Over the Top:
Canadian Red Cross Fundraising during the Second World War

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Abstract

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Throughout the Second World War, the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS) exerted its significant influence in the field of voluntary homefront labour to provide a vast number of services for the benefit of Canadian, Commonwealth and Allied servicemen, prisoners of war, and civilians affected by the horrors of war. These wartime programs, which cost the Society over $90 000 000, were made possible through voluntary contributions of millions of dollars from Canadian citizens mainly through the yearly Red Cross national campaigns. Beginning in November 1939, a mere two months after Canada’s declaration of war, the first national campaign raised over $5 000 000 against a quota of $3 000 000. This trend of oversubscription continued throughout the war, culminating in the collection of nearly $16 000 000 in 1945 on a $10 000 000 quota. Even when the CRCS was denied the opportunity to fundraise nationally, as was the case in 1941, Canadian citizens of all backgrounds continued to support the Society financially to allow it to continue its humanitarian work abroad. Because of the organization’s claim to reach over cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious lines, it benefitted from the support of various national groups within Canada. These groups supported the CRCS for a variety of reasons, one of which was that it gave them an opportunity to serve within an organization in their newly adopted country. Another important group of contributors to the Red Cross structure were women who formed the
backbone of the organization’s structure. Women served in nearly every capacity within the CRCS, which allowed them to gain valuable experience in a working environment outside of the home. All told, the Canadian Red Cross Society’s wartime program was a tremendous success because of the cooperation between itself, the Canadian government and Canadian volunteers. Although these relationships were at time tenuous, the overwhelmingly positive expressions from those who received Red Cross aid during the war point to the overall success of the Society’s work.
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Introduction

The Canadian homefront during the Second World War has been the focus of a vast number of studies. These overwhelmingly deal with recruitment and conscription, political management, labour relations, social welfare development, suppression of dissent, industrial mobilization, the impact of war on the status of women, its effects on children, and the influence of the war on individual communities.\(^1\) Still, there remains a dearth of work on the mobilization of millions of Canadian men, women, and children through patriotic and voluntary homefront activities.

The focus of this study is on one of the largest such enterprises, the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS). Although work has been done on CRCS efforts to aid Allied prisoners of war, the means by which its activities were organized and funded, as well as their scope, remains significantly understudied. One of the most important voluntary organizations during the war, the CRCS stands as a prominent example of the importance of wartime voluntarism, and what one organization can do to inspire millions

of people to give both their time and money to help achieve victory.

During the war, the CRCS, which was a branch of the International Red Cross based in neutral Switzerland, played an extremely important role in inspiring Canadians to volunteer to help the war effort. Across Canada branches were set up in local communities to facilitate fundraising activities in support of Canadian troops, POWs and other worthy causes, such as the Russian relief campaign of 1941 and 1942. The organization also contributed to the war effort by helping British child evacuees and war brides in their transition to life in Canada. Furthermore, it collected donations of blood serum to be used on the battlefields of Europe and in the Red Cross-run hospitals in England. Much of this work was done and organized by women; though voluntarism conformed to gender-based stereotypes in that it was unpaid, still such activity brought many women outside of the home and generated pride and confidence from the knowledge that they were performing important roles in the drive to victory.

This study will explore the Canadian Red Cross Society and its actions in relation to fundraising at both a national and local level. It will also examine the place of women within the organizational structure and the volunteer ranks, the role of immigrant populations in various fundraising activities, and the involvement of local communities in the national Red Cross relief effort. It will seek to answer the following questions: Was the CRCS run as a top-down organization from the national level, or did initiatives from the local branches across the country determine the direction of the organization? How well did the Red Cross cooperate and coordinate with the Canadian government? What was the place of women within the organization? Were they appointed to positions of power and influence, or merely assigned to more marginal roles? What were the approaches taken by the CRCS in local communities that enabled it to inspire men,
women and children to volunteer so much of their time and money? In a broader sense, this study will help assess the degree of patriotism and commitment shown by Canadians at home to back the war effort.

Although there is currently no comprehensive study of the activities of the CRCS during the Second World War, previous scholarship does include coverage of some of its actions in broader narratives of the conflict. In *Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross*, John Hutchinson provides a general overview of the organization in an international context. There is little information specifically on Canada, and the study looks at the period between the organization’s founding in 1868 to the end of the First World War.² Jeff Keshen’s *Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers: Canada’s Second World War* explores the impact of the conflict on Canadian society, including sexuality, juvenile delinquency, black market profiteering, and the development of social security.³ Although it also touches on wartime voluntarism, in does not deal in any detail with the CRCS. The same pattern, namely only a brief mention of Red Cross activities, is evident in Serge Durflinger’s intensive local study, *Fighting from Home: The Second World War in Verdun, Quebec*. More extensive in noting some CRCS activities is Jonathan F. Vance’s *Objects of Concern: Canadian Prisoners of War through the Twentieth Century*.⁴ Vance provides a detailed account of the actions of the CRCS relative to POW relief in both World Wars, but does not make readers aware of the numerous other patriotic activities undertaken by the organization.

Scholarly articles have also been written on various aspects of the CRCS’s work

³ Keshen, 5-8.
during the Second World War. Douglas Baldwin and Gillian Poulter examined women involved in homefront volunteer organizations by looking at the work of Mona Wilson, a certified nurse who became the Assistant Red Cross Commissioner for Newfoundland from 1940 until 1945. They also published Wilson’s account of her work in Newfoundland, which serves as an excellent primary source for women’s volunteer activities.\(^5\) Nancy Sheehan examined the Junior Red Cross in Canadian schools in order to understand “the role of international movements, voluntary agencies and informal educational practices in curriculum changes.”\(^6\) Richard W. Kapp focuses his study on the creation of Canada’s first blood donor clinic, which occurred during the Second World War through a partnership between the Canadian government, the CRCS, and the University of Toronto where activities were managed by Dr. Charles H. Best, the cofounder of insulin. The program attained over two million donations during the war and spawned the creation of a permanent blood donor program in Canada.\(^7\) Although these works contribute to the overall history of the CRCS, each provides information on only an aspect of its many wartime activities.

The role of women on the Canadian homefront during the Second World War has been a popular topic among social and feminist historians. Among the most prominent and influential works is Ruth Roach Pierson’s *They’re Still Women After All: The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood*. With a focus on women’s


participation in the workforce and the military, she argues that the persistence of gender-based stereotypes and discrimination prevented any significant change in the “male-dominant sex/gender system of Canadian society.”

She portrays volunteer activities by women as fitting into this pattern because they were unpaid. However, her work does not completely consider the importance attributed to such activities, such as in the press, nor the fact that in such capacities, women often assumed leadership roles.

Despite the Red Cross being one of the most important voluntary services in Canada at the time, utilizing thousands of women volunteers across the country to fulfill its relief mission, there is not a single reference in Pierson’s book to women’s work within the organization. Examining the Red Cross at both the national and local level leads to a fuller understanding of the development of the role of women in Canadian society.

In filling in this gap in the historiography on the Red Cross, this study will be based to a large degree on primary sources derived from two main categories. One is archival documents located at Library and Archives Canada. The most important of these sources are the National War Services Fonds and the files of the Red Cross, which hold a wealth of information about the national organization and its work, and its relationship with the provincial divisions and local branches. Other archival sources include the papers of prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie King; Conservative opposition leaders Robert Manion (1939-1940), R.B. Hanson (1940-1942), and Arthur Meighen (1942); and J.T. Thorson, the Minister of the National War Services in 1941-1942. Also of significance are the records of the Canadian Council on Social Development, the National Council of Women, the Ottawa Women’s Canadian Club,

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8 Pierson, 21.
9 Pierson, 12.
and the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE), all of which often worked closely with the Red Cross on war relief and humanitarian aid.

The second main category of sources are newspapers from six key Canadian centres: Montreal, QC; Toronto, ON; Hamilton, ON; Windsor, ON; London, ON; and Winnipeg, MB. These communities were selected because they served as Red Cross depot centres for the packaging and distribution of millions of relief parcels for prisoners of war, which was the CRCS’s most extensive undertaking. These newspapers will help to determine what the local and provincial organizations were able to accomplish, and how much influence they had with the overall direction of the Red Cross. The newspapers will also form the backbone for understanding the local activities undertaken during the national campaigns and how well certain centres performed during these drives.

This work will be organized chronologically based on the yearly national campaign for funds put on by the Red Cross. This will show both the continuity and change in the Red Cross’s organization and strategies. Chapter one will examine the pre-Second World War structure of the Red Cross. This will help to set the foundation for discussing the relationship between the national, provincial and local levels of the organization in their fundraising and voluntary activities. The chapter will also describe the first two national campaigns organized in 1939 and 1940.

Chapter two will look at 1941, the only year during the war in which the CRCS was unable to mount a national campaign for funds. Because of the success the Red Cross achieved during the first two drives, and because of the lack of cooperation it extended to the government in working with other voluntary organizations like the

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10 Keshen, 27.
YMCA, the YWCA and the Salvation Army, Ottawa refused to allow the CRCS to put on a national drive for funds in 1941. Rather, the CRCS had to fundraise at the local level. However, a special nationwide campaign was set up during the later part of the year to give aid to Russia, the details of which will be examined. A subtopic to be explored in this chapter is the extensive fundraising efforts of many immigrant groups across Canada which had connections to devastated former homelands. These groups, often organized into their own ethnic associations, held dances, put on concerts, organized parades and performed a variety of other activities all in the name of helping the Canadian Red Cross. Although many of these groups were helping in order to provide needed aid to their former homelands, another important reason for their involvement was to pay tribute to and become a part of an important Canadian organization in their adopted home. The Red Cross was an excellent outlet for these displays of patriotism, as the organization spoke of its appeal to people of all backgrounds.

Chapter three will examine the return and expansion of the Red Cross national campaigns for funds in 1942 and 1943. After not having a campaign for over a year and a half, voluntary contributions to the CRCS exploded during these years, as many people were experiencing the war in a more personal manner. As will be detailed, certain communities excelled at creating ideas to better mobilize their population to get behind the drive; those that relied on traditional canvassing strategies generally struggled to reach their objectives within the allotted time frame of the campaign.

Finally, chapter four will look at the 1944 and 1945 campaigns. Despite widespread knowledge that the war was drawing to a close, the Red Cross was able to continue to inspire Canadians to make large donations of both time and money for the
welfare of those overseas. The tone of these drives also changed, as in 1945 the Red Cross joined with the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund (CUARF) to provide aid to the devastated nations of Europe, several of which had been allies throughout the war.

This study will add to the still scant historiography on voluntarism on the Canadian homefront in the Second World War, and more particularly to the efforts of the Canadian Red Cross Society. In doing so, it will also contribute information on the impact of the Second World War on various aspects of Canadian society, including the roles and changing status of women, the contributions from ethnic groups and children, and the patriotic activities of local communities. The Red Cross has become a symbol of community support and citizen volunteerism, and a study of its wartime fundraising activities will help illuminate how its vast volunteer activities were accomplished.
Chapter 1

1939-40: Beginning

The Canadian Red Cross Society has formally existed since 1909 when it was created by an Act of Parliament. Its origins trace to the 1859 Battle of Solferino, when Henry Dunant, a young French banker, witnessed the carnage of war and the lack of care for those soldiers injured in the battle.11 His idea of creating an organization to “help not only to heal wounds, but to prevent them by the establishment of world peace,” spawned the creation of the Red Cross Society in 1863, based in Geneva, Switzerland.12 In the next few years similar national societies began to form in various countries in Europe, and in 1896 a Canadian branch of the British Red Cross was established through the initiative of Lieutenant-Colonel G. Sterling Ryerson, who had participated in the suppression of the 1885 North-West Rebellion as a surgeon and became the Canadian Society’s first president.13 By 1909 the Canadian association had grown so much that it was incorporated as an autonomous organization through the passing of “an Act to incorporate the Canadian Red Cross Society.” This document specified that the main purposes of the Society, through continued cooperation with the British organization, were to give aid to the sick and wounded members of the army in times of war, and to perform all national duties as specified under the 1864 Treaty of Geneva.14 The Act was

11 Hutchinson, 11.
12 Winnipeg Free Press, 12 November 1939, 8.
14 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), MG28 I10, Canadian Council on Social Development (CCSD), Vol. 178, file “Canadian Red Cross Society General 1938-39,” Memo
modified on several occasions, the most significant change coming in 1919 with an additional purpose of the Society being set out, namely to “carry on and assist in work for the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.”15

The organization of the CRCS within Canada was based on three main levels: local, provincial and national. Each focused on trying to fulfill the objectives and purposes of the Red Cross as stated in the CRCS legislation. The most basic level, the local branch, was the main point of contact between the organization and ordinary Canadians. Thousands of branches existed across Canada, and hundreds more were created at the outbreak of war in 1939.16 Branches varied in size, from those located in the major centres of Toronto and Montreal, to those in tiny rural communities across the country. Almost every community had a Red Cross branch, and each participated in a variety of local and national fundraising projects. The branches had relative autonomy in relation to the provincial and national groups, and each had a charter that enabled them to raise and spend funds in the name of the CRCS.17

The provincial districts consisted of all of the local branches within that province’s boundaries. The districts relied on the branches for money, as they were allowed to levy funds from the branch’s reserves to spend on province-wide activities. The national council was made up of the nine provincial districts and only existed in time of war. During peace time the national council ceased to exist, unless called upon to deal with a national or international disaster. During a time of war, however, the national

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15 Ibid.
16 Montreal Daily Star, 18 September 1940, 22.
council became the main Red Cross body, and had all funds raised at both the local and provincial level placed at its disposal.

Fundraising campaigns were organized nationally and all the work of the branches was coordinated during one national drive. That meant that for the duration of the war no separate appeals for individual branch needs were allowed.\(^\text{18}\) In dispersing funds raised, what generally occurred was that after the expenses for the continued peace-time work of the branches and districts had been worked out, the local branches were given fifty percent of the remaining money raised in fundraising drives for local war work, while the national office received the other half. The divisions were allowed access to the money retained by the branches to use in any province-wide undertakings.\(^\text{19}\)

With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the CRCS, along with every other voluntary organization in Canada, was required to apply for authorization to perform war work from the government through the War Charities Act 1939. The national office completed the application for the entire organization, and specified that they were applying as a fully formed Society that would function throughout the duration of the war.\(^\text{20}\) Once the authorization was given by the War Charities Fund, the Red Cross initially became the only voluntary organization to be classified as an auxiliary of the government, directly under the Department of National Defence (DND). Throughout the war the CRCS was to submit to DND a complete list of all money raised and expended

\(^\text{18}\) Hamilton Spectator, 9 November 1939, 10.  
per calendar year, which was constantly a problem because of the make-up of the organization. With hundreds of branches spread across the country, it took a great amount of time and planning to gather and organize the complete data of the Society every year.\(^{21}\)

The Red Cross also took the lead in coordinating other voluntary wartime organizations through three main levels of war councils: national, provincial and district. The goal of this work was to “achieve a method of coordinating all war efforts through consultation and discussion in these national, provincial and local war councils, and thus avoiding duplication, overlapping and confusion.”\(^{22}\) Although this goal was far from realized at the national level,\(^{23}\) the Red Cross did have some success in coordinating activities of voluntary organizations at the local level through the creation of these war councils. Although many national organizations had difficulty acknowledging the CRCS as a partner, various local groups who participated in this collaboration gained much help by being able to use the vast Red Cross organization to further their voluntary focus.\(^{24}\)

One of the common complaints from other voluntary organizations, which often discouraged cooperation with the CRCS, was that the Red Cross was “sticking its nose into all sorts of work which did not properly belong to it.”\(^{25}\) Certain members of the CRCS, including P. H. Gordon, chairman of its executive council, agreed with this

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\(^{23}\) For an overview of some of the competition between different voluntary relief organizations, see Vance, “Canadian Relief Agencies and Prisoners of War,” 133-148.

\(^{24}\) Winnipeg Free Press, 14 November 1939, 8.

claim, and pointed to the situation at the close of the First World War as the main cause. In 1918 the Red Cross had had an extremely successful national drive and was left with $3 000 000 when the war ended. Over the next few years no less than fifty different groups approached the CRCS for help, which gave a precedent for overextension throughout the interwar years. The Red Cross followed this precedent as the Second World War began. From 1914 to 1918 the organization raised over $30 000 000 in cash and goods, and built hospitals in England and France, provided ambulances and motor lorries, gave surgical supplies, medicines, food and comforts to those overseas, and ran an information bureau out of its London office. Although the goals and objectives of the CRCS changed as the new war progressed, it attempted to begin 1939 where it left off in 1918.

The Red Cross began the Second World War in a state of preparation. More than a year before the outset of hostilities, the organization began working under an emergency basis and updated its nearly nonexistent mobilization plans so as to be ready for the predicted war. Volunteers were recruited to put in place a war plan that would swiftly and orderly bring about the needed preparations for giving aid, and to avoid overlap and waste. The Society was so organized that within three days of the outbreak of the Second World War, which Canada joined a week later, the CRCS was working in every province of the Dominion to set up its wartime preparations. It also provided $10 000 worth of assistance to Great Britain for the relief of the survivors of the sinking of the *Athenia* by a German submarine and had hospital and medical supplies

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26 Ibid.
ready in Halifax and Quebec City for the arrival of the survivors. Despite all of these preparations and early assistance, the Red Cross was severely lacking in funds. Since the end of the First World War the war committees had ceased to exist, and with the opening of the second great war of the twentieth century the Society quickly realized that it needed a large amount of money in order to follow through on all of its planning. As such, a national coast-to-coast appeal was planned.

