THE MEANING OF MAN IN ST. AUGUSTINE

by

REV. ALBERT B. HAKIM

OTTAWA

1954
UMI Number: DC53406

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI

UMI Microform DC53406
Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Objectives</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Method</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The current problem of the meaning of man</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Man, one of Augustine's favorite themes</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Orientation on truth</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relatedness of all things</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reason and faith</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Confessions as the book <em>per excellence</em></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: Body and soul in the philosophy of St. Augustine</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: MAN IN RELATION TO GOD</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The interior path to God</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The contemplation scene at Ostia</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The image of God in man</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Illumination</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The place of love</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ascent of man to God</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The three stages</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Plotinian and Augustinian ascent</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The final end of man</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE: THE LIBERTY OF MAN</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Liberty and human nature</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Moral evil and moral good</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Liberty and grace</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR: MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Unity of mankind</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Principles of justice and love</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The two cities</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE: MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. St. Augustine and values</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Frui-uti</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Development of the person</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE MEANING OF MAN IN ST. AUGUSTINE
INTRODUCTION

1. Objectives
2. Method
3. The current problem of the meaning of man

1. Objectives

The interest of the author of this thesis has been aroused over a period of years by the problem of humanism which today has become one of our great problems. Never before has man ever been considered from so many points of view; not only from the point of view of the scientist, the historian, the theologian, and the philosopher, who are more or less traditional observers, but also from the point of view of the psychologist, the sociologist, and the anthropologist, comparative newcomers to the study of man. Much has been written of man as an individual, as a social being, as a person faced with moral decision, as a being located in a complex network which is often referred to as the "human situation." The notions of property and ownership have again arisen for a thorough inspection. World events and politics of recent years have engendered a new concept of international law that would bind man individually and collectively to the world community. All of these attest to the problematic that man has become, a careful study of which is not only necessary in
INTRODUCTION

1. Objectives

our times, but also richly rewarding.

Solutions to the problem of man suggested by various modern disciplines are bound to be superficial and insufficient if they are based upon merely proximate needs and circumstances. If solutions are to possess any substance they are to be based upon ultimate truths. The problem therefore is basically philosophical; likewise the solution.

The attention of the author was then drawn to the irresistible figure of St. Augustine. He is a typically Christian philosopher for the study of whose works no excuse nor justification is needed. However, upon analysis the author discovered two probable reasons for his attraction to him in the matter of philosophical humanism: the first is the bishop's intensely personal approach to the whole of philosophy, and nothing seems better calculated to draw a person to the truth than to see it in another as a veritable principle of action. Augustine was a bishop of an active diocese; his charge was the care of souls; his prime objective was their salvation. His polemics, his orations, his letters, his commentaries, are all weighted heavily with his mission to encourage men to
INTRODUCTION

1. Objectives

love God and to achieve their final perfection. The second reason is historical, in that Augustine's time was remarkably like our own, a time in which the tradition of the west seemed sure of falling and in which the three-fold error of skepticism, materialism, and the self-sufficiency of man was filtering into the masses by way of Manicheanism and Pelagianism. So it is in no way astonishing that we turn to Augustine as a philosopher benefiting by the Christian revelation for a philosophical humanism that answers to the cry of the present day.

This thesis is a construction from the writings of the holy doctor; it does not purport to give a complete Augustinian psychology, but it does intend to give a reasonably full treatment of the meaning of man. Since, on his own admission, Augustine's philosophical interest was confined to God and man, many, if not all, of his outstanding doctrines have a bearing on the meaning of man and will therefore be viewed herein in that light. Polemics have generally been eschewed; our attempt has been to show how Augustine's various positions contribute to his idea of man, even if some of them are controverted; for example, even if the validity of his demonstration
... INTRODUCTION

1. Objectives

of God's existence be called into doubt, it still stands that, for him, the interior path to God attests to man's glory and makes of man, in a sense, the key to reality.

There can be no doubt that when it comes to anthropology, the bishop of Hippo gives his estimate of man as he is in this historic context; no other means, for him, permit us to arrive at this full knowledge. Though it is quite possible, it would serve no purpose to make a painful and detailed separation of the philosophical and theological elements\(^1\) of Augustine on this subject.\(^2\)

Where an obvious opportunity to add appropriate theological comments presents itself, it has been used; our winnowing principle, however, has been to pass by topics that are, so to speak, purely supernatural, such as the nature of grace or its precise mode of influencing the soul; but where a revealed truth intensifies what is already

---

1. "Il y a donc une philosophie de saint Augustin, mais chez lui, elle est si intimement liée à la théologie, que l'on ne peut les séparer." E. Portalé, "Saint Augustin" in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, t. I (1902), Paris, Letouzey, col. 2322.

philosophically known, it has been discussed for the sake of pointing up that intensification: for example, man bears within himself the image of God, but much more is this realized when it is realized that the image is also of the Trinity.

Our study of man has been embodied in the study of the relations of man. The relations of things betray their meaning; if per impossibile a created thing existed without relations it would have no meaning. This is not to suggest that the nature of a thing is its relations, but that the relations of a thing lie rooted in its nature; by studying the relations we come to know the nature itself and the perfection of that nature, as St. Thomas says:

Perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenditur secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum ordinem unius rei ad aliam. ¹

It follows then that the only way to apprehend the meaning of man is to piece together his manifold relations. This truth was obvious to St. Augustine, for there is nothing more obvious to him than order, and order is nothing more

¹ De potentia, VII, 9, c.
... INTRODUCTION

1. Objectives

than relation. Our first chapter then is a discussion of the notion of relatedness in the Doctor of Grace; the second chapter treats of man in relation to God; the third, man as endowed with the faculty of will by which he is free to acknowledge his relation to other beings; the fourth, man in relation to other men; the fifth, man in relation to values.

2. Method

In order to fulfill the objectives as stated several methods of approach were suggested, having in mind the thesis nature of the inquiry. The first suggestion was largely historical, to trace the development of Augustine's philosophical humanism by following the chronological sequence of his writings. The second was to confine the treatment to the early dialogues of Cassiciacum. The third was to allow a wider freedom in drawing together his picture of man from his works at large. Each method has something to recommend itself.

The first method might have indicated a deepening of Augustine's understanding as he more and more understood Christian revelation; but this method, it seemed to
the author, would offer too much of a temptation to make a Procrustes' bed of a pre-conceived pattern of what Augustine's development should have been with the consequent forcing of texts into that pattern; it also clearly disallows the possibility of Augustine's having a firm grasp on the meaning of man very early in life, but taking a lifetime to articulate it.¹

The second method offered a better starting point in that Augustine's retreat at Cassiciacum was for the sole purpose of inquiring into man and therefore one would expect to find his most deliberate thoughts on man in the dialogues written at that time. However, the disadvantage here was seen to be just the reverse of the first method: it ruled out the possibility of either a

¹ This point is borne out by a change in the attitude of M. Gilson who earlier had reproached P. Boyer for not having approached the doctrine of St. Augustine from an evolutionary point of view. Gilson, maintaining a psychological evolution, now writes: "...nous n'avons jamais réussi à déceler la moindre variation proprement philosophique dans aucune de ses thèses essentielles. Saint Augustin a fixé ses idées maîtresses dès sa conversion, même, croyons-nous, en ce qui concerne la grâce, et il a toujours vécu sur ce capital une fois constitué." Étienne Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin, (Études de Philosophie Médiévale, XI), Paris, J. Vrin, 1943, 2me édition, p. 310. #1.
later development or at least a later articulation of a previously held truth.

The third method had the merit of a lifetime's philosophical reflection. Since the over-all objective of this thesis is to present the fulness of Augustine's humanism, it seemed to be wisest not to close off any source of contribution to that fulness. Therefore not only are the formal works of Augustine investigated, but also his many sermons and letters in which the bishop encouraged his flock and his friends to a true understanding of themselves and their destiny. This method too enjoys the surveillance of the *Retractiones*, in which, almost unique among the great writers, Augustine surveys all his previous writings to approve or correct them. For these reasons, this third method was chosen as the means most suited to our purpose.

3. The current problem of the meaning of man

The philosophical drift of our age is shot through with materialism: the material world is the sole actuality; there are no eternal values in the Christian sense of the word. Materialism, as F. J. Sheed points out,
... INTRODUCTION

3. The current problem of the meaning of man has the apparent effect of ennobling man, while in reality degrading him:

The Christian ... is at least crediting man with some element higher than matter, while the materialist is denying man an element higher than matter; and the Christian in this is coolly represented as degrading man by his teaching, and the materialist as emancipating man from this degradation.¹

De Lubac characterizes our century as having come forward with a faith in science that is ambitiously directed towards possessing the world, bringing in its wake a transformation in society insofar as man tends to make himself master and owner of human forces and insofar as a developing technology enables man to forge his own destiny.²

Materialism forces a shift in values, and since the problem of value is one with the problem of being, the departure of philosophers from the realm of metaphysics has taken them from the realm of values. Value, like being, can never be suppressed: where value is denied in one place it must be affirmed in another. This is


... INTRODUCTION

3. The current problem of the meaning of man

precisely what has occurred in those thinkers who control the philosophical temper of our day. They have divorced themselves from God; having divorced themselves from infinite being, they have divorced themselves from infinite value and are therefore powerless to fashion a scheme of values that is always valid. They find themselves forced to assign to man a value from below, not from above, and are fruitless in their basic understanding of man, what he is, where he is going. That is why, after four centuries of tending towards an anthropocentric humanism, we, of the twentieth century, are in the throes of a materialist reversal:

Le moment du renversement materialiste des valeurs, le moment révolutionnaire, où l'homme, posant décidément sa fin dernière en lui-même, et ne pouvant plus supporter la machine de ce monde, engage une guerre désespérée pour faire surgir d'un athéisme radical une humanité toute nouvelle.¹

Atheism does not take its origin from scientific and intellectual arguments against the existence of God, even though it adapts them as a defensive means. It

... INTRODUCTION

3. The current problem of the meaning of man originates, in the opinion of M. Maritain,\(^1\) in a fundamen-
tamental, moral choice, whereby, in a deliberate rejection
of transcendent law and every final end, the will distorts
the total direction of man. Atheism devolves into a man-
centered universe; it contemplates man as though his good-
ness were self-given and looks forward to a gradual tem-
poral deepening of that goodness as a result of principles
latent within man.

With the denial of God comes the denial of true
transcendence. There is nothing before which man can be
open; no being, no value in whose possession man can de-
velop and enrich himself. Man is master of his destiny.
The more atheism denies transcendence the more man has to
appropriate himself as a final end: "Une totale réjection
de la transcendance entraîne logiquement une adhésion
totale à l'immanence."\(^2\)

This idea is amply verified in the atheistic human-
ists of the last century like Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and

---

1. Jacques Maritain, *La signification de l'athéisme con-

contemporain*, p. 18.
Marx. The attributes we predicate of God, they maintained, are in reality man's. Nothing exists outside material nature; man's religious fantasy has created the higher beings which are actually the reflection of man's own essence. Man, over the course of centuries, has "alienated" himself, dispossessed himself of those attributes and only now is able to recover them for himself.

Nietzsche was not only a great enemy of Christianity but also of God. He firmly believed that God had died, -- slain by man. That is why he could write in a casual way: "Why atheism nowadays? 'The father' in God is thoroughly refuted; equally so 'the judge,' 'the rewarder.' Also the 'free will': he does not hear -- and even if he did, he would not know how to help."¹ Like Feuerbach before him he held "alienation" to be the reason why man believed in God. As de Lubac writes:

God, according to Nietzsche, is nothing more than the mirror of man, who, in certain intense, exception states, becomes aware of the power that is in him, or of the love

---

INTRODUCTION

3. The current problem of the meaning of man

exalts him.¹

Karl Marx, whose speculative thought is today unwinding itself into practice, held the dialectical progress of history and antitheism as formed conclusions, and then frankly proceeded to revolutionize man as an economic and social entity. He, like the others, exalted man as a compensation for destroying God. Henceforth he had his own metaphysics. As Maritain says,

Nous voilà donc en présence d'un démenti apparent au matérialisme marxiste qui regarde toute idée métaphysique ou religieuse comme une expression (elle-même active) de l'economie; l'economie marxiste elle-même, la sociologie marxiste subissent le primat et la détermination d'une certaine métaphysique, -- athée, réaliste-dialectique, immanentiste absolue.²

Man, in the spirit of Marxism, seeks his perfection in man. Man plunges into the very depths of material nature and comes up with complete possession of the Marxist total man. This brand of evangelism is far from dead. At the philosophical congress at Amsterdam in 1948 the Marxists

INTRODUCTION

3. The current problem of the meaning of man openly professed their belief in a "mundane salvation," which means a salvation in the natural order, "... a salvation without God, one which is to be achieved by man and for man, and which is possible only after God has been destroyed in the interest of humanity."¹

Another current philosophical trend takes its whole tenor from its attitude towards God and man: existentialism. It can be a confusing task to try to find a definition that universally covers all that goes by the name of existentialism, whether Christian or non-Christian. Nevertheless, it may be said in general that it considers the fundamental problem of philosophy to be the existence of man; it is "... a reaction of the philosophy of man against the excesses of the philosophy of ideas and the philosophy of things."² It declares itself to be against systematization of thought and too rigid outlook on the realm of being. Historically there seems to be some connection between existentialism and a time of crisis; this

INTRODUCTION

The current problem of the meaning of man

is suggested partially by the fact that it became fairly widespread during the time of both world wars. It is acknowledged by some to be a declamation against the dehumanizing of man in an age of mechanization, an attempt to fathom the presence of emptiness and futility in man, and a struggle to achieve the fulness of life by personal experience.

In this wide sense, a division is usually made between two lines of existentialism, those whose ideas spring from an atheistic approach like Heidegger and Sartre, and those whose ideas generally center around Christian truths, like Jaspers and Marcel, though Marcel himself repudiates the term "Christian existentialism." When the word "existentialism" is used in these few pages, it is the atheistic type that is intended.

Above it was described that every time atheism was propounded in the past, a distorted humanism resulted. Existentialism is no exception: whenever it denies or


... INTRODUCTION

3. The current problem of the meaning of man

lessens value in one place it affirms or exaggerates it in another; when it denies God to be the absolute value, it proclaims man to be such. Sartre sees this clearly; in denying God, man becomes a value unto himself. He says in answer to an objector:

But if I've discarded God the Father, there has to be someone to invent values. You've got to take things as they are. Moreover, to say that we invent values means nothing else but this: life has no meaning a priori. Before you come alive, life is nothing; it's up to you to give it a meaning, and value is nothing else but the meaning you choose.¹

Existentialism is the ideal inheritor of the atheistic humanism of the nineteenth century; the alienation theory of Feuerbach comes back in a different form.

Yet there is a difference in this matter between the atheists of the last century and the existentialists of today. The former began by denying God, and then looked to see what effect this denial had upon man; the latter begin by beholding man, and then maintain that there is no need for God: existentialism declares, "... even if God did exist, that would change nothing ..."

... INTRODUCTION
3. The current problem of the meaning of man

the problem of His existence is not the issue."¹

God being denied, avenues of activity are open to
man; he is free. Freedom of man is, in a way, the su-
preme quality of the existentialist man, for it is by this
freedom that man is able to determine himself. Whereas
before he was an existent undetermined, now his existence
has been, as it were, essentialized, and his essence is
what he wants to make it by his own choice.²

Man's choice is always engulfed by a certain dark-
ness and incomprehension which causes anxiety or dread
in him; nevertheless, it is by choice, free and spontane-
ous: that man becomes what he wants to be and only that.
Man cannot speak of being governed by the truth, for there
is no such thing as the truth; only my truth. There are
never any dilemmas, therefore, between what is true and
untrue, moral and immoral, for decisions or actions have
only those characteristics I want to impart to them.³

Although humanism of the type that has just been

¹ Sartre, op. cit., p. 61.
² Collins, op. cit., pp. 70-79.
... INTRODUCTION

3. The current problem of the meaning of man

described is by no means universal belief, it is indicative of a vast neglect of the high calling of man -- of the calling that declares man to be primarily a spiritual thing, a creature of God, and fashioned to His image. It is too commonly held that praising God despoils man, that attributing perfection to God belittles man. On the contrary, if our world is to gain back the total and genuine image of man, with true liberty of spirit and fulness of being, it must hasten to return to the true source of all. As pere de Lubac writes:

To rediscover that vanishing image, and with it, that sense of being, that concept of stable truth and that belief in eternal values we must appeal to our faith in the creation of man in the image of God.¹

The nature of the problem was acutely observed by Nicholas Berdyaev, the late Russian philosopher. He wrote, for example:

Max Scheler, who is more interested than other philosophers in the problem of anthropology, says, "Zu keiner Zeit der Geschichte der Mensch sich so problematisch geworden ist, wie in der Gegenwart." This means that the time has come to formulate a philosophical anthropology which has not

¹: de Lubac, op. cit. in Dublin Review, p. 17.
INTRODUCTION

3. The current problem of the meaning of man existed in the past. Psychology, biology and sociology have not solved the problem of man. Man has been approached from various points of view and studied in parts. The name of anthropology is applied to a science which throws least light upon man as such. And yet a philosophical anthropology must be the basis for philosophy as a whole. The ancient Greeks understood that man can only begin to philosophize through knowing himself. The key to reality is to be found in man. ¹

But Berdjaev in properly sounding the crisis of the present has not meted out justice to the past; it is hardly true, as he avers, that a comprehensive philosophy of man never existed in the past, for Christianity has established and inspired the religious and spiritual matrix for a thorough, philosophical anthropology.

Though the meaning of man is a matter for the complete Christian heritage, we find in St. Augustine all the elements for an interpretation of man that is entirely Christian. The study of Augustine reveals the depth of being in which man has his meaning; such a study is the concern of the following pages.

CHAPTER ONE

ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN

1. Man, one of Augustine's favorite themes
2. Orientation on truth
3. Relatedness of all things
4. Reason and faith
5. The Confessiones as the book par excellence

Appendix: Body and soul in the philosophy of St. Augustine

1. Man, one of Augustine's favorite themes

One of the favorite themes of St. Augustine is man. In the Confessiones he expresses the conviction that man is a great deep, "Grande profundum est ipse homo ..."\(^1\)

During his lifetime he never lost that conviction nor ignored the mystery that is in man: "... non cor hominis abyssus est... Quid enim est profundius hac abysso?"\(^2\)

Man is one of the two realities that are the entire contents of his writings and that reflect all he wanted to know: "Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihil ne plus? Nihil omnino."\(^3\)

It was a simple evidence to Augustine that he could not understand one reality without the other, which belief underlies his prayer, "Deus, semper idem, noverim

\(^1\) Confessiones, IV, 14, 22; PL 32, 702.
\(^2\) Enarratio in psalmum 41, 13; PL 36, 473.
\(^3\) Soliloquia, I, 2, 7; PL 32, 372.
... I ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
1. Man, one of Augustine's favorite themes

me, noverim te."¹

At Cassiciacum, the retreat outside Milan that Augustine established with his friends, conversation centered about man's nature and the problem dealing with the happiness of man; this is clearly seen in the early dialogues which had their origin there: Contra academicos, De beata vita, De ordine, and the Soliloquia. He spared nothing that would enable him to penetrate the problem of man. Whether the power to understand man came from the fresh contact of experience, the light of rational knowledge, or the insight provided by Christian teaching, Augustine would use truth, wherever he found it, to answer the question posed in Sacred Scripture, "What is man that thou art mindful of him?"²

At the outset it might be well to insist that for Augustine man is one, lest it be taken as a foregone conclusion that somehow or other he professed an exaggerated dualism in the constitution of man that robs his philosophical humanism of its meaning. Time and time again he

¹. Solil., II, 1, 1; PL, 32, 385.
². Psalm 8, 5.
... I. ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:

1. Man, one of Augustine's favorite themes avers that man is a unitary being. He says, for example, in De moribus ecclesiae, "Quamquam enim duo sint, anima et corpus, et neutrum vocaretur homo si non esset alterum ...".

Or again:

Quoniam homo non est corpus solum, vel anima sola, sed quae anima constat et corpore. Hoc quidem verum est, quod non totus homo sed pars melior hominis anima est; nec totus homo corpus, sed inferior hominis est...

He held from Christian principles that it is man, body and soul who lives, that it is man, body and soul, who dies. He knew that Christ died to save man, the whole man; that body and soul will rise glorious when man rises glorious.

It is one thing to say that Augustine never justifies his position; it is another to say that he is unable to do so. He simply does not take up the question as to how precisely the unity of body and soul is effected; he never felt it necessary to justify it. In the one place

---

1. De moribus ecclesiae, I, 4, 6; PL 32, 1313.

2. De cive Dei, XIII, 24, 2; PL 41, 399.

3. Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, (trans. A. H. C. Downes), N. Y., Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940; "... St. Augustine, firm as he was in asserting the unity of man, found himself quite unable to justify it." p. 175.
ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:

1. Man, one of Augustine's favorite themes

where he does pause to weigh the importance of the **manner of union**, he says, admitting the difficulty of a judgment, that since it makes little difference in determining what man is, he will not delay on it. To quote at length:

Nec nunc definitionem hominis a me postulandum puto. Illud est magis quod mihi hoc loco quaerendum videtur, cum inter omnes pene constet, aut certe id quod satis est, inter me atque illos cum quibus nunc agitur hoc conveniat, ex anima et corpore nos esse compositos, quid est ipse homo; utrumque horum quae nominave, an corpus tantummodo, an tantummodo anima. Quanquam enim duo sint, anima et corpus, et neutrum vocetur homo, si non esset alterum (nam neque corpus homo esset, si anima non esset; ne rursus anima homo, si ea corpus non animaretur); fieri tamen potest ut unum horum et habeatur homo et vocetur. Quid ergo hominem dicimus? an animam et corpus, tanquam bigas vel centaurum? an corpus tantum, quod sit in usu animae se regentis; tanquam lucernam, non ignem simul et testam, sed testam solam, tamen propter ignem appellamus? an nihil aliud hominem quam animam dicimus, sed propter corpus quod regit, veluti equitem non simul equum et hominem, sed hominem solum, ex eo tamen quod regendo equo sit accommodatur, vocamus? Difficile est istam controversiam dijudicare; aut si ratione facile, oratione longum est; quem laborem ac moram suscipere ac subire non opus est.1

Augustine is not trying, like Plato, to reduce man to a part of himself; what he is trying to do is to determine

1. *De moribus ecclesiae*, I, 4, 6; PL 32, 1313.
... I. ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:

1. Man, one of Augustine's favorite themes

what is man in the order of finality; what is man to become. Man seeks for his highest good; in that sense man becomes what is highest in him. Surely man's highest good is not whatever is the highest good of the body, as a body; man's highest good is whatever is good for the soul, or the body and soul together:

Sive enim utrumque, sive anima sola nomen hominis teneat, non est hominis optimum quod est corporis; sed quod aut corpori simul et animae, aut soli animae optimum est, id est optimum hominis.1

Augustine's pre-occupation is with the moral, or spiritual order, the proper subject of which is the human soul: what is man for, how does he get there. His interest is, not the philosophical composition of man, but the philosophical meaning of man.

Another reason that should temper one's consideration of the occasionally dualistic terminology of Augustine is the historical fact that all during his life, in one way or another, he was fighting the Manichean error that no reality existed other than physical substance.2

1. Loc. cit.

... I  ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
1. Man, one of Augustine's favorite themes

As a normal reaction he would tend to emphasize the spiritual part of man\(^1\) thereby exposing himself to the risk of denigrating its corporeal counterpart. It is right then to conclude that while Augustine held that man is one he was never obliged to enter into the thirteenth century controversy on justifying that unity: "Homo est animal mortale rationale ... definitio ... ista perfecta est."\(^2\)

2. Orientation on truth

St. Augustine's philosophy of man is thoroughly orientated on truth; truth, however, is more the province of wisdom than of science. The distinction between scientia and sapientia is typically Augustinian.\(^3\) Science deals with the many, the practical, and, in general, the knowledge of temporal things; such knowledge, of course, is necessary, for without it the virtues required

1. V. De Trinitate, X, 7, 9-10; PL 42, 979.
2. De quantitate animae, 47; PL 32, 1062.
ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:

2. Orientation on truth

for right living cannot be had. Wisdom tends to draw
the many to unity; it is concerned with the contemplation
of eternal and immutable truth: "In hac differentia
intelligendum est ad contemplationem sapientiam, ad
actionem scientiam pertinere." Both science and wisdom
pertain to truth; but whereas the former scans the sur-
face, the latter sounds the depths and is therefore "truth"
in the profound sense of the word. That is why wisdom,
by its very contemplative and unifying force forbade
Augustine, the "Christian Plato," from considering truth
merely from without; we are to enter into it. It is
utterly alien to Augustine to think that truth can be
viewed as though it were a museum-piece; his spirit al-
ways yearned for truth in order to assimilate it: "O
veritas, veritas! quam intime etiam tunc medullae animi
mei suspirabant tibi."

1. De Trin., XII, 14, 21; PL 42, 1009.
2. De Trin., XII, 14, 22; PL 42, 1010.
3. Maurice Blondel, "The Latent Resources in St. Augus-
tine's Thought," in A Monument to Saint Augustine
(M. C. D'Arcy et. al.), London, Sheed and Ward, 1954,
p. 326.
4. Conf. III, 6, 10; PL 32, 687.
2. Orientation on truth

Man, like other realities, cannot be understood unless he is approached in the light of truth. In this Augustine is genuinely Platonic -- a true philosopher is an amator sapientiae. How can anyone understand God, his own soul, the final happiness towards which wisdom leads him unless he gives himself to the truth? And he cannot give himself to the truth unless he does so wholly, entirely: "... ipsum verum non videbis, nisi in philosophiam totus intraveris." Love of truth does not stop at contemplation; it overflows into life. It is a clear contradiction to Augustine that one could love truth and not live it:

Imo assentior, et hanc quae abs te descripta est, probo esse virtutem: nam et ratio non dicenda est aut existimanda, nisi vera; et cujus vita per omnia congruit veritati, is est profecto vel solus, vel certe maxime, qui bene atque honeste vivit; et qui ita sit affectus, solus habere virtutem, et ea vivere judicandus est.

Truth is necessary for life, and life is the truth lived.

1. Contra academicos, II, 3, 8; PL 32, 923.

2. De quan. anim. 16, 27; PL 32, 1051; "La vérité n'est point pour Tui seulement un spectacle à contempler: c'est un bien qu'il faut s'approprier: il faut l'aimer et en vivre." Portalié, op. cit., col. 2433.
ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
2. Orientation on truth

This attitude is instanced in Augustine while he was seriously questioning the Manichean doctrine: he was of the mind that there must be something true in it because it inspired the elect to lead holy lives. He realized later that their holiness was hypocrisy, but he was willing to weigh the worth of a doctrine by the effect it had on one's life.¹ Thus was foreshadowed his life-long conviction that somehow truth and life are correlative. If a man loves truth he will live according to the truth; he will be just, he will be charitable, he will love God: "... hominis sapientia pietas est."² He gives a striking example of this in showing how the virtue of chastity springs from living the truth:

Certe pia, vera, sancta castitas non nisi ex veritate est: et quisquis adversus eam facit, profecto adversus veritatem facit. Cur ergo et si non possit periclitantibus subveniri, non committo stuprum, quod ideo est contrarium veritati, quia contrarium est castitati: et ut periclitantibus subveniatur, loquor mendacium, quod ipsi apertissime est contrarium veritati? Quid nos tantum promeruit castitas,

¹. Gustave Bardy, Saint Augustin, l'homme et l'oeuvre, (Bibliothèque augustinienne), Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1948, p. 66.
². Enchiridion, I, 2; PL 40, 231.
... I ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
2. Orientation on truth

et offendit veritas? Cum omnis ex veritate sit castitas, et sit non corporis, sed mentis castitas veritas, atque in mente habitet etiam corporis castitas.¹

It is the living truth upon which Augustine's philosophy of man is built.

Now a thing that is entirely unknown cannot be loved: "... rem prorsus ignotam amare omnino nullus potest."² When a thing is known and is sought, it is only because of good that it is sought and therefore loved: "Non amas certe nisi bonum."³ It is in this way that knowledge brings us to love, for it engenders in the rational being a response that is due to the good:

Sic itaque adhibeatur scientia tanquam machina quaedam, per quam structura charitatis assurgat quae maneat in aeternum, etiam cum scientia destructur; quae ad finem charitatis adhibita multum est utilis; per se autem ipsa sine tali fine, non modo superflua, sed etiam perniciosa probata est.⁴

The intellect offers objects to the will, it is true; but since all the faculties whereby man acts are rooted in the same individual, the intellect itself is moved by the

¹. Contra mendacium, 19, 38; PL 40, 545.
². De Trin., X, 1, 1; PL 42, 971.
³. De Trin., VIII, 3, 4; PL 42, 949.
⁴. Epist. 55, 21, 39; PL 33, 223.
ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:

2. Orientation on truth

affection of the will and the person, as a whole, becomes more a partaker of the good. That is why Augustine, with the evangelist, always insists that knowledge achieves its end only through love:

Proinde sic dictum est, 'Caro non prodest quidquam;' quomodo dictum est, 'Scientia inflat.' Jam ergo debemus odisse scientiam? Absit. Et quid est, 'Scientia inflat?' Sola, sine charitate: ideo adjunxit, 'Charitas vero aedificat.' Adde ergo scientias charitatem, et utilis erit scientia; non per se, sed per charitatem.

