THE ROLE OF SELF-EXPERIENCE IN PERSONALITY THEORY:
A STUDY OF THE ALLPORT-BERTOCCI DEBATE

by

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INTRODUCTION

This study has grown out of a concern over the study and understanding of the individual person. Each individual person is unique by virtue of that area of unqualified privacy referred to by Hopkins:

when I consider my selfbeing, my consciousness and feelings of myself, that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man...Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. Nothing explains it or resembles it, except so far as this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling. But this only multiplies the phenomena to be explained so far as the cases are like and do resemble. But to me there is no resemblance: searching nature I taste self but at one tankard, that of my own being. The development, refinement, condensation of nothing shews any sign of being able to match this to me or give me another taste of it, a taste even resembling it.¹

Yet this same uniqueness which is the core of selfhood and the source of all personal values is at the same time the source of many problems. Thus, like Maugham, the individual person can claim that "to myself I am the most important person in the world; though I do not forget that...from the standpoint of common sense, I am of no consequence whatever. It would have made small difference to the universe if I had never existed."¹

For the individual person to discover a mean between this subjective sense of importance and this objective sense of inconsequentiality is not an easy task, as Maritain has pointed out:

These two images - of myself and of my situation in respect of other subjects - can positively not be superposed. These two perspectives cannot be made to coincide. I oscillate rather miserably between them. If I abandon myself to the perspective of subjectivity, I absorb everything into myself, and, sacrificing everything to my uniqueness, I am riveted to the absolute of selfishness and pride. If I abandon myself to the perspective of objectivity, I am absorbed into everything, and, dissolving into the world, I am false to my uniqueness and resign my destiny.


²Ibid., p. 82
This dilemma facing the individual person is reflected in the dilemma facing those disciplines which attempt to study and understand the nature of personal being: too much emphasis on one aspect upsets the delicate balance which must be maintained in order to preserve intact these subjective and objective perspectives.

Two thinkers who were acutely aware of this dilemma were Gordon W. Allport and Peter A. Bertocci. While Allport approached the nature of personal being from the perspective of a psychologist, Bertocci approached the nature of personal being from the perspective of a philosopher. The fact that their approaches did not coincide accounts in part for the debate which sprang up between them, and which was to become "a classic dialogue in psychological and philosophical literature". ¹ While both could agree on many issues, they nevertheless remained divided, despite mutual concessions, on one particular issue of major importance, namely, the theoretical accounting for the unity and continuity of the person. Here, then,

¹R. I. EVANS, Gordon Allport: The Man and His Ideas (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1970), p. 38. The details concerning the nature and loci of this debate will be given in Chapter I below.
is an ideal situation for an objective study which focuses on the nature of personal being. The debate, which lasted twenty seven years ending only with the death of Allport, remains unresolved. Thus, from a purely historical point of view, there is the question of whether this debate can in fact be resolved, and, if so, what concessions each of the protagonists would be required to make. But there is the further question which any proposed resolution of this debate would raise, namely, just what contribution will such a proposed resolution of this historic debate add to the future study of the nature of personal being?

The contribution to the future study of the nature of personal being which such a study would provide is, we submit, significant. Indeed, the implications of such a study are far-reaching both for the psychological perspective of Allport and for the philosophical perspective of Bertocci. Thus, in this study we shall argue that Allport's perspective must make certain concessions concerning the nature of the self - a concept he had tried consistently to ignore. At the same time we shall argue that Bertocci's perspective requires certain clarifications concerning the nature of self-experience and self-awareness together with a modification of its interpretation of the mind-body relationship. The principal argument of this study will concentrate on the importance of the starting point and 'givens' at the outset of any investigation of the nature of personal being, and will establish that the role of self-experience in such an
The method adopted by this study has been dictated by the very nature of the subject-matter itself. To resolve the Allport-Bertocci debate - a debate, it should be added, which has been surprisingly ignored by commentators - the perspective and thought of each protagonist must be examined and understood, and the reasons for their disagreement isolated. The first two parts of the study will thus be primarily expository and concerned with an internal criticism of the perspectives and thought of Allport and Bertocci respectively, although the opening chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the more general nature of the debate. Since we believe a resolution of this debate is possible, given certain concessions on the part of both protagonists, we have attempted to remain within the framework of the debate itself as far as possible. However, a certain amount of external criticism is necessary especially in our discussions of the nature of self-experience, self-awareness, and personal bodiliness - points upon which, we shall argue, Bertocci's thought is neither sufficiently clear nor adequate.

In the first place, therefore, this study attempts to contribute a resolution to this historic debate between G. W. Allport and P. A. Bertocci. However, at the same time it is hoped that, as a further contribution, this proposed resolution of the Allport-Bertocci debate
will underline the importance of self-experience in any investigation of the nature of personal being. Indeed, it is the argument of this study that, unless an accurate account of self-experience is given at the outset, no investigation of the nature of personal being, be it psychological or philosophical, can hope to be adequate.

Within the context of the more general philosophico-scientific debate, however, it is worth noting that the Allport-Bertocci debate is equally significant. Not only does the Allport-Bertocci debate focus on a perennial philosophical problem, namely, the nature of the self, but it also focuses on a highly questionable aspect of Allport's conception of psychology as a science. Thus, if psychology as a science is to be defined in Allport's terms as a 'meta-science' of man, then it must take into account the specifically philosophical problems which such a meta-science must inevitably raise. If, however, psychology as a science is defined in a less all-inclusive manner, then those specific philosophical problems connected with an understanding of certain aspects of personal being can be left to philosophy to decide. If the latter definition of psychology as a science is adopted, then the Allport-Bertocci debate
must be viewed as essentially a philosophical debate concerning a specifically philosophical problem. Within such a perspective, the Allport-Bertocci debate would still be highly significant since it would be a salutary reminder to all psychologists that a clear definition of the limits of their scientific endeavours must be established at the outset of their investigations.

In this study, we have adopted the framework of the two protagonists. Within this framework we have accepted Allport's view of psychology as the 'meta-science' of man, though not without a degree of criticism. And, in so far as both Allport and Bertocci concur in arguing that each psychology of the person is at the same time a philosophy of the person, it could be argued that their debate was indeed a philosophico-scientific debate. We are fully aware, however, that Allport's conception of psychology and of science is highly questionable, and for this reason we have not attempted to present this debate within the context of the more general debate between philosophy and science. Yet, we submit, the significance of their debate remains for the reasons pointed out above as does the argument of this study,
namely, that no psychology of the person, understood in Allport's terms, can hope to be adequate without an accurate account of self-experience being given at the outset.
CHAPTER I: THE NATURE OF THE DEBATE

1. The Peculiar Problem.

There is a central enigma in being a person. While all of us would subscribe to Terence's phrase, "proximus sum egomet mihi" we would, were we asked to explain what we meant by such a statement, undoubtedly feel like Augustine when he declared, "si nemo ex me quiserit scio: si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio". William James found himself caught within this same paradox when beginning his discussion of the nature of consciousness:

When I say every thought is part of a personal consciousness, 'personal consciousness' is one of the terms in question. Its meaning we know so long as no one asks us to define it, but to give an accurate account of it is the most difficult of philosophic tasks.

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1 PUBLIUS TERENTIUS AFER, Andria, Act IV, sc.1, 12; AUGUSTINE, Confessiones, XI, 14, where Augustine is replying to the question, "quid est ergo tempus?"

2 WILLIAM JAMES, Principles of Psychology (New York: Holt and Co., 1890), I, 225. Cf. also PLATO, the Phaedrus, 246: "Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse..." (All references to the text of Plato refer to The Dialogues of Plato, transl. by B. JOWETT, 2 volumes (New York: Random House, 1937).). ARISTOTLE, De Anima, 402a, 9: "To attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world." (All references to the text of Aristotle refer to The Works of Aristotle, translated into English under the editorship of W.D. Ross and J.A. Smith, 11 volumes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931).).
As a psychologist, James wanted his 'first fact' to be that "thinking of some sort goes on". There is even an element of regret in his admission that, although the way of stating this fact most simply and with the minimum of assumption would be to say "it thinks" as we say "it rains" or "it blows", this is, he admits, nevertheless, impossible in English.

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There has been, however, an effort to maintain this thesis. Cf. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), p. 232: "It is not exact, nor relevant to say 'I experience' or 'I think'. 'It' experiences... or 'it' thinks... or is thought, is a juster phrase." Cf. also ERNST MACH, Contribution to the Analysis of Sensations, transl. by C.M. Williams (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1897), p. 22: "We should say, It thinks, as we say It lightens."

The same thesis is mentioned in a different context by P.F. STRAWSON, in his Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 95, footnote, where Strawson refers to Lichtenberg's dictum, which Wittgenstein at one stage adopted, that "instead of saying 'I think', we... ought to say 'There is a thought' (i.e. 'es denkt')". Elsewhere, in his article "Persons", in Essays in Philosophical Psychology, ed., by Donald F. Gustafson (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1964), p. 377, Strawson boldly announces: "It may be difficult to explain the idea of something which is both a subject of experiences and a part of the world. But it is an idea we have: it should be an idea we can explain." (Italics added). This, of course, is the paradox.
Yet such a proposal is not only contrary to linguistic form, but is contrary to experience itself, as James himself admits:

The universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and thoughts exist', but 'I think' and 'I feel'... The worst a psychology can do is to interpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their worth.¹

The central enigma in being a person resides precisely in this element of 'worth'. While a person is a 'thing among things' in the material universe and subject to the laws of physics like any other 'thing', and while he is an 'animal among animals' and subject to the laws of biology, he is, nevertheless, a being endowed with self-consciousness - the capacity to reflect on the immanent activities of consciousness - and one who must live in a society of self-conscious beings. Any attempt to understand the nature of man, or to formulate a human psychology, must, therefore, study man in his wholeness as a person.

Historically, the study of man has been subject to a tendency to fragmentize the person, placing too much emphasis on one aspect of his nature at the expense of others. Thus, in the psychology of Plato, the intellectual, self-conscious aspect of man was given pride of place to the detriment of the corporeal aspect: the body was reduced to a prison of the soul. Aristotle, while steadfastly attempting to study man as an integral spiritual/corporeal unity, was hard pressed to reconcile man's vegetative and animal activities

1 Cf. Phaedrus, 250, where Plato speaks of being "enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell." Also, Phaedro, 82, 83, where Plato suggests that "the soul was simply fastened and glued to the body - until philosophy received her, she could only view real existence through the bars of a prison ... philosophy ... sought to release her ... bidding her trust in herself and her pure apprehension of pure experience, and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to variation." Plato's exact doctrine of the soul is not systematically developed. For example, in the Timaeus, 69, he argues that only the rational part of the soul is immortal, while in the Myths of the Republic and the Phaedrus, he implies that the soul survives in its totality. (The divisions of the soul are given in both the Republic, Book 4, and in the Timaeus, 69). Cf. C. RITTER, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy, transl. by A. Alles (London: George Allen & Urwin, 1933), p. 280ff.
with his higher intellectual activities: the highest aspect of the intellect became almost impersonal.¹

¹A clear statement of Aristotle's position on the necessary union of body and soul, together with a refutation of the Platonic view that any soul could somehow inhabit any body, occurs in De Anima, 414a 19-28: "Hence the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot be a body; it is not a body, but something relative to a body. That is why it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind. It was a mistake, therefore, to do as former thinkers did, merely to fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind or character of that body. Reflection confirms the observed fact; the actuality of any given thing can only be realized in what is already potentially that thing, i.e. in a matter of its own appropriate to it. From all this it follows that soul is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being besouled." For the much-disputed reference to the Active Intellect which alone is immortal, CF. De Anima, 430a 17-26: "Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassable, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity... When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this sense is impassable, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks." H. D. GARDEL makes the following comment in his Initiation à la Philosophie de S. Thomas D'Aquin (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1957), III, 18: "Ainsi donc le problème autour duquel la psychologie d'Aristote aurait progressivement pris sa consistance originale serait des rapports de l'âme et du corps; problème qui d'ailleurs ne trouvera pas en cette ouvrage de solution tout à fait adéquate, puisqu'au terme on se trouvera devant l'aporie d'une âme, à la fois solidaire du corps dans sa fonction de forme substantielle, psychê, et transcendant ce corps comme principe des opérations spirituelle, nous." Cf. also Sir David Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1930), p. 153ff.
With the advent of Christianity, reflection on the nature of man tended to become theological, although the great Manichaean controversy, in which Augustine participated, showed that the enigma was far from clarified. In the thought of Augustine, a Platonic dualism was re-instated with vigour.\footnote{Cf. De Quantitate Animae, 13, 21, where Augustine speaks of the soul as "substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accommodati". Cf. also De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum, 1, 27, 52: "Homo anima rationalis est mortali atque terreno utens corpore." Cf. also his explicit reference to an important aspect of self-consciousness in De Trinitate, 1, 9, 3: "...mens seipsam per seipsam novit."} To a certain extent, the enigma of being a person was given its fullest clarification in the great syntheses of Medieval thought. In the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, the person, viewed from within the Christian Weltanschauung, was at once necessarily a union of body and soul, but a union ordained by a salvific Creator Who, having created the human soul at birth, maintained it in existence after physical death in
order to reunite it with the body at the **Parousia**.¹

Yet strangely neglected in such synthetic views of the nature of man and of the universe was any serious elaboration of the social

¹For St. Thomas Aquinas' position on the union of body and soul, Cf. *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, 57: "Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint secundum esse diversa." Cf. also *Summa Theologica*, I, 75, 4; 76, 1.

For his position on the creation of the soul, Cf. S.T., I, 90, 2: "Anima autem rationalis... non potest fieri ex materia praecipuente ... necesse est dicere quod non fit nisi per creationem." Cf. also *Compendium Theologiae*, 93: "Solius autem Dei est creare ... A solo igitur Deo anima rationalis in esse producitur."

For his position on the immortality of the soul, Cf. S.T., I, 75, 6: "Anima autem humana non posset corrupi nisi per se corruptur ... Omnis igitur intellectualis substantia est incorruptibilis". Cf. also *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, 57.

On Aquinas' assumption of the resurrection of the body, Cf. *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, 95: "Non est tamen aemtandum quod animae, postquam resument corpora in resurrectione, immobilitatem voluntatis amittant, sed in ea perseverant: quia ... corpora in resurrectione disponentur secundum exigentiam animae, non autem animae immutabuntur per corpora". The most significant biblical text for this belief is **1 Corinthians**, 15, 35-54.
consequences of man's personal nature. As a person, man had autonomy - "dominium actis sui". As such, as well as being a member of society, he was also an end in himself, and a legislator of the moral law very much as Kant later expounded. It was Luther, with his insights into the nature of personal consciousness's autonomy, who, in developing the meaning of 'fiducia', re-introduced that aspect of the person's trusting his 'pure apprehension of pure experience' which Plato had emphasized. Yet ironically, the philosopher who was to

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\[\text{(2) AQUINAS, S.T., I, 29, 3 ad 2.}
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recognize and formulate this unique aspect of man's self-consciousness in his famous *Cogito* also re-introduced a fundamental fragmentation of the person through his elaboration of what Gilbert Ryle has humourously described as the Cartesian Myth of the Ghost in the Machine.\(^1\)

Even the new science of Psychology, as it emerged from its nineteenth century beginnings, was unable to avoid the pitfalls of fragmentation.\(^2\) This sudden emergence of Freud and his discoveries


Descartes' exact psychological doctrine is not entirely clear. While affirming a net distinction between soul and body (*The Sixth Meditation, Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. by C. ADAM & P. TANNERY (Paris: Cerf, 1897-1909), VII, 78), he nevertheless vacillated over their respective completeness, and, therefore, separateness, as substances (*Cf. Replies to Objections, 4,1; A.T. VII, 222*). Descartes was, however, clearly aware of the enigmatic nature of being a person, as his "Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 28 June, 1643", testifies: "It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of conceiving at the same time the distinction and union between the body and the soul, because for this it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and at the same time to conceive them as two things: which is absurd." (*Descartes: Philosophical Letters*, transl. & edited by A. Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 142.

concerning the subconscious, while definitely broadening the traditional view of the nature of man, nevertheless succeeded in fragmentizing him by reducing man the person to 'homo natura', and, "in this process, all that makes man into a man, and not an animal, is obliterated."¹


Cf. also ROLAND DALBIEZ, Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud, transl. by T. F. Lindsay (London: Longmans, 1948), II, 306: "Freud's views on sexual ethics are inspired by a very radical biologism. He seems consistently to postulate that the satisfaction of the instincts is the only satisfaction required by human nature, and that all the rest is artificial surplus... Freud must be blamed for not taking into account the vital fact that instinct is not sufficient to govern human behaviour. Instinct in man is not in the same position as instinct in animals. Animal instinct is the only guide to behaviour; human instinct is made to function in a being gifted with intelligence... When Freud maintains that all human and ethical governance is artificial, we must reply that he is forgetting the place of the intelligence, and that this or that form of culture in man is artificial, yet the general requirement of culture is part of man's nature... Freud... almost comes not to regard anything as natural to man but the characteristics he shares with other animals".
Another form of fragmentation occurred in the reduction of the person to a stimulus-response mechanism inspired, in part, by Galton's introduction of experimentation and measurement in his attempt to understand man's character.¹

¹Cf. SIR FRANCIS GALTON, "Measurement and Character", Fortnightly Review, 42 (1884), 179-85. A classic statement of the stimulus-response theory is given in N. E. MILLER & J. DOLLARD, Social Learning and Imitation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 1-2: "What, then, is learning theory? In its simplest form, it is the study of the circumstances under which a response and a cue stimulus become connected. After learning has been completed, response and cue are bound together in such a way that the appearance of the cue evokes the response... Learning takes place according to definite psychological principles. Practice does not always make perfect. The connection between a cue and a response can be strengthened only under certain conditions. The learner must be driven to make the response and rewarded for having responded in the presence of the cue. This may be expressed in a homely way by saying that in order to learn one must want something, notice something, do something, and get something. Stated more exactly, these factors are drive, cue, response, and reward. These elements in the learning process have been carefully explored and further complexities have been discovered. Learning theory has become a firmly knit body of principles which are useful in describing human behavior."
That such extremes of interpretation are possible throughout the history of Western thought witnesses to the central enigma of personal being. In every effort to understand the nature of man, there is a fine balance to be struck: over-emphasis of one aspect leads to a fragmentation of his total complex nature. Not man the imprisoned spirit or thinking substance, not man the animal among animals or automatic response mechanism, but man the person in all his complex personal and social being must be the object of our inquiries, if we are to arrive at a truly comprehensive understanding of ourselves, which is wisdom in its classical sense.¹

Such an attempt at comprehensive understanding of man as a person has been carried out by two thinkers whose disputes have become known as "a classic dialogue in psychological and philosophical literature".² While Gordon W. Allport, on the one hand, approached the person as a psychologist, Peter A. Bertocci, on the other, has

¹Cf. PLATO, Alcibaides I, 129: "... knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves ... And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom".

approached the person as a philosopher, yet neither has ever lost sight of man's total nature. This study proposes to approach the enigma of man's personal being through an examination of the work of these two thinkers, and, by an attempted resolution of the issue on which they could never reach complete agreement, elucidate certain considerations without which no study of man as a person can hope to be complete.
2. The Allport-Bertocci Debate

The Allport-Bertocci debate began in 1940 when Bertocci submitted an article to the Psychological Review entitled "A Critique of G. W. Allport's Theory of Motivation". This article, the first draft of which had been corrected and commented on by Allport, criticised Allport's theory of motivation as developed in his now classic Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, published in 1937. Allport replied in the same issue of the Psychological Review in an article entitled "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci".¹

One of the central issues in this initial debate was how Allport's theory of motivation could account for the unity and continuity of the person throughout personality development. This issue was not resolved by Allport's reply, and continued to be a controversial issue between them throughout the long friendship.

¹Cf. Psychological Review, 47 (1940) 501-554 for both articles.
their initial conflict had engendered, and which ended only with Allport's death in 1967.¹

¹For particular reference to their friendship and its stimulating nature Cf. GORDON W. ALLPORT, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. viii; Idem, Personality and Social Encounter, p. vi; Idem, "Peter Bertocci: Philosopher Psychologist", Philosophical Forum, 21 (1963-64) 3-7; and especially Cf. Idem, The Person in Psychology; Selected Essays, p. viii: "The dedication of this volume to Peter A. Bertocci, Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy in Boston University, is an attempt to recognize not only his help in bringing this and other publications to the light of day, but also his invigorating instruction in the philosophical dimensions of personhood; and, above all, it is an attempt to thank him for many years of close intellectual and personal friendship." Cf. also Ibid., "An Autobiography", p. 391.


However, the nature of this dispute cannot be appreciated fully without some knowledge of each protagonist's pre-occupations and thought. That both were person-centred and that they both shared many methodological presuppositions and principles will become evident as this study progresses. By distinguishing those aspects of their thought which are common from those which are divergent, the causes of their disagreement can be isolated, and a direction for the resolution of their conflict possibly discovered. Such an attempted solution should also bring us closer to a clearer understanding of the central enigma of personal being, and to a fuller appreciation of those aspects of the enigma which must be considered if our inquiries are to be truly efficacious.
PART ONE: GORDON W. ALLPORT
CHAPTER II: G. W. ALLPORT'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGY

1. Introduction

Gordon W. Allport, born in 1897 in Montezuma, Indiana, obtained an A.B. in 1919 from Harvard University, spent a year at Robert College, Istanbul, teaching English and Sociology, and returned to Harvard to complete the requirements for a Ph.D. in psychology, which he received in 1922. For the next two years, Allport studied in Berlin, Hamburg, and Cambridge, England. He then returned to Harvard to teach social ethics and a new course in the psychology of personality. Two years later, he accepted the position of assistant professor of psychology of Dartmouth College, where he taught until 1930. He then returned to Harvard, where he remained until his death in October, 1967.

Allport had an exceptionally successful career, receiving virtually every award his fellow psychologists could offer. He was elected president of the American Psychological Association, president of the Eastern Psychological Association, and president of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. In 1963 he was awarded the gold medal of the American Psychological Foundation, and in 1964 received the award of the American Psychological Association for distinguished scientific contributions.
Allport's wide range of interest was reflected in his extensive bibliography which ranged from problems dealing with personality development to problems related to rumor, radio, prejudice, religion, and values. Besides his own writing and collaboration, Allport also served for twelve years as editor of the influential Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.

Allport's diverse educational background was reflected in his work. A spirit of eclecticism pervaded Allport's approach to psychology, and while he was undoubtedly influenced by William James, Wilhelm Stern, Kurt Lewin, (and other Gestaltists), and by William McDougall, he was never, in any sense of the term, a disciple of any of them. Indeed, the whole idea of discipleship was quite foreign to Allport and to his central concern, as he himself has pointed out:

\[\text{Cf. Bibliography below. Allport's complete bibliography is given in GORDON W. ALLPORT, The Person in Psychology, pp. 410-430.}\]

What then is my personal idea? I suppose it has to do with my search for a theoretical system - for one that will allow for truth wherever found, one that will encompass the totality of human experience and do full justice to the nature of man. I myself have never had a strictly defined program of research, nor have I tried to establish a 'school' of psychological thought.¹

Allport's approach to psychology and to personality can thus begin with Allport himself.

¹GORDON W. ALLPORT, "An Autobiography", in The Person in Psychology, p. 406. Cf. also, HALL & LINDZEY, Theories of Personality, p. 290: "In contrast to most theorists, Allport has never developed a school of followers, although traces of his influence may be found in the work of former students such as A. L. Baldwin, J. S. Bruner, H. Cantril, D. G. McGranahan, and M. B. Smith".
2. **Psychology as a Natural Science**

It is a commonplace among contemporary thinkers to criticize the efforts of scientific psychology as it has been practiced in the last half-century. Wittgenstein's criticisms of "empirical psychology" have initiated a widespread trend in Anglo-American philosophy, while within the ranks of psychology itself, the voices of the "Third Force" have long sounded a warning note. And yet traditional psychology has never been without its own critics. William James himself spoke of psychology as a science "particularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint, a psychology all of whose elementary assumptions and data must be reconsidered in wider connections and translated into other terms," a science which in fact

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1Cf. L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical Investigations, transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1968), p. 232; "The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 'young science'; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings... For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion." For a general view of the current debates among Linguistic philosophers, cf. Essays in Philosophical Psychology, ed. by D. F. GUSTAFSON, Anchor Books (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1964).
had not produced "a single law in the sense in which physics shows us
laws, not a single proposition from which any consequence can causally be deduced."\textsuperscript{1} Allport has been described as above all continuing this peculiarly Jamesian perspective:

James is reflected not only in Allport's brilliant writing style, a wide-ranging, relatively humanistic orientation toward human behavior, and in an interest in the self, but also in certain doubts concerning the ultimate power of psychological methods to represent adequately and to understand completely the enigma of human behavior."\textsuperscript{2}

Yet both James and Allport viewed psychology as above all a science, James insisting that it be "treated as a natural science",\textsuperscript{3} and Allport declaring that "one of the most significant happenings in the first part of the twentieth century has been the discovery ... that human personality is an accessible subject for scientific probing."\textsuperscript{4} This discovery, according to Allport, gave birth to a new science which

\textsuperscript{1} W. JAMES, Psychology (Briefer Course), (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1963), p. 407.


\textsuperscript{3} W. JAMES, Psychology, p. 17.

"has come to be known (in America) as the psychology of personality."¹

The great problem for psychology as a science is not, Allport argued, that its methods are inadequate, but rather that its perspectives have been too narrow.² As will be seen, Allport always worked within the framework of psychology as a natural science employing empirical methods of investigation. Thus the remarks of a Laing, that "it is impossible to derive the basic logic of a science of persons from the logic of non-personal sciences," are totally alien to Allport's point


²Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, "The Productive Paradoxes of William James," in The Person in Psychology: Selected Essays by Gordon W. Allport (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 323: "The message of James for psychology today is this: Narrow consistency can neither bring salvation to your science, nor help mankind. Let your approaches be diverse, but let them in the aggregate do full justice to the heroic qualities in man ... To accommodate the whole of human experience keep layers of space and air and vision in your scientific formulations."
of view. For Allport, psychology is a science with its own objectives and methods, but equally with its own particular problems.

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1 R. D. LAING, Self and Others, Pelican Books (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971), p. 28. For an example of Allport's belief in science as traditionally understood, cf. GORDON W. ALLPORT, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1954), p. xiv: "Especially encouraging is the fact that in recent years men in large numbers have become convinced that scientific intelligence may help us solve the conflict... Men are saying, "Let us make an objective study of conflict... let us seek out the roots of prejudice and find means for implementing men's affiliative values" (Italics added). This is surprisingly reminiscent of the earlier credo of Freud: "We believe that it is possible for scientific work to gain some knowledge about the reality of the world, by means of which we can increase our power and in accordance with which we can arrange our life." (SIGMUND FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Freud, transl. from the German under the editorship of James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), vol. 21, 55. Allport, however, differs considerably from Freud in his conception of science, as will become evident as this study progresses.
3. Psychology as Science: Its Unique Dilemma

As a psychologist devoted to the study of personality, Allport constantly argued that psychology must take full account of the uniqueness of each individual person: "any adequate psychology of personality must deal with the essential uniqueness of every personal structure." Yet, when he first began his researches, he was convinced that "by and large American psychology gave man less than his due by depicting him as a bundle of unrelated reaction tendencies." Indeed, his work during the early part of his career "took up cudgels in behalf of a psychology of the normal and integrated person. Most existing schools of thought seemed inadequate, whether they favored stimulus-response, psycho-analysis, differential psychology, typology, or factor-analysis." There is in fact a sustained polemic running

1 G. W. ALLPORT, "An Autobiography", The Person in Psychology, p. 395 Cf. also Idem, Becoming. Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, p.23: "But when we are interested in guiding or predicting John's behaviour, or in understanding the Johnian quality of John, we need to transcend the limitations of a psychology of species, and develop a more adequate psychology of personal growth."


throughout Allport's writings. Thus his first major work, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, opened with a theme which would be repeated ad infinitum throughout his other writings:

As a rule, science regards the individual as a mere bothersome accident. Psychology, too, ordinarily treats him as something to be brushed aside so the main business of accounting for the uniformity of events can get under way. The result is that on all sides we see psychologists enthusiastically at work upon a somewhat shadowy portrait entitled 'the generalized human mind'.

By 1961, when he completely rewrote this work for its revised publication he could still claim:

The basic problem remains unchanged. The problem, as I see it, is to discover the proper balance between uniform factors and individual morphogenic factors in personality... The more we search out, and discover, what is uniform in human nature, the more urgent it becomes to account for uniqueness in the form and pattern of the whole... I persist in my belief that patterned individuality should be, and can be, a datum for the science of personality.

Elsewhere, Allport called this "the dilemma of uniqueness." The dilemma springs partly from the nature of personality, since

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"each person is an idiom unto himself, an apparent violation of the syntax of the species ... yet at the same time idioms are not entirely lawless and arbitrary;" and partly from the scientific training of the psychologist, which "leads him to look for universal processes common to the species, and to neglect the idiomatic pattern of becoming. While he may say that his subject matter is human personality, his habits lead him to study mind-in-general rather than mind-in-particular."¹

The first horn of this dilemma, the idiomatic nature of personality, will be considered in the following chapter of this study when Allport's approach to personality will be analysed. But the second horn of the dilemma, namely, the psychologist's scientific training, must be examined closely, for Allport always claimed that he had remained within "the tradition of academic psychology," and had doggedly fought to have precisely this scientific training utilized in what he considered the most fruitful manner.² Indeed,

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, pp. 19-20.

²G. W. ALLPORT, "An Autobiography," in The Person of Psychology, p. 394. Cf. also C. HALL & G. LINDZEL, Theories of Personality, p. 258, where they claim that Allport "represents, perhaps better than any other contemporary theorist, the synthesis of traditional psychological thought and personality theory."
Allport quite clearly expressed his respect for science and the scientific ideal, but in his own peculiar way:

The desire for status on our part is understandable, but because of it we are in danger of losing sight of the true source of the eminence of the elder sciences. Their enviable glory does not consist in their fidelity to a set of conventional methods, but rather in the unexampled power they have given mankind in predicting, understanding, and controlling the course of nature for mankind's own benefit.¹

And since the "supreme criterion of validity of science" is the "practical control of human affairs," Allport pleaded that psychologists should strive to "evaluate our science rather by its success in enhancing - above the levels achieved by common sense -

our powers of predicting, understanding, and controlling human action.\footnote{Ibid., p. 70. Cf. also Ibid., p. 73.} Such a science would still demand that "special emphasis should be placed on empirical methods of discovery", \footnote{G. W. ALLPORT, "Traits Revisited", The Person in Psychology, p. 50. Cf. also G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychological Nature of Personality", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 20: "What attributes must a theory of personality have in order to be considered adequate to the empirical facts before us?" (Italics added).} since "no one wants adequacy of outlook if the resulting system remains a tissue of unverifiable assertions." \footnote{G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p.18.}
Indeed, Allport made a special plea for the scientific psychologist in whose science alone "the four winds" of the natural sciences, the biological sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities "collide and run a tempestuous course."¹ According to Allport, it is the impact of the natural and biological sciences that accounts for psychology's "ruling obsession to reach the eminence of scientific respectability."² From the natural sciences came the impact of scientific methodology: "the desire to emulate the success of physics has led psychology to import at an increasing rate instruments of precision and mathematics into its treatment of mental life." And from the biological sciences come "high standards and exacting methods of research."³

Indeed, the "Zeitgeist of this century" was moving, Allport suggested,⁴ in the direction of extreme positivism, that urge "to reduce abstract concepts to the data of observation or to the process of

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¹G. W. ALLPORT, "Personality: A Problem for Science or for Art?", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 4.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
observation itself."¹ Thus, although "the influence of modern positivism upon psychological study of personality is in part wholesome", yet "positivism also has stultifying effects."² Indeed, "addiction to machines, rats or infants" had led many psychologists to overplay "these features of human behavior that are peripheral, signal-oriented or genetic."³ Allport characterized this attitude in typical hyperbole:

Better, it was said, become objective; avoid introspection; eschew personal meanings. Whenever practicable fit all data to mathematical or computer models; employ statistics; determine probabilities. Minimize intervening variables; better still, think in terms of 'empty organism', so all measurements and concepts may be publicly verified.⁴

There resulted a "one-sided pre-occupation with the general" which rendered the psychologist's encounters with "concrete personalities often inept and sometimes even clownish."⁵

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 11.
However, Allport did not condemn his predecessors and contemporaries in scientific psychology, but rather noted the influences and pressures under which they work. He even produced a remarkable apologia on behalf of his fellow-professionals:

The psychologist is held by the requirements of fidelity to fact, to all facts; and he is expected to secure his facts from controlled and verifiable sources. He must prove his inferences step by step. His terminology is standardized, and he is deprived almost entirely of the use of seductive metaphor. These restrictions surrounding the psychologist make for reliability, verifiability, lessened bias and relative freedom from self-projection into the products of his work.1

Thus Allport in no way diminished the positivist's demand for scientific rigor, but staunchly upheld it. What Allport sought was rather a broadening of the scope of the scientific psychologist:

... we must learn ... to dwell longer upon him [the individual] modifying as is necessary our conception of the scope of science so as to accommodate the single case more hospitably than heretofore.2

Nor should we be deterred by preconceived ideas about what science can and cannot with propriety do.3

2Ibid., p. 12.
3G. W. ALLPORT, "What Units Shall We Employ?" Personality and Social Encounter, p. 128.
In order to understand what such a broadening of the scope of scientific psychology would entail, certain of Allport's presuppositions must be examined, notably his views on the goal or aim of psychology and his proposed methods for the attainment thereof.
If Allport viewed science as above all "the practical control of human affairs", it is not surprising that he should have considered psychology along similarly pragmatic lines. Allport considered that psychology "may yet become the central science for the understanding and amelioration of mankind."¹ Indeed, "the goal of psychology is to reduce discord among our philosophies of man, and to establish a scale of probable truth, so that we may feel increasingly certain that one interpretation is truer than another."² In this sense:

the psychologist has his own special contribution to make. He hopes that his detailed search for the facts will prevent erroneous philosophizing ... no philosophy of the person can be correct if it flatly contradicts known facts about human motivation, learning, cognition, stages of growth, pathology - provided, of course, that such factors are both firmly established and reasonably complete. As yet, however, psychology cannot provide full enough knowledge to warrant the final choice of one's interpretation of man's nature or the rejection of all others. The best we can do at the present time is to seek the philosophical formulation that on the whole seems to be the most coherent with available psychological evidence.³

¹G. W. ALLPORT, "Six Decades of Social Psychology", The Person in Psychology, p. 40. Cf. also Idem, The Individual and his Religion: A Psychological Interpretation (New York: Macmillan, 1950), p. v: "Psychology is a solidly growing science: there is hope that it may emerge as the decisive science of the twentieth century".

²G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 17.

³G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 567.
Indeed, one of Allport's earliest convictions was that "if one were to do effective social service, one needed a sound conception of human personality. Sound theory must underlie application."\(^1\) Perhaps one of the boldest statements of his view of the aim of psychology is in the following aside:

> I would add that physicalistic and deterministic theories tend so to restrict our science as to render it incapable of having fruitful bearing upon practical life. And theories that don't work in practical life cannot be entirely sound.\(^2\)

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\(^2\)G. W. ALLPORT, "The Fruits of Eclecticism: Bitter or Sweet?" The Person in Psychology, p. 19. (Italics added). Allport's insistence on the practical bearing of theories on life is exemplified especially in his studies on prejudice, rumor, and religion. Cf. Idem, The Nature of Prejudice, p. 507ff., where Allport lists thirteen "positive principles" as to where alterations in the social structure of personality structure may best begin in order to reduce prejudice. In the same volume, he also refers to the social scientist's "superordinate value of applying science to the improvement of human relations". (Ibid., p. 516). Cf. also Idem, The Psychology of Rumor, (in collaboration with LEO POSTMAN) (New York: Holt, 1947), p. 220ff., where a "Guide for the Analysis of Rumor" is given, consisting of sixty questions together with eight cases offered as "Originals for Solution". Cf. also Idem, The Individual and His Religion; A Psychological Interpretation, p. vii: "In one sense the present volume may be viewed as a specialized expansion of this earlier volume [viz., Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, 1937]."
Thus, though Allport might admit that "psychology is assigned the task of being curious about human persons",\(^1\) he obviously had in mind a curiosity leading to action and results. He would even go so far as to declare that "psychology is in essence the science of democratic living ... without psychology democracy will surely fail."\(^2\)

Very closely connected with this highly pragmatic view of psychology as a science was Allport's conviction that "personality is far too complex a thing to be trussed up in a conceptual straight jacket" and requires "conceptual open-mindedness."\(^3\) This emphasis on the complexity of personality and the subsequent need for humility rather than arrogance in psychological theorizing is a constant theme in Allport's writings. While still a student he had come to the conclusion that it was "better to be tentative, eclectic, and humble."\(^4\)

\(^1\)G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 573.


\(^3\)G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. vii.

The pluralism of William James was re-echoed in Allport as he declared:

A pluralist in psychology is a thinker who will not exclude any attribute of human nature that seems important in its own right. Like the pluralist in philosophy, he favors multiplicity and diversity of interpretation.

One of the characteristics of the pluralist, according to Allport, is his willingness "to sacrifice rational coherence in order to keep alive his recognition of diversity and subtness." And hand-in-glove with pluralism is eclecticism: "the most obvious way to be a pluralist is to be an eclectic." Allport spoke of both systematic pluralism and systematic eclecticism, but these are synonymous terms:

The goal of systematic pluralism is to fashion a conception of the human person that will exclude nothing that is valid and yet at the same time preserve our ideal of rational consistency... We shall not have to settle for arbitrary eclecticism, or for pragmatic pluralism, for we shall have defined our subject matter in such a way that any and all valid data and all verified processes can be woven into our central conception of man as an open system.

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1 G. W. ALLPORT, "Imagination in Psychology". The Person in Psychology, p. 113.
2 Ibid., p. 114
3 Ibid.
By eclecticism in psychology I shall mean a system that seeks the solution of fundamental problems by selecting and uniting what it regards as true in the several specialized approaches to psychological science.¹

Thus Allport admitted that "valid explanations (as well as descriptions) can be made in terms of many models." These models would include "neural and mental; conscious and unconscious; active and reactive at low levels and high; based on local energies and on total synergies." Yet, warned Allport, "it is not enough to say ... that all these models are equally valid. As they stand they are often contradictory. The theories we need will have to absorb antinomies while avoiding flat self-contradiction." What Allport above all wanted to avoid was the dogmatism which leads an investigator to maintain that "his preferred parameter, or his chosen model, overspreads the whole of human personality."² And here Allport betrayed his fundamental

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²Ibid., p. 10.
scepticism regarding psychology's power to pronounce any final words about personality:

Until a systematic eclecticism is achieved, if ever it can be, a pluralism is in order. And pluralism means that neither human nature, nor the universe itself, is yet complete. Hence the imposition of any form of final closure is not allowable.¹

Nevertheless, despite such qualifications, Allport still saw merit in the psychologist's search for such a systematic eclecticism. Obviously this view of psychological science was heavily weighted by Allport's extremely practical approach mixed with his profound scepticism as to the absolute value of any theory or model of personality, a scepticism founded upon his conviction that personality was simply too complex to be completely exhausted within conceptual categories. Just how he proposed to achieve this systematic eclecticism must now be discussed.

¹Ibid., p. 23. Cf. also Idem, The Individual and His Religion, p. 18: "The universe is simply incomprehensible."
5. The Goal of Psychology according to Allport

Allport would have psychology seek "a systematic eclecticism reflecting a viable image of man."¹ The elaboration and, above all, the application of this systematic eclecticism might be termed the ultimate goal of psychology and lies, so argued Allport, in the future (if at all). Meanwhile, Allport proposed a proximate goal for psychology. Having stated psychology's goal as "the accounting for the organization and growth of the individual person with all his outreachings, downward, upward, outward", Allport added a significant statement: "if present-day psychology is not fully equal to the task then we should improve the science until it is."² The proximate goal of psychology is its self-improvement.

To achieve this, Allport proposed two considerations: one an epistemological position for research in personality, the other a metatheory of man which could facilitate the integration of the various theories of man based on different models (systematic pluralism in practice). The former he called heuristic realism, the latter, the open system.

²G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 5. (Italics added).
(a) Heuristic Realism

Heuristic realism, according to Allport, "holds that the person who confronts us possesses inside his skin generalized action tendencies (or traits) and that it is our job scientifically to discover what they are."¹ In fact, heuristic realism accepts the common-sense assumptions that persons are real beings, that each has a real neuropsychic organization, and that it is our job to comprehend this organization as well as we can.²

But Allport did not mean to espouse any naive realism; indeed he had chosen to speak of heuristic realism because "special emphasis should be placed upon empirical methods of discovery."³ Once again, Allport did not propose any radical departure from the accepted methods of scientific research; "empirical testing... is an important aspect of heuristic realism, but it is an empiricism restrained throughout by rational considerations," As opposed to "galloping empiricism" which lets the discordant data sing for themselves", heuristic realism claims

¹G. W. ALLPORT, "Traits Revisited", The Person in Psychology, p. 49.
²Ibid., p. 62
³Ibid., p. 50.
what while its theories are based on empirical evidence, the area it
carves out for study "should be rationally conceived, tested by
rational methods, and the findings should be rationally interpreted."\(^1\)
It is noteworthy that Allport insisted that the researcher "employ
rationally relevant methods, and be strictly bound by empirical
verification."\(^2\) Such researchers would "return to fit our findings
to an improved view of the person. Along the way we regard him as an
objectively real being whose tendencies we can succeed in knowing - at
least in part - beyond the level of unaided common-sense."\(^3\)

It would appear that Allport was led to introduce this
clarification of his epistemological position as a researcher for two
reasons, both closely connected. Positively, Allport was concerned with
the individual personality in its complex richness and uniqueness, and
was seeking methods which would enable him to understand, control and
predict in a fuller way the behavior and thought of this complex subject
matter. At the same time, he was a scientist and had to use scientific

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 60.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 62.
\(^3\)Ibid.
methods involving empirical verification, but he was appalled by what
he called the "intemperate empiricism which yields unnamable factors,
arbitrary codes, unintelligible interaction effects, and sheer
flatulence from our computers."\(^1\) Thus, negatively, heuristic realism
was an attempt to restrain the intemperate galloping of his fellow-
researchers by introducing rational (and even pragmatic) considerations:
persons are real beings and must always be so considered by the
researcher. He stated his position firmly: "in general our besetting
sin in personality study is irrelevance, by which I mean that we
frequently impose dimensions upon persons when the dimensions fail to
apply."\(^2\) Such a position implies that the researcher view his subject-
matter in a pluralistic way, and this led Allport to propose his concept
of open system.

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 61. Cf. also Allport's amusing account of his only
encounter with Freud, when he suddenly and startlingly discovered that
Freud was trying to uncover some kind of neurosis that was hidden from
the author, and this during the course of a perfectly innocent
recounting of an event which occurred in a tram, G. W. ALLPORT, "An
(b) Personality as an Open System

To be a pluralist seeking systematic eclecticism through the adoption of a heuristic realism demands that the psychologist view personality as a system, as "a complex of elements in mutual interaction". But this system must be viewed as open, and Allport pleaded that the broadest interpretation of the concept of open system be adopted. Thus he argued:

If we combine definitions of open systems, we can piece together four criteria: (1) There is intake and output of both matter and energy. (2) There is the achievement and maintenance of steady (homeostatic) states, so that the intrusion of outer energy will not seriously disrupt internal form and order. (3) There is generally an increase of order over time, owing to an increase in complexity and differentiation of parts. (4) Finally, at least at the human level, there is extensive transactional commerce with the environment.

Allport complained that most current theories of personality take full account of two of the requirements of an open system. They allow interchange of matter and energy, and they recognize the tendency of organisms to maintain an orderly arrangement

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1 G. W. ALLPORT, "The Open System in Personality Theory", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 42.
2 Ibid., p. 43.
of elements in a ready state. Thus they emphasize stability rather than growth, permanence rather than change ... Hence most personality theories are biologistic in the sense that they ascribe to personality only the two features of an open system that are clearly present in all living organisms.¹

To counteract this narrowness, Allport proposed that psychology consider equally the remaining two criteria of an open system.

Thus the third criterion, that of increased order over time, must be introduced "to account for the integrating tonus involved in 'goal orientation'" for which homeostasis cannot adequately account. As Allport argued, change within personality is a "recentering, but not an abatement of tension." Only a sufficiently open system concept of personality can allow for the "tendency of human personality to go beyond steady states and to elaborate their internal order, even at the cost of disequilibrium."²

The fourth criterion, transaction with the environment, involves an "integumented view of the personality system".³ In other words,

¹Ibid., p. 44.
²G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 569.
³G. W. ALLPORT, "The Open System", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 47.
"for all his elaborate transactions with the world, the individual remains a separate unit."¹ Allport gave a twofold justification for this position:

(i) There is a persistent though changing person-system in time, clearly delimited by birth and death.

(ii) We are immediately aware of the functioning of this system. Our knowledge of it, though imperfect, is direct, whereas our knowledge of all other outside systems, including social systems, is deflected and often distorted by their necessary incorporation into our own apperceptions.²

Allport thus refused any attempt to reduce personality to nothing but social interaction, or to any form of interpersonal system.

The great advantage to be gained from viewing personality as an open system is that a systematic eclecticism becomes a possibility. Given Allport's basically pluralistic approach - that "personality is many-sided and needs many avenues of approach" - everything that is "validly established by positivistic psychology" can somehow be "fitted

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 570
in". Thus,

within the framework of 'system' one approach helps to correct the other. If positivism leads toward fragmentation and impersonality this bias can be tempered by emphasis on personal dispositions and unity. All that is valid in either approach must be fitted in... It will not be difficult to reconcile them if we regard all data, from whatever source, as adding to our knowledge of a single organic science.  

Another advantage to be gained from this open system view is that "we find ourselves forced in part toward the indiographic outlook. For now the vital question becomes: "what makes the system hang together in any one person?" This question, closely connected with his insistence on the uniqueness of the individual, and which, more than any other, "haunted" him throughout his life, is in fact the starting point of Allport's approach to personality.

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2 G. W. ALLPORT, "The Open System", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 52.
6. Allport's Dilemma

Yet Allport's position is not at all clear. While he proposed a systematic eclecticism through a heuristic realism's approach to personality as an open system, he does not appear to have proposed any adequate criteria for this program. Thus, when Allport introduced heuristic realism in order to curb galloping empiricism, the criterion he offered for this control was reason: there were to be "rational considerations," "rationally conceived" areas of research, "rational methods", and "rationally interpreted findings", and through such rational investigations a view of the person would emerge which would be an improvement upon the view of unaided common sense. Essential to such heuristic realism was the viewing of personality as an "open system". In defining this concept, Allport proposed two additional considerations which most personality theories tended to ignore: (1) the tendency of personality to strive ever forward, even at great costs, and (2) the integumented view of personality. To support these inclusions, Allport in (1) appealed to common sense by rejecting the objection that such inclusions do not lead to testable propositions on the grounds that "our task is to study what is, not merely what is immediately convenient," and in (2) Allport again appealed to common sense by referring to the life-span of the individual (person-system)
and to our immediate felt awareness of the functioning of this system. Indeed, it is difficult to see how Allport's criterion of "reason" or "rationality" differs from common sense. The same difficulty plagues Allport's notion of systematic eclecticism: he offered no criterion of validity apart from common sense.

Allport himself was acutely aware of this difficulty, and attempted to surmount it. While pointing out that "Cousin's guidance of common sense would place us at the mercy of subjective temperament, for my common sense is not necessarily your common sense", and while insisting that, "we need superordinate criteria for discriminating truth from error in any given system", Allport did not in fact identify this superordinate principle. Indeed, the only principle he did offer, apart from his insistence on openness to common sense, was eclecticism itself:

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1G. W. Allport, "The Open System in Personality Theory", Personality and Social Encounter, pp. 46-49.

2Cf. C. Hall & G. Lindzey, Theories of Personality, p. 293: "Allport's position represents man in terms that are altogether too similar to those which the man in the street himself uses in his accounting for his behavior."

In speaking of 'systematic eclecticism' I know that I am on the edge self-contradiction. A system, however hospitable it may be, is more than an eclectic assemblage. It offers a plus quality, a superordinate principle, to bind together the accepted particularisms. But I hope that my meaning is nonetheless clear, namely, that by striving for a system in an eclectic manner, we may actually achieve a comprehensive metatheory. When such a time comes eclecticism merges into system.

Some light, however, can be thrown on Allport's position from remarks he has made concerning science and value, and the scientific frame of thought. In The Nature of Prejudice, Allport made the following statement which deserves to be quoted at length:

Value enters the scientific situation at two points. First, it motivates the scientist (or the student) to undertake and sustain his investigations. Second, it directs his final efforts to apply his findings in the service of what he considers to be a desirable social policy. Value does not enter, and therefore cannot distort, the following essential stages of scientific work. (1) It does not affect the identification or definition of the problem... (2) Values do not enter into the process of scientific observation, experimentation, or fact collecting. (On the rare occasions when this does happen the bias of the investigation is detected and rightly reproved). (3) Values do not enter into the process of generalizing scientific laws (excepting, of course, in the sense that one deems the formation

\[1\text{Ibid., p. 24.}\]
of general laws desirable)... (4) Values do not enter into the process of communicating results and theories. Unless there is a clear unbiased communication there can be no replication of experiments, no invitation to create a cumulative science that would in the long run achieve the ultimate value in view.

... To sum up: The present volume, and the researches it reports, were initiated by the authors' values; likewise the present volume is written in the hope that the facts and theories presented may contribute to the amelioration of group tensions. At the same time, it claims to be a scientific production as accurate and objective as the present state of human knowledge allows.

Elsewhere, Allport referred to the "heuristic character" of mature religion and argued that:

an heuristic belief is one that is held tentatively until it can be confirmed or until it helps us discover a more valid belief... It is characteristic of the mature mind that it can act wholeheartedly even without absolute certainty ... Probabilities always guide our lives.

Later, when discussing "scientific doubting", Allport made the following remark:

Yet to the mature religious thinker the scientific frame of thought, though thoroughly honest, seems limited. Every person, he points out, is compelled to build his life on probabilities that are

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far less certain than those of science. Moral and political commitments, the affirmation of this purpose or that, the superiority of love over hate, rest ultimately on no scientific ground.Obviously, the values motivating Allport's scientific investigations belong to this latter category of probabilities which rest on no scientific grounds.