This was much easier said than done. Not only did the national council have to coordinate with the nine provincial divisions and the hundreds of local branches across Canada to have their campaigns at the same time, but they had to contend with the other Canadian relief agencies, who were also trying to organize and raise funds for their wartime objectives. During the interwar years most of the branches conducted their peacetime campaigns in September, but in 1939 the society postponed its national drive until November 13 in order to give the other charitable organizations time to finish their drives. During September Norman Sommerville, Chairman of the Red Cross Central Council, spent much time working with Charlotte Whitton, Executive Director of the Canadian Welfare Council, which looked after many of the smaller Community Chest organizations. Although Whitton claimed to have very little binding power over these charitable groups, she worked alongside Sommerville to encourage them to move their campaigns forward to October so that the month of November would be clear for the

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29 Montreal Daily Star, 6 November 1939, 11; 19 November 1939, 11; Winnipeg Free Press, 14 November 1939, 8.
32 Community Chests were groups banded together under the Canadian Welfare Council to raise money for homefront needs. See LAC, MG28-I9, Canadian War Services Fund (CWSF), Vol. 5, file “National - Red Cross,” Letter to Mr. Blair M. Clerk, 15 October 1941.
Red Cross national drive.\textsuperscript{33} Overall the response was positive and the smaller charities made way for the CRCS. Still, there were some problems, such as with charities based in Vancouver. Both the Vancouver Federation and the Catholic Charities of Vancouver wished to join with the Red Cross in November and form a larger joint campaign. This was a common request, yet one to which the Red Cross was strongly opposed. Not only was the CRCS worried about what this would do to its drive, but Whitton was also concerned for the Vancouver charities. She felt that should this plan go forward, it would only cause confusion and weaken both campaigns. In her correspondence with these groups, she strongly urged them to reconsider and move their campaigns up to October, which they eventually did, thus clearing the way for the first Red Cross national campaign of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{34}

At the time of the 1939 Red Cross national campaign, the extent of Canada’s role in the new war was still being debated and the thousands of volunteers ready to fight for their country were a long way from the battlefields of Europe. Nonetheless, the CRCS felt it needed to be ready when the call came for aid, and declared it to be “poor business” to delay preparations until Canadian troops were at the front lines.\textsuperscript{35} Because of the delays caused by both the coordination of all charity campaigns across Canada, and the declaration of war late in the year, Red Cross officials had very little time to


\textsuperscript{35} Toronto Daily Star, 19 November 1939, 4. It was also declared that “the duty of the Red Cross is to be prepared,” and that it would be “too late to regret the support that should have been given to this urgent national appeal of Red Cross when sudden and overwhelming demands are made for the help and comfort that only Red Cross can give!” See Hamilton Spectator, 9 November 1939, 10.
organize the drive. In Montreal co-chairmen J. Henri Labelle and R.P. Jellett, both prominent local businessmen, had only four weeks to organize the drive for all of Quebec. To impress upon citizens of the province the amount of work that had to be done in that short period of time, the *Montreal Daily Star* reported the following figures:

125,000 campaign folders, 150,000 subscription cards, 70,000 window stickers, 10,000 receipt books, 18,000 cash envelopes, 12,000 copies of “Hints to Canvassers,” 12,000 identity cards, 5,000 window display cards, 2,000 cash boxes with stickers, 5,000 automobile stickers, 40,000 speakers’ manuals, hotel displays, posters, and a variety of miscellaneous material.\(^{36}\)

This list only accounted for campaign materials, and could have also included countless hours of time spent deciding on budgets, creating campaigning routes, and recruiting volunteers to help collect the money. Considering this whole process was occurring across the Dominion, it becomes evident that executing the campaign was a remarkable accomplishment.

The national objective set for this campaign was $3 000 000 and each division and branch was assigned a quota to reach based on population. Each of the provincial quotas were set based on the objectives of all the local branches within their boundaries. Branch totals ranged from $1 000 000 for Toronto, the largest in Canada, down to $400 for tiny Reston, Manitoba. The grand total was carefully budgeted so that the CRCS could meet its initial wartime aims, with some money left over for unexpected emergency situations for which the Society would be expected to provide. Some of the money needing to be raised had already been spent on purchasing required material for the branches across Canada, and an eight month budget was set for further expenses of the branches.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{36}\) *Montreal Daily Star*, 13 November 1939, 3.

Because of the nature of the Red Cross, these drives were carried out at all levels by Canadian volunteers, whose efforts amounted to an estimated 97% of the total work.³⁸  A voluntary national committee was put together under the leadership of Hon. G. Howard Ferguson, the former Canadian high commissioner to London and premier of Ontario. This committee included men and women from all walks of life, including church, professional, educational and financial leaders from across Canada. These members, whose names were published in local papers, were to “stand in support of the work of the society with belief in its great necessity and in full confidence that the people of every section of the country will respond with their utmost financial and moral support.”³⁹

At the local level, thousands of men, women and children volunteered to help with the door-to-door canvassing in virtually every Canadian community. In fact, there were so many people wishing to volunteer that Jackson Dodds, general manager of the Bank of Canada and Vice-President of the Quebec Division of the Red Cross, stated that there were more volunteers than work to be done.⁴⁰ In Toronto more than 10 000 workers, split between 4700 canvassers and 6000 taggers, participated in one of the first tag days, in which people were beseeched to buy and wear a tag to show their support.⁴¹ Other cities, including Montreal (8000), Winnipeg (2000), and Windsor (1000), all had huge numbers of volunteers registered to assist the Red Cross.⁴²

Many businesses also became voluntarily involved in Red Cross drives. In

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³⁸  Canadian Red Cross Society, Canadian Red Cross Organization and Services (Canada: National Headquarters CRCS, 1955), 5.
³⁹  Winnipeg Free Press, 13 November 1939, 8.
⁴¹  Toronto Daily Star, 9 November 1939, 26.
⁴²  Montreal Daily Star, 13 November 1939, 3; Winnipeg Free Press, 18 November 1939, 1; 9, Windsor Daily Star, 21 November 1939, 3.
Toronto the entire Red Cross campaign headquarters and equipment, as well as utility costs, were provided free of charge by businesses. Business executives voluntarily served as supervisors (providing organizational skills and motivating and mobilizing others through their stature), and stenographers and business machine operators were provided gratis from a number of firms, especially in larger communities.\textsuperscript{43}

The first national Red Cross campaign ran between November 13 and December 2, 1939 (except in Manitoba, where its opening was delayed by one week).\textsuperscript{44} Volunteers were instructed on how to do their work through canvasser meetings and provincial canvasser pamphlets, which included a brief history of the Red Cross, answers to commonly asked questions, examples of prepared speeches, and a list of the provincial society members and campaign personnel.\textsuperscript{45} Authorized canvassers were also provided with official permits issued from the Red Cross, and the public were invited to request to see these credentials when canvassed for money.\textsuperscript{46} This was to help eliminate phony canvassers, who were trying to take advantage of the Society in order to make money at the public’s expense. Although men and women were equally involved in the campaign, their roles were designated based on traditional gender stereotyping. Women were given charge of the community-wide door-to-door appeal, while the men tackled the canvassing of local industries and businesses. This continued the trend of men being in charge of the more importantly perceived “big-money” accounts, while women dealt

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Toronto Daily Star}, 16 November 1939, 32.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 13 November 1939, 3.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 21 November 1939, 1.
with the smaller donations coming from individual households. Despite the perpetuation of traditional gender roles, it was only through cooperation between the groups that the communities could ever have reached their set quotas.

The official opening of the drive was marked by a nation-wide radio broadcast made by the Duke of Gloucester, who was the chairman of the British Red Cross, Governor General Lord Tweedsmuir, the honorary president of the Canadian Red Cross Society, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Conservative leader R. J. Manion, and E. L. Patenaude, the lieutenant-governor of Quebec. Their messages were also reprinted in newspapers across Canada, and all made strong appeals for Canadians to get behind the campaign. Some communities also organized their own opening events, including a large rally in Winnipeg and a tea for canvassers in Toronto. The Winnipeg Red Cross branch went so far in its opening day activities to “bomb” the city with Red Cross leaflets stating that “This Leaflet Might Have Been A Bomb [sic],” and that contained the 1939 Red Cross motto, “Dig in and Give.” By the time thousands of volunteers began canvassing, enthusiasm for the humanitarian cause of the Red Cross was at such a high level that the Windsor Daily Star reported that even confirmed pacifists in the area were ready to assist in the cause.

Returns reported from the first day of the campaign were high in most communities. The Quebec division reported that over $100 000, or one-eighth of the objective, had been collected in the initial twenty-four hour period. The Manitoba

47 Hamilton Spectator, 10 November 1939, 7.
48 For examples of newspaper reprints, see Winnipeg Free Press, 13 November 1939, 8; Montreal Daily Star, 13 November 1939, 11; and Windsor Daily Star, 13 November 1939, 8.
49 Winnipeg Free Press, 20 November 1939, 6; Toronto Daily Star, 6 November 1939, 21.
50 Winnipeg Free Press, 20 November 1939, 6.
51 Windsor Daily Star, 22 November 1939, 10.
division also had great success, securing $26,872, or over one-fifth of its objective, in just two days.\textsuperscript{52} The Windsor branch had one of the most successful community campaigns in Canada, with $71,300 collected in the first forty-eight hours, nearly ninety-percent of its official objective of $80,000.\textsuperscript{53} Many mid-size and smaller communities in Ontario, such as Waterloo, Kingston, Chatham and Simcoe, had no difficulty reaching their quotas relatively quickly. In fact, by November 21, Waterloo had tripled its objective, and both Kingston and Chatham had gone over the top as well.\textsuperscript{54}

However, many of the larger centers had slower returns. Toronto, with a $1,000,000 objective, the largest quota in Canada, struggled to reach its objective. By November 25, when its drive was supposed to be over, the Toronto branch reported only $528,718 had been collected, and the only reason it reached its goal was because of an anonymous $100,000 donation that came in just as the extended campaign was officially closing.\textsuperscript{55} Toronto’s difficulties seemed to have occurred due to a few factors. Ascribing one-third of the national quota to a single centre was excessive and pointed to an overestimation by the Red Cross of the city’s fundraising potential. Officials also complained of having a smaller area in which to collect the needed funds. Other nearby communities which had previously been included in the Toronto objective now had their own quotas after the establishment of new Red Cross branches.\textsuperscript{56} The city of Hamilton also had difficulty surpassing its objective. Despite noted sympathy for the Red Cross in the area, the first week of the three-week campaign brought in only $25,732 out of an

\textsuperscript{52} La Presse, 14 November 1939, 3; Winnipeg Free Press, 22 November 1939, 1.
\textsuperscript{53} Windsor Daily Star, 24 November 1939, 3.
\textsuperscript{54} Hamilton Spectator, 21 November 1939, 3.
\textsuperscript{55} Toronto Daily Star, 25 November 1939, 9; Globe and Mail, 4 October 1940, 7.
\textsuperscript{56} Toronto Daily Star, 17 November 1939, 28.
objective of $100 000. This total increased very slowly over the next week, and many Red Cross officials doubted whether Hamilton’s objective would be reached.\textsuperscript{57} Some officials suggested that the problem derived from the same misplaced optimism that occurred at the beginning of the First World War, namely the belief that citizens were not donating because they felt the war would be over soon and the Red Cross did not need their money.\textsuperscript{58} These centres eventually extended their campaign dates until they were able to raise the required money to meet their objectives.\textsuperscript{59}

In the end, the overall campaign was a huge success, going well “over the top.” The national total was oversubscribed by $2 000 000, making the final total over $5 000 000.\textsuperscript{60} The Quebec division, which was the first province to reach its objective, collected $938 000 compared to its quota of $800 000 while the Manitoba division more than doubled its $125 000 objective with a total of $315 000.\textsuperscript{61} At the local level, the Windsor branch raised close to $160 000, nearly doubling its objective of $80 000, while the Toronto branch, despite lagging behind for much of the campaign, ended up going just over its $1 000 000 target.\textsuperscript{62} According to Mrs. H. P. Plumptre, vice-chair of the national Red Cross executive, the CRCS accomplished in two months in 1939 what it took eighteen months to do in the First World War.\textsuperscript{63}

What was most remarkable about this campaign, however, was not the end totals of the divisions and branches, but the time in which it transpired and the amount of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{57} Hamilton Spectator, 20 November 1939, 7.
\textsuperscript{58} Hamilton Spectator, 21 November 1939, 7.
\textsuperscript{59} For examples of campaign extensions, see Hamilton Spectator, 25 November 1939; 7, La Presse, 18 November 1939, 3.
\textsuperscript{60} Montreal Daily Star, 5 September 1940, 3.
\textsuperscript{61} La Presse, 23 November 1939, 3; Montreal Daily Star, 9 September 1940, 3; Winnipeg Free Press, 5 September 1940, 3.
\textsuperscript{62} Globe and Mail, 19 September 1940, 9.
\textsuperscript{63} Winnipeg Free Press, 5 September 1940, 3.
\end{footnotesize}
sacrifice the Red Cross was able to inspire from ordinary Canadians. The drive took place a mere two months after the start of the war, and after a decade of unprecedented economic hardship. Millions of Canadians were still feeling the effects of the Great Depression and had barely enough money to support themselves and their families. Still, there were countless examples of sacrifice that helped bring about this incredibly successful campaign. In Montreal a group of young girls worked odd jobs around their community and raised five dollars in dimes, nickels and pennies, which they gave to the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{64} In Hamilton an elderly woman came into the campaign headquarters and quietly gave one dollar, which was all she could afford as she had no work and lived on her own.\textsuperscript{65} A young boy in Windsor donated eleven cents that he earned from running errands and promised to give a few cents more once he had earned it.\textsuperscript{66} People living in rural Manitoba who had no money contributed by offering wheat, milk and cream, while miners in Drumheller, Alberta, despite losing twenty-two working days that year due to a fire in the mines, donated the first three cars of coal brought out of the mine, as well as fifty cents a month per employee.\textsuperscript{67} Many wealthier citizens offered significant sums to the campaign. On one day in Montreal, newspapers reported that seven different individuals gave at least $1000.\textsuperscript{68} American citizens, whose country was neutral until December 1941, also sent donations to the Canadian Society, ranging from a $5500 anonymous gift registered in Ottawa, to a five dollar donation in Winnipeg from a female resident of Devil’s Lake, North Dakota.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{64} Montreal Daily Star, 20 November 1939, 3.
\textsuperscript{65} Hamilton Spectator, 14 November 1939, 7.
\textsuperscript{66} Windsor Daily Star, 23 November 1939, 3.
\textsuperscript{67} Winnipeg Free Press, 20 November 1939, 1; 16 November 1939, 24.
\textsuperscript{68} Montreal Daily Star, 20 November 1939, 3.
\textsuperscript{69} Winnipeg Free Press, 13 November 1939, 8; 20 November 1939, 1.
No matter how much the Red Cross raised in this first national drive it would soon be used up by the quickly expanding demands of the war. By September 1940 it was reported that virtually all of the $5 000 000 raised in the 1939 national campaign had been spent on war allocations, war materials and the continued peace time programs and that the Society needed to raise a similar sum in 1940 to meet its increasing commitments. The CRCS expected this, so the National Council, which included representatives from all nine Canadian provincial divisions, met in early spring 1940 to discuss when the next national fundraising campaign would take place. After a short meeting, it was unanimously decided that the campaign would begin no later than September. This decision caused some friction between the CRCS and the Community Chests Federations, which wanted to follow the pattern set in 1939 whereby their drives would be put on prior to the Red Cross’s national campaign. In August the Red Cross was asked by Justice T. C. Davis, Associate Deputy Minister of the National War Services (NWS), to once again postpone its campaign until November in favour of the Community Chests. Summerville refused, stating that it was too late to change the date of the campaign as all the advertising material had gone out, and the thousands of local branches could not be contacted in time to alter the former decision. As the Red Cross had campaigned in September for fifteen years previously, Sommerville was sure that the arrangements, whereby the CRCS national drive would run between September 23 and October 15, would be beneficial to both the Red Cross and the Community Chests. Seeing that it was hopeless to alter this decision so close to the advertised campaign, NWS relented, and allowed the Red Cross drive to go ahead as planned.

70 Montreal Daily Star, 9 September 1940, 3.
71 NWS, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1940-41,” Letter to Mr. Justice T. C. Davis, 20 August 1940.
The new drive’s total objective was increased to $5 000 000 because of three emergency requests that the Red Cross had agreed to take on in 1940, all of which required significant funds. These included the establishment of eight convalescent hospitals in Canada, the delivery of care for 100 000 Continental European refugees who had fled to England, and the provision of 10 000 food parcels per week for British and Canadian prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{72} Dr. Fred W. Routley, national commissioner of the Canadian Red Cross, stated, “if the public of Canada should give $10,000,000 instead of the minimum quota of $5,000,000 asked in the Red Cross campaign, I can say that every dollar would be used wisely and advantageously toward the relief of suffering in the motherland alone.”\textsuperscript{73}

Despite the renewed enthusiasm behind the national campaign, some officials were worried that returns would suffer because of the recently finished Canadian war loan drive.\textsuperscript{74} What helped to overcome this concern was the news that a British refugee ship, the \textit{City of Benares}, with hundreds of children on board, many bound for Canadian homes, had been sunk by the Germans. This event, which caused the deaths of 87 children on board, stirred the sympathy of both canvassers and subscribers, and once again illustrated the pressing need of the Red Cross work.\textsuperscript{75} Another surge of enthusiasm for the 1940 campaign was generated by a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) radio broadcast made on September 29 by Hollywood stars and Prime Minister King on behalf of the CRCS. Broadcasting from California and Ontario, celebrities that included Laurence Olivier, Madeleine Carroll, Vivien Leigh, Mary

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 5 September 1940, 3.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 21 September 1940, 1.
\textsuperscript{74} The loan drive ended up raising over $300 000 000. See \textit{London Daily Free Press}, 23 September 1940, 13.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Globe and Mail}, 24 September 1940, 9; \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 24 September 1940, 3.
Pickford, Ronald Colman, Sir Cedric Hardwicke, Gloria Jean, and Merie Oberon all told of England’s indomitable spirit and asked Canadians to continue to support the efforts of the Red Cross to alleviate suffering overseas. Prime Minister King opened the broadcast by stressing that “the voice of the Red Cross is the voice of humanity.” The broadcast brought in almost $100,000 for the CRCS drive, while another $300,000 was sent directly to England. The broadcast clearly resonated with listeners, as canvassers reported the following day an increase in enthusiasm and donations from those that had tuned in.

With the increased national objective, each of the branches and divisions had higher goals to reach in the drive. The Quebec objective was raised to $1,000,000, or one fifth of the national total, while Manitoba’s goal was $300,000, over double its 1939 objective. While other centres’ totals increased, Toronto’s objective remained at $1,000,000 as Red Cross officials realized that it had been difficult for the city to reach that goal.