When the objects to be loved are themselves considered it is God, of course, Who is the true good and Who is to be loved as goodness itself. 2 As the ultimate good God is also the ultimate end. Now every being tends to its


2. "Sic amandus est Deus, non hoo et illud bonum, sed ipsum bonum. Quaerendum enim bonum animae, non cui supervolitet judicando, sed cui haereat amando; et quid hoo, nisi Deus? Non bonus animus, aut bonus angelus, aut bonum coelum; sed bonum bonum." De Trin, VIII, 3, 4; PL 42, 949.
... I  ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
2. Orientation on truth

end according to its nature; and man's rational nature demands not only the knowledge of God, but also love of Him -- and insofar as man's end and perfection is union with God, love is a more unifying force than knowledge.\(^1\) There is no true wisdom without love of God,\(^2\) while love itself brings the fulness of knowledge:

Terret te ramorum diffusio; radicem tene, et de magnitudine arboris noli cogitare. Sit in te charitas, et necesse est plenitudo scientiae consequatur. Quid enim nescit qui charitatem scit, quandoquidem dictum est: 'Deus charitas est.'\(^3\)

The ordering of man towards his final end is part of

1. "Item cum dicat Apostolus, 'supereminentem scientiae charitatem Christi;' quid est insanius, quam putare ex Deo esse scientiam, quae subdenda est charitati, et ex hominibus charitatem, quae supereminet scientiae? Fides autem vera et doctrina sana ambas esse dicit ex Deo, quia scriptum est, 'facie ejus scientia et intellectus procedit': scriptum est, 'Charitas ex Deo est,' Et legimus, 'Spiritum scientiae et pietatis': legimus, 'Spiritum virtutis et charitatis et continentiae.' Sed majus est donum charitas quam scientia: nam scientia quando est in homine, charitas est necessaria, ne infletur; 'charitas solum non aemulatur, non agit perperam, non inflatur.'" Lib. de grat. et lib. arb., 19, 40; PL 44, 905.

2. "Frui autem sapientia Dei, nihil est aliud quam ei dilectione cohaerere: neque quisquam in eo quod percipit permanet, nisi dilectione..." Liber de fide et symbolo, 9, 19; PL 40, 192.

3. Enar. in Ps., 79, 2; PL 36, 1022.
the universal order, and the universal law governing that order is known by man. It is for man, then, to understand that the universal law orders love to fulfill it and that mere knowledge of the law, or other divine things, without love can be a misfortune to the soul.\(^1\) For Augustine, fulness of knowledge for man in via cannot be had in counting the stars in the heavens or the grains of wheat, but in knowing and abiding by the law of God, in which is charity.\(^2\)

For the basis of this correlation of knowledge and love, Augustine once again looks to the Blessed Trinity. In the Trinity, the Word, Who is Wisdom, bursts forth into

---


2. "Sed forte dicturus es: Et quando in me erit plenitudo scientiae? et quis potest ad tantum culmen pervenire, ut sit in illo plenitudo scientiae?putras hoc velle Deum, ut sit in nobis ista plenitudo scientiae, ut noverimus aut quot sint stellae, aut quot sint grana, non dico arenae, sed tritici, aut quot poma pendeant in arbore? Ille novit omnia; quia capilli nostri numerati sunt Deo. Sed alia est plenitudo scientiae quam voluit hominem nosse; ad legem Dei pertinet scientia quam te voluit habere ... ait enim Apostolus, 'Plenitudo autem Legis charitas.' ... Interroga cor tuum, vide utrum habeat charitatem. Si est ibi charitas, est ibi plenitudo Legis." Enar. in Ps. 98, 3; PL 37, 1260.
I. ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:

2. Orientation on truth

the Holy Spirit, Who is Love: Wisdom culminates in Love, and Love begins in Wisdom; Love is seen as the perfection of Wisdom, and Wisdom is seen as the origin of Love. So too in man, love proceeds from knowledge,¹ and knowledge is perfected in love, whence it is called wisdom; and just as in God whatever is in the Word is also in the Holy Spirit, so in man, all power of knowledge should pass into love.² Here too is seen the basis for the correlation of truth and life as spoken of above; for knowledge is of the truth and life is of love; but the highest truth is

---


2. "Quaer vobiscum modo sic agendum est, non ut ea jam intelligatis, quod fieri non potest; sed ut intelligere aliquando cupisatis. Facit enim hoc simplex et pura charitas Dei, quae maxime spectatur in moribus, de qua multa jam diximus: quae inspirata Spiritu sancto perducit ad Filium, id est, ad Sapientiam Dei, per quam Pater ipse cognoscitur. Nam si sapientia et veritas non totis animi viribus concupiscatur, inveniri nullo pacto potest ... Amore petitur, amore quaeritur, amore pulsatur, amore revelatur, amore denique in eo quod revelatum fuerit permanetur." De mor. ecc. cath. 17, 31; PL 32, 1324.
In the good which we are to love -- and in this is life.¹

It is certainly true that Augustine was not concerned with the methodological and technical approach in philosophy, which came later with the scholastics. But we must not lose sight of his pervading purpose -- to communicate life. As a shepherd of souls he knew what it meant to illuminate and inspire with the truth:

Ergo vitae vellemus addi veritatem, ut corda nostra invicem nosceremus, ne nostris suspicionibus falleremur: ut de ipsa vita perpetua, quod ab ea non caderemus certi essemus. Adde vitae veritatem, et invenis vitam beatam.²

By the very demand of his office he avoided the danger of separating the intellect from the other faculties of the soul which would have turned wisdom into a purely theoretical science.³ The communication of life, the development of the person, the enrichment of the life of the spirit are the proper domain of Augustine's thought and an integral

¹ Neque enim vir bonus merito dicitur qui scit quod bonum est, sed qui diligit. De civ. Dei XI, 28; PL 44, 341. "Non enim est veritas, nisi in opere bono." Enar. in Ps. 139, 13; PL 37, 1811.
² Sermo 306, 10, 9; PL 38, 1405.
... I ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
2. Orientation on truth

part of the true philosophy of man.¹

3. Relatedness of all things

The entire notion of relatedness is an attempt to lay a subject open to understanding by envisioning it in the whole fabric of reality and, transcending time, in the presence of every being. Nothing is really known unless it is grasped in its full context, in its relation to everything else.² Knowledge of one thing can be used to understand another. Man, because of the relationships he enjoys, is a complex being; there is no definition of man that encompasses its subject. The meaning of man involves what some writers refer to as the "open side" of

¹. "Le côté métaphysique de l'anthropologie l'attirait beaucoup, mais il le rattachait étroitement à l'observation directe de la vie de l'âme, ou mieux encore, la vie de l'esprit, et voilà fixé avec précision le domaine propre de la pensée augustinienne. Celle-ci est un vrai spiritualisme, mais un spiritualisme vécu. F. Cayré, A.A., Initiation à la philosophie de saint Augustin (Bibliothèque augustinienne), Paris, Desclée, de Brouwer et Cie, 1947, p. 57.

... I  ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
3. Relatedness of all things

man's nature — what he is by reason of his relation to God, to his fellow man, to values. Man is immersed in ties of position, function, and expression whereby he is engaged in an ever-widening and related unity which gives him his meaning.¹

This principle was always held by the Christian thinkers of the past who perceived man as transcending himself by his relation to truth and value; and as complex as the world might be they measured its unity as a unity under God.² Probably respect for unity and relatedness can be attributed more to the bishop of Hippo than any other Christian philosopher. It is a sense that he bore from his youth when, as manifested in the Confessiones, he used every word, every thought, every experience to deepen his grasp on truth and to develop a vivid realization of the union of man with God. In De

2. "The greatest contribution of medievalism to the formation of the scientific movement ... (is) ... the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles." Whitehead, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
... I ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
3. Relatedness of all things.

ordine, he was to look upon all creation as a vast unity with God as Supreme Measure and, later on, as in De civitate Dei, he was to consider the history of mankind as having been traced directly and immediately by Him.

Man, for Augustine, must be seen in his fulness; and his fulness demands proper regard for universal relationships, for they govern his "open-ness." Augustine surely perceived his thought to be in close harmony with that of St. Paul when the apostle writes to the Romans that while men await the glorious freedom of the sons of God every creature groans in travail.¹ On this Augustine comments:

Omnis creatura in homine numeratur, non quod in eo sint omnes Angeli, et supereminentes Virtutes ac Potestates, aut coelum et terra et mare et omnia quae in eis sunt; sed quia omnis creatura partim spiritualis est, partim animalis, partim corporalis.²

1. Romans, 8, 18-24.

2. Lib er de diversie quaestionibus 83, #67, 5; PL 40, 68; the whole paragraph reflects this mood of man's oneness with the rest of creation. Augustine continues a little farther on: "Omnis itaque creatura in homine congemiscit et dolet. Non enim totam, sed omnem dicit: tanquam si quis dicat, quod solem omnes homines vident qui sunt incolumes, sed non toti vident, quia tantem oculis vident; ita in homine omnis creatura

37
... I  ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
3. Relatedness of all things.

Every man is in some way in contact with every being; God, angels, material creation; every man is in some way in touch with virtue and value: truth, justice, love; every man has recorded in him in some way the history of the world: the creation, the fall, the incarnation, the final glory. This thought is well expressed by Professor Cochran when he writes:

Thus with Augustine each individual human being is envisaged as a centre of radiant energy. Born into a world of contacts, he presently develops a whole tissue of external relationships, but the "subject" is not on that account to be resolved into any or all of the relationships thus established.¹

4. Reason and faith

In the face of this unity and relatedness in reality, Augustine employed anything that could possibly

---

... I  ST. AUGUSTINE’S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
4. Reason and faith

aid him to understand man; and that which comes as a
divinely appointed instrument to aid understanding is
faith. Since truth is one it makes little difference
whether it comes to us by faith\(^1\) or reason. Knowledge
is ours though the source may be things seen or things
believed; knowledge is in the mind whether it is there
because of the senses, the mind itself, or faith.\(^2\)

Augustine’s intention is never to belittle reason,
but to see it in its rightful place with respect to
faith; it has its work to do, for faith itself would be

1. Though "faith" can have a purely natural meaning in
Augustine, it is supernatural faith that is faith
par excellence and the type that Augustine ultimately
intends even in his discussion on natural faith. See
Gilson, op. cit., Introduction à l'étude de saint
Augustin, p. 32.

2. "Constat igitur nostra scientia ex visis rebus et
creditis: sed in ipsis quae vidimus vel videmus, nos
ipsi testes sumus; in his autem quae credimus, alius
testibus movetur ad fidem ... Non autem imermo
scire non dicimus non solum ea quae vidimus aut videmus,
verum et illa quae idoneis ad quamque rem commoti tes-
timoniis vel testibus credimus. Porro si scire non
incongruenter dicimur etiam illud quod certissimum
credimus, hinc factum est ut etiam recte credita,
et si non adsint sensibus nostris, videre mente dicamur.
Scientia quippe menti tribuatur; sive per corporis
sensus, sive per ipsum animum aliquid perceptum cog-
nitumque retineat: et fides ipsa mente utique videtur
quamvis hoc fide creatur quod non videtur." Epist.
147, 3, 8; PL 33, 600.
impossible without reason: "... nullus quippe credit aliquid, nisi prius cogitaverit esse credendum;"¹ "Alia sunt enim quae nisi intelligamus, non credimus ..."² It is thus a typically Augustinian principle that we do not bear within ourselves the means of our own enlightenment: reason can give the titles of belief, but never the intimate truth. God's help is required for understanding:

Sed hoc (progress in understanding) non fit propriis tanquam naturalibus viribus, sed Deo adjuvante atque donante; sicut medicina fit, non natura, ut vitiatus oculus vim cernendi recipiat.³

Reason undergoes no violence at the hands of faith -- as the higher perfects the lower, faith perfects understanding:

Haec dixerim, ut fidem tuam ad amorem intelligentiae cohorter, ad quam ratio vera perducit, et cui fides animum praeperat.⁴

Faith is the sun that illumines the intellect; it brings reason to fruition, for our minds are cleansed by believing

¹. De praedestinatione sanctorum, II, 5; PL 44, 962-963.
². Enar. in Ps., 218; Sermo 18, 3; PL 37, 1552.
³. Loc. cit.
⁴. Epist. 120, 1, 6; PL 33, 454.
... I ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
4. Reason and faith

what they are unable to understand.\(^1\) Faith inspires a clearer penetration into the world of eternal and immutable truths and facilitates the intellect in grasping reality from the viewpoint of sapientia.

It is true that not everyone who knows believes; but everyone who believes knows, for believing leads to knowing, and knowing leads to believing\(^2\) -- faith and reason do not cancel each other as they are mutual in their effect:

Proficit ergo noster intellectus ad intelligenda quae credat, et fides proficit ad credenda quae intelligat; et eadem ipsa ut magis magisque intelligentur, in ipso intellectu proficit mens.\(^3\)

---

1. "Itaque priusquam mens nostra purgetur, debemus credere quod intelligere nondum valemus ..." De agone christianae, 13, 14; PL 40, 299.


3. Enar. in Ps. 118, Sermo 18, 3; PL 37, 1551-1552. Cf. "Intellige, Omnis homo vult intelligere; nemo est qui nolit: credere non omnes volunt. Dicit mihi homo, Intelligam, ut credam: respondeo, Crede, ut intelligas. Cum ergo nata inter nos sit controversia talis quodam modo, ut ille mihi dicat, Intelligam, ut credam; ego ei respondeam, Imo crede, ut intelligas: cum hac controversia veniamus ad judicem, neuter nostrum prsumat pro sua parte sententiam. Quem judicem inventuri sumus? Discussiss omnibus hominibus, nescio utrum meliorem judicem invenire possimus, quam hominem per
ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
4. Reason and faith

The axiom credo ut intelligam finds its fulfillment in Augustine. Mysteries have it in their power to fecundate the truth so that one who is illumined by the light of faith in turn is able to seize with his understanding the mysteries themselves; this is the urgency of the fides quaerens intellectum of the Middle Ages. Faith broadens the horizon of our knowledge and deepens the profundity of our understanding; understanding becomes the reward of faith:

Propter hos igitur interiores oculos, quorum caecitas est non intelligere, ut aperiantur, et magis magisque serenentur, fide corda mundantur. Quamvis enim, nisi aliquid intelligat nemo possit credere in Deum; tamen ipsa fide qua credit, sanatur, ut intelligat ampliora. Alia sunt enim quae nisi intelligamus, non credimus; et alia sunt quae nisi credamus, non intelligamus.¹

One last step was necessary for Augustine in the

quem loquitur Deus. Non eamus ergo in hac re et in hac controversia ad litteras saeculares; non inter nos judicet poeta, sed prophet. " Sermo 43, 3, 4; PL 38, 255-256.

1. Enar in Ps. 118, Sermo 18, 3; PL 37, 1552. Cf. Cochran, "... if faith precedes understanding, understanding in turn becomes the reward of faith. In this understanding Augustine discovers at once the answer to his quest for certitude and the recovery of his birthright as a rational animal ... 'faith' and 'reason' are in reality correlative and complementary aspects of experience." Op. cit., p. 400.
... I  ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:  
4. Reason and faith

relation of faith and reason. God is the summit of truth;  
and He is supremely personal. Since He is truth, all  
truth has something personal about it; it is a Person who  
is true. Faith, then, centers our understanding about a  
person; it re-finalizes our awareness by awakening us to  
a truth-person context. Truth is found in its absolute  
fulness only in God, in One who is ineffable Person and  
ineffable Life:

Dominus enim noster Jesus Christus, qui ait,  "Ego sum via, et veritas, et vita," ambulare  
nos voluit et per se ipsum et ad se ipsum.  
Qua enim ambulamus, nisi per viam? Et quo  
ambulamus, nisi ad veritatem et ad vitam,  
vitam scilicet aeternam, quae sola vita  
dicenda est.1

This principle -- that only where there is a person is  
there truth, and where there is truth is there a person --  
gives us a glimpse of the ultimate reason why St. Augustine  
saw the participation of truth as the participation of  
life, and the communication of truth as the communication  
of life. It is in this context of faith and reason that  
Augustine sees man; now he can understand even more dearly  
man's exigency for truth as the means of sharing in life.

1. Sermo 341, 1; PL 39, 1493.
5. The Confessiones as the book par excellence

The Confessiones more than any other of Augustine's works gives the fundamental idea of his approach to the meaning of man: they show man to be one of his favorite themes; they breathe an atmosphere of unity, an intense unity in God; they are inspired by his ardently personal relation to truth. It is his own wish that those who seek the truth many, by reading the account of his life, give themselves -- intellect and will -- to the Truth:

Confessionum mearum libri tredecim, et de malis et de bonis meis Deum laudant justum et bonum, atque in eum excitant humanum intellectum et affectum; interim quod ad me attinet hoc in me egerunt cum scriberentur, et agunt cum leguntur.¹

Even as a boy Augustine was conscious of being, of life, of truth; he writes, looking back on his boyhood:

Eram enim etiam tunc, vivebam et sentiebam meamque incolumitatem, vestigium secretissimae unitatis, ex qua eram, curae habebam, custodiebam interiore sensu integritatem sensuum meorum inque ipsi parvis parvarumque rerum cogitationibus veritatem delectabar.²

As his life progressed, this acute sensitivity developed;

1. Retractiones, II, 6; PL 32, 632.

2. Conf., I, 20, 1; PL 32, 674.
it became an attitude of awareness that bade him examine every intellectual problem by analyzing the self in its relation to the truth. How much this is exemplified in his struggle for chastity! It was not that purity alone pressed him so much, but that purity, like any other virtue, is an exigency that springs up in the soul with the full acceptance of the truth: full acceptance of the truth compels the will as well as the intellect.

The Confessiones portray the saint's conviction that the grasping of truth is a matter for the whole person. Knowledge, consciousness, intelligence, will, love, form a concert of beauty and strength only when the person becomes the center of truth.\(^1\) The person who loves truth, loves God as the supreme truth; in him piety becomes the work of wisdom and his life tends to oneness in God: "Tibi dico, anima ... Deus autem tuus etiam tibi \textit{vita} vitae est."\(^2\)

At one point of the Confessiones Augustine speaks

\(^1\) Cf. Blondel, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 336.

\(^2\) \textit{Conf.}, X, 6, 10; PL 32, 783.
5. The *Confessio*nes as the book par excellence.

of the majestic transcendence of God: one errs if he thinks that the divine being can be categorized according to Aristotle's inflexible ten categories, as if God's being were a substance in which His greatness or beauty inhere:

> Quasi et tu subjectus esses magnitudini tuae aut pulchritudini, ut illa essent in te quasi in subjecto sicut in corpore: cum tua magnitudo et tua pulchritudo tu ipse sis...2

But it is this very transcendence of God that allows man to transcend himself, for the truth man seeks, the life he desires, and the ultimate perfection he wants, are in God; and when man possesses them in a measure *in via* it is only because God in some way is in him; and thus, at one and the same time, Augustine claims a transcendence of man in God and an immanence of God in man. In this framework Augustine can clearly be seen to be encouraged by the philosophy of Plotinus for whom he shows rightful

2. *Conf. IV*, 16, 29; PL 32, 705.
... I. ST. AUGUSTINE'S APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF MAN:
5. The *Confessiones* as the book *par excellence*.

esteem in the *Confessiones*.\(^1\) He applies to the life of
the spirit what he learned from Plotinus about the desire
for truth, the intellectual vision of the good, and union
with God; Cayré sees in this adaptation of Plotinus an
example of Augustine's striking originality.\(^2\)

St. Augustine summarizes the whole of his *Confes­
siones*, and, indeed, the whole of his life in the oft­
quoted words: "Tu excitas, ut laudare te delectet; quia
fecisti nos ad te, et inquietem est cor nostrum, donec
requiescat in te."\(^3\)

Appendix

In discussing his attitude on the problem of body
and soul, it is well to point out that some authors are

---

1. *Conf.* VII, 10-17, 16-23; PL 32, 742-745. Cf. the
penetrating remarks of A. C. Pegis on the influence
of Plotinus on Augustine in "The Mind of St. Augus­

2. "L'originalité peut-être la plus remarquable de saint
Augustin est précisément cette transposition dans un
monde tout nouveau, celui de la vie spirituelle, d'une
doctrine métaphysique et d'une pure observation intel­
lectuelle faite par le plotinisme sur la perception

prone to conclude that Augustine, being so inclined to
Platonic metaphysics, held body and soul to be two separate entities effecting a mechanical union in which the
soul moves, or uses, the body. There are formulas in his
writings that make this seem true: "Homo igitur, ut
hominis appareat, anima rationalis est mortali atque ter-
reno utens corpore;"\(^1\) or, again, the soul is a certain
kind of rational substance fitted to rule the body:
"... esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo
corpori accommodata."\(^2\) It is not surprising, then, that
these authors would accentuate the separatist tendency
of Augustine, especially in consideration of his analysis
of sensation in *De musica*, Book VI.\(^3\) There is no point
of reviewing here his explanation of sensation except to

\(^1\) *De mor. ecc.* I, 27, 52; PL 32, 1332.
\(^2\) *De quant. anim.* XIII, 22; PL 32, 1048.
\(^3\) Cf. Bourke, *op. cit.*, Augustine's Quest of Wisdom,
pp. 110-112; Elizabeth Salmon, "The Nature of Man in
St. Augustine's Thought," in Proceedings of the Ameri-
can Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXV (The
Nature of Man), Washington, D. C., Cath. Univ., 1951,
pp. 25-41. Gilson is surprisingly definitive in this
matter when he says that in Augustine's doctrine, "... sensation is an operation proper to the soul and one
in which the body plays no part." *Spirit of Mediaeval
Philosophy*, p. 185.
indicate the main lines of his thought: no action of the soul can really result from the body's action; the soul's sensations are the soul's own action in its attentiveness to the dispositions of the body; the soul acts on the body by divine command. Professor Bourke, for example, upholds the notion that Augustine was forced to the "active theory" of sensation because of the duality of body and soul, although their separation is not so radical as to rule out any possibility of interaction. ¹ But this is hardly the only conclusion that can be drawn from Augustine's theory. It is Bonhôte teaching that the operations of life are immanent actions: they begin and terminate in the agent, thereby perfecting the agent. Augustine's problem can be re-located in this light of immanent activity: what he may be trying to do is to explain how sensation takes place in a knowing being which, somehow, upon receiving an impression from without -- lest knowledge be merely a passive procedure -- by its own active power makes of that impression a vehicle for knowing the external object. Far from the "active theory" of sensation being one of the weakest

¹ Loc. cit.
elements in the philosophy of St. Augustine,\textsuperscript{1} it is a vigorous attempt to solve the problem of vital, immanent activity and yet keep the sensing subject a unitary being.

It is true to say that Augustine adopts an original solution which is neither platonic dualism nor aristotelian-anthomistic hylemorphism.\textsuperscript{2} Nevertheless, there are strong indications that he would be sympathetic to the latter. Following Gilson,\textsuperscript{3} the reason why the soul can be held to be the form of the body is precisely because the soul is a substance; man owes all his substantiality to the substantiality of the soul. The human soul is act, and is a substance because it is act:

If there are positive reasons for considering the soul as a substance, there is nothing to prevent us admitting at the same time that it is a form, since, on the contrary, it is precisely its formality that lies at the basis of its substantiality.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Bourke, \textit{op. cit.}, 237.
\item Van Steenberghen, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{Les directions doctrinales de saint Augustin}, p. 38.
\item Gilson, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy}, pp. 183-188.
\end{enumerate}
Now, it can be argued that for Augustine the soul is both a form and a substance. It is a form, for the soul gives the body not only sensitive and vegetive life, but even corporeal subsistence and being. As he writes in De immortalitate animae:

[Naturae ordine]... intelligitur a summa essentia speciem corpori per animam tribui, qua est inquantumcumque est. Per animam ergo corpus subsistit, et eo ipso est quo animatur...

and in the Confessiones:

Jam tu melior es; tibi dico, anima; quoniam tu vegetas molem corporis tui, praebens ei vitam, quod nullum corpus praestat corpori.

Though there are various meanings of the word substantia in the writings of Augustine, it always refers to something that is a being in its own right:

Nulla natura est... et omnino nulla substantia quae non in se habeat haec tria, et prae se gerat: primo ut sit, deinde ut...

---

1. V. Portalié, op. cit., col. 2358.
2. De immort. anim., XV, 24; PL 32, 1033.
3. Conf., X, 6, 10; PL 32, 783.
The references to the soul in the sense of substance thus defined is constant and frequent in Augustine's work. The elements therefore which Gilson describes as characteristic of the soul united to the body would seem to be found in Augustine a little more clearly than at times is allowed.

In a very illuminating and detailed article on this subject, P. Hieronymus A. Parisiis, O.M.C. offers the following conclusions, among others, with regard to Augustine's doctrine: that both body and soul pertain to the notion of human nature; that both form a unique principle of operation, albeit the soul uses the body as a conjoined instrument; that the to-be, to-live, to-act is given to the body by the soul. The author holds that it is impossible to admit that Augustine supported any other position than that there is a substantial union.

1. Epist. XI, 3; PL 33, 76.
between rational soul and human body.¹

¹ "Jamvero evidenter ea omnia (sc. argumenta), sive cumulatim sive jam singillatim sumpta, stare nequent cum conceptu unionis merae accidentalis utriusque principii in homine, sed exigunt omnino ut intellegatur, haec unio, substantialis prorsus, id est, talis ut ex ea ens exsurget simpliciter, seu per se unum ... Quapropter stat conclusio nostra: nullam aliam conjunctionem animae rationalis cum corpore humano admittit Augustinus quam substantialem," op. cit., p. 303.
CHAPTER TWO
MAN IN RELATION TO GOD

1. The interior path to God
2. The contemplation scene at Ostia
3. The image of God in man
4. Illumination
5. The place of love
6. Ascent of man to God
7. The three stages
8. Plotinian and Augustinian ascent
9. The final end of man

1. The interior path to God

In his younger years, Augustine, like a good Manichaean, was a materialist. He describes in the Confessions how he had a lingering difficulty concerning the nature of spiritual things and even conceived of God as some sort of corporeal substance. As time went on, however, he began to realize that corporeal things are changeable and, to their degree of changeability, untrustworthy. A thing that undergoes continual change bespeaks its instability and imperfection. It is somehow not desirable -- at least when it is compared with something unchanging. Time and time again Augustine enunciates the principle that the unchangeable is to be preferred to the changeable; as he says in De doctrina christiana

1. Conf., VII, 1, 2; PL 32, 733-734.
... II  MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
1. The interior path to God

"Quam cum adhuc mutabilem viderint, etiam huic aliquam incommutabilem assignuntur praepone."¹

It was in this frame of mind that he undertook the study of some Platonic works.² The first great effect these had on him was to enable him to bridge the chasm between Manichean matter and Christian immaterial substance.³ The second, and greater effect, was that the method of the Platonists became his method, and turning from the changeable world to the inward spirit and by way of one's own soul to rise to God, the Unchangeable:

[Anima mea]... erexit se ad intelligentiam suam et abduxit cogitationem a consuetudine, subtrahens se a contradicentibus turbis phantasmatum, ut inveniret, quo lumine aspargetur, cum sine ulla dubitatione clamaret incommutabile praefereundum esse mutabili...⁴

To turn to one's inward self as a means of rising to the truth was guaranteed for Augustine by the opening

1. De doc. chrls., I, 8, 8; PL 34, 22.
II. MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

1. The interior path to God

pages of Sacred Scripture where, in the Genesisic account of creation, he read that God made man wearing His own image and likeness. Augustine began to feel that man could lay hold of truth by knowing himself; if man is created by God to His image, there must be a way of discovering it; and since that image is inmost in man it will be discovered only by an inward-looking search. Thus did the famous injunction of Socrates, "know thyself," receive a fresh impetus in a Christian setting, which is referred to by Professor Gilson as a "Christian Socraticism." It means that man has truth locked up, as it were, within himself and that by returning into himself he can unlock it; it means that somehow knowledge of man is knowledge of the universe, for man holds the key to the universe by his communion with everything that is. Though this knowledge is always potentially man's, it never actually is until man is attentive to himself, conscious of himself. The whole burden of Augustine's writings like the Confessiones and the Soliloquie is that

1. Genesis, 1, 26-27.
2. Gilson, Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 213.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
1. The interior path to God

truth is revealed by fathoming one's own soul. His advice is, "Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas."¹

The intellect is equipped for judging the proper order of realities by having knowledge of itself. The soul lives according to its own nature when it understands that it is subordinate to God and superior to corporeal creatures.² That is why the soul is commanded to know itself, for then it is able to know what it is subject to, and what is subject to it.

