between one act of thinking and another, or between one thing we think and another...9

Collingwood says that the distinction of first order thought from second order thought is the same as the traditional distinction of understanding from reason, or of science from philosophy.

The problem of imagination, or the question to which the imagination is the answer, arises in connection with thought in its primary function, namely as thought is concerned with the relations between sensa. This question arises in regard to the very possibility of making comparisons and establishing relationships between sensa, and when we say 'this is blue,' 'that is red,' and 'this blue is bluer than that blue.' To say that it is hotter now than a moment, or a minute, or an hour ago, implies that we have some means of comparing the presently

8 Ibid., p. 166. See also The New Leviathan, p. 16, pp. 3.54 and 3.6 for 'feeling' as one of the traditional meanings of the term 'body'.

felt sensum with the sensum felt a moment, or a minute, or an hour ago. But the sensum of a moment, or a minute, or an hour ago is no longer present, having since been carried away by the flux of sensation. The flux of sense seems to destroy any sensum before it has lasted long enough to permit its relations with other sensa to be studied. So called sense data are not mere data of sensation, but sensa as given and retained, established or fixed like a datum line in a survey, and therefore already taken out of the pure flux of sensation. Sense data are already thought-interpreted (mediated) and stabilized.¹⁰

Again, we cannot call our relationship with our sensa an 'acquaintance', for, in order to be acquainted with someone or something there has to be contact made with it on a number of occasions. It would thus have to be a recurring feature of one's experience. But sensa neither persist nor recur. Redness may recur and enable us to get acquainted with it, but this red patch does not recur so that one can not get acquainted with it.

(Talk about and appeal to sense data) implies that I can know what certain sensa, not present to me, would be like if they were present to me, and can say 'These are, or are not, the sensa I expected,' comparing sensa which I now have with some idea of them which I framed in advance of having them; and it should be explained how this is possible.¹¹

¹⁰ See Ibid., p. 169. That is, 'sensa', as data, are established, as well as defined, as objects. Note also the character of 'past' which becomes relevant in such a comparison.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 170.
Talking about our sensa in this way is to raise the term sensum and all its cognates to mean something quite different from the momentary and evanescent colours, sounds, scents and the rest which we actually feel in sensation but which we mistakenly substitute for them. If there are such things, they differ from sensa in not being wholly fluid and evanescent, since any one of them admits of retention in the mind as an object of attention after the sensation of it has occurred, or in anticipation of the sensation before it occurs. But, on the other hand, these quasi-sensa are sufficiently like sensa to be taken for them and to receive the same name.

Collingwood maintains that there are such things. Hume called them ideas as distinct from impressions, and Collingwood holds that "there is a special activity of the mind correlative to them... what we generally call the imagination, as distinct from sensation on the one hand, and intellect on the other."\(^{12}\)

This activity, according to Collingwood, is the point at which the activity of thought makes contact with the merely psychic life of feeling. It is Kant's blind but indispensable faculty which bridges sensation and understanding, and that without which, according to Aristotle, thought would be impossible.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 171.
Supposal and Imagination

Attention to the fact that everyday language has two ways of talking about sense and sensations, one of which maximizes the similarity between (say) seen and imagined colours, the other which stresses the difference. In the first way of talking, 'really seeing' and 'imagining' are both named sensations, and the objects of both are indifferently referred to as sensa, or sense data. In the second way of talking, the words 'sensum' and 'sensation' are restricted to cases referred to as 'really seeing', whereas the terms 'imagining' and 'what is imagined' are used in opposition to 'really seeing' and 'what is really seen.' The second way of talking does not have any generic term to cover 'sensing' and 'sensum' on the one hand and 'imagining' and 'what is imagined' on the other hand, so that there is no indication, in this way of talking, as to how the two are generically related. Collingwood proposes to use the term 'sensation' as a generic term to cover both the act of sensing and the act of imagining, and the term 'to sense' when a verb is needed, and the object sensed will be referred to as 'a sensum' whose species are colors, sounds, etc. As specific names for the two cases, he proposes to reserve the terms 'real sensation' and 'imagination', the species of real sensation being really seeing, really hearing, etc., and their objects, the species 'real sensa', are real colors, real sounds etc., and imaginary sensa are imagined colors, imagined sounds, etc.

13 See Ibid., pp. 172-174.
B. Problem of the Distinction of Imagination from Sensation in the History of Modern Philosophy.

Collingwood examines the opinions of philosophers throughout the history of modern philosophy on the question of the distinction of imagination from sensation.\textsuperscript{14}

The assumption by the mediaevals, that sensation gives real acquaintance with the real world, was undermined by sixteenth century sceptics and the problem of guarding against illusions arising from mistaking an imaginary sensation for a real one became a major issue with Descartes, as, for example, our inability to distinguish sleeping and dreaming from the state of being awake. Descartes did not deny that there was a distinction between a real sensation and an imaginary one, between really sitting in front of the fire and only dreaming it, but he concluded that there was no available test whereby one could decide and make the distinction. Hobbes subsequently denied the reality of the distinction, since immediacy was a feature of all sensuous experience. Spinoza agrees with Hobbes against Descartes that in principle all sensation is imagination. For Leibnitz, sensa deserve the name idea, since, for him, unlike Spinoza, they are modes of thought. But they are ideas of a peculiar kind, namely confused, which, if they could be brought to distinctness would thereby lose their sensuous character.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} See Ibid., pp. 174-190.

\textsuperscript{15} See Ibid., pp. 174-176.
Locke does not distinguish real from imaginary sensa, although his reason for doing so differs from that of Hobbes and Descartes. For Hobbes and Descartes all sensa are imaginary, whereas for Locke they are all real ('Our simple ideas are all real'). But Locke was the first to attempt to distinguish 'real ideas' from 'fantastical.' The only ideas Locke allows as fantastical are certain complex ideas formed at will by the arbitrary combination of simple ideas.  

Berkeley and Hume disowned Locke's position that sensa are real. Accepting Newton's world populated by bodies, Locke consequently accepted that real ideas are 'such as have a conformity with the real Being and Existence of things, or with their Archetypes.' Locke describes a 'fantastical idea' as one which the mind 'makes to itself.' Complex ideas are sometimes fantastical, as when they are voluntary combinations of simple ones in which the mind 'uses some kind of liberty in forming them.' Simple ideas can never be fantastical, because they can never be 'Fictions at Pleasure.'  

Locke inadvertently provided Berkeley with a method which he (Berkeley) thought would enable him to distinguish real from imaginary sensa by introspection, namely, by distinguishing ideas voluntarily

16 See Ibid., p. 176.
17 See Ibid., pp. 176-177.
produced in us from those 'forced upon' us. Thus Berkeley distinguished 'ideas of sense' from 'ideas of imagination' on the score that 'ideas of sense' are stronger and more lively than those of imagination. But this turns out to be ambiguous. If the distinction refers to the objects (the sensa) it would simply mean that a real sensation (say) sound, is louder than an imaginary one, so that to call a sound real or imaginary would refer merely to a difference in audiability. But if the distinction refers to the acts of sensing and imagining, it would mean that a real sound has a way of forcing itself upon us that an imaginary sound does not, so that a real sound is heard whether we will it or no, whereas an imaginary one can be summoned up at will. In the latter case, the difference is not between what we hear, the sounds, but between the experiences of hearing them, that is, a difference not recognizable by the ear but by the introspection of reflexive consciousness in which we are aware of those experiences.¹⁸

However, this introspectionist theory, drawn out of Locke by Berkeley, is still unable satisfactorily to distinguish real from imaginary sensations. In the hallucinations of mental disease the patient is obsessed by imaginary sights, sounds, etc., which are altogether beyond his control. Indeed, in a healthy organism, a man who has been horrified by certain sights and sounds cannot banish them

¹⁸ See Ibid., p. 177.
from his mind for quite some time, for he continues to imagine the
crash, the blood, the cries etc., in spite of all his efforts to stop
doing so. On Berkeley's principle, this should be a sure indication
that he is really seeing them. But all it proves is that we have but
limited control over our imaginative activity.  

Berkeley then attempts a second theory of distinction. Ideas
of sense have a certain steadiness, order and coherence according to
discoverable laws, the so called Laws of Nature which we learn by ex­
perience. For Berkeley, the Laws of Nature are not laws concerning the
relations between bodies or bodily movements or bodily forces, but are
laws concerning the relations between sensa, and the Laws of Nature
are obeyed by 'ideas of sense' but not by 'ideas of imagination' which
are wild.  

Collingwood says that this theory does not hold on closer
scrutiny. Either I see what looks like a black animal crouching in the
halflight or I do not. No animal is found when I turn on the light
and search the room, so I conclude that I was not really seeing but only
imagining. But, does the imaginary animal really disobey the laws of
nature, as Berkeley contends it should? It may disobey some, but it
obeys others. It comes under definite conditions, at the dark, when I

19 See Ibid., pp. 178-179.
am tired, bringing a slight but perceptible fear to one who, as a little boy, was frightened by the dark. So, although it does not belong to a family discernable in physical terms, yet it clearly does belong to one discernable in psychological terms. 21

Can, asks Collingwood, a distinction be made between real sensa and imaginary sensa on the score that real sensa obey natural laws whereas imaginary sensa obey psychological laws appropriate to the mental world? He rejects this possibility, firstly, since the two orders are not absolutely distinct. Real sensa obey psychological laws as well as do imaginary sensa, and it is still a debated point whether the psychological is not reducible to the physical. Secondly, the laws of nature are what we learn by studying our real sensa, and the laws of psychology are what we learn by studying our imaginary sensa. But this distinction presupposes that we are already able, as a principle of that distinction, to distinguish real sensa from imaginary sensa. So, if we need rules in order to distinguish real sensa from imaginary ones, it cannot be sensation, the undistinguished mixture of sensation and imagination, that teaches us those rules. 22

Hume, therefore, says Collingwood, dropped the relation theory and tried to redevelop the introspection theory. Since in his

21 See Ibid., p. 181.
22 Ibid., p. 182.
Treatise on Human Nature he set himself the task of showing how all our knowledge is derived from what Berkeley called ideas of sense, and what he himself called 'impressions,' he say that it is necessary to be able to distinguish ideas of sense from ideas of imagination, which he calls simply 'ideas.' How, therefore, are we to place this distinction on a firm basis? The distinction, he maintained, must depend on a difference perceptible, by direct inspection, between the two types of experience. "The difference betwixt these," he says at the beginning of his Treatise, "consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness." This is the same as Berkeley's criterion 'more strong, lively, distinct.' The distinction between real sensation and imagination is resolved into the distinction between our inability of set purpose to control, excite, suppress or modify our sensory experiences. But, when Hume admits that ideas 'in sleep, in fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of the soul' conform to what he calls impressions and the definition he gives of impressions, instead of concluding that they are impressions, or that his definition of impression is faulty, he excuses himself by pleading that these are exceptional cases. Collingwood says that Hume does not see that this is really an appeal to the alternative criterion which he has already rejected, namely that of the relation in which our various experiences stand to each other, since 'exceptionalness' is something we can at-
tribute to something only when we try to think of it as an instance of a rule, which, here, is question of a rule determining the relations which our sensa must bear to one another if they are to be regarded as real sensa. Thus, Hume's attempt to derive all knowledge from sensation has broken down on the very first page of his Treatise.  

But, Collingwood maintains, progress in the science of man, as in any other science, comes through taking exceptions seriously. Kant noted that if there is any distinction between real and imaginary sensa, it cannot lie in a difference of 'force and liveliness', that is, in the involuntary or voluntary character of the acts by which we perceive them, but must lie elsewhere.

Kant distinguished thought into a primary function, called understanding, which is concerned with the relations between sensa, and thought in its secondary function, which is concerned with the relations between thoughts in the primary function. Thought in its secondary function, for Kant, is reasoning.

According to Berkeley, the laws of nature are all empirical laws learned from experience by noting the relations between sensa. Kant explicitly attacked this position by showing that these first order laws (relations between sensa) imply second order laws, which Kant called 'principles of the understanding.' Now, a sensum may be wild (unruly)

23 See Ibid., p. 185.
relatively to first order laws of nature, so far as they have been discovered at any given moment in the history of scientific discovery. The laws, as thus far known, may not yet permit classification of such sensa in any family whose law of behaviour is known. But this, according to Kant, cannot be so in regard to second order laws which govern the understanding itself. It is a principle of the understanding that every event has a cause, and no event that comes under our notice can escape that principle. To call a sensation wild is simply to say that we have not yet discovered what its particular cause is.24

According to Collingwood, Kant's discovery of second order laws, the principles of the understanding, involves the discovery that there are no wild sensa, and at the same time tells us why we can speak of wild sensa existing. What we are really saying is that certain sensa considered in the light of second order laws must admit of interpretation but have not yet been interpreted, and may remain uninterpreted until certain hitherto unknown first order laws are discovered. Furthermore, according to Kant, 'reality' (as when we speak of 'real' sensa) is a category of the understanding, so that a sensation said to be real or not real is a sensation interpreted by the interpretative work of the understanding.25

25 See Ibid., p. 186.
Thus, Kant, instead of trying to conceive real sensa and imaginary sensa as two coordinate species of the same genus, conceived the difference between them as a difference of degree.

For (Kant) a real sensum can only mean one which has undergone interpretation by the understanding, which alone has the power to confer the title real; an imaginary sensum will then mean one which has not yet undergone that process.\textsuperscript{26}

So, the common sense distinction between real and imaginary sensa, although flatly denied by the Cartesians, can be justified according to Kant, but it cannot be justified as a distinction between two classes of sensa.\textsuperscript{27}

Now, Collingwood has already drawn attention to the ambiguity in common sense dialogue when it refers to real and imaginary sensa.\textsuperscript{28} Sometimes it refers to both under the common genus of sensa, but other times it distinguishes sensation from imagination without the mediation of a common generic term. This second way of talking is most obvious in referring to what we call illusions or illusory sensa, which common sense abruptly distinguishes from real sensa. An illusory sensum is (not merely an imagined sensum, but) an imagined sensum taken for a real one. There is nothing special in the sensa themselves which would

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 187.

\textsuperscript{27} See Ibid., p. 188.

\textsuperscript{28} See this appendix, p. 734.
make them illusory; to say that they are illusory is simply to say that a mistake has been made about them. Pride may lead us to place the blame on them as if our error were due to them and not to our faulty thinking about them.

But so-called real sensa are likewise susceptible to such mistakes about them. A child, or a primitive, looking into a mirror for the first time, may look for the source of his sensations by placing his hand behind the mirror, whereas experience will teach him that he has to place his hand in front of the mirror to correctly interpret them.  

Collingwood says, therefore, that it is wrong to define illusory sensa as imaginary sensa which we mistake for real ones (according to that second way in which common sense talks). He maintains that illusory sensa can be defined without any reference to the distinction between imaginary and real. "Any sensum (so-called 'real' or so-called 'imaginary') is illusory insofar as we make an error about it." 