Thus there is a unique dilemma for Allport himself: as a scientist he was constantly seeking to improve upon common sense in his effort to predict, understand, and control human action, yet he was unable, as a scientist, to discover a method or principle to achieve this which did not in itself rely upon common sense. Thus Allport's empiricism was "rationally" controlled to the extent that his "common sense view of personality" was not contradicted or distorted; his eclecticism would integrate every model of personality together with all data concerning personality which could be reconciled with this "common sense view"; and yet nowhere did he define what he meant by common sense.

\[1\] Ibid., p. 112.
This tension, already noted in William James, is a constant element in Allport's thought and will feature prominently in this study when we come to discuss the nature of the self. Nor can Allport be accused of self-contradiction, although his approach to psychology, certainly involves an inadmissible circularity: he openly asserted that personality was "too complex a thing to be trussed up in a conceptual straight jacket", and was quite willing "to sacrifice rational coherence in order to keep alive his recognition of diversity and subtlety". His fundamental problem was, after all, to discover what made "the system hang together in any one person", and while Hall & Lindzey might concur that "the enigma posed by the complex individual is too great to be completely understood through the earth-bound methods and conceptions of the psychologist", Allport was determined to make some inroads in our understanding of that enigma. In order to achieve this, Allport felt obliged to introduce new considerations for the scientific study of personality. These new considerations must now be examined.

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1 C. HALL & G. LINDZEY, Theories of Personality, p. 261.
CHAPTER III. G. W. ALLPORT'S APPROACH TO PERSONALITY

1. Personality Defined

If Allport's approach to personality reflected the scientific ideals and aspirations discussed in the previous chapter, it also manifested a remarkable consistency. This consistency is nowhere more apparent than in his definition of personality. In 1937, Allport defined personality as

the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment.\(^1\)

Twenty-four years later, he defined personality as

the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought.\(^2\)

Such a modification, though significant, will be seen to be very minor indeed when Allport's detailed explanations of his definitions are examined. Never one to consider definitions as matters to be taken

\(^1\) G. W. ALLPORT, Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, p. 48.

\(^2\) G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 28.
lightly, Allport went to great lengths to explain his definitions point by point.¹

By dynamic organization, Allport intended to focus attention on what he considered the crucial or central problem of psychology, namely, "the forming of patterns or hierarchies of ideas and habits that dynamically direct activity."² The term psychophysical was a reminder that personality is neither exclusively mental nor exclusively neural (physical). Its organization entails the functioning of both 'mind' and 'body' in some inextricable unity"³

¹Cf. C. HALL & G. LINDZEY, Theories of Personality, p. 263: "For Allport, definitions are not matters to be treated lightly."

²G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 28. His earlier explanation read: "Yet this organization must be regarded as constantly evolving and changing, as motivational and as self-regulating; hence the qualification 'dynamic'". (Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, p. 48).

³G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 28. In the earlier definition Allport had explained "psychophysical systems" together, but without elaborating on the meaning of "systems", which referred to "traits or groups of traits in latent or active condition." (Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, p. 48).
By systems, Allport was referring to the complex of elements, such as habits, sentiments, concepts, and styles of behaving which are latent in the organism and which are in mutual interaction. Borrowing from R. R. Sears, Allport described these systems as our "potential for activity."¹ Allport's use of the term determine is interesting:

Personality is something and does something. The latent psychophysical systems, when called into action, either motivate or direct specific activity and thought. All the systems that comprise personality are to be regarded as determining systems. They exert a directive influence upon all the adjustive and expressive acts by which the personality comes to be known.²

The term characteristic was, on Allport's admission, somewhat redundant. Its inclusion was intended as a reminder that all

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 29.

²Ibid. Allport's earlier explanation of this term was more polemical in tone, but contained an interesting addition: "This term is a natural consequence of the biophysical view. Personality is something and does something. It is not synonymous with behavior or activity; least of all is it merely the impression that this activity makes on others. It is what lies behind specific acts and within the individual. The systems that constitute personality are in every sense determining tendencies, and when aroused by suitable stimuli provoke those adjustive and expressive acts by which personality comes to be known". (Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, pp. 48-49). This reference to "suitable stimuli" must be read in conjunction with Allport's remarks on the individual's "adjustments to his environment" (Ibid.)
behaviour and thought are unique to the person. No matter how common or 'shared' acts or concepts might appear to be, "none can be found that lacks the personal flavor."¹ The final terms, behavior and thought, mark a slight change of emphasis in Allport's more mature thought:

These two terms are a blanket to designate anything whatsoever an individual may do. Chiefly what he does is to adjust to his environment. But it would be unwise to define personality only in terms of adjustment. We not only adjust to our environment but we reflect on it. Also, we strive to master it, and sometimes succeed. Behavior and thought, therefore, make both for survival and growth. They are modes of adjustment and outreach elicited by the environmental situation we are in, always selected and directed by the psychophysical systems that comprise our personality.²

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 29. For Allport, his earlier use of "unique" was synonymous with "characteristic", both terms serving as redundant, though salutary, reminders of the idiosyncratic nature of each human act.

²Ibid. Earlier, Allport had defined his phrase "adjustments to his environment" as follows: "This phrase has a functional and evolutionary significance. Personality is a mode of survival. 'Adjustments', however, must be interpreted broadly enough to include mal-adjustments, and 'environment' to include the behavioral environment.

Above all, adjustment must not be considered as merely reactive adaptation such as plants and animals are capable of. The adjustments of men contain a great amount of spontaneous, creative behavior toward the environment. Adjustment to the physical world as well as to the imagined or ideal world - both being factors in the 'behavioral environment' - involves mastery as well as passive adaptation." (Personality, A Psychological Interpretation, pp. 50-51).

The differences between Allport's earlier and later definitions are thus essentially minor, marking a less polemical tone, together with less emphasis on the too passive sounding notions of adjustment to environmental stimuli in favour of the more active notions of behavior and thought.
One term, however, was not discussed in the early definition, namely, the term individual. In his later definition and commentary, Allport noted that this term deserved to be discussed, especially in view of the criticism his earlier definition had encountered in this regard, but he was content to point out that "individual" in his definition was employed to point out that personality lies "within the skin" and is not merely a matter of "external effect". In a sense, his earlier commentary on his definition was slightly ambiguous on this point. Allport had stated that personality "is what lies behind specific acts and within the individual", thus raising the question of the relation of personality to the individual. Like Allport in his later commentary, we too shall return to this problem in the following chapter, since another aspect of Allport's definition must now be examined, as it is crucial to his thought as a whole.

While Allport had twice insisted that mental organization is the central problem of psychology, his definition of personality focused attention on what he considered to be the central problem

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1 G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 30.
of the psychological study of personality. The mental organization under discussion is that which forms patterns or hierarchies of those ideas and habits that dynamically direct or motivate activity. Such organization cannot be understood without some knowledge of the nature of motivation as that which explains why men act as they do. Indeed, Allport's theory of personality pivots upon his analysis of motivation, and the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to examining Allport's theory of motivation, which includes his most original contributions to motivational theory - his principle of the functional autonomy of motives, together with his introduction of personal dispositions as the basic units for the psychological science of personality.

\[1\]Ibid., p. 196: "The problem of motivation is central to the psychological study of personality ... any theory of personality pivots upon its analysis of the nature of motivation."
2. Requirements for an Adequate Theory of Motivation.

A key concept in Allport's definition of personality was the term dynamic.¹ In his commentary on his later definition, one noteworthy modification was Allport's qualification of his earlier use of the concept of "adjustment" by introducing the concept of growth in conjunction with survival. This element of growth is a particular problem for any theory of personality, since personality, "like every other living thing, changes as it grows", and to account for "the vast transformation that occurs between infancy and adulthood is not an easy task."² The growth from the total dependence of the infant to the achievement in adulthood of a certain amount of social responsibility requires that major changes in motivation must have occurred. Unlike the child, "the mature adult possesses motives that are controlled, socially relevant, and fairly well integrated into a planned career."³

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¹Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, p. 192: "Now, any type of psychology that treats motives, thereby endeavoring to answer the question as to why men behave as they do, is called a dynamic psychology."

²G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 219.

³Ibid., p. 196.
To account for this transformation, an adequate theory of motivation is necessary.

Allport maintained that any theory of motivation must include four requirements at least, if it hopes to be adequate. To begin with, it must acknowledge the "contemporaneity of motives". By this Allport intended to stress the importance of the present state of the organism: "the past is not important unless somehow it can be shown to be dynamically active in the present". At the same time, he was attacking the notion of "secondary drives". Secondly, such a theory had to be pluralistic, allowing for motives of many types. Here Allport was opposing any tendency to reduce motives to any given common denominator. Quite simply, motives are too diverse to be simply categorized: "about all we can say is that a person's motives include all that he is trying (consciously or unconsciously, reflexly or deliberately) to do".

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1 G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 220.

2 Cf. Ibid., pp. 211-12: "The S-R psychologist or psychoanalyst may claim that adult interests can be traced to his chosen or unchanging energies, but he cannot prove that they are. An adult may want to be a stamp collector, a scientist, a traveler, a philanthropist, a priest; he desires to support the United Nations, to provide opportunities for his children, to carry through his responsibilities. None of these interests can be directly traced to drives".

3 Ibid., p. 221.
Once such a perspective has been adopted, the inadequacy of, for example, the machine, the animal, the child, or the pathological, as models for human motivation becomes apparent.

A third requirement is the ascription of dynamic force to cognitive processes such as planning and intention. Here Allport was at once turning away from the tendency of viewing human motivation as basically irrational, while proposing a more traditional view of the "intellect". Allport considered intention as a form of motivation "of central importance for the understanding of personality", since it "enables us to overcome the opposing of motive and thought". The concept of intention also points to several important features of motivation, such as the fusion of the cognitive and the emotive processes in personality into an integral urge; the strong future orientation of intention; the "flavor of tension-maintained" which reflects the condition of all long-range motives; the possibility of identifying major intentions and thereby being able to keep other "subsidiary" trends in perspective. Such a concept obviously introduces the problem of purpose, "the efficacy of conscious planning, and a 'pull' that man's image of the

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\[1\textit{Ibid.}, p. 223.\]
future exerts on his present conduct".¹

A fourth requirement would be that the theory allow for the "concrete uniqueness of motives". By this Allport attempted to counteract the tendency to fit motives to "some theoretical system" or to derive them from "allegedly basic and common motives of men". Such abstract views of motives concern only "personality-in-general" and apply quite loosely to the concrete case: "it is a caricature of a person to view his interests merely as changes rung on a common pattern".² This fourth requirement raised one of the central points of Allport's approach to personality: general principles of motivation can help in understanding how uniqueness comes about, and it is the task of the psychologist to undertake this scientific quest. And for this undertaking, Allport introduced his famous principle of functional autonomy.

¹Ibid., p. 224. In Allport's opinion, drives do not allow sufficiently for "organization and direction by cognitive attitudes, by foresight, by cortical control", since drives are blind. As an alternative for the term intention, which might offend some because of its traditional connotations, Allport offered the term interest: a person's intentions are his "characteristic interests". (Ibid., p. 225).

²Ibid., p. 226.
3. The Functional Autonomy of Motives

"Functional autonomy regards adult motives as varied, and as self-sustaining, contemporary system, growing out of antecedent systems, but functionally independent of them". More technically, functional autonomy refers to "any acquired system of motivation in which the tensions involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tensions from which the acquired system developed". Thus a man who, for economic reasons became a sailor and thereby developed a love for the sea, may well, years later, as a banker or businessman, still have a love of the sea and sail whenever he can. Allport's contention was that his love of the sea, insofar as it is a motivating factor in this man's personality, is functionally autonomous of his initial motive in going to sea.

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1 G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 229.
2 Ibid.
Allport in his final elaboration of this principle distinguished between perseverative and propriate functional autonomy.\(^1\) Perseverative functional autonomy is closely tied to simple neurological principles and holds that "a mechanism set in action because of one motive continues at least for a time to 'feed' itself".\(^2\) Allport cited experiments on rats, addiction, circular mechanisms, familiarity and routine as examples.

\(^1\)Allport first introduced the principle of functional autonomy in "The Functional Autonomy of Motives", American Journal of Psychology, 50 (1937), 141-56. This article was incorporated in Chapter 7 of Personality. A Psychological Interpretation. Allport then defended his principle against an attack by Peter A. Bertocci in "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci", Psychological Review, 47 (1940), 545-550, and later against an attack by Cyril Burt in "Geneticism versus Ego-Structure", (first published in 1946), Personality and Social Encounter, pp. 140-51. His final exposition of his principle in Pattern and Growth in Personality had, he admitted, benefited from these criticisms, and was, in his opinion, more convincing than the original exposition of 1937 (Ibid., 229). His introduction of the distinction between perseverative and propriate functional autonomy thus came "after giving some years of thought to the problem" (Ibid., p. 230).

\(^2\)G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 231.
of such perseverative autonomy. **Propriate** functional autonomy involves such motives as "interests, sentiments, values" which have "selective powers". Thus what a person "perceives, remembers, and thinks is in large part determined by his own propriate formations".\(^1\) Also, interests taken together in an individual combine to form "a complex self-image or life-style which is also functionally autonomous". Allport's position was that "although lower-level self-maintaining (perseverative) systems exist, the most important instance of functional autonomy is found in the complex propriate organization that determines the 'total posture' of a mature life-system".\(^2\)

Yet Allport recognized that such a theory of motivation was highly hypothetical. Despite his qualifications concerning motives that are definitely not functionally autonomous (such as drives, reflex action,

\(^1\) *Ibid.*, p. 237. Allport admitted that this level of functional autonomy "frankly depends upon certain philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of human personality". (*Ibid.*, p. 230). The nature of the proprium together with Allport's philosophical assumptions will be dealt with in the following chapter.

constitucional equipment, habits, primary reinforcements, infantilisms and fixations, some neuroses, and sublimation), Allport still ended up admitting that it was not always possible "to determine whether a given motive is rooted in drives, in infantile fixation, in sublimations, or in wholly adult formulations of life". There is no simple either/or test to be applied: "we must allow for the possibility that life's motives may show many degrees of purity and impurity in respect to functional autonomy ... In principle, however, we can say that to the extent that a present motive seeks new goals (i.e. manifests a different kind of tension from the motives from which it developed) it is functionally autonomous".

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1Ibid., p. 244. Cf. Allport's earlier statement in "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci", p. 549: "...it is more reasonable to take a motive at its face value, to assume that it is pretty much what it seems to be, unless proof is adduced that instincts are actually at the basis of the motive, or that it is sustained by some infantile fixation. These demonstrations are rarely forthcoming". Allport's appeal to the "reasonableness" of this approach will encounter the same difficulties referred to in the previous chapter. This will be dealt with in the final section of the present chapter.

2S. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 244.
Allport also had great difficulty in explaining just how functional autonomy came about. Basically, he argued that "functional autonomy comes about because it is the essence or core of the purposive nature of man".¹ Indeed, "the phenomenon of functional autonomy will never be clearly understood until we know more about relevant neurological mechanisms and about the correct formulation of the purposive nature of motives".² A discussion of Allport's views on the "nature of man" will be reserved for the following chapter. What is important to note regarding functional autonomy is its insistence on the difference between adult normal behavior and that of infants, abnormal human beings, and even animals. This insistence on the contemporaneity of motives further reinforced Allport's basic contention that the individual is absolutely unique. Thus individuals brought up in a similar environment as children can easily, through the principle of functional autonomy, be expected to exhibit quite different characteristics in their adult behavior, and thereby manifest their own uniqueness. Such a position is obviously the antithesis of any exclusively deterministic view.

¹Ibid., p. 250.
²Ibid., p. 245
However, Allport was still left with the problem of systematically accounting for the growth and development of personality. Granted the principle of functional autonomy and the vast field of possibilities such a view of man opens for the diversification of personalities, how can the scientific psychologist set about understanding, controlling, and predicting the behavior of individuals without falling back on abstract views of motivation?
4. Traits and Personal Dispositions

Allport's approach to this problem was characteristic:

The success of psychological science, therefore, as of any science, depends in large part upon its ability to identify the significant units of which its assigned portion of the cosmos is composed.¹

Allport proposed traits as "fundamental units of personality", yet conceded that the "issue of traits is one of the areas where common sense, even if fundamentally correct, needs to be critically examined and refined".² According to Allport "a trait is a broad system of similar

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 311.

²Ibid., p. 332. Allport's theory of traits was first proposed in "What is a Trait of Personality?" Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 25 (1931), 368-72, but he had already written on traits in general prior to this in "Personality Traits: Their Classification and Measurement", (with F. H. Allport), Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 16 (1921), 6-40, and in "Concepts of Trait and Personality", Psychological Bulletin, 24 (1927), 284-93. He then published, with H. S. Odbert, "Trait-Names: A Psycholexical Study", Psychol. Monogr., 47 (1936), 1-171, No. 211, which had been designed as an appendix to chapters 11 and 12 of Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, where his theory of traits was presented at length. Allport subsequently further elaborated his theory in "What Units Shall We Employ?", (first published in 1958), Personality and Social Encounter, pp. 111-30, and in Pattern and Growth in Personality, chapters 14 and 15. His final statement on his theory of traits was given in "Traits Revisited", (first published in 1966), The Person in Psychology, pp. 43-66.
action tendencies" existing in the person being studied.¹ More technically, a trait is "a neuropsychic structure having the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent (meaningfully consistent) forms of adaptive and expressive behavior".² Traits are more general than habits or attitudes, and can be empirically established through reliable testing, in which it can be shown that "people respond consistently over a period of time and with characteristic intensity". Thus common traits "offer a better method and theory for the comparative study of personalities", but Allport preferred to push even further than such common traits and to introduce individual or personal traits, which, for purposes of clarity, he chose to designate as "personal dispositions".³

Personal dispositions are the "neuropsychic units that we actually find in individual persons";⁴ or, more technically, "a personal disposition is a generalized neuropsychic structure (peculiar to the individual), with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally

¹ G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 337.
² Ibid., p. 347.
³ Ibid., p. 356.
⁴ Ibid., p. 376.
equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and stylistic behavior."¹ Allport also referred to "morphogenic traits" as synonymous with personal dispositions, thereby focusing on the "internal patterning (the morphogenesis) of the life considered as a unique product of nature and society."² Quite openly Allport declared:

We view personality - in the only way it can be intelligibly viewed - as a network of organization, composed of systems within systems, some systems of small magnitude and somewhat peripheral to the central or propriate structure, other systems of wider scope at the core of the total edifice; some easy to set into action, others more dormant; some so culturally conforming that they can readily be viewed as 'common'; others definitely idiosyncratic. But in the last analysis this network - employing billions and billions of nerve cells fashioned by a one-time heredity and by environmental experiences never duplicated - is ultimately unique...if we are interested in personality, we must go beyond the elementaristic and reach into the morphogenic realm.³

Allport also referred to the interdependence of personal dispositions, to their consistency, to the fact that some are genotypical (more fundamental, deeper), others phenotypical (more superficial),

¹Ibid., p. 373.
²Ibid., p. 360.
³Ibid., p. 360–61.
and that "only by studying exhaustively the single life can we hope to
distinguish genotype from phenotype with reasonable success".\textsuperscript{1} Allport
even went so far as to propose a "hypothesis subject to eventual
scientific testing" that the number of major dispositions in a
personality will "vary between five and ten".\textsuperscript{2}

Allport then tackled the problem he had been nursing ever since
his student days: the method with which to explore the morphogenic
organization of the individual. The first step was to particularize
common traits through testing or rating scales, or even through case
studies, although Allport admitted that he preferred "safeguards and
analytic tools".\textsuperscript{3} Then would follow the attempt to "try empirically to
verify our hypothesis and, if need be, correct it".\textsuperscript{4} Allport also
referred to his celebrated Letters from Jenny, and argued that "careful

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 364. Allport points out that he has borrowed this
distinction between genotypical and phenotypical from Kurt Lewin. (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 367.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 368. Cf. especially G. W. ALLPORT v. P. E. VERNON, A
Study of Values (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931); revised (with G.

\textsuperscript{4}G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 368.
quantitative work can be conducted in the area of unique personal dispositions. Psychology can be concerned with the single case".¹

And yet such proposals were primarily tentative. Allport admitted the difficulties his proposals raised such as the essentially inferred existence of traits and personal dispositions and the difficulty in determining their exact character in a given life, but firmly insisted that "the investigator must use all relevant empirical tools of his science to make his inferences valid".² At the same time, traits and personal dispositions are sometimes clearly motivational, but at other times not; indeed, "in some cases they are the leading motives in life, especially if they are mature, functionally autonomous systems of purpose ... not merely ways of reacting to the environment but ways of meeting it".³ Also, while traits and personal dispositions stabilize conduct, "they are never wholly consistent, nor are they independent of one another ... A given personality may show contradiction and conflict - as novelists and clinicians never tire of telling".⁴


²G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 375.

³Ibid., p. 373.

⁴Ibid., p. 375.
Thus, while the "major foci of organization in a given life may be few in number, the net-work of organization, which includes both minor and contradictory tendencies, is still elusively complex".¹ But this should not discourage the scientific psychologist, since Allport remained convinced that "a knowledge of intra-individual patterns of consistency and congruence in behavior gives us enhanced scientific power, for such knowledge increases our comprehension, predictive ability and control over individual persons beyond the range achieved by unaided common sense or by nomothetic science".²

¹ G. W. ALLPORT, "Traits Revisited", The Person in Psychology, p. 63.
² G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychological Nature of Personality", The Person in Psychology, p. 32.
5. The Recurring Dilemma

There is an unmistakable consistency in Allport's whole approach; beginning with his basic pluralistic eclecticism, there followed a broad-minded attempt to include all the data and findings of every branch of psychology to date, which never once forgot that the goal of psychology is an attempt to understand, control and predict the actions of a given personality.

Allport's particular approach to personality rested upon two principal assumptions: that motives are functionally autonomous of their origins, and that within each personality there exist certain characteristics which, when considered in conjunction with man as a class or species, can be defined as common traits, but which, when considered from the point of view of the unique individual exhibiting them consistently and congruently, are to be defined as personal dispositions.¹

¹Allport thus disagreed with the too nomothetic view of C. M. KLUCKHOHN, and H. A. MURRAY, and D. M. SCHNEIDER, Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 53, where they state: "...every man is in certain respects:
- a. like all other men (universal norms)
- b. like some other men (group norms)
- c. like no other men (idiosyncratic norms)."
Such common traits are readily admitted by psychology and can be obtained from a class or group of individuals through recognized testing scales. Personal dispositions, however, are much more difficult to isolate, observe and verify in their consistency. And, of course, is where Allport had his greatest difficulties. There is no doubt that the "morphogenic" approach to personality is highly praiseworthy and much more practically oriented than the various experiments and detailed analysis which seem to manifest the "galloping empiricism" Allport abhorred so much. Yet Allport was unquestionably on tenuous grounds.

It could be argued that, quite simply, he asked too much. His insistence on empirical methods of procedure did not sit well with his hypothetical constructs of functional autonomy and personal dispositions. Thus his radical severance of adult from infant, normal from abnormal, human from animal motives, which was so central to his concept of functional autonomy, cannot be empirically verified by the methods employed by scientific psychology to date: indeed, Wolman argues that there is a "growing body of contrary evidence."\(^1\) Also, personal

dispositions, although Allport had demonstrated that they can be
discovered and verified (as in the case of Jenny), do present a serious
problem to the investigator, since each personality would have to be
minutely and exhaustively examined, and a whole set of unique or
idiosyncratic terms be introduced to refer to the individual's unique
personal dispositions. Allport, of course, was fully aware of both of
these weaknesses, yet his position does make sense. No phenomenologist
would question the validity of the principle of functional autonomy;¹
and the common sense conviction that we do act at times from ideal
motives (and do so freely), is a factor Allport's pluralism is pledged
to account for fully. Nor were the difficulties involved in naming
personal dispositions overlooked by Allport;² his plea, after all, was
that research be attempted along such morphogenic/idiosyncratic lines.
Nor is the fact that most of Allport's own research has been "of the

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¹Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, "Scientific Models and Human Morals", p. 60:
"I am not arguing surreptitiously for phenomenology, though in order to
improve our grasp on the subtleties of man's intentions we would do well
to emulate the refinement of its descriptive method".

²Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 375:
"Regrettably though it may be, the attributes of human personality can
be depicted only with the aid of common speech, for it alone possesses
reasonable subtlety and established intelligibility".
nomothetic type" any argument, as Hall and Lindzey seem to imply, against the validity of Allport's proposals.¹

Yet Allport's dilemma kept constantly recurring. His reason for postulating functional autonomy in the first place was that it was "more reasonable" to take motives at their face value than to appeal to unchanging or changing drives. And by "more reasonable", Allport was presumably referring to his criterion of common sense which was criticised in the previous chapter.² Again, while Allport argued that traits coincide with common sense, they nevertheless had to be critically examined and refined by empirical testing, since "common sense is sometimes a faulty guide".³ On the other hand, nomothetic science, for all its empirical rigour, fails to

¹C. S. HALL & G. LINDZEEY, Theories of Personality, p. 294.

²Cf. Allport's candid remarks on functional autonomy in RICHARD. I. EVANS, Gordon Allport. The Man and His Ideas, p. 29: "To me it was simply a way of stating what was perfectly obvious to me, that motives change and grow in the course of one's life ... To me it is more or less self-evident".

³G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 332.
"reconstitute to a satisfactory degree the personality of the individual who is the object of study".¹ For this reason, the morphogenic study of the individual, employing personal dispositions as its basic units, should be adopted, since only thus could the required "satisfactory degree" of reconstruction be attained. Thus, while this satisfactory degree of reconstruction might enhance scientific power beyond the level achieved by unaided common sense or by nomothetic science, the criterion of satisfaction remained Allport's as yet undefined common sense-cum-pragmatism. In the following chapter, we shall examine one particular area where this dilemma came explicitly to the surface in Allport's thought, namely, the problem of the self.

CHAPTER IV: A CRITICISM OF G. W. ALLPORT'S POSITION ON THE NATURE OF THE SELF

1. Allport's Initial Tentativeness:

In introducing his theory of traits, Allport was well aware of the attacks such a position might expect to encounter. Thus, in his initial elaboration of the nature of traits, he was anxious to avoid the "chief danger in the concept of trait", namely, that through "habitual and careless use, it may come to stand for an assembly of separate and self-active faculties thought to govern all by themselves, without interference".¹ Such a view would be a "purely fanciful doctrine of 'little men within the breast' possessing, by hypothesis, exclusive control over each and every separate activity. A kindly little man will be made responsible for initiating acts of kindness, and other homunculi will be credited with acts that are aggressive, vulgar, or avaricious".²

¹G. W. Allport, Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, p. 312.
²Ibid., p. 313.
Yet Allport had not been sufficiently clear in this exposition as to the total integration of traits, or of motives, within the total personality. On these specific points he was attacked by Bertocci, who asked two questions:

(1) Why do not all old mechanisms become self-sufficient drives?¹

(2) How is the constancy of a trait determined?²

Allport replied by explaining that (1) "the functional autonomy which a motive may demonstrate was never intended to indicate autonomy of the Self, or ego ... Motives, I contend, may be autonomous in respect to their origins but never in respect to the ego;"³ and that (2) "no motive ultimately runs itself; it serves the organism. But the organism is, after all, but a living system of interdependent motives. Hence it comes about that evolving motives reconstitute the ego even while

¹PETER A BERTOCCI, "A Critique of G. W. Allport's Theory of Motivation", Psychological Review, 47 (1940), 527. The full import of Bertocci's criticisms will be dealt with in chapters VIII and X below.

²Ibid., p. 530.

³G. W. ALLPORT, "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci", Psychological Review, 47 (1940), 547.
dependent upon it for their viability".¹

Later, Allport attempted to clarify his concept of the ego. He listed eight main conceptions of the ego in psychological literature: (1) the ego as knower; (2) as object of knowledge; (3) as primitive selfishness; (4) as dominance-drive; (5) as passive organization of mental processes; (6) as a 'fighter for ends'; (7) as a behavioral system; (8) as the subjective organization of culture.² He then showed that when "ego-involvement" took place, "the ego in several of its historical senses seems to be active".³ He therefore left unanswered a question he himself had raised, as to whether "these eight conceptions reflect irreconcilable theories, or shade imperceptibly into one another, or are ultimately to be subordinated under one inclusive theory of the ego."⁴ He did, nevertheless, advance the following conclusion: what

¹Ibid., pp. 549-50.

²G. W. ALLPORT, "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology", (first published in 1943), Personality and Social Encounter, pp. 73-77.

³Ibid., p. 89. Allport acknowledged his indebtedness to the research of G. S. KLEIN & N. SCHOENFIELD, "The Influence of Ego-Involvement on Confidence", Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 36 (1941) 249-58. This is an excellent example of one of Allport's common sense convictions being 'verified' through empirical testing.

his predecessors "called the soul, we may now, with good conscience, call the ego." ¹

Bertocci, however, returned to the attack. He pointed out that, on Allport's analysis, "there seemed to be a perpetual squinting on the part of the ego": it was at once knower and known, developer and development. ² Bertocci then went on to suggest that "what seems to be called for is a psychological agent whose activities endure throughout changes in egos, personalities, and, for that matter, all other

¹Ibid., p. 90.

²P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Psychological Self, the Ego, and Personality", Psychological Review, 52 (1945), 91. The problems surrounding the fact of self-consciousness or self-awareness lie precisely in accounting for the self's being able to know itself. On Allport's analysis, we have an ego which is at once the object of knowledge and the subject of knowledge. This can be accounted for only if the self is transparent to itself, and even then, as will be pointed out in Chapter XI below, this transparency is possible only if we admit a form of knowledge which does not involve the subject-object paradigm which Allport seems to employ. On the face of it, Allport's ego as knower and known manifests, as Bertocci correctly points out, an unquestionable squint.
experiences which are identified as 'my' or 'his' experiences'. The effect of this criticism was decisive: Allport dropped the terms 'ego' and 'self', and introduced a new term - the proprium.

1 Ibid. Bertocci's developed position will be examined in chapters VII and VIII below.

2 Cf. G. W. Allport, "Peter Bertocci: Philosopher-Psychologist", Philosophical Forum, 21 (1963-64), 6: "To me he points out (1945) that no semantic analysis of 'ego', 'self', or 'personality' can change the ineluctable fact that a 'thinking, willing, oughting' self alone can confer unity upon sub-systems of personality. I confess that his criticism has driven me into another semantic refuge. To appease him I have dropped 'self' in favor of 'the proprium'".
2. The Proprium.

Allport first introduced this term 'proprium' in his Terry Lectures delivered at Yale in 1954, and published in 1955. In these lectures he had raised the question, "Is the concept of self necessary?" In the previous year, Allport had stated that "an adequate psychology of personality will allow adequately for the concept of self but, unlike some philosophers, will not employ it as a factotum". Eight years later, he was still struggling with the same problem: "the psychology of personality harbors an awesome enigma - the problem of the self". In all of these discussions, Allport's approach to the

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1. G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming. Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, p. 36.
3. G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 110.
According to Allport, the sense of self develops gradually. During the first three years of infancy there emerge (1) the sense of bodily self, (2) the sense of continuing self-identity, and (3) a sense of self-esteem or pride. Between the ages of four and six, two other aspects emerge: (4) the extension of the self, and (5) the self-image. Between six and twelve another aspect appears, (6) the self as rational cope. Finally, in adolescence, (7) appropriate striving emerges. Allport then asked if these seven aspects of selfhood could be united, since "together they compose the me as felt and known", thus attempting to answer the problem his discussion of the ego had raised in 1943. His

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1Ibid., p. 111. Allport's analysis of the evolving sense of self in this volume incorporated much of his discussion on the proprium from Becoming, section II, as well as his earlier discussion of "The Self and Its Constraints", in Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, chapter 6.

2Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, pp. 111-27 for a full account of Allport's analysis.

3Ibid., p. 127.
answer was affirmative: "it seems reasonable to unite these aspects (even though they are phenomenologically different, i.e. differently experienced) under a single name. Let us choose the term proprium".¹

Allport chose this new term rather than the term 'self' for two reasons: (a) negatively, because there was a great deal of confusion surrounding the use of terms like 'self' and 'ego'; and (b) positively, because he wanted to use the term to cover the self as "'object' of knowledge and feeling".² In this sense, the concept of the proprium is "entirely indispensable in psychological theory," not only because the subjective or felt side of personality is what everyone knows about, but also because people's behavior varies greatly according to whether they feel self-involved or merely task-involved in what they are doing".³

¹Ibid.. The term 'proprium' was used by Swedenborg, a fact acknowledged by Allport in Becoming, p. 44, footnote 24, where Allport notes that Swedenborg used the term in the narrow sense of selfishness and pride, which corresponds more to Allport's sense of 'ego-enhancement' or 'self-esteem'.

²G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 127.

³Ibid., p. 128.
Earlier, Allport had put the matter more succinctly:

all psychological functions commonly ascribed to a self or ego must be admitted as data in the psychological study of personality. These functions are not, however, co-extensive with personality as a whole. They are rather the special aspects of personality that have to do with warmth, with unity, with a sense of self-importance. In this exposition I have called them 'propriate' functions.¹

He also gave a clearer account of the 'felt' aspect of these propriate functions:

It is I who have bodily sensations, I who recognize my self-identity from day to day; I who note and reflect upon my self-assertion, self-extension, my own rationalizations, as well as upon my interests and strivings. When I thus think about my own propriate functions I am likely to perceive their essential togetherness and feel them intimately bound to the knowing function itself.²

Allport's definition of the proprium could thus be stated:

Proprium is a term intended to cover those functions that make for the peculiar unity and distinctiveness of personality, and at the same time seem to the knowing function to be subjectively intimate and important.³

¹ G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 55.
² Ibid., p. 53.
³ Ibid., p. 61.
To this Allport immediately added a definition of the *person*: "The person is thus an individual organism capable of propriate activities, including, of course, the function of knowing".¹

Allport thus ended up with a triple distinction: the person or individual, from within which emerges a personality, within which can be identified the proprium. Yet the basic problem his introduction of the term proprium sought to resolve remained: if his previous use of the term 'ego' had been accused of having a perpetual squint, since it was at once knower and known, developer and development, his new term 'proprium' is no less guilty.

Allport, of course, was acutely aware of this. Indeed, in his initial introduction of the term proprium, he had listed 'the function of knowing' as an eighth "clear function" of the proprium, "since such

¹Ibid. Allport thus clarified any confusion his original definition of personality may have caused. Personality lies 'within' the individual in the sense that the term 'individual' is synonymous with the term 'person', a term more inclusive than 'personality' referring as it does to the organism and its potentialities. Cf. the somewhat similar definition of W. Stern, General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint, p. 70: "The person is living, whole, individual, unique, striving toward goals, self-contained and yet open to the world around him; he is capable of having experience".
knowing is, beyond any shadow of doubt, a state that is peculiarly ours."¹ He had even added that "it is surely one of nature's perversities that so central a function should be so little understood by science, and should remain a perpetual bone of contention among philosophers".² In his final presentation of his theory of the proprium, Allport's hesitancy became more apparent. While using the term proprium to cover the self as 'object' of knowledge and feeling, and while limiting propriate functions to those special aspects of personality which have to do with warmth, unity and self-importance, Allport offered no solution to the problem of the self as knower, despite devoting a section of his text to this specific problem. Indeed, rather than re-enter the problem, Allport was content to refer back to his previous arguments in Becoming, and merely to assert: "It is my position that in the structure of personality, if rightly understood - including, of course, the propriate structure - we shall find the explanations we seek".³

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 53.
²Ibid.
³G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 130.
The dilemma which constantly plagued Allport as a psychologist has recurred here with a vengeance. The reason for Allport's hesitancy was simple: while willing to admit the knowing function, Allport was unwilling to admit the existence of a self, or ego, or soul, as knower on purely methodological grounds.
3. Allport's Rejection of the Self.

We have seen that Allport had always been acutely aware of the danger his theory of traits must always face, namely, the danger of what he came to call 'homunculism'. Thus, while insisting that all psychological functions commonly ascribed to a self or ego must be admitted as data for psychology, Allport balked at the admission of any self or soul:

What is unnecessary and inadmissible is a self (or soul) that is said to perform acts, to solve problems, to steer conduct, in a trans-psychological manner, inaccessible to psychological analysis.¹

While commenting on William James' rejection of a knowing self, Allport had declared:

The reason may well have been (and the reasons would be valid today) that one who laboriously strives to depict the nature of propriate functions on an empirical level, hoping thereby to enrich the science of psychology with a discriminating analysis of the self, is not anxious to return to the homunculus theory by introducing a synthesizer, or self of selves.²

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 55.
²Ibid., p. 52.
Yet, despite his rejection of the concept of 'self' or 'soul' from psychology, Allport's pluralism prevented him from rejecting the concept completely:

It is entirely conceivable, indeed probable, that an acceptable philosophy or theology of the person may logically require the concept of self to indicate the considerations of value and ontology important to a system of thought. It is partly to allow for this contingency that we have introduced the concept of proprium. It is a device to avoid trespassing upon, and confusion with, philosophical concepts that deal with somewhat different matters than does the psychological study of personality.¹

He even admitted that "the danger that abuse might follow the admission of a substantive knower into the science of psychology is no reason to avoid the step if it is logically required".²

This question of the logical requiredness of a substantive knower or self is crucial to any theory of personality. Indeed, on Allport's admission, the concept of 'soul' had been endorsed by thinkers like James, Royce, and Dewey, (prior to Wundt), on order to account for the

¹Ibid., p. 62
²Ibid., p. 52.
"coherence, unity and purposiveness that they thought prevailed in mental life". Allport's theory is thus obliged to account for this fact of mental life, or be guilty of robbing the 'self' of its special worth.

Earlier it was noted that Allport, in arguing for functional autonomy, had insisted that "functional autonomy comes about because it is the essence or core of the purposive nature of man". He had even gone so far as to declare that "except for certain isolated perseverative systems, functionally autonomous motives are highly appropriate, i.e., well anchored to the self. Indeed, to a large extent they constitute the self". In this respect, Allport argued:

We prefer to say that the essential nature of man is such that it presses toward unification of life (never fully achieved). In this trend toward unification we can identify many central characteristics ... we note that man's conduct is to a large degree proactive, intentional, and unique to himself. In the total process the sense of selfhood, or self-image, is involved.

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2G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 250.

3Ibid., p. 252.
Yet it is not the self (as a separate agent) that brings it about. Selfhood is reflection of this fundamental human process of becoming.\(^1\)

Allport had yet to account for this 'essential nature of man', this process of becoming, which, in any individual is always unified as uniquely his. A cautious approach was recommended: "philosophical sophistication is needed in order to reach a completely satisfactory theory of the nature of unification in personal life".\(^2\)

Characteristically, Allport proposed a solution along the lines of propriate functions: "unity in personality is to be sought primarily in propriate (and not in opportunistic and peripheral) functions".\(^3\)

Quite simply, "propriate functions tend to unify personality\(^4\)... unification comes via striving".\(^5\)

Yet this will hardly do. Allport's position entails a circularity which cannot be avoided unless he admits the logical necessity of a

\(^1\)G. W. ALLPORT, *Pattern and Growth in Personality*, p. 252.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 380.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 383.
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 384.
\(^5\)Ibid., p. 391.
self or soul in the sense of a substantive knower of some sort. The person as knower cannot be, as Allport argued, the proprium somehow knowing its propriate function of knowing. Nor can his appeal to functional autonomy help him in his predicament, since the circularity remains: propriate functions constitute the unity from which the proprium emerges as the anchor for such propriate functions.

Allport's dilemma is thus obvious. He could not deny that the self as knower was just as important as the self as known and felt, yet, because this knowing self was inaccessible to the methods of psychology, he would not admit it as a datum to his science. In his rejection of the self as knower, Allport's criterion of common sense which served him in his heuristic realism's eclecticism and in his struggle against the excesses of positivism, had been deserted in favour of another criterion: the criterion of methodological accessibility. We must now clarify this rejection of the self on methodological grounds.
4. The Significance of Allport's Dilemma.

There is a significance to Allport's dilemma which his rejection of the self as substantive knower has startlingly underlined. His dilemma, of course, is the dilemma each pluralist must eventually face: "we want coherent systems but we are not able to include in our limited coherence all the diversity of mental functioning that we encounter".\(^1\) He was thus led to the principle that the pluralist, in order to maintain his "recognition of diversity and subtlety", would be prepared to sacrifice rational consistency. To a great extent, such a position depends, in Allport's opinion, on such factors as 'temperament'.\(^2\) Indeed, we have seen that ultimately the superordinate value of the scientist, on Allport's own admission, is essentially not scientifically grounded.

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\(^1\) G. W. ALLPORT, "Imagination in Psychology", The Person in Psychology, p. 114.

\(^2\) Cf. Ibid.: "If his temperament can tolerate contradictions he will find himself holding one theory at one moment and an opposite theory the next." Cf. also Idem, "The Fruits of Eclecticism", The Person in Psychology, pp. 11-12, 24; Idem, "The Productive Paradoxes of William James," The Person in Psychology, p. 318.
Such a position necessarily runs the risk of illogicality, and we have seen this tendency manifested in Allport's thought. Yet the dilemma was dramatically resolved in Allport's rejection of the self as substantive knower. In this rejection, the twin causes of the dilemma clashed, and with astonishing results.

It will be recalled that Allport had stated succinctly the other horn of his dilemma just prior to his rejection of the self as substantive knower. The horns of his dilemma were thus:

A. The ultimate criterion of validity for any theory concerning personality is one's 'recognition of diversity and subtlety', to maintain which, rational coherence must be sacrificed.

B. The self as substantive knower, despite the dangers such an admission must run, must be admitted if it is 'logically required'.

We have seen that principle A is the keystone of Allport's pluralism. By means of this principle he was able to surmount the narrow confines of positivism, or of any particular scientific perspective, and because of it he was able to evolve a systematic eclecticism into which he could assimilate the findings of the various branches of psychological

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1Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, "Imagination in Psychology", The Person in Psychology, p. 115. Cf. also Ibid., p. 116: "If accused of illogicality he can retort, with Emerson, that 'consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds'."
science, no matter how 'reductionist' these might prove to be, provided these findings did not contradict or distort his 'recognition' or common sense view of man in his complex and subtle uniqueness. This principle also enabled Allport to introduce new concepts and methods into his approach to personality and thereby propose a morphogenic science of the individual which would bring psychology closer to understanding, controlling and predicting the personality and behavior of the individual precisely because this approach was better able to reconstruct the individual in a manner more satisfactory to Allport's 'recognition' or common sense view of unique personality.

Principle B illustrates the negative pole to the pluralist's thrust, for here Allport admitted the demand for rational coherence by referring to logical requiredness. Yet what is astonishing in Allport's resolution of this dilemma in his rejection of the self is that he actually rejects both principles A and B!

Thus, instead of admitting - as principle A would demand - a self as substantive knower (of a sort to be defined), which his own 'recognition' or common sense view of man admits (the function is obviously admitted) but which was rationally inconsistent with his scientific principles of methodology which require that each datum be accessible to empirical analysis, Allport opted for methodological
consistency at the expense of his ultimate criterion of common sense.\footnote{We shall note Allport's insistence upon what is observable as the criterion of acceptability in psychology in the following chapter. We shall return to this question of observational and non-observational knowledge in Chapter XI below.} Again, while the recognition of the self as substantive knower is logically required by his analysis of the proprium and of the nature of man, Allport refused to admit this logical requiredness - as principle B would demand - but opted instead for an illogical circularity which did not correspond to his ultimate criterion of common sense either, and this in order to maintain a methodological consistency as a scientific psychologist.

Allport, in fact, had no grounds whatsoever, on the basis of his own analyses and principles, for the refusal of the self (as substantive knower of some sort still to be defined) save those of a scientific psychologist who feared the dangers of homunculism. This was a serious lapse in Allport's pluralism, the full significance of which can be seen only when the alternative position which forced him
into this particular resolution of his dilemma has been examined and its implications understood. While Allport's refusal to fragmentize the enigmatic nature of personal being for the sake of rational or systematic coherence must be admired, the cost in logical terms has been too high to be entirely satisfactory. It remains to be seen whether his protagonist, Bertocci, can offer an alternative which maintains intact the unique unity of personal being while at the same time satisfying the demands of reason and logic. And this will be the burden of the second and third parts of this study.
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS ON THE STUDY OF GORDON W. ALLPORT

This exposition of Gordon W. Allport's approach to psychology and to personality has given adequate evidence to support the claim that Allport was a "wise and sensitive scholar who was committed to representing the positive aspects of human behavior in terms that respected the uniqueness of every living organism".¹ His work was characterised by that spirit of tentativeness and humility which had recommended itself to him while still a student as the only authentic posture possible for a sincere search for truth. While fiercely critical of the excesses of his fellow psychologists, Allport never indulged in dogmatism of any sort, but, through his pluralistic approach, sought to include the findings of every branch of psychology within his systematic eclecticism. In his opinion, psychology as a science had the unique task of furthering man's understanding of himself. Such an understanding would enable man to control his activity and direct it towards goals more in harmony with his unique and enigmatic nature.

¹ C. HALL & G. LINDZEY, Theories of Personality, p. 295.
Yet while his faith in the ultimate task of psychology never wavered, Allport was sceptical about psychology's ability to achieve this goal at the present time. A great deal of further research would be required, above all, research along the lines he had advocated, namely, of a morphogenetic-idiosyncratic approach to personality which used personal dispositions as its basic units, and functional autonomy of motives as one of its basic principles.

Allport's sensitiveness to the enigmatic nature of personal being was undoubtedly the source of his pluralistic approach with its refusal to fragmentize human nature as a result of reductionist zeal. Yet this same pluralism was to involve him in paradoxes not unlike the paradoxes he had pointed out within the thought of his predecessor William James.¹ Thus, while he demanded rational control and direction of psychological research, the criterion of rationality or reasonableness was not reason itself, but a non-scientifically (or pre-scientifically) grounded common sense view of man's complex nature guided by a pragmatic concern for the usefulness of the findings of such researches.

¹Cf. THOMAS F. PETTIGREW, "Gordon Willard Allport, 1897-1967", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12, no. 1, (May, 1969), 1-5, reprinted in RICHARD I. EVANS, Gordon Allport: The Man and His Ideas, p. 135: "As you go through that paper [viz. Allport's "The Productive Paradoxes of William James"] you see in his dealings with James's paradoxes or polarities ... that, point after point, these are the issues that have been polarities for Gordon Allport".
In a similarly paradoxical way, the principle of functional autonomy which Allport introduced, as well as his adoption of personal dispositions as the basic units for his research in personality, were neither of them founded upon his own empirical investigations, but relied upon his common sense view of man's complex nature, together with his pragmatic concerns for the usefulness of his scientific research.

To be a pluralist and a dedicated scientist at the same time is never an easy task, particularly when a paradoxical element in one's thought comes under fierce and persistent attack and one is forced to resolve the paradox.\(^1\) If nothing else, the fierce yet friendly debate between Allport and Bertocci has shown that a fruitful interdisciplinary debate can be sustained and can prove fruitful. Yet, at the end of the debate, Allport was seen to be in the rather strange position of refusing on scientifico-methodological grounds what he did

\(^1\) Cf. Allport's characterisation of Bertocci as "an erudite and benevolent gadfly - with the jaws of a hippopotamus. And he spares neither friend nor foe." G. W. ALLPORT, "Peter Bertocci: Philosopher-Psychologist ", Philosophical Forum, 21 (1963-64), 3.
admit on his own ultimate common sense view of man's enigmatic nature. Allport, in fact, was bound to admit the self as knower of some sort to his system, but his manner of admittance involved him in that perpetual squinting on the proprium's part, of being at once knower and known, which had been one of Bertocci's chief complaints. His position as a pluralist was thus maintained with a consistency - he did, after all, admit that the concept of the self might be required for ultimate problems of philosophy and theology - but a consistency which involved a circularity that is highly unsatisfactory. While admitting the functional aspect of the self as knower, Allport steadfastly refused to enter into the question as to the nature of this knowing function.

Yet deeper within Allport's thought lay the key to this costly dilemma. On his own admission, "all books on the psychology of personality are at the same time books on the philosophy of the person. It could not be otherwise".¹ In fact, hidden in Allport's pluralistic approach lay some very definite philosophical presuppositions.

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. xi. Cf. Also RICHARD I. EVANS, Gordon Allport: The Man and His Ideas, p. 87, where Allport states that "all psychology rests on philosophical presuppositions of some sort..."
1. Allport's Naturalism.

Allport was acutely aware of the fact that his own position gravitated towards an ontological position. On his own admission, any psychologist would be shortsighted if he denied a dependence on some ontological scheme, or if he refused "to articulate, as best he can, his own thinking about human nature with that brand of philosophy with which it is most closely allied". Yet, while Allport felt a deep sympathy for the philosophical system known as personalism, his reservations concerning this system show that he did not consider himself in any strict sense a personalist.

Indeed, Allport's ontological presuppositions were more closely akin to naturalism:

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2Cf. Ibid. "In so far as I am person-centered, yes, I am a personalist. But, as this essay explains, there are areas of serious disagreement ... Since a psychologist has no professional competence to argue an ontological position, he could not, as a psychologist, be a personalist".
My own approach is naturalistic, but open-ended. Naturalism, as I see it, is too often a closed system of thought that utters premature and trivial pronouncements on the nature of man. But it can and should be a mode of approach that deliberately leaves unsolved the ultimate metaphysical questions concerning the nature of man, without prejudicing the solution.¹

Allport's naturalism was given its most forceful presentation in 1937:

Some Original Cause or Source of Animation is assumed explicitly or implicitly by all biological and psychological sciences. Life exists in individual forms. This fact, unexplained and perhaps inexplicable, is the starting point for these sciences.²

... the observable stream of activity [is] the only basic datum with which the psychology of personality has to work.³

Within such a context, Allport's question, "What is it that sets the stream of activity into motion, that sustains it until it lapses or changes?"⁴ became synonymous with the problem of motivation.

Thus, at the very outset of his approach, Allport faced a serious difficulty: the problem of accounting for the transformation of motives.

³Ibid., p. 313.
⁴Ibid., p.110.
We have seen that he solved this problem through his use of the principle of functional autonomy, but also by distinguishing clearly between the motivation of infancy and of adulthood.¹ A similar problem was the emergency of self-consciousness. In our discussion of Allport's introduction of the term 'proprium', it was noted that Allport approached this problem in a characteristic way, namely, through an examination of the "developing sense of self from infancy onward".²

What is significant about Allport's treatment of these two particular problems is his openly naturalistic approach. When

¹Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci", Psychological Review, 47 (1940), 535: "Infant behavior, I submit, conforms more closely to the alleged characteristics of drive-impelled conduct. Adult behavior, with its widened consciousness of goals, and with its lavish use of symbols and all higher mental operations, on the other hand, shows the working of a type of motivation that can only be expressed in terms of interest, attitude, value, desire, will - terms quite inappropriate to infancy".

