Retranslating Philosophy: 
The Role of Plato’s Republic in Shaping and Understanding Politics and Philosophy in Modern Greece

Effrossyni Fragkou

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the PhD degree in Translation Studies

School of Translation and Interpretation
Faculty of Arts
University of Ottawa

© Effrossyni Fragkou, Ottawa, Canada, 2012
Acknowledgements

This work would not have been possible without the help, contribution, and support of a great number of people who held my hand along the difficult path of its creation and during its different stages. I am particularly greatful to one of the greatest professors I ever had the pleasure and privilege to work with and thanks to whom I received my very first initiation in Translations Studies, the late Daniel Simeoni. I am also intellectually indebted to professors Claude Tatilon, Alan Baudot, and Maria Pateli for showing faith in my capacities and encouraging me to follow my dreams. I am also very greatful to Karen Van Dyck, Dalie Giroux, Salah Basalamah and Francisco Gonzalez for their valuable comments.

I have been very fortunate to be surrounded and loved by a great number of people, such as friends, co-workers, and family all of whom provided practical, financial, intellectual and moral support when I needed it the most. I am particularly greatful to Mehrad, Tony, Elsa, Markos, Lola, Manos, Denis, Kostas, Marianna, Despina; all my friends from Multi-languages; my clients who gave me work when I needed the extra money; and the various publishers who showed faith in my translations and decided to publish them. I would also like to thank the Greek State Scholarship Foundation for its funding and my co-workers from Koraes Public Library in Chios, especially Aristoula, Dora, Maria and Anna. I am extremely greatful to my directors Mr Kalogerakis, Mrs Vlysidou and Mr Konstantinides from the Board of Secondary Education of Chios and the 4th Middle School of Chios for showing understanding and for being more than accommodating with
my schedule. They were the ones who ensured better working conditions so that I would be able to concentrate on my thesis while teaching and doing some important translation work.

There are no words to express my gratitude, appreciation, and respect to my very best friend, Marielle Godbout. She has been standing by me since the very first day I started my PhD programme at the University of Ottawa. She has been the best advisor, the most reliable, honest, trustworthy and warm-hearted friend, a true inspiration, an excellent editor, a critical reader of my work, an extremely generous person who opened her home and her heart to me and my family. This thesis would not have been possible without her help and constant encouragement. I will be forever indebted.

I consider myself extremely fortunate to have been given the opportunity and the privilege to undergo this research under the supervision of two amazing professors, Annie Brisset and Jacques Bouchard. Their intellectual and academic caliber made me humble in front of the wealth of knowledge they so generously shared with me. Their guidance had been unparalleled and their complementary fields allowed me to expand the scope of my methodological and research perspective as well as my approach vis-à-vis the Translations Studies. Our discussions evolving around my research topic were always inspirational and engaging. Their immense psychological support, in addition to their academic guidance, has been extremely appreciated. It is thanks to them that I reached the finishing line. I only hope I will be able to make them proud and as such to repay them for all they have done for me.
I would also like to thank my sister and my brother-in-law for their support and patience, especially during the most challenging times of my work. Finally, I would like to publicly voice my indebtedness to my parents for being the best, most generous, most supportive and most engaging parents a child could ever dream of or have. Everything I am, everything I do, and everything I will ever accomplish, I owe to them for they made sure —through all kind of sacrifices, hardship, as well as endless hours of work, guidance and sleeplessness— that my dreams and that of my sister materialized. It is only fair that this research be dedicated to them as a token of my immense love and infinite appreciation.
To Stergios and Mary,

my parents, my beacons!
Abstract

This thesis seeks to advance a new hypothesis for addressing retranslations, namely that the traditional explanation according to which translations become outdated and must be renewed can no longer account for all the aspects of the retranslation phenomenon.

I propose to view retranslation as a means of transforming documents into monuments, of unearthing the mass of elements they contain and of making them relevant to the present and to the future. Retranslations become a source of inspiration for original philosophical texts, hence new philosophical trends or schools of thought, and for commentaries on the translation and its agents, all of which reflect the place and time where they emerge, thus shaping symbols of self-representation, collective consciousness, memory, and identity.

I test this hypothesis through the exploration of 20th century Modern Greek retranslations of Plato’s *Republic* and through the examination of the diachronic and synchronic values of key political and philosophical elements of Plato’s system within the retranslations. These retranslations reflect not only how Plato’s philosophy is perceived by the modern Greek philosophical and political environment, but also whether they represent and prolong the canonical discourse on classical philosophy or introduce a more critical turn.

I explore a case of a philosophical text whereby key elements of the *Republic* become a source of inspiration to answer basic questions of justice and polity from a modern point of view.
I conclude that retranslations project the aspirations, fears, and values of the time and space in which they emerge while using the openness of the text to add extra layers of interpretation and meaning. Almost all retranslations and their corresponding paratext maintain a consistent referential relationship with one another and with other political and philosophical texts produced during the same period. The link that ties these texts together is not necessarily chronological. It also depends on the discursive approach adopted; the translator’s political or philosophical affiliation; the degree of canonicity of each translation and translator, and the prevailing ideologies of the society in which retranslations emerge. A classical work can become either a vibrant document used to promote, sustain, and revive dominant discourses on politics, national identity or philosophy or, alternately, a reactionary document that voices concerns over the relevance of the canonical or traditional discourse with which the original is equated.
Résumé

Cette thèse présente une nouvelle hypothèse sur la retraduction et la façon dont celle-ci est vue par les traductologues. L’explication traditionnelle des traductions qui vieillissent et doivent donc être renouvelées ne suffit pas pour saisir l’ampleur du phénomène de la retraduction ni ses différentes significations.

L’étude propose de traiter la retraduction comme la transformation de documents en monuments. Il s’agit d’en faire ressortir les multiples constituants pour voir ce qui les rattaché à leur présent et avenir. Les retraductions suscitent de nouveaux textes voire de nouveaux courants philosophiques ainsi que des commentaires : ensemble, ils reflètent l’espace-temps de ces retraductions et forgent des symboles d’autoreprésentation, de conscience, de mémoire et d’identité collectives.

Cette hypothèse est testée à partir des retraductions de la République de Platon publiées au 20e siècle en examinant la valeur diachronique et synchronique des principaux éléments philosophiques et politiques du système platonicien tels qu’ils se présentent dans les différentes versions en grec moderne. Ces retraductions ne reflètent pas seulement la manière dont la philosophie platonicienne est perçue dans l’environnement politique et philosophique de la Grèce moderne. On peut voir aussi dans quelle mesure elles prolongent le discours canonique sur la philosophie classique ou bien s’en démarquent par une approche plus critique. Le cas étudié est celui de la République de Platon et de la manière dont les arguments centraux deviennent une source d’inspiration.
pour répondre aux questions fondamentales sur la justice et la gouvernance qui se posent dans une société moderne.

L’étude montre que si la retraduction reflète les aspirations, les peurs et les valeurs de l’espace-temps qui les suscite, l’ouverture du texte original permet de nouvelles interprétations et de nouvelles significations. Les retraductions et leurs paratextes respectifs se font presque toujours écho mutuellement tandis qu’ils sont en résonance avec d’autres textes philosophiques et politiques qui leur sont contemporains. Le lien n’est pas seulement chronologique. Il dépend aussi du statut du traducteur, de son approche discursive, de ses inclinations politiques et philosophiques, du degré de canonicité de la traduction, ou encore des idéologies de la société qui entourent le traducteur et où les retraductions voient le jour. La retraduction d’une œuvre classique peut servir à promouvoir ou à consolider le discours dominant sur la politique, l’identité nationale ou la philosophie, mais elle peut également subvertir le discours canonique ou traditionnel auquel on associe l’original.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 12

CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL OUTLINE ............................................................................... 18
1 DEFINING RETRANSLATION .................................................................................. 18
  1.1. An overview of retranslation discourse .......................................................... 18
  1.2. Positing the problem of retranslation .............................................................. 22
  1.3. Life and death in retranslation theory ............................................................... 26
  1.4. The socio-historical basis of retranslation ........................................................ 28
  1.5. Retranslation as re-creation of philosophy ...................................................... 34
  1.6. Challenging interlingual and intralingual frontiers ......................................... 38
    1.6.1. Defining intralingual translation in Greece .................................................. 38
    1.6.2. Diglossia, bilingualism and intralingual translation in Greece .................... 42

CHAPTER II: THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN MODERN GREECE ............................ 49
  2.1. Philosophy before, during and after the Enlightenment .................................... 49
  2.2. From 1453 to 1821 .......................................................................................... 51
  2.3. Philosophical continuity in modern Greece ..................................................... 65
  2.4. The return to political philosophy: challenges, hurdles, disenchantments ....... 70
  2.5. Corpus and timeframe ..................................................................................... 72

CHAPTER III: PLATO’S REPUBLIC IN 20TH CENTURY GREECE ............................... 80
  3.1. Alexandros Galinos’ Republic ......................................................................... 82
  3.2. Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ Republic .................................................................. 87
  3.3. Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ Republic and the Didaskaleiaka incident .................. 90
  3.4. Ioannis Gryparis’ Republic ............................................................................. 94
  3.5. Konstantinos Georgoulis’ Republic ................................................................. 99
  3.6. Odysseas Hatzopoulos’ Republic .................................................................. 101
  3.7. Nikolaos Memmos’ Republic ......................................................................... 104
  3.8. Theodoros Mavropoulos’ Republic .................................................................. 106
  3.9. Nikolaos Skouteropoulos’ Republic ................................................................. 109

CHAPTER IV: THE PARATEXTS ......................................................................................... 112
  4.1. The Republic as classical reading .................................................................... 114
  4.2. The Republic as holistic matter ...................................................................... 119
  4.3. The Republic and education .......................................................................... 133
  4.4. The Republic and justice and happiness ......................................................... 140
  4.5. The Republic as popular reading .................................................................... 151
  4.6. The Republic and Plato’s politeia .................................................................... 157
  4.7. The Republic and the academic status of philosophy .................................... 165
  4.8. The Republic as a matter of understanding Plato ......................................... 174
  4.9. Preliminary conclusions ............................................................................... 189

CHAPTER V: THE REPUBLIC WITHIN THE MODERN GREEK POLITICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT .................................................................................. 207
  5.1. How politics are represented in the retranslations ......................................... 207
  5.2. Readings of the different forms of governance ............................................. 210
    5.2.1. Memmo’s political translatory discourse .................................................. 216
    5.2.2. Georgoulis’ holistic translatory discourse ............................................... 232
5.2.3. N. Skouteropoulos’ philosophical and academic translatory discourse ........245
5.2.4. Gryparis/Papanoutsos’ translatory discourse on justice and doubt ..........253
5.2.5. Mavropoulos’ translatory discourse on logos .....................................262
5.2.6. The translatory discourse of minor translations .................................272
5.3. Plato’s *Republic*: a source of philosophical inspiration in modern Greek political culture ................................................................. 277

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................291

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................................................326
Bibliography in Greek .............................................................................................................326
Bibliography in French and English .........................................................................................331
INTRODUCTION

Born, raised, and educated in a country that prides itself on being the cradle of civilization and philosophy, I was brought up to think, better yet, to take for granted, that all cultural goods I, as a Greek, have inherited from my “noble” ancestors (the Ancient Greeks), placed me at an advantageous position over the “other”.

This fundamental myth about the “self” —present in every historical time, space, race and nation— is also an integral part of the elements shaping modern Greek identity. There has always been plenty of testimony and undisputable evidence to support this belief: everyday trips to downtown Athens, my home town, would involve passing by the Parthenon, going through Plato’s Academy, contemplating the Greek Agora, admiring Parthenon and its newly inaugurated Museum. Speaking Greek and using words, such as “mathematics” or “democracy”; mastering abstract concepts, like “entropy” or “empathy”; being able to memorize words, such as “osteoporosis” or “ecchymosis”, simply because their etymology appears logical, obvious, and unforced, all these would automatically elevate me to the rank of a “privileged” successor of my “venerated” ancestors.

This belief has been nurtured, sustained, and expanded by a dominant discourse which can succinctly be summed up in one of the favourite expressions used by modern Greeks: “when we were talking about/inventing philosophy, they were climbing trees”, and all its possible variants referring to a series of arts and sciences for which Greek Antiquity claims authorship. “We” refers to an obscure collective and represents a long lineage which extends from Ancient Greeks, generators of all good things, to modern Greeks,
rightful owners of their ancestors’ achievements. “They”, in turn, refers to an equally vague collective of “others”, the “other” being everyone who is not Greek.

In this “we vs. they” tug-of-war, the “other” is most often depreciated— the basis of every science is that Ancient Greeks thought of it, gave it a name, and turned into a concept or a system. However, as if enduring a schizophrenic attack, following a traumatic stimulus, “we” almost simultaneously reveals another persona, which rejects the “self” by extolling the virtues and the long record of accomplishments of the modernized West. Although originally ignorant, the “other” has attained technological and economic development and has been setting an example for progress for sluggish “we”.

In this newly shaped relationship of disequilibrium between the “other” and the “self”, the latter’s incapacity to follow the former needs to be acknowledged and accounted for. This is done via another set of “myths” whereby character faults, such as a more laid back attitude to life (and work), and historical events, namely a long history of wars and invasions from 1821 onward, are amalgamated to provide a soothing yet inglorious explanation. All these are attributed to a long conditioning, which translates, covertly, into the dreadful legacy of the Ottoman rule. In the modern Greek imaginary, the 400-year Ottoman occupation often serves as a scapegoat for everything that is wrong, harmful, or of lesser value.

This bulldozing approach, whereby everything and its exact opposite applies, fails, on the one hand, to recognize all positive traits of modern Greeks, and, on the other, to put into real perspective and within realistic expectations the latter’s successes and failures. The
evaluative discourse about the “self” tends to coincide with periods during which nationalist passions are ignited. This is a general, timeless trend for which Greece cannot claim exclusiveness. During difficult times, be they financial, political, or cultural, “self-evaluative discourse” rises along with the “deprecating discourse” about the “other”, while the “self-deprecating discourse” subsides.

Tensions between, on the one hand, the “other” and the “self” and, on the other hand, the “other” within the “same/self” underline various aspects of my research. Its starting point lies in the assumption that, the more the turmoil, the greater the tendency to remember the Classics and to search for possible answers to problems. In terms of popular discourse, this is called a return to the fundamentals and the alleged certainties they offer. Certainties stem from what is more or less proven by trial and error, has survived over time and is, subsequently, considered infallible. Classical philosophy fits this description. Hence the idea of probing retranslations of Plato into Modern Greek, and more precisely his political works.

The issue of philosophy and its fate within modern Greece and grew stronger as I was delving into multi-disciplinary aspects of the Translation Studies field. My preoccupation became to trace philosophy’s trajectory via the process of translation and retranslation. By examining various forms and stages of the retranslation process, I was aiming to re-create, *inter alia*, the prevailing ideology on politics, the image of the “politician”, the “ideal” regime, the evasive “statesman”, the statesman as a philosopher, as well as some basic concepts such as democracy, natural justice, and the rule of law.
The rejection of politics and political institutions could signify the death of philosophy. ¹ Although this may appear as a trite statement, it is an interesting conjecture. Castoriadis, for instance, associates politics with culture and philosophy and warns against risks inherent to the death of philosophy. Western culture, he says, —hence Greek culture— has entered a prolonged crisis; one of the many expressions of this crisis is the proclaimed death of philosophy. When philosophy dies, freedom dies with it.

Freedom is not only threatened by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Freedom is also secretly and less strongly threatened by the atrophy of the critical conflict, the expansion of amnesia and irrelevance, the increasing incapacity to question present time and existing institutions, whether they are purely political or they represent conceptions/perspectives of the world. (Castoriadis 1991: 281-282; my translation)

On the basis of the intricate connection between politics, philosophy, and freedom, I chose as the starting point of my research the 1821 Greek War for Independence, a purely military act driven by political concerns, aiming to give Greek people their freedom and resulting in the creation of the first independent Greek state in 1830. The endpoint is 2006, i.e., two years following the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. Assigning the Olympic Games to their country of birth was perceived as a major diplomatic victory, in other words a political victory, “political” being understood in the stricter sense of the

¹ The European Union is a case in point. For a long time now, the European Union and its various institutions has been considered as a monstrous self-absorbed body, mainly considered with its own internal functions and increasingly dissociated from the people it was created to serve. A typical example is the position expressed by Alfred Gusenbaur, leader of Austrian Social Democratic Party SPÖ, in the March 2006 issue of “Social Europe, The journal of the European left” where he stated: “This is why I would consider it perfectly reasonable [...] to address this dissatisfaction with the present state of Europe, which is being articulated by citizens around Europe. Such confrontation with people’s concerns will inevitably lead to the question of what should be the nature of policy change in Europe. What needs to be done differently in order to increase the practical benefits people can draw from Union Membership?” (p. 2). Additionally, a survey conducted by Sofres and published on October 3, 2005 states that “[...] citizens from five of the EU’s six largest member states are predominantly negative about the effects of belonging to the EU. Results revealed that a large number of people remain unconvinced that the benefits of EU membership outweigh the disadvantages. Overall, the economic implications appeared to be the greatest cause for concern.” (Source: http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/eu-citizens-respond-negatively-europe/article-145275?print. Last accessed on November 20, 2008))
word. Carrying out the Games was a significant cultural event for Greece which provided plenty of valuable opportunity for the country to make both a political and a cultural statement.

On the philosophical plane, the period extending from 1821 to 2006 is marked by the proliferation of retranslations and/or re-editions of the political works of Plato and Aristotle. If the hypothesis above holds true, in other words, if the end of politics announces the death of philosophy, it is then crucial to acknowledge that there is such thing as philosophical production (original) and re-production (via retranslations and re-editions) and to attempt to provide a valid explanation for it.

This explanation needed an exploration framework. Given that my interest is both political and philosophical, I felt the need to unveil the complex relationship between politics and philosophy. I therefore set out to study how, from the philosophical and political point of view, retranslations or re-editions of the Classics have been used as a means for reshaping Greek collective memory, Greek identity and politics in Greece.

---

2 I understand collective memory within the theoretical framework established by Halbwachs, that is the way a group sees itself “[…] from within during a period not exceeding, and most often much shorter than, the average duration of a human life.” (Halbwachs 1997: 84) It important to establish this representation and self-representation within the particular time and space the group inhabits and perceives, that is, within the familiarity of objects, things, thoughts and environments into which meaning is interpreted and the group is delimited. It is also important to stress the dual relationship between the group, and its corresponding collective memory, and history. According to Halbwachs, history remains almost unchanged in the eyes of the collective memory, simply because the group understands its own history, as well as the extended history, in terms more of a sequence of resemblances and less of as a series of differences. (Ibid:85). However, separating history seen as the sum of the totality of past events from the memory of the group or groups results in “[…] severing the bond that held [the events] close to the psychological life of the social milieu where they occurred, while retaining only the group’s chronological and spatial outline of them.” (Op. cit.: 84). I view collective memory as one possible way of preserving the past in the present in so far as retranslation serves to turn text into a monument (both material and imaginary) of the past in which are inscribed representations of the present and aspirations for the future.
More specifically, I created a “theoretical” window from which I could “view” my corpus and contemplate Greek identity three-dimensionally.

The first dimension explores the relationship between retranslation and the philosophical discourse. The purpose here is to provide a meta-philosophical analysis of how retranslations of the Classics shape, create, and sustain a philosophical discourse that helps re-establish philosophy in its birthplace.

The second dimension places all meta-philosophical discussion on a purely political level. The aim here is to explore how the philosophical discourse as defined above gives rise to a specific political discourse within the Greek territory with reference to what is (or should be) the Greek State, its political identity and, subsequently, the identity of “Greek nationals”.

The third dimension merges the meta-philosophical and the meta-political analyses to support the original claim of retranslation used as a means for shaping Greek collective memory. The very existence of modern Greek collective identity as we know it is linked with the notion of state, and more precisely a national state, as well as language, seen both as a philosophical concept and a tool for communication. All three components ([national] identity, [national] state, and [national] language) are syncretized into the “eternal/intertemporal Greek” and the latter’s collective memory about the “self” and the “other” as part of the “self” and as opposed to it.
Chapter I: Theoretical Outline

1 Defining retranslation

1.1. An overview of retranslation discourse

Notwithstanding recent developments in the field of Translation Studies, it is still commonly accepted by translation theorists that retranslation functions as an “update” of the used and often the misused original text (always in connection with the original and the relationships the latter entertains with all previous “failed” or “obsolete” translations). This update used to be conceived of in terms of going from a “translation-introduction” (Meschnonic 1973: 305-316/2007: 436-437) to a more free-target oriented translation followed by a translation closer to the source text (Berman 1990: 4)\(^2\) Thus, retranslation acquires an axiological labelling that refers to death —most dramatically so to “the Fall in the Garden of Eden”— and subsequently to life through birth (mostly after the Fall) and re-birth (as an attempt for Redemption), and is often expressed in terms of “primary failure” (Berman 1990: 5; Gambier 1994: 415-416; Rodriguez 1990: 71-72; Topia 1990: 48) and “growing old”.\(^4\)

This axiological approach never ceases to remind us that the original, especially what is often labelled as a “masterpiece”\(^5\), always stands on a pedestal and shares the glories of gratification and the joys of immortality. In this context, retranslation operates on a linear

\(^2\) This is not shared by all translation theorists. For instance, Bensimon (1990) claims that first translations tend to be target-oriented whereas retranslations are more source-oriented because the target language and culture become increasingly more familiar with the “foreign”.

\(^4\) A re-print is another form of retranslation insasmuch as it ensures that any given time is not deprived of access to a certain work of arts.

\(^5\) “A masterpiece is a complete and completed work that always stands in comparison with other works. This implies a transcendent evaluation. Whereas an open-end work, a processual, is something unique in way.” (Guattari: 2002: 58)

Additionally, it is also a common *topos* in translation theory to measure the degree of immortality of the original by the number of its retranslations and to come to the truism that, if it is worth retranslating, it is because of the “elevated” status attributed to the original, which no contemporary mind can ever grasp entirely\(^6\). This view sustains Benjamin’s position that the fate, better yet the essence, of the very existence of the masterpiece is to be reproduced (Benjamin III 2000: 273). Translation and retranslation are traditionally seen as re-productions. Inversely, the greater the number of retranslations, the closer we can potentially get to understanding what the original might have wanted to communicate in the first place. This view also supports the theory of retranslation as supplementarity. The latter should be understood on the retranslation-to-retranslation axis instead of the retranslation(s)-to-original level. More specifically, Koskinen and Paloposki sustain that

The supplementary nature of retranslations suggests a positive attitude toward difference: variation is a facet of supplementarity. Different, varying interpretations need not be locked into a continuum of assimilation-source-text orientedness […] where the researcher’s particular viewpoint is seen as that of determining faithfulness or assimilation. Instead, texts and their interpretations function simultaneously on several layers, denying easy classification into assimilative first and source-text oriented new translations. (*Ibid.*: 27)

There is, however, a point to consider here: by taking into account the number of retranslations as a measure of the success of the original, as well as a means for adding interpretation layers to the original, we acknowledge a triple failure: evidently, failure to

---

\(^6\) This is also expressed via the process of reprint. As Paloposki and Koskinen’s study on retranslation and editorial processes in Finland demonstrates, it is often an acceptable alternative to produce reprints of the so-called Classics if there is no new translation.
attain the full meaning of the original text in the first attempt; secondly, failure to produce “adequate” translations or to assign them to “adequate agents”; and, finally, failure to effectively fulfill the needs and expectations of the readership (see Susam-Sarajeva 2003: 1-36). Unfortunately, this approach does not provide us with a plausible definition of what is “adequate” and under which circumstances. It also fails to explain how readership and expectations are identified. Finally, the prevailing issue, i.e., failure *per se*, bears the seeds of negativity and relates inevitably to wear and tear over time.

From a psychoanalytical point of view, we could claim that this triple failure translates into a triple resistance: first, translation is seen as a means for denying the translator and the reader full access to the “absolute” authority of the masterpiece. This is a cultural failure insofar as social agents, such as translators, editors, etc., are unable to grasp the “real”, cryptic meaning of the original. The lack of understanding leads inevitably to “inadequate” translation acts performed by “inadequate agents”.

---

7 With regard to translating and retranslating philosophical texts, the “issue of failure”, or the problem with translating philosophy, as Venuti suggests, relates to the primacy given to language as communication. “Language is viewed as constitutive of thought and translating can more readily be seen as determining the domestic significance of the foreign text […]” and “[..] Philosophy had long engaged in the creation of concepts by interpreting domestic versions of foreign texts, but for the most part these versions have been taken as transparent, and the concepts unmediated by the domestic language and culture that is their medium.”. Venuti develops his argument “Translation exposes a fundamental idealism in philosophy by calling attention to the material conditions of concepts, their linguistic and discursive forms, the different meanings and functions they come to possess in different cultural situations.” (1998: 106).

8 This is what Venuti calls “chastising the translator for missing the foreign philosopher’s intention or the full significance of the foreign philosophical terms. In such cases, translations are presumably adjusted, brought into a more adequate relation to the essential meaning of the foreign text, whereas the adequacy that is in fact established reverts to a domestic standard, usually a stylistic canon or a competing interpretation applied implicitly by the critic.” (1998:106; my emphasis)

9 “As I have noted above, the discussions about retranslations are often based on a linear idea of progress. The path leads either towards the source text, its otherness, the translation’s adequacy (in the sense Gideon Toury uses the term), or towards contemporary readers’ imagined expectations. The main assumption behind the former is that (re)translations try to restore something back to the original something lost in previous translations. This argument is especially strong in the writings of those who believe that initial translations are mostly assimilative, and tend to reduce the ‘otherness’ of the source text because of local constraints [...]” (Susam-Sarajeva 2003: 1-36).
Second, when initial or repeated failure leads to re-production, therefore retranslation, we are experiencing a second-level resistance, namely the refusal, from the point of view of the receiving language (and culture), to consider the imported text as a “foreign body” (Ricœur 2004: 10). Third, there is manifestly resistance in accepting only one possible interpretation of the original, in other words the interpretation offered by the translation which stands as an “authority”. This would mean depriving readership from possible readings and interpretations and, consequently, failing their expectations. In this case, there is a clear volition not to reduce retranslation to a simple rearrangement of meaning through a mere production of a new sequence of signifiers.

It is under the labelling of this third resistance that I interpret all recent attempts to redefine the Retranslation hypothesis by bringing forth other theories (especially philosophy, psychology, history, discourse analysis, literary theory, narrative theory, etc.), and by attempting to account for the diversity of the practice, its various forms of occurrence and its complex causes.
1.2. **Positing the problem of retranslation**

In my search for a more flexible, comprehensive, and workable definition of retranslation, I undertake to approach the study of retranslation as a historical project. Multiple, parallel, and subsequent translations of the same work (literature, theater, philosophy, etc.) occur or may potentially occur over time, at various moments in time, and may follow patterns of continuity and discontinuity. The purpose of this analysis is to advance an alternative hypothesis\(^{10}\) whereby retranslation as a theoretical research subject relates to a historical set of conditions. In other words, retranslation responds to all traits of modern historical research as defined by Foucault (Foucault 1969: 9-28) and can therefore be inscribed within an overall historical project. In turn, the historical project implies going beyond putting together, yet segregating, in their exploration, all sub-histories, or the plurality of possible histories, which are to be viewed together not in fusion, but only in parallel (*Ibid.*). The historical project’s merit lies in that all elements of the past are working together to form or re-form something that can place us back in actual time.\(^{11}\)

From this point of view, retranslation is part of modern historiography insofar as it contributes to defining what type of relationship may legitimately be described in terms of all forms of retranslation and in connection with all other possible historical forms that feed the retranslation process and justify its purpose. Similarly, retranslation is a

---

\(^{10}\) The Retranslation Hypothesis (RH) as formulated by Gambier (1994: 414) rests on the premise that “une première traduction a toujours tendance à être plutôt assimilatrice, à réduire l’altérité au nom d’impératifs culturels, éditoriaux […] La retraduction dans ces conditions consisterait en un retour au texte-source.” On the same topic, see also Koskinen and Paloposki in *Retranslation in the age of digital reproduction*.

\(^{11}\) “La perspective génétique de Foucault à cet égard est très intéressante puisqu’il ne faisait pas exactement de l’histoire mais il reprenait des éléments d’archives, des éléments du passé pour recomposer quelque choses qui nous jetait, littéralement, sur les situations actuelles.” (Guattari 2002: 23)
historical form of enunciation as long as its practice can produce other vertical series of
history as well as a set of correlations and dominances (Op. cit.: 18).

To attempt such an analysis, it is appropriate to consider retranslation in its dual form,
i.e., the process and everything it entails (agent, commissioner, user, readership, intent,
etc.), and the document, i.e., the text itself: What makes this approach historical is that
retranslation as document serves to write or rewrite a specific form of history. As
Foucault suggests, history has modified its position vis-à-vis the document. What is of
primary importance for history is not a mere interpretation of the document: the
document is now taken apart, broken up into pieces, organized, re-organized, re-
positioned, re-distributed, placed in levels, categories and series, distinguishing between
what is relevant and important and what is not. This is what Foucault means by giving
history the opportunity to turn the text into a living, breathing organism and allowing
history to redefine all units, sets, series, and relationships that every textual web holds
within it. (Ibid: 14)

This approach places history and historical research outside the narrow framework of
studying the past and all things dead\(^\text{12}\), hence the importance of treating retranslated texts
as contemporary enunciation acts. This approach certainly positions historical
investigation away from the typical methodological clichés: a society or a civilization
needs to know its past in order to understand its present and predict its future. By making
an alternative use of the text (“the document”), history represents and defines the position

\(^{12}\) Compare this to a more traditional definition of history such as the one given by Aron: “L’histoire, au
sens étroit, est la science du passé humain. Au sens large, elle étudie le devenir de la terre, du ciel et des
espèces aussi bien que de la civilisation. D’autre part, au sens concret, le terme histoire désigne une certaine
réalité, au sens formel la connaissance de cette réalité.” (1986:17).
any given society adopts every time it decides to analyze and give status to the textual mass it possesses, a mass which forms an integral part of this society (Foucault 1969: 14). This is a pivotal moment for a society which undertakes the task to reassess its current representations, put them into question, change their order of importance, modify the value system in which they belong, and, possibly, create new representations, hence new values.

Additionally, as part of the historical project, the study of retranslation, especially a comparative one, may reveal the so-call “influential” translations (stemming or not from “influential” originals) by positioning them in time and space but, most importantly, by giving the opportunity to any discipline into which belongs the re-translated text “to gain a historical knowledge of itself, of the hierarchical arrangement of discourses that exists in the discipline at any given moment […]” (Venuti 1998: 110). This is particularly true in philosophy and, as far as our analysis will attempt to demonstrate, can be even more intriguing or complicated in the case of any retranslation process that oscillates between interlingual and intralingual transfer.

At this point, it is important to outline a key methodological intention. This research deals with “retranslation as history”. With that in mind, history will be considered outside the context of its traditional definition, that is, turn all monuments of the past into documents for the future, thus giving voice to all unheard traces of the past (Foucault 1969:15), but rather as a means of rendering documents into monuments, while trying to unearth the whole mass of elements, unfold them for the future by isolating and categorizing them,

13 See below the discussion on interlingual and intralingual translation in the Greek space and the way it relates to diglossia.
grouping and regrouping them, and making them relevant to the present and to the future
by establishing relationships and group creations (Ibid). This approach also allows us to
account for all pseudo retranslations, namely all reprints that occur in different moments
in time, be it periodically or not.
1.3. Life and death in retranslation theory

As stated above, my aim in this study is to redefine the Retranslation Hypothesis and, in doing so, I will attempt to approach retranslation as a historical project by using theoretical principles found mainly in Foucault and the philosophical apparatus of Cornelius Castoriadis. Special emphasis is placed on the workings of the “social-historical” in the imaginary institution of societies, namely historical societies.

In one of his seminal lectures at the EHESS in Paris, Castoriadis suggested that, when traditional philosophical thinking refers to time, it always perceives it in the following pairs: time equals creation and time equals destruction. One most readily admits that time has a destructive effect: youth, beauty, and vitality are stripped away as time goes by and leaves its decaying marks on any living creature or non-living thing, including translations that become old and obsolete. Quoting Bichat, Castoriadis furthers the argument of traditional philosophical thinking by examining the following axiom: “life is a set of functions resisting death” while “death is the set of functions leading toward the end of life” (Castoriadis, 2002: 16). By accepting the axiom whereby time equals both creation and destruction, one automatically subscribes to the inevitable equation between creation and destruction. In other words, death equals life insofar as death is the destruction of the set of functions resisting death.

From a purely philosophical point of view, this is a typical circular argument. However, as Castoriadis would claim, when history and society are studied over time and from the

---

14 Castoriadis also suggests that we are not currently going through a phase of historical creation, or, at best, a strong institutional phase. This is merely a phase of repetition or, at worst, a phase of historical
point of view of time, the first thing we need to consider is not necessarily the issue of creation and death but rather the notion of the “social-historical”. Based on the latter’s definition, we need to envisage how any given society or any given history conceptualizes time, and, subsequently, whether there is such a thing as historical creation, i.e., a historical project. Finally, one must examine whether historical creation sustains or enhances social creation over time, and investigate the reasons which lead to social creation and the circumstances under which the latter may occur.

destruction or destitution. He defines destitution as the movement whereby the social imaginary moves away from its institutions or existing social imagery significations, the movement which strips these institutions and significations of their very core of validity, by questioning their legitimacy, without replacing them by other institutions that would invest new social imagery significations (Castoriadis 2003: 16).
1.4. The social-historical basis of retranslation

According to the functionalist theory, societies through history have a purposeful existence. This means that all institutions within a society and all individual actions performed by members of the society aim at fulfilling a pre-established set of objectives. One possible expression of this theory may be seen in the capitalistic project, as defined by Marx, where the ultimate goal of the society consists in the production and reproduction of material life (this is the basis of the industrial society). All components of the society work together in achieving this ultimate goal, which differs from one society to another and over time within the same society.

This explanation is severely questioned by Castoriadis, mainly because, on the one hand, it does not account for all the things a society fails to achieve and, on the other hand, because it does not sufficiently explain why societies feel the need to constantly set higher goals, therefore seek continuous progress and change. Castoriadis calls this the rational-mastery project, in other words the capacity of individuals and the society to subject the world to their ends through their efforts.

As a counter-answer to the functionalist approach of society and history, structuralism suggests the presence of “universal structures”. Societies organize themselves by each choosing the elements that are relevant to them, as if choosing from an endless catalogue of items. When all elements are assembled, put together, they form the so-called universal structure. Castoriadis also criticizes this school of thought, on the one hand, for not providing a valid explanation of what really happens when historical conditions
change and, on the other hand, for founding its hypothesis and theoretical assumption on societies which no longer exist (Castoriadis 2002: 19).

Castoriadis’ alternative consists in taking into consideration an important element of individual and social life, that is the “individual imaginary and the social imaginary”. This is where humans differ from animals: humans possess the faculty of imagination which allows them to create individual and social imaginaries. Put simply, imaginaries are a world of desires —fulfilled or unfulfilled— originally expressed by individuals (even at the infant stage) and subsequently adopted and instituted by societies.

Castoriadis’ definition of the “social-historical” is nothing less than the world created through human activity. Based on the premise that no human can live and prosper alone but needs the presence of other humans to survive and create, human subjects can and must interpret the world they have created and give meaning to it at any given (historical) time. Humans, in turn, are “humans-being-in-the-world”, which means that, at a specific time, they are subjects (i.e., subjected) to the worlds they have created and they equally subject their world to their ends. Additionally, but also simultaneously, humans are subjects (i.e., subjected) to the creation of their own psyche.

Castoriadis conceptualizes psyche in a unique and interesting way. Some (such as Gauchet) suggest that his definition of the psyche and, most importantly, of sublimation\(^{15}\) (and, subsequently socialization), completes Freud’s work on the topic. Psyche, according to Castoriadis, embodies two forms: the “closed psyche”, or the “psychic

---

\(^{15}\) For Gauchet, “the concept of socialization must be radicalized beyond the usual culturalistic understanding: it does not simply refer to the adaptation of a given cultural environment, but —most significantly— to the psychic embedding of being-in-society” (in Smith 2005:13).
monad”, and the “open psyche”, or the “psyche-into-the-world”. A newborn incarnates the closed psyche (psychic monad) which is omnipotent, omnipresent, undifferentiated, sufficient unto itself, self-referential and incapable of distinguishing between self and the other and between self and the world. The psychic monad has desires but cannot really make the difference between the desire and the object of its desire (i.e., hunger which is the desire and the breast, the object of the desire). At the infant level, psychic monad represents a totality, a homogeneous flux. But when the psychic monad comes in close contact with the “other”, when it attempts to meet the “other” and “another” in order to satisfy its desires (desire being in this case the medium for the movement toward the “other”), the total psyche enters what Castoriadis calls a “triadic phase”. At this stage, psyche becomes “defunctionalized” and expresses intention (or finality), affect and representations.

This is the moment when the individual makes the acquaintance of the other and therefore of the society, when the individual becomes a social individual (eidos), in other words an “I”, and a “You” and the “Other(s)”. Socialization is the process whereby the psyche abandons (although not entirely) its initial ways of being and objects of desire and invests socially meaningful ways of behaving, acting, and creating objects. This is one of the aspects of sublimation, in accordance with Castoriadis’ definition.

In turn, sublimation requires a two-level action, that is, on the one hand, the psychic process described above and, on the other hand, the presence of the society, namely the social fabrication (nurturing, rearing, and upbringing) of the individual. Each particular
society and each particular historical time of this society will create a new *eidos*, or *social individual*.

It is easy to conclude that, in Castoriadis’ philosophical apparatus, sublimation and socialization are interchangeable: socialization is the process which leads to the institution (i.e., creation) of *eidos* (You and I and the Other); it is the *psyche*’s originally homogenous flux which becomes representational flux and is subsequently structured. Socialization is also the process whereby the institution, i.e., the creation of society registers itself. This means that the instituting force (the social individual and its historical society) comes to actualize itself—to be instituted—in the world and to give meaning to the world by the institutions it creates for this specific purpose.

Through sublimation, individual finalities, affects, and representations enter the social sphere and blend in with the social-historical finalities, affects, and representations. This is where the individual meets the collective. Castoriadis considers this to be a turning point in the evolution of the *psyche*: the human subject represents an instituting institution formed in the interpenetration of the singular radical imaginary (which is a spontaneous stream or flux, a source of creation, of representations, affects and desires) and the social imaginary.

In an attempt to express in simple yet intelligible way what Castoriadis means by finalities, affects, and representations, it would be fair to say that finalities are the various objects of desire of the individual both as a monad and as an instituting institution. Representation is a psychical work that produces and organizes meaning; it is the bond that links various elements within a form or a figure. Representation allows the *psyche* to
imagine in two different ways: first, by seeing something where there is absolutely nothing; and, second, by seeing something as something else which is not. In other words, representation is the ambassador of a drive in the psyche (see Urribarri 2002: 44-45). Finally, affect in Castoriadis’ philosophical and psychoanalytical system takes a more radical meaning than the one suggested by Freud. Both Freud and Castoriadis consider that there is a relationship between “affect” and “representation”, but for Castoriadis affect is not subordinated to representation, but rather is articulated by it.

Although this interrelation of desire, affect, and representation is oversimplified, it offers a unique theoretical basis for rethinking retranslation. The common denominator in all these elements is the psyche and its capacity to imagine and to create meaning (imaginary meaning). Imagination in turn is the source of the meaning that psyche produces. As Urribarri points out, Castoriadis cannot dissociate the development of the psyche from its socialization. “If someone cannot actively invest and create meaning and pleasure within social significations, the socializing process does not work, and this results in severe psychical dysfunctionalities (exemplified by autism and the “as if” personality).” (Urribarri 2002: 43).

Once the psyche is socialized, the radical imagination of the eidos has potentially the capacity to examine and question social significations, in other words all meanings created by the instituting individual is his/her capacity to imagine both individually and

---

16 As Urribarri notes, Castoriadis’ definition of representation differs from Freud’s definition. Freud associates representation to previous perceptions (according to the traditional definition of Vorstellung) whereas for Castoriadis representation cannot derive from perceptions.

17 Laplacne and Pontalis define affect as follows: the affective state, either painful or not, specific or vague, which manifests itself as a massive discharge. Freud considered that every drive could be expressed in two registers: the affect and the representation. The affect refers to the qualitative expression of the amount of energy a drive possesses and of its variations. (Laplanch and Pontalis 1967: 12).
collectively, and to give meaning to its desires (personal and collective) within the existing institutions. Examining social significations means examining them from the standpoint of social discourse as well as from the point of view of personal identification or wish (Op.cit.: 43). “That is to say that the radical imagination is one of the metapsychological foundations of reflexive and creative subjectivity […]” (Ibid: 42-43)

Finally, as Castoriadis explains, social significations fulfill a threefold role: first, they structure representations of the world in general. These are time-specific structures (the world we are living in is not the ancient world). Second, social significations dictate what is to be done and not to be done, what is good and what is not, what is considered legitimate and what is not, what is allowed and what is forbidden. In other words, significations are “finalities in action” or “ends in action”. Third, social significations establish the types of affects that are characteristic of a society (faith, for instance, is an affect created by Christianity and some societies are more faith-oriented than others) (Castoriadis 1997: 86-87).
1.5. **Retranslation as re-creation of philosophy**

The previous analysis underlines creation’s pivotal role in the social-historical context. Castoriadis defines creation as “[…] the capacity to bring about the emergence of what is not given —not derivable by means of [combination] or in some other way— starting from the given.” (Castoriadis 1997: 104). Put simply, creation is the “positing of new determinations” (*Op. cit.*: 103), it is imagination inasmuch as it is capable of positing new forms. New forms use already existing elements but the result is in itself entirely new.

Modern science considers that the true value of any research lies beyond simply probing another human creation and consists in unveiling another form created by humans. If that holds true, then the real challenge for translation would be to re-consider retranslation as an attempt to create *new* forms deriving from the original’s existing form. In this case, we would have to assume that the existing forms do not necessarily (or no longer) correspond to the radical imaginary, to the creative needs of the anonymous collective, man in society, the society of man, the historical man and, subsequently, history. It also means that the “finalities in action” of any given society have changed, be it totally or partially, radically or conservatively, and that new affects emerge and need to replace, redefine, or coexist with previous ones. This becomes clearer if we consider that society is always history:

 [...] there never is—even in a primitive, repetitive society— a frozen or congealed present. More exactly, even in the most archaic society, the present is also constituted by the past that inhabits it and by the future it anticipates. There is always a historical present. Beyond biology, which in man both persists and finds itself put irremediably out of order [*déréglée*], man is a psychical being and a social-historical being (Castoriadis 1997: 105)
For the society to exist, it is necessary for it to institute itself through history in the “closure of meaning”. In other words, almost every historical society creates meaning, at least at its early stages, in closure, and man-in-society creates the closure of meaning, i.e., the bounds within which meaning can be perceived. Whatever the society inherits and receives as being instituted acquires the status of something that is true, valid, and legitimate (Op. cit.: 107)

Philosophy, on the other hand, operates a rupture in the closure of meaning. In other words, philosophy questions the “closed or fixed meaning”, the social imaginary significations and the institutions embodying these significations (Ibid: 108). According to the hypothesis put forth above, retranslation can be creation, i.e., production of a new form. However, philosophy is also creation, insofar as it is a human activity whereby man asks the fundamental question of what a social-historical individual is to think about the world. This creation seeks to go beyond a closed meaning by putting into question existing meanings (significations in Castoriadis philosophical jargon), by denying the meaning its de facto status (meaning is what it is because it was instituted and inherited as such), its de facto validity. Consequently, philosophy is the attempt to give meaning a de jure validity; this means that philosophy no longer accepts a representation as such but demands “an account and a reason” (logo didonai) for it.

Based on these premises, I postulate that retranslation is part of this social-historical process of philosophical questioning that emerges from the matrix of what is already

---

18 “To put these representations, these significations and these institutions into question is therefore equivalent to putting into question the determinations, the very laws, of one’s own being and doing so in a reflective and deliberate fashion. This is what happens with philosophy and politics.” (Castoriadis 1997: 108)
there; it is a quest for new representations which produce a new form, a creation as defined above. If retranslation as a process is part of a philosophical reflection, retranslations as texts can be considered as the historical monuments that each society creates for itself by searching deep into the documents of the past and the representations they convey in order to create the monuments of the present historical time, in other words all new meanings that can only emerge in “a synchronic and diachronic agora, which prevents subjectivity from becoming shut within its own closure” (Castoriadis 1997: 111).

My analysis of the selected corpus (see below) rests on the premise that the re-translated philosophical texts are creations born within a given public space and at a specific a public time, which calls for reflection, and when necessary conditions favour the creation of new meanings. It also takes into account the multiple interrelations that emerge from retranslation as a philosophical and social-historical process as well as retranslation of philosophy as a means of creating new meanings.

Finally, from a purely linguistic point of view, retranslation both as a process and a product can be seen as the epitomic expression of “language” as instituting imaginary. Castoriadis maintains that language has to be logical (2+2=4); therefore, the product of retranslation has to be logical, to make sense to its respective readership (target culture or target language or target society). But language must also be imaginary to be able to express social significations (such as God, Nation, Europe, North America, Unification, Irredentism, Revolution, etc.) that hold society together (Op. cit.: 106). Retranslation can claim creativity insomuch as it may offer new significations of the “completed
masterpiece” through new openings of meaning of the original “in closure” and all previous translations “in closure” may represent. Under these circumstances, I believe that it would be legitimate to claim that retranslation may well be the triumph of philosophy over the closure of meaning instead of the translation’s failure to grasp the *de facto* validity, the absolute, perennial truth of the original.
1.6. **Challenging interlingual and intralingual frontiers**

1.6.1. **Defining intralingual translation in Greece**

My hypothesis on the openness of meaning operated by retranslation in the case of philosophy, especially political philosophical thought emerging in the cradle of Western philosophy and democracy, is associated with a major component specific to my corpus and to Greek translational reality: retranslations of the classical text discussed in this research belong to a category that is commonly acknowledged in Greece as being part of intralingual transfer or intralingual translation.

This classification, although presented as a given, is far from being self-explanatory. It can be seen as the product of a social-historical creation, which rests on a major linguistic assumption and serves to perpetrate a “fundamental myth” with regard to Greek language. This myth has transcended traditional Greek frontiers to be adopted, on a larger scale, by the international community of translation theorists.

Inspired by the model of Roman Jakobson (1959), who defined intersemiotic translation as the process whereby “the two or more channels of communication used in the translated text differ from the channel(s) used in the original text, i.e., the source and target text are semiotically non-equivalent” (Gottlieb 2005: 35), Gottlieb creates the term “intrasemiotic translation”, an umbrella term for Jakobson’s “interlingual” and “intralingual” translation, to describe a process whereby the sign systems used in source and target text are identical or almost identical (Ibid). Intralingual translation covers a series of subcategories, namely *diachronic* translation, i.e., the translation between different historical changes of the same language; *dialectical* translation, i.e., the
translation performed between different geographical, social or generational variants of the same language; *diasemic* translation, implying a change in language mode, i.e., from speech to writing and vice-versa and, finally, *transliteration*, which involves a change in alphabet (*Op. cit.*: 36).

Rather recently, the Routledge *Encyclopedia of Translation Studies* acknowledged that:

 […] intralingual translation is not such a minor issue as the existing literature on translation might suggest. Intralingual translation figures far more prominently in the Greek tradition than interlingual translation: the major preoccupation in Greece has been with ancient Greek texts into the modern idiom. (Baker and Malmkjær 1998: 6)

Seen primarily as a Greek issue, intralingual translation is closely intertwined with the question of language and has therefore animated translation theories in Greece specifically through the lens of the infamous Greek language controversy. Intralingual translation in the so-called “Greek space” has a long tradition that dates as far back as Byzantine times. In the Byzantium, the Atticism movement did not favour translation in the vernacular whereas the reverse trend was most often observed.

Nevertheless, due to the popularity of classical education —namely the use of classical texts written in ancient Greek in the educational system—, there was a considerable production of “companions” which consisted mainly of “paraphrases” (i.e., semi- or pseudo- translations) of the original in a simpler language. These companions would take the form of compiled glossaries providing all kinds of synonyms to keywords. Toward the end of Byzantine times, intellectuals belonging to the Palaiologos era produced a considerable philological opus which consisted of comparing manuscripts, correcting and
commenting original texts in ancient Greek, and producing all kinds of paraphrases in a simpler language.

Subsequent to the Fall of Constantinople, numerous intellectuals fled Byzantium to emigrate to Italy. Once established in the West, these intellectuals contributed to the expansion of classical education by publishing ancient Greek texts and by translating the Greek Classics both in Latin and Italian. During the first half of the 16th century, Greek intellectuals from the Ionian Islands who emmigrated to Venice followed the example of their European counterparts, who translated ancient Greek and Latin originals into their national languages, and therefore translated classical texts in the koine, i.e., the language spoken at the time. It is also worth mentioning, be it in passing, the campaign to translate biblical texts, which was launched during this period and resulted in the movement of “religious humanism” also known as “Demotiki in the Church”. Religious humanism “Greek style” attempted to promote a historical exposure of ancient Greek language, literature and thought in modern times and preached its acceptance in the target society via translation.

Under the Ottoman Empire, the revival and promotion and the ancient Greek language and literature acquired a clearly dogmatic stand. During that period, schools operated under the auspices and the direct control of the Church. The bulk of the curriculum was devoted to ancient Greek and there was no real room for a hermeneutical approach to the Classics. As far as grammar and syntax were concerned, “cyclopedia” was a favoured pedagogical method. Teachers would “invent” “texts” in the “vernacular” and ask their students to “transfer” them into Greek, i.e., ancient Greek.
The linguistic movement for promoting *demotiki* favoured the practice of translation, especially for educational purposes. Proponents of the *demotiki* movement went a step further suggesting that translation should not be seen as an exercise of purely pedagogical value (up until then students were asked to translate classical texts (i.e., texts in ancient Greek) into the “spoken language” in order to become familiar with both linguistic forms) but as a systematic practice whereby students would be taught the Classics through “official” translations prepared with a specific pedagogical goal in mind.

Dimitrios Glinos, one of the major advocates of translating Ancient Grammatology into Modern Greek, considered the latter to be a means for making humanistic education available to the masses by allowing students from all walks of life to get acquainted with the wealth and depth of classical literature by simply reading it in their own “natural language”. Delmouzos was the first to apply this principle in his school in Volos (The Upper Primary School for Girls) where he used three influential translations, namely Homer’s *Odyssey* translated by Polylas, Homer’s *Iliad* translated by Pallis and Sophocles’ *Antigone* translated by Manou.
1.6.2. Diglossia, bilingualism and intralingual translation in Greece

The process, practice, and product of intralingual translation and, subsequently, retranslation(s) are closely associated with the issue of Greek diglossia and bilingualism. Further in the analysis, I will attempt to discuss Greek language both from the point of view of “language as myth” and “language as part of the problem of Greek continuity”, but also from the standpoint of the “language question”, i.e., the infamous Greek language controversy which is yet to be definitely resolved.

For now, I will only address the distinction between Greek diglossia and Greek bilingualism and, in doing so, I will use the typology put forth by Anna Frangoudaki. This typology will reveal that translation and retranslation in an “intralingual transfer” context are far more complicated processes than the terms themselves would suggest.

This issue becomes more complicated due to two facts. The first one relates to the lack of universal consensus on what diglossia and bilingualism really refer to. As Hudson notes, “[…] forty years after the publication of the late Charles Ferguson’s historic paper on diglossia (Ferguson 1959), a coherent and generally accepted theory of diglossia remains to be formulated.” (Hudson 2002: 1). And he concludes that:

[...] what the term “diglossia” should be understood as designating is a matter of linguistic convention within the discipline of sociolinguistics. The meaning is not given in the term itself, nor is the meaning intended by Ferguson in 1959 necessarily immutable for all time. Fishman’s (1967) argument that the term “bilingualism” referring to individual linguistic versatility should be distinguished from the term “diglossia” referring to societally held norms governing differential functional allocation of codes is a crucial one, although […] it may be unfortunate that the term “diglossia” should have been coopted to refer to patterned situational variation more generally. (Op. cit.: 42-43).
The second fact has to do with a semantic confusion specific to the Greek language: diglossia is a Greek compound word, made of the prefix *dis* (i.e., two or double or “bis”) and the word *glossa*, i.e., language. Frangoudaki draws attention to this key etymological problem by noting that “Diglossia […] is a word that already exists in Greek and it means *bilingualism*. The term diglossia in its Greek meaning (=bilingualism) has been used since the eighteenth century to describe the *metalinguistic difference of opinion* on which language the Greeks “should” speak.” (Frangoudaki, 2002: 105)

It is equally important to note, as Kaye suggests, that “Ferguson's original conception of diglossia sharply contrasted with bilingualism, since he states that diglossia is different from “the analogous situation where two distinct (related or unrelated) languages are used side by side throughout a speech community, each with a clearly defined role (1964 [1959]: 429)” (Kaye, 2001: 118). However, Ferguson, who took the term diglossia from French, claimed that diglossia applied only to three languages, namely Arabic, Greek, and Swiss German.

Departing from Hudson’s (2002) theoretical attempt to come up with a more “uniform use” of diglossia in sociolinguistic research and theory construction, while remaining, at the same time, closely attached to Fishman’s typology on diglossia and bilingualism, Frangoudaki suggests that the case of Greek should not only be viewed as a diglossic study case *par excellence* but primarily as a phenomenon which evolved from the status of diglossia to societal bilingualism through transitional diglossia19.

---

19 For a complete analysis of this argument, see Anna Frangoudaki (2002: 61-107).
Frangoudakis’ argument in favour of this distinction is developed as follows: the period extending up to 1880 refers to a sociolinguistic situation that could be considered as typically diglossic. On the economic front, Greece represents a pre-industrialized society, i.e., it fulfils one of the fundamental requirements for diglossia. From a linguistic point of view, there are two separate sets of codes: on the one hand, there is *katharevousa* (i.e., pure or purist language) and, on the other hand, there are various dialects of Modern Greek. *Katharevousa* is mostly a written code used in formal contexts (such as the administration, the judicial and legal system, the educational system, etc.) whereas all other dialects and variants of Modern Greek are used by the vast majority of people, mainly peasants in everyday interaction. *Katharevousa* is more or less a codified language whereas Modern Greek has neither standardized nor codified norms.

This is a typical diglossic situation insofar as it occurs, as Hudson (2002) suggests, in a pre-industrialized society, and precedes any attempt for a comprehensive, widespread literacy movement and the creation of a standard national language. It is also worth noting that, although *katharevousa* is the “official language” of the Greek state, it is not the language of choice of the Greek people.

In the same vein, Frangoudaki claims that the period between the 1880s and 1920s corresponds perfectly to what Fishman defines as “transitional diglossia”. However, “since the interwar period, we [Greeks] definitely have a case of societal bilingualism.” (Frangoudaki, 2002: 101). To substantiate this claim, Frangoudaki proceeds by setting the record straight with regard to basic misconceptions about the role of *demotiki* and *katharevousa*, their features and functions as well as their interrelationship.
It seems that in doing so, she is using the definition of societal bilingualism as “[the bilingualism] concerned with between-group interactions in which the two languages serve as a symbol over which interaction occurs. This perspective is not really concerned with individual differences within groups. […] What matters […] is that language in some ways signals membership in a group and serves to maintain the group’s cohesiveness and identity.” (Hakuta et al. in Rosenberg (ed.) 1987: 285)

Frangoudaki’s attempt to clarify the above-mentioned misconceptions is based on an analysis using the following pairs: High vs. Low language (i.e., language perceived from the point of view of the users, i.e., from a purely linguistic approach); official vs. non-official language (i.e., language perceived from a more normative point of view, namely a more sociological approach); and, finally, prestige language vs. vulgar language (i.e., language perceived from a more historical, mythical (see evaluative), and social point of view (a purely sociological approach)).

