HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF SELFHOOD: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE PROCESS OF WHOLENESS AND THE CHRISTIAN'S
LIFE OF FREEDOM IN C. JUNG AND R. NIEBUHR

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Graduate Studies of the University
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<td>ACU</td>
<td>The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious.</td>
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<td>&quot;C&amp;S-C&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Human Creativity and Self-Concern in Freud's Thought.&quot;</td>
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<td>ICE</td>
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<td>MMIS</td>
<td>Moral Man in Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>The Nature and Destiny of Man.</td>
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<td>POP</td>
<td>The Practice of Psychotherapy.</td>
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<td>PR:WE</td>
<td>Psychology and Religion: West and East</td>
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<td>RN:RSPT</td>
<td>Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought.</td>
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<td>SDH</td>
<td>The Self and the Dramas of History.</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche</td>
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<td>SNE</td>
<td>The Structure of Nations and Empires</td>
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<td>ST</td>
<td>Symbols of Transformation.</td>
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<td>&quot;TinM&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The Truths in Myths.&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;TofS&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The Tyranny of Science.&quot;</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between human selfhood and the person of Jesus Christ has been a prime interest to the present writer for several years. Interest in this relationship was initially aroused by two statements in the New Testament that appear contradictory when looked at from a psychological point of view. These two statements, believed by Christians to be sayings of Jesus, are recorded in all three Synoptic Gospels. In these Jesus speaks variously of the importance of loving oneself (Matthew 22.36-40 and parallels), of leaving self behind, and of finding one's true self (Matthew 16.24-26 and parallels). In the first passage it is made clear that love of God, love of one's neighbor, and love of oneself are all intimately interrelated. In the second, the true self is represented as a goal of life which is of greater value than any material possession but as one which may be forfeited, or not attained, in the normal processes of living unless certain conditions are met. These conditions, as applied to the self seeking to become free and whole, are expressed in the following terms: "he must leave self behind; he must take up his cross and come with me."¹

¹ The New English Bible: New Testament (Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, 1961) introduces the terms self and true self. This is not a literal rendering of the Greek text of Matthew 16.24f. As is most
INTRODUCTION

Thus it would seem that Jesus spoke on the one hand of a self to be loved, and on the other of a self to be denied, and that he considered that there was also a true self to be found in the process of becoming free and whole. The psychological contradiction disappears when it is recognized that the term self is here being used with three rather different connotations. The question then naturally arises whether it is appropriate and helpful to use the common term "self" of that which is to be loved, that which is to be denied, and that which is to be found in the following of Christ. Do these three belong together or are the differences of such an order that separate terms would make clearer the differences in the three concepts?

Today the term self is used in many different ways by psychologists and there is no common agreement as to its common, the text here uses the reflexive pronoun ἐμ疴 for self but in Greek, as in English, this form is capable of many interpretations, one of them being that which the translators of The New English Bible have seen fit to use. The word which has been translated as true self is the common noun ἀλήθεια which is more often rendered as "life" or "soul" but, as Arndt and Gingrich point out in their A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament (Chicago, 1957), "it is often impossible to draw hard and fast lines between the meanings of this many-sided word." Two of the possible renderings which they offer clearly reflect an integrative function (see W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich (eds.), A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament, p. 901; English translation of Walter Bauer, Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments (4th ed.).
precise meaning. In the first chapter we must look closely at this diversity of meanings encountered in the disciplines of theology and psychology. Theologians have historically tended to deny much common ground between the three concepts: self to be loved, self to be denied, and true self to be found. Our experience suggests that in the past, theological emphasis has commonly been laid on the self to be denied, and this is spoken of without the balancing awareness that the purpose for which the denial is enjoined may also involve a concept of self. Likewise, those theologians who have spoken of a self to be found in the following of Christ have rarely attempted to be specific about the relation between this self and the "self" left behind.

We believe that reserve in dealing with the concept of self widely encountered in psychology and theology along with ambiguities surrounding the term, derives largely from imprecision in using the word "self," and from misconceptions of its nature and that of the psychological and theological disciplines. Different connotations of and compounds in which self has been employed often go unrecognized.

Thus, for example, self-denial may be regarded as the direct antithesis of self-acceptance when the meaning of self- in both compounds is held constant. But self-denial can also be regarded as a necessary step along the path
to self-acceptance and both concepts may be regarded positively when rather different meanings are accorded to the self-element in each. Similarly, the role and meaning of self is not always and necessarily the same in the compounds self-rejection, self-love, himself, selfish, itself, self-centered, self-initiating, etc.

It is our conviction that a psychology and a theology which are only tentative about coming to grips with the problems and possibilities of human selfhood unwarrantedly and unnecessarily impoverish themselves. On the evidence of the two passages cited above it is clear that a comprehension of the concept of self is important for an understanding of man's freedom and wholeness and the significance of Christ in this understanding. But it is also apparent that a constructive approach to psychological and theological understandings of self has to take serious account of the variety of meanings and usages which have developed in connection with the word. If this is not done, communication between the two disciplines is likely to be seriously hampered. It is important, therefore, that the particular usage(s) which are adopted in psychology and theology be defined as precisely as possible so that it is clear what is, and what is not, comprehended in the term self.

2 See, for example, the use of the terms self-acceptance and self-rejection in Robert Bonthius, Christian Paths to Self-Acceptance, New York, King's Crown Press, 1948.
The work of this dissertation is an attempt to establish an adequate psychological perspective upon the human self and to explore the relationship between the self and Jesus Christ. It endeavors to be faithful to the insights of contemporary dynamic psychology in general, and analytical psychology in particular, while taking into account the important contributions to the understanding of selfhood made by Christian dialectical theology.

It is recognized that a certain element of ambiguity and imprecision is unavoidable in any discussion of man which seeks to investigate those functions and attributes which are not amenable to physical measurement or to direct observation. The present study is no exception. But within the limitations imposed by the subject matter, the attempt will be made here to assess the meaning and significance which can be attached to the concept of self, as defined, for persons who do not acknowledge any explicit relationship to Jesus Christ, for persons in the process of becoming Christians, and for persons who do acknowledge a relationship of faith to Jesus Christ.

We have chosen Carl G. Jung for study not only because he shares important insights into the meaning of the ego and of the self with his psychiatric colleagues of different schools, but because he also develops a distinctive understanding of selfhood which attempts, from a psychological perspective, to assess the role of the figure of Jesus Christ in the formation of the human self. For Jung the goal of psychic development is
the self. It is probably the most important concept of his psychological discoveries and represents the final result of his extensive studies of archetypes. "The self is not only the center but also the whole circumference which embraces both conscious and unconscious."  

The goal of the psyche becomes wholeness in such a way that self and wholeness are identical. For Jung, self is the central archetype of orders, and among its several representations is best symbolized by the mandala. "I know that in finding the mandala as an expression of the self I had attained what was for me the ultimate. Perhaps someone else knows more, but not I."  

The late Reinhold Niebuhr has been chosen for analysis in this dissertation because the concept of self was central to his lifetime study of man's nature and destiny. For Niebuhr man is first and foremost a self, an individualized unity of the basic elements of nature, reason and spirit. These constitute the structure of the self. Selfhood is the uniqueness of man which no other organism can claim. It is capable by its freedom to transform the natural survival impulse into a much higher developed and far superior system than the simple survival impulse of animals. The self is also able to comprehend a greater good than its own preservation, and to make some attempts at achieving that good. The self is capable of experiencing  


guilt if it does not make a positive attempt at this achievement.5

There are important, and sometimes subtle, similarities and differences between the approaches and conclusions of Jung, the psychiatrist son of a Swiss pastor, and Niebuhr, the theologian son of a German pastor.

In general terms, both are concerned to conserve important conceptions shared with their professional colleagues and both exhibit a willingness to explore new and potentially fruitful approaches to their own disciplines. Both are convinced in their own ways that the person of Jesus Christ is of central significance for an understanding of human life in general and human selfhood in particular. But while the contributions, actual and potential, of both writers will be treated here in a generally sympathetic manner, and while the final constructive statement of this dissertation will obviously be indebted to both Jung and Niebuhr, no claim is made that either has said the last word on the subject, or that a combination of their views will yield a finally adequate formulation. No attempt will be made to construct an artificial synthesis of their views. Each will be regarded as providing both a general line of thought and some specific data which will then be

5 Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History, New York, Scribner's, 1949, p. 94-95. (Hereafter referred to as FH.)
independently developed to support the hypothesis of this dissertation.

The present work is primarily a psychological study of selfhood and its relationship to Jesus Christ as enlightened by a theological source. First, an analysis of the self will be made from writings of the psychologist and theologian that have, as we just pointed out, been chosen for this study. Secondly, an attempt will be made to formulate a consistent and constructive approach to selfhood drawn from the prior analysis. The present study has been limited to an intensive exposition and analysis of just one psychologist and one theologian since it is quite apparent that the whole range of thinking from each discipline on the subject of "self" is far too broad for inclusion in a single dissertation.

In general it is the thesis of this dissertation that a constructive statement describing the experience of the self can be developed from, and remain faithful to, the thought of Carl Jung and Reinhold Niebuhr. It is also our thesis that within this constructive statement one can demonstrate that Jesus Christ is experienced as playing a significant role in shaping the self as described by the two thinkers just named.

As stated above, this dissertation is essentially a psychological study of the self with heavy emphasis upon
freedom and wholeness, each experienced psychologically as identity, destiny, and relatedness. Secondly, it is a study of the significance of Jesus Christ for man in the process of becoming a self.

Although the theological works of Niebuhr will be used as a source in describing the nature, function and sociality of the self, our dissertation is not primarily a theological study since it is not concerned with proving the truth or falsity of a particular confession. A theological source is used not to substantiate the superiority of a Christian's condition of freedom but to explicate that human condition of freedom experienced by a Christian.

The method could be called comparative since its purpose is to demonstrate that the human dimensions of selfhood underlying freedom are identical to those underlying the human process of wholeness. The dimensions of identity, destiny and relatedness have been chosen to describe psychologically the integrating function at work in the experience of becoming free and whole, thus the hypothesis is that:

(a) a Christian believer's life of freedom is experienced psychologically as wholeness because that freedom involves the same dimensions of self as does the process of wholeness;

(b) Christ is experienced as playing a significant role in shaping the dimensions of self.

The dimensions of self, as we just mentioned, are identity, destiny and relatedness. This hypothesis springs from the
question: do freedom and wholeness involve the same experience regardless of the reality that is posited as an explanation of that experience?

This comparative study is possible only because the process of becoming whole and the Christian's life of freedom are human experiences, and it is only at this level that the comparison can be made. The hypothesis is not that the Christian's life of freedom and the human process of becoming whole are the same reality, but that each involves the same experience which can be described in terms of identity, destiny and relatedness. To speak of a Christian's life of freedom and the human process of becoming whole as though they were one and the same reality would be to account for wholeness in terms of the divine-human encounter. Psychology can, however, legitimately study the dimensions of identity, destiny and relatedness which characterize the human experience of the Christian believer.

In the present study, the criteria of nature, function, sociality and the Christ-event will be employed to analyze the self, experienced by Niebuhr as freedom and by Jung as wholeness. These first three criteria are derived

from those used in Peter Homans's analysis of Niebuhr and Freud. The fourth criterion, the Christ-event, is needed to evaluate the many references to Christ as principle clarifying phenomenon in understanding the self found in the thought of both Niebuhr and Jung. "Nature" refers to the enduring elements which each posits in his thinking about the structure of the self, and "function" refers to the modes of processes by which these elements interact--both being descriptive of the self in its individualized, internal aspects. The third criterion refers to the way each thinker construes the relation of the self to its socio-historical context: to its past; to its family, culture and sub-cultures; to institutions; and to the environment generally. The fourth criterion, the "Christ-event," refers to the way each thinker understands the relation of the self to his experience of Jesus Christ.

Any comparative study of this nature demands some kind of perspective upon both thinkers, and would be an imposition if the perspective was developed entirely from one or the other. This would have been the case had we uncritically accepted Niebuhr's conception of the self and/or his version of Jung's view of the self. Any procedures which would encourage subsuming the thought of one man under the thought of the other must be avoided. The use of concepts

extraneous to both protects us from imperializing one over the other.

This, however, does not indicate why these four criteria are to be preferred over others. There is nothing magical about these four or the number four. Their value lies in their organizing power and explanatory usefulness: do they work? Do they make it possible to lay before the reader more of a man's thought, in a way responsible to his basic intentions, than other criteria? These, along with internal consistency, are the standards by which the value of these criteria stand or fall.

Niebuhr talks of man and the self first and foremost in terms of body, mind and spirit--this is human nature, to be limited and free, etc. These are the enduring elements of the self, and so they constitute the nature of the self. Yet knowledge of one's human nature tempts its denial, resulting in anxiety, fall into sin and a different kind of potentiality for freedom. These aspects of Niebuhr's view of the self may be called the functions of the self, for they are descriptive of the way the elements interact. Both, however, are internal considerations. Niebuhr says the self must be understood in its societal environment, prompting the question, "What are the self's relations to history, society, culture, etc.?" Such a consideration also protects against focusing too completely on an internal-psychological approach. And
finally we inquire about the impact of the Christ-event upon this kind of self. In what way does it influence man as a self. Does such a procedure distort Niebuhr's thought? We think not. It permits clarification of what he is saying and at the same time it allows for comparison with other thinkers of different disciplines.

Turning to Jung one finds him speaking of the conscious and unconscious self. These are considerations of man's nature. He continues from there to look at the role of symbols and the role of religion in man's psyche, and these are functional considerations. Then one of the most important concepts of Jung's work, the individuation process, highlights the importance of man's psychological development in relationship to others. This is an issue dealing directly with one's sociality. Finally, Jung spends much time with the self and Christ. He studies the relationship between the life of Christ and the emerging self, and points toward the experience of Christ as the union of opposites. Here he is obviously referring to the Christ-event. Does such a procedure distort Jung's thought? We think not. Surely it does not exhaust the range of either Jung's or Niebuhr's thought; but neither does this deny accuracy or objectivity. Such criteria will permit us to develop a comparison between the two men around the selected topic of self without misrepresenting what each has to say.
There is a certain parallel between the implications of these four criteria and the three dimensions of selfhood central to our thesis. The tendency here is to equate nature and function with identity, sociality with relatedness and the Christ-event with destiny. This temptation must be resisted for to yield to it at this early stage would encourage the imposition of our thesis upon material that has not yet been analyzed. The criteria here employed are addressed to parameters much broader than those implied in the three specific dimensions of selfhood. From the analysis of each thinker under the application of the four criteria the dimensions of selfhood—identity, destiny and relatedness—begin to emerge, but there is such an overlapping that no single criterion can claim credit for yielding one of the three dimensions.

Out of our study it will become clear that the critical questions raised by Niebuhr and by Jung in connection with the concepts of freedom and wholeness resolve around a three-point focus which can be expressed, so far as an individual is concerned, in three distinct but related questions: "Who and what am I?"; "Where am I going?"; and, "How do I relate to persons and things around me?" It is readily apparent that these three are, respectively, questions of identity, destiny and relatedness. That is to say, the really crucial thing about Niebuhr's experience of the self
as freedom and Jung's experience of it as wholeness is that the experience involves the three dimensions of identity, destiny and relatedness. We propose that these dimensions point beyond doubt to the fact that the mutual experience of the two thinkers is identical even though conceptualized differently.

Human wholeness may be described in terms of identity, destiny and relatedness; the Christian believer's experience of freedom may be described in terms of identity, destiny and relatedness; therefore, the Christian believer's experience of freedom may be described in terms of wholeness. The dimensions—identity, destiny and relatedness—therefore become in this case the common ground of both disciplines, and the bridge over which dialogue may take place.

Some scholars have questioned the validity of applying scientific methodology to interdisciplinary research. We fully recognize the methodological problems inherent in philosophy, theology and science. The key to method in philosophy is the same as that of science—inevitability and necessity. In our case, however, it is ontological necessity. The basis for this is the category of reason and its rational and logical processes—the laws of reason and logic. Philosophy validates its assertions in the light of logicality and rational consistency. And it too attempts to remain detached from its data, organizing these on the basis of the inevitable

8 Forsyth, op. cit., p. 352.
and necessary conclusions which they evoke. Most fundamental to philosophy and rationality is the sense of self-confidence and comprehensiveness which is written into each approach: the conviction that truth can be spelled out and verified on the basis of man's conceptual power and logicality, impartially and without being distorted by the ambitions, strivings and wishes of the self.

Niebuhr's procedure for theological verification (tests of truth) emerges from his analysis of science and philosophy. Neither nature nor reason, neither science nor ontology, neither empiricism nor rationalism can account for their own most basic presuppositions. These, which Niebuhr refers to as conceptual schemes or hidden dogmas or ideological taints, shape the "impartial" findings and conclusions of natural and logical thinking, rendering them far more partial than is usually recognized. There is, therefore, this point of continuity between Niebuhr's method and that of the natural scientist and the ontological analyst: each looks at its data from a point of view or frame of reference, and the conclusions of each are shaped by their premises. In this sense the (Niebuhrian) Christian anthropologist operates in a similar manner. He has basic presuppositions, he deals with "facts" and he validates his conclusions in the arena of human history. The basic facts with which Niebuhr deals with are the self's freedom, its corruption of that freedom,
and its capacity partially to overcome this corruption. These are as factual and real as the facts discerned by scientific method. The basic facts of the Christian Faith serve to organize the facts of human life and history as well as do rationalistic and naturalistic theories, and are of necessity empirically validated in the realm of human affairs. Therefore they resemble the basic presuppositions of any religious or ideological system. It is in this sense that revelation is validated in human experience. There is another sense in which scientific method and Niebuhr's approach are similar. Both are characterized by recurrence—i.e., both seek to discern patterns of meaning or laws by which events are interpreted. In this sense the patterns of creativity and self-concern in history are just as reliably recurrent as are the patterns of reason and nature. At this point the thought forms of the Christian faith are not radically "beyond" the thought forms of science and philosophy. The difference is, of course, the premise of freedom, and its basis, self-transcendence.

There are a number of essential points at which Niebuhr and Jung agree with respect to methodology. First, both believe that the knowledge enterprise consists of the relationship between the empirical facts of human behaviour and human history and interpretive schemes or categories of some sort. Both agree that the data of scientific scrutiny
do not, in and of themselves, provide categories for their interpretation. Neither Jung's conventions nor Niebuhr's principles or frames of reference are the fruit of the new data only. For Jung the new data are organized by hypotheses which are at their inception little more than conventions. For Niebuhr the facts of history are organized by the biblical conception of man and his destiny. Both give priority to the facts over against interpretive schema; for Niebuhr, if the biblical interpretation contradicts the facts, then it is wrong; Jung's conventions are refined again and again in the light of the data.

Both thinkers believe that the self's most basic problem and task—that of recovering its own most basic nature—is integrally related to the knowledge enterprise: epistemology is rooted in anthropology, such that man becomes himself by knowing himself, and knows himself by becoming himself. According to Niebuhr creativity and self-transcendence are not processes detached from other aspects of the self, but are associated with revelation and other forms of knowledge. For Jung scientific method is continuous with the processes of individuation: the more knowledge, the more individuated; the more individuated, the more self; and the more self the more knowledge.

Both Niebuhr and Jung find that what is problematic for the self, with respect to epistemology, lies in
its failure to distinguish between the way it really is and the way it would have itself or prefer to be. For Niebuhr the self, in its freedom, prefers to define itself primarily as dynamic and vitalistic, or rationalistic, or spiritual—but not as a unity of these. For Jung the self prefers to view itself not only at the center of the personality, but also as understanding the forces which compose its wholeness. Consequently both Niebuhr and Jung interpret other disciplines and systems of thought on the basis of their own views, as well as interpreting each other's discipline.

This dissertation represents a study within the mainstream of research being done at the University of Ottawa in the psychology of religion. There the work of Dr. Mary Andrew Hartmann and Dr. James Forsyth centers upon an analysis and articulation of contemporary religious experiences, as understood in the thought of twentieth-century theologians and psychologists. The following diagram and research are based upon a model gleaned from the teaching and work of Doctors Hartmann and Forsyth. The diagram presents the scheme of this dissertation and hopefully it will clarify what the writer has presented in this introduction (see this in Figure 1 below).
Applying the Criteria of Nature, Function Sociality and the Christ-event to the Human Experience of Self

Described Theologically by Niebuhr as Freedom
Described Psychologically by Jung as Wholeness

For these are two descriptions of one and the same Experience

The Underlying Human Dimensions of Freedom being:
- Identity
- Destiny
- Relatedness

The Underlying Human Dimensions of Wholeness being:
- Identity
- Destiny
- Relatedness

Thus the hypothesis is that:
(a) a Christian believer's life of freedom is experienced psychologically as wholeness because that freedom involves the same dimensions of self as does the process of wholeness
(b) Christ is experienced as playing a significant role in shaping the dimensions of self

But the Dimensions are Shaped by Jesus Christ

Theologically through his clarifying effect as principle revealer
Psychologically through his clarifying effect as principle archetype

Figure 1.
One can readily see in the diagram above that this dissertation--Human Dimensions of Selfhood: A Comparative Study of the Process of Wholeness and the Christian's Life of Freedom in C. Jung and R. Niebuhr--applies the criteria of nature, function, sociality and the Christ-event to both Jung and Niebuhr, for purposes of demonstrating that the human experience of self is described theologically as freedom and psychologically as wholeness, and that these are two descriptions of one and the same experience. The underlying human dimensions of that experience, whether described theologically or psychologically, are identity, destiny and relatedness. Ultimately these dimensions are, for a Christian, believed to be shaped by Jesus Christ theologically through his clarifying effect as principle revealer and psychologically through his clarifying effect as principle archetype.

Chapter one situates the present study in a contemporary context through the presentation of a few typical views of this dissertation's main theme, treated by both the theological and psychological disciplines. This work will lead into chapter two and the formulation of tentative descriptions and understandings of both self and Jesus Christ which can be used as guides until the final descriptions are put forward. Chapters three and four will contain detailed
analyses of the self described by Niebuhr and Jung, applying the criteria of nature, function, sociality, and the Christ-event. Chapter five discusses conclusions regarding the limitations and contributions of both thinkers to our present task. The specific aspects of Niebuhr's work relevant to this thesis will be summarized, then will follow a psychological critique of those key issues. Similarly, Jung will be looked at from a general and psychological perspective. The relevant contributions of both men, particularly those involving the dimensions of identity, destiny and relatedness, will be set forth and utilized in support of the hypothesis. Chapter six presents a formal description of self and shows how freedom and wholeness are bridged by the dimensions--identity, destiny and relatedness. It becomes apparent in this last chapter that the Christ experience is very significant in shaping the self, and it is in this chapter that the final support for our hypothesis takes form.
 CHAPTER I

USAGE OF THE TERM SELF

1. Etymology and General Usage.

The word self is of dubious etymological origin. It comes into modern English from the Old English with cognates in contemporary Germanic languages (cf. Dutch zelf and German Selbst). In its original form self was normally appended, either adjectivally or in apposition, to the personal pronoun and was declined along with the pronoun: he self, his selfes, him selfum (dat), hine selfne (acc), etc. ¹

In current usage, self appears both as a noun in its own right and also as a compound. It may be compounded with the personal pronoun (as, e.g., in myself, himself, etc.) or with another noun or verb. In these latter cases, the force of the self- may be adjectival (as in self-loving, where love is considered as directed toward oneself); or adverbial (as in self-righteously, where self- suggests hypocrisy). It may denote either the person or thing affected (as in self-conscious), or the agent "that of itself acts in a manner

implied by the word with which it is joined"\(^2\) (as in self-actualizing). It may also be the subject of the action as well as the agent.

The development of a concept of self as something other than the entity expressed by the personal pronoun may be illustrated by a brief consideration of two sentences: "he did it himself," and "he was not himself when he did it."

In the first of these, himself is clearly intended to reinforce the word he. There is an essential identity between that which is represented by the pronoun he and that represented by himself. These are regarded as being one and the same thing. In the second sentence, however, there is an essential incongruity between the he and the himself. The himself is deliberately placed over and against the he to convey the idea that he is no longer behaving in the customary manner.

The first of these two sentences represents the compounding of the objective \textit{him} and self to form a reflexive. But in the second sentence the compound is formed from the possessive \textit{his} and self and serves to highlight the differentiation of something which may be called a self from the totality of the person as represented by the pronoun.

2. Theological Views of the Self.

In the history of theology there have been many serious attempts to illuminate the nature of man and his destiny, to describe man's place in the created structures of the world, and to suggest ways in which he can most appropriately realize his own humanity. It is, therefore, the more remarkable that there have been so few attempts to deal at length with the concept of self. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern three major ways in which the term self has been used in Reformed theology. The first of these may be called the rejectionist approach in which self is identified primarily with the sinful and idolatrous aspects of unregenerate human nature. The second may be called the relational approach in which the emphasis falls upon the consciousness, or otherwise, of one's relatedness to God. The third approach may be designated integrationist since, on this view, the self is broadly conceived as the integrative function of human life.

In the following brief exposition of these three major approaches to selfhood, it will become clear that the relational and integrationist positions are closely related and do not necessarily exclude the rejectionist approach. In fact, however, many who have chosen to follow the rejectionist pathway have also implicitly or explicitly denied
the legitimacy of speaking about the self theologically in any other fashion.

A. The Rejectionist Approach to the Self

In an important and pioneering work, *Christian Paths to Self Acceptance*, Robert Bonthius has pointed out that Christianity has always been concerned with self-acceptance, even though this term is not frequently encountered in theological discourse. By this Bonthius means that Christianity has always been concerned with "ideas of the way man should look at himself, of the manner in which he should treat himself." Bonthius suggests that there have been three basic approaches to self-acceptance in the different expressions of Christianity and he designates these as the Rejectionist, the Meliorist, and the Forensic pathways. Each of these terms refers to a basic attitude towards the self which Bonthius discerns in the Reformed tradition (rejectionist), the Wesleyan Methodist tradition (meliorist), and the Thomist tradition of Roman Catholicism (forensic). The present concern is with the Reformed tradition and hence it will be valuable to look in greater detail at what is meant by rejectionism.

Bonthius characterizes rejectionism as "the service of God in which the self is renounced" and suggests that such otherwise diverse figures as Paul, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Fox, and Bunyan "all more or less represent renunciation and despair of self and the whole natural human organism. They place their hope solely in the transforming work of the Divine Spirit." Among the more modern theologians, he regards Kierkegaard, Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr as rejectionists.

This is a useful characterization although, as will be seen, it does not exhaust the Reformed understandings of selfhood. Bonthius makes it clear that the rejectionists normally have certain specific things in mind when they inveigh against the self. These he characterizes as the corruptness and inadequacy of reason, religious and moral self-sufficiency, worldly achievements, and sensuality.

Thus it can be said that the first sense in which the term self is used in Reformed theology identifies the self with the limitations of human reason, the tendency to pride and inflation, the idolatrous search for human autonomy from God, and any pandering to the sensual appetites. That is to say, self is here identified with what the rejectionists

4 Ibid., p. 2.
5 Ibid., p. 17f.
regard as the sinful, the negative, the destructive, and
the idolatrous elements in man's unregenerate nature.

In this sense John Calvin was an arch-rejectionist. He never set out to produce a unified concept of the self but he strongly insisted on the need for self-denial in such words as the following:

For as consulting our self-interest is the pestilence that most effectively leads to our destruction, so the haven of salvation is to be wise in nothing and to will nothing through ourselves but to follow the leading of the Lord alone. Let this therefore be the first step, that a man depart from himself in order that he may apply the whole force of his ability in the service of the Lord.  

Calvin went on to spell out in considerable detail how this self-denial could be achieved and what benefits could be expected to follow from it. His discussion clearly indicates that Calvin used the term self in much the same way as Luther used the figure of the heart curved in upon itself. That is to say, he contended that the fundamental thrust of the self-centered life was wrongly directed and that therefore any preoccupation with man in this condition was bound to lead only to further perversity.

When the self is characterized in such terms as these, the emphasis falls upon the purely human, or natural,

viewed primarily in its sinful and negative dimensions. But manifestly this is not the whole of Calvin's view of man even though it is all that he chose to include under the rubric of self. Calvin clearly recognized, for example, that there may be valid knowledge and wisdom in man even in his unregenerate state⁷ and that, by God's grace, there could also be virtue in man even when there is no acknowledgment of Jesus Christ.⁸ But Calvin chose to concentrate on man's predicament rather than upon his natural possibilities, and this predicament he saw with unusual clarity. He characterized human life as a "miserable ruin" and as a "teeming horde of infamies" but he also never lost sight of the power of God's grace to regenerate man.⁹ He did not choose to entertain any notion of selfhood in relation to redeemed man and indeed when he spoke of redeemed man, rather than of man as he is in his unregenerate nature, the object of Calvin's attention subtly ceased to be man at all and became God in Jesus Christ to whom was attributed the sole power for the regeneration of man.

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⁷ Ibid., 2.ii.13,14.
⁸ Ibid., 2.iii.3,4.
⁹ Ibid., 1.i.1; cf. Thomas Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine of Man, London, Lutterworth Press, 1949, p. 16ff. and references there cited. The whole of the first chapter of Torrance's work is a brilliant summary of Calvin's approach to self-acknowledge in man.
There can be little doubt that this attitude was largely occasioned by the nature of the polemical struggle against the Church of Rome of that day. In Bonthius' words, "the Reformers [...] charged the Church of Rome with focusing on man--man's history and his traditions, man's intelligence and his natural powers, man's goodwill and his capacity for grace. Their own disposition was to depend wholly upon God."\(^{10}\) Calvin, therefore, could not afford to give any aid and comfort to views which seemed to overestimate the role or power of man or to undervalue the great Reformed insight into the necessity for reliance upon God's justifying grace made available in the gift of faith.

Many subsequent Reformed theologians have appeared suspicious of any other usage of the term self than that adopted by Calvin. It would seem that the fear persists that any other construction placed on the term self constitutes a threat to the concern for the sovereignty of God and the principle of justification by faith alone. The contention is here made, however, that this restriction of usage is arbitrary and that the fear is unfounded. But this does not mean either that Calvin's usage, or his negative attitude towards the self as he conceived it, was unjustified. Quite the contrary. Any theological understanding which seeks to

\(^{10}\) Bonthius, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2.
be faithful both to the New Testament and to the Reformed tradition, will be seriously concerned to preserve Calvin's insight that there are important aspects, attributes, and tendencies in human life which need to be restrained or repudiated if man is truly to become what he may be in God's revealed intention for him. But the claim is made in this dissertation that this usage of the term self, with its strong flavor of selfishness, self-inflation and self-conceit, is neither the only possible usage nor yet the most meaningful one for theological discourse.

B. The Relational Approach to the Self

Soren Kierkegaard belongs squarely within the rejectionist approach but has nevertheless introduced another dimension into the understanding of selfhood in the Reformed tradition. That is to say, he fully acknowledges those aspects of human life which need to be denied or renounced if one is to grow into Christian maturity, but he uses the term self to denote a rather different concept. By self, Kierkegaard understands:

[...] the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude which relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself, a task which can be performed only by means of a relationship to God. But to become oneself is to become concrete. But to become concrete means neither to become finite nor infinite, for that which is to become concrete is a synthesis. Accordingly the development consists in moving away from oneself infinitely by the process of infinitizing oneself, and in returning to oneself infinitely by the process of finitizing. If on the contrary the self
does not become itself, it is in despair, whether it knows it or not. However, a self, every instant it exists, is in process of becoming, for the self kata dunamin does not actually exist, it is only that which it is to become. In so far as the self does not become itself, it is not its own self; but not to be one's own self is despair.\textsuperscript{11}

In Kierkegaard's view it is not difficult to lose one's self and indeed he says that the self is "the thing of all things the most dangerous for a man to let people notice that he has it."\textsuperscript{12} A man may in fact do all those things for which society honors and esteems men, and may even be accorded a place in history, and yet not be himself. Kierkegaard says of such men: "spiritually understood they have no self, no self for whose sake they could venture everything, no self before God—however selfish they may be for all that."\textsuperscript{13}

For Kierkegaard, to be conscious of oneself as spirit, as self (for "spirit is the self"\textsuperscript{14}), means to be conscious of one's existing before God\textsuperscript{15} with the privilege and the demand inherent in such consciousness.\textsuperscript{16} To be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, and Sickness unto Death (tr. by Walter Lowrie), Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954, p. 162f.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 165.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 168.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 146.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 159ff; cf. p. 163.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 160ff.
\end{itemize}
selfish, on the other hand, means to be conscious of oneself in such a fashion that one has no consciousness of existence before God, no sense of the demand made by the awareness of such existence, and hence no genuine selfhood.

Thus, self as a specific concept is used by Kierkegaard to denote a synthesis, a constant movement between the polarities of consciousness of finitude and of infinitude. This self is always in process of becoming and is never statically realized. Essentially it consists in an awareness of existing before God. It is thus an object of awareness; it is the fullness of one's own personal existence seen in a particular relationship.

Kierkegaard also speaks of other and lesser forms of selfhood in which the measure is not God but man. He thus distinguishes between what he calls the "human self" and the "theological self" which has acquired a "new quality or qualification in the fact that it is the self directly in the sight of God." This means that the self can be looked at from another perspective and regarded as the product of the views of others about one. Thus, a whole series of gradations is possible ranging from unconsciousness of being an eternal self, through an awareness of "having a self in which there is after all something eternal," to the "infinite reality" involved in the recognition of being a self directly in the sight of God. The value of selfhood then depends upon
When he discusses self-love, Kierkegaard recognizes that the concentration of recognition, acceptance, and regard, upon the totality of one's own personhood, can be either constructive or inhibitory. In his view it is both a necessary pre-condition for love which is to be directed away from the self to other objects, and also that condition which constantly threatens to prevent love being directed towards another object.\(^1\)

This view of selfhood has the great merit of recognizing that what a man in fact is, what he sees himself to be, and what he may become, are intimately tied up with the type and quality of the relationships into which he enters. The emphasis is laid upon conscious awareness of one's own selfhood but there is also the suggestion that man has a stature in the sight of God which is important for a full understanding of what that man is even when he himself does not recognize the God before whom he stands.

Another significant element in Kierkegaard's conception is his suggestion that man is always a self in some


\(^1\) S. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments; or a Fragment of Philosophy (tr. by David F. Swenson), Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1936, p. 38.
sense, even if it be only "in the sight of his cows," but that there is a fullness and a richness in the acknowledgment of one's existence before God without which man is "in despair." That is to say, the self, for Kierkegaard, is a continuing element in human life but as one moves closer towards an awareness of the ambiguity and possibility inherent in life truly lived before God, the quality of one's selfhood takes on a radically new reality. Manifestly this is a much more sophisticated view of the self than that of simple rejectionism and Kierkegaard has been responsible for stimulating further theological reflection on the self. His influence upon the two integrationists now to be discussed will become apparent.

C. The Integrationist View of the Self

Yet another aspect of selfhood in the Reformed tradition is introduced by Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr, building upon the self-affirmation of Kierkegaard. Each of these theologians shares with Calvin the conviction that the sinful self needs to be shattered and broken but each of them also feels free to speak of a self which emerges from this process. Their approaches are not identical but a dominant theme in each is that the self can be regarded as providing the integrating function in human life.
Brunner sometimes seems to equate the self with mental process (as opposed to physiological brain functioning) but his main concern is to demonstrate that God created man as a true self and that man redeemed by Jesus Christ becomes once more the self he was designed to be. Brunner equates this selfhood with man's freedom to respond as a person to the personal address of God:

[...] the heart of the creaturely existence of man is freedom, selfhood, to be an "I," a person. Only an "I" can answer a "Thou," only a Self which is self-determining can freely answer God [...].

The free Self, capable of self-determination, belongs to the original constitution of man as created by God. But from the outset this freedom is limited.

When Brunner discusses the life of the "new man in Jesus Christ," the new creation, he does not hesitate to characterize this new life as true selfhood. The "new reality" which comes into being is manifest as an "integration which ends the disintegration." This integration is twofold. It is both an integration of the person, making him


21 Brunner, Dogmatics II, p. 56.
a unified whole, and it is an integration into the fellowship of faith of the **Ekklesia**.\(^{22}\) That man is truly a self, in Brunner's view, whose life is organized around and focused upon his relationship with God in Christ so that this relationship integrates his actions and his thinking.

Brunner also uses the term self in its compound forms in rather different ways. When, for example, he speaks of self-surrender and of the selfish will\(^{23}\) he is clearly not referring to that self which brings life into integrative focus upon Jesus Christ. And when he speaks of self-transformation he makes it clear that he intends both that transformation in which the subject is the active agent in the process and also the transformation of something basic within the person who is doing the transforming and is yet being transformed by the creative power of the Holy Spirit.\(^{24}\)

The knowledge that Christ gives a man of his own selfhood is, in Brunner's view, a dynamic thing in that the quality of knowing involved in the knowing of Christ itself "transforms our existence at its heart."\(^{25}\)

The mainstream of Brunner's thought on selfhood is, then, that the self belongs to God's intention for man but

\(^{22}\) Brunner, *Dogmatics III*, p. 274.


does not actively come into existence until a person is brought into living and dynamic relationship with Jesus Christ. Selfhood, in this view, is only potentially integrating until this relationship with Christ is established. This approach has the merit of taking man's humanity seriously after the decisive encounter with Jesus Christ, and seeks to avoid the arbitrariness of simple rejectionism. However, Brunner's conception becomes arbitrary at a different point in that he virtually denies any selfhood to unredeemed man. The self of which he speaks in redeemed man has little, if anything, in common with the humanity of the unregenerate—or at least Brunner has not chosen to be explicit about the relationship.

Reinhold Niebuhr, on the other hand, does retain a strong sense of integration in human selfhood. He states, for example, that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit "never means the destruction of human selfhood."26 The integration or unity of the self is, in Niebuhr's words, "a unity of finiteness and freedom, of involvement in natural process and transcendence over process."27 Chapter four will be devoted to a detailed analysis of this process.

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27 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 113.
3. Psychological Contributions to the Concept of Self.

In comparatively recent years the psychological disciplines have made many contributions towards an understanding of human selfhood but there is no one particular conception which has found universal acceptance among psychological researchers and theorists. Indeed, the diversity of views has led some workers to advocate the abandonment of the term altogether although they agree that the phenomena under discussion are important. Gordon Allport, for example, lists eight ways in which the term self is currently employed: bodily sense, self-identity, ego-enhancement, ego-extension, rational agent, self-image, appropriate striving, and the knower. Each of these, says Allport, has a legitimate place in the psychological understanding of man but he argues that it is simply inviting confusion to call them all by the name self.

But the term seems solidly implanted and there are now few personality theorists who do not have some concept of a self, or of a series of selves, which forms an integral part of their understanding of the human personality. Hall and Lindzey, in *Theories of Personality*, provide an excellent

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brief summary of the contemporary situation which highlights many of the problems and difficulties encountered in any psychological discussion of the self. They demonstrate, for example, the lack of consistency in the differentiation between the terms ego and self. Some theorists use self to describe attitudes, functions, or processes which others designate ego, and vice versa. Sigmund Freud, the pioneer of a great deal of much modern psychological thinking, rarely used the term self at all but in his discussion both of ego and psyche he dealt with phenomena which Carl Jung and many later psychologists have chosen to associate with the term self.

Hall and Lindzey suggest that all the significant extant definitions and understandings of self in the psychological literature can be placed within two broad categories. In the first, which they call the "self-as-object" definitions, the self tends to be identified with a person's attitudes and feelings about himself, and with the convictions and ambivalences that he experiences in relation to who and what he is, and the values that he places upon the various aspects of his own personality as he sees them. In the second grouping, which they designate as the "self-as-process" definitions,
attention is focused rather upon certain of the psychological processes which determine behavior and adjustment.\textsuperscript{31}

The usefulness of this distinction is somewhat marred when it is recognized that systems of perception about oneself can also be processes which, in part at least, determine behavior and adjustment; nevertheless this typology has the merit of reflecting two important differences in emphasis. Another possible way of characterizing the different psychological approaches is in terms of the relative amount of attention given to the development of the self on the one hand, and to its function or significance in the life of a person on the other.

For the present purpose, however, it appears that a combination of these approaches is possible and that the most useful way of surveying some of the more pertinent contributions of the psychological disciplines is to start from the same three categories as were employed above in the discussion of theological approaches to selfhood. Each of these three categories, the rejectionist, relational and integrationist approaches, raises one particular issue above others. Rejectionism involves the problem of attitudes toward certain attributes and tendencies in the human organism. The relational approach raises the question of how the self is developed and maintained, and of the role of other persons in

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
this process. The integrationist position concentrates attention upon the functional aspects of selfhood. Thus the question can be asked of the psychological disciplines, in a preliminary way, as to what contribution they have to make to the notions of attitude, development and relatedness, and function in respect of the self.

A. Attitude

Two related matters are involved in this notion—the self considered as a certain set of attitudes, and also attitudes which psychologists take towards certain matters involved in the different concepts of selfhood. The work of Carl Rogers will be reviewed briefly to illustrate both these aspects.

Rogers claims that the fundamental and basic tendency of the human organism, acting as a whole, is to develop "all its capacities in ways which serve to enhance or maintain the organism,"\(^{32}\) that is, to become all that is within it to become. He regards the self, or self-system (the terms are interchangeable for him), as that expression of this general actualizing tendency which is specifically concerned with the awareness of being, of functioning.

He defines the self as:

[...] the organized, consistent, conceptual gestalt composed of perceptions of the characteristics of the "I" or "me" and the perceptions of the relations of the "I" or "me" to others and to various aspects of life, together with the values attached to these perceptions. It is a gestalt which is available to awareness though not necessarily in awareness. It is a fluid and changing gestalt, a process.33

This means that so far as Rogers is concerned, the self is what the individual perceives himself to be both in his own particularity and in his relationships with other persons and with things and institutions. This perception may be of what the person concerned regards as the actual situation, or it may relate to what he would ideally like to be (the ideal self). This self can be measured in cross-section, so to speak, at a given point in time (at least partially, and in operational terms) by the use of a Q-sort or similar device. Since it is static only in the sense that it is a specific entity at a given moment, it is best characterized as a process, constantly in movement and with ill-defined limits but nevertheless maintaining a certain consistency of shape and with a constant flow between figure and ground in awareness.

This is a classic example of what Hall and Lindzey mean by a self-as-object definition. But Rogers also believes, and certainly seems justified in this belief, that persons

33 Ibid., p. 200.
tend to act in ways which are consistent with their own picture of themselves, with their own self-concept. He argues that the self-concept can, and in fact does, assume a relative independence of the general actualizing tendency of the organism and, in his view, the neurotic pattern of life takes shape in the conflict of interests between the developing self-system and the more general actualizing tendency. Since persons do react to other persons and to situations in life in accordance with their self-concept, those forces which together constitute the process of self-hood are dynamic forces which may either enhance or inhibit the healthy development of human personality. This brings the Rogerian view also into the self-as-process category.

Rogers regards the attitudes that a person adopts towards his own self as extremely important in his adjustment to the demands of life. That person who cannot accept some aspect of his personality as truly "belonging" to him may well be threatening the integrity of his total personality and is certainly restricting his own possibilities of valuable experience.

In his "client-centered" therapy, Rogers strives to help persons recognize and accept the full range of their own endowments, aptitudes, and limitations, in the belief that they can thereby live more creatively and more healthily.
As a corollary of this view, Rogers regards positively those things which free a person to realize his own potential and he is critical of the inhibitory forces and endeavors to counteract them in his therapy. A great deal of stress is placed upon the role of appropriate and inappropriate self-concepts in this question of freedom and inhibition.

Without necessarily accepting all of Rogers' theory concerning the self it can be said that he illuminates the fact that attitudes towards oneself significantly affect behavior and must therefore be taken seriously in any attempt to deal fully with the phenomenon of selfhood.

It was noted above that the rejectionist position in theology is reluctant to foster any procedure which will focus attention upon man in such a way as to reinforce his sinful preoccupation with himself in which he seeks to raise an idol of selfhood in the place of God. The psychological disciplines have also clearly recognized that preoccupation with oneself, in the sense of self-centeredness or selfishness, is the very antithesis of that positive self-regard which marks the psychologically mature man. This can be illustrated by Rollo May's brief discussion of the psychological approach to conceit and an inflated sense of one's own importance. May suggests that "a courageous humility is the mark of a realistic and mature person," but, he continues,
Thinking too highly of oneself, in the sense of self-inflation or conceit, does not come from a greater consciousness of one's self, or greater feelings of self-worth. In fact it comes from just the opposite. Self-inflation and self-conceit are generally the external signs of inner emptiness and self-doubt; a show of pride is one of the most common covers for anxiety.\textsuperscript{34}

This insight, which is certainly not peculiar to May, has important implications for theology. It suggests that it is unwarranted to assume that all consideration of the self must end in self-centeredness. When concern with one's self does induce pride this probably indicates that the concern has not been sufficiently thorough-going. It is a common tendency in human life to cease exploration at the point where the expected, or the congenial, has been uncovered. To plumb beneath this and to risk finding the unwelcome, the unsettling, the unexpected, requires a certain courage and a tenacity of purpose of a high order. The Christian doctrine of sin proclaims that there is within man's very nature that which subverts and distorts, and perhaps even destroys, his capacity for free movement in the direction intended for him by his Creator. Man therefore needs to be allowed to see and face up to the implications of his own sin in his own life. The evil in human life must be one of those very factors which is taken seriously in any consideration of selfhood.

\textsuperscript{34} Rollo May, \textit{Man's Search for Himself}, New York, Norton, 1950, p. 97.
and likewise it is important to be able to face realistically one's own limitations. These factors taken together are effective antidotes to pride.

B. Development and Relatedness

Just as Freud suggested that the development of the ego from the id is shaped by the demands of reality mediated through significant other persons in the child's environment, so many self theorists have emphasized the role of other persons in the development and maintenance of the self. Indeed, there have been those who have been prepared to characterize the self as being little, if anything, more than a reflection of the influences and expectations of other persons.

This view was first propounded by William James in his conception of the social self. James suggested that persons shape their behaviors, or "play roles," in accordance with their awareness of the social expectations involved in the conceptions that others have of them. The social self he regarded as "the sum of the different roles the person plays."35 In more recent times, the idea of the self being formed by the reaction to the perceived expectations of

others has been developed by George Herbert Mead in his *Mind, Self and Society* (1934) and has since been taken up by the so-called cultural analysts and plays an important role in the influential interpersonal theory of Harry Stack Sullivan and his followers. Patrick Mullahy has expressed this view succinctly as follows:

> Since the child has no data for appraising himself or his performances except what he learns from significant others, he tends to accept their judgments as to his worth and their valuation of his performance. **Hence, the self comes to be made up of reflected appraisals.** One learns to appraise his own worth as it has been appraised by others, who are themselves conditioned and moulded by their life experience. In the beginning there is nothing else the child can do; and when he grows older and perhaps catches on at least dimly to the fact that different people have different views as to his worth, the self has already been firmly established and is as a rule quite inhospitable toward the idea of change.36

Again this conception of self is cast primarily in terms of evaluative perceptions of one's own person and mode of functioning. The self so formed is largely regarded by the interpersonal theorists as more of an encumbrance than a help in coping with the realities of daily living.

There is an insight embodied in this approach which is important even for those who use the concept of self rather differently and who consequently evaluate it more

positively. The "social self" approach recognizes that the attitudes that one forms in relation to oneself are greatly influenced by the attitudes and actions of other persons.

To go one step forward, this points in the direction of saying that what a man is, and what he becomes in life, are largely determined by the quality of the relationships established between that man and significant other persons in his environment. In psychoanalytic and in much other psychotherapeutic thinking, the heavy emphasis is laid upon the relationships established in infancy (and particularly within the family) and upon the successful or unsuccessful resolutions of the problems created by these relationships.

One increasingly important school of thought, however, has strongly suggested that this is too restricted an approach to the complex and fundamental question of relationships. According to the proponents of the existential movement in psychology, all relationships at whatever stage of life are important and produce change in the persons involved. As Rollo May has expressed it, "the essence of relationship is that in the encounter both persons are changed." 37

The existentialists seek to "rediscover man as a being interrelated with his world and to rediscover world as

meaningful to man." In the outworking of this endeavor, the two poles, self and world, are regarded as "always dialectically related. Self implies world and world self; there is neither without the other, and each is understandable only in terms of the other." In this context world is defined as:

[...] the structure of meaningful relationships in which a person exists and in the design of which he participates. Thus world includes the past events which condition my existence and all the vast variety of deterministic influences which operate upon me. But it is these as I relate to them, am aware of them, carry them with me, molding, inevitably forming, building them in every minute of relating. For to be aware of one's world means at the same time to be designing it.

World is not to be limited to the past determining events but includes also all the possibilities which open up before any person and are not simply given in the historical situation.

Three modes, or simultaneous aspects of the world which characterize man's existence, are distinguished by the existentialists: the biological world, the world of one's fellow men, and the "mode of relationship to one's own self." This latter is recognized as being most in need of psychological exploration and understanding.

38 Ibid., p. 59.


In the social self theory of James and the interpersonal theory of Sullivan, the self is regarded as the product of the introjected attitudes of others. In existential analysis, however, the crucial factor in selfhood is awareness of one's own being, of Dasein (and, as an important corollary, of the threat of non-being). This developed sense of identity, which involves a conviction of "authentic existence," is not regarded as being a mere social phenomenon. One may in point of fact need certain orders of social experience, such as acceptance and trust, to be able to experience one's own being but the existentialists claim that awareness of self cannot wholly be reduced to such social factors. Even more basic than the attitudes directed toward one is what the individual himself, "in his awareness of an responsibility for his existence," does with the fact that others regard him in this way. Rollo May sums up this view when he takes issue with William James and says that "we propose, rather, that the self is not the sum of the roles you play but your capacity to know that you are the one playing these roles. This is the only point of integration and rightly makes the roles manifestations of the self."  

Thus the self is regarded by the existentialists in a much more positive light than in interpersonal theory, and

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41 Ibid., p. 45ff.
42 Ibid., p. 64, note 33.
 USAGE OF THE TERM SELF  

a rather different significance is ascribed to relationships. But the claim is made in both that the self cannot be understood in abstraction from the involvement of the person with the people and things about him. This is the enduring insight which needs to be taken into account in any adequate Christian understanding of self.

C. Function

In the discussion of James' concept of the social self, and of the self theories of Rogers, the interpersonal theorists, and the existential analysts, it was claimed in each instance that the attitudes taken towards the self (or the attitudes which comprise the self) help to determine the behaviors of the person concerned. Rollo May characterized the self as the "point of integration" of the personality. Some theorists have laid a primary stress on the role of the self in influencing behavior, and particularly in determining the quality and mode of adjustment to life. It is this aspect of the total question which is most frequently, but not universally, associated with the term ego where self and ego are differentiated.43

43 See, e.g., Hall and Lindzey, op. cit., p. 521, for discussion of Chein's attempt to regularize usage of ego and self in this way. Bertocci, however, reverses this customary distinction and regards the self as a "complex, unitary, activity of sensing, remembering, imagining, perceiving, wanting, feeling, and thinking."
Some theorists become wary at this point lest the self be conceived as in any sense an homunculus, or "little man within the breast." Gordon Allport echoes this concern when he says that "what is unnecessary and inadmissible is a self (or soul) that is said to perform acts, to solve problems, to steer conduct, in a transpsychological manner, inaccessible to psychological analysis." 44

Karen Horney is one theorist who, among other approaches, employs a dynamic conception of self. She speaks of an actual self, an idealized self, and a real self. The actual self is purely descriptive of phenomenological reality, it is the totality of what a person is. The idealized self is "what we are in our irrational imagination, or what we should be according to the dictates of neurotic pride." But this self is more than a descriptive concept. She claims that the idealized self possesses the power to move the whole person in the direction of the illusory goal of his distorted perceptions of what he is and wants to become. The idealized self, in her view, lies at the heart of human neurosis. Her concept of the real self, which even she admits may seem highly speculative and even abstract, postulates an "'original' force toward individual growth and fulfillment, with which we may again achieve full identification when freed of the

44 Allport, op. cit., p. 55.
crippling shackles of neurosis." Potentially, therefore, this real self also possesses a dynamic which shapes the movement of life towards its goal.\(^{45}\)

In addition to his concept of the social self, William James spoke of a material self, a spiritual self and a "pure Ego."\(^{46}\) His spiritual self is most relevant to the discussion at this point. This he defined as "a man's inner or subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely."\(^{47}\) Within the general "stream of consciousness" which comprises the spiritual self, James isolated one segment or portion which may be distinguished from the rest as a "self of all the other selves." This, he claimed, is the active principle in all consciousness. In his words, the self of the selves:

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[...]
\text{presides over the perception of sensations, and by giving or withdrawing its assent, it influences the movements they tend to arouse. It is the home of interest—not the pleasant or the painful, not even pleasure or pain as such, but that within us to which pleasure and pain, the pleasant and painful, speak. It is the source of effort and attention, and the place from which appear to emanate the fiats of the will.}\(^{48}\)
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\(^{45}\) Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle Toward Self-Realization, New York, Norton, 1950, p. 158. What Horney calls three aspects of self are in fact three conceptions at different levels of discourse.