²G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 111.
pressed by Bertocci to account for the radical difference between the non-purposive 'push' of infancy and the purposive 'pull' of increasing maturity, or, as Bertocci put it, the "magic" of "ontogenetic emergent evolution", Allport candidly replied:

This proposition does not seem magical to me, but on the contrary about as simple and straightforward a statement of empirical fact as we are likely to find in the realm of motivation.

Similarly, when pressed by Bertocci to account for the longitudinal or temporal continuity of personality, since functional autonomy cannot do so, Allport appealed to the ego-satisfying character of motives, and to the fact that the organism is a "living system of interdependent motives", which are continuously reconstituting the ego, even while dependent upon it. This view would later be re-stated to the effect that propriate strivings are the principle of unity of personality, and that unity comes through stiving.

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It is thus clear that Allport's naturalistic approach merely describes or articulates the problem, but offers no solution. That infant motives are transformed radically into adult motives no-one disputes; how this transformation comes about the scientific psychologist can begin to explain through his investigations of the learning process with its accompanying evolving sense of self; but just why, or in function of what, this should come about he nowhere asks. Similarly, with functional autonomy, Allport's analysis merely states that motives are contemporary and functionally independent of prior motives, and this within the same organism whose identity is assured by "individual threads of memory, habits of expectation, recurrent plans, hopes, and ideas of future goals,"¹ but nowhere does Allport give any reason why this should be the case. No principle of unity or of continuity is given other than the observable or felt

¹Ibid. Cf. also THOMAS F. PETTIGREW, "Gordon Willard Allport, 1897-1967", in R. I. EVANS, Gordon Allport: The Man and His Ideas, p. 121: "... his doctrine of functional autonomy was not really a solution to this problem; it was rather a focusing on the problem as really a very central one for psychology".
stream of activity itself. ¹ The explicandum is thus itself the explicans: 'I think' and 'I act' are to be explained in terms of 'there is a thought' and 'there is activity'.

Allport's naturalistic approach is thus beset with difficulties. The stream of activity mysteriously set into motion at birth must serve as the basic datum which, although differentiated at birth into mass

¹Thus Bertocci's question, "Whence the more enduring permanent interests of personality? If they are not innate, or if they are not changes rung on innate tendencies, then they are mechanisms-on-the-make. But on the make for what? Since instrumentalities must have reference sooner or later to something outlasting or underlying them, how can we avoid the conclusion: They are mechanisms-on-the-make for the satisfaction of innate drives which are not themselves functionally autonomous?" (P. A. BERTOCCI, "A Critique of G. W. Allport's Theory of Motivation," pp. 529-30), received this candid reply from Allport: "It is not, I think, particularly pertinent for Bertocci to ask what habits are on the make for ... Tasks once accepted are always ego-involved, but for many reasons and in many ways ... They may be accepted because of suggestion, previous habits of obedience, simple association with routine living, or any other mode of involvement in the developing ego". (G. W. ALLPORT, "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci," p. 548).

Cf. also Allport's comment in R. I. EVANS, Gordon Allport: The Man and His Ideas, p. 32: "If you ask me how it [viz. functional autonomy] comes about, I would have to say merely that it is of the nature of the human organism".
action and specific reflexes, which in turn are set into motion and sustained through simple sensitivity and segmental drives which employ innate individual equipment (intelligence, temperament, and physique), together with adaptive mechanisms,\(^1\) must, nevertheless also contain "the basic existentialist urge to grow, pursue meaning, seek unity".\(^2\)

The organism, self-explanatory as a datum, is nevertheless haunted by a ghost or inexplicable 'will-to-live' which, "however acceptable it may be in the underlying metaphysics of personality, does not in itself aid in the task of psychological analysis".\(^3\) As Bertocci has ironically declared: "it is a curious 'metaphysical abstraction' indeed which holds that the ultimate reality of human nature has little effect on the apparent, phenomenal reality".\(^4\)

Thus, Allport's naturalism, albeit essential to his scientific approach as a psychologist, could not offer a sufficient explanation

\(^1\)G. W. ALLPORT, Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, p. 108.

\(^2\)G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 563.

\(^3\)G. W. ALLPORT, Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, p. 205.

or account of personal being since it precluded the posing of fundamental metaphysical questions concerning the basic datum which his own analyses of that datum themselves demanded. Adopting as he did a theory of emergent evolution in motivation, Allport was unable to account for the genesis of a process which was conceived of as necessarily self-explanatory in terms of empirically observable laws and empirically verifiable hypotheses. Yet, in all fairness, Allport regarded his naturalism as more than a scientific principle. It also served him in his appeal for open-mindedness, for a pluralism that would not close its eyes to various possibilities which a more dogmatic position would be unable to tolerate. His naturalistic approach as open-ended thus presupposed a basic view of the nature of truth.
2. Allport's Pluralistic View of Truth.

We have seen that although Allport considered psychology as the science which would eventually give the fullest explanation of man's complex nature, he nevertheless realised that this was a distant goal. Unable as yet to supply the necessary data to warrant the final choice of one particular interpretation of man's nature and the rejection of others, psychology must turn to philosophy. "The best we can do at the present time is to seek the philosophical formulation that on the whole seems to be most coherent with available psychological evidence".\(^1\)

Indeed, Allport was convinced that psychology and philosophy must eventually merge: "It seems inconceivable to me that two well-intentioned disciplines, working on a common subject-matter, can indefinitely remain apart".\(^2\) Both disciplines have in common "the conviction that the person is altogether central in the scheme of things."\(^3\)

\(^1\) G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 567.
\(^2\) G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychological Nature of Personality", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 36.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 19
And, indeed, Allport's criticisms of Bertocci were to prove fruitful in Bertocci's subsequent thought.¹

In a similar way, Allport believed that a systematic eclecticism was a possibility, and that the findings of most branches of psychology could be assimilated into this meta-theory. He thus re-echoed William James' belief, which he approvingly quoted, that "there's a harmony somewhere, and that our strivings will combine".² We have already seen the difficulties such a view encountered within Allport's thought: while appealing for rational controls, and while adopting a highly rational concept such as 'system', Allport retained an anti-rational policy of sacrificing rational coherence in order to maintain his own personal view of the diversity and subtlety of human individuality. Indeed, the paradoxical concept of 'open system' attempted to wed these contrary pulls of which Allport was only too well aware.

¹Cf. Ibid., pp. 35-36. Allport's influence on Bertocci will be discussed below.

In a certain sense, therefore, Allport's view of the nature of truth was simple: ultimately, truth is one, and a harmony will be achieved. Yet, at the same time, the very dynamic nature of human nature and of the cosmos itself precludes any rational system ever achieving total comprehension. Man must therefore settle for probabilities, be guided by reason, but all the while be ultimately controlled by common sense. That Allport fully accepted this basic unity of truth is manifested by his belief that one of the functions of psychology in its present state is the correction of 'erroneous philosophizing', since, in his opinion, no philosophy of the person can be correct if it flatly contradicts 'known facts' about human nature, provided that such facts "are both firmly established and reasonably complete".1

Allport's view of truth is thus extremely perplexing. While affirming that all valid approaches to personality are compatible,

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1G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 567. Cf. also R. I. EVANS, Gordon Allport: The Man and His Ideas, p. 93, where Allport states: "Truth is, I think, what informed people are eventually fated to agree upon".
and while affirming that psychology and (personalistic) philosophy must ultimately agree since they study the same subject-matter, the criterion he offers for validity of approach (and thereby of compatibility) is not rational coherence (which is nevertheless the criterion he proposes for the compatibility of correct philosophy and for the rejection of 'erroneous' philosophy), but his own common sense view of the person, albeit aided, in part, by his empirical investigations. If Allport the scientist had difficulty over this dilemma, it is difficult to see how psychology, no matter how far we regard into the future with all the data then presumably amassed, can ever resolve this same dilemma. Truth may ultimately be one, but we shall never arrive at this harmony Allport desired through the search for rational coherence, since Allport failed to relate his common sense views to his rationality. Unless reason and common sense can somehow be shown to be continuous, Allport's distant hope could never be achieved, yet nowhere did Allport adequately account for this continuity. Through an over-riding fear of dogmatism and closed-mindedness, Allport was never able to admit that ultimately a reasoned interpretation of the data of experience is the only guarantee of truth we have. His pluralistic view of truth, reflecting as it did his own open-mindedness, helpful as it was as a methodological principle for systematic eclecticism, is nevertheless inadequate as a means of achieving a fully adequate theory of the enigmatic nature of man.
3. The Basic Issues.

The fundamental issue which this study of Allport's thought has uncovered is essentially the problem of the givens in personality theory. Indeed, Allport's naturalistic presuppositions are the root cause of his recurring dilemma. In his opinion, the givens are the observable stream of activity together with its multiple differentiations through growth and maturation. This insistence on that which is observable is entirely consistent with his insistence on empirical methods of procedure. It is also the source of his common sense view of the complex nature of man.

Within limits, such an approach is valid, yet, as we have seen, this same approach is necessarily closed to an essential aspect of personal being, namely, the knowing and anchoring (or unifying) function. While Allport admitted those propriate activities which are felt as peculiarly 'mine', he refused to account adequately for the knowing function and for the essential unification of these propriate functions.
Thus Allport cannot be accused entirely of inconsistency in this regard. It would appear that his common sense view of personal being coincided essentially with those propriate and perseverative functions which he had enumerated, all of which were observable (or could be 'felt') and thereby open to empirical observation through testing of various forms. It was his belief also that the answer to his basic question, as to what makes the system hang together in any one person, lay essentially in the scientific analysis of the givens at his disposal, namely, his common sense view of man's observable nature. Yet absent from such a view was any adequate accounting for the functions of knowing and unification which seem to demand a subject as knower and unifier.

Of course, Allport's reluctance to admit a self as knower or unifier in any sense is readily understandable, since the threat of homunculism is a threat to the very existence and value of psychology as a science. And in his criticisms of certain philosophical positions, his fear is shown to be well-founded. But it is surely a strange anomaly, as Bertocci pointed out, that two functions so essential to man's nature should be glossed over because they are, by their very nature, inaccessible to scientific analysis by the psychologist. This is an application of the Berkleyan principle "esse est percipi" with a vengeance.
Thus the issues Allport's position has raised are the following:-

1. The basic issue of the givens in personality theory. Is the observable and differentiated stream of activity together with empirical analysis sufficient for the elaboration of a theory of personality which hopes to be adequate?

2. The related issues of the functions of knowing and of unification.

(a) While Allport admits the function of knowing (an sit), he does not adequately account for this function of personal being (quid sit).

(b) While Allport admits the 'fact' of unity in personality, and even the function of 'propriate striving' (an sit), he does not adequately account for the unity and continuity of personal being (quid sit).

3. The relationship between common sense, reason and science is not adequately elaborated in Allport's pluralistic approach.

These issues will be dealt with in the third section of this study: it is now time to consider the position of Allport's principal antagonist in this debate, Peter A. Bertocci.
PART TWO: PETER A. BERTOCCI
CHAPTER VI. PETER A. BERTOCCI'S APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

1. Introduction.

Peter A. Bertocci, born in 1910 in Elena, Italy, received his A.B. from Boston University in 1931, and his M.A. from Harvard in 1932. He then pursued further graduate studies in philosophy at Boston University, obtaining his Ph.D. in 1935. During the years 1934-35, he studied with F.R. Tennant and W.R. Sorley at Cambridge University, England. He then spent nine years as professor of psychology and philosophy at Bates College before returning to Boston University in 1946 as professor of philosophy. In 1951 he was a Fulbright Scholar, and spent a year at Croce's Instituto Storico. In 1953 he succeeded E.S. Brightman as Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, a chair which he still holds. A second Fulbright scholarship enabled him to visit the University of Calcutta in 1960-61, where he studied the thought of Radhakrishnan. He was President of the Metaphysical Society of America, and of the American Theological Society in the year 1963-64.

Bertocci's wide range of interests is reflected in his extensive bibliography, which ranges from specifically philosophical issues to
problems relating to religion, marriage and sex, and education.\textsuperscript{1} Besides his own writings, Bertocci has served on the editorial board of \textit{The Philosophical Forum} for 27 years.

Bertocci underwent various influences, such as A.N. Whitehead at Harvard, and F.R. Tennant at Cambridge, and his psychological reading leaned heavily on William James and William McDougall,\textsuperscript{2} yet throughout his career, Bertocci has repeatedly referred to the influence of his teacher and predecessor at Boston University, Edgar S.

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\textsuperscript{1}Cf. Bibliography below.
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Indeed, Bertocci has always considered himself at once a disciple of Brightman and a continuator of that rich and vital tradition.

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Brightman's influence will become apparent as this study progresses.
which began at Boston University with Borden Parker Bowne, who taught there from 1876 until his death in 1910. Thus no study of Bertocci's thought could be adequate without taking into account this personalistic tradition, but especially as it was presented by E. S. Brightman. Accordingly, Brightman's position will be given in conjunction with Bertocci's whenever this appears necessary.

2. Philosophical Method.

While Bertocci's approach to philosophy has always been "problem-centred rather than method-centred", he nevertheless acknowledges "how momentous philosophically is the decision to accept a method and criterion of truth as one's guide in examining".¹ In his choice of method and criterion of truth, Bertocci revealed his debt to his mentor, Edgar S. Brightman. We shall therefore devote some space to Brightman's method and criterion of truth before examining Bertocci's.

(a) Brightman's Philosophical Method and Criterion of Truth.

Throughout his writings, Brightman showed a remarkable consistency in method.¹ His methodological principles were first


expressed in 1925, when he declared that philosophy must be synoptic, as "the viewing of any object or complex of objects as a whole".

Specifically,

in synoptic reason ... the mind does more than to review the separate facts of deduction, analysis and synthesis, experiment, and feeling. Knowing these facts, it sees them together and sees also the qualities of the object as a whole, which the other methods tend to omit, underestimate, or merely take for granted.¹

This approach was distinctly tentative, since "every synopsis is, in a sense, an hypothesis until it has been tested by all the means at our disposal".² Closely related to this approach was Brightman's adoption of coherence as the criterion of truth. Thus,

coherence means consistency³ ... The coherence criterion looks beyond the mere self-consistency of propositions to a comprehensive synoptic view of all experience ... The coherence theory would then offer the following criterion: Any judgment is true, if it is both self-consistent and coherently connected with our system.

²Ibid., p. 29
³Ibid., p. 59.
of judgements as a whole.\footnote{Tbid., p. 61. It is worthwhile at this point to clarify an initial confusion regarding empirical coherence. While consistency or logical coherence is a necessary rule of thought and can be achieved only by following the principles of logic, empirical coherence is neither a necessary rule of thought, nor can it be achieved by following the principles of logic. Indeed, as we shall have occasion to point out in Chapter X below, neither Brightman nor Bertocci has any ground for assuming that the data of experience are capable of providing empirical coherence rather than incoherence. Rather, the criterion of empirical coherence is more of a proposal or leading principle of investigation, and Brightman's tendency to use 'coherence' in both its logical and empirical sense in the same statement does introduce a confusing note. Thus his statement just quoted above, that "any judgment is true, if it is both self-consistent and coherently connected with our system of judgments as a whole", is confusing, since it seems to speak only in terms of logical coherence. (On the basis of that statement, taken in isolation, any judgment within the Einsteinian view of the universe would be true if both self-consistent and coherently connected with his system of judgments as a whole; but then so also would any such judgment within the Ptolemaic view of the universe). It is only when Brightman's insistence on the need for a comprehensive synoptic view of all experience is heeded that we realize that empirical coherence demands that we look beyond the mere self-consistency of propositions and systems (logical coherence) and judge the adequacy of our truth-claims or hypotheses in the light of experience as a whole (empirical coherence). And when we consider the strong pragmatic bent of Brightman's perspective, which we shall examine below, we can easily appreciate his demand for empirical coherence: mere logical coherence or consistency, since it does not require attention to the facts of experience, is ill-suited to produce "knowledge which can help humanity to live together in peace and goodwill and civilized creativity". E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Personality and Religion (New York: Abingdon Press, 1934), p. 10.) Thus as R. D. RAMSEY has pointed out, "the coherence criterion becomes a metaproposal concerning conscious experience ... it is ... only a suggestion or exhortation to examine the various hypotheses about life, those of both the normative and descriptive sciences, in its light". (Brightman's View of the Person and Educational Theory", p. 171). Cf. Also HUGO A. BEDAU, "Must We Accept the Coherence Criterion", Philosophical Forum, 11(1953), 34-36.
The philosopher thus must adopt a holistic approach to experience, and formulate hypotheses. These hypotheses will be true in so far as they are coherent with our other judgments of experience, and in this sense, "the truth about experience must comprise the truth about all experience, including the experience of value".¹ This emphasis on the inclusion of all experience, and especially the experience of value, as necessary for any adequate philosophical investigation, was an important aspect of Brightman's thought.

Brightman gradually developed his position, later adding that "coherence is the criterion of truth and reasonableness".² Indeed, when we undertake to give a coherent account of the meaning of experience as a whole, we are launched on what is the most unavoidable and the most precarious task of reason. Much confusion arises from demanding in our synoptic interpretation of reality the same type of coherence as is appropriate to some of the types already mentioned, such as formal logic.³

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¹E. S. BRIGHTMAN, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 316. Cf. also Brightman's predecessor and founder of American Personalism, BORDON PARKER BOWNE, Personalism, p. 104: "This view might well be called transcendental empiricism ... The meaning is that all thought about reality must be rooted in experience and that apart from experience we can never be sure whether our conceptions represent any actual fact or not".


³Ibid., p. 27
In this respect, Brightman added,

Carneades was right in holding that probability is the guide of life; absolute rational certainty is not accessible to man. But it remains true that there is a vast difference between random guesswork and the probability of coherent thought. Only the most rational probability is intellectually respectable.¹

Nine years later, Brightman stated that:

reason is the function of surveying all the facts in a situation and of understanding their relations and their implications. To use philosophical terms, reason is a coherent explanation based on a synoptic view of experience.²

Yet such explanations are always tentative, as Brightman never tired of admitting: "I have a system of my own, but I am convinced that my views are not absolute truth. I present them as hypotheses to stimulate thought..."³

Brightman's fullest account of his method was not elaborated until his final years. His penultimate statement referred to the need for a 'radical empiricism', the demand that all the data of experience be

¹Ibid., p. 31

²E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Personality and Religion (New York: Abingdon Press, 1934), p. 27.

included. Hand-in-hand with this radical empiricism there must be a method "adequate to the data", and, in this respect, "synoptic method is an inclusive method". The criterion of truth was re-stated: "coherence, specifically, empirical coherence".¹ And, again, such a philosophical approach "cannot lay claim to absolute logical necessity, nor to finality. In not pretending to absolute necessity, it departs from traditional rationalism; in testing all hypothetical truth claims by their coherence with experience and with each other, it departs from all irrationalism..."²

The final and definitive statement of his philosophical method was given in his posthumously published Person and Reality, where Brightman described his method as empirical, experimental, personalistic, synoptic-analytic, coherent, and dialectical. His method was empirical to the


²Ibid., p. 292.
degree that "it will assume no source of information about the real, other than the experience of conscious experience". It was experimental in that "metaphysical method requires the data from all types of experiment and requires the interpretation of all these data by a coherent 'scheme of ideas' (Whitehead) or 'postulational continuum' (Northrop). Experiment, scientific or philosophic, thus presupposes hypotheses to be tested and eventuates in tested hypotheses. Knowledge thus gained is always probable, in the sense of being incompletely

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demonstrated".¹

Also, in so far as this method "focuses attention on the importance of the person and his nature" it was personalistic. At the same time, "since metaphysical method ... cannot stop with analysis, but requires

¹Ibid., p. 25. This emphasis on experimentation eventuating in tested hypotheses must be seen in the light of the personalistic concern for avoiding dogmatism of any sort. Thus the basic contention of both Brightman and Bertocci, as we shall see below, that we can be certain of nothing beyond the momentary self is not an espousal of a Gogito from which a Weltanschauung can be deduced more geometrico. On the contrary, this prime datum is the basis for the construction of hypotheses or inductions concerning the nature of the world through an empirical and synoptically coherent interpretation of the data of experience. While the use of the term 'hypothesis' in this context could be considered unfortunate, since it suggests a programme of research similar to that of the natural sciences, its legitimacy can be defended on the basis of Brightman's and Bertocci's candid attempts to arrive at truths which are practical, based on experience, and merely probable within those limits. Their proposals are thus hypothetical rather than categorical, reflecting as they do their pronounced anti-dogmatic perspective. Cf. also STEPHEN STRASSER'S remarks on hypothesis and interpretation, Phenomenology and the Human Sciences; A Contribution to a New Scientific Ideal (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1963), pp. 170-77.
analysis-synopsis, back-forth, the synoptic method is as incomplete without analysis as the analytic method is without synopsis".\(^1\) The method also had to be coherent: "logical coherence must become empirical coherence if it is to be fruitful", thus implying "consistency supplemented by system",\(^2\) and the "use of synoptic hypotheses, those guesses about the whole that is revealed in our experience",\(^3\) together with verification, "the testing of a coherent synoptic hypothesis by as many scraps of evidential fact as can be experienced".\(^4\) Brightman also added that such a method must also be dialectical: "the heart of dialectical method is this: I, the metaphysician, ... must start exactly where I am ... I must observe this principle of development at work in reasoning, in nature, in individual and social growth, in art,

\(^{1}\) E. S. BRIGHTMAN, _Person and Reality_, p. 27.
\(^{2}\) Ibid., p. 28
\(^{3}\) Ibid., p. 31
\(^{4}\) Ibid., p. 32.
religion and philosophy".¹

Such a method, applied and modified over the years, provided Brightman with the framework necessary for the development of a metaphysical view of reality which was at once empirical, pragmatic, synoptic, and coherent. It also quite clearly reveals Brightman's basic starting point - experience, consciousness, the self. Such was the method Bertocci inherited.

¹Ibid.
(b) Bertocci's Philosophical Method and Criterion of Truth.

Bertocci's choice of method was revealed in his first major publication, when he approvingly quoted F. R. Tennant:

We must begin with experience, since otherwise there is no problem; and return to experience, since otherwise there is failure of that continuity and resemblance in which explanation consists.¹

In Bertocci's own words, "empirical philosophy must start in mediis rebus, with common sense knowledge".² Such an empirical philosophy must also be synoptic, since "the task of synoptic philosophy is to render experience coherent through further analysis and synthesis than is open to the various sciences".³ In order to accomplish this task, philosophy must, according to Bertocci,

proceed to the logically prior through the psychologically prior. Thus a philosophy (a) controlled by the presumptive

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 4. Cf. the similar proposition of B. P. BOWNE, in Personalism, p. 303: "We have again and again pointed out that experience is first and basal in all living and thinking, and that all theorizing must go out from experience as its basis, and must return to it for verification".

²Ibid., p. 195.
knowledge of common sense and science which is the data for further criticism, and (b) employing the ordo cognoscendi, takes less risk of being led astray, for it sets out from fact and keeps close to fact (or knowledge with the minimum of theory attached), than would a philosophy which employed the ordo concipiendi or the ordo essendi.¹

In other words,

if philosophy is to seek knowledge of the whole through examination of the presuppositions of the sciences and common sense knowledge, it would be careless if it did not investigate the nature of knowledge itself.²

Thus Bertocci had already outlined his methodological approach as an empirical, coherent, and synoptic interpretation of experience. Such an interpretation could be termed "analytical psychology" since it "must begin with the fact of consciousness, 'our prime datum'."³

This strongly empirical bent of appealing to conscious experience,

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
³Ibid., p. 198.
which had been so noticeable in the later thought of Brightman, runs consistently through the thought of Bertocci. In 1945 he stated that "whatever else we do, we must begin with conscious experience, and finally come back to it for confirmation of proposed hypotheses". Indeed, "all views of the physical world, body and sub-conscious, as well as the nature of other minds and God, are to be judged by their ability to account most coherently for the data of finite conscious experience". Yet it was only with the publication of his Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion in 1951 that Bertocci offered a properly systematic presentation of the method he had chosen. Above all, the hypothetical character of his conclusions was clearly stated: "this difference between strict logical consistency and actual connections in


2P. A. BERTOCCI, "Brightman's View of the Self, the Person, and the Body", Philosophical Forum, 8 (1950), 52.
experience we shall call growing, empirical coherence".\(^1\) In other words, "the more experience confirms a particular hypothesis, the more empirically coherent (or reasonable) that particular assertion is".\(^2\) This means that "we can never be absolutely certain of anything beyond the momentary self ... human knowledge is always tentative and probable, rather than logically certain".\(^3\)

At this point, Bertocci introduced a distinction which he would later use with effect, and which he hoped would clarify the relationship between common sense, reason, and science, a relationship which, we have argued, Allport did not clarify to our satisfaction. Bertocci argued that there are three types of certitude: psychological, logical, and empirically coherent. Psychological certitude obtains when little, if any, evidence supports a held belief, such as such common sense


\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 61.

\(^{3}\)Ibid.
convictions that the mind and body form one composite whole. Logical
certitude results from logical coherence, when a necessary connection
between ideas obtains, as in the case of a valid syllogism. Empirically
coherent certitude results from the realization that a given proposition
gives the most coherent interpretation of the evidence available, or,
conversely, leaves the least evidence still to be explained. These
distinctions are important, since they show that for Bertocci, as for
Brightman, the aim of philosophy is not the uncovering of eternal,
changeless, and absolute truths. Bertocci will even admit:

We are accordingly forced to define knowledge in terms of
reasonable probability.

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1 Cf. Ibid., p. 62ff. The same distinction recurs in P. A. BERTOCCI,
"Descartes and Marcel on the Person and His Body: A Critique",
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society of Great Britain, 68 (1968), 208,
209, 217; Idem, "The Perspective of a Teleological Personalistic
The validity of this distinction will be discussed below.

2 This issue of the aim or goal of philosophy will also be
discussed below.

3 P. A. BERTOCCI, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 78.
But no faith is acceptable unless it is guided by reason as far as possible, reason here meaning not simply logic, not simply science, but the determined attempt to guide one's life by beliefs which, without flying in the face of logic or evidence, lead to further thought and action consistent with the best one knows.\(^1\)

There seems to be no way of removing faith from the knowing situation. The issue is whether it will be blind faith or reasonable faith.\(^2\)

As Bertocci himself declares,

If we would live the life of reasonable beings, we must live up to the following norms:

Be consistent (eliminate all contradictions).
Be systematic (discover all relevant relations).
Be inclusive (weigh all available experiences).
Be analytic (consider all the elements of which every complex consists).
Be synoptic (relate all the elements of any whole to its properties as a whole).
Be active (use experimental methods).
Be open to alternatives (consider many possible hypotheses).
Be critical (test and verify or falsify hypotheses).
Be decisive (be committed to the best available hypotheses).\(^3\)


\(^2\)P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Person as Key to Reality", being Chapter 18 of E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Person and Reality, p. 348. This chapter was written by Bertocci. (Cf. Ibid., p. 343, footnote).

\(^3\)P. A. BERTOCCI, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 79.
This methodological approach remains throughout the remainder of Bertocci's published works:

The truth about oneself or about the world is to be discovered by coherent organization of all knowledge-claims made in, and on the basis of, the situation-experienced ... to be considered true, any hypothesis must not only be self-consistent and consistent with other claims and presumable facts, but it must also be made to correlate the different aspects and phases of experience better than any other hypothesis. This criterion is not the criterion of logical coherence ... but the criterion of growing, empirical coherence.¹

... empiricism should be wholistic or synoptic, and not favor in advance any one phase of conscious experience.²

Radical empiricism, synoptic examination as well as analysis - this is the methodology that alone can provide hypotheses which, however far they range, will not lose their anchorage in what is phenomenally given.³

This reference to what is phenomenally given leads to one final point which must be mentioned regarding Bertocci's method, and that is

his inclusion of phenomenological description. Strictly speaking, in so far as he appealed to all conscious experience as the data for philosophy Brightman was to that extent phenomenological, but Bertocci uses the term explicitly. Thus he states,

... phenomenologically (that is, experienced) activities of willing do not ever feel like activities of wanting. I am obviously appealing at this point, to the introspective difference each of us is immediately aware of when he resolves a conflict between wants, and in favor of the weaker want.¹

The approach here is once more phenomenological, that is, to describe what we experience before evaluating any theories about it.²

This phenomenological method allows Bertocci to speak of the different 'psychic tones' of different experiences:

But anxiety is not guilt. Feel the psychic tones of the two ... For myself I can only say that the psychic difference between fear and guilt is so great that I wonder how acute thinkers could have confused the two and used the terms 'anxiety' and 'guilt' interchangeably.³

¹ P. A. BERTOCCI, Free Will, Responsibility and Grace, p. 17.
And while respect is related to many other emotions and dispositions, ranging from gratitude to sorrow, it imposes its own psychic tone in all those situations that the person contemplates and admires.\(^1\)

On the whole, however, it can be seen that Bertocci's philosophical method and criterion of truth differ only slightly from those of Brightman, in that there is a greater emphasis on growth. Bertocci, in fact, proposes a method which will produce a growing, empirical, and synoptic interpretation of experience, which must begin with "the data supplied in the dynamic activities which constitute ... consciousness or awareness".\(^2\) The starting point for philosophy, for Bertocci as for Brightman, is consciousness, the self.

However, two aspects of Bertocci's philosophical method require further discussion: (1) the goal of philosophy which such a method hopes to attain, and (2) the validity of Bertocci's distinction of


\(^2\)P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Person as Key Metaphysical Principle", p. 207.
three types of certitude. The former aspect will be dealt with at some length in the following section of this chapter, since this question of goal or perspective is central not only to Bertocci's and Brightman's thought, but to that philosophical tradition known as Personalism as a whole. The latter point, however, merits immediate consideration.

To begin with, it must be admitted that Bertocci's choice of terminology is unfortunate. If certitude is defined as at once firm assent and absence of doubt concerning the truth of any given proposition, then certitude can only be 'psychological' since it is de facto a subjective state of mind. Bertocci is obviously referring to that type of firm conviction which is often attached to what has been termed 'opinion' (doxa) when he speaks of 'psychological certitude'. We hold a great many such convictions, yet, like Augustine in the passage quoted earlier, we are often hard put to furnish adequate evidence to support these 'opinions'. Indeed, the very driving force behind science has been that "cherished dream" of finding "an escape from obscure and wayward personal persuasion to truth objectively valid
for all thinking men". With scientia (episteme) comes certitude in its formal sense as firm assent which, although still a subjective state of mind, is now based upon objective evidence about which common agreement can be made. It is this element of objective evidence which, once established, gives rise to further deductions or inductions which, if logically coherent, produce further truths which are similarly objectively valid for all thinking men. Thus, once again, Bertocci's choice of language is unfortunate. Certitude in its strictest sense depends upon sufficiency of evidence, and not on logical connections as such.

Obviously, Bertocci is attempting to establish a via media between the 'subjective' certitude of mere opinion and the 'objective' certitude of scientia. Such a middle position would be less assured than scientia due to the insufficiency of the evidence to remove all doubt and thereby guarantee full assent, yet it would be more probable

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2Cf. the terse definition of AQUINAS: "Certitudo proprie dicitur firmitas adhaesionis virtutis cognitivae in suum cognoscibile". (In III Sent., 26, 2, ad 4.).
than mere opinion, since it would have benefited from a reasonable attempt to establish such sufficient evidence through a consistent, systematic, inclusive, analytic, synoptic, experimental, dialectical, and critical interpretation of the data available. In so far as such available data cannot furnish sufficient evidence, a tentative or hypothetical interpretation can be formed which takes into account all of the data available. Such an interpretation would certainly be more reasonable than an initial opinion, and would furnish a higher degree of probability which, in turn, would decrease one's doubt while strengthening one's assent. Analogically, such a state of mind might be described with justification as tentatively certain, in the sense that the 'empirically coherent' interpretation in question is seen to be the best interpretation possible of the evidence so far available.¹ And this would be where that element of decisiveness, which Bertocchi also advocates, would enter, especially in moral issues. Within such limits, then, Bertocchi's distinction of three types of certitude can be accepted, although the term 'certitude' is used univocally.

¹It is obvious that Allport sought such a via media in his thought. We shall reserve discussion of the relationship between these two approaches until the third part of this study.
only once in its formal sense, and this in reference to what Bertocci
has described as 'logical certitude'. Indeed, in his choice of
language, such as 'psychological' and 'logical', in his distinctions,
Bertocci has been singularly unfortunate.

Yet, while this distinction can be accepted, many philosophers
would demur at Bertocci's further contention, contained implicitly
in his philosophical method, that such 'reasonable opinion' rather
than 'scientia' is the goal of philosophy.
3. The Goal of Philosophy.

Implicit in any philosophical method is a conception of the goal of philosophy. For both Brightman and Bertocci the goal of philosophy was clearly defined - practical wisdom, as the elaboration of an empirically coherent interpretation of the data of experience which would enable mankind to live better lives. Before examining the consequences of such a philosophical perspective, it will be instructive to examine Brightman's arguments for this perspective, before elaborating Bertocci's.

(a) The Philosophical Perspective of E. S. Brightman.

Brightman's philosophical perspective was extremely practical. In his own words:

To be of substantial value, theoretical or practical, philosophy must have something to say. The philosophical spirit should not remain impalpable but should make itself felt in real life. The student of philosophy has the responsibility for choosing as his working philosophy the way of looking at things that seems to him most reasonably to interpret reality as a whole.¹

¹E. S. BRIGHTMAN, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 361. Cf. also Ibid., pp. 207, 248, 304.
A philosophy that is to be humanly useful must shed some light in the nature and purpose of selves and their function in the universe.¹

What I mean by useful is, rather, knowledge which can help humanity to live together in peace and goodwill and civilized creativity.²

Philosophy deepens and broadens life, gives it a principle of growth, disciplines its excesses, and points toward the eternal.³

Theoretical knowledge is and should be primarily for the purpose of making better persons.⁴

The practical reason has primacy over the theoretical.⁵

There can be no doubt that this primary concern for practical knowledge led Brightman to adopt a method which could provide practical results. This strong pragmatic spirit, coupled with his insistence on the necessarily empirical foundation of any adequate philosophy,⁶ would also

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¹ E. S. BRIGHTMAN, "Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self", p. 289.
² E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Personality and Religion, p. 10.
³ E. S. BRIGHTMAN, A Philosophy of Religion, p. ix.
⁴ Ibid., p. viii.
⁵ E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Person and Reality, p. 15.
⁶ Cf. the particularly forceful assertion that "when self and person, their nature, and their values, their relation to the body and environment, cease to be central problems, philosophy itself will have lost interest in its own empirical foundations as well as in the only available material for the construction of a world view".
explain his refusal to attempt any approach to absolutism, and his constantly repeated admission that his conclusions were merely hypothetical while possessing an adequate degree of probability.

Such a perspective has not been without its critics. J. R. Cobb, Jr., notes that:

personalism has great confidence in the reliability of a kind of common-sense speculation about the cosmos as a whole, whereas sophisticated moderns generally find such confidence naive and out of date. Even when sympathetic to such an inquiry they find the results too suspect and humanly unreal to serve as a basis for ultimate decisions of life and death.¹

And John Wild has asked if "this confidence in the all-encompassing power of our objective reason" is still a "living option for us today".² These are serious objections, and ones which will have to be discussed below, but one point must be noted in Brightman's perspective. One of Brightman's main concerns was to examine the nature of purpose, and

¹J. R. COBB, Jr., Living Options in Protestant Theology, p. 82.
this in particular with regard to human motivation, as will be seen in the following chapter. Such a perspective must necessarily also examine the nature of value and of obligation, and must necessarily, on Brightman's grounds, go far beyond the scope of any empirical or positivistic method as such. There can be no verification of whether "the universe is friendly or indifferent to the ideals that we human persons cherish", yet this is a question the answers to which Brightman presumed "every thoughtful person wants to know".¹

Thus, in Brightman's philosophical perspective lay the tacit assumption that the goal of philosophy was knowledge practical in the sense above described. Whether such an assumption is justifiable or not we shall leave until later for discussion. What is important is the influence such a view of the goal of philosophy must have on the method being adopted to achieve it. The construction of a world view is never an easy task, but it is a valid one:

¹E. S. BRIGHTMAN, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 207.
world visions are, it is true, generally frowned on by those who prefer either to insinuate their own, without explicitly stating it, or simply to presuppose its validity. But it is natural for the reflective mind to attempt to form a coherent interpretation of the world; and world-visions are often present even when they are not acknowledged as such. It is desirable that they should be made explicit, and that presuppositions should be revealed.\textsuperscript{1}

We must now consider Bertocci's philosophical perspective before appraising Brightman's.

(b) The Philosophical Perspective of P. A. Bertocci.

Just as he had adopted the method and criterion of truth of his teacher and predecessor, so also did Bertocci adopt the philosophical perspective of Brightman. Bertocci's work is interspersed with references to the practical goal of philosophy. In referring to W. R. Sorley, Bertocci remarked: "a man of many interests extending from literature to politics, Sorley represents an ideal which many of his

profession might well emulate, at least if philosophy is to be the leaven of everyday life". Elsewhere he would declare:

I would define philosophy, briefly, as man's systematic search for the most dependable in the total situation ... the philosophical enterprise withers in irrelevance unless its investigations are related, sooner or later, to the human task of knowing in what directions the examined life is worth living.

Philosophizing does not take the place of living, or of any values of living; it is the systematic attempt to connect every fact and value in one's life so that the person will know his connections, and act accordingly.

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It is the experience of love and fidelity that sets the fundamental problems of existence - problems of proving, not that there is a world, God, and other persons, but problems of discovering the grounds and meaning of creativity in human existence.¹

This concern for practical wisdom is evidenced by the range of topics covered by Bertocci's thought, referred to by the friendly remarks of Allport:

Let it be noted that PAB [Bertocci] deals always with the toughest of psycho-philosophical issues. Instincts, virtues, the will, the self, moral obligation - what an array of jaw-breakers; and to these he adds the nature of the religious sentiment (1958) and the protean problems of sexual behavior...²

Bertocci has, however, devoted some time to explaining his philosophical perspective. Bertocci supports the belief that "the whole of experience is more to be trusted than any part", and that this synoptic concern for the whole is a form of 'liberalism' - "it is

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, "Descartes and Marcel on the Person and His Body", p. 215.
the liberal's respect for all experiences as a guide to truth which makes him weigh carefully every experience and see experiences in their relation to each other".\(^1\) Indeed, part of the reason for this liberalism is his concern lest one particular aspect of experience be allowed to dictate what the nature of the person is or must be.\(^2\) A consequence of this 'philosophic faith' and concern for the whole of experience is Bertocci's opposition to any form of methodological dogmatism. Indeed, the philosopher's task is not to dissipate the mystery confronting all thinkers but rather to "corner it".\(^3\) If such is the case, if "we live within processes which are indeed mysterious, and will never be completely understood by us", then our interpretations of such processes will always be partial, probable, hypothetical.\(^4\) Within such a perspective, the goal of philosophy, as a systematic

\(^1\) P. A. BERTOCCI, The Person God Is, p. 332.

\(^2\) Cf. Ibid., pp. 332; 41-42.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 335, where Bertocci quotes a statement made by Whitehead in class.

\(^4\) Ibid.
search for the most dependable in the total situation, coincides with Brightman's desire for the construction of a world view. Such a perspective, highly practical in character, uses a method which can produce practical results. Yet, while it is decisive in its choice of interpretation, it is at the same time tentative in its acceptance of the truth of its results, which it considers as hypothetical and probable within the limits of the data available. Absent from such a perspective is the desire to establish absolute and universally valid truths, yet this, some thinkers have argued, is the goal of philosophy. This alternative position must now be examined.

(c) An Alternative Philosophical Perspective.

One of the clearest expressions of an alternative philosophical perspective is the appeal of Edmund Husserl for a greater degree of apodicticity in philosophy. In his own words, "if a philosophical revolution in our times is to be justified, it must without fail be animated by the purpose of laying a new foundation for philosophy in the strict sense of science". And since, in Husserl's opinion,

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science "is a title standing for absolute, timeless values", it follows that "only science can decide, and its decision bears the stamp of eternity". Within such a perspective, the personalistic perspective of Brightman and Bertocci is excluded. Indeed, when Husserl discusses the somewhat similar perspective of Weltanschauung philosophy he characterizes it as that

which in the great systems gives relatively the most perfect answers to the riddles of life and the world, which is to say, it affords as well as possible a solution and satisfactory explanation to the theoretical, axiological and practical inconsistencies of life that experience, wisdom, mere world and life view, can only imperfectly overcome.

Yet, because Weltanschauung philosophy is "essentially not science", since it is historically bound, it can merely "engage in controversy", whereas "only science can decide and its decision bears the stamp of eternity". In this connection, Husserl makes the significant remark

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1 Ibid., p. 136.
2 Ibid., p. 142.
3 Ibid., p. 133.
4 Ibid., p. 143.
that "Weltanschauung philosophy teaches the way wisdom does: personality directs itself to personality ... Science, however, is impersonal".¹ Only in this light can his dismissal of profundity be understood:

Profundity is a mark of the chaos that genuine science wants to transform into a cosmos, into a simple, completely clear, lucid order. Genuine science, so far as its real doctrine extends, knows no profundity ... Profundity is an affair of wisdom; conceptual distinctness and clarity is an affair of rigorous theory.²

¹E. HUSSERL, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", p. 144. Cf. the similar remarks of BERTRAND RUSSELL in The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 13: "The free intellect will see as God might see, without a here and a now, without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge - knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history do not enter, than the knowledge brought by the senses and dependent, as such knowledge must be, upon an exclusive and personal point of view".

²E. HUSSERL, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", p. 144.
Thus Husserl's goal in philosophy is simply to "fight through from the level of profundity to that of scientific clarity".¹ Such scientific clarity would produce the absolute, timeless truths Husserl sought. In the face of such apodictic evidence, all doubt would be dissipated, and the philosopher would have gained that absolute certitude which Bertocci referred to as 'logical certitude'. Obviously, such a philosophical perspective is far removed from the personalistic perspective of Brightman and Bertocci. We must now decide whether these perspectives are mutually exclusive.

(d) Philosophical Perspectives: Mutually Exclusive or Complementary?

An adequate discussion of this issue would take us beyond the scope of this study, yet a brief discussion will do much to clarify

¹Ibid. We are reminded of the goal of LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, in Philosophical Investigations, transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1968), p. 50, no. 129: "For this clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that philosophical problems should disappear completely".
the personalistic perspective of Brightman and Bertocci. In a remarkably candid statement, Bertrand Russell referred to the basic problem every philosopher must eventually face:

Love and knowledge, so far as they were possible, led upward toward the heavens. But always pity brought me back to earth. Echoes of cries of pain reverberate in my heart ... and the whole world of loneliness, poverty and pain make a mockery of what human life should be. I long to alleviate the evil, but I cannot, and I too suffer.

We have already referred to this vertical thrust of thought as that 'cherished dream' of establishing truth objectively valid for all thinking men. We have also referred to certitude in its formal sense as that assent achieved when apodictic evidence is available. Now, there can be no doubt that science, in its strictest sense, must seek to establish such apodictic proofs, and, in order to do so, must climb ever higher on its vertical axis.

One philosophical endeavour which epitomises this necessarily vertical aspect of reason's search for the apodictic is Kant's approach.

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to ethics. In this instance, the vertical thrust of reason is predominant, to the exclusion of the demands of the horizontal. In his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant attempted to "seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality". Kant argued that such a moral principle must hold "not merely subject to contingent conditions and exceptions, but with absolute necessity". And he immediately added that "no experience can give us occasion to infer even the possibility of such apodeictic laws". Such apodeictic laws must, therefore, be grounded in pure, but practical, reason "prior to all experience". In fact, Kant considers the moral law as a set of principles established entirely *a priori*, analogous to the principles of mathematics and logic:

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1 Following Paton's system of referring to Kant's *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, all references will begin with the abbreviation *Gr.*, and will then give the page number of the edition of the Berlin Academy (volume IV) followed, in brackets, by the page number of the second German edition (published during Kant's lifetime). The translation is that of Paton.

2 *Gr.*, 392 (=xiii).

3 *Gr.*, 408 (= 28).

4 *Gr.*, 408 (= 28).

5 *Gr.*, 408 (= 28).
We can, if we like, distinguish pure moral philosophy from applied (applied, that is, to human nature) - just as pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics and pure logic from applied logic. By this terminology we are at once reminded that moral principles are not grounded on the peculiarities of human nature but must be established a priori by themselves; and that from such principles it must be possible to derive practical rules for human nature as well, just as it is for every kind of rational nature.¹

This is an extremely interesting position. On Kant's analysis, the supreme principle of morality and the moral law are both given entirely a priori, and cannot even be inferred a posteriori. The 'riddles of life and the world' which Husserl alluded to and which constitute the demands of the horizontal are swept away in the upward thrust of Kant's thought. In other words, for Kant, experience is an untrustworthy guide. Even were we convinced that we had acted solely from duty (mere opinion), we could never be sure (have apodictic proof) that this was so, for some hidden factor may have "unconsciously" influenced the will. As Kant declared: "Who can prove by experience that a cause is not present? Experience shows only that it is not perceived".²

¹Gr., 401 (= 32). Cf. also L. W. BECK, "Apodictic Imperatives", Kant-Studien, 49 (1957), 16, where Beck points out that "the moral law ... is like the laws of mathematics and natural science in Kant's theoretical philosophy".

²Gr., 419 (= 49).
Obviously, Kant's reasons for seeking such a 'metaphysic of morals' were highly praiseworthy. He was profoundly dissatisfied with the "disgusting hotch-potch of second-hand observations and semi-rational principles on which the empty-headed regale themselves".¹ Yet the desire for apodicticity, for scientia, cannot overlook the need for an adequate enumeration of the data involved. Thus, while Kant began with the experience of moral obligation, it is highly questionable whether he did in fact examine this experience of obligation adequately before assuming that such 'necessity' necessarily

¹Gr., 409 (= 31).
required the presence of law.¹ From this point of view, the emphasis

¹In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant had stated that "we come to know pure practical laws in the same way we know pure theoretical principles (to wit), by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us, and to the elimination from them of all empirical conditions, which reason directs". (30 (= 18), Beck's translation). In his 'attending to the necessity' in the Grundlegung, Kant nowhere established that necessity, of the type discoverable in moral obligation (and this irrespective of the sense in which he used the notion of 'duty'), necessarily entails the concept of law (taken as at least analogous, if not univocal, with the concept of law in physics, mathematics, and logic), nor that this 'law', once discovered, has universal applicability to all rational beings. Only a thorough phenomenological description and analysis of moral experience could establish these premises satisfactorily, but, even then, Kant would still be bound up with the 'trammels' of the human condition, and, as he so clearly saw, would still be far from the apodictic laws he so dearly wished to establish.

In commenting on this difficulty in Kant's position, Beck states that "regrettably, he [Kant] never explained the precise sense in which he meant, and the precise sense in which he did not mean, that moral judgments are universal". (L. W. BECK, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 114). Beck is equally unable to explain Kant's precise meaning. While referring to the features of moral experience which render it problematical, Beck nowhere mentions the concept of 'law', yet in his summation of this examination, the concept of 'law' is dominant. (Cf. Ibid., pp. 112-117). By comparison, Paton treats of universality quite tidily by relating it immediately to law. (Cf. H. J. PATON, The Categorical Imperative (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1953), p. 69).

on a synoptic interpretation of the data of experience, which both Brightman and Bertocci propose, is highly salutary. And from this point of view, both perspectives would be complementary.

On the other hand, there is certainly an element of mutual exclusiveness involved in these two perspectives. Husserl might admit that ultimately the purpose of speculative knowledge is to "serve man", and that even a purely theoretical and rigorously scientific philosophy would still retain "the role of guide, which is its special infinite task", but the basic thrust of his thought would still be the vertical flight toward the apodictic. In sharp contrast to this stands the personalistic perspective with its insistence on the fundamental 'unforeseeableness' of the person which introduces an essentially disruptive element into any attempt to enumerate sufficiently the evidence required for the erection of a complete

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1EDMUND HUSSERL, "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man", in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 178. Husserl wrote the article "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in 1911, "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man" in 1935.
and apodictic theory of man. Only when the search for apodicticity encroaches upon the sphere of the person does this perspective balk: the search for apodicticity in logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences, however, it fully encourages and pursues. To this extent, the philosophical perspective of Brightman and Bertocci excludes the perspective of Husserl and Kant, in so far as they appertain to the erection of a theory of the person.

The basic assumption which such a perspective adopts is, of course, that personal experience is to be believed unless evidence is forthcoming to contradict it, and that such experience provides the

1 The personalistic perspective was given forceful expression in the writing of Mounier. Cf. EMMANUEL MOUNIER, Oeuvres, tome III, 1944-50 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1962), pp. 429-30: "Le personnalisisme est une philosophie, il n'est pas seulement une attitude. Il est une philosophie, il n'est pas un système ... 

Mais son affirmation centrale étant l'existence de personnes libres et créatrices, il introduit au cœur de ces structures un principe d'imprévisibilité qui disloque tout volonté de systématisation définitive".
data for the erection of an empirically synoptic world-view. Both Cobb and Wild are sceptical about this confidence in such a common sense approach, and Kant would undoubtedly concur. Yet the source of such confidence in the data of personal experience is at once the source of the difference in philosophical perspective and of starting point in philosophy. We have already alluded to the starting point of both Brightman and Bertocci, but, before moving on to an examination of their approach to consciousness and the self, a final word on the question of perspective must be given.