Collingwood clarifies by explaining that this error does not consist in mistaking one sensum for a different sensum. Such an


30 Ibid., p. 189. This echoes Kant's "...truth or illusion is not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it, insofar as it is thought." Critique of Pure Reason (B.350); see Norman Kemp Smith's translation, London, MacMillan, 1933, p. 297.
error is impossible because all that there can ever be in a sensum is present to the act of sensation. The mistakes we make about our sensa are mistakes about their relations with other sensa, possible or anticipated. The child or primitive before the mirror is not mistaken in thinking that he sees a pattern of colours, nor that what he sees is like what he sees when he looks at someone else's face two feet away. His mistake lies in thinking that, because of these facts, he can touch the face he sees by feeling behind the glass. Further experience will teach him that in order to touch it he must feel in front of the glass.

An illusory sensum, then, is simply a sensum as to which we make mistakes about the relation in which it stands to other sensa. The conception of illusion disappears, resolved into the conception of error.31

Collingwood then applies his conclusion to such problems as the distant man looking smaller than the nearby one, and the railway lines which 'look' convergent but 'really' are parallel, etc. He rejects the commonly accepted distinction between realities (real men, real train tracks etc.) and appearances (of men, of train tracks, etc.) according to which the men are really the same size but appear different and the train tracks are really parallel though appearing to converge. He criticises the attitude which attributes to sensation itself an inducement or temptation to us to make a mistake about it. He insists,

contrarily, that "just as no sensation can force us to make a mistake about it, so none can persuade or tempt us to do the same." When we say that a distant man looks smaller, or that railway tracks converge, what we mean is that we are warning ourselves or others against the error of thinking that because the pattern of colours we now see resembles the patterns we have seen on occasions of a certain kind then the further sensa which we may expect to behave in certain ways will continue to show the same kind of resemblance.

Thus, the phrase 'illusions of sense' or 'illusory sensa' describes cases in which actual errors are made as to the relations between sensa, so 'appearances of sense' describes cases in which care is taken that errors of this kind shall not be made.

Before coming to his conclusion of this long discussion, Collingwood asks us to consider three cases in which we speak of imagining something. A match box is before me; I say that I really see the three sides facing me, but that I imagine the other three, each with its appropriate color. I also say that I imagine the inside of the box and the matches in it. I also imagine the feel of the box and the smell of its phosphorous edge. These imagined things are really there, and, as Collingwood, following Kant, says, it is only inasmuch as I imagine these things to be really there (though not sensed to be there) that I

32 See Ibid., p. 190.
33 Ibid., p. 191.
am aware of the box as a solid body. If a person could only see the box without imagining he would not see a world of solid bodies, but only (as Berkeley put it) 'various colours variously disposed.' Thus, says Kant, imagination is an 'indispensable function' for our knowledge of the world around us.\(^{34}\)

The second kind of imaginings Collingwood asks us to consider is illustrated by looking out of a window and seeing a rainbow. When I do this, he says, I do not think of an arched and painted structure, over which men might climb and swallows build their nests, standing upon two plots of ground at its two ends. I think that I am looking at rain (although I see no drops) which is lit by sunlight and whose whiteness is broken into colors. Collingwood says that in saying this he is rejecting one interpretation and embracing another. Collingwood further says that the rainbow is 'really' there not in one sense only but in two. As a sensum, or arrangement of sensa, it is really there in the sense that I see it. And, he adds, in\(^{3}\) that sense of being real, the imaginary beast in the twilight is really there as also are the snakes in \textit{delirium tremens}. In the second sense of being 'really' there, what is really there is the rain and the sunshine, that is, the things in terms of which I interpret my sensa.

\(^{34}\) See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 192.
A person suffering from a bilious attack may see a zigzag pattern of lines before his eyes. Are these really there? Collingwood answers that they are really there in the first sense of being really there. That is, they are sensa actually seen. In the second sense of being really there, no answer can be given to the question until they have been interpreted in the way the rainbow was interpreted in terms of rain and sunlight. If in seeing the rainbow we see drops of rain and in seeing the zigzag lines we see the bilious attack, we are seeing what is 'really' there, just as when a man goes red in the face we are seeing his anger which is really there. But 'really there' in this second sense is a correct interpretation according as our sensa (in the first sense of being 'real') are placed in a correct relationship among themselves and with other sensa. 35

The third case of imagining Collingwood proposes for consideration is that of a boy who dreams that a fire destroys his home while he looks on helplessly. This, says Collingwood, is a clear case of imagination, probably complicated by illusion. When the boy awakens

35 See Ibid., pp. 192-193. On p. 186 of The Principles of Art, Collingwood, following Kant, understands reality to be a category of the understanding. But, here, Collingwood distinguishes two senses of 'reality' as applicable to the question 'Are these (sensa) 'really' there?' The interpretative sense of the term is quite consistent with the Kantian meaning of 'reality,' but in what sense is 'reality' to be taken when it is used to mean that the sensa are actually seen?
the illusion is dispelled, whereas the imagination (if he remembers his
dream) remains. The fire is 'really' there in the first sense; he
'really sees' the sensa, the colors and shapes, etc. But, is it 'really
there' in the second sense? The dream has to be interpreted in order
to answer this question. If it is interpreted as meaning that his house
will shortly be burned down then we must say that the fire is unreal.
Modern psychologists will connect the dream, in their interpretation,
with the awakening of adolescent passions, etc. If their interpretation
is right, then the fire is as real as the rainbow and the zigzag lines;
it is the way that the boy sees the crisis which has come upon him.36

The conclusion, therefore, of this long analysis of sensation
and imagination, according to Collingwood, is as follows:

Sensa cannot be divided by any test whatsoever
into real and imaginary; sensations cannot be divided
into real sensations and imaginations. That experience
which we call sensation is of one kind only and is not
amenable to the distinctions between real and unreal,
true and false, viridical and illusory. That which is
true or false is thought; and our sensa are called real
and illusory insofar as we think truly or falsely about
them. To think about them is to interpret them, which
means stating the relations in which they stand to
other sensa, actual or possible. A real sensum means
a sensum correctly interpreted; an illusory sensum,
one falsely interpreted. And an imaginary sensum means
one which has not been interpreted at all; either because
we have tried to interpret it and have failed, or because
we have not tried.37

37 Ibid., p. 194.
Collingwood adds that these latter are not three kinds of sensa, nor are they sensa which, when correctly interpreted, are related to fellow sensa in three ways. They are sensa "in respect of which the interpretative work of thought has been done well, or done ill, or left undone." He adds that the common sense distinction between real and imaginary sensa is not false, but that it is not a distinction among sensa. It is a distinction among the various ways in which sensa may be related to the interpretative work of thought.

What this amounts to, as far as it is relevant to the theory of questioning in Collingwood, is that sensa are not distinguished as sensa, but are distinguished according to the different interpretative attitudes taken in regard to them. An imaginary sensum, for Collingwood, is one not yet interpreted, one not yet subjected to affirmation and negation in thought. But, nevertheless, a sensum, as imaginary, is

38 Ibid.

39 See Ibid. But, what about that second sense of real referred to above? (n. 35 p. 748). A second difficulty also suggests itself as a result of this conclusion. If imaginary sensa are un-interpreted sensa, as contrasted with real sensa understood to be correctly interpreted sensa and illusory sensa understood to be incorrectly interpreted sensa, this seems to regard imaginary sensa as something more basic than real sensa. But this appears to be quite inconsistent with the basic character of actually experienced feeling (that is, sensation accompanied by its emotive charge), for imaginary sensa would now appear to be something more primordial.
one already set before the mind as an object about which one can ask (question) what interpretative attitudes are possible and justifiable in regard to it. Thus, the world of objectivities, which, according to Meinong, constitutes a distinctive world on its own, meriting study by a distinct branch of philosophy ignored until now, is Collingwood's world of imagination and supposal.  "Attending to a feeling," says Collingwood, "means holding it before the mind; rescuing it from the flux of mere sensation, and conserving it for so long as may be necessary in order that we should take note of it." 

These imaginary, uninterpreted sensa, if considered as looking forward towards affirmational or negational interpretation which they call for, are Bradley's floating ideas. They float inasmuch as they demand of the mind that they be attached to reality somehow or another, that is, that they be interpreted through judgment. 

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40 See J. Passmore's A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Penguin (Pelican), Middlesex, 1968, ch. 8, pp. 174-200 on The Movement towards Objectivity. See especially pp. 180-185 for a contextualization of Meinong's problem regarding the status of the objective order as an order distinct from that of reality. Also, see J. Dawes Hicks, "The Philosophical Researches of Meinong," Mind, XXXI (1922), pp. 1-30.


although not yet affirmed or denied, they are nevertheless objectivized, and thus constituted to be in a proximate condition to enter into the interpretative business of affirmation and negation.

In dialectic thought, action replaces the static concept of substance as the basic reality. Action results in polarized opposites, the most basic of which is that between subject and object. Aesthetic activity is par excellence the work of objectivization, the activity whereby the subject opposes himself to himself as subject to object. 43

of objectivity as abstracting from truth and falsity. Stout says (p. 299) that "(b) y a proposition I mean what Meinong calls "an objective." It is best represented in language by such phrases as 'that a is b' or 'a being b'. It is a factor common to judgments, supposals and questions. I may affirm or deny that a is b. I may inquire whether a is b; I may merely suppose a to be b. The object in such processes, considered as something proposed or capable of being proposed to a thinking mind, is a proposition. As I maintain, propositions are just possibilities considered as proposed to a thinking mind [compare Collingwood's notion of possibility as explained in The Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 274-276]. A proposition is the intentional term corresponding to the 'formal' term possibility." If I understand Collingwood rightly, I think he would say that an imaginary is the term of an intentional act constitutive of the objectivity of a sensum, whereby the sensum is in such a condition as to be able to enter into the constitution of propositions; and, rather than being capable of being proposed, is, more fundamentally, made an object (of imagination), which is the very foundation of the possibility of propositional capacity.

(The) immediate origin (of the idealist conception of the absolute) was the relation between subject and object in knowledge. The opposition between subject and object, in turn, had its roots in the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, and the group of ideas of which it formed a part. This dualism reappears in idealism as the difference between nature and spirit; and is formulated as a contrast between a dead, material substance on the one hand, and a free, creative subject on the other. In fact, the idealists often identify spirit with freedom, which they interpret as a spontaneous act of creation. This notion is best illustrated by art, because in art the self is most clearly creative. The artist objectifies his ideas in a medium. He puts himself into his works so completely that they could not have been made by anyone else; They are different from their author, yet they are himself in another form, for in them he expresses, or better, actualizes himself. Their full meaning is lost if they are taken in abstraction from him; in fact, to suggest this possibility is to imply their imperfection, by an external relationship between artist and work. Ideally he, as artist, can be adequately seen in them. The difference is that the work is finished, a created thing, while the artist is creating; it is the difference between being and becoming.44

The essential dialectical relationship between artistic activity and the subject-object dichotomy is further explained by Otis Lee:

Dialectic considers the process of objectification, negation. It is variously described: creation, objectification, actualization, self-expression. But these are all ways of stating the same idea. It is the activity by which spirit objectifies itself, not an operation performed on a pre-existent substance.

To continue our analogy (with art), we must suppose that the artist creates his own medium. Also, the act is double, for it both results in an object which is other than spirit, and relates this to spirit. The artist paints a picture, which is outside himself: he may sell it, or give it to a friend, and forget about it. This is the "first negation." Yet at the same time, the work is himself; it does not really have an independent being, although it may be elsewhere in space and time. This is the second negation, the "negation of the negation." The two phases are not separate, nor do they succeed one another in time. To become other is to become more completely oneself. Thus objectification is a process of differentiation and at the same time of integration; it is both exclusion and inclusion, antithesis and synthesis; the first can not occur without bringing the second along with it.45

Thus, the artistic dimension in conscious activity is the activity whereby objectivity is seen to arise from the creative, self-assertive activity of the conscious subject.46 Now, questioning, as Collingwood has repeatedly stated, is primarily a dialogue of the soul with itself, of the soul as subject with itself as object. The first and fundamental condition of the very possibility of a questioning situation is here posited by the aesthetic activity of the conscious subject. Collingwood says that we can speak to others only because we first have the experience of being ourselves listeners to ourselves as speakers:

"...the speaker is his own first hearer."\(^{47}\)

C. Relation Between Imagination and Consciousness.

Collingwood next investigates the contrast of imagination with sensation as something active contrasted with something passive, something we do as contrasted with something we undergo, something under our control compared to something we cannot help, a making compared to a receiving.\(^{48}\) Common sense makes this distinction, but is unable to give an account of it.\(^{49}\)

This distinction cannot be one between activity and passivity as such, since sensation itself is an activity. Even if we are stimulated to do it by outside forces, it still remains something we do. Response to a stimulus is passive in the sense that it cannot arise without a stimulus, but it is active in as much as it is a response. It is not a distinction between activities we choose to do and those we cannot help doing; it is easier to stop seeing this paper (by shutting one's eyes) than it is to stop imagining the frightful accident seen yesterday.\(^{50}\)

\(^{47}\) R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, p. 249. See Ibid., pp. 247-252 for discussion of the distinction between speaker and listener. But, see also, chapter 9, above, pp.658-659 for comment on this.


\(^{49}\) See Ibid., p. 196.

\(^{50}\) See Ibid., p. 197.
But in spite of this, in some sense or another, imagination is more free than sensation. Sensation is not entirely unfree, arising as it does from the spontaneity of a living and sentient organism. The freedom of the imagination goes a step further than this although it is not the conscious freedom of carrying out an intention, which is freedom of choice.

Regarded as an activity or manifestation of freedom, then, imagination seems to occupy a place intermediate between the less free activity of mere feeling and the more free activity of what is generally called thought.\(^{51}\)

The task, then, says Collingwood, is to define this intermediate place, between the minimal freedom of spontaneous response characteristic of sensation, and the full conscious freedom of choice.

Two things which must be distinguished are confused, according to Collingwood, by modern philosophers when they talk about sensation and sensa. When they are talking about the sensa that we should or would perceive given certain circumstances, or those perceived in the past or expected to be perceived in the future, they are talking about something vastly different from the sensa we actually see or feel, and the sensations we are actually having.\(^{52}\) Actually experienced sensation must be regarded as a flux of activity in which a greater or lesser

\(^{51}\) Ibid., pp. 197-198.

number of distinct sensory acts are going on together at the one time, and each is no sooner achieved than it gives place to another. What is thus sensed can only be present in the performance of the corresponding act. Its esse is sentiri. But the sensa, and sensations referred to above as spoken of by modern philosophers, are not present, and not presently available, to be spoken of in relation to one another, and in relation to past or future sensations. Unless there is a distinction between these two kinds of things, the statements made about relations between sensa, quite apart from whether they are true or not, could not be made; they would be meaningless.