\(^{46}\) James, op. cit., p. 292.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 297f.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., p. 294.
The contributions of Sigmund Freud have made it all but imperative for subsequent workers to recognize the existence of unconscious factors in the motivation of behavior and in the determination of modes of adjustment to life, whether one chooses (as he did) to speak of ego in connection with the dynamic and integrative agency, or of self.

Carl Jung's use of the term self is always related to the concept of wholeness. It is the central point around which all of the other systems are constellated. The self provides the personality with stability and unity. For Jung the self is "the point of a new equilibrium, a new centering of the total personality, a virtual center which, on account of its focal position between conscious and unconscious, ensures for the personality a new and more solid foundation." Jung experiences the self to be much broader than simply a stabilizing and static center. He understands the self as a dynamic integrating function of personality. Chapter three will be devoted to a detailed exposition and analysis of the self in Jung's thought.

D. Summary

The psychologists reviewed have underlined the importance of attitudinal factors in the attainment of

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psychological wholeness. Some have concentrated on the attitudes which adversely affect healthy growth and development, while others have given more attention to the attitudes which promote the desired goal. Stress has been laid on the role and influence of other persons and institutions both in the formation of attitudes concerning oneself and in the adoption of modes of adjustment to life.

Two general, and rather different, conceptions of self have been apparent in this survey. The first primarily relates to the organized system of perceptions regarding one's own person, identity, and functioning. The second views the self more in terms of a dynamic center which provides a point of integrative focus for the personality and which thereby influences behavior and adjustment in relationship to others. It has been suggested that these conceptions represent different points of emphasis rather than totally different phenomena but it has also been noted that many psychologists have used the term ego to denote the integrative function and have reserved self for the perceptual systems.
CHAPTER II

PRELIMINARY UNDERSTANDING OF SELF AND OF JESUS CHRIST

1. The Self.

In the preceding chapter it was suggested that certain emphases and conceptions in both theological and psychological views of the self ought to be preserved in any adequate treatment of the concept. The more important of these may be summarized as follows.

First, there are tendencies and attributes in natural human life which need to be controlled, or eliminated, if man is to grow in wholeness and freedom. Fundamentally these relate to man’s unwarranted assumption of his own autonomy independent of God and to the attitudes and behaviors which flow from this assumption.

Secondly, the individual Christian cannot truly be understood in isolation from God and his fellow-man. The attitudes and behaviors of other people, and his own reactions to these, help both to determine his own sense of who and what he is and to mold his own attitudes and adjustment to life. The experience of being in relationship to God may profoundly affect these attitudes and adjustments.

Thirdly, there is that in man which organizes his different and sometimes conflicting needs, desires,
motivations, etc., in such a manner as to make specific actions possible and generally to facilitate movement towards a life-goal or destiny—whether or not that goal be known or unknown by the person concerned. Both conscious and unconscious factors need to be taken into consideration in understanding this organizing principle.

Perhaps one can tentatively state the issue another way in that selfhood, when integrated, is experienced intuitively through a series of human and divine relationships in which one knows who he is and where he is going. The who question is obviously one of identity, the where question is one of destiny, and when involved with others in this process there is a question of relatedness.

In the final analysis, the concern of the theologian for a concept of self is rooted in his concern about the direction of movement of human life toward appropriate goals. This is the context in which rejectionism receives the validity it does possess. Both the relational and integrationist approaches are also interested, and in an even more direct way, in the manner in which personal life is focused and directed. In the psychological disciplines this same order of concern is apparent in each of the approaches discussed above, but finds its clearest expression when the emphasis is upon function. It is important to recognize that the theological and psychological disciplines do not necessarily agree as to what constitute appropriate goals. In general terms, theology insists that the goals of life appropriate
for man are those inherent in God's revelation of His will for man's integration.

It would seem, then, that the concept of self most likely to be fruitful for the present work is one which concentrates upon function and integration. The self will thus be considered in the remainder of this dissertation as the integrative function in human personality.

The introduction of the notion of integration does raise some problems which will need to be dealt with in due course. Not least of these is the fact that the process of development involves, at various levels and stages, the dis-integration of existing adaptive patterns so that new patterns may emerge.

The general sense of the term integration revolves around the notion of uniting elements into a whole. Wholeness may be achieved either by bringing together in a meaningful relationship parts, or elements, which are already in existence, or by introducing into a situation some element which has hitherto been lacking and is needed for completion. The Latin form integrio, from which integration is derived, contains the strong suggestion of renewal, restoration, or recreation, i.e. that the whole formed in the integrative process is a refabrication of a previously existent whole.

Wholeness may be conceived of either in static terms or in dynamic terms, as something which a man is (or has) or as something which he is in the process of becoming. It is a commonplace of contemporary theology to speak of man as a
unified whole in the sense that he is not, as the Greeks tended to think, merely a fusion of the three separate elements of body, mind, and spirit. But wholeness may also be thought of as something which man lacks because of the "Fall" and the loss or distortion of the imago dei in man. In this context wholeness needs to be restored (or created anew) and becomes very closely allied with the concept of freedom. At the same time it is widely recognized in contemporary theology that redeemed man is in process of becoming whole and that freedom and/or wholeness cannot be spoken of in static terms.

At this point it shall suffice to note that the term "integrative function" is here being employed with a dual reference. In the first place it designates the actual bringing together of the diverse motivational and attitudinal factors at work within a particular person at a particular time into sufficiently cohesive a pattern to permit action. Secondly, it is also being used to denote the direction of movement of life towards a goal, and particularly towards the goal of wholeness and freedom. Subsequently, it will be necessary to re-examine this dual reference to determine whether it is useful and desirable to use the common term self in relation to both approaches to wholeness. What is clear is that these two functions cannot finally be divorced from each other.

The employment of the term self to denote the integrative function in human life has no direct sanction from
Neither the Hebrew nor the Greek languages contain a substantive noun that is the precise equivalent of self. Nevertheless there are many occasions when the modern translator of both Old and New Testaments has to render a pronominal form by the term self to capture its significance for English readers. In addition to this there are a number of different words employed in the biblical text which have something of the significance here suggested for self. In the Old Testament spirit, flesh, and particularly heart may all have something of this flavor in particular contexts. Similarly, in the New Testament, mind, flesh, body, soul, spirit, heart, man, and even sin, are sometimes used to denote integrative centers in human personality. Thus, the general concept is known even though the particular term is not.

The preliminary understanding of self here proposed will make it possible to consider the important attributes, attitudes, characteristics, endowments, and processes within the person, and the forces impinging upon the person, as they come to some sort of focus to determine his identity, destiny and relatedness. This general approach also permits, and indeed requires, consideration of the unconscious factors in integration.

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1 See, e.g., Eccl 2.3,10; Ps 84.2; Is 57.17 et al.

2 See, e.g., Mk 7.21; 8.12; 14.34; Rom 6.6,12; 7.20 et al.
Finally, such an approach permits examination of various integrative possibilities in human life as a preliminary to assessing their adequacy. One cannot merely dismiss the possibility of selfhood in either regenerate or unregenerate man a priori. It may ultimately be decided that the concept of selfhood is not a useful one, or that some distinguishing term must be applied to differentiate free from unfree or whole from divided man insofar as the integrative function is concerned. The possibility of the term being employed validly and usefully must be left open at this point so that the thesis as stated may in fact be examined critically.

It is to be emphasized that this preliminary approach is intended to serve simply as a starting point and to eliminate certain other conceptions (such as those which confine the term self to certain attitudes and perceptions). Detailed exploration of the major sources will obviously require modification, qualification, and refinement of this approach and it is only in the light of that detail that greater precision can be introduced to support the hypothesis.

2. Jesus Christ.

In the following statements there is no intention of making a judgment about the truth or falseness of Christian
teaching. We are only trying to present a picture of what was historically believed and taught. The major streams of Protestant thought insist that a valid understanding of man begins with an understanding of God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ. The person of Jesus Christ is widely recognized in theology as in some sense determinative of genuine humanity and/or normative for an understanding of what it means to be a human being. It is thus imperative that a psychologist of the Christian religion, when studying selfhood, pay serious attention to the person and role of Jesus Christ. One of the important concerns of this dissertation is the attempt to determine in what manner, and in what sense, Jesus Christ is significant for human selfhood. A necessarily prior consideration is to ask what precisely is meant by the term Jesus Christ in such a context.

Historically, the name Jesus has a primary reference to the Galilean religious leader who was born in Bethlehem, raised in Nazareth, and executed in Jerusalem in the first century A.D. The Church which subsequently arose in response to the witness and preaching of his earliest disciples regarded him as the Christ, the anointed Son of God, who had become incarnate in human flesh to redeem a fallen humanity and restore it to a proper relationship of filial faith and trust in God and response to His will. The record of his birth, life, death, and total mission, is contained in the
Holy Scriptures, and particularly in the New Testament. Controversy still rages among biblical scholars over the historicity of the Gospel records. It is no part of the present purpose to attempt to unravel the mysteries associated with the phrase "the Jesus of history" (either in terms of the so-called old quest or the new). Insofar as an historical person is spoken of in the remainder of this dissertation, the understanding of the early church, as preserved in the canonical writings, will be taken as definitive unless the contrary is explicitly indicated. This stand is taken in full cognizance of the fact that these early writers were not primarily concerned with objective history but rather with religious and spiritual significance.

The Christian faith witnesses to the incarnation as an event in the historical time sequence, as a concrete and mundane event. A great deal of its significance derives from this historical concreteness and this-worldly reality. The extra-mundane at its highest, the fullness of Godhead, finds its expression to human understanding most completely in concrete particularity.

The historic creeds of the Church express belief in Jesus as "very God and very man" and this can only mean that he is regarded as having been as truly man as he was truly God. The docetic heresy which sought to deny the fullness of this humanity was not only one of the earliest of Christian heresies but has also proved one of the most persistent. But
it is clearly the teaching of the New Testament and the early Fathers (and indeed of the great theologians throughout the ages) that the mystery of his being both God and man cannot lightly be resolved by any qualification placed upon either the fullness of his humanity or of his divinity. To be faithful to this central and crucial affirmation of Christian faith, one must say of Jesus that in his humanity his human nature was, so to speak, uncompromised by his divinity. Similarly, one must say that his divinity was uncompromised by the full humanity through which it was expressed.

The New Testament sees Jesus Christ both as a man and as the man, a truth unconsciously witnessed to by Pilate in his *ecce homo!* The declaration that he was a man involves the recognition that he shared with other men those structures, qualities, and attributes which together constitute and define manhood. He was neither sub- nor supra- nor non-human but a man like other men. To speak of him as the man, however, is to set him apart from other men and to regard him as an exemplar or standard against which the quality of other humanity can be measured. In this particular man can be seen man at his finest which means, in Christian terms, man as God intends him to be. This similarity and difference from other men provides a continuing tension in Protestant theology which, in the final analysis, is inadequately resolved in the application of the negative concept of sinlessness as the differentiating factor.
It is the claim of the New Testament, and of subsequent Christian theology, that the Christ event, i.e., the birth, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus, has effected a change in the conditions of human life. Sometimes this is spoken of as if only those individuals who have been explicitly incorporated into the redemptive activity of God in Christ, and who have recognized their incorporation and have responded to it, have undergone basic change. At other times it is claimed that something new has been infused into the whole created order. And yet other times it would seem that change has come wherever the Gospel has been proclaimed but irrespective of whether individual persons have believed the Christian revelation. In any event, the common witness is that Jesus the Christ is in some way responsible for the change.

This consideration leads naturally to the second sense in which the term Jesus Christ is used. The historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth, in his humanity and his divinity, provides the fundamental criterion for any genuine Christian understanding of man. But theology has rarely been content to limit Christ to the first century A.D. The resurrection and ascension permit the use of the term Jesus Christ in relation to the ongoing activity of God in His Church and in the world. This continuing action is regarded as dependent upon, and in historical continuity with, Jesus of Nazareth and
is variously spoken of as the action of "the living Christ" or the "Spirit of Christ." There has frequently been some confusion between this continuing personal presence and power and the Holy Spirit of God but the traditional doctrine of the Church has endeavored to preserve a sense of difference in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity.

It is this "living Christ" who is said to encounter contemporary man and the "Spirit of Christ" who dwells in redeemed man. Just what precisely is meant by these expressions is not always clear. Countless thousands of persons have had many and varied experiences, some of which have produced attitudinal and behavioral changes of a marked order and varying degrees of permanence, which they have ascribed—or which have been ascribed by others—to the power and presence of Christ. Some of these experiences have been essentially contemplative, others have involved a high degree of emotion; some have been experiences in isolation, others have occurred to many persons together at the same time; some have taken place in an explicitly ecclesiastical context, and others not. The mode of the contemporary existence of Christ and His acting upon persons will need to be further discussed.

It is frequently said in theology that a man may "be Christ" to his neighbor. This would seem to mean two rather different things. The first is that the person concerned may
exhibit in his actions something of that same grace and compassion which was characteristic of Jesus of Nazareth. In a more mystical sense it may also mean that the action of one person toward another may be the vehicle whereby the living Christ makes communication directly with the other.

These three usages—the historical Christ, the living Christ, and the Christ in personal encounter—may be said to have the official sanction of the Church although emphases will differ in regard to each in different churches and different theologians. The norm of scripture can be used to determine the adequacy or otherwise of particular views and constructs within these broad categories. But it must also be admitted that there are many conceptions of Jesus Christ in the minds of men—believers and unbelievers alike—which bear little or no relationship to the Christ of scripture. Some of these conceptions are based on other, non-canonical, sources but many are peculiar to those who hold them and reflect the individuality of their possessors. The ideas of Christ which people actually have do not necessarily correspond to the ideas that the Church would like to think people have as a result of its preaching and teaching. Carl Jung in particular explores the significance of some of these different ideas of Christ.

With the notable exception of Jung, few psychologists have evinced much professional interest in the role of Jesus
Christ in relation to modern man. There have, of course, been many (and usually quite unconvincing and inadequate) attempts to analyze his personality from different viewpoints but none of these has had much influence on Christian thought. Sigmund Freud has a few scattered comments about the figure of Christ, suggesting that he is the one in whom the classical murder of the primal father is expiated. By his sacrificial death the guilt connected with the murder is atoned for. The other side of the ambivalence associated with this death and guilt is expressed in the fact that through his self-sacrifice the son actually succeeds to the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the father, and effectually replaces him. The rite by which believers associate themselves with Christ, the eucharist, expresses their identification with him both in the expiation and in the supplanting.

Freud is undecided as to whether there ever was an historical person, Jesus, but concludes that the significance


4 Sigmund Freud, "Totem and Taboo," in A.A. Brill (ed.), The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud (tr. by A.A. Brill), New York, Modern Library, 1938, p. 924 f.

of the Christ figure is that he enables men to shed their continuing guilt for the ancient murder and to express their freedom from the ancient paternal restrictions by symbolically re-enacting the primordial situation, in the doing of which they set the father aside anew. This continues to be relevant because man continues to have trouble in resolving the problems associated with the oedipus complex. Theodore Reik and Erich Fromm have each also done studies from the Freudian perspective with generally similar conclusions. These studies deserve more attention than they can be given here but their general value for the present purpose, recognizing their descriptive rather than explanatory nature, is to indicate that the idea of Christ may serve unconscious needs of man, and that the figure of Christ may, in part at least, be shaped in accordance with such needs.

Recognizing all the ambiguities and possibilities surrounding this term, Jesus Christ, one of the tasks of this dissertation will be to attempt an answer to the question: Is Jesus Christ experienced by us today as playing a significant role in shaping the self?

CHAPTER III

NIEBUHR'S EXPERIENCE OF THE SELF AND CHRIST

The writings of Reinhold Niebuhr cover a large variety of topics indicating a broad range of interests. Perhaps most important are his social concerns--his analyses of politics, economics, social ethics and their historical contexts. It is with such issues and problems that Niebuhr is most regularly preoccupied. But there are other significant issues. Very important for Niebuhr is the problem of epistemology and the variety of forms this takes in both Christian and secular thought: verification, literal and symbolic modes of thought and the uses and mis-uses of scientific thinking are but a few. And there is as well his preoccupation with and commitment to the "biblical story" as articulating what is expressed as ultimately true of human nature and destiny. We might speak of these as the social, epistemological and religious concerns, respectively. Accompanying this is Niebuhr's own testimony to the effect that he is not a "theologian" and that he does not wish to take or be given such responsibilities.

It can be argued both ways as to whether Niebuhr is a "theologian," but for our purposes it is not important to decide that issue here. What is important is the fact that behind these concerns--and behind the protest as well--lies a
theological attempt to describe what he experiences as the nature of man and his destiny, an attempt which undergirds these concerns without conflicting with them. Niebuhr's writings illustrate his own "anthropological premise"—namely, that however varied a thinker's interests and concerns may be they ultimately reflect anthropological considerations. And this is as true of his own work as it is of the thinkers whose writings he is so concerned to analyze.

Man is for Niebuhr first and foremost a self, an individualized unity of the basic elements of nature, reason and spirit. This is the structure of man, the self, of human nature. Included in this is man's capacity to transcend both his world and himself—i.e., he has the capacity to reflect upon his nature and his unity. This capacity and the accompanying knowledge produces temptation and anxiety, which in turn leads to "the fall"—the unity is broken, such that the self finds itself in the power of sin as pride and sensuality. On the other hand, anxiety is the occasion of grace as well as sin, humility as well as pride, the capacity to love others as well as the inclination to self-love and self-concern. These vicissitudes which anxiety produces in the self constitute what we shall call the functions of the self.

But for Niebuhr the self is experienced in a "dramatic-historical" or social environment, and therefore reference must be made to his concept of sociality and
history as these illumine his understanding of man. This consideration will involve a discussion of the place of memory in the life of the self, the notions of organism, artifact and drama as categories which interpret the structure of the self's collective life, as well as a discussion of the collective manifestations of both self-concern and creativity. Also included will be Niebuhr's experience of Christ as the power and wisdom that play a significant role in shaping the self.

It is these considerations which organize our delineation of Niebuhr's concept of the self. They are interrelated, for the self is a "unity" of its various aspects just as much as it is a unity in the above-mentioned sense.

1. Niebuhr's Life as a Christian Thinker.

Niebuhr was a man who could not divorce the theory of theology from practice. His political action and expertise sprang from deep roots of Christian reflection. The most extended analysis of Niebuhr's theological thought is found in the Gifford Lectures, The Nature and Destiny of Man, but it runs through all his works. His thought is centered in anthropology, his understanding of who man is and where he is going. Much of Niebuhr's thought was shaped by a struggle between the errors of naturalism and idealism. These are the
two basic varieties of miscalculation which manifest modern culture's divided mind on the question of man.

Naturalism centers upon the affinities between man and his environment. Man is determined by his biological drives and sensory intake. It is illusory to talk of the I as free to shape its future.

The other error that Niebuhr struggled against was Idealism. It situated man in a capacity which transcended the natural, and accentuated his rational quality. Idealism's rationalist point of view is characterized by two presuppositions. First it sets up a dualism between body and mind. In this dualism, naturalism's organic relationship between thought and extension is divided. Secondly, idealism identifies the good with man's rational capacity, and evil with man's natural urges. Consequently, human weakness is believed to be overcome by overpowering natural urges with reason.

The work of Niebuhr is influenced by a recognition that the individual tends to be destroyed through an adherence to either naturalism or idealism. The former began by affirming man in his uniqueness, but developed to the point of stressing the individuality of the state and its superiority over the individual. Idealism, on the other hand, uncovered aspects of the individual self unknown to naturalism, but finally destroyed individualism in an abstract universalism. We see this at its best in Hegel's glorification of the state as the historical manifestation of mind.
It must be admitted, however, that both the anthropologies of naturalism and idealism are highly optimistic of man and his future. Each is anti-institutional in the sense that institutions are seen as the embodiment of man's defiance of nature or reason's laws. Each holds that man's future is moving in the direction of progress. In history there is at work a natural force for the naturalist, and a rational force for the idealist which is responsible for, and assures us of, a progressive, futuristic movement.

Human experience in its broadest sense does not find either of these anthropologies agreeing with the existential situation of man according to Niebuhr. Neither does he believe that these anthropologies provide an adequate base for man's responsibilities and social relationships.

The position that Niebuhr takes is described as that of biblical religion, prophetic religion or the Judeo-Christian tradition. This alternative to the above-mentioned anthropologies enlightens man's choices and can be validated by our common experience. Of course, commitment to this alternative comes only through faith and not by reasoning or debating. Niebuhr holds that this alternative preserves man from alienation and despair on one hand, while from naïveté and complacency on the other. For Niebuhr man "lives at the juncture of nature and spirit," thus he avoids the reductionism of naturalism and idealism. In this context, we must now look in depth at Niebuhr's understanding of the self.
2. The Nature of the Self.

The terms "self" and "man" are by no means clearly distinguished in Niebuhr's usage. Sometimes he seems to identify them, or at least to use them interchangeably. On the other hand, it seems equally certain that some kind of distinction is clearly presupposed; otherwise, the two terms can be distinguished at one important point.

The term "man" in Niebuhr's thought is generally associated with the nature and/or structure of human nature, the basic elements of whatever is truly human, the objective human situation, and with man as he is essentially. The term "self" appears to be associated with the functional, actional...
aspect of human life, the way its basic elements interplay one upon the other, the way in which these basic realities of life are subjectively appropriated, and with what a human being is existentially and in actuality. To put it another way, "man," we are told, "stands at the juncture of nature and "spirit"; but it is primarily "the self" which is anxious about this fact. In a representative passage, Niebuhr asserts that:

To the essential nature of man belong, on the one hand, all his natural endowments, and determinations, his physical and social impulses, his sexual and racial differentiations, in short his character as a creature imbedded in the natural order. On the other hand, his essential nature also includes the freedom of his spirit, his transcendence over natural process and finally his self-transcendence.

Man is made up of the elements of nature and spirit, wherein elements suggest that which is irreducible, indivisible and incapable of further derivation. These basic elements refer to the nature of man and what he is "truly," to his "proper state and nature." They describe and characterize human nature as it is intended to be or as it should be--they refer to man's potentialities and to his most possible possibilities.

In spite of the liabilities to which it is subjected, and in spite of the various possible distortions which it may undergo, this essential nature is always recognizable:

[...] Christian theology [...] has never been without witness to the fact that human sin cannot destroy the essential character of man to such a degree that it

would cease being implied in, and furnishing a contrast to, what he had become.7

Niebuhr makes the point in different ways:

Nothing can change the essential nature and structure [...].8

[...] the real structure of life [...] asserts itself, in spite of all errors, against the confusion which human egotism and pride introduce into the relations of men.9

The essential character, while descriptive of man as he is intended to be, nevertheless endures in actual life, and in spite of the greatest distortion of all—human sin.10

We must, then, in discussing the nature of human nature and the self, begin with the categories of nature, reason and spirit.11

In addition to being anthropological constructs, they are also primary organizing categories by means of which Niebuhr interprets and understands both the self and the world. It is not just the self, apart from everything

10 We have elected to use the term nature in the sense of "the enduring elements which any thinker posits in his formulation of human nature (see Chapter I, p.xvii, this dissertation).
11 The place of "reason" in Niebuhr's thought is ambiguous. As man's rational faculty, and as a principle of order, it is continuous with spirit and therefore is, we believe, of cognate rank with nature and spirit. This will become clear as our study progresses. Nature here refers to the limitations of man and his universe.
else, which occupies Niebuhr's attention, but rather the world about man as well.¹²

These three categories are referred to by Niebuhr as principles of comprehension,¹³ as principles of interpretation,¹⁴ as a principle of explanation,¹⁵ and as a principle of meaning.¹⁶ All are interchangeable and all are used frequently. The last, however, is the one he most prefers. For example:

[The problem of meaning...] is not solved without the introduction of a principle of meaning which transcends the world of meaning to be interpreted.¹⁷

What is finally and inevitably needed, of course, is a principle of meaning which is "ultimate."¹⁸ This is included in Niebuhr's concept of spirit—the third of the basic organizing categories. Together these three principles organize the Niebuhrarian analysis of man and his world.


We can ask which of the categories should be discussed first. It is our task to be responsible to Niebuhr's thought and work as a whole, and therefore we should allow ourselves to be guided by his own procedure in developing these concepts. A clue to this problem lies in Niebuhr's understanding of the apologetic task for which all Christians must take responsibility. This task has a negative and a positive aspect. The negative aspect consists in "exploring the limits of historic forms of wisdom and virtue," and making the recognition of the failure of the wisdom of the world an unavoidable one. The insights and knowledge of culture are examined in order that their particularity, incompleteness and their shortcomings become clear. The positive aspect consists in "correlating" the truth of the Christian Faith with the "specific truths revealed by the various historical disciplines," so that the "Christian truth is enriched by the specific insights" and in turn enriches them by saving them from "idolatrous aberrations."

Niebuhr, through the approach which could be called his "procedural via negativa," shows us where he believes any good theological analysis should begin. Whether his intention

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19 FH, p. 152. 20 FH, p. 165.
21 FH, p. 167. 22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
is negative or positive, he begins with the truths and insights of immediate experience, with what is less than ultimate and final, in order that what is ultimate and final may emerge most clearly and be defined most precisely. His statement of what is theological emerges from what is not. Or, in terms of the three basic, organizing categories, the concept of spirit emerges from an analysis of nature and reason. Therefore, our analysis must begin with nature rather than reason or spirit; and it must decline to discuss the self in its unity or integrating function until the elements of the self have been described.

A. Nature and Body

We have pointed out that "nature" as it appears in the heading of this section (The Nature of the Self) refers to the general qualities or characteristics that define and identify the self. In the sub-heading "nature" will be used

Niebuhr does himself what he says should be done. In ND, Vol. I (see the "Table of Contents," for example), he begins with certain distortions of nature and reason—and then moves to the "Christian View of Man" and his analysis of spirit, freedom and self-transcendence. In FH he begins with an analysis of the doctrine of progress, which is rooted in nature and reason, and only then develops the "Biblical View" of history (see the "Table of Contents"). In SDH he begins with a concession to "empirical verification" and the "spirit of contemporary empiricism," and only later discusses his belief that "the self is in dialogue with God" (see SDH, p. 5, for example).
in a more restricted sense where it will refer specifically to the limitations of man and his universe. Here "nature" represents one of three subordinate categories which constitute the self. Since Niebuhr recurs again and again to the basic category of nature, and since his concerns, preoccupations and interests are far-reaching, we might expect that the meanings and significance which he assigns to it will be complex. However, a basic consistency is present throughout his discussions. We understand Niebuhr's usage of "nature" to have one primary meaning, made up of several secondary meanings, all of which are together embodied in several distinct but closely allied concepts.

The generic term for "that which limits" man and his world is nature. It means limitation, and suggests the various and subtle ways in which men and the universe are limited. Limitation suggests derivation, dependency, determinacy and insufficiency. Niebuhr puts it in various ways:

Though it [the self] surveys the whole world and is tempted to regard its partial transcendence over its body [i.e., nature] as proof of its candidature for divinity, it remains in fact a very dependent self. 25

The created world of nature is characterized by "brevity and dependence," 26 it is "dependent and insufficient." 27 Man is involved in the "necessities and contingencies of nature." 28

and "the determinate character of its [his ego's] existence."\textsuperscript{29} The world of nature is the "world of natural contingency,"\textsuperscript{30} of "natural necessity."\textsuperscript{31}

Man and his world are limited in a number of different ways. One is obvious and commonplace: the physical and biological world around and in man, i.e., the realm of the material and the inorganic, and the organic-physiological processes which are interconnected with the latter. Nature, therefore, refers to the inorganic world, where "substance and forces are integrated and disintegrated [...] with mathematical exactitude"; and to the organic world where plant life while living exists as a unity, and when dead sinks back into the inorganic world. A higher level in the organic world is that of animal life which has a "specific center of unified interdependence, a central nervous system."\textsuperscript{32} Niebuhr also makes reference to "the world of natural necessity" with its "biological structure,"\textsuperscript{33} to "animal life"\textsuperscript{34} and "animal organisms,"\textsuperscript{35} and to the "realm of the biological and organic."\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{ND}, Vol. I, p. 189. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{30} \textit{FH}, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{FH}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{32} See \textit{ND}, Vol. I, p. 54-55, for references to these citations.
\textsuperscript{33} Reinhard Niebuhr, "The Tyranny of Science," \textit{Theology Today}, Vol. 10, January 1954, p. 466. (Hereafter referred to as "TofS.")
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{ND}, Vol. I, p. 54-55 \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{35} \textit{SDH}, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{ND}, Vol. I, p. 40.
Geographical factors are also suggested by the word "nature." Such determinations include fire, flood, disease, and the accidents or conditions of birth—where one was born (geographical location, national identity, topography), his sexual identity, his racial origins and his place in the socio-economic structure of his society.\textsuperscript{37,38}

Nature as causality and ordered sequence is even a more important understanding of Niebuhr. This refers to the repetitive, cyclical and mechanistic aspects of nature. Typical references are: "the harmonies of nature,"\textsuperscript{39} "the forms and unities of nature,"\textsuperscript{40} "the regularities and dependable recurrences of nature,"\textsuperscript{41} "the causal sequences of nature";\textsuperscript{42} other, less frequent references are "natural cause" and "the natural process"\textsuperscript{43} or the "facts of nature."\textsuperscript{44} He describes

\textsuperscript{37} For discussions of this aspect of nature, see ND, Vol. I, p. 69; Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, New York, Scribner's, 1952, p. 142 (hereafter referred to as IAH); "TofS," p. 466.

\textsuperscript{38} Closely related to these definitions are Niebuhr's discussions of nature as "organism"—i.e., the basic and primal forces of social cohesion which are more or less "given" in any culture. In much the same way that physical and organic conditions are given—see, for example, Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, New York, Scribner's, 1959 (hereafter referred to as SNE), p. 260-261—and which therefore constitute another kind of limitation on human life. Clearly, nature has socio-historical dimensions in Niebuhr's thought, but we defer discussion of this to the third section of this chapter.


\textsuperscript{43} FH, p. 66. \textsuperscript{44} FH, p. 100.
this aspect of human life in various ways:

This [human transcendence] is the basis of human history, with its progressive alteration of forms, in distinction from nature which knows no history but only endless repetition within the limits of each given form.45

In an essay devoted to this subject he says:

[... ] only in nature are there repeatable processes and recurrences which make repetitions of an experiment under controlled conditions possible until the mind is compelled to draw one, rather than another, conclusion.46

In an earlier work we are told that:

[... ] myth [...] transcends the surface of history, on which the cause-effect sequences, discovered and analyzed by science, occur. Science can only deal with this surface of nature and history, analyzing, dividing, and segregating its detailed phenomena and relating them to each other in terms of their observable sequences. [...] It is bound to treat each new emergent [...] as having the adequate cause in an antecedent event.47

Man and his world are limited through the "closed-off" quality of natural processes. It is a realm of endless repetition, a closed cycle incapable of novelty and variety, where alternatives do not exist. It is characterized by complete determinism, for each event's emergence or appearance can be fully and completely accounted for by attentively scrutinizing antecedent causes. Any event exists only because of and only on the basis of prior events.


47 Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, New York, Meridian, 1956, p. 21. (Hereafter referred to as ICE.)
Accompanying this determinism is the absence of subjectivity, decision and consciousness\(^{48}\) whereby alternative movements,\(^{49}\) processes, directions, etc., can be reviewed and considered. Animal life, too, is in the power of endless repetition, being subject at all times to the "life strategy of the species."\(^{50}\) As soon as awareness or consciousness--and their concomitants of decision and freedom--become a possibility, then something more than nature is operative.

\(^{48}\) To say that in nature there is no consciousness is simply to say that consciousness, self-consciousness and awareness all refer to the realm of spirit rather than to the realm of nature. However, we also wish to mention a variant use of "consciousness" in Niebuhr's thought. From time to time he refers to men's actions on the basis of "unconscious" fears, etc.: "His [man's] privileges and securities, or lack of them, his mode of work, whether rural or urban, are fairly determinative in prompting his decisions [...] they are in each instance compounded with, modified, and frequently overruled by partly conscious and partly unconscious hopes, fears and strivings of his fellow creatures" (ND, Vol. I, p. 68). This seems to indicate that one's "unconscious hopes, fears, strivings" are forces which limit, and that therefore they properly belong to the realm of nature.

It is important, however, to distinguish this usage of the term "unconscious" from another way in which Niebuhr uses it--i.e., from his concepts of anxiety, sin and irony. This second use is far more closely associated with the process whereby limitation is recognized than it is associated with the natural fact of it.


\(^{50}\) ND, Vol. I, p. 55.
Precisely because of its mechanistic, cyclical and repetitive qualities, the realm of nature is also without ends and purposes:

Science is most precise when it instructs us about the possible consequences of particular actions, about the means which must be used to gain certain ends. But are these ends discernible? Science either claims that it is able to answer questions about norms, in which case it does so simply by making the system of nature into a false norm; or, if it is wiser, it refuses to answer these questions and declares its ethical neutrality. That is to say, it admits that it cannot answer questions about the desirability of certain human and historical ends which are most urgent for mankind. It cannot do so because the ends above the level of natural necessity are a part of a value scheme in which each value gets its meaning from a total system of meaning.51

"Natural necessity," or "the system of nature" is amoral, for it contains neither moral principles nor the basis for such principles.

Nature, by itself, also lacks uniqueness, particularity and individuality, because of its amoral and mechanistic qualities.52 In nature there are no grounds or criteria (or reasons, for that matter) for attempting to identify anything unique or singular. No entity or object of the realm of nature has sufficient power of particularity by which it


52 We recognize that these three words--uniqueness, particularity and individuality--have special meaning for Niebuhr. He usually refers to the uniqueness of selfhood (e.g., SDH, p. ix), the particularity of the body (e.g., ND, Vol. I, p. 55), and human individuality (e.g., ND, Vol. I, p. 56).
might exhaust and defy the characteristics of the other objects to which it is related. It can be fully described by, and subsumed under, the general and the universal:

Naturalism loses the individual because it does not comprehend the [...] human spirit. This spirit is a reality which does not fit into the category of natural causality.\textsuperscript{53}

Of the several meanings which Niebuhr ascribes to the realm of nature, none is more important--and certainly none more complex--than vitality or as he puts it "natural vitality."\textsuperscript{54} Some of his more characteristic references are "the forces [...] of nature," or "human vitality";\textsuperscript{55} "the vitality of nature";\textsuperscript{56} "the vital impulses of physical life";\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{53} ND, Vol. I, p. 61. For further documentation of this point, see almost any of Niebuhr's many references to individuality. For example: ND, Vol. I, p. 82-83, 91-92, 69-70; or SDH, p. 3-5.

\textsuperscript{54} It is "most important" for several reasons. It is, along with the correlate "form" (as, for example, in the phrase "the problem of vitality and form") the Niebuhrian construct most consistently basic to his analysis of the self; for the true meaning of the self emerges from what vitality and form, in and of themselves, are not--namely, the union of vitality and form. The real self is neither wholly vital or wholly formal. Second, Niebuhr's definition of God and of the divine-human encounter is rooted in his analysis of vitality, form and God's transcendence of these. Third, Niebuhr associates the term "creativity" with his discussions of vitality and form and their transcendence. Vitality and form, then, are the basis of any attempt to bring together the basic categories (nature, reason and spirit), the concept of the self, and the concept of creativity.


\textsuperscript{57} ND, Vol. I, p. 34.
"the impulse of nature"; 58 "the sub-rational vitalities of the self"; 59 and "the vitalities of life." 60 There are others, scattered, as are so many important Niebuhrian statements, throughout his works. While vitality is clearly an important aspect of nature, 61 its precise meaning is not easy to comprehend.

The vitality of nature or natural vitality is first of all a dynamic and energetic force characteristic of the biological and the organic 62—which Niebuhr often refers to as "animal life" or as "animal existence." In an early work he describes this in some detail:

Human beings are endowed by nature with both selfish and unselfish impulses. The individual is a nucleus of energy which is organically related from the very beginning with other energy, but which maintains, nevertheless, its own discreet existence. Every type of energy in nature seeks to preserve and perpetuate itself and to gain fulfillment within terms of its unique genius. The energy of human life does not differ in this from the whole world of nature. 63

Along with lower creatures man shares social impulses which are "obviously rooted in instinct and nature" and which

58 "TinM," p. 126.
60 ND, Vol. I, p. 11.
61 In associating vitality with nature we do not ignore Niebuhr's references to spiritual vitality or redemptive vitality (e.g., ND, Vol. I, p. 26). The relation between nature and spirit on the one hand, and form and vitality on the other, will be discussed below.
62 The biological and organic are associated with vitality and nature.
63 MMIS, p. 25.
"carry life beyond itself." \(^{64}\) In a much later work Niebuhr speaks of "the exuberant vitality" which is expressed by all creatures, men and animals, and refers to the vitality of nature in terms of its "impulses and drives." \(^{65}\)

Niebuhr prefers to speak of this energy or exuberance in terms of direction or purpose, and of the forms which it takes rather than describing it. This energy, arising in organisms, drives beyond its specific locus, seeking completion and harmony in another. Its goal is that of carrying life beyond itself—although in and of itself it is equally capable of discord and destructiveness. Specifically, this reaching out takes the form of two impulses; \(^{66}\) the will to survive and the will to propagate. Thus he speaks of "the vital force of the sex impulse" and "the sex impulse." \(^{67}\) And he mentions the will to survive in connection with animal or creaturely exuberance. \(^{68}\) These two specific impulses are referred to as "determinations of instinct" and as "forms of natural cohesion and differentiation." \(^{69}\)

On the other hand, while Niebuhr does specify these two impulses, he more often speaks simply of the impulses, instincts and drives of man.

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\(^{66}\) See, for example, ND, Vol. II, p. 296, where Niebuhr refers to the survival impulse and sexual desire.


\(^{69}\) ND, Vol. I, p. 27.
and nature, without further discriminating among them. This leads to the impression that he probably does have more than these two in mind, but that they are not nearly as important as the two he has chosen to specify.⁷⁰

This vitality is very difficult to describe, nevertheless, a description must be attempted. We suggest that Niebuhr has in mind an enduring and compelling force of biologic nature and origin which, while it can undergo peripheral modifications, remains essentially what it always was. In this sense one of the basic meanings of vitality is that it exercises limitation upon man. It limits him for it is something he must cope with, or come to terms with, something he cannot of his own will alter or reverse. It is one of the "givens" of existence. Vitality in this sense is a relentless but always highly patterned urging and thrusting outward, a native assertiveness (but not self-assertiveness) on the part of all animal life.

That vitality is itself without limits should not be a conclusion drawn from the statement that vitality is a given which limits man. To be sure, Niebuhr is sometimes fond of referring to "the anarchic"⁷¹ vitalities of nature;

⁷⁰ For example, "Every impulse of nature in man can be modified, extended, repressed and combined with other impulses in countless variations" (ND, Vol. I, p. 55). Also of interest in this statement is the unqualified use of the term "repressed."

but he is not suggesting that natural vitality knows no form, order or structure. We have already referred to the mechanistic aspect of nature, and it is in connection with this that Niebuhr speaks of "the forms and unities of nature";\textsuperscript{72} of its "determinations"\textsuperscript{73} and of its necessities--of "the inherent order and unity of biological impulse."\textsuperscript{74} The vitality of nature, whatever may be its specific instincts or impulses, has a kind of "built-in" order or schema for patterning whatever direction it will take. Natural vitality is never without its own form, unity and order. Each physical impulse has its own "restraints which hedge it about in nature."\textsuperscript{75} This inherent form and unity of natural impulse is allied with Niebuhr's concept of "form" as this is used in the phrase "vitality and form."\textsuperscript{76}

The meaning of the drives, impulses and instincts of nature must further be specified. For example, the concept of "instinct" can suggest the sudden contraction of striped musculature in lower animals when stimulated by a sharp instrument--there is an "instinctual" response; or, it may suggest migratory patterns of fish or birds--they "instinctively" seek out a particular location; or, it can be used in

\textsuperscript{72} ND, Vol. I, p. 27. \textsuperscript{73} Ibid. \textsuperscript{74} ND, Vol. I, p. 40. \textsuperscript{75} Ibid. \textsuperscript{76} This use of the term "form" will be discussed below.
a more symbolic way to suggest any unavoidable or relentless yearning, of no particular nature, on the part of a man—men "instinctively" seek justice. In like manner the term "impulse" may suggest any sudden discharge of organic energies, or it may be used in speaking of desire and wish. Much the same could be said for the term "drive."

We believe, in the case of Niebuhr's thought, that the guiding conception is that of an organic force interpreted from the point of view of a machine. Instincts, impulses, drives—the vitalities of nature—all are organic mechanisms, the "mechanisms of impulse with which nature has endowed him [man]."77 Natural vitality has the predictable, repetitive and unalterable qualities of a machine.

Niebuhr's concept or understanding of what is "organic"—i.e., the figure of speech or model behind this—is an even more basic one. It is simply the growth and development of plant and animal life, as common sense understanding conceives of this. What is organic develops on the basis of a built-in entelechy78 which guides each new change and novelty.


78 On this point Niebuhr's conception of nature resembles that of the seventeenth century, as this is described and criticized by A. N. Whitehead (see Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, New York, New American Library, 1948, chapter 3) wherein nature is mechanistic rather than organic. However, Niebuhr and Whitehead are more similar than might appear, for Niebuhr emphasizes organism in his notions of the organic unity of consciousness and the organic unity between body and spirit. (See, for example, "TinM.")
and which is thoroughly predictable from beginning to end, from birth to death, such that the less predictable the less "natural" in the process. This built-in directionality is what Niebuhr means by the forms and unities of nature.\(^\text{79,80}\)

His understanding of nature gives meaning and form to a number of related concepts which are, in effect, simply other ways in which Niebuhr articulates and makes increasingly relevant his understanding of nature. We refer to his concepts of "finitude," "creatureliness" and "body," each of which is highly dialectical: finitude or finiteness is in dialectical relation to freedom; creature and creatureliness to creator; and body to spirit.

The adjective finite (as, for example, in the phrase "finite freedom"), or the noun finitude, is the moral dimension of Niebuhr's anthropological reference to nature: finitude is to freedom what nature is to spirit; or, put in another way, everything which can be said of nature can also

\[\text{79 For discussion of this point see IAH, p. 142; ND, Vol. I, p. 56. These examples are in terms of social, rather than individual phenomena. However, there is continuity in Niebuhr's thought between the natural and organic aspects of individual and social life.}\]

\[\text{80 Our discussion of Niebuhr's concept of nature has proceeded as if there were for him such a thing as "pure" nature--i.e., nature existing apart from reason and spirit. The precise understanding of the interrelations between these three aspects of man and his world will be discussed under the notion of "spirit."}\]
be said of finitude. While Niebuhr does frequently speak of "man's finiteness" or of "human freedom and finiteness," the preferred phrase is "the paradox of freedom and finiteness" or "the contradiction of freedom and finiteness." In addition to what can be said of nature, however, finitude signifies as well the partiality of every man's point of view—the fact that no man is omnipotent or omniscient, that he does not know, see and understand everything. Niebuhr tells us that "human perspectives are partial and finite," and that we are all involved in "the denial of the finiteness of our knowledge." Finiteness signifies "incompleteness" as well, in the sense that man is in and of himself insufficient to fulfill his own basic nature. In an interesting discussion of sexuality and sin Niebuhr says:

 [...] generation is so obviously a necessity of finite existence [...] the incompleteness of man and woman, one without the other, is the most striking example of the insufficiency and dependence of one life upon the other.

Finitude might also be called the parochial and dependent nature of all human life. It is the moral dimension of man's ineluctable natural origin.

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82 For example, ND, Vol. I, p. 182.
83 For example, ND, Vol. I, p. 179.
Like Niebuhr's concept of finitude, his concept of man as a creature takes its meaning from his concept of nature: everything which can be said of nature can be said of "the creature." This term is the biblical cognate of nature, just as the term "creator" is the biblical cognate of spirit, and the relationship between man as creature and man as creator is controlled by the relationship between nature and spirit. The term creature establishes continuity between Niebuhr's anthropological and moral analyses, on the one hand, and his commitment to biblical modes of thought and speech on the other.

(a) Body.- Niebuhr's concept of "the body," the third of the concepts, is also sufficiently allied with his concept of nature to repeat the dictum that anything said of nature must also be said of the body. However, the concept of body is used primarily in connection with the term "self." Thus "body" is for Niebuhr the natural dimension of selfhood--it is nature as nature applies to the self. "Man" may live at the juncture of nature and spirit; and "man" may be rooted in nature; but, according to Niebuhr's rhetoric, only "the self" has a body. His definition of body, beyond what he has to say of nature--lies in his emphasis upon its particularity and upon its organic unity with spirit.

Men exist as discrete units or entities over against the world, and they are aware of this separateness. Human
individuality lies in these two facts: "Individuality is a fruit both of nature and spirit. It is the product of nature because the basis of selfhood lies in the particularity of the body [...]". The body, then, is an individuated and clearly distinguishable segment of nature. To it Niebuhr assigns all the aspects of natural vitality, while at the same time recognizing in it at once the basis of genuine—i.e., human—individuality and the uniqueness of every human personality (or self). The uniqueness of each self is in part accountable to the fact that each person's body is never entirely identical with any other person's.

Between nature and body there exists a continuity which permits Niebuhr to assign to the realm of the body the sexual impulse in man (the impulse to self-propagation) and the impulse toward survival or self-preservation. However, further discrimination between impulses would not be responsible to Niebuhr's thought. We can only say that to the body belong the vital impulses of man, what Niebuhr has said of man's finitude and also his understanding of being a creature.

Nevertheless, as there is no such thing for Niebuhr as "pure" nature, so there is no such thing as a body apart from spirit and mind. The relationship which body bears to


88 This point is implicit in such a statement as "the unity of vitality and reason, of body and soul" (ND, Vol. II, p. 258).
the dimension of spirit in the self is that of "unity."
This means that the self experiences continuity between itself and its body, such that its body is never known as merely one object among other objects, while at the same time possessing a genuine kind of objectivity (in the sense of transcendence) towards its body. 89

B. Reason and Mind

In Niebuhr's thought the concept of reason is cognate with nature and spirit. It is one of the basic and central organizing categories, a principle of meaning, comprehension, interpretation and explanation. Yet, of these three, it receives the least emphasis and discussion; less time and space are devoted to precise or formal definition, and there are fewer related categories whose definitions are derived from it. We will begin our discussion with the various meanings Niebuhr assigns to this concept, and then conclude with some reference to his concept of form. This will put us in a position to discuss spirit and self, since the union of vitality and form is one important way of defining spirit.

For Niebuhr, reason, as a principle of meaning, denotes "the order of the world," 90 the "rationality" of the

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89 For example, see SDH, p. 26. This organic unity will be discussed in more detail below.

universe which makes the facts and events of man and his world amenable to some kind of shape, pattern, form or order. It refers to the twofold fact that there are "orderable" or identifiable aspects to life, and man has the capacity to grasp these. However, we will focus upon reason as an aspect of man and its coordinate term "mind." Together they refer to "man's rational faculties" or to the capacities of "the human mind."

Organizing, restricting, and harmonizing the natural vitality of the body together represent for Niebuhr one of the most basic functions of reason. This is really a twofold function--that of channelling and directing, and that of inhibiting or withholding. Niebuhr refers to this function as "the harmonizing force of the mind," or "the mind's impetus to coherence and synthesis." In an early work he describes it in detail:

His [man's] reason endows him with a capacity for self-transcendence. [...] Reason enables him, within limits, to direct his energy so that it will flow in harmony, and not in conflict, with other life. In an early work he identifies rationality with:

[...] the extent to which we become conscious of the real character of our own motives and impulses, the ability to harmonize conflicting impulses in our own life and in society.

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Thus reason harmonizes and extends impulses; and it may even from time to time check them. But it cannot transform them into anything more altruistic or of a higher order. Reason can form the impulses of nature, but "it cannot reform them." This, as we shall see, is the function of spirit.

Niebuhr not only thinks of reason as a function but also as a capacity—the capacity to form ideas and concepts and to organize them in a logical and coherent fashion. It is man's "capacity for thought and reason," his capacity to develop "canons of rational intelligibility," and "rational principles of coherence." It includes as well the capacity to discern recurrent patterns in the events of the world—for example, he argues that:

Science objects because the religious thinker is not rational: because nothing follows "in a necessary manner," in a way that either logicians or scientists define necessity.

It would seem that the model or metaphor behind this aspect of Niebuhr's concept of reason is that of mathematical consistency, logicality and inevitability—wherein any and all alternative patterns and explanations seem clearly incorrect and cancel themselves out. Thus reason would refer at once to the most cursory attempt at being scientific as well as

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to the most highly developed philosophical systems (e.g., Hegel's) wherein truth was claimed on the basis of logical consistency and "rational" inevitability.

The notions of reason as controlling vitality and as conceptual power both have behind them that of reason as the capacity for consciousness, but not for self-consciousness. It is that aspect of human consciousness which transcends the natural process, but it does not transcend this transcendence. It is the capacity "to stand outside the world," but it does not include the "further ability to stand outside oneself."102 It is a kind of preliminary and highly limited consciousness or awareness of "the world" which man but not the animals possess,103 a partial kind of transcendence. On the other hand, this capacity is continuous with spirit104 and united organically with body.

The capacity for consciousness is closely associated with the capacity for memory. Reason and man's rational faculties suggest a limited capacity for recall, one which, however, must be completed and augmented by genuine self-transcendence. Thus memory as men generally know it is a function of spirit rather than reason. Any kind of "rational"

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103 See, for example, ND, Vol. I, p. 55.
memory would have to be limited to the mechanics of perception and the conceptual and mathematical-like forms which the mind uses in organizing its perceptions.  

With respect to reason, perhaps the most inclusive term Niebuhr uses is that of "form," as it is used in contradistinction to "vitality." In various ways this concept is allied with the above-mentioned understandings of reason—i.e., it is Niebuhr's generic and inclusive way of identifying the principle of order, coherence and synthesis in the world and in the life of man. It refers to the integrating function of life, representing the direction, intention and purpose of the forces, energies and power of life. Form, however, should not be simply equated with reason or spirit, nor should vitality be equated simply with nature, for there are rational and spiritual vitalities, just as they are natural and spiritual forms or coherences.

105 For a discussion of this point see SDH, p. 4. Niebuhr puts this point in another way when he says that, "the complex of events which constitute history represent a bewildering confusion of destiny and freedom, which conform to the patterns of neither logical nor natural coherence. They are comprehended as a unity by memory but not by logic" (FH, p. 20).


107 See, for example, ND, Vol. I, p. 26-27. The precise relationship between nature and spirit and form and vitality will be discussed below.
C. Spirit and Self

Like its kin, nature and reason, Niebuhr's conception of spirit has a central integrating function and a principle of meaning and comprehension. Unlike nature, and a great deal more like reason, it applies to man rather than to other creatures. It is the dialectical opposite of nature and the clue to the essence of genuine humanity. Indeed, it is the truly informative notion behind Niebuhr's concept of human nature. And since his thought is so thoroughly anthropologically oriented, it is not inconsistent that the category of spirit should be important in shaping the meaning of a cluster of related conceptions: self-transcendence and self-consciousness, freedom, the image of God and selfhood. The relation between spirit and these concepts is so close that we shall argue that the latter are really alternative ways in which the various meanings of spirit can be developed.

As the dialectical opposite of nature, the most general and inclusive meaning of spirit is that dimension of life which, at any particular moment, knows no limit. It is that aspect which is self-sufficient rather than insufficient, independent rather than dependent, self-deriving

108 That it is a principle which lies "beyond" all other principles need not concern us here.
rather than derivative and self-determining rather than determinate. As such spirit is always defined in relation to nature, and consequently that which is unlimited takes its shape from that which is limited. Insofar as certain aspects of life are not characterized by the limitations of nature, then to this degree they participate in the realm of spirit.