We have attempted to show that the philosophical perspective of Brightman and Bertocci is at once complementary to that alternative philosophical approach, (epitomized by the thought of Husserl, Russell and Kant), which seeks apodictic truth, in so far as the personalistic perspective adds a necessary reminder of the demands of the horizontal, (that all of the evidence be included in a synoptic interpretation), while being also at once antithetical to this alternative perspective in so far as it refuses to admit that any synoptic interpretation of personal being could produce evidence sufficient for apodicticity,¹

¹Apodicticity, that is, beyond the momentary self. We shall deal with this point below, in Chapter XI of this study.
and this due to the enigmatic or 'unforeseeable' character of personal being. We would not insist upon this antithesis too much since the complementary character of these two perspectives, if sufficiently exercised, would obviate the erection of such an antithesis. Our reasons for this position will become clear as this study progresses.
CHAPTER VII. PETER A. BERTOCCI'S APPROACH TO PERSONALITY

1. The Starting Point as Consciousness: the Self.

The importance of the starting point of any philosophical endeavour has been humourously underlined by Loewenberg while commenting on Hegel:

'C'est le premier pas qui coûte', remarked a witty person who was told of the famous walk through the streets of Paris by the decapitated St. Denis. Hegel's dialectical march is equally plausible if we offer no resistance to the manner in which he takes his first step.¹

Indeed, the choice of philosophical perspective, philosophical method, and starting point are quite inextricably bound together.²

We have seen to what extent Bertocci adopted the method and

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²Cf. the remark of J. R. COBB, Jr., Living Options in Protestant Theology, p. 87, footnote: "I believe, nevertheless, that in Brightman's thought there is a circularity of starting point and conclusion that could be pointed out on careful analysis".
perspective of Brightman in his philosophical endeavour. That he was equally indebted to Brightman in his choice of starting point was thus inevitable. However, in his treatment of this aspect of his thought, Bertocci was to show a far greater degree of that "independence of thought ... and critical ability" referred to by Tennant.¹ It will, therefore, be necessary to examine Brightman's thought regarding the starting point of philosophy, in order to appreciate the developments of Bertocci.

(a) The Starting Point as Consciousness in Brightman.

According to Brightman, "the theory of mind (psychology in its broadest sense) is the most fundamental part of philosophy". A theory of mind, according to Brightman, must begin with consciousness: "It would appear that the word consciousness is the least objectionable term to indicate what we are going to examine ... We all experience thoughts, feelings, perceptions, memories, imaginations, choices and the like". Consciousness is thus "that flowing stream in which are reflected the varied colors of the neighbouring world". Consciousness is to be distinguished from matter: "consciousness is utterly different from matter in this respect; a state of consciousness does not continue to exist if separated from the cluster in which it occurs". Indeed,

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1E. S. BRIGHTMAN, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 166. Cf. also Idem, "Review of Reviews", Philosophical Forum, 9 (1951), 4: "To me there are no metaphysical problems more fundamental than those concerning the self. The self is fundamental because it is the very nature and structure of experience".

2E. S. BRIGHTMAN, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 167.

3Ibid.
conscious clusters have a property that gives them a stability entirely different from that of what we call matter. This is the property that consciousness has of experiencing itself as belonging together and as belonging with past (and even future) clusters. The fact of experiencing consciousness as belonging together in a unique way is called self-experience. A self (or person) is conscious life thus experienced; and so far as we know, consciousness from the lowest to the highest forms is always thus experienced.  

From this point of view, "a self is any conscious experience or process taken as a whole and as experiencing itself". Yet this self-experience, this "experience of the whole of experience as belonging together and thus as being 'mine'", is distinct from reflective self-consciousness, since, according to Brightman, self-consciousness happens "only occasionally in our introspective moments", while "self-experience is always present". Brightman could thus conclude that selfhood is "unity in variety, the true synthesis of the manifold". At the same time,

\[1\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 191-192.}\]
\[2\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 192.}\]
even in the specious present, self-experience transcends
time, for it is the organization and unifying in one
self of conscious processes that last a certain time by
the clock ... The fact of personal identity thus abides
through changing processes, and even crosses chasms of
intervening unconsciousness, or abnormal consciousness,
to assert, I am the same that I was before ...

One further elaboration on the nature of self-experience was
central to Brightman's thought, and this was the distinction between
those selves that think and evaluate, and those which do not:

The ideal of thought, of logical coherence, can be attained
or even conceived only by a mind that is capable of
relating all its members in a system that is a coherent whole.
Only a person can think; thought is a personal act ...
Valuation is an experience in which the entire person is
engaged; it includes thinking and all the other functions
of consciousness fused into one ideal whole. If only
persons can think and all thought is personal, how much
truer is it that only persons can value and that all
value is personal.

Brightman thus introduced a distinction between a self and a person;
while consciousness implies selfhood, only some selves are persons.

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1 Ibid. Cf. also Idem, "The Finite Self", in Contemporary Idealism
in America, ed. by C. I. Barrett (New York: MacMillan, 1932), p. 181:
"The finite self is a genuine whole, an experienced unity, in which
reason and sense are inseparable aspects of one indivisible mind".

2 E. S. BRIGHTMAN, An Introduction to Philosophy, p.194.
This distinction was central to Brightman's thought, and it was in this context that he introduced a further distinction between the datum self and the whole self:

Every conscious being is a complex unity, a unitas multiplex, to use William Stern's phrase ... A present complex consciousness may be called a datum self. The whole self is the whole range of present, past and future experiences that belong with a datum self by virtue of conscious linkages. Morality may be said to consist largely in an intelligent interest in the whole self on the part of the datum self. A person is a self capable of moral experience.¹

¹E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Moral Laws (New York: Abington Press, 1933), p. 79. A. J. RECK in "An Essay in Psycho-Ethics: Review Article", Philosophical Forum, 21 (1963-64), p. 13, refers to this work as Brightman's "neglected masterpiece". Brightman's work is interspersed with reminders of this distinction between self and person based on the quality of experience. Cf. Idem, Religious Values, p. 125: "Only for persons can ideals, obligations, values be real"; Idem, Personality and Religion, p. 16: "We may define a self as any actual conscious experience, and then define a person as any member of the class of selves who is capable of achieving value". To the possible objection that all consciousness is "striving for some goal", Brightman replied, "Some selves achieve their ends and enjoy their values thoughtlessly, or even without the capacity for thought; this seems to be true of worms and butterflies, and indeed, of most subhuman selves, though not all. Other selves are able to choose and judge their values in the light of reasons ... They test their values by ideals. Such selves are persons. We are now ready to define persons as selves capable of achieving rational values or (to use a synonymous expression) ideal values". (Ibid., p. 17). This definition was repeated in Idem, "What is Personality"? The Personalist, 20 (1939), 137: "A person, however, is a self that is able to develop the experience of ideal values, that is, of value experience tested by an appeal to a rational norm of some sort".

Throughout all of these discussions, the self remains for Brightman that "unity in variety ... a unitas multiplex, which is many by virtue of the details of consciousness and is one by virtue of the experience and memory of self-unity". (Idem, Personality and Religion, p. 17).
Brightman elaborated this distinction between the datum self and the whole self considerably over the years. Thus, in 1940, he replaced the term 'datum self' with the term 'Situation Experienced', which is "a self, a person or an experient, because it is a self-experiencing whole which includes thinking, choosing, remembering, anticipating, purposing, as well as feeling and sensing".¹ The term 'whole self' was incorporated into the 'Situation Believed-in' (or Disbelieved-in), which is whatever is not a Situation Experienced.

This further clarification was of considerable importance for Brightman, since it enabled him to state quite frankly that "no portion of an experient's nervous system nor any part of his body can ever be a Situation Experienced by that experient".² He would even go so far as to declare that

personal consciousness alone is experience, and ... all bodies, brains, and gods are objects of belief ... But I - the experient, the person, the Situation Experienced - am not to be identified with what sustains my being. I am not my nervous system, the sun, or God. I am what I experience myself to be - a conscious self.³

¹E. S. BRIGHTMAN, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 348.
²Ibid.
³Ibid., p. 349.
As regards the subconscious, "for any experient, his subconscious consists of Situations Believed-in which are no part of Situations Experienced by him". ¹

Brightman also gave a detailed account of the distinction between a self and a person which was so vital to his thought as a whole. By listing the characteristics of a 'minimum self' and contrasting them with those of a person, Brightman was able to illustrate how each characteristic was developed to a higher degree in the person. Thus, in the person, the unitas multiplex is far more complex and highly organized, since reference to past and future plays a much larger part in the present experience of the self. New qualia emerge, such as feelings of moral obligation, which come to be recognized as imperative norms. The range of time and space is vastly extended. Time-transcendence is extended by the development of a

¹Ibid., p. 360, footnote. Cf. also Idem, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 201, where the subconscious is classed as part of the "environment" of the self, since it is "other than our conscious experience". Cf. also Idem, Personality and Religion, p. 15: "Personality is not identical with what it depends on. A man's personality is his conscious experience".
more complex field of attention and of a richer and more accurate memory accompanied by recognition. The self of the present is thus identified with the self of the past and future. Space-transcendence is increased by a multiplication of non-spatial interests in spiritual values and abstract ideas. Conation rises to the level of free purposive self-control and control of the environment. While a self desires, the person is, within limits, freely selective and critical of its desires.

Also, awareness of meaning becomes conceptual thought and reasoning, and this reflective self-consciousness, as distinguished from mere self-experience, arises only on the personal level. The response to the environment is increasingly a response to a social and ideal environment, and the responses are more freely selective rather than mechanical. Finally, "although privacy is transcended by language and understanding, it remains a fact that all communication is sent by and received in private experience; and developed persons respect the fact and the right of privacy".¹ In concluding his comparison, Brightman states that "among these emergent traits of personality, the most important are the consciousness

¹E. S. BRIGHTMAN, A Philosophy of Religion, pp. 351-53.
of imperative norms, freedom, and reason". He was thus able to claim that he had "established a level of purpose as the criterion for distinguishing selves from persons. Persons are essentially purposers, and purposers of rationality and value".

Some later developments must also be noted. By 1951, Brightman had introduced 'the shining present' as synonymous with the specious present, the datum self, and the Situation Experienced, and offered a list of the characteristics of the self (as that which is "at once a unitary experience and a succession of experiences".

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1 Ibid., p. 353.
2 Ibid., p. 371. Cf. also Idem, Nature and Values (New York: Abingdon Press, 1945), p. 53: "A personality is a complex but self-identifying, active, selective, feeling, sensing, developing, experience which remembers its past (in part), plans its future, interacts with its subconscious processes, its bodily organism, and its natural and social environment, and is able to judge and guide itself and its objects by rational and ideal standards".

3 E. S. BRIGHTMAN, "Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self", p. 295. The seven characteristics of the self which Brightman offered were:-
(i) its temporality indissolubly connected with time transcendence;
(ii) its experience of both space and transcendence of space;
(iii) sensation;
(iv) feeling or conation, in the sense of liking or disliking, approval or disapproval;
(v) will, as a function of every self;
(vi) thought, as a trait of the personal self, which need not be exclusively human;
(vii) the union of change and identity, the unitas multiplex. (Ibid., pp. 295-98).
'the shining present' was an effort on Brightman's part to modify his previous distinctions, which bordered closely on solipsism if taken too rigorously. Thus, if the datum self or shining present is given and undeniable at any one time, it yet contains within it signs "which if properly interpreted give it reasonable justification for believing not only in the existence of its body, biological entities of all sorts, other persons, and a cosmic Person, but also in a 'whole self'. The whole person is the being which each person conceptualizes as existent on the basis of memories and anticipations within shining presents, but which is never present in any one shining present".¹ The whole person is thus the "coherent interpretation of all his conscious experience".² Brightman's final definition of the person thus read: "person is defined as a complex unity of self-consciousness that is able to develop ideal values and to act in itself and to interact with others".³

¹E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Person and Reality, p. 272.
²Ibid.
³Ibid., p. 201.
In his treatment of the self as starting point for philosophy, Brightman has shown a remarkable consistency, yet several aspects of his thought require further discussion, since they have been openly criticized. Before examining these criticisms, however, it must be noted that Brightman used the terms 'person' and 'personality' synonymously.\(^1\) This introduces an unfortunate confusion. We might clarify this confusion by noting that, for Brightman, 'person' meant a self capable of reasoning and valuing while 'personality' meant a person actually reasoning and valuing. Thus he could declare:

> These words summarize the development of personality. A self is given; a personality is achieved. Personality is, of course, achieved on many different levels, through sharp and prolonged conflicts, through dialectical struggles, through sin, forgiveness, and redemption. But it is the reality of spiritual values that measure the evils as well as the goods of personality. Pessimism could not even be thought of if it were not seen that the true destiny of man was the achievement of values worthy of him.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Cf. for example, E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Person and Reality, p. 261: "The terms self, person and personality will mean the same unless otherwise stated". Cf. also P. A. BERTOCCI, "Brightman's View of the Self, the Person, and the Body", p. 22, footnote: "Brightman uses the words personality and person interchangeably".

\(^2\) E. S. BRIGHTMAN, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 358. Cf. also Idem, "What is Personality?", p. 138: "Philosophically, then, personality is restricted to actual consciousness ..."
This restricted view of personality is quite consistent with Brightman's exclusive emphasis on consciousness as the sole constituent of selfhood (and personhood).

Indeed, this exclusive emphasis on conscious experience (the specious present, the datum self, the Situation Experienced, the shining present) was the source of a difficulty within Brightman's own reflections. For Brightman, the self of self-experience is always conscious, the experience always 'mine', and this self is at once the same experient as it was in the past and will be the same experient in the future; there is a continuity in this time transcendence which is the very core of selfhood, this very unity of the manifold which is able to experience the whole of experience as belonging together.

And yet, Brightman insisted, the self is not a 'soul', is not "that which has consciousness ... that which is continuously existing even when we are unconscious".¹ Indeed, he argued, the 'soul hypothesis'

¹E. S. BRIGHTMAN, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 175.
was the "hypostatization of this wholeness",\(^1\) the isolation of one element of selfhood - its unity - without due regard for the manifold. The question then of continuity through intermittent consciousness evoked the following frank reply:

the human self is fragmentary, incomplete, interrupted. It seems very probable that we are at times unconscious and our self non-existent ... The finite self is incomplete and dependent not meeting the full demands of the lex continui.\(^2\)

This fragmentary aspect of the person was given fuller treatment when Brightman discussed "the most perplexing category", the category of substance.\(^3\) Indeed, the "union of continuity and discontinuity is the essence of what the mind is looking for when it seeks for the meaning of substance".\(^4\) Brightman placed the person within the category of substance for two reasons: "insofar as the shining present is private experience, it is an independent substance ... It is also

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 191.


\(^3\)E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Person and Reality, p. 177.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 181.
relatively independent insofar as it is efficient cause". Efficient cause in this context was identified with volition since, according to Brightman, we experience efficient causality precisely in our free acts of choice. He could thus declare:

substance, the, is efficient cause, is activity, is volition (plus whatever given and inactive content is revealed by experience). Esse est agere; agere est velle; velle est persona. The third phrase means that volition does not occur as bare activity but as the act of choice and spontaneous initiative of a complex unity of consciousness which includes the actual choice, the effects of the other efficient cause acting on it, and the given experiences of rational validity and brute fact content of sensation and related experience.

In this sense, substance "is not really a sub-stance, but an in-stance; it does not stand below in some sub-way of being; it stands revealed in experience as active-passive personal unity of consciousness. It is experienced efficient cause". Thus "substance is person, as efficient cause, in a complex unity of active consciousness".

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}} \text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 185.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}} \text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 168-69.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}} \text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 186.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}} \text{Ibid.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}} \text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 199.} \]
Yet even these further clarifications fail to take Brightman any closer to the ideal of the *lex continui*, since he is still left with a fragmentary self. Indeed, given his starting point there can never be a fixed solution to this problem.\(^1\) Thus, in his discussion of 'substance', Brightman's appeal to volitional efficient causality merely underlined the fragmentariness of the self conceived in such terms, although it does much to support the self's claim to independence. Similarly, Brightman's appeal to freedom merely compounds

\(^1\)Of course, given the starting point of the soul-theorist, (namely the unity of consciousness), Brightman argued, following the arguments of Berkeley and Lotze, that this theory merely raised the same problem without actually solving it. Cf. E. S. BRIGHTMAN, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 175ff.
the problem of continuity in his analysis.\(^1\) If "to be is to will",\(^2\) then the self must somehow 'will' its own ceasing to be in periods of intermittent consciousness, such as sleep and unconsciousness, and then somehow 'will' its own return to being when active consciousness resumes. That Brightman was convinced that his fragmentary view of the person was consistent with his synoptic view of experience is quite clear. There is even a note of apology in his final claim that "we must look in the direction of empirical coherence - and not consistency alone - to adjudicate issue after issue and the hypothesis

\(^1\) Brightman took freedom of choice as an undisputed datum. Cf. Idem, Moral Laws, p. 281: "Freedom ... contains the decisive causal factor within itself in the power of choice instead of being determined by what is external to it; and it grants to man's will the power of choosing to obey (or to disobey) rational and moral norms whatever the other circumstances may be". Cf. also Ibid., p. 277: "The person determines his choice by a spontaneous, selective act". Cf. also Idem, "Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self", p. 297: "The free man lays autonomous responsibility on himself".

\(^2\) E. S. BRIGHTMAN, "Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self", p. 297.
as a whole.\textsuperscript{1} Yet, while the fragmentariness of the self is coherent with our experience of discontinuity, Brightman is unable to account satisfactorily for the very real experience of time-transcendence, upon which he had so insisted, which enables us to recognise the continuity that we unquestionably are. As Cobb has pointed out, "an ontology that expresses this continuum would seem more coherent with experience than one which introduces radical dualities."\textsuperscript{2} From this point of view, Brightman's exclusive emphasis on consciousness as the sole consistent of selfhood requires modification.

This exclusive emphasis on consciousness resulted in two further difficulties for Brightman's view of the person. We have already seen that Brightman excluded both the subconscious and the body from the unity of the self, and this exclusion has been criticised by both Cobb and Wild.\textsuperscript{3} Yet the most trenchant criticism of Brightman's position

\textsuperscript{1}E. S. BRIGHTMAN, Person and Reality, p. 198.

\textsuperscript{2}J. R. COBB, Jr., Living Options in Protestant Theology, p. 86, Cobb proposed that "we should consider the idea of experience or subjectivity as a broader category than consciousness..." (Ibid.). We shall see that this is the crux of the problem with which this study is dealing.

\textsuperscript{3}Cf. Ibid., pp. 84-85; and J. E. WILL, "The Psychological Method of Personalistic Theology", Religion in Life, 35 (1966), 740-44.
came from Gordon Allport in an essay written in honour of Brightman shortly after his death. Allport criticised Brightman's restriction of personality to actual consciousness, and went on to declare:

I doubt that any psychologist whose interest is truly centered in the person could work comfortably within a frame that regards unconscious processes, reflex processes and physiological processes as unintegrated, unco-ordinated or less important for the unity of the person than the conscious operations of the self. All these levels of functioning are vital.  

We shall see that Allport's criticisms were to have a salutary effect upon Bertocci's subsequent thought, but for the moment some time must be spent on a point of possible misunderstanding.

Allport makes some relevant comparisons between psychology and philosophy. Thus he points out that both disciplines agree that "consciousness by no means always involves self-awareness", and that a person "can go through the entire day without being self-aware at all.  

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1 G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychological Nature of Personality", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 35.
2 Ibid., p. 36.
3 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
He also points out that both agree that "despite the ephemerality of self-awareness, it remains the most certain attest we have of personal existence. It is the solid empirical core of human personality. We do not always recognize our consciousness as 'owned', but the fact that we occasionally do so is basic to our sense of personal identity and of continuity".¹ This leads Allport to declare:

Such evidence leads us to assume that, however transient the consciousness of self may be, all sensing, acting and willing are, at bottom, owned and that selfhood is the central presupposition we must hold in examining the psychological states of human beings.²

We would certainly concur with Allport in lamenting Brightman's restriction of personhood to consciousness, but we would do so on grounds other than those Allport proposes. In fact, Allport, we submit, has failed to see the significance of Brightman's difficulties over continuity of consciousness and the fragmentariness of the self. Allport is correct in pointing out that self-awareness is ephemeral

¹Ibid., p. 34.
²Ibid., pp. 34-35.
while nevertheless central to our sense of selfhood, but he is incorrect in assuming that Brightman based his theory of the self on self-awareness. Brightman quite clearly distinguished between self-experience, as the actual unitas multiplex of consciousness, and self-awareness, the reflective act of self-consciousness. All consciousness is self-experience, but only some forms of personal consciousness are self-aware. Indeed, this was merely to enunciate James' dictum that the universal conscious fact is not that there is a thought, but that I think, and that all conscious acts are necessarily owned.

Thus, Allport's other point, (that the moments of self-awareness, when we do actually recognize our self-experience as indeed 'ours', are central to our sense of personal identity) has a different significance in Brightman's thought. It is precisely because persons are selves who are purposers of rationality and value that such reflection is possible. Those acts of 'sensing, acting and willing' to which Allport refers, insofar as they are conscious acts, involve self-experience, but a self-experience which can be grasped or seized consciously only by a personal self in an act of self-conscious reflection. That such a Cogito is central to Brightman's
thought is indisputable, but he nowhere attempts to identify the self exclusively with such a Cogito of self-awareness. Hence Brightman's difficulties with the problem of personal continuity. The fact is that all self-experience, and not simply self-awareness, is intermittent and fragmentary due to such factors as sleep and unconsciousness. And insofar as Brightman had identified the self with the activities which were constitutive of self-experience, namely, consciousness, as unitas multiplex, he had no alternative but to admit the self's fragmentariness. It is the identification of the self with exclusively self-experience which led to Brightman's difficulties. We must now see to what extent Bertocci followed his master in adopting consciousness as the exclusive point of departure for metaphysics and theory of mind.
(b) The Starting Point as the Self in Bertocci.

According to Bertocci, one principle unites all 'personalistic thought', namely, that "the human being as he experiences himself, as erlebt, provides data that all theorizing about him and the world must not disregard or explain away".¹ The circularity of method and starting point is again encountered in Bertocci. Thus Bertocci argues that "all knowledge about our whole self or the world is based upon the experience and development of the specious present".² This specious present "refers to an indefinable and ultimate qualitative feeling which is present in sensation, perceiving, enjoying or thinking, and is logically and psychologically prior to knowledge".³ Tennant had denoted this feeling by the term erlebnis, and was thus able to declare as the 'first principle of psychology' that "there is a unique kind of erleben which simply is and 'shines by its own light'".⁴

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, "Foundations of Personalistic Psychology", p. 293.
²P. A. BERTOCCI, The Empirical Argument for God, p. 73.
³Ibid., p. 198.
⁴Ibid.
By adopting Tennant's position, Bertocci was able to state that experience (or consciousness) reveals "a subject ... capable of pleasure and displeasure, desire, and active attention to objects which evoke both". In this light,

each individual ultimately lives in his own private, impressioned, and imagined world, which could not exist without him. This private experience is presupposed by all intercommunication between selves which brings to the individual the consciousness that his world has elements in common with that of other persons. Knowledge of the self, other selves, and the world develops pari passu.

Bertocci is quite clear throughout his works about what he means by consciousness:

Whenever we are conscious we are feeling pleasant or unpleasant, we are sensing, remembering, imagining, perceiving, thinking, purposing, wanting, willing, oughting.

Consciousness is the active, ongoing and undergoing Erlebnis which, differentiated, is described as sensing, remembering, imagining, perceiving, thinking, feeling, wanting, emoting, oughting, willing, appreciating...

\[1\] Ibid.
\[3\] P. A. BERTOCCI, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 203.
\[4\] P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Person as the Key Metaphysical Principle", P. 208.
Thus, by beginning with the specious present or datum self, and proceeding from there, Bertocci has closely followed Brightman. Indeed, he quite openly admits this:

As we have said, and as Professor Edgar S. Brightman states with greater force, the whole self is all the consciousness we are able to connect, by the complex experience of self-identification, with the basic category of self-experience, the 'datum self', or the self as grasped in the immediate consciousness of the specious present ... To repeat, the fundamental fact in our view is that in any specious present we experience ourselves as complex conscious wholes of conative, vilitional, and cognitive experience. There is unity, continuity, and order in the specious present or the datum self.¹

Even his first definition of the self repeated Brightman: the self is "a conscious complex of feeling and willing and knowing".²

However, Bertocci does not consider the distinction between a self and a person to the extent Brightman did, nor does he use the

²Ibid., p. 207.
the distinction in any way significant for this study.\(^1\) In fact, Bertocci is more concerned with two other distinctions: the distinction between the self as he conceives it and any 'soul-theory' which he vigorously opposes, and the distinction between the self, the ego, and personality. The former, of course he inherited from Brightman, but the latter is his own contribution. For the sake of clarity, Bertocci's elaboration of these two distinctions will be presented before we enter into a critical discussion of his method and starting point.

\(^1\)Bertocci is content to repeat Brightman's distinction but without much elaboration. Cf. for example Idem, Free Will, Responsibility and Grace, p. 21: "A person, a personal as opposed to a subpersonal self, is the kind of being that can think". Cf. also Idem, "Mind", in The Encyclopedia of Mental Health, ed. by A. Deutsch (New York: Franklin Watts, 1963), IV, 1232: "'Person' usually refers to the kind of mind that not only can sense, remember, desire, and feel (as animals do), but one that can also think in accordance with logical principles and conscious purposes... Thus persons can develop and guide themselves by ideals... 'Person' and 'human mind' are synonymous."

On the other hand, Bertocci uses the terms 'self' and 'person' synonymously. Cf. Idem, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 203: "The I, the self, the conscious being (all used synonymously here), is the complex unity of activity which consists in sensing, thinking, willing, wanting, oughting, imagining".
2. The Self as the Unity of its Activities: The Rejection of any Soul-theory.

Like Brightman, Bertocci has opposed any 'soul-theory' on the grounds of 'radical empiricism'.¹ His arguments emerge as early as 1938:

... we have no ground to suppose that the self is anything but its experiencings (as opposed to objective experiences) ... The self is a conscious complex of feeling and willing and knowing.²

By 1945, the argument runs:

The hypothesis here suggested is that I refers to a complex, unitary activity of sensing, remembering, imagining, perceiving, wanting, feeling, and thinking. These activities are the dynamic unity referred to by the word self. This hypothesis presupposes that there

¹In defining 'radical empiricism', James had postulated"that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience. (Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum, but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate)". (WILLIAM JAMES, The Meaning of Truth (New York: Logmans, Green & Co., 1909), p. xii.). We shall return to the paradoxical nature of experience in Chapter XI below.

is no acceptable reason for postulating an inactive or unchanging substantive self or soul beyond or underlying these activities in the manner of many scholastics and modern philosophers. The activities are distinguishable aspects, not distinct parts, of the total unitary activity of what I am calling the psychological self.¹

What we are suggesting is that these processes are phases of an ongoing process which is itself not an abstraction from them but which is they.²

The basic problem involved is that of accounting for the unity within the manifold of conscious experience, and how this unity is sustained throughout the various changes in experience. We have seen how Brightman tackled this problem, and how he opted for discontinuity of the self through periods of intermittent consciousness. Thus the demands of the lex continui were ignored, and this seemed inevitable given Brightman’s methodological starting point which gave such

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Psychological Self, the Ego, and Personality". Psychological Review, 52 (1945), 90-91.
exclusive primacy to consciousness. Bertocci has always been keenly aware of the difficulties of the position he has inherited. Thus he states quite candidly that "there are other problems which personal selves confront, as Brightman admits, such as fragmentariness and intermittency during sleep". Yet, as Bertocci points out, prior to this particular problem is the broader question of continuity (and unity) of consciousness through immediate succession, and it is in this context that Bertocci introduces his fullest discussion of the 'ontic self' as opposed to any 'soul-self'.

Indeed, by examining the specious present or datum self, Bertocci is able to discover a given indivisible complex Gestalt of activities which, after study, we define minimally as sensing, imagining, perceiving, conceiving, feeling-wanting-emoting, willing and oughting. These activities, as undergone, are phases of the experienced whole that is itself a dynamic span or durée ... In this very burgeoning present however, we detect two aspects: the relatively unchanging active structure of activities (abilities and capacities) and the changing content or qualia of the total experience.\(^2\)

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\(^1\)P. A. BERTOCCI, "Brightman's View of the Self, the Person and the Body", p. 28.

This in turn leads him to conclude that

the psychic moment is the test tube or matrix; it is what
we shall call the personal self in one of its moments.
And its nature is the original unity of interpenetrating
activities without which it would be nothing at all ...

at any given moment the matrix of structure-activities and
quality content is the matrix of mental being in a complex
unity.¹

It is this level of complex activity-structure - with its
capacities for certain contents and not others - that we
call a person, personal mind, or personal self. But
crucial to it as mentality is the fact of unitas multiplex
with enduring capacities and relative flux of content at

any moment of its being.²

Bertocci can thus assert that "the person ... is a successive mental
unity of activities that in turn persist beyond any particular content
created by his interplay with the environment".³

Having examined the unity and continuity within the datum self,
Bertocci must now account for the continuity of the self through
periods of intermittent consciousness. To accomplish this, Bertocci

¹ Ibid., p. 405.
³ Ibid., p. 414. This introduction of the term 'mental', as
opposed to 'conscious', is significant, and will be dealt with below.
proposes a new consideration:

The tentative suggestion we now propose - not half-heartedly yet not sure that it would satisfy all the data - requires that we identify a person not only with conscious self-conscious activity but also with an activity present wherever consciousness and self-consciousness exist, namely telic or purposive activity.¹

This is a new approach to the problem of continuity. As Bertocci admits, "the focus of definition moves in short, from essentially cognitive functions to essentially conative activities of feeling-emoting-desiring (to speak minimally)".² What Bertocci is in fact introducing is a broader basis for the unity in variety found in consciousness; and this new basis is mentality. Bertocci argues that "it may help us to distinguish this broader conative matrix if we can designate three states or phases of mentality".³ These three states are (i) self-conscious awareness, which emerges from (ii) consciousness, leaving (iii) the unconscious or subconscious. This third dimension of mentality

involves telic processes such as are not open to but

¹Ibid., p. 415.
²Ibid., p. 416.
³Ibid., p. 417.
continuous with their nature as experienced in consciousness and self-consciousness. Such telic processes are neither self-conscious nor conscious ... but they are a complex unity of same-difference. They are able to maintain themselves during the intervals when consciousness ... (is) not experienced ... in this phase of mentality, a unity of telic activities is postulated that does not have the 'advantage' of having directive 'guidance' and differences which they would enjoy in consciousness and self-consciousness.

Bertocci is quite frank about this argument:

It will be clear that we are defining the essence of mentality at the human level as the range of telic activity from unified minimal purposive striving (in which neither 'self' - focus nor 'world' - focus is clear) to self-conscious, purposeful organization of telic tendency ... The person, therefore, during the deep-sleep (intermittent) periods does little more than persist, without disturbance by memory or cognitive activity ... there is never an interval in mentality (as purposive striving of a sort to be better defined) but only in consciousness.

Bertocci's argument concerning the nature of the self, despite this change of emphasis from consciousness to mentality, nevertheless remains the same. There is no need to appeal beyond the evidence

\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 418.}
available to any soul-theory in order to account for the continuity of the self, since the self simply is the unity of its activities, both cognitive and conative:

We have sought to explain continuity despite intermittent consciousness by identifying the person not only with conscious-self-conscious phases of mentality but also with continuant affective-conative activity ranging from the unconscious to the conscious and self-conscious.¹

Elsewhere, Bertocci has returned to this argument in discussing the problem of self-identity. Bertocci argues that self-identity is not to be thought of as a mathematical or logical identity, but rather as identity "provided in the fact of telic change. The growth is always from within the identity of a unitas multiplex - unified and telic from its inception".² Nor can an adequate analogy be found for this self-identity:

There is no image that will quite do ... I know my experience is mine ... because I am able to maintain, and re-form and enrich within limits, the telic unity that constituted me from the beginning of my being.³

¹Ibid., p. 419.
³Ibid.
Bertocci admits that such self-identity is a "metaphysical postulate that requires further justification", yet it is necessary, since "unless something like it is hypothesized, one is hard put to account for the unity and continuity, the continuity-within-dynamic-unity that we do find ... in our experience of ourselves as persons". ¹

Bertocci thus feels that he has solved the problem of accounting for the continuity of the self through intermittent consciousness by broadening the basis of his definition of the self. Yet the question remains whether in so doing he has remained faithful to his original starting point. We have seen to what extent Bertocci relied on Brightman, and that he was well aware of the problems he had inherited. Yet, although both begin with consciousness, Brightman was more concerned with the capacity for direction and selection which the personal self manifests. Indeed, his distinction between a self and a person was based precisely on this capacity. Such exclusive pre-occupation with this after all specifically distinguishing aspect

¹Ibid.
of the person perhaps blinded Brightman to that other aspect of consciousness which Bertocci was able to examine.\(^1\)

The point is that cognition itself involves purpose and anticipation: the person now is already projecting into the future, indeed, the very guidance and evaluation Brightman emphasises already pre-suppose this forward looking aspect. Bertocci's innovation is his focusing on this telic aspect of conscious activity, which leads him to declare: "In this sense, conor, ergo sum tells a more complete story of the human being than cogito, ergo sum".\(^2\) Thus in any specious present are to be found conative-cognitive processes which can be distinguished through careful analysis, such as attention and "selectivity in accordance with interests and moods".\(^3\) Indeed,

\(^1\)Cf. the remarks of JOSEPH NUTTIN, in Psychoanalysis and Personality. A Dynamic Theory of Normal Personality, transl. by G. Lamb (New York: New American Library, 1962), p.163: "The moralists' attitude towards human behaviour is closely connected with his sense of the value of effort. This is for him a necessary condition of the struggle against impulsive tendencies and the establishment of an ideal of personality ... By means of a continuous psychic effort man maintains himself in his specifically human condition. The moralist therefore considers any relaxing of psychic effort dangerous".


\(^3\)P. A. BERTOCCI, "Existential Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis", Review of Metaphysics, 28 (1965), 703.
It is in the normal life of awareness that we feel the contrast between the changing waves of cognition which focus and 'light up' the sea of conation. There is always that relatively clear focus of awareness emerging out of the relatively unclear, felt background of seething.

Nor has there been any departure from Bertocci's method in this analysis. There is no appeal to any Freudian or other theory to substantiate the claim that there is an unconscious. On this Bertocci is quite firm:

Indeed, it is the relationship between conative and cognitive factors in our conscious life which must, in the last analysis, provide the model-analogy between the conscious and unconscious life generally.¹

This, in any specious present conative processes are actively involved in the cognitive processes, but always as consciously 'mine'. By analogy with such telic or conative processes as are distinguishable in consciousness and self-consciousness, Bertocci postulates a 'third dimension of mentality' involving telic processes which are not open to, yet are continuous with, the telic processes of consciousness.

The reason for postulating this dimension, in this instance, is to account for the continuity of the self through periods of

²Ibid., pp. 418-17.
intermittent consciousness, and it is here that Bertocci's dissatisfaction with Brightman's fragmentary self becomes apparent. Thus, granted such a dimension within mind, and given the methodological principle that all inferences about the 'whole self' must be based upon a growing, empirically coherent interpretation of experience, then the basis for the analogy between telic processes at the conscious level and those at the unconscious level is legitimate. Carrying this analogy further, these unconscious telic processes must also be 'a complex unity of same-difference' analogous to the complex unity of same-difference constitutive of the self at the conscious level. Nor is this a return to Bertocci's previous position, which was so close to Brightman's and in which there is interaction between the personal self and the unconscious as the psychic self of the body, for now the unconscious telic processes constitute a pole of mentality.\(^1\) In fact, consciousness is not possible without postulating an unconscious of some sort to explain conation, since some "power reservoir or dynamo"

\(^1\)Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, "Brightman's View of the Self, the Person, and the Body", p. 28: "On Brightman's view the personal self is related to, but distinct from, the subconscious as well as the body. If the body is a psychic system which contributes to the content of the personal self, may it be that the psychic life of this (bodily) society constitutes the subconscious of a personal self?"
is necessary. And because of this, mental being, or mind, cannot be identified exclusively with conscious and self-conscious activities, but must be seen as a matrix of activities ranging from the one pole of unconscious telic processes to the other pole of conscious and self-conscious control of such telic tendency.

In this sense, the person cannot be defined as simply the unity of conscious activities without due attention being paid to the fuller dimensions of mental being demanded by an examination of the nature of telic or conative tendency. Such an examination leads us to define the person as a complex unity of mental activities, and thereby provides a basis for personal continuity even when conscious and self-conscious activities are interrupted. From the point of view of internal consistency, Bertocci's shift from consciousness to mentality as the basis for definition of the person is entirely legitimate and marks a progress in clarification. No one phase of experience has been

favoured in advance, the starting point remains the conscious experience of the specious present, yet, through a growing, empirically coherent interpretation of the data of such experience, Bertocci was led to conclude that the unconscious was a 'mental' activity and as such continuous with conscious conative-cognitive processes, and thus part-constitutive of the whole self.

We shall not enter into the fuller question of the validity of Bertocci's starting point at this stage.¹ That he has been consistent in his position appears to us abundantly clear. Like Brightman, he has insisted that the self be viewed as the unity of its activities in any specious present, but, unlike Brightman, he has argued that an examination of the telic nature of these activities leads to the postulating of an unconscious pole to these activities which is at once continuous with such conscious activities while being closed to them. In this sense the datum self provides data upon which our

¹This will be the burden of Chapter XI of this study.
interpretation of the nature of the whole self depends. In this context, Bertocci has argued that the unconscious pole of mental activity must be considered integral to the whole self as part-constitutive. To this extent, Bertocci has unquestionably developed Brightman's position in a satisfactory direction, and, in part, answered the objection raised against himself by Allport that "the person ... is more than a conscious unity". Yet, Bertocci has not clarified the exact nature of this 'unconscious pole' of mentality, although it would appear to resemble more what is defined as the 'preconscious' rather than what is defined as the 'unconscious' or

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1G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychological Nature of Personality", in Personality and Social Encounter, p. 35. Once again however, Allport takes consciousness in the extremely narrow sense of self-awareness, when he argues against Bertocci that "many of the activities of sensing remembering, imagining, thinking, feeling, willing, and the like proceed in a unified way without full- and sometimes without any - participation of consciousness". (Ibid). As with Brightman's case, Allport has failed to understand what is meant by 'self-experience' as opposed to 'self-awareness'. In this sense, we cannot conceive of any of the above-mentioned activities 'proceeding' without being ipso facto 'mine', thereby implying self-experience.
'subconscious' in psychological literature. Nevertheless, while agreeing with Nuttin that "an analysis of human behaviour soon reveals that it is not at all unusual for an inclination to arise or start from the unconscious layers of the personality", we see no reason why Bertocci's position could not accommodate certain interpretations of the unconscious, provided, of course, that they are empirically and synoptically coherent with his data and theory of the person. It is obvious, however, by his insistence on the basic continuity of the telic processes involved, that Bertocci distances himself

1 Cf. JOSEPH NUTTIN, Psychoanalysis and Personality, p.141: "In ordinary psychology the term unconscious is often used to designate the latent form in which certain contents are present to the mind. It is in this way, for instance, that memories are present in the mind when they are not actually being remembered. Freud suggests that this kind of unconsciousness should be called 'preconsciousness'. This preconscious is not in fact conscious but, unlike psychoanalytical unconscious, it can easily become conscious".

2 Ibid., p. 142.
considerably from the Freudian interpretation of the unconscious.  

Cf. for example the remarks of LUDWIG BINSWANGER, in "Freud's Conception of Man in the Light of Anthropology", in Being-in-the-World: Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger, transl. and with a Critical Introduction to this Existential Psychoanalysis by Jacob Needleman (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p.166: "Freud's idea of homo natura is a scientific construct that is only feasible if it is based on a destruction of man's experiential knowledge of himself ... Instead of a self grounded in itself, sufficient unto itself, a self that can mature via a working encounter with the world, we have here a self that is not autonomous, a self swept along by its images, wishes and drives. Freud succeeds in constructing homo natura by generalizing this one cosmos, this one anthropological mode of being, into an objective principle and an absolute life and death power." (Ibid., p. 177).

For Bertocci's views on Freud, Cf. especially, P. A. BERTOCCI & R. M. MILLARD, Personality and the Good, pp. 24-46; also P. A. Bertocci, "A Reinterpretation of Moral Obligation", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 6 (1945-46), pp. 273-79. Cf. also Bertocci's remarks in his unpublished manuscript "Philosophy of the Person", p. VIII-28: "... unconscious telic activities are to be included in the total dynamics of the unified person. The unconscious, accordingly, is not a unity of its own, for it is constituted by telic psychic processes of the sort we find in consciousness. These unconscious processes constitute a dimension of personal being not open to immediate inspection, but without an ontological autonomy that is the condition of the ego. Until we have better grounds than seem available, we cannot suppose that these unconscious processes function in a way, and for ends, diametrically opposed to what we know in consciousness. If they did, or if they were completely autonomous, they would not be mine, but environmental events beyond the scope of my being".
We may conclude this sub-section by recalling Bertocci's basic position, that the person is the unity of those activities which constitute consciousness in any specious present (minimally, sensing, remembering, imagining, perceiving, wanting, feeling, thinking). By identifying the person as the unity of these activities Bertocci considers that he has avoided the necessity of postulating any form of 'soul-theory', which he considers methodologically superfluous. So far, he has merely adopted the position of Brightman, but when he came to consider the problem of the continuity of the person through periods of intermittent consciousness, Bertocci departed from Brightman's radical option for a fragmented person by introducing a new consideration. By examining the telic tendency in the conative-cognitive activities of consciousness, Bertocci was led, through a growing, empirically and synoptically coherent interpretation of these data, to the conclusion that this telic tendency must be grounded in an 'unconscious' (of a type unspecified) which is at once continuous with, yet not open to, the conative-cognitive telic tendency manifest in conscious and self-conscious activities. Such an 'unconscious' constitutes a 'pole' within the matrix of the person, marking the 'lowest' degree of telic tendency, in contradistinction to the 'highest' pole of self-conscious telic tendency (such as those rare moments of calm, unhurried, fully lucid decision). As such, such unconscious activities must be considered part constitutive of the
'whole self' or total person. Bertocci is thus able to broaden his basis for definition of the person to include all 'mental' activities, inclusive of 'unconscious' as well as conscious and self-conscious activities, and, at the same time, is able to solve the problem of the intermittency of consciousness which had caused Brightman such embarrassment, for now that the person is identified as the unity of mental activities, he is able to argue that mentality persists throughout such periods of intermittent consciousness insofar as the 'unconscious' telic activities do not cease during such periods.

There are, of course, a number of difficulties in this position. To begin with, on Bertocci's analysis, the 'unconscious' is an inferred state, based partly on an interpretation of conscious data, and partly on an analogy with consciousness itself. There is also the difficulty, which will shortly become apparent, of integrating such an exclusively 'mental' being with the bodiliness of experience. Above all, there is the difficulty, which must be discussed later at greater length, of finding common ground with regard to the data to which both Brightman and Bertocci constantly appeal. After all, the exclusive emphasis on consciousness or mentality as the starting point of philosophy places great value on the efficacy of introspection. It is through such introspection that Bertocci postulates an 'unconscious' that is hospitable to his experience, and discovers
that he is a unity of exclusively mental activities. That throughout he has been faithful to his stated method and criterion of truth is to his credit, yet this heavy reliance on introspection is unquestionably that aspect of his position most open to criticism. We shall examine one such criticism, that of Allport, in the following chapter, but before doing so, we must examine one of Bertocci's most original contributions to personalistic thought, namely, his distinction between the self, the ego, and personality.
3. The Self, the Ego, and Personality.

Thus far, this chapter has limited itself to an examination of Bertocci's approach to the self which begins with the momentary self, specious present, or datum self, and attempts to account for its continuity. The fundamental unity of the self is presupposed; as Bertocci argues, it is an undeniable given "in the sense that any attempt to deny it assumes the very memorial activity denied".¹

This sub-section will be devoted to a study of Bertocci's approach to the self as a dynamic unity, a being whose unity, once given, must live within a given environmental structure and within a given time-span, and which must somehow undergo the process of growth. This is one of the aspects of personhood that has most intrigued Bertocci, and it is in this area that his most original contributions have been made.

Brightman, of course, had spoken of the 'whole self', and even of the development of personality, but it has been seen that he used

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, "A Temporalistic View of Personal Mind", p. 412. A fuller discussion of the nature of this presupposition will be reserved for the third part of this study.
the terms person and personality synonymously. Even in Bertocci's first major work there is little attention paid to the growth aspect of the whole self, although certain passages are highly significant. Thus, in discussing A. Pringle-Pattison's views on the nature of the self, Bertocci notes that "the self is a distinct reality with a definite nature of its own, that one of the characteristics of that nature ... is the power to initiate activity". He also makes a distinction between the ontological and the cultured self:

If a distinction is made between the cultured and the ontological or structured self which becomes cultured, the relation between the self and society may be expressed by saying that the existence of the cultured self is impossible if isolated from society.

Later, in the same work, Bertocci states in reference to W. R. Sorley's thought:

In other words, in the very erlebnis of momentary experience one is conscious of one's self, and his knowledge of himself grows as the nature of the self is unfolded in its activities. It is important to note that on this view the experience of ourselves always contains more than we can or do articulate; there is a penumbra we experience but of which our knowledge is not clear; we know that it is there and that it is ours but we cannot say what it is.

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1 P. A. BERTOCCI, The Empirical Argument for God, p. 75.
2 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
3 Ibid., p. 203.
Already, then, Bertocci was aware of the need for articulation on the fuller aspects of personhood - the person as initiator of its activities becomes cultured and yet is somehow always more than it can experience itself to be. It was to this need for articulation that Bertocci now turned in the period between 1940 and 1945. This was the period when his friendship and debate with Gordon Allport began, and during which he crystallised his thought into a position from which he has not seriously departed, and from which he has carried on his subsequent and valuable criticisms of some of the theories of modern psychology.

Bertocci's fullest account of his position was given in an article in 1945 which merits close examination. His concern in this paper is to discover

a psychological agent whose activities endure throughout changes in egos, personalities, and for that matter, all other experiences which are identified as 'mine' or 'his' experiences. My ego and personality may change, but it is clear that they are my readjustments, and that I am never completely exhausted or absorbed in any one adjustment. What, then, is the referent for the I or he, my or his, to
In reply to this question, Bertocci begins by defining the self: "I refers to a complex unitary activity of sensing, remembering, imagining, perceiving, wanting, feeling, and thinking. These activities are the dynamic unity referred to by the word self". For the sake of clarity, Bertocci calls the self the 'psychological self'. This psychological self "discriminates and selects ... its living adjustments to other selves and things. As a vital part of this adjustment-process, it develops a personality and an ego ... The psychological self, then, is a fighter for ends". In this sense, Bertocci is able to argue that

1P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Psychological Self, the Ego, and Personality", The Psychological Review, 52 (1945), p. 91. This concern on Bertocci's part was caused in part by Allport's failure to satisfy him that, on Allport's analysis, "there seemed to be a perpetual squinting on the part of the ego". (Ibid.). Cf. supra, pp. 82-85.

2Ibid., pp. 91-92.

3Ibid., p. 92. The phrase 'fighter for ends' is taken from WILLIAM JAMES, Principles of Psychology, I, 141.
the self is a knower, but the ego is not. The ego symbolizes for the self a particular evaluation of that self's predicament ... The ego is the self's evaluation of its activities in the life-situation ... the ego represents the evaluation of the self's activities influenced of course by the evaluations placed on the self's activities by others.

Having distinguished the psychological self from the ego, Bertocci then distinguishes the self from its personality:

A self's personality is its unique dynamic organization of its own unique psychological wants and abilities which renders adjustments to its environment unique. The personality is indeed a self's mode of survival, unique because no two selves have the same basic inherited constitution ... The personality a self develops is probably the most important by-product of the self's encounters with the world, for personality is the particular adjustment the self has learned to make to the conceived world.

1P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Psychological Self, the Ego, and Personality", p. 92.

2Ibid., p. 94. This definition of personality is obviously influenced by Allport's 1939 definition of personality which we have already discussed above, and which ran: "Personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment". (G. W. ALLPORT, Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, p. 48). Bertocci admits his indebtedness to Allport in "The Psychological Self, the Ego, and Personality", p. 91, footnote.
Yet this personality is no "mere mask which the self can put on or put off at will". Indeed, "personality is anchored in a self, but a self's further actions are modified or anchored to the personality developed".¹

It now remains for Bertocci to distinguish the ego from personality: "The ego, like the personality, is acquired, and ... is not an entity separate from the personality, but a distinguishable functional unity within the system of personality".² In fact, the ego is that portion of the personality with which the self has identified its greatest value or adjustment-segment at the time ... Generally speaking, then, the ego will be the core or cluster of values ... with which the self identified its 'security' or success at the time.³

¹Ibid., p. 95
²Ibid.
³Ibid., p. 96. Cf. also P. A. BERTOCCI, "A Critique of Professor Cantril's Theory of Motivation", Psychological Review, 69 (1942), 379: "The ego which the agent-self develops as the standard for its own activity in a given social situation is the best means, presumably, of satisfying its needs and abilities in that environment. It also no doubt functions as an internal frame of reference for the further satisfaction of needs and abilities".
However, Bertocci does not mean to imply any simple threefold division of the self: "the self, its personality, and ego are not like layers of an onion, but one inter-penetrating psychological organization".\(^1\) Nor are the ego and personality to be taken as the merely 'subjective side of culture', since "they are always, in varying degrees, the means a self has taken in developing itself among the possibilities suggested to it by the surrounding world".\(^2\) Bertocci is thus able to propose 'an interpretative concept' of the psychological self as "an enduring, unique, complex unity of knowing-wanting activities ... the agent ever organizing its activities in relatively stable personality patterns and evaluating its adjustments in the light of environmental demands".\(^3\)

\(^{1}\) P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Psychological Self, the Ego, and Personality", p. 98.

\(^{2}\) Ibid.

\(^{3}\) Ibid.
Bertocci thus proposes an interpretative concept of the self with which the inter-relationship between the self, the ego, and personality can be understood, and which at the same time can account for the "continuity, succession and interaction within the personality-ego systems". The concept of the 'whole self' has thus been substantially clarified, and this within the context of a debate with psychology. Nevertheless, Bertocci's foundation is still philosophical, as he himself admits: "the writings of Professor Edgar S. Brightman have exerted the strongest influence on the central concept here entertained".  

