THE GNOSCEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE
IN NICOLAI HARTMANN'S METAPHYSICS OF COGNITION

by

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CURRICULUM VITAE

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"Irrationalism", in ibid.

"Lotze, Rudolf Hermann", in ibid.

"Metaphysics of Light", in ibid.

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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

In the submitted study a problem from Nicolai Hartmann's philosophy is presented. A brief introduction to the life, works and significance of the contemporary thinker seemed advisable for Hartmann is still little known in the English speaking world. Besides, it seemed practical to circumscribe in this introduction already the extension of the chosen theme. This appeared necessary because the cosmos of Hartmann's philosophy embraces many areas, and is rich on problems which are related to the theme, but claim their own domain.

The presentation of the extended bibliography was motivated by the partly still prevailing lack of such informations on this continent and by the desire to indicate with it the dimensions of Hartmann's work. For the sake of clarity footnotes, definitions and diagrams were added throughout the text.

The author of this thesis is solely responsible for the translation of the titles of Hartmann's (and other authors') books and articles, and of all the cited quotations. In the bibliography the books and articles appear with their original German title.
INTRODUCTION

Nicolai Hartmann was born in Riga on February 20, 1882. At the age of eight he lost his father. Close contact with his mother and the teachers was never established. From 1895 to 1901 Hartmann attended the German Gymnasium at (at that time) St. Petersburg, now Leningrad. After graduation (Abitur) studies in medicine, classical languages and philosophy followed at the universities of Dorpat, St. Petersburg and Marburg/Lahn. In 1907 the doctor's degree was conferred to him by Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp at the University of Marburg. This university was at that time considered the center of the Methodical Idealism and Neo-Kantianism. In 1909 Hartmann became a member of the faculty of that university.

From 1914 to 1918 Hartmann served in the German Armed Forces on the Eastern front. After World War I he

1 This is the reason why Hartmann sometimes is called erroneously a Russian. For instance, Dagobert Runes writes in his Treasury of World Philosophy, 1959, p. 472: "Born and educated in Tzarist Russia Hartmann shortly after 1900 emigrated to Germany where he became naturalized..." and "... in his adopted country..." To this Frida Hartmann, the widow of the thinker, remarks in her Letter of April 24, 1960 to C. E. Schuetzinger: "That my husband is called a Russian, is an astonishing naivety... But generally one knows..., that the inhabitants of the Baltic Provinces are Germans. The Baltic cities of Riga, Reval, Dorpat, and others... were founded by Germans... and ruled by the German citizens themselves. Only at the end of the nineteenth century the Russianizing began..."

2 Ibid.: "During that time, as a soldier in Russia he worked much on his Ethics..."
returned to Marburg. In 1920 he was nominated university lecturer (ausserordentlicher Professor). In 1922 he succeeded Paul Natorp. Hartmann was nominated professor of the University of Cologne in 1925 and in 1931 he became professor at the University of Berlin. There he taught during the Hitler period and the attacks of World War II. Hartmann adjusted life and academic activities to the most drastic circumstances. How difficult this was for him during the national-socialistic years, is indicated in remarks such as found in the preface to Problem des geistigen Seins,\(^3\) where he writes:

... a book on the spirit and its historical existence, on its power and reality, was undesirable to those who at that period decided what German readers should and should not read.

During the air attacks of World War II on Berlin the twenty-four chapters of Logic\(^4\) were lost with other valuable manuscripts of Hartmann. Later Hartmann did not find time

\(^3\) Nicolai HARTMANN, Das Problem des geistigen Seins (The Problem of Spiritual Being), Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1949, p. v.

\(^4\) Cf. also Joseph KLEIN, "Nicolai Hartmann und die Marburger Schule", in Nicolai Hartmann, Der Denker und sein Werk ("Nicolai Hartmann and the Marburg School", in Nicolai Hartmann, The Thinker and His Work), ed. H. Heimsoeth and R. Heiss, Goettingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952, p. 105: "The philosophical opus of Nicolai Hartmann is available to us almost completely, Indeed, it is even measurable on the plan constructed by its own creator during the years of his activity; only Logic remains lost."
enough to rewrite these finished chapters. After Berlin Hartmann taught at the University of Goettingen from 1945 on until he died on October 9, 1950.

It is still to early to evaluate justly Nicolai Hartmann's work and significance. The inclinations and interests of a generation usually are directed towards the seasonable, that is, towards that what is said or written for and in the present time. But the problems of the philosophia perennis, the profound problems of the centuries with their eternal validity are not attractive enough for the fast-living masses. Hartmann devoted himself inexorably to these problems. He never did avoid them. However there, where the progress of knowledge ramified into new directions, there Hartmann pointed them out and called for teamwork in these fields.

Hartmann's own work comprises many branches of philosophy. Already the early works show him deeply anchored in the beginnings of classical Western Philosophy. These early works surprise the student with Hartmann's mental capacity

and dimensions. Joseph Klein said of the first work on Platons Logik des Seins, that it is a hymnus demonstrativus to Cohen's philosophy of the origin. The methodical Idealism is presented there in such a manner which was not even displayed in the works of the heads of the [Marburg] School. ⁶

Already in these works of the young Hartmann, who, at that time was a fervent adherer of his school, are found propositions, which foreshadow positions of his later thinking. They indicate already the soon beginning philosophical metanoia of Nicolai Hartmann, who was intensively occupied by the search for his own philosophical standpoint. He admits that from 1922 on the theory of cognition was the main object of his thought which had brought him earlier (in 1915) in conflict with the position of the School of Marburg. He states:

One of the most responsible questions of a system... [is] the position regarding the much debated correlation: Subject-object... On its inner disposition depends the problem of the systematic holding especially of idealism and realism with all their subspecies.'

And then he announces his own conviction:


INTRODUCTION

The classical solution of this question was given by Kant. According to him cognition is only possible when there is something identical in thought and being. But this identical something is not the full object with its infinite determinations. This lies forever as entity beyond what is recognized... [and] in that datum consists the necessary non-identity of thought and being.

This non-identity of idea and being became Hartmann's motto in his philosophical strife "against the Marburg Logical Idealism and the Neokantianism on the whole." Due to this insight Aristotle, Kant and Hegel appeared in a different light. Hartmann devoted to them special treatises. At the same time, however, Hartmann remained alert and receptive for novel contemporary positions as, for instance, the ones of Husserl and Scheler. Heidegger's subjective existentialism, however, found never Hartmann's applause nor his acception.

Hartmann's philosophical development can be passed along with his writings. In 1919 (after severe experiences on the battle front), "the breakthrough to a new ontology


was completed. Its first document is Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. This book has to be considered the basic and pioneering work of Hartmann's entire teaching. It is explored in this thesis under the aspect of the title of the thesis.

Hartmann's philosophical interest turned further to ethical and ontological problems, which he documented in the following inquiries: Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, considered a prolegomena to Hartmann's ontological positions; Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, Hartmann's study of potentiality and actuality; Der Aufbau der realen Welt, a compendium of a general theory on the real categories, which

10 Werner ZIEGENFUSS, op. cit., p. 454.


prepared for the *Philosophie der Natur*, a compendium on the special categories. Hartmann wrote also an inquiry on immaterial or spiritual reality and its historic-philosophical consequences. This work he called *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*.

To these comprehensive writings Hartmann added numerous smaller studies and essays on systematic and historical problems of philosophy. These were collected and posthumously edited by Frida Hartmann under the title *Kleinere Schriften*. Some of these essays are evaluated and cited as classical contributions to Western thought.

The progress of Hartmann's philosophy and its condensation in these writings was accomplished in a continuous dialogue with the great forerunners and those contemporaries who left their imprints on the history of ideas.

Hartmann's own philosophy is unchangeably coined by his ontological orientation, that means, by his grasp of reality and his understanding of the cognition of reality.


Similar to Aristotle, Thomas, Kant, etc., unlike Plato, Augustine and especially the existential philosophers, Hartmann was an absolutely objectively aligned thinker. A mentioning of his individual self scarcely occurs in any of his writings. Hartmann put every philosophical idea into the current of a philosophia perennis of problems, and related it to the already available results of Western Philosophy. His writings show a clear and noble style of which J. Bochenski said: "His works are real models of dispassionate exactitude and scientific comprehensiveness," and which J. Klein praised:

In the works of Ernst Cassirer, the artist among the thinkers of the Marburg School, we find similar achievements of perfect style; but his elegance lacks the same depth, clarity and penetration of thought.

This thesis is limited to a problem which has been recognized as central in cognition. Hartmann explored it in his basic and pioneering book, in Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. It is the question of the union of

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19 Cf. Joseph KLEIN, op. cit., p. 120.


21 Joseph KLEIN, op. cit., p. 110: "...bei dem Künstler unter den Gestalten der Marburger Schule, bei Ernst Cassirer, findet man Gleichwertiges unter dem Aspekt des formvollendeten Ausdrucks; seiner Eleganz fehlt jedoch die gleiche Tiefe, Klarheit und Durchstosskraft des Gedankens."
the cognizing subject with the recognized object, or the problem of the gnoseological transcendence. It is rooting in the fact that the things themselves, when recognized, always remain without the subject. The intellect never "has" the things, but only impressions, notions, images of the things. Hartmann presents this factual condition in an antinomy:

The intellect must transcend itself inasmuch as it grasps something outside itself, that is, inasmuch as it is the recognizing consciousness. But, the intellect cannot transcend itself, inasmuch as it can grasp only its own contents, that is, inasmuch as it is recognizing consciousness. 22

In order to find a solution to this difficulty Hartmann approaches it by a phenomenological analysis of the cognitive act, in which he discovers the gnoseological transcendence.

The term "transcendence" means here the reaching of the subject beyond itself through its act of cognition 23 and the reaching of the object beyond itself through its effect on the subject.


23 Note the contrast to the immanent acts of the intellect, such as thinking, judging, knowing, imagining.
The term "gnoseological" modifies the term transcendence, because it is essentially a transcendence of cognition, not a transcendence of being, in contrast to the teaching of the Greeks which held an ontological transcendence of ideas.

The problem of transcendence occurs in many transformations in the history of philosophy. Hartmann had to come to terms with these historical positions. In this study, however, only inasmuch as it seemed necessary these positions will be mentioned. No attempt was made to adjust Hartmann's position to any historical school. Furthermore, the intention of this work was to avoid any bending of Hartmann's philosophy towards traditional systems or principles of being and/or of principles of knowing. There where Hartmann's theory coincides with them it is not necessary to point this out to those who are familiar with philosophy. There where Hartmann deviates, a bending in favor of traditional principles would be a falsification of Hartmann's teaching.

This study does not claim any other privilege than to present Hartmann as Hartmann from the point of view of the theme. It is expected to draw more attention to a philosopher who, due to contemporary trends, becomes overlooked, but who certainly will survive some of these trends and fertilize the dialogue of future thinkers. This
conviction is based upon the truth that Hartmann opens up again the entire wealth of being, its real structures, categories, principles and relations, in objective consideration of their history as well as by thinking, measuring, anticipating within the noetic affluence of the twentieth century.

In the first part of this study is presented the theme and Hartmann's position. For this purpose it seemed helpful to sketch Hartmann's gnoseological antinomies. This allowed then the progress to the central thesis of the gnoseological transcendence. The second part analyzes the gnoseological transcendence in detail. In the third part, that is in the conclusion, a criticism is offered in which Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition on the whole, its acceptability on the basis of the findings of this study is evaluated and its limitations are measured. The prevailing attitude thereby was to remain unbiased in the face of the positive and negative criticism of Hartmann as displayed in the contemporary philosophical literature.
CHAPTER ONE

METAPHYSICS OF COGNITION

IN GENERAL

Problematic Thinking versus Systematic Thinking
Hartmann's Place among the Problem-Thinkers
Hartmann's Concept of Metaphysics

IN PARTICULAR

Hartmann and the Gnoseological Main Problems
Hartmann and the Historical Apriorism
Hartmann and the Criterion of Truth
Hartmann's View on Problem Awareness
Hartmann and the Progress of Cognition

ON METHOD

Hartmann's Concept of Method
Hartmann's Classification of Methods
Hartmann's Mastery of Methods in General
Hartmann's Method in his Metaphysics of Cognition

Phenomenology
Aporetics
Theory
IN GENERAL

"Philosophy does not begin with itself. It presupposes the accumulated knowledge and methodical experience of all sciences as well as the two-edged experience of the philosophical systems of the centuries. From all that philosophy has to learn."

Nicolai Hartmann.

In order to hear Hartmann I had come to Marburg for a semester. I came with definite expectations. For us younger ones the name Hartmann was a notion characterized perhaps most distinctly by the title of his book Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. We had experienced Kant as the great master of philosophical thought, but at the same time also as the great critic. Kant's idea that metaphysics is impossible on the basis of pure reason was for our generation, as for many previous ones, an intransgressible position. One was used to consider distrustfully everything called metaphysics, and to look at all metaphysical movements rather suspiciously. Although Kant had written the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, and some of us knew that in the opus postumum were even found beginnings and pieces of this metaphysics, nevertheless, the large region of philosophical thought, the metaphysical thinking of all kinds, was orphanized. The theory of knowledge stood before it as a kind of safeguard.

Nicolai Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition was a theory of knowledge. But this thinker, who was in no way inferior to Kant in critical keenness, and who gave now a coherent theory of knowledge, called his resulting theory metaphysics. Supported by the Kantian inquiry into the foundations of knowledge, Hartmann, in carrying on, proved that there are metaphysical foundations in knowledge itself.
Therefore, with this work now we re-experienced what Hartmann certainly had realized by and for himself when he wrote it. It was a dispute with Kant, most of all with the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School, from which Hartmann had come. Indeed, the metaphysics of cognition was a work of eruption. Formerly, Kant’s teaching had put itself as a bulwark in front of all philosophical efforts dealing with metaphysical issues. With Hartmann’s theory a practicable path into the open reappeared.

Thus, Heiss, one of the most eminent students in the Hartmann circle, depicts the philosophical situation during the twenties of this century. Hartmann’s metaphysics of cognition had made the young thinkers listen attentively. Indeed, one came to Marburg in order to hear Hartmann. This thinker had gone through years of profound study and a controversy with the Marburg logical Idealism. An essential philosophical discussion had taken place in Hartmann’s mind with the most important thinkers via Husserl and Scheler back through the centuries, and in reverse again from Plato to the present time. But it was mostly on Aristotle, Kant and Hegel that his own philosophy had matured. From this experience results the statement:

Nobody begins with his own thinking. Everyone finds in his time a gnoseological and problematic situation into which he grows, and out of which he himself begins to search. He accepts the great content of the problems from the historical stage which they have reached. For these problems go through the centuries without changing essentially. They are the same metaphysical problems about which Kant said, they were the fate of reason, because

1 Robert HEISS, "Nicolai Hartmann", in Nicolai Hartmann Der Denker und sein Werk, Goettingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952, p. 16.
reason can neither reject nor solve them. However, there are many more of them than Kant assumed.  

Here we find Hartmann strongly impressed. Through this status quo his own philosophic mission became clear to him. He accepted it with all its difficulties. The philosophic idea occupied him constantly. From the historical data he had found, he groped back into the very origin of systems and problems. Clearly he distinguishes both:

In most of its representations philosophy had started from preconceived world-views, subsequently into which it had to fit whatever the contemporary horizon... assigned to master. The mental constructs which developed this way are then the so-called philosophical systems. They form a whole before they master the pertinent problems and determine the latter from the consequences of the whole.  


Then Hartmann adds sagaciously:

Philosophy does not consist merely of those constructs. Another kind of mental work moves along with the systems, shrouded by them, namely the efforts advancing along the problems by analyzing them, investigating them, penetrating them. Such work has the tendency to accept nothing but verified proofs. It is the healthy tendency philosophy shares with all the other sciences. It is clear, besides a philosophy of systems there advances a philosophy of problems.  

Accordingly we have to classify Hartmann himself within the established dichotomy. Viewing his opera omnia one is inclined to see in Hartmann a systematic thinker. He mastered the traditional branches of philosophy, presented his studies translucently and in excellent organization, so that the term "systematic thinker" seems well justified. But system was not Hartmann's starting ground. System was to Hartmann a result achieved, an end, a goal. It was Hartmann's great desideratum, the completion of which seemed never reached, for philosophical knowledge is never finished. System meant to Hartmann the totality and perfection of philosophical knowledge. This idea of "system"

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had resulted from Hartmann's own philosophical genesis. He strode through reality seeingly, thinkingly, reflectingly, and the more he saw, the more he thought, reflected, and knew. But the more he knew, reflected and thought, the more he perceived. It was Goethe who had stated: "One sees as much as one knows." Hartmann verified this statement especially in regard to his penetration, evaluation and criticism of the history of ideas. For this reason it is so difficult to separate Hartmann's noetic development and philosophical speculation from the development of his works. Both advance step by step and grow organically towards their completion. H. Huelsmann, too, has this impression. He remarks in a footnote of his Methode in der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns:

In Hartmann's philosophy as well as in his philosophical development there is no flaw, there is only now and then an accomplished correction. It seems to me that the turning away from Marburg is such a correction. It is not an inner change. Everything here has the way of correction.5

5 Heinz HUELSMANN, Die Methode... (The Method in the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann), Dusseldorf, Schwann, 1959, p. 115, note 1: "In der Philosophie Hartmanns, in seiner philosophischen Entwicklung gibt es keinen Bruch, sondern nur je und je vollzogene Korrekturen. - Auch die Abwendung von Marburg ist eine solche, wie mir scheint. Sie ist keine innere Verwandlung, alles hat hier den Stil der Korrektur."
Such considerations aid to classify Hartmann among the problematic thinkers. This is in accord with his own conviction. He stated about the present era that the time of the preestablished systems is past.

In history Hartmann had discovered that the system thinkers are in the majority. There were the systems of Plotinus and Proclus. The Scholastics of the Middle Ages were almost without exception systematics. A counter-movement occurred only in the late Nominalism. The Modern era produced new systems: Bruno, Spinoza, Wolff, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel bent reality according to their systems, that is, they pre-constructed and attempted to solve the problems by complying with the principles of their pre-conceived systems.

To the minority group Hartmann counts foremost Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant. Thereby he used as criterion

that their thinking either does not submit to a system at all, or that it constantly transgresses it or breaks through it.⁶

⁶ Nicolai HARTMANN, "Der philosophische Gedanke...", in op. cit., p. 3: "... dass sich ihr Denken entweder ueberhaupt nicht in ein System fuegt oder doch es staendig ueberschreitet und durchbracht..."
Such a criterion enables us to recognize in Hartmann himself a problem-thinker, and this criterion becomes for him the criterion of true philosophy on the whole:

[Philosophy] does not predetermine. It does not presuppose a world-view to which everything has to adjust, or at least it remains ever ready to revise it. It does not accept prescribed principles. It first searches for them. It begins with the problems which it finds... in advancing. It is concerned with the solution of problems, but when it cannot solve them, it perseveres with them in exploration and uncertainty. Problems which do not coincide with its calculation, are never rejected. Philosophy remains with them, follows their paths in any direction. Again and again the consequences stemming from the problems may force philosophy to break through established mental constructions. Therefore, it may often appear inconsequent when viewed from the side of the systems. On account of this the two ways separate unequivocally: whether thinking is concerned with the harmony of mental constructs or with cognition.

It appears then that all systematic thinking results in something conditioned by time, whereas problem-thinking

7 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Der philosophische Gedanke...", in op. cit., p. 3: "Sie entscheidet nicht vor, setzt kein Weltbild voraus, auf das alles hinauslaufen muss, oder ist doch bereit, es jederzeit zu revidieren. Sie lasst sich ihre Prinzipien nicht geben, sie sucht erst nach ihnen. Sie geht von den Problemen aus, die sie vorfindet, oder auf die sie im Vordringen stoesst; um Loesung der Probleme ist es ihr zu tun, und wenn sie sie nicht losen kann, so verharrt sie im Suchen und in der Ungewissheit. Sie weist keine Probleme ab, weil sie in ihrer Rechnung nicht aufgehen; sie harrt bei ihnen aus, geht jeden Weg mit ihnen, wohin immer sie fuhren moegen. Die Problemkonsequenz zwingt sie, den aufgefuhrten Gedankenbau immer wieder zu durchbrechen. Darum erscheint sie, vom System aus gesehen, meist als "inkonsequent". Daran scheiden sich eindeutig die beiden Wege, ob es dem Denken um Einheit des Gedankenbaus geht oder um Erkenntnis."
achieves something supra-temporal, namely, the progress of cognition. Because it starts from the problem, it can advance from problem to problem through the centuries.

Hartmann took an empathic stand regarding this problem development. His works bear witness to the fact that the problems led him to his analysis of the categories, a gigantic intellectual achievement, overdue since Kant's Critique. The problems taught Hartmann also to treasure the Aristotelian Aporetics and to revive it in contemporary thought since the philosophical demands of the twentieth century urged him. The problems with their inextricable remainders transmitted from generation to generation were challenging Hartmann also to become the philosopher of the trans-intelligible, of the irrational, that is of what transcends here, now, and perhaps for ever, the human intellectual capacity. But the problems made Hartmann also search for his own position which he finally found as ontologist and metaphysician.

But what did Hartmann actually mean with metaphysics? Did he take the term in its traditional meaning? In the first part of his metaphysics of cognition Hartmann explains his own position. He speaks here of three kinds of metaphysics: The subject-matter metaphysics, restricted to special fields; the speculative metaphysics, and the
metaphysics of problems. The first and the last withstand criticism. But the second kind is contestable.

On the whole the specialized metaphysics is not more traditional than the metaphysics of problems. Both kinds have been transmitted from generation to generation of thinkers through the centuries and have become more developed. But the subject-matter metaphysics is predominantly the province of the system-thinkers, who understand metaphysics as a field with restricted subject-matter circumference, for instance, to many of these thinkers ontology was the fundamental science from which cosmology, psychology and natural theology forked off as specialized fields.

Such specialized metaphysics could indeed preserve its meaning even after the specialized domains themselves became either partly very questionable, or partly independent and non-speculative. But once the tradition thereof had been torn down, and other philosophic basic sciences had pushed themselves in the foreground, it would be necessary to set their foundations anew. However, this assignment, even if it were possible to fulfill it, seems not to be ours. 8

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8 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik..., p. 11-12: "Solche Gebietsmetaphysik kenne zwar ihren Sinn behalten, auch nachdem die "Gebiete" selbst zum Teil sehr fragwürdig, zum Teil selbständig und unspekulativ geworden sind. Aber nachdem die Tradition hierin einmal abgerissen ist, andere philosophische Grundwissenschaften sich vorgedrängt haben, wäre es erforderlich, ihre Fundamente erst neu anzulegen. Diese Aufgabe, selbst wenn sie möglich sein sollte, ist nicht die unsre."
Hartmann refutes the traditional view by saying,

> it is erroneous to think metaphysics begins first of all with a speculation about God and the soul, or about the whole universe.... The metaphysical questions indicate themselves rather closely behind the given and the grasped facts. This is valid also for all the non-speculative disciplines. ⁹

The second kind of metaphysics according to Hartmann is the metaphysics which serves more or less as "battlefield of speculative systems, of their doctrinal constructs and worldviews."¹⁰ Hartmann points out that the specialized metaphysics speculates, too, but it strives for a solution of the problems. In the purely speculative metaphysics, however, the problems "remain basically unsolved, while the speculative hypotheses enjoy greatest freedom."¹¹ This results in a steady fluctuation of contradictory solutions of the problems.

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¹⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

¹¹ Ibid.: "[Probleme im Grunde]... ungelost bleiben, wahrend die spekulativen Voraussetzungen in groesster Freiheit variieren... [im Gewoge]... widersprechender Losungen von Problemen."
The problematic areas remained within their own rights; only the theories, which had dared to approach them, became objects of criticism. Metaphysics as speculation is rightly considered outdated. Finally Hartmann asks, what kind of metaphysics remains since the mutual chasing of the systems seems at the end. In answering this question, Hartmann points to the perennial problems which require further development. It follows, that modern metaphysics can be only a metaphysics of problems with "slow progress of research" because of the always urging but unsoluble remainders of problems. Hartmann explains:

The strange phenomenon, however, is that almost in all fields the philosophical basic and central questions are of such a nature. They are metaphysical questions inasmuch as they are finally unsoluble questions. Consequently systematic thinking is necessarily metaphysical thinking, systematic philosophical research is necessarily metaphysical research. Man sees himself continuously confronted with the ancient, eternal aporias with their

12 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 12: "... die Problemgebiete blieben in ihren Gerechtsamen; die Theorien nur, die sich an sie gewagt hatten, verfielen der Kritik. Metaphysik als Spekulation ist es, was... mit Recht fuer lahmgelegt gilt."

13 IDEM, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung", in op. cit., p. 11.

14 Ibid.
irrational woof. And this situation is the
decisive one. It constitutes the unchanging
basic condition of philosophy.15

Hence, metaphysics of cognition, too, is understood by
Hartmann in this sense. This will become clear from the
following inquiry.

15 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Systematische Selbstdar-
stellung", in op. cit., p. 11: "Das Eigentümliche aber
ist, dass fast auf allen Gebieten die philosophischen Grund-
und Kernfragen von dieser Art sind. Es sind metaphysische
Fragen im Sinne nicht endgültig losbarer Fragen. Die
Folge dieses Umstandes ist, dass systematisches Denken
notwendig metaphysisches Denken, und systematisch-philoso-
phische Forschung notwendig metaphysische Forschung ist.
Es sind die alten, ewigen Aporien mit irrationalen Einschlag,
vor die sich dauernd der Mensch gestellt sieht... Diese
Sachlage ist die ausschlaggebende. Sie macht die dauernde
Grundsituation der Philosophie aus."
IN PARTICULAR

It is clear that Hartmann belongs to the problem thinkers. How then were his relations to the individual prominent representatives of his own group and which problems occupied his mind especially? It is evident that no thinker can be concerned with the entire cosmos of problems. What Hartmann had stated in regard to the plethora of the categories applies also to the multitude of problems:

... to outline these... is the desideratum of philosophy which to fulfill is not only beyond the power of the individual thinker but transgresses the boundaries of an era. Generations will have to work on it. But they, too, will achieve only what has become mellow in their time.^[16]

This study is geared towards the gnoseological problems. Therefore, it is necessary to approach only that sector of Hartmann's problem thinking which deals precisely with cognition. Two possibilities exist for research in order to receive answers to the above questions: Either one begins with the thinker or with the problems. In both cases

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16 Nicolai HARTMANN, Philosophie der Natur (Philosophy of Nature), p. v: "Diese... zu entwerfen, ist ein Desiderat der Philosophie, das zu erfüllen nicht nur über die Kraft eines Einzelnen, sondern auch wohl über die eines Zeitalters hinausgeht. Daran werden Generationen zu arbeiten haben, und bewältigen werden sie offenbar auch stets nur das, was in ihrer Zeit spruchreif geworden ist."
then one has again an alternative, namely, either one traces the problem from the beginnings to their contemporary state, or, one regresses from the present time to the origin of the history of Western philosophy. Hartmann often did the latter. It seems therefore inviting to follow his procedure.

The problems were Nicolai Hartmann's primary concern. Since he had disclosed again the ontological realm with his Metaphysik der Erkenntnis he had to screen those problems which were related to cognition and had registered in the history of ideas. Thereby was his attitude the one he pictures in the description of a problem thinker:

The theory of cognition... has to proceed critically. Critical procedure, however, is not selection of problems, indeed, such can take place only from the point of view of solubility, but critical procedure is... selection of a position. The inquiry has to be critical not in regard to the problem but in regard to the system and theory.17

The conviction that the problem of cognition is a metaphysical problem is rooted in Hartmann's theory that cognition deals with the "grasping of the given, that is, cognition is concerned with the objectification of an

17 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik..., p. 125: "Erkenntnistheorie... muss kritisch vorgehen. Kritisches Vorgehen ist aber nicht Auslese der Probleme, eine solche konnten ja nur vom Gesichtspunkt der Losbarkeit stattfinden, sondern gerade die Auslese des Standpunktes. Nicht zum Problem, sondern zum System und zur Theorie soll sich die Untersuchung kritisch verhalten."
existent, or, that an existent becomes an object."\(^{18}\)

Approaching cognition under such an aspect, a nexus of problems presents itself. Hartmann lists the following as the fundamental questions of cognition:

1) The problem of the subject-object union, which is the problem of the gnoseological transcendence;
2) the problem of the apriori and aposteriori knowledge;
3) the problem of the criterion of truth;
4) the question of the problem awareness;
5) the problem of the progress of cognition.

All these problems are metaphysical problems in Hartmann's view. But they are aporias, problems which resist a perfect solution, "because they contain an irrational remainder." Therefore, Hartmann seeks to separate within these problems the "transintelligible or the irrational from the intelligible, in order to find for the intelligible part the starting point."\(^ {19}\) Through this method the propositions become gnoseological aporias the ontological foundation of which Hartmann strives to discover. He turns his attention to the metaphysical data of the subject-object relation, which obviously is anchored in the existential sphere.

\(^{18}\) Cf. Werner ZIEGENFUSS, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 466.

\(^{19}\) Cf. \textit{ibid.}
At any given time only a part of our surrounding world is known, a circle of objects renders itself prominent through the actual limit of objection which is based relatively upon the noetic condition of the subject. However, beyond this there lies an unlimited zone of the transobjective, that is of the unknown. Since the limit of objection is moving during the noetic process, the question arises, whether it is capable of boundless shifting. This has to be denied, for the phenomenon of the unintelligible-for-us is demonstrable. It follows, that there must exist a second boundary, the boundary of objectification or recognizability (intelligibility). Obviously this border must be fixed for it is established by the kind and disposition of our apparatus of cognition.

This condensed ontological account of Hartmann's theory of cognition points then to the "transintelligible" beyond the limits of objectification, for there is a difference whether something is unknown or unknowable. Hartmann deals then with the "affirmative notion of the thing-as-such", with the removal of its aporias, and, finally he demonstrates the irrational given in the object of cognition and in the categories.

20 Werner ZIEGENFUSS, op. cit., p. 466: "... jederzeit [ist] nur ein Teil der uns umgebenden Welt erkannt..., so hebt sich durch die jeweilige Grenze der Objektion ein "Hof der Objekte" heraus, der relativ auf dem Erkenntnisstand des Subjektes besteht, jenseits dessen sich aber eine unbegrenzte Zone des "Transobjektiven," also des Unerkannten, anschliesst. Da nun die Objektionsgrenze sich im Erkenntnisprozess verschiebt, so fragt es sich, ob sie sich unbegrenzt verschieben kann. Das muss verneint werden, weil es nachweislich das Phaenomen des uns Unerkennbaren gibt. Also muss es eine zweite Grenze geben, die Grenze der Objizierbarkeit oder Erkennbarkeit (Rationalitaet) und diese muss offenbar unverrückbar feststehen, weil sie uns durch Art und Anlage unseres Erkenntnisapparates gezogen ist."
All this shows that Hartmann has learned from his philosophical ancestors, but that he accepts critically and carefully only what withstands his remeasuring on reality. We follow him now in his passing along the history of philosophy. Thereby we do not stop at trivialities for Hartmann truly was concerned with the great problems of the great thinkers, these he pursues into their origins.

This thesis will deal in detail with the first problem, the problem of the gnoseological transcendence after having established the groundwork. Therefore the inquiry proceeds here now to the remaining problems.

The second problem of the theory of cognition is in Hartmann's study of the problem of apriori and aposteriori cognition. As realist, Hartmann notices that the natural ability of human cognition presses towards the outer realm. William of Ockham already called this noetic path or direction the intentio prima. Its bending back he called reflexion. Hartmann exchanges these two traditional terms for the expressions intentio recta and intentio obliqua. He does so in order to sharply outline the realm of cognition against the domain of thinking. For
in the cognitive phenomenon we deal not at all with thinking. Although there is cognitive thinking, nevertheless there is also the blank thinking, the dreamy, imaginary, or constructive thinking.\footnote{Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie" (Cognition in the Light of Ontology), in Kleinere Schriften, Vol. 1, p. 129: "[Es geht] im Erkenntnisphänenomen garnicht einmal um das Denken. Wohl gibt es erkennendes Denken, aber es gibt auch das leerlaufende Denken - das traeumende, phantasierende oder konstruktive."}

For cognition, however, there is always a given object of which the intellect must grasp how it is, not how it is thought, nor how it is thought of. It is this alignment towards the object which makes cognition a transcending act, for it goes beyond the subject limit and aims for the object, hence is different from thinking.

In regard to these general essential traits of the noetic relation between object and subject there is actually no difference between apriori and aposteriori cognition, for the determinations of the object are within the object and are there before the object becomes recognized by the subject, that is pre-noetically, and therefore, it is not possible to speak under this aspect of an opposition between prius and posterius. The object in reality does not conceal such a contrast. Prius and posterius begin in the realm of cognition only, for
only the cognition of determinations of an object can be arranged "before" or "after", and even this is not possible in regard to the object's being (which is always the ontic prius), but only in regard to a definite mode of data. In regard to the content of a thing this means, that to be sure not in the object itself single traits or elements are apriori, or aposteriori, but they are so in the "image" of the object.\textsuperscript{22}

But because the "image" itself of the object has the form of the object in cognition, possesses objectivity, one can in a certain sense rightly speak of the objectivity of the apriori or of the aposteriori. Yet from this it becomes clear that this concerns only the formal object, in no way, however, the material object, for real objectivity, existential objectivity (subsistence) of the object is not found in the subject. Thus the apriori-aposteriori distinction is one within the realm of cognition, a distinction concerning the mode of data of the "image" of the object within the subject. All processes in which a real particular as such is given and of which something is seen, grasped, or recognized, is then consequently an aposteriori cognition. But

\footnote{22 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 49: "...nur Erkenntnis von Gegenstandsbestimmtheiten kann "vor-" oder "nach-" geordnet sein, und auch das nicht in Bezug auf deren Sein (welches immer das ontische prius ist), sondern nur in Bezug auf eine bestimmte Gegebenheitsweise. Inhaltlich bedeutet dieses, dass zwar nicht am Objekt selbst, wohl aber am "Bilde" des Objekts einzelne Züge oder Elemente apriori resp. a posteriori "sind"."}
since whatever is valid in regard to one particular can very well have validity in other cases, this universal validity then has to be considered "before" (prior to) the particular case, which, however, in no way means that the universal traits in totality are grasped immediately and directly when cognition of the particular happens. Thus what follows is, therefore, the particular itself, and it is this that is posterior, for "the particular single case is the ontologically secondary, the essential posterius."\textsuperscript{23}

When a particular is not presented to cognition but the "universal characteristics regardless of their presentation in a real case"\textsuperscript{24} are given, then we deal with an apriori cognition.

Apriori insight does not wait for the real occurrence. It knows beforehand how it stands with the object (from a certain aspect)... Inasmuch as ontologically such characteristics are primary in relation to the particular given, they form the essential prius. In this sense any cognition gained from such a prius (and any cognition stretching out from there) is indeed "cognition a priori".\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 50.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid.: "Apriorische Einsicht wartet nicht auf das reale Vorkommen des Gegenstandes, sie weiss zum Voraus, wie er (in bestimmter Hinsicht) beschaffen sein muss... Sofern aber ontologisch solche Wesenszüge das Primäre dem Einzelfall gegenüber sind, bilden sie das essentielle prius. In diesem Sinne ist Erkenntnis, die an diesem prius gewonnen ist und erst von ihm aus sich auf den Fall erstreckt, in der Tat "Erkenntnis a priori".
\end{itemize}
Therewith also is at once determined the circumference and the essential difference of both noetic categories. The object of aposteriori cognition is always a real, concrete, individual being. It is never an ideal, abstract, universal nature, whereas the object of apriori cognition can be provided by both, the real and the ideal realm of being.

Ideal being simply does not have particular cases; its constructs lack the individual existence here and now. But the posterius, with which aposteriori cognition begins, is precisely the particular individual case in its here and now. Cognition apriori then connects gnoseologically both realms of being; cognition aposteriori separates them.26

We understand now why Hartmann had fewer and less intense disputes with his philosophical forerunners on the aposteriori cognition, although he certainly said much about that subject too. Particulars and the cognition of the particular — as complicated as they may be in themselves and in their relationship — nevertheless are objects of perception and, therefore, they are to a certain degree objects of evidence. Hartmann holds that a final analysis

26 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 50: "Ideales Sein hat eben keine Einzelfälle, seinen Gebilden fehlt das individuelle Hier-und-Jetzt-Sein. Das posterius aber, an welchem "aposteriorische" Erkenntnis ansetzt, ist gerade der individuelle Einzelfall in seinem Hier und Jetzt. Erkenntnis a priori also verbindet gnoseologisch die beiden Reiche des Seins; Erkenntnis a posteriori scheidet sie."
"concentrating upon the individual givenness of the object" within the process of perceptive cognition is sufficient for a clear position.

However, it is different with the controversy on the apriori cognition. Hartmann involves in it intensively and extensively. He dedicated to this theme entire articles and many pages if not whole chapters in various books. This problem was for him an important philosophical concern. In all his deliberations therefore, there were not only discussed the variations of the historical apriorisms, he clearly stated in them also his own position.

Whenever the problem requires it, Hartmann holds his position. So he does especially in regard to Kant. But in no way does he display an attitude of prejudice, neither in a positive nor in a negative sense. As epigone in the twentieth century, however, he finds that the entire problem of the apriori — due to Kant — "shrunk from a universal element of human cognition to one of mere judgment." He

27 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 51.


29 IDEM, "Das Problem des Apriorismus etc.", in Kleinere Schriften, Vol. 2, p. 48: "... war... von einem allgemeinen Element aller menschlichen Erkenntnis... zu einem solchen der Urteile zusammengeschrumpft."
admits that in it is found still a remnant of space and time of the old intuitionism, but all the rest had been tailored "to the synthetic judgments in science and philosophy," when they did not otherwise come from experience. During the Post-Kantian decades one had been inclined to interpret and color with this Kantian understanding even the former theories also, for instance, the theories of Leibniz and Descartes, and

finally Neo-Kantianism generated an interpretation of the Platonic theory of cognition which looked almost like a miniature of the Critique of Pure Reason. Nowadays it has become unnecessary to criticize that any longer.30

Hartmann sees the essential error of this mental attitude rooted in the system-thinking of the specific era, for

no period can grasp historically more than it can hold systematically... Under the import (weight) of the scientific judgment one forgot that there is in every act of cognition, even in the most naive and most unscientific one, an apriori woof, so that in life pure empirical cognition does not occur just as pure apriori cognition does show nowhere, and that even perception is filled with apriori elements.31


31 Ibid.: "... keine Zeit kann historisch mehr begreifen, als sie systematisch zu fassen vermag... Man vergess ueber dem Gewicht des wissenschaftlichen Urteils, dass
As is well known, Kant had put the chief stress of the apriori cognition upon the form element of the concept and had presupposed the material element as the aposteriori given condition. But in doing so he had made all the apriori elements purely subjective and he had considered them as the result of the function of the intellect. Hence, in the objects of cognition then the aposteriori element dwells there alone, a mistake, which many times occurs in the history of ideas. From this, however, grows then also the great difficulty for Kant and his followers up to Neokantianism, with whom Hartmann took up the actual discussion. This great difficulty caused by such a position is "to deduce" the objective validity of the pure rational notions distinctly before hand.32

Likewise was it impossible to stick to the functional origin and to the pure formal nature of the apriori element. This apriori element of any cognition is rooted, as Hartmann sees it, in certain universal principles — Kant called es in aller Erkenntnis, auch in der naivsten und wissenschaftfersten, einen apriorischen Einschlag gibt, dass schon im Leben selbst rein empirische Erkenntnis ebensowenig fuer sich vorkommt, wie rein apriorische, dass selbst die Wahrnehmung voll apriorischer Elemente ist."

32 Nicolai Hartmann, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in Kleinere Schriften, vol. 2, p. 51: "... die objektive Gueltigkeit der reinen Verstandesbegriffe erst besonders zu "deduzieren"."
them categories — for which other philosophers, however, use divers older terms: from the eidos of the Ancient thinkers via essentiae and universalia of the Scholastics to the simplices of the Rationalists and to the Wesensgesetze of Husserl. The decisive point in them is however not recumbent in the diversity of expression but in the alternation (ambivalence) of their occurrence, namely on the one side as principle of cognition, and on the other side as principle of being.\textsuperscript{33}

The significance of this duality is clear, and only with this in mind Hartmann's entire theory of cognition, which one might better designate as his metaphysics of cognition, can be understood correctly. It is the identity relation of the categories of being and of cognition upon which is founded the apriori intelligibility of all spheres of reality.\textsuperscript{34} To transform this relation — as Kant did — into a purely subjective, formal, and functional element disagrees with reality, and entangles in gnoseological errors, at the same time, of course, increasing the difficulties, as shown in history. But in spite of all that


\textsuperscript{34} Upon this situation will come light through the investigation concerning the essence of transcendence. In order to avoid repetitions at this place reference to the following chapter of this study seems advisable.
Kant has his great merits. Hartmann stresses them too. These consist in Kant's "critical evaluation of Empiricism, Sensualism, practical Relativism, and Opportunism."³⁵

John Locke, the representative of Empiricism had criticized the heritage of the Cartesians, namely, the "innate ideas". In diagonal opposition to their teaching Locke derives cognition from the senses and from reflexion, which is nothing else but the turning back to the sensations. The Scholastics had known that before Locke. They had called reflexion *intentio secunda*. Locke sees aposteriori knowledge immediately coming from sense perception. The apriori, universal ideas are secondary, complex and develop in the intellect through combination and connection of the results of simple aposteriori notions. Due to such a view Locke and the Empiricists fail to grasp the identity relation of the categories of being and cognition. Priori cognition becomes the product of the aposteriori notions in the subject, for "nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu"; against which Leibniz carefully and intuitively added: "excipe: nisi ipse intellectus." With this Leibniz defended the apriori cognition against the

³⁵ Nicolai HARTMANN, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in op. cit., p. 52.
empiricists and preserved for his Monadology the withinness, i.e. the inner function of cognition on the part of the created, windowless monads or rational souls. As is generally known the preestablished harmony in Leibniz' system then grants the verification of these immanent apriori notions locked up in the monads.