When looking for the meaning of spirit, one finds it more specifically in a particular kind of transcendence or consciousness—i.e., self-transcendence or self-consciousness. For nature knows neither of these. Self-transcendence is a kind of self-consciousness, which is in turn a kind of imaginative awareness and grasping of the world and of oneself as the seat of this awareness. Unlike mere consciousness it includes the ability to distinguish clearly between oneself and the world, and then the ability to inspect oneself as the locus of this distinction. At no point is the capacity to reflect upon the fact that one has just reflected potentially limited. To be self-conscious, to transcend oneself, this is to stand outside of nature, life, oneself, one's reason and one's world. The human spirit:

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109 Niebuhr uses these interchangeably. If a precise and refined distinction had to be made, self-transcendence would be understood as more metaphysical, and self-consciousness more psychological.
[...] has the special capacity for standing continually outside itself in terms of indefinite regression. Consciousness is a capacity for surveying the world and determining action from a governing center. Self-consciousness represents a further degree of transcendence in which the self makes itself its own object in such a way the ego is finally always subject and not object. The rational capacity of surveying the world, of forming general concepts and analyzing the order of the world is thus but one aspect of what Christianity knows as "spirit." The self knows the world, insofar as it knows the world, because it stands outside both itself and the world, which means that it cannot understand itself except as it is understood from beyond itself and the world. 110

This typical Niebuhrian statement was chosen as much for its inclusiveness as for its representativeness. It is the ability and capability, the possibility and potentiality for ever-increasing ranges of imaginative inspection and then reflection upon (or inspection of) this inspection—literally, ad infinitum. This suggests specifically that spirit is the capacity for viewing and knowing alternatives. 111 It is that dimension of man's life wherein alternative courses of action and thought insistently face him, such that he cannot defer to forces beyond his influence, but must rather enter into the alternatives and order them in some way. Put in


111 Thus in distinguishing spirit from reason Niebuhr says that man must "direct and re-direct," and "arrange and re-arrange" the vitalities and unities of nature. The prefix "re-" suggests the presence of an indefinite series of alternatives or possibilities (e.g., ND, Vol. I, p. 26-27). Another typical Niebuhrian phrase is "endless variations and elaborations" (e.g., ND, Vol. I, p. 55).
another way, spirit is that dimension of man's life in which he must limit himself, where limitations are not imposed by "nature," but rather where the problem of limitation must be solved by man and his awareness of it.

The sense of oneself as apart from and over against the events and entities of the world, the recognition of separateness and discreteness, the sense of human individuality, all of these have spirit as their basis:

Genuine individuality, embodying both discreteness and uniqueness, is a characteristic of human life. It must consequently be regarded as the product of spirit as well as of nature. Nature supplies particularity but the freedom of the spirit is the cause of real individuality [... the] capacity for self-transcendence which distinguishes spirit in man from soul [...] is the basis of discrete individuality, for this self-consciousness involves consciousness of the world as "the other." [...] Self-knowledge is the basis of discreet individuality.112

Written into the meaning of spirit is the notion of apartness and singularity. The discreteness of human individuality is thought of by Niebuhr to be in contrast to universals, collectivities and generalities.113 Nature is least of all capable of individuality; but as one moves up out of nature—we might even say, as one individuates out of nature—life begins to approximate the ranges of spirit; and, in doing so, begins to acquire genuine individuality.


113 Thus naturalism destroys individuality by reducing it to an undifferentiated "stream of consciousness" (ND, Vol. I, p. 70), and rationalism loses individuality in universals (ND, Vol. I, p. 75).
Spirit is also the basis of human freedom:

Human capacity for self-transcendence is also the basis of human freedom. [...] Human consciousness not only transcends natural process but it transcends itself. It thereby gains the possibility for those endless variations and elaborations of human capacities which characterize human existence. [...] To a certain degree man is free to reject one environment for another. 114

On the other hand, this freedom is dialectically rooted in finitude—i.e., the range of available alternatives is never purely unlimited. Thus man must recognize that:

[...] there are limits of creatureliness which he cannot transcend, and that there are inexorable forces of nature which he cannot defy. 115

What is unlimited is the various combinations and recombinations of alternatives which man has the capacity to envision. His freedom therefore lies, not just in the capacity for self-consciousness or transcendence in itself, but rather in the self-transcending grasp of the actual alternatives which such a capacity permits. Niebuhr's concept of human freedom is perhaps closer to the moral and existential aspects of life than are his notions of spirit, self-consciousness and self-transcendence. The concept of freedom takes us one step away from the concept of spirit and structure, and moves us one step closer to the concepts of temptation, anxiety, and the functions of man and selfhood. Put in still another

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way, Niebuhr's concept of freedom is the conceptual link between essential and actual man. It unites spirit as a capacity for viewing alternatives with the actual grasping of these alternatives at any given and concrete moment.

Niebuhr's term for spirit is the image of God. This concept of spirit is behind his use of the biblical category of "the image of God" or "creator." These are used synonymously, and each is in dialectical relationship to the concept of creature:

The Christian view of man is sharply distinguished from all alternative views by the manner in which it [...] emphasizes the height of self-transcendence in man's spiritual stature in its doctrine of "image of God." 116

The doctrine of the image of God has reference to "the highest spiritual dimensions of his [man's] existence." 117

(a) Man and Self. - 118 Through the insight we have just gained into nature, reason and spirit we are now in a position to examine the elements that constitute the nature


117 Ibid. The basic meaning of the image of God is that man's essence is to be understood and interpreted from a point of view beyond himself--i.e., in God. In this sense spirit also means the point of contact between God and man, the locus of the divine-human encounter--or, as Niebuhr himself chose to put it more recently, it is the seat of man's dialogue with God. However, since this is so much a methodological issue, it will be discussed below.

118 We entitle this section "Man and the Self" in order to acknowledge that Niebuhr never makes a final and clear-cut distinction between these two terms.
of Niebuhr's self in even more specific fashion. Thus far we have attempted to define and characterize these elements, and have not spoken of the relations between them. The relations which the elements bear to one another are crucial for a total understanding of each element. The elements of Niebuhr's anthropology can be brought together, and our discussion of their nature completed, in developing his concept of the unity of the elements. For, given the elements, man is a unity of nature and spirit and the self is the wholeness or unity of body, mind and spirit.

Man's essence lies in the way he unites within himself both nature and spirit because he lives "at the juncture of nature and spirit."\textsuperscript{119} In this case "juncture" is Niebuhr's spatial representation of his more often used concept of unity. The essence of man is to be found not in his natural vitalities, not in his capacity for reasoning, and not in his ability to transcend himself--in and of themselves each is merely an element. Man's essence lies in the relationship which obtains between them. To say that man is a unity or wholeness of these elements is to say that each element, while still remaining distinctive, is what it is because of its connectedness with the other. Thus Niebuhr can give enthusiastic support to the assertion that "what is highest in spirit is

\textsuperscript{119} ND, Vol. I, p. 17.
also deepest in nature."\textsuperscript{120} Neither nature nor spirit is compromised on this account. Instead, when nature and spirit are a unity, then the more nature the more spirit; and the more spirit, then the more nature.

The term "organic" is sometimes used when referring to this unity—e.g., "the organic unity between the spirit of man and his physical life."\textsuperscript{121} "Organic" is used in a highly symbolic and metaphorical manner to suggest a depth of relatedness between the elements, or possibly some kind of internal relatedness as opposed to external (i.e., superficial) relatedness. Organic unity implies depth and authenticity. It suggests something akin to what might be called "essential" relatedness.

Organic unity and its discussions are closely associated with an analysis of human nature in terms of the problem of vitality and form. These concepts are not interchangeable, although it seems that Niebuhr identifies nature and vitality, spirit and form at one point, and then at other points distinguishes them. The distinction is crucial, for it permits

\textsuperscript{119} "TinM," p. 121. This relatively early essay contains an interesting discussion of Niebuhr's concept of unity (of nature and spirit) and its identification with the concept of "wholeness."

\textsuperscript{120} ND, Vol. I, p. 123.
him to assert the organic unity of nature and spirit while at the same time maintaining a fundamental distinction between them.

Nature and spirit are not the same as vitality and form, for there are vitalities of nature and spirit and forms of nature and spirit. Niebuhr says that "nature and spirit both possess resources of vitality and form," and he speaks of the "contributions of nature and spirit to both form and vitality." Nature, being vital, nevertheless has form; and spirit, while having the capacity to form and re-form, nevertheless has vitality to it as well. There is continuity, then, between these qualities of nature and spirit. To locate life's vitalities in nature, or to attribute all form and directness in life to spirit--this would commit an error Niebuhr feels is most fundamental, namely, unnecessarily dichotomizing nature and spirit. At certain points, however, Niebuhr speaks in such a way as to identify them:

The perennial importance of power in social organizations is based upon two characteristics of human nature. The one is unity of vitality and reason, of body and soul [... this] characteristic, the unity of vitality and reason in human nature, guarantees that egoistic purposes will be pursued with all vital resources which an individual or collective will may control.123

And he tells us that the modern mind "fails to comprehend the unity of mind and nature, of freedom and necessity, in the actual life of man."[124]

The force which carries life beyond itself from one center of life to another, the energies of life—these are the dynamics which characterize or describe vitality. Form means the direction these energies take and/or are given. It is the imprint made upon all vitality in and through creation; and it is the imprint man makes upon the vitalities

[124] ND, Vol. I, p. 123. In this and the preceding citation Niebuhr's syntax suggests a rough equating of vitality, body, nature and necessity; and of reason, soul, mind and spirit. He also speaks of "the unity of spirit and body" (ND, Vol. I, p. 16) and the "wholeness of the human self in body, mind and soul" (SDH, p. 84). There does not seem to be much precision or consistency in his use of these terms, and therefore some kind of clarification must at least be attempted.

There is continuity between reason or mind, and spirit, for both are defined in terms of self-transcendence and self-consciousness. Reason and spirit share the capacity to form the vitalities of life, although spirit surpasses reason because it can create an entirely new realm of order, rather than simply ordering, forming and synthesizing the vitalities already present (see, for example, ND, Vol. I, p. 27). The principle of form applies to reason and spirit together. In nature the forms are already given—i.e., there are no alternatives, and therefore no "forming capacity." Niebuhr sometimes uses the term soul to refer to an organic harmony underlying all organic life, and differentiating the organic-biological from the organic-physical. In this sense animals share a soul with men, and in this sense spirit is the principle of soul.

Vitality denotes the energies of life at whatever level of freedom they may occur. Nature and spirit refer to aspects of the world and of man. Vitality and form are ontological-metaphysical principles of analysis; and while these are not identical with the former, they nevertheless take their distinctiveness from the nature-spirit dichotomy.
which are presented to him in creation. Essential man, "the real self," is constituted in the unity of vitality and form. Here unity refers to the harmonious relationship which obtains between the energies of life and the directions they are given. There is no conflict between energy and intention. Put in another way, the fact that there are alternatives (a variety of "forms") and alternatives to the alternatives does not make for conflict. The forces of life are congruent with the direction-giving aspects of life. This is the unity of vitality and form in human nature.

The self and man as a unity of nature and spirit is a theme which pervades Niebuhr's moral and biblical thought as well. It is behind his discussions of "the real self in the unity of its finiteness and freedom," of the self in its "transcendent unity and freedom." When the self is discussed in terms of finitude and freedom Niebuhr usually refers to it as the "responsible self," "the real self" and the "guilty" self. "Unity" refers to the fact that freedom is never simply arbitrary, but is always qualified by the limiting conditions of finitude. Niebuhr's biblical discussions of selfhood are similar:

125 FH, p. 81. 126 SDH, p. 29.
127 See, for example, the discussion of the self in FH, p. 91-97.
In its purest form the Christian view of man regards man as a unity of God-likeness and creatureliness in which he remains a creature even in the highest spiritual dimensions of his existence and may reveal elements of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of his natural life.  

And once again the term unity insists that at no point and in no situation are human actions, decisions or intentions purely the result either of self-transcending reflection or of pure vitalistic and dynamic energy. There is something of each in the other.

The general nature of Niebuhr's self, in its structural aspect, is rooted in and shaped by his specific view of nature, reason and spirit and their closely allied and highly dialectical moral and biblical equivalents. Body and spirit (which includes, or rather is continuous with, mind) are the elements—the autonomous, constitutive structures which endure, regardless of the conditions of life in which man finds himself. Precisely because they are elements no one can be collapsed into the other, or held entirely accountable for the doings of the other. This autonomy is the first meaning of the nature of the self.

The organic unity or wholeness of the elements, the deep and primary internal continuity between body, consciousness and the capacity to reflect upon this consciousness—these constitute the second meaning of the nature of the self.

One's body is an object of reflection (autonomy), but not merely an object among other objects (organic unity).\footnote{129} The self is precisely this: the capacity, a possession of everyman, to be regressively reflective and the intimate relation of this capacity to the human body. To understand this is, according to Niebuhr, to understand the real self.\footnote{130}

In the light of the foregoing discussion of Niebuhr, the self can be preliminarily defined as the total personality viewed from the standpoint of its function to unify and integrate the human elements of body, mind, and spirit. We may now turn to the functional elements of this real self.

3. The Functions of the Self.

The elements of Niebuhr's thought which have been under discussion up to this point have centered upon his

\footnote{129}{This is the "unity and difference between the self and its body and its mind" (SDH, p. 26).}

\footnote{130}{Niebuhr occasionally refers to this autonomy and unity of the self as "a center" (ND, Vol. I, p. 14), as "wholeness" (SDH, p. 84), and as the self's "internal dialogue." This recent concept of the internal dialogue takes place between personae. However, the structural basis or poles of the dialogue take their significance and function from the distinction between nature and spirit, between the immediate necessities of life and the ultimate meanings. Hence the dialogue is between the "immanent and the transcendent self" (SDH, p. 80). However, it can and does occur at many levels (SDH, p. 6-11). The fact of the dialogue is for Niebuhr evidence of man's capacity for self-transcendence or spirit, for the latter is simply the self standing above its functions and capacities and yet proving its relation to them.}
understanding of the nature of the self—upon those enduring qualities, factors or structures which, come what may, constitute man's being. We now turn to the functions of the self, the processes undergone by the elements when they are submitted to the conditions of actuality. In Niebuhrian thought this refers to temptation, anxiety and the relation of both to freedom. In so discussing Niebuhr at these points we shall find ourselves more involved in discussing "the self" rather than "man," in analyzing what is "actual" rather than what is "essential," and in considering what man has become rather than what he really and truly is. To do this we shall discuss temptation and anxiety as the response to freedom; the "fall" of man into sin and self-concern; and the alternative possibility to this, a movement (or "fall") into creativity or the concern for others.

A. From Freedom to Temptation and Anxiety

It is the concept of freedom which bridges the gap between Niebuhr's understanding of the essentials and actual in human life, thereby uniting his ontological and ethical concerns. Man, in his essentiality, embodies within himself

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131 A good deal more will be said about the place and significance of "freedom" in Niebuhr's thought. For the purpose of this discussion, however, freedom is taken to be primarily a dynamic conception.
"the contradiction between finiteness and freedom."132

Because of the unique way in which he combines these elements, man exists in a unique state—the state of temptation:

Man is tempted [...] to break and transcend the limits which God has set for him. The temptation thus lies in his situation of finiteness and freedom.133

But something more than this situation is required in order that man be tempted, for man's essential nature is only one of the important elements in the situation which tempts to sin. In and of itself the contradiction is not a temptation. Man's knowledge and recognition of his essential nature always comes to him in the form of a distortion. It is "falsely interpreted"134—i.e., it occurs to the human imagination in such a way that its reception contains some prior distortion for which man is not entirely responsible. This fact is mythologically articulated and supported by the biblical story of Satan's fall from heaven. The story asserts that "there is a principle or force of evil antecedent to any human action,"135 and "the existence of this force in the world is

132 ND, Vol. I, p. 179. This understanding of freedom is, of course, precisely what we have been discussing in the above section. We will therefore not attempt to delineate it further. To speak of the "contradiction" between finiteness and freedom does not suggest that man essentially contradicts himself—it refers to the fact that the two are different and cannot be identified.

a mystery.\textsuperscript{136} To paraphrase Niebuhr at this point, if man were not so constituted, he would not be tempted; however, that he is so constituted does not insist that he sin. This "false interpretation"\textsuperscript{137} is a second element in the situation of temptation.

Still in another way temptation can be spoken of in terms of its internal or subjective aspect, that which is called anxiety. Anxiety is man's inward, interior response to being confronted by his true nature. This confrontation is never simply clear and distinct--i.e., it is not unavoidably present to his mind; nor is man entirely ignorant and unknowing of his own being. Man's reception of this is a "darkly felt consciousness":

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[...].\textsuperscript{138}
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Anxiety is simply the internal, subjective state of freedom--it is freedom, subjectively conceived. Since freedom is the fact of alternatives, anxiety is the awareness of alternatives and the awareness--however "darkly felt"--that these alternatives are at any given moment limitless:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} \textit{ND}, Vol. I, p. 181.
\item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{ND}, Vol. I, p. 185.
\item \textsuperscript{138} \textit{ND}, Vol. I, p. 183.
\end{itemize}
Man is anxious not only because his life is limited and dependent. [...] He is also anxious because he does not know the limits of his possibilities. He can do nothing and regard it perfectly done, because higher possibilities are revealed in each achievement. All human actions stand under seemingly limitless possibilities.139

Anxiety, then, is a "darkly felt" awareness, not solely of limitless alternatives, nor solely of the limitations of finitude; it is an awareness that both obtain in inextricable unity. This is the dizziness of freedom called anxiety.

Anxiety must not be identified with sin, or held accountable for it, just as temptation and freedom, in and of themselves, do not lead inevitably to sin:

The actual sin is the consequence of the temptation of anxiety in which all life stands. But anxiety alone is neither actual nor original sin. Sin does not necessarily flow from it.140

Niebuhr means to affirm a relationship between anxiety and sin, in the sense of a condition or prerequisite. But he wishes to deny any relationship in the sense of a mechanistic-scientific cause. Anxiety does not cause sin, although the fact or condition of anxiety makes sin inevitable.

Neither should the experience of anxiety be associated solely with self-concern, destructiveness and sin. According to Niebuhr it is clearly a "cross-roads" condition--i.e., it leads not only to the negative aspects of life, but to the positive ones as well. It is the precondition of both.

Being free and anxious, man can move in either direction with equal ability and inability, for anxiety is "both a source of creativity and a temptation to sin."\textsuperscript{141} Niebuhr sometimes refers to the creative and destructive aspects of anxiety:

The destructive aspect of anxiety is so intimately involved in the creative aspects that there is no possibility of making a simple separation between them. The two are inextricably bound together by reason of man's being anxious both to realize his unlimited possibilities and to overcome and to hide the dependent and contingent character of his existence.\textsuperscript{142}

A good deal more emphasis is given to the destructive aspects, and we will discuss these first.

B. From Anxiety to Self-Concern

The principle of false interpretation present in the world and the paradox of man's essentiality in and of themselves cannot be held totally responsible for sin. There is still another factor, the human will:

[...] the basic source of temptation [...] resides in the inclination of man, either to deny the contingent character of his existence (in pride and self-love) or to escape from his freedom (in sensuality).\textsuperscript{143}

Man attempts to deny either his freedom or his finitude:

Man is a sinner. His sin is defined as rebellion against God. Sin is occasioned precisely by the fact that man refuses to admit his "creatureliness."\textsuperscript{144}

Man denies, he refuses, he is unwilling. This is a "universal inclination" of human life, the most basic motivational force there is. It issues from "the very center of human personality: the will," and therefore man is finally responsible for his situation.

When he rebels against God's will and wisdom, man is placing his own will above God's will, in effect man is denying his own essential nature. His life is no longer organized and interpreted from a center beyond himself, for man has become his own center and final meaning. To do so is to sin; and because man does sin, he is a sinner.

The state of sin is referred to by Niebuhr in a variety of ways: "pride and self-love," "self-assertion," "self-glorification," "will-to-power," "egotism," or "self-concern." His major analysis refers to pride and self-love, and in his more recent writings the term "self-concern" has become prominent. We shall use this last term, although we will draw most of our discussion from the Gifford Lectures.

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152 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Human Creativity and Self-Concern in Freud's Thought," in Freud and the Twentieth Century, (ed. and selected by Benjamin Nelson), New York, Meridian, 1957. (Hereafter referred to as "C&S-C").

153 In ND, Vol. I, Niebuhr's analysis of sin was clearly in terms of pride (self-love) and sensuality. More recently he has had recourse to the term "self-concern" (see SDH, p. 128, 149, 158; the essay, "C&S-C"; and SNE, p. 30). Selection here of the term self-concern as generic
While not necessary, the state of self-concern or sin is inevitable, and along with freedom and finitude, it is one of the "three aspects of human existence." It is "the destruction of life's harmony by the self's attempt to center life around itself." Because man is insecure, he seeks security at the expense of other life, thereby "disturbing the original harmony of nature." This alters the unity of the self. The self-concern which eventuates from anxiety breaks the essential relatedness of body, mind and spirit, such that man becomes a disunity, both within himself and between himself and others and God.

Niebuhr talks specifically about sin as "pride" and defines four kinds, no one existing apart from the others. The pride of power is the attempt of men to establish themselves in Power, either over people or things, in order to flee the contingent and dependent character of life. One may

was made on the basis of two considerations. First, it is associated more with discussions of the self than are other terms. For example, Niebuhr argues that we must "carefully analyze the detailed facts of man's self-transcendence, his creativity and self-concern" ("C&S-C," p. 272). In a sense "self-concern" is to the "self" what "sin" is to "man." When Niebuhr wishes to talk about the self in relation to sin, he speaks of self-concern. Secondly, it does not appear that the content of Niebuhr's thought on the self changed substantially, in spite of the change in terminology.

158 This discussion is drawn from ND, Vol. I, p. 186-207.
be "darkly" aware of it. Intellectual pride is a "spiritual sublimation" of the pride of power, and refers to the inevitable fact that human knowledge, although finite, claims ultimacy and finality. Moral pride is man's pretension that his virtue is absolute and his moral standards identical with God's standards. This is self-righteousness, and is responsible for the most serious cruelties of history. Moral pride merges into spiritual pride, which consists in making explicit the self-deification implied in the former. It is the frank and open assertion that one's claims are, without qualification, those of God. Spiritual pride is the pride of religious groups and individuals who use their religion to dominate others. All forms of pride, however, are instances in which men love themselves inordinately, esteeming themselves at the expense of others, in order to deny the finite and determinate character of their existence. Pride, then, is a misuse of spirit in order to deny nature.

It is not purely through ignorance, nor purely through arrogant, self-conscious insistence that man is proud. An inevitable concomitant to sin and self-love is the process whereby men continually convince themselves that they are worthy of the esteem they accord themselves--i.e.,


men do not believe they are being proud, but instead they believe they are being virtuous; and since they are not virtuous, they of necessity must deceive themselves.

Here we are dealing with what Niebuhr calls the "mechanism of self-deception." It is due neither to a purely conscious act of dishonesty nor to any condition of ignorance, but is instead an on-going pretension which "can be maintained only by willful deception."\(^1\) All attempts at representing oneself as more than one is are really efforts on the part of the self to keep itself from realizing what, in another sense, it already knows. This continual deception is, in effect, an attempt to avoid recognizing that one has denied his basic nature. It is not the fact of finitude, nor is it the fact of sin; it is the denial of this fact and of the "darkly conscious" awareness of this fact.

Sensuality is another kind of sin which complements self-love or pride. Man can inordinately use nature in order to flee the transcendent and free aspects of his life as well. When such is the case, he falls prey to sensuality—sexual license, gluttony, extravagant living, drunkenness and abandonment to various forms of physical desire.\(^2\) Sensuality is "the self's undue identification with and devotion

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\(^{1}\) ND, Vol. I, p. 205.

to particular impulses and desires within itself.\textsuperscript{163} It too is a destruction of the basic harmony and unity of the self: "man, having lost the true center of his life, is no longer able to maintain his own will as the center of himself."\textsuperscript{164}

Pride, however, is a more autonomous form of sin than sensuality, so that in the last analysis pride is the basic and only sin. Sensuality is "another and final form of self-love,"\textsuperscript{165} in the sense that energies, ordinately intended, are inordinately given over to oneself. However, sensuality is more than a derivative kind of self-love. It is also an attempt to flee the freedom of alternatives by committing oneself to an object or process outside oneself, such as the passionate adoration of a love-object. Third, it is a generally confused attempt to flee any kind of awareness of freedom at all, such that sensual activities are sought, not for their pleasure, but for the sense of forgetfulness and general oblivion which is produced.\textsuperscript{166}

Niebuhr attempts to clarify the meaning of sexual desire in his discussion of sensuality. The sexual impulse is, along with other natural impulses, not evil or sinful

\begin{footnotes}
\item[165] ND, Vol. I, p. 239.
\item[166] Niebuhr summarizes this point in ND, Vol. I, p. 240.
\end{footnotes}
in itself. It is "the method by which nature insures that
the individual shall look beyond himself to the preservation
of the species."\textsuperscript{167} In this sense it is the natural basis
of alter-egoism. However, it is a particularly powerful
impulse, and once sin is presupposed, "the instincts of sex
are particularly effective tools for both the assertion of
the self and the flight from the self."\textsuperscript{168} At one point
Niebuhr refers to sex as "the most obvious occasion for the
expression of sensuality and the most vivid expression of
it."\textsuperscript{169} It would seem that Niebuhr wishes to affirm several
things about sexuality: it is no different from other
impulses, and therefore is not in and of itself sinful; like
other impulses it is subject to misuse—by and through it man
lives inordinately—although it can also be the occasion of
creativity as well; it is more important than other impulses
because it is such a strong and ubiquitous one; in spite of
this, it is only one form of sensuality, and therefore must
not be identified with it.\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{169} ND, Vol. I, p. 239.
\textsuperscript{170} Niebuhr's distinction between sexuality and sensu­
ality is a difficult one to comprehend. Sexuality is primarily
a structural consideration—i.e., it is defined in terms of
nature and its relation to spirit, and is therefore an endur­
ing component in the self. Sensuality is primarily a dynamic
term, for it refers to the vicissitudes, the uses and misuses
of nature as these occur under the impact of anxiety and
temptation. Thus sexuality appears dynamically as a compounding
of both sensuality (self-concern) and love (creativity).
C. From Anxiety to Creativity

We might say that freedom leads to anxiety and anxiety precipitates self-concern. To be free is to be anxious, and to be anxious leads inevitably to the state of self-concern as pride and its derivative form, sensuality. To be free and anxious, however, also leads in another direction—it leads to grace rather than sin; to love rather than pride; to concern for others rather than concern for oneself; it leads away from destructiveness, away from rebellion against God and into creative relation to other life and faith. In short, it leads to creativity as well as self-concern. We have elected to refer to this positive movement as creativity, subsuming under it any and all of Niebuhr's thoughts on this subject. Our discussion will focus on the recent use of the term, its metaphysical and ontological usage, and Niebuhr's discussions of original righteousness and grace.

The term "creativity," in its more recent usage, is a kind of short-hand way of referring to the opposite of pride and self-love. This is the sense in which it is used,

171 We use the term creativity rather than any other one of a variety of possibilities, because Niebuhr uses it alongside of "the self," and because he often uses it as the dialectical opposite of self-concern. Like these two other terms, its appearance in his thought is more recent, although its most substantial analysis is to be found in the earlier Gifford Lectures.
for example, in the essay title, "Human Creativity and Self-Concern in the Thought of Freud." Sometimes Niebuhr uses the term "destructiveness" as the polar opposite of creativity, but in each case creativity refers to the actual capacity of the self, individually or collectively, to become genuinely concerned for the other, and to abandon its proud and sinful concern for itself. In one of his latest works, Niebuhr asserted that:

A valid moral outlook for both individuals and for groups, therefore, sets no limits to the creative possibility of concern for others, and makes no claim that such creativity ever annuls the power of self-concern or removes the peril of pretension.

Creativity is distinctly allied with the enhancement of the other, with "the possibilities of creative relation to other life"; and it is clearly the opposite of self-concern and pride. Therefore, we must turn to Niebuhr's most detailed analysis of the opposite of pride and self-love.

The interpretation of this term admittedly has a clearly moral connotation—it seems to suggest little more than the "sacrificial love" of his earlier work. But the

172 See "C&S-C." This is, of course, the sense in which we are using it here.

173 See, for example, SDH, p. 158.

174 SNE, p. 31. 175 Ibid.

176 For example, ICE.
self is not primarily a moral category, although it has a moral dimension, and creativity is not, therefore, primarily a moral concept. It has an ontological-metaphysical meaning as well and this meaning underlies its moral significance.

Niebuhr, in his most compressed and instructive discussion of the subject, identifies the distinctively human capacity for self-transcendence with the capacity to break "the forms of nature and create new configurations of vitality." Self-transcendence is the ability to "arrange and re-arrange the vitalities and unities of nature within certain limits." This, however, is also "the problem of human creativity," the problem of the relation between the limiting forces of life and the ability of man to re-order these forces, thereby creating new forces and also the possibility for a new ordering of them.

An analysis of human creativity yields four factors or elements: vitalities of nature, unities of nature, the freedom to transcend these forms, and the ability (or capacity) to create an entirely new realm of order and coherence. According to this analysis creativity is simply a particular relation between the vitalities of life and the forming capacities of life. Man is creative to the extent that there is no conflict between these, and he is destructive.

177 We refer to the analysis of the problem of vitality and form, ND, Vol. I, p. 26-30. All citations in this discussion, unless otherwise indicated, are drawn from these five pages.
to the extent that he participates in conflict between these. Put in another way, creativity is the unity of vitality and form, and destructiveness is the disunity or disharmony between vitality and form. In this sense creativity is but another way of discussing the kind of unity which obtains between nature and spirit.

In his discussion of original righteousness, Niebuhr becomes more specific. In his analysis of man "before the fall" he quickly acknowledges that this is not an historical problem, but rather an attempt to identify and clarify the image of God in man which endures in spite of human sin. While not a moment in history, it is nevertheless very clearly a moment in the memory and consciousness of men—i.e., it is an aspect of man's nature which he is capable of envisioning and grasping with his consciousness and awareness. In any moment in which the self happens to transcend itself, then the consciousness and memory of original perfection arise. Niebuhr makes a distinction between the self in contemplation and the self in action. The self views its actions or concretions of will from the point of view

178 It could be argued that since original righteousness is an aspect of essentiality, it should have been discussed along with other structural considerations. However, we believe that Niebuhr's discussion here centers on the self's functions, and that it should therefore be presented at this time. This discussion is drawn from ND, Vol. I, p. 269-276.

of self-transcendence (contemplation) deeming them sinful, but then returning to an "action-phase" in which it no longer possesses the recognition it momentarily had.

The self can, therefore, intermittently view and re-view itself long enough and clearly enough to realize its undue claims. This is the memory and consciousness of its original righteousness. Because it is a moment of the self which "transcends history," it is always an after-thought—i.e., it is a memory, and cannot exist in the present.

Man can only "recall" his original perfection. The original perfection is presently possible only as law, and man experiences it as judgment. Niebuhr analyzes creativity from a biblical point of view under the concepts of grace as power and pardon. The self seeks its own at the expense of the other. It does not know this, and therefore deceives both itself and the world. Niebuhr summarizes:

The plight of the self is that it cannot do the good that it intends. The self in action seems impotent to conform its actions to the requirements of its essential being, as seen by the self in contemplation.

As such the self is helpless, and therefore must be altered from beyond itself. The self must be "shattered"—i.e., recentered or re-unified from beyond itself, because it does not have within itself the power to change itself:

The self is shattered whenever it is confronted by the power and holiness of God and becomes genuinely conscious of the real source and center of all life.\(^{182}\) This shattering produces the Christian experience of the new life, or the new self. It is the real self, or rather the reshaping of that self which in a sense lay behind the sinful self all along. It lives in and for others, and attributes its new orientation to a power outside the resources of its own will and imagination.\(^{183}\)

Niebuhr never calls the new self "an accomplished reality."\(^{184}\) It is a highly qualified renewal, for there clearly remains "an element of sinful self-realization or premature completion of the self with itself at the center [...] the new self is the Christ of intention rather than an actual achievement."\(^{185}\) This is Niebuhr's biblical way of asserting that sin is broken "in principle but not in fact,"\(^{186}\) that perfection is an "intention" and not a "reality."\(^{187}\)

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\(^{183}\) In spite of his emphasis upon the place of Jesus Christ in this analysis, this discussion needs further clarification, at the point of the relationship between Christ and the self, or, as Paul Lehman puts it, at the point of the "Christ-self relation" (RN:RSPT, p. 262). In its narrower sense, this is the problem of the relation of Christ to creativity, or to "human creativity." The issue is that of the function of Christ's effect upon the reshaping of the self. We will go into this issue in more detail below.

\(^{184}\) ND, Vol. II, p. 114.  \(^{185}\) Ibid.

Within the process of creativity there is a change both in contemplation and in intentionality. Before the shattering of the self, the self was unaware of its pretensions and ambitions, and the ways in which it misused its freedom and avoided recognizing its finitude. It believed itself to be willing the good when in fact it willed evil and its own ignorance of this willing. The recentering of the self consists, not primarily in being able to do the good, but in being able to know and will the good—in recognizing (envisioning) the good and intending it, while at the same time knowing that it will inevitably fall short of its goals. In repentance man acquires the capacity to desire the good, and to know that in so desiring he is desiring to be what his God intended him to be and intended him to desire to be.

This creativity may be described in terms of freedom, but it is actual, rather than essential freedom:

The final exercise of freedom in the transcendent human spirit is its recognition of the false use of that freedom in action. Man is most free in the discovery that he is not free.188

Freedom is the discovery or recognition, the "seeing," that what one believed to be virtuous--to be, in effect, concern for others--was really pride, concern for oneself. It is to

be free, not from sin, but from the belief that to be free
from sin and pride is a simple possibility.

Seeing, becoming or recognizing also involves "the
discovery of man's guilt";\textsuperscript{189} to be free is to be guilty,
or rather, to know that one is guilty. Before such a dis­
covery, Niebuhr would contend, a man is guilty although he
has not discovered it. Niebuhr thereby distinguishes between
guilt and sin:

Guilt is distinguished from sin in that it represents
the objective and historical consequences of sin, for
which the sinner must be held responsible. [...] Guilt is the objective consequence of sin, the actual
corruption of the plan of creation and providence in
the historical world.\textsuperscript{190}

It becomes apparent, then, that creativity is first
of all a change in awareness or contemplation and in inten­
tion rather than in action and accomplishment. It is a
partial recovery of original righteousness, but differs from
this in that it is a recovery on the basis of the conditions

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{190} ND, Vol. I, p. 222. Guilt is therefore both
ontological and psychological, both structural and dynamic. It is on the one hand the objective consequence of sin, the
actual disunity of the self both individually and collectively,
and as such is identical with the condition of sin in which
the self finds itself. But in the freedom which is creativity
the self recognizes that this is its condition, that it is
"guilty." Such a discovery does not remove the guilt,
although it does alter its power over man and his estimate
of his condition. In this sense creativity means more guilt,
but it is an increase which results in more freedom for the
self.
of actuality and not a denial of them. It also includes changes in action and in actual achievement, although these are far more partial and limited than are the former. Here Niebuhr has very little to say—i.e., after indicating that partial and limited changes do occur he does not describe in detail what these look like or how they might be recognized. We may simply note that at this point Niebuhr may seem to deny actual change, but that perhaps this is because he is so much more concerned to protest against the easy belief that radical fulfillment is a simple possibility. 191

4. The Sociality of the Self.

With regards to the nature and functions of the self, our discussion has focused upon its internal aspects—the nature of the elements and the way in which these elements interact one with another. Put in another way, we have been focusing upon the self's dialogue with itself. Now we are

191 Niebuhr's thought here seems to evince what might be called, for want of a better term, a kind of "sliding dialectic." As the self undergoes a moment of recognition it becomes more free; but this freedom makes possible both more self-concern and yet more freedom, so that every change has to be set every time in the context of the ultimate. Niebuhr is not saying that nobody can accomplish anything. He is saying that every accomplishment re-opens the struggle between creativity and self-concern, and that no achievement, however great, makes doing the good a simple possibility; and no limitation, however formidable, makes doing the good simply impossible. Niebuhr is more specific as to the actual details of creativity in his discussions of justice and democracy. This will be taken up in the next section.
in a position to discuss the self in its societal aspects: in its relations with others, with history, and with its collectivities both past and present. "The self must be understood in its dramatic-historical environment,"¹⁹² and to know the nature of this environment will further knowledge of the self.¹⁹³ Our discussion will begin with Niebuhr's understanding of the self apart from society and history and of memory as a link between the self and history; we will then proceed to a discussion of the collectivities of the self in terms of organism, artifact and the dramas of history; and then to a discussion of creativity and self-concern at the level of group life,¹⁹⁴ and of the extent to which these differ from the individual situation.

¹⁹² Cited in RN:RSPT, p. 11.

¹⁹³ Two procedural points must be clarified here. First, we are not concerned to develop, in any comprehensive manner, Niebuhr's concept of history, which in itself could easily be the subject of another dissertation. We are concerned to summarize his thought at this point with respect to the self. Second, we have used the terms society, history and collectivities in an interchangeable way, although Niebuhr's use and emphasis change. We believe the term society unifies and contains Niebuhr's other concepts describing the social life of man.

¹⁹⁴ This analysis of history follows the analysis of the nature and functions of the self. This is correct, for Niebuhr says that "The behavior of collective man naturally has its source in the anatomy of human nature" (SNE, p. 287).
A. The Self Apart from the Collective

In relation to the socio-historical environment in which the self exists, it is a separate and distinct entity. Its distinctiveness lies in the uniqueness of its spirit and the particularity of its body. In this sense it stands "over against" the collectivities of history:

[...] the significant unit of thought and action in the realm of historical encounter is not a mind but a self. This unit has an organic unity of rational, emotional and volitional elements. 195

But the self faces its world of collectivities ambiguously. For in the collective lies both the possibility of its completion and the possibility of frustration:

[...] it is necessary to explore the relation of the human self to the community. It is a paradoxical relation, for the community is at once the fulfillment and the frustration of the self. It is the fulfillment because the self cannot fulfill itself within itself but only because a true self as its interests and creativities are engaged in the community [sic]. 196

The self is destined to seek completion or fulfillment, for in and of itself it is incomplete and partial. It cannot, however, accomplish its completion on the basis of itself and to the exclusion of others. It is, therefore, moved by its essential nature to seek completion in the life of another or of others, and in so doing becomes involved in the

ambiguities, conflicts, struggles and failings of society and history. The ambiguity, like the involvement, is inevitable.

It is upon the basis of the above distinction that the self is related to history. The clue to this relation is the self's capacity for self-transcendence and self-consciousness, which permits it to comprehend the phenomenon of society:

Man's ability to transcend the flux of nature gives him the capacity to make history. Human history [...] is compounded of natural necessity and human freedom. Man's freedom to transcend the natural flux gives him the possibility of grasping a span of time in his consciousness and thereby of knowing history.197

The capacity for freedom provides man with the capacity for memory, "the possibility of grasping a span of time in his consciousness and thereby of knowing history." Memory brings together the self and society. It is one of the facets of man's freedom; it is "one aspect of what Christian thought has defined as the 'image of God' in man";198 it is "the fulcrum of freedom for man in history."199 Memory, therefore, is also an aspect of man's spirit.

One of the essential elements of freedom is memory. Memory is the means whereby one may recognize that the

199 FH, p. 19.
present is not entirely shaped by natural causation and necessity, but that there is always an element of past human contrivance which underlies any present situation: "The memory of how things came to be prevents the present reality from appearing as an event of pure natural necessity." Memory therefore permits both the self's transcendence over natural necessity as well as its distortions of the true causes of any particular situation.

Memory, because it is the basis of freedom, is also significant for the reception of revelation, although it is not the only factor in this reception. Individuals and nations seek an understanding of themselves which goes beyond the mere recording of past events and their relation to the present. They attempt to understand their past from the point of view of an event or person which will give meaning to all the other events--i.e., which will provide comprehension of the whole. This event or person Niebuhr refers to as a "structure of meaning" or a dimension of meaning, and the function of such a person or event is a "revelatory function." Memory makes possible the recognition and identification of this person or event, and the recognition that this does unity, make whole and embody all other events.

The capacity for receiving a structure of meaning is provided by memory. But memory is by no means restricted to one particular structure, nor does it always clearly apprehend a structure of meaning. It is, therefore, as much the basis of distorting the past and the misapprehension of a structure of meaning as it is the basis of the positive aspects. For memory, while being continuous with logic, also transcends it:

... the complex of events which constitute history represents a bewildering confusion of destiny and freedom, which conform to the patterns of neither logical nor natural coherence. They are comprehended as a unity by memory but not by logic.202

Memory is, therefore, both creature and creator in the historical and socializing process.

B. The Nature of the Self and Its Collectivities

Earlier in our discussion mention was made of the two sets of categories which Niebuhr used in his analysis of man. The first set--nature, reason and spirit--was said to be primary and to be the basis of the second set, which applied to "the self"--body, mind and spirit. A somewhat similar situation confronts us as we pursue Niebuhr's thought on sociality and the self. Nature, reason and spirit remain primary in his analysis of society,203 but they in turn

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202 FH, p. 20.
203 See, for example, the analyses of various conceptions of history in FH.
inform and shape another set of categories which also refers to the set in a specific manner: organism, artifact and drama. These define the nature of collective life.

(a) Organism, Artifact and Drama. - Organic factors, organic forces, and organic growth are all spoken of by Niebuhr in analyzing community life, and he refers to collectivities as organisms of nature or collective organisms. Organism refers to the dimension of natural vitality which obtains in any particular social situation, and attempts to account for the "causes" by which a collectivity is held together. It also refers to the absence of consciousness or recognition:

Every human community is both organism and artifact. It is an organism insofar as it is integrated by loyalties, forms of cohesion and hierarchies of authority which have grown unconsciously with a minimum of conscious contrivance.

Organic forces are those of which the individuals of the group are not aware. They are accepted as given, and thereby beyond any possible scrutiny or change. They are, in effect, the conditions of limitation which obtain for man in his social dimension.

204 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, New York, Scribner's, 1953, p. 25. (Hereafter referred to as CRPP.)
208 Ibid. 209 SDH, p. 163.
210 By and large Niebuhr devotes most of his analyses to large and powerful groups and sub-groups--nations, classes, unions and management, etc. However, he is quite clear that a
Artifact is the word Niebuhr applies to a second dimension of man's social life. As opposed to the given and unconscious nature of organic factors, artifact designates the consciously contrived, voluntaristic dimensions of collective life: "The community and its authorities are artifacts insofar as the forms of cohesion and the integration of the community have been consciously contrived."\(^{211}\) Artifact is the rational—but not the spiritual—attempt to build community wherein sociality is clearly the "creation of the human will and reason."\(^{212}\)

Niebuhr identifies as the "dramatic" element,\(^{213}\) that aspect of man's collective-social life which corresponds to the dimension of spirit in the individual life. He is concerned with "the dramatic-historical environment of the self,"\(^{214}\) "the dramatic essence of history,"\(^{215}\) "the dramatic

"collectivity" can be as small as the family, for example. Indeed, the family is the most basic organism: "The simplest, most primordial and most persistent community is the family, which is rooted in nature, that is in heterosexuality, providing for the basis of sexual partnership [...]" \(^{216}\)

\(^{211}\) SDH, p. 163.

\(^{212}\) SDH, p. 165. Niebuhr says the most striking example of artifact is the written constitution of a community, which all members affirm voluntarily \(^{217}\).

\(^{213}\) This does not contradict the fact that Niebuhr also uses "dramatic" to refer to the problem of revelation and knowledge of God—e.g., "it [the self] may be known through introspection and dramatic encounter [...]" \(^{218}\).

\(^{214}\) Cited in RSN:RSPT, p. 11. \(^{215}\) SDH, p. 57.
realities of history," or the "dramatic variety of the self's encounter with other selves in history." Whatever the precise phrase, the word "dramatic" is crucial. It is the socio-historical dimension of self- hood and it is related to organism and artifact just as spirit is related to nature and reason. The dramas of history are events, actions, series of events, historical periods, etc., which have been created, or rather which have occurred, as the result of actions motivated by the use and misuse of freedom on the collective level. They are as much the result of competitive and egoistic self-willing of individuals with each other as they are a result of the creative use of freedom:

The dialogues, in which the self is involved, are transmuted into dramas whenever they precipitate action. These actions are formed into dramatic patterns which constitute a web of destiny for the individual, determining subsequent actions and dialogues. These dramatic patterns may extend to various communities, family, local or national. The dramatic patterns are historic realities in which freedom and necessity are variously compounded.

More precisely, a dramatic pattern can refer to any event or series of events in which two or more people are involved, wherein the resultant events are motivated by man's capacity for freedom and the presence of alternatives. The dramas,

216 SDH, p. 75.
217 SDH, p. 84.
218 SDH, p. 44.
because they are a compounding of freedom and necessity will inevitably (but not necessarily) be an admixture of creativity and self-concern.

These socio-historical events are not moved by natural necessity nor by rational-logical inevitability. In this sense the socio-historical realities mentioned by Niebuhr are not "caused," and therefore they can never be fully and certainly comprehended or contained by the human mind:

The radical freedom of the self and the consequent dramatic realities of history are naturally embarrassing to any scientific thought, either to understand or to master history.219

Niebuhr also speaks of man's capacity to elaborate "endless dramas which do not fit into any pattern of nature or reason."220

Niebuhr makes a very important distinction221 between the dialogues of the self and the dramas of history. The former are distinguished from the latter by the presence of "action." Dialogue refers to the self in contemplation and drama refers to the self in action.222 This means, roughly speaking, that the dialogues of the self represent the self

219 SDH, p. 4. 220 SDH, p. 24. 221 For example, SDH, p. 44. 222 We refer to this distinction as Niebuhr makes it in his discussion of original righteousness. ND, Vol. I, P. 277-278.
in actuality. The dramatic patterns, therefore, are them­selves a compounding of self-concern and creativity, and to these we may briefly turn.

C. The Functions of the Self and Its Collectivities

During the dramatic encounter between self and its collective environment it tends to misuse its freedom, and on the social level this is a manifestation of self-concern. It is a subject dear to Niebuhr's heart, occupying his atten­tion continually. While we cannot develop these discussions in detail, we will refer briefly to his discussion of egoistic nationalism in the Gifford Lectures, 223 which we believe is sufficiently basic and inclusive for our purposes.

On a collective level the most basic manifestation of self-concern is egoistic nationalism. This is an element of every culture, empire or nation, however just; and it can become dominant in the most sophisticated of nations (e.g., Naziism). Perhaps the best contemporary example of egoistic nationalism is manifested by the U.S.A. It is no different in kind from the self-concern of the individual:

On the egoistic-nationalistic level [...] history is regarded as obscure and [...] life is threatened with meaninglessness primarily because the collective life of nation or empire, which is the primary source of meaning, is known to be more finite than it pretends to be.224

The functions of collective self-concern are identical in kind with those of the individual, as already discussed. It is the finite, contingent nature of existence which moves the collective to abuse its capacity for self-transcendence and freedom and "fall" into collective pride or self-love. The ensuing decisions and events are the historical deposit of this fundamental human situation. Niebuhr does not, however, speak of "collective sensuality" as he does of sensuality in the life of the individual.

The functions of the collective and the individual are no different in kind, yet the degree of self-concern in both cases is clearly to be distinguished. There is something inherent in the nature of group life which makes self-concern more actual and creativity less so. It is as though the "fall into self-concern" were tantamount to a "fall into collective life," which is to say that the more men seek to fulfill and complete themselves in affiliation (which they must, inevitably), the more they fall into sin. The collective base of sociality provides for a multiplicity of alternatives which goes well beyond the possible alternatives of any individual situation. As man becomes engaged in the collectivities of life, the possibilities for freedom are magnified, as are the possibilities of losing that freedom. A formed society means more freedom and therefore more destructiveness or self-concern. This principle might be referred to as the
"moral man in immoral society" principle which, while it has received further comment since its original statement, nevertheless remains a basic Niebuhrian principle.

With regards to the possibility of "collective creativity" for the self in society, Niebuhr's thinking is also clearly shaped by this assertion. The individual is, at moments, capable of such heights of self-transcendence as to recover the consciousness and memory of original righteousness and at least dimly to recall his essential nature and the possibilities it gives for mutual love and concern for others. In its collective aspect, however, the self's capacity for creativity is limited to a "tolerable justice" which, whenever it is acquired, is the best that can be expected. It is a balance of power as opposed to a brotherhood of love; it is the law of love rather than the gracious love of law in which the divine will and the human response are at one.

Niebuhr's paradoxical or dialectical thought is, on the other hand, consistent, even to this point. The unity of nature and spirit in man insists that what is "highest in

225 In *FH* Niebuhr clarifies the nature of this deficiency of collectivities. They have no organ of self-transcendence whereby they can gain a vantage point on their motives or actions--they lack the particularity and discreteness of individual organisms (*FH*, p. 216); and they are not bound by death in as decisive or predictable manner as the individual (*FH*, p. 218).
spirit is deepest in nature." It suggests that every increment in the possibility of creativity means an equivalent increase in the possibilities for destructiveness, and vice versa. It would follow, then—precisely because society and the collective are occasions of more self-concern than is individual life—that society and the collective should also be the locus of a comparable amount of potential creativity.

Not only does an increase in freedom mean more destructiveness but also the possibility of more creativity as well. At the socio-historical level this balance between self-concern and creativity appears as the paradox of the necessity and possibility of democracy. Man's inclination to self-concern, magnified as it is in collective life, makes democracy necessary. But his capacity for creativity makes democracy possible. And this possibility has actual consequences—it is within the range of the actual self's actual social achievement. Democracy is a tolerable justice, but because social life is the occasion of such powerful self-concern this "tolerable" justice is also highly creative.

The Christ event reflects and clarifies this paradox. In Christ's death on the cross the full power of collective self-concern is focused upon one person and subsequently

226 "TimM," p. 121.
transformed into the possibility of collective creativity. Logically one might think that collective enmity could be countered only by collective love. But for Niebuhr the pride of nations is matched by the grace of but One--only through this One can the powers of self-concern be overcome in such a way as to issue in the kind of creativity which is inherently social.

Christ's creativity is the culmination of society and the key to the fulfillment of the self, both in and of itself as a member of a social-historical collectivity: Christ is experienced as both the judgment and fulfillment of the variegated dramas of history.

5. The Self and Christ.

We have set forth what Niebuhr believed man and the self to be--what he experienced as the contents of his concept of self. Now we must try to understand how the basic Niebuhrian concerns, which recall the discussions of nature, functions, and sociality, are all involved in, and in a sense coalesce in, Niebuhr's understanding of the self's relationship to Christ the revealer.

Niebuhr distinguishes two aspects of God's revelation to man--"a personal-individual revelation and a revelation in the context of socio-historical experiences."227 The former

aspect is a common or general human experience, available to all men in all places, and not historical in any specific sense. It occurs to the consciousness of every person, causing him to sense that "his life touches a reality beyond himself." Its contents include the universal experience of being commanded and judged, which men interpret as the law of God for them. It also includes a willingness to acknowledge certain majestic and awe-inspiring aspects in life. But perhaps most important is "the longing for forgiveness" which accompanies the sense of obligation and duty. Niebuhr uses the term "a sensing," which indicates a kind of realization which is neither purely feeling nor purely thought or concept.

The second aspect of revelation complementing this experience is referred to as special or historical revelation. It differs from general revelation because of its specifically Christian nature. Niebuhr speaks of this special Christian revelation as having form and content:

The form is that of a story, an event in history which becomes, by the apprehension of faith, something more than a mere event [...] The specific content of this revelation involves the crucifixion of the Messiah.

The form, in other words, is that of a drama, while the contents consist in the messianic career and claims of Jesus Christ which both disappoint and fulfill the expectations of Israel. This event is genuine, final and clearly revelatory. It signifies in an objective and historical way all the vague and confused longings found in the sensings of general revelation, and it clearly answers the desire for forgiveness which the general revelation contains but cannot of itself provide. In the special revelation of the Christ event man's reverence for majesty and sense of obligation are clarified, and his desire for forgiveness is met with forgiveness.

However, in Niebuhr's thought, revelation is neither wholly historical nor wholly a common, human experience; instead it is some kind of coming together of both. In and of themselves the former would lack credence and the latter would become capricious. Both are necessary, and what brings them together is Niebuhr's concept of meaning or "structure of meaning." Revelation is the disclosure of a principle of comprehension (meaning) and the appropriation of this:

Without the principle of interpretation furnished by this "special revelation" the general experience or the general revelation involved in conscience becomes falsified.231

What is revealed is the meaning of the whole, a principle organizing, understanding and interpreting the patterns of

both individual and social life. The principle of meaning, found in the Christ event, provides a frame of reference for patterning and centering the many events and processes of life. In this sense it is a basic presupposition or set of basic presuppositions. Therefore, the career of Christ

[...] represent[s] an event in history, in and through which a disclosure of the whole meaning of history occurs [...] the interpretation of history in the light of this event creates a structure of meaning.232

A sense of otherness is prerequisite to such a disclosure--i.e., the reception of the revelation presupposes some acknowledgment that its contents differ from (transcend) what was expected. Revelation is related to faith, and therefore it never destroys faith; but revelation never simply completes faith. In addition it corrects and disappoints faith, for it comes to man from beyond those patterns of expectation and anticipation which are available to him. Just so, Niebuhr sees in Hebrew prophetism a beginning kind of revelation because in it "the divine is not regarded as the extension and fulfillment of the highest human possibilities."233 The disclosure presupposes a source from beyond the frame of reference of the recipient. At such a point, or in such a moment, God is not conceived as "the projection or extension of the nation's or individual's ideals and

purposes, nor as a power co-extensive with, or supplementary to, the nation's power."\(^{234}\)

Revelation is twofold in another sense—it is both "disclosure and fulfillment,"\(^{235}\) both a meaning and the power to pursue this meaning. Revelation is knowledge of God, self and world. It is a becoming aware, a discovery, a recognition with many facets and dimensions. And implicit in such a disclosure is the knowledge of a direction in which the self must move, a new design for the interrelations of the basic elements and of the self's relation to others. But this knowledge is also accompanied by the beginnings of power by means of which the given direction of life can be pursued.

