THE TREATMENT OF UNIVERSALISM IN ANGLICAN THOUGHT FROM
GEORGE MACDONALD (1824 - 1905)
TO
C.S. LEWIS (1898 - 1963).

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UNIVERSALISM IN ANGLICAN THOUGHT FROM GEORGE MACDONALD TO C.S. LEWIS
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TITLE: The Treatment of Universalism in Anglican Thought from George MacDonald (1824 - 1905) to C. S. Lewis (1898 - 1963).

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The doctrine of universalism is ancient. It has been endorsed by individuals from the beginning of Christianity to the present. During the last 100 years, universalism became a topic of great concern within Anglicanism, particularly in the writings of F. D. Maurice, F. W. Farrar, E. B. Pusey and Percy Dearmer.

Likewise, universalism has attracted the attention of George MacDonald and C. S. Lewis. It is within the writings of these authors that the historical treatment of universalism is considered in this thesis, in terms of the former's influence on the latter. By examining universalism in MacDonald and Lewis's writings, I am offering a contribution to the historical study of the doctrine, especially in Anglican theological history. This complements several modern theological writers who have considered universalism, including Karl Barth, Karl Rahner, John Hick and Thomas Harpur.
In appreciation to Dr. E. Lacelle and staff, and especially to The Marion E. Wade Center staff at Wheaton College, Illinois.
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I. Introduction

Few religious writers have equalled the success of C.S. Lewis. His books have enjoyed immense sales and wide circulation, even numbering into the millions.1 E.L. Allen, an adamant critic of Lewis's theology, concedes that Lewis's volumes outsell other writers' by a ratio of "a score or so" to their "two or three."2 This is not to say that Lewis's books have been well received universally. On the contrary, Lewis has had his share of antagonists as well as supporters from both the conservative and liberal factions of theology. Still, his popularity remains phenomenal, and he is frequently quoted even by his opponents. As one Episcopalian bishop once remarked:

It is almost embarrassing the way I find myself quoting Lewis so often, but the plain fact is, he simply says everything better than anyone else.3

This is all the more remarkable when one considers that Lewis, by his own admission, was never formally trained in theology.4

It is my primary purpose in this thesis to discuss universalism within the writings of Lewis, and to determine the influence of George MacDonald on his approach to the subject. In doing so, I am not arguing that Lewis was a universalist. It seems clear that he, contrary to MacDonald, was not. I assert, however, that the writings of Lewis
overall contain a substantial interest in universal salvation which merits academic investigation, and that the universalism of MacDonald was a major influence on Lewis. Furthermore, I assert that there is direct evidence indicating a relationship between the writings of George MacDonald and C.S. Lewis.

Lewis's writings contain much testimony to the influence of George MacDonald on his overall theological beliefs. In *George MacDonald: An Anthology*, he repeatedly confesses MacDonald's strong influence on his thought. The following quotations describe Lewis's regard for MacDonald in plain, but powerful language:

A) I have never concealed the fact that I regarded him as my master; indeed I fancy I have never written a book in which I did not quote from him.5

B) Of Lewis's conversion to Christianity:

But when the process was complete - by which, of course, I mean 'when it had really begun' - I found that I was still with MacDonald and that he had accompanied me all the way and that I was now at last ready to hear from him much that he could not have told me at that first meeting.6

C) On the *Unspoken Sermons* series:

My own debt to this book is almost as great as one man can owe to another.7

In addition to this testimony, Lewis, in his autobiography, *Surprised By Joy*, credits MacDonald's *Phantastes* as having inspired him towards a religious conversion. Similarly, in *The Great Divorce*, Lewis
creates a literary MacDonald, or to be more precise, the departed spirit of George MacDonald, to guide him through heaven in a manner not unlike Dante's use of Virgil in Divina Commedia. In this work, Lewis describes himself as being one of the late MacDonald's "children."9

There is further direct evidence that determines precisely which of George MacDonald's books C.S. Lewis actually read. In all, MacDonald produced some 52 volumes over a period of 42 years between 1855-1897.10 Although it is feasible that Lewis may have read every one of these books, there is no evidence to indicate that he did. Rather, there are definite testimonies found throughout his writings that indicate, by quotation, admission or consideration, which of the 52 books he has read. These testimonies point to the following works by MacDonald:

1. Phantastes.11
2. The Princess and the Goblin.12
3. The Princess and Curdie.13
4. The Golden Key.14
5. The Wise Woman.15
6. Lilith.16

These books appear to have impressed Lewis considerably. In his anthology on MacDonald, he refers to them as being MacDonald's "great works."17 In addition to these titles, Lewis appears to have been familiar as well with the following:

1. Robert Falconer.18
2. What's Mine's Mine.19
In his various other writings also, Lewis refers to MacDonald briefly, without giving specific references. Throughout Lewis's writings, it remains obvious that MacDonald's influence is seldom far from his thought. The extent to which this influence operates within Lewis's treatment of universalism will be explored in the examination and comparison of his own theological views with those of MacDonald.

Contribution and Originality.

The resources of the University of Toronto and the Marion E. Wade Collection at Wheaton College disclose no thesis treating universalism within the writings of Lewis and MacDonald. No one appears to have shown interest in their views on universal salvation, but, as my thesis will indicate, these are substantial enough to merit academic recognition.

My thesis should bring insight into this subject on the grounds
that:

1) Although several writers, including C.S. Lewis, acknowledge George MacDonald to have been a universalist, no one has specifically analyzed his particular form of universalism, which, as I shall show, is distinctive from his contemporaries. In fact, there has been relatively little written about the theology of George MacDonald in general. The majority of authors are more concerned with him as a literary writer. Most of the unpublished theses in the Wade Collection, for instance, emphasize MacDonald as a literary, rather than a theological writer. One attempt at a combination was offered by R.N. Hein in his *Faith and Fiction: A Study of the Effects of Religious Conviction in the Adult Fantasies and Novels of George MacDonald*, but his thesis primarily contains literary criticism with some general theological insight, rather than an analysis of MacDonald's universalism.

2) The discussion of universalism within Lewis's writings is also unique. No other writer has displayed an interest in analyzing Lewis's thought concerning universal salvation. More so than in the case of MacDonald, some authors have examined Lewis in terms of his theology, but he remains primarily of interest as a literary writer. Of those who consider Lewis from a theological standpoint, several are outstanding. K. Takeno's *A Study of C.S. Lewis' Doctrine of God* deals mostly with Lewis's views on deity, including his trinitarianism, the knowledge of God, and evidence for God. J. Beversluis's book, *C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion*, advertizes itself as the first systematic
and radical critique of Lewis's theology, and discusses such issues as apologetics, morality, reason, pain, and grief. J. Willis's *Pleasures Forevermore: The Theology of C.S. Lewis* refers to several areas of Lewis's overall theology, such as God, Jesus Christ, the Church, Hell, and the last things, but these references are usually briefly stated, without any deep analysis. Likewise, K. Lindskoog offers brief and general remarks in *Mere Christian*, concerning such areas as death, Heaven, and Hell.

The unpublished theses on Lewis largely follow the same pattern of focusing on him primarily as a literary writer. Of those that deal with his theology, only two come remotely close to considering his views on universalism. The first, C. Dye's *The Evolving Eschaton in C.S. Lewis*, is primarily concerned with Lewis's expression of eschatology, but not universal salvation. G. Kingsley's *The Doctrine of Soteriology in the Writings of C.S. Lewis* explores soteriology from various angles, including election and free will, call, faith, baptism, and communion. It is a brief (55 pages) thesis, however, and disregards universalism.

As also in the case of MacDonald, no author appears to be interested in analyzing Lewis's thought on the subject of universal salvation. A thesis dealing specifically with the subject of universalism within the writings of Lewis would be an important contribution.

Reasons for the lack of interest in the topic of universalism are probably varied, but I would propose three which seem reasonable.
First, universalism has not been an overly popular doctrine with theologians, although Karl Rahner and Tom Harpur suggest that it is now growing in popularity. It has always been suspect in traditional theology, and often regarded as a heresy. Second, most authors appear inclined to regard both Lewis and MacDonald primarily as literary writers, rather than theological ones. While it is true that Lewis was never formally trained in theology, many of his writings are exercises in the same, and his works of fantasy are predominantly religious. MacDonald, by contrast, was a trained theologian, who began in the Congregationalist tradition and later converted to Anglicanism. Last, C.S. Lewis was not a universalist himself, and while his overall writings do express a strong concern for universalism, it is not a matter of urgency for him. Whereas MacDonald remained a convinced universalist throughout his life, Lewis's consideration of the subject suggests that, at best, it is a feasible position.

In addition, this thesis will also make a contribution to the history of Anglican thought. By analyzing MacDonald's influence on Lewis, I am focusing on the history of an idea within Anglicanism, through the writings of two unique individuals. The theme of universalism is one on which MacDonald, who wrote from 1855 to 1897, in particular held original views. His universalism, while generally distinct from both the Congregationalist and Anglican traditions, occurs in a period of Anglican thought in which much attention was given to the question of universal salvation. Lewis, who wrote from 1919 to 1963, was a powerful apologist for traditional Anglican beliefs.
I further believe that this thesis will contribute to a further interest in George MacDonald and C.S. Lewis. Interest in Lewis is very widespread, and he has had a significant influence on the laity, clergy and, to a lesser degree, seminaries in the Anglican tradition. In one instance, it was claimed that Lewis's spirit appeared in a saintly vision, and this experience was approved by an Anglican bishop at Dorset. Whether or not one wishes to accept this testimony, it does express an unusually high regard for Lewis. Interest in MacDonald, however, is relatively less evident since his death in 1905. Therefore, the thesis should help to promote further interest in a somewhat neglected field.

In discussing universalism within the writings of MacDonald and Lewis I have encountered a problem in interpreting the literary genre of fantastic fiction. While this thesis is not concerned with literary criticism, it is necessary to briefly address this difficulty.

George MacDonald was a writer of many talents. He was a poet, an essayist, a novelist and a preacher. He possessed degrees in chemistry and natural philosophy, an honorary LL.D., and was trained in theology by the Congregationalist Church, which put emphasis on doctrine and preaching. He chose to express his theological views through the genre of fantasy as well as in essays, sermons and non-fantastic fiction. And although his meaning is usually clear in these works, his fantasies are often confusing and hard to interpret with precision.

Much of the confusion that surrounds MacDonald's fantasy lies in the obscurity of his imagery. Secondary writers note the difficulty in
categorizing MacDonald's use of fantasy, suggesting that it could be considered as allegorical, parabolic, or possibly fabulous. His imagery appears to defy intellectual interpretation, for it does not follow any concrete or stable form or limitation, such as number, physical law, gender or tradition.

This appears to be the result of a deliberate effort by MacDonald, who, being "typically the mystic" as his son describes him, did not intend his fantasies for conscious edification. Rather, he designed his fantastic works to appeal to the imagination, which he considered to be the sign of divinity in humanity: "The imagination of man is made in the image of the imagination of God." Two of his essays, The Imagination: Its Functions and Its Culture and The Fantastic Imagination, impress upon his readers the caution that they are not to attempt any intellectual interpretation whatsoever, but should instead enjoy his fantasies for their effect upon the imagination.

There is less of a problem with Lewis's fantasies. Although he uses this genre to express theological views, his imagery is usually far more easily identifiable. An excellent example of this more defined imagery is that of Aslan, the great lion of Narnia. It seems obvious that Aslan is to be identified with Jesus Christ, not only from the parallels between the Narnia tales and the gospels, e.g., arrival at Christmas, death, resurrection, last judgement, but by Lewis's own admission as well.

While this remains a problem for the discussion of universalism
in both authors' writings, I believe that it can be solved. By MacDonald's admission, his fantasies are unrestricted fairy stories with allegory in them. Both he and Lewis employ allegory to illustrate intangible mythological beliefs. Thus, they can be interpreted theologically by penetrating the imagery and focusing on the basic ideas or principles lying beneath. These principles, when discussed alongside of other complementary passages from their non-fantastic works, should more clearly express the authors' intention.

I intend to begin this thesis by defining universalism as a theological concept. In this I shall place emphasis upon its consideration in the 19th - 20th century and in the writings of MacDonald and Lewis. After this I shall examine the historical consideration of universalism in two chapters. The first chapter will be a brief survey of universalism within Anglicanism in the centuries that preceded the 19th - 20th century. The second chapter will deal with the doctrine in the later period, through the writings of F.D. Maurice, F.W. Farrar, E.B. Pusey and Percy Dearmer.

The main body of my thesis will consist of the discussions of MacDonald and Lewis's treatment of universalism, both in and beyond the human situation. Following these discussions, I shall compare both treatments on the same grounds. Finally, I intend to reach a conclusion in terms of the relationship, influence and contribution to the overall historical consideration of universalism within the Anglican tradition.
Footnotes:


6. Ibid., p. 21

7. Ibid., p. 18


15. Ibid., p. 17.


Footnotes:


25. Ibid., pp. 105-6.


27. Ibid., pp. 119-121.


Footnotes:


33. J. Willis, Pleasures Forevermore: The Theology of C.S. Lewis (Chicago: Loyola, 1983).


41. Greville MacDonald, George MacDonald and His Wife, p. 400.

Footnotes:


II. Historical Overview of Universalism Prior to the 19th-20th Century

Universalism.

There are three alternative senses of "universalism" in theology. First, it is salvation extending to all nations, as distinct from the ancient Hebraic concept of particularism in terms of Israel's relationship to God. This sense is due to the influence of F.C. Baur. In the second, it declares the conditional universal benefit of Christ's atonement as opposed to Calvinistic election. This usage is basically attributed to the Arminians. In the third instance, it is "the belief in the final salvation of all mankind."\(^1\) It is this last usage of universalism, first used by Obadiah Howe in 1648,\(^2\) with which this thesis is concerned.

In this last sense, universalism is also termed apokatastasis. Taken from a unique passage in scripture, Acts iii: 21, "the restoration of all things," apokatastasis has been understood from the time of Origen to represent the ultimate salvation of all created beings.\(^3\) This was the term generally used by the early Church.

Although all universalist doctrines agree on the ultimate salvation of all humanity, there are many differences between them. For example, Origen's approach to universal salvation in First Principles demands a final restoration of all rational beings through Divine refinement. In this he includes demons, but excludes animals. He further opens the question as to whether this universal restoration will be vulnerable to yet another fall from grace, and therefore might have
to undergo further cycles of corruption and redemption without end. This is considerably different from those "tender-hearted fellow Christians" whom Augustine rebuked in his City of God. These latter supporters of universalism were inclined to dismiss the doctrine of an everlasting hell merely out of pity, and for humanity alone.

Likewise, there are notable variations in modern doctrines. The universalism described in The Divine Principle of the Unification Church or Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity is based on predestination, wherein every human individual must eventually reach salvation. Hell serves only as a punishment for those who stubbornly refuse to accept the grace of Sun Myung Moon, and this is only a temporary retribution. This is different from the theodicy of John Hick in Evil and the God of Love, who demands the ultimate salvation of every human individual as a proof of God's perfection. And both in turn are different from the popular contemporary "broad" Church position of Anglicanism which states quite simply that hell is incredible in light of an all-loving, omnipotent God.

MacDonald and Lewis share a unique quality in their respective considerations of universalism. Both writers expand their views to include creation beyond the human situation. This comprises the possibility of salvation for animals, demons and other created beings. This is considerably different from the contemporary 19th - 20th century opinion which largely limits universalism to the human situation. F.W. Farrar, who wrote during this period, offers the following definition of universalism as it was then perceived:
"Universalism, or, as it is now sometimes termed Restorationism: the opinion that all men will be ultimately saved." By their discussions of salvation beyond the human situation, MacDonald and Lewis have contributed to the study of universalism in the broader scope of the doctrine. Such expansive discussions are uncommon among universalist writers (with the exception of a few individual thinkers such as Origen). The majority of universalists have been concerned with humanity alone.
Footnotes:


2. Ibid., p. 530.


A. Before the 18th Century.

Although universalism has never been a main tenet within Anglicanism, it has attracted the attention of several individuals over the centuries. Prior to the 18th century, which witnessed a popular movement of organized universalists, advocates and sympathizers of universalism were largely a collection of individual writers whose efforts were unrelated.

One of the earliest examples of universalism is known from the Revelations of Divine Love, a record of the visions of the mystic Julian (or Juliana) of Norwich, about 1373. In this Julian claimed to have seen visions of Christ, who told her, amongst other things, that "Sin is behovable, but all shall be well, and all shall be well, and all manner of thing shall be well," and "I shall save my word in all things, and I shall make all thing well."¹ A revelation of this nature was contrary to the doctrine of the 14th century. Papal literature affirming the reality of an everlasting hell was well circulated throughout England during this period, including De miseria humane conditionis in which Pope Innocent III clearly condemned universalists.²

C.S. Lewis makes several references to Julian's experience. In a letter to Warren H. Lewis, he briefly comments on Christ's promise that all shall be well and Julian's description of Christ's redeeming
all things, and suggests that it is all very "odd." But in The Great Divorce, he quotes again from Christ's words, implying that it may be, as Christ said to Julian, "All shall be well..."

During the reign of King Edward VI the Articles of Religion of the Church of England underwent a substantial revision. In the 1552-3 edition of the Articles of Religion there were originally 42 articles, the 42nd entitled, "That all men shall not be saved at the length," and this article states:

They also are worthy of condemnation who endeavour at this time to restore the dangerous opinion, that all men, be they never so ungodly, shall at length be saved, when they have suffered paines for their sins a certain time appointed by God's justice.

The consensus of opinion, including that of F.D. Maurice, is that this article was originally aimed at German Anabaptists, who were circulating a belief that even the demons will be redeemed in time. Even so, the word "restore" seems to imply, contrarily, that the object of this article was an earlier form of universalism, perhaps one that was native to England. This form appears to be anthropological in concern, limiting universal salvation to humanity.

The dismissal of the 42nd article in 1562 is highly significant to the overall consideration of universalism within the Anglican tradition. Several writers, including Percy Dearmer, assert that the removal of this article marks the beginning of the toleration of universalism in the Anglican Church, and that this affirms the legality of universalism from 1562.
In the 17th century the doctrine of universalism found two episcopal sympathizers. George Rust, Bishop of Dromore, published *A letter of resolution concerning Origen and the chief of his Opinions* in 1661.\(^8\) Rust treated Origen's view of universal restoration with much favor. Likewise, John Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, in his *Exposition of the Epistle to the Colossians* in 1627, stressed Christ as being the restorer of all things.\(^9\) These writers hinted at universalism, but took care not to openly advocate it.

There is good cause for the caution on the part of Rust and Davenant. During this century the Draconic Ordinance was passed by Parliament, about 1648. This ordinance sought to prohibit all forms of dissension from the current Church of England doctrine, such as Roman Catholics, Independents, non-trinitarians, universalists, those refusing to take oaths, by a wide range of penalties including fines, dismissals, confiscations, imprisonments and death.\(^10\) Similar prohibitions were agreed on at the second Synod of London, in 1648.\(^11\)

These prohibitions doubtless discouraged some universalists from proclaiming their views. In 1646 an anonymous book entitled *Divine Light, manifesting the love of God* began to circulate throughout London. Its author (or authors) openly declared the salvation of all in Christ, and further declared that the opponents of this view were "antichristians."\(^12\) Others who attempted to preach universalism while remaining anonymous were Jeremy White and Thomas Burnet.\(^13\) The growing opposition to universalism, as evident in the attempts to outlaw it, is characteristic of the 17th century.
Some writers were not intimidated by this oppression, however. Gerrard Winstanley in *Fire in the bush*, in 1650, declared that Christ was the restorer of all things. He argued that God would eventually purge all things and destroy nothing, and that ultimately all would be subdued by Christ. Richard Coppin demanded that it was no theological error to say that all would be saved in due time, on the grounds that God had already promised this goal in I Timothy ii: 4 and II Cor. iv: 14-15. These views were presented in *Michael opposing the dragon*, in 1659. Likewise, Joseph Alford, a Fellow of Oriel, in *The church triumphant* emphasized the effectiveness of God's salvific power to such an extent that his universalist sympathies were obvious. Issac Barrow discussed universal salvation from the Arminian position in *The Doctrine of Universal Redemption Asserted and Explained*. While he suggested that it was possible to reject saving grace, he repeatedly described Christ as being the saviour of all in accordance with God the Father's will, based on such scriptures as I Timothy iv: 10, God the saviour of all men, specially of those that believe.

This pattern of individual writers approaching the subject of universal salvation independent of each other continued well into the 18th century. George Cheyne in 1740 wrote *An Essay on Regimen Together with Five Discourses*. In the fourth discourse, "On Spiritual Nature," Cheyne stressed that the perfection of God had no other goal than to restore and make happy all the intelligent finite spirits created out of divine love. He further stated that it was blasphemous to assume that ours was the only inhabited world in the universe. Similarly, the
works of William Law, especially *The Spirit of Love*, described Christ as pure love, emphasizing the saving nature which in time will save all.\textsuperscript{19} Charles Chauncey, an American, provoked much controversy from the Episcopal, Presbyterian and Congregationalist churches in Boston, through his universalist writings, especially *Salvation for All Men* in 1782.\textsuperscript{20} By the end of the 18th century universalism was growing in favour with the English Unitarians, including John Estlin and T. Southwood Smith.\textsuperscript{21}

The 18th century gave rise to the first distinctly Universalist organizations. Previous to this period, attempts to forge a Universalist organization met with little success. Of these organizations, which were little more than private societies with a shared interest in universal salvation, two are prominent. The "Philadelphian Society," formed near the end of the 17th century, endured for about 50 years.\textsuperscript{22} The "Burnham Society," founded in the mid 18th century, likewise exercised little influence outside of its membership.\textsuperscript{23} It was not until John Murray that the popular movement towards organized universalism became prevalent.
B. The 18th Century and the Organized Universalists.

This movement may be considered as Anglican for two reasons. First, it arose from Methodism prior to its separation from the Church of England. Second, its most influential leader, John Murray, was himself an Anglican.

Methodism, basically an evangelical movement within the Church of England, was largely the work of two men, John Wesley and George Whitefield. From the start, Methodism was divided over the issue of free will and predestination. Whitefield and the Welsh Methodists remained staunch Calvinists while Wesley and his party espoused Arminianism. The Wesley faction, eventually dominant, promoted the belief in conditional universal redemption and thus proffered this message to thousands in England and the United States, utilizing any suitable location to preach.24

Under Wesley's leadership, the Methodists remained within the Anglican Communion, save for some minor dissenters. Wesley strongly resented such dissension, and described the participants as "seceders and mongrel Methodists" in his journal.25 Even so, the desire to break with the Church of England was steadily growing, and schism seemed inevitable. Finally, after Wesley's death in 1791, Methodism was well on its way to becoming a separate denomination despite a confrontation with the pro-Anglicans (mainly over sacraments).26

It is difficult to place responsibility for the schism. On one hand, the bishops and clergy resented Methodist interference in their parishes, as the Methodist practice of field preaching enabled them to
flout the legal requirements of bishop's licence and incumbent's permission. This resulted in some persecutions, which led to further ill will and the desire to secede. On the other hand, the Methodists' preaching rooms rivaled the Anglican pulpits, and field preachers often challenged ecclesiastical authority.

Regardless of who was to blame, the Methodist movement remained well within the Anglican tradition until March 2nd, 1791, the death of Wesley. But by this time, the novel Universalist Church had long since left its Methodist origins.

James Relly (1722-1778).

James Relly was a Welsh antinomian Calvinist. In 1741 he became a convert to George Whitefield's predestinarian Methodism, and served as a preacher for about 8 or 9 years. Like many of the Welsh Methodists, he adhered strongly to the Calvinist tenet of predestination, upon which he based his universalist theology.

By 1751 Relly had broken away from the Methodists over the issue of universal salvation. He began preaching his own views which he set down in *Union: or a Treatise of the Consanguinity and Affinity between Christ and His Church*. In this work Relly proclaimed that there was a mystical union between Christ and all humanity, based on I Cor. xv: 22, all humanity dead through Adam, and yet all raised through Christ. Through Christ, all are elected to salvation with or without their knowledge, since he, in accordance with God's predestined will, has borne wrath and punishment for each individual, with or without their
consent. Therefore, argued Relly, "Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? Who shall condemn?" Through Jesus, the mystical head of the whole human race, all are saved no matter what they chose to believe during life.

Relly was able to set up a congregation of "Rellyans" at London, and he served there as their pastor until his death in 1778. Upon his death, his congregation accepted Elhanan Winchester as his successor, despite differences in theology. The congregation managed to survive, despite a constant barrage of hostility from the more conventional Christians.

Relly's theology thoroughly convinced John Murray of the validity of universalism, and Murray became his most loyal follower. After Murray had established himself in America, it was Relly's views on universalism which he promoted with great enthusiasm.

John Murray (1741-1815).

John Murray was born into a strongly Calvinist Anglican family. A full-fledged Anglican communicant, he began attending Methodist meetings during his family's residence in Ireland. He was familiar with both Wesley and Whitefield, but accepted the latter leader's views on predestination. He probably met James Relly at the Methodist meetings, and by 1760 he had become completely converted to Relly's universalism.

Although Murray consistently refused to become a universalist preacher under Relly, his sympathies towards universalism resulted in
his exclusion from the Methodist Societies. This was just the beginning of a relentless series of crises that drove him to America, where he hoped to live out the remainder of his life in peaceful seclusion.

After a series of further mishaps, Murray found his way to Good-Luck Point in America. From there he began a few years of itinerant preaching until he founded the first Universalist Church at Gloucester, Massachusetts, in 1779. His early preaching was reserved in terms of its universalism, and this gained him access into many conventional pulpits. When it became obvious that he was preaching universal salvation, many of the established churches turned hostile. But by then, Murray's Universalist Church was strong enough to survive their opposition. Due to his efforts, this church - the first to have its covenant drawn upon a strictly universalist basis - continued to grow, even to the present day. Organized universalism became strong in America.35

Rivalry between universalist factions continued despite an eventual union. Murray, for one, was entirely intolerant of any non-Rellyan forms of universalism.36 This was also a characteristic of Relly. In his Union, Relly repeatedly labelled other theological opinions as being "Antichrist's."37 For their part, non-Rellyan factions, such as Charles Chauncy's, strongly opposed Relly's views.38

Still, the Universalist churches continued to thrive, despite external and internal unrest. By 1803, 38 societies converged at Winchester, N.H., and their participants reached an agreement on their standard Profession of Faith, i.e., the Winchester Profession.39
Murray's overall contribution to the movement is basically that of being its founder, the first to set up Universalist churches as a separate denomination based on the doctrine of universalism. Whereas James Relly fashioned the theological framework of universalism in his Union, it was John Murray who was responsible for its success as an independent denomination. The modern Universalist Church readily acknowledges its debt to Murray. In the words of L. Fisher:

John Murray is entitled to be called the pioneer of our faith, the father of our organized Church in America, and so let him be forever affectionately remembered and highly honoured among us.40

Hosea Ballou (1771-1852).

Hosea Ballou succeeded to John Murray's leadership of the Universalists upon the latter's death in 1815. Until that time, he remained largely inconspicuous within Elhanan Winchester's ranks. At first Ballou, coming from an American Baptist background, preached a conservative trinitarian universalism. This was soon discarded in favor of a doctrine of rationality in religion that was non-trinitarian and more deistic, not unlike the Unitarian position. Deism, including such books as Ethan Allen's Reason the Only Oracle of Man, was widespread throughout America during this period.41

Ballou's books, including Notes of the Parables, 1804, and A Treatise on Atonement, 1805, did little to bridge the gap between himself and Murray. In the latter book Ballou attempted to disprove
trinitarianism, a major tenet of Relly's universalism.\textsuperscript{42}

After Murray's death, Ballou emerged as the leader of the progressing Universalist denomination. During his leadership the Universalists came to accept a position complementary to that of Unitarianism. This eventually led to the formal union between the two churches in 1961. Under his influence the denomination expanded from 30 or so churches to 500.\textsuperscript{43} Except for a brief schism over Ballou's teaching on salvation immediately after death (which was short lived and involved only 8 ministers and their following\textsuperscript{44}), his leadership proved highly successful, and Universalist churches spread into Canada and abroad.

Conclusion.

Prior to the 18th century, universalism within the Anglican tradition was largely limited to individual sympathizers and advocates. During the 18th century, it became the main thrust of a popular movement that has endured until the present, in the form of the Unitarian-Universalist Association.

While it is difficult to precisely assess the impact of this movement on 19th-20th century Anglican views, it would seem reasonable to suggest that, at the very least, it did draw much attention to the doctrine of universalism due to its rapid growth. From F.D. Maurice's \textit{Theological Essays} in 1853, it is apparent that Maurice was aware of this movement, and refers to it in terms of disagreement.\textsuperscript{45} Likewise, Maurice reveals that certain parties such as the Evangelical Alliance
were both aware of the movement and opposed to it.46 It had, it appears, captured the attention of 19th century theologians.
Footnotes:


10. Draconica - an abstract by George Larkin, 1687 - orig. date 1648? No other information given.


Footnotes:


15. Richard Coppin, Michael opposing the dragon, 1659, no further information given, pp. 12.


Footnotes:


31. Ibid., p. 135.


40. Fisher, A Brief History..., p. 47.

41. Cassara, Hosea Ballou, pp. 11, 22-3.
Footnotes:

42. Fisher, A Brief History ..., p. 58.


44. Williams, "Universalism," p. 775.


46. Ibid., p. 321.

* In some of the original works - as indicated by question marks - the place or dates have been omitted. In these instances, I follow the suggested place or date set by editors or commentators.
III. Britain in the 19th Century.

George MacDonald lived in Great Britain during its greatest period. Although there was widespread poverty and social unrest, Britain was at the height of its imperial glory. Just before World War I, the British empire contained one quarter of the world's land surface and population. The British Royal Navy, unchallenged on the seas, promoted a militant enforcement of British Christianity throughout the colonies.

British militancy was probably encouraged by the victory over Napoleon in 1815, since many Britons feared the French emperor as the biblical antichrist. One attempt to invade England by the Franco-Spanish navy met with utter defeat in 1805, even while Napoleon was crushing Europe on land. This apparent invulnerability, combined with the lengthy duration of Queen Victoria's reign (1837 - 1901), probably endowed Great Britain with an overall attitude of security and optimism.

This optimism was reflected in some of the religious movements throughout Britain. In some extreme instances, religious groups such as the "British Israelites" and the "Panacea Society" of Joanna Southcott presumed such divine favor that they proclaimed Britons to be the "chosen" people of God.

During the latter half of the 19th century, universalism gained popularity within the Church of England. F.W. Farrar, a prominent Anglican theologian in this period, records that universalism found
popular support amongst the Anglican clergy:

... once, as I know to my cost, savagely and generally anathematized, now openly professed by multitudes of the clergy — to which I gave utterance in my sermons on "Eternal Hope." (Here Farrar agrees with Maurice's pro-universalist conclusions against an "eternal " hell).

Likewise, Percy Dearmer, another Anglican theologian who lived through this period, summarizes the situation as "a strenuous battle for universalism." He attributes the novel interest in universalism to the 19th century advances in biblical interpretation, including the dissemination of Greek texts, the discovery of new manuscripts (probably the most notable of these being Codex Sinaiticus, discovered by Constantin von Tischendorf in 1859), gospel exegesis and the discovery of Jewish apocalyptic literature and its relevance for the New Testament.

Scientific exegesis of scripture, combined with the overall optimism rising from national security, appears to have made universalism a popular topic. Added to these factors was the Universalist movement in the preceding century, which at the very least drew attention to the doctrine.

Interest in universalism also carried over into the academic world. In addition to Farrar and Dearmer, other Anglicans who considered the doctrine included F.D. Maurice and E.B. Pusey, whose views on universalism I shall presently discuss.

In general, this period was strongly oriented towards religious intensity. In addition to interest in universalism, the Anglican Church
was torn between the Oxford movement, which sought to establish an ecclesiastic position akin to Roman Catholicism, and its opponents, the resisting "low" Church and evangelical parties. Missionary lobbyists, both within Anglicanism and outside of it, were exerting a strong pressure against Parliament. Methodism was now a fully fledged separate denomination from the Church of England, and both it and its offshoot, the Salvation Army, were strenuously evangelizing across the British Isles and abroad.

A variety of incoming sects, mostly from the United States, found willing listeners in Britain. These included several adventist groups, the aftermath of William Miller's failed prophesies, e.g., the Seventh Day Adventists; Mormons; and Jehovah's Witnesses. Also, some other groups, both natural and foreign, were distinctly non-Christian. These included the various spiritualist parties, Helena Blavatsky and the Theosophical Society, and the followers of Aleister Crowley.

George MacDonald's views on universalism may have been distinct from the Congregationalist and Anglican traditions. Even so, the militancy of his universalism was characteristic of both the optimism and intensity of this period.
Footnotes:

5. Larsen, Strange Sects and Cults, pp. 75-91.
15. R. Kennedy, "Jehovah's Witnesses, "Inter. Dict. of Rel., p. 100.
The Anglican Consideration of Universalism in the Mid 19th - Early 20th Century.

Although some Anglican clergy endorsed universalism as a dogmatic revelation, others attempted to keep it confined to a scholarly, objective question. These writers, including F.D. Maurice, F.W. Farrar, E.B. Pusey and Percy Dearmer, considered the problem of universalism in terms of scriptural, historical and theological perspectives. Maurice, the earliest of these scholars, is of particular interest, since he led George MacDonald into the Anglican Communion.

F.D. Maurice (1805 - 72).

Frederick Denison Maurice was not born into the Anglican tradition, but rather converted to it early in life. He, along with his mother and four siblings, deserted his natural Unitarian Church, mainly because of the Anglican stress upon the Trinity, which he declared to be "... the centre of all my beliefs."¹ His Unitarian background continued to exert a strong influence throughout his life, and his notable book, Theological Essays, was largely written with the Unitarians in mind.²

Maurice did not openly or dogmatically proclaim universalism in the manner of Relly or Murray, but may be considered as a "martyr" to it
in a manner of speaking. By 1853 he had published a series of essays entitled Theological Essays and his conclusions suggested the eventual salvation of all humanity, chiefly by refuting the notion that the Greek word aionios, when applied to hell, should be translated as "endless." As a result of this implication of universalism, Maurice was dismissed from his post as professor of moral philosophy in King's College.3 Much of the antagonism towards Maurice may also be explained by the internal unrest within the Anglican Church during this period, at a time when the "High" and "Anglo-Catholic" parties of the Oxford Movement were resisted by the "Low" faction (he remained "Broad Church" in outlook).4

Generally speaking, Maurice's life seems to have been a series of controversies and oppositions. His list of antagonists is considerable and includes the staff and students at King's College;5 The Record and The Quarterly Review;6 E.B. Pusey, with whom he clashed over the sacraments;7 and other denominations such as the various Evangelicals and sectarians.8 Much of his trouble arose from the difficulty of his language, which, as several secondary writers have noted, is often complex and vulnerable to misinterpretation.9

Maurice's Approach to the Question of Universalism.

Scriptural and Historical Considerations of Universalism.

Maurice begins his consideration of Scripture with the demand that it be interpreted with the presupposition that God is eternally
good and the divine will is universally salvific. In *On Eternal Life and Eternal Death*, the particular essay that was largely responsible for his dismissal in 1853, Maurice insists that Scripture be reconciled with the concept of a loving God.

Using a passage from Scripture - Matthew x: 27-31, namely, Jesus' instruction that God should be feared despite the fact that one's very hairs are numbered - Maurice demands a deeper theological understanding of the Bible:

> We are come to such a pass, as actually to suppose that Christ tells those whom He calls His friends, not to be afraid of the poor and feeble enemies who can only kill the body, but of that greater enemy who can destroy their very selves, and that enemy is - not the devil, not the spirit who is going about seeking whom he may devour, not him who was a murderer from the beginning - but that God who cares for the sparrows! They are to be afraid least He who numbers the hairs of their head should be plotting their ruin! Does not this interpretation, which has become so familiar that one hears it without even a hint that there is another, show us on the edge of what an abyss we are standing, how likely we are to confound the Father of lights with the Spirit of darkness?10

This demand for a higher interpretation of Scripture is generally consistent throughout Maurice's writings.11

To a lesser extent, Maurice also discusses universalism from a historical viewpoint. In considering Chrysostom's practice of threatening the reprobates of Antioch with a material fire and brimstone, he declares that although useful, such policies are "shameful in the minister of Truth."12

Similarly, he points to the absence of hell in the early
Athenasian, Apostles' and Nicene creeds. "They speak of Eternal Life," declares Maurice; then adds, "They contain no sentence about future punishment."¹³ This is a common argument used by universalists, who contend that the early Church did not deem it necessary to believe in an everlasting hell. It is similarly expressed in Karl Barth's commentary on the Creed.¹⁴

The Interpretation of "Eternal."

Maurice's essay, On Eternal Life and Eternal Death is difficult and very vulnerable to misinterpretation due to its complexity of thought. In his most basic argument, Maurice refutes the popular notion that "eternal" or aionios signifies an "endless" or "everlasting" state of perdition when applied to such themes as "eternal punishment" or "eternal death" - two common descriptions used to denote the popular concept of an everlasting, definitive, and entirely inescapable hell. The word "eternal" can only be applied to God, who alone is "eternal" in the sense of being without beginning or end. Maurice states: "Whenever the word Eternal is used, then, in the New Testament, it ought first, by all rules of reason, to be considered in reference to God."¹⁵ But it cannot be readily applied to hell in the same sense, since hell is not without beginning.

Although "eternal" may be applied to the things that God in his eternal goodness intended for humanity, e.g., "eternal bliss," it may only be so in that such positive and beatific concepts are from the "eternal" nature of God. But perdition or hell cannot be considered to
be eternal in this same sense. Instead, such concepts as "eternal punishment" or "eternal death" can only be considered as being "eternal" in the sense that they are the loss of the true "eternal" things of God: "What is Perdition but a loss? What is eternal damnation, but the loss of a good which God had revealed to His creatures...?"16

In this sense, the word "eternal" actually denotes a quality, rather than a duration. Hell is eternal only in that its quality is consistent of the loss of the eternal things of God. It is not a fixed state of "endless" torments, into which a number of guilty individuals are to be cast by an angry deity. Rather, hell is a self-imposed state wherein the individual in question willingly refuses the efforts of an all-loving God to endow it with eternal bliss, or "eternal life":

I ask no one to pronounce, for I dare not pronounce myself, what are the possibilities of resistance in a human will to the loving will of God. There are times when they seem to me -- thinking of myself more than of others -- almost infinite.17

This consideration of eternal is entirely different from the popular conception of hell as being a state or even a place of ordained and fixed hopeless punishment. Maurice points out that the groups favoring this latter interpretation of an endless torment imposed by God (for example, the Evangelical Alliance) are inclined to regard the question of universalism as the belief that the punishments of hell will eventually be relieved, in proportion to an individual's earthly crimes.18 Yet, in Maurice's view, hell is not a question of duration or of time at all. Rather it is a self-imposed quality fixed by the human
will, and not imposed by the "eternal" and eternally good God.

This is a difficult argument to follow. Maurice offers a simpler version of the usage of "eternal" in What is Revelation?. Here, Maurice states his case in far clearer language:

... the Gospel means the admission of men in Christ, into the possession and enjoyment of these Eternal Treasures, which men in the ages before His coming were feeling after, and in which they were sure that they had an interest, -- believing that to be without these Eternal treasures, is to be in the state which the Apostles describe as Death, Eternal Death...19

The Consideration of Hell.

Maurice is highly critical of the "crude theology of blood and hell-fire with which the Evangelicals unsuccessfully sought to salvage souls."20 But the concept of an actual state of perdition remains to be a real possibility within his overall theology. The term "hell" is by no means employed by Maurice as it was popularly conceived by many of the contemporary religious groups and thinkers of his day. In the previous section this was described as the belief of the Evangelical Alliance, i.e., a state of punishment imposed by the relentless will of an angry and/or just God. Yet, this popular notion of hell as a state or even a place or divinely ordered punishment (often described as material torment, hellfire, brimstone) was shared by many besides the current evangelical groups. Maurice states that "the belief in hopeless punishment belongs, no doubt, as much to Romanism as to Protestantism."21

Maurice's understanding of hell is considerably different.
Hell, according to Maurice, is a self-imposed state of loss, and its liability falls not towards God, but humanity. Hell, therefore, in its most basic definition is the loss of God, and the things of God, i.e., "of Righteousness, Truth, Love, the state which is contrary to these, is and must be Hell."\(^{22}\) He states further: "the horror of the Kingdom of Hell consists in the absence of all knowledge of God's Righteousness and Truth and Love."\(^{23}\) Hell is not to be perceived as a future calamity, but as a state that incorporates the past, present, and future, if the remedy is not achieved. Maurice is particularly confusing on this issue, and admits to an amount of uncertainty within himself. He readily confesses that he "cannot understand how men realise a state except in some place. I do not try to understand it."\(^{24}\)

Although Maurice rejects the idea that God is a punisher who condemns humans to everlasting perdition - literally casting them into hell - nevertheless, he retains in his theology the reality of "punishment." He conceives of punishment as being the natural consequence of resisting the divine salvific will. In this case, God can only be regarded as a punisher in that he allows the impenitent to freely choose to reject saving grace, thereby imposing on themselves the state of perdition or loss. Maurice sums up this position as follows:

> Our Lord pronounces this unbelief to be its own all-sufficing punishment. 'The light is there; you do not love it; you fly from it. What worse state can there be than that? You hug the evil deeds from which you might be delivered. You choose the evil which is contrary to the being and nature of the blessed God in whose image you are made. What torment can there be so great as that?'\(^{25}\)
In this instance, God allows the individual to self-punish, but does not directly inflict an external punishment. In brief, the rejection of God's salvific grace is perceived of as "a sin; a sin which punishes itself." The possibility of self-punishment may also occur at the national level as well as at the individual level. Such was the case of Israel in its failure to acknowledge the Messiahship of Jesus Christ. In this case, as Maurice states, God punished Israel by permitting it to continue in its rejection both of the Gospel and of its mission to spread the message of God's love to the Gentiles:

We talk of God punishing the Jews for their unbelief. Assuredly He did punish them. The punishment was that they ceased to be a nation of witnesses for a merciful and righteous God; that they sank into a nation of witnesses for a cruel God, that they became the servants of Mammon. No worse calamity came upon them than this, no worse could come. Rather than to take retribution, God is seen to simply allow Israel to sink into a state wherein it wrongly perceives of God as being of a cruel and Mammonistic character.

There is a secondary notion of punishment within Maurice's thought which may help to explain why an all-loving God allows humanity to actually punish itself. This is the concept of a correctional or educational chastisement. This corrective punishment may promote the salvation of an individual through the pain of loss:

that He will, by taking them from us, by any restraints or punishments which may seem good to Him, bring us back to Trust in Him and to Fellowship with one another.
Maurice seems to reject the sectarian concept of annihilation, and considers hell from two viewpoints: potential punishment and potential death. He concludes that the notion of an everlasting punishment is less terrifying than an everlasting death, in that the former view at least includes the picture of an accompanying "punisher," which is (in Maurice's opinion) infinitely preferable to the loneliness of an everlasting death, void of even the unpleasant company of the punisher. Yet, even so, this notion of an everlasting death, as Maurice describes it, cannot be readily concluded as being actual annihilation or oblivion. Rather it is a "bottomless pit" of despair, wherein the lost souls grow "colder, and darker, every hour." But even in this state of loneliness and despair, the souls are able to appreciate their misery. This appreciation must indicate a state of existence, albeit one that may be hopeless of any possible salvation.

