Migrating “Otherness”:

Serbian Ethnic Media amid Nationalism and Multiculturalism

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Abstract

The thesis explores the ways in which Serbian ethnic media in Canada represent their own group and “Others”, specifically Croats, Slovenians and Catholics, Bosniaks, Albanians and Muslims, Montenegrins and the West. The research investigates the convergence of these representations with Canadian multiculturalism. The thesis epistemologically feeds from Jean Jacques Rousseau’s 18th century theories of recognition and patriotism, Stuart Hall’s (1997) theory of representation and identity and Edward Said’s (1978) theory of Orientalism, and is further guided by the theoretical frameworks of Charles Taylor’s (1994) politics of recognition, Benedict Anderson’s (1992) long-distance nationalism and Maria Todorova’s (1994) Balkanism. Qualitative content analysis through purposive and sequential sampling of Serbian ethnic broadcasting is conducted to gauge the programs’ representations of the “Self” and “Others”. Ethnic media provide a method to promote a minority group’s heritage, but also to facilitate communication between various cultural, ethnic, religious and racial groups. In the age of an increased critique of multiculturalism, the role of ethnic media rises in importance. The findings of the thesis show that Serbian ethnic media employ Canadian multiculturalism to promote Serbian heritage, but also to stereotype other groups. Applying the theoretical juxtaposition of multiculturalism, nationalism and “Othering”, this research argues that through negative identification of “Others”, Serbian ethnic media deviate from Canadian multiculturalism that calls for a positive recognition of all Canadian groups.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Preamble

The I is always in the field of the Other.

*Jacques Lacan, French psychoanalyst*

Since the 1970s there has been a clear trend across Western nation-states towards the rejection of the earlier ideas of unitary and homogenous nationhood and the increased recognition of cultural, ethnic, religious and racial minorities through various multiculturalism policies. Multiculturalism has been all about engaging “Otherness”. In the 1990s a new change occurred with the backlash against multiculturalism and re-assertion of ideas of nation-building and even assimilation of minority “Others” into the mainstream. The retreat is partially driven by the majority group’s fear that multiculturalism has gone too far and a belief that multiculturalism has failed to address sources of the minorities’ exclusion and even contributed to their isolation.

A series of events around the turn of the millennium unified these critical voices and centered the multiculturalism debate on a single religious “Other”. The September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA, the March 2004 Madrid bombing, the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the July 2005 London bombings, the September 2005 prophet Muhammad cartoon controversy, the October-November 2005 Paris riots, the 2006 arrest of 17 Canadian Muslims and a series of articles, reports and public statements coming not from the right, but the center-left, sparked the debate about whether multiculturalism encourages minorities to live parallel lives, avoid cultural interchanges
and engage in illiberal practices opposed to democratic principles out of which multiculturalism was born. The post 9/11 era has clearly intensified and unified the earlier sporadic doubts about the value of multiculturalism.

Most Western democracies still more or less accept that minorities are free to maintain customs regarding cuisine, heritage, language, music, etc. These “benign” features are not the only ones that shape an ethnic group’s identity. Practices considered controversial in the West may play an important role in the formation of a minority group’s identity. The particular interest of the Western world today is on immigrants from Asia and Africa, Muslims in particular. Customs like arranged and forced marriages and the “headdress” question are intensely debated. The almost exclusive focus of multiculturalism debates on Muslims has shadowed controversial practices of other communities that seem to be inadvertently encouraged by multiculturalism. The accommodation of diversity enables minorities to continue to define themselves in terms of their ethnicity. While multiculturalism encourages the preservation of ethnic identity, ethnicity in itself entails difference and opposition to “Others”. Ethnic minority groups are internally heterogeneous and ethnicity does not necessarily contradict democratic values of ethnic groups’ hostlands. However, segments of ethnic diasporas at times become involved in support of crises or conflicts against their homeland “Others”, either through direct funding, or dissemination of propaganda through various media such as the World Wide Web, newspapers, television and radio broadcasts. These long-distance nationalistic practices are less frequently discussed in public. Both multiculturalism and nationalism are inextricably concerned about the relations with “Others”, the former in an affable and the latter in an antagonistic manner. Studies of interethnic relations in
multicultural contexts usually reduce minority groups to having a single “Other” – the host society. The nationalism and stereotype-laden relationship of ethnic minorities with “Others” from their land of origin has been largely understudied.

Toronto, one the most multicultural cities in the world, is an entwined web of copious interethnic “Others”. Over 140 languages are spoken there and half of its population was born outside of Canada. Skipping through Toronto’s many radio stations one can hear Middle Eastern, Eastern-European, Latin-American, Asian and African music among the variety of non-English and non-French lingo. Except for the speakers of the language, most people do not understand what is being said, making the presence of ethnic media appear fragmented and largely irrelevant. The common assumption is that the radio programs are informing the community about English and French courses, job opportunities in the city, the ethnic group’s festivals, restaurants, music events. Is this really the case?

**Research Problem and Objectives**

Ethnic media have reflected political and demographic changes that have been occurring in Western democracies since the 1970s. Ethnic media were already in existence at the start of ethnic minorities’ quest for recognition and became the critical tool to preserve their ethnic identities, which official multiculturalism in countries like Canada and Australia encouraged them to do. Still, ethnic media were receiving little attention from mainstream producers, advertisers, marketers, policymakers as well as academics. They were seen as small, irrelevant and not having the resources to commission agencies that would document their impact.
The tide is turning. Simultaneously with the steady rise of the importance of ethnicity, ethnic media have been proliferating, both in terms of the number of media outlets and the variety of media forms. The growth is linked to technological advances, increased international migration, the integration of world economies and multicultural policies of various nation-states. Audiences in large urban centres are different than 20 or 30 years ago. Ethnic media have been capturing a significant percentage of the mainstream media’s audience, especially in case of ethnic minorities with a large presence. Ethnic media, typically seen as too small, unimportant and incomprehensible to the majority, have been coming out of the dark. While the producers’ and advertisers’ newly-found interest in ethnic media is mainly profit-related, governments are also increasingly using ethnic media to communicate their message across to minorities. Since ethnic minorities seem to want to listen to ethnic media content, it is starting to matter what these “Other”-language media are saying. In 2008 Barack Obama, as the new President-elect of the United States gave his first interviews to ethnic media, two African-American magazines and two Spanish-language radio talk shows. Obama’s first television interview was with the Arab-language channel al-Arabiya.

Criticism of multiculturalism has also been on the rise, hauling more and more visible ethnic media into the spotlight. Media studies of the relationship between minorities and the host society have largely focused on the representation of minorities in mainstream media and ethnic media’s attempts to offset those images. Studies of the presence of ethnic minorities’ other “Others” in ethnic media are absent. While the ability of ethnic media to compete with mainstream media for revenue is important, it is also
essential to examine ethnic media in the context of intergroup relationships and multiculturalism’s quest for intercultural harmony.

Given the proliferation and interest that ethnic media have been gaining, the rationale of this study is significant. This thesis contributes to the growing scholarship of ethnic media by providing insight into the content of Serbian ethnic broadcasting. The research adds a new dimension to studies of ethnic media, as well as studies of interethnic relations, by expanding the discussion of ethnic media as competition to mainstream media and means for the minorities to offset majority media images, to the investigation of ethnic minorities’ relationship to their various “Others”, as opposed to a single “Other”.

The phenomenon of long-distance nationalism has been gaining more attention by academics. This research acknowledges the significance of nationalistic practices of diasporic groups and contributes to the scholarship by investigating the presence of Serbian long-distance nationalism in an ethnic media context. The study thus broadens the studies of multiculturalism, diaspora and ethnic media, by adding long-distance nationalism to the discussion.

This research recognizes that the debate about the worth of multiculturalism is far from over. As a result of the global discussion on pros and cons of multiculturalism, an investigation into the role of ethnic media rises in importance. This study contributes to the growing literature on multiculturalism and ethnic media by examining the role of long-distance nationalism in ethnic media for the multiculturalism cause.
Thesis Overview

Chapter 2, Literature Review, outlines the epistemology behind the study’s research of multiculturalism, nationalism and “Othering”. Drawing upon Jean Jacques Rousseau’s 18th century writings on the origins of recognition and patriotism, Stuart Hall’s (1997) insight into the role of representation in the formation of identity, and Edward Said’s (1978) theory of Orientalism, Chapter 2 synthesizes theories of multiculturalism, long-distance nationalism and Balkanism that guide the direction of the thesis.

Chapter 3, Methodology begins with a discussion of the conceptual level of the thesis. Drawing upon Chapter 2, the main terms are conceptualized, discussed and linked. Research questions are outlined before the most appropriate research design is used to analyze Toronto CHIN FM’s two Serbian radio programs’ representation of the Serbs and Serbian “Others”. Next, a description of the data collection methods, sampling strategy and selection is provided.

Chapter 4, Findings and Analysis, provides a summary of the results of the content analysis. It presents the findings in relation to the relevant themes that arise from the data collection. The main findings are divided into two main sections – the “Self” – ethnic media representation of the Serbs, and “Others” – Serbian ethnic media portrayals of other cultural, ethnic and religious groups, Catholics (Croats and Slovenians), Muslims (Bosniaks and Albanians), Montenegrins and the West.

Chapter 5, Conclusion, provides a succinct summary of the previous chapters and provides a brief discussion of significant findings and implications. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the study’s limitations in addition to providing suggestions for areas of future research.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

To explore the juxtaposition of multiculturalism and nationalism in the context of media representation, this thesis’s theoretical foundation builds upon the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Stuart Hall and Edward Said. Jean Jacques Rousseau’s 18th century writings on the origins of inequality of people are discussed and linked with Charles Taylor’s 1994 conceptualization of multiculturalism as the politics of recognition. Next, Jean Jacques Rousseau’s philosophy of patriotism leads into Benedict Anderson’s discussion of the origins of long-distance nationalism. Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism prompted the historian Maria Todorova to investigate “Balkanism” - the “Othering” of the Balkans by the West. Stuart Hall’s discussion of how identities are defined by external representations feeds into the discussion of the role of ethnic media in multicultural societies. The theoretical juxtaposition of multiculturalism and nationalism underpins the discussion of the place of long-distance nationalism in multicultural societies and the way this synthesis plays out in ethnic media.

Foundation for Multiculturalism and Nationalism

Jean Jacques Rousseau: Recognition and Patriotism

Even though Jean Jacques Rousseau is most frequently described as a French philosopher, it was Geneva, his city of birth, that played an integral role to his development as a political thinker (Rosenblatt, 1997). Rousseau’s writings and
biographies reveal he had an uneasy relationship with Geneva, where he was born and raised, and Paris, where he spent his adult life. In the preface to “Discourse on Inequality and Foundations of Inequality Among Men”, Rousseau, writing from Paris, nostalgically describes Geneva as his perfect country, “a state where...that sweet habit of seeing and knowing one another turned love of the Fatherland into love of the Citizens rather than love of the soil” (1992: 3). He addresses the Genevans as his “fellow citizens, or rather my brothers” who do not know the value of all the good things they enjoy “better than I who have lost them” (Ibid: 7).

Growing up under the Calvinist values, young Rousseau was taught as a child to see through and have contempt for the wealth and magnificence of Geneva's neighbouring nations (Rosenblatt, 1997). After he moved to Paris at the age of 16, contradictions and confusions in Rousseau’s writing reflected “a desire to embrace the aesthetic and intellectual values of French cultured society, and a deep uneasiness about these very values” (1997:40). Rousseau attempted to influence political currents in Geneva through his writing, but never to the political and social effect he had anticipated. Rousseau never returned to Geneva, defending his decision to forever stay out of his city of birth in Emile:

There are circumstances in which a man can be more useful to his fellow citizens outside of his fatherland than if he were living in its bosom. Then he ought to listen only to his zeal and endure his exile without grumbling. This exile itself is one of his duties.

(1979: 474)

While Rousseau briefly addressed his fellow Genevans in “Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men”, originally published in 1775, the main purpose of the
essay (1992) was to mark the moment when right replaced violence, and law replaced nature. Rousseau’s quest starts with the man as he sees him today,

walking on two feet, using his hands as we do ours...sating his hunger beneath an oak, slaking his thirst at the first Stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same tree that supplied his meal, and with that his needs are satisfied.