Niebuhr's ontological-metaphysical assertions about the nature of God are clearly reflected in this twofold nature of revelation. God reveals Himself to man "from beyond the contrast between vitality and form,"\(^{236}\) for God is both the source of vitality and form in human life, as well as the unity of vitality and form. God's power is the principle of vitality and His wisdom is the principle of form. God as the principle of form is behind Niebuhr's conception of revelation as the disclosure of an ultimate meaning which orders all preliminary meanings; and God as the principle of vitality is behind Niebuhr's assertion that revelation is not

\(^{234}\) FH, p. 102. \(^{235}\) ND, Vol. II, p. 35. 
only the disclosure of meaning but also the gift of a power
to pursue the recently acquired meaning:

The Christian gospel nevertheless enters the world
with the proclamation that in Christ both "wisdom"
and "power" are available to man; which is to say
that not only has the true meaning of life been
disclosed but also that resources have been made
available to fulfill that meaning. 237

However, when revelation genuinely occurs it is some kind of
unity of both, and the authenticity of the revelation lies
as much in the unity of the two aspects as it does in the
presence of either one.

Although in Niebuhr's later writings—and particularly
in The Self and the Dramas of History—his language changes,
there does not appear to be any basic change in the substance
of his thought. Here, general revelation is spoken of in
terms of the self's search for ultimate meaning--its attempt
to "penetrate the ultimate mystery, the mystery of the self's
transcendent freedom." 238 The problem of meaning appears to
man as he comes upon, in his awareness, the mystery of his
own freedom. He seeks to comprehend it, to see it in terms
of a center or structure which illumines the meaning of
everything else. This imaginative grasping for a structure
of meaning is the beginning of man's dialogue with God. "The
self's experience with the ultimate in the final reaches

of its self-awareness" is interpreted "as a dialogue with God." It is the height of the "religious dimension of self-awareness." Particularly, nevertheless, the search for meaning (the desire to penetrate the mystery, the dialogue), while it represents human spirituality at its noblest, cannot of itself be in any sense fulfilling or completing of the essential nature of man. The self must encounter Christ in the realm of history in order that its own meaning and the meaning of the whole become fully clarified. This "encounter" is Niebuhr's more recent way of speaking of specific or historical revelation:

Thus the encounter of the self with God is defined in Biblical faith in terms of a norm which has been set by an historical "revelation." And this revelation is an historical event or series of events [...] in history which are discerned by faith to have revelatory power into the ultimate mystery.

In Niebuhr's thought revelation, therefore, has a number of different aspects. It is, first of all, clarification of the meaning of the whole and a recognition of some kind of center or key to the varied patterns of individual and social life. This is accompanied by a completion and fulfillment of what was heretofore partial and ambiguous. In this sense revelation is "knowledge" of God, a knowing, recognizing

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239 SDH, p. 64. 240 SDH, p. 75. 241 SDH, p. 66.
or an awareness of the disclosure of God's nature in the
dramatic career of Jesus of Nazareth. Revelation is also an
"experiencing" on the part of the self--both individually
and collectively--that its claims were more than they should
have been, and that its conceptions of God, truth and the
good were in the service of self-aggrandizement. It is the
awareness of limitation which in turn leads to the power to
accept the limitation.

The moment of revelation or the revelatory point in
time--the encounter of the self with God through Christ--is
integ rally influential upon the self in all its various
aspects. It affects its internal relations, for it is a
reshaping of its disunity. It affects the sociality of man
as well as his capacity to recall his origins, both immediate
and ultimate. And it affects the self's knowledge of its
motivations. In the revelatory moment these aspects are
gathered together into some kind of transitory and momentary
unity of interrelationship, a unity which is a recalling of
essentiality on the basis of recognizing actuality.

A. Christ as Power and Wisdom

It has become apparent through a development of
Niebuhr's analysis of man that the self stands in contradic-
tion to its nature as revealed in Christ, and thus it needs
reshaping. If the self is to be reshaped by Christ it must
appropriate his revelation. "It is this dimension of appropriation and of life in the light of Christ revealed as the wisdom of God which also makes Christ the power of God." Through the application of revelation to man's experience it becomes apparent that he cannot fulfill the ultimate meaning of his life. Only in Christ is the true shape of the self clarified and the power for its fulfillment made possible.

Niebuhr uses the term grace to encompass both power and wisdom. The action of Christ's grace does not mean that selfhood is destroyed. Rather, the self confronted by the wisdom and power of Christ is shattered, but only to be made aware of its pride, its tendency to make itself its own center. Christ reveals to man that there is power and possibility for a new centering of life, for realizing that human life and human history cannot complete themselves but can only find their meaning in relation to a power beyond themselves. The self experiences this as Christ's grace in and over it:

Grace is the power of God over man. Grace is on the other hand the power of God in man; it represents an accession of resources, which man does not have of himself, enabling him to become what he truly ought to be.243

The self comes to experience Christ as it realizes its own incompleteness and searches for fulfillment. Before the self can know Christ in faith it must first feel the need for him, must recognize its capacity for relationship with him. "The self is shattered whenever it is confronted by the power and holiness of God and becomes genuinely conscious of the real source and center of all life." 244

But the achievement of such newness of life, such recentering of the self, is never an accomplished reality. This new life is not a possession for the self to control. "The grace of God is new every morning only to those who have both the humility and the boldness to receive it as a gift every morning." 245 This breaking of the circle of self-concern, this conversion, is never completed. Christ is dynamic. He brings peace but a peace growing from the experience of forgiveness and not from the contentment of achievement. He brings wholeness, but not in an accomplished sense. He breaks the power of sin, but sin remains.

Thus Niebuhr emphasizes both dimensions of the experience of Christ: "The conquest of sin in the heart of man on the one hand, and the merciful power of God over the sin


which is never entirely overcome in any human heart, on the other. 246

Christ is both the power of God in man while at the same time He is the power of God over man. Even as the self is given the power to move beyond itself, at the same time it can distort the new life, and self-interest can reappear in a new and different form. Men can be most self-centered when they believe they have overcome their self-centeredness. That is why the power of God over man is so important. It emphasizes that Christ is operative throughout the life of man, that sin and self-seeking touch every level of human effort, that conversion and self-giving are never fully achieved, that forgiveness and self-shattering are as necessary at the end as at the beginning of the Christian life in the Christian experience of God. 247

But Niebuhr is not so naive as to think that mere analysis of the biblical view of grace will convince modern man of its relevance. Niebuhr attempts to correlate the biblical view with the facts of human experience in order to establish the validity of his interpretation. In doing so he relies on the Pauline text:


247 See, ND, Vol. II, p. 100-107, for a further explanation of Niebuhr's interpretation of this doctrine of grace based on Pauline thought.
I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God who loved me, and gave himself for me (Gal. 2:20).

Niebuhr considers this statement of Paul to be a classical analysis of the self-reshaping experience. He explores its assertions in three steps, and we must look closely at each.

In the first part, "I am crucified with Christ," the call is for a death of the old self with its self-centered concerns and self-seeking ends. This is not a mere intellectual recognition. Rather the whole self must be shattered, must be "crucified," if its true being is to be realized. The situation of the self is that it cannot do the good it intends. "I can will what is right, but I cannot do it" (Rom. 7:18). The self is able to stand over itself in contemplation and see what it must do; yet in action it falls short of its expectations:

The self is so created in freedom that it cannot realize itself within itself. It can only realize itself in loving relation to its fellows. Love is the law of its being. But in practice it is always betrayed into self-love. It comprehends the world and human relations from itself as center. It cannot, by willing to do so, strengthen the will to do good.”

The weakness of the self is due to both its natural as well as its spiritual limitations. In all its efforts toward fulfillment the self will be somehow motivated or affected by self-interest, either openly or in disguise. Thus there is the need for the self to be initially and continually broken and shattered, to be confronted by the grace of Christ and to become conscious of the real source and center of life. Niebuhr explains further:

In the Christian faith Christ mediates the confrontation of the self by God; for it is in Christ that the vague sense of the divine, which human life never loses, is crystalized into a revelation of a divine mercy and judgment. In that revelation fear of judgment and hope of mercy are so mingled that despair induces repentance and repentance hope.252

But it is also at this point that Niebuhr introduces his notion of the "hidden Christ" operating in history. True conversion is possible for any man, whether he is consciously aware of the historical Christ or not. All men are at least touched by the "vague sense of the divine." The power of Christ can operate in a hidden way to bring this "vague sense" to active realization as the self goes out in loving relation to its fellow selves.

In the second part, "nevertheless I live," Niebuhr once again asserts that the unique situation of the human self, as transcending itself yet involved in the natural

processes, makes it impossible for the self to fulfill itself through its own power. The self must be broken from beyond itself since it lacks its own power to lift itself out of its own circle of narrow interests. The transcending powers of the self are so united with its natural affinities that the self must be destroyed from beyond itself:

Human personality is so constructed that it must be possessed if it is to escape the prison of self-possession. The infinite regression of its self-transcendence represents possibilities of freedom which are never actualized in self-possession; for self-possession means self-centeredness. The self must be possessed from beyond itself. 253

But this destruction means that the self will be brought to be the "real" self, living in and for others in relationship with God. Again, the true experience of self and the true experience of God must ultimately be social, must involve other selves. The experience of God through Christ, the experience of his power in the self and over the self, is the encounter which makes this possible. The self born again in relationship with the true center of existence can be free from giving its ultimate loyalty to a nation, social class or race, or from losing its true individuality through mystic absorption into an eternal Being. The self lives most fully in relationship with God and with other men. The criterion for such relationship is Christ:

He is the criterion of holiness because the revelation of God in Christ is on the one hand an historical focus of the divine, through which the mystery of the divine becomes morally and socially relevant to human nature, involved in finiteness and unable to comprehend the eternal. On the other hand it is the unique character of the revelation of God in Christ that it makes the divine and eternal known in history without giving any particular or partial force, value or vitality of history a sanctity or triumph which its finite and imperfect character does not deserve. Christ is thus both the criterion of the holiness of spirit and the symbol of the relevance between the divine and the human. 254

Thus it is the Christian view of the self which is able to perceive both the transcendent and the finite aspects of the self, as well as its individual and its social dimensions.

Thirdly, we have the declaration "Yet not I; but Christ liveth in me." With the assertion that the self has been destroyed in realizing itself there comes the further assertion that it is yet destroyed again on another level. Niebuhr's interpretation of this Pauline affirmation proceeds in two ways. First, as a realization by the self that its new life is possible only because of an experience of Christ's grace, an experience of God, which comes from beyond itself. Second that this new self is never an accomplished reality but rather has been given as an orientation toward Christ in a continual effort by the self to realize what it has been given.

It is not easy to maintain a sensitivity to both dimensions of Christ's grace—on the one hand to assert that the human self is given new life, new power by the gift of Christ, while on the other hand to maintain that the gift is dynamic, not static, and that the self must continually seek to grow in this gift.\textsuperscript{255}

The possibilities are innumerable for the self to move beyond itself to find its true center. These possibilities are the fruits of grace, of either Christ consciously known or of the "hidden Christ" operating among men.\textsuperscript{256} But Niebuhr does not depend solely on the biblical doctrine to affirm the workings of Christ. Rather he seeks within other interpretations of history to find how the experience of men also validates the paradoxical movement of Christ's grace:

A new synthesis is therefore called for. It must be a synthesis which incorporates the twofold aspects of grace of Biblical religion, and adds the light which modern history, and the Renaissance and Reformation interpretations of history, have thrown upon the paradox of grace. Briefly this means that on the one hand life in history must be recognized as filled with indeterminate possibilities. There is no individual or interior spiritual situation, no cultural or scientific task, and no social or political problem.

\textsuperscript{255 \textit{ND}, Vol. II, p. 126.} "To understand that the Christ in us is not a possession but a hope, that perfection is not a reality but an intention; that such peace as we know in this life is never merely the peace of achievement but the serenity of being 'completely known and all forgiven'; all this does not destroy moral ardour or responsibility. On the contrary it is the only way of preventing premature completions of life."

\textsuperscript{256 See, \textit{ND}, Vol. II, p. 123.}
in which men do not face new possibilities of the good and the obligation to realize them. It means on the other hand that every effort and pretension to complete life, whether in collective or individual terms, that every desire to stand beyond the contradictions of history or to eliminate the final corruptions of history must be disavowed.257

Again we find Niebuhr's restating of the principle that the very nature of the self demands that while men recognize the importance of their historical situations and human relationships, they must not absolutize them and forget that the true fulfillment of the self lies in a center beyond history. It is grace, whether hidden or consciously realized, which makes possible this recognition of the self.

B. The Cross as Christ's Agape

The self finds its ultimate meaning in reference to Christ on the cross. The finite freedom of the self is experienced within history yet its fullness can only be found in transcending history:

The significance of the affirmation that God is revealed in Christ, and more particularly in his Cross, is that the love (agape) of God is conceived in terms which make the divine involvement in history a consequence of precisely the divine transcendence over the structures of history. The final majesty of God is contained not so much in His power within the structures as in the power of His freedom over the structures, that is, over the logos aspects of reality. This freedom is the power of mercy beyond judgment. By this freedom he involves himself in

the guilt and suffering of free men who have, in their freedom, come in conflict with the structural character of reality. The agape of God is thus at once the expression of both the final majesty of God and of His relation to history.258

Self-fulfillment is not only symbolized by the cross of Christ but made possible in and by it. Agape is the active wisdom and power of Christ on the cross:

The Christian can draw not only on the wisdom concerning the self and human history contained in the revelation of the Cross, but also, when this wisdom is livingly appropriated, upon a power and a resource of faith and hope and love which guide, sustain, and temper his endeavors.259

For Niebuhr the self experiences God working in and for it as clarified by Christ on the cross. Once the clarification has been understood there is no aspect of experience that cannot be conceptualized in light of Christ's agape:

That the final clue to the mystery of the divine power is found in the suffering love of a man on the Cross is not a proposition which follows logically from the observable facts of history. But there are no observable facts of history which can not be interpreted in its light. When so interpreted the confusions and catastrophes of history may become the source and renewal of life.260

Niebuhr is not saying that Christ's agape as a solution to the self's need for fulfillment can be proved by rational analysis. He holds, rather, that this agape is

259 Harland, op. cit., p. 160.
260 FH, p. 137.
experienced as a power beyond the limits of reason. However, a limited rational validation for the effects of Christ's agape is possible. It consists of a negative and positive relationship of agape to existing forms of rational truth. Negatively agape can be validated by exploring the human limits of wisdom and virtue as experienced over and over again in history. History has not supplied the total answer.

Positively, agape is validated when it is correlated with the so-called truths of science and philosophy. Agape proves itself a resource for coordinating them into a deeper and broader system of integration.
HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF SELFHOOD: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE PROCESS OF WHOLENESS AND THE CHRISTIAN'S
LIFE OF FREEDOM IN C. JUNG AND R. NIEBUHR

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CHAPTER IV

JUNG'S EXPERIENCE OF THE SELF AND CHRIST

Our method, as we saw from the introduction of this dissertation, has been to employ the criteria of nature, function, sociality and the Christ-event for purposes of analyzing the self experienced by Niebuhr as freedom and by Jung as wholeness. Now that these criteria have been applied to the study of Niebuhr's thought on the self we must proceed to a similar analysis of Jung.

Understanding the mood, shape, and content of Jung's conception of the relation between the self and Jesus Christ requires some understanding of the general configuration of his life and work. His interest in the self, and his interest in Jesus Christ in particular and religion in general, lie very close to the heart of his whole life and work. In the final analysis these interests are intimately related expressions of a deep concern to find meaning and significance for the individual human being and justification for his own life experience.
The emphasis that will be placed here on the religious dimensions of Jung's psychological views is not the sole emphasis to be found in his works, but it is a dominant one. It is possible to imagine studies of Jung which would subordinate the religious to other concerns, but it is well-nigh impossible to image any responsible study of his life or his work which could ignore the religious content and the religious dimensions of the material he discusses. His interest in these dimensions, as he conceives them, is obtrusive in all his works, even those which deal more specifically and technically with procedures and techniques of analytical psychology.

1. Jung's Life and Experiences of Religion.

The reader of the largely autobiographical Memories, Dreams, Reflections is immediately impressed with both the long-standing nature and the urgency of Jung's concern with religious questions. Equally impressive is the prevailing sense of his isolation and alienation from others which continued throughout his life as an essential loneliness.¹

Carl Jung was born in 1875, the only surviving male child, and for nine years the only child, of Johann Paul Achilles Jung (1842-1896), a pastor of the Swiss Reformed

¹ Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 41f.
Church, and Emilie Preiswerk Jung (1848-1923). Johann Jung had been a competent oriental scholar in his university days and took his doctoral degree in that area. He turned to the study of theology when a family financial crisis made this the only feasible way of completing his university education. He married the daughter of his Hebrew teacher but the marriage was not an altogether happy one and Jung records at least one period of separation between his parents. Johann Jung did not pursue his scholarly interests after entering the pastorate but he did encourage his son in such ways as teaching him Latin at the age of six. Jung thereafter continued to be proficient in that tongue.

Carl Jung was abundantly supplied with ecclesiastical relatives with no fewer than eight uncles in the ministry—his father's two brothers and six on his mother's side. There was thus no lack of exposure to the then prevailing conceptions of orthodox Christian doctrine in Jung's formative years. But his father's religious faith rested on shaky foundations and Jung was to witness an ever-increasing but finally unsuccessful struggle against doubt in his father's life. At the same time he sensed as a child a real discrepancy between his mother's conventional assertions of Christian orthodoxy and the "true and deep foundations of

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Jung's recollections of his earliest years deal very largely with religious matters. For example, he records his intense dislike of church services (except for Christmas); his early ambivalence and growing mistrust of "Lord Jesus" (whom he associated with funerals and with the "iniquities" of the Jesuits); his lack of interest in the "unspeakably dull" Divinity classes in the gymnasium; and his extreme disappointment in his preparation for and reception of his first communion; his interest, even before he could read, in the pictures of Eastern religious figures such as Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva, and his awareness of the peculiar inflection in

3 **Memories, Dreams, Reflections**, p. 90ff.
4 **Ibid.**, p. 50.
5 This confusion of identity between "Jesus" and "Jesuit" loomed large in Jung's first conscious trauma—the sight of a Jesuit priest. See **ibid.**, p. 10f.
6 **Ibid.**, p. 27, 52ff. The disappointment that "nothing had happened" made Jung resolve that this first communion would also be his last.
his mother's voice when she pronounced them 'heathen'; and, from the age of eleven years, an interest in the idea of God who was, to him, a figure "not complicated by my distrust," one who was incomprehensible and who could not be dealt with as familiarly as the now discredited "Lord Jesus."\(^7\)

But these attitudes had a basis in some overwhelmingly important personal experiences—visions (or dreams) and fantasy play—which he felt at the time, and indeed for many years later, had to be kept secret but which laid the foundation for so much of the later development of his life and thought. Three such are of particular importance and are recorded in detail in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. The first was a dream which he had before he was four years old and which, he says, "was to preoccupy me all my life." The second concerned a curious manikin figure which he carved for himself and hid in the attic, together with a colored stone, and from which he drew much secret strength and solace when the atmosphere in the family home became unbearable. This incident occurred in his tenth year. The third experience was a dream or vision about God which he had in his twelfth year.

The first dream concerned his discovery of an underground chamber which housed an enthroned phallus, although at the time he recognized it only as a thing shaped like a tree

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 17. \(^8\) Ibid., p. 27.
with an eye on top. The phallus terrified him and his terror increased when in the dream he heard his mother's voice calling, "Yes, just look at him. That is the man-eater!"

Some eighty years later Jung was to comment on the significance of this dream in these terms:

At all events, the phallus of this dream seems to be a subterranean God "not to be named," and such it remained throughout my youth, reappearing whenever anyone spoke too emphatically about Lord Jesus. Lord Jesus never became quite real for me, never quite acceptable, never quite lovable, for again and again I would think of his underground counterpart, a frightful revelation which had been accorded me without my seeking it.9

This comment contains some quite fundamental conceptions. In the first place it is significant that the enthroned phallus was interpreted religiously and not sexually, in spite of its manifest content. This phallic "God" is dimly apprehended as the subterranean counterpart of the Lord Jesus. Some connection between "Jesus" and "man-eater" becomes apparent when one reads of Jung's infantile reflections upon a prayer that his mother had taught him. In this prayer Jesus was said to "take" little children to himself and, as a child, Jung imagined that this meant that he "took" them as one "takes" nasty medicine!10

Then, too, it should be noted that the Jesus who is "not quite" real, or acceptable, or lovable, is the Jesus

9 Ibid., llff, (quotation from p. 13).
10 Ibid., p. 10.
of other people's formulations, a Jesus divorced from his counterpart. Jung maintains that he had had no prior experiences that could have been expected to inform him about such things as subterranean caverns and the anatomical structure of the human phallus and, finally, it is noteworthy that the revelation contained in the dream was both frightening and imposed. He had not sought knowledge about hidden gods but this knowledge had been vouchsafed to him nonetheless. Even at the age of three Jung recognized that he would be wise to keep this experience to himself.

The play with the manikin and stone hidden among the rafters of the attic constituted a source of secret pleasure and fascination for about a year.\footnote{Ibid., p. 21ff.} Doubtless part of this fascination derived from the simple fact that his parents had forbidden him to play in the attic. At the time, however, Jung was unaware of any particular significance attaching to either object but he recalls that he in fact engaged in some form of ceremonial and ritual communication with them. Many years later, when the adult Jung was doing the preliminary research for his work on The Psychology of the Unconscious,\footnote{This was in the year 1917. The work was subsequently revised and retitled Symbols of Transformation, Vol. V of The Collected Works, edited by Herbert Read, Michael Fordham and Gerhard Adler; translated by R.F.C. Hull (Bollingen Series XX, New York, Pantheon Books, 1952). Vol. V hereafter is referred to as \textit{ST}.} he recognized that the ritual in which he had unreflectively
engaged as a child had definite affinities with various primitive religious rites and, moreover, that the manikin was actually "a little cloaked God of the ancient world, a Telesphoros such as stands on the monuments of Asklepios and reads to him from a scroll." The stone was shaped and colored in a manner reminiscent of "the cache of soul stones near Arlesheim and the Australian churingas."

Thus this secret activity also had definite, if hidden, religious significance as well as a fascination and consoling power at least partly explicable on other grounds. As was the case with the dream of the enthroned phallus, Jung maintains that there was nothing in his prior experience to account for the particular symbols employed. He had carved the manikin at random and had selected the stone and colored it with no particular reason in mind. There were, he said, no books in his father's library from which he could have gained knowledge of the primitive god form or of soul stones and, moreover, his father "demonstrably knew nothing about these things."

He soon forgot about his manikin and the whole incident remained dormant in his mind for something like twenty-five years but as he then recalled the childish play he records that:
There came to me, for the first time, the conviction that there are archaic psychic components which have entered the individual psyche without any direct line of tradition.13

The third incident occurred in Jung's twelfth year. Like the dream but unlike the phantasy play, it was accompanied by highly and negatively charged affect and created in him deep fear, confusion, and conflict. In this vision (or dream)14 Jung was standing in the cathedral square in Basel admiring the glittering new roof on the cathedral and reflecting that the creator God sat high above all this beauty on his golden throne. But then, as he continued to gaze, he saw to his horror a giant lump of excrement drop from beneath the heavenly throne and smash the cathedral into ruins.15 For three whole days Jung refused to acknowledge, even to himself, how this vision had ended--he would consistently stop thinking at the point of the sight of God enthroned above beauty and harmony. He could not confess to anyone what he had seen (since this would necessarily involve a full acknowledgment of the terrible thought) and he lived in mortal fear that he would commit the unpardonable sin, the sin against the Holy Spirit, if he did acknowledge the fullness of the vision. He mentally reviewed the gallery of his ancestors but could find no flaw in their impregnable respectability which could account for his having so heinous a thought.

13 Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 22-23.
14 Bennet, op. cit., p. 17, note 1.
15 Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 36ff.
Finally he decided that his primordial ancestors, Adam and Eve, had been intended to sin by God and that it may be that God himself was forcing him into his present terrible predicament. Pursuing this line of thought he agonized over the possibility that "God wishes to see whether I am capable of obeying His will even though my faith and my reason raise before me the specters of death and hell." In this spirit he finally permitted himself to acknowledge the full content of the vision and thereupon felt and "indescribable" relief.

Jung interpreted this experience as one of God's grace coming to him where he had expected only damnation. Grace came with obedience even though that obedience meant the rejection of traditional religious thinking. Grace demanded "utter abandonment" to God for unless one fulfills His will, "all is folly and meaninglessness." And grace led him to the dim understanding that God "could be something terrible."

Jung claims that this "dark and terrible secret [...] overshadowed my whole life" and he was later to express his understanding of the experience in the following terms: "God Himself had disavowed Theology and the Church founded upon it. On the other hand God condoned this theology, as He condoned

16 Ibid., p. 39f.
so much else."  

By the time he entered university Jung was to be convinced that faith had played a deadly trick upon his own father and upon "most of the cultivated and serious people I knew." "The arch sin of faith," he comments, "was that it forestalled experience."  

His experience gave him a new perspective on his father's difficulties which he summed up in these words:

He had failed to experience the will of God, had opposed it for the best reasons and out of the deepest faith. And that was why he had never experienced the miracle of grace which heals all and makes all comprehensible. He had taken the Bible's commandments as his guide; he believed in God as the Bible prescribed and as his forefathers had taught him. But he did not know the immediate living God who stands, omnipotent and free, above His Bible and His Church, who calls upon man to partake of His freedom, and can force him to renounce his own views and convictions in order to fulfil without reserve the command of God. In his trial of human courage God refuses to abide by traditions, no matter how sacred. In his omnipotence He will see to it that nothing really evil comes of such tests of courage. If one fulfils the will of God one can be sure of going the right way.

In these experiences and reflections the crucial features of Jung's concern with religion and religious questions were already shaped and the contents of his later personal beliefs adumbrated. These may be summarized as follows:

(1) The category of religious experience is a primary category in psychic life and is neither derived from nor

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17 Ibid., p. 93.  18 Ibid., p. 94.  19 Ibid., p. 40.
JUNG'S EXPERIENCE OF THE SELF AND CHRIST

Reducible to any other category (such as will-to-power or repressed sexuality).

(ii) Genuine religious experience is both frightening and healing.

(iii) Genuine religious experience is not dependent upon, and may indeed be distorted or constrained by, traditional formulations, doctrines, creeds, and beliefs.

(iv) Genuine religious experiences lead one to an awareness of the "hidden," "dark," "terrible," and "inexpressible" qualities of the God whom orthodoxy represents as all "love" and "light," and whom the theological thinkers presume to "know."

(v) Experience of the grace of God is an overwhelming experience which cannot lightly be dismissed or disposed of; it makes demands of a total nature upon the experiencing person but it also gives assurance of support and sustenance through the necessary pain associated with obedience.

(vi) Genuine religious experience is imposed upon one in the sense that it comes without being consciously summoned or desired by the individual concerned.

Jung's interest in religion, and his sense of commitment to God, continued throughout his student days and indeed throughout his life. There were occasions during his university career when he seriously contemplated a formal study of theology but increasingly his sense of alienation from
traditional ecclesiastical thought forms propelled him in
the general direction of science. But even this direction
was not to be followed in the then traditional categories as
his philosophical reading had aroused in him a curiosity
about the human psyche. He recognized that the psyche was
responsible both for the acquisition of knowledge and the
gaining of insight, but the science of his day had little or
nothing to say about the psyche. Such a challenge could
not be long ignored.

In 1900, after completing his medical degree, Jung
joined the staff of Burghölzli Hospital, in Zurich, and there
did important pioneering work with the word-association test
and firmly established his psychiatric reputation with his
publication of *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox* in 1907.
Shortly afterwards he first met Sigmund Freud, although he
had been acquainted with Freud's writings for some years prior
to that time. The association lasted approximately six years.
Jung was already in process of developing the basic lines of
his Analytical Psychology.

20 Ibid., p. 98.

21 Jung's debt to Freud was, of course, considerable,
and nowhere more so than in the actual details of therapy.
One volume of Jung's *Collected Works* (Volume 4) is devoted to
Freud and psychoanalysis. There are many, and contradictory,
reports on the personal relationships between the two men
and on the factors responsible for their final break. Jung
gives his version in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 146ff.
A Freudian version will be found in Ernest Jones, *The Life*
Jung's personal experience of dreams, visions, etc., did not cease with his childhood. He says of himself that he began to confront the contents of his own unconscious as he entered the second half of his life. But he clearly recognized that, in themselves, his own fantasies, dreams and visions could not provide sufficient basis for the "natural science" that he conceived analytical psychology to be.22

Throughout his long working life (except for the last ten or fifteen years) he was an active therapist and much of the material for his subsequent reflections on religion derived from the psychic productions of his patients. Their dreams and visions were carefully noted and various other phenomena, such as artistic productions, were analyzed in an attempt to explore their meaning. Jung was impressed with the frequency with which material presented by his patients featured motifs and symbols familiar to a student of mythology and folk-lore (as he had long been) even though frequently the patient concerned was not aware of any such parallels.


22 Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 200; cf., p. 206 where Jung specifically dates a period of "intense preoccupation with the images of [his] [...] own unconscious" as lasting from 1913 to 1917.
But even this material had to be interpreted by Jung himself (and the patient) and Jung recognized that as an observer with personal biases he could not escape a certain lack of objectivity. Something beyond his own psychic productions, and those of his own patients, was necessary to guarantee a validity wider than the merely personal or, at least, "to exclude [...] the crudest errors of judgment."  

During the years 1918-1926 he had embarked on a serious study of Gnosticism in the belief that the Gnostics also had "been confronted with the primal world of the unconscious and had dealt with its contents, with images that were obviously contaminated with the world of instinct." In his view, Christianity, like all completed religious forms, had in fact placed severe limitations on individual unconscious activity and had substituted stereotyped symbolic ideas for individual unconscious productions. These ideas found in Christianity, he argued, had their origins in the unconscious productions of Jesus, the founder of the religion, but were subsequently interpreted as universally valid and universally binding. Individual fantasy construction was therefore represented as invalid and worthless and soon lapsed amongst the faithful. Where it did


24 Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 200f.
persist, as in the Gnostic movement and other heresies, "it was actually persecuted as heretical."\textsuperscript{25}

But it was precisely this factor so abhorred by the orthodox religious leaders after Jesus which attracted Jung to the Gnostics, and later to the medieval alchemists and the whole stream of German mysticism, particularly as exemplified in Meister Eckhart. Jung grants a certain grandiosity to the early Gnostic Christian heresies but says of them that:

\[\ldots\] the Gnosis displays unconscious psychology in full flower, perhaps in almost perverse luxuriance; it reveals, therefore, that very element which most stoutly resists the \textit{regula fidei}, that Promethean and creative spirit which will submit only to the soul and to no collective ruling. Although in a crude form, we find in the Gnosis that belief in the power of individual discernment which was absent in the later centuries. This belief had its source in that proud feeling of individual relationship to God which is subject to no human statutes, and which may even constrain the gods by the sheer weight of understanding.\textsuperscript{26}

Two things limited the usefulness of Jung's study of Gnosticism, the paucity and nature of the sources available, and the lack of a bridge from the thought-world of Gnosticism to the contemporary world. The first was ultimately overcome in the discovery of new and original Gnostic material (most

\textsuperscript{25} C. G. Jung, \textit{Psychological Types, or the Psychology of Individuation} (tr. by H. Godwin Baynes), London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959, p. 70ff. Hereafter referred to as \textit{Psych Types}. Jung sees an earlier parallel to this development in Christianity in the imprecations against the false prophets recorded in the Old Testament, e.g., in Jeremiah 23.16, 26ff.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 298ff.
of the material extant when Jung began his investigations was to be found in the accounts of Gnosticism's orthodox Christian opponents). The second inhibitory condition was overcome, in Jung's view, when he began to understand alchemy. Then, he says:

I realized that it represented the historical link with Gnosticism, and that a continuity therefore existed between past and present. Grounded in the natural Philosophy of the Middle Ages, alchemy formed the bridge on one hand into the past, to Gnosticism, and on the other into the future, to the modern psychology of the unconscious.27

It was thus the search for historical and literary parallels to his own inner experiences which motivated Jung to pay attention to these sources. An interesting example of his modus operandi is provided by his account of the development of his interest in alchemy. He had had, before ever beginning the study of alchemy, a series of dreams which consistently placed him in the sixteenth and seventeenth century surroundings. One such series even features a library of alchemical volumes and various other medieval incunabula such as he was later to acquire in fact. The crucial dream came around 1926 and in seeking to explain it Jung records that he

"ploughed through ponderous tomes on the history of the world, of religion, and of philosophy," but without finding any key. In 1928 Richard Wilhelm sent him the text of the Golden Flower, a volume of Chinese Alchemy, and thereupon Jung set about collecting as many alchemical books as he could. But it was not for some years after that that he was able to overcome his rational prejudice against this "nonsense" which seemed so "impossible to understand." When he finally decided that the alchemists were in fact talking in symbols, "those old acquaintances of mine," he became seriously interested and determined to unravel their significance. Working along philological lines, he assembled and cross-referenced thousands of key phrases and words which seemed to be used in a particular, but as yet unknown, sense. More than a decade of work was involved before he finally felt that the alchemical mode of expression had yielded its meaning. 28

It is typical of Jung that the critical impulse came from an inner experience. This in turn was followed by a desire to understand the experience and to see it in historical perspective. After several possible means had been explored, only to be abandoned as unfruitful, one unlikely possibility presented itself and was pursued with an unremitting tenacity until an "answer" had been wrung from it. In this

answer lies both personal vindication and an enlarged perspective on his psychological work. Jung sums up the results of his work on alchemy in the following terms:

I had very soon seen that analytical psychology coincided in a curious way with alchemy. The experiences of the alchemists were, in a sense, my experiences, and their world was my world. This was, of course, a momentous discovery: I had stumbled upon the historical counterpart of my psychology of the unconscious. The possibility of a comparison with alchemy, and the uninterrupted intellectual chain back to Gnosticism, gave substance to my psychology. When I pored over these old texts, everything fell into place: the fantasy images, the empirical material I had gathered in my practice, and the conclusions I had drawn from it. I now began to understand what these psychic contents meant when seen in historical perspective. My understanding of their typical character, which had already begun with my study of myths, was deepened. The primordial images, and the nature of the archetype took a central place in my researches, and it became clear to me that without history there can be no psychology, and certainly no psychology of the unconscious.29

Jung seems somewhat ambivalent on the question of whether the Gnostics saw themselves as psychologists, but he is quite definite in his view that the alchemists regarded

29 Ibid., p. 205. Jung gives Sigmund Freud full credit for inaugurating the modern psychology of the unconscious and claims that both Gnostic and alchemical influences may be discerned in Freud's work. "The Gnostic Yahweh and Creator God reappeared in the Freudian myth of the primal father and the gloomy super-ego deriving from that father." In the Freudian myth Yahweh became a "daemon who created a world of disappointments, illusions, and suffering." Alongside this, however, is a materialist trend which derives from the alchemical preoccupation with matter and, in Freud, led to his ignoring the other essential aspect of Gnosticism: the higher god who makes spiritual transformation possible for man (ibid., p. 201).
the physical aspects of their work (e.g., the transmutation of base metals into gold) as an integral but inferior aspect of their general concern with the mysteries of matter in general and of life and the human soul in particular. 30

30 On Gnosticism, see Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 201: "It seems to me highly unlikely that they had a psychological conception of [the images of the unconscious]." Cf. Aion, p. 222: "From various hints dropped by Hippolytus it is clear beyond a doubt that many of the Gnostics were nothing other than psychologists." Jung certainly attributes to them an awareness of the human psyche as a source of knowledge; specific views on the existence of the unconscious; and an understanding of the differentiation between the totality of the self and the observing ego--Aion, p. 174, 190f., 222. "Gnosis," he says, "reached its insights by concentrating on the 'subjective factor,' which consisted empirically in the demonstrable influence that the collective unconscious exerts on the conscious mind. This would explain the astonishing parallelism between Gnostic symbolism and the findings of the psychology of the unconscious."--ibid., p. 222; cf. C. G. Jung, "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass," in PR:WE, p. 280f.

On alchemy, Jung considers the religious views of alchemy to be clearly Gnostic in origin--"Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 90f. In his paper on "The Idea of Redemption in Alchemy," in C. G. Jung, The Integration of the Personality (tr. by Stanley M. Dell), New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1939, p. 205ff., Jung clearly defines his understanding of the perceived difference—that is, the difference perceived by the alchemists themselves—between the practical part of the opus (the actual operatio which today is only meaningless confusion) and the "psychic transformations that hold a real fascination" for them and which they try and express in a nomenclature derived from the chemical operations (p. 206). The alchemists were, however, clearly dealing with psychic projections (p. 207ff.) in the belief that they were investigating the properties of matter but there are many indications in the literature which suggest to Jung that some primitive understanding of the relation of the psychic world to the chemical process was widely current (p. 213ff.). In summary form, Jung says of the alchemists that the "relation to the invisible powers of the psyche constituted the actual secret of the magistery." (p. 221) Jung discerns in the
In addition to these sources he also made extensive reference to the poets and philosophers of the ages, and in particular to Goethe, Schiller, Kant and Nietzsche.31

2. The Nature of the Human Psyche.

This section will contain three major subdivisions. The first will establish Jung's understanding of reality and metaphysics of the alchemists the awareness that the psyche is only partly to be identified with conscious being (p. 225); cf. "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 94, 97f.

The symbols of alchemy are concerned with the union of opposites and particularly is this true of Mercurius, or mercury: "Mercury stands at the beginning and end of the work [...]. He is the hermaphrodite of incipient being which divides into two in the classic symbolism of brother-sister, and unites in the coniunctio, to appear again at the end in the radiant form of the lumen novum, the stone. He is metal and yet fluid, matter and yet spirit, cold but fiery, poison but also the healing draft—a symbol that unites the opposites." Cf. Jung's paper "The Idea of Redemption in Alchemy," in The Integration of the Personality, p. 227.

31 See, e.g., Psych Types, chapters II and V. Elsewhere Jung states that he regards his work on alchemy as a sign of his inner relationship with Goethe (he rejects the tradition which makes him a natural descendent of Goethe). Both Goethe and he were men in the grip of that process of archetypal transformation which has gone on through the centuries. "Both shared the great dream of the [...] archetypal world." For Jung this meant that from his eleventh year he had been launched upon a single enterprise which is my 'main business.'" So far as Jung is concerned, the "one idea and the one goal: namely to penetrate into the secret of personality," has informed all his life and work. Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 206.
of psychic facts. The second will deal with some significant features of his understanding of the human psyche, conscious and unconscious, and the third will review briefly the role of religion in his work.

We apply the criteria—nature, function, sociality and the Christ-event—to Jung's understanding of the psyche rather than directly to his concept of self because the self, due to its archetypal nature, can only be studied by way of its organizing effects upon the psyche:

Archetypes, so far as we can observe and experience them at all, manifest themselves only through their ability to organize images and ideas, and this is always an unconscious process which cannot be detected until afterwards. By assimilating ideational material whose provenance in the phenomenal world is not to be contested, they become visible and psychic. Therefore they are recognized at first only as psychic entities and are conceived as such, with the same right with which we base the physical phenomena of immediate perception on Euclidean space.31a

Jung is not easy to read or to comprehend. In part, this is doubtlessly due to the very nature of the subject matter and the unavoidable involvement of the psyche in any attempt to understand the psyche. In part, also it must be conceded that Jung's formulations are calculated to arouse the prejudices of the reader since they frequently appear to impinge on such diverse disciplines as philosophy, theology, metaphysics, biology, etc., as well as the more clearly defined areas which the general consensus of opinion allots to psychology.

But it is also true that part of the responsibility for the difficulties of the reader must be laid squarely at Jung's own door. By his own confession he is no "terminological rigorist" and he clearly regards the names to be given to facts as of secondary importance. He can thus use different terms on different occasions to denote the same thing and even the same term to denote different things. He coins words freely or borrows from other sources, sometimes quite exotic, but without always retaining the precise sense of the original and sometimes, indeed, without defining the differences. He is also prone to use words in common currency in a peculiar or restricted sense. His writing is rarely systematic and frequently impresses one as contradictory even where he is not intending to represent paradox. He delights in the paradox and employs it widely as an instrument for rendering the complexities and contradictions which he sees in psychic phenomena.

But what makes him particularly offensive to some readers, and particularly to those with scientific training, is his conviction—which finds ample expression in his works—that dramatic and mythological language is actually more expressive and more exact than abstract scientific terminology

when one is attempting to convey the realities of the human psyche.\textsuperscript{33}

A. The Nature of Reality and Psychic Facts

Jung is very much aware of the subjective limitations of knowledge in general and of psychological knowledge in particular. The psychological observer can never obtain full objectivity by virtue of his own humanity but he can and should, become sufficiently aware of the direction in which his own subjectivity leads him to be able to take full account of its presence.\textsuperscript{34} The nature of the subject matter involved in an investigation of the human psyche limits what the psychologist can do. He cannot make assertions in the same way as is possible for some other natural scientists but he can construct models which may open up promising fields of enquiry. A model, he says, "does not assert that something is, it simply illustrates a particular mode of observation."\textsuperscript{35} But, on the other hand, Jung will not concede that this means that the psychologist is not dealing with "reality."

His concern is with the nature of the human psyche and the self as its unifying center. He is adamant that this cannot be considered as a mere epiphenomenon of biological or physiological processes but neither is the psyche a wholly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Aion}, p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{34} \textit{Psych Types}, p. 16f.
\item \textsuperscript{35} "On the Nature of the Psyche," in \textit{SDP}, p. 184.
\end{itemize}
unapproachable and recondite matter. It can be investigated and it bears its own reality different from, but neither inferior nor superior to the reality of the external world. The "living reality" with which he is primarily concerned cannot be equated with the objective behavior of things nor yet with formulated ideas about actual objective behavior.

In his work on *Psychological Types*, Jung distinguishes between two fundamental orientations to life which he calls the introverted and the extraverted. One of the distinguishing features of these different orientations lies in their reaction to an object of perception. The introvert's impression of the perceptual experience is primarily concerned with what has been constellated in him as the observing subject in consequence of his encounter with the object, whereas the extravert is primarily concerned with what reaches him from the object itself. Thus, the introvert relies more heavily than does the extravert on the subjective factor which Jung defines as "that psychological action or reaction which, when merged with the effect of the object, makes a new psychic fact." But the important thing to note is that neither the introvert nor the extravert is in any position to make exclusive claims in respect to the reality involved in their different modes of experience. "The world exists," says


37 *Psych Types*, p. 68. 38 Ibid., p. 473.
Jung, "not merely in itself but also as it appears to me." 39

The reality of the subjective factor is just as firmly established, and is to be taken just as seriously, as the reality of the outer object. He says, in this respect:

> The subjective factor is something that is just as much a fact as the extent of the sea and the radius of the earth [...] and the man who is based upon it has a foundation just as secure, permanent, and valid, as the man who relies upon the object. 40

Thus Jung can speak of psychic facts and claim for them that they are just as real as anything external but their validity can neither be epistemologically criticized nor yet scientifically verified. They manifest themselves as conscious contents, as thoughts or ideas or images, and this in itself constitutes the only validity they need, and the full warrant for the psychologist's taking them seriously. These are facts of experience and if a person, any person, has the experience, this in itself establishes the fact. The fact gains general validity if experienced by a number of persons. Science, says Jung, can only be invoked "when the content claims to be an assertion about something that can be met in the external world" and even then the role of science is limited to the demonstration of the extent to which the assertion is supported or otherwise by the phenomena of the external world. In this particular context he is apparently not regarding psychology as science although elsewhere he certainly regards the psychological enterprise as a scientific one. Epistemological

criticism is appropriate "only when an unknowable thing is posited as knowable." 41

God is one such psychic fact for Jung. Science has never discovered any God and epistemology demonstrates the impossibility of knowing God. But human beings down through the ages have claimed an experience of God or, in Jung's terms, "the psyche comes forward with the assertion of the experience of God." Had there never been such a psychic experience there would never have been so much talk of God. 42

This means that, as an empiricist, Jung feels constrained to take God seriously as a psychic fact and to ask what this fact may mean about human psychic functioning. But taking God seriously in this way does not involve the psychologist in having to subscribe to any metaphysical views or to any theology. 43 Jung himself expresses doubt as to whether "what metaphysics and theology call God is the real ground of these [i.e., religious] experiences." 44

In spite of this expression of doubt, which is after all a qualified expression of judgment, he maintains that psychology

42 Ibid.
43 Aion, p. 198.
as such cannot pass judgments or make statements about metaphysical matters. Psychology does not claim that God Himself is intrinsically a psychic fact and hence He does not come within the scope of psychology. Psychology can offer no alternatives to God by erecting something in his "place."[^5] But the God-image, and the idea of God, are psychic facts since they are experienced and psychology must take them seriously if it is genuinely to be concerned about the whole reality of man.

Thus, psychology cannot, in Jung's view, establish any equation between "God Himself" and the God-image[^6] but


[^6] The tendency, particularly on the part of his critics, to equate the God-image with "God Himself" arises, in Jung's view, from the "perpetual confusion between object and image which characterizes most thinking from primitive times through to the present day. It was this confusion which led the primitives to see the projected products of their own psyches as detached and external spirits, daemons, gods, etc., and it is this confusion which leads modern man to suppose that the psychologists are 'speaking of God and giving a 'theological' explanation when we are really speaking of the 'idea of God.'"General Aspects of Dream Psychology," in SDP, p. 278.

Jung concedes that there are times when the boundary lines between the domain of the empiricist and the domain of the theologian appear to have been crossed. His own strictures against the doctrine of evil as the privatio boni are a case in point. But even here he insists that his criticism applies only to ideas and concepts and not to metaphysical entities, and hence is valid only within the empirical realm. It may conceivably be, he says, that there is some validity attaching to the privatio boni concept in the "metaphysical realm" but, for his own part, "I know of no factual
it can recognize that whenever men speak of God they do so in certain identifiable contexts and as a result of certain orders of psychic experience. Psychology can discern some of the processes involved in the formulation of concepts of God and Jung claims that these processes have to do with psychic wholeness or, as he also terms it, with the becoming of a self.\(^4\)

Jung felt himself to be widely misunderstood on this point\(^4\) and frequently reiterated his contention that he was dealing with religion in general and the concept of God in particular from a "purely empirical point of view." This empirical standpoint is, he claims:

\[\ldots\text{] exclusively phenomenological, that is, it is concerned with occurrences, events, experiences--in a word, with facts. Its truth is a fact and not a judgment. When psychology speaks, for instance of the motif of the virgin birth, it is only concerned with the fact that there is such an idea, but it is not concerned with the question whether such an idea is true or false in any other sense. The idea is psychologically true inasmuch as it exists.\(^4\)

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experience which approximates such an assertion, so at this point the empiricist must remain silent." Cf. "Foreword to White's God and the Unconscious," in PR:WE, p. 304ff.

\(^{47}\) Aion, p. 194; "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity," in PR:WE, p. 160, 162f., 190; "Answer to Job," ibid., p. 468f. The matter will be dealt with at greater length below.

\(^{48}\) "A Psychological Approach to the Trinity," in PR:WE, p. 163, note 16.

All religious statements are psychic facts in Jung's view, since they refer to things which cannot be established as physical facts. These psychic facts may indeed conflict with observed physical phenomena but this does not make them invalid as psychic facts. It rather demonstrates that "psychic experience is to a certain extent independent of physical data." The reality of the psychic may be equal to the reality of the external world even when these realities would be logically mutually contradictory. If one persists in treating the facts of faith in the same manner as the facts of science then this conflict would be intolerable, but if each is recognized as possessing its own peculiar validity and reality, then neither has to be falsely subjugated to the other.

His own introverted approach and the conception of different modes of reality enables Jung to make such statements as, for example, that "each new day reality is created by the psyche" or, again, that "reality is that which works in a human soul." The singular article in this last quotation is worthy of further comment. It is Jung's conviction that the individual is not only the supremely important unit


51 The Undiscovered Self, p. 64.

52 Psych Types, p. 56, 69.
for psychological study, but also that the individual person is the "true and authentic carrier of reality."\textsuperscript{53} The "man" of rational scientific statements is an abstraction; reality lies in the concrete individual.

B. The Nature of the Conscious and Unconscious Self

Jung is not only concerned to establish the reality of psychic facts as over and against external objects, he is also eager to establish the reality and importance of the unconscious psyche and its contents along with the reality and importance of consciousness.

His conceptions, as might be expected, have not remained static over the years. On the contrary, he has been in constant process of refining, reshaping, and restating his developing understanding of the human psyche and the models through which this understanding can be expressed. He has been prepared to qualify and even discard hypotheses and formulations which he felt had outlived their usefulness. There is, however, a certain constancy about the general thrust and direction of his thinking.

Even before his final break with Freud, Jung published an essay on "The Structure of the Unconscious" which contained

\textsuperscript{53} The Undiscovered Self, p. 12.
many of the basic themes which his later work was to develop. In this essay he acknowledged the great light that Freud had thrown on the unconscious but rejected the claim that the unconscious could be totally comprehended in terms of repressed or forgotten material. The latter view, he said, would make all the essential contents of the unconscious completely personal in character. Even at this early stage of his career he was concerned to make provision in his model of the psyche for what he called the "collective unconscious."

Jung's understanding of the human psyche, as expressed in this early essay, may be summarized as follows:

(i) Both the conscious and the unconscious psychological processes are partly personal in nature and partly impersonal or collective.

(ii) Four basic structures or systems may be discerned: the ego, which consists of the conscious personal components, the conscious personality; the self, which consists of the unconscious personal components; the persona, which is the sum of both ego and self; and the non-ego, which

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54 C. G. Jung, "The Structure of the Unconscious," translated by Phillip Mairet from a French translation (1916) of the now lost German original; reprinted in Two Essays, p. 277f.

55 Ibid., p. 283. The distinction introduced here between the "collective soul" and the "collective mind" within the collective psyche was not pursued in later writings.

56 Ibid., p. 302f.
is opposed to the persona and consists in the conscious and unconscious components of a collective nature.

(iii) Within the collective psyche there exist pairs of opposites and the understanding of the principle of opposites (called enantiodromia, a term borrowed from Heraclitus) is basic to an understanding of psychic processes.

In his later work the themes of differentiation between conscious and unconscious, personal and collective, ego, self, and persona, and the principle of opposition, all occupy important roles but the specific content of some of these terms was changed quite dramatically. This is particularly true of the concepts ego, self, and persona, while non-ego tended to disappear as a technical term.

This brief historical note has been included both to demonstrate Jung's willingness to review and change his formulations as he further refined the direction of his work and also to suggest another possible reason for the confusion and apparent contradictions found in his writings, namely, the fact that his mature concepts passed through developmental stages which need to be recognized. In the following account of Jung's position his more mature understandings will be used as the basis for the exposition and discussion of his concepts.

(a) Consciousness and the Ego.- Jung certainly does not intend to undervalue consciousness and the processes
associated with it. In his view, consciousness is an indis­
pensable condition for existence as such. Without conscious­
ness, he says:

[...] there would, practically speaking, be no
world, for the world exists as such only insofar
as it is consciously reflected and consciously
expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a pre­
condition of being.57

It is consciousness which largely determines individuality and which checks and orders the otherwise chaotic and poten­tially contradictory instinctual forces. The existence of individual consciousness does make man aware of difficulties to be confronted in both his inner world and the world of external reality but nevertheless it is of such fundamental importance that he can say that "man's capacity for con­sciousness alone makes him man."61

The center of consciousness is the ego and indeed Jung formally defines consciousness in relation to this center: "By consciousness I understand the relatedness of psychic contents to the ego insofar as they are sensed as

57 The Undiscovered Self, p. 46.
such by the ego." In theory, the bounds of consciousness cannot be specified but in practice it is limited by the unknown, both the unknown of the outer world and the unknown of the inner world, the unconscious. The contents of consciousness vary in regard to the clarity with which they are perceived and related to the ego, i.e., in regard to their intensity, and indeed it can be said that there is no conscious content which is not in some respect also unconscious. This means that the line of demarcation between consciousness and the unconscious can never be drawn with unambiguous clarity.