Free Will.

Maurice basically accepts the Arminian position as to human free will. The liability of hell lies against humanity by its refusal to accept salvation. Thus, Maurice rejects the Calvinist position of double predestination, i.e., election and reprobation.

In this he counters two common theological arguments in favor of predestination, the cases of Judas Iscariot and the Pharaoh of Exodus fame. In the first instance, Maurice concludes that Judas's betrayal of Jesus was acted solely out of his own free will. There can be no
question of Judas working out a predestined role, or that "love was withheld from Judas."\textsuperscript{32} In the second instance, Maurice again stresses the fact Pharaoh was the author of his (and Egypt's) own misfortune. Pharaoh's will, according to Maurice, was altogether bad concerning the Israelites, and the contrast between this vile will and the divine will lashed the Egyptian ruler into a greater fury.\textsuperscript{33} God did not, however, coerce Pharaoh into oppressing the Israelites.

Maurice further suggests that the concept of predestination rose out of Israel's misunderstanding of its mission to be a light unto the Gentiles. In this regard he is very critical of Judaic Christianity, which he accuses of avowing the "sinking of God's righteousness,"\textsuperscript{34} or regarding divine sovereignty as a prevention of divine love, if not of outright hatred for some members of humanity.

\textbf{Death.}

Maurice's conception of death is notably different from the common view of this period, which F.W. Farrar summarizes as follows:

\begin{quote}
(i.) that at death there is passed upon every impenitent sinner an irreversible doom to endless tortures, either material or mental, of the most awful and unspeakable intensity.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

Death was regarded as definitive, disallowing any "second chances" of salvation.

Maurice's position, by contrast, allows for salvation beyond the grave. In this, he makes no claim to have insight into the realm beyond
death, and is often skeptical of those who do. Yet, he is concrete in his assertion that God's salvific power is not limited by death.

Maurice appears to base this assertion both on an optimistic evaluation of the divine universal saving will and on I Peter iii: 19, the preaching of Christ after death to those in the state of death:

'But Christ went and preached to the spirits in prison.' I rejoice to believe it... that Christ is the Lord of all spirits, who have lived in all times, and that He is the great deliverer of spirits.

And likewise:

-- that men, at all times and in all ages, who have been in their graves, have heard the voice of the Son of Man and have lived ...  

Christ's Atonement.

Once again, Maurice differs from the contemporary opinion, as concerns the Atonement. In common thought, the antilutron formula of I Timothy ii: 1-7, that Christ gave himself for a ransom in order to satisfy God's justice, held sway. God's justice could not be satisfied without infinite punishment, and that punishment would have been visited on all humanity if Christ had not substituted himself for them. By his agony, Christ was thus able to save some.

Maurice rejects the common opinion as being "a Justice which means only the demand for Vengeance," and "a Mercy which means only the exemption of certain persons from that demand." Instead, Maurice contends that Christ died and rose in order to destroy the oppressing
power of sin, and came to reveal the entirely good nature of God. This nature, according to Maurice, is incompatible with God's being bought off with the blood of an innocent victim. The same would be a gross injustice in letting the guilty escape and continue in sin, while the innocent party suffered and died.

Maurice's rejection of the common notion of the Atonement probably added to his opposition. He held on to this position with pugnacity, refusing to compromise in the least with his demand for the absolute goodness of God. If the common view is correct, states Maurice, then "Jesus Christ the Righteous does not show forth the mind and purpose of God."

Non-Christian Religions.

The common opinion, according to Farrar, asserted that the majority of humanity was damned. Salvation was considered to be reserved exclusively for Christians, despite the fact that the vast majority of non-Christians never had the opportunity of hearing the Christian gospel.

Maurice takes a sharp issue with this opinion. For him, the Atonement of Christ benefits all humanity, both Christian and non-Christian. The salvific power of the divine is seen to have been at work throughout every age, in every religion and in every situation. Hence, the Atonement is seen to be the climax of the unchanging love of God towards all:
Good Friday is the day on which we may speak, and do speak, of a love which surrounds Jews, Turks, Infidels, Heretics ... 46

The common opinion, in all its exclusiveness, impoverishes the absolute goodness of the divine. 47

Despite this expanded view of salvation, Maurice does not propose an equality of religions. Often, he appears highly critical of the other major religions. For example, of Islam he declares: "It cannot satisfy any Christian." 48 Even so, he consistently asserts the universal benefit of salvation through Christ. His message to the non-Christian world concerning salvation is:

His marvellous light is as much for you as for us. We can only enjoy it upon the condition of renouncing all exclusive claim to it, upon the condition of bidding you enter into it. 49

Sin. Since God is seen to be of an absolutely good nature, there can be no toleration of any evil or imperfection. In Maurice's thought, sin is not so much the various acts of fallen humanity, e.g., theft, murder, lies, but rather an internal human feature or an intricate part of human nature that wars with the perfect divine nature. 50 Thus sin becomes the "target" of divine wrath, since the perfection of God cannot tolerate it. The human agent, however, is the subject of nothing other than God's infinite love. Thus, the salvific power of the unchanging divinity is constantly at work in destroying the sinfulness within humanity:
... the Spirit which will bear all things, endure all things, except falsehood; which will send forth a fire to consume that utterly.  

God, in his sovereignty, has already pronounced this destruction on sin, through the death and resurrection of Christ.

Sin, therefore, is largely impotent in its ability to separate humanity everlastingly from God. The scriptural "unpardonable" sin or the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit in the synoptic gospels is thus viewed in a light different from a literal interpretation. Here, Maurice contends that the act itself is not unpardonable, but is representative of a deeper problem, the Pharisees' confusion of good with evil.  

To interpret this as literal, to conclude that some individuals could be everlastingly lost due to an act of sin, would be, according to Maurice, to "have darkened the Gospel."  

Salvation Beyond Humanity.

Maurice makes little reference to the possibility of salvation beyond the human sphere. His is largely an anthropological consideration of universalism. Even so, there are some references to the non-human situation. In On the Evil Spirit Maurice affirms the existence of the devil as a created being, against the scientific view that the belief in evil spirits is "degrading and despicable." He maintains this position consistently throughout his other writings.

Since the devil is seen to be a creature rather than a symbol,
in fact "the first to deny God and His love," it could be argued that the devil too might benefit from the ultimate destruction of sin. In light of the divine love and preservation of the creature, it would seem reasonable to propose the devil as a last candidate for a general apokatastasis. This must remain speculative, however, since Maurice entirely avoids any discussion of the devil's salvation.

Maurice is less consistent towards the rest of the created order. He describes two views of a general restoration in vague terms. In the first view, he describes the universe as a fallen creation requiring redemption:

... till He who is the Sun of righteousness is felt to be shining everywhere, and till there is no corner of the universe into which His beams have not entered?57

Or:

... that He must at last conquer all the evil in us and in the universe; that He will yet destroy all the separations and hatreds of sects, schools, nations...58

And again,

... the promise was to include not only humanity, but all that is related to humanity -- the body through which the spirit speaks and acts - the whole frame of nature, which has shared man's decay and death. The final day cannot come till all that the Father has redeemed is raised to its proper life.59

Yet, by contrast, Maurice also describes the universe as being unfallen, thus requiring no redemption:
The order which God created is very good. The order which He preserves and upholds is very good. There was no flaw in it before man fell, there is no flaw in it since man fell. That fall had actually no power to subvert it, or derange it. That fall was precisely the refusal of man to recognize his own glorious place in this order...60

Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any solution to this obvious inconsistency.

Eschatology.

Maurice knew of several prominent eschatological positions, e.g., of the American Baptist, William Miller. Maurice appears to have been highly critical of these, labelling them "exceedingly fantastic, figurative, inoperative."61

His own views on eschatology are vague. He suggests a highly complex theory of the last times, which is largely based on moral rather than historical considerations. In this, Maurice emphasizes working towards establishing the kingdom of Christ on earth, rather than waiting exclusively for a day in the remote future when Christ returns in a manifestation of supernatural quality.62

He does hint at a final day, however, when Christ will ultimately triumph over evil, sin and harm. He describes such a day as follows:

... that great and terrible day approaches -- terrible to every man who knows what the treachery of his own heart is, and yet most blessed, because in that day God will cast out the dividing destructive principle on which He has pronounced His sentence...63
And:

There must come a day when God shall be known as the Father of all the Families of the Earth, and when they will not refuse to be His children. 

Also:

We must expect a day when all things shall be put under His feet; we must ask to be God's ministers in preparing the world for that day.

Maurice's overall outlook on eschatology is extremely optimistic, and implies universal salvation. While he expresses a vague theme of judgment, it differs from the popular notion of a bifurcating sentence of salvation and perdition. Judgment, in the form of punishment, falls upon all manner of sinfulness alone, but the created order itself is purged and preserved.

Further Implications of Universalism.

I have already pointed out that Maurice's language is complex, and very vulnerable to misinterpretation. In addition to this confusion, there are several passages in his writings that would appear to guarantee universal salvation in clear, precise terms. The following are only a few:

The sun, the light, the air -- these are common gifts. The sacrifice of Christ, this must be claimed for all if it is claimed for any. The righteousness, truth, love, in which He will be revealed, we must expect for the universe if we expect it for ourselves.
And:

Only He, who was going to the Father, that He might unite all in Himself. And He, knowing that He had come for this end, and was going away that He might accomplish it fully. 68

Also:

That purpose of God which He purposed when He created us in Christ Jesus, and which He will accomplish when He shall gather all things together in Him. 69

Likewise:

That we are heirs through hope of a wider, an enduring inheritance — the inheritance of mankind... we confess a Unity which lies beneath all other Unity; a deep eternal mystery of Reconciliation and Peace, which shall overcome the mystery of Division and Evil once and for ever. 70

Again:

Jesus Christ was crucified in the flesh, that He might be quickened in the Spirit, and that, together with His own body, He might quicken us and the whole universe. 71

And finally:

That He has established a complete reconciliation with His creatures; then He will have been indeed with us... as the sure pledge to each man and to the whole earth of Resurrection and Life. 72

These and other passages strongly indicate the advocacy of universalism. Any reader of Maurice's writings, if unaware of the possibility of self-inflicted perdition, might readily conclude that he
proclaims universal salvation. Passages such as these probably added to his troubles at King's College.

Conclusion.

In life, F.D. Maurice strove desperately to maintain a neutral position towards universalism. His emphatic repudiations appear to have greatly confused his colleagues.\textsuperscript{74} When directly confronted with accusations of being a universalist, Maurice's usual response was akin to the following:

If it sounds dangerous to say that God willeth all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth, and that His Will shall one day be done, we must leave Him to justify the language; since we cannot, at least let us not contradict it.\textsuperscript{75}

Still, in light of Maurice's overall optimism, his consideration of aionios, hell as a possibility only, and his language in general, it would seem reasonable to conclude that his theology does point to universal salvation, despite his efforts to deny this. Although he refused the title "universalist" his theological position appears to have justified it.

**Contribution to the Study of Universalism.**

Maurice's contribution to universalism is twofold. In the first instance, he is one of the earliest 19th century theologians to have explored the question of universalism at great depth, especially in regard to aionios. Unfortunately for him, he was also a martyr to its
cause, in his dismissal from the college in 1853.

In the second instance, Maurice was largely responsible for MacDonald's conversion to Anglicanism, after MacDonald was driven from the Congregationalist Church. Although MacDonald had officially joined the Anglican Communion in the mid 1860's (precise date unknown) he had attended Maurice's services and been under Maurice's influence for some time before that. Greville MacDonald describes his father's relationship with Maurice in terms of intimate friendship. He also describes Maurice as a friend of all who shared the belief in universal salvation, and this latter description suggests that Maurice was less shy of admitting to universalism in the privacy of his intimate acquaintances.
Footnotes:


Footnotes:

16. Ibid., p. 309.
17. Ibid., p. 323.
18. Ibid., p. 321.
20. Richardson, Causes..., p. 199.
30. Ibid., pp. 322-3.
31. Ibid., p. 322.
Footnotes:

34. Ibid., p. 269.
43. Maurice, The Epistles of St. John, p. 58.
44. Farrar, The Eternal Hope, p. xiv.
49. Ibid., p. 243.
53. Ibid., p. 194.
Footnotes:


60. Maurice, The Patriarchs and Lawgivers, p. 140.


64. Ibid., p. 443.


70. Ibid., p. 277.


73. Also implied in the following writings by Maurice:

Footnotes:


75. Maurice, What is Revelation?, p. 431.
76. Greville, MacDonald, George MacDonald and His Wife (London: Allen, 1924) pp. 397-401.
77. Ibid.
In 1878 F.W. Farrar published *The Eternal Hope*. This work, largely a series of sermons, provoked E.B. Pusey on the grounds that it both implied universalism and referred to him as a severe, if not brutal, exponent of hellfire theology.¹ Pusey responded with *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment* in 1880, a historical defense of the doctrine of everlasting punishment.² Farrar countered with *Mercy and Judgment* in 1882,³ in which he argued against Pusey's conclusions on the same historical grounds.

This had not been the first conflict between these two. Farrar, coming from the Calvinist "low" Church party, had actively resisted the Oxford Movement led by Pusey.⁴ Farrar had been F.D. Maurice's pupil at King's College and retained a lasting affection for Maurice throughout his life.⁵ Maurice, as pointed out in the last chapter, had clashed with Pusey over the sacraments. This was a heated battle in which he remarked "How can we insult God and torment man with such mockery?"⁶ Pusey remarked that he and Maurice worshiped different gods.⁷ Farrar appears to have inherited the battle.

Farrar was an extremely popular preacher in his own right. R. Flindall describes him as "a formative influence on Victorian middle-class culture."⁸ This, combined with his ecclesiastical rank, made him a comparatively influential figure whose opinions were well respected.
throughout the 19th century. As such, his treatment of the question of universalism proves to be thorough and precise. He approaches the doctrine largely upon complex historical grounds, with much consideration of scriptural interpretation.

Farrar's Approach to the Question of Universalism.

Historical Consideration of Universalism.

In *The Eternal Hope* Farrar offers a brief justification of the hope of universal salvation based on the grounds that it had been endorsed by several ancient writers, including Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Diodorus, Didymus, and Gregory Nazianzus. Likewise, he points to several contemporary opinions which, if they do not openly support universalism, at the very least promote a serious questioning of the doctrine of an everlasting hell. He cites the opinions of such persons as F.D. Maurice, Canon Kingsley, Thomas Erskine, Archbishop Tillotson, Dr. Ewing, and especially, Bishop Butler.

Farrar's *Mercy and Judgment* is perhaps his most thorough and precise historical consideration of universalism. In this work he repudiates Pusey's conclusions, almost argument for argument. He records and discusses the more hopeful opinions of many of the early Church authorities, such as Clemens, Methodius, Theophylact, as well as more recent writers like John Bunyan, Jonathan Edwards, Bishop Wilberforce, and others. He further discusses historical opinions
throughout the ages on such aspects of universalism as the following: the notion that the majority of humanity is condemned to endless torments; \textsuperscript{12} terminable punishment beyond the grave; \textsuperscript{13} purgatory; prayers for the dead; mitigations; \textsuperscript{14} causes of various assertions concerning hell; \textsuperscript{15} Jewish eschatology and its influence upon the common notion of hell; \textsuperscript{16} the opinions of the early Church fathers which lend support to universalism; \textsuperscript{17} and a critical study of the ecumenical councils which were alleged to have condemned universalism. \textsuperscript{18}

Farrar is particularly sympathetic towards Origen's position, asserting that he was the victim of internal ecclesiastic politics; that Origen was "Anathematised for centuries by the ignorance and prejudice of men incomparably his inferiors in learning and saintliness." \textsuperscript{19} Farrar further asserts that Origen was "the victim of episcopal jealousy and party intrigue ... History itself has been falsified" \textsuperscript{20} - a reference to his excommunication centuries after his death. He describes Origen as being, in actuality, the "greatest of all the Fathers, the most Apostolic man since the days of Apostles." \textsuperscript{21}

Farrar's historical conclusions generally suggest that universalism was at the very least tolerated, if not openly advocated, within the history of the Church. Yet he endeavors to maintain a relatively objective opinion, admitting also that the doctrines of annihilation and everlasting punishment were advocated as well. His conclusions may be best summarized as follows:

That though I am neither an Universalist nor an "Annihilationist," I believe that both of these views have at
all times been held by many good and faithful Christians; that neither of them is positively rejected by any formula of our Church; that neither of them cuts off those who hold them from the rights of full communion...22

He concludes that it was non-heretical to have believed in universalism during the early stages of Christianity. Agreeing with this conclusion are Farrar's frequent descriptions of the early Church as highly positive and optimistic in outlook; for example: "the Church was irradiated by an eternal hope, and rejoicing with a joy unspeakable."23 Likewise:

This ebullient gladness, this joy in the Holy Ghost in the midst of much tribulation... were the essential characteristics... of early Christian life.24

Moreover, Farrar discusses the optimistic nature of the Church as revealed by its art. He concludes that during the first two centuries the atmosphere of the Church was one which emphasized the positive, salvific aspects of Christianity, to the exclusion of the more negative, judgmental elements.25 This bright optimism is contrasted with the later art which depicted the emphasis upon hell, the Last Judgment, and material tortures. As he suggests: "This gloom was partly due to the false views of Christian duty, which date from the third and fourth centuries."26 But the mood of the infant Church was highly salvific and extremely optimistic.
Scriptural Consideration of Universalism.

In addition to discussing the question of universalism from a historical perspective, Farrar also considers it in terms of Scripture. His first principle in the interpretation of scriptures suggesting an infinite or everlasting hell is that they must be interpreted with the presupposition that God is absolute love and perfect goodness. In this, he declares that:

God is Love. We shall never go far astray in the interpretation of Scripture... if we strive by our theology to regulate our life, and to sway the whole movement of our intellect by the spirit which Christ manifested and by the Divine example which He set; by the golden rule...27

Farrar is extremely critical towards any traditional interpretation which he considers to be taken out of context in order to promote the belief in everlasting torture, or similar abuses of Scripture. He suggests that these scriptures have been abused in that they have been interpreted outside of the presupposition that God is love, in order to express personal prejudices:

I should shudder to maintain for them the false claims which they never make for themselves as a whole, but which have been foisted upon them by ignorance and superstition...28

In Mercy and Judgment (and to a lesser extent in The Eternal Hope29) Farrar offers an indepth study of the passages from Scripture which imply an everlasting, or endless hell. He considers these passages in the context of their historical and linguistic elements, and includes the correct interpretation of hell with its varied terms of
"Sheol," "Hades," "Gehenna." He provides an overview of the general teaching of Scripture concerning future retribution, and as well, the specific teaching of the New Testament on the same.

In addition, Farrar largely shares Maurice's conclusions concerning the correct usage of aionios or "eternal," when applied to hell as "eternal death," or "eternal punishment." He strongly refutes the notion that aionios must always imply endless duration:

That the adjective aionios is applied to some things which are "endless" does not of course for one moment prove that the word itself meant "endless"; and to introduce this rendering into many passages would be utterly impossible and absurd.

And:

It must be indeed a hopeless prejudice - a blindness which must be regarded as little short of penal - which refuses to see that aionios does not necessarily mean endless.

In this, Farrar assumes Maurice's assertion that "eternal," when applied towards the descriptions of hell as eternal death or eternal punishment, does not imply a relentless, everlasting, and endless sentence of doom passed upon humanity by God. Farrar strengthens this assertion by discussing how aionios and related forms of the word were used by such Christian and Hellenistic writers as Paul the Apostle, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Leontius of Byzantium.

Finally, Farrar cites a collection of scriptural passages which would appear to imply universalism, e.g., John xii: 32, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto Me"; Acts iii: 21,
"Until the times of the restitution of all things"; I Cor. xv: 28, "That God may be all in all"; or Col. i: 19-20, "It has pleased the Father... by Him to reconcile all things to Himself." With these go a challenge to any who would claim that he had, in effect, explained away those passages which indicate an everlasting hell. Farrar's challenge reads:

And now if any reader thinks that there has been any "explaining away" of these texts let him consider whether the advocates of the popular view will not have to "explain away," not only multitudes of passages in the Psalms of David and in the Old Testament, but also in the New Testament?

The Consideration of Hell.

Farrar expresses an outspoken revulsion of that which he perceives to be the popular, or common notion of hell: "an irreversible doom to endless tortures, either material or mental, of the most awful and unspeakable intensity." He utterly abhors the common descriptions of this theoretical state of everlasting misery, such as "a vast and burning prison, in which the souls of millions and millions writhe and shriek forever, tormented in a flame that will never be quenched." More often than not, Farrar's language becomes highly passionate in expressing this abhorrence. He goes so far as to declare that he would accept a personal annihilation, if the common notion proved to be true:

that I might die as the beasts that perish, and for ever cease to be, rather than that my worst enemy should endure the hell described by Tertullian, or Minucius Felix, or Jonathan Edwards, or Dr. Pusey...
The inclusion of Pusey's name within this quotation seems to have angered him, for he described the wish as being quite unlike that of Paul's (that he would be separated from Christ for his brethren), and offered the strong hope that Farrar would retract it.\textsuperscript{41}

Despite this personal revulsion, Farrar does admit that an endless state of perdition is possible, a serious threat that is to be taken into consideration. Yet even in this admission of the possibility of everlasting perdition, Farrar firmly denies that it could be a state of material torture.\textsuperscript{42} He demands that certain descriptive texts, e.g., Matt. v:22, 29, 30; Mark ix: 41-50, which indicate a material hell of fire and brimstone, be interpreted responsibly, alongside of the concept of God as infinite love. Thus, any literal interpretation must be dismissed.\textsuperscript{43}

Instead, Farrar considers hell to be largely a state of self-inflicted loss, i.e., the loss of God. It is the individual, and not God, who maintains this same state, by refusing to repent or accept the divine offer of salvation. In other words, "the soul which never repents to the end will suffer to the end."\textsuperscript{44} Farrar's most basic definition of hell and all that he concludes it entails is best stated in his conclusion to \textit{Mercy and Judgment}:

\begin{quote}
And I believe that to be without God is "hell"; and in this sense there is a hell beyond the grave; and that for any soul to fall even for a time into this condition, though it be through its own hardened impenitence and resistance of God's grace, is a very awful and terrible prospect; and that in this sense there may be for some souls an endless hell.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

But alongside of this, he also declares:
Free Will.

As the last three quotes indicate, Farrar allows for the possibility of hell upon the grounds of human free will, i.e., "hardened impenitence and resistance." He shares Maurice's conclusion that hell is the consequence of human will, and not divine retribution. In this, Farrar largely rejects his own Calvinistic background in double predestination. Yet in discussing the question of predestination in the Pauline epistles (as opposed to Calvin's double predestination), he acknowledges the apparent contradiction between that which appears to be God's absolute will - the rejection of Israel and acceptance of the Gentiles - and the free human will as seen in Israel's own historical resistance. He openly admits that "The two answers might seem mutually irreconcilable," and his solution appears to be unclear. In fact, it would seem that Farrar does not truly offer a solution at all, but rather simply accepts this ambiguity as a matter of resignation: "God predestines; man is free. How this is we cannot say; but so it is." Despite this apparent contradiction, Farrar reads an optimism into the situation which implies a universalist conclusion.

He begins by suggesting that, although there is a mystery involved as to how there can be both predestination and free will, it should not trouble serious theologians: "But happily, this mystery need in no way oppress us, for it is lost in the plentitude of God." In the specific instance of the hardening or rejection of Israel, God is
seen to have predestined the loss of Israel only that his salvation should be expanded towards all humanity. Even this necessary rejection is seen to be only of a temporary nature, in that all Israel is to share in this universal plan of salvation: "Israel in part is hardened, yet 'all Israel shall be saved,'"50 and "the partial hardening of Israel should only last until the fulness of the Gentiles should come in."51 Alongside of his conclusion that the two positions were irreconcilable, i.e., "Since they cannot be reconciled, they must be left side by side,"52 Farrar asserts the divine universal salvific will: "God wills the salvation of all."53 Hence his conclusions do suggest universalism, in that God's absolute will is thrust towards the accomplishment of a far higher expansion of salvation. In other words, "The duality of election revolves into the higher unity of an all embracing counsel of favour."54

Despite this optimistic consideration, Farrar still points out that human free will might be strong enough to present the danger of an everlasting state of perdition. His universalistic evaluation of predestination must be considered alongside of his conviction that "the soul which never repents to the end will suffer to the end."

**Death.**

Farrar differs greatly from his contemporaries, in that he does not consider death to be a termination of the individual's ability to accept the offer of salvation. Contrary to the common notion that "at death there is passed upon every impenitent sinner an irreversible doom
Farrar argues that God's universal offer of salvation extends beyond the grave and that it is possible for the soul to be saved even after death. This assertion is a matter of dogma for Farrar, who insists that it is actually declared in the Apostles' Creed:

But this much, at any rate — that the fate of man is not finally and irreversibly sealed at death, you yourselves — unwittingly perhaps, but none the less certainly admit, and declare, and confess, every time you repeat, in the Apostles' Creed, that Christ descended into hell.56

He therefore asserts boldly: "There is hope for you; - hope for you, even if death overtake you before the final victory is won."57 And his assertion is based upon the historical consideration that death is not a "last chance" that limits the soul's free will. With respect to death, he discusses the concept of Christ's descent into hell, suggesting that, as is implied in the Petrine epistles, Christ preached to the souls who had already died.58 Similarly, he considers the various opinions of Church authorities through the ages concerning purgatory,59 prayers for the dead,60 Christ's descent into hell,61 and the belief in mitigations, or temporary reliefs for the damned.62

Farrar's conclusions respecting these topics are generally favorable and optimistic. He finds that collectively they offer validity and in all of them concludes "comfort and hope to those who find a stumbling-block in the remorselessness of human fancies."63 Along this same line, Farrar concludes that Pauline theology expresses an optimistic opinion of death:
What, then, was to be said about those who had died .. But Paul does not leave his converts in their perplexity about their departed friends. He tells them, in words which have comforted millions of mourners since, not to sorrow as those who have no hope, for that "if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which had been laid asleep by Jesus will God bring with him.64

Christ's Atonement.

Basically, Farrar shares Maurice's rejection of the literal interpretation of the antilutron formula in I Tim. ii:6, that Christ gave his life as a ransom for all, in order to deliver humanity from the willful wrath of God.65 Based upon three arguments, i.e., "God is Righteous," "God is Light," and "God is Love,"66 Farrar refutes that God would demand an innocent victim to appease his wrath, contrary to traditional views suggesting that Christ delivers humanity from the punishment of sin. He agrees with Maurice in asserting that Christ delivers humanity from the very power of sin itself. He firmly asserts that "forgiveness of sins is a very different thing from remission of consequences."67 Instead, Christ died and rose to break the power of sin universally, in order to liberate all humanity. He strongly denies that the atonement of Christ would ultimately prove effective only for a small percentage of humanity. If the majority of humanity is ultimately lost despite the Atonement, then, suggests Farrar, the devil and not Christ is the ultimate victor:

... what, we may well ask, is the result of the Atonement? Christ died for human souls. In spite of His cross shall the great harvest of human souls become the prey of Satan and only the gleanings be the Lord's? Shall Satan gather the clusters of the vintage, and leave for our Father in Heaven only a grape here and there upon the topmost boughs?68
Farrar continues along this line of thought, pointing out that Christ is described in theology and Scripture as being a universal saviour, e.g., "He is the Saviour of the Universe," I John iv: 14.69 Although Farrar does not specifically state that all must therefore be ultimately saved, he strongly suggests that, at the very least, the majority will be.

Non-Christian Religions.

Farrar argues that the Atonement benefits both Christians and non-Christians alike. He rejects the traditional view that salvation is exclusively a property of the Christian religion, to the exclusion of all others. Farrar describes this traditional view as follows:

... the notion that they perish has been till very recent times the avowed argument of many who, - most justly and righteously, but with a rash statement of the ground of their appeals - have urged on the Christian Church the sacred duty of missions.70

He proceeds to dismiss it:

If it had been necessary to interpret our Lord's words in the sense that the majority of mankind would perish, the Church would have drawn that conclusion from them. But she has not done so; she has not required of any of her children any such belief; and in all the Burial Services of her communions has been led by a holy instinct or a divine inspiration to utter over the bodies of those whom she commits to the dust the language of an inextinguishable hope.71

Instead, Farrar considers that the atonement of Christ covered both those within the Church and outside the Church, Christians and non-
Christians alike, as part of the overall history of God's salvation.
As he states: "God, viewing our whole race as redeemed in Him, pronounced a judgment of acquittal upon all who (consciously or unconsciously) are found in Him." His view is that God has all the while been working towards the salvation of all humanity, throughout every age and land. God is to be found in every human situation, even as the atonement of Christ is for the benefit of every human situation:

God was their God as well as ours - their Creator, their Preserver, ... And His Spirit was with them, dwelling in them, though unseen and unknown... And more than all, our Saviour was their Saviour too.

In addition to this expansive view of grace, Farrar holds much appreciation for many notable non-Christian individuals throughout history. Britannicus, son of the Roman Emperor Claudius, is described in Farrar's Darkness and Dawn as an extremely noble and virtuous figure, even though he was not a member of the then infant Church. It would seem that Farrar shares Seneca's view that "In every good man, God dwells." Certainly, he expands salvation beyond Christian exclusiveness.

Sin and the Devil.
Like Maurice, Farrar equates sin as being, in the widest sense, everything that is contradictory to the absolute goodness of God. God, being all righteousness, is totally incompatible with sin, and thus sin becomes the target of divine wrath. Although the love of God is towards
every member of humanity without exception, there can be no compromise with the power of sin, which the atonement of Christ has overcome universally (at least conditionally). Hence, Farrar declares that "God saves the sinner but he cannot save the sin." In order for God to save the individual, therefore, the latter must be willing to forego every degree of sin, since the perfect nature of the divine, and the divinely intended plan of humanity, cannot compromise with it, i.e., ".. the utter detestation of sin." 

Farrar uses the term "sin" in its widest usage, denoting every aspect of it, rather than the individual acts. He shares Maurice's conviction that no specific act or commitment can separate an individual from God. In considering the "unpardonable sin," or the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit in the synoptic gospels, Farrar does admit that this sin may be unforgivable - "there is but one sin of which He said that it should be forgiven neither in this aeon nor in the next" but concludes that this lack of forgiveness is only conditional, based upon impenitence on the part of the sinner, not literally an act so evil that God refuses to forgive it.

The devil is a difficult matter for Farrar, and his conception of him as being a creature, as opposed to being a symbol or personification of human sinfulness, is often contradictory. In Mercy and Judgment he describes the devil as being a creature, an evil being perpetually seeking to thwart God's purpose: "shall the great harvest of human souls become the prey of Satan...?" He also describes the devil's destruction by Christ.
Contrarily, in *The Life of Christ* he conceives of demonic possession as a mental condition. The demoniac boy whom Jesus exorcises is described as being the victim of "epilepsy, in its most raging symptoms, accompanied by dumbness, atrophy, and a suicidal mania," and likewise: "the most deadly and intense form of epileptic lunacy." In this same book, Farrar devotes an entire section in his appendix to the consideration of demonology within Judaism at the time of Jesus, but does not reach any substantial conclusions either affirming or refuting the existence of such beings. Possibly this contrary position is an attempt to placate scientific opinion, since it was then becoming fashionable to regard demonology as superstition.

Farrar does not discuss the question of Satan's salvation at any great length. He does mention it briefly, while commenting on Origen's overall theology, but largely ignores the actual question itself. He describes it as "a question which I set aside as beyond our range." Regardless of this neutrality and his effort to avoid an indepth consideration of the devil, Farrar does present a contradiction. On one hand, he describes the devil as a being, a malevolent intelligence, and on the other, an expression of human insanity, a personification or representation of a natural phenomenon. There seems to be no solution for this inconsistency. It remains throughout his overall consideration.
Salvation Beyond Humanity.

Farrar's overall consideration of the created order beyond humanity is negligible. His views on faith and Jonah suggest the rest of the created order, but only in the briefest of terms, e.g., "Light ... glowing in the heavens, and sometimes flashing from the sea," or, "the whole world is as a drop of morning dew. But Thou hast mercy upon all." His conclusion to Mercy and Judgment is expressed in similar suggestive, but inconclusive language:

I believe in the restitution of all things; and I believe in the coming of that time when - though in what sense I cannot pretend to explain or to fathom --

GOD WILL BE ALL IN ALL.

Even so, in an apparent contradiction to what is being suggested here, the restoration of all things appears to exclude animals. In his previous statement in The Eternal Hope, Farrar claims to prefer to "die as the beasts that perish, and forever cease to be," than have even his worst enemy tormented in an everlasting torment. This indicates that he considers the ultimate fate of animals to be annihilation. Perhaps this statement cannot be taken to be conclusive, since, as Pusey points out, this is "passionate language" rather than a critical discussion on the question. Possibly this isolated statement concerning animals has reference to Marlowe, whose literary character, Faust, considers the exact same choices of annihilation or everlasting torture. Given the choice between a hell of endless torments and the comparatively happier state of animals, Faust declares that:
... All beasts are happy,
For, when they die,
Their souls are soon dissolv'd in elements;
But mine must live, still to be plagu'd in hell.93

Eschatology.

Farrar differs greatly from Maurice in his consideration of eschatology. Whereas Maurice surmises a final period or age or day wherein all might be restored in grace, Farrar largely emphasizes the present to the near exclusion of a futuristic phenomenon. His consideration of the "Second Coming" of Christ is mostly contained within his historical discussion of the early Church's expectation of an imminent parousia. In this, Farrar recognizes the fact that the infant Church expected an immediate return of Christ:

They had been taught again and again to hope for, to look unto, the coming of Christ. That blessed Presence was to be for them the solution of all perplexities, the righting of all wrongs, the consolation for all suffering.94

Yet, even in this recognition, Farrar points out that there was an obvious mystery to the precise time of the parousia which remained unanswered even for the early Christians: "But when should this be?... the only answer which could be given, which was that the day of the Lord should come as a thief in the night."95 Since this mystery has remained unsolved for the past 1900 years, Farrar suggests that emphasis should be placed upon the present, rather than upon the remote and indefinable future:
We believe that Christ will come to judge both the quick and the dead; but it would not be true of any one of us that we are living in special expectation of that coming... "The last day is hidden, that all days may be observed." The attempt to calculate the day by Apocalyptic dates is distinctly anti-scriptural, as well as foolish.96

Farrar's own conclusion about eschatology is largely inconclusive, vague, and ambiguous. He asserts that Christ will judge all humanity, yet he does not precisely state the manner in which this is to be accomplished: "I believe that every man shall stand before the Judgment seat of Christ, and be judged according to his deeds."97 Alongside of this judgment motif is the statement: "I believe that He who shall be our Judge is He who died for the sins of the whole world."98 The first statement suggests a literal realization of the biblical Second Coming, as well as an element of judgment. The second implies an extremely pro-universalist conclusion, in that the "judge" has already acquitted all humanity through his own atonement. At the very least, it would appear that Farrar's consideration of eschatology is extremely ambiguous and largely unclear.

Conclusion.

Throughout his writings, Farrar consistently denies being a universalist.99 Even so, his arguments largely point to universalism as a logical conclusion. He seems to be defending the doctrine while at the same time refusing to confess it, and in this he is following the practice of F.D. Maurice. Although ambiguous at times in his statements, he expresses clear sympathy for the doctrine of universal salvation.
Contribution to the Study of Universalism.

His main contribution to the study of universalism lies in his historical considerations. In this respect, he has presented an exhaustive study of the doctrine that is thorough and precise, perhaps even monumental. Although his conclusions do favor universalism, it seems that he has made every effort to remain objective in his evaluations, and has approached the subject with an overall openmindedness and honesty.
Footnotes:

1. F.W. Farrar, The Eternal Hope (N.Y.: Dutton, 1878(, P. 202
5. F.W. Farrar, Men I Have known (N.Y.: Crowell, 1897), pp. 93 - 108; The Eternal Hope, p. 175.
10. Ibid., pp. 171 - 92.
13. Ibid., pp. 156 - 75.
15. Ibid., pp. 91 - 136.
16. Ibid., pp. 180 -221.
17. Ibid., pp. 222 - 95.
Footnotes:


26. Ibid., p. 484.


31. Ibid., pp. 410-443.

32. Ibid., pp. 444-80.


34. Farrar, Mercy and Judgment, p. 378.

35. Ibid., pp. 378-409.


39. Ibid., pp. 55-6.
Footnotes:

41. Pusey, What is of Faith...?, pp. 2-3.
42. Farrar, The Eternal Hope, pp. 49-89.
43. Farrar, Mercy and Judgment, pp. 444-80.
44. Ibid., p. 177.
45. Ibid., p. 485.
46. Ibid., p. 485.
48. Ibid., p. 243.
49. Ibid., p. 243.
50. Ibid., p. 245.
51. Ibid., p. 255.
52. Ibid., p. 244.
53. Ibid., p. 245.
54. Ibid., p. 245.
56. Ibid., pp. 86-7.
57. Ibid., p. 88.
58. Ibid., p. 87.
60. Ibid., pp. 72-5.
61. Ibid., pp. 75-81.
62. Ibid., pp. 81-9.
63. Ibid., p. 90.
Footnotes:

66. Ibid., p. 411.
69. Ibid., p. 421.
70. Ibid., pp. 146-7.
71. Ibid., p. 148.
75. Ibid., p. 81.
78. Ibid., p. 485.
79. Ibid., pp. 463-5.
80. Ibid., p. 419.
81. Ibid., p. 421.
83. Ibid., p. 384.
Footnotes:

87. Farrar, The Eternal Hope, p. 158.
91. See Footnote #40.
92. Pusey, What is of Faith...?, p. 3.
98. Ibid., p. 483.
99. Farrar, The Eternal Hope, pp. xxiv. 84, 86; Mercy and Judgment, pp. 384, 481.
Edward Bouverie Pusey (1800-82).

E.B. Pusey did not directly address the question of universalism until F.W. Farrar published *The Eternal Hope* in 1878. Previous to this, he appears to have taken the belief in an endless hell for granted, and his sermons reflect this concept, e.g., *The Fewness of the Saved,*\(^1\) *The Terror of the Day of Judgement.*\(^2\)

Farrar's inclusion of his name amidst a list of those noted for their severe views on eternal punishment prompted Pusey to write in 1880 *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?*\(^3\) In this, his last major undertaking before his death in 1882, Pusey explored the question of universalism from a historical perspective. He accomplished a lengthy and thorough defense for the belief in an endless or everlasting state of perdition.

Pusey is famous for his championing of the Oxford Movement, which sought to adopt a liturgical and sacramental ecclesiology within the Church of England that was similar to that of Roman Catholicism. Pusey's name, in fact, became synonymous with this movement, which his opponents called "Puseyism."\(^4\) It is probably this ecclesiological stance which added fuel to his debate with Farrar, since the latter was adamantly opposed to it. Even so, Pusey and Farrar exchanged a series of letters in *The Guardian* over their respective views on universalism, and though neither could convince the other wholly, this exchange cleared up many misunderstandings.\(^5\)
Pusey's Approach to the Question of Universalism.

A Defense for Hell.

Almost every biographer describes E.B. Pusey as an extremely loving, caring individual. Even so, it is on the very grounds of love that he defends the doctrine of an endless, irremedial state of perdition, or hell. He demands that it must be possible for the individual to reject God, since free will is not given except as a condition of love. This demand is consistent throughout Pusey's writings:

For it may be, that in hell, it will be part of the misery of the damned, still to rebel against the Justice of God, as here against His Love and righteous Will.6

And:

In that deluge of fire, the whole race of man will end... and God in an austere mercy, will close the trial, which will yield so few victors, so few to possess the end of their being, His infinite love.7

Also:

... His heavy displeasure against the sinner... as the soul is beneath them, wounded, writhing, crushed, overwhelmed, the head dizzy, the heart reeling; a burning fever in the whole frame; no wholeness, no soundness, no peace...8

Again:

O what an aggravation of the misery even of Hell will be the memory of past graces!... What a source of mockery to the other damned! What a triumph to Satan! ... Aha! Aha! And thou' art
become like unto us'!" 0 that hideous laugh and mockery of
devils!  

Moreover:

Chief in malice must be chief in torment. They who corrupt
others prepare for themselves a more horrible damnation. Even
in Hell itself, one can scarcely imagine anything so horrible,
as the sight of one, who came thither through the participation
of any one's sin, who has also perished... Horror of horrors all
this!  

Added to which, is Pusey's personal confession:

The 'everlasting fire,' is, from the very first, with very few
notable exceptions, so uniformly spoken of by those who speak of
future punishment at all, that I myself believe it
literally... 

Despite this frank admission, there is no necessity for others
to share his own opinion. Alongside of Pusey's statement of his
personal belief, he declares that "those who do not receive it are free
not to receive it." Within this lenient stance, Pusey freely admits
that it has never been part of orthodox theology to insist upon a
material hell. He declares that the sufferings in hell in traditional
theology are largely undefined: "Holy Scripture warns us of them and
their intensity; it does not define their quality," and, "With regard to
the nature of the sufferings, nothing is a matter of faith." Furthermore, Pusey agrees with Farrar's assertion that the loss of
heaven or the beatific vision would be far greater than any physical or
sensational torment.
Pusey's assertions of hell as a material state are not stressed. He approaches the matter of the nature of endless suffering with honesty and reason. Contrary to Farrar's accusation, Pusey is seen to be not a severe enthusiast of everlasting torture, but an adamant though reasonable supporter of the belief in the doctrine of hell, in its most basic sense of being everlastingly and incurably separated from God:

In eternity those who behold Him will know what the bliss is, eternally to love Him. But then that bliss involves the intolerable misery of losing him through our own evil choice. To lose God and be alienated from Him is in itself Hell.  

**Free Will.**  

Pusey's primary argument in favor of an everlasting hell is based on the grounds of human free will. He holds free will to be a God-given, inalienable ability to choose or reject salvation: "God ennobled us by that almost Divine gift of free-will." This same gift is further perceived to be a condition of love, in that Pusey declares "without free-will we could not freely love God. Freedom is a condition of love." Depsite the grounds of love, on which basis free will is considered, the consequences that arise from the exercise of human free will are seen to be irremediably definitive. Those individuals choosing salvation are set solidly in a state of bliss, the beatific vision actualized: "they cannot sin... Temptation itself, soliciting the will from without, will have ceased then." But, contrarily, the definitive quality of free will works both ways: "that bliss involves the
intolerable misery of losing Him through our own evil choice," that is, by the rejection of salvific grace. Briefly stated, human free will, made definitive upon death, possesses the ability to effect either an everlasting salvation or perdition.

The liability of everlasting perdition lies entirely with the human, since Pusey confirms the divine universal salvific will. Pusey strongly asserts that "God wills that all should be saved, if they will it," and that "None will be lost, whom God can save, without destroying in them His own gift of free-will." God's universal salvific will is expressed in the warmest, most loving terms. Pusey describes the unceasing efforts of God towards universal salvation as follows:

... I confidently believe that our Heavenly Father threw His arms round each created spirit, and looked it full in the face with bright eyes of love, in the darkness of its mortal life, and that of its own deliberate will it would not have Him.