(1992: 134)

As Savage man started interacting more with his environment, he started seeing relations of “great, small, strong, weak, fast, slow, fearful, bold” (Rousseau, 1992: 162). He realized his superiority over the other animals, but also that other men could help him get what he wanted. When the stronger men withdrew into caves, the weak copied.

Rousseau describes how the first nation was made:

Men, who until now had roamed in the Woods, having become more settled, gradually come together, unite in various troops, and finally in every region form a particular Nation united in morals and character, not by Rules or Laws, but by the same kind of life and of foods, and the influence of a shared Climate.

(1992: 165)

Men started making comparisons and acquiring “ideas of merit and of beauty which produce sentiments of preference” (Rousseau, 1992: 165). Rousseau pinpoints the first step towards inequality:

It became customary to gather in front of the Huts or around a large Tree: song and dance, true children of love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the occupation of idle men and women gathered together. Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a price. The one who sang or danced best; the handsomest, the strongest, the most skilful, or the most eloquent came to be the most highly regarded, and this was the first step at once toward inequality and vice: from these first preferences arose vanity and contempt on the one hand, shame and envy on the other.

(1992: 166)
The idea of recognition became important and everyone started claiming a right to it. There were no laws and “everyone was sole judge and avenger of the offenses he had received” (Rousseau, 1992: 167). Natural inequality developed as differences between people became more perceptible. Self-love (*amour de soi-même*) turned into vanity (*amour propre*). Rousseau explains the difference between the two:

> Self-love is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation and which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Amour propre is only a relative sentiment, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else, inspire; men with all the evils they do one another, and is the genuine source of honor.  
> (1992: 218)

As people were comparing themselves with others and craving their recognition, inequality of prestige and authority became inevitable. The desire for reputation, and preference turned people into competitors, rivals and enemies. Rousseau concludes that “from the extreme inequality of Conditions and fortunes...would arise masses of prejudices equally contrary to reason, happiness and virtue” (1992: 185).

Since man’s departure from Nature and creation of *amour propre* caused man’s corruption, it may seem logical that the only solution would be a return to the state of nature. Rousseau instead proposes that *amour propre* is directed towards *amour patrie* - the love of fatherland. In the essay “Discourse on Political Economy”, first published 1755, Rousseau writes that

> it is certain that the greatest miracles of virtue have been produced by the love of fatherland. By combining amour-propre with all the beauty of virtue, this sweet and ardent feeling gains an energy which, without disfiguring it, makes the most heroic off all the passions.  
> (1978: 151)
In his 1772 essay “The Government of Poland” Jean Jacques Rousseau recommended patriotism and nationalism as solutions for Poland’s growing problems. Poland was large, surrounded by even larger and stronger states, with no strongholds, economic organization and few or no troops. Rousseau sees only one way to give Poland the stability she desires: the love of fatherland. Rousseau (1772: Para.7) guarantees that “if you see to it that no Pole can ever become a Russian...Russia will not subjugate Poland”. Poles need to be distinguished from other people: this will prevent them from mixing or feeling at ease with those peoples. The best way to instil the love of the fatherland is through games that may seem trivial and shallow, but that form “cherished habits and invincible attachments”. Polish children should be taught to love the fatherland from the moment they open their eyes to the moment they die and should only taught about Poland by Polish teachers.

Because of this call for identification with the state, Jean Jacques Rousseau is widely credited as the “father or grandfather of nationalism” (Melzer, 2000: 113), even though he would not have endorsed it (Engel, 2005).

**Stuart Hall: Representation and Identity**

The second epistemological root of the thesis comes from another exilic intellectual, Stuart Hall, who was born in Jamaica, but who has spent most of his life in Great Britain, where he still feels “displaced, or out of place” (2009: 669). Relevant for this thesis are Hall’s conceptualizations of identity, representation and stereotyping of the “Other”. Identification, according to Hall, involves “recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure
of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation” (1996: 2). Identities always need to be placed in the historical context: they are not about “who we are” or “where we came from”, rather what we “might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves” (Ibid). Hall points out that identity is constructed within, not outside representation and through, not outside of difference and the relation to the “Other”. Identities function as “points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, abjected” (1996: 5, emphasis in original). The process is fictional and imaginary, but none the less politically effective. There are two different ways to think about a cultural identity. The first position views cultural identity as one, shared culture, a collective true “Self” hiding inside people with a shared history and ancestry. The second view of cultural identity recognizes that there are many differences that constitute “what we really are” and that cultural identity is a matter of “becoming” as well as “being”, subject to “continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power” (1994: 394).

If identities form in relation to “Others”, representation gives them meaning. According to Hall:

It is by our use of things, and what we say, think and feel about them - how we represent them - that we give them a meaning....we give things meaning by how we represent them - the words we use about them, the stories we tell about them, the images of them we produce, the emotions we associate with them, the ways we classify and conceptualize them, the values we place on them.

(1997: 3, emphasis in original)

When we give “Others” meaning through representation, we also get a sense of our own identity and of who we are. Representation is “a complex business” that when dealing with the “Other” “engages feelings, attitudes and emotions and it mobilizes fears and
anxieties in the viewer (Hall, 1997: 227). Representation always involves “the positions from which we speak or write – the positions of enunciation” (1994: 392, emphasis in original). Even though we speak “in our own name”, of ourselves, who speaks and who we speak of are never identical (Ibid). Identity is a production, not an accomplished fact. The difference between the “Self” and “Others” positions the “Other” in reference to us. We are thus able to construct our identity as that which the “Other” is not. National cultures acquire a strong sense of identity by contrast with other cultures (Hall, 1995). Those perceived as different are exposed to binary representations:

They seem to be represented through sharply opposed, polarized, binary extremes - good/bad, civilized/primitive, ugly/excessively attractive, repelling-because-different, compelling-because-strange-and-exotic.

(1995: 229)

One type of a representational practice is stereotyping. According to Hall, stereotyping has “essentializing, reductionist and naturalizing effects” that reduces people to a few simple traits and excludes everything that does not belong (1997: 257). Hall points out that stereotyping

sets up a symbolic frontier between the “normal” and the “deviant”, the “normal” and the “pathological”, the “acceptable: and the “unacceptable”...It facilitates the “binding” or bonding together of all of Us who are “normal” into one “imagined community”; and it sends into symbolic exile all of Them - the “Others” - who are in some way different, “beyond the pale”.

(1997: 258)

Hall (1996) explains that the key features of the discourse of the “Other” involve collapsing several characteristics into one simplified figure that represents the essence of the people, and then splitting the stereotype into its “good” and “bad” sides.
Edward Said: Orientalising the “Other”

The Jerusalem-born intellectual Edward Said (1935-2003) devoted his whole life striving to expose the Palestinian side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the world. Much like the Genevan-born Jean Jacques Rousseau who believed that his political and intellectual activities in exile can be productive and useful for his fellow Genevans, Edward Said, born two centuries after Rousseau, fought for the Palestinian cause from exile in the United States. For Said, being an “exilic intellectual” meant having the “pleasure of being surprised, of never taking anything for granted, of learning to make do in circumstances of shaky instability that would confound or terrify most people” (1996: 59).

Said became internationally renowned after publishing the influential *Orientalism* in 1978. The book made a massive impact on thinking about the discourse of “Othering” and still continues to be the site of “controversy, adulation and criticism” (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2001: 49). In *Orientalism*, Said illustrated the manner in which the representation of Europe’s “Others” has been institutionalized by various disciplines. For Said, Orientalism denotes

> dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.

(1978: 3)

Said later reiterated that he objected Orientalism as

> a system of thought it approaches a heterogeneous, dynamic and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and, so to speak, from above.

(1995: 3)
Said (1978) argued that it is through the process of “Othering” that the “West” (the “Occident”) is able to Orientalise the region. “The Orient” is not just geographically close to Europe. It is the location of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies and the source of Europe’s civilizations, languages and culture that has helped Europe to define itself. “Orient” and “Occident” are not facts of nature, but man-made representations of a “relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (1978: 6). Said elaborates that

if we agree that all things in history, like history itself, are made by men, then we will appreciate how possible it is for many objects or places or times to be assigned roles and given meanings that acquire objective validity only after the assignments are made. This is especially true of relatively uncommon things, like foreigners, mutants, or “abnormal behavior”.

(1978: 54, emphasis in original)

To demonstrate the dominance of the idea of “Us”, superior Europeans against all others, “non-Europeans”, Said analyzed the writings of major British and French philological, historical and creative writers of the 19th century who drew upon a tradition of knowledge that allowed them to textually construct and control the Orient (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2001). Said’s analysis revealed stereotypes such as that all “Orientals” are the same: irrational, depraved, childlike, prone to conflict and different from rational, peaceful, virtuous, liberal, logical, mature, normal Europeans (Said, 1978). Said used the metaphor of theatre to explain the understanding of the “Other”, in this case “the Orient”, as the stage that confines the whole East:

On this stage will appear figures whose role it is to represent the larger whole from which they emanate. The Orient then seems to be, not an unlimited extension beyond the familiar European world, but rather a closed field, a theatrical stage affixed to Europe.
This “imaginative geography” initiates a vocabulary that becomes the way in which “the Orient” is known (Ashcroft & Ahluwali, 2001: 61). The construction of geographically imagined entities such as “the Orient” requires the maintenance of rigid boundaries in order to differentiate between the Occident and the Orient. Said wonders if human reality can be genuinely divided into clearly “different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races” without severe consequences (1978: 45)? He thinks not, since it is difficult to avoid the hostility created by the division of people into “us” and “them”. This distinction between “some men and some other many” usually does not lead to “especially admirable ends” (Ibid).

The theory of Orientalism is relevant for this thesis as it explores how one part of the world, be it Europe, the Middle East or, as will be argued later, the Balkans, constructs and represents “Others”, be they outside or within its perceived boundaries.

Ethnic and Political Communication

The previous section explored Jean Jacques Rousseau’s writings on the origin of inequality in order to situate the philosophical inception of politics of recognition, or multiculturalism. Inequality was caused by comparison with “Others”, creating the categories of superior/inferior and causing envy and vanity, or amour propre. For Rousseau, the only way to rid ourselves of amour propre is to redirect it into amour patrie, or patriotism. Next, Stuart Hall argued that we shape the identity of “Others” (and “Self”) simply by talking or writing, i.e. representing them. Finally, in Orientalism, Edward Said explored the superior/inferior dichotomy in a specific context, by analyzing
European representations of the geographically imagined “Orient”. The following section discusses modern-day theories of multiculturalism, nationalism and representation.

**Politics of Recognition**

Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor is an influential figure in contemporary discussions of multiculturalism. His 1994 essay “The Politics of Recognition” has solidified the view that recognition is the central element of multiculturalism. Taylor (1994) credits Jean Jacques Rousseau’s writings about inequality to be the philosophical origin of multiculturalism, not for initiating the change, but rather for articulating something that was already happening in the culture.

As argued earlier, Rousseau presents the issue of morality as following a voice of nature within us. Being true to oneself comes from within, and not from society. Taylor (1994) takes Rousseau’s notion of authenticity further to argue that the genesis of the human mind is dialogical, rather than monological. Our identities are defined through interaction with other people. This interaction can be a dialogue with, or a struggle against them. When we outgrow some of these “Others”, for example parents, the conversation with them continues. Even those who choose to free themselves from this dialogue, like the hermit or the solitary artist, are still addressing God or a future audience. There is always a dialogue. Understanding that identities are formed in an open dialogue is crucial for the politics of recognition. The projection of an inferior image on another can “distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized” (1994: 36).