As far as the first criterion is concerned, it is argued that, despite considerable disagreements among Greek linguists, as reflected in the Greek sociolinguistic literature, *demotiki* is a language *per se* and not a vernacular, or a dialect, or a linguistic variety. Frangoudaki subscribes to the position according to which *demotiki* is a standard language because “it is the product of a process of codification and normalization of the spoken language out of varieties used by the educated in the urban centers.” (Frangoudaki, 2002: 102).

Consequently, *demotiki* is a High code insofar as it is a standardized language that possesses both an oral and a written form and is widely used by the educated in the urban
centres (pre-industrialization and industrialization phase). However, borders between High and Low language become blurred due to the insistence of demotiki proponents to associate the latter with “the language of the people” in an attempt to defend its values and elevate demotiki to official language status. In the eyes of the advocates of katharevoussa, the language of the people is synonymous with Low language, i.e., a peasant or a vulgar idiom, whereas katharevoussa is considered the sole dignified successor of classical ancient Greek on the basis of the “proximity in form” of the two variants (Idem).

With regard to the second criterion, i.e., official vs. non-official language, katharevoussa was attributed the status of “official language” from 1911 to 1974. Why katharevoussa prevailed over demotiki for such a long period remains a complicated issue. It is not the purpose of this study to analyze the reasons behind it. However, as Frangoudaki clearly suggests, “these reasons are political and fall out of the scope of the discussion on diglossia. Nevertheless, the long dominance of the purist code as the language of public administration, law, politics and part of the academy, as well as the violence of the continuing debate on the normative issue of which language the Greek people ‘should’ speak, has considerably contributed to an obscuring of the sociolinguistic reality”. (Frangoudaki 2002:102).

At this point it should be noted that, although katharevoussa may have been the official language of the Greek state and have been awarded the status of H language, it was progressively losing ground on the prestige vs. non-prestige language front. By the 1930s, demotiki in its purest form, namely a form free from all katharevoussa mixtures and
residues, had become “the linguistic indicator of educational distinction and social superiority” (Op. cit.: 103). Its use, better yet its proper use, was limited to a very few “chosen” ones, in other words to an intellectual elite. This was due to the fact that *demotiki* was not taught in schools and therefore remained a mystery language to the “uninitiated”.

The status of the Greek language during that period presents a very interesting study case whereby *demotiki* was elevated to the rank of prestige language while *katharevoussa* still enjoyed the status of official language. This resulted in the mixing of the two linguistic forms, a situation which became increasingly common to the extent that one could witness a very peculiar situation of two H languages co-existing and fulfilling different and supplementary functions and roles.

The ambiguous status of the two languages is also reflected in the dual interpretation of the term diglossia in Greek (see p. 23). As Frangoudaki reminds us:

[...] in various phases of the conflict over language, the term diglossia has been contested, precisely because of its meaning (two languages), by the traditional supporters of Katharevoussa, who claimed the existence of only “one” Greek language, from antiquity until today. For the same reason, the supporters of Demotiki systematically used the term diglossia (=bilingualism) in order to underline the fact that the issue is about two different languages.

In the long process of this social conflict, there have been efforts to solve the difference by drowning the fish [...] that is by acknowledging the “actual” fusion of the two languages, due not only to their linguistic proximity as varieties of the same language, but also to their very long coexistence in the same linguistic community [...]. Along the same line of thought, the new notion of diglossia, invented by Ferguson, has been translated into Greek with two words (*dimorphia* and/or *diyfia* meaning “two forms” and “two styles”; Babiniotis 1979a: 171-172). This translation has been used, with reference to Ferguson, as an argument denying the existence of bilingualism, since *Katharevoussa* and *Demotiki* are just two forms or styles of the same Greek language (Babiniotis 1979a: 27). It has also been used as an argument in favor of the fusion of these two forms or styles, considered of
higher linguistic quality than the one actually produced by following the “normative” rules of Standard Demotiki (Babiniotis 1979b, 1984). This metalinguistic evaluation is closely related, \textit{inter alia}, to a sort of revival of the support of Katharevousa in modern times, again for political reasons (Frangoudaki, 2002: 105-106)

By taking into account that the corpus of the retranslations used in this study extends from the 1930 to 2006, it becomes obvious that the issue of Greek diglossia is vitally important both with regard to whether we are really dealing with interlingual or intralingual transfer as well as with reference to the transfer mechanisms used in the translation process and the final product in both cases.
Chapter II: The role of philosophy in modern Greece

2.1. Philosophy before, during and after the Enlightenment

In Greece, any reference to philosophy seems to produce a series of inferences whereby an indisputable connection exists between philosophy, philosophical achievements of the Classical times, and the heritage of the Ancient Greek world. These automatic reflexes may be attributed to a systematic “conditioning” produced by a complex apparatus, which includes the educational, social, and political system, and may be viewed as the result of a longstanding tradition. The relationship between philosophy and “Ancient wisdom”, and, subsequently, between philosophy and Ancient Greek as a linguistic vehicle *par excellence* for conveying philosophical meaning, may sound like an outdated cliché. However, it seems to be inscribed in the social imaginary of the Greek people mainly because it has long served as a basis for self-identification and self-promotion and has hardly been challenged throughout the years. In other words, philosophy and Greek philosophical heritage are some of the basic representations shared by contemporary Greeks. Whether it is used in an “instituting institutions” way (as mentioned previously), will be explored in the context of this research.

Regardless of whether modern Greek philosophy is going through a quiescent state or an active process of creation, it would be impossible to offer a comprehensive description of the philosophical background that prevailed during modern times, the various statuses of philosophy (from grace to disgrace and all the stages in between) and its trials and tribulations along the centuries so as to posit the focus of my research and justify its results. Instead, I will attempt a provisional account of modern Greek philosophy, mainly
by referring to the context into which any original work was generated in the extended Greek world from 1453 onward. Special emphasis will be placed on the period preceding the Greek Enlightenment, the years during and after the Enlightenment, and the influence of this strictly intellectual phenomenon on a purely political and military act, i.e., the Greek Revolution and the War for Independence.
2.2. **From 1453 to 1821**

Choosing 1453 is neither totally arbitrary nor innovative: it has already been used by other researchers as a starting point in analyzing original philosophical works produced in what would conventionally be called the “Greek world” within the Ottoman Empire; it also marks a key historical event: the Fall of Constantinople. This event has systematically been exploited by historians and historiographers alike for multiple purposes, including attempts to sustain a basic myth, i.e., “the fundamental truths” of modern Greek history.

With that in mind, Psimmenos suggests that one of these “fundamental truths” is the perpetrated myth of Greeks having *continuously* and *vigorously* fought for their freedom and independence since the first day of the Ottoman invasion (i.e., 1453) until 1821. Another associated “truth” suggests that all intellectual leaders of the time have internalized the pivotal role education and philosophy should play in achieving a common goal, i.e., to shake off the Ottoman yoke and create an independent Greek state. The latter “truth” provided the Insurgence with both an intellectual pretext and a philosophical foundation. According to Psimmenos, all these self-explanatory statements express a deeper psychological need to associate freedom, as a concept, with history, as an identity and memory-building process. This goal is achieved via a discourse which resorts to a seductive play of words and wisdom statements about modern Greek philosophy that lack substantial content (Psimmenos 1988: 18).

Those who attempted to establish a chronology of modern Greek philosophy have already been confronted with the major issue of periodization and its subsequent difficulties,
namely finding the sources and choosing a starting point for their research. As Psimmenos points out, these problems refer equally to a distinction that needs to be made between modern Greek philosophy, on the one hand, and modern Greek philosophers, on the other hand. These are not synonymous simply because some philosophers were born Greek but wrote in a foreign tongue and vice-versa; others exercised their philosophical activity in the West (mainly in Italy) and have influenced Western philosophy via the translation of their works (originally written in Greek) into other languages (including Latin). (Op. cit.: 27-30)

Going beyond the issue of origin and language, the question of selecting the reference material to define modern Greek philosophy is further complicated by the definition of philosophy *per se*. Psimmenos warns against possible discrepancies in defining modern Greek philosophy, which stem from the point of view of the definer and the point of view of the defined, but also from a meta-philosophical point of view, in other words how philosophy views its own field\(^{20}\). To say it differently, when defining philosophy, we must ask the following questions: *a.* Can a text be qualified as philosophical and on what criteria?; *b.* Can an intellectual be considered a philosopher?; and, finally, *c.* What is the role of philosophy at any given time; in other words, what is expected of philosophy?

The answer to these questions depends on a number of conditions that need to be met, such as whether a text is considered a philosophical text at the time of its production or is qualified as such at a later time; who qualifies the text as being philosophical (is it a

\(^{20}\) This is what Pentzopoulou-Valala calls a circular phenomenon: the role of philosophy is to be defined by the interpretative look which approaches philosophy from a specific point of view. This is the look of the philosopher who has already established his/her own interpretative horizon. (Pentzopoulou-Valala, 1994: 301)
Finally, there is another puzzling issue, which is specifically raised in the case of modern Greek philosophical production, especially between 1453 and 1821. It revolves around the ideal of originality, in other words, the quest for innovative philosophical reasoning resulting in the emergence of a unique philosophical system as opposed to any para-philosophical production in the form of commentaries, companions used for pedagogical purposes, direct or indirect transfer of ideological achievements —which could also include the case of translation as a means of intellectual mobility— and patchwork productions consisting of heterogeneous compilations of philosophical thinking.

Moreover, with regard to the role of philosophy at a given space and time, Psimmenos suggests that the latter defines, either directly or indirectly and from a historical point of view, what is philosophy and who is a philosopher. More precisely, mapping philosophical production during the Ottoman occupation can only be achieved when considering “philosophy” in its broader definition. “It is only within this larger context, for instance, that one can label under ‘philosophical production’ any attempt to provide a theoretical foundation for theological, political and other questions raised” (Psimmenos 1988: 31; my translation). In other words, one must include texts such as notes, commentaries, memoranda and statements, mainly written for educational purposes, as
well as direct or indirect attempts to “trans-fuse” Western thinking in the Greek space. Translation is one of the many plausible processes of ideological “trans-fusion”.

Establishing a registry of the major trends and directions that dominated philosophical activity during this period is useful for our research in order to re-construct the environment and the prevailing conditions into which (re)-translation(s)\textsuperscript{21} post 1821 were situated at the time they emerged and for as long as they were considered functional. For instance, it would be difficult to comprehend the use and role of any retranslation, as stand-alone text but also in relationship with the source text and other contemporary original philosophical production, without acknowledging the prevailing intellectual background, which was dominated by the dispute between Platonists and Aristotelians, or more precisely between Neo-Platonists and Neo-Aristotelians. Any such analysis would have to explore how this intellectual dispute influenced the philosophical landscape within the Greek space, and more precisely the educational system of the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras. It is equally important to understand that the dispute, although not limited to the Greek space (this was a wider European phenomenon), was felt differently in the East than in the West.

Notwithstanding possible influences emanating from the West, recent philosophical debates revolving around the topic of imported influences and periodization of pre-revolutionary Greek philosophy share a common \textit{topos}, i.e., to perceive transition from traditional to innovative philosophy, in other words from Aristotelianism to the new philosophy, within the confined limits of the Greek space and to underline the different

\textsuperscript{21} By retranslations here we understand the corpus selected for the purpose of this research.
outcome. Put simply, the history of philosophy maintains that, as a consequence of the French Enlightenment, European philosophy adopted a more balanced approach vis-à-vis Plato and Aristotle. In Greece, however, and despite the fact that the Greek Enlightenment was modeled after the French Enlightenment, Aristotelianism prevailed massively and indisputably over Platonism\textsuperscript{22}, except for the years of the Greek Enlightenment and between 1830 and 1926, for reasons that are socially, culturally, and politically specific to Greek circumstances\textsuperscript{23}.

At this point, I will only mention that the dispute between Aristotelians and Platonists, incarnated in the clash between Plethon and Scholarius (the first being an outspoken supporter of Plato whereas the second was traditionally anchored in Aristotelian philosophy), suggests that any attempt to promote the superiority of the Platonic system over the Aristotelian translates into the need to return to Ancient Greek forms of religious life, as demonstrated in the \textit{Laws}, and to promote them as an alternative solution to Ottoman expansion and its threat to Byzantium\textsuperscript{24}. This is a purely political issue, which goes beyond any philosophical or historical cleavage, and feeds directly into all philosophical and theological thinking. Psimmenos suggests that the intense of the dispute can only be understood under the “political” banner. This also explains why it soon deteriorated into a series of libelous statements, personal attacks and outrageous

\textsuperscript{22} For a more in-depth analysis of the fate of Platonism in Greece, see also further down in this section as well as in the section dedicated to fundamentals of Platonism vs. Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism vs. Neo-Aristotelianism.

\textsuperscript{23} This will be discussed at great length further in this study.

\textsuperscript{24} Cf. 1415 pamphlets written to Theodore and Manuel Palaiologos by Plethon in which he described how it would be possible to re-organize the Empire according to Plato’s \textit{Republic} by introducing political, legal, and economic reforms.
insults instead of being a fruitful exchange of political ideas and philosophical positions (Psimmenos 1988: 53-60).

Outside Byzantium, 15th century Greek intellectuals who lived, studied, and taught in the West had a different perception of the issues pertaining to the Greek space and the problems their homeland had been experiencing at the time. Although these intellectuals would acknowledge major difficulties on the political and the administration level, they would rather emphasize the need to bring the largely uneducated West in closer contact with Classical Antiquity and the philosophical systems of Plato and/or Aristotle, depending on their respective philosophical affiliation. Greek intellectuals abroad, who fell in the ranks of the two opposite camps (Aristotelians vs. Platonists), were mainly driven by historical and philosophical concerns regarding Greek Antiquity and dealt with specific intellectual questions raised by both philosophical systems, mainly the more obscure or controversial ones (such as the question of nature and art).

Psimmenos provides a summary of the differences of this dispute: the clash between Aristotelians and Platonists does not occur simultaneously in the West and in the East; the main protagonists are different; and, most importantly, the stimulus in the West is philosophically driven whereas in the East it has its roots in political and theological issues. Finally, as mentioned above, the outcome also varies: in the East there is no question that Aristotle dominated (most probably because early 15th century philosophers were apprehensive toward platonic polytheism and how this could compromise the fate of Christianity), while, in the West, Aristotelianism would yield its exclusiveness in favour of a more balanced philosophical approach demonstrating tolerance toward Plato, whose
importance would finally be recognized and whose philosophy would be studied in comparison with basic Aristotelian positions.

1613 is another key year in the history of modern Greek philosophy: it coincides with the return of Theophilos Korydaleus to Greece upon completion of his university studies in Italy under the supervision of Cesare Cremonini, a well-known neo-Aristotelian. 1613 also marks the beginning of a reverse philosophical “trans-fusion”, moving from the West to the East. The West was no longer the “un-educated, un-cultivated” “other” in desperate need of the Classical Antiquity. Over the years, it managed to come out of dark ages and rise as an illuminating source for the East, which, at the time, was caught in a vicious spiral of geographical and intellectual isolation, conservatism, and introversion.

The philosophical system of Korydaleus was destined to attract attention and receive a warm welcome within the Greek space. Since 1460, when Gennadius publicly burnt Plethon’s *Laws*, an outspoken defense speech for Plato and his philosophy, Aristotelianism became the official philosophy of the Greek Nation and the latter’s expression from a state of freedom to a state of slavery (i.e., from the Byzantine Empire to the Ottoman rule) (Psimmenos 1988: 32). As Psimmenos stresses, since the early 17th century, the “Philosopher”, an alias referring exclusively to Aristotle the Stagirite, was taught in the Academy of the Patriarchate and in the very few schools operating all over the Greek space within the confines of the Ottoman Empire’s jurisdiction. Formal

---

25 This position is also adopted by Mazaropoulos (2008).
education was directed and controlled by the clergy and the curriculum was evolving around the principles of Aristotle. (*Ibid*: 178-181).26

Despite the severe criticism Korydaleus endured for his positions —his opponents maintained he was largely influenced by Calvin and accused him of introducing the double-truth principle, thus separating, as Papadopoulos suggests, neohellenic philosophy from the yoke of theological domination (Papadopoulos 1988: 119)— his philosophy was appealing to Greeks at the time of its introduction. Marazopoulos seems to join Psimmenos in acknowledging that Korydaleus’ overall positive reception was due to the fact that the philosopher introduced a new Aristotelian perspective. Korydaleus’ Neo-Aristotelianism would better serve the educational needs of the enslaved nation and, most particularly, the intellectual aspirations of the “aristocracy”, as well as the educational reform vision of Patriarch Loukaris and his circle.

It is worth mentioning that, thanks to Loukaris, post-secondary educational curricula were renewed and expanded to encompass topics going beyond the traditional sterile teachings, especially within the Academy of the Patriarchate. Among the main breakthroughs put forth by Korydaleus’ philosophical system, major Neo-Hellenists mention, on the one hand, the dissociation between Christian dogma and Aristotelianism and, on the other

---

26 It is worth mentioning that the role of the Church during the Ottoman Empire is one of the basic “fundamental myths” or, as Psimmenos calls them, “fundamental truths” that feed the Modern Greek imaginary to the present time. Mazaropoulos, in his latest book on Korydaleus, published in 2008, does not deviate from the traditional discursive line. “The Church, led by its various Patriarchs of Constantinople, who were raised to the rank of “head of the Greek nation” (*ethnarhis*) while exerting religious and political influence to all orthodox people…. Every Patriarch managed to use to the advantage of the enslaved Greeks privileges attributed by the High Gate to the Church, either because this was customary or because the Ottomans had no other choice.”
hand, the expansion of philosophical research topics which, at the time, were limited to Aristotle’s *Logic* and *Rhetoric*.

The new themes and spheres of philosophical interest are some of the basic reasons a growing number of contemporary Greek intellectuals, driven for the most part by issues relating to the history of philosophy and historiography, suggest that Korydaleus be the “starting point of neohellenic philosophy (Papanoutsos 1959: 15; Psimmenos 1988: 35-50) and that a plausible periodization of Greek philosophy during the years of the Ottoman rule proceed by dividing this timeframe into three parts: the period preceding the arrival of Korydaleus; the period which coincides with the arrival of Korydaleus in his homeland and his teaching career in Athens, Constantinople, and elsewhere; and, finally, the period following the death of Korydaleus and the teachings of his successors.

Kyrkos maintains that “the last two centuries of Byzantium left a living tradition of studying the works of Aristotle.” (Kyrkos in Dragona-Monahou (ed.) 1994: 147). Nevertheless, this tradition would be questioned by the Greek Enlightenment Movement. The intellectual and educational *status quo* was first impugned from the outside. Nicholaos Mavrocordatos, Prince of Moldavia and Wallachia, member of a well-known Greek Phanariote family, was the first to challenge Aristotle’s authority, especially on the topics of the nature of things and human ethics. Mavrocordatos published *Philotheou Parerga*, a treatise dedicated to the new philosophy, whereby Aristotle was “asked” to admit defeat and to submit his authority to the Moderns.\(^{27}\) This is one of the first ideological instances of the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns in the Greek space.

---

\(^{27}\) Paraphrased citation of the direct quote taken from *Philotheou Parerga* (Mavrocordatos 1800: 54-55) quoted by Psimmenos (Psimmenos 1989: 13). See also Bouchard (1989: 120).
Nicholaos Mavrocordatos also explored Plato’s dialogues by re-discovering their pedagogical value.

Psimmenos observes that Alexandros and Nicholaos Mavrokordatos represent the newly emerging class of leaders and aspiring politicians, merchants and businessmen, operating outside the traditional centers of Constantinople, Athens and elsewhere. These people, located in Moldavia, Wallachia and the surrounding areas, held important offices, possessed wealth and, subsequently financial power, and had the opportunity to travel abroad and become acquainted with various influential movements of the West. Arguably, their intellectual interests were driven by practical concerns: as part of the political and administrative organization of the Ottoman Empire, these rulers were not willing to follow the official line imposed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and intended to expand their interests in areas that went beyond physics and ethics, i.e., the two aspects of Aristotle’s philosophical apparatus systematically exploited by the Orthodox Church.

Mavrocordatos father and son inaugurated a new era in terms of philosophical investigation and set an example for further progress. The philosophical and scientific reasoning of the West progressively gained room in the East and expanded before and after the 1821 Revolution. At this point, it is important to note, following Demos’ argument, that “the contribution of the Enlightenment [was] not to be found in its philosophical content so much as in the fact that it introduced the attitudes, temper and method of modern science.” (Demos 1958: 532). Scientific experiments became possible thanks to the creation of numerous laboratories in various academies that were being equipped accordingly.
Mathematics held a prominent position and operated as a symbol for progressivism. This is because mathematics was fulfilling a double role: on the one hand, it demonstrated human reasoning and, on the other hand, it was the language of physics. Conservatives, who were in favour of Classical education, were vehemently opposed to the introduction of sciences and would seize any opportunity to make a mockery out of mathematics. As Demos stresses “the opposing parties in the hostilities were the ‘mathematicists’ vs. the ‘grammarians’” (Op. cit.: 532).

The quarrel between the ‘mathematicists’ and the ‘grammarians’ was, in fact, a manifestation of an interplay between theology and science, introduced for the first time via the Enlightenment. Innovative scientific statements about the natural world symbolized free, inquisitive thinking and a rejection of dogmatism. This represented a direct threat to the traditional dogma of the Orthodox Church. What made it more interesting was that early philosophers were monks or ecclesiastics.

Accusations that the proponents of Aristotelianism were unable to fully grasp Aristotle’s system increased the urgency to expand the spectrum of philosophical, scientific, and educational considerations. Eugenios Voulgaris incarnated the polymath par excellence and introduced eclecticism and the experimental method of science as a means for the attainment of truth. For Voulgaris, all knowledge rested upon metaphysics and logic. His eclecticism was mainly developed in his Logic whereby he attempted to “find merit both in the old and the new learning, both in revelation and in reason” (Ibid: 534; my emphasis).
Voulgaris’ major contribution to eclectic philosophy consisted in adapting classical rationalism to the point of view of natural science. “While reason controls all belief, reason is not the sole source of ideas; there is also sense (and along with it, memory and imagination). For the study of natural phenomena, observation and experiment are necessary; nevertheless, the data of sense, while necessary, are not sufficient conditions for science. The mind must construct theories to explain phenomena […], theories about the causes of phenomena, and such theories must be certified by observation.” (Demos 1958: 534-5; my emphasis)

The history of modern Greek philosophy treated Voulgaris as a precursor to the Enlightenment, sensu stricto. However, in the figure of Iosipos Moisiodax, a student of Voulgaris, it recognized the “full flowering of the Enlightenment”, to use Demos’ expression. What is interesting about Moisiodax is that his philosophical system opened up new possibilities for modern Greek philosophy by introducing the concept of “healthy philosophy” (υγιής φιλοσοφία). Healthy philosophy encompasses all learning by rejecting prejudice and superstition. It presupposes the study of the nature of things and has an ultimate goal, namely true happiness and well-being that Man, in his quality as Man, can enjoy on earth. One of Moisiodax’s major philosophical breakthroughs consisted of arguing in favour of the autonomy of philosophy vis-à-vis theology.

Finally, Moisiodax openly declared that the Church’s insistence on Aristotelianism was increasing the gap between East and West in terms of scientific progress. His heretical view with regard to the progress the West has accomplished as opposed to ancient Greece made him quite unpopular, especially when he maintained that “to arithmetic Europe had
added analysis, and to geometry the theory of curves [...] [and] has contributed to the theory of gravitation, of the rotation of earth, of the periodic revolution of the earth around the sun, and the doctrine that the earth was spherical [...]” (Demos 1958: 536)

All these philosophers were, according to Psimmenos, thinkers acting on an individual basis and developing philosophical arguments on partial topics. This fragmented philosophical map was about to change toward the beginning of the 19th century in Paris around Adamantis Korais. His international prestige, in-depth knowledge, and considerable efforts to coordinate the renaissance of Greek education attracted a circle of people around him and transformed his reflections into a school of thought.

Korais commented extensively on the Classics, although he was considered more a philologist than a philosopher. His main concern being the education of the Greek people, he delved into the problem of language (i.e., a national language) and discovered its socio-political dimensions, and studied them ‘in their real context”, namely the social, cultural and political Greek realities of the time. The question of language as a means of philosophical and scientific reasoning (logos), as Psimmenos points out, were central concerns for numerous other thinkers who preceded Korais.

With Korais the issue is placed in a different dimension. His solution, known as the “middle ground”, would take equal distance from both extremes: on the one hand, the koine and, on the other hand, a return to ancient Greek. His aim was to associate Grammar (= an undivided logic) with philosophy and science in order to protect the nation from those who, “riding the Religion high horse”, attack philosophy and obstruct its introduction to Greece. (Psimmenos 1989: 25).
Psimmenos astutely observes that the attacks against modern philosophy came from the Ecumenical Patriarchate and were coupled by ridiculous attempts to re-formulate specific scientific theories that were “offensive” to the Christian faith and by sermons, launched by the clergy, with a view to warning the “faithful” of the dangers inherent in the “transfusion” of cultural goods coming from the West. (Op. cit.: 25-26)

The dispute between Korais and the clergy would reveal two things: a. Korais placed great importance on philosophy; b. Philosophy was given a purely political goal. This view was shared by many prominent people of the time, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, who turned to the West in search of what was called an “unfailing guide” to happiness and well-being. Healthy philosophy would enter the so-called Greek space starting in the 1780s. However, it would not materialize despite the movement of the Greek Enlightenment and the 1821 War for independence. The reasons of this failure will only be evoked indirectly in the course of this analysis.
2.3. **Philosophical continuity in modern Greece**

In Greece, modern metaphilosophical discourse, its origin, purpose, methods, and developments as well as its various sub-disciplines and derivate sciences, appear to evolve around a set number of axioms. The most important of all attributes the existence of Western philosophy in all its forms and shapes, to classical Greek philosophy.\(^{28}\) This axiom inevitably creates two subsequent axioms: a. It is impossible to understand any philosophical school of thought or any given philosophical system as a whole without having previously delved into classical Greek philosophy and been fully acquainted with it. Consequently, b. Teaching philosophy presumes starting from the basics, i.e., the Greek classics, and moving one’s way up.

I think it is necessary to point here that Greek axiomatic claims of the foundation of Western philosophy are not a standalone position. Russell’s *History of Western Philosophy and its connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, a canonical work, by many accounts, in terms of establishing a historical and critical overview of Western philosophy, is treated by some as a means of reflecting and, consequently, reproducing the “philosophical canon” (Kenny 2006: x-xii).

---

\(^{28}\) The term Western philosophy is often used either in connection with continental philosophy, which, in turn, is used in opposition to analytic philosophy. This is where the confusion often lies. As the Blackwell Dictionary of Western philosophy points out the distinction between analytic and continental should “not be understood to be a geographical one. Although analytic philosophy seems to be the dominant tendency in English-speaking countries, it is also practiced in many European countries, and was also contributed to greatly by continental philosophers such as Brentano, Frege, and the Members of the Vienna Circle. The single most influential philosopher, Wittgenstein, was from Austria. Confusion with regard to the term “continental philosophy” stems from the fact continental philosophy seems to be part of Western philosophy, whereas it does not refer to any single identifiable style of philosophy, style or tradition. Additionally, while the expression was originally coined to designate European philosophy, it is a “label that is more appropriate overseas than in Europe itself (Solomon and Sherman 2003:1). For a more detailed discussion on continental philosophy and the confusion and the unsolved dichotomy between analytic and continental philosophy, see Solomon and Sherman (2003).
This would most probably imply the choice of philosophers, periods, and movements to consider as the intellectual substratum upon which contemporary philosophical investigation founds its developments.

Although criticized for inaccuracy in this particular analysis and for being oblivious to important details while, by the same token, praised for his “entertaining and stimulating” (Ibid.) rendition of the state of Western philosophy, Russell can be credited for having attempted to “exhibit philosophy as an integral part of social and political life: not as the isolated speculations of remarkable individuals, but as both an effect and a cause of the character of the various communities in which different systems flourished. This purpose demands more account of general history than is usually given by historians of philosophy.” (Russell 1946 (2004 reprint): ix).

Russell’s book preface is quite suggestive of the role of personal preferences in selecting the corpus. This, however, does not apply to Russell alone. Kenny’s preface of An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy reserves an important place to personal criteria for selection: “Like Russell I have made a personal choice of the philosophers to include in the history, and the length of time to be devoted to each […] I have devoted considerable space to ancient and medieval philosophy, though not as much as Russell […]”. (Kenny 2006: xi)

These examples set the tone for defining the criteria which form Western metaphilosophical discourse and are representative of an extensive bibliography on this particular topic. There is little doubt that, in the intellectual imaginary of Western philosophy, Greek philosophy, roughly starting with the pre-Socratics and leading up to
the times after Aristotle and the Early Christian philosophy, constitutes an axiom for the international philosophical world as much as for Greek discourse.

All three axioms mentioned above automatically elevate classical Greek philosophy to the unparalleled rank of a “universal good” for the humanity to partake. This axiological evaluation becomes an axiom in itself insofar as it makes classical philosophy the norm against which all philosophical production is compared and measured. To put it simply, Greek philosophical heritage is the starting point and the finishing line of everything philosophical. This applies more prominently in the teaching of philosophy, especially at the university level, whereby any attempt to by-pass the Classics is being considered as unorthodox and imposturous as building a tower from the penthouse down instead of the ground up.

There is a fifth axiom, which derives almost effortlessly from all previous four: the scope and depth of all philosophical investigation and the validity of the systems established, formulated, and put forth by the Greeks are proofs of classical Greek philosophy’s unparalleled quality and unshakeable credentials. Providing future generations with a holistic philosophical system is where the success of this particular philosophy lies. This could not have been achieved if it hadn’t been, on the one hand, for a philosophical development that extended over a considerable period of time and had therefore gone through all the required stages and, on the other hand, for the Greek language.

This association is based on the construct that Greek (namely ancient Greek) possesses inherent qualities that allow for this code to give all necessary elements, both linguistic and conceptual, to express a specific mental activity resulting in the development of a
system. In other words, Greek becomes a necessary condition for the emergence and the 
survival of philosophy. We are faced here with a sixth axiom. It is claimed time and again 
that, both semantically and semiologically, Greek language has produced the fundamental 
terms [οροί] and δοξας [beliefs] upon which philosophy was founded and contemporary 
philosophy has built upon. In other words, Greek provided philosophy with the necessary 
tool to appropriately designate distinctions between the various beings. Therefore, a 
prerequisite to perceiving and understanding reality is to master Greek and to become 

Associating a linguistic code with a discipline and a system creates a specific syllogism 
which equates philosophy to Greek. Based on this syllogism, philosophy could not have 
existed if it hadn’t been for the Greek language and inversely Greek has been the only 
code capable of generating philosophy. For modern Greek discourse, this is a self-evident 
assumption, either of general nature, that is political or linguistic, or of a more specific 
one, that is mainly philosophical, and refers both consciously and subconsciously to the 
myth of language. It is worth noting that Greek academics are currently in the process of 
reinventing a discourse whereby the return to a linguistic form, presumably closer to 
Ancient Greek (i.e., katharevousa, a purist form, with its multi-accented spelling, which 
is considered a historical spelling) is a panacea to all problems since it is believed that 
this linguistic form is able to express abstract thinking, as in the case of classical 
philosophy.

Finally, there is a seventh axiom that relates directly to the topic of this analysis. It has to 
do with political philosophy and the end of ideology. Numerous voices, often coming
from disparate groups, tend to converge to the assertion that there is a pressing need to call upon classical political philosophy, as initiated by Plato and completed by Aristotle, in order to exit postmodern political deadlock and put an end to a-moralistic perceptions of society and the place of the citizen within the latter.

It is neither without consequence nor purpose that those who favour the return to classical political philosophy justify their choice by providing a typical example: the unprecedented failure of almost all communist regimes, which resulted in their spectacular collapse. These regimes incarnated dictatorship, totalitarianism, and monolithic socialism. The alternative would be to re-visit Greek political philosophy whereby social, personal and political freedoms are intricately related, not separated and not submitted to utilitarian claims.
2.4. **The return to political philosophy: challenges, hurdles, disenchantments**

Renewed calls to revisit political philosophy in an effort to search for possible answers to current problems raise two crucial questions: To what does political philosophy amount nowadays? And, most importantly, what should political philosophy be and why its current state of affairs allows for nihilistic claims such as the “end of ideology”, hence the “end of philosophy”?

Criticism regarding the failure of political philosophy to address political issues crucial to society appears to share a common denominator regardless the origin. There is a well-entrenched belief that political philosophy is dissociated from philosophy as a whole. A rather recent “Greek” reading of this is provided by Koutlouka who points out that separating political philosophy from the whole body of philosophy and making of the former a sub-discipline of the latter is not acceptable mainly because philosophy is conditional to a politically organized society. Philosophy can flourish provided society is open to philosophical investigation and freedom of expression. If this condition is not fulfilled, society may very well become a dictatorship or a tyranny (Koutlouka 1994: 114).

Classical Greek philosophy does not dissociate between facts and values, since political dialogue, within the society and its institutions, contributes in bringing together practice (*praxis-praktiki*) and evaluation judgments (*krisis*). In the hierarchy of things, political philosophy is intricately connected with philosophy as a supra system (if one would venture this neologism). According to Koutlouka, three major reasons are behind this: a.
Political philosophy is able to envisage the depth and width of political issues because it operates under holistic capacities of philosophy, for which politics is one of the many objects of investigation; b. It is necessary to give philosophy precedence over any of its sub-disciplines, political philosophy in particular. This will diverge any possible danger of political intimidation and will establish the conditions for creating a “contract” (cf. Plato’s “social contracts” in Book 2 of the Republic) with nature, perceived in terms of political life, to guarantee a better political system; c. If political philosophy overrides philosophy, this will translate in “ politicizing” any form of political thought (Ibid.).

It is obvious, resumes Koutlouka, that today’s reality reflects the “philosophical nightmare” described above. Her position openly and fervently opposes today’s philosophical trends in fragmenting philosophy because this fragmentation is one of the pretexts used for proclaiming the end of ideology.
2.5. Corpus and timeframe

Previously, there have been several direct or indirect references to the corpus used in this analysis. All mentions were given in connection with politics or philosophy. Here, I will endeavour to define the corpus strictly from the standpoint of the texts chosen in my analysis. The process of selecting the corpus is closely related to the scope and the aim of this research. However, its justification goes beyond these two components; it encompasses elements that are related to the nature of the original text, its chronological sequence and the literary category in which they belong, the time of its creation, its content, and the philosophical framework which supports them.

Bearing in mind the ultimate goal of this analysis —that is to re-position modern Greek philosophy in its birthplace and to study retranslation as a vehicle for re-shaping Greek collective memory and identity— a conscious decision was made to use the following criteria in selecting the corpus. First, all reference texts had to be philosophical in nature and to address questions pertaining to politics. Second, from a purely quantitative point of view, there had to be a significant mass of data (i.e., a satisfactory number of retranslations and/or re-editions) so that results could be rather definitive and conclusions relatively safe. Additionally, texts had to be sufficiently long to provide a significant array of types of discourses without being too long to make analysis impossible, repetitive or redundant. Third, there had to be a “web of relevance”, i.e., a textual nexus, connecting the various works with each other and with other para-philosophical texts (i.e., para-texts), namely the documents on and about the reference material.
Undeniably, the reference text used here belongs to the category of the “canon”. Canon is not understood only in its rigid aesthetical meaning given by Bloom in 1994, namely “the relation of an individual reader and writer of what has been preserved out of what has been written.” (Bloom 1994: 17). Canon formation is a “highly ambivalent phenomenon” (Op. cit.: 491), with cultural and political ramifications that goes beyond literature, sensu stricto, to encompass a considerable range of artistic creation, including philosophy. As in the case of diglossia and bilingualism discussed earlier, the debate on canon and canonicity is still open. Given the scope of this work, it would be impractical to provide a comprehensive critical analysis of all canon theories by enumerating their advantages and disadvantages. Instead, I would limit the discussion to some points that, in my view, have a direct bearing to the corpus and the ultimate goal of my research.

Consequently, I share the concerns expressed by Sela-Sheffy (2002) as per the fact that current debate on canon fails to acknowledge the “sense of continuity and the general agreement canon renders, even in conflicting situations, serving, thus, as a counterbalance to accelerated change.” (Ibid: 150) Additionally, I adhere to the trend already launched by other studies whereby canonization includes, better yet presupposes, a particular theory and a history of the field as well as the formation and implementation of a set of rituals (in the form of celebrations, etc.) that “sustain the formation of a solid stock of models and their consecration as indispensable assets of the relevant fields.” (Sela-Sheffy 2002: 153).

Finally, with reference to the position of Castoriadis who posits that, in the political and philosophical imaginary of the West, “Greek political thinking” is associated with Plato,
more than it is with Aristotle (Castoriadis 1991: 292, fnt. 1) and that the Athenians’
defeat at the Peloponnesian war is (404 BC), followed by the death penalty imposed on
Socrates, are two highly symbolic events that coincide with, on the one hand, the
destruction of *demos*, and *polis* and the death of *democracy* and, on the other hand, with
the emergence of the two most important philosophers of all times, one can safely argue
that canonicity as far as Plato and Aristotle are concerned is ensured by factors that are
internal (i.e., purely Greek) and external (i.e., going beyond Greek territories) and
subscribe to historicity.

If I were to use the *theory* and *history* hypothesis regarding the canon and apply it to the
field of philosophy, I could come to the conclusion that philosophy, in general, and
classical philosophy, in particular, have both a *theory* and a *history* upon which to
consolidate their presence as well as a considerable existing *repertoire*, which can be
either active or inactive depending on socio-cultural circumstances, such as a stagnation
phase of any sort. Equally, the very nature of philosophy as defined by Castoriadis, that is
“a creation that seeks to go beyond a closed meaning by putting into question existing
meanings [...] by denying the meaning its *de facto* status [...] its *de facto* validity”, bears
the quality of *prefiguring* (Sela-Sheffy 2002: 153) a new repertoire via the production of
new philosophical works, hence, the constitution of new possible canons emerging from
the existing one.

Seen from the point of view of retranslation, and departing from our hypothesis that
retranslation is a possible expression of the opening of the meaning in closure, it could be
argued that innovation heralded by the retranslation process, which operates within the
“canon”, is the privilege given to senior capital-holders as a powerful means of sustaining their established authority to set the rules of the game in the field of philosophy. (Op. cit.: 153)

Following the scheme provided above, the author of my corpus (Plato) has attained the status of a “canonized brand name” according to Sela-Sheffy’s expression whether or not people are familiar with these philosophers or have read their works. “As a rule, [these canonized brand names] – be they the heroes themselves or their celebrated works – attain a high status which does not coincide with, neither derives directly from current agendas of production and consumption in the different relevant views.” (Ibid: 147) This definition suggests that canonization is not necessarily linked with mechanisms of popularization and fashionable consumption of goods (cultural, intellectual or others) and that their market value does not depend on the number of sales or their marketability at any given point in time or space.

With regard to the “textual mass” upon which this analysis is founded, canonization may operate on three different levels: Plato is a “canonized brand name” (first level) and so are his dialogues (second level); canonization of his works is not hindered by the (re)translation process per se: rendering Plato’s Republic in Modern Greek and in any other language, for that matter, may provide sufficient proof that this is a celebrated work of a canonized author, regardless of the “quality of the translation” in the target language.

---

29 Sela-Sheffy says that, “[canonization] can [often] serve, more sophisticatedly, as a means of revolutionizing a given field and constructing a new canon, by claiming a hold, in the name of “authenticity”, of a most genuine version and ultimate interpretation of an old canonical reservoir.” (2002: 156). She also gives the example of Bob Dylan’s whose poetry was overtly conformed with the canon of the time and, once canonicity was conferred upon him, could later deny affiliation with the established canonical poetry and claim autonomy and legitimization as a song-writer.
It has already been implied that criticism referring to translations and retranslations, although always made with reference to the original, does not change, i.e., compromise, the “absolute” status of the original work.

Whether translations or retranslations of canonized works become in turn canonized translations (third level), this is a whole different issue. I would argue, however, alongside Sela-Sheffy, that canonized originals remain canonized even if their translations are not canonized simply because some of these originals are elevated to the rank of “sacred” or “quasi-sacred” goods; therefore re-production, in any shape or form, of the model(s) they introduce, or the use of such a model, is utterly unthinkable (Sela-Sheffy 2002: 149).

Finally, with reference, on the one hand, to canonization and continuity and, on the other hand, to canonization as a counter-balance to accelerated change, my analysis will make use of this hypothesis to reveal whether and to what extent retranslations of the classics contribute to securing a continuity in the canonization of classical philosophy. I will also apply the hypothesis of retranslation as a process of counter-balancing accelerated changes every time the process of retranslation does not produce a seemingly “new” text but offers a “false retranslation”, in other words a re-edition with minor or no changes.

The corpus used here consists of retranslations and re-editions of Plato’s main political opus, i.e., the Republic. The thematic choice is far from being arbitrary and can be summed up as follows: the Republic is the centerpiece of Plato’s middle period. The Republic is not the most important work of the philosopher’s opus (some consider the Laws to be Plato’s most valuable philosophical contribution); however, it provides a
unique sample of his early thought and bears witness to the evolution of both his philosophical system and writing.

The *Republic* belongs to Plato’s middle dialogues, which introduce a more positive attitude and give voice to Plato (instead of Socrates). In the *Republic*, it is no longer Socrates that is reported through Plato but Plato who speaks via Socrates and expresses his personal opinions on matters related to the nature of things, God, the laws, and the ideal political system. Most importantly though, the *Republic* is the most celebrated utopian political system ever conceived, which inspired many subsequent writings in various languages and at various times and was the text *par excellence* to have been used by all kinds of leaders to justify their politics and consolidate their power. Additionally, the *Republic* and its various retranslations into Modern Greek created a considerable paratext which accompanied every translation. This paratext cannot be ignored because of its volume and the philosophical discussion it helps generate. Finally, the phenomenon of an extensive paratext is most prevalent in the case of the *Republic*. It therefore suggests that Plato’s imprint is more important than Aristotle’s, especially during the 20th century, possibly because of his controversial positions.

As far as the timeframe of my corpus is concerned, it should be noted that, although the start date for the extended corpus (primary and secondary) is the 1821 War for Independence, which refers to a major military event in modern Greek history, the main corpus (i.e., Plato’s *Republic*), was only translated during the 20th century. The 2006 end date should be view in relation to a major cultural event, the 2004 Olympic Games, stemming from political and diplomatic efforts and aiming to make an important political
and cultural statement: to demonstrate that the modern Greek identity (the "Greek Self") is unique due to its specific cultural and linguistic heritage (Greek Antiquity) but is also “up-to-date” and part of the “other” (mainly the European “other”) in the collective “same” (Greek identity as an integral part of the European identity). Therefore, it is not an aberration to say that the 2004 Olympic Games were primarily vested with a political and cultural agenda; their athletic value was only secondary to the collective perception of the event.

The timeframe thus defined is rich in political, social, cultural, and linguistic events that correspond to major landmarks of Greece’s long trajectory from the status of an occupied territory under the Ottoman Empire to an independent State with its own central government, its own official language, as well as its institutions. On the political level, these years coincide with the emergence of the nation-state and its subsequent evolvement into the political institution known as the “European Union”. Over these years, questions of identity and belonging change dramatically and so does our understanding of the traditional forms of government. Under these circumstances, the example of Plato as a “supra-citizen”, the philosopher who placed himself outside the polis in order to form its episteme, in other words his own philosophical system for others to consider, becomes all the more up-to-date.

While unification is the order of the day and authorities strive to by-pass differences and put emphasis on similarities to ensure adherence to a unified Europe, irredentism emerges from everywhere and peoples claim strongly their cultural, linguistic, historical, and territorial independence and uniqueness. This is the case of Macedonia, the place where
Aristotle worked as Alexander the Great’s preceptor, as contemporary study-case of political and diplomatic misadventures that change the power differential within the European territory and create new “wars” that put anew concepts such as “identity”, “belonging”, “lineage” and “blood-line” at the front line of modern politics.

Finally, the period between 1821 and 2006 also provides a typical sample of all the trials and tribulations the Greek language underwent and the changes in the status of “official language”. It is also representative of the non-ending discrepancies between the official language, the spoken language, and the language used in certain domains, such as philosophy, as a means for conveying concepts.
Chapter III: Plato’s Republic in 20th century Greece

In Greece, translating Plato, and more specifically the Republic, into Modern Greek became a major enterprise during the 20th century. There are no records of a translated version of Plato’s opus, in whole or in part, dating before 1937. The main sources for locating the various (re)translations of the Republic are the catalogues of public and university libraries (consulted via their OPAC system) as well as bookstore catalogues. There is a high degree of inconsistency in public and university libraries’ cataloguing methods, which prevents us from having a clear and complete picture of the exact number of available retranslations of the Republic as well as detailed information regarding the translator(s), the publishers and the year of publication or reprint. The difficulty in distinguishing between an old edition and its newer reprints stems from a recurrent issue directly related with multiple cataloguing methods, for instance, the numerous ways of indicating the publication date. This is a particularly serious problem because it can lead to false conclusions with respect to the sequence of the various (re)translations.

When viewed strictly in quantitative terms, the number of retranslations of the Republic published during the 20th century may not seem remarkable given the number of translations and/or retranslations of classical works into Modern Greek. More specifically, between 1937 and 2004, there have been nine retranslations of the Republic, a number that does not take into consideration every re-edition or reprint. However, in qualitative terms, this number, when carefully combined with other relevant data (such as the rate at which other philosophical translations from other languages or books of philosophical interest written in Greek are published) demonstrates a phenomenal
production, especially when demographic factors and the economics of the Greek publishing industry are taken into account.

The phenomenon of multiple retranslations raises a number of questions: why such a small nation and such a rather marginal language—Modern Greek in its various forms and shapes—end up producing so many retranslations of a controversial masterpiece; what happened before 1937, in other words, why are there no signs of a translation of the Republic into the corresponding prevailing versions of Greek? And, should there be any, why no trace of them can be found?

Any attempt to provide a plausible answer to these questions would be incomplete without an investigation to discover how these retranslations came about and their itinerary over the years. Like any other publication, some retranslations fell into oblivion and were replaced by newer ones, some of which were published by the same publishing house under different circumstances and with different translators. Others held or are still holding competing and/or complementary positions within the dominant poetic sphere of the philosophical thinking of their time.
3.1. **Alexandros Galinos’ Republic**

Alexandros Galinos’ translation of the *Republic* (1937-1940) was originally published in 1936 by Papyros Editions. A. Papatheodorou and F. Pappas are identified as “translators” and the preface is by Adamantios Diamandopoulos. It has since been reprinted but the frequency of the reprints remains unknown.

The edition currently available presents an interesting case. All intra- and extra-textual references indicate that this is a “fusion” edition made up of two parts. The first, comprised of Books I to V of the *Republic*, is translated, commented and annotated by Papatheodorou and Pappas whereas the second part, that is Books VI to X, is attributed to Alexandros Galinos, translator and commentator. The circumstances under which this fusion edition came about and the chronological sequence of its production are unknown. The front matter of the book does not provide any reference as to the place and date of the translation’s first publication and its subsequent re-editions or reprints. Additionally, there is no information as to whether Books VI to X were translated first, followed by a translation of Books I to V under different translational authorship.30 Diamantopoulos’ introduction, presumably written at a different time, remains the only consistent element throughout these editions.

Lack of reliable information makes it difficult to distinguish between a first, second or third edition and a reprint, and creates confusion about the chronological sequence of the translations and/or (re)editions and the circumstances leading to the publication and

---

30 This order would explain why the 1939 edition is attributed to Alexandros Galinos and not to Papatheodorou and Pappas.
circulation of the copies currently available. Most importantly, though, it makes it difficult to trace changes in the translated text, should there be any, to recreate their logical order and to attribute them to the appropriate translators or editors. This carries major consequences with regard to historical facts, authorship and discursive analysis, given that it is not clear who interferes with the translated text, why, when and how.

The complexity of this matter called for a compromise in order to avoid irreparable mistakes, which could lead to faulty conclusions; hence the decision to use the latest reprint of this retranslation without comparing it against other copies or versions. This compromise was made easier following additional information from the editorial house that holds the copyright for this translation. This information reinforced my original inclination to maintain a critical stance vis-à-vis the apparent abundance of (re)editions and confirmed my primary analysis, which suggested that all re-editions were actually mere reprints.

More specifically, Papyros Editions maintains that all copies currently available on the market are photographic reprints from its 1975 re-edition of the 1936 edition. An inquisitive observer will easily discover that the book’s pages are not the same colour nor of the same paper quality. This is because the collective work of Plato’s Republic is a “pieced-together” collection of all the Republic’s Books (i.e., Books I to X), which are also published and sold individually.

Interestingly, Papyros Editions encountered a number of difficulties in tracking down the full story behind the creation of this translation and its subsequent re-editions and
reprints. A fire in the 1970s, which destroyed a considerable part of the publishing house’s material, further complicated this task.

All the information mentioned previously has also been corroborated by intratextual data, such as references to works on and about Plato used in Diamantopoulos’ introduction, including a suggested bibliography referring to commentaries on Plato’s *Republic*, the works cited being more or less contemporary to the time the introduction must have been written.  

Extratextual information, or the lack thereof, is equally suggestive as to the time the translation was first published. Nowadays, online bookstores sell photographic reprints of the 1975 translation. Interestingly enough, 1975 is also the year a number of retranslations of other classical works (by Plato, Strabo, and other philosophers), attributed to A. Papatheodorou, were published (or reprinted) by the same editorial house (Papyros Academic Society of Greek Letters).

---


32 The version issued for this analysis shows no indication of a serial edition or any other date allowing us to locate it in time.
The Galinos-Papatheodorou-Pappas version of the *Republic* belongs to the *Opus of Ancient Greek Authors* (Ἀπαντα Αρχαίων Ελλήνων Συγγραφέων), a collection created by Papyros Editions and launched in 1936, the year the publishing house was founded by Andreas Pournaras. Originally, the sole purpose of establishing Papyros Editions was to introduce the Opus collection and to make classical authors accessible to the general public through translations.\(^{33}\) Despite a rather elaborately presented book, at least as far as the cover of the hardcopy edition is concerned, the translated text creates little if any intertextual discussion around it. There does not seem to be any analysis of consequence that refers to this translation and its annotations, either directly or indirectly.

One plausible explanation might be that the translation is written in *katharevoussa* (better yet in a rather simplified version of it), the prevailing idiom and official language at the time the translation was written. This language is no longer relevant to the average Greek reader. Another possible explanation is that the fragmented commercial availability of this translation makes an overall evaluation of it difficult.

The Galinos-Papatheodorou-Pappas translation is preceded by a typically academic introduction authored by Adamandios Diamantopoulos, an educator and historian with strong attachments to classical philosophy and religious values, as demonstrated by his career and intellectual production as history professor at the *Evangeliki Scholi*\(^{34}\), professor in the Greek School of Commerce at Odessa and one of two contenders for the

\(^{33}\) In 1962, under the direction of Yiannis Pournaras, son of Andreas Pournaras, Papyros Editions evolved into Papyros Graphics S. A. a company publishing encyclopedias and historical books. Papyros signed a collaboration agreement with major European publishing houses, such as Larousse, Fabri and Mondadori, Kister and the American Encyclopedia Britannica. An addition to Papyros Graphics S. A. appeared in 1968 when Papyros Press was founded, specializing exclusively in periodicals.

\(^{34}\) A well-renowned High School in Smyrna (İzmir).
Chair of General Ecclesiastic History at the School of Theology of the University of Athens in 1923. Finally, the Galinos-Papatheodorou-Pappas version is not included in the bibliography of suggested readings compiled by the Ministry of Education. This list is used for hermeneutic analyses of Plato’s *Republic* for educational purposes as described in the detailed school curriculum. This fact alone is suggestive of the decline of Papyros’ version of the *Republic.*
3.2. Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ Republic

Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ paraphrased version adds to the brief yet intriguing history of the Republic’s retranslations into katharevousa and/or demotiki. First published in Athens in 1948 by Andreas Sideris Editions, this retranslation was re-edited in 1962. The publishing house responsible for the 1962 “improved and expanded” re-edition remains unknown.

Locating and examining this retranslation proved to be a real challenge. Although several university libraries, including the National Library of Greece, hold copies of both the 1948 and 1962 editions, it was difficult to have access to and examine these books. Library policies that prohibit loans, especially in the case of rare and old books, as well as precautionary measures, which frequently consist in taking books published before 1950 off the shelves in order to protect them, pose additional obstacles to research.

Despite the difficulties, I finally managed to obtain various segments from both editions. The copy of the 1948 edition presents additional information, namely a hand-written note whereby Skouteropoulos dedicates his treatise/translation entitled Plato’s Republic and newer pedagogy (Η Πολιτεία του Πλάτωνος και η νεωτέρα παιδαγωγική) to Nikolaos Vlachos, professor of Modern Greek History at the University of Athens.36

35«[…] επί το βέλτιον μεταρρυθμισμένη, επηυξημένη, πληρεστέρα και ακριβεστέρα, ως προς πάμπολλα, και της σημερινής εκπαιδευτικής της Πατρίδος ημών καταστάσεως και ενεργείας απτόμενη, και πολλαχώς άλλως βελτιωνέται αυτοῦ, ώστε και σχεδόν νέον βιβλίον δύναται να χαρακτηρισθή» (Skouteropoulos 1962: 10) ([…] a reformed, expanded, improved and more accurate, in many aspects, [translation], which is relevant to the current state and policy of our country’s educational system, an amended edition, in many aspects, to the extent that it could be considered a different book […] ) (my translation)

36 Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ dedication must be related to one of the many hats Nikolaos Vlachos wore and most particularly to his capacity as lecturer of Modern Greece’s political history at the Panteion Academy
What makes this particular translation more interesting than previous or subsequent retranslations of Plato’s Republic is that it can be easily identified as “personal rewriting”. Acting in his primary capacity as an educator, the author and academic writer in I. Skouteropoulos overrode the translator, therefore allowing himself considerable latitude in re-writing the Republic by turning it into a purely educational text. The result was a pedagogical treatise divided into five parts—this division abolishes the Republic’s classical division into ten books—of which three parts are subjected to Skouteropoulos’ analysis. In the 1948 edition, the Republic’s classical division is also abolished but in a totally different manner: this version consists of two parts, with the translation incorporated within the author’s commentary.

As is the case with Galinos-Papatheodorou-Pappas translation, Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ version has fallen into oblivion. Written in katharevoussa, Skouteropoulos’ paraphrase breaks free from Plato’s style, which uses a dialogue with several interlocutors, to adopt instead the style of an opinion essay. This translation/treatise is less about the Republic according to Plato and more about offering a podium for promoting the educational topics dear to Skouteropoulos.

In his analysis, Ioannis Skouteropoulos departs from Plato’s project of educating the philosopher-leader in order to purposefully defend the need to create for the Greek State an intellectual class of leaders, made up of brilliant and enlightened men, who would...
stand out by reason of their superiority, acquired, *inter alia*, through refined education. The members of this class would be assisted by a multitude of well-trained and obedient public servants, who would pride themselves on their integrity and dedicate their life to serving the common good.

Thus, Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ treatise is an ideological address in favour of a class-structured society where administration is entrusted to a person who incarnates Plato’s philosopher-leader and who comes from the upper social echelons. The need to provide advanced education to the governing class is supported by a strong argument advocating for moral integrity and superiority that comes with educating the “noblest elements” of the society. Education, ethics, and dedication to serving the country are *sine qua non* conditions to progress. Leaders and public servants alike should be able to earn an acceptable living to ensure that they will not be tempted by wealth and will subsequently perform their tasks in a manner that is free from corruption and venality.

In Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ analysis, there is no room for a communist-inspired interpretation of the *Republic*. The absence of personal property that the *Republic* imposes on the leading class is replaced by a reasonable salary and a respectable living in order to guarantee that public servants and government leaders will shy away from any material temptation that would increase their appetite for authority and abuse of power.
3.3. Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ *Republic* and the Didaskaleiaka incident

The interpretation of the *Republic* offered by this translator-author is consistent with his political and linguistic beliefs and his views regarding the country’s educational system, its goals and the means to achieve them. A fervent advocate of *katharevousa*, the purist form of the Greek language, Ioannis Skouteropoulos is known for his active involvement in one of the most notorious incidents of 1928 involving one of the numerous aborted attempts to use *demotiki* in the country’s educational system. *Didaskaleiaka* — an additional chapter to two major incidents that took place before 1928 (i.e., the *Atheïka* and the *Marasleiaka*) — was a typical case of a long raging dispute between conservatives and progressives and their ideologically divergent views as to the purpose of the State and its school system.

The dispute, disguised as a language issue, was exacerbated by political instability, which in turn was aggravated by the humiliating 1922 defeat in Asia Minor, the massive arrival of Greek refugees on the mainland and the ideological crisis, which led to exorcizing the communist ideology and associating the use of *demotiki* with communist philosophy. Manariotis stresses the fact that, in the 1920s and 1930s, Greek educators overwhelmingly espoused the principle of subordinating the educational system to the needs and ideology of the Nation-State, as was the trend in most European countries, while ensuring that each social class would be educated on the basis of the role it was destined to fulfill within the country’s social, economic and political apparatus. (See Manariotis)
The *Didaskaleiaka* controversy was ignited by a series of initiatives introduced by a handful of progressive educators, such as Miltos Koundouras, who considered *demotiki* the language of the people and, therefore, the only instrument capable of educating the masses and creating equal opportunities for all. The philosophy of a multi-tier educational system was the dominant ideology of the middle and upper middle classes who were shaping urban areas, such as Athens. A classical educational system would ensure that the offspring of the middle and upper social classes would acquire the means for social, economic, and political ascension. This would translate into laying the foundation for shaping the Nation’s “intellectual workers”, i.e., Greece’s elite, to use an expression borrowed from G. Palaiologos, one of the most fervent proponents of classical education, *katharevoussa*, and of the Greek Orthodox Christian values of that period.38

Miltos Koundouras was at the centre of the *Didaskaleiaka*. A brilliant and insightful educator, he had studied in Germany where he embraced progressive pedagogical principles, such as the New School (or “Progressive School” as it was known in the USA.) and the Arbeitschule. Inspired by Kerschensteiner, Koundouras’ motto was “die Vollendung des Werkes” (the completed task or work).

In 1927, Koundouras applied his educational theory in his capacity as Principal of the *Didaskaleio Thileon Thessalonikis* (the Instructional School for Girls in Thessaloniki). He favoured the use of *demotiki* instead of *katharevoussa* and encouraged literary readings in

---

38 The 1922 capitulation in Asia Minor resulted in the ideological entrenchment of the middle and upper middle classes in nationalism and anti-communism. The so-called communist threat consisted in the emergence of a left-wing political entity and a strong workers’ union that would speak in the name of the working class and would question the traditional structure of Greek society. As Frangoudaki points out, every discourse evolved around the concept of “Nation”: national language or the nation’s language, national progress, the future of the Nation, national education, national position instead of political position, a school at the service of the Nation, etc. (Frangoudaki 1992: 124).
the former. He also created working groups and promoted arts and crafts, placing them at the centre of the school’s curriculum.

His liberal views on the purpose of the educational system and the role of the educator were too progressive for the highly conservative elements of Thessaloniki society. Koundouras encouraged students, especially girls, to take the initiative and to use deductive methods for problem-solving and acquiring knowledge. He replaced traditional school desks by regular tables arranged in Π formation inside the classroom, and substituted morning prayer by a different religious chant every day, while using instruments and vocal support such as a choir. These and countless other innovations were considered subversive actions that ran contrary to classical values.

Koundaras came under fierce attack by some of the teachers in his own school who accused him of attempting to “abate the law, subvert public order and abolish the language [i.e., καθαρευόμενα]” On April 14, 1928, the faction of the Didaskaleion School Board who opposed Koundouras drafted an accusatory report on him and sent it to the Ministry of Education. Following an investigation, the Board of Education concluded that the report’s claims were unsubstantiated. However, in an attempt to strike a sensitive but necessary balance between the opposite camps in the dispute, the members of the Board found some irregularities in Koundouras’ pedagogical conduct.

The Board of Education finally concluded that Koundouras was not guilty and that he should be reinstated in his position. Nevertheless, two members of the Board of Education, namely Dimitrios Souhleris and Ioannis Skouteropoulos, expressed their disagreement with the Board’s conclusions and requested that Koundouras be brought
before the Board to answer for his actions on the grounds that “he committed the crime of linguistic fanaticism, which degenerated into a crusade against katharevousa” thus creating pressure “on the ‘linguistic consciousness’ of the pupils, which [...], in turn, resulted in a dispute among the [school’s] personnel [...]” (Koundouras 1985: 411).
3.4. Ioannis Gryparis’ Republic

Gryparis’ retranslation of Plato’s philosophical opus is the most poetic rendition of the retranslations of the Republic. This widely known version constitutes one of the two or three canonical translations of the Republic (the others being Georgoulis’ and N. Skouteropoulos’ translations). It was the fruit of a rework by Gryparis who used as a matrix his 1911 translation written in katharevoussa and published by Phexis Editions. An outspoken advocate of the people’s natural language (i.e., demotiki), Gryparis, who was first and foremost a poet who cherished popular poetry and folkloric songs (demotiko tragoudi), left a great name and a considerable legacy as translator of the classics and the translator par excellence of Aeschylus and Sophocles’ tragedies.

Gryparis started working on the demotiki version of the Republic in September 1935, but his work was interrupted for reasons that are not well documented. In September 1941, while World War II was raging, Gryparis re-launched the Republic’s translation project starting from where he had left it in 1935. Papanoutsos was the first to draw attention to the obvious discursive differences in Gryparis’ writing39 before and after 1935. Gryparis’ second attempt to translate Plato aimed at bringing the translation to completion. On page 1 of Book IV, Gryparis inscribed the following date: 1-IX-41; a month and a half later (14-X-41), he was already working on Book V. A prolific translator, Gryparis was equally productive when working on the Republic. By October 30, 1941, Gryparis was

---

39 «Από τη διαφορά όμως της γραφής, της πάντοτε κομψής και καθαρής του ποιητού, φαίνεται ότι η εργασία είχε αρχίσει πριν από τον πόλεμο, αλλά την ξανάπιεσε ο Γρυπάρης το φθινόπωρο του 1941, για να την τελειώσει.» [“The difference in writing, which remains smart and clear, suggests that the work started before the war and that Gryparis got on with it again in the fall of 1941 with the intention to finish it.” (Gryparis 1945: 1) (This statement belongs to Evangelos Papanoutsos who prefaced Gryparis’ translation).]
already on book VI and, in less than a fortnight (by November 11), he was already translating book VII.

Despite his remarkable speed and stamina, Gryparis was unable to complete the translation. Death found him in the winter of 1942 at his home in Kallithea (Athens) where he was working diligently on Plato. There has been considerable speculation over Gryparis’ death. A popular scenario among many was that Gryparis died of exhaustion, starvation and neglect. In reality, Gryparis suffered from a chronic heart condition and was of a rather frail constitution, which was aggravated by old age and the hardships of war.40 The Hellenic Literary Society, to which Gryparis bequeathed his literary property, as well as all of his belongings, his house and the Republic’s manuscripts in katharevoussa and demotiki, gave both translated versions to Zaharopoulos Editions to assemble and turn into a book.41

Given that there was only one version of Books VII to X, i.e., the translation in katharevoussa, and that it would be preferable to produce a complete version of the Republic in Gryparis’ preferred language, Zaharopoulos commissioned Evangelos Papanoutsos to transliterate books VII to X into demotiki using Gryparis’ 1911 version in katharevoussa.

Papanoutsos was well versed in Plato as well as in Gryparis’ work as a translator and intellectual. Papanoutsos’ academic itinerary started at the University of Athens in 1919, where he completed his studies in theology. He then received a scholarship and went to

---

40 For more on Gryparis’ life and work, see G. Valetas in Άπαντα Γρυπάρη έκρινε Γ. Βαλέτας, Νεοελληνική Βιβλιοθήκη, Δωρικός, Αθήνα, 1980.
Germany where he obtained his PhD. His Doctorate thesis, dedicated to Plato, was entitled *Das Religiose Erleben bei Plato* (The religious experience in Plato). Upon his return to Greece, Papanoutsos worked as a teacher and was appointed Secretary General in the Ministry of Education (in 1944, 1950 and 1963-64 respectively), taught philosophy, psychology and pedagogy and was elected a member of the Academy of Athens in 1980. Papanoutsos’ credentials as a translator of the classics consisted of his canonical translation of Plato’s *Phaedo* and his short but meaningful introduction to Gryparis’ translation of the *Republic*.

Gryparis’ translation in *demotiki* offers a critical reading of Plato’s complicated philosophical treatise. Gryparis’ language and style may account for his translation’s favorable reception over the years and its elevation to the rank of canonicity. One of the main characteristics of this translation is its concision. Unlike all other retranslations of the *Republic*, Gryparis’ revised version does not burden the reader with a lengthy introduction or heavy annotations. Papanoutsos’ introductory note follows Gryparis’ example of being short and to the point.

One possible explanation for this approach may be that Gryparis was translating as a poet rather than as a philologist or a philosopher. Regardless of the style of this retranslation, its canonicity is confirmed in more than one way. First, it is included in the suggested list of school readings established by the Ministry of Education because of its literary value and its plain yet elaborate language. Second, it has entered the public domain and is available through the “Portal for the Greek Language” website of the Centre for the Greek Language, an institution and a research facility that operates under the supervision
of the Ministry of Education, Life-long Learning and Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Tourism. The portal’s electronic library provides an important array of services, including free online access to the Classics. In Plato’s case, there are two translations of the *Republic* for the reader to consult and compare: the latest translation signed by Nikolaos Skouteropoulos and the Ioannis Gryparis’ version in *demotiki*. Third, the canonicity of Gryparis’ translation needs to be considered from the point of view of the canonical position Gryparis holds as a translator of classical tragedy and his *post mortem* recognition as a poet and a major 20th century Greek literary figure. Finally, his bold decision to recant his previous translation of the *Republic* in *katharevoussa*, by admitting that this was a work with which he was not fully satisfied, mainly because it was written in a language that did not seem natural to him, gave added value to his *demotiki* version and therefore may have contributed to its canonicity.

A critical question raised in the course of this research was whether both retranslations attributed to Gryparis should be examined. There was a great temptation to work exclusively on the demotiki version for which Gryparis is known and respected in the philosophical community. Unfortunately, Gryparis did not live long enough to finish his retranslation of the *Republic* in demotiki and Papanoutsos had to rely on the 1911 version. Consequently, the latter cannot qualify exclusively as Gryparis’ work. For these reasons, and in order to render homage to both Gryparis’ and Papapanoutsos’ work, it was important that Gryparis’ translation into *katharevoussa* be taken into account. The following chapters will reveal that Gryparis’ translation in *demotiki* was the driving force behind a considerable discursive production on and about politics and philosophy. This
discursive production is particularly obvious in Papanoutsos’ writings and his philosophical system.
3.5. Konstantinos Georgoulis’ Republic

Konstantinos Georgoulis’ version is the fifth retranslation of Plato’s Republic. Before the publication of Nikos Skouteropoulou’s translation in 2006, Georgoulis’ version was counted among the Republic’s canonical translations along with the one signed by Gryparis. Georgoulis characterized his attempt to translate the Republic as a logical extension of Gryparis’ work, which allows us to conclude that, when referring to Gryparis’ translation, Georgoulis had in mind the 1911 version published by Phexis Editions. It would have been impossible for Georgoulis to have had knowledge of and access to the first five books of Gryparis’ 1935 retranslation in demotiki, simply because this work was still in progress and the manuscript was kept out of the public eye.

Additionally, Georgoulis’ attempt to provide a newer interpretation of the Republic was part of a series of translations initiated in 1935 by editor D. Alexiou in Thessaloniki. This project started with the translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The nexus between Gryparis’ translation of the Republic and Georgoulis’ translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the Republic was highlighted by the latter in an effort to situate his work both in time and space but also within a specific philosophical and political framework.

Georgoulis’ foreword is the first to introduce the element of the reader in any of the Republic’s translations. But it is not only the reader in which the translator is really interested: Georgoulis clearly stated his intent to offer an interpretation of Plato’s Republic, an up-to-date philosophical reading of a dense, often indecipherable text known for its writer’s unparalleled philological talent and intellectual depth.
Georgoulis’ views are consistent with his intellectual, academic and professional background: he studied philology at the University of Athens between 1912 and 1917 and then philology, philosophy and pedagogy in Berlin and Freiburg, thanks to a scholarship he received from the Greek government (1930-1933). He was influenced by Goethe, Husserl and Heidegger, all of whom were at the time canonized philosophers. Georgoulis was an exceptional teacher, an expert in Greek philology, a philosopher and an educator. Moreover, he was a prolific writer and a recognized translator. He is widely known for having translated Aristotle (specifically the *Metaphysics*) and more specifically for his monumental translation of the *Physics*. He is also the author of a canonical book entitled *History of Philosophy*, which is frequently included in the university curriculum.

Although not officially included in the approved list of translations of Plato’s *Republic*, Georgoulis’ version is still quoted and provides inspiration for philosophical discussions. Most importantly, it is the reference work for commentaries on the *Republic* and all school books and teachers’ manuals refer almost exclusively to the paratext of his translation for any philosophical and textual analysis.

The significance of Georgoulis’ translation and its philosophical paratext is also reflected in the interdiscursive activity this text created over the years. For instance, Elli Pappas’ analysis on Plato and the influence of the latter’s work on modern societies is an excellent case in point. Finally, the fact that Georgoulis’ *History of Philosophy* is widely used as a bibliographical reference at the secondary and university levels confirms the translator’s canonical status and the pedagogical orientation of his work, whether in translation or as an original work.
3.6. Odysseas Hatzopoulos’ *Republic*

This particular translation is part of a series of translations of the Greek classics launched by Kaktos Editions in 1991, under the editorial guidance of its founder, Odysseas Hatzopoulos. Between 1975 (the year it was founded) and 1991, Kaktos published 2,800 books, which it financed entirely along with a series of books entitled “Ancient Greek Letters – *The Greeks*” launched in 1991. This project consisted in translating and annotating all Ancient Greek authors, a huge and unique undertaking both for Greek and international standards.42

Some 700 volumes have since been translated in “The Greeks” collection, including the *Republic*, published in two volumes preceded by an editor’s note, a short biography on Plato, a concise introduction with a summary of each of the ten books that make up the *Republic*, a table with the names of the participants in the dialogue, the translation into Modern Greek (with the original text on the left side) and some basic notes at the end of each volume. The total length of this version (both volumes included) amounts to 461 pages (in pocket book format). Most of the translations published by Kaktos, including the *Republic*, were done by an anonymous team of translators under the supervision of Vasileios Mandilaras, professor emeritus of Ancient Hellenic Philology at the Ionian University and a papyrologist.

---

42 In April 2000, this series received an award from the University of Aix-en-Provence, which characterized it as one of the greatest achievements in contemporary history. It was also awarded a prize by the Pierides Foundation of Cyprus in 2002. In 2004, Odysseas Hatzopoulos presented the collection to the Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes in Havana, Cuba.
With the exception of Gryparis’ version, Kaktos’ edition is the least lengthy of all the retranslations of the Republic. It seems that this translation have received a somewhat moderate endorsement by philologists and intralingual (Ancient into Modern Greek) translation specialists. There is a wide-spread belief that the translations made by Kaktos are free renditions of the original\(^{43}\) whereby the original, that is the Ancient Greek text \textit{per se}, was not used or was used only as a supportive document. Critics claim that the translators relied heavily on the Republic’s translations into other languages (English, French and possibly German) and less on the original. This criticism may have originated in part from the bibliography quoted in the first pages of the book, which refers to major translations into English and French.\(^{44}\) The editorial house’s decision to not clearly identify the members of the translation team (sometimes called the philologists’ team) adds to the mitigated reception of this translation despite the credentials of the project supervisor, Vasileios Mandilaras.

Notwithstanding the criticism attached to this particular retranslation, it is nevertheless included in the Ministry of Education’s approved list of books that a school library can offer to its users (teachers, professors and students). One explanation for this choice is the cost of this particular translation (sold for approximately 11 Euros per volume or 20

\(^{43}\) The question of fidelity to the letter of the original text, that would subsequently guarantee a fidelity to the spirit of the venerated author, is a recurrent theme, mainly used by those who consider this type of translation as intralingual instead of interlingual. In this particular context, philologists within the Greek educational system are less prone to endorse Kaktos’ translations.

Euros for both), which makes it more affordable than the other retranslations, with the exception of the Georgoulis version (which also sells for approximately 20 euros).

45 For instance, N. M. Skouteropoulos’ version, which is also included in the approved list of books for school libraries, sells at approximately 40 Euros, i.e., twice as much as the Kaktos’ version.
3.7. Nikolaos Memmos’ *Republic*

In 1994, Nikolaos Memmos decided to publish his own version of Plato’s *Republic*. This limited edition, financed by its author and published in Thessaloniki by Pournaras Editions, is the seventh consecutive retranslation of the *Republic*.

In a letter addressed to me, Memmos shed some light on the history of this endeavor. He revealed that there was only a limited print run, of which 200 copies were donated to municipal public libraries in Macedonia and Thrace, with the remaining copies being made available for sale. The proceeds from the sales were used to pay for the printing.

Consequently, it comes as no surprise that, nowadays, Memmos’ translation falls into the category of relatively rare books: some libraries, including the National Library of Greece, hold a limited number of copies and Pournaras Editions provides copies to only the most persistent readers from its scant supply. Although the *Republic* according to Memmos is not included in the short list of Plato’s canonical translations, it appears to be a favorite among specialists of classical philosophy.

Nikos Memmos appears to be aware of the success of his translation and its popularity among a specialized audience. He therefore modestly admitted being touched by the positive response of its readers. Memmos is a former educator who, upon his retirement, decided to revisit Plato by translating the *Republic*. ⁴⁶ After 29 years of service in the

---

⁴⁶ This is an expression used by Memmos and borrowed by the person who first initiated him to the study of Plato while he was a high school student. In a letter addressed to me, Memmos mentioned that he was fascinated by the way his school’s principal, Emmanouel Georgoulakis, gave them a speech about Plato instead of his regular class in Latin.
educational system, the retired teacher seized the opportunity to keep busy. Choosing Plato was for him the obvious choice since:

Everyone familiar with the systems advanced by Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, Protagoras and Gorgias, Prodicus and Hippias would realize that they have their share in Plato’s philosophy and have contributed in his writing. All their favorite topics, along with Plato’s ideas, have been explored and developed in a masterly way. This is a ‘heroic’ endeavour, produced in times of peace, which deserves admiration and justifies any attempt to turn it into a popular text.47

For Memmos, retranslating or re-visiting classical philosophy was an attempt to find a solution to contemporary problems. Quoting Heraclitus’ “Everything is flux and nothing is at rest”, he claims that every age is different. There is no doubt in Memmos’ mind that every new philosophical trend can find its origins in classical philosophy. His reference to Plato goes through Heraclitus and the notion of change, which Memmos seems to associate with the notion of translation. As it will be shown later on, his reference to Popper and the analysis of the similarities between Plato and Heraclitus48 dominate both the paratext of his translation and the letter he addressed to me and where he provided answers to my questions.

47 «Όποιος είναι εξοικειωμένος με τη διδασκαλία του Θαλή, του Αναξιμανδρού, του Αναξιμένη, του Ηράκλειτου και Παρμενίδη, του Αναξαγόρα και του Πυθαγόρα, του Πρωταγόρα και του Γοργία, του Πρόδικου και του Ιππία, θα διαπιστώσει ότι υπάρχει το μερικό του, ως συμβολή στα κείμενα του Πλάτωνα. Όλα τα θέματα και τα προβλήματα μαζί με τις δικές του ιδέες τα έχει επεξεργασθεί, και τα αναπτύξει με αριστοφημική δεξιοτεχνία. Αυτό ολόκληρο το ηρωικό σε καιρό ερήμης άξιζε το θαυμάσιο και δικαιολογητικό δικαιώματα για λαϊκό ανάγνωσμα.» (απόσπασμα από την αλληλογραφία μου με τον Νικόλαο Μέμμο, Καλαμαρία 29-07-09/excerpt from my correspondence with Nikolaos Memmos dated Kalamaria 29-07-09).

48 “Heraclitus was a thinker of unsurpassed power and originality, and that, in consequence, many of his ideas have (through the medium of Plato) become part of the main body of philosophic tradition, the similarity of doctrine can perhaps be explained, to some extent, by the similarity of social conditions in the relevant periods. It seems as if historicist ideas easily become prominent in times of great social change.” (Popper 1972: 27)
3.8. Theodoros Mavropoulos’ Republic

In 2006, Zitros, an editorial house based in Thessaloniki, decided to publish a new version of Plato’s Republic into Modern Greek. The translation was entrusted to Theodoros Mavropoulos, a philologist with extensive experience in translating the classics, including various translations and philological commentaries. The translation was supervised by the publisher (Konstantinos Zitros) and Dimitrios Lypourlis, professor of Ancient Greek Philology at the University of Thessaloniki from 1969 until 1996 and an expert in Ancient Greek epistemological discourse.

Mavropoulos’ task was not limited to the translation. He also produced a summary of the ten books of the Republic, an analysis of Plato’s opus followed by extensive annotations and commentaries. As well, at the end of the translation of each book (books I through X of the Republic), he included questions for classroom discussion. This philological version reflects Mavropoulos’ main vocation, that of educator, and sets the tone for the way this retranslation is expected to be read.

From the point of view of its sheer size, this work is an impressive achievement. The decision to publish Plato’s works translated into Modern Greek falls within Zitros’ business plan, implemented in the early 1990s, to launch a series dedicated to ancient authors by translating representative works from each category of the classical genres (tragedies, poetry, philosophy, essays, history, etc.).

Before publishing the Republic, Zitros introduced Plato via Phaedo, followed by the Statesman, Myths, Apology, Crito, Secret dialogues on Justice, Symposium, and
**Protagoras.** What is interesting about Marvopoulos’ retranslation of the *Republic*, however, is that it was not produced on commission. Konstantinos Zitros knew that Theodoros Mavropoulos had already worked on the translation of the *Republic* since the 1960’s and it was simply a matter of persuading the translator to make his work available for publishing.

This two-volume edition, which runs to 1611 pages, opens with an editor’s note, followed by the author’s (i.e., the translator’s) preface, an introduction to Plato, his life and theoretical system. A section dedicated to Plato’s biographies precedes the translation of the *Republic*. At the end of each Book, Marvopoulos proposes a series of questions and topics for discussion. Finally, there is an extensive postface consisting of a Name Index (*Onomasticon Platonicum – Index Nominum*) and an Author Index (*Index Scriptorum*) as well as a selective bibliography.

In his author’s preface, Mavropoulos reveals that Zitros’ edition of the *Republic* is the result of a certain compromise given that the translation and its whole paratext could hardly fit within two volumes. Therefore, a decision was made to omit two chapters, however useful they might have been. The first chapter would have provided an overview of the history of Platonism throughout the centuries and its influence on the subsequent systems of thought. The second one would have addressed how Plato’s *Republic* influenced or might influence other utopian works, up to the present day.

Despite its clear vocation and its well-defined target audience, namely the secondary educational system and the educational community, it is not clear why this particular work is not widely known among Greek educators or the general public. There is no
public record of a critical review regarding this translation, as is the case with other retranslations of the Republic, despite the fact that it is the last to have been published and it has been more than five years since it reached Greek bookstores. Finally, it seems that other translations, also produced by Mavropoulos, especially his translations of the tragedies, are better known and accepted by professors of philology at the secondary and post secondary educational system.
3.9. Nikolaos Skouteropoulos’ Republic

Nikolaos Skouteropoulos’ retranslation was published by Polis Editions in 2002. From a purely chronological standpoint, the presentation of this translation ought to have preceded Marvopoulos’ version, launched four year later in 2006. However, among the most recent retraductions of the Republic, Nikolaos Skouteropoulos’ version has received the warmest reception both from the educational and the academic community and the general public. One explanation is the translator’s credentials: now retired, Skouteropoulos was a university professor, specializing in philosophy, and the authority of his position within academia adds to the acceptance of his translation work.

Born in Athens in 1938, Skouteropoulos studied classical philology and philosophy at the University of Athens and furthered his education at Göttingen and Tübingen. He published three treatises on Plato’s dialogues, most specifically on Lysis, Euthyphron and Euthydemos. He was a professor at the Department of German Language and Literature at the University of Athens where he taught history of philosophy. His work as a translator and author is extensive. Besides studying and translating Ancient Greek grammatology, he has translated over 26 volumes (individual books or collective works). Some of his most popular translations into Greek include Winderband’s Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, published in several volumes by the National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation between 1991 and 1995; Friedrich von Hardenberg’s only prose essay, Novalis: Die Christenheit oder Europa, as well as several other canonical authors such as Goethe, Schopenhauer, Maximilian Braun, and Husserl. Almost all of his
translations involve the following language combinations: German into Modern Greek and Ancient Greek into Modern Greek.

According to BiblioNet, a database created in 1998 by the National Book Center of Greece (EKEBI), there are 26 translations attributed to Nikolaos Skouteropoulos and some 30 additional books, mainly translations or collective works produced under his supervision. Skouteropoulos’ up-to-date bibliography amounts to a total of 60 titles, an impressive number coupled with the exemplary quality and erudition characteristic of Skouteropoulos’ work.

His translation of Plato’s *Republic* falls into the category of canonical translations along with Gryparis’ version into Modern Greek. As mentioned earlier, both translations have been included and presented as reference texts by the Centre for the Greek Language, a government supervised research institute based at Thessaloniki, and created to identify and document trends in Modern Greek language, both within Greece and abroad, without any ideological prejudice as to the future of Modern Greek49.

It should be noted, however, that the Centre’s claim to a lack of ideological prejudice could easily be questioned, given that the second founding premise of this institute is a purely ideological one. Based on this premise, the present shape and form of the Modern Greek language should not be considered faulty, either compared to alternative forms and shapes of the language or in absolute terms, and need not therefore be corrected using linguistic patterns from the past. It is on the basis of this particular premise that, as far as

49 For more information on the history of the Centre for the Greek Language, see www.greeklanguage.gr under History. This website is currently available only in Greek.
Plato’s *Republic* is concerned, the Centre for the Greek Language has chosen Skouteropoulos’ and Gryparis’ versions.

Along with positive criticism in favour of Skouteropoulos’ retranslation of the *Republic*, which aims to bring a classical work into the modern era, the above provides enough evidence to consider Skouteropoulos’ version a new canonical translation produced to replace a previous canonical version. In contrast to Mavropoulos’ work, Skouteropoulos’ retranslation is more philosophical than educational. Although the book itself is 933 pages long, it has a short translator’s note and a very brief introductory note, where the translator sets the philosophical tone of his work. Skouteropoulos’ decision to be brief has been positively noted by his commentators. In contrast with the brief preface, the postface of this version is extremely extensive: it contains 138 pages of footnotes and references and 12 pages of bibliography.
Chapter IV: The paratexts

One of the main observations in the previous chapter was the noticeable paratext found in almost all retranslations of the Republic. In the vast majority of cases, this paratext comprises the editor’s note (where available) and the translator’s introduction—which form the front matter of each retranslation—as well as a set of annotations, annexes, commentaries and bibliographies, which account for the retranslation’s back matter.

In some cases, the staggering volume of each paratext amounts to more than two thirds of the overall text. If the translator’s visibility were to be measured in terms of the wordiness of each paratext and the amount of research required, it would be easy to conclude that all Greek translators of Plato’s Republic were not afraid of leaving their mark. However, the focus of this particular work is not to reduce the paratext to a simple matter of translator’s visibility. Regardless of its length, every paratext unravels interesting information about the translators’ approaches vis-à-vis the original text, their interpretation of the Republic and the intratextual nexus between the paratext and the translation as a text.

In all of the Republic’s renditions examined here, the value of the paratext is threefold. First, it reveals the philosophical stance of each translator while putting it within the context of the time in which the translation was produced, the prevailing philosophical and political trends—as they transpire through the translation—and the purpose the translation was called upon to serve. Second, each paratext allows us to explore the extent to which each translator’s claims with regard to their translatory approach are reflected in
the translation. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this analysis allows us to work on the diachronic level by investigating the intertext, both from the point of view of the transition from one retranslation to the other and the traces that one retranslation leaves on subsequent versions and the possible influence of each retranslation on other texts, especially those of a philosophical and political nature.
4.1. The Republic as classical reading

Papyros’ retranslation of the Republic falls into the category of the retranslations with limited paratext. All re-editions of the Pappatheodorou-Pappas version kept an introduction written by Ad. N. Diamantopulos, as it was considered an unmatched analysis. This 23-page introduction relates Plato’s Republic with other political projects, written by ancient authors, especially the Constitution of Athens, and more particularly Xenophon’s Constitution. Several footnotes provide references to other works signed by Diamantopulos on Xenophon and his writings.

Diamantopulos’ introduction is a scholastic analysis typical of the time in which it was written (the 1930s). The author wrote in katharevousa, using its more pedantic version, even more so than the katharevousa used by Pappatheodorou and Pappas in their translation. Diamantopulos belonged to the academic establishment of his time: he was educated in Istanbul and Izmir and studied theology in Kiev. For 33 years, he served as the principal of one of the most prestigious private schools in Athens (the Arsakeion School). His work revealed a profound knowledge of historical ecclesiastical sources as demonstrated by several books he authored on the history of the Orthodox Church.

The introduction is divided into two major parts: the first one consists of seven paragraphs (pages 3 to 11) while the second part provides a summary of each of the books of the Republic, under the general heading “Analysis of the ten books of the

---

50 Arsakeion is a private school for children from well-off families. The school curriculum relied heavily on Christian values. The school is also known for its more conservative approach to education, whereby religion and nation go hand-in-hand.
At the end of the introduction, there is a brief presentation of the participants in the Platonic dialogue, a paragraph dedicated to all known codices of the Republic and finally a list of some translations of the Republic in other languages.

The first paragraph of the first part situates Plato’s work in time and space. Like in so many other introductions of the Republic, the author gives an overview of the political, social and financial situation of the city of Athens following the end of the Peloponesian War. These political and military events greatly influenced Plato who felt duty-bound to go beyond a superficial explanation of possible causes. Diamantopoulos stresses Plato’s extensive research, which consisted in studying diligently Athens’ case and in comparing in with other forms of governance known to him. This observation leads him to the conclusion that issues related to justice for the individual and for polity should be dealt philosophically. Consequently, for any city to prosper, governors should be trained in philosophy.

The Republic or On Justice is the fruit of Plato’s philosophical search for justice and for a better form of governance. Diamantopoulos’ introduction acknowledges the importance of the Republic’s subtitle while noting that the latter was not used by Plato but came nonetheless from his Academy. The book’s primary title captures the general purpose of Plato’s work. The subtitle highlights the fundamental principle of a just Republic.

In the third paragraph of the first part of the introduction, the author touches upon the critical question of the historical time within which the Republic was written. What is different here, compared to the paratext of all other retranslations, is the link established between the Republic, on the one hand, and Xenophon’s response to it via Cyropaedia
and Herio. Diamantopoulos points toward the rivalry which arose between Socrates’ most prominent students, a debate which continued when Plato retorted Xenophon’s pedagogical views in the Laws.

Thrasyllus’ division of the Republic in ten books is somewhat questioned by Diamantopoulos, but not to the same extent as does Skouteroupoulos in 2002. Without going as far as to denounce the traditional 10-Book division, Diamantopoulos sees in the Republic the following thematic parts: Book I serves as an introduction; Books II to IV provide a detailed account of the ideal city and the ideal individual who is destined to act as an exemplary reflection of the perfect city. In Books V through VII, Plato develops his theory of the community of women and children and completes the picture of the ideal city with the relationship between the members of the city’s three classes. In Book VII, Socrates ceases to deal with perfection and how this is reflected in the ideal city and attempts to demonstrate imperfection in the so-called less perfect forms of governance, namely timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. In 595b to 608b, the narrative reintroduces Socrates who debunks poetry by listing its devastating effects both on the soul and the impressionable minds of young students. The conclusion of the Republic consists in proclaiming the superiority of justice, in terms of the benefits the individual can enjoy both by men and by God, in this life and in afterlife (514a-621d).

At paragraph 5 of his introduction, Diamantopoulos pinpoints the basis of Plato’s philosophical system on the definition of justice as being the harmonious combination of the three powers of the soul: knowledge, strength and desire. When defined in this way, claims Diamantopoulos, justice appears to have a dual application: one is metaphysical
and theoretical, and refers mainly to the soul; the other is practical and deals primarily with its application to human life as a whole. Plato’s main concern is a true definition of justice, which can only be informed in the context of life within the city-State. Plato’s investigation starts with the basic reason for which men gathered to form an entity, a communal life and arrives at an investigation of various forms of governance, and their advantages and disadvantages. The exploration ends with the presentation of the ideally just city, where rulers rule like philosophers.

Diamantopoulos mentions, although briefly, the importance ascribed by Plato in educating the philosopher-ruler. Plato’s educational system can be summed up as the intellectual training giving rise to discovering the truth within each being. What we perceive as true is actually nothing more than a reflection, a distorted image of being. The real being exists only in the world of ideas.

Finally, it is important to note Diamantopoulos comment with regard to Plato’s so-called loose narrative structure (Diamantopoulos 1937-40: 9). As far as Diamantopoulos is concerned, the unity of the Republic is undeniable despite the variety of issues discussed and their dialectic development. The idea of justice, as an external pretext for the conception of the Republic, is widely associated with the human psyche and a man’s intellectual life as much as it relates to politics in general. Polity provides a fertile ground for discussion and critical investigation of past and present forms of governance and political theories. Diamantopoulos reminds us that Plato was not the only philosopher to be preoccupied with these questions. Before the Peloponesian War, Herodotus also provided a critical analysis of all three major forms of governance (democracy, oligarchy
and monarchy). In his intellectual quest, he was followed by Pericles and Thucydides. The list also includes Critias, Aristotle, Xenophon, Isocrates and others who also provided similar comments.

Diamantopoulos raises the question of the applicability of Plato’s *Republic*. Although he does not address the issue directly, he sees in the *Republic* a comprehensive system which accounts for all aspects of a well-organized state. In the *Republic*, Plato considered work, production, foreign and domestic trade, territorial expansion (including military actions to appropriate land) and the creation of armed forces for the purpose of going to war or ensuring domestic order; education, etc.

Diamantopoulos concludes his analysis on the question of the historical time of the narration in the *Republic*. Many scholars tried to find whether the *Republic* was written all at once or over different periods. By accepting Diès findings, Diamantopoulos endorses the theory whereby the *Republic* was written during a long period of time, probably while Plato was still lecturing in the Academy.
4.2. The Republic as holistic matter

Before the release of Nikolaos Skouteropoulos’ version, Konstantinos Georgoulis’ 1939 translation was the most revered retranslation of the Republic. Georgoulis’ 1939 retranslation was re-edited in 1962 as the first edition was out of print. The 1962 re-edition allowed the translator to introduce changes and additions to the annexes.

Georgoulis’ version is widely known not only for the translation and its presumed qualities but, most importantly, for its lengthy and detailed paratext consisting of a 3-page preface, a 135-page introduction, a 3-page diagram of the structure of the Republic, and 244 pages of notes, in addition to a 6-page index and a single page dedicated to all additions made in 1962. The translation per se is 335 pages long. In other words, the paratext represents 53 per cent of the overall book.

The paratext in Georgoulis’ retranslation—an absolute favorite of and an indispensable tool for secondary school teachers, university professors, philologists and researchers interested in the Republic’s exegesis—introduces an important element in the (re)translation process of the classics into Modern Greek, one that was seen for the first time at least as far as the Republic is concerned. The merit of this work lies in its detailed hermeneutical research, which depended heavily on what was written at the time on and about Plato and the Republic. The use, through quotes and references, of all recognized analytical works, mainly consisting of foreign bibliography, was dully acknowledged and accounted for by Georgoulis. In his preface, the translator refers to a number of canonical authors who have dealt with platonic questions—especially those posed in the
Republic—and have translated and/or commented this particular book into their respective languages.

Georgoulis’ intellectual debt and gratitude goes to Stephanus, Schleiemacher, Ast, Stallbaum, Schneider, Jowett, Campbell, and Adam. This means that the Greek translator read, consulted, and compared against each other Stephanus’ three-volume edition of Plato’s Dialogues, in Ancient Greek, with Latin translation, introduction and notes by Johannus Serranus printed in 1578 and with Christoph Schneider’s Opera graece (Leipzig, 1831-33). Similarly, Georgoulis must have had access to at least one of Ast’s editions of the Republic (1804 and 1814), and had read Schleiermacher’s Über die Philosophie Platons and Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato in the original (Georgoulis was among other things a Germanist). He had certainly studied G. Stallbaum’s Platonis Politeia, a 3-volume edition of the Republic in Ancient Greek with commentary in Latin (published in London in 1868). His classical and Germanic literary and philosophical background made it possible for Georgoulis to delve into the work of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, and most probably his work entitled Platon (1919). Finally, Georgoulis was certainly acquainted with Republic: The Greek Text, with Notes and Essays, by B. A. Jowett and L. Campbell (3 vols. Oxford, 1894) and with John Adam’s canonical work entitled The Republic of Plato, published for the first time in Cambridge in 1902 and reprinted in 1963.

As far as Georgoulis is concerned, intellectual attribution is justified and sought for in the name of academic accuracy: “Any interpretation that aspires to authenticity must depart
from the works of the intellectuals mentioned above” (Georgoulis 1962: v).51 Equally, the need for a new translation of the Republic into Modern Greek is supported by the traditional argument of a previous translation, which have become rare and outdated:

For many years now, it has become obvious that there is a need to provide Greek readers with a commented version of Plato’s Republic. The translation produced by I. Gryparis, which was extremely successful, had become hard to find, whereas the circle of readers had grown bigger. In addition, in recent years, the interest around the questions raised by Plato in his Republic have increased, thus making it necessary to re-read this book with great diligence. (Ibid: iv).52

Finally, the recourse to a lengthy paratext does not go unaccounted for. The translator seems to strongly believe that all major works belonging to Ancient Greek grammatology require some sort of preliminary information to ensure a more appropriate exegesis. In the case of the Republic, the only way to unravel the genius of Plato’s masterpiece is to demonstrate his ‘architectural’ master plan, the unparalleled structure of the whole book, its depth and the way arguments are built upon a solid foundation and intertwined with each other. For this to happen, it is important to produce a sufficiently informative paratext, which, in this particular case, consists of an introduction and extensive notes in the book’s front and back matter respectively. The paratext allows for a critical reading and a fresh appreciation of Plato’s masterpiece, especially since the latter is so often seen as a utopian system defying traditional understanding of time and space.

51 «Κάθε ερμηνεία που θέλει να είναι γνήσια, πρέπει να έχει ως σημείο προσανατολισμού της τις εργασίες των σοφών που αναφέραμε.»
52 «Από πολλά χρόνια είχε γίνει αισθητή η ανάγκη να τεθεί στη διάθεση του Ελληνικού κοινού ερμηνευμένη η Πολιτεία του Πλάτωνος. Η μετάφραση που είχε φιλοτεχνήσει με εξαιρετική επιτυχία ο κ. Ι. Γρυπάρης είχε καταντήσει διεύθυνση, ενώ ο κύκλος του αναγνωστικού κοινού έγινε πολύ ευρύτερος. Το ενδιάφέρον πάλι γύρω στα ζητήματα έδωσε αναπτύσσοντας στην Πλατωνική Πολιτεία είχε γίνει κατά τα τελευταία χρόνια τόσο ζωηρό, ώστε να είναι απαραίτητο να ξαναδιαβαστή με προσοχή το βιβλίο τούτο.» (My emphasis)
As is the case with most, if not all, translators of Ancient Greek authors, the prevalence of the original text and the affinities in meaning and style offered by the concise form of Ancient Greek are an inescapable *topos*, a condition against which any translatory attempt is almost certain to be of a lesser value. As far as the language of his retranslation is concerned, Georgoulis points out to a series of shortcomings which belong to two different kinds of problems.

First, the absence of the original text in apposition to the translation (this is the most typical presentation of a classical text when translated into Modern Greek) is perceived as a significant omission imposed by external constraints, such as restrictions related to the book’s sheer volume. Georgoulis willingly admits that his version of the *Republic* would have turned this publication into a much bigger (hence difficult to handle and read) book had the original text been included. In the absence of a parallel reading, Georgoulis’ retranslation could be read against any available version of the original, since all possible variations, susceptible of introducing changes in the meaning, had been accounted for in the translator’s notes.

Second, Georgoulis classifies his translation into the category of as a hermeneutical rendition for which various linguistic forms have been used in the way of synthesis:

*Demotiki*, as is the case with every other language, when introduced for the first time, is forced to follow the path which leads to an analytical syntax. As time goes by and the need to express more complicated notions becomes more pressing, it is impossible [for a language like this] not to resort to linguistic means capable of addressing these needs. For some time now, *demotiki* had gone beyond the level of idyllic descriptions of the outside world and has come to the realization that it needs

---

53 The translator announces the release of a separate volume, which would comprise the Ancient Greek text of the *Republic*, dully annotated and critically commented, to enable readers to know the history of the reconstruction of the *Republic*’s original text over the centuries.
to become a means for expressing complex notions. Nowadays, modern Greek literature uses fragmented sentences for psychographics and for discovering the characters’ state of mind. The purpose behind this is to unearth the fragmented nature of events, especially those which lay hidden in the deepest strata of the psyche. But in the case of a writer of a superior synthetic intellect, as is Plato, the product of the said intellect forms an entelechy, a unified, comprehensive force, which cannot be broken down into multicolour, discontinued beams of iridizing light. The latter being a modern technique in contemporary painting and music, it is used to represent images and sounds. [But this technique cannot apply to Plato’s construct], simply because his intellect moves as a unified beam, thus projecting intact scores of referential intellectual activities within a single central meaning. (Georgoulis 1962: iv-v)54

Georgoulis’ poetic analogy encompasses all the fields of human knowledge Plato was concerned with: there is the question of physics and the difference between perception, (especially sensory perception) and reason, or logos, projected on natural phenomena. Thus, the metaphor of the beam coincides with the belief that the Republic is a comprehensive work which could only be understood in its entirety and not simply as the sum of its constituent parts. References to human consciousness and unconsciousness somehow project Plato’s developments on the psyche and the relation between the latter’s parts and the parts the ideal politeia should consist of.

It should be noted, however, that all these analogies have a single point of reference: demotiki, a newly-formed language with its advantages and, most importantly, its limitations. If Georgoulis sounds somewhat apologetic for the shortcomings of demotiki, it is because he has made a choice to use this linguistic form instead of the official

54 «Η δημοτική, όπως και κάθε γλώσσα, στο πρώτο της ξεκίνημα, αναγκαστικά ακολούθησε αναλυτική συντακτική μορφή με τον καιρό όμως προχωρώντας στην έκφραση συνθετότερων νοημάτων αδύνατον είναι να μη χρησιμοποιήσει ανάλογο εκφραστικό τρόπο. Από καιρό τόσο εξερευνώντας η δημοτικό το στάδιο της ειδικευμένης περιγραφής του εξωτερικού κόσμου έχει αισθανθεί τον αναγκασμό να γίνει εκφραστικό όργανο συνθετότερων νοημάτων. Αν στη σύγχρονη Νεοελληνική φιλολογία παρατηρείται σήμερα η χρησιμοποίηση κομματιασμένων προτάσεων, αυτό γίνεται για ψυχογραφικούς και ψυχογνωστικούς σκοπούς, επειδή επιδύκεται να γίνει ορατός ο αποστασιματικός χαρακτήρας των γεγονότων, όσον ανήκουν στα βαθύτερα ψυχικά στρώματα. Για συγγραφέα όμως ανώτερης συνθετικής νόησης, όπως είναι ο Πλάτων, το διανόημα αποτελεί ενδελεχειακή συνολική κίνηση, δεν θρηματίζεται σε πολύχρωμες και ασυνεχείς ιριδώσεις μικροακτίνων, όπως η σύγχρονη ζωγραφική των ήχων και των χρωμάτων, αλλά προχωρεί απαράλλακτα ώσαν εννία ακτίνα συγκρατώντας αδιάπτωτη την αναφορά όλων των νοηματικών προσπαθειών σε ένα και το αυτό κεντρικό νόημα.»
language, *katharevousa*, whose use would have been totally legitimate, especially on the part of a serious academic who aspired to see his work recognized.

As an experienced philologist, Georgoulis was aware both of the restrictions of a language that was still evolving and its potential to become a complete medium for expressing any form of human knowledge, including philosophy. The use of a mixed language allowed the translator-philologist to demonstrate the potential of the new language by ensuring its continuity over history and by placing trust in *demotiki*. Should Georgoulis have been involved in the “language debate” the way it unfold later, he would probably have been among those who privileged the compromise solution, in other words a mixed language.\(^{55}\) In reality today’s Greek linguistic landscape is a reflection of this medium solution, thought somewhat distorted and certainly not regulated.

Georgoulis’ introduction to Plato’s *Republic* constitutes the core of the translator’s hermeneutical work and provides a considerable amount of information on the position the translator takes vis-à-vis the original text. The first chapter of the introduction is dedicated to the birth of Plato’s philosophy as a result of the political agony resulting from the death threat facing the Greek *polis*, and more specifically the Athenian democracy, during the Peloponnesian War. The second chapter is an analysis of Plato’s text and a summary of the plot. Chapter three of the introduction deals with the unity of the *Republic* and the question arising from the text’s modern division. Finally, chapter four delves into the issues posited by Plato in the *Republic*, namely *politeia* (the *Republic*), justice and prosperity, hegemony and eugenics, Plato’s political consciousness

\(^{55}\) See also Georgoulis’ active involvement in debate following the 1964 Educational Reform Bill on the use of Ancient Greek in teaching the Classics.
as a Greek and the relation between Plato’s Republic, modernity and history. A sub-
chapter is dedicated to the conditions required for the emergence of the perfect Republic,
whereas another one deals with Plato’s political project in the Laws and the Statesman
and the transition from the Republic to his latest works.

Plato’s intellectual production is closely associated with his birthplace. Additionally,
platonic philosophy is a system in itself. Plato is a model citizen, a true Athenian
originating from a noble family that goes back to Solon, and forms part of Poseidon’s
genealogy. Plato’s primary quality as a fully engaged citizen in a previously prosperous
polis, perhaps by all accounts the most important city of the Hellenic world, reveals two
important aspects of the philosopher’s character. The first is his loyalty to the city in
which he was born, raised and lived, the city that shaped his personality and allowed him
to benefit from the privileged and comprehensive education he received as a result of
being a free Athenian. Plato’s philosophical system emerges into Athens and is the
product of the education and the multiple experiences the latter offered to her citizens.

Plato’s loyalty goes beyond a civilian sense of commitment. The Republic, says
Georgoulis, offers testimony of Plato’s family attachments, via the active involvement of
his siblings, Glaucon and Adeimantus, in the dialogue. The love, respect and
unquestionable admiration for Socrates is an even more meaningful demonstration of
Plato’s loyalty to all those who had a significant influence in his life. The
acknowledgement of the student for his master is demonstrated via the instrumental role
Socrates has in the Republic, when he speaks for Plato and when he is used by the latter
to preserve for posterity the thoughts of the most important teacher of classical times.
Plato’s second quality is the sense of responsibility that comes from the realization that human beings, those who, in the Athenian conceptual framework, are designated as free citizens do not exist outside the boundaries (physical, notional and emotional) of the polis. Perceiving life in and via the Greek polis nevertheless creates a tragic reality: on the one hand, there is the inescapable link between polis and the citizen whereby the one cannot exist without the other. To put it simply, the death of the polis can only translate into the death of human beings. This does not necessarily refer to the death of humanity as a whole. It is however the death of the free citizen. On the other hand, Plato personified more than any other person of his time the identification of the citizen with their polis thus anguishing over the dissension among Greeks.

For Georgoulis, Plato’s mental anguish with respect to the fate of Athens in particular and the Greek poleis in general is rooted in a specific perception of the polis as a political entity, which was unique to Greeks and was inherited by the intellectuals of Ionia (the ancient region of Anatolia). This system was then transposed to all ancient poleis of Ionia and had its origin in the Ionian philosophers, such as Anaximander and Heraclitus.

Anaximander’s typical Ionian philosophical system evolved around the notions of time, justice and rectification⁵⁶, which would suggests that all judicial and political concepts of a given community could be transposed upon the sphere of the universe. In other words,

---

⁵⁶ Here Georgoulis partially quotes the only surviving fragment of Anaximander’s writing as transmitted by Simplicius in quotation. The fragment reads as follows:

Whence things have their origin,
Thence also their destruction happens,
According to necessity;
For they give to each other justice and recompense
For their injustice
In conformity with the ordinance of Time.
stresses Georgoulis, justice becomes an ontological concept and not a human invention. Justice is relevant to the whole creation and to all living creatures because it exists everywhere, always and beyond them.

Georgoulis is careful when he deals with justice, especially with attributing to Heraclitus the notion of divine justice. In the latter, Heraclitus stresses on the preponderance of divine law, which forms the basis for human law. Based on this relationship, Georgoulis brings forth Heraclitus’ recommendation to “follow the common” (which, in a simplistic way, would suggest to not follow one’s own judgment but everything that is set out as an example by the Gods) and associates it with divine law and polis.

Inspired by Heraclitus’ positions, the translator maintains that polis’ common was not created by humans regardless of the existence (and subsequently the needs) of the community of the kinds (human beings). The harmony between the common and the polis is the same as the one prevailing in the universe. The macrocosm is an expansion, at a much larger scale, of the polis, or the Republic, or society —as we would say in more contemporary terms— which is ruled by law and justice. In other words, concludes Georgoulis:

[...] The world of the universe should be a model on the basis of which humans must organize their political life. Seen from this angle, it should not come as a surprise that Plato sought the model of his Republic in the familiarity and commonality of the universe. (Georgoulis 1962: IX)

57 Georgoulis fails somehow to stress that Heraclitus dissociates the human sense of justice from his concept of God.
58 «Ωστόσο ο κόσμος του σώματος πρέπει να είναι το πρότυπο με το οποίο πρέπει και οι άνθρωποι να ρυθμίζουν την πολιτική ζωή. Αν ιδούμε έτσι τα πράγματα, δεν θα μας φανή καθόλου παράδοξο το ότι ο Πλάτων αναζητά μέσα στην οικεία και την κοινότητα του σώματος το πρότυπο της ανασυγκρότησης της δικής του πολιτείας.»
Law and justice can only materialize in the Greek *polis*, which differ largely from the hordes of Asian peoples, or any theocratic society that would prevent progressive ideas from developing and circulating freely. The Greek *polis* is a “common place” where humans thrive and personalities are shaped. The importance of personality and individuality is one of the prevailing features of the element of ‘common’ in the *polis*, because they both allow citizens to fully cultivate all qualities which are fulfilling to humanity. Following the destructions of Miletus, Athens became the incarnation of the ideal *polis*. The adoration of the city of Athens by her citizens, bordering on the sphere of *eros*, demonstrated the utmost fondness of human beings for all that Athens stood for.

The interdependence between *polis* and the citizen reaches new heights with the devastation brought upon Athens by the Peloponnesian War. This tragic event became the driving force behind Plato’s attempt to contrive a political and social entity whereby the *noetic* world (or the world of the intellect) would go hand-in-hand with the world of perception.

In order to achieve his goal, Plato uses two discursive means, or figures of speech, that allow him to make intellectual sense of the sensory reality he perceives in Athens. Georganolis argues that Plato uses the traditional definition of *aporia*, namely a philosophical puzzle or an impasse, to denote a state that emerges when life can no longer move forward. Socrates and Plato’s *aporia* is not a rhetorical device, in the derogatory sense of the word, but a sincere concern for the loss of normalcy and stability and, more particularly, any kind of blind disregard of moral values, which were at the heart of the Athenian way of life. “Know thyself” means exploring virtues which are known to the
intellect through a man’s positive behaviour toward his fellowmen. Consequently, exploring these virtues translates into exploring human existence within the society of commons, i.e., the community of men and fellow citizens. Georgoulis maintains that Plato’s incisive analysis in Books VIII and IX of the *Republic* unravels the full spectrum of the fall of man as a political being.

Georgoulis is convinced that Plato’s motive for imagining his ideal *Republic* is not to be found in his interest in science. The Greek philosopher had a passion: the salvation of the Greek *polis* and, with that, the salvation of mankind. Rebuilding from the rubbles implied going back to the essence of things.

In order to understand what essence meant for Plato, Georgoulis suggests to depart from the word’s original meaning: initially, *ousia* (essence) meant *periousia* (property and properties), in the most mundane sense of the word, namely all the goods (and by extension qualities) that one possesses, which are indispensable to his or her survival and to maintaining being. If *ousia* means survival, the only possible solution for counteracting the flux leading to destruction is to recover (or restore) the essence of things. But in order to restore the essence one needs first to clearly identify it. And since *ousia* is *periousia* (property/properties), Plato’s essence is the discovery of what is inside an object, a thing, or a being at any given time. The issue that arises from the threat of destruction—the latter being the direct result of decadence—is the need to replace not-being by being.

---

59 Annas adds another layer to the *ousia/periousia* interrelationship, which is related to the Guardians. More specifically, she claims that “[The Guardians] turn out, eventually, to illustrate the highest development of human reason; but they begin, prosaically enough, as the army needed for aggressive expansion if the city has to have enough resources to meet the citizens’ needs. (Plato is probably making a pun at 374a; the Guardians are needed to protect the city’s *ousia* or ‘substance’ in the sense of property [*periousia*]; *ousia* is the word he uses later for the essence of a thing, and possibly we are meant to reinterpret this passage in the light of later developments.” (Annas 1981: 78)
With regard to Plato’s enquiry on the essence of being, Georgoulis argues against Kant, who posited that these questions are of a purely metaphysical nature. Instead, he is in favour of a more practical motivation behind the Greek philosopher’s master plan: to choose life when faced with annihilation.

The new political community Plato envisions posits a *sine qua non* condition: man must become a complete human being or, put differently, he must achieve individual perfection. This difficult yet noble task takes place within the real world by turning one’s focus on the Forms. The way Georgoulis reads Plato’s Theory of Forms follows a very specific sequence: the political community is an integral part of the universe which, in turn, is made up of material things. In order to understand the world, it is important to understand its material things. Deductively, understanding the world also means understanding the *polis*. Understanding leads to knowledge, which is achieved through the investigation of the only true objects of study, i.e., the Forms. Forms are the *idea* and the basis for understanding material things, in other words the essence of every object. Forms interpret material things beyond time and space. This means that each material thing is [re]presented and gets its true meaning in reference to the Forms.

The Theory of Forms is the discovery of the notional content of each material thing perceived through sensations. This theory relies upon *episteme*. *Episteme* answers to a series of questions formulated on the basis of “What is?” in search of answers that lead to knowledge. Given that knowledge is achieved through an in-depth enquiry of Forms, *episteme* is the apprehension of unchanging Forms and their mutual relationship.