As might be expected, Pusey absolutely rejects Calvinistic predestination, i.e., double predestination into election and reprobation. Free will is essential to the human existential condition. Without it, "man would be inferior to the lower animals, which have a sort of limited freedom of choice." In the light of this assertion, it is logical that Pusey regards double predestination as erroneous, often expressing it in terms of contempt. He refers to it as "the heresy of Calvin," and describes how wise people merely dismiss as "something horrible."

Unfortunately, the divine gift of free will, considered to be
that which gives humanity its dignity and worth, also remains that which threatens the human individual with an everlasting state of misery and perdition. As Pusey points out, perhaps somewhat sadly, "The only hindrance to man's salvation is, in any case, the obstinate misuse of that free-will."\(^{25}\) Whereas for Maurice and Farrar hell remains only a serious possibility, for Pusey it appears to be an actuality for some individuals.

Death.

Pusey's overall consideration of death appears to present a notable contradiction. On the one hand, he suggests that death terminates the human individual's ability to choose or reject salvation, and on the other, that the question of death and a further chance of salvation remains open. In the first instance (Pusey's usual position), death is perceived as a statute of limitation. There can be no "second chance" for the soul who has consistently refused grace throughout his or her lifetime. In this case, Pusey declares that "there is no change from bad to good or from good to bad after this life,"\(^ {26}\) and again, "The disembodied soul can do no act to please God, whereby it may abridge its exile from God."\(^ {27}\) Furthermore, Pusey declares that "the doctrine of a fixed state hereafter of weal or woe is the direct revelation of Jesus."\(^ {28}\) Perhaps it is with Farrar's view of future probation in mind that Pusey likewise declares:

A further probation, after this life, is clearly a mere human imagination. 'Universalism' itself does not require it. It is only a human theory, devised to make 'universalism' plausible.\(^ {29}\)
Despite this insistence on the finality of death, Pusey's overall theology does appear to allow for some future change of condition. For one thing, he allows for the practice of praying for the dead, although their state is alleged to be definitive: "But we have no doubt that we may pray... I say this, in case any should be afraid so to pray." At times, Pusey appears to be outright enthusiastic about prayers for the departed:

But since it is lawful, what an unspeakable priviledge! It is so cold a thought that we have for the time no more to do with those who loved us here, and whom we loved, that it must needs, on that ground alone, be false, because it is so contrary to love.

An immediate question rises from the above assertion: What possible good could come from prayers for the departed if they are already made definitive after death? Such a practice would appear to contradict Pusey's primary conclusion that the departed soul is actually finalized after death, either in everlasting bliss or misery. Added to this confusion is a further statement which strongly suggests that death contains a mysterious, unknown quality, rather than an effective termination of free will:

What God does for the soul, when the eye is turned up in death and shrouded, the frame stiffened, every limb motionless, every power of expression gone, is one of the secrets of the Divine compassion.

This latter statement indicates that there may be some further chance of salvation, at least immediately at the time of death. Death
is seen to be mysterious, but not necessarily definitive, i.e., a "secret of the Divine compassion." This mystery, plus the advocacy of praying for the dead, appears to contradict Pusey's assertion that death is a terminator of free will, that the damned are incapable of effecting a future repentance and subsequent salvation. There is, at the very least, an inconsistency evident within Pusey's overall consideration of death.

The Majority of Humanity

In The Eternal Hope, Farrar defines the common view that hell is reserved for the majority of humanity: "this doom awaits the vast majority of mankind." Pusey refutes this view, largely upon the grounds that it is, firstly, a reaction to Calvinism or "A horrible saying of the hard Calvin," and secondly, based on the assumption that the vast majority (especially non-Christians) die in a state of sin. Pusey further points out that there are no grounds whatsoever to assume that the majority of humanity is lost, and that the scriptures "... told us nothing about the proportion of the lost to the saved," or that the exact proportions were unknown. Moreover, Pusey personally wrote Farrar to assure him that his own position towards the ultimate fate of non-Christians was far from being as severe as Farrar had suggested. In a letter written to Farrar on July 30, 1880, Pusey confesses: "I do strongly hope that the great mass of mankind will be saved, all whom God could save without destroying their free-agency."

Pusey's position toward the majority of humanity, the non-
Christian or heathen majority, is an individual, not a collective position: "in God's sight they are individual souls, each with its own separate history, by which they have been or shall be judged."37 To each individual soul, grace is at least implicitly offered in the person of the Holy Spirit. If the implicit offer is accepted in a manner that surpasses present understanding, then the atonement of Christ becomes effective in promoting the salvation of that individual. Pusey's position may be summarized as follows:

God the Holy Ghost (it is a matter of faith) visits and has visited every soul of man whom God has made, and those who heard His voice and obeyed it, as far as they knew, belonged to Christ, and were saved for His merits, Whom, had they known, they would have obeyed and loved.38

Pusey fully realizes the unfairness of the common view. He readily admits that some have not been given the opportunity to meaningfully hear the Christian gospel: "that light has shone and shines very unequally among those, on whom the light of the Gospel has not shone."39 In recognition of this inequality, he affirms: "We are then wholly ignorant of the rule, by which they will be judged."40 Even so, Pusey maintains a strong pro-Christian position, demanding that being a Christian is a surpassing privilege, along with devastating responsibilities towards the non-Christian world. He declares: "It is a great gift to be Christians, not Heathen... we cannot divest ourselves of the responsibility of having received it."41

The conflict between being Christian and non-Christian is most
stressed in terms of the question of baptism. Despite his statement of being "wholly ignorant of the rule, by which they will be judged," Pusey appears to be advocating a policy that denies salvation to the unbaptized, particularly unbaptized infants. In discussing the problem of unbaptized children in relation to the Athanasian Creed (with regards to proposed revisions in the Church of England's policy concerning the burial of the same), Pusey declares:

I do not doubt, myself, that the children who die unbaptized are happy in their degree, for Christ's sake, as well as all heathen children, although not members of Christ, and not admitted to the Beatific Vision, which yet they do not miss because God did not create them for it.42

And likewise:

It is now the universal belief, that, although children who had not been made members of Christ are not admitted to that Bliss which Christ purchased for us, the Beatific Vision of God, yet since they lost it not by fault of their own, they do not feel any loss, but lead lives of natural happiness.43

Despite Pusey's assertion of "being ignorant of the rule," it would appear that he denies, at the very least, an equal salvation for Christians and non-Christian individuals. Admittedly, he does not necessarily suggest damnation, but it is obvious that the non-baptized do not share in the beatific vision with the baptized. It is curious that the latter of the above passages occurs, in context, right after a statement that the unbaptized poor in London would be judged by "the same law as the heathen in China and Japan,"44 and in conjunction with an open condemnation of Calvin's position towards the reprobation of non-elect infants.45 This inequality of salvation, despite an
alleged ignorance of the ultimate fate of non-Christians, would appear to logically contradict any form of implicit salvation effected by the Holy Spirit.

Salvation Beyond Humanity

Although Pusey is primarily concerned with the human situation, he considers briefly the question of salvation beyond the human level, most notably regarding demons, but also alluding to animals. In the case of the latter, Pusey's words appear to indicate that there can be no question of salvation for animals. In the case of the former - the restoration of Satan - he again appears to reach a negative conclusion.

Animals, according to Pusey, possess a "sort of limited freedom of choice," but he does not expand upon this notion. He contrasts the natures of humans and animals, asserting that humans were divinely ordained towards a far higher, near angelical nature, i.e., "God created us to be like unto Angels." In this contrast, Pusey equates bestial nature with that of the demonic, with respect to the performance of sensual sins: "the sins of devils, and of a beast's nature." Furthermore, Pusey describes animals as being "the beasts that perish," meaning, presumably, annihilation. Although these references are extremely brief and inconclusive, it would appear that the salvation of animals is unlikely within Pusey's overall theological position.

Pusey is far more conclusive in regarding the question of Satan's salvation, which he outright rejects. Satan and demons are a firm reality to Pusey, and his writings are filled with references to
them, e.g., "... that hideous laugh and mockery of devils,"50 "the devil as its father, instead of God,"51 or, "Satan, full of hatred, envy, jealousy, malignity, ..."52 From these numerous references, it is clear that Pusey considers demons to be actual beings, i.e., fallen rational creatures beyond redemption, as opposed to poetic or symbolic expressions of evil.

Pusey addresses the question of the salvation of demons in What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?. He asserts that Farrar's theological position points to the ultimate salvation of Satan, although Farrar deliberately avoided the question, an avoidance "extending even to what he intended to exclude from his consideration, the restoration of Satan."53 Pusey asserts that Farrar's arguments, which favored universalism, would be inconsistent if the devil was not included within them. "The old Universalists saw consistently," Pusey argues, "that any theory of universal restoration is inconsistent, which does not include the restoration of Satan."54 Pusey does not specifically identify these "Old Universalists," but he equates Farrar's conclusions with them.

Having accused Farrar of promoting a theology which implies (at least as its logical conclusion) the salvation of demons, Pusey then denies the possibility of the devil ever being restored to his former grace. The devil, being complete in his own self-induced evil, would find heaven to be "the worst Hell,"55 since his entirely corrupt nature would prevent him from appreciating the love and goodness of the same. The beatific vision, according to Pusey, would be so intolerable to Satan that he "would again cast himself out of it, and that his own
Again, God is seen to be absolved from even the liability of Satan's damnation. The fault lies entirely with the devil and his legions, through free will.

This last point is significant to Pusey's theories of free will. In order to prove his point, Pusey employs the illustration of the legendary encounter between St. Martin and Satan. According to this legend, the devil tried to get the better of the saint in a heated debate. Finally, St. Martin offered the devil absolution, in the following manner:

If thou thyself, thou miserable one, wouldest desist from infesting men and wouldest repent of thy deeds, even now, when the Day of Judgement is nigh at hand, I, truly trusting in the Lord, would promise thee the mercy of Christ.56

Pusey admits that the devil's answer is not recorded in the legend, but he suggests that it was one of willful contempt. In place of the devil's alleged response, Pusey offers a substitute answer which illustrates his own theological evaluation of the question of the salvation of Satan: "Do you think that, if I had meant to repent, I should not have repented long ago?"57 These, the devil's words, clearly illustrate that the liability of Satan's inability to be restored is entirely his own and not God's in the least, even as the liability of human damnation falls entirely to humanity.
Historical and Scriptural Consideration of Universalism.

The areas treated above are the main points in Pusey's overall consideration of the question of universalism. His position may be summarized as follows:

And yet if we know anything at all, we know that the doctrine of Everlasting Punishment was taught by Him Who died to save us from it.\textsuperscript{59}

This assertion is defended by Pusey, largely upon historical grounds, i.e., the traditional opinions within the Church from its earliest times. He asserts that in Judaism, especially at the time of the historical Jesus, there was the firm belief in the everlasting duration of hell.\textsuperscript{60} He further asserts that Origen was rightly condemned for his views by a legitimate ecclesiastical council.\textsuperscript{61} Pusey points to the writings of earlier Church authorities, e.g., Ignatius, Polycarp, Clement, Ambrose, to affirm his conviction that the traditional view of the Church was in favor of the doctrine of an endless, everlasting state of perdition,\textsuperscript{62} and he pays particular attention to the testimony of early martyrs, such as Felicitas, Biblias, Domnina, and Theonilla, towards the same.\textsuperscript{63} Pusey's defense of the doctrine of everlasting hell is large and indepth. Yet it is notable that Farrar, in his \textit{Mercy and Judgment}, covers practically the same grounds but arrives at a conclusion that is largely favorable towards the question of universalism.

Although Pusey defends the doctrine of an everlasting hell primarily on historical grounds, he also issues a strong assertion of
its validity based on the interpretation of the Greek word, aionios. Pusey directly refutes Farrar's claim that aionios did not necessarily denote eternity or eternal things in the sense of being of an everlasting or endless duration. Pusey attempts to demonstrate that aionios (and variations of the same) was used "strictly of eternity, and eternal existence." Furthermore, Pusey proceeds to argue that Jesus "did mean to teach the everlastingness of punishment beyond the grave," and that Jesus knew that he would have been understood to have been referring to eternity or everlasting duration when he employed the word. It is Pusey's conviction that the belief in the eternity of punishment mainly rests on the word aionios, and that this word was certainly used to denote an endless or everlasting duration. This conclusion, according to Pusey, is the result of "the direct revelation of Jesus."

In considering other portions of the scriptures, Pusey strongly refutes that there is any biblical support for universalism. He considers the allegations of universalism in I Cor. xv. 20-8, God's becoming all in all; Acts iii. 21, the restitution of all things; Rom. xiv. 9, Christ as Lord of both the living and the dead; and I Cor. xv. 22, all being made alive in Christ, and concludes them all to contain absolutely no implication of universalism. In brief, he holds the views of Farrar and all who find universalist arguments in such biblical passages with a degree of scorn: "What encouragement Dr. Farrar can think that these words give to those who do treasure to themselves wrath, I cannot imagine."
Conclusion.

Pusey reaches an entirely negative conclusion to the overall question of universal salvation. On the grounds of human free will, historical and scriptural evidence, he rejects the possibility that all might be saved. Although, as Pusey suggests, there is no indication that the vast majority of humanity will be lost, it seems certain that some will be.

Contribution to the Study of Universalism.

Pusey's contribution to the overall study of universalism is unique. In an era when the doctrine was steadily gaining popularity, he revealed that it was possible to reject universalism on the same historical grounds that it was often defended. His work was thorough and precise, and it won the praise of many throughout the theological world, including Cardinal Newman.71
Footnotes:


8. Ibid., p. 317.


10. Ibid., p. 91.


12. Ibid., p. ix.

13. Ibid., pp. 19, 23.


15. Ibid., p. 22.


17. Pusey, What is of Faith..., p. 22.


Footnotes:

20. Ibid., pp. 22 - 3.
21. Ibid., p. 17.
22. Ibid., p. 22.
23. Ibid., p. 8.
24. Ibid., p. 8.
25. Ibid., p. 22.
31. Ibid., p. 127.
32. Pusey, What is of Faith...?, p. 16.
34. Pusey, What is of Faith...?, p. 11.
35. Ibid., p. 11.
39. Ibid., p. 9.
40. Ibid., p. 9.
43. Pusey, What is of Faith...?, p. 11.
Footnotes:

44. Ibid., p. 10.
45. Ibid., p. 11.
46. Ibid., p. 22.
47. Pusey, "Address VIII," Addresses..., p. 86.
48. Ibid., p. 86.
49. Ibid., p. 86.
50. Ibid., p. 89.
51. Ibid., p. 90.
52. Pusey, What is of Faith..., p. 4.
53. Ibid., p. vi.
54. Ibid., p. 28.
55. Ibid., p. 4.
56. Ibid., p. 4.
57. Ibid., p. 286.
58. Ibid., p. 286.
59. Ibid., p. ix.
60. Ibid., pp. 48 - 105.
61. Ibid., pp. 129 - 53.
62. Ibid., pp. 155 - 286.
63. Ibid., pp. 155 - 71.
64. Ibid., p. 38.
65. Ibid., p. 49.
66. Ibid., pp 46 - 9.
67. Ibid., pp. 38 - 45.
Footnotes:


Percy Dearmer (1867 - 1936).

Percy Dearmer is not well documented for his consideration of universalism, which is largely contained in his *The Legend of Hell*, written in 1929. He is best known for his contributions to the study of the liturgy of the Church of England. In this he has proved himself peerless as an authority on the rituals, vestments, art and ceremonies of the Anglican tradition.\(^1\) His greatest works were *The Parson's Handbook* and *The English Hymnal*,\(^2\) which were in use right into the 1960's.

Dearmer's knowledge of the correct historical liturgy endeared him to the Anglo-Catholic party, the aftermath of the Oxford Movement.\(^3\) Dearmer strongly directed reforms in many of the Anglo-Catholic rituals, in an effort to purify liturgy and eliminate many of the abuses in Church practice that he repeatedly condemned as "lawlessness."\(^4\)

He is reported to have been of a highly pugnacious spirit with which he readily confronted any critic, even those in a higher ecclesiastical office.\(^5\) This pugnacity is often obvious throughout *The Legend of Hell*, wherein he attacks the doctrine of an everlasting perdition passionately.

Dearmer's work also offers an excellent first hand historical account of the universalist controversy of the late 19th century. The original date of *The Parson's Handbook*, 1899, reveals that he was actively advocating his liturgical and theological reforms during this period.
Dearmer's Approach to the Question of Universalism.

An Optimistic Theory of the Universe.

In his overall theology, Dearmer presents an entirely optimistic view of the universe. His thought consists of a theodicy, or how a God alleged to be good can actually allow the existence of evil, which is confirmed as "... a real existence." Dearmer approaches this question with a good deal of boldness: "But man must question; and the craving for an explanation is precisely the most divine element in his nature." He is clearly not content with the traditional answers - the mythology of a fall and subsequent notions about a sin debt. He demands in their place a reasonable theodicy that explains the problems of imperfection, pain, misery and evil.

Dearmer's conclusions are basically optimistic and founded upon science and reason. God is entirely good, and cannot be considered as anything else. His optimism may be summed up in two statements: "it is the supreme contribution of the Christian religion to say that God is love," and "the Soul of the World is good." Dearmer demands that this perfect goodness and perfect love be justified, and asserts that the traditional views do not provide this justification. He maintains that the Genesis myth fails to "save the character of the Creator," whom he asserts is "responsible for all creation." Likewise, he demands that suffering cannot be the result of God's punishment, or vengeance, since far too many innocent people suffer.

The problem of evil in all its shapes and forms is seen to be
exclusively the liability of human nature. To be more precise, it is in the God-given free will of humanity. Basing himself on the psychology of his time (e.g., James Ward\textsuperscript{14}), Dearmer notes that this freedom is somewhat limited. Still, it is seen to be effective enough to promote results, including the problem of evil in the world. Dearmer asserts that "Evil... is in the will"\textsuperscript{15} of the human being, and that God will not act in any manner which can be considered as supernatural or as miraculous in countering this autonomy. He labels any such notion as "ridiculous,"\textsuperscript{16} and suggests that such notions are the result of being "too anthropomorphic about God."\textsuperscript{17} With logical consistency, Dearmer dismisses any notion of predestination, either of an Augustinian or Calvinistic type. He declares that in such systems, "the most evil part of the problem of evil would be God himself."\textsuperscript{18} 

The problem of evil within the universe is seen to be the fault of humanity in the wrong employment of human autonomy. Yet there is a solution, based upon the expression of the principle of evolution. In this, Dearmer applies Darwin's principles of evolutionary progression to the problem of evil in light of an all-perfect, all-loving, and all-good creator. He suggests that "Evolution has helped us by showing that imperfection is moving towards perfection,"\textsuperscript{19} and that "The general trend of evolution has been towards the higher spiritual values."\textsuperscript{20} In short, there is a universal progression towards perfection, and the mover of this evolutionary progression is God.\textsuperscript{21} Dearmer further describes God's efforts as unceasing, until all is made perfect:
So the Spirit of God, with sighs that cannot be uttered, will not rest till the World is the Church, and all the kingdoms of the world are become the kingdom of Christ, and the whole world is mighty and wise, and tender with charity.22

A Refutation of Hell.

Dearmer's refutation of the concept of an everlasting hell can be understood as nothing short of an all-out assault upon this doctrine. His attack is chiefly confined to The Legend of Hell, written in 1929, in which he considers hell in terms of historical and scriptural interpretation. Dearmer's reputation for pugnacity is well founded by his attack, which can only be described as an unmitigated repulsion of the concept of hell. Much of Dearmer's personal feeling, as well as his objective scholarly observation, is evident within The Legend of Hell. It is clear that he is attacking the doctrine out of subjective, as well as objective motivation.

Dearmer's Personal Repulsion of the Doctrine of Everlasting Hell.

It is perhaps ironic to find that a writer who so rigorously legislated the liturgy of the Anglican Church based upon its historical traditions should so severely attack the traditional theology concerning hell; yet, such is the case. Dearmer begins his consideration of the doctrine of hell by boldly declaring his personal opinion of it. First, he defines precisely what he means by "hell," namely, the "plain meaning as a place of everlasting punishment"23 - a meaning accepted from the dark ages till the 18th century as the orthodox view. This is not to be confused with the self-imposed state of damnation or perdition described
by Farrar or Maurice, but precisely the "place which God has prepared" for humanity.24 The condition which is humanly self-imposed, as suggested by Farrar and Maurice, is not what Dearmer is refuting. It is the place of torment imposed by God in an everlasting irremedial sentence of doom that Dearmer correctly understands to be the meaning of "hell" as traditionally received. He further observes that this traditional definition was still very much alive by 1929, and was being taught by "two or three hundred millions of people,"25 presumably, the majority of Christian churches.

Second, Dearmer describes this conception of hell with a precise and obvious loathing. He calls it "the most monstrous of all legends,"26 "a powerful enemy of the Christian religion,"27 and in more severe terms he states:

The whole conception is wicked, shocking and monstrous; and not a splinter of its nauseous wreckage can be retained. To endeavour to spiritualise it, in the desire to justify the brutalised conceptions of a discredited dogmatic, is to put ourselves again on the side of Moloch.28

It is clear that this refutation of hell does not follow the examples of Maurice and Farrar, who sought to explain it away as the self-imposed state of perdition whose liability lies with human free will. Dearmer sets out to disprove the notion of hell entirely. He bases his refutation upon three related grounds, namely, the psychological, historical, and scriptural consideration of the problem of the doctrine of hell.
The Psychological Consideration of Hell.

Dearmer considers the development and promotion of the doctrine of everlasting hell to be the result of the negative human mind, perhaps best summarized as "the darkness which converted the Christ into a minister of vengeance and wrath." He cites the human causes of this development and sustenance as being those of fear, exclusiveness, mendacity, misunderstanding and ignorance, credulity, cruelty, the desire for power and the distortion of the concept of God. Notably, the negative existentials of the human mind were expressed in the conception of the universe.

In the case of cruelty, for example, Dearmer notes Bertrand Russell's assertion that religion affords humanity the luxury of sadism. While suggesting that this is too generalized an opinion, Dearmer nonetheless points out that there is an obvious psychological element in the human structure which explains the expectation and even advocacy of the doctrine of hell:

And we are obliged to mention here -- for psychology warns us of its importance -- the intimate connection of cruelty with sexual emotion, whether that emotion be debauched, or suppressed.

This negative human existential, combined with ignorance over the centuries of civilization, helped to give rise to the doctrine of everlasting hell. Dearmer summarizes civilization as having been "grossly and unimaginatively cruel." This human condition, combined with an ignorance of nature and the environment, has promoted the belief that the gods and even God willed suffering to an everlasting extent and
an infinite level. To ancient people, pain was the wrath of the gods and of God:

Physical pain seemed wanton and meaningless; and men thought of it as the heartless sport of the gods, or as their vengeance, or, when religion developed, as the punishment of God for sin. 34

It is not only ignorance that has proven to be responsible for the doctrine of hell. In addition to the limitations of human knowledge in centuries past, the doctrine of hell was preserved by a willful, deliberate perseverance of those in power. Hell was used by many as a means of exploitation, or a preservation of power and authority by a threat of everlasting duration. Dearmer cites the clergy as the biggest offenders in this deliberate practice. He suggests that the clergy would have been completely in power, if some of the laity did not question the validity of the doctrine they preached:

The domination of the world by the clergy would in truth have been complete and irresistible if the laity had entirely believed in excommunication and hell; but the freedom of mankind was ultimately saved by a general undercurrent of lay scepticism, which often expressed itself in jest and ridicule. 35

The negative elements in the human structure are seen to have played a major role in the development and sustenance of the doctrine of everlasting hell. Humanity, by will and error, is guilty of having created and promoted the concept of an imposed, irremedial place of everlasting torment, by which it has enslaved itself for centuries. All this consideration of human liability leads Dearmer to conclude that
civilization before his age was largely in error concerning the revelation of Christ. In short, burdened by its psychological shortcomings, humanity in general was "not ready to accept in its entirety Christ's revelation of God," and so substituted a false and brutal conception of its own. Since "the ancients had not our knowledge," they created the "clumsy idea that virtue is promoted by vengeance" - the idea of an everlasting hell.

The Historical Consideration of Hell.

Unlike Farrar and Pusey, Dearmer does not consider the problem of hell in the writings of the earliest Christian writers. He is largely content to merely generalize their position as follows: "Thus it is that the Church as a whole has never committed itself to the doctrine of eternal punishment." Rather Dearmer considers the problem of hell within the history of the Church of England, and pays particular attention to many of the historical controversies surrounding it. This might be expected, considering the fact that Dearmer was one of the foremost authorities on the subject of Anglican traditions.

Dearmer admits that "in the Dark and Middle Ages there had been a practical agreement in favour of everlasting punishment." He suggests that this popular view had given way during the time of the Reformation. Although it was being preached in many of the pulpits, the Church had not affirmed it as official dogma: "As by a miracle, the Church of England at the Reformation escaped the danger of committing herself to the doctrine of hell." He asserts that the rejection of
the 42nd article from Anglican canon allowed for the legal belief in universalism within the Church of England. This 42nd article had affirmed hell in moderate terms:

> They also are worthy of condemnation who endeavour at this time to restore the dangerous opinion that all men, be they never so ungodly, shall at length be saved, when they have suffered pains for their sins a certain time appointed by God's justice.\(^{42}\)

The article's rejection in 1563 by the Convocation which reduced Anglican canon to 39 articles afforded universalists the privilege of orthodoxy, according to Dearmer. "It became therefore lawful," he argues, "to affirm the salvation of all men."\(^{43}\) And he further demands that the assertion of hell as Church canon thereby became extinct.\(^{44}\)

Dearmer suggests that the various Methodist and evangelical movements of the 18th and early 19th century were a reinforcement of the doctrine of hell, since they "relied much upon the fear of hell, and partly because they strengthened the uncritical and mechanical use of the Bible."\(^{45}\) He points to the middle of the 19th century as the turning point at which the Church of England, mostly under the influence of the Broad Church theologians, began to seriously challenge the doctrine of hell.\(^{46}\) Along this line, Dearmer discusses the various controversies that arose over the problem of the doctrine of hell and of implied universalism, including those of F.D. Maurice and King's College in 1853, H.B. Wilson and the Judicial Committee headed by Lushington in 1862-4, and the Farrar-Pusey controversy in 1878-82.\(^{47}\) Dearmer suggests that these controversies led, in the 20th century, towards the serious
questioning of the credibility of hell: "In the present century the change has been completed recognised, though there is still an aftermath and abundant survivals in popular thought."48 Added to which, Dearmer suggests that universalism was steadily becoming more and more acceptable. He alleges that "Universalism is becoming universal,"49 suggesting perhaps that the doctrine of universal salvation was gradually wearing down the remnant reservation and opposition (at least in 1929).

The Scriptural Consideration of Hell.

Dearmer's scriptural consideration of the doctrine of everlasting hell is based upon the then modern scientific approach to biblical interpretation. He defines this scientific study of Scripture as having developed in four stages; A) the dissemination of the Greek texts, from the 15th century on; B) the discovery of fresh manuscripts in the 19th century, and subsequent revisions such as the Revised Version of the Bible; C) the unravelling of the Synoptic problem, mainly through the identification of the common sources of Matthew and Luke's gospels; and finally, D) the interpretation of the New Testament in light of the discovery of Jewish apocalyptic literature.50 Dearmer describes this approach as one of relative novelty. He asserts that previous to his era, theology was greatly lacking in scientific knowledge, even up to the Pusey-Farrar conflict:
Even as late as 1880 hermeneutics were still so much in the pre-scientific stage that a very learned man like Pusey could assume, apparently without fear of contradiction, that... "if we know anything at all, we know that the doctrine of Everlasting Punishment was taught by Him Who died to save us from it."  

In view of the modern scientific methods of examining Scripture, Dearmer launches a complex and indepth attempt to refute the doctrine of hell, focusing upon those biblical passages which give it sustenance. In this effort, Dearmer sets out to disprove many of the biblical concepts which offer support for the doctrine of everlasting punishment, e.g., "gehenna and fire," or "Dives and Lazarus." He asserts that many such concepts are based upon mistranslations, such as "damnation," "hell," or "punishment." He proceeds to examine such concepts in light of the scientific interpretation of apocalyptic literature and its application to the New Testament, and denies that Christ taught everlasting torment. Finally, Dearmer examines the particular passages in Scripture that have traditionally provided an argument in favor of the doctrine of hell, e.g., the parable of the sheep and goats, the unpardonable sin in the Synoptics, the few chosen, and he rejects the implied conclusion that points to an everlasting damnation.

His observation concerning the word "eternal" is interesting in its depth and complexity. Dearmer has thoroughly researched the Greek texts and concludes that aionios, the word most often used to denote "eternal," cannot be considered as "everlasting." Such phrases as "eternal damnation," "eternal death," and "eternal perdition," are not truly biblical, at least in the original texts, but even so, such could only be translated as "nothing more than age-long or enduring
condemnation... 56 He goes on to point out that the only word that does imply "everlasting" is *aidios*, which ironically is used only twice in the bible: *Rom. i:20*, as God's eternal power, and in *Jude 6*: the everlasting chains which bind the fallen angels. Yet in this latter usage, the everlastingness must be questioned in that these chains only last until a future theoretical day of judgment. He also points out that there are other Greek words which imply an "everlasting" or "endless" quality, such as *ateleutetos* or *apernantos*, and these are never used to indicate hell as being endless or everlasting. 57

The understanding of the correct usage of *aionios*, alongside of the overall scientific approach to Scripture, offers a substantially convincing refutation. Dearmer's conclusion towards the everlasting hell implied in the scriptures is decisive and definite. It may be summarized as follows:

Thus do the old arguments for hell drop away one by one as we examine them in the light of scientific New Testament criticism. The object of scholars in this field has been to get back as closely as is possible to the actual words of Christ, putting aside all personal desires and prejudices, and to accept honourably whatever results may come out of the investigation. They did not foresee at the dawn of the scientific era that one outstanding result would be the elimination of the Legend of Hell. 58
The Definite Universalist Conclusion.

Having reached the conclusion that the case for hell cannot stand up to scientific investigation, Dearmer concludes his work with a closing chapter that appears to be clearly universalistic. In this chapter, Dearmer reconsiders the bible and concludes that the message contained in it is one of pure and uncompromising optimism. The synoptic gospels and the apostolic writings of John and Paul all point to a final elimination of evil from all of creation, although it is not clear in what manner such a universal restoration and salvation is to occur. It is clear, however, that this final elimination of all evil is totally incompatible with the doctrine of hell:

Nothing could well be further from the idea that God will maintain an eternal torture-house of spiritual failures and unchangeable reprobates and unbaptised babies than this vision of a perfected universe, with all things summed up in Christ and all coming as one body into the measure of the stature of his fullness.

Although Dearmer does not explicitly confess to being a universalist, his conclusion as to the absolute refutation of the doctrine of hell would appear to be logically in favor of universalism. Also his assertion that "Universalism is becoming universal" may be placed alongside of the assertion that "The mastering power of the truth... is felt almost instinctively" - the truth in this instance being that of his general conclusions towards hell throughout The Legend of Hell. The implications of universalism wax strong. His final description of Christ adds to the already obvious advocacy of universal salvation:
His teaching was of mercy and forgiveness; he bade men harbour no thoughts of vengeance or retribution, but forgive utterly because that is the way God forgives; ... and it is his infinite kindness that has drawn all men to him and has led the hesitating world to a moral conception of God.\textsuperscript{62}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Dearmer's Contribution to the Study of Universalism.}
\end{center}

Dearmer's contribution, although chiefly confined within \textit{The Legend of Hell}, appears to be unique, and like Dearmer himself, highly individualistic. Although he follows the examples of Farrar and Pusey in basing his considerations upon historical and scriptural grounds, he alone incorporates the science of psychology into his work. His approach, of course, relies heavily upon advanced scientific discussions of those concepts which were familiar to Farrar and Pusey, and his overall conclusions often appear more definite and decisive. If, in accomplishing a serious refutation of the doctrine of hell, he has not claimed to be a universalist, neither has he denied the same. Rather, his conclusions point logically towards the actuality of universal salvation, and Dearmer comes far closer to proclaiming this doctrine than either Maurice or Farrar.

In addition, Dearmer's work reveals that interest in the question of universalism had survived into the 20th century, at least until 1929. His advanced era afforded him the benefit of considering such theological concepts from a more modern, scientific position, and it is clear that science and theology can be compatible, in this instance the former serving the latter. Although Dearmer's work arrives too late to have influenced MacDonald, it follows the pattern of
the late 19th century overall consideration of universal salvation.
Footnotes:


7. Ibid., p. 23.

8. Ibid., p. 23.

9. Ibid., p. 60.

10. Ibid., p. 63.

11. Ibid., p. 34.

12. Ibid., p. 23.

13. Ibid., pp. 46, 47 cf.

14. Ibid., p. 56.

15. Ibid., p. 58.

16. Ibid., p. 50.

17. Ibid., p. 50.

18. Ibid., pp. 57-60.

19. Ibid., p. 27.

20. Ibid., pp. 102, 28 cf, 35 cf, 64 cf.

21. Ibid., pp. 30, 144.
Footnotes:


Footnotes:

46. Ibid., p. 118.
47. Ibid., pp. 119-27.
48. Ibid., p. 127.
49. Ibid., p. 290.
50. Ibid., pp. 129-31.
51. Ibid., p. 76.
52. Ibid., pp. 129-284.
53. Ibid., pp. 129-46.
54. Ibid., pp. 172-221.
55. Ibid., pp. 222-56.
56. Ibid., p. 138.
57. Ibid., pp. 138-40.
58. Ibid., p. 256.
60. Ibid., p. 287.
61. Ibid., p. 290.
62. Ibid., p. 291.
Conclusion to Universalism in the 19th - 20th Century

This period marks a stage in the history of universalism in which the doctrine was afforded substantial attention. Universalism was more or less tolerated on the whole, as in contrast to the 17th century. F.D. Maurice, although he lost his position at King's College, suffered no further penalties through his opponents' allegations of universalism (he could conceivably have been defrocked). Nine years later, H.B. Wilson was similarly accused and condemned for his implications of universalism, chiefly in an essay submitted in Essays and Reviews. Wilson appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which obligingly reversed the decision of the Court of Arches. This left Wilson acquitted and his antagonists as the butt of numerous jests throughout England.1 In the short span between Maurice and Wilson, universalism was deemed tolerable.

There were other writers whose works either implied or advocated universal salvation. These included Andrew Jukes, The Second Death and the Restitution of All Things2; Dr. Plumptre, The Spirits in Prison and Other Studies on the Life after Death3; Dr. Littledale in his articles on hell for The Contemporary Review4; Alfred Guerney, Our Catholic Inheritance in the Larger Hope5; Canon Westcott in the Speaker's Commentary, New Testament6; Prebendary Constable in Future Punishment7; and Chauncy Townsend in Sermons in Sonnet.8
Footnotes:


2. Ibid., p. 125.

3. Ibid., p. 125.

4. Ibid., p. 127.

5. Ibid., p. 127.


7. Ibid., p. 50.

IV. MacDonald's Treatment of Universalism.

History.

George MacDonald was born in Scotland, in 1824. Details concerning his early life are probably most reliable in three sources: George MacDonald and His Wife¹ by his son Greville MacDonald; George MacDonald: A Personal Note,² by another son, Ronald; and George MacDonald,³ by J. Johnson, a close friend of the family. From these sources we learn that MacDonald grew up in an atmosphere filled with the popular mythology of Scotland. His early life was saturated with tales of kelpies, elves, brownies, and other unworldly creatures, which later entered into his writings. Familywise, save for the early death of his mother, MacDonald was happy and secure. His father seems to have been benevolent in character, unlike the normally severe Calvinist lifestyle. In short, MacDonald was "the child of a happy home and an unhappy Church."⁴

In addition to the benign atmosphere of his Scottish homelife, MacDonald was very appreciative of German Romanticism, particularly of Novalis. Likewise he displayed an uncommon interest in German sciences, and had considered moving to Germany to study.⁵ In the end, however, MacDonald decided upon a career in the ministry, in response to what he believed was a divinely inspired vocation.
The decision to become a Congregationalist minister proved to be an unhappy one. In the early 1840's he took part in a minor universalist movement within the Congregationalist colleges led by Ralph Wardlaw. This caused the conservative factions much anxiety.\(^6\) When finally ordained by the Congregationalists in 1850, he revealed a near contempt for any form of formal liturgical ordination, which did not sit well with the Church.\(^7\) He openly clashed with his church at Arundel, although it is not clear whether the issues of conflict were his universalism, views on non-Christians, opinion of bestial salvation, or personality clashes. Greville MacDonald suggests that it was chiefly his views concerning non-Christians,\(^8\) but accusations of a "German" theology (a widely used term for non-conformists) were also prevalent. Finally, he left the Congregationalist ministry in 1853 and took up popular writing and various other odd jobs.

MacDonald's decision to convert to Anglicanism was influenced by two factors. In the first instance, there appears to have been a strong bond of intimacy between himself and F.D. Maurice. MacDonald found Maurice's services to his taste, and eventually joined the Anglican communion around 1865 (precise date unknown). Greville MacDonald describes their views on universal salvation as being largely compatible,\(^9\) though Maurice was inclined to stress the historical element in theology while MacDonald emphasized the more mystical, individual experience. Maurice appears to have been less cautious in discussing universalism with MacDonald, and the younger MacDonald describes him as a supporter of universalists.\(^10\)
In the second instance, it is notable that the Anglican Church was growing progressively more tolerant of universalism by the 1860's. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, universalism was becoming more popular both academically and devotionally. While it is true that MacDonald's militant universalism appears to have developed outside of both Congregationalist and Anglican influences (he appears to have been convinced of the reality of universal salvation before Wardlaw's movement), it was not altogether incompatible with current Anglican trends.

I propose to discuss MacDonald as an Anglican writer for the simple reason that the vast majority of his works came after his conversion to Anglicanism in the mid 1860's. Of the 52 volumes produced by MacDonald, only six were before 1865 and three of these, David Elginbrod, Adela Cathcart and The Portent, came into publication between 1863-4, when MacDonald was moving towards the Anglican tradition.11 Certainly, with the exception of Phantastes, 1858 (still after MacDonald left the Congregationalist Church), all those books, which it is evident, C.S. Lewis read, were written after MacDonald's conversion. Although Greville MacDonald, in listing his father's publications, admits that a few ran through periodicals before publication, the majority were the products of his Anglican period.

MacDonald's universalism was not entirely characteristic of the Anglicans, many of whom approached the subject with a cautious appreciation. His was a militant universalism delivered with the conviction of a mystical personal experience of divinity. And his works
seem to have provoked an extreme reaction, either positive or negative. This led to both enthusiastic support and adamant opposition. On the one hand, he was praised as a seer, or as described by The American Monthly Review: "One of the men who helped to overthrow the old despotic idea of God." Likewise, the Universalist Quarterly praised him for affirming the omnipotence and beneficence of God. On the other hand, he was soundly condemned by some critics such as Samuel Wilson, who stated that MacDonald's anti-traditionalism was erroneous. George McCrie condemned MacDonald's views as being "most unsound and dangerous." This undoubtedly reflects the historic transition in the 19th century wherein universalism, though growing in popularity, was still suspect in some circles.

MacDonald's insistence on universal salvation stems from the fact that he was a mystic. Although as a trained theologian he was aware of the value of historical doctrine, his views are based on his own personal experience of the divine. In this case, he appears to have realized God in terms of a theodicy in which the perfection of God logically resulted in the complete restoration of all creation, including humans, animals, demons, and others. His proclamation of universalism was, at times, expressed with pugnacity.

I have already acknowledged a problem of genre in the introduction to this thesis. The complexity of MacDonald's symbols no doubt arises from his mysticism. By his mystical conceptions he wishes to express intangible truths, those which can only be experienced
through the God-given human imagination, rather than the intellect. While this may prove difficult at times to analyze, I believe it is possible to do so, if the analysis is kept within the limits of relativity rather than precision. I propose that MacDonald often expresses principles, rather than concrete facts, and I shall attempt to discuss his fantastic passages with this in mind.

After a lifetime of essays, novels, poems, short stories and fantasies, George MacDonald passed away on September 18, 1905. His career consisted of a series of highs and lows; at times riding a crest of tremendous popularity, at others, suffering extreme poverty. He is certainly one of the most unique, perhaps even eccentric, of the 19th century Anglican writers to have explored the question of universalism.

A. Universalism and the Human Situation

MacDonald's primary concern is for the human situation. In this his views are complementary with the overall 19th century consideration of universalism, which was largely anthropological in scope. MacDonald's belief that all humanity would eventually be saved reflects an optimistic approach to theology, founded upon an unshakable confidence in the divine salvific power.

I. Salvation.

George MacDonald perceives of human salvation as being the restoration of former perfection. Rather than being a deliverance from an everlasting punishment of hell, salvation is basically the recovery
of the natural human state or perfect human nature, not unlike the
Genesis theme. The chief attribute of this perfection is the ability to
love as perfectly as God loves. MacDonald describes it as follows:

True, no man can see it perfectly until he is it; but we must
see it, that we may be it. A man who knows that he does not yet
love his neighbour as himself may believe in such a condition,
may even see that there is no other goal of human perfection,
nothing else to which the universe is speeding, propelled by the
Father's will... The Love, in us, working even now the far
end.17

The present human condition is one of an imperfect nature which
retards perfect love. This contrast between that which is divinely
created (perfection) and that which is not (sin, imperfection, human
corruption) is dramatized in the character of Lilith. Lilith, although
a non-human entity, shares an imperfect nature parallel to the human
condition.

... before her, cast from unseen heavenly mirror, stood the
reflection of herself, and beside it a form of splendid
beauty. She trembled, and sank again on the floor helpless.
She knew the one what God had intended her to be, the other what
she had made herself.18

Since salvation is perceived to be the rescue from sin and
imperfection, i.e., "All that is not rooted in him"19 (God), it is not
surprising that MacDonald demands an absolute and utter conversion or
repentance as a prerequisite. In this, MacDonald refuses any
compromise, and he expresses this demand throughout his writings in
terms of severity:
God will never let a man off with any fault. He must have him clean.20

Likewise:

... who will have you clean, who will neither spare you any needful shame, nor leave you exposed to any that is not needful.

MacDonald appears to be aware of the severity of this demand for perfection. Through the mouth of one of his non-fantastic characters, Ian, in What's Mine's Mine, he expresses the human reaction to this demand:

'I am sometimes almost terrified,' said Ian, 'at the scope of the demands made upon me, at the perfection of the self-abandonment required of me; yet outside of such absoluteness can be no salvation.'22

This terror is amply justified by the example of Lilith, who undertakes a slow, tortured conversion. Her repentance is represented by the inherent evil within her being painfully devoured by a literal fiery worm, an actualization of the "worm and fire" of Mark ix: 44, 46, 48.23 This extinction of evil is a necessary prerequisite to salvation. Robert Falconer, another of MacDonald's non-fantastic characters, demands this same necessary repentance of his own father:

'You will have to repent some day, I do believe - if not now under the sunshine of heaven, then in the torture of the awful world where there is no light but that of the conscience...24
Repentance can be mild as well as merciless, depending on the penitent's ability to resist or submit. In the latter case, as with Lilith, MacDonald frequently refers to the painful experience as "paying the uttermost farthing," as derived from the expression in Matt. v: 25.