While Rousseau criticizes the strife for preferences, his solution is not to reject the importance of esteem, but rather to direct it towards equality, reciprocity and unity of
purpose. Taylor finds this solution flawed because there is a “rigorous exclusion of any differentiation of roles” (1994: 50). In Rousseau, three things are inseparable – non-domination, the absence of difference, and a very tight common purpose. Rousseau is thus the prominent early exponent of the politics of equal dignity. Today, the politics of equal dignity means “the equalization of rights and entitlements” (Ibid: 37). What is established is meant to be universally the same, “an identical basket of rights and immunities” (1994: 38). Growing out of the politics of universal dignity is the politics of difference. They are in conflict, because the politics of difference asks that each individual and group is recognized for its distinctiveness that has been ignored, glossed over or assimilated. The universalism of the politics of equal dignity is charged with being only a reflection of one hegemonic culture. A supposedly difference-blind society is, in a subtle and unconscious way, highly discriminatory.

Charles Taylor argues that as more societies are becoming multicultural, “the rigidities of procedural liberalism may rapidly become impractical in tomorrow’s world” (1994: 61). More and more people live the life of diaspora and there is something peculiar about simply saying “This is how we do things here” (Ibid: 63). However, even the variant of liberalism hospitable to differences has to draw the line. There can be variations in applying the schedule of rights, “but not where incitement to assassination is concerned” (1994: 62).

Charles Taylor essentially argues that in order to develop a positive sense of identity, one’s distinctness needs to be morally validated by other people. He views the positive valuation by “Others” as a vital human need and the foundation of Western multiculturalism. The following discussion of long-distance nationalism will obscure
Taylor’s optimistic vision of the politics of recognition by exposing migrant practices that take advantage of, or run against the principles of multiculturalism.

**Imagined Long-Distance Communities**

Jean Jacques Rousseau is widely credited for planting “the seed of nationalism”, even though he thought that “true patriotism and public devotion can exist only within a small, democratically ruled state” (Melzer, 2000: 515). Modern forms of nationalism that span national borders and continents have proven Rousseau wrong. Historian Benedict Anderson attempted to determine exactly what factors paved the way for the rise of national consciousness in the 18th century and the subsequent upsurge in nationalism. Anderson famously called a nation “an imagined community” because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991: 6).

As Anderson notes, people used to be governed by centralized monarchies in which “borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded into one another” (1991: 19). Monarchies were not founded on nations, and holy scripts were only accessible through sacred languages such as Latin and Arabic that many did not understand. Anderson argues that imagining the nation became possible when monarchies, the languages of religious scripts and the concept of temporality lost their grip on people’s minds. He credits capitalism for this. The appearance of the novel and the newspaper made it possible for an imagined community to envisage its presence “calendrically through homogenous, empty time”, which is “a precise analogue of the
idea of the nation” (Ibid: 26). The print revolution in Europe spread the conviction that languages were the personal property of their daily speakers and readers, and that these imagined communities “were entitled to their autonomous place in a fraternity of equals” (1991: 84).

According to Anderson (1992), capitalism is responsible for the emergence of another form of nationalism. Starting in the 16th century, millions of Europeans and Africans migrated across the Atlantic. Ships were built that “physically moved these millions of bodies”, guided by “the compass, the sextant, the Mercatorian map, and all the cumulative knowledge stored, and massively disseminated, in the millions of books created after 1453 by print-capitalism” (1992: 3). Next, long-distance nationalism was born. The settlers took with them their national identities, sowing their ethnic identity on the American soil. Anderson gives the example of the colonial writer Mary Rowlandson who was briefly captured by the natives in 1682. As far as she was concerned, the incident happened in “deserted English fields”, surrounded with “English cattle” (Ibid). Rowlandson had never been to England and the real site of her capture was today’s Massachusetts.

It took a few generations for this “Englishness” to turn into “Americanness” (Anderson, 1992). In the next few centuries, the people in exile eventually made the hostland their real home. However, more immigrants were coming from different parts of Europe, settling into “solidary communities”, producing “newspapers in the old vernaculars”, teaching their children “the old-time religion” and taking interest in the political fate of their homelands (1992: 6). These sentiments were not lasting or powerful,
since “distances were long enough, communications were slow enough, and America was politically attractive enough” (Ibid).

Capitalism continued playing a leading role in the development of long-distance nationalism. Aeroplane flights, telephone, fax and other means of communication were becoming cheaper and cheaper. These changes in transportation and communication have had great effects on labour markets, intercontinental migration and conceptions of identity, inspiring “a tidal wave of migration” (Anderson, 1992: 8). The subjective experience of migration also changed. New immigrants were now able to go back to their homelands and frequently communicate with relatives, send them money or receive and send photos and videos, transporting the “mediated imagery of home” always with them (Ibid). Most people were migrating from established nation-states, with passports as their identity cards. Unlike in the 19th migrants that were moving from multi-nation monarchies to newborn republics, the 20th century immigrants, and indeed the whole world, defined themselves in national vocabularies. This made a juxtaposition of multiple nationalities in metropolitan nation-states possible. Feeling “politically marginalized and economically subordinated”, and nonetheless trying to remain in the new countries “for a hundred practical reasons”, the new immigrants emotionally and psychologically turned to an imaginary “heimat”, that, thanks to capitalism and technology, retains a “powerful daily grip over them” (1992: 9).

Benedict Anderson pictures a negative portrait of a long-distance nationalist. Giving Canadian multiculturalism a negative grade, Anderson provides an example of a successful Punjabi businessman who lives in Toronto, where his family is safe and financially stable. He fanatically supports the Khalistan movement in India, providing
substantial financial support which is suspected be used to purchase weapons. Anderson comments that “Canada indeed, by its profound indifference to him and his fellows, encourages him to Sikhify himself, and to live out a suburban dream-politics of his own” (1992: 11). To demonstrate that long-distance nationalism is not unique to Canadian Sikhs, Anderson notes the role of German and Australian Croats, British and Canadian Tamils or Massachusetts Irish in supporting their homeland’s political causes. He also reminds there are “millions of other long-distance ethno-nationalists” who are not involved in “fanaticism and violence” (Ibid: 12). However, all these émigrés have something in common: they have no intention of going back to a home, which, as time passes “serves as a phantom bedrock for an embattled metropolitan ethnic identity” (Ibid). Anderson pictures a gloomy portrait of a long-distance nationalist:

> For while technically a citizen of the state in which he comfortably lives, but to which he may feel little attachment, he finds it tempting to play identity politics by participating (via propaganda, money, weapons, any way but voting) in the conflicts of his imagined Heimat - now only fax-time away. But this citizenshipless participation is inevitably non-responsible - our hero will not have to answer for, or pay the price of, the long-distance politics he undertakes. He is also easy prey for shrewd political manipulators in his Heimat.


Anderson clearly finds long-distance nationalism to be a negative, irresponsible and one-directional politics, a “menacing portent for the future” that “creates a serious politics that is at the same time radically unaccountable” (1998: 74).

In order to situate the discussion of multiculturalism and nationalism in the context of former Yugoslav ethnic groups, the final section of the theoretical framework migrates Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism in the Balkan Peninsula of Europe.
In the imagination of many people the Balkans is a region in south-east Europe which has, throughout history, denoted an area of conflict and turmoil. During the 1990s Balkan wars the region became, “via a plethora of travel accounts, films, memoirs, and media articles” one of the West’s most significant “Others” (Hammond, 2007: 202). The Balkan region is associated with backwardness, unreason, disorder, violence, mismanagement, authoritarianism, incivility, barbarism, savagery, primitiveness, bloodshed, uncontrolled passion and even terrorism (Patterson, 2003; Volčič, 2005). It has historically been viewed as a land of “European savages, fierce warriors, archaic myths and cruel customs” (van de Port, 1999: 8).

Tracing the words “Balkan” and “Balkanization” as pejorative terms, the Bulgarian scholar Maria Todorova (1994) formulated the concept of “Balkanism”. She drew on a variety of material in numerous languages, including travelogues, diplomatic accounts, academic surveys, journalistic sources and belles lettres, in an attempt to offset some of the more disapproving notions attributed to the area. Todorova’s target is the negative public image of the Balkans that consolidated around the First World War, remaining unchanged for most of the century and intensifying in 1989 when the Iron Curtain fell.

Acknowledging her debt to Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), Todorova (1994) suggests that “Balkanism” is a variant of internal European Orientalism. Balkanism is not simply a subspecies of Orientalism. Todorova maintains that the Orient was more abstract in its function as a “metaphor for the forbidden”, whereas the Balkans does not share even “a whim of the accompanying luridness and overtly sexual overtones of
orientalism” (1997: 14). Balkanism is also not Orientalism because the Balkans is not in the Middle East. Balkanism evolved separately from Orientalism, partially because the Balkans’ Christianity opposed the region to Islam and “fed the crusading potential of western Christendom” (Todorova, 1994: 455). Even though the Balkans’ predominant Orthodox Christianity was throughout history depicted as Oriental and non-Western, the boundary between Islam and Christianity was still the principal one. As the Balkans was not colonized by the West, its inhabitants found their own identity not in opposition to the West, but to the very Orientalism Said wrote about, their “oriental Others”, namely the Ottoman Empire and Turkey and the legacy of the Ottoman period (Ibid). Balkanism is distinct from Orientalism in that the Balkans is Europe’s “Other within”, unlike “the Orient” which is Europe’s polar opposite (1994: 188). The Balkans are interstitial, neither here, nor there. The relatively frequent conflicts in the region in the 20th century gave the Balkans a bad reputation, turning it into a “repository of negative characteristics”, against which a “positive and self-congratulatory image of the ‘European’ and ‘the west’ has been constructed” (1997: 188).

Todorova (1997) points out that prior to 1900, there was no widespread Western stereotype of the Balkans. The travelogues dominated by the positive feelings of German and French writers started to harden into a uniform and very unflattering picture due to the accounts of British explorers who portrayed the Balkans as subject to Ottoman tyranny. Todorova first traces the Balkans’ reputation for untameable violence to coverage of terrorist acts in Ottoman Macedonia after 1900, the brutal assassination of King Alexander and Draga Mashin of Serbia in 1903 and the Carnegie account of Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian army ravages against the opponents’ villages and civilians
in the Balkan Wars. By the 1920s, blaming the First World War on its beginning in the Balkans combined with a Western upsurge in racial stereotyping to identify the region with a “peculiarly elemental and irreconcilable racial enmity” (1997: 124). From then on, British and American writers used the terms "Balkan" and "Balkanization" as synonymous with aggression, ethnic hatred and primitivism. Despite the West’s own decline into darkness in the Second World War, these terms have stuck. After the Second World War, communism also adversely affected the Balkan image. Finally, between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, the region was constructed in journalism, politics and travel writing as a “zone of backwardness, barbarism and violence” that threatened to “engulf the civilized and democratic West” (Hammond, 2005:1).

Ultimately, Todorova identifies the Balkans largely as a legacy of the Ottoman period. To the common view that the Ottoman period retarded Balkan development, Todorova counters a more inclusive view of the Ottoman legacy as “the complex symbiosis of Turkish, Islamic, and Byzantine/Balkan traditions” based on centuries of coexistence (1997: 164). Even though she finds the Ottoman Empire guilty of hindering political trust, social cohesion and urban autonomy, Todorova praises the Empire’s destruction of local aristocracies to the advantage of peasants, as a legacy absent in other European empires. She is also scornful of the members of the Balkan academia who have accepted this stigma, and of Polish, Hungarian, and Czech writers who tout the term “Central Europe” a false concept she regards as a ploy to distinguish their countries from the Balkans (Ibid: 141).

Todorova begins and ends her analysis with an indictment of George F. Kennan’s preface to The Other Balkan Wars, a 1993 edition of the Carnegie Endowment 1913
report on the two Balkan wars of 1912-1913. Evoking the Holocaust, Vietnam, as well as the “neat and clean” Gulf war operation that happened just two years before Kennan wrote his essay on the Balkans and during which there were “twice as many casualties than incurred by all sides during the two Balkan wars”, Todorova maintains that the Europeanness of the Balkans may be a matter of political and academic debate, but that “the area certainly has no monopoly on barbarity” (1994: 460).