How contradictory and opposed to one another these theories may be, nevertheless they have one good effect: they make evident that there are definitely two sources of cognition: "the sensual stem, and the stem of reflection upon principles, the aposteriori and the apriori region."^36

Hartmann's criticism of these historical theories can easily be anticipated, for these doctrines, too, fail seeing the phenomenon of the "duality of the occurrence of the categories", which function as cognitive and as real principles.

The relationship of Hartmann to the classical thinkers of Greek philosophy is a unique one. He examines and weighs what they say just as he does with the statements

^36 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einfuehrung in die Philosophie (Introduction to Philosophy), p. 37: "... den sinnlichen Stamm und den Stamm der Besinnung auf Prinzipien, den aposteriorischen also und den apriorischen." Cf. ibid., p. 78, the Kantian quotation: "Concepts without perceptions are empty; perception without concepts is blind." "Begriffe ohne Anschauungen sind leer; Anschauung ohne Begriffe ist blind."
of modern and contemporary philosophers. But his subtle ability shows especially then when he has to abstract from the teachings of these men the historical ballast with its retrospectively projective effects; in other words when he has to perceive, to grasp, to interpret Plato as Plato, Aristotle as Aristotle, and others likewise. He confesses, for instance, in "Das Problem des Apriorismus...", where he speaks about the aporia of the apriori element:

In today's terminology one could express this problem thus: How ought the principles to be which on the one side can be grasped by intuition immediately and at the same time constitute the nature of the objects which are given to us by external (sensual) perception? Unmistakably the content of this question coincides with the problem of the "objective validity" of the apriori cognition, a question which is famous through Kant's philosophy. Such a striking parallel obliges further research to proceed utterly careful. For it predisposes the searcher to project the thought content of a much later era into the Platonic theory and to falsify it. In regard to this danger it seems necessary first of all to look for a hint in Plato's own explanations.  

It is especially for this reason that Hartmann approaches with care and neutral attitude the historical situation at Plato's time and he does it with reference to the apriori problem. He states:

What is well known as Kant's merit: the settlement with sensualism had already happened with the Platonic philosophy... For the latter grew in the dispute against the sensualism of the Pre-Socratics (Antisthenes and Aristippus) and stronger still against the enlightenment tendency of the Sophists which made everything relative. Plato's intellectual action is more radical than the one of Kant. It was generated under great pressure of his time, and it is more universal in regard to its range and it is greater as cultural achievement.38

At Plato's time Protagoras had declared man "the measure of all things: of the existing ones that they are, and of the non-existing things that they are not."

According to that, all the norms, all the laws, all the values and all validity would become dictated by man or could become undone by man. Plato saw that could not be true, that could not be so. Therefore, it became urgent to find another measure of all things, one which would measure...

38 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in op. cit., p. 52: "Was als das Verdienst Kants wohlbekannt ist, das Abrechnen mit dem Sensualismus war schon einmal da in der Platonischen Philosophie... Denn dieselbe erwuchs im Kampfe gegen den Sensualismus der fruehsokratischen Schulen (des Antisthenes und Aristipp) und mehr noch gegen die alles relativierende Aufklaerungstendenz der Sophisten. Platons gedankliche Tat ist radikaler als die Kants; sie ist weit mehr aus der Not der Zeit geboren, ist universaler der Tragweite nach und als kulturelle Tat groesser."
and survive even man himself, the very changeable, mortal being.

But in order to find such a measure one needs the pure vision of the "ideae" which is independent of all empirical conditions.39

Due to such holdings Plato became the thinker, who saw all the things of this world measured by the idea. For this was the insight he passed on: The overcoming of cultural relativism, the regaining of firm foundations for the state, the ethos and the meaningful content of life depend on the recognition of the universality and of basic principles. Therefore, the firm efforts of Plato for the apriori element of cognition.40

Of course, apriorism was there objectively before Plato. But it was Plato "who grasped the total seriousness of the vital problem",41 and, therefore, it was Plato and no other one who opened up for philosophy the gnoseological problem of apriority.

39 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in op. cit., p. 52: "Um ein solches zu gewinnen aber, bedarf es der reinen, von aller empirischen Gegebenheit unabhaengigen Schau der Ideen."

40 Ibid.: "... alle Dinge dieser Welt unter dem Masstab der Idee sah. Denn dieses war die Einsicht, die er hinterliess: an der Erkenntnis des Allgemeinen und Prinzipiellen haengt die Ueberwindung des kulturellen Relativismus ..., die Wiedergewinnung fester Fundamente fuer den Staat, das Ethos und der Sinngehalt des Lebens. Daher das unentwegte Bemuehen Platons um das apriorische Element der Erkenntnis."

41 Ibid.: "... den ganzen Lebensernst des Problems ... erfasste."
Accordingly, seen and evaluated without prejudice, the whole Platonic theory of ideas is rooted in that problem. In it is given at once the foundation of the absolute measure of values, applicable to all the regions of human life, and to all the other spheres of reality be they subhuman or superhuman. But this measure has to be independent from mere sense experience and must through pure vision always become understood in a certain contrast to sensation... Its object was therefore called by Plato the pure "form" (idea, eidos).  

It is true, Plato is not the creator of the theory of ideas. This theory had been latently in existence in Socratic philosophy, and it had been brought to its primary philosophical appearance by Euclid of Megara. But Plato had given to it its universal significance in disclosing the entire range of the aprioristic problem. It was Plato who grasped in classical coinage the aporia of the apriori element. Hartmann sees that stated in Phaidon:  

Under no condition do I admit that somebody who considers the things in the logos does consider them more imaginary than he who sees them in the facts.  

42 Nicolai Hartmann, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in op. cit., p. 52: "... stets in einem gewissen Gegensatz zu ihr durch reine Schau erfasst werden... Ihren Gegenstand bezeichnete Platon als die reine "Gestalt" (Idee, Eidos)."  

43 Ibid., p. 63: "... Das gebe ich keineswegs zu, dass der, welcher die Dinge in den Logoi betrachtet, sie bildlicher betrachtet als der, welcher sie in den Tatsachen betrachtet." Zitat aus Phaidon, 100 A.
That means the "idea" which constitutes the proper essence of the things is grasped in the logos not less real than in the things. In this statement then there is confronted the "idea" in the logos with the "idea" as essence of the things in the things. Consequently the paradox results, how the turning away from the things and the reflection upon the inner could make the "idea" seen. In the event that the idea is the essence of the things, then it is to be searched for in the background of the things rather than in the background of the soul, that is in the prolongation of the outward direction beyond the things, and not in the inward direction beyond the given.44

Hartmann presents the scheme of the aporia of the apriori element, which is valid for any apriorism, not only for the Platonic system, in a descriptive and phenomenological manner:

The psyche shows itself as closed sphere turned with one side, the aesthesis, however, towards the onta, which it comprehends only opaquely. For what aesthesis shows, namely, the diversity of things, that although it has the tendency to be like the idea, is nevertheless weaker than the idea.45

44 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in op. cit., p. 63: "... wieso die Abwendung von den Dingen und die Umkehrung des Blickes nach innen die Idee greifbar machen soll. Ist die Idee das Wesen der Dinge, so müsste es im Hintergrund der Dinge zu suchen sein und nicht nach innen über die Dinge hinaus und nicht nach innen über das Gegebene hinaus."

45 Ibid., reference to Phaidon 74 E.
Thus the realm of the \textit{aesthesis} forms the surface of the psyche which is turned towards the external world, and this very direction or external alignment is the soul's embarrassment in the world of appearance. This embarrassment can be overcome by withdrawing from the senses, by reversal of the direction and by contemplation. Without more ado it would be understandable if through this contemplation of the \textit{onta} all claims to recognize the \textit{onta} would be given up, and if only the essence of the soul would be comprehended. But this is not the teaching. For the soul does not meet in its depth its own disclosure but that of the \textit{onta}.^{46}

As is known, in Plato's theory the proper predicates of matter are missing. But Plato determines the factor which embraces all the bodies, space. This notion, however, is difficult to comprehend. It is an "a-logical" something, a difficult and obscure \textit{eidos}, and in last analysis just that "in-which" (\textit{en ho}) everything is. Hence according to Plato's idea it is certainly not that "out-of-which"

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^{46} Nicolai \textsc{Hartmann}, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in \textit{op. cit.}, p. 63-64: "Die Psyche stellt sich als geschlossene Sphaere dar, die mit ihrer etien Seite, der \textit{aesthesis}, zwar den \textit{onta} zugewandt ist, sie aber nur undeutlich erfasst. Denn was die \textit{aesthesis} zeigt, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Dinge, hat wohl "die Tendenz," zu sein wie die Idee, verhailt sich aber schwaecher. Das Reich der \textit{aesthesis} bildet so die der Aussenwelt zugewandte Oberflaeche der \textit{psyche}, und dieses ihr Zugewandtsein oder nach aussen Gerichtetsein ist ihr Befangensein im Schein... Dieses Befangensein wird durchbrochen durch die Abkehr von den Sinnen, Einkehr in sich selbst, Umkehr der Blickrichtung... Es waere ohne weiteres verstaendlich, wenn bei dieser Einkehr der Seele in sich selbst auf Erkenntnis der \textit{onta} verzichtet und nur das eigene Wesen der Seele erfasst werden sollte. Das aber ist die Meinung nicht. Denn nicht auf ihre eigene Unverborgenheit stoesst die Seele in ihrer Tiefe, sondern gerade auf die der \textit{onta}."

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everything is. Plato's elementary bodies, too, are understood as pure geometrical bodies (polyhedrons) without material content. But since matter dissolves, so to say, in such a way in space there remains finally nothing but the plexus (web) of the eide. About that Hartmann speculates:

It follows that the eide really are solely that which being is and with which cognition has to deal. Consequently if cognition succeeds to grasp the eide, then by doing so, it must grasp everything that "is". On this ground then the gravity of the apriori element approaches so closely the absolute apriorism that one wonders why Plato did not give it the tapering off. But precisely here his sound insight into the limitations of the human being shows. Just as the things have the "tendency" only to be like the "idea", so the human episteme, too. Episteme takes in the knowledge of the philosopher a look of its own "idea", and it is longing for it, but it never will achieve to be like it.

Thus Hartmann recognizes the reason why man cannot persevere in the vision of the ideas, as Plato recognized it, and that man must return again and again to the senses,

47 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in op. cit., p. 74; reference to Timaeus 49 A - 52 C.

48 Ibid.: "Dann aber sind die eide auch das alleinige in Wahrheit Seiende, mit dem die Erkenntnis es zu tun hat. Gelingt es ihr also, die eide zu erfassen, so muss sie durch sie in der Tat alles, was "ist" erfassen. Damit nähert sich das Gewicht des Apriorischen so sehr dem absoluten Apriorismus, dass man sich wundern koennte, warum Platon ihm diese Zusippitizung nicht gab. Aber gerade hier duerfte sich sein gesunder Blick fuer die Begrenztheit des Menschenwesens zeigen. Wie die Dinge nur die "Tendenz" haben, zu sein wie die Idee, so auch die menschliche episteme. Sie hat im Wissen des philosophos wohln ihre Idee vor Augen und sehnt sich, ihr gleich zu werden, aber sie erreicht sie nicht."
and to that which they transmit in sense perception. But although this descent into the spheres of the things must be accomplished, man who returns to the things sees them now in the "ideas" which are their true being. This is also the meaning of the famous parable of the cave.

On the basis of these premises Hartmann reasons further:

In the event that this thought becomes applicable to the occurring descent in Parmenides then that means that the so-called Platonic Dualism disappears at once. Then a realm of things and a realm of ideas confronting one another irreconcilably, no longer exist, but a single kingdom of being the upper pole of which are the ideas, the lower pole the aletheia ton onton again consisting of ideas only. All the rest, however, would be mere fancy of the aesthesis, undeserving the name being.49

From this excursus transgressing the apriori problem in Platonic philosophy Hartmann returns to the great question again and evaluates Plato's contribution to the history of apriorism. He sees in the Platonic "disclosing and solution of the apriori problem" both of which are given in

49 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in op. cit., p. 73: "Sollte sich dieser Gedanke auf den im Parmenides auftretenden Abstieg anwenden lassen, so wuerde das bedeuten, dass der sogenannte Platonische Dualismus mit einem Schlage verschwindet. Wir haeetten nicht mehr ein Reich der Dinge und ein Reich der Ideen, die unaufhebbar einander gegenueber stueden, sondern nur noch ein einziges Reich des Seienden, dessen oberer Pol die Ideen, dessen unterer die aus den Ideen allein bestehende aletheia ton onton waere. Alles uebrige aber ware blosses Trugbild der aesthesis - verdiente den Namen des Seienden nicht." Cf. the accord with newest trends, for instance with Teilhard's world view, with Heisenberg's philosophy, with Conrad-Martius' theory of nature, and others.
diaphanous simplicity a genial achievement of thought. For here the origin of being and the origin of cognition are shown identical. Perhaps it was here that Hartmann received his deep insight into the "duality of occurrence" and into the "identity relation" of the categories, which sometimes appear as principles of being and then again as principles of cognition. At any case it seems justified to conclude that Hartmann's Metaphysik der Erkenntnis was inspired — at least historically — by Plato.

What kind of a relationship has Hartmann then to Aristotle? What does he find in the teaching of the Stagyrite concerning the apriori problem? Hartmann, who has a great appreciation for Aristotle, says:

The theory of the eidos as such is not a creation of Plato... But Plato gave to it a universal signification... by showing the range of that aprioristic problem which was hidden in it. This connection had become shrouded through the dispute on the dogmatics of the ideas which began already during Plato's lifetime. This connection was also not fully seen by Aristotle. It is a tragic fate that Aristotle who with sober clarity knew how to use the theory of the eidos and who made it in purified form the foundation of his own metaphysics, remained constantly fascinated by the "problem of participation and by chorism" and therefore misjudged the genial gnoseological idea of Plato.50

50 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in op. cit., p. 53: "Die Eidoslehre als solche ist zwar nicht eine Schöpfung Platons;... Aber die universale Bedeutung... hat Platon ihr gegeben... durch die Aufdeckung der ganzen Tragweite jenes Apriorismusproblems, das in ihr steckte. Dieser Zusammenhang ist durch den schon bei Lebzeiten Platons einsetzenden Streit um die Ideen-Dogmatik
While for Plato the ideas existed independently in a higher world, Aristotle considers them the "essences or principles of things". The independent existence of the ideas, metaphysically understood, is no longer accepted. In the gnoseological sense, the gravity of the apriori shifts to the aposteriori and the ideas or forms become that which the epigones call the universalia in re. Aristotle's "ti en einai" stands simultaneously for a real formal principle (morphe), and a logical (conceptual) determination. But it should not be overlooked that Aristotle's Analytics is not yet a "logic" in the sense of the epigones. Hartmann criticizes that in the Analytics a proper concept of the concept... is still missing. What the Latinists called notio and conceptus, is still unknown in the Analytics; whereas genos and eidos often unexamined as it seems presented by (later) interpreters, as genus and species, belong truly just as well to being as to thought. "Genus" and "species" are rather degrees (levels) of the universal in the realm of form. The latter, however, is in Aristotle still identical in being and thought. From this stems his foregone conclusion with which

verdeckt worden. Er hat auch dem Aristoteles nicht in voller Klarheit vor Augen gestanden. Es ist ein tragisches Geschick, dass dieser Mann, der die Eidoslehre mit neuen Blick auszuwerten wusste und sie in gereinigter Form zur Grundlage seiner Metaphysik machte, den Blick dauernd auf das "Teilhabeproblem und den Chorismus" gebannt hielt und dadurch den genialen erkenntnistheoretischen Grundgedanken Platons verkennen musste."
he meets the part of the form in all existents as the intelligible and the predicible element.\textsuperscript{51}

Therefore, in Aristotle is present still the ontic foundation of the Platonic apriorism, respectively — as Hartmann expresses it — the "identity relation of the categories of being and cognition", but it is there in a modified way. In Aristotle the "ideas", embedded in matter, burdened with matter, shrouded by matter, must first be liberated from matter, that is, they have to become known via sense perception, that is aposteriori. In other words, the coining of the form (= universal idea) is now depending on matter, and form becomes individualized by matter. Therefore, it is so conditioned that it has to be found by the intellect through abstraction and only then we have it as "notion", as "concept". And all this in spite of Aristotle's theory on matter which he considers in things as the impenetrable "alogon and agnoston",\textsuperscript{52} for "first matter (materia

\textsuperscript{51} Nicolai HARTMANN, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in op. cit., p. 78-79: "... ein eigentlicher Begriff des Begriffs... (existiert hier) ueberhaupt noch nicht. Was die Lateiner notio und conceptus genannt haben, ist der Analytik noch unbekannt; genos und eidos dagegen, die von den Interpreten meist unbesehen als Ober- und Unterbegriff hingestellt werden, gehoeren in Wahrheit ebenso wohl dem Sein wie dem Denken an. "Gattung und Art" sind vielmehr Abstufungen des Allgemeinen im Reich der Form; dieses aber ist bei Aristoteles noch ein identisches im Sein und Denken. Daher die Selbstverstaendlichkeit, mit der er die Seite der Form in allem Seienden als das Erkennbare und Aussagbare ansieht."

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 79.
prima) as such is formless."\(^{53}\)

This precisely is then aposteriori cognition: The cognition of an idea in spite of its entanglement in matter. Hence in the Aristotelian system we meet the idea as identification of \textit{forma} in being and of \textit{conceptus} in the intellect. Hartmann concludes on this fact:

Of all the stipulations which Aristotelianism has imposed on us this one of the absolutely arbitrary identity of the real form with the mental concept is probably the most durable one. Neither Kant, nor the entire Kantianism got rid of it.\(^{54}\)

Morphe embedded in \textit{hyle} individualized in the single being, becomes recognized now only aposteriori. Aristotelian hylemorphism has pulled the gravity of cognition back again to the level of perception. Therefore, there can be said finally,

\begin{quote}
In Antiquity Apriorism... belongs exclusively to the Platonic trend... Aristotle, although he presupposes certain modifications of it, does not develop it further, and does not devote a special inquiry to it.\(^{55}\)
\end{quote}

\(^{53}\) Nicolai HARTMANN, "Das Problem des Apriorismus", in \textit{op. cit.}, p. 79.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 53: "Von allen Bedingungen, die der Aristotelismus uns aufgeprägt hat, dauerde diese an sich durchaus willkuerliche Identitaet von Seinsform und Begriff wohl die dauerhafteste gewesen sein. Weder Kant noch der gesamte Kantianismus hat sich von ihn freigemacht."

Summing up, it is with Plato and Aristotle that the great and so important aporias of cognition have entered the history of philosophy, namely, the aporia of the apriori and the aporia of the aposteriori cognition. The first asks: How is it that we know something of a species of beings characterized by an objective universality and necessity, although no previous experience is given? — Hartmann answers this question: This is possible because of "partial identity of the cognitive and real categories." The second aporia asks: How is there a cause-effect relation possible between things and sensations, or, how can an external object, located outside the senses, cause an effect, a perception in the subject? Hartmann explains that ontologically there exists no difficulty, since the causal nexus (as producing) is anyhow irrational (even within the sphere of things themselves), for here, too, it connects heterogeneous beings. Why should it then not be able to connect objects with an intellect (of a subject)?

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56 Cf. Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., chapters 46 to 49.

57 Cf. ibid., chapters 51 to 54; also IDEM, Philosophie der Natur, chapter 29; Werner ZIEGENFUSS, Philosophen Lexikon, p. 467: "... Der Kausalnexus (als Hervorbringen) ist ohnehin irrational (auch innerhalb der Dingsphaere), denn auch da verbindet er Heterogenes. Warum sollte er nicht auch Dingliches mit Seelischem... verbinden koennen."
THE QUESTION OF THE CRITERION OF TRUTH

Cognition, regardless of whether it is apriori or aposteriori cognition, always brings the intellect to the question of truth. After all, cognition can only be true or false. A third alternative is excluded. Of course, knowledge can be partly true and partly untrue, which, however, does not affect the previous statement, for "that part of it which is true, is then, too, plainly true; that part which is not true, is then plainly false." But how can we determine that the known is true, or not true? Do we possess a criterion of truth?

Hartmann probes without prejudice into the problem of the criterion of truth. Historically this question has its roots in antiquity. Hartmann sees in it an aporia with which modern philosophy also has to come to terms. Actually the situation of the problem is the same as it was at Plato's and Aristotle's time, namely: Because through cognition an object always becomes known by a subject, cognition then is a bi-polar process, and the question is, whether the image of the object — that is what of the

58 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 66: "der Teil an ihr, der wahr ist, wird auch dann schlechthin wahr; der Teil, der unwahr ist, schlechthin unwahr sein."
object imprints on the subject — matches the truth, or, whether this image shows the same determinations which are bad by the object itself. If the obtained knowledge (image) of the object shows the same traits or characteristics as the object, then it is true knowledge. But if the object-image in the subject shows deviations from the object, then we deal with untrue, improper knowledge, with illusion or inaccuracy, or with plain error. It is necessary to keep in mind that the two poles of the cognitive process, object and subject, are — inasmuch as they are real — at once definitely true. Such ontological truth is not affected by any cognition or knowledge. The cognition of the object, however, that is, the identical image of it, reflected in the subject, or expressed in other terms, the logical truth of the object in the subject can become distorted, twisted, bent, inaccurate, and thus untrue.  

59 Of course, the subject can fail to recognize the object at all. In this case, then, we do not deal with the problem of truth; we deal with the unequivocal lack of cognition. Indeed, the latter furnishes the largest percentile of the entire possible object-subject relationship, in spite of all progress of knowledge or noetic boom. In such a situation we do not deal with a distortion of the object-image in the subject, but with the absence of any image at all, which means we have a total absence of any cognitive relation between object and subject.
gnoseological relation, but it is directed towards the concord between the object-image in the subject and the given external object. Hartmann stresses this fact:

Concord and the lack of it are contradictory opposites, so that here the principle of the excluded middle applies. Between true and untrue there is no in-between.60

This clear alternative also does not permit a proper aporia of truth, for an aporia always means a pathlessness. However, in this instance, there are clearly only two directions possible: true - untrue. The aporetic, labyrinthian, pathless character of the problem appears then, when a guarantee of the cognition of truth, of its correctness, of its certainty is asked for; in other words, when a criterion of truth is sought by which the concordance with the object can be measured. This question, flowing from Hartmann's cited word, can also be formulated: If an "in-between" between the true and the untrue is not possible (regardless of how minute in the given case these elements may appear), how then do we recognize the true as true, the untrue as untrue? Do we really possess a measure, a criterion of truth, and in what does it consist?

60 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einfuehrung..., p. 74: "Ueber-einstimmung und Nichtuebereinstimmung sind kontradiktorische Gegensatze, so dass hier der logische Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten gilt. Zwischen wahr und unwahr, Erkenntnis und Irrtum gibt es kein Zwischending."
Hartmann is convinced of the possibility of a criterion of truth — perhaps that conviction is the result of his experience. Otherwise he could not have offered so positively as true what his own cognition and reasoning visualized precisely during his investigation of the real, objective world. Categorically Hartmann admits:

An absolute criterion is a utopian demand, which is even not in correspondence with the phenomenon. But a relative criterion can very well be proved, one that in practice meets the demands of the sciences.

In his dealing with this problem Hartmann displays again his characteristic carefulness regarding philosophical evaluation, preservation, and continuation. Conscientiously he screens whatever the problem-thinkers before him had probed and promulgated:

Hartmann was always a thinker inclined towards reconciliation. Steadily he followed the direction of preserving the old, and constructing something new only in the instance, where it was necessary. Though he did not hesitate to refuse or to criticize something, his fundamental attitude was to do justice to the other thinker and to preserve what had proved good. All the works which Hartmann wrote show this trait of continuation of philosophy and preservation

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61 Werner ZIEGENFUSS, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 467:
"Ein absolutes Kriterium ist eine utopische Forderung, die auch dem Phaenomen garnicht entspricht. Wohl aber laesst sich ein relatives Kriterium aufzeigen, wie es der Praxis der Wissenschaften entspricht."
of what has been the tradition of the occidental philosophy for two millenia.\textsuperscript{62}

What then did Hartmann find in the history of ideas in regard to the criterion of truth and how did he continue in this direction?

\textsuperscript{62} Robert HEISS, "Nicolai Hartmann", in Nicolai Hartmann, Der Denker und sein Werk, p. 17-18. Cf. also translation of this article by C.F. SCHUETZINGER, in The Personalist, Vol. 42, No. 4, 1964: "Nicolai Hartmann A Personal Sketch", p. 469-486: "Stets war Hartmann ein versohnlicher Denker, stets hat er die Linie verfolgt, das Alte zu bewahren und das Neue nur dort zu bauen, wo es notwendig war. Er scheute sich keineswegs etwas abzulehnen und zu kritisieren, aber seine Grundeinstellung war die... zu bewahren, was sich bewahrt hatte. Und alle Werke, die Hartmann schreibt, tragen diesen Stempel der Fortsetzung der Philosophie und der Bewahrung dessen, was seit zwei Jahrtausenden Tradition der abendländischen Philosophie ist." Cf. C. T. FREY's term "critical awareness of tradition", in Grundlage der Ontologie Nicolai Hartmanns, Tuebingen, 1955: "Mit diesem Ausdruck ist gemeint, dass sich Hartmann 'aufs engste mit der problemgeschichtlichen philosophischen Uberlieferung verbunden fuhlt und andererseits die traditionellen Losungen einer staendigen und stets erneuten kritischen Sichtung unterzieht. Aus einem anderen Gesichtswinkel betrachtet zeigt sich diese kritische Tendenz als ein tiefgegruender Fortschrittsglaube, als Uberzeugung vom unerhaltens sich weitenden philosophischen Erkenntnisbereich.'" Note No. 1, p. 15, in Joseph SCHMITZ, Disput ueber das Teleologische Denken. (Translation: "With this expression is meant that Hartmann feels 'closely connected with the historical problem-philosophical tradition, but on the other side submits the traditional solutions to a steady and ever renewed critical examination. Seen from another point of view this critical tendency shows here as a profound deeply rooted faith in progress, a conviction of the ceaselessly opening-up of the philosophical realm of cognition.")"
Hartmann found as early as in Aristotle a reference to the "principle of contradiction", which terminates in the clear demand for an inner agreement of all "images" with the object from which they result.  

Hartmann's analysis states:

The principle of contradiction seems to be absolutely simple in itself. The formula "A is not non-A" is quite valid in analytical judgment. But it is not correct in this formulation. Any arbitrary synthetic judgment has the formula "A is non-A", wherein "non-A" obtains the meaning of a positive "B". The proposition becomes true only when one grasps it more completely, as in the formula of Aristotle: "The same attribute cannot simultaneously and in the same being be truly affirmed and denied." And so the proposition is no longer simple. It contains in its formulation a fourfold identity, one of which is found in "simultaneous". Hence, the principle of contradiction is not a first priror but has as precondition the principle of identity. Therefore, one will have to retain the latter. But regardless of all that, the question arises, is the principle of contradiction in its broader formulation really intelligible, is it self-evident? Is it truly evident that "A" cannot at once be "B", and "non-B"? Or is there evidence rather that only under such a condition unequivocal judgments, conclusions, insights, even objects are possible? Doubtless, the latter is the case. Whether the first is true also, must be considered dubious. Of course, through this not the principle of contradiction as such, but that which is referred to as

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63 Cf. ARISTOTLE, On Interpretation, chapters 7 and 9. B. WUELLNER, Summary of Scholastic Principles, Chicago, Loyola University Press, 1956, Nr. 33, p. 15: "The principle of contradiction, logical formula: The same judgment cannot at the same time in the same meaning be both true and false. Variants: a) The same attribute cannot at the same time in the same being be truly affirmed and denied of the same subject. b) Contradictory judgments cannot be simultaneously true."
"intelligibility" becomes doubtful. One is only too easily tempted to mistake its intelligibility for the intelligibility of its indispensability (its unconditional validity). To this be added, that neither the formulation, nor the region where its law is in force are univocally determined. Is it then a principle of thinking and judging, or of cognition on the whole only, or is it perhaps a principle of being?°4

Thus the "principle of contradiction" is criticized by Hartmann. It cannot be taken as "an independent criterion", for it is possible that "the entire coherence" in

the subject "contains an error", as it often actually happens in life, and in the sciences, for instance, when there
"develop analogous formulations which show no contradiction as such, but are erroneous." Hartmann demonstrates what he means in the following example:

as perhaps Ptolemy's world view, which was in itself unbroken (coherent), but was wrong because finally it was irreconcilable with the phenomena.65

When research had developed more subtle methods and instruments to examine the theory by measuring it on the actual facts, the original formulation proved to be erroneous.

Consequently the principle of contradiction can be a criterion only for the immanent correctness (not immanent truth),66 for in such connection truth would be referred to improperly.67

65 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einfuehrung..., p. 75: "...wie etwa das Ptolemaeische Weltbild, das in sich lueckenlos war, ... sich letztlich nur mit den Phaenomenen nicht vereinbaren liess."

66 According to Hartmann "immanent truth" refers to the inner agreement of the mental constructs themselves. Therefore, it plays a subordinated role within the realm of the problem of objective cognition, although a role important enough as pre-condition. Inner agreement is only correctness not truth, its form is the reciprocity or "dialele". For the sake of sameness in terminology, therefore, uniformity, the inner agreement, according to Hartmann, should not be called "immanent truth" but rather "correctness", whereas the proper concept of truth with which the natural consciousness is familiar, is solely the transcendental truth.

67 Ibid.: "So kann der Satz des Widerspruchs nur Kriterium der Immanenten Richtigkeit sein (nicht der immanenten Wahrheit), in solchem Zusammenhang waere der Wahrheitsbegriff zu Unrecht herangezogen."
According to Aristotle, the Sceptics of the Academe probed into the problem of the criterion of truth. Hartmann takes up the same problem. Their main representatives are Arcesilaus of Pitane in Aeolia, scholarch of the Middle Academe from 268/264 - 241/240 B.C., biographical dates: 315/314 - 241/240 B.C., who wanted to surpass the wisdom of Socrates by saying about himself: "I am ignorant even of my ignorance", and Carneades of Cyrene, scholarch of the Third (antidogmatic) Academe, from its beginning (unknown) to 137/135 B.C.; biographical dates: 214/212 - 139/128 B.C.  

68 Cf. Werner ZIEGENFUSS, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 47: "This Second Academe is distinguished from the original Platonic Academe by introducing Scepticism into the doctrine. Arcesilaus had first studied under Theophrast, then Crantor, Polemon and Crates. The Stoic Zenon he considered his main opponent, against whose measure of certainty Arcesilaus fought especially..." Cf. there also more bibliographical data. Cf. Enc. Brit., 1960, Vol. 1, 2, etc., articles "Academy (Greek)"; "Arcesilaus", etc.  

69 Cf. Werner ZIEGENFUSS, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 649: "The beginning of his schola is unknown... Carneades connects with the theory of Arcesilaus, and continues it. He, too, considers his main opponent the Stoa and fights against the Stoic Chrysippos so exclusively that it is said he had stated about himself: "If Chrysippos would not be, I would not be either" (Diog. Laert. 462). Carneades' teaching achievements were so important that posterity begins the Third Academe with Carneades, just as it does in regard to the Second Academe with Arcesilaus. - On the basis of Sceptical Dogmatism Carneades reached the conclusion that any knowledge is impossible, for there is no criterion of truth, and, therefore, there is given no possibility to separate the false concepts from the true ones. - Carneades projected a theory in which he tried to determine more accurately the degrees and conditions of probability. He began it with the statement against the Stoics, that not everything is hidden.
METAPHYSICS OF COGNITION

These were followed by the Sceptics, Ainesidemos of Cnossus (Knossos) on Crete, 70 and Sextus Empiricus. 71 From the writings of these scholars of the Academe Hartmann takes the argumentation of the Sceptics for the criterion of truth:

Some data can be clearly seen even if that cannot be proved sufficiently by science. He presented three degrees of probability: (1)... the notions as such are probable, (2) or, they are probable and cannot be attacked in their consistence by other notions connected with them, (3) or, they are probable, not influenced by others in their own content, and are, besides, examined and found unshatterable." Cf. there also other bibliographical data as in note No. 68, p. 63.

70 Cf. Werner ZIEGENFUSS, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 30: "Renovator of the Phyrrhonian Scopes, taught about 70 A.D. in Alexandria. He drew up ten "tropes" (tropoi = headings) for the impossibility of certain knowledge which... can neither be reached by sense perception nor through thinking. The tropoi state that nothing can be certain because against certainty stand: 1. the variety of ensouled beings as such; 2. the variety of humans; 3. the variety of the assertions of the five senses; 4. the variety of human conditions; 5. the variety of localizations; 6. the intermixture of perceivable objects with others; 7. the quantitative and synthetic variety of the objects; 8. relativity on the whole; 9. the variety produced by the frequency of perception; 10. the ethnological and cultural variety of measures (standards)." Cf. bibliography there.

71 Cf. ibid., Vol. 2, p. 522: "... lived in Alexandria and Rome at the end of the second century, A.D. He not only had developed a special kind of Scopes, but also had collected and arranged the arguments against Dogmatism of the earlier Sceptics. Thus he produced one of the most important source works on ancient philosophy. For his study he used the works by Ainesidemos (now lost). His very critical examination of all the forms — at his time known (contemporary and earlier) — of Greek philosophy measures them on the basic ideas of the Phyrrhonian Scopes, and so (Sextus Empiricus) planted the seed for the later development of a critique of cognition..." Cf. bibl. there.
There are only two alternatives as a criterion (K) for our concept (V - which may have the determinations a, b, c): either it lies within the intellect (consciousness), or outside of it. Is it in the intellect, then I admit, we are able to compare the criterion with the concept, but since the criterion itself is a concept within the intellect, it is in no way closer to the object than the other concept, and, therefore, it can find out as little as the other concept. A criterion, therefore, within the intellect does not help. Consequently, the criterion must lie outside the intellect. If, then, the concept in the intellect agrees with the external measure, then the latter could be found truly conclusive. But then the criterion is as distant from the intellect as the object itself. Therefore, it would again have to be brought into the intellect and the above described difficulty would occur again. It follows that the criterion can neither be without nor within the intellect. Therefore, Ainesidemos concluded: if the criterion of truth is possible neither within nor without the intellect, then it is not possible at all. Hence, truth, too, is not possible. 72

72 The diagram is copied from HARTMANN's *Einfuehrung in die Philosophie*, p. 75 (with excerpts from his own
The modern opening of the problem... goes farther still... namely, the criterion can lie neither within nor without the intellect, but it must have in itself the structure of a relation between the intellect and the object, a relation besides and beyond the one of usual cognition. The latter is in itself already a twofold relation: an apriori and an aposteriori one. [See diagram.] But this cognitive relation alone does not suffice. It must be assumed that another (second) one exists: the relation of the criterion to truth, because otherwise any orientation in life would be impossible. Furthermore, there must be a third relation for the problem awareness which stretches to the transobjective. - Since the progress of cognition... is a matter of fact, it too, is not able to be verified by an eventual solution of the problem awareness only. Therefore, a fourth existing relation must be assumed, which causes the positive turnover of the transobjective into something objectified, i.e., the progressing objection (=objectification). Accordingly, since the first relation is a twofold (reciprocal) one, we have to deal with all together five relations.

73 Ibid.: "Die neuzeitliche Aufrollung dieses Problems... geht noch weiter... Das Kriterium kann naemlich
Hartmann admits that the form of Ainesidemos' aporia is constructed correctly, but it misses the point, for, as quoted, the Sceptics — and Ainesidemos is one of their main representatives — searched for the criterion of truth as if it were a certain "point" within or without the intellect (consciousness). In Hartmann's thinking this criterion must possess the structure of a relation between intellect and object, besides and beyond the regular relation of cognition which is twofold through the apriori and the aposteriori process.74

To reiterate and further clarify his position, Hartmann sums up the teaching of the Sceptics in an antinomy which — although he explicitly disproves of it — he

weder innerhalb noch ausserhalb des Bewusstseins liegen, sondern es muss die Struktur einer Relation zwischen dem Bewusstsein und dem Objekt haben — ausser der regulaeren Erkenntnis, die schon an sich doppelt, apriorisch und aposteriorisch ist (siehe Zeichnung!)... Die Erkenntnisrelation allein genugt (aber) nicht. Es muss eine zweite, die des Wahrheitskriteriums, angenommen werden, weil uns sonst eine Orientierung im Leben unmoglich waere. Fuer das Problembewusstsein muss eine dritte Relation bestehen, die bis in das Transobjektive reicht (Siehe Zeichnung!). — Da der Erkenntnisprogress... besteht und er auch nicht durch eine eventuelle Losung der Aporie des Problembewusstseins geklaert werden koennte, bleibt uns nichts anderes uebrig, als noch eine vierte Relation anzunehmen, welche den positiven Umsatz von Transobjektivem in Objiziertes, d.h. also, die fortschreitende Objektion, bewirkt (siehe Zeichnung!). Da die erste Relation doppelt ist, erhalten wir insgesamt fuenf Relationen."

74 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einfuehrung..., p. 75: "...die Struktur einer Relation zwischen dem Bewusstsein und dem Objekt... ausser der regulaeren Erkenntnis, die schon an sich doppelt, apriorisch und aposteriorisch, ist."
herself nevertheless uses as a step towards a further ascent, in order to demonstrate the error in the problem of the Sceptics:

**Thesis:**
- The criterion is supposed to be a concept in order to be in any way an element of comparison for the subject, for the latter can compare its concept of the object only with something that lies within its sphere.

**Antithesis:**
- The criterion cannot at all be a concept if it is to be a criterion; for a comparison with a concept in the subject cannot give any guarantee for the agreement with the object without the subject's sphere.

In the second case (antithesis) then the criterion would be existing as such, but it would not be for the recognizing subject.

In the first case (thesis), however, the criterion would exist for the subject as such, but not as a criterion of transcendental truth.  

Concluding from the Sceptics that there is no criterion of truth, one comes in conflict with the facts — with the phenomenon of consciousness of truth.

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75 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 68: "Das Kriterium müsste Vorstellung sein, um überhaupt Vergleichspunkt für das Subjekt zu sein; denn vergleichen kann dieses seine Objektvorstellung nur mit etwas, was in seiner Sphäre liegt.

Das Kriterium darf nicht Vorstellung sein, wenn anders es gültiges Kriterium sein soll; denn ein Vergleich mit einer Vorstellung im Subjekt koennen keine Gewähr für Übereinstimmung mit dem Objekt ausserhalb der Subjektsphäre leisten.

Im Fall der Antithese also bestaende das Kriterium zwar an sich, aber nicht für das erkennende Subjekt. Im Falle der These dagegen bestaende es zwar für dieses, waere aber kein Kriterium transzendenter Wahrheit."
Hartmann now concerns himself with the problem of the criterion of truth as an aporetic, making full use of his findings and by examining the historical positions. First of all, he tries to deal with the "locus" of the criterion (in reference to the position of the Sceptics), and he formulates a negative aporia similar to Ainesidemos' :
"A criterion can neither be inside the mind, nor can it be outside the mind", consequently, "it can neither be a concept, nor can it be no concept." Hartmann calls this his "negative aporia". Because of its negation, it is not strong enough to survive, since, as evident in the criticism on the Sceptical position, it gropes for a "locus" ("dotted" structure) in the assumption that the criterion of truth lies perhaps in the sphere of the object, perhaps in the sphere of the subject. But it is clear, the criterion of truth cannot be other than relational, i.e.,

it can consist only in a ... relation between the cognitive image in the mind and the external object, in addition to the proper cognitive relation. Only a relation which transcends the subject's limit can provide the intellect with an objective element (standard) of comparison, which then is the actual measure (check) of the cognitive image.  

76 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 427: "Ein Kriterium kann weder im Bewusstsein noch ausser dem Bewusstsein... weder Vorstellung noch nicht Vorstellung sein."

The question then arises: Is such a relation possible? Does the entire cognition in this theory not become an extremely complicated process, if, as it were, more and more threads are woven between the object and the subject?