The finalized or completed stage of this salvation is the beatific vision or "heaven," a definitive state of perfection after death. MacDonald portrays the beatific vision in his fantasies, equating it with the "fairy land" in which many of his works are situated, most notably Phantastes and The Golden Key. In Lilith it is indistinguishable from an overall, general apokatastasis which includes the salvation of every human, animal, and demon. The symbols with which MacDonald illustrates heaven in these fantastic works are very complex and difficult to analyze. They do, however, express the principle of a perfected nature, free from any sin, strife, or unhappiness.

MacDonald's scheme of salvation is very reminiscent of F.D. Maurice's theology, particularly of his views that sin punishes itself, of corrective chastisement, and the Atonement. To a degree these views are also reflected in Farrar's writings. Although Maurice's influence is evident, MacDonald's position lacks the caution characteristic throughout Maurice's writings. He asserts, as I shall presently discuss, that salvation must eventually be accepted by all, in accordance with the universal salvific will of God.

MacDonald's views, like Maurice and Farrar's, are doubtless a
reaction against the bifurcating notions of traditional opinions of salvation, including those of the evangelical parties, the Congregationalist and various Calvinist churches, and E.B. Pusey. It marks a transition from the conventional beliefs which saw salvation as being saved from the wrath of a just God to the more liberal reforms of the latter part of the century.

II. Universal Salvific Will of God.

There is a strong advocacy of trinitarianism throughout MacDonald's writings. In this, he asserts the divinity of Jesus Christ:

Let me then ask, do you believe in the Incarnation? And if you do, let me ask further, was Jesus ever less divine than God? I answer for you, Never.27

It is probably due to trinitarianism (as also to Maurice and broad dogma) that MacDonald was encouraged to embrace Anglicanism, rather than the Universalist Church. The trinitarian position was fortified within Anglican doctrine through the first, second, and fifth Articles of Religion, as well as the Nicene, Apostles', and Creed of Saint Athanasius. While the Anglican Church of the 19th century remained trinitarian, the Universalist Church, under the leadership of Hosea Ballou, had by now become basically deistic. This was intolerable to MacDonald's beliefs.

Although MacDonald disagreed with the Universalist Church over the Trinity, he was in harmony with their assertion of the universal
salvific will of God. The insistence that the saving will and power of the divine is directed towards every individual (indeed, every portion of creation) is a basic tenet of MacDonald's theology. He expresses it repeatedly throughout his writings:

... that our one free home is the Heart, the eternal lovely Will of God, than that which should fail, it were better that we and all the worlds should go out in blackness. But this Will is our Salvation.28

And:

He has not two thoughts about us. With him all is simplicity of purpose and meaning and effort and end - namely, that we should be as he is, think the same thoughts, mean the same things, possess the same blessedness. It is so plain that anyone may see it, ... everyone shall see it. It must be so. He is utterly true and good to us, nor shall anything withstand his will.29

Likewise:

Everyone who works without believing that God is doing the best, the absolute good for them, is, must be, more or less, thwarting God.30

The classic biblical text for the divine universal salvific will is I Timothy ii: 1-7, that God wills all to be saved and come to the knowledge of truth. It is similarly expressed in II Peter iii: 9, that God does not want anyone to be destroyed, but desires all to repent. These scriptures were usually interpreted by predestinarian and exclusivist parties as referring to all manner or sorts of individuals, rather than literally to all individuals.31 In this, MacDonald's position is probably as much a reaction against the Calvinist parties in Scotland, as an expression of his personal conviction.
This unfaltering demand for the universal salvific will corresponds to an equally unfaltering demand for the perfection of God. MacDonald consistently asserts that either God is perfect in goodness and love (and this entails the universal salvific nature of the divine) or is not truly God. This is perhaps best illustrated by the speech of Ian, his non-fantastic character in *What's Mine's Mine*. In answer to his mother's claim that God was to be perceived of as an elective God, who could not or would not save all, Ian replied:

Mother, I would gladly -- oh how gladly! perish for ever, to save God from being the kind of God you would have me believe him. I love God, and will not think him other than good. Rather than believe he does not hear every creature that cries to him, whether he knows Jesus Christ or not. I would believe there was no God, and go mourning to my grave.\(^{32}\)

MacDonald is not the first to demand universal salvation as the logical consequence of the perfection of God. Origen first approached this position in *First Principles*, suggesting that salvation would be incomplete until all beings, including the devil, were redeemed.\(^{33}\) MacDonald adheres to this argument pugnaciously:

The idea that God would be God all the same, as glorious as he needed to be, had he not taken upon himself the divine toil of bringing home his wandered children, had he done nothing to seek and save the lost, is false as hell. Lying for God could go no farther.\(^{34}\)

This is basically a theodicy, a demand that the perfection of God be demonstrated. It is consistent throughout MacDonald's writings and reoccurs in many themes within his universalism.
Although MacDonald considers the person of Jesus Christ as the saviour of all humanity (and beyond humanity), he does not accept the concept of the Atonement as being a deliverance from the punishment of sins, i.e., from an everlasting hell of torment. The idea that the perfect God would accept the suffering of an innocent to satisfy his vengeance and allow the guilty to escape from punishment is abhorrent to MacDonald:

... to say that the justice of God is satisfied with suffering, is a piece of the darkness of hell... Nothing can satisfy the justice of God but justice in his creature. The justice of God is the love of what is right, and the doing of what is right... Eternal misery in the name of justice could satisfy none but a demon whose bad laws had been broken.  

Rather than accept the more traditional opinion that the Atonement is a deliverance from the punishment of sins, MacDonald formulates an opinion nearly identical to that of F.D. Maurice, namely, that Jesus is the saviour in that he saves humanity from the power of sin. In MacDonald's own words: "Jesus did not die to save us from punishment; he was called Jesus because he should save his people from their sins." Directly addressing the question of the Atonement in Justice, MacDonald proceeds to describe how Jesus was given over to humanity as a proof of God's perfect love, and how his sufferings were to lead people from the path of unrighteousness. His death and resurrection are seen to be a victory over the power of sin which corrupts creation, but not a satisfaction of God's just wrath in order to allow sinners to escape rightful punishment. In this, MacDonald's
theological position is quite similar to that of Maurice, and it is possible that these conclusions are due to the latter's influence.

His position is a logical one, in that MacDonald considers punishment to be a chief instrument in the salvation of an individual. Punishment is seen to be corrective rather than vindictive, in that it is only used in order that an obstinate soul should relinquish the will to sin and should repent:

... He who refuses must be punished and punished - punished through all the ages - punished until he gives way, yields, and comes to the light.38

Likewise:

Away with him to the Outer Darkness! Perhaps that will make him repent.39

Since punishment is one of the chief salvific instruments, it would be highly unreasonable to consider the Atonement as being the deliverance from the punishment of sins. Rather, corrective punishment is seen to be instrumental in the perfecting of the individual, in order to promote eventual salvation. Again, it is reserved only for the impenitent, until that time when repentance, out of free will, should occur.
III. Human Free Will.

There is an inconsistency within MacDonald's consideration of human free will. On the one hand, MacDonald appears to accept the Arminian position, that human beings (and other advanced races) are endowed with the ability to choose to accept salvation, as opposed to Calvinistic election. This strong assertion of free will throughout his writings is perhaps best illustrated by the archdemoness, Lilith. Though of an alternate race, Lilith serves to demonstrate an exercise in the abuse of free will.

After a long agonizing battle in which the demon struggles to resist salvation, she finally repents. But during this spectacular resistance, Lilith almost succeeds in totally rejecting the divine salvific power. Only the realization that the consequence of such a triumph will be her self-created degradation, in a striking contrast to her former perfect beauty, prompts her to desist, and the process of restoration commences.40

Likewise, MacDonald asserts in clear, sharp language:

Nor will God force any door to enter in. He may send a tempest about the house, the wind of his admonishment may burst doors and windows, yea, shake the house to its foundations; but not then, not so, will he enter. The door must be opened by the willing hand, ere the foot of Love will cross the threshold.41

This is basically the Arminian position, as espoused by Maurice, Farrar, and Pusey. The human agent, though submitted to tremendous pressure by the divine, remains free to reject the universal offer of salvation.42

Yet, by contrast, MacDonald also declares the following:
He gave man the power to thwart his will, that, by means of that same power, he might come at last to do his will in a higher kind and way than would otherwise have been possible to him. God sacrifices his will to man that man may become such as himself and give all to the truth; he makes man able to do wrong, that he may choose and love righteousness.  

This passage, plus that of the previous section, ".. nor shall anything withstand his will," suggests Calvinist overtones. It appears that God's purpose in redeeming all humanity has already been destined. Human free will serves only as an instrument in this destiny.

There seems to be a compromise between Calvinist irresistible grace and Arminian conditional universal salvation. Yet this compromise is somewhat characteristic of Anglicanism during this period. In Farrar, for example, there is an ambiguity: "God predestines; man is free. How this is we cannot say; but so it is." The Anglican Church at this time was torn between the Oxford Movement and the resisting low church and Calvinist factions. The compromise in Farrar and MacDonald's writings may reflect the extremities of the Anglican situation; on one hand the Arminianism of the high, broad, and Anglo-Catholic church parties, and on the other, the Calvinism of the low church. Both Farrar and MacDonald were of a Calvinist background, and this early influence may have pervaded their later theological opinions.

MacDonald appears to have loathed traditional forms of Scottish Calvinism. The proposal of a restricted election appears contrary to MacDonald's convictions and his writings express this disagreement. Through the Rev. Cowie, the kind but timid minister in Alec Forbes, MacDonald offers the following advice: "... dinna trouble yer heid about election, and a' that. It's no' a canny doctrine."
IV. Sin and Evil.

Sin and evil are identical in MacDonald's works, and as such are seen to exist as the principle that is contrary to God's perfection. In this, the principle of evil is seen to be distinct from the nature of the devil/demons, which MacDonald considers to be separate creatures. These creatures, like humans, are perceived of as being bound by this negative principle, but their true and original created nature is not identical to it. Evil and sin do have a real existence, but only as a principle that is contrary to God's perfection:

God is so altogether alien to wrong, because it is to him a heart-pain and trouble that one of his little ones should do the evil thing...47

MacDonald stresses the incompatibility of God's perfection with the imperfection of evil by asserting that a redeemed soul would willingly endure an eternal torment, rather than to sink back into the principle that is contrary to God: "No soul is saved that would not prefer hell to sin."48 Thus, all that is not of God's perfection, i.e., the imperfection of the creature in various forms, is against God and therefore evil or sin.

Since the principles of sin and evil are entirely incompatible with the perfect nature of God, MacDonald demands that God eventually must destroy all evil, in every shape and form. He expresses this assertion in clear and precise language: "It is the nature of God, so terribly pure that it destroys all that is not pure";49 "if any man's
work is not with God, its results shall be burned, ruthlessly burned;\textsuperscript{50} and, "Punishment is not the thing required of God but the absolute destruction of sin."\textsuperscript{51}

However, this destruction is not that of the human or demonic agent of the contrary principle, but only of the sin itself. God, because of his perfect divine nature, must destroy the very principle that is contradictory to perfection, but this does not include the creature. If God were to destroy the creature along with the principle, rather than to eventually redeem that which he has created, then for MacDonald this would be "... for God to suffer defeat, blameless indeed, but defeat."\textsuperscript{52} In this, MacDonald demands that the perfect nature of God includes the ability to carry out his own universal salvific will.

The destruction of the evil principle within the creature, rather than the creature itself, is expressed in the salvation of MacDonald's literary villains. In both his fantastic and non-fantastic works, the villain is often redeemed despite the depth of his or her depravity. I have already described the salvation of Lilith in the previous section. Other redeemed villains include the sadistic Angus MacPholp,\textsuperscript{53} the incredibly wicked princess Rosamund,\textsuperscript{54} and perhaps most notably, Murdock Malison of \textit{Alec Forbes} fame. This last villain, an uncommonly vicious school-master, is of note since his character is based upon a real life person whom George MacDonald felt was personally responsible for the death of his younger brother, James. Yet, true to form, MacDonald creates a divine repentance for the man.\textsuperscript{55} It would seem that the divine salvific power is able to redeem even the worst of
MacDonald, being traditionally a Protestant, does not discuss the different natures of sin, as might a Roman Catholic theologian such as Karl Rahner. Yet his consideration of the acts of sin prompts him to distinguish two types as being conditionally unpardonable. The first of these two acts is the traditional unpardonable offense, i.e., the sin against the Holy Spirit. In this instance, the sin is only unforgivable in that it is perceived of as being the unrepented rejection of salvation. Yet it remains unpardonable only for so long as the guilty party remains impenitent. It is not to be considered as being literally unpardonable, or an act which could forever separate a creature from the love of God. MacDonald suggests that the literal interpretation which proposes that such an act could never be forgiven by God despite sincere repentance on the part of the perpetrator is no more than "a doctrine of devils."

This position is nearly identical to those of Maurice and Farrar, in demanding a higher interpretation of the synoptic unpardonable offense in Matthew xii: 31, Mark iii: 29, and Luke xii: 10. It reflects a stage of biblical criticism, which occurred after the discovery of new manuscripts and subsequent textual analysis.

The second sin is much the same as the first, i.e., the unwillingness to forgive others. This sin is only considered to be unpardonable in that the perpetrator is both hindering God's plan of complete restoration and refusing personal perfection. It too remains unpardonable only for so long as there is impenitence. Yet neither sin
can effectively frustrate God's will towards universal salvation.

It is notable that MacDonald did not consider suicide to be unpardonable, even though this act was traditionally so regarded by the contemporary Scottish churches. This vast difference in opinion is dramatized by MacDonald in the correspondence between his hero Wilfred Cumbermede and Charles Osborne. In this passage, MacDonald, through the letters of Cumbermede, tries to assure the severely religious Osborne that his son's recent suicide had by no means forever damned him. The older man, however, remains adamant that his son has committed an act that excludes the possibility of future repentance, and is irrevocably damned. MacDonald proceeds to assert the error of this traditional view, in light of the perfection and salvific power of God, even after death.60

V. Death.

MacDonald's consideration of death differs from both the liberal Anglicans and conventional Scottish Calvinists. The Anglicans, including Maurice and Farrar, maintained that it was possible for salvation to occur after death, apparently basing this view on I. Peter. iii: 19 and an optimistic evaluation of salvific grace. Rather than sharing this cautious optimism, MacDonald goes one step further. Death becomes an instrument of universal salvation, after every resource in life has been exhausted. A prime example of this is the death of Sir George, the hopeless alcoholic in Sir Gibbie:
He was gone to see what God could do for him there, for nothing more could be done here. 61

Likewise, the murderer Leopold in Thomas Wingfold confesses the salvific properties of death:

'Oh!' he signed, 'isn't it good of God to let me die! Who knows what he may do for me on the other side! Who can tell what the bounty of a God like Jesus may be!' 62

Thus death is described as "that blessed invention which of itself must set many things right." 63

The Scottish Calvinist position disallowed any second chances for salvation. If repentance did not occur during life, then the soul was lost forever. Thus prayers for the dead, as endorsed by E.B. Pusey and expressed in the Anglican Prayer Book, were strictly prohibited. MacDonald dramatizes this theological position in the character of Robert Falconer's grandmother. On hearing the news that her son had died, presumably in a state of sin, Mrs. Falconer refused to compromise with Calvinist practice:

'Lea' him oot o' oor Prayers, laddie, and I canna bide it.'

'What for that?'

'He's deid.' 64

MacDonald takes issue with this prohibition. He heartily endorses the practice of praying for the departed as follows:
... the departed soul, which cannot be beyond the need of prayer, as the longings that follow it into the region of the Unknown, are not beyond its comfort.65

This probably reflects his early experiences with Calvinism. The Anglican practice of praying for the dead no doubt helped to attract MacDonald to the Anglican Communion.

Given this positive and optimistic consideration of death, it is not surprising to find that a favorite MacDonald theme is that of a highly emotional death-bed scene. In these situations, e.g., the final moments of "Dooble Sandy," Dr. Anderson, and Robert's grandmother in Robert Falconer,66 the dying victim is illustrated as receiving salvation just at the moment of death. This reoccurring theme is probably employed by MacDonald to reassure his audience, since he is well aware of the popular terror of the mystery of death: "Am I going to sleep - to lose consciousness - to be helpless for a time - thoughtless - dead?"67

Similarly, MacDonald thinks of death as being an opportunity for reconciliation, i.e., the reunion of departed family members with a dying individual. The most dramatic expression of this reunion occurs in Lilith, wherein the archdemoness is laid beside the daughter she has murdered. Lilith dies in order that she might be reunited with this same daughter, Lona, who is described as being a hybrid (half demon and half human).68 In addition to the theme of family reconciliation, this situation serves as an outstanding illustration of universal reconciliation within MacDonald's writings, i.e., the final reconciliation between humans and demons, in grace.
VI. Hell.

MacDonald's consideration of hell differs greatly from the contemporary 19th century view. Whereas Maurice and Farrar allowed for the possibility of a state of endless separation from God, MacDonald rejects it completely. He considers the traditional view to be contrary to divine perfection since it would simultaneously allow sin and imperfection to exist forever. His opposition to the concept of an everlasting hell is expressed in the strongest and clearest of terms:

O God, wilt thou not cast Death and Hell into the lake of fire - even into thine own consuming self?69

And:

I do not believe that any being, never good enough to see the essential ugliness of sin, could sin so as to deserve such punishment.70

Similarly:

Believe it not, my brother, lest it quench forgiveness in thee, and thou be not forgiven, but go down with those thy brothers to the torment.71

MacDonald does agree with the traditional notion of the painful consequences of rejecting grace, but this can only be of a temporary nature, wherein corrective rather than retributive punishment is administered in the form of loss, namely, the loss of bliss, of the direct presence of God, of joy. Yet this remedial punishment is seen to be only the result of impenitence and the consequential pain of loss.
It is not necessarily directly inflicted by the divine or by agents of the divine, similar to the social penal system. Even so, MacDonald places emphasis upon the reality of the pain of loss, albeit a temporary pain:

If still he cling to that which can be burned, the burning goes on deeper and deeper into his bosom, till it reaches the roots of the falsehood that enslaves him.72

This description is highly complementary with the fiery worm that torments Lilith until she repents.73 Lilith's pain by the same worm is part of her recognition of what she has lost, i.e., her own former perfection and perfect beauty.74 Lilith herself provides an excellent illustration of the pains of hell being both the loss of all goodness and good things, as well as an adherence to the evil things that are being continually burnt and destroyed by God.

Since hell is perceived of as temporary in nature, it is logical that MacDonald should reject the conception of hell as an annihilation. In Wilfred Cumbermede MacDonald utterly rejects the concept of annihilation, describing it as having merit only if there were no God: "If there is no God, annihilation is the one thing to be longed for."75 Likewise, he describes it as being a blameless defeat of God, God being unable to both save the sinner and destroy only the sin.76 In such a case, God's perfection remains in question. MacDonald considers the question of annihilation with less rebuff in It Shall Not Be Forgiven. Here, MacDonald admits that annihilation could be considered as a form
of euthanasia, but only if a soul could theoretically position itself as being beyond God's salvific power. Even so, God's infinite salvific power would make such a theory invalid, and hence annihilation has no place within the theological structure of MacDonald's treatment of universalism.

MacDonald's rejection of an everlasting hell probably reflects both his theodicy and his aversion to hell fire homiletics. The former is characteristic of MacDonald's mysticism. In this he relies on his inner conviction that God will not allow an everlasting victory for the powers of evil. The second is a reaction to the popular belief in an endless material hell, endorsed by many preachers. This traditional view is based on a literal interpretation of such scriptures as Matthew iii: 12; v: 29; vii: 13; viii: 11; x: 28; xiii: 30-50; xviii: 8; xxii: 13; xxv: 41; Mark ix: 43-48; Luke iii: 17; xvi: 23-26; II Thess. i: 9; Jude 23; Revelation ix: 1; xiv: 10-11; xix: 20; xx: 10; xxi: 8, all of which can be taken to indicate a hell of material torment. This view was still strong in 19th century theology, not only with evangelical and literalist groups, but also within Anglicanism. E.B. Pusey, as I have indicated, readily admitted to a personal belief in the actual fire of hell.

One of MacDonald's strongest arguments against the everlastingness of hell is that no perfected soul could truly enjoy the beatific vision, knowing that a lost relative or even an acquaintance was suffering in hell. A soul, having achieved its salvation (which is to say, its perfection), could not abide the continual misery of lost
members. Such an existence, the redeemed on one side enjoying eternal bliss, the damned on their polarity suffering eternal misery, would be contrary to the very nature of salvation itself, i.e., perfect love. In short, the traditional bifurcating view of heaven and hell would be contradictory: "their moans, myriads of ages away, would turn heaven for us into hell." Rather, MacDonald demands that the unceasing petitions of the redeemed for the damned would be as follows:

'O Christ!' the redeemed would cry, 'where art thou, our strong Jesus? ... Come, Lord of Life! Monarch of Suffering! Redeem them. For us, we will go down into the burning, and see whether we cannot at least carry through the howling flames a drop of water to cool their tongues.'

In his fantasies, MacDonald illustrates saving grace as being vastly superior to any force of evil or principle of sin. This is obvious in Phantastes, wherein every evil creature, ranging from evil trees to evil fairies, is constantly thwarted by good trees and good fairies. Likewise, the goblins in The Princess and the Goblin are constantly driven back by the hero, Curdie, and a large force of virtuous miners. Even divine agents- as hideously deformed as the beast Lina in The Princess and Curdie prove to be more than a match for the forces of evil, both men and beasts, although she herself is not fully restored. Perhaps the clearest illustration of the obvious imbalance between the salvific and anti-salvific forces is to be found in Lilith. In this situation, Lilith, now penitent, fears the power of the Shadow, i.e., Satan, who threatens to destroy her if she ceases to
be his queen of hell. Yet she is reassured by Adam (of Genesis fame) that even the devil is powerless to prevent her redemption: "Here he can hurt no one. Over him also is power given me." 83

VII. The Church and Other Religions.

The role of the Church appears to be instrumental as an agent of salvation, yet not essential. Although two of his non-fantastic heroes are clergymen, i.e., the narrator of Annals of a Quiet Neighbourhood and its sequel, The Seaboard Parish, and Thomas Wingfold of the book by the same name, the clergy is generally depicted as being, at best, ineffective, e.g., the Rev. Cowie of Alec Forbes. Usually, MacDonald depicts the clergy as having a limited merit, illustrating the purpose of the Church as merely a part of the total salvific process, which would continue with or without it. The Church would appear to be an instrument of salvation, as may be observed by the actions of Thomas Wingfold and the Annals narrator, but by no means the only instrument, or perhaps not even the chief instrument of salvation. MacDonald's assertion that "He will say to no man, 'You never went to Church: depart from me; I do not know you..." 84 is an excellent illustration of his consideration of the role of the Church.

On occasion, MacDonald seems to hold the Church in contempt. He accuses Scottish Calvinists of proclaiming "all the fictions of an ignorant and low theology." 85 Likewise, he states that "Theologians have done more to hide the gospel of Christ than any of its adversaries." 86
The low esteem afforded to the Church reflects both MacDonald's mysticism and his reaction to the contemporary ecclesiastic situation in Britain. In the first instance, MacDonald emphasizes the individual relationship between each member of the human race and God, rather than the collective relationship. In this he asserts that "There is no massing of men with God," and that "By his creation, then, each man is isolated with God." The Church, being an organization, is given a much lesser importance.

The second instance is probably an indication of MacDonald's personal disillusionment. The universalist movement led by Wardlaw in the early 1840's was soundly discredited by the more traditional clergy. MacDonald's charge at Arundel was mostly grieving, and it drove him from the Congregationalist tradition. Upon entering into the Anglican Communion, he could not have helped but to notice the open hostility between the Oxford Movement champions and the resisting parties, a prime example being Pusey and Farrar.

In addition to the Congregationalist and Anglican ecclesiastic disputes, it must be remembered that the British Isles were filled with every manner of religious intensity. Notably, the three hundred year old battle between Catholicism and Protestantism was still raging. Many of the novel sectarians, both domestic and foreign, were exclusivist in their theology of salvation. A popular theme, as expressed by such groups as the Seventh Day Adventists, was to hold in disrepute every other religious group or denomination, often accusing them of being the "antichrist." Given this situation, it is small wonder that MacDonald,
according to his son, Ronald, utterly detested the title "Protestant," since it was claimed by so many diverse groups, as well as mainline denominations. He was particularly contemptuous of the Scottish Protestants (undoubtedly a reflection of his early life) and he makes note of their forbidding of prayers for the dead: "for at the grave the Scotch terror of Popery forbids any observance of a religious character."

MacDonald is highly optimistic in regarding the state of non-Christians. He is fully confident that salvation extends beyond the limits of Christianity, although salvation is technically through Christ. This optimism is dramatized in the powerful testimony of Ian, the young Scot who refused to accept the selectively salvific descriptions of God prescribed by Scottish Calvinism:

Rather than believe he does not hear every creature that cries to him, whether he knows Jesus Christ or not, I would believe there was no God, and go mourning to my grave.

Likewise, the salvific power of God is expressed as being great enough to become effective in agnostics and atheists. MacDonald goes so far as to suggest that God actually promotes atheism in such cases wherein an individual is exposed to a false image of the divine:

When souls like Robert's have been ill-taught about God, the true God will not let them gaze too long upon the Moloch which men have set up to represent him. He will turn away their minds from that which men call Him, and fill them with some of his own lovely thoughts or works, such as may by degrees prepare the way for a vision of the Father.
In this, the honest conviction of an atheist is employed in order to purge away the falseness of the imperfect image of the divine. Of course, this is merely a preliminary to the inspiration of the true nature of the divine, i.e., that of perfect love, rather than a permanent state. MacDonald's illustration, however, amply describes the ability of the divine to render anything into an instrument of salvation. Thus the salvific power of God is perceived to be effective in atheists and agnostics, as well as in non-Christians.

The inclusion of atheists and agnostics may be attributed to MacDonald's belief in the mystical encounter between God and every human being, each working out his or her individual salvation. Notably, MacDonald has little to say about the other major religions.

This latter observance may reflect on the thrust by the various missionary groups towards Christianizing the entire empire. As a convinced trinitarian MacDonald would have welcomed the spread of the gospel to non-Christian lands, though as a militant universalist he would have disagreed with the contemporary view that the vast majority of humanity, not yet having heard the saving news, was already damned. Missionary efforts were encouraged by the extending of the empire, as well as by increased transportation by sea and the Navy's unmatchable ability to enforce Christianity abroad, if the need arose. Such scriptures as Matthew xxiv: 14; Mark xvi: 15; and Luke xxiv: 47, the risen Christ's instruction to preach the gospel to the nations, strongly motivated the many lobbyists in Parliament. Likewise, such passages as Acts iv: 12; xvi: 30-31; Rom. x: 4-13; I Tim. ii: 5; Heb. ii: 3;
and especially John iii: 16-18, which stress the necessity of salvation through Christ alone, reinforced the opinion that members of the other major religions were already under a sentence of damnation.

The lack of a sizable consideration of the state of other religions in MacDonald's overall theology is contrary to the pattern of the 19th century. Clearly, this question was of concern to Maurice, Farrar and Pusey. MacDonald may have ignored this question due to mixed feelings. Even so, his firm belief in the salvation of every member of humanity dismisses any theoretical problem of disbelief.

VIII. Assertions of Universal Human Salvation.

MacDonald's assertion that God will save every member of humanity is consistent throughout his writings. This is often stated in clear, precise terms, as follows:

... the eternal lovely Will of God, than that which should fail, it were better that we and all the worlds should go out in blackness. But this Will is our Salvation. Because He liveth we shall live also.\(^92\)

Also:

Then indeed wilt thou be all in all. For then our poor brothers and sisters, everyone - O God, we trust in thee, the Consuming Fire - shall have been burnt clean and brought home.\(^93\)

Again:

God is, and shall be, All in all. Father of our brothers and sisters! thou wilt not be less glorious than we, taught of Christ, are able to think thee.\(^94\)
Likewise:

... nothing will ease our hearts of their love but the commending of all men, all our brothers, all our sisters, to the one Father.\(^\text{95}\)

And again:

... for that no man sinks into the grave. He only disappears. Life is a constant sunrise, which death cannot interrupt, any more than the night can swallow up the sun. 'God is not the God of the dead, but of the living; for all live unto him.'\(^\text{96}\)

Also:

... they all, with one voice of multiform yet harmonious utterance, declare the glory of God and of his Christ.\(^\text{97}\)

And finally:

His will cannot finally be thwarted; where it is thwarted for a time, the very thwarting subserves the working out of a higher part of his will.\(^\text{98}\)

MacDonald defends this stance chiefly on the grounds of a theodicy, an insistence that God would not be truly perfect unless he could carry out his will—universal salvation—perfectly. In this, he offers the following prayer:

Our God, we will trust thee. Shall we not find thee equal to our faith? One day, we shall laugh ourselves to scorn that we looked for so little from thee; for thy giving will not be limited by our hoping.\(^\text{99}\)
Likewise, through Wilfred Cumbermede he declares that "I am only insisting on the perfection of God - as far as I can understand perfection." 100

The principle of this theodicy is carried over to his consideration of the non-human situation as well. In this, he similarly discusses universalism and its inclusion of all creation beyond the human sphere.

B. Universalism Beyond the Human Situation.

1. Universalism and Animals.

There is a constant concern for the welfare of animals throughout MacDonald's writings, especially over their mistreatment. In life, MacDonald despised such pastimes as hunting, describing the sport as "The heartlessness of the common type of sportsman" and as "loathsome." 101 His concern for animals is well expressed in Wilfred Cumbermede, wherein he protests every animal abuse from the shooting of a small bird 102 to the beating of the white horse, Lilith (a different creature from the villainess in the book of the same name): "It was a cowardly thing to strike the poor dumb animal..." 103

The concern for bestial welfare during this period was not limited to MacDonald's works. In 1824, the year of MacDonald's birth, the first society for the prevention of cruelty to animals began in England. At Queen Victoria's command, this became in 1840 the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. By the late 1860's
societies and groups advocating animal protection had spread across Britain and into North America: New York in 1866, Montreal in 1869, Quebec City in 1871, and Toronto in 1873. The success of the English SPCA was largely due to the efforts of a parliamentarian, Richard Martin, an Anglican priest, Arthur Broome and Lewis Gompertz, a Jewish author. 104

MacDonald's concern for animals lies in his belief that every creature has a soul: "everything has a soul and a body, or something like them." 105 MacDonald dramatically asserts this assumption in What's Mine's Mine, wherein he depicts the grim clan Macruadh mourning the death of the family stag (a family mascot which many of the old highland clans kept on the premises): "Poor old Ruadh! God rest his soul!" 106 To display a fierce highland clan offering prayers for a dead stag seems to be somewhat extreme. Yet MacDonald's concern for the welfare of animals in such a dramatic manner is constant throughout his writings. 107 Although he doesn't offer any argument for such a conclusion, MacDonald's belief that animals have, at least, some form of a soul also leads him to conclude that they have some part in the overall universal salvation.

In this, he refers to Jesus as the "Saviour O' man an' beast" in Sir Gibbie, 108 but he does not elaborate on this statement. Bestial salvation appears to be an improvement or "raising" of the quality of nature and this would appear to be the case in The Golden Key. In such an instance, a small flying fish willingly serves humanity by patiently being eaten. After this noble and generous sacrifice, it emerges fully
resurrected as a strange, angelic creature, suggesting a spiritual progression. This, in light of MacDonald's concept of perfection, would indicate that an animal's salvation is not only the destruction of its imperfections, but an advance or "promotion" as well, to a higher level. Still, The Golden Key, like so many of MacDonald's children's books, is filled with highly confusing and debatable imagery, and it might not be possible to form a definite conclusion based upon this instance.

Although MacDonald is not clear in his descriptions of bestial salvation, he nevertheless does assert that they do achieve some form of restoration, and this would seem closely connected with human salvation. Mara's leopard, in Lilith, is a good example of this expression. The leopard, an apparent servant of Mara (who in turn is an agent of salvation) is killed while trying to assist in the redemption of Lilith, the archdemoness. However, Eve (of Genesis fame) affirms the fact that the beast will be included in the overall salvation:

'I fear she is dead!' said Mara.
'I will send and find her', answered the mother.
'But why, Mara, shouldst thou at all fear for her or for anyone?...
... She will rise the righteous. We shall see her again ere very long.'

This same affirmation of bestial salvation is echoed repeatedly throughout many of MacDonald's books. MacDonald utterly rejects the
notion that an animal should have no further existence after death, and should be excluded from the same universal salvation afforded to all humanity: (that his horse) "... Lilith is gone to worms - no, that I do not believe ..." 112 In this instance, "gone to worms" signifies the termination of the white horse's existence, i.e., a form of annihilation or oblivion. MacDonald refuses to believe that such is the fate of any creature, created by the perfect divinity. Bestial annihilation appears to be incompatible with MacDonald's concept of the perfect divine nature.

This view, as opposed to his concern for animal welfare, was radically different from most of the 19th century Anglicans. Farrar and Pusey both used the phrase "the beasts that perish" with such ease as to take for granted the fact that animals were annihilated upon the event of death. This view, to an extent, is supported by Scripture. In Eccl. iii: 21, the contrast between the human soul's rising as opposed to the bestial spirit descending into the ground can be taken to mean that the former survives death while the latter does not.

Likewise, the superior quality of the human soul is expressed in the first chapter of the book of Genesis. Humans are created with the special purpose to dominate and govern the rest of the created world (i:26ff). In contrast to animals, humanity is created in the image of God, bestowed with the very breath of God. Thus, in chapter two, verses 19-20, the human, Adam, is given the godlike power over animals by being allowed to name them. This act was considered to be an act of near-supernatural quality, since names were often regarded as magical. Gods,
demons, or any principalities could be invoked if one knew their personal, often secret name. Thus Hebraic scholars, fearful of sacrilege, took pains to avoid any attempt to name the God of Israel. God's instruction to Moses in chapter three of Exodus, that he was to be called "I am who I am," reflects this piety.

The mechanical use of such scriptures reinforced the belief that salvation was exclusively an anthropological event. MacDonald, apparently motivated by personal conviction, rejects this common view in a most radical fashion.

Far from being mere brutes of sentience, MacDonald depicts animals as being divine agents, which aid in human salvation. In Alec Forbes he illustrates this theme by describing a hapless orphan's timely aid from the sudden and apparently God-sent intervention of the family cat, i.e., "... God's angel, the cat..." Likewise in Wilfred Cumbermede, the hero while recovering is ministered to by the gentle influence of the white horse, Lilith. The horse appears to have been sent by God, in order to work some special grace upon the ailing Cumbermede.

This view is also founded on biblical evidence. Such passages as Numbers xxii: 22-35, Balaam and the ass, or Jonah i: 17 - ii: 10, the prophet and the great fish, depict animals affording humanity some supernatural service. Other passages, such as Exodus viii: 1 - x: 20, the plagues of Egypt, Joshua xxiv: 12, the hornet, and Jeremiah viii: 17, snakes, illustrate animals as being instruments of God's will.

Some scriptures, the most notable being Romans viii: 19-25, the
groaning of all creation for restoration, can be taken to imply that salvation may be extended beyond humanity. Likewise, certain descriptions of the beatific vision such as Isaiah xi: 1-9, the harmless beasts in the new kingdom, or Revelation xxi: 1-end, the new heaven and earth, could conceivably add to this implication, if taken without indepth scriptural interpretation.

While MacDonald's views on bestial salvation appear to have originated out of his mystical conviction that God will redeem all creation, such scriptures as these probably reinforced his conclusions. As a highly trained theologian, MacDonald could not have helped but to have been aware of them.

MacDonald places little emphasis upon the rest of the natural creation, i.e., vegetation and minerals. The ultimate fate of plants and rocks does not seem to interest him. Regardless, he appears to hint in brief terms that all the natural order will at length be restored. The final vision of the complete restoration presented in Lilith does include physical descriptions involving natural phenomena, and Phantastes would appear to have some consideration towards the various trees and plants, suggesting that they are empowered by various entities, some benevolent, others malicious. All in all, however, the rest of nature is only of a minor significance to MacDonald's overall view.
II. Universalism and the Supernatural.

It would appear that MacDonald's consideration of universalism includes such beings as those in the sphere of the supernatural. The most obvious of these are the many fairylike creatures illustrated in his fictions. While it is true that his fantasies are difficult to interpret with precision, it seems obvious that, at times, he is advocating the salvation of these beings.

At this point I propose that MacDonald actually believed in the existence of the supernatural. I base this proposition on the following arguments.

First, as his son Greville's testimony indicates, George MacDonald grew up in an atmosphere that was saturated with the belief in a multitude of supernatural beings, including fairies, brownies, kelpies and ghosts. The younger MacDonald implies that his father's early life may have given him cause to have accepted this belief.117

Next, MacDonald was a mystic. His religious convictions were frequently based on heartfelt intuition, rather than intellectual analysis. For him, the experience of spiritual truths was not limited by hard scientific fact. The inclusion of fairies within his fantasies probably indicates, at the very least, the desire to believe in their existence.

While the belief in fairies and the like cannot be said to have been the norm in Britain during this period, there is evidence that it still waxed strong, notwithstanding. Wirt Sikes, who wrote British Goblins in 1880, reported that the belief in fairies was still strong,
though passing, particularly in the rural and mining areas. Sikes himself did not appear to have shared in the belief, and suggested that it was largely a throwback to pre-Christian mythology. Likewise, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle pointed out that there were numerous cases involving experiences with fairies throughout the 1800's right up into the 1920's.

This belief appears to have reached a peak in the early 1920's, after two school girls, Elsie Wright and Frances Griffith at Cottingley in Yorkshire, set off an elaborate hoax involving the fabrication of several fairy photographs. While experts were somewhat divided as to the photographs' authenticity, many mediums, spiritualists, and mystics converged in Yorkshire and soon began reporting fairy sightings behind every tree and shrub. Even such writers as Arthur Conan Doyle appear to have been taken in by the farce, and Doyle reported the merriment in *The Coming of the Fairies*, in 1921. Though amusing, this episode does indicate that MacDonald's belief was not an isolated case.

MacDonald appears to be highly critical of those not sharing in the belief in fairies, regarding them with disapproval. In *Sir Gibbie* the villain, Galbraith, is soundly condemned for adhering to the Calvinist prohibition of the belief in such creatures: "it was a point of Mr. Galbraith's poverty-stricken religion to denounce all superstitions, however diverse in character..." While MacDonald realized that his belief in fairies and the like was, in his words, "antagonistic to the Church of Scotland," he nonetheless held to it.
MacDonald's fantastic literature, therefore, is filled with many supernatural creatures: chiefly fairies, goblins, and the like. Throughout such books as *Phantastes*, *The Princess and the Goblin*, *The Princess and Curdie*, *The Golden Key* and *Lilith*, numerous fantastic beings exist, and serve either to aid in or frustrate the divine universal salvific action. Occasionally, these creatures are the object of salvation themselves. The evil goblins in *The Princess and Curdie*, whose plans for domination are thwarted by an army of miners, are later transformed into "brownies," following their inglorious defeat. Brownies, in traditional Scottish mythology, are largely benevolent fairy-like creatures, quite friendly and highly industrious (if not provoked). They often co-inhabit a household with a human host, performing the most unpleasant of chores for a mere pittance of gratitude. This transformation from goblin to brownie signifies the principle of conversion, the turning from evil to good, and thus the commencement of salvation.

The theory of the salvation of fairies is not eccentric to MacDonald. During the 1800's there arose a view concerning fairy origins which maintained that fairies were once rebellious angels who fell with Satan. It was believed that fairy sightings were growing less and less, since these particular angels were actively refraining from evil in the hope of being reconciled with God. This view complements MacDonald's theodicy, in that the all-loving, perfect divinity should be willing to redeem even supernatural creatures who express repentance.

For the most part, however, fairies serve as salvific agents, in
that they work for the hero or heroine in the latter's quest for salvation. This is certainly the case in *Phantastes* and *The Golden Key*, wherein the fantastic creatures repeatedly aid the heroes throughout their journey. In this, MacDonald appears to have been influenced strongly by the traditional Scottish superstitions.

In Scottish lore, fairies and their like could be either evil or benevolent, depending on the type and circumstances. In the former case, generally the norm, these creatures possessed terrible powers and used them for diabolical purposes. Travelling Scots frequently wore a shamrock (symbol of the Trinity) to ward off fairy attackers. The worst offenders of the evil variety were goblins, the 'Host' of the Unseelie Court, fachans, bean-nighes, kelpies, each-usiges, nuckelavees, shellycoats, glaistigs, and occasionally, male selkies.

But there were a number of benign breeds as well, not adverse to aiding humanity. In addition to the often benevolent brownies there were the brown man of the muirs (a protector of animals), the Seelie Court, urisks, and female selkies. Though fewer in number, creatures as these were said to assist humanity on occasion, and tales of this benevolence probably helped mold MacDonald's illustrations of fairies as salvific agents.

Scotland still persists in many of its ancient beliefs, even to this day. The celebrated "Loch Ness Monster" phenomenon is actually an acknowledgement of the viability of the ancient kelpie legends, reported as early as about 565 A.D., when the early missionary, St. Columba, allegedly encountered one. More modern figures which indicate a
belief in this variation of the kelpie legend range from an estimated 3,000-plus sightings between 1933 and 1961,\textsuperscript{131} to 4,000-plus by 1975.\textsuperscript{132} These figures would indicate that the belief in the kelpie, although somewhat modified by science, is still alive in Scotland. They do not mention, of course, the countless numbers of sightseers who regularly visit the area with, at the very least, a hope of sighting the famous kelpie. Given this consideration, it would not appear to be unreasonable for a 19th century Scottish writer such as MacDonald to have believed in many of the various supernatural legends.

There are two notable salvific agents which are clearly supernatural. First there is the reoccurring "mother figure." This feminine being appears throughout \textit{The Princess and the Goblin} and its sequel, \textit{The Princess and Curdie}, as the princess's "fairy grandmother." Likewise, she, as Anodos's fairy-like ancestor, first introduces him to the strange fantasy world in \textit{Phantastes}. In \textit{The Wise Woman} she is basically the heroine, perhaps modelled after the parable of the woman and the lost coin in Luke. xv: 8-10. In these books, she is constantly illustrated as an extremely powerful salvific agent, exercising awesome supernatural powers.

It is not clear whom this agent is meant to represent. The consensus of secondary writers suggests that MacDonald is illustrating God in feminine rather than in traditional masculine imagery.\textsuperscript{133} While I do not disregard the possibility of this view, I propose that this figure may also be taken to represent the Virgin Mary, particularly in her role as a saintly interventionist. This appears to be the case in
Lilith, where she is cast as Mara, the daughter of Adam and Eve.

The name Mara, if taken by itself, may be derived from the biblical Mariam or Maria, both being names for the mother of Jesus. This name is basically the hellenization of the Hebrew word for obstinancy or rebellion.¹³⁴ When pronounced in a Scottish accent, Mary readily becomes Mara, as can be detected in the old Scottish song, Mary's Wedding (or it could also mean "bitter" in Hebrew).

The practice of praying to the saints, especially the Virgin, is strong within the Anglican tradition. Though more characteristic of Catholicism, the belief in saintly intervention is endorsed by High Church and Anglo-Catholic parties, while generally condemned by the Low Church faction. In Lilith, Mara is first feared by the children she is trying to protect. She is referred to as the "cat" woman and spoken of in terms of terror.¹³⁵ It is possible that this is a reflection of the Low Church's opposition to Mariology, i.e., the term "cat" subtly referring to Catholicism, as well as literally to the leopard and cat who serve her.