It is thus clear that the nosce teipsum for Augustine is a true means of metaphysical inquiry; it is an attempt to grasp reality by fathoming man; it unfolds his nature; it discovers the hierarchy of being and man's

1. De vera religione, 39, 72; PL 34, 154.
2. "Postremo si quamvis locum occupanti corpori anima tamen non localiter jungitur: summis illis aeternisque rationibus, quae incommutabiliter manent, nec utique loco continentur, prior afficitur anima quam corpus; nec prior tantum, sed etiam magis. Tanto enim prior, quanto propinquior; et eadem causa tanto etiam magis, quanto etiam corpore melior. Nec ista propinquitas loco, sed naturae ordine dicta sit. Hoc autem ordine intelligitur a summa essentia speciem corpori per animam tribui, qua est quantumque est." De immor. anim. 15, 24; PL 32, 1033.
place within it by demonstrating him to be superior to purely corporeal things of the world and to be subordinate to God with a total dependency and yet with a dignity that comes from possessing God's image. But first of all does the "know thyself" manifest God's existence, which is the reason for Augustine's exhortation:

Sed memento cum te transcendis, ratiocinantem animam te transcendere. Illuc ergo tende unde ipsum lumen rationis ascenditutr.¹

In some memorable sections of the Confessiones, Augustine outlines the elevation of his soul to God. In his typical manner, he demands a report from the material world -- the earth, the waters, the stars, which answered, "Non sumus Deus tuus: quaere super nos."² Next Augustine, beginning his inward journey proper, turns to himself, first the body, then the soul; he finds in the soul certain wonderful powers, especially that of memory, or consciousness; but even this must be passed by: "transibo et hanc vim meam, quae memoria vocatur, ut pertendam

¹ De vera rel., 39, 72; PL 34, 154.
² Conf., X, καπ, κα; PL 32, 783.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
1. The interior path to God

ad te, dulce lumen. 1 Lastly he considers reason and discovers it to be the depositary of truth, which, because it is unchangeable, brings him directly to the Unchangeable Truth. 2

There are passages in other works 3 that are quite similar. They indicate why St. Augustine turns his gaze inwards in the attempt to search for God. 4 The principal works that delineate his itinerary are De libero arbitrio and De vera religione; there are many other supporting texts. 5 To begin his investigation of the inner man Augustine tries to isolate that which is the most excellent. He is directly faced with three perfections: esse, vivere, and intelligere. 6 But since

3. Enar. in Ps. 41, 18; PL 36, 475-476.
4. The life of the spirit is not the only argument for God's existence that Augustine uses, though it is characteristically his, v. R.P.F. Cayré, Dieu présent dans la vie d'esprit, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1951 pp. 18-27.
5. V. Cayré, op. cit., p. 43 ff.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

1. The interior path to God

A thing can be without living, and can live without understanding, and an understanding thing must both be and live, it follows that understanding beings are the most excellent; we must focus our attention on them. Augustine invokes here what Cayre calls "le principe d'intégration," by which a superior being comprises and, as it were, integrates, the perfections of beings that are ontologically lower. By thus choosing the superior of several terms, he gradually screens out what, for him, will be the sure manifestation of God's existence.

Three knowing faculties are easily discerned in man: the exterior sense, the interior sense, and the reason. Augustine discusses the work of the five exterior senses and shows how each one has its proper object; one sense does not judge another and yet the corporeal world is known by them: "... manifestum est nullo quinque istos sensus eorum sensu posse sentiri, quamvis eis corporalia quaeque sentiantur." Though the senses

2. De lib. arb., II, 3, 8-9; PL 32, 1244-1246.
... II  MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
1. The interior path to God

cannot perceive each other, the interior sense perceives all the exterior senses and through them the corporeal world. The interior sense moderates the exterior sense and judges it; for that reason the interior is higher. This exemplifies another general principle in St. Augustine, that that which judges is better than the judged: "Nulli autem dubium est eum qui judicat, eo de quo judicat esse meliorem." Cayré refers² to this principle, whereby the inferior is subordinated to the superior, as the principle of active subordination. It is a principle that occurs, whether expressed or implied, repeatedly in Augustine as one of the major constituents of his dialectic.³ The judgment made by one being over another is taken in a metaphysical sense indicating that the judging being is ontologically higher than the judged. On the strength of this principle, reason, since it is the highest of the judging faculties, is the most sublime element in man's nature: "Quare vide, obsecro, utrum aliquid

1. De lib. arb., II, 5, 12; PL 32, 1248.
3. Cayré, op. cit., p. 121.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
1. The interior path to God

Augustine's problem in his inward path to God now becomes to transcend man by transcending the highest element in man. It is not enough merely to transcend man to attain to God, but to transcend something in man beyond which there is nothing but God:

Non continuo, si quid melius quam quod in mea natura optimum est, invenire potuero, Deum esse dixerim. Non enim mihi placet Deum appellari, quo mea ratio est inferior, sed quo nullus est superior.

If there is something above man that is eternal and immutable, we can call that God. The heart of Augustine's proof is the analysis of truth and then it is not so much the content of ideas that holds his interest, as the truth value that is contained in them.

1. De lib. arb., II, 6, 13; PL 32, 1248.
2. De lib. arb., II, 6, 14; PL 32, 1248.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Cf. Van Steenberghen, op. cit., P. 41, "...toute son attention se porte, non pas sur le contenu des idées qui représent des réalités corrélatives, mais sur la valeur de vérité ou intelligibilité que toute idée recèle."
Before proceeding in De libero arbitrio\textsuperscript{1} to the question of truth, Augustine shows that even in sensible, corporeal objects there is a kind of transcendence; for, though the objects themselves are single, they are perceived by many persons, and even by several senses; yet the objects remain distinct. He seems desirous of acquainting his readers with the notion of transcendence by making an analogy between transcendence in the sensible order and transcendence in the purely intellectual order: just as the terminus of transcendence in the sensible order is man, so the terminus of transcendence in the intellectual order is God; and just as the sensible object perceived is distinct from the sense, so is truth perceived distinct from man.

Augustine now turns his attention to rational knowledge by analyzing the remarkable characteristics of numbers: necessity, immutability, and eternity. That seven and three, for example, are ten is true not only now, but always; it is an incorruptible truth.\textsuperscript{2} Truths enunciated

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. De lib. arb., II, 7, 15-19; PL 32.
\item 2. De lib. arb., II, 8, 21; PL 32, 1251-1252.
\end{itemize}
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
1. The interior path to God

by wisdom, such as those pertaining to moral life, e.g., "...juste esse vivendum ... propria suis quibusque tribuenda,"¹ are likewise necessary, immutable, and eternal. So much is truth imperishable that even if the world and per impossible truth perished, it would still be true that the world and truth perished: "Ex eo ... veritatem non posse interire conclusimus, quod non solum si totus mundus intereat, sed etiam si ipsa veritas, verum et mundum et veritatem interisse."² All truths are intelligible; all of them are somehow in truth itself which is grasped by the intellect knowing individual truths: "...esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnis quae incommutabiliter vera sunt continentem."³

Further, truth is not the possession of an individual; separate minds can see one truth; truth in common, it belongs to all: "...veritatem ... quam non possis dicere tuam vel meam, vel cujusquam hominis, sed omnibus

¹. De lib. arb., II, 10, 28; PL 32, 1256.
². Solil, II, 15, 28; PL 32, 898.
³. De lib. arb., II, 12, 33; PL 32, 1259.
... MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

1. The interior path to God

incommutabilia vera cernentibus.

Truth, then, is transcendent; it transcends all particulars -- corporeal objects, knowing faculties, and persons; it is beyond every individual circumstances and conditions; it is not contingent, changeable, or temporal, but, on the contrary, necessary, immutable, and eternal.

Whence the characteristics of truth? Surely not from anything below reason, for all things below reason are subject to change. Not from reason itself, for the human spirit is liable to err; as Augustine writes in De vera religione:

Haec autem lex omnium artium cum sit omnino incommutabilis, mens vero humana cui talem legem videre concessum est, mutabilem pati possit erroris, satis apparet supra mentem nostram esse legem, quae veritas dicitur.

Reason does not judge of truth, but judges by it. A person is aware that he is not the inventor of truth,

1. De lib. arb., II, 12, 33; PL 32, 1259.
2. De lib. arb., II, 12, 34; PL 32, 1259.
3. De vera rel., XXX, 56; PL 34, 147.
but its discoverer; and he rejoices therein.\textsuperscript{1} The point that Augustine wants to establish is actually established here, -- that to which nothing is superior, which is eternal and immutable is to be called God. But nothing excels the eternal and immutable truth; God therefore is that truth:\textsuperscript{2} "Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille

---

1. De lib. arb., II, 12, 34; PL 32, 1259.

2. In a very illuminating lecture in the \textit{Acta Hebdomadae Augustininae-Thomistiae}, Prof. Joachim Sestili holds that the singular property of Augustine's argument consists in this, that the immutable intelligible ratio of itself expresses an absolute truth of the ideal order, thus founding the argument for a subsistent truth. In the ensuing discussion R. P. Garrigou-Lagrange asks if the argument can be reduced to form:

\textit{Leges necessariae, quibus \textit{reguntur} tum intellectus nostri, tum omne ens reale (sive possible, sive actuale), debent habere suum fundamentum supremum in primo ente necessario et in primo intelligente.}

\textit{Atqui principium contradictionis est lex necessaria, qua \textit{reguntur} tum omnes intellectus nostri, tum omne ens reale (sive possible, sive actuale). Ergo principium contradictionis debet habere suum supremum fundamentum in primo ente necessario et in primo intelligente, et hoc dicimus Deum.}

\textit{Forte non convenimus circa primum cognitum ab intellectu nostro, sed si ita proponitur haec demonstratio existentiae Dei, admitto quod est vere apodictica, et a posteriori, quamvis \textit{formaliter} procedat ex veritatis bus necessaribus et aeternis, quae sunt \textit{materialiter} seu tanquam in subiecto in rebus contingentibus, quae necessario ab ipsis \textit{reguntur}.}

Prof. Sestili agrees that the argument can be reduced to form. \textit{Acta Hebdomadae Augustininae-Thomistiae}, Taurini, Marietti, 1931, p. 267.
... MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
1. The interior path to God

...II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
1. The interior path to God

It would be a serious mistake at this point to think that somehow Augustine places truth above being, as though truth could exist without being, or being exist without truth. On the contrary, clearly are truth and being identified in that which is: "Nam verum mihi esse id quod est,"2 or again, "Omnia vera sunt, inquantum sunt."3 So that God, as infinite truth is infinite being. Reflecting on the deep difference between a being that can change and one that cannot, Augustine speaks of the latter as vere esse: "Res enim quaelibet, prorsus qualicumque excellentia, si mutabilis est, non vere est; non enim est ibi verum esse, ubi est et non esse."4 He does not arrive at God's existence at two different points, God the Unchangeable and

1. De lib. arb., II, 15, 39; PL 32, 1262.
2. Solil., II, 5, 8; PL 32, 889.
3. Conf. VII, 15, 21; PL 32, 744. Boyer distinguishes four different senses of the word "veritas" in Augustine; but that which gives meaning to them all is that "truth" is the affirmation of that which is. V. Charles Boyer, S. J., L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de saint Augustin, 2me édition, Paris, Beauchesne et ses fils, 1951, pp. 10-11.
4. In Joannis evangelium, Tract, 38, 10; PL 35, 1689.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

1. The interior path to God

God the Truth; rather, in what Gilson calls one of the profoundest portions of Augustine's metaphysics,\(^1\) he conceives the two together in God, the Unchangeable Truth, the Vere esse:

Priora enim spiritualia opera tua quam ista corporea, quamvis lucida et caelestia. At ego nec priora illa, sed te ipsam, te Veritas, in qua "non est commutatio nec momenti obumbratio," esuriebam et sitiebam.\(^2\)

The Vere esse in the highest life: "... et ibi esse primam vitam et primam essentiam, ubi est prima intellectus,"\(^3\) and has no defect of being: "Aliquam quaerit (sc. animus) incommutabilem veritatem, sine defectu substantia."\(^4\) Augustine saw in this unchangeable existence all the perfections that are proper to the fullness of being: "Aeternus, potens, speciosus, justus, bonus, spiritus..."\(^5\) he read the perfect name of God in Exodus:

\(^1\) Gilson, op. cit., Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin, p. 27.
\(^2\) Conf., III, 6, 1; PL 32, 687.
\(^3\) De vera rel., 31, 57; PL 34, 147.
\(^4\) Enarr, in Ps. 41, 7; PL 36, 469.
\(^5\) De Trin, XV, 5, 8; PL 42, 1062.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

1. The interior path to God

"Qui est."¹

Since, for St. Augustine, it is the whole man who responds to truth, he is not automatically drawn to acknowledge the truth as though he has no control over his own direction. One must dispose himself to see the truth: '"... videbit autem qui bene vivit, bene orat, bene studet."² The truth cannot be grasped unless the will acquiesces, for the will through pride can cause resistance to the call of truth -- this especially true in arriving at a knowledge of God.³ On the other hand, no one can fail to know God if he seeks the truth with pure and pious intention:

Fieri autem non potest quadam divina providentia, ut religiosis animis seipsum et Deum suum, id est veritatem pie, caste ac diligentem quaerentibus, inveniendi facultas desit.⁴

¹. Exodus, 3, 14.
². De ordine, II, 19, 51; PL 32, 1019.
³. "Dès qu'on touche à Dieu, le mystère nous enveloppe, effraie l'intelligence, et l'empêche d'être irrésistiblement entraînée par les preuves si la volonté ne vient y joindre son empire." Portalé, op. cit., col. 2332.
⁴. De quan. anim., XIV, 24; PL 32, 1049.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

1. The interior path to God

They will infallibly find God who seek Him; those who empty themselves of their own self-seeking and seek the truth will discover Truth as their reward.

Ascendimus ad coelum, si cogitamus Deum, qui ascensus in corde fecit. Quid est ascendere in corde? Proficere in Deum. Quomodo omnis qui deficit, non descendit, sed cadit: sic omnis qui proficit, ascendit; sed si sic proficiat, ut non superbiat; si sic ascendat, ut non cadat: si autem proficiendo superbiat, ascendendo iterum cadit. 

Thus does man become the means of Augustine’s inward path by which he rises to God: from the changeable world to the nosce teipsum; from the interior man to the truth; and thence to the Immutable Truth, the Vere esse, Life Itself.

2. The contemplation scene at Ostia

For Augustine, then, the first relationship that man has towards God is that, by an interior means, he is manifestative of God’s existence. We may now turn to analyze the relationship of the very being of man with

1. De gen. anim. XIV, 24, PL 32, 1049.
2. Enarr. in Ps., 122, 3; PL 37, 1631.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

2. The contemplation scene at Ostia

God, which relationship Augustine surely views as the most profound in the nature of man. It is a thorough domination of his life. It is the source of the image of God in him; the source of his personality, his liberty, his charity; the source of every value, corporeal or spiritual, temporal or eternal. It encompasses every segment of man's life which has no meaning apart from God. Without this relationship man is but nothingness: "Quid autem vilius quam homo sine Deo."1 With it man becomes a person, knowing truth and choosing good, loving and being loved, subsisting in himself yet open to God — a sacred thing in God's eyes: "Deus enim deum te vult facere."2

Augustine's own personal life was such that a strong desire for God and life in Him became the law of his being.3 He often implies God's sway over man is so

---

1. Sermo 349, 2; PL 39, 1537.
2. Sermo 166, 4; PL 38, 909.
3. "La nostalgie de Dieu, le désir d'un salut personnel, possession plénière de ce Dieu, la persuasion que le bonheur le plus pur ici-bas n'est qu'un acompte sur cette échéance tant désirée, mais reculée, ces convictions sont l'âme de son âme et la loi organique de sa vie." Pere Paul Henry, S.J., La vision d'Ostie dans la vie et l'oeuvre de saint Augustin, Paris, J. Vrin. 1938, p. 75.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
2. The contemplation scene at Ostia

intimate and so internal that it is insufficient to say that man is near God; it is closer to the truth to say that God is the very life of man: "... ut vita carnis anima est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est;"¹ "Tu autem eras interior intimo meo, et superior summo meo;"² "... vita animae Deus."³

Probably nowhere in his writings does Augustine speak with more force or more poignancy of man's place with God than in that part of the Confessiones where he tells of the contemplation at Ostia that enraptured his mother and himself.⁴ They were discussing what the life of the saints might be like in the presence of Truth, for the beauties of earth and sky do not compare with Him, nor even the wisdom of our minds which is as nothing measured against Eternal Wisdom -- and this, for an instant, they touched: "... attingimus eam modice toto

¹ De Giv. Dei, XIX, 26; PL 41, 656.
² Conf., III, 6, 2; PL 32, 688.
³ Sermo 156, vi, 6; PL 38, 853.
⁴ Conf., IX, 10, 13ff; PL 32, 773-774.
While the tumult of the external world became quiet, Augustine and Monica heard only one voice, that of Eternal Wisdom:

Rapida cogitatione attingimus aeternam sapientiam super omnia manentem, si continuetur hoc et subtrahantur aliae visiones longe imperis generis, et haec una rapiat et absorbat et recondat in interiora gaudia spectatorem suum, ut talia sit sempiterna vita, quale fuit hoc momentum intelligentiae, cui suspiravimus. Nonne hoc est: Intra in gaudium Domini tui?

Augustine's entire life was a movement towards God, and the vision of Ostia was that life rolled into a single moment. It included the great Augustinian ideas of the preferability of the unchangeable to the changeable, the desire for absolutes, the place of eternal truth, and the true life in the light of Eternal Wisdom. The vision goes beyond being a mere, historical incident because it locates itself in the sphere of religious philosophy and metaphysics. In this sense Père Henry discerns three

1. Loc. cit.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Henry, op. cit., p. 3.
4. Henry, op. cit., p. 27.
2. The contemplation scene at Ostia

forces at work in the scene at Ostia: that of philosophy, of Sacred Scripture, and of Monica.

The literary and philosophical frame of Ostia has a distinctly Plotinian core; Père Henry even suggests the name "enneadique."¹ The spirit of Plotinus is easily recognized in the desire for truth, in the desire of God, in the element of unification with the divine, and in the mystical elevation that accomplishes union.² There is a striking similarity between this part of the Confessiones and certain parts of the Enneads on the three hypostases and the good.³

It was this Plotinian philosophy, too, that Augustine applied to Sacred Scripture; not that he had learned St. John and St. Paul in Plotinus, but that he was able to bring the philosophy of Plotinus to them to achieve a breadth of understanding that would have been impossible

---

1. Henry, op. cit., p. 32.


3. Enneads, I, 6 and V, 1; Cf. Henry op. cit., p. 17.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

2. The contemplation scene at Ostia

for him otherwise. He himself tells how foolish it is to admit of any plausibility that the disposition engendered by the sacred books could be engendered by the "books of the Platonists."¹

In his mother, Monica, Augustine saw his favorite principle personified: that truth is not truth unless it is lived. She is frequently mentioned in the writings of the holy doctor, and her continued influence over her son is clearly seen; she was, for him, the full symbol of the Christian life. This force, together with the others, took a new direction in Augustine, one that was original and unique.² The experience at Ostia taught Augustine that all his thought was to be orientated on that renewal of spirit and intensity of life that develop only when solidly founded on truth -- this became his great philosophical objective. He now realized even more that man is entitatively dependent upon God, that man's life is immersed in the divine life.

¹. Conf., VIII, 20, 26; PL 32, 761.
². "La vision d'Ostie prend un sens, une direction d'aucune de ses composantes. La force résultante est une force nouvelle, originale et, d'une certaine façon, unique." Henry, op. cit., p. 28.
3. The image of God in man

In a single glance in the vision of Ostia, St. Augustine was enabled to peer into the deeper reaches of the meaning of man's relationship to God. Among them that he later came to articulate was that man is a creature of God and that he exists in a universe created by Him. But the doctrine of creation gives rise to that of participation — a fundamental doctrine in Augustinianism. Imperfections indeed indicate the poverty of creatures; but the perfections of creatures express some facet of the Creator's perfection, in which creatures themselves share. Since God is the principle of all, all somehow participate in His being:

Quae utique in Deo est, ubi est etiam illa sapientia, quae non participando sapientes est, sed cuius participatione sapiens est anima quaecumque sapiens est. Quapropter etiam similitudo Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, propriè dicitur similitudo; quia non participatione alicujus similitudinis similis est, sed ipsa est prima similitudo cujus participatione similia sunt, quaecumque per illam fecit Deus.

1. De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, XVI, 57; PL 34, 242. All of c. XVI is a discussion of participation and likeness.
On the strength of participation there is a resemblance between creature and Creator. The resemblance that things possess is theirs by the very force of creation, for creative influence and resemblance to God are correlative: "...omnium pulchritudo quodam modo vox eorum est, confitentium Deum ... Si pulchra sunt quae fecit, quanto pulchrior est qui fecit?"¹ God is the exemplary cause of all that He has made, for He is the model of all; and the features of God that are reproduced in creatures are reproduced without their really possessing anything that belongs to Him.

The basis for exemplarity is the divine ideas, which are variously called by Augustine, ideae, formae, species, rationes, exempla,² and which, with a certain platonic tendency, express the object in a universal way. Since things differ it is reasonable to expect that each has its own ratio: "Nec eadem ratione homo, qua equus: hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur

1. Enar. in Ps. 148, 15; PL 37, 1946-1947.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
3. The image of God in man

propris sunt creata rationibus."¹ It was impossible for Augustine to ascribe the rationes to separately existing forms as Plato did; he ascribed them directly to God:
"Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris?..."² He states his position clearly and succinctly in the following words:

Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur.³

On further reflection, anything found in God enjoys eternity and immutability, and is therefore eternal truth; all creatures -- imitations of God by their participation -- participate in God as the Eternal Truth, the Vere esse:

Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatae, summe rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque incommutabile potest esse ... non solum sunt ideas, sed ipsae verae sunt, quia aeternae sunt, et ejusmodi atque incommutabiles manent; quarum participatione fit ut sit quidquid est,

1. De ideis, #462, of 83 Quaestiones; PL 40, 30. V. also De Gen. ad lit. V, 12, 28; PL 34, 331.
2. De ideis, loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
3. The image of God in man

quoquomodo est.¹

Creatures have their being from that Eternal Truth con­
_considered as a unique synthesis, infinitely simple, of the
 divine ideas. Augustine is able to explain participation
 and exemplarity by conceiving the divine ideas not only
 as models but also as creative energies: "... les Idées
 ne doivent pas être conçues comme des représentations
 statiques et inertes, mais comme énergies d'une fécondité
 illimitée."²

God has it within His power to produce greater or
 lesser imitations of Himself by greater or lesser partici­
pation in His truth; in creatures this distance from the
 Creator is characterized by varying degrees of mutability --
 the nearer they are to the Veritas incommutabilis the less
 mutable they are:

Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est
 summe sit, et ideo immutabilis sit; rebus
 quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non
 summe esse, sicut ipse est; et aliis dedit
 esse amplius, aliis minus, atque ita naturas

1. Loc. cit.

2. Boyer, op. cit., L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie
 de saint Augustin, p. 139.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

3. The image of God in man

*essentiarum gradibus ordinavit.*

All creation indeed is a vestige of God, all is a testimony to His goodness, and all praises Him. But at the head of creation are the beings endowed with reason: "Anima rationalis inter eas res quae sunt a Deo conditae, omnia superat..." They are a greater participation of the truth: "quemadmodum inipsis corporibus... meliora fiunt participatione melioris... sic incorporeae creaturae rationales ipsius Creatoris fiunt participatione meliores..." The reason that Augustine assigns for this higher participation of rational creatures is precisely their rationality: "...his omnibus ratiocinando et intelligendo meliores sumus..."

This participation of rational creatures in God was

1. *De civ. Dei.*, XII, 2; PL 41, 350.
2. *De lib. arb.*, II, 16, 43; PL 32, 1264-1265.
3. *Enar. in Ps. 118*, Sermo 1; PL 37, 1501-1504.
4. *Enar. in Ps. 48*, 5; PL 36, 546-547.
5. *De ideis*, #462, of 83 QQ; PL 40, 31.
7. *De civ. Dei*, VIII, 15, 1; PL 41, 240.
3. The image of God in man

given a further meaning when Augustine read in Sacred Scripture that God said, "Let us make man wearing our own image and likeness."¹ Since this was not said of irrational creatures, the reflection that man bears is radically different from that of inferior beings. This special resemblance is called an "image" by Augustine.² An image is always a likeness, but it adds to the notion of likeness that it is a copy of the exemplar, that it represents a thing according to a likeness in species - it expresses a thing by its resemblance:

Omnis imago similis est ei cujus imago est; nec tamen omne quod simile est alicui, etiam imago est ejus: sicut in speculo et pictura, quia imagines sunt, etiam similes sunt ... Imago enim tunc est, cum de aliquo exprimitur.³

The fact that all creatures imitate God but only man, in corporeal creation, is an image forces Augustine to inquire into the highest part of man for an expressed resemblance; the image is in man not because he exists,

2. Throughout all his works, e.g. De gen. impf. liber. XVI, 54–62; PL 34, 241–246.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
3. The image of God in man

nor because he is living, but because he is knowing —
the relation is that of wisdom to Wisdom. That which is
noblest in man is his mind: 1 "... in eo quod ipse homo
in sua natura melius caeteris animalibus, melius etiam
daest animae suae partibus habet, quod est ipsa mens." 2
It is the mind that calls upon God's light and God's truth,
that judges the true from the false, the just from the un-
just, that raises the soul by seizing the truth from above. 3

Therefore, the mind is the proper place of the image of
God: 4 Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem
suam in mente: ibi est imago Dei." 4

The image of God in man is yet more profound, for
it reflects the Trinity of Divine Persons. The great

1. Augustine variously calls the same thing mens, ratio,
spiritus depending on the context. Cf. Gilson, In-
troduction, p. 289, #2.

2. De Trinitate, XV, 27, 49; PL 42, 1096.

3. V. Enar. in Ps., 42, 6; PL 36, 480, e.g. "Ergo intel-
ligimus habere nos aliquid ubi imago Dei est, mentem
collicet atque rationem. Ipsa mens invocabat lucem
Dei et veritatem Dei. Ipsa est qua est capimus justum
et injustum; ipsa est qua discernimus verum a falso;
ipsa est qua vocatur intellectus..."

4. De symbolo (Sermo ad catechumenos), I, 2; PL 40, 628.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
3. The image of God in man

truth God has revealed of Himself, of His inmost nature, is the Most Holy Trinity; it takes man far beyond the penetration of pure reason and presents to him, at the very source of being, a plurality of persons in infinite unity. This truth for Augustine was so radical that it became nothing less than a question of first principles. Belief in the Trinity, since believing leads to understanding, was a divinely given principle that brought the holy bishop to a deeper understanding of the universe.

Augustine discovered reflections of the Trinity wherever he looked; since all things were made by the Trinity, all things reflect it — there are indications of Its presence in Its work: "Universa nobis Trinitas in suis operibus intimatur." There are trinitarian reflections in the sensitive part of man, e.g. the res visa, visio externa, and animae intentio. These reflections, however, cannot be called images of the Trinity, but

The image of God in man 

vestiges or traces only. It is man that possesses the image of the Trinity. For this image Augustine turns to the soul of man, and precisely the superior soul. Though there are several trinities that he speaks of, there are two that pre-occupy him. The first is mens, notitia, and amor; the second memoria sui, intelligentia, and voluntas. Augustine tries to show that, just as in the Trinity there are three Persons, each distinct from each yet one with the divine nature, each element of the trinitarian images is distinct from the other two yet is one with them.

As regards the first trinity, the mind sees itself and produces an internal word, which is knowledge; that which joins the two is love. The mind in knowing knows itself, and in knowing itself, loves itself. Each is in each, for mind must be referred to knowledge and to love, and knowledge must be referred to mind and to love, and love must be referred to mind and knowledge:

2. De Trin., IX, 3-5; PL 42, 949-953.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

3. The image of God in man

In illis tribus, cum se novit mens et amat se, manet trinitas, mens, amor, notitia; et nulla commixtione confunditur ... Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis, et tamen eorum singulum quodque substantia est, et simul omnia una substantia vel essentia, cum relative dicantur ad invicem.¹

As regards the second trinity, the mind, as it were, turning back on a thought previously had and now being conscious of itself (memoria sui) as having had the thought, expresses itself (intelligentia) and loves itself (voluntas). As in the first trinity, this too stands for three elements in one substance:

Haec igitur tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita; nec tres mentes, sed una mens; consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia.²

It must be kept in mind that for St. Augustine the images of the Trinity in man belong to the natural order of things, and not to the supernatural. It is quite true that the knowledge of the Trinity is had by supernatural revelation, and that therefore the knowledge of the image

---

2. De Trin., X, 11, 18; PL 42, 983.
3. The image of God in man

of the Trinity is contingent on revelation; but it would be impossible for a spirit, by its nature, not to image the Holy Trinity. With the knowledge of revealed truth with regard to the Trinity we are equipped all the more to understand the true grandeur of human nature; and for St. Augustine, ever alive to truth, the image of the Trinity in man is that grandeur.