There must, in other words, be a form of experience other than sensation, but closely related to it; so closely as to be easily mistaken for it, but different in that colours, sounds and so on which in this experience we 'perceive' are retained in some way or other before the mind, anticipated, recalled, although these same colours and sounds in their capacity as sensa, have ceased to be seen and heard. This other form of experience is what we ordinarily call imagination. Collingwood says that it was in order to distinguish this other form of experience, imagination, from sensation, that Hume distinguished ideas from impressions. What modern philosophers call relations between impressions are, according to Collingwood, really re-

53 See Ibid., p. 198.
54 Ibid.
lations between ideas. It is not, as Locke says, sensation which furnishes the empty room of the mind, but imagination. It is Hume's ideas which inhabit Locke's empty room, which becomes furnished with what 'the busy and boundless Fancy of man provides.' And it is, according to Collingwood, imagination to which Empiricists really appeal when they appeal to 'experience.'

It is then the work of thought to detect relations between sensa, to find similarity between this patch of colour and others, so that it can be called 'red.' But the detection of such resemblances, or of any other relationships, prerequires that each sensum must be recognized as distinct in itself. "This act of appreciating something, just as it stands, before I begin to classify it, is what we call attending to it." This act of attention must be carefully distinguished from an act of sensation.

55 See Ibid., p. 203.

56 See Ibid., p. 200.

57 See Ibid., p. 203. No doubt Bernard Bosanquet has influenced this conclusion: "The object which thought in the true sense has worked upon is not a relic of decaying sense, but is a living world, analogous to a perception of the beautiful, in which every thought-determination adds fresh point and deeper bearing to every element of the whole." See Bosanquet's The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 58.

Looking is different from seeing and listening from hearing. Seeing and hearing are species of sensation; looking and listening are the corresponding species of attention.\textsuperscript{59}

Collingwood says that current tradition speaks of 'a red patch' as a sensum, but, he continues, what we see inasmuch as we merely see is always a visual field, more or less parti-coloured, never a red patch. A red patch is a well defined region cut out of this field, so that to describe it as a patch implies that the field is divided into an object of attention and a background or penumbra from which attention is withdrawn. This division of the general field of feeling into foreground and background by conscious attention is the division into the conscious and the (more or less) unconscious.\textsuperscript{60} Such a distinction does not exist at the merely psychical level, where the mind exists only in the shape of sentience.\textsuperscript{61}

When the light of consciousness falls on sentience, what was sentient becomes imagination. Consciousness can tell us clearly only of the things to which it attends and obscurely of those it ignores (which remain more or less unconscious). The so-called unconscious of modern


\textsuperscript{60} See \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 204-205.

\textsuperscript{61} See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 205.
psychology is not an area distinct from and independent of consciousness, but it is that which consciousness ignores in sentience by not attending to it.

Attention has a double object, whereas sentience has one only. What we attend to is not only what we sense but the act of sensing it. Sight sees only colour but conscious attention attends both to the colour seen and to the act of seeing it. The word consciousness signifies the togetherness of sensation and sensum in the object. A man conscious of his anger is aware that the anger he has is his.62

Thus the difference between seeing and looking, or hearing and listening is that a person who is said to be looking is described as aware of his own seeing as well as of the thing he sees.63

When consciousness enters into experience a new principle is established. Mere presence to sense does not claim attention; it may solicit it but does not secure it. Consciousness is master in its own house and dominates feeling. Feeling thus dominated, as compelled to accept the place accorded to it by consciousness, is no longer impression

62 But in The New Leviathan Collingwood says that "(I)n anger you have no consciousness of being angry; that comes only with reflection upon anger; what you are aware of is simply a contrast between yourself and something...other than yourself." (pp. 70-71, pgph. 10.43). See Alan Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, p. 48, on Collingwood's revised conception of first order consciousness.

but idea (in Hume's sense). Consciousness is absolutely autonomous. Its decision alone determines whether a given sensum or emotion will be attended to or not. A conscious being is not free to decide what sensations he will have, but he is free to decide what feeling he will place in the focus of his consciousness. He is not free as to whether he will decide or not; he must decide. But he is free to decide to attend to this or that feeling. And that choice, says Collingwood is consciousness itself. 64

This freedom of consciousness, Collingwood explains, is not a freedom of choice between alternatives; the decision is not made by reviewing the various sensations and opting for this or that one. In fact, says Collingwood, this freedom of consciousness (as distinct from freedom of choice) is a prerequired condition of the possibility of alternatives for there to be choice about. Freedom of choice is enjoyed only at the intellectual level. The freedom of mere consciousness is thus an elementary kind of freedom, yet it is very real. At the level of sentience, of psychical experience, the self is dominated by its own feelings. This dominance, says Collingwood, is what Berkeley and Hume refer to as 'force' or 'liveliness.' A child screams when it feels pain; a child become conscious of its feelings screams because it wants attention.

64 See Ibid., p. 207.
The consciousness of the self as something other than the feeling of the moment, something to which the feeling belongs, is the assertion of the self as able in principle to dominate the feeling. The self consciousness and the self assertion, the theoretical and the practical, form together a single indivisible experience.\(^{65}\)

An effect of this is that the feelings are tempered in their strength and thereby they more and more lose their power of determining our actions, although their quality or intensity is not thereby altered. They become domesticated and less like storms or earthquakes. They are structurally fitted into the fabric of our life instead of going their own way.

They become fitted into a structure. In asserting ourselves as against our feelings we have asserted in principle a structure of some kind, though as yet an indeterminate one. In becoming aware of myself I do not yet know all what I am, but I do know that I am something to which this feeling belongs, not something belonging to it.\(^{66}\)

Another result of this domestication of feelings is that we become able to perpetuate them, including sensa, at will.

\(^{65}\) See Ibid., p. 209. Owing to the distinction which Collingwood makes later in The New Leviathan, as referred to by Alan Donagan, (see above, p. 759 n. 62) we have to say that consciousness has only implicit awareness of self, an awareness in which the self is experienced but not yet objectified by second order consciousness. That is, by conscious awareness, the self asserts itself in the presence of its feelings, but reflection on this assertive activity is needed in order that the self be distinguished objectively from the non-self.

Attending to a feeling means holding it before
the mind; rescuing it from the flux of mere sensation,
and conserving it for so long as this may be necessary
in order that we should take note of it. This, again,
means perpetuating the act by which we feel it.67

In the flux of sensation one pattern of the total sensory
field is replaced by another. Attention focusses itself on one element
of that field. By attending, say, to the scarlet and neglecting every­
thing else, a kind of compensation for the fading of the sensation in
pure flux is effected.

By...adjusting our attention...we obtain a new kind
of experience by moving as it were with the flux, so
that the self and the object are (so to speak) at rest
relatively to each other for an appreciable time....
We have (thereby) liberated ourselves for a moment from
the flux of sensation and kept something before us long
enough to get a fair sight of it.68

By doing this Collingwood says we have converted a sensation
into an idea. We have become conscious of ourselves as its masters,
and broken its mastery over us. "We have told it to stay still, and
it has stayed, though only for a moment."69

So long as any trace of a past feeling remains, attention is
able to single it out and reconstitute the original feeling into an
idea. What we call remembering an emotion is never anything but this

67 Ibid.
69 Ibid. A truly objective world is thereby constituted,
a world set over against the conscious subject, which can be looked at
'from a distance,' so to speak.
focusing of our attention on the traces it has left in our present feeling. This, says Collingwood, is the meaning which we can attach to Hume's formula, that all ideas are derived from impressions.

Collingwood draws attention to the fact that the analysis so far yields two concepts of the imagination, both arrived at by an analysis of Hume's distinction between impression and idea.

Firstly, the distinction between impressions and ideas was understood to be equivalent to the distinction between sensa interpreted by thought and sensa not so interpreted. Next, the analysis revealed that this same (Humean) distinction between impressions and ideas is equivalent to the distinction between sheer feeling and feeling modified by consciousness dominating and perpetuating it.

But there seems to be a double discrepancy between these two explanations stemming from the same source (the Humean distinction). Firstly, a discrepancy between impression as real sensum (that is, sensum interpreted by thought) and impression as sheer feeling, secondly a discrepancy between idea as feeling not interpreted by thought, and idea as feeling perpetuated and dominated by consciousness. Collingwood proposes to show that these discrepancies arise not from his own faulty analysis but from Hume's confusing of two quite different things under

70 See Ibid., p. 212.
the one same pair of terms. 71

Considering the second discrepancy first, Collingwood says that the work of determining the relations between things must depend on something prior, namely, that those things, whose relations are to be determined, must be able to be held before the mind in such a way as to make it possible to compare one with another, in order to see how they resemble one another, and so forth. Each must be known as to what it is in itself before being known as related. 72 Our knowledge that this is a patch of red goes far beyond knowing a patch of red as it is in itself; it is a consideration of it in relation to an established system of colours with established names. Our knowledge of what a red patch is in itself, if it could be verbalized, would be expressed something like 'This is what I see', or 'This is how I feel.' This is the kind of thing Collingwood maintains that we must be able to say before we can begin the work of interpreting, that is, discussing relations. But it is not through bare sensation that we are able to do

71 Ibid.

72 This knowing of what it is in itself, previously to setting up any relational knowledge, is what I understand by saying that it is first constituted in its objectivity. That is, interpretation presupposes objectivization. But, if this is to be called knowledge, then we have admitted the existence of something entitled to be called knowledge which is not the answer to a question.
this, but through the consciousness of sensation, by its work of
attention, selecting and perpetuating some element in the field of
sensation and some corresponding element in the sensory act.

Collingwood reconciles the two conflicting accounts (of
impressions and ideas) by recognizing that a feeling of which we have
become conscious, by attending to it, is one not yet interpreted but
nevertheless ready for interpretation; one which we have only begun to
interpret. Conversely, an uninterpreted feeling, if it means a feeling
which is ready for interpretation, can only be a feeling of which we
have become conscious through attention.

As regards the first discrepancy, between imagination as real
sensum (interpreted by thought) and impression as sheer feeling, the
situation is different. Collingwood points out that three stages in
the life of feeling have so far been distinguished: (i) feeling as
bare feeling below the level of consciousness, (ii) feeling of which we
have become conscious by the process of attending to it, and (iii)
feeling not only brought to consciousness by attention but also placed
in relation with others. The second stage of this enumeration is what,
according to Collingwood, Hume means by idea. But Hume failed to
distinguish impression in sense (i) from impression in sense (iii). An
impression for Hume is distinguished from an idea only by its force or
liveliness. But this force may be of two kinds, either the brute force
of pure sensation not yet dominated by thought, or the solid strength
of a sensum firmly placed in its context by the interpretative work of thought. Hume's failure to recognize this difference provided a pitfall for subsequent philosophers, especially in regard to the term 'sense datum.' The word 'sense datum' or sensum, is applied promiscuously not only to something given by sensation (in which case it would at once be taken away again; sense (i) ), and not only to something perpetuated by consciousness or imagination (in which case the only region from which it could be called up would be that of past sensation; sense (ii) ), but also to something constructed inferentially by the work of intellect (sense iii) .

Impressions are converted into ideas, that is, crude sensations into imaginations, by the activity of consciousness. Consciousness and imagination are synonyms if taken as names for a certain kind or level of experience. But within that same experience imagination is the name for what has undergone conversion, and consciousness is the name for what effects that conversion (of sensa into ideas). Imagination is thus the new form which feeling takes when it is transformed by the (attending) activity of consciousness. Imagination is a distinct level of experience, intermediate between sensation and intellect, and the point at which the life of thought makes contact with the purely psychical experience, the world of pure feeling. So, it is not sensa as such that provide the intellect with data, it is sensa transformed into ideas of imagination.
by the attending work of consciousness. 73

D. Summary of the Foregoing into a General Theory of the Imagination.

The discussion began with the common sense two-term distinction between feeling and thought as two distinct features of experience. 74 We now seem to have a three-term distinction, with consciousness assuming an intermediate level of experience connecting the two. But, Collingwood insists, consciousness is not something other than thought, it is a level of thought which is not yet intellect. The two-term distinction includes consciousness inasmuch as thought in that expression is taken in the wide sense, as including consciousness, and not in its strict sense, which is intellection. The work of intellect, that is, of thought par excellence, is to construct relations. But this takes two forms. Intellect in its primary function apprehends relations between, not feelings as such, as experienced psychically, but feelings modified by consciousness and so converted into ideas. Intellect in its secondary function apprehends relations between the acts of primary intellection, or between what we think in such acts. 75

Consciousness, says Collingwood, is that activity without which we would have no terms between which intellect in its primary form

74 See this appendix p. 734 above.
could detect or construct relations. Thus, consciousness is thought in its absolutely fundamental or original form.  

All thought presupposes feeling; and all the propositions which express the results of our thought belong to one of two types: they are either statements about feelings, in which case they are called empirical, or statements about the procedure of thought itself, in which case they are called 'a priori'. 'Thought', here, means intellect; 'feeling' means not feeling proper, but imagination.  

By the act of attention, or conscious awareness, which is activity distinct from mere feeling, the self asserts itself as owner of its feelings, dominating them, so that they are no longer experiences forcing themselves upon us unawares, but are experiences in which we experience our own activity. Their brute power over us has been replaced by our power of conscious control over them. From being impressions of sense they are transformed into ideas of imagination. They are still feelings of the same kind as before, but have ceased to be mere sensations and have become what we call imaginations.  

The important point of this discussion is that imagination has affinity with two opposite features of experience. It shares in the characteristics of thought and also in the characteristics of feeling.  

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76 See Ibid.  
77 Ibid., p. 221.  
78 Ibid., p. 223.
sensation. What we sense and what we imagine are the same kinds of things (colors, scents, etc.,). This explains why philosophers have experienced difficulties in distinguishing them, and why common sense, according to one way of speaking, calls both (sensations and imaginings) by the same name, sensation, and their respective objects, sensa. But, from another point of view there is a vast difference between imagining and sensing, which is indicated by the fact that common sense has a second way of talking about them, in which imagination is sharply distinguished from sensation, with no generic term to cover both. What we imagine is tamed or domesticated, and what tames it is consciousness, which is a kind of thought, the kind of thought which stands closest to sensation or to mere feeling. Every further development of thought presupposes this kind of thought and is based upon it as upon a foundation; it deals not with feeling in its raw form, but with feeling as transformed into imagination. 79

Consciousness itself does not consider the likenesses and differences between feeling, or classify them or group them into other arrangements, such as a time series, etc., but only prepares the ground for such systematizing work of thought. In itself, consciousness does no more than attend to the here-and-now of feeling. In attending to a present feeling, it perpetuates it at the cost of turning it into some-

79 See Ibid., pp. 222-223.
thing new, no longer merely crude feeling or impression, but domesticated feeling, or imagination, or idea. 80

Consciousness does not compare one idea with another. While enjoying one idea, another may be summoned up. The new idea is not held alongside the first, as two distinct experiences between which I can detect relations. Rather the two ideas fuse into one, the new idea presenting itself as a colouring or modification of the old.