The previous section presents the views of modern day philosophers and historians, as influenced by their epistemological roots. Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1994) sees multiculturalism as premised on positive evaluations of others. His optimistic vision is obscured by Anderson’s (1992) discussion of long-distance nationalism that functions within the multiculturalism framework. Todorova’s (1994) discussion of Balkanism, a variant of Orientalism, geographically contextualizes the analysis of the convergence of nationalism and multiculturalism. Theories of multiculturalism, long-distance nationalism and Balkanism tie in together in the following section through discussions of Canadian multiculturalism and long-distance nationalism of former Yugoslav diasporas.

**Multiculturalism and Constructions of the “Other”**

*The Multiculturalism Hypothesis*

According to Kymlicka (1995), the question of recognition of different cultures was not an issue prior to 1960s when immigrants to Canada were expected to leave behind their ethnic heritage and assimilate to the host society’s cultural norms”. The “Anglo-conformity” model of immigration was obscured by the “popular but misleading contrast
between the American ‘melting pot’ and the Canadian ‘ethnic mosaic’” (1995: 14). What it simply meant was that immigrants to Canada had a choice of two cultures to assimilate to.

The English and French groups themselves always had an uneasy relationship. As Bibby notes, descendants from Britain and France lived for almost 350 years, from the 1600s until the 1960s, when “a new generation of Quebec leaders emerged...determined to bring the province into the modern age” (1990: 25). To show that the renewed province of Quebec had a place in Canada, the federal government established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the 1960s, resulting in the recommendation that Canada officially becomes bilingual and bicultural. During that same period, groups of non-British and non-French origin accounted for 25 percent of Canada’s population (Ley, 2007). They too started pressuring policy makers to accept a more inclusive and pluralistic policy that encouraged immigrants to preserve their ethnic heritage (Kymlicka, 1995). To undercut growing Quebec nationalism, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau reversed the bicultural recommendations of the Royal Commission in a speech in the Canadian Parliament in 1972. Canada remained officially bilingual, but was no longer bicultural. The origin of Canadian multiculturalism was thus to some extent unintended (Ley, 2007).

The 1988 Multiculturalism Act states that every individual has “the freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, peaceful assembly and association and guarantees those rights and freedoms equally to male and female persons”. The importance of “preserving and enhancing the multicultural heritage of Canadians” and “rights of the aboriginal peoples” is recognized (1988: 1). English and
French are the official languages of Canada, but “neither abrogates nor derogates from any rights or privileges acquired or enjoyed with respect to any other language” (Ibid). All Canadians are equal, whether they obtained their citizenship by birth or choice. Everyone should have an equal opportunity to “make the life that the individual is able and wishes to have, consistent with the duties and obligations of that individual as a member of society” (1988: 1). As per the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion or to use their own language” (Ibid: 2). The act also promotes “the understanding and creativity that arise from the interaction between individuals and communities of different origins” and “exchanges and cooperation among the diverse communities of Canada” (1988: 4). It strengthens the status and use of English and French, while preserving and enhancing the use of non-official languages. It helps minorities to “conduct activities with a view to overcoming any discriminatory barrier and, in particular, discrimination based on race or national or ethnic origin” (Ibid: 5).

Canadian multiculturalism has been a subject of fierce debates. Supporters stress the positive value for a tolerant society and the construction of social harmony. Critics argue that multiculturalism is a “divisive concept that ultimately favours one community over another, fuelling competition and conflict” (Prato, 2009: 2). While Bibby agrees with the basic principles of bilingualism, multiculturalism and the Charter, he argues that multiculturalism has lost its purpose since “the building blocks have become the sum of the building” (1990: 158). Bibby quotes sociologist Morton Wenfield who argued that “the multiculturalism assumption - that a positive sense of one’s groups will lead to
tolerance and respect of other groups has not received strong support” (Wenfield, cited in Bibby, 1990: 10). On the contrary, the evidence suggests “a kind of ethnocentric effect, so that greater preoccupation with one’s own group makes one more distant from and antipathetic to others” (1990: 10). In the most well-known non-academic critique of Canadian multiculturalism, novelist Neil Bissoondath (1994) writes that, as an immigrant and member of visible minority who migrated from Trinidad and Tobago at the age of 18, he does not feel any emotional attachment to his country of birth. When he first arrived in Canada, Bissoondath noticed university cafeterias with students of different ethnicities sitting at segregated tables. He recalls students’ attitudes that Canada did not require anyone to change. Bissoondath argues that not much has changed as multiculturalism seems to have created deep segregation, rather than dialogue among different groups. Echoing the Multiculturalism Act’s key words “recognition, appreciation, understanding; sensitive, responsive, respectful; promote, foster, preserve”, Bissoondath argues that the Act wrongfully assumes that immigrants want their personalities to remain frozen in time (1994: 37).

While multiculturalism assumes that human beings are culturally embedded, it also stresses the importance of active engagement with other cultures (Parekh, 2004). Good society should foster intercultural dialogue and should ideally be “dialogically constituted” (2004: 16). Minority groups should be connected to the whole, through contribution, participation, interchange, and language acquisition (Reitz, 2009). This aspect of multiculturalism is reflected in the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988). Reitz argues that multiculturalism has been advocated by political philosophers “on moral grounds”, yet it is barely a philosophical question (2009: 2). Is multiculturalism a cross-
cultural exchange, or, as Nagle put it, a “dialogue of the Deaf” (2009: 1)? The public focus has been on relationships between minority and majority groups, yet the exchanges and cooperation apply to various groups, regardless of their size. Immigrants bring to the new country not only their customs, but also their old politics and attitudes towards the homeland “Others”. The question is: how does multiculturalism figure in the interaction between various ethnic groups?

Speaking to the Canadian House of Commons in October 8, 1972, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau stated that:

National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes, and assumptions.


This is how Trudeau introduced what came to be known as the “multicultural hypothesis” (Moghaddam, 2008). The most common interpretation of Trudeau’s statement is that confidence in one’s own identity leads to openness towards others. If one’s personal identity is partially based on their ethnic ingroup, presumably those who feel secure in their own ethnic group identity and background will have more accepting and appreciative feelings toward other ethnic groups. This interpretation seems to match the original intent of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. If this hypothesis is correct, multiculturalism should lead to more positive and secure ethnic identities and to the acceptance of others (Verkuylten, 2005). The optimistic view of the multiculturalism hypothesis is in contrast with the social identity theory that predicts that the more strongly individuals identify with the ingroup, the more negatively biased they will be
against outgroups (Negy, Shreve, Jensen & Udin, 2003). These two theories form the basis of many empirical studies, yet seem to share a “peaceful, but independent coexistence” in the literature (2003: 342). Moghaddam questions the positive correlation between ingroup confidence and outgroup tolerance, citing the examples of the Nazis and “religious fundamentalists intent on annihilating the followers of other faiths clearly” as examples of groups who seem secure and proud of themselves, but who are not accepting towards others (2008: 155). Moghaddam suggests that such groups may seem secure on the outside, but that the attacks on other ethnic groups could in fact come from their insecurities.

Gayer notes that the construction of “inimical figures” of “Others” lies at the heart of the identity formation process (2007: 1). As Mohammad-Arif and Moliner (2007) further argue, if “Otherness” is crucial in fashioning collective identities, the transactional feature of identity is reinforced in the process of migration. Migration tends to strengthen antagonistic perceptions of “us” and “them”. Mohammad-Arif and Moliner write:

> Although nationalist discourse is opposed to expatriation, and to the mixing of population and the transgression of national boundaries it implies, migration fosters nationalism both among the indigenous population (through defensive, xenophobic forms of nationalism) and among migrants, through exacerbated expressions of national identity, defined along ethno-religious lines. In this process mutually exclusive religious nationalisms are fashioned. They are based on a reinvention of the past, on naturalizing the link between people, culture and territory and on antagonist constructions of the others.

(2007: 6)

Due to the complex process of migration that generates a sense of insecurity, some migrants turn to what they see as unchanging values and traditions of the past. Gayer (2007) argues that constructions of the “Other” in diasporic environments have two major characteristics: multiplicity and volatility. As very little empirical material is presently
available on this subject, Gayer urges social scientists to expand studies of ethnic relations from diasporic communities’ single “Other”, the host society, to a whole range of other “Others”.

**Ethnic Broadcasting**

Canadian ethnic, cultural, religious and racial diversity has been reflected in Canadian media. In the period of 1962 to 1985 the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) and its predecessor, the Board of Broadcast Governors, licensed seven radio stations to provide broadcasting services in languages other than the official languages of French or English and Aboriginal languages (CRTC, 1985). However, there was no official policy regulating ethnic broadcasting. To reflect Canada’s multiculturalism, the CRTC brought forth a Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in 1985. The policy acknowledged that, other than Aboriginal peoples and those from France and the British Isles, there were 9 million Canadians who did not belong to these three groups. The need of Canadian minorities to broadcast in their native languages was officially recognized.

When ethnic minorities’ representatives were requesting this step, they cited that ethnic programming should achieve the following:

- serve as a bridge to enable groups to overcome cultural barriers;
- increase access by ethnic groups to conventional radio and television and to cable services;
- foster cultural appreciation and promote encounters among all Canadian cultural groups; and
- assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages.

(CRTC, 1985)
Easier integration into Canada and inter-cultural dialogue seemed to be at the heart of the initiative. Throughout the hearings those speaking on behalf of ethnic communities stated that the major concern to the Commission should be “the inaccurate depiction of culturally and racially distinct groups and their traditions by conventional media” (CRTC, 1985). Minority ethnic groups felt they were inaccurately portrayed in the dominant media. While the Commission acknowledged these concerns, it pointed out it had neither resources, nor the legislative mandate to monitor all on-air programming. Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity included Section 3(h) of the Broadcasting Act that states that “all persons who are licensed to carry on broadcasting undertakings have a responsibility for the programs they broadcast” (CRTC, 1991). The Commission also pointed in the Policy that licensees are prohibited from transmitting any comment or pictorial representation which, when taken in context, tends or is likely to expose an individual or group or classes of individuals to hatred or contempt on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

(CRTC, 1985)

The Commission highlighted that it is the responsibility of the larger public to report any programming that may be breaching the Broadcasting Act or Regulations.

As Karim notes, migrants take with them “mythical and linguistic allusions to the ancestral territory” despite diminished physical links with the homeland (2003: 3). This creates a demand for cultural products that maintain and celebrate the link with the homeland. Ethnic media “re-territorialise the diaspora through the resonance of electromagnetic frequencies” (Ibid: 10). According to Bailey, ethnic media connect fellow members of a diasporic group, but also mediate “communication between different cultural groups and individuals in local, national and transnational spaces” (2007: 3).
They are outlets for “transporting and translating ideologies and cultural repertoires beyond bounded physical places” (Ibid).

Karim (2003) wonders what the role of diasporic or ethnic media might be this “in-between” (Bhabha, 1994) world of immigrants, exiles and refugees? Do they encourage cosmopolitanism or seclusion? Cohen (2008) argues that ethnic media are perceived as enabling ethnic groups to adapt to their new country and its culture by broadcasting it in their own language. Sreberny (2005), however, notes that one of the biggest dangers of multiculturalism is that it fails to develop channels to cross over ethnic divisions and foster dialogic understanding. She wonders if “adding media to the multicultural conundrum actually work[s] to reify difference rather than support complexity” (2005: 444).

According to Johnson (2000), most models of ethnic media recognize assimilation or pluralism functions. Ethnic media with an assimilative role serve as instruments of social control, aimed at maintaining the official languages of the host country and the dominant ideology, borrowing general market media genres, and socializing to the modern. In contrast, ethnic media with pluralism functions serve to preserve and transmit native culture and identity by maintaining the language and promoting ethnic pride; to establish a minority news agenda, to announce community events and cover minority social activities (including minority business advertising); to promote the group's political and social interests and motivate them to be socially and politically active; to serve as collective expressions of anger at injustices; and to provide comfort and respite from negative images in general market media. (2000: 5)

Black and Leithner (1988) similarly argue that ethnic media roles centre around two poles: a positive, integrative role aimed at facilitating the transition into the new society and an alternative, negative role that encourages continued identification with the
homeland and resisting external pressures of acculturation. De Leeuw and Rydin divide ethnic media functions into “bonding” and “bridging” (2007: 176). The former sustain bonds with the homeland and the latter engage with the new country. Drawing upon these definitions, the function of Canadian ethnic media falls somewhere in between integrationist and pluralistic. According to the Broadcasting Policy Reflecting Canada’s Linguistic and Cultural Diversity, Canadian ethnic media should encourage cultural retention and preservation of heritage languages, but also assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada’s official languages (CRTC, 1985).