If the reoccurring feminine figure does represent the Virgin, then it seems logical that MacDonald had, at some point, been influenced by the Anglo-Catholics. Yet, as I have suggested in the introduction, his imagery is so fluid that it seems impossible to reach a concrete conclusion on this point.

The second figure also occurs in Lilith. This is Lilith's daughter, Lona, who is a hybrid - half human through her father, Adam, and half demon, through Lilith. Although she is clearly an agent of
divine salvation, her powers are far less than Mara's. She herself becomes the object of salvation when killed by Lilith. Though dead, her salvation is guaranteed by Adam and Eve, who assure the repentant demoness that her daughter will awake when all are redeemed.

This particular episode strongly expresses salvation beyond the human sphere. Lona's name—could mean "moon" (Latin) and this would seem appropriate for a being who, like the moon itself, is part of this world and yet remains beyond it. Her nature is basically that of the "Nephilim," in Genesis vi: 1-4, hybrids resulting in the union between the sons of God and the daughters of men.

I make this last point with some reservations. This passage is not altogether clear as to whether the nephilim themselves were the hybrids mentioned, or co-existed beside them. Most authorities (for example Peakes' Commentary or The Interpreter's Bible) agree that they were hybrids. Still, there is a tendency to interpret this union as mixed marriages between the godly line of Seth and the descendants of Cain, as opposed to being a throwback to an earlier mythology.

Even so, Lona is the child of both humanity and the supernatural. Her inclusion into the overall redemption clearly expresses the belief that salvation is expanded beyond the human level. While it would be difficult to analyze his fantasies with precision, the principle of expanded salvation is consistently endorsed by MacDonald, and it complements his views on theodicy.
III. Universalism and the Demonic.

There was a strong tendency during this period to dismiss the belief in the devil as mere superstition. As discussed in the chapter on Maurice, and to some extent, on Farrar, it became increasingly popular to assert that Satan was nothing more than a symbol or representation of evil. Sikes, for example, while discussing the various British superstitions, suggested that the devil was a later Judeo-Christian invention, based on eastern religions and modelled after jins and Ahriman.\textsuperscript{137}

To some extent, MacDonald seems to have been influenced by this opinion. In his sermon, \textit{The Temptation in the Wilderness}, he suggests that Jesus' temptation by Satan is better understood as a parable than as literal.\textsuperscript{138} Similarly, in \textit{Annals} he refers to the human inability to forgive one another as being the "devil within."\textsuperscript{139} Wilfred Cumbermede's confession that "the universal self is the devil"\textsuperscript{140} also suggests that the devil is merely a representation of evil. Even so, and in spite of these few examples, MacDonald's primary expression of the devil is that the same is an actual being or creature, and this is most widely expressed throughout the rest of his literature,\textsuperscript{141} most notably in \textit{Lilith}.

The representation of Satan in \textit{Lilith} is somewhat traditional. Although he does possess great powers, he is still very much a finite being. The salvific agents, including Adam, Eve and Mara, repeatedly reveal that the devil is unable to match them in terms of power against power.\textsuperscript{142} Perhaps the greatest demonstration of this demonic limitation...
lies in Adam's accusation that Lilith, though a lesser demon, had actually seduced Satan into becoming her slave:

... had so ensnared the heart of the great Shadow, that he became her slave, wrought her will, and made her queen of Hell.143

Although MacDonald expresses the limitations of the devil as being such that even a lesser demon could seduce him, he nonetheless reveals that the seduction could not last long. After this lesser demon, Lilith, decides to repent, the great Shadow rises up in a wrathful protest that causes his former queen to quail: "'But the Shadow!' she moaned; 'I fear the Shadow!"144 The devil, although a finite being, is still terrifying enough to present the salvific agents with a serious threat.

MacDonald's consideration of the devil as an actual being leads to the assertion that as such, he will be restored, along with the totality of the natural creation. In what appears to be a somewhat sizable compassion, MacDonald expresses some sympathy for the devil, for the sake of the latter's state of damnation. In What's Mine's Mine the young Scottish hero, Ian, expresses a moral indignation and much sorrow that the devil has not yet repented: "And he has not repented yet!"145 In Alec Forbes the devil is referred to as "the puir fallow"146 (poor fellow), and in this same book, MacDonald refers to an unidentified Scottish cleric as "that worthiest of Scotch clergymen,"147 because he had offered prayers for the devil's redemption.
The height of MacDonald's compassion for the plight of the devil is expressed in Robert Falconer, through the mouth of its hero, young Robert. Twice in this book, Robert asks his friends if they believed that the devil could be saved, if he would repent. The first person to whom Robert addresses this question is the hapless, impoverished street urchin, Shargar. Shargar's response is as follows:

'There's no sayin' what fowk wad du till ance they're tried,' returned Shargar, cautiously.148

It is notable that MacDonald describes Shargar's answer as "cautious." Far more bold is the response of Ericson, an older, more worldwise subject than Shargar: "if God was as good as I would like him to be, the devils themselves would repent."149 Here, MacDonald strongly hints that the devil can be saved, leaving the entire question as a definite possibility. He assumes a far more definite stance in Lilith, wherein he declares in no uncertain terms that the devil not only can be redeemed, but eventually will be.

Lilith is an extremely difficult book to analyze, due to its mystical nature and confusing imagery. But it seems clear that MacDonald is expressing the principle of Satan's salvation, chiefly through Adam, the chief of the divine agents. Adam declares to Lilith:

When the Shadow comes here it will be to lie down and sleep also. - His hour will come, and he knows it will.150
Also:

You and he will be the last to wake in the morning of the universe.\(^{151}\)

Likewise:

Over him also is power given me.\(^{152}\)

And finally:

Every creature must one night yield himself and lie down... he was made for liberty and must not be left a slave!\(^{153}\)

The opinion that Satan could be saved has long been an issue of contention within the history of the Church. As I have pointed out in the introduction, Origen accepted it as part of his overall theodicy in *First Principles*, while Augustine of Hippo, in *The City of God*, held that salvation was reserved for humanity alone, to the exclusion of Satan. This latter view eventually became dominant. The Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner declares that the official Church teaching concerning demons is that they are finite created powers which are evil by their own choice and "which cannot be restored to a state of perfection."\(^{154}\)

Despite the official position (which seems to have been based on medieval opinion) there have been some lingering contentions over this. Karl Barth, for example, briefly discusses the possibility of Satan's restoration in his *Church Dogmatics*. Barth looks to the view that the devil might be considered as a last candidate for a general
apokatastasis, but he rejects it only on the grounds of das nichtige, or nothingness. The devil, according to Barth, has no real existence outside of being a representation of the nothingness of sin (as opposed to the reality of grace), and therefore has no substance or nature that might be restored. For Barth, it is not the fact that the devil cannot be restored, either through impenitence or the judicial will of God. It is simply that there is no real creature to be redeemed, and this view is considerably different from the official teaching that there are finite beings which cannot be restored.

MacDonald's opinion concerning the salvation of Satan is not without precedent, and it complements a historical theological issue which has lasted to the present. His assertions are reinforced by the character of Lilith, who in many ways is a villain worse than the great Shadow or Satan.

Lilith has captured the attention of several secondary writers who describe her as anything from a succuba to the fiend of the Talmud. One book review, written in 1896, went so far as to accuse MacDonald of stealing the person of Lilith from other authors, especially Marie Corelli's Lycia.

While it is true that MacDonald did employ the name and history of Lilith from the Talmudic tradition, his character serves as a direct contrast to all that is ideal; she is described as a leech, a devil, a queen of hell and a child killer. This despicable nature could be based on Scottish superstitions, as it strongly complements descriptions of glaistigs and the related Leanan-sidhes of the Isle of Man. These
fairylike creatures were bloodsuckers who often took the form of beautiful women to seduce and destroy their victims.\textsuperscript{158} Possibly, MacDonald was influenced by such lore, and incorporated it into the development of his character.

Regardless, Lilith serves to illustrate one point clearly. No matter how vile or evil the creature may be, and in spite of its efforts to resist saving grace, eventually it must be redeemed. In Lilith's case, she is taken prisoner by the salvific agents led by Vane. She is forcibly taken to Mara, Adam's daughter by Eve. Salvation, in the form of an agonizing conversion, begins in Mara's house and is later completed in Adam's, where the penitent demon is laid to rest beside the daughter she has murdered. She, along with her ex-lover, the devil, will be the last to awake from death (MacDonald considered death to be a salvific instrument) and rise to a state of perfection.\textsuperscript{159} It seems, according to MacDonald's view, even the demons will be included in God's overall plan of restoration.

Conclusion.

MacDonald's conclusion to the question of universalism is expressed quite clearly. Because of the perfect nature of God, particularly the ability to carry out his will, all creation without exception will be restored. While this is expressed less clearly in his fantastic works (though easily understood in his sermons, essays, and non-fantastic fiction) the principle of this \textit{apokatastasis} is evident. Being aware of traditional opposition to the doctrine of universalism,
he readily admits that it is "a dangerous doctrine." But in spite of arguments to the contrary, he consistently adheres to it, mainly on the grounds of theodicy and personal, mystical conviction.

**Contribution to the Study of Universalism.**

MacDonald's outlook on universal salvation is a highly individual one. In terms of the human situation, he often complements other 19th century Anglicans, particularly Maurice and to a lesser extent, Farrar. His views on death, hell, and theodicy are eccentric, however, and seem to originate from his mysticism, rather than from historical considerations. His concrete conclusion that all humanity will be redeemed because it is the will of God appears to be the result of a personal, intangible conviction of the Spirit of God working on his imagination, as he would claim.

Likewise, his views on universalism beyond the human level are equally eccentric. Though not without historical precedence, his assertions that the entire created order must be redeemed appears to be similarly based on personal conviction, rather than on historical or scriptural considerations.

His practice of expressing his theological opinions through the genre of fantasy and non-fantastic fiction is a highly unique contribution as well. While it is true that many literary writers have expressed theological convictions through similar literature, e.g., Spencer, Milton, Marlowe and Dickens, few have presented a case for universalism. In this, I suggest that as a universalist writer,
MacDonald's works present a novel approach to the overall study of the doctrine.
Footnotes:

6. Greville MacDonald, *George MacDonald and His Wife*, p. 79.
7. Ibid., pp. 80-145.
8. Ibid., pp. 178-9.
9. Ibid., p. 400 cf.
10. Ibid., pp. 397-401.
11. Ibid., p. 563-5.
13. C. Simmons, "George MacDonald and His writings," *Universalist Quarterly*, XLI (Jan. 1884), pp. 59, 63.
Footnotes:


Footnotes:

31. For example, the 19th century Jehovah's Witnesses, as expressed in The Kingdom Interlinear Translation of the Greek Scriptures (Brooklyn: Watchtower, 1969 ed.) p. 930.


37. Ibid., pp. 156-60. Also, "The Consuming Fire," pp. 41-5.


40. MacDonald, Lilith, pp. 268-304.


Footnotes:


46. MacDonald, Alec Forbes, p. 121.


52. MacDonald, "Justice," p. 129.


55. Greville MacDonald, George MacDonald and His Wife, p. 60.


57. Ibid., pp. 82-99. Also, "Light," pp. 177-9 cf.

58. MacDonald, "It Shall Not Be Forgiven," p. 87.

59. Ibid., pp. 82-6. Also, Annals of a Quiet Neighbourhood, pp. 303-4; Sir Gibbie, p. 125 cf.

60. MacDonald, Wilfred Cumbermede, pp. 448-52.
Footnotes:


63. MacDonald, Wilfred Cumbermede, p. 208.

64. MacDonald, Robert Falconer, p. 88; Also, Alec Forbes, pp. 2, 6-7.


70. MacDonald, "Justice," p. 126.


74. MacDonald, Lilith, pp. 283-7.

75. MacDonald, Wilfred Cumbermede, pp. 476-7.

Footnotes:

77. MacDonald, "It Shall Not Be Forgiven," pp. 92-3.
78. MacDonald, "The Consuming Fire," p. 49.
80. MacDonald, Phantastes, pp. 9-11, 52-8, 70-77, 198-9, 237.
83. MacDonald, Lilith, p. 298.
88. R. MacDonald, "George MacDonald ...," p. 86.
89. MacDonald, Alec Forbes, p. 2.
91. MacDonald, Robert Falconer, p. 156. Also, Wilfred Cumbermede, p. 354.
Footnotes:

100. MacDonald, Wilfred Cumbermede, p. 353.
102. MacDonald, Wilfred Cumbermede, pp. 179-80.
103. Ibid., p. 503.
Footnotes:


120. Ibid., pp. 24, 30, 40, 45-6, 48, 53, 80.

121. Ibid., pp. 108, 122, 137.


123. Ibid., p. 203.


Footnotes:

129. Ibid., pp. 90, 102, 121. 126.


135. MacDonald, Lilith, pp. 92-105.

136. Ibid., pp. 250-305.

137. Sikes, British Goblins, pp. 210-211.


140. MacDonald, Wilfred Cumbermede, p. 330.


142. MacDonald, Lilith, pp. 272, 298, 301-2.

143. Ibid., p. 204.

144. Ibid., p. 301.


146. MacDonald, Alec Forbes, p. 422.

147. Ibid., p. 246.

148. MacDonald, Robert Falconer, pp. 79, 100-1 cf.

149. Ibid., p. 101.
Footnotes:


151. Ibid., p. 302.

152. Ibid., p. 298.

153. Ibid., p. 317.


155. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics III/3 (Edin.: Clark, 1961 ed.) pp. 289-305.

156. Reis, George MacDonald, p. 118; Greville MacDonald, George MacDonald and His Wife, p. 553; Wolf, The Golden Key, pp. 345-9; R. MacDonald, "George MacDonald...", p. 61.


158. Froud, Faeries, p. 122.

159. MacDonald, Lilith, pp. 250-305.

Britain in the Early to Mid 20th Century.

There were many formidable changes in Britain after MacDonald's death. Victoria was dead, and with her, the stability and respectability of the British crown. By comparison, her successors' reigns were short and scandalous. The height of scandal (aside from allegations of Edward VII's affairs) came in 1936, with the unprecedented abdication of Edward VIII in order to marry American divorcee Wallis Simpson. No longer could Britons enjoy the security of a stable monarchy.

This discomfort was mild compared to the military and imperial situation. Up to World War I the empire remained largely intact, and Britain's military power - at least its navy - was unchallenged. During the first World War, Britain saw a nearly complete change in allies. France, traditionally an adversary, was now its closest ally, whereas the united Germany, commonly a friend, was now the chief adversary. While the British were able to dominate the German colonies with ease, the German navy proved to be an unexpected match. At the battle off the coast of Jutland, May 31 - June 1, 1916, a terrible naval encounter ensued with no clear cut victor.\textsuperscript{1} If Britain's navy was not actually defeated, it lost the matchless superiority it had enjoyed up to this point.

The overall costs of this war were shattering. Universally, the military dead totalled close to nine million. Of British losses, 908,
371 were killed outright; 2,090, 212 wounded (C.S. Lewis was one of these); 191,652 prisoners or missing; for a total of 3,190,235 casualties. These losses were heavy compared to the mere 22,182 Britain lost in the Crimean War (most due to disease), or the relatively negligible losses of the Franco-Prussian War: Germany, 41,210; France, 138,871.

Overseas, the first signs of dissolution were seen throughout the empire. Ireland was in a series of rebellions between 1916-21. India was undergoing a series of independence movements led by Nehru and Gandhi. In Africa, there were similar movements under Kenyatta and Nkrumah. At the start of World War II, the Asian holdings were threatened by Japan, who during World War I had been an exclusively British ally.

World War II proved to be even more distressful for Britons. France had fallen early in the war, leaving Britain - until the United States entered - as the chief opponent of Hitler's forces. The British navy, though still formidable, was taking a tremendous beating from the German U-boats, and when possible, aircraft. Japan was enjoying some progress in the pacific, as well.

At Dunkirk, the British army had retreated weaponless, saved only from wholesale slaughter by its civilians' efforts. Finally, the Battle of Britain spelled the lowest mark in modern British military history. Although Britain survived the three months of relentless pressure, and held the German Luftwaffe in check, the cost was high. In London alone there were 12,696 civilian deaths by bombing. For the
first time since the Franco-Spanish fleet in 1805, there was a direct attack on England itself, a task unthinkable during Victoria's reign. But whereas the Napoleonic fleet was crushed with ease, the German air forces were able to inflict tremendous damages upon the heart and capital of the empire, London itself.

Figures for the devastations of World War II appear to be less definite than World War I. Estimated casualties suggest that British losses totalled 403,195 dead and missing, and 369,267 wounded. But the civilian casualties numbered 77,007, from 1939 - 1945. While this might appear somewhat less than the first World War, these latter figures indicate only the United Kingdom. Totals for the rest of the empire would doubtless present a much higher figure.

After World War II, the empire drew to its close. Independence was afforded to the various dissatisfied colonies, most notably India and Pakistan, 1947; Burma, 1948; Malaya, 1958; and the eventual loss of the African colonies from 1948 to the 1960's. This also pointed to the succession of the United States and the U.S.S.R. as the world's leading military powers.

While it is always difficult to determine the precise effects of such events on a population, it seems logical that both world wars promoted an inherent pessimism. Gone was the sense of security and optimism of MacDonald's day, and the legacy of C.S. Lewis seemed dismal by comparison. Added to the overall depression was the universal horror at the Holocaust and the Stalinic purges. These were demonstrations of inhuman cruelty, nearly beyond belief. The mass torture of millions of
civilians also added to the general sense of despair.

Likewise, the introduction of nuclear weapons increased the growing anxiety. Armageddon, generally conceived as a theoretical, comfortably futuristic event was now imminently possible. Humanity now possessed the technology to bring about the "final battle." Lewis himself was well aware of the horrors of nuclear warfare, and expressed it in his poem, *On the Atomic Bomb.*

It would seem that this pessimism carried through to the consideration of universalism. Dearmer's *The Legend of Hell* would indicate that support for the doctrine had continued until 1929, but the energy with which it had been explored during the 19th century was notably diminished. On the continent, such theologians as Karl Barth produced some works that hinted at universal salvation, most notably his *Church Dogmatics,* but Barth never admitted to concrete universalist conclusions. John Hick produced a spirited defense for universal salvation in *Evil and the God of Love.* In this work he argued in favor of universalism on the grounds of theodicy. But this work was not produced until the 1960's, and seems to be of an individual character, rather than part of a collective movement. In short, the interest in universalism had waned, probably a reflection of the post-war atmosphere of gloom.

There were, however, other movements within the British churches, most notably ecumenism and theological progression. Ecumenism was not unique to this period, and had been part of the overall history of the Church. In the 19th century the broad Church, under F.D.
Maurice, Charles Kingsley, and Thomas Arnold, had advocated an outreach towards the various Protestant denominations, even as some of the Oxford Movement thinkers were looking sympathetically towards reunion with Rome. Progress was steady if slow, and though many inquiries were made between denominations, perhaps the most outstanding event was the Evangelical Alliance, formed in 1846 from some 800 delegates at London. By 1910 the missionary parties had brought about the Edinburgh Conference to discuss union and cooperation. World wide ecumenism gained more rapid grounds at Oxford in 1937. By 1948 the first assembly of the World Council of Churches was held. Rome had been observing but refraining from participating in the ecumenical progress. This practice was reversed when Pope John XXIII announced the ecumenical council (Vatican II) on January 25, 1959. By this time, it was clear that ecumenism was to be a main concern of the 20th century churches. Lewis was a strong supporter of this proposed reunion, and considered divisions between denominations as scandalous.

Advances in theology, particularly scriptural interpretation, were also characteristic of this later period. During the time of MacDonald, this biblical criticism had been brought about by the discovery of new manuscripts. It was carried on through the 20th century, sustained to an extent by shared theological studies between churches, and the discovery of rare texts such as the Dead Sea Scrolls in 1947, and the Gnostic gospel fragments in 1945. Added to which, both physical and social sciences contributed to the overall study of theology, seeking to interpret theological concepts by their criteria.
Out of this advancement in scriptural interpretation emerged a strong tendency among theologians to demythologize Christianity. These writers seriously questioned previously accepted beliefs in the light of novel evidence, for example, the divinity of Christ. For the most part, such practitioners were within the Church itself, not seeking to destroy Christianity, but to purge many ancient beliefs they considered to be mythological as opposed to literal.

This tendency was by no means universal. Some, such as E.L. Allen, opened their arms enthusiastically to the new criticism. Others, like John Robinson, Bishop of Woolwich, sought to compromise between the new inclinations and traditional theology. Still others, such as C.S. Lewis, remained somewhat conservative, and were largely opposed to many of the new conclusions. Lewis's essay, *Fern Seeds and Elephants*, indicates strong disagreement with the more liberal biblical critics.

The writings of Lewis are very reflective of the early to mid 20th century. Most notably, there is a sense of pessimism (as opposed to the optimism of MacDonald) which manifests itself in frequent uncertainties. At times, there appears to be a strong influence by the contemporary theological trend. In brief, it is a time considerably different from that of George MacDonald.
Footnotes:

3. Ibid., p. 236.
7. Ibid., p. 610.
Footnotes:


THE TREATMENT OF UNIVERSALISM IN ANGLICAN THOUGHT FROM
GEORGE MACDONALD (1824 - 1905)
TO
C.S. LEWIS (1898 - 1963).

By

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A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

David M. Kelly, Ottawa, Canada, 1989
V. Lewis's Treatment of Universalism.

History.

Clive Staple Lewis was born in Ireland, in 1898. Incidents concerning his private life are perhaps best recorded in his own autobiography, *Surprised by Joy* (London: Fontana, 1955). This book is chiefly a testimony to his conversion to Christianity from atheism, about 1929. For the purpose of this chapter, it is of interest to note that early in life he displayed a strong enjoyment of the fantastic, i.e., fiction such as Beatrice Potter's *Squirrel Nutkin*. Such a love of fantastic literature, even in childhood, eventually led to the discovery of George MacDonald's fantastic literature, which in turn inspired Lewis towards his conversion. Lewis confesses that MacDonald has inspired him more than any other writer, and even goes so far as to describe MacDonald (whom he never met personally) as his "master."

Other incidents from Lewis's early life, although interesting, are largely irrelevant for purposes here. It appears that as a child Lewis was raised as a strict Ulster Protestant, but was thrown into the Anglo-Catholic tradition when his family moved to England. He describes the change as being traumatic, and suggests that if (as several of his critics have indicated) there is too strong an emphasis upon hell throughout this writings, then it is the fault of the Anglo-Catholics.
Lewis briefly fought in W.W. I., but was wounded in the front line. About this same time he won an Oxford scholarship and proved to be a masterful scholar. Before his death in 1963, Lewis held the distinguished chair of Medieval and Renaissance English at Cambridge University. He was one of the foremost literary critics and an expert in philology.

Lewis's books have enjoyed immense sales and vast circulation, easily numbering into the millions. His popularity may be explained by the fact that, in addition to his literary skills, he was identifiable to the general audience. As a convert from secular atheism, his opinions were based on experiences not uncommon to the average reader and this, no doubt, afforded him some authority on matters of popular religion. Likewise, many conservatives saw in Lewis a champion against the more radical tendencies in 20th century theology such as extreme secularization and demythologizing. R. Cunningham, for example, afforded Lewis the title "Defender of the Faith."

The popularity of Lewis's books is remarkable in light of the fact that he possessed no formal theological training. In his writings, Lewis readily admits to this lack of training. In his anthology on MacDonald, he openly confesses that he is not a theologian:

I will attempt no historical or theological classification of MacDonald's thought, partly because I have not the learning to do so, still more because I am no great friend of such pigeon-holing.

Many of his readers were unaware of this, and as Lewis points out in his
preface to the Screwtape epistles, they believed his opinions to be
based on years of study in moral and ascetic theology.\textsuperscript{11}

As I have stated in the introduction to this thesis, Lewis was
not without opponents, despite (or perhaps because of) his overwhelming
popularity. While it is true that multitudes of the clergy,
seminarians, and laity supported his theological views, others –
including theologians adhering to the modern trends – condemned him.
Amongst his critics were W. Norman Pittenger, J.B. Haldane, and E.L.
Allen.\textsuperscript{12} Opposition to Lewis was often characterized by Allen's
following remarks:

He shuts his eyes to all that we have gained in the last century
and a half by a closer acquaintance with Jesus as He spoke in
Galilee.\textsuperscript{13}

Likewise:

Here is medievalism with a vengeance!\textsuperscript{14}

In other cases, however, Lewis appears to have been condemned for being
too liberal. Chick Publications, for example, declared that his
writings were "occultist" in their liberality.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite heavy criticism, Lewis continued to be regarded as a lay
authority on Christianity by many of his readers. As such, I propose
that his views on universalism are part of the overall history of the
study of the doctrine. While he does not reach a concrete universalist
conclusion, there is nonetheless notable concern for universal salvation
throughout his writings. At this point, I would point out that it is not necessary to be a universalist in order to contribute to the study of this complex doctrine. Maurice and Farrar, for example, never accepted the title "universalist." Pusey considered the doctrine from a historical viewpoint and rejected it outright. During Lewis's period, the Swiss theologian Karl Barth implied universalism throughout his writings, from the Calvinist tradition. Yet Barth never allowed apokatastasis to be a matter of dogma. The same may also be said of Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner. Lewis approaches the question from the position of a 20th century layman, and his theology presents a unique study in the overall history of the doctrine of universal salvation.

To a degree he follows the same methods as MacDonald in expressing his views. He employs essays and fantasy in his discussion of the various aspects of universalism, but his fantastic literature is notably different from MacDonald's. Lewis's allegory is far less confusing than MacDonald's. His representations more clearly express his intent. This may be explained by the fact that MacDonald was a mystic. By contrast, there is nothing to suggest mysticism in Lewis's fictions. Lewis's symbols and characters attempt to establish an allegorical retelling of traditional mythology. They reflect his high regard for historical elements in theology (MacDonald emphasized the mystic experience). It is usually far easier to interpret Lewis's fantasy, though in some instances, several interpretations are possible. I shall bear this in
mind when discussing his views.

A. Universalism and the Human Situation.

While Lewis does expand his consideration of universalism to include the non-human situation, he is still concerned with the human situation. Throughout his writings there is an obvious compassion for humanity. In The Problem of Pain Lewis declares that he "would pay any price to be able to say truthfully 'All will be saved.'" He obviously considers universal salvation to be a worthy goal.

I. Salvation.

"Salvation" signifies two principles in Lewis's writings - restoration and deliverance. In the first instance, it is a return to perfection; a restoration of the past perfect nature that was divinely intended. This restoration theme is constant throughout Lewis's writings, and is perhaps best expressed throughout The Great Divorce. Here, Lewis continually contrasts souls in grace with those outside of grace, i.e., the saved and the damned. Those individuals in whom the restorative process has either been completed or is being completed are referred to as "spirits," which consist of the same nature as the beatific representation of heaven wherein they dwell. This perfected nature is described as being solid, and dynamically opposed to the souls resisting the restorative grace, who are described as being mere "ghosts," or "man-shaped stains on the brightness of that air."
In his other writings, Lewis expresses this concept of salvation in more direct language:

We are, not metaphorically but in very truth, a Divine work of art, something that God is making, and therefore something with which He will not be satisfied until it has a certain character.20

And:

... God designed the human machine to run on Himself.21

Likewise:

It is promised, firstly, that we shall be with Christ; secondly that we shall be like Him...22

And, again:

In the same way the Church exists for nothing else but to draw men into Christ, to make them little Christs.23

In this Lewis appears to be endorsing the principles of Genesis i: 1 - iii: 24, the divine creation of the universe and humanity, and the subsequent fall from created perfection. This no doubt reflects Lewis's opposition to liberal biblical criticism. The Genesis motif had long been under attack with the emergence of evolutionary scientific theory, as well as geology and archeology. In the 19th century, Old Testament critics such as Hermann Hupfeld had determined the four basic sources of Genesis; Jehovistic, Elohistic, Priestly, and Deuteronomic. Attempts to date the various sources were advanced by Graf, Colenso, and
Wellhausen, and for a time, the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis was dominant. In time this too was challenged, notably by Moller and Gunkel, through form criticism. After World War I, British scholars followed the patterns of criticism set by S.R. Driver, though heavily influenced by German origins. The Dead Sea Scrolls added some valuable insight for textual criticism, particularly towards the Massoretic texts. 24

While many biblical critics remained conservative or moderate, there was also a tendency among the more radical elements to dismiss the theme of creation and fall, mostly from a physical scientific position. The famous "monkey" trials in the United States, wherein the principles of evolution opposed divine creation, reflect this trend. Lewis, though by no means extremely literalist, opposes liberal biblical criticism, arguing instead the basic principles of a fallen human nature, and the need for restoration.

In the above quotations, Lewis equates salvation as being "with Christ," and being "like him." This is an expression of Lewis's Christology, which asserts the divinity of Jesus Christ against the then modern tendency towards the "historical Jesus," as described by Allen. 25 I shall discuss this assertion in the following section. For the present, I simply note that salvation is strongly connected with the traditional thoughts of Christology.

The process of restoration does not appear to be easily accomplished. Lewis expresses it in terms of suffering and labor:
Whatever suffering it may cost in your earthly life, whatever inconceivable purification it may cost you after death, whatever it costs Me, I will never rest, nor let you rest, until you are literally perfect.26

Likewise he describes the divine as a "consuming fire," as opposed to a benevolent passivity.27

This concept of salvation as the fruit of enduring divine refinement probably reflects the pessimism of Lewis's period. The wars had taken a terrible toll on humanity, and it no doubt appeared that such pleasant themes as peace were only accomplished through lasting conflict and distress. Lewis, himself, it may be remembered, was wounded in the first World War, and thus experienced this suffering first hand.

In the second instance, salvation is perceived to be a deliverance from everlasting punishment, or hell. I shall expand on this in the sections entitled Human Free Will and Hell. The writings of Lewis overall contain the threat of an everlasting perdition, seen to be the consequence of the abuse of human free will. He summarizes this threat as follows:

It's not a question of God 'sending' us to Hell. In each of us there is something growing up which will of itself be Hell unless it is nipped in the bud. The matter is serious.28

Salvation, therefore, must also be regarded as a rescue or liberty from this everlasting danger.
II. Universal Salvific Will of God.

Throughout his writings, Lewis assumes a strong trinitarian position, firmly asserting the doctrine of the tri-personal God. He makes this quite clear in Beyond Personality, in the chapters entitled "The Three Personal God," "Time and Time Beyond," and "Good Infection." In these and similar writings, Lewis affirms the divinity of Jesus Christ, often in passionate language:

Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse. You can shut Him up for a fool, you can spit at Him and kill Him as a demon; or you can fall at His feet and call Him Lord and God.

This assertion reflects Lewis's opposition to the current trends in demythologizing Christianity, particularly in terms of Christology. The quest for the historical Jesus during this period led many to seriously question the four gospels in terms of historical value, and further led to reconsiderations of what the New Testament meant by the title "Son of God." Some concluded that the Jesus of the Synoptic gospels was considerably different from the dogma of second person of the Trinity. Lewis fought hard against opinions of this type.

This antitrinitarianism was not characteristic of the whole of theology, however, and certainly not of Anglicanism during this period. Both Barth and Rahner maintained trinitarian positions against modern opinions to the contrary. The trinitarian position remained dominant in Anglican dogma, and this is reflected in the Book of Common Prayer. The 1959 edition, for example, in accordance with the General Synod of 1943
and the Lambeth Conference of 1948, retains trinitarianism as a matter of doctrine. This is evident in the Nicene, Apostles' and Athanasian Creeds, and it is repeated throughout the sacraments, sacramentals and catechism.

The divinity of Christ is further illustrated throughout Lewis's fantastic works. Christ is identified with the great lion Aslan in the Narnia series, and also with Maleldil in his science fiction trilogy, Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra and That Hideous Strength. In these works the Christ-figure is seen to wield awesome powers and authority. It seems clear that Maleldil and Aslan are illustrations of divinity.

In his overall consideration of the divine, Lewis affirms the universal salvific will. This is strongly expressed in the theme of the Atonement. In The Lion, the Witch and The Wardrobe, the great lion offers his life to the evil witch-queen of Narnia in exchange for the release of Edmund, the erring child over whom, it appears, the evil queen has a legitimate claim. In this instance, the witch's claim is based on the "Deep Magic," or greater cosmic laws of the universe. Here it is obvious that Lewis is advocating the concept that Christ died to pay a ransom for sinful humanity not unlike the antilutron theme in I Tim. ii: 6, with the devil being the recipient of the ransom. This is a reference to medieval theories, some of which held that God received the antilutron or ransom, others that the devil held a legitimate claim over fallen humanity and was thus afforded the ransom. The author of I Timothy (some suggest Paul, others suggest a pseudonymous author) does
not make it clear who receives the ransom, but in the first chapter of this epistle, verse 20, it seems that Satan is considered to possess some judicial power, as revealed in his being handed Alexander and Hymenaeus for punishment. Still, this is a difficult passage to interpret with precision, and it remains inconclusive.

Whereas Lewis advocates the theme of the devil being the recipient of Christ's ransom in the Narnia series, it is obvious that he is aware of other views on the Atonement. In this he is very broad-minded:

A good many different theories have been held as to how it works; what all Christians are agreed on is that it does work... the thing itself is infinitely more important than any explanations that theologians have produced.34

The atonement of Christ is for the conditional benefit of all humanity, upon the acceptance of the offer of salvation. God's will is clearly universally salvific, and even the archdemon Screwtape confesses as much:

... but the Enemy (for whatever inscrutable and perverse reason) thought them worth trying to save. Believe me, he did. You youngsters who have not yet been on active service have no idea with what labour, with what delicate skill, each of these miserable creatures was finally captured.35

Likewise, Lewis's literary MacDonald reveals that Christ has gone so far as to have entered hell in order to retrieve lost souls,36 a reference no doubt to I Peter iii: 19, and the Anglican adherence to the
Apostles' Creed, that "He descended into Hell" (though the official policy is to interpret hell as being the place of departed spirits)\(^{37}\).

While Lewis affirms that God wills all to be saved, there is a notable contradiction in his overall view of divinity. On the one hand, Lewis insists that God is omnipotent,\(^ {38}\) while on the other, he declares that "even omnipotence cannot save the unconverted."\(^ {39}\) Lewis appears to be aware of this contradiction of terms, and states:

Finally, it is objected that the ultimate loss of a single soul means the defeat of omnipotence. And so it does.\(^ {40}\)

At this point I would raise the question as to how God could be considered as omnipotent in light of the potential inability to carry out the universal salvific will. Omnipotence, meaning, presumably, all mighty or possessing unlimited power, cannot be defeated and remain omnipotence by the very definition of the word. Yet Lewis appears to affirm that it can. His solution for this obvious contradiction lies in an apology for the divine, based on the concept of human free will. He asserts that by this God-given and irrevocable gift, God might actually be defeated by his creatures, although such a defeat must be considered as blameless:

'What are you asking God to do?' To wipe out their past sins and, at all costs, to give them a fresh start, smoothing every difficulty and offering every miraculous help? But He has done so, on Calvary. To forgive them? They will not be forgiven.\(^ {41}\)

In this apology, God is likened to a gambler, who, having given his
creatures free will and the ability to reject salvation, must pay the price of losing them for all eternity should they refuse saving grace.

III. Human Free Will.

Throughout his writings, Lewis endorses Arminianism. Indeed, Lewis's demand for human free will is an essential part of his overall treatment of the question of universalism, in that the danger of perdition lies in the God-given ability to concretely or definitively reject the universal offer of salvation. The following quotations are only a small sample of Lewis's insistence upon the inherent free will of humans:

There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, 'Thy will be done,' and those to whom God says, in the end, 'Thy will be done.' All that are in Hell, choose it. Without that self-choice there could be no Hell.

Again:

Merely to over-ride a human will (as His felt presence in any but the faintest and most mitigated degree would certainly do) would be for Him useless. He cannot ravish. He can only woo.

Likewise:

God created things which had free will. That means creatures which can go wrong or right... If a thing is free to be good it's also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible.
The same gift of free will is described as having been given to non-humans as well as humans. In *Miracles* Lewis describes angels as having been equally endowed with free will. Those that chose to remain loyal to God remained as angels. Those employing their free will to reject God, in effect chose to become devils, or fallen angels. Yet Lewis describes the human endowment of free will as something glorious, or at the very least, as a gift that would appear to be more worthy than universal salvation without it:

I would pay any price to be able to say truthfully 'All will be saved'. But my reason retorts, 'Without their will, or with it?' If I say 'Without their will' I at once perceive a contradiction; how can the supreme voluntary act of self-surrender be involuntary? If I say 'With their will', my reason implies 'How if they will not give in?'

Although this position is usually expressed throughout his writings, it is not entirely consistent. Lewis largely dispels the concept of predestination in *The Problem of Pain* and appears to do the same in *The Great Divorce*. Even so, he expresses an extremely confusing theme wherein foreknowledge is justifiable upon the grounds that God is actually beyond time and timespans as we know them. This confusing foreknowledge sheds doubt as to the actual freedom of the allegedly free creature.

Similarly, there is the matter of Lewis's own conversion, which is described in terms of an almost irresistible grace. In his autobiography, *Surprised by Joy*, Lewis describes his personal conversion as follows:
This apparent coercion is similarly described in *The Seeing Eye*. God's salvific power is compared to a hunter stalking a deer: "He stalked me like a redskin, took unerring aim, and fired." Such descriptions of Lewis's salvation appear to be irresistible, rather than of free will. The same coercive power is also applied to Aslan, when confronting the atheistic dwarf Trumpkin in *Prince Caspian*. Aslan roars, pounces, and terrifies the hapless dwarf into a form of salvation, a confession of faith and service. There would appear to be little concern in this passage for the dwarf's free will.

Even so, throughout the majority of his writings Lewis asserts the Arminian viewpoint that, due to free will, the liability of eternal damnation lies against humanity in its refusal of divine grace.

IV. Sin and Evil.

Evil and sin are largely identical principles in Lewis's writings. Expressed in the simplest terms, they are anything contrary to the will of God, and specifically, the promotion of the self: "... self-concern and self-pity... Either condition will destroy the soul in the end." This is perhaps most dramatically expressed in *The Great Divorce*, wherein the evil or sinfulness of the damned souls is perceived to be a selfishness that defies salvation.

Lewis does not expend much attention in considering the various types of sins, or acts of sins. In his autobiography, he points out...
that sodomy, which apparently was an established practice in the British school system, is really no worse than cruelty, although there is no social law prohibiting the latter.\textsuperscript{57} In this same spirit of equality, the archdemon Screwtape confesses that the size of the sin is irrelevant, so long as it can lead to a soul's eternal damnation:

It does not matter how small the sins are provided that their cumulative effect is to edge the man away from the Light and out into the Nothing. Murder is no better than cards if cards can do the trick.\textsuperscript{58}

An exception to this is in the sin of pride, Lewis's chief crime against divinity. Pride, for Lewis, is the futile attempt by humanity - and demons - to be like God. \textit{Humanity was corrupted by Satan.} "That was the sin of Satan," argues Lewis, "And that was the sin he taught the human race."\textsuperscript{59}

This position is basically Augustinian in concept, but differs in that it is the fruit of free will, not predestination. This consideration of pride seems to reflect more strongly on Milton's \textit{Paradise Lost}. In the first two books Satan and his host display a most tenacious pride, while assessing their newly fallen state. Though some consider open warfare and others peace, the final decision is to remain in hell, ruling as gods. Even if God were to relent and "publish grace to all,"\textsuperscript{60} the demons would not submit to a new subjection. Their pride and desire to be like God causes them to forfeit salvation.

In his eschatological writings, most notably \textit{Perelandra} and \textit{The Last Battle},\textsuperscript{61} Lewis expresses the notion of the utter destruction of
sin and evil, in the ultimate restoration of the universe. Unfortunately, the sinful agents appear likely to share in this universal catharsis. Notably the worst villains in Lewis’s fiction are not saved. In _The Great Divorce_ only one ghost is redeemed, and this poor soul is seen to be guilty only of lust, rather than pride. By contrast, the fate of Jadis, the daughter of Lilith and chief agent of evil in the Narnian series, is described as destruction at the paws of Aslan.

The damnation of the unrepentant sinful agents reveals the seriousness of sin. Uncured, it can effect an eternal separation from God. Lewis’s illustration of the destruction of the agents is probably characteristic of the pessimism of his period, particularly regarding such historical atrocities as the Holocaust and the Stalinic purges. Clearly, the power of evil in humanity was amply expressed in the 20th century.

V. Death.

There are two themes concerning death within Lewis’s writings. The first suggests that death is a finalizing of the state of the individual, i.e., being made definitive towards or against salvation. This position is constant within his science fiction trilogy and _The Screwtape Letters_. In _Out of the Silent Planet_ death is described as a necessary first step towards a higher state of existence, even for a creature that is technically still in a state of original grace, a
The collective deaths of the evil scientists in *That Hideous Strength* are described as being "The last moments before damnation..." Similarly, it would appear that the object of the demons throughout the Screwtape epistles is to lure a human towards damnation before God can intervene for salvation. The demon Screwtape implies that souls in hell cannot be redeemed. Once in the power of the hellish host, souls serve only as sustenance.

This first theme is largely the traditional one, dating back to the medieval period. It reflects the view of Pope Innocent III, in his assertion that "there is no redemption in Hell." Likewise, it was the view of E.B. Pusey and many in the Anglo-Catholic tradition that there is no future probation after death. Lewis's expression of this theme no doubt reflects both his expertise on medieval literature and his early background in Anglo-Catholicism at Belsen.

Alongside of this first theme Lewis also expresses the view that there might yet be some hope for those who died outside of grace, in that a chance for salvation after death is possible. In *The Problem of Pain*, he implies that it may be so:

... in saying that death ought not to be final, that there ought to be a second chance. I believe that if a million chances were likely to do good, they would be given.

Even so, he admits that he is somewhat doubtful as to the effectiveness of such offers.
Despite his doubtfulness in the after death offer of salvation, Lewis does depict it as a real offer. In The Last Battle Aslan offers a host of dead dwarfs a final escape from the darkness they have chosen to exist in, or, hell. Yet not one of the dwarfs seems willing or even capable of accepting Aslan's last offer of grace.70 Even so, in The Great Divorce, Lewis depicts the dead as being "ghosts" who are offered the chance to escape from hell. And some, including a lust ridden ghost and the emperor Trajan, accept.71

This secondary theme reflects the view of many Anglicans in the Broad Church tradition, and most notably was the view shared by Maurice and Farrar - though they concluded the potential second chance more optimistically. Again, it is based on I Peter iii: 19, the crucified Jesus' descent into hell to preach, and Lewis is obviously aware of this argument in The Great Divorce.72

Lewis's expression of this theme appears to be a compromise between the medieval and Anglo-Catholic view and the more optimistic Broad Church view. He depicts the offer of salvation after death as being genuine (which gratifies the liberal view), but in effect somewhat useless (which agrees with the traditional opinion). The second theme may also reflect on Lewis's wartime experiences. As I have previously indicated, the loss of human life - mainly young men of service age - was staggering. Possibly Lewis was impressed by the fact that many of the casualties died at too young an age, thereby shortening their lifetime chances for salvation. Thus, in such cases, the possibility of salvation beyond the grave would seem reasonable, in light of the divine
universal salvific will and the unfairness of an early death.