Thus, imagination resembles feeling in this, that its object is never a plurality of terms with relations between them, but a single indivisible unity: a sheer here and now. 81

Conceptions of past, future, the possible, the hypothetical are meaningless for imagination as for feeling. These conceptions belong to a further development of thought. 82

"To form an idea of feeling is already to feel it in imagination," so that "imagination is blind, that is, it cannot anticipate its own results by preconceiving them as purpose in advance of

80 See Ibid., p. 223.

81 Ibid.

82 See Ibid., p. 224. Nevertheless, these conceptions suppose imagination. Imagination, as ordered to the past, the future, the possible, and, especially, the hypothetical, is supposal, as looking beyond itself towards the assertion of reality, questioning activity mediating. So, although these terms are meaningless for imagination, imagination is not meaningless for them, for they suppose imagination as a necessary precondition.
executing them." Its freedom is not freedom of choice to carry out a preconceived plan or to choose between alternative possible plans, which freedom belongs to a later stage of thought. Its freedom is freedom from submission to the sheer flux of feeling, whereby these can be, so to speak, 'distanced' from the self and looked at, or objectivized.

Imagination is, therefore, for Collingwood, consciousness of feeling, or, conversely, feeling become conscious. From one point of view, it is thought in affinity or continuity with the psychic, with feeling. From another point of view, it is feeling as thought. It mediates between the two levels of experience, namely thought and feeling, by partaking of both (in Kant's way of saying it, it is homogeneous with the categories on the one hand and with sensation on the other). So, the identification by philosophers sometimes of imagination with thought (Leibnitz) and sometimes with feeling (Spinoza) has a foundation in experience itself. Sensations imagined and sensations 'sensed' or felt do not differ as sensations (as the distinction of sensations into real and imaginary sensations implies), but they differ as to whether they have been consciously attended to or not. Brute, merely felt, feelings, such as they are at the psychic level of experience, impose themselves forcibly upon us, and we experience a certain helplessness with respect to them. But feelings imagined, or feelings attended to by being consciously

83 Ibid.
aware of them, are, so to speak, put at a distance with a definite control over them on our part. But they are the same feelings in both cases.

Sensations at the brute level of feeling are uninterpreted, and indeed not in a condition of being able to be interpreted by thought. Sensations as imagined are indeed not interpreted sensations (that is, ordered with other, past, present and future, sensations into a systematic unity), but are now proximately ready for the interpretative work of thought operating at a higher level of consciousness, namely that of the understanding. What are usually referred to as 'sense data' are really sensations, not merely attended to and stabilized, but also interpreted by the understanding, by being put in relational order with other sensations from which they are distinguished. They are, as such, not something absolutely 'given' to the mind, as if the mind were a mere passive recipient, but they are rather something the mind gives to itself in its systematizing function, and it gives them to itself from the storehouse of the imagination, not from brute sensa.

Imagination is therefore both 'consciousness' and 'idea' (in the Humean sense). As 'idea' it refers to feelings, but feelings now transformed, by attention, into objects of consciousness. As consciousness it is thought, not intellectual thought, but thought preliminary to intellection and ready for intellection.

What is important in this discussion, as far as Collingwood's theory of questioning is concerned, is that, just as brute sensation
as such lacks objectivity, lacks that characteristic of being set over against a subject as its object, but only becomes objectivized as converted into an idea of imagination, so, correspondingly, awareness would not be a conscious awareness if that of which it was the awareness was not 'set before it' as something confronting it with which it has to deal. Thus, just as imagination renders sensa available as objects, so also it constitutes imaginative awareness to be the awareness of a conscious subject set before and over against the object of that awareness. That is, imagination first gives rise to the fundamental distinction and relationship of subject and object. It distinguishes them in the very same activity in which it unites them. That is, the bipolarity characteristic of thought is first constituted by imagination; that is, imagination sets up both the object as object, and the subject as subject.

E. Imagination and Expression.

To further relate the theory of imagination to that of questioning it is necessary to understand that consciousness becomes, or makes itself aware of, or objectivizes its feelings, by expressing them to itself. Language comes into existence with imagination as a feature of the conscious level of experience.\(^{84}\) Original or native

language is imaginative or expressive. Calling it imaginative describes what it is; calling it expressive describes what it does. Language is an imaginative activity whose function is to express emotion.  

Below the conscious level of linguistic expression there is psychic expression, the involuntary cry of pain, the scream of fear, which rather betrays feeling than expresses it. Every kind and shade of emotion which occurs at the purely psychical level of experience has its counterpart in some change of muscular or circulatory or glandular system which, in a sense, 'expresses' that emotion. To express an emotion is one thing, but to observe and interpret it is another, which belongs to acts of higher levels of consciousness reflecting on acts of lower levels. Psychical expression is the only expression of which the psychical (basic feeling-level of) emotions are capable, although levels of consciousness other than the psychic may admit also of psychic expression. Emotions such as hatred, love, anger

85 See Ibid. This identification of art, as expression, with language, derives from Croce. A. Gennaro in his "Croce and Collingwood," The Personalist, XLVI (1965), p. 197, writes: "Having established that art is spirituality, Croce deduces that art is language. "If Aesthetics were a manifestation different from Linguistics, it could not have as its object the expression which is an aesthetic fact.""


87 See Ibid., p. 230.
and shame arise only through consciousness of self, and they thus presuppose self-awareness. Unlike purely psychical emotions, these emotions accompanying acts of self awareness, of consciousness, admit of expression in language, in a phrase, or controlled gesture or such like. But, in addition to this linguistic mode of expression (characterized by conscious control), they have their own special psychical expressions, the blush of shame accompanied by muscular reaction, the blush of anger with muscular tension and rigidity. A psychical emotion is an emotional charge on a sensum, but an emotion of consciousness is an emotional charge, not on a sensum, but on a certain mode of consciousness.

Emotions can be expressed in two different ways because of the relation between the level of expression and the next above it. The lower level achieves a new principle of organization, when, through the reflection of consciousness, it is transformed to a higher level. Emotions of consciousness can be expressed either formally as modes of consciousness, or materially as constellations of psychic elements.

Psychical expression is uncontrollable, characterized by brute givenness. A change occurs at the level of consciousness. Con-

88 Ibid., p. 231.
89 Ibid., p. 232.
90 Ibid., p. 233.
91 See Ibid., p. 234.
consciousness transforms the emotion from the condition of brute givenness to that of being dominated by thought, so that we now do not just simply feel but feel in a new way, a way we call imagining. This change likewise affects the bodily act of expression which is raised above the crude psychical level to the imaginative.  

Bodily actions expressing certain emotions, insofar as they come under our control and are conceived by us, in our awareness of controlling them, as our way of expressing them, are language.

In its wide sense language is thus simply the bodily expression of emotion as this is dominated by thought in its primitive form as consciousness. A child soon learns to distinguish the cry expressive of uncontrolled emotion from the self-conscious cry deliberately uttered to call attention to its needs. The second cry is language though not yet speech. It bears a new relation to the child's experience as a whole. It is the cry of a child aware of itself and asserting itself. Thus, imaginative experience creates for itself, by an infinite work of refraction, reflection, condensation and dispersal, an infinity of emotions demanding expression in a infinite sublety of articulations in the language created in expressing them. An emotion cannot be felt at

92 See Ibid., p. 235.
93 Ibid.
94 See Ibid., p. 236.
any level of consciousness without being expressed; there are no unexpressed emotions. So-called unexpressed emotions are emotions felt and expressed at their appropriate level of which the one who feels them is trying to become conscious of them, that is, trying to convert them into the material of a higher level of consciousness which, when achieved, will be an emotion at this higher level, with an appropriate expression of it.

Every kind of language (speech, gesture, etc.,) is an offshoot from, and transformation at a higher level, of an original language of total bodily gesture. The language of total bodily gesture is thus the motor side of our total imaginative experience. Language in its original nature expresses, not thought in the narrower sense of intellectual thought, but only emotions, not crude impressions of brute sensations, but sensations transmuted into ideas by the activity of consciousness. Language at the intellectual level undergoes modification to express intellectual emotions.

The general distinction between imagination and intellect is that, whereas imagination presents to itself an object which it experiences as one and indivisible, intellect goes beyond that single object

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95 See Ibid., p. 238.
96 See Ibid., p. 239.
97 See Ibid., p. 246.
98 See Ibid., p. 252.
and presents to itself a world of many such objects with determinate kinds of relations between them. However complex an imagined object may be, it is imagined as a single whole in which relations between the parts are present as a quality of the whole. Thus, a May thrush singing a May song is imagined alongside the previous imagination of a January thrush singing a January song. Insofar as the experience remains at the imaginative level, distinct from that of the intellect, the two songs are not imagined separately as two things with a relation between them. Rather the January song coalesces with the May song, toning it with a quality of mature mellowness. In an imagined whole the parts do not present themselves distinctly as parts but merely as qualitative modifications of the whole. But if the experience is thought about, by strictly intellectual thinking, it is analysed into its parts, becoming a manifold, a network of things with relations between them. Different notes are distinguished in a definite way; each note subject to being thought about itself (one note might have been higher or lower, etc.) The difference between the two songs can be described, one has a sweeter tone, or is longer, or contains more notes than the other. This is analytic thought.

Every different kind of activity has its corresponding kind of emotion which has its corresponding kind of expression. The emotional

99 See Ibid.
charges on sense experience, as broadly distinguished from thought, are expressed psychically by automatic reactions, being felt at the purely psychic level. The emotional charges on thought-experiences are expressed by the controlled activity of language. The emotions of consciousness, taking consciousness as a level of thought lower than intellect, are expressed by language in its primitive and original form. The emotions proper to intellectual experience have their appropriate expression in language in its intellectualized form. The excitement which drove Archimedes from his bath was not a mere generalized excitement but specifically the excitement of a man who has just solved an intellectual problem. In the expression of intellectualized emotion by intellectualized language the thought is also expressed in the same linguistic expression. Symbolism is intellectualized language. Language because it is expression of emotion, intellectualized because it is adapted to the expression of intellectual emotions. Original, imaginative language is expressive, but lacks meaning, not distinguishing the speaker's meaning from what he says. Intellectualized language both expresses and expresses meaning. As language it is emotively expressive, as symbolic, it refers beyond that emotion to the thought whose emotional charge it is. Thus we commonly distinguish what we say from what we mean.

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100 See Ibid., pp. 266-267.
What we say is what we immediately express: the eager, or reluctant, or triumphant, or regretful. The emotions, together with the sounds and gestures that express them, are inseparable parts of a single experience. What we mean is the intellectual activity upon which these emotions are the emotive charge, which is, so to speak, pointed to by the words expressing the emotions as a sort of finger-post indicating from which direction they came and in which direction the other person must go if he is to understand what we say, that is, if he is to reconstruct for himself and in himself the intellectual experience which has led us to say what we did.  

101 Ibid., p. 269. It is interesting to note that, in regard to researches on learning disabilities in children conducted at the Montreal General Hospital, as presented by a recent C.B.C. telecast, children, who, without any apparent physical or psychological handicaps, but simply seemed unable to learn, were basically unable to distinguish one part of their body from another (e.g., neck from knee), and were thus unable to piece together the drawing of a human figure cut up into jigsaw puzzle pieces. They remained unable to distinguish such parts until they were able to name each bodily part distinctly. Once the distinctions were made by being able to express the appropriate names ('neck', 'knee' etc.) the learning process proceeded more or less normally. Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Humanities*, Yale University Press, 1960, pp. 59-60, says that "...the language function...is not a mere result but a continuous self-renewing process: and the contour of man's "world" defines itself more clearly and determinately in direct proportion to the development of this process. Thus a name is not simply tacked on to its completed and ready-to-be-used objective intuition as an extraneous symbolizing of knowledge; instead, in it there is expressed a determinate way, a manner, and tendency for coming to know. Everything we know concerning the development of language in children gives factual substantiation to this basic view. For it is manifestly not the case that in this development a fixed stage of
Theoretically, the artist is a person who comes to know himself, his emotions, which is also to come to know his world, that is, the sights and sounds etc., which go together to make up his total imaginative experience. Knowing himself and his world is one knowledge only, since the sights and sounds are to him steeped in the emotion by which he contemplates them; they are the language in which that emotion utters itself to his consciousness. His world is one with his language; what it says to him it says about himself; his imaginative vision of it is his self knowledge.

But this knowledge of himself is together a making of himself, a conversion of himself from mere psyche, from mere feeling, into consciousness. Coming to know his emotions is, at the same time, coming to dominate them, to assert himself as their master. This is not yet already acquired objective intuition is strung on to a subsequent stage, in which this new acquisition is now also named, defined, and grasped by words. Quite the contrary, language awareness - the awakening symbol consciousness - impresses its stamp upon observation and perception in ever increasing measure as it grows in strength and extends and clarifies itself. Both observation and perception become "objective" just to the degree that this linguistic energy succeeds in clarifying, differentiating, and organizing the mute, undifferentiated chaos of particular circumstances. Linguistic symbolism opens up an original phase of spiritual and intellectual life. A life of "meanings" supplants the life of mere impulses...." Compare this with Collingwood's discussion of the child throwing its bonnet off its head with the exclamation 'Hattiaw;' see his Principles of Art, pp. 227-228 and pp. 239-241.
the life of morality but an indispensable step towards that life. He has learnt to acquire by his own efforts a new set of mental endowments which must be accomplished first if later he is to acquire by his own effort those mental endowments possession of which will bring him nearer his moral ideal.

The world he has together come to know and to make is a linguistic world, in which everything is an expression of emotion. To the extent to which this world is expressive, or meaningful, it was he who made it so, out of what was presented to him in the still more elementary stage of the purely psychical experience of colours, sounds, etc.

Looking at the aesthetical experience from a higher level of reflection, distinction is made between the theoretical and the practical. It is seen to embody both kinds of activity. It is both a knowing of one's self and one's world and a making of one's self and one's world. The self consists only of emotions expressed in that language which is its world, and the world is the language expressive of those emotions. The self which was psychic was remade in the shape of consciousness, and the world, previously crude sensa, was remade in the shape of language, or sensa converted into imagery and charged with emotional significance. Thus, the step forward in the development of experience which leads from the psychic level to the level of consciousness, which step is the specific achievement of art, is a step forward both in
The essence of art is that it is activity whereby we become conscious of our own emotions. As such it has nothing that is due to intellect. The proper sphere of art is, therefore, that of making conscious the previously unconscious emotions of the psychic level.