With the increase in objectives came the need for more volunteers and an even stronger organization to run the whole operation. Under the leadership of Leopold Macaulay K.C, who was assisted by many important Red Cross and community leaders, including Norman S. Caudwell, K.C., President of the Toronto branch, and Norman Urquhart, who later became Chairman of the National Executive Committee, over 12,000 volunteer canvassers in Toronto went from house-to-house and office-to-office.

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76 Globe and Mail, 30 September 1940, 1-2.
77 Globe and Mail, 2 October 1940, 5.
collecting funds for the Society.\textsuperscript{80} The Quebec division, under campaign chairmen Hon. Henri Groux, the Provincial Secretary and Minister of Health, and R. N. Watt of the Royal Trust Company, had 160 branches and 18 000 workers throughout the province involved in the drive.\textsuperscript{81} The London branch went after a $100 000 objective by having their 400 volunteer workers - led by campaign chairman Lt.-Col. H. K. Ingram - canvass every home in the city.\textsuperscript{82} Because of the large number of manufacturing firms located in Windsor, campaign chairman Malcolm G. Campbell deployed almost 1000 men and women to reach employees at their workplace, verses 500 women who were tasked with the house-to-house canvass.\textsuperscript{83}

Gifts and sacrifices, both large and small, from across the Dominion enabled the organization to reach its 1940 campaign goal. The Toronto branch reported receiving at least three large anonymous individual gifts of $10 000, $20 000 and $25 000,\textsuperscript{84} while in London, Ontario, John Labatt, Ltd. and the London Life Insurance Company each donated $10 000.\textsuperscript{85} Employees of the Montreal Tramways Company increased their donation to the campaign from $600 in 1939 to $17 000 in 1940,\textsuperscript{86} while the Checker Cab Co. in Windsor, Ontario donated the entire proceeds of a twenty-four hour period to the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{87} Individuals with very little money also contributed, a 72 year old man in Windsor who was receiving relief payments but was trying to find work so that he

\textsuperscript{80} Globe and Mail, 19 September 1940, 9.
\textsuperscript{81} Montreal Daily Star, 18 September 1940, 22; 3 October 1940, 3.
\textsuperscript{82} London Daily Free Press, 23 September 1940, 13.
\textsuperscript{83} Windsor Daily Star, 30 September 1940, 3.
\textsuperscript{84} Globe and Mail, 4 October 1940, 7.
\textsuperscript{86} Montreal Daily Star, 26 September 1940, 3.
\textsuperscript{87} Windsor Daily Star, 30 September 1940, 11.
could donate his earnings to the drive.\textsuperscript{88} It also became popular to donate items rather than money, such as one Winnipegger who gave silver dishes.\textsuperscript{89} As in the previous campaign, residents of the United States contributed to the CRCS drive, including a man from Cortland, New York, who sent in a cheque for $1000 and Hollywood star Katherine Hepburn, who pledged to turn over her entire salary for her eight performances of “The Philadelphia Story” that had been playing in New York.\textsuperscript{90} The second drive was another huge success, with the final tally exceeding $6 000 000.\textsuperscript{91}

Beyond the yearly national drives, individual branches were encouraged to continue to support local endeavours, including through fundraising. At the start of the war, however, there was much confusion relating to the specifications for voluntary fundraising as laid out in the \textit{War Charities Act 1939}. The Act stated that any charitable organization that was endeavouring to raise funds through voluntary means for war work needed to apply for a permit from the government in order to do so. Under the Act, groups that wanted to raise money for other registered war charities were also forced to apply for this permit. This included smaller organizations, such as a local United Church that wanted to hold a fundraising tea, or a ladies’ musical club that wanted to put on a concert in favour of the CRCS. The Red Cross had some serious concerns over this

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 26 September 1940, 5; \textit{Windsor Daily Star}, 4 October 1940, 3.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 30 September 1940, 3.
\textsuperscript{90} It was reported that the total amount would reach close to $10 000. \textit{Globe and Mail}, 26 September 1940, 4.
\textsuperscript{91} NWS, Vol. 5, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1941-42,” Brief General Statement of Present Financial Situation of Canadian Red Cross, n.d.; and Vol. 39, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1939-41,” Memorandum to Mr. Justice Davis, 19 May 1941. The figures given in these reports were $3 769 329.85 for the 1939 campaign and $7 223 091.80 for the 1940 campaign. Because the 1939 campaign took place so late in the year, some of the funds listed under the 1940 revenue actually came from the 1939 campaign. As the 1939 campaign was reported to have officially raised $5 000 000, this would put the 1940 total at around $6 000 000.
stipulation. The CRCS was initially afraid that these small groups would find the process of having to apply for authorization a source of annoyance and would therefore abandon their fundraising activities altogether. But obvious public enthusiasm quickly put this fear to rest. The CRCS continued to oppose this plan, as it brought up three more issues with the current program, namely “the multiplication of Fund-raising organizations; the loss of control over appeals for Registered Funds; and the refusal of authorization to all un-registered groups [sic].” Using examples from its own experiences with these small fundraising groups, the CRCS attempted to show the government how unfeasible this system could prove to be.

Because of the importance of the Red Cross to the voluntary war effort, it had sway with the government, and the relationship between the organization and small groups wishing to fundraise for the Society was altered. With suggestions from both the CRCS and the government, a provision was added for the Red Cross to the War Charities Act that effectively solved the problem. It read:

That the Canadian Red Cross Society be authorized to issue permits, from time to time, to any group of voluntary workers for the holding of teas, entertainments or other single functions promoted for the purpose of raising funds for the Red Cross where no general direct appeal is made to the public. Provided that such permits shall not be given to persons or organizations who propose to sell tickets to the public generally for, or otherwise invited general participation of the public in concerts, theatrical productions, shows, bazaars, carnivals, athletic competitions or other similar entertainments to be held in any public hall or other place rented for such purposes.

With the adoption of this provision, all registered Red Cross branches were able to provide local fundraising groups the authority to put on activities to raise money in the name of the CRCS, with the Red Cross National Executive assuming full responsibility for the actions of the branches.  

The question then arose of issuing permits for fundraising games of chance, such as novelty pin ball machines, but the idea was eventually turned down. The CRCS felt that it was better to “risk losses rather than authorize performances about which there is any doubt.” There was, however, nothing stopping these organizations from presenting their final profits as a gift to the Red Cross. Gambling events, such as organized Bingos, were approved for fundraising permits, and became very popular as the war went on. However, these events did draw some criticism, especially from religious leaders, as they felt the nature of the events, no matter how good the cause, was harmful to society.

The major reason behind bureaucratic intervention was to cut out ill-advised and poorly planned events that would harm, rather than help, the war effort. One such event happened on November 2, 1939, when the Advertising and Sales Club of Toronto, Inc. held their annual dance as a fundraiser on behalf of the Red Cross. Although the group requested an additional charge of fifty cents per person who attended the dance, in order that the proceeds would amount to a substantial contribution to the CRCS, the event ended in a $162 deficit. Despite this, the organization presented the CRCS with

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96 Ibid.
98 Keshen, 26.
two cheques totaling fifteen dollars. The War Charities Act stipulated that at least 75% of the proceeds of any voluntary fundraiser were required to be turned over to the designated charity, which apparently did not happen in this case. Upon a government inquiry, the organization turned out to be a reputable group whose dance happened to be poorly attended. W. G. Gunn of the Department of the Secretary of State implored the CRCS to be more careful in authorizing charitable events so as not to repeat such a result.

Despite being such a large organization, official activities of the Red Cross were extremely well-planned and carried out effectively. Women played a key role in producing success; they were, as one male Red Cross organizer said, “the backbone of the Red Cross.” Their work for the Red Cross occurred both at home and in work rooms located in many of the branch offices across Canada, where they met to take up various sewing and knitting projects for servicemen, refugees, British bombing victims and hospital patients overseas. In larger centres, these work rooms generally operated five days a week, with women organizing programs throughout the war. The entire organization was run by women volunteers, who beyond sewing and knitting, took on the tasks of purchasing supplies; inspecting, packing and delivering finished products; and supervising other volunteers. In smaller communities, women met in their homes to do Red Cross work. They received patterns, samples and directions for needed articles.

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104 Windsor Daily Star, 10 November 1939, 21.
from the national Red Cross office in Toronto. The finished articles were then sent to larger branches for distribution overseas. The articles needed were numerous and varied, and included things like finger-less gloves, turtle-neck scarves, convalescent sweaters, sailors’ stockings, bandages, pneumonia jackets and numerous other clothing articles and hospital supplies.\textsuperscript{105} Within just a few months of the outbreak of war, massive orders from overseas were being met, and the total number of articles voluntarily made for the Red Cross during the war by an estimated 750 000 women across Canada numbered over 50 000 000.\textsuperscript{106}

Women led in canvassing during the national fundraising drives. Tens of thousands participated each year in organizing and carrying out various fundraising plans in cities, towns and villages across the country to gather voluntary subscriptions from millions of Canadians. Women volunteers were usually assigned the duty of conducting the house-to-house canvassing, and more often than not had great success in carrying out their tasks.\textsuperscript{107} They took this assignment very seriously. One woman in Winnipeg, in the 1945 campaign, could not use her car to reach her designated canvassing area because of poor weather. Instead of using this as an excuse for not carrying out her assigned tasks, she “hitched a team of horses to a wagon, loaded [her three young] children, and completed her canvass 100 per cent.”\textsuperscript{108} Women also took

\textsuperscript{105} Winnipeg Free Press, 17 September 1940, 5.
\textsuperscript{106} The total number of articles made by women’s war work was 50 661 534. NWS, Vol. 2, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 3,” Summary of some of the Outstanding Activities and Accomplishments in WWII, n.d.
\textsuperscript{107} In London, Ontario during the 1943 campaign the entire block plan of house-to-house canvassing was completely carried out by women. See London Daily Free Press, 4 March 1943, 13. For examples of the success women had in canvassing, see Globe and Mail, 28 September 1940, 22; and Winnipeg Free Press, 31 March 1945, 5.
\textsuperscript{108} Winnipeg Free Press, 31 March 1945, 5.
the jobs of operating collection booths in local hotels,\textsuperscript{109} and organizing community tag days.\textsuperscript{110} Through newspaper ads, responsibility was put onto housewives to contribute to the campaign, and not leave the job of giving money to their husbands.\textsuperscript{111} In this way every woman, whether physically volunteering or not, could be an important part of the Red Cross campaign and programs.

Not only did women carry out the physical canvassing of houses, but many also served in positions of authority in establishing and organizing towards achieving the national objectives of the Red Cross. In the 1939 Toronto campaign, Mrs. A. E. Moysey, chairman of the women’s campaign committee, was in charge of over 3000 women canvassers, while Mrs. W. A. Hogg, divisional war chairman in Winnipeg, led around 1500 women volunteers in the 1940 national campaign.\textsuperscript{112} As the war progressed, and the scope of the national campaigns increased, women continued to be appointed to positions of responsibility, like Miss Eula White, who oversaw nearly 1000 women in the 1945 drive in London, Ontario as chair of the block plan canvass.\textsuperscript{113} More than twenty-five women from across the country also served on the Red Cross National Committee. This national group provided leadership in the annual war appeals of the organization,\textsuperscript{114} and used their purchasing, warehousing and distribution expertise to ensure the funds were being used as economically as possible.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{109} Winnipeg Free Press, 24 February 1944, 11.
\textsuperscript{110} These events were also held during peace time fundraisers, but their magnitude was greatly increased during the war. In the 1940 campaign Toronto had over 7000 young women out selling tags, while Hamilton, in its 1944 drive, had more than 1000 collecting money. See Globe and Mail, 3 October 1940, 10; and Hamilton Spectator, 11 March 1944, 7.
\textsuperscript{111} Winnipeg Free Press, 18 May 1942, 1.
\textsuperscript{112} Toronto Daily Star, 11 November 1939, 20; Winnipeg Free Press, 13 September 1940, 1.
\textsuperscript{113} London Daily Free Press 7 March 1945, 10.
\textsuperscript{114} Winnipeg Free Press, 13 November 1939, 8.
\textsuperscript{115} London Daily Free Press, 27 February 1943, 17.
Some women became so important to the success of the Society that they held permanent positions within the national structure of the CRCS. One such woman was Adelaide Plumptre, Toronto’s only female Alderman and Vice-President of Red Cross War Activities during the Second World War. Plumptre began her voluntary career at the CRCS during the First World War as a secretary, but was quickly given more responsibilities because of her obvious executive abilities. Her Red Cross work continued after the war as she attended and addressed the Assembly of the League of Nations at the end of the First World War as the only female delegate. She also founded and served for ten years as President of the Ontario division of the CRCS, was the only female president of the Toronto Red Cross branch and attended two meetings of the International Red Cross.\textsuperscript{116} During the Second World War her duties again expanded as she served as editor of the monthly Red Cross publication \textit{The Despatch},\textsuperscript{117} took the position of vice-chair of the executive committee\textsuperscript{118} and organized and temporarily directed the Red Cross Enquiry Bureau in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{119} Despite all of her duties, Plumptre found time to contribute to the knitting of supplies for soldiers and never once accepted a penny for any of her work.\textsuperscript{120} Other important women in the Red Cross structure included Mona Wilson, who served as the assistant Red Cross commissioner in Newfoundland and Labrador from 1940 until 1945, and Gladyes E. Campbell, the

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Windsor Daily Star}, 22 November 1939, 4.
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Toronto Daily Star}, 18 November 1939, 25.
national work chairman of the CRCS for the majority of the war.\textsuperscript{121}

Besides being active in the Red Cross work rooms and the annual campaigns, women also volunteered their time and services to work in one of the six POW parcel packing plants across the country. The parcels became one of the costliest wartime services provided by the CRCS, with about half of each yearly budget going towards the program.\textsuperscript{122} A large number who volunteered in this area had relatives or friends who were prisoners of war and an even greater number had family members serving in the Canadian armed forces. Several had also lost sons or husbands in the war for whom such work likely had a therapeutic effect, as it helped them stay busy and assist a worthy cause. The work was carried out five days a week, with different groups of women generally working on the assembly line one day per week.\textsuperscript{123}

Numerous women’s groups joined with the Society in a mutually beneficial system of voluntary labour. Some, including the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE), the Ottawa Women’s Canadian Club (OWCC), the Catholic Women’s League (CWL) and the National Council of Women (NCW), coordinated their activities with the Red Cross, allowing the women to utilize the CRCS’s “official position, its facilities, information and experience.”\textsuperscript{124} In fact, the IODE made a formal agreement between

\textsuperscript{121} For a detailed account of the work of Mona Wilson in Newfoundland and Labrador during the Second World War, see Baldwin and Poulter, 281-311. Campbell served in this position for the first five years of the war, and then as the campaign chairman in Windsor in the 1944 and 1945 drives. For an account of some of Campbell’s accomplishments, see \textit{Windsor Daily Star}, 14 March 1945, 18-19; McKenzie Porter, \textit{To All Men; the Story of the Canadian Red Cross} (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960), 76.
\textsuperscript{122} Over the course of the war, beginning in 1941, the Red Cross packed 16 310 592 parcels, with nearly all of the work done by women volunteers. Largely because of this the cost of each parcel was able to be kept down to $2.50. See NWS Vol. 2, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 3,” Summary of some of the Outstanding Activities and Accomplishments in WWII, n.d.
\textsuperscript{124} LAC, MG28 I35, Ottawa Women’s Canadian Club (OWCC), vol. 14, Letter to Mrs. G.
itself and the Red Cross to carry out the collection, packing and shipping of needed supplies for Canadian servicemen overseas. This was done in order to avoid duplication.\textsuperscript{125} Although things did not always run smoothly between the Red Cross and these other women’s voluntary organizations, overall the cooperation between these groups was a success, providing the Red Cross with labour and money, and the women’s groups with another area in which to help out.

Although many of the leading figures of the CRCS were men, the Society was kept functioning at such a high level because of the extraordinary work done by millions of women volunteers. To take an example from one community, historian Serge Durflinger stated that though the men were listed as the official heads of the Verdun organization, the women of that community “did much of the organizing and most of the work.”\textsuperscript{126} In his book \textit{Fifty Years in the Canadian Red Cross}, P.H. Gordon, who served as chairman of the executive council during the war stated, “without our women there would be no Red Cross as we know it.”\textsuperscript{127} Although some might argue that the tasks generally assigned to women were menial and perpetuated the sexual divide, the evidence remains that without all the services provided by women, from those anonymously knitting articles in the work rooms to the numerous responsibilities of Adelaide Plumptre, the Red Cross would not have been able to render the enormous amounts of services it did.

Overall, the first two years of the war proved to be a huge success in terms of Red Cross fundraising. Despite having almost no monetary reserves as the war began,

\textsuperscript{125} D. Findlayson, 6 December 1939; \textit{Toronto Daily Star}, 11 November 1939, 20; Keshen, 25; \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 14 November 1939, 8.
\textsuperscript{126} IODE, Vol. 23, Memorandum and Agreement, 23 August 1940.
\textsuperscript{127} Durflinger, 110.

\textsuperscript{127} P. H. Gordon, \textit{Fifty Years in the Canadian Red Cross} (Canada: 1969), 97-98.
the organization was able to plan and implement a $3,000,000 nationwide campaign within two months that was oversubscribed by $2,000,000. The 1940 campaign met similar success as its $5,000,000 objective was also oversubscribed by a large margin. The CRCS was able to accomplish these massive feats through its high levels of preparation and organization, with work being split between the national, provincial and local levels of the Society. For its campaigns, each provincial district and local branch was given a specific objective to reach. This was accomplished by massive numbers of volunteers a majority of whom were women who, among other things, conducted house-to-house canvasses, knitted garments for those overseas, packed parcels for POWs, and used their own voluntary groups to aid the Red Cross in meeting its fundraising and humanitarian goals.
Chapter 2

1941: Denied

After two extremely successful years, during which both of the Red Cross national campaigns were oversubscribed and the services provided by the Society continued to grow, the CRCS faced its first major trial with the cancellation of its 1941 national fundraising campaign. The government claimed that the national campaign denial came about because of the previous successful campaign, and the assumption that the Red Cross had adequate funds for its needs. However, a closer look at the records shows that other factors were also at play. One of the most important reasons for the decision was the steady refusal of the Red Cross to participate in any type of joint campaign with other voluntary wartime organizations. The federal government’s Department of National War Service (NWS) was very anxious to have only one combined annual national wartime appeal. It eventually made the decision to deny the Red Cross the ability to fundraise nationally in 1941 and to go ahead with the joint campaign without the CRCS. Although not officially banned from raising money, the Society was forbidden from approaching people directly in a systematic national campaign, unless authorized by the government. An emergency appeal was granted late in 1941 when the Red Cross was allowed to hold a campaign to provide relief supplies for Soviet Russia, as requested by the Russian Red Cross.