---

60 This theory is reviewed by Plato in *Parmenides*. 
Since *polis* and, more specifically, the ideal *polis* is part of the universe and is made of material things, the search for the renewed common, which will bring citizens together, should rely on *episteme*, which will lead to the proper understanding, i.e., knowledge, of the Forms. The latter will restore unity and harmony by putting an end to chaos. Chaos being a feature of our sensory world, it is orbited back into order by referencing it to the sphere of the community of ideas. Under this new order of things, humans can achieve the same degree of understanding of the world and the political community in which they hitherto belong because they have grasped the true nature of Forms. In the realm of perfect understanding, all divisional causes which place people into opposite camps automatically cease to exist.

Georgoulis maintains that any interpretation of the Platonic political system formulated in the *Republic* should depart from the notional framework sketched out in the previous paragraphs. The process that will lead to redefining the commonality of the citizens in the perfect *polis* will eventually form a model upon which each individual will manage to reconcile all opposite forces within himself by submitting the “other” (*etéron*) to the “same” (*tauton*). It is only then that justice, friendship and a community with the Gods will be achieved.

Georgoulis is strongly convinced that Plato’s analysis reached universal conclusions which made it diachronic and applicable to the fate of the whole of humanity. The Greek translator sees a parallel between, on the one hand, the elevation of the sensory world to a noetic sphere and, on the other hand, the restrictive horizon of the *Republic* (polity) transposed to a universal political model. This explains why nations, at various times,
recognized in Plato an enlightened thinker, a pioneer who would bring political life out of its crude reality and into a nobler state of political being.
4.3. The Republic and education

In 1948, Ioannis Skouteropoulos published in Athens, at Andreas Sideris, a pedagogical treatise entitled Plato’s Republic and modern pedagogy. As the title eloquently suggests, this work was inspired by Plato’s Republic, which served as a raw material for Skouteropoulos’ analysis. In that sense, Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ work is less about translating the Republic and more about the author’s concern to develop his ideas on education based upon Plato’s educational system as it was sketched out in the Republic.

Consequently, Plato’s Republic and modern pedagogy is not a retranslation of the Republic in the strictest sense of the word. It is an original work that aims to analyze Plato’s views on education and the system the Greek philosopher developed in his book. Skouteropoulos also focuses on the way the Republic inspired various pedagogical systems, throughout the centuries, with special emphasis on educational theories and practices that were known to Skouteropoulos and his contemporaries.

Finally, the author attempts to demonstrate the relevance of Plato’s pedagogical views to modern societies and their respective educational systems. Plato’s Republic and modern pedagogy opens with a brief summary of the Republic written in katharevousa (Skouteropoulos’ language of choice), a purposely orchestrated rewriting of Plato’s work where only the elements relevant to Skouteropoulos’ theoretical analysis were used.

Considering the nature of this writing, the summary Skouteropoulos provides cannot qualify as a translation per se but rather as a paraphrase focused primarily on education.
Most importantly though, Skouteropoulos sets out a primary goal: to interpret controversial elements in Plato’s system in a way that is appropriate and acceptable to the former’s epistemological principles and moral values. Seen from this angle, this intentional paraphrase of the Republic could also be treated as part of the book’s paratext, given its length and the position it occupies both physically and discursively within the text.

Plato’s Republic and modern pedagogy is a 146-page long analysis divided into two parts. Part I (pages 11-52) is made of the Republic’s paraphrase-summary and a 2-page recapitulation (pages 50-52), with the author’s comments. Part II has three chapters: Chapter A, entitled Plato’s Republic and the most important contemporary pedagogical trends; Chapter B, A systematic analysis of Plato’s pedagogical theory and thought in the Republic; and, finally, Chapter C entitled Final observations and critical analysis. Pages 1 to 10 form the introduction, whereas page v (numbered ε’ using the Greek alphabet) carries the author’s dedication which reads as follows: “I respectfully dedicate my present research to those who, since October 28, 1940, fought for the Greek idea, honour and freedom, whether dead or alive.”

This dedication is a clear reflection of Skouteropoulos’ patriotic feelings and relates to the publication date of his treatise (1948), three years after the end of the Second World War and just shy from the end the Greek civil war, which determined Greece’s political fate by placing the country in the Western camp.

---

61 «Εις τους από της 28 Οκτωβρίου 1940 Έλληνας προμάχους της Ελληνικής Ιδέας, τιμής και ελευθερίας τους τε θανόντας και τους žώντας ευλαβώς την μελέτην μου ταύτην αφιερώνω». (Σκουτερόπουλος 1948: ε’).
In his introduction, Skouteropoulos treats Plato as an educator, in the Greek sense of the word “pedagogist”, that is the person who leads a child. The purpose of pedagogy is to lead the child who belongs to an inferior degree in the scale of human life and, therefore, requires adequate training to achieve some form of perfection and purpose in adult life.

It is therefore suggested that Plato’s theoretical system evolves around two major axes: to detect early and to clarify fundamental problems that relate to human life by providing insightful solutions; and to pave the way to leading a healthier and more meaningful life. A parallel is drawn between Plato and Rousseau (cf. Émile ou de l’éducation) to underscore the latter’s admiration for the Greek philosopher. By quoting Rousseau’s statement as per the true nature of the Republic, Skouteropoulos falls within the ranks of those who consider that the Republic is not a political book, as most of the critics claim, but the ultimate treatise on education. (Skouteropoulos 1948: 2)

In the Republic, adds Skouteropoulos, Plato is not content with providing educational tips. The Greek philosopher puts forth a comprehensive educational system, which sets specific goals and describes in details measures and policies to achieve them. Every educational system refers to and is dependent upon a certain bio-theory, a theory on and about life that, in turn, can only be understood within a society and in relation to the conditions prevailing in it. For ancient Greeks, what Skouteropoulos’ refers to as bio-theory translated into living in the polis and, by extension, living in the geographical area that could be labelled under the generic name of Greece. The latter would be made up of all Greek poleis put together.
The construct of a space called Greece is transposed in Plato’s thinking by Skouteropoulos, who most likely thinks in terms of “Nation”, a concept which did not exist in Plato’s time. This imaginary Nation —at times fused with the notion of “State”— to refer to the Greek polis is a leitmotiv in Plato’s Republic and modern pedagogy. If Skouteropoulos’ construct were to be represented in the form of a triangle, the tips of the notional triangle would be occupied by the three concepts of polis, nation and State, all of which embrace the notion of being Greek:

![Diagram of a triangle with polis, Greek, State, and Nation]

The central idea of being Greek is to be understood in opposition to everyone and everything that is not Greek. The survival of Greekness could be achieved via the elimination of barbarians and the eradication of barbarism and by maintaining the superiority of [Hellenic] civilization and the acknowledgement of its superiority.

This ethnocentric discourse, which Skouteropoulos attributes indirectly to Plato’s intentions in writing the Republic, situates the latter’s work in the political, social and
historical context he witnessed in his home city of Athens, especially during the Peloponnesian War. The disintegration of the Greek world, stresses Skouteropoulos, and the threat of a barbarian invasion were rooted in the obvious failure of the three political systems known in the Greek *poleis* (oligarchy, aristocracy and democracy), which lead to feuds between them. As a result, Greek *poleis* were enfeebled and consequently vulnerable to succumbing to barbarians.

Skouteropoulos places Plato’s bio-theory within the legacy of Pythagoras and Socrates and its application to the social and military organization and political governance of Sparta and Crete, the only cities to have followed the example of the life led by the Dorians. As the author suggests, Plato was fully aware of the resemblance between his favourite philosophers’ theories and the Cretan, Spartan and Dorian lifestyle. He was also acutely sensitive to the disadvantages of the organization of Sparta (a small *polis* in terms of the number of its citizens, who lived mainly in poverty and had no major intellectual accomplishments) and the contrast generated by their lifestyle and their war achievements, especially during the Peloponnesian War, which made them the unquestionable leaders of the free Greek world.

Departing from this premise, Skouteropoulos justifies Plato’s patriotic concern for the fate of Greeks and the Greek world in general and the moral obligation the philosopher carried to consider the future of Greeks and their civilization from a philosophical point of view:

> It goes without saying that Plato’s major and permanent concern ought to be the question of education, because not only was he the citizen of the greatest and most glamorous Greek city, as well as an aristocrat and a major philosopher, but also a
student of the school of Socrates and Pythagoras, both of whom were true pioneers in education, the latter being the ultimate and most sincere goal of their life. (Skouteropoulos 1948: 9) 62

Seen from this angle, the purpose of Plato’s Republic and modern pedagogy was to demonstrate the great pedagogical value of the Republic and the place it should occupy within modern pedagogy. The limited scope of this treatise did not allow Skouteropoulos to examine other aspects of Plato’s opus, even if some of them were related to pedagogy.

Skouteropoulos departs from the premise that Plato’s educational theory exposed in the Republic is founded upon the axiom that the soul is the main element of the human being, its very essence; it is eternal, close to God, the eternal being which it resembles. The soul is constantly exposed to bad influences as much as it is exposed to positive experience. Under the malicious influence of society, the human body and other evils, the soul is impaired. The intellect perceives impairment as affect which, at the representation level, gives a twisting perception of reality. 63 Twisted reality, the only one a man’s mind can grasp, is reflected back to a traumatized soul.

Skouteropoulos recognizes the restrictive scope of this work which is limited to the pedagogical aspect of the Republic. He adopts a rather apologetic tone for not having followed the order in which Plato unfolds his arguments. He claims, however, that he remained faithful to the spirit of the philosopher’s word. In that effect, Skouteropoulos

62 «Ευνόητον περαιτέρω είναι, ότι την σκέψιν του Πλάτωνος ισχυρότερον και μονιμώτερον ή παντός άλλου ώριμα να απασχολή το ζήτημα της αγωγής διότι ούτος ήτο όχι μόνο της μεγίστης και λαμπροτάτης Ελληνίδος πόλεως πολίτης και αριστοκρατικός την καταγωγήν και φιλόσοφος μέγιστος, αλλά και φιλόσοφος Σωκρατικός τε και Πυθαγόρειος ήτοι τρόφιμος των σχολών, ων οι αρχηγοί την αγωγήν του ανθρώπου προς τι αληθέστερον και υψηλότερον επεδίωξαν δι’ άλλης της ζωής αυτών;» (Σκουτερόπουλος 1948: 9)

63 Affect should be read in the sense Laplanche and Pontalis define the term. (Laplanche-Pontalis 1998: 12).
often invokes Plato’s “letter”. Non-translated verbatim quotes ensure the power in Plato’s word is not weakened by translation. After all, one should not be afraid to admit that “the width, height, depth, beauty and greatness, and so much more which we cannot put into words!... can only be communicated in the original” (Op. cit.: 10)
4.4. The Republic and justice and happiness

The paratext in Gryparis’ 1911 translation in katharevousa is an atypical case when compared to the other retranslations of the Republic, especially those published around the same period. Three main elements differentiate Gryparis’ paratext from all the others. First, Gryparis’ foreword is very short (11 pages in both the 1911 and the 1954 edition). Additionally, his foreword is less an abstract of the Republic’s books and more a translator’s commentary aimed at highlighting the importance of Plato’s work and the shortcomings of the philosopher’s argument built around the question of justice and its relationship to happiness, both individual and collective, within a society. Finally, Gryparis’ paratext is limited to a foreword. There are hardly any footnotes, annotations or commentaries within the text, and there is no bibliography.

In addition to the translator’s foreword, Gryparis’ 1954 retranslation in demotiki is preceded by Papanoutsos’ short introductory note (2 pages). The 1954 foreword is the translation of the original foreword written by Gryparis in 1911 with few imperceptible changes which do not affect the translator’s overall argument. Finally, Gryparis’ retranslation in demotiki does not have any additional paratext compared to the 1911 edition. In other words, there are very few footnotes, annotations or commentaries. In line with the 1911 translation, the 1954 version does not have any bibliography.

Gryparis’ foreword reveals the translator’s concern about justice. His argument revolves around the second title of Plato’s book, On the nature of justice or On Justice, as is widely known in the Western world, which the translator acknowledged as an important
part of Plato’s work, long ignored in favour of the book’s main title, *The Republic*. The latter prevailed over the years, thus emphasizing the “political and social content of the dialogue” (Gryparis 1940: 11)

In Gryparis’ mind, there is very little doubt as to Plato’s primary concern. For Plato, the purpose of the *Republic* was to investigate the nature of justice and its correlate, injustice, in order to underline the importance of virtue and, by extension, the need for social morality. The latter can only be viewed as a necessary component of both the state and the individual (human being and citizen), without which neither the one nor the other would be able to regulate their conduct on the basis of justice. Ultimately, justice is the very incarnation of virtue, in other words the source of perfect happiness and absolute prosperity for individuals and societies. To put it differently, justice is Plato’s God.

Gryparis did not overlook the fact that, for Plato, it would be practically impossible to conceive notions related to the state and its organization outside the political realm of the *polis* and, most specifically, the Athenian *polis*. Consequently, Plato’s justice presupposed some form of organized society that would find its ultimate expression within a set of social and political relationships. The search for a flawless political system inevitably leads to an analysis around the notion of justice and its practical applications. (Gryparis 1911: γ’/1954: 3).

64 «[…] και μολαταύτα εκ των δύο τίτλων, που μας δίδασκεν η αρχαιότατη παράδοσις: Πολιτεία ή περί δικαίου, επεκράτησεν ο πρώτος, διά του οποίου εξαίρεται αποκλειστικώτερον το πολιτικόν και κοινωνικόν περιεχόμενον του διαλόγου.» (Γρυπάρης 1911: γ’)

«[…] και μολαταύτα, από τους δύο τίτλους που μας δίδασκε η αρχαιότατη παράδοσις: Πολιτεία ή περί δικαίου, επεκράτησε ο πρώτος κ’ έτσι ξεχωρίστηκε μ’ αυτόν πιο αποκλειστικά το πολιτικό και κοινωνικό περιεχόμενο του διαλόγου.» (Γρυπάρης 1954: 3)
The third most important element in Plato’s *Republic*, after justice, virtue and happiness, is education. Education implies instilling the virtue of justice in all human beings, better yet to all citizens, via a comprehensive system. Gryparis stresses Plato’s project of sketching out his educational system in the *Republic*, thus attempting to demonstrate that a true *politeia*, a perfect state, “is nothing more than the perfect implementation of justice and, consequently, the knowledge of the latter that comes with *logos* and science.” *(Ibid.)*65 This comment introduces an important hypothesis with respect to both justice and the state, in other words, the need to consolidate the perfect state governed by justice on a philosophical and epistemological foundation.

Gryparis’ critical stance vis-à-vis Plato’s monumental project, exposed throughout the *Republic*, starts at page 9 of the 1911 and 1954 retranslations. Departing from the analysis by Theodor Gomperz66, for which the translator offers no bibliographical reference in either version, Gryparis postulates that one of Plato’s fundamental hypotheses, i.e., the complete identification between happiness and justice (hence between virtue and justice), is not sufficiently proven, despite’s Plato’s claim to the contrary.67 According to Gryparis, any “objective judge” —and by that Gryparis meant

---

65 “Η δικαιοσύνη είναι αρετή εφικτή εις τον ἀνθρώπον μόνον δι’ ενός γενικού συστήματος εκπαίδευσιν. του οποίου ο Πλάτων χαράσσει το σχέδιον εν τη Πολιτεία, συγχρόνως όμως η αληθής πολιτεία, το τέλειον κράτος, δεν είναι άλλο παρά η εφαρμογή και κατά συνέπειαν η μετά λόγου και επιστήμης γνώση της δικαιοσύνης.” (Γρυπάρης 1911: γ’)

«Η δικαιοσύνη είναι αρετή, που μπορεί να την αποκτήσει ο άνθρωπος μόνο μ’ ένα γενικό σύστημα εκπαίδευσιν, συγχρόνως όμως η αληθινή πολιτεία, το τέλειο κράτος, δεν είναι παρά η εφαρμογή και επομένως η «μετα λόγου και επιστήμης» γνώση της δικαιοσύνης.» (Γρυπάρης 1954: 3)

66 In the 1911 translation, Gryparis refers to “Th. Comperz” whereas this author is referred to as Th. Gomperz in the 1954 retranslation. We assume that both spellings refer to Theodor Gomperz and more specifically to his opus *Griechische Denker: Geschichte der antiken Philosophie* (vols. i. and ii., Leipzig, 1893 and 1902). There is no way of knowing whether Gryparis read Gomperz from the original version in German or through its translation into English by L. Magnus (vol. i, 1901).

67 Cf. “It is not difficult to see the attractiveness of such an identification and to see why it is that we often tend to think of justice as a pivotally necessary feature of virtue in general, not merely one aspect of a virtuous life but a condition central to our very concept of a virtuous life.” (Kosman 2007: 118)
any critical reader—will conclude that, despite Plato’s ambitious intent, the whole foundation of the argument is hollow.

The first problem stems from Plato’s axiomatic position according to which material things have no value for man and that any man who is not interested in accumulating wealth is capable of achieving happiness, even if he is laughed at, put down or even tortured. Although rather absurd, Gryparis acknowledges the merits of this claim, a greatness that comes with recognizing men who have ideals, who live their lives based on values, some of which are worth dying for. This is “a cry from the heart” which comes from all men who possess moral education. (Gryparis 1911: 9, 1954: 10)

From this point onward Gryparis offers an interesting interpretation, which springs from the idea of moral education. Knowledge, and more particularly the one that makes life worth living for, the kind which allows some people to stand out from the masses, ensues from a learning process and an educational system that only an organized society can provide to individuals. For education to be possible, it is necessary that the individual possesses a natural predisposition. It is only then that society’s energeia (action) of educating its members can be effective. Equally, energeia is the force that puts in motion any predisposition. The development of this energeia differs from one environment to the other. Belonging to one or the other environment is however a matter of fate.

External influences, such as the one exercised upon humans by the environment, in conjunction with men’s natural predisposition towards learning, introduce a key component as to how justice and therefore happiness are perceived. Gryparis was not afraid to state that, although there is a natural foundation for social virtue (or justice),
justice in itself is not a product of nature. Experience which comes from countless historical evidence provided throughout the centuries allows us to safely draw this conclusion. The problem with Plato was that he espoused Socrates’ idealism, to which he gave extraordinary dimensions, thus overlooking the obvious, in other words, the importance of the environment and human nature with all its faults.

Plato’s idealism and the incongruity in his argument are most prevalent when he equates justice to two opposite things: on the one hand, he draws a parallel between justice and human propensity to fairness and, on the other hand, he sees justice as a perfect balance between the main forces that make up the psyche.

What does that really mean? It means that justice is both equated to a man’s capacity to espouse values (i.e., moral ethics) and to a balance between various values that make up a man’s psyche. In other words, justice is equated to a potentiality of being (also known as dispositional being) as well as the various forms of being (existing values) coexisting harmoniously in the psyche (also known as active being).

In response to Plato’s thesis, Gryparis argues that there have been scores of thugs, tyrants and traffickers who were perfectly happy, active and full of energy while doing harm. These people were not deprived of their ability to use their mental and physical abilities to the fullest simply because they were evil. If one were to find in them an imbalance in their psyche, as Plato suggested, they were supposed to be condemned to unhappiness.

Instead, posits Gryparis, the antisocial type, the man who hates mankind, in more aspects than one, is in no danger of losing his energetic nature and his willingness to remain
active. In other words, in a strange yet practical way, the person dominated by evil has achieved an internal balance and remains true to his nature and the predisposition of his psyche (his dispositional being remains intact). There is imbalance the moment this man is overcome by kindness, love and compassion, all of which are feelings that go against his very nature. This imbalance is equally detrimental to the kind man, when possessed by malice, as it is to the man who is driven by evil.

Gryparis’ analysis gets even more complex when he attempts to unravel Plato’s conflicting arguments from an essentially psychoanalytic point of view. His dense paragraph on page 11 of his 1911 version (page 12 of the 1954 version) demonstrates an analytical reasoning that is often difficult to follow. One possible way of decoding his argument is to map it out on a diagram. This diagram can be read as an X-ray of a person’s soul and the changes in his or her character following traumatic events, which in turn result in affect.

Two scenarios are possible according to Gryparis. In the first hypothesis, we assume that the traumatic event is temporary, the resulting trauma is most probably acute but reversible, although sometimes not completely. In this case, the person is changed by the experience, since the cause of the trauma sets in motion an internal conflict, whereby two opposite forces of the psyche collide. For some people, this conflict is difficult to bear. Inversely, when the traumatic event introduces a permanent cause, the subsequent trauma leads to chronic illness. In the latter case, the persisting effect results in an unremitting counteraction between the emotional and the intentional impulse. In principle, human nature rejects any conflicting situation by trying to avoid it. When a person’s soul
experiences conflict, especially between intent and emotion, the outcome is enfeeblement. The following schematic representation helps to decode Gryparis’ analysis.

First scenario

1. A dominant feeling is present in a person’s character (soul)

2. A [traumatic] event takes place, which has a temporary effect causing the dominant feeling to be lost.

3. When the cause is no longer in effect, the feeling is reinstated.

4. Although re-instated, the feeling is no longer exactly the same. It is accompanied by a “package”, i.e., a set of feelings such as sadness, disillusionment, remorse, etc.

5. The person is no longer the same. There are two conflicting forces inside him or her and the constant battle between the two opposite forces causes pain. Sometimes, this pain is too hard to bear.
Second scenario

1. There is a dominant affect in a person’s character (soul).

2. There is a [traumatic] cause, which has a permanent effect. Consequently, the feeling is lost.

3. When the cause persists, the affect never comes back.

4. The force of both the affect and the will power diminish progressively as a result of an incessant counteraction between the emotional and the intentional impulse, which leads to enfeeblement.

5. This enfeeblement is reinforced, be it indirectly, by the tendency, inherent to human nature, to avoid conflict. Thus, intentional and emotional impulses cancel each other out.

A PERSON’S SOUL WITH CHRONIC ILLNESS
In the case of chronic illness (second scenario), the results can lead to permanent damage in the function of the soul. Gryparis used medical jargon to prove that opposing ideas are banned from the psyche simply because human nature tends to avoid conflict. The banning of the “circulation of ideas” or the obstruction of their normal flow leads to soul damage.

Gryparis’ attempt consisted in highlighting all the argumentative problems within Plato’s definition of virtue as a state in which a “person [is] properly disposed to act in certain appropriate ways” (Kosman 2007: 118) or, as McDowell called it, “a reliable sensitivity to the requirements that situations impose on behaviour.” (McDowell 1979: 332) This definition does not coincide with a philosophical/theological approach to virtue, based on which the latter is a general state or condition of morality.

The diagrams above were designed to decode the fallacy Gryparis saw in Plato’s central thesis, as did many engaged readers of the Republic after Gryparis. There is a common denominator that comes out of these diagrams, namely the function of the soul. It is my understanding that Gryparis’ interpretation of the function of the soul is dissociated from virtue whereas, in the Republic, the argument which unfolds suggests that virtue is the quality which an entity possesses to perform its ergo (task, or work) well (cf. Kosman 2007). Seen from this point of view, virtue is a quality, better yet a desirable quality and, as Kosman suggests, it would be wrong to think of virtue as a general moral condition. We should think instead of particular virtues that coexist in every entity. In such a case, Gryparis’ claim that evil men can be perfectly happy and function perfectly while acting in an evil manner has a rather solid foundation.
If we transpose Gryparis’ adumbration of a man’s soul to a bigger scale, that is, the polis, we can conclude that when elements with a pervasive effect on any aspect of social function can be ousted or handled by the polis, they may affect social cohesion, harmonious function, and the well-being of citizens. In this case, however, given the principle of resistance, social cohesion and function are preserved despite the fact that they can possibly be altered. Inversely, if elements of erosion have penetrated social tissue and corrupted every aspect of social and political life—in other words the polis’ institutions as well as individuals—social cohesion may vanish and there is no coming back.

In my opinion, it is the latter case Gryparis had in mind when expressing his critical views on the validity of the platonic argument. Gryparis’ sombre picture was drawn from the translator’s personal experience, which was heavily influenced by the political background of the time and place in which he lived and worked. In Greece, the first decade of the 1900 was a particularly tumultuous period marked by political instability within the country and several open fronts on the diplomatic level, which led to the Balkan Wars (1912-13) just before the country’s involvement in the First World War.

If Gryparis’ criticism was reiterated in the 1954 retranslation, it is probably because the second version of his translation, this time in demotiki (his language of choice), was produced in the midst of the Second World War, from 1940 to 1945, when the Nazis occupied Greece. German occupation was one of the most traumatic events in recent Greek history. It is not very hard to imagine that Plato’s argument, no matter how noble, would sound deeply misplaced in times where madness and total injustice prevailed over
reason, justice and freedom. In this light, it is totally understandable why Gryparis chastised Plato by saying that the philosopher’s attempt to deceive the reader amounted to a subterfuge whereby Plato substituted injustice by the motives for being unjust. One can readily admit, says Gryparis, that the person who can control his desires and impulses is happier than the person who is a slave to them. However, it is not possible to accept that a philosophical way of life, where a person is freed from their desires, can lead to a happier life than that of a person who can act outside themselves and exert power over others. According to Gryparis, this is what Plato failed to prove beyond any doubt, philosophical or logical.
4.5. The Republic as popular reading

The 1992 retranslation of Plato’s Republic published by Kaktos Editions is part of a bigger project, entitled Greek Classics, launched by the publishing house with a view to reinstating the Greek Classics within modern Greek letters thus allowing Greek readers to acquire anew the taste for this type of literature.

From a purely visual point of view, this small-format book is an understated editorial presentation, comprising a limited paratext made up of the editor’s note (pages 10-11), a four-page foreword dedicated to the life and work of Plato with an outline of his philosophy; and a 9-page summary of the Republic followed by a two-page index of the names of the participants in the dialogue. The endnotes are specifically tailored to meet the needs of a general audience and are therefore neither extensive nor elaborate.

The targeted audience is clearly outlined in the editor’s note: this publication is aimed at the everyday reader who is poorly acquainted with the Greek Classics. This unexplored region (terra incognita as editor Odysseas Hatzopoulos calls it) is the result of a specific policy used so far to approach Ancient Greek literature in a way that alienates the average reader. Pedagogical approaches to the Classics, long used in Greek secondary and post-secondary educational system, as well as the awe of modern Greeks toward their intellectual heritage, further enhanced by mystic and indecipherable translations, did very little to bridge the gap between the Classics and contemporary Greek readers. The list of plausible reasons for this failure should also include any futile attempts to seek refuge in the glorious past to acquire an added-value as a modern nation.
However, the biggest problem with modern Greeks’ attitude toward the Classics and their literary products has been people’s refusal to treat Ancient Greek writings as readings. “Major Ancient Greek authors are nothing more than street names in our minds”, laments Hatzoupoulos (Republic 1992: 10), who does not fail to see in these writings a whole different world full of vitality, humour and spirit.

To appropriate the Classics, as the Modern Greek language did with so many foreign authors, the only plausible solution would be to retranslate their works and transform them into pure readings. Up-to-date translations should reflect Greek modernity in language and spirit. Readers all over the world have been enjoying of such readings for many years now. For Greek publishing to follow suit was long overdue.

Hatzopoulos situates his editorial endeavour of retranslating the classics within the political and intellectual context of our times:

Nowadays, intellectual dogmatism is collapsing thus allowing the emergence of a new series of questioning as per where Europe and the world in general are heading toward. In this context, classical Greek thinking remains open-ended and inquisitive, hence the momentum it regained. It does not however provide ready-made solutions. Instead, it allows us to rethink issues which pertain to man and his relationship to the world in a fresh way and with a modern approach. (Op. cit: 11)68

Branding Kaktos’ retranslation of the Republic as “popular reading” is partially accurate. Evidence shows that this work was produced under the supervision of an academic (Vasileios Mandilaras). This becomes obvious especially in the translation’s introduction, wherein discursive elements belonging to the specialized fields of philosophy and

---

68 «Σήμερα που κάθε είδους θεωρητικοί προβληματισμοί καταρρέουν και ξαναρχίζουν έντονοι προβληματισμοί για την πορεία της Ευρώπης και του κόσμου, η ανοιχτή και ανήσυχη ελληνική σκέψη περνά πάλι σε πρώτο πλάνο, όχι για να δώσει έτοιμες λύσεις, αλλά για να μας κάνει να στοχαστούμε με φρέσκο, σύγχρονο μυαλό πάνω στα μεγάλα ζητήματα που αφορούν τον άνθρωπο και τη σχέση του με τον κόσμο.» (Χατζόπουλος 1992: 11)
academia can easily be identified. The text of the introduction resembles academic writing, but the absence of a direct auctorial claim (as is the case with the translation itself) forbids any serious speculation as to who really wrote it.

Here, the *Republic* is seen as a pivotal text and a point of reference in Plato’s overall work. It is qualified as a political dialogue dealing with justice while globally capturing Plato’s genius and most importantly his views on ethics and morality. In the author(s) opinion, the *Republic* is to morality what *Timaeus* is to physics and *Parmenides* is to dialectics.

The *Republic* is defined as the sum of fundamental principles which regulate the organization and functioning of its regime, in other words it is a means of governance. *Polis* is teleology in itself and this teleology covers all secondary goals by excluding whatever may endanger the purpose and the ultimate design of the *polis*. Personal achievements, property and relationships must therefore serve the ultimate goal, the one that incarnates the political creation where human existence becomes meaningful. Here the author(s) most probably allude to what Julia Annas calls the first city (Annas 1981: 73 *et passim*) and not the ideally just city, the latter being more realistic because it accounts for humans’ propensity to seek gratification, thus recognizing true human nature and working beyond impossible ideals (*Op. cit.*: 77).

The way this particular position is presented in Kaktos’ introduction raises questions as to the proclaimed goal of this retranslation, i.e., targeting the uninitiated. Understanding the teleology of Plato’s first city presupposes some knowledge of the differences between, on the one hand, the political and social situation where Plato lived and developed his
philosophical system, and, on the other hand, the transition from the first city to the just city as it emerges in the form of a realistic version of the utopian prototype.

In the absence of this important link, it is even more difficult to grasp the relationship between individual and social qualities through constant interaction between ethics and politics to the point where no one would be able to discern between them. Drawing this parallel also presupposes a degree of familiarity with the Theory of Forms. Failing to address the Theory of Forms at an early stage of the introduction and, consequently, establish a relationship between ideas and matter (essence) proves yet again that this introduction can only be read by those who have already studied Plato and perhaps the Republic before reading the translation. It is the interconnection of ideas and matter that could account for the understanding of psyche and its relation to the ideally just city.

One of the introduction’s dominant features is Plato’s ultimate goal to associate the psyche with virtue. Platonic psychology posits that every function of the soul refers to a particular virtue. Once again, the author(s) take for granted a pre-existing knowledge regarding the distribution of the soul and the parallel between the soul and the city, whereby the total is achieved via maximization and, consequently, transcendence of individuality. Polis becomes the place where individual beings can ultimately contribute. The conclusion drawn is that political actions and functions carry their own particular virtues.

This conclusion stems from a somewhat elliptic argument: it is assumed that, departing from the equivalence between polis and the soul, both man and the city strive to attain virtue. However, every part of the soul, hence every part of the city, represents a different
kind of virtue. Equally, *polis* is a superior form which encompasses beings and transcends them into a productive and harmoniously united entity. Simply put, *polis* is the transcended sum of its individual yet interconnected parts, and, by extension, a synthesis of all virtues into one superior virtue. The glue between individual virtues is justice, which brings together virtues by fusing them into workings (*ενεργήματα* – *energēmata*) of the soul and *polis*. Here the author(s) argue that the application of justice materializes the request for order both in the soul and in the ideally just city.

Plato’s *Republic* was not conceived to introduce a social or political reform because it is not the product of empirical observation or a copy of a political prototype. The *Republic* is a prototype in itself, a new political organization (a living, breathing organism) founded on justice and education with no specific provisions made by its creator for details regarding its practicability. Some authors (cf. Annas), who see in the *Republic* a sketch instead of a detailed project, share this hypothesis.

A final word on justice is required: all limitations imposed by Plato to personal freedom aim at attaining intellectual freedom. The latter will demonstrate the power of *logos* (rationality) over passions, which are at the root of every injustice. History has shown that people always strived toward Plato’s ideal for justice. However, the philosopher’s method to achieve it was questionable.

Kaktos’ introduction closes on a familiar observation with regard to the utopian nature of the *Republic*. Many ideologies of our times share the utopian denominator with Plato’s work. One must, however, see beyond this common place by embracing the *Republic’s* transcending nature over time or any other obstacle of the same nature. The prevailing
elements in this philosophical system are *logos* and the promise for justice. These two can only be conceived of if they are dissociated from the demand for applicability often associated with the *Republic*. In a way, the *Republic* is a self-fulfilling prophecy since it starts from and ends with itself while aiming at the completeness of the individuals (citizens) who form it. In other words, the *Republic* is a constant transition toward superior qualities of what is real, i.e., the essence itself.
4.6. The Republic and Plato’s politeia

Memmos’ 1994 retranslation of the Republic opens with a very personal foreword and proposes a paratext unlike any other we have seen in the Republic’s retranslations into Modern Greek (katharevousa or demotiki). One should first notice that Memmos shares Will Durant’s opinion that the Republic sums up Plato’s philosophy69. The Greek translator is referring specifically to the ambiguous reception, over the centuries, of Plato’s treatise, but insists that the Republic offers “a superb charm, a dramatic totality and an unparalleled poetic style” (Memmos 1994: 9)

Even Plato’s most hostile critics, posits Memmos, had no other choice but to recognize the Greek philosopher’s well-intentioned motive for his quest for justice, social happiness and viable solutions to all serious problems which societies constantly face. The fact that modern societies are bedevilled by the same unresolved problems is proof enough that humanity remains tied up in the darkness and confusion of Plato’s cave.

Early in the introduction, the Greek translator makes clear that his interpretation of the Republic and of Plato should be viewed as an attempt to re-read Plato in order to find answers to our current problems. Memmos acknowledges the existence of previous translations of the Republic, some of which are of great value, but believes that all of them leave room for a new interpretative approach, a contribution from a different standpoint.

69 It is worth noting that, contrary to other languages, Durant’s classic The Story of Philosophy is not translated into Modern Greek. His monumental work on The Story of Civilization has been translated into Greek; this translation dates back to the 60s and is a rather unknown publication produced by a somewhat inglorious publishing house. The identity of the translator(s) also remains unknown.
In his brief foreword, Memmos recaps the political and social conditions prevalent in the city of Athens during Plato’s time and describes all major political and military figures. A separate section is dedicated to pre-Socratic philosophers and the Sophists, while another chapter introduces Socrates and his fundamental teachings. The second part of Memmos’ *Republic* is dedicated to the translation. (The original in Ancient Greek is not printed on a side-by-side format to avoid a voluminous book which would be expensive to print and difficult to sell.) Finally, the third part of the book comprises notes and commentaries on major issues brought about by Plato in this dialogue.

Like most of the retranslations of the *Republic* into Modern Greek, Memmos’ version is 784 pages long, while almost half of the book (i.e., 330 pages) accounts for the paratext (the translation being 454 pages in total). The *Republic’s* indirect dialogue is the most dramatic of all Platonic dialogues despite the philosopher’s contempt for poetry and drama. Memmos detects in the *Republic* Aeschylus’ style, Sophocles’ beautiful language and Euripides’ passion. Plato is purely dialectical, resorts heavily to an archaic language, has a preference for semantically overcharged words, experiments with unknown symbols, uses unparallel allegories and unexpected paradoxes, appears to be simple and straightforward but is often difficult to understand. The austerity of the style, dictated purely by the subject-matter of the *Republic*, does not preclude Plato from demonstrating love and irony, all of which are expressions of intense emotions. (*Ibid*, 10)

The stylistic and philological description of the *Republic* allowed Memmos to identify the challenges of the translation and to inform the reader that, in his translation, a conscious
effort was made to account for each element described above and to introduce it into the translation. There were, however, some limitations to this task:

I strived to maintain all the qualities of this dialogue and to transfer them in the language used by today’s readers, when they engage in a discussion over the questions raised by the *Republic*, while avoiding the difficulties and dangers of a typical structural analysis of Plato’s language. At the same time, the degree of freedom in the rendition was strictly reduced to preserving the syntagmatic meaning of Plato’s message. To achieve this goal, I maintained the form of the dialogue throughout the text, whereby participants alternate in a lively and direct manner which empowers the text and raises the interest and curiosity of the reader.70 *(Op. cit.: 10)*

Additionally, the translator strived to take into consideration the poetic use of language in Plato, and more specifically the link between sound and meaning. According to Memmos, the Modern Greek equivalents create all the conditions that are necessary to unearth hidden and difficult-to-understand meanings. Endnotes work as an additional guide to understanding the text by referring to other Platonic dialogues, or to other philosophers or Plato’s commentators, depending on the question raised each time.

Finally, Memmos informs us that the translation was made based on the Teubner version of the Ancient Greek text. This is the first time in any of the retranslations of the *Republic* that the translator clearly states which version of the original was used in the translation process. An acknowledgement of Adam’s *The Republic of Plato* is not however a first as far as retranslations and commentaries of the *Republic* into Modern Greek are concerned.

Once again, Adam’s status as a canonical author specializing in Plato is reaffirmed and so

---

70 «Τα χαρίσματα αυτού του διαλόγου προσπάθησα να διατηρήσω μεταφέροντάς τα στη γλώσσα που χρησιμοποιεί ο σημερινός αναγνώστης, όταν συζητά γύρω από τα θέματα της «Πολιτείας», χωρίς τις δυσκολίες και τους κινδύνους που συνεπάγεται η κλασική δομική ανάλυση της γλώσσας που χρησιμοποιεί ο Πλάτωνας, ενώ ο βαθμός ελευθερίας στην απόδοση περιορίζεται αυστηρά από τη διαφύλαξη του προτασιακού μνημόζευ. Για την εξασφάλιση αυτού του στόχου διατηρείται στο ακέραιο η διαλογική μορφή, πρόσωπο με πρόσωπο, με αμεσότητα και ζωντάνια η οποία δυναμίτεζε το κείμενο και κεντρίζει το ενδιαφέρον του αναγνώστη.» (Μέμμος 1994: 10)
is the intellectual debt of all of his Greek counterparts in their attempts to decipher the
*Republic*.

One of the most striking features in Memmos’ foreword is the translator’s insistence on
issues pertaining to the philological rendition of the *Republic* (as opposed to a purely
philosophical transfer). To understand this, we should bear in mind that Memmos is not a
philosopher. He was an educator, a philologist in Greece’s secondary educational system,
and had a classical upbringing, primarily centered on literature and poetry. His literary
vocation did not however preclude philosophy. The paratext of his translation, especially
the postface, under the general heading of “Comments”, reveals the philosophical
inquisitiveness of the translator and his attempt to re-establish the philosophical value of
the *Republic* via a literary appreciation anew.

It is worth noting here that both the quantity and the quality of Memmos’ paratext
demonstrate extensive research and familiarity with Greek and foreign bibliography as
well as an innovative analysis that covers all aspects of the *Republic*, namely the problem
of the soul and psychology according to Plato; law and justice and the historical evolution
of law and the rule of law; Plato’s philosophy of law; political science, polity and
governance according to Plato; education; and, finally, philosophy and poetry and the
rivalry between them.

One of the most interesting analyses offered by Memmos is Plato’s definition and
understanding of democracy and Popper’s outspoken criticism on the matter. As is
usually the case with most orthodox readings of Plato’s *Republic*, Memmos takes apart
Popper’s reading of the *Republic* by positing that the former’s criticism is unfounded
because it serves the interests of those who would rather ignore the failures of our democratic systems of governance as opposed to Plato who identified and stigmatized them.

Memmos feels the need to redress all the accusations Popper launched against Plato, especially when the latter is accused of being an enemy of democracy and egalitarianism. As far as the first accusation in concerned, Memmos insists that when Plato criticizes democracy, he does not refer to the period governed by Pericles but to the years before and after the latter’s governance. The Greek translator accuses Popper of being oblivious to the fact that Plato refrained from qualifying democracy as an evil, a sin or a terrible disease as he did with all other forms of governance known to him. This particular remark is attributed to Despotopoulous and reiterated by Memmos. Despotopoulous also directed attention to elements of sarcasm in Plato’s discourse, when the latter was referring to democracy, as well as the philosopher’s imagination and capacity to use humour in order to chastise unacceptable practices and distressful events within a democratic polity. (Memmos 1994: 631)

Popper wrongly interpreted Plato’s ability to invoke various discursive strategies as sophism while Popper himself was unable to give a satisfactory definition of contemporary democracy in his capacity as a liberal.\textsuperscript{71} According to Memmos, Popper also misunderstood Plato’s appreciation of equalitarianism (\textit{isonomia} or equality before

\textsuperscript{71} Memmos’ accusatory goes on and on. The author uses harsh language against Popper’s liberal position. More specifically, he accuses Popper of going as far as considering Plato an enemy of the individual. Based on the ideal of liberalism and in the name of equal opportunities, the individual is forced into a never-ending competition in order to develop his capacities and ensure his existence and livelihood. However, competitiveness poisons human relationships as well as living conditions, because it promotes selfishness and uses science and knowledge as a weapon which empowers the individual who possesses it at the expense of those who do not by making them unhappy. (Memmos 1994: 633)
the law). Many Platonic scholars have acknowledged the importance of equality, and equality before the law, in Plato, which started in *Phaedo* and evolved in Books I and II of the *Republic*.

Memmos is adamant to prove that Plato understood the unfortunate absence of pure equality.\(^\text{72}\) There is no such thing as pure equality, in other words two people cannot be equal to two other people the same way \(1+1 = 1+1\) (*Op. cit.*: 635). This is because intellectual and physical properties cannot be evaluated the same way. What we are really left with is the idea of a coefficient or a relationship of numeric approximation. *Phaedo’s* numeric equality becomes a geometric (or proportionate) equality in *Georgias* and *Timaeus*.

Memmos posits that Popper refuses, on the one hand, to acknowledge the difference between the two equations presented by Plato; and, on the other hand, to accept a historically established fact, namely democracy’s many forms and the duality of equality before the law (equalitarianism), which is a purely numeric equality and politics’ proportionate equality. We are reminded that Plato’s *Apology* deals exclusively with the issue of numeric equality whereas the goal set out in the *Republic* is to address the issue of equality in political life (proportionate equality), which is basically established upon

\(^{72}\) I believe that Memmos agrees with Popper on this particular point although he presents it as an objection to the latter’s interpretation. More specifically Popper states that “[…] some of [Plato’s] best-known formulations of the equalitarian demands were couched in the impressive but questionable language of ‘natural rights’, and that some of their representatives argued in favour of these demands by pointing to the ‘natural’, i.e., biological, equality of men. We have seen that the argument is irrelevant; that men are equal in some [important] respects and non-equal in others; and that normative demands cannot be derived from this fact, or from any other fact.” (Popper 1966: 100)
meritocracy. 73 If all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law, this does not imply that all citizens are equally capable of performing any job or task. Applying meritocracy to all aspects of life, and first and foremost to the public sector (public administration), is allowing justice to prevail in the name of the general good. However, history demonstrated time and again that political games and dubious interests hampered meritocracy. This practice has had devastating consequences.

Additionally, it is only fair to acknowledge that legal recognition and protection of typical and real requirements for a number of professions and jobs, through a process of qualification and/or formal competition, especially for positions within public administration, are a personal victory for Plato. They are the most tangible proof that proportionate equality prevails over numeric equality in a just society.74

Finally, it is important to notice that Memmos sees in the Republic a political project that can be defined as a product of political science. Although political science is a modern concept, its object of investigation—which deals with political theory and the practice of politics as well as the description and analysis of political systems and political behaviour—falls perfectly within the scope of the Republic. This is how Memmos situates the Republic by emphasizing Plato’s capacity to recreate the anatomy of the political systems of his time and, most importantly, their pathology and to propose a

73 Memmos suggests that modern states and their system of administration legally recognize the existence of typical and real qualifications. This legal framework, says Memmos, does justice to Plato by proving how right the Greek philosopher was. However, one could inversely argue that political, legal and administrative organization of modern societies was heavily inspired by the platonic standard and this is not to say that the said model is necessarily the best. In my opinion, Memmos resorts to the same rhetorical practice, of which he accuses Popper, namely he tries to prove facts through axioms and axioms through facts.

74 Memmos gives the example of the exams held at any level of the educational system; the hierarchy in the army and public services and the relation between pay and position/responsibility in the last two cases as tangible application of the meritocracy system. (Memmos 1994: 637)
salutary alternative. According to Despotopoulos Plato’s ideal *Republic* is a pure product of rationalism, and Memmos seems to agree with it (Memmos 1994: 619). The idea of Good is the antidote to people who are drawn to politics, because it ensures the balance between, on the one hand, the three parts of the soul, and, on the other hand, physical strength, one of the many necessary conditions to a inspiring, trustworthy and successful leader.
4.7. The Republic and the academic status of philosophy

Nikolaos Skouteropoulos authored the 2002 retranslation of Plato’s Republic published by Polis editions. This 933-page work is currently considered one of the best translations of the Republic and enjoys a high rating on the list of canonical translations. Despite the overall length of the book, Skouteropoulos consciously refrains from a long-winded introduction but offers extensive explanatory notes at the end of the book (pages 779-917), as well one of the most complete bibliographies ever seen in any retranslation of the Republic into Modern Greek.

The two-page foreword instantly reveals the author’s primary identity as an academic, a former professor of philosophy. It also provides information on the duration of the translational and hermeneutical work (Skouteropoulos started working on the translation at the beginning of 1997 and finished it toward the end of the year 2000), and the extent of the research leading to the translation’s completion. As the translator admits, he based his work primarily on James Adam’s canonical exegesis The Republic of Plato, an almost obligatory reading, which, surprisingly enough, has not been translated into Greek despite its popularity and the frequency with which it is quoted.

Skouteropoulos also acknowledges having read a number of translations of Plato’s Republic in other languages, and more specifically, translations into English by F. M. Corforld, P. Shorey, G. M. A. Grube and A. D. Lindsay; translations into German by Schleiemacher, O. Apelt and K. Vretska, and É. Chambry’s translation into French. Interestingly enough, there is no mention of a previous translation of the Republic into
Modern Greek. This omission is restored in the bibliography. There it becomes obvious that Nikolaos Skouteropoulos had read the two canonical Greek translations of his time, namely the ones signed by Gryparis and Georgoulis respectively.

For the quotes used by Plato when referring to Homer, Skouteropoulos chose some of Homer’s canonical translations into Modern Greek, especially the ones by N. Kazantzakis, I. Kakridis, D. N. Maronitis and P. Lekatsas (for some of Hesiod’s quotes). According to the translator, explanatory notes serve a double function. First, they are intended to bridge the gap between the original text and contemporary readers by providing all necessary *realia*. Second, they serve to demonstrate commonalities, or points of convergence, between platonic philosophical elements and contemporary trends in philosophy as well as political and sociological thinking. The usefulness of these notes is limited and cannot be anything more than a “first glance” approach to understanding the platonic text.

The foreword closes on a note of thanks where the translator acknowledges the contribution of friends, colleagues and fellow academics who helped in more than one ways in the creation of this translation. But the most important element in this foreword is Skouteropoulos’ translational approach. His brief account comes after the enumeration of foreign language translations used as a basis for his rendition into Modern Greek. By his own account, Skouteropoulos attempted to “[…] create a translation in Modern Greek that would be natural and vibrant but, at the same time, as faithful as possible to the basic meaning of the original.” (Skouteropoulos 2002: 7)
The language of the introductory note in the 2002 retranslation adopts a different discursive pattern from the one in the foreword. The use of the first person recedes in favour of a third person narrative, intended to ensure objectivity and a certain degree of erudition.

The introduction is divided into four smaller sections. The first section is an overview of the content of Plato’s Republic and the participants in the dialogue. It praises Plato’s literary skills in this particular work, which, according to the translator-philosopher is the second most dense yet extensive book Plato wrote after the Laws. In the Republic, Plato abandons the genre of the aporetic dialogue in favour of a positive and occasionally dogmatic development of his system. The latter covers a considerable range, extending from metaphysics to ontology, gnoseology, ethics and relationship to political science, economics, applied political theory, aesthetics and literature. This is achieved through to a remarkable unity which results from a synthesis only Plato’s intense thinking process could have produced. The intensity remains constant throughout the Republic. (Ibid: 9)

Section II of the introductory note deals with the issue of Thrasyllus’ division of the Republic into ten books. Skouteropoulos raises the question of the validity of this division while referring to alternative divisions put forth by distinguished platonic scholars and translators, such as F. M. Cornford (and his 1941 translation). Cornford sees in the Republic six distinctive parts, whereas K. Vretska and O. Gigon are of the opinion that the Republic should be divided in five parts. Finally, there is O. Höffe (1997) who favoured a division of the Republic into seven or, alternatively, in four different parts.

75 According to Skouteropoulos, this is a magnificent translation.
Nikolaos Skouteropoulos suggests that we should take aside Books I and X of the Republic, which correspond more or less to the introduction and the conclusion of Plato’s text, and reconsider Books II to IX. The translator sees in this part three different theme patterns: the first one extends from the beginning to 471 c3 (which corresponds to Thrasyllus’ Book V). There Plato discusses general principles of social organization and class division in his ideally just city, all of which are articulated around the principle of extending justice. The second major theme starts at 471 c4 and extends through Book VII. Here the focus turns into platonist ontology and gnoseology built around the profile of the philosopher-governor (or philosopher-ruler) and the education of his class. The most important element in this part is the discussion on the ideal of Good. The third and final theme deals with the pathology of inadequate political regimes as well as with the dispute between philosophy and poetry (Books VIII and IX) (Ibid: 14-15).

In this same section of the introductory note, Skouteropoulos briefly discusses the place and function of the Republic’s first book within the overall text and some key questions that arise with regard to the unity of Plato’s opus. Skouteropoulos concludes that, regardless of place, time and sequence in which the different parts of the Republic were written, they all fit together perfectly into a unified entity that demonstrates careful planning.

The text is an impressive symmetric whole, whose centre is dominated by an ontological and metaphysical consideration leading to the idea of Good. The latter is a departing point for three magnificent allegories: the Sun, the Line and the Cave, all of which are integrated into the depiction of the ideal society, namely the ideal city of justice. The two opposite sites of [Plato’s] plan represent two sketches of epekeina [beyond existence or transcendence]: on one end of the spectrum there is Cephalus and his myths regarding Hades whereas, on the other end of the
spectrum, there is the eschatological myth of Er and the fate of the soul in the afterlife. *(Op. cit: 16)*

The third part of Skouteropoulos’ introduction offers a brief account of the historical time of Plato’s *Republic*, namely estimations as to when it was written, whether it was written all at once, and how long it took Plato to finish it. The translator also discusses the narration time, estimated between 409 BC and 421 BC and the genre to which this particular dialogue belongs.

However, the most interesting analysis comes in the fourth part of the introduction, wherein the translator attempts a hermeneutical approach to the *Republic*. Skouteropoulos maintains that one of the greatest difficulties in Plato’s text is the distance the author maintains between himself and the readers by inserting different obstacles. In the *Republic* in particular, the distance between Plato and his readers is further increased via a net of narrative strategies such as irony, sarcasm, a tug-of-war between playfulness and seriousness and a complex development of his basic ideas.

Before the *Republic*, all platonic dialogues were aporetic. In other words, all questions raised, be they of moral or political nature, were left unanswered and the reader would remain perplexed before pressing questions of “how one can live [better]” *(πώς βιωτέον – pos vioteon).*

---

76 «Είναι πραγματικά εντυπωσιακή η συμμετρία του Όλου, στο κέντρο του οποίου δεσπόζει η οντολογική-μεταφυσική θεώρηση με κορώνια την ιδέα του Αγαθού, από την οποία εξακτίνωσαν οι τρεις αριστουργηματικές αλληγορικές εικόνες του Όλου, της γραμμής και του σπηλαίου, πλαισιωμένες από την εικόνα της ιδανικής κοινότητας: της αρίστης πόλεως της δικαιοσύνης, ενώ στα δύο άκρα του σχεδίασματος διαγράφονται τα αχνά περιγράμματα του Επέκεινα: στο ένα άκρο με τα λόγια του Κέφαλου για τους μύθους περί των εν Αίδου, στο άλλο με τον μεγάλο εσχατολογικό μύθο του Ηρός για τη μοίρα της ψυχής στον Άλλο Κόσμο.» *(Σκουτέροπουλός 2002: 16)*
In the *Republic*, Plato attempts not only to provide answers but to present them in the form of binding answers. In Skouteropoulos’ view, these answers may have an imperative nature but are far from being a regulatory set of rules, as in the case of the Ten Commandments and their importance to Judaism or the significance of the Golden Rule for Christians. Skouteropoulos posits that the objective of Plato’s argument was to define the nature and essence of justice and injustice and to compare their consequences on the individual and collective levels. (Skouteropoulos 2002: 21)

Skouteropoulos stresses the gap between how ancient Greeks and modern societies (western societies in particular) perceive private life, i.e., that of the individual, and public life, in other words, life within an organized polity. In the Greek *polis*, private and public spheres were more fused and less distinctive than they are today. Accordingly, questions regarding justice and ethics directly affected the social and political spheres of the *polis* and there would be no valid reason to perceive justice and ethics for the polity differently from theorizing on justice and ethics for the individual.

Despite the intermingling between the individual and the collective and the emphasis placed on the so-called ideally just city, Skouteropoulos proposes a different reading for the *Republic’s* open-ended text. In his opinion, Plato is more concerned about the virtue of the individual, of every man and woman seen as separate entities, and less about the virtue of the city. He also maintains that ethics take precedence over politics, given that justice and injustice are dispositions of the soul and mental states of the human being defined primarily as an individual rather than that of the city, society and polity. (*Ibid.*: 21)
On the basis of this interpretation, it is postulated that Plato’s *Republic* should be read as a representation of man’s soul and that the ideal city is the city of the human soul. It is therefore wrong to maintain, as do Popper and many other anti-Platonist modern philosophers, that when Plato wrote the *Republic* he was writing a political manifesto, in other words he was constructing a political programme.

Building upon W. K. C. Gurthie’s argument, Skouteropoulos suggests that the interpretation of the *Republic* as the “city of the soul” can easily be justified by the platonic text itself: originally, the “perfect city” is made up of children younger than 10 years of age and of philosophers-governors (or philosophers-rulers) who assume the responsibility for educating these children. An additional supporting argument in favour of this alternative reading is that, in Book IX, all participants in the dialogue agree that the ideal or perfect city has yet to exist. It does not really matter if this city ever existed somewhere or whether it will exist in the future: it belongs to the sphere of the ideal and can serve as a template, a prototype, an ideal plan men can mentally internalize and set out to achieve.

By saying that the *Republic* is not a political programme *per se*, we do not invalidate the political argument behind the book. Plato touches upon a wide range of issues that refer to political and social ontology, namely the creation, structure, and organization of the state; political and social mobility, social transformation, education, economy, and economics. All these concepts made the *Republic* one of the fundamental political texts of the Western world.
Finally, the interpretation of the ideal city as the city of and for the soul is also supported by the importance Plato ascribes to Good. Good exists beyond essence; it is an ontological principle in itself, it embraces the whole world and every meaning there is to it; it gives meaning to every single thing by “making it be what it is meant to be”. Good is also a prerequisite to knowledge, which, in turn, allows us to perceive the world intellectually. In other words, Good is a theological concept that Plato formulated in metaphysical terms.