This interpretative concept of the self re-appears throughout Bertocci's work. There is a marked preference for the term 'agent-self'  

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1 Ibid.  
2 Ibid., p. 91, footnote.  
rather than 'psychological self', and, in 1963, the term 'proprium'
is borrowed from Allport as a synonym for the 'ego':

The agent-self is defined at the originative pole, by
the kinds and limits of its actual capacities; but it
is understood at the other, acquired, pole (the
personality and its central proprium) as the venture
and achievement to date of the originative pole. The
concrete life of the originative (agent) self is what
its activities are engaged in as an ongoing personality,
but the personality and proprium, as the agent-self's
response to the total environment, are always open to
further changes as required by the total constitution
(conscious and unconscious) of the agent-self.1

Elsewhere that same year, Bertocci gave a more historical introduction
to the problems which modern psychology has raised concerning the self's
continuity:

the 'self' or the 'ego' came back into psychology of
personality when it was observed that within it there
seems to be a relatively persistent structure with
which 'the individual' identifies himself, and by
which he actually guides himself as he selects his
environment and schedules his future - in contrast
to parts of his personality that are more peripheral

1 P. A. BERTOCCI, "The 'Self' in Recent Psychology of Personality:
also Idem, Personality and the Good, pp. 126, 144, 152.
to this burning psychic center of his being.¹

There is also a clear statement of Bertocci's position:

A person is an original complex unity of knowing-striving activities in distinction from, but not separate from, any specific personality and ego that it develops.²

The person is not any personality or ego; yet every personality and ego are not merely 'owned' by person-activities for they influence and affect the way any person, having invested himself in his ego-personality, may express himself in the future. Person-personality-ego are one complex fact or agency that cannot be separated ontologically or psychologically at any one stage in life.³

A more succinct presentation was given the following year:

... the agent-self always exists in two dimensions - as unlearned, sustaining, immanent unity, and as learned unity expressing the nature of interaction between itself and its environment.⁴

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Person, the Ego, and Personality in the Light of Recent Psychology", in Memorias del XIII Congreso Internacional de Filosofía (Mexico City: University of Mexico Press, 1963), II, 50.

²Ibid., p. 52.

³Ibid., p. 58.

Bertocci has thus been able to evolve a concept of the person which is adequately interpretative. There can be no charge that he has not listened to his contemporary psychologists, nor that, in so doing, he has lost sight of his philosophical foundations. Indeed, Bertocci has proposed a concept of the person which begins with the immediate data of experience, the datum self, which is in turn interpreted in a growing, empirically and synoptically coherent manner. Through such an interpretation, Bertocci has been able to account for the continuity of the person, not only through intermittent consciousness, but also through those changes in personality and ego structures which are studied by contemporary psychology. Throughout this interpretation, Bertocci has insisted that he is not espousing any 'soul-theory', or any theory which is in any way inconsistent with the 'radical empiricism' his method has adopted. The 'whole self' is thus the

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1 Cf. the remarks of J. E. WILL, which certainly do not apply to Bertocci, in "The Psychological Method of Personalistic Theology", p. 739: "... their ontological interest in the person, though it made personality their central concept and concern, tended to turn away from adequate psychological study of the person which would try to analyze personality's every contingent relation".
person as dynamic growth in which the immanent, originative pole, in response to its environment, develops a personality and an ego. The self's personality is that mode of adaptation which it has learned to make in the struggle to survive within the give and take between its needs and capacities and the demands of the environment, and, within that learned system of personality, the self chooses that cluster of values with which it can most identify, and thus constitutes its ego or proprium. The person, or agent-self, although distinguishable from the personality it has developed and the ego it has chosen, is not separable from them, but together they form an indivisible whole. Thus, on Bertocci's analysis, a person at any given moment is a given complex unity of activities at once stretching back into its past, at once acting as a learned and chosen ego-personality structure simultaneously open to new possibilities and adjustments.

Once again, it is apparent that Bertocci has been consistent with his method and starting point. The activities constitutive of the originative agent-self are at once conscious and unconscious in one continuous range, and, in attempting to understand the growth of such personal being, Bertocci has examined the theories of his contemporary psychologists, and has shown that a great deal of their findings can be integrated into a total interpretative concept of
personal being. We have already noted that at least one psychologist, while agreeing with Bertocci on many issues, was unable to accept this interpretative concept of the dynamic growth of personality. We shall examine Allport's objections in detail in the following chapter, but it will be obvious that his principal objection must be similar to Nuttin's remarks, quoted above, that the moralists' attitude has a tendency to over-estimate the role of the 'conscious will' in personal being.\(^1\) And it must be equally clear that the crux of Bertocci's arguments lies in his starting point and method, as we have pointed out above, in so far as he insists on the primacy of conscious experience as starting point and ultimate criterion of validity for any theory of personal being.

We have already seen how Bertocci managed to include the 'unconscious' within the total person, and in our discussion of that inclusion, we pointed out the difficulty which such an exclusively 'mental' approach to personal being must face in accounting for the

\(^1\)Cf. also J. NUTIN, Psychoanalysis and Personality, p. 160: "Traditional psychology ... concentrated on the other aspect of this dynamic activity and represents self-determination, or the conscious will, as a force which can govern human conduct in sovereign fashion absolutely". We shall see that Bertocci's position is much more nuanced than this slightly caricatured version of the traditional view.
bodily aspect of human experience. Before examining Allport's criticisms of Bertocci's position, it is therefore necessary to examine how Bertocci reconciles his 'mentalistic' approach with bodiliness.
4. The Personalistic Dilemma: The Person and His Body.

Brightman, it was noted, had not only excluded the unconscious from the self, but he had also excluded the body, and, just as Bertocci came to modify Brightman's position on the relationship between the self and the unconscious, so too he came to modify Brightman's position on the relationship between the self and the body. Once again, in his initial statements, Bertocci tends to corroborate Brightman's view that "body is no part of mind and that mind is not the by-product of the nervous system", and this because, methodologically, "all that we can know about the body ... is by way of coherent interpretation of the data of consciousness". Indeed, Bertocci will even claim that "the human mind is an irreducible kind of being, not identical with its body and not dependent upon the body for its existence, though affected by the body". Thus, "a human being, then, is a person - a complete unity of mental activity related, but not reducible to, his

1P. A. BERTOCCI, "Brightman's View of the Self, the Person, and the Body", pp. 24-25.

Both Brightman and Bertocci, while insisting on this "functional unity of mind and body", nevertheless insist emphatically on the irreducibility of one to the other: "a person's brain is no more a part of his consciousness than is his foot ... the one is not the other any more than cause is identical to effect". This interactionist position is re-stated in 1961, when Bertocci argues that "this personal agent, though not identical with bodily events, interacts with its body ... The personal agent interacts with the space-time world by way of its body". This argument is repeated in 1963, when Bertocci states that "this personal self ... is dynamically related in a give-and-take with a body, but it is not identifiable with the body".

This dualism, once again, is inextricably bound up with the starting point and method Brightman and Bertocci have adopted. If, as they argue, it is an undeniable fact of experience that mind is irreducible to matter, and if the self is the unity of its conscious or mental activities, then the self cannot include its body as an

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1Ibid., p. 220.
2P. A. BERTOCCI, "Brightman's View of the Self, the Person, and the Body", p. 25.
3Ibid.
4P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Moral Structure of the Person", p. 369
integral part of itself. Thus, no matter what degree of intimate functional unity might be admitted, Bertocci, at this stage, seems to agree with Brightman that such a unity must be understood in terms of interaction between mind and body in a dualistic sense.  

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This, of course, facilitates Bertocci's argument for the possibility of personal immortality. Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 535-44, where he argues that since "the human person cannot be reduced to biological or physical energy" (Ibid., p. 202), there is "no good reason to deny immortality on the basis of scientific fact" (Ibid., p. 542). According to Bertocci the denial of immortality rests on the fundamental contention "that because we do not find mental events where there are no bodily events, the mind throughout, in every bit of its experience, depends on conditions in the body" (Ibid., p. 537). This is to overstate his opponent's position. After all, if one were to conceive of personal being as an integral mind-body unity, the possibility of personal immortality would thereby be rendered more problematical, since such an incorporeal existence would no longer correspond to the personal existence we now experience. It must be noted, however, that Bertocci's principal concern in this argument is to point out that personal immortality is not an impossibility, given the data of conscious experience, or even of 'scientific fact'. Indeed, his argument for immortality is based, not upon the distinction and independence of mind from body, but upon the pursuance of value: "Life after death ... is needed to allow further progress in the pursuit of significant value" (Ibid., p. 523). In this sense, personal immortality is conceived as "the continuation of the person in the opportunity for growth of character and value realization ... and ... in view of the weakness of alternatives ... personal immortality ... is a state which ought to be desired" (Ibid., p. 531). This is an important distinction, since Bertocci's subsequent position, as we shall see, tends to view the person as a unity, not only of unconscious-conscious activities, but of the mind and the erlebt body. From this point of view, his arguments against his opponents are slightly weakened, although his arguments for immortality would still be valid, while facing the difficulty, noted above, of accounting for a form of incorporeal existence which no longer corresponds to the corporeal existence we actually experience here and now.
We have already noted Allport's objection to such an admittedly narrow view of personal being, yet a much more systematic criticism of the position Bertocci was espousing has come from a group of thinkers who were, at some stage in their lives, associated with the French personalist, Emmanuel Mounier. Bertocci turned his attention to their criticisms in two significant articles which merit our attention.¹ Both articles are closely related, being at once a refutation of Bertocci's opponents, while being a defence of his own position. In this defence, Bertocci was to elaborate significantly upon his previous views on the relationship between the person and his body.

In these papers, Bertocci devotes himself to a defence of Descartes against the attacks of Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Paul Ricoeur. Marcel's principal attack on Descartes is concerned with the apparent inevitability of a mind-body dualism once given Descartes' starting point and method. Thus he will state:

In reply to such charges, Bertocci seeks to present a modified version of Descartes' position. Thus he states:

Descartes ... was wrong in holding that the extended being had to be identified with the body and excluded from the Cogito even in the complete man. My counter-suggestion is that when we analyse the complex unity, I, we shall find that the realm of its extended being is not an addendum to its unextended activity, but is rather an intrinsic dimension in the unity of the I-activities.¹

To support this suggestion, Bertocci offers four considerations:-

(a) It is necessary to distinguish the various I-activities (sensing, remembering, perceiving, thinking, etc) from their respective


contents. Thus while 'I' cannot sense without an object or content (qualia), 'I' can nevertheless continue this activity while the content or qualia change, as when 'I' sense warmth, then cold.¹

(b) It is necessary to understand the meaning of 'my'. Bertocci argues that there is "no 'my' without an 'I', yet 'my' is not co-extensive with 'I'."² Thus 'my' thinking is not simply 'I'-thinking, but 'I' guiding and controlling my own activities, as for example, the fact that 'I' could have dreamed, or imagined, instead of thinking. In other words, "to say that this is my thinking, my desiring is to say that this degree of activity with its specific content did not necessarily have to be ... The basic involuntary constituents as given in I include its capacity to become a specific being, of a specific character rather

¹We have already met this distinction above in our analysis of Bertocci's thought on the self as the unity of its activities.

²P. A. BERTOCCI, "Descartes and Marcel on the Person and His Body", p. 218.
than another, that is my or mine.\footnote{Ibid., p. 219.} In this sense, from the point of view of potentiality, the 'I' is always more inclusive than the 'my'.

(c) Each activity, or activity-potential, such as remembering, perceiving, etc., has its own structure or nature which differentiates it from the other activities within the unity of the 'I'. Bertocci also points out that there are two types of 'givenness' involved in these activities: there is the intrinsic type of givenness discovered in the activity of thinking, for example, where it is discovered that the 'logical norm' of consistency is given, and the extrinsic type of givenness discovered in the activity of sensing, for example, where the qualia, such as warmth and cold, are essentially 'given to' from beyond. Insofar as such qualia are 'extrinsic', they are not 'mine' nor 'I'.

(d) Descartes had a similar observation regarding the body, Bertocci argues, insofar as he looked upon the body as though it were a set of qualia given to the Cogito from beyond. Bertocci, however, proposes that 'my' bodily qualia be considered a "relatively continuous and persistent 'family' within my total field of experienced

\footnote{Ibid., p. 219.}
qualia and their refractory order. In a word, my 'body' is a matrix of qualia I have never been without". In other words, 'I', as the unity of 'my' activities, "have always been, and am, a unity of non-extended activities and 'content', including the sensory matrix I learn to call mine".¹

Having offered these four considerations, Bertocci turns to the problem of how 'I' can ever come to know 'my' body as 'mine'. He argues that sense-content or qualia are either extended or in relations that involve reference to place, such as warmth, colour, etc., while many 'I-activities', such as thinking and valuing together with their contents, are non-extended. Concentrating his attention on the qualia involved, Bertocci attempts to work out an adequate view of what constitutes 'my arm':

It takes a great deal of sorting out to arrive at a reasonably accurate view of what my arm is, but I suggest that the answer is basically in terms of the kind of control I can exert upon the qualitative patterns I experience.²

However, a further distinction must be made between 'my' body as experienced or erlebt, and 'my' body as conceptualised. Thus 'my'

¹Ibid., p. 220.
²Ibid., p. 221
body is an object to another person just as 'my' arm can be an object to 'myself', yet this 'thingness', or body-in-space, is not an adequate way of describing 'my' body insofar as it is 'my' erlebt body. In this sense, Bertocci argues, there is little 'I' can do about 'my' arm insofar as it is conceived as an object-there, just as there is little I can do about the other qualia 'I' experience, such as sound, colour, temperature, which are simply 'there' or 'given to' in all their refractoriness. And yet, insofar as it is 'my' erlebt arm, 'I' can control it to a far greater degree. As Marcel remarked, 'I' am at once master and slave of 'my' body. Bertocci can thus argue that "my body is the erlebt nuclear matrix which I come to discriminate, within my total extended and non-extended experience, as my body".

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1 Cf. G. MARCEL, Being and Having, p. 56: "I will make an effort to fix my attention on this central datum, and not yield to the vertigo which threatens to overwhelm me when I see the gulf opening at my feet: in fact, what is this body of which I am at once master and slave? Can I, without folly or insincerity, relegate it to the huge foreign empire that eludes my grasp? But I cannot completely include it, either, in that subject realm where my own decree gives me the power to discount any of its contents. It seems to me equally true to say that I am and am not responsible for my bodily fluctuations; both assertions seem accurate to me, and both ridiculous. I will question myself no further on this point...."

2 P. A. BERTOCCI, "Descartes and Marcel on the Person and His Body", p. 222.
This appeal to the genesis of the 'erlebt bodily matrix' coincides with Bertocci's earlier analyses. Thus, "my constitutive activities (sensing, remembering, perceiving, etc) ... are the activities given as co-extensive or co-inclusive with I".¹ These activities are 'mine' insofar as they are phases of 'my I-unity', but they are not 'mine' insofar as 'I' cannot bring them into being: "they are mine only as I use them".² In this sense, 'I' gradually arrive at knowledge of 'my' total self through discrimination, and this will include 'my' body. Bertocci can thus state that 'non-extended and extended phases of my total being set limits to what I am and can be".³ For example, if 'I' am to think, 'I' must obey the logical law of consistency, and this 'I' cannot control, just as 'I' cannot control the "order of my somatic qualia". Yet 'my' somatic qualia ('my' body) are 'mine' because "they have been and are always with me, and because I can use them for my total purposes, within limits".⁴

¹Ibid., p. 223.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid., p. 224.
However, Bertocci argues, 'my' body is not 'mine' to the same degree that 'my' non-extended activities are within 'my' total being. What 'I' am thinking, willing and valuing have greater significance, according to Bertocci, than 'my' somatic qualia. In this sense, 'I' cannot say, "I am my body" in the same sense that "I" can say "I am my thoughts, desires, obligations". Bertocci thus concludes that "my body, then, is mine and not mine in a way that nothing else is ... it cannot be viewed as an incarnation of mind in Marcel's sense". On the other hand the dualism of Descartes is equally unacceptable:

What we call body is not an incarnation of I; it is one erlebt segment of the integral unity, I, within which we distinguish varied activities and their 'contents' and norms.¹

Nor does this deny the irreducibility of the non-extended to the extended, of which Descartes was so acutely aware, but, argues Bertocci,

¹Ibid. There has been an unfortunate glissement in Bertocci's argument at this point in his passing from activities to content. We shall return to this point below.

²Ibid.
is a broadening of Descartes' original position arrived at through an investigation of sensation:

Had Descartes seen that sensing, which he included in his definition of a thinking being, always involves some qualitative extended-order, he might have found better ground for his psychological certitude that the complete man is a mysterious mind-body union.\(^1\)

Bertocci thus proposes an integrative interpretation of the body as erlebt: "my experienced body will always be that sensed system within the complete personal system, I am".\(^2\)

\(^{1}\)Ibid., p. 225. Bertocci here uses his former distinction, noted above, between psychological, logical, and empirically coherent certitudes. As noted earlier, Descartes referred to the "notion of the union (of soul and body) which everyone has in himself without philosophizing. Everyone feels that he is a single person with both body and thought so related by nature that thought can move the body and feel the things that happen to it", but then added "it does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of conceiving at the same time the distinction and union between the body and the soul, because for this it is necessary to conceive them as two things: which is absurd". (Letter to Princess Elizabeth, dated 28 June, 1643, in Philosophical Letters, transl. & edited by A. Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 142.

\(^{2}\)P. A. BERTOCCI, "Descartes and Marcel on the Person and His Body", p. 226.
There are several aspects of this argument which require further discussion before we conclude this chapter. To begin with, we shall not enter into the question of the accuracy or validity of Bertocci's interpretation of Descartes, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, or Ricoeur, since our primary concern in this section is to determine Bertocci's position regarding the relationship of the person to his body. We shall, however, return later to Marcel's allusion to the possibility of a different interpretation of the Cogito from that of traditional idealism. But our immediate concern is to ascertain Bertocci's exact position, and this, we submit, is not at all a simple task. One of the reasons for our lengthy and detailed analysis of his most recent argument is to underline the extraordinary difficulties his starting point and method involve him in when he comes to consider the person and his body in anything other than a clearly defined dualism, as was the case with Brightman, and Bertocci himself in his earlier writings. Bertocci's dilemma is in fact revealing. By adopting a strictly intentionalistic view of knowledge, he has great difficulty in viewing the body as anything other than a 'matrix of qualia', albeit of qualia
which have always accompanied the self's very act of sensing.\(^1\) He therefore must face the greatest difficulty in attempting to account for mind-body interaction, since the body, as qualia and as thereby 'given to', must always remain somehow 'outside' of mind. Bertocci, of course, sees no real objection in such a procedure, since he again and again insists on the irreducibility of mind to matter, and of the non-extended to the extended.

We would insist equally upon this conceptual irreducibility, but we would argue that this irreducibility need not necessarily entail the division of mind from body which Bertocci's position apparently necessitates. Indeed, our central criticism of Bertocci will focus

\(^1\)Cf. for example P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Nature of Cognition: Minimum Requirements for a Personalistic Epistemology", Review of Metaphysics, 8 (1954), pp. 53-54, where Bertocci argues that "the epistemological object in awareness and the metaphysical object x known are two separate entities, and are in no way identical with each other". We shall return to Bertocci's manner of viewing the relationship between the person and his body below, in Chapter XI of this study, where we shall argue that a non-positional, or non-intentional (intentional as implying a subject-object paradigm of knowledge) form of knowledge is possible.
precisely on the most crucial aspect of his thought which we have
encountered in this exposition, namely, his choice and interpretation
of starting point. We shall reserve a full discussion of this until
the third part of this study when we shall attempt to reconcile the
Allport-Bertocci dispute, but for the moment, some further criticisms
of Bertocci's arguments for a theory of interaction between mind and
body must be offered.

We accept, for the time being, Bertocci's initial distinction
between 'I'-activities, and activity-contents, but we seriously
demur at his proposed distinction between 'I' and 'mine'. While his
distinction between them is based on the distinction between potency and
act, and from this point of view, 'I' is always more inclusive than
'my' or 'mine', the linguistic difficulties involved in such a
distinction render its choice in this argument unfortunate.¹ Indeed,

¹Cf. for example the illuminating analyses of the concepts of
'my' and 'mine' in JOHN KING-PARLOW, "The Concept of 'Mine'"; Inquiry,
7 (1964), 268-76; Idem, "'Mine' and the Family of Human Imaginings",
there is an arbitrary limitation of 'my' when Bertocci restricts its reference to the 'I-activities' which constitute the person. But what is more serious, is Bertocci's subsequent extension of this reference to the 'matrix of qualia' which the 'I' comes to identify as 'mine'. We noted earlier a glissement in Bertocci's argument when he slipped from reference to activities to content, and, we submit, this glissement plagues his central argument in his accounting for mind-body interaction. Thus, if the body is a set of matrix of qualia, it must always be experienced by the self in its sensing phase of its 'I-activity': the body must always be an activity-content, and not an activity-potential, as Bertocci later argues.

1Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Person and His Body; Critique of Existentialist Responses to Decartes", p. 140: "Is my body among my activity-potentials? Indeed it is." Bertocci identifies 'my body' with the "restricted sensory realm" which constitutes "my body as experienced" (Ibid.), but we fail to see how this differs from, for example, the restricted sensory realm which constitutes 'my pencil'. As we are about to note in the text, the fact that 'I' have a higher degree of control over this realm of sensory experience is not a sufficient criterion for its identification with those activity-potentials discovered in conscious experience.

Equally unacceptable is Bertocci's assertion that 'I' cannot say 'I am my body' in the same sense that 'I' can say 'I am my thoughts, desires, obligations'. (Ibid., p. 141). Even on his own analysis, the only legitimate statement would read, 'I am my thinking, desiring, obliging', in so far as these are activity-potentials, while the thoughts desires, and obligations are the activity-contents, and therefore cannot be identified with the 'I'. Altogether, the distinction between 'I' and 'my' is highly unsatisfactory for Bertocci's purposes.
to control as a further criterion of 'my', he merely compounds his problem by departing from his initial criterion of 'my', namely those given, original activities (such as sensing, remembering, perceiving, etc) constitutive of 'I'. This 'my' arm may well be more under my control than 'my' pencil, but in this case we are merely speaking in terms of degree. Even in terms of familiarity, 'my' body is merely more familiar than 'my' house, or 'my' clothes. Thus the criterion of control is not sufficiently entailed by the admission if 'I-activities' which define what is 'mine'. In sum, we find Bertocci's account of the interaction between mind and body unsatisfactory. While he is unquestionably attempting to modify his previously unqualified dualism, Bertocci, we submit, has not succeeded in achieving his aim. The person remains a complex unity of mental activities interacting, albeit on intimate and functionally united terms, with his body. The criticisms of Allport are thus all the more significant. We must now examine these criticisms, together with Bertocci's defence, before concluding this part of the study devoted to Bertocci.
THE ROLE OF SELF-EXPERIENCE IN PERSONALITY THEORY:
A STUDY OF THE ALLPORT-BERTOCCI DEBATE

by

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CHAPTER VIII: A CRITICISM OF BERTOCCI'S POSITION ON THE NATURE OF THE SELF

1. Allport's Homunculus Charge.

Just as Bertocci was relentless in his criticism of Allport's treatment of the self or 'proprium' so also was Allport relentlessly critical of Bertocci's treatment of the 'psychological' or 'agent-self'. We noted above, in our treatment of Allport's thought, that one of his greatest concerns was avoiding the danger which threatens any theory of traits, namely, the danger of what Allport termed 'homunculism'. It is noteworthy that Allport had expressed this concern before encountering Bertocci, and continued to express this
concern in a strictly psychological framework.\textsuperscript{1} Quite simply, homunculism, for Allport, is the attempt to introduce a Deus ex machina into the study of personality. As he himself stated:

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, Personality. A Psychological Interpretation, p. 312-13. Cf. also Idem, "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology", (1943) Personality and Social Encounter, p. 90; Idem, "The Trend in Motivational Theory", (1953) Ibid., p. 107: 'There is no need to take fright at the conception of an 'active ego'. As I see the matter, the term ego does not refer to a homunculus, but is merely a shorthand expression for what Goldstein calls 'preferred patterns'.' We have noted above that Allport made a sharp distinction between a psychological and a philosophical (or even theological) framework, especially in reference to the admission or rejection of the 'self'. While the distinction between these frameworks is certain valid, we have also noted Allport's tendency to overstep the boundaries of his own framework in so far as he sees psychology as something of a meta-science which will produce a meta-theory of man. We shall argue below in the third part of this study that Allport's psychological framework, with its insistence on the observable stream of activity as the source of the 'givens', is precisely the cause of his failure to account adequately for the total nature of personal being.
If we admit the self as a separate agent that knows, wills, wants, and so on, are we not in danger of creating a personality within a personality? We seem to be postulating 'a little man within the breast'. If we ask why Jim works hard, it explains nothing to say that 'his self wills it'. If we ask why this hospital patient is depressed, it is not helpful to say that 'the self has a wrong self-image'. To say that the self does this or that, wants this or that, is to beg a series of difficult questions. The psychologist does not like to pass the buck to a self-agent.¹

This, of course, was Allport's principal reason for rejecting the 'self' from the psychological study of personality. And in the context of that rejection, Allport explicitly attacked Bertocci's concept of the self. In discussing the problem of the knower somehow being able to know itself, Allport noted:

This puzzle has led to the postulation of a special agent-self (either as a pure knower - a transcendental ego - or else a combined knower-wanter-striver-willer). This latter point of view seems to set up a master co-ordinating agent within the personality, a little man within the breast who pulls the strings.²

¹ G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, pp. 129-30. A similar argument is found Ibid., p. 252, and in Idem, Becoming, pp. 54-55.

² G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 138. This 'latter point of view' is Bertocci's position. Cf. Idem, Becoming, p. 54, where he gives a statement of Bertocci's position. Bertocci himself points out that this criticism is directed against his own views, in "The 'Self' in Recent Psychology: A Philosophic Critique", Philosophical Forum, 21 (1963), p. 26.
Later, in an article on Bertocci, Allport would declare:

To appease him I have dropped 'self' in favor of 'the proprium'. but I cannot win him over. All I can do is to bite back, and say that he has failed to convince me that his own approach avoids the charge of homunculism. I continue to believe that we can account best for moral (and all other) aspects of behavior in terms of a differentiated but still total personality, rather than via an inner self-agent.¹

What is strange about this criticism of Allport is that it imputes to Bertocci precisely what Bertocci himself has been trying to avoid, namely, some form of 'soul-theory'. We have already seen how emphatically he opposes such a position. We must now examine how he defends himself against this criticism of Allport's.

2. Bertocci's Developing Reply to Allport's Criticism.

It will be obvious from Bertocci's previous rejection of any 'soul-theory' that he would equally reject Allport's accusation that his proposed concept of the personal self involves homunculism. In fact, between 1960 and 1964, Bertocci issued a series of vehement repudiations of Allport's charges:

A person, as a Gestalt of activities, is not exhausted in his personality, that is, in the acquired, dynamic, and relatively systematic mode of response he has developed thus far ... This does not mean that the person is an homunculus behind and within the acquired, developing personality. It means that the personality does not develop itself ... The main point is that the person is not simply a cross-roads or center of converging activities; he is himself a unified agent cutting across streams of events around him, coming to know what his own potential is, and trying to maintain himself within the concurrent events that constitute the world.¹

Difficult to describe or define, this conscious unity of activities, engrossed in direction and response, is not hidden from introspection; it is not an homunculus behind experienced activities because it consists of those activities-in-function. To say that the 'self' does such and such never relieves one of asking what activity or activities of the self are involved in such doing, and how the doing gets done.²


²P. A. BERTOCCI, "The 'Self' in Recent Psychology", p. 28. This assertion that the self's unity of its activities is open to introspection will be discussed in detail in Chapter XI below.
The person is not a little man behind, and unaffected by, knowing-wanting activities; he is those activities in unity. ¹

The personal self is not an homunculus behind its activities, carrying them 'somehow' in its own unchanging nature, as some soul-psychologies would have it. ²

It was not until 1964, however, that Bertocci gave a fully satisfactory reply to Allport's criticism. His arguments are extremely interesting, since they bring to the fore some of the points which our analysis of Allport considered crucial. To begin with, Bertocci asks whether the admission of a self such as he proposes "is not actually what will give greater coherence to his [Allport's] theory of the propriate self and the development of personality". ³ This is precisely what we have argued in our discussion

¹ P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Person, the Ego, and Personality in the Light of Recent Psychology", p. 56.
² P. A. BERTOCCI, Personality and the Good, p. 152.
of Allport's rejection of the self, but we also noted that Allport was quite prepared to sacrifice rational consistency if he considered this necessary. Bertocci does not consider this aspect of Allport's pluralistic approach, and this is a matter which must be discussed below.\footnote{Cf. Ibid., p. 314, where Bertocci states that "although such a self-psychology would lead to no specific prediction, it does provide greater theoretical foundation for the order in uniqueness without which prediction is hard to explain". Bertocci thus seems to endorse Allport's definition of scientific psychology as that which attempts to understand, control, and predict human behavior. As we noted above, Allport's thought is not clear on the precise relationship between science, reason, and common sense, and this partly explains his preparedness to sacrifice rational coherence for common sense conviction. We shall return to this question in the third part of this study when we attempt to resolve the Allport-Bertocci debate.}

After a clear analysis of Allport's reasons for rejecting Bertocci's concept of the self, Bertocci states:

A knower he needs - and accepts - a knower each of us presumably catches a glimpse of, but he cannot allow it to be conceived as something beyond the stream of patterned experience.\footnote{Ibid., p. 310.}
Bertocci then points out that Allport's objections to some unempirical, hidden homunculus are grounded in the same radical empiricism that inspired self-psychology in its rejection of soul psychology. Allport's strictures against an agent pulling the strings, but not revealed, in conscious experience or in personality, cannot be ignored by any philosophy, let alone psychology, that would ground logically intelligible hypotheses without remainder in terms of experience. Indeed, this is the very reason for Brightman's beginning with the unity in and of conscious experience as given and for his building hypotheses about the whole self, including the body and the unconscious, on evidence provided by conscious experience.1

Then in order to justify his own position, Bertocci appeals to his 1945 distinction between the self, the ego, and personality, and to the need for a 'continuant' of some sort:

if the 'self' or proprium of personality is acquired, and is a part of the personality that is also acquired, then a continuant that begins the learning, moves from one learned solution to another as it recognizes and responds to new problems, must be involved to play the 'integrative' role in behavior. There is a self-identity of the knower without which to talk of personality as a learned system is meaningless. No system, especially if it is a growing structure, is without a systematizer. Nor need the systematizer be an homunculus. At every stage from birth to death it is engaged in the differentiations and interpretations that make this as opposed to another possible personality actual. It is never disengaged from any actual phase in the growth of personality or proprium.2

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1 Ibid., p. 311.
2 Ibid.
At this stage of his argument, Bertocci makes the following assertion, which, we shall argue, is crucial to an understanding of the differences of opinion between Allport and himself, and this despite the extraordinary similarities and complementariness of their thought in general:

What we must do is to begin also with the kind of being who is actively knowing and involved in the way he expresses his needs at a given stage in his development, and a given environment. This kind of being is not a puller of strings but pulling, pushing, and aiming in response to problems in a given way now; he is now becoming the pulling-pushing-aiming-self-in-personality.\(^1\)

Bertocci, however, cannot propose an analogy for the relationship between the self and its personality, but he urges that "we must try to grasp this dynamic relation without giving in to substantive modes of thought".\(^2\) Nevertheless, Bertocci does offer an example:

This self is indeed 'interlocked' with its total personality structure, but not exhausted in its basic activity potential by the personality it has developed in a given environment. I am the personality that my self, given its needs and capacities, has been able to acquire in America.

\(^1\)Ibid. This appeal to the beginning, or starting point, is the key to the Allport-Bertocci debate, and will be examined in the third section of this study.

\(^2\)Ibid.
Had I been born and brought up in China, my knowing, wanting, willing, feeling (agent-knower) would have taken different forms, but they would not be different capacities.

Once again, Bertocci is arguing for his concept of the self as an originative unity of activities and activity-potentials which is constantly interacting with its environment, thereby forming a learned mode of response (its personality) within which it identifies with that cluster of values considered to be 'warm' or central (its ego or proprium):

In seeking to fulfill itself, in learning to transact successive proprium-personality systems, it is always engaged in the selective process of taking and giving. It is always discriminating and developing what we might call the warmer and colder aspects of adjustment in accordance with unrealized potential that is making itself felt. The self is never without some personality, but which personality is a by-product of its interaction with the environment in the light of the maturation-learning processes and activities that define its being at any one time.

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 312.
\(^2\) Ibid.
Bertocci also argues that such a knowing self must also be a knowing-wanting unity, "or a unitas multiplex of knowing-feeling-wanting-willing-oughting-activities".\(^1\) This is simply to continue his analysis of those propriate functions which Allport had viewed as "interlocked within the total personality structure".\(^2\) Since the propriate function of knowing, on Bertocci's analysis, requires anchorage in the self, so also must the remaining propriate functions which Allport has defined. Bertocci is thus in a position to conclude:

Thus, unique and unified to begin with, living in environments its own given nature and life history make eligible for it, the self acquires its own characteristic more or less systematic mode of adjustment (personality); it continues to live from the vantage point and achievement of that personality until further change is forced on it or selected, or both. But as it grows and learns, it is this knowing-wanting self that discriminates the near and the far, the possible and the impossible, the convenient and the necessary. In this process, the valuable and the disvaluable to it, the proprium or warm center of its adjustment, is acquired, enhanced, and sustained against attack, until it proves to be

\(^1\)Tbid., p. 313.

\(^2\)G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 138. Cf. also Idem, "The Psychological Nature of Personality", Personality and Social Encounter, pp. 34-35, where Allport agrees that "conation becomes bound into the system".
so inadequate that new adjustments are made. The self that was Saul becomes Paul, and Paul, no doubt, was the Paul that Saul could develop in view of Saul's past. But it could not have become Paul without giving expression and direction to unused and unrealized potential.¹

Bertocci thinks that he has thus met "Allport's qualms about self-psychology" and that his position avoids the danger of homunculism. However, there is more to this dispute than mere 'coherence'. There are, in fact, two further, though closely connected, criticisms of Allport which Bertocci has omitted to mention: the charge that Bertocci over-emphasises the role of the will and freedom, and that his method is too dependent upon introspection. We must now examine these two criticisms.

3. The Problem of Freedom.

In his article on Bertocci, Allport had declared that "there are times, I confess, when his voluntarism seems to outrun the psychologist's conception of man's space of free movement".¹ And in the same article he noted that 'will' is "the most persistent concept" in Bertocci's psycho-philosophy.² Allport himself was acutely aware of the difficulties involved in any attempt to reconcile the common sense view of freedom with the basic presuppositions of psychological science. As early as 1943, in his discussion of the paradoxes in the thought of William James, Allport had noted that "psychology by not taking freedom into account, if freedom is a fact, must of necessity give a distorted view of human conduct".³ Yet it was not

¹G. W. ALLPORT, "Peter Bertocci: Philosopher-Psychologist", p. 4. Cf. also Idem, "An Autobiography", in The Person in Psychology, p. 391: "While he [Bertocci] approves the general trend of my thought, he would like me to subscribe to an agent-self and to a larger measure of voluntarism".


until 1955 that Allport gave a comprehensive account of his own view on freedom.¹ This account was repeated in 1961, when Allport asked "is man free?"²

His reply to this question was extremely evasive. While "all existentialists tell us that man is free", this position "collides sharply with the traditional viewpoint of psychology".³ In explaining the nature of this conflict, Allport was led to declare:

Psychology approaches the matter at the level of the demi-god. It does not pretend to predict every act or thought of the person as might an all-wise God, but it knows so many limitations upon freedom that it inclines to assume that in the last analysis all conduct is determined and no act is free. It knows that personality is dependent on many 'givens', on the inherent capacities and limitations of the human species, on native constitution (physique, temperament, intelligence), and on the social environment in which personality is fashioned and from which it draws nutriment; it is dependent also upon the immediate situation which calls forth one or another of the potential modes of conduct available in the nervous apparatus. Such dependencies weave a net of determinism whose strength is greater than the person knows.⁴

¹Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, pp. 82-88.
²G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 560.
³Ibid., p. 561
⁴Ibid.
Yet he did not thereby espouse 'strict determinism' which sees man as 'no freer than a billiard ball responding within a triangle of forces'. Indeed, according to Allport, the "case for rigid determinism is no stronger than the case for the positivist view of man's nature, which, as we have seen, is vulnerable". To begin with, there is the problem of consciousness, to which Allport replied: "it seems more sensible to assume that consciousness exists for a purpose; at the very least it can tip the scales at the moment of choice". Equally important is the capacity man has for reflection: "when we have an important decision to make we call upon our stores of past experience so far as they are relevant to the issue in hand". In this context, Allport noted that the greater one's experience and knowledge, the greater will be one's 'degree of freedom'. Indeed, Allport argued, every school of therapy assumes that 'the goal of treatment' is "to lead the patient to a relatively greater freedom of decision than his disorder originally allowed". After therapy the patient should have

\[1\] Ibid.
\[2\] Ibid., p. 562.
\[3\] Ibid.
\[4\] Ibid.
\[5\] Ibid., p. 563.
"freedom from such domination, and also freedom for a life that will accord more closely with his self-ideal". Allport could thus offer the following solution:

In this line of thought lies a possible reconciliation between the freedom claimed by existentialism and the determinism claimed by positivism. There are, we repeat, degrees. Precisely what do we mean when we say that the normal personality is relatively free to program his own identity? Not that he is liberated from all his drives ... that he is entirely free from early learning ... that he is independent of the continuous stream of 'nutriment' that the environment gives him ... All these pressures exist. But becoming is the process by which all these forces are employed by the creative urge to program a style of life for oneself. The basic existentialist urge to grow, pursue meaning, seek unity is also a 'given'. It is a major fact ... It is this desire for autonomy, for individuation, for selfhood, for existential uniqueness, that enters into the shaping of the product ... The promise I see for myself is the essence of my freedom.

From Allport's point of view, "freedom lies in our general posture toward life, in living out our hope of continuous becoming". He can thus conclude that "the relative freedom of man lies in his seeking

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
and utilizing knowledge that will enable him to discover the final shape of his life. The final shape will incorporate all dependencies, but will move toward the guiding image, the unfulfilled promise.\textsuperscript{1}

In Allport's argument, two important admissions must be noted, Allport appears to accept the belief of psychology that "in principle human nature is as predictable as the orbit of a satellite in space",\textsuperscript{2} and he asserts that "the determinists are right in saying that the fabric of the world is structured and orderly", albeit that "they are wrong in believing that the fabric of a given life has reached its final, lawful form".\textsuperscript{3} The tension between common sense and science, which we noted above, is once more present in Allport's thought, although in this instance he seems to opt for the scientific view of determinism rather than the common sense view of freedom. In this respect, he admits that "determinism may seem outrageous to the person who 'knows' that his acts are free and who assumes that all other men are free", but he still insists on opting for determinism, albeit of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 564.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 562.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 564.
\end{itemize}
Once again, we are faced with the problem of starting point: the person who 'knows' that he is free, and who, like Bertocci, appeals to conscious experience as the starting point of his interpretive effort at a growing, synoptic and coherent view of reality, will certainly demur at Allport's appeal to a scientific theory which explains away the very thing he seeks to understand. We shall not discuss Bertocci's concept of freedom at this point, since it is tied essentially to his insistence on conscious experience as the ultimate criterion of the truth of any theory of man. Allport's objections to Bertocci's 'voluntarism' stem from the same source which

\footnote{Ibid., p. 562. Cf. also Allport's remark in Becoming, p. 83: "It is customary for the psychologist ... to proceed within the framework of strict determinism, and to build barriers between himself and common sense lest common sense infect psychology with its belief in freedom". Cf. also Idem, "The Fruits of Eclecticism: Bitter or Sweet?", The Person in Psychology, p. 20: "If you define freedom as planning-striving-hoping, then yes, there is in these theories an ascription of freedom. Yet freedom in this sense does not necessarily mean a suspension of lawful regularity".}

\footnote{We shall use the problem of freedom in the third part of this study as a focal point for the resolution of the Allport-Bertocci debate.}
led him to criticize personalistic philosophy as a whole for its
"tendency ... to overstress the function of consciousness". The
source, of course, is the problem of the 'givens' at the outset of
any endeavour to understand man's nature. And in this context, it is
noteworthy that Allport himself includes "the basic existentialist
urge to grow, pursue meaning, seek unity" as a 'given', but a 'given'
which excludes the freedom a person 'knows' he has when he acts.
Before passing on to a resolution of these differences, however, we
must note briefly one further explicit criticism of Allport, namely,
the methodological reliance of Bertocci upon introspection.

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1G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychological Nature of Personality", in
Personality and Social Encounter, p. 35.
4. The Problem of Introspection.

The final criticism of Allport which must now be examined occurred in Allport's important paper on the psychological nature of personality, written to honour the memory of E. S. Brightman. At the very beginning of this article Allport stated that "a 'personalistic' psychologist might find himself in sympathy with the trend of philosophical personalism and yet object to being ticketed as a 'self-psychologist', for self-psychology is too dependent on introspection". Allport's reasons for this criticism are, of course, purely scientific. Testing has shown that "the limen of ego-involvement is lower than the limen for self-recognition", and this, Allport argues, "warns us once more that conscious reporting and introspection will

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never be a sufficient method for exploring the operations of the ego-system". This also becomes apparent in the error of 'projection' when "the judge sees in the other person traits that reside only in himself ... much of our misunderstanding is colored by egocentrism; we assume that the other fellow must feel and think as we do, and that he is merely perverse in not showing it more clearly".  

We must note, however, that Allport's criticism of personalism is that it is too dependent on introspection, which is not to imply that he rejected introspection as a necessary element in any scientific study of personality. Indeed, we have seen that in his opposition to positivism, and in his insistence on the uniqueness of the individual, Allport valued highly both conscious reporting and

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1. G. W. ALLPORT, "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 86. The testing involved judgments based upon records of expressive behaviour. It was discovered that the judges, while routinely judging examples, would rate expressions which were either their own, or similar to their own, either very highly or vehemently lowly, yet without being aware of their ego-involvement. Cf. C. W. HUNTLEY, "Judgments of Self Based upon Records of Expressive Behavior", Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 27 (1932), 209-13.

introspection. In this respect he could declare:

Fierce and portentous is the modern attack upon immediate experience. While it is commonly granted that the immediate experience of the investigator is the source of the subject matter of psychology, as of all other sciences, yet it is said that like the older sciences psychology should instantly supplant this direct experience by indirect objective formulations. Subjective immediatism must give way to a public outdoor attitude toward our knowledge. It is said that the very claim made by some psychologists that their work remains true to life, close to untrammeled common sense, is the very thing that disqualifies this work from being scientific.\(^2\)

\(^1\) This reference to 'subjective immediatism' is important since, as will be argued in Chapter XI below, this is a point on which both Brightman and Bertocci are particularly vulnerable to criticism.

\(^2\) G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychologist's Frame of Reference", Psychological Bulletin, 37 (1940), 60. Cf. also Idem, "Imagination in Psychology: Some Needed Steps", The Person in Psychology, p. 105: "An era of extreme positivistic reduction set in. All theories become suspect because of their verbal seductiveness and slender empirical support. Wundt and James, McDougall and even Freud were offering us essentially one man's view, a personal interpretation. This is not science, we were told, for it is based on personal meanings and all meanings are subjective. Better, it was said, become objective; avoid introspection; eschew personal meanings ..." Cf. also Idem, Becoming, pp. 11-12: "Positivism desires to reduce abstract concepts to the data of observation or to the process of observation itself. In spite of reluctant concessions to verbal reporting as an allowable operation under certain circumstances, the sparseness that results from the application of operational criteria discourages the investigation of consciousness as a datum, as well as of personality as a complex structure, for in these domains relatively few concrete operations can be performed, few are repeatable, and few are public ... For this reason we find animal psychology and mathematical psychology highly developed".
In fact, Allport's position is not at all clear on this issue. Thus, while Allport opposed positivism, he could offer no clearly defined alternative:

Those who wish psychology to be a purely objective, repeatable, and positive science will, no doubt, criticize some methods reviewed here as being 'unscientific', as making assessment into a subjective, impressionistic game. The defender of these 'soft methods' would reply, "Your hard-headed methods yield mostly trivial and obvious information. Personality is too complex a thing for your machinelike methods ... It is indeed a struggle to strike a balance between rigid and perfectionist standards that risk sterilizing research by yielding artificial fragments of behavior having no essential bearing upon personality, and loose standards that permit wanton assertions to go without check or proof."1

He did, however, state clearly the need for introspection:

The outlines of the needed psychology of becoming can be discovered by looking within ourselves; for it is knowledge of our own uniqueness that supplies the first, and probably the best, hints for acquiring orderly knowledge of others. True, we should guard against the fallacy of projection: of assuming that other people have states of mind, interests, and values precisely like our own. Yet it is by reflecting upon the factors that seem vital in our own experience of becoming that we identify the issues that are important.2

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1G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 459.

2G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 23.
From this point of view, Allport's pragmatic perspective came to the fore:

since the current methodological trend will not take direct experience as a model for its constructs nor return to it for a validation of its results, it seems unlikely that the utility of its predictions will be great.¹

Yet despite his opposition to positivistic trends, Allport has to confess that there was a certain justification for the positivist's position:

The difficulty of interpreting personal documents and case histories has been emphasized in order to show fairly why many psychologists will have no truck with such 'loose' methods. To some they seem subscientific. Certain it is that we have far to go in learning how to use them as tools in personality assessment. As yet we cannot honestly say that psychologists have learned to analyze documents or write histories in a way that surely leads them beyond the level of accuracy achieved by unaided common sense.²

Obviously, Allport's criticism of personalism's high dependency on introspection is closely related to his fundamental criticism that personalism tends to overstress the function of consciousness. Indeed, one of the reasons for positivism's rejection

² G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 410.
of immediate experience was its desire to retain "the patent unity of mind and body which here and now marks the organization and functioning of human personality".\footnote{G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychological Nature of Personality", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 36. Cf. Idem, "The Psychologist's Frame of Reference", p. 60, footnote 4, where Allport lists the following reasons for the attack upon immediate experience: "(a) long frustration with the body-mind problem, (b) cumulative attacks upon the reliability of introspection, (c) imitative strivings after the 'monism' of the natural sciences, (d) slight success in empirical studies of thinking, reasoning, volition, (e) correspondingly greater (felt) success with animal experimentation". However, Cf. J. P. SEWARD, "The Sign of a Symbol: A Reply to Professor Allport", Psychological Review, 55, (1948), 277-96 for a defence of animal experimentation.} We have seen the difficulties Bertocci faced in accounting for the unity yet essential difference between mind and body. We have also seen to what extent his thought depends upon introspection: the very method of a growing, empirical and synoptically coherent interpretation of the data of consciousness implies that personal experience and personal meanings are at once the starting point and ultimate point of reference for theories of man and his environment. That Allport did not entirely oppose this method has been made abundantly clear: he even went so far as to praise Bertocci's method for the very element of
introspection he thought was too heavily emphasized in personalistic thought:

he shows that, when we study the ought-consciousness phenomenologically, we discover how entirely different it is from the must-consciousness. This discovery leads to a justifiable suspicion that, whatever conscience may be, it does not derive mainly from fear of punishment or from social coercion.

Indeed, in this particular criticism, we discover once again Allport's lack of clarity concerning the relationship between common sense, reason, and science. While he refused to discount his common sense convictions in the face of the positivist's theories and the personalist's theories, neither will he accept his common sense convictions as bases for his theory of personality. His reasons are clear: at certain times, and under certain circumstances, introspection is simply not reliable. There must, therefore, be some 'control' of some sort to ensure the validity of our common sense

\[1\] G. W. ALLPORT, "Scientific Models and Human Models", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 67, footnote 13. Allport was referring to Bertocci's article "A Reinterpretation of Moral Obligation", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 6 (1945), 270-83. We shall return to Bertocci's position on moral obligation in the third part of this study.
convictions. In this respect, his criticism of personalism's high dependence on introspection is valid, yet Bertocci could surely argue that his emphasis on synoptic coherence is a sufficient 'control' for his introspective data and meanings. The problem, obviously, lies at a deeper level, namely, the level of the 'givens', of the very starting point of any interpretation of man's personal being. We may conclude this section by noting that all of Allport's criticisms, from the homunculus charge to his suspicions about Bertocci's voluntarism and his dependence on introspection, may be grounded in a radical difference in their thought, namely, their respective conceptions of the 'givens' and starting point involved in any attempt to understand man's enigmatic nature. We shall return to this radical difference in the third part of this study, but our immediate task must be to conclude this part, and to isolate the basic issues this examination of Bertocci's thought has revealed.
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSIONS ON THE STUDY OF PETER A. BERTOCCI

This exposition of Peter A. Bertocci's approach to philosophy and to personality has corroborated Bertocci's claim that "an interest in problems on the borderline between psychology of personality and philosophy has long been a catalyst for my reflection".\(^1\) It has also shown to what extent Bertocci is indebted to E. S. Brightman both for his philosophical perspective and methodological presuppositions. We have also argued that the choice of perspective, method, criterion of truth, and starting point, while crucial to any philosophical endeavour, tend to imply one another. Thus the highly pragmatic perspective of Brightman and Bertocci is more concerned with the discovery of workable hypotheses in the living of a life of wisdom than in uncovering apodictic truths. Within such a perspective, the experience of the individual is of utmost importance, especially those aspects of his experience which are relevant to him as a person. Involved in such

\(^{1}\)P. A. BERTOCCI, *The Person God Is*, p. 18.
experience is the awareness of the diversity of human experience, and of how essential it is to maintain a synoptic (as opposed to an exclusive or reductionist) view of experience. Such a manner of interpreting personal experience leads quickly to the conviction that that hypothesis has the greater claim to probability which is most coherent with such a synoptic viewing of all personal experiences. Inevitably, then, such a perspective of necessity must begin with the data of experience. And following the insight of William James, both Brightman and Bertocci argue that the prime datum of experience is the fact of consciousness that all conscious experience is somehow 'owned', that there can never be a succession of experiences without there being at the same time an experience (and therefore an experiencer) of succession. Consciousness as the specious present, or datum self, thus becomes the starting point for such a perspective.

We have seen that Bertocci accepted many of Brightman's positions while adding some necessary qualifications. Thus Brightman's exclusive emphasis on consciousness as the sole constituent of the self was modified in Bertocci's thought. While still beginning with conscious experience, and while still interpreting its data with growing, empirical coherence, Bertocci, by analysing the conative aspect of
such conscious activities as wanting-willing-emoting, was able to postulate that this conation had roots in an unconscious or preconscious pole of mental life which must be considered part constitutive of the self as experienced in conscious and self-conscious control of such conative activity. With this qualification, Bertocci was able to propose a modified definition of the personal self as a unitas multiplex of mental activities. We have seen that Allport had criticised him on precisely this point, and doubtless this criticism acted as a catalyst, as Bertocci has alluded to above.