In order to understand Hartmann's theory it is essential to follow his own presentation exactly. Therefore, what does he consider next? Hartmann probes into the apriori and aposteriori cognition as the given instances which are, indeed, empirically, historically and scientifically, that is ontologically and gnoseologically, proved, insofar as they actually have a bearing on the criterion of truth. He calls them in this connection the "forms of cognition."78

These postulates of cognition are in their nature heterogeneous and independent from one another. Therefore, they can serve as two distinct witnesses of the cognition of truth. In other words, they function as reciprocal counter-instances and together they are the measure of the correctness of the known. If, namely, both heterogeneous forms of cognition agree in regard to the same object of cognition (object image) then they constitute together a relative criterion of truth. The elements of this criterion are: firstly, they are in immanent accord with the identical

78 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 430.
reflected image of the object, secondly, each one of these forms has its own transcendental relation to the external object itself. The complex relational structure of the thus obtained criterion of truth, therefore, gravitates not only around two poles, but around three.\(^79\)

a) around the two (apriori and aposteriori) inner subjective instances of cognition (gnoseological forms),

b) around the extramental object of cognition with which the latter as such is concerned.

It follows that these two instances of cognition at once are related immanently (in the subject with one another) and transcendentally (to the object) and constitute the cognitive orbit. Hartmann explains:

Comparison, that is, the awareness of concord or discord between them [from which the object-image in the subject results] is then originally a relation between homologous terms of two other (transcendental) relations, the counterpart of which is found in the ontological object as such...\(^80\)

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79 See Hartmann's own diagram concerning this point, and the translated explanation to it on the following page.

80 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 431: "Das Vergleichen, d.h. das Bewusstsein der Übereinstimmung oder Nichtübereinstimmung zwischen ihnen [woraus das jeweilige Objektbild im Subjekt resultiert! C.E.S.] ist dann von Hause aus eine Relation zwischen homologen Gliedern zweier anderer (transzendenter) Relationen, deren Gegenglieder im ontologischen Ansichsein der Sache, resp. des Sachverhalts, liegen."
In the scheme (=diagram)... one can see the complex relational structure of the criterion as follows: It is assumed A and B are two heterogeneous representations of the object X, which result from different approaches. Each of them is nothing but a naively accepted content, a momentum of it, which for itself contains no sort of a criterion of its actual accordance with X. - A is based upon the transcendent relation of cognition (Rel. a), B likewise upon the other one (Rel. b). However, in as far as A and B confront one another within one and the same intellect (consciousness), and in as far as both occur with the same claim to represent X, there lies in the identity of this transcendent relation at once the demand, that they must agree with one another in their very content. This agreement does not need to cover neither a total, nor partial content, for A and B may refer to very different traits of X; but somehow they must fit together, i.e. they cannot make contradictory "predications" of the identical X. If they do so, an error must be either in A or in B. To be sure the error then cannot be in the inner relation between A and B alone, but must necessarily be also in one or both of the transcendent relations a or b. In this sense the relation K although it is a purely
immanent one, is nevertheless a criterion of the
transcendent truth of A and/or B. For A and B
are the inner components (terms, links) of two
transcendent relations. The counterparts of both
of them lie in X.81

Hartmann does not at all overlook the existence of
other heterogeneous cognitive instances, for example in the
realm of perception of the various senses: seeing, hearing,
etc., from which — in the case of agreement — can result

81 The diagram is copied from HARTMANN's Metaphysik
der Erkenntnis, p. 432: "Im Schema (Diagramm)... kann man
sich die komplex relationale Struktur des Kriteriums folgen-
dermassen klarmachen: A und B seien zwei heterogene, auf
verschiedenem Wege gewonnene Repräsentationen des Gegen-
standes X. Jede von ihnen ist nichts als ein naiv hinge-
nommener Inhalt, resp. ein Inhaltsmoment, das fuer sich
genommen keinerlei Kriterium seiner Ubereinstimmung mit X
enthaltet. A ist basiert auf der transzendenten Erkenntniss-
relation a, B ebenso auf b. Sofern sich nun aber A und B in
einem Bewusstsein gegenueberstehen und beide mit dem Anspruch
auftreten, X zu repraesentieren, so liegt in der Identitaet
dieses ihres transzendenten Beziehungspunktes zugleich die
Forderung, dass sie inhaltlich miteinander ubereinstimmen
muessen. Diese Ubereinstimmung braucht keineswegs
Deckung zu sein, weder totale noch partiale, denn A und B
koennen sich auf sehr verschiedene Seiten von X beziehen;
aber sie muessen sich doch irgendwie reimen oder zusammen-
passen, sie duerfen nicht Widersprechendes von dem identi-
schen X besagen. Tun sie letzteres, so muss entweder in A
oder in B ein Fehler sein. Und zwar kann der Fehler dann
nicht etwa in der inneren Relation K zwischen A und B allein
liegen, sondern er muss notwendig in einer der beiden
transzendenten Relationen a oder b, oder auch in beiden,
ilgen. In diesem Sinne ist die Relation K, obgleich sie
selbst eine rein immanente ist, dennoch ein Kriterium der
transzendenten Wahrheit von A, resp. von B. Denn A und B
sind die Innenglieder transzendenten Relationen, ihre
beiderseitigen Gegenglieder liegen in X."
"a positive criterion of a relatively high degree of certainty."\textsuperscript{82}
Hartmann deals then critically with his own theory of the criterion of truth in order to illuminate what it has to offer positively.

First Hartmann points out the weakness of his criterion. He diagnoses: firstly, this criterion of truth is only a relative one. Secondly, it is a negative one. Both debilities, he finds, are rooted in the contents which become compared by the two heterogeneous cognitive instances or forms. None of these contents possesses absolute truth. Each "seeks support from the other." Accordingly, the criterion has the form of the diallel, which has no claim of positive absoluteness, a deficiency which adheres to the criterion of transcendent and immanent truth. However, it does not lose through this deficiency the significance as symbol of certainty, for in both cases (in regard to the transcendent and immanent truth) the question does not ask for

Wie wir so schon in der Erkenntnis der Dinge viele apriorische Elemente aufweisen können, so ist das erst recht moeglich bei der Erkenntnis von Personen, von Lebensverhaeltnissen, usw. Wir haben also zwei Zeugnisse von ein und demselben Objekt, einerseits das der Wahrnehmung und weiterhin des Erlebnisses und andererseits das der apriorischen Einsicht. In diesen beiden auf ein Objekt gehenden Instanzen liegt offenbar die Moeglichkeit eines Kriteriums."

83 Nicolai HARTMANN, Metaphysik..., p. 433.
isolated single cognitive results, but for greater coherence (connection), which at the end embraces one great totality. In it then the discrepancy levels out through the relatively firm counter-instance of the harmonious testimony of many data.

Summing up again, Hartmann has advanced the problem of the criterion of truth, mainly by rooting it in the forms of apriori and aposteriori cognition. What seemed impossible to the ancient Sceptics, Hartmann attempts to bring closer to a possible comprehension, at least to a deeper intellectual penetration. The criterion of truth —although a relative criterion only, according to Hartmann's own judgment — is neither given within, nor without the mind, for it consists in the (subject-)inner relation between the apriori insight and the aposteriori cognition of an (subject-)outer object.

Hartmann calls this double connexion of both cognitive instances (a) to one another in the subject, (b) to the external object, a diallel:

84 Nicolai HARTMANN, Metaphysik..., p. 433: "...um isolierte Einzelekenntnisse, sondern um grössere Zusammenhange, die letztlich in einen einzigen grossen Erkenntnis-zusammenhang eingefügt werden. In diesem hebt sich dann das Unstimmige an der relativ festen Gegeninstanz des vielfach ubereinstimmend Bezeugten auf."
This diallel is not empty, as the one of the mere immanent agreement. It is filled with the relation of both elements (A and B) to the common transcendent third (X, the external object).\textsuperscript{85}

It is this diallel which Nicolai Hartmann considers the relative criterion of truth.

THE QUESTION OF THE "KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNKNOWN"
AND OF THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE

The next question Hartmann takes up is the one of the "knowing of the unknown" or the question of problem awareness. This, too, had been transmitted historically from and through the Socratics. In Plato Hartmann discovers two formulations of the problem.

The first aims at "inquiry" (seeking: from the Greek zétesis, zeteo: to seek, to ask for):

How is research (seeking) at all possible? Surely, we do not search for what we have gotten already. But we cannot search for that about which we know nothing.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{85} Nicolai HARTMANN, Metaphysik..., p. 441: "Diese Diallele ist nicht leer, wie die der bloss immanenten Uebereinstimmung. Sie ist erfuellt durch die Bezogenheit beider Relationsglieder (A und B) auf das gemeinsame transzendente Dritte (X)." Cf. Diagram on the Criterion of Truth, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{86} IDEM, Einfuehrung..., p. 104: "Wie ist Forschung ueberhaupt moglich? Wir forschten doch nicht nach dem, was wir schon erfasst haben. Nach dem aber, von dem wir noch garnichts wissen, koennen wir auch nicht suchen."
The answer of the Sceptics to that question is straight negation: seeking, searching is not at all possible.

The second formulation in Plato is aimed at learning (mathesis):

What I know already that I have surely not to learn, but that of which I know nothing, about which I am completely ignorant, that too, I cannot learn, for I even do not know what I am wanting (lacking). 87

In this "classical opening of the aporia of the problem awareness" 88 Hartmann finds enough inspiration to examine its relation to the apriori and aposteriori cognition and to the entire cognitive phenomenon.

It is certain that the apriori cognition itself "goes actually... beyond the recognized and that it claims universality and necessity." 89 By doing so it is weaving connections for "empirical foundations which are not even given yet." But is not this already a "knowing of the unknown"? Is that not a problem knowledge, a problem awareness? Hence, the latter already occurs in the apriori cognition.

87 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einführung..., p. 104: "Was ich schon weiss, das brauche ich doch nicht zu lernen, das aber, von dem ich garnichts weiss, ueber das ich voellig unwissend bin, vermag ich auch nicht zu lernen, denn ich weiss ja garnicht, was mir fehlt."

88 Ibid.: "die klassische Aufrollung der Aporie des Problembewusstseins."

89 Ibid.: "Apriorische Erkenntnis "ueber das tatsaechlich... Erkannte hinausgeht und Anspruch auf Allgemeinheit und Notwendigkeit" erhebt.
The aposteriori cognition on its part also goes beyond the aposteriori cognition as such:

In practical life and most of all in the natural sciences, in biology, physics, and chemistry we face a plethora of factual knowledge, of observed facts of all kinds, which is not yet completely intelligible. One must arrange it first in intelligible connections. 90

Consequently, here too, we have to deal with a "knowing of the unknown", with problem knowledge, problem awareness. The deficiency of insight into the general or specific connections causes many scientists and many a man in daily situations to confess the Socratic awareness of the "I know that I know nothing."

Hartmann's cognitive instances of the criterion of truth then, stand within the problem awareness in an overlapping relationship, which Hartmann represents in a diagram as two intersecting circles. 91 It is an attempt to demonstrate and to simplify the understanding of the phenomenon of the "knowing of the unknown."

90 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einführung..., p. 104: "Im praktischen Leben und vor allem in den Naturwissenschaften, in Biologie, Physik und Chemie stehen wir vor einer Fülle von Tatsachenerkenntnissen, von Beobachtungsmaterial aller Art, das noch nicht verstanden worden ist, das man erst in begreifbare Zusammenhänge einordnen muss."

91 See Diagram with Hartmann's explanation on the following page.
As far as both circles cover one another, so far knowledge reaches in an actual case. On both sides there are the uncovered parts of the apriori and aposteriori spheres too long (overlapping). Towards the one side we have a plus of experience, a knowing of something that we have not grasped yet; and on the other side we have a knowledge of universal principles and connections without knowledge of the subordinated real particular case.92

92 The diagram is copied from HARTMANN's Einfuehrung in die Philosophie, p. 105: "Soweit sich die beiden Kreise decken, reicht die wirkliche Erkenntnis. An beiden Seitenstehen nicht in Deckung befindliche Teile der apriorischen und aposteriorischen Sphaere uber. Nach der einen Seite zu haben wir ein Plus der Erfahrung, ein Wissen um etwas, was wir noch nicht begriffen haben, und nach der anderen Seite haben wir ein Wissen um Gesetzmaessigkeiten und Zusammenhaenge ohne Kenntnis der unterzuordnenden realen Einzelfaelle."
But wherever problem awareness occurs, be it in "learning", or in "searching" (as in Plato), or in the daily empirical rhythm, there appears at once the tendency "to transgress the limit of the hitherto objectification." With problem awareness, therefore, an advancement of cognition begins, which we know and witness as the phenomenon of the progress of cognition or of knowledge.

On the level of the individual person in the entire development of a man from infancy to senescence there takes place an increase of knowledge, a progress of cognition which, of course, takes various dimensions in the different persons concerned, even in one and the same person this process shows different phases.

On the general level we see the progress of knowledge in the sciences.

Science strives successfully to recognize its object clearer and clearer, to limit the unrecognized (unknown) more and more, to press the limit of objection more and more forward into the trans-objective realm.  

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93 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einführung..., p. 77.

94 Ibid.: "Die Wissenschaft strebt mit Erfolg danach, ihre Gegenstände immer deutlicher zu erkennen, das Unerkannte immer weiter einzuengen, die Objektionsgrenze immer weiter in das Transobjektive zurueckzudraegen."
Hartmann formulates the aporia of the problem awareness, that is of the awareness of the inadequacy of knowledge, or the knowing of the unknown, as follows:

How is a grasping of something possible, that is, of something that remains uncomprehended and in as much as it remains uncomprehended? How can objection of the transobjective take place without suspension of the transobjective as such, or without objectification of the transobjective?

In other words: How is it that we not only know that we know and that which we know, but that we know also, that we do not know and that which we do not know? How can the

95 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 70: "Wie ist ein Erfassen dessen mögliche, was vielmehr unerfasst bleibt und gerade sofern es unerfasst bleibt? Wie kann Objektion des Transobjektiven stattfinden, ohne dass dieses als solches aufgehoben, das heisst, zum Objizierten gemacht wuerde?" Cf. also p. 54: "The intended object is not limited to that what becomes (is) recognized (the actually objectified element). Its determinations can go unlimited beyond that. The intended being (objiciendum) and the actually objectified (objectum in the strict sense) need not to coincide. In as much as they do not coincide the phenomenon of an inadequacy between objiciendum and objectum persists. The latter is limited within the first through the border of objection. This limit divides the objiciendum in the objectified and the transobjective.... The transobjective remains outside the determination relation, which rules the range from object to subject." ("Das intendierte Objekt ist nicht auf das Erkannte an ihm (das wirkliche Objizierte) beschrankt. Seine Bestimmtheiten koennen unbeschraenkt ueber das letztere hinausgehen. Das intendierte Seiende (objiciendum) und das tatsaechlich objizierte (objectum im strengen Sinn) brauchen sich nicht zu decken. Und sofern sie sich nicht decken, besteht das Phaenomen einer Inadequatheit zwischen objiciendum und objectum. Das letztere ist innerhalb der ersteren durch die Grenze der Objektion eingeschraenkt. Diese Grenze teilt das objiciendum in Objiziertes und Transobjektives.... Das Transobjektive steht ausserhalb des Bestimmungsverhaeltnisses, das vom Objekt zum Subjekt waltet.")
strange phenomenon be explained that the subject knows about the adequacy and at the same time the inadequacy of a knowledge of a recognized object, more accurately, of the object image in the subject? Such a Socratic amazement is caused precisely by the knowing of the unknown. Hartmann comments:

Because knowing consists in comprehending and comprehension consists in objection (objectification), knowing must also be called the grasping of the uncomprehended as such, or the objection of the unobjectified as such.96

Thus the problem consists in an enigmatic awareness of inadequacy. Hartmann again presents this contradiction in an antinomy:

Thesis:
Problem means cognition of the transobjective, that is objection of the transobjective, for it is knowledge of the non-objectified.

Antithesis:
Problem cannot be cognition of the transobjective, that is, it cannot be its objection (objectification), for it knows precisely its not-knowing of the non-objectified.97

96 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 54: "...Weil Wissen im Erfassen, und Erfassen in Objektion besteht, so muss es zugleich als Erfassen des Nichterfassten als solchen, als Objektion des Nichtobjizierten als solchen bezeichnet werden."

97 Ibid., p. 70: "Thesis: Das Problem bedeutet Erkenntnis des Transobjektiven, also Objektion desselben, denn es ist Wissen um das Nichtobjizierte. - Antithesis: Das Problem kann nicht Erkenntnis des Transobjektiven, also auch nicht Objektion desselben sein, denn es weiss ja gerade sein Nichtwissen um das Nichtobjizierte."
In this aporia Hartmann stated a new cognitive phenomenon, one which is neither contained in the simple relation of cognition, nor in the relation of the criterion of truth. For these two relations deal actually with what is within and not with something that is outside the limit of objection. The problem of the knowing of the unknown, however, consists in the fact that the limit of objection is transgressed by cognition.  

The progress of cognition, of knowledge on the whole presses also beyond the actual limit of objection. Problem awareness as well as progress of cognition both have this characteristic in common. Whether it is identical, that is, whether we deal here with one and the same transobjective relation of two phenomena, or whether the two have individual relations is the next consideration.

Hartmann's aporia of the progress of cognition asks:

How is it possible that from the knowledge of the unknown positive knowledge of the object originates? How can problems be solved? How can the dynamics of active comprehension emerge from what is not possessed?

98 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 71: "das Hinausgreifen (des Erkennens) über die Objektionsgrenze."

99 Ibid., p. 72: "Wie kann aus dem Wissen des Nichtwissens das positive Wissen der Sache werden? Wie können Probleme gelöst werden? Wie kann aus dem Nichthaben die Dynamik aktiven Erfassens hervorgehen?"
Since in this aporia a contradiction is neither contained nor hidden, it is also not possible to extract an antinomy of the progress of cognition from it. Neither the oscillation of the limit of objection, nor the approaching of the transobjective, nor the spontaneity of cognition in the subject contain contradictions. Therefore it follows that in the phenomenon of the progress of knowledge when problems are solved an objectification of the trans-objective results. This is possible then when the trans-objective is not simply nothing, but the veiled side of the existing object, or the surface turned away from cognition, therefore not yet seen by cognition. Regardless how simple or how complex the object of cognition may be, there is always something recognized, either easy to know, or difficult to understand. But there is also always something, at

100 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 55: "...In the recognizing subject the phenomenon of progress reveals likewise a momentum of its most individual, active dynamics, a specific cognitive spontaneity of the intellect. The latter does not the least oppose the principal receptivity in the subject with regard to the object... It does not signify an intervention in the determinations of the object, but only a co-processing receptivity for them and a passivity to be determined by them." ("Im erkennenden Subjekt deckt das Phaenomen des Progresses gleichfalls ein Moment eigenster, aktiver Dynamik auf, eine spezifische Erkenntnis- spontaneitaet des Bewusstseins. Dieselbe widerspricht nicht im mindesten der prinzipiellen Rezeptivitaet des Sub- jekts gegen das Objekt... Sie bedeutet kein Eingreifen in die Bestimmtheiten des Objektes, sondern nur ein fortschrei- tendes Empfaenglichmachen fuer sie und Sichbestimmenlassen durch sie."
least a remnant, that is not known, something unintelligible to the human mind. In contrast to the objects of thinking, reflection, imagination, "the existing object of cognition is split in the known and the unknown and between these two lies (runs) the limit of actual objection." Whatever lies within the latter is the objective of cognition. Whatever lies beyond it is the transobjective of cognition, and cognition, knowledge presses gradually deeper and deeper into the transobjective, in which the progress of cognition consists, be it on the individual or on the universal level. Simultaneously new determinations of the object and its content occur in an unclear, opaque light, thus providing new stimulation for further advancement and penetration, so that

actually in the prolonged direction of the object, that is beyond the limit of objection, there lay an existent, something that existed before the penetration of cognition and independent of it, but something that made itself noted in the problem awareness.

101 In order to see that verified one may turn for a moment to concrete objects, for instance, one may think of a stalk, a pencil, or anything either natural or man-made. As soon as these objects fulfill the law of objectivity, that is, if they transcend with their being their being-an-object for a recognizing mind, they preserve transobjectivity. Cf. Nicolai HARTMANN, Zur Grundlegung..., p. 154.


103 Ibid. Cf. also Einführung..., p. 105-106: "... wirklich in der verlängerten Objektrichtung - über die
... this question [progress of cognition] can be
answered by the reciprocity of apriori and aposteriori
cognition. The correlative overlapping of both of
these instances... does not only take place once.
It is one which is continuously repeated. For
instance, if in a field of natural science a multi-
tude of not yet elaborated factual material accumu-
lates, which points to a stretch of the apriori
cognition (1, see drawing) soon a hypothesis develops
which not only shows some understanding of the factual
material, but anticipates on its part again what is
not yet justified by the aposteriori cognition. The
apriori instance (2) then encroaches still beyond the
already advanced aposteriori instance. Whereupon the
latter does the same in regard to the apriori instance
again (3) and so on. The thus developing momentary
limits always are partial limits for the advancing
apriori or aposteriori instances. Here again the
two stems of cognition prove themselves heterogeneous.
Independent from one another they shoot reciprocally
beyond each other. This progression however is the

Objektionsgrenze hinaus - ein Ansichseiendes lag, etwas,
was vor dem Eindringen der Erkenntnis und unabhaengig von
ihr schon bestand und sich im Problembewusstsein geltend
machte."
progress of cognition, of knowledge, which is not complicated to explain. Participating in the progress are solely the two components of cognition in contrast to their relationship in the criterion of truth in the intellect. But the simplicity here is based precisely on the fact that the two instances overlap one another.\textsuperscript{104}

Seen in synthesis, problem awareness and progress of knowledge go together, and in some respect they condition one another and point to one another. But in regard to an analysis of these phenomena we stand again before other aporias. The further progress in this inquiry will illuminate these elements.

\textsuperscript{104} The diagram is copied from HARTMANN's Einführung die Philosophie, p. 105-106: "... diese Frage lässt sich durch die Wechselwirkung von apriorischer und aposteriorischer Erkenntnis beantworten. Das gegenseitige Übergreifen beider Erkenntnisinstanzen ist nahezu nicht nur ein einmaliges, sondern ein sich ständig wiederholendes. Besteht zum Beispiel in einem Gebiet der Naturwissenschaften eine Fülle von noch unverarbeitetem Tatsachenmaterial, was auf ein Voreilen der aposteriorischen Erkenntnis (1, siehe Zeichnung!) hindeutet, so wird bald darauf eine Hypothese entstehen, die nicht nur das Verständnis dieses Tatsachenmaterials gibt, sondern ihrerseits wieder etwas vorwegnimmt, was noch nicht durch aposteriorische Erkenntnis gerecht- fertigt ist. Die apriorische Erkenntnisinstanz (2) greift also noch über die schon vorgeschrittene aposteriorische Instanz über, diese wird daraufhin wieder über jene hinausschiessen (3), usw. Die hier entstehenden Grenzen sind immer nur einseitig. Die beiden Stämme der Erkenntnis erweisen sich wieder als heterogen. Unabhängig voneinander schießen sie wechselseitig übereinander hinaus. Dieses Vorwärtschreiten ist der Erkenntnisprogress, der so auf eine einfache Weise seine Erklärung gefunden hat. An ihm sind lediglich die beiden Komponenten der Erkenntnis beteiligt, im Gegensatz zu ihrem Verhältnis im Wahrheitsbewusstsein aber gerade sofern, als sie sich nicht decken."
Hartmann considers the fact of the mutual overlapping of the cognitive object and the actual objectified area of great importance. Without this overlapping the object would be exhaustible. But where does this occur within the realm of human cognition and knowledge? If the object could be totally known it would be mentally absorbed by the subject and this would provide the basis and conclusiveness of idealism. However this explanation cannot be verified in reality. The inexhaustibility of the existent, as the object of cognition, however, proves the ontological independence of the object in being, and at the same time the indifference of the existent in regard to the gnoseological relationship is also demonstrated.

Another important question is concerned with the relation between the problem awareness and the progress of cognition. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to clarify how far both areas go beyond the limit of objection. Problem awareness is always the recognizing, grasping, knowing of an unknown. These natural notes require then that problem awareness transcends the limit of objection and advances into the realm of the transobjective. But how can this be on the basis of those connections between object and subject which establish the apriori and aposteriori cognition, and in regard to the relations of the criterion of truth? Does the phenomenon of problem awareness again
demand a new kind of relation to the poles of cognition, that is, to the object and to the subject?

In regard to both forms of cognition (apriori, aposteriori) and in regard to the criterion of truth, the problem centers on the potential within the limit of objection, for whatever is recognized bridges the object and the subject. The potentiality of problem awareness, precisely because it recognizes what is not known, transcends the limit of objection. It reaches out into the transobjective realm. It connects a transobjective part of the object with the subject and is thus not only a continuation of the relation between object and subject, but it must be considered a new, independent relation. Its poles are the transobjective and the subject. This relation, too,

must be a transcendent one - not between subject and object (the objectified part), but between the subject and the transsubjective. The nature of this relation then consists in the fact that its potential surpasses the one of the relation of cognition, from which follows that the problem awareness consists in nothing else but in its surpassing of the positive cognition. 105

105 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 71: "... muss aber... eine transzendente... sein - nicht zwischen Subjekt und Objekt (Objiziertem), sondern zwischen Subjekt und Transobjektivem. Das Wesen dieser Relation besteht eben darin, dass sie an Spannweite die Erkenntnisrelation überragt; wie denn das Problembewusstsein in nichts anderem besteht als im Hinausragen über die positive Erkenntnis." Cf. Hartmann's Scheme of Cognition, Diagram I, p. 65.
In the progress of knowledge another relation exists. This relation must be proportionate to the problem awareness in the same way as the positive comprehension of a content is proportionate to its anticipation. Therefore, this relation must be more powerful, it is a more positive connection than that which is found in the knowing-of-the-unknown. In order to fulfill this purpose it needs a more positive connection than the one of the problem awareness. However, in regard to its vision, broadness, extension, potential, etc., this relation must be inferior to the relation of the problem awareness. It is a matter of fact that the progress of cognition moves slowly, step by step, safely grounded, without sudden transitions, and also without anticipations as such. Anticipations are the reservation of the problem awareness. Certain systematic advancement in the progress of cognition rests upon the fact than antinomies are neither contained nor admitted therein. "In the problem awareness the difficulty is that knowledge stretches towards a given which is not known yet," whereas the progress of cognition simply deals with an increase of knowledge, in the straight advancement of cognition, in the

106 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 458: "Im Problembewusstsein war die Schwierigkeit die, dass ein Wissen sich auf dasjenige erstreckte, was vielmehr nicht gewusst wird."
inclusion of a new content within its circle or circumference — and the object of wonder here is that cognition is able to do this at all. For the content as such "which it includes, is... not the one of the gnoseological image but the one of the object which is known."  

Hartmann is distinguishing between "passive" and "active" advancement in the progress of knowledge. The first happens simply in that steadily new sides of the object show themselves to the subject... Of course, in order to accomplish this the general data (conditions) of the relation of cognition would be sufficient, but these serve the "passive" advancement only. The concern here is the "active" progress. "In [the active] the condition of the progress is the knowing of the unknown and the spontaneous anticipation."  

The "active" advancement is achieved by raising hypotheses which emerge from the problem awareness and in which the progress of cognition or knowledge takes interest

**References:**

107 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 458: "...den sie einbezieht, ist ja an sich nicht der des Erkenntnisgebildes, sondern der des zu erkennenden Gegenstandes."

108 Ibid.: "... dem Subjekt andauernd neue Kehrseiten des Gegenstandes darbieten... Um dieses Hernehmen als solches verständlich zu machen, dazu würden freilich die allgemeinen Bedingungen der Erkenntnisrelation hineinreichen" (= apriori, aposteriori relations).

109 Ibid.: "In ihm ist das Wissen um das Unerkannte und das spontane Vorausschauen die Bedingung des Progresses."
and which it wants to develop for demonstration or proof. Hence,

every step is conditioned by an entirely positive relation of cognition to the unknown..., co-determined already by the content of the unknown. And this is more than the simple cognitive relation can explain.\textsuperscript{110}

The progress itself presupposes problem awareness: "Plato was right: only a person who has the knowledge of the unknown seeks and searches. The desire to know originates on this basis."\textsuperscript{111} But the relation which the progress of cognition establishes between object and subject is "principally understandable on the basis of the general conditions of knowledge."\textsuperscript{112} Progress does not require a totally new connection of the intellect to the transcendent object. The apriori and aposteriori forms suffice; "only that progress is — due to these conditions — limited from step to step, hence cannot follow agreeably the speedy problem


\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.: "Platon hat recht gesehen: nur derjenige sucht und forscht, der das Wissen des Nichtwissens hat, nur aus diesem resultiert Wissenwollen."

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p. 468: "... prinzipiell aus den allgemeinen Erkenntnisbedingungen heraus verständlich."
A totally new, unique relation of the progress to the object would lead to an unlimited and therefore, uncontrolled progress. The existing relation, however, has to take upon itself the "positive transformation of the transobjective into the objectified."

It seems evident that the progress of cognition is most closely connected with the awareness of the inadequacy of knowledge and presses, therefore, for positive adequation. In achieving this adequation true progress of knowledge is accomplished.

Phenomenologically seen the criterion of truth, the problem awareness, and the progress of knowledge are closely connected. The first two phenomena are, strictly speaking, the preconditions of the third. Progress of knowledge can begin only where, first of all, the criterion of truth points to an inadequacy which may consist in an incomplete cognition, in a lack of comprehending the untruth, and others; second, where this inadequacy presents itself to

113 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 468: "Nur ist... der Progress auf Grund dieser "Bedingungen ein von Schritt zu Schritt eingeschränkter, der dem weit vorausseilenden Problembewusstsein nicht beliebig nachfolgen kann."

114 Cf. IDEM, Einführung in die Philosophie, p. 77.

115 Hartmann shows this relation as the fourth one in his scheme of cognition, see Diagram I, p. 65.
the intellect as a problem. By reason of such conditions
the intellect then activates itself in order to achieve
positive adequacy, whereby progress of knowledge in the
proper sense is achieved. Hence it appears that the pro-
gress of knowledge (in this study preference is given to the
term "problem of the progress of cognition"), is the com-
prising problem of the entire problem group.

Where the criterion and the problem divergency
indicate discretion, partiality, there the progress
of cognition strives for convergency, continuity
and totality.116

But because totality remains transobjective in every
cognition, "for it is infinite and besides it is also irra-
tional in its content,"117 the concept of the object becomes
in the progress of cognition an "idea"118 and a perennial
task, demanding a solution in the life of the individual as
well as in the life of the generations, and in all the
sciences.

116 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 471: "Wo
Kriterium und Problem Divergenz, Diskretion, Partialität
anzeigen, da geht der Progress auf Konvergenz, Kontinuität,
Totalität."  

117 Ibid.: "... denn sie ist unendlich und über-
dies auch inhaltlich irrational..."

118 That is, an anticipating thought, or an
apriori penetration.
Approaches into such a depth of problems require a suitable means, a method by which success can be expected. What was Hartmann's attitude in regard to method and which method did he choose for his philosophical inquiries? In continuous mental dialogue with the centuries of thought and in view of the various means used by the thinkers he says:

... Cognition does not stop. It does not only advance in its content by enlarging and deepening its world-view, it moves in another sense, too. Cognition changes its own procedure. It learns to work with other methods, it even creates and invents such tools and improves and polishes them.

In the historical advancement of philosophy there are found not only the transitoriness of projected world-views and systems but also lasting achievements of cognition and with them arises the question how to grasp, how to preserve and advance them. An answer is possible if, in all these achievements, there can be discovered a coherence that outlasts the opposition of systems and historical eras and that points

beyond all these limitations. In such a coherence, then, lies the possibility and overture for the epigone to distinguish between truth and error within the transmitted ideas and systems. In order to augment the efficiency of

120 Cf. Heinz HUELSMANN, *Die Methode in der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns*, p. 21: "Hartmann often used the word epigone in order to express his own relation and the relation of his contemporaries to the great thinkers in history." Cf. also note 2, *ibid.*: "The word epigone is not an arbitrary term. It means a very exact relationship. First of all it signifies the descendant and the late-born. In it is also a point of modesty and humility, of respect for the greatness of the past. However, epigone means also to be the older in the objective spirit, for the epigone is enabled without own merits but through his historical place where he stands to harvest fruits ripened in history. Thus the epigone has possibilities, provided by the historical development, by the progress of the sciences, which put him in a more advantageous situation than the thinkers of the past. It is informative, too, that this term occurs especially in connection with the method. It dares to presume that Hartmann by using this term intended to determine his own place in the history of ideas."

the thinker it becomes necessary that a methodical procedure be acquired which helps the epigone not only to escape the relativity of his own time-conditioned views and interpretations, but also in order to overcome these views, if they are untenable. Hence the assignment of the individual thinker is to recognize the content of the problems provided by the millenia. He must rediscover these problems. He must grasp their meaning and importance in order to be able to evaluate the work achieved by his predecessors, and to make use of valuable achievements. Therefore, the serious philosopher faces the task to continue the inquiry where the transmitted problems and propositions demand it. Of course, such a work challenges mental efforts. The philosopher must truly be a researcher, one who probes and wrestles with the tradition and the given reality. He must be a systematic thinker, that is, one whose problem-thinking discovers the continuity of thought, of questions and problems and who works with it, hence, prolongs it and passes it on to the coming generations. Hartmann believed that

the important thing is not the variety of attitudes and interpretations, but the methodical basis, that is, a forcing power of cognition, a consequential attitude determined by its relationship to the object.\(^\text{121}\)

\(^{121}\) Nicolai HARTMANN, "Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte", in op. cit., II, p. 18: "[Es kommt] nicht auf die mannigfachen Unterschiede der Einstellung und Auffassung an, sondern einzig auf das methodische Grundmoment... das heisst, dass es eine zwingende Macht der Erkenntnis gibt, eine Konsequenz, die aus dem Verhaeltnis zum Gegenstande heraus bestimmt ist."
and to the labor already achieved by the past.

Thus method is not an arbitrary matter dependent only on the choice of the thinker who uses the method.

It is prescribed by the species of the object. For the own procedure there is only one alternative given: to meet or to fail the object. The object is met only by a proper method. And to be sure, the object can be failed (missed) in many ways. It is truly comprehended by the correct way. 122

Here Hartmann refers to Aristotle who explained in regard to his own philosophical predecessors: "In proceeding... the object itself pointed the way for the researchers and forced them to continue the inquiry." 123

From this it is clear that method has to adjust to the object. If one approaches an object with a heterogeneous method, the object keeps itself closed up, or becomes complicated and appears unconquerable. But as soon as the homogeneous method is found and applied, the object itself opens up, appears simple, lucid, and soluble. This insight caused Hartmann to define method as

122 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Der philosophische Gedanke..." in op. cit., II, p. 48: "Sie ist durch die Artung des Gegenstandes vorgezeichnet; man kann sie im eigenen Vorgehen nur entweder treffen oder verfehlen. Und zwar verfehlen auf vielerlei Art, treffen nur auf eine."

123 Metaphysics, I, 3/984 a 18 f.
the manner by which an object is approached. The method is practical when it commences there where the object shows its open assailable sides. Whoever proceeds otherwise will experience that the object escapes. It is wrong to think that one can approach one and the same object by so and so many different methods. Certainly one can, but one does not get hold of the object.124

Hartmann admits that there are various methods, but he cautions the user, for the choice of the method is determined by the object.

Another surprising aspect of the theory of Hartmann125 is that methods themselves do not result from mere pondering about method. Methods originate rather through "the full devotion to the object."126

In his earlier work "Systematische Methode",127 Hartmann distinguishes three principal methods: the transcendental method, the descriptive method, and the dialectical method. Later Hartmann speaks of "method-momenta" which are

124 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Der philosophische Gedanke ...", in op. cit., II, p. 18: "Methode ist die Art, einen Gegenstand anzupacken; sachgerecht ist eine Methode, die ihn dort anpackt, wo er seine freiliegenden Angriffsflächen hat. Wer ihn anders anpackt, dem gleitet er durch die Finger durch. Es ist ein Irrtum zu meinen, man könne dieselbe Sache so oder auch anders in Angriff nehmen; man "kann" freilich, aber man bekommt sie nicht zu fassen."

126 Ibid.
127 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die systematische Methode", in Kleinere Schriften, III, p. 25.
continuously interrelated.\textsuperscript{128} Some of these interlacing moments are the phenomenological-descriptive, the analytic-retro-conclusive, the dialectic-synthetic points. Other methodical elements follow from these, complement these and allow a synopsis of the different levels of methodical procedures. This synthesis leads to a theory of methods which can be detected and proved in most of the teachings of outstanding philosophers. However, since there are many thinkers and many problems, the methods applied at any given time must vary.

Method and content are not neutral to one another. A special content demands a special method. How should one be able to prescribe a methodical type if all the philosophical potential of the method lies in its elasticity and adaptability? This fact becomes especially important when one tries to tailor such a method for a definite type of system. A systematic method obtained that way is then nothing else but an instance of censorship which prevents the admission of what had not been curtailed previously by the system.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{128} W. ZIEGENFUSS, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 468.

\textsuperscript{129} Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die systematische Methode", in \textit{op. cit.}, III, p. 22-23: "Denn Methode und Inhalt sind nicht indifferent zu einander. Jeder besondere Inhalt verlangt eine Besonderung der Methode. Wie also kann man einen Methodentypus vorzeichnen wollen, wärend doch alle philosophische Leistungsfähigkeit der Methode in ihrer Dehnbarkeit und Anpassungskraft liegen muss? Besonders schwer aber fällt solch ein Vorwurf ins Gewicht, wo man diesen Methodentypus noch dazu auf einen bestimmten Systemtypus zuschneiden will, so dass systematische Methode dann nichts anderes ist als eine Zensurinstanz, die ins System nicht einlaesst, was nicht vorher "systematisch" zugestutzt ist."
The viewpoint of Hartmann, that the system is considered the result, the end, the goal of philosophical reasoning, has been explained. Hartmann sees the method working towards such an end. However, method, unlike system, is not the end but the beginning of a philosophy. It has to serve as guide in all actual philosophizing. This does not mean that — before using any method — the philosopher has to penetrate method fully beforehand. Often such penetration comes aposteriori through reflection upon the function and achievement of the method. And with the aposteriori insight there develops the method awareness.

For instance,

the final methods of Formal logic are present in practically every thinking. But not every thinking knows about their presence... and if it does know about the methods, thinking does not become more methodical by knowing about them.130

From this statement of a phenomenon it follows that a certain methodological apriority is generally given. Already in the pre-Socratic philosophy a method was used. But a "reflection upon the own procedure" was completely absent. Plato and Aristotle illuminate later the immanent

130 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die systematische Methode", in op. cit., III, p. 23: "... die Schlussmethoden der formalen Logik (sind) schlechthin in allem Denken vorhanden. Aber nicht alles Denken weiss um dieses Vorhandensein; und wenn es darum weiss, so wird es dadurch im allgemeinen um nichts methodischer."
methodical moments. They show that knowledge of content must precede knowledge of methods, for

without the preceding of a philosophy of nature geared ... towards a content, that is, without the application of method (at first naive and unconscious) posterity would not have been able to find the method. Research of method presupposes experience of method.131

In other words: Method, too, can become object of study, but before it can be analyzed it has to be. Method becomes lucent by applying it and becomes objectified only after its application by the methodologist. Thus the apriority of method conditions its application.

The method of cognition is the very first of all conditions; but the recognition of the method which comprehends the method of cognition is the very last of all insights.132

Based on these insights Hartmann himself uses the methods in a skilful manner in his philosophy. He approaches the problem of method by formulating the aporia of method as follows:

131 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die systematische Methode", in op. cit., III, p. 24: "... ohne den Vorgang rein inhaltlich gesinnter Naturphilosophie, d.h. ohne die zunächst naive und unbewusste Anwendung der Methode hätten die Späteren eben garnicht auf sie kommen können. Methodenforschung setzt Methodenerfahrung voraus."

132 Ibid.: "Die Erkenntnismethode ist die erste aller Bedingungen; die sie begreiende Methodenerkenntnis aber ist die späteste aller Erkenntnisse."
How can method exist in a vital subject-matter research, and, what is more, how can it function if there is no guiding methodical awareness in the intellect?  

In this formulation of the aporia determining factors of the method are given: the object, the subject-matter, and the intellect. For the method is prescribed by the assailable surface which the object shows. But it is not determined by the object alone, for it is just as much influenced by the structure of the cognitive apparatus.

In the method then two categories meet which Hartmann considers given and necessary in every process of cognition: the category of being in the object, "which can be taken from any level of the hierarchy of being," and the spiritual category of cognition or knowledge in the subject, which constitutes the counterpart of the first. The existential realm and the gnoseological realm indeed affect the method also. Hence, method too, becomes relationally determined by "the coordination... which connects

133 Nicolai HARTMANN, Aufbau der realen Welt, p. 577: "Wie kann in der lebendigen Sachforschung die Methode bestehen und folgerichtig arbeiten ohne ein leitendes Methodenbewusstsein?"

134 Ibid., p. 578: "Die Methode ist bestimmt durch die Angriffsflächen, welche der Gegenstand ihr darbietet; aber das "Darbieten" ... ist nicht vom Gegenstand her allein bestimmt, sondern ebensosehr von der Struktur des Erkenntnisapparates her."