4. Illumination

Another segment of Augustine's teaching that shows the relation of man to God is the manner of man's knowing, -- the theory of illumination. A great deal has been written on illumination, comprising critical interpretations and comparisons with other theories of knowledge. Within the scope of this thesis, however, allowing for divergent views as to Augustine's true meaning, the over-riding importance of illumination lies in its inner connection with the entire augustinian system insofar as it bespeaks man's dependence on God; it is not to be considered as an isolated problem but as part of the general problem of our dependence on God.¹

¹ Cf. Portalié, op. cit., DTC, col. 2334.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
4. Illumination

It is quite possible that St. Augustine was encouraged to believe that there was a reciprocal function between light and knowledge by references to them in Plato. All the more would he have been encouraged by the striking references in the New Testament from which he learned that light emanates from God Himself, Who is the source of knowledge. That is why he could write, for example, in the early-written Soliloquia that no truths can be understood "... nisi ab alio, suo sole illustrentur."

1 Just as the eyes are unable to see physical objects without corporeal light, so the intellect is unable to understand intellectual objects without some kind of spiritual light which emanates from God. This is reiterated by Augustine with clarity in the late-written De Trinitate, where he says:

Credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, subjuncta sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea.

Since there is no exact formulation of the theory

1. Solil, I, 8; PL 32, 877.
2. De Trin., XII, 15, 24; PL 42, 1011.
in any of the writings of Augustine, Cayré, in an admirable summary,\(^1\) rejects any interpretation that is based on pantheism, pre-existence, ontologism, or any system that considers God as placing intelligible ideas into the soul at birth, or imparting them fully elaborated to the mature soul. To several current conceptions Cayré adds a few precisions and presents his own explanation in which he refers to illumination as a kind of indirect intuition of the spirit; it is "... une perception intellectuelle des vérités fondamentales, lesquelles manifestent l'action supérieure d'une Vérité pure ou transcendantale et la font voir indirectement."\(^2\)

Illumination is at one and the same time a divine action on the created spirit and an action of the spirit itself, accomplished in a way that is marked by an appeal to the natural powers of the soul, therefore not requiring anything beyond an ordinary divine concurrence of the purely

---

II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
4. Illumination

Illumination, in any system of interpretation, allows Augustine to place man in the more immediate presence of God since the fundamental truths which the mind of man grasps are somehow made perceptible by the action of eternal Truth immediately present: "... docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus, Deo intus pandente, manifestis." This is why there is an intimate connection between illumination and exemplarism in St. Augustine, and why, in one sense, illumination is the best expression of exemplarism, for the formal resemblance of man to

1. Boyer emphasizes more the knowledge of sensible things and holds for a thomistic abstraction in illumination. As a matter of fact, in the essentials of their metaphysics of knowledge St. Augustine and St. Thomas differ little: "A un endroit où il a voulu entrer profondément dans la pensée d'Augustin, il a conclu que selon ce Père la force intellectuelle qui fait voir les intelligibles est immanente en chaque homme et que, malgré une autre manière de parler, la différence entre la doctrine d'Augustin et la sienne propre n'est pas grande: "non multum refert" (De essir. creat., 10, 8)." "La philosophie augustiniennne ignore-t-elle l'abstraction?" in Nouvelle Revue Theologique, LVII (1930), p. 830. See his Essais sur la doctrine de S. Augustin, Paris, 1932, pp. 138-184 and L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de Augustin, Paris, 1951, pp. 237-241.

2. De magistro, XII, 40; PL 32, 1217.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

4. Illumination

God centers about knowledge. Further, all knowledge is in the eternal truth of the Word; and when St. Augustine read, "There is one who enlightens every soul born into the world; he was the true light," it is not surprising that he found in the mind's generation of knowledge of itself an admirable parallel to the Father's generation of the Word. This is the very fountain-head of Augustine's theory and leads him to hold that Christ, the Second Person becomes man, is in some way the interior illuminative light, as unmistakably recorded in the classic text of De magistro. The external speaker is of little avail; we understand only because the illuminative power is present within us -- which seems to be an extension of St. Paul's indwelling of Christ "by faith:"

Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque semper-terna Sapientia.

1. John, 1. 9.
2. De mag. 11, 38; PL 32, 1216.
3. Eph., 3, 16.
It follows as a direct and necessary corollary that illumination has its counterpart in the sphere of practical conduct; there is a moral illumination comparable to intellectual illumination. It has already been shown that, for Augustine, the truth must be lived, that wisdom is not wisdom unless it is taken into the fabric of the practical man. Some light is shed on this in De libero arbitrio where Augustine points out that everyone realizes that he must act justly towards others, that incorruption is to be preferred to corruption, that inferior things are to be subordinated to the higher.\footnote{De lib. arb., II, 28; PL 32, 1256.}

These "quaedam lumina virtutum"\footnote{De lib. arb., II, 29; PL 32, 1256.} are true and immutable, and share in the Eternal Truth; they pertain to the perfection of wisdom:

\[\text{Manifestissimum est igitur omnes has, quas regulas diximus et lumina virtutum, ad sapientiam pertinere: quandoquidem quanto magis quisque ad agendam vitam eis utitur, et secundum haec agit vitam, tanto magis vivit facitque sapientia; omne autem quod sapienter fit, non potest recte dici a sapientia esse separatum.}\footnote{Loc. cit.} \]
Cooperation with these lights of virtue is made urgent by the simple fact that God's law holds sway over universal order. The eternal law, identified with Himself, is the law whereby God conserves the order of nature ordained by Him. This order of things, thus imposed by the unchangeable law of God, has been transcribed to rational creatures:

Haec autem disciplina ipsa Dei lex est, quae apud sum fixa est inconcussa semper manens, in sapientia animas quasi transcribitur.  

Man makes his judgments, then, by way of participation in the eternal law made known to him by a moral illumination so that he can seek virtue in light of Eternal Truth.

Illumination, for Augustine, is no chance theory; it arises from the nature of the soul and its relation to God. By means of this doctrine, the doctor of grace again drives home the complete dependence of man on God, and shows more deeply the sense of noverim me, noverim Te; the more one knows God the more he knows himself, and the more he knows himself the more he knows God.

1. De ordine, II, 8, 25; PL 32, 1006.
... II  MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:  
4. Illumination

Illumination as Blondel points out,\(^1\) gives us a more profound perspective of ourselves, the meaning of our existence, and the destiny of our being.

5. The place of love

Man’s relationship towards God is not satisfied with, as it were, a merely theoretical knowledge of Him; the true possession of a good is not only to know it, but also to will it; and to will it is to love it, so that a good is possessed by being known and loved at the same time: "Bonum quod non amatur, nemo potest perfecte habere vel nosse."\(^2\) Man is moved by love, for his will is ordained to the good, which he loves. Augustine is fond of using the physics of the ancient world to bring out this idea; just as physical objects, by their own weight, tend to their natural resting places, so does the will, by its own weight of love, tend to its natural place: "Corpus pondere suo nititur ad locum suum ..."

\(^1\) Blondel, op. cit., in Monument to St. Augustine, p. 331.
\(^2\) De div. quaes. #35, 1; PL 40, 24.
II  MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
5. The place of love

pondus meum amor meus; eo fero quocumque fero ... Dono
tuo accendimur, et sursum ferimur.\(^1\)

In the proper order of things, love\(^2\) is to be ex-
tended to an object according to the goodness it has; it
is the virtue of charity when that which ought to be
loved is loved: "charitas, qua id quod diligendum est,
diligitur."\(^3\) In a relative sense, "... quod non propter
se amatur, non amatur,"\(^4\) for goods inferior to God are
good relatively to Him; they are good because He is good.
But God is good, not because of another, but because of
Himself: "Ita Deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed

\(^1\) Conf. XIII, 9, 10; PL 32, 849.

\(^2\) St. Augustine objects to those writers who make a
distinction between amor, charitas, and dilectio,
pointing out that Sacred Scripture makes no such
distinction (De civ. Dei, XIV, 7, 2; PL 41, 410-411);
all three are used in regard to both good and bad
loves. Gilson, however (Introduction, op. cit., p.
177), shows that Augustine himself uses charitas re-
ferring to illicit loves very rarely. At times he
commends the use of charitas and dilectio in prefer-
ence to amor, e.g. "Amor autem rerum amandarum,
charitas vel dilectio melius dicitur." De div. quaes.
#35, 2; PL 40, 24.

\(^3\) Epist., 167, 4, 15; PL 33, 739.

\(^4\) Solil. I, 13, 22; PL 32, 881.
... II  MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
5. The place of love

bonum omnis boni."¹ God is the sum total of all perfection, and, therefore, the sum total of all good; He is the absolute good, and that is why Augustine wholeheartedly accepts² the definition of St. John, "Deus charitas est."³ God, then, is to be loved with an absolute love since He is the absolute good; a love of God that is an admixture of love and of something else is not the pure, absolute love that is due Him: "Minus enim te amat qui tecum aliquid amat quod non propter te amat."⁴ Our love of God should be such that whatever good our nature has is to be returned to Him as its source: "quid remanet de corde tuo, unde diligas te ipsum? quid de anima tua? quid de mente tua? ... Totum exigit te, qui fecit te."⁵ The measure of our love for God is to love Him without measure.⁶

¹. De Trin., VIII, 3, 4; PL 42, 949.
². Enar. in Ps. 149, 4; PL 37, 1951-1952.
³. 1 John, 4, 8.
⁴. Conf., X, 29, 40; PL 32, 796.
⁵. Sermo, 24, 4, 7; PL 38, 212.
⁶. Epist. 109, 2; Severus to Augustine; PL 33, 419.
The love of God is the perfection of the soul, for the perfection of the object becomes the perfection of him who unites himself to it; and since man wills to unite himself to God by love, he participates in God's goodness, and Love itself dwells within: "Conscientiam suam attendat, et ibi habitat Deus... si autem charitas ibi habitat, Deus ibi habitat."\(^1\) Man's moral life is to live in God by love. Thus love is not only the means whereby we shall attain God hereafter, but also the means of possessing God here and now.

It is necessary here, in speaking of the relationship of love between God and man, to make brief mention of Augustine's idea as to the work of grace in the supernatural order in which man is constituted. Grace is an entirely gratuitous gift on God's part\(^2\) that enables the acts of man to be elevated to a place commensurate with his end. It restores to man, having fallen in Adam, the possibility of accomplishing his supernatural destiny, and brings about in him what is tantamount to a

\(^1\) *Enarr. in Ps. 149, 4*; *PL* 37, 1951.

\(^2\) *De dono persever.* 9, 21; *PL* 45, 1004-1005.
re-creation; thus the image of God that was present in
man in a special way by grace and lost by sin, is re-
produced by a second approach of grace: "Non vos, sed
ego sum Deus: ego creavi, ego recreo; ego formavi, ego
reformo; ego feci, ego reficio."\(^1\) Grace, at one and
the same time, effects the expulsion of sin and the re-
newal of man: "Gratia perfecte hominem novum facit...\(^2\)
perfecte innovat hominem, quantum attinet ad liberatione-
em omnibus peccatis." The possession of God is perfected
by grace, for the love of God becomes an ineffable union
between Him and man that would be unthinkable in the order
of nature; the order of grace manifest God's love for man
and the true dignity of man as a child of God.

6. Ascent of man to God

Augustine's notion as to the meaning of man as seen in his relation to God would be incomplete without
some idea as to how man approaches God and how he is
united to Him. In his present milieu man has to over-

---

1. Enar. \textit{in Ps. 45}, 14; PL 36, 524.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
6. Ascent of man to God

come the drag of the corporeal world; he has to surmount whatever obstacles, exterior or interior, may distract him from his final end. Man's vision of God demands cleanness of heart; it means that he has learned to view inferior things as inferior so that they do not disturb his proper judgment regarding superior things; it means that he values the invisible over the visible, God over creatures; it means that he is to rise to God, to ascend to Him.

This ascension does not take place instantaneously as though there were no intervening stages or degrees on man's part. Augustine always speaks in terms of progression in ascending to God, of a gradual approach involving the best efforts of man. That is why Augustine

1. "Ad eam vero visionem qua videbimus Deum sicuti est, mundanda corda communuit. Quia enim corpora consuetudine loquendi visibilia nominantur, propterea Deus invisibilis dicitur, ne corpus esse credatur; non quia corda munda suae substantiae contemplatione fraudabit; cum haec magna et summa merces Deum colentibus et diligentibus promittatur, dicente ipso Domino, quando corporalibus oculis visibiliter apparebat, et invisibilem se contuendum mundis cordibus promittebat, 'Qui diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo; et ego diligam eum, et ostendam meipsum illi.'" Ep. 147, De videndo Deo, 20, 48, PL 33, 618.
praises the "canticle of degrees;" after insisting, in
the Confessiones, that our weight is our love, he says:

Dono tuo accendimur, et sursum ferimur.
Inardescimus et imus. Ascendimus ascensio-
nes in corde, et cantamus canticum
graduum. Igné tuo, igne tuo bono inardesci-
mus et imus; quoniam sursum imus ad pacem
Jerusalem, quoniam "jucundatus sum in his
qui dixerunt mihi, In domum Domini ibimus."
Ibi nos collocavit voluntas bona, ut nihil
velimus aliud quam permanere illic in aeter-
num.1

It is expected then to find in Augustine frequent
references to the degrees whereby man is elevated to God;
it depends entirely on the context how many degrees there
are and what kind they are. For example, the degree of
charity in the soul is the degree of union with God;2 in
De natura et gratia3 he gives a scale of degrees based
on charity:

1. Conf. XIII, 9, 10; PL 32, 847.

2. "Inquantum autem in te charitas crescit, efficiens
te et revocans te ad similitudinem Dei ... Quantum
accedis ad similitudinem, tantum proficis in
charitate, et tanto incipis sentire Deum. Et quem
sentis? Qui venit ad te, an ad quem tu redis? Nam
ille nunquam discessit a te: recedit a te Deus,
cum tu recedis a Deo." Ener. in Ps. 22, 5; PL 77,
1273-1274.

3. De nat. et grat. 70, 84; PL 44, 290.
... MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
6. Ascent of man to God

1. charitas inchoata
2. charitas proveeta
3. charitas magna
4. charitas perfecta

In *De doctrina christianae*,¹ inspired by the prophet Isaias,² he lists seven steps leading to the wisdom of God:

1. fear
2. piety
3. knowledge
4. fortitude
5. counsel
6. cleansing of heart
7. wisdom

Again, in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*,³ he ingeniously compares the soul and the seven days of creation, and discovers seven states in man's elevation:

1. the dawn of faith
2. the discernment between carnal and spiritual, inferior and superior
3. the desire to do good works despite temptations
4. the discernment of the incommutable truth
5. the persistence in good works against terrible onslaughts

---

... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
6. Ascent of man to God

6. the stability of mind regarding spiritual goods
7. perpetual quiet

Probably Augustine's most characteristic division of the ascent of the soul, or, at least, the one to which he devotes the lengthiest description, is that of De quantitate animae.¹ It is a discussion of the rising of the soul to the contemplation of God, basing the ascent on the various activities of the soul ranging from the power it has to give life to the body to the power of dwelling in the vision of God. According to Portalie,² Augustine unites the Aristotelian distinction of our faculties with the Platonic method for the elevation of the soul to the contemplation of the good and considers the soul as endowed with seven activities. These activities are the basis for seven degrees of the soul's power and the seven stages of its elevation. Augustine names the seven stages as:

1. animatio
2. sensus
3. ars
4. virtus

¹ De quan. anim., 33-36, 70-80; PL 32, 1073-1079.
² Portalie, DTC, op. cit., col. 2442-2443.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

6. Ascent of man to God

5. tranquillitas
6. ingressio
7. contemplatio

The dignity of the soul is indicated by the succeeding steps, each of which represents an increase of the internal dimensions of the soul until it reaches the point of its highest nobility, union with God.

In the first degree, the soul gives life to the body, preserves its unity, gives it due proportion, and enables it to generate.

In the second degree, the soul applies itself to the countless activities of the five senses by which it seeks what is suitable and rejects what is harmful.

The third degree, the soul

\[
\]

\[
\text{2. De quan. anim., 33, 70; PL 32, 1073-1074.}
\]

\[
\text{3. Op. cit., 33, 71; PL 32, 1074.}
\]

\[
\]
pertains to the higher functions of the memory insofar as it serves to recall the past great and varied arts of man demonstrated in the construction of cities, formation of languages, composition of poetry, and the like: "Magna haec et omnino humana."

The turning point of the soul's elevation is reached in the fourth degree, *virtus* (virtue, evaluation),\(^1\) for it is here that awareness of its own dignity dawns upon the soul -- the value of the material world pales into insignificance before the value of the soul; it is here that moral goodness and the meaning of defilement and purification become clear:

Inde quo magis se delectat, eo magis esse abstrahere a sordibus, totamque emaculare ac mundissimam reddere et comptissimam; roborare se adversus omnia, quae de proposito ac sentientia dimovere moliuntur; societatem humanam magni pendere, nihilque velle alteri quod sibi nolit accidere; sequi auctoritatem ac praecepta sapientium, et per haec loqui sibi Deum credere ... Deinde quo magis magisque sentit anima, eo ipso quo proficit, quantum interit inter puram et contaminatam; eo magis timet, ne, deposito isto corpore, minus eam possit Deus quam seipsa ferre pollutam.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\) *Op. cit.*, 33, 73; PL 32, 1075.

\(^{2}\) *De Quan. anim.*, 33, 73; PL 32, 1075.
Cleansing itself from defilement is one action of the soul, keeping it from defilement is another. In the fifth degree,\textsuperscript{1} \textit{tranguillitas} (tranquility, stabilization), the soul possesses itself in purity and enjoys a peace in God that fosters progress towards Him: "ingenti quadam et incredibili fiduciam pergit in Deum."

The sixth degree,\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ingressio} (approach, fixation), is the function of the soul in pursuing those things that are highest and best, and in directing a calm and simple gaze to that which is to be seen: "... serenum atque rectum aspectum in id quod videndum est, dirigere."

Augustine refers to the seventh and final degree,\textsuperscript{3} \textit{contemplatio} (contemplation), not so much as a stage as a dwelling place, a \textit{quaedam mansio}, since it is that final place to which the previous steps lead. Here the soul enjoys the true and supreme God with a peace undisturbed and with a wonder so great that only a few chosen souls, in this life, have been able to behold it. It is here

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Op. cit.}, 33, 74; PL 32, 1076.
\item \textit{Op. cit.}, 33, 75; PL 32, 1076.
\item \textit{Op. cit.}, 33, 76; PL 32, 1076-1077.
\end{enumerate}
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
6. Ascent of man to God

that all vanities are unmasked and all visible things, marvelous as they are, are as nothing compared to unseen realities. In this vision of Truth, all other knowledge is inconsequential, and the soul yearns for deliverance from this life:

Tanta autem in contemplanda veritate voluptas est, quantacumque ex parte eam quisque contemplandi potest, tanta puritas, tanta sinceritas, tam indubitanda rerum fides, ut neque quidquam praeterea scisse se aliquando aliquis putet, cum sibi scire videbatur; et quo minus impediatur anima toti tota inhaerere veritati, mors quae antea metuebatur, id est ab hoc corpore omnimoda fuga et elapsio, pro summo munere desideratur.¹

Augustine gives two other sets of names for the seven degrees;² the first set concerns the objects of the soul's activity, the second set concerns more the quality of the objects:

1. de corpore pulchre de alio
2. per corpus pulchre per aliud
3. circa corpus pulchre circa aliud
4. ad seipsam pulchre ad pulchrum
5. in seipsa pulchre in pulchro
6. ad Deum pulchre ad pulchritudinem
7. apud Deum pulchre apud pulchritudinem

¹ De quan. anim., 33, 76; PL 32, 1077.
Augustine himself never used the now classical division of spiritual ascension; the purgative, illuminative, and unitive (or contemplative) ways. Nevertheless, this three-fold division is perfectly adapted to his doctrine and may be well employed in presenting its essential lines. To be sure, the doctor of grace often speaks of a triple ascent that can be paralleled to the three ways. Probably the best example is a section of the Confessiones already mentioned in treating of the interior path to God. The first stage, corresponding to the purgative way, is characterized by the attraction of corporeal objects. The soul cannot regard bodily beauty, sweet melodies, fragrant odors, nor whatever else presents itself to the senses, as the object of final repose; the soul must pass beyond them. This degree can be compared to the first and second of De quantitate animae. The second step corresponds to the

1. V. F. Cayré, La contemplation augustinienne, principes de la spiritualité de saint Augustin, 2me édition, Paris, Blot, 1927, pp. 72-73; Portalié, DTC, op. cit. col. 2442.

2. Conf. X, 6-7, 8-11; PL 32, 782-784.

illuminative way. There is a certain elevation over corporeal things, for immediate contact with them is absent though indeed they are stored in the memory; likewise does the immeasurable capacity of the memory retain the liberal sciences, laws, and such things, never impressed by the senses. But these do not satisfy the yearning of the soul and are remembered as not satisfying. The soul, like the woman who lost the groat and sought after it until she found it, continues to yearn for something else and seeks higher for its beatitude. This stage can roughly be compared to the third, fourth, and fifth degrees of De quantitate animae. The third step\(^1\) corresponds to the contemplative way, for here God is realized as the final good and union with Him is achieved as with the supreme Truth. This final degree can be compared to the sixth and seventh of De quantitate animae.

The number of degrees, however, is not at all important to Augustine, for, depending on the context, he will describe two, three, four, five, or seven steps towards union with God. The important thing in the ascent

---

\(^1\) *Conf.* X, 20-29; 29-40; PL 32, 791-796.
MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

6. Ascent of man to God

of the soul is the notion of progress. Man requires progress; he approaches God gradually; little by little does he, with God's help, work for his final perfection. This is what he means when he says, for example, "... gradibus ascendens ad eum qui fecit me." The division of the three ways that is used in the following pages is one of convenience; it is an appropriate division for outlining Augustine's thought.

7. The three stages

Purification conveys the general notion of cleansing oneself from that which is actually causing defilement or is able to do so. For St. Augustine, it is, succinctly, love of the world. Love of the world connotes devotion to the corporeal, the physical, the bodily, and the sway they have over the mind and will of man; it embraces, first of all, the grosser vices, then the more subtle and intangible. Augustine continually speaks of fleeing from the world; but this fleeing from the world, to be sure, does not mean a condemnation or contemnation of the world, for

1. Conf. X, 8, 12; PL 32, 784.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
7. The three stages

it is a good creature of God. But it does mean a detachment from the world whereby we view created goods as means to the end, and not ends in themselves. The more one recedes from the love of the world, the more he approaches his true end; the more can he keep himself free from the world's tarnish. Nor is this accomplished once for all, because a sustained effort on man's part is to be maintained so that he might gradually bring himself to the harmony of a good life:

1. Amor mundi adulterat animam, amor fabricatoris mundi castificat animam; sed nisi de corruptione erubuerit, ad amplexus illos castos redire non cupiscit. Confundatur ut redeat, quae se jactabat ne rediret. Superbia ergo impedit animae reditum. Qui autem incredat, non facit peccatum, sed ostendit peccatum. Quod nolobat anima videre, ponitur ei ante oculos, et quod post dorsum habere cupiebat, ad faciem illi admovetur. Vide te in te. "Quid vides stipulam in oculo fratris tui, trabem autem in oculo tuo non vides?" Revocatur ad se anima, quae ibat a se. Sicut a se ierat, sic a Domino suo ibat. Se enim respexerat, sibique placuerat, suaque potestatis amatrix facta fuerat. Recessit ab illo, et non remansit in se: et a se repellitur, et a se excluditur, et in exteriora prolabitur. Amat mundum, amat temporalia, amat terrae: quae se ipsam amaret, neglecto a quo facta est, jam minus esset, jam deficeret amando quod minus est. Minus est enim ipsa quam Deus; et longe minus, tantoque minus, quanto minus est res facta quam factor. Ergo amandus erat Deus; et amandus est Deus ita, ut, si fieri potest, nos ipsos obliviscamur. Sermo 142, 3, 3; PL 38, 779.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
7. The three stages

Gradatim enim se, et ad mores vitamque, non
jam sola fide, sed certa ratione (sc. anima)
perducit. Cui numerorum vim atque potentiam
diligenter intuenti, nimis indiguum videbitur
et nimis flendum, per suam scientiam versum
seque ipsam quae anima est, devium iter sequi,
et dominante sibi libidine, cum turpissimo se
vitiorem strepitu dissonare.1

Purification aims at the extermination of vices
which, though numerous, are contained in the three broad
categories of incontinency, curiosity, and pride; these
form the three-fold concupiscence that St. Augustine finds
in St. John.2 Concupiscence of the flesh must not be

1. De ordine, II, 19, 50; PL 32, 1018-1019.
2. "Haec autem tria genera vitiorum, id est voluptas
carnis, et superbia, et curiositas, omnia peccata
concludunt. Quae mihi videntur a Joanne apostolo
enumerata, cum dicit: 'Nolite diligere mundum,
quoniam omnia quae in mundo sunt, concupiscientia
carnis est, et concupiscientia oculorum, et ambitio
saeculi.' Per oculos enim maxime curiositas praevalet;
reliqua vero quo pertineant, manifestum est.
Et illa Dominici hominis tentatio tripartita est;
per cibum, id est per concupiscientiam carnis, ubi
suggeritur, 'Dic lapidibus istis ut panes fiant':
per inanem Iactantiam, ubi in monte constituto
ostenduntur omnia regna hujus terrae, et promittuntur
si adoraverit: per curiositatem, ubi de pinna
templici admonetur ut se deorsum mittat, tentandi
gratia utrum ab Angelis suscipiatur. Iteque postea
quam nullo istorum tentamento valere apud eum potuit
inimicus, hoc de illo dicitur: 'postquam complevit
omnem tentationem diabolus.' In Ps. 8, 13; PL 36,
115-116.
II. MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

7. The three stages

allowed to reign, for it makes a miserable master:

Est ergo in nobis peccati concupiscentia, qua non est permittenda regnare: sunt ejus desideria, quibus non est obedientium, ne obedientibus regnet. Propter quod membra nostra non sibi usurpet concupiscentia, sed sibi vindicet continentia; ut sint arma Justitiae Deo, ne sint iniquitatis arma peccato: sic enim nobis peccatum non dominabitur. 1

Concupiscence of the eyes is the seeking for pleasures of the eyes in such a way as to desiccate the desire for progress in purification; it dissipates the attention we need for directing our powers towards our final end. 2

The third concupiscence, the pride of life, is a senseless jealousy over one's goods as though they take their origin in the person himself; it loves the praise of men. 3

1. De continentia, 3, 8; PL 40, 354.


II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
7. The three stages

and is more difficult to discern than other vices.\(^1\) It
is a powerful hindrance to perfection and can bring about
the destruction of man's efforts:

Hoc ergo malum superbia est, impediens per-
fectionem. Jactet ergo se quisque de divitiis,
jactet de pulchritudine et de viribus corporis:
ista certe omnia mortalia sunt ... Illud est
vitium capitale, quod cum quisque bene pro-
ecerit, superbia tentatur, ut perdat totum
quod profecerit. Denique omnia vitia in malefa-
tis timenda sunt; superbia in benefactis plus
mutueda est.\(^2\)

Moral purification has a two-fold aspect in that it is not
only a means of escape and deliverance from the material,
but also an education of the mind to apply itself to the
truth. That is, that the person who wills to see the
truth must cleanse himself of those loves that defile
the soul:

Sed id nunc agitur, ut sapientes esse possi-
mus, id est, inhaerere veritati: quod pro-
fecto sordidus animus non potest. Sunt autem

\(^1\) "Est enim qualiscunque in aliis generibus tentationum
mihi facultas explorandī me; in hoc bene nulla est.
Nam et a voluptatibus carnis, et a curiositate super-
vacanea cognescendi, video quantum assecutus sim
posse refrenare animum meum, cum eis rebus careo, vel
voluntate, vel cum absunt." Conf. X, 37, 60; PL 32,
804-805.