Although the fundraising denial occurred in 1941, the problems that led to this traced back several years. In a 1938 conference between Charlotte Whitton, executive
director of the Canadian Welfare Council, and Dr. Fred Routley, then director of the Ontario Red Cross division and acting commissioner of the National Red Cross Society, the topic of having joint campaigns between Community Chests and the Red Cross was brought up. Whitton suggested that the budgets of the Chests be contained in the objectives of the local Red Cross branches, and that money needed for national purposes be gathered through a separate national Red Cross campaign. Routley reserved judgment on the issue, as there could be no official national position until war actually began, but he did state that if he had to decide, he strongly preferred having only one separate Red Cross campaign. Because of the close connection between the national executive and the local branches of the organization, Routley felt that the Red Cross would suffer by having two separate drives each year. As war was still only a possibility, the idea was put aside. When Canada joined the war on September 10, 1939, the Red Cross quickly went along with its preferred plan by having its own separate campaign.

The idea of having the Red Cross join with other voluntary war organizations did not resurface until the summer of 1940. The press reported that the “intention of the Government [was] to require all National Organizations dependent upon the public for funds for war work, to make one united appeal.” The main organizations that were affected by this proposal were the Red Cross, the YMCA, the Knights of Columbus Huts Fund, the Salvation Army, and the Canadian Legion War Services Fund. The CRCS expressed alarm, and national committee members requested a meeting with James G. Gardiner, the Minister of NWS, to discuss their concerns with the proposed plan. The

executive council felt that the Red Cross would be tied down in monetary terms by not being able to campaign when it needed money. They also argued that because the Red Cross addressed emergencies, it was very difficult for any kind of firm budget to be set to meet its various requirements.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 15, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1940-41,” Letter to Hon. James G. Gardiner, 22 July 1940.} The Society’s other concerns towards this proposal included the potential long-term merging voluntary campaigns,\footnote{NWS, Vol. 15, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1940-41,” Letter to Mr. Justice T. C. Davis, 22 October 1940.} the adverse affect it could have on the Red Cross’s post-war peace activities, the potential loss of support from among Canada’s foreign born population due to association with organizations not as international in scope as the Red Cross, and the difficulties of trying to coordinate thousands of individual campaigns across the country.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 15, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1940-41,” Letter to Hon. J. G. Gardiner, 25 July 1940.}

While the Red Cross opposed the newly-proposed approach, the government’s position did have validity. James Gardiner, Minister of NWS, told of people complaining of being approached too often to give donations to various charitable organizations, thus threatening to produce donor fatigue.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 15, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1940-41,” Letter to W. J. Cairns Esq., 8 August 1940.} Having one drive was also meant to increase efficiency in the collection process, and bring about greater harmony between the organizations involved.\footnote{The Saskatchewan Red Cross branch evaluated these points and came to the conclusion that having one large campaign would actually decrease efficiency and lead to lower financial returns. They argued that based on past campaigns held with the local Community Chests that greater harmony did not develop between the organizations. See NWS, Vol. 15, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1940-41,” Letter to Hon. J. G. Gardiner, 25 July 1940.} The government was also looking into the idea of separating war and non-war related appeals and having each occur only once per year; one suggestion, which was eventually adopted, was for organizations primarily involved
in war work to have their appeals in the spring and others to conduct their drives in the fall. However, with the Red Cross’s national appeal having already been scheduled for September, the federal government said it had no immediate plan to implement such proposed changes.

This, however, did not stop Red Cross branches and divisions from immediately expressing concerns to NWS. Letters were received from branches across the country expressing displeasure at the idea of a united campaign of all major voluntary charitable organizations. Each branch and division felt that its wartime efforts would be limited if it was forced to participate in only one drive a year. It was feared that these limitations would ultimately cause a loss of identity for the Red Cross, which was key to its fundraising efforts. This fear was clearly shown through the situation in the tiny Saskatchewan town of Scott. With a population of only 350, the Red Cross branch in that town was desirous to fold and join with a single community fundraising group for the duration of the war. Saskatchewan Red Cross officials feared that should this happen, the overall Red Cross structure in the province would suffer, as it was assumed that other smaller branches in the province would follow Scott’s example. For them, the idea of a joint campaign meant the real possibility of a loss of not only identity, but of actual Red Cross branches.

Concern was also expressed by Mrs. W. R. Campbell, national work chairman

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136 All of the provincial divisions sent letters, and many local branches did as well, including those in Hamilton, Ottawa, Port Arthur, Toronto Swift Current, Estevan, and Yorkton. See NWS, Vol. 33, file “Protests from the Red Cross Society,” Letters to Hon. James G. Gardiner, July 23; 24; 25; 27, 1940; October 3; 5; 7; 9; 10; 11; 12; 14, 1940.
for the CRCS, over the difficulties of creating a strict Red Cross budget. In her public opposition to the plan, she stated that “human disaster cannot be budgeted.” She explained how completely inadequate the services of the Red Cross would be if it was forced to budget for emergencies before they happened. She also argued that each worthy organization should stand alone and appeal to the Canadian public for its own funds.\textsuperscript{138} A startling example of the results of a joint campaign was given of the situation in Vancouver, where the Red Cross had previously been forced to conduct its public appeal in conjunction with the local Community Chests. This resulted in Vancouver recording the lowest per-capita donations to the Red Cross of any city or town in all of Canada.\textsuperscript{139} Should such a plan be carried out throughout the country, Red Cross officials were afraid the lower per-capita results experienced in Vancouver would be reciprocated for the entire campaign.

Because of the complaints about the proposed plan, a meeting was held on October 16, 1940 involving representatives from the NWS and all the major Canadian voluntary war service organizations.\textsuperscript{140} Its purpose was to make a decision on the advisability of having one national joint campaign in 1941. However, the groups failed to reach an agreement. Red Cross representatives again argued that unifying into one campaign would break down the individual strengths of the organizations involved, result in less money raised, and compromise the ability to respond to international

\textsuperscript{138} Windsor Daily Star, 7 October 1940, 3.
\textsuperscript{139} NWS, Vol. 33, file “Protests from the Red Cross Society,” Letter to Hon. J. G. Gardiner, 3 October 1940.
\textsuperscript{140} Along with the organizations specified above, the IODE, YWCA and the Navy League of Canada also wanted to conduct national fundraising drives in 1941, and were therefore present at the meeting. Representatives were also present from the National Council of Women, the Association of Community Chests and Councils and the Canadian Welfare Council, but only in an advisory capacity.
emergencies. The CRCS also argued that it was in the national interest to appeal frequently to the public to keep alive their spirit of giving.

The other organizations opposed the Red Cross and expressed their willingness to join in one united campaign, although the Salvation Army and the YMCA were tepid. These groups all felt that Canadian public opinion was pushing strongly for a joint campaign and cited examples of local communities compelling such unity upon voluntary organizations in their area. The idea was explored of having organizations other than the Red Cross join in one campaign. The representatives of the Salvation Army and the YMCA, however, were opposed, stating that they were only authorized to agree to a joint campaign if all groups, including the CRCS, were involved. As there was a lack of unanimity, and as these groups were all voluntary in nature, the chairman of the meeting felt that it was not in the national interest to use compulsion to bring about any type of decision.  

One step that was taken out of the meeting in working towards some sort of broad agreement was the creation of the National War Services Advisory Board. This new group consisted of one representative from all of the major voluntary war organizations and a chair appointed by the Minister of NWS. Its mandate was to consider all general canvassing appeals in light of proposed budgets, annual financial statements and programs of service.  

It was meant as a type of control over all the major voluntary organizations and in theory would be able to allow or deny groups the right to fundraise. Unfortunately, the process of filling the members of the board took an extended amount of time, which hurt the possibility of the Red Cross being able to


\[142\] Ibid.
appeal for its own national campaign in 1941.

By the middle of November, following the close of the 1940 Red Cross national campaign, Gardiner made an official decision that the only national appeal for war time funds in 1941 would be through a joint appeal of all major voluntary organizations. His major concern was the fact that if individual campaigns were to continue, five separate national drives would transpire between January and May. This would place an undue burden on the Canadian public and interfere with government-led campaigns, namely for people to purchase Victory Bonds. Gardiner again mentioned the possibility of local communities taking the initiative to combine drives in their own domain, which would cause the national organizations to lose control of their own budgets and quotas. In his opinion, the only option if the CRCS wanted to campaign nationally in 1941 was for the Society to join with other groups. Gardiner was also working to get the NWS Advisory Board running in order to formalize budgets and plans for a united drive.143

As the scheme proposed by Gardiner had been accepted by the government, the united campaign was planned to begin on March 24 without the support of the Red Cross. CRCS national headquarters did, however, advise all branches and districts to “lend all practicable, personal support to the United Appeal,” which consisted of the Canadian Legion, the Salvation Army, the Knights of Columbus Huts Service, the YMCA, the YWCA and the IODE.144 While the United Appeal was in progress, the Red Cross was continuing to press the government to allow it to put on its own national campaign later in the year. In a speech made in the House of Commons on March 7,

Gardiner announced that the Red Cross had agreed with the government’s national appeal program and therefore the Society would not be conducting a drive for funds in 1941. This statement was publicly refuted in a circular letter from W. F. Marshall, commissioner of the Saskatchewan Division of the Red Cross, stating that the Society would conduct its usual national campaign for funds in the fall. Quoting Norman Sommerville, national chairman of the Red Cross, the letter stated that “at no time had the Red Cross entered into an agreement not to make an appeal for funds during 1941.”

NWS responded to Marshall’s statements in a letter to Dr. J. W. Hedley, president of the Saskatchewan Division, explaining the confusing nature of the situation. What it amounted to was that Marshall had not been up-to-date on negotiations between NWS and the CRCS national executive, in which it had been formally concluded that the Red Cross was not to have a national appeal in 1941. Marshall’s statement had been carried all across Canada, and the government was urging the Red Cross to do its best to clarify the situation and prepare the branches to deal with fundraising on their own.

Not all fundraising options for the CRCS were banned by the government’s decision. In fact, the only method of raising funds that was not allowed was a national campaign, which was defined as “an appeal made between certain dates on a national basis right across Canada by a national organization and involving a house to house canvass for subscriptions, or, in other words, a personal appeal by the canvasser to a proposed subscriber.” Any other type of fundraising was acceptable, so long as it followed the guidelines in the War Charities Act and was approved by NWS. The

145 Star-Phoenix, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 25 March 1941, 3.
government was pushing the CRCS branches to fundraise as much as possible through these other means. Some popular methods included sporting events, variety shows, bingos, phone campaigns and press funds. The more money the Red Cross could obtain through these methods, the less it would have to rely on a national canvass to support its endeavours.\textsuperscript{148}

Throughout the year, the Red Cross branches and districts undertook many different fundraising activities that served as a basis for the organization’s survival - though some ideas were accepted by the government and other voluntary organizations more readily than others. The Ottawa branch undertook a phone and letter campaign to have members of the Society renew their Red Cross membership for a donation of one dollar or more.\textsuperscript{149} Some other organizations took exception to the phrase “or more,” seeing it as a way around the ban on public fundraising. These groups also felt that this idea, though not an official financial appeal, would have negative ramifications on future united campaigns.\textsuperscript{150} The constitution of the Red Cross, however, called for a yearly renewal of membership, which was given for every donation of one dollar or higher, making this form of fundraising legitimate.\textsuperscript{151} Another fundraising idea that was questioned was the idea of a Mr. Fred Wilkes of Regina, who proposed using the sale of flowers to help benefit the Red Cross. Although there was nothing inherently wrong with this proposal, it was felt that it would have been impossible to reach his goal of selling half a million plants, as all the seed houses in Canada combined did not sell that

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{149} CCSD, Vol. 178, file “Canadian Red Cross Society General 1940-49,” Letter from Finley McRae, 13 September 1941.  
\textsuperscript{150} CWSF, Vol. 5, file “National - Red Cross,” Telegram to Mr. Vernon K. Knowles, 20 September 1941.  
amount in a single year.\textsuperscript{152} With such a simple idea causing significant problems, the financial difficulties the CRCS faced in 1941 grew even more apparent.

Despite these difficulties, the most remarkable aspect of the Red Cross’s situation in 1941 was the extremely successful efforts of the local branches and provincial districts to support the national organization financially without a national campaign. It was reported that the Society raised $4 694 000 in 1941 all through community-initiated events like those described above. Through this money the branches and divisions fully financed their own workrooms and contributed the remainder of their funds to the national office.\textsuperscript{153} Because of this effort, the CRCS was able to continue its ever increasing wartime humanitarian work, which cost $9 542 000 in 1941, with the balance of the money coming from funds carried over from the 1940 national campaign. The Society was also able to avoid borrowing any money from the banks, as it had initially feared it would need to, thus saving it funds in the long run.\textsuperscript{154}

While it was officially declared that the Red Cross was not to conduct any major, national public appeals in 1941, a stipulation did allow for a larger appeal to be conducted should an emergency situation arise.\textsuperscript{155} Late in 1941 the Red Cross was called upon by National War Services to coordinate an emergency drive to raise $500 000 to purchase specifically requested medical and hospital supplies for Russia. This was in addition to $250 000 worth of supplies the CRCS had already provided for the

\textsuperscript{153} Montreal Daily Star, 9 May 1942, 3; Windsor Daily Star, 7 May 1942, 17.
\textsuperscript{155} NWS, Vol. 33, file “Protests from the Red Cross Society,” Letter to Hon. Mr. Justice P. H. Gordon, 11 October 1940.
Russian people.\textsuperscript{156} This campaign was in conjunction with similar drives for Russian relief being carried out by Red Cross committees in Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{157} The CRCS was chosen to coordinate this drive with numerous other Russian and Ukrainian groups because of its vast experience in supplying medical needs. This allowed the drive to be carried out as quickly and smoothly as possible.\textsuperscript{158} The Red Cross was also used as a compromise to permit money to be raised for communist Russia without having to allow previously banned Canadian communist groups to receive government recognition.\textsuperscript{159} After presenting the idea to the National War Services Fund, in which the resolution passed,\textsuperscript{160} the government officially announced that the campaign would begin the third week of November 1941.\textsuperscript{161}

The drive, however, was not a typical Red Cross national campaign, and the

\textsuperscript{156} NWS, Vol. 17, file “Canadian Red Cross Society Russian Relief Fund,” Letter to Michael Mutzak, Esq., 31 October 1941.
\textsuperscript{157} NWS, Vol. 17, file “Canadian Red Cross Society Russian Relief Fund,” Suggested Statement for Mr. Thorson, 19 November 1941.
\textsuperscript{160} Although the resolution passed, some of the organizations in the Fund did raise complaints against the idea. The Knights of Columbus felt that no help should be given to the Russians because communism was an idea opposed to Christianity, while the Salvation Army stated “the Russians were Red and the less we had to do with them the better.” The resolution ended up being passed because Russia had become an important, and beleaguered, ally of Canada after the Nazi invasion of 1941. It was also argued that the increase of Russian morale at that time would amount to the saving of British lives in the years to come. See NWS, Vol. 17, file “Canadian Red Cross Society Russian Relief Fund,” Letter to Hon. Mr. Justice T. C. Davis, 4 November 1941.
\textsuperscript{161} NWS, Vol. 5, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1941-42,” Memorandum to Hon. J. T. Thorson, 4 November 1941.
government provided some stipulations on how the CRCS was to proceed. The campaign was to be limited to appeals through radio and the press, and no direct canvass of individuals was allowed. It was to be made known to the public exactly what the money was being used for. A special effort was also to be made to raise the money from foreign language groups within the Canadian population. This item was included to encourage new Canadians to support the Canadian war drive, and the Red Cross was requested to include foreign language individuals in its organization. All other groups wishing to put on fundraising drives for Russian relief were denied and told to direct their efforts towards the Red Cross campaign. The campaign’s goal was set at $500 000, and any money oversubscribed was to be strictly kept within this same fund.\textsuperscript{162}

Although this was seen as an acceptable compromise, other voluntary organizations were not happy with the plan. The Salvation Army continued to oppose the drive, arguing that the Russian Relief campaign would severely injure the planned united campaign in February 1942. The organization appealed to NWS to appoint a campaign manager and committee for the united campaign prior to the approval of the CRCS’s Russian Relief Campaign.\textsuperscript{163} The government acknowledged the complaints of the Salvation Army, but once again stated that it was in everyone’s best interest if the Red Cross handle the campaign separate from and prior to the planned united campaign.\textsuperscript{164} Another concern came from the War Savings Committee, which was putting on fundraising drives for Victory Bonds in each of the nine provinces during the

month of November. Many of the provinces reported that their campaigns would extend into December, and felt that any additional voluntary drives would harm efforts at securing necessary funds. The Red Cross was notified that the War Savings Organization would not in any way ease up its activities in favour of the Russian Relief drive. NWS, however, felt that there would be no competition between the two campaigns, as they would be “supplementary and in aid of the other.”