Insofar as the field of consciousness comprises the empirical personality, the ego is the subject of all personal acts of consciousness. While the ego is itself a "conscious factor par excellence" it seems to have its bases in both somatic and psychic factors. The somatic basis may be either (or both) conscious or unconscious, i.e., subliminal, and similarly the psychic basis consists of both conscious and unconscious factors. The ego, despite its complexity, could,

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62 *Psych Types*, p. 535.
64 *Aion*, p. 3; "The Structure of the Psyche," in *SDP*, p. 185.
theoretically at least, be described completely. But this would give a picture of only the conscious personality and would not include those factors unknown or unconscious to the subject even though these factors will have helped shape and form that subject. Hence, self-knowledge ought not, in Jung's view, to be identified with knowledge of the conscious ego personality (which is, he suggests, the usual approach to self-knowledge) since this comprises only part of the total personality.

But if Jung does not wish to underestimate the role of consciousness and the conscious ego, neither does he wish to overrate these phenomena which, if not recognized as a part of the psyche rather than its totality, may produce dangerous consequences both for the individual and the culture.

(b) The Unconscious.- Those psychic contents and processes which are not conscious constitute the unconscious. If the unconscious is being viewed from the perspective of a psychology of consciousness it can be said to consist of three groups of contents: first, those which can be summoned into consciousness voluntarily (memory); second, those which

66 Aion, p. 3-5.

67 Ibid., p. 6; The Undiscovered Self, p. 6f. Jung is here using "self-knowledge" in the generally accepted sense of that term which he equates with knowledge of the personal ego, but he is using it in such a way as to point to the possibility of knowledge of the "real psychic facts" involved in knowledge of the self.
can be made conscious but not voluntarily (repressed material, etc.); and third, those contents which cannot become conscious at all or which have never been conscious. The existence of this third group is, of course, an hypothesis, a logical inference, rather than an observed fact.\textsuperscript{68}

More usually, however, Jung is concerned to describe the unconscious from a different perspective and to divide it into just two groups or strata, the one whose contents are of a personal nature and the other whose contents are impersonal or collective in nature. In a brief summary statement, Jung says of these two groups:

The first group comprises contents which are integral components of the individual personality and could therefore just as well be conscious; the second group forms, as it were, an omnipresent, unchanging, and everywhere identical quality or substrate of the psyche per se. This is, of course, no more than a hypothesis. But we are driven to it by the peculiar nature of the empirical material, not to mention the high probability that the general similarity of psychic processes in all individuals must be based on an equally general and impersonal principle that conforms to law, just as the instinct manifesting itself in the individual is only the partial manifestation of an instinctual substrate common to all men.\textsuperscript{69}

In general, the relation of the unconscious to consciousness is a compensatory one, i.e., the unconscious forms a counter-position to conscious activity. This is an energetic model based on the principle of homeostasis. Psychic contents,

\textsuperscript{68} Aion, p. 7; cf. Psych Types, p. 614ff.

\textsuperscript{69} Aion, p. 7; cf. Psych Types, p. 615ff.
in Jung's view, are charged with energy which naturally seeks for release. The normal means of discharging this psychic energy is through conscious expression. But consciousness is also subject to restricting and restraining forces which compel it to be selective in its operations and this means that there are many psychic contents which will be denied expression in consciousness. Not only does consciousness not make room for the expression of all psychic contents (and hence for the discharge of their energies), it does not even provide for the expression of a representative sampling of the full range of psychic contents. There are thus whole areas of experience which are denied expression in consciousness and are thereby more or less permanently confined to the unconscious.

Consciousness, then, tends to develop in a one-sided fashion. As this one-sidedness intensifies, the energy attaching to those contents excluded from consciousness (both the forgotten or repressed contents and those which have never been previously conscious) actively seeks to effect a redress of the imbalance so as to resolve the tensions produced. If the one-sidedness proceeds beyond a certain point, the unconscious contents begin to break through into consciousness in such forms as dreams and spontaneously produced images. In extreme cases, the one-sidedness of consciousness
may be so acute as to force the unconscious into taking a
directly contrary position to that of the conscious
attitudes.\textsuperscript{70}

Jung also speaks in terms of man's having a shadow,
or unconscious inverse reflection of what he consciously is.
This concept clearly belongs to the general compensatory
function of the unconscious. The further the shadow side
is from the individual's consciousness, the blacker it be­
comes but nevertheless the shadow ought not to be thought of
as something totally evil. Its existence is grounded in our
instinctual nature and its potential dynamism ought not to
be underestimated. The shadow consists of repressed tenden­
cies and thus is "inferior, primitive, unadapted, and awkward;
not wholly bad."\textsuperscript{71} But, by virtue of its being composed of
repressed material, the enforced quiescence of the shadow is
illusory and it constantly threatens to erupt in revolt.
These eruptions may be either constructive or catastrophic,
depending entirely upon "the preparedness and attitude of the
conscious mind,"\textsuperscript{72} i.e., depending upon how the conscious mind
can assimilate the material thus crudely and forcibly brought
to its attention.

\textsuperscript{70} Psych Types, p. 532f.
\textsuperscript{71} "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 76, 78;
cf. The Undiscovered Self, p. 82f., 107.
\textsuperscript{72} Psych Types, p. 143.
Yet another aspect of the compensatory function is the fusing together in the unconscious of everything which, in consciousness, is divided and antagonistic. The whole of this compensatory function involves the principle of enantiodromia, "the emergence of the unconscious opposite." Jung cites Paul's conversion to Christianity as an example of this principle in action. Opposites play a fundamental part in his psychology. True opposites are never incommensurable, in his view, but are rather extreme qualities in a single state which enable one to perceive that that state is real. He can say, indeed, that a psychic fact is established only if the opposite can also be validly asserted. Nevertheless, opposites cannot be rationally united. Some compromise is inevitable and in fact the fusion or reconciliation of opposites produces an irrational third factor which clearly partakes of both the combining elements and yet has an autonomy of its own. This is not the same as Hegel's thesis/antithesis producing a synthesis in spite of some superficial similarities. Jung's irrational third does not

74 Psych Types, p. 542.
75 "On the Nature of the Psyche," in SDP, p. 212. He cites, by way of example, the fact that physical and spiritual passion are both "deadly enemies" and also "brothers-in-arms."
76 Psych Types, p. 132.
become a new thesis to be combined in its turn with another antithesis. The autonomous form of the irrational third, which is produced by the unconscious in defiance of the logic congenial to consciousness, possesses a certain order of finality.

The unconscious, then, is a dynamic psychic system which invisibly determines a great deal of the life of an individual. It contains contents which are clearly the products of the personal life experience of the individual in question and which are therefore personal and peculiar to him. But it also contains contents which seem to transcend this individuality and to be part of a living deposit of all human experience right back to the remotest beginnings. These collective contents are held in common and cannot really be understood as the possession of any one individual and yet they are available to each individual from within himself but not from within the realm of his own ego. It is the contents of this collective unconscious which provide the reservoir from which the creative artists and the poets of every age draw, and which inform the experiences of the mystics and all who deal in revelations. The fascination that such diverse figures as Meister Eckhart, Goethe, and Nietzsche exert for

Jung lies precisely in his conviction that each of them expresses in his work the outpourings of the collective unconscious. Nietzsche attains peculiar significance through his work, Thus Spake Zarathustra, for in it Jung claims to see the collective unconscious of our own day brought to light.\textsuperscript{78}

By its very nature, and containing as it is presumed to contain contents which have never been conscious, the unconscious must be recognized as being of quite uncertain extent and constitution.\textsuperscript{79} In a sense psychology cannot make any valid statements about it or, rather, any statements it does make cannot ever be scientifically verified. All that can be done is to construct models on the basis of the observed effects which are presumed to be effects of something not representable in itself.\textsuperscript{80}

It should be noted that Jung deliberately chooses to call this dimension of the psyche the unconscious rather than the subconscious or supraconscious. This reflects his conviction that the unconscious embraces both the above and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{78} Psych Types, p. 236f., 318f.; cf. Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 102f., 206; The Undiscovered Self, p. 110.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} The Undiscovered Self, p. 91.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} "On the Nature of the Psyche," in SDP, p. 214. Jung points out that a similar situation exists in physics with respect to the atom.
\end{itemize}
below aspects of the psyche if one wishes to speak in terms of spacial relationships to consciousness. This is in contrast to the Freudian view which makes the unconscious appear (to Jung at least) as a subliminal appendix to the conscious mind. 81

(c) Archetypes.— Sigmund Freud had established the existence of archaic vestiges and of primitive modes of functioning in the human mind but Jung's conception of the collective unconscious manifestly goes beyond any of Freud's explicit formulations. This becomes clearer in Jung's conception of the nature and function of the archetypes.

Late in his life Jung acknowledged that most people found his concept of the archetype very difficult to comprehend and he suggested that this probably accounted for the widespread misunderstandings current about it. 82 He emphatically denies that he is propounding a theory of "inherited representations" or of "inborn ideas." Archetypes are rather to be thought of as "specifically human, typical modes of behavior" which, when they are represented in consciousness appear in the same form as any other conscious contents, that is, as ideas or images. 83

81 Ibid., p. 178, note 35; 179.


He is quick to point out that he invented neither the name nor the basic concept of the archetype. His own contribution, as he saw it, was merely to give

[...] an empirical foundation to the theory of what were formerly called primordial or elementary ideas, 'categories' or habitudes directrices de la conscience, 'representations collectives,' etc., by setting out to investigate certain details. 84

Jung's interest in this concept was aroused by his recognition that a limited number of recurring motifs seem to repeat themselves in essentially similar, if not identical, form in mythologies, folklore, religion, fairy tales, and individual dreams arising in quite diverse places at different times. These motifs he calls archetypes or, more strictly, archetypal forms or images. Their nature is collective and they may appear either in the collective possessions of a tribe or of a culture (as, for example, in myths) or as autochthonous individual products of unconscious origin. 85 When they do appear in individual dreams or other psychic experiences they are not consciously produced by the ego and they manifest a certain primitivity or aboriginal quality. The archetypal images possess a numinous character (in Rudolph Otto's sense of that term) and thus both attract and repel.

84 "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 50f. Jung claims as antecedents in the use of the term or the basic concept, Cicero, Pliny, the Corpus Hermeticum, Adolf Bastian Nietzsche, Hubert and Mauss, and, particularly, Lévy-Bruhl.

85 Ibid., p. 50.
Jung does suggest that there is some "anatomically or physiologically determined disposition" which is expressed psychically in this phenomenon and he speaks of this as a deposit formed by the "condensation of innumerable similar processes." That is to say, the accumulated experiences of whole races, tribes, cultures, epochs, etc., are deposited in such a way as to leave impressions upon the structure of the human mind or to have created latent possibilities in the human psyche. These possibilities can be reactualized in the present by certain psychic experiences and thus be given new life, new immediacy, new power. One can, in a sense, speak only metaphorically or analogically of the archetypes. One analogy that Jung uses is of a dried-up creek bed which, if water again became available, will contain and direct that water over the old course. As occasion demands, energy can flow again through the channels provided by these primordial deposits and will in the process acquire the accumulated power and force of the aboriginal experiences. Another analogy which he employs is that of the axial system of crystals. The axial system, "as it were, preforms the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of its own." Thus, the archetype itself is purely formal or "a possibility of representation.

86 *Psyche Types*, p. 556.
which is given \textit{a priori}." Only this pure form may be said to be inherited. It will manifest itself in images and ideas which are not themselves inherited but which lead one to postulate an underlying formal system because of their limited range and number, their apparent numinosity and power, and the general way in which they seem to behave as if in accord with some fore-ordained plan.\(^87\)

There is thus an important distinction to be drawn between the archetypes themselves, which are essentially unknowable, and the archetypal images or forms which may be experienced immediately and which furnish the only clue to the unknowable something which lies behind them.\(^88\) In all fairness it must be conceded that Jung himself is a frequent offender in not making it clear when he is intending to speak of the formal principal or the archetype itself, and the form it assumes in the archetypal image. In later years Jung came to doubt whether one could properly speak of the archetypes themselves being psychic phenomena but human experience of them is always and necessarily through their psychic


manifestations. But if it is not possible to say what the archetypal forms might ultimately refer to there is still a responsibility incumbent upon the psychologist, and upon the man who would live with true responsibility, to give an approximate description of the unconscious core of meaning in the experienced images. This is the best that can be done, but even this much is of great importance.

The archetypes are intimately related to the instincts. Jung expresses this relationship in many ways. Sometimes he speaks of them as polar opposites (the archetype being "spirit" to the instinct's "nature") but for this very reason they belong together. Sometimes he calls the archetypal image the "formal aspect of the instinct" or "the form the instincts assume." At other times he can speak of the instincts and the archetypes determining each other and

89 "On the Nature of the Psyche," in SDP, p. 215. The "psyche proper" extends to all functions which can be brought under the influence of a will (p. 183).


91 "On the Nature of the Psyche," in SDP, p. 206. But see p. 210 where he calls the archetype "pure unvitiated nature." On p. 205 he speaks of a "probable connection" between archetypes as "collective form-principles" and instincts, whereas on p. 219, note 124, he speaks of "archetypes as instincts."

92 "Foreword" to Jacobi, Complex, Archetype, Symbol ..., p. x.

together forming the contents of the collective unconscious. Since these different formulations do not belong to different periods of Jung's life and work it must be assumed that this relationship is a Gilbertian "most ingenious paradox" and that Jung is loath to disturb an essential antinomy by coming down too heavily on any one particular side. But the relationship is important, even if its nature cannot be specified unambiguously, because it seems that it is precisely this association with the instincts that gives the archetype its specific and enduring energy.

In terms of the particular interests of this dissertation, the archetypes and archetypal images are of fundamental importance because they are, in Jung's view, the bearers of protection, of wholeness, of freedom, of health—or of destruction. They constitute the one essential content of all religions as well as of all mythologies.

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94 "Instinct and the Unconscious," in SDP, p. 133f.
95 "On the Nature of the Psyche," in SDP, p. 219, note 124.
and ideologies. The God-image is an archetypal image, and one which possesses the characteristic numinosity in very high degree. Jesus Christ is sometimes referred to as an archetypal image and his significance in Jung's psychology derives largely from the way in which he is associated with the archetypes. And the self, the center and circumference of psychic totality, is a representation of the archetypal idea of wholeness.

Since the archetypes can neither be denied nor neutralized, they have to be interpreted but, precisely because they have the important functional significance indicated above, Jung warns against any attempt to provide explanations which would impair this function. Archetypes cannot be rationalized away in his view. Their autonomy has to be respected and in large measure they must be allowed to speak for themselves. The attitude of the conscious mind towards the archetypes will largely determine their psychological efficacy.

We may summarize this section briefly by stating that the conscious and unconscious constitute the two essential structures of the psyche; self is the archetype which centralizes and unifies these structures.

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3. The Functions of the Human Psyche.

The concept of function is used in several different ways by Jung. For example, thinking, feeling, sensing and intuiting are considered by him to be the four fundamental psychological functions. Thinking and feeling are called rational functions because they make use of reason, judgment, abstraction, and generalization. They make it possible for man to look for order in the universe. Sensation and intuition are considered to be irrational functions because they attempt to understand the accidental, particular, and concrete. The intuitive man goes beyond facts, feelings, and ideas in his search for wholeness, freedom and selfhood. For this reason, we are in the present study, more concerned with the intuitive function and particularly with symbol and religion, the two more specific functions which stem from it.

A. The Role of Symbols

Jung sees man at his most primitive level as directed almost entirely by the functions of his unconscious. In this state he is bound and oppressed, indeed possessed, by forces which he cannot control but which regulate his whole life for him and keep him in a constant state of fear and awe. 100

100 "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 84.
Psychic reality becomes indistinguishable from physical or external reality\(^\text{101}\) and there is little or nothing to curb the frequently contradictory and conflicting instinctual impulses. Primitive man is unfree because the possible range of human activities is severely restricted and the negative impulses can, and frequently do, overwhelm the primitive affections.\(^\text{102}\) These archaic psychic functions are not, however, the exclusive property of primitive man. Modern man, too, retains this archaic man at the deepest level of his psychic being.\(^\text{103}\)

The primitive, in Jung's view, does not think so much as he experiences thoughts, ideas, and images which seem to come to him from beyond himself. He is a keen observer of natural phenomena but the limited nature and development of his rational capacities causes him to project the contents of his own psyche onto the external world and thus to create


\(^{102}\) "On the Nature of the Psyche," in SDP, p. 201. Elsewhere Jung tells of a primitive hunter who, on returning home from an unsuccessful expedition, strangled his own son in his rage, only to find himself plunged from rage into wild grief and remorse.

for himself a realm of gods, spirits, demons and other forces in nature.  

As consciousness begins to develop—and Jung sees this as the reality underlying the myth of the Fall of man in Genesis—these anthropomorphic projections become progressively less satisfactory. Man begins to recognize some differentiation of his inner from his outer world. The development of consciousness makes man distinctively human, as has been seen above, but it also creates a whole new range of problems for him at the same time as it opens up splendid new possibilities.

One problem that has become all too real in the present century, Jung asserts, is the tendency of the developing consciousness to consider itself autonomous and, forgetting that it, too, has its roots in the primitive and that it is shaped and formed by the total psyche, to regard itself as the sum total of psychic reality. When this dangerous one-sidedness becomes manifest, the primitive and archaic forces of the unconscious may rise in revolt and overwhelm

104 "Archaic Man," passim.
105 Two Essays, p. 318, note 1.
107 Ibid.
108 The Undiscovered Self, p. 81.
consciousness, replacing the hard-won comparative freedom by a new form of the old oppressive bondage to the instinctual, the archaic, and the destructively contradictory.\textsuperscript{109}

At best, one-sided concentration on man's rationality and conscious awareness constitutes a real impoverishment of the total life of the individual concerned. At worst, it opens the way to the destruction of individual freedom and the unleashing of social forces characterized by brutality, oppression, and complete disregard of individual persons. The twentieth century, heir to the inflation of consciousness produced by the so-called "Enlightenment" and all too willing to impute to the Goddess of Reason power to encompass the whole of reality, has been prodigal in the production of individual neuroses and the errors that have arisen from such socio-political movements as Fascism, National Socialism, Imperialism, and Communism.\textsuperscript{110} The barbarity evidenced in these political systems with their further destruction of individual rights and freedoms, reflects the primitive and archaic forces which have come to the surface in the lives of whole peoples.

Jung sees social phenomena as the collective manifestation of the processes of the individual psyche, but he also

\textsuperscript{109} "On the Nature of the Psyche," in \textit{SDP}, p. 223ff.
recognizes that the collectivity can swamp the individual and reduce or even paralyze his capacity for independent action.\textsuperscript{111} As was noticed above, Jung's whole orientation is towards the freedom and purposeful functioning of the individual although it should also be noted that this is the one way that he sees for society to function freely and responsibly. The progress of a culture results from the efforts of a few individuals to be all that is within them to become. The majority of persons are ruled by the collectivity but there are always a few who, like the 7,000 who did not bow the knee to Baal, remain able to assert their essential reality over and against the mass and to become whole persons. These few are, however, thereby condemned to an essential loneliness and estrangement from their fellows but in enduring this they preserve what is truly human and provide the possibility of the progression of civilization.\textsuperscript{112} Jung, of course, sees himself as such a person.

Merely living in the twentieth century does not necessarily make one a modern, or twentieth century man,

\textsuperscript{111} The Undiscovered Self; cf., "Die Kunst das menschliche Leben zu verlängern" in Europäische Revue, V, 8, November 1929, quoted in Jacobi (ed.), Psychological Reflections, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{112} The Undiscovered Self, p. 109; "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man," in Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 196ff.
psychologically speaking. Many, indeed most, persons alive today live at a psychological level more appropriate to the eighteenth century (the age of rationalism) or even the thirteenth insofar as their relationships to internal and external realities are concerned. There may even be a few who live considerably ahead of their time. One way or another, then, most people, and particularly the mass or average man, are psychological anachronisms. But this is the twentieth century and this century demands a recognition of psychological factors and of the essential differentiation of the human psyche. The truly modern man is the man who is aware of his own psychic depths without being imprisoned in them.\footnote{113 "Foreword to White's \textit{God and the Unconscious}," in \textit{PR;WE}, p. 308f.; "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man," in \textit{Modern Man in Search of a Soul}, p. 197. In both these works Jung characterizes the present age by its interest in psychology—an inevitable and important development of a consciousness which has not become prematurely inflated.}

If neither the forces of the unconscious nor the forces of consciousness can be independent of each other without threatening the psychic, and hence the total, well-being of the individuals and cultures concerned, then it is obviously of fundamental importance that a constructive and positive relationship be developed between these forces. The primitive projection of the unconscious contents onto
the external world is no longer a valid option but the contents of the unconscious cannot simply be brought into consciousness since in their naked form, so to speak, their power could not be withstood by consciousness. Some form of mediation is therefore necessary and Jung sees this need supplied in the symbol.

The symbol represents for him "a comprehensive resultant of all the unconscious factors" but is actually perceived and responded to by the conscious mind. When the symbols arising from the unconscious are accorded value by the conscious psyche, the necessary constructive relationships between the forces of the unconscious and of consciousness is established. The unconscious gives content to the symbol; the conscious mind accords it value and hence it comes to possess motivational power for conscious decision-making. In this process the disturbing influences of the unconscious are either eliminated or minimized and limits are placed upon the sovereignty of consciousness. It will be apparent that in this context the term "unconscious" applies specifically to the collective unconscious since the personal unconscious could be brought into consciousness, under favorable conditions, in direct form.

114 Psych Types, p. 158.

115 Ibid., p. 159, 608f.
Because the symbol contains antithetical elements within itself it also performs the psychic function of reconciling the real-unreal antithesis. In Jung's words, it can do this "because on the one hand it is certainly a psychological reality (on account of its effectiveness), while on the other it corresponds with no physical reality. It is a fact and yet a semblance."¹¹⁶

Symbols, then, arise from the unconscious and function to release psychic tension generated by the conflict of opposites. This function has both compensatory and integrative aspects for the psyche. The opposites are united in a form which is not consciously devised but seems rather to be given by way of revelation or intuition.¹¹⁷ One could not conceive of unconscious life without symbols¹¹⁸ but their meaning is, by definition, unknown.

Jung draws important distinctions between symbol, sign, allegory, and symptom. Briefly, one may say that a sign is "an analogous or abbreviated expression of a known thing." An allegory is an "intentional transcription or transformation of a known thing." Similarly, a symptom is a fact, state, or condition causally related to "a definite

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 162.
and generally known underlying process." The quality these each have in common is their relation to something essentially known. The symbol, on the other hand, is, for Jung, always and necessarily the best possible expression of something otherwise essentially or relatively unknown. To say that the cross is a symbol of divine love is, then, actually to make a semiotic statement since that which is signified is known and is even less ambiguous than the sign. But the cross may be a symbol in the true sense if it is perceived as an expression of "an unknown and as yet incomprehensible fact of a mystical or transcendent, i.e., psychological character, which simply finds its most striking and appropriate representation in the cross."120

Symbols may be living or dead according as they are, or are not, still pregnant with meaning and are, or are not, still the best representations of the "sought, expected, or divined thing" that have been found.121 Thus, if a symbol can be totally explained it ceases to be a symbol and ceases to exercise the powers of a symbol. Any psychic phenomenon can be a symbol if one is prepared to assume that there yet

119 *Psych Types*, p. 601, 606.

120 Ibid., p. 601f. Quotation is from p. 602.

121 Ibid., p. 602.
remains in it something more and greater than consciousness can explain at any given time.

Some symbols seem to obtrude their symbolic nature but there are others which would not necessarily be granted symbolic status by everyone. Some symbols also seem to require the recognition of the conscious mind before they are genuinely symbolic but in the final analysis this seems to mean that they are able to exercise their full power only when consciousness is engaged by them and forced to grant them recognition without presuming to exhaust their meaning.\(^{122}\) It is necessary to maintain this distinction between the reality of the symbol and its potential effectiveness to understand Jung's positive evaluation of the Christian symbols and his generally negative approach to Christian theology.

One may speak both of individual symbols, that is, symbols peculiar to particular individuals and arising from their own depths and relatively meaningless to other persons, and of social symbols. Social symbols are psychic products which possess functional significance for a large group of persons, even for a whole tribe or culture or for a particular epoch. For a symbol to be alive for so many persons it must of necessity relate to some unconscious factor held in common. The symbol will arise only in a complex and differentiated

mental atmosphere but be functionally efficacious it must have its ultimate reference to the most primitive levels of the collective psyche since these are the only unconscious contents that can be presumed to be common. The living symbol derives its potency and its redeeming function precisely from the fact that it does give the highest possible form of expression to something in the depths of the collective unconscious. 123

The symbol-making function of the human psyche can take unsuitable forms leading to neurosis. In these instances it is the task of therapy to break down the symbolic formations and to restore the natural course of events. But, as any review of the conditions of primitive existence clearly indicates, the state of nature is far from ideal for contemporary man and, consequently, the therapist must then assist the patient in a synthetic reconstruction of the symbol. The reductive process, says Jung, "leads back to the subjection of the primitive" to all the suprapersonal forces and powers, "be they instincts, affects, superstitions, fantasies, magicians, witches, spirits, demons, or gods." And, similarly, the synthetic treatment of the symbol brings man to the religious question:

123 *Psych Types*, p. 605.
[...] not so much to the problem of present-day religious creeds as to the religious problem of primitive man. In the face of the very real powers that dominate him, only an equally real fact can offer help and protection. No intellectual system, but direct experience only, can counter-balance the blind power of the instincts.\(^{124}\)

B. The Role of Religion

It is easy to misunderstand Jung's deep concern with what he calls the religious question or the religious problem in man's psyche. Many have interpreted his statements as if they were intended to be primarily theological assertions, while others have regarded him as intending to provide psychological proofs for their own particular religious convictions. One thing is clear, however, and that is that he consistently claims to be speaking empirically and psychologically when he speaks of religion in general and God in particular.

Jung has himself defined his understanding of religion in terms which make it apparent that he regards religion as a certain attitude of the psyche taken towards particular factors of experience which are seen as powerful, dangerous, grand, beautiful or meaningful.\(^{125}\) These factors of experience are functions of psychic experience and especially


those psychic experiences which arise from the collective unconscious. Religious ideas originate with the archetypes, in Jung's view, and careful consideration of the archetypal symbols and images constitutes the essence of religion.126

Religion has thus a transcendent quality because these unconscious processes transcend the realm of the conscious ego, the observing subject, and the ideas and motifs of religion appear to the ego to come from "beyond" as revelations. But psychologically speaking, this beyond is also within, although not restricted to the individuality of the experiencing psyche. Jung considers that the realm of the unconscious from whence these revelations derive, may possess an insight superior to that of the fallible conscious mind. It is grounded in what is both "absolute subjectivity and universal truth"; it partakes of the accumulated wisdom of the ages and is not lightly influenced by the caprices of consciousness with its passing fashions and fancies.127

The images enshrined in such Christian dogmas as the God-man, the Trinity, the Virgin Birth, or the Cross, are not peculiarly or exclusively Christian. Not only can they be found in many pagan religions but they may also appear or

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reappear spontaneously—with all sorts of variations—as psychic phenomena. In Christianity they have been refined and developed more highly than elsewhere but their remote origins are neither faith nor tradition but primitive dreams, visions, or trances. They are certainly not conscious inventions but Jung considers that they came into being at that stage of human development in which man did not so much think, as he does today, as be aware of thoughts "coming to him." These dogmas may last for untold centuries: "the suffering God-man may be at least five thousand years old and the Trinity is probably even older." Jung claims, therefore, that the doctrines of a particular religion, such as Christianity, are expressions of unconscious psychic functions with their roots in man's primitive past. The particular function of religion is to shape and refine these ancient symbolizations.

In consequence of this common reference of symbols of all religions to the fundamental archetypes, the empirical scientist cannot concede the exclusive and absolute claims made by the devotees of any particular religion, even Christianity, on behalf of its own God. These claims must rather be regarded as an index of the intensity of the conviction aroused in the believers by their experience of the

overwhelming numinosity which they have called God. The psychic experience is certainly valid, but the interpretation of it may not be. Anything or anyone, any figure or symbol, which can produce this overwhelming effect is entitled to the name "God" from the point of view of the empiricist. Thus, not only can Jung claim that God "can just as well mean Jahweh, Zeus, Shiva or Huitzilopochtli," but he can also say that, psychologically speaking, the God-concept includes "every idea of the ultimate, of the first or last, of the highest or lowest. The name makes no difference." As a psychologist, then, Jung agrees neither with those who see God as absolute, existing in Himself, nor yet with those who adopt the relative view of God which recognizes at least in an elementary way that there is some personal involvement in the process which produces the conception of God ("personal" here relating to the personal psyche). Within its self-imposed empirical limits, analytical psychology recognizes God as a function of the unconscious, and particularly of the collective unconscious. The image of God is, then:


131 Two Essays, p. 248, note 6 (p. 321). Jung does claim here that God is to be treated as "relative to man, as man is to God" but note that this is not the form of relativity he disavows in the reference following (132).
[...] the symbolic expression of a certain psychological state, or function, which has the character of absolute superiority to the conscious will of the subject; hence it can enforce or bring about a standard of accomplishment that would be unattainable to conscious effort.132

In the process of man's developing consciousness, Jung says, two unfortunate—but probably unavoidable—errors arose in relation to the concept of God. The first of these was materialism which declared in effect that since God could not be discovered in the galaxies he had never existed. The second error was psychologism which regarded God as an illusion based on some such factor as the will to power or repressed sexuality.133 But Jung believes that man cannot thus easily dispose of God or of the instinctually or archetypically based religious impulse. From time immemorial men have recognized the existence of gods or a God in one form or another and have been unable to do without them. "You can take away a man's gods, but only to give him others in return."134 Consciously or unconsciously the idea of an all-powerful divine Being is everywhere present. He who says, with Nietzsche, that "God is dead" does not thereby rid himself of God but rather suffers the "fatal inflation" of

132 Psych Types, p. 300f. Quotation is from p. 300.
133 "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 84ff.
134 The Undiscovered Self, p. 65.
becoming his own God—and such gods are but "tin-gods with thick skulls and cold hearts."  

The positive alternative which Jung propounds to these two errors is based upon his conviction that the God-images in the psyche have not only numinosity and power, but also an essential autonomy. They exist, and they are not dependent for their existence on any other need, motive, desire, or attribute of man. For the empiricist, the unanswerable question concerning the metaphysical reality of God in Himself is irrelevant beside the fact that "the idea of God is an absolutely necessary psychological function of an irrational nature." The idea is archetypal and thus there is that within the human psyche which will behave as a god and which may be conceptualized as God.  

Man, then, does not create gods for himself but there is a sense in which he may choose the master he wishes to serve. Jung quotes St. Paul as putting the issue in terms of "Jesus Christ" or "the belly" (Rom. 16.18). In choosing his God man necessarily denies his services to other masters and attempts to secure himself against them. Such choices do

135 Two Essays, p. 81.
137 Two Essays, p. 81.
define one's God but they do not make intelligible that unknown psychic quantity which impels choice. \(^{138}\) For true wholeness, freedom and selfhood, it is important that man choose wisely. In other words, man can become a self only by choosing the right God for him. The live issue for modern man is between the archetypal image with its authenticity and its immediacy, on the one hand, and the intellectual constructs of the so-called enlightened mind on the other. In the final analysis these constructs represent the abortive attempt on the part of the enlightened to deny the reality of both the God-image and the realm from whence the image derives.\(^{139}\)

Christianity and Judaism, and others of the world religions, recognize God as being not only redemptive, but also dangerous. In Judaism, for example, the holiness of God is seen as something unapproachable: "no man can see God and live." (Compare the elaborate precautions taken to protect the unwary from the holy mountain, from the ark, etc.) God must be mediated to man, and this mediatory function finds its highest expression in the figure of Christ. This concept of the danger of the nearness of God is a well-established

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\(^{138}\) Ibid.

psychological fact, says Jung. The concentration of psychic energy in the unconscious can have catastrophic effects upon consciousness and the saving factor is the symbol "which is able to reconcile the conscious with the unconscious and embrace them both."\textsuperscript{140} Since, as has already been noted, the God-images are practically indistinguishable from the symbols of the self, this means that the function of these symbols and images is that of putting man in touch with his own depths in such a way that the contact does not destroy him but immeasurably enriches his life and increases the boundaries of his awareness. This is the prime function of the Christ symbol.

Jung is convinced not only that the function of religious dogmas and doctrines is to express and formulate essential psychological attitudes, but also to serve as a medium of expression for irrational facts like the psyche. A theory is necessarily highly abstract and exclusively rational, whereas the imagery of dogma can encompass psychic totality and can express the living processes of the psyche in suitably dramatic forms, like the drama of creation and redemption, for example.\textsuperscript{141}

Thus, Jung argues strongly for the positive value of myth and claims that to divest the Gospels of myth would be

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Psych Types}, p. 326.
\textsuperscript{141} "Psychology and Religion," \textit{PR:WE}, p. 45f.
to sacrifice that very quality in them which conveys whole-
ness freedom, or selfhood. Myth becomes suspect only when
one attempts to take the mythological contents literally and
concretely, in which case they come into insufferable con-
flict with objective knowledge of the external world and are
likely to be totally repudiated by modern man. Treated
symbolically, they have tremendous force and power. In this
connection he criticizes those theological positions which
rigidly insist that the life of Christ, for instance, must
be comprehended in categories more appropriate to knowledge
than to faith. Indeed, he says:

It is the theologians themselves who have recently
made the attempt—no doubt as a concession to
"knowledge"—to "demythologize" the object of their
faith while drawing the line quite arbitrarily at
the crucial points. But to the critical intellect
it is only too obvious that myth is an integral
component of all religions and therefore cannot be
excluded from the assertions of faith without
injuring them. 142

Myth ought not to be equated with fiction, in Jung's
view, but should be recognized as the dramatic expression of
facts of psychic experience which have been constantly
repeated in individual lives and in whole cultures. 143 Since
they relate back to the archetypes, their content cannot be
exhausted in rational explanation and to dismiss them as

142 The Undiscovered Self, p. 38, 74; "Psychology and

primitive is to overlook the fact that man still has his primitive nature.

Much unnecessary confusion arises from the failure to distinguish between what Jung calls religion as immediate experience (or, more usually, just religion) and religion as creed. Once again Jung himself is partly responsible for the confusion since he is not always consistent in making it unambiguously clear whether his praise of or polemic against religion is directed towards the experiential or the creedal variety.

Religion as immediate experience is grounded in the experience of the numinosum, the extra-mundane, which is manifested through the unconscious.\textsuperscript{144} Essentially it is personal and individual experience of the collective depths and as such it is superior to even the best traditions, at least with respect to the intensity of conviction that it imparts. One who has had such an experience has been subjected to something overwhelming and he knows that his experience is absolute and not open to dispute, even if others have not shared it.\textsuperscript{145} His reflection on his experience may or may not accord with the orthodox conceptions and

\textsuperscript{144} The Undiscovered Self, p. 21; "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{145} "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 50, 104f.
formulations of particular religious confessions but the official pronouncements of church, synagogue, mosque, or temple are comparatively meaningless unless the individuals to whom they are addressed can themselves authenticate them by personal experience.

This experience may well be mediated through the historic religions with their wealth of symbols and images expressive of wholeness freedom and selfhood, but only if those symbols and images are consciously recognized and valued for what they are. The whole meaning and purpose of immediate religious experience can be expressed in language more congenial to the great religions of the world by saying that this purpose lies "in the relationship of the individual to God (Christianity, Judaism, Islam) or to the path of salvation and liberation (Buddhism)." 146 Psychologically, the meaning and purpose lies in the relationship of the person to his own self, or to the path of wholeness and freedom.

Whereas it has normally been the Eastern religions which have been most explicit in recognizing that the aim of religion is the realization of the self, Jung points out that Christianity is unique among the religions of the world in the central place it gives to the life process of a particular man, Jesus of Nazareth. In his words:

146 The Undiscovered Self, p. 21.
It should not be forgotten that, unlike other religions, Christianity holds at its core a symbol which has for its content the individual way of life of a man, the Son of Man, and that it even regards this individuation process as the incarnation and revelation of God himself. Hence the development of the Self acquires a significance whose full implications have hardly begun to be appreciated, because too much attention to externals blocks the way to immediate inner experience.\(^{147}\)

Thus, it becomes apparent that religion as immediate experience is psychologically identifiable with the process of individuation and that therefore the religious symbols and images have their origin in the archetypes and, in consequence, a primary reference to man's endeavors to actualize his potential wholeness. This does not necessarily exhaust the significance of symbols and images since Jung leaves open (if only just) the possibility of their having ultimate reference—but this possibility is empirically non-verifiable.

Religion as creed, by contrast, has largely lost touch with its own origins in immediate experience and, by compromising with the mundane realities in order to commend itself to the world at large, has so codified its views, doctrines, and customs that the authentic religious element has been thrust into the background. Jung frequently identifies the creeds with the established churches. Adherence to a creed, or membership in a church, is more frequently

\(^{147}\) Ibid., p. 47f.
a social rather than a genuinely religious matter and, in consequence, mere adherence to a creed provides the individual with little or no foundation and may in fact take away his individuality and submerge him into the collectivity.  

Religion as creed, therefore, may have precisely the opposite effect on the individual to that of religion as immediate experience. The one confines him by binding him to the collective consciousness, the other frees him by relating him to the collective unconscious. In should not be forgotten, however, that the symbols of the creeds also relate to once operative archetypes and could be reactivated under the proper conditions.

In Jung's view Christianity has functioned to perform many valuable services for mankind, but also has much to answer for. So deep and far-reaching have been its effects

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149 "On the Nature of the Psyche," in SDP, p. 221.
150 The Undiscovered Self, p. 73.
151 Among the specific contributions to Western civilization which Jung sees negatively are the following:
(i) Christianity does not take the individual seriously, in spite of its claim to do so—The Undiscovered Self, p. 38ff.
(ii) Christianity has introduced a veneration of the word which has got out of hand and has become a source of suspicion and mistrust by personifying the impersonal and denigrating the truly personal—ibid., p. 75ff.
(iii) Christianity splits good and evil into an artificial antithesis which does not allow the individual
on the psychic life of Western man that it cannot easily be sloughed off by contemporary Western minds. That is to say, that although many persons will explicitly repudiate Christian doctrine, and many others will appear indifferent to the teachings of the Christian Church, Christianity continues to shape and form the expressions of psychic life. The symbols which are meaningful within this culture are precisely those which have been given their specific form by Christianity.\footnote{152}{Psych Types, p. 230; C. G. Jung, The Integration of the Personality (tr. by Stanley M. Dell), New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1939, p. 155.}

One consequence of this is that in spite of their many attractive features for those seeking self-knowledge, the symbols of Eastern religious systems are alien to the Western mind and cannot express for the man of the West what they do for his counter-part in the East. Their usefulness is virtually restricted to the demonstration that the basic functions expressed in archetypal symbolization are everywhere the same. Psychologically speaking, then, contemporary Western man is always and necessarily Christian and the present wide-
spread abandonment of the creedal forms of Christianity has not yet altered this fact.153

One does not have to be either a believing or a practicing Christian for these Christian symbols to be potential sources of selfhood, freedom, and wholeness. They are part of the inescapable cultural heritage. But they remain potential until such time as they are recognized as symbols and responded to accordingly. Their mere presence in the Church, or the culture, does not in and of itself guarantee their efficacy. Like any other symbol, they become efficacious only as the appropriate conscious attitude is adopted toward them.

Jung therefore calls for a reinterpretation of Christianity to revitalize the symbols which can have meaning for the present time and the present situation. In his own words, he says:

This is not to say that Christianity is finished. I am, on the contrary, convinced that it is not Christianity, but our conception and interpretation of it, that has become antiquated in face of the present world situation. The Christian symbol is a living thing that carries in itself the seeds of further development. It can go on developing; it depends only on us, whether we can make up our minds.

to meditate again, and more thoroughly, on the Christian premises. This requires a very different attitude towards the individual, towards the microcosm of the Self, from the one we have had hitherto.154

4. Individuation and Sociality.

In the primitive mind, and in the archaic and primitive dimensions of the psyche of contemporary man, there is to be found not only the multiplicity and inner division characteristic of the instincts but also an equally powerful regulating principle which Jung calls individuation. This is the principle of integrative unity, a function which impels in the direction of wholeness.155

In general terms Jung describes individuation as "the process of forming and specializing the individual nature" but more particularly it is:

[...] the development of the psychological individual as a differentiated being from the general collective psychology. Individuation, therefore, is a process of differentiation, having for its goal the development of the individual personality.156

Jung advocates neither the isolationism of extreme individualism nor the subordination of the individual to the collective mass and its norms. In his view the

154 The Undiscovered Self, p. 63; cf. p. 37.
156 Psych Types, p. 561.
individual is a "single, separate being" with a particularity that has an "a priori foundation in the psyche." But the individual is not only this; his very existence as a self presupposes a condition of sociality, a collective relationship. Thus, the process of individuation "must clearly lead to a more intensive and universal collective solidarity, and not to mere isolation."\(^{157}\)

Since, however, the individuation process is one of the differentiations of the particular from the general, there will always be some form of tension and opposition between individuation and the collective or social norms. Submission to the collective norms means the sacrifice of particularity and uniqueness, but total divorce from these norms means the loss of social orientation and of the "vitally necessary solidarity of the individual with society." On closer inspection, Jung argues, it will be found that the opposition to the collective norm is more apparent than real; the individual standpoint is not so much antagonistic to the collective norm as it is differently oriented and the individuation process actually leads to a natural appreciation of the collective or social norm.

This natural appreciation is not uncritical and it does not involve the individual in the loss of his own personal particularity, dignity, wholeness and freedom. On the

\(^{157}\) Ibid., p. 562f.
contrary, it embodies his awareness of his own debt to society, his own responsibility for society, and his complementary dependence on and independence of society. Jung firmly believes that only that society which "can preserve its internal union and its collective values, while at the same time permitting the greatest possible freedom to the individual, has any prospect of enduring vitality."¹⁵⁸ And, clearly, the responsibility for creating and maintaining such a society rests with the individuals who would comprise it.

The importance of the individuation process for the present purpose is that individuation is, for Jung, an alternative way of expressing the reality involved in the process of becoming simultaneously an individual and a social self; the individuation process and the evolution of the self are one and the same thing.

The self, says Jung, is to be distinguished clearly from the ego. As was seen above, the ego is the center of consciousness and its boundaries are enlarged as more psychic contents come into conscious awareness. But consciousness is not the whole of psychic existence and Jung believes that to do justice to psychic totality it is necessary to postulate a self. He concedes that the idea of the self is a "step beyond science" but claims it is forced upon him if he is

¹⁵⁸ *Psych Types*, p. 562f.
adequately to formulate the empirical psychic processes.\footnote{Two Essays, p. 252.} Intellectually, he says, "the self is no more than a psychological concept, a construct that serves to express an unknowable essence which we cannot grasp as such, since by definition it transcends our powers of comprehension."\footnote{Ibid., p. 250.}

The self, then, is a supraordinate reality which includes the ego but which manifestly extends beyond the bounds of ego-consciousness to form both the "centre [...] circumference enclosing consciousness and the unconscious."\footnote{The Integration of the Personality, p. 96; cf. Aion, p. 3; Psych Types, p. 475.} Because of its unconscious dimensions no final limit can be placed upon the self; it is a psychic reality which is partly conscious and partly inexpressible except through symbols.\footnote{The Integration of the Personality, p. 176; "Psych Approach to the Trinity," in PR;WE, p. 156.} If the self could be completely known and circumscribed it would be identical with the ego and, indeed, the assimilation of unconscious contents to the ego makes the ego ever more closely approximate the self. But the self cannot be finally and exhaustively known and approximation can never become identity. Jung regards it as
a "fatal inflation" on the part of the ego to consider itself coterminous with the self.\textsuperscript{163}

But at the same time it must also be said that "the ego is the only content of the self that we do know."\textsuperscript{164} Anything that is known about the psyche comes within the province of ego-consciousness and if the self were to be viewed in cross-section what would be recognizable would in fact be an expanded ego. In Jung's view, however, it is a dangerous illusion to live one's life on the assumption that the only significant psychic forces are those that can be known--known, that is, in the sense that one is not only conscious of their existence but is also able to determine their boundaries and in some measure to control them. In the genuinely individuated person, the ego acknowledges that there are dimensions of psychic reality over which it has no control and which it cannot pretend to comprehend in all their fullness. But these dimensions are nevertheless recognized as exercising a powerful influence upon the known contents of ego-consciousness.

After remarking that "becoming whole has remarkable effects on ego-consciousness which are extremely difficult to describe,"\textsuperscript{165} Jung proceeds to characterize what happens

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} Aion, p. 23ff.; cf. "On the Nature of the Psyche," in SDP, p. 224f.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Two Essays, p. 252.
\item \textsuperscript{165} "On the Nature of the Psyche," in SDP, p. 223.
\end{itemize}
to the ego in the following terms:

Although it is able to preserve its structure, the ego is ousted from its central and dominating position and thus finds itself in the role of a passive observer who lacks the power to assert his will under all circumstances, not so much because it has been weakened in any way, as because certain considerations give it pause. That is, the ego cannot help discovering that the afflux of unconscious contents has vitalized the personality, enriched it, and created a figure that somehow dwarfs the ego in scope and intensity. This experience paralyzes an over-egocentric will and convinces the ego that in spite of all difficulties it is better to be taken down a peg than to get involved in a hopeless struggle in which one is invariably handed the dirty end of the stick. In this way the will, as disposable energy, gradually subordinates itself to the stronger factor, namely to the new totality-figure I call the Self.166

When Jung speaks of the displacement of the ego from the center of personal existence he has in mind this subordination of will, as disposable energy, to the self.

Jung's use of the term self is always related to the concept of wholeness but, since, in point of fact, he uses wholeness in at least two distinct ways, he also employs different, but not unrelated, usages of the term self. On the one hand he sometimes speaks of wholeness as if it denotes little more than inclusiveness. The whole, in this sense, is the sum of the parts. On the other hand, he also uses wholeness to imply a particular form of relationship between the parts. These usages give rise to what may, for

166 Ibid., p. 224.
distinguishing purposes, he called the inclusive concept of self and the process concept of self.

By the inclusive concept of self is meant that self that Jung speaks of when he is endeavoring to preserve the general insight that consciousness is only a part of psychic reality. Thus, for example, he suggests on one occasion that it is no longer permissible to limit the reality of a man either to what the individual concerned is conscious of being or yet to what others think that he is. "When we now speak of man," says Jung, "we mean the indefinable whole of him, an ineffable totality, which can only be formulated symbolically. I have chosen the term 'Self' to designate the totality of man, the sum total of his conscious and unconscious contents." 167

In these terms every man has, or is, a self, provided only that some degree of differentiation from the purely collective has taken place. 168 In this definition the idea of circumference is uppermost although it is recognized that the extent and even the ultimate character of psychic existence can never be defined in any final sense. Essentially, this is a static conception of selfhood. But it is not the only one.

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167 "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 82.
Jung also suggests that man is not whole simply because he has both conscious and unconscious elements in his psyche but rather he is whole only when these elements are brought together in such a way that the unconscious contents are integrated into consciousness. The term self is used in two ways in connection with this individuation process, both of which are intended in the designation "process concept of self."

In the first place, Jung speaks of self as the archetypal disposition towards wholeness which, he claims, resides in every human psyche. In this sense self refers to a potential which lies within each person but which needs to be activated before it becomes actual. Since it is an archetypal disposition, this self performs the function of shaping the individuation process. The second sense in which self is used within the process notion is of the end-product of the individuation process, that which man may become.

Although the potential is present in all men, the goal of selfhood, thus understood, is achieved only by a few. The integration of the unconscious contents into consciousness is a relatively rare occurrence "which is experienced only by those who have gone through the wearisome but ["..."

169 Aion, p. 68.
indispensable business of coming to terms with the uncon­
scious components of the personality." 170 It is only these
rare few who simultaneously become individual and social
selves.

It is quite meaningful to speak of both these aspects, potential and realization, under the single rubric of the process concept of self since both are dynamic conceptions relating to the presence, significance, and development of something which is given man a priori but which has to be brought into active existence. Both circumference and center are involved in this concept in that the self envisaged has both an extensive form (it comprehends the totality of psychic existence) and also the function of providing a point of integrative focus for the whole of life. The process of becoming an individual-social self is never finally completed because of the indefinite nature of the extension involved. One can say that the self is the total personality but this totality can never be known in all its richness and all its dimensions. One can only say that there is such a thing and approximate its realization. In positing its existence one can designate those contents that are knowable (ego-related), and recognize that there are others which can only be symbol­ized, and perhaps even postulate a third group which by their

very nature do not admit even of the quasi-consciousness possible through symbolization. 171

From this discussion it becomes clear that the self that one is (the inclusive concept of self) and the self that one may become in the realization of the archetypal disposition to wholeness (the process concept of self) are in fact concepts from two different levels of discourse. The one is a static representation of an alleged universal fact, the other comprehends different aspects of a life process. They have in common the fact that both refer to the totality of conscious and unconscious contents (the circumference notion) but the process concept of self is even more importantly a center. 172 In the developmental process as Jung sees it, the true antecedent of the process concept of the self as the center of personality is the ego, and not the inclusive concept of self.

Jung's own emphasis falls upon what has here been designated the process concept of self with its attendant understanding of wholeness as a quality of life. This wholeness has been characterized as always out of reach, but Jung contends that it is empirical in the sense that, and insofar

171 "Psychology of the Transference," in POP, p. 316; "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 82; Aion, p. 5; Two Essays, p. 186f.
as, it is "anticipated by the psyche in the form of spontaneous or autonomous symbols." These anticipatory symbols frequently take the form of quaternity or mandala symbols.¹⁷³

Quaternity symbols, as the name suggests, are structured with four basic components. Jung sees a significance in the number four which is reflected in its widespread use to suggest completeness or exhaustive classification. Thus, for example, there are four seasons, four elements, four corners of the earth, four evangelists, four psychological functions, etc. The quaternity is an archetype which, as such, predisposes man to see wholeness in units of four.¹⁷⁴

Very frequently, three of the parts of a quaternity are of life nature and the fourth, or completing part, is unlike. For example, the symbols commonly used for the four evangelists consist of three animals but St. Luke is represented by an angel. In Jungian terms, this fourth added to the three makes them one, a totality.

The word mandala comes from the Sanskrit and means basically a magic circle. Mandala symbols usually take the form of a "flower, cross, or wheel, with a distinct tendency toward four as the basis of the structure."¹⁷⁵ There are many

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¹⁷³ Aion, p. 31; cf. Two Essays, p. 121.
¹⁷⁵ Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 334.
mandala forms extant in Christian art, for example, particularly in the art of the Middle Ages. In these, Christ is normally shown at the center of the figure with the four evangelists, or their symbols, occupying each of the cardinal points. Mandalas usually appear in times of psychic stress and confusion and are also archetypal expressions. Jung claims that they not only anticipate the order to come from the present and evident chaos, but actively participate in bringing this order into being.\textsuperscript{176}

The mandala and quaternity images are not the only images and symbols relating to the self. One rich archetypal motif in the individuation process is that of the child, for example, which represents the continuing but pre-conscious, childhood aspect of the collective psyche.\textsuperscript{177} Jung says on one occasion that "anything that a man postulates as being a greater totality than himself can become a symbol of the self"\textsuperscript{178} and the symbols he actually discusses take many shapes and forms, including the characteristics of human personality. The symbols produced by the alchemists, for

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., p. 274.


\textsuperscript{178} "Psych Approach to Trinity," in \textit{PRiWE}, p. 156.
example, included personal figures, geometrical configurations and chemical substances.\textsuperscript{179}

Of fundamental importance is the close correspondence, even identity, of symbols of the self and God-image. Jung even goes so far as to say that the psychological experience of self-realization can be expressed in religious terms as the incarnation of God.\textsuperscript{180} Strictly speaking, however, "the self must be regarded as the extreme opposite of God" but nevertheless the empirical symbols require two diametrically opposed interpretations, both of which are psychologically true: that the God-images are a reflection of the self and, conversely, that the self is the \textit{imago Dei} in man. The symbol "means both and is therefore a paradox."\textsuperscript{181}

Since the self represents totality, wholeness, completeness, it is by definition always a \textit{complexio oppositorum}, a combination of opposites,\textsuperscript{182} and those symbols which perform the function of uniting psychic opposites may be recognized as symbols of the self. The Christ figure suggests wholeness and it is experienced as representing a greater totality

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\item \textsuperscript{180} \textit{Psych Types}, p. 468f.; "Psych Approach to Trinity," in \textit{PR:WE}, p. 156f.
\item \textsuperscript{181} "Psych Approach to Trinity," in \textit{PR:WE}, p. 190.
\item \textsuperscript{182} "Answer to Job," in \textit{PR:WE}, p. 443.
\end{itemize}
than that of man. It is a God-image, and combines within itself the divine/human opposites. The Christ-figure is thus a pre-eminent symbol of the self for Western man, even, Jung would claim, for the non-believer.