Skrbiš (1999) notes that ethnic media are highly influenced by the diaspora intellectual elite. Ethnic media usually spread and propagate particular ideas and information that they believe will assist the cultural survival of their diasporic group. However, diasporic media products often show “an important difference between the migrant and homeland environments” (1999: 89). In many cases what the homeland sees as a “tabloid” political culture is perceived as “mainstream” in the diaspora setting (Ibid). By “tabloid” culture Skrbiš refers to three sources of information,

first, alarmist information generally to be found in the right-wing oriented media; second, other media inclined towards sensationalism and a priori bias; and third, the purportedly scientific discourses which go against established scientific knowledge.

(1999: 89, emphasis in original)

Skrbiš argues that diaspora settings tend to selectively receive, generate and transmit ideas coming from the homeland. The greater the disparity between the homelands and diaspora, whether because of political differences or duration of diaspora experience, the greater “the likelihood of an emphasized generative function of the diaspora” (1999: 84). This “distant view” causes a tendency to “amplify certain aspects of the homeland reality
and to minimize or discard the significance of others” (Ibid). The sieve-effect enables the diaspora to put a different spin on the nationalist politics in the homeland setting. For instance, diaspora may nurture conservatism, where such conservatism is absent in the homeland. Skrbiš suggests that the safety offered by the “distant view” makes diaspora populations more passionately nationalistic than their homeland counterparts. Skrbiš’s notion of the tabloid culture of diasporic media corresponds closely with Keemanovic’s “the world backs our cause” myth of nationalistic discourse “keen to cite the opinions of various famous novelists, scientists, diplomats, and so on who, on occasion did or wrote something in favor of the traits or skills of the nationalists' group members” (1996: 77). This is particularly the case with “publication of papers, fragments of larger works, of various comments and so on, in which the rival national group members are shown in a highly unfavorable light” (Ibid: 78).

**Serbian Diaspora in North America**

In order to contextualize this study’s investigation of media representations of Serbian ethnic broadcasting in Canada, the following section provides a brief background on the history of Serbian diaspora in North America. Serbian immigration to North America can be divided into four stages: 1900-14, the 1920s and 1930s, post-1945 and post-1991 (Pavlovic, n.d.; Bock-Luna, 2008). The majority of the early arrivals in Canada were made up by the Serbs from Croatia, Dalmatia, Herzegovina, and Slavonia (Pašić, 1987). In 1906 the first immigrants from Serbia settled mostly in Ontario, around Toronto and Hamilton. Many of them left Serbia for economic and political reasons. Before 1921,
Serbs and other “small ethnic groups” were reported as “others” (1987: 14). After 1921, Canadian census included the category “Yugoslav”.

The working-class Serbian immigrants had little in common with the next major migration from the Old Country (Hockenos, 2003). Following the Second World War, many Serbs immigrated because they opposed socialist rule established in former Yugoslavia or feared persecution (Pavlovich, n.d.). Most Serbs who migrated to North America shortly after the Second World were members of the militant nationalist group Četniks that engaged in “guerrilla warfare” led by Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović (Bock-Luna, 2008: 26). During the Second World War, Četniks were initially supported by British and American allies. However, in 1942 Josip Broz Tito led another resistance movement, the communist Partisans, who “wrest the allies’ support from the Royalist Chetniks” (2008: 26). Tito and the allies won the war and established the Socialist Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia. Defeated by Tito’s partisans, many Četniks fled to North America, Australia and Western Europe. Serbian pre-First World War immigrants and their children did not share the “militant visions of these nationalistic political exiles, former soldiers and victims of the Ustaša” (Ibid: 28). As a result, Serbian diaspora divided into communists and anti-Communists. Hockenos writes that “almost to the last man the immediate post-1945 émigrés were Serb monarchists of one stripe or another” (2003: 115). During the Cold War they laboured to keep alive the Četnik leader’s Draža Mihailović fighting spirit hoping they would one day return to Serbia. The only obstacle

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1 Ustaša were a Croatian fascist movement that nominally ruled the Independent State of Croatia the Nazi puppet state during the Second World War.
was Josip Broz Tito, a Croat perceived as trying to “tie Serbia’s hands, keep it humble, truncated and weak” (Ibid: 116).

The final phase of Serbian migration to Canada happened after the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the subsequent conflicts with the arrival of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and young “brain drain” immigrants from Serbia that transformed Serbian diaspora again (Pavlovich, n.d; Bock-Luna, 2008). According to Statistics Canada (2006), in the 2006 census 72,690 people declared to be Serbian and 65,305 claimed Yugoslav ancestry. According to Pavlovich (n.d), many people who declared a Yugoslav ancestry are in fact Serbs. He estimates that there are between 100,000 and 125,000 Serbs in Canada. In the 2006 census, 21,040 people indicated Bosnian as their ethnic origin and 110,880 declared being Croatian (Statistics Canada, 2006).

The following section delves deeper into the dynamics of “Othering” and nationalism in the Balkans. The theoretical discussion of inter-ethnic stereotyping of former Yugoslav groups travels back and forth from the Balkans to various diaspora settings in order to illustrate how ideas and beliefs migrate with their subjects. Interethnic “Othering” is then discussed in the context of multiculturalism principles.

“Otherness”: Shifted to the East, Migrated to the West

Orientalism and Balkanism typically refer to the West “Othering” the Middle East and the Balkans. However, “Othering” is highly mobile, multidirectional and interactive: it can shift more to the East or South or migrate with its subject entirely to the West. Objects of “Othering” can stereotype (Occidentalize) the West, or internalize Western stereotypes and engage in self-“Othering” or “self-Orientalising” (Todorova, 1997;
Bakic-Hayden (1992) argues that, geographically, the perceived “value” declines from north to south, from west to east. Asia is more “East” or “Other” than Eastern Europe. Within Europe, the Balkans is perceived as most “Eastern”. Division between the East and the West is characterized by the distinction between the eastern Orthodox churches and the Western ones. Each part has a hierarchy within: in the East, Islam is viewed less favourably than Orthodox Christianity. In the West, the Protestant church is seen more positively than Catholicism. Various geographical regions thus grade, or “nest” Orientalist attributes in order to “view cultures and religions to the south and east of it as more conservative or primitive” (1992: 4). Each part views itself as the neighbour’s Occident (Bjelić, 2002). As Bracewell put it, nesting Orientalism is

the application of Orientalist distinctions to one’s neighbour in an attempt to offload the stigma of difference onto others, thus asserting one’s self as non-Oriental and as European, in the eyes of the West as well as one’s own estimation.

(2009: 12)

Bakic-Hayden argues that nesting Orientalisms are evident in former Yugoslavia where the “Other” has been “appropriated and manipulated by those who have themselves been designated as such in Orientalist discourse” (1995: 922). Former Yugoslavia has been a meeting place of Ottoman and Hapsburg empires, Cyrillic, Roman and Ottoman scripts, Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Protestantism, Islam and Judaism, as well as cold-war politics and ideologies. The Orientalist dichotomy resulted in distinctions between “northern republics” and “southerners” (Ibid). Orientalism is nested within nations: Croatia is Balkan vis-à-vis Slovenia, Serbia is Balkan vis-à-vis Croatia, Muslims are Balkan vis-à vis the Serbs, and so on (Razsa & Lindstorm, 2004). The Slovenian philosopher’s Slavoj Žižek’s depiction is salient:
For the right-wing nationalist Austrians, this imaginary frontier is Karavanke, the mountain chain between Austria and Slovenia: beyond it, the rule of Slavic hordes begins. For the nationalist Slovenes the frontier is the river Kolpa, separating Slovenia from Croatia; we are Mitteleuropa, while Croats are already Balkan, involved in the irrational ethnic feuds which really do not concern us...For Croats the crucial frontier, of course, is the one between them and Serbs, between western Catholic civilisation and the eastern Orthodox collective spirit, which cannot grasp the values of western individualism. Serbs see themselves as the last line of defence of Christian Europe against the fundamentalist danger embodied in Muslim Bosnians and Albanians.

(1993: 223)

Patterson’s study of the public discourse of Slovenian intellectuals, politicians, journalists and cultural critics found that Slovenian culture is portrayed as a “stable, orderly, civil, and democratic” central-European country, and essentially different from that of “Serbs, the Macedonians, and the Kosovo Albanians” (2003: 116). Skrbiš’s 1999 study of Slovenian long-distance nationalism shows that the Slovenian ambivalent attitude towards their Southern neighbours migrated to the West: Australian Slovenians did not care to distinguish between members from other former Yugoslav republics: they are abstract Southerners, sometimes even called “Bosnians”, who represent a symbolic pollution of Slovenian culture. For Slovenians, Croatia represents where Europe ends and Balkans begin. Croatia pushes the Balkanness further East, to Serbia:

Important myths include the Antemurale Christianitatis, the belief that Croatia represented the easternmost outpost of European civilisation. Across the divide were the Serbs, often presented as being on a lower level of civilisation, with an “Asiatic” mentality, and distinct racial and psychological features, as well as different linguistic and cultural forms of identity. Such forms of differentiation would buttress Croatian arguments that, at all levels, Serbs were more backward, barbarous, and warlike. These innate or primordial characteristics were cited as the cause of Yugoslavia’s breakdown and the wars that followed.

(MacDonald, 2002: 8, emphasis in original)
Bechev writes that at the beginning of the 1990s Croatian president Franjo Tudjman was “keenly asserting that in its struggle for independent Croatia was really choosing Europe and leaving the Balkans” (2004: 87). Razsa and Lindstorm’s (2004) analysis of Croatian newspaper columns, political cartoons, government documents and speeches from the 1990s shows that Croats employed Balkan stereotypes to distinguish themselves from their ethnic neighbours. Croatian identity is defined particularly in opposition to Serbs, “the epitome of a Balkan people” and Croatia’s largest minority and important neighbour (2004: 648). Thompson also found that Croatian media’s news reports on the 1990s war systematically placed Croatia in European culture and condemned “the barbarity of the aggressor and its lack of culture” (1994: 175).

Serbia’s perceived Balkanness is not the only reason for Serb-Croat animosity. The two groups have a complicated relationship rooted mainly in their 20th century conflicts. According to MacDonald (2002), the instrumentalisation of Holocaust imagery has been of central importance in structuring both Serbian and Croatian representations of the past and present. In the 1980s and 1990s Serbian and Croatian nationalist elites painted each nation as “a longsuffering victim of ancient, predatory enemies, bent on their destruction” (2002: 6). Both Serbian and Croatian nationalism subscribed to a “cyclical view of history”, portraying their histories as a series of battles against powerful enemies (Ibid: 5). The Second World War is the most important historical period for both Serbs and Croats who accuse each other of being willing and zealous collaborators with the Nazi occupiers. Each accused the other of being an enthusiastic participant in the Final Solution against Yugoslavian Jews, through membership in the Serbian Četniks or
the Croatian Ustaša\textsuperscript{2}. Each side also claimed to have suffered a ‘Holocaust’ at the hands of the other - the Serbs at the Ustaša - run death camp Jasenovac, the Croats, after the war, at the Austrian town of Bleiburg, when Communist Partisans (perhaps Serbian) massacred escaping collaborators.