On the other hand, if art is taken not merely as art but as a certain kind of art, it may express emotions of another order, such as intellectual emotions, or emotions that only an intellectual being can feel. These emotions are emotional charges on, not merely psychical experience of bare feeling, nor upon conscious experience, but upon thought at the level of intellectual experience, or thought in the strict sense of the word.

A change in the type of emotion felt takes place as a new level of conscious awareness is reached. The feeling of an intellectual being is different from that of the child or primitive; his emotions at the psychic level are modified and expressed in a different way. Higher levels of consciousness react on the basic structure, thereby modifying it. The poet converts human experience into poetry by fusing thought itself into emotion, not by first expurgating the intellectual elements and then perceiving the emotional but by thinking in a certain way.

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way then expressing how it feels to think in that way. Thus, Dante fused the Thomistic philosophy into a poem which expressed what it feels like to be a Thomist. ¹⁰⁴

To relate this theory of linguistic expression to the theory of questioning, we have to recall Collingwood's position regarding the relation of art to other aspects of human experience. Collingwood regards the experience of human life as having two aspects, the aesthetic and the logical. ¹⁰⁵ Art indulged in as an all absorbing form of experience mistakes the aesthetic aspect for the whole, the aspect which Collingwood had previously referred to as the cutting edge of the mind. The logical aspect is the weight of fact as something asserted which gives power to that edge to cut. ¹⁰⁶ Collingwood's account of art in Speculum Mentis is an attempt to give an account of the mind's cutting edge, which he likewise refers to as the element of pure spontaneity, or inquiry, that is, questioning, which is the true beginning of knowledge. The life of art regarded as a distinctive type of life-experience is the

¹⁰⁴ See Ibid., p. 295.

¹⁰⁵ See Speculum Mentis, p. 101. This dichotomy is of Grocean derivation; see William M. Johnston, The Formative Years of R.G. Collingwood, p. 73.

assertion of a philosophical error which abstracts the aesthetic from the logical function and erects each into separate experiences. The so called life of art is the persistent pursuit of this error which increasingly becomes a futile quest at every turn.

In fact, the so called aesthetic experience is a name for all experience insofar as this element of spontaneity or questioning or supposal enters into it. Art correctly appreciated is therefore an element of all experience. It is the element of spontaneity, or questioning or supposing. That is, it is identical with the very dynamism of the mind in its forward thrust. Divorced from the matrix of fact in which it is embedded, artistic activity is intuition removed from its context in experience, intuition absolutized and divorced from its logical context. But when artistic activity is seen in its concrete context in lived experience it is seen to be the questioning or supposal aspect of conscious life.

Representing, as it does, the lowest level of human experience, art is the most rudimentary form of thought. The concept of art seems to function in Collingwood's thought something like the concept of Eros in Plato's thought. It is the name for that intrusive and dynamic power which spirits the mind forward to further adventures.\footnote{108 See L.O. Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, p. 237.}

\footnote{107 See \textit{Ibid.}, p. 103.}
This activity, absolutized as art, seems to be identical with the power of negativity, which is the dynamism of the dialectical movement of the mind. The mind is what it does; it is its activity. But this activity is a dynamic strive from a prior state or condition to a subsequent state or condition. The questioning or imaginative or supposal activity which is absolutized in aesthetic activity, seems in its context in lived experience, to be the condition of negating the prior state of affairs (expressed by past fact, indeed constituted as past fact inasmuch as recognized to be prior) and the simultaneous thrusting towards a posterior state of affairs (a future which when expressed, thereby becoming present, will function as answers fulfilling the mind's strive). We can see here the radical constitution of the historical character of human experience. Achievements of the mind's striving, answers to its questions, from the content of the past and provide the matter (the weight behind the cutting edge) for further striving in the form of questioning. A question as unanswered, but with a restlessness demanding an answer, points to something as yet unrealized, but demanding to be realized; this is what we recognize as the future. Thus, the question and answer activity, dynamically and exercisedly considered, is basically constitutive of human experience as distinguishable (by thought when it reflects over the process) into a (achieved) past and a (as yet unrealized, but straining to be realized)
future, both features being co-actualized in the present. But that is precisely what we mean by the historical character of human experience. The objectivised, the achieved, the asserted is (more or less) the past. The striving to achieve, the questioning, is the present activity of the mind (and mind is what it does) reaching beyond this present actuality to what is as yet not actualized in order to actualize it; and this is the future. So the future already exists, not actually achieved, but in the dynamic tendency of the mind in the process of realizing the as yet unrealized. The intimate relationship between questioning and history becomes clear. The mind thus, so to speak, 'feeds' on its own (past) achievements (the ascertained facts which are the weight behind the cutting edge of questioning) in bringing itself

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110 "All externality is imaginary; for externality - a mutual outsidedness in the abstract sense of the denial of a mutual insidedness - is, as such, abstraction, and abstraction is always intuition or imagination. It is only to the imagination that the mind is ever outside its object; but to the imagination it is always outside its object, even when that object is itself as in fact it always is. Therefore, since the externality of the object is only imaginary, the act by which we create the object is never capricious: we only imagine it to be capricious: in point of fact it is necessary and an integral part of the life of reason." R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 293. Imagination, and imaginative activity would therefore seem to be the foundation of that externality which is characteristic of the objects of scientific (as distinct from historical or philosophical) knowledge.
forth in new forms of activity (which, we must remember, are identical
with the mind itself). Its past is a quasi-substance which it trans­
forms into new forms of itself through questioning and reflection.
Objectivizing is the making available of what is achieved (past facts)
as a condition of the mind's questioning activity (that it have some­
thing to act about in a questioning way) so that it can creatively
bring forth new forms of itself as successive reflections upon its
(past) achievements.\textsuperscript{111}

Towards this future affirmational state to which it is
striving, the question, that is, the mind in its activity of questioning,
is related both affirmatively and negatively: it affirms it, inasmuch
as the very asking of the question presupposes and demands an (as yet
unrealized) answer as its complement; it negates it, inasmuch as the
question, being an unanswered question, is the absence (negation) of
the answer. Likewise in relation to the past, to the body of achieved
factual information, it affirms it, inasmuch as questioning presupposes
available information; it negates it inasmuch as the mind, through the
question, strives to go beyond it, and in doing so alters it; past facts

\textsuperscript{111} "...inasmuch as its whole life is a process of self-
determination, the past in any such process is the evil which is
rejected, good when it was brought into being but now outdated and there­
fore evil if it had been retained." \textit{Speculum Mentis}, p. 296.
look different as they are seen from greater perspective. Hence, the question is in dialectic interplay with prior fact (presupposed by the question and to some extent embodied in the question) and subsequent (future, as yet not ascertained) fact, to be made known through the process of questioning. Thus it appears how the question is a function of the dialectic of negativity, which is the life blood of the mind.

The questioning activity of the mind, as Speculum Mentis illustrates, is the dialectical dynamism whereby the mind ascends from lower to higher levels of consciousness. Collingwood denies that any level of consciousness necessitates a higher one. But, as Louis O. Mink well points out,112 every mental activity is accompanied by its own characteristic emotion, and this emotion may remain unexpressed at that level. What drives the mind to a higher level is not the thirst for knowledge or novelty, but the need to express the emotion attendant on thinking at the lower. Only a higher level of conscious activity can express an emotion attendant on a lower order of activity. And here is the dynamism of the dialectical transformation from implicit (lower level) to explicit (higher level). It is in reflection that emotion is made explicit, not as an object of reflection but by being expressed in the discursive act of reflection.

112 See his Mind, History and Dialectic, p. 237.
The relation between emotion and thought therefore occupies in Collingwood's thought the conceptual locus which in other systems is occupied by a distinction between "subjective" and "objective." Emotion is, in all its occurrences, the felt ("subjective") quality of experience, thought the grasp of ("objective") structure in experience. Emotion never becomes an object of thought, but it is not opposed to thinking, as if every human act were a tactical victory over the other in a Manichean war for dominance.113

Unexpressed emotion inhibits and holds consciousness back from its forward thrust, from its work of questioning and criticism. Collingwood regards this failure to express an emotion as a corruption of consciousness. Louis O. Mink says114 that the expression of emotion is not just an ornamental decoration on the life of reason, nor a mere catharsis which clears the way for thought, but it is the energy for

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113 Ibid., p. 237. Felt disconformity with itself is the emotional counterpart of error, and the spur to the mind to reconstitute itself by reflection over its present actual state, and bring to (objective) clarity what is there in implicit confusion. "...any error (the mind) makes concerning its own nature (and every error is that) creates two conflicting results: a new state of itself, and a new notion of itself. But, because its own state is a state of consciousness, this new state, even though only implicitly, contradicts the newly formed notion. Thus there are two conflicting notions of itself in the mind, and this conflict is the mark of error and the signal that a return to the road of truth is required. Thus the equilibrium of thought is a stable equilibrium like that of a gyroscope; but it is only the energy of the gyroscope that keeps it upright." Speculum Mentis, pp. 296-297.

114 See Louis O. Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic, p. 238.
all rational inquiry. The mind's search for truth must not only satisfy the logical criteria for knowledge but must also express the emotions which well up through the levels of consciousness. For this end, the work of art is indispensable. The life of art may be a stage to be eventually abandoned, but it is indispensable for education in expressiveness. 115 "Thought never outgrows the need of language, never learns to live without that immediacy or intuitiveness which marks the aesthetic consciousness. To lose that would be to lose its own cutting edge."116

115 See Ibid.
116 R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, p. 158.
APPENDIX TWO

FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE LOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER

The conclusion of chapter nine, that there is a logic of questioning proper to history, leads inevitably to ask regarding the principles, structure and mode of procedure of this logic.

The basic principle of this logic, the concrete universal, was shown following Collingwood, in chapter four above, to have the structure of an overlap of classes in a scale of forms. Looking at this logical basis precisely as it is the principle of logical structure in history, it was shown, in chapter nine, with the help of Robert Stover, John Wild, and Ernst Cassirer, that this basic unity in diversity (universal) is actively created and constitutively constructed by a unity in diversity of consciousnesses unified in the activity of dialectical interrogation.

Given, then, that this is the basis of the intelligibility of history, what can we say regarding the structural outlines of this logic such as might form the subject matter of a logical textbook?

Leslie Armour feels that the elaboration of such a dialectical logic is possible.

I can only conclude, then, that though it is by no means easy to say what a dialectical logic is, there is, certainly a kind of logic which one can distinguish in this way and the possibilities for its development seem to be considerable. In fact there are important grounds for thinking that we
cannot do without such a logic. Under the circumstances, there seems to be no reason to suppose that the demand for this kind of logic is illegitimate.¹

But the elaboration of such a logic does seem to be frustrated in principle right from the start, since the identity of form and content is a basic tenet of dialectical thought. This seems to imply that any concrete situation embodies its own sui generis logic, so that nothing can be said a priori to the concrete situation. This seems to be confirmed by what Collingwood says about the need for insight into the concrete situation in order to know how to act² and also when he says that nothing is recognizable as evidence until it is used as such.³

But the situation is not quite as hopeless as this may make it appear to be. For, notwithstanding that Leslie Armour affirms the possibility of elaborating such a logic, he warns that such a logic is limited and kept in check by the existence of other and equally valid logical systems:

...arguments in favour of a dialectical logic need not be arguments for the abolition of other sorts of logic. The relations between them are

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³ See his The Idea of History, p. 280. See also chapter 1, above, pp. 51-52.
complex, but I have suggested that one may well need a "logic of limiting cases" even within the confines of a dialectical logic and that this will have important properties in common with traditional logics. The relationship in this case will simply be that of part and whole - and the worst sin of the traditional logician on this view, will have been that he made the part seem like the whole.4

In agreement with this observation it is submitted (conclusion to chapter nine above) that genus-species, abstract, propositional logic is valid and exercises its own sui generis autonomy. Therefore, from the point of view of abstract genus-species logic, we can look at dynamic self developing human consciousness from the outside, not merely from inside some concrete situation of involvement.5 We can then articulate what belongs to it as such.

If looked at in this way, what is said about the dialectical logic of self constituting consciousness is going to concern more the moral qualities of the conscious subject, and the insight-abilities accruing to such a conscious subject. In other words, this chapter of a logical textbook would bear upon that part of logic in which logic overlaps with ethics, which is quite consistent with what Collingwood

4 Leslie Armour, op.cit., p. 115.

5 It may be remarked that Charles Reich's The Greening of America is a dialectical analysis of the American fact from within the American consciousness.
said about the various parts of philosophy.  

If, following Collingwood's lead, we focus our train of thought on the logic of a consciousness engaged in research of a scientific or historical, or crime solving nature, we can delineate at least in a broad perspective, what are some of these moral qualities, and how they are logically determining, especially if we allow a little help to come from Michael Polanyi, since Collingwood himself leaves his investigative logic little developed. The principal feature of logical import in the following analysis will be the concept of "guessing" and more specifically, of "right guessing." There are no prescribed rules for discovering the unknown, or finding the solution to a newly arisen problem. Where prescribed rules and methods are silent, the researcher or questioner is "on his own", and his personal judgment, in which he "puts himself and his reputation on the line" is ultimately determining. But his "guesses", though prescriptively without pre-given foundation, are not arbitrary, or mere "shots in the dark." His guesses, or "hunches" are "right" if he correctly follows a directive principle which he himself embodies within his conscious self. And this is nothing other than the infixed directedness of consciousness to reality, or to the

6 See his Essay on Philosophical Method, pp. 189-190. Also see chapter 4 above, pp. 222 et seq.
whole of that which is. This infixed directedness is present not as something seen but as a conscious "weight," presenting itself as a feeling of concern and urgency to act. The researcher has to "feel his way" through the pathway to the solution of his problem, and the pathway becomes gradually evident only as each step is actually taken. In other words, he constructs the pathway in the very activity of "picking" his way through it. Fidelity to this tension of consciousness in search of the truth, the fully real in which his true self is also realized, is the only lodestone the researcher, or problem solver has to follow in cutting new pathways where none are already provided.

A. Commitment to a Consensus: Acceptance of Authority: Aim of Each to be his own Authority.

The first quality of a good researcher is commitment to a tradition. In order to learn 'the tricks of his trade' a novice researcher does not simply consult research manuals. He attaches himself to a reputable community of scientists (or historians, if his field is history) which community is defined by scientific (or historical) aims and objects and professes a responsible commitment to truth.

As the bearer of a tradition, this scientific (or historical) body, which may be regarded as a common consciousness shared by many individual consciousnesses (whose unity in diversity is basically linguistic, as was explained in chapter nine above), is defined by an accepted set of convictions about the world (natural or historical, as the case may be) as to how it looks and how it should look, or as to how
it was in the past.