In *A Grief Observed*, one of Lewis's last writings, he records his thoughts and feelings over the death of his wife, Helen Joy Lewis. In this extremely personal and highly emotional book, Lewis reveals much confusion over the concept of death. He confesses that up to the time of his wife's death he had always prayed for the dead, and this confession would seem to reinforce the theme of the possibility of salvation after death. Yet Lewis repeatedly declares that death is largely a mystery to him, and that the state of departed spirits is "incomprehensible and unimaginable." After disregarding many of the common considerations of death, including the theme of the family "reunions on the further shore," Lewis suggests that "We cannot understand... The best is perhaps what we understand least."

This personal testimony serves as an expression of the common pessimism in Lewis's works. While much of the nature of the book reflects his immediate grief, there is a notable absence - perhaps even rejection - of spiritual hope and comfort. In this, Lewis appears to be resisting any notion of sentimentalism.

VI. Hell.

The concept of hell as an everlasting state of separation from God is a major theme within Lewis's writings and occurs frequently throughout his books. There is so much emphasis placed upon hell that in his autobiography he felt compelled to answer his critics as follows:
... but if in my books I have spoken too much of Hell, and if critics want a historical explanation of the fact, they must seek it not in the supposed Puritanism of my Ulster childhood but in the Anglo-Catholicism of the church at Belsen. I feared for my soul...

Hell, according to C.S. Lewis, is an intolerable doctrine, yet a necessary one because of the reality of human free will. He makes this case quite clear in *The Problem of Pain*, throwing the entire blame for this damnation against humanity and depicting God as being blameless.

Two themes of hell occur within Lewis's writings, the first being a demonically dominated sphere which suggests either duration or gradual annihilation, and the second being a human situation, strongly suggesting a gradual degradation into oblivion. In the first case, confined chiefly to the Screwtape epistles and *Perelandra*, hell is described as being a sphere of demons, wherein lost human souls are literally at their mercy. The Screwtape epistles depict hell as being a state or place wherein demons feed upon human souls in a manner that Lewis does not make clear. If sufficient numbers of human prey are not lured to their destruction, then the failing devils themselves become food for the stronger devils. Wormwood, a young devil, fails to capture the human assigned to him. As a result, his uncle Screwtape sadistically declares that Wormwood must forfeit himself as prey, despite the younger demon's pleas for mercy. The rule of hell remains firm: "Bring us back food, or be food yourself." This same rule is advertized to other young demons by the same Screwtape in *Screwtape Proposes a Toast*.
Your career is before you. Hell expects and demands that it should be - as Mine was - one of unbroken success. If it is not, you know what awaits you.82

Lewis does not entirely clarify what he means by "food." Apparently, it is a spiritual feeding, wherein the stronger devils feed upon the wills, emotions, or spirits of humans and weaker devils, and are in turn fed upon by even stronger devils. The strongest, and therefore most predatory devil of all, is Satan himself, who feeds upon all others. Hence, Satan "hopes in the end to say 'Mine' of all things on the more realistic and dynamic ground of conquest."83

In this, Lewis appears to be advocating a diabolical monism, wherein Satan feeds upon all the damned through the "sucking of the will and freedom out of a weaker self into a stronger."84 This same theme is continued in Perelandra, as represented by the evil scientist, Weston. Weston, fully possessed by the devil, is described as being totally animated and controlled by Satan, his humanity forever destroyed, i.e., "the un-man." In this total dominance, Weston is actually absorbed by Satan, whom, Lewis warns, is capable of absorbing all in his power.85 Diabolical feeding, as it is described, would appear to destroy all trace of humanity and individuality, wherein all creatures lost in hell gradually become one with Satan.

Although it may appear logical to conclude that such demonical predation results in the eventual annihilation of the victim, Lewis does hint that this may not be the case, and that this feeding may consist of an everlasting duration of torture. Screwtape, the high ranking
prelate of hell, encourages Wormwood to succeed in capturing his human quarry by the motive that they can amuse and feed the younger devil for all eternity. If so, then one might conclude that hell is of an everlasting duration of demonical torture and misery, rather than annihilation.

This concept of hell as a terrifying abode of demonic action was influenced by three sources: Milton, Belsen and medieval literature. In the first instance, Milton's *Paradise Lost* presents a diabolical hierarchy which inverts that of heaven. Satan, though highest ranking in hell, is in effect the lowest ranking in creation, since he is the furthest from God. Others like Moloch, Beelzebub or Belial fit somewhere between Satan and the least demon. Satan's insistence that it is "Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven" puts him in the position of being chief in torment as well as chief in status.

In the second instance, Lewis declares that his Anglo-Catholic upbringing at Belsen terrified him as a child. It may be recalled that the popular preaching of E.B. Pusey, the champion of the movement towards Anglo-Catholicism, was saturated with hellfire and brimstone, as well as references to demonic tormentors. Doubtless Lewis experienced much of the same at Belsen.

In the third instance, I would propose that Lewis was influenced by the popular medieval spirituality rather than formal theology. For example, medieval drama, especially that of the English passion plays, was filled with scenes of demons carting off the damned
for torture. This is notable in The Resurrection, Harrowing of Hell and The Last Judgment plays. Likewise medieval art largely illustrates scenes of similar demonic activity (for example, the tympanum of Bourges Cathedral or the west tympanum at Autun Cathedral). Such art, says Farrar, began in the third and fourth centuries. By contrast, however, it is notable that the official policy of the Church in the Middle Ages did not demand demonic torment as a matter of doctrine. Innocent III, in describing every form of the punishments in hell, both spiritual and material, does not include any reference to diabolical torture, though the concept was popular.

There is a second theme of hell within Lewis’s writings. Here, hell is depicted as a human situation. In this second view there is no discussion or description of demons or demonical activity, and the entire matter remains totally human.

In this consideration, chiefly confined to The Problem of Pain and The Great Divorce, hell is described as a last kindness of God to humans, in his allowing them to do as they please, even if their will (and not God’s) is to reject heaven and enter into hell. A line from The Pilgrim's Regress largely expresses this theme as a final kindness or respect for free will: "It is the Landlord's last service to those who will let him do nothing better for them." Similarly, Lewis's literary character, the MacDonald figure in The Great Divorce, confesses that all who enter hell are those to whom God says "Thy will be done." The Great Divorce dramatizes this last point. The "ghosts" or
damned spirits are constantly invited to enter into heaven and to become solid "spirits." Yet all except one refuse. In this book, hell is depicted as a gradual degradation of human nature in that the ghosts are merely the remains of what were once human beings: "man-shaped stains on the brightness of that air." The entire nature of hell is to become gradually diminished into apparent nothingness, or oblivion. The narrator ghost of The Great Divorce discovers that all the while he has been in heaven, the hell he has left behind has shrunk down to a size wherein it could not hold so much as one butterfly from heaven:

All Hell is smaller than one pebble of your earthly world: but it is smaller than one atom of this world, the Real World. Look at yon butterfly. If it swallowed all Hell, Hell would not be big enough to do it any harm or to have any taste.

From this constant diminishing, it would appear obvious that the ultimate fate of hell in this secondary concept is annihilation. This conclusion is echoed in The Problem of Pain. Here, although Lewis confesses that "whether this eternal fixity implies endless duration - or duration at all - we cannot say," he also points out that "What is cast (or casts itself) into hell is not a man; it is 'remains'." These remains appear to be destined for an eventual oblivion in that they simply become more and more diminished, until they appear to simply vanish out of existence.

Similar to this secondary theme is the depiction of hell in The Last Battle. Briefly summarized, all who are not saved are locked outside the gates of heaven. Fierce beasts come at Aslan's request,
and devour all which is outside heaven. Although there are strong implications that the damned are annihilated, presumably in the jaws of the beasts, Lewis does not specifically declare this. Concerning the damned, he writes: "I don't know what became of them."

In discussing hell in purely anthropomorphic terms, Lewis appears to be rationalizing hell. This view is similar to Maurice and Farrar's position, but was rejected by Dearmer as being a human invention rather than the historical belief. Possibly, Lewis was influenced by the broad tradition, which tended to rationalize perdition, or even dismiss it altogether on the grounds of the all loving nature of God.

Whether expressed as a sphere of demonic torment or an anthropomorphic suicide, Lewis's concept of hell does represent the danger of everlasting perdition for some individuals. One of the main arguments contrary to hell is that which suggests that no redeemed soul could legitimately enjoy the beatific vision with the knowledge that others were eternally damned. Lewis refutes this argument in both The Problem of Pain and The Great Divorce. In the former, he replies that this argument is based upon the assumption that heaven and hell are fixed polarities. He refutes this, strongly suggesting that hell is not to be considered as an equal parallel to heaven, and is probably to be considered in terms of non-entity. The damned are separated from the saved by the nature of finality, and this final non-entity of the lost could not affect those in the beatific vision in the least. In The Great Divorce, and to a lesser extent in The Last Battle, Lewis
dramatizes this conclusion, and illustrates the saved being charitable, but largely undisturbed by the ultimate loss of the damned.100

There is an obvious reluctance within Lewis's overall attitude towards hell. His emphasis is due to his honesty rather than any willful assumption. In The Problem of Pain for example, he admits that "There is no doctrine which I could more willingly remove from Christianity than this."101 But alongside of this reluctance, there is the recognition of the danger of everlasting damnation, in that "the Divine labour to redeem the world cannot be certain of succeeding as regards every individual soul."102 Hell remains a serious possibility for some.

At times, Lewis appears to have concluded damnation in the case of some historical individuals, as in The Great Divorce and Screwtape Proposes a Toast.103 Yet this should not be taken to be meant literally, for the following reasons.

Lewis agrees with the official doctrine of Anglicanism. Following the inclusion of the Creed of Saint Athanasius, the Anglican Church declares:

Wherefore the warnings in this Confession of Faith are to be understood no otherwise than the like warnings in holy Scripture; for we must receive God's threatenings, even as his promises, in such wise as they are generally set forth in holy Writ. Moreover, the Church does not herein pronounce judgement on any particular person or persons, God alone being the Judge of all.104

And throughout Mere Christianity Lewis warns that Christ-
ians are forbidden to judge anyone, since God alone can see the motivation behind actions. Not even such notorious individuals as Himmler may be judged by ourselves.

Next, while it is true that a literal interpretation of the Screwtape passages would conclude that such celebrities as Messalina or Henry VIII have been eternally lost to demonic consumption, it is notable that Napoleon in The Great Divorce is not hopelessly damned. He can be saved at any time. I suggest that Lewis's use of historical figures is more of a creative device, rather than a statement of his theological thought.

Lewis presents a strong assertion of purgatory throughout his writings. In The Great Divorce hell and purgatory are closely associated. If a ghost willingly leaves its hell and accepts the free admittance into heaven, then its limited residence in hell is seen to have been merely a duration in purgatory. By contrast, if the same ghost chooses to remain in hell with a fixed choice, then hell remains to be a final, or everlasting state, made so by the individual's free choice.105

Elsewhere, Lewis's consideration of purgatory is expressed with much more precision. In Letters to Malcolm Lewis affirms his belief in purgatory in the most direct language: "I believe in Purgatory."106 He goes on to reveal that his concept of purgatory is different from that which he perceives to be the traditional Roman Catholic doctrine of the same. For Catholics, Lewis concludes, purgatory consists "purely of retributive punishment."107 For Lewis, purgatory is a place of
purification, so necessary to salvation that he can ask, "Our souls demand Purgatory, don't they?"108

Of course, such purification may require some corrective pains. The archdemon Screwtape, while taunting Wormwood for the loss of his human prey, reveals that the escaped human soul might have to endure some pains before being directly admitted into heaven, but these pains are described as being ones which the soul will "embrace."109 Even so, all this is concluded to be an entirely positive experience.

Alongside of this theme of corrective punishment, it is notable that Lewis often refers to punishment, even civil punishment, in terms of a positive experience. Hopefully, the same will lead to some benefit for the sufferer, if not towards salvation, then at least as personal improvement.110 Thus the pains of purgatory are to be considered in terms of the soul's purification. They are in no sense to be considered as being retributive. In this regard, purgatory appears to be reserved only for those souls who have already made the affirmative choice towards their salvation, but have not yet become advanced in their spiritual purification or perfection.

Finally, there is one obscure reference to "limbo" within Lewis's writings, but this is only mentioned in a passing comment from the demon Screwtape, while describing the miserable nature of his human victims.111 Apparently, limbo is reserved for those souls who are fit neither for heaven nor hell, but are allowed to sink into an eternal sub-human nature of their own. Lewis is not clear on this other state, and does not refer to it in much detail. Possibly, it is merely an
afterthought in his overall theology, since it occurs in one of his later writings, i.e., 1960. It remains a relatively obscure and unimportant part of his overall treatment of universalism.

VII. The Church and Other Religions.

The role of the Church is an extremely important one within Lewis's overall theology. Even the Anglo-Catholic experience at Belsen is described as being wholesome, despite the obvious fear that it inspired in his youth.112 Throughout his writings, Lewis describes the Church as being a definite instrument of salvific grace,113 whose power, according to the demon Screwtape, "makes our boldest tempters uneasy."114 Lewis's case for the Church as a divine salvific instrument may be summarized as follows:

Christians are Christ's body, the organism through which He works. Every addition to that body enables Him to do more.115

This appreciation is no doubt the product of both the tremendous support Lewis received from the clergy and laity - barring liberal theologians, naturally - as well as the advancement in ecumenism. Lewis strongly supported the ecumenical movement, asserting that re-union should be a priority and that divisions between denominations were "a sin and a scandal."116 He emphasizes this opinion through Screwtape, whose gloating reveals that religious bigotry is a demon's delight.117

Despite this strong emphasis upon the role of the Church, Lewis does not diminish the importance of the specific relationship between
each individual and the divine. In fact the individual relationship is essential, since the Church consists of a union of individuals rather than an objective collectively. Through Screwtape, the prelate of hell, Lewis reveals the importance of the individual, as opposed to the collective mass of humanity:

... the real end is the destruction of individuals. For only individuals can be saved or damned, can become sons of the Enemy or food for us. The ultimate value for us... lies in the individual anguish...

Since the specific relationship between God and the individual is emphasized, the hope of salvation cannot be limited to Christianity. Non-Christians, including atheists and agnostics, must be included in the overall divine salvific will:

We do know that no man can be saved except through Christ; we don't know that only those who know Him can be saved through Him.

This extended salvation is expressed in the case of Emeth, the young Calormene warrior who is included in the beatific vision in The Last Battle. Briefly stated, Emeth is admitted into heaven by the gracious Aslan, despite the fact that he had been a worshipper of Tash, the Calormene devil. His admission is based on the grounds that he had served Tash well, not knowing that Tash was actually evil, and that Aslan claimed every good service rendered for Tash as his own. Aslan's acceptance of Emeth is as follows:
I take to me the services which thou has done to him. For I and he are of such different kinds that no service which is vile can be done to me, and none which is not vile can be done to him.¹²⁰

Throughout his writings, Lewis maintains an appreciation of other religions, particularly ancient Greek and Norse mythologies.¹²¹ In terms of the images of these mythologies, Lewis goes so far as to "Christianize" them. Hence the ancient classical Greek gods become the guardian angels of each planet named for them in Lewis's science fiction trilogy.¹²² These same gods are illustrated as coming to earth to battle the demonic takeover in That Hideous Strength, and are clearly representatives of Maleldil, the cosmic name for Christ.¹²³

Lewis likewise suggests that it is possible for atheists and agnostics to be saved. In this, Lewis confesses that when an individual ceases to attend church upon the grounds of an honest disbelief in the validity of Christianity, then, as a result of this honest conviction, "the spirit of Christ is probably nearer to him then than it ever was before."¹²⁴ Similar to this confession is Screwtape's mournful address concerning the salvific power of the divine, particularly the saving of individuals whose causes were greatly opposed to God's will. The archdemon's lament is chiefly that God saves these individuals because they acted through ignorance, in their own minds convinced that their actions were the right ones. God, according to Screwtape, "often makes prizes" out of these same ignorant individuals.¹²⁵

Even so, Lewis warns, such expanded salvation requires an absolutely sincere conviction. It is one thing to reject Christ's grace
through honest disbelief, but quite another matter to willfully evade the offer of salvation knowing it to be wrong to do so. This point is dramatized in the case of Rishda Tarkaan, the Calormene atheist who exploited the worship of Tash for his own profit. In this instance, where Tarkaan is carried off by Tash (presumably to hell), Lewis points out that it is possible for a non-believer to be lost as well as saved.

This potential extra-Christian salvation seems to be characteristic of other writers of Lewis's period. Rahner, for example, suggested that it was possible for non-Christians and atheists to experience a legitimate implicit or anonymous state of grace and justification, without expressing an explicit faith. Likewise, Barth proposed that the "non-elect," or those not yet aware of their election to salvation, were under the same grace as those who had recognized and accepted the universal offer.

Lewis's views on this matter are reminiscent of the early and medieval Church's appreciation of some of the nobler and virtuous aspects of paganism. The earliest Christian art often depicts Christ in classical pagan images, e.g., as a pastoral shepherd or a bright sun god. Likewise, the question whether non-Christians were automatically damned without having heard meaningfully of the gospel was obviously a concern of Anglicanism in the latter part of the last century, even in the writings of E.B. Pusey.

To a degree, Lewis was probably influenced both by the two world wars and by the spirit of ecumenism. In the first instance, it seems
hard to accept the belief that many of the imperial forces, e.g., the Hindus of India or the Moslems of Pakistan, were to be damned even though they were fighting for the British empire, alongside of the Christian soldiers. Doubtless, also, the Jewish victims of the Holocaust were afforded much sympathy in light of their horrendous plight at the hands of a nominally Christian regime.

In the second instance, it is notable that one of the trends in ecumenism is the recognition that salvation is not exclusively the property of any one denomination. This principle of expanded salvation can be applicable to the other world religions as well. Certain scriptural passages, if taken at face value and without any indepth interpretation, can also be used to support the possibility of salvation beyond Christianity. These include Matthew XXIV: 31, the gathering of the chosen from one end of the world to the other; Matthew XXV: 34, the universal rewarding of the merciful; Mark IX: 41, the rewarding of the giving of water to those who are Christ's; I Tim. IV: 10, God as the saviour of all; and of course, the universal salvific will of God in I Tim. II: 6, and II Peter III: 9.

B. Universalism Beyond the Human Situation.

I. Universalism and Animals.

In his autobiography, Lewis confesses that he has always appreciated animals - with the exception of insects - and this appreciation prompted him to an early exercise in fantastic writing, the
unpublished Animal Land series. His writings also contain a strong concern for the proper treatment of animals, which undoubtedly reflects this early fondness.

In Perelandra this concern is dynamically expressed. The devil is described as a wanton sadist whose depravity includes the senseless destruction of frog-like creatures by torture. Similarly, in his essay Vivisection, Lewis addresses this practice. Although he attempts to remain objective, discussing the arguments for and against this scientific procedure, he condemns it in such terms as "sinister" and "alarming," and suggests that the police should investigate the laboratories that practice vivisection. Likewise, in The Problem of Pain, he approaches the question of animal suffering from various angles, suggesting that their pain may be different from human pain, and implying that bestial suffering may be attributed to the overall fall of creation by the instigation of Satan. This last point reflects Lewis's defense of the Genesis theme against some modern attempts to dismiss it, as previously discussed.

Despite his personal interest, Lewis generally discusses bestial salvation as a possibility, rather than an actuality. He considers the salvation of animals in terms of the quality of the animal soul, immortality, and the relationship to humanity. While his overall consideration is "confessedly speculative," he does suggest that the higher animals alone might be candidates for salvation (excluding such lower creatures as newts), but these may only be so because of their ennoblement through human contact.
This last point is expressed in *That Hideous Strength*, through Bultitude, the pet bear. Because of inhibitions imposed on him by Ransom, the divine agent, Bultitude appears to acquire the rudiments of morality. The beast is described as possessing a rudimentary soul, or an immortal spirit that contains only various hints of spiritual appreciation. The salvation of animals, if it occurs at all, would seem to consist of little more than immortality, or the survival of existence after death.

Lewis does, however, open the question as to whether there may be such creatures as "spiritual animals" existing on other planets. If such beings could exist, then they might possess rational souls similar to that of humanity and subsequently free will. The various aspects discussed in the human situation might be applicable to them as well. The Narnia series is filled with such creatures, some, like Reepicheep being morally good, and others, like Shift, being utterly wicked. But this too remains speculative. The possibility of such superior animals probably reflects scientific theories concerning extraterrestrial life, and I shall discuss this in more detail in the next section.

In his fantastic works, Lewis illustrates animals as being included in the beatific vision. In *The Last Battle* they are included with the saved, after Aslan judges all creation. The restoration of Perelandra appears to be an all inclusive one, from the least grain to the greatest being. Likewise, the illustration of heaven in *The Great Divorce* contains animals, including lions and a butterfuly whose
perfected nature enables it to swallow all hell.143

These fantastic illustrations, if taken literally, indicate the actuality of bestial salvation. However, when set alongside of his usual position of potential salvation, it may well be that they represent only the wish or hope of it. Lewis appears to have been personally motivated in his discussion of animals, and such a hope would add to his strong appreciation.

Even so, I propose that bestial salvation is a definite possibility within Lewis's overall theology. In addition to his direct testimony, it would seem to be reasonable to suggest that animals, if vulnerable to suffering because of the fall of creation due to humanity's deception by Satan, should also be susceptible to the restoration and benefits of Christ's atonement. If they can die because of humanity, why can they not also be included in the salvation of humanity? Yet Lewis's overall position regards this as being a possibility only.

II. Universalism and the Supernatural.

Lewis's writings contain a definite implication of the existence of supernatural beings. "Supernatural" in this instance includes creation beyond the normal order of everyday or "natural" experience, i.e., of spiritual entities and extra-terrestrial creatures. The first category of these speculative beings involves the traditional superstitions of Greek, Norse and Judeo-Christian mythologies. The second category is an attempt at scientific speculations as regards the
possibility of life on other planets.

Lewis's incorporation of mythological creatures into his theology probably stems from his early childhood, wherein he confesses an irrepressible joy in his reading about the same. Thus, his Narnia series is filled with every sort of mythological creature imaginable, from the dryads, naiads, and centaurs who form the royal court of Aslan in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe to the entirety of the created order in The Last Battle.

In the Narnia series, Lewis confirms the possible salvation of these creatures by including them in the final beatific vision illustrated in The Last Battle. Admittedly, the series does not offer any support for the conclusion that Lewis actually believes in the existence of such beings. It is more likely that Lewis is merely employing traditional images to illustrate certain concepts, such as the universal lordship of Aslan and salvation beyond humanity. His science fiction trilogy does, however, indicate a strong belief in elemental spirits, which he names "eldils."

Eldils are described as celestial powers endowed with a ghostlike nature very similar to elves, sprites, and the like. Occasionally, these same beings visit our earth, although their homes are largely on the other planets of this solar system, wherein their existence is as natural as the physical creatures upon earth. It would appear that Lewis is seeking to provide a scientific explanation which would actually allow for the existence of fairies and the like; an apology for the belief in elemental spirits as a natural phenomenon.
Lewis affirms their salvation, for he includes them in the beatific vision realized on the planet Venus or "Perelandra." In the science fiction trilogy, it would appear that Lewis is advocating both the existence of spiritual entities and their salvation.

One notable illustration of this supernatural salvation occurs in the person of Koriakin, the star entity in *Voyage of the Dawn Treader*. This creature, which appears to have been the spirit or entity which constitutes a star, has sinned against Aslan and is subsequently punished, but only with a temporary, corrective punishment. The star entity, in penance, continues to serve Aslan, but with a greatly reduced prestige. Although Lewis does not indicate the specific nature of this entity's offense, he does express the opinion that it is possible for supernatural powers to sin, yet also acquire pardon and salvation.

Lewis's consideration of the supernatural also includes a strong belief in angels. In the science fiction trilogy, Lewis becomes somewhat confusing in his illustration of the "oyarsas." These creatures appear to be a superior variety of eldil, and each is given the particular charge of a planet. The Martian oyarsa, however, suggests that he is not an angel, but Lewis is not entirely clear as to exactly what he or it is. By contrast, however, Lewis describes the devil as being a "bent" or corrupted oyarsa, in charge of our earth. This is an interesting description, in that Satan has traditionally been portrayed as a fallen angel, and as will be discussed in the following section, is largely described by Lewis with that term. It is not clear...
whether the oyarsas are actual angels or merely angel-like beings.

In his more academic writings, Lewis discusses the existence of angels with much more clarity. He offers a lengthy discourse which confirms their existence in terms of a supernatural reality, an actual being as opposed to a symbol:

All angels, both the 'good' ones and the bad or 'fallen' ones which we call devils, are equally 'Supernatural' in relation to this spatiotemporal Nature: i.e., they are outside it and have powers and a mode of existence which it could not provide. ¹⁵²

Lewis relates how these "good" angels remained in grace by utilizing their free will to submit to the divine will, whereas their demonic counterparts chose to rebel. ¹⁵³ At this point, it is obvious that Lewis considers angels to be endowed with free will and rationality, similar to humans. This theological position is entirely consistent throughout Lewis's works, ¹⁵⁴ with the notable exception of two humorous references. In the first, Lewis playfully compares angels with "corkers," ¹⁵⁵ and in a similar spirit of mirth describes a missionary society whose sole purpose is to provide astronauts with sex. ¹⁵⁶ Neither, of course, reflects Lewis's more serious treatment of angelology, but both instances reveal that the subject was not entirely one of gravity for him.

Alongside of this consideration of traditional angelology is a strong interest in extra-terrestrials. Lewis's science fiction trilogy is largely based upon this interest in life on other planets, perhaps the most notable illustration being the temptation of the Venusian Eve
by the devil in *Perelandra*. In this book, the devil is described as having escaped our world by taking possession of the villainous scientist Weston. In his host's body, the devil schemes to tempt the Venusians into a fall similar to that portrayed in the book of Genesis. Satan is foiled, however, when the host's body is destroyed by Ransom, the heroic agent of Christ. \(^{157}\) This dynamic fantasy is probably an expression of Lewis's concern for the possible exploitation of alien life by human explorers. It is perhaps noteworthy that the devil was able to escape from our world by employing a human as his instrument, rather than to have traveled through his own supernatural powers. This pessimistic concern is voiced in clear and alarming language:

> I look forward with horror to contact with the other inhabited planets, if there are such. We would only transport to them all of our sin and acquisitiveness, and establish a new colonialism. I can't bear to think of it.\(^ {158}\)

In his other writings, however, Lewis assumes a more speculative position, suggesting that other races might be in a state of grace that requires no redemption, or in a corrupted state in which God might have acted in a manner similar to the Atonement. \(^ {159}\) In either case, Lewis suggests that it is largely a speculative and unknown situation, and does not concretely conclude the question of extra-terrestrial salvation.

Lewis's consideration of the supernatural contains an incorporation between traditional superstition and mythology, and the speculative mysteries of outer space. Often there is an implied hope,
probably the result of his childhood enjoyment, that the vast, unexplored reaches of outer space might somehow contain creatures that complement the traditional fantasies of bygone mythologies. An excellent example of this implication is Lewis's story, *Forms of Things Unknown*, wherein the first moon explorers encounter such inhabitants as might be taken for gorgons. His consideration of the supernatural, therefore, might properly be described as a conflation of fantasy and wishful scientific speculation.

In this scientific consideration of possible alien life forms, it is interesting to note that Lewis bases his speculations on the Cambridge cosmologist, F.B. Hoyle, whose theories have advocated life on other planets. It is notable that during Lewis's lifetime, a well documented conference of top scientific minds met and discussed the possibility of life on other planets, at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory at Green Bank in West Virginia. The meeting was held in November of 1961 and the results of its discussions were openly published at the Goddard Space-Flight Centre, NASA. F.H. Giles, of the Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of South Carolina, revealed (in an interview with noted archaeologist Clifford Wilson) that the overall conclusion concerning life on other planets was extremely doubtful, and that only one possible planet outside our solar system was detectable, as a dark companion to a distant star. Lewis's views partially complement both the opinions of Giles and Hoyle in that it remains intellectually possible for life on other planets to exist, but it is not intellectually compulsive to believe in it.
III. Universalism and the Demonic.

Lewis's views on demonology have led to various criticisms, some of which border on joviality. *Time* magazine for example, advertising an article on Lewis once featured on its cover a devil complete with horns, tail and pitchfork. This and similar instances appear to have proved too exasperating, for at one point Lewis declared:

The Devil, I shall leave strictly alone. The association between him and me in the public mind has already gone quite as deep as I wish: in some quarters it has already reached the level of confusion, if not of identification.

Regardless, the fact remains that Lewis's literature is saturated with the expression of a belief in an actual devil, the most predominant being the Screwtape epistles. Here, the devil is largely presented as being real, that is to say, an actual being or spirit, rather than a symbol or poetic representation, and is a creature endowed with rationality and cunning.

For the most part, Lewis agrees with the Judeo-Christian tradition which suggests that Satan was once an angel, but rebelled against God's authority (the theme of Revelation xii: 7-9). He affirms this opinion often, declaring that the devil and his fallen angels sinned against God by their own free will, and as such were cast from heaven. In this affirmation, Lewis strongly implies that the devils have retained their angelic nature, except that it has become depraved: "Devil is the opposite of angel only as Bad Man is the opposite of Good Man." The demonic beings were not originally evil, but chose to be
so through the abuse of their own free will. They are to be perceived of as being creatures, rather than having an original existence, or as existing merely as representations or symbols of negative principles. As such, Lewis seeks to present the belief in demons as being scientifically viable.

He begins this endeavor by dismissing the common illustration of a devil, i.e., horns, hoofs, tail, pitchfork and red leotards, as pure imagery. He considers the existence of devils in terms of eldils and oyarsas, which are creatures that would occur quite naturally on other worlds, and therefore are not to be dismissed as being pure superstitions. These creatures are scientifically categorized as being "macrobes," as opposed to being "microbes." They are conceived to be a higher form of life that may be compared scientifically to microbes or other organisms so greatly beyond normal human vision that special apparatus is required to observe them. Thus, as Lewis would have it, it is respectable both scientifically and theologically to believe in the demonic.

In the Narnia series, two figures stand out as being illustrations of Satan - Jadis, the White Witch, and Tash, the devil-god of the Calormenes. Either of these beings could be identified with Satan, in that they both function as opponents of Aslan.

In the case of the White Witch, it is obvious that her powers are tremendous, even so far as having a claim over all sinners through the cosmic laws or "Deep Magic" that governs the dimension of Narnia. This strongly suggests that Lewis advocates the antilutron formula.
(previously discussed in Lewis's views on the Atonement), with the devil being the recipient of Christ's ransom.

Likewise, Tash serves as a competitor to the worship of Aslan. This being, though utterly vile, commands the adoration of the Calormenes and this is most dynamically expressed in *The Last Battle*. Here, Tash is at one point identified with Aslan by many through deception or confusion, until Aslan reveals the incompatibility between them:

For I and he are of such different kinds that no service which is vile can be done to me, and none which is not vile can be done to him. Therefore if any man swear by Tash and keep his oath for the oath's sake, it is by me that he has truly sworn, though he know it not, and it is I who reward him.174

This last passage also serves as an expression of Lewis's tendency towards dualism. Though aware of Satan's lesser status as a creature, Lewis emphasizes the extreme polarity between God and Satan, not unlike the conflicting hierarchies in Milton's *Paradise Lost*.

Lewis appears to have conscientiously attempted to avoid dualism. In his preface to the *Screwtape* epistles he asserts that there is no equal to the Divine:

Now if by 'the Devil' you mean a power opposite to God and, like God, self-existent from all eternity, the answer is certainly 'No'. There is no uncreated being except God. God has no opposite.175

Added to this strong refutation of dualism is the assertion that if
there is any natural opposite to Satan it is Michael, the biblical leader of the good angels (as implied in Rev. xii: 7-9).\footnote{176}

In spite of this adherence to traditional theological beliefs, Lewis's overall consideration strongly implies a dualism between the divine and the diabolical. In addition to Aslan's testimony, Lewis describes Satan as being the most predatory devil of all. As indicated in the section entitled Hell, one portrait of hell suggests a predatory hierarchy wherein devils feed upon human souls and weaker devils, and in turn are fed upon by stronger devils. Satan, as the biggest or strongest devil of all, ultimately feeds upon the others until he absorbs all. This absorption would appear to be the gorging of the weaker's outraged individuality by the stronger, the veritable drawing of one spirit into another; the lack of a physical body, a characteristic of ghosts and angels, allows for such an operation to become possible.\footnote{177} Lewis describes this as being both the will and ability of Satan:

\begin{quote}
... the bloated - spider parody, the only imitation he can understand, of that unfathomed bounty whereby God turns tools into servants and servants into sons...\footnote{178}
\end{quote}

In this instance, Lewis, speaking through the voice of Screwtape, confesses a dualistic outcome wherein all things will eventually become either God's or Satan's: "Our Father or the Enemy will say 'Mine' of each thing that exists, and specially of each man..."\footnote{179}

The confession of Screwtape is dramatized in Perelandra, in the
person of Weston, the demonically possessed villain/victim. Weston is a startling example of Satan's ability to absorb and destroy human individuality. The possession is complete, and Weston's humanity is utterly demolished, rendering him a mere puppet of Satan. This ability to completely absorb and destroy with an utter destruction would appear to render Satan as the natural opposite to God, despite his lower status as creature, and Lewis's claim to the contrary.

Lewis's belief in Satan and his tendency towards dualism doubtless reflect a reaction against liberal theological trends and the pessimism of the wars. As discussed in the previous chapters, the belief in demons had been condemned as superstition by some critics since the time of F.D. Maurice. Lewis's affirmation of an actual devil opposes this view vigorously. Having witnessed the immense carnage and suffering through two world wars, as well as the imminent threat of nuclear disaster, Lewis no doubt came to the conclusion that there was indeed a tremendous evil intelligence at work in the world, and one that was endowed with no mean power. Thus, the medieval view of the devil (modified with Lewis's near-dualism) seemed intellectually credible.

In discussing the question of the devil's salvation, Lewis is not consistent. On the one hand, he describes Satan and the demons as being beyond redemption, yet on the other, he appears to imply that such salvation is nevertheless feasible.

The description of Satan's ability to absorb other devils largely points to a denial of them, in that all of his victims are basically destroyed, or consumed. This would suggest that there is no
remaining substance left to redeem, i.e., the total absorption of a spirit by another spirit. This destruction, when combined with the dualistic position of Satan, strongly suggests that for demons there can be no chance of redemption. Satan, as the ruler of hell and highest ranking demon in Lewis's hierarchy, appears to be so definitive in his separation from God that salvation is an impossibility. This conclusion is largely agreed to be Lewis's description of Satan in Perelandra; a spirit that has become totally depraved, without any remaining merit or virtue.  

This is the most obvious answer to the question of the salvation of demons, but there are some contrary implications, found chiefly in the Screwtape epistles. Despite Lewis's efforts to depict the archdemon Screwtape and the apprentice Wormwood as being "nasty," they succeed in attracting some sympathy from the reader, since these two demons may not be entirely depraved. If their depravity is not total, is it not conceivable that they may yet be redeemed?  

Wormwood, as a young tempter sent into the world of humans to lure them towards damnation, reveals a positive nature for which he is severely reprimanded by the older, presumably more corrupt, Screwtape. Wormwood, once in the human world, begins to inquire into the moral attributes of human nature, especially of love. For this, Screwtape rebukes him, describing such sentiments as being more appropriate for humans than demons. Elsewhere, Screwtape again reprimands the younger demon for similar acts of conduct unbecoming a devil, and suggests that Wormwood's association with humans is starting to work
some form of redemption within him:

... if you are not in some danger of becoming infected by the sentiments and values of the humans among whom you work. 184

In this, Wormwood even goes so far as to ask for some form of justice, in that he should obtain mercy upon the grounds that his failures were not his own fault. This is condemned by Screwtape as being heretical, of "The Enemy" or God. 185 Wormwood, although a tempter and an evil spirit, displays a few redeeming virtues that make it debatable as to whether he is totally beyond all hope of redemption.

Even Screwtape, to a lesser degree, commands some sympathy. Although he is a greater demon, he still retains one or more glimpses of virtue. For all his faults and demonic nature, he displays a rare paternal consideration towards Wormwood, during the younger demon's first attempts to lure his prey afoul:

I can hardly blame you. I do not expect old heads on young shoulders. 186

Likewise, the archfiend Satan is described as having fallen through being frustrated in trying to understand God's love:

When the creation of man was first mooted and when, even at that stage, The Enemy freely confessed that he foresaw a certain episode about a cross, Our Father very naturally sought an interview and asked for an explanation. The Enemy gave no reply except to produce the cock-and-bull story about disinterested love which He has been circulating ever since. This Our Father naturally could not accept. He implored the Enemy to lay His cards on the table, and gave Him every opportunity. He admitted
that he felt a real anxiety to know the secret; the Enemy replied 'I wish with all my heart that you did.'

Alongside of the sympathy that Lewis's demons obtain from the literary readership is Screwtape's confession that it is possible for a demon to repent, or rather, that the same would be possible if they could only fathom what God means by "love." In discussing love as something that is beyond his present understanding, Screwtape brings himself to confess that it is only the lack of understanding divine love that separates demons from God:

Members of His faction have frequently admitted that if ever we came to understand what He means by Love, the war would be over and we should re-enter Heaven.

From this particular passage, it would appear that Lewis allows for the possibility, at least, of the devil's salvation.

Lewis also considers the question of this salvation in his preface to John Milton's *Paradise Lost*. In this work, he evades the issue as to whether the devils can be saved. Although he contends that the devils are willfully unrepentant, the doors of hell being locked on the inside, Lewis commends Milton for his wisdom in that the poet "never really allows the question ' What if they did repent?'" Here, it would appear that Lewis is trying to avoid any speculation regarding the salvation of fallen angels.
Conclusion.

To a large extent, Lewis's conclusion on the question of universalism is ambivalent. In discussing the human situation, he at one point seems to reject universal salvation due to the danger of an eternal hell, which is seen to be the irremedial consequence of the abuse of free will. This view may be summarized as follows:

...the Divine labour to redeem the world cannot be certain of succeeding as regards every individual soul. Some will not be redeemed.190

On the other hand, however, Lewis speaks of universalism as being feasible, in light of the universal salvific will and power of God, the possibility of conversion after death, and the expansion of salvation beyond Christianity. These views do not affirm a definite universalist conclusion, but they imply that it is still possible for all to be redeemed. Thus, his literary MacDonald (speaking with far more caution than his historical counterpart ever did) declares:

It may be, as the Lord said to the Lady Julian, that all will be well, and all will be well, and all manner of thing will be well. But it's ill talking of such questions.191

In this passage, Lewis appears to afford some credibility to the revelation of the 14th century mystic Julian, whose views he once described as being "odd." Even so, this is an extremely reserved and cautious consideration.

In discussing universalism beyond the human situation, Lewis
remains ambivalent. He speaks only of the possibility of affording salvation to animals and supernatural beings, and much of his discussion is intellectually speculative. Of the devils' salvation, it may be that the archfiend and his hosts are too far beyond redemption because of their great depravity, and yet, as Screwtape confesses, if they could but fathom divine love, they would be saved.

While Lewis's hesitancy to accept universalism may be understood in light of his adherence to traditional (especially medieval) theological beliefs and the overlying pessimism of his age, he never dismisses the doctrine entirely, as did E.B. Pusey. I propose, and in the following chapter will demonstrate, that this is due to the enduring influence of George MacDonald, who is never far from Lewis's thought.

**Contribution to the Study of Universalism.**

*Certain notable features are found in Lewis's discussion of universalism. First, he approaches the question from the position of a layman without any formal theological training, as opposed to a theologian or religious scholar. This is a notable contrast to Maurice and contemporaries, and even to MacDonald. Second, he attempts to weigh both sides of the argument objectively, and if he at times reaches ambivalent conclusions it is only due to an honest observation, discarding personal bias. This is somewhat different from the obvious pro-universalist positions of Maurice, Farrar, Dearmer and MacDonald, and the anti-universalist position of Pusey. Third, he expands the discussion of universalism beyond the human situation,*
which is uncommon, even among convinced universalists. In this last instance, his concern for extra-terrestrial life is both individual and preparatory — interest in this field will most likely increase as space exploration continues.
Footnotes:


13. Allen, "The Theology of C.S. Lewis".


Footnotes:


26. Lewis, Beyond Personality, p. 45.

27. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, p. 35.


29. Lewis, Beyond Personality, pp. 14-27.
Footnotes:


34. Lewis, "What Christians Believe," p. 52.

35. Lewis, Screwtape Proposes a Toast, 1960, p. 143.


41. Ibid., p. 116.

42. Ibid., p. 59. Also, The Great Divorce, pp. 115-6.


Footnotes:

48. Ibid., p. 107 cf.
49. Lewis, The Great Divorce, p. 115.
50. Lewis, Beyond Personality, pp. 22-3; The Great Divorce, p. 116.
55. Lewis, Surprised by Joy, pp. 116-17.
57. Lewis, Surprised by Joy, pp. 89-90.
60. J. Milton, Paradise Lost, (San Fransico: Rhinehart, 1951 ed.) Bk. II, line 38, p. 34.
61. Lewis, Perelandra, pp. 226-50; The Last Battle, pp. 151-85.
63. Lewis, The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, pp. 160-3.
Footnotes:

68. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, p. 112.
69. Ibid., p. 112.
70. Lewis, The Last Battle, pp. 146-50.
71. Lewis, The Great Divorce, pp. 60-114.
74. Ibid., p. 22.
75. Ibid., p. 23.
76. Ibid., p. 59.
78. Lewis, Surprised by Joy, p. 33.
81. Ibid., p. 131.
82. Lewis, Screwtape Proposes a Toast, p. 141.
84. Ibid., p. 84.
85. Lewis, Perelandra, pp. 106-207.
86. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters, pp. 27, 36.
Footnotes:


94. See Footnote #39.

95. Lewis, The Great Divorce, p. 113.

96. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, p. 113-115.

97. Lewis, The Last Battle, pp. 146-61.

98. Lewis, The Last Battle, p. 156.


100. Lewis, The Great Divorce, pp. 112-14; The Last Battle, pp. 146-61.


102. Ibid.

103. Lewis, The Great Divorce, pp. 20-1; Lewis, Screwtape Proposes a Toast, pp. 141-2.


105. Lewis, The Great Divorce, p. 36.

106. Lewis, Letters to Malcolm, p. 139.

107. Ibid., p. 140.

108. Ibid.

Footnotes:


111. Lewis, Screwtape Proposes a Toast, p. 143.

112. Lewis, Surprised by Joy, p. 33.


118. Ibid., p. 156. Also, Perelandra, p. 249 cf.; The Screwtape Letters, pp. 47, 63-4, 84 cf.


120. Lewis, The Last Battle, p. 167.


122. Lewis, Out of the Silent Planet, pp. 178-80 cf.; Perelandra, pp. 226-232; That Hideous Strength, pp. 391-408, 467-75.

123. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, pp. 391-408.