\hspace{1cm}(2002: 8)

Čolović notes that:

\begin{quote}
Despite these images of allegedly irreconcilable differences between Serbs and Croats, portrayed as the consequence of their belonging to antagonistic civilisational circles, the Serbian and Croatian political myths about Europe and its culture contain much the same stories. These are, among other things, stories of a chosen people as a kind of cultural hero of European civilisation, which has the duty to fight in the world, even by fire and sword, for the victory of authentic cultural values.
\end{quote}

\hspace{1cm}(2002: 42)

The importance of history, notably the Second World War, travelled with both Serbs and Croats to the West. Bock-Luna’s 2008 analysis of long-distance nationalism among American Serbs and Pryke’s 2003 examination of the same phenomenon among British Serbs show that Serbian immigrants, especially the older ones, continually emphasized the importance of remembering the casualties and suffering that Serbs experienced during the Second World War. The Croatian Fascist Ustaša’s concentration camp Jasenovac\textsuperscript{3} was frequently mentioned in both studies. To many Serbs in America, Jasenovac and other camps run by the Ustaša “epitomized the degree to which Nazi-backed Croat fascists perpetrated Serbs, Jews and Gypsies in Yugoslavia, similar to the Holocaust against Jews” (Bock-Luna, 2008: 155). Second generation young Serbs from Britain

\hspace{1cm}

\textsuperscript{2} As Hayden (1995) notes, the Serb Četniks and Croatian Ustaša are the “prototypes of extreme nationalism” during the 1941-1945 war in Yugoslavia.

\textsuperscript{3} It is estimated that 500,000 to one million Serbs were killed in Jasenovac (Bock-Luna, 2008). However, the numbers vary greatly. Some authors argue that between 800,000 and one million Serbs, others estimate a total of 487,000 (Ibid).
reported being “saturated” by talks about history, politics and especially Second World War by their elders (Pryke, 2003: 160). History was told through stories, anecdotes and jokes, often involving reference to a heroic figure, a family member or friend. Most conversations centered on the “suffering, betrayal and courage of the Serbs during this time” (2003: 161). Older and Second World War history forged a view of “Serbs as victims of circumstance and history” (Ibid: 163). This victimhood, however, did not imply acquiesce, as the male respondents stressed that Serbs do not back down, they are not scared of anybody.

Bock-Luna (2008) also observed that most Serbs in the United States she spoke to avoided the talk of the most recent Balkan Wars. Even Serbian refugees who experienced the wars of the 1990s rather engaged in lively discussions about the Second World War which occurred almost sixty years before. Bock-Luna explains that new migrants are at first busy establishing themselves in the new country, avoiding “an active memory work about their past experiences” (2008: 157). The stories of the past are dormant in the productive years of their life, but get reactivated when people get older, especially if there is a crisis in the homeland. In the case of the older migrants who experienced the Second World War, the Balkan Wars of the 1990s served as a mirror for “reliving the Second World War due to the lack of reconciliation and remorse in the Tito era and after communism’s demise” (Ibid: 131). Life in exile nourished the need to expand their individual painful past to collective proportions and produce a “far-reaching antagonistic ethnic universe” (2008: 163). The 1990s conflicts had a divergent influence on Pryke’s Serbian participants living in Britain: some denied the existence of concentration camps as media sensations and Muslim and Croatian stunts to discredit the Serbs, whereas
others condemned Serbian actions. However, they all felt that Serbs were consistently misrepresented in the media.

Studies of Serbian long-distance nationalism found that Serbs largely view themselves in relation to their allies or enemies. For Serbs in the United States and Britain, Croats figure as a boundary maker to set Serbs apart, particularly because of the events of the Second World War. Bock-Luna observed that Croats are seen as an “antidote to Serbian drives for liberation” (2008: 70). While Croats want to be like others, namely Austrians and Germans, Serbs are authentic, identical with themselves (Ibid). Pryke also reported that accounts of the Second World War Ustaša atrocity “broadened into a generally negative depiction of the Croats as the historic enemy of the Serbs” for Serbs in Britain (2003: 163).

Skrbiš’s 1999 ethnographic study of long-distance nationalism also confirmed the importance of the Second World War for Croats in Australia, as this was when Croatia was an independent state under Ante Pavelic’s Ustaša government. The question of Ustaša “genocide against target groups of Serbs, Gypsies and Communists” continues to haunt present-day Croatia (1999: 16). The fact that Croatia was an independent state during the Second World War was nevertheless a source of inspiration for Croats that emigrated after the Second World War. The ultimate goal of the post-Second World War Croatian diaspora was to establish the Croatian state again, which indeed did happen in 1991. The possibly “embarrassing historical facts” such as “collaboration with Nazis and Fascists” were dismissed as lies, or rationalized in terms of “historical inevitability” (Ibid). Croatia’s shift of “Otherness” to the east (Serbia) also travelled with Croatian migrants to the West. Skrbiš’s study revealed that second-generation Croats in Australia
mostly constructed a negative image of the Serbs. One participant reported that his father, described as a non-racist, would be perfectly satisfied if his daughter in law was “Asian, black, whatever – but not Serbian” (1999: 176). While the second-generation Croats would occasionally question their parents’ “knee-jerk” reactions against Serbs, these negative sentiments were strengthened with the onset of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Winland’s (2007) study of Canadian Croats shows, with a few sporadic exceptions, similar negative sentiments towards Serbs in Toronto. Interestingly, Skrbiš (1999) found that Australian Slovenian migrants had very favourable views towards Serbs, since Serbia and Slovenia do not share a border and the Serbs are “faraway” (1999: 136).

Balkanist stereotypes continue to nest to the east of Croatia, where Serbs view themselves as the last frontier of Europe in contrast to Muslims. As Čolović (2002) notes, tensions between Muslims and Orthodox Christians have been continuous since the 14th century, when the Ottomans conquered Serbia and the rest of the Balkans. The 1389 Battle of Kosovo when the Serbian army, even though defeated by the Ottomans, defended Europe from the Turkish advance is used as the epitome of Serbian sacrifice for Christianity. Serbian nation is to a great extent built on Orthodox Christianity and thus inevitably constructs Muslims as a definite “Other” (Petrović, 2008). MacDonald (2002) argues that in both Serbian and Croatian national consciousness, Bosnian Muslims are one of three things: an artificial, constructed nation, members of the Serbian or Croatian nation who were forced by the Ottomans to abandon their true identity, or harbingers of a dangerous Islamic conspiracy. As far as Albanians are concerned, Kosovo continues to be a crucial conflict area for Serbs, who see Kosovo as the cradle of Serbian Orthodoxy, and Albanians as colonizers. Quoting Marković (2003), Petrović writes:
The perception of Albanians as Others was strengthened through the production and maintenance of stereotypes of Albanians as savages that need to be civilized, barbarians and intruders characterized by violent and deviant sexual behaviour, as people who “reproduce like animals” and who “destroy Orthodox churches and other sanctuaries”.

(2008: 73)

Cigar (2003) argues that during the 1990s conflicts Serbian intellectuals were instrumental in establishing and cementing an in-group/out-group dichotomy between Muslims and Serbs based on stereotyping Muslims as treacherous, cold-blooded, fastidious and loyal to the Middle East, and Islam as morally deficient, backward and aggressive. Serbian intellectuals portrayed the present as “a mechanical application of the past, based on a literal reading of the Qur’an and a linear application of past Islamic history to today’s society” (2003: 328). Serbian nationalist intellectuals represented the “Muslim problem” as part of a “broader, unified Muslim threat applicable to the entire West” and their mission was to warn the “unsuspecting West” (Ibid: 329). Erjavec and Volčič’s (2008) argue that in the last decade or so, Serbian national discourse has borrowed the post 9/11 global discourse of terrorism in relation to Muslims in the Balkans. Their analysis of young Serbian intellectuals’ interpretations and reconceptualizations of global reactions to publication of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons found that the “cartoon crisis” was framed to label Muslims as fundamentalists and terrorists, in order to legitimize Serbian nationalistic ideology, as well as Serbian military actions against Bosnian and Kosovo Muslims in the 1990s. Local appropriations of the global events were used to “re-position Serbia from being an ‘Eastern’ community...towards the ‘Western’ discursive community” (2008: 306). According to Petrović, the Serbian discourse of Islamic threat is very similar to Western media
reporting and “political discourse on Islamist fanaticism and threats of Muslim terrorism” (2008: 70).

Poulton and Farouki note that the fear of Islam is not emblematic to Serbia:

While many Serbs today see Islam as an expansionist threat, Bulgarians have similar apprehensions about Turks living with them. Orthodox Macedonians, faced with the rapidly growing Muslim Albanian population, have similar fears.

(1997: 7)

Hayden argues that the Europeanness of Christianity and the non-Europeanness of Islam is an “essential contrast in the messages of the dominant political forces of both the Serbs and Croats” (2002: 119). In contrast, Muslims have been represented more vaguely in Serbian and Croatian diasporic contexts. Bock-Luna’s (2008) Serbian participants from the United States portrayed Bosnian Muslims ambiguously, since many Serbs stated that Muslims were in fact Serbs who were forced to convert to Islam during the Ottoman Empire. Still, the high number of fatalities among Bosnian Muslims and Serbs during the 1990s conflicts created a distance in the diaspora. When 9/11 happened, many Serbs were “happy” because the “Islamic threat” that Serbs experienced in Bosnia and was supported by the West was at last recognized as the enemy (2008: 89). The interviewees hoped that the U.S. would change its relationship with Serbia because of “Bosnian Muslims’ alliance with ‘terrorist Islam’” (Ibid). In his analysis of second-generation Serbs in Britan, Pryke (2003) also found that, in contrast to the Croats, there was little parental talk of the Slovenians, Bosnian Muslims or Albanians. For Croats in Australia, Bosnian Muslims and Yugoslavs did not represent “real” ethno-national categories, as there was no “legitimate historical reasons for their existence” (Skrbiš, 1999: 115). One of Skrbiš’s female respondents’ former partner was a Muslim from former Yugoslavia, which was
acceptable to her family because as a Muslim he was considered as “one of their own” (1999: 161). During the 1999 wars Australian-Croatian Radio always called Serbian soldiers the Četniks, but the labelling of Bosnian Muslims varied from neutral language to “Muslim fundamentalists” depending on whether Croats and Muslims were allies at that moment (1999: 91). Hockenos (2003) found in his analysis of diasporic nationalism among Croats in Canada that:

> In the diaspora media there was no comparison between the vitriol lavished on Serbs and the benevolent indifference with which they ignored the Bosnian Muslims. In fact, attesting to the Croats’ sincerity, a number of Croat-behaving Muslims (“Croats of Islamic faith”) held high-ranking positions in some of the Croats’ most radical émigré organizations. (2003: 45)

A new, neither Catholic nor Muslim, but fellow Eastern Orthodox “Other” has been appearing in the Serbian national milieu. In the last decade or so, Montenegrins have been transforming from a small Serbian Sub-Self, to a Semi - “Other”. Until the early 1990s Montenegrins were perceived as an integral part of the Serbian national and cultural paradigm (Gallagher, 2003). In the 1990s, Montenegro supported Serbia, at the same time developing a strong anti-Serbian nationalism movement and finally separating from Serbia in 2006. The county has since experienced a conflict between two ethnic identities, Serbian and Montenegrin. The perception of Montenegrins as Serbs is largely based on a historical narrative that “elevates the role of Montenegro in holding together and preserving the construction of the Serbian national mythos” (Pavlović, 2003: 94).

The history of Montenegro is frequently presented as the history of a “remote army camp, whose swordsmen were guarding for posterity the spirit of the Eastern Orthodox faith and protecting it from falling under the cold shadow of the Crescent” (2003: 95, emphasis in original). Cross and Komnenich (2005) argue that Montenegrin identity is
best illustrated by the 19th century ruler of Montenegro Prince-Bishop Petar II Petrović Njegoš’s 1846 epic poem *The Mountain Wreath* about the struggle against Islam. The poem is constructed around a single event that allegedly took place on a Christmas Day in the early 1700s: the mass execution of Montenegrins who had converted to Islam. Montenegrins were depicted as a local variety of the Serbs, the best of the Serbs and “the essence of Serbdom” (2005: 12). Pavlović (2003) notes that Serbian nationalists use *The Mountain Wreath* as the ultimate proof of the Montenegrins’ true Serbian identity; Croatian nationalists view it as the ultimate evidence of the Oriental nature of their eastern neighbours, and Muslim nationalists see it as a manual that was brought back to life during the wars in former Yugoslavia. Montenegrins were mentioned rarely, and only interchangeably with Serbs in Bock-Luna and Pryke’s research of long-distance nationalism among Serbs in the United States and the United Kingdom, perhaps because the studies were conducted before Montenegro’s independence in 2006.