As the campaign got underway, P. H. Gordon, chairman of the executive council of the Red Cross, was besieged by prominent members of society to request the government to allow volunteers to personally solicit specific individuals for donations. These people felt that the Red Cross was not making an all-out effort to support Canada’s ally, and were afraid that without a personal canvass, the objective of the campaign would not be met. Although Gordon felt the drive would ultimately be successful without a direct canvass, he did agree that extending the campaign to specific personal solicitations would help raise awareness and inspire further volunteerism. He passed this petition on to NWS, with the suggestion that only those specially interested in Russia be directly canvassed. After consulting over the issue with the Minister of Finance, NWS approved the suggestion and allowed certain groups, including the Civil Service in Ottawa, to be directly canvassed to donate funds to the Russian Relief

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165 Six of the nine provinces, representing 91% of War Savings receipts, felt that the CRCS Russian Relief drive would harm their work and requested that it be postponed. See NWS, Vol. 5, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1941-42,” Letter to the Hon. J. L. Ilsley, 3 November 1941.


drive.\textsuperscript{168} Even with these concessions, much of the fundraising came from national groups, especially Russian and Ukrainian groups, who had a deeper interest in providing relief for the Russian people.\textsuperscript{169}

Overall, publicity for the campaign was rather spotty. Much of the focus of the drive was placed in Toronto, as that city’s objective was $100 000, or one-fifth of the overall national total.\textsuperscript{170} The campaign had the full approval of all parties in the House of Commons, as well as the support of many organized labour groups.\textsuperscript{171} NWS Minister J.T. Thorson officially opened the drive by stating “the courage and sacrifices of the Russian armies in the gigantic struggle now going on have not only earned the profound admiration of the whole democratic world, but have also created an earnest desire in all sections to send them all possible aid.”\textsuperscript{172} What was most striking about his comments, and subsequent advertisements, was the lack of remarks regarding communism. The Soviet Union was viewed as a close ally and a victim of Nazi brutality.\textsuperscript{173} In Quebec, where communism was seen as an even greater threat than in English Canada, the focus of the newspaper advertisements was fixed on the immense sufferings of the Russian soldiers and citizens.\textsuperscript{174}

This focus proved successful as the $500 000 campaign was oversubscribed by

\textsuperscript{169} Toronto Daily Star, 1 December 1941, 19; Hamilton Spectator, 26 November 1941, 7.
\textsuperscript{170} Toronto Daily Star, 2 December 1941, 3.
\textsuperscript{171} Toronto Daily Star, 28 November 1941, 39; 4 December 1941, 22; La Presse, 28 November 1941, 31.
\textsuperscript{172} Toronto Daily Star, 26 November 1941, 2.
\textsuperscript{173} See Toronto Daily Star, 19 November 1941, 35; Montreal Daily Star, 28 November 1941, 3; La Presse, 25 November 1941, 15.
\textsuperscript{174} See La Presse, 28 November 1941, 31.
$250,000 within a few months. Although all the money was earmarked for purchasing medical and hospital supplies, the Russians had sent specific requests and would accept no substitutes. This made it difficult for the CRCS to spend the money, as the majority of the eighty-three items requested were not available in Canada, or had already been provided by similar British and American groups. Any other suggestions for the use of the money, such as providing clothing, were turned down by NWS. It would reflect poorly on the CRCS if it endeavoured to send items that the Russians did not want. $100,000 was sent in March 1942 to the Soviet Red Cross stationed in Britain, under the leadership of Madame Maisky, wife of the Soviet ambassador to Britain. Although the CRCS felt it had found an acceptable avenue to spend the money, it was eventually reprimanded for this action, and told not to send any further funding to the Soviet Red Cross, as that group had used the money to buy up blankets that were meant for British citizens. By late August the CRCS still had over $300,000 on hand for Russian relief, as the Soviet government continued to specifically request supplies not readily available in Canada. Indeed, nearly one year after the campaign had taken place, the Society was still struggling to find ways to use the

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176 NWS, Vol. 16, file “Russian Relief Fund,” Medical Supplies for Russia, 20 December 1941.
177 This was suggested by Patrick Duff, the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, in April 1942, following the example set by Mrs. Churchill’s Red Cross “Aid to Russia” Fund, which sent garments, blankets and wool to Russia. In view of the clothing difficulties in the UK, Duff suggested that the CRCS provide the garments that Mrs. Churchill’s group would have. See NWS, Vol. 16, file “Russian Relief Fund,” Letter to Mr. Robertson, 3 April 1942.
money, prompting Gordon to declare the whole campaign a “flop.”\textsuperscript{181}

The Russians were not the only Canadian ally to request specific aid from the CRCS. In March 1942, following the Russian relief drive, Victor Podoski, the Consul General of Poland in Canada, requested a similar type of drive from the CRCS for the relief of over two million Polish women and children who had been deported into the Soviet Union. He stated that the IODE had already launched a successful appeal for this cause, but because of the huge amount of relief needed, he felt the CRCS would be better able to meet the prolonged need of all those suffering in Russia.\textsuperscript{182} Unfortunately, as the Red Cross was about to start its 1942 national campaign, it felt that a special drive for Polish relief was impossible at that time. The Society did, however, include in its budget funds that would be advanced to specific allied nationals in distress, including Polish exiles. It was commonly felt that the Polish population had suffered some of the worst hardships among the allied nations. Because of this, the CRCS, along with the American Red Cross, had continually provided the Polish refugees with assistance through comforts and medical supplies. The Canadian Red Cross also specified that all relief supplies sent to Russia be shared with the Poles living there, although it was unsure whether this actually happened.\textsuperscript{183}

Not all international groups requested the Red Cross carry out special fundraising drives for them. Despite reports from such groups as the War Savings Organization claiming that foreign elements in Canadian society were not pulling their weight in the

\textsuperscript{181} NWS, Vol. 16, file “Russian Relief Fund,” Letter to Hon. Mr. Justice T. C. Davis, 10 November 1942.
war effort, thousands of new Canadians and immigrants organized themselves to help out in numerous ways for the annual CRCS national fundraising campaigns. Many sought to repay the Society for work it had done among their kindred overseas. For example, in 1939 a young boy presented a donation of $17.25 from the Winnipeg Chinese community in recognition of the work done in China by the CRCS. In his own words, the boy stated, “White boy help China boy when he have troubles. Now China boy want help white boy in his war [sic].” During the 1942 campaign, Greek-run restaurants and stores in Toronto and Hamilton set aside one day in which their entire gross proceeds were donated to the Red Cross. Peter Basil, president of the Greek Red Cross branch in Toronto, stated that this was done “in appreciation and gratitude to the Canadian Red Cross society for the splendid work being done by them for our own Canadian soldiers, as well as the soldiers of our native Greece” who, along with the civilian population, were provided with clothing, blankets, and food.

Many groups sent in donations and canvassed their communities to provide aid directly to their homeland. The Red Cross approved of the idea of having national groups, including based upon ethnicity, form their own local branches in order to contribute. These groups put on special concerts, parties, dances and parades and canvassed their fellow citizens, all in the name of the Canadian Red Cross. In the first national campaign, Winnipeg’s Polish population, under the direction of Dr. Frank

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185 Winnipeg Free Press, 16 November 1939, 24.
187 Hamilton Spectator, 22 May 1942, 7.
188 For some examples of the work done by these national elements of society, see Toronto Daily Star, 18 May 1942, 13; Hamilton Spectator, 22 May 1942, 7; Windsor Daily Star, 14 March 1945, 3; Windsor Daily Star, 17 March 1945, 6; Winnipeg Free Press, 20 March 1945, 1.
Sedziak, chairman of the Polish national defence and relief fund, gave $10 000 to the Red Cross drive, money that was to be used “for the relief of distress caused by the present war in Poland, and in neighbouring countries wherever Polish refugees and war sufferers may be found.”¹⁸⁹ By 1945, when the Red Cross national campaign was also supporting the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund (CUARF), this type of specified donation had become much more common. In Toronto, the Serbian Shield Society of Canada made a $218 donation on behalf of the CUARF, while the Farband Russian Ukrainian Jews donated $1000 that was divided between Jewish relief and general aid to Russia.¹⁹⁰ Numerous other national groups became involved including Canadians from Syria, Lebanon, Slovakia, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Lithuania, especially as their homelands were liberated and aid became crucial to support civilian populations.

The unifying influence of the Red Cross was also evident in Quebec, where the usual wartime divide between French and English, typically highlighted in Second World War historiography, was absent. Enthusiasm among French Canadians for the Red Cross was displayed through all the national campaigns, as every Quebec hamlet, it seemed, worked to reach its ascribed objective. Quebec’s provincial co-chair W. Wynne Robinson, announced that differences of language had been put aside because of the important work of the Red Cross. He stressed that “the Red Cross makes no distinction between French and English - Catholic, Protestant or Jew, when it gives or asks for help.”¹⁹¹ Another Red Cross official went so far as to declare the Red Cross as a significant influence for keeping Canada united during the war.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Quoted in Winnipeg Free Press, 13 November 1939, 9.
¹⁹⁰ Globe and Mail, 12 March 1945, 4.
Still, 1941 proved to be a mixed year for the Red Cross. After having its annual national fundraising campaign cancelled because of lack of cooperation with the government and other voluntary war service organizations, the Society’s branches and districts dug in and raised a huge amount of money, which allowed the CRCS to continue its ever expanding wartime programs. As the year was ending, the CRCS was commissioned by the government to carry out an emergency fundraising campaign in support of Canada’s Russian ally. Although the campaign itself was a success, the Society had a difficult time expending the funds raised due to the strict demands of the Russians for items not readily available in Canada. On the other hand, these fundraising activities arguably contributed to national unity and highlighted contributions from Canada’s immigrant and foreign language populations. Although their motivations ranged from displaying gratitude to Canada to securing assistance for family and friends overseas, assistance from these groups was significant to the overall success of the Canadian Red Cross Society, and, by extension, Canada’s war effort.
Chapter 3

1942-43: Development

1942 began in much the same way as 1941 did for the CRCS. Plans were again made for a joint campaign of all major voluntary wartime organizations and the Red Cross continued to fight against the strategy. Although the government had been pushing for only one large campaign per year, by early 1942 it had begun to back off that position in favour of once more allowing the CRCS to fundraise nationally on its own. This decision was a huge relief for Red Cross officials as the Society was facing severe financial problems due to the cancellation of its 1941 national campaign. The 1942 drive more than made up for the deficiencies of the previous year. The total funds gathered in the 1942 drive amounted to nearly double that of the previous national campaign. Following this drive, the government once again threatened to refuse the Red Cross a nationwide campaign in 1943. The CRCS responded by citing the example of the American Red Cross Society (ARCS) and its relations with the US government that supported the Society’s right to conduct its own separate national campaign. Although the Red Cross was allowed to campaign yearly for the remainder of the war, its problems came in the form of newly created voluntary war relief organizations, which competed with it for campaign time and funds and threatened to bring about another joint campaign scheme. Overall, however, these years saw a great leap take place in all
areas of Red Cross activity, as the war was expanding and the conflict began to hit closer to home.

At the beginning of 1942 discussions were again underway on how one large national campaign could be conducted incorporating all major voluntary wartime organizations. The 1941 United Campaign had proven to be a huge success, with over $7 000 000 received from the Canadian public, well exceeding the $5 500 000 objective. The Canadian War Services Fund had then held the money and dispersed it to the organizations involved in the drive as required.\footnote{CCSD, Vol. 112, file “National War Services General 1939-42,” Press Release by Hon. J. T. Thorson, Minister of National War Services, 28 February 1942.} As the Red Cross had abstained from joining the United Campaign, it was coming dangerously close to completely running out of funds to carry out its humanitarian services. It had survived until February 1942, but was afraid that its coffers would be completely empty within days, as its commitments at the time totaled roughly $1 000 000 per month.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 5, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1941-42,” Telegram to Hon. J. T. Thorson, 10 February 1942.} Concurrently, the government was attempting to coordinate another United Campaign that would include the CRCS, the IODE, the Navy League of Canada, the YMCA, the YWCA, the Canadian Legion, the Salvation Army and the Knights of Columbus, with the possibility of including the Canadian Jewish Congress and the St. John’s Ambulance. A preliminary budget had been calculated for all the organizations involved, totaling $21 660 500.\footnote{Of that total, the Red Cross requested $10 912 000. For a complete breakdown of the budget of the proposed United Campaign, see NWS, Vol. 7, file “1942 Joint Appeal,” Memorandum to Mr. Justice Davis, 21 January 1942.} The groups involved had also been told that the drive would not begin until the end of April at the earliest, to make way for the government’s Victory Loan
The main problems with the plan as set out above were the huge amounts of money needed to be collected and the time that would be required for these organizations to secure their objectives. Even after the overall objective had been cut back to $17 000 000, it was estimated that the United Campaign would require at least six weeks in order to obtain this from the public. This time would also need to be uninterrupted by other government fundraising campaigns, which was an unacceptable situation for the Department of Finance, especially when it came to the twice-yearly Victory Bond drives. Thus a decision was made to have the government finance the needs of the Auxiliary Services, which included the YMCA, the YWCA, the Canadian Legion, the Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army and the Navy League. This decision disposed of any need for these groups to carry out a direct national canvass. It was estimated that the cost of this plan to the Canadian treasury would be between $5 000 000 and $6 000 000 for 1942.

While the Auxiliary Services were denied a national drive in 1942, the Red Cross was allowed to conduct a separate campaign. The government felt that the smaller individual drive, with a preliminary objective of $8 000 000, would still be a success if it ran concurrently with the government’s Victory Loan Campaign. The government also argued that because of the voluntary nature of the Red Cross and its international convention obligations, it was not only unwise, but impossible, for that organization to have its activities subsidized by the government. The Red Cross continually echoed these sentiments, stating that if it received any funds from the government, it “would

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196 NWS, Vol. 7, file “1942 Joint Appeal,” Memorandum to Dr. W. C. Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance, 31 January 1942.
197 Ibid.
cease to be a voluntary organization and would become more or less a government-sponsored one, and that it would cease to have the protection accorded to it by international law and international agreement.”198 Any type of arrangement whereby the Society would receive funds from any other source than the general public would result in it losing standing with the International Red Cross under the Geneva Convention, a situation neither the CRCS nor the Canadian government desired. Although a preliminary objective had been set, the CRCS was still required to submit a detailed budget to the National War Charities Fund Advisory Board, which continued to exercise control over the budgets and expenditures of all the national war charities.199

Not all of the Auxiliary Services accepted this arrangement. The Salvation Army sent a spirited letter to NWS providing a case for why the United Campaign should proceed as planned. Writing on behalf of the other Auxiliary Service members, it argued that they had become “essential factors in national life and character and [could not] be destroyed or crushed without materially effecting the Citizen Morale of Canadians [sic].”200 These groups were built on public approval and good will, and they argued that their financing should continue to come from the Canadian public. They also felt that if the Red Cross’s budget was held down, the overall objective of the drive would be only $16 000 000, a figure the Salvation Army felt was reasonable. This letter recommended that either the 1942 United Campaign be carried out as originally planned, or the Auxiliary Services be allowed to carry out a joint campaign with the Red Cross

for any funds not provided by the Department of Finance. It also suggested that should a
United Campaign not be carried out, the Salvation Army and the YMCA be given the
right to conduct their own national campaigns just as the Canadian Red Cross.\textsuperscript{201}

The government, however, had already made its decision on the matter and did
not bend to any of the requests. At the end of February 1942 the proposed financing of
the Auxiliary Services was publicly announced and the Red Cross officially began
preparing for its first campaign in over a year.\textsuperscript{202} One of the first things that needed to
be settled was the date of the campaign. The Red Cross initially requested the first two
weeks of June,\textsuperscript{203} but the government needed the drive to be concluded by the first of
June to make room for its own national appeal for Victory Bonds.\textsuperscript{204} The dates for the
drive were finally set between May 11 and 23, and the CRCS moved ahead in
publicizing the new campaign.

Other points that needed to be addressed were the budget and objective of the
drive. A meeting was set with the Advisory Board to officially decide on the matter. The
Red Cross put forward a budget of $9 000 000, claiming that this was the government’s
request for its 1942 objective.\textsuperscript{205} Justice T. C. Davis, the Associate Deputy Minister of
National War Services, took exception to this statement, as the government had
requested a figure of $8 000 000 or lower be announced to the public. This they felt

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid.
T. Thorson, 28 February 1942.
\textsuperscript{203} NWS, Vol. 17, file “Canadian Red Cross Society Prisoner of War Parcels,” Letter to Hon.
J. L. Ilsley, 13 March 1942.
\textsuperscript{204} NWS, Vol. 16, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1941-42,” Letter to Hon. Mr. Justice P.
H. Gordon, K.C., 8 April 1942.
\textsuperscript{205} For the breakdown of the 1942 campaign budget, see NWS, Vol. 17, file “Canadian Red
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would interfere as little as possible with government financing plans.\textsuperscript{206} The Red Cross explained that because it was planning on having to stretch the campaign money for fifteen months, it needed to increase the announced objective. Although its expenditures were estimated at between ten and eleven million dollars, the Society felt those figures were too high, and kept the budget at $9,000,000.\textsuperscript{207} NWS eventually approved of this change, as it recognized that the Red Cross had to begin its publicity prior to official government sanction of the objective. The government also knew “full well that regardless of the amount [the Red Cross] sought, that [its] appeal would go away over such amount [sic].”\textsuperscript{208}

As the campaign began, both Prime Minister Mackenzie King and the Earl of Athlone, who was the Governor General and honorary president of the CRCS, again issued public statements praising the work done by the Red Cross and appealed to Canadians to donate as much as they could to the national campaign.\textsuperscript{209} On May 15 NWS Minister Thorson also made a public address over CBC radio detailing the critically important work done by the organization up to that point and assuring listeners that every dollar raised would be spent on addressing humanitarian need. Thorson concluded his address by stating that “to give to the Canadian Red Cross Society is a privilege,” and he urged Canadians “to the utmost limit of [their] capacity, to give

\textsuperscript{207} NWS, Vol. 16, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1941-42,” Letter to Hon. Mr. Justice T. C. Davis, 10 April 1942.
\textsuperscript{209} CCSD, Vol. 178, file “Canadian Red Cross Society General 1940-49,” Premier King Endorses Appeal, 11 May 1942; Athlone Appeals for Support in Red Cross Drive, 13 May 1942.
willingly, to give freely, and to give generously...”

With an objective of almost double the previous campaign, the Red Cross needed the voluntary help of Canadians more than ever. Provincial objectives soared to greater heights, with Ontario budgeted to cover $4,500,000, or half of the national total. Both Quebec and Manitoba’s objectives doubled from the 1940 campaign, with Quebec expected to collect $2,000,000 and Manitoba aiming for $600,000. Many cities also had their objectives increased, though some more than others. Toronto again had the largest single objective in Canada at $1,500,000, but the increase was proportionately less than several other communities due to its past performance.