Every interpretation of nature, whether scientific, non scientific or anti-scientific, is based on some inductive conception of the general nature of things.⁷

This corresponds to Collingwood's presuppositions, including absolute presuppositions, which determine the integrity and identity of the corporate consciousness, and whose acceptance by the members identifies them as scientists, or historians as the case may be. Each member thus begins his career by an act of fidelity to this tradition and to its embodied values and aims which that group as such is committed to safeguard. "The premisses of science on which all scientific teaching and research rests are the beliefs held by scientists on the general nature of things."⁸ The medical profession thus has the Hippocratic Oath as something in the nature of a codified creed, much in the same way as Collingwood regarded the Catholic Faith of the early Christian Fathers as a codification of the basic commitments of Western civilization and culture.⁹

Similarly, if one aspires to become proficient in the business of crime detection one will apprentice oneself to competent masters who

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⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

⁹ See Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 225-227; see also, above, chapter 5, pp. 308-309.
embody that art, judgment and skill. Collingwood refers to two traditions (exemplified in a Kierkegaardian fashion) as typified by the fact-finding Sherlock Holmes on the one hand, and by the more rationalistic Henri Poirot on the other hand, with Collingwood's decided preference in favor of the latter. ¹⁰

Since discovery is more of an art, and "since an art cannot be precisely defined, it can be transmitted only by examples of the practice which embodies it."¹¹ This means that the novice researcher must "recognize as authoritative the art which he wishes to learn and those from whom he would learn it."¹² He must incorporate a tradition by first subjecting himself to acknowledged masters as authorities in order that he may eventually establish himself as an authority.

To learn an art by the example of its practice is to accept an artistic tradition and to become a representative of it. Novices to the scientific profession are trained to share the ground on which their masters stand and to claim this ground for establishing their independence of it. The imitation of their masters teaches them to insist on their own originality which may oppose part of the current teachings of science.¹³

¹¹ Michael Polanyi, op.cit., p. 15.
¹² Ibid.
¹³ Ibid.
This traditionalism and respect for authority are not to be understood in the pejorative sense which one associates with conservatism and authoritarianism as quite inconsistent with critical inquiry and progress. For "it is inherent in the nature of scientific authority that in transmitting itself to a new generation it should invite opposition to itself and assimilate this opposition in a reinterpretation of the scientific tradition." A scientific community thus delicately balances enforcement of discipline together with inducement to dissent, which balance is realized in dialectical intercourse between the society and its members. This balance is expressed in the way research resources are allocated, and in the acceptance of publishable material by the scholarly organs of publication. A certain tension will be inevitable in such a dialectical balance.

Scientific opinion embodies the sovereign authority of science. "It is only by his peers that any claimant to knowledge is judged." Furthermore "(e)very succeeding generation is sovereign in reinterpreting the tradition of science."

14 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
16 M. Polanyi, op.cit., p. 16.
However, the sovereignty of everyone's position is more fundamental than the differences in rank between scientists.\(^{17}\) Collingwood says much the same thing when he says that

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\text{...the only way of knowing whether a given type of argument is cogent or not is to learn how to argue that way, and find out. Meanwhile the second best-thing is to take the word of people who have done so for themselves.}\(^{18}\)
\]

But, if each aspirant is to finally become his own authority, he has to recognize the superiority of his peers when he is in the formative stage. Docility, in the ancient traditional sense of the virtue whereby a student is a good learner through a readiness to submit himself to his masters, is thus an indispensable quality in any apprentice researcher being put through his paces in acquiring his own status as an authority.

If any reader wishes to rise here on a point of order and protest that a philosophical question, which ought therefore to be settled by reasoning, is being illegitimately disposed of by reference to the authority of historians, and quote against me the good old story about the man who said 'I'm not arguing, I'm telling you', I can only admit that the cap fits, I am not arguing; I am telling him.\(^{19}\)

The novice in scientific research will thus find himself,

\(^{17}\) Ibid.


\(^{19}\) Ibid.
through commitment to the tradition, the possessor of a body of information in the form of dogma, of commonly accepted commitments about the status quo of his field, and convictions as to how the world ought to behave and respond. Columbus, as an explorer, was committed to a world view specifiable meaningfully in the directional terms, north, south, east and west, and likewise he was committed to the view of the global structure of the navigable world. Given these presuppositions he was right in conjecturing that the East could be reached from the West. His mistaking of America for India was not due to these legitimate principles, but to his own mistaken belief that the world was much smaller than it actually is, so that he was quite unsuspecting as regards the likelihood of a large, hitherto unknown continent intervening.

The power to expand hitherto accepted beliefs far beyond the scope of hitherto explored implications is itself a pre-eminent force of change in science. It is the kind of force which sent Columbus in search of the Indies across the Atlantic. His genus lay in taking it literally and as a guide to practical action that the earth was round, which his contemporaries held vaguely and as a matter for speculation.

Thus "the influence of these premisses (beliefs held regarding the nature of the world) on the pursuit of discovery is just and indispensable. They indicate to scientists the kind of questions which


21 Ibid.
seem reasonable and interesting to explore." Howsoever great our convictions may be assailed, some holding firm is essential, otherwise there is a complete fragmentation of consciousness, with a sceptical abandonment of all research and no longer a conscious domination of the situation, no longer a "self reliance" in which the conscious self stands firm.

The intellectual daring which impels our acts of commitment retains its dynamic character within the state of commitment in relying on its own resourcefulness to deal with the unspecifiable implications of the knowledge acquired by the act of commitment. In this self reliance lies our ultimate power for keeping our heads in the face of a changing world. It makes us feel at home in a universe presenting us with a succession of unprecedented situations and even makes us enjoy life best precisely on these occasions which force us to respond to novelty by reinterpreting our accepted knowledge.

Such a commitment to a tradition does not eliminate doubt, otherwise research would be frustrated in principle from the start. But, no matter to what extent we encounter the unexpected, or the situation changes, we must stand firm on our beliefs which represent nothing other than our commitment to the truth.

A fiduciary philosophy does not eliminate doubt, but (like Christianity) says that we should hold on to what we truly believe, even when realizing the

22 M. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, p. 11.

23 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 317.
absurdly remote chances of this enterprise, trusting the unfathomable intimation that calls upon us to do so.24

Thus, just as Jacques Maritain points out that a man sacrificing his life to save a friend or to defend his country, if he does this consciously and deliberately, must know in the depths of himself that all is not lost, even though this action seems to negate that basic conviction,25,80 also the committed researcher must hold fast to some basic conviction right to the end, in spite of all obstacles and apparent failures, if he is ever to achieve success. The Newtonian physicist, confronted with the challenging conclusions of the Michelson-Morley experiment will not sceptically abandon science as a self refuting enterprise, but will see rather a fuller and richer understanding of his spatio-temporal vision of the world. The world conceived spatio-temporally stands firm, whereas the conception of an immobile framework of an absolute space at rest has to be relinquished. Again, as far as crime detection is concerned, the T.V. series, Columbo, has, as perhaps its unique characteristic, the image of a man who stands firm to certain unshakeable basic insights whose dynamic logic he follows to the end, much in the same way as Columbus' unshakeable

24 Ibid., p. 318.

commitment to the rotundity of the earth impelled him three times to try to seek a sea route to the Indies.

The science of today serves as a heuristic guide for its own further development. It conveys a conception about the nature of things which suggests to the enquiring mind an inexhaustible range of surmises. The experience of Columbus who so fatefuly misjudged his own discovery is inherent to some extent in all discovery. The implications of new knowledge can never be known at its birth. For it speaks of something real and to attach reality to something is to express the belief that its presence will yet show up in an indefinite number of unpredictable ways.26

B. Relativism of World Views: Reality of the Whole of that which is as Arbiter Between Different World Views.

But this grounding of research in the basic convictions of a community seems to involve a relativism of world views. Given a certain constellation of (absolute and relative) presuppositions, or basic convictions, "it would seem that our daily experience compels us with the force of logical necessity to accept certain natural laws as true," and that "(g)eneralizations such as 'all men must die' or 'the sun sheds daylight' seem to follow from experience without any intervention of an intuitive faculty on the part of ourselves as observers."27 But, Polanyi objects that this is due to our inclination to regard our own

26 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 311.
27 M. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, p. 25.
particular convictions (or absolute presuppositions) as inescapable. But such general convictions are often denied by primitive peoples. Death may seem to them not to be a matter of natural necessity but of evil magic or that the darkness of night is due to the sun returning across the night sky without shedding any light. Thus, the smashing of a man's skull would be regarded by us as highly significant in regard to his death, but would be regarded by the magical culture as incidental and irrelevant, whereas, to them, the passage overhead of a rare bird would be ominous and seized upon as the explanatory cause. Such primitive people are of normal intelligence, yet they hold their views as consistent with daily experience and "uphold them firmly in the face of any attempt on the part of Europeans to refute them by reference to such experience."\textsuperscript{28} Because "the terms of interpretation which we derive from our intuition of the fundamental nature of external reality cannot be readily proved inadequate by pointing at any particular new element of experience," "it would seem that we are in danger of losing sight of any difference between the rival claims of the magical and the naturalistic interpretations of events."\textsuperscript{29}

The objection stated above is that we stand enmeshed in a radical cultural relativism, inasmuch as each culture seems to be locked

\begin{itemize}
\item [28] Ibid.
\item [29] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
in its own world view determinants as regards the meaning of events, and therefore as regards what attitude or action together with its inherent logic, is to be taken in the presence of such events. Polanyi cites the instance of St. Augustine who had a profound interest in science before his conversion to Christianity. But, as he approached conversion, he came to regard all scientific knowledge as barren and its pursuit as spiritually misleading. Eleven hundred years later, at the time of the Renaissance, the spell Augustine exercised over Western culture waned as the secular, critical, extrovert, rationalist spirit spread into many fields, and finally revived the scientific study of nature. Today, however, a reverse process seems to be felt, as among many scientists there is felt "the balance of mental needs tilting back once again." 30 Science today seems to be not so self confident as regards the extent to which its generalizations make sense as far as the world as a whole is concerned. How do we stand then, when, with wavering and multiple basic commitments, we are confronted with wavering and multiple interpretations of daily experience. Polanyi answers as follows:

...the objective experience cannot compel a decision either between the magical and the naturalist interpretation of daily life, or between the scientific and the theological interpretation of nature; it may favour one or the other, but the decision can be found

30 Ibid., p. 27.
only by a process of arbitration in which alternative forms of mental satisfaction will be weighed in the balance.\textsuperscript{31}

But, what is to be the final arbiter in determining the alternative forms of mental satisfaction? It is that of reality or wholeness. Each explanation is more or less satisfactory insofar as it gives us an acceptable coherent view of experience. Consciousness is a tendency to an integral and fully determined totality of experience, according to which integrity and determination the elements of experience are regarded as real. But unfortunately

...there exist...no explicit rules by which a scientific proposition can be obtained from observational data, and we must therefore accept also that no explicit rules can exist to decide whether to uphold or abandon any scientific proposition in face of any particular new observation.\textsuperscript{32}

If no observation can supply explicit rules for the abandonment or upholding of any scientific position, what, then, is the role of observation? Polanyi states that the precise role of observation in scientific discovery "is to supply \textbf{not rules, but} clues for the apprehension of reality;" and he adds that this is "the process underlying scientific discovery."\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 28. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 29.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. Emphasis added.
This apprehension of reality thus gained in its turn provides
us with a clue to future observations, which is the process underlying
verification. This corresponds to Collingwood's position that ex-
perience produces strains in our basic convictions (a constellation of
absolute presuppositions) as they prove more and more inept to integrate
our experience into a coherent totality. With readjustment following
restructuring in the constellation of absolute presuppositions, we then
approach experience, whose meaningfulness (i.e., implication in wholeness)
is intelligible in the light of our readjusted constellation of absolute
presuppositions. This also corresponds to Collingwood's mutual relation
of implication that exists between the starting point and conclusion of
a philosophical inquiry, which he conceives as a constant return to the
beginning, combining together the movements from principle to conclusion
(as in deduction) and from fact to principle (as in induction). 34

Polanyi says that "(i)n both processes there is involved an
intuition of the relation between observation and reality: a faculty
which can range over all grades of sagacity, from the highest level
present in the inspired guesses of scientific genus, down to a minimum
required for ordinary perception." 35 Polanyi concludes with the

160-175; see also chapter 4, above, pp. 210 et seq.

35 M. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, p. 29.
incisive statement that "(v)erification, even though usually more subject to rules than discovery, rests ultimately on mental powers which go beyond the application of any definite rules."\textsuperscript{36}

Three things stand out here as highly relevant to our investigation of the logic of questioning, research and discovery. Firstly, the highest level of all grades of sagacity is accredited to be the "inspired guesses of scientific genius," and secondly, that there are basic "mental powers which go beyond the application of any definite rules." Furthermore, thirdly, "these mental powers" and "the inspired guesses of scientific genus" are concerned precisely with "an intuition of the relation between observation" (facts, events, fragmentary experiences, etc.) "and reality" (that is, universal integrity, mutual implicatedness, wholeness, the totality of all that is grasped somehow as a universal, that is, as a unity in diversity, not as an abstract, generic type of universal but as a universal whose differences are relevant to it).

Thus, says Polanyi, "(i)n the course of any single experimental inquiry the mutual stimulus between intuition and observation goes on all the time and takes on the most varied forms."\textsuperscript{37} He illustrates as

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 30.
follows:

Most of the time is spent in fruitless efforts, sustained by a fascination which will take beating after beating for months on end, and produce even new outbursts of hope each as fresh as the last so bitterly crushed the week or month before. Vague shapes of the surmised truth suddenly take on the sharp outlines of certainty, only to dissolve again in the light of second thoughts or of further experimental observations. Yet from time to time certain visions of the truth, having made their appearance continue to gain strength both by further reflection and additional evidence. These are the claims which may be accepted as final by the investigator and for which he may assume public responsibility by communicating them in print. This is how scientific propositions normally come into existence.38

The common consensus of the professional community will be the deciding factor as to whether the individual researcher's conclusion is incorporated into the fund of scientific knowledge as an established position which future researchers have to take into account, that is, whether science as a whole will now operate from a world view which is adjusted so as to take account of the individual researcher's findings. Thus, the common acceptance of the Einsteinian reinterpretation of the spatio-temporal constitution of the world as a result of the Michelson-Morley experiment gave rise to the world view of relativity physics which present researchers adopt as their basis for future investigations.

38 Ibid.
C. Objectivity and Universality Guaranteed by Responsible Commitment.

The concept of responsible commitment discussed above presents us also with the concept of consciousness establishing its autonomy and creating itself as a true self in the decisive act of staking its identity as a unique and original self on that very self-made decision in regard to the alternatives with which it is faced in seeking the solution to a problem. Human consciousness as such is an innate tendency to an integral and fully determined totality of experience. It maintains its self-ness and conscious integrity in backing its decision with the whole of that self as its stake.