However, in yet another problematic area of Brightman's thought, Bertocci has been unable to elaborate a satisfactory formulation of the relationship between mind and body. While Brightman was frankly dualistic about this relationship, Bertocci has attempted to qualify his earlier adoption of this same dualism. We have seen that his proposed modification is, in our opinion, unsatisfactory. The criticism of Allport that the function of consciousness is over-emphasised can thus still be levelled at Bertocci.

Nevertheless, Bertocci has achieved a great deal. From within his personalistic framework and perspective, he has tackled Allport's theories of personality consistently over the years. We have seen that he was able to evolve a highly satisfactory interpretative concept
of the person viewed from the perspective of growth. From this point of view, borrowing liberally from Allport, Bertocci proposed that the agent self (or psychological or ontic self), conceived as the originative pole of activity-potentials constitutive of the 'I', develops a personality as its learned mode of response in the dialectic between its own needs and capacities and the environment in which it finds itself. From within this learned mode of behaviour-pattern (the personality), the agent self can distinguish those values and activities with which it can most identify (the 'warm' or appropriate functions). Bertocci thus offers a distinction between the self, the ego, and personality which he considers adequately interpretative of the data of experience, and of the findings of much contemporary psychology.

At the same time, Bertocci has vehemently insisted that such an agent self is not to be conceived of in any substantial way: he is not proposing any form of soul-theory. In his opinion, the self is the unity of its activities, and there is no need to appeal beyond this unity, which is given in conscious experience, to any further soul or substance. All the more unwelcome, then, were the criticisms of Allport, that this agent self was indeed an homunculus. We have seen Bertocci's replies to this charge, while noting two further criticisms of Allport's which were closely connected with his homunculus charge,
namely, that Bertocci was guilty of an exaggerated voluntarism and relied too heavily on introspection.

Altogether, then, the cumulative effect of Allport's criticisms has been to underline the importance of what our exposition of Bertocci's thought has revealed, namely, the crucial importance of the starting point in any philosophical or psychological endeavour to understand the enigmatic nature of personal being. Nor is it merely a question of isolating the actual point of departure - for example, consciousness as our starting point - for there remains the even more difficult question of isolating just what is given in such a starting point. Thus the crucial point of contention between Bertocci and Allport lies in the very starting point and givens at the outset of their inquiries. The remark of Loewenberg quoted earlier applies most appropriately to Bertocci's position: "c'est le premier pas qui coûte". We shall not assess the validity of Bertocci's starting point at this stage, since we shall be analysing consciousness and the data of consciousness in detail in the succeeding chapters. Suffice at this point, we submit, is it to draw attention to this central core of Bertocci's thought, and to its role in the Allport-Bertocci debate.

We may conclude this part of our study devoted to Bertocci by parallelling our procedure in the previous part of our study
devoted to Allport in offering what appear to be the basic issues Bertocci's position has raised:-

1. The ultimate importance of the starting point of any investigation of the nature of personal being, be it philosophical or psychological. Inextricably involved with the question of starting point is the establishment of the 'givens' at the outset of such investigations. Thus Bertocci claims that the 'self' is given in conscious experience, and this indubitably. Equally given, on Bertocci's admission, is the fact that man is free. We are thus required to evaluate the reliability of introspection, and the role it can play in any theory of personal being.

2. The relationship between the person and his body must be satisfactorily accounted for in any theory of personal being. We have argued that Bertocci fails to do this.

3. The relationship between science, reason, and common sense must be clarified, especially as regards the apodictic in Bertocci's approach to philosophy.
PART THREE: THE BASIC ISSUES
CHAPTER X: A RESOLUTION OF THE ALLPORT-BERTOCCI DEBATE

In the previous two parts of this study we have examined the respective approaches of Gordon W. Allport and Peter A. Bertocci - to psychology in Allport's case, to philosophy in Bertocci's case, and to personality in both cases. Our reason for this examination was simple: insofar as both of these thinkers had debated with one another in print and in friendly conversations over the years in what has been described as a "classic dialogue in psychological and philosophical literature", we felt that a great deal could be learned from an examination of the nature of their dispute for any subsequent attempt at elaborating a theory of personality which sought to understand man as a whole while avoiding the dangers of fragmentation which so many theories have fallen into in the past. We have seen that both Allport and Bertocci were highly sensitive to the enigmatic nature of personal being. We have also seen that, despite their mutual friendship and influence, they were unable to resolve the deep-rooted differences which led to their dispute. In this chapter we propose to offer a possible means of resolution of their disagreement which remains within the framework of their debate. We shall begin by drawing attention to those points of agreement between these two thinkers which are significant. This will be followed by those points of disagreement which we have already noted.
above, and thus, having established a common frame of reference, we shall attempt our proposed resolution of their debate.
1. The Allport-Bertocci Points of Agreement.

In our examination of the thought of Allport and Bertocci so far, we have perforce concentrated on those points of contention which brought about their celebrated debate. Yet that such a debate was possible at all is surely due to certain common interests and common convictions. Indeed, while there are striking differences between them, there are equally striking points of agreement.

1) The uniqueness of the person.

We have seen that both Allport and Bertocci stress the uniqueness of the individual. It was precisely this conviction which led Allport to oppose the reductionist theories and methods of positivism, and to insist upon a morphogenic approach to the individual as such. This same conviction is manifested in Bertocci’s insistence that no method can hope to encompass adequately man’s uniqueness, and that all methods must maintain a synoptic perspective in their investigations of man’s nature. Both, therefore, are problem-centered rather than method-centered, and both regard the problems of personal living as paramount. From the point of view of method, Allport proposed a pluralistic approach which would culminate in a systematic eclecticism, while Bertocci, proclaiming himself to be a ‘liberal’, proposed a synoptic
approach which would culminate in a synoptical and empirical coherence which he frankly admitted was eclectic. From the point of view of the problems which interested both thinkers, we have noted the highly pragmatic perspective both adopted to their respective inquiries. And this raises a point which merits further discussion.

2) The relationship between understanding and prediction, truth and wisdom.

It was noted to what extent Allport insisted upon the need for prediction in any discussion of the aim of psychological science. The understanding he sought of the nature of man, and of his personality, was tied essentially to his desire to control and predict human behaviour. It was also noted that Bertocci appears to agree with Allport that one of the reasons for seeking an understanding of the

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1Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, The Person God Is, pp. 330-35 where Bertocci outlines his liberal stand against 'methodological dogmatism'. Cf. also Ibid., p. 17, where Bertocci admits that his 'theistic personalism' could be accused of 'eclecticism'.
dynamics of personality is to be able to predict subsequent behaviour. Bertocci equally tends to view philosophy from a similarly pragmatic stance; the truth he seeks is essentially tied to man's capacity to live a life of wisdom - a 'symphony of values'.¹ There is thus a tendency in Allport's thought to equate understanding with prediction which is reflected in Bertocci's tendency to equate understanding (or truth) with wisdom. While we agree wholeheartedly with Allport's refusal to entertain the irrelevencies of many of the endeavours of psychological science, and agree wholeheartedly with Bertocci's conviction that all philosophical endeavours which do not include some discussion of man's purpose and values in life must eventually wither into irrelevancy, we seriously question their tendency to overstate their case.

Thus we would question Allport's definition of science as that form of knowledge that enhances our understanding, prediction, and control of phenomena above the level achieved by unaided common sense.²

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¹Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, Personality and the Good, Chapter 15.
²Cf. supra, p. 29, footnote 1.
We would argue that the Darwinian theory of evolution is a form of knowledge that certainly enhances our knowledge of certain phenomena above the level achieved by unaided common sense, but we fail to see that such knowledge as such can aid us in predicting or even controlling the future evolution of whatever species may be in question. Yet such knowledge is no less scientific for this. Indeed, a great deal of contemporary debate on the significance of the data of the various sciences involved in any synthetic view of evolution (such as biology, pure physics, geology, history, archaeology, anthropology, and palaeontology\(^1\)) involves precisely such questions. Thus Dobzhansky declares that "the problem of controlling and guiding human evolution has no single or simple solution",\(^2\) and goes on to assert:

> The crux of the matter is evidently what purposes, aims, or goals we should choose to strive for. Let us not delude ourselves with easy answers. One such answer is that a superior knowledge of human biology would make it unmistakable which plan is the best and should be followed ... Now, I would be among the last to doubt that biology sheds some light on human nature; but for


planning even the biological evolution of mankind, let alone its cultural evolution, biology is palpably insufficient.

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1 Ibid., p. 162. (Italics added). Cf. also Idem, Mankind Evolving (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 345-47. Dobzhansky thus opposes the position of Julian Huxley, who claims that man's discrimination between good and evil is a product of biological evolution. Yet, although Huxley might claim that "science has two functions: control and comprehension" (Evolution in Action, p. 9), he will later concede: "It is easy enough to make broad statements about the steps of advance which have transformed the quality of human life and experience ... What is difficult is to discover just how any one step is effected, still more to distinguish desirable from undesirable change, and restrictive from non-restrictive improvement". (Ibid., pp. 124-25). This, from a biological point of view, is precisely what Dobzhansky refers to as the 'dilemma' - "if we enable the weak and the deformed to live and to propagate their own kind, we face the prospect of a genetic twilight; but if we let them die or suffer when we can save or help them, we face the certainty of a moral twilight". (Heredity and the Nature of Man, p. 158). Cf. also the remarks of E. Mayer, in "Cause and Effect in Biology", Science, 134 (1959), 1504, where he argues that "one of the most important contributions to philosophy made by the evolutionary theory is that it has demonstrated the independence of explanation and prediction". A similar argument is found in M. Scriven, "Explanation and Prediction", Science 130 (1959), 477-82. For a full discussion of the implications of evolutionary theory on the 'orthodox criteria of prediction and control', Cf. John Deely and R. Nogar, The Problem of Evolution (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973), especially pp. 1-80.
Another sphere of scientific endeavour would be the science of astronomy, where, until quite recently, the understanding being sought gave the scientist little or no control or predictive power.\(^1\) Closer to hand, the psycho-analytical method of Freud, while it may aid our understanding of certain events, is powerless to predict future events within that same framework.\(^2\)

There is thus a great deal more to science than an understanding which helps us control and predict phenomena above the level achieved by unaided common sense. There is also knowledge and understanding for its own sake.

\(^1\) Cf. for example the remarks of HANS REICHENBACH in From Copernicus to Einstein, transl. by Ralph B. Winn (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1942), p. 11: "Men have been forming ideas concerning space and time since times immemorial, and curiously enough, have been writing and fighting about these things with the greatest interest ... Why do we need to know whether the sun revolves around the earth and vice versa? ... Can this knowledge be of any use to us? No sooner have we uttered these questions than we become aware of their foolishness. It may not be of any use to us, but we want to know something about these problems".

\(^2\) Cf. ROLAND DALBEIZ, Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud, II, 299-300, where Dalbeiz points out that through analysis we can show that such a result X is caused by premises Y and Z, but that prior knowledge of Y and Z does not enable us to predict X.
own sake, the theoria to which Husserl referred. The same argument would apply to Bertocci's tendency to equate philosophical understanding (or truth) with wisdom conceived in an existential sense. We would agree with Husserl that personal temperament undoubtedly plays a role in the perspective any thinker adopts:

let it be admitted from the beginning that on the basis of the individuals who philosophize no definitive practical decision for the one or the other kind of philosophizing can be given. Some are pre-eminently theoretical men inclined by nature to seek their vocation in strictly scientific research ... Herein it may well be that the interest, even passionate interest, in this field comes from some temperamental needs ... On the other hand, the situation is different for aesthetic and practical natures (for artists, theologians, jurists, etc.). They see their vocation in the realization of aesthetic or practical ideals, thus ideals belonging to a nontheoretical sphere.

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1Cf. EDMUND HUSSERL, "The Crisis of European Man" in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, pp. 171-72: "Men are gripped by a passion for observing and knowing the world, a passion that turns from all practical interests and in the closed circle of its own knowing activities, in the time devoted to this sort of investigation, accomplishes and wants to accomplish only pure theoria. In other words, man becomes the disinterested spectator, overseer of the world..."

2EDMUND HUSSERL, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 137.
Thus, quite apart from temperament and personal persuasion, we must qualify the tendency present in the approaches of Allport and Bertocci to overstress the practical at the expense of the theoretical. Thus we would re-state Allport's definition of science to read that science is that form of knowledge which enhances our understanding of phenomena above the level achieved by common sense, and which may, but need not necessarily, at the same time enhance our prediction and control of these same phenomena. And we would remind Bertocci of that element of wisdom to which Aristotle referred when he stated:

> but the philosopher, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is ... And this activity alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating ... the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself...¹

Such qualifications given, it must nevertheless be noted that Allport's pluralism and Bertocci's fundamentally synoptic approach render any possible antithesis between the practical and the theoretical highly unlikely, save in such cases when the theoretical proves to have

practical consequences detrimental to the uniqueness of man's personal being.

3) The role of common sense conviction.

Allport's insistence on the primacy of his common sense convictions about man's unique nature involved him in the dilemma we pointed to above of reconciling what he was convinced of with what he could scientifically establish, such as the functional autonomy of motives. Indeed, the clash between what was 'reasonable' for Allport, and what was merely in accord with 'unaided common sense' - and should therefore be 'clarified' through scientific investigation - was never resolved. We noted also that one of the criticisms of personalistic philosophy was Cobb's questioning its belief in the reliability of a common-sense speculation which seemed to him somewhat naive. Indeed, part of Bertocci's misfortune in his choice of terminology for describing those states he refers to as 'psychological', 'logical', and 'empirically coherent' certitudes lies, we submit, in his failure to distinguish adequately between what is merely a 'common sense' conviction, and what is a 'reasonable' and 'scientific' conviction. Thus, while both appeal constantly to common sense for data for, and for verification of, their hypotheses, both end up contradicting to a degree some common sense conviction they both admit to having: Allport in his
refusal to discuss the nature of the self as knower, and even to admit it as a datum to his science; Bertocchi in his adoption of a dualistic theory of the person's bodiliness, despite his conviction that we are somehow intimately one mind-body unity. Indeed, in this latter point, Bertocchi's common sense convictions of unity yet division, so clearly expressed in Descartes' letter to Princess Elizabeth, underline the difficulties any theory which relies on common sense convictions must face, since the data of common sense can themselves be paradoxical.

Thus, in this very point of agreement lies a source of disagreement; Allport in his rejection of Bertocchi's agent self, and Bertocchi in his rejection of Allport's organic view of the person as a necessarily psycho-physiological unity. In our opinion this disagreement is not necessitated by this basic agreement in the 'inccorrigibility' of common sense convictions, but is due, rather, in both cases to a difference in interpretation of what are in fact the 'givens' at the outset of their respective enquiries. We shall, therefore, return to the clarification of the relationship between common sense, reason, and science below, once we have clarified the nature of the 'givens'.
4) The complementary nature of psychology and philosophy.

Both Allport and Bertocci consider that psychology and philosophy have much in common, and that both disciplines should be considered complementary. We noted, however, a marked tendency in Allport to view psychology as somehow being that discipline destined to produce a meta-theory of man which would not only act as a monitor for erroneous philosophizing, but which would eventually supersede philosophy. This destiny, however, was yet distant, and for its present programme, Allport proposed a close working relationship with philosophy. Indeed, the friendship which sprang up between Bertocci and himself would have been inconceivable had both not considered their studies and investigations as somehow complementary. We find Allport insisting on this complementary nature of psychology and philosophy quite frequently. Thus he considered it inconceivable that "two well-intentioned disciplines, working on a common subject-matter, can indefinitely remain apart". Indeed, he would even insist that while "the philosophy of the person is inseparable from the psychology of the person", he would

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2G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 567.
simultaneously admit that "all books on the psychology of personality are at the same time books on the philosophy of the person". Yet it was the realm of ethics that Allport considered the area par excellence of collaboration and complementariness between psychology and philosophy:

My discussion of the problem of normality and abnormality has, in a sense, yielded only a niggardly solution. I have said, in effect, that the criterion we seek has not yet been discovered, nor is it likely to be discovered by psychologists working alone, nor by philosophers working alone. The cooperation of both is needed. Fortunately, psychologists are now beginning to ask philosophical questions, and philosophers are beginning to ask psychological questions. Working together they may ultimately formulate the problem aright - and conceivably solve it.

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1 Ibid., p. xi.

His reasons for praising Bertocci are thus obvious:

He knows that human nature itself sets the outer boundary lines for a valid theory of knowledge or of value. Better than most of his fellows he recognizes that in these areas the intellectual destinies of psychology and philosophy are lockstitched together.

Bertocci has been no less insistent on this complementary nature of philosophy and psychology. As early as 1946 he wrote:

In view of the parallelisms and similarities which exist between the problems, data, description, and interpretation at the philosophical and psychological levels of analysis, one can only deprecate the unwillingness of natural partners to study and understand the contributions of each other.

Later, he refers to the "artificial battle of disciplines", and throughout his work tries to present "a theory of the self that might satisfy both metaphysical, epistemic, and psychological interests". However, it is in the area of ethics that Bertocci, like Allport, locates the nexus between philosophy and psychology:

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1G. W. ALLPORT, "Peter Bertocci: Philosopher-Psychologist", p. 3. Cf. also Ibid., p. 7: "He frowns upon the psychological naiveté of many philosophers, and upon the philosophical naiveté of many psychologists".


In dealing with the virtues, we can draw on both the psychologist and the ethicist; they will help us in our ultimate aim: to decide what are the components of an ideal personality ... we shall suggest an approach to the virtues that will take account of factors in development that neither the psychologist nor the ethicist can afford to overlook.1

It was this belief in the complementary nature of philosophy and psychology which unquestionably led to the fruitful and friendly collaboration between Allport and Bertocci.

We may conclude this section dealing with the points of agreement between Allport and Bertocci by repeating the common conviction held by both of them that the human being in his uniqueness is the object of their research; that this research is problem-centered rather than method-centered, and therefore pluralistic and eclectic. At the same time, both adopt a highly pragmatic approach to their endeavours: the understanding they seek is not merely a theoretical understanding, but one which will enable individuals to live better lives. Above all, neither is prepared to adopt a method or conclusion which patently contradicts common sense or the data of experience synoptically viewed. Where, then, were their points of disagreement?

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1P. A. BERTOCCI, Personality and the Good, p. 361. Cf. also Ibid., pp. v-viii, where the authors describe what they mean by psycho-ethics.
2. The Allport-Bertocci Points of Disagreement.

We have already had occasion to isolate the points of disagreement between these two thinkers. We now propose to discuss these points of disagreement in detail before proposing a means of resolving them.

1) The Problem of the Starting Point.

a) Allport's Starting Point.

We have already noted Allport's starting point: the observable stream of activity of the individual human being. To begin with, there is a certain ambiguity in Allport's use of the term 'observable'. By 'observable', Allport means that which can be observed either through introspection, as in the case of those propriate functions which are 'known and felt', or through inspection, as in the case of experiments, such as observing the reactions or expressions of an individual in any given or controlled situation. What is significant is Allport's marked preference for the latter procedure. Thus he always returns to the stream of activity as that which is somehow 'set in motion' at birth, and which develops certain functions which can be distinguished through observation by someone other than the growing child. Thus
Allport can speak of an 'evolving sense of self', of those activities which are 'ego-involving', without ever appealing to the subjective or felt aspect of selfhood. Indeed, the discoveries of tests which could empirically measure and establish such 'ego-involvement' constituted what Allport considered a major breakthrough for psychology of personality.\(^1\) And here the hesitancy of Allport, which we noted above, comes to the fore. As the individual stream of activity is differentiated through growth, an observer of the growing child can note an evolving sense of bodily sense, of continuing self-identity and of self-esteem between birth and about the age of three. From the ages of four to six, he can observe an evolving sense of extension of the self, and of the self-image of the child; and from six to twelve may note the evolving sense of the self as rational cooper in the child. At this stage, Allport notes:

"But as soon as personality enters the stage of ego-extension, and develops a self-image with visions of self-perfection, we are, I think, forced to postulate motives of a different order, motives that reflect properate striving. Within experimental psychology itself there is now plenty of evidence that conduct that is 'ego-involved' (properate) differs markedly from behavior that is not."\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 78.

\(^2\) G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 48. We shall return to Allport's naturalism below.
It was at this stage that we noted Allport's hesitiation, for now he was obliged to consider the subjective side of the stream of activity:

We not only know things, but we know (i.e. are acquainted with) the empirical features of our own proprium. It is I who have bodily sensations, I who recognize my self-identity from day to day; I who note and reflect upon my self-assertion, self-extension, my own rationalizations, as well as upon my interests and strivings.\(^1\)

This, of course, heralded in the problem of the self as knower, since "a complete theory of personality cannot shelve this difficult problem of the subjective (felt) nature of the self, but must face up to it".\(^2\)

We submit that it is precisely at this point that Allport's starting point proves inadequate. The observable stream of activity existing in its individual form is simply incapable of accounting for this subjective or felt nature of personal being. Even were we to allow Allport's too hasty identification of 'knowing things' and 'knowing the empirical features of our own proprium' - a point to which we shall return below - we would still be hard pressed to account for

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 53.

\(^2\)G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 110.
this observing observer who can observe only what others can observe, albeit in a different manner, namely, subjectively through 'acquaintance'. And the reason for this is simple: nowhere in the observable stream of activity is such a knower observable:

Our cognition of our knowing self is always indirect, or of the order of presupposition. On the other hand, all features of the empirical self are known directly, through acquaintance, as any object is known which falls into time and space categories.¹

Allport is thus left facing this 'awesome enigma' which his starting point in fact precludes - the self as knower. His solution to the enigma we have already seen: the admission of such knowing as a appropriate function, the nature of which is inexplicable; inexpicable, that is, if one begins with the observable stream of activity.

b) Bertocci's Starting Point:

Bertocci's starting point stands in sharp contrast to Allport's, as we have already seen. In fact, Bertocci begins with the experience of an adult, and takes this experience

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 53.
as his starting point. Thus beginning with the data of adult experience, Bertocci attempts to elaborate a growing, empirical, and synoptically coherent interpretation of this data. Central to such experience is that universal conscious fact referred to by William James that all experience is owned. The starting point is thus this unity of conscious experience - the datum self as given in self-experience. Reflection on such self-experience, that unitas multiplex of sensing, imagining, perceiving, conceiving, feeling-wanting-emoting, willing and oughting, soon leads to the hypothesis that such conscious activities must be continuous with (but not open to) unconscious activities of an analogous nature. Yet while this additional pole of mental activity must be admitted, the starting point for Bertocci remains the experience of the adult in any given moment synoptically interpreted in the light of his accumulated experience.

1 Bertocci is well aware of Allport's insistence on the absence of many adult experiences, notably propriate striving, in the infant and young child. Thus Bertocci will state: "at any moment some of these activities are more regnant than others (and in infancy all are not yet present)". ("A Temporalistic View of Personal Mind", p. 411). We shall return to the problem of the 'emergence' of such experiences and activities below.
Absent from such an approach is the appeal for controls *ab extra* which is so prominent a feature of Allport's approach. Indeed, Bertocci begins with the 'subjective (felt) nature of the self' which was the cause of Allport's discomfort. There is, in fact, no control to Bertocci's introspective reliance on his own experience, save his criterion of synoptic coherence. This 'philosophic faith' that the whole of experience is more to be trusted than any part is, Bertocci argues, an act of reasonable, as opposed to blind, faith.¹ We would argue that Bertocci's main concern is the avoidance of 'methodological dogmatism' or over-hasty reductionism with its consequent fragmentation of personal being, and, to this extent, we endorse his criterion of truth. Yet, like Allport, we suspect his unqualified confidence in introspection of being somewhat exaggerated. The very complexity of personal experience, indeed, its even paradoxical nature (as Marcel's reflections on bodiliness have shown), seem to be overlooked by Bertocci. While we may have apodictic evidence of the unity of those activities constitutive of the self,² we have no such evidence to support the belief, implicit in Bertocci's philosophic faith, that the experiences we have are capable of providing synoptic coherence rather than synoptic incoherence.

²We shall return to this particular belief of Bertocci's below.
Nevertheless, while the 'possibility of surds in nature' must always be admitted, and while a metaphysical basis for such a belief is required, we would argue that a growing, experiential (or empirical), and synoptic interpretation of personal experience is a valid and fruitful philosophical option, which need not necessarily entail opposition to science and the scientific method.¹ We would equally argue that it is a method fraught with the danger of subjectivism, as Allport suggests, a danger we do not consider Bertocci to have avoided in certain instances.² It must also be admitted that the choice of such a method

¹BRAND BLANSHARD, in his The Nature of Thought (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939), vol. II, p. 262ff., refers to the possibility of surds in nature in his admission that "somewhere thought may end its pilgrimage in frustration and futility before some blank wall of the unintelligible". Yet his basic contention remains: "To think is to raise a question; to raise a question is to seek an explanation; to seek an explanation is to assume that one may be had; so to assume is to take for granted that nature in that region is intelligible". He then argues that "the degree of truth of a particular proposition is to be judged in the first instance by its coherence with experience as a whole".

²We have in mind particularly Bertocci's unqualified appeal to the immediacy of experience in his assertion that the self is the unity of its activities. Thus baldly asserted, as will be argued in Chapter XI below, Bertocci is guilty of the 'subjective immediatism' referred to by Allport as one of the reasons for the modern attack upon immediate experience. (Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychologist's Frame of Reference", pp. 59-63). For an extreme example of this partly justifiable attack upon immediate experience, cf. E. G. BORING, "A Psychological Function is the Relation of Successive Differentials of Events in the Organism", Psychological Review, 44 (1937), 445-61. For a full discussion of the problems involved in the 'subjective versus objective debate', cf. STEPHEN STRASSER, Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, pp. 3-56.
need not necessarily condemn the choice of another method, such as the method of linguistic analysis, or the method(s) of phenomenological analysis. After all, as Bertocci never tires of insisting, such a method seeks probable hypotheses which are open to correction from any source, provided the alternative source and position do not contradict or distort or explain away the data of personal experience. While such a method is taken to be valid, the interpretations and arguments subsequent to the method's actualization are subject to further scrutiny.

c) The Starting Points Compared:

We have thus isolated the root difference between Allport and Bertocci. Allport approaches personal being from the standpoint of a scientist who accepts the scientific presupposition that life exists in individual forms, and that such individuals present themselves to the scientist as an observable stream of activity from which patterns emerge and can be studied and classified; such observations and interpretation establish many common sense beliefs about personal being, but have great difficulty in accounting for the unobservable, but no less undeniable, fact that within such a given observable stream of activity self-consciousness occurs. That such self-conscious knowledge occurs, Allport will admit, but he will not admit it as an initial given at the outset of his enquiries, for such an inclusion would commit him to too high a
dependence on introspection. Such high dependence on introspection marks the perspective of Bertocci, for whom the givens and starting point consist of the data of adult conscious-mental experience, which must subsequently be interpreted with growing, empirical and synoptic coherence.

We now propose to examine the conflict which these two starting points entailed, by discussing what we consider to be primary and secondary focal points in the Allport-Bertocci debate, namely the nature of the self, and freedom. For reasons of clarity and logical exposition, we shall begin with the secondary focal point, which will lead into a discussion of the primary focal point.

2) A Secondary Focal Point of Disagreement: Freedom.

We have already had occasion to refer to this particular point of disagreement when we were discussing the criticisms Allport had levelled against Bertocci. At that time we noted that Allport's position on this issue was not at all clear. While admitting that most persons 'feel' free in their choices, Allport nevertheless considered that the factors determining human behaviour are too great to allow this introspective belief credence. He thus opted for 'degrees' of freedom, in which the 'basic existentialist urge' to grow, pursue
meaning, and seek unity plays a vital part. From this point of view, he could define the 'essence of freedom' as the 'promise' the person sees for himself. We might note this inclusion of an existentialist urge within the 'givens' upon which personality depends, such as the inherent capacities and limitations of the human species, the person's native constitution (physique, temperament, intelligence), the social environment, and the present situation which demands a responsive mode of activity from the person. But just as the proprium was at once a knower and a known, so also is this basic urge at once an urger and an urged, as Allport implicitly admits when he states that "activities involving 'will' emanate form the most complex systems of personality".¹

In other words, this basic urge, like the proprium, is a co-product of the patterning and growth of personality, and, as such, can hardly be considered the producer or guider, which is what the common sense belief would lead us to assume.

Indeed, Allport's concessions to his common sense conviction that man is free merely enumerate the conditions of freedom, and not the act of freedom which is the source of our belief in freedom in the

¹G. W. ALLPORT, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, p. 51.
Thus the promise each person sees for himself, the 'desire for autonomy, for uniqueness and for selfhood', are the very factors which present the individual concerned with that element of choice or decision. Were man not capable of reflection upon the alternatives open to him, he should never be free to choose one rather than another. Yet this choice is precisely the freedom we 'feel' in our acts of

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1 Cf. the distinction of Aquinas: "radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio". (S.T.I-II, 17, 1 ad 2).

2 Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, Personality and the Good, p.177, where Bertocci argues that "the terms 'freedom' and 'creativity' and even 'choice' occur frequently, but in the last analysis, the growth, change, or development that they [psychologists] have in mind involves the becoming that a given individual, with his potential must become in the environment that presses in upon him. The change is 'free' if some notion of an implicit goal is injected as the 'end' of the development". Bertocci then adds the following qualification: "the word 'must' may seem too strong here, but it is intended to convey the idea that what happens as a result of interaction between individual and environment would be entirely predictable if we knew fully what the past and present forces in a given situation are". (Ibid.). We are reminded of Allport's argument, cited above in part one of this study, that "successful prediction ... is the acid test of science ... Only a complete understanding of his personality, of his present and future circumstances, will give us a basis for sure prediction". (G. W. ALLPORT, "The General and the Unique in Psychological Science"; The Person in Psychology, p. 88.).
decision. And it is precisely this 'felt' freedom which Allport cannot accommodate in his theory of personality. We have seen that his principal reason for hesitation in this respect was his pervasive fear of homunculism. Bertocci thus must present a theory of freedom of choice that can both account for the 'felt' aspect of freedom together with the determined aspect which Allport has enumerated in his analyses.

a) Bertocci's Theory of Human Freedom.

In his discussions on the nature of human freedom Bertocci characteristically appeals to the introspective data of consciousness: "the effort of will as introspected is the experiential base for the assertion that the will is free to exert its intrinsic power, whatever efficacy it may turn out to have".¹ In such introspective reflection, Bertocci argues, the effort of willing can clearly be distinguished from

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, "William James' Psychology of Will: An Evaluation", Philosophical Forum, 4 (1946), 5. Cf. also Idem, "The Moral Structure of the Person", Review of Metaphysics, 14 (1960-61), 374: "Here we emphasize what seems to be an undeniable, prima facie datum of experience, which constitutes the basis for our conviction that we are free within limits to make a difference in what will occur to us ..." Cf. also Idem, Personality and the Good, pp. 178-79.
the activities of wanting, oughting, or thinking. Indeed, "will-agency is an activity with a qualitative psychic tone of its own which makes a difference in my total awareness when it is present".  

Thus, Bertocci argues, the difference between thinking and associating clearly manifests the unique qualitative difference which effort or will adds to any situation. By thinking, Bertocci means "the process of relating ideas to each other to answer questions, or to solve problems in accordance with logical norms and some accepted criterion of

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1P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Moral Structure of the Person", p. 373. Cf. also Idem, Personality and the Good, pp. 182-83: "At this point, the reader must be the final judge as to whether he does find himself having experiences in which this willed effort - which is different in its 'feel' from 'wanting' or desiring - is a pervasive factor on those occasions in which he asserts himself, as it were, against the dominant tendency at a given juncture in his experience, and in favor of an approved, dominant goal". Cf. also Idem, Free Will, Responsibility, and Grace, p. 18: "I am asserting, then, that the experience of will, of effort, of fiat, is prima facie at least, qualitatively unique ..." Cf. also Idem, "Free Will, the Creativity of God, and Order", in Current Philosophical Issues: Essays in Honor of Curt John Ducasse, ed. by F. C. Dommeyer (Illinois: Thomas, 1966), pp. 216-17.
On the other hand, the "psychological processes of remembering and associating are, at any one moment, filling my consciousness with images and ideas which are there before I can do anything about them".\(^2\) Thinking occurs only when there is effort to "keep affirming and adopting a thought which, if left to itself, would slip away".\(^3\) Bertocci can thus approvingly quote James' contention that "although attention is the first and foremost thing in volition, express consent to the reality of what is attended to is an additional and quite distinct phenomenon involved".\(^4\) Hence Bertocci's statement that "when I want both to stop associating and continue thinking, to exert effort makes it possible for me to continue the activity of thinking beyond the point where, were my battlefield left to itself, I would stop thinking".\(^5\)

\(^{2}\) Ibid.  
\(^{3}\) WILLIAM JAMES, Principles of Psychology, II, p. 565.  
\(^{5}\) P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Moral Structure of the Person", p. 373.
It is in this sense that Bertocci can view 'will-agency' as the condition of truth-finding:

Any rational faith in the reflective life is baseless unless human beings can plow through difficulties, interpret data and develop hypotheses in the way which makes all the difference between rationalizing and reasoning. If thinking is going to be more than having ideas flit through one's mind, lighting up this emotion and that impulse; if thinking is to be the more orderly process of logically connecting ideas with each other, with the data, and with the problem to be solved, then there must be sufficient will-agency to initiate and continue the process of organizing varied data in accordance with the demands of experiential growing coherence.\(^1\)

Bertocci can thus claim that "perhaps the most fundamental of all moral actions, the act at the base of all others, is the willingness to think as accurately and as circumspectly as possible".\(^2\)

Bertocci is careful to point out that such an interpretation of the experience of free will does not involve him in either an homunculus self,

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 376-77. Cf. also Idem, Free Will, Responsibility, and Grace, pp. 24-25: "... I am suggesting that the word truth itself, the distinction between a warranted conclusion and any other conclusion, is meaningless, unless man's freedom is first and foremost the free will to think, to interpret, to correlate, what is happening to him". Cf. also Idem, Personality and the Good, pp. 192-93.

\(^2\)P. A. BERTOCCI, Free Will, Responsibility and Grace, p. 25. Bertocci thus re-echoes the position of William James, in Principles of Psychology, II, 566: "To sustain representation, to think, is, in short, the only moral act, for the impulsive and the obstructed, for sane and lunatics alike".
or a purely capricious will. Indeed, throughout his writing he
constantly appeals to a distinction between will-agency and will-power:
"will-agency is free initiative; will-power is the measure of control
determined by its interplay with other factors in the total choice
situation".¹ Indeed, Bertocci argues that

whatever free-agency a person has is never agency which
operates (1) outside the basic unlearned capacities of
the person, or (2) outside the particular engagement
of such capacities in the more or less stable
dispositions of the personality thus far developed.²

Thus will-power "is a joint-product of my will-agency and all the factors
psychological and otherwise in the choice-matrix".³ Thus the degree of
will-power which a person has can never be completely certain. To this
extent, will-agency is not some capricious power which can operate
independently of a person's personality structure. Indeed, "will-agency
cannot break habits and attachments 'at will', for will-agency is always

also Idem, "William James' Psychology of Will: An Evaluation", p. 4;
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 228-31; "The Moral

also Idem, Personality and the Good, p. 184: "The two terms, 'will-agency'
and 'will-power', are introduced not because we have two discontinuous
experiences, but to focus attention on two phases of the total psychological
matrix in which willing is present".

hedged about, or works within, the total complex of 'forces' that are at play within the personality at any given time".¹

At this stage, two further points in Bertocci's argument must be noted. To begin with, "the most vivid consciousness of will comes in our experience of resistance to approved ideals".² And, consequently, "willing does not enter into experience until the person is mature enough to become aware of alternatives".³ Will-agency is thus a highly conscious activity possible only for a being capable of reflecting upon alternative possibilities. Thus Bertocci can argue that "will-agency is one kind of activity that a person can perform under conditions in which, presented with alternatives, a person initiates action in favor of the approved end at that moment".⁴ This is an interesting qualification, since it enables Bertocci to admit that "when the will exerts itself it seems not to exert itself as much as some other conscious activity intrinsic to the choice situation".⁵

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, Personality and the Good, p. 184.
⁴P. A. BERTOCCI, Personality and the Good, p. 185.
Yet, he argues, the will should not be considered a form of some underlying activity like feeling, or emotion, or intellect; this is precisely the type of consideration which leads to the situation where, "picturing the choice-situation as we would the meeting of three physical bodies [viz. will, intellect, and emotion] at a certain point, we then go on to think that the outcome of the situation could be predicted by one who knew enough about the power and position of each factor". Indeed, the more accurate consideration lies elsewhere:

But we are much more closer to the actual situation as experienced if we think of each psychical event as a moment in the experience of the self, and of each mental process and ability as an activity which is constitutive of the very structure of the self. Willing is a form of activity in which the self engages under circumstances involving choice. Indeed, willing is so closely associated with a self's being all that it can, given its powers, that one might well say with Stern, volo, ergo sum, - especially if he wanted to point to the fact that a person is most conscious of himself when he is asserting himself, despite resistance, in a preferred direction.

From this point of view, Bertocci can argue that

1 Ibid., p. 11.
2 Ibid.
such moral freedom ... is not itself a product of other formations in personality. It is a native capacity or function of a person capable of reflection. This initiating effort persists along with other formations in personality and its effectiveness is therefore influenced by them. But its own action is a formative factor in the matrix of personality development at a reflective level - even though the person does not succeed in achieving his approved goal.

The significance of Bertocci's position on the nature of freedom is clearly illustrated in his critical review of Allport's The Nature of Prejudice. While accepting Allport's analysis of the nature of prejudice as that dynamic structure which results when a person's aggression, caused by the frustration of his desire for 'affiliation', becomes displaced upon relatively defenseless 'goats', Bertocci raises the question "Must the individual whose affiliative need is frustrated, and who feels aggressive, displace on defenseless 'goats'?" For it is at this point, Bertocci argues, that

the psychologist's 'scientific' frame of reference comes into play and he begins to look for causes for the particular displacements. He wants to know what it is

\[1\text{P. A. BERTOCCI, Personality and the Good, p. 196. (Italics added).}

\[2\text{P. A. BERTOCCI, "Gordon W. Allport's The Nature of Prejudice and the Problem of Choice", Pastoral Psychology, 5 (1954), 34.} \]
that makes one displace, so that he can provide the conditions which will ensure or control its occurrence. ¹

Within this frame of reference, Allport suggests that people high in prejudice may be more susceptible to frustration; indeed, there may even be a 'constitutional irritability in their nature', or they may have a stronger craving for affiliation and status. ² Yet, Bertocci points out, Allport himself is "fully aware that frustration does not have to lead to aggression, that some individuals simply do not either blame others or themselves for frustration, but simply 'take it' ... " ³ From this point of view, Bertocci suggests that a person, frustrated and faced by the alternative of say, bearing or blaming, can will either to bear or to blame ... a point comes in a person's experience when, the conditions having been set up for him both by his own present and past nature, and by impinging environmental forces, he must add the last determining act himself.

In other words, "persons themselves are initiating causes in the presence of alternatives presented by their past histories and present opportunities". ⁵

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¹Ibid.
²Cf. Ibid.
³Ibid. ⁴Ibid.
⁵Ibid., p. 36.
At this point Bertocci raises a possible objection that such a reintroduction of the concept of will will not help us to 'predict and control prejudice'. To this he replies that, while this is so, "we are trying to understand the full dynamics of prejudice", yet, on Allport's analysis, "we have conceptualized the structure of human nature without reference to the possibility of choice; we have looked for particular mechanisms or motives or 'capacities' which automatically trigger our responses".¹ Such a conception of human nature is not only 'untrue to the data of our experience', but could also be quite damaging. Thus, argues Bertocci, "the individual who comes to believe that he has no will may never use any that he has;

¹Ibid. This, of course, is the crucial problem of the 'givens' emerging once more.
he feels 'a victim' dependent completely on circumstances".  

1Ibid. The problem of accounting for freedom within determinism which plagued Allport occurs with equal perplexity in the thought of Ludwig Binswanger. In Binswanger's case we are never sure, as with Allport's analysis of prejudice, whether insanity is caused by the individual himself, his 'givens' in Allport's sense, or somehow a combination of both. Thus Binswanger will state: "Suzanne Urban was ... from childhood on a self-willed, obstinate and inconsiderate person who could never subordinate herself to the opinion of others, who never formed real friendships, who had, in general, little trust in her fellow man". (LUDWIG BINSWANGER, "Introduction to Schizophrenie", in Being-in-the World, p. 263). He will then state that "it was Lola's constitution, perhaps aggravated by lack of moral training, which can account for her first anxious insecurity as well as for her later fears of fate and enemies". ("The Case of Lola Voss, Ibid., p.325.). Binswanger will even describe insanity as "a mode in which the Dasein of its own free will renounces neither life nor social life. What rather is renounced is life as independent, autonomous selfhood ..." ("Introduction to Schizophrenie", Ibid., p. 259).
There are two interesting aspects to Bertocci's opposition to Allport over the nature of prejudice. There is first of all a clear expression of the root difference between them on the nature of freedom together with Bertocci's assertion of his starting point and criterion of truth. But there is the additional aspect of the difference in 'framework' - and here Bertocci emphasizes understanding as the principal task of scholars, and the control and prediction Allport seeks as a secondary task completely dependent upon the principal one. At the same time, Bertocci emphasizes the pragmatic concern of his attempt at understanding man's nature, when he points to the dangers any distorted view of this nature can introduce.

Bertocci has thus produced a subtle theory on the nature of human freedom. Beginning with the data of experience, in this case of adult reflective consciousness at any moment of decision or choice, and by interpreting it in an experientially coherent manner, Bertocci has argued that the activity of willing (or effort) consists primarily in attention and consent to an activity of the self (such as thinking, emoting, wanting), and finally in the decision to adopt one alternative rather than another. He has stressed the distinction between will-agency and will-power, thereby underlining (1) that will-agency is a 'given', is part constitutive of the person as a 'native capacity' similar to thinking or remembering, etc, at the originative pole of
personal being, and (2) that such will-agency is dependent for its
efficacy on the other 'givens' in the person as they develop
(personality) together with its environment.

b) The Significance of This Secondary Focal Point:

This examination of the nature of freedom in the thought of
Allport and Bertocci has served to re-emphasize the importance of
starting point in any theory of personal being. We have seen that
Allport, by insisting on his starting point of the observable stream
of activity, was unable to account for the 'felt' freedom each person
feels to be his in any decision or choice upon which he has reflected.
Here Allport's naturalism becomes evident: that such decisions are
made, none will dispute; how they are made can be ascertained by
examination of the factors at play in any given personality and its
environment; but why they are made is not a question Allport is willing
to raise. Thus, while a person's decision unquestionably depends upon
his native constitution, his educational environment, and the
environment of the moment, this is merely to point to the degree of
will-power any person may have at any particular moment. And since a
person's will-power is dependent upon such 'givens', a necessary
connection between these givens and his final decision can certainly
be established. Yet this form of understanding is a far cry from the
form of understanding that would have enabled us to predict that X would have made decision Y rather than decision Z. The very fact that alternatives are possible is due to the 'givens' of any situation, i.e. that human beings are capable of reflection and decision, and that in any human situation, there are numerous possibilities of 'response', any one of which is intrinsically dependent on the person-personality involved and the situation. To this extent, Allport merely offers the conditions of freedom - the capacity man has for reflection on possible courses of action to the exclusion of others - but not the actual freedom to choose one alternative rather than another. And the reason for this is quite simple: his starting point and method make such an interpretation of freedom unnecessary. After all, what is observable is the will-power of the individual, and this is explicable in terms of that individual's givens at birth together with their growth in interplay with his evolving environment.

Bertocci, on the other hand, by insisting on the 'felt' experience of will or effort, and by insisting that this erlebt experience be considered a 'given' which must be considered part constitutive of the person, radically opposes Allport's analysis. We would argue that his distinction between will-agency and will-power accurately illuminates the point of contention between Allport and himself. For while will-power is the result of natural capacities in the individual and their
interaction with his environment, and can thereby be 'observed' and subsequent decisions be 'explained' in this light, such explanations in fact explain away the very experience of will or effort they set out to explain. As with all naturalistic theories, the explicandum emerges as the explicans. Bertocci's position is thus clear:

I am arguing that in the very nature of our experience and development of character, insofar as it is willed, we have a stark, brute kind of event that defies analysis into logical connection, mechanical connection, and even telic connection of the sort exhibited at the biological level. In the creative event to which I have been pointing, something comes into being because of willed effort that we say must have been there potentially, but this is ex post facto, only after the creative event has taken place.

There are, however, several points which Bertocci's position raises. To begin with, he must account for the 'emergence' or appearance of will-agency/will-power at the adult stage of personality development. Also, while he allows that many decisions and choices are made spontaneously in the course of a person's daily life, he must

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clarify the role of conscious 'willing' or 'effort' in the life of the person. Above all, the validity of his introspective starting point must be established or rejected, since this is the source of the disagreement between Allport and himself. Before attempting to resolve these disagreements, however, we must consider Bertocci's theory of the growth of personality, together with his conception of the role of conscious choice in the life of the person. Both of these points can best be discussed within our primary focal point of disagreement, namely the self.

3) A Primary Focal Point of Disagreement: The Self.

We have seen that the nature of the self was a major bone of contention between Allport and Bertocci throughout their long debate. The concept of 'self', so far as Allport was concerned, was synonymous with the threat of homunculism in psychology; for purposes of scientific investigation, such concepts should be avoided. For Bertocci, on the other hand, the concept of 'self' was central to his whole scheme of ideas and theories concerning the nature of man; to ignore the 'self' is to ignore the most fundamental aspect of man's being, namely, his most immediate sense of being. We have seen that the debate centred on two major issues: the accounting for the continuity of personality through growth and development, together with the accounting
for the 'knowing function' by which man, in reflection, is able to
know that he knows. We propose to examine these issues separately,
since we feel that a clarification of the differences involved will
facilitate our proposed resolution of this debate.

a) The Problem of Personal Continuity.

We have seen that personal continuity in itself presented no
problem to either Allport or Bertocci. Memorial activity is our
surest guarantee that we are the 'same' as we were yesterday, and will
be the 'same' again tomorrow. Yet when we attempt to understand this
aspect of personal being, we immediately run into problems. Thus
Allport, recognising the enormous difference between infant and adult
motivation, was led to introduce his theory of the functional autonomy
of motives in order to account for this radical difference. He could
then appeal to the continuity of the 'organism' through growth, while
maintaining discontinuity in motivation. Bertocci, on the other hand,
by beginning in the specious present with the datum self was faced with
a different set of problems, above all the problem of accounting for
intermittent consciousness. We saw that he did this by broadening his
concept of 'self' to include those unconscious or preconscious mental
activities which were continuous with conscious conative activities.
Yet, another set of problems awaited Bertocci, namely, how to account
for the advent of such activities as reflection, willing and oughting,
which appear only in the mature person. We have seen that Bertocci attacked Allport's theory of motivation precisely because it failed to account for the longitudinal continuity of personal being, and we noted that this was a prime example of Allport's naturalism. In reviewing this particular focal point, we shall see that once again the starting point is of crucial importance.

It will be recalled that in their original clash, both Allport and Bertocci clearly presented and attacked their respective views on the nature of personal continuity. Thus Bertocci, beginning with the complex motives and ideals of the adult, appeals to a hormist or instinct theory to account for the emergence of such highly purposive activity as we witness in adult motivation. In referring to pleasure, Bertocci asks if the kind of pleasure obtained from the satisfaction of a bodily need such as eating-pleasure could "give birth to aesthetic, social, or intellectual pleasure without the entrance of any other need or desire". To this he replies:

As the situation now stands, we can appeal to the mysterious concept of ontogenic emergent evolution to account for the appearance of new needs and consequent pleasures. Or we can appeal to an instinct-theory which attempts to delineate what these basic drives (and consequent pleasures) are in the first place and then shows how they are modified by ability and environment to constitute the uniqueness and the
continuity of the individual personality.\(^1\)

Allport, however, opted for ontogenic emergent evolution:

Bertocci regards it as inconceivable that sophisticated purposes should emerge from vegetative urges. It is black magic, he thinks, to hold that out of the young infant's demand for only the physical comfort its mother can give, should eventually grow a craving for the 'social, aesthetic, and mental' comfort of her companionship. This proposition does not seem magical to me, but on the contrary about as simple and straightforward a statement of empirical fact as we are likely to find in the realm of motivation.\(^2\)

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\(^1\)P. A. BERTOCCI, "A Critique of G. W. Allport's Theory of Motivation", p. 520. Bertocci adopted a theory of instincts based partly on McDougall's theories. (Cf. Ibid., pp. 503-04; Idem, "Sentiments and Attitudes", Journal of Social Psychology, 11 (1940), 245-57; Idem, Personality and the Good, pp. 157-74). We shall not enter into this aspect of Bertocci's thought, since it is not entirely relevant to this study as such. Bertocci's basic thesis is that "in every person ... there is a structure of unlearned motive-need and ability (talent, intellectual and otherwise) that persists, though not rigidly, through the changes that go on in him and confront him from without."(Ibid., p. 158). The point of interest for this study is that some theoretical basis is required to account for the continuity of personality throughout such changes as those involved in the transition from infant to adult motivation. We agree with Bertocci (as our text proceeds to explain) that Allport's theoretical basis, namely, functional autonomy, fails to accomplish just this.

\(^2\)G. W. ALLPORT, "Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci", p. 543.
Thus Allport's starting point reasserted itself: the stream of activity which we observe supplies the data for all subsequent theories. In this light, adult motives do 'supplant' infant motives.¹ Nor need we appeal beyond this observed datum to any instinct theory since, Allport argued, the principle of functional autonomy can account adequately for such supplanting. To this Bertocci later replied:

> If Allport gives up the continuity in striving that doctrines of persisting motives provide, if he substitutes a doctrine of motives that stresses the discontinuity of present motivational structures with the past, he is faced with the formidable problem of accounting for the inner, long-range, complex variety and continuity of personality... But metaphysical theories of emergence explain variety, novelty, and plurality always at the possible expense of systematic unity, so, if the discussion is pushed to a deeper level, the same problem of accounting for unity despite discontinuity needs to be faced.²

Yet, quite apart from this metaphysical level, Bertocci argues, Allport must answer on the purely psychological level, since:

> what is to hold a personality (not its bodily aspect alone) together if motives, being functionally autonomous, have no continuous inner bonds with each other or with pervasive motives? On the face of it, there is no ground for assuming either continuity or unity of aim if functional autonomy, the emergence of new motives, the supplanting of old, is taken seriously. Yet it is the

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¹Cf. Ibid., p. 545.

complex unity of this unique system that Allport makes the obstinate empirical datum of personality theory.¹

We have seen that Allport was unable to provide a satisfactory account of the 'anchorage' or unifying principle of personality. Indeed, his own account of functional autonomy is guilty, as Bertocci correctly points out, of fragmentising the very unified datum it seeks to explain.