\(^2\) In Ps. 58, Sermo II, 5; PL 36, 709.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

7. The three stages

sordes animi, ut brevi explicem, amor quarum-libet rerum, praeter animum et Deum; a quibus sordibus quanto est quis purgator, tanto verum facilius intuetur. Verum igitur videre velle, ut animum purges, cum ideo purgetur ut videas, perversum certe atque praeposterum est.¹

This is in keeping with Augustine's devotion to the primacy of truth. Sin is inimical to truth; the sinner has no wisdom. Vices are to be suppressed for they are contrary to truth. Purification is the first step toward the font of wisdom.²

Purification does not stand by itself; no one can purify himself without making progress in the elevation

1. De uti cred. 16, 34; PL 42, 89-90.

2. "Serpentes vitae tua sunt: consume serpentes iniquitatis, tunc amplius desiderabis fontem veritatis. Avaritia forte in te tenebrosum aliquid sibilat, et sibilat adversus verbum Dei, sibilat adversus praecipitum Dei: et quia tibi dicitur, Contemne aliquid, ne facias iniquitatem; si mavis facere iniquitatem, quam aliquod commodum temporale contemnere, morderi eligis a serpente, quam perimere serpemtem. Cum ergo adhuc faveas vitio tuo, cupiditati tuae, avaritiae tuae, serpenti tuo; quando in te invenio tale desiderium, quo curras ad fontem aquarum? quando concupiscis fontem sapientiae, cum adhuc labores in veneno malitiae? Interfice in te quidquid contrarium est veritati: et cum te videris tanquam vacare a cupiditatibus perversis, noli remanere quasi non sit quod desideres." In Ps. 41, 3; PL 36, 465-466.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
7. The three stages

of his soul. It is a step; it is a movement, -- a movement towards the end dimly seen, just as the mariner sees at a distance the light he will enjoy:

Quapropter, cum illa veritate perfruendum sit, quae incommutabili vit, et in ea Trinitas Deus, auctor et conditor universitatis, rebus quas condidit consultat; purgandus est animus, ut et perspicere illum lucem valeat, et inhaerere perspectae. Quam purgationem quasi ambulationem arbitremur. Non enim ad eum qui ubique praesens est, locis movemur, sed bono studio bonisque moribus.¹

Man does not accomplish purification alone, for God, Who is at the summit of the ladder of ascent, helps him who is in the ascent.²


2. "Nunquid non potens est manus tua, Deus omnipotens, sanare omnes languores animae meae, atque abundantior gratia tua lascivos motus etiam mei soporis extingueres? Augebis, Domine, magis magisque in me munera tua, ut anima mea sequatur me ad te, concupiscentiae visco.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

7. The three stages

Though purification leads into the illuminative way, it would be unwise to try to draw an absolute line of demarcation between the two stages. Illumination continues the work begun in purification. It signifies an increase of light in the soul, with the desirability of God, the Supreme God, becoming clearer and clearer. With its gaze fixed on God, the soul strives for a more intimate correspondence with Him by means of the virtues. The soul is animated with activity in its desire to inhere in God.

While purifying itself, the soul becomes more and more aware that its final goal is never-failing substance:

Aliquid enim quaerit animus iste quod Deus expedita, ut non sit rebellis sibi ... Nunc tamen quid adhuc sim in hoc genere malī mei, dixi Domino bono meo, exultans cum tremore in eo quod donasti mihi, et lugens in eo quod inconsummatus sum, sperans perfecturum te in me misericordias tuas usque ad pacem pleniam, quam tecum habebimus interiora et exteriora mea, cum absorpta fuerit mors in victoriam." Conf. X, 30, 42; PL 32, 797.

1. Portalié, DTC, op. cit., col. 2442.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
7. The three stages

The soul deepens in its realization that the indefectible substance it tends to is indefectible truth, and the more it understands that truth the more it is filled with light, for the source is together the source of truth and the source of light. 2

As drawing closer to God enhances devotion to truth, it inspires, as a corollary to that devotion, an unquenchable longing for cleanness of heart:

Ergo cogita illum (sc. Deum) priusquam dicas

---

1. En. in Ps. 41, 7; PL 36, 469.
2. "Eia, fratres, aviditatem meam capite, desiderium hoc mecum communicae: simul amamus, simul in hac siti exardeadamus, simul ad fontem intelligendi curramus. Desideremus ergo velut cervus fontem, excepto illo fonte quem propter remissionem peccatorum desiderant baptizandi, et jam baptizati desideremus illum fontem, de quo Scriptura alia dicit: 'Quoniam apud te est fons vitae.' Ipse enim fons et lumen est: quoniam 'in lumine tuo videbimus lumen.' Si et fons est, et lumen est; merito et intellectus est, quia et satiat animam avidam sciendi; et omnis qui intelligit, luce quadam non corporali, non carnali, non exteriori, sed interiore illustratur." En. in Ps. 41, 2; PL 36, 465.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD
7. The three stages

illum. Quod enim vis bene videre, ut habeas quod loquaris, accedis ut inspicias, ne forte longe videndo fallaris. Sed ut oculis ista corpora, sic ille mente conspicitur, corde attenditur et videtur. Et ubi est cor unde ille videatur? "Beati, ait, mundi corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt."1

The effort towards virtue becomes intensified: the clarity with which truth shines in the soul impels it to overcome the persistent corrosion of the world.2 The gaze of the soul is reason; it is clearest when it is perfect,

1. En. in Ps. 99, 5; PL 37, 1273. "Quoniam ecce, inquit, qui longe faciunt se abs te, peribunt: sequitur, 'Perdidiisti omnem qui fornicatur abs te.' Nobis autem quid? Quia illi longe, et ideo in tenebris, et ita sauciatis oculis in tenebris, ut lumen non solum non desiderent, sed etiam perhorrescant; nobis in longinquo inventis quid dicitur? 'Accedite ad eum, et illumini.' Ut autem accedas et illumineris, displiceant tibi tenebrae tuae; damna quod es, ut merearis esse quod non es." En. in Ps. 99, 5; PL 37, 1273.

2. "Quarto die, quo jam in illo firmamento disciplinae spirituales intelligentias operatur atque distinguat, videt quae sit incommutabilis veritas, quae tanquam sol fulget in anima; et quemadmodum anima ipsius veritatis particeps fiat, et corpori ordinem et pulchritudinem praestet, tanquam luna illuminans noctem: et quemadmodum stellae omnes, scilicet intelligentiae spirituales, in hujus vitae obscuritate tanquam in nocte micent et fugant. Quarum rerum notitia fortior effectus incipiat quinto die in actionibus turbulentissi saeculi ..." De Gen o. Man. I, 25, 43; PL 34, 194.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
7. The three stages

and it is perfect in virtue.¹

The over-all meaning of the illuminative way is the abiding awareness of God's presence in the life of the soul that Augustine calls "sensing God." The more one "senses God," the more he lives in His presence, becoming like Him -- abounding in charity:

Et cum accedere coeperis similes, et per-sentiscere Deum, quantum in te charitas crescit, quia et charitas Deus est, senties quiddam quod dicebas, et non dicebas. Ante enim quam sentires, dicere te putabas Deum: incipis sentire, et ibi sentis dici non posse quod sentis.²

The purgative and illuminative ways are not terminal; they lead to the culminating point of contemplation, the third stage. Man's soul, having been cleansed from defilement and having been brought to a correct reason that is called virtue whereby, as with a gaze, it looks towards God, is called to a vision of God:

Jam aspectum sequitur ipsa visio Dei, qui

¹. "Aspectus animae, ratio est: sed quia non sequitur ut omnis qui aspicit videat, aspectus rectus atque perfectus, id est quem visio sequitur, virtus vocatur; est enim virtus vel recta vel perfecta ratio." Solil., I, 6, 13; PL 32, 876.

². En. in Ps., 99, 6; PL 37, 1274.
MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

7. The three stages

Augustine speaks of three different types of vision as he finds them in Sacred Scripture. The first is vision according to bodily sight, the second according to the imagination, the third according to a mental grasp. It is the third type in which the vision of God is included:

Tertium autem genus visionis est secundum mentis intuitum, quo intellecta conspiciuntur veritas atque sapientia... Ex hoc terto genere est visio illa quam commemoravi, dicente Apostolo, "Invisibilia enim Dei, a constitutione mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur." Hac visione videtur Deus, cum per pietatem fidei et per cognitionem Dei morum optimorum corda mundatur.


2. Contra Adimantem Manichaeum, 28, 2; PL 42, 171. "... tria genera visionum occurrunt: unum per oculos, quibus ipsae litterae videntur; alterum per spiritum hominis quo proximus et absens cogitatur; tertium per contingum mentis, quo ipsa dilectio intellecta conspicitur... tertium vero illud quo dilectio intellecta conspicitur, eas res continet, quae non habent
The three stages

Contemplation, conceived to be the most intimate knowledge of God, is acquired first by discursive thought, then by intuition, followed by the clear and certain experience of "touching God." ¹ Contemplation, or the *visio Dei*, in St. Augustine is the final end of the love of God. It is the knowledge of God in the highest sense: it is knowledge, at once intuitive and experiential, by which God is perceived as the transcendent reality and by which the soul is correspondingly flooded with charity.² The 

---


². v. Cayré, "... elle (contemplation) est une connaissance intuitive et experimentale de Dieu, perçu à la fois comme réalité transcendant et comme vérite et bonté, connaissance qui accompagne d'ordinaire la charité parfaite, et qui permet d'en faire très souvent des actes sans le secours du raisonnement (actes directs)." *op. cit.*, *La contemplation augustiniennne*, p. 292.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
7. The three stages

vision of God is fundamentally intellectual, and may be described as an intellectual rapture in which all oppression by the senses disappears and in which God is seen to be the supreme happiness.

The contemplation of God, in its fullest


2. "Porro autem, si quædammodo raptus est a sensibus corporis, ut esset in ipsis similitudinisibus corporum, quae spiritu videntur, ita et ab ipsis rapiatur, ut in illum quasi regionem intellectualium vel intelligibilium subvehatur, ubi sine ulla corporis similitudine perspicua veritas cernitur; nullis opinionum falsarum nebulis offuscatur: ibi virtutes animae non sunt operosae ac laboriosae. Neque enim opere temperantiae libido frenatur, aut opere fortitudinis tolerantur adversa, aut opere justitiae iniqua punitur, aut opere prudentiae mala devitantur. Una ibi et tota virtus est amare quod videas, et summa felicitas habere quod amas. Ibi enim beata vita in fonte suo bibitur, inde aspergitur aliquid huic humanæ vitae, ut in tentationibus hujus saeculi, temperanter, fortiter, juste, prudenterque vivatur. Propter illud quippe adipiscendum ubi secures quies erit et ineffabilis visio veritatis, labor suscipitur, et continendi a voluptate, et sustinendi adversitates, et subveniendi indigentibus, et resistendi decipientibus. Ibi videntur claritas Domini, non per visionem significantem, sive corporalem, sicut visa est in monte Sina, sive spiritualem, sicut vidit Isaias, vel Joannes in Apocalypsi: sed per speciem, non per aenigmata, quantum eam capere mens humana potest, secundum assumptis Dei gratiam, ut os ad os loquatur ei quem dignum tali Deo colloquio fecerit; non os corporis, sed mentis." De Gen. ad lit., XII, 36, 54; PL 34, 476.
II  MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

7. The three stages

comprehension, is the joy of the blessed in heaven,¹ but even in this life it comes mutatis mutandis as an occasional occurrence.² In a passage in Enarratio in Psalmum 41, which Butler calls "... a noble piece of exegesis ... a masterpiece of its kind,"³ Augustine describes the actual mystical experience as being the perception of Something Unchangeable which fills the beholder with indescribable joy, after which he returns to normal life:

1. "Diligamus igitur Deum ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, quicumque ad vitam aeternam pervenire proposuimus. Vita enim aeterna est totum praemium, cujus promissione gaudeamus ... Hic fortasse non incongrue quaeeritur, aeterna ipsa vita quid sit. Sed ejus largitorem potius audiamus: 'Haec est, inquit, vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te verum Deum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum.' Aeterna igitur vita est ipsa cognitio veritatis ... Quid ergo agendum est, quid quaeas, nisi ut sum ipsum quem cognoscere voluisses?" De mor. ecc. Cath. 25, 47; PL 32, 1331.

2. "Neque in his omnibus, quae percurro consulens te, invenio tutum locum animae meae nisi in te, quo colligantur sparsa mea, nec a te quidquam recedat ex me. Et aliquando intromittis me in affectum multum insitatum introrsus ad nescio quam dulcedinem, quae si perficiatur in me, nescio quid erit quod vita ista non erit. Sed recido in haec aerumnosis ponderibus, et resorbeor solitis, et teneor, et multum fleo, sed multum teneor. Tantum consuetudinis illic volo, nec valeo; miser utrobique." Conf. X, 40, 65; PL 32, 807.

... MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

7. The three stages

Sed quia, fratres, quamdiu sumus in corpore hoc, perpseudarum a Domino, et corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitamentum: etsi utcunque nebulis diffugatis ambulando per desiderium, ad hunc sonum pervenerimus interdum, ut aliquid de illa domo Dei nitendo capiamus; onere tamen quodam infirmitatis nostrae ad consuetu recidimus, et ad solita ists dilabimur. Et quomodo ibi inveneramus unde gauderemus, sic his non deerrit quod gemamus. Etenim cervus iste manducans die ac nocte lacrymas suas, raptus desiderio ad fontes aquarum, interiorem scilicet dulcedinem Dei, effundens super se animam suam, ut tangeret quod est super animam suam, ambulans in locum tabernaculi admirable, usque ad domum Dei, et ductus interioris et intelligibilis soni jucunditate, ut omnia exteriora contemnere, et in interiora raperetur; adhuc tamen homo est, adhuc hic gemit, adhuc carnem fragilem portat, adhuc inter scandala hujus mundi periclitatur. 1

Augustine's teaching on contemplation, the summit of the soul's ascent to God, is summarized by Dom Butler in the following points:

1. The remote preparation for contemplation lies in the purification of the soul.

2. The proximate preparation lies in processes called "recollection" and "introversion."

3. Though it really belongs to the next

1. In Ps. 41, 10; PL 36, 470-471.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

7. The three stages

life, some beginnings of it are possible in this life, --
some passing glimpses or intuitions of divine things.

4. The contemplation of God is the lot of
the blessed in heaven -- their essential happiness.¹

8. Plotinian and Augustinian ascent

The dependence of Augustine on Plotinus has al-
ready been noted in speaking of the contemplation scene
at Ostia. There are even several striking textual similar-
ities between the two.² Doctrinally for Plotinus the soul
requires purification, which is basically moral and con-
sists in giving a special place to virtue; purification
is a preparation for contemplation, for by it the soul
acquires a new faculty of vision and becomes enabled to
behold the One and unite with it. The broad outlines
of ascent are thus the same for Augustine and Plotinus,
but there is still a vast difference between them be-
cause Augustine's mystical theology re-fashions the


². v. Paul Henry, Plotin et l'occident, "Spicilegium
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
8. Plotinian and Augustinian ascent

neoplatonic theories in a Christian mold.

Plotinian purification consists essentially in separating the soul from everything corporeal, for the body is essentially the prison of the soul: man is truly and only soul.\(^1\) The purpose of the soul is to win release from the sensible world, since the soul's imperfection is its co-existence with the body.\(^2\) Intrinsically, the soul is perfect, so that as soon as the soul is released it achieves the state of perfection it possessed before its union with the body. Obviously, this desired separation is not to be had in this life, but will be had in the life to come. Augustinian purification, on the other hand, involves the clearing of

\footnotesize{1. "The real Man differs from the body; pure from every passion, he possesses the intellectual virtues, virtues which reside in the soul, either when she is separated from the body, or when she is -- as usually here below -- only separable by philosophy; for even when she seems to us entirely separated, the soul is, in this life, ever accompanied by a lower sensitive part, or part of growth, which she illuminates." Plotinus, Enneads, I, 10; trans. by E. S. Guthrie, London, George Bell, 1918.}

\footnotesize{2. Bruno Switalski, Neoplatonism and the Ethics of St. Augustine, N. Y., Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1946, p. 8.}
heart from every love but God and self -- the elevation of the soul from the domination of the body, not the separation of the soul from the body.

Accordingly, since matter is the source of all evil,\(^1\) it is the soul's duty, in the scheme of Plotinus, to submit matter to reason: that is, to understand the place of matter. For him, the external practice of virtue is not the important thing; it is our mental attitude or disposition. True happiness derives from the disposition of the soul, not from any activity of the body which, being evil, can never produce happiness.\(^2\) Theory, then, excels practice; purification is confined to the soul alone.\(^3\) Much weight, therefore, must not be

1. "Thus even under the hypothesis that evils are referred to the body, matter is the cause of evils." Enneads, I, 8, 8.

2. "True beatitude and the joys it yields must be derived from the constant disposition of the soul. To predicate it of activity, would be to make it depend on things alien to virtue and the soul. The soul's actualization consists in being wise, and in exercising her self-activity; this is true happiness." Enneads, I, 5, 10.

3. Cf. Switalski, op. cit., p. 11. Cf. also Plotinus' own comments on Hercules as a type of hero who only partially ascends since his virtue was practical and not theoretical: Enneads I, 1, 12.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
8. Plotinian and Augustinian ascent

given to the external observance of certain virtues, say, continence.\(^1\) It has already been seen how foreign these ideas are to Augustine, for whom virtue indeed resides in the soul as in the superior part of man, but for whom too, since the body is essential to man, virtues are to be observed externally as an essential corollary to the disposition of the soul.

Further, in Plotinus there is no sense on the part of the creature of its own creatureliness, no feeling of humility nor powerlessness in the presence of the Creator, with the result that purification towards union with God is accomplished by the creature's own virtue and strength.\(^2\) For Augustine, man must be aware of the infinite abyss between God and himself, and, though indeed he must respond *pro viribus*, he must realize that his salvation cannot be wrought without God's aid.

The inspiration for purification comes, for Augustine, from the love that man has for God, thereby

---

engendering in him the desire to exercise virtue. That love springs, uncoerced, from man's inner freedom. But for Plotinus, love is considered more as the necessary tendency -- an impulse of nature -- towards the One; Plotinian love therefore does not direct man's ethical life with the freedom and spontaneity of Christian love.¹ This difference between Plotinus and Augustine, like other major difference on their speculations on the destiny of the soul, is based largely on the fact that Plotinus' inquiry is thoroughly religious, even though presented as philosophical; whereas, Augustine, taking his direction from authority (credo ut intelligam) gives a philosophical meaning to a religious truth.²

¹ "The command to love has as little meaning for Plotinus as it has for the modern eroticist or romantic, though for different reasons. In Plotinus, Eros is universal in the sense that 'all that exists aspires towards the Supreme by a compulsion of nature:' it is part of the necessary constitution of the universe, equivalent to the movement by which potency on every rung of the ladder of existence tends to actuality. It is 'law' in the scientific, not the normative sense; and it can therefore have no strictly ethical interest." John Burnaby, Amor Dei, A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1938, p. 89.

² v. Hultgren, op. cit., p. 58.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

8. Plotinian and Augustinian ascent

At the summit of the soul's ascent, for both Plotinus and Augustine, is the vision of God. Though there are several places in Augustine concerning vision that may well be free translations of Plotinus,¹ their doctrine is wide apart. For Plotinus, union with God goes beyond an immediate intuition of the Deity to the extent of fusion,² safeguarding however the individual's own identity; somehow each soul remains itself, but is one with the One. For Augustine the final end in no way causes man to lose his own being; man is united to God by acts of intellect and will that permit him to be absorbed in God, but not absorbed by Him.

9. The final end of man

It has already been observed how much the notion of order is one of the predominant characteristics of Augustine's thought. His classic definition of order is


... II  MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

9. The final end of man

found in his classic Chapter XIX of De civitate Dei:

"Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca
tribuens dispositio."¹ But the very notion of order is
impossible without the notion of finality; and universal
order is impossible without one who ordains to a final
end; Augustine succinctly states this idea: "Ordo penes
ipsum sit, qui novit ordinare quod creavit."²

Man, as a noble part of creation in that by his
intelligence he is able to contemplate the Creator,³
consciously participates in universal order and enjoys
a final end peculiar to his nature. It is basically by
observing that order that man is brought to his final
end:

Ordo est quem tenuerimus in vita, perducet
ad Deum. et quem nisi tenuerimus in vita,

---

1. De civ. Dei, XIX, 13, 1; PL 41, 640.
2. Sermo 296, 5, 6; PL 38, 1355–1366.
3. "Ipse est enim, qui in principio condidit mundum,
plenum bonis omnibus visibilibus atque intelligibilius
rebus, in quo nihil melius instituit quam spiritus, quibus intelligentiam dedit, at suae con-
templationis habiles capacesque sui praestitit." De civ. Dei, XXII, 1, 2; PL 41, 751.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

9. The final end of man

non perveniemus ad Deum. ¹

Man has some sort of intuitive awareness of the meaning of happiness and in this awareness he confidently declares his wish to be happy, ² and to be happy without end. Then comes the realization that God Himself is man's final end; human nature looks forward to the peace of immortality in eternal life in God. ³ Everything that man does should be viewed in the light of his ultimate end, and if he truly loves life, he should seek the true life in God as the perfection of his own. ⁴

¹ De ordine, I, 9, 27; PL 32, 990; cf. also II, 1, 2-3; PL 32, 993-995.

² "... antequam beat! simus, mentibus tamen nostris impressa est notio beatitatis; per hanc enim scimus, fidenterque, et sine ulla dubitatione dicimus beatos non esse velle..." De lib. arb., II, 9, 26; PL 32, 1254-1255.

³ "... accipiat (sc. natura humana) ampliora atque meliora, ipsam scilicet immortalitatis pacem, eique convenientem gloriam et honorem in vita aeterna ad fruendum Deo..." De div. Dei, XIX, 13; 2: PL 41, 642.

⁴ "Hoc sequitur in sancto Symbolo, quod omnia quae credimus et speramus, in vita aeterna percipiamus. Vita aeterna, dilectissimi, nunquam vilescat, semperque dulcescat. Si amatur vita, quare non quaeritur vera?...Et si amatur, quare non quaeritur? aut si quaeritur, quia hic non est, ad eum locum ubi est
By quoting Varro to the effect that among the pagan philosophers there were two hundred and eighty-eight possible interpretations as to what constituted the ultimate good, Augustine tries to show that there is no final happiness in this life. Search where one will, search as one must, he will find no lasting happiness outside God. Further, love of God is the most natural thing for man and, in a sense, easier for him than love of the world which does not possess the constancy the soul looks for:

1. De civ. Dei, XIX, 1; PL 41, 621-624.

II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

9. The final end of man

Laboriosior est hujus mundi amor. Quod enim in illo anima quaerit, constantiam scilicet aeternitatemque, non inventit. Only God, the highest good, the sum total of all good, and the veritable culmination of every legitimate desire of man, can make man happy. It is He Who gives Himself to His own rational creation to beatify them:

Neque enim facit beatum hominem, nisi qui fecit hominem. Nam qui tanta creaturae suae bona bonis malisque largitur, ut sint, ut homines sint, ut vigentes sensibus, valentes viribus, affluentes opibus sint; seipsum bonis debit ut beatit sint, quia etiam hoc munus est ut boni sint.

The kind of life to be expected is unknown, but it is certain that it will be a blessed life, without fear, without sorrow, without loss; a life that is of God and with God and, indeed, God Himself. It is only eternal

1. De musica, VI, 14, 44; PL 32, 1186.
2. "... sed 'beati' dixit, ubi est bonorum omnium summa et cumulus." In Ps. 2, 11; PL 36, 72.
3. Epist. 155, 1, 2; PL 33, 667.
4. "Vera veritas promittit vitam, non solum aeternam, sed etiam beatam; ubi nulla molestia, nullus labor, nullus timor, nullus dolor. Ibi plena et tota certa securitas. Vita sub Deo, vita cum Deo, vita de Deo, vita ipse Deus." Sermo 297, 5, 8; PL 38, 1363.
... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
9. The final end of man

life that can be called life.¹

All of man's direction is towards eternal life; it is the fulfillment of man. Man's intellect is to know God; his will to love Him; all his faculties to subserve Him. Man's meaning, however profound and delicate, will be realized. The truth he seeks for, the good he yearns for, will be his. His freedom will be perfected and the image of God in man will achieve its unending perfection. Whatever Augustine wants to say about the final end of man he says in the striking phrase that man is "filled with God":

Tu esto haereditas mea, amo te, totus amo te, toto corde, tota anima, tota mente amo te. Quid erit mihi, quidquid dederis mihi praeter te? Hoc est Deum gratis amare, de Deo Deum sperare, de Deo properare impleri de ipso satiari.²

Man's beatitude, however, is not to be taken as

1. "Quare autem dixi quia nondum est vita? Si vita esset esset ista, non diceret dominus cuidam, "Si vis venire ad vitam, serva mandata.' Non enim ait illi, Si vis venire ad vitam aeternam; non addidit aeternam, sed tantum dixit, vitam, Ergo ista nec vita nominanda est, quia non est vera vita. Quae est vera vita, nisi quae est aeterna vita?' In Joan. Evan. Tr. 22, 3; PL 35, 1575.

2. Sermo 334, 3; PL 38, 1463.
9. The final end of man

a thing apart from the glory that man gives to God; willingly-given glory to God and man's happiness go together. It is foolish to think that somehow man can give ultimate voluntary glory to God and not be happy, or that man can enjoy final happiness without giving glory to God. This is the eminent sense of Augustine: "Tu excitas, ut laudare te delectet; quia fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te;"¹ the restlessness of the heart is pacified and glory is rendered to God simultaneously.² The sentiment of the oft-quoted words that terminate the De civitate Dei is that glory to God, love of God, and happiness in Him are admirably inseparable:

Ibi vacabimus, et videbimus; videbimus, et

¹. Conf. I, 1, 1; PL 32, 661.
². "... on ne doit pas oublier les principes de théorie augustinienne: d'une part, Dieu n'est notre beauté que parce qu'il est Dieu, et l'aimer comme source de notre bonheur c'est aimer et glorifier toutes ses perfections infinies ... D'autre part, Dieu est la fin dernière de tout, de notre bonheur final comme de notre vertu sur la terre, et notre beatitude elle-même doit tendre à Lui en le glorifiant. C'est le sens profond des formules augustinienes sur Dieu, fin de tout, dont il est permis de jouir, non d'user." Portalié, op. cit., col. 2438.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

9. The final end of man

amabimus; amabimus, et laudabimus. Ecce quod erit in fine sine fine.¹

Since Augustine's philosophy is orientated on truth, it is not surprising that he finds the most reasonable explanation of man's happiness, in via and in termino, to be based on truth. Those who wish happiness are compelled to wish wisdom too, for without wisdom no one is happy; it is the truth by which the good is discerned, and this knowledge of the good is called wisdom.² It is only because of what is best in man's nature -- reason -- that he is permitted to be thought of as a possessor of wisdom, participating in the wisdom of God.³ In this life, as Augustine explains in De beata vita, wisdom is the measure of the soul:

1. De civ. Dei, XXII, 30, 5; PL 41, 804.

2. "Summo modo bono assecuto et adepto, beatus quisque fit; quod omnes sine controversia volumus. Ut ergo constat nos beatos esse velle, ita nos constat velle esse sapientes; quia nemo sine sapientia beatus est. Nemo enim beatus est, nisi summo bono, quod in ea veritate, quam sapientiam vocamus, cernit et tenetur." De lib. arb., II, 9, 26; PL 32, 1254.

3. "Nam ex sapientia Dei sapientes vocantur animae rationales..." De Gen. impf. lib., XVI, 59; PL 34, 293.
... MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:
9. The final end of man

"... nihil est aliud quam modus animi."¹ Wisdom is therefore a plenitude, because it is the opposite of want in the soul: "Sapientia igitur plenitudo, in plenitudine autem modus."² God, however, is the Supreme Wisdom, from whom all truth derives; the function of truth, then, as possessed by man is to lead him back to the Supreme Wisdom, Who is the true plenitude, the true measure of the soul; in this is happiness:

Haec est beata vita, pie perfecteque cognoscere a quo inducaris in veritatem, qua veritate perfruaris, per quid connectaris summo modo.³

In the light of truth, then, we come to know the highest good, the possession of which is happiness;⁴ since truth brings man to the ultimate truth, which is the *sumnum bonum*, it can be said that only truth makes

---

1. *De beata vita*, IV, 32; PL 32, 975.
2. *De beata vita*, loc. cit.
3. *De beata vita*, IV, 35; PL 32, 976.
MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

9. The final end of man

man happy: "Sola veritas facit beatos, ex qua vera sunt omnia." The Augustinian principle, examined in Chapter I, that truth requires to be lived is borne out here in that man is made happy by a vision of the truth to which he is united by love:

Sed anima rationalis inter eas res quae sunt a Deo conditae, omnia superst; et Deo proxima est, quando pura est; eique in quantum charitate cohaeserit, in tantum ab eo lumine illo intelligibili perfusa quodam modo et illustrata cernit, non per corpora eculos, sed per ipsius sui principale, quo excellit, id est per intelligiamentiam suam, istas rationes, quarum visione fit beatissima. 2

St. Augustine's doctrine of possession of the final good is thoroughly intellectualist: it is God Who is the truth; man therefore possesses God by means of the intellect; being thoroughly illumined by the Truth, man loves Him as the Good:

Secutio igitur Dei beatitatis appetitus est, consequio autem ipse beatitas; at eum sequimur diligendo, consequiram vero, non cum hoc efficimur quod est ipse, sed ei proximi, eumque mirifico et intelligibili modo contingentes, ejusque veritate et

1. Enarr. in Ps. 4, 3; PL 36, 79.
2. De ideis, #46 De diversis quaes. 82; PL 40, 31.
II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

9. The final end of man

sanctitatem illustrati atque comprehensi.