What finally survives in research is what is commonly accepted by reputable authorities. As Collingwood puts the matter:

...it is not enough that science should be autonomous or creative, it must also be cogent or objective; it must impress itself as inevitable on anyone who is able and willing to consider the grounds upon which it is based and to think for himself what the conclusions are to which they point.  

Columbus, in staking his all in seeking a route to the Indies, was being true to himself. Notwithstanding that his empirical self went down in personal shame after three unsuccessful attempts to reach

39 See this appendix, pp. 796 et seq.

the Indies, his apparent "failure" was recognized for the success it really was when subsequent navigators correctly understood the epoch-making discovery he had made. The universal intent of his responsible self, was valid notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary. The Columbus we know would never have been incorporated into history if he had relinquished his project merely to avoid the shame of failure. His fundamental commitment was too strong for that. Being true to one's self means holding one's self in truth, that is, in relation to the whole of that which is, in which the self has its life, movement and mode of being. The "failures" of a truly committed man are never mere failures, but more often are the very occasions of that leap in the scale of forms whereby the consciousness moves from a lower to a higher level. Not all is lost, the true self survives in its self-developed fulfillment.

The explorer gambles for indefinite stakes. Columbus sailed out to find a Western route to the Indies; he failed and after repeating his voyage three times to prove that he had reached the Indies he died in shame. Still, Columbus did not merely blunder into America. He was wrong in accepting on the evidence of Esdras and presumably of Toscanelli's map that the Westward distance of the Indies from Spain was only about twice that of the Azores, but he was right in concluding that the East could be reached from the West. He staked his life and reputation on what appear now to be insufficient grounds for an unattainable prize but he won another prize instead, far greater than he was ever to realize. He had committed himself to a belief which we now recognize as a small distorted fragment of the truth, but which impelled him to make a move in the right
direction. Such wide uncertainties of aims are attached to every great scientific inquiry. They are implicit in the looseness of the hold which a daring anticipation of reality has upon it.\(^{41}\)

This "daring anticipation of reality" is nothing other than the responsible judgment of the researcher which in addition to being a daring anticipation of reality is together a positing of his true self in putting his whole self "on the line" as the stakes. As Aristotle had said\(^{42}\) "...the end appears to each man in the form answering to his character;" and G.C. DeMenasce incisively explains as follows:

Choice of the end is more of a conversion than a simple choice. There is only an analogy between the liberty of conversion or betrayal and that little, imperious liberty of the choice of means. In love of the end, it is the whole subject who seeks wills, mobilizes himself and finds. In this choice of the end, it is the whole subject who thus finds his raison d'être, his justification, his honor and glory. When I choose the means it is the means that presents itself to me to be sought, when I choose the end, I myself give an account of it.\(^{43}\)

Commitment is the act of a conscious self in which it together poses its authentic self (its self-posited self) and its relation to

\(^{41}\) M. Polanyi, \textit{Personal Knowledge}, p. 310.

\(^{42}\) In his \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, 1114a 30-35, b 1-5; see Richard McKeon's edition of \textit{Aristotle's Basic Writings}, p. 973.

reality, or to the whole of that which is. It is the self-taking-in-hand act whereby the self posits its self-ness in itself and in its distinction from, and in relation to, the non-self. This decisional self-positing of the self is not merely a self-isolating act but is together an act of universal import (therefore involving logical relevance which is our precise concern) and an act of consciousness, a grasping of a self in its opposedness to a non-self in a whole of meaning, an opposition which is together a definition of the self. Consciousness (as explicit or implicit thought) reaches out for the whole of that which is, that is, reality, but it effectively takes hold only of fragments, parts, which, as such, do not totally embody meaningfulness. Commitment, therefore, involves the desire and intent that others also ought to hold to the same, and it is therefore an appeal to the approbation of others, especially to the authorities to ratify.

D. The Researcher or Problem Solver goes beyond Rules and Present Achievements by Committing Himself in his Decisive Judgments.

Responding to Plato's objection in the **Meno** that to search for the solution to a problem is absurd, since if you do not already know what you are looking for you would neither be moved to look for it (and so would not have a problem) nor would you be able to recognize it if you found it (so, even if you had a problem its solution would be impossible), M. Polanyi says that "we must have a foreknowledge sufficient
to guide our conjecture with reasonable probability in choosing a good problem and in choosing hunches that might solve the problem."\(^44\)

But he agrees with Plato in that "we still have no clear conception of how discovery comes about."\(^45\) Such rules as we may have at our disposal are "merely rules of art" whose "application...must always rely on acts not determined by rule."\(^46\) Polanyi does not deny the existence or usefulness of rules guiding verification but says "only that there are none which can be relied on in the last resort." If rules guide decisions, it is equally the case that decisions are needed in the choice of the relevant guiding rule. Between whatever rules may be to hand and the solution of the problem to hand there is interposed the personal, responsible decision of the researcher or problem solver. It is precisely this which must bring the researcher out of a state of continuous suspension in doubt in the presence of the alternative courses he may take. To say that there are no established rules of procedure is not to say that we must always remain in doubt, but only that our decision what to accept as finally established cannot be wholly derived from any explicit rules but must be taken in the light of our personal judgment on the evidence.\(^47\)

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 30. In judicial decisions "(r)ules, principles
Problems that are solved by the mere application of available rules are solved by mere routine procedure. Likewise it is routine procedure (i.e., without any creative effort on the part of the researcher) to explain deviations from a rule by a deeper understanding of the rule and of its application. But some deviations from accepted rules may involve serious consequences for the rule itself, such as for example, deviation of the movement of the planet Mercury from the rules of Galilean and Newtonian physics. Likewise in judicial decisions "(i)nterpretation is most challenging when it involves a jump from the domain of rules to the domain of action. It then establishes the link between guidance and action." According to Collingwood:

the generality of law, like the generality of archaeology, is not an end in itself but a means to an explicitly recognized concrete end. The ideal of law is not the self identical immobility of this or that statute, but its interpretation; and this interpretation means using the law as an aid to the determination of concrete cases, just as the archaeologist uses his generalized rules for the purpose of fixing the concrete date of a building or other object.49

Polanyi maintains that "(t)he rules of scientific inquiry and canons are an assortment of tools for the performance of the judicial task. The judge picks the tool he finds most suitable and proceeds to use it on the body of the text interpreted." Gidon Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice, Allen and Unwin, 1968, p. 102.

48 Gidon Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice, p. 98.
leave their own interpretation wide open, to be decided by the scientist's judgment." This decisive judgment is the researcher's major function, and it includes "the finding of a good problem, and of the surmises to pursue it, and the recognition of a discovery that solves it." If he does rely on the support of a rule, he selects the rule that applies to the case, as a golfer chooses the club most appropriate to his next stroke. The researcher does not operate like a pre-programmed machine but "from beginning to end he is himself the ultimate judge in deciding on each consecutive step of his inquiry."  

This brings us to the crucial activity in research, that in which the researcher vitally and deliberately inserts his personal, decisive judgment into his proceedings. This is the activity of "guessing" and of "guessing rightly."

Polanyi says that, although natural laws are discoverable, this is not done by the mere application of some explicitly known operation to the given evidence of measurements and observations. The

51 Ibid., p. 15.
52 Ibid.
53 See Ibid., p. 22.
way a research scientist proceeds is somewhat similar to the way one proceeds in "discovering" a burglar in a neighboring room. First, there is the registering of observed facts: certain unusual sounds are heard from the direction of the room. Then, there is questioning: "Is it wind? A burglar? A rat?" First there is guessing as to what it might be, then some definite feature, what sounds like a foot-fall, is accepted as evidence that it is a burglar. There is then the judgment in which we decide that it is in fact a burglar. In that judgment the adjudicator stands committed, himself to be judged right or wrong upon verification.54 Here it is not a question of deducing new observational data from what is already given. The data, as data, are consistent with an infinite number of possible future observations. What was discovered is the presence of a burglar. Polanyi explains the manner in which the discovery was made as follows:

Curious noises are noticed; speculations about wind, rats, burglars, follow and finally one more clue being noticed and taken to be decisive the burglar theory is established.55

Polanyi says that what we see here is "a consistent effort at guessing and at guessing right." He details as follows:

The process starts with the very moment when certain impressions being felt to be universal and

54 See Ibid., pp. 22-23.
55 Ibid., p. 23. Emphasis added.
suggestive, a 'problem' is presenting itself to the mind; it continues with the collection of clues with an eye to a definite line of solving the problem; and it culminates in the guess of a definite solution.\textsuperscript{56}

Now "(t)he propositions of science...appear to be in the nature of guesses" and "...their conjectural character remains inherent in them" notwithstanding that they are "founded on the assumptions of science concerning the structure of the universe and on the evidence of observations collected by the methods of science" and "subject to a process of verification in the light of further observations according to the rules of science."\textsuperscript{57}

But, this "guesswork" so vital to scientific discovery, and "right-guess work", the mark of scientific genius, is not unfounded, not a mere exercise of arbitrariness. The method inherent in its operation is as follows:

In science the process of guessing starts when the novice feels first attracted to science and is then attracted towards a certain field of problems. This guesswork involves the assessment of the young person's own yet largely undisclosed abilities, and of a scientific material yet uncollected or even unobserved to which he may later successfully apply his abilities. It involves the sensing of hidden gifts in himself and of hidden facts in nature, from which

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., pp. 23-24. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 31-32.
two, in combination, will spring one day his ideas that are to guide him to discovery. It is characteristic of the scientific conjecture that it can guess, as in this case, the several consecutive elements of a coherent sequence - even though each step guessed at a time can be justified only by the success of the further yet unguessed steps with which it will eventually combine to the final solution. 58

It is important to recognize in this that the progressive unfolding is both an unfolding of the self in its own awareness of itself as a self and as a centre of potentialities (a future self) and of the unfolding of its world, which is together the shared world in which other selves participate owing to its universal intent. As Collingwood says:

The self and its world are correlative. I am the self that I am, simply because of the nature of the world: by studying a certain kind of world and living in it as my environment, I develop my own mind in a determinate way. And conversely my world is the world of my mind... 59

This process of serial "guessing" implies a certain foreknowledge of the solution to the problem.

In order to guess a series of such steps an intimation of approaching nearer towards a solution must be received at every step. There must be a sufficient foreknowledge of the whole solution to guide conjecture with reasonable probability in making

58 Ibid., p. 32.

the right choice at each consecutive step.\textsuperscript{60}

This process "resembles the creation of a work of art," about which Polanyi says that

\begin{quote}
(it) is firmly guided by a fundamental vision of the final whole, even though that whole can be definitely conceived only in terms of its yet undisclosed particulars - with the remarkable difference however that in natural science the final whole lies not within the powers of our shaping, but must give a true picture of a hidden pattern of our outer world.\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

This comparison of the groping and guessing of scientific discovery with artistic creation can be well appreciated if we consider what Jacques Maritain\textsuperscript{62} and G.C. DeMenasce\textsuperscript{63} say regarding "the practical intelligence, in wedlock with love" initiating a project and carrying it through to completion. We are asked to reflect on how a primitive man, as yet ignorant of a boat as a means of crossing a river, may come to invent one. Such a man, standing on a river bank \textit{desires} to cross the river. He retains in his memory fragments of knowledge from past experiences, such as, for example, having seen uprooted trees carried down a stream by a current, and having seen some birds perched on these

\textsuperscript{60} M. Polanyi, \textit{Science, Faith and Society}, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{63} See his \textit{The Dynamics of Morality}, Sheed and Ward, N.Y., 1961, p. 149.
flowing trees. He likewise remembers how he bound together tree branches to make a hut. These different memories, experiences and facts become fluid in his consciousness, no longer tied together in the unity they had as originally experienced. In this free-floating state they form a dialogue with his desire to cross the river. This desire to cross the river is the active form of his consciousness according to which these fragmented memories recoalesce in the growing consciousness of a primitive boat.

These recalled experiences rubbing against each other [in dialogue with his desire to cross the river] form a new synthesis, and thus, the savage creates his first boat, which is a true boat because it will be the man's knowledge and experience that will enable him to cross the river.64

The desire which characterises the inventor's present conscious experience is the motor principle in the reassembling of the fragmented past experiences presently retained in memory. The reunification, in which consists precisely the invention of the man-made boat, takes place when the fragments are viewed not in relation to the unity they had in their original past experience but in relation to the presently felt, but as yet unfulfilled desire to cross the river. The truth of the true boat consists in the conformity of what is known to the desires of the agent.

64 Ibid., p. 149. Emphasis in original.
From this comparison of creative inventiveness with research and discovery we can see how "the historian is...the criterion of history," in which he is "both the architect of the past, which is the subject of his judgment and the author of the principles by which he judges." The historian will be equipped with information derived from experience and past research. He will likewise have a question in his mind, a problem calling for solution. His informational data, referred to his conscious self in the form determined by his question will guide him to his solution. His skill as a historian will consist in his ability, perfected by past experience and the guidance of masters, to synthesise his material content in terms of the desire of which his question is the expression. His continuing decisions, in which there is exercise of the creative imagination in constituting a whole of parts, involve that he stake his all in each succeeding decision, like a judge in applying law to a concrete case, and like a scientific researcher in solving a scientific problem. The scientist precisely engaged in the work of research and discovery is bringing about science precisely in its historical dimension, inasmuch as the knowledge involved is taken


precisely as it satisfies human concerns, and answers questions which articulate the particular human interest involved. Concerning the researcher in science, Polanyi says the following:

(T)he curious fact (is) that he is himself the ultimate judge of what he accepts as true. His brain labours to satisfy its own demands according to criteria applied by its own judgment. It is like a game of patience in which the player has discretion to apply the rules to each run as he thinks fit. Or, to vary the simile, the scientist appears acting here as detective, policeman, judge and jury all rolled into one.

Thus, the "scientific conscience cannot be satisfied by the fulfillment of any rules, since all rules are subject to its own interpretation." Quite distinct from the routine verification of facts and references which forms part of the daily work of any scientist "the real scientific conscience is involved in judging how far other people's data can be relied upon and avoiding at the same time the dangers of

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67 See chapter 9, above, pp. 699 et seq.