135 Ibid., p. 577.
cognition with the content of its object."\textsuperscript{136}

In philosophy this coordination is the point of departure for the selection of a method, for philosophy has to ask either for a problem or because of a problem. The content of the unknown area in an object is expressed in the problem. This unknown area has to become disclosed through the chosen method. Therefore, by its very nature the method is the path on which the objects of the real categories or the problems of reality move into the noetic sphere. In the noetic sphere then the real categories are represented by their corresponding cognitive equivalents obtained by a suitable method. Hence, in the entire process of cognition method is needed for the problem awareness in the subject does not remain static. Problem awareness urges towards problem solution by investigation of possible answers. In this phenomenon Hartmann recognizes an essential methodical element:

Such an investigation reflects the finding of a method, although it is not yet an explicit method awareness. But it is an object awareness stemming from an awareness of a prevailing problem situation whereby the chance of possible advancement is subjected to deliberations because of the data.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{136} Nicolai Hartmann, Aufbau der realen Welt, p. 577: "[Methode wird bestimm] ... durch die Zuordnung... welche die Erkenntnis mit ihrem Gegenstande inhaltlich verbindet."

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p. 579-580: "Die Umschau ist Reflexion der Methodenfindung. Sie ist... freilich noch kein explizites Methodenbewusstsein. Aber sie ist ein Sachbewusstsein.
In such deliberations the methodical design develops and becomes seen for one needs the total apparatus of methods, ... the direct analytical ascent from the concrete..., the dialectical synthesis..., and the hierarchic perspectives of the strata. And whatever the method may be that is used as first one the other methods must join it for the sake of complement and control. Among all the possible methods Hartmann considers the transcendental method (by Kant also called the critical method, because it involves an analysis of the conditions and limits of knowledge) the proper philosophical method. It searches for the ultimate principles and connects in the process of knowledge the object with the subject, real categories with the categories of cognition. By means of the transcendental method the philosopher proceeds from the actual real to the conditions of the possibilities of the given. Therefore, Hartmann evaluates this method as the fundamental step towards the finding of universal principles and, therefore, a necessary requirement of objective

138 Nicolai Hartmann, Aufbau der realen Welt, p. 616: "... man [bedarf]... des ganzen Methodenapparates, ... den direkten analytischen Aufstieg vom Concretum her..., die dialektische Zusammenschau... und Schichtenperspektive ... Und je nachdem die eine oder andere Methode vorangegangen ist, müssen die anderen zur Ergänzung und Kontrolle nachfolgen."
cognition and/or of philosophic problem awareness. By means of this method reason gives to itself an account of the unknown in either the problem or the object. Reason approaches the unknown hypothetically thereby aiming at an exact determination of it and at an explanation and definition of the object. Historically this method was practiced in Plato’s philosophy. The discovered principles of problems or objects were the apriori conditioning of objective knowledge; the objects themselves were the factors conditioned by these principles. Both together, that is the principles (as conditioning elements in knowledge) and the given object (as the conditioned factor) were understood as being — later called the ratio essendi. In the gnoseological situation the apriori or universal principles are not the first, but the last recognized element, or precisely the unknown and, therefore, searched for factors of a problem. The problematic character of this situation intensifies in philosophy because philosophy has to find out the laws of these universal principles. Therefore, it must be understood that

this kind of method obviously rests upon a retroconclusion (Rueckschluss): the ontological prius becomes simultaneously in the gnoseological order the posterius. 139

The transcendental method then consists actually in this kind of procedure. The usual order becomes reversed for the general direction of inference is normally a descending motion deductively proceeding from general principles to the given particulars. In the transcendental method, however, there is an ascent from the object to the conditioning principles. Plato called this methodical direction of the hypothesis the **anabasis**. The Neoplatonists provided in their apodeictic method a necessary supplement to the **anabasis**. Hartmann points this out:

In this opposition of the directions and in the simultaneous penetration of both the idea of a system of methods becomes clearly apparent. In such a system, however, the hypothetical method, the one which provides the conclusion a posteriori in the research of principles is the proper philosophical method. The principles of philosophy lie in another sphere than the principles of mathematics and physics. They lie on a higher level and form, as it were, an upper floor in the division of the sciences. They in turn are again conditions of scientific principles. For the latter become in philosophy a problem, an object, the ultimate principles of which philosophy has to search for. Therefore, the sphere of the philosophical objects, too, is transferred to a higher level... Only the upper link of the concatenation, the inference of the philosophical categories, is a transcendental conclusion in the strict sense. The problem of the principles appears here in a more condensed, more powerful form; we deal with the highest, first principles. Conclusions leading beyond this level are not possible. For on the level of first principles (**archai** in the strict sense) the inference depends methodically on itself alone and is the only entrance to the principles. In this uniqueness of the philosophical conclusion (**aposteriori**) there lies the special characteristic
of the transcendental method as an exclusively philosophical procedure.140

An other procedure which provides an object and outlines the content of the object is used by the natural sciences. This procedure is the descriptive method. The descriptive method does not predicate anything about the cognitive validity, correctness, necessity of the object, and it does not inquire into its principles. Nevertheless, this method is useful for all the empirical sciences and it aids the transcendental method too. In this study's second part reference to this method is made, because some of its

140 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die systematische Methode", in op. cit., p. 29-31: "In dieser Entgegengesetztheit der Richtungen und dieser gleichzeitigen Durchdringung beider findet sich deutlich der Gedanke eines Systems der Methoden angelegt, innerhalb dessen aber die hypothetische, als die der rückwärts laufenden Prinzipienforschung, die eigentlich philosophische Methode bildet... Die Prinzipien, mit denen es Philosophie zu tun hat, liegen in einer anderen Sphäre als die mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlichen. Sie liegen eine Stufe höher, bilden gleichsam ein oberes Stockwerk zu ihnen. Sie sind selbst wiederum Bedingungen für die Wissenschaftsprinzipien. Denn diese werden auf philosophischem Gebiet selbst wiederum zum Problem, das heißt zum Gegenstand dessen Prinzipien es zu finden gilt. Auch die Gegenstandsosphäre ist also hier eine Stufe höher hinauf verlegt... Ein transzendentaler Schluss im strengen Sinne ist nur das obere Glied der Schlusskette, der Schluss auf die philosophischen Kategorien. Die Prinzipienfrage erscheint hier in verdichteter, potenzierter Form; es handelt sich um die obersten, ersten Prinzipien, über die hinaus kein Rück- schluss mehr führen kann... Denn nur dort, wo es sich um "erste Prinzipien" (archai im strengen Sinne) handelt, ist der Rückschluss methodisch ganz auf sich selbst gestellt, ist er der einzige Zugang zu den Prinzipien. Und in dieser Einzigkeit des Rückschlusses liegt das Eigentümliche der transzendentalen Methode als eines bloss philosophischen Verfahrens."
aspects must be considered when we deal with Hartmann's method in his *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*.

In the transcendental method the philosophical principle confronts the philosophical object or problem. In description, however, the object is outlined, observed, limited, described.

In a third method, the dialectical method, the principles of the objects or problems become interwoven. Hence the vertical direction of the transcendental method becomes horizontalized. The static concept — resulting from the transcendental method — becomes through the dialectical method a dynamic one, for through this method's synthesis the conceptual identification, stabilization and determination become related to other concepts, objects and problems. Therewith the functional character of both of these methods becomes evident. This then is the foundation for the coherence, coordination, categorization of a system:

... by ascending with the transcendental method to the highest principles, it seems at first as if each category were something isolated and for itself inasmuch as its relativity consists in the relation to the object only. ... the system would be nothing but the sum of these single fundamental concepts — as valid as they may be. Dialectics teaches the reverse. A single category is nothing without its relation to other categories. Without any other categories a single category cannot even be defined. Hence, there is still something that is superior to the principles without being their genus: the relation between the principles, their reciprocity, their dependence on one another. That means, each
category is conditioned through all the others, is
determined by the others, but at the same time, it
is co-conditioning and co-determining all the other
categories. It is then clear: this universal,
reciprocal relationship is the idea of a system, or
the system of the categories is the logical prius
of the single categories. However, a system cannot
be defined as the sum of the categories which the
system comprises. The system is more than their sum
total, for it is the unity and the essence of their
relations. Thus it is a dynamic system of relations
and not a static system of concepts. 

This thesis is not intended to be a study of
methods. Method is viewed only within the limitations given
by Hartmann's general theory of method. Therefore, the
above given sketch of the principal methods occurring in
Hartmann's thought seems sufficient, especially since method

141 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die systematische Methode",
in op. cit., p. 45-46: "... Steigt man mit der transzenden-
talen Methode rückschliessend zu den Prinzipien auf, so
scheint es zunächst dass jede Kategorie fuer sich etwas ist
und ihre Relativitaet nur in dem Verhaeltnis zum Gegenstande
hat. Das System ist dann nichts als die Summe dieser ein-
zelnen, fuer sich vollgueltigen Grundbegriffe. Dialektik
lehrt das Umgekehrte. Die einzelne Kategorie ist nichts
außerhalb der Beziehung zu den anderen Kategorien. Sie ist
ohne diese nicht einmal begrifflich fixierbar. - Es gibt
also hier noch etwas, was den einzelnen Prinzipien ueber-
geordnet ist, ohne doch ihr Oberbegriff zu sein; das ist die
Beziehung zwischen ihnen, ihre Gegenseitigkeit, ihre Gebun-
denheit aneinander, welche besagt, dass jede durch die
anderen alle bedingt und bestimmt ist, und dennoch zugleich
Bedingung und Bestimmungsgrund aller anderen ist. Diese
allseitige Beziehung, diese Wechselbeziehung, ist aber
nichts anderes als die Systemidee. Das System der Kategorien
ist also das logische prius gegenueber der einzelnen Kateg-
orie. Das System ist nicht definierbar als Summe der Kateg-
orien; es ist mehr als ihre Summe, es ist die Einheit und
der Inbegriff ihrer Beziehungen. Es ist dynamisches
Beziehungssystem, nicht statisches Begriffssystem."
plays a part in the analysis of Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition. More insight into the problem of method within Hartmann's philosophy can be obtained from H. Huelsmann's excellent work, *Die Methode in der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns*.  

We have now to investigate how Hartmann used his methodical insights in his theory of cognition. In his principal work on metaphysics of cognition Hartmann presented in *nuoce* his entire philosophy. Huelsmann, having studied his work, comes to the same conclusion. He states:

Later Hartmann referred to it again and again. Often he used even the formulations of his thoughts verbatim from this work. As a philosopher Hartmann adheres to the obtained results and continues to work with them, advances from them and preserves them as lasting foundation. Such an attitude characterizes him the more as a typical methodic and systematic thinker.  

Hartmann comes from the Marburg School. The goal of this Neo-Kantian school was to investigate the nature of knowledge and to provide the theory with new philosophical

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foundations. Hartmann made this goal to his own, only that his intention transcended the Marburg goal, for he gave to the theory of cognition a realistic level in proving its metaphysical anchorage. Hartmann comments on his own development in this direction:

From 1912 on the theory of cognition became my main concern. The battle against Marburg's... idealism... took a few years. Essential influence came from the writings of Husserl and Scheler..., from the outstanding thinkers of history, namely, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. Around 1919 the turn to a new ontology was completed. Its first result was the Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (1921).

During these years Hartmann studied not only the problem of cognition. He also studied its history. He went into the schools of the historical thinkers.

144 Werner ZIEGENFUSS, op. cit., p. 454: "Von 1912 ab wird Erkenntnistheorie der Hauptgegenstand. Einige Jahre geht der Kampf gegen den Marburger... Idealismus... Wesentlichen Einfluss hierauf haben die Schriften Husserls und Schelers, unter den Denkern der Geschichte Aristoteles, Kant und Hegel, die dem Suchenden in neuem Lichte aufgegangen sind. Um 1919 ist der Durchbruch zu einer neuen Ontologie vollzogen. Das erste Resultat ist die Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (1921)."

Due to such studies and the admitted influence Hartmann comes to the following holdings in regard to cognition:

Firstly, cognition is a metaphysical problem. Secondly, metaphysical problems proved insoluble throughout the history of thought. Thirdly, the old metaphysics contains much that lacks problematic content. Fourthly, throughout the history of human thought, there are found problematic, transintelligible, irrational elements. Fifthly, this situation demands a return to Aristotle's aporetics, especially in regard to the theory of cognition. Consequently: Aporetics must be revived.

Hartmanns ist saekular und gegenueber diesen Bereichen autonom." - Vgl. G. SOEHNGEN, Sein und Gegenstand, Muenster, Aschendorffsche Verlagsanstalt, 1930, p. 27: "... er [Hartmann] selbst knuepft bewusst an die alte Ontologie inhaltlich und methodisch an und setzt sich mit ihr auseinander."

H. Huelsmann (op. cit., p. 23), remarks, "that the Medieval thinkers are almost completely missing (in Hartmann's philosophy). No thinker of that period became a partner of an ... impressive encounter" as the great thinkers of Antiquity and of the Modern era did. However, in Hartmann's work "reference to medieval thinking is not lacking. In all his significant writings Hartmann goes in the directions and deals with the themes of the one or the other thinker of the Middle Ages. But his interest was never captured by this period... In this fact we have to see more than just an accident. The Middle Ages are undoubtedly a momentum in the continuity of Western thought. But Hartmann was not attracted by it. Therefore, the theological, Christian, and personal aspects of problems come short in Hartmann's philosophy. Hartmann's philosophy is a secular theory and it is autonomous in regard to the mentioned areas. Cf. also G. SOEHNGEN, Sein und Gegenstand (Being and Object), Muenster, Aschendorffsche Verlagsanstalt, 1930, p. 27: "... Hartmann seeks conscientiously connection with the old ontology in regard to content and method..."
In regard to the gnoseological problem on the whole Hartmann's method led him to three major approaches. First, Hartmann attempted to refute positions opposed to the phenomena of cognition. This showed him the limitation and determination of the proper gnoseological problem areas. Having found these he was able to uncover the roots of cognition in the ontic realm.\textsuperscript{146}

On this path the question of the scientific \textit{locus} of cognition occupied the thinker. Is cognition, properly speaking, a problem and/or object of psychology or of logic? Hartmann found that none of these disciplines can explain the phenomenon of cognition. Therefore, the study of the entire field must be divided into theoretical problem spheres in accordance with the areas of the data. First, the subject in itself presents a closed psychological sphere. Another one is the ideal logical sphere that corresponds to the given field of the logical structures. Finally there is the total ontic sphere of reality.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{146} H. HUELSMANN, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{147} Nicolai HARTMANN, \textit{Grundzüge einer Metaphysik}, p. 213: "... die Gesamtbetrachtung... in Problemsphaeren der Theorie spalten, entsprechend den Gebieten der Gegebenheit. Das Subjekt bildet hier in sich selbst eine geschlossene psychologische Sphäre der Theorie; dem Gebiet der logischen Strukturen muss eine Sphäre der logisch idealen Theorie entsprechen; die ontisch reale Gesamtsphäre erfordert ein Gebiet ontologischer Betrachtung."
In Hartmann's philosophy these spheres exist for themselves, that means they are distinct and independent from the subject. There is, for instance, the logical sphere as such with its ideas, judgments and conclusions, which show "even a certain independence from the various levels of cognition." Then, confronting this sphere, there is the sphere of the psychic acts within the cognitive process. These acts function in accord with the content of cognition as acts of perception, ideation, intuition. Hence, these acts constitute a sphere of their own, namely, "the sphere that supports spiritual being, for spiritual being depends on psychic being."

Consequently, the psychis sphere is the primary, the logical sphere is the secondary sphere, the specific phenomena of which integrate unnoticeably, therefore the tendency of the theory of cognition to display preference either for the one or for the other and turn either into a kind of logism or of psychologism. The proper orientation is obtained only by strict consideration of the transcendental nature of the gnoseological relation.

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149 Ibid.

150 Ibid., p. 176: "Daher die Tendenz der Erkenntnistheorie entweder nach der einen oder nach der anderen Seite zu entgleisen, entweder einem Logismus oder einem Psychologismus zu verfallen. Die eigene Linie in ihr ist überhaupt nur im strengen Sichhalten an den Transzendenzcharakter der Erkenntnisrelation durchführbar."
This required "proper orientation on the transcendence of cognition" was observed by Hartmann himself in the methodical reduction of cognition to being ("methodische Selbstueberfuehrung der Erkenntnis") by means of the phenomenological method. Through it cognition becomes the phenomenon "access to being".\textsuperscript{151}

Through such a phenomenological self-identification of cognition, or, as Huelsmann calls it, "the ontological self-understanding of cognition,"\textsuperscript{152} applies a methodical correction\textsuperscript{153} which makes Hartmann's approach essentially

\textsuperscript{151} H. HUELSMANN, op. cit., p. 117.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.: "diese ontologische Selbstauflassung der Erkenntnis".

\textsuperscript{153} Cf. N. HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 37-38: "The phenomenon of cognition must be described in such a manner that the coherence of its essential characteristics as a whole becomes seen and that through this coherence a guarantee is given for its completeness. We possess the method of such an essential description today in the procedure of phenomenology. This recent philosophical theory has already brought forth a multitude of important analyses of essences. However, in the field of cognition, ... it adhered almost exclusively to the logical sphere and to parts of the psychological sphere of the phenomena. A phenomenology of cognition as essential analysis of the metaphysical aspects in the phenomenon of cognition as such is not yet made. It needs to be newly outlined from its very origin... It can be anticipated that the phenomenology of cognition has to become an independent science."

"Das Erkenntnisphaenomen muss so beschrieben werden, dass der Zusammenhang seiner Wesenszuge als Ganzes uber-sichtlich wird und dadurch zugleich eine Gewaehr fuer die Vollzaehligkeit derselben bietet. Die Methode einer solchen Wesensbeschreibung besitzen wir heute im Verfahren der Phaenomenologie. Diese noch junge philosophische
different from Husserl's method.\textsuperscript{154} Actually Hartmann's phenomenological description proves to be a methodical distinction of the phenomenon itself, that is, it becomes the

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\textsuperscript{154} H. HUELSMANN, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 77: "It seems here preferable not to speak in general of "essential difference or deviation" but to consider Hartmann's own judgment on this matter: He says, "Our analysis of the phenomenon of cognition deviates in one aspect from the phenomenologists. They exclusively adhere to the immanent elements of the phenomenon and do not grant to the transcendent element its own way. This is not a mere inconsequence of their method, but rather a partiality of their interest in the phenomenon ... or a remnant of a fixed prejudice. Phenomenology today sees itself handicapped in its own development by the limitations of a philosophy of immanence which in last analysis rests upon an idealistic prejudice. This restriction is avoided by our analysis of the phenomenon of cognition. The transcendence of the object of cognition definitely belongs to the phenomenon and must be described."

reflexive relation of cognition to its own noetic path. Distinctions are made only in reference of cognition to itself and so the description remains reflexive. In Hartmann's theory the basic properties of cognition are its relationship and its relativity. The subject-object relationship is a multiple one. But cognition becomes actualized by reflection, that is, in relation to itself.

Hartmann found this position through his study of Aristotle. From Aristotle he learned the appreciation and mastery of aporetics, or of the pure science of problems. In Aristotle, Hartmann discovered also the method to investigate the problems as such before treating them theoretically and to see them independently from possible attempts of solutions, that is, to distinguish the unknown from that which is comprehended and to elaborate the difficulties and contradictions of the given phenomena for their own sake.\textsuperscript{155}

This Aristotelian procedure served Hartmann immediately as a model, but Hartmann remained independent in his approach, for in Aristotle's method, too, Hartmann discovered deficiencies,

\textsuperscript{155} Nicolai HARTMANN, \emph{Grundzüge...}, p. 39: "... die Probleme vor ihrer theoretischen Behandlung und unabhängig von möglichen Lösungsversuchen rein in sich selbst zu untersuchen, das Unbegriffene vom Begriffenen zu scheiden, Schwierigkeiten und Widerspruche der vorliegenden Phänomene um ihrer selbst willen herauszuarbeiten."
In one point we may hope to advance farther than the old Aporetics. The latter is not based on an analysis of the phenomenon. It is not supported by descriptive preparation which clearly is distinguished from the analysis. Therefore, the old Aporetics suffers of a certain lack of organization. Observing more critically, one finds in Aristotle some phenomenological motives in the midst of aporetics. The very limiting of the problem requires a start from the facts. Are these facts not determined beforehand, then it becomes necessary to assure them step by step.\(^{156}\)

However, through such a procedure the coherence of the method suffers from many excursions, certainly, the understanding is rendered more difficult. For this reason Hartmann aims at a synthesis of Aporetics and a phenomenology in which the analysis of the phenomenon is the basic step. After this is accomplished, aporetics is enabled to follow freely its own laws or its "inner logic."

The latter consists not in the coherence of the data, but in connections between the data and the unknown, the searched for elements.\(^{157}\)

\(^{156}\) Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 39: "In einem Punkt... dürfen wir hoffen weiter zu kommen als die alte Aporetik. Diese ist nicht auf Analyse des Phaenomens basiert, stützt sich auf keine beschreibende Vorarbeit, die deutlich von ihr abgehoben wäre und leidet daher an einer gewissen Planlosigkeit. Sieht man genauer zu, so findet man bei Aristoteles phaenomenologische Motive mitten in die Aporistik hineinverarbeitet; Problemfixierung bedarf eben des Ausgangs von einem Tatsachenbefund, und wo dieser nicht vorher festgelegt ist, muss sie sich seiner von Schritt zu Schritt versichern."

\(^{157}\) Ibid.: "Diese besteht nicht in Zusammenhaengen des Gegebenen in sich selbst, sondern in solchen zwischen Gegebenem und und Gesuchttem."
This freedom of a proper legality is achieved only by an examination — as comprehensive as possible — of the total findings granted by the phenomenological preparation. Through this Hartmann accomplishes a methodical synthesis:

The methodical steps themselves become inquired while phenomenologically understood and differentiated. In the light of history they become critically distinguished and determined, and investigated as a problem before these methodical steps become identical with the method of reductive analysis.  

Hartmann deliberated, planned, and accomplished these steps in his *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. This is shown in the fifth chapter of the above mentioned work, in which Hartmann's methodical principles and insights are presented.

Already in the first passages of that chapter, Hartmann abolishes the immanence of orthodox phenomenology. He departs from it by making the gnoseological transcendence the basis of all of his deliberations. The

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158 H. HUELSMANN, op. cit., p. 119: "Die methodischen Schritte haben sich selbst zum Inhalt, indem sie phaenomenologisch aufgefasst und differenziert, kritisch-historisch abgehoben und bestimmt, problematisch in Frage gestellt und Grundlegung werden."

159 Walter BRUGGER, *Philosophisches Woerterbuch*, Freiburg, Herder, 1951, p. 258: "as the objects reveal themselves to us in our consciousness (intellect—transcendental reduction)... Phenomenology in the narrow sense becomes the science of the phenomena which presents itself to the mind. In order to establish an incontestable basis for all the sciences... [Husserl] used the phenomenological
gnoseological transcendence is the fundamental separation of subject and object. It is that momentum of the basic phenomenon of cognition which is fully supported by the data. Hence, Hartmann departs unmistakably from the logical

method. It begins with a double reduction ("double brackets"), namely: "The eidetic reduction first of all ignores totally the existence of the "I", the existence of cognitive acts and of the objects. It considers only the eidos (=essence). The eidos is considered in its total concreteness. In the second reduction, the so-called phenomenological one, the independence of these contents from consciousness becomes excluded too. Phenomenology considers its objects merely "as" objects (object theory), as correlates of consciousness. Consciousness comprises the noesis (=conscious-having) and noema (the object). Noema is not contained in the noesis as a real part, but it becomes constituted as objective noema by the noesis. This is the reason why, in immediate vision of the eidos, the noema (=idea- tion) can be grasped and described. Hence, philosophy is to be defined as a purely descriptive theory of the eidos of the immanent structures of consciousness."

"Da die Gegenstaende sich uns... im Bewusstsein offenbaren, heisst Phaenomenologie im engeren Sinne die Wissenschaft von den sich im Bewusstsein offenbarenden Phaenomenen. Um eine unanfechtbare Grundlage aller Wissenschaften zu erhalten, bediente er (Husserl) sich der phaenomenologischen Methode. Diese hebt mit einer doppelten Reduktion (Einklammerung) an: "Die eidetische Reduktion sieht zunächst von aller Existenz des Ich, der erfassenden Akte und der Gegenstaende ab und betrachtet blos deren Wesen (Eidos), allerdings in seiner ganzen Konkretion. In der zweiten, der phaenomenologischen Reduktion, wird auch die Bewusstseinsunabhängigkeit dieser Inhalte ausgeschaltet. Die Phaenomenologie betrachtet ihre Gegenstaende blos, 'als' Gegenstaende (Gegenstandstheorie), als Korrelate des Bewusstseins. Es gliedert sich in Bewussthaben (Noesis) und Bewusstes (Noema). Das Bewusste ist in der Noesis nicht als reeller Teil enthalten, wird aber als Gegenstand durch die Noesis konstituiert. Darum kann das Noema in unmittelbarer Wesensschau, Ideation, erfasst und beschrieben werden. Die Philosophie ist daher auch als eine rein descriptive Wesenslehre der immanenten Bewusstseinsgestaltungen zu definieren."
idealism and roots cognition in reality. Therewith, Hartmann also corrects the phenomenological method for

the transcendent character of the determination of the subject through the object is valid not only in the cognition of concrete things but in any cognition of objects. A confrontation remains even then when the object is not a space-temporal one. For the ideal object, too, (for instance a mathematical proposition, or a specific subjective element, such as an attitude, a feeling) becomes an object. For it is without abrogation face to face with the recognizing subject, and therefore, transcendent. The recognized object does not surpass the cognitive construct, but it remains what it was when unrecognized... A mathematical proposition does not become more true or less true by being known. A mental attitude does not become changed by being recognized. Hence, only in the object's independence lies the universal gnoseological meaning of transcendence, not in a psychological outer or inner of the subject.

160 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 48-49: "der transzendierende Charakter der Bestimmung des Subjekts durch das Objekt gilt nicht nur für konkrete Dingerkenntnis, sondern schlechthin für alle Gegenstandserkenntnis. Das Gegenüber bleibt unauflösbar, auch wenn es kein raumzeitliches ist. Auch der ideale Gegenstand (etwa ein mathematischer Satz), ja selbst ein spezifisch subjektives Gebilde (eine Gesinnung, ein Gefühl), ist, sofern es Gegenstand des erkennenden Subjekts wird, diesem unauflösbar gegenüber und insofern tranzendent. Der erkannte Gegenstand geht auch hier nicht über in das Erkenntnisgebilde, sondern bleibt, was er unerkannt war... Ein mathematischer Satz wird nicht wahrer oder unwahrer dadurch, dass er erfasst wird, eine Gesinnung nicht anders dadurch, dass sie durchschaut wird. In dieser Unabhängigkeit allein und nicht in einem psychologischen Außen gegenüber dem Innen des Subjekts, liegt der allgemein gnoseologische Sinn der Transzendenz."
Hartmann advances here from the subjective element to the objective element, from the ideal to the real, from the purely psychological functional phenomenon to the ontic phenomenon. His intention is to show the pure basis of knowledge in which his theory of cognition is rooted. Huelsmann summarizes as follows: "therewith the ontological self-establishment of cognition begins and it leads to the ontic domain." 161 Huelsmann's work deals with Hartmann's method, especially the method which Hartmann applied in his metaphysics of cognition. Therefore, the reference to Huelsmann's study seems sufficient, as Huelsmann's work impresses as excellently written by an objective epigone of Hartmann.

For the sake of clarity a few traits of Hartmann's phenomenology have to be summarized, for they seem fundamental for the advancement of this thesis.

In the fifth chapter 162 of his Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, Hartmann exposes the following phenomena of cognition:


162 Pages 44-60.
I. 1) In every cognition are confronted

the cognizing intellect and the recognized being
= subject = object
= original state of separation of both
= transcendence.

2) This equals the

being subject for an object being object
for a subject
= correlation
= reciprocal dependence or conditionality of both of them, for "their relation is a correlation." 163

3) Since the subject returns to itself and reflects in itself
Since the object is indifferent, is neutral towards a cognizing subject
it is possible to speak of

the subject as a being-for-itself
the object as a being-in-itself. 164

163 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 44.

164 IDEM, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, p. 153: "Is the idea of the being-in-itself erroneously constructed? This is impossible for without the "in-itself" character of the object there is no cognition. The difficulty disappears if one keeps in mind the gnoseological origin of the idea of the in-itself. Gnoseologically the difference between the "in-itself" and "for-me" is absolutely unequivocal and essential. A being can be an "object" only in "confrontation" (opposition), that is in relation to a subject. In contrast to this being-relative-to, the being-in-itself means nothing other but the total independence from the subject, and especially from the recognition by the subject..." Cf. also p. 155: "The nature of the gnoseological being-in-itself is
4) Between Subject and Object a correlation or a reciprocal dependence exists, but it is an irreversible one, a non-interchangeable one, and, therefore, it is at any given time a relation going in one direction only, because of the qualitative difference of the function of the subject and of the object in the process of cognition, which is ontically rooted in the natural difference of subject and object.

a relational one. It means that the existence and essence (= the being) as such of the object is never dependent on the act of cognition whose object it is."

5) Under the aspect of function there occur in cognition in the subject, in the object, = in object-awareness:

a transcending, a standing against
a being-outside-itself, 165 or a confrontation,
a grasping and returning, a remaining indifferent,
a grasping of itself an absence of change,
= an (immaterial) a being grasped
objectification of a determination of
the object through cognition in the
subject
= a transcending,

which result in

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object-awareness.

However, this means:

a widening of the an immutability
sphere of the subject of the sphere
through cognition of the object
= a bringing into = (from the point of
the within view of the subject)
the without

= interiorization of
the object in the subject.

165 Huelsmann says (op. cit., p. 117): "'transcendent' shows up in Hartmann's list of the object phenomena only." - "'transzendent' nur in der Liste der Objektphäno-
mene". After comparing with Hartmann's presentation (Grund-
gänge..., p. 45 § 6), it seems, however, advisable and justified to present the correlation or the reciprocal dependence of the transcendence completely in contrast to Huelsmann, who in his work was primarily interested in method and who is not concerned with transcendence.
II. COGNITION

1) = Function of a cognizing substance or of the subject;

2) = Representation of a recognized object in the subject;

3) = Recurrence (immaterial) or repetition or reproduction of an object in the subject;

4) = Reflexion upon the natural consciousness;

5) = RELATION

From these traits of the phenomenon of cognition, Hartmann sees flowing four different concepts of cognition, namely, concepts "which overlap" but of which each one "is the expression of an entire complex of essential traits."

These concepts are:

a) cognition (as essential relation between subject and object) = relation of cognition,

b) cognition (as image or representation of the object in the subject) = image of cognition,

c) cognition (as adequation of the image with the object) = truth,

d) cognition (as tendency for the advancement of the image to the whole content of the object) = progress of cognition.167

166 Nicolai HARTMANN, op. cit., p. 58: "die einander ueberlagern, respektive sich ueberschneiden."

167 Ibid.: "a) Erkenntnis als Wesensverhaeltnis von Subjekt und Objekt (= Erkenntnisrelation), b) Erkenntnis als Bild oder Repraeentation des Objekts im Subjekt (= Erkenntnisgebilde), c) Erkenntnis als Ubereinstimmung des Bildes mit dem Objekt (= Wahrheit), d) Erkenntnis als Tendenz der
Hartmann's analysis of the phenomenon of cognition advances then to the problem of the *aposteriori* and *apriori* cognition, and comes to the following results:

1) In regard to the general essential traits of the relations of cognition, no difference between the *aposteriori* and the *apriori* cognition is found.

2) A difference between the two exists, however, in the mode of their givenness, for
   a) cognition obtained from the given (in the here and now) = *aposteriori* cognition;
   b) cognition of the universal characteristics, regardless whether a particular existent is given or not or cognition obtained from the ontological prius of universally valid attributes = *apriori* cognition.

3) Philosophy today has developed beyond the Kantian classical "transcendental" (= idealistic interpretation of the transcendent apriority which means the *apriori* synthetic judgments), especially through the phenommenological research in the stricter sense. Cognition *apriori* has proved itself as a homogeneous element of all and every cognition, even of cognition which is not formed in judgments.

Hartmann's inquiry of the phenomenon of cognition turns then to the problem of the gnoseological being-in-itself, to the

Annaeherung des Bildes an den vollen Gehalt des Objekts (= Erkenntnisprogress).

168 Here given in summary only.
169 Cf. *Grundzüge...*, p. 49 etc.
170 Cf. ibid., p. 51.
171 Cf. ibid.
problem of the borderline phenomena of cognition. This is the question of the oscillating limit of objection, and to the problem of truth. With these inquiries Hartmann considers the phenomenological preparation completed and advances to the aporetics of cognition. The aporias of cognition — in as far as they are those of the above mentioned problems — have been historically and systematically disclosed.\textsuperscript{172} A recourse to them is unnecessary. The problem or aporia of the gnoseological transcendence, however, must now be dealt with in greater detail and thereby Hartmann's third methodical step in his theory of cognition will be seen also: the theory.

\textsuperscript{172} Cf. in this study, p. 27 and following.
CHAPTER TWO

THE GNOSTEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE
IN NICOLAI HARTMANN'S METAPHYSICS OF COGNITION

Hartmann's Principle of the "Highest Possible Maximum of Data"

Hartmann's Phenomenology of the Gnoseological Transcendence

Distinctions: Object
              Subject
              Gnoseological Relation

Hartmann's Aporetics of the Gnoseological Transcendence

Distinctions: The Proposition of Consciousness
              The Proposition of the Transcendence of the subject
              The Rooting of the Gnoseological Aporia in the Ontological Aporia

Hartmann's Theory of the Gnoseological Transcendence
HARTMANN'S PRINCIPLE
OF THE "HIGHEST POSSIBLE MAXIMUM OF DATA"

Hartmann, a phenomenologist sui generis, begins the approach to all the problems he deals with in the gnoseological realm by a descriptive, practical disclosure of the phenomena. He is aware of his own criticism of the motto of Scienticism: Orientation on mathematics and on the mathematized sciences of nature.1 The last consequence of this motto necessarily results in "a caricature of the phenomenon of cognition."2 Hartmann decides that if any orientation on science should be considered for the theory of cognition, then "it ought to be obtained in equal proportion from all these sciences."3 But that, too, seems

1 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, p. 40.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.: "... gleichmaessig an allen Wissenschaften stattfinden." Cf. also IDEM, Einführung in die Philosophie, p. 67: "The fundamental difference between the previous theory of cognition in the period from Descartes to Kant is given in the fact that in our time, we have entered an anthropological phase. We judge cognition not only by the factor science but from the facts of the total human existence as one of the many functions of man. This difference is a radical difference."

insufficient for in doing so the entire domain of scientific cognition becomes eliminated. Besides, "the factum of cognition is not only inexhaustible by the factum of the sciences but becomes also distorted by it." Therefore, Hartmann demands that scienticism is confronted with a healthy anti-scienticism which again is not allowed to dominate. The confrontation must be regulated: "A certain distrust in both of these positions is fruitful. Their suspension gives security to completion."  

But is such a widening of the realm of orientation not a non-philosophical attitude? The methodical scientific doubt takes as little as possible for granted. The scientific method is ruled by "the device of the minimum of data." Descartes, for example, accepted as given only one point, the "cogito". Fichte accepted as jumping-board the "active Ego ('I')" only. But

4 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 41: "Das Faktum der Erkenntnis ist mit dem Faktum der Wissenschaften nicht nur nicht erschöpft, es ist durch dasselbe auch entstellt."

5 Ibid.: "Ein gewisses Misstrauen beider Richtungen ist hier gerade fruchtbar..., ihr Spannungsverhältnis verbürgt am ehesten die Vollstäendigkeit."

6 Ibid.: "die Devise des Minimums an Gegebenheit."
if it were possible to deduct from one point or from one proposition the plethora of the content of cognition, those thinkers would be justified. However, this hope has long proved delusive. It rested upon the most monstrous self-illusion of philosophy since each one of these deductions showed a surreptitious obtainment of the manifold content which previously had been excluded by the elimination of data. In reality the plenty of the content does not flow from the erroneous denial of the quantity of data which *nolens volens* is at the disposal of the deducing consciousness.  

As is well known, the "device of the minimum of data" led the logical idealists to the extreme position which finally refuses to admit that anything is given. They considered everything a question or problem. Such attitude urges us to ask whether at least the question is given. For is the question given, then a determination of the content is given. If that were denied, the problems would no longer be distinguishable among themselves.

The intuitivistic camp of Positivism offered the antithesis to the idealistic thesis, namely "everything (all) 

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7 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 41: "Waere es moeglich aus dem einen Satz die Mannigfaltigkeit des Erkenntnisinhalts zu "deduzieren", so behielten diese Denker recht. Diese Hoffnung hat sich laengst als truegerisch erwiesen. Sie beruhte auf der ungeheuerlichsten Selbsttäuschung der Philosophie, indem alle solche "Deduktion" auf die Erschleichung eben jenes mannigfaltigen Inhalts hinauslaeuft, der durch die Beschräenung der Gegebenheit ausgeschlossen war. Die Inhaltsfuelle fliesst eben in Wirklichkeit nicht aus der faelschlich verleugneten Masse alles uebrigen Gegebenen, die gewollt oder ungewollt dem deduzierenden Bewusstsein eben doch zur Verfuegung steht."
is given." If this antithesis were true, then all theory, all speculation and thinking of philosophy would become unnecessary for this antithesis indirectly declares the natural ratiocination of human reason superfluous. Both of these extremes blurr the meaning of the concept of givenness (data). This meaning is rooted in the fact that in all the mental activities is found something which is clearly distinct basis in contrast to that which has to be discovered.8

"Given" is only a part of the whole. Therefore, the "too much" and the "too little" of data demand a balance. Hartmann ponders:

In the "too-much-of-givenness", at least, the possibility exists that the error becomes balanced; an erroneous assumption is confronted with other data which correct the assumption. The continuous revision of the premises by looking back step by step is the only criterion available in the question of givenness.

But in the "too-little-of-givenness", the danger of the embezzlement of problems exists... A problem once refuted does not return by itself. For unnoticed but simultaneously with the selection the bias of the position occurs and excludes for ever the once excluded. The "petitio principii" of the position, the most ordinary of all errors of philosophical systems is fundamentally an error in regard

8 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 42: "Verwischen den Sinn des Gegebenheitsbegriffs. Denn dieser wurzelt eben darin, dass es in aller Gedankenarbeit etwas gibt, was sich als Ausgangsbasis vom Gesuchten und Aufgegebenen deutlich unterscheidet. Das Gegebene ist... gerade nicht das Aufgegebene, sondern ein anderes."
to the data, the one of the elimination of data. To approach the problems with a prejudice equals a predetermination of their solution. Such thoughts led Hartmann to the "device of the largest possible maximum of data", for it suits the critical attitude of the thinker and the approach to the phenomenological analysis of the problem.

9 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 42: "Bei einem "Zuviel an Gegebenheit" besteht wenigstens die Möglichkeit, dass sich der Fehler wieder ausgleicht; einer falschen Annahme treten andere Gegebenheiten gegenüber, denen sie sich aufheben kann. Die bestaendige, von Schritt zu Schritt zurueckblickende Revision der Praemissen ist ohnehin das einzige Kriterium, das es in der Gegebenheitsfrage gibt. Bei einem "Zuwenig an Gegebenheit" aber besteht die Gefahr der Problemunterschlagung... Ein abgewiesenes Problem kehrt von selbst nicht wieder. Denn unbemerkt schleicht sich zugleich mit der Auslese die Vorentscheidung ueber den Standpunkt ein, und der Standpunkt schliesst das einmal Ausgeschaltete aus. Die petitio principii des Standpunktes, der gewoehnlichste aller philosophischen Systemfehler, ist im Grunde ein Gegebenheitsfehler, und zwar ein solcher der zu eng gefassten Gegebenheit... Mit einem fertigen Standpunkt an die Probleme herantreten, heisst ihre Losung vorentscheiden..."

10 Cf. Werner ZIEGENFUSS, op. cit., p. 573-574: "Husserl starts with the analysis of the "natural attitude" which is nothing else but the continuous inexplicitly rati­fied presupposition of the existence of the world shown in the practical and theoretical walks of life. With the removal of that presupposition, that is with a radical change of the natural attitude the phenomenological position be­comes possible. This change is based upon the "bracket" of the existence of the world which must be kept untouched and the "bracket" of all the objects of the world... what remains after the "bracketing" that is the pure consciousness with its understanding of the world. "World" then has become the term for the correlate of the definite coherence of the conscious life by which is meant objectified existence as such: intuitive experience, opaque imagination, thinking, evaluating, practical striving, and so on. World becomes
This chosen device permits

firstly to return again and again and to go beyond
the held and the possible positions; secondly, to
accept the data for the time being without

the "Phenomenon World". The universal theme of phenomenology is "phenomenon restricted to a meaning of consciousness." This then is the science of the pure or of the transcendental consciousness according to its empirical and intentional content... or... the science of the construction of a world at any given time existing in the phenomenological subject...."

Cf. ibid., p. 487-489: "Heidegger's philosophizing takes its start from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl but he re-arranges and transforms it gradually. Heidegger treats the "fundamental question of philosophy on the whole", the question of the meaning of being, according to the phenomenological method. Heidegger is aware that he takes a philosophical risk by asking being for its meaning, when he treats ontology phenomenologically, finishing thereby the traditional theory of being. The analysis has to begin with man's existence, which has to disclose the way to the answer of the question of the meaning of being. We ourselves are the existent, a given which has to be dealt with. The existence of that being is my existence at any given time...."