The inherence in God as the *sumnum bonum* is the highest wisdom, it is the fulness of wisdom and properly called our final end.²

Here, in this possession of God, is the ultimate and perfect act of *frui*, for it is the full, final transport of joy in the *Verum bonum*. God is not the means to anything else, but is the perfection of perfections Who is loved for His own sake; happiness is joy over truth;

*Beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate. Hoc est enim gaudium de te qui Veritas es, Deus meus, illuminatio mea, salus faciei meae, Deus meus. Hanc vitam beatam omnes volunt, gaudium de veritate omnes volunt. ... Et cum amant beatam vitam quod non est aliud quam de veritate gaudium, utique amant etiam veritatem.*³

In the words of Boyer, the intellectual possession of God is not an emptiness of impersonal abstractions, but a

---

1. *De mor. ecc.* 11, 18; PL 32, 1319.

2. "Haec erit plena et sempiterna sapientia, et demque veraciter vita jam beata; perventio quippe est ad aeternum ac sumnum bonum, cui adhaerere in aeternum est finis nostri boni." *Epist.* 155, 3, 12; PL 33, 671.

... II MAN IN RELATION TO GOD:

9. The final end of man

most real and personal embrace of Him -- an infusion into us, so to speak, of the living and substantial good who is God.¹

In the achievement of his final end, man fulfills God's will by which all creation praises Him, for God's glory resides in that ever-enduring act of living in truth, of comprehending the fulness of knowledge:

*Ibi erit Dei sine fine laudatio, ubi erit Dei plena cognitio; et quia plena cognitio ideo summa clarificatio vel glorificatio.*²

---


2. *In Joan Evan. Tr. 105, 3; PL 35, 1905.*
1. Liberty and human nature

Since his approach to philosophy is so personal, there is hardly a problem pertaining to the person that St. Augustine does not touch upon in some way. Almost as a matter of direct proportion, the more personal the problem, the more attention he pays it; and since there is nothing more personal than the prerogatives of free will and liberty we should expect to find Augustine expending tremendous efforts in exploring them. For him, liberty flows absolutely, directly, and immediately from the nature of man as a rational creature. The notion of person could never be arrived at unless liberty were considered as an integral part of personality -- the ultimate glory of the person. Liberty stems from free will; insofar as free will is the faculty of unconstrained and spontaneous choice, it is the essential power of the person. Augustine realized that the employment of this power to good in this life, in which the will particularizes a universal tendency, is its true liberty and
... III THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
1. Liberty and human nature

enables man to choose the higher values and make them his own; in this sense, the person is a reality present and a reality still to be achieved.\(^1\) The will is capable of the infinite; it is able to seek God above all values and unite itself with Him in an exercise that is the crowning perfection of liberty.

Despite the fact that liberty follows man's nature, it took the Christian thinkers to elaborate a philosophy of liberty. Aristotle himself, though he dealt with the act of choice as springing from man's spontaneous will to happiness after rational deliberation on the means, never treated of liberty nor free will.\(^2\) The reason for Christian insistence on liberty was, of course, the rigorous teaching of personal responsibility for one's acts -- a moral responsibility calling for absolute freedom of will as its primary condition. Inasmuch as the will possesses this power, it is a striking example of participation in the divine

---

... III THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
  1. Liberty and human nature

power.¹

For Augustine, the will is a true nature, and
like all created natures, good. Even though it is the
cause of the vitiated condition of human nature, it is
still good:

Natura humana, etsi mala est, quia vitiata
est, non tamen malum est, quia natura est.
Nulla enim natura, in quantum natura est,
malum est; sed prorsus bonum, sine quo
bono ullam esse potest malum.²

As a nature the will possesses an end, the good; and it
is to man's glory that he is free to will the good towards
which he is orientated: "Melior autem homo est qui vol-
untate, quam qui necessitate bonus est."³ Repeatedly
does Augustine affirm, at one and the same time, the
existence of the will and its freedom. He brilliantly
exposes, in De gratia et libero arbitrio, the Scriptural

1. "Unless we remember that the dynamism of second causes
   was regarded by the Christian as an analogue of the
   creative fecundity, the whole evolution of the prob-
   lem of liberty in the Middle Ages becomes unintelligi-
   ble." Gilson, op. cit., p. 306.

2. Opus imperfectum contra Julianum, III, 206; PL 45,
   1334.

3. De div. quaes. 83, #2; PL 40, 11.
position that where there is responsibility there must be liberty; and probably nowhere more than in Book III of De libero arbitrio does he defend the freedom of the will from such plausible onslaughts as God's foreknowledge and the corruption of the creature. When asked by Evodius whence that motion arises by which the will turns itself from the unchangeable good, Augustine answers:

Propterea, quid opus est quaerere unde iste motus existat, quo voluntas avertitur ab incommutabili bono ad commutabile bonum, cum eum non nisi animi, et voluntarium, et ob hoc culpabilem esse fateamur...

In the same work he makes a vigorous affirmation of the will and its freedom, as it were, by an intuition:

Non enim quidquam tam firme atque intime sentio, quam me habere voluntatem, eaque me moveri ad aliquid fruendum; quid autem meum dicam prorsus non invenio, si voluntas qua volo et nolo non est mea: quapropter cui tribuendum est, si quid per illam male facio nisi mihi?

The quality of incoercibility in the will is the starting point of liberty in the anthropology of St. Augustine.

1. De lib. arb., III, 1, 2; PL 32, 1272.
2. De lib. arb., III, 1, 3; PL 32, 1272.
... III THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
1. Liberty and human nature

The question,\(^1\) therefore, whether freedom is to be sought along the lines of intellectualism, as with Boethius, or of voluntarism, as with Scotus, or whether materially in the will and formally in the intellect, as with St. Thomas, can be laid aside. For our purpose, what is of importance is that the will has the power to determine itself from within, that it can will or not will, place an act or not place it. This truth Augustine recognizes as incontrovertible and altogether obvious; in all his writings on grace he is most zealous in protecting man's prerogative, and even while defending the divine rights, he is implicitly asserting the will's freedom.\(^2\) A thing can hardly be free if it is not within our power:

\[
\text{Voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra potestate. Porro, quia est in potestate, libera est nobis. Non enim est nobis liberum, quod in potestate non habemus, aut potest non esse quod habemus.}^3
\]

Augustine goes one step further by maintaining that

\(^1\) Gilson, op. cit., 310 ff.
\(^3\) De lib. arb., III, 3, 8; PL 32, 1275.
nothing is as much ours as is the will: "Quapropter nihil tam in nostra potestate, quam ipsa voluntas est."¹

Understood thus, "necessity" and "free will" are in radical opposition and the will retains its liberty of exercise. The libertas a necessitate (a coactione) is reducible to the natural spontaneity of the will, and Augustine summarily states his position: "Velle enim et nolle propriae voluntatis est."²

Free will, then, pertains to the physical power of free choice, whereas liberty pertains to the due exercise of that power towards the achievement of its proper end. Now, the root of liberty is reason, by which man is brought to the truth; for it is the truth that is to be sought and, inasmuch as the true and good are one (at its highest in God, the Vere esse and Summum bonum) the possession of the true is the possession of the good and the possession of the good the possession of the true. One who resists the truth, therefore, resists his proper good: "...nec alteri potius quam sibi

¹. De lib. arb., III, 3, 7; PL 32, 1274.
². Lib. de grat. et lib. arb., 3, 5; PL 44, 885.
III THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
1. Liberty and human nature

adversatur, qui resistit apertissimae veritati. As a consequence, the truth is to be loved of itself: "Veritas propter seipsam diligenda est."

The reward for embracing truth is liberty; as Augustine writes apropos of the words of Our Lord that the truth sets us free:

Quid mihi prodest, cognoscere veritatem? "Et veritas liberabit vos." Si non delectat veritas, delectet libertas ... Liberari autem propriae dicitur liberum fieri: quomodo salvari, salvum fieri: sanari, sanum fieri: sic liberari, liberum fieri. Ideo dixi, Si non delectat veritas, delectet libertas.

Ultimately, of course, as subjection to the truth is liberty, subjection to the highest Truth is the highest liberty, and the only thing that can separate man from the truth and despoil his liberty is a perverse will:

Haec est libertas nostra, cum isti subdurnur veritati: et ipse est Deus noster qui nos liberat a morte, id est a conditione peccati. Veritatem autem atque sapientiam nemo amittit invitus: non enim locis separari ab ea quisquam potest; sed ea

1. De baptismo contra donatistas, V, 3, 3; PL 43, 178.
2. Expos. epist. ad Gal., 4; PL 35, 2108.
3. Sermo 134, 2, 2; PL 38, 743.

147
III THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
1. Liberty and human nature

The payment, on the other hand, for the deliberate rejection of truth and the willing embrace of error by the perversion of will, which is sin, is the death of the soul: "Quae est enim pejor mors animae, quam libertas erroris." 2

2. Moral evil and moral good

Perversity of will is attached to the same physical freedom that allows the will to choose the good: "Liberum arbitrium et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum confitendum est nos habere." 3 The simple statement of Augustine that underlines the will's freedom to sin is: "Voluntate peccatur." 4

2. Epist. 105, 2, 10; PL 33, 400.
3. De correptione et gratia, I, 2; PL 44, 9v.
4. De vera rel., XIV, 27; PL 34, 139. This paragraph is a brief consideration of the voluntariness of sin.
III THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
2. Moral evil and moral good

Here a dilemma arose for Augustine, on which the whole problem of moral evil hinges. As he himself poses it:

Si enim motus iste, id est aversio voluntatis a Domino Deo, sine dubitatione peccatum est, num possumus auctorem peccati Deum dicere? Non erit ergo iste motus ex Deo? Unde igitur est?¹

The reason why good actions of the creature are attributed to God is to protect the divine causality. If sin, as such, is a positive reality, it too would have to be ascribed to God. To escape this conclusion Augustine felt it was necessary to discover an affiliation between sin and nothingness.² There is no changeability in God because He is all perfect. Created beings are changeable, for when God creates them He calls them forth from nothingness; there is, therefore, a kind of original want in creatures, participating as they do not only in being but also non-being:³ "... per hoc si

---

¹ De lib. erub., II, 20, 54; PL 32, 1269.
² V. Boyer, op. cit., L'idee de verite dans la philosophie de saint Augustin, p. 165.
... III  THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
2. Moral evil and moral good

(Deus) solus incommutabilis, omnia quae fecit, quia ex nihilo fecit, mutabilia sunt."¹ From this general principle that all evil is a want of being it was an easy deduction for Augustine that moral evil in a human act is essentially a privation of what that act ought to be: it lacks due order in its refusal to love God:

Motus ergo ille aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineat, et ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites.²

Somehow or other, then, the finite nature of the will explains its power to initiate a deficient movement. The will is the cause of sin: "Ergo improba voluntas, malorum omnium causa est."³ Once this position was formulated in the early De libero arbitrio, Augustine never changed it; it occurs in a clear and ample presentation in the late De civitate Dei, especially chapters six and seven of Book XII:

Quid est enim quod facit voluntatem malam,

¹. De natura boni contra Man., I; PL 42, 551.
². De lib. arb., II, 20, 54; PL 32, 1270.
³. De lib. arb., III, 17, 48; PL 32, 1295.
... III THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
2. Moral evil and moral good

Sin is caused by the will; but the ability to sin
is not on that account an exercise of its liberty. Rather
it is a violation of liberty, a loss of freedom, for such
a choice is contrary to its nature. Augustine vigorously
upheld the notion that the choice between good and moral
evil has nothing whatever to do with the metaphysics of
liberty. When Julian objected that liberty of the will
consists in the possible choice of good or evil, August­
tine reminded him that God would not then be free:

\[
\text{Si liberum non est, nisi quod duo potest velle, id est, et bonum et malum, liber}
\]
\[
\text{Deus non est, qui malum non potest velle,}
\]
\[
\text{de quo etiam ipse dixisti, verumque dixisti,}
\]
\[
\text{"Deus esse nihil justus non potest." Sic-}
\]
\[
\text{cine Deum laudas ut ei auferas libertatem?}
\]

1. De civ. Dei, XII, 6; PL 41, 353.
2. De civ. Dei, XII, 7; PL 41, 355.
2. Moral evil and moral good

Choosing evil is a defect of the will and contrary to liberty; the will is more free the less fallible it is; God, therefore, is supremely free. On the same score, those souls who attain heaven and cannot sin have achieved the perfection of their freedom and enjoy a liberty that is their birthright:

Redimuntur autem (i.e. homines) in libertatem beatitudinis sempiternam, ubi jam peccato servire non possid ... Hominis vero liberum arbitrium congenitum et omnino inamissibile si quaerimus, illud est quo beati omnes esse volunt, etiam hi qui ea nolunt quae ad beatitudinem ducent.2

The choice of evil is a calamitous subversion of the entire person, for the movement of the will, which, though made for good, and truer to itself as it tends more to its proper end,3 orientates itself towards a false end and becomes a pessima voluntas:

\[\text{an potius intelligere debes esse quandam beatam necessitatem, qua Deus injustus non potest esse.}^1\]

III  THE LIBERTY OF MAN:

2. Moral evil and moral good

Quis vero dubitet dicere voluntatem nullo modo justitiam diligentem, non modo esse malam, sed etiam pessimam voluntatem? 1

The situation with regard to liberty is entirely otherwise: having no part with sin, true liberty is the willing embrace of God's law and service to His commands. 2 This acceptance of God's law by voluntary submission, rather than by necessity, is man's peculiar glory:

Nam Deus hominem inexterminabilem fecit, et ei liberum voluntatis arbitrium dedit. Non enim esset optimus, si Dei praeceptis necessitate, non voluntate serviret. 3

Liberty, therefore, for Augustine is the freedom to practice virtue; in using it one becomes a servant of justice by which the divine, universal order is maintained: "Erit enim voluntas tua libera, si fuerit pia. Eris liber, si fueris servus; liber peccati, servus justitiae." 4 Liberty is the fruit of a good will and is

1. De pecc. mer. et rem., II, 18, 30; PL 44, 169.
2. V. De lib. arb., II, 18, 47; PL 32, 1266.
3. De agon. chris., 18, 11; PL 40, 296.
4. In Joan. Evang., Tract. 41, 8; PL 35, 1696.

153
never lost unless the good will itself is lost; should the will sin, its infirmity is healed permanently only by the influx of a "voluntary and happy necessity" of never sinning again. Thus, only the good are free: "Proinde bonus etiam si serviat, liber est: malus autem etiam si regnet, servus est..." 

Man's unconstrained desire to keep God's commandments springs from love of God; love of God and liberty, therefore, enjoy a mutual life: "Sed in recte faciendo ... nullum est vinculum necessitatis, quia libertas est charitatis." The good we do emanates from love rather than fear -- from the very love of rectitude; a good work springs from the love of justice. Freedom is naught unless it is freedom to love God; the sweet yoke of the Lord is to serve Him, and in that service is love and freedom:

Simul es et servus et liber: servus, quia

1. De perf. just. hom., 4, 9; PL 44, 295.
2. De civ. Dei, IV, 3; PL 41, 114.
4. Enar. in Ps. 57, 3; PL 36, 675-677.

154
... III  TRUE LIBERTY OF MAN:

2. Moral evil and moral good

St. Augustine's simple formula is: "Lex libertatis, lex charitatis."\(^2\)

3. Liberty and grace

It is not to our purpose in discussing the question of liberty and grace in St. Augustine to enter into all the delicate problems that must be faced. As Gilson avers, despite the repeated assertions of St. Augustine, one has to hesitate in recognizing precisely in what manner his doctrine insures the rights of free will.\(^3\) But this objection would be valid against any system even if it tries to offer a comprehensive treatment of grace. Our only purpose here is to show that, for Augustine, grace, in acting on man, not only respects free will, but confers liberty.

1. *Enar.* *in Ps.* 99, 7; PL 37, 1275.
III TRUE LIBERTY OF MAN:

3. Liberty and grace

St. Augustine clearly states the difficulty in the relationship between free will and grace:

Sed quia ista quaestio, ubi de arbitrio voluntatis et Dei gratia disputatur, ita est ad discernendum difficilis, ut quando defenditur liberum arbitrium, negari Dei gratia videatur; quando asseritur Dei gratia, liberum arbitrium putetur auferri ... 2

Viewing man historically, as he always does, Augustine elaborated the distinction, vividly presented by St. Paul, 3 between the will and its power after the fall of man. The poor condition of fallen man leaves him powerless; whereas to fall, man had only to will it,

1. "Grace has several meanings in the writings of Augustine. In a very wide sense, all the works of God are a grace, since existence is given by God gratuitously (Gilson, op. cit., 191-192). In a strict sense, grace is a supernatural gift. Portalle (op. cit., col. 2387) likewise acknowledges two orders of grace: one, natural, for natural virtues, and the other, supernatural, for salutary acts. Precisely which grace is meant is made clear from the context.

2. De grat. Christi, 47, 52; PL 44, 383; Portalle gives three principles as the foundation of Augustine's system: "1. Dieu est le maître absolu par sa grâce de toutes les determinations de la volonté; 2. l'homme reste libre sous l'action de la grâce, comme en son absence; 3. la conciliation de ces deux vérités re­ pose sur le monde de gouvernement divin." (col. 2385).

III  THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
3. Liberty and grace

to will is not sufficient to raise him: "Deinde dictum est, ex qua miseria peccantibus justissime inflicta, liberet Dei gratia, quia sponte homo, id est libero arbitrio, cadere potuit, non etiam surgere..."¹ Man, left to himself, can do no good of himself: "... quae autem ab homine sunt, mendacia sunt."² The will has its radical freedom, but, of itself, has not the efficacy to do good:

"Velle enim," inquit (Paulus), adjacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio. His verbis videtur non recte intelligentibus velut auferre liberum arbitrium. Sed quomodo auferit, cum dicat, "Velle adjacent mihi?" Certe enim ipsum velle in potestate est, quoniam adjacent nobis: sed quod perficere bonum non est in potestate, ad meritum pertinet originalis peccati.³

Thus it is that the will in this state of "captive liberty" requires help from God in order to effect the good that lies within its power: "Valet itaque

---

1. Retract. I, 9, 6; PL 32, 598.
III THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
3. Liberty and grace

liberum ad opera bona, si divinitus adjuvetur..."¹ So impoverished is man that he needs divine assistance to inspire him to good; by it he knows what must be known and does what must be done.² Since every good, however great or small, comes from God, so does the good use of free will:

Et quia omnia bona, sicut dictum est, et magna, et media, et minima ex Deo sunt; sequitur, ut ex Deo sit etiam bonus usus liberae voluntatis, quae virtus est, et in magnis numeratur bonis.³

Far from denying that freedom of the will is lost because of divine help, Augustine affirms that the reason

---
¹ Epist. 157, II, 4-5; PL 33, 675-676. "Illud vero quod dicunt, sufficere homini liberum arbitrium ad dominica praecepta implenda, etiam Dei gratia et Spiritus sancti dono ad opera bona non adjuvetur, omnino anathematizandum est..." Loc. cit.

² "Docet ergo Deus suavitatem inspirando delectationem, docet disciplinam temperando tribulationem, docet scientiam insinuando cognitionem. Cum itaque alia sint quae ideo discimus ut tantummodo sciamus, alia vero ut etiam faciamus: quando Deus ea docet sicut docet ut scienda sciamus, aperiendo veritatem, sic docet ut facienda faciamus, inspirando suavitatem." Enar. in Ps. 118, Sermo 17, 3; PL 37, 1549.

³ Retract., I, 9, 6; PL 32, 598.
III  THE LIBERTY OF MAN:
3.  Liberty and grace

it is not lost is that it is helped;\(^1\) further, there is
no liberty without grace: "... libertas sine gratia
non est libertas, sed contumacia."\(^2\) It is because of
grace that liberty exists: "...liberum arbitrium non
evacuatur per gratiam, sed statuitur, quia gratia sanat
voluntatem."\(^3\) and it is because of grace that liberty
can be preserved:

Secundum gratiam Dei, non contra eam, liber­
tas defenditur voluntatis. Voluntas quippe
humanae non libertate consequitur gratiam,
sed gratia potius libertatem.\(^4\)

Since, for Augustine, the law of liberty is the
law of love, grace is the divine means of giving birth
to liberty because it gives birth to love; the greater
the liberty the greater the love; the greater submission
to divine charity, the deeper the freedom:

Haec enim voluntas libera tanto erit liber­
ior quanto senior; tanto autem sanior,

1. "Neque enim voluntatis arbitrium ideo tollitur, quia
    juvatur; sed ideo juvatur, quia non tollitur." Epist., 157, II, 10; PL 33, 677.
2. Epist., 157, II, 16; PL 33, 682.
4. Liber de cor. et gratia, 8, 17; PL 44, 926.
... III  LIBERTY OF MAN:

3. Liberty and grace

quanto divinae misericordiae gratiaeque
subjectior.¹

The will is not free for its own sake, as though it is an end in itself. A Christian does not say that, having been called to freedom, and to that end redeemed, he is free to do as he will.² Free will indeed is a glory of man, but a glory insofar as it is a witness to the universal order, to the ineffable praise of the Creator, and to the glory of God.³ Liberty is achieved when the will fulfills its vocation by voluntarily accepting the order of the universe,⁴ for this order leads

¹. Epist. 157, II, 8; PL 33, 676.
². "Non ergo dicat christianus: Liber sum, in libertatem vocatus sum: servus eram, sed redemptus sum, et ipsa redemptione liber effectus sum, faciam quod volo; nemo me prohibeat a voluntate mea, si liber sum." In Joan. Evang. Tract. 41, 8; PL 35, 1696.
³. A constant theme of St. Augustine; e.g. De lib arb., II, 17; PL 32, 1249-1250: "Quidquid igitur laudabile advertitur in rerum natura, sive exigua, sive ampla lauda dignum judicetur ad excellentissimam et ineffabilem laudem referendum est Conditoris: nisi quid habes ad haec." Loc. cit., 46, PL 32, 1266.
⁴. The freedom of the will can only be understood with respect to the final end of man; there is a danger in considering liberty in too abstract a fashion: "Ne nous faisons pas de la liberté une conception trop abstraite." R.P. Fulbert Cayré, Les sources de l'amour divine presence d'après saint Augustin, Paris, Desclée, 1933, p. 207.
to God: "Ordo est quem si tenuerimus in vita, perducet ad Deum; et quem nisi tenuerimus in vita, non perveniemus ad Deum."\(^1\) By grace man is able to enter into full possession of himself in choosing the Absolute Good and in giving himself to God; man is called in grace by God to be god: "Deus enim deum te vult facere: non natura, sicut est ille quem genuit; sed dono suo et adoptione."\(^2\)

---

1. *De ordine*, I, 9, 27; PL 32, 990.
2. *Sermo 166*, 4, 4; PL 38, 909.
CHAPTER FOUR
MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

1. Unity of mankind
2. Principles of justice and love
3. The two cities

1. Unity of mankind

As always, St. Augustine refuses to bypass any of the great problems concerning man, and so it becomes an indissoluble mark of his philosophical humanism to consider the relationship that man has with other men.

The human intellect is able to rise from the diversity present in the changing world about it to the discovery of unity that pervades the entire universe. That unity is from above; it is imposed by Him Who is the Supreme Modus from Whom all unity takes its origin and in Whom all unity is measured. As God Himself is one, so also is the eternal law by which He brings all things to their final end; the universe, then, as the governed, participates in the unity thus established and must possess a finality in accord with the divine plan.

As part of the universe, mankind exhibits a unity and finality. In a sense, unity and finality are the core of Augustine’s inquiry into the philosophy of society. Men are to live in unity as a social body; this is
a demand of human nature: the individual rational person, as an individual, is perfectible as a member of mankind, but this perfectibility remains unfulfilled unless he accomplishes his function as a part of a whole. Human nature does not act necessarily; therefore, the final end of mankind can never be achieved except by the will. That is why, for Augustine, all human society finds its foundation in a common will, which, if it stems from the love of earthly things, causes a disturbance in the universal order, and, if it stems from the true love of divine things, builds up a society unto God, which, by its gradual development over the course of time, gives an intelligible unity to the very history of mankind.

St. Augustine never tires of extolling unity, for him unity in reality is a basic metaphysical principle. Every nature, since it participates in the order of the universe, tends to unity.¹ When there are many things,

---

¹ "Numerus autem et ab uno incipit, et aequalitas ac similitudine pulcher est, et ordine copulatur. Quamobrem quisquis fatetur nullam esse naturam ... debet fateri ab uno principio per aequalem illi ac similem speciem divitiis bonitatis ejus, qua inter
... IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

1. Unity of mankind

the unity discerned among them is much more pleasing than any one by itself.² He likens the beauty of the universe to the beauty of a song that unfolds itself as each succeeding note is sung;³ the beauty resides not in any one note, but in the unity of the whole.

The philosophical humanism of Augustine manifests this principle of unity in a remarkable way; it lies at the bottom of his strong social sense. The meaning of man in this regard is that he does not exist as an isolated thing, with a separate and individual existence, but as a part of a whole; and whereas man is a unit in himself, he is encompassed by a larger unity, the society of men. Augustine frequently speaks of the unitary society of mankind, with special encouragement

se unum et de uno unum charissima, ut ita dicam, charitate junguntur, omnia facta esse atque condita quacumque sunt, in quantumque sunt." De mus., VI, 17, 56; PL 32, 1191.

1. "Ita, semper omnia quibus unum aliquid constat, et non simul sunt omnia ea quibus constat: plus delectant omnia quam singula, si possint sentiri omnia." Conf., IV, 11, 7; PL 32, 706.

2. "...donec universi saeculo pulchritudo, cujus particulariae sunt quae suis quibusque temporibus apta sunt, velut magnum carmen cujusdam ineffabilis modulatoris excurrat ..." Enist. 138, 5; PL 33, 527.
IV. MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

1. Unity of mankind

in this matter because of the realization that all mankind comes from one man:

Hominem vero ... unum ac singulum crevit (Deus), non utique solum sine humana societate deserendum, sed ut eo modo vehementius ei commendaretur ipsius societatis unitas vinculumque condordiae, si non tantum inter se naturae similitudine, verum etiam cognationis affectu homines necterentur; quando nec ipsam quidem feminam copulandum illo placuit, sed ex ipso, ut omne ex homine uno diffunderetur genus humanum.¹

Unity of origin likewise accounts for that relationship between man and man that makes them "fellowmen," a relationship that goes beyond mere unity and sees in each person the "neighbor" of the Gospel.² This "neighborliness" reaches its perfection in the great good

1. De civ. Dei, XII, 21; PL 41, 372. "Diximus ... ad humanum genus, non solum naturae similitudine sociandum, verum etiam quadam cognationis necessitudine in unitatem concordem pacis vinculo colligandum, ex homine uno Deum voluisse homines instituere..." De civ. Dei, XIV, 1; PL 41, 473.