Skouteropoulos acknowledges that Plato does not elaborate on the link between Good and Governance but leaves it open to interpretation. Implying that Good could potentially be achieved by the philosopher-ruler and that the latter would be able to govern wisely at an advanced age suggests that Good is not necessarily linked to the educational system. Skouteropoulos sees here a third solution, namely that Good is not to be appropriated only from a gnoseological point of view but also as a life-long process of completion, something that is achieved with the help of maturity and experience (Op. cit.: 23).

In that sense, Skouteropoulos agrees with W. Jaeger on that the Republic aims to drive home the psyche, in other words to return psyche to psyche itself, as well as placing the moral component above and beyond a decaying state. However egocentric this might sound, it does not negate the importance of the political aspect prevalent in Plato’s philosophy.

To sum it up Plato considered ethics, virtue and justice in governors to be the catalyst in shaping the State and its fate. After all, Plato knew that “individually defined people and not laws, ideals or the people as a whole rule” (Skouteropoulos, loc. cit.) but he also
acknowledged the importance of some moral element in the ruled. Education, the only realistically viable option according to Plato, should be focused on shaping personalities both morally and intellectually.
4.8. The Republic as a matter of understanding Plato

The newest retranslation of Plato’s Republic, dated 2006 and translated by Theodoros Mavropoulos under the direction of Dimitrios Lypourlis, professor emeritus at the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki, was published by Zitros Editions, a publishing house based in Thessaloniki.

In line with most of the retranslations of the Republic, the Mavropoulos version provides readers with a rich paratext comprising the following parts: an editor’s note; the author’s foreword (here the word ‘author’ refers to the translator); an introduction to Plato, which includes a short biography, a historical overview of how Plato constructed his philosophy, as well as Plato’s works and the classification of his dialogues into categories. Readers will also find a summary of the Republic followed by an extensive commentary of the morphology and structure of this particular dialogue; an analysis on the historical and narrative time of the Republic; the role and function of every participant in the dialogue; and, finally, a study regarding the Republic’s literary value.

An additional part is dedicated to a series of biographies on Plato, including an autobiography, i.e., the famous Seventh Letter of Plato. This is the first time one of Plato’s epistles—possibly the only one ascribed to Plato—has found its way into one of the paratext of the Republic’s retranslations into Modern Greek. Mavropoulos publishes the entire epistle in translation. The Seventh Letter is followed by Albinus’ Introduction to Plato’s dialogues as well as by Alcinous’ [The] Handbook of Platonism, also translated into Modern Greek. Finally, at the end of each Book, the translator gives a
summary followed by detailed notes and a series of questions for further discussion. Each of the two-volume translation has a selective bibliography divided into two parts: A general bibliography on Plato and his work and a Republic-specific bibliography.

The most striking element of this paratext is the translator’s concern for understanding Plato, the philosopher, the thinker and the writer, not only via the Republic but through biographies and commentaries written on Plato as well as the autobiographical Seventh Letter. From Albinus’ extract, it is important to retain the definition of dialogue simply because this definition allows us to understand the choice of genre made by Plato, which, in turn, defines Plato as a philosopher.

More specifically, Albinus departs from the premise that the dialogue is logos (i.e., discourse) made up of questions and answers. Logos is partly inward and partly outward and the dialogue is logos’ outward expression77. The dialogue’s main feature is the question-and-answer sequence and its essence needs to be in harmony with the dialogue itself. Consequently, the most appropriate topics to be dealt with via a dialogue are politics and philosophy. Additionally, a genre should also be in harmony with the ethos of the author78. This means that philosophers seek truth, and their discourse should reflect

77 According to Hierotheos (in Williams’ translation): “In many Fathers, ... the word is also called the ‘logistikon’, intelligence. The word in man is said inwardly but also expressed outwardly. Outward silence does not mean that there is not an inner word. But after a study of the works of the Fathers it can be asserted with some caution that the word is inward and outward and is united with the nous, while the intelligence which is connected with the mind, is the organ through which the word is expressed. Thus it can be stated that there is a subtle difference between the word and intelligence, just as there is between the word and mind. St. Thalassios teaches that the intelligence by nature submits to the Logos”. The intelligent man must submit to the Word. (Williams 1994: 205)

78 And most probably with all the participants in the speech act, in other words, in the case of the Republic, Socrates and his interlocutors. This particular point is not made clear in Albinus’ text.
idealism, simplicity and honesty. Albinus therefore suggests, although indirectly, that only dialogue can reflect these qualities which are a precondition to philosophizing.

Another central element in Albinus’ introduction to Plato is the question of the division of Plato’s work. Early in the text, it becomes obvious that Albinus disagrees with Thrasyllus’ and Dercyllides’ division of Plato’s works on the grounds that both scholars sought to devise a classification for categorizing the participants in the Platonic dialogues and the conditions surrounding their existence. In doing so, Albinus posits, Thrasyllus and Dercyllides failed to acknowledge the importance of making sense of Plato’s teaching and demonstrating its wisdom. Therefore, Albinus is convinced that the starting point of Plato’s $\textit{logos}$ (cf. discourse, and, subsequently word and dialogue) is not fixed. He believes that all of Plato’s works form a perfect circle with no beginning and no end; it is a wheel that spins purposefully around its axis, whereby all philosophical elements stem from logical principles and lead ineluctably to other elements that are important for completing the circle.

Finally, it is crucial to examine the inclusion of Plato’s $\textit{Seventh Letter}$ in the paratext of the 2006 retranslation of the $\textit{Republic}$. Several things need to be taken into consideration. First, Mavropoulos puts forth his own translation of the letter, with no obvious acknowledgement or references, directly or indirectly, to two previous translations of the same letter, namely Iro Korbeti’s translation (1986/1993) and the latest translation signed by S. Tselikas in 2006$^{79}$. Both are widely known and have an almost canonical status.$^{80}$

$^{79}$ The original text in Ancient Greek is also missing. This is inconsistent with the overall presentation of the book where the rule is that every translated text is preceded by its original. The only noticeable exceptions are Albinus’ and Alcinous’ original texts.
Second, the very presence of the letter presumes that we are dealing with an authentic autobiography, a text written by Plato himself. This presumption is of a particular interest in that it appears to have settled the issue of authenticity at far as Greek readers are concerned with. The title used by Mavropoulos to introduce his translation of the letter is *Plato’s biography by Plato*81 - *The Seventh Letter*, which, in itself, leaves very little room for doubt.

One can safely conclude that Mavropoulos espouses academic claims according to which Plato did write this particular epistle (as opposed to the 12 remaining epistles for which the question of authenticity is still a matter of debate within the academic community). In an article published in *Epopteia* (vol. 109, 1986) on the issue of the *Seventh Letter*, Iro Korbeti provides an analysis of the letter, which preceded her translation of the epistle. In quoting J. B. Skemp via her own translation, Korbeti puts forth the idea that scholars from Continental Europe tend to ascribe the *Seventh Letter* to Plato (this is, for instance, the case of Cherniss, Merlan and Souilhé, although the latter’s position is somewhat less doctrinaire). Others, such as Kurt von Fritz, take a more critical stance whereas the newest trend is to question the authenticity altogether (as is the case with Ludwig Edelstein and Norman Gulley). The return to scepticism is often met with academic disbelief and counter arguments that can prove as solid as the ones used by those who refuse to credit Plato with this particular epistle.

---

80 Excerpts of both these translations are included in the electronic archive of Classical texts compiled by the Portal for the Greek language at [http://www.greek-language.gr](http://www.greek-language.gr).
81 My own translation of the Greek title Ο Πλάτωνας αυτοβιογραφούμενος – Η ἐβδομη επιστολή.
Third, one cannot help but to ask an obvious question with regard to the function of this letter in the translation of the Republic. Given the structure of the letter and the progression of the argument in it, one would expect to find it in the paratext of other Platonic dialogues, such as Parmenides.\textsuperscript{82} One of the main arguments supporting this position is that Plato’s seventh epistle answers the question ‘what are ideas’ via its long digression on the Theory of Forms, a question which dominates Parmanides’ narrative.

Besides, if we accept R. G. Bury’s reading of the Seventh Letter as an open letter to the Athenians, intended to defend Plato in the eyes of the people of his own polis, one rightfully wonders why it would be useful to add a rather apologetic discourse within the context of an assertive dialogue such as the Republic, wherein the perfect state is not portrayed as one plausible political form of governance among others but as the only political alternative capable of ensuring happiness, justice and equality.

In my opinion, Mavropoulos’ decision to include the Seventh Letter in his translation of the Republic should not be examined separately from the other elements of the latter’s paratext, especially Chapter 6 of Part VII of the Introduction. One of the many possible readings of the Seventh Letter is for Plato (or whomever wrote the letter in his defence) to make it known to posterity that the author of the Republic did indeed try to test his theory of the philosopher-ruler or philosopher-king in the real world with a view to creating the

\textsuperscript{82} The letter opens with an introduction followed by Plato’s first visit to Sicily; then, the narrator recounts the story of Plato’s second visit to Sicily and the limits of his counsel to Dion. The next subchapter deals with Plato’s attempt to advise Dionysius, followed by Plato’s present advice. There follows a narrative that links Plato’s second visit to Sicily with his rational behind re-visiting Sicily for the third time. Next is a rather detailed recount of what happened to Plato during his third visit, which led to Dion’s invasion and assassination. Between the recounts of the third visit and Dion’s assassination, there is long digression on the theory of the forms followed by the resumption of the narrative on the third visit. At the end of the letter, there is a conclusion.
ideal state, whereby the ruler is a true philosopher and citizens base their lives on the
principles of equality and the rule of law.

This is the best defense against the most common criticism of the Republic, namely that it
describes a utopian state. The word “utopia” should be understood in its second and most
popular acception, that is, an impractical and idealistic scheme for social and political
reform. In Chapter 6, Part II of the Mavropoulos’ introduction mentioned previously, the
Greek translator asks the questions whether Plato’s Republic is a utopian state. To answer
it, he traces the meaning of word utopia to its Greek origin (οὐ τόπος = no topos = no
place) as well as to its first occurrence in Thomas More’s Utopia. The 15th century
English author was certainly inspired by Plato’s Republic and by Plutarch’s account of
the Spartan life under Lycurgus.

Plato’s and More’s examples were followed by others, notably Tomasso Campanella in
La citta del sole (The City of the Sun)\(^\text{83}\), written in Italian in 1602, while Campanella was
in prison for heresy and sedition.\(^\text{84}\) In his City of the Sun, Campanella depicts a theocratic
society, in which citizens enjoy the community of goods, women and children. The

\(^{83}\) Both More’s and Campanella’s names are quoted in the Greek text in Latin characters but both are
misspelled (Thomas More becomes Thomas Mor whereas Tomasso Campanella is spelled Tomazo
Campanela). Given the frequency of the misspelling (4 times in two pages), we are forced to assume that,
although we are dealing with a newer edition and a rather reputable publishing house, we encounter
problems that remain common in Greek publishing practices although less frequent than in the past.
Foreign names and book titles are often misspelled and/or misquoted, which suggests that there isn’t
sufficient research or care in quoting. Some could conclude that this is a sign of lack of respect for foreign
authors and works, especially by Greek philologists who are too involved with their subject matter and
concerned about everything Greek. In the context of this particular translation, these mistakes may go
unnoticed to the untrained eye and may not be offensive to a Greek philologist who reads the book from a
different standpoint and with different expectations than those of an interlingual translator. However, a
more attuned reader would find this offensive and could go as far as questioning the quality of the
publication altogether. This is all the more serious if we take into consideration that Mavropoulos’
retranslation has the credentials of a scholar and an academic such as Lypourlis.

\(^{84}\) A Latin version of this book was published in Frankfurt in 1623.
author was greatly inspired by Plato and most specifically by the political form of
governance put forth in the *Republic* and the city of Atlantis in *Timaeus*. Utopian plans
also existed in the 19th and 20th century, especially the communist model, whose
application failed completely.

Mavropoulos posits that during the 20th century, utopian works were acknowledged for
their contribution in promoting social criticism. However, this did not help to erase the
stigma of the derogatory meaning attached to the word “utopia”. Given that Plato’s
*Republic* is conceived on a purely theoretical plane and that its applicability is as likely as
Real socialism, then it can only be a utopia. However, we should remain sensitive to the
first acceptance of utopia and view the *Republic* accordingly, in other words, as a useful
work, which brings awareness to political problems and social inequalities, thus inviting
people to envision a more just society. In that sense, Mavropoulos views Plato as a
pioneer who paved the way to feasible reforms that favoured humanity.

At first glance, the content of the *Seventh Letter* may appear contradictory to what was
just said: after all, Plato failed three times to make Sicily his ideal state. But a more
profound reading will reveal that Plato’s epistle is a letter of hope to those who aspire to a
different form of governance. The most convincing argument in favour of this reading is
the development of the Theory of Forms included in the epistle. Although its presence in
the text introduces a deviation in the narrative, it sums up the foundation for
understanding ideas through the soul and, subsequently, in the ideal state.

Mavropoulos’ translatory strategy in the *Seventh Letter* calls for a brief comment, which,
in my opinion, is central to understanding the translator’s views with regard to
philosophy, the translation of philosophical texts and their function within Modern Greek language as well as political and philosophical discourse. It is no coincidence that Marvopoulos chose not to use Korbeti’s translation of the *Seventh Letter*. As far as Tselikas’ translation is concerned, Mavropoulos was most probably unaware of its existence, because it was published either at the same time as Mavropoulos’ or even later.

A most striking feature in Mavropoulos’ translation is the difficulty one encounters in reading and understanding the text in Modern Greek, especially if the reader does not have a background in Ancient Greek literature or is not fluent in Ancient Greek. After all, some would argue that the point of reading the translation is to make it accessible to today’s readership. The degree of difficulty increased in 341b-345c, which corresponds to the section dealing with the Theory of Forms.\(^{85}\) Marvopoulos maintains Plato’s terminology while closely following the structure of Ancient Greek. The following table allows us to better grasp the extent of this issue.

---

\(^{85}\) Although a native Greek speaker, I had to resort to J. Harward’s translation of the *Seventh Letter* into English and Iro Korbeti’s translation into Greek to be able to decipher Marvopoulos’ version.
### The Seventh Letter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancient Greek Text</th>
<th>Harward’s Translation</th>
<th>Korbeti’s Translation</th>
<th>Mavropoulos’ Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Έστιν των ὀντών</td>
<td>For everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is the knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself, which is known and truly exists. The first is the name, the second the definition, the third the image, and the fourth the knowledge.</td>
<td>Σε κάθε πράγμα αντιστοιχούν τρία μέσα απαραίτητα για να προκύψει η γνώση του· το τέταρτο είναι η ίδια η γνώση· ως πέμπτο πρέπει να βάλουμε την ιδέα του πράγματος, που μόνη αυτή επιδέχεται γνώση και έχει αληθινή ύπαρξη. Το πρώτο είναι το ὄνομα, το δεύτερο η λέξη, το δεύτερο ο ορισμός, το τρίτο το εἴδωλο· το τέταρτο η γνώση.</td>
<td>Σε καθένα από τα ὀντά υπάρχουν τρία, με τα οποία είναι φυσικό να έρχεται η επιστήμη· τέταρτο είναι η ίδια· πέμπτο πρέπει να τοποθετήσουμε αυτό που είναι γνωστό και αληθινό· από αυτά το πρώτο είναι το ὄνομα, το δεύτερο ο λόγος, το τρίτο το εἴδωλο και το τέταρτο η επιστήμη.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εκάστω, δι’ ον την επιστήμην ανάγκη</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παραγίνεσθαι, τρία, τέταρτον δ’ αυτής - πέμπτον δ’ αυτό τίθενται δεί ο δή γνωστόν τε καὶ αληθῶς ἐστιν ον-εν μεν</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὄνομα, δεύτερον δή λόγος, τὸ δε τρίτον εἴδωλον, τέταρτον δε επιστήμη</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Number of words**

- 39 words
- 56 words
- 55 words
- 50 words
Translation of the Greek texts into English

For each thing there are three instruments, necessary for acquiring knowledge; the fourth is knowledge itself; as fifth we must place the idea of the thing, the only one to bear knowledge and which has a true existence. The first is the word, the second the definition, the third the image and the fourth the knowledge.

In each being there are three, through which it is natural to achieve episteme; the fourth is [the latter] itself; as fifth we must place what is known and true; from these, the first is the name, the second is the logos, the third the image and the fourth the episteme.
# Word analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancient Greek Text</th>
<th>Harward’s Translation</th>
<th>Korbeti’s Translation</th>
<th>Mavropoulos’ Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Όντων ➔ όντα ➔ ον</td>
<td>Everything that exists</td>
<td>Πράγμα [= thing]</td>
<td>Όντα ➔ ον ➔ being as something that exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[being as something that exists]</td>
<td>➔</td>
<td>➔</td>
<td>➔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>every + thing ➔ thing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Επιστήμην ➔</td>
<td>knowledge</td>
<td>Γνώση [= knowledge]</td>
<td>Επιστήμη [= episteme]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>επιστήμη</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Γνωστόν</td>
<td>Known</td>
<td>1. Γνώση ➔</td>
<td>1. Γνωστό ➔ ➔ known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Αληθώς εστίν</td>
<td>Truly exists</td>
<td>2. Αληθινή ύπαρξη ➔</td>
<td>2. Αληθινό ➔ ➔ true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>true existence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ον</td>
<td>The thing</td>
<td>3. Ιδέα ➔ ➔ idea</td>
<td>3. Αυτό ➔ ➔ this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>itself</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancient Greek Text</td>
<td>Harward’s Translation</td>
<td>Korbeti’s Translation</td>
<td>Mavropoulos’ Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. όνομα</td>
<td>4. name</td>
<td>4. λέξη [= word]</td>
<td>4. όνομα [= onoma]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[=onoma]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. λόγος [= logos]</td>
<td>5. definition</td>
<td>5. ορισμός</td>
<td>5. λόγος [= logos]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[= definition]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. είδωλον</td>
<td>6. image</td>
<td>6. είδωλο</td>
<td>6. είδωλο</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[= eidolon]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[= eidolon]</td>
<td>[= eidolon]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. επιστήμη</td>
<td>7. knowledge</td>
<td>7. γνώση</td>
<td>7. επιστήμη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[= episteme]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[= knowledge]</td>
<td>[= episteme]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This sample is taken from paragraph 1 of the above-mentioned segment. It is very informative insofar as it reveals the translator’s points of view on translation and philosophy, while demonstrating a certain trend in Mavropoulos’ version of the Republic.

It seems that the translator adheres to the camp of those who believe that the translation of the classics is not a matter of ‘interpretation’.

As is still often the case with biblical translations, any attempt to interpret a classical text would only lead to misinterpretation and, therefore, the ‘safest solution’ is a literal transfer. This view remains largely popular among Greek philologists, who turn it into real practice in the classroom when they ask students to translate (almost verbatim) the Ancient Greek text into Modern Greek or, inversely, when they themselves translate the text into demotiki for the purposes of understanding and analyzing the classics.
This approach has several implications: first, there is the issue of the chain of authority in the disciplines which form the humanities (Pym 2007: 21-44). Literal translation (or transliteration of some sort) is, on the one hand, a means for demonstrating that translation is almost impossible, from an ethnocentric point of view, since all other languages (including vernaculars) are “barbarous” and therefore inferior. On the other hand, it arms us with a powerful weapon in order to make sure that linguistics rank lower than philosophy and that Modern Greek is nothing more than a historical evolution of Ancient Greek.

This is also consistent with what Pym means when he says that “[…] translations [are treated] as inferior products, given that the directionality [is] normally from prestigious to inferior languages.” (Ibid: 26) In the case of Greek, the said directionality allows us to infer that whoever can read, write and speak Modern Greek can potentially understand Ancient Greek or is supposed to. Regardless of whether this deduction is soundly founded or not, there is a political and philosophical underpinning, namely continuity in the Greek language and, subsequently, the debate between interlingual and intralingual translation (in the Ancient Greek vs. Modern Greek combination). Sadly enough, the discourse on language continuity and on the impossibilities or inadequacies of translation unveils an important inequality in the theological hierarchy of languages, whereby Ancient Greek, seen as a divine language, ranks higher than Modern Greek, the former’s contemporary historical equivalent, which, in turn is treated as a vernacular in the case of philosophical translations.
Second, Mavropoulos’ translatory approach reintroduces the question of equivalence in translation, especially in the form of literal meaning, a concept put forth by Davidson. This approach could be achievable when translating from Ancient to Modern Greek, provided the latter was considered only as an interlingual transfer. However, this would also imply that either some signifiers (especially those belonging to the philosophical language) have what Derrida called “transcendental signifieds” (Derrida 1988, in Pym 2006: 32) or that translation as a practice should rectify any loss of transcendental meaning by reverting to literal transfers.

Which ever the case, I tend to believe that Mavropoulos’ version demonstrates more acutely the “[intimate concern] that many contemporary philosophical discourses share about their own language being translational on some level.” (Ibid: 41). In the excerpt given above, it is obvious that Mavropoulos resorts to a translationese when he decides to follow very closely the syntax of the original. Most importantly though, his refusal to attach a specific equivalent to the notions of episteme – logos – eidolon reveals a set of philosophical considerations as far as understanding and interpreting these concepts, which, in connection to the notion of Forms, are a recurrent theme in platonic dialogues.

It can be argued that Mavropoulos is aware of Plato’s non-fixed use of these key words and this is probably the reason why he chooses to keep the signifier of logos to account for all “intricacies of [Plato’s] use of the word, to insist on remembering the saying and statement connexion”86 (Cross 1954: 445) that the word holds within. In the same vein, it

---

86 As far as logos in concerned, Cross uses Parain’s suggestion to translate logos by opération de langage or linguistic operation despite the objections this rendition may raise, especially with qualifying ‘naming’ as a linguistic operation. But he agrees that logos must remain in the domain of language, even if this implies some degree of vagueness. (Cross 1954: 445) Mavropoulos is aware of the vagueness of the logos
would be inappropriate to equate *episteme* with knowledge given that *episteme* would be, simply put, the discovery of *logos* that applies to and encompasses all kinds of knowledge. One could hypothesize that *episteme*’s raison d’être is the answer to all forms of “what is X” questions, raised by Plato in all his dialogues, and where it is presumed that there are Forms labelled under X and that *episteme*’s purpose is to reveal the essence of these Forms.

We could potentially extend this discussion to account for all the elements of the table above, but this would be rather unproductive. The main point here is that the differences between all three versions in the example state a fundamental epistemological debate on the true nature and understanding of knowledge in relation to *logos*. Harward’s and Korbeti’s versions provide a more pragmatic approach to what is a thing and how one can acquire an understanding of it. Without going as far as labelling Harward’s and Korbeti’s renditions as products of constructivism, I would suggest that their understanding of the thing —and therefore the knowledge that stems from it— relies both on material things and perceivable mental processes (i.e., instruments/means, names, words and definitions) and on notions originating from processes of generalization and abstraction (*eidolon*-image). Inversely, Mavropoulos’ interpretation (for there is interpretation despite any claim to the contrary) launches anew the question of epistemology and the on-going philosophical debate by returning to rationalism and the belief that knowledge exists *a priori* and independently of the mind, as Plato posits in this Theory of Forms.

---

that needs to be examined in relation to onoma [rendered either as name or as work] and the choices made by Korbeti and Harward to equate *logos* to ‘definition’. ‘Definition’ is a phénomène de langage insofar as it is a statement of the essence of things in the classical (i.e., Aristotelian) understanding.
4.9. Preliminary conclusions

Delving into the extensive paratext of the *Republic’s* various renditions has a specific merit, that is, to unravel a set of relationships which run deeper in the text and help shed some light on the translation as a text and on the translator as an author. A logical first step would be to account for the historical factor, namely the time and space in which both the translation and the paratext were produced. At the same time, it is important to place emphasis on those few cases where the elements of time, space and author of the paratext and the text within any given retranslation are not identical.

If the examination of the historical time is to produce interpretable results, it should also be viewed through the lens of all prevailing philosophical trends and the political reality of this particular time-period, explored, invoked or even reframed by the author-translator throughout his paratext and its possible reflections on the translated text. This would inevitably lead us to explore any bidirectional relationship between the paratext and the translated text in order to discover, *inter alia*, the translator’s approach and the consistencies or inconsistencies between methodological claims pertaining to the translation and actual translational choices made throughout the text. The intratextual analysis can potentially extend to an equally revealing intertextual exploration whereby the object of investigation becomes, on the one hand, the transition from one paratext to another (preferably examined on a chronological basis); and, on the other hand, the relationship between the corpus’ paratext and any other text of philosophical and political aspiration that falls within the extended timeframe of this research.
The very essence of the historical factor claimed above presupposes an understanding of history and historical time. To put it differently, there is a need to identify a (historical) event, put it in context (time and space), and relate it, in the form of historical experience, to the knowledge that stems from the said experience (Koselleck 2004: 93). Retranslation and its paratext (if there is any), as a linguistic and mental process, is, among other things, a germination of concepts. In other words, retranslation invents or reinvents concepts related to the subject-matter while being an infinite source of potential concept-formation in the target language and consequently for the historical experience of the target culture. According to Koselleck, the concept’s latter capacity, and most specifically its political and social possibilities, does not mean that a concept’s “semantic function and performance [are] uniquely derivative of the social and political circumstances to which they relate.” (Koselleck 2004: 86). Instead, explains Koselleck, it means that this concept not only suggests the relations which it encompasses but is also a factor within them. *(Ibid)*

In keeping with Koselleck’s theoretical development, it is also vital to consider the historical factor from the standpoint of time “from which concepts can be used as indicators of sociopolitical change and historical profundity…” *(Ibid: 79)*. To put it differently, it is vital to account for the historical moment after which words were given new meaning or new words were invented or old words produced new mental and theoretical associations when placed within a different context and have subsequently altered the linguistic arsenal of the entire political and social space of experience, thus establishing new horizons of expectation. *(Ibid)*
Given that translation, and for that matter retranslation, shapes words and creates or reproduces new concepts, it is important to consider the historical factors that allow for their emergence. The paratext, as an integral part of the retranslation process and product, cannot be excluded from this investigation.

Any discussion evolving around the historical factors of the retranslations and their corresponding paratext inevitably raises the problem of the historical classification of time, concepts, past conceptual usage insofar as the latter “must refer not only to the history of language but also to sociohistorical data, for every semantic has its link to nonlinguistic content” (Koselleck 2004: 81). In our particular case, historical classification can be rather tricky because of the short period of time covered by the retranslations discussed here (mainly from the 1930s to the present) and the proliferation of political and social events that occurred in Greece during this period. In other words, the limits between diachronic and synchronic become somewhat blurry.

In the vast majority of the paratexts in the corpus, there are, however, some factors that have the characteristics of a recurrent theme and that appear consistently. This theme coincides with a major historical (past) event, that is, the Peloponesian War (431-404 BC) and its significance in shaping the post-classical Greek world. The Peloponesian War weighs heavily on the inception of Plato’s *Republic*, but most importantly, on the modern narrative on and about the *Republic*, hence the latter’s possible readings. The outcome of the war with its unprecedented devastation of cities, the countryside and several cultural and religious landmarks, which signified the end of the civilized world and the end of democracy, also shattered hopes for a unified Greek world.
Most importantly though, the Peloponesian war becomes a pivotal historical event which in turn shapes a political reality through which a central concept is being redefined. This concept is that of *Hellenikotita* or Greekness or the Greek collective identity. In many aspects, the Peloponesian War shattered the dream of *Hellenikotita* by dismantling some of its constituent parts, hence the historical and conceptual significance of this event.

Hélène Arhweiler sees in Greekness a necessary underpinning, a common racial base as she calls it: Greek nationality. Defining Greek nationality is not easy especially since its meaning is not consistent throughout the centuries. By referring back to Herodotus and his definition of the ‘community of Hellenes’, Arhweiller retains four key elements: race, religion, language and customs. These four “brought together the group of human beings […] which, for all its internal contradiction, its civil, political and military conflicts, and the local peculiarities of its constituents, composed the critical mass around common interests and vital concerns (as during the Persian Wars), the critical mass that brought about the civilization we call Greek.” (Arhweiller 1998: 20)

Western perception of Greek civilization (including modern Greek perception) equates it with a unique character, that is, her anthropocentrism. Man not only becomes the central most important factor in the universe, he is the absolute measure of all things, of all the natural laws of necessity (*Op. cit.*: 21). As Arhweiller stresses, “only thus can one contrive the rationale and dialogue that sustain scientific inquiry and bolster the democratic state, which alone guarantees equality of birth, equality of speech, equality before the law, and equality of rights and obligations, and in doing so sets the example for all mankind.” (*Ibid*)
The city or any human, social and political formation which encompasses all of the above, in other words, the group of humans who embrace this culture, is capable of producing philosophical thought. Philosophy is nothing less than the “foundation of factual, worldly-based training, both intellectual and moral, that sustains the relationship of trust in fellow-man (the term synanthropos is uniquely Greek) and in anthropomorphic gods and the personified forces of Nature.” (Idem)

Oddly enough only one Greek city, Athens, managed to embrace the humanistic values described above, thus creating an anthropocentric civilization. Arhweiller insists that the Athenian success lied in the fact that these key elements were more developed in Athens than in any other Greek city. Whether this is a fundamental political and cultural myth of the Western world or not, its value lies in the understanding that man is capable of pushing the boundaries of knowledge. There is a deep-rooted faith that man can rule over Nature, not simply in order to improve life materially, but with a view “to better understand the meaning of the universe and […] the function of cosmic harmony.” (Arhweiller 1998: 22)

The end of the Peloponnesian War, which resulted in Athens’ decimation, marked the end of the classical world and, to some extend, the dissolution of the true meaning of Hellenikotita, a philosophical way of life with man being at the centre of the universe, and knowledge being the ultimate and most noble pursuit of free man. In pre-War Athens, the free man lived in a truly democratic society and enjoyed equality before the law.
When Sparta prevailed and an oligarchic regime was imposed on Athens, the dream for a humanistic society and the unification of Greeks under one Nation or State was suspended and so was the myth of Greek continuity expressed through Greekness. From a historical point of view, Athens’ total defeat has been treated as a disaster not only for Athens but for the whole world known up to that time. When Diamantopoulos opens his introduction of the Papyros retranslation of the Republic with a brief overview dedicated to the consequences of the Peloponesian War, he views the situation by placing himself within the Athenian camp. This is done not only because Plato is an Athenian but mainly because Athens was the ideal city; democracy was the most efficient political system ever known; Cleisltthenes, the father of Athenian democracy, was an insightful lawmaker and Pericles an unmatched, gifted and shrewd politician.

In this context, it would not be far-fetched to see in the Republic—a pure philosophical treatise which deals with all aspects of human life within an organized political society—a means for returning to normalcy, that is, a tool that would help re-establish, on a purely theoretical plane, Greek continuity, Greekness and therefore Humanism. This hypothesis would also explain why the Republic is constantly treated as a venerated, multipurpose text both by Modern Greeks (especially as far as Greek identity and purity are concerned) and the Western world (as far as some humanistic values are considered).

For Georgoulis (1962), Plato had a truly Greek political conscience which was manifest in the Republic. The key word here is “political”, which should not be confused with “national”, especially since the word “national” is open to various interpretations and gives rise to major theoretical debates. Georgoulis acknowledges that nation and national
are modern concepts which cover a gnoseological and pragmatic array that simply does
not apply to Ancient Greece or classical times.

He also stresses the importance of being political, of creating a political union as well as a
purely political city-state, the latter being a true symbol of political unity. Georgoulis
reiterates the significance of political unity for Ancient Greeks in general and for Plato in
particular. Questions of descent, language and religious affiliation acquire an added value
in terms of meaning only if they are viewed from a political perspective. They may be an
important pre-requisite to shaping a union of people susceptible to embrace common
goals and visions, shared values and mutual interests; but they can fail if this group of
people does not partake in a politically shaped idea of unity whereby the sole being and
existence of the group, as a whole or in its individual parts, is to incorporate the citizen in
all his possible forms of existence and activity.

Georgoulis claims that a “[…] political union is a binding link that stands above any
cultural, financial or other linkage; it is not concerned with secondary human
possibilities; it is the decision man makes for and about his own existence […]”
(Georgoulis 1962: CVIV). In doing so, Georgoulis adheres to Weber’s understanding of a
political union as an existential form of governance which has the authority to declare
war and to impress upon its citizens demands regarding the essence of their own lives.

Plato’s understanding of what it means to be Greek should be viewed in the political
framework described above. The Greek philosopher founded his political conscience on
the notion that Greeks would declare war against the Barbarians but they could only have
conflicts among themselves. Georgoulis provides several examples in support of this
position: the Republic’s guardians are supposed to be able to distinguish between friends (i.e., other Greeks) and foes (i.e., the Barbarians); shared use of religious symbols and worship temples is an additional element in support of a political unity, which, in Ancient Greece, also came through a religious community of worship. Finally, Plato’s attempt to regulate internal conflicts, that is, disputes among Greeks and the claim of a unified defence of Greeks (here, one should read Greekness) against a Barbarian invasion are testimony to Plato’s understanding of the Republic as a political entity and an expression of what the word Greek can potential embody.

As Georgoulis posits, Plato’s obsession with a political life à la grecque does not constitute a philosophical obstacle in creating an ideal politeia, one that would potentially reach universal proportions. A true man can only exist in a Greek political community. In purely Greek terms, a true community of men is one where education leads to the perfection of mankind. Consequently, any perfect politeia, Greek or other, need only paideia as its guiding rule in order to achieve perfection for mankind. Plato’s philosophical need to imagine and describe such as perfect state through his ideal politeia is largely due to Athens’ political state of affairs and the events that led to the Peloponnesian War and its devastating consequences.

The prevalence of the perfect politeia in the Greek imaginary, both past and present, (including Plato’s imaginary) is mainly expressed in the latter’s attempt to transform theory into practice. Plato’s personal involvement with the political affairs in Sicily and his mediation with a view to resolving the dispute between Dion and Dionysus I of Syracuse is one tangible example. Plato was deeply concerned about the fate of the Greek
colony in Syracuse, especially following its destruction by the Barbarians, and had a vested interest in Dionysus II’s proclaimed reforms that never materialized in the sense Plato had envisioned. Macedonia also attracted Plato’s interest. When King Perdiccas III asked Plato to refer an advisor, the latter sent Euphraeus, one of his personal friends and closest philosophers from the Academy, to consult with the Macedonian King. Upon Euphraeus’ advice, Perdiccas III granted a principality to his brother Philip II for him to occupy and govern. Following the king’s death, and thanks to this principality, Philip was able to seize power and to create the great state of Macedonia. It is therefore thanks to Plato’s political advice that Philip gained his kingship. The Academy’s political involvement expanded beyond Plato’s existence. Georgoulis recounts several cases where Plato’s students acted as lawmakers or consultants and went as far as reversing dictatorships and abolishing tyrannies in several Greek city-states.

The rhetoric on the Peloponesian War is also present in Nikolaos Skouteropoulos’ version (2006) although is more covertly presented in the text. In that context, there is no mention of this major political event in the preface or the translator’s introduction but there are several mentions in the postface, namely the endnotes referring to specific passages of the translation. Plato’s concern with politics and the real world are highlighted in a note (2006: 788) referring to 347c 5. Skouteropoulos invokes R. Waterfield’s view on Plato’s pessimistic attitude with regard to the Greek political landscape which permeates the Republic as a whole. This pessimism is definitely related to the Peloponesian War and its aftermath.
Skouteroupoulos’ footnote in reference to 469 b8 – c2 is extremely interesting, especially when read in connection with Georgoulis’ analysis on the difference between friends (all Greek tribes despite their differences) and foes (a common enemy – the Persians – against whom all Greeks must present a united front) and the Greekness of Plato’s utopian Republic. Skouteropoulos uses Field’s 1967 analysis of this passage to explain that Plato’s insistence for his ideal, utopian Republic to be Greek is not organically necessary in the Republic’s argument. Activating the question of Greekness was necessary for the text’s narrative at the time Plato was writing the Republic (i.e., the beginning of the 4 B.C.). However, the events narrated in this passage refer historically to the treaty that ended the Peloponnesian War, known as the King’s treaty 387/386 B.C. According to Skouteropoulos and Field, this treaty was perceived as a complete humiliation for the Greek world and reinforced a common desire to fight the Persians. However, this particular passage of the Republic, which is nothing less than an example of overinflated patriotism, should be read in conjunction with Plato’s experience during his stay in Syracuse and his first-hand testimony of the dangers Greek city-states constantly faced from various enemies. This interpretation coincides with Georgoulis’ understanding of Plato’s Republic as a tangible attempt to expand Greekness as well as an alternative form of government outside the known Greek borders. To do that, it was necessary to identify friends and foes and reverse totalitarian regimes.

Skouteropoulos’ reference to Vlastos’ comment with regard to passage 469c 4-7, whereby Plato sets out the rules of military engagement in conflicts occurring between Greek tribes, reinforces Georgoulis’ understanding of the prevalence of Greekness by introducing an unknown code of ethics in the art of war. Fearing slavery is, according to
Vlastos, a legitimate reason for avoiding going to war with the Barbarians, since capture and capitulation would inevitably lead to the loss of one’s freedom and sale as a slave. However, Skouteropoulos cannot be oblivious to Plato’s partiality in his utopian Republic: considering moral issues and advocating in favour of a code of ethics specific to warfare can only be valued for its humanitarian importance when it applies to all and not only to a given group of people (Greek tribes) (Ibid: 845).

Finally, Skouteropoulos refers to the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War in 565d 2 in order to highlight a change in the sequence in which regimes alternate historically. The Greek translator astutely points toward a significant degeneration where tyranny, originally an in-between state leading from oligarchy to democracy, becomes, post-Peloponnesian War, democracy’s abasement when the latter comes to extremes. In this way, tyrants incarnate the champions of the people (demos) against oligarchy (Ibid, 888).

Gryparis’ and Papanoutsos’ paratext (1954) is the only one where the Peloponnesian War narrative is utterly omitted. One could only hypothesize on the absence of such reference. Any such conjecture should take into account the limited length of Gryparis’ paratext (including the translation’s scarce footnotes) and its predominant focus on the issue of justice. We could speculate that, in a situation of war, the issue of justice takes on a special meaning: the aggressed party internalizes a feeling of injustice for being ‘unjustifiably’ attacked by the aggressor, who, in turn, justifies the attack as part of a plan to redress a real or presumed state of injustice of which he has been the victim.

It should be noted that, in his 1941 paratext in demotiki, Gryparis did not alter a word of his 1911/1935 paratext in katharevousa. This may be due to historical facts: during that
period, Greece engaged in a series of military conflicts. As a result, any attempt to delve
upon a past historical event, such as the Peloponesian War, would be misplaced given the
suffering people were presently experiencing. Additionally, the narrative on Greekness is
also omitted and replaced by a more universal, hence humanitarian, approach to
analyzing and understanding justice in a democratic state, which in itself should be an
authentic expression of humanistic values. Finally, Gryparis’ critical, yet reverent,
attitude toward Plato, which I analyzed earlier in this book, cannot possibly accommodate
any nationalistic views. Instead, it focuses on the supra-national, supra-state component
of the Republic in an attempt to highlight all the elements that could influence the
formation of a just society of humans. In this sense, Gryparis’ approach is less about
politics, both in the positive and pejorative acception of the word, and more about a
global political scheme to re-create societies, in which philosophy and ethics play an
important if not central role.

In Hatzopoulos’ version of the Republic (1992), the discourse on and about the
Peloponessian War is also absent. This applies equally to the preface and to the
introduction of the retranslation as well as to its postface. One possible explanation for
not following the pattern set out by the other retranslations of the Republic is the fact that,
in Hatzopoulos’ version, the main focus of the retranslation is literary and its purpose is
primarily exegetical. This is done in a subtle way, which unfolds gradually throughout the
text, despite all auctorial claims for presenting the target audience with a ‘popular’
version, tuned into the needs of modern readership, and responding to a commercial
demand for well-priced, accessible readings of the Classics.
Equally, the Peloponnesian War does not seem to concern Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ treatise (1948). Although references to the Guardians’ training and education are numerous in this analysis, the ideology of Greekness as described above does not transpire in the text. Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ only reference to the war in his introduction (pp. 3-4) puts heavy emphasis on the moral consequences of the Peloponnesian War in the Greek world as a whole. This should not come as a surprise given that his whole version provides strictly ethical solutions to moral quandaries via a well-structured and regimented pedagogical system. This is consistent with Skouteropoulos’ vocation as an educator and his conservative personality.

Mavropoulos’ version of the Republic (2006) represents an in-between state whereby the influence of the Peloponnesian War rhetoric is present without taking centre stage. The most surprising feature of this retranslation is the brief reference to the Peloponnesian War, under the veil of the so-called ‘dramatic time’ of Plato’s work, as opposed to the lengthy introduction dedicated to the author and his book. Mavropoulos situates the time of the Republic’s narrative (what he calls the ‘dramatic time’) in the first decade (421 B.C.) following the peace of Nicias which marked the end of the Peloponnesian War. In Mavropoulos’ view, the dramatic time does not coincide with the historical time of the Republic, that is, the period during which Plato wrote the book (estimated between 380-370 B.C.). Book I’s almost blithe setting, with young people carelessly journeying from Athens to Piraeus to celebrate a religious holiday, is a sign of a relative return to normalcy, which Athens enjoyed during a much desired period of peace, when the Athenians were relieved from the annual pillage of the land of Attica performed by the Spartans as part of their retaliation scheme.
Mavropoulos’ reference to the Peace of Nicias is followed by a corresponding footnote (pp. 369-370). Nicias, a prominent military and politician, was instrumental in devising the peace between the Athenians and the Spartans, which was supposed to last thirty years. Unfortunately, the peace was broken much sooner and led to another round of hostilities between the two opposite camps. At that time, Nicias, a cool-headed diplomat, tried to dissuade Athens from engaging in a military expedition in Sicily. However, the Athenian *demos* decided to go ahead with its military plans and appointed Nicias as one of the heads of the expedition. The Athenian defeat in Sicily resulted in Nicias’ tragic death.

Besides this reference to Nicias, in relation to the ‘dramatic time’ of Plato’s *Republic*, Mavropoulos makes no other significant attempt to exploit the nationalistic discourse of the Peloponesian War. This allows for one possible interpretation: as in the case of Hatzopoulos, the retranslation of the *Republic* by Mavropoulos is a version introduced with a view to promoting literary analysis. Its exegetical qualities are, however, different from Hatzopoulos’ version in that the latter calls his translation a popular version whereas the former addresses a more sophisticated and specialized audience.

The Peloponesian War is most prominently analyzed in Memmos’ paratext (1994). It is almost exclusively associated with Pericles’ personality, aspirations, and actions. Memmos’ analysis of Athens’ most venerated political and military figure, his family background, his obsessive emulation especially vis-à-vis Cimon, who incarnated one of his biggest threats, culminate into a conclusion where Pericles is altogether demystified. The discourse of demystification runs opposite a more canonical historical discourse
imposed in Greek bibliography by Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, the father of Greek historiography and an indispensable source for contemporary Greek historians.

To all appearances, Memmos’ ‘dogmatic’ interpretation of a complex personality such as Pericles clashes with a more ‘balanced’ approach to understanding the man and his work, the latter being a more acceptable perception of this historical figure. Often in history, Pericles is compared to, better yet measured against, Solon, Themistocles, Clisthenes and Cimon. Memmos states that:

In general, Pericles’ politics is not known for the subtlety, quality, and ethical anguish seen in Solon and Clisthenes. He lacked long-term planning for the extended Hellenic world, something which was naturally expected from him by all Greeks, especially following the Persian Wars. From an intellectual standpoint, his approach was unidirectional. He favoured the arts while keeping secondary and higher education out of the people’s reach. Higher education was in the hands of sophists and the private sector, in other words it was accessible by the wealthy bourgeois, who had the money and the ambition to offer their offspring the best professional training available. (Memmos 1994: 48; my translation)\(^87\)

It is worth comparing this segment with a quotation from Paparrigopoulos’ *History of the Greek Nation*, which is very similar in spirit yet opposite in intent. In this segment, Papparigopoulos also gives a brief but overall account of Pericles’ leadership. Papparigopoulos asks two basic questions: What made Pericles such a popular leader, strategist, and General of the Athenian army? How did Pericles manage to hold power for 15 years? The answers to the questions suggest that:

\(^87\) «Γενικά η πολιτική του Περικλή δεν διακρινόταν για τη λεπτή ποιότητα και την ψυχική αγωνία του Σόλωνα και του Κλείσθένη. Ακόμη το έλειπε ο μακροπρόθεσμος προγραμματισμός, για έναν ευρύτερο ελληνικό χώρο και για ό,τι δικαιολογημένα περίμενε η γενιά των Ελλήνων αμέσως μετά τα Μηδικά. Ο πνευματικός του προσανατολισμός ήταν μονομερής, έδωσε έμφαση στο πολιτιστικό στοιχείο, ενώ κράτησε τη μέση, την ανώτερη και την ανώτατη εκπαίδευση μακριά απ’ το λαό, στα χέρια των σοφιστών και της ιδιωτικής πρωτοβουλίας, δηλαδή των ευπόρων αστών, οι οποίοι είχαν την οικονομική άνεση να προσφέρουν στα παιδιά τους την καλύτερη δυνατή επαγγελματική κατάρτιση.»
In reality, Pericles did not introduce a new political behaviour as did Solon; nor did he create a brand new city as did Themistocles. He did not create a new hegemony either as did Cimon. He did however accomplish something equally great: he invented ways to maintain for a very long period of time the existing city-state and [Athenian] hegemony, long enough for them to be regulated and established. At the same time, he embellished [the city of Athens] with works of art, which sufficed to ensure that the Greek name would remain immortal throughout the world. (Paparrigopoulos, 2009: 103)88

Undoubtedly, Memmos’ demystification of Pericles allows for a critical reading of history and, more specifically, of the Peloponnesian War. There is, however, an interesting contradiction in it, in so far as any discourse in favour of Pericles, or a discourse that criticizes the Greek politician, his actions and choices, is tolerated to the extent that the conclusion leads to inevitably recognizing his genius. A canonical discourse on and about Pericles equates a discourse on Greekness (Paparrigopoulos’ segment provided above is a point in case and is not a singled-out occurrence). Although Memmos’ paratext does not openly attack Greekness as a concept and working hypothesis of the Republic, it depicts Pericles as a shrewd politician, a manipulator of the masses, a man governed by spite and hatred, a megalomaniac whose actions were dictated by a strong need to assert his authority.

This quite negative portrayal of the Athenian leader and the severe criticism of his governance cannot account for one of the most popular interpretations of the Peloponnesian War. It is often suggested that this conflict summed up the ideological gap between Athens (incarnating the Ionian democracy) and Sparta (embodying the Dorean oligarchy). This explanation, which has already been put forth by Georgoulis and

88 Είναι αλήθεια ότι δεν δημιούργησε νέα πολιτική συμπεριφορά, όπως ο Σόλωνας· ότι δεν δημιούργησε νέα πόλη όπως ο Θεμιστοκλής· ότι δεν δημιούργησε νέα ηγεμονία όπως ο Κίμωνας. Έκανε όμως κάτι εξίσου μεγάλο και καλό με τη δημιουργία: δημιούργησε με πολλούς τρόπους και συντήρησε επί πολύ καιρό την υφιστάμενη πολιτεία και ηγεμονία, όσο ήταν δυνατό ίσως να ρυθμιστούν και να συντηρηθούν, ενώ κόσμησε την πόλη με τ’ αριστουργήματα εκείνα, τα οποία θ’ αρκούσαν από μόνα τους να καταστήσουν αθάνατο το ελληνικό όνομα στον κόσμο αυτό.»
sustained by Arthweiller, was openly acknowledged by Paparrigoupoulos in his historical account of the Peloponnesian War. In reality, this ideological gap resulted from a different approach in understanding and organizing the city-state. During the 4th century B.C., Athens’ population had grown considerably and so did its citizens’ standards of living. To maintain higher standards, it was necessary to expand territorially in order to find additional sources of wealth (food resources, raw material, etc.) and to solve housing problems. With growth came an increased consumption of all types of goods, including works of art and intellectual products and, with their enjoinment, a subsequent sense of fulfillment. Consumption strengthened trade, both foreign and domestic, and expanded Athens’ horizons in all possible aspects.

Consequently, if the main cause for the Peloponnesian War lay in Athens’ need to acquire more property, both for the individuals and for the state, the underlying reasons were to be found in an ideological switch: Athens broke free from the self-contained, self-sufficient philosophy of the city-state and attempted an audacious opening to the outside world, which came not only with advantages but also with a high price.

Seen from this point of view, the Peloponnesian War, maintains Paparigopoulos, was inevitable, with or without Pericles, although it could have been postponed, especially since Athens had given Sparta the right to exert control over Greek continental territories. Pericles’ long governance, despite its shortcomings, such as financial moroseness due to the payment all citizens received for their involvement in the state’s political affairs, is associated with one of the city’s most glorious times. “Pericles incarnated the ideal politician of Ancient Greece. Themistocles might have been a great politician, Cimon a
great General and Demosthenes a great orator. However, Pericles was all of the above.”
(Paparrigopoulos 2009: 340) In other words, Pericles embodied the essence of Greekness as described earlier in this chapter.
Chapter V: The Republic within the modern Greek political and philosophical context

5.1. How politics are represented in the retranslations

To say that politics is at the core of the Republic is nothing more than a platitude. To grasp the ways all subsequent (re)translations of this work understand and reflect Plato’s political scheme in the target language and culture and, most importantly, his criticism of the existing forms of government, both from a political and philosophical point of view, adds a different dimension to the attempted analysis.

In the previous chapters, the element of politics in each retranslation paratext revealed, in part, the translators’ intentions vis-à-vis Plato’s political project. In this chapter, emphasis is placed on the translated text itself and the discursive relationships between, on the one hand, the translation as a text and its corresponding paratext (horizontal shifts) and, on the other hand, the nexus connecting one translation to another (vertical shifts).

It is important to keep in mind that any approach to understanding and interpreting politics remains philosophical. Modern language usage equates “philosophical” to “utopian” or “theoretical”. Here, philosophy, lato sensu, and political philosophy, stricto sensu, are to be viewed as worldly systems of perceiving, understanding and expressing our relationship (political or other) and trust of our fellow-man. Any attempt to understand the evolution of politics should account for the ways man has looked at his fellow-man, morally, practically and intellectually, throughout the centuries. Established forms of governance and their corresponding governments are the practical manifestation
of the relationships among men (better yet citizens) and between them and their environment.

The translation lens adds an additional layer through which these relationships can be viewed. It provides an angle which allows the reflection into the translated text of a multitude of real and potential readings of the latter, which, in turn, are made possible thanks to the accumulated global experience of the world, the text in the world, and the historical facts that separate the historical time of the text from the historical time of each translation.

In other words, individual understanding of politics and its tangible expressions (i.e. timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny, etc.) is the product of a complex process of which we are often unaware and whose mechanism sets in motion a series of “reactions”, both mental and factual. Our reading of the Republic’s retranslations and their intertextual connections take into consideration intratextual and extratextual elements that shape the identity of the translator, the imprint of the translation on its culture and, inversely, the culture’s mark on the translation and its agent(s).

More specifically, the interpretation of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny which every retranslation puts forth should be “read” in association with modern Greece’s political culture, the latter inevitably being the product of a series of practices and, most importantly, the result of a long tradition that goes back to Plato, Aristotle and the other classical philosophers. The inescapable connection between politics and philosophy brings to the surface the latter’s humanistic (cf. anthropocentric) value and its
two different acceptions: the one inherited by the Classics and the one introduced into Greek culture via the French Enlightenment.

On a more theoretical plane, Plato’s analysis of the forms of governance examines the experience gained, over the years, from cases representing historical cities (Keyt 2008: 189). Plato’s state, or the simile of the Ship of State as presented in Book VI (488a7-489a6), symbolizes an ideal city. Although the fundamental pillar of this city is justice, Plato does not attempt to “put forward a whole political philosophy dealing with all matters important for the relation of individual and state.” (Annas 1981: 171) Instead, Plato seems content with a sketchy account of this ideal city while his main concern is to suggest the possibility of ever having a Perfect City by enumerating all the conditions that should be met to this effect.

This view is in contradiction with the prevailing Greek discourse whereby Plato’s ideal city is a complex and complete system in which every human activity is thought of and therefore regulated and accounted for in a rather exhaustive manner. With this incongruity in mind, we will examine the extent to which several conflicting views of philosophical nature are portrayed in the Republic’s retranslations. We will also examine the bidirectional relationship between the text and the culture in which it emerges and the text as a result of the agent’s habitus (i.e., the translator as an author but also as a reader).
5.2. **Readings of the different forms of governance**

In Book VIII, following the discussion on government and governance launched in Book VI and VII via the description of his ideal or perfect city, Plato develops an ideological system of the pathology of all known forms of government and their fall, i.e., the degenerating transition from one state to the other. This analysis occupies all of Book VIII and part of Book IX. As mentioned earlier, Plato’s account of the four imperfect forms of government is based on historical experience and observation. In that sense, the description of timocracy (or timarchy) is a reflection of the city of Sparta during its decline. This is also true with democracy. Plato’s depiction of the democratic state is inspired heavily by the conditions prevailing in the Athenian democracy during its worse hours.

Although drawn from historical experience, Plato’s analysis is profoundly ideological. Marvopoulos draws attention to this point in one of his notes (2006: 1267) by stressing the difference between Plato’s mechanical/ideological system and Aristotle’s critical and historical categorization of governments. Mavropoulos refers to Penelopi Tzioka-Evangelou preface of Aristotle’s *Politics* (2005: 33-34) in which the author-translator describes the differences between the two philosophers.

More specifically, in Aristotle’s theory, governments evolve historically. That is to say, some forms of government (such as a kingdom) become rarer in the course of time. This is because evolution in the political arena results from numerous factors and conditions interacting at a specific time and place. Plato’s ideological (one should read less
practical) description of governments is suggestive of his origin (an Athenian), his social and financial background (an aristocrat) and his personal experiences (Plato lived long enough to witness the rise and fall of the Athenian democracy). He is therefore entitled, suggests Tzioka-Evangelou, to remain optimistic about the possibility of envisioning an ideal form of government that would lead to an ideal city.

This idealistic view of politics clashes with Aristotle’s pragmatic approach. Aristotle lives a life divided between Athens and Macedonia, on the one hand, and his native city of Chalkis, on the other. He comes from the middle class and becomes the spokesperson of the concerns, preferences, and aspirations of the average 4th century citizen; he recognizes the value of family, property, public opinion and rights (cf. political and human rights). Most importantly, however, his analysis is based on observation: he performs a comparative and contrastive analysis of the city-states of the 4th century by taking into account financial, social, political, cultural, geographical and anthropological factors (Op. cit.: 2005: 33-34)

Based on these data, one can safely argue that Mavropoulos’ note on the mechanical/ideological nature of Plato’s evolutionary system of governments demonstrates the translator’s familiarity with Georgoulis’ similar comment on this particular topic. In the introductory note of his translation of Book VIII (Georgoulis 1962: 498), Georgoulis maintains that Plato’s analysis of the various forms of governments is not a historical account of reality. Rather, it is a systematic, step-by-step development of all a priori conditions which account for the decline of the cities. Contrary to Books VI and VII, which reflect an ascending movement toward the
inception of a better political system, culminating in the creation of Plato’s ideal city, Books VIII and IX follow a spiral movement from grace to disgrace. Georgoulis suggests that this movement responds to two basic principles: time flow and lack of stability of all things human (Idem).

These two conditions are rejected by Aristotle. In the latter’s view, Plato places more emphasis on the principle of time flow than on education in determining the fate of a form of government and, subsequently, that of the city. Additionally, the transition from one form of government to the other is not subjected to an evolutionary mechanism but works in opposite pairs (democracy vs. oligarchy/tyranny vs. perfect city). Georgoulis’ profound knowledge of the Aristotelian philosophy works in favour of Plato, for the translator recognizes in the latter a meta-historical project whereby transformation of governance does not respond to pragmatic laws, in other words to the ‘what is’, but to the ‘what can be’.