69 Ibid., p. 40.

70 "Confronted with a ready-made statement about the subject he is studying, the scientific historian never asks himself 'Is this statement true or false?' The question he asks himself is 'What does this statement mean?' (which)...is equivalent...to the question, 'What light is thrown on the subject in which I am interested by the fact that this person made this statement meaning by it what he did mean?,' " R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 275.
either too little or too much caution." In his responsible decisions not predetermined by rules, the researcher is making himself the reason for his assertions and putting his reputation on the line in doing so. His conscious awareness and decision is thus an ultimate in scientific progress. "The scientist takes complete responsibility for every one of these actions and particularly for the claims he puts forward." The same is true of the historian, the judge making a difficult decision and the crime solver in interpreting clues in the disclosure of evidence. If his judgment is later confirmed by others he is said to have been right. If his work is later proven wrong he is said to have failed, since "he is bound to no explicit rules and is entitled to accept or reject any evidence at his own discretion." His job "is not to observe any allegedly correct procedure but to get the right results." Thus, in discovery, "the scientist has to be judge in his own case," and, in doing so, he proceeds much in the same way as the primitive inventing a boat. The process is described as follows:

72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p. 41.
Intuitive impulses keep arising in him stimulated by some of the evidence but conflicting with other parts of it. One half of his mind keeps putting forward new claims, the other half keeps opposing them. Both these parties are blind, as either of them left to itself would lead indefinitely astray. Unfettered intuitive speculation would lead to extravagant wishful conclusions; while rigorous fulfillment of any set of critical rules would completely paralyse discovery. The conflict can be solved only through a judicial decision by a third party standing above the contestants. The third party in the scientists' mind which transcends both his creative impulses and his critical caution is his scientific conscience.\footnote{Ibid.}

This central role of the conscience in forming the researcher's progressive and final decisions thus highlights the basic moral factor in the foundations of scientific research.

E. Reality as Researcher's Aim.

Sometimes the solution to a problem, or answer to a question consists in selecting for its solution one of the known elements of reality, and such was the discovery of the presence of a burglar as solution to the problem of the noises in a neighbouring room.\footnote{See this appendix, above, pp. 818 et seq.} At other times, and often in scientific research, the solution is by way of the postulation of an entirely new entity. It is this reality-orientation...
which distinguishes the art of scientific, or historical, or crime research from the art of creating fiction such as in the writing of a novel.

Now "our principal clue to the reality of an object is its possession of a coherent outline." \(^{79}\) It would take years of labour to recognize an egg-shape if it were presented as a catalogue of spacial coordinates, a feat which would rate equal to the discovery of the Copernican system as an intellectual achievement. \(^{80}\) But it is precisely this capacity to grasp wholes in the presence of fragments which is at the root of discovery. \(^{81}\)

...the capacity of scientists to guess at the presence of shapes as tokens of reality differs from the capacity of our ordinary perception only by the fact that it can integrate shapes presented to it in terms which the perception of ordinary people cannot readily handle. The scientist's intuition can integrate widely dispersed data, camouflaged by sundry irrelevant connections, and indeed seek out such data by experiments guided by a dim foreknowledge of the possibilities which lie ahead. \(^{82}\)

The most fundamental commitment, or most basic absolute presupposition to use Collingwood's term, seems to be that of reality, or

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80 Ibid.
81 Refer chapter 4, above, pp. 133 et seq.
wholeness, the conviction that all our experience is "of a whole" or that our variety of experiences to be intelligibly and meaningfully appreciated, must be reduced to the unity of a whole, to a global world view of unity in diversity.

Human consciousness, as such, seeks wholeness, but everywhere encounters only particularity, and, so, must continue its search.

Now (and this is precisely the remarkable difference referred to by Polanyi between a work of art and a work of science), there is some mysterious, pre-established harmony between human consciousness and reality, or the whole of that which is. According to Collingwood, consciousness is itself the whole of that which is, so that, for consciousness to be consciousness of unintegrated multiples of experience is for consciousness to be not fully conscious of itself. The fulfillment of consciousness is thus, according to Collingwood, the full consciousness of experience as a whole. This is clear from what he says about philosophy as the absolute knowledge of absolute mind. 84

We do not assert that the trees and hills and people of our world are 'unreal' or 'mere ideas in my mind'...the very essence of trees and hills and people is that they should be not myself but my objects of perception: they are not subjective

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83 See above, this appendix, pp. 798 et seq.

84 See his Speculum Mentis, pp. 291-317.
but objective not states of myself but facts that I know. Nonetheless my knowing them is organic to them: it is because they are what they are that I can know them, because I know them that they can be what to me they really are. They and I alike are members of one whole, a whole which the destruction of one part would in a sense destroy throughout, as the death of our dearest friend darkens for us the very light of the sun.\textsuperscript{85}

It is this commitment to reality which guides the researcher in his discoveries.

All these processes of creative guesswork have in common that they are guided by the urge to make contact with a reality, which is felt to be there already to start with, waiting to be apprehended.\textsuperscript{86}

It is this 'sense of reality' which validates the researcher's right to make 'hunches' and 'intelligent guesses', even though it sometimes happens that such 'hunches' and 'guesses' turn out to be abortive (how many primitives perished in their first attempts to cross a river on improvised rafts?). In research, the realignment of the fluid fragments of past experience in the search for wholeness is articulated in the form of a question or problem.

Thus, the reality-concept functions both as the basis of criticism of different conflicting traditions, absolute presuppositions


\textsuperscript{86} M. Polanyi, \textit{Science, Faith and Society}, p. 35.
or world views and as that which guarantees the universality of the individual researcher's commitment, and the principle which determines whether his "guesses" are "right" or wrong.

F. Unpredictability of Solution: Emergent Character of Solution.

Discovery of the solution to a problem, or answer to a question, occurs as "a process of emergence rather than a feat of operative action." This is somewhat contrary to Collingwood's position, for which the activity of questioning is unduly credited as being the sole operative force in the discovery of the answer. Since Collingwood recognizes as the sole agent in knowledge the self creative activity of self evolving consciousness, he does not allow that rest of the mind in which the questioned other (person or object) is allowed to respond in its own right.

Since, as said above, "there are no manuals prescribing the conduct of research...because its method cannot be definitely set out" the rules of research, like those of all the higher arts, are embodied only in practice, and so can be learned only by going through a form of

87 Ibid., p. 33.
88 See above chapter 5, pp. 250-251. See also criticism of Collingwood's position in this regard, chapter 7, above, pp. 438-439.
89 See above, chapter 7, pp. 438-447. See also chapter 9, above, pp. 703-708.
90 M. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, p. 33.
apprenticeship to someone who is already proficient in its practice. Discovery is "an extremely delicate and personal art which can be but little assisted by any formulated precepts."\(^{91}\)

Polanyi holds that "the most essential phase of discovery thus represents a process of spontaneous emergence,"\(^ {92}\) and, contrary to Collingwood, maintains that "discovery does not usually occur at the culmination of mental effort...but more often comes in a flash after a period of rest or distraction."\(^ {93}\) Collingwood insists on the need for sustained effort.\(^ {94}\) But Polanyi says that after "our labours are spent as it were in an unsuccessful scramble among the rocks and gullies on the flanks of a hill...when we would give up for the moment and settle down to tea we suddenly find ourselves transposed to the top."\(^ {95}\) Thus, "the efforts of the discoverer are but preparations for

\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 34.

\(^{92}\) Ibid.

\(^{93}\) Ibid.

\(^{94}\) See especially his Essay on Metaphysics, p. 37. "Everything that we call specifically human is due to man's power of thinking hard...high grade thinking...depends on...increase of mental effort and skill in the direction of that effort."

\(^{95}\) M. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, p. 34.
the main event of discovery, which eventually takes place - if at all - by a process of spontaneous mental reorganization uncontrolled by conscious effort." 96

G. Research and Problem Solving as the Building up of a Concrete Universal.

It was shown above 97 that "the origin of the spontaneous coherence prevailing among scientists" is found in the fact that "they are speaking with one voice because they are informed by the same tradition." 98 Because the scientists as a corporate group are agreed in accepting one tradition, and trust each other as being informed by this tradition, they express the continued existence of science. 99 Fruitful discussion between them would become impossible if they were not able somehow to rely on each other's opinion. 100

But Polanyi warns that this coherence of scientific opinion must not be imposed after the manner of a central authority, but rather by the spontaneous recognition and acceptance by the members of those whose judgment is the more authentic and to be followed, rather than

96 Ibid.
97 See this appendix, pp. 797 et seq.
98 M. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, p. 52.
99 See Ibid.
100 See Ibid.
questioned. And it is precisely in this that we can see the character of a concrete universal realized in the case of a scientific body informed by a scientific tradition. It fits perfectly what Collingwood said regarding the concrete universal when he says that "(e)verything in it is determined by its place in the whole." Collingwood says, further, that determinism is not involved, since "every part determines the whole and therefore by implication every other part." Thus, "each part taken separately may be regarded as the crucial determinant of everything else just as every separate link bears the whole responsibility for keeping the chain together." And so, "(e)verything in it is as unique as the whole, and the uniqueness of every part is based upon the uniqueness of every other." Polanyi speaks similarly regarding the scientific corporation:

Every time a scientist makes a decision in which he ultimately relies on his own conscience or personal beliefs, he shapes the substance of science or the order of scientific life as one of its sovereign rules.

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101 See Ibid., p. 53.
102 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
104 Ibid.
Polanyi asserts that scientists themselves recognize this in recognizing that "inasmuch as each scientist is following the ideals of science according to his own conscience, the resultant decisions of scientific opinion are rightful."\textsuperscript{106}

This "give and take" within the scientific corporation simply articulates from another optic all that was said previously\textsuperscript{107} about the essentially linguistic character of the concrete universal. It is in language that is established that unity in diversity of consciousnesses. Language is nothing other than intersubjective objectivity or, what says the same, objective intersubjectivity, or again, one consciousness participated in by many conscious subjects.

Thus, speaking of the "logic" of institutions, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman\textsuperscript{108} say that this logic "does not reside in the institutions and their external functionalities, but in the way these are treated in reflection about them."\textsuperscript{109} This means only that "reflective consciousness superimposes the quality of logic on the institutional order."\textsuperscript{110} They explain further as follows:

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} See chapter 9, above, pp. 657-658 and 676-684.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p. 64.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
Language provides the fundamental superimposition of logic on the objectivated social world. The edifice of legitimations is built upon language and uses language as its principal instrumentality. The "logic" thus attributed to the institutional order is part of the socially available stock of knowledge and taken for granted as such.\textsuperscript{111}

H. Overlap of Classes in a Scale of Forms.

The essentially ongoing temporal character of this corporate body and its convictions is understandable as an overlap of classes in a scale of forms. The successful guidance of science by scientific opinion demands strict understanding that "this opinion represents only a temporary and imperfect embodiment of the traditional standards of science."\textsuperscript{112} The aim of a scientific researcher, however, in soliciting the confirmation of his colleagues in the acceptance of his innovations must not consist of merely subjective motives of personal prestige and salary status, but "only in satisfying the standards of science,"\textsuperscript{113} that is, as a lover of truth. Thus, "viewing oneself as a lover of truth may provide the motivation for great effort in both creative and critical thinking."\textsuperscript{114} This forward movement of communally controlled

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} M. Polanyi, \textit{Science, Faith and Society}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
scientific convictions takes the shape of a scale of forms in an overlap of classes, such as was explained above,\textsuperscript{115} regarding the dynamic, dialectical concrete character of the concrete universal.

\textsuperscript{115} See chapter 9, above, especially pp. 699-701.
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ABSTRACT

Collingwood's call for the development of a hitherto neglected logic of questioning which he alleges to be the logical procedure proper to history is presented (chapter one). Chapter two investigates Collingwood's identification of knowledge with the activity of asking and answering questions, in which he takes the distinctive position that the meaning of any proposition can only be known in relation to the question which the proposition is intended to answer. This, in consequence, involved him in also taking the distinctive position that all statements are essentially historical in meaning, since every question (to which propositions are relative as regards their meaning) is asked by a definite person in a definite context of time, place and circumstances.

Chapter three investigates the suppositional character which, according to Collingwood, is essential to the activity of questioning. Questioning, as supposing, is important for Collingwood since it is this characteristic that marks knowledge as an activity, as distinct from the mere co-presence of the mind with an already given object simply to be contemplated. In the supposal of questioning the mind takes an active stand with respect to its objects, and is able to consider the non-existent, the "supposed." Since Collingwood identifies this particular feature of questioning with the activity proper to art, Collingwood's position on the nature of art is examined. In questioning as supposal, the proper activity of art, the mind exercises its creative
initiative in knowledge, as distinct from mere contemplative co-presence with a datum, as Positivists maintain.

The key logical entity in Collingwood's proposed question and answer logic is shown (in chapter four) to be that of the concrete universal, which is the principle of concrete unity in diversity in history and "the daily bread of every historian" in contradistinction from the abstract universal, which is the principle of intelligibility in mathematical deduction and scientific induction. Whereas the abstract universal is the principle of genus-species, propositional logic most apt for scientific thought, the concrete universal is necessary for concrete, historical thinking, which, according to Collingwood, alone could provide mankind with the intellectual instrument for the harmonious management of human affairs. The application of Renaissance science to the solution of human problems has resulted in the sundering of the various life forms, art, religion, science, history and philosophy, and Collingwood sought, through history and its properly human logic, to bring about a rapprochement of the now departmentalized human affairs, which departmentalizing fragmentation had culminated in the disaster of the first World War. Collingwood's concrete question and answer logic is his answer to the problem of prevailing human ills as he saw them to flow from the practice of treating human affairs with the methods of science which are properly applicable only to the natural, external world.
Collingwood's theory that relevant questions arise from historically determined presuppositions is examined (in chapter five). According to Collingwood, Metaphysics is really the historical study of the absolute presuppositions which determine the relevant questions of this or that particular historical period. Whereas relative presuppositions are themselves answers to previous questions, absolute presuppositions, which ultimately condition the meaning of all questions and their answers, are statements which are made not in answer to any question but are catalytic tools which the mind forms out of itself in order to question experience and thereby to convert it into the experience of a rational being. They are simply presupposed for the purpose of questioning.

Chapter six deals with Collingwood's theory of mind as the ultimate basis of all that is, and expounds his position that mind is not a thing, a substance, but is self-activating and self-creating activity. The totality of that which is, or reality, is thus understandable as reduced to the dialectical self-creativity of mind becoming progressively conscious of itself through the raising and solving of problems.

In evaluating Collingwood's position on the logic of questioning, chapters seven and eight conclude that, although Collingwood is right in recognizing that propositions have a distinctive meaning in the concrete situation in which they function as answers to questions, he was wrong in denying that they have a meaning in themselves distinct
from their function as answers to questions. Chapter eight also takes Collingwood to task for neglecting to recognize an already well developed logic of questioning in the Aristotelian tradition. In terms of the Aristotelian logic of questioning, Collingwood's theory of knowledge as question and answer is criticized as being the result of disorderly interrogation.

Chapter nine investigates Collingwood's claim that history proceeds by a distinctive logic of questioning, and concludes by agreeing that such a logic proper to history does exist. This chapter also considers precisely how historical meaningfulness differs from scientific meaningfulness, namely, that whereas science looks at the world as intelligible in terms of impersonal, deterministic laws, the historian looks at events in their relation to human, free causality, in which there is self-determination of alternative possibilities. When a proposition is taken precisely as an answer to a definite question, it is taken precisely in relation to human freedom and its projects and concerns which the question articulates.