The success of individual communities was determined in part by whether or not the Red Cross officials shaped the format of the drive to fit the specific area. The frontrunner of this type of community adaptation was Windsor. With an objective of $250,000 ($100,000 higher than the 1940 campaign objective) the two week campaign was primarily directed at factory and office workers. The first week was set aside for those working under the industrial and special names committees, while the second week consisted of canvassing every store and office in the city. With this plan in place, the Windsor Red Cross announced that there would be no direct house-to-house canvassing, and anyone who would be missed by the direct canvass was invited to send in their donations to Red Cross headquarters. This plan worked extremely well as Windsor had approximately 36,000 industrial workers who would each be directly

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petitioned by a man prominent in that industrial or manufacturing field.\textsuperscript{214}

Another development that became popular in many centers during the collection process was the payroll deduction plan, which became the most prominent method of donating in Windsor. Here, workers pledged a small portion of their monthly salary to the Red Cross, giving the organization a steady income throughout the year. While most donations ranged between ten and twenty-five cents per month, these amounts added up to significant contributions to the CRCS. This plan also helped speed up the process of the campaigns, as most workers signed up to continue the payroll deductions until the end of the war.\textsuperscript{215} Other communities, most notably Hamilton and Montreal, also focused canvassing efforts on employees of factories, offices and business.\textsuperscript{216} These donations were often published in the local newspapers as a way of celebrating those who gave, and pressuring others to do the same.

The communities that made adaptations to the collection process did remarkably well in the 1942 campaign, led by the success of Windsor. On May 19 it was reported that in the first day of canvassing it had raised over $39 000, which was the best performance in the city to date.\textsuperscript{217} The community total increased steadily and quickly once the Industrial Division totals began to be reported. These figures were delayed because of the time consuming work of totaling payroll deduction pledges. Still, by May 23, after only four days of official community canvassing, Windsor had already surpassed its total, coming in at $272 258, almost $25 000 over its original objective. Of that total, over $200 000 had come directly from the payroll deductions of industrial

\textsuperscript{214} Windsor Daily Star, 11 May 1942, 3.
\textsuperscript{215} Windsor Daily Star, 9 May 1942, 3.
\textsuperscript{216} Hamilton Spectator, 12 May 1942, 7; Montreal Daily Star, 28 May 1942, 5.
\textsuperscript{217} Windsor Daily Star, 19 May 1942, 3.
workers in the city, proving the plan’s immense worth.\textsuperscript{218} Montreal was also extremely successful in its campaign, collecting nearly $1,500,000, or three-fourths, of the $2,000,000 Quebec objective.\textsuperscript{219} Hamilton was so successful in its drive that it voluntarily raised its objective by $25,000, to $250,000, while its drive was still going on.\textsuperscript{220}

Not all of the local campaigns were as successful. Manitoba again struggled to reach its higher objective within the allotted campaign period, sitting at just 39\% of its total on May 22, the day before the scheduled close of the drive. This put Manitoba behind every other province, including Ontario and its massive objective.\textsuperscript{221} Only after extending the campaign by a week did the Manitoba district reach its $600,000 target.\textsuperscript{222} Toronto also fell behind, as it had only reached the half-way point in collections by May 22,\textsuperscript{223} as it was hampered by relatively low numbers of volunteers and poor weather conditions.\textsuperscript{224} Another factor was lack of adaptation in the collection process, as Toronto stuck to the status quo, despite disappointing results in previous campaigns.

Also, after such a long break since the last drive, the national campaign began slowly, which alarmed many Red Cross officials. After the first five days of the drive, only $1,257,000 had been collected, compared to $1,800,000 in the same time frame for the 1940 campaign. Justice P. H. Gordon, chairman of the national executive committee, expressed his regret at the disappointing results of. Prince Edward Island was an exception, as it had already gone over its objective, which, of course, was significantly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Windsor Daily Star}, 23 May 1942, 3.
\item \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 28 May 1942, 3.
\item \textit{Hamilton Spectator}, 23 May 1942, 7.
\item \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 22 May 1942, 1
\item \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 6 June 1942, 1.
\item \textit{Toronto Daily Star}, 22 May 1942, 4.
\item \textit{Toronto Daily Star}, 27 May 1942, 10. Weather conditions were not a good excuse for poor collections, however, as the Hamilton branch was able to collect over $5500 on its tag day despite poor weather. See \textit{Hamilton Spectator}, 18 May 1942, 7.
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smaller than that of the other provinces.\textsuperscript{225} There were also reports of run-ins with “the Scrooge type” of people who refused to give anything to the campaign, though according to many canvassers, these cases were relatively few in number.\textsuperscript{226}

Despite the disappointing circumstances at the beginning of the drive, success was ultimately achieved. Canadians were told to “give ‘till it really hurts,” and stories abounded of people living up to this request, including the young. For example, in Montreal twenty-seven children who were patients in the Children’s Memorial Hospital sent in a donation of $3.25.\textsuperscript{227} School children in Hamilton reached 175\% of their quota,\textsuperscript{228} while school teachers in Winnipeg raised well over $4000 for the campaign, which was described as a very impressive sum.\textsuperscript{229} Large donations also abounded, including one from the T. Eaton Company and its employees of $158 360,\textsuperscript{230} a $10 907 donation in Manitoba by the Hudson’s Bay Company,\textsuperscript{231} and $22 000 raised by employees of Canadian Pacific in Montreal, well exceeding its official objective of $16 000.\textsuperscript{232} All of these donations helped bring the campaign over the top; indeed, the drive eventually totaled nearly $10 000 000, thus allowing the Red Cross to continue to expand its wartime humanitarian efforts.\textsuperscript{233}

Directly after the close of the campaign, Red Cross national officials began consulting with NWS in an attempt to schedule a date for the 1943 campaign. Gordon

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\item\textsuperscript{225} Montreal Daily Star, 18 May 1942, 4.
\item\textsuperscript{226} Montreal Daily Star, 16 May 1942, 3.
\item\textsuperscript{227} Montreal Daily Star, 26 May 1942, 4.
\item\textsuperscript{228} Hamilton Spectator, 21 May 1942, 7.
\item\textsuperscript{229} Winnipeg Free Press, 23 May 1942, 1.
\item\textsuperscript{230} Montreal Daily Star, 23 May 1942, 7.
\item\textsuperscript{231} Winnipeg Free Press, 22 May 1942, 1.
\item\textsuperscript{232} La Presse, 27 May 1942, 3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
explained that the 1942 campaign had suffered because of the short notice the Red Cross was given. This, he argued, put extra pressure on both employees and volunteers, and added to the overall costs of planning and preparation.\textsuperscript{234} In replying to this request, NWS stated it understood the added strain put on the organization because of the late approval, but it could not specify when the next national campaign could take place. In fact, it hinted at the possibility of denying the Red Cross a campaign in 1943, pointing to the precedent set in 1941. It claimed that because the higher campaign objective had been met in 1942, and since other sources of revenue could be found to keep the organization afloat, a national drive might not be necessary until 1944.\textsuperscript{235} Obviously this prospect was alarming to the Red Cross executive, but the government decided to put off any decision for the time being.

The CRCS also appealed to the Canadian government to follow the pattern set by the American government and the American Red Cross Society (ARCS) in dealing with the continued desires of some groups for restrictions on Red Cross national fundraising plans. In 1942 the ARCS received requests from individual cities to carry out united campaigns of all voluntary wartime humanitarian groups. As the ARCS felt this went against both its national and international character, it appealed to US President Roosevelt for permission to deny these communities the ability to form united campaigns and to allow the Red Cross to continue to put on its annual national fundraising drive.\textsuperscript{236} Roosevelt agreed with the ARCS’s petition and fully endorsed its

\textsuperscript{235} NWS, Vol. 5, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1941-42,” Letter to Hon. Mr. Justice P. H. Gordon, 10 June 1942.
\textsuperscript{236} NWS, Vol. 15, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1941-42,” Letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 17 June 1942.
planned national campaign in March 1943. He also declared March to be “Red Cross Month,” further enforcing the great humanitarian role the organization was playing in the global conflict.²³⁷ CRCS officials used this announcement to request the next national campaign also occur in March, so as to run concurrently with the American campaign and thus add to and benefit from the media coverage.²³⁸ Although the government may have agreed with the desires of the CRCS, it was unable to secure March for the next national campaign as NWS was more focused on the Victory Loan campaigns. It decided that the Red Cross campaign would run either before or after the spring 1943 Victory Loan campaign, the dates of which had yet to be firmly scheduled. This put any plans the CRCS may have had on hold.²³⁹

The debate over the 1943 national campaign date was not settled until early January 1943. Although the CRCS had thought the matter of a March campaign date had been settled as early as October 30, 1942,²⁴⁰ Major-General L.R. Laflèche, now the Minister of NWS, had only approved the campaign date in January 1943.²⁴¹ Luckily for the Red Cross, it had begun publicity in late 1942 under the previous assumption of a campaign approval. This enabled the Society to be adequately prepared for the drive, which was to begin on March 1. Without this early preparation, the CRCS would have

had only two months to organize a major national campaign.

The budget was the next matter to be settled, and the Red Cross was extremely upset with the manner in which it was handled. The Society felt the government was trying to exercise too much control on the CRCS’s ability to set its own yearly budget and campaign objective. The Red Cross argued that it was dangerously close to losing its status as an international voluntary society because of interference from the Canadian government. Still, the government did not back down on its desire to set and approve the annual Red Cross budget through the work of the NWS Advisory Committee. The committee eventually agreed with the requests of the CRCS that the overall 1943 budget be set at $11 650 000, putting the national campaign objective at $10 000 000.

Before the 1943 campaign started, the CRCS was put into a difficult position that could have hindered the success of the drive. This was due to the activities of the Canadian Aid to Russia Fund (CARF), which was a non-profit corporation that had been set up in the summer of 1942 by a group of important Toronto personalities. This group was given the right to raise money through national and local campaigns to aid the people of Russia; to use the money collected to purchase food, clothing, medical supplies, and other needed articles; to ship those articles to Russia; and to set up across Canada other groups to promote and carry out these objectives. Although the

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244 For information on the creation of this Fund, and its agreements with the CRCS, see NWS, Vol. 16, file “Russian Relief Fund,” Letter to J.M. MacDonnell, Esq., 25 June 1942; Letter to Hon. Justice P. H. Gordon, 27 June 1942; and Letter to Mr. George Pifher, 1 August 1942.
245 LAC, MG28-I65, Canadian Aid to Russia Fund (CARF), Vol. 14, file “National Committee - Original Set up, Bylaws, etc,” Canadian Aid to Russia Fund, 29 October 1942.
responsibilities of the CRCS and CARF in relation to Russian aid were separate,\textsuperscript{246} the Red Cross complained that the CARF was beginning to move into areas set aside for Red Cross relief. The bigger problem, however, was the fact that the CARF national campaign, which had been scheduled to close at the end of January 1943, was being continued indefinitely. Although the CARF committee had officially withdrawn all national advertising programs on January 27, thirty-one newspapers, under the assumed leadership of the Toronto Star, had officially adopted the fund and were continuing collections. Despite the fact that the original $1 000 000 objective had been tripled by mid-February, these newspapers were “unwilling to terminate their activities in view of the popularity of the campaign.”\textsuperscript{247} In fact, Gordon reported that on February 11 the evening edition of the Toronto Star carried twenty-five-and-a-half columns in support of the Fund.

Although the Society claimed that it was not worried about its own campaign, this was not completely true.\textsuperscript{248} Going against such a popular fundraiser, which was located in the major cities of Canada, posed a threat to the overall success of the Red Cross campaign. This was especially true in those larger centres that provided a significant percentage of the overall CRCS objective. What made the situation even more worrisome to the Red Cross and NWS was the delicate position it created for the

\textsuperscript{246} The CRCS was responsible for providing surgical, medical and hospital supplies, while the CARF was to provide for civilian relief only. See NWS, Vol. 1, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1,” Letter to Major-General, the Hon. L. R. Laflèche, 8 February 1943.

\textsuperscript{247} NWS, Vol. 1, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1,” Memorandum to the Minister, 10 February 1943.

\textsuperscript{248} NWS, Vol. 1, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1,” Letter to Major-General, the Hon. L. R. Laflèche, 12 February 1943. This claim is refuted in a telegram sent by Dr. Routley to Laflèche, in which he stated “If this is true [the extension of the CARF drive until February 15] we feel that it will be definitely harmful to our forthcoming campaign.” See NWS, Vol. 1, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1,” Telegram to Major-General L. R. Laflèche, 8 February 1943.
CRCS should it publicly complain about the extension of the CARF campaign. As the campaign was extremely popular, any pressure the CRCS might put on the press to terminate their activities could result in a backlash of public opinion, thus harming the forthcoming national campaign. The matter was brought before the NWS Advisory Board, which concluded that in order to ensure the success of the CRCS national campaign, the CARF drive had to be terminated immediately. It was suggested that the Prime Minister take personal action in addressing the Toronto Star and formally requesting it cease its fundraising operations. The administrators of the CARF had to resort to this plan, as their efforts to stop the newspaper drive had proven ineffective.

Despite any problems the CARF drive could potentially cause to the CRCS, the Society’s 1943 national campaign began on March 1, running concurrently with that of the American Red Cross. NWS Minister Laflèche released a statement calling the Red Cross “a shining light of humanitarianism which keeps hope burning in the hearts of the people in the war-torn occupied countries of Europe.” He also could have referred to the ever-increasing aid the CRCS was providing to Canadian servicemen after thousands were taken as prisoners of war following the Battle of Hong Kong in December 1941 and the Dieppe raid in August 1942. Because of these events, many more Canadians began to have a personal connection to Red Cross work.

Many local newspapers latched on to the new link between Canadians and those held captive overseas. In the Windsor Daily Star pictures of Windsor soldiers held in

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249 NWS, Vol. 1, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1,” Memorandum to the Minister, 10 February 1943.
250 NWS, Vol. 1, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1,” Memorandum to the Minister, 22 February 1943.
POW camps in Europe were published, while the *London Daily Free Press* released the names of the thirty POWs from the area, along with the names and addresses of their next of kin. Stories were also told from both the POWs and their families, attempting to elicit pity and charity from those reading these accounts. The *Montreal Daily Star* included a story of a poor woman who expressed her appreciation of the care the Red Cross had provided for her husband who had been taken prisoner at Dieppe. There were also numerous stories reported from men in the prison camps expressing their gratitude for the work done by the CRCS.

Besides the focus on POWs, many communities continued to introduce new ideas into their individual Red Cross drives. In Montreal, the industrial section of the campaign asked all workers in that city to contribute at least half a day’s pay, which became the slogan throughout the drive. The Windsor Red Cross once again followed its plan of focusing on the industrial and business sections of the city, and expanded its payroll deduction scheme. Recommended giving was based on a scale depending on pay, with a minimum donation of ten cents per week. Throughout the month of March Winnipeggers were asked to place a red cross on their door to show their support for the organization. Members of the Winnipeg Junior Red Cross, totaling over 10 000 from 52 local schools, distributed over 100 000 crosses on the Friday and Saturday.

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252 *Windsor Daily Star*, 12 March 1943, 3. By this time, over 480 families in the district had relatives who were receiving Red Cross aid as POWs. See *Windsor Daily Star*, 1 March 1943, 3.


257 *Windsor Daily Star*, 8 March 1943, 3; 9 March 1943, 3; 13 March 1943, 3.
before the start of the campaign, and full-page advertisements, paid for by local businesses, were placed in the press promoting the scheme.\textsuperscript{258} In the end over eighty percent participated in the plan, which also helped canvassers quickly determine which houses would likely donate to the campaign.\textsuperscript{259}

Another development in the community collection process was the creation of block plans, a strategy that traced to Victory Bond campaign as early as the First World War. Communities were divided up into zones, then sectors and finally blocks, each of which had an assigned leader to manage the area. Volunteers were then assigned to canvass houses in their own neighborhoods. This cut down on travel time, quickening the entire collection process. It also allowed for canvassers to work in their own locale, where they knew many people.\textsuperscript{260}

One element the Red Cross could not control, however, was weather conditions. This campaign was the first to be held in March, and much of the country experienced extremely harsh weather conditions. In fact, the \textit{Hamilton Spectator} claimed that the 1943 national campaign faced the worst weather in fifty years.\textsuperscript{261} During the first weekend of the campaign, much of Quebec faced a huge snowstorm.\textsuperscript{262} Ottawa had to request an extension on its campaign from the national executive committee due to street blockages caused by massive snowfall.\textsuperscript{263} Much of Ontario was hit by harsh

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\item [258] \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 25 February 1943, 11.
\item [259] \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 17 February 1943, 9; 20 February 1943, 3; 27 February 1943, 4; 1 March 1943, 1.
\item [261] \textit{Hamilton Spectator}, 6 March 1944, 11.
\item [262] \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 10 March 1943, 6.
\item [263] NWS, Vol. 1, file “Canadian Red Cross Society I,” Letter to Major-General, the Hon. L. R. Laflèche, 17 March 1943.
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snowstorms that which left sidewalks icy and kept temperatures frigid.\textsuperscript{264} The West also had snow and extremely cold weather, making it difficult to travel, especially in rural areas. On top of the snowstorms and cold weather, a major outbreak of the flu was evident in many centres in the West, especially Winnipeg.\textsuperscript{265} During the campaign a small earthquake even hit Western Ontario, and though very little damage occurred, many people were still emotionally shaken by the experience.\textsuperscript{266} All of these events together caused the campaign to go beyond its allotted twenty day time frame.