Cf. also N. HARTMANN, Einfuehrung..., p. 94: "As early as at the era of the Sophists the idea "emerges" that perception is entirely relative, subjective; that it has no objective correlate. If that were so, it would mean that in reality perception cannot show the evidence of the object. Continuing in this direction and considering that everything experienced in life as fact registers through the senses then one understands how Protagoras in the fifth pre-Christian century was able to arrive at an extreme relativistic position, such as, "there is one kind of being only: Everything that is for me and it is in such a manner as it appears to me. Whatever of being appears to me that, indeed, is (for me), and whatever of being appears to you, that really is (for you). A comparison between that which appears to you and to me is not possible. I cannot enter your consciousness and you cannot enter mine." This radical relativism explained by means of convention those concepts which are universal and the same for all men. Protagoras pointed to the fact that men superficially slip over differences of their opinions on the data because these differences seem unimportant to them. From this position a short step only leads to the extreme formulation of the Cyrenaics,
screening. The phenomena as such ought to be taken as equally valid by the phenomenological analysis that follows from the fact that namely, that in reality every man is closed up within the circumference of his own consciousness, his own subjective conditions so as if he were in a state of siege. The skeptic conclusion of such a theory is: Any knowledge of the extramental world is questionable."


Cf. also: "Heideggers Philosophieren nimmt seinen Ausgang von der Phaenomenologie Edmund Husserls, verleiht ihr aber allmaehlich Ausgestaltung und Umgestaltung. Nach phaenomenologischer Methode behandelt er die "Fundamentalfrage der Philosophie uberehaupt": die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins... Heidegger ist sich bewusst, ein philosophisches Wagnis zu unternehmen, wenn er dem Sein seinen Sinn abfragt, wenn er, die bisherige Seinslehre abbauend, phaenomenologische Ontologie treibt... Vom Dasein des Menschen hat die Analyse auszugehen, die den Weg zur Beantwortung der Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins freimachen soll."

"Das Seiende, dessen Analyse zur Aufgabe steht, sind wir je selbst. Das Sein dieses Seienden ist je meines."

Cf. also: "... Schon in der Zeit der Sophisten" taucht "der Gedanke auf, dass die Wahrnehmung ganz relativ, subjektiv sei, kein objektives Korrelat habe. Das aber
phenomenology is not concerned with the theory
nor with the formulation of any problem. 11

But it is the assignment of phenomenology to arrange the
data and to collect them under the genus of descriptive
notions. However,

wuerde besagen, dass sie uns in Wirklichkeit nichts ueber
das Objekt aussagen kann. - Geht man nun von hier aus weiter
und bedenkt man, dass alles, was wir an Tatsaechlichkeiten
im Leben erfahren, den Weg der Sinne nimmt, so wird es
verstaendlich, wie Protagoras im 5. vorchristlichen Jahr-
hundert zu einer extrem relativistischen Anschauung kommen
konnte: Es gibt nur diese eine Art des Seins: Es ist alles,
was ist, nur fuer mich, und zwar nur so, wie es mir erscheint.
Was mir zu sein scheint, das ist auch (fuer mich), und was
dir zu sein scheint, das ist auch (fuer dich). Ein Ver-
gleich zwischen dem, was dir, and dem, was mir erscheint,
ist nicht moglich. Ich kann nicht in dein Bewusstsein
hineinsteigen und du nicht in meins. - Begriffe in denen
doch anscheinend alle Menschen ubereinstimmen, erklarte
dieser radikale Relativismus aus der Konvention und daraus,
that die Menschen uberein die Unterschiede ihrer Auffassungen
von den Dingen hinweggleiten, weil sie ihnen unwichtig zu
sein scheinen. - Von hier ist es nun nicht mehr weit bis zu
der extremen Formulierung der Kyrenaiker, dass in Wirklich-
keit jeder Mensch im Umkreis seines Bewusstseins, seiner
subjektiven Zustaende, eingeschlossen sei, als ob er sich
im "Belagerungszustand" befaende. Daraus folgt die skep-
tische Konsequenz: Ein Wissen von der Aussenwelt ist
ueberhaupt fraglich."

11 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 43:
"erstens, je und je zurueckzugreifen hinter mogliche und
gewonnene Standpunkte, zweitens, Gegebenes vorerst ohne
Auslese anzunehmen, da fuer die Phaenomenanalyse die Phaeno-
mene an sich gleichwertig sein muessen, steht "die Phaeno-
menologie... ja nicht nur dieses der Theorie, sondern
auch, dieses all der Problemstellung."
the data collected by phenomenology do not claim to be the given of objective reality. But they claim validity as phenomena. And it is, indeed, the phenomenon which the theory has to interpret.\textsuperscript{12}

For the theory, however, the phenomena have not the same value.

Now Hartmann's approach becomes seen. The prospect of this way indicates:

1. Hartmann takes "the optimal maximum of data" as basis of his orientation.\textsuperscript{13}

2. Hartmann discloses the data phenomenologically. Therefore, he remains at least for the beginning unconcerned with possible consequences. "Phenomenology can deal with the metaphysical elements of the problem of cognition inasmuch as such elements are found in the accessible realm of data."\textsuperscript{14}

3. Hartmann investigates the phenomenological result critically in his aporetics.

4. Hartmann clarifies when possible — through his theoretical solutions — the aporetic results.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 43: "... was sie als gegeben zusammenstellt, erhebt nicht den Anspruch auf objektive Realität, sondern nur auf Geltung als Phaenomen. Und eben das Phaenomen ist es, was die Theorie zu deuten hat."

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 44: "Phaenomenologie darf das Metaphysische im Erkenntnisproblem herausarbeiten, sofern sie es als metaphysische Tatsache im Umkreis des ihr zugaenglichen Gegebenheitsbereiches vorfindet."

\textsuperscript{15} IDEM, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie", in op. cit., 1, p. 125: "... the experience of science teaches us to return again and again to the given in order to penetrate it, for the first grasps with which we embrace it are usually quite incomplete and inexact. A highly
In this study Hartmann's dealing with the problem of the gnoseological transcendence is followed up. This problem is referred to in many of Hartmann's writings. It often appears as does its counterpart — the problem of the ontological immanence. Both problems are, indeed, main problems of philosophy.

Hartmann starts his collection of characteristics of the phenomenon of cognition with the statement:

Cognition is an act, which transcends consciousness. That is fundamental. The subject is confronting the object. The object presents itself in space, is empirical, is something.

scientific concentration is necessary for obtaining even the phenomena as such and to register them correctly. A fruitful exposition of the problem can be achieved only after a correct understanding and description of the phenomena.

From the problems, then one can proceed to the finding of solutions which deserve their name and lead to a clearer survey of the connections — this then is the "theory". Every scientific advancement or progress develops in these three main stages: phenomenon, problem, theory.

"... die Erfahrung der Wissenschaft lehrt uns, dass wir immer wieder zum Gegebenen zurueckkehren mussen, um es auszuschoepfen, denn die ersten Zugriffe, mit denen wir uns seiner bemaechtigen, pflegen ganz unvollstaendig und ungenau zu sein. Es ist schon eine hoehe wissenschaftliche Besinnung erforderlich, um auch nur die Phaenomene als solche zureichend zu registrieren. Erst nach ihrer rechtmaessigen Erfassung und Beschreibung kann eine fruchtbare Problemstellung erfolgen; und erst von einer solchen aus kann man hoffen, Losungen zu finden, die den Namen verdienen, und zu grosserer Ueberschau der Zusammenhaenge, der eigentlichen "Theorie" gelangen. - In diesen drei Hauptetappen - Phaenomen, Problem, Theorie - bewegt sich alles wissenschaftliche Vordringen."

16 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einfuehrung..., p. 68: "Erkenntnis ist - das ist hier grundlegend - ein Akt, welcher das Bewusstsein ueberchreitet. Das Subjekt steht dem Gegenstand, der sich raumlich, empirisch, dinglich darstellt, gegenueber."
Thus, cognition is not recognized as simple conscious act, as for example thinking, recalling, imagining, dreaming. These acts originate in the subjective realm, function in it, and their orientation is immanent. That means they urge the subject to an expression in the subject or by the subject. In Hartmann's statement cognition is recognized from the very beginning as an act which transcends the

17 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einfuehrung..., p. 68: "There is a great number of transcendent acts. These acts connect the consciousness with their goal. The peculiarity herein consists in the fact that man has some interest in the goal of the act. Primitive consciousness and the consciousness of the animals is totally directed by the acts of appetition (sensual), urge, escape, avoidance" (always direction towards or away from an object). "The intellectual consciousness, however, frees itself from the interest of the vital urge. Only in the intellectual consciousness we find the accomplishment of a cognitive relation — without abolition of the other forms of the transcendent act in the developed consciousness."

"Es gibt eine Unzahl von transzendenten Akten, die immer auf etwas gehen, was unabhaengig vom Bewusstsein an sich besteht, und sie verbinden es mit ihm. Das Ursprungs- liche dabei ist, dass den Menschen irgendein Interesse an das Ding bindet. Das primitive Bewusstsein und das der hoheren Tiere ist ganz und gar geleitet von den Akten des Habenwollens, des Dranges und des Fliehens, des Vermeidens. Erst das geistige Bewusstsein macht sich den Interessen des vitalen Dranges gegenueber frei - und erst bei ihm geschieht es, dass so etwas wie ein Erkenntnisverhaeltnis zustande kommt. Damit aber sind im entwickelten Bewusstsein die anderen Formen des transzendenten Aktes nicht aufgehoben."

Cf. also: IDEM, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie", in op. cit., I, p. 129: "There are many transcendent acts. Loving and willing are of this kind. They are directed towards a real person, towards something real in the real world; experience, expectation, fear, hope, are directed towards the current of events — even their errors are chained to it. Cognition — and, to be sure, on all its levels, from perception upwards to investigation — is
subject's consciousness. A grouping of cognition with the immanent conscious acts leads to error. Therefore, it must be understood that the cognitive act transcends.

only one among the transcendent, conscious acts and it is neither the very first nor the fundamental act. Cognition presupposes and requires those mentioned other acts. Cognition is related to the world which the other acts disclose and in its own beginning, it serves the other acts. Later cognition attains its independence from these acts.


18 Cf. Nicolai HARTMANN, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, p. 15: "Kant... reduced everything to an affection of the senses through the Ding-an-sich (the-thing-as-such). He failed to trace the aporias which are contained in this position. The transcendental aesthetics, too, touches only on the apriori element of sensuality. Nevertheless, so much is clear that Kant recognized very well the transcen­
dental relation in the sense data and took it seriously. — Younger theories ignore this relation and therewith begins the distortion of the problem of cognition. This decline has led on the one hand to psychologism, on the other hand to logicism. To the latter belong all those interpretations which identify cognition with judgment — regardless of how these theories may differ otherwise. Thinkers such as Natorp, Cassirer, Rickert, Husserl, and Heidegger succumbed in this regard to the same error. They opposed the same psychologism which shared with their logical theories the misjudging of the transcendence in the phenomenon of cognition."

"... Kant... fuehrte alles zurueck auf die Affektion
Neither the subject as such, nor the object as such are transcending. The objects remain always "without" (extra-mental); the subject remains always "within" (in itself) in the entire cognitive process. It is the act of cognition — accomplished by the subject — which transcends the subject's limit. As a rule every transcendent act is connected with the subject from one side only. Its other end transcends the subject. The latter connects with the real which becomes through it the object.19

Actually man is in connection or relation with his environment through numerous such acts. Every action, for example, is a transcendent act. But in contrast to cognition —

19 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung", in op. cit., I, p. 21: "... mit seiner einen Seite am Subjekt, ragt mit der anderen darüber hinaus; mit ihr haftet er am Seienden, das durch ihn zum Objekt wird."
which leaves the object unchanged, although the effect of
the object becomes "registered" in the subject — action
seeks to alter the object. Likewise does willing which
nourishes always the inclination to seize the extramental
world in order to accomplish something in it. The direction
of these acts flows from within, that is from the subject to
the world of the objects. But there are other acts, too,
which move in the opposite direction, and are nevertheless
transcendent acts. The source of these acts is an extran­
tmental (extrasubjective) object, as is the case, for
instance, with the act of experience, suffering (Erleiden),
sympathy, empathy, compassion, and with all the acts of
cognition. In all of these cases an object with its deter­
mining effect is received. In the phenomenon of cognition,
too, there is always a relation between an object and a
subject: a being which is recognized and a being which
recognizes. Both are beings, both anchor in being. The
something which is recognized becomes first of all through
cognition something that stands opposite (= object) which
means the something becomes objectified for a subject by
the cognitive relation and within this relation.

This fact causes Hartmann to ask whether anything
in the existential mode of the objectified something becomes
changed through such a relation of cognition, or whether the
existential mode of the object turns into a pure objective mode.
The answer is clear: Cognition cannot and does not change the existential mode of the object. The existential mode of every recognized object remains a "being-in-itself" (Ansichsein).

However, in regard to the transcendent character of the phenomenon of cognition one has to understand that "cognition is the objection (= objectification) of an existent to a subject, the turning-into-object of being." 20

In such a context, "transcendent" always means, according to Hartmann, transcendere or "crossing over". But it is significant that "transcendent" is predicated of the act; it is not predicated of the objects of the act. "Transcendent" is predicated of the functional mode of cognition but not of the cognitive object.

Hartmann presents this transcendence in a diagram:

20 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung", in op. cit., p. 20: "Erkenntnis ist die Objektion eines Seienden an ein Subjekt, Objektwerdung des Seins."
Empirical awareness

Subject

Concept, Idea

Empirical object

Object

The subject stands opposite of the object (confronts the object). Cognition is nothing else but the coherence, the relation between subject and object. Consciousness and the object, only the two together amount to the total real world. If one takes as basic phenomenon the direction of intention from consciousness to the object then the essential character (of cognition) is seen, namely, that the limit of the consciousness is transcended. Therefore, cognition is a "transcendent act". "Transcendent" in this sense (or application) does not contradict the meaning of transcendere (stepping across), but it differs in regard to the usual application to transcendent objects distinguished from immanent objects, for the objects do not transcend a borderline, but their acts transcend.

Hartmann recognizes therewith as the fundamental phenomenon of cognition: "the grasping of something". This basic phenomenon, however, must still be analyzed into its elements which are so essential that — if they remain unnoticed — the reknown errors of the philosophical schools

22 Cf. Nicolai HARTMANN, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung", in op. cit., p. 17: "One had been accustomed to understand cognition either as a conscious act, or as a logical construct (judgment). The proper meaning of "grasping" (comprehending) of something had submerged in oblivion. In regard to this fact logicism was in no way safer than psychologism. Logicism considered cognition a logical structure. In the judgment, one possessed the closed-in unity of the content which was not in need of a relation beyond itself to a real object. ... This position permitted a purely immanent theory of the sciences. But the problem of truth (verification) — asking for the accord with the object as such which had to be comprehended — became superfluous. Even phenomenology did not progress beyond this theory. In phenomenology, the relationship between act and object was considered necessary to every awareness (Bewusstsein von), but the object was here only an "intentional object", not an object of cognition. Consequently, the object of imagination became undifferentiated from the object of experience (empirical object). In every one of these positions the relationship between subject and object appeared as a perfect correlation. Therefore, it was impossible to separate the object from the subject and to see it independent from the act of cognition as a real being:

"Man hatte sich gewöhnmt, Erkenntnis entweder als Bewusstseinsakt, oder als logisches Seinsgebilde (Urteil) zu verstehen. Den eigentlichen Sinn des "Erfassens von etwas" hatte man ganz aus den Augen verloren. Der Logizismus war hierin um nichts besser als der Psychologismus. Fuer ihn fiel Erkenntnis mit logischer Struktur zusammen. Im Urteil hatte man die in sich geschlossene Inhaltsseinheit, die einer Beziehung aus sich hinaus auf reale Gegenstände gar nicht bedurfte. Die Wissenschaftstheorie liess sich auf dieser Basis rein immanent halten. Aber ein Wahrheitsproblem als Frage nach der Uebereinstimmung mit einem Gegenstande, der als solcher erfasst werden sollte, wurde dann uebberfluessig. Auch die Phaenomenologie hat nicht wesentlich andere
may originate as proved by history. Hartmann begins his analysis of the phenomenon of cognition with an investigation of these elements:

1. "Being-subject (Subjektsein) of an object is different from being-object (Objektsein) for a subject."23 The function of both of these elements is essentially different, for

a) the subject (= a being endowed with intellect or consciousness) actualizes the transcendent act of cognition;

b) the object affects the subject:

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Act
Subject --------> Object
Effect
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2. These two functional roles in the relation are not interchangeable, for

a) the subject comprehends (grasps) the object;

b) the object is comprehensible and is comprehended, or the object is intelligible and is understood.


23 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 44: "Subjektsein für das Objekt ist ein anderès als das Objektsein für das Subjekt."
Hartmann describes the "grasping" as:

"the subject's reaching beyond its sphere, a reaching into the sphere of the object — which is a transcendent and heterogeneous sphere in regard to the subject — a seizure of the determinations of the object within the sphere of the object..., a bringing-in and an inclusion of the comprehended determinations within the sphere of the subject." 24

3. The subject, by accomplishing the act of cognition, has necessarily to transcend by its act, that is, it must "leave itself". But in order to become aware of the determinations of the object, the subject must function within its own sphere. Therefore, according to Hartmann, the function of cognition presents itself as

a threefold act of the subject:
- a transcending,
- a being-without-itself,
- a returning to itself. 25

4. The object remains untouched by this subjective act. It does not become immanent through this act but remains the something in the homogeneous existential sphere. The object's determinations through which the object affects the subject do not become shifted through "being-comprehended" and "being-included" in the sphere of the subject. 26

24 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 44: "ein Hinausgreifen des Subjekts über seine Sphäre, ein Hineinübergreifen in die ihm transzendente und heterogene Sphäre des Objekts, ein Ergreifen der Bestimmtheiten des Objekts in dieser Sphäre..., ein Einbeziehen oder Einholen der ergreifenen Bestimmtheiten in die Subjektsphäre."

25 Ibid.: "... als Heraustreten, Aussersichsein, und in sich Zurückkehren des Subjekts."

26 Ibid.: "werden durch ihr Erfassstsein und Einbezugensein in die Subjektsphäre nicht verschoben."
The bringing-in to the subject (collecting) of the determinations of the object is not an inclusion of the object itself, but "only the repetition of the determinations of the object re-occurring in a construct which becomes the content of the subject's consciousness, namely, in the cognitive construct or the image of the object."27

5. Accordingly, change takes place

a) not on or in the object: the object remains (and behaves) indifferent towards its recognition;

b) but in the subject through the function of cognition.

"On the object no novel phenomenon occurs; in the subject, however, there originates the object awareness with its content, the image of the object."28

Thus, Hartmann sees the "something of comprehension" as one of the foundation pillars of the phenomenon of cognition. He fixes its limit through what is proper to this "something of comprehension": the characteristic "being-in-itself". Prior to any presentation of a being as an object is the object's "being-in-itself", for

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27 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 44: "Nur die Wiederkehr der Bestimmtheiten des Objekts an einem inhaltlichen Gebilde im Subjekt, dem Erkenntnisgebilde oder dem "Bilde" des Objekts."

28 Ibid.: "Am Objekt entsteht nichts Neues. Im Subjekt aber entsteht das Gegenstandsbewusstsein mit seinem Inhalt, dem "Bilde" des Objekts."
All cognition aims according to its nature at something in existence inasmuch as this being exists prior to cognition and independent from it. 29 If the object were not a being-in-itself, it would be possible to recognize whatever one wishes, just as one can think, or will what one wants to think, or to will. The in-itself-existence of the object is clear through the act of perception.

Nobody believes that the thing perceived comes into existence with the act of perception, for example, by a looking at it, or by a glance. The general knowledge is that the thing is and is before it is perceived. It is independent of perception. 30

29 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 44: "Alle Erkenntnis geht ihrem Wesen nach auf Seiendes, sofern es auch vor ihr und unabhängig von ihr besteht."
Cf. ibid., p. 51: "... The object's being in itself ... is first of all a mere gnoseological one; it neither does mean a "thing-as-such" (Ding-an-sich = ontological being-in-itself), nor a mere "ideal existence" (for example, a logical being-in-itself). It may be one of those, but it is not fixed to be the one or the other. The being-in-itself means — for the time being — rather a mere principal independence from the degree of recognition, and through it also from the subject on the whole."
"... Ansichsein des Gegenstandes... ist zunächst ein durchaus nur gnoseologisches; es bedeutet weder ein "Ding an sich" (ontologisches Ansichsein), noch ein bloss "ideales Sein" (z.B. ein logisches Ansichsein). Es kann beides bedeuten, ist aber nicht auf eines von ihnen festgelegt. Es bedeutet vielmehr vor der Hand nur die prinzipielle Unabhängigkeit vom Grade des Erkanntseins, und dadurch auch überhaupt vom Subjekt."

30 IDEM, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung", in op. cit., p. 18: "Niemand glaubt, dass der Gegenstand der Wahrnehmung erst in der Wahrnehmung (etwa im Hinsehen) (a.a.O. "durch Augenaufschlag") entsteht. Die Grundüberzeugung ist vielmehr durchweg, dass er vor allem Wahrnehmen und unabhängigg von ihm so ist, wie er ist."
Otherwise any relation of cognition to a given, that is to existents, would be untenable, and "every difference between comprehending and failing the object, or the difference between truth and error, would perish." The natural awareness of reality needs no proof when facing the real. It can be demonstrated on the phenomenon, that the object has a being-in-itself:

Cognition is the grasping (comprehending) of a being-in-itself; that is a relation between subject and existing object, or, more exactly a relation between the notion (concept) which the subject attains of something and the very something itself, inasmuch as the latter exists independently from the first.

Therefore, cognition is not a mere "phenomenon of consciousness", for the cognitive act crosses over, transcends consciousness. Cognition has its ontic roots in the object, and in the subject. Thus, it is evident that the problem of cognition is not only a gnoseological problem. It is a metaphysical problem too. This finding is now investigated under the aspects of the object and of the

31 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung", in op. cit., p. 18: "aller Unterschied von Treffen und Verfehlen, von Wahrheit und Irrtum waere hinfällig."

32 Ibid., p. 19: "Erkenntnis ist das Erfassen eines Ansichseienden... Relation zwischen Subjekt und seielndem Objekt, genauer, zwischen der Vorstellung, die das Subjekt von etwas hat, und dem etwas selbst, sofern dieses unabhängigg von ihr besteht."
subject. The previous inquiry showed that the being-in-itself (Ansichsein) of the object is an essential factor of the object. Hartmann stresses:

Any being (without exception) when becoming the object of cognition becomes an object posterior to its existence. There is no being whose essence is so constituted that it is necessarily object of a subject or of a consciousness. The "being-an-object" originates only when a subject appears on the plane of the world which recognizes the object and establishes a relationship of confrontation.\(^33\)

According to Hartmann, the notion of the "being-in-itself" of an object is at first

in no way an ontological concept, that is, this notion is not the same as the concept of "being-as-such", for it originates entirely from the gnoseological considerations. Hence, it is from the sphere — or formed in view — of the intentio obliqua.\(^34\)

But if the notion "object" stems from the aspect of the intentio obliqua or from reflection, then it is a gnoseological concept. Since some thinkers and schools disagree on

\(^{33}\) Nicolai HARTMANN, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, p. 17: "Alles Seiende wird, wenn es zum Gegenstande wird, erst nachträglich zum Gegenstand gemacht. Es gibt kein Seiendes, in dessen Wesen von Hause aus es laege, Gegenstand eines Bewusstseins zu sein. Es rückt erst durch das Auftreten des erkennenden Subjekts in der Welt in das Verhältnis des Gegenstehens ein."

\(^{34}\) Ibid., p. 152: "... Ansichsein ist durchaus kein ontologischer Begriff, es steht also dem des "Seienden als Seienden" in keiner Weise gleich. Er stammt voll und ganz aus erkenntnistheoretischen Erwägungen, ist in der Sichrichtung der intentio obliqua (= Reflexion) gebildet."
that point, Hartmann devotes some deliberations to the dis-

tinctions of gnoseological being-in-itself\textsuperscript{35} and ontological

being-in-itself.\textsuperscript{36} In his \textit{Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der

Erkenntnis}, he says:

the gnoseological being-in-itself signifies —

only the essential independence from the degree

cognition and therewith also from the subject

on the whole.\textsuperscript{37}

But this being-in-itself is essential for the gnoseological

relation because all object cognition necessarily means

some being independent from cognition. In this, Hartmann

sees the reason why cognition distinguishes its object from

the conceptual image of the object. "The latter has the

index of objectivity. The object shows the index of being-
in-itself."\textsuperscript{38} It is clear that the notion of "being-in-

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\textsuperscript{35} Nicolai HARTMANN, \textit{Zur Grundlegung...}, p. 51-53.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 58-60.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 51: "nur die prinzipielle Unabhängigkeit vom Grade des Erkanntseins und dadurch auch über-

haupt vom Subjekt."

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 52: "Die letztere trägt den Index
der "Objektivität", das Objekt den des "Ansichseins".

Cf. also IDEM, \textit{"Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Onto-

logie"}, in \textit{op. cit.}, p. 131-132: "The object of cognition

is by nature meta-objective. It is not absorbed or exhausted

by being an object; it consists independently from it and is

indifferent towards its own recognition as an object for a

subject. This circumstance is decisive for the position of

cognition and of the knower (man) in the world. On account

of such basic data, the subject and the object can no longer

be understood as correlative links (versus Husserl). For

the world considered as the sum total of all the (actual

and) possible objects, is incomparably older than man; man

— ontologically seen — is a late product of this world.
itself" — as Hartmann sees it — is "an expedient of reflection, a counter-concept to the notion of appearance or of the phenomenon of the object." Such a counter-concept occurs in the gnoseological relationship alone. The subsequent reflection or the intentio obliqua conditions the emergence or the development of the notion of being-in-itself in order to signify existence gnoseologically. Hence, the notion of being-in-itself designates independence within the gnoseological correlation.

Hence, first there was being in the world although there were not yet any intellectual beings, whose intellectual object being could have been. When homo sapiens appeared, very secondarily indeed, being became his intellectual object. Being an object is on the whole exterior to being as such. For the recognizing subject, however, the object is essential.


This independence, however, is unessential for the ontological being-in-itself, for if something is "in-itself" — that is, if something is subsistent in the ontological sphere — then it does not matter whether its existence is related to any other being such as perhaps to a real subject.\[40\]

With this neutrality or indifference, the ontological being-in-itself actually absorbs the gnoseological being-in-itself whereby it is directed not towards the subject, but towards being as being. Seen from the point of view of the subject, all being-in-itself becomes or is a being-for-me (Fuermichseiendes) or something that confronts me. Seen from the point of view of being as being both are identical, namely being. Hence, the ontological concept of being-in-itself returns here from the intentio obliqua to the intentio recta.\[41\]

In this point, however, gnoseology turns to ontology, therefore, Hartmann's phenomenology of cognition has only to indicate the facts.

\[40\] Nicolai HARTMANN, Zur Grundlegung..., p. 153: "... wenn etwas "an sich" ist - d.h. wenn es mitsamt seinem Sosein ein Dasein in seiner Seinssphaere hat - so ist es dafuer ganz gleichgueltig, ob dieses sein Dasein in Relation zu etwas anderem Seienden steht (also etwa zu einem realen Subjekt) oder nicht."

As a result of such an inquiry, Hartmann considers neither the subject the center of gravity in the phenomenon of cognition nor the gnoseological relation, for the real center of gravity lies neither between subject and object, nor beyond the subject, but it is found beyond the object: in the transsubjective (sphere).  

Therewith, Hartmann expresses phenomenologically the emergence of the deeper ontic relation which is found beyond the gnoseological relation. The latter is embedded in the ontic relation for the ontic sphere not only encompasses gnoseological elements: subject, object, gnoseological relation — it transcends all of them, stretches beyond all of them. For all of these cognitive factors have not only their own existence, that is their own ontological gravity, but are embedded in the sphere of being on the whole. This is the reason why subject, object, and cognition are not totally exhausted within the gnoseological sphere. As existents, they tower beyond knowledge, or they reach the gnoseological sphere from their existential locus. These factors of cognition have also their surrounding which they bring into the relation of cognition. Hartmann

42 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 58: "Der Schwerpunkt liegt weder zwischen Subjekt und Objekt, noch auch (nur) über das Subjekt hinaus, sondern über das Objekt hinaus: im Transobjektiven."
sees this arrangement of the data and he sketches them accordingly in his diagram. On his scheme the gnoseological and the ontological spheres are not the same. The ontological sphere encompasses the gnoseological sphere. In reality, the sphere of being is not only prior to, but also deeper than the sphere of cognition. As a consequence, the relation between both of these spheres is obvious.

DIAGRAM VI.
THE SPHERES OF COGNITION AND OF BEING

Sphere of Transobjective Being

Circle of Objects

Subject

Limit of Objectification

Limit of Intelligibility

The limits of cognition are found within being. The limits of being stretch far beyond cognition. The radius of cognition reaches only from the subject to the being objectified at any given time. Only in the realm of

43 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 205.
cognition being becomes objectified. The subject, however, is an existent. It follows that through cognition and through objectification a gnoseological zone is cut out of being, and the things which are taken into that zone of cognition, form the "circle of objects" around the subject. Theoretically and potentially the circle of objects is unlimited. However, being remains indifferent towards cognition. As being, it does not resist recognition. In actual cognition, however, the sector of the existential sphere which becomes known, or which becomes the gnoseological sphere, is relatively limited, for it becomes the zone of objectified being, surrounded or framed by the zone of transobjective being.

Through such a synopsis, the way is opened to correctly arrange cognition within the total coherence of life and being. There was a time when man thought the world was nothing else but the opposite pole of the knower, namely mere object. Now it is seen differently, cognition itself is a sector, a piece of the whole world, a link and truly a link of a chain of many other pieces, which are prior to and independent from cognition.45

44 Naturally there is a resistance against "being recognized". For instance, certain plants and animals close themselves when touched. Animals escape when approached. A child "hides" something when detected in doing wrong. But such resistance does not occur by reason of being, for what is can be recognized as being.

45 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte...", in op. cit., p. 138: "Damit erst ist das Feld frei fuer die richtige Einordnung der Erkenntnis in den gesamten Lebens - und Seinszusammenhang der Welt. Einst glaubte man die Welt sei nichts als das Gegenglied des erkennenden Subjekts, ihr
At the same time, this arrangement causes another insight, namely, that cognition is not static but dynamic and "a different one in content for every new level of position." This level changes and changes in one and the same subject, therefore, the sector of the objectified is another one for the naive position, another for the scientific one, and for the scientific view it is again another one than for the philosophical position.

The quality of cognition, however, does not alter the general validity of the fundamental relationship between the objectified and the transobjective. Hartmann calls this range of the cognitive relation of the subject to its surrounding in its total circumference the "circle of objects". The circle of objects or the limited zone of the objectified existents is, however, on its part again surrounded or enclosed by the unlimited sphere of being. This latter sphere is the not yet disclosed or the still sealed sphere to knowledge. It is the truly transobjective sphere. The transobjective sphere is not sealed off for ever to

"Objekt". Jetzt sieht es umgekehrt aus: was sie sich zum Objekt zu machen weitz ist nur ein Ausschnitt aus der Welt, die Erkenntnis selbst aber ist ein Stueck der Welt, ein Glied, und zwar ein vom vielen anderen Stuecken getragenes, die alle ihr gegenueber primaere sind und ein selbstaendiges Bestehen haben."

46 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzüge..., p. 204: "...fuer jede Hoehe des Standpunktes inhaltlich eine andere."

47 Ibid.: "... fuer die naive Einstellung ein anderer wie fuer die wissenschaftliche, und dieser wiederum ein anderer wie fuer die philosophische."

48 Ibid.
cognition, but it is the necessary precondition on the side
of the objects for the progress of cognition.

This second limit, too, does not exist as such.
It is given for the subject only. It functions as
a limit in regard to the subject's ability to move
the limit of objection.49

Thus, the relatively limited circle of objects emerges from
the unlimited ocean of being which in itself remains indif-
ferent or neutral to cognition. The circle of objects, as
part of this ocean of being, is recognized, hence, objecti-
fied and related to the subject. Hartmann summarizes:
"Obviously, the ratio cognoscendi... presupposes a ratio
essendi, an existential relation between the subject and its
objects."50

Although both the object and the subject belong to
the identical sphere of being, nevertheless, they constitute
within it the counterpoles of an identical sphere of cogni-
tion. The object and the circle of objects have been pre-
sented so far from various aspects. Now we have to turn to

49 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 205: "Auch
diese zweite Grenze besteht nicht an sich, sondern nur fuer
das Subjekt. Sie hat nur den Sinn einer Grenze seiner (des
Subjekts) Faehigkeit, die Objektionsgrenze zu verschieben."

50 Ibid.: "... die ratio cognoscendi... setzt
offenbar eine ratio essendi, ein Seinsverhaeltnis zwischen
dem Subjekt und seinen Objekten schon voraus."
the subject in order to render the other of the two poles
of cognition intelligible and demonstrate the metaphysical
grounding of both.

The subject, too, is an existent. As an existent
and as an independent being, it is situated in the homo­
geneous existential sphere in which the objects are. There­
fore, to the subject, too, does apply what has been found in
regard to the object: If the subject would be nothing else
but the counterpole of the objects within the gnoseological
relation, we would have to assume that it becomes totally
merged or absorbed in this relation. In regard to the
objects, we saw that the objects transcend this relation,
that they are prior to this relation, and that they are more
than objects within this relation for they are in themselves.
They root existentially and essentially in being, display
their various functions, and they have many relations to
other existents beyond and without the gnoseological rela­
tion to a subject. Can that be said also in regard to the
subject?

The subject, too, stretches beyond the gnoseological
relation to its object. It is not exhausted by this rela­
tion. The subject — just as well as the object — is exist­
tentially and essentially rooted in being. It is not only
a cognizant being, a knower; it is prior to cognition an
existent, a being who wills, desires, loves, acts, feels, thinks and reflects. The subject is a person capable of many other acts and functions than to cognize and to know. 

It is clear: the subject as well as its objects is interwoven in numerous primary connections of being, of life, and of the cosmos. It is interlaced in many relations which precede cognition. Hence, how could the subject merge totally in the gnoseological relation?

It is possible to declare these data a semblance as some of the speculative positions do. But then one has to explain the semblance... the critique of those positions has shown that such an explanation is unsuccessful, ... that it regresses and confuses the problem still more.51

In restricting the subject's being to a mere knowing, that is, in making it a mere gnoseological subject, it becomes uprooted from its original existential ground. The theories developing from this are numerous and shown in the history of philosophy.

Therefore, the problem and its roots must be investigated and it must be asked in how far the gnoseological relation is possible between a subject

51 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 319-320: "Man kann diesen Sachverhalt fuer Schein erklären, wie ein Teil der spekulativen Standpunkte tut; aber dann gilt es den Schein zu erklären. Und die Kritik jener Standpunkte hat gezeigt, dass diese Erklärung auf keine Weise gelingt, ... das Problem nur verschiebt und verdunkelt."
which is not only a knower, and an object, which is not only a known, and which are the requirements of such a relation.52

Hartmann's scheme of the spheres of being and cognition53 shows that these spheres can neither become identified, nor separated, that the sphere of being lies before, above, beneath the sphere of cognition, and that the latter is embedded in the first. From this it becomes evident that it is equally impossible to clarify the problem of the subject without consideration of these data, as it is impossible to explain the problem of the object without seeing it rooted in these connections. Consequently, the entire problem of transcendence depends on these data.

In regard to the object, these data become comprehensible through the object's interlacing with the circle of objects and the transobjective,

but in reference to the subject these existential relations become comprehensible through the fact that the subject itself contains principles, whose functions and mode of being the subject does not

52 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 320: "Es gilt daher das Problem wieder an der Wurzel aufzugreifen und zu untersuchen, inwieweit die Erkenntnisrelation auch zwischen einem Subjekt, das nicht nur Erkennendes, und einem Objekt, das nicht nur Erkanntes ist, moeglich ist und wie die Bedingungen einer solchen Relation beschaffen sein muessen."

53 Cf. p. 159 in this study.
penetrate, that is, principles whose being evident-
ly is another than the being of consciousness.\textsuperscript{54}

The existential sphere of the subject "seen from the point
of view of the consciousness towards within"\textsuperscript{55} transcends
the subject itself. Besides it furnishes transsubjective
conditions which keep the subject rooted in a "sphere of
transsubjective existential relations."\textsuperscript{56} Thus, the homo-
geneity of the subjective and the objective sphere of being
is at once recognizable, since "the subject understands
itself as being existence in the same way as the object
is."\textsuperscript{57} Therefore, it is clear that both the cognizing sub-
ject and the recognized object are "embedded in a common
sphere of being in which they are perfectly embraced... and
conditioned by multilateral relations."\textsuperscript{58} According to
Hartmann from this situation out

\textsuperscript{54} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 231: "Am
Sujet aber werden diese Seinsrelationen daran fassbar,
dass es selbst Prinzipien enthält, deren Funktionen - und
Seinsweise es nicht durchschaut, Prinzipien also, deren Sein
offenbar ein anderes als das des Bewusstseins ist."

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.:} "... einer Sphäre transsubektiver
Seinsrelationen..."

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid.:} "... in eine gemeinsame Seinssphäre
eingebettet und von deren mannigfachen Relationen...
vollkommen umschlossen, getragen und bedingt sind."
the relation of cognition which we know... as a one-sided determination of the subject by the object..., must be understood as one which is capturing the multiple connection of being, or as exactly the relation which appears in the phenomenon of cognition.99

Such statements show Hartmann as an ontologist who brings his theory of cognition with the given, who weighs and measures reality and the cognition of reality. Hartmann himself declares:

"What at first looked as being of great disadvantage proves, in closer analysis, an invaluable advantage, and appears to be the naturally given practicable way of the gnoseological research. ... The independent existential character of subject and object is that which takes both of them away from isolation and shows them joined in the nexus of relations. Isolation exists only for the most restricted horizon of subjection. The independence of isolation is a relative one, that is one which is insuperable for ratio only.60

In these data, Hartmann anchors his theory of irrationality, too.

59 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 231: "... die Erkenntnisrelation, die wir... als "einseitige Bestimmung des Subjektes durch das Objekt" kennen, ist nur als eine von vielen Seinsrelationen verstanden, naemlich eben als diejenige, die im Erkenntnisphäenomen in Erscheinung tritt."

60 Ibid.: "Was zuerst wie ein schwerer Nachteil aussah, erweist sich... bei tieferem Eindringen als ein unschaetzerbarer Vorzug, ja als ganz naturlich gegebener gangbarer Weg der gnoseologischen Forschung. Gerade der selbstandige Seinscharakter des Subjekts und des Objekts ist es, der sie beide aus ihrer Isoliertheit heraushebt und sie in ein Gefuege von Beziehungen eingegliedert zeigt... Die Isoliertheit besteht nur fuer den engsten Gesichtskreis der Subjektgebundenheit. Ihre Selbstandigkeit ist eine bloss relative, nur fuer die ratio unueberbrueckbare."
As long as one maintains the impossibility of irrational relations, naturally one is cut off from the insight into this ontological situation. In the moment, however, when one grasps that relations have not to be more rational than substrates and that they... are as neutral towards intelligibility as all the other existents, then the ontological condition becomes clearly seen.  

Therefore, Hartmann considers also

the ontological understanding of the irrational in its principles a necessary condition for the understanding of the basic gnoseological relation of subject and object within the sphere of being. Evaluating the theories of knowledge, he points out:

this sphere is not a constructed, clear-cut unity as is the one of speculative monism, but it is a relationally restricted and divided multiplicity. Theory cannot judge about the sphere’s principle of unity. All the inconsistencies of monistic attempts to derive multiplicity from unity are insufficient. It is likewise with the open systems of dualism (for instance, the Cartesian dualism) which rest upon a similar mistaking of the sphere, namely upon the purely subjectivistic isolation of subject and object, which, to be sure, cannot be avoided on a certain level of speculation but which is easily removed.

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61 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 231: "... solange man an der Unmöglichkeit irrationaler Relationen festhält, ist einem der Ausblick auf diesen ontologischen Sachverhalt freilich verschlossen. Er öffnet sich in dem Augenblick, wo man einsieht, dass Relationen um nichts rationaler zu sein brauchen als Substrate, und dass sie... ebenso gleichzueitig gegen die Erkennbarkeit dastehen, wie alles andere Ansichstende."