124. Lewis, Beyond Personality, p. 37.


126. C.S. Lewis, Man or Rabbit Pamphlet (London: SCMS, 1946?) p. 3.
Footnotes:


129. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II (Edin.: Clark, 1961 ed.) pp. 54-354; Dogmatics IV/3/1, pp. 8-447 cf.


133. Lewis, Perelandra, pp. 122-6.


139. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, pp. 378-81.

140. Lewis, "Religion and Rocketry," pp. 84-5.

141. Lewis, The Last Battle, pp. 150-85.

142. Lewis, Perelandra, pp. 226-250.


144. Lewis, Surprised by Joy, pp. 97-106.

Footnotes:


147. Lewis, Out of the Silent Planet, pp. 86-90, 107, 159-61, 179.


151. Ibid., pp. 135-9.

152. Lewis, "Appendix 'A'," Miracles, p. 204.

153. Ibid., p. 204.

154. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, p. 19; The Screwtape Letters, pp. 136-7; Beyond Personality, p. 55; The Great Divorce, pp. 15, 89-95; Letters to Malcolm, p. 27.


160. C.S. Lewis, "Forms of Things Unknown," The Dark Tower and Other Stories, orig. date unclear, pp. 124-35.


162. C. Wilson, Crash Go the Chariots (N.Y.: Lancer, 1972), pp. 115-22.

163. Lewis, "Shall We Lose God in Outer Space?" p. 9.


165. C.S. Lewis, "The Inner Ring," The Weight of Glory, 1944, p. 56.
Footnotes:


171. Lewis, Out of the Silent Planet, pp. 135-7.

172. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, p. 315.

173. Lewis, The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, pp. 130-153.


178. Ibid., pp. 10-11.


180. Lewis, Perelandra, pp. 105-207.

181. Lewis, Perelandra, pp. 105-207.

Footnotes:

184. Ibid., p. 124.
185. Ibid., p. 131.
186. Ibid., p. 36.
187. Ibid., p. 88.
188. Ibid., p. 88.
VI. A Comparison of MacDonald and Lewis.

In this chapter I intend to compare both authors' treatment of universalism, and to demonstrate MacDonald's influence. In doing so, I do not contend that MacDonald was the sole influence on Lewis's consideration of the doctrine, since it was obvious from the previous chapter that Lewis was also heavily impressed by the pessimism of his age as well as by his medieval studies and English literature. I do, however, propose that MacDonald's influence was substantial, particularly concerning the question of universal salvation.

Histories.

The lives of both authors are somewhat dissimilar, but they have a few points in common. For one thing, both Lewis and MacDonald share a common Celtic ancestry, although MacDonald remained tied to his traditional Scottish heritage whereas Lewis's ties with Ireland were severed when his family moved to England. Lewis, for the most part, grew up in an English environment.

Both were brought up in an early Protestant atmosphere, but Lewis's experience as a young Ulster Protestant appears to have been somewhat benevolent (at least compared to the Anglo-Catholicism at Belsen), whereas MacDonald's attitudes towards Calvinism were formed as a reaction to the severity of the system.

As writers, both enjoyed a large circulation (Lewis particularly so), but MacDonald's lot was usually one of financial destitution, whereas Lewis's sales were immense. Both experienced their share of
opponents and supporters, yet it is notable that while Lewis's readers regarded him as a highly trained theologian, the audience of George MacDonald largely ignored his theological merit. To many, MacDonald remains a universalist literary writer with an individual approach to fantasy.

The use of fantasy as a means of expressing theological views is common to both, and is not without historical precedent. The genre has been used by several English writers as a means of disclosing their theological opinions: these include Edmund Spenser, *The Faery Queen*; John Milton, *Paradise Lost*; and Charles Dickens, *A Christmas Carol*.

I have already discussed the differences between the fantastic works of MacDonald and Lewis in terms of the former's resistance to intellectual interpretation. Unlike MacDonald, however, Lewis employs the genre of science fiction, most notably in his trilogy, *Out of the Silent Planet*, *Perelandra*, and *That Hideous Strength*. While it is obvious that space travel was feasible during Lewis's period (as opposed to the limited technology of MacDonald's), the genre of science fiction was familiar during Victoria's reign, and this included such works as George Tucker's *A Voyage to the Moon* (1827); Jules Verne's *From the Earth to the Moon* (1865); and H. G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds* (1893). The fact that MacDonald did not use science fiction as a means of theological expression is somewhat puzzling in light of his degree in science.

It was MacDonald's fantasy, however, that deeply influenced
C.S. Lewis. By his own admission, Lewis was led towards conversion after reading MacDonald's fantastic works. As I have indicated in the introduction to this thesis, MacDonald's influence upon Lewis's spiritual development was profound. And although they never met, Lewis's description of MacDonald as his "master" would appear to be appropriate (Lewis was about seven years old when MacDonald died, and by then the older man had lived the last years of his life withdrawn and in failing health). Many of Lewis's readers appear to have failed to notice the intensity of this relationship. In the preface to his anthology of MacDonald's works, Lewis recognizes this failure:

But it has not seemed to me that those who have received my books kindly take even now sufficient notice of the affiliation.¹

Finally, in terms of family life, MacDonald and Lewis were highly dissimilar, save for a mutual loss of their natural mothers in youth. Despite the severity of the Calvinist atmosphere, MacDonald appears to have enjoyed a magnificently joyful relationship with his father and kindred.² He married and raised a large family (probably one of the reasons for his constant poverty), which, in judging from the testimony of his sons, was genuinely harmonious.

Lewis, by contrast, appears to have been burdened by his father, who, while not cruel, seemed to have been of an altogether disagreeable nature.³ Lewis married late in life, unfortunately losing his wife to cancer.
While it is tempting to consider the contrasting father relationships psychologically, it is not my purpose in this paper to do so. I would, however, propose that it is reasonable to consider the contrast in family lives as a possible influence on their respective theological positions, i.e., MacDonald's confidence in God, the divine parent's ability to save all, and Lewis's ambivalence as reflections of the early fathers' behavior. Such a topic, however, would be better suited for a thesis dealing with religion and psychology than for my purposes here.

A. Universalism and the Human Situation.

While both MacDonald and Lewis expand their consideration of universal beyond humanity, the primary concern of both authors is for the human situation. In this they share, at the very least, the desire that all members of the human race will be saved.

I. Salvation.

Salvation is agreed upon as being primarily a state of restoration. In this the redeemed individual is restored to the original, divinely intended perfection of humanity, as expressed in the creation theme of Genesis. In Lilith, MacDonald contrasts this perfect nature with the self-induced state of corruption in the person of Lilith. Here, the demoness laments her fallen state when it is observed beside a vision of her former perfection.\(^4\) In similar fashion, Lewis, in The Great Divorce, contrasts the natures of the saved and the damned, the former being spirits of a solid, glorious nature, and the latter as
mere smokelike ghosts. This contrast is stressed in the case of the lizard-ridden ghost who relinquishes his imperfection and becomes a magnificent spirit-rider.5

The consummation of the perfection is heaven or the beatific vision, wherein the redeemed soul becomes definitive in its perfection. This is illustrated in both Lilith and The Last Battle as the final phase in human history, when all (or at least all that are going to be) are made perfect. It is towards this goal that God is working continuously.

There is a similar agreement between Lewis and MacDonald respecting the goal of perfection. Both agree that God can never be satisfied with anything less than perfection in the redeemed creature, and they agree that the Divine labor in accomplishing this redemption may well be agonizing. Both describe God's efforts to purge the redeemed soul of its imperfection in vivid terms, e.g., as "a consuming fire."6

The theme of a consuming fire is by no means an exaggeration. Lilith, while impenitent, suffers the ravishes of a fiery worm that consumes every bit of imperfection in her.7 MacDonald's demand for perfection is firm:

God will never let a man off with any fault. He must have him clean.8

Lewis appears to endorse this opinion. Speaking for God, Lewis declares:

Whatever suffering it may cost in your earthly life, whatever
inconceivable purification it may cost you after death, whatever it costs me, I will never rest, nor let you rest, until you are literally perfect.\textsuperscript{9}

While Lewis generally accepts MacDonald's views on salvation, there are, however, some notable differences. For one thing, in Lewis's thought the pain of redemption is reserved for the penitent, those who convert and must be made perfect by a willing consent. Those addressed in Lewis's quotation above are individuals in whom God has begun the process of salvation, rather than those who reject salvation. MacDonald, by contrast, affords the pain of conversion to both the converted and the unconverted. The degree of pain increases or decreases with the measure of impenitence. Lilith, for example, suffers tremendous agony because her rejection of saving grace is formidable. The salvation of Vane, the imperfect human agent of the divine, is by contrast a series of distressing lessons, since his impenitence is far less - an impenitence marked more by ignorance than by willful rejection. Likewise, Robert Falconer's proposal to his father, that the older man must either repent now under the sunshine of Heaven or later in the tortures of hell,\textsuperscript{10} indicates that pain will be doled out in measure to the human will.

A further difference is found in MacDonald's conclusion that saving grace, whether involving great or mean pain, will be successful in every case. Though the divine labor towards this goal may require more effort in some cases, he is confident that everyone will be "burnt clean and brought home."\textsuperscript{11}

At this point Lewis emerges from the influence of MacDonald.
Contrary to MacDonald's optimism, he regards the workings of God towards salvation with great reservation, indicating that there is no guarantee that salvation will become effective in all humanity: "the Divine labour to redeem the world cannot be certain of succeeding as regards every individual soul," declares Lewis.12

Lewis's consideration of salvation differs further from MacDonald's in that it includes a deliverance as well as a restoration. There is a deliverance from eternal damnation, which Lewis perceives as a real threat to the individual. I shall discuss this in greater depth in the following sections. The theme of deliverance is foreign to MacDonald's theology, and he considered hell to be a drastic instrument of salvation, one which is used to promote conversion when all else fails: "Away with him to the Outer Darkness!" declares MacDonald (paraphrasing Jesus' words in Matthew viii: 12; xxii: 13; xxv: 30). "Perhaps that will make him repent."13

Lewis's departure from MacDonald at this point may be attributed to three sources. First, it probably reflects the influence on him of medieval literature, which emphasizes the great difficulty of following the rules of Christianity. This is particularly true of the notion of penance. An excellent example are the Morality Plays, in which Everyman, representing humanity, must undergo bodily penance at the instigation of Knowledge and Good-Deeds before receiving salvation.14 Second, it is a reaction to the current trends towards liberal (in some cases radical, optimistic) theology, which Lewis considered to be a dilution of true Christianity.15 Third, it
doubtless reflects the pessimism of his age. Lewis, having witnessed two world wars, must have been convinced that such beatific themes as peace came only after much suffering and hard labor.

Even so, MacDonald's influence is obvious in the agreement concerning salvation. In this Lewis considered him to have been a great religious instructor. In fact, his regard for MacDonald seems at time excessive:

But to speak plainly I know hardly any other writer who seems to be closer, or more continually close, to the Spirit of Christ Himself.\textsuperscript{16}

Lewis, however, does qualify this opinion with one important reservation: "I dare not say that he is never in error."\textsuperscript{17}

II. Universal Salvific Will of God.

MacDonald and Lewis share a common trinitarianism. The belief in the Trinity, God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, has been dominant in western Christianity since the Council of Nicaea in 325 A.D., wherein the divinity of Jesus Christ was confirmed against Arian claims to the contrary. In Anglicanism, the trinitarian position is upheld in the creeds, prayers, and the 39 Articles of Religion. The first of these articles, Of Faith in the Holy Trinity, reads:

There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the Maker, and Preserver of all things both visible and invisible. And in unity of this Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.\textsuperscript{18}

This is further proclaimed in the second and fifth articles, Of the Word
or Son of God, which was made very Man and Of the Holy Ghost. Likewise, the Nicene and Apostles' creeds staunchly defend the belief in the tri-personal God. The Creed of Saint Athanasius not only stresses trinitarianism as doctrine, but warns also that those refusing to believe will be damned: "This is the Catholic Faith,/ which except a man do faithfully and stedfastly believe, he cannot be saved," and "Which Faith except a man keep whole and undefiled,/ without doubt he will perish eternally."20

MacDonald and Lewis's expressions of trinitarianism are at times defensive. "Was Jesus ever less divine than God?" asks MacDonald, "I answer for you, Never."21 Likewise, Lewis declares: "Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse."22 In both these passages, the language is passionate, as if opposing an adverse opinion.

In MacDonald's case, the opponents were probably the Universalist and Unitarian Churches. By this time the Universalists had become basically deistic and had reached a Christology similar to that of the Unitarians. The Unitarians, it may be remembered, were a substantial concern of F. D. Maurice, MacDonald's close friend and confidant. Doubtless this concern was passed on to MacDonald. The fact that MacDonald converted to Anglicanism rather than to the Universalist Church reflects his insistence upon the Trinity as a matter of dogma.

Lewis's militant trinitarianism was a reaction to the modern trends in theology towards the "historical Jesus." Lewis opposed all efforts to compromise the divinity of Jesus Christ as proposed by some
liberal bible critics. The Christ-like figures throughout the Narnia Series and the science fiction trilogy, Aslan and Maleldil, are clearly endowed with divine powers, and this may be understood as an affirmation of the second person of the Trinity, his being of one substance and power with God the Father and the Holy Spirit.

Both Lewis and MacDonald agree that the will of the tri-personal God is that all humanity might be saved. MacDonald expresses the universal salvific will in precise terms: "But this Will is our Salvation." Likewise, Lewis affirms the universal salvific will through the mouth of Screwtape. In commenting on the fate of the damned, the demon confesses that God fought hard to preserve them from damnation: "the Enemy (for whatever inscrutable and perverse reason) thought them worth trying to save. Believe me, he did." Even so, there are two obvious areas of disagreement between MacDonald and Lewis.

The first of these concerns the Atonement. Although both confirm the belief in Jesus Christ as the Son of God, his death and resurrection - which corresponds to the second and fourth Articles of Religion in Anglicanism - MacDonald rejects the traditional belief that Christ died to placate an angry God, and by his suffering spared humanity from the punishment of their sins. He considers this view to be abominable, or "a piece of the darkness of hell." In its place he advocates a position nearly identical to that of F. D. Maurice, namely, that Christ was given over to humanity as proof of God's love and also in order to destroy the power of sin rather than to punish sins.
Lewis, by contrast, appears to endorse the antilutron formula of 1 Tim. ii: 6, that Christ gave himself as a ransom for humanity. In Lewis's thought, however, it is the devil and not God who is the recipient of the ransom, as expressed in The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. Here, the great Lion Aslan lays down his life in order that the White Witch relinquish her claim over Edmund, the erring child. The White Witch appears to be identified with the devil, at least in this, the first book of the Narnia series. She is clearly the recipient of Aslan's ransom.

The official Anglican policy concerning the Atonement is not altogether clear. In the second Article of Religion, Christ's atonement is described in the following manner:

... who truly suffered, was crucified, dead and buried, to reconcile his Father to us, and to be a sacrifice, not only for original guilt, but also for all actual sins of men.\(^27\)

Although this description may allow for differences of interpretation, I propose that it is advocating the opinion that MacDonald vehemently opposed; that Christ died to deliver humanity from the punishment threatened by Divine wrath. It would further appear that God is the recipient of the sacrifice, since there is no mention of the devil. In this, the official policy of the Anglican Church appears to be in some dispute with the opinions of both Lewis and MacDonald.

Lewis's views on the Atonement are not as vehement as MacDonald's. In his Broadcast Talks Lewis considers the various theories concerning the Atonement, and becomes quite tolerant. He suggests that while there are notable differences of opinions, all are
agreed that the Atonement actually does effect salvation. "The thing itself is infinitely more important than any explanations that theologians have produced," argues Lewis. It appears that Lewis does not actually reject MacDonald's consideration of the Atonement - at least in the same spirit that MacDonald rejects traditional views - and he conceivably affords it, along with the others, a certain degree of merit. At the very least, Lewis does not openly condemn MacDonald's opinion.

The second area of disagreement lies within MacDonald's theodicy. In addition to confirming the Trinity and the divine universal salvific will, MacDonald demands that the perfection of God be justified by the ability to carry out this same will. If God is truly perfect, argues MacDonald, then all must be saved in accordance with God's will. I shall discuss this in further detail in the following section. For God to fail to redeem any individual would be for omnipotence to suffer a blameless defeat. MacDonald's position on this matter is that it cannot be so.

Lewis is aware of this argument. He readily agrees with the proposal that the loss of a single soul spells the defeat of omnipotence: "And so it does." Yet, whereas MacDonald protested the actuality of omnipotence being beaten by a finite creature, Lewis merely acquiesces. Even so, he defends this view on the grounds of an apology for the divine: "What are you asking God to do?" inquires Lewis. He points out that God has done everything possible to aid the human individual in the process of salvation, but due to human free will,
salvation may still be rejected.

This is major disagreement between MacDonald and Lewis. While both agree that God would be blameless if a human soul was ultimately lost, MacDonald remains adamant in his belief that it is not possible for God to fail in his desire to save all and remain perfect, whereas Lewis implies that it is possible. This disagreement most likely reflects the differences in historical time spans. In MacDonald's day it was unthinkable that the British empire should ever be defeated. This led to an overall sense of optimism. By Lewis's time, however, it was obvious that England was no longer invulnerable. Even as the English nation could be attacked in its own capital, so could the Creator be - at least in theory - defeated by his creature.

III. Human Free Will.

The Arminian position, while contrary to the 39 Articles of Religion, is asserted throughout MacDonald and Lewis's writings. The tenth and seventeenth articles, Of Free Will and Of Predestination and Election, espouse Calvinism. This was mainly due to the Calvinist parties during the Tudor period, but by the 19th - 20th centuries many Anglican theologians within the Broad, High and Anglo-Catholic parties had rejected it in favor of human free will. Some, like F. W. Farrar, preferred a compromise which afforded merit to both views.

Although MacDonald advocates human free will, his overall theological position contains some definite Calvinistic overtones. The human person is endowed with freedom of choice, and at one point
MacDonald declares that God will never violate this freedom. True, God may buffet the human heart like a tempest, demanding a conversion, but the divine efforts will not coerce. Lilith's agonizing conversion illustrates the relentless demand of the divine that the individual repent.

Even so, at another point MacDonald declares that the gift of free will is only given in order that humanity willingly accepts salvific grace, and that nothing can withstand the will of God to save all. In this, human free will serves only as an instrument of perfection. It is no match for divine power; salvation is irresistible.

Lewis generally adheres to the doctrine of free will and expresses a purer form of Arminianism. He asserts that God created all things with a free will, and argues that God cannot "ravish" the individual. Unlike MacDonald's raging tempest, God can only "woo" his creature.

Lewis's only concessions to Calvinism are a brief acknowledgement of the merits of foreknowledge on the grounds that God is beyond timespans as perceived by humans, and his testimony concerning his conversion. In this latter instance, Lewis describes God's presence as an overwhelming force, which spiritually dragged him into the process of salvation. However, as this is a personal tribute, perhaps some allowance may be made for passionate and overzealous language.

The fact that both writers assert Arminianism may be understood as much through their personal histories, as through their historical
periods. MacDonald loathed the Calvinist doctrines which were part of his early life, the chief of which was the belief in double predestination. This loathing may explain his assertion of human free will, i.e., as a reaction to exclusive salvation for a restricted elect. But the influence of Calvinism still lingers on in his conclusion that saving grace will eventually triumph over temporal resistance.

Lewis's early life greatly lacks any such aversion to Calvinism. In Ireland, his family were Ulster Protestants—often Calvinist in nature. This period appears to have been somewhat benign and left him with no lasting resentment. His experience with the Anglo-Catholics at Belsen, by contrast, was terrifying and this seems to have impressed strong ideas of free will— as well as hellfire and brimstone—into his overall theological position.

There is a strong disagreement over free will and the ability to reject salvation in a definitive manner. According to MacDonald, God's will must ultimately triumph over even the most adamant sinner: "He is utterly true and good to us," declares MacDonald, "Nor shall anything withstand his will."38 The tremendous battle over Lilith's conversion bears witness to this declaration. Though the demoness struggles with a supernatural tenacity, God's saving power emerges victorious. If an archdemon, even the queen of hell, is no match for saving grace, what chance has any human being?

Contrary to MacDonald, Lewis affirms that there is a real danger in the exercise of free will that can lead to an everlasting separation from God. He stresses this danger in The Great Divorce, declaring that
all those in hell are there because of choice; "Without that self-
choice," argues Lewis, "there could be no Hell."\(^{39}\) Salvation
appears to be conditional, rather than irresistible. Unless the human
freely consents to be saved, there can be no salvation: "How if they
will not give in?" asks Lewis.\(^{40}\)

In considering MacDonald's influence on Lewis in the matter of
human free will, I must acknowledge that Lewis was probably impressed by
other sources, most likely his years at Belsen. Arminianism is common
throughout Anglican writers, e.g., Maurice, Pusey, and Dearmer, and
Lewis was doubtless subjected to a steady flow of literature promoting
this opinion. Still, I propose that MacDonald's writings, wherein the
Scottish writer attempted to remain Arminian, reinforced Lewis's
adherence to human free will. In praising MacDonald as a Christian
teacher, Lewis declares: "He knows (none better) that even omnipotence
cannot save the unconverted."\(^{41}\) In this agreement, I perceive that
Lewis is utilizing MacDonald's views within his overall position.

IV. Sin and Evil.

In both writers' consideration sin and evil are identical
principles. Briefly summarized, these terms express anything contrary
to the perfect nature and will of God. Neither MacDonald nor Lewis
pays much attention to the different types of sins - as might an
Anglo-Catholic theologian - but Lewis is inclined to interpret the
negative principles as essentially the promotion of the self above the
sovereignty of God.
Both MacDonald and Lewis are agreed upon the ultimate destruction of sin, since it is incompatible with the perfect nature of God. God's nature, MacDonald argues, is "so terribly pure that it destroys all that is not pure," and Lewis, in agreement with MacDonald on this point, in *Perelandra* and *The Last Battle*, creates visions of a purified universe, the result of a divinely engineered catharsis.

While there is mutual consent in foreseeing a final time when God will bring about the destruction of all evil, there is some serious discord over the matter of the agents of sin. For MacDonald - in accordance with his views on theodicy - the universal catharsis which must be expected from the perfect divinity cannot include the agents or the sinful creatures. The creature, whether human or demon, is the object of divine love, and only the negative existential existing within it must perish. This may mean a drastic operation if the creature is unreasonably tenacious in its adherence to sin, but nonetheless the imperfection within it will and must be "burned, ruthlessly burned." Only then will the creature be saved.

In Lewis's thought however, there is a serious possibility that the agent might be destroyed along with the principle. The condition of sin, especially in the promotion of self, has the potentiality, Lewis warns, to "destroy the soul in the end." If the creature adheres to the imperfection within it, then it risks a damnation of everlasting consequence.

The contrast between these considerations is perhaps best
expressed by the literary villains. In MacDonald's books, the villain, whether great or petty, is usually redeemed. Rosamund, Angus MacPholp, even Murdock Malison of Alec Forbes, eventually find their way to salvation. The divine salvific power is capable of redeeming the worst of sinners. This is not so in the literature of C. S. Lewis. In his books very few villains are saved. Frost, Weston, and Rishda Tarkaan all meet with horrible fates. In The Great Divorce only one ghost is redeemed (at least on that trip) and this individual is more of a victim than a villain. The others, more impenitent, wind their ways back to hell. Both theological opinions are superbly illustrated in the contrast between Lilith and Jadis, MacDonald and Lewis's respective archdemons. Lilith, after a monumental battle with salvation, is purged of her evil and brought into grace. Jadis, the White Witch, though equally impenitent, is merely destroyed at the paws of Aslan. Having clung to the evil principle, Jadis appears to have perished.

In both situations, the various acts of sin are largely inconsequential. In MacDonald's thought, even the Synoptic "unforgivable sin" has no power formidable enough to everlastingly separate a human from God. Sin, though a very real and serious problem, is no match for the omnipotence of God. An act of suicide or murder - as in the cases of Osborne and Leopold - is both grievous and calamitous, as MacDonald recognizes, but it cannot effect eternal damnation.

Lewis agrees, but for different reasons, that the size of the sin is inconsequential. Every act of sin, according to Lewis, has the
power to place a human in an everlasting state of separation from God. The act of even relatively minor offenses - let alone pride, the great sin - can be used as a lever to promote the self over God. Thus the archdemon Screwtape advises Wormwood that "Murder is no better than cards if cards can do the trick." The danger of damnation through willful adherence to sin is grave in Lewis's consideration.

The differences between both writers' opinion probably reflects the different historical attitudes. Sin, the great enemy of humanity, could not, in MacDonald's view, defeat divine grace. This undoubtedly reflects the invulnerability of the British empire in the 19th century. By contrast, Lewis's witness of the overwhelming power of England's adversaries during both world wars probably convinced him that evil was a force to be reckoned with - a force capable of achieving its goal of everlasting damnation.

V. Death.

With respect to death, Lewis's views are very much in conflict with those of MacDonald. MacDonald's position on death was one of thoroughgoing optimism. He considered death to be a highly positive experience and an instrument of universal salvation. When all else failed in life - as in the case of Sir George - then God could employ death as a means of saving his creature. This was a radical position, even amongst the more liberal Anglicans of the 19th century who more cautiously allowed for the possibility of salvation after death.

Lewis's position is ambiguous. On the one hand he suggests that
there is no chance of salvation after death (the traditional view of conservative theologians) and on the other he implies that it is at least feasible. Even so, in this latter case Lewis notably lacks the optimism of Maurice and Farrar, and his position is far more cautious. In this ambiguity Lewis appears to be balancing between the traditional views held by both Catholic and Protestant conservatives and the liberal view to the contrary. He is, at times, most open-minded:

... that there ought to be a second chance. I believe that if a million chances were likely to do good, they would be given.46

Likewise, in The Great Divorce one ghost actually does accept the universal "second chance." The others, though they refuse it, demonstrate that the offer is real.

Even so, this cautious hopefulness does not reflect the radical optimism of MacDonald. It is probably due more to the influence of the Broad Church parties such as Maurice's. Far from agreeing with MacDonald's assessment of death as "that blessed invention which of itself must set many things right,"47 Lewis regards death - even if it is possible for salvation after death - as a totally negative and repulsive phenomenon. In Surprised by Joy and A Grief Observed Lewis describes the event of death as mysterious and loathsome.48

In a similar manner, Lewis rejects MacDonald's view that death is a glorious opportunity for reconciliation, especially the reunion of departed family members with a dying individual. The theme of "reunions on the further shore"49 is discarded as sentimental. There is too much of a mystery to death that is beyond present human
understanding. In The Great Divorce this theme is rejected in the attitudes of the redeemed spirits towards their impenitent friends and relations. The fact that the damned ghosts do not repent does not dampen the spiritual contentment of the saved in the least. Post-death reunions appear to be inconsequential to the happiness of those who have died in grace.

There seems to be only one agreement between the writers and this is the practice of praying for the dead. Both Lewis and MacDonald openly confess the merits of this practice, although in neither case does it seem to be essential. In MacDonald's consideration one might wonder why it would be necessary to offer prayers for the departed when death is part of the process of universal salvation - in fact an effective instrument of saving grace when all else in life fails. The same question may be applied to Lewis. If at death, as Lewis suggests in his science fiction trilogy and the Screwtape epistles, the soul is made definitive either in salvation or damnation, what good can prayers do? Or, as implied in The Great Divorce, the second chance for salvation is universally offered but its acceptance is exclusively the choice of the individual, then what benefit can be achieved by prayer? It is notable that in The Last Battle the prayers of the children for the dead dwarfs are useless despite Aslan's miracles. In both writers' considerations the usefulness of praying for the dead appears to be questionable.

Lewis's adherence to this practice was probably reinforced by MacDonald's writings. Prayers for the dead was, and is, popular
in Anglican ecclesiology (except in Calvinist factions). Although the twenty-second Article of Religion condemns the Roman Catholic doctrine concerning Purgatory in vague terms, the order for The Burial of the Dead is filled with prayers for the departed and their mourners. Likewise, it may be remembered that E. B. Pusey, while convinced that there was no chance of salvation after death, was enthusiastic over the practice of praying for the dead, considering its prohibition as being contrary to love. MacDonald shared Pusey's sentiments concerning the prohibition of such prayers and was scornful of the Calvinists who did not allow for graveside services.

VI. Hell.

While there is much disagreement concerning the subject of hell, it is obvious that MacDonald's views were a strong influence on Lewis's overall consideration. MacDonald utterly rejects the idea that there could exist an everlasting and irremedial state of separation between God and any individual. If this were so, argues MacDonald, then God cannot be considered to be perfect since he had been defeated by the finite creature and the negative existential within. "Believe it not," advises MacDonald, "lest it quench forgiveness in thee." Lewis, by contrast, readily admits that it is possible for a soul to be everlastingly lost, despite the omnipotence of God. His writings present two possibilities of hell, and these are either a state of duration or annihilation. He also pictures hell as being a sphere of demonic domination and as a purely anthropomorphic state. His
literature is, in fact, saturated with the concern for the danger of everlasting damnation.

I have previously discussed the contrast between Lewis and MacDonald concerning the latter's views on theodicy. But in addition to MacDonald's primary argument that hell cannot exist if God is perfect, there are two further arguments against hell which MacDonald endorses. Lewis is not only well aware of these secondary arguments, but he also affords them much consideration in his overall view.

The first of these arguments suggests that no redeemed soul, having been restored to perfection, could be completely joyful with the knowledge that a relative, friend or even an adversary was suffering in eternal misery. The traditional bifurcating view, according to MacDonald, is contradictory to the very essence of perfect love. The suffering of the damned - particularly as illustrated in the popular hellfire homiletics - would turn "heaven for us into hell." MacDonald further states that the saved, upon witnessing the torment of the damned, would be unceasing in their petitions for universal salvation: "where art thou, our strong Jesus?... Come Lord of Life! Monarch of Suffering! Redeem them." Added to these petitions, the saved would pour across the burning flames to relieve the suffering in any manner possible - an illustration based on the parable of the rich man and Lazarus in Luke xvi: 19-26.

Lewis's answer to this argument occurs in The Problem of Pain and The Great Divorce. In The Problem of Pain Lewis suggests that hell may not be of an everlasting duration of suffering at all, but a
finality, possibly even a gradual annihilation of what was once a human being. He also points to the injustice that the damned, if still impenitent, should be able to dampen the joy of the redeemed who are making themselves miserable over a group that willfully refuses to accept saving grace. This point is demonstrated in *The Great Divorce*. The redeemed are depicted as being charitable towards the impenitent, but not to the degree that the fate of the damned - a self-imposed fate - should corrupt their own joy. In this Lewis employs a literary George MacDonald to refute the proposal that "Hell should be able to veto Heaven." Lewis's MacDonald points out that it would be the height of injustice to allow the tyranny of the damned - meaning their willful opposition to salvation - to forever hold hostage the completeness of eternal joy.

This latter passage demonstrates MacDonald's influence on Lewis's thought. MacDonald's argument obviously holds sway over much of Lewis's assertion that it is possible for the human being to be everlastingly damned. Lewis's MacDonald opposes the argument set forth by the historical MacDonald - an argument which in life George MacDonald never retracted. The use of a literary MacDonald expresses the reverence and weight of merit that Lewis felt for MacDonald.

The second argument MacDonald offers against the existence of an everlasting hell is that of justice on the part of God. "I do not believe that any being," declares MacDonald, "... could sin so as to deserve such punishment." This argument is not without historical precedent, and it is noticeable that Pope Innocent III's opponents
used it against the belief that the pains of hell were endless.

Lewis basically answers this in the same response to MacDonald's first argument, that hell may not be of duration at all, much less eternal suffering. Added to which, Lewis points out that the lot of the damned is their own choosing. All the unredeemed ghosts in The Great Divorce remain damned by their own choice, not by divine sentence. If they are in hell they not only deserve to be, but they also refuse to come out. It is not injustice on the part of God, but impenitence on the part of humanity.

MacDonald and Lewis's conflict over these two arguments is probably due to a personal reaction by both writers. In making his arguments against an everlasting hell MacDonald challenges traditional descriptions common to both Protestant and Catholic beliefs, i.e., of unending fire and brimstone. MacDonald loathed such beliefs, particularly in Scottish Calvinists. Lewis, on the other hand, attempts to rationalize hell. He analyzes hell in terms of its nature, e.g. of duration or finality, rather than defending the traditional belief in a literal place of sensational torment. This is perhaps a reaction to his experiences at Belsen in which he acquiesces rather than rebels. Doubtless, his studies in Medieval literature added to his analysis.

There is a strong disagreement concerning the idea of hell as annihilation. From the mid 19th century on the belief that hell was annihilation rather than enduring torment was widely promoted by many of the sectarian factions, including Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists. Farrar and other Anglicans considered the historical regard
for this belief through the ages, and it was often concluded to be more humane than an everlasting torture. The support for annihilation is usually based on such biblical themes as "eternal death" and the "second death." It is substantiated by such scriptures as Matthew x: 28; II Thess. i: 9; Rev. ii: 11; xx: 14; xxi: 8.

Annihilation is rejected in MacDonald's overall consideration. He asserts that it would have merit only as an unpleasant alternative if God were not perfect.59 His theodicy is emphasized at this point; either God must save all or let all be terminated. There is little room for compromise in his assertions.

Annihilation appears to be the logical conclusion to Lewis's views on hell. On the one hand he depicts hell as a gradual wearing down of the remnants of a degraded humanity. It seems that the damned will eventually pass out of existence. On the other hand, he describes a sphere in which the damned become sustenance for demons. It is not entirely clear whether this diabolical feeding completely destroys the soul - which would seem more likely - or if it is an everlasting torture, as Screwtape hints to Wormwood. In suggesting annihilation as the consequence of God's inability to succeed in the salvation of each individual, Lewis has reached a practical if indirect agreement with MacDonald.

Though there is substantial disagreement between MacDonald and Lewis, there is some harmony as well. MacDonald asserts that there is a hell, but denies that it can be everlasting. Rather, it is a temporary punishment or one of innumerable divine instruments of salvation. The
impenitent soul is simply left in the pain of loss, which is affirmed as real and agonizing. This pain, increased by the action of the divine in destroying sin - often referred to as "burning" - can reach alarming proportions. The redemption of Lilith clearly illustrates the measure of the corrective punishments of hell. While MacDonald does not use the term "purgatory" he has, for all practical purposes, concluded hell to be nothing more than a state of purging or purifying, before admittance into the beatific vision. Possibly, MacDonald refrained from using purgatory as a title because of the Anglican prohibition in the twenty-second article.

Basically, Lewis has reached a practical agreement with MacDonald concerning purgatory. Lewis's demand for purgatory is consistent throughout his writings. In The Great Divorce Lewis illustrates purgatory and hell as being nearly identical, with one notable difference. If a ghost or damned soul relinquishes its grip on hell, then its limited residence there has been nothing more than a duration in purgatory. But if the same ghost remains impenitent, clinging to hell until it diminishes into nothing, then it is everlastingly lost. Both agree on the inclusion of corrective pains, but for Lewis these are reserved for the penitent in whom the process of salvation has begun, while MacDonald asserts them to be universal, since God intends for all to be saved.

Perhaps the main difference between MacDonald's view of hell and Lewis's is the matter of the duration of consequences. MacDonald, fully confident in the salvific power of God, declares that hell cannot endure
forever. Lewis, aware of traditional arguments and the power of human free will, warns that for some impenitent individuals, hell may be of everlasting consequences.

VII. The Church and Other Religions.

There are notable differences between MacDonald and Lewis's consideration of the Church regarding salvation. In MacDonald's thought the Church may be instrumental as an agent of salvation, but it is clearly not essential. MacDonald's assertion that God will never say to an individual "You never went to Church: depart from me" clearly indicates that salvation is not limited to membership in the Church. MacDonald's literary clergymen are seen to have a limited merit, rather than an indispensable role.

Throughout Lewis's writings the Church is described as being of vital importance to salvation. Even the terrifying experience at Belsen appears to have been of some benefit for Lewis in that it at least gave him a rudimentary faith. Lewis's appreciation for the Church as a whole is amply demonstrated in the testimony of Screwtape who declares that the Church "makes our boldest tempters uneasy."

The contrast between both positions may be explained by a number of factors. First, MacDonald grew up in an inconsistent atmosphere. His family life was one of exceptional happiness (except for the early death of his mother who was readily replaced by a loving, supportive step mother) but his Calvinist ecclesiology left him cold. Lewis, however, grew up in an unhappy family, though the early Protestantism of Ulster
was benign. It was only after the family's migration to England that Lewis encountered the severity of Anglo-Catholicism and this he described as having a wholesome - if terrifying - effect on him.

MacDonald's clash with the Church at Arundel and his subsequent departure from Congregationalism no doubt added to the conclusion that the Church was not essential to God's overall plan of salvation. Lewis's writings, while not without opposition, were generally well received by the laity and clergy - barring the liberal and literalist factions. This acceptance is clearly demonstrated by the overwhelming success of his books, and probably reinforced the belief that the Church as a whole was a powerful salvific instrument.

The historical progression of ecumenism was also a likely factor. MacDonald lived through an age of religious intensity. In addition to conflicting sectarian movements, many claiming an exclusive salvation, the mainline Churches drew clear lines between each other, most notably between Protestantism and Catholicism. Within the Anglican communion, there was much distress between the Low, Broad, High and Anglo-Catholic parties. Lewis's era saw increased efforts towards ecumenism and this probably encouraged his appreciation of the Church even as MacDonald was discouraged.

In addition to these contributory causes, MacDonald was a mystic and Lewis was not. In this, MacDonald stressed the basic relationship between the individual soul and the divine over the collective relationship between God and the Church. Lewis, while agreeing with MacDonald on the necessity of the individual experience, is inclined to
emphasize the importance of the Church as a whole. This is perhaps due to his medieval studies as well as to his lack of mysticism.

MacDonald's mysticism, while not entirely opposed to the historical revelation of the Church, emphasized personal insight into divine workings. MacDonald's strong belief in universal salvation is reinforced by his mystical inspiration. This is not without historical precedent, and it may be remembered that the 14th century mystic, Julian of Norwich, was subject to private revelations of universal salvation while papal literature confirming eternal damnation was simultaneously circulating. Lewis, not being a mystic, appears more inclined towards historical ecclesiastical opinions, rather than towards individual inspiration.

Although the issue of the importance of the Church is somewhat in dispute, both Lewis and MacDonald agree on the expansion of salvation beyond Christianity. In this, both conclude that it is possible for atheists, agnostics, and members of the major world's religions to be saved, even without an explicit acceptance of saving grace.

In considering the other major religions, MacDonald has relatively little to say. Instead of working through arguments in favor of their salvation, he largely includes them with the totality of humanity in terms of the essential individual experience, the universal salvific will of the divine, and his theodicy. This is somewhat uncharacteristic of the 19th century, when the fate of non-Christians was a matter of serious concern both to Anglican deliberators of universal salvation and missionary factions. MacDonald, other than
asserting the salvation of all humanity, appears to avoid the issue of non-Christian religions.

Lewis, on the other hand, expresses a deep interest in other religions, particularly in Greek and Norse mythologies. Probably due to his medieval studies as much as an obvious personal appreciation, Lewis often Christianizes the classical pagan images, and throughout the Narnia series one finds satyrs, driads, dwarfs and the like in the service of Aslan. Likewise, throughout his science fiction trilogy, the "gods" of ancient Greece and Rome now serve Maleldil. The case of Emeth clearly shows that a non-Christian can be saved even if he or she is honestly seeking salvation within another religion. In this an implicit acceptance is required of the individual. Emeth, for example, would have worshipped Aslan all along if he had realized the difference between the leonine Christ and Tash. But with his usual caution, Lewis points out that it is also possible for a non-Christian to be damned as well, as in the case of Rishda Tarkaan. Lewis accepts MacDonald's views on expanded grace to non-Christians but only conditionally. There must be, in Lewis's thought, an acceptance of grace, whether implicitly or explicitly, and this means that it is also possible to refuse grace in the same manner.

This conditional agreement continues in the consideration of atheists and agnostics. In discussing this subject MacDonald is more conversable. Far from being a detriment to salvation, atheism is described as a divine instrument in the perfecting of the individual, especially when that individual has been exposed to erroneous depictions
of God. When frail, impressionable minds are presented with false representations of the perfect divinity - "Moloch" is how MacDonald describes these - then God actually inspires atheism in order to purge away the error and prepare for a true vision. To accomplish this, God employs the honest doubt of the atheist or agnostic in order to bring about a true saving faith. God, in MacDonald's thought, can and does use anything as an instrument of universal salvation.

Lewis agrees with the expansion of salvation to atheists and agnostics, but with the same reservation of conditional acceptance. When an individual honestly cannot believe in Christ, then that individual is probably justified in his disbelief since it is based on sincerity. Screwtape's lament that God saves those who act wrongfully but are convinced in the righteousness of their action dramatizes this argument. However, Lewis also points out that it is equally possible for atheists to be damned if their rejection of saving faith is based on an evasion of the truth, which they might feel instinctively. In this instance, salvation is rejected through willfulness and not ignorance, and the logical conclusion to such rejection is everlasting damnation.

Lewis's agreement with MacDonald's expanded salvation doubtlessly indicates a strong influence on the latter's part (besides the effect of a general sympathy towards non-Christians during the early-mid 20th century). While this idea is not unique to MacDonald, being expressed in medieval thought - for example the esteem for Virgil in Dante's Divina Commedia - Lewis's views were at the very least
reinforced by MacDonald's convictions, though modified by some caution. By allowing for salvation beyond Christianity, Lewis invited criticism from conservatives and evangelicals who insisted that salvation was the exclusive property of Christianity. Even so, the fact remains that it is possible for atheists, agnostics and non-Christians to be saved, according to Lewis's overall theology.

B. Universalism Beyond the Human Situation.

I. Universalism and Animals.

The concern for the welfare of animals is characteristic of both MacDonald and Lewis's writings. Both share a common appreciation of animals and this is evident in their protests over inhumane treatment. MacDonald despised hunting and similar corporal abuse, labelling such practices as "loathsome" and "cowardly." Lewis takes a more severe attitude against animal mistreatment. In Vivisection he suggests that it has criminal connotations, and in Perelandra he describes it as nothing short of diabolical, i.e., in Satan's torturing of the frog-like victim.

From this mutual concern arises the consideration of bestial salvation. MacDonald affirms that animals are part of the universal redemption that must be effected by God. He asserts that animals possess a soul or at least some form of soul. Thus he describes the grim clan Macruadh mourning the death of the family mascot: "Poor old Ruadh! God rest his soul!" Lewis's approach to this subject is more cautious. He suggests that it is possible that animals - yet, only
the higher orders - might possess a rudimentary soul which, because of human contact, may survive death. Bultitude, the tame bear, illustrates this speculation. The bruin is seen to possess a basic soul or spirit, but this is ennobled through restrictions placed on him by Ransom, God's agent. Bultitude gains a hint of spiritual appreciation through an instinctive knowledge of right and wrong and acts accordingly.67

This elevation is highly reminiscent of MacDonald's flying fish in The Golden Key. This animal, like Bultitude, is ennobled by humanity in its sacrifice of itself to nurture two hungry children. Afterwards, it is resurrected into something not unlike an angel.68 This principle of promotion through contact with humanity probably indicates MacDonald's influence. The Golden Key is described by Lewis as one of MacDonald's "great works," indicating that the book left a lasting impression on him. This praise, plus the common principle of promotion through human contact, no doubt reflects MacDonald's effect on Lewis's consideration.