2. "Quis est, inquit, mihi proximus? Omnis homo proximus tuus est. Nonne duos parentes habuimus omnes? Proxima sunt sibi cujusque generis animalia, columbus columbo, pardus pardo, aspis aspidis, pecus pecori, et non est proximus homo homini? ... Attendite genus nostrum: de uno fonte manevimus; et quia ille unus in amaritudinem versus est, omnes ex oliva oleaster facti sumus." Sermo 90, 7; PL 38, 563.
of friendship, so that men are bound to each other not
only by a bond of generic similarity, but also by the
bond of friendly affection:

Quoniam unusquisque homo humani generis
pars est, et sociale quiddam est humana
natura, magnumque habet et naturale bonum,
vim quoque amicitiae; ob hoc ex uno Deus
voluit homines condere, ut in societate non
sola simililibude generis, sed etiam co-
gnitiones vinculo tenerentur. ¹

Even though men, by nature one, exhibit over the
course of time a diversity of opinions and wills where-
by they become as many, their true unity will shine forth
with clarity in that desity that is the same for men as
an individual, and mankind as a totality:

Illi enim homines per consortium et commun-
ionem unius ejusdem naturae, qua omnes
homines erant, unum erant: et si aliquando
secundum diversitates voluntatum et sententi-
arum, opinionum morumque dissimilitudines non
erant unum; erunt autem plene perfecteque
unum, cum perventum fuerit ad eum finem, ut
sit Deus omnia in omnibus. ²

1. De bono conjug., 1, 1; PL 40, 373.

2. Epist., 238, 2, 13; PL 33, 1043. St. Augustine's at-
titude towards the unity of mankind reaches its per-
fection in the theological reasons for that unity.
Time and time again, he, like St. Paul, speaks of the
oneness of mankind exhibited in the fall of Adam, in
whom, in some way, the entire human race was gathered

166
... IV  MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN
2. The principles of justice and love

2. The principles of justice and love

The social virtues *par excellence*, by which the social body is effected and by which the relationship of man to other men, inherent in human nature, is articulated, are justice and love. Now justice and love, for Augustine, are so thoroughly intertwined that one cannot be had without the other. They seem to possess this

together and fell with him -- *unus homo, omnes homines*; Adam's sin tainted all (e.g. *Quæs. in Hept.* Lib. VI, VIII; PL 34, 778-779). Likewise is this seen in the restoration of man as a whole and the unity effected through baptism (e.g. *De bap. con.* Don., III, 13, 18; PL 43, 146). Even more than creation, sin, and restoration does the Mystical Body bear the unity of mankind; directly the Mystical Body affects the members of the Church, but indirectly it affects all men insofar as they are potential members: "Haec dicuntur ut amemus unitatem, et timeamus separationem. Nihil enim sic debet formidare christianus, quam separari a corpore Christi... non est mem- brum ejus; si non est membrum ejus, non vegetatur Spiritu ejus..." (In Joan. Evan., Tract 27, 6; PL 35, 1618). This mysterious union is especially expressed in the Blessed Sacrament with its symbolism of many grains to form one bread and many grapes to form one wine: "Sic exposuit sacramentum mensae dominicae, 'unus panis, unum corpus multi sumus.' Commendatur vobis in isto pane quomodo unitatem amare debeatis. Nuncquid enim panis ille de grano uno factus est? Nonne multa erant tritici grana? Sed antequam ad panem venerent, separata erant..." (Sermo 227; PL 38, 1100). It might well be that the profound sense of unity of mankind in Augustine is primarily founded on the unity of the Mystical Body.
IV  MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

2. The principles of justice and love

difference: that justice regards what is due to another whereas charity regards the love for another whereby a union is achieved; but, since what is due flows from the right order of things, and the right order of things dictates what is to be loved, justice and love, in a certain fundamental sense, are one. Augustine offers a narrow definition of justice when he writes: "Jam justitiam quid dicamus esse, nisi virtutem qua sua cuique tribuentur."¹ However, in the wider use of justice, which is the favorite use with him, Augustine speaks of justice as pertaining to what is due absolutely — that is, in the absolute order of things as coming from God:

Magister: Jamvero ipsa ejus ordinatio qua nulli servit nisi uni Deo, nulli coaequari nisi purissimis animis, nulli dominari appetit nisi naturae bestiali atque corporeae, quae tandem virtus tibi esse videtur?
Discipulus: Quis non intelligat hanc esse justitiam? Mag.: Recte intelligis.²

That is why charity, rooted in the actual person, is justice and justice charity:

Charitas ergo inchoata, inchoata justitiae est; charitas prorecta, prorecta justitiae

¹. De lib. arb., I, 13, 27; PL 32, 1235.
². De mus., VI, 15, 50; PL 32, 1189.
IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

2. The principles of justice and love

Augustine goes a step further and sees all virtues as referring to charity: "Omnis itaque praecepti finis est charitas, id est, ad charitatem refertur omne praeceptum." Nevertheless, all virtues, insofar as they are subsumed in charity, evince due order, and, therefore, justice. The person who is just and holy is so because his love is ordered, and that is why Augustine equates virtue -- love in practice -- with order: "... definitio brevis et vera virtutis: ordo est amoris." And there can be no true virtue without true love of God, Who is the author of order, nor without subjection to His sway.

1. Lib. de nat. et grat., 70, 84; PL 44, 290.
2. Enchiridion (ad Laurentium) de fide, spe et charitate, CXXI; PL 40, 288.
3. De civ. Dei, XV, 22; PL 41, 467.
4. "Quamlibet enim videatur animus corpori, et ratio vitiiis laudabiler imperare; si Deo animus et ratio ipse non servit, sicut sibi serviendum esse ipse Deus praeceptit, nullo modo corpori vitiiisque recte imperat. Nam qualis corporis atque vitiiorum potest esse mens domina, veri Dei nesicia, nec ejus imperio subjugata, sed vitiiissimis daemonibus corrumpenti-bus prostituia?" De civ. Dei, XIX, 25; PL 41, 656.
IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN
2. The principles of justice and love

Doubtlessly inspired by the oft-repeated precept in Sacred Scripture of loving God and neighbor, Augustine always speaks of love of God in conjunction with the love that we are to have for our fellow-man, so that they are inseparable.¹ Only he loves his fellow-man rightly who loves God with his whole heart, soul, and mind:

_Quisquis in ergo recte proximum diligsit_,
_hoc cum eo debet agere, ut etiam ipse toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligat Deum. Sic enim eum diligens tanquam seipsum, totam dilectionem sui et illius refert in illam dilectionem ei Dei, quae nullum a se rivulum duci extra patitur, cujus derivatione minuat._²

The only ultimate reason for man to love his neighbor is the love he bears for God; that is, the love of God is reason for loving man, since man participates in the being of God: "... nec hominem recte diligere

1. "Jam vero quia duo praecepta, hoc est, dilectionem Dei et dilectionem proximi, docet magister Deus; in quibus tria invenit homo quae diligat, Deum, se ipsum, et proximum; atque ille in se diligendo non errat qui diliget Deum; consequens est, ut etiam proximo ad diligendum Deum consulat, quem jubetur sicut se ipsum diligere." _De cív. Dei_, XIX, 14; PL 41, 642-643.

2. _De doc. Chris._, I, 22, 21; PL 34, 27.
IV  MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

2. The principles of justice and love

noverit quisquis eum non diligit qui hominem fecit."¹

We must love all men equally since we share the same nature;² and likewise, since what is true of one man with relationship to God is true -- by a community of nature -- of all men, and therefore we are to desire that all mankind love God with us.³ So impelling is the urgency of our love for our fellow-man that it is more than an earnest of our love of God, -- it is a certain means of our ascent to Him and inherence in Him:

A dilectione autem proximi tanta quanta praecipitur, certissimus gradus fit nobis, ut inhaereamus Deo, et non teneamur tantum ordinatione illius, sed nostrum etiam ordinem inconcussum certumque teneamus.⁴

The principles of justice and love have their immediate and direct effect upon society. An orderly love, which is the fruit of justice and charity, works for harmony in social life, whereas a disorderly love brings only disharmony; society is not best founded unless

1. Epist., 258, 2; PL 33, 1072.
4. De mus. VI, 14, 46; PL 32, 1187.
... IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

2. The principles of justice and love founded on the love of God and the love of neighbor in Him.¹

The love of man for his fellow-man dictates the exercise of virtue. Since all men are destined to the same goal and are straining for it, the perfection of love of neighbor lies in assisting him, to the height of our powers to achieve that end:

Velle tamen debemus ut omnes nobiscum diligant Deum, et totum quod vel eos adjuvamus vel adjuvamur ab eis, ad unum illum finem referendum est.²

The call of charity will vary as persons vary; the quality of charity will not change, but the manner of dispensing itself will:

Et quia cum eadem omnibus debetur charitas, non eadem est omnibus adhibenda medicina: ipsa item charitas alios parturit, cum aliis infirmatur; alios curat aedificare, alios

---

1. Sermo 368, 5, 5; PL 39, 1654-1655. "... neque enim conditur et custoditur optime civitas, nisi fundamento et vinculo fidei, firaeqe concordiae, cum bonum commune diligitur, quod summum ac verissimum Deus est, atque in illo invicem sincerissime se diligunt homines, cum propter illum se diligunt, cui, quo animo diligant, occultare non possunt." Epist. 137, 17; PL 33, 524.

IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

2. The principles of justice and love

contremiscit offendere, ad alios se inclinat, ad alios se erigit; alius blanda, alius severa, nulli inimica, omnibus mater.

Here again, St. Augustine affirms his unwavering belief in the primacy of truth, for without truth due order even in matters of charity will be lost. For that reason, we are not to seek an obligation of charity, but give ourselves up to the study of truth, nevertheless, if such an obligation is imposed upon us we are to undertake it without thereby losing our good resolve to seek truth. That does not imply in any way that the good of our fellow-man is to be neglected, for it is part of truth to leave contemplation when required, in order, in the very exercise of charity, to impart truth to

1. De catechizandis rudibus, 15, 23; PL 40, 328. "Per-tinet ergo ad innocentis officum, non solum nemini malum inferre, verum etiam cohibere a peccato, vel punire peccatum; ut aut ipse qui plectitur, corrigitur experimento, aut alii terreantur exemplo." De civ. Dei, XIX, 16; PL 41, 644.

... IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

2. The principles of justice and love

others. Our relationship towards others should, in practice, be governed by the attitude of imitating the good and tolerating the wicked in the hope that they too will acquire ultimate justice.

Homines ergo bonos imitare, malos tolera, omnes ama; quoniam nescis quid oras futurus sit qui hodie malus est. Nec eorum ames injustitiam; sed ipsos ideo ama, ut apprehendat justitiam... 2

3. The two cities

Man's relationship to man, for Augustine, is based upon the unity of mankind: the de facto unity that follows the unity of nature, and the potential unity that follows from the unity of will. Man has no control over

1. "Ex tribus vero illis vitae generibus, otioso, actuso, et ex utroque composito, quamvis salva fide quisque possit in quolibet eorum vitam ducere, et ad septemterna praemia pervenire; interest tamen quid amore teneat veritatis, quid officio charitatis incept. Nec sic quisque debet esse otiosus, ut in eodem otio utilitatem non cogitetur proximi; nec si actuosus, ut contemplationem non requirat Dei. In otio non iners vacatio delectare debet; sed aut inquisitio, aut inventio veritatis; ut in ea quisque proficiat, et quod invenerit teneat, et alteri non invidet." De civ. Dei, XIX, 19; PL 41, 647.

2. De cat. rud., 27, 55; PL 40, 348.
... IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

3. The two cities

the former unity, though indeed he must acknowledge it; the latter unity is entirely within man's control inasmuch as the choice of union by love lies within the realm of his free will.\footnote{1} Thus, many men may become one man by voluntary choice, so that, though there are many individuals there is but one mind and one heart.\footnote{2}

This notion of unity effected by the will is what inspires the idea of the two cities in the writings of St. Augustine, especially in De civitate Dei.\footnote{3} The two cities, or societies, are divided according to the love of men; each society is determined by what it loves: 
"... illa sunt intuenda quae diligit."\footnote{4} If that love

\begin{enumerate}
\item Cf. Dawson, op. cit., in Monument to St. Augustine, p. 59.
\item "Qui ergo sic vivunt in unum, ut unum hominem faciant, ut sit illis vere quod scriptum est, 'una anima et unum cor;' multa corpora, sed non multa corda; recte dicitur dixit, id est unus) solus." In Ps. 132, 6; PL 37, 1733.
\item The idea of the two cities was not a new notion in Augustine, but an inheritance from Christian tradition. V. Dawson, op. cit., pp. 48 ff. Cf. also R.H. Barrow, Introduction to St. Augustine's 'City of God', London, Faber and Faber, 1950, pp. 148-154.
\item De civ. Dei, XIX, 24; PL 41, 655.
\end{enumerate}
... IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

3. The two cities

is directed towards the things of this world to the exclusion of the love of God, then the first society is had, the *civitas terrena*. But if that love for God and the things of God, then men are united to form the second society, the *civitas Dei*:

> Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo; terrenam scilicet amor sui ad contemptum Dei, coelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui.

The city of God is formed, first of all, by the love of God and by the love of men for each other in God; its law is the law of charity. It is holy, social, amicable, and considers the common good. The city of earth, however, whose love of earthy things unites mankind apart from God, is unclean, selfish, envious, turbulent, and considers only private domination. An excellent summary of the qualities of the two cities is found in


2. "Homines enim amantes se invicem, et amantes Deum suum qui in illis habitat, faciunt civitatem Deo. Quia lege quadam civitas contingatur; lex ipsa eorum, charitas est, et ipsa charitas, Deus est: aperte enim scriptum est, 'Deus charitas est.' Qui ergo plenus est charitate, plenus est Deo; et multi pleni charitate, civitatem faciunt Deo." *Enar in Ps.* 28, 4; PL 37, 1261.
... IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

3. The two cities

De Genesi ad litteram:

Hi duo amores, quorum alter sanctus est, alter immundus; alter socialis, alter privatus; alter communi utilitati consulens propter supernam societatem, alter etiam rem communem in potestatem propriae rediens propter arrogantem dominationem; alter subditus, alter aemulus Deo; alter tranquillus, alter turbulentus; alter pacificus, alter seditiosus; alter veritatem laudibus errantium praefereens, alter quoquo modo laudis avidus; alter amicalis, alter invidus; alter volens proximo quod sibi, alter subjecere proximum sibi; alter proximi utilitatem regens proximum, alter propter suam praecesserunt in Angelis; alter in bonis, alter in malis; et distinxerunt conditas in genere humano civitates duas, sub admirabili et ineffabili providentia Dei, cunctas quae creatas sunt administrantis et ordinantis, alteram justorum, alteram iniquorum.

Before proceeding it is necessary to get a clear idea of Augustine's use of "societas" (or "civitas," or "populus"). Having considered Scipio's explanation, which Cicero approved, to the effect that justice is an integral part of a society, Augustine rejects it. If that were true, he writes in a famous passage, "Remota


2. De civ. Dei, II, 21; PL 41, 66, and XIX, 23, #5-24; PL 41; 654-656. A good summary of this question is found in Barrow, op. cit., 252-257.
... justitia, quid sunt regna, nisi magna latrocinia.\(^1\)

To avoid this disastrous conclusion,\(^2\) which, at one blow would brush away all the great states and leave only one society, the city of God, Augustine excludes all moral elements in his definition: "... civitas, quae nihil aliud est quam hominum multitudo aliquo societatis vinculo colligata;"\(^3\) or, "Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis, rerum quas diliget concordi communione sociatus."\(^4\) In this manner, with a remarkable sense of realism, he was able to view the greater states like the Roman republic as true societies.\(^5\) It further salvaged

---

1. *De civ. Del.*, IV, 4; PL 41, 115.
3. *De civ. Del.*, XV, 8, 2; PL 41, 447.
5. Cf. Figgis, "Observe once more, that Augustine declared that his definition of a State was more probable than that of Scipio. His sense of reality led him to prefer a definition which would include all existing and historical communities, and hamper him as little as possible by an abstract ideal." J. N. Figgis, *The Political Aspects of Augustine's "City of God,"* London, Longmans, 1921, p. 63; V. also Etienne Gilson, *Les métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu*, Louvain, Publications Universitaires, 1952, pp. 41-46.
IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

3. The two cities

his right to call the civitas terrena a civitas at all.\(^1\)
The civitas Dei, however, is a society in the true and
perfect sense, for it is a society united by the love of
God as He ought to be loved, and of neighbor in God;
where this justice is not found, neither is there found
the true spirit of commonweal.\(^2\)

Though there was, in the course of succeeding cen-
turies, the attempt to identify Church and State with
the heavenly and earthy cities, for Augustine this was
never so, and it would be a serious error so to identify
them. Time and time again\(^3\) he speaks of the difference
between the Church and the civitas Dei;—between those,
who, though outside the Church, belong to the City of


2. "... ut quemadmodum justus unus, ita coetus popu-
lusque justorum vivat ex fide, quae operatur per
dilectionem, quo homo diligit Deum sicut diligendus
est Deus, et proximum sicut semetipsum: ubi ergo non
est ista justitia profecto non est coetus hominum
juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus." De civ.
Dei, XIX, 23, #5; PL 41, 655.

3. De civ. Dei, XX, 9, 1; PL 41, 672-673. From time to
time Augustine also refers to the Church as the city
of God, but this is in a very narrow sense: "... quae est civitas Dei, nisi sancta ecclesia." Enar.
in Ps. 98, 4; PL 37, 1261.
IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

3. The two cities

God. Likewise, if the State were identified with the civitas terrena, then it would have to be suppressed, as Figgis points out,\(^1\) for the civitas terrena, insofar as it is evil to be suppressed; on the contrary, the State is a natural society, and therefore in itself good. In this sense, the terrestrial city has a certain probity of its own, which is expressed in the laws whereby the temporal welfare is cared for;\(^2\) the early Romans did not have the true religion, nevertheless, God showed in them the necessity of civil virtues.\(^3\) The term civitas terrena (or civitas Dei) is a mystical

\(^1\) Cf. Figgis, pp. 56-67.

\(^2\) A person may be a member of State and the civitas terrena (or civitas Dei) at the same time; if he is a member of State and a member of the civitas terrena, then insofar as he is a member of State and despite his belonging to the civitas terrena, the laws, etc., he professes are good.

\(^3\) "... custodientes (primi Romani) tamen quamdam sui generis probitatem, quae posset terrenae civitati constituita, augendae, conservandaque sufficiere. Deus enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo et praelario imperio Romanorum, quantum valerent civiles etiam sine vera religione virtutes, ut intelligeretur hac addita fieri homines cives alterius civitatis, cujus rex veritas, cujus lex charitatis, cujus modus aeternita..." Epist. 138, III, 17; PL 33, 533.
... IV  MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

3. The two cities

entity\(^1\) and not to be identified with any concrete society historically realized.\(^2\)

The primary objective of unity among men is peace, as Augustine admirably writes in *De civitate Dei*, XIX, chapters 11-14. Everyone desires peace: "... nemo est qui gaudere nolit, ita nemo est qui pacem habere nolit."\(^3\)

One seeks peace regardless of how contentious he may seem, or how warlike, for all men seek peace by war, not war by peace. The final good of man is supreme peace; in heaven the saints, freed from sin, are true servants to the will of God and therefore enjoy in Him peace unto life everlasting and life everlasting in peace. Now that which is the source of peace in heaven is the order in which all things are subject to the divine will; perfect subjection brings perfect peace. On earth, insofar as it is possible in the frail vessel of man's free will,

1. "Quibuslibet alius etiam mysticus nominibus appelle-tur, una civitas et una civitas: illa rege diabolo; ista rege Christo." *Enar. in Ps. 61*, 6; *PL 36*, 733-734.


3. *De civ. Dei*, XIX, 12; 1; *PL 41*, 637.
... IV  MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN
3. The two cities

that order is to be imitated: concord is to be achieved by the due subjection of the lower to the higher, and in the subjection of man to God and adherence to Him lies the peace of the city of God:

Pax hominum, ordinata concordia. Pax domus, ordinata imperandi atque obediendi concordia cohabitantium. Pax civitatis, ordinata imperandi atque obediendi concordia civium. Pax coelestis civitatis, ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo. Pax omnium rerum, tranquillitas ordinis.1

Each of the two cities makes peace its end: the city of God by reason of the intelligible will of God and His incommutable law,2 the city of earth by trying to unify the wills of men in solely earthly matters.3 But the civitas Dei is to use the peace of the civitas terrena, respecting the diversity of laws as they are found in diverse places as long as they tend to preserve peace:

Utitur ergo etiam coelestis civitas in hac sua peregrinatione pace terrena, et de rebus ad mortalem hominum naturam pertinentibus,

1. De civ. Dei, XIX, 13; 1; PL 41, 640.
3. De civ. Dei, XIX, 17; PL 41, 645-646.
The peaceful existence of men in due harmony is part of the universal direction of all things towards peace as witnessed in the order by which God has given man all things necessary in visible creation so that he might lead a suitable life on earth together with his fellow-man, and having used the gifts of God wisely, he and his neighbor might be rewarded with the peace of God forever.²

1. De civ. Dei, XIX, 17; PL 41, 646.

2. "Deus ergo naturarum omnium sapientissimus conditor et justissimus ordinator, qui terrenorum ornamentorum maximum instituit mortale genus humanum, dedit hominibus quaedam bona huic vitae congrua, id est, pacem temporalem pro modulo mortalis vitae in ipsa salute et incolumitate ad societate sui generis, et quaeque huic paci vel tuendae vel recuperandae necessaria sunt, sicut ea quae apte ac convenienter adjunct sensibus lux, nox, aurae spirabiles, aquae potabiles, et quid-quit ad alendum, tegendum, curandum ornandumque corpus congruit: eo pacto aequissimo, ut qui mortalis talibus bonis paci mortalium accommodatis recte usus fuerit, accipiat ampliora atque meliora, ipsam scilicet immortalitatis pacem, eique convenientem gloriam et honorem in vita aeterna ad fruendum Deo, et proximo in Deo." De civ. Dei, XIX, 13; PL 41, 641-642.
Peace being the prize of unity, many contrary things have to be foregone for the sake of unity among men: "...omnia bono pacis et unitatis esse toleranda."¹ Whoever violates unity, violates charity, which is the safeguarding virtue of unity; and the uncharitable person, though he possesses much, possesses nothing, for he is wanting the bond of love by which he peacefully uses all.²

The city of God does not exist perfect all at once; it exists on earth commingled with the terrestrial city. Jerusalem is to live with Babylon; it is to use its peace and whatever other good it may find there in a certain modus vivendi in order to achieve its final destiny:

Hanc (pacem) autem ut interim habeat in hac vita, nostra etiam interest: quoniam, quamdiu permixtæ sunt ambæ civitates,

¹ De bap. con Don., VI, 22, 39; PL 43, 211.
² "Qui autem deseruerit unitatem, violat charitatem: et quis quis violat charitatem, quodlibet magnum habeat, ipse nihil est .. Universa inutiliter habet, qui unum illud, quo universis utetur, non habet. Amplectamur itaque charitatem, studentes servare unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis." Sermo 88, XVIII-XIX, 21; PL 38, 550.
... IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN

3. The two cities

... non tantum propter istam vitam honestissime
gerendam, nec tantum propter civitatis terrenae con-
cordissimam societatem: verum etiam propter adipis-
cendam sempiternam salutem, et sempiterni cujusdam
populi coelestem divinamque rempublicam, cui nos
ovis ascendit fides, spes, charitas ..." Epist. 138, III, 17; PL 33, 533.

As Gilson sums it up: "Le fin dernière, c'est en effet l'établissement de la cité de Dieu parfaite,
dans la beatitude éternelle dont jouira le peuple des élus. La construction progressive de cette cité
selon les desseins de la providence, c'est la signification profonde de l'histoire, ce qui confère à
... IV MAN IN RELATION TO OTHER MEN
3. The two cities

love. The city of God will then embrace, according to the divine plan, all spiritual creation insofar as it has not been vitiated by sin. All those who have loved God will be united as one society unto God and mankind will have reached its ultimate perfection and culminating glory:

Quae autem domus Dei, et ipsa civitas ...
Omnes autem fideles, quae est domus Dei non solum qui modo sunt, sed et qui ante nos fuerunt et jam servierunt, et qui post nos futuri sunt, adhuc qui nasci habent in rebus humanis usque in finem saeculi, congregati in unum fideles innumerabiles, sed Domino numerati... omnes simul unam domum Dei faciunt, et unam civitatem.2

1. Enar. In Ps. 56, 8; PL 36, 666.
2. Enar. In Ps. 126, 3; PL 37, 1668-1669.
CHAPTER FIVE
MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES

1. St. Augustine and values

Professor von Hildebrand, in his recent work on Christian ethics,\(^1\) warns of the serious mistake that can be made in considering impersonal relationships to be more metaphysical than personal ones. Impersonal relationships should never be taken as a kind of model or pattern of personal relationships, for the sphere of the person is intrinsically higher and the acts of the person are intrinsically superior.\(^2\) Into this danger St. Augustine never fell. We have seen how intimately personal his philosophy is and how he avoids the pitfalls of systematization; a rigid systematization and a warmly personal philosophy seem almost

\(^1\) Dietrich von Hildebrand, \textit{Christian Ethics}, N. Y., McKay, 1953, pp. 29 ff.

\(^2\) "It is of the utmost importance from a metaphysical point of view that we free ourselves from any state of mind in which impersonal beings, impersonal relations, and impersonal principles function as a pattern (\textit{causa exemplaris}) of the higher sphere." von Hildebrand, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.
... V MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES
1. St. Augustine and values

incompatible to him.

To man, the person of visible creation, values are a data that are "given." The existence of values as a "spiritual given" is an Augustinian trait; value is as intuitively perceived as being itself. It is, for example, immediately known that an unchangeably wise life is preferable to a changeable one:

Nemo est enim tam impudenter insulsus qui dicat: unde scis incommutabiliter sapientem vitam mutabili esse praeferendam? Idipsum enim quod interrogat, unde sciam, omnibus ad contemplandum communiter atque incommutabiliter praesto est. Et hoc qui non videt, ita est quasi caecus in sole, cui nihil prodest ipsis locis oculorum ejus tam clarae ac praesentis lucis fulgor infusus.¹

What man has to do is to subject the data thus given to a prise de conscience so that his awareness of value is enlarged and his attitude of relatedness towards value is made more open.

More truly are those realities to be called values that play an active role in the life of the spirit.²

¹ De doc. Chris., I, 9, 9; PL 34, 23.
² Cayré, Dieu present, op. cit., p. 129.
MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES

1. St. Augustine and values

They manifest themselves as somehow desirable, but they are not to be conceived as platonic entities existing in themselves as beings apart. Rather are they, in Augustine's eyes, metaphysical relations grasped by the activity of the spirit under the influence of the objects whose essences are known to it. Values have a dynamic aspect; they are presented to man as moving forces, as forms to specify the choice of man and intensify his spirit. Man unites himself to the objects thus drawing him and participates in them, not by knowledge only, but by love; as von Hildebrand writes: "Yet St. Augustine saw in love a partaking of the object, surpassing by far the participation by knowledge even though love presupposes and includes knowledge."¹

The philosopher faces a deep problem when he considers the relation of being and value.² For Augustine a beginning can be made by grasping that in the order of substantial existents, the higher the degree of existence the higher the value. Existence is a

¹ von Hildebrand, op. cit., p. 233.
² von Hildebrand, op. cit., p. 145.
1. St. Augustine and values

great good:

Considera igitur ... quam magnum bonum sit ipsum esse, quod et beati et miseri volunt ... Omnia tamen eo ipso quo sunt, jure laudanda sunt; quia eo ipso quo sunt, bona sunt.¹

Living is a higher existence than non-living, so we place the animate above the inanimate, the sentient life above the merely animate, intelligent life above the sentient life, and finally the unchangeable life of wisdom above the changeable life -- it is the rule of truth that the unchangeable is always better.²

Augustine sees the hierarchical order as the key to value; there is an excellent summary of this attitude in one of his epistles known as the Liber de gratia novi

2. "Quam cum adhuc mutabilem viderint, etiam huic al- quam incommutabilem coguntur praeponere, illam scilicet vitam quae non aliquando desipit, aliquando sapit, sed est potius ipsa Sapientia. Sapiens enim mens, id est adepta sapientiam, antequam adipiscere- tur non erat sapiens; at vero ipsa Sapientia nec fuit unquam ingeniens, nec esse unquam potest. Quam si non viderent, nullo modo plena fiducia vitam incommuta- biliter sapientem commutabili vitae anteponerent. Ipsam quippe regulam veritatis, qua illam clamant esse meliorem, incommutabilem vident..." De doc. chris., I, 8, 8; PL 34, 22.
In this sense God is the supreme value, the value of values, since He is existence itself; He is the sum of all being, possessed of all perfection — and all our acts of adoration, hope, petition, thanksgiving have meaning only if God is understood as the infinite good.

1. *Epist.* 140, 2, 4; *PL* 33, 539.
1. St. Augustine and values

Order, and therefore value, is in all things as established by God: "Ordo est ... per quem aguntur omnia quae Deus constituit." Every value in a created being is there as a reflection of God's value, God's beauty, and God's goodness; all measure, all form, all beauty come from Him. He is the source of all good, and every good leads back to Him:

Ipse (Deus) enim fons nostrae beatitudinis, ipse omnis appetitionès est finis. Hunc eligentes, vel potius religentes, amisera-mus enim negligentès: hunc ergo religentes, unde et religio dicta perhibetur, ad eum dilectione tendimus, ut perveniendo quiesca-mus: ideo beati, quia illo fine perfecti. Bonum enim nostrum, de cujus fine inter philosophos magna contentio est, nullum est aliquod, quam illi cohaerere cujus unius anima intellectualis incorporeo, si dici potest, amplexus, veris impletur fecundaturque vir-tutibus.

1. De ordine, I, 9, 28; PL 32, 991.

2. Nos enim catholici Christiani Deum colimus, a quo omnia bona sunt, seu magna seu parva; a quo est omnis modus, seu magnus seu parvus; a quo omnis species, seu magna seu parva; a quo omnis ordo, seu magnus seu parvus. Omnia enim quanto magis moderata, speci-osâ, ordinata sunt, tanto magis utique bona sunt; quanto autem minus moderata, minus speciosa, minus ordinata sunt, minus bona sunt. De nat. boni con. Men. III; PL 42, 553.