62 Ibid., p. 322: "Das ontologische Verständnis für das Irrationale in den Prinzipien als bedingend für das Verständnis des gnoseologischen Grundverhältnisses..."
ontologically. Through a removal of that isolation all these speculative theories, and those idealistic and realistic theories, too, which try to overcome the subject-object dualism by constructed means, become superfluous. Constructed means are not necessary... because the problem for the solution of which they had been constructed does not exist. Subject and object are originally joined in the sphere of being.°3

Hartmann's theory then is based on the fact that "the subject is an existent among other existents,"64 and that the other being (= object) affects the subject by conditioning and determining it. For

there where everything is joined, and mutually conditioned and determined, there it would be unintelligible if precisely the subject would not be included in the net of these relations and if the subject would be exempt from being determined by the other beings.°5

63 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 322: "Diese Sphaere ist nicht eine konstruierte, punktuelle Einheit, wie die des spekulativen Monismus, sondern eine relational gebundene und gegliederte Mannigfaltigkeit, über deren Einheitsprinzip sich die Theorie durchaus kein Urteil gestatten kann. Alle Unstimmigkeiten der monistischen Ableitungsversuche des Mannigfaltigen aus einer Einheit fallen daher hier von vornherein fort; ebenso wie der offene Dualismus (z.B. der der Cartesianer) welcher auf aehnlicher Verfehlung der Sphaere beruht, naemlich auf rein subjektivistischer Isolierung von Subjekt und Objekt, die freilich auf einer gewissen Stufe der Spekulation nicht zu vermeiden, aber ontologisch leicht aufhebar ist. Mit der Aufhebung dieser Isolierung fallen zugleich alle spekulativen Theorien als ueberfluessig hin, die den Dualismus von Subjekt und Objekt auf konstruktivem 'ege zu ueberbruecken suchen, sowohl die idealisti- schen als die realistischen... Sie sind... gegenstandslos, weil das Problem, zu dessen Losung sie entworfen wurden, nicht besteht. Subjekt und Objekt sind schon urspruenglich verkneupft."

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., p. 322-323: "... wo alles in Relationen steht und alles durcheinander bedingt und bestimmt ist, da waere es unverstaendlich, wenn gerade das Subjekt in das
Such deliberations concerning the subject led Hartmann to his definition of cognition: cognition consists in the process that an "in-and-for-itself existent", a subject, becomes "determined by another existent, the object" on the intentional, that is on the gnoseological level. The determining element remains thereby unchanged in its own being-in-itself. The object does not become totally objectified, it rather remains in a certain sense supra-objective. The subject, however, becomes gnoseologically enriched and intentionally determined by the object, more exactly, by the content of the object. Hence, the relation of cognition means ontologically the unilateral modification of a subject by an object which for itself remains totally untouched by or indifferent in regard to the entire event. One is tempted to say that cognition is a one way street, for it is "a unilateral, irreversible determination of the subject by the object." Not the latter becomes determined through the subject and its cognition — it remains before and after cognition the same — but the agent itself becomes "impressed"; the subject becomes modified through what is

Geblecht dieser Relationen nicht einbezogen und nicht durch anderes Seiendes bestimmt sein sollte."

66 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 323.
67 Ibid., p. 206.
recognized. Therefore, it is justified to speak here with Hartmann of a "sphere of content of the subject itself." As a matter of fact, on the side of the subject, a "sphere of images is facing the circle of objects." These images are formally subjective images or constructs, that is, they originate and exist in the subject. They are with the subject and wither away with the subject in spite of their transcendent (non-immanent) origin. But truly they result from the object-reality, or from the object-effect upon the subject through the subject's act of cognition.

Materially, they stem from the object's sphere. Hence, they are not subjective in content. Their content is the cognized object, therefore, the content is materially objective. Consequently, it is clear, cognition happens in the subject; through this a gnoseological counter-sphere of object-images in the subject originates. But since the subject itself is an existent, this gnoseological counter-sphere of object-images in the subject is rooted in the ontological sphere, too. It follows that through cognition an entrance is opened for the subject into the being of the object. Therefore, the subject, or

68 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 208.
69 Ibid.
the knower is to be defined ontologically as that being in which this relation which connects the subject with the other beings, produces a modification which is typical for such a relation, that is, a sphere in which the homologous links of this unilaterally determined relation join, a sphere of modifications which resemble their counterlinks scattered in all directions of reality. 70

It appears, then, that the sphere of the subject is not one of psychological limitations. Empirical psychology deals more or less with the functional only, with factors and phenomena of the stimulus-response relation. Rational psychology, however, deals with the mode and being of the psychic; it asks for essence and existence of the soul as such, which is a concern with the ontic sphere, a sphere prior to all the stimulus-response relations, prior even to the modi. It is the existential sphere of the objects and the existential sphere of the subject with its cognition by which being becomes ennobled. In this situation, therefore, the subject becomes visible as "that summit or integer being where being reflects itself." 71

70 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 209: "... das Erkennende ontologisch zu definieren als dasjenige Seinsgebilde, in welchem diese Relation, die es allseitig mit anderen Seinsgebilden verbindet, die fuer sie charakteristischen Modifikationen hervorruft; eine Sphaere also, in welcher sich die homologen Glieder dieser einseitig bestimmenden Relation zusammenfinden, eine Sphaere von Modifikationen, die den allseitig im Sein verstreuten Gegengliedern entsprechen, sie repraesentieren und gleichsam wieder-spiegeln."

71 Ibid.: "... derjenige Punkt im Sein, in welchem dieses in sich selbst reflektiert."
THE GNOSEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE

Summing up, we find the subject embedded in the same sphere of being in which its own objects are found, so much so that this or that subject even can become an object of cognition of other subjects.

Therefore, in this very sphere of being which comprises everything, the subject excels by its very nature. It is the "highest, the most individualized, the most different," and the most complex being. Through cognition, the subject receives such a unique superiority which is found in no other sensible being. Cognition, namely, expands the sphere of the subject according to the measure of the known objects within the subject to "a multifarious world of representations of being as such." This closed sphere of the subjective gnoseological content,

which develops in universal relation, reflection, and representation, and forms in itself a counter-world to the existing real world, is the sphere of objective content in the cognizing consciousness. Its inner aspect is the consciousness itself.

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72 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 209.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid., p. 182: "... streng geschlossene Inhaltsphäre, die in allseitiger Relation, Reflexion und Reprasentation entsteht und in sich eine Gegenwelt der seienden Welt bildet, ist die "objektive" Inhaltssphäre des erkennenden Bewusstseins. Ihr Innenaspekt ist das Bewusstsein selbst."

Cf. also, p. 209-210: "The reflection in itself is the ontological scheme of the intellectual consciousness; representation is the scheme of the relation of the known.
The uniqueness of the subject in the midst of other beings is clear, for the other existents are the subject's objects; being-an-object, however, means (in the original sense) to Independent from that is its coming into existence. Its proceeding from conditions can be profoundly irrational. In as far as they must be real conditions and inasmuch as only these can determine an existing subject in its existential function, namely, to represent the real, these conditions, too, belong to the ontological problem. In this sense a desideratum of an ontology of consciousness is given. To what a degree such a desideratum can be fulfilled, that is open to question. But it must be visualized by the theory of cognition as the highest point of the problem of the subject."

"Die Reflexion in sich ist das ontologische Schema des erkennenden Bewusstseins; Repraesentation ist das Schema der Beziehung von Erkannten. Wie sie zustandekommt, ist davon unabhaengig. Ihr Hervorgehen aus Bedingungen kann tief irrational sein... Sofern sie... letzten Endes seiende Bedingungen sein mussen und nur als solche ein seierendes Subjekt in seiner Seinsfunktion, der Repraesentation des Seienden bestimmen koennen, gehoeren auch sie dem ontologischen Problem an. In diesem Sinne besteht das Desiderat einer Ontologie des Bewusstseins. Wieweit ein solches Desiderat erfuellbar waere, kommt hier nicht in Frage, aber als oberster Gesichtspunkt des Subjektproblems muss es der Erkenntnistheorie vorschweben duerfen."

This desideratum of an ontology of consciousness would be an interesting onset to other philosophical theses, especially now in the era of the theory of noospheric consciousness of humanity as held by Teilhard de Chardin, Julius Huxley, Paul Overhage, N. Nartmann, K. Rahner, and a steadily increasing number of scientists, philosophers and theologians. A. Portmann says about Teilhard de Chardin: "He stresses that this privileged evolution of the humane creates much more than a new species of mammals because it establishes a new sphere on earth whose basic character is reflection, and it seems that here emerges a new meeting ground of the sciences and philosophy in the future." Adolf PORTMANN, Der Pfeil des Humanen (The Arrow of the Humane), Freiburg-Muenchen, K. Alber, 1962, p. 30.

to-become-reflect. Objection in this sense is the strict correlate to the representation in a subject. The arrangement of the spheres depends on the relation of the objects to the subject (according to the measure of the subject's understanding) and it exists in this order only for the subject within the ontic sphere. The circle of objects "is nothing else but that fraction of being which comes to a representation in the subject, that is the fraction of being which is reflected." 75 Therewith the subject itself becomes a gnoseological cosmos — depending at any given time on its own noetic potential and activity, — a "modulus of reflection" 76 of those objects which transcend the subjective sphere by their effect on the subject. Therefore, whatever is known of being is attained by cognition.

Hartmann anticipates 77 that such an interpretation will find a certain opposition because it assumes a transcendental relation of causality between object and knower, for the image, resulting in the subject, is understood as effect of the object on the subject. Object and subject,

75 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 210: "... ist nichts als derjenige Bruchteil des Seienden, der im Subjekt zur Repräsentation gelangt, der also reflektiert wird."

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid., p. 323.
however, are heterogeneous poles, thus it would follow that
they are heterogeneous as cause and effect, too.

Besides, it is difficult to see how "a mental
construct should be the effect of something that is extra-
mental." 78

In meeting these objections, Hartmann explains two
misunderstandings which obscure the facts.

Firstly: A causal relationship cannot be refuted on
the basis of mere transintelligibility. In the realm of
nature the cause-effect relation remains "throughout unintel-
ligible, that is, the function, the "how" of the generation
of the effect, the structure of the causal nexus, and the
proper essence of this dependence remain irrational. The
law of efficient causality as universal formula, however,
is generally accepted by the natural sciences, at least
hypothetically.

By the same privilege then, one may consider
valid — at least the ontological hypothesis of the
theory of cognition — a determination which trans-
cends the object and becomes an object-image in a
subject, regardless of whether this determination
of the subject by the object is understandable or
not. 79

78 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 323.
79 Ibid., p. 323-324: "Mit gleichem Recht darf man
also eine Determination, die sich vom Objekt auf ein Sub-
jectgebilde heruber erstreckt als ontologische Hypothese
der Erkenntnistheorie gelten lassen, unbeachtet dessen, ob
diese Determination des Subjekts durch das Objekt verstaend-
lich oder unverstaendlich ist."
Secondly, this noetic determination is not one which is totally merged in the causal relation. Such "is the case with the dependence of space-temporal phases of certain processes from which its formulation originated." But in regard to the noetic image in the consciousness, this object-image is — apart from its psychological genesis — an adimensional one. Therefore, it cannot be the effect of a four-dimensional object or cause.

Furthermore, we may remember that there are other determining relations, too, besides efficient causality. For instance, there is the relation of reason and logical consequence as demonstrated in mathematical theorems. There is also the relation of means and purpose (finality). But, these relations do not provide a solution regarding the gnoseological subject-object relation. How then have we to deal with this problem?

In cognition the situation is that subject and object — although heterogeneous as such — belong nevertheless to the ontological sphere. Due to this homogeneous sphere of being then, and in it the phenomenon of the gnoseological relation is possible.

80 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 324: "... passt fuer die Abhaengigkeit raumzeitlicher Prozess-Stadien, als deren Formulierung es angenommen wird."
In the ontological realm many different beings are connected with and related to one another by reason of the all-embracing ens. The type of determination which prevails in this realm, of course, can be much more universal than the type of determination within the causal nexus.81

In seeing that the object and the subject exist pre-noetically and ontologically in a homogeneous realm, to Hartmann one of the gnoseological difficulties becomes transparent. This is not so, however, in a philosophy of immanence, inasmuch as such a philosophy operates simply immanently. Hartmann's theory that an extra-mental object can determine a recognizing subject in such a way that this determination becomes the representation of the extramental object in the subject must appear to representatives of any philosophy of immanence as a theory of "extreme absurdity". Realistically seen, however, it is clear that a mere ontological relation, which conditions and connects object and subject, suffices to impress the object's traits upon the structure formed in the subject (= objeget image); and to make this image "objective".82

81 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 325: "Der Typus von Determination, der auf ontologischem Gebiet in der alles umfassenden Seinssphäre waltet und die nur durch den Seinscharakter als solchen verbundenen, im übrigen aber mannigfach heterogenen Seinsgebilde miteinander verknüpft, kann selbstverständlich nur ein viel allgemeinerer sein als der des Kausalnexus."

82 Ibid., p. 326: "Ein bloß ontologisches Bedingungsverhältnis zwischen Objekt und Subjekt genügt, um die Züge des Objekts auf ein Subjektgebilde zu übertragen und dieses dadurch "objectiv" zu machen."
Summing up Hartmann's inquiry of the gnoseological condition, we find in cognition:

Firstly: The transcendent subject faces the object.
Secondly: The transcendent object faces the subject.
Thirdly: Cognition as such is transcendent.

This particularity of confrontation or transcendence (= objectivity in the original sense) is shown by every object determination. The knower knows of this transcendence, for normally the knower does not consider these determinations his own. He distinguishes them as those of the object. Indeed, the entire cognitive structure in the subject is objective, for "objective is not the object as such but the image of the object in the intellect inasmuch as it shows the traits of the object."\(^83\) In being conscious the subject knows of both data: of the object and of the object-image, for the subject discriminates the objective image in itself from the extramental object. Furthermore, the subject is aware of itself and of its relationship to the object. In this then, properly speaking, the object awareness consists.

\(^83\) Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 48: "Objectiv ist... nicht das Objekt, sondern das Bild des Objekts im Bewusstsein, sofern es die Zuege des Objekts traegt."
Under such conditions, the object and the object-image, therefore, are not understood as one although they are identical in their content.84

In describing the phenomenon of cognition, Hartmann states four distinct notes or concepts of cognition of which each one expresses a complex of essential characteristics of the gnoseological problem. These concepts, although they overlap, they are not identical as the enumeration shows. They are:

First: the relation of cognition (or the essential subject-object relation),

Second: Cognitive structure or object-image (object representation) in the subject.

Third: Truth, or concord, of the object-image and the object.

Fourth: Progress of cognition, or the tendency of development of the image in order to absorb or represent more and more the total content of the object.

The description of these gnoseological phenomena forms the basis for Hartmann's advancement to the whole problem of the gnoseological transcendence. Again Hartmann's pioneering attitude leads him now not only to a deviation...

84 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 48: "Objekt und Objektbild fallen ihm dann auch nicht zusammen, wenn sie sich inhaltlich decken."
from the usual analytic method of the phenomenologists, his attitude towards the "dogmatic attempts for a solution," too, determines Hartmann's original approach to the problems of transcendence. By accepting the transcendence as the original phenomenon in cognition, Hartmann opens for his phenomenology the way to metaphysics, for metaphysics of cognition is his great concern. Of course, it is a metaphysics according to his own understanding. As previously shown, this is neither the traditional subject-

85 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 77: "[The phenomenologists] keep exclusively to the immanent elements in the phenomenon and ignore the original transcendent elements. Such a procedure is not so much an inconsequence of their method than a bias of their interest for the phenomenon or a remnant of their predetermined position. Phenomenology today finds itself restricted in its own development by the boundary of immanence which — in its last analysis — is based upon an idealistic prejudice. This boundary is ignored by our analysis of the phenomenon of cognition. The transcendence of the object of cognition definitely belongs to the phenomenon and has to be described." "Diese halten sich ausschliesslich an das Immanente im Phaenomen und lassen das Transzendente in seiner Eigenart nicht zu Worte kommen. Das ist nicht sowohl eine Inkonsequenz der Methode, als vielmehr eine Einseitigkeit des Interesses fuer das Phaenomen, resp. ein Rest standpunktlischer Voreingenommenheit. Die bisherige Phaenomenologie sieht sich in ihrer eigenen Entfaltung gehemmt durch den Bannkreis der Immanenzphilosophie, der letzten Endes auf einem idealistischen Vorurteil beruht. Dieser Bannkreis ist in unserer Analyse des Erkenntnisphänomens durchbrochen. Die Transzendenz des Erkenntnisgegenstandes gehört mit zum Phaenomen und muss beschrieben werden."

86 Ibid., p. 91.

87 Ibid., p. 11-12, and in this thesis p. 22-26.
matter metaphysics, nor the speculative systematic metaphysics, but a metaphysics of problems. Consequently, Hartmann's phenomenology, which is his analysis of the phaenomenon of cognition, proceeds further to the aporetics of cognition or to the inquiry of the problematic elements of cognition.

**APORETCICS**

In the first chapter of this thesis, an outline of the four basic aporias of cognition according to Hartmann's philosophy was presented. The theme of this study, however, refers essentially to the very first aporia, namely, to the gnoseological transcendence. The *phenomena* of the gnoseological transcendence, namely: subject, object, cognitive relation, were presented in the light of Hartmann's interpretation. Hartmann approaches now the enigmatic nature of the gnoseological transcendence. In other words, we have to deal now with the perennial problematic character of cognition which was indicated by the phenomena but has not become completely translucent by their analysis. Therefore, the aporias of the gnoseological transcendence have to be explored. Thereby is to be considered what Hartmann stresses:
... the mark of its metaphysical nature lies...
in the perennial problematic character which
reaches beyond solubility.88

Hartmann explains:

Aporetics has to follow without restriction
its own laws, its own inner logic, ... the latter
does not consist in a coherence of the data..., but in a coherence between the given and what is
searched for. This liberty can be secured for
aporetics only through the broadest possible survey
of the total results of the phenomenological
findings.89

Therefore, Aporetics (or the science of philosophical
insoluble problems) must follow the phenomenological descript-
ion. It can never precede phenomenology. This requirement
has been fulfilled in the previous inquiry. According to
Hartmann, phenomenology as well as aporetics precede "prin-
cipally all theory, all positions and their metaphysics."90
Nevertheless, phenomenology and aporetics are different.
The latter no longer describes, it compares, examines,
arranges the given, states the discrepancies contained in
the given. It formulates the acuteness of the paradox which

88 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 38: "...das
Kernmal des Metaphysischen liegt... in dem ueber alle Los-
barkeit hinausreichenden, perennierenden Fragecharakter."

89 Ibid., p. 39: "Die Problematic muss ihrer Eigen-
gesetzlichkeit, ihrer inneren Logik unbehindert folgen koen-
nen,... diese besteht nicht in Zusammenhaengen des Gegebenen
in sich selbst, sondern in solchen zwischen Gegebenem und
Gesuchtem. Diese Freiheit kann ihr nur durch moglichst
weite Ueberschau ueber das Ganze des Befundes gesichert
werden."

90 Ibid., p. 40: "grundsätzlich diesesseits aller
Theorie, diesesseits aller Standpunkte und ihrer Metaphysik."
is characteristic of all opposition in actuality. "Aporetics has not to concern itself with the overcoming of the opposition. This is the concern of the theory." \(^{91}\) But the perfection or completion of aporetics depends on the question whether and how it approaches and masters its assignment. The more aporetics can point out "the intellectual pathlessness of the opposition," \(^{92}\) and the more it succeeds in establishing the boundary of the intelligibility of the problem, the more it is what it ought to be: "The meaning of the word aporia... is the stopping of the method in the face of the actual." \(^{93}\) In this sense it was used by the Greeks and the literal translation "pathlessness" stresses the original meaning.

The further elaboration of a problem consists in the re-opening of the way; all theory is a finding of a path, a creation of a new method. \(^{94}\)

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\(^{91}\) Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 40: "Um die Ueberwindung der Widerspruche hat sie sich nicht zu kuemmern, das ist Sache der Theorie."

\(^{92}\) Ibid.: "die gedankliche Unwegsamkeit des Widersprechenden."

\(^{93}\) Ibid.: "Die Wortbedeutung von Aporie... ist... das Stocken oder Versagen der Methode vor dem Tatsachlichen."

\(^{94}\) Ibid.: "Im Wiederanbahnen des Weges besteht dann die weitere Bearbeitung des Problems; alle Theorie ist Pfadfindung, Schoepfung neuer Methode."
Thus Hartmann marks out the methodical span of aporetics. It leads from the accomplished phenomenological description to the "threshold of the theory without ever crossing its limits." Aporetics has to lead from the given to the assignment. The assignment is nothing less than the development of the problems.

In the preceding pages the given of the gnoseological transcendence has been presented. In closing this part of the study, the phenomenological description tried to be as precise as possible in its formulation. The main concepts resulting from Hartmann's inquiry of cognition were presented. These given elements pointed beyond themselves towards the problem. The problem then in Hartmann's formulation is "the union between subject and object in the cognitive relation and the transcendence of the object in the direction of the subject," in its enigmatic complexity. Our problem then is none other than the basic aporia. It originates from the confrontation of two propositions, the proposition of consciousness or interiority and the

95 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 40: "Schwelle der Theorie, überschreitet diese aber niemals."

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid., p. 92: "die Einheit der Relation von Subjekt und Objekt und die Transzendenz des Objekts gegen das Subjekt."
proposition of the exteriorization of the subject or the subject's reach beyond itself.

In his presentation of the general aporia of cognition, Hartmann distinguishes three elements:

Firstly, the subject-object relation;
secondly, the standpoint of the subject;
thirdly, the standpoint of the object.

Naturally, aporetics has to go back to the given, that is to the description of cognition in the accomplished phenomenology. Only after this basic preparation aporetics can show its problems. The result of Hartmann's phenomenological study was that "in every cognition... a knower and a recognized object confront one another." With this the problem begins, for this very fact presses towards the question:

How can an actual relation consist between these two (subject, object), since their levels or spheres are definitely separated and transcend each other so that each of them exists also outside or independent of this relation.

The gnoseological being-in-itself of the object or its independence from the subject is a phenomenon which cannot be ignored. The same is the case with the subject. The

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98 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 44: "in aller Erkenntnis... ein Erkennendes und ein Erkanntes... einander gegenueberstehen."

99 Ibid., p. 61.
subject is not only rooted in itself or is a being-in-itself as the object, but the subject excels by its being-for-itself.

Therefore, an alternative appears: either the relation levels out the transcendence of subject and object: then they form a unit; or the relation is "neither essential nor actual"\textsuperscript{100} for any one of the two.

These alternatives are incorrect: subject and object are not a unit, they are not identical. Subject and object are ontologically as well as gnoseologically separated.

If the subject and the object were in their entire being, nothing else but only a knower (cognizer) and a known (recognized thing) and if they were absorbed by the cognitive relation, the latter could be understood, indeed, as the primary factor. Subject and object were then nothing else but subordinated moments or elements in the relation, the poles of the relation and therefore exhaustible by it. Under such a condition the unity or identity of subject and object would naturally flow from it.\textsuperscript{101}

If that were the case, it would mean that each were present in the other, or "with the subject, the object were

\textsuperscript{100} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 61: "unwesentlich und inaktuell."

\textsuperscript{101} Ibíd.: "Wenn Subjekt und Objekt mit ihrem ganzen Sein nur Erkennendes und Erkanntes waaren und in der Erkenntnisrelation aufgingen, so koennte diese als das Primaere aufgefasst werden. Subjekt und Objekt waaren dann nichts anderes als untergeordnete Momente an ihr, Pole der Relation, und gingen als solche in ihr auf. Dann waere ihre Einheit ihnen wesentlich."
necessarily given,\textsuperscript{102} and, in reverse, with the object the subject would be given. This is not the case, although this erroneous position is held in "every philosophy of identity,"\textsuperscript{103} the evidence of the phenomena, the evidence of reality refute it.

The second of the two alternatives is incorrect, too, for the cognitive relation is not at all "unessential and inactual" to the subject and for the object. For it is through this intellectual relation — and, to be sure, within this relation only — that the subject is a knower and the object is a recognized or known something.

From where does this unity stem which is given in the cognitive relation of the positively separated beings? How is such a relation possible? Here it becomes obvious that the cognition of cognition has arrived in a pathlessness or at an aporia. Hartmann remarks:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{102} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.: "Es sei hier noch einmal betont, was die Phaenomenologie herausstellt: Das Objekt ist nur für ein Subjekt Objekt, wogegen das Subjekt auch Subjekt anderer Erfahrungen sein kann, die nicht gnoseologischer, sondern z.B. emotionaler, voluntaiver etc. Natur sein koennen."
"It must be noticed that the object is an object only for a subject, whereas the subject can very well be a subject for other experiences, too, which must not be of gnoseological, but can be of emotional, conative nature, etc., also."
\end{quote}
In its most external and most schematic part already the problem of cognition presents its metaphysical nature.¹⁰⁵

The problem becomes even more obscure when dealt with separately under the aspect of the one or the other, because from "the standpoint of the subject, cognition is the comprehension of an object."¹⁰⁶ Hence, the object is precisely, through this relation, through the object-image, placed in the subject. However,

it is essential to consciousness that it can obtain only its own content, for it never can leave its own sphere... When the intellect aims at an extramental something, the something in truth is put in the intellect, it is thought about, it is conceived, it is sensed. The intellect transforms the independent object about which it thinks — precisely by doing so — into a dependent object, namely into the object-thought-of. The immanence of intellection is, so to say, more powerful than the intention of the transcendent subject. The intellect (or the consciousness) cannot break through this restricted ring, the "circle of thinking," in spite of all the objectivity of the resulting idea. The consciousness remains forever enclosed in itself and dependent on the world of its own determinations and ideas.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzüge..., p. 61: "Schon hier im Aeusserlichsten und Schematischsten ist das Erkenntnisproblem ein metaphysisches."

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.: "Vom Subjekt aus gesehen ist Erkenntnis ein Erfassen des Objektes."

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 61-62: "zum Wesen des Bewusstseins gehoert es, dass es nie etwas anderes als seine eigenen Inhalte zu fassen bekommt, nie aus seiner Sphaere heraustreten kann... Indem das Bewusstsein etwas setzt als ausser ihm seidend, ist dieses in Wahrheit eben doch nur in ihm gesetzt, gedacht, angeschaut, empfunden. Es macht das von ihm Unabhaengige, das es meint, eben dadurch, dass er es meint, nichtsdestoweniger abhaengig - eben zum bloss Gemeinten. Die
Unequivocally, we deal here with the theorem of consciousness or of the content of the subject. The cognizant subject's world is a closed one, a world in the subject only. This natural "seclusion" of the intellect or of the consciousness in the subject — in spite of all the transcendent elements—does not come from an empirical source; therefore, it cannot become disproved empirically. This natural "seclusion" is also not caused by external factors which might influence the phenomenon of cognition. This seclusion grows on the subject's own ground and stems from the natural apriori traits.108

This "seclusion" belongs, therefore, essentially to the notion of the subject. The subject claims, as has been demonstrated, not only to be a being-in-itself, but also a being-for-itself and is capable of accomplishing many other functions besides cognitive acts.

Hartmann studies also the historical origin of the theorem of consciousness and reports his findings:

Immanenz des Setzen ist gleichsam stærker als die Intention des Transzendenten. Aus diesem ehernen Ring, dem "Zirkel des Denkens" kommt das Bewusstsein bei aller Objektivität des Gedachten nicht heraus. Es bleibt ewig in sich gefangen auf die Welt seiner Setzungen und Vorstellungen allein ange- wiesen."

108 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 62: "gegen alles ihm Transzendente, ist nicht empirischen Ursprungs, daher auch nicht empirisch zu widerlegen; sie ist auch nicht von aussen an das Erkenntnisphänenomen herangetragen, sondern waechst auf dessen eigenstem Boden, aus seinen Wesenszuegen a priori hervor."
The theorem that the consciousness can comprise nothing else but its own content, and that it is therefore irretrievably imprisoned in itself had not to wait for modern subjectivism. It was used by skepticism of antiquity, but its origin seems to date as early as the sophists. If the witnesses of posterity are trustworthy, the first formulation is found in the teaching of the Cyrenaics. By declaring their inner states and concepts insufficient, they locked themselves up, as it were, in "a state of siege" (hosper en poliorkia) in their own subjective state of mind, cut themselves off from any exterior influence in order to get some information about the things.

This picture of the state of siege is the exact phenomenological description of the condition in which the intellect (or the consciousness) finds itself when it begins to reflect (or to think) about its relationship to its comprehensible own content. This picture characterizes an apriori intelligible trait of the intellect which — once recognized — leaves no doubt about the nature of the intellect. It is only astonishing that in the history of philosophy so many keen gnoseologists failed to see that.109

109 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzüge..., p. 93-94: "Der Satz, dass das Bewusstsein nichts als seine eigenen Inhalte erfassen kann und so unrettbar in sich gefangen ist, hat nicht erst auf den neuzeitlichen Subjektivismus zu warten gebraucht; er ist schon der antiken Skepsis geläufig, seine Ursprünge scheinen aber noch weiter auf die Sophisten zurückzugehen. Die erste formelhafte Ausprägung tritt uns, wenn man späten Zeugen trauen darf, bei den Kyrenaikern entgegen. Indem diese die Zustände und Vorstellungen in ihnen für unzulässig erklärt, um etwas über die Dinge festzustellen, schlossen sie sich selbst, als "gleichsam im Belagerungszustand" (hosper en poliorkia), von allem Aussensein abgeschnitten, in ihre (subjektiven) Zustände ein... Dieses Gleichnis von der Belagerung ist die genaue phänomenologische Beschreibung des Zustandes, in dem sich das Bewusstsein vorfindet, wenn es auf sein Verhältnis zu dem ihm allein erfassbaren Inhalt zu reflektieren beginnt. Es charakterisiert einen apriori einsichtigen Wesenszug des Bewusstseins, der, einmal erkannt, keinen Zweifel zulaessst, und von dem es einen nur wundern kann, dass im Lauf der Geschichte so viele scharfsichtige Erkenntnistheoretiker an ihm vorübergegangen sind." The School of the Cyrenaics is the one of Aristippus of Cyrene (ca. 435-355 B.C.).
After such considerations it appears the more complicated to understand that nevertheless "from the point of view of the subject... cognition is the grasping of an object."\textsuperscript{110}

Hence, the subject must be able somehow to reach beyond its own sphere for the object. Consequently, it must "protrude and be without itself in order to be able to comprehend."\textsuperscript{111}

How could the subject otherwise reproduce in itself the object-image, showing the determinations of this or that object of the concrete order? The determinations of the object-image must be the replica of the determinations of the extra-mental real object. Since the object is neutral to cognition, its neutrality testifies for its non-participation in the act of comprehension. Consequently, comprehension must be accomplished solely by the act of the subject, which means that the subject must reach outside itself, in spite of its immanence of consciousness, for only by doing so can it attain the determinations of the object. "This getting outside of itself of the subject in the cognitive

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{110} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 61: "vom Subjekt aus gesehen... Erkenntnis ein Erfassen des Objekts."

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.: "aus sich heraustreten und ausser sich sein, um es erfassen zu koennen."
\end{flushright}
function is the enigma." For this externalization of the subject in the cognitive process is clearly contradicting the subject's characteristic seclusion-in-itself. In this contradiction the "antinomy of consciousness," as Hartmann calls it, becomes evident. Hartmann formulates it as follows:

Thesis:
The consciousness must exteriorize itself inasmuch as it has to grasp something outside itself, that is, inasmuch as it is cognizing consciousness.

Antithesis:
The consciousness cannot exteriorize itself inasmuch as it can grasp its contents only, that is, inasmuch as it is cognizing consciousness.

Obviously, transcendence and immanence of the noetic function are in contradiction, or the nature of cognition seems to be opposed to the nature of the intellect.

But this opposition is

112 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 61: "dieses Aussersichsein des Subjekts in der Erkenntnisfunktion ist das Raetsel."

113 Ibid., p. 62: "Thesis: Das Bewusstsein muss aus sich heraustreten, sofern es etwas ausser sich erfasst, d.h. sofern es erkennendes Bewusstsein ist." 
"Antithesis: Das Bewusstsein kann nicht aus sich heraustreten, sofern es nur seine Inhalte erfassen kann, d.h. sofern es erkennendes Bewusstsein ist."
unavoidable because only the intellect or the consciousness can have cognition. It follows that either the nature of cognition dissolves or neutralizes the antinomy of consciousness, or the antinomy of consciousness becomes dissolved by the phenomenon of cognition.\textsuperscript{114}

Hence, an aporia presents itself again. Hartmann divides this aporia. He says:

In the antinomy of consciousness phenomenon stands against phenomenon. This did not become clear in the development of the first aporia because the phenomenal character of the theorem of consciousness was not seen yet. This character could not be dealt with in the analysis of the phenomenon because the analysis had to adhere to the natural point of view, that is to the naive as well as to the scientific one. The knowledge of the self-seclusion of the intellect belongs to the philosophical reflection already.

The antinomy of consciousness is indeed a gnoseological antinomy. But this does not make it necessarily a proposition of the theory. It can very well be a mere expression of a phenomenon, but of course, of a phenomenon which becomes seen only when the philosophical deliberation has departed from the natural position which is always directed towards the object, which is clearly expressed in the skeptic character of the antinomy.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 62: "unausweichlich, weil nur ein Bewusstsein Erkenntnis haben kann. Entweder also hebt sich das Wesen der Erkenntnis am Satz des Bewusstseins auf, oder der Satz des Bewusstseins hebt sich am Phaenomen der Erkenntnis auf."

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 93-94: "In der 'Antinomie des Bewusstseins' steht ... ein Phaenomen dem Phaenomen gegenüber. Das konnte in der Entwicklung der ersten Aporie noch nicht zu voller Klarheit kommen, weil der Phaenomencharakter im 'Satz des Bewusstseins' dort nicht ersichtlich war. Dieser konnte in der Analyse des Phaenomens nicht enthalten sein, weil dieselbe den Gesichtspunkt des natürlichen (d.h. des naiven und wissenschaftlichen) Bewusstseins festhalten müsste. Das Wissen um das In-sich-Gefangen-sein des Bewusstseins gehörte aber bereits einer philosophischen Re-

\textsuperscript{115}lication an."
We deal here then with two propositions which are equally significant as expression of the phenomenon, but which are at the same time contradictory to each other.

The being-outside-of-itself of the subject is necessary for cognition is the grasping of a transcendent object; at the same time this is impossible because the subject is the consciousness or intellect.

The antinomy does not admit a solution as long as the thesis and the antithesis share the same degree of apriori certainty. If it should be dissolved, one of the two propositions is supposedly false. Concerning the consciousness only one of the alternatives can be true: either the subject is secluded in itself, or it is capable of exteriorization. But both cannot be true at the same time. There is another alternative, however: if it were possible to demonstrate that the two propositions have to be interpreted in a different sense. The latter requests the highest and most difficult speculation. It was, therefore, long overlooked and perhaps only Leibniz used this interpretation in his theory of the "windowless monad," which, in its own representations, can indirectly grasp a transcendent. This way out of the difficulty, however, is a purely aprioristic way and can be used only at the expense of the independence of the sensual data. It comes into conflict with the phenomenon of the empirical givenness. 116

116 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 94-95: "Das 'Aussersich-sein des Subjekts' ist notwendig, weil Erkennen Erfassen eines Transzendenten ist; und es ist zugleich unmöglich, weil das Subjekt Bewusstsein ist. Die Antinomie ist unlösbar, so lange der These und Antithese der gleiche Grad a priori einsichtiger Gewissheit zukommt. Soll sie sich lösen, so muss die eine von ihnen falsch sein. Das Bewusstsein kann nur entweder in sich geschlossen oder des Heraustretens aus sich faehig sein, aber nicht beides zugleich. Oder aber es musste sich erweisen lassen, dass beides in verschiedenem Sinne zu verstehen ist. Dieser Weg stellt die spekulativ hoechsten und schwierigsten Anforderungen. Er ist denn auch am laengsten uebersehen und vielleicht nur von Leibniz wirklich beschritten worden -
The third consideration begins with the aspect of the object. Descriptive phenomenology has shown that from this point of view

cognition... reaches for the determinations of the object in order to bring them to the subject. It is the indirect determination of the image in the subject through the real determinations of the object. 117

As has been previously shown, the object of cognition proves indifferent, neutral towards cognition. It does not transfer to or into the subject. It remains unconcerned before and after its cognition and it remains without being secluded or locked up in the consciousness, for itself does not at all become the "image" in the subject. The act of cognition, as well as the consciousness or intellect itself, distinguish clearly between object and object-image. The object stays transcendent when confronting the subject. It never inhabits the subject. But,

naemlich in der Lehre von der 'fensterlosen Monade,' die in ihren eigenen Repräsentationen dennoch mittelbar ein Transzendentes erfasst. Dieser Ausweg ist aber rein aprioristisch und kann nur auf Kosten der Selbständigkeit des sinnlich Gegebenen beschritten werden. Er geraet in Konflikt mit dem Phaenomen der empirischen Gegebenheit."

117 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 95: "dass Erkenntnis... das Uebergreifen der Bestimmtheiten des Objekts auf das Subjekt und die mittelbare Bestimmung des Bildes im Subjekt durch sie ist."
this aporia has been ignored in every philosophy of immanence because in it the awareness of the being-in-itself has been overlooked which accompanies every object consciousness. 118

From the point of view of the object then a new antinomy results. It is, so to say, the counterpart, or the reverse side of the antinomy of the subject or the antinomy of consciousness. Again, Hartmann offers his formulation:

Thesis:
The determinations of the object must in some way become transmitted to the subject inasmuch as cognition takes place; the image in the subject can be "objective" (that is, shows the traits of the object) only if the object can convey the traits in some way to the subject. However, in this conveyance, the transcendence of the object for the subject is broken through.

Antithesis:
The determinations of the object cannot become conveyed to the image in the subject. They remain transcendent to the sphere of the subject, for in the object awareness the transcendence of the object for the subject is not violated. It remains intact. The object awareness means precisely the object as a being-in-itself which is indifferent to its being recognized. 119

118 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 63: "Diese Aporie ist in aller Immanenzphilosophie übersehen, weil in ihr das Bewusstsein des Ansichseins, das alles Objektbewusstsein begleitet, als Phaenomen übersehen ist."

119 Ibid.: "Thesis: Die Bestimmtheiten des Objekts muessen dem Subjekt irgendwie übermittelt werden, sofern Erkenntnis stattfindet; das Bild im Subjekt kann nur 'objektiv' sein, d.h. die Züge des Objekts tragen, wenn das Objekt sie irgendwie auf dasselbe übertragen kann."

"Antithesis: Die Bestimmtheiten des Objekts koennen sich auf das Bild im Subjekt nicht übertragen, sie bleiben der Sphäre des Subjekts transzendent; denn im Objektbewusstsein ist die Transzendenz des Objekts fuer das Subjekt
The difficulty from the point of view of the subject consists in the contradiction between the nature of cognition and the nature of the intellect or consciousness. The difficulty from the point of view of the object consists again in a contradiction, this time, however, it is a contradiction between the nature of cognition and, in difference to the first, the nature of its object. Here, too, the contradiction "is unavoidable, for only an object can be recognized, or, because cognition always deals with an object." Hartmann finds again an alternative:

Either the phenomenon of cognition neutralizes itself on the transcendence of the object — a transcendence which belongs to the phenomenon; or the transcendence of the object dissolves itself on the phenomenon of cognition.  

\[ \text{nicht durchbrochen, sondern bleibt intakt; es meint das Objekt gerade als Ansichseigendes, welches gleichgültig ist gegen sein Erkannt-werden.} \]

120 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzüge..., p. 63: "unausweichlich, weil nur ein Gegenstand erkannt werden kann, resp. weil Erkenntnis immer nur Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes sein kann."

121 Ibid.: "Entweder hebt sich das Phaenomen der Erkenntnis an der Transzendenz des Gegenstandes, die selbst zu eben diesem Phaenomen gehört, auf; oder die Transzendenz des Gegenstandes hebt sich am Phaenomen der Erkenntnis auf."
Here, too, all thinking winds up in wondering, for an aporia presents itself again. Hartmann says:

It is not an incident that on the data, too, the same antinomy occurs that adhered to cognition. The alternative: either the given is an illusion, or the transcendence is an illusion is basically the same as: Either the grasping of the object as such is an illusion, or the enclosure of the consciousness is an illusion. A solution of the aporia can result only from a synthesis which reconciles the approved phenomena.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the antinomy of the object which is in its content the direct reverse of the antinomy of consciousness or the subject in no way coincides with the latter. Here we deal solely with a breaking or not-breaking of the relation of transcendence between subject and object; a being-without-itself as in the case of the subject is not the question here. Therefore, it would be very well thinkable... that a solution of the object antinomy would draw along with itself the solution of the antinomy of consciousness so that the latter could be treated indirectly from the side of its objective counterpart. But for such a solution it would be necessary to find a unifying synthesis bridging the opposites.122


Beachtenswert dagegen ist, dass die 'Antinomie des Objekts', die der Sache nach die unmittelbare Kehrseite der Bewusstseinsantinomie ist, dennoch mit dieser keineswegs zusammenfället. Hier handelt es sich lediglich um Durchbrechung oder Nichtdurchbrechung des Transzendenzverhältnisses zwischen Subjekt und Objekt; vom Aussersehsein des Subjekts ist gar nicht die Rede. Es wäre daher, soviel sich hier voraussichtlich lasst, wohl denkbar, dass eine Lösung der Objektsantinomie (falls sie möglich ist), auch die Lösung
Related to the aporia of the object is the problem of perception, the nuclear phenomenon of every a posteriori cognition. This problem emerges automatically in such a philosophizing. It seems that perception makes graspable the transcendent\textsuperscript{123} (that is here, according to Hartmann, the totally other, or, from the subject's station, the object).