According to Kiossev (2002: 180), there is an “asymmetric power play between Occidental and Oriental identities” in the Balkans that reproduces the “archaic sign of mock, shame, and nausea against the ‘semi-other’ who prevents the completeness of the Occidental self”. Zooming in on the region, “Othering” nests into smaller and smaller groups: ethnic groups distinguish among themselves, but also within themselves. In the Balkans, collective identities split outward and inward. Zooming out of the region, the “Other” becomes more diluted, generalized, embracing more people in less categories, gradually transcending ethnic, religious, or state borders. In what Mishkova (2008) calls “Balkan Occidentalism”, the French, British, Europeans, Americans are compacted into
one entity – the West. Serbia has always had an ambivalent, contradictory and complex relationship with the West. Čolović notes that:

This *topos* of the Serbian political myth, in which Serbia is opposed to rotten Western Europe as the guardian of authentic European values, may be interpreted today as a polemical response to the equally mythic representation of the West as the embodiment of justice, culture and prosperity, in which the Balkans and Serbia take on the inglorious role of representing backwardness, primitivism and barbarity.

(2002: 41, *emphasis in the original*)

Volčič’s 2005 study of young Serbian intellectuals’ notion of the West shows a significance of the category of “West” as the “Other” in the shaping of Serbian national identity. Volčič’s interviewees tended to essentialize and stereotype the West as self-centred, only interested in capital, individuality and domination, empty and pompous. Slobodan Milošević’s nationalistic discourse in the 1990s portrayed the West as advocating a “New World Order” and representing a tyranny over the small and proud Serbia (2005: 157). Economic sanctions and the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia still trigger feelings of deep mistrust, fear and hatred of the West. However, Serbia’s “vilification in the eyes of the world was facilitated by a well-documented culture of defiance” (Jackson, 2004: 107).

The complex relationship of Serbs with the West travels with them even if they live in the West. Proctor’s study of Serbian Australians analyzed what life is like for people who “see themselves under attack” by the host country that wrongly blames their group for the war (Proctor, 2000, cited in Bock-Luna, 2008: 46). Perceived biased media reporting enhanced what Proctor termed the “long-distance devastation”. When the NATO bombing of Serbia started in 1999, Serbs in America felt shattered and “under attack” by an unfair attribution of all cruelties to Serbs (Bock-Luna, 2008: 45).
Hockenos’s 2003 study also shows that the bombing left American Serbs feeling confused and betrayed by America. As one participant lamented, “Every Serbian American kid...learns that the United States and Serbia were allies in two world wars” (2003: 105). Serbs in America could not fathom how Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Albanians, “the very ones who fought against America in the Second World War, who were fascists”, were suddenly America’s allies (Ibid). The bombing prompted diaspora Serbs from the United States, Canada, Europe and Australia to actively protest the foreign policy decisions of their adopted countries. American President Bill Clinton and other NATO leaders were called war criminals and Nazis. According to one Hockenos’s interviewee, “the U.S. administration had been badly duped by a coalition of adversarial forces ranging from the Vatican to Islamic paid lobby groups” (2003: 106). Hockenos also notes that diaspora Serbs firmly believed that “Croats, Germans, and others are somehow genetically disposed to fascism: they are ‘genocidal peoples’” (Ibid: 118).

Bock-Luna writes that, curiously, when 9/11 happened, and only two years after NATO bombing of Serbia, the Serbs’ reaction to the event even “equaled that of the general ‘nationalist’ fervor” that was happening in American society (2008: 89). Many Serbs in America were seen wearing stars and stripes and carrying American flags, hoping that the United States will finally recognize the threat of Islam that Serbs had already experienced in Bosnia and change its policy towards the Balkans.

Along with the West “Othering” the Balkans, the region itself has internalized this outside perception (Todorova, 1997). Volčić’s 2005 study shows that young Serbian intellectuals engaged in internal “Othering” and celebrating the negative Western
stereotypes, simultaneously trying to “reverse, exploit and fully accept negative valuation through self-exoticization”. Volčič elaborates:

This strategy claims that barbarity is actually vital, fresh, desirable, powerful, lustful, passionate and authentic and further asserts that being irrational and passionate doubles as a form of freedom and resistance against western oppression.

(2005: 167)

Serbian participants in van de Port’s study of Serbian celebrations also readily accepted being the definite and stubborn “Other”, reiterating that “it takes a Serb to know a Serb” and that it is impossible for outsiders to understand the Balkans and the Serbian mentality (1999). Van de Port explains:

The “obstinate others” that I met in Serbia, those people who told me in a thousand different ways “No way! You are not going to penetrate our Otherness! We are different!” were not interested in intercultural dialogue. They were up for exclusivity, for being essentially different. Over and over again they told me that I should not expect to be able to grasp everything about them, insisting that some differences between Serbs and people from the West are for real.

(1999: 8, emphasis in original)

In his analysis of Serbian nationalistic reflective prose and popular songs, Čolović views the “Let us be what we are” attitude as the quintessence of Serbian nationalism (2002: 64). This “ethno-myth” involves a complete separation from the world and is characterized by the view that Serbs are the only nation “consistently true to its self, capable of shaping that self as original and unique” (Ibid: 66). Americans have no national identity for they are an “artificial community, without roots, without tradition, without collective memory, without soul” (2002: 67). Western Europeans have “a kind of sick, limp, rotten identity” (Ibid). Finally, Croats (Catholicised Serbs), Albanians, Muslims (Islamicised Serbs), Bulgarians and de-Serbicized Romanians have abandoned
their “real, that is Serbian, one and adopted a foreign or invented national identity as their own” (2002: 69). Čolović quotes Serbian poet Gojko Desnica:

“But a Serbs remains a Serb”, says Gojko Desnica, “wherever he is born and wherever he lives. For little Serbs can be born in a foreign state, but their consciousness of belonging to their people surpasses everything”.

(2002: 64-65)

Bock-Luna (2008) also noted that American Serbs tended to present themselves as different and impossible for outsiders to understand. In addition, the participants “self-orientalised” their own nation, stereotyping the Serbs as militant, rebels and destroyers (2008: 64). Other common “Balkanizations” were that the Serbs were lazy and primitive “Mafiosis” that do things the “barbarian way” (Ibid: 66).

Čolović (2002) argues that the interpretation of Serbian ethno-nationalistic myths must be considered in the context of events in former Yugoslavia and the Balkans. Similarities between Serbian and Croatian political myths show that they can be seen as “variation on elements from a common fund of plots, topoi and images” (2002: 74, emphasis in original). The Serbo-Croatian “fund” is merely borrowing from a “common Balkan bank of political myths” (Ibid). However, ethno-myths are not confined to the Balkans and Eastern Europe – they are alive and kicking in Western Europe as well. Čolović argues that ethnic nationalism in Western Europe is “not a thing of the past - it represents one of the central ideas of the social order” (2002: 75). Quoting Rex (1993) who wrote that Europeans today “reject all Muslims as ‘fundamentalists’” and have “great difficulty in accepting truly pluri-cultural society”, Čolović concludes that an
understanding of the Serbian political myths requires the context of Balkan and European contemporary life (2002: 79).

As argued above, nesting Balkanisms are inextricably tied with nationalism, as they both include a negative identification of “Others”. MacDonald, paraphrasing Alter (1992), contends that ethnic groups define themselves in negative terms: “Encounters with ‘alien’— other forms of language, religion, customs, political systems – make people aware of close ties, shared values and common ground”. Disrespect, animosity and negative encounters with external “Others” are crucial in creating a cohesive national identity (2002: 27). Kecmanovic notes that distinguishing between “us” and those who resemble “us”, usually involves “hushing up or loudly denying every similarity between...my people and your people”, as well as inventing and overemphasizing differences until they become “an absolute obstacle to mutual understanding and closeness” (2002: 79). Kecmanovic further argues that “hatred towards similar ethnic groups is the price that some ethnic groups pay either to establish and/or ensure their own identity” (Ibid). This puts an ethnic group into a dependent position: it becomes a prisoner of the enemy it has created, whom it cannot do without.

In a diasporic context, the tolerant principle of multiculturalism can, paradoxically, further deepen the gap. Skrbiš (1999) argues that Australian policies of multiculturalism act as catalysts of Croatian long-distance nationalism. Hockenos (2003) contends that “exile patriotism” does not necessarily reflect the democratic and pluralistic values of the host countries. He elaborates that:

The world of diaspora politics is a no-man's-land with few written rules, one in which basic democratic concepts such as accountability, checks and balances, term limits, representation, and pluralism are meaningless...
who shouts the loudest or raises the most money or both carries the mantle until someone louder and wealthier appears on the scene.

(2003: 218)

In their analysis of Hindu long-distance nationalism in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, Jaffrelot and Therwath (2007) argued that multiculturalism strengthened community groups and centralized political organization. Kurien (2004) similarly notes that Hindu nationalists in the United States use the discourse of multiculturalism to demand a Hindu state that would deny minority groups in India many of the basic rights that Hindu Indians enjoy in America and that make their activism possible. Kurien argues that ethnic nationalism that works within the multicultural framework prevents the formation of coalitions between minority groups, and even among people belonging to the same ethnic group.
Chapter 3

Methodology

This thesis aims to explore how ethnic media of the Serbian community in Canada represent different cultural, ethnic and religious groups and how these representations relate to the Canadian policy of multiculturalism. First, drawing upon Jean Jacques Rousseau’s writings on the causes of inequality that stand at the philosophical origins of modern day politics of recognition, this thesis takes the position of multiculturalism as an expression of mutual acceptance, respect and cooperation between different groups. Second, drawing on Rousseau’s writings on patriotism, the research conceptualizes long-distance nationalism, a modern form of nationalism that develops within the multiculturalism framework. Finally, drawing upon Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism and Stuart Hall’s theory of representation and identity formation, this thesis examines the representations of the “Self” and “Others” in ethnic media narratives. The next section outlines concepts identified in the literature and applied theoretically for the purpose of the research.

Concepts and Terms

Drawn from the Literature Review, the following concepts are defined in order to understand the terms used in the Findings and Analysis chapter. As this is a qualitative study, the concepts were refined during the process of data analysis. The concepts below are pivotal to the thesis because they serve as parameters for investigating the study’s
research questions – Multiculturalism, Long-Distance Nationalism, Representation, Orientalising/Balkanizing and Ethnic Media/Broadcasting.

**Multiculturalism**: Multiculturalism is a principle that maintains or supports distinctive identities of different cultural, ethnic, religious or racial groups. This thesis’s focus is multiculturalism in Canada, where the principle is also an official government policy. The Canadian policy of multiculturalism encourages all Canadians to preserve, enhance and share their heritage. Multiculturalism is not simply a one-directional act of respect and recognition. Rather, it assumes a two-way communication between groups. Canadian multiculturalism policy calls for all Canadian groups to promote exchanges and cooperation. This does not apply only to communication between the host society and minority groups. All Canadians are asked to not only tolerate, but interact with each other. Minority ethnic groups are encouraged to interact with the majority group, but also with other minority ethnic groups. The focus of this thesis’s exploration is communication of minority groups with other minority or majority groups. For the purpose of this thesis, multiculturalism is defined as the principle or policy that promotes recognition, respect and communication between all Canadian cultural, ethnic, religious and racial groups, regardless of their majority or minority status.

**Long-Distance Nationalism.** Long-distance nationalism is a set of political and historical identity claims and practices expressed by migrants. Not everyone who visits the homeland, maintains ties or sends remittances is a long-distance nationalist. National identity does not equal long-distance nationalism. Long-distance nationalism is different from transnationalism or patriotism in that the latter involves a connection to or love of homeland, but not necessarily political activism. Long-distance nationalism occurs in
times of crises and war and is characterized by a political discourse on historical injustice and violence. Examples of long-distance nationalism range from returning to the homeland to fight a war, becoming politically active, raising money in the host country to fund conflicts in the homeland, to lobbying, protesting and using media to disseminate information to other migrants. For the purpose of this thesis, long-distance nationalism is defined as a form of nationalism observed in migrants, occurring in times of wars and real or perceived crises and instabilities in the homeland, characterized by a discourse of historical injustice and violence.