This question of 'emergence' within personality-structure is central to the Allport-Bertocci debate. We have already seen its intrusion in the problem of freedom, and now in the problem of accounting for the longitudinal unity and continuity of personal being. Yet there is another specific aspect of personal being which serves as an illuminating focal point for the agreement and disagreement both of these thinkers were destined to encounter, once given their respective starting points. The issue is again the question of the interpretation of the advent of an activity-experience in personal being at the adult stage. We shall see that Allport, characteristically, opted for a theory of 'emergence' or supplantation, while Bertocci opts for a theory of instincts, or innate growth. In both cases, the issue is at once the contemporaneity of motives and the continuity of

¹Ibid.
personal being. The issue was the articulation of the experience of moral obligation.

We have noted that Allport greatly admired Bertocci's approach to this question, frankly praising him for his 'phenomenological' approach. Indeed, one of Bertocci's recurrent arguments has been that the experience of moral obligation or 'ought' is radically different from the experience of compulsion or 'must'. Indeed, this experience

\[\text{G. W. ALLPORT, "Scientific Models and Human Morals", in Personality and Social Encounter, p. 67, footnote 13.}\]

\[\text{2Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, The Person, Obligation, and Value", The Personalist, 40 (1959), 144: "It is such a far cry from 'I must', or 'I want', to 'I ought', that this writer would hold that the experience of obligation is as primitive and irreducible as the experience of wanting or thinking, and that it appears in the maturing person at that point when he begins to contemplate and compare alternatives. The moment he decides which alternative is best, he feels, I ought to do it. Thus we may conceptualize the experience of oughting in the words 'I ought to do the best I know'". Cf. also Idem, "A Reinterpretation of Moral Obligation", pp. 273-79; Idem, "The Moral Structure of the Person", pp. 380-82; Idem, Personality and the Good, pp. 209-20.}\]
of obligation as erlebt is so unique in its 'psychic tone' that Bertocci argues that it must be considered a distinct activity part constitutive of the self.\textsuperscript{1} Once again the difference in starting point between these two thinkers becomes apparent: Bertocci appealing to the introspective data of the adult, while Allport appeals to the observable stream of activity beginning at birth. Thus Bertocci states:

We propose therefore to analyze our adult experience of moral obligation, because, after all, we shall surely make errors in tracing the genesis of an experience if we do not describe it accurately in its adult form.\textsuperscript{2}

Such an analysis leads him to conclude that

the basic unlearned endowment of human nature has two components that are not granted in most recent 'scientific' psychology ... These components are the notion of (limited) free-will-agency, and of moral obligation. We must not bog down in the important genetic question as to when these appear in the

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Moral Structure of the Person", p. 380: "I shall use the verb 'oughting' for the erlebt experience of obligation. Oughting, like willing, thinking, sensing, does not exist except as a focus or phase of the person. It is distinguished from what I ought, just as I distinguish thinking from thoughts - although, as there is no experience of thinking without thoughts, so there is no oughting without oughts".

\textsuperscript{2}P. A. BERTOCCI, Personality and the Good, p. 209.
human being, for our contention is that genetic psychology cannot know what it is tracing unless the analysis of what we know most directly in adult experience is adequate.¹

Allport, however, refused to follow Bertocci's advice:

My position is somewhat different. While I agree concerning the phenomenological difference, I believe that the observation of children assures us that the must precedes the ought and is a necessary first stage in the process of becoming. For this reason I prefer an emergent to an innate theory of moral obligation.²

Allport explains this 'transformation' or supplantation as follows:

1. External sanctions give way to internal - a change adequately accounted for by the processes of identification and introjection familiar in Freudian and behavioral theory. 2. Experiences of prohibition, fear, and 'must' give way to experiences of preference, self-respect, and 'ought' ... 3. Specific habits of obedience give way to generic self-guidance, that is to say, to broad schemata of values that confer direction upon conduct.

Thus, on Allport's view, the 'ought' emerges from the 'must'. We have, as Bertocci pointed out, novelty without continuity for, on introspection, the 'psychic tones' of the prohibition, fear, and 'must' which Allport

¹Ibid., p. 217. We shall return to this allusion to "what we know most directly in adult experience" below.

²G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 74, footnote. (Italics added).

³Ibid., p. 73 (Italics added).
mentioned above are quite different from the 'psychic tones' of preferences, self-respect, and 'ought'. As Bertocci insists:

we shall leave it to the genetic and developmental psychologist to tell when and under what conditions these facets of human nature occur, but we shall refuse to have them explained away as the 'results' or 'by-products' of other factors which, as we experience them, simply do not have the same psychic quality ...¹

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, Personality and the Good, pp. 217-18. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this study to enter into Bertocci's highly developed theory of moral obligation and normative universalism. According to Bertocci, the conceived best is determined by a theory of values (normative universalism) in which value claims are judged to be best or dependable according to a criterion of growing, empirical coherence with other value claims and facts involved in the total situation in which the moral agent finds himself. Bertocci argues that, in any choice situation where the person is presented with alternatives, the person experiences an irreducible imperative to the conceived best. In this context, his earlier theory of the nature of freedom is synoptically coherent with such an interpretation of moral experience. Thus, although the person experiences an obligation to the conceived best, he is nevertheless free to choose the other alternative. Once again, Bertocci has made allowance for the 'determinism' of the 'givens' in any human situation, since the 'conceived best' will depend upon each person's value system and value experience to date in interaction with a given environment. Cf. Ibid., especially chapters 9 and 13; also Idem, "Values and Ethical Principles: Comments on Professor Reck's Review of Personality and the Good", Philosophical Forum, 22 (1965), 82-86.
We would argue that Bertocci is correct in his criticisms of Allport's attempts to account for the unity and continuity of personal being through change and growth: quite simply. Allport's naturalism is unable to account for the appearance of novelty, be it in motive or experience, while at the same time accounting for continuity. An anchorage of some sort is needed to provide for this continuity. We have already seen, in part one, that Allport's introduction of the proprium did not solve this problem in any satisfactory way. Indeed, both the proprium and the principle of the functional autonomy of motives require some form of anchorage in order to account for the unity of personal being they in fact presuppose, but which finally they merely succeed in fragmentising. Bertocci, on the other hand, is able to present an account of the unity and continuity of personal being by his introduction of his concept of the self, together with a theory of instincts or innate capacities. The issue, of course, is not, we repeat, whether there is personal continuity - both Allport and Bertocci are firm in their agreement on this point - but rather

1This is not to endorse Bertocci's theory of instincts, although we see no objection to them as explanatory of the gradual advent of such factors in our experience as reflection and moral obligation.
how this personal unity and continuity can be articulated without fragmentising the personal unity and continuity we feel. And, we submit, this is something Allport's naturalism is incapable of achieving. Once more, the importance of starting point has become apparent. We must now examine the related problem which so troubled Allport in his rejection of the concept of the self: the problem of the self as knower.

b) The Problem of the Self as Knower.

Allport's sensitiveness to the enigmatic character of personal being is nowhere better manifested than in his discussion of the role of self-conscious reflection in personal being. Once again, Allport admitted that such a knowing activity took place, but his great difficulty was in accounting for its role in the total personality structure of the person. Thus, he places the full weight of 'ownership' upon this function of knowing, when, in introspection, he 'perceives' an essential togetherness of his propriate functions and 'feels' them 'intimately bound to the knowing function itself'.\(^1\) It was thus that he presented his criterion of 'warmth' or 'intimacy'.

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\(^1\) Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 53.
whereby he could identify those specific functions as propriate, such as the sense of bodily self, self-identity, self-assertion, self-extension, rationalizations, interests and strivings. The term proprium, however, was introduced by Allport to 'cover' or denote the 'self' as 'object' of knowledge and feeling.\(^1\) His dilemma is apparent: Allport is left with a knowing function which in itself is unknowable. Thus while we may know or be acquainted with 'the empirical features of our own proprium',\(^2\) only the knowing function can relate them together and to itself, yet without at the same time knowing itself. The knowing function simply is not one of the empirical features of the proprium but is rather the condition of these features being empirical in the first place.

Allport, of course, realized that he was on treacherous ground, and it is to his credit that he mentioned the philosophical disputes over the nature of the knowing function. Yet neither the transcendental ego of Kant, nor the thinking thought of William James, were satisfactory accounts of this complex problem.\(^3\) Allport could thus,

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\(^1\)Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 127.

\(^2\)Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 53.

\(^3\)So argued Allport in Becoming, pp. 51-53, Cf. also Idem, Pattern and Growth in Personality, p. 129.
with relief, appeal to his naturalism: such a knowing function is a fact, but a fact which need not cause the psychologist any discomfort, since it can be assumed as an 'eighth clear function of the proprium'.

Yet, as Bertocci continuously points out, this is not an adequate account of the knowing function within the structure of the person. While it accounts for the fact that knowledge of some sort takes place, it does not account for that peculiar type of knowledge which occurs in self-conscious reflection. For here the self or proprium knows itself, and, on Allport's analysis, this is to admit that the knower and known are one and the same. In Bertocci's words, there is a perpetual squinting on the part of such a proprium. Allport's account of the self as knower is thus lamentably inadequate, but we have seen that his reasons for such inadequacy were to a great extent justified. The spectre of homunculism was Allport's constant companion.

Once again, the essential importance of starting point becomes apparent. Allport has no qualms about introducing the term proprium

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1G. W. ALLPORT, *Becoming*, p. 53.

2That is to say, unless Allport admits a form of 'knowledge' which is transparent to itself. There is no such admission in Allport's writings. We shall return to this problem in the following chapter.
to denote the self as object of knowledge and feeling. After all, this empirical self is included within the observable stream of activity which Allport has assumed as his starting point. To this extent, he was correct in arguing that some degree of introspection and direct reporting was necessary for any fruitful understanding of personality. However, a self that is knowing but not known, a self which is somehow non-empirical or non-observable, which is thus somehow 'transcendental' - such a self cannot be admitted to psychology precisely because it is no longer contained within the observable stream of activity which is taken as the source of all data. Allport's excruciating dilemma was thus unavoidable. His common sense criterion with its complementary pluralism, his desire to follow the inexorable path of logic and admit a self if the data so require, all of these were entirely inadequate to meet with the problem of the self as knower, precisely because all of them were at the service of an investigation whose starting point precluded any adequate account of an activity which was somehow beyond

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1We use the term 'transcendental' in Allport's sense when he asked: "Do we not have in addition a cognizing self- a knower, that transcends all other functions of the proprium and holds them in view?" (Becoming, p. 51). As will become evident in the following chapter, we do not envisage a Kantian or Husserlian transcendental ego, but a self which is transparent to itself.
the observable stream of activity of the individual. Thus, while Allport admitted the knowing function, and included it within the appropriate structure of the personality, his very starting point precluded his ever being able to adequately account for its functioning.

Bertocci, on the other hand, is able to include the knowing function within the erlebt experiences of the person. By identifying the self or person with its mental activities, and while the knowing function is obviously one of these activities, Bertocci thereby has no difficulty in including such an activity within the structure of the person. Nor has he any difficulty in accounting for self-conscious reflection: the self, as the unity of its activities is 'transparent'. Thus he asserts that this conscious unity of activities is 'not hidden from introspection', and is thus not an homunculus. He thus appeals to the self-experience of the specious present in which the unity of the self is given in consciousness. The conscious fact that each

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1Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, "The 'Self' in Recent Psychology of Personality: A Philosophical Critique", p. 28. This assertion of the transparency of the self requires further discussion. We shall return to this point in the following chapter.
conscious activity of thinking, willing, oughting, remembering, feeling, etc., is 'mine' and is always thus 'owned' is the basis of self-awareness, when the self, in reflection, can 'know' itself in its experiences. We have noted that Bertocci's reliance on self-experience (inherited from Brightman), was a factor Allport failed to understand. Yet it was also a factor intrinsically tied to Bertocci's method of introspection. We shall return to the very real problems such a method must encounter, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that on Bertocci's analysis, the self as knower is adequately accounted for in his conception of the self as a unitas multiplex capable of self-experience and self-awareness. His concept of the self as the unity of its activities gives also the necessary anchorage which Allport's proprium requires.

We may conclude this discussion of this primary focal point of disagreement by repeating the importance of starting point for both of these thinkers. In attempting to account for the admitted continuity of personal being, Allport was unable to offer any anchorage to explain the continuity in motivation which his principle of functional autonomy disrupted. While he may criticize personalistic thinkers for their
circular pronouncements à la Gertrude Stein, Allport himself falls into this same type of circularity in asserting that personality is continuous because of propriate striving, while the proprium itself is formed through such striving. Equally, while emphasizing the contemporaneity of motives with his principle of functional autonomy, Allport thereby failed to account for the unification of striving and motivation in the development of personality. Allport is thus left with a process of becoming which, in its dynamic openness to novelty, loses its roots with its past. Indeed, while we most certainly observe such becoming, we must, if we are to be honest in our search for understanding, give some account of the continuity which we experience at the same time. This Allport fails to do. Bertocci, on the other hand, by appealing to a theory of instincts, is able to give some theoretical basis for both the novelty and continuity which we experience in personal being.

Also, in attempting to account for this obstinate fact of self-conscious awareness, of the self as knower, Allport was led

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}Cf. G. W. ALLPORT, "The Ego in Contemporary Psychology" in Personality and Social Encounter, p. 72: "Much of self-psychology, we must now admit, dwelt on the unenlightening plane of dialectics. Its statements were often redundant or circular: in the manner of Gertrude Stein, it sometimes asserted that a self is a self is a self".}\]
to conclude that while it must be admitted that the knowing function is an unquestionable fact of personal being and must thereby be a proprieate function, just what the nature of this function is, Allport will not venture to suggest. His only caveat is that such a knowing function be not construed as evidence of a 'soul' or 'self' which somehow 'transcends' the observable stream of activity. An empirical self he will admit, but a 'transcendental ego' is inadmissable. Yet it is precisely this unknowable function which serves as the 'anchor' or criterion of identification of those functions which are central to the person and which constitute the proprium. It is at this point that Allport's starting point becomes apparent: for methodological reasons he refuses to admit any self other than the empirical self (proprium) to the science of psychology, for this would be to go beyond the observable stream of activity in the individual. Bertocci, on the other hand, by arguing from the datum self of introspection, is able to offer a concept of the self as knower which can account for self-conscious awareness while avoiding the danger of homunculism. Thus the self is not something above or beyond the knowing function, since this knowing function is but a phase of that unity of mental activities which constitutes the self.

The question which now must be raised and answered is this: is a resolution of this debate possible, and, if so, how?
3. A Resolution of the Allport-Bertocci Debate.

We believe that a resolution of this debate is possible, but not without some concessions on the part of both Allport and Bertocci. The resolution we have in mind remains within the framework of the debate we have been studying in these pages, although its consequences, we submit, must carry us beyond this same framework to a degree. We have noted the extraordinary degree of agreement between these two thinkers: both are acutely aware of the uniqueness of the individual, both are problem-centred rather than method-centred, both are pluralistic, eclectic and pragmatic in perspective, both rely heavily on common sense convictions, and both consider their respective disciplines to be essentially complementary. Yet the basic differences also emerged: each adopts a starting point with its own ineluctable démarche, and the effects of this choice are reflected in their respective interpretations of man's freedom and self-consciousness. We shall begin with Allport, noting the concessions he must give, before turning to Bertocci and our proposed resolution of the debate.
To begin with, we submit, Allport must admit an agent-self to his scientific investigations of the nature of personal being. We have seen that de facto Allport virtually does so in his treatment of the self as knower and in his inclusion of the knowing function within the proprium. Let us enumerate the reasons for this necessary admission once more. To begin with, Allport admits that we are aware of our identity as it persists throughout changes in personality structure, as in the transformations which occur between infancy and adulthood. On his own common sense view of personal being, Allport insists that motives must be viewed for what they are, namely, contemporary 'systems' within a given personality. In order to support this notion of the contemporaneity of motives, Allport was led to the introduction of the principle of the functional autonomy of motives. He thus was able to establish the contemporaneity of motives, but at the expense of the continuity of personality. There is indeed a dynamic organization within the individual organism, but there is no principle of organization. Thus, while we may admit that personality develops in the manner observable in the stream of activity we witness any individual manifesting, we are a long way from understanding such development if we cannot give some account of why such development is taking place. We have argued that Allport's naturalism precludes such
an accounting, but that his analysis of personality development indeed demand some principle of organization.

We also saw Allport's attempt at such an accounting within his own naturalistic framework. He argued that propriate functions emerge in the organism, foremost among which is the function of propriate striving. Here again, we submit, Allport's data demand a unifying principle which somehow persists throughout the various changes in personality. His concept of the proprium as the empirical ego which somehow constitutes itself involved him in a circularity to which we objected. The proprium cannot be constituted through propriate striving unless the proprium is continuous with personality from birth and is the principle of such growth. Similarly, with respect to the function of knowing, we have argued that the proprium cannot know its own propriate functions unless it is seen as a principle of propriate growth. Indeed, within the logic of Allport's own analyses, and given his own common sense criterion and his pluralism, the persistent recurrence of the problem of the self as knower which Allport entertains shows that Allport was ill at ease with his own solution. Thus while his own analyses demanded the postulation of a self which knows but is not itself known, (or at least a self which knows but which is not 'empirically' knowable), Allport refused to admit such a self to his science for the methodological reason of accessibility.
Yet the burden of our argument is not merely that Allport's data require that a systematizer or organizer be postulated, but that common sense, which Allport valued so highly, equally demands that the persistent fact of consciousness, that all conscious experience is somehow 'owned', be adequately accounted for in any interpretation of personality development. Indeed, the extraordinary anomaly in Allport's thought, to which we drew attention in the first part of this study, is that his sole reason for rejecting the concept of an agent-self as knower and unifier of the psychophysical systems constitutive of personality was his fear of homunculism and his fidelity to his starting point.

We would therefore argue that Allport must admit a self as unifier, continuator and knower within his analysis of the nature of personal being as it develops in personality. The concessions he must make, therefore are:--

1. He must admit the transparency of the self, thereby admitting the fact of 'transcendence' in his sense, or a subjective knowledge of the self by the self.¹

2. He must broaden the basis of his starting point to include the 'observing observer' (or subject) who is the individual manifested in his observable stream of activity.

¹The clarification and implications of this admission, we repeat, are the burden of the following chapter.
While Bertocci has argued that his concept of the self as the unity of its activities avoids the homunculus charge, he has not adequately accounted for the transparency of the self. Indeed, while Brightman and Bertocci refer to both self-experience and to self-awareness, they do not clarify the nature of these experiences sufficiently. Thus, while Bertocci might justifiably accuse Allport's proprium of squinting, his own concept of the self is open to the same charge unless he can give an adequate account of the self's transparency. This, we submit, is assumed rather than articulated, yet such an articulation must be essential to any resolution of a debate of this nature, since it is this root experience which is the ultimate source of the problem and the conflict. Thus, while we have insisted on the crucial importance of starting point in any investigation of the nature of personal being, we have also insisted on the importance of the givens and on the interpretation of these givens. Indeed, we shall argue in the following chapter that it is precisely here that Bertocci must make a concession. It will be recalled that one of Allport's (and psychology's in general) reasons for distrusting introspection was his conviction that the mind-body problem, though unquestionably a 'riddle', tended to fragmentize the psycho-physiological unity which is found in man. There can be no question that Bertocci's
dualism merely reinforced Allport's apprehensions of homunculism in Bertocci's thought and system. The single concession, then, which Bertocci must make, together with a more adequate account of the nature of self-experience, self-awareness, and the transparency of the self, is that the person is a mind-body or psycho-physical unity in being and not merely in function.

(c) The Resolution.

If Allport were to have made the concessions we have asked for, and were Bertocci to elaborate on the transparency of the self, and concede a unity in personal being of mind and body, we see no reason why this debate should not be resolved. We are aware that the concessions on both sides are far-reaching. By conceding that the self is indeed inaccessible to psychological analysis in so far as it is 'transcendent' or not observable, Allport would be obliged to reconsider the validity of his starting point. He would also be obliged to reconsider the 'givens' at the outset of his investigations, for the givens would now have to include such experiences as freedom and moral obligation, all experiences of this 'transcendent' self, and explicable only in terms which take into account these experiences as erlebt. From this point of view his theory of emergence would face serious difficulties, since the experience of 'ought', being sui generis as erlebt, could no
longer be derived from the infantile 'must'. As a given, this experience must be accounted for in terms of itself, and not in terms of an antecedent, yet totally different, experience. Similarly with freedom: Allport would have to include the erlebt experience of freedom of choice between alternatives in his account of personality development. We have argued that such admissions, with the qualifications which Bertocci has provided, need not dismay the psychologist, since our understanding of the human situation is thereby enhanced. We have also seen that there might be some practical results from such concessions: the role of conscious choice and effort could make a difference in the manner in which a given person will react to a given situation, such as in the case of prejudice.

The concession on Bertocci's part, however, would involve a far-reaching reconsideration of his interpretation of the data of consciousness, the full extent of which will not become apparent until we have made a thorough examination of the nature of self-experience. Indeed, it is the argument of this study that the interpretation of self-experience is crucial to any attempt at understanding the nature of personal being. The elaboration of this argument will be the burden of the following chapter, but before passing to this chapter, we would re-emphasize that our aim has been to resolve this debate within the framework of the debate itself. We do not consider it necessary,
even now, to go significantly beyond this given framework, since we find in Bertocci's thought the basis we consider necessary for an adequate interpretation of personal being. Thus we would argue that an adequate account of personality development can be given if we pursue a growing, experientially or empirically synoptic interpretation of the data of experience. What we must clarify now is the precise meaning of the term 'experience'.

We would conclude this chapter by arguing that the Allport-Bertocci debate is resolvable, provided the concessions we have asked for be granted.
CHAPTER XI: THE ROLE OF SELF-EXPERIENCE IN PERSONALITY THEORY

It has been the principal argument of this study that the crucial point at issue in the Allport-Bertocci debate was the problem of starting point. We have seen how far-reaching the consequences of starting point were for both of these thinkers, involving as it does the determination of the 'givens' and the interpretation of these 'givens'. We have argued also that Allport's starting point - the observable stream of activity - is simply inadequate, and rules out any possibility of satisfactorily accounting for such aspects of personal being as the continuity of the person, the selfhood of the person, his freedom, and his sense of moral obligation. We have equally argued, albeit in a tacit form, that the starting point of Brightman and Bertocci is adequate, although we would qualify their interpretations of the data supplied in this starting point of self-experience. In this chapter we propose to clarify the Brightman-Bertocci starting point with particular reference to transparency and apodicticity, and then to suggest an alternative interpretation of bodiliness which we consider to be more synoptically coherent with the data of experience. We shall then be in a position to offer some suggestions as to the role of such a clarified self-experience in any personality theory which seeks adequacy.
1. Self-Experience and Self-Awareness

a) Bertocci's Lack of Clarity.

Bertocci's whole theory of personhood rests on his interpretation of the starting point both he and Brightman had adopted, namely, the erlebt experience of the person. It will be recalled that Brightman had argued that every conscious experience involves self-experience, but that this self-experience was not to be identified with self-awareness, which occurs only in reflection, and hence spasmodically. Both he and Bertocci have argued that in any 'now' of consciousness the 'datum-self' of self-experience is given immediately:

Wherever there is consciousness there is self-experience, and the word experience, unless specifically differentiated, is always used by Brightman as a synonym for consciousness ... This is another way of saying that all conscious experience is owned ... ¹

This of course is the universal conscious fact to which James alluded, yet there are serious difficulties involved in the adoption of the specious present or immediate experience as the starting point of an investigation of the nature of personal being. And these difficulties surround Bertocci's treatment of his starting point.

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, "Brightman's View of the Self, the Person and the Body", p. 22.
To begin with, Bertocci claims, on the basis of such self-experience, that he has "both psychological and logical certitudes of myself as a unity of sensing, remembering, perceiving, thinking, feeling, emoting, willing, oughting ... To put this more abstractly: An I is an undeniable complex unity of these activities".¹ We have already discussed Bertocci's division of certitude into psychological, logical, and empirically coherent. Yet what is startling in this statement is that Bertocci claims to have logical or formal certitude, and not merely psychological certitude, of the self as the unity of conscious (or mental) activities. To have logical or formal certitude requires that there should be apodictic evidence. For such evidence

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Person and His Body: Critique of Existentialist Responses to Descartes", p. 135. This same argument occurs in "Descartes and Marcel on the Person and His Body", p. 217. Cf. also Idem, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 63, where Bertocci argues that we "can never be absolutely certain of anything beyond the momentary self ..." He later qualifies this position to a degree when he states, in "Toward a Metaphysics of Creation", p. 500: "I have been urging as a highly probable if not undeniable fact, that in self-experience we have a kind of unity whose nature it is to be self-identical in change". However, this qualification does not prevent him from "suggesting that we take this fact, unity-in-change, as primitive ..." (Ibid.). (Italics added).
to be judged apodictic, there must be reflection, hence the difficulty Bertocci must face: whence this apodictic evidence?

The obvious objection to Bertocci's approach is that it smacks of what Allport referred to as 'subjective immediatism', and there are times when he does seem to advocate that the immediacy of self-experience should be taken as it is as indubitable. Thus he argues that the unity of the person "cannot be proved if by proof one means that this contention is based on some more fundamental premise. There is no more fundamental fact than the unity of being that constitutes the reasoner himself". Indeed, "we must simply accept (the) fact of unity in any specious present or moment for what it is".¹ We are thus reduced to a pre-reflective immediacy - a Gestalt: "In introspected experience, then, we find nothing more elementary than this Gestalt or durée ... What we find is an indivisible complex Gestalt of activities ..."² Thus, present in such conscious activities, there is

¹P. A. BERTOCCI, "Foundations of Personalistic Psychology", p. 293. Cf. also Ibid., p. 298 where Bertocci asks, "why go beyond experience for unity when it is there in self-experience?"

"an indefinable and ultimate qualitative feeling" which is the datum self. Yet such a position will hardly do, since it is natural for the reflecting mind to seek a fuller understanding of this primitive unity. Indeed, the 'soul-theories' Bertocci so vigorously opposes had precisely this primitive fact in mind when they elaborated their hypotheses which they hoped would account for this primitive fact. Bertocci may have 'psychological' certitude of himself as this primitive unity of an undefinable, qualitative feeling or Gestalt and the conscious activities occurring within his introspected field, but he is far from furnishing apodictic evidence to justify his claim that he has, in his own terminology, 'logical' certitude of this unity. To this extent, he relies, in the arguments just quoted, on an immediacy whose self-evidence is highly questionable, since reflective thinkers have been far from unanimous in admitting its self-evidency.2

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Another form of argument Bertocci proposes is that this unity is presupposed by the fact of memorial activity. Thus a succession of experiences, such as a clock striking the hour of six, can become an experience of succession only if these experiences are unified and can be recognised as 'mine'. Indeed, Bertocci's position goes much further than this. "Our own analysis would force us to agree that cognition of any kind - not merely remembering - implies a subject conscious of its own identity in its different apprehensions."\(^1\)

However, once again, this is not a sufficient argument in itself to establish apodictic evidence that the person is a complex unity of his conscious activities, since the soul-theorist or substantialist can still interpret this presupposition to imply that the self must be a subject somehow underlying, but not identical with, these same activities.

The difficulty involved in Bertocci's position is that when we reflect upon any specious present - as when he distinguishes between activity-potentials and activity-contents - the 'feeling'  

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 408.
of selfhood (or 'ownership' or unity) is, as he himself admits, 'indefinable'. Bertocci's difficulty can best be shown by examining his treatment of F. R. Tennant's interpretation of the specious present. Tennant, in fact, was wrestling with the problem of the fact that "I know that I am knowing" - the problem which was to harass Allport in later years. Tennant's argument was that to render intelligible the presentation of consciousness in self-consciousness, a noumenal self is needed. The basis of his argument is that the act of knowledge involves subject and object, but also that this act of knowledge involves another subject or possessor. Thus a unity is needed to unify not simply any act of cognition, but 'subjective states' as well: "every single 'content' of the empirical self's experience, every single drop in the 'stream of consciousness', must have its subject".¹ To this argument Bertocci replies:

Now we certainly do not deny that our awareness of ourselves in the act of knowing is impossible, unless there is a unity of self-experience, but it is difficult to see why the self that knows it is knowing

¹F. R. TENNANT, Philosophical Theology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1928), I, 81.
is noumenal. What seems to be given in the specious present is the whole fact 'I know what I know', not the fact that 'I know that Me knows'. It is only when we review this experience intellectualistically that we differentiate between the 'I knowing' and the 'Me knows'. We are consequently led to consider this unique experience of self-knowledge and experience in the light of our other cognitive experiences, wherein the distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon is necessary, owing to the activity of the self which knows the non-self. The unity of a specious present in which I know that I know is the (former) I conscious that it is having a certain experience of itself or of another object.¹

There are two points to this argument which must be noted: there is Bertocci's astonishing hesitancy when he offers that 'what seems to be given' is the whole fact of self-consciousness; and there is the obscure explanation of Tennant's apparent error through an appeal to a 'reviewing of this experience intellectualistically'.

We would submit that what is given most definitely in reflective self-consciousness (or self-awareness) is that 'I know that I am knowing'. We would equally submit that Tennant's error is easily understandable, and that it is not sufficient merely to dismiss this error without attempting to resolve the very real difficulty this error sought to explain in the first place. The I that is conscious that it is having a certain experience of itself must admittedly be a unique form of experience, but it must be a form of experience explicable in terms of experience, and not merely a unique 'event' or Gestalt which must be accepted as it is without any further probing. If the act of knowledge requires or involves a subject and an object, then Bertocci must admit a form of experience similar to Tennant's - a type of experience which can best be rendered 'cogito me cogitantem'. The only way Bertocci can avoid this position is to admit a form of knowledge that is transparent to itself in reflexive immediacy - a type of experience
best rendered by 'cogito, ergo sum'. In so far as such an admission

1 For the purposes of our argument, several distinctions must be introduced. To begin with, we would distinguish the pre-reflective from the reflective and reflexive, using as our basis the notion of 'posture' or attitude. Thus the pre-reflective refers to that pre-philosophical posture or attitude described by Husserl as naive: "daily practical living is naive. It is immersion in the already-given world, whether it be experiencing, or thinking, or valuing, or acting". (EDMUND HUSSERL, Cartesian Meditations, p. 152).

The reflective and reflexive refer to that philosophical attitude or posture described by Plato as beginning in wonder. (Theatetus, 155. Cf. Also ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 982b, 12: "For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize...".) Such a posture or attitude involves the willed effort to sustain the activity involved, thus involving sustained attention (Cf. WILLIAM JAMES, Principles of Psychology, I, 416-458), and concentration (Cf. MAX SCHELER, Man's Place in Nature, transl. by H. Meyerhoff (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1982), pp. 40-63).

We would then distinguish the reflective from the reflexive. Our arguments below will hopefully establish this distinction's validity, but we might, in advance, give a brief account of this distinction for the sake of clarity. The basis of this distinction lies in the type of act involved. Both are carried out - for the sake of our argument, which is not to say exclusively - in the philosophical attitude, but, while a reflective act has a phenomenal 'object' as its term of reference, a reflexive act has its very activity itself as its term of reference. While a reflective act is still centrifugal in its intentional dynamism, the reflexive act is centripetal in its attentional dynamism. Only thus can there be a Cogito, ergo sum, and not a Cogito me cogitatem.

The purpose of this distinction is two-fold:
1. To establish that the self is transparent to itself within an act carried out in the philosophic posture.
2. To render explicit this aspect of personal being, namely, the capacity of the person to seize himself as subject, and not merely as object, in an act of reflexive attention.

The reasons for introducing this subtle and perhaps debatable distinction will become apparent as our argument progresses.
has not been made or explained by Bertocci, his basic position lacks clarity, and borders closely on subjective immediatism. We shall now attempt to show that Bertocci's position is amenable to clarification, that the transparency he presupposes can be grounded in a particular type of knowledge or experience, and that this grounding can give the apodictic evidence required for logical certitude of the self as a complex unity of its mental activities.

b) Self-Experience as Implicit or Marginal.

Our attempt to clarify Bertocci's position must begin with self-experience. In this discussion of self-experience we shall begin by clarifying the use both Allport and Bertocci have made of the term 'knowledge', and then we shall argue that self-experience is not an intentional act in the Husserlian sense.

(i) Knowledge as Observation and as Introspection.

Both Allport and Bertocci assume that knowledge gained through observation and knowledge gained through introspection are equivalent. Thus Allport will state that "all features of the empirical self are know directly, through acquaintance, as any object is known which"
falls into time and space categories". Bertocci, while espousing a much more qualified epistemology, still uses the term 'knowledge' to refer to knowledge as observation and to knowledge as introspection. Thus, when describing error, Bertocci states that error occurs when an 'entity' is found "in some degree not to refer correctly to ... the state of affairs to be known". Later, he raises the possibility that even if "we had no introspective knowledge of mind", the very fact that error occurs would make the postulate of mind quite reasonable.

While we see no fundamental objection to speaking of knowing something through introspection and knowing something through observation, we realize that a great deal of caution is required in any such

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1G. W. ALLPORT, Becoming, p. 53.


discussions. Quite apart from the question of verification of judgments based upon either form of knowledge, there are serious linguistic considerations which must be kept in mind in any discussion of introspective knowledge. Indeed, the whole problem of the distinction between observational and non-observational knowledge has been the subject of lengthy debate among linguistic philosophers.¹ A full discussion of the intricacies of these debates is beyond the scope of this study, yet some mention must be made of their contribution to the problems facing any attempt to understand the nature of self-experience.

To begin with, it must be admitted that there is a radical difference between observational and non-observational knowledge. Thus, if we take the classic test-case of 'pain', we see very quickly that the knowledge that 'I am in pain' differs considerably from the knowledge that 'X is in pain'.² In first-person 'pain' statements, a

¹Cf. especially P. F. STRAWSON, Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen & Co., 1959), p. 110: "But how can one ascribe to oneself, not on the basis of observation, the very same thing that others may have, on the basis of observation, reasons of a logically adequate kind for ascribing to one?"

²Cf. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical Investigations, 303: "I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am".
different set of criteria is operative than in any second or third person pain statements, and this simply because in the former we have non-observational knowledge, while in the latter we have observational knowledge. Thus, when we ascribe pain to another, we do so on the basis of certain behavioural manifestations which can be termed 'pain behaviour'. Such pain behaviour is the basis, together with human capacities for communication and social living, for the language we use to refer to pain. Yet, when we ascribe pain to ourselves, we do so not on the basis of observation, but on the basis of the sensation we are experiencing. This fact, that it is our own experience which supplies the 'evidence' or criteria for the ascription of pain to
ourselves, has caused a great deal of confusion.\(^1\) We would submit that

\(^1\)The difficulty is that while the sense of the language we use to refer to pain is de necessitate common or public, its reference, unlike the language we use for ordinary observabilia such as 'things', is personal or private. Indeed, and this is a point which we consider incontestable, unless the sense of words like 'suffering', 'discomfort', 'pain', and 'agony' were common, and were based upon common observation and judgment concerning behavioural patterns which are found to be typical, no common language about sensations would be possible. Hence the difficulty that although (i) we ascribe pain to others, (ii) we do not ascribe pain to ourselves in the same manner, (a) because the evidence in (i) is public, while in (ii) it is private, and (b) because we observe in (i) what is public, but in (ii) what is private.

a great deal of confusion could be avoided in this respect if a somewhat artificial distinction be allowed between 'suffering', (as referring to a genus or class of sensations which are included within that spectrum of sensations running from 'discomfort' to 'agony') and those specific examples of 'suffering' which we specify as 'discomfort', 'pain', or 'agony' according to their intensity.

On the basis of this admittedly artificial or 'neat' distinction, \(^1\) we would propose the following argument:-

1. We ascribe 'suffering' to others.

2. We also ascribe the specific forms of 'suffering' to others, such as 'discomfort', 'pain', and 'agony'.

\[^1\] Ryle is, of course, quite accurate in his statement that we do not employ a 'neat' sensation vocabulary. (The Concept of Mind, p. 194). In this discussion, however, we have introduced a highly artificial distinction for the sake of clarity. At the same time, we have purposely avoided discussion of the role played by analogous descriptions of our sensations, (such as the description of a pain as a stabbing, a grinding, or a burning pain), since we do not consider their inclusion in this particular aspect of the problem to be at all relevant. On the analogous description of sensations, Cf. P. F. STRAWSON, "Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations", pp. 89-91.
3. In both 1 and 2 the evidence for such ascriptions is based upon observation of that characteristic behaviour which is the foundation of our common language of 'suffering'.

4. We do ascribe 'suffering' to ourselves.

5. We also ascribe the specific forms of 'suffering' to ourselves, such as 'discomfort', 'pain', and 'agony'.

6. In both 4 and 5 the evidence for such ascriptions is private or personal, although such ascriptions are necessarily based upon the mastery of a common language:

   (a) In 4 the evidence is given immediately and indubitably within an act of 'phenomenological attention' by a person who has mastered a common language.

   (b) In 5 the evidence is given mediately and dubitably in an act of reflective or 'phenomenological' observation by a person who has mastered a common language.1

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1 We do not intend to imply that ascription 1 is a necessary prerequisite of ascription 2, nor that ascription 4 is a necessary prerequisite of ascription 5. Indeed, these distinctions are dictated by the complex differences between the ascription of 'suffering' and/or its specifiers in first, second, and third person 'suffering' statements.
We would argue that, conscious of the difficulties involved in any discussion of observational and non-observational knowledge, we must proceed with caution in any over-hasty identification of knowledge through observation and knowledge through introspection. We also consider that our distinctions above are significant for our fuller discussion of self-experience. Thus, we have argued that our sensation of 'suffering' is given immediately and indubitably in an introspective act of pre-reflective attention and not of observation. Indeed, observation of a type we have described as 'phenomenological' occurs only in an act of reflective observation of the sensation of 'suffering' which we are undergoing. We have argued that only in this situation is error possible, in so far as the subject might identify his 'suffering' as 'pain' when it is in fact merely 'discomfort'. From this point of view, Allport's proposed 'observable stream of activity of the individual' would be somewhat reduced, since it would include only what is publicly observable by another party, and what is 'phenomenologically observable' by a subject; the immediate act of pre-reflective attention would be ignored. Yet it is precisely in such pre-reflective acts of attention that we have indubitable 'evidence' concerning our sensations. Thus while we might err or be in doubt concerning the identification of a sensation (such as 'suffering' as specified according to degrees), we cannot err or be in doubt about the actual sensation as erlebt.
We are thus compelled to reconsider the importance of erlebt experience, the starting point of Bertocci's investigations. While there can be no doubt about a subject's experiences in any specious present, as for example, if he is 'suffering', there can be doubt and error in his identification and interpretation of his sensations and erlebt experiences. The question which must now be raised is the following: in self-experience, if the self is given indubitably, can it be phenomenologically observed and identified in a manner similar to our reflective observation and identification of our sensations?

(ii) Self-Experience and Intentionality.

In our discussion of first person 'suffering' statements, we noted a marked difference in the way in which we ascribe such sensations as 'suffering' and/or its specifiers such as 'discomfort', 'pain', and 'agony' to ourselves and to others. By concentrating on first person ascriptions, we were, in fact, concentrating on sensations in so far as they are psychic phenomena, albeit psychic phenomena which are manifested physically in typical behavioural patterns. This distinction between psychic and physical phenomena was referred to by Brightman, as we noted above, in his discussion of consciousness and self-experience. And since the data of erlebt experience are de necessitate psychic phenomena, it is imperative that we examine the
nature of such phenomena.

To begin with, each psychic phenomenon contains within itself something as object, although each in its own manner; there is always this intentionality or direction towards an object (which we shall leave unspecified as to its ontological status). Briefly, there is always an intentional presence of the object in the psychic subject. Equally, such psychic phenomena are perceived in the interior consciousness in immediately evident perceptions, as we have argued above. However, we are not simply conscious of the intentional object, such as 'suffering', but we are equally conscious of being conscious of the intentional object. Thus the subject who 'feels pain' is at the same time a subject who has a 'feeling of feeling pain'. In other words, each psychic phenomenon includes consciousness of the act of intending. While the 'pain' is the primary object of consciousness which 'feels' (as an intentional act), the consciousness of 'feeling' is the secondary object (as contained in the internal consciousness in which psychic phenomena occur). ¹ This

¹ While trying to avoid the very real difficulties involved in articulating the nature of a psychic phenomenon in so far as an ultimate epistemological position is involved, we consider the above analysis to be adequate for our present purposes. We consider that our position is close to Aristotle's in the Metaphysics, 1074b 34-36: "But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way".
secondary object is not explicit or central, and can only be grasped

(italics added). The same interpretation is found in his De Anima, 429b, 5-9, and 430a, 2-9. In his commentary on De Anima, Aquinas states: "Id est, si accipiamus intelligibilia in actu, Idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, sicut idem est sentiens in actu et quod sentitur in actu. .. Species igitur rei intellectae in actu est species ipsius intellectus; et sic per eam seipsum intelligere potest... Non enim cognoscam intelletctum nostrum nisi per hoc, quod intelligimus nos intelligere". (In Libros De Anima Expositio, III, 4 lect. 9, n. 724ff.).


Leibniz held a position somewhat similar to the one we are proposing. Thus he referred to 'primitive truths of fact', such as 'I exist', which are "immediate internal experiences of an immediacy of feeling" (GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, transl. by A. G. Langley (New York: Macmillan Co., 1896), p. 410). He could thus argue: "Et de même je crois qu'on a une idée claire, mais non pas une idée distincte de la substance, qui vient à mon avis de ce que nous en avons le sentiment intérieur en nous mêmes qui sommes des substances". ("Letter to T. Burnett, 20 January, 1699", in Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, ed. by C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875), III, 247). Leibniz also distinguished between 'perception' and 'apperception'; perception being "the internal condition of the monad representing external things", while apperception is "consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this internal state". (GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ, "The Principles of Nature and of Grace", in The Philosophical Works of Leibniz, transl. by G. M. Duncan (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, 1890), p. 211). According to Leibniz only 'rational souls' or 'spirits' are capable of apperception, and it is only through such apperception that they are able to perform those acts
explicitly, it would seem, by an act of intentionality in which it becomes a primary object. We would argue that the self-experience to which Bertocci alludes is just such an implicit or 'marginal' consciousness of self as a secondary object. The great difficulty which Bertocci must face is how to account for the transformation of this implicit consciousness into an explicit consciousness of self. We have stated that 'it would seem' that the only way that this transformation from implicit to explicit consciousness of self would be through the

of reflection through which they conceive "the ego, substance, monad, soul, spirit ..." (Ibid.). There is thus a continuity between the immediate internal experience of an immediacy of feeling and the, in our terminology,'reflexive' apperception of it.

In order to maintain the continuity between the implicit and explicit consciousness of self without at the same time positing an act of perception (or an intentional or positional act), we choose to adopt Leibniz's use of the term 'apperception'. Our intention will become clearer as this argument develops. For the moment our concern is to avoid misunderstanding of the term apperception, a term which, as James pointed out, "has carried very different meanings in the history of philosophy". (WILLIAM JAMES, Psychology, Briefer Course), p. 291.
transformation of the subject into an intentional and primary object.

This, of course, is the position adopted by Husserl. According to Husserl, consciousness is essentially and exclusively intentional:

Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be conscious of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum.¹

Thus Husserl no longer sees the psychic phenomenon as immediate consciousness of self (as secondary object) and intended object (primary object) simultaneously given, but as two distinct phenomena: consciousness of the object and consciousness of the act that intends the object are two distinct phenomena. He is thus led to a series of 'reductions' and descriptions:

Thus, when phenomenological reduction is consistently executed, there is left us, on the noetic side, the openly endless life of pure consciousness and, as it correlate on the noematic side, the meant world, purely as meant ... Consequently I, the transcendental phenomenologist, have objects (singly or in universal complexes) as a theme for my universal descriptions:

solely as the intentional correlates of modes of consciousness of them.¹

From such a perspective, we never meet the subject as subject but always as object - the intentional act must always ricochet away from itself due to its fundamentally and exclusively intentional or centrifugal dynamism.²

It was against such an impossibility of immediate self-consciousness that Sartre, while admitting that "la conscience se définit par l'intentionnalité", would also argue that

¹Ibid., p. 37.

²Cf. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, "La Transcendance de l'Ego. Esquisse d'une Description Phénoménologique", Recherches Philosophiques, 6 (1936-37), 88, 95: "En outre, si le Je fait partie de la conscience, il y aura donc deux Je: le Je de la conscience réflexive et le Je de la conscience réfléchie. Fink, le disciple de Husserl, en connaît même un troisième, le Je de la conscience transcendantale... De là le problème des trois Je, dont il mentionne avec quelques complaisances les difficultés. Pour nous ce problème est tout simplement insoluble, car il n'est pas admissible qu'une communication s'établisse entre le Je réflexif et le Je réfléchi, s'ils sont des éléments réels de la conscience, ni surtout qu'ils s'identifient finalement en un Je unique". Cf. also STEPHEN STRASSER, The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1963), pp. 48-55.
"la conscience est conscience d'elle-même". But this 'clear and lucid' consciousness is possible only if a non-positional or non-intentional consciousness is admitted:

Tout est donc clair et lucide dans la conscience: l'objet est en face d'elle avec son opacité caractéristique, mais elle, elle est purement et simplement conscience d'être conscience de cet objet, c'est la loi de son existence. Il faut ajouter que cette conscience de conscience ... n'est pas positionnelle, c'est-à-dire que la conscience n'est pas à elle-même son objet.

We saw a similar difficulty occur in Tennant's position. If self-consciousness, the 'I knowing that I am knowing', is construed on a subject-object basis, and this because no form of consciousness other than 'intentional' or 'positional' is admitted, we can have only an unknowable transcendental ego with its 'knot of opacity' forever impenetrable. As Sartre says, 'le Je transcendental, c'est la mort de la conscience'. We are thus obliged to seek some other way of

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1 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, "La Transcendance de l'Ego. Esquisse d'une Description Phénoménologique", 88, 90.

2 Ibid., p.90. The adoption of Sartrean terminology is not intended to be an endorsement of the Sartrean view of the nature of the self. Indeed, we shall adopt the term non-positional solely to underline the radical difference between such an act of lucid or transparent self-awareness and the act of opaque and centrifugal self-consciousness involved in an intentional act which has as its term the self characterised as 'object'. Our argument proceeds to clarify this point.

3 Ibid.
transforming the implicit consciousness of self of any specious present into an explicit consciousness of self. This, we submit, can be done only if we admit that this original implicit or 'marginal' consciousness of self (or self-experience) is capable of becoming, in the Leibnizean sense, an apperception.

(iii) Self-Experience as a Secondary Object.

We have argued that in any specious present we are aware not only of the intentional object, but that we are also aware that we are aware of this object. We have described this awareness of the act of consciousness as a secondary object: as such it is merely implicit or 'marginal - 'only by the way', as Aristotle suggested. Unless a continuity between this implicit consciousness of self, which occurs in self-experience, and the explicit consciousness of self, which occurs in self-awareness, is granted, we see no way of avoiding the infinite regress of Husserl, or the unknowable, because transcendental, ego of Tennant, or the 'empty' ego of Sartre. Our task now must be to show that the passage from implicit to explicit consciousness of self, (or from the 'immediacy of feeling' to an apperception of the self) is possible and that in such reflexive self-consciousness we do have, in fact, evidence sufficient for apodicticity. Our argument presumes that our analysis of the specious present or psychic moment is accurate, and that in any moment of consciousness, consciousness of the intentional
object and consciousness of the act of intending are given immediately and indivisibly, and that it is only by abstraction and reflection that we can actually distinguish between them. On this basis we shall now seek a means of accounting for the transparency of the self which can furnish us with reflexive and apodictic evidence that the self is the unity of its activities, as Bertocci argues.

c) Self-Awareness as Explicit: The Cogito.

Allport had argued that "despite the ephemerality of self-awareness, it remains the most certain attest we have of personal existence".¹ In self-awareness we have explicit consciousness of ourselves: we are able to say with Tennant that 'I know that I am knowing'. And we have seen that it is in accounting for this fact that divergent views are possible. Our basic argument is that such an explicit awareness of self is possible without our positing a reflective intentional or positional act. Instead of the cogito me cogitans of Tennant, we propose the cogito, ergo sum of Descartes.

¹G. W. ALLPORT, "The Psychological Nature of Personality", Personality and Social Encounter, p. 34.
We submit that in the reflexive analysis of the specious present, through a centripetal concentration of attention, as opposed to a centrifugal concentration of intentionality, the transparency of the self which we seek can be found.

Thus, if we assume temporarily the posture of Descartes, namely that of radical or hyperbolic doubt, we see immediately the difference between this posture and the posture of Tennant. Through the hyperbolic doubt, Descartes cannot state, 'I know that I am knowing', since the evil genius might well be deceiving him. Yet, this does not prevent

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1 Cf. DESCARTES, Méditations Métaphysiques, Première Médiation, in Oeuvres de Descartes, éditées par C. Adam et P. Tannery (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1904), IX, 17-18. The doubt or époche of Descartes is thus radical: "Je demeurerai obstinément attaché à cette pensée; et si par ce moyen il n'est pas en mon pouvoir de parvenir à la connaissance d'aucune vérité, à tout le moins il est en ma puissance de suspendre mon jugement ..." (Ibid., p. 18). Despite this difference in posture between Descartes and Tennant, both obviously have adopted a philosophic posture. Our argument is that while Descartes adopted a reflective and reflexive posture, Tennant remained entrenched in a reflective posture.
Descartes from continuing:

"mais il y a un je ne sais pas quel trompeur très puissant et très rusé, qui emploie toute son industrie à me tromper toujours; il n'y donc point de doute que je suis, s'il me trompe; et qu'il me trompe tant qu'il voudra, il ne saurait jamais faire que je ne sois rien, tant que je penserai être quelque chose ... Enfin il faut conclure, et tenir pour constant, que cette proposition, Je suis, j'existe, est nécessairement vraie, toutes les fois que je la prononce, ou que je la conçois en mon esprit."