In perception, the perceived is to the intellect the part allotted directly from the object to the subject. Therefore, an aporia originates again:

\begin{quote}
\textit{der Bewusstseinsantinomie nach sich zoege, so dass diese also mittelbar von ihrer objektiven Kehrseite her sich behandeln liessse. Aber auch hierfuer wuerde es einer uebergeordneten, die Gegensaetze umspannenden Einheit beduerfen."
}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{123} Cf. Nicolai HARTKANN, Grundzuge... , p. 44 and 47: "Seen from the point of view of the object, the relation of cognition presents itself in the reverse... The two kinds of transcending are, however, not equivalent. Both of them are only aspects of one and the same act of contact or of determination, and in that act the object shows distinctly the preponderance compared to the subject. In the relation of cognition, the object alone is the determining factor, the subject is the determined element."

\textit{Vom Objekt aus gesehen stellt sich dieselbe Erkenntnisrelation umgekehrt dar... Beide Arten des Transzenderers sind aber nicht gleichwertig. Beide sind nur Aspekte eines und desselben Aktes der Beruehrung oder Bestimmung, und in diesem hat deutlich das Objekt das Uebergewicht ueber das Subjekt. In der Erkenntnisrelation ist allein das Objekt das Bestimmende, das Subjekt aber das Bestimmte."

How can a subject receive (or perceive) the object if the object is not given to the subject? But how can the object be given to the subject when the object is transcendent (totally other, totally separated) to the subject in the relation of cognition, that is, when the object remains indifferent to the subject? 124

The dilemma is obvious: Is the transcendence or is the given an illusion? As is known, idealism denies the transcendence of the object (the total otherness, the total separation). Skepticism denies the givenness (Gegebenheit).

But,

If the giving act is an act of the object, then it cannot be understood how it can reach into the sphere of the subject. Is the act, however, an act of the subject, then it cannot give to the subject any determinations of the transcendent object; it can transmit only the determinations of immanent object awareness, 125 as shown above, and this is the realm of the aporia of cognition aposteriori.

124 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 64: "Wie kann ein Subjekt das Objekt empfangen... wenn dieses ihm nicht gegeben wird? - Wie aber kann das Objekt ihm gegeben werden, wenn es ihm doch in der Erkenntnisrelation transcendent, d.h. unaufhebbar gegenüber bleibt?"

125 Ibid., p. 64: "Ist der gebende Akt ein solcher des Objekts, so ist nicht zu verstehen, wie er auf die Sphaere des Subjekts uebergreifen kann. Ist er aber ein Akt des Subjekts, so kann er dem Subjekt auch keine Bestimmtheiten des transzendenten Objekts 'geben,' sondern nur solche des immanenten Objektbewusstseins."
How, then, is it with the apriori cognition? One is inclined to think that apriority in cognition is by its very nature an immanent momentum and therefore, the situation might be less complicated. Hartmann, however, draws attention to the fact that it should not be forgotten that apriori cognition of ideal and of real being shows throughout a transcendent character. It should not be mixed up with that exclusively immanent apriority which consists in the inter-subjective universal validity only which accompanies every apriori insight. The problem of the latter, to be sure, consists independently, but it forms only the periphery of or the first step to the proper aporia of the apriori cognition.  

The root of all apriority, however, is, as is known, the apriori cognition of the real things. In contrast to the aposteriori cognition, the phenomenon of direct connection with the object is not provided in the apriori cognition. "The intellect anticipates here the determinations of a real being by skipping the actually given concrete individual."  

126 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 65: "darf nicht vergessen werden, dass apriorische Erkenntnis idealen wie realen Seins durchaus transzendente Apriorität ist und nicht zu verwechseln ist mit jener bloß immanenten Apriorität, die in der alle apriorische Einsicht begleitenden intersubjektiven Allgemeingültigkeit besteht. Das Problem der letzteren besteht zwar selbständig, bildet aber der eigentlichen Aporie des Apriorischen gegenüber nur eine Aussenseite oder Vorstufe."

127 Ibid., p. 66: "Das Bewusstsein antizipiert hier Bestimmungen eines Realen mit Ueberspringung der Gegebenheit."
In the case of ideal being, this process is accomplished without consideration of whether the real does or does not exist, and whether or not it can ever be presented to the intellect as an actual existent.  

Hence, the problem of the gnoseological transcendence does in no way appear simpler when concerned with cognition a priori.

In his "Critical Remarks" (Kritischen Zusatzen), Nicolai Hartmann deals explicitly with the distinction between the intentional and the real, and the immanent and the transcendent. These terminological pairs are not identical. Hartmann maintains that every intentional object is transcendent for it does not lie in the sphere of the subjective states but is directly comprehended by the cognizing subject as subsisting outside itself, regardless of whether the intentional object is real or ideal.

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128 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 66: "... ohne alle Rücksicht darauf, ob es das Reale überhaupt gibt oder nicht, und ob es ihm (= dem Intellekt) jemals als Daseiendes gegeben werden kann oder nicht."

129 Ibid. Cf. p. 115.

130 Ibid.: "... er liegt nicht in der Sphäre der Ichzustände, sondern wird, ganz gleich ob real oder nicht, vom erfassenden Ich unmittelbar als ausserhalb seiner bestehend erfasst."
The example used by Hartmann for verification of this statement is the reminiscence of an event which may or may not have taken place. In the first case, the transcendent datum is evident. But I may also deceive myself, that means, I may imagine the event had taken place; but in reality it did not happen. In both cases, the event is an intentional object of cognition. The question arises: do we deal with transcendence in the first case, and with immanence in the second case? The latter is obviously imaginative.

Hartmann states:

It is an erroneous idea to understand every immanent factor as one of a subjective state. Thoughts, fancies, and notions are not subjective states. They possess their objective character; they are meant as objects, that is, they are genuine intentional objects.131

But they lack the being-in-itself character (Ansichsein). Therefore, they are not real objects, and — according to Hartmann — they are not objects of cognition but depend on the subjective immanent act, inasmuch as they depend on intention. Nevertheless they can become objects of the intellectual reflection, or of the intentio obliqua. But as such they are "gnoseologically immanent objects".

131 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzüge..., p. 66: "Es ist ein Irrtum, alles Immanente als "Ichzustand" zu verstehen. Gedanken, Phantasien, Vorstellungen sind keine Ichzustände. Sie haben Gegenstandscharakter, sind als Gegenstände gemeint, d.h. sind echte intentionale Gegenstände."
Transcendent in the gnoseological sense is only what is independent from the act...
This meaning of immanent and transcendent is the older interpretation which has become accepted in philosophy. Only its erroneous use by the psychological theory has falsified it.

It appears again that the enigmatic nature of the gnoseological transcendence does not become more translucent when analyzed in regard to perception and givenness of the object. A deeper penetration of the problem of cognition aposteriori and apriori shows the gnoseological transcendence rather more than less enigmatic. The intellect, in dealing with this problem experiences a kind of confusion because aporetics proves to be a "pathlessness". Therefore, the intellect turns to the gnoseological relation in order to grope its way back to the actuality of the thing and of the knower. In other words, reason seeks the ground of the gnoseological transcendence. Therefore, the intellect turns naturally to the close allied of cognition: to being. All the gnoseological problems lead, when rightly considered, to the ontological condition. This is documented, for example, in the history of Monism and Dualism, in the

132 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuge..., p. 66:
"... transzendent im gnoseologischen Sinne ist nur das vom Akt Unabhängige... Diese Bedeutung von "immanent und transzendent" ist die aeltere, im philosophischen Sprachgebrauch festgewordene. Erst der Missbrauch der psychologischen Theorie hat sie verfälscht."
history of Idealism and of Realism and in their variations.
Hartmann has pointed out some of the important theories in
regard to this phenomenon found in the history of ideas.
He grew on these theories and he purged his own views by
learning from the mistakes and their consequences.

At the beginning of Western thought Parmenides pre­
sented a theory of identity: thinking and being are one;
they are the same, they are simply being. Heraclites, too,
offered an identity philosophy, differing from the first
only by its dynamic panta-rhe-view of the world. The logoi
of Heraclites, however, are found in two very differen­
tiated spheres: in the cosmos and in the soul.133 Hart­
mann comments:

In this teaching, the logos is at once the sub­
jective and the objective law... which leaves un­
touched the differentiation of the sphere of
consciousness and the sphere of being, as well as
their mutual independence.134

In Plato's theory of the ideas, human questioning
reaches its classical peak. Plato has

133 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 356:
"... zwei sehr verschiedenen Sphaeren... im Kosmos und in
der Seele."

134 Ibid., p. 356-357: "Der Logos ist hier deut­
lich zugleich subjektives und objektives Gesetz... welches
die Verschiedenheit der Seinsphäre, sowie ihre beider­
seitige Selbständigkeit unangetastet stehen lasst."
discovered the logical sphere in the realm of ideas, but the main insight, thereby, was that the ideal sphere was also a metaphysical sphere of principles of being. That means, the basic thought was an explicitly ontological one: the essence of the ideal forms (for instance of the mathematical proportions) is also the nature of the real being; thus, one can fairly summarize the transcendent as identity of the principles as presented in the theory of ideas.\textsuperscript{35}

The dualism of Aristotle deviates from Plato's theory. Matter becomes the attribute of real being and distinguishes it from thinking and from the eide of the logical sphere. Form, identical with the eide, is in both.

\textsuperscript{35} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 357: "Plato hat im Ideenreich die logische Sphaere entdeckt, aber der Hauptgedanke dabei war, dass sie zugleich eine metaphysische Sphaere von Seinsprinzipien sei. Das heisst, der Grundgedanke war ein ausgesprochen ontologischer: Das Wesen der idealen Gebilde (z.B. der mathematischen Verhaeltnisse) ist zugleich das Wesen der realen Gebilde. So darf man die transzendente Identitaet der Prinzipien im Sinne der Ideenlehre zusammenfassen."

In the same passage Hartmann continues to support his position through the following example: "this theory is perhaps best demonstrated by the theory of the idea of the good, in which is held, that the good not only brings forth cognition and truth by disconcealment of the recognized (object) and by showing the knower's capability (to know), but also by giving being and actuality to the things. From this principal position stems the ontological direction of logic which is characteristic of the later thinkers."

"Beleg fuer diesen Sachverhalt bieter vielleicht die Lehre von der Idee des Guten dar, in welcher direkt zu lesen steht, sie sei nicht nur dasjenige, was Erkennnis und Wahrheit hervorbringt (dem Erkannten die Unverborgenheit, dem Erkennenden aber seine Faeiglichkeit verleiht), sondern auch dasjenige, was den Dingen das Sein und die Wirklichkeit verleiht. - Aus dieser Grundeinstellung stammt die ontologische Richtung der Logik her, die fuer die meisten spateren Denker charakteristisch ist."

\textsuperscript{15}
Hence, the Aristotelian "essence" appears as having a dual nature, namely, as being in the logical and in the ontological sphere. "The idea is the substantial form of the existent, but the things are actualizations of the idea in matter."\textsuperscript{136} In this twofold occurrence of essence Hartmann sees the centre of truth of the Aristotelian system. He thinks that

\begin{quote}
a certain and universally valid cognition of being is possible only when logical essences exist which simultaneously are the essences of things.\textsuperscript{137}
\end{quote}

This was also the teaching of the medieval scholastics up to Christian Wolf (= Wolfius, Wolff. Hartmann uses one "F" only). But erroneous theories, too, developed in the course of history through identification of the logical with the ontological. However, this erroneous identification usually appears as a relapsus in the "Eleatic identity theory of thinking and being,"\textsuperscript{138} a ground from which grew, for instance, the ontological proof of the existence of God in which the boundary between essence and existence is effaced.

\begin{flushright}
136 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 357: "Der Begriff ist die Formsubstanz des Seienden, die Dinge aber sind Realisationen des Begriffs in der Materie."

137 Ibid.: "... gewisse und allgemeingültige Seinserkenntnis nur geben kann, wenn es logische Wesenheiten gibt, die zugleich Wesenheiten der Dinge sind."

138 Cf. ibid., p. 359.
\end{flushright}
But "the logical and the real cannot be taken identically, however, their essences or principles are the same," in the logical and in the ontological sphere.

In the modern era by means of the method of doubt a philosophical catharsis is noticeable.

The thought which is the strongest antithesis to the thesis of identity stands as pioneering accomplishment on the threshold of this development; it is the open dualism of extensio and cogitatio, or Descartes' theory of the two substances.

In Descartes' system, a categorical separation of consciousness and the extramental world is accomplished. Both confront one another. Both are opposed to one another. Both are essentially separated or transcendent — and so much so that the hiatus remains unbridged even by Descartes' theory of the Pineal gland.

In Kant's philosophy, the key concept is synthesis. Applying it to the problem of cognition, Kant came to the conviction that

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139 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 357: "... nicht das Logische und das Seiende duerfen identisch gesetzt werden, sondern nur ihre Wesenheiten oder Principien..."

140 Ibid.: "Als bahnbrechende Tat steht an der Schwelle dieser Entwicklung gerade derjenige Gedanke, der die äusserste Antithese zur Identitätsthese bildet: der offene Dualismus von extensio und cogitatio, Descartes' Zweisubstanzenlehre."
in the sphere of the empirical human subject there develop gradually the notions, judgments and finally the theories. On the one hand, they are constructed of the material provided by empirical cognition which stems from the affection on our senses caused by the Ding-an-sich (thing-as-such), on the other hand, however, they originate apriori in the sphere of the categories. The objects can result from a synthesis of both only. The intellect has to provide the unity. 141

Hartmann shows here very distinctly the extreme point of Kant's error. Although he himself had been a Neo-Kantian in the beginning of his philosophical development, he no longer agrees with Kant that "the objects... can result from a synthesis only" and that "the unity must be given by or stem from reason."

The discovery of this error served Hartmann as weapon against the Marburg School. He criticized the Neo-Kantians:

the idea of the synthesis is also the root of Neo-Kantianism. The essence of the object develops for the Neo-Kantians in the course of the historical process which presents itself as a great process of cognition. The historical process consists in the

141 Nicolai HARTMANN, Einführung in die Philosophie, p. 106: "... in dem Bereich des empirischen menschlichen Subjekts allmählich die Begriffe, die Urteile und schließlich die Theorien... bilden. Sie werden aufgebaut einerseits aus dem Material, das die empirische Erkenntnis liefert, das aus der Affektion unserer Sinne durch das Ding an sich stammt, und andererseits von der apriorischen Seite her durch das Reich der Kategorien. Die Gegenstände kommen erst durch eine Synthese zustande kommen, die Einheit muss dabei der Verstand hinzutun."
fact — as this strange Idealism assumed — that
the world becomes more and more perfected in its
ideas. Kant still found the Ding-an-sich hidden
behind the empirical thing, the objects of the Neo-
Kantians however, results from the synthesis only.
There is no other world behind the ideas. Therefore,
it appears that the progress of cognition is nothing
else but a steady inner construction of ideas.

We do not believe that the world is nothing but
such a cognitive progress. We distinguish precisely
the ideas from nature. Nature remains always the
same. Only our notions of nature have changed and
have become more correct.\footnote{142}

Hartmann does here neither deny the sphere of the ideas,
nor the steady expanse of this sphere through the progress
of cognition,\footnote{143} but he opposes the one-sided interpretation

\footnote{142} Nicolai HARTMANN, Einfuehrung..., p. 106: "Der
Begriff der Synthesis ist auch der Ansatzpunkt des Neukant-
ianismus. Fuer die Neukantianer bildet sich der Inbegriff
der Objekte erst im Lauf des geschichtlichen Prozesses, der
sich als ein grosser Erkenntnisprozess darstellt. Der ge-
schichtliche Prozess besteht darin, so meint dieser merk-
wuerdige Idealismus, dass die Welt in ihren Vorstellun-
gen immer weiter und weiter ausgebaut wird. Waehrend fuer Kant
hinter dem empirischen Gegenstand sich noch das Ding an sich
befand, bestehen fuer den Neukantianismus die Gegenstaende
nur in der Synthesis. Eine andere Welt hinter den Vorstell-
ungen gibt es nicht. So stellt es sich hier dar, als ob der
Erkenntnisprosess nichts anderes ware als ein staendiges
inneres Aufbauen von Vorstellungen. Wir glauben nicht, dass
die Welt selbst in einem solchen Erkenntnisprosess besteht,
wir unterscheiden gerade die Vorstellungen von der Natur.
Die Natur ist immer dieselbe geblieben, nur unsere Begriffe
von ihr haben sich geaendert und sind richtiger geworden."

\footnote{143} Hartmann continues in the quoted paragraph:
"Such a continuous construction of ideas actually takes
place. Therefore, the transcendental question and the total
transcendental method are so highly actual. They survived
Idealism and are today still of significance. This is
clearly seen on the status quo of the sciences, for example,
of the science of nature if one compares today's insights
with the previous levels of development."

"Einen solchen staendigen Aufbau von Vorstellungen
of the idealistic and rationalistic philosophies by pointing strongly to the primary given in reality which precedes any gnoseological experience and without which the latter would not at all be possible. In this criticism Hartmann's own philosophical position becomes demonstrated. He stresses that

the ideal solution... has to search for an original unity of subject and object which lies beyond their non-identity, hence, a unity which embraces subject and object.144

Here Hartmann points to the rooting of the gnoseological problem in the ontological sphere and in being itself. Thus Hartmann not only confronts cognition with being, he actually puts cognition into the sphere of being because it not only stems from the thinking subject, it is also founded in the object, although the latter is essentially separated (urgeschiedenen) from the subject. Hartmann sees in the problem of cognition "certain points... in which the

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144 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 173-174: "... die ideale Lösung... eine ursprüngliche Einheit von Subjekt und Objekt jenseits ihrer Zweiheit suchen muss, eine Einheit also, die weder im Subjekt, noch im Objekt aufgeht."
gnoseological problem runs in a straight direction into the ontological problem."\textsuperscript{145} He is convinced of the metabasis (Plato), because, "behind the "object" there emerges the existing thing, behind the relation of cognition there appears the relation of being,"\textsuperscript{146} and both confront one another as "being and being instead of as knower and the known."\textsuperscript{147}

As mentioned earlier in this work, being by becoming an object may remain totally indifferent or neutral to its objectification. It also may react as it is, for instance, in the case of objects which are other humans. But it is clear that the establishment of cognitive relations does not change the being of the objectified existent. The noetic relation as such does also not change the ontic relation. However, when a being becomes a knower, when an intellectual being recognizes an object, in such a case being does not remain indifferent in regard to the other pole because of the act of cognition which is necessary in this relation.

\textsuperscript{145} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 174: "... gewisse Punkte..., in denen das gnoseologische Problem geradlinig ins ontologische übergießt."

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.: "... hinter dem Gegenstand... die seiende Sache, hinter der Erkenntnisrelation, die Seinsrelation..."

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.: "... statt des Erkennenden und Erkannten, nur noch ein Seiendes einem Seienden gegenüber."
Therefore, the recognizing being "tends to embrace the existent thing in the relation (of cognition) more and more intensively."\(^{148}\) From this angle Hartmann sees all the gnoseological problems and relations grounded in the ontological sphere. He says:

To the degree to which the transobjective is still understandable... that means in as much as it belongs to its nature to be intelligible, to such a degree it still fits in the gnoseological relation, at least one would be justified to presume, that it exists only in and for the gnoseological relation. However, to the degree to which the transobjective contains elements of the irrational, or better, of the transtransintelligible, to such a degree it will not be absorbed by the gnoseological relation, regardless of how extended the latter may become. In this condition its relation to the subject is no longer one of real or possible cognition but it is simply a confrontation of two existents, the relational structure of which although it cannot be questionable, may nevertheless be intelligible. Therefore, it is clear that this relation is an ontological one.\(^{149}\)

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148 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 174: "... tendiert auf die immer weitere Einbeziehung der seienden Sache in die Relation."

149 Ibid., p. 74: "Soweit das Transobjektive noch prinzipiell erkennbar... d.h. so weit es zu seinem Wesen gehört, intelligibil zu sein geht es in der... gnoseologischen Relation noch auf; insoweit lasses sich allenfalls noch annehmen, dass es nur in der Relation und fuer sie bestehe. Sofern aber... das Transobjektive ein Irrationales (genauer, ein Transintelligibles) enthält, so geht es auch in einer wie immer erweiterten gnoseologischen Relation nicht auf. Insofern ist seine Beziehung zum Subjekt nicht mehr die wirklicher oder moeglicher Erkenntnis, sondern einfach die eines seienenden Sichgegenueberstehens, dessen relationale Struktur zwar nicht in Frage stehen kann, aber deswegen keineswegs erkennbar zu sein braucht. Diese Relation ist also eine ontologische."
Such firm footing on the ontological basis prevents Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition to deviate into relativistic positions, such as, for example, those shown in Greek philosophy, and those perceptible in contemporary trends, for instance, Heidegger's Existentialism.

150 Cf. Nicolai HARTMANN, Einführung in die Philosophie, p. 94.

151 Cf. IDDEM, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, p. 43: "Martin Heidegger instead of asking for being as being, asks being for its meaning. An ontology which does not clarify this question is blind. This was the reason why the ancient ontology had to decline. A new beginning must be found. It is to be discovered in existence (Dasein), which on its part becomes restricted to the existence of man. This existent is superior to the other being because it is being which understands itself in existence. All existential understanding is rooted in it. Therefore, ontology must be based upon the existential analysis of this "Dasein". From this position it follows that all being must be interpreted relative to man...: the world in which I am is at any given time my world (je meinige), but can very well be another for any other man. Similarly is the truth my truth (je meinige). (Cf. Martin HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, Halle, 1927, especially the introduction and the first part.) Therewith, the question for being as being is eliminated. What is asked for is only being as it is for me, given to me, understood by myself. This is a predetermination of the basic ontological question throughout and, to be sure, through the formulation of the question..."

"An Stelle der Frage nach dem "Seienden als Seienden" setzt... Martin Heidegger... die nach dem "Sinn von Sein." Eine Ontologie sei blind, solange sie diese Frage nicht klare; die alte Ontologie mußte deswegen der Destruktion verfallen, ein neuer Ansatz müßte gewonnen werden. Er soll gewonnen werden an "Dasein", das seinerseits gleich auf das Dasein des Menschen beschränkt wird. Dieses habe den Vorrang vor anderem Seienden, dass es das sich in seinem Sein Verstehende ist. Alles Seinsverstehen sei in ihm verwurzelt, und die Ontologie müsse auf der Existenzanalyse dieses "Daseins" basiert werden. Die Konsequenz dieses Ansatzes ist, dass alles Seiende von vornherein als relativ
Hartmann proved the untenableness of such positions. The object, the subject and the gnoseological relation of both of them are truly encompassed by being. Therefore, contrary to relativistic theories, Hartmann teaches that finally all gnoseological problems must turn into ontological questions, for behind all cognition, there is waiting the question for being. The thinking subject formulates many variations of this question, for example: "What is the existing thing?" "What is meant with Ding-an-sich?" "What does the relation of being to being (object to subject) mean?" Here is not intended to deal with these questions. The theme of this thesis restricts the study to its boundary. But by pointing to the emergence of the ontological problems behind or beyond the gnoseological questions a methodical way is visible which leads from the aporetics of cognition to the theory. Theory, in Hartmann's philosophy, does not mean an...
even solution of problems. Theory is the treatment of problems described by phenomenology, and explored in aporetics. Hartmann confesses in all theory: *Ignoramus et ignorabimus*, that is, he admits the insolubility of the perennial problems, and the limitation of consciousness which is experienced when confronted with the transintelligible sphere.

THEORY

In this thesis an attempt was made to show that the counter-sphere of the cognizing subject is nothing else but the sphere of reality in which the recognized object is a thing-in-itself. Therefore, aporetics of cognition in last analysis must arrive at the sphere of being for "the nature of the thing is not exhausted by an objectification for a subject." Consequently, for the subject, too, the object is an existent, a Ding-an-sich. This condition challenges human cognition to search.

152 Niculai Hartmann, Grundzuege..., p. 182: "... weil das Wesen des Gegenstandes in seinem Gegenstandsein fuer ein Subjekt nicht aufgeht."

153 Hartmann who analyzed the problem of cognition thoroughly, is, of course, aware of reflection. But in his investigation, he limits cognition to its primary givenness in the ontological realm in order to explore unhindered the primary condition of all cognition.
But the searching subject itself is an existent. Hence, the relation between these two real beings which becomes established by cognition is, so to say, in the foreground only a gnoseological one. Its background or its basis is an ontological one, namely being.

Hartmann uses these findings in his theory in order to illuminate the gnoseological aporetics. He says:

A theoretical treatment... has to attempt to see the gnoseological nature of the subject-object relation against the background of its ontological nature.\(^{154}\)

Therefore, Hartmann divides his theory or treatment of the aporetics of cognition into an ontological and a gnoseological inquiry.

In the ontological part, Hartmann treats the problem of the object as being the introduction to the problem of being. He says that when at all, then only from from this point the ontological relation can be seen, a relation which is hidden in the gnoseological nature of the relation of cognition.\(^{155}\)

154 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 182: "Eine theoretische Behandlung... muss das gnoseologische Wesen der Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung aus ihrem ontologischen Wesen heraus zu verstehen suchen."

155 Ibid., p. 183: "nur von hier aus, wenn ueber-haupt, lasst sich das ontologische Wesensverhaeltnis erschauen, welches im gnoseologischen Wesen der Erkenntnisrelation verborgen ist."
Hence, the problem of the object is the recognized exemplum crucis in the noetic problem.

In the approach to Hartmann's theory of cognition, it seems advisable to secure the premise that the object is confronting the consciousness of the subject. Therefore, we must ask what Hartmann means with consciousness? Hartmann criticizes the "widely spread view which identifies spirit, mind, with consciousness." This would allow the equation spirit = consciousness. However, although consciousness falls within the range of spirit, nevertheless, not all spiritual being is consciousness. Besides, there is also a very unspiritual consciousness. One cannot deny that it possesses practical shrewdness and a certain amount of intelligence, but all this remains tightly bound to the service of vital needs. It shows in no way an autonomous intention.

156 Nicolai HARTMANN, Das Problem des geistigen Seins, p. 48: "... eine weitverbreitete Ansicht, der Geist sei Bewusstsein." This view is, according to Hartmann, "not only found in Psychologism; the idealistic theories, too, suggest it." But Hartmann objects to it for this view does not aspire high enough.

157 Ibid.: "auch sehr ungeistiges Bewusstsein... dem man praktische Findigkeit und eine gewisse Intelligenz nicht absprechen kann, das aber fest an den Dienst der vitalen Beduerfnisse gebunden bleibt und keinerlei autonome Intention zeigt." He continues: "We know this from the higher animals... Perhaps one can at least say, there where sense organs are found, there may well be a beginning of consciousness." "So kennen wir es bei den hoheren Tieren... Vielleicht laesst sich zum mindesten sagen, wo Sinnesorgane sind, da wird es wohl auch im Ansatz Bewusstsein geben, wenn auch ein dem unsrigen sehr unaehnliches."
The actual genesis of spirit from unspiritual consciousness which during the last decades has become a controversial issue in the academic world, especially in the natural sciences and in philosophy, is not the question here. Hartmann thinks that "from the aspect of consciousness alone spirit cannot be understood." It is clear to him that the consciousness of man is of another kind than the consciousness of the even highest developed animals. Hartmann points out the factor which differentiates the spiritual consciousness from the lower. It is the severance or detachment from the tension of the drives, the freeing from the vital urges, the distance spiritual consciousness takes from the matter with which it has to deal. Therefore, spiritual consciousness is not restricted to the vital level.

158 Nicolai HARTMANN, Das Problem des geistigen Seins, p. 48: "... ist der Geist nicht aus dem Bewusstsein zu verstehen." Hartmann had pondered deeply in these themes. He even wrote on "Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie", in Kleinere Schriften, III, p. 76-187. Within the hierarchy of being, the spiritual consciousness means to Hartmann "a novum, which is added, but which is not another continuum of the successive levels. With spiritual consciousness it is the same as it is with the organic life which is added to the inorganic nature. Nobody doubts the coherence, but the organic cannot be explained by mechanics, even not by the most advanced forms of the latter." "... ein Novum, das nicht in der Konsequenz der Stufenfolge liegt, sondern zu ihr hinzutritt. Es ist damit nicht anders als mit dem Verhaeltnis des Organismus zur anorganischen Natur auch. Niemand zweifelt hier am Zusammenhang, aber zu erklaren ist das Organische aus dem Mechanismus - auch der hoechsten Formen - nicht."
of the individual. The individual's environment is not limited to needs, it is widened in its content, and, strictly speaking, it is without determinable limits. It can expand as far as experience and conjecture will lead it... Therewith it shows an essentially different relationship to the real world in which the individual lives, than other beings, namely, an objective relation coined by penetration and comprehension.\(^{159}\)

For that reason, consciousness is truly "an existent, a being, a species of being,"\(^{160}\) which has a very definite univocal meaning. The latter becomes clear if there is spoken of a privation of consciousness, the tacit supposition of any non-ontological theory of cognition is that there is consciousness, which means that consciousness is something.\(^{161}\)

Therewith, the ontological supposition supports all the cases. Furthermore by it becomes evident that all cognition and all the theories of cognition are based on this presupposition.

\(^{159}\) Nicolai HARTMANN, Das Problem des geistigen Seins, p. 109: "... sie ist inhaltlich erweitert, ist streng genommen ohne angebbare Grenzen, kann sich ausdehnen, soweit Erfahrung und Vermutung sie führen, ... zeigt damit grundsätzlich ein anderes Verhältnis zur wirklichen Welt, in der das Individuum lebt: ein objektives Verhältnis des Eindringens und Erfassens.

\(^{160}\) Cf. Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, p. 182: "... auch ein Seiendes, eine Art des Seins..."

\(^{161}\) Ibid.: "... wenn man von... Fehlen des Bewusstseins spricht. Die stillschweigende Voraussetzung aller nichtontologischen Bewusstseinstheorie ist eben doch die, dass es Bewusstsein gibt, d.h. dass Bewusstsein etwas "ist"..."
The cognizable element of being can only be determined gnoseologically. But the being of cognition and of its object can only be understood ontologically. One cannot treat these problems separately; in abstracto only one can isolate them.\textsuperscript{162}

In the following presentation of Hartmann's \textit{theory}, only those parts of his ontology and gnoseology are referred to which stand directly in relation to the gnoseological transcendence.

Hartmann's inquiry centralizes at first — as previously seen — on the object by viewing its ontological and its gnoseological aspects. From the object, the theory proceeds to the subject and finally to the noetic relation in which both become intentionally united.

Ontologically seen, the object is in itself. It is completely indifferent towards recognition and towards intellectual comprehension and penetration. "From the natural and from the philosophical point of view of cognition the object is the transcendent,"\textsuperscript{163} for cognition is never without the subject, or, cognition is in the subject,

\textsuperscript{162} Nicolai HARTMANN, \textit{Grundzüge...}, p. 318: "Das Erkennbare am Sein ist nur gnoseologisch bestimmbar, das Sein der Erkenntnis und ihres Gegenstandes aber nur ontologisch zu verstehen. Man kann beide Probleme nicht anders als zusammen behandeln. Sie lassen sich uveberhaupt nur in abstracto isolieren."

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 183: "Vom natuerlichen Gesichtspunkt alles Erkennens, auch des philosophischen, ist der Gegenstand das Transzendente..."
and "the mode of cognizing an object is always the mode of a subject."\(^{164}\) Hence, any artificial orientation of cognition towards its object in the existential sphere is unnecessary for the orientation or the direction of the subject — even in reflection — is towards an object. Therefore, Hartmann considers it necessary to clarify the problems first from the point of view "of ontology before treating them gnoseologically — hence, this is not a theoretical arrangement but it is the natural order."\(^{165}\) Naturally the realistic tendency of cognition reaches deep into the ontological realm, because it not only advances to the object and to the transobjective, but in comprehending the nature of being, it recognizes itself, the subject, and with it the transsubjective also. Hartmann adds that the sphere of ontology has to be thought of "as homogeneous unifying sphere of the transcendent and of the immanent."\(^{166}\) This

\(^{164}\) Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 183: "... ihre Art den Gegenstand zu sehen, ist immer die von einem Subjekt aus."

\(^{165}\) Ibid.: "... die Vorausstellung der Ontologie vor der Gnosemologie [ist] keine theoretisch gemachte, sondern die natürliche Ordnung."

\(^{166}\) Ibid., p. 200: "... als durchgehende Einheitssphäre des Transzendenten und Immanenten."
is due to the object, for being is one in spite of being shared by the many. 167

The object of cognition at any given time is, therefore, always a "sector of the sphere of being"168 woven into the nexus of reality, exposed by it for cognition and yet never severed from it. This sector is, to be sure, potentially unlimited for the existent on its part does not resist to any further objectification. It is indifferent towards it. Cognition can explore it in every direction — at least principally.169

Gnoseologically seen, this sector of reality, however, is precisely an existential sector and therefore, a limited something, determined and enclosed for the subject. What lies beyond it is excluded from the momentary cognition. It is the transobjective which lies beyond the momentary comprehension. Through this condition the existential spheres of objection170 at any given time become distinguishable. No further demonstration is necessary to

167 This position reminds us of the Aristotelian problem of the one and the many, but it is not dealt with here by Hartmann. However, as is seen, it is presupposed.

168 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 204.

169 Ibid.: "... potentiell unbegrenzt, denn das Seiende setzt von sich aus der weiteren Objektion keinen Widerstand entgegen, es ist gleichgültig gegen sie. Die Erkenntnis kann prinzipiell in allen Richtungen vordringen."

170 Cf. diagram p. 159: The Spheres of Cognition and of Being.
make clear that the *ratio essendi*, which is searched for by cognition, precedes the *ratio cognoscendi*.

The uniqueness of the intellectual being in the midst of being puts the noetic object which emerges from the plane of being at any given time in position to itself (= subject) and transforms the relation therewith into a gnoseological one. It is in the subject that through the cognitive process there originates the *ratio cognoscendi* or the object image, which stems from the *ratio essendi*. Therewith is shown that the subject is

the very point in reality in which being is reflected — and, since this reflection causes a multitude of representing images — the point in which this reflection takes place widens to a cosmos of multiform representations of being,\(^\text{171}\)

which, on the other hand, are the subject's own representations, because they exist in the subject and through its act, or briefly, because they are subjective representations of objective images, or, in regard to their content, these subjective representations are object-determined, wherefore they are rightly called object-images. These images are

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171 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, p. 204: "... derjenige Punkt im Sein, in welchem sich dieses in sich selbst reflektiert - und da die Reflexion... eine Mannigfaltigkeit repraesentierter Gebilde hervorruft, so erweitert sich der Reflexionspunkt zu einer in sich mannigfaltigen Welt von Repraesentationen des Seienden..."
the obtained aspects of the extramental object in the noetic cosmos of consciousness. This sphere of the subject is, therefore, not simply a psychological sphere, but it is the inner sphere, or the countersphere of the objects, that is, it must be understood as gnoseological sphere.

Hartmann does not claim that the here presented determinations of cognition are an "explanation or even a theory of consciousness." They may, however, be used as an outline towards the progress of the theory. In any case, they seem necessary in order to arrange the spheres of the problems of the theory according to its areas. Hartmann distinguishes three such areas:

a limited psychological sphere,
a logical (ideal) sphere, and
an ontological sphere.

In this threefold confrontation of psychology, logic and ontology the field of the proper (narrower) problem of cognition takes a special middle position through which it connects the other problem areas with one another, but it does not level them out.

172 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 209: "Erklärung, oder auch nur eine Theorie des Bewusstseins..."

173 Ibid., p. 213: "In diesem dreigliedrigen Gegenüber von Psychologie, Logik und Ontologie nimmt das Gebiet des engeren Erkenntnisproblems eine eigenartige Mittelstellung ein, die es mit jenen drei Problemgebieten verbindet, aber nicht in ihnen aufgehen lasst."
If one compares these spheres in Hartmann's theory with the spheres of being with which we have previously dealt, we notice that their arrangement is different although they are based on the spheres of being. Here we are concerned with the theory of cognition in the proper sense, that is, with gnoseology, and here again with a part of it only, namely, with the gnoseological transcendence and its treatment. This spheric difference was brought to attention because it makes clear that whatever sphere may be considered, according to Hartmann, each one is based on the ontic sphere, on being. A philosophical analysis, therefore, cannot ignore the import of the ontological moments upon the problems.

Hartmann's demonstration of the ontological roots of the gnoseological aporias is not an artificial speculation. It begins with the empirical natural cognition which always presupposes being. The relation, too, between subject and object is a natural phenomenon. The seclusion of the conscious subject in its own sphere does not make it isolated from other beings. But a certain "subjection to a definite kind of relation" takes place in which the noetic appropriation of the determinations of the object

174 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 328: "Gebundenheit an eine bestimmte Art der Beziehung...."
result as object images in the subject. This result, however, belongs to the sphere of knowledge already. It is no longer purely gnoseological or object of cognition. As object image, the result of cognition has become intentional content of the intellect or of the consciousness and thereby leaves the sphere of the gnoseological transcendent. Hence, now it can be seen that the gnoseological transcendence in Hartmann's theory is a comprehending of a being-in-itself; this is the clear restriction or the boundary of the genuine act of cognition compared to all the other intellectual acts.

Cognitive intention transcends simply not only the sphere of the subjective states but also the sphere of the mere intentional objects, or, of the for-me-existents; it penetrates to the being-in-itself. 175

175 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 118: "Erkenntnisintention transzendiert eben nicht nur die Sphäre der Ichzustände, sondern auch die des bloss intentional Gegenständlichen, d.h. des bloss fuer mich Seienden, und dringt damit ins Ansichseiende durch." Hartmann still remarks: "Of course, there are many kinds of transcendence, just as there are many peculiar borderline relations. For instance, the transobjective remainder of the momentary objection is transcendent; furthermore there is the realm of the transintelligible to reason; values transcend being; God (as extra-mundum) transcends the world, etc. But all these kinds are not the gnoseological transcendence, with which we are concerned here." "Es gibt selbstverständlich viele Arten der "Transzendenz", genau so viele als es eigenartige Grenzverhältnisse gibt. So ist z.B. das Transobjektive der jeweiligen Objektion transzendent, das Transintelligible der ratio; ebenso etwa sind Werte dem Sein transzendent; Gott (als Extramundaner) der Welt, usw. Alle diese Arten sind nicht die gnoseologische, mit der allein wir es hier zu tun haben."
In regard to a solution of this basic aporia, Hartmann holds that it is sufficient to have

a mere ontologically conditioned relationship between object and subject... in order to transmit the determinations of the object upon a subjective construct; thereby the latter is made objective.\textsuperscript{176}

Such a position, however, does not claim to have found a final solution for — as Hartmann explicitly states — the "how of the transmission of the object-image into the subject, the genesis of the images in the consciousness remains irrational"\textsuperscript{177} (= transintelligible) at least for today's understanding. Nicolai Hartmann then accepts as a solution of the basic gnoseological aporia what he summarizes of his findings:

\textsuperscript{176} Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzuege..., p. 326: "... ein bloss ontologisches Bedingungsverhältnis zwischen Objekt und Subjekt... [zu haben], um die Züge des Objekts auf ein Subjektgebilde zu übertragen und dieses dadurch "objektiv" zu machen."

\textsuperscript{177} Cf. ibid., p. 238; Hartmann, as is known, distinguishes also between the gnoseological and the ontological irrational: "the meaning of the first is irrational in the sense of the unfathomable which, in the ontological order, would mean chance; in the gnoseological order it means the incomprehensible, the unknowable, that which is unaccessible to reason and lies beyond the limits of cognition, or which is the transintelligible." In the latter sense it is used here. "Der ersteren Bedeutung entspricht das Irrationale als das Grundlose, was ontologisch [also] das Zufällige bedeuten wuerde; der letzteren das Irrationale als das der Vernunft Unzugängliche, Unbegreifliche oder Transintelligible."
In the determination of the subject through the object the mutual transcendence fully remains. This transcendence causes no contradiction to the phenomenon of object-awareness. The object is independent from the latter. It stands indifferent towards its cognition. The relation of cognition... is a transcendent relation; it is an ontological relationship which cannot resolve in any inner aspect of the subject.  

Hartmann checked this result of his theory by comparing it with other theories. He measures on them again and again his own position. In general, he criticizes that many contemporary thinkers display a kind of "atavism", that is: they cling to a theory which teaches that cognition is a production within the consciousness, a forming of notions and ideas, or at least a transforming, hence, a process which is characteristic of the synthetic judgment.  

178 Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 362: "... dass in der Bestimmung des Subjekts durch das Objekt die Transzendenz beider gegeneinander nicht aufgehoben wird, sondern voll und ganz bestehen bleibt, und dass durch sie kein Widerspruch gegen das Phaenomen des Objektbewusstseins entsteht, in welchem das Objekt als selbständig und gleichgültig gegen sien Erkanntwerden dasteht. Die Erkenntnisrelation... ist... eine transzendente Relation, ein ontologisches Verhältnis, das in keinem Innenaspekt des Subjekts aufgehen kann." In the same passage Hartmann adds about the admitted irrationality or transintelligibility that it "is not in need of a special justification. It is naturally ontological. However, for that reason, it is not less certain than in the case of a clear understanding of its structure and function. It possesses a degree of hypothetical certainty which marks the unavoidable minimum of metaphysical assumptions."  