This particular note, which opens Georgoulis’ annotation to Book VIII, should be read in association with his note on Plato’s number of harmony (Op. cit.: 510-515). The Greek translator is heavily indebted to Adam and his analysis on the complicated equation put forth by Plato in his search of a perfect number that would guarantee some sort of harmony within fluidity. It also appears that Georgoulis studied Pappatheodorou and Pappas’ similar note on the perfect number (1936: 468-471).

Georgoulis, Pappatheodorou and Pappas reflected on the ways Plato’s discussion of the perfect number introduces a key element on the structure of the universe and the latter’s evolution in time. All three translators claim that these two questions are at the centre of
modern scientific investigation. Modern science is trying to determine whether the space within which the universe moves is limited or unlimited and whether time evolves following a straight line or in circles. Plato concluded that the world moves in circles and that time has recurrent periods.

Georgoulis elaborates further on the question of time (1962: 515) in an attempt to give credit to Plato’s epistemological claims. He argues that our understanding of the principle of entropy can only move time forward. This means that any cosmic event can only progress from the past to the future and not the other way around. However, the very principle of entropy is based on a scientific assumption and, therefore, can not hold an absolute truth. It is therefore possible, says Georgoulis using Boltzmann’s hypothesis, that once the universe has reached “thermic death”, a state where there is no thermodynamic free energy flowing (this state is also called heat death of the universe), it is possible that a reverse process may be launched.

As mentioned earlier, one of Plato’s fundamental hypotheses is the lack of stability in all things human. Inevitably, the creation of the perfect city will emerge from a set of conditions that create dissimilarities, that is, within a framework of opposite forces. This is the main reason why the perfect city is destined to fail. Georgoulis’ reading of Plato is based on the hypothesis that the decline of the city starts when its leaders fail to understand the importance of time (in this case the importance of perfect timing) within the general framework of the movement of cosmic events. Schematically speaking, Georgoulis draws a parallel between understanding the perfect number and its bearing on
the fall of the city, on the one hand, and the evolution of the universe over time as a template for the evolution of the city, on the other.

The other Greek translators of the *Republic* do not seem to pay any particular attention to the philosophical debate between Plato and Aristotle as to the classification of the various forms of government. This, however, does not mean that they ignore the issue altogether, especially as far as its connection with the corresponding human type and soul is concerned.

Intertextual analysis of all retranslations reveals the connection between the forms of government and the corresponding human type and the way each retranslation understands the connection and positions it in its corresponding culture. This analysis revolves around a set of fixed characteristics: the leader or leading class (or government); the people or those who are governed; the analogy between the father and the son; the pathology of the city; the pathology of men; the *psyche*; and, finally, the discourse of “the fall”, that is, the decline from one state to another (including the degeneration of the *psyche*).

It is not without consequence that our focus remains on Plato’s dissection of imperfect governments (what he calls “fallen governments” or *ημαρτημένες πολιτείες*). Greece’s current financial crisis is widely imputed to an underlying political pathology that has been essentially diagnosed and has evolved since the creation of the modern Greek State over 170 years ago. Twentieth-century Greek political reality offers a representative sample of changes in governments and forms of governance, of various shades and
colours, which have a striking resemblance to what Plato describes in Book VIII of the
Republic, as far as their true nature rather than their chronological sequence is concerned.
5.2.1. Memmo’s political translatory discourse

Of all the retranslations of the *Republic*, Memmos’ version (1994) could easily be branded as purely political. The text reads as an essay, in which the narrative is interrupted by minimal dialogue between the participants. The essay form reinforces the *Republic’s* value as a political treatise, whereby Plato strongly imposes his opinions on Socrates’ real (from the narration’s point of view) and perceived (from the translation’s point of view) audience.

To achieve this goal the translator undertakes a powerful transformation of the narrator’s (Socrates) rhetorical questions into factual statements. The omitted questions, which for the most part are rhetorical in nature, are intended by the author (Plato) to convey irony in the narration. The question-answer form is consistent with the Socratic Method and maintains the illusion of a dialogue which, by going beyond the exchange of platitudes such as the interlocutor’s necessary acquiescence, embraces debate and advances critical thinking. In addition, Memmos introduces a typographic innovation, that is, the use of the dialogue marks (dashes) followed by the name of the participant in each turn-taking.

A in-depth analysis of the translation reveals that the translator deliberately chose to do without Plato’s style so as to ensure that the *Republic* becomes politically more engaging and authoritative. Many discursive elements sustain this claim. All of them are developed within the framework of the fixed characteristics proposed above.

Notwithstanding the difficulties in rendering *politeia* and its multiple acceptions into Modern Greek (the word *politeia* has evolved considerably over the years and its current
signifieds are only partially overlapping), it can be assumed that Memmos reads *politeia* in the sense of polities. Polity is herein understood as a politically organized society, state or institution, and its corresponding form of government. This understanding presupposes the presence of a set of written rules, such as a Constitution, as well as political, social, legal and economic structures which stem from political conventions ascribed to the Constitution.

In Memmos’ polity, governments take various shapes and forms (τύπος/οι πολιτευμάτων – 544d) and one of the premises of political *power* (εξουσία), that is, the driving force behind governing the polity, is the existence of opposite [political] parties (αντιμαχόμενα κόμματα – 547b). Political parties are part of the polity’s founding structures reflecting *social groups* (κοινωνική ομάδα/κοινωνικές ομάδες – 544e), *authorized state or public officers* (or state/public officials) representing the people or acting on the latter’s behalf (εντεταλμένοι κρατικοί λειτουργοί – 546d); and, finally, the country’s *intellectuals* (διανοούμενοι – 547e).

Shifts from one form of government to another (μεταπολίτευση = polity or regime change) are subject to an investigation of the *social ethos* or *social ethics* of the various types of government (κοινωνική ηθική των πολιτευμάτων – 545b) followed by an analysis of the *individual ethos* or *individual ethics* of each citizen (ατομική ηθική του πολίτη – 545b) that, in turn, dictates the *moral stand* of each social group (το ήθος της κοινωνικής ομάδας – 544e) within the polity.

This schematization of the polity lays mainly on the first two pillars of the framework introduced earlier, that is, the government (leader and/or leading class) and the people
(the governed masses). More specifically, it is built upon a set of premises that assume a modern interpretation of political and social theory. First, it is understood that, with the exception of tyranny, where power is arbitrarily and forcefully imposed upon the people, all other forms of government are legitimized by the citizens in one way or another. To put it differently, the ruling class can only exert power with the consent of the ruled mass. The people’s consent suggests that a set of legal provisions, which describe, regulate and monitor attribution of political power, are complied with. In other words, we are dealing with a modern understanding of polity, which is built upon the principle of the rule of law regardless of the latter’s fairness.

Second, it is also assumed that social stratification is one of the polity’s main features. From a purely Marxist point of view, social stratification leads to class struggle as a result of conflicts of interest, hence the existence of opposite political groups (or parties) representing these conflicting interests. Marxist theory also suggests that class struggle is one of the driving forces behind regime change. In this setting, a polity’s intellectuals are to undertake a key role in instigating political change. The latter is deemed historically inevitable every time there are shifts in political and social ethics and in the citizen’s individual ethos.

Although it would be an aberration to claim that Memmos’ translational discourse introduces a purely Marxist, class-free, equal-to-all-and-for-all polity, it would be safe to argue that Memmos embraces a more Aristotelian and European Enlightenment-inspired approach to what a citizen is meant to be and to become in an organized society governed
by law. This also implies that the pathology of the city may be partly imputed to men (or at least some men) trying to place themselves above the law.

This interpretation deviates from Plato’s magistral position whereby *epikouros* (i.e., the philosopher king) incarnates the ideal of a perfect man and, by the same token, is nothing short of a wise leader. In the presence of wise leadership, human law acquires a secondary function given that, ideally, there will be no need to transgress the law. Transgression of the law stems from a faulty leadership, which in turn is a sign of corruption of the man and the city as a whole.

Memmos’ translational discourse on the pathology of men and hence that of the city is perceived within the ideological context described above. The transition from one form of government to another (that is, from aristocracy —Plato’s ideal city— to timocracy then to oligarchy then to democracy and finally to tyranny) is designated by a specific term (*μεταπολίτευση*). In Greek political discourse, *μεταπολίτευση* refers almost exclusively to the transition from the Colonels’ Regime (1967-1974) to a democratic form of government resulting in a democratically elected parliament and a new constitution, by means of which fundamental political rights are re-established and government is chosen by the people.

The choice of *μεταπολίτευση* projects the translator’s interpretation of the process of moving from one form of government to another while disrupting Plato’s mechanical/ideological flow of his various *politeies*. That is because, in modern Greek political history, dictatorships (i.e., one of tyranny’s possible manifestations) were

---

followed by a democratic regime (also known in Greece as ‘return to democratic legitimacy’) and not the other way around as suggested by Plato. Once again, Memmos does justice to Aristotle and the latter’s historical development of the evolution of governments while transposing his personal views onto his translation.

The description of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny follows a specific discursive pattern. Timocracy is described as an ambitious polity (φιλόδοξη πολιτεία – 545b) seeking victory and prices/rewards (νίκη και τιμή – 545a). One of its main features is the love of power (αρχομανία – 548c). Power is assumed not by the intellectuals, as one would expect, but by those who were born fearless (θαρραλέοι – 547e), that is, men who were born to lead wars rather than live peaceful lives. In timocracy, intellectuals are feared not because of their ability to destroy evil in polity but mainly because they are no longer considered purebreds (καθαρόαμοι – 547e).

In short, this is a mixed state made up of mixed people (an alloy of metals – κράμα [μετάλλων], σύμφυρμα – of a superior and inferior quality – 548c). Because of their mixed nature, people are rude, uneducated and incapable of expressing themselves regardless of their love for music and the art of rhetoric (θρασύς, αμόρφωτος, ανήμπορος να εκφραστεί ἕστω κι αν συμπαθεί τῇ μουσική καὶ τῇ ρητορικῇ – 548e). They display rudeness instead of disdain/disregard (σκαιότητα καὶ ὁχὶ καταφρόνια – 549a) vis-à-vis their slaves whereas they resort to mildness and flattery in their dealings with their superiors (θα συμπεριφέρεται με πραότητα η οποία θα μετατρέπεται σε δουλικότητα προς τοὺς ανωτέρους τοῦ – 549a). Politicians and military officials of a lesser value, that is, the ones resulting from the alloy described earlier, are on a quest for money and power via
dubious contracts, percentages in land acquisition and housing projects and through the accumulation of gold and silver ([...]) το ρίξαν στα λεφτά με πονηρές συμβάσεις και με ποσοστά στην αγορά γης, οικοπέδων και οικοδομών και στην αποταμίευση χρυσού και αργυρού – 547b)

In timocracy, the relation between a father and a son is mainly negotiated in the private space and is defined in terms of the balance of power within the household and the influence the spouse and domestic help exert on family matters. Memmos’ rendition of 549d-e is by far the most colourful of all known translations of this passage. The father is depicted as a peaceful, introverted man, who does not hold a public office, has little regard for money, is not interested in politics, in debates or in claiming his rights before the courts. Instead, the father from whom the timocratic son will spring is a man who goes about his life in a stoic manner (αλλά δέχεται το κάθετι με στωική υπομονή), keeps to himself (αυτοσυγκεντρώνεται) and chooses to isolate himself from the rest of the world (και από τον κόσμο αποξενώνεται). He neither appreciates nor ignores his wife (όσο για την ίδια τη γυναίκα του ούτε την εκτιμά ούτε την περιφρονεί), who keeps nagging on a daily basis (την καθημερινή της γκρίνια) belittling the father of her own son and treating him as cowardly and soulless90 (τα παράπονα της μητέρας πως ο πατέρας του είναι δειλός και άψυχος). This is because she feels pushed aside and socially inferior toward all other women (of her social status) (παραγκωνισμένη και μειωμένη απέναντι στις άλλες γυναίκες). The mother of the timocratic son keeps playing all these things in her mind, minute after minute, raving all day long (και γι’ αυτό τον κρένει ολημερίς) that the son’s

90 Here soulless should not be read in its main English acception. In Greek, it can also mean gutless and this is the way it is used by Memmos.
father is not a real man because he is useless and has no backbone (δεν είναι ἀντρας με πυγμή και δεν έχει προκοπή) (Memmos 1994: 437).

This description of the Athenian household and the relations between, on the one hand, the married couple, and, on the other hand, the couple with the offspring and the other dependents of the household (slaves) is largely inspired by Greek folklore tradition. This paragraph reads like a folklore song with its words carefully chosen from a more popular register (τα παράπονα της μάνας, συλλογιέται καθημερινά η καημένη η μάνα, κρένει ολημερίς – γκρίνια) and the occasional internal rhyme ([…] αυτοσυγκεντρόνεται και από τον κόσμο αποζευγόνεται […], […] δέχεται το κάθετι – με στοική υπομονή […], […] άντρα με πυγμή – δεν έχει προκοπή […]).

Memmos’ staging of the domestic scene is that of a Southern European or Middle Eastern household, a typical middle class family where the wife is a stay-at-home mother and the husband is the breadwinner. The imbalance of power, supposedly in favour of the male, is offset by the woman’s manipulative capacities and her hold on her offspring, especially the male one. Although Plato’s painting of the Athenian woman, in particular, and the female sex, in general, is not very flattering, Memmos’ rendition suggestively depicts, if not enhances, the actual power women traditionally exercise in societies where they are blatantly denied meaningful roles in the public arena. At the same time it provides a magnificent word-painting of a typical Mediterranean mother hen, by implicitly portraying her psychological profile and by inferring the power of the Oedipus syndrome. Finally, it delivers an astute sociological analysis of the couple’s dynamic.
Following the example of timocracy, oligarchy is outlined in terms of wealth and the subsequent division of citizens in two opposite camps: the rich and the poor. The former are allowed access to power on the basis of their income, one of the criteria for holding public offices, whereas the latter cannot participate in politics due to lack of financial means. Oligarchy’s corrosion (διάβρωση – 550d-e) is rooted in the accumulation of wealth (capital) (συσσώρευση πλούτου (κεφαλαίου) – 550e-d) in the hands of few individuals (ιδιώτες). Wealthy individuals, that is, φιλοχρήματοι (true misers– 551a), hungry for money, readily acknowledge (look up to) a rich citizen and promote him to the upper echelons of power ([…] καταντούν να γίνουν φιλοχρήματοι και μάλιστα αχόρταγοι, και με ευκολία αναγνωρίζουν, επαινούν και προωθούν στα ανώτερα αξιώματα της πολιτείας τον πλούσιο […] – 551a) while dishonouring the poor.

In an oligarchic polity, segregation of citizens on the basis of wealth⁹¹ inevitably results in the formation of two opposite [social] classes. Although these two classes inhabit the same city and coexist in the polity, they covet each other and the clash soon becomes inevitable (Και ενώ κατοικούν και συνυπάρχουν στην ίδια πολιτεία, η κάθε μια επιβουλεύεται την άλλη και η σύγκρουση των τάξεων αρχίζει να προβάλλει – 551d).

Once again the rhetoric of social struggle takes centre stage in Memmos’ translation. Gold and silver are perceived in the extended sense of wealth, which, in turn, embodies the concept of capital. The latter is inevitably associated with profit ([…] και ερευνά πώς το μικρότερο κεφάλαιο θα αποκτήσει το μεγαλύτερο δυνατό κέρδος – [and it is looking for ways to make the biggest profit out of the smallest capital] […] – 553d) and the creation

⁹¹ It should be noted that Memmos does not use the word gold, which he replaces consistently by wealth and its derivatives.
of private property (ιδιωτική περιουσία) as opposed to public property. Accumulated private property, that is, excessive wealth or huge capital, leads to the formation of a special social class, the plutocrats (or plutocracy) (πλουτοκράτες/πλουτοκρατία). The latter are so entrapped in their quest for money that they are oblivious to the suffering of the paupers (φτωχολογιά).

Poverty as a result of the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few has severe social consequences. The presence of several pathological types of men, such as beggars (ζητιάνοι), thieves (κλέφτες), crooks (λωποδύτες), impious men (ιερόσυλοι) and other instigators of scandals and similar evils (πρωτεργάτες παρόμοιων σκανδάλων και συμφορών) is suggestive of the polity’s pathology. All these pathological types are the product of the corrupted society stemming from extreme social and financial inequalities.

Memmos’ description of the oligarchic polity sets the scene in Greece’s working-class neighbourhoods. There is the aroma of animated political discussions held in factories and other formal (unions) or less formal (friend and neighbour groupings) forums about class identification and social awareness with a view to improving one’s situation and promoting better working conditions and standards of living for the struggling working class.

For that purpose, certain words are carefully chosen by Memmos to work as qualifiers within the text. Consequently, plutocracy (πλουτοκρατία) automatically limits the semantic spectrum of wealth to capital and refers instantly to those who hold excessive capital, that is, the plutocrats (πλουτοκράτες). Seen from the point of view of the capitalistic ideology, the presence of the ‘haves’ suggests the existence of the ‘have-nots’.
This means that plutocrats owe their existence to paupers (φτωχολογιά), whereas the latter are entitled to blame the former for their pauperization (φτωχοποίηση).\(^92\)

Interestingly enough, the words πλουτοκρατία (plutocracy) and φτωχολογία (phtohologia – the paupers) carry a particular semantic load. For several decades now, they have been part of the official political discourse of the Communist Party of Greece and are used primarily to promote the party’s official doctrine. This doctrine can schematically be summarized as follows: capital and plutocracy are the enemy of the working class (εργατιά) hence the enemy of the people; workers should resist any oppression coming from the plutocrats simply because they are ‘blood seekers’; people’s primary concern ought to be the recognition of their rights; the only means morally and practically acceptable to achieving this goal is an open confrontation with capital and its supporting structures, that is, all post-dictatorship governments. Regime change can only come through the struggle of classes and their inevitable clash.\(^93\)

\(^92\) Memmos’ choice of terms to designate the processes of pauperization is particularly instructive. The biggest evil in an oligarchic polity is the large indebtedness of its citizens as a result of borrowing (δανεισμός) money via onerous contracts (επαχθέοις όροι δανεισμού), which impose heavy conditions such as the of one’s personal property as collateral (υποθήκευση της ατομικής τους περιουσίας) and outrageous interest rates (τοκογλυφία – τοκογλύφοι [loan-sharking-loan-sharks]).

\(^93\) In the Greek Communist Party dialect, working-class is a generic term referring not only to workers (such as factory workers) but to all categories of employees, that is, all working men and women who are exploited by the plutocracy and, therefore, have no negotiating power on matters pertaining to production processes and distribution of wealth. The words πλουτοκρατία and φτωχολογία are negatively connoted in Modern Greek. The Greek Communist Party discourse sounds very anachronistic and utterly utopian, especially after the historical experience gained from the collapse of most of the Communist regimes worldwide. Memmos’ decision to use these two words creates an intratextual discrepancy at one level while demonstrating intratextual consistency at another. This is happening at the level of the horizontal shifts discussed earlier. Memmos’ translational discourse is consistent with a leftist political affiliation and is consistent throughout his translation. However, his translational discourse is inconsistent with the views the translator advances in his paratext. For instance, Memmos openly opposes Popper’s interpretation of the Republic, especially on the issues of equality. His understanding of equality projects a non-socialist interpretation in the extent that not all people should have equal access to all offices or positions (within government). Memmos is in favour of meritocracy, thus objecting to the idea that all men are created absolutely equal on all levels.
As far as democracy in concerned, Memmos’ translational discourse is built around the idea of the disease and, by extension, the pathology of men and the polity at large. Democracy’s depiction as a pathological state of affairs is gradually built via the use of the medical metaphor. The younger generation is made up of fat, lazy⁹⁴ young men (μαλθακοί) (λιπόσαρκοι)⁹⁵. Their bodies are weak and sickly, prone to infection and disease brought upon by an external cause ([…]) πως αν το ανθρώπινο σώμα είναι ασθενικό και καχεκτικό, με την παραμικρή εξωτερική αφορμή μπορεί να μολυνθεί και να αρρωστήσει – 556d-e).

The medical metaphor is gradually transposed onto the question of equality before the law via the idea of splurging (on all possible levels such as food, sex, and other pleasures). In order to denounce the absence of meritocracy in a democratic polity, Memmos uses an exaggerated description of a feast made up of highly elaborate foods (μεγάλη ποικιλία φαγητών με πολλά καρυκεύματα και αλλόκοτα παρασκευάσματα [a great variety of spicy foods and weird concoctions] – 559b-c). In this state of libertinism, holding public office is not a matter of having the necessary qualifications (απαραίτητα προσόντα – 557e) as well as the ability to carry on the associated duties (απαιτούμενη ικανότητα – 557e). Access to power and public offices is a right given equally to all citizens regardless of their suitability. It resembles an all-you-can-eat buffet where power lover can find the perfect outlet to appease their gargantuan appetite for authority.

---

⁹⁴ A colourful modern term for it would be ‘binge’ given the reference made by Plato to splurging.
⁹⁵ The word λιπόσαρκοι refers by association to the word λιποβαρής, a medical term to designated premature underweight babies at birth or anyone weighting less than his or her medically acceptable normal weight.
Finally, the discourse on tyranny revolves around three major axes. The first is political and develops around one particular human type: the demagogue or rabble-rouser or populist. The second is social and deals with the faults of the squanderer and the slacker. The third is financial and discusses measures positing a modern understanding of the basic principles of economics.

In tyranny, the demagogue leader’s popularity resides mainly in practices benefiting the poor. Regardless of the reasons that lead to poverty (Plato suggests that, for an individual, poverty comes from poor management of one’s property due to lack of self-discipline, excessive spending, and heavy borrowing), the demagogue’s solution is to capture the masses in order to legitimize his usurped power through redistribution of wealth. This is achieved mainly via suspending due payments and interest rates ([…] ἡ δὲ δίνει εἰλπίδες καὶ δὲν αναστέλλει τῆς πληρωμῆς χρεών καὶ τόκων; […] – 566e, απόσβεση χρεών – 566a), by confiscating and communalizing private land in order to redistribute it to farmers ([…] αναδιανομή γαιών […] 566a, […] ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γεωργοὺς, στοὺς ὁποίους μὲ αναδιανομές χωρίζει ακόμη καὶ χωράφια; […]); and, finally, by overtaxing the rich until they become poor and unable to conspire against the tyrant ([…] μὲ βαριά φορολογία, μὲ σκοπὸ να εξασθενήσει οἰκονομικά τοὺς πλούσιους πολίτες μέχρι να καταντήσουν φτωχοί καὶ ανήμποροι να συνωμοτήσουν εναντίον του – 567a).

On the social level, the pathological human type of squanderer and slacker is the result of excessive freedom within a democratic polity. Therefore he is consistently associated with the drone. The metaphor of the drone was introduced earlier by Plato to describe the democratic polity and is further developed in timocracy. Drones live at the expense of the
most valuable elements of the society (Αυτήν, νομίζω, απομυζούν οι κηφήνες σαν την κερήθρα και απ’ αυτήν τρυγούν με ευκολία το πιο πολύ μέλι [This is the one, I believe, the drones are easily sucking all the honey from as if they were in a honeybee – 564e]). They are the ones regulating the democratic regime; their actions provoke the reaction of the haves who vehemently oppose any confiscation of their property for the benefit of the demos.

Drones incarnate the pathology of men and that of the democratic society at large: their spirit is uneducated (απαίδευτο), atrophic (ατροφικό) and slow (νωθρό). The most evil elements of the drone clan, that is, the ones carrying the sting, use the parliament (βουλή) as a platform to advance their agenda by silencing all dissident voices (opinions) (αποστομώνουν όποιον έχει αντίθετη γνώμη – 564e) and by befuddling the people (αποπροσανατολίζουν το λαό – 564e). Dissident opinions, voiced by those who feel threatened before massive communization of mobile and immobile property, are labeled as reactionaries (αντιδραστικοί). Reactionaries are usually accused of planning to reverse (or overthrow) democracy and reinstate oligarchy ([…] στοχεύουν στην ανατροπή της δημοκρατίας και στην παλινόρθωση της ολιγαρχίας […] – 565b).

These are all the necessary ingredients for a new social clash. The only difference between this clash and the one described earlier is that, in a democratic polity, there are three different classes involved: the class of the drones, which is thirsty for power and public offices; the class of the nobles, that is, a class made up of individuals who love to work, know how to save money and are extremely wealthy; and, finally, the lower class made up of technites (manual workers) indifferent to politics since they are more
preoccupied in making ends meet ([…]) ποιν μόλις κατορθώνουν να ζουν με τα λίγα που κερδίζουν […] – 565a).

In this political setting, the third class is prone to seeking security and comfort in a demagogue who will embody the saviour of the people, ensure economic prosperity for the have-nots and provide them with power and support. Naturally, these cheap promises (φτηνές υποσχέσεις – 566e) are consistent with a populist (λαϊκισμό) approach to politics. Once empowered by the people, the demagogue-tyrant will utilize measures to eliminate opposition, both within his own entourage and beyond that, via outlawing, suspending from the party or decapitating his political enemies in order to reinforce his grip onto power.

Once again, it becomes quite obvious that Memmos’ translatory project is to propose an politically-oriented reading of the Republic. As suggested earlier, his whole project presupposes a modern interpretation of political phenomena which have a diachronic value. I therefore argue that Memmos’ leftist-inspired reading of the evolution of polities from grace to disgrace is in agreement with the political discourse of the time in which the translation was produced. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, the Andreas Papandreou socialist government had already been in power for over eight years (well into its second term of office) and had therefore contributed to establishing and sustaining a specific political culture centred around a particular citizen-type, that is the popular man, and by extension the populist man. The second type, which is neither completely associated with nor completely dissociated from the first type, embodies the user and consumer of “populist”-branded products, namely the ones prepared and promoted in the
context of Greece’s post-dictatorship cultural politics that shaped the so-called popular identity of the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Sofos claims that, although Greece’s popular identity should not be equated exclusively with the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the latter’s ascent to power triggered an inflationary creation of symbols associated with popular identity. These symbols formed a set of discursive identities and blank banners, which were not party-specific but were symbols of belonging to a well-defined community of men. The community is outlined not only thanks to the commonalities shared by its members but mainly by all the features that differentiate this community from other communities.

One of PASOK’s ideological pillars was the possibility of allowing the people (λαός) to take centre stage in the political arena. From the point of view of its political ideology, what PASOK originally understood by people (λαός) was a community of “progressive anti-imperialists”, who were long denied the right to express themselves by using alternative interpretative codes. (Sofos: 133, 135, in Demertzis ed. 2000)

Populism being one of the modalities of constructing a popular identity, it was equally important to define the enemy of this identity. In other words, if one were to understand who the people were, one should have to identify first the enemy of the people. In the post-dictatorship era, the enemy of the people was, among other things, numerous abstract social categories: the status quo, the evil West, several monopolies, a purely capitalistic society, etc.96

96 In market economics terms, a capitalistic society opposes any form of monopoly. Although these two ideas seem contradictory, they coexisted in the ideological imaginary of the time.
The populist discourse was soon transformed from a dominant to an official discourse which impregnated everyday utterances thus filtering reality through its corrective lenses. It would be difficult for Memmos’ translational discourse to ignore or to escape the dominant political and cultural discourse of its time, especially if the translator were to make its work legible (i.e., accessible) to its readership.

In the 1980s and the 1990s, the people were portrayed as a politically-conscious community of men and women, fully aware of the influence Great Powers (mainly powerful countries of the West, such as the USA, with their robust economies and their potent military) had been exercising in the country for decades and of the price the Greek people paid as far as its political and territorial sovereignty were involved.

The enemy of the people was the a-political type (cf. the politically uneducated, atrophic and slow man), indifferent to the exploitation of the workers by the “big capital” (το μεγάλο κεφάλαιο), that is, plutocracy and the latter’s ultimate goal: pauperization of the masses in the name of excessive wealth. The rhetoric of pauperization and plutocracy rhymed almost infallibly with a popular conspiracy theory whereby the forces of the West, labeled under the obscure name of “foreign decision-making centres” (ξένα κέντρα αποφάσεων), were coveting Greece and the Greek people from a financial, political but mainly territorial standpoint.
5.2.2. Georgoulis’ holistic translatory discourse

It was suggested earlier that Georgoulis’ version of the Republic in Modern Greek (1962) put forth a holistic approach to Plato’s work. It was also argued that, in his paratext, Georgoulis dealt comprehensively with all major issues developed in the Republic, namely the connection between perception (in general and sensory perception in particular) and logos; the importance of consciousness and unconsciousness in approaching and analyzing the psyche; the link between polis and the citizen examined under the scope of justice, hegemony, and eugenics; Plato’s understanding of justice as an ontological concept (cf. divine justice) and not a human invention and its association with the noetic world; Plato’s theory of Forms; the understanding of the ousia/periousia couple from the point of view of the survival of polis and its citizens; and, finally, the importance of conceiving Plato’s aporia in the context of the philosopher’s real and theoretical concerns for the loss of normalcy and stability in known polities.

One of the key discussions with regard to Georgoulis’ version was the use of Modern Greek as a vehicle for introducing the Republic to his readership. It was demonstrated that Georgoulis had resorted to a mixed language to ensure nuances were fully conveyed in the target language. There is no doubt that Georgoulis was a proponent of Modern Greek and language reform in general. There is, however, evidence that his position vis-à-vis the educational reform via a language reform was not so clear-cut.

Once again, the retranslations’ paratext becomes a valuable source of information. In one of his footnotes referring to Book VIII (pp. 1270-1271), Mavropoulos expresses his deepest gratitude to Georgoulis for his translation and its exegetical annotations. This
gratitude is nevertheless shadowed by Georgoulis’ vehement opposition to the 1964 educational reform.

In Greek parliamentary history, Law 4379 is known as “The Papandreou-Papanoutsou Reform Bill”. It introduced, among other things, _demotiki_ as the language of instruction to be used exclusively in primary schools thus abolishing _katharevoussa_ at the primary level of Greece’s educational system. Additionally, the Bill stipulated that, at the Junior High level, the Classics would be taught not in the original but from translation, more precisely in versions approved for their literary and philosophical value. School manuals would include both the original and the translation in apposition to guarantee that pupils were ultimately acquainted with the Attic dialect.

Given the spirit of the reform, Mavropoulos does not conceal his disappointment for Georgoulis’ rejection of the 1964 Bill. Georgoulis opposed the pupils’ introduction to the Classics via translated texts, regardless of the fact that these translations were tailored to use a “mixed language” so as to be acceptable from a literary and philosophical perspective.

Varmazis and Giannou suggest that the 1964 reform, which never came into effect because it was suspended by the 1967 coup d’état, managed to legitimize one of the modern Greek state’s fundamental myths and expectations, that is, a purely “urban educational reform” within the lines set out by Harilaos Trikoupis in 1889. This was an important accomplishment in so far as it established a political philosophy whereby
educational matters followed a diachronic pattern of problem identification and problem solving regardless of the social and economic setting in which they emerged.\(^7\)

This perception of the educational system’s expectations, goals, and objectives dominated political and academic debates throughout the 20\(^{th}\) century. Varmazis claims that all related measures were dictated by this philosophy. I tend to disagree with Varmazis’ view simply on the evidence that, in modern Greek history, there were almost as many educational or \textit{quasi} educational reforms as governments which came to power.

In my view, the number of educational reforms introduced so far speaks volumes of the country’s malaise in coming to a consensus on what the educational system should be and what its ultimate goals are. This may be partly due to the fact that Greece’s urbanization did not follow the same pattern as other European countries. Consequently, seeking to establish an urban-oriented educational system using the European or international experience was one of the many reasons all educational reforms failed. The only diachronic element present in the educational bills known to date is the perceived benefits of a classical education with or without translation.

Mavropoulos’ testimony is extremely valuable because it allows us to better understand and, for that matter, interpret Georgoulis’ translational choices. One noticeable difference between Georgoulis and Memmos is their respective understanding of justice. Earlier we concluded that Memmos perceives law and justice within its human dimensions, that is, in the context of the rule of law. Georgoulis for his part remains faithful to Plato’s

\(^{7}\) See N. Varmazis and T. Giannou at: \url{http://www.greeklanguage.gr/greekLang/ancient_greek/education/translation/handbook_interlingual/page_003.html}, (Last accessed on April 1, 2011)
approach to justice and law as ontological concepts of divine inspiration. This explains
his preference for the more polyvalent term politeia when describing the four types of
cities and governments Plato puts under the microscope. What Memmos calls polity and
government (πολίτευμα καὶ διακυβέρνησις – 544d), in Georgoulis becomes politeia and a
theory of politeies (or political theory). Terminological and discursive choices reveal the
translator’s philosophical position: in Plato’s analysis of the various types of politeies
there are no political parties or social groups, only types of men (είδη κατασκευής
ανθρώπων – 544e) which correspond to certain types of politeies (πολιτείες – 544e). In
total, there are five types of formation of an individual’s soul; the underlying structure of
their creation is morality (ήθη).

The transition from one politeia to another is not processed through μεταπολίτευση
(regime change), ανατροπή (overthrow) or παλινδρόμηση (reinstatement) but in terms of
a less violent, more subtle and more mechanical (thus more permanent) transition from a
state of grace to a state of disgrace. This devolution is operated gradually from αλλαγή
(change – 545d) to μετάπτωσις (fall, 547c-d, 553a-b, 563e) and is occasionally interrupted
by phenomena such as επανάστασις (revolution – 555e) and κλονισμός (reversal – 545d).

Georgoulis’ choice of words suggests that he embraces Plato’s concept of a mechanical,
non historical necessity to change politeies, rather than Aristotle’s causal movement from
one form of government to another. Georgoulis’ lengthy footnote on Plato’s perfect
number is part of the translator’s discursive strategy to prove that politeies, in their
evolutionary trajectory, are entities integrated within the universe. In this sense, they are
subjected to the same movement the universe is supposed to follow and are destined to
emerge, rise, and fall.
In this translation, the depiction of every single *politeia* aims at disclosing the Form behind each *polis*. In other words, Georgoulis follows in Plato’s footsteps by trying to uncover the *ideas* which are at the source of understanding material things, namely, the essence of every object (including the human being).

By asking the question of “What is?” in a slightly modified way, namely “Isn’t it true that [this or the other *politeia*] is [followed by a description of the state of the *polis*]...?”, Plato does not simply introduce a rhetorical question. He goes beyond *aporia* to express his profound concern for the loss of normalcy and stability in all *politeies* known to him. The analysis that follows every rhetorical question is a penetrating exposé of the pathology of men and their city. Georgoulis is aware of the importance of the role the so-called rhetorical questions assume in the *Republic*. By maintaining the form and narrative function of the rhetorical questions, Georgoulis highlights the moral component of Plato’s analysis while introducing a powerful discourse on morality.

Morality is to be understood in the sense of *ethos* and more particularly as the sum of values which ensure stability and normalcy of the human *psyche*, the man in the city, *politeia* (i.e., the perfect *politeia*) and the universe at large. In Georgoulis’ translation, things frequently present themselves in pairs (*δύο, διπλός, διττός* – two, double, dual) to denote the good and the bad, the ethical and the unethical, the acceptable and the unacceptable.

Wise men (549a-b), known to be able to judge things correctly in any subject matter (*σωστή κρίσις στο θέμα* – 545c) became, at some point, unable to mobilize effectively their intuition and intelligence/common sense (*αίσθηση και λογισμός [logos] – 546b*) to
determine the most appropriate time for procreation [eugenics] ([…] να βοηθήσουν το λογισμό τους με την αίσθηση να διακρίνουν καθόλου καλύτερα τον καιρό της ευγονίας από τον καιρό της αφορίας – 546b). This failure launched a series of falls from one defective type of man and politeia to another more defective type.

The emergence of a mixed type of man is primarily a problem occurring at the level of the psyche. This is where one of Georgoulis’ fundamental innovations in his translation comes into play: the psyche takes a primary role in understanding men and the city. This is because psyche is the ousia of man: it represents the sum of each human type of properties (periousia), which, in their own right, determine the human type’s qualities or lack thereof. Consequently, Georgoulis’ translational discourse posits an ontological reading of the Republic.

Accordingly, the wise man (in his purest or less pure state) is equipped with a ‘rich soul’ that leads to virtue and the archetypal state of things, which only the perfect politeia can embody ([…] δεν είχαν μέσα στην ψυχή τους φτώχεια αλλά πλούτη οδήγησαν προς την αρετή και της παλαιά κατάσταση […] – 547c). His mission as a leader is to create the conditions where children will have the best physical predisposition possible ([…] παιδιά με καλή φυσική προδιάθεση […] – 564d).

One of the many features of the wise man is his perfect education (paideia – παιδεία ή άρτια παίδευση – 548e ή ευπαιδευσία – 560e). In a less perfect society, the missing link refers once again to educational matters and is personified in the Guardian ([…] ποιος είναι αυτός ο φύλακας; Ο λόγος συγκερασμένος με τη μουσική/ Who is this guardian? It is logos coupled with music […] – 549d).
The greater enemy of *paideia* is the absence of *paideia* (*απαιδευσία* – 552d), inadequate upbringing and poor organization of the *politeia*. Almost every concept in Georgoulis works in opposite pairs as in the case of oligarchy, when one can find two *poleis* instead of one: the first is occupied by the poor whereas the second is inhabited by the rich. They both share the same space and are planning ways to eliminate (eradicate) each other ([…]

*το ὅτι εξ’ ανάγκης μια τέτοια πόλη δεν θα είναι ενιαία αλλά θ’ αποτελείται από δύο πόλεις, τη μία θα την αποτελούν οι πένητες και την άλλη οι πλούσιοι, ζώντας στο ίδιο μέρος και σχεδιάζοντας η μία τάξη τον εξολοθρευμό της άλλης [ … and by necessity a polis like this one will not be united; instead there will be two poleis, one made by the poor and the other made by the rich, sharing the same space and planning to eliminate one another […]} – 551d).

The simile of the two separate *poleis* within the same territorial space (*polis*) is quite different from the class struggle metaphor Memmos uses in his translation. Georgoulis also uses *class* to denote two opposite *gene* (*γένη*-groups), namely the poor and the rich. Nevertheless his reference to two distinctive *poleis* implies an impossibility of ever bridging the gap that separates the two sides. The *poleis* within the *polis* simile presupposes the existence of two different universes that will never meet but are aware of one another’s existence and are fighting for survival via annexation.

In Georgoulis’ version, the discourse on morality is a discourse on conduct: there is the way men lead their lives (conduct of the individual) and the way *politeies* organize their existence, choose their government, and structure their political and social life (conduct of the polity). The fall from aristocracy to timocracy is attributed to dissension and the creation of unworthy men (mixed children) born during the so-called period of *aphoria*. 
In timocracy there are disparities (ανομοιότητα – 547a) and inappropriate anomaly (ανάρμοστη ανωμαλία – 547a). Disparities lead to war (πόλεμος – 547a) and enmity (έχθρα – 547a) manifested through hostilities (βιαιοπραγίες – 547a) and conflicts (αντιμαχίες – 547a).

As far as the administration of the timocratic politeia is concerned, Plato stresses the corrupted polity’s fear of electing wise men to power (547e). This is because the so-called fallen politeia (ημαρτημένη πολιτεία) is impure by nature and does not have a “positive composition” (θετική σύσταση – 547e). All state affairs evolve around military machinations and stratagems (πολεμικοὺς δόλους καὶ πολεμικὰ στρατηγήματα). This explain why this polis is poorly organized (πόλη ἁσχημα ὀργανωμένη – 590c). The prevailing atmosphere in timocracy is one of darkness and secretiveness: money is accumulated in obscure ways (με τρόπο ὧν φανερῶ – 548b); fortunes are hidden in secret nests (φωλιά – 548b).

The description of the pathology of men follows the same discursive pattern as the one used in the pathology of the city. Citizens, in general, and the leading class, in particular, are rude and less educated than the Guardians of the ideal city (αυθάδεια/λιγότερη μόρφωση – 548e). The new leaders are naturally attracted to education but have no rhetorical capabilities (καμία ρητορική δεξιότητα – 548e). There is rudeness in free citizens’ dealings with the slaves (instead of disregard) and humbleness (ταπεινότητα) in their interaction with those in power. This is one of many signs suggesting that the human soul (psyche) is besieged by a great deal of love for power that, in turn, leads to taking over authority (κατάληψη αρχῆς). As in the case of the timocratic city, where impurity is
the result of gene mixture, the timocratic greedy man does not possess pure virtue (virtues) (χωρίς καθαρή αρετή – 549b).

The relation between the father and the son is only partly influenced by the presence of the mother and the grip the extensive family has on the sibling. In Georgoulis’ rendition, the scene of the frustrated mother/wife complaining to her son of all the wrongdoings of her indifferent husband is less impressive than in Memmos. Here there is no eloquent narration that would take us into another time or place. More importantly, though, the role of the woman/mother becomes less effective. Once again the narrative is a tale of morality and soul-searching (ο νους του είναι στραμμένος στον εαυτό του [his mind is focused on himself] – 549d) and is centered on the essence of human nature (η φύση του [του γιου] δεν έρχεται από κακό άνθρωπο – [his nature [the nature of the son] does not come from a bad man] – 550b).

The fall from timocracy to oligarchy is based on yet another opposite pair: a frantic search for money (μανία του χρηματισμού – 550e) vs. total disregard for virtue (ανυποληψία για την αρετή). The abandonment of virtue accounts for politeia’s faults and shortcomings (σφάλματα – 551b/ ελαττώματα – 551e-d). Financial inequalities generate a variety of pathological man types such as κλέφτες (thieves), βαλαντιοτόμοι (pickpockets), ιερόσυλοι (profane), αριστοτέχνες όλων των παράνομων εγκλημάτων (artists of all illegal crimes), ζητιάνοι (beggars), etc.

The pathology of the city lies within what Plato considers an erroneous precondition for the existence of the polity, that is, money as a prerequisite to holding public office. One could argue that well-off public officers would be less inclined to appropriate public
funds for their personal benefit. Equally, Ioannis Skouteropoulos raises the issue of public servants receiving fair compensation for their services. He argues that adequate pay guarantees respectable standards of leaving for public officers thus deterring them from committing financial crimes through appropriation of public funds. Notwithstanding Plato’s optimism on the possibility for a perfect city to ever materialize, the philosopher remains realistic when it comes to his expectations of mankind. His profound knowledge of human nature tells him that greed remains one of the stronger properties of the soul.

The metaphor of the ship governed by the richest but not the fittest (ἐστοι κι αν ἡξαρε καλότερα την κυβερνητική τέχνη [even if he mastered the art of governing/sailing/better] – 551c) is followed by the simile of the soul as a throne that, in the timocratic man, is occupied by the appetitive part of his soul ([…] αντός βάζει να στρογγυλοκαθίσει μέσα στο θρόνο της ψυχής των το επιθυμητικό […] [the throne of his soul is grossly taken over by the appetitive part of the soul […] – 553b). This particular type of man takes great pride in and enormous satisfaction from the possession of money and all things contributing to the growth of his personal property. The second simile leads once again to a third simile, namely that of the two-faced drone: the first is dangerous because it carries a sting whereas the other resembles parasites (the wretched). In Geogoulis’ translation, Plato’s preference for opposites to define the essence (ousia) of things as well as the human being is associated with periousia. At the textual level, Geogoulis’ references to periousia understood as material property are closely followed by a qualifier (noun or adjective) referring to a quality or virtue, thus invoking periousia’s second acception as a property of human nature and, by extension, a property (or properties) of the soul.
Georgoulis’ discursive pattern remains intact throughout Plato’s depiction of democracy and tyranny. The more deeply the narrative penetrates into the reasons of the devolution of the *polis* and the man in the *polis*, the more its expressional means intensify and the stronger they tighten around the idea of the soul, the importance of mental health (*ψυχική νυξία* – 571d), wisdom or wiseness (*σωφροσύνη* – 571d), as well as the consequences of mental disorders due to an imbalance occurring at the so-called logical part of the soul; this imbalance could ultimately lead to madness (*φρενοπάθεια* – 573c-d).

Thanks to his simple, concise, and unpretending style, Georgoulis manages to capture, more than any other translator of his generation, the complexity of Plato’s *Republic* and the interconnectivity of its constituent parts. The translated text constantly invokes the paratext while referring to its numerous lengthy notes that shed light on key philosophical questions. Given the absence of any obvious discrepancies between Georgoulis’ paratext and his translation, it is safe to assume that they were both written with a view to completing each other. This also explains the popularity of Georgoulis’ commentary among Greek philologists. As a matter of fact, Georgoulis’ paratext of the *Republic* has outlived its corresponding translation thanks to its academic and exegetical value.

Finally, the translator’s stance toward the 1964 linguistic reform could be examined within the following lines. First, we need to keep in mind that Georgoulis took an active part in the debate in a dual capacity: first, as a philologist and translator of the Classics; and second, in his capacity as a former Secretary General of the Ministry of Education.98

---

98 For an in-depth analysis of the 1964 educational bill and the reactions it created, see Malalia and Tsibouka, *Αντιδράσεις στην εκπαιδευτική μεταρρύθμιση του 1964* (Available at www.media.uoa.gr/lectures/.../docs/02_malahia_tsibouka.doc). For the purpose of their study, the authors compiled a series of articles, most of which were authored by Georgoulis, published in
As mentioned earlier, Georgoulis was vehemently opposed to the 1964 bill. His arguments in favour of *katharevoussa*, thus against the introduction of *demotiki* in primary education, revolves around two major axes. The first relates to the value of classical education, hence the importance of maintaining Ancient Greek in the curricula. This was argued from the point of view of language continuity and the untranslatability of the Classics. The second is purely political and equates language choices to real or perceived ideological shifts in Greek politics.

The first part of Georgoulis’ argument is both predictable and surprising. In his capacity as a philologist and an exegetist of the Classics, especially classical philosophy, Georgoulis had a hard time accepting an educational system whereby the Classics were reduced to being studied in translation. To make matters worse, any translation in *demotiki* would be an additional betrayal of the letter and the spirit of Ancient classical literature. The element of surprise in this debate is Georgoulis’ alignment with the *tradutore traditore* dogma. Georgoulis was an experienced translator of classical literature and had frequently argued for making the Classics accessible to modern readers, which is why he produced his own version of the *Republic*.

The second axis of Georgoulis’ argument against *demotiki* is purely ideological, that is, political. Those who opposed the 1964 educational reform exploited the alleged communist threat. Georgoulis and others maintained that the introduction of *demotiki* as a preferred language of the educational system was a means for promoting communist

*Kathimerini*, a national distribution newspaper, known for promoting conservative views. (Last accessed: Thursday, April 21, 2011)
ideology. Consequently, *demotiki* was a dangerous device in the hands of the communist propaganda aimed at distancing the Greek people from their Hellenic-Christian heritage.
5.2.3. N. Skouteropoulos’ philosophical and academic translatory discourse

Our earlier analysis of the Republic’s paratext in Nikolaos Skouteropoulos’ version (2002) demonstrated the translator’s hermeneutical approach to Plato’s work. This approach translated into an academic and philosophical discourse on the Greek philosopher, his work in general and the translation of the Republic in particular. Additionally, it was maintained that one of the main difficulties in the Republic was the way Plato distanced himself from the readers. Various obstacles were inserted in the narration to build this gap; they materialized in ironic turns, sarcastic comments and swift *qui pro quos*, half of which were serious, whereas half of which were playful.

It was also shown that the Republic was the most important non-aporetic work in which Plato finally gave binding solutions to all stated theoretical problems. Contrary to the book’s main title, these solutions were ethical rather than political. The Republic’s central theme according to Skouteroupolos is the question of Good in its ontological dimension and as a life-long process of completion gained through maturity, experience and, most importantly, education.

Based on this conjecture, namely that Good is an ontological issue and it therefore embraces the whole world and every meaning there is to it, Skouteropoulos proposes to read the Republic as an open-ended text, whereby Good is not necessarily related to governance or specific types of government or linked to this or this other educational system.

Skouteropoulos is more inclined to understand the Republic and its central investigation (the essence of Good) in meta-ontological terms. More specifically, the real question is
not what is *good* for any given polity and for men in the polity but what is *good* in itself. Asking this question automatically means accepting the existence and the absence of Good which, in turn, means viewing the existence or absence of Good from a particular conceptual framework which allows for a question like this to be asked in the first place.

By producing an open-ended text, Plato achieves two goals: the first is to allow all possible interpretations of Good, thus opening the semantic spectrum of the *idea* of Good, whereas the second is to readjust the conceptual framework within which the question is asked. The second possibility acquires an additional significance in the case of translation. A proclaimed open-ended text has the potential to become a text whereby every ontological posit, as are the questions of “What is Good? or “What is Good for…?”", is being brought to date to accommodate new or different conceptual frameworks.

As far as Skouteropoulos’ translation is concerned, textual analysis can no longer follow the exact pattern used earlier (namely the analogies between the leading class and the people; the father and the son; the pathology of city and the pathology of men; the *psyche* and the fall). This is because the platonic system is not really concerned with the pathology itself, the way it is manifested and the reasons behind it. The etiology of the fall as a sign of the pathology of the polity and men in the polity is important only insofar as it allows us to ask the ontological questions regarding good and bad in the universe and answer them successfully, that is, in a way that embraces all possible levels of understanding of their *ousia*. 
Seen from this point of view, Skouteropoulos’ discourse does not highlight the transition from one *fallen politeia* to its more degenerate state. Contrary to Memmos, but in line with Georgoulis, the devolution from one form of government to the next is marked in more neutral terms such as change in the polity (*πολιτειακή μεταβολή* – 545d), general change (*αλλαγή* - 547d, 553e), ‘what comes next in line’ (*πον ἐρχεται αμέσως μετά στη σειρά* – 550c), transition (*μετάβαση* – 550e, 555b) or ‘sure transition’ (*σίγουρη μετάβαση* – 553e), origin/originated from (*προέλευση* [...] *ότι προέρχεται* [...] – 562a), etc.

Occasionally, there are references to the fall (*μετάπτωση* - 553) or the overthrow (*ανατροπή* – 562c) of a government, but these occurrences are not significant from a quantitative point of view and have no serious discursive weight.

The effect produced by the use of a more dispassionate terminology helps support Skouteropoulos’ theory regarding, first, the distance Plato keeps from his readers and, second, and most important, the need to demystify the misery of going from a bad to a worse polity. The so-called *fallen polities* have disadvantages (*μειονεκτήματα* – 544a), (*αρνητικά γνωρίσματα* – 544c), which will inevitably bring about their dissolution and distraction. Their major shortcoming is their lack of homogeneity and their inappropriate abnormality (547a). These two terms (*ανομοιογένεια, ανωμαλία ανάρμοστη*) were already used by Georgoulis in his holistic rendition of the *Republic*. They refer to *gene/γένη* and more specifically their essence, thus transposing the element of *periousia* (let us not forget that Plato discusses Hesiod’s categories of gold, silver, and bronze) to a meta-ontological level, namely the *idea* or *ousia* of normalcy and homogeneity and its generalized application in order to avoid worrying any more about *lost souls* or *fallen politeies*.
By the same token, the types of politeies and their corresponding men are no longer types. The word type suggests a collective body of individuals or things. Skouteropoulos replaces τύπος (type) by χαρακτηριστικά (characteristics) and γνωρίσματα (attributes) thus moving from a generic to a loftier (cf. academic) and more philosophical register. As is the case in English, one of the many acceptions of the word γνωρίσματα/attributes is that of the quality or character inherent to a person or a thing. For a Greek speaker, γνωρίσματα are usually qualities of higher application (i.e., the γνωρίσματα of God, of the Virgin Mary, of the Orthodox dogma, of the true Christian way to lead one’s life, etc.)

As in the previous case, the shift from types to attributes — be they those of the polis, its governance, or men — is consistent with how Skouteropoulos interprets Plato as well as with his declarations in the preface of his translation. More specifically, one of the translator’s hypotheses has been that, in the Republic, Plato is more interested in treating the virtue of the individual as a separate entity than exploring the virtue(s) of the city. Attribute being an individual quality, it comes before and above types which suggest groups. Equally, the word’s ‘exalted character’ brings us closer to the notions of eidos and ousia, for in a way it brings us closer to God (both historically, as far as usage of the word is concerned, and metaphysically).

In any case, it is difficult to ignore a pattern in Skouteropoulos’ version whereby he gradually creates a discursive foundation upon which he carefully constructs his translation in accordance with his understanding of the text. The move from type to attribute is a move from material to spiritual, thus a perfect way to introduce the importance of psyche and associate it with justice and injustice as dispositions of the human spirit and the human soul. Γνωρίσματα are parts of a man’s ιδιοσυστασία, that is,
the individual make-up of one’s soul which defines character. It is very difficult to render ἴδιοσυστασία by psychological make-up, or disposition or even habitus. In medicine, habitus and diathesis are often used to designate either a patient’s asthenic diathesis (sickly disposition) or a habitus phthisicus as in the case of tuberculosis. In philosophy, ἴδιοσυστασία encompasses all the possibilities given above to which one should add γνωρίσματα, since they are qualities of the soul hence constitutive parts of a man’s character.

Ψυχική ἴδιοσυστασία των ανθρώπων (the make-up of the human soul – 544e) and μπερδεμένη ἴδιοσυστασία (confused make-up of an individual’s soul – 548e) or φυσική ἴδιοσυστασία (natural make-up of an individual’s soul – 550b) are only a few of the many examples of the way this term (with or without qualifiers) is used to re-present the human soul by exploring the periousia/ousia duality of the psyche. It is in this particular framework that we need to understand an inappropriate abnormality (also called lack of normalcy) in the category of the γένος. After all, any imbalance in the soul translates into an imbalance in human societies and real politeies.

Striking similarities between Georgoulis and Skouteropoulos, especially at the level of a discursive web created around the narrative of the soul (psyche) and, by extension, moral issues, such as justice and injustice, suggest that Skouteropoulos relied heavily on Georgoulis’ work. Their commonalities are not a matter of the former copying the latter. They both share a common ground, that of dealing with philosophy in a professional (in their capacity as professors of philosophy) and systematic (i.e., academic) way, that is, in terms of science and research. We could therefore argue that their respective translations
are part of their research to discover the amazing features of Plato’s philosophy as sketched out in the Republic.

We mentioned earlier that one of Skouteropoulos’s main concerns was to reconstruct the open-endedness of Plato’s Republic in Modern Greek. One way to achieve this was to propose a shift from type to γνωρίσματα and ιδιωσυστασία to circumscribe the human psyche in order to construct an ontological definition of the good and subsequently the bad in meta-ontological terms (what is good in its own right). It was also suggested that this could not be done outside a conceptual framework for it is the latter that poses the question of the existence of good and bad.

With that in mind, I believe it is necessary to revisit Skouteropoulos’ terminological choices from the angle of the conceptual framework hypothesis. Earlier we claimed that the Republic’s open-endedness is appealing for translation because it creates a space where new conceptual frameworks can emerge. In Greek, γνωρίσματα and ιδιωσυστασία belong to complementary yet different conceptual categories. The first deals with the soul in a more metaphysical way whereas the second, a newer word in the Greek vocabulary, also refers to the soul but approaches it from a medical perspective. In other words, ιδιωσυστασία situates the philosophical examination of the soul (hence the question of the essence of good) on scientific and pragmatic planes. Certainties offered by science — in this case, psychoanalysis — are utilized in the quest of a philosophical and metaphysical understanding of the soul.

This explanation is not inconsistent with Skouteropoulos’ hypothesis that the Republic is all about driving home the psyche. It accounts for the conceptual framework used to
access psyche and to pave the way toward achieving a comprehensive, metaphysical understanding of good. If good is a prerequisite to knowledge, mobilizing a scientific conceptual framework, that is, the existing human knowledge or part thereof, could be interpreted as acknowledging aspects of good and searching for the missing components.