The movement towards wholeness is, in Jung's view, a movement towards the "realization, in all its aspects, of the personality originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm; the production and unfolding of the original, potential wholeness."\(^{183}\) That is to say, man contains within himself the seeds of his own wholeness; there is nothing that has to be added to him from outside. But, so far as the conscious ego is concerned, the progression towards wholeness, towards the self, will appear as if something is being added from beyond oneself since the compensatory factors do arise from a realm beyond the ken and control of the ego.

In the first half of life this is not normally a matter of pressing concern. The expansion and mastery of one's world absorbs the greater part of one's attention and unless some crisis situation develops there is little reason for the average person to have to come to grips with the archetypes. This is not to say that they have no influence in the earlier years but rather that the problems associated with this period of life are normally handled in a different

\(^{183}\) *Two Essays*, p. 121.
way, for example by the seeking of mastery over situations, by cultivating social effectiveness, by establishing oneself in one's calling or profession, etc.

In the years of the climacteric, however, in the second half of life, the images arising from the collective unconscious do require special attention. The focus of one's legitimate concerns in life has changed and the expansiveness of the earlier years becomes inappropriate and, usually, impractical as well. The problem of the opposites becomes now a genuine problem requiring solution.

This change of life, which Jung sees as beginning at between thirty-five and forty years of age, is in response to "an inexorable inner process [which] enforces the contraction of life." Just as the youth cannot continue to be childish without sacrificing the very meaning and value of his young manhood, so the middle-aged and elderly cannot prolong indefinitely the ego-assertion by means of which youth strives to achieve its ideals. A new style of life needs to be developed, with a new focus of primary attention. The very fact that life is normally prolonged for several decades beyond youth is sufficient evidence that nature has a purpose for the later years, that they have meaning and significance in their own right—and in their own way. In Jung's view this meaning is to be found by the progressive withdrawal of oneself from the extensive activity appropriate to youth in favor of a
more intensive approach to oneself, to the realization of one's self. Man should also, during his later years, become more social conscious.

And thus it is that the symbols of psychic wholeness become matters of more urgent concern in the second half of life—although they are by no means exclusively reserved for that period.

The completely individuated man, as Jung envisions him, would be free from emotional ties. Here is how Jung expresses it in his autobiography, after having related a dream about his dead wife and a series of visions he had experienced during an illness:

The objectivity which I experienced in this dream and in the visions is part of a completed individuation. It signifies detachment from valuations and from what we call emotional ties. In general, emotional ties are very important to human beings. But they still contain projections, and it is essential to withdraw these projections in order to attain to oneself and to objectivity. Emotional relationships are relationships of desire, tainted by coercion and constraint; something is expected from the other person, and that makes him and ourselves unfree. Objective cognition lies hidden behind the attraction of the emotional relationship; it seems to be the central secret. Only through objective cognition is the real coniunctio possible.  

When individuation is still incomplete a man finds himself liable to great suffering at the hands of others,

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184 "The Stages of Life," in SDP, p. 392ff; cf. Two Essays, p. 120f.

185 Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 296f.
especially at the hands of those closest to him. As individuation becomes more complete one begins to understand his relationships and to share this understanding with others. The completely individuated man would be free of emotional ties precisely because his relationships would be based on a sharing of understanding. In the very early stage of individuation, as Jung describes it, man is bound by emotional ties, where his ties with other persons still contain projections of himself, where his relationships are those of desire, tainted by coercion and constraint, in which something is always expected of others, leaving them and himself unfree.

The self takes shape as one passes to "objective cognition" and the "real coniunctio." This passage is characterized by increases of freedom from emotional ties at each stage. The individuation proper to youth brings freedom from emotional ties proper to childhood; manhood brings with it freedom from the emotional ties proper to youth; age brings freedom from the emotional ties of manhood.

Very often, however, one fails to outgrow some of the ties appropriate to earlier stages. One finds oneself at a later stage of life, such as manhood, and realizes that one has not worked through problems of the earlier stages, childhood and youth. For example, a man may enter into a relationship with one of his peers on a level considered
normal only for relationships between a child and an adult, or between an adolescent and an adult. Other examples include the grown man's experience of childhood fears and the adolescent's sexual turmoils.

Some persons may need assistance in the individuation process and, in principle, such help can be given by pastoral ministers as well as by the psychotherapist who, in Jung's view, has become something of a modern priest as well as a medicine man by default. Only a truly modern man, that is, only one whose consciousness is as fully developed as is possible in this modern age, and only one who has himself discovered the reality of his own selfhood, can be of genuine assistance to the modern man in search of a soul.

One who guides others in the individuation process must be able to recognize the absolute necessity for coming to grips with his own evil; he must be able to tolerate and, where necessary, encourage the pursuit even of his worst mistakes; he must be capable of entering into the situation of the sufferer with a sensitivity born of his own personal experience. This can be done, Jung asserts, because of the individuated person's experience and conviction that the warring halves of the personality can be re-united so that healing arises from destruction and evil turns to good.185a

185a "Psychotherapists or the Clergy," in PR:WE, p. 330ff.
A final experience that comes with individuation is that of being outgrown by others. It is interesting to note that Jung was an old man in his eighties when he recognized this experience and wrote the words that we quoted above. The experience of outgrowing relations, to be sure, comes early, when the youth ceases to be a child, and when the man ceases to be a youth, but the experience of being outgrown by others generally comes later when one has children or students or other persons committed to one's charge and they become eventually independent or when one's wife or husband dies or when one's friends die; it comes earlier mainly in the estrangement of friends and lovers.

The individuated man understands the value of releasing his possessions of all these relationships. He has the confidence which allows him to be outgrown without being shattered. The individuated man realizes that those who were once close to him can develop only by outgrowing him. The completely individuated man, far from being without relationships, would be totally free of emotional ties. His relationships would not be demanding of others. His state would not be one of mere autonomy and unrelatedness, for he would have touched the minds and hearts of others. The completely individuated man would find himself in a coexistent state of freedom and relatedness, a state of sociality.
5. The Self and the Christ.

The general outlines of Jung's conception of the relation between the human self and the figure of Christ have already been laid down in the preceding sections of this chapter and may be summarized as follows.

In the psychic constitution of man there are two contradictory directions of energy, the one impelling towards diversity, multiplication, fragmentation, and differentiation of psychic life, and the other impelling towards unity, wholeness, freedom and selfhood. The differentiation process is necessary for the establishment and enlargement of that consciousness by virtue of which man has mastered the world about him; the integrative process is necessary so that the freedom won in the differentiation is not imperiled by man's failure to realize his own full potential for living and for coping with the problems that arise in his inner as well as his outer world.

The differentiation process has developed in the human race to the point where man may recognize that his psychic life consists of two broad areas which co-exist in a compensatory relationship to each other. The one is the realm of consciousness, the other of the unconscious. The contents of consciousness can, for the most part, be recognized and adequately described, even if they cannot
ultimately be defined and delimited. The unconscious contents, however, are recognizable and describable only insofar as they can be fully represented without remainder in consciousness. That is to say, there are some unconscious contents which are unconscious purely as a matter of convenience (repressed and forgotten material) and are thus of the same order, at least in principle, as contents actually in consciousness. But there are other unconscious contents which are genuinely present in the psychic life of all individuals but which can be represented in consciousness only in symbolic form. That is to say, their existence and reality are beyond dispute but their nature cannot fully be known, even in principle. These contents which can only be symbolized link the individual person to the whole of humanity in all ages and times and to the particular race and culture of which he is part. These contents form a basic substratum of human life per se.

The integrative process seeks constantly to bring together consciousness and the unconscious and achieves this object largely by a constant process of compensation whereby the attitudes of consciousness are reflected in mirror image in the unconscious. But the balance thus maintained is precarious in the extreme and consciousness constantly threatens to become autonomous and deny the unconscious while the unconscious constantly threatens to overwhelm and destroy
consciousness by assimilation. The only finally satisfactory way of reconciling the opposites of consciousness and the unconscious is by the integration of the unconscious contents into consciousness in such a fashion that neither consciousness nor the unconscious is denied or given any false glory at the expense of the other. This process is known as the individuation process by virtue of which man realizes the potential wholeness which is his by nature and truly becomes the self he is designed to be.

Since the process of becoming a self is a process of realizing a given which has been man's from the time immemorial, there is an immense deposit of the prior experience of humanity in this endeavor which is available to the individual person to guide him as he sets out to achieve the goal. This prior experience is accessible through the structure within the psyche called the archetype. This structure both guarantees the reality of the individual self and preforms or prefigures the path to be taken in its realization. It is, however, only a general guide and specific content must be added to this structure in accordance with the specific life experiences of the individual concerned. The archetype makes itself known by way of symbols and one of the essential prerequisites for achieving selfhood is the adoption of the appropriate conscious attitudes towards the symbols arising from the unconscious.
These symbols possess such numinosity and power that they cause the conscious ego to see them as God images. The most potent symbol available to contemporary Western man is the figure of Christ. This figure both reveals the archetype of the self and assists in the process of one's becoming a self. The Christ-symbol may be represented in consciousness in various forms, both animate and inanimate, both human and non-human. With this short summary in mind, we must now study in detail the significance of Christ for the self.

A. The Christ Figure and Jesus of Nazareth

Of the two realities, the self and the Christ, the primary reality so far as Jung is concerned is the self, conceived both as the archetypal disposition towards wholeness which resides in every human psyche and as the end-product of the individuation process with its specific content appropriate to the particular individual concerned. Some suitable symbolization will be found in every age and culture to give expression to this disposition and to help effect its realization. This means that while the Christ figure will supply the need for persons living in a culture which has been determined dominantly by Christianity, other figures and other symbols will perform the same function for, say, Eastern cultures, just as other figures and other symbols did perform this function in pre-Christian times and in cultures
which had little or no contact with Christianity. Thus, Jung speaks of the idea of redemption through a God-man as being anticipated in the myth cycles of Osiris, Orpheus, Dionysus, and Hercules, in the messianic prophecies of the ancient Hebrew prophets, and in the various hero myths.186 In the East, the figure of the Buddha himself, and the conceptions of atman and of Tao, and the tension of opposites between the yang and the yin of Chinese philosophy, all related to this same archetypal function.187

One would naturally expect there to be certain striking correspondences between these various figures and symbols if each of them is genuinely an expression of the same archetypal structure, and Jung documents a number of these correspondences.188

Thus, the question naturally arises, why the Christ figure for Western man? Jung is adamant that in spite of the

186 The Integration of the Personality, p. 233; "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 89, Aion, p. 68.


188 See, e.g., summary of the similarities between Christ and Osiris, Orpheus, Hercules (Heracles), etc., in "The Idea of Redemption in Alchemy," of The Integration of the Personality, p. 278, note 20, and the correspondence of sun and water symbols for both Christ and the Buddha in "The Psychology of Eastern Meditation," of PR:WE, p. 569f. The difference between Eastern and Western conceptions are also stressed here, as elsewhere. For attributes of the hero, see "Psych Approach to Trinity," in PR:WE, p. 154f.
widespread abandonment of creedal Christianity, Christ is the "still living myth of our time, our culture hero," because he represents to contemporary Western man the true image of God after whose likeness our inner man was made.\(^\text{189}\) This is not only man as God intended him to be (which is a faith conception), but this is also the reality which it is in man to become. Because Christ's life is archetypal in such high degree, that is because his life reveals the fundamental integration and wholeness which is present as a potential in all human life, this particular life evokes a response as no other life does.\(^\text{190}\) There is an archetypal disposition within the psyche of Western man which is appealed to by this life and which is relatively untouched by the mere goodness of other good men, or even by the sublimities of moral teaching of other revered teachers.

Christ is not only ideal man but He is also representative man. The life of the ordinary human being is lived in archetypal patterns, consciously or unconsciously, and thus Jung can say that "what happens in the life of Christ happens always and everywhere."\(^\text{191}\) This is human life, and true

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\(^{189}\) *Aion*, p. 36, 38f.


\(^{191}\) "Psychology and Religion," in PR:WE, p. 88f.
wholeness, genuine selfhood, involves the recognition that this reality is one's own reality. Thus, by curious paradox, it is precisely in respect to those features which give Christ his uniqueness (his dual nature, for example) that his essential identity with all men is made manifest.

In a summary statement, Jung speaks of the "archetypes of the self in the soul of every man that responded to the Christian message." This response in the early days of the Christian era meant that the concrete person Jesus of Nazareth rapidly became assimilated by the constellated archetype. That is to say, the historical Jesus was soon obscured by the complexity of functions and attributes appropriate to a genuine and living symbol of the archetype of the self. This process, Jung argues, had begun as early as the time of writing of Paul's letters.192

Only faith can decide the question of the extent to which Jesus himself was responsible for lighting the light that shone in the darkness and how much he was merely a victim of the unconscious expectations of his contemporaries. Whatever the whole truth may be of this matter, Jung is convinced that there must have been something about the quality of Christ's daily living and the manner of his dying to excite the sort of response evidenced in the New Testament writings.

But the objective historical facts are not of much concern to Jung. If Jesus had been seen only as an historical figure and his humanity had been regarded as the whole truth about him, then it is unlikely that his present influence would be any greater than that of a Socrates or of a Pythagoras, or of any other great teacher of the past. It is precisely because he was recognized or responded to as being himself God, and therefore beyond the merely historical, that his life takes on the quality of revelation. And this recognition, or response, was shaped by the "consensus of unconscious expectation," and continues into the present because of the perseverance of this same unconscious structuring and its presence in contemporary man.193

When Jung speaks of the life of Christ, therefore, he is concerned primarily with that life as interpreted by some other person or group of persons. One primary source for this life is, of course, the New Testament (and Jung fully recognizes the presence of different traditions within the New Testament) but this is not the only source. Jung ranges widely in his quotations about Christ and is prepared to establish the psychic facts of his life from the New Testament, the early Church Fathers, the later exponents of Christian orthodoxy, from the mystical traditions, from the

193 Ibid., p. 153f.; Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 211f.
medieval alchemists and from the visionary and dream experiences of contemporary men and women, including his own.  
This procedure is at least consistent with his claim to be investigating psychological rather than theological truth.

From time to time, however, Jung does make statements which make it appear as if he is either crediting these various records (and particularly the New Testament) with historical accuracy or at least is able to penetrate to the historical from the record. Thus, for example, he speaks of the Matthean record of the temptations as being clearly concretizations of the unconscious fantasies of Jesus of Nazareth. Jung assures his readers that Jesus himself did not treat these fantasies concretely and when he entered the world as a King it was as one to whom "the kingdoms of Heaven are subject."
Jung rejects any suggestion of morbidity in Jesus' psychology

194 For visions and dreams in the latter category, see F. Wickes, The Inner World of Choice, New York, Harper & Row, 1963, p. 18f., 37ff., 41. This last vision is referred to by Jung in Aion, p. 220, note 147.

Jung records of himself that he frequently experienced "extremely vivid hypnagogic images," and in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 210ff., he shares one such vision of Christ and the Cross which he interpreted as essentially alchemical. Jung also draws extensively on the writings of the poets and philosophers—and particularly on Goethe, Schiller, Kant, and Nietzsche—but does not use these so much as sources for the "life" of Christ as for independent corroboration of psychic processes involved in individuation, or for insights which reveal unconscious functioning.
as "nothing but ludicrous rationalistic twaddle" on the part of those who have completely misunderstood psychic process."\(^\text{195}\)

Similarly, Jung at one point characterizes Jesus as possessing both a love of mankind and "a certain irascibility." He continues his description, presumably of the empirical man, by saying:

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[...]	ext{and, as is often the case with people of emotional temperament, [he exhibited] a manifest lack of self-reflection. There is no evidence that Christ ever wondered about himself, or that he ever confronted himself. To this rule there is only one significant exception--the despairing cry from the Cross: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"}\(^\text{196}\)
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When, later in the same work, Jung says of Christ that he was "not an empirical human being at all" he seems to be establishing a difference between the "concrete Rabbi Jesus" and the archetypal Christ and assigning the parthenogenesis and the sinlessness to the archetypal figure and not to the historical person.\(^\text{197}\)

B. The Life of Christ and the Emerging Self

The various incidents in the life of Christ, beginning with his birth and on through to his resurrection and ascension, parallel the psychic processes involved in the genesis

\(^{195}\) Psych Types, p. 70ff.
\(^{196}\) "Answer to Job," in PRiWE, p. 408.
\(^{197}\) Ibid., p. 414.
and development of the self. This is not, however, an accidental or independent parallelism as might be with a simple analogy. The events in Christ's life are themselves symbolic expressions of the stages of the individuation process and both the Christ-life and the individuation process in a particular person are rooted in the same fundamental and transpersonal reality, the archetypal functioning.

(a) Birth.- There is a miraculous element in Christ's birth represented, for example, in the accounts of the Annunciation, of the virginity of Mary, and of her conception by the Holy Spirit. This miraculous element corresponds to the non-empirical genesis of the self. Since the self is a transcendent reality which encompasses the essentially unknown realms of the unconscious, it cannot, by its very nature, arise in empirically knowable ways. Both the birth of the Saviour and the rise of the symbol of the self from the collective unconscious come upon one unawares, they are unexpected and surprise happenings.198

But, in spite of these extraordinary elements, the birth of Christ was an obscure and insignificant event by ordinary human standards. He was born without fuss, and indeed without even the primitive comforts and securities

that might have been available in the home or in the inn proper, to parents who were far removed from the political, economic, social, or religious power structures of their day. His mother was a simple Galilean peasant girl and the supposed father a humble carpenter. Shortly after birth, the child who had been "protected" by the animals whose stable he shared, was taken on a journey to Egypt in order to escape the very real and powerful threat of Herod's vindictive anger. This obscurity and the element of danger together represent the extraordinary difficulties to be faced and overcome in the attaining of psychic wholeness. The very possibility of achieving this state is a precarious one. The emerging self is threatened both by the forces of consciousness and by the unknowable and unpredictable forces of the unconscious.199

(b) Childhood.- It is the child Jesus who is clearly recognized by the ancients Simeon and Anna as the expected saviour of Israel, thus bearing out Isaiah's prophecy concerning the child who would be called "Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace" (Is. 9.6). A child is an unlikely person to bear this responsibility and thus the irrational character of the symbol is again established.200

200 Psych Types, p. 323f.
Jung speaks of the child-god, or child-hero, as a familiar archetypal figure appearing in myth, legend, religion, folklore, and in spontaneous psychic imagery in contemporary dreams and visions. The Christ-child is only one such child among many. Others would include Apollo, Baldur, Siegfried, Maui, and Hercules. Each of these has in common with Christ obscure or miraculous birth; threat from the outset of life by apparently invincible powers over which he ultimately triumphs; a destiny to bring light into darkness; and a death finally brought about by virtue of something relatively insignificant in itself.²⁰¹

For Jung, the child-motif represents the "pre-conscious, childhood aspect of the collective psyche." He notes that the numinous image of the child, which causes it to be worshipped and revered, will frequently appear in dreams or visions of persons who have allowed certain parts of their lives to develop an autonomy which amounts to a dissociation of their present from their past, a loss of psychic roots. The child-motif is sufficiently pervasive to suggest that humanity as a whole stands in danger of forgetting its original, unconscious, and instinctive state. The religious observances which center on the retelling and ritual repetition of the myth of the birth of the child-god:

[...] consequently serve the purpose of bringing the image of the child, and everything connected with it, again and again before the eyes of the conscious mind so that the link with the original condition may not be broken.202

Christ's childhood, then, and the appearance of symbols of Christ in the form of a divine child, correspond to the necessary link that the self forms with the primitive origins of humanity in general and of the individual person in particular.

But the significance of the Christ child (and other child-gods) clearly goes beyond this past referrent. The child is represented as growing and as a future deliverer. The child therefore suggests potentiality. Individuation is a process in movement towards a goal. The child-figure points to the necessity for the continued development of the emerging self but a development which does not involve the severance of the necessary roots in the past. The emergence of the child-figure in the individuation process is an anticipation of the future synthesis of conscious and unconscious elements in the personality. It is, therefore, says Jung, "a symbol which unites the opposites: a mediator, a bringer of healing, that is, one who makes whole."203

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203 Ibid., p. 164.
The Christ child is also recognized as the one who brings light into darkness (cf. the prophecy of Isaiah quoted by Simeon, and Jesus' later claim to be the light of the world--Lk. 2.32). The theme of light opposed to and threatened by darkness reappears in connection with Jesus at a number of points in the New Testament and particularly in the Johannine writings. Light (and day) are, according to Jung, synonymous with consciousness, and similarly darkness (and night) with the unconscious. Thus, the advent of the bearer of light reflects the eruption of consciousness into existence and consequently its differentiation from the unconscious—a necessary prerequisite to true selfhood. Unconsciousness, as has been seen, is regarded by him as the state of original psychic distress which remains as a threat to consciousness and from which the individual needs to be delivered.\textsuperscript{204}

Jung thus perceives the infant Christ as the expression of the archetypal child-god/child-hero image who performs the function of linking both individual and race back to their true origins; who gives expression to that sense of futurity which is necessary for complete psychic wholeness; who unites the opposites of light and dark, human and divine, conscious and unconscious, in order to form a transcendent reality, a wholeness which is the self. The

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 166f.
child is the irrational third which consciousness could not conceive of unaided and which provides the necessary union of opposites and attracts by its meaningful, but essentially unknown, content.

In the individuation process the self has to be experienced in terms which take seriously the materiality of the body. The child symbol also fulfills this object.

(c) The Suffering of Christ.- The Gospels record that after he commenced his public ministry, Jesus had "nowhere to lay his head." He lived a life of hardship which culminated in the agony of Gethsemane and the sequence of events which together comprise his Passion. Likewise, says, Jung, there is much suffering and estrangement involved in the process of becoming a self. The empirical man is threatened in this process, in a very real and thoroughly frightening way, with being swallowed up in a dimension greater than his ego can comprehend. All securities seem to be lost, menace seems everywhere present, and no clear issue to the conflict can be seen. The experience of Christ upon the cross signifies the dramatic and extreme nature of the loss of all values which must be endured before the supreme value can be realized.

Christ was crucified between two thieves, the one destined for paradise, the other for hell. But the suffering emphasized here in the crucifixion clearly has a redemptive quality about it. Jung expresses the psychic analogy in terms of the crucifixion of the ego in its agonizing suspension between two irreconcilable opposites. That is to say, the confrontation of consciousness and the unconscious presents a tremendous threat to the ego but one which must be met if the self is to emerge. The ego must die, that is to say, must relinquish its claims to being the center of the whole of psychic reality, to make selfhood possible.

After death comes the three days of the descent into hell in which the loss of all values seems to be a permanent state. But then follows the resurrection and the ascension and newness of life. In the genesis of the self, the apparent chaos and the loss of securities and values, turns out to be a necessary part of the coming to terms with the depths of the unconscious in order to establish a new order of values and hence a "supreme clarity of consciousness" by the integration of the contents of the collective unconscious into consciousness. Jesus' resurrection appearances were limited in number and only a few people were able to see and recognize him in his resurrected state. So, too, says Jung, the transformed values are not easy to find or to recognize.  

For Jung this is more than analogy, and more than allegory. This is the reality of Christ in us and the reality of the Kingdom of Heaven which is within. Jung poses a fundamental question to modern man when he asks (addressing himself to Protestants in particular):

Are we to understand the "imitation of Christ" in the sense that we should copy his life and, if I may use the expression, ape his stigmata; or in the deeper sense that we are to live our own proper lives as truly as he lived his in its individual uniqueness? It is no easy matter to live a life which is modelled on Christ's, but it is unspeakably harder to live one's life as truly as Christ lived his. He makes it clear that living as truly as Christ lived involves living with the same danger, threat, and isolation as Christ lived; it is a recapitulation, and not a mere imitation of the Christ life.

C. Christ as the Union of Opposites

As has been seen, Jung's thought revolves around the fundamental principle that psychic life can only adequately be understood as a system of tensions between opposites, and that psychic wholeness demands the constant reconciliation of these opposites. But true opposites cannot be rationally combined without violence being done to the integrity of one

208 Aion, p. 37.

or other of them. Hence, the need for the irrational symbol which arises from beyond the ego to effect the necessary reconciliation.

The primary opposition in psychic life is that between consciousness and the unconscious. This may be represented symbolically as the opposition of light to darkness, or of the earthly to the heavenly, or of the human to the divine, or of the material to the immaterial, or of the spirit to nature, etc.

That symbol will have power in the individuation process which itself represents an irrational union of fundamental opposites and which, in consequence, can be the means whereby the individual in process of becoming a self can reconcile the opposites in his own psychic life by the integration of the one into the other rather than by the total assimilation of either to the other.

The Christ-symbol is singularly well-suited to this task. As the incarnation of God, Christ is recognized as lacking neither humanity nor divinity and so is "understood to be all-embracing and to unite all opposites." The totality thus represented is of a heavenly or divine kind inasmuch as Christ is both more perfect and more complete

He thus stands in relation to natural man as the whole to the part, as an adult to a child, or as the self to the ego.\(^{212}\)

In his own person Christ draws together the human and the divine, and hence the temporal and the eternal, the unique and the universal,\(^{213}\) life and death. In so doing, he is recognized as redeemer or saviour. Isaiah poignantly describes the meaning of redemption in terms of the union or reconciliation of opposites when he speaks of the wolf dwelling with the lamb (Is. 11.6ff.). Psychologically speaking, redemption means the awakening to life of the hitherto neglected or inferior functions of the psyche, the expression of that which has formerly been unexpressed or inexpressible. Again, Isaiah gives poetic and vivid form to this insight in his imagery of the new and unexpected possibilities of the redeemed state—the blind see, the lame leap like the hart, the deaf hear (Is. 35.5ff.).

Thus, man in the process of individuation can see in Christ the meaning of the suffering that he is undergoing and can see something of the direction of the process in


\(^{212}\) "Answer to Job," in PR:WE, p. 441f.

\(^{213}\) Aion, p. 63.

which he is engaged. Jung refers to this process as one of symbolic incarnation as man receives into himself (that is, into his ego-consciousness) the numinous and transcendent God (the contents of his collective unconscious) with all the risks and dangers attendant upon coming close to the holiness of God (the threat of being overwhelmed and destroyed by the unconscious). 215

In the figure of the One who was both God and man, who suffered and died and rose again to newness of life, the directional lines of the process are laid down. But, more than this, that person who can accept this symbol as being a valid expression of his own nature can, through the symbol, effect the reconciliation of the opposites within his own person and thus appropriate for himself the redemptive benefits of salvation, of selfhood. The mere acknowledgment that the symbol is there is not enough; one has to engage with it, struggle with the reality it represents and which is by nature substantially hidden, and persevere in the struggle with all its attendant threat and pain, until the redemptive power of the symbol makes itself felt and triumphs.

There is, however, one major drawback to the traditionally conceived Christ figure (which has formed the basis for the discussion to this point) and this factor limits its

usefulness as a symbol of the self in Jung's view. One extremely important aspect of human life does not achieve integration with its opposite in the figure of Christ; no place is made for the reality of evil. The animal side of man is included in the Christ-figure, but not the dark shadow which is nonetheless essential to the self. Christ is represented as being without sin and, like the Father, as wholly good.216

Jung insists that evil has as much substantial reality as good and that the Patristic formula which regards evil as a mere *privatio boni*, absence or diminution of good, is an evasion of psychological reality which has had singularly unfortunate effects on the progress of Western civilization. The devil, or Satan, is the split-off shadow of Christ, in Jung's view, and the anti-Christ has as much claim as Christ himself to be a symbol of the self insofar as the anti-Christ also represents a part of the true self, the dark side.217

216 *Aion*, p. 41ff., 63; "Psych Approach to Trinity," in *PR:WE*, p. 156.

217 *Aion*, p. 44; "Psychology and Religion," in *PR:WE*, p. 59. Jung's strictures against the concept of God as the *summum bonum* and evil as *privatio boni* are many, and quite vehement--see, eg., *Aion*, p. 45ff.; "Psych Approach to Trinity," in *PR:WE*, p. 168ff.; "Foreword to White's *God and the Unconscious*," in *PR:WE*, p. 304ff. "Answer to Job" is an extended attempt to explore the "dark side" of God. The tremendous reality of evil in human life leads Jung to suggest that the Christian trinity is incomplete since it makes no room for evil in the God-head. The devil, Satan, and anti-Christ are sometimes distinguished by Jung as names
Jung regards it as vitally important that man not overlook the evil within his own nature, and insists that there is a distinction to be drawn between perfection and wholeness. Man may strive for perfection in one way or another, but the fundamental thrust of his life, the in-born goal which constantly seeks for expression, is fulfilled in a completeness which is not perfection. The individual seeking perfection "must suffer from the opposite of his intentions for the sake of his completeness." Jung here recalls Paul's plaint in Romans 7.21: "I find then a law that, when I would do good, evil is present with me." 218

Another opposite in human life which does not find complete expression in the Christ-figure as traditionally conceived is the male/female antithesis. Since Jung sees this as an intropsychic opposition and not merely an interpsychic one, this, too, constitutes a lack in the traditional Christ-figure which is only partially met in the imagery of the Church as the Bride of Christ. 219

218 Aion, p. 69, 53.

219 Jung posits the existence in the psyche of the human male a figure (the anima) which is archetypal in origin and which exists in compensatory relationship to male consciousness. Similarly, there is an animus (or male counterpart) in the unconscious of females. The anima or animus may erupt into consciousness and reverse the dominant
The basic conjunction of opposites in the figure of Christ is amplified in traditions other than the orthodox Christian ones. In some of these, and particularly in the Gnostic tradition and its alchemical derivatives and extensions, Jung sees the deficiencies of the orthodox Christ-figure compensated for in symbols and conceptions which bring together the evil and the good, the male and the female.

One such figure is the serpent which occupies a prominent place in both Gnosticism and alchemy. The serpent figure has an important dual reference to the highest and the lowest, to the supremely spiritual and to the material and instinctual, to the destructive and to the redemptive, to darkness and to light, to evil and to good, to the devil and to Christ. Jung admits that the New Testament also has some symbols which Christ shares with the devil (and the serpent is one of them—cf. John 3.14; Rev. 12.9), but he maintains that these have had no influence on dogma.

sexually related characteristics of the person concerned—see, e.g., Aion, p. 11ff. Animus and animus together make a "divine pair," the one with a "Logos" nature, the other with an "Eros" nature. It is this divine syzygy (pair) which is symbolized in the "marriage" between Christ and the Church in Jung's view (ibid., p. 21).

220 Aion, p. 185ff., 199, 230ff., 233, 237, 244ff.
221 Ibid., p. 269.
Similarly, many of the symbols or allegories of Christ in both Gnosticism and alchemy are distinctly hermaphroditic in nature,\(^{222}\) signifying a reconciliation of the opposites of male and female. Jung also cites some contradictory streams of Catholic mysticism which see Christ as androgynous.\(^{223}\)

In an almost bewildering array of symbols, images, allegories, parallels, and formulations of one kind and another, the Gnostics and their successors presented conceptions of wholeness, and of man's involvement in the struggle to differentiate his own innate wholeness in terms appropriate to their own level of consciousness. The Gnostic symbols were drawn to the fundamental Christ symbol "as a magnet draws iron," and were employed to elucidate the significance of this basic symbol. In this process, says Jung, the heretics frequently showed deeper insight than their more orthodox contemporaries and successors.\(^{224}\) Just as the Gnostic symbols were drawn to the Christ symbol so, in some of the Gnostic systems, the true nature of man was magnetically attracted to the redeeming symbol.\(^{225}\)


\(^{224}\) *Aion*, p. 181ff., 184ff., 268f.

In the twentieth century, however, a marked increase in conscious development (that is as over against the second or third or even seventeenth centuries) has made it possible to replace the symbols of the fish and the serpent and the philosopher's stone with a psychological concept of human wholeness, the self.

In as much or in as little as the fish is Christ does the Self mean God. It is something that corresponds, an inner experience, an assimilation of Christ into the psychic matrix, a new realization of the divine Son, no longer expressed in theriomorphic form, but expressed in a conceptual or "philosophical" symbol.226

As has been seen above, not all will recognize the relation between the self and the Christ but Jung argues that this recognition and its clear articulation is of the utmost importance, both psychologically and religiously.

D. The Meaning of Being a Self

Much emphasis has been laid in the above account on the difficulties encountered in becoming a self, on the pain, the threat, the isolation, the estrangement, the suspicion and rejection on the part of others. But this is not the whole of the story and these negative elements are not just stoically endured for their own sakes. In this final section a brief account will be given of some of the

226 Ibid., p. 183.
features of the genuinely individuated life, of what it means to be a self. The self being discussed here is the self which was previously designated as the process concept of self as opposed to the inclusive self.

The normal means of liberating the energies of the contents of the unconscious is by projecting them upon the outside world. These projections may be quite crude or very subtle. Both God and the devil are projections of this nature when they are seen as autonomous and external entities. Likewise, man projects onto other persons the qualities he does not care to recognize in himself and the vices he could not imagine as being natural to him. These projections take both individual and communal forms and are to be held responsible for the split of the contemporary Western world into the rival capitalist and communist camps.

The individuated person, however, has withdrawn these projections from the external world and recognized that he cannot blame the ubiquitous and external "they" for the evils of life. He has come to terms with the fact that God and the devil, the evil in other persons and other societies, and all the negativities of life reside primarily within himself. He has learned to deal with his own shadow and to recognize that thereby he has done something real for the world. "He has succeeded in shouldering at least an
infinitesimal part of the gigantic, unsolved social problems of our day."227

In this process he has come to appropriate the fundamental components of purposeful life: faith, hope, love, and understanding. He has recognized that these are gifts of grace:

[...] which are neither to be taught nor learned, neither given nor taken, neither withheld nor earned, since they come through experience which is an irrational datum not subject to human will and caprice.228

He recognizes, moreover, that experiences cannot be manufactured, they happen, but their independence of man's activity is not absolute but relative. This means that although he cannot create such experiences for other people, he can assist others to come closer to the experiences of grace, acknowledging that such a venture requires a total commitment of the whole person.229

This faith which the individuated person now possesses is not, of course, that faith which Jung equates with belief


228 "Psychotherapists or the Clergy," in PR:WE, p. 331f.

229 Ibid. See also The Undiscovered Self, Chapter 1, for a discussion of the fundamental differences between knowledge and understanding of a particular individual person. This distinction means in practice that neither the doctor nor anyone else can have a stereotyped and rigid method of approach.
and which is required of the adherents of a particular religious system. It is a faith in his own wholeness, composed partly of respect for his own integrity and partly of a trust in the still unknown areas of his own unconscious. It is a fundamental security which does not have its full basis in knowledge but in the experience of so much of himself that he need not fear that which is yet unknown and unknowable about himself. Similarly, the new hope and the new love are freed in the release from the struggle to fulfill the unreasonable demands of his own ego. He has now a stable center from which he can view the world and operate within it. He is related in a meaningful and integral fashion to the basic level of human life, the source of all meaning and purpose, and, in being so related, he recognizes both the limitations of his individuality and the infinite worth of his humanity.

This faith and love and hope recognize the immanence of the transcendent but in such a way as not to diminish its power or its glory.

The person who has thus come to terms with his own reality finds, as a matter of fact, that he exerts a powerful influence on those round about him. This is not done by conscious exhortation or persuasion directed to other people but arises from what Jung terms the well-known fact that anyone who does possess insight into his own actions, and
has thus found access to the unconscious:

[... ] involuntarily exercises an influence on his environment. The deepening and broadening of his consciousness produce the kind of effect which the primitives call "mana." It is an unintentional influence on the unconsciousness of others, a sort of unconscious prestige, and its effect lasts only so long as it is not disturbed by conscious intention.\[230\]

It is with such individuals that Jung sees the future of mankind to rest. It is not given to everyone to be such a person but because there are some who are willing to accept the gift which fate has allotted them, the Christ becomes incarnate, dies, and rises to newness of life again in this the twentieth century. There is a responsibility upon those who have the capacity for selfhood in this sense to realize their own potential, and to encourage those others who share that capacity and that potential, and to provide for the masses who could not tolerate so much of reality.

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230 The Undiscovered Self, p. 109.
Chapter V

Conclusions Drawn from the Evaluation of Niebuhr and Jung

The last two chapters, five and six, bring together this writer's conclusions resulting from the foregoing analysis of Niebuhr's and Jung's thought regarding the self. The present chapter discusses conclusions regarding the limitations and contributions of both thinkers to our present task. The specific aspects of Niebuhr's work, relevant to this thesis will be summarized, then will follow a psychological critique of those key issues. Similarly, Jung will be looked at from a general and psychological perspective. The specific contributions of both men, relevant to our work, will be set forth and utilized in support of the hypothesis.

1. Conclusions Drawn from Niebuhr.

Niebuhr approaches the nature of man and his world in terms of nature, reason and spirit—three explanatory and interpretive categories of the most basic kind, to which he recurs again and again. They provide the contents for three different aspects of man: man in his essentiality, as he really is, in spite of all that he has or may yet become; man in his actuality, as he is here and now; and man in his potentiality for recovering what he really is on the basis of what he has become. Each of these dimensions is present
in the here and now, however much one may obscure and over-shadow another; each is necessary for a full and accurate discussion of man's nature. The categories constitute the nature of the human self, its enduring elements; the dimensions suggest the various relations the elements may take, one to another. But Niebuhr's view of man has limitations manifested by the small amount of space he gives to the treatment of man's developmental capacities. We must here draw some conclusions regarding the strengths of Niebuhr's thought as well as its weaknesses.

A. General Reflections Upon Niebuhr's Work

Man lives at the juncture of nature and spirit, which is to say that the self is the unity or wholeness of body, mind and spirit. Nature is the structure of limitation in the life of man: its drives, its vital exuberance, its cyclical and repetititve quality, its lack of consciousness—all these confront man with the conditions of his identity, the boundaries beyond which he cannot advance and from which he cannot retreat. Nature limits and defines man. But man is spirit as well as nature. Spirit is the limitless in man—the open-ended, the indefinite, the infinite—it is the realm where he must limit himself. Man has the capacity for self-transcendence: at no point in life is he without further possibilities or alternatives. There is no "naturally"
given point of satiety, of accomplishment, of virtue or of perfection. Man is free to transcend himself in any given situation. This freedom informs him of his destiny.

But man is neither fully limited nor completely limitless, neither simply nature nor simply spirit, except as these exist in unity one with another. Man is a unity of nature and spirit, of finitude and freedom, of creatureliness and godliness—and therefore what is highest in spirit is deepest in nature. Nature is fully natural only by virtue of its connectedness with spirit, and spirit is fully spiritual only by virtue of its connectedness with nature. Every bodily impulse, drive and urge is inescapably infected with the freedom of spirit. There is no such thing as a purely sexual urge, no such thing as a purely aggressive drive, apart from spirit. Man is therefore both more sexual and less sexual, more bestial and less bestial than the animals. Similarly, every reasonable evaluation, every rational assertion, every objective calculation is also infected with the freedom of spirit. Every act of will, every decision, everything spiritual is influenced by nature and reason, by the impulses of body and the reasonings of mind. Man may use his reason as well as his body to excuse himself, and he may permit his body and his reason to use his self, for body and mind are in basic unity with spirit. This is essential man, the free and responsible self.
Not only is man a unity of body and spirit, he also knows it. But his knowledge is ambiguous--on the one hand he is "darkly" conscious of it; on the other hand it comes to him "falsely interpreted." Being neither fully aware nor fully ignorant, he becomes anxious. Faced with this situation, man, in his anxiety, pursues a "universal inclination" of his psyche: he sees himself simultaneously as more than he presently is and as less than he is destined to be. Where he is truly limited, man wishes to be free, and where he is truly free he misuses his liberty. Man falls, he becomes less than he is destined to be, but nevertheless what he presently is: actual man.

This unity of body and spirit is the basis of man's freedom and his essentiality; and it is through the misuse of this freedom that he disrupts this unity. In actuality the self is a guilty self, bound by self-concern and living in a state of pride (self-love) and self-deception. Man pits himself against the limits of nature and flees the possibilities of spirit. He seeks his own security at the expense of other life, pursuing his own ends in such a way as to limit inordinately the freedom and selfhood of others. His not-so-virtuous actions are considered virtuous because he deceives himself—he neither "sees" that his actions have been inordinate nor that he is responsible for their excesses.

Accompanying man's anxious fall into self-concern is the possibilities of its opposite--the recovery of freedom,
the re-unification of body and spirit, the movement into creativity, both in contemplation and action. In moments of self-transcending self-inspection the self recognizes its self-concern for what it is—a function of its own will, a misuse of its freedom. And in so doing the self becomes free. It is the freedom of forgiveness, the recovery of the right relation between nature and spirit, between limitation and limitlessness. It, in turn, leads to "creative relation with other life," the capacity actually to become concerned with the freedom of another apart from its implications for oneself. Man can find his identity and destiny only in relationship to other men and Christ. Without the grounding of human social interaction and the intuitive experience of God through Christ one cannot know who he is or where he is going.

The self is related to the collectivities available to it at its particular historical moment, yet each self is driven to seek life beyond itself. Because man transcends himself in freedom, he has a memory, and this makes him an historical being as well. He is free to view his past, to evaluate it and to modify the present on the basis of it; and he is limited by it as well. The self creates and is created by the dramatic patterns of historical-social conflict and compromise, here recalling its past and writing its history as it would have it, there transcending the forces of the past in the interests of new patterns of creativity, love and justice.
Just as the contents of recall are a function of the freedom of the self, so is collective life in general. The drive towards the other is compounded by freedom and therefore collective life is always ambiguous--both frustrating and fulfilling, the occasion of both self-concern and creativity. But as the self engages itself in the wider ranges of collective life--institutions, nations and other power structures of social life--the alternatives confronting it also increase. Its capacity for guilefully imposing its wishes at the expense of the freedom of others becomes magnified a hundredfold. Moral man creates for himself--and for his neighbor--immoral society. In the face of this love is of no avail. Man needs justice if he is to find his identity and destiny amid the assaults of collective self-concern, and godly indeed is the society which can produce a rough and tolerable one.

Yet, limited as collective life is, the depths of self-concern to which the self can and does attain under such conditions is balanced by an equally collective and, comparably speaking, equally creative possibility, the possibility of democracy. For the self also has the capacity, both in contemplation and in action, to construct and implement forms of social and political life which not only limit its own self-concern but also evoke the freedom of others. Democracy is the means whereby such a task can be accomplished, and it is possible, not because it is necessary, but because the self
in its collective life is both unjust and just, both finite and free, both limited and limitless.

In its wholeness and fragmentation and as both creative and self-concerned, the self knows its identity and destiny as they really and truly are only in the experience of being known from beyond its own range and power of knowing. Such self-knowledge lies in the experience that it is comprehended by that which is beyond all comprehension--by a principle of comprehension which is beyond comprehension. God as revealed in Christ is the source of such comprehension, both as a principle of meaning and as the power to pursue the meaning, once received. The self becomes free, whole or centered only in seeing that its identity and destiny lie beyond itself--which is to say that its true identity, destiny and even ability to relate to not lie in itself. Only in this way can man's universal inclination to shape his god in his own image be met and overcome. The restoration of freedom consists in the recognition that the self is itself subject to a structure and power of limitation it did not acknowledge. This constitutes the self's experience of a dramatic encounter with God through Jesus Christ, the dialogic aspects of revelation.

The record of this experience is contained in the biblical narratives--especially in the creation and resurrection stories. In and through them the fullness of human freedom and existence in all its conflict and unity becomes
as accessible to man as is possible. Their permanent mythological structure permits his consciousness to grasp the nature of his existence (immanence of God in Christ, meaning of life), although the myth also contains more than man can rationally discern in it (transcendence of God, mystery of life).

By way of summary one might define Niebuhr's concept of the self as spirit, or as self-transcendence, or as freedom, for no one of these can be subsumed under the other. However, we suggest that the term "freedom"—provided that it is understood as a spiritual and self-transcending freedom—is a concept which best unifies Niebuhr's thought on the self in all its variety of aspects: man is free, the self is a freedom, this is the most basic meaning of selfhood for Niebuhr. For it points to the autonomous but unified elements which constitute the nature of the self—to be free is to be a unity or wholeness of body, mind and spirit; it points to the power of self-concern and the creative possibilities which, while present for the self, nevertheless remain dependent upon its discovery of the ubiquity and tenacity of these powers; it points to the necessity and capacity for social involvement and the ambiguities of collective life; it points to man's destiny to both possess and be possessed by the past and to the balance between the necessity and possibility of democracy; and finally, it points to the dramatic and mythological as the most efficacious representation of both the
meaning and the mystery of human identity. Indeed, it would seem that in the right relation between such meaning and mystery lies the essence of Niebuhr's view of freedom and selfhood.

B. Psychological Criticisms

The theological enterprise, as Niebuhr makes abundantly clear, begins with some fundamental assertions which are distinctive to theology. He can legitimately expect any critic from outside the theological disciplines to respect his right to make these assertions and to develop his arguments from them. The psychological critic, for example, is in no position to challenge the theological legitimacy of Niebuhr's claim that the action of God is the basis of all reality. He may very well ask what this means in terms of the phenomenological reality with which he customarily deals but he cannot, as a psychologist, deny the premise.

When the theologian discusses man and insists, as he must, that man can truly be seen only in his relationship to God, the psychologist must respect his right to make this assumption but he can also expect that there will be at least some order of congruence between the self as the subject of theological discourse and the self as the subject of psychological enquiry. In light of Niebuhr's and Jung's thought we hold that this congruence is between a particular
human experience psychologically conceptualized as wholeness, and theologically conceptualized as freedom. In spite of the different contexts within which they work, the different presuppositions they may bring to their endeavors, and the different methods they may employ, both the theologian and the psychologist are dealing with the same experience.

When Niebuhr speaks of a shattering of the self consequent upon the action of God in Jesus Christ, he is clearly implying that changes are experienced in the empirical life of man. To experience this change "the self in the state of preoccupation with itself must be 'broken' and 'shattered' or, in the Pauline phrase, 'crucified.' It cannot be saved merely by being enlightened." Changes of self-perception are the common lot of all men and are equally the concern of the psychologist. In other words, Niebuhr is here giving implicit testimony, however reluctantly, to the fact that the changes induced by the experience of encounter with Christ do involve psychic processes. He affirms, of course, that they cannot be understood in their entirety in terms of psychic processes.

The first and principal psychological criticism of Niebuhr centers on his failure to deal with the developmental basis of the self. Compared with Jung in this respect,
Niebuhr is at the opposite end of the spectrum. Does the Niebuhrian self develop? The shattering of the self is perhaps a kind of development or emergence, modelled after a Kierkegaardian conception of stages on life's way. This is a kind of development in the sense that each stage is a sequential building upon the effects of the preceding one. Yet this shattering is described without reference to what, in a strict sense, could be called developmental factors or personal history. For the most part Niebuhr assigns such factors to the distortions of individual rather than social life. That is, he seemed to equate nature with individual development, and spirit with socio-historical "maturity," without reference to the underlying unity which he is otherwise so insistent to commend. And yet, Niebuhr does not exclude the notion of development from his understanding of selfhood, for he speaks of a primeval "we" consciousness, and believes that human individuality is "subject to development." By and large, however, such remarks are infrequent, and when uttered they are not accompanied by explication.

In similar fashion one wonders whether there are developmental traces in the life of the "mature" self and in socio-historical existence. Niebuhr criticizes the reductionism

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of some psychoanalytic thinking on social problems, saying, for example, that it "eliminates all genuinely historical causes of human behavior." Clearly, to say that child-training methods are entirely responsible for totalitarianism is a crude form of reductionism. But it is not, we suggest, reductionistic to say that developmental factors, alongside of other factors, do nevertheless affect the forms of a nation's political life. Neither reductionism nor the equally rigorous attacking of it is as necessary if causality is interpreted more deeply and broadly. Perhaps developmental factors are more like forces in a field than like mathematically measurable units of energy in sequential order. Again, might it not be possible to define the self in terms of both continuity and discontinuity, of what remains the same and what changes during development? Niebuhr's abbreviated treatment of self-development is seen as a criticism relevant to the present thesis because the four criteria that we employed in analyzing the self indicated that his understanding of what it is to become free ultimately involves a developmental process that he never explicated.

Another point at which Jung's thought calls Niebuhr's into question is that of a "program" or body of principles and procedures by which creativity, both individual and collective, might be brought about. This is really the question of a

4 "C&S-C," p. 270. Note the use of the term 'causes' in this case. Niebuhr seems to be fusing cause as mechanism and cause as the freedom which posits itself.
theory of pastoral care, and it is significant that, while Niebuhr gives us a very articulate moral psychology, he has no explicit pastoral psychology. By and large he believes that any attempt to construct a body of principles which would reliably guide a program given over to evoking creativity and to managing self-concern is simply too reminiscent of the mechanistic and deterministic thinking of science. It is acceptable for the sciences—indeed, it constitutes their methodological obligation. But the freedom side of existence "posits itself," which is to say that it can only be encountered, and can never simply be brought about by human will, or hope, or intellect.

One wonders, however, whether every kind of principle need be so "mechanistic" that it by definition eliminates all possibility of freedom. Does the notion that perhaps there are principles which comprehend the mystery of human freedom enough to guide the self in this direction wholly collapse that dimension of mystery? Is it not possible to develop principles which will move the self towards creativity and away from self-concern without necessitating the conclusion that total creativity has been, or might have been, achieved? To put the point a bit impatiently: perhaps the principle of comprehension which lies beyond comprehension is not as far beyond comprehension as Niebuhr asserts.

This is a difficult problem, for which neither Jung nor Niebuhr offer unambiguously clear solutions. Niebuhr clearly sees that there are human developmental factors
beyond mechanism, but his attempts to formulate these are in part idealistic, and in part what he calls realistic—although, as we have already suggested, the latter appears to be more consistent with the basic thrust of his thought. But, nonetheless, he offers no principles, and criticizes those who do. Put in another way, anyone who, like Niebuhr, has as much to say about the "practical" aspects of social and political problems, also has something of a "practical" nature to say about the processes of individual change. It is a responsibility he cannot forego.

With Niebuhr we may still speak structurally of the self in terms of three levels, and still use the distinction between non-conscious impulse and self-conscious awareness as the criterion defining the three levels. With Niebuhr we may say that there is but one motivational structure or center, and that the fundamental motivational question for man lies in the understanding he has of the limitations and achievements of the self. On the other hand, we must be wary of idealistic distortions in Niebuhr. Selfhood as a centered unity of drives and awareness is a real possibility. Real unity is a real possibility, but there is no reason why this should lead inevitably to the pitfall Niebuhr constantly dreads, namely, that the law of love in human life come to be thought of as a simple possibility. "Real" unity here does not mean the kind of closure which total and final unity sometimes suggests.
Centered unity insists upon full attention to the wish, or drive or urge aspects of selfhood. Using Jungian language a centered unity means "the center of the total personality [...] which coincides] with a point midway between the conscious and unconscious."\(^5\)

This raises the question of the precise meaning of self-consciousness. From the point of view of selfhood as freedom, self-consciousness merges with decision, and decision with responsibility. With Niebuhr we can affirm that self-consciousness as spirit transcends nature and culture—which is to say that it is not merely the carbon copy of cultural norms, injunctions, etc. The self has the capacity to transcend itself at this and at every point; otherwise, its decisions and subsequent responsibility would simply be the dictates of "culture," thereby denying the very meaning of decision and responsibility and freedom.

Self-consciousness is a dynamic consideration as well, for the meaning of a self also lies in the fundamental perspective from which its structural unity or disunity is viewed. The free self is a responsible or self-decisive self, which is to say that it is originally and essentially an "organic unity of consciousness." The self has the capacity

\(^5\) Two Essays, p. 219.
not only to be responsible and decisive, but also to view itself as such. The structure of self-apprehension or subjective side of selfhood is potentially in unity with its objective side. Both being and perceiving are necessary for full responsibility.

We would assert, with Niebuhr, that the organic unity of consciousness "posit" itself: it is a possibility always available to the self, and therefore it is always a factor to be considered in the self's motivational life. However, Jung gives a developmental dimension to this atemporality, thereby adding a personal-historical aspect to self-awareness. And therefore the reality of freedom as well as awareness of it emerges through interaction with and attentiveness to these factors. Put quite simply, the capacity for self-transcendence "grows." And in like fashion self-deception and self-denial can be clarified only in the personal-historical context of the life of the self. In its actual situation the self is indeed in bondage; but any and all bondage has its "causes"—perhaps we should say, has its "beginnings" and "context"—and in a re-encounter with these lies the beginning of release.