MacDonald is firm in his assertion of bestial salvation. He refers to Jesus as the "Saviour O' man an' beast,"69 but he does not elaborate on this statement. It would appear, however, that bestial salvation is closely linked with human salvation. In addition to the principle of spiritual elevation through human contact, MacDonald describes Mara's leopard as being destined to "rise with the righteous."70 Mara, the leopard's mistress, receives a mild rebuke from Eve for her fear concerning the leopard's death. The ultimate fate of animals, according to MacDonald, appears to be an automatic inclusion
in the universal salvation of humanity as engineered by divinity. He speaks with such certainty and simplicity concerning bestial salvation that it would appear that animals are divinely afforded a guarantee of their eternal welfare.

Lewis, unlike MacDonald, offers only the possibility of bestial salvation. He considers the subject in terms of the quality of the animal soul, its immortality, and the relationship to humanity. While his consideration is, by his own admission, "confessedly speculative," he appears to reserve any theoretical salvation for the higher orders alone. Such lesser orders as newts are dismissed as being creatures of pure sentience. In *Perelandra*, however, he momentarily digresses from this position, and describes a local *apokatastasis* which includes all creation from the greatest oyarsa to the least grain. In general, however, Lewis remains speculative in his approach.

In speculating on the possible salvation of animals, Lewis raises the question as to whether there might be "spiritual animals" inhabiting other parts of the universe. I shall discuss this more in the next section. Lewis discusses the possibility that such animals might be endowed with a rational soul, and if so, whether the theological concerns of humanity might apply to them as well. In this, however, he reaches no definite conclusions.

The main disagreement between MacDonald's consideration and Lewis's lies in the decisiveness of the former and the speculation of the latter. MacDonald's approach is radical, whereas Lewis's is
somewhat conservative. Even so, there is an obvious longing for bestial salvation within Lewis's fantasy, and this would indicate, at the very least, a strong sympathy for MacDonald's conclusions. Animals are illustrated as achieving salvation in *The Last Battle*, *Perelandra*, and *The Great Divorce*. It is clear that Lewis considers bestial salvation as desirable.

In asserting the salvation of animals, MacDonald appears to have been eccentric among the other 19th century pro-universalist Anglicans. Many of these, including Farrar and Pusey, took for granted the traditional belief that animals were annihilated at death. MacDonald utterly rejects this view on the grounds of theodicy; the perfect God would not allow his creature to perish faultlessly. "No," exclaims MacDonald, "that I do not believe."

Lewis, in part, goes against MacDonald's conclusions. First, his speculative position allows for the possibility that animals may be annihilated at death or may achieve some form of salvation. While it is possible for a beast to survive death, it may also be possible for a beast to perish. Such are the options of speculation, though Lewis's sympathy is clearly on the positive side. Second, Lewis suggests that bestial salvation is exclusive, reserved only for the higher orders. Lesser creatures - newts are his prime example - seem doomed to perish since they are merely beings of sentience. Annihilation is a serious possibility in Lewis's theology, although it was anathema in MacDonald's.

Both MacDonald and Lewis agree that animals can function as
agents of the divine. Aside from the many fantastic creatures that aide - or hinder - the divine plan of salvation, MacDonald describes non-fantastic beasts as aiding in human welfare. In this he depicts the white horse Lilith as having been sent by God to work some special grace on Wilfred Cumbermede, and similarly, he describes the feline rescuer in Alec Forbes as "God's angel, the cat." Lewis also acknowledges this bestial role. Aside from the fantastic creatures throughout the Narnia series, he describes Bultitude and a host of animals as aiding in the divine destruction of the evil forces in That Hideous Strength. This work, though a science fiction, illustrates Bultitude and company as being real, non-fantastic beasts.

The difference between MacDonald's and Lewis's considerations again lies in the fact that MacDonald was a mystic and Lewis was not. In MacDonald's thought there is no need for an intellectual explanation as to how bestial salvation is to be accomplished. He is sufficiently convinced in his personal revelation that the perfect God will save the totality of creation, and that the salvation of animals is assured. Lewis, by contrast, takes into consideration the traditional belief that the ultimate fate of animals is annihilation. Yet he does not entirely accept this common view, and repeatedly wavers towards MacDonald's position. In this he rationalizes the possibility of bestial salvation in terms of arguments for and against, and his overall position remains speculative. If he is not entirely convinced of MacDonald's opinion, neither does he dismiss it. Thus the salvation of animals remains a serious - indeed, even a hopeful - possibility within Lewis's theology.
II. Universalism and the Supernatural.

In both theological considerations there is a place for the "Supernatural," i.e., beings beyond everyday, natural observation. This consideration is mostly contained in MacDonald and Lewis's fantastic works, and as such, a precise analysis is often difficult.

It would seem that MacDonald actually did believe in the existence of fairies and other elf-like beings. I base this upon his son's testimony, his early life, his mysticism, his contempt for materialist disbelief, and the fact that the belief in fairies was still strong in Britain during his time. His illustrations of fairies occur throughout his fantasies and it is possible that this expresses his belief in them.

By contrast, there is nothing to indicate that Lewis definitely believed in the existence of the many traditional mythological creatures that are expressed throughout the Narnian books. It is quite possible that they only serve to illustrate a principle, e.g., the universal lordship of Aslan over all beings, and doubtless reflect Lewis's childhood appreciation of classical stories. Nevertheless, there are several indications that Lewis at least allowed for the possibility of the existence of the supernatural.

First, he does admit to the possibility of life on other planets, mainly due to the influence of F. B. Hoyle. I shall discuss this possibility presently. In his science fiction trilogy, Lewis implies that there may exist such creatures that, though perfectly natural in their native world, would be taken for supernatural beings.
on our earth. Thus, creatures such as "eldils" are described as being endowed with a nature akin to ghosts, elves, sprites, and were possibly the basis of the earlier belief in such beings. Added to which, the belief in fairies was still alive in the 20th century, especially in the 1920's when Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and the spiritualists began producing actual photographs of elves, gnomes and the like. While I have not found anything that points to Lewis's awareness of this episode, it is probable that he had heard of it due to the widespread publicity. Possibly this added to Lewis's speculation concerning the existence of elves and their kin.

Both MacDonald and Lewis express the principle of expanded salvation within their fantasies. While MacDonald's fantasies are difficult to analyze with precision, his heroine Lona represents a definite post-human salvation. This creature is a hybrid, half demon and half human. I have proposed that her nature is that of the Nephilim, if Genesis vi: 1 - 4 is referring to a supernatural union between humans and non-humans. Likewise, British mythology often includes tales of halfbreeds that arise from the union of human and fairy parents. Such tales are common to many cultures, including the ancient Greeks. They have included many well known heroes with gods for a father or mother, such as Heracles, Perseus, and Aeneas. The salvation of Lona, despite the confusion of MacDonald's imagery throughout Lilith, clearly illustrates the expansion of saving grace to include metaphysical beings.

Lewis shares this principle. In Voyage of the Dawn Treader the
star entity Koriakin has apparently sinned against Aslan but is afforded mild penance. While Lewis avoids naming the specific nature of the star creature's offense, he nonetheless indicates that Koriakin is working towards redemption through Aslan's pardon. In this case the same principle of expanded salvation is present.

There are notable features that are unique to both writers. These do not denote disagreement, but point to a novelty in each writer's overall consideration. In MacDonald's writings there is the reoccurring "mother figure," whom I have proposed as the Virgin Mary. Some secondary writers are inclined to conclude this to be a feminization of God in light of MacDonald's high regard for women. In recognizing the merit of this opinion, I would add the suggestion that if such is the case, then it is reasonable to presume that Queen Victoria's stable and lengthy rule contributed to the image. In this God is illustrated as a heavenly queen as opposed to the traditional king image presented in Psalms x: 16; xxix: 10; Isaiah xxxiii: 22; Jeremiah xlvi: 18; I Tim. i: 17; and Rev. xv: 3. In Lewis's books this figure is notably missing. Possibly this reflects the respective churchmanship of both writers. While MacDonald's closest ties to a church party appears to have been in his relationship to F. D. Maurice, the champion of the Broad Church thinkers, it is notable that the Anglo-Catholics were steadily gaining ground during the mid to latter part of the 19th century. It would appear reasonable to suggest that MacDonald may have been impressed by their Mariology or even by that of Roman Catholicism. After all, his son Ronald states that he utterly
detested the term "Protestant," and his writings are often scornful of "the terror of Popery." Lewis, by contrast, in his autobiography recalls his early days of Protestantism as benevolent and his Anglo-Catholic sojournment in terms of severity, if of some benefit. This might partially account for the lack of a Madonna figure, even in his fantasies. Mariology was, of course, a prominent characteristic of the Middle Ages, and Lewis's omission of her might be understood as a reaction to Anglo-Catholicism, despite his interest in medieval literature. Unfortunately, the fluidity of MacDonald's imagery makes it difficult to determine if the mother figure is actually the Virgin Mary at all. Even so, I propose that it is a reasonable theory.

Lewis's writings contain a unique aspect that is missing in MacDonald's. This is the consideration of extra-terrestrial life. In his science fiction trilogy, Lewis dramatizes the idea that life may exist on other planets - in this case Mars and Venus - and how contact with the human race might affect it. In a more grave manner, Lewis suggests that humanity, or rather the devil working through humanity, might bring about the spiritual downfall of any theoretical race still abiding in created perfection. In more academic writings, he describes such encounters in clearly pessimistic language. He states that he looks forward with "horror" to future contacts with extra-terrestrial life, which is likely to be exploited and degraded by human sinfulness. Generally, however, Lewis remains cautiously speculative concerning extra-terrestrials, and though his opinions are
based on Hoyle's theories of potential existence, he largely regards life on other worlds as a possibility only.

Lewis's concern for potential life on other planets is no doubt a reflection of advanced 20th century technology, which even in the mid decades held out the promise of space travel. Yet this cannot totally explain the omission of extra-terrestrial life in MacDonald's books. While some creditable researchers in extra-terrestrial life such as P. J. Klass - whose books dispel most allegations of "U.F.O.'s" - point to the year 1947 as the start of the modern trend of thought, the belief in life on other planets is ancient, and was certainly present in MacDonald's period. For example, the town of Aurora, Texas, reported a "crash" of an alien space craft on April 19, 1897. The "pilot," presumed to be of Martian origins, was duly buried in a local cemetery. While the validity of this report is highly questionable, it does indicate a belief in extra-terrestrial life. Likewise, a number of science fiction works were produced in the 19th century including George Tucker's *A Voyage to the Moon*, 1827; Jules Verne's, *From the Earth to the Moon*, 1865; *Round the Moon*, 1870; H. G. Wells', *The War of the Worlds*, 1893; and P. Greg's, *Across the Zodiac*, 1880 (?). In spite of this, however, MacDonald notably neglects the question of life on other planets and their relationship to universalism.

In considering this neglect, I find it extraordinary that an author whose concern for universalism extended towards fairies and animals should disregard the immediate question of extra-terrestrials.
The belief in life beyond our earth was certainly prevalent in Victorian Britain, and in addition to this, MacDonald possessed a sizable education in science which would logically point to a scientific interest. Possibly, this reflects the mysticism of MacDonald, a reaction against intellectual analysis - even as he discarded the intellectual approach to his fantasies. Yet all accounts indicate that MacDonald's interest in science was great and a source of immense pleasure. At one point, MacDonald appears to have considered emigrating to Germany in order to study the advanced German sciences. The omission of life in outer space from MacDonald's overall treatment of universalism is puzzling, to say the least.

III. Universalism and the Demonic.

In both considerations the existence of the devil is affirmed despite theological trends to the contrary. In MacDonald's time the belief in the devil was seriously questioned by many scientists and intellectuals who tended to dismiss it as superstition. Likewise, Lewis encountered much opposition to his view that the devil was real, and at times it appears to have proven exasperating for him. Regardless, the devil and demons remain as actual creatures in both authors' books.

MacDonald and Lewis agree that Satan is a finite creature, the leader of a rebellion against Heaven. In accordance with Revelation xii: 7 - 9, the demons sinned against God by their own free will but were defeated and cast out. Thus fallen from grace, the demons remain
hostile and malevolent towards humanity and wield superhuman power.

Despite this mutual affirmation of Satan in traditional Judeo-Christian thought, there appears to be some disagreement concerning the extent of Satan's power. In MacDonald's *Lilith* the devil can become terrifying - as when he discovers his queen's abandonment - but is easily bested by the divine agents. Even Vane, the least powerful of these, can afford to ignore Satan's threats as he carries out Adam's orders. Nor is Satan the complete master of his own kingdom, as it is evident that he can be seduced by Lilith, who, though a lesser being, managed to elevate herself to the position of queen.

While Lewis agrees that the devil is limited, e.g., "There is no uncreated being except God," his writings point to a practical dualism wherein all the universe is to be divided into two portions - God's and Satan's. "Our Father or the Enemy will say 'Mine' of each thing that exists," boasts the demon Screwtape. Satan seems to have the ability to absorb anything and everything that falls into his power.

This disagreement can be explained by the contrast in historical settings. MacDonald's view that the devil is easily bested by even the least of divine agents no doubt reflects British confidence in the power of their empire. Even as the Royal Navy was capable of defeating the enemies of Britain, so must God's power be capable of defeating the enemies of humanity. By Lewis's time the situation had changed. The wars, the holocaust and Stalinic purges, the threat of nuclear warfare, added to the diminishing of England as a military power, must have
Lewis convinced that there was an evil power at work in the world that possessed the potential to effect an everlasting damnation on a sizable portion of creation, and especially human beings.

Despite the conflict in assessing Satan's power, there is an obvious sympathy for the devil in both positions. MacDonald's heroes often express a sizable compassion for the devil's separation, which complements his argument that no redeemed soul could be perfectly happy unless all others were redeemed as well. Ian, the fiery Scot in What's Mine's Mine expresses moral indignation that the devil has not yet repented. Ericson, the worldwise doubter in Robert Falconer, expresses MacDonald's views on theodicy when he declares that the demons would repent if God were as good as he might imagine. The reference to Satan as "the pur fallow" in Alec Forbes probably best expresses MacDonald's regret that Satan has not yet surrendered to saving grace.

Lewis appears to have inherited a portion of this outstanding compassion. While his main description of the devil and his hosts is one of immense malevolence, the Screwtape epistles attract some pity for the demons, particularly Wormwood. Lewis meant for these books to present the demons as predatory and hostile - which, of course they are - yet one cannot help but to sympathize with Wormwood who, though at times is downright sadistic, finds himself in an unsavory position. He must either provide food or be food, and there seems to be no third option open to him. Wormwood is caught up in an impossible situation, and while it is true that at times he appears to be enjoying it, he is constantly reminded by Screwtape that he is as much a candidate for the
menu as are the humans he preys upon. What else can the poor fiend do, but hunt down members of what he considers to be an inferior species? Added to this dilemma, there are occasional glimpses of virtue that Screwtape readily rebukes.

This sympathy is carried over, but to a far lesser extent, to Screwtape. This demon appears to have been highly successful in his career and this means that he has lured a number of human beings to their damnation. He is safely out of the immediate danger facing Wormwood, and he writes in a boastful, arrogant manner. Yet, for all this, there remain some glimpses of virtue within an otherwise utterly vile nature. For one thing, he displays some rare paternal instincts towards Wormwood and at times appears enthusiastic in encouraging him. For another, he is apparently loyal to Satan, and seeks to justify the rebellion on the grounds of God's alleged injustice. In this, even Satan is revealed as having fallen through apparent ignorance, in that he and his followers seem incapable of understanding God's "disinterested love." In other works, however, Lewis illustrates the devil as a creature of irremedial evil, without the least shred of merit. Of this latter view, perhaps best described in Perelandra, the devil is totally corrupt, and retains only a few shreds of rationality in order to effect greater misery upon creation.

The salvation of Satan is definite in MacDonald's overall theology. While it is true that in some works such as Robert Falconer and Alec Forbes this is only hinted at, it is declared in the strongest terms in Lilith. Lilith is extremely difficult to interpret because of
its mystical nature. Yet the salvation of Satan is quite clear. Adam, the chief of the divine agents, repeatedly states that Satan must one day submit to saving grace. "His hour will come," affirms Adam, "and he knows it will." Even so, human salvation appears to take precedence over non-human salvation, and Adam further reveals that Satan - and Lilith - will be the last to be redeemed. In this I am reminded of Barth's description of the devil as the last candidate for a general apokatastasis. Added to which is the salvation of Lilith, who in some ways is a worse villain. If the demoness who could actually seduce Satan with her power can be saved, it would seem logical to presume that Satan can be as well.

Lewis partially agrees with MacDonald's views on the salvation of demons. For the most part, Satan and his host would appear to be unlikely candidates for salvation. The demons, despite some theoretical virtue left over from their original grace, are for the most part corrupt and hostile towards God and humanity. Yet alongside of this remains Screwtape's confession that if the demons could but fathom divine love, then "The war would be over and we should re-enter Heaven." It would seem possible for a demon to be redeemed, despite the vastness of its evil.

On the other hand, there is the problem of Satan's absorption of the universe. If the devil ultimately devours his own followers as well as impenitent sinners, then it stands to reason that there can be nothing left to save. If the fate of the demons is destruction rather than eternal duration in misery, then there can be no question of
salvation.

Given these two alternatives, it would seem that Lewis's overall conclusion to the question of the devil's salvation is one of ambivalence. On the one hand - in agreement with MacDonald - it seems possible for a demon to be saved, while on the other, an impossibility. Added to this ambivalence is his praise of Milton for never allowing the question 'What if the devils did repent?'

In the apparent avoidance of speculating on the fate of fallen angels while discussing Milton's work, Lewis has taken up a common Anglican practice. Notably, F. D. Maurice affirmed the existence of demons but refused to comment on the possibility of their redemption. Farrar took pains to avoid any discussion of this potential redemption, discarding it as a matter beyond human understanding. Pusey took note of this deliberate avoidance and insisted that it was contradictory in light of Farrar's arguments. Dearmer was pugnacious in attacking the doctrine of hell, but he left out any consideration of the devil, even though visions of demonic torment were common in the doctrine he wished to discredit. While the issue of Satan's salvation has a long history within the Church as a whole, it does not appear to have been particularly popular for Anglicans, not even during the extremely optimistic 19th century. The inclusion of it is an uncommon feature of both theological positions.

Finally, there is the mutual practice of illustrating the demonic as feminine as well as masculine. In addition to the devil, MacDonald employs a chief villainess in his expression of post-human
salvation. Lilith, whose reputation for evil was exceptional in the
talmudic tradition, is promoted to a virtual queen of hell in Lilith.
She is powerful enough to have enslaved Satan through seduction and is
seen to be inferior to the devil only after her conversion.

Likewise, Lewis also makes use of the Lilith tradition to
express his views on the demonic. In The Pilgrim’s Regress Lilith
makes a brief appearance as a would-be poisoner. In the Narnia
Series, however, the character of the White Witch is basically that
of MacDonald’s Lilith. She is a great queen of evil and wields
tremendous power. Her claim over sinners suggests that she might be a
representation of Satan, as the recipient of Aslan’s ransom, similar to
one possible interpretation of the antilutron formula in I Tim. ii: 6.
Like MacDonald’s Lilith, Jadis can change her shape and does so in order
to escape Aslan’s agents. Finally, in accordance with both MacDonald’s
and the traditional Lilith, the White Witch is seen to be a child
killer, at least in intention. While it is true that the fate of both
literary fiends is different - yet it is hinted in Prince Caspian that the White Witch can be brought back - Lewis appears to have adopted
MacDonald’s Lilith in expressing his own views on demonology.

IV. Universalism and Eschatology.

The discussion of universal salvation and eschatology
contains one of the most obvious expressions of the influence of George
MacDonald on C. S. Lewis. In discussing the concept of eschatology -
the subject of last things - there appears to be a direct indication
of Lewis's indebtedness to MacDonald.

Generally speaking, George MacDonald does not devote much attention to the consideration of eschatology, even though he strongly asserts that universal salvation is an inevitable reality. In terms of eschatological themes, it would appear that he affirms the eventual resurrection of the body, i.e., "It'll be a glorified body...sown in dishonour, and raised in glory." although at death the soul appears to proceed directly to God if no further purging is required. Such eschatological references, however, are not common. His consideration of the theme of a last judgment is unclear and brief, but it seems that he is rejecting the traditional view of a final bifurcating trial, as implied in Scripture, i.e., Jude 6, the judgment of the great day; 15, judgment upon all; or Rev. xx: 12-13, every individual judged according to their works. Apart from these brief implications of eschatological themes, MacDonald's consideration of final things is chiefly confined to two fantastic works, Lilith and The Princess and Curdie.

In Lilith MacDonald expresses the conclusion that all creation, including humans, beasts, and demons, is to be finally restored. In this, he illustrates an apokatastasis, or the final restoration of all things, as implied in Acts iii: 21. In this illustration, there is much dynamic symbolism and vivid imagery, though mostly fluid and open to a number of interpretations. It is, perhaps, notable that there is no suggestion of a last judgment, but rather, the glorious restoration appears to be both universal and automatic.
His consideration of eschatology is considerably different in *The Princess and Curdie*. In a brief summary of the story, a king is poisoned and his throne usurped by his council. Curdie, the same hero of *The Princess and the Goblin*, is sent forth by the mother figure, the dynamic divine agent, to restore the king to his rightful throne. With the help of the horrifying beasts, Curdie succeeds, and the seven worst traitors are brought to judgment. In this, the eschatological theme of the last judgment is expressed. The seven archvillains are carried off to the woods beyond the kingdom by the hideous beasts, not unlike the scriptural theme of Matt. xxii: 13, the binding and casting out of the offending wedding guest by the king.

At this point in the narration, MacDonald comes closer to asserting the possibility of an everlasting hell than in most of his literature. The fate of the hapless seven, except for the fact that they are given over to the horrifying animals, remains unknown. MacDonald declares that "What became of them I have never heard." Here it would appear that the victims are totally at the mercy of the beasts, and this might indicate a strong possibility of destruction, torment, or similar devastation. Yet MacDonald also offers a hint that expresses some hope of salvation. The female divine agent excuses herself from the rejoicing kingdom for some unfinished business with the beasts in the woods. The beasts, evidently her servants, are referred to as "the dear old Uglies," despite their terrifying appearance, and it would seem logical to conclude that her business with them is one of a salvific nature, i.e., their eventual admittance
into the kingdom. In this, the hero Curdie thinks that her business in the woods might also include the seven lost traitors, whom MacDonald merely refers to as "others." The implication that the seven villains are included in the agent's salvific purpose is not precisely expressed, but in view of MacDonald's overall consideration of hell, it is logical.

In his consideration, Lewis confesses that much of eschatology remains to be of a mysterious nature. While he admits to the belief in a collective resurrection, he considers the same to be beyond his present understanding: "Guesses, of course, only guesses." He further suggests that if the current speculations concerning the collective resurrection are not accurate, then "something better will be." In brief, his attitude towards eschatological themes remains affirmative, but highly flexible.

He assumes this stance in considering the theme of the final judgment in The World's Last Night. In this, he discusses the proposal of the second coming of Christ, and concludes it to be a firm reality in the future, although lacking a clear and precise description of the circumstances. Mostly, eschatology is viewed in terms of judgment. Emphasis is placed upon finality, rather than punishment, i.e., the rendering of all creation into a definitive state.

The most obvious influence of MacDonald occurs in Perelandra and The Last Battle. In Perelandra Lewis illustrates an apokatastasis, which is extremely similar to that of MacDonald's Lilith. Every category of creation is restored, from the least grain to the greatest
being. In this, it is evident that our earth is not affected, in that the trilogy continues with *That Hideous Strength*, which takes its setting upon this world, still burdened by imperfection. This eschatological vision is somewhat confusing. The contrast between a local *apokatastasis* and a universal one is not made entirely clear. Added to the confusion is the fact that Venus, or Perelandra, never actually fell from its original grace, as did our earth in the Genesis theme. The question arises as to how the planet Perelandra might be restored, even at the local level, never having fallen from original perfection in the first place? Lewis does not explain this.

In terms of a restoration, however, *Perelandra* strongly resembles *Lilith* in its eschatology. Whether Lewis's *apokatastasis* is intended to be universal (which appears illogical) or local, it seems to have been substantially influenced by MacDonald's theme of restoration covering the entirety of creation. It is further notable that in the precise vision of restoration in *Lilith*, there is no illustration of the restored devil or the restored Lilith, even though MacDonald strongly expresses the inevitable salvation of both, just previous to his description of the vision. Lewis, in light of his flexible conclusion as to the possibility of Satan's salvation, might have found this omission to be in keeping with his own theological position, and it is notable that he has omitted (in *Perelandra*) any suggestion of a vision of misery in polarity to the *apokatastasis*. The exact fate of the devil, or bent oyarsa, is not entirely clear.

Further evidence of MacDonald's influence occurs in *The Last
Battle. The plot of this fantasy is probably based on the Book of Revelation. In brief, Narnia is bewitched by a pseudo-Aslan called Puzzle, a donkey in lion's clothing (probably named for the riddle of 666 in Rev. xiii: 18), who is really only the innocent victim of an evil ape named Shift (possibly the false prophet of Rev. xix: 20). The armed forces of the Calormenes invade Narnia and the Armageddon theme commences. Aslan returns, defeats the forces of evil, and initiates a final judgment that results in the separation of the saved and the damned (Rev. xxii: 14 - 15).

At this point, the influence of George MacDonald upon C. S. Lewis is most obvious. Hell, in The Last Battle, is expressed in nearly identical terms with those of MacDonald's The Princess and Curdie. The damned are cast outside the gates of the beatific vision, as are the seven traitors in The Princess and Curdie. Fearsome monsters are summoned by Aslan to devour all creation outside of the gates, possibly even the damned, although Lewis does not specifically say this. The terrifying beasts are apparently the servants of Aslan, even as are the "dear old Uglies" the servants of MacDonald's mother figure. In both cases, these beasts are the agents of the possible destruction of the individuals who fell to divine wrath. In this, it is obvious that Lewis takes MacDonald's illustration of the theme of the last judgment and employs it as the conclusion to a Narnian version of the Book of Revelation.

Furthermore, Lewis basically employs the same conclusion to the ultimate fate of the damned as MacDonald, precisely in the instance of
the lost souls who are at the mercy of the beasts. Just as MacDonald expresses this ultimate conclusion as mystery, i.e., "What became of them I have never heard," so Lewis declares the exact same conclusion with near-identical language: "I don't know what became of them." 106 Both the eschatological scenes and the complementary phrases are obvious evidence of MacDonald's influence upon Lewis.

There is, however, one difference between both illustrations which typifies the theological positions of both men. Lewis, whose consideration of hell differs greatly from MacDonald's in terms of definitiveness, immediately includes an implication that the damned may be irrevocably lost: "The children never saw them again." 107 MacDonald, typically the universalist, adds the implication that there is at least some hope of salvation for the damned, in that the great mother figure had continuing business with both the monsters and the traitors still lost in the outside woods. Neither implication is a definite statement, but both present a typification of the respective theological considerations of both writers.
Footnotes:


11. MacDonald, "The Consuming Fire," p. 49


17. Ibid.


19. Ibid., pp. 669, 700.

36. Lewis, Beyond Personality, pp. 22-3; The Great Divorce, p. 116.


50. Ibid., p. 21; MacDonald, *Alec Forbes* pp. 6-7.


70. MacDonald, Lilith, p. 295.


72. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, pp. 125-9; Beyond Personality, p. 39 cf.

73. Lewis, Perelandra, pp. 226-50.


75. Lewis, The Last Battle, pp. 150-85; Perelandra, pp. 226-50; The Great Divorce, pp. 35, 113.

76. MacDonald, Wilfred Cumbermede, p. 424.

77. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, pp. 125-9; Beyond Personality, p. 39 cf.

78. MacDonald, Alec Forbes, p. 25.


84. Ibid., pp. 255-66.
89. MacDonald, Alec Forbes, p. 422.
91. MacDonald, Lilith, p. 302.
100. Ibid., p. 238.
101. Ibid., p. 238.
104. Lewis, Letters to Malcolm, p. 158.

106. Lewis, *The Last Battle*, p. 156.

107. Ibid.
VII. Conclusion.

The basic difference between MacDonald and Lewis's treatment of universalism is obvious. George MacDonald consistently affirms universal salvation throughout his writings while for C. S. Lewis, it remains an ambiguous question. At times Lewis appears to reject universalism, mainly on the grounds of free will. Yet there is also some allowance that it is a feasible doctrine. Nevertheless, Lewis's treatment of universalism has been heavily influenced by that of George MacDonald and I assert this conclusion on the following grounds.

First, there are areas of frequent agreement between both writers and in these MacDonald's views are heartily endorsed by Lewis. This is particularly true of MacDonald's trinitarianism, his demand for a complete conversion, his views on sin, the use of fantasy as a means of expressing theological principles, and the expansion of universalism beyond the human level. It is in these areas of agreement that Lewis's praise and enthusiasm waxes strong, especially in his preface to George MacDonald: An Anthology. Here he applauds MacDonald as a great religious teacher and unsurpassed fantasy writer. He regards MacDonald as his spiritual master and his theological views strongly reflect the latter's influence.

Next, there are areas of partial agreement in which Lewis often modifies MacDonald's opinions. This is common throughout his treatment, and while he is aware of the merit of MacDonald's opinions, his overall approach is one of ambiguity. In the consideration of other religions, for example, he maintains that is possible for non-Christians to be
saved - MacDonald demanded that all must be saved - but at the same time, it is possible for a non-Christian to be damned. Likewise, Lewis regards bestial salvation as a serious possibility but not a definite conclusion. This appears to be Lewis's usual position; a modification or partial agreement with George MacDonald's views.

Finally, there are areas of obvious disagreement. These are most noticeable in Lewis's rejection of death as a positive experience and MacDonald's arguments against an everlasting hell in light of God's perfection. Yet even here MacDonald's influence is keenly felt, in that Lewis is directly assailing MacDonald's position on these matters. In *The Great Divorce*, for instance, Lewis seeks to make MacDonald retract his argument that no perfected soul could be happy in paradise if even one soul was left unredeemed. The historical MacDonald consistently asserted this argument throughout his life.

The areas of partial agreement and disagreement are understandable by a number of factors. First, there is the obvious contrast between historical settings. For all its problems, Victorian England was optimistic in its outlook on religion. Optimism is often based on success and security and the British empire possessed a plentitude of both. By Lewis's time this had changed. England was now vulnerable to attack and the empire in serious decline. While there were many advances in medicine, hygiene, ecumenism, and technology, the previous atmosphere of optimism was gone.

Second, as a professor of medieval studies Lewis could not have helped being influenced by medieval thought - at least to some degree.
While the medieval period's emphasis on hellfire and demonic torment has probably been exaggerated by its critics - often to the exclusion of the numerous positive characteristics - there was, nevertheless, a strong belief in damnation, as evident throughout the theology, art and popular thought of this period. Lewis was doubtlessly affected by this.

Third, there were the personal lives of the writers. MacDonald grew up in a benevolent home atmosphere which gave him confidence in God as a father figure. Likewise, he grew up in a severe Calvinist region of Scotland, which appears to have rendered him scornful of many Calvinist tenets, particularly predestination and eternal damnation. This, plus his relationship with Maurice - whose theology complemented his in many areas - no doubt supported his strong belief in universal salvation. Lewis, by contrast, reported his early life as far less joyful. While his early experiences with Ulster Protestantism was benign, the Anglo-Catholicism of Belsen was severe. Lewis's father, while neither vicious nor abusive, was burdensome, unpleasant and unsupportive. This, plus a period of secular atheism, seems to have produced some indecision in Lewis's thought, as compared to MacDonald's cheerful confidence.

Finally, there is the fact that MacDonald was a mystic while Lewis was not. MacDonald's theodicy is as much based on his mysticism as on the above considerations. Being a mystic MacDonald felt himself to be inspired with an individual revelation; God working on his imagination, as he would describe it. This personal - perhaps even
'private' - experience led him to conclude that God was perfect and therefore all creation must be redeemed. While not denying the collective revelations of the Church throughout history, MacDonald clearly emphasized the one-on-one, personal experience between God and each human being. In the case of his own experience, MacDonald perceived theological principles in terms of a theodicy, and thus enforced by what he believed to be divine inspiration, he consistently affirmed universal salvation against all opposition.

This is not without historical precedence, of course, and I am reminded of Lady Julian and her *Revelations of Divine Love*. Like MacDonald, this mystic also experienced private revelations which revealed universal salvation, contrary to the common theological beliefs. It is possible that the literary MacDonald's quoting from Julian's words "All shall be well..." in *The Great Divorce* indicates that Lewis was also aware of this historical similarity.

By contrast, Lewis was not a mystic. I have not encountered any secondary writer who describes him as one. His views are strongly based on logic and traditional dogmas, and he often offers apologies for these. This non-mystical nature is likewise apparent in his fantasies, and as I have pointed out these are usually far easier to interpret than MacDonald's. Yet in his apologies Lewis attempts to remain fair and honest. No matter how unpleasant or personally revolting a subject, Lewis approaches it in a straightforward manner. If he often appears ambiguous - certainly his overall conclusion to universalism is so - it is because he struggles to present both sides of an argument, and to
consider both in a reasonable and fair discussion.

Perhaps the most obvious indication of MacDonald's influence is the fact that Lewis does not entirely dismiss the possibility of universal salvation. The fact that the writer who inspired his conversion was a universalist remains a heavy factor throughout Lewis's overall treatment of universalism.

Contribution.

I have already discussed the contribution that a thesis dealing with universalism would make in my introduction. In this final section I propose to discuss the contributions that MacDonald and Lewis have made to the overall history of the doctrine.

Generally speaking, interest in universal salvation or apokatastasis has been scarce. Compared to other theological topics, e.g., Christology, there are few writers that have discussed the doctrine, either objectively or in order to promote it. Outside of Origen and Augustine's opponents - whom I have previously discussed - there are few exponents of apokatastasis in the early Church. Gregory of Nyssa and his sister Macrinna - both regarded as orthodox and saints in the eastern churches - appear to have been advocating universal salvation. In The Great Cathechism Gregory asserts that all will be redeemed eventually and this includes the purgation of the universe as a whole. This universal redemption may include the devil, since Gregory describes the salvation of the "introducer of evil" or "he who first devised our ruin."¹ Macrinna's views on this matter are only known
to us through Gregory's *De Anima et Resurrectione*! In this, a lengthy witness to her dying words, Gregory records that she foresaw the ultimate redemption of all humanity, and possibly the demons as well.²

In other early writings, however, the doctrine is merely hinted at. Clement of Alexandria in *Fragments (1st John)* describes God as being a universal saviour. He asserts that God saves all, but some only through severe punishments.³ It is not clear, however, whether he means all humanity or if he is referring to the totality of an "elect." Ambrose, *bishop of Milan, in On the Death of Satyrus* describes God in vague terms as enlightening all and being desirous that none should be lost.⁴ Yet the language is so general that at best it suggests only the hope of universal salvation. Gregory Nazianzen's *Orations* describe the destructive nature of hellfire, but he briefly rejects this in favor of an interpretation that suggests that this fire is better understood as being corrective rather than vengeful. This latter view, he declares, is more worthy of God.⁵ Along this line, he briefly describes God being all in all at the time of the restitution⁶ and transforming all things,⁷ but these descriptions are vague and inconclusive. In life, Gregory was baptized late, apparently due to the fear of committing sin after baptism. His overall writings, like the others, may contain sympathy for universalism but not a definite conclusion.

The reasons for the comparative fewness of universalist writers are probably varied, but there are three which are outstanding. First,
there are strong implications of an everlasting hell throughout the bible. Second, there is a long standing tradition of eternal damnation in the history of the Church. Third, universalism is often objected to on moral grounds. In this last instance, it is argued that universal salvation - including the worst of sinners - demotes the value of Christian morality, or cheapens the conscious efforts of sincere believers towards virtue by dismissing the rewards of a well lived life. It is argued that adherence to moral values would be worthless since even the vilest individuals would reap salvation. In extreme instances, it is objected that the belief in universal salvation would grant a licence to commit the worst of atrocities, the perpetrator being confident in eventual redemption. These three factors have helped make universalism a relatively obscure doctrine and Lewis and MacDonald's considerations are a contribution to a largely neglected field of study.

Of the scarcity of universalists, Anglicanism appears to have acquired more than its fair share. In the first two historical chapters I have demonstrated that there has been a number of exponents of universal salvation throughout the history of the Anglican Church but even these have been a relatively small percentage of the whole. Of this group there has been a tendency to limit the discussion of universalism to humanity. Both MacDonald and Lewis counter this pattern by expanding their consideration beyond the human situation. This has been a comparatively unique contribution to the study of universalism within the Anglican tradition.
I believe that this expanded universalism may offer a substantial contribution to contemporary Christian thought as well. As I have indicated, interest in universal salvation has been expressed in the writings of such modern authors as Barth, Rahner, Hick and Harpur. It is also endorsed by several current groups such as the Unification Church, Children of God, Unitarian-Universalists and liberal American Methodists. But in particular, current interest in creation — and thus salvation — beyond the human level is substantial.

First, in considering the rest of the natural order, it is notable that anthropology has made considerable progress in discovering fossil remains of prehuman and early human creatures. Aside from the distinctly pithecine or true ape groups, e.g., dryopithecus, Ramapithecus, gigantopithecus, there is evidence for the existence of hominids which appear to be borderline, as well as those truly human. Amongst the true humans neanderthals and cro-magnons (these are general terms for diverse groups, some of which show characteristics of both, e.g., the Skuhl skulls of Mount Carmel) may be included in the discussion of human salvation. The same may be said of the homo erectus groups, with some caution since although the majority of scientists seem to consider them to be truly human, they are still referred to by many as "pithecanthropines" or, loosely translated, "ape-like men." But then there are those of the australopithecine faction, both gracile and robust. Opinion concerning these creatures is diverse, some claiming that they are, as their name indicates, merely apes, while others describe them as legitimate hominids, i.e., potential ancestors of
true humans. Added to this hotly disputed controversy - mainly due to the shortage of complete skeletal remains - is the question of *homo habilis*. Some suggest that this creature is, in accordance with its common title, an early human and hence the genus *homo*. Others contend that it is merely a form of *australopithecus*, nothing more than another "southern ape."

In the preceding paragraph I have loosely described the common terms for these beings. It is not my purpose at this point to undergo an elaborate discussion of evolution and anthropology since A) it is not specifically discussed in Lewis and MacDonald's treatment of universalism; and B) I have not - to quote C. S. Lewis - "the learning to do so." I do, however, wish to point out that the contemporary scientific investigation of such fossils raises some theological issues pertaining to universalism. At what point are these creatures to be considered within the scope of humanity and human salvation? Where do they fit in general contemporary Christian thought? The discussion of these beings no doubt falls into the category of expanded universalism, to which Lewis and MacDonald have made - especially in terms of bestial salvation - a unique contribution.

There is also current interest in universalism and the supernatural, especially the question of extra-terrestrial life. In the 1970's Erick Von Daniken drew much attention to the possibility of extra-terrestrial intervention in human history. His books, beginning with *Chariots of the Gods?*, suggested that many of the earth's marvels - including its religions - were the remnants of earlier alien activity.
In *Chariots of the Gods?* Von Daniken went so far as to pose the question "Was God an Astronaut?" This trend caught on fast and there arose a number of extra-terrestrial "experts" who claimed they had physical evidence pointing to the labors of space visitors in bygone days. Some of these merely repeated Von Daniken's evidence, while others bordered on the ridiculous. Marc Dem, for instance, in *The Lost Tribes From Outer Space* asserted that Jews were actually the genetic creation of aliens working under the collective name YHWH. While these incredible claims have been amply countered by such investigators as Clifford Wilson, Philip Klass and Ronald Story, belief in the U.F.O. and related phenomena is still strong. In a more rational manner, some authors such as Carl Sagan and Isaac Asimov have suggested that it is possible that there is intelligent life in outer space - though not definite - and that efforts are being made to reach them through radio signals. This procedure is usually referred to in such terms as S.E.T.I. - the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence. Interest in the possibility of life in outer space was also shared by Pope Paul VI, who often visited the Jesuit-manned Vatican observatory at Castel Gandolfo. It appears to have been a favorite recreational pastime of the late pontiff to theorize on the possibility of other human-like life forms in the whole of creation. At present, there is a series of claims by individuals who have been "abducted" by alien beings. These individuals, as presented in Bud Hopkins's *Intruders* and William Strieber's *Communion*, allege that they have been captured by beings presumably from another planet, examined, and released. The
number of such reports appears to be on the rise.

While I personally believe that the evidence, testimony and arguments in favor of the existence of extra-terrestrial life is faulty, improbable and at times fraudulent, they are nonetheless an indication of the current strong belief in life on other worlds, often expressed with religious considerations. The extra-terrestrial phenomenon - though improbable in actuality - raises some theological issues concerning salvation beyond the human level. Lewis especially contributes to this area of contemporary Christian thought.

To a lesser degree, there is also contemporary interest in the demonic. While some Anglican factions are moving to exclude the belief in Satan from the liturgy, e.g., replacing the phrase "the devil and all his works" 14 with more general renouncements of evil in the Order for Confirmation, others such as Canon John D. Pearce-Higgins have assumed a different stance. Pearce-Higgins was - and is - one of the foremost exorcists of the Church of England, although he objects to the term "exorcist." While he affirms the existence of demons on biblical grounds, his exorcisms of allegedly possessed victims are somewhat different than the usual methods based on the traditional Roman ritual. Pearce-Higgins employs a mixture of kindness and firmness while commanding a demon to vacate its host. The canon's alternate service - given with some concern for the demon's possible salvation as well as relief for the victim - proceeds as follows:

'In the authority of Christ, I command you to be taken hence and bound fast as with chains and cast into the darkness, from which there is no return save through repentance,' or 'until
the day of repentance, so that you trouble no more the servants of God.  

Both Lewis and MacDonald have made unique contributions similar to this line of thought, which, as I have suggested, is uncommon within Anglicanism.

Finally, there is a contemporary belief in eschatology to which the question of universalism will have significance. In the 1970's Hal Lindsey wrote The Late Great Planet Earth, which proposed that the end of the world was imminent. Lindsey based his predictions on divine inspiration, biblical prophesy, the current world political situation in which Israel figured prominently, and the threat of nuclear warfare. Having been in theological training during this time, I can personally testify to the controversy stirred up by Lindsey's book - particularly amongst evangelical parties, many of which still adhere to Lindsey's basic ideas. Other writers, while not sharing Lindsey's views on biblical prophesy, also suggest that an actual "armageddon" - brought on by nuclear warfare - is a realistic and terrifying possibility. Undoubtedly the approach of the end of the millennium has added to the fearful anticipation that the end of the world may be close at hand. Still, there appears to be sufficient cause on which to base such foreboding. One Canadian estimate suggests a present world arsenal of some 50,000 nuclear weapons with an explosive yield of 12,000 megatons.

In discussing these areas I am not attempting to afford them credibility or am I attempting to deny them. I am pointing out, however, that - credible or not - they are part of contemporary
Christian thought and that the treatment of universalism in both MacDonald and Lewis's writings might make significant contributions to these areas, even as it has to the study of universalism in general and Anglicanism in particular.


7. Ibid., pp. 386-8.


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