In spite of all these setbacks the 1943 national campaign once again proved to be a financial success. By April 1 the national total had surpassed the $10 000 000 objective.\textsuperscript{267} Once again Prince Edward Island was the first province to meet its objective, which it reached in only two days, while Montreal led all cities with a total of $1 598 037.\textsuperscript{268} Windsor’s campaign was so successful that Red Cross officials there voluntarily raised the objective by $35 000 to $310 000, a total which was exceeded within the original time frame of the campaign.\textsuperscript{269} Both London and Hamilton went over the top by March 24, and Manitoba exceeded its $600 000 objective by over $70 000.\textsuperscript{270} However, with its objective remaining at $1 500 000, Toronto struggled, with an

\textsuperscript{265} \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 22 March 1943, 1; 9 March 1943, 1.
\textsuperscript{266} \textit{London Daily Free Press}, 9 March 1943, 1.
\textsuperscript{267} \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 1 April 1943, 5.
\textsuperscript{268} PEI’s quota was only $22 000; within two days, it had raised $27 532. Its target was later raised to $50 000, and that too was oversubscribed. See \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 3 March 1943, 5; 16 March 1943, 5; 17 March 1943, 5.
\textsuperscript{269} \textit{Windsor Daily Star}, 16 March 1943, 3; 23 March 1943, 3. Windsor’s drive began a week after the national campaign, making March 23 the close of its drive.
\textsuperscript{270} London raised $155 769, exceeding its objective of $155 000, while Hamilton reported it was $15 000 over its $260 000 objective. See \textit{London Daily Free Press}, 24 March 1943, 14; 25 March 1943, 2; \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 3 April 1943, 7.
opening week total at just over one third of its target.\textsuperscript{271} By March 20, with the total still sitting at under $1 000 000, officials extended the campaign by one week. Some people in the city refused to give,\textsuperscript{272} though another factor was the city’s continued use of its original collection plan. A general lack of reporting on the campaign in newspapers also contributed to slow returns. Totals appeared most days in the press, but relatively few large advertisements for the campaign were included, as if success was being taken for granted.\textsuperscript{273}

Despite some difficulties, Red Cross officials agreed that “it was the ‘little guys’ with small contributions who were keeping the campaign [strong].”\textsuperscript{274} Stories once again abounded of people making sacrifices to give to the Red Cross, and that inspired others, including some larger donations. In Toronto, a First World War veteran who lost his legs at Ypres gave $3.50 in pennies that he had been saving to buy a Christmas present for his wife.\textsuperscript{275} In Winnipeg a twenty dollar donation, all in pennies, was given from proceeds of a children’s party at St. Charles church, while a 94-year-old man sent in two dollars to the campaign along with a note, stating it was all he could afford.\textsuperscript{276} Other such donations included eighteen cents given by a family stricken with influenza,\textsuperscript{277} three dollars from a mother of a soldier missing at Dieppe,\textsuperscript{278} $15.50 raised in a concert by a group of five-year-olds,\textsuperscript{279} and a small donation from an older
women who gave the money she usually used to buy flowers for her husband’s grave.\textsuperscript{280}

Following a nineteen month break between national campaigns, the CRCS fundraising program grew immensely. This occurred despite attempts from both the Canadian government and other voluntary wartime organizations to either force the Red Cross into a joint campaign, or to cancel its national fundraising activities altogether. Once the CRCS was cleared to campaign nationally, it became evident that some Red Cross officials had used the time away from campaigning to adapt their local programs to the needs of the community. More emphasis on payroll deduction, the “duration giving” plan, the block plan, and the use of red crosses on supporter’s doors helped raise vast sums of money, despite setbacks such as poor weather and widespread influenza. Those cities that carried on as usual had troubles keeping enthusiasm high, and often struggled to raise their assigned quotas within the allotted timeframe. Still, however, 1942 and 1943 were extremely successful years for the Canadian Red Cross Society as it was able to expand its humanitarian work along with the increasing Canadian commitment to the war.

\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Globe and Mail}, 6 March 1943, 3.
Chapter 4

1944-45: Closure

Despite increasing knowledge that the war was drawing to an end, the Red Cross program actually expanded in the final years of the war. Funds were collected in record amounts, and the national campaigns were conducted in an increasingly shorter timeframe. This is not to say that the CRCS did not face any perceived threats to its program. In 1943 the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund (CUARF) was created in an effort to consolidate the fundraising needs of Canadian organizations supporting various allied nations. By 1945, as the number of liberated allied nations grew, this fund had drastically grown in influence. Because of this, the government requested the Red Cross participate in a joint campaign with the CUARF. The Society had been able to cancel a proposed united campaign in 1944, but one was conducted between the CRCS and the CUARF in the spring of 1945, but ultimately with record-breaking results.

The Red Cross began preparations for the 1944 national campaign in September 1943 by once again requesting the month of March for its drive.281 The Society was fully aware of the dangers associated with any delay in this decision. The 1943 campaign had only been approved by the government in late January, leaving the Red Cross a mere month to officially organize itself for the drive. Fortunately, it had taken the initiative of starting publicity in October 1942. It did not want to repeat this scenario in 1944.

281 NWS, Vol. 16, file “Canadian Red Cross Society Campaign 1944,” Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 20 September 1943.
March remained the best option for the CRCS, as the American Red Cross was once again conducting its national campaign during that time. The National War Finance Committee, however, felt that it would be best for broader government fundraising programs if the Red Cross campaign was held in February, because the Sixth Victory Loan campaign was scheduled to be held between March 15 and the middle of May.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 16, file “Canadian Red Cross Society Campaign 1944,” Letter to Dr. W. C. Clark, 20 October 1943.}

The Red Cross was eventually allowed to campaign in March, but was instructed to finish no later than March 15\textsuperscript{th}.\footnote{CCSD, Vol. 112, file “National War Services Pifher 1940-45,” Letter to Miss Florence Hunter, 10 November 1943.} With the campaign set to officially begin on February 28, this strict limit on the ending date effectively cut the timeframe of the 1944 campaign in half.\footnote{Windsor Daily Star, 3 March 1944, 6.}

Following this debate on timing, the National War Services Funds Advisory Board set the 1944 budget and campaign objective. Due to the Red Cross’s ever expanding commitments to the war effort, it was difficult for the Society to produce a firm budget to give to the Advisory Board. The main area that caused trouble was the production of POW parcels, as this program was continually being increased.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 15, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1943-44,” Letter to Major-General, the Honourable L. R. Lafleche, 24 December 1943.} The organization initially requested a campaign objective of $10 000 000, but later requested an increase of $1 000 000.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 15, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1943-44,” Letter to Major-General, the Honourable L. R. Lafleche, 17 December 1943.} Although the Advisory Board was sympathetic to the Red Cross, it did not approve the increase. A total budget of $22 320 000 was approved, at least $10 000 000 of which would come from voluntary donations from the Canadian
public.\textsuperscript{287}

As this was the fifth national campaign since 1939, the prospect of having the drive’s timeframe cut in half was, in fact, not that great of a concern.\textsuperscript{288} Communities already had campaign structures in place and were able to begin the collection process immediately after the drive was launched. In Winnipeg, the plan of having a red cross on every door was continued and expanded to include Red Cross emblems hanging from every street lamp in the downtown area.\textsuperscript{289} Industrial workers in Montreal were beseeched to give at least half a day’s pay to the campaign,\textsuperscript{290} while in both Windsor and Winnipeg the slogan among workers was “at least one day’s pay.”\textsuperscript{291} Thousands of women volunteers in communities across the country once again participated in house-to-house collections organized through the popular and effective block plan.\textsuperscript{292} Communities aimed to have Red Cross activities and advertising dominate for the two week campaign, with the goal of speeding up the collection process.\textsuperscript{293}

As the drive began, Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced that more funds were needed by the Red Cross than ever before as 1944 would “witness the heaviest fighting in which Canada’s armed forces have yet been engaged.”\textsuperscript{294} Many community leaders also supported the drive by citing the successes of previous campaigns. In Quebec, Red Cross officials pointed out that no previous drive in that province had

\textsuperscript{287} The remainder of the CRCS budget came from money carried over from the 1943 campaign, as well as payments from other Commonwealth countries for POW parcels. NWS, Vol. 2, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 3,” Letter to Dr. F. W. Routley, 29 January 1944.
\textsuperscript{288} Windsor Daily Star, 3 March 1944, 6.
\textsuperscript{289} Winnipeg Free Press, 23 February 1944, 7.
\textsuperscript{290} Montreal Daily Star, 2 March 1944, 3.
\textsuperscript{291} Windsor Daily Star, 29 February 1944, 3; Winnipeg Free Press, 26 February 1944, 5.
\textsuperscript{292} For examples, see Winnipeg Free Press, 24 February 1944, 11; Windsor Daily Star, 6 March 1944, 3.
\textsuperscript{293} Windsor Daily Star, 29 February 1944, 3.
\textsuperscript{294} Montreal Daily Star, 28 February 1944, 3.
failed due to the generous financial support of its citizens.\textsuperscript{295} In fact, every Red Cross campaign in the province had been oversubscribed, demonstrating the support Quebecers had for the CRCS program, which contrasted with relatively low recruitment numbers and strong opposition to conscription among its majority French population.\textsuperscript{296} Red Cross officials in Windsor took out a full page advertisement in the \textit{Windsor Daily Star} that outlined community campaign plans and sought to generate activity by stating that the funds collected would go towards assisting the over 400 servicemen from Windsor held in German POW camps. It also stated that because of its great success in previous campaigns that it had become know nationwide as “the City with the Big Heart.”\textsuperscript{297} Hamilton’s mayor, Sam Lawrence, publicly promised local success in the current drive, stressing that people realized that supporting the Red Cross “is the least we can do for our boys.”\textsuperscript{298}

The pace of the drive quickly surpassed that of the 1943 campaign. In Winnipeg the first day of the campaign brought in $75 589 compared to $17 000 in 1943.\textsuperscript{299} Manitoba’s $600 000 quota was exceeded nine days faster than in 1943.\textsuperscript{300} By March 3, only days after the official beginning of the campaign, PEI had already gone over the top in its drive. By the same time, the Windsor campaign had reached the half-way mark of its $310 000 objective.\textsuperscript{301} Toronto had netted just over $500 000 by March 6, a total which took over double the amount of time to collect in the 1943 campaign.\textsuperscript{302}

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\textsuperscript{295} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{296} \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 16 March 1944, 3.
\textsuperscript{297} \textit{Windsor Daily Star}, 24 February 1944, 10.
\textsuperscript{298} \textit{Hamilton Spectator}, 28 February 1944, 7; 11 March 1944, 11.
\textsuperscript{299} \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 1 March 1944, 1.
\textsuperscript{300} \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 20 March 1944, 1.
\textsuperscript{301} \textit{Windsor Daily Star}, 3 March 1944, 3, 6.
\textsuperscript{302} \textit{Toronto Daily Star}, 6 March 1944, 2; \textit{Globe and Mail}, 13 March 1943, 4.
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Hamilton officials calculated that an average of $16 700 would need to be collected every day of the campaign in order to reach the city’s $300 000 objective. Although daily totals were often lower than the objective, the city stayed ahead of levels in its 1943 campaign and the 1944 national average, soon reaching its goal. Ultimately, the 1944 campaign raised over $12 500 000, more than twenty-five percent above the overall target.

This campaign saw a greater variety of sources of income. Canada’s Labour Department created a program whereby conscientious objectors could obtain approved employment rather than be sent to forced work camps, but part of the agreement was that a portion of their wages had to be given to the Canadian Red Cross. Up to the end of January 1944, around 5000 men participated in this program, resulting in $219 316.24 being received by the Red Cross. On April 15, 1944 the CRCS received $12 500 from the Canadian proceeds of the Hollywood movie “Forever and a Day.” The film was made specifically as a donation towards Canadian war charities and the proceeds were split evenly between the CRCS and St. John’s Ambulance.

Throughout later campaigns, volunteers created more innovative ways for Canadians to subscribe to the Red Cross. In Winnipeg a group of 75 lumbermen organized a box social which raised $412, while the Regent’s Park United Church gave

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303 *Hamilton Spectator*, 29 February 1944, 7; 2 March 1944, 7; 6 March 1944, 11.
304 *Windsor Daily Star*, 5 March 1945, 10.
$45 from a silver tea it held. A hockey game was organized in Montreal between two local teams to raise funds for the campaign. The public was also invited to participate in a charity skating race at the same event. In Windsor, people were invited to tour the POW parcel packing plant to see just how the system worked, how their donated money was spent, and to inspire them to give more. Another popular event that was held in tandem with the national campaign was speaking tours by former prisoners of war. Flight-Lieutenant Donald F. Morrison, who had been shot down over Germany and spent several months in a POW camp, spoke to groups in Hamilton about his captivity and the great value of Red Cross parcels. Many groups also organized benefit concerts on behalf of the Red Cross, such as the National Serbian Defence group and the Ukrainian-Canadian Association, each of which raised $800.

Children also continued to play a notable role in campaigns. The Junior Red Cross in Winnipeg sought to collect enough pennies to fill one large Red Cross shipping case, which would amount to approximately $10 000, or 4000 POW parcels. Donations came from businesses and parents, though also from school children throughout the province. In Hamilton, school children from McIlwraith School raised $155 from a Christmas fair, while the grade six class at Prince of Wales public school sent to Red Cross headquarters a donation of $20 from the sale of Christmas cards. Also in Hamilton, pupils at Loretto Academy organized a tag day, a midway, a fashion show, a skit on school life, a concert, and an impression show of Hollywood characters; all told,

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307 Winnipeg Free Press, 29 February 1944, 1.
308 Montreal Daily Star, 6 March 1944, 3.
309 Windsor Daily Star, 29 February 1944, 3.
310 Hamilton Spectator, 9 March 1944, 7.
311 Windsor Daily Star, 29 February 1944, 3; 13 March 1944, 5.
312 Winnipeg Free Press, 6 March 1944, 3.
313 Hamilton Spectator, 13 March 1944, 7.
these events raised over $150 for the Red Cross.\footnote{314}{Hamilton Spectator, 17 March 1944, 11.}

By late 1944, with the end of the war in sight, the Canadian government once again requested that the CRCS join in a united campaign for its 1945 national drive. This time, it was requested that the Red Cross link with the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund (CUARF). This initiative, which joined eleven different national groups into a single fund, was created in 1943 under the direction of Minister of National War Services Laflèche.\footnote{315}{These groups included the Chinese War Relief Fund, Belgian War Relief Fund, Czechoslovak War Charities Fund, Canada-France Relations Committee, Greek War Relief Fund, Luxembourg Relief Fund, Netherlands Relief Fund, Norwegian Relief Fund, United Polish Relief Fund, Canadian Aid to Russia Fund, and Canadian Friends of Yugoslavia. See NWS, Vol. 55, file “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund - Red Cross Relations,” Letter to Dr. W. C. Clark, 15 January 1945.} He felt that there was a growing desire among Canadians - who were constantly being asked to give money for numerous war charities - to have campaigns for Allied relief be amalgamated with fundraising confined to a specific period. It was also the case that NWS was having difficulties setting dates that would keep the various campaigns, including that of the Red Cross and Victory Loan drive, well sequenced. 1943 became especially convoluted in dealing with Allied Relief drives, as the Aid to Russia appeal had been unofficially extended. This interfered with the CRCS national campaign and necessitated postponement of similar drives for Chinese, Greek and Polish relief. With these factors in mind, Laflèche recommended that all allied relief organizations be joined into one united fund, so as to avoid “unnecessary multiplicity and unwise competition.”\footnote{316}{NWS, Vol. 51, file “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund 1940-43,” Letter to Norman A. Robertson, Esq., 23 March 1943.} The new fund would be under the supervision of the National War Services Funds Advisory Board, which would examine the finances
of each member organization and set the fund’s overall campaign objective.\textsuperscript{317} Representatives of the allied nations that received funds met with the Canadian government to discuss the idea, which was subsequently approved with the CUARF officially formed under NWS and subject to the provisions of the \textit{War Charities Act}.\textsuperscript{318}

Following the establishment of the CUARF, the government proposed that the CRCS and the CUARF coordinate in 1944 for one large united campaign. As the Red Cross had already provided over $3 000 000 for allied relief, the government felt that the needs of the new fund could be neatly incorporated into the overall Red Cross budget. The members of the CUARF unanimously supported this idea, as they recognized the benefits of using the organization and experience of the Red Cross for a national campaign.\textsuperscript{319} The Red Cross, however, was not enthusiastic about the proposed united campaign. Although the CRCS had supported allied relief in the past, its main focus continued to be the support of Commonwealth, and especially Canadian, prisoners of war. This program cost the organization millions of dollars every year, and was also expected to increase, as more servicemen were being taken prisoner through heavy fighting in the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe. The Red Cross felt that it would be impossible in one composite campaign to raise the money it required, which was estimated at $10 000 000.\textsuperscript{320}

The government then suggested that the Red Cross lead a separate campaign for

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Ibid.
\item NWS, Vol. 55, file “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund - Red Cross Relations,” Organization of the National Appeal for Relief, 28 November 1944.
\item Ibid.
\item NWS, Vol. 51, file “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund 1943,” Memorandum from the Canadian Red Cross Society to Major General, the Honourable L. R. Laflèche, Minister of National War Services, on Appeals in Canada for Assistance to Allied Nations, 5 November 1943.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the requirements of the CUARF. This proposal was also turned down by Red Cross officials who did not believe they could lead another national campaign, given the Society’s immense responsibilities. The CRCS also argued that should its emblem be used in the campaign, the Society should then control the money raised, which reflected regulations of the International Red Cross. It was thought those linked to the CUARF would not accept this stipulation.\textsuperscript{321}

Still, as the Red Cross was invested in the relief of Canada’s European allies, it decided to assist the CUARF campaign, short of having an official united drive. The Red Cross stated that it was willing to place its publicity facilities as far as possible at the disposal of the Allied Campaign organization, and to buy through its purchasing departments any supplies which the organizations concerned may request, and also to use its special facilities in shipping such supplies through the International Red Cross to the suffering people in Europe.\textsuperscript{322}

The Red Cross felt this was the best approach, as it allowed the Allied Relief organizations access to the Red Cross structure, while not forcing the Society to officially run a larger campaign that included other organizations.\textsuperscript{323} In December 1943 a request was made by all CUARF organizations but one to secure the aid of the Red Cross through publicity, purchasing and shipping. The one outstanding organization, which was not named, believed individual purchasing would serve it better. The other organizations requested that NWS try to convince this group that the plan presented would be more economical, as well as popular with the general public, rather than

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid.
having separate organizations doing the same work.\textsuperscript{324} As the government could not convince the Red Cross that it was in its best interest to officially fund a campaign for the CUARF, these plans were put on hold, and the CRCS continued with its own planned national campaign in 1944.