This conjecture is supported by the translated text. Human behaviour as well as the make-up of all fallen polities are described in terms that belong to a more academic register, a quasi psychoanalytic jargon and evoke mental associations of a morally-centered discussion without the moralistic component. Here are some of these words classified into the following categories: human attitudes and behaviours, states of being, conditions and values. A loftier register in Greek is marked under AR (academic register) whereas terms belonging to a specialized category, namely psychology, are marked PSY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human attitudes and behaviours</th>
<th>States of being</th>
<th>Conditions and values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greek</strong></td>
<td><strong>English</strong></td>
<td><strong>Greek</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ατομιστής</td>
<td>selfish</td>
<td>αξίωση</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>άμουσος (AR)</td>
<td>philistine</td>
<td>πολιορκημοσύνη (AR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>απότομος</td>
<td>abrupt</td>
<td>μαλθακότητα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>προσηνής (AR)</td>
<td>courteous</td>
<td>επιθυμία – ενδιάθετη επιθυμία (PSY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλόδοξος</td>
<td>ambitious</td>
<td>ανδρεία – ανανδρία</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οκνηρός (AR)</td>
<td>lazy</td>
<td>τρυφηλότητα (AR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, it is important to note that the shift from the collective to the individual is suggestive of the new philosophical trends and ways of life emerging in modern Western societies. The individual in them acquires an added value in the community of the same, whereby otherness and uniqueness take precedence over the idea of mass and uniformity. Modern societies tend to operate on the principle of individuality, personal effort, kernel family, etc., as opposed to Ancient societies, where the spheres of personal and public life are fused. This happens because, in Ancient Greek societies, the individual was defined primarily in terms of his membership in the community and less as a stand-alone entity existing parallel to the society.
5.2.4. Gryparis/Papanoutsos’ translatory discourse on justice and doubt

During my examination of Gryparis’ preface (1954), I suggested that the translator adopted a critical position vis-à-vis Plato. Some could interpret Gryparis’ criticism as an attempt to cast doubt on Plato’s authority and the validity of his argument in the *Republic*. In my view, although this interpretation is possible, it is not plausible. Gryparis would not have attempted to translate the *Republic* twice had he not seen the value for such an endeavor.

All things aside, Gryparis understood that Plato’s plan, no matter how grandiose or utopian, was worth examining and discussing from a philosophical point of view. I therefore argue that, for Gryparis, the word philosophical refers to political philosophy, the science of examining, evaluating, and comparing worldly systems of perceiving, understanding, and expressing our world, the relationship (political or other) and trust (or lack thereof) of our fellow-man.

Gryparis’ understanding of Plato’s *Republic* presupposes the existence of an organized society, a polity and an educational system. Justice is a human construct the *ousia* of which is circumscribed in human societies. Consequently, it is not possible to follow Plato’s argument especially in terms of the incongruity it puts forth. More specifically, Gryparis argues that Plato equates justice to a potentiality of being (or dispositional being) as well as to the various forms of being (existing values) coexisting harmoniously in the *psyche* (active being). As a result, Plato equates justice to the soul (*psyche*). The unjust man loses his quality of being active as a result of an imbalance in his *psyche*.
As far as Gryparis is concerned, this is a fallacious assumption. Instead, it posits that virtue and soul are not interconnected; virtue is the quality which an entity possesses to perform its *ergo*. Given that an entity performs more than one *ergo*, there are several qualities in each entity. This explains how it is possible for a man to be perfectly happy and quite energetic while being evil and hurting other people.

In my view, Gryparis tried to reflect onto his translation the position he adopted in the introduction of his work. There, he managed to create a clear-cut distinction between the various *poleis* and the corresponding human type. In his account of the various *poleis*, one can easily identify three different elements: the polity, understood in the sense of an organized society; its corresponding government, exercised by those in power; and the social elements of the polity, such as the administration of justice, the management of wealth and finances, including questions of private property vs. public property. Social elements also comprise issues of behaviour, relations between social groups or classes and education as one of the catalysts for shaping personalities and creating human types.

As in the case of Memmos, Gryparis uses several terms to designate the transition from one form of government to the next. His choices of *μεταβολή* (change/succession), *μετάβαση* (transition), *μεταπολίτευση* (regime change) have already been discussed in the analysis of Memmos’ translation, especially as far as the connotations of the third word are concerned. There is, however, a noticeable difference between Memmos and Gryparis, namely that Gryparis does not create a change of scenery in order to situate Plato’s narrative into a modern society. His translation suggests that Plato’s story-telling takes place with Socrates and the *Republic’s* designated interlocutors and not in a 20th
century Greek city where Socrates, Adeimantus or Glaucon, etc are simply aliases assumed by any modern man.

Equally, Gryparis is not interested in getting involved with the debate on the mechanical evolution of governments as opposed to the historical one. I believe that Gryparis was not concerned with how Plato moved from one polity to another because he was more interested in bringing out the elements that support his understanding of Plato’s text, that is, that justice and virtue exist within a society of men, that evil and good are always fighting each other and that justice is not a prerequisite to happiness and absolute virtue.

To achieve the desired effect, Gryparis creates a discursive system which revolves around the following axes: polis; polity and government; social group dynamic, institutions and social behaviours. The following table provides a limited yet revelatory sample of Gryparis’ discursive choices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polis</th>
<th>Polity and government</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>δυναστείες (dynasties)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αγοραστές βασιλείες (bought kingships)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τιμοκρατία/τιμαρχία (timocracy/timarchy)</td>
<td>φίλαρχη πολιτεία (a polity which loves power)</td>
<td>τάξη προμάχων (class of soldiers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ανώτατα αξιώματα (highest public office)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ανήκει] στους επισήμους (dignitaries)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polis</td>
<td>Polity and government</td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δυναστικές και δυναστευόμενες (despotic/oppressed)</td>
<td>[με ή χωρίς] κοινωνική σειρά (social order)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ανάρμοστη ανωμαλία (inappropriate abnormality)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μεταπολέμηση (regime change)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ολιγαρχία</td>
<td>μετάβαση (transition)</td>
<td>υπέρπλουτοι, θεόφτωχοι, ξοδευτής (extremely rich, deadly poor and spenders)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>βασικός όρος του πολιτεύματος (fundamental condition of government)</td>
<td>απατεωτικά, κακή ανατροφή (lack of education and poor upbringing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ελαττωματική σύσταση της πολιτείας (a defective composition of polity)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μετάπτωση – άρχοντες, αξιώματα με χρήμα (devolution, rulers, public offices acquired through money)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δημοκρατία</td>
<td>μετάβαση (transition)</td>
<td>εκούσια συμβόλαια (voluntary contracts)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πολίτες (citizens)</td>
<td>συναλλαγές – τιμιότητα στις συναλλαγές (transactions – honesty in transactions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polis</td>
<td>Polity and government</td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ορισμός νόμων (lawmaking)</td>
<td>δανειστές τοκογλύφων (creditors and loan sharks)</td>
<td>στρατιώτες – συστρατιώτες (soldiers and fellow soldiers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>διατάραξη της πολιτείας (disturbance in polity)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δημοκρατούμενη πόλη (democratically-ruled city)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μοίρασμα αρχών και αξιωμάτων (distribution of offices and positions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υποχρέωση ανάληψης δημόσιας λειτουργίας (obligation to take upon public service responsibilities)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τυραννία (tyranny)</td>
<td>αναρχία (anarchy)</td>
<td>συναθροίσεις δήμου (meetings of the demos)</td>
<td>φιλελεύθερο φρόνημα (liberal spirit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>καταγγελίες (political denunciations)</td>
<td>περιοδείες [τραγωδών] σε άλλες πολιτείες (poets touring from one city to another)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>κρίσεις (accusations)</td>
<td>[...] προσελκύουν τα πλήθη [...] μαζεύουν τον οχλό (attract the crowd, gather the mob)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τάξεως (classes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polis</td>
<td>Polity and government</td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>διοίκηση της πολιτείας (government administration)</td>
<td>δικαστικοί αγώνες (litigation)</td>
<td>[αυλή] δημιουργία κολάκων (lackeys)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πολιτικές καινοτομίες (political reforms)</td>
<td>απόσβεση χρεών (write-offs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ανατροπή πολιτεύματος (subversion of the polity)</td>
<td>αναδασμός γης (estate partition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πολίτες – συμπολίτες (citizens and fellow citizens)</td>
<td>διανομή γαιών σε ιδιώτες (distribution of land to private individuals)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εξορία (exile)</td>
<td>διανομή γαιών στο δήμο (distribution of land to demos → nationalizations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κυβέρνηση (Government)</td>
<td>δάνεια (loans)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[σταδιακός] εξαφανισμός της περιουσίας (property gradually eaten away)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>διαφθορά – αθλιότητα (corruption and abasement)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are a few of the many words Gryparis chose to describe various polities and their corresponding governments. These are the distinctions he maintains between **politeia** and **government**: the first term is used when introducing the various types of **poleis** (timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny) whereas the second is used to describe the
ruler/ruled pair. Government also denotes political institutions and the political pathology of the city.

One key observation as far as Gryparis’ version is concerned is the description of the pathology of men. Words describing human behaviours are carefully chosen to refer to social situations and to underline the possibility that people may choose an ‘alternate’ solution. Although this solution is not presented in the text, it is understood that there is another way of going about things. By stating his disagreement with Plato’s equation of justice and virtue with a perfect balance of the main forces of psyche, he gives permission to readers to ‘critically’ approach the text.

This is particularly evident each time Plato introduces the father/son analogy. The father, who is supposedly less corrupted than his son, tries to instill in him values that go against the social and political trends of the society the son is brought up in; and the son, always faces a dilemma. Social influences are paramount in understanding the reasons behind the son’s choice.

We know that Gryparis does not see eye to eye with Plato’s system whereby the pathology of the city and that of the men is a moral concern. Despite his objections, Gryparis does not alter the essence of Plato’s text. He follows Plato’s reasoning but not without interfering: in his 1911 version, there is a typographical mark (the dash) to mark the transition from a given form of governance to its corresponding human type. In his newest version in demotiki, the dash was replaced by titles in the margin introducing each time the polity and the associated human type.
This creates the impression that the analysis on the pathology of men was created as a text within the text. Gryparis insisted that Plato’s claim was untenable: the antisocial type, whose life and actions do not follow the rule of morality and show complete disrespect to others, is not necessarily unhappy. Unless dealing with pathological cases, such as people suffering from depression or other mental illnesses, people demonstrating moral excellence can be unhappy as long as they live in society and interact with other people. I believe that Gryparis entertained the possibility of Plato’s claim being valid provided men lead an ascetic existence. However, the latter is not a social way of life.

Finally, I must turn my attention toward some striking similarities between Gryparis’ version and Nikolaos Skouteropoulos’ translation (552a-b, 552e, 564c are a few of several examples). Skouteropoulos seems to have used almost verbatim segments of Gryparis’ translation. Most of these segments are related to the descriptions of the polities. One possible explanation for this is that Skouteropoulos sees in Gryparis’ objection to the treatment of the interrelation between the pathology of the city and the pathology of men in platonic terms an attempt to demystify the misery of going from one poorly organized government to another. Taking stock of the devolution of human societies so as to prove that the human soul needs to be purified by obtaining perfect balance in order to achieve happiness is not of the outmost importance.

In Gryparis’ terms, what is most important is to achieve political and social normalcy by allowing a society to develop necessary reflexes to neutralize negative effects (cf. affect’s central meaning in the diagrams on pages 134-135) that could potentially turn acute conditions to chronic illnesses. In that sense, Gryparis puts forth a political sociology of


*praxis*. Skouteropoulos, on the other hand, gives a meta-ontological twist to the same argument by insisting on the importance of the *ousia* of normalcy as a generalized application in order to avoid worrying about *lost souls* or *fallen politeies*. 
5.2.5. Mavropoulos’ translatory discourse on logos

In the section entitled The Republic as a matter of understanding Plato, it was argued that Mavropoulos’ preface in his 2006 version was particularly concerned with rendering multi-layered attributes of the concepts introduced by Plato, especially with regard to the Theory of Forms. In support of this argument, my discursive analysis —performed on a brief segment of the Seventh Letter— demonstrated that Mavropoulos was sensitive to issues of fidelity in rendering the Classics into Modern Greek and the semantic consequences of an ‘interpretative’ translation of the Republic.

More precisely, it was argued that the translator’s professional identity, namely that of the philologist, would explain in part Mavropoulos’ predilection for a literal translation. This translatory approach, so popular among philologists, reveals a strategy aimed at demonstrating the appropriate reverence to the Classics and at treating their works in the same way that theologians and translators specializing in the rendition of the Bible treat the Scriptures. But this is only part of the explanation. The other part, as already suggested, is related to questions associated with the hierarchy of languages, whereby the target language is considered inferior to the source language as well as the hierarchy of sciences, in which philosophy ranks higher than other areas of human knowledge. The latter could be considered as a reminiscence of Plato’s hierarchy of episteme, according to which there is only one true episteme (the knowledge of good through logos = dialectics),99 whereas all other epistemes belong to the intellect and not to the space

---

99 Pappa suggests that for Plato Good is a self-fulfilling prophecy in what Good is perceived in teleological terms and is the beginning and the end of a mental trajectory. The starting point is good as a general principle and the finishing line is the discovery of good in less general concepts.
dominated by pure noetics. In that sense, literal transfers could be viewed as a means for compensating for losses of transcendental meaning during interpretative renditions.

In the analysis of Mavropoulos’ preface, the discussion on literal translation, in general, and the *Seventh Letter*, in particular, focused on the concept of *logos* and its relation to *episteme* and *eidolon*. My exegetical approach suggests that the translator’s concerns are reflected in his translatory discourse, especially with regard to *logos* and education.

*Logos*’ place within Plato’s work, especially as far as the *Republic* is concerned, has attracted the interest of theoreticians and resulted in a significant exegetical production. All things considered, modern Greek philosophical discourse on Plato and *logos* could be divided into two major categories: a) the canonization discourse; and b) the sceptical discourse. Before examining both discourses, it is crucial to remember that it is impossible to conceive of *logos* as separated from *dialectic* and *dialectics*, that is, the Socratic method of argument presented in question-answer form and Plato’s perfection of this genre.

One of the very few points of conversion of the conflicting philosophical discourses on Plato and *logos* is the nature of dialectics introduced in the *Republic*. For Pappa, Plato introduced a new direction in dialectics by transforming it into the only method capable of conceiving the truth of the *ideas* (i.e., the truth within the Theory of Forms). (Pappa 1997: 248) Roussopoulos sees in Plato’s dialogues, and consequently in the philosopher’s use of dialectics, a *topos* whereby the ‘whole’ is being materialized in broad daylight. The ‘whole’ thus becomes available to *logos* (Roussopoulos 1997: 226). Roussopoulos maintains that *logos* and *mythos* (myth) are an inseparable pair in Plato since the latter is
included in the essence of the former. Finally, Despotoupoulos defines the conditions for the existence of *logos* from the point of view of its materialization, that is, oral and written discourse. In his chapter on *critique*, Despotopoulos states that Plato clearly outlined three pre-conditions to *logos*: a true knowledge of the object of *logos* (discourse); the ability to define every single element of the object’s component in terms of its *ousia*; and, finally, the relationship between *logos* and *episteme* as a pre-requisite for providing a definition of the object of *logos* in terms of its holistic entity (Despotopoulos 1997: 271).

The common denominator of the above-mentioned discourses on Plato’s *logos*, dialogue and dialectics, as per their essence and function, is their holistic, interconnected nature. Although each author approaches the subject from a different angle, they all come to the same conclusion. What is not said in this conclusion but is understood because it is already developed elsewhere in their work can be summarized as follows. First, in the *Republic* (with the exception of Book I) Plato introduces a different dialectic genre. Pappa adheres to Ryle’s view that the purely Socratic method consists in receiving the obligatory answer “yes”/ “no” to the *elenchus* questions put forth by Socrates. I will argue that, although, Book II, introduces the starting point from which Plato changes his dialectic by placing it into the sphere of *idea*, he maintains the obligatory answer form (‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘It could not be otherwise’, ‘How else could it be’, ‘I totally agree’, etc.) to which Socrates’ participants in the dialogue are reduced. By doing so, Plato shows that he is not interested in introducing contradictory facts in order to resolve real or apparent contradictions. His Theory of Forms has no real contradictions because it is the only theory that holds the absolute, holistic truth.
Second, the distinction made by Despotopoulos between written and oral discourse as constitutive elements of *logos* and *episteme* could be linked to Plato’s *Seventh Letter* in which the Greek philosopher suggests that what he has written so far does not represent his real philosophical system, which he might have taught (orally) in the Academy. This is a point on which Pappa insists greatly in her analysis. However, this distinction could also be linked to Roussopoulos’ hypothesis of the *logos*-myth interdependence in Plato’s dialectics.

Myth as a sacred narrative is mainly diffused via oral discourse. Additionally, myth is an “indispensable supplement to [Plato’s] analytical language” (Roussoupolos 1997: 226-7) because, thanks to myth, Plato helps the reader perceive everyday experience. (*Ibid.* ) It is suggested that modern analytic tradition rejects myth, mainly because it emphasizes clarity and argument and uses formal logic to achieve its goals. In reality, Roussopoulos sustains that, despite the prevalence of the anti-myth discourse, myth is a dominant feature of modern philosophy and society (especially the ones dealing with natural sciences as is the case of the scientist-hero myth, depicting a prodigy laboring in foreign countries or remote labs for the good of humanity) (*Ibid*: 227-8).

By treating *logos* as a myth and dialectics as an “[…] initiation process leading to ‘contemplating’ the absolute Idea […]” (Pappa 1997: 252), I am inevitably reaching the same conclusions as Pappa, namely that Plato’s way of treating dialectics in terms of moving from the individual and single to the general and global is connected with his political theory (*Idem*). Based on Pappa’s understanding of *logos* in Plato, initiation to dialectics is the culmination of a long process of moving from the lowest level to the
highest one. At the lowest level lies the non-being. In the Republic the non-being encompasses the rejection of a dynamic conception of the world, the rejection of the coming into being and of death, the rejection of opposite forces and of change. The highest level, that is, the one which coincides with knowledge and episteme, is the being. In between being and the not-being stretches an intermediate topos, branded as doxa. For Plato, doxa is a way to view relativity and diversity in the material world (Op.cit.: 253-4).

Departing from the proposed delimitation of dialectics, which is prominent in the Republic, I propose to interpret Marvopoulos’ translation choices vis-à-vis logos from a double perspective: first, the importance the translator attributes to Plato’s Seventh Letter and his renditions of logos; and, second, his interpretations of logos in the context of the fallen polities (ημαρτημένες πολιτείες), described in Book VIII. More specifically, it will be argued that the pathology of the city, and the inferred pathology of the men in the city, is, as Plato’ posits it, the result of the absence of good, thus the lysis, or the breaking-down, of dialectics. This is happening because the art of dialectics, in other words, true episteme, has been handled by people who had not received the appropriate education and did not fit into Plato’s strict intellectual and psychological profile of the philosopher-guardian.

More specifically, in Book VIII and the beginning of Book IX, Mavropoulos almost systematically translates logos by logos and its derivatives. The table below recaps some examples from Mavropoulos’ translation and offers the Skouteropoulos, Gryparis and Georgoulis equivalences.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mavropoulos</th>
<th>N. Skouteropoulos</th>
<th>Georgoulis</th>
<th>Gryparis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[...] αλλά με τη βία, καθώς θα έχουν παραμελήσει την αληθινή Μοίσα, που τη συντροφεύονταν οι έλλογες αναξιολογούν και η Φιλοσοφία […] (548b-c)</td>
<td>[...] και η παιδεία τους δεν θα στηρίζεται στην πειθού αλλά στη βία, αφού την αληθινή Μοίσα, αυτή που τη συντροφεύονταν ο λόγος και η φιλοσοφία […]</td>
<td>[...] αλλά βιάς έπειτα από την παραμελήση της αληθινής Μοίσας, δηλαδή αυτής που συντροφεύεται από τη διαλεκτική και τη φιλοσοφία […]</td>
<td>[...] στηρίζεται στη βία και όχι στην πειθού, επειδή παραμελήθηκε η Μοίσα η αληθινή των λόγων και της φιλοσοφίας […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κάνεις λόγο για ένα πολίτευμα ανάμικτο από καλό και κακό (548c)</td>
<td>[...] χορής αμφιβολία, είπε, περιτρόπες ένα υπολειμμα ανάμικτο από καλό και κακό</td>
<td>[...] παρουσιάζεις, είπε, μια πολιτεία που είναι σε όλα τα σημεία ένα μινύμα από κακό και από καλό. […]</td>
<td>[...] προηγματικά, εντελώς ανακατωμένη είναι αυτή η πολιτεία με καλό και κακό […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...] για το λόγο αυτό μετονομάζεται έναντι των άλλων γυναικών […] (549d)</td>
<td>[...] ο λόγος, είπε, ο συγκεκριμένος με τη μοναρχία και την ποιήση […]</td>
<td>[...] ο λόγος, είπε εγώ, συγκεκριμένος με τη μοναρχία […]</td>
<td>[...] το λόγο, συνδυασμένο με τη μουσική […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...] για το λόγο αυτό μετονομάζεται έναντι των άλλων γυναικών […] (549d)</td>
<td>[...] και πως τι αυτό η ιδία μετονομάζεται σε σύγχρονη με τις άλλες γυναίκες […]</td>
<td>[...] και θεωρείς τον παραγονόμοντα του αυτό και μείωση της δικης της θέσης απέναντι στις άλλες γυναίκες […]</td>
<td>[...] και τι αυτό δεν έχει και αυτή καμιά κοινωνική σειρά ανάμεσα στις άλλες γυναίκες […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...] ο πατέρας ποτίζει και μεγαλώνει μέσα στην ψυχή του το «λογιστικόν» […] (550b)</td>
<td>[...] ο πατέρας ποτίζει και θρέφει μέσα στην ψυχή του νέου το λογιστικό της κοινάτη […]</td>
<td>[...] ο πατέρας του που ποτίζει και μεγαλώνει μέσα στην ψυχή το λογιστικό […]</td>
<td>[...] ενώ ο πατέρας του καλλιεργεί και δυναμώνει το λογιστικό μέρος της ψυχής του […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...] νομίζω δεν τους επιτρέπει να συλλογίζονται και να εξετάζουν τίποτε άλλο παρά πού από λόγοτα χρήματα να βγάλει περισσότερο κήρυκον [...] (553d)</td>
<td>[...] δεν θα τους επιτρέπει να συλλογίζονται και να επιθυμούν τίποτε άλλο παρά τούτο: Το μεν πρώτο το λογιστικό με ποιο τρόπο από λόγοτα χρήματα θα βγάλει περισσότερο κήρυκον […]</td>
<td>[...] και δεν τ’ αφήνει τίποτε άλλο να λογιστικού και να κοιτάζουν παρά μονάχα ποιος τρόπος υπάρχει για να βγάλει κανείς από λόγοτα λεπτά περισσότερο κήρυκον […]</td>
<td>[...] και στο ένα δε θα επιτρέπει να συλλογίζονται και να σκέφτεται τίποτ’ άλλο, παρά πού από λόγοτα θα κάνει περισσότερα τα υλικά αγαθά του […]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavropoulos</td>
<td>N. Skouteropoulos</td>
<td>Georgoulis</td>
<td>Gryparis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...] καταφέρνει να χαλίναγωγεί άλλες κακές ενδιάθετες επιθυμίες του όχι πείθοντας τον εαυτό του ότι οι επιθυμίες του δεν είναι κάτι καλύτερο ούτε μαλακόνοντας με κάποιο λογικό επιχείρημα [...]. (554d)</td>
<td>[...] καταφέρνει με την κατάλληλη αυτοσυγκράτηση να χαλίναγωγεί κάποιες άλλες ενδιάθετες επιθυμίες του, όχι πείθοντας τον εαυτό του ότι οι επιθυμίες τους δεν συνιστούν κάτι καλύτερο ούτε μαλακόνοντας τον με κάποιο λογικό επιχείρημα [...].</td>
<td>[...] αλλά κακές επιθυμίες που ενισχύουν μέσα του, χωρίς να τις κάνει να παραδεχθούν με την πιθανότητα ότι η επιδιοίκησή τους δεν ήταν κάτι το καλύτερο και χωρίς να τις ημερώνει με το λόγιο [...].</td>
<td>[...] με όχι μικρήν επιβολή του εαυτού του, να συγκρατήσει τις άγνωστες επιθυμίες που κράβα μέσα του, όχι με την πιθανότητα του να αυτό δεν είναι το καλύτερο, ούτε η συγκράτηση της χαλίναγωγεί με τον ορθό λόγο [...].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...] λοιπόν λόγοι και γνώμες ψεύτικες και κενόδοξες ορμούν αντί για τους φύλακες αυτούς [...] (560c)</td>
<td>[...] και αντί για τους φύλακες αυτούς, ορμούν μέσα και παίζουν τον ιδίο τόπο της ψυχής ενός τέταρου νέου λόγια και γνώμες κιβώτιο και κενόδοξες [...].</td>
<td>[...] σκέψεις λοιπόν και δοξασίες, θαρρεί ψεύτικες και αλαζονικές κάνοντας έρωτα και ουδέτερες [...].</td>
<td>[...] και τότε κρίσεις γευοί και δοξασίες επιπλάιαις και αλαζονικές ανεβαίνουν και πάνω τη θέση που έπρεπε να κατέχουν εκείνες [...].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...] εκείνα τα αλαζονικά λόγια κλείνουν τις πόρες του βασιλικού τείχους που έψαλ ένα μέσα του και ούτε αρφήνων αυτούς τους συμμέτοχοι να περάσουν ούτε δέχονται στο τείχος λόγια σταλμένα σαν επίσημη αποστολή [...] (560c-d)</td>
<td>[...] τα αλαζονικά λόγια κλείνουν τις πόρες του βασιλικού τείχους μέσα του και ούτε αρφήνων μέσα στο τείχος λόγια σταλμένα σαν πρεσβεία [...].</td>
<td>[...] που αγαπά την οικονομία κλείνοντοι οι αλαζονικοί λόγιοι τις πόρες του βασιλικού που υπάρχει μέσα του [...].</td>
<td>[...] δεν κλείνουσαν τα αλαζονικά δοξασίες τις πόρες τού μέσα του βασιλικού τείχους και ούτε είπε την επικοινωνία επιτρέπουν την είσοδο ούτε έχουν να ακούσουν τους λόγους που φέρνει πρεσβεία ανθρώπων [...].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...] δε δέχεται κανένα σωστό λόγο ούτε τον αρφίνει να μαζί στο κάστρο της ψυχής [...] (561b)</td>
<td>[...] και βίβασια, είπα εγώ, ένα σωστό λόγο δεν δέχεται ούτε τον αρφίνει να μαζί στο κάστρο της ψυχής του [...].</td>
<td>[...] και δεν θέλει, είπα εγώ, το λόγο της αλήθειας ούτε να τον ακούσει ούτε να τον δέσει είσοδο για να μπει στο φρεάτιο της ψυχής του [...].</td>
<td>[...] και δε δέχεται, εννοείται, ν’ ακούσει ν’ ακούσει επιτρέπει την είσοδο στο φρεάτιο, εάν έρθη ο σωστός λόγος να τον επιτρέπει να υπάρξουν δύο ειδών ήδεις [...].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[...] μερικές φορές συκοφάντοι, αν είναι ικανοί στο λόγο, ψευδομαρτυρούν και δωροδοκούνται. (575b)</td>
<td>[...] πότε-πότε χαλικίσσουν συκοφάντες, αν είναι δυνατά στο λέξεις, επίσης πάντες ψευδομαρτυρούν, δωροδοκούνται – τέτοια [...].</td>
<td>[...] μερικές φορές κάνουν το συκοφάντη, αν έχουν το χάρισμα του λόγου, γίνονται ψευδομαρτυρούν και αγοράζονται με δωροδοκίες [...].</td>
<td>[...] κάποτε δε, αν έχουν κάποια ευλογησία, κάνουν το συκοφάντη και ψευδομαρτυρούν ή πουλούν τη συνείδησή τους [...].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table leads to two conclusions. The first relates to the translations’ wordiness. The selected segments are a representative sample of all four translations and correspond exactly to the same parts of the Republic. The word count for Mavropoulos (column 1) is 204, against 234 for Skouteropoulos (column 2), 230 for Georgoulis (column 3) and 235 for Gryparis (column 4). Mavropoulos’ concision is consistent with his philological approach to faithfulness as commented earlier. In other words, expanding in the rendition is often considered as interpreting the text instead of transferring it in the target language.

The second is Mavropoulos’ insistence on adopting a conservative approach in his use of logos and its derivatives in all their possible acceptions, both in Ancient and in Modern Greek. The translator identifies the different nuances of logos Plato uses in his text, especially when, in the context of fallen polities, that is, at the level of the non-being (fallen polities represent the society’s lysis), the philosopher is trying to denote the in-between state leading from doxa (δοξασίες, κρίσεις, σκέψεις) to being. In these cases, it is obvious that the translator is struggling with all possible choices made available to him in Modern Greek. And almost infallibly, he stays close to logos by using λόγια (=words) or ἐλλογες αναζητήσεις (this could be very loosely translated as mental awakenings or mental processes) (Georgoulis chose dialectic instead), or συλλογίζονται (logos + together = to reason understood as using the faculty of reason, of thinking logically).

The only deviation from the original and the other translations is at 549b, where Mavropoulos translates μουσική (music) by πνευματική καλλιέργεια (the act of cultivating the mind). In reality, this is only an alleged discrepancy insofar as Mavropoulos systematically substitutes paideia in its broader acception for πνευματική καλλιέργεια
Besides being a periphrase, πνευματική καλλιέργεια connotes a deliberate movement toward achieving a better state. This is consistent with the hypothesis of moving from doxa to the highest level human estate embodied by being, for which knowledge (episteme) is a fundamental pre-requisite.

If we also take into account what has already been said about Mavropoulos in his translation of the Seventh Letter with regard to his renditions of logos (as opposed to that of Korbeti), it would be legitimate to suggest that Mavropoulos sees in logos the complete spectrum of the platonic dialectics as posited in the Republic. He also accounts for the cases where logos is either a written or an oral discourse, thus adhering to Despotopoulos’ position that it is equally if not more important for the philosopher-ruler to be able to defend orally his knowledge of the truth and/or his writings about the truth. One of Plato’s fundamental pedagogical principles was that of the oral transmission of knowledge, whereby logoi are the true products (children) of those who offer them (cf. Despotopoulos 1997: 275).

A closer look on Mavropoulos’ and N. Skouteropoulos’ versions reveals significant similarities, which are found all over Mavropoulos’ translation. There is little doubt that Skouteropoulos was a source of inspiration for Mavropoulos, since the former’s translation was published first. Skouteropoulos’ holistic approach to the Republic discussed earlier could also have accounted for Mavropoulos’ feeling of ‘philosophical affiliation’ to the latter.

Seen from this point of view, both Mavropoulos and Skouteropoulos translations should be treated as typical cases of promoting and sustaining the canonization discourse.
suggested at the beginning of this chapter. The main feature of this discourse is to accommodate an interpretation of Plato’s dialectics as the only effective method of reaching the holistic entity of the Theory of Forms from its humanistic standpoint. It is widely claimed (as in the case of Georgoulis’ preface) that the Republic is an ‘ode’ to optimism: it proposes an alternative to an ideal polity and a plan (although not a real system) to exit the state of decomposition, sustained by all forms of fallen polities, and enter into a state of perfect happiness. Despotopoulos’ works on Plato definitely fall into this category.

Contrary to the canonization discourse, the skeptical discourse suggests that there is nothing humanistic about restricting access to mastering dialectics to a cast of chosen people (the philosopher-ruler), thus automatically segregating people into the rulers and the ruled. Additionally, I argue that dialectics is based on a method of argumentation whereby opposite arguments are weighed-in with a view to reaching a resolution. Instead, in Plato’s ideal politeia, there is no room for contradictions. This automatically effaces elenchus, a sine qua non condition to dialectics, while suggesting that worthy candidates for mastering the dialectics are obedient young men with the appropriate background and a propensity to discipline and respect for authority (Pappa 1997: 258-260)
5.2.6. The translatory discourse of minor translations

At this point, it is vital to examine the discourse of two translations whose influence is marginal for two very distinct reasons. The Pappatheodorou/Pappas version is seen as an obsolete translation and is therefore irrelevant, from a bibliographical and referential point of view, both to other translations of the Republic and to works on and about the Republic. Kaktos’ edition is somewhat ignored by the agents of canonical philosophical discourse (translatory or not) because there is a prevailing belief that this is not an authentic intralingual rendition (from Ancient to Modern Greek) but an interlingual translation, whereby other languages (namely English, French and German) are used to support the original. The argument behind this position is that the task of this translation was assigned to an obscure team of inexperienced translators.

Regardless of the validity of the second claim, it is undeniable that both versions are marginal translations with limited if any circulation and certainly very little comments stemming from them and about them. Using this observation as a starting point, I will briefly examine the intratextual transition from their respective paratext to their translated text. In the case of Pappatheodorou/Pappas’ version, a key feature of Diamantopoulos’ introduction was the dual application of justice, that is, the metaphysical and theoretical materialization of justice that refers mainly to the soul and the practical aspect of it, which deals primarily with the ways justice applies to human life in a well-organized state. In the case of Kaktos’ rendition, the analysis will evolve mainly around the assertion that the translation is tailored to cater to the literary and philosophical needs of the masses, hence its branding as “popular reading”.
In the first case, my initial evaluation of Pappatheodorou/Pappas’ version as a classical reading is supported, among other things, by an extensive system of notes providing philological explanations to the translation and cross-references to Plato’s other works, including major Classical authors, especially Classical philosophers. In addition to this, I argue that the dual application of the hypothesis of justice relies heavily on the narrative framework created around the concepts of knowledge, strength and desire, that is, the three powers (elements) of the soul, and their projection onto the various types of fallen polities.

The translators’ discursive choices remain faithful to the distinction whereby knowledge is designated by words such as λογισμό (reasoning), paideia (education), απαιδευσιά (lack of education and culture), μορφωμένος (educated), διαλεκτική (dialectics), νοοτροπία (mentality), δοξασίες (doxas) instead of logos. Equally, all references to the concept of strength, be it physical, mental or political, are made with words that designate power in all its forms, shapes and degrees, and not with words that simply allude to it: δυνατός (strong), ξεραγκιανός (bony), ξένα κρέατα (additional meat/fat), άρχοντας (ruler), αρχόμενος (ruled), revolution, στάσεις (insurgence), etc. This also applies in the case of desire, which is mostly denoted by ηδονή (pleasure) without the analogies of debauchery.

From a semantic point of view, these choices transpose the moral and transcendental aspect of the soul to the level of tangible applications in the city and the man in the city. In this sense, polis is almost constantly translated as polity (politeia), has a government, that is, an administration (διοίκησι), and its people belong to as many social classes as
the type of polity provides for (λαός). The distinction between government and governed people introduces the difference between public sphere (δημόσιο και δημόσιος) and private sphere (ιδιωτικός) thus inviting us to understand the citizen in terms of its private, individual identity (ιδιώτης). From this point on, both the city and the citizen (ιδιώτης) have their own personality (χαρακτήρα), which ensures individuality. This is very different from the discourse on the so-called types of polities and types of men in the polity we have seen so far or the features (characteristics) of one and the other. The main difference is that the latter are individual elements that may or may not come together, whereas the former introduces the idea of entity, a whole, which is not defined by its constitutive parts but by the fact that it exists as a whole in its own right.

Finally, with regard to Kaktos’ translation, the ‘popular reading’ hypothesis was already partially refuted in the analysis of the paratext, which proved that readers would need to have some preliminary knowledge of Plato, his political system and his opus to be able to understand the author’s introductory commentary. The translation did not prove popular reading for two reasons.

First, the translational style is that of a word for word rendition, in which the text in Modern Greek remains lexically and syntactically very dependent on the original. This verbatim translation goes against one of the basic principles of the ‘popular reading’ hypothesis, namely fluidity and domestication of the text to the perceived needs and likes of the receiving culture. To their surprise, readers of Hatzopoulos’ version unsuspectingly find themselves before a text that is hard to read without having to refer to the original for questions of terminological nature. That is to say, of all the renditions of my corpus, this
was the only one where I felt the need to rely on the original to shed light on ambiguities regarding the use of words whose signifier remains the same in Modern Greek but whose signified is significantly different.

Second, and most important, there is a disruption in the narrative on the soul, especially at the level of the description of its constitutive parts. More specifically, almost all of the retranslations in the corpus adopt the λογισμικό, θυμοειδές, επιθυμητικό (rational, spirited, appetitive) designation of the soul while using the same terminology to identify, throughout the text, features of fallen polities as well as of human types that bear proof to each one of the above-identified components. In Hatzopoulos' version, this continuity is disrupted by an ambiguous use of the words ορμητικός και μονότροπος (impulsive and one-sided) to designate the features of oligarchical man in which the spirited part of the soul (hence his personality) dominates the other two parts.

This disruption does not seem to follow a pre-determined narrative pattern. One possible explanation is that the translation of the Republic was entrusted to more than one translator and that the editors did not ensure homogeneity and discursive consistency throughout the text, hence the mistrust of the canonized circle of translators-philosophers of the Classics vis-à-vis this particular version.

Regardless of the reasons behind this discrepancy, one should examine its impact on the translation’s proclaimed value and goal: one of the fundamental pillars of a popular publication is consistency which, in turn, guarantees legibility and flow. These indispensable qualities enhance understanding while helping to avoid ideological dogmatism by shifting between conflicting linguistic and philosophical approaches in the
process of rendition. I believe that neither the first goal nor the second goal defined in the introduction was proven beyond any doubt by the translatory discourse.
5.3. **Plato’s Republic: a source of philosophical inspiration in modern Greek political culture**

So far I have attempted to explore a complex network of relationships and articulations between the various retranslations of the *Republic* into Modern Greek, the translators’ profiles and ideology, their understanding of the *Republic*’s project as portrayed in the preface of their work and in the translation *per se*. To ensure a better understanding, I provided some essential background information on the political, social, linguistic and philosophical make-up of the modern Greek State, covering the period during which the translations were made and published. I insisted heavily on the translators’ personalities, their professional status and place within the elite world of intralingual translation of the Classics, especially that of Ancient philosophy (i.e., inside or outside the circle of canonization of intralingual translation) and on the editors’ role. All these parameters were viewed both on the vertical and horizontal level proposed earlier, in other words from one translation to another but also within each publication taken separately. In the latter case, some interesting conclusions were drawn following a careful examination of discursive continuities and discrepancies between the translation’s paratext (preface, postface and notes) and the translated text.

The above have sufficiently demonstrated that the corpus’ translated texts emerged from a public space and at a public time which called, each time, for reflection. This reflection is the society’s mental and historical process for creating new monuments within the present historical time using, critically, the representations of the past. This explains how seemingly identical or almost identical translations of the *Republic* created different
renditions, hence interpretations of the same monument of the past. These renditions may be complementary in some cases and opposite in others. But they all carry within them and bring to an open space the subjectivity of each representation (or layers of representations) so that it can be judged and measured against other representations. It is in this *agora* that new meanings and therefore new policies or value systems are made available for people to evaluate and to adopt or reject. It should be noted that these subjectivities have the unique capacity of embracing collective values on how a group views, is expected to view or would like to view processes of creating meaning for itself and for the society at large.

My original hypothesis contains a fundamental claim, namely that it is infinitely more productive to consider retranslation as the triumph of philosophy over the closure of meaning rather than translation as failure to grasp the *de facto* validity, the absolute, perennial truth of the original. I believe that this claim is most prominently asserted in instances whereby both the original Classic and its subsequent translations create a metaphilosophical, meta-translational discourse. More precisely, in the case of the *Republic* and its various renditions in Modern Greek, the most obvious example of metaphilosophical, meta-translational discourse is the corpus of works written with a view to analyze, evaluate, and position Plato’s political and philosophical theory within the context of the modern Greek State. Evidently, some of these works are more important than others, either because they adhere to the dominant socio-historical and political ideology or because they introduce a discourse of dissidence, thus causing a rupture with the so-called canonical discourse.
In this particular context, Evangelos Papanoutsos’ work entitled Πολιτεία και Δικαιοσύνη και άλλοι διάλογοι (Politeia and Justice and other dialogues), published at Philippotis Editions (Athens) in 1989, calls for special consideration. This is a philosophical essay presented in the form of a compilation of dialogues aimed at exploring political, social, and ethical issues of universal, diachronic, and synchronic value. The dialogue bearing the title Πολιτεία και Δικαιοσύνη (Politeia and Justice) is a modern version of Plato’s Republic à la Papanoutsos. As in all of Papanoutsos’ dialogues in this collection, this one is carried out by five participants: the Teacher (ο Δάσκαλος), Markos, Athinogenis, Theophanis and Minas.

In a 100-page dialogue, Papanoutsos recreates Plato’s Republic but this time the discussion is held in Greece during the 1980s. Most of the key elements of the platonic dialogue are present in Papanoutsos’ discourse with some notable exceptions. The Teacher is a modern version of Socrates without the aporetic style or the need to utilize frequently the process of elenchus. Questions are asked and real answers (regardless of their validity) are given by all the participants. The discussion is carried out on equal terms and with equally allotted turns, thus giving everyone the opportunity to sufficiently develop his point. There is little irony and, when there is, it is usually found in Minas’ statements. Myth is also used by Papanoutsos to stress a point and is usually taken from popular tradition. Finally, there are some striking analogies with the Republic, as in the case of sickness and the pathology of men and the city (the metaphor of a virus spreading menacingly among the societies), or the analogy of the perfect number, etc.

There are definitely some major differences between the Republic and Politeia and Justice, the most important being the conclusion toward which the dialogue is finally
driven, namely that democracy is the best form of government. There are objections to this conclusion throughout the discussion, which are mainly voiced by Markos and Minas, and are supported by numerous examples of democracy’s failures all over the world and since its inception as a political form of governance in a politically organized society. In Papanoutsos’ view, democracy is not in itself a fallen polity: there is a difference between democracy’s potentiality of being and democracy’s current forms of being. Plato, for his part, considers democracy to be one of the most problematic forms of government, rivalled in evilness only by tyranny.

Despite their divergent point of departure, both Plato and Papanoutsos seek to explore justice in society, or a just society. While, in the platonic system, justice cannot materialize in a democratic polity, Papanoutsos will demonstrate that democracy can be the only possible platform for realizing the ideal of justice. Both recognize that a politically organized group is the basis for conceiving justice and the law. More specifically, Athinogenis claims that “[…] with the polity and within the polity springs not only Law (this is rather a common place that nobody questions) but a sense of justice, in other words, the realization that the members of the community are morally equal to one another […].” (Papanoutsos 1989: 27) (My translation)

From the proposed definitions of justice and its connection to the Law (i.e., the legal system, including the administration of justice), the discussion slowly advances toward proving a basic axiom that justice is logon didonai (=accountability). Accountability is

100 «[…] ότι μαζί με την πολιτεία και μέσα στην πολιτεία γεννείται όχι μόνο το Δίκαιο (αυτό δε είναι ένας κοινός τόπος που κανείς δεν τον αμφισβητεί) αλλά και το αίσθημα της δικαιοσύνης, με άλλους λόγους η συνείδηση της ηθικής ισότητας των μελών της κοινότητας.»

defined as the *logos* by which all parties involved in an action (the agent, the one toward whom the action is directed and the observer of the action), be it directly or indirectly, are convinced that the agent is allowed to act in such a way.

The act of *logon didonai* acknowledges the value of the human being as well as every single action that can seriously influence human relations (*Ibid*, 38). The absence of accountability in an organized society is one of society’s major ailments, which eat away all healthy tissue and, if left undiagnosed or untreated, can suppress the society’s immune system and lead to its destruction.

Contrary to Plato, Papanoutsos sustains that polities are not destined for self-destruction. As in the case of the human being, every polity wants to prolong its life and will automatically develop mechanisms to guarantee its survival. That is to say, external factors penetrate polities in order to destroy them. *Lysis* (breaking-down) of the society occurs in the presence of blatant inequalities. Pappanoutsos identifies three major forms of excess: excess of wealth (plutocracy), excessive growth of the public sector (bureaucracy) and excessive power in the hands of the armed forces (militarism). These excesses create inequalities because they violate the *logon didonai* basic principle, therefore leading to injustice.

One key element in Papanoutsos’ theory is that democracy or its shortcomings are not to be blamed for these excesses. When one or more of the three components grow disproportionately, democracy is at risk without being the generator of these excesses. It should be noted that an imbalance of this sort introduces injustice in various degrees. That being said, it is possible to say that polity A is more unjust than polity B but one
cannot equally claim that polity X is more just or less just than Y. Justice is an absolute idea that exists in itself, an *agnoston (Good)* almost in the sense Plato posits it.

This argument, which is introduced quite early in the discussion, will be fully developed toward the end of the dialogue. During its progression, the participants in the dialogue will acknowledge, more or less willingly, a set of pre-conditions: *a)* humans are infants in terms of their presence on the face of the earth, especially as far as organized political societies are concerned. This principle begs for us to demonstrate tolerance vis-à-vis man’s incapacity to attain to wisdom and perfection, thus slowly killing the beast inside him. *b)* Despite their shortcomings, civilizations made possible by and thanks to a polity, that is, a politically organized society, brought about significant changes in terms of basic fundamental rights while introducing major social, political, and cultural breakthroughs (cf. the UN, or the universal right to vote, the right to go on strike, minimum wages, etc.)

This conclusion holds the same degree of optimism Plato shares when he describes his ideal *Republic*. In Papanoutsos, the ideal polity is not outlined as clearly, regimentally or even as dogmatically as in Plato. However, in both cases there is an underlying faith in man. There is always the possibility of envisioning a better future, a different polity, a polity where justice and the law can ultimately prevail.

Plato and Papanoutsos, in their respective analyses of real polities, their pathology and, subsequently, the pathology of men, entrust the polity’s awakening to a special category of men. Plato calls his ideal man the philosopher-ruler, whereas Papanoutsos makes an appeal to the polity’s intellectual community. The first one is more restrictive because it equates the philosopher to a political leader and vice-versa; the second is broader because
it encompasses different types of intellectuals, including, but not limited to, politicians. The role of the intellectual in a modern polity as described by Papanoutsos is to create awareness of the polity’s external enemies, the ones hovering at its doors seeking its destruction. The role of the intellectual is to alert the society to the dangers stemming from the lack of accountability, complacency and inertia.

Papanoutsos’ magisterial conclusion of his dialogue on politeia and justice stresses the idea of personal and collective responsibility. In the author’s view, it is impossible to maintain the existence of a just polity, when some of its people are unjust or when those who are just refuse to denounce injustice out of fear or complacency or because they are content with their lot. This idea highlights the moral component of justice as a prerequisite for adhering to the law but not as a substitute for it.

Papanoutsos’ political and philosophical construct is a critical synthesis of the philosophical thought produced by various schools. Unquestionably, the philosophical foundation of his work is Plato’s Republic, especially as far as justice is concerned. But his views on the law and the relation between justice and law, as well as the sociology of the polity are largely inspired by Aristotle. There is also the imprint of modern philosophy, especially Hegel’s idealism, Toynbee’s views on the history of civilization; Weber’s criticism of bureaucracy; Galbraith’s admission of the death of the consumer and the advent of the producer-tyrant, and many others. Finally there is the obligatory reference to Christianity’s moral approach to justice. Note that for each argument Papanoutsos presents its counterargument, with the exception of the issues of faith (Christianity), where there is not a single statement arguing the case of atheism. One could argue that the discussion on anarchy encompasses issues pertaining to atheism, but
this is a far-fetched conclusion, especially since anarchy is used exclusively in reference to the values of living collectively, that is, in politically organized groups.

The publication of *Politeia and Justice* begs a number of questions: Why did Papanoutsos write a new version of the *Republic*? Did Papanoutsos admire Plato to the point that he felt the need to imitate him? Was he dissatisfied with Plato’s proposed solution and therefore felt he had to redress the *Republic’s* deficiencies? These questions are difficult to answer with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Whatever the answer, it is bound to be subjective because it will inevitably convey the answerer’s understanding of Plato’s *Republic* and of Papanoutsos as an author, a philosopher, and a politician.

Plato’s supporters would see in Papanoutsos’ endeavour a justification of the *Republic’s* diachronic value and universally accepted ideas. By the same token, Plato’s opponents would claim that all of the *Republic’s* grey areas could no longer go unnoticed — especially by an intellectual such as Papanoutsos— and needed reajustment. My personal view is that Papanoutsos makes a clear distinction between the diachronic and the non-diachronic elements of the *Republic*. Justice and the law remain one of man’s key investigations; justice and happiness are humanity’s ultimate goals. This means that they are yet to be achieved. On the other hand, the historical time of the *Republic’s* dialogue is no longer relevant to modern readership. Consequently, there is a need to reposition the question in today’s public space and time to make it pertinent to contemporary socio-historical and political circumstances. Additionally, from the time the *Republic* was written until today, humanity has made considerable progress — both in terms of evolution and devolution— that needed to be accounted for.
Seen from this point of view, Plato’s _perfect politeia_ or _ideal Republic_ contains basic ideological, moral, and political germs that can be used to achieve a better political organization of human polities. I argue that this is the framework into which Papanoutsos places his work vis-à-vis its goal as well as its source of inspiration (the _Republic_ of Plato).

Papanoutsos’ approach to Plato strikes a fine balance between respect and criticism. There is an overt admission that Plato’s _dialectical_ conceptualization of justice and the law is an inescapable _topos_. The goal of the law is to achieve justice whereas the latter needs a legal framework to materialize. By extension, polity and justice have the same root:

> the logical being, namely the one endowed with social instinct, has claimed and expressed the need to give an account of his actions and receive an account of those of his fellow beings. The logical being is striving to avoid his/her material and moral annihilation caused by the abuse of two inescapable forces interacting within a politically organized community: power and wealth. To stand corrected: power that is made possible via wealth and wealth which is produced through power. (Papanoutsos 1989: 44; my translation)\(^\text{102}\)\(^\text{103}\)

If Papanoutsos agrees with Plato on this point, he disagrees with the way the Greek philosopher imposes his philosopher-ruler upon a polity. Departing from the premise that justice is a desired moral state of happiness and equality, we must assume that men take action to achieve this state. This hypothesis presumes in turn that men wish to improve

---

\(^\text{102}\) “[…] την ανάγκη και την αξίωση του λογικού όντος, του προαχημένου με το κοινωνικό ἐνστικτο, να χρειάζεται και να παίρνει λόγο των πράξεων των ομοίων του, για να προσπαθεί, όσο μπορεί, να μην εκμηδενίζεται υλικά και ηθικά από την κατάχρηση δύο αναπόφευκτων μέσων στην πολιτικά ὀργανωμένη κοινότητα δυνάμεων: της εξουσίας και του πλούτου.” (Παπανούτσου 1989:44).

\(^\text{103}\) By the same token, Papanoutsos predicts a schism in the polity when wealth and/or power are concentrated in the hands of the few. Using Plato’s example, he introduces the analogy of the city divided in two opposite _cities_ that are at war.
their ‘moral being’ (ηθικό ποιόν). This assumption is nevertheless an aberration because one first needs to make sure that men have this desire.104

By the same token, Papanoutsos sees in the philosopher-ruler a variation of an oligarchical form of government. Markos admits (Ibid: 97) that tyranny comes in all shapes and forms. The polity of aristo (noble men) is one of tyranny’s many faces because it creates a state whereby, in exchange for the illusion of a peaceful and secure life, citizens lose their dignity. Benjamin Franklin’s famous quote used in support of this argument — “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety” — proves the philosopher’s position regarding the role all members of a politically organized polity must assume and must be given the right to undertake.

Papanoutsos is equally critical vis-à-vis Plato’s denouncement of tragedy in particular and the arts in general (with the exception of music). In Politeia and Justice, Minas assumes the role of the enemy of modern theater and poetry. But his positions are readily refuted by Athinogenis who sees in the art’s expressional forms the futility of human existence, the impossibility for man to go beyond his self-contradictions, the madness of modern living. Art simply states that man can neither change his destiny nor abandon life all together. Human drama consists in man’s entrapment into this horrible deadlock.105

104 This point does not contradict Papanoutsos’ conjecture based on which a polity is not self-destructive. Every society needs first to define what is morally acceptable and what is not and then label what is morally unacceptable as an ailment capable of destroying the polity’s foundations. Additionally, Papanoutsos believes that society’s ailments are foreign elements, exteriorly-born viruses that besiege the polity in order to alter its function.

105 Athinogenis pessimistic representation of human life as depicted in the arts is somewhat mitigated by the Teacher. The latter defines modern art as the expression of the feverish state of the social body. The analogy of fever falls within the bigger analogy of the pathology of men and the pathology of the city. Papanoutsos states medicine’s different approach in the interpretation of fever. Before, fever was
In the *Republic*, Plato pleads the case of the ideal *Republic* and the philosopher-ruler. In *Politeia and Justice*, Papanoutsos becomes an advocate for democracy. His definition of democracy reveals a well-thought out philosophical underpinning and a profound, historical and critical knowledge of the law and the latter’s practical, ethical, philosophical and legal premises: “[...] [democracy is a system] which acknowledges the citizens’ right to defend themselves against the arbitrariness of the state, first through the use of legal means, and then, if these means are proven ineffective, through resurrection in order to redress the [rule of] Law which was transgressed by the power’s inept agents.” (*Op. cit.:* 76; my translation). 106

This definition of democracy, says Papanoutsos, attests to the degree of maturity political consciousness has reached over the centuries with regard to the citizen’s self-worth. It carries within it the influence of classical philosophy and the latter’s anthropocentric orientation as defined by Arhweller (1998: 22). The relations between *synanthropoi* (fellow men), and the trust they should have for one another, as well as the belief that man can push the boundaries of knowledge in order to improve his material and moral life are also understood in the definition of democracy, a form of government capable of sustaining the trust between fellow citizens and stability in everyday life in order to allow humans to concentrate on accessing knowledge, on achieving justice and happiness and, ultimately, reaching the realm of *agathon* (Good).

---

106 «Από πολλούς και διάφορους ορισμούς που έχουν δοθεί στη Δημοκρατία, εντύπωση βαθιά μου έχει κάνει εκείνος που κύριο γνώρισμά του παραχωρεί την παραχώρηση στους πολίτες του δικαιώματος να αμύνονται εναντίον της αυθαιρεσίας του κράτους, πρώτα με ένδικα μέσα και έπειτα, εάν αυτά αποδείχθοντο απελέξοφοι, με την εξέγερση – για να αποκατασταθεί το Δίκαιο που παραβιάστηκε από τους ανάξιους φορείς της εξουσίας.» (Παπανούτσος 1989: 76)
This interpretation is sufficient proof that Papanoutsos’ understanding of Plato and the Republic is both critical of and reverent toward the philosopher and his political project. It is as critical as Gryparis/Papanoutsos’ text and paratext of the Republic while conveying the idealism and optimism found in Georgoulis’. Skouteropoulos’ and Mavropoulos’ renditions, which came after the publication of Politeia and Justice. They all however reflect the need to access the Republic synthetically, or as was already suggested holistically, so as to account for its extreme ideas without discrediting the work as a whole.