179 IDEM, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie", in Kleinere Schriften, I, p. 123: "[...dass] Erkennen ein...
Not only the idealistic schools are based on such a theory. From them it is to be expected. But the correlativism of the theory of knowledge, too, is not free from it, because this correlativism "assumes the insolubility of the mutual connection between subject and object." In the "as-if-philosophy" (Als-Ob-Philosophie) of Hans Vaihinger this

"Hervorbringen" im Bewusstsein ist, ein "Bilden der Vorstellungen und Begriffe", zum mindesten ein "Umbilden", ein Prozess, der sich synthetisch im Urteil vollzieht." Hartmann adds: "This interpretation is taken as Kantian with reference to the authority of the Critique of Pure Reason by its representatives... In Kant there are indications which seem to support such an assumption - most distinctly so in the "transcendental deduction of pure reason". (2nd ed.) There Kant taught that the objects originate directly through intellectual action in a synthesis only. Of course, one seems to forget that many a contrary statement from the same Critique of Pure Reason can be quoted. "Diese Auffassung gilt ihren Vertretern als Kantisch und glaubt sich auf die Autoritaet der Kritik der reinen Vernunft stuetzen zu koennen... In der Tat finden sich bei Kant Wendungen und ganze Partien, die ihr recht zu geben scheinen; am deutlichesten wohl in der "Transzendentalen Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe" (der 2. Ausgabe), wo die Objekte geradezu erst durch die "Verstandeshandlung" der Synthese zustande kommen sollen. Man vergisst dabei freilich, dass sich manches Gegenteilige aus derselben Kritik der reinen Vernunft anfuehren laesst."


181 Werner ZIEGENFUSS, op. cit., II, p. 767: "According to Vaihinger thinking and willing are originally only media in the service of the will. Thinking is not capable to comprehend through pure theoretical cognition the given, the immediately experienced reality. Such a cognition cannot obtain truth in the sense of an accordance with reality. Cognition must be taken as if it were true, that means as fiction. Fictions are inadequate and subjective;
erroneous idea is found. The historical relativism, too, is firmly convinced "that man cannot advance to the objects ... as they are and retain nothing of them but changing opinions." Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology, too, as presented in the Ideen does not advance further. Husserl supplements the intuition of the ideas (eide, Wesensformen) with reflective studies of the spiritual (mental) acts which lead finally to the level of the essences.

But whereto do such theories finally lead, theories which make it impossible to arrive at the truth either because of erroneous premises, or because of a lack of distinction between the true and the false? Such theories actually deny to cognition its proper object, therefore, in their last consequence, these theories arrive at a denial they are imaginary modes of notions, the conclusiveness of which in reality is barred from the very beginning." (Die Philosophie des Als-Ob, p. 606). "Denken ist nicht imstande, das gegebene, die unmittelbare Erlebniswirklichkeit, in rein theoretischer Erkenntnis zu erfassen... Wahrheit im Sinne einer Uebereinstimmung mit der Wirklichkeit vermag sie nicht zu erreichen... Die Erkenntnis [ist] so zu betrachten, als ob sie wahr waere, d.h. eine Fiktion bilden. Fiktionen sind inadaequate, subjektive, bildliche Vorstellungswesen, deren Zutreffen mit der Wirklichkeit von vornherein ausgeschlossen ist."

182 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie", in op. cit., p. 123: "... dass wir an die Gegenstaende, wie sie sind, nicht herankommen und nichts als die wechselnden Auffassungen von ihnen zurueckbehalten."
of being. Therewith would disappear any genuine knowledge and any true science. Cognition divorced from its object — as it is the case in the above mentioned theories — can no longer be called cognition and the tendency of those systems towards total scepticism must become considerably strong for these theories succumb to the circle "into which all such procedures usually run. They come under their own law of the suspension of univocal truth, whereby they extinguish themselves."¹⁸³ All these theories fail having the proper basis. They begin with the supposition that cognition consists in a mental forming (constructing), and because the forming starts from a given, it must be a transforming. If one identifies the content of the data with the variety of perception, the mode of being of the data, however, with reality — as the unwise Neo-Kantian understood it — then the outcome must show that the intellect by its scientific procedure does change (or transform) the given real into a more or less unreal something and that the intellect issues as true cognition what it does change.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie, in op. cit., p. 123: "... dem alles rein negativistische Vorgehen verfaellt. Sie fallen unter ihr eigenes Gesetz der Aufhebung eindeutiger Wahrheit und heben damit sich selbst auf." See there also Hartmann's evaluation of the natural sciences, especially of physical theory, of the micro-mechanics of the atomic processes, etc. He states that any positivism "which makes the empirical data subjective because they are rooted in sense-data" is incapable to provide a final answer and therefore, needs a conversion to ontology.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 125: "... dass die Erkenntnis in einem geistigen Bilden bestehe; und da das Bilden von einem Gegebenen anhebt, so muss es die Form des "Umbildens" haben. Setzt man nun das Gegebene dem Inhalt nach dem Mannigfaltigen der Wahrnehmung gleich, der Seinsweise nach aber dem
Therefore, the real is not recognized but it is mistaken, for "the real is never given as such, neither through the senses, nor in any other elementary form of cognition."\textsuperscript{185} It lies always "outside" the subject (= intellect or consciousness) and, therefore, must necessarily be searched for. "Real, in the strict sense of the word is simply the real existent only."\textsuperscript{186} But the gnoseological transcendence stretches — although in varying degrees — from the lowest to the highest levels of human intellection. "The scientific experience teaches us that we have again and again to return to the data in order to exhaust them."\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{185} Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie", in op. cit., p. 125: "... das Wirkliche ist niemals als solches gegeben, weder durch die Sinne, noch in sonst einer elementaren Erkenntnis."

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.: "'Wirklich' im strengen Sinne ist eben nur das real Seiende."

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.: "Die Erfahrung der Wissenschaft lehrt uns, dass wir immer wieder zum Gegebenen (der Wirklichkeit) zurueckkehren mussen, um es auszuschoepfen..." Cf. the work by Karl RAHNER, Geist in Welt, Muenchen, Koesel-Verlag, 1957, in which the author analyzes the Conversio intellectus ad phantasmata of Thomas Aquinas.
Hence, the object is the important factor which makes the gnoseological theory a true or false theory of cognition. For naturally with the object, the essence of cognition either stands or falls. If the object is seen erroneously as being in the subject, better, as being in the consciousness, as it is the case when sense perception, conception, ideation or any other performed functions of the consciousness or any results of such functions are taken as the starting point of cognition, then, indeed, an object as being-in-itself and existing in the extramental sphere cannot be found. Consequently such cognition (erroneously called that way) is not in need to search for objects in the sphere of being, and then, it is not necessary to seize an object in order to appropriate it. Such a function, however, ceases to be a cognitive one. Such operations of the intellect belong to the immanent sphere of thought. Naturally, the gnoseological transcendence is ignored, for it is not needed to reach the extramental being or a being-in-itself. The realm of reality and the realm of consciousness however, are bridged or connected only through this transcendence, hence, they can come to each other solely through this transcendence, and this transcendence is the basic phenomenon of real cognition. Theories, systems, speculations, etc., which do not take account of this phenomenon, necessarily are doomed to failure.
Hartmann wonders how the notion of the object-in-itself was ever put either in opacity, or how it could be so totally ignored, "since the normal consciousness (or intellect) — when it becomes attentive to that notion (which happens in the conflict of opinions) — never mixes the notion up with the real object."\(^{188}\)

The ponderability of this question led Hartmann to the disputed discovery of the "circle of thinking" (Zirkel des Denkens) by tracing the errors and demanding from the erroneous theories an answer to the question of the real object. Thereby, he comes across a position which abolishes the confrontation of object and subject, in other words, a position which ignores the heterogeneity of object and concept. This theory asks:

What — if anything — do we know of the object which is not contained in our concept (idea) of it? The concept and the judgment, both of them are on the level of the concept and are transformations of the concept. Hence, what then does confront the concept (or what is opposite of the concept)? In last analysis, it seems that this confrontation itself consists merely in our mode of conception, the independence of the object from thought (mei-nung) is itself only an object-we-think-of, a thought. If we suppose in our judgment the object as being-in-itself, this being-in-itself is a supposed one only.

\(^{188}\) Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie", in op. cit., p. 127: "... wo doch das unverbildete Bewusstsein, wenn es überhaupt einmal auf die Vorstellung aufmerksam wird (was z. B. stets im Streit der Meinungen geschieht), ihn niemals mit ihr verwechselt."
If one thinks the object as an independent structure in the extramental sphere, the independence and with it the extramental sphere too are spheres of thought.

This circular current of thought is truly a vicious circle which returns to its starting point within the sphere of consciousness. It presents the argument of the "circle of thinking", which in such an illusory manner acquits itself of the real in-itself-existing object, and if the objects were accepted, this deception would fall back into the ancient error of the duplicity of the world, which is criticized in Plato's philosophy. According to Hartmann, it would be more exact, however, not to speak of a doubling but of a multiplication of the world, for "in every consciousness the concept is different, whereas the object remains identical with itself." The criterion of all

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189 Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie", in op. cit., p. 127: "Was wissen wir denn vom Gegenstande, was nicht in unserer Vorstellung von ihm bestuende? Der Begriff, das Urteil stehen ja selbst in der Ebene der Vorstellung und sind Umbildungen der Vorstellung. Was bleibt also ihr "gegenueber"? Im Grunde ist wohl das Gegenueberstehen selbst nur ein in unserer Vorstellungsweise Bestehendes, die Unabhaengigkeit des Gegenandes von der Meinung selbst nur eine gemeinte. "Setzt" man ihm im Urteil als Ansichseendiend, so ist das Ansichsein ein blossom gesetztes; denkt man ihn sich als selbstaendiges Gebilde ausser dem Bewusstsein, so ist die Selbstaendigkeit, und mit ihr das Aussensein, ein blossom Gedachtes."

190 Ibid., p. 131: "... in jedem Bewusstsein ist die Vorstellung eine andere, wahrend der Gegenstand identisch verharrt."
cognition versus thinking remains positively bound to the gnoseological transcendence which is not only conditioned by, but necessary for the object-subject relation, for in the cognizing consciousness an object image originates which is adequate to the external object, but the latter remains for ever a transcendent object-in-itself, which is not identical or one with the image.\textsuperscript{191}

Therefore, cognition neither is, nor can be a mental construct. It is an act, which is in continuous progress by dealing with the enigmatic nature of being. The transcendent cognitive relation progresses with cognition, and it, too, increases its range within the surrounding world.\textsuperscript{192}

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\textsuperscript{191} Nicolai HARTMANN, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie", in op. cit., p. 130: "[...dass] im erkennenden Bewusstsein ein inhaltliches Gebilde dem Gegenstande außer ihm... entspricht, ... das immer ein vom Gegenstande Verschiedenes bleibt..."

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., p. 176: "... fortschreitende Arbeit an den Rätselfragern des Seienden... und das Transzendenzverhältnis in ihr, schreitet selbst fort, ist in staendiger Auswitung ueber die umgebende Welt begriffen."
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CONCLUSION

SUMMARIZING CRITIQUE OF
NICOLAI HARTMANN'S GNOSCOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE

From Hartmann's Perspective
From a Realistic Point of View
in general
in particular: Object
                      Truth
                      Progress of Cognition
The detailed presentation of Hartmann's gnoseological transcendence is now open to an evaluation and a critique. A critique proves itself justified if it can show its point of departure, or its basis. The critique offered here views the problem of the gnoseological transcendence from two perspectives, namely,

from the immanent point of view of Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition, and
from a realistic (orthodox realistic or traditional scholastic) perspective.

Seen from the immanent point of view, the gnoseological transcendence is the cardinal point from which the logical Idealism and Neokantianism can be attacked and overcome. For the non-identity of object and subject, or their gnoseological heterogeneity, established with the proven gnoseological transcendence, points unequivocally to and shows the object's foundation in being, i.e., the object's pre-gnoseological existence. Therefore, it is proven that the object of cognition is in itself and is, therefore, causally independent from and in time before the cognition through a subject. Whereas, when a production of an object through a subject is either assumed or actually taking place, then we deal no longer with real cognition but with thinking, imagining, or phantasy. But — as Hartmann shows — the object of cognition is not produced or generated by a cognizing subject. The object which at any given time is
recognized is extramentally given — according to Hartmann's view of the hierarchy of being — on a certain existential level or in a sphere of being and is in itself whether it is ever recognized by a subject or not. Such a given real object when recognized influences through its effect the subject and challenges, so to say, the subject to accomplish an act of cognition. Thus the original givenness of the object is the first prerequisite of any possible cognition. Therefore, the cognitive intention of a subject is not aiming at an "intentional" but at a real object. This fact is indicated also in the original meaning of the word "object", signifying the "standing against" of two given beings. Through such a direction or alignment of the intention cognition penetrates the "brazen ring" of consciousness and causes it to transcend or to step over itself, when aiming at an object which is in itself and therefore is a transcendent object, i.e., a being of another kind than the subject. Accordingly, in real cognition always real subjects face real objects and both become the poles of a genuine gnoseological relation (a relation which Hartmann finds to be a fivefold one, as shown in the previous exposition and through the unchanged diagrams of Nicolai Hartmann).

The object of cognition is a being-in-itself and is therefore never in the cognizing subject, it remains neutral to its being recognized, unaltered by it, may even outlast
the subject and its own recognition. But in the subject there results an image of the at any given time recognized, external object through the effect of the object and the cognitive act of the subject. The more exact the in the subject generated and existing image of the object is, the more perfect is the cognition. And the more perfect the cognition is, the more justifiably is it called a truth in view of its relation to the object, which it pictures. Hence, in Hartmann's theory we meet again a notion of truth which equals the adaequatio intellectus et rei of the Scholastics, however, this truth is subject-immanent, i.e., resulting and existing in the subject and therefore the logical or gnoseological truth only. Hartmann's concept of truth therefore is neither the one of Antiquity, nor the one of the Middle Ages, for the ancient and the medieval notion of truth was unequivocally based upon the truth of reality, or the ontic truth. Cognition was considered a more or less perfect grasping of the essence of beings through which the recognizing intellect participated in the intellectus archetypus. In Hartmann's philosophy this is not accepted. The admitted apriori elements of cognition, occurring on all levels of cognition, have hypothetical character, i.e., they are subject-produced assumptions for the phenomenology of cognition shows that a recognizing subject does set up, first of all, certain assumptions or hypotheses stimulated by
experience, in order to prove them by re-checking with them the given reality, and, when proven, to apply them to reality. Here, too, Hartmann's method or criterion of "several instances" becomes applied. It follows, that Hartmann's apriori elements of cognition are of a hypothetical nature and subject-conditioned, but they are not founded upon the unchangeableness and eternity of essences. However, they meet from the subject's side the real, given object with certain notions of categories and of being. This is the case not only on the scientific, but on any noetic level. Hartmann stresses, however, that such identical elements in object and subject "are not the categories themselves", as Hegel and other idealists assumed, and that they are not "even definitions of them; they are the hypothetical representations of the undefinable and in their nucleus actually never graspable categorical essences only."¹

Within Hartmann's theory of cognition such a forming of hypothetical apriori notions and principles or laws becomes a necessity for any objective cognition, because the progress of knowledge is based upon an awareness of an insufficient cognition of beings or upon the knowledge or

cognition of not-knowing. Only the cognition of a lack of knowledge, of an imperfection of insight or grasp does stimulate the mind to conquer more and more the realm of the trans-objective reality. And truly, the "circle of (recognized) objects" is always surrounded by the immeasurable ocean of the unknown, perhaps even of the for human grasp unobtainable, impenetrable given. In other words, according to Nicolai Hartmann the real object remains transcendent, and the subject is ever newly challenged to transcend its own consciousness because reality remains to a certain degree supra-rational, irrational. It seems then that this is the new formulation, the new admission of the ancient confession "Ignoramus et ignorabimus".

Built upon such insights Hartmann's theory of cognition becomes therefore an aporetic metaphysics of cognition, and he expresses that already in the restrained, prognostic title of Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, i.e. basic characteristics of a metaphysics of cognition, for it, too, cannot determine and predicate the ultimate and the last of human cognition in spite of the advanced information of the twentieth century. In the preceding chapters Hartmann's theory was therefore presented as an aporetic metaphysics, precisely in reference to Nicolai Hartmann's distinctions between ontology and metaphysics, between problematic and systematic thinking and within this frame the gnoseological
aporias were introduced. The concentration of the second chapter shows the gnoseological transcendence, since only upon the latter the breakthrough and a breaking-away from idealism of any form is possible. This was Hartmann's great concern: to deliver cognition from the logico-idealistic bondage. Therefore, this is considered Hartmann's proper merit: the in-itself-being object of cognition can no longer be an illusion for a generating mind does not produce it. Whoever will follow Hartmann's thought will be led to a cognition of the real object in its own existence, for Hartmann's philosophy points to the real world with its proper hierarchy of being, its own structures, categories, principles and laws, with its relations and its dependence. Hartmann's advancement to the gnoseological transcendence then — intended and shown by Hartmann as the necessary basis for realism — can be considered by realistic thinkers at least a highly valuable attempt, a beginning or even a road to a crossing over the idealistic border and to a refusal of logical Idealism.

What then can be said about Nicolai Hartmann's gnoseological transcendence from a realistic (Aristotelian-Scholastic) point of view?

First of all the basis of such a criticism is to be shown. The orthodox realist knows about and acknowledges the gnoseological transcendence. Without such a
transcendence, truth (a true cognition of the world, of essences of beings, even partial cognition) would not be possible. But the truths, the essences are not only recognized or known. They cannot be recognized or known if they are not first in themselves and before any cognition. The orthodox realist, therefore, holds that there is an ontic, an ontological truth, or in this context, a pre-gnoseological truth in the things.

Whenever such a realistic thinker gets acquainted with Hartmann's aporetic metaphysics of cognition, he will be at first surprised of Hartmann's thought, which in many points is in concord with Aristotle, Aquinas and Scholasticism. This impression may have caused Gottlieb Soehngen to admit: "Nicolai Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition has many essential starting points in common with the Aristotelean Scholastic thinking." This is not astonishing. Hartmann himself says that "it needs a total revolution of the world view through which the phenomenon of the natural object-awareness becomes changed (auf den Kopf gestellt wird)" in order to be able to agree with the idealistic thinkers. "For regardless how much one may attempt to

2 Gottlieb SOEHNGEN, Sein und Gegenstand, Muenster, Aschendorff'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1930, p. 103.
interpret transcendence into its reverse (immanence), one cannot ignore it in the phenomenon. And the fact that all consciousness means with its object a transcendent remains." Nevertheless, the realistic thinker has not only to deal with Hartmann. He has to get down to the individual problems and the differences of the positions.

The greatness of a philosopher may be measured, at least partially, on the attitude the thinker displays in regard to the real problems and especially to those urgent and pertinent in his own era. Hartmann states that no thinker begins in philosophy with a blank. To everyone a certain level of problems, of knowledge and of principles is transmitted. Indeed, even Aristotle found a certain problem-situation given, i.e., he found the Sophistic, the Platonic and other theories in which the epigone could detect inevitable provocations and valuable premises. Aristotle saw and responded to the pre-Aristotelian positions with critique, corrections and agreements. What made Aristotle immortal was the fact that he bent the pre-Aristotelian thinking to realism by measuring the theorems of his forerunners on reality.

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3 Cf. Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., 1925, p. 76.
During the Middle Ages the word was coined of the "waxen nose of the authority" which allowed to be shaped or reshaped. Thomas Aquinas acted accordingly when he, in the wealth of thoughts of the thirteenth century and in the wealth of Christian tradition, accomplished his great philosophical synthesis by adjusting transmitted ideas to the at that time "modern" level.

Immanuel Kant was, according to his own report, "aroused from slumber" by the bias of the English empiricists. Hence, to this problematic situation of the eighteenth century the world owes the three Kantian "Critiques".

In the post-Kantian, post-Hegelian era Nicolai Hartmann found himself philosophically challenged by the gnoseological situation and therefore, he dealt with the idealistically imbalanced problem of cognition. Nothing had made philosophy more disrespected than the theories of the neo-Kantian rationalists and of the logical idealists. These systems preconstructed their theories in order to explain and interpret reality and truth according to their immanently generated ideas.

Besides Hartmann recognized early that the error of a system of thought does not remain limited to an ideology. It spreads contagiously to other large and significant regions of human existence. For instance, during his own lifetime, Hartmann had experienced in Russia the effects
of Dialectical Materialism and later in Germany those of the superman ideology. Therefore, it seems, Hartmann felt obliged to break away from any form of idealism and to turn radically to Realism. He devoted himself strongly, courageously and completely to this task. The separation from the Marburg School was taken as a necessary consequence of his decision. Hartmann began to follow up the "idea" and to pursue it into its origin in reality. He searched back on the phenomena of the given to the object of cognition and found it a being-in-itself. From there then he took his gnoseological orientation and completed his philosophical synthesis. He did it with inexorable logical accuracy and in a brilliant style. From then on he considered himself no longer an idealist, but an ontologist, for his philosophy had become realistic and independent as he stated in the first sentence of his fundamental and important early work Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis: "The... enquiries are based on the understanding that cognition is not a creating, a generating or producing of the object as the Idealism of the old and the new version wants to teach us, but it is a grasping of something which exists already before any cognition and which is independent from it."

This basic orientation and attitude of Hartmann cannot be ignored by realistic thinkers.
For the criticism here it is now especially important to see what Hartmann actually means with cognition. He described it: "Cognition always is a grasping of an object which is in itself, and therefore, it is not a having of an objectivity, of a mere intentional object". In this statement lies in nuce also the thesis of the gnoseological transcendence. Three issues are here especially important for a critique of Hartmann's thought:

Firstly, the object;  
secondly, the truth;  
thirdly, the progress of cognition.

All three issues depend more or less on a transcendence and the critique has to measure on them Nicolai Hartmann's realism.

As shown in the previous exploration Hartmann's concept of the object is in concord with the one of the orthodox realist. Both hold that cognition does not aim at the image of the object in the intellect but at the real, extramental thing-in-itself. This was expressed by the Scholastics in the statement that cognition does not aim at the object's esse intentionale but at the object's esse reale. The Scholastics called this intellectual alignment or direction the intentio prima. Hartmann introduces in his theory the

4 Cf. Nicolai HARTMANN, Grundzüge..., p. 103-121.
CONCLUSION

term intentio recta as equivalent to intentio prima, the
term intentio obliqua for the Scholastic intentio secunda,
which reflects on the image. Hartmann wants these funda­
mental differences clearly distinguished in his gnoseolo­
gical theory. So did the Scholastics. For the intentio
obliqua deals with the picture of the extramental object in
the intellect and can therefore be influenced by the
receiver. It is indeed more or less perfect according to
its degree of similarity with the thing-in-itself and the
mode of the knower. But this image is never the object of
the intentio recta. Hartmann's theory harmonizes here with
the traditional realistic notion of the object. Gottlieb
Soehngen even asks, "whether the notion of transcendence was
formulated as radical by Thomas as it is done in Hartmann's
Metaphysik der Erkenntnis". 5

The second issue is the problem of truth. The
transcendent concept of cognition necessarily comprises the
transcendent concept of truth. Gnoseological (logical)
truth, respectively error, is always either the agreement or
the disagreement of the obtained cognitive image with the
thing-in-itself. This is strongly underlined in Hartmann's
theory also. 6 Such a concept of truth harmonizes with the

6 Cf. Grundzuge..., 1925, p. 54-56.
Scholastic *Veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem*. However, this is the gnoseological (logical) notion of truth only. The orthodox realist knows also the ontological truth which is found in the essence of the thing and which is considered the measure of all logical, respectively gnoseological truth.

Hartmann now takes strictly the gnoseological truth as truth proper. He was certainly influenced by his Aristotelian study and by the phenomenological method *(sui generis)* according to which truth in the proper sense of the word can be spoken of only in regard to cognition and knowledge but not in regard to the thing. Truth as property of the thing presupposes the agreement of the thing with its idea, its original design, or, Thomistically speaking, with its "eternal exemplar". Hartmann does not accept this concept of truth. He limits his notion of truth to a subject-immanent (consciousness), human truth. In his philosophy he neither presupposes nor accepts a personal creative, divine intelligence. As a hypothesis it would not be helpful, and the possibility to prove or demonstrate it is not seen by Hartmann. Such a divine intelligence would be to Hartmann especially an even trans-metaphysical mystery, with which to deal he refuses, for it would be beyond philosophical reasoning. Here then the critical question must be asked: Whether Hartmann's concept of truth does not overburden the
gnoseological transcendence again from the side of the subject? Is here Hartmann's realism not weakened or even endangered again? For followed up into its last consequences such a concept of truth — and finally also of certainty — seems to open the door to an encroachment of the immanent idealistic view. Hence, from this point of view, the immu-
nity of Hartmann's realism seems in danger.

An excursus appears here helpful. Thomas Aquinas himself accepted the Aristotelian concept of truth. Through the Christian tradition — which, although it was known to Hartmann, was not Hartmann's background — the Augustinian verum est id quod est was assigned to Thomas, and the rationes aeternae pointed the way to the roots of the truth of things in the Divine Intelligence. To Thomas Aquinas and to Nicolai Hartmann truth is and remains relational, i.e., it is subjectively objective. In the philosophies of these thinkers truth means not an object of, but the objectivity of cognition in the subject.

Naturally, Thomas had the invaluable advantage which Hartmann did not accept, that he understood noetic subjectiv-
ity within the human realm s a determined, partly passive and limiting subjectivity. In the divine order, however, truth was to Thomas a determining, measuring, creative, personal intelligence. Consequently, there was no difficulty
to maintain the relational character of his concept of truth. His concept of truth was not only not endangered but deepened, safeguarded and elevated in the Divine Spirit. Therefore, Thomas can say convinced and convincingly:

The Divine Ideas are certain principles or forms or the stable and incommunicable reasons of the things which have no other causal forms and which are therefore eternal, immutable and dwell in the Divine Intelligence. But although they themselves neither develop nor vanish, it is assumed that all the other things which may develop and vanish, or which actually develop and vanish, are formed according to them.  

And again Thomas explains:

What the Greek called "idea", is called by the Latinist "form". Therefore, with ideas are meant forms which are valid for other things and which exist for themselves outside the things. Such a form can serve a twofold purpose: either it is the original reason of the thing of which it is the form, or, it is the intelligibility in which sense it is spoken of when referred to the forms of intelligible things that they are in the knowing intellect. In both cases the supposition of ideas is necessary.

7 THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 15, a. 2: "Ideae sunt principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quia ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae divina intelligentia continentur. Sed cum ipsae neque orientur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit."

8 Ibid., a. 1: "'Idea' enim graece, latine 'forma' dicitur: unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem alicujus rei praeter ipsam existens, ad duo esse potest: vel ut sit exemplar ejus cujus dicitur forma; vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente. Et quantum ad utrumque est necesse ponere ideas."
On such grounds Saint Thomas comes to the conclusion:

Hence, the things of nature are constituted between two intellects and are said to be true according to their similarity with the one or the other of the two. Namely, the things are said to be true according to their similarity with the Divine Intellect inasmuch as they fulfill the end towards which the Divine Intellect has ordered them... A thing is said to be true according to its similarity with the human intellect, inasmuch as nature aims to produce a true opinion of itself. The first relation of truth spoken of is prior to the other. For the relation to the Divine Intellect precedes the relation to the human intellect. Even if there were never such a thing as a human mind, nevertheless the things would be called true because of their relation to the Divine Intelligence.  

Hartmann never arrived at such a conclusion bridging with it the gnoseo-ontological hiatus. The gnoseological transcendence in Nicolai Hartmann's theory of cognition shows no such final anchorage of cognition neither in a theory of participation nor in an analogia entis. Hartmann's transcendence remains in the horizontal dimension of cognition, i.e. inner-worldly, inner-cosmic. It is not secured through a

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9 THOMAS AQUINAS, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 2: "Res ergo naturalis inter duos intellectus constituta, secundum adaequationem ad utrumque vera dicitur; secundum enim adaequationem ad intellectum divinum dicitur vera, in quantum implet hoc ad quod est ordinata per intellectum divinum... secundum autem adaequationem ad intellectum humanum dicitur res vera, in quantum nata est de se formare veram aestimatio-nem;... Prima autem ratio veritatis per prius inest rei quam secunda, quia prior est comparatio ad intellectum divinum quam humanum; unde, etiam si intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur verae in ordine ad intellec-tum divinum..."
connection with the vertical line of cognition which ascends and transcends to the meta-cosmic realm of the Divine. This then is the reason for not having a final solution neither for cognition nor for truth. If Hartmann's excellent and clear dealing with cognition — although it is throughout inner-worldly oriented — could find and incorporate the vertical dimension of the idea, it would no longer remain a mere aporetic metaphysics, for it could view the summit of transcendence and from there it could find a still more satisfactory answer and its last and ultimate transcendence.

The third point viewed for measuring Hartmann's theory of the gnoseological transcendence is the progress of cognition. Through the knowledge of the unknown or through the cognition of the inadequacy, of the incorrectness, of the lack of cognition the human intellect is urged again and again to strive for greater similarity, for more exact adequacy, which is for truth. Therefore, the intellect strives for deeper comprehension of the real, of the world, of the universe and its cause.

In the progress of cognition appears therefore again a transcendence which is, according to Hartmann, a trans-subjective and a trans-objective one. For in progressing cognition aims at an element of the thing which is not yet known, which is not yet objectified. Hence, the consciousness transcends not only the subjective sphere but also the
objectified region. This phenomenon gives new strength to Hartmann's proof of the transcendent, respectively to the argument against the production or generation of the idea in the subject as it was taught by the logical idealists of Marburg. Precisely through the progress of cognition it becomes obvious that the thing remains in itself, remains neutral, indifferent towards cognition. The phenomena show that the object of cognition in its existence and essence remains untouched of any changes and variations which, however, occur in the cognition of the individual as well as in the knowledge of mankind and in the sciences.\(^{10}\)

Here another moment of agreement with Scholasticism can be seen. In his Summa Saint Thomas distinguishes: "Alius est modus intelligentis in intelligendo, quam modus rei in existendo."\(^{11}\) The existing thing in itself, which is recognized and acknowledged in Thomas' and Hartmann's philosophy, however, is in the Thomistic theory firstly an idea embedded in a created being, as shown in the previous excursus, secondly, an idea ordered toward a created intellect. Hartmann sees the human intellect ordered towards a cognition

\(^{10}\) Cf. Grundzüge..., p. 52-54, 67-71, 99-102 and others.

\(^{11}\) Summa Theologicae, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1.
of things (cf. his a-teleological concept of the universe) which are never completely exhaustible. They reserve always a mysterious, impenetrable remnant, a particle of trans-intelligibility or irrationality. Hartmann, greatly influenced by modern phenomenology and the findings of scientific psychology\(^{12}\) takes the limitations of the human intellect as the borderline of possible objectification. Consequently, he diverges here again from the Scholastic viewpoint according to which all things are ordered to man, but man is ordered to God. Here too, Hartmann remains consciously inner-worldly and sees the progress of cognition in spite of its obvious transcendence within the anthropological sphere. Hartmann measures the phenomena and the dimensions of the so far achieved human knowledge and draws the line between the objectified and the transobjective. The transobjective region, be it in a single thing, be it in the universe, becomes the basis for Hartmann's theory of irrationality or of trans-intelligibility. Apparently impressed by Hegel's word "The truth is the whole", Hartmann concludes that only when the whole of being could be grasped,

\(^{12}\) Modern Ganzheits- and Gestalt-psychology have shown, for instance, that the "naked" perception of an isolated fact or being or thing proves to be an illusory abstraction in every regard.
or be penetrated and known, the single thing, which is a cosmic momentum, a mesh of the whole, then it too, can be truly recognized and known. The full meaning then of the being-in-itself can be applied only to the world as a whole. The whole world is the "proper object" of a cognizing subject, although the subject itself is a part of the whole. In this sense then, too, all transcendence, all progress of cognition leads to the ontic sphere.

But the human intellect cognizes the determinations of the whole and of a single being — as the phenomena show. These determinations which are known by the individual and/or by mankind are given always within and through the basic ontic relation. They are proportioned to the pre-gnoseological existential relation: man-world; they determine only that "part of the universe" which is so far objectified and they therefore can be the assignment of an individual and/or of many, and of the specialized sciences. Whatever man objectifies anew of the trans-objective sphere that can be obtained only through the gnoseological transcendence which enlarges the "circle of objects". But human cognition will never exhaust the trans-objective realm.

This summary and critique then shows that through Hartmann's philosophy in general, through his metaphysics of cognition and his theory of the gnoseological transcendence
in particular a philosophical progress was achieved. It may be pointed out that Hartmann's contributions appear as a broad basis for a continuation of the domestic dialogue and as a challenge especially for Neo-Scholasticism. In it is given a promising possibility to advance, and this not only because of the concord of certain positions found in both philosophical systems (certainly many more may be found than those discovered and elaborated so far), and which doubtlessly will result in surprising affirmations of traditional views, but especially also because of the diverging positions. The latter seem a suitable starting ground for reciprocal corrections and complementations and may therefore contribute to a new transcendence as is to be hoped for in any progress of human knowledge.
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SUMMARY

The submitted thesis on The Gnoseological Transcendence in Nicolai Hartmann's Metaphysics of Cognition is limited to the transcendental problem of cognition within Nicolai Hartmann's philosophy and vision. Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) wrote his works in German. Therefore, the original sources were available in that language only. From that fact stem some complications for the English presentation of Hartmann's ideas. Hartmann was not only an original thinker, he expressed himself also in words coined and made by and for his own insights. Consequently the reader may find some difficulties in the English presentation which, however, are due rather to the translation than to Hartmann's thought.

In the introduction, the thesis offers a brief sketch of Nicolai Hartmann's life and philosophical development, and of his works. The special concern of the introduction is to acquaint the reader with Hartmann's philosophical metanoia from the logical idealism of the Marburg School to a surprisingly realistic standpoint which, of course, estranged Hartmann from contemporary idealistic thinkers and from the Neo-Kantians.

Hartmann's philosophical itinerary - an ascent - is in the introduction retraced along the chronological
listing and introduction of his writings in which Hartmann actualized a continuous dialogue with the thinkers of the past centuries and with the contemporary schools and/or systems of Western thought. In these works Hartmann shows himself not only the epigone of the great philosophers, he also uses his synoptic insights and knowledge of the systems and schools as basis for a healthy criticism of the fore-runners and of the contemporaries and from this background emerges Hartmann's ontological orientation, i.e. his grasp of reality and his understanding of cognition.

Hartmann's acquaintance with the modern sciences (mathematics, biology, medicine, astronomy, and others), his mastery of style, and his own method (starting with and based upon the phenomena of the material objects of his studies) show him as one of the important thinkers of the twentieth century within the middle-European area.

After the bio-bibliographical introduction of Hartmann an analysis of the wording of the theme seemed advisable because of the equivocal use of some terms.

In chapter one the contour of Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition is offered. First of all, Hartmann's distinctions between problematic and systematic thinking, between the traditional and his own understanding of metaphysics, between knowledge in general and cognition in particular are presented in order to make known Hartmann's fundamental
concepts and also to prevent dangerous confusion in this realm of philosophical concepts and terminology. A condensed description of the gnoseological aporias follows this clarification. The problem of cognition in general is focussed and analyzed into its aporias. This preparation leads then organically to the fundamental aporia of the gnoseological transcendence. Consequently, the first chapter concentrates on Hartmann's theory of the gnoseological main problems, namely on Hartmann's analysis of the historical apriorism, on the problem of the criterion of truth, of the problem-awareness, and, finally, on the problem of the progress of cognition. Thereby it was necessary to explore and explain to some extent Hartmann's own method especially the one which he used in his metaphysics of cognition. This methodical approach moves in three steps, namely,

firstly, it deals with the phenomenological description of the gnoseological data,
secondly, it shows their aporetics,
thirdly, it concludes in a theory or with a treatment of the aporias and problems.

In order to facilitate the understanding of more difficult parts of the problems some of Hartmann's diagrams appeared useful and were therefore inserted. From this preparation the thesis proceeds to the central problem of cognition.
The second chapter deals thoroughly with the aporia of the gnoseological transcendence and the proper elements of cognition, namely, with the object and the subject of cognition, and with the gnoseological relation of both of them. Thereby it seemed of importance to show especially and to stress the rooting of the gnoseological poles (object and subject) and of their relation in the real, in being, i.e. in the ontic sphere. Methodically the steps of Hartmann's own approach (descriptive, phenomenological and aporetical) were closely followed. These steps lead finally to Hartmann's theory of the gnoseological transcendence and culminate in the finding that the ontological supposition is the necessary starting point for any theory of cognition. For the gnoseological object of any real cognition (intentio recta) is in the given, real, ontic sphere. If the object—by error—is seen as being in the subject, or as constructed or imagined by the subject, then a being-in-itself existing in the extra-mental sphere cannot be discovered. Such a function of the intellectual faculty cannot be called a real cognition for such immanent operations belong, properly speaking, to the sphere of thought. The world of reality and the world of consciousness, however, are brought together only through transcendence which therefore must be considered the basic phenomenon of real cognition and which is the true criterion of it.
In the determination of the subject through the object a mutual transcendence remains. But this transcendence causes no contradiction to the phenomenon of object-awareness since the object remains independent from or neutral towards the subject and its cognitive act. However, the relation of cognition, originating from this confrontation and from the transcendence is a gnoseological relation based upon an ontological relationship between the two poles and which, too, transcends in as much as it can never be exhausted by and through the cognitive function of the subject — into the ontic realm.

Such data and holdings lead to the conclusion that Hartmann's theory of cognition can be considered immanently an aporetic metaphysics of cognition for although it advances beyond the idealistic views and teachings and corrects them, it does not and cannot offer a final answer or solution of the gnoseological transcendence, but it shows that this transcendence is the basis for gnoseological realism and stresses this fact strongly. Therefore, Hartmann's contribution must be considered a breaking through the idealistic frontiers and a strong refutation of the logical idealism.

But from the point of view of orthodox realism (= here Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy) some cautious reservations and justified questions remain. These center
upon Hartmann's concept of truth. Hartmann's truth is a logical, gnoseological truth only, based upon the gnoseological relational data, and is, therefore, limited to the subject's sphere. With this then a tendency towards an overburdening of the gnoseological transcendence from the side of the subject seems to endanger or at least to weaken Hartmann's realism. Hartmann does not and cannot bridge the gnoseo-ontological hiatus with a theory of ontological truth. Consequently, his theory of cognition remains somewhat vulnerable and/or open for an encroachment of idealistic inclinations. But on the whole, Hartmann's contribution to Western philosophy and to a penetration of reality by philosophical insights appear a broad basis and are a promising possibility to advance in the direction of realism.
CONSTRUCTIONS

TO

THE EPHEMEROLOGICAL TRANSFORMANCE ...

p. 16 Note 1: see Idem, transl. by C. E. Schuetzinger in
p. 31 last paragraph 2nd line: "...Hartmann's study the problem."
Omit "of".
p. 40 6th line from below up: "A priori cognition..." (end of line)
p. 65 Heading (IV): "Progress of Cognition"; complete arrows in the
diagram showing the space for the transobjective.
p. 85 Note 100: middle of 8th line: "co-progressing" (not "c").
p. 97 Note 120 3rd last line change "it dures..." into "It allows u.
p. 119 last line of text: change comma into ";"p.
127 complete dotted lines with opposing arrows such as \[<----<\]
p. 147 last line: "...but the acts transcend."
p. 158 1st quote (42): "in the transobjective (sphere)."
p. 151 2nd last line "of knowledge" (instead of "to").
p. 166 6th last line (text) "itself as being present...";
note 54, 3rd line: "den Funktionen und...
4th line: "Prinzipien also,.."
p. 170 note: "Geflecht..."
p. 174 text, last line omit "to";
note, 3rd paragraph, 5th line: "W. Hartmann..."
note 60: 4th last line, omit "..." insert "," only.
p. 168 3rd quote, 1st line: "clear-cut unity".
189 2nd last line: "...dass es es waelt..."
194 first quote, 3rd line "neutralizes through the antinomy..."
p. 207 note 135, 3rd paragraph, 1st line: "...ich verhilft bieten...
p. 212 note (143) last line: "...Entwicklungsstufen..."p.
218 quote (155) 1st line omit one "from".
p. 221 note 152 close with "."p.
229 note 176 3rd line "...um die Zuge..."
p. 232 note, 1st paragraph, 4th last line "...a.h. eine Fiktion bildet
(omit "n")p.
236 quote, 4th last line "(Meinung)..."
p. 238 text last paragraph 2nd line put in quotation after: It is an
act, "...etc...world". 192
p. 249 3rd line omit line "Idealism" cf. Realism in next line.
p. 258 5th line "...findings..."
AD: BIBLIOGRAPHY

pages:

1* 3rd entry last line "...Klassen...

2* Etica...follows in alphabetical order after Ethik, see p.3*.

4* 8th entry: "Leibniz. Zu seinem...."

9* Start page with added entry as follows:

Continue with
---------- "Die Erkenntnis- und Seinsproblematik...."

13* last entry first line, separate: "....wirklich-kidsprobleme"

15* under BRUESEL, second entry first line: "...Raum und Zeit und d:


35* add after LEWKOWITZ:


47* last line "Monatsschr...."

48* add after Schottlaender:


51* third entry first line: "...Harburg-Wilhelms- etc."

54* fifth entry second line: drop g, write "wissenschaft durch,...' second last entry, second line separate from first line: "Unbestimmtheitsrelation"

57* last entry first line: "...Handwörterbuch...."

58* last entry second and third line separate: "...Wissenschaft...."

first line write: Tatwelt und Erfahrungswissen.

C. E. Schuetzinger