Self-transcendence or self awareness is bodily as well as personal-historical or developmental, and inattentiveness to this dimension makes truthful self-inspection impossible. In some sense the body "sees" along with the
mind and spirit. In spite of protests to the contrary, Niebuhr's discussions of self-transcendence are prone to idealistic distortions, in that bodily feeling tends to become associated with mechanism, and it is precisely mechanism which Niebuhr so insistently dissociates from self-transcendence.  

The concept of freedom assumes that self-renewal is a possibility, that transformation does take place both in the course of growth and becoming and in the more intense and compressed treatment or pastoral experiences. With Niebuhr we concur that such transformation is not a simple possibility, in the sense that the meeting of certain requirements and procedures reliably removes conflict and produces desired effects.

Yet transformation does occur, such that it is possible for the self to become decisive, free and responsible. This assertion is contrary to that strand in Niebuhr's thought which asserts in effect that the shattering of the self is a kind of psychic thunderstorm producing a brief and transitory period of clarification before everything returns to the state it was in before. From still another psychological stance

6 Thus the "mechanism of self-deception" is a thoroughly self-contradictory phrase. Here, Niebuhr applies mechanism to that which he also defines as least mechanistic of all. In doing so he denies to the process of self-deception the biological aspect we are defending here.
Niebuhr's shattering of the self sounds more like the kind of outbursts or eruptions which follow upon years of repression and denial, rather than the basis for any normative conception of growth and crisis. Our conception of selfhood takes a developmental view of all such things and sees the shattering of the self as an event in which long-term developmental and existential processes have been willy nilly compressed into a brief and chaotic period. We further believe that Niebuhr's general refusal to admit any developmental basis for his dramatic or existential encounter has forced him into the anomalous position of attempting to normalize an experience which need not—in fact, which should not—be so critical. In doing so his psychology of religion resembles the conversion psychologies at the turn of this century, which also did not sufficiently attend our conclusion that the developmental and the existential self can at no point be separated.

With Jung we assert not only that real development is possible, but that real change is possible, which is to say that a program for helping a person to change is really possible as well. In theological language this means principles and procedures for pastoral care and religious education. However, this nurture of the emergence of freedom need not be based on principles of a rigid or mechanistic kind, such that nurture and helping come to mean the ingenious
manipulation of forces. Instead, we would prefer to speak of such nurture as the evocation of freedom, and would ground such principles finally in our conception of intelligibility--i.e., in neither mechanistic meaning (rules and laws) nor in absolute mystery (the unscrutable will of God, transcending all laws and principles).

Ultimately freedom finds expression in the realm of identity and destiny as well as relatedness, suggesting the extent to which authentic selfhood lies in answer to the question of who one is, where he is going and to whom he relates.

Niebuhr's biblical realism affirms the simultaneity of individuality and sociality in authentic selfhood such that creativity and self-concern are characteristic of both personal and socio-historical existence. The concept of freedom insists that growth in individuality is also growth in social relatedness and vice versa. There can be no radical split between individual and social responsibility.

Because of this there is also continuity between personal-individual growth and the various forms of social existence--political, economic, social, etc. With Jung we must agree that developmental factors do carry over into institutions, political movements, social reforms, international conflicts, and so forth. There is a developmental
basis for all of these which cannot be denied simply because they tend to be obscured by other factors in the "mature" self's participation in the forms of socio-historical existence. Contrary to the implications of his own avowed biblical realism, Niebuhr denies this continuity, and in doing so denies not only the dynamic aspect to politics, for example, but also the existential aspect to personal development.

C. Specific Conclusions

The following conclusions will be availed of in the constructive statements to support our hypothesis. It should be recognized that they will there be developed in the total context of the present writer's reflections upon both major sources, and his own personal reflections, and will not necessarily appear there in the form which Niebuhr himself developed in his task of expounding a systematic concept of the self.

(i) The insistence on the priority of the experience provoked by God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ as principle clarifier of the self's destiny.

(ii) The distinction between the self as it experiences itself and the self as it stands before God, and the awareness that it is the same self.
(iii) The recognition of the impossibility of finding one's identity and destiny in abstraction from his relationships to others and his responsibility for others.

(iv) The insistence that man cannot be considered by theology except in his relations to God and that this is believed to constitute a primary reality about man.

(v) The understanding that the concept of freedom is a bringing together of the natural, functional, and societal aspects of the self in such a way that it both includes and is included by them.

(vi) The recognition that human freedom lies in the self's experience that its meaningful achievements are always limited by a realm of mystery and that this realm of mystery is the most fundamental of the many Niebuhrian paradoxes.

(vii) That the self experiences that it is comprehended from beyond, and in coming to recognize this, the self comes to know God and its own identity, destiny and need for relatedness.

2. Conclusions Drawn from Jung.

In the opening words of her critical appreciation of Jung's psychology, Avis M. Dry has written that "probably few writers in any field have been held in more varied esteem
than C. G. Jung. One cannot but agree. There have been both spirited attacks upon the man and upon his concepts, and equally spirited defences. In the history of Jung criticism neutrality has rarely seemed to be considered as a live option. Some of the criticism has been justified, a great deal of it is understandable in the light of the history of psychology in his lifetime and in view of his unsystematic mode of presentation, his preference for dramatic and mythological language, and his general imprecision in terminology. But much of the criticism arises from an unwillingness or an inability to concede that there is anything genuinely empirical in Jung's concern with such exotic mysteries as religion, alchemy, Gnosticism, Eastern philosophy, parapsychology, and the like.

It is beyond the scope of the present investigation to detail the responsible psychological criticisms that have been made of his work. This discussion will proceed on the general assumption that until other and demonstrably more satisfactory and adequate hypotheses are available to account for the phenomena with which he deals, his formulations are

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entitled to be taken uncritically. In this present chapter a brief review will be made of some of the important theological issues posed by Jung's work. This will be followed by an equally brief statement of the values and limitations seen in his work and, finally, by a preliminary appraisal of the contribution that Jung has to make towards the thesis of this dissertation.

A. Theological Issues Raised by Jung's Work

Two possibilities are open in addressing any theological criticism towards Jung and his work. One can either regard his work as theological in fact if not in name, and proceed to prosecute his heresies, or one can take seriously his expressed intentions and then argue with him on the basis of the implications raised for theology by his assumptions, methods, and conclusions. Martin Buber exemplifies the first approach and Victor White has been the most eloquent exponent of the second. In either event White's comment is appropriate that "if it is difficult to divest Freud of the professor's


The distinction between these approaches is, nevertheless, important and only the second allows the theologian to respect the integrity of another discipline while retaining the freedom to pursue his own with its distinctive methodology and its particular presuppositions.

As a psychologist, Jung is quite within his rights in suggesting that the psychological function performed by the Christ-figure is no different in principle from the function performed by any other hero or child-god figure. As a psychologist he can speak freely of features which are lacking in the Christ-figure and which, if present, would make that figure a more perfect representation of wholeness—as he defines it. As a psychologist he is entitled to regard Gnostic and other non-Christian writings as of equal value to the canonical scriptures and ecclesiastically sanctioned.

10 White, God and the Unconscious, p. 49. Jung himself wrote the foreword to this work in which he welcomed White's contribution as well-informed, responsible, and a genuine contribution to the mutual co-operation that Jung hoped for from the clergy. White's writings strongly reflect his Thomist theology. Another competent but less sympathetic critic from the standpoint of Catholic theology and philosophy is Raymond Hostie, Religion and the Psychology of Jung (tr. by G. R. Lamb), New York, Sheed & Ward, 1957. An earlier critique from a Protestant point of view is contained in Hans Schaer, Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology, New York, Pantheon Books, Bollingen Series XXI, 1950. David Cox, Jung and St. Paul, London, Longmans, Green, 1959, rounds out the list of major critical writings with a dominantly theological purpose.
traditions as sources of information concerning the ideas people have, and have had, of Christ. As a psychologist he can concentrate his attention upon the role that the Christ figure plays in the attainment of individual wholeness without paying more than passing attention to man's sociality. As a psychologist he can adopt any and all of these positions, provided only that he can defend them from the perspective proper to his own discipline. By and large it must be conceded that he has made a case for treating his material in the way that he does.

But this most emphatically does not mean that the theologian who wishes to take Jung seriously has to adopt the same positions in relation to the person of Christ. The theologian has equally good reason for conserving the uniqueness of Christ, for refusing to combine the figures of Christ and anti-Christ, for preserving the masculinity of Jesus of Nazareth, for insisting upon the importance of canonical authority, and for enlarging his conception of the work of Christ to embrace the community as well as the individual.

What is involved here is a question of fundamental presuppositions and perspectives. Jung takes man very seriously--as the theologian must take man seriously if he is to be faithful to his own task--and Jung seems also to take man's need for God very seriously. Psychologically, the question which Jung raises in relation to concepts of God is,
"does this (or that) concept of God prove most useful to man in his attempts to cope with life?" The theological question, on the other hand, must be phrased differently: "does this, or that, conception of God conform to God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ as witnessed to in the scriptures?" One can hardly minimize the importance of the difference between these two modes of phrasing a question about the concept of God but this does not mean that answers to the first question have no relevance to the second.

Jung recognizes that man receives an idea of God from a realm beyond the confines of his personal consciousness, but that this idea is shaped and molded in consciousness in accordance with man's inner needs, hopes, desires, and capacities. In turn, this idea of God gives one a sense of who he is, where he is going, and the importance of relationships in this experience. Theology must take account of the fact that man's attempt to recognize, acknowledge, and appropriately respond to the God who gives Himself in His revelation involves man in psychic processes which need to be appreciated if the element of distortion is to be kept to a minimum.

Simply to dismiss Jung as a humanist because, in the final analysis, his measure both of God and of wholeness turns out to be man, is to run the risk of failing to recognize that this sort of humanism may contribute to a
theological understanding of the processes by which revelation is received.

Jung assumes that the goal of religion is personal salvation and that the distinctive emphasis of Protestantism is upon the individual in his private and personal search for salvation. This assumption can no longer be said to agree with the mainstream of contemporary Protestant thought (and certainly not with Niebuhr's thought). But a theology which ignores concrete and particular persons in their uniqueness is dealing with an abstract conception of man which is at variance with the very principle of the Incarnation.

In a perceptive essay on "The Christ-Life as Mythic and Psychic Symbol," Hugh T. Kerr has argued that there is a place in theology for a consideration of the Christ-Life in mythological and psychological terms as well as in the more traditionally used biblical and doctrinal categories. Kerr suggests that this approach has largely been neglected because of the "false fear that the kerygma would be somehow endangered." He comments, in this connection, that "the Christ-Life's own integrity is not imperilled by observing its mythic-psychic parallels--unless it be proclaimed as isolated rather than as
related truth.\textsuperscript{11} This contention is wholeheartedly agreed with. Kerr suggests that there are both strategic and apologetic advantages to be gained from such an approach. It may also be said that there are distinct advantages to be gained in possibly bringing the level of much theological thinking down from the abstract to the concrete.

The faith of the Christian can neither be reduced to, nor divorced from, questions of psychic functioning and natural process. Paul's famous phrase, "not I, but Christ who dwells in me" does not give theology the warrant to avoid coming to terms with the meaning of the "I" and the "me" by concentrating upon "Christ." Paul is here speaking simultaneously at two different levels of discourse. At one level he is witnessing to the great new truth about the focusing of life--on Jesus Christ--and, more than that, on the power which flows from that focusing. Here the emphasis is legitimately upon the "not I." But, at another level, it is Christ dwelling in "me" and there is a reality attaching to the "me" which is not totally coextensive with Jesus Christ who is "not-me." There are, then, two realities involved in this

statement of Paul's: the reality of Christ and his crucial importance for his life; and the reality of the person, Paul, for whom Christ is central. In considering the reality of Paul (and this involves a consideration of his selfhood) one has also to consider what it means to have Christ "in" one. This is a mystical conception, as is his "in Christ" formula, but it is also a conception which can be illuminated by an understanding of psychological process such as Jung seeks to develop.

When the theologian turns to consider the meaning of wholeness for man, and for particular men, the presuppositions of his discipline preclude him from thinking of wholeness as something which relates to individuals in isolation from the community of men. Man is whole to the extent that his life is a reflection of God's intention for him. Whatever this may involve in terms of his own individual psychic integration it also clearly involves the questions: "Who am I?"; "Where am I going?"; "What role do others play in this process?" These are, respectively, questions of identity, destiny and relatedness. Jung, as has been seen, speaks of the responsibility for others which is involved in the process of becoming a genuine self and with this the theologian would have to agree.

B. Values and Limitations

(a) The first thing that must be said for Jung is that he does attempt to deal with religious phenomena as
important in their own right and as having something significant to say about man's psychic constitution and its outworkings. He avoids the common psychological temptation to reduce religious phenomena to the status of epiphenomena of man's sexuality, will to power, or other such factors. He is convinced both that the psychological disciplines have contributions to make to the theological, and also that the theological disciplines, and the independent study of religious phenomena, have important contributions to offer psychology. This conviction makes him a peculiarly appropriate person with whom to engage in dialogue.

But regarding his intent positively does not imply agreement with every detail of the way in which he actually deals with religious material. The prevailing criticisms of his general treatment have been summarized briefly and competently by Dry who draws upon the work of White, Hostie, and others. Her comments cover the following matters: the legitimate doubts that can be cast upon the significance Jung attaches to quaternity; the difficulties involved in his treatment of the problem of evil; the controversy over the extent to which he does stay within the bounds of "psychic truth" in his expositions; what she calls his "blanketing tendency" which causes him to ignore uncongenial facts and to employ out-of-date conceptions; and the tendency to render material out of its original context, thereby distorting the intentions of its authors. There is some substance to each
of those criticisms but the methodological ones are of greatest moment here.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that in his treatment of the figure of Christ Jung is unduly and illegitimately selective. He seems to deal only with that material which will support his independently derived (and frequently implicit) conception of what is significant in man's understanding of Christ, and either to reject (without presentation) or to ignore other conceptions which lay equal claim to consideration as "psychic facts" but which might require different conclusions. Two illustrations are cited below.

Jung characterizes Jesus as exhibiting a "manifest lack of self-reflection. "There is no evidence," he says, "that Christ ever wondered about himself, or that he ever confronted himself." He makes an exception for the cry of dereliction from the cross but chooses to ignore, in this context, the evidence of the temptations, the agony in Gethsemane, the changes in direction and emphasis in Christ's preaching and approach to his mission, and many other recorded components of his life. When he speaks elsewhere of the temptations he regards them as "unconscious fantasies" but he does not consider the clear implication of the Gospels that Jesus' struggle in the wilderness, whatever else it may have been, was a desperate and painful attempt on the part of a

12 "Answer to Job," in PR:WE, p. 408.
man to come to terms with who and what he is, and wherein
his life's work lies. Two other passages that Jung fails to
consider are found in Matthew 16.13-15. First Jesus asks his
disciples: "Who do men say that the Son of man is?" Then he
asks them: "But who do you say that I am?" Both passages
clearly indicate that Jesus reflected upon his own identity.

In treating the doctrine of the Fall and the perver-
sion of the imago dei in man, Jung follows the views of the
Latin Fathers which have come down through the Augustinian-
Calvinist tradition. On the basis of this he speaks of the
Christ-figure symbolizing the restoration of the primitive
relationship to God, the original state of man in relation to
his own unconscious and the unconscious of the race. This is
certainly one "psychic fact" which, as such, deserves comment
and interpretation. But it is not the only "psychic fact"
extant in this same connection. The followers of the tradi-
tion of the Greek Fathers, for example, have no conception of
a primitive, pre-Fall relationship to God. Christ does not,
in their view, perform the function of restoring man to his
original condition. In this conception, which is shared by
millions of Christians, the relationship which Christ makes
possible between man and God is basically prospective and not
retrospective. Jung leaves the reader largely to guess at
what this view may mean for an understanding of the psychic
significance of Christ. It is quite possible that Jung may
not have known of this tradition but it is unlikely that he
was unacquainted with every conception of Christ other than those he treats. It is, of course, quite proper to be selective but the suspicion remains that Jung's selectivity at times limited, and may also have distorted, his conclusions.

(b) Jung's treatment of the role of the psyche in religion, and of religion in psychology, has been a valuable attempt to elucidate the ways in which man receives religious experience and how they affect his behaviors and attitudes. He presents a positive alternative to the attempts to make religion a purely rational matter (or a purely emotional matter) by insisting that each of the functions of thinking, feeling, intuition, and sensation,¹³ must play a part in the fully developed person.

His conception of the role of the unconscious in religion is particularly striking. Conversion phenomena, for example, are obviously important for a full consideration of the relation between Christ and the human self. Jung's view of the compensatory function of the unconscious offers a possible explanation of the emotional intensity of some conversion experiences and of the sorts of changes sometimes evident from, say, a dominant emphasis on rational thought to an over-emphasis on feeling or intuition. More than this, however, his theory of the existence and potential power of

¹³ *Psych Types*, p. 9ff.
the archetypes is an expression of a conviction that the
distorted, perverted, limited part of man is not the whole
truth about man. Jung suggests, in this conception, that
there is a potentil in man which can be re-activated given
the appropriate circumstances.

This is a much more subtle conception than most state­
ments about an essentially good or positive-thrusting core in
man which the individual person can utilize for his own sal­
vation. Jung suggests that buried within man, but inaccessible
to him in the sense that he cannot produce it by sheer act of
will, lies a power which is strong enough to influence and
correct his personal misdirections and inadequate orientations
to life. This power has to be activated from beyond the
bounds of ego consciousness. This view has a rough theologi­
cal parallel in the conception of *imago dei* as something which
man has not lost irretrievably through its destruction, but
rather as something which has become overlaid, distorted,
damaged, etc., while yet remaining a true image which can be
restored to its original configurations by the grace and power
of God.

This innate power, which Jung speaks of in terms of
an archetypal disposition towards wholeness, can be either
constructive or destructive of individual life. From the
viewpoint of the conscious ego it seems to be alien and
intrusive and to erupt into spontaneous life with its threat
and its promise. But, Jung argues, the process of activation of the power is triggered by natural process occurring beneath the level of consciousness.

One way to conceptualize this process is to say that the archetype is only apparently dormant. In fact it constantly seeks, in its own independent mode of existence, a form in which it can be expressed. It can be roused into active life by the encounter with (i.e., by the unconscious recognition of) anything that seems to be expressive of a greater wholeness than the wholeness of the individual person concerned. By means of a psychic force whose nearest physical parallel is magnetic attraction, it appropriates the perceived wholeness and gives expression to its own urge towards wholeness in the form of symbols relating to the perceived whole. These symbols are released into consciousness and if the conscious ego can handle them appropriately, the desired movement towards wholeness in the individual person begins to take shape. Jung stresses that the process of individuation is both painful and slow.

Jesus Christ, in his view, is one powerful expression of greater wholeness which can rouse the archetypal predisposition to life and thus activate the process by means of which man faces his own depths without being overwhelmed by them. From within these depths again and again come the questions of one's identity, destiny, and relationship, and to the
extent that one understands the answers to these questions he experiences wholeness. The particular figure, Jesus Christ, has been recognized in Western culture for so many centuries as an expression of wholeness that it has become pre-eminently the figure to which the symbols arising from the collective unconscious of Western man refer. Even when there is no explicit and conscious awareness of any connection between the symbols presented in consciousness and the person of Jesus Christ, Jung argues that there is a strong unconscious relationship.

This view takes seriously the fact that encounter with Christ must be encounter which affects man both in his conscious living and in the unconscious dimensions of life. It attempts to provide a framework within which the action of Christ on contemporary man can be comprehended. But it also creates problems.

In this conception Christ "lives" because the idea of Christ as the epitome of wholeness persists in the collective unconscious of Western man. Christ has no contemporary existence beyond this and even the historical life of Jesus of Nazareth becomes relatively unimportant. What is important is that there once was a life which was responded to as a fitting expression of the deep urge within the human psyche to give form to the disposition towards wholeness, and that this response has been reinforced by the experience of men through
the ages. Christ has been experienced as one who knew who he was, where he was going and who knew the vital importance of relationships. The Christian theologian must object that this conception of Christ is too limited, but he must also seriously ponder whether it is not one possible way of conceptualizing the relation between Christ and individual man.

Jung's conception also places a premium upon a particular order of immediate experience, that is, experience of dreams, visions, etc., which embody the symbols arising from the collective unconscious. Jung speaks as if these were the only valid forms of religious experience. The dogmas and doctrines of the Church, its liturgy and its community life, are reduced to the status of second-hand expressions of valid symbols of the collective unconscious. He concedes that this mediate experience may be necessary for most people but contends that it is a hindrance to the aristocratic élite who are capable of sustaining direct experience of God.

It is salutary to be reminded that religious exercises can be substitutes (and quite inadequate ones) for genuinely personal experiences of faith, and to be reminded that different persons have different capacities to endure experiences of the presence and power of God. But Jung gets dangerously close to suggesting that the only full, free, and final liberation and enrichment must come in the fashion he describes in the individuation process. The Christian theologian cannot
concede that there is only one way in which Christ may be encountered or that anything other than a particular mode of appropriation of mystical experience is a concession to human weakness. The biblical witness strongly suggests that God may encounter man in the manner, time, and place of His own appointing and reflection upon images and symbols of the type envisaged by Jung does not constitute the sole possibility for this encounter.

Another positive feature of Jung's emphasis upon the unconscious dimensions is the new order of significance that is thereby given myth as a vehicle for conveying reality.

(c) Another noteworthy feature of Jung's position is his concern to find identity, destiny and meaningful relationships in human life at all stages. Whereas many psychologists have enriched human understanding by concentrating upon the earliest years of life and upon the development of the powers of mastery over and adjustment to the environment, Jung has gone beyond this. He has sought to underline the importance of also coming to terms with the different realities involved in the later years of life. He has seen clearly that adjustment means different things at different stages of life, that one must both adjust to different realities and also employ different approaches to these different realities. It is by now a commonplace to recognize that what may be normal at age twelve can be aberrant at age twenty-six. It is
salutary to be reminded that what is properly regarded as maturity at age twenty-six may be immaturity at age fifty-six.

There are three characteristics of these present times which make this insight the more relevant and important. The first is the ever-increasing extension of normal life expectancy which has already created a dramatic upsurge in the percentage of older citizens in the communities of the Western world. The second is the high premium that tends to be placed in contemporary living upon activism, achievement and a form of success which is largely measured in materialistic terms. Jung reminds modern man that achievement and success have their place but that they cannot be made the sole resources from which value systems are derived. The third characteristic is the prevalent preoccupation of modern man with his own psychology. Never before in history has the ordinary man been so concerned, or considered himself so well-equipped, to uncover the secrets of his innermost life. This "age of anxiety" constantly finds men and women of all ages desperately posing the question of identity: "Who am I?"; of destiny, "Where am I going?"; of relatedness, "What do others mean to me?"

Jung offers no easy answers to these questions but he does issue the timely warning that there are more answers than one and that the questions mean different things at different stages of life. For example, the child's search
for identity is conducted in terms of the meaning of the developmental stages through which he is passing. Within certain limits, the child has no option but to grow and his questing for identity in this process is largely concerned with the problems involved in losing the security of a particular stage of development for the unknown dimensions of that to which life is summoning him.

For the young adult, "Who am I?" takes on different significance. Here the question is posed in terms of extension and mastery over one's world. It is a matter of establishing capacities and limitations and appropriate attitudes towards each, of developing potentials that have lain dormant, of testing relationships and of making decisions in the important areas of marriage, vocation, and one's place within society. It is a time of expansion and the question of identity is basically concerned with retaining a sense of personal significance in and through this expansion.

But Jung suggests that in the second half of life the world begins to contract again and that the older adult must turn from extension to intension to probe the question of the significance of his own being when his roles as father, worker, and even citizen, are no longer the most important thing about him. It is in connection with this phase of life that Jung speaks of the emergence of the self.
Two problems are posed for the present study by Jung's making the individuation process a phase of development most appropriate to the second half of life. The first concerns the self: is there no sense in which man is or has something which may appropriately be called a self before he begins to confront the contents of his own unconscious in such a way as to lead to the integration of unconscious contents into consciousness?

The second problem concerns the meaning for selfhood of experiences which are conceptualized as "encounters with Christ" and which may occur at any age and frequently do occur (in some form of conversion experience) in the period of adolescence or immediate post-adolescence. Jung has little to offer on this point although, as his own writings and those of his disciple Frances Wickes clearly show, the activity of the collective unconscious in symbol formation is certainly not confined to the later years. Eruptions occurring even in childhood are regarded as important in determining modes of adjustment at the particular stage of life at which they occur.

It was suggested above that what was called Jung's inclusive concept of self, the self that man is, is not of the same order as the process concept of self, the self that man may become through the individuation process. This means that one would have to look elsewhere for any conception of a form of self antecedent to the development of the process
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM EVALUATION OF NIEBUHR AND JUNG

concept of self. If the main function of the self is taken to be integrative, then the question is what performs the integrative function in personality prior to the emergence of the self.

Clearly, it is the ego which informs the direction of movement of life before it is supplanted by the self. Does this then make the ego a prior form or mode of selfhood? Ego is the center of consciousness and it is clear that Jung regards the personal dimensions of the unconscious as, in principle, the same as material actually in consciousness. The ego, then, may be conceived as the organizing principle which brings the resources of consciousness and the personal unconscious into the focus necessary to meet the demands of life at a period when the emphasis is properly upon the expansion and mastery of one's world. In this sense it performs an integrating function but the wholeness which is comprehended in the term integration is here limited.

In general terms, then, one may say that man first develops an ego as an integrative center but in due course the mode of adjustment dictated by the ego becomes increasingly less satisfactory and the whole which the ego comprehends proves to be an inadequate and an illusory conception. In the years of the climacteric, the ego as integrative center proves more of a hindrance than a help in the realization of all that is in man to become. If he is to realize his own full
potential, man must strive to cease looking about him for new worlds to conquer and to actualize those deeper dimensions of his own being which lie in the collective unconscious. If this process is carried out conscientiously, a new mode of integration appears involving a new concept of wholeness; a new concept of identity, destiny and proper relationships. To this new mode and new wholeness, Jung gives the name self and the role of Christ in the formation of this self has already been discussed.

There is, then, a real sense in which the ego and the self belong together in the developmental process in adulthood as successive modes of integration. Jung chooses to render them by different names to highlight the differences between extension and intension, between adjustment which is primarily concerned with coming to terms with the world about, and adjustment which is primarily concerned with coming to terms with the world within. That which is being integrated is different in each case, and the whole that is formed in the integrative process is conceived in a correspondingly different fashion.

These differences are important but it is also true that there is a general sense in which both ego and self are different dimensions of a continuous process of selfhood viewed as the integrative function in human personality. The terms of the present investigation require this functional constant to be taken seriously, just as the differences are to be taken seriously.
C. Specific Conclusions

The following particular contributions of Jung will be availed of in the constructive statements to support our hypothesis. It is emphasized, however, that the use to be made of these will not necessarily accord with Jung's own use of them within his psychology.

(i) The stress on the role of religion in meeting man's needs, and particularly his unconscious needs.

(ii) The recognition that individual persons cannot, by conscious effort of their own wills, create the conditions under which they will find identity, destiny and relatedness.

(iii) The awareness that man can easily sacrifice his individuality but thereby loses an important part of his own reality.

(iv) The insistence that genuine religious experience must also be personal experience and that any formal expressions of religion must make allowance for individual differences in experience and in sophistication.

(v) The illumination of the processes by which man projects his own attributes onto the external world and worships the gods of his own creating, and the limited efficacy of such gods in pointing the way toward wholeness.

(vi) The emphasis upon the need to understand all of life and death as manifestations of one's identity, destiny and relatedness.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS RELEVANT TO THE SELF AND JESUS CHRIST

This concluding chapter represents an attempt to support the basic hypothesis posed in the introduction and explored in the first two chapters of this dissertation largely in terms of the specific contributions of Niebuhr and Jung as discussed in chapters three and four, but detailed and specified in chapter five. The two major parts of the hypothesis, as we saw, are:

(a) a Christian believer's life of freedom is experienced psychologically as wholeness because that freedom involves the same dimensions of self as does the process of wholeness;

(b) Christ is experienced as playing a significant role in shaping the dimensions of self.

It became apparent in chapter five and it will become even more clear in this final chapter that the dimensions of self are identity, destiny, and relatedness.

It is apparent that the whole subject cannot be treated exhaustively in one dissertation so that there are in fact two tasks to be accomplished. The first is to give as specific and concrete an understanding of the self and the role of Jesus Christ as the data allow. The second is to provide a context and a direction of thought as a basis for a larger-scale treatment and to indicate specific areas where further work is required.

This chapter will be divided into three main sections. The first will be devoted to a reconsideration of the notions
of freedom, wholeness and of self and will present a formal
description of self. The second will be concerned with the
way in which freedom and wholeness, our two descriptive
terms for the one common experience of selfhood, are bridged
by the dimensions of identity, destiny and relatedness. The
third will deal with the significance of the Christ experi­
ence in shaping the self.

1. Freedom, Wholeness and Self Reconsidered.

In the first two chapters of this dissertation, and
following a brief review of some major theological and
psychological approaches to the concept of self, it was
suggested that the most fruitful approach to selfhood was
likely to be one which emphasized function. In accordance
with this view it was there proposed that the self be re­
garded in general terms as the integrative function of per­
sonality. It was recognized that the introduction of the
notion of integration raised questions about the relationship
of wholeness, freedom and selfhood. It was also recognized
that the general understanding of the self would need both
modification and amplification in the light of the more
intensive study of Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl Jung.

It is now appropriate that this preliminary under­
standing be re-examined and the present section will be
devoted to establishing the sense in which freedom, wholeness
and the self can most appropriately be conceived, so as to support the hypothesis.

A. The Meaning of Freedom

Our detailed study of Niebuhr's thought with regards to man makes it clear beyond doubt that he construes the problem of the self to be in the last analysis the problem of human freedom, if human freedom be defined in terms of an awareness of the extent to which human achievement is and should be both limited and limitless.

We have seen that the self's anxious fall into self-concern, resulting from its misuse of freedom, is experienced as an incompleteness or a lack of wholeness. But the self's anxious misuse of freedom is accompanied by the possibilities of its opposite—the recovery of freedom, the reunification of body and spirit, the movement into creativity, both in contemplation and action.

For Niebuhr human freedom lies in an especial kind of balance between human achievement and the limitations and partialities which such achievement inevitably but not necessarily encounters. Man's freedom lies neither in simply fulfilling himself any more than it lies in simply realizing the limits and boundaries of his fulfillments and accomplishments. Instead, it consists in a right relation between both of these. The self must realize and in effect "see" that it
truly becomes itself only when three conditions have been satisfied. First, it must construe, logically and rationally, structures of meaning whereby it can progressively modify itself and its world. The self must, in other words, comprehend itself and its world, and at this point its possibilities for progress and achievement are limitless. But in addition to comprehending itself and its world, the self must also comprehend the fact that it is in turn comprehended by a principle of comprehension which lies beyond itself and beyond the structures of meaning which it has, in and of itself, derived. At the upper ranges of human accomplishment meaning merges into mystery, and this realm of mystery is properly as much a part of the self as is the realm of comprehension and meaning. Third, the self must recognize that its freedom lies strictly neither in such meaning nor in such mystery per se, but in an especial or right relation between the two.

In short, human freedom lies in the self's recognition that its meaningful achievements are always limited by a realm of mystery and that this realm of mystery is—and here, we suggest, is the most fundamental of the many, many Niebuhrian paradoxes—the final meaning from which all natural, rational and even spiritual achievements derive their significance. This experience in which the self comprehends that it is comprehended from beyond, is a double action in which the self,
in coming to know that it is known by God, comes to know God and itself. This is the constitutive human experience in which selfhood, freedom and knowledge of God coalesce into an inseparable and indistinguishable whole.

Because such freedom is a mark of the self in its wholeness or totality, it cannot be characteristic simply of the cognitive life of the self, as this discussion of meaning and mystery might suggest. This root definition of Niebuhr's view of freedom can be so construed as to include the natural, functional and societal aspects of the self as well. In this sense, freedom is a bringing together of all of these aspects in such a way that it both includes and is included by them.

Freedom, as an experience of the right relation between meaning and mystery, includes first of all a natural or structural aspect, an objective "what" or fact which is actually experienced with respect to the self. This objective "what" or fact of freedom is experienced psychologically as both the "essential" wholeness and actual or "existential" incompleteness of the dimensions of the self.

This paradoxical way of experiencing freedom is characteristic of many other life experiences. Regardless of how distorted and infected with sin the self may be in any particular individual, social or historical situation, the possibility of recovering its essential wholeness is always present. This essential wholeness can and does, from time to
time and under certain conditions, become concrete in even the most disastrous, destructive and uncreative situations. Therefore, the actual conditions of life, the existential conflicts between nature, reason and spirit, are vital to the integration of the self.

The self is free or not free insofar as it psychologically experiences the dialectic between essential wholeness and existential incompleteness to be at once the central meaning of its life as well as one which inevitably eludes—excepting those all-important but all too transitory moments of self-transcendence—its capacity for comprehension.

The object of the self's experience must be subjectively appropriated or comprehended, and therefore human freedom has a functional as well as a natural aspect, consisting in the alternately distorting and clarifying processes of self-deception and self-recognition. At this point we may draw upon two concepts to which Niebuhr gives relatively little attention, but which we believe to be highly instructive. The opposing processes of self-deception and self-recognition are also defined by the paradox of "an organic unity of consciousness" on the one hand and "mechanistic causality" on the other hand, and freedom depends upon the extent to which the former prevails.¹ Niebuhr is concerned

¹ For a discussion of these two concepts, see "TinM."
to assert, in the former conception, a centered self constituted not only by a unity of body and spirit, but also by an undistorted and fully conscious experience of this unity or wholeness. "Organic" suggests a kind of primary connectedness between body and spirit, while "unity of consciousness" suggests an experience of this unity as a wholeness untainted by the anxious distortions of temptation. Such conscious experience is in sharp contrast to mechanistic causality. "Mechanistic" suggests the absence of self-consciousness and "causality" suggests a self-consciousness caused or determined and therefore clouded by natural and rational forces.

While the natural and functional aspects of freedom are primarily characteristic of the individual self, they must be viewed within the context of their societal environment. The self's freedom is also determined by its relation to history, for deception and recognition occur only in relation to other life. At the individual level love is the moral expression or aspect of freedom, and it represents the potential achievements of the self, both as a wholeness of body and spirit and as a wholeness of consciousness. But love occurs in a social context, and at the social level it takes the form of democratic justice. Justice represents
the inevitable limitations which all impulses to love encounter. Yet the democratic process—however rough and tolerable is its justice—nevertheless fully exemplifies both the possible achievements of self-recognition as well as the ironies of self-deception.

The self experiences Niebuhr's human freedom psychologically as a wholeness characterized by the right relationship between meaning and mystery, between comprehension and being comprehended, a process which gives shape not only to the self's peculiar nature as both a wholeness and incompleteness of body and spirit and as both proudly deceiving itself and creatively recognizing itself, but also to its equally peculiar social destiny as the creator and creature of justice and injustice.

B. The Meaning of Wholeness

There are two tasks to be performed in this subsection: first to explore in brief the general understanding of wholeness as a process with both ideal and realistic dimensions, and secondly, to establish a particular perspective upon wholeness which can be used as a basis for conceptualizing one's experience of self.

(a) Static and Process Concepts of Wholeness.—In the discussion of the two senses in which Jung employs the term self (p. 224f. above) it was concluded that his inclusive
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concept of wholeness and of self is an essentially static conception at a level of discourse different from his process concept of wholeness and of self. The static concept of wholeness highlights that sense in which man is said to be whole because he is an indissoluble unity of body, mind and spirit, or because, so far as his psychic life is concerned, he has both a consciousness and an unconscious. The value of this static conception of wholeness is that it does safeguard against the illegitimate abstraction of any of these aspects of human life as the important truth about man. Its limitation for the present purpose is that it does not permit any differentiation between man and man or between what a particular person is and what he may become.

The alternative understanding of wholeness which will be adopted here takes account of the fact that both Niebuhr and Jung see man as a teleologically oriented being. They each claim, though Niebuhr less explicitly than Jung, that man is so constituted as to be in process of movement toward a goal or purpose in life. Recognizing that both authors are keenly aware that there are temptations, inhibitions, and difficulties which obtrude in the attempted fulfillment of this goal, it can be said that Niebuhr and Jung both imply that there is some norm or standard of wholeness against which an individual life can be measured. For both Niebuhr and Jung Christ clarifies this norm but it is important to
recognize that neither author is prepared to make this norm absolute in any static sense.

Jung chooses to put the emphasis upon the individual's coming to terms with both the extent and depth of his own psychic life and hence becoming whole. He claims that nothing has to be added to human life from beyond the bounds of the individual psyche in order that man may become whole. But he also claims that the individual ego is incapable of comprehending the depths of the collective unconscious and that, therefore, the self has to come into existence as the new center of personality.

Niebuhr by no means denies the importance of the individual but strongly suggests that unity or wholeness in human life has to take account of the total context in which the individual lives. This means that man cannot be considered united and whole unless he recognizes that he is in a particular relationship to God and that, because of this relationship, he has certain responsibilities toward others and toward himself. Niebuhr claims that man cannot become united or whole unless he receives from God that which he cannot supply from the resources of his own psyche, namely, God's revelation of Himself which establishes the reality in which all life is lived.

The question of norms or standards and the role of Christ in these has still to be faced. It will be apparent
that wholeness in relation to man can be spoken of either in terms of an ideal equally applicable to all men, or in terms which take seriously the actual limitations of freedom under which particular persons must operate in life. For purposes of differentiation these two perspectives may be designated ideal wholeness and realistic wholeness.

Both Niebuhr and Jung regard Jesus Christ as providing the norm for ideal wholeness. Niebuhr regards the person of Jesus Christ as the new man, the true man, the wholeness of what it means to be man, a unity of body, mind and spirit. So far as Jung is concerned the Christ-figure is the embodiment of wholeness (for Western man) and the more so if the traditional figure is expanded to include both evil and the feminine principle. It is clear, however, that man never achieves the ideal in this life. For Niebuhr this is a fact of life dictated by the continuing presence of the limitations of man's freedom. Jung speaks of the unknown and unknowable boundaries of the psyche which prevent man ever from becoming whole in any static sense. It is also true that both authors see Christ as representative man as well as ideal man, but in considering him as the ideal it is important to recognize that one is dealing with a dynamic life and not with a mere synthesis of particular attributes, qualities, and principles.

At times Jung does seem to view the Christ-figure as little more than the incarnation of the principle of
enantiodromia but he also insists that the most significant mode of the "imitation of Christ" is to live one's "own proper [... life] as truly as he lived his in its individual uniqueness."² This means that the ideal is itself a process, a manner of life, and not a static thing which can be copied as regards all its details. The details of Christ's own life are important for their individual contribution to the uniqueness of his life and not as specific measures to which the details of other lives must conform before it can be said that those other lives are whole.

As has been seen, Jung speaks of wholeness in individual human lives largely as a possibility restricted to the second half of life which is the period at which it is more appropriate to confront the contents of the collective unconscious and to come to terms with them. From his different perspective on what constitutes an experience of freedom, wholeness and encounter with Christ, Niebuhr sets no one period of life aside as being more appropriate for wholeness than any other. Experiences of Christ are not reserved for the second half of life although it is true that Niebuhr discusses man mainly in terms applicable to the mature, adult, and fully developed person. This difference in approach to the appropriate time for the emergence of wholeness raises an important problem for the concept of wholeness.

² "Psychotherapists or the Clergy," in PR:WE, p. 341.
Jung points out that man passes through successive developmental stages which involve physiological and psychological growth and decline. This means that there are different limitations and different possibilities open to man in the periods, say, of infancy, of childhood, of adolescence, of young adulthood, and through into senescence. The fact of difference at different stages applies to all men and it is possible to make general statements about the distinctive characteristics of each developmental stage. But Jung also points out, and this can hardly be disputed, that individual persons living in twentieth century Western civilization function at different levels of sophistication and have varying capacities to endure certain orders of experience. This insight can be broadened to recognize that not only are there tremendous differences in the abilities and capacities with which individual persons are endowed, but there are also extensive variations in the actual opportunities and experiences to which individual persons are exposed.

Any concept of wholeness which makes no provision for these general and specific differences dictated by the stage reached in the developmental process and by specific life experiences, is likely to remain so much of an abstraction as to be of little value for the attempt to arrive at an adequate understanding of selfhood. Thus it becomes necessary to speak of realistic wholeness.
The concept of realistic wholeness involves the idea of the appropriation by the individual of all necessary resources beyond himself, together with the development of all that realistically can be developed within the person. It takes account of the necessary tensions between conflicting aspects of the person's total life but implies the resolution of avoidable conflicts and tensions. Also implied in this concept is some measure of discrimination between the forces and conditions of personal and social life which can be changed, and those which must be accepted, even if only temporarily, as immutable. The norm of the ideal is not lost to sight in the concept of realistic wholeness but the application of the ideal to the individual life can be neither rigid nor absolute. How, then, can one meaningfully speak of wholeness in these realistic terms?

Jung's formula, "to live one's own proper life as truly as he lived his in its individual uniqueness," still seems appropriate as a general statement. In view of what has been said above, it is recognized that a pre-condition of "truly living" is the awareness of the reality given in the revelation of God, insofar as it lies within a man's ability to be aware of this revelation. There is an important distinction to be made between the person who is so limited in his mental functioning that such an awareness is quite beyond his capacities and the person who has the necessary freedom but, for whatever reason, has not developed the awareness.
It is by no means a simple matter to establish what the realistic freedom and limitation are with respect to a given person in a particular situation. The boundaries of possibility are rarely clear. Some of the difficulties involved can be illustrated by a consideration of three situations of varying complexity.

In the first situation we recognize that severely retarded persons and the grossly deformed are certainly human in the sense that they are not merely animal and they are neither vegetable nor mineral. In a descriptive sense they live at the extreme limit of the distinctively human. Persons so afflicted obviously are not ideally whole or free, nor can they become so in this life. In the more extreme cases there is no great difficulty in determining the narrow limits of their capacities (although the frequently attendant inability to communicate requires that some latitude be allowed in defining boundaries). The severely retarded can hardly be said to be capable of understanding the revelation of God in Jesus Christ in any meaningful intellectual sense—but this does not mean, of course, that they do not live under the judgment and mercy of God in Christ. If such a person lives fully to the limits prescribed by his physical and mental condition, then it can meaningfully be said that that person lived a realistically free and whole life. Any growth within these limits of freedom is a growth in humanity, a move in
the direction of greater wholeness. Any extension of the narrow limits of freedom within which his life is confined, whether it be by manipulation of the external environment, by successful therapies of whatever kind, or by any other means, constitutes a new possibility of wholeness for the person concerned. He may, or may not, take full advantage of the new limits of freedom and thus may, or may not, experience the new potential for wholeness.

Secondly, the person, for example, who is handicapped by the loss of an arm, obviously has much wider limits of freedom within which he can live than has the idiot. The handicap may have far-reaching effects upon other aspects of his life but while it does constitute a reality with which the person must learn to live, it is only one factor among many in his life.

Artificial limbs, of varying degrees of effectiveness, can now be obtained to help compensate for such deficiencies. But these appliances have to be purchased or otherwise procured before they are available to a particular individual in need. For many persons this constitutes a practical barrier to their having an artificial arm—either they cannot afford one, or they are so situated that one is not available to them. Then, too, a certain order of determination and will power, and a certain willingness to accept both the limitation of freedom and the substitute limb, are required before an
artificial arm is likely to be effective. That is to say, there are conditions both external and internal to the individual which may limit the practicality of compensating for his deficiency by using an artificial limb.

A given individual may have the necessary attitudes but no funds. A second may have the funds but no incentive. A third may have incentive and funds but no opportunity because of isolation, ignorance, or the inequitable distribution of medical appliances. A fourth may conscientiously decide that he can adapt his remaining faculties sufficiently well to provide adequately for himself and for those for whom he is responsible. A fifth may be reluctant to accept an artificial arm, even as a gift, because he feels that to do so would deprive someone else in greater need than he. Other responses are also possible within this same general situation. It is obviously arbitrary to decree, in abstraction, that one attitude and one only, and one set of social circumstances and one only, constitutes the realization of realistic freedom and wholeness for persons afflicted with the loss of an arm. And since this handicap, serious though it is, by no means determines the totality of the person's life, the question of his general freedom and wholeness becomes even more complex.

Thirdly, the neurotic person (or, as Karen Horney would say, each person to the extent that he is neurotic) has
adopted a certain order of defence against real or perceived threat to his integrity as a person. The effects of the neurosis may be restrictive and limiting but the intent is positive and, within certain limits, the adoption of the neurotic pattern enables the person concerned to continue functioning. It sometimes happens that the form that the neurosis takes makes possible a very high level of socially useful functioning in a particular direction. For example, a person who is compulsive, to a degree short of obsession, may for that reason be capable of an order of concentration and single-mindedness which enables him to perform efficiently at tasks requiring intense and sustained attention to detail. Resolving the neurotic pattern and breaking down the defense system may very well extend the areas of life from which the person concerned can experience pleasure and profit. But it may also remove the motivation for those socially useful behaviors which arose as a consequence of the one-sided development of the personality.

Niebuhr insists that individual wholeness must issue in both freedom and responsibility and he quite properly sees these two things as intimately interrelated. But it is never easy to determine the point at which the legitimate demands of social responsibility must inhibit the expression of

3 FH, p. 95.
individual freedom. Similarly it is not possible to decree in abstraction the point at which the individual must be allowed freedom from certain orders of social responsibility for the sake of his own individuality. Freedom from some orders of restriction enables one to be free for certain orders of responsibility but one must also be free from certain other orders of responsibility in order to be free for the exercise of genuine responsibility to oneself and to others.

In regard to the question of freedom and responsibility, Jung and Niebuhr both emphasize the need for freedom from those orders of social relatedness which inhibit the development of true individuality in the belief that becoming a self will inevitably and automatically lead to genuine social responsibility.

(b) Perspective on Wholeness.- We have applied the criteria of nature, function, sociality, and Christ-event to Niebuhr's and Jung's understanding of self for purposes of analyzing that self. Out of this analysis it became clear that the critical questions raised by Niebuhr and by Jung in connection with the concept of freedom and wholeness revolved around a three-point focus which can be expressed, so far as an individual is concerned, in three distinct but related
questions: "Who and what am I?"; "Where am I going?"; "How do I relate to persons and things around me?" It is readily apparent that these three are, respectively, questions of identity, destiny and relatedness.

That is to say, the really crucial thing about Niebuhr's experience of the self as freedom and Jung's experience of it as wholeness is that the experience involves the three dimensions of identity, destiny and relatedness, dimensions which point beyond doubt to the fact that the mutual experience of the two thinkers is identical even though conceptualized differently.

Jung gives expression to this in his conception of the individuated person as one who knows the extent and depth of his own being in both its conscious and unconscious dimensions (although the latter are never fully known nor are they known in the same ways as the conscious dimensions). The individuated man knows the meaning of his own existence in terms of his own being and, by realizing his solidarity with human kind through the ages, he is led to a renewed sense of responsibility to his contemporaries. In the thought of Niebuhr the genuinely whole man is not so much concerned to know who and what he is "in himself" (although Niebuhr does not deny the legitimacy of that question and actually asks it of
himself) as he is to know the ambiguity of his own being as one simultaneously limited and free. The meaning of one's life is clarified by the Christ-event in such a way that the self becomes aware of its identity, destiny and relatedness.

This concern for identity, destiny and relatedness, found with different emphases in both Niebuhr and Jung, and their common experience that Jesus Christ plays a central role in defining the identity, destiny and relatedness of the self, links Niebuhr's and Jung's understanding of the self more closely than perhaps either of them would have realized.

The perspective upon wholeness and freedom which has this threefold focus also obtains clarification from the New Testament picture of Jesus Christ who is represented (and nowhere more clearly or succinctly than in the eighth chapter of John's Gospel) as the man who knew who he was (v. 28), whence he had come and whither he was going (v. 14), and who could clearly define his relationship to other men (vv. 16, 31ff.) and their appropriate response to him (John 13.34-35). The sense of identity, destiny, and relatedness which characterized the life of Christ is always and everywhere in the Gospels set in the context of his relationship to God and his awareness of God's will and purpose. It is also contrasted sharply with the pretensions of those who claim to know themselves and their relation to God, with all that flows from
that knowledge, but who do not know God in Jesus Christ (see, e.g., John 9).

Considering these three points of focus as together constituting the most important thing to be said about freedom and wholeness in man now makes it possible to conceptualize a universal experience of the self which is not only useful in the psychology of religion and life but which also allows for the preservation of the permanently valuable insights of the approach to selfhood as discussed in chapter two above. The experience of the self must now be explored in greater detail.

C. The Meaning of the Self

In this subsection we shall continue to generate support for the hypothesis as presented in the introduction of this thesis. A revised understanding of self will be presented and, since the notion of integration is to be retained, the above discussion on the concept of freedom and wholeness will help shape this presentation. Some important implications of this revised understanding of the self will be briefly discussed together with the relation of this approach to selfhood to the particular ideas of Niebuhr and Jung.

One of the characteristics which distinguishes man from the other animals, and yet at the same time affirms his belonging to the animal creation, is his capacity to be aware
of his own identity, his destiny, and his relatedness. The life process seems to invest man with the peculiar responsibility to discover who and what he is, to live in accordance with some meaning and purpose, to discover and pursue goals in life, and to establish appropriate relationships with other men and with the other orders of creation. The nature, functions and sociality of the self provide for the exercise of this responsibility through the formation and development of human life.

In accordance with all the foregoing, it is now possible to amplify the understanding of self given in chapter two above and to describe self as a perspective upon human personality. More specifically, self is the human personality viewed from the standpoints of freedom and wholeness which are experienced in at least three dimensions: the sense of identity, the sense of destiny, and the sense of relatedness. It will be necessary in a later section to explore more closely what is meant by identity, destiny, and relatedness.

It should be emphasized that the self is not a "little man within the breast" which organizes behavior and experience independently of other psychic processes. It is a way of looking at a total phenomenon of human life, i.e., at human personality. It is not the only way of looking at personality but such a concept of the self makes it possible to distinguish, for the sake of clarification, those functions
which bring together in a fluid but relatively consistent whole the many and varied experiences of freedom and wholeness in an individual to inform his sense of identity, destiny, and relatedness.

It will be apparent that some of the factors which come together in the self will be unconscious processes; others will be conscious. Some will have their ultimate genesis totally from within the individual personality; others will be internal reactions or responses to realities originating externally to the individual.

The adoption of this view of the self has several important implications. In the first place, one may speak of a self in human life whenever there is any sense of personal identity, however confused, any sense of destiny, however vague, or any sense of relatedness, however weak. Thus, even the idiot may be said to have a self in the minimal sense that he possesses a rudimentary awareness of separateness (identity) and dependence (relatedness), and that he gives unconscious testimony to a meaning and purpose in life by his continuing to live (destiny).

The self thus conceived is a continuing phenomenon in human life which undergoes change and development in respect to content in accordance with different experiences and with the stages of the developmental processes. Thus, for example, the child, the adolescent, and the middle-aged, may all ask
the same question, "Who am I?" but their different life experiences and their different capacities and limitations in dealing with experience will cause each of them to seek to answer the question in rather different terms and by drawing upon different orders of data.

Similarly, the man who has had no experience of God through Jesus Christ and the Christian believer may each ask the question, "Who am I?" The experience of the Christian with the revelation of God in Jesus Christ provides him with both a different context from within which to ask the question and also with some specific new content which will give rise to an answer of a different quality from that of non-Christian. But it must be emphasized that both believer and non-believer will need to pay attention to some factors which are common to both of them before either can truly and fully answer the question. This matter will be dealt with in greater detail in a later section but one example will help make the point here. The sense of identity involves, among other things, an awareness of sexual identity. The man who has experienced God in Jesus Christ is obviously not thereby absolved from the responsibility of coming to terms with his sexual identity if he would truly seek to know who and what he is.

The psychological emphasis upon selfhood as wholeness carries an important implication for theology. On such a
view of self it is no longer possible for theology to be either for or against the self. The self can neither be identified in its entirety with the old Adam, nor yet regarded as something which comes into existence only in consequence of an experience of Jesus Christ. The freedom of selfhood will always be experienced as a paradox between the old Adam and the new. It is, of course, entirely proper for theology to be concerned about different qualities of selfhood and about the orders of data which are used in an individual life to shape and inform the sense of identity, destiny, and relatedness.

The traditional theological emphases upon self-denial and upon the finding of the self in the following of Christ express important truths but in terms which can be very misleading. It is not the self which is to be denied but rather particular orders of understanding in regard to one's own identity, destiny, and relatedness. More specifically, theology properly contends against any understanding (and against the behaviors which flow from such an understanding) which assumes that the individual can truly and finally know himself without first having to acknowledge the relationship in which he stands before God as a sinner justified by grace.