In other words, Descartes, by rendering the primary or intentional

1 Ile Méditation, A.T., IX, 19. Cf. Also Discours de la Méthode, 4e partie, A.T., VI, 32: "Mais, aussitôt après, je pris garde que, pendant que je voulais ainsi penser que tout était faux, il fallait nécessairement que moi, qui le pensais, fusse quelque chose. Et, remarquant que cette vérité: je pense, donc je suis, était si ferme et si assurée, que toutes les plus extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques n'étaient pas capables de l'ébranler, je jugeai que je pouvais la recevoir, sans scrupule, pour le premier principe de la philosophie que je cherchais". Cf. also DESCARTES, La Recherche de la Vérité par la Lumière Naturelle, A.T., X, 521.

We shall argue in the text that this Cogito is a unique non-positional seizing of the self by the self in a reflexive act. Taken in this sense, the Cogito is not merely a refutation of scepticism, as is Augustine's "Si fallor, sum" (De Libero Arbitrio, 2, 3, 7); rather, it is a rendering of the implicit awareness of self explicit through a reflexive act. This difference seems to have eluded Bertocci, when he writes: "As both Augustine and Descartes saw, if I doubt that I am thinking these lines, I, the doubter must exist at the moment that I am doubting (thinking) about these lines ... Let me find any proposition about matter of fact which to deny is to assert, and it shall be added to this one indubitable truth of fact". (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 59).
object implicit through his radical doubt, renders the secondary object or self-experience itself explicit. We have here a unique, non-positional seizing of the self in a reflexive act of consciousness:

Enfin, il importe de le signaler, le je pense, donc je suis revêt le caractère d'une expérience métaphysique unique dans la philosophie de Descartes; c'est une évidence directe d'une réalité existentielle, et non une connaissance par idées représentatives. La pensée se saisit dans l'exercice même de penser et voit dans la réalité de cette pensée sa dépendance nécessaire du sujet pensant existant.

The Cogito of Descartes thus fulfills the requirements we seek. Descartes would admit that self-experience is marginal in any act of consciousness or specious present, but, and this is our principal concern, the act through which consciousness becomes conscious of itself in self-awareness is not an intentional act, but a reflexive seizing


2 Cf. DESCARTES, "A Mersenne, juillet, 1641," A.T., III, 394: "Il est impossible que nous puissions jamais penser à aucune chose, que nous n'avons en même temps l'idée de notre âme, comme d'une chose capable de penser à tout ce que nous pensons."
of this act by itself through an act of centripetal attention. We have, in Leibniz's terminology, an apperception of the self, and not a perception of the self. From this point of view, we avoid the infinite regressions of Husserl, and the noumenal ego of Tennant: we have a self transparent to itself, translucid, but without being necessarily empty in the Sartrean sense.

We have examined the Cogito of Descartes because we consider his presentation of explicit self-consciousness preferrable to Tennant's or Bertocci's, precisely because in Descartes we see exemplified the act of attention which renders the implicit awareness of self explicit. The hyperbolic doubt is in fact an unnecessary means of executing this act of attention. Indeed, its sole function is to render the explicit object of consciousness implicit so that the act of consciousness might be deprived of all objects, and thus become aware of itself as an act of awareness. This form of consciousness is thus

2Descartes himself admits as much: "je dois rejeter tous les doutes de ces jours passés, comme hyperboliques, et ridicules". (VIe Méditation, A. T., IX, 71). Cf. also A. LOWIT, "'L'époque' de Husserl et le doute de Descartes", Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 62 (1957), 399-415.
centripetal as opposed to centifugal, non-positional as opposed to positional (of objects), attentional as opposed to intentional.

We would also argue that the 'evidence' in this reflexive act is apodictic. From this point of view, the Cogito or self-awareness is no longer subject to the criticism of subjective immediatism to which self-experience certainly is, for in such a Cogito, we submit, the 'evidence', albeit given immediately, is nevertheless given in a reflexive act.\(^1\) We are thus in a position to clarify Bertocci's prima facie lack of clarity. We have argued that the self of self-experience in any specious present is a secondary object which is merely marginal or implicit in the act of consciousness through which we are conscious of an object which is primary, explicit, and intentional. We have equally argued that this implicit self of self-experience can be grasped in an explicit act of attention in which

\(^1\)In so far as such a reflexive act is possible only through concentrated attention it takes us beyond the naive realm of pre-reflective immediacy. Here, then, we have an immediacy, but an immediacy open only to the philosophic posture of reflexive attention, and providing, in this immediacy, indubitability.
consciousness becomes conscious of itself in and as act, and not as object. From this point of view the self is transparent to itself, and can be so seized apodictically. What, then, is this self which can be seized explicitly in a reflexive act of attention? With Descartes, and Bertocci, we can reply:

une chose qui pense: qu'est-ce qu'une chose qui pense? 
c'est-à-dire une chose qui doute, qui conçoit, qui affirme, qui nie, qui veut, qui ne veut pas, qui imagine aussi, et qui sent.

We must now question Bertocci's (and Descartes) interpretation of this apodictic evidence with respect to the person's bodiliness.

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1IIe Méditation, A.T., IX, 22. We do not consider that this initial use of the word 'chose' or 'res' necessarily implies the subsequent 'substantialist' theory of Descartes. As we shall argue in the next section, our interpretation of the apodictic data does not coincide with Descartes', nor for that matter with Bertocci's.

We also agree with ANTHONY KENNY that "any conscious activity is capable of providing a premise for the cogito" ("Cartesian Privacy", in Wittgenstein. The Philosophical Investigations: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by G. Pitcher (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 355). Hence our basic agreement with Bertocci's definition of the self as (at least, we would add) the unity of its mental activities.
2. Self-Experience, Self-Awareness, and Bodiliness.

Earlier, in Chapter VII of this study, we expressed our dissatisfaction with Bertocci's treatment of the person's bodiliness. In the previous chapter, we argued that it was precisely on this point that Bertocci must make a concession if the Allport-Bertocci debate was to be resolved. Our argument will continue along the lines of the previous section of this chapter, namely, by beginning with Bertocci's starting point of erlebt experience in the specious present, and by reflexively analysing the data of such experiences.

a) Volo, ergo Sum.

Bertocci himself, as we have seen, considered the 'effort of will' as our surest experiential basis for our conviction that we are free within limits. He even went so far as to quote approvingly the phrase of Wilhelm Stern, "volo, ergo sum", - especially if we wanted to "point out the fact that a person is most conscious of himself when he is asserting himself, despite resistance, in a preferred direction".

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Once again, we are in entire agreement with Bertocci, yet we do not consider that he has taken into account the fuller implications of his position. We shall now attempt to analyse reflexively such a specious present of 'effort of will' in a manner similar to our analysis of the cogito in the previous section of this chapter.

To begin with, in any act of will, we have, as in any psychic moment, both consciousness of the willed effect, together with consciousness of the act of willing. The effect is the 'primary object', while the awareness of willing is the 'secondary object'. By the act of reflexive attention, we can concentrate on this implicit awareness of willing, thus rendering it explicit, while the willed effect becomes merely implicit. In such reflexive attention we have a non-positional seizing of ourselves as the act of willing: \textit{volo, ergo sum}. From this point of view, in the immediacy of reflexive self-awareness, we can grasp that we are the cause of this act of will which we are: the self, in short, is \textit{causa sui}. While Bertocci argues to this same conclusion, he does so without appealing to this reflexive grasping of the self through a non-positional act of attention. Yet the consequences of our analysis will carry us beyond the results of Bertocci's.
Thus, just as the object of perception defines the other, or non-self, so also the effect of an effort of will, in face of resistance, defines the other, or non-self. Indeed, there could be no effort as such if there were no resistance, or an obstacle of some sort to be overcome. If, to take Bertocci's example, a person in such reflexive self-awareness decides to raise his hand, he will find, we submit, that the willed effect - the raising of his hand - is equivalent or continuous with the act of willing which he can seize as himself in that very instant. Thus, just as he can say, 'I am my act of willing', (volo, ergo sum), so he could say 'I am my raising hand', ('I am my willed effect'). However, were this same person to decide to lift some heavy object, while he could again say, 'I am my effort of willing', he could not say 'I am my willed effect' precisely because the effect in this case defines the other, or non-self, in so far as it resists his will and requires further effort on his part. In the case of raising his hand there was no opposition or resistance, and this was why the effect was equivalent to the cause (or act of will

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1 Cf. MAX SCHELER, Man's Place in Nature, p. 53 where Scheler remarks that "reality is always a sense of resistance".

2 Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, "Descartes and Marcel on the Person and His Body: A Critique", p. 221, where Bertocci discusses what his arm and hand are.
In deciding to raise his hand, there is no 'distance' between this decision and the actual raising of his hand, while in deciding to raise a heavy object, there is a 'distance' between this decision and the actual raising of the object precisely because this latter decision met with opposition. It was to this immediacy of willing and bodily movement that Maine de Biran was referring when he declared:

In vain me dit-on que ce n'est pas moi qui exécute les mouvements volontaires de mon corps, qu'il n'y a qu'un simple rapport de concomitance ou de succession entre mes vœux ... et les mouvements de mon corps, que lorsque je veux tel mouvement, une puissance étrangère à moi ou Dieu même intervient pour remuer des organes nerveux et musculaires qui me sont inconnus ... Je répondrai toujours par le fait de conscience qui est pour moi la source de toute vérité: le moi qui veut est bien le même qui exécute et commence tels mouvements du corps ou les sensations musculaires qui les accompagnent, il n'y a d'autre force en jeu, d'autre puissance en cause que ma volonté, qui est moi, Si c'était Dieu qui remuait mon corps, ce serait lui qui voudrait à ma place; en ce cas Dieu serait moi ou je serais Dieu, car c'est une seule et même force qui détermine et produit ou exécute tous les actes ou mouvements que la volonté ou le moi s'approprie.  

In other words, in any act of willing, such as raising one's

hand (intentionally), there is given immediately a unity of cause and
effect. The willed effect is the raising of the hand; the cause of
this willing is the person himself (and this can be established
apodictically by a reflexive act of attention in the moment of willing);
and the effect is simply the act of willing. The same argument can be
applied to all bodily movements: in each case of willed bodily
movements, the person can say, 'I am my moving body'. There is thus no
distinction between mind and body at the level of experience, not
merely of pre-reflexive immediate experience, but also at the level of
reflexive immediate experience. Indeed, we not only have 'psychological'
certitude that the self is a bodily being, but we have 'logical'
certitude of this bodily being also, in so far as this bodiliness can
be grasped in a reflexive act of attention while a person is
exercising an act of will. We must now examine Bertocci's reasons for
agreeing with Descartes that "mind in the order of logical certainty was
prior to body".¹

²P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Person and His Body: Critique of
Existentialist Responses to Descartes", p. 117.
b) Bertocci's Dilemma.

Bertocci's principal reason for distinguishing mind from body resembles Descartes': the concept of mind is quite distinct from the concept of body.\(^1\) This conceptual difference, which Bertocci calls a 'brute fact', is not, he claims, the consequence of Descartes' method and criterion, but "is given him as he analyses all that is available to him as he experiences and thinks about 'mind' and 'body'".\(^2\) From such an analysis Bertocci concludes that "we must grant that extended being is never unextended being, and that both realms of being exemplify irreducible structures".\(^3\)

\(^1\)Cf. P. A. BERTOCCI, "Descartes and Marcel on the Person and His Body: A Critique", p. 209. For Descartes' argument, cf. VIe Méditation, A.T.,IX, 62: "... néanmoins pour ce que d'un côté j'ai une claire et distincte idée de moi-même, en tant que je suis seulement une chose que pense et non étendue, et que d'un autre j'ai une idée claire et distincte du corps, en tant qu'il est seulement une chose étendue et qui ne pense point, il est certain que ce moi, c'est-à-dire mon âme, par laquelle je suis ce que je suis, est entièrement et véritablement distincte de mon corps, et qu'elle peut être, ou exister sans lui".


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 225.
We have insisted in this chapter on the importance of reflexive self-awareness as the only means of establishing an adequate grounding for the 'logical' certainty of the unity of the self. In this argument, we did not seek to alter Bertocci's position, but rather to establish it in a more satisfactory manner than he himself had offered. Now, however, in dealing with the mind-body relationship, we encounter a dilemma in Bertocci's position. Indeed, the same thinker who accused Tennant of viewing self-consciousness 'intellectualistically', is the same thinker who now views the immediacy of willed bodily movement 'intellectualistically'. Indeed, we argued, in agreement with Bertocci, that self-consciousness, (or 'I know that I am knowing') can be accounted for only by avoiding the subject-object paradigm which Tennant had adopted, and by introducing a non-positional act of reflexive attention. We thus grounded apodictically the erlebt experience of the specious present which Bertocci hesitantly suggested 'seemed' to be given. If our argument in that instance was valid, we cannot accept Bertocci's recent volte face. Indeed, it is astonishing that he can overlook the significance of Ricoeur's statement, which exemplifies the position we have proposed, when he quotes Ricoeur's arguments:

The bond which in fact joins willing to its body requires a type of attention other than an intellectual attention to structures. It requires
that I participate actively in my incarnation as a mystery. I need to pass from objectivity to existence.¹

Bertocci's reply to this position is the following:

For example, when Ricoeur says that 'moving and deciding can be distinguished only in abstraction' he seems to me to simply ignore the experienced fact that 'knowing' involves both space and time, but 'deciding' is experienced with not an iota of spatiality in it. I cannot believe that in the end the existential-phenomenologist takes seriously enough the considerations that forced Descartes to conjunctive-disjunctive interaction between these orders.²

Yet the significance of this volte face is far-reaching within Bertocci's philosophic endeavour. In both his rejection of Tennant and in his defence of Descartes, Bertocci has appealed to the data of experience. In self-awareness, we have argued, we do not have a subject knowing an object, a noumenal self knowing a phenomenal self, but the self knowing itself in a non-positional centripetal act of


reflexive attention. We are thus able to ground the immediacy of experience without being accused of mere subjective immediatism. The datum of this experience is that 'I know that I am knowing'. We have equally argued that in any act of willed bodily movement, there is no distinction possible between cause and effect, just as there is no distinction between subject and object in the cogito. It is indeed, as Ricoeur argues, only by abstraction, by viewing our experience 'intellectualistically', that we are able to distinguish the moving from the deciding. Bertocci's error, we submit, is that he has failed to examine his experience as erlebt, before interpreting it in a synoptically coherent manner.\(^1\)

The problem, of course, is the problem to which we have already alluded, namely that of observational and non-observational knowledge. The hand which a person decides to raise is at once himself as erlebt but an 'object' as observed. Bertocci is only too well aware of this: "... I must be careful not to confuse my body as erlebt or experienced,  

\(^1\)We shall return to this error in the following sub-section of this section of this chapter.
from my body as conceptualized, be it by common sense, by science, or by philosophy". Yet, we must insist, there is no 'distance' between deciding and moving in bodily movements as erlebt. Bertocci cannot, therefore, assign this erlebt experience to the general category of 'qualia' as he argues, not can he identify the body, on this basis as a 'matrix of qualia'. This is to adopt a subject-object paradigm for the non-observational or non-positional knowledge of one's erlebt body. It was precisely against such a subject-object paradigm that Maine de Biran argued:

Cette main mobile, qui se promène successivement sur les différentes parties, et qui devient l'unité de mesure d'une surface sensible, ne se palpe point elle-même, pas plus que l'œil ne se voit, et pourtant elle peut être connue avant d'être employée comme instrument ou comme mesure.

\[1\] P. A. BERTOCCI, "Descartes and Marcel on the Person and His Body", p. 223.

\[2\] Cf. Ibid., p. 222: "... in my total experience of all sensory data, the complex I come to identify as my body is a qualitative refractory 'family' that I cannot get rid of ..." Thus Bertocci is led into arguing that we 'discriminate' this 'matrix of qualia' from the other qualia of our experience.

\[3\] MAINE DE BIRAN, Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie, Oeuvres, IX, 382.
In other words, Maine de Biran appeals to the 'fait primitif' of all consciousness which we have termed self-experience: in any act of sensation, such as touching, we are conscious not merely of the intentional object or 'qualia', but we are also simultaneously conscious of the act of touching. And with reflexive attention, we can establish that we are the act of touching, we are our touching hand.

In the words of Michel Henry:

Mon corps est ce pouvoir absolu, irréfutable, par lequel j'ouvre ou referme mes doigts, par lequel je me lève et marche. Mon corps est le mouvement qui se prouve en marchant, c'est-à-dire qui s'atteste lui-même intérieurement, il est mon action telle que je la vis dans une expérience immédiate qui défie tout commentaire.  

Thus, while we must speak in terms of an embodied consciousness, and define the self accordingly, we must equally account for the very real difficulty which such embodiment presents. Indeed, the use of the word 'body' is so ambiguous in such a statement as 'I am my body' that Marcel might well pause.  

As with the word 'pain', we have here a word

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1MICHEL HENRY, "Le concept de l'âme a-t-il un sens?" Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 64 (1966), 27.

2Cf. GABRIEL MARCEL, The Existential Background of Human Dignity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 46: "What possible sense could there be in saying 'I am my body' if my body could be reduced to an extended thing to be exhaustively characterized in terms of objective science?"
with a public sense but private reference in any first person 'body' statement, but which has at once a public sense and reference in second and third person statements. We would argue, then, that just as a person can be in 'pain' and be aware that he is in 'pain', and just as others can recognize that he is in 'pain' because of his typical 'pain'-behavioural patterns, so also a person as an erlebt body, or embodied consciousness, can be aware of his bodiliness, while others can be aware of him as manifested in his observed bodily movements. Thus while the person is not the eyes and smile and extended hand which another encounters in any introduction, but is rather manifested in these bodily movements and activities, he is non-objectively or non-positionally as erlebt precisely all of these movements and activities.

While such an analysis of these difficulties requires further elaboration, we consider that, for our present purposes in this study, this analysis is sufficient. Indeed, our primary concern has been to expose Bertocci's dilemma: should experience be viewed as erlebt, or should it be viewed 'intellectualistically'? We have argued that the transparency of the cogito can be established only if we accept experience as erlebt, that is, that every act of consciousness is at once consciousness of an object together with consciousness of consciousness of an object. We have equally argued that the
distinction between a noumenal or transcendental ego and a phenomenal or empirical ego is possible only if the erlebt experience of self-experience is viewed 'intellectualistically', or according to the subject-object, or positional, paradigm. In opposing such a 'splitting' of the self, Bertocci, we have argued, was correct. However, when it came to interpreting the erlebt experience of bodiliness, Bertocci, we submit, did not view his experience non-positionally but positionally on the subject-object paradigmatic basis. Only thus could he 'split' the experienced unity of the embodied self into 'mind' and 'body', into two irreducible realms of being which must somehow 'interact' yet not form a lived or erlebt unity.

Obviously, the position which begins with the erlebt experience of embodiment must face serious difficulties in accounting for the intellectual impossibility of conceiving 'mind' and 'body' as a unity, and of accounting for the 'interaction between the extended and the non-extended', but this is not an argument against this position as such. Indeed, we submit that this position is fundamentally more experientially and synoptically coherent than is Bertocci's, precisely because it begins with the erlebt experience of bodiliness, is able to establish such bodiliness apodictically through reflexive attention in a non-positional seizing of the self in its willed bodily movements, and is therefore a more adequate interpretation of personal being than
is Bertocci's, given his own starting point and criterion of truth.

c) The Paradoxical Nature of Experience.

Bertocci's dilemma has brought us face to face with one of the central issues we have already raised concerning Bertocci's criterion of truth, namely, synoptic coherence. We suggested that Bertocci's 'faith' in the possibility of coherence rather than incoherence in any synoptic interpretation of the data of experience was asserted rather than argued. We now feel that we are in a position to clarify the paradoxical nature of experience which is the cause of our uneasiness with Bertocci's over-hasty optimism both concerning the efficacy of introspection and of his synoptically coherent criterion of truth.

Indeed, Bertocci's dilemma as to how experience should be viewed, as erlebt or 'intellectualistically', together with our analysis of experience as being at once the intentional act together with awareness of that act, underline the fact that, in the first place, to speak of the data of experience is to use an extremely ambiguous terminology. Thus, given in experience are both the explicit and implicit 'objects', and, depending upon which 'posture' is adopted, be it positional or non-positional, (reflective or reflexive) the data we interpret will be the content of the activities of consciousness (the intentional objects
of positional acts of consciousness), or the activity itself of consciousness become explicit through a non-positional reflexive act of attention. There is thus an ambiguity at the very outset of any appeal to the data of consciousness or of experience.

We have argued that it is only through the seizing of the self as its activity that we can establish apodictic evidence that we are the unity of our activities as so seized in an act of reflexive attention, or cogito. We are thus led to argue that such a seizing of the self in its immediacy provides data which is indisputable, and to which all subsequent data must conform or be rejected as inconsistent, or synoptically incoherent. And here, of course, is where the paradox enters, for when we consider the data of experience, in so far as this data is the data supplied by the content of the activities of consciousness, we discover that inconsistencies arise, as when we consider such concepts as permanence and change, unity and multiplicity, mind and body, extended and non-extended, which, as concepts, are contradictory or mutually exclusive. This is the difficulty Descartes referred to in his letter to Princess Elizabeth, when he admitted the impossibility of 'conceiving' at the same time the union of mind and body and their distinction. It is the same difficulty Bertocci encounters when he attempts to reconcile his concepts of extended being and non-extended being with his experience of bodiliness. If our
argument is valid, if the clarification of self-experience which we have offered is indeed necessary, then we are obliged to clarify equally the criterion of truth which we have adopted.

Thus, we submit, the criterion of experientially synoptic coherence must mean, above all, that the data of experience as obtained in reflexive attention, or the cogito, are primary and indubitable, and that all data obtained in intentional reflection on the content of conscious activity must be interpreted in the light of this 'primitive' or primary data. From this point of view, while we cannot escape from the paradoxical nature of experience taken in its totality of activity and content, we nevertheless remain faithful to the starting point of ourselves as experienced in the cogito, or in the immediacy of our being. We have thus no guarantee that we can achieve a synoptically coherent interpretation of this paradoxical data, yet we do have an ultimate criterion of the validity of any interpretation of personal being: no theory of personal being can be valid if it contradicts that data of experience which is apodictically given in self-awareness - that seizing of the self as subject in an act of non-positional reflexive attention. From this point of view, personal being as experienced at the human level is the unity of conscious, incarnate activities such as sensing, remembering, perceiving, thinking, feeling, emoting, willing, oughting, and aesthetic and religious appreciating.
d) The Relationship between Reflexive Attention and Intentionality.

While we have argued that it is only through a non-positional reflexive act of attention that we can grasp the self explicitly as subject, we do not intend to argue that this form of consciousness is prior to intentionality. Indeed, we have argued that it is only when intentionality, consciousness of an object, occurs, that self-experience occurs, but only as marginal, implicit, 'only by the way'. Thus while we would admit that intentionality is chronologically prior to such reflection, we would argue that such reflection is ontologically more primary than such intentionality. Indeed, we have argued, with Descartes, that the Cogito, taken as a non-positional reflection of the self on its act of becoming, is that which grounds our intentionality in existence. Through such reflexive attention we uncover the indubitable existent which we are. Yet such a reflexive act is possible only within consciousness, whose chronologically primary act is intentional. We grasp ourselves reflexively only in so far as we are in act, as Aquinas argued, the act being the intentional act of consciousness.

We thus do not dispute that all consciousness is 'consciousness of...'. We merely argue that consciousness cannot be arbitrarily defined in exclusively intentional terms. Thus, once again, the importance of
starting point is crucial. The starting point which Bertocci adopts, and which we adopt, is the specious present, any conscious now, or psychic moment, in which there is given immediately both the intentional act together with the awareness of that act. Yet it is in the interpretation of this erlebt moment that error is possible, as when a positional or subject-object paradigm is adopted and the data are viewed 'intellectualistically'. We must, therefore, clarify the nature of self-experience in any attempt to understand the nature of personal being.
3. The Role of Self-Experience in Personality Theory.

We have argued, with Bertocci, that any attempt to understand personal being must begin with experience and return to experience for verification. For this reason, the method of growing, experientially and synoptically coherent interpretation of the data of experience recommended itself as an adequate method, if our qualifications concerning the paradoxical nature of experience are included. We have equally argued that the choice of starting point is of crucial importance in such an endeavour. We noted that for Allport, the observable stream of activity of the individual organism was his starting point, while for Bertocci, following Brightman, the experience of the individual as erlebt was the chosen starting point. We have argued that Allport must concede a further dimension which would account for the observer as observer and as unifier and continuator of this observed stream of activity. We have also argued that Bertocci must clarify the nature of the transparency of the self - and we have proposed such a clarification - and must concede that his interpretation of personal being is too mentalistic and does not take personal embodiment sufficiently into account. Throughout this study we have repeatedly insisted on the importance of starting point, on the givens at the outset of any theory of man, and on the interpretation of these givens. Above all, we have insisted, with Bertocci, on the primacy of erlebt experience as the necessary starting point of any
such endeavour. We would, therefore, submit, that the Allport-Bertocci debate could be resolved if the two protagonists could reach agreement on the starting point of their respective inquiries: namely, self-experience or the datum self.

a) Self-Experience and Allport.

We noted that self-experience in Allport has an extremely minor role to play. While to a great extent his common sense criterion coincided with self-experience, he was never able to take an adequate view of the significance of such self-experience, primarily because of his fear as a psychologist of the danger of homunculism. Yet, without an adequate view of self-experience, he was unable to account for the unity and continuity of personal being, and was even driven to reject the concept of 'self' from his system of thought, despite his admitted incapacity to account for the fact of self-consciousness, (although it is to his credit that he did not reject this fact from his system). Equally, without an adequate view of self-experience, Allport was unable to give any satisfactory account of freedom or of moral obligation: his naturalism and theory of emergent evolution merely ignored the insistent data of self-experience.
b) Self-Experience and Bertocci.

The role of self-experience in Bertocci, and in Brightman, is significant. By beginning with the specious present and erlebt experience, Bertocci was able to construct a theory of personal being which was experientially and synoptically coherent with the data of that experience. However, in his interpretation of self-experience, Bertocci failed to give an adequate account of its nature. Indeed, his over-hasty identification of the self with its conscious and mental activities stems from this lack of adequate analysis of his prime datum, the datum self of self-experience. Indeed, by merely asserting the unity of the self as the unity of its mental activities, Bertocci is unquestionably on tenuous grounds, and could be accused of the subjective immediatism to which Allport referred. This lack of adequacy is nowhere more apparent than in his interpretation of the erlebt experience of embodiment. While previously he had insisted on the erlebt experience of self-consciousness as primary in opposition to any viewing of this experience from an 'intellectualistic' position, he himself is guilty of just such a viewing when he comes to interpret the embodied experience of personal being.

We have submitted an alternative interpretation of self-experience which introduces a further dimension to Bertocci's thought,
while remaining within his philosophical framework. We have argued that through reflexive analysis of the specious present, and through an act of non-positional reflexive attention to the act of consciousness, the transparency of the self to itself can be grounded ontologically and apodictically, and that the bodiliness of the self can be equally so grounded. The person cannot then be defined exclusively in mental terms, but must be defined in terms of an 'embodied consciousness' manifesting itself through its bodily activity with which it forms a unity of being, and not merely of function.

If Bertocci were to accept our interpretation of self-experience, we see no reason why the debate which both he and Allport maintained through the years could not be resolved, provided Allport agreed also to adopt our interpretation of self-experience.

c) Self-Experience, Introspection, and Homunculism.

If our analysis of self-experience is valid, then we are forced to admit that introspection is a necessary method of inquiry into the nature of man. Indeed, our discussion of observational and non-observational knowledge has pointed to the deficiencies of observation as an exclusive means of studying personal being. Does this commit us to an homunculus theory of a little man within the breast continually
pulling strings, as Allport had feared? We think not. Indeed, we have argued that the person is the unity of his erlebt experiences and that there is no 'distance' between 'mental' acts and 'bodily' acts. We have, however, argued that the person is free, experiences moral obligation, and has explicit awareness of himself as subject. These experiences alone are sufficient to show that the method of observation cannot hope to encompass the person, precisely because such experiences as such are not 'observable', do not involve a positional act of intentionality, (although they can become 'objects' in the phenomenological sense which led to Husserl's infinite regress, but then the experiences are no longer the experience of the subject as subject but of the subject characterized as object). To this extent, there will always be an element of personal being which defies analysis and observation by someone other than the person himself. But this is a far cry from an homunculus.

There is, however, a very real danger in adopting an introspective method of procedure. We have noted Allport's reasons for being rightfully suspicious of any theory which relies exclusively on introspection, and we would concur with him in so far as such introspection is concerned with assessment of the self. We all know how easily we are self-deceived, and it is to Bertocci's credit that his theory of personality included the concept of the ego as that
"portion of the personality with which the self has identified its greatest value"; in short, the ego is the "core or cluster of values with which the self identifies its 'security' or success at the time". In other words, the ego is personality assessed by the self in an intentional act; the self as subject has an 'objective' notion of what it is, which need not necessarily be accurate. What we would insist upon in this instance is that in this case we are dealing with an objective judgment of value based upon a subject-object paradigm, and not a non-positional act of reflexive attention. From this point of view, while we would agree that introspective assessment of the self requires some objective reference for validation, (be it an ideal value system, or the opinion of others), the introspective analysis of the self based upon reflexive acts of attention does not require such objective validation since it is a purely immanent activity within the subject as subject, and not as object being assessed.

1P. A. BERTOCCI, "The Psychological Self, the Ego, and Personality", p. 96.
d) Self-Experience, Common-sense, Science and Reason.

Equally, if our argument thus far is valid, the ordinary convictions of common-sense concerning personal being acquire a profound significance. The 'psychological' certitudes to which Bertocci referred can be grounded apodictically in self-experience as grasped in a non-positional act of reflexive attention. While we assume that we are individuals, unique, free, obliged imperatively to act in a certain way under certain circumstances, and are intimately united to our bodies in some mysterious way, our argument would provide a basis for this 'naive' or psychological certitude which, while far from being a dissolver of the enigma of personal being, since our reflections would be required to take us much farther, would at least maintain intact the unity and diversity of personal being which we experience ourselves to be. Our task in attempting to understand this enigma must proceed along rational lines, since reason alone provides us with the capacity for judgment and reasoning, and for thus establishing truth apodictically, or for establishing a given empirically and synoptically coherent interpretation of the data of experience as that hypothesis or interpretation most probable to date. We therefore proceeded, with Bertocci, to interpret the data of our experience as activity and activity-content in an experientially and synoptically coherent manner. From this point of view, science in Allport's sense
of the term, cannot be a sufficiently adequate means of procedure, since it relies, on Allport's analysis, exclusively upon observation. While a great deal about personal being can be learned from such a method of procedure, we question the efficaciousness of this approach as at all adequate in enabling us to understand and penetrate the enigma of personal being. There are, in short, aspects of personal being which are simply beyond the scope of such observation, yet it is in these very aspects of personal being that indubitable facts of personal being are established. Thus, while we would argue that there is a continuity between our common-sense convictions, reason and science - the very existence of language testifies to this - we cannot accept Allport's assumption that a science, be it psychology or any other science based exclusively upon observation and exclusive of our interpretation of self-experience, can ever attain an adequate understanding of the nature of man. Indeed, no philosophy of man can hope for adequacy if it does not include an adequate interpretation of self-experience. The role of self-experience in personality theory is thus imponderable.
PART FOUR: CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to examine the Allport-Bertocci debate with the hope of discovering a means of resolving this 'classic dialogue in psychological and philosophical literature'. It was hoped that by distinguishing those aspects of their thought which are common from those which are divergent, the causes of their disagreement could be isolated, and a direction for the resolution of their conflict be discovered. Such an attempted solution, it was hoped, would bring us closer to a clearer understanding of the central enigma of personal being and to a fuller appreciation of those aspects of the enigma which must be considered if our investigations of personal being are to prove fruitful. This, we submit, our study has succeeded in achieving.

Thus, in the first part of this study, the thought of G. W. Allport was examined in detail, and the basic issues which his dispute with P. A. Bertocci had raised were isolated. We noted that Allport had chosen as his starting point the observable stream of activity of the individual person from birth to death that such a naturalistic perspective dictated the 'givens' to be considered, and that from this perspective Allport was unable to account adequately for the functions of knowing and of unification which occur within this observable stream.
of activity. We also noted a certain confusion in Allport's thought concerning the relationship between common sense, science and reason.

A similar procedure was adopted in the second part of this study when we examined the thought of P. A. Bertocci in detail. Due to his acknowledged reliance and indebtedness to his predecessor at Boston University, Edgar S. Brightman, we devoted some time to an examination of his thought where Bertocci's reliance seemed evident. We then noted the basic issues which Bertocci's dispute with Allport had raised. Crucial among these basic issues was the question of starting point. Bertocci, by beginning with the self as given in introspection, was able to introduce a set of 'givens' quite different from Allport's, including such 'givens' as freedom of choice, and moral obligation. Equally given, on Bertocci's analysis, was the distinction between mind and body, an issue on which Allport disagreed radically. Finally, we noted a similar confusion, on Bertocci's part, on the relationship between common sense, science and reason.

In the third part of this study we attempted to resolve the Allport-Bertocci debate. We noted the striking similarities in the thought and approach of both thinkers, how they both considered the person to be unique, were eclectic, pluralistic, and pragmatic in approach, relied heavily on common sense convictions, and considered that their respective inquiries were complementary. We then noted
their central point of disagreement, the source, we have argued, of their differences and debate, namely, the starting point of their respective inquiries. By comparing their starting points, and by examining their thought on two specific points of disagreement, we were in a position to offer a solution to their debate. We argued that if certain concessions were made by Allport and by Bertocci, and that if Bertocci were to clarify his starting point in the manner we suggested, we could see no reason why their debate could not be resolved. These concessions and clarifications centred on the starting point of their respective investigations. We argued that Allport must admit a subjective knowledge of the self by the self and thereby broaden his starting point to include the observing observer, or subject, of the observable stream of activity of the individual. Such a subjective self would supply him with the anchorage or continuity which his principle of functional autonomy failed to provide. We also argued that Bertocci must clarify his starting point of self-experience if he wished to avoid the charge of subjective immediatism. Equally, on his unclarified position, he was vulnerable to criticism on precisely the same point upon which he was criticising Allport, namely, a self which knows itself but which is not distinct from its known self. We thus argued that Bertocci must admit and articulate the transparency of the self. Equally, we argued, he must admit that the person is a mind-body unity in being, and not merely in function.
Since our primary aim in this study has been to resolve the Allport-Bertocci debate within the framework of the debate itself, we did not consider it necessary to introduce any further external criticism. Indeed, while our argument for the transparency of the self does go beyond Bertocci's framework to a degree, we do not consider that we have altered his framework, but rather that we have extended it in a manner wholly consistent with his principles and method. Indeed, our whole purpose in the final chapter of this third part of our study was to establish Bertocci's position by providing an apodictic grounding for the starting point which he had adopted.

The significance of these concessions, if granted, would be far-reaching. To begin with, Allport would be obliged to re-consider his conception of the goal of psychology, since the admission of subjectivity would entail the admission of an unobservable realm of personal being whose significance is paramount. It is this central core of subjectivity which is the source of the unforeseeableness to which Mounier referred, and which renders any attempt at complete control and prediction of human behaviour quite impossible. Equally, Allport would be obliged to account for the advent of such activities and experiences as willing and freedom, oughting and obligation, in a manner other than his theory of emergence, since these activities and experiences as erlebt are sui generis within the sphere of
subjectivity, and cannot be traced back to other activities, experiences, or motives. Yet, while these concessions would unquestionably have these far-reaching consequences, it must be admitted once again that Allport's breadth of vision, his pluralism and sensitivity to the enigma of personal being all contributed to his qualified theory of personality in which, where problematic areas were touched upon, Allport always chose a cautious and tentative solution. Thus he refused to ignore Bertocci's criticisms and strove to answer them, even introducing the concept of the proprium in order to clarify his position. Equally, he refused to discount the common sense conviction he had that in self-consciousness the self knows itself, but attempted to include this 'awesome enigma' within his theory of the proprium. That self-consciousness was a fact, that the person is a continuing self-identity, he never disputed, yet, at the same time, these were facts for which his theory of personality could never adequately account.

The clarification and concession which we demanded of Bertocci would have significant consequences also. The grounding of the transparency of the self, as we have argued, would provide Bertocci with apodictic evidence of the unity and existence of the person, but it would also show that in any willed bodily movement there is no 'distance' between the willing and the moving, and that consequently, to view such an activity on a cause-effect paradigm would be
to view it 'intellectualistically', the very error Bertocci imputes to
Tennant when he argued for a noumenal ego. There is thus no ground
in the erlebt experience of willed bodily movement for the distinction
between mind and body, but only in the concepts of mind as defined in
terms of the non-extended and of body as defined in terms of the
extended.

We were thus led to a distinction concerning the nature of
experience. Experience, we argued, is paradoxical, in the sense that
in any experiential moment there is always a double form of awareness-
awareness of the object intended, and awareness of the act of intending.
That Bertocci would accept this distinction seems certain, given his
distinction between activity-potentials and activity-contents. The
paradox lies precisely in the fact that the data from this ambivalent
experience need not necessarily be amenable to the synoptic coherence
which Bertocci pursues. Thus the activity of consciousness, when
seized immediately in a reflexive act of attention (the cogito)
provides certain 'data': the person so seized is an undeniable unity
of, minimally, sensing, remembering, perceiving, thinking, feeling,
emoting, willing, oughting, and aesthetic and religious appreciating.
Equally, the content of consciousness when considered reflectively
provides certain data: the 'non-I' so considered provides the data upon
which we construct our conceptions of the whole self, of the world,
and of other persons. Yet in such a reflective interpretation of the data given in the content of our experience, we very quickly conceive such abstract ideas as cause and effect, subject and object, extended and non-extended, mind and body. Armed with such concepts we then attempt to understand the enigmatic nature of personal being through further interpretation of the data of experience. This, we have argued, is precisely what Bertocci has done in his reflections on the person and his body, forgetting precisely the paradoxical nature of experience. For while we have indubitable certitude of the self as the unity of its erlebt activities, we do not have such indubitable certitude about the contents of these activities. Thus it may well be inconceivable that non-extended mind can be united in being with extended body, since this is rationally incoherent, but it most certainly is not impossible, as erlebt experience of bodiliness testifies. Bertocci thus faces a difficulty vis-à-vis his criterion of truth, if our analyses are correct, for he must give priority to the data of experience as supplied in those acts of reflexive attention (the cogito) which provide him with the apodictic certainty that the person is the unity of (at least) his conscious activities. All other data and interpretations must bow to these facts, no matter how synoptically coherent they may be: synoptic coherence begins and ends with the data of experience as supplied in those acts of reflexive attention in which the selfseizes itself as subject in its activities. The criterion of truth must be synoptic coherence with this data, and, from this point of view, we have argued,
Bertocci's reasons for a dualism of mind and body are unacceptable, since they are not synoptically coherent with the data of experience — explicitly, the experience of willed bodily movement as seized in an act of reflexive attention.

Such concessions, clarifications and qualifications having been made, we are now in a position to offer an interpretation of personal being which will have benefited from the debate which we have studied. To begin with, such a personalistic view of personal being will not differ greatly from Bertocci's. We too would argue that the datum self or momentary self is an undeniable unity of its conscious activities, although we would add that this is undeniable on the basis of a reflexive immediacy which Bertocci does not provide. We would also argue that such a datum self is necessarily an embodied or incarnate self, and this in opposition to Bertocci. On the basis of such a datum self, we are in a position to interpret the data of the contents of experience in a synoptically coherent manner and thus propose, with Bertocci, an interpretation of the whole self.

To begin with, such a whole self must be seen as a unity of mental activities in Bertocci's sense. This is to argue that mentality is to be seen as bi-polar, with one pole unconscious or pre-conscious, the other self-conscious. Such pre-conscious mentality is continuous
with, but not open to, the telic-conative activities of consciousness and self-consciousness. The postulation of such a pole of mental being is based upon a synoptically coherent interpretation of the activities of consciousness, together with a consideration of the intermittency of consciousness. These mental activities in unity constitute the agent self, or ontic self, which, in interaction with its environment and within the limitations these activities and capacities provide, develops a personality. The personality of the self is the dynamic organisation of its own unique psychophysical wants and abilities which renders adjustments to its environment unique. Within this personality structure the agent-self is able to identify itself with a certain core or cluster of values which we call the ego. The ego is thus the self's assessment of itself at any time in its life and, as such, is that area of interpretation most liable to error, as Allport has pointed out.

The personal self is thus an original unity of embodied activities which develops characteristic patterns of behaviour in its interaction with its own needs and the environment in which it finds itself. We have argued with Bertocci that we must begin with the mature personal self if we are to understand the nature of personal being, since a genetic account, for all its very real value, cannot account for the radically different experiences and activities of
adult personal being. We thus insist upon the need for introspection, above all of that type of introspection which we have called reflexive analysis. In such reflexive analysis we are able to grasp the self as its act of willing, and as its act of oughting, both of which are sui generis and cannot be derived from antecedent activities, experiences, or motives. From this point of view, we argue that the personal self is free, and experiences a moral imperative. These activities must be considered 'givens' at the outset of any investigation as to the nature of personal being. To be a person is to be such a given unity of embodied mentality constantly choosing, deciding, guiding within the limitations and demands of one's own needs and capacities, and the demands and limitations of the environment.

We are aware that Nuttin might consider this an overloading of the role of conscious choice in personal living, but we would argue with Bertocci that while there are undoubtedly determining factors about which we know so little, (as Allport has shown), such factors cannot be accepted at face value if they distort or deny the erlebt experience of the activity of willing which we grasp in the cogito as free. Rather, these factors must be interpreted in the light of such erlebt experiences of freedom. From this point of view, the relationship between common sense, science and reason can be clarified.
Those common sense convictions about the nature of personal being, based as they are upon personal experience, cannot be taken at face value without some reflection upon their validity. We saw that Allport, while accepting this position in principle, failed to remain faithful to it, but himself vacillated between a form of subjective immediatism in which he accepted his common sense convictions uncritically and a form of positivism in which he demanded empirical verification of his convictions. There was equally a tendency in Bertocci to accept his common sense convictions about personal being uncritically, in so far as the unity of personal being was asserted as pre-reflexively given in immediate experience. We have argued that such common sense convictions about the nature of personal being — such as our conviction that we are unique, self-identical in growth and time, free, morally obliged under certain conditions to act in a certain manner at certain times — can be critically grounded in an apodictic manner through a reflexive seizing of the self in its activities through a non-positional act of attention. From this point of view, we have an undeniable self as the unity of its activities on the basis of which we can construct an interpretation of the whole self and of the world around us which will be reasonable to the extent that it is synoptically coherent with the data as provided by such subjective reflexive acts of attention by the self on its activities. There is no reason why such interpretations should conflict with the interpretations of science, and, indeed, we have seen to what extent
the scientific investigations of Allport are amenable to the philosophical investigations of Bertocci. It is only when such theories and interpretations distort or contradict the undeniable data of subjective reflexive analysis that conflict arises. We have seen that even Bertocci himself did not escape the paradoxical nature of experience in his rejection of such data for the theoretical interpretation of the mind-body relationship which his conceptual framework postulated.

That such an error is possible is a salient reminder that the nature of personal being is enigmatic. Like Bertocci, we would argue that our aim is to corner the mystery and not to expand in it. That our analysis raises as many questions as it answers is not in doubt. We realise that there is no simple solution to the relationship between the body as erlebt and the body as an object among objects which our proposed embodiment or incarnation proposes, yet we consider that such a solution can be found along the lines of the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of hylomorphism in which two co-principles of being, potency and act, which in abstraction are mutually exclusive, constitute nevertheless a unity in being. Indeed, the purpose of this study, we consider, has been fulfilled, in so far as we have proposed a resolution of the Allport-Bertocci debate, and that in this proposed resolution, we have uncovered the root difference between these two thinkers. We are thus in position to argue that no theory of personality or of personal being can hope to be adequate if, like Allport, the
investigator adopts a starting point which excludes subjectivity. Only a starting point which can include the personal self as it is, that is, as it is grasped in an act of reflexive non-positional attention in its diverse activities, can ever hope to produce an adequate interpretation of personal being which would avoid the danger of fragmentation. We might thus quote Bertocci's basic principle of personalistic thought, (bearing in mind our earlier qualifications), that "the human being as he experiences himself, as erlebt, provides data that all theorizing about him and the world must not disregard or explain away". We are thus able to appreciate the significance of William James' 'universal conscious fact' together with the profundity of Terence's epigram, 'proximus sum egomet mihi'. The personalist, therefore, aware of the importance of introspection, self-experience, self-awareness, and, we would add, the act of reflexive non-positional attention which we have described, would willingly agree with Augustine in his oft-quoted dictum: "Noli foras ire; in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas".¹

¹AUGUSTINE, De Vera Religione, 39, 72. Husserl quotes this phrase at the end of his Cartesian Meditations, (p. 157), but in a quite different sense.
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**SCHEMA OF RESOLUTION OF DEBATE**

**ALLPORT**

- **Starting point (the givens):** the person as an observable stream of activity from birth to death

- **Problem:** self as knower of itself

- **Concessions:**
  - self as transparent to itself
  - broadening of basis of starting point to include erlebt experience of unitas multiplex

**BERTOCCI**

- **Starting point (the givens):** the person as adult erlebt experience of unitas multiplex

- **Problem:** mind/body relationship

- **Concessions:**
  - mind/body unit

**Principle of Resolution**

- self as transparent to itself through an act of reflexive attention in which the self as unitas multiplex is grasped as unitas in its multiplicity of activity

**Implications:**

- admission of a form of personal activity not open to observation

- need for either:
  a) re-definition of psychology as a science which cannot be the meta-science Allport advocates
  
  or
  
  b) the inclusion within psychology, defined in Allport's terms, of such non-observable immanent activities as givens at the outset

- Bertocci's basis for a mind/body dualism is unfounded, therefore the unity of mind and body must be admitted

- the self as unitas multiplex rendered explicit through reflexive attention provides the basis for a metaphysical worldview
ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT

SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to resolve the historical debate between Gordon W. Allport and Peter A. Bertocci which began in 1940 and ended only with the death of Allport in 1967. This debate, which became known as 'a classic dialogue in psychological and philosophical literature', was concerned with the theoretical interpretation of the growth and development of personality. While Bertocci, as a philosopher, argued that an 'agent-self' of some sort was required to account for personal continuity through personality development, Allport, as a psychologist, steadfastly refused to admit a 'self' to his system, arguing that such an admission would involve his system in 'homunculism', a charge which he maintained Bertocci's system failed to avoid. In order to attempt to resolve this debate, it is necessary to examine the thought of each protagonist. By distinguishing those aspects of their thought which are common from those which are divergent, it is possible to isolate those basic issues which were the cause of the conflict.
The first part of the study is thus devoted to an examination of the thought of Allport. It is discovered that Allport had chosen as his starting point the observable stream of activity of the individual person from birth to death, that such a naturalistic perspective dictated the 'givens' to be considered, and that from this perspective Allport was unable to account adequately for the functions of knowing and of unification within the person. Equally, it is discovered that there was a certain confusion in Allport's thought concerning the relationship between common sense, science, and reason.

The second part of the study is then devoted to an examination of the thought of Bertocci. Due to Bertocci's reliance on the thought of Edgar S. Brightman, some space is devoted to an examination of Brightman's thought where Bertocci's reliance seemed evident. The basic issues which Bertocci's dispute with Allport had raised are then noted. Crucial among these issues was the question of starting point. Bertocci, by beginning with the self as given in introspection, was able to introduce a set of 'givens' quite different from Allport's, including such 'givens' as freedom of choice and moral obligation. Equally given on Bertocci's analysis was a distinction between mind and body, an issue on which Allport disagreed radically. Finally, a similar confusion concerning the relationship between common sense, science and reason on Bertocci's part is noted.
The third part of the study then attempts to resolve the Allport-Bertocci debate. The source of their disagreement is isolated, namely, the starting point of their respective inquiries. It is argued that, if certain concessions were to be made by both Allport and Bertocci, and that if Bertocci were to clarify his starting point in a specific manner, there is no reason why this debate could not be resolved. Allport, it is argued, must admit a subjective knowledge of the self by the self and thereby broaden his starting point to include the observer, or subject, of the observable stream of activity. Such a subjective self would provide the anchorage which his system needed, and which his principle of the functional autonomy of motives failed to provide. Bertocci, on the other hand, must clarify his starting point of self-experience if he hopes to avoid the charge of subjective immediatism. Equally, his unclarified position is vulnerable to criticism on precisely the same point upon which he had criticised Allport, namely, a self which knows itself but which is not distinct from its known self. Bertocci must, then, it is argued, admit and clarify the transparency of the self to itself. At the same time, he must admit that the person is a mind-body unity in being and not merely in function.

The significance of these concessions, if granted, is far-reaching. To begin with, Allport would be obliged to reconsider his conception
of psychology, since the admission of subjectivity would entail the admission of an unobservable realm of personal being whose significance is paramount. Equally, Allport would be obliged to account for the advent of such activities and experiences as willing and freedom, oughting and obligation in a manner other than his theory of emergence, since these activities as erlebt are sui generis and cannot be traced back to other activities, experiences, or motives. Yet, it is argued, while these concessions would have far-reaching consequences, it is noted that Allport's pluralism and sensitivity to the enigma of personal being had never totally excluded the possibility of these concessions being granted. Indeed, that self-consciousness is a fact, and that the person is a continuing self-identity are facts Allport never disputed but rather took for granted, yet they remain facts for which his theory of personality could never adequately account.

The consequences of these concessions for Bertocci would be equally significant. While the suggested grounding of the transparency of the self would provide Bertocci with apodictic evidence of the unity and transparency of the person, it would also show that in any erlebt experience of willed bodily movement there is no ground for the distinction between mind and body. Indeed, this distinction arises only between the concepts of mind as defined in terms of the non-extended and body as defined in terms of the extended when willed bodily movement is viewed 'intellectualistically' on a cause-effect paradigm, which is
the very error Bertocci repudiates in arguing against a noumenal self and in favour of a self transparent to itself.

The study is thus in a position to conclude that a resolution of the Allport-Bertocci debate is possible, provided the proposed concessions be granted. At the same time, it is argued that as a result of this study's investigations, it could also be legitimately concluded that no theory of personality or of personal being can hope to be adequate if, like Allport, the investigator adopts a starting point which excludes subjectivity. Only a starting point which includes the personal self as it is, that is, as it can be grasped in a reflexive non-positional act of attention in its diverse activities, can ever hope to produce an adequate interpretation of the enigma of personal being which would avoid the perennial danger of fragmentation.