The idea of having a joint campaign between the CRCS and the CUARF was once again brought up at the end of 1944. The government had planned on allowing the CUARF time to campaign prior to the March Red Cross drive, but preparations for this were not completed on time. NWS again requested the Red Cross have the CUARF join its campaign in order to lower expenses and eliminate further appeals by CUARF members for funds.\textsuperscript{325} This time the Red Cross seemed more willing to discuss the possibility. As Germany was near defeat, more and more people in liberated areas needed support. After a series of meetings between representatives of the Red Cross and the CUARF, the Red Cross specified a set of terms for its involvement in the proposed 1945 united campaign. The CRCS would consent to make the appeal only if it would be recognized as a Red Cross campaign with CUARF collaboration, that all funds collected would be held by the Red Cross, and that the Red Cross would be allowed to expend all funds in agreement with the individual representatives of the CUARF.\textsuperscript{326}

Although the CUARF was pleased that the Red Cross was willing to join in one united campaign, it was unhappy with the terms requested. The CUARF felt that the campaign should be specified as being a Red Cross appeal in association with the

\textsuperscript{325} NWS, Vol. 55, file “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund - Red Cross Relations,” Letter to Dr. W. C. Clark, 15 January 1945.
\textsuperscript{326} NWS, Vol. 55, file “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund - Red Cross Relations,” A Memorandum Concerning the Canadian Red Cross Position in a Campaign Including CUARF, 15 November 1944.
CUARF, putting the organizations on more of an equal footing. The bigger problem, however, was the Red Cross’s refusal to deal with the CUARF organization, instead desiring to work individually with each of the allied relief groups. CUARF officials feared this would complicate the process of purchasing needed relief supplies, as well as diminish the organization’s own reputation and power. The CUARF resubmitted to CRCS these proposed amendments.\textsuperscript{327} Although the CRCS agreed to include the CUARF more in its advertising, it again refused to deal directly with the CUARF, insisting on interacting with the individual members for any issues having to do with purchasing and shipping. As the CUARF felt it could not expect any more concessions from the Red Cross, the matter was referred to the Minister of NWS.\textsuperscript{328}

On January 17 1945, the CUARF made a final agreement with the Red Cross for the united campaign. It stipulated that it was to be a Red Cross drive in collaboration with the CUARF for $10 000 000, with $9 000 000 going towards the Allied Relief program. All money raised would be held in trust by the Red Cross. The CRCS would then be notified by the CUARF of the allocations to be made to each of its member groups. In dealing with purchasing and shipment of supplies, the Red Cross would continue to deal with individual member funds. However, the CUARF would be allowed to appoint a representative from each fund to conduct business with the CRCS. Although CUARF officials were disappointed that their organization would not be dealt with directly, they felt this provision would give them more power than what had originally been requested by the Red Cross. Officials from both the CUARF and the CRCS signed


\textsuperscript{328} NWS, Vol. 55, file “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund - Red Cross Relations,” Organization of the National Appeal for Relief, 28 November 1944.
the agreement, and a stipulation was inserted to allow the Minister of National War Services to settle any differences of opinion in regards to the contract.\textsuperscript{329} The campaign was to run throughout the month of March, terminating on the 31\textsuperscript{st} to make way for the next national Victory Loan Campaign.\textsuperscript{330}

As the campaign got underway, Red Cross information regarding the joint campaign was somewhat lacking. Despite its previous agreement to include the CUARF in its advertising, it appeared that the CRCS was presenting this as another of its national drives. Very few newspapers noted that the Red Cross was joining with the CUARF. Those that did, such as the \textit{Montreal Daily Star} and the \textit{Globe and Mail}, focused their remarks on the fact that the Red Cross was increasing its budget for allied relief to meet the needs of the CUARF and the government.\textsuperscript{331} Red Cross advertisements emphasized the new focus on allied relief, as opposed to POWs, but left out the fact that much of that relief would go through the CUARF.\textsuperscript{332} Advertisements stressed the increasing role the Red Cross would play in devastated post-war Europe. The \textit{London Daily Free Press} estimated that should the war end immediately, it would take around a year-and-a-half to repatriate all POWs in Europe, and an even longer time to restore basic, acceptable, living conditions to over 17 000 000 Europeans who had been directly affected by the war.\textsuperscript{333}

Many Red Cross branches and districts announced their intent to carry out the work following the end of the war.

\textsuperscript{331} \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 17 February 1945, 3; \textit{Globe and Mail}, 1 March 1945, 9.
\textsuperscript{332} See \textit{Globe and Mail}, 5 March 1945, 9.
\textsuperscript{333} \textit{London Daily Free Press}, 3 March 1945, 7; \textit{Montreal Daily Star}, 17 February 1945, 3. Also see \textit{Globe and Mail}, 5 March 1945, 9 for more detailed information regarding Red Cross work following the end of the war.
fastest and most lucrative campaign in the organization’s history. Citizens were requested not only to give generously, but to have their donations ready when the canvassers called to eliminate time-consuming call-backs.\(^{334}\) The 1945 campaign continually stayed ahead of the fast pace set the 1944 drive. On March 12, a week into the drive, the national total sat at 29% of the $10 000 000 objective, compared to 27% in 1944.\(^{335}\) Two days later the national total was at 40% compared to 36% in 1944.\(^{336}\) On March 27, the drive went over the top after just eighteen days of canvassing.\(^{337}\) Donations continued to pour in to the national headquarters throughout the year, giving the organization a final total of $15 735 090 for 1945, the largest in the history of the Red Cross national campaigns.\(^{338}\)

Numerous provincial districts and local branches also had record setting results. The Quebec campaign, with an objective of $2 250 000, raised $2 451 071.\(^{339}\) Tiny Prince Edward Island, which was the first province to go over the top, eventually reached nearly 200% of its ascribed $50 000 objective.\(^{340}\) Manitoba, which passed its $600 000 objective on March 15, ultimately exceeded $900 000 in donations.\(^{341}\) Toronto fared much better in this campaign than in those of previous years, reaching its objective of $1 500 000 by March 26.\(^{342}\) Windsor also exceeded its 1944 total, raising a

\(^{334}\) See Winnipeg Free Press, 24 February 1945, 1; 15 March 1945, 5; Montreal Daily Star, 14 March 1945, 3; Windsor Daily Star, 24 March 1945, 5; Globe and Mail, 26 March 1945, 4.

\(^{335}\) Montreal Daily Star, 12 March 1945, 3.

\(^{336}\) Montreal Daily Star, 14 March 1945, 3.


\(^{339}\) Montreal Daily Star, 23 March 1945, 3; La Presse, 23 March 1945, 13.

\(^{340}\) Winnipeg Free Press, 15 March 1945, 1; Montreal Daily Star, 23 March 1945, 3.

\(^{341}\) Winnipeg Free Press, 15 March 1945, 3; 31 March 1945, 5.

\(^{342}\) Globe and Mail, 26 March 1945, 4.
Despite the lack of publicity on behalf of the CUARF, that organization was able to secure the $9 000 000 it had been campaigning for due to the huge success of the Red Cross national drive. Civilian allied relief became so important during 1945 that before the campaign was complete, the CUARF had received a $2 000 000 advance for humanitarian work.\footnote{Windsor Daily Star, 24 March 1945, 5; 13 March 1944, 5.} That work also became the focus of the Red Cross following the end of hostilities in the spring and summer of 1945. As Canadian and Commonwealth prisoners of war were being released, the CRCS turned its focus to working with the CUARF to aid in the reconstruction of Europe. In June the Red Cross petitioned the government to reinstate its recently expired wartime shipping permit, which had allowed the organization to fill empty spaces on ships with relief supplies that were leaving for Europe without having to apply for individual shipment permits.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 49, file “Canadian Red Cross Society General 1945,” Re: CUARF - Red Cross $2,000,000 Credit, 6 March 1945.} This issue became even more important when it was relayed to the CRCS in August that the British government had requested all relief supplies for allied nations be purchased in Canada and not in Britain, where there continued to be severe rationing.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 49, file “Canadian Red Cross Society General 1945,” Letter to Major General B. W. Browne, 26 June 1945.} The license permitting free shipping was extended to the Red Cross until May 21, 1946 when the shipping companies decided to once again charge voluntary organizations. Canadian railways continued to allow free transport of goods for accredited relief agencies until June 30, 1946. The CRCS announced that it would stop taking shipments for many relief organizations once these changes were put in place. It did agree, however, to continue to

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\item \footnote{Windsor Daily Star, 24 March 1945, 5; 13 March 1944, 5.}
\item \footnote{NWS, Vol. 49, file “Canadian Red Cross Society General 1945,” Re: CUARF - Red Cross $2,000,000 Credit, 6 March 1945.}
\item \footnote{NWS, Vol. 49, file “Canadian Red Cross Society General 1945,” Letter to Major General B. W. Browne, 26 June 1945.}
\item \footnote{NWS, Vol. 49, file “Canadian Red Cross Society General 1945,” Letter to Major General B. W. Browne, 14 August 1945.}
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look after the transport of all CUARF goods, with the price of shipment charged against the budget of each member’s funds.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 37, file “Relief Shipments to Europe,” Memorandum to the Honourable the Minister, 14 June 1946.}

The Red Cross kept very detailed files concerning the budgets and purchases of all of the eleven CUARF member funds.\footnote{For examples see NWS, Vol. 56, file “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund - Red Cross Relations 1945,” Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 11 October 1945; Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 12 December 1945.} Each of the CUARF funds had a specific budget and had to make requests to the Red Cross to be able to access its share of the money. The system seemed to work so well that the government requested the Red Cross carry out another joint campaign with the CUARF in 1946. The CRCS strongly objected to this idea, instead suggesting that either the CUARF stop its activities at the end of 1945 or carry out its own appeal. As the government felt that the need for allied relief remained critical, it strongly opposed the Red Cross’s suggestion. CUARF officials also felt that should the organization be required to have its own appeal, the objective would not be reached, as the Canadian public was becoming tired of such appeals especially now that the war had ended.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 56, file “Canadian United Allied Relief Fund - Red Cross Relations 1945,” Memorandum for the Honourable the Minister of National War Services, 18 October 1945.} Both the CRCS and the CUARF, however, were eventually disappointed. The government decided not to allow the Red Cross the opportunity to publicly campaign until it had significantly reduced its excess funds, which amounted to around $15 000 000, though it was permitted to conduct its annual membership campaign on a branch and division basis.\footnote{NWS, Vol. 15, file “Canadian Red Cross Society 1946,” Letter to Norman C. Urquhart, 11 January 1946.} This left the CUARF on its own, resulting in the end of the united organization.\footnote{CCSD, Vol. 112, file “National War Services War Charities Act,” Letter to Mr. D. L.}
With the end of the war, the Red Cross reviewed its financial situation, as well as its activities and accomplishments. The war saw a huge expansion in Red Cross membership, much of which came about through the yearly national campaigns. The organization allowed every donor of at least one dollar to become a Red Cross member. By the end of 1945, 2499 Red Cross branches existed, with a total membership of over 3 000 000. Between September 1939 and December 31, 1945 these branches, with help from the national council and the provincial divisions, raised $80 647 874 through voluntary contributions, a spectacular success, well in excess of the $47 000 000 in combined campaign quotas. Along with other sources of income, most notably money received from other countries for the delivery of CRCS prisoner of war parcels, the Red Cross ended 1945 by having spent over $90 000 000 on wartime services. Over half of the expenditures went towards the Red Cross POW parcel program, which packed and distributed 16 310 592 parcels from six plants in Toronto, Montreal, Hamilton, Windsor, Winnipeg and London. Money was also spent on 560 vehicles used overseas, welfare services for merchant marines and civilian war sufferers, grants to general allied relief, and aid for European war brides starting their new life in Canada. Just as impressive as total expenditures was that only $2 879 689, or just over 3% of the money raised, was spent on administration.

Over the latter half of the Second World War the fundraising work of the Canadian Red Cross Society progressed into becoming a well-oiled machine. Local

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Morrell, 13 February 1947.


branches used the expertise they had gathered from previous drives and created new, and often fun, methods of attracting public support and getting across the Red Cross’s message. Both the 1944 and 1945 campaigns received record-setting donations. The CRCS became so well established that it was able to conduct the largest drive in its history as part of a united campaign with the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund in March 1945. This partnership also allowed the Red Cross to seamlessly expand its role in the field of European civilian relief, which became its focus over 1945. Throughout the war the Red Cross used publicly subscribed money in myriad ways, and was so organized, and well-supported by volunteers, that some 97% of the funds it raised went directly to its relief projects. Despite its disputes, debatable practices and turf protection during a time when Canadians were urged to pull together, the story of the CRCS in the Second World War undoubtedly remains one of great success.
Conclusion

The Second World War saw the mobilization of millions of Canadians through voluntary homefront activities. A leader in this capacity was the Canadian Red Cross Society. This organization, which had existed since 1909, expanded to such a great extent during the war that one Red Cross official called it “God’s greatest gift to modern civilization.”\(^{355}\) The organization’s development came about through its many areas of humanitarian work, most significantly the provision of relief parcels for Canadian, Commonwealth and allied prisoners of war. For a period of about one month during nearly every year of the war, the Red Cross petitioned the Canadian public to voluntarily contribute funds in support of the organization’s war work. The results were astounding, as throughout the war over $80 000 000 was raised by the CRCS.\(^{356}\)

With only 3% of its total wartime expenditures given to administration,\(^{357}\) the success of the national campaigns depended on a countless number of volunteers who did everything from donating advertising space to going door-to-door canvassing for funds. The government, mainly through the department of National War Services, fully supported what the Red Cross stood for, and, for the most part, allowed it to carry out its campaigns at the most convenient time for the organization. In the later years of the war the government declared March to be Red Cross month, thus focusing the country on the fundraising efforts of the organization.

Throughout the war the CRCS held six national fundraising campaigns, each of

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\(^{355}\) P.H. Gordon, Fifty Years in the Canadian Red Cross (Canada: 1969), 1.


which was oversubscribed. As the war progressed, the objectives of the drives increased from $3,000,000 in 1939 to $10,000,000 for each of the last three years of the war. Having collected over $5,000,000 in 1939, the 1945 campaign, which was the most successful, brought in over $15,000,000. Also impressive was the support the public gave the Red Cross in 1941 when the organization was denied the ability to conduct a national campaign. Provincial divisions and local districts still managed to collect enough funds to support the expanding role of the organization until its next national campaign in the spring of 1942.

However, not everything worked exactly as the Red Cross had wanted. As stated above, the biggest set-back the CRCS faced was the cancellation of its 1941 national campaign because of its unwillingness to cooperate with the government’s plan for a united campaign of all major wartime voluntary organizations. This opposition came about because of the CRCS’s belief that this would result in budgetary restraints and the inability to meet the increasing scope of its wartime activities.

The strength of the fundraising drives lay in the structure and organization of the CRCS. Backed by the national council, which only existed in times of war, the nine provincial divisions and nearly 2500 local branches led the way in the collection of needed funds. Each division and branch was assigned a firm objective that was generally increased alongside the national total each year. These objectives aimed to be proportionate to the area’s population, so as to make them achievable within the allotted campaign time. The objectives of the provinces and branches were made public through local newspapers, and updates were regularly provided on how the campaign was

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progressing, both to congratulate the successful and to pressure areas whose lack of generosity could be seen as indicating a lower level of patriotism. Many places succeeded in raising the necessary funds by tailoring the collection process to the nature of the community. For example, Red Cross officials in Windsor largely shifted resources away from door-to-door canvassing in favour of direct appeals at the city’s many large industrial establishments.359

Women were key to the success of the Red Cross. At the highest level of the national organization women served in a variety of capacities. Beyond these higher profile women, countless others volunteered with provincial divisions and local branches. Women played a vital role in nearly every aspect of the Red Cross war effort, including knitting articles of clothing for Canadian servicemen and British bombing victims, working in the POW parcel packing plants, conducting much of the canvassing during annual national fundraising drives, and providing comfort to repatriated servicemen and war brides arriving in Canada. As P.H. Gordon, chairman of the Red Cross executive council during the war, stated, “there is no Red Cross effort which is not operated by women.”360 This work allowed many women to acquire valuable experience and greater self-esteem through serving in patriotic voluntary functions outside of traditional roles in the home.

Several recent immigrant groups also proved strong supporters of the Red Cross, as it provided them with a means to support their former homeland and to demonstrate their loyalty to their adopted country. Also appealing was the Red Cross’s claim to be a universal organization offering support for all individuals, regardless of race, creed or

359 See *Windsor Daily Star*, 16 March 1943.
360 Gordon, 98.
language. This aspect was on display during the war as the CRCS not only raised millions of dollars for the overseas relief of soldiers, but also for civilians, as demonstrated in the 1941 Russian Relief Drive. In the later years of the war, as the Red Cross emphasis shifted to providing aid to the devastated allied nations, many immigrant groups supported the fundraising drives in even greater numbers in an effort to secure support for citizens of their nation of origin.

Beyond the millions of dollars raised, and the numerous different services provided by the Red Cross, the most important tribute to its work came from those who experienced firsthand the good done by the organization. Dr. Grace Maynard, PhD, who visited prison camps in Europe at the end of the war to conduct a survey on POW food parcel recipients, stated: “[The POWs] would grasp our hands and in tears, tell us to let the Canadian people know that the Red Cross parcels had saved their lives. For a young woman, it was a very humbling experience.”

General A.G.L. McNaughton, who had commanded the First Canadian Army in Britain, commented after the war that Red Cross support was key in having maintained the morale of troops. Also, the chief surgeon at a British-based Canadian military hospital noted that “Red Cross was always with us. They came through bombed roads with any goods we wanted. One week eighty bombs dropped around our hospital, but the Red Cross trucks got through.” Former Canadian POW Harold Hayes echoed such sentiment, recalling of his confinement in Poland and Czechoslovakia: “Normal rations were two potatoes, a few slices of bread, coffee and a couple of dubious stews, every now and then, including one that we call the

363 Porter, 84.
‘green death.’ You could drink it or shave with it, it was warm. That’s why Red Cross parcels made all the difference in the world.”364 John Vernier, President of the National Ex-Prisoner of War Association added that “many prisoners of war share the belief that it is the work of the Canadian Red Cross that gave us the strength to survive the war.”365

While the Canadian Red Cross did not involve itself in any type of combat during the war, it nonetheless played a vital role in the Canadian war effort. The organization worked with the Canadian government, various Canadian relief agencies and international Red Cross national societies to bring aid to millions of people affected by the conflict. The CRCS also played an important role within Canada, by inspiring millions of men, women and children to give their time, energy and money to support its many patriotic efforts. It is a record that speaks to a major contribution to Canada’s war effort, and that profoundly impacted upon the lives of countless numbers of Canadians both at home and abroad.

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364 Canadian Red Cross Society, 100 Years, 33.
365 Canadian Red Cross Society, 100 Years, 32.
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