**Representation.** Representing “Self” and “Others” includes everything we say about us or them: words we use, stories we tell, thoughts we think, and emotions we feel. By representing “Others” we give them identity, but we also get a sense of our own identity and who we are. The “Self” is defined as that which the “Other” is not. Stereotyping is a form of representation that one-sidedly and exaggeratedly reduces others to a few simple traits that become the signs by which the group is known. Representation may take many forms, and media representations are one of the most powerful ones. For the purpose of this thesis, representation is defined as anything said about one’s own, or another cultural, religious or ethnic group, be it a majority or minority group. Media representation is defined as any comment expressed publicly, in the media, about one’s own group or other cultural, ethnic, religious or racial groups, regardless of the minority or majority status.

**Orientalising** originally refers to representing people living in the Middle East or the “Orient” as different from Europeans. More generally, to Orientalise, also to “Other” means to represent others as different from us, typically as inferior, irrational, prone to
conflict, the opposite of “normal”. It usually applies to representations of people living in or originating from the East of “us”. The reverse side of “Orientalising” is “Occidentalizing” - reducing those West of us to simple characteristics such as shallow, rootless or materialistic. For the purpose of this thesis, the “West” is defined as Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. The West typically excludes countries of Orthodox Christianity, Islam and Eastern religions of India, China, Japan and Southeast Asia.

**Balkanism** refers to representing people living in or originating from the Balkans as different from people living in the West. Typical “Balkanizations” include the belief that people from the Balkans are irrational, stubborn, prone to conflict, lazy, hostile and uncivilized. For the purpose of the thesis, the Balkans are defined as Europe’s southern peninsula, comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, large parts of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia and small parts of Romania, Turkey and Italy. Even though the Balkans comprise more than the territory of former Yugoslavia, “the Balkans” is often used interchangeably with “former Yugoslavia”. Former Yugoslavia, or the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a state that existed from 1943 until 1992. It was made up of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia and two provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Yugoslavia was led by Josip Broz Tito. The rise of nationalism after Tito’s death in 1980 led to Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the 1990s civil wars.

**Ethnic Broadcasting**: An element of ethnic media, ethnic television and radio are directed to specific minority groups, broadcasting or writing in the minority group’s
language, official language, or combination of languages. Ethnic broadcasting in Canada is regulated by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) whose guidelines call for ethnic broadcasters to bridge cultural barriers among groups, foster respect and promote communication among all Canadian groups. Ethnic broadcasting enables ethnic minorities to represent themselves, as opposed to being represented by dominant media. In addition to self-representation, ethnic media are encouraged to promote communication among different ethnic groups. Interaction with other groups through ethnic media involves representation. If mainstream media represent minority groups by making references to them, ethnic media also represent other groups by making references to them. Ethnic media representations are thus not restricted to “Self”, but extend to “Others”. This thesis’s focus is representations of the “Self” and “Others” in ethnic media. For the purpose of this thesis, ethnic media are defined as media products directed to a specific minority ethnic group, whose objective is to represent its own group in order to benefit from multiculturalism’s support for the group’s ethnic identity, as well as to communicate with and represent other groups by making references to them.

In addition to the above concepts, the following terms used in the Findings and Analysis chapter are also conceptualized:

Minority Group is a social group that, in a larger society, is set apart and bound together by common ties of language, religion, origin, culture or race. In Canada, people not originating from France or the British Isles are considered minorities. This thesis makes references to the following Canadian minority groups: Serbs: South-Slavic people, adherents of Orthodox Christianity, inhabiting mainly Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia and Montenegro and speaking the Serbian language; **Croats**: South-Slavic people, adherents of Catholicism, inhabiting mainly Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and speaking the Croatian language; **Bosniaks** or **Bosnian Muslims**: South-Slavic people, adherents of Islam, inhabiting mainly Bosnia and Herzegovina and speaking the Bosnian language; **Montenegrins**: South-Slavic people, adherents of Orthodox Christianity, inhabiting mainly Montenegro and Serbia and speaking the Montenegrin and Serbian languages; **Albanians**: ethnic group from Albania and Kosovo, adherents of mostly Islam, as well as Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism, speaking the Albanian language. **Slovenians**: South-Slavic people, adherents of Catholicism, inhabiting mainly Slovenia, speaking the Slovenian language. For the purpose of this thesis, Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Albanians, Montenegrins and Slovenians are considered “ethnic groups”. Catholics and Muslims are considered to be “religious groups”.

**Majority Group** is a cultural, ethnic or religious group that has the largest population and usually the greatest economic and political power in a society. In Canada, people originating from France or the British Isles are considered majority groups, or the host society.

“All Others” are those perceived to be different from us. “Others” include members of other minority or majority groups. For Serbs, “Others” include Croats, Bosniaks, Albanians, Montenegrins, the broader religious categories of Catholics and Muslims, as well as the broad category of “West”. For the purpose of this thesis, the “West” is considered to be a cultural, as opposed to ethnic, religious or racial group.
Research Questions

This thesis investigates long-distance nationalism observed in Canadian ethnic media and its concurrence with Canadian multiculturalism. The research is conducted by analyzing minority and majority group representations in Serbian ethnic broadcasting in Canada. The purpose of the study is to explore the relationship between long-distance nationalism in ethnic media and the Canadian policy of multiculturalism. The main research questions of the thesis are:

RQ1: How do Serbian ethnic media in Canada represent their own group? What themes dominate the representations of the “Self”? What role do these representations play in a wider context of Serbian diaspora?

RQ2: How do Serbian ethnic media in Canada represent other cultural, ethnic and religious groups? How do they portray ethnic groups from former Yugoslavia, specifically Croats, Slovenians, Bosnian Muslims, Albanians and Montenegrins? How do Serbian ethnic media represent non-Orthodox religions, specifically Roman Catholicism and Islam? How is the West represented in Serbian ethnic media? What are the dominant narratives of these representations? How do Serbian ethnic media represent Canada? What is the function of the representations of Serbian “Others” for diasporic Serbs?

RQ3: How do Serbian ethnic media representations of “Others” relate to Canada’s multiculturalism? Specifically, how do they relate to Canada’s Multiculturalism Act and CRTC’s ethnic broadcasting guidelines?

RQ4: What elements of long-distance nationalism are present in Serbian ethnic media?
The research questions tie in with the Literature Review in that they seek to investigate the ways that long-distance nationalism observed in ethnic media corresponds with multiculturalism, both as a principle and an official policy. Ethnic broadcasting is a result of Canada’s official shift to multiculturalism. Ethnic media thus directly reflect Canadian multiculturalism in action.

**Research Design**

This thesis is a qualitative study that uses inductive reasoning. Inductive approach emphasizes developing insights and generalizations from the data collected (Eid & Lagacé, 2007). The researcher is guided by Neuman’s characterization of qualitative approach as the analysis of “the richness, texture, and feeling of raw data”, rather than measurement and sampling (2007: 175). Qualitative researchers avoid distancing themselves from the phenomenon they study and take advantage of “personal insights, feelings, and human perspectives to understand social life more fully” (Ibid: 178-179).

This study focuses on the vivid images of Serbian ethnic media representations. The research design particularly suitable for analyzing media messages is content analysis. Berg defines content analysis as “a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings” (2007: 247). A content analysis entails a “systematic reading of a body of texts, images, and symbolic matter, not necessary from an author’s or user’s perspective” (Krippendorff, 2004: 3). Qualitative content analysis is used when researchers are interested in the meanings associated with the text, rather than the content’s quantification. In this thesis, the goal is to identify, connect and interpret
dominant themes in Serbian ethnic media representations. Qualitative content analysis is thus the most appropriate method.

After the research questions and theoretical concepts have been developed, content analysis starts with coding (Berg, 2007). This research employs three stages of coding: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. During the process of open coding the data is read through and themes and preliminary concepts are identified throughout the sample. The central purpose of open coding is to “open inquiry widely” (2007: 261). The second step, axial coding, involves more intense coding concerted around single categories (Strauss, 1987). It is also called “the first sorting” (Berg, 2007: 264). After the researcher decides which categories are central, the final step, selective coding begins. Selective coding allows for all other subcategories to be linked with the main ones.

Data Collection and Analysis

The researcher’s interest in the relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism in diaspora settings originates from her experiences in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina when the international community urged the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks to strive to leave the past behind and embrace a tolerant, multicultural stance towards each other. While it may not be surprising that the previously warring ethnic groups were hesitant to trust each other again, the ex-patriots from diaspora that would visit Bosnia in the summer seemed even less open to other ethnic groups and even more embedded in the past. The researcher thought it was peculiar that the progressive, liberal, tolerant, multicultural Western countries they lived in had not made any effect on the nationalist attitudes. In
fact, it seemed like the ex-patriots from former Yugoslavia were more conservative than people still living in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other newly-formed independent republics. Upon her arrival in Canada, the researcher observed a similar trend in local ethnic media produced by former Yugoslav communities and, upon embarking on her graduate studies, decided to investigate the relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism in ethnic media in Canada.

Canadian ethnic radio programs suitable for this study were identified employing purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is characteristic of qualitative research and is used to identify unique, especially informative cases for in-depth investigation (Neuman, 2007). This type of sampling was an appropriate technique for sampling radio programs of ethnic groups originating from former Yugoslavia. When the sampling began, an internet search revealed there were about 15 radio programs in the Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian languages. Before former Yugoslavia split up into separate states, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian shared the same name - Serbo-Croatian. It is generally considered that Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian are linguistic and political variants of same language. In the English-speaking world the most frequently used name is the abbreviation BCS that stands for Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian (Alexander, 2006). The researcher was initially interested in analyzing ethnic media of any of these three ethnic groups. The researcher’s first sample included all Canadian radio programs in BCS. Music-based programs were eliminated, as well as those produced by the Bosniak community, which, after careful listening, the researcher felt she did not have enough competence to analyze. What remained were a few Croatian and Serbian ethnic radio programs. CHIN FM Toronto’s
Serbian programs Šumadija and Ravna Gora were finally chosen as richer in intriguing content, as well as more within the realm of cultural knowledge of the researcher.

Until the fall of 2010, Šumadija aired every Saturday from 7 to 8 PM on Toronto’s 100.7 CHIN FM, as well as on www.chinradio.com. When Šumadija ceased to air after 40 years of broadcasting, the time slot was taken by another Serbian program, Ravna Gora. Šumadija broadcast mostly in the Serbian language, with some content in English, while Ravna Gora is broadcast entirely in Serbian. The first half hour of Šumadija began with an introduction, followed with a mix of Serbian music and advertisements from local Serbian businesses, as well as Government of Canada infomercials. The second half started with a five-minute Editorial [Uvodnik] in Serbian, followed by a five minute Editorial in English. After a mix of music and advertising, the program would end with a ten-minute news report. Šumadija had one permanent host and one or two guest hosts that changed every week. Ravna Gora is simpler in format. It starts with a fifteen-minute news review, followed by music requests, commercials and infomercials. Ravna Gora has one permanent host.

After purposive sampling was employed to identify the radio programs to be analyzed, sequential sampling was used to sample the programs’ content. This meant that the content was recorded until there was no additional information or new characteristics (Eid & Lagace, 2007). The recording of the selected Serbian radio programs’ online streaming began in January 2010. Following Neuman’s (2007), note that qualitative researchers develop most of their concepts during data collection, the researcher reflected on data, searched for patterns and developed categories during the recording of data. This resulted in the termination of data collection in April of 2011, when it was concluded that
data patterns became repetitive and there was no need for further data collection. A total of 26 broadcasts were captured: 13 of Šumadija and 13 of Ravna Gora. Since this study focuses on group representations in the context of nationalism and multiculturalism, music, commercials and infomercials were excluded from analysis, and the study focused on Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s editorials and news stories.

This study identified a total of nine different announcers of Šumadija and Ravna Gora. The researcher distinguished between the announcers by their names. In order to keep their anonymity, the announcers are labelled as Ancr#. The study’s sample identified a total of eight different announcers for Šumadija (