The Christian believes that the gospel calls man to depart from (or leave behind) the assumption that he is autonomous of God and that he can therefore effect his own wholeness from within his own resources; that he can establish
his own values and standards without reference to the revealed will of God; and that he can give expression to his own impulses, instincts, wishes, and desires, without having to take seriously his responsibility toward others. Self-denial does not mean that the Christian has to repudiate the belief that mankind and each individual person (including oneself) have value and significance; it does mean the repudiation of the belief that man in general and the individual in particular are the creators of value and the ultimate measure of right and wrong, good and evil. Self-denial does not mean that the individual has no right to take his own instincts and impulses and wishes and desires seriously; it does mean that he is called upon to exercise a measure of discipline in regard to the expression of these attributes and a measure of responsibility for others so that his behaviors accord not merely with his own unmodified desires but also with the needs of others and the believed intentions and activity of God. For the believer, self-denial means the abandonment of the gods subtly created by man in his own independent search for answers to the mysteries of life; it means also the acceptance of the revelation of a God who shows himself in Jesus Christ to be consistently for man in his creative and redemptive power and even when this power is expressed in his judgment and his wrath. In a later section the realistic limitations upon man's freedom for this sort of self-denial will be discussed briefly.
Similarly, it is not the self which is found in the process of becoming whole if finding the self is taken to mean discovering or developing a structure, a function, or a process within oneself which did not exist in any form prior to an experience of Jesus Christ. What is found is new data which need to be taken into account, and a new context within which data formerly known require re-assessment. These new data and new context lead to a restructuring of the sense of identity, of destiny, and of relatedness of such an order that only hyperbolic terms like "new freedom," "new wholeness," etc., seem adequate to convey the experience of the difference.

As we have already acknowledged, Niebuhr's concept of the self may be described as freedom. It is the concept which best unifies his thought on the self in all its variety of aspects: man is free, the self is freedom. This is the most basic meaning of selfhood for Niebuhr. To be free is to be a unity of body, mind, and spirit. This freedom is experienced as the necessity and capacity of identity, destiny, and relatedness. The description here proposed is obviously not identical with Jung's and Niebuhr's self. Nevertheless, it is contended that this present approach to selfhood is consistent with the essential elements of Jung's and Niebuhr's self.

The present description cuts across the distinction that Jung draws between ego and self. The functions which he
ascribes to ego and the functions which he ascribes to the self can both find a place within this present understanding of the self. The recognition that it is possible to speak of different qualities of selfhood, however, preserves the important distinctions that he was concerned to make by using the two conceptions of ego and self.

At this juncture it should be made clear that the present conception of selfhood makes possible at least three different orders of discrimination in assessing the self in any given individual. At the descriptive level one may speak of clarity or ambiguity in regard to the self according as the senses of identity, destiny, and relatedness are sharp and clearly defined, or blurred and vague. At the ethical level one may speak of truth or falsity in regard to the self (or, more loosely, of true or false selves) according as the senses of identity, destiny, and relatedness accurately or inaccurately reflect some chosen criterion. In the present discussion the criterion will be the experience of what man is as given in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. No statement is being made, however, about the truth of this revelation.

The third order of discrimination, however, is neither purely descriptive nor purely ethical although it has close affinities with both. It concerns the relative freedom or limitation of the self. In this context freedom means freedom
from certain conditions and preoccupations which limit or prevent the individual from genuinely coming to terms with who and what he is, where he is going, and how he can most appropriately relate to the world around and within him.

The unfree self is the self of selfishness or self-centeredness or eros and, to the degree that the self is unfree, the person is unable to consider orders of reality beyond those which he can directly relate to his own needs and desires. The self will experience an increase of agape to the degree that it is liberated from self-concern or eros.

In their different ways, both Jung and Niebuhr bear witness to the fact that there are orders of understanding of reality which are not open to the person who has not had an experience with Jesus Christ. Both affirm that this experience drastically alters the way in which a person can look at himself, at the purpose and meaning of his life and at his relationships to other persons. Both affirm that there are some things in human personality which continue through and beyond the experience of Christ without being fundamentally changed so that, for example, ego remains ego even when subordinated to the self in Jung's theory and Niebuhr is moved to take account of the ever-present limitation and freedom of the self which can affect one's response to Christ.
Each of these common affirmations gives support to the present conception of the self but in a later section we must be more specific about the things that change and the things that remain constant in the experience of Christ. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to explore in greater detail what is meant by a sense of identity, of destiny, and of relatedness.

2. Freedom Experienced as Wholeness.

The task of this section will be to demonstrate that freedom is experienced as wholeness. It will become evident that this is possible because both freedom and wholeness can be bridged and circumscribed by the dimensions of identity, destiny, and relatedness. This will make it possible in the next section to assess the effect of an experience of God through Jesus Christ in shaping the human self.

Identity, destiny and relatedness are separated only as a matter of convenience, but it will become apparent in the final analysis that they are three dimensions of one identical experience. One cannot have the experience of truly knowing who one is in abstraction from one's relationships to others or apart from the experience of some purpose in one's life. But the separation of these three dimensions has its value because it makes possible a discussion of both the uniqueness of the individual person and his inevitable
involvement with others. The self cannot be experienced as freedom unless this tension between uniqueness and involvement is maintained, and the self cannot be experienced as wholeness unless the latter two are integrated. One cannot here avoid speaking broadly and generally since the factors which together determine any one particular self are of necessity unique to the individual person concerned.

A. Identity in Freedom and Wholeness

The sense of identity is concerned in the first instance with the consciousness of being a free and whole person distinct from other persons and with needs, desires, feelings, hopes, dreams, capacities, and limitations, which are peculiarly one's own. This consciousness arises in the developmental process in the context of relationships with others and is constantly threatened by the presence and power of others in one's life. The development of a clear or definite sense of identity requires a measure of resistance against the impingement of others upon our freedom and wholeness.

The task of realizing the individuality of one's freedom and wholeness begins in infancy through association, which is often in conflict with the task of socialization. The young child has to learn from the significant others in his environment (and particularly from the parents) the
extent to which his use of freedom is socially acceptable behavior, and what is not, and he assimilates this knowledge as he discriminates between the sorts of behavior for which he can expect to be rewarded and those which are likely to result in punishment. Even in the most favorable circumstances this is a difficult task but in healthy development the child both introjects the standards and views of others and also asserts his freedom in displays of open or secret resentment against the thwarting of his own natural desires to become whole. If the resentment is freely expressed, it manifests itself as naughtiness of one kind or another, and if restricted or secretly expressed may be internalized as self-punishment. 

But circumstances are not always favorable and the child may be confused by the ambiguity or inconsistency of the impressions received from the parents as to what is acceptable and what is not. In consequence he may develop a basic uncertainty about who and what he is in relation to others. Alternatively, the child may perceive that freely asserting his independence involves a threat of rejection which is intolerable in its intensity and so he feels compelled to be on the safe side and repress any sense of being

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an individual and thus conform as totally as possible to the expectations of others. It sometimes happens also that a child comes to distrust others so completely, on the basis of these earliest experiences, that he can place reliance only upon what he is able to wrest from the environment by his own efforts. In each instance, his sense of identity as a whole self is likely to become distorted, either in the direction of denial of any separate identity or in the direction of the denial of the significance of others for his own identity. If these conditions are not reversed they can interfere seriously with later adjustments to the demands of life and give rise both to an ambiguous self and a self that is not free. Problems in relation to identity which arise in this way are not necessarily or automatically resolved through an experience of God in Jesus Christ.

The common phenomenon of adolescent rebellion against parental standards and values is another manifestation of resistance to being engulfed by others and consequently restricted in one's freedom. This rebellion may be carried on with varying degrees of awareness of what is involved in it. Conformity continues to pose a threat to individuality throughout life and Jung rightly recognizes that much social activity, including religious social activity, may confirm conformist tendencies at the expense of that freedom and wholeness which demand a sense of identity. But it is also true that it is possible to establish social relationships
which are a complement rather than a threat to individuality. It is important to recognize also that conformity to one set of standards and values (e.g., those of the peer group so far as the adolescent is concerned) may be necessary as a temporary expedient to provide security in the break with another set of external standards and values (e.g., those of the parents). Thus, conformity in itself is not necessarily a threat to the identity that underlies one's experience of freedom and wholeness. It is no part of the present intention to attempt to specify the conditions under which the individual must resist others, and those under which he should conform to the expectations of others.

The dimension of identity also requires some positive content. It is not enough merely to establish independence and individuality; it is also necessary to give some concrete form and shape to the individual "I" that is undergoing an experience of freedom and wholeness. This latter task involves the development of the self's potentials, the adoption of personal standards and values, the recognition of the depth and extent of one's own personality, and the awareness of one's own role in the interpretation and assimilation of experience, etc. It also means coming to terms with the implications of one's biological (animal) nature.

A brief consideration of the role of identification will illustrate some of the problems involved in establishing
positive content in the dimension of identity which is so necessary if one is to experience freedom and wholeness. The earliest identification affected by the developing child is with the parents, and particularly with the parent of the same sex. Closely allied with this is the oedipus complex with its ambivalence toward the same-sex parent and the first primitive movement toward the establishment of sexual identity.

In due course the early parental identifications are transferred to other significant adults or to peers. The phenomenon of hero-worship of a teacher, military hero, sovereign, sporting personality, entertainment star, etc., is partly an attempt to establish one's own identity by the magical appropriation or imitation of the desired qualities possessed by the other, and is partly also an attempt to compensate for the lack of freedom and wholeness that one experiences. That is to say, the growing child attempts to secure an identity by becoming someone else. The process of hero-worship frequently involves the distortion of the hero beyond recognition (either by the intensification of those qualities in him seen as desirable or by the denial of any other qualities in the hero than those seen as desirable).

The attempt to establish freedom and wholeness by identification with another is clearly appropriate in childhood when one's powers and capacities to cope with the demands of daily living are essentially undeveloped. But the
phenomenon of identification is by no means confined to childhood. The popularity of many adult entertainments on TV, stage and screen, for example, rests largely on the fact that members of the viewing audience can identify with the characters portrayed. In much of contemporary society, imitation of those believed to be free and whole is regarded as the surest means of obtaining similar success for oneself and this imitation frequently extends beyond methods to personal characteristics. The boundaries between fantasy and reality are hard to draw but there are limits beyond which the temporary escape from reality or the calculated imitation of another can become falsifications of one's own personal identity, leading the self into the delusion of freedom and wholeness where in reality the self may be severely restricted and fragmented.

The mechanism of searching for freedom and wholeness through identification is of particular interest in the present enquiry because of the fact, highlighted by Jung, that Jesus Christ tends to be seen as a hero-figure with whom men can identify. The legitimacy of the many and varied forms of identification with Christ needs a much more detailed treatment--from both the theological and the psychological perspectives--than it can be given here.

Some approaches to Christian education make an overt bid to claim Christ as the proper object of "boyhood's
inspiration." Both Niebuhr and Jung, however, make it clear that the correspondence between so much of the Christ-myth and other hero-myths of antiquity is a reflection of a need for a hero, characterized by freedom and wholeness, that far outlasts childhood. It seems that man always requires heroes in whom he can invest something of himself and find something of himself. In a pungent phrase, however, Jung warns that "aping the stigmata" of Christ is a perversion of the proper relationship to the hero.

The sense of identity cannot be restricted to what the individual person consciously acknowledges in relation to himself. Jung has shown clearly how man can project onto others, and onto the world at large, attitudes, powers, potentials, and feelings of restriction and fragmentation which, for one reason or another, he is not able or not willing to recognize as being part of the truth concerning his own personal existence. This phenomenon looms large in religion and represents the attempt to incorporate within the sense of identity the full range of one's own attributes without having to acknowledge that they are in fact one's own.

Similarly, a well-behaved and law-abiding citizen may harbor a secret admiration for the criminal and delinquent whom he publicly denounces. This ambivalence bears testimony to the fact that there is present within the law-abiding man personal experiences of restriction and fragmentation which
he cannot consciously acknowledge as a genuine part of his own personality but which can unconsciously be recognized and responded to when present in another person.

The self experiences both freedom and wholeness together as a well developed sense of personal identity and can therefore afford to withdraw these projections and identifications while recognizing the full extent of its own powers and potentials as well as its restrictions and frustrations. This involves equally coming to terms with the experience of what is good within oneself as well as with what is evil, with those things which are regarded as socially reprehensible as well as those which are regarded as socially desirable.

It is common in the early years of adulthood to abandon the intense introspection of adolescence and to seek to find the self's freedom and wholeness in the various roles one is called upon to play in life, e.g., as husband, father, worker, member of this organization or that, etc. It is important to recognize that this mode of search for identity may not be articulated as a search for identity and indeed is more likely to be seen by the person concerned as part of the attempt to find meaning, purpose, and significance in life. In point of fact it is an experience of both the quest for identity and for destiny of the self cast largely in terms of material gains. As both Niebuhr and Jung have
pointed out, early adulthood is the period of concern for achieving freedom and wholeness, but at that stage identity tends to be sought in terms of success and achievement in material things if it has not previously been established on other grounds.

Jung makes the further valuable point that with increasing age the emphasis on action and achievement may properly give way to a more detached contemplation and assessment. In the second half of life introspection again becomes important and is likely to be more sustained than in earlier periods. The experience of freedom and wholeness has to accommodate itself to the contraction of the demands of life and the breaking of many former ties with other persons and things which shaped the self's identity. It is most particularly at this stage of life that psychic realities beyond those of the personal consciousness and unconscious may press for recognition. The fact of death also represents itself in a new way, and if the event is understood in such a way as to threaten the self's sense of identity then the experience of wholeness and freedom becomes ambiguous.

In sum, then, it can be said that the sense of identity develops naturally in the life process of becoming free and whole if not inhibited by other factors, and that this identity is one of the three dimensions which constitute the experience of human wholeness and the freedom of the Christian believer.
Identity derives specific content from the interaction between self and others at each stage of life. The full development of the sense of personal identity involves coming to experience one's own physical, intellectual, and emotional strengths, weaknesses, assets, skills, limitations, and liabilities. It involves also the resolution of any ambiguities in relation to one's identity in different roles (husband, father, worker, etc.) and in respect to such matters as sexuality. The question of relationships and of life-goals is also important in shaping this content. It is precisely this content of selfhood which forms the bridge over which dialogue between freedom and wholeness may take place. Both these latter experiences may be described in terms of this content, namely, identity, destiny, and relatedness.

During and following an experience of Jesus Christ all these component factors in the sense of identity become clarified and set in a new context in which the paradoxical experiences of freedom, wholeness, restriction, and incompleteness are unified and given meaning. Some of the orders of experience that man has had, and particularly those arising in early childhood, can be so crippling in their inhibition of the sense of identity as to require special therapy in order that the person concerned may regain (or establish for the first time) the freedom and wholeness to know himself and to engage in constructive relationships with other persons.
But, because the Christian believes himself to be comprehended beyond comprehension, he does not experience these crippling events of his life as totally limiting his fundamental freedom.

B. Destiny in Freedom and Wholeness

Under this heading it is intended that the meaning of the sense of destiny be discussed along with the role of religion and faith in clarifying that destiny. Through this discussion it will become clear that destiny forms the second of our three dimensions of human wholeness and the Christian believer's experience of freedom.

The term destiny is used to comprehend three separate but related phenomena in human life. The first is the awareness of the extension of life in time for a period which cannot be designated in advance (except within broad limits). The second is the characteristically human sense of the need to find meaning or significance in order to sustain life. The third is the implicit or explicit setting of life goals to the achievement of which all behavior tends in one way or another.

The first of these three factors, which may be called the sense of futurity, is intimately related to man's resistance to the idea of his own mortality. Life is actually lived by most persons over the greater part of its course in
the implicit belief that he will eventually become free and whole. The importance of life to man is demonstrated in the tenacity with which he hangs onto it even in the most adverse of circumstances.

Man rarely consciously invites death although there is some suggestion that at the unconscious level there are mechanisms which operate in even the healthiest human beings which seek to prepare for appropriate modes of death and to resist inappropriate ones. The circumstances in which man does invite death would seem to fall into two categories: that in which death is viewed as an escape, either from intolerable restrictions of freedom or from a life of disintegration; and that in which death is viewed as an opportunity, either for investing life with freedom and wholeness or for pursuing a destiny which is not available (or is no longer available) in continued living. These attitudes may be thoroughly mixed in any particular individual, and may engender fear, despair, peace, relief, or any combination of these, in the actual face of death.

There are two periods of life in which preoccupation with death is most marked: adolescence and old age. In adolescence the concern expressed for the destiny implied in

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5 Sigmund Freud's Thanatos theory seems to have this idea as a major thrust but little has been done to develop the notion.
one's death is more usually a way of attempting to find freedom and wholeness in life. In old age the concern with death may be both an attempt to find freedom and wholeness in the life that has been lived and a facing of the fact that life has all but run its course. In other words, one's destiny has all but been shaped. The temptation of contemporary Western man at all stages of life is, however, to endeavor to escape the reality of death by denial, by refusal to think about death, by romanticism, or by investment in the idea of a life of wholeness and freedom beyond death. Religion has always been one particularly fruitful means by which man has attempted to give shape and content to a sense of the perpetuation of life beyond the grave. It is not the only means, however, and many persons seek to secure their immortality through their children, through possessions, or through the investment of themselves in a cause, an ideal, the production of a work of art, etc., which they expect to survive their own passing.

We have seen that both Niebuhr and Jung bear witness to the fact that each individual person has a personal history with dimensions in past, present and future. Both affirm the importance of each of these dimensions and both affirm that the individual's own personal history is a participation in, and a reflection of, the history of the human race. Both also affirm that the individual sense of futurity will be
conditioned by the fact of this individual and collective history in its past dimensions. One of the functions of the individuation process, says Jung, is to put man in touch with his own origins; one of man's basic problems, in Niebuhr's view, is that he has lost the awareness of his true origins and has come to regard himself as his own raison d'être.

Both authors claim that it is only as man is led to recover the sense of his own origins that he can truly live in the present and toward the future. That is to say, that both Jung and Niebuhr, each in his own way, suggest that man's having a history and his being in history must be taken seriously by the self if it is to experience freedom and wholeness at any given point in time.

But Niebuhr's main concern is with the belief that an experience of Jesus Christ clarifies the meaning of history for man. In this new understanding of history the determining dimension is not so much the past as it is the future. This history begins with the end and all that precedes the end is recognized only in light of that end.⁶

The effect of this new understanding of history is to place the empirical events belonging to the old history in a new light. The fact of the new history does not alter the fact that these events have taken place and that the specific

⁶ FH, p. 139.
life experiences of a given individual will shape and mold many of his personality characteristics and his general responses to life. The new experience of history does involve the setting of new goals and invests the events of daily living with a new significance. But it does not necessarily cancel the goals formed in response to other specific experiences. At the theological level this particular experience of history possesses, for the Christian believer, the expectation of a destiny of freedom; at the psychological level, however, the new history is just one experience which takes its place along with others in shaping the sense of destiny.

Questions pertaining to a life of wholeness and freedom imply the existence of some sort of context within which specific events and experiences may be viewed, some sort of Weltanschauung. This world view need not be made explicit in order to be effective in the life of a particular person. Jung claims, in effect, that man can experience wholeness in life by establishing a harmony with the life-processes themselves. Niebuhr argues that in order to be truly free, life must be experienced in proper perspective, one must be enabled to look beyond the empirical realities to recognize that human life has its significance in a comprehension beyond comprehension.

When the focus of attention is upon the individual self it becomes apparent that specific goals are set within
the general context of the individual's world view. These specific goals are shaped and informed by specific life experiences of the same order as those which shape the individual sense of identity. That which is regarded as significant for wholeness and freedom in a particular person's life will be that which is in accord with the particular goals of that life.

Dynamic psychology has made it clear that there are both implicit and explicit goals operating in any given person's life and that the implicit ones may be contradictory to, and more powerful than, those explicitly acknowledged. It is not uncommon for persons to achieve specific goals or ambitions that they have set for themselves (e.g., in terms of vocational or educational success) and yet to find themselves unfree and incomplete rather than free and whole after achievement. This may very well be due not to any inherent incapacity in those goals and ambitions to yield satisfaction, but rather to the fact that the acknowledged goals represent only a small portion of the total goal-structure of the individual concerned and the larger, unconscious, portion remains restricted and only partially whole.

It has been suggested above that religion may be a major source of definite content for the sense of freedom and wholeness in life. But religion itself is a product of human experience and aspirations. It is appropriate at
this point to look a little more closely at the phenomenon of religion.

Jung has provided a wealth of fascinating data concerning the way in which man uses religion to satisfy his need to find meaning and significance in life and in death. Jung regards it as the natural and proper function of religion to put man in touch with his own depths in such a way that he is not overwhelmed by those depths. That means, among other things, that he sees religion as the natural and proper mode of formulating and expressing those realities which must be taken into account in any attempt to find one's full personal destiny and to find freedom and wholeness in the experiences of life and death. The particular religious forms which he advocates as most useful for this general purpose are those which enable man to make sense of the psychic experiences which the ego cannot control or understand.

In his fourfold typology of persons who cannot be Christians, those who should be Roman Catholics, Protestants within Protestantism, and Protestants beyond Protestantism, Jung draws attention not merely to the different capacities of different individuals to endure certain orders of direct experience, but also to the fact that different persons will find the questions pertaining to their own destiny best met in different forms of religious activity, doctrine, and understanding.
The religion that a man adopts may well mold his views on other aspects of his life, but it is equally true that the effects of other experiences of life upon the individual personality will play their part in determining the sort of religion that a man will adopt. For example, the person who, as a child, was deprived of love and affection in his most formative years, may well have difficulty in conceiving of a God who is love; the man ridden by secret guilt, however, may need a God who is relentless and implacable in his searching out of sin and terrible in his wrath--only such a God can adequately punish. The person who has experienced forgiveness at the level of human relationships can the more readily find meaning in a God who forgives and loves; the man who harbors a deep (and neurotic) sense of his own omnipotence may need a God who will punish and destroy others who do not give that man his due.

For Niebuhr, religion "does not promise to overcome the fragmentary and contradictory aspects of man's historic existence."7

As Niebuhr has suggested, and Jung has richly illustrated, religion as an answer to man's felt needs is, in the final analysis, a human creation with a long tradition and many modes of expression. Religions may vary in their

7 FH, p. 135.
effectiveness in answering the questions pertaining to a particular man's destiny. Religions may vary in accordance with the cultural conditions of a specific area or race, the level of sophistication of the individual believers, and the specific life experiences of the persons concerned.

For Western man in this age and time, the forms of religious expression are likely to be shaped by the conceptions of the Christian faith which have been so influential in individual lives over the centuries and in molding the general culture. There are many reasons why Christianity has persisted as so strong an influence on Western thought that even in the contemporary widespread apostacy from Christianity the Christian influenced forms and conceptions remain, if only as forces in the collective unconscious. Not least of these reasons is the early association of the Christian church with the power of the State. This association made the Christian thought-forms common currency in the Roman Empire and, later, in the reconstituted Europe. The political, social, and economic power of the Church in past days made provision for the wide dissemination of its teachings and for their general acceptance. It should be emphasized here that we are making no claim for Christianity as a superior form of religion. We are simply pointing to the fact that Christianity has shaped the understanding of our destiny and ultimately the development of our freedom and wholeness.

The experience of faith does not necessarily accompany the assimilation of doctrine. One consequence of this has
been the persistence side-by-side of a Christian faith and a Christian religion so intimately interrelated that the forms of the one are and have been all but indistinguishable from the forms of the other.

Both Jung and Niebuhr recognized that religious forms widely current in their day were lacking in the sophistication necessary to meet the needs of truly modern man, and they each felt that these religious forms would become increasingly irrelevant as the general level of sophistication developed. From this common awareness Jung pleaded for a more sophisticated form of religion by a reinterpretation of traditional categories so that man's destiny could be understood more adequately. Niebuhr, on the other hand, pointed out that there is a "destruction of self-hood through a too desperate effort to preserve and realize it," and that this destruction can be overcome when man gives in to the "power and mercy in faith." Christ does not come mainly to answer man's immediate problems, or to annul his natural condition, but to reveal to him an ultimate freedom which transcends reason.

Since it is to the believing man living in this world that the revelation of God comes, it is within the structure of this world that the revelation of man's destiny is made

8 FH, p. 136.
manifest. Religion is one of the structures of this world by which the believer experiences freedom and wholeness as an uneasy tension of contradiction and affirmation. Thus that paradox which Niebuhr speaks of as an impossible possibility for the man who, of his own volition, tries to follow Christ is both poles apart from the life in Christ given as Christ's gift and also shares many of the structures, attitudes, and behaviors of the true life in Christ. The religion of which Jung speaks may be a vehicle for the faith with which Niebuhr is concerned, and it may be a barrier to faith. The one thing which neither Niebuhr nor Jung gives much guidance on is how, in practice, faith achieves what religion cannot achieve. Niebuhr stresses the paradox between the initiative of God and the initiative of man. The response to the initiative of God is said to issue in a freedom which religion, as the activity of man, cannot supply. This is obviously of crucial importance when the self is being looked at from the standpoint of its destiny. For Jung, Christ, in his own person, clarifies the destiny of man by drawing together the human and the divine, and hence the temporal and the eternal, the unique and the universal,⁹ life and death. In so doing, Christ is recognized as the redeeming and saving embodiment of man's destiny. It is precisely this destiny which describes

⁹ Aion, p. 63.
the wholeness of self. Thus man in the process of individuation can see in Christ the meaning of the suffering that he is undergoing and experiences it as pointing to the destiny toward which he is in process.

C. Relatedness in Freedom and Wholeness

We must now examine the third dimension of selfhood to see how it may help describe the experience of freedom and wholeness. It has already been suggested that the sense of relatedness is intimately connected to both the sense of identity and the sense of destiny. The discussions above have incidentally shed some light upon the development of the sense of relatedness.

By relatedness is meant the awareness of one's own belonging in the world, one's place in relationship to other persons and to the structures of community, society, and humanity. The self comprehends the relationships established both with those who are physically or emotionally close (family, friends, business associates, companions, etc.) and those who may be remote and personally unknown but who nevertheless constitute the other members of the race, the clan, the nation, the world, humanity. It will also include one's relationships to the other orders of creation, both animate and inanimate.
The sense of relatedness will manifest itself in such areas of life as friendship, love and marriage, social relations, work and play, community responsibilities, political views and activities, and indeed in every area of life in which a person is confronted with the fact or idea of other persons, institutions, and even things.

As we saw above when talking about identity, one of the earliest experiences of life is the experience of the presence and importance of other persons in one's life. One of the first tasks of life is to develop attitudes and behavior patterns which will enable the child to cope with this fact in a manner most likely to yield him an experience of freedom and wholeness. From the child's point of view other persons are significant only as they satisfy or frustrate his own needs and desires to be free and whole. So far as he is concerned, any independent existence of others is quite irrelevant.

Something of this attitude toward other persons—regarding them in terms of their usefulness for oneself—tends to persist throughout life to greater or lesser extent. As the situations of life become more complex, however, and the child learns to postpone present satisfactions for the sake of even greater satisfactions in the future, the relationship between particular attitudes or behaviors toward others and the satisfaction of one's own needs for freedom and wholeness
tends to become less obvious. The process of rationalization also makes it possible for man to convince himself that he genuinely acts for the good of others without thinking of his own good. In a complex society it becomes increasingly difficult to know what behaviors and attitudes will in fact serve one's own interests best. Closely allied with this is the difficulty of knowing how to become free and whole, a difficulty which is compounded by the fact that many human desires and needs are not readily available to consciousness.

The young child forms his reactions to other persons on two bases. The first is his perception of their attitudes toward him, or his interpretation of their actions in terms of acceptance or rejection of him. The second is his own psychosexual development which creates different needs in him, for the satisfaction of which he is dependent upon others, at different stages. Both these bases are of fundamental importance in determining the later capacity to become free and whole. If the child is fortunate enough to become relatively free and whole, he will experience these developments as a capacity to satisfactorily relate to others. The two bases on which the young child forms his reaction to others can be illustrated.

The formation of attitudes (and behaviors) to others in reaction to their attitudes toward oneself can be illustrated by a brief discussion of a difficulty commonly
encountered in later life when relating at depth to (loving) another person. No attempt will be made to go into all the complexities of human loving nor into all the shades of meaning which have gathered around the term love. In general, however, it can be said that the capacity to express love (and indeed to feel it) is largely derived reflexively, that is, it arises from the experience of being loved. But the capacity to recognize that one has been loved, and that one is loved, depends largely upon the ability to recognize and acknowledge that one is capable of being loved. The paradox of adulthood is that one cannot feel lovable unless one has first experienced being loved; one cannot accept that one is experiencing being loved unless one can accept oneself as lovable. The same paradox applies to the freedom, wholeness, relatedness dilemma. One cannot experience adequate relationships with others unless one is free and whole; one cannot become free and whole unless he has experienced adequate relationships with others.

The above dilemma is a common one in contemporary Western society but it is a peculiarly adult dilemma. The small child can accept a genuine priority of the experience of being loved which leads to his valuing himself as someone relatively free and whole. If this experience is forthcoming he will find little difficulty in later years valuing himself as free and whole and this self-concept will be confirmed by
his subsequent experience of adequate relationships. But if this experience of adequate relationships is denied in childhood (and the denial can be very subtle), or if the child interprets his childhood experience as denial, then the vicious cycle of the adult dilemma gets started and becomes self-perpetuating until and unless something breaks in from beyond the circle. This something may, in the present day and age, be a form of psychotherapy.

The importance of adequate or satisfactory relationships is widely recognized in society generally (and certainly in religion) but without any correspondingly widespread ability to relate deeply with others. In consequence, many persons may be aware of their need of these relationships, but yet not be free and whole enough to risk the threat of possible rejection and open themselves to an experience of a relationship in depth.

In more general terms it may be said that the ability to experience deep relationships requires a freedom from certain orders of concern about oneself. Granted this freedom, however, man may relate to others deeply, widely, and lovingly. But this does not mean that during the experience of deep relationships the self does not have some admixture of its own concern for personal freedom and wholeness. We have seen that both Jung and Niebuhr speak of this paradox.
Attitudes formed as a result of the particular demands of the various psychosexual developmental stages of childhood can be illustrated by reference to the oedipus complex. The ambivalence toward the parents which characterizes the oedipal situation normally does not exist in the first few years of life. Inadequate resolution of the oedipus complex, however, can result in lasting restrictions of one's freedom to relate to other persons, and particularly to persons in positions of authority.

Similarly, the relationship between the sexes undergoes changes at various stages according to the particular level of development reached. Frustrations, inhibitions or fixations in early development can result in adult sexual development which is not whole or complete.

The above observations are made to illustrate the importance of early training and experience upon later modes of relatedness to other persons, and ultimately upon one's freedom and wholeness. The illustrations could be extended to cover many areas of life such as the political, the social, the business or vocational areas, etc. Suffice it here to say that these manifestations of the sense of relatedness will be both the product of early character formation and will help shape and mold specific later attitudes and behaviors. Thus, for example, a man's politics may be conservative or liberal either by virtue of conformity to learned
patterns of political response or in rebellion against these learned patterns. But having opted for a particular political orientation, this orientation will itself supply specific content for various forms of relationships to other persons. The same can be said for religious orientations.

By way of summary, it can be said that the experience of freedom and wholeness in its most adequate and satisfactory form will contain a variety of component factors, but certainly none of these factors will occupy a more important place than relatedness. It is precisely for this reason that freedom and wholeness may be described in terms of relatedness.

It should be emphasized that freedom and wholeness are not to be understood as interchangeable. This is in no way our intention. Even though we have not reverted to the fact, it should be understood, in light of what has been said in preceding chapters, that in the present section freedom always implies a human experience theologically conceptualized by a Christian believer, while wholeness always implies a human experience psychologically conceptualized. Our point is that freedom and wholeness are, respectively, theological and psychological descriptions of one identical experience. We can say this because both freedom and wholeness are experienced as, and may be described in terms of a unity of identity, destiny, and relatedness. We can say further that human wholeness may be described in terms of identity, destiny,
and relatedness; the Christian believer's experience of freedom may also be described in terms of identity, destiny, and relatedness, therefore, the Christian believer's experience of freedom may be described in terms of human wholeness. The first part of our hypothesis as presented in the introduction is hereby supported:

A Christian believer's life of freedom is experienced psychologically as wholeness because that freedom involves the same dimensions of self as does the process of wholeness.

The dimensions of self are, of course, identity, destiny and relatedness.

3. The Experience of Jesus Christ.

The major task now remaining is to enquire more specifically into the role played by the Christ experience in shaping or restructuring of the human self. In this section, therefore, it is intended to discuss briefly the sense in which Jesus Christ is experienced, the processes involved in an experience of Christ, and the effect of such an experience upon the dimensions of identity, destiny, and relatedness in terms of what changes and what remains constant in the self of a particular person. This enquiry will yield support for the second part of our hypothesis:

Christ is experienced as playing a significant role in shaping the dimensions of self.

A. How Is Jesus Christ Experienced?

We have seen that Niebuhr refers to the grace of Christ as "the power of God over man" and as "the power of God in man." He is saying that in Christ both wisdom and power are available to man. Not only has the meaning of man's life been made known but also the means have been made available to fulfill that meaning.11

Jesus Christ is the one who demonstrates to man the fact that man is both sinner and guiltless before God; he is both bound to God in unbreakable unity and has also proclaimed himself independent of God. The Christian experiences himself in this revelation both as the man who lives as if God did not exist and as the man who cannot live except by the grace and power of God. But with this knowledge of his own contradiction comes the insight that the same Jesus Christ who has revealed the contradiction to him has overcome it in His own person and that the new history into which he has been inaugurated has already replaced the old history in which he still lives in the uneasy tension between the paradox of affirmation and denial.

Niebuhr speaks at two levels when he discusses the role of Christ. At the one level Christ is experienced as the

person who, when he encounters a man, gives that man the power to endure the tensions and ambiguities of daily living and, indeed, the power to live freely within the structures of ordinary life. This He does by enabling the person to make responsible decisions both in respect to himself and to others. At the other level, Jesus Christ is experienced as the one who, in his coming to a man, makes it known that the ultimate and final truth about that man is not given in a consideration of what the person is and does but in the knowledge of what God is doing.

Jung makes it clear that when he speaks of the contemporary existence of Jesus Christ he is concerned only with the fact that contemporary men and women have ideas about Christ and that there are images which arise from the collective unconscious which can be regarded as historically linked to the Christ-figure. As a psychologist (and a prudent man) Jung claims that there is no empirical evidence to support the contention that these ideas and images have, or may have, any ultimate reference beyond the confines of man's own psyche.

Theology recognizes and accepts the impossibility of bringing any empirical evidence to bear to prove the independent existence and the free action of God in Christ. Only faith can bring one to believe the reality proclaimed in the revelation of Christ, the reality which testifies to the activity of God in the world, in the community of the Church, in the Word and sacraments, and in individual lives.
It is important to recognize that the claim of faith that God in his independent reality can and does encounter man does not mean that Jung's insights can be regarded as relevant only for a discussion of the man without faith. It is tempting to assume that what Jung has to say applies only to man's attempt to provide for his own salvation from the resources available to him within his own psyche in consequence of the experience of humanity through the ages. Notwithstanding Jung's personal reluctance to speak unequivocally about the independent reality of Christ, such an assumption is premature. When Christ is experienced by man, that experience is registered as an idea, a conviction, and an image which possesses power. Only in faith can one believe that it is the coming of Christ to man and not the spontaneous action of man's own psyche. This means that it is important to know how ideas and images of Christ operate within man.

Jung's conception of the images arising from the collective unconscious places stress upon that which comes to man from beyond the bounds of the ego and it is this emphasis which makes his discussion relevant for an understanding of the encounter with Christ who, as faith attests, comes to man from beyond the bounds of man's own ego. This does not mean that God can be located in the psyche (an idea which Niebuhr implicitly rejected) but it does mean that if man is to know anything of God psychic processes will be involved in his knowing.
As a psychological study, our purpose is neither to establish the independent reality of Christ nor to suggest that the reality of Christ is dependent upon a person's experience of Him. We are simply saying that in order to experience Christ as a power over him and in him, man must to some extent experience Christ as independent of himself.

We have already seen that in his conception of the idea of Christ, Jung does not lose sight of the purpose or function that the idea can perform in human life. Thus, there is a sense in which he, too, characterizes Jesus Christ in terms of His impact in or over man.

At the psychological level no differentiation can be made between an experience whose object is believed to be true and one whose object is in fact true. An experience resulting from illusion or delusion can be identical to that resulting from reality or truth. At the psychological level there is no way of distinguishing between: (a) an experience of Christ arising within the psyche as a result of the impinging action of an external and independent reality, and (b) an experience of Christ arising within the psyche without any immediate external origin.

It is clear that Niebuhr and Jung are primarily concerned with different sources of the experience of Christ. Niebuhr's conceptualizations are largely drawn from that experience which comes in the dynamic process of living with
others and in the engagement of one's full powers with the challenges and opportunities of life. Jung's descriptions center in that source of experience which comes in contemplation of the depth and extent of one's own psyche. As has been suggested, these sources each have a particular appropriateness at different stages of life. Both introspective contemplation and activity have their place; each can complement the other, but neither can claim to give man an experience of the whole truth about Christ.

There are some persons, both old and young, for whom introspection becomes an escape from reality and reflects a form of bondage of the self. When introspection represents undue ego-preoccupation the self is relatively unfree to recognize Jesus Christ—and further introspection may only compound the problem of the bondage of the self. Similarly, there are persons who seek to escape from reality by plunging themselves into activity, even activity for others, and this may reflect another form of bondage of the self. In such instances it may be necessary for the person to look within before the full effect of Jesus Christ can be experienced.

Jung's discussion places a great deal of emphasis upon the role of the archetypes in the formation of the self. It was suggested, in chapter five above, that the Christian theologian who regards Jung's conception of Christ as too narrow must nevertheless also ask whether there is not some
wisdom in the idea of the archetypes to which theology could profitably attend. This point must now be made more clear.

Looked at from a theological perspective it appears that there is in man some point of contact (to borrow a phrase from Emil Brunner) to which the revelation of God makes appeal. Niebuhr calls this point of contact comprehension beyond comprehension. When this point of contact or comprehension is looked at from a psychological point of view, Jung presents evidence by way of the archetypes to suggest that there is some structure in man (for which Jung attempts to prescribe a form) which makes it possible for man to respond to figures, conceptions, persons, etc., which he perceived to be possessed of greater wholeness than he himself has. Jung states that the Christ-figure is one which activates this archetypal disposition toward wholeness. Obviously, Jung credits his archetypes with more power than most theologians would ascribe to a point of contact, but the notion of archetype would seem to have some significance in an attempt to express the dynamics of an experience of Christ.

We have seen above that identity, destiny, and relatedness are the terms which have been adopted as a bridge between the Christian believer's experience of freedom and the human experience of wholeness. In one sense, the archetypes can be understood as the experience of an innate striving to realize a sense of identity, destiny, and relatedness. In light of
what has been said up to this point, it is here contended that man will give some content to this striving with or without an experience of Jesus Christ. But it is also contended that in the experience of Christ the sense of identity is challenged by the declaration that man can understand himself in the midst of all his contradictions more lucidly in light of that same Christ experience; the sense of destiny is challenged by the declaration that man can understand his own end and the significance of his own life more clearly when he experiences himself in some way as the bearer of Christ's image; and the sense of relatedness is challenged by the declaration that man gains a clearer understanding of what it means to act lovingly and responsibly when he experiences himself as sharing in the freedom and wholeness of a loving relationship with Christ. However, a statement such as this is empty unless some attempt is made to differentiate between the things that change and the things that remain constant in respect to the self through an experience of Jesus Christ.

B. Continuity and Discontinuity in the Self

The task here is to discuss in specific terms the sorts of things that do change in regard to man's self through an experience of Jesus Christ, and those which do not. It is contended that one cannot simply characterize the self as shaped by the Christ experience by pointing only to the new context in which the whole of life is set and the specific new content to be taken into account in arriving at a sense
The consistent claim of Christian theology has been that to know oneself as a sinner redeemed by the grace of God is not merely to possess another lifeless or abstract fact. This truth is said to make men free (John 8.32) and while this freedom certainly has an eschatological reference, it is also said to be manifest in the structures of daily living so that the Christian becomes a "new creature." What, then, is genuinely new in the new creature? This question can best be answered by looking first at some of those things which are significant for the selfhood of man (since the self is the primary concern of this dissertation) and which remain unchanged in and through an experience of Jesus Christ.

In the first place it is clear, for example, that bodily functions remain the same before, during, and after and experience of Jesus Christ. In a more extended treatment of this theme provision would need to be made for a full discussion of Christian healing but, in general terms, it can be said that an experience of Christ does not basically alter bodily functioning. Does this matter?

The fact of continuity is of peripheral interest only insofar as many of the bodily functions are concerned. The breathing apparatus, for example, operates so automatically that unless some malfunctioning occurs or some abnormality
develops, the fact that one breathes receives little or no attention in the quest for identity, destiny, or relatedness. The fact that one continues to breathe after experiencing Jesus Christ may, in theological terms, be a testimony to the grace of God but it does not invest breathing with any greater significance for selfhood.

But there are also some bodily functions which are important in the shaping of the self and the fact that these continue in and through an experience of Christ is of much more moment than continued breathing. The sexual function, for example, plays a large role in informing the sense of identity, of destiny, and of relatedness. The fact that man is a sexual being creates both problems and possibilities for him which reflect in his sense of who and what he is, in the goals that he implicitly and explicitly sets for himself in life, in the meaning and significance he attaches to various aspects of life, and in the way in which he reacts to others round about him.

The degree of ambiguity or clarity which obtains in respect to an individual's awareness of his own sexual identity will play a part in structuring his general sense of identity. The male who has experienced Jesus Christ has still to come to terms with the continuing implications of what it means for him that he is male and not female. Similarly, the woman who has experienced Christ has still to reckon with
her femininity in her continuing search for identity. If the basic problems of sexual identity have not been resolved prior to an experience of Christ, they will continue to obscure the sense of identity subsequent to that experience until and unless some specific help is given with these problems. This help may, and frequently does, necessarily involve some form of counseling or explicit therapy.

In the same way the frustrations and fixations which can arise in the course of psychosexual development do not automatically cease to be or to become problems when a person enters into a faith relationship to Jesus Christ. The unresolved oedipus complex, for example, may still interfere both with the sense of identity and the sense of relatedness (and also with particular theological understandings); the implicit goals of life may still bear the mark of the influence of early experiences of satisfaction or frustration in the expressions of infantile sexuality. Genital maturity brings new orders of possibility in respect to relationships at depth and new opportunities for the expression of one's sense of destiny, identity, and relatedness in and through one's family.

In other words, the adult who experiences Christ is a man who has been a child and who has therefore been involved in the processes of sexual development. Because of this involvement, and irrespective of the specifics applying in
each individual instance, it can be said that there will be some elements in the personality structure which are important for the self and which will have become fixed to the point where they strenuously resist change. The self after an experience of Christ will still reflect these characteristics.

In general terms, then, it is possible to say that such matters as biological structure and the instincts with which men are equipped (recognizing the difficulties involved in determining these) will of necessity continue to be part of man in and through the experience of Christ. Character patterns established and reinforced through actual experiences of life will also frequently persist through the experience of Christ.

But one must also reckon with the possibility that specific help given with specific problems of personality may actually be the start of an experience of Jesus Christ. The fact that someone has cared sufficiently to help, has offered love or forgiveness or acceptance in such a way that it can be recognized and appropriated by the needy person, may well be the mode by which the mercy and compassion of Christ are experienced by that person. Subsequently, the person who has been helped may come to recognize that in the encounter with the helping individual, or group, or community, he has experienced Jesus Christ.
In these circumstances, the experience of Christ does involve changing basic personality structures but it must be recognized that this process is often long and even painful.

It is also possible that established character patterns will receive new forms of expression through an experience of Christ. Such seems to have been the case with the Apostle Paul, for example, when his zeal for persecution gave way to zeal in the propagation of the Christian faith. In this change he demonstrated that he continued to be the man who could not do anything by half-measure but the motivation behind this determination to excel was capable of being harnessed in different causes.

An experience of Jesus Christ can bring changes in attitudes and behavior but it is apparent that change will not always and necessarily be in the one direction. In regard to sexuality, for example, it is clear that some persons find a new freedom to rejoice in the God-given sexual function after experiencing Jesus Christ. They become more free and whole with respect to sex. But others may become more rigid and more puritanical with respect to sex. These different directions of change do not reflect differences in the Christ experience but rather enduring differences in the personality make-up of the persons experiencing Christ (which may be compounded by different modes of proclamation of the Gospel).
Similarly, one cannot simply say that the whole value system of the person changes after he experiences Christ. Perhaps many things which were formerly looked upon as unimportant will receive more attention and other things which seemed very important will become peripheral. But at a deeper level, many of the forces which formerly operated in ascribing value to particular orders of experience will still operate.

One implication of this discussion is that not only can a neurotic experience Christ but one who has experienced Christ may also become neurotic. The fact that a man can see himself in a larger context does not mean that his neurosis ceases to be an important part of him. To the extent that he is neurotic the way in which he views the larger context will be distorted.

From a theological point of view, Niebuhr insists that the Church has a responsibility to proclaim the biblical understanding of the freedom of the Christian man, of the responsible service demanded of the Christian, and of such matters as love, sex, etc. But this proclamation does not in and of itself produce that freedom or that responsibility for each and every person who experiences Christ any more than it ensures that each and every Christian will in fact hold the same views on love and sex and on other subjects.
Insofar as the church's proclamation is a valid statement of the biblical view, and a valid reflection of what is believed to be God's revealed will and intention for man, this proclamation is a statement of possibility for man. It is also a description of the deep experiences of man—the hidden dimensions which do not necessarily and automatically find expression in the empirical realm with respect to each and every detail of the life of the individual person. The realization of this possibility, the actualization of these dimensions, in the life of any given individual may require much time, opportunity for growth, and perhaps special and even intensive education and therapy to remove particular obstacles. For some persons, the full possibility will forever remain unattainable.

We can say that the dimensions of selfhood are shaped by Christ theologically through his clarifying effect as principle revealer and psychologically through his clarifying effect as principle archetype. Through an experience of Christ as a symbol of freedom and wholeness, man comes to a more lucid understanding of his own identity, destiny and relatedness. Through this experience he is also enabled to live with his own failings short of this fullness, but hopefully expecting to grow in the direction of greater wholeness. From a psychological point of view the Christian who believes himself to be redeemed by God in Christ can look less
timidly upon his own limitations, upon the evil and destruc-
tive and rebellious tendencies within himself.

And believing himself to be still a sinner, he can be helped to a recognition that these things are genuinely part of him and do not have to be hidden away in his uncon-
scious or projected onto others. Realistically, a given individual may need help, and even psychotherapeutic help, before he can embark on this discovery of his own psychic extension. It is, of course, quite possible for a man to know the extent of his own psyche (to the degree that it is possible for any man) without knowing Christ—but without the experience of Christ the meaning of one's own identity, destiny and relatedness is not that easily understood.

In summary, that dimension of the self which changes as a result of the Christ experience is understood as a new possibility for relationships, a new sense of where one is going in life and a clearer image of who one is. Through his experience of Christ, man is presented with a new image of freedom and wholeness which, among other ways, he may redefine in terms of identity, destiny and relatedness. But since the experience of Christ gives man a clearer under-
standing of his responsibility for self and others, it also requires him to take seriously those dimensions of his sense of identity, destiny and relatedness which continue to express his own biological structure and personality
characteristics, his own implicit and explicit goals and values, and the way in which he is, in fact, able to relate to other persons and institutions. His self receives a new context and some new content but continues to be in recognizable continuity with what it was before the experience. In light of the preceding development, the second part of our hypothesis has been supported:

Christ is experienced as playing a significant role in shaping the dimensions of self.

These dimensions of self, as we have demonstrated, are identity, destiny, and relatedness.

In this study of the human dimensions of selfhood we have compared the process of wholeness and the Christian's life of freedom. The analysis was carried out by applying the criteria of nature, function, sociality and the Christ-event to the human experience of self. The self is described theologically by Niebuhr as freedom, and psychologically by Jung as wholeness. These are two ways of describing one and the same experience. This oneness is manifested in the fact that the underlying human dimensions of both wholeness and freedom can be understood as identity, destiny and relatedness. It has also been demonstrated that these three dimensions are shaped by Jesus Christ. The process of this research has been diagrammed in Figure 1, on page xxii.
Our final task is to present briefly some suggestions for further research which emerge from the present study. The subject matter of dialogical studies such as the present, is the interrelationship between disciplines. These fields of dialogue are area studies rather than disciplines grounded in well formed methodologies. It does not, therefore, come as a surprise that methodology is an important issue in the psychology of religion or more specifically in the dialogue between a psychologist and a theologian.

James Forsyth, using the criteria of transformation, transcendence and discontinuity, has developed a method applicable to a substantial number of psychologists and theologians. He has been successful in making a psychological study of the religious phenomenon of man while remaining faithful to the proper domain of both theology and psychology. Following a very similar method, the present research has been undertaken using the criteria—nature, function, sociality and the Christ-event—as a standard or rule by which to analyze a psychologist and a theologian with respect to their experience of selfhood. This research remains faithful to the proper sphere of each discipline. From the analysis it became clear that even though each thinker

12 Forsyth, op. cit.
described his experience differently, both experiences were identical because each included the dimensions—identity, destiny and relatedness. Jung, the psychologist, describes this experience as wholeness; Niebuhr, the theologian, describes it as freedom.

The whole field of dialogical studies has gained strong momentum in the past twenty years and today no good reason presents itself to suggest that Forsyth's criteria or that used in the present research cannot be applied to a wide variety of concerns experienced by contemporary psychologists and theologians. Examples of this type of future research could perhaps involve dialogical and comparative studies of the following men with reference to the issues central to their thought: Rollo May's self-awareness and Jürgen Moltmann's eschatological freedom; Alfred Adler's creative self and Norman Pittenger's God in process; Erik Erikson's self-identity and Charles Hartshorne's divine relativity; Carol Rogers' real self and Teilhard de Chardin's omega point; Ludwig Binswanger's Dasein and James Macquarrie's ultimate concern; Abraham Maslow's identity-experience and Bernard Lonergan's concept of religious conversion.


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APPENDIX 1

ABSTRACT OF

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The purpose of this dissertation is to acquire an adequate psychological perspective upon the human self and to explore the relationship between the self and Jesus Christ. It endeavors to be faithful to the insights of contemporary dynamic psychology in general, and analytic psychology in particular, through an analysis of C. G. Jung's thought on the self. This study also analyzes the important contributions to the understanding of selfhood made by Christian dialectical theology in the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr.

More specifically, this is a comparative study to demonstrate that the human dimensions of selfhood described as freedom in the theology of Niebuhr are identical to those human dimensions of selfhood described as wholeness in the psychology of Jung. The dimensions of identity, destiny and relatedness have been chosen to describe psychologically the integrating function at work in the experience of becoming

free and whole, thus the hypothesis is that (a) a Christian believer's life of freedom is experienced psychologically as wholeness because that freedom involves the same dimensions of self as does the process of wholeness, and (b) Christ is experienced as playing a significant role in shaping the dimensions of self. The hypothesis is substantiated on the grounds that the dimensions of self—identity, destiny and relatedness—are found to be present in both the process of human wholeness and the Christian's life of freedom.

Chapter one situates the present study in a contemporary context through the presentation of several typical views of this dissertation's main theme, treated by both the theological and psychological disciplines. It concludes that the most fruitful concept of self is considered to be the integrative function in human personality.

This work leads into chapter two and the formulation of tentative descriptions and understandings of both self and Jesus Christ which are used as guides until the final descriptions are put forward. In chapters three and four the criteria of nature, function, sociality and the Christ-event are applied first to the thought of Niebuhr and then to that of Jung for the purpose of analyzing each man's concept of self. The conclusions are that Niebuhr's most descriptive term for self is freedom and that Jung's term for it is wholeness.
Chapter five presents the conclusions rendered from a psychological critique of Niebuhr's and Jung's thought as presented in chapters three and four. It yields a series of contributions from each thinker which are then drawn upon in chapter six to support the hypothesis. The sixth and final chapter concludes that the three dimensions of selfhood, identity, destiny and relatedness, underlie both the Christian's life of freedom and the process of human wholeness, thus indicating that the latter are two different conceptualizations of one identical experience of the self. The conclusion is also reached that Jesus Christ is experienced as playing a significant role in shaping the dimensions of self, because through these dimensions he clarifies the Christian meaning of selfhood and serves psychologically as its archetype.