Papanoutsos’ objection to the role of the philosopher-ruler in the ideal Republic echoes Pappas’ concerns with regard to a tailored-made use of dialectics to educate the philosopher-ruler. As Pappa astutely points out, dialectics is made of logos and anti-logos, that is, argument and counterargument. Dialectics is the elenchus (examination, verification) of all doxas on what is justice and what is good used to reveal possible contradictions in canonized concepts and venerated institutions. For in Plato’s Republic, says Pappa, allowing only the obedient, ‘right-minded’ youth to have access to dialectics is abolishing the element of elenchus thus reducing dialectics to a structured method of dictating, maintaining, and ensuring endurability of the polity’s prevailing ideology. (Pappa 1997: 259-260). In the same line of thought, Moraitis expresses a more radical view according to which “Plato gives intellectuals what they [always] wanted (i.e., power) and the non-intellectuals what they also wanted (namely the possibility to acquire material things)” (Moraitis 1997: 47).

Similarly, eugenics, the abolition of the traditional structure of family and the community of women and children are thorny issues that open up to a series of major questions such
as the state’s right to regulate births or the parents right to create super babies (brainiacs or other genetically modified babies to carry the best strain of genes ensuring longevity, resistance to diseases and eternal youth); the role of the family and who has to right to procreate; the equality of the sexes or the equality between humans regardless of sex; issues of meritocracy, etc.

Papanoutsos touches upon these questions tentatively by admitting that nature does not evenly distribute all qualities and features. This is said in order to acknowledge that not all men are naturally predisposed to wisely lead a polity and that those who do take upon themselves a considerable responsibility and carry a huge burden. For this reason, they need to be rewarded accordingly and allowed to live in comfort. This view has already been openly defended by Memmos in his development on meritocracy, which does not equate to a narrow interpretation of equality. It is also vehementaly defended by Despotopoulos (1997: 114) as well as Ioannis Skouteropoulos. The latter also introduces the argument of fair remuneration of public officials and public servants alike as a strong deterrent to corruption.

The issue of eugenics and the abolition of family are treated more radically by Pappa and Moraitis, both of whom accuse Plato of being inhuman and of reducing love and relations between a man and a woman to a manner of administration regimented by the principles of collectivism. (Moraitis 1997: 51). By the same token, Ioannis Skouteropoulos interprets the community of women and children from a Christian point of view, whereby women become everyone’s mother and sister and children become the society’s collective moral concern and responsibility. Despotopoulos, for his part, sees in Plato’s project the only possible way to equate men and women without the one possessing the
other. As far as the Guardians are concern, Despotopoulos acknowledges Plato’s right as a lawmaker to make special provisions for temporary ‘conjugaison’ of equals (this terms needs to be read in its medical acception, that is, coitus or copulation) («Ισότιμη σύζευξη απλώς, παροδική, ορισμένου άνδρα και ορισμένης γυναίκας.») (Despotopoulos 1997: 113)

The discussion of Papanoutsos’ *Politeia and Justice* as opposed to Plato’s *Republic* and in relation to all the latter’s retranslations into Modern Greek as well as essays and commentaries on Plato and on the *Republic* could go on indefinitely. This is not possible in the context of this work. The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overall presentation of the major issues which come up periodically in my corpus and refer to one another either directly or indirectly. What has been examined so far is by no means analyzed exhaustively. Nevertheless, the corpus’ texts have been dissected both horizontally and vertically to unveil shifts in representations of philosophy and politics in the imaginary of modern Greek society.
CONCLUSION

Traditional views in translation studies demonstrate that retranslation is seen from a purely axiological perspective. Consequently, retranslation primarily becomes a process of remedying the loss of meaning of the original or the inevitable aging of previous translations. These approaches elevate the status of the original to that of an immortal text by attributing to the latter a transcendental value. In the same vein, there is a wide-spread view among translation theorists that one of the criteria for retranslation is the canonicity of the original, which accounts for it being translated and retranslated over and over again and which, in turn, adds to the original’s canonical status and sacredness.

There is also the ‘linear progress’ approach to retranslation for which the move from one translation to a newer one aims at “[...] restor[ing] something back to the ‘original’, something lost in previous translations.” (Susan-Sarajeva 2003: 1-36). This is a popular argument especially among those who believe that first translations tend to be mostly assimilative whereas later versions account for the otherness of the text to enter the sphere of the target-language and the target-culture.

Finally, a more recent trend in translation studies, seen in the works of Alexis Nouss, proposes to treat translation and, subsequently, retranslation as the product of transhistoricism. Nouss claims that transhistoricism “[...] aims to create a dialogue between distant historical situations, keeping from the past what is most relevant and enlightening both translated and translating worlds.” (Nouss 2007: 170). Nouss
understands transhistoricity in relation to historicity and metahistoricity. Historicity takes into account the historical context of both agents and the events that give meaning to the historical context. Metahistoricity is the ideological attitude that places any given reality beyond the temporal flux. (Nouss 2007: 147-8)

I believe that all existing retranslation theories fail to address more pragmatic and functional issues associated with retranslation. There are several reasons why these theories need to be challenged. First, a text is canonical or sacred insofar as it is of value within a given social-historical context. Canonicity and sacredness are characterizations perpetuated when a given society and its agents see an added value in the objects they elevate to this rank. Second, the number of retranslations cannot be a sufficient indicator of the original’s degree of canonicity. It is possible that canonical texts may have preferential treatment when considered for retranslation; but it is also a fact that non-canonical texts are being retranslated constantly and vice-versa.

Third, the transhistoricist approach to retranslation suggests an ideological dialogue between texts that belong to different social-historical contexts. My objection to Nouss’ proposal is that texts cannot really converse with one another. It is the individual agent (the reader, the translator, the commentator, i.e., society at large) who reads and interprets a given text and can potentially converse with it. However, this presumed conversation is tainted by the agent’s belief system, which is the result of his or her set of experiences and knowledge shaped in and by a given social-historical, tributary to a specific social system. No contemporary reader can really converse with a text that belongs to a different
Historicity, as Nouss suggests, because he or she is unable to identify with the author’s social-historical reality of which he or she has no direct knowledge or experience. By the same token, it is virtually impossible for any retranslation to objectively shed light onto the translated world simply because the reader-interpreter will always view the latter through the lens of his or her own social-historical. Should an understanding of the two worlds (the translated and the translating one) be possible, there should be at least some overlapping (chronological, historical, cultural, social or other), although this alone would not suffice.

Most importantly, the author of the original can only partially reflect his or her own social-historical and therefore cannot account for its multiple aspects. Given that a productive dialogue presupposes equality among the participants, Nouss’ proposal invokes a pseudo-dialogue, founded upon ideological assumptions of what is or ought to be the text, history, agent, translation, etc. Unfortunately, all these assumptions appear to be forced upon the retranslation phenomenon as unshakable tenets.

In view of the current theoretical deadlock into which the retranslation phenomenon has fallen, I put forth an alternative solution, which uses a more flexible theoretical apparatus. Inspired by Castoriadis’ work on the social-historical and its connection to autopoiesis, in conjunction with Varela’s and Maturana’s original work on autopoiesis, as well as Luhmann’s understanding of the autopoiesis of social systems, I proposed in my thesis to treat retranslation as a social-historical process of philosophical inquiry whereby a pre-existing matrix (the original text when retranslated) is used. In doing so, I place
retranslation within the sphere of creation, a process that involves putting into motion of the human imagination as a pre-requisite to generating new and meaningful forms.

It is important to stress that the creation of new forms does not necessarily imply their originality. Originality is not an axiological category that exists beyond and above any other notional category. Any creation—whether this is a work of art, a translation, a scientific discovery—is original for and in relation to the space, time, and circumstances from which it springs. Its originality ends the moment other agents, spaces, times and circumstances give rise to a new work of art, a new translation, an amazing invention or a scientific breakthrough that is relevant to the social-historical and replaces all previous creations by rendering them obsolete.

In Castoriadis’ view, organized societies are creations that accommodate two important components: the individual imaginary and the social imaginary. The first corresponds to the desires of a single individual whereas the second embodies the collective desires of a historical society. Some of these desires are fulfilled while others are not. On the social plane, fulfilled desires become instituted significations, that is, institutions vested with social legitimacy.

For Castoriadis the social-historical is the world created by investing—both individually and collectively—in the society. Investing in the society means that any given society specifies its own finalities, affects and representations, namely the driving force behind any form of creation or radical imaginary. In the absence of a radical imaginary, the
society and the individuals in the society cease to exist. But every time there is creation of new forms, the radical imaginary is at work. This means that a historical society is launching a reflexive and self-reflexive work on its own finalities, affects and representations. This complex yet important work, which Castoriadis names legein, consists in replacing, displacing, completing, contrasting, prolonging or abolishing finalities, affects and representations based on the elements that emerge in any given social-historical context.

*legein* is a reflexive process insofar as it posits six different co-substantial schemas: introducing things (*positing*), identifying them as such (*being*), designating them (*naming*), and assembling them (*gathering*). The latter presupposes *separating* elements already present in existing categories and *choosing/selecting* those which are appropriate to what the social-historical is trying to achieve. This process creates the conditions of equivalence, that is, the conditions of identity or quasi identity, based on the elements that enter into a system or on those that are excluded from it.

Castoriadis maintains that, in order to define finalities, affects and representations, it is necessary to circumscribe meaning. He calls this operation the closure of meaning. It is the closure of meaning that determines what is true, valid, and legitimate for any given society, at a specific time and place. Philosophy, for its part, breaks the closure of meaning because, as Castoriadis suggests, it questions all given significations by refusing their *de facto* presence and function within a given social-historical. Philosophy always aims at identifying the reason of the significations’ institutionalization and seeks an
account for their existence. The process of asking for a reason and of demanding an account for everything that is happening is called logon didonai and amounts to replacing the de facto by the de jure.

Logon didonai posits that the social-historical operates a self-reflexively, and this operation is in itself autopoietic. In Varela’s and Maturana’s terms, the autopoietic system “[…] is organized (defined as unity) as a network of processes of production (synthesis and destruction) of components such that these components: (i) continuously regenerate and realize the network that produces them, and (ii) constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the domain in which they exist.” (Varela 1991: 5) This means that autopoietic systems (the social-historical being one of them) possess a dual capacity: to produce and eventually change their own structures; and to influence the production of other components as a result of their self-referential nature. (Luhmann 1986: 177)

Luhmann’s analysis on the autopoiesis of social systems has many commonalities with Castoriadis’ theoretical apparatus. To the process of legein Luhmann opposes the notions of selection and responsibility for the narrowing of choices in communication theory, which, in his view, replaces or should replace action theory. The former is reflexive (one has to attribute responsibility for selecting communication, for identifying who said what and for deciding about further contributions) and reflexive communication is not “[…] an occasional event but also a continuing possibility being co-produced by the autopoiesis itself. Every communication has to anticipate this kind of recursive elaboration, questioning, denial or correction, and has to preadapt to these future possibilities.”
It is clear that Luhmann’s function of communication almost coincides with Castoriadis’ role of philosophy within a social system, a given social-historical.

It is important to note that, in the eyes of the above-mentioned theorists, autopoiesis is a self-regulating process that allows a social system or a social-historical to consciously take charge of and regulate its own functions either by regenerating or by decaying. As Luhmann suggests, autopoiesis as a mechanism of self-regulation and self-maintenance has been used to displace teleological reasoning. In the event of decay, a system decides to cease its autopoietic work. But in the case of regeneration, autopoiesis is in full swing. This means in that the closure of meaning opens up to new possibilities that communicate meaning by moving it from the \textit{de facto} to the \textit{de jure}.

This transposition needs not be subversive. When something is replaced by something else, the new form is not always radically new or revolutionary. It may be that the new meaning simply reaffirms what has been viewed as a closed meaning (\textit{de facto}) by making it rational (in other words functional) for the new context within which it is ascribed. To put it differently, there is no imperative need to associate new with original, in the sense traditional discourse views originality.

Consequently, when Castoriadis suggests that philosophy is the openness operated to the closure of meaning, he really means that philosophy, when and where it operates, is an autopoietic mechanism, whose “[…] components in general and basic elements in
particular can be reproduced only if they have the capacity to link closure and openness.” (Luhmann 1986)

My proposal to treat retranslation as a social-historical process of philosophical inquiry (thus an autopoietic function of the radical imaginary that operates on the binary nature of meaning) that associates retranslation with philosophy. Both share a set of common elements: they are mechanisms of creation; they aim at generating new representations so as to embody newly shaped social finalities; their coming into being is not the result of an *ex nihilo* process. As Castoriadis suggests, philosophy (thus by extension retranslation) is the product of the social-historical’s radical imaginary which, through the process of *legein*, is forced into looking at all the possibilities of mediating closure and openness, that is, shutting down the system or exploring its evolutionary potential for building new systems within the system (new imaginaries within the existing radical imaginary) “[…] which will be able to maintain closure under the condition of openness and openness under the condition of closure.” (*Ibid*)

I therefore agree with Luhmann that the binary nature of the radical imaginary’s autopoietic capacity rejects any transcending or self-transcending power. It is not the outer world (or the outer world alone) that will determine the need for the social-historical to define or communicate meaning in the same token as it is not the retranslation’s internal representation to grasp the evasive transcendental meaning of the original with a view to restoring it. Retranslation as well as philosophy have a practical
value, a functional purpose, namely to create meaning for and within a given social-historical.

For this reason, I posit that retranslations become the society’s historical monuments. Monuments are material and mental reminders and points of reference for what a specific social-historical can shape from a given matrix (in our case the original text that is being translated and retranslated) and circumscribe it to make sense for its members.

Considering retranslation from the point of view of Castoriadis’ theoretical apparatus provides a set of benefits. Retranslation as a social-historical, autopoietic process places translation studies within the realm of contemporary epistemological inquiry. The tools of this epistemological investigation are both natural (we are dealing with social, linguistic, and cultural phenomena and with real agents facing real constraints) and material (the raw material is the retranslated text and its function within the context to which it refers). In this sense, the tools are not transcendental: what is at stake here is no longer the presumed sacred nature of the original or the translation’s failure to capture the former’s illusive meaning. Retranslation as a functional analytical process has the advantage to acknowledge, posit a set of problems and reflect on the conditions susceptible to generate an investigation leading to feasible solutions while using specific strategies. The positing of problems, the functional analysis that allows the discovery of mechanisms for problem-solving and its subsequent action, namely comparing solutions to problems, open the door to universal or global theories insofar as “[…] they have the important
advantage of seeing and comparing themselves with other objects of the same type.” (cf. Luhmann 1986).

In other words, this new approach to retranslation allows us to reflect on translation studies as well as on philosophy by taking into consideration their function and their impact on the society. The demystification of the original, the de-demonization of the first, usually labelled as inadequate, translation —none of which is by definition a scientific category— present new possibilities for the study of retranslation. Besides being a social-historical-specific process, retranslation enters the realm of generalization, hence theorization and episteme, and it does so by becoming one of the constitutive parts that shape and feed (or re-feed) a system of thought based on which a specific social-historical perceives the cosmos, identifies it and is self-identified through it.

In this thesis, I undertook the task of testing my new retranslation hypothesis on the case of the numerous 20th-century retranslations into Modern Greek of Plato’s Republic. What is particularly interesting in this study is that the raw material fits a specific profile: the Republic is a canonical (in the traditional sense of the word), philosophical text, which makes it suitable for the possibility of the openness of the closure of meaning. Additionally, the number of retranslations of Plato’s Republic, namely nine in less that a century, and more specifically between 1937 and 2006, raises questions as to the reasons behind the social-historical’s drive to use the same raw material in order to create and re-create meaning and the nature of the openness of meaning that was achieved thanks to these retranslations.
My analysis in Chapters III, IV and V suggests that all retranslations of the *Republic* into Modern Greek share a common theoretical denominator that evolves around three axes: philosophy, politics and education. Although somewhat distinct, these axes are interrelated in that philosophy, by its nature, should be considered a superior category that encompasses politics and education as part of its comprehensive system of thought aiming at all domains of knowledge and the understanding of nature and human actions-creations. This assumption being a valid one, it does not preclude the analysis from separating philosophy into its constitutive parts so as to examine them independently.

As a result, it comes as no surprise that all three elements entertain a referential relationship to one another, even when considered separately. The discourse analysis of all nine retranslations of Plato’s *Republic* shows clearly that the autopoietic process of the social-historical is at work because it constantly reflects on and about the society. And it does so via its own discourse but also mainly by the discourse which it generates in support of its own position or as a reaction to it. At first glance, one could suggest that each retranslation, despite the general nature of the original, favours one of the three axes at the expense of the others. A closer look reveals, however, that this is partially true insofar as the primary concern of the social-historical reflected on each retranslation, or conveyed as a social message via its text, presupposes the causal relationship between the three elements (philosophy, politics and education).

More specifically, Plato’s seminal educational program in the *Republic* inspired Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ 1948/1962 paraphrase in *katharevousa*. The circumstances of the origins
of this paraphrase and the profile of the translator (his educational, political, and ideological views) were analyzed in depth in Chapters III and IV. Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ version of the *Republic* is the one dedicated to education par excellence. Here I am interested in demonstrating how this retranslation reflected upon and influenced its own social-historical.

Before doing so, it would be useful to remember that, in Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ case, we are not really dealing with a retranslation *per se* but with a paraphrase that evolves into a commentary of pedagogical interest. This is consistent with the translator/author’s explicit and implicit intentions, his professional status, and his linguistic views. A translation would challenge the primacy of Ancient Greek and its noble evolution, *katharevousa*. Using the latter as a means for writing a commentary is legitimate insofar as the content of the commentary supports the author’s views and the way he manipulates the *Republic* to shape a social-historical meaning.

1948 marks the end of the Civil War and the triumph of the Western forces and the dominance of the conservative segment within Greek society. This segment of society is self-identified, among other things, by the use of *katharevousa* and a political ideology that idealizes Western polities while remaining attached to traditional values, such as Orthodox dogma, and an understanding of civicism that is founded upon a set of moral and ethical (i.e. religious) premises rather than the importance of human rights, as was the case in the republican West.
Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ 1948 presentation of Plato’s *Republic* both reproduces (i.e., reaffirms) and solidifies a number of representations that were germinating in this particular social-historical. His understanding of the profile of the ideal citizen is transposed upon Plato’s educational plan, which was based on the premise of the child’s incomplete nature (children being an inferior class of the human race), and the need for a close, regimented guidance of youth with the help of a strict educational system. From a purely psychological standpoint, this could represent a particular affect of a big segment of Greek society, more specifically the need for security and stability, after a prolonged period of social and political unrest, the divisions created in the Greek social fabric as a result of the Civil War and the inevitable chaos and loss of order that came with the latter.

The way Ioannis Skouteropoulos unfolds his patriotic and conservative stance in the *Republic’s* commentary is consistent with his educational activities as a teacher and a member of the Council of Primary and Secondary Education Inspectors. At the time, the Council was heavily divided due to the presence of two opposing factions: the progressives and the conservatives. These factions, which had great influence in the country’s educational matters, would understand and interpret the purpose of national education as a response to the needs of Greece’s civil society in the making in ways that were not necessarily fundamentally opposed, although they were presented as such.

More specifically, neither the progressives nor the conservatives objected to the finality of shaping a modern Greek civil society upon the model of any other Western European society. The idea of a modern Greek civil society reflected the aspirations of an
immersing middle class of traders, lawyers, doctors, and public servants who would gradually populate big cities (mainly the country’s capital) and associate education with financial prosperity, ownership and security, as well as social ascension and recognition.

This common goal (finality in action) needed to be sustained by a new social representation, which translated in the openness of a closed meaning. The closed meaning equated with a traditional, Ottoman-inspired organization of the polity that relied on deep-rooted beliefs and practices such as nepotism, as a result of thinking locally and within a short-term benefit perspective instead of having a more global (national) perception of what is good for society or the nation as a whole, thus shaping a national identity. The emergence of a new social class exacerbated social struggle while, at the same time, it provided the impetus for class-consciousness and self-identification as a result of belonging to a specific social class.

Greece’s transformed social makeup, in conjunction with a rapid yet uncontrolled urbanization process, required a theoretical foundation. The foundation was to be found in the inception of an educational system capable of rationalizing new realities and assigning meaning to them. Despite the almost unanimous understanding of the finality at stake, the factions involved in shaping the educational system would disagree on the means to achieve it. In the years between 1834 and 1964, the number of educational reforms (whether proclaimed, voted, cancelled or carried through) reflects a malaise in shifting from the de facto to the de jure but also a pressing need to come up with the comprehensive educational system the country so desperately needed. Conflicting
positions reflect opposite affects which, in turn, suggest that the specific social-historical is somewhat torn between the need to incarnate new representations for collective finalities and the contradictory drives that invest their respective energy in achieving the common goal from a different standpoint.

In 1948-1949, the social and political dimensions of the country’s educational policy were at the centre of the discussion, because they would ultimately determine the social-historical understanding of politics, society, and the rights and obligations of the citizens of a new state that was trying to build itself from the ashes of the Second World War and the Civil War. More specifically, during the 1949 School Inspectors’ National Conference, the main topic of discussion was civic education. Although both progressives and conservatives agreed that political consciousness was not sufficiently developed among Greek citizens and that this particular deficit would translate in a never-ending conflict between the citizens and the State, their approach to educating future citizens was fundamentally different.

The progressive faction was in favour of introducing a separate subject matter (called civic education) as early as primary school to familiarize pupils with the role and function of the country’s parliamentary system and the rights and obligations of all Greek citizens as set out by the Constitution. The subject matter would aim at shaping “good citizens” thus putting an end to the intolerable practices of the past.
The conservative faction was more concerned with the moral aspect of the issue and posited that Greeks shied away from their civic duties and responsibilities because of their individualistic nature. Representatives of the conservative faction, led by Ioannis Skouteropoulos, were concerned that the new subject matter would undermine classical Greek Orthodox values, thus promoting imported ideals, such as utilitarianism and a clear preference for whatever seems practical.

In order to understand the implications of introducing civic education into the Greek curriculum (primary and secondary level of education), it is necessary to delve into the debate on the philosophy of education (cf. pp 90-94 in this thesis). Post-Second World War Greek society was torn between two opposite views. On the one hand, there was the paradigm of classical education, based on the principles of Christianity and the values inherited from our great ancestors. In this system, the child is considered an incomplete, imperfect entity in need of guidance and advice deposited in “revered elders”, who possess a wealth of knowledge acquired in the course of time through study and accumulated experience. This view was unfailingly portrayed by Ioannis Skouteropoulos in his Plato-inspired pedagogical treatise on the educational value of the Republic.

On the other hand, a more progressive approach to education was slowly emerging. It would embrace civic education as a means of turning school into a hands-on civic experience, thus going beyond sterile memorization of pieces of information while encouraging reflective learning. The plan behind this approach was to transform the modern Greek school into a self-governed modern polity with its own Charter or Rights
(Constitution), a set of conduct and disciplinary rules whereby its members (mainly teachers) would lead by example. This view was promoted by Papanoutsos whose philosophical underpinning was primarily political, that is, concerned with establishing a fair, democratic polity founded on an equally democratic educational system (cf. Tsoumanas 2008).

The question of civic education and its introduction into the school curriculum would come to a deadlock, because it was not applied continuously or consistently over the years and throughout Greek territory. One possible explanation for this deadlock is that the Greek social-historical was still uneasy about how far it would go to accept new meanings by abolishing, in full or in part, established ones.

The 1964 attempt to reform the country’s educational system is a case in point. Bill # 4379, introduced by Papanoutsos and Papandreou, aimed at bringing about innovative measures (such as extending mandatory schooling from six to nine years, teaching the Classics exclusively via translation, promoting *demotiki* as the working language in the classroom and the country’s official language, instituting the Baccalaureate as a means of upgrading post-secondary education, introducing modern subject matters such as social studies and economics, to fulfill the dream of a civic-oriented educational system.

The bill was never implemented as a result of mounting pressure coming from conservative educators, politicians, and academics, whose views were becoming increasingly popular. Once again, Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ involvement in the debate was
central. After all, Ioannis Skouteropoulos was a prominent and readily recognizable proponent of the *de facto* meaning. All attempts to reform the Greek educational system came to an end with the 1967 coup d’état, which gave legitimacy to traditional notional categories such as the importance of nation, race, spiritual civilization, humanism and the teachings of Greek Orthodox theology.

Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ official position, stated in his 1958 articles *Έλεγχος των πορισμάτων της Επιτροπής Παιδείας*, (Overview of the Findings of the Educational Committee), *Η σχολική γλώσσα* (The language of education), *Η σχολική οργάνωσις* (Educational Organization), and his 1964 *Σύντομος έλεγχος των κυριοτέρων διατάξεων των εκπαιδευτικών νομοσχεδίων* (Quick overview of the most important provisions of the educational bills) were reproducing his main theoretical and political views as fully elaborated in his commentary on the *Republic*.

In that sense, *Plato’s Republic and newer pedagogy* assumes a functional role within its corresponding social-historical inasmuch as it contributes to postponing, be it temporarily, the shift toward openness of meaning. This, however, can be considered a particular openness of meaning to the extent that the *de facto* acquires authority via a re-legitimization process. Additionally, Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ public views create a web of referential and self-referential discursive relationships with similar or opposing views. This is especially obvious in the case of Georgoulis and his involvement in the educational and linguistic debate, particularly in connection with the introduction of civic education in the school curriculum, its perceived benefits and potential threats to social
stability and cohesion. Georgoulis’ involvement in this case becomes all the more interesting if we take into account two major factors: first, his own canonized version of Plato’s *Republic* into modern Greek, which dates back to 1939 (re-edited in 1962); and, second, the shift in his linguistic and educational positions from his 1939 introduction of his translation of the *Republic* to his 1953-1967 conservative turn vis-à-vis language, the place of Ancient Greek in the educational system and the importance of preserving classical, Christian Orthodox values.

As part of the so-called “reactionary progressive” faction of educators of his time, Georgoulis sided with Ioannis Skouteropoulos’ views on the issue of civic education. Although not directly opposed to the introduction of civic education in the school curriculum, Georgoulis maintained that a strictly ideational approach to civic education could be detrimental to students if it was not included in a broader, historically-centered framework of defining and understanding the concepts of the citizen, the polity, civic and political rights and responsibilities.

Reactionary progressive educators belonged to the most progressive wing of the conservative pedagogues concerned with preserving traditional values in education, such as the primacy of classical letters (including Ancient Greek) and the importance of the Christian Orthodox dogma within an educational system founded upon the principle of preventive pedagogy, which uses discipline and admonishment.
Grollios and Tzikas (2002) suggest that Georgoulis’ progressiveness decreased between 1953 and 1967. The educator’s more liberal stance transpires in his 1939 translation of the *Republic*, where Georgoulis speaks highly of the qualities of Modern Greek and its potential to express complex concepts, despite any shortcoming stemming from its relatively new use. In his defense of Modern Greek, Georgoulis recognizes the importance of a new language in shaping meaning and expressing the aspirations of a new generation of Greek citizens.

His change of heart between 1953 and 1967 should be examined in relation to the position he held from 1952 to 1957 as Secretary General at the Ministry of Education under the direction of Ministers Konstantinos Kallias\textsuperscript{107} and Ahilleas Gerokostopoulos respectively, in General Papagos’ government. Papagos’ party, named *Ellinikos Synagermos* (Hellenic Alert)\textsuperscript{108} came into power on November 16, 1952, after a sweeping victory, which translated into 238 out of the 300 seats in the Greek Parliament. Papagos’ government, in power from November 19, 1952 to October 4, 1955, benefited from the outspoken support of the United States as well as that of major publishing houses in Greece, which had the capacity to influence public opinion through their publications.

Papagos’ rule was in fact a military-driven, conservative government that turned to the West (especially the USA) for guidance and approval. Policies during this period, more

\textsuperscript{107} Konstantinos Kallias resigned as Minister of National Education following a government shuffle on April 11, 1954.

\textsuperscript{108} The party was inspired by and named after Charles de Gaulle’s Rassemblement pour la République. Before entering politics, Papagos resigned from his military position and created his party with a view to putting an end to the country’s political deadlock, especially all failed attempts by the progressive faction of the political spectrum, particularly parties inspired by Elefterios Venizelos’ ideas, and to form a viable government.
specifically with regard to economic measures initiated by Minister of Coordination Spyros Markezinis, were bold yet controversial. They did, however, allow Greece to enter the sphere of international economics by associating the country’s national currency with the US dollar under the Bretton Woods 1944 agreement. This was achieved via a 50 per cent devaluation of the Greek drachma against the US dollar on April 9, 1953. All these measures were consistent with the Greek government’s philosophy of acknowledging the military and political power held by the USA at the international level and resulted in the creation of American military bases on Greek territory.

In reality, Papagos launched the era of a series of pro-American conservative governments, all of which presented the following paradox: on the one hand, progress was associated with being part of an American-inspired version of the Western civilized world, that is, an extroverted approach to politics; on the other hand, Greekness was understood via the preservation of traditional values, such as katharevousa, the teachings of the Greek Orthodox Church and a renewed sense of patriotism. The latter resulted in an introverted, self-referential turn. A strict, military-inspired educational system had to be in place to ensure that the above-mentioned values were instilled in the mind of future citizens.

When seen from this point of view, Georgoulis’ position can be explained more easily. Being part of a government such as the one formed by Papagos would require compliance with the founding principles of the Hellenic Alert party. One should not, however, deduce that Georgoulis was forced to go along with positions that did not reflect, be it partly, his
personality or went against his own philosophical, linguistic, and political views simply because of the office he held or his desire to hold on to his political position.

As mentioned earlier, Georgoulis belonged to the reactionary progressive faction of Greek educators who succeeded in imposing their pedagogical views during the 1953-1957 period. Their general philosophy on pedagogy was labeled “state didactics” (κρατική διδακτική) and was founded upon the traditional pillars of national, moral, social and religious education. The ultimate goal of state didactics was to initiate students in Christian Hellenic civilization. The means to achieve it consisted in a new subject matter introduced in primary schools under the name of “Getting to know my country” (Πατριδογνωσία - Patridognosia).

As early as Grade 1, students were called upon to learn about their country. This familiarization was not achieved by using a scientific approach to knowledge. Instead, it relied heavily on invoking feelings and emotions. The goal of this subject matter was to posit the knowledge of the country, stricto sensu, as a precondition for understanding the notion of country, lato sensu. To achieve this goal, the topic was divided into large thematic units, each dealing with a specific characteristic of the country stricto sensu.

From a pedagogical point of view, the creators of Patridognosia believed that this approach would enhance natural learning given that knowledge was presented in a holistic form, which in turn is consistent with the nature of the human psyche. Additionally, moving from the themes pertaining to the country stricto sensu to the
notion of a country *lato sensu* was deemed more effective from the standpoint of a national-oriented (read nationalist-oriented) education because all the activities related to the subject-matter were articulated around holistic notions such as the country, race, and the Greek nation (cf. Grollios and Tzikas 2002: 17).

Georgoulis was among the biggest proponents of *Patridognosia* or “Getting to know my country”. As a philologist, he was ready to admit the importance of a Modern language that would combine new forms with older ones, taken from katharevousa, to provide users with a complete linguistic and notional arsenal. As a philosopher, he was particularly concerned with treating philosophy, especially classical philosophy, from a holistic point of view. His approach to translating the *Republic* (see pp. 120-133 of this thesis) constantly invoked the need to return to the essence of things in order to rebuild from ruins. As an educator, he readily admitted that the role of education is to associate knowledge with moral values and to treat them as inseparable units that always refer to the human *psyche* and its constitutive yet undivided parts.

As a translator, Georgoulis’ reading of the *Republic* was in tune with his personal set of values and the expectations of his generation. Not surprisingly, the central elements found in his interpretation of Plato’s *Republic*, as far as education, philosophy and politics are concerned, were being translated into politics and measures that became finalities in action, especially during the period he was holding office with Papagos’ conservative but stable government. In the image of Plato, Georgoulis is the loyal citizen, a good soldier who works toward achieving normalcy and stability. The Second World
War and its subsequent Civil War is for Georgoulis the equivalent of Plato’s Peloponnesian War. Their common goal is to return to the essence of things, already set out by Greek Classical philosophy, via a holistic reconstruction process.

The opening of the closure of meaning offered by Georgoulis’ translation of the *Republic* consisted in underlying the importance of unity for a nation, the Greek nation in particular, understood in connection with the Greek race. This nationalist reading sets aside humanistic values insofar as militarization becomes, be it implicitly, a legitimate means to achieve territorial and political recognition for a newly formed State-Nation. We should notice that Georgoulis identifies with Plato’s disheartenment before the devastation of the Greek *polis*. He is not, however, particularly critical of Pericles for his actions leading to the Peloponnesian War. One plausible explanation would be that Pericles was also responsible for the greatness Athens achieved under his rule. Georgoulis’ association with the Papagos government, as well as with Konstantinos Karamanlis, who succeeded Papagos after his death, could possibly mean that Georgoulis saw in them two charismatic politicians and identified with their cause.

For Georgoulis, the question of democracy becomes less of an issue probably because he participated in a government that was “democratically” elected by the Greek people. It is my understanding that Georgoulis was more interested in questions related to a properly run polity in which democracy was a procedural element rather than in the essence of democracy as such. In Gryparis and Papanoutsos’ interpretation of the *Republic*, the question of democracy is at the forefront of their philosophical investigation insofar as it
is directly related to justice and human nature. They both aspire toward a truly democratic polity that would achieve the ultimate goal of happiness despite its real or perceived shortcomings.

The interpretation of the *Republic* put forth by Gryparis was analyzed in chapters 3.4 and 4.4. The openness of the closure of meaning operated by both Gryparis and Papanoutsos consisted in suggesting that democracy is the only alternative both in the absence of democracy as well as in conditions that invoke the elements of democracy but translate into non-democratic behaviours. In the case of Gryparis, the absence of democracy is manifested in three different ways: first, in Venizelos’ 1910 democratic government which was marked by the Balkan Wars (1912-14); second, Metaxas’ 1936 dictatorship and the collapse of all democratic structures; and, finally, the Second World War and the Civil War that succeeded the former. Papanoutsos’ 1954 retranslation of Gryparis’ 1911 version was made against the political background described in Georgoulis’ political involvement in the government formed by General Papagos.

The position that Papanoutsos holds in favour of democracy operates a new openness of the closure of meaning in that it objects both to the letter of Plato’s *Republic* vis-à-vis the evil traits of democracy, and to the spirit of the *de facto* interpretation of Plato during Papanoutsos’ time, as suggested by the versions put forth by Georgoulis, Ioannis Skouteropoulos, or Galinos, namely a holistic philosophy centered in the primacy of the Greek race and the Greek nation and the benefits stemming from a strictly regimented education founded solely upon the Classics and traditional Christian values.
Papanoutsos reflected the thoughts and aspirations of a different segment of Greek society, that is, the progressive faction that was concerned with re-establishing democratic values via the rule of law. The innovative factor in Papanoutsos’ case is that the rule of law is closely associated with the essence of the human being. For Papanoutsos, this means that the law should take into consideration a fundamental principle, namely that “[…] the human being is the only being in the known universe that has the irrevocable right to be treated as a goal toward which one strives and not as a means to achieve any given goal.” (Papanoutsos 1978/2009: 22 – My translation).

In other words, Papanoutsos introduces a humanistic turn in modern political philosophy since his definition of the human being aims at repositioning man within a democratic polity whereby the human being is the ultimate value against which any other value is measured and accounted for. In this polity, the law is entrusted with a specific task, that is, to organize life within by respecting and safeguarding the above-mentioned fundamental, thus stating clearly the rights and responsibilities of citizens toward their very essence as human beings as well as the values stemming from their own existence.

Papanoutsos’ views on politics and philosophy are reflected in the work he undertook in his capacity as a member of government (the 1944- and the 1963-64-Georgios Papandreou government as well as the 1950-Sophoclis Venizelos government) or as part of the opposition with regard to education (he favoured demotiki) and his active involvement in the question of civic education against the demands put forth by the conservative faction of educators.
Papanoutsos chose to work with the *Republic* in order to give voice to new political and philosophical interpretations that were slowly emerging during his lifetime. He opted for the *Republic* because, based on his own definition of a short-lived vs. a long-lived work of art, Plato’s ultimate political dialogue belongs to the category of masterpieces. According to Papanoutsos, a long-lived work of art is an open-ended creation that accounts for everything that is *always* relevant and new to people and not with what is *occasionally* or *circumstantially* new or relevant. In other words, a work of art has unlimited potential simply because its creator managed to capture and understand the human being and human soul (Papanoutsos 1978/2009: 113).

I believe that Papanoutsos saw in Plato’s *Republic* all necessary conditions for launching an autopoietic process of regenerating perennial questions as per human nature, the nature of the polity, justice, happiness and all known forms of governance. In doing so, he positioned the *Republic* into the realm of a work of art, that is an open-ended text that can be relevant to any society and to any given time and can perpetually acquire relevance when a given social-historical sets goals that need to be achieved.

Additionally, the choice Papanoutsos made, on the one hand, to translate one of Plato’s dialogues and, on the other, to recreate the *Republic*’s philosophical debate in his original work *Πολιτεία και Δικαιοσύνη και άλλοι διάλογοι* (*Politeia and Justice and other dialogues*) suggests that he decided to take advantage of the discursive benefits of a philosophical dialogue as opposed to those of an essay. By his own account, a dialogue allows the author to identify with all the participants in the dialogue, without representing
any one of them exclusively or in total. A dialogue is valid only insofar as the author treats *logos* and *anti-logos* on equal terms, that is, when all arguments have equal counterarguments. For that to happen, all participants need to be of equal standing. Since the author is present in all participants, the author in the dialogue needs to ensure that he or she does not allow for an easy way out of all possible dialogical deadlocks. The latter also implies that, even if the dialogue is to have a foreseeable end, that is, an anticipated conclusion, it can always account for the element of surprise. In other words, the dialogue can eventually bring to light aspects of the problem that were not previously accounted for and offer a new perspective, thus putting forth new solutions to problems.

In my view, the way Papanoutsos circumscribes the role and function of the dialogue reflects his understanding of democracy. Democracy is by excellence a political system that favours dialogue, whereby citizens entertain a reflexive and self-reflexive interaction with each other and with themselves. Democratic citizens are foremost *synanthropoi* (fellow men) in that their equal standing provides the necessary conditions for mutual trust, understanding, and equality (justice). A dialogical relationship promotes knowledge inasmuch as it accounts for new emerging possibilities (interpretations) of the goals and aspirations of citizens in their respective social-historical.

It is clear that Papanoutsos’ critical interpretation of the *Republic* (see also 5.3) reflects the autopoietic potential of his social-historical, especially since it positions political reflection within the realm of dialectics, which in turn is above all a philosophical question. Papanoutsos portrays the concern of his social-historical in quest of true
democracy, both in terms of a form of governance and a philosophical way of life, by insisting on the need to place *elenchus* (dialectics) at the centre of all human *doxas* with regard to every single aspect of human life and social organization (institutions). Papanoutsos, along with many of his fellow citizens, was convinced that the Greek state of his time had not reached democracy as described above and that the political quest for democracy required a philosophical underpinning, namely a definition of the society’s representations, finalities and affects.

Greece’s current financial crisis is the result of a deep political crisis in the sense that Greek society remains a deeply fragmented society whose finalities are sketchily defined and mostly contradictory. This could possibly mean that all autopoietic forces within the social-historical were working either in parallel without ever managing to reach one another in order to come to a productive synthesis or that they were working against one another in an undermining, subversive way.

The shift from *katharevousa* to *demotiki* and the mixed language we are currently using is a very good example of the lack of consensus of the prevailing representation of the Greek social-historical and the hold conflicting positions have in the social arena. The table below reflects all the back-and-forth of Modern Greek (as opposed to Ancient Greek) as reflected in the various retranslations of the *Republic*. The colour scheme (moving from dark red to bright yellow) helps those who cannot read Greek to appreciate the move from a more archaic to a more popular version arriving at the prevailing linguistic form that is the result of a political compromise to an ever-ending debate.
Gryparis

Glykonis – Papatheodorou-Pappas

Gryparis – Papanoutsos

Georgoulis

Hatzopoulos

Memmos

N. Skouteropoulos

Mavropoulos

Φαντάσου τόρα ανθρώπους να περνούν κατά μήκος αυτού του τοίχου, φορτωμένοι παντοδιάδρομης κάτασκευάσματα και ανθρώπινες κατασκευασμένα από λίθον ή ξύλον ή απ’ ο, τι άλλο, εις τρόπον ώστε όλα αυτά να φαινόταν πάνω από τον τοίχο, και από αυτούς που τα σηκώνουν άλλο μεν να ομολογούν μεταξύ τους, άλλο δέ να σιωπούν. – Είναι παράξενη η εικόνα και παράξενοι οι δεσμώτες σου.

[χρησιμοποιείται πολυτονικό]

Φαντάσου τόρα ανθρώπους που να βαδίζουν παράλληλα προς το μικρόν τοίχο και να μεταφέρουν κάθε είδους κατασκευάσματα, που είναι ψηλότερα από τον τοίχο, και ανθρώπινες κατασκευασμένες, και όπως είναι φυσικά, άλλοι από αυτούς ανθρώπους που παρελθόντων με τα μεταφέροντα μελών και άλλους σιωπούν. – Πολύ παράξενης είπε, είπε, είπε η εικόνα που μοι πορουσιάζεις και δεσμώτες που παράξενοι.

[χρησιμοποιείται πολυτονικό]

Φαντάσου τόρα ανθρώπους που να περνούν κατά μήκος αυτού του τοίχου φορτωμένοι κάθε λογίας κατασκευάσματα, και άλλοι και ανθρώπινα μεταφέροντας, καθώς και κοντά σε αυτούς που παρέλθουν, και ξόνα κατασκευασμένα από ξύλο ή πέτρα ή άλλο, που είναι ψηλότερα από το τοίχο, και ανθρώπινα κατασκευασμένα, και όπως είναι φυσικά, άλλοι σιωπούν. Πολύ παράξενης είπε, είπε, είπε η εικόνα και αλλόκοτοι οι δεσμώτες σου.

[χρησιμοποιείται πολυτονικό]

Φαντάσου λοιπον κοντά σε τούτο το τοιχίο, ανθρώπους να μεταφέρουν κάθε είδους κατασκευάσματα, που εξέχουν η λογίας, καθώς και κανένας ανθρώπινα κατασκευασμένα με κάθε είδους λογίας, και όπως είναι φυσικά, από αυτούς που τα μεταφέρουν, και άλλοι μελών και άλλους σιωπούν. Πολύ παράξενης είπε, είπε, είπε η εικόνα και από αυτούς ανθρώπους, ή από άλλους, ή από τους άλλους, σιωπούν. Παράδοξον αλλόκοτοι οι δεσμώτες, και δεσμώτες, αλλόκοτοι σιωπούν. Κάθως και άλλοι μελών και άλλους κατασκευάσματα, και από αυτούς ανθρώπους, ή από αυτούς ανθρώπους, ή από τους άλλους, από αυτούς ανθρώπους, ή από τους άλλους.

[χρησιμοποιείται πολυτονικό]
Lately there has been an intense debate on the failures of Greek civic democracy. A common *topos* in this debate is to associate the current crisis with corruption, the latter being the catastrophic result of aggressive capitalism and globalization. Chrysogonos suggests that corruption is in no way a Greek phenomenon *per se*. What makes Greece stand out from other “democratic Western polities” is that corruption has increased during the last two decades and that there are no counter-forces to eradicate corruption and bring about *catharsis*. Chrysogonos identifies four major causes of this problem, all of which revolve around the concept of politics being de-politicized: first, the autarchic internal organization of Greek political parties; second, the fact that politics is a family affair, thus a privilege and a right reserved for a selected few; third, the lack of true separation of powers, especially that of justice and government, and the former’s incapacity to work promptly and effectively; and, fourth, society’s tolerant attitude vis-à-vis illegal economic activity and violation of the law. (Chrysogonos 2011: 95-97)

Chrysogonos’ description of Greece’s inherent political shortcomings is reflected in Memmos’ version of Plato’s *Republic*, although the latter precedes the former on a chronological sequence. Memmos is the only translator among the nine retranslators of the *Republic* who goes as far as making a caricature of Modern Greece by stigmatizing, via his vivid and at times grotesque use of language, the problems of his society while transposing modernity into the *Republic*’s real discursive time. Memmos’ translated text and corresponding paratext is limited to an enumeration of Greece’s political problems, which in itself is useful inasmuch as it allows us to conclude that all previous autopoietic forces at work only had a short-term effect.
In reality, the question remains purely philosophical because depoliticization is a sign that a given social-historical has trouble with identifying representations that would allow it to understand and organize its life around humanistic values that pertain to a democratic society governed by the rule of law, ensuring equality before the law, economic development that would benefit all according to their contribution and involvement and a set of common priorities (finalities) and goals that would contribute to collective happiness and give meaning to life.

Consequently, suggesting that the Greek crisis is a financial or political crisis is only partly true since it is a philosophical problem at large. Marvopoulos and Skouteropoulos produce their retranslations of the *Republic* in the midst of the crisis. Skouteropoulos more than Mavropoulos acknowledges that key political representations of his social-historical have reached a saturation point and that it would be practically impossible for them to progress further. At the time Skouteropoulos retranslates the *Republic*, Greece has mostly stable governments elected in accordance with the Constitution. Fundamental institutions are in place, social development has been achieved, territorial integrity is a given and citizens live in relative security and prosperity.

Yet all these political, social, judicial and other “acquis” are questioned because they did not fulfil their intended purpose, especially since they failed to promote justice and happiness. Instead they contributed to increasing the gap between the have and the have-nots. It is therefore necessary to reconsider the problem from its purely philosophical perspective, that is, to move away from the etiology of Greece’s pathology toward a
superior category, that of a meta-ontological level of considering and circumscribing the idea or ousia of normalcy, happiness, and justice. N. Skouteropoulos’ philosophical shift translates a reflective attitude toward Western philosophy, thus suggesting that there is an interaction between modern Greek political thought and major philosophical trends developed outside Greek confines. The latter marks an attempt to break free from the self-referential attitude of Greek philosophy, which consists in contemplating philosophy primary through the lens of the teachings of Ancient Greek classical philosophers, thus ignoring, at worst, or underestimating, at best, modern contributions of other schools of thought, mainly those from the West.

In that sense, N. Skouteropoulos’ interpretation of Plato’s Republic operates an openness of the closure of meaning as far as Greek philosophical self-containment is concerned. An additional opening of a closed meaning takes place at the level of moving from practical, social-specific problems to a more abstract, non-time or non-space-specific level in order to treat them ontologically and come up with more general representations and more sustainable social-historical finalities.

From the point of view of historicity, the period during which all nine retranslations of Plato’s Republic emerge is too short to be treated in segments. In other words, any attempt to come up with different periods within this historical time frame would be arbitrary because none of them is sufficiently long to be examined separately. All these historical segments are subdivisions of an evolving social-historical, that is, characterized by intense internal conflict.
All nine retranslations of the *Republic’s* open-ended text resort to discursive strategies, which may not be unique in the world. Other languages and other social-historicals may have reached similar discursive results. What is of interest here is the way these results incorporate their social-historical and are incorporated in the latter in order to produce specific meaning for and through it. In the case of Modern Greece, all nine retranslations contributed to a different extent in serving as an ideological support for concrete politics (such as in the case of Georgoulis, I. Skouteropoulou and Papanoutsos vis-à-vis Greek education); in stigmatizing practices, especially with regard to political moral principles; in preparing a political shift toward more democratic forms of governance (cf. Papanoutsos); in giving voice to discourses of dissent (as in the case of Pappa) or in announcing a new philosophical turn (as in the case of N. Skouteropoulos). As mentioned earlier, all nine retranslations reflect the malaise of a fragmented society in quest of meaning. Each retranslation is a piece of the fragmented image of a social-historical that is always changing. The change is manifested in that, despite signs of decline, there is still *poiesis* and *autopoiesis*, thus there is no decay.

The new theory of retranslation I advance in this thesis opens new possibilities in philosophy and Greek Studies in that it suggests that both should have a functionality for the social-historical in which they emerge. Greece’s self-referential, self-contained attitude vis-à-vis philosophy, in general, and Greek Studies, in particular, (mostly expressed via the truisms of “philosophy is a Greek affair because it was invented by Greeks” and “how could one know better about Greekness and Greek history other than Greeks themselves”) results in both philosophy and Greek Studies dealing with the study
of the past as if the past is still transposed in the present and as if practices of the past are still relevant today. Instead, the new model proposes to move from the archaeological inquiry to a documental treatment of the past. Documents contain information that is relevant to its users. In the same vein, philosophy and Greek studies need to be relevant to their users and be in tune with the social-historical’s representations, finalities and affects.

Given that this work offers only one possible approach to viewing the wide spectrum of real representations of all aspects of the *Republic* examined from the point of view of ‘monuments’ erected by present historical time, a feasible extension of this analysis would be to study aspects of the *Republic* that were left untreated, such as the issue of equality between the two sexes. In this case, the study would have to take into consideration the political evolution of the rights of women in Greece, from the legal and social point of view, and the retranslations’ contribution to promoting change or preserving tradition.

Research could also be directed toward the legal field, namely how the law (civil law, criminal law, family law, the code of civil procedures and Greece’s Constitution) understand and reflect the essence of justice over the years. Finally, it would be equally interesting to perform an extensive analysis of all retranslations of Plato’s and Aristotle’s political works to discover how their political discourse influences politics and philosophy in Greece, which philosopher prevailed at any given point in time or on any given topic, whether there is discursive merging of their ideas, for what reasons and under what circumstances.
ΒΙΒΛΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ

Bibliography in Greek

ΑΓΓΕΛΟΥ, ΑΛΚΗΣ, Πλάτωνος Τύχαι (Η λόγια παράδοση στην Τουρκοκρατία), Αθήνα, 1963.

ΑΡΓΥΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, ΡΟΞΑΝΗ Δ., Η Φιλοσοφική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα από το 1828 έως το 1922, Τόμος Α’ Ευρωπαϊκές επιδράσεις και προσπάθειες για μια εθνική φιλοσοφία 1828-1875, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Γνώση, Φιλοσοφική και πολιτική βιβλιοθήκη, 1995.

ΑΡΓΥΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, ΡΟΞΑΝΗ Δ., Η Φιλοσοφική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα από το 1828 έως το 1922, Τόμος Β’ Η φιλοσοφία μεταξύ επιστήμης και θρησκείας 1876-1922, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Γνώση, Φιλοσοφική και πολιτική βιβλιοθήκη, 1998.


ΒΑΛΕΤΑΣ, Γ. Άπαντα Γρυπάρη έκρινε Γ. Βαλέτας, Αθήνα: Δωρικός, Νεοελληνική Βιβλιοθήκη, 1980.

ΒΕΡΕΜΗΣ, Θ (επιμ.), Εθνική Ταυτότητα και Εθνικισμός στη Νεότερη Ελλάδα, Αθήνα: Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης, , 2003.

ΓΕΩΡΓΟΥΛΗΣ, ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ Δ., Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Φιλοσοφίας, 6ο έκδοση, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαδήμα, 2008.


ΚΟΝΔΥΛΗΣ, Π., «Η παρουσία του Πλάτωνα στον νεοελληνικό Διαφωτισμό», Τα ιστορικά, Περιοδική έκδοση ιστορικών σπουδών, Τόμος Πρώτος, Τεύχος 1, Σεπτέμβριος 1983, Εκδοτικός Οίκος Μέλισσα: 85-100.


ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, Πολιτεία, μητρ. Ι. Ν. Γρυπάρη, Επιμέλεια Ευάγγελος Παπανούτσος, Αθήνα: «Δαιδάλος» - Ι. Ζαχαρόπουλος, 1954.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, Πολιτεία, μητρ. Α. Παπαθεοδώρου–Φ. Παππάς, Άπαντα Αρχαίων Ελλήνων Συγγραφέων, Αθήνα: Επιστημονική Εταιρεία Ελληνικών Γραμμάτων Πάπυρος, 1939.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, Πολιτεία, μητρ. Κ. Δ. Γεωργούλη, Αθήνα: Εκδοτικός Όίκος Ι. Σιδέρη, 1939, 1962.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, Πολιτεία, μητρ. Κ. Μαυρόπουλος, Τόμοι Α και Β, Εκδόσεις Ζήτρος, Θεσ/νίκη, 2006.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, Πολίτεια, μτφ. Ν. Μ. Σκουτερόπουλος, Αθήνα: Πόλις, 2002.
ΡΑΜΦΟΣ, ΣΤΕΛΙΟΣ, Ιαρόν Φως του Κόσμου, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Αρμός, 2006.
ΡΟΥΣΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, ΓΙΑΝΝΗΣ, «Η Επικαιρότητα της Πλατωνικής Σκέψης στη
Μεταφρεγκεανή Φιλοσοφία», Η επικαιρότητα της Αρχαίας Ελληνικής Φιλοσοφίας,
Επιμ. Μυρτώ Δραγώνα-Μονάχου και Γιώργος Ρουσόπουλος, Αθήνα: Ελληνικά
ΣΚΟΥΤΕΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ, Η Πολιτεία του Πλάτωνος και η Νεωτέρα Παιδαγωγική,
Αθήνα: Τύποις Ανδρέου Σιδέρη, 1948.
ΤΣΑΤΣΟΣ, ΔΗΜΗΤΡΗΣ, Ελληνική Πολιτεία 1974-1997, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Καστανιώτης,
1998.
ΤΣΑΤΣΟΣ, ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ, Πολιτική, Θεωρία πολιτικής δεοντολογίας, Αθήνα: Οι
Εκδόσεις των Φίλων, 2000.
ΤΣΟΥΜΑΝΑΣ, ΝΑΟΥΜ, Το περιεχόμενο του εγχειρίδιου της κοινωνικής και πολιτικής
αγωγής της ΣΤ' τάξης του Δημοτικού Σχολείου, Διπλωματική Εργασία, Θεσ/νίκη,
2008.
ΦΙΛΙΑΣ, ΒΑΣΙΛΗΣ, Κοινωνία και εξουσία στην Ελλάδα, Η νόθα αστικοποίηση 1800-1864,
Αθήνα: Gutenberg, 1996.
ΦΡΑΓΚΟΥΔΑΚΗ, ΆΝΝΑ, Γλώσσα και Ιδεολογία, Κοινωνιολογική Προσέγγιση της
Ελληνικής Γλώσσας, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Οδυσσέας, 1999.
ΦΡΑΓΚΟΥΔΑΚΗ, ΆΝΝΑ, ΘΑΛΕΙΑ ΔΡΑΓΩΝΑ, Τί είν’ η πατρίδα μας; Εθνοκεντρισμός στην
εκπαίδευση, 2η έκδοση, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Αλεξάνδρεια, 1997.
ΦΡΑΓΚΟΥΔΑΚΗ, ΆΝΝΑ, Εκπαιδευτική Μεταρρύθμιση και Φιλελεύθεροι Διανοούμενοι,
Αγονοί αγώνες και ιδεολογικά αδιέξοδα στο μεσοπόλεμο, Όγδοη Έκδοση, Αθήνα:
ΧΡΙΣΤΙΔΗΣ, Α.-Φ., Γλώσσα, Πολιτική, Πολιτισμός, Β' Έκδοση, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Πόλις,
2002.


ΨΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ, ΝΙΚΟΣ (επιμ.), Η Ελληνική Φιλοσοφία από το 1453 έως το 1821, Ανθολογία Κειμένων με εισαγωγή και σχόλια, Τόμος Β’ Η Επικράτηση της νεοτερικής φιλοσοφίας, μετακορυδαλική περίοδος, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις «Γνώση», Φιλοσοφική και πολιτική βιβλιοθήκη, 1989.

ΨΥΧΟΠΑΙΔΗΣ, ΚΟΣΜΑΣ, O φιλόσοφος, o πολιτικός και o τύραννος, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Πόλις, 1999.
Bibliography in French and English


CHERNISS, HAROLD F., Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1944.


MESCHONIC, HENRI, “Proposition pour une poétique de la traduction”, *Pour la poétique II*, Paris: Gallimard, 305-316.