However, since value co-exists with being, with reality, there are other realities, not substantial, that have value. These realities lie in the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic spheres; they have a value of their own, albeit they ultimately converge on the Substantial Existent. Of these, Augustine indisputably gives first importance to the moral values, for it is by the moral values that man achieves his final happiness and personal perfection.

Moral values are embodied in the choice that man makes with regard to the order of goodness; all things are to be chosen according to that order:

Aliud enim est tenere ordinem, aliud ordine teneri. Tenet ordinem, seipsa tota diligens quod supra se est, id est Deum, socias autem animas tanquam seipsam. Hac quippe dilectionis virtute inferiora ordinat, nec ab inferioribus sordidatur. Quod autem illam sordidat, non est malum, quia etiam corpus creatura Dei est, et specie sua quamvis infima decoratur, sed prae animae dignitate contemnitur; sicuti auri dignitas, etiam purgatissimi argenti commixtione sordescit. Quapropter quicumque de nostra quoque poenali mortalitate numeri facti sunt, non eos abdicamus a fabricatione divinae providentiae, cum sint in genere suo pulchri. Neque amemus eos, ut quasi perfruendo talibus beati efficiamur. His etenim, quoniam temporales sunt, tanquam tabula in fluctibus, neque abjiciendo quasi onerosos, neque amplectendo quasi fundatos,
... MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES

1. St. Augustine and values

Humility, justice, purity and all the other virtues are values integrated in the order deriving from God; pride, injustice, impurity and all the other vices are "disvalues" in that they are intrinsically opposed to that order. Love subsumes all the virtues in that it signifies an embrace of moral values reflected in the individual virtues. That is why we can speak of the order of love as the order of value in Augustine; that person leads a holy life who, according to the value of things, possesses an ordered love with regard to them, loving more what is to be loved more, and less what is to be loved less.2

Since God is the summit of value, the supreme being and supreme goodness, He is to be loved above all:

Quid autem eligamus quod praecepue diligamus.

1. *De musica*, VI, 14, 46; PL 32, 1187.

2. "Ille autem juste et sancte vivit, qui rerum integer aestimatur: ipse est autem qui ordinatam dilectionem habet, ne aut diligit quod non est diligendum, aut non diligit quod est diligendum, aut amplius diligit quod minus est diligendum, aut aeque diligit quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est, aut minus vel amplius quo aeque diligendum est." *De div. chrst.* I, 27, 25; PL 34, 29.
... V MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES

1. St. Augustine and values

Loving the world with the love that belongs to God brings about such a value-perversion as to court inevitable destruction of one's self.² Love should be freely given to God, not for benefits that He may impart, but for Himself alone.³

2. Frui - uti

Another doctrine of St. Augustine that mirrors his

1. Epist. 155, 4, 13; PL 33, 672.

2. "Attendite saeculum quasi mare, ventus validus, et magna tempestas. Unicuique sua cupiditas, tempestas est. Amas Deum; ambulas super mare, sub pedibus tuis est saeculi tumor. Amas saeculum; absorbebit te. Amatores suos vorare novit, non portare." Sermo 76, 6, 9; PL 38, 482.

3. "... non ita est Deus noster; laudetur voluntate, ametur charitate; gratuïtum sit quod amatur, et quod laudatur. Quod est gratuïtum? Ipse propter se, non propter alium. Si enim laudas Deum ut det tibi aliquid aliud, jam non gratis Deum. Erubesces si te uxor tua propter divitias amatet." Ener. in Ps. 52, 10; PL 36, 626.
attitude towards value in that of *frui* - *uti*; man's relationship towards certain objects is one that he is able to control -- some things he can use as a means to something else, other things he can enjoy. This doctrine is principally contained in the first book of *De doctrina christiana*, but it is also found *passim* in his works at large. The basic meaning of these terms is that *frui* pertains to the love man has of an object because of itself, while *uti* pertains to that which is used to obtain that which is loved because of itself:

> Frui enim est amore alicui rei inhaerere propter seipsam. Uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen amandum est.\(^1\)

*Uti* merely indicates that the will act has been employed in the choice of some thing, but *frui* means actually to possess a thing with a transport of joy:\(^2\)

> Uti enim, est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis; frui est autem, uti cum gaudio, non adhuc spei, sed jam rei.

---

1. *De doc. chris.*., I, 4, 4; PL 34, 20.

2. "Frui ergo dicimur ea re de qua capimus voluptatem. Utimur ea quam referimus ad id unde voluptas capienda est." *Lib. de div.*. QQ. 83, #20; PL 40, 19.

196
... V MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES

2. Frui - uti

Proinde omnis qui fruitur, utitur; assumit enim aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, cum fine delectationis: non autem omnis qui utitur, fruitur; si id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, non propter illud ipsum, sed propter aliud appetitiv.  

Professor von Hildebrand refers to the act of frui as the culminating act of union with being embodied in a self-surrender to the value-call of the object.  

There is a perfectly legitimate use of things by man; this use, of course, would be in accord with the divine plan, for all things were made good by Him and may be used by man to stay in the fulness of His love.  

It would be an abuse of the goodness of creatures for man to love them for themselves -- respect for their


2. "The intimate union, the true 'wedlock' with being, is ultimately achieved in the act of frui, the embrace of full awareness, in the 'possession through self-surrender' and in the abandonment implied in the response to value." von Hildebrand, Transformation in Christ, N. Y., Longmans, 1948, p. 48.

3. "Ecce autem omnia quae fecit Deus, bona valde ... Usus autem rerum est legitimus, ut anima in lege Dei maneat, et uni Deo plenissima dilectione subjecta sit, et caetera sibi subjectae sine cupiditate aut libidine ministret, id est secundum prae-septum Dei." De Gen. impf. lib., 1, 3; PL 34, 221.

197
true value would thereby be vitiated, for it would be esteeming them as man's crowning beatitude:

Quod enim propter se diligendum est, in eo constituitur vita beata; cujus etiam si non-dum res, tamen spes ejus nos hoc tempore consolatur. ¹

When human reason scans the world of creatures it realizes that it can judge them; it can use them because it can judge them. But God man cannot judge, therefore, he cannot use Him, only enjoy Him. All things must be referred to God; He is referred to nothing; man, therefore, judges according to God.² These creaturely things, however, though they cannot be loved of themselves, can be loved in reference to God; that is, the acts of uti and frui can be exercised in regard

¹. De doc. chris., I, 22, 20; PL 34, 26.
². "Ita (ratio) omnibus et sensis et non sensis utitur; nec aliquid tertium est. Judicat autem de omnibus quibus utitur: de solo Deo non judicat, quia secundum Deum de cæstis judicat; nec eo utitur, sed fruitur. Neque enim ad aliquid alius Deus referendus est. Quoniam omne quod ad alius referendum est, inferius est quam id ad quod referendum est. Nec est aliquid Deus superius, non loco, sed excellentia suae naturae. Omnia ergo quae facta sunt, in usum hominis facta sunt, quia omnibus utitur judicando ratio, quae homini data est." De div quaes. B3, 20; PL 40, 20.
to them: uti insofar as they are used within the divine ordinance to bring man to God, frui insofar as they are loved as God's good creation and lead man to Him:

Res ergo aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur. Illae quibus fruendum est, beatos nos faciunt. Iste quibus utendum est, tendentes ad beatitudinem adjuvamus, et quasi adminiculumur, ut ad illas quae nos beatos faciunt, pervenire, atque his inhaerere possimus.1

Man himself, as one of God's creatures, is not to enjoy himself; that is, he is not to love himself for himself, but for God. Further, a man's goodness is measured by the intensity with which he directs his own life towards the Life Incommutable.2 Whenever man loves himself, or another, in God he is truly loving God:

Cum autem homine in Deo frueris, Deo potius quam homine frueris. Illo enim frueris quo

1. De doc. chris., I, 3, 3; PL 34, 20.

2. "Sed nec seipso quisquam frui debet, si liquido advertas; quia nec seipsum debet propter seipsum diligere, sed propter illum quo fruendum est. Tunc est quippe optimus homo, cum tota vita sua pergit in incommutabilem vitam, et toto affectu inhaeret illi: si autem se propter se diligit, non se refert ad Deum; sed seipsum conversus, non ad incommutabile alicujus convertitur." De doc. christ., I, 22, 21; PL 34, 26.
efficeris beatus; et ad eum te pervenisse laetaberis, in quo spem ponis ut venias.\textsuperscript{1}

The more one approaches the eternal and unchangeable the more is he called upon for the response of frui:

In his igitur omnibus rebus illae tantum sunt quibus fruendum est, quas aeternas atque incommutabiles commemoravimus; caeteris autem utendum est, ut ad illarum perfructiōnem pervenire possimus.\textsuperscript{2}

The final and supreme act of love is towards God, Who alone is to be loved for Himself; the Trinity is the proper object of frui:

Res igitur quibus fruendum est, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, eademque Trinitas, una quaedam summa res, communisque omnibus fruentibus ea...\textsuperscript{3}

Man, as discussed above in the chapter on freedom, has within himself the power to pervert himself by over-valuing or under-valuing a creature; the evil lies precisely in a false attitude towards value as perceived in the order of things: to use what is to be enjoyed, to enjoy what is to be used:

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. \textit{De doc. chris.}, I, 33, 37; PL 34, 33.
\item 2. \textit{De doc. chris.}, I, 22, 20; PL 34, 26.
\item 3. \textit{De doc. chris.}, I, 5, 5; PL 34, 21.
\end{itemize}
... V  MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES

2. Frui - uti

Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis ful.1

It is, therefore, not things that are evil, but the use of them. St. Augustine never disparages inferior goods, though he always inveighs against their wrongful use:

Videtis jam, ut arbitror, fratres, quam magno errore magnaque dementia in res ipsas quibus homines male utuntur, crimen male utentium transferatur. Nam si propterea vituperatur aurum et argentum, quia homines avaritia depravati, neglectis praeceptis omnipotentissimi Creatoris, in ea quae condidit detestabili vi rapiuntur ... 2

The ordinate use3 of things is to give them their rightful value; in man this is a virtue: "... ordinatio,


2. Sermo 50, 5, 7; PL 38, 329.

quae virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui, et utendis uti. To do otherwise would be a mockery of God's creation.

3. Development of the person

Certainly for St. Augustine one of the great values of the universe is man himself. We have already seen in what terms Augustine refers to man — that he is a profound mystery, that he is the crown of material creation, that he is, not simply a vestige, but an image of the Trinity. The value of the human person is not to be categorized; it is a value by itself and bespeaks a whole realm of values which are found only in the person. When man is truly defined as "rational animal" the danger to be avoided is to consider man as a closed, independent thing, whereas he is really open to the fulfilment that comes to him by possessing all the qualitative values.

1. De div. quaes. 83, #30; PL 40, 19.

2. "We have no proper name to characterize the ontological value of the human person as such, but we must instead refer to the being which incarnates this value." von Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, p. 132.
... V MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES
3. Development of the person

for which he is destined. The personality of man develops with every response to a legitimate call of value; man is not satisfied with knowing merely that something is, but he yearns for the fulness of meaning that is enshrined in that thing.

It is in this sense that man is able to transcend himself. Transcendence is a possibility and a power in man beyond the immanent development that his entelechy demands.\(^1\) Man, by his immanent direction, develops maturity; he does not, in the same way, develop chastity. He comes to learn the meaning of chastity; and sees its goodness; he understands that he is ordered to it and is free to respond to it. This pattern Augustine intimately evinces in the Confessiones:

\[
\text{Aperiatur enim, ea parte qua intenderam faciem, et quo transire trepidabam, casta dignitas continentiae, serena et non dissolute hilaris, honeste blandiens ut venirem neque dubitarem et extendens ad me suscipiendum et emplsestendum piar manus plenas gregibus bonorum exemplorum.}\(^2\)
\]

In the same way is man able to respond to all the

---

1. von Hildebrand, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 218-220.

... V MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES
3. Development of the person

intellectual, aesthetic, or moral values. In that re-
response he transcends himself for he participates in the
good, he is affected by it. He shares the value of due
learning, of good membership in society, of justice, of
truth, of piety. The ultimate good, the supreme value
to which we are ordered and which subsumes every other
good and every other value, is God:

Omnia etiam non summa bona, sed propinqua
summo bono, et rursus omnia etiam novissima
bona, quae longe sunt a summo bono, non
possunt esse nisi ab ipso summo bono.¹

God's goodness and our ordination to Him make man's
heart restless until it rests in Him.

Moral values are immediately personal; man is
called more directly to them than to the others: the
ordo servandus pertains more to love and virtue than
any other category. The awareness of order -- the ac-
knowledgegment of truth -- has a good life as its prime
consequence in us: "Hi mores sunt optimi, per quos
nobis etiam, provenit, ad quam omni studio rapimur,
agnitio veritatis."² Moral values are a greater good

¹. De nat. boni con. men. I; PL 42, 551-552.
... V  MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES
   3. Development of the person

for man; obviously man is not good if he only knows what
good is and is not good himself: "Neque enim vir bonus
merito dicitur qui scit quod bonum est, sed qui diliget."¹

Man is responsible for the moral values for they spring
from the core of his freedom; man deepens his personality by freely loving the good:

Cur ergo et in nobis ipsis non et ipsum
amorem nos amare sentimus, quo amamus quid-
quid boni amamus? Est enim et amor, quo
amatur et quod amandum non est: et istum
amorem odit in se, qui illum diligat, quo
id amatur quod amandum est. Possunt enim
ambo esse in uno homine, et hoc bonum est
hominis, ut illo proficiendus quo bene
vivimus, iste deficiat quo male vivimus,
donec ad perfectum sanetur, et in bonum
commutetur omne quod vivimus.²

Man is made better by loving the good: "... bonum
amando, nos meliores efficium."³ Since all good con-
verges in God, our approach to Him is judged by love;⁴
our approach rests on loving Him as the supreme good,

1. De civ. Dei, XI, 28; PL 41, 341.
2. Loc. cit.
3. En. in Ps. 144, 1; PL 37, 1869.
4. Cf. the very beautiful prayer with which Augustine
   beings the Soliloquia, I, 1, 1-6; PL 32, 869-872.
... V MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES
3. Development of the person

on responding to moral values.¹

Blindness to value is a result of the basic vices in man, namely pride and concupiscence. Pride is the radical source of human ills,² while concupiscence of the flesh tends to draw man away from spiritual goods.³ The great decision placed before man is whether he will choose that which is merely satisfying to him or that which has a true value, whether he will use what is to be loved or love what is to be loved. It is on this score, as soon in Chapter Four, that Augustine makes the sweeping division of mankind into the civitas terrena and the civitas Dei. Good and evil can co-exist in man; and since they bear an inverse ratio towards

¹. "Ad eum qui ubi praesens et ubique totus, non pedibus ire licet, sed moribus. Mores autem nostri, non ex eo quod quisque novit, sed ex eo quod diligat, dijudicari solent: nec faciunt bonos vel malos mores, nisi boni vel mali amores. Pravitate ergo nostra, a rectitudine Dei longe sumus: unde rectum amando corrigimur, ut recto recti adhaereere possimus." Epist. 155, 4, 13; PL 33, 672.

². "Vitiorum namque omnium humanorum causa superbia est." De pecc. mer et rem., II, 17, 27; PL 44, 168.

³. "Desiderium, inquam, tuum tale esse debet ad Deum, ut omnino non sit ipsa concupiscencia cui resistere oporteat." Sermo 151, 3, 3; PL 38, 815.
... V MAN IN RELATION TO VALUES

3. Development of the person

each other the more the true value-response the less the drag of pride and concupiscence; man's duty is to increase the reign of love: "Quanto magis regnum cupiditatis destruitur, tanto charitatis augetur."\(^1\)

---

1. *De doc. chris.* III, 10, 16; PL 34, 72.
CONCLUSION

As explained in the introduction, it was the aim of this thesis to arrive at an understanding of the meaning of man in the great Doctor of Hippo. This goal was set before us as a result of modern writings on man, so many of which profess an inability to appreciate the true dignity of man. Taking Augustine as an eminent representative and eloquent spokesman for Christian philosophy and knowing that he did not despair of metaphysical certitude, the attempt was made to discover his fundamental theses on our subject. This was done by considering man in his relations -- the obvious path to learning the meaning of a thing.

Augustine never took up ex professo the problem of unity in the composition of man, -- a philosopher of his times, he was not confronted with it as St. Thomas was in the face of the Arabian commentators of Aristotle; but he was confronted with the problem of Manichean panmaterialism. Augustine's concern was, admitting the spiritual counterpart of man to be his determining

element, what finality is man's, what is he destined for, how does he achieve it.

That man is able to know the truth is, for Augustine, the most notable characteristic of man; he is a knowing being and is certain that by an intuitive awareness he comes to a knowledge of being. By the interior path, whereby man reflects upon his own inward activity, he rises from one echelon of stability to another until he concludes that truths that are eternal and immutable can be found only in a being that is eternal and immutable; this is the Verum esse whom we call God.

Man, the rational being, does not stop his activity at merely knowing, for he is called to love the truth as well as to know it. At its inner core truth is dynamic and moves the knower to love it; there is no being that is not at the same time true and good, so that in loving the true man is loving the good. Especially is this so in man's call to God, the Summa veritas, Summum bonum.

Man's relationship to God is all-in-all. There is no pantheism, ontologism, or occasionalism in Augustine, but there is a relationship of untold dependency
so that all of man's meaning comes from God. God is the exemplar of man inasmuch as the imitability of the divine essence is spoken of as being contained in the divine ideas; by the same token man is the image of God -- a noble imitation which reaches its perfection in imaging the Most Holy Trinity. Man, therefore, participates in God; he participates in the divine being inasmuch as he exists; he participates in the divine life inasmuch as he is living. Because he is a being, man is both true and good, but because he is a being of intellect and will he is able to possess the true and the good, thereby participating in God, the True and the Good.

The union with God that is enjoyed upon man by reason of this relationship is a union of the whole man with God -- not a union, in some impossible way, by parts. The desire for union bursts forth in a life of virtue, which is of the whole man; only in this way is the full demand of truth satisfied because it is a principle of life -- truth is not thoroughly embraced unless it is lived. The person who loves truth will live in holiness, in piety, in justice. The navigator
in man is the will, for the will is the power that is
directive of man's acts according to the order perceived
in truth. ¹

The power of good and evil, of perversity and
honesty, of loss and salvation is in the will, while
virtue conserves and enhances the image of God in man,
sin can destroy it. ²

The freedom of will, consequently, is not an
end in itself; rather it is for the sake of man to
fulfill his vocation as a rational creature of God.
Man, by reason of his will, is master of himself; sev­
eral possibilities are open to him: he can take the
will as an end in itself and thereby seal himself up

¹. "Quapropter res quidem agendas pro nostro captu
ordinare debemus ... Quia et ordo agendarum rerum,
quam nostro arbitrio tenere volumus, ille utique
approbandus est, ubi potiora praecedunt. Cur ergo
nos delemus homines a Domino Deo tanto potiore
praedici, ut eo ipso quo nostrum amamus ordinem,
inordinati esse cupiamus? Nemo enim melius ordinat
quid agat, nisi qui paratior est non agere quod
divina potestate prohibetur, quam cupidior agere
quod humana cogitatione meditatur." De cat. rud.,
14, 20; PL 40, 326.

². "Facti sumus manu veritatis: sed propter peccatum
projecti in diis vanitatis. Facti sumus ad imaginem
Dei: sed detrivimus eam trangressione peccati."
Sermo 60, 2, 2; PL 38, 403.
CONCLUSION

as an independent entity emptied of all relational ties: or he can use the will to choose something of merely creaturely value, one that is not transcendent; or he is able to employ the will towards the transcendent values and towards the Absolute Good in Whom he finds his proper transcendence. Freedom of will in this last sense is the perfection of rational nature; it is man's spiritual liberty by which he gains full possession of himself. As Mouroux says:

We might call the act thus specified an engagement, and say that spiritual liberty is the engagement by which a man enters into full possession of himself, expands and fulfils his own being by giving himself to God.¹

Augustine's terrific insistence on the unity of mankind comes as an enlivening realization for today's world in the throes of internationalization. No one is destined to live in a world apart; he lives within the unity of men having the same nature. It is mankind that lives in this present order as well as every man; it is mankind that works out its destiny as well as every man;

¹. Mouroux, op. cit., The Meaning of Man, p. 152.
... CONCLUSION

it is mankind fallen and mankind restored as well as every man. As a part of universal humanity each man depends on the whole -- so much so that a man independent in his activity, his livelihood, his very existence, would be a social anomaly. Further, as a member of social humanity each man has the opportunity of enriching himself, for mankind disposes the individual man to transcend himself by giving himself unto the good of the whole. Likewise is the whole of mankind somehow found in man: each man reflects and contains all men within himself. Human nature is found in each man; all of mankind depends for its complete perfection on the individual, for some social good is wanting if the individual fails to perform the good he is called to; mankind itself is enriched to the degree that each man contributes his personal goodness and worthwhile activity: omnes homines unus homo, unus homo omnes homines.

In his insistence on the unity of mankind, Augustine is a true Christian, for across the centuries of time, with all its thinkers, religious men, and sects, it has been Christianity alone that has consistently affirmed a collective as well as an individual transcendence; as
CONCLUSION

M. de Lubac writes:

Dans ce concert universel, seul le Christianisme affirme à la fois, indissolublement, pour l'homme une destinée transcendante et pour l'humanité une destinée commune.¹

For these reasons it is eminently logical that Augustine should contemplate all of history in a synoptic view, and the whole course of human history becomes comparable to the life of a single individual. Mankind is under the unique providence of God. The collective destiny of humanity, if it is to be worked out at all, is to be worked out in time and under divine guidance; the patient study of history will detect the finger of God. Figgis has admirably captured this attitude of Augustine:

Augustine's philosophy of history is a philosophy of the time-process as a whole. History according to S. Augustine is not merely terrestrial. It is the whole course of social happenings in time, in relation to a timeless Deity. No one could be more profoundly imbued than was S. Augustine with the doctrine of the timeless reality of God. On that ground

... CONCLUSION

he felt the more need of relating this to
the world of successive events ... It is
history as a whole history from the crea-
tion of light until the Last Judgment,
that is the justification of God.¹

Love for his fellow man, springing from the love
of God, is the supreme virtue of men towards each other.
All social relations rest on the foundation of love. In
the absence of this love, there arises a segment of
humanity that Augustine calls the civitas terrena; in it
there is no godly interest, though indeed it can achieve
a modicum of peace which the civitas Dei can utilize in
its movement towards the final peace of the children of
God.

Truth, order, and love converge in Augustine's
philosophy of value. At bottom, value is concerned with
the good; to see a thing in truth, to see it in order,
is to see its goodness; further, to grasp its goodness
is to grasp its value, and thus in the relationship of
the willing subject to the object perceived. Man is
confronted by a hierarchy of values which are good in

¹. Figgis, op. cit., The Political Aspects of St.
themselves; man is open to them and can respond to them. The highest value absolutely is God, in Whom all other values are subsumed. Man's way to God lies in the moral values; he may not reject them, for in the last analysis it is by reason of moral values that a man orders himself towards God and is called good. Rectitude or perversion in this matter Augustine explains on the basis of frui - uti: we are to love what is to be loved, not love what is to be used.

By responding to the values that call him, man is able to develop his person. To hold that man, in the presence of values, is simply a bystander and that he can in no wise be fecundated by them completely desiccates the fruitfulness of Augustine's outlook.

That man is a rational creature of God, that he possesses the image of his maker, that he is endowed with liberty, that he participates in the society of men, that he can love, that he can be chaste, that he is ordained to eternal happiness, that he gives glory to God, are all values that are spread before men -- it is by them that he transcends himself, and, since his primary transcendence is God-wards, his power of transcendence is
limitless.

The realm of spiritual beings is appointed to eternal life; this is the possession by the highest faculties, intellect and will, of the *Summum bonum*, the *Summum verum*, the *Verum esse*. Each man will come to his destiny of happiness in God's glory, and mankind will reach its full flowering in the never-failing life of peace.

The materialism we face today Augustine had to face. A thorough-going materialism takes away what is noblest in man, re-ordains him to a false end, thereby destroying his dignity. Augustine answered materialism with a vigorous affirmation of the spirit. What he tried to do was to uphold man's true dignity as a rational creature, made to the image of His Creator and destined to return to Him. He saw that far from alienating himself by predicating perfection of God, man possesses himself by realizing his due order to God, which is the crowning achievement of wisdom. A false dignity is the atheistic-materialistic conception of man: it is a spiritless, relationless, valueless void. Man's ambition is infinitely greater than merely to appropriate himself
... CONCLUSION

as his own end, for his true end is the Infinite. Man
is not to fear matter; he is to become its master by
using it for its intended service of bringing him closer
to his final end.

Existentialism has well divined that man is a
problem and a central mystery of the universe. But the
humanism of atheistic existentialism, denying as it
does that there is unchangeable truth and that man is
able to know metaphysical realities, is diametrically
opposed to the humanism of Augustine. It lapses into
most of the errors of materialism and, therefore, under­
mines the spiritual character of man. It offers nothing
more than an anthropocentric humanism. A true humanism,
which is the need of our age, can be had only when the
very source of humanity is seen as its true origin:
humanism must be theocentric. In the words of Maritain:

If civilization is to be saved, the new age
must be an age of theocentric humanism.
Today human dignity is everywhere trampled
down. Still more, it crumbles from within,
for in the mere perspective of science and
technology we are at a loss to discover
the rational foundations of the dignity of
the human person and to believe in it. The
task of the emergent civilization (which
will doubtless not appear tomorrow but which
may possibly appear the day after tomorrow)
... CONCLUSION

will consist in refinding and refounding the sense of that dignity, in rehabilitating man in God and through God, not apart from God... The age will be an age of dignification of the creature, in its living relation with the Creator, as vivified by Him, and as having in Him the justification of its very existence, its labor on earth, its essential claims and its trend toward freedom.¹

The relationship of man to God is, in a sense already seen, the totality of Augustine's philosophy: all of the meaning of man is in God. Augustine's answer to his own age is the answer to ours. He wrote in the Soliloquia that there was nothing he wanted to know more than God and man; he said the same in De ordine:

Cujus (philosophiae disciplina) quaestio est: una de anima, altera de Deo. Prima efficit ut nos metipsos noverimus; altera, ut originem nostram. Ila nobis dulcior, ista charior; illa nos dignos beata vita, beatos haec facit; prima est illa discentibus, ista jam doctis. Hic est ordo studiorum sapientiae, per quem fit quaque idoneus ad intelligendum ordinen rerum, id est, ad dignoscendos duos mundos, et ipsum parentem universitatis; cujus nulla scientia est in anima, nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat.²


². De ordine, II, 18, 47; PL 32, 1017.
Primary sources


Secondary sources

Acta Hebdomadæ Augustinianæ-Thomisticae, Taurini, Marietti, 1931.


1. With regard to the Maurist edition J. de Ghellinck, S.J., writes: "Absolument parlant, cette oeuvre garde toujours une trèè haute valeur; et malgré les perfectionnements incontestables et les corrections de détail qu'apportent les derniers volumes du Corpus de Vienne, on peut se demander si, du point de vue de la critique d'authenticité, de l'unité de la mise en œuvre, de la cohésion et du cadre, de la richesse du contenu et de la plénitude des documents, de l'ampleur et de la méthode des tables, la glorieuse édition bénédictine, vraie création de génie pour son siècle, ne maintiendra pas dans l'ensemble de ses lignes une superiorité durable sur l'œuvre moins harmonieusement conçue et plus inégalement édifiée par les philologues de Vienne." "L'édition de saint Augustin par les Mauristes," in Nouvelle Revue Théologique, LVII (1930), p. 774. A particular example is given by John H. Taylor, S.J., who holds that the Benedictine text of De Genesi ad litteram is more reliable than Joseph Zycha's CSEL text. Speculum, XXV, (1950), pp. 87-93.


Bourke, Vernon J.: Augustine's Quest of Wisdom, Milwaukee, Bruce, 1945.


------ L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de Saint Augustin, 2me édition, Paris, Beauchesne et ses fils, 1951.


Butler, Dom Cuthbert: Western Mysticism, New York, Dutton, 1924.


------ Dieu présent, dans la vie de l'esprit (Bibliothèque augustiniennne), Paris, Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, 1947.

------ Initiation à la philosophie de Saint Augustin (Bibliothèque augustiniennne), Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1951.

------ Les sources de l'amour divin, Le divine présence d'après saint Augustin, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer 1933 (Bibliothèque augustinienne).
... BIBLIOGRAPHY


----- Les métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu, Louvain, Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1952.


----- La vision d'ostie, sa place dans la vie et l'oeuvre de saint Augustin, Paris, J. Vrin, 1938.

222


BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

Doctrine spirituelle de saint Augustin, Paris, P. Lethielleux, 1901.


Nourisson, La philosophie de saint Augustin, 2me édition, Paris, Didier & Cie, 1866, 2 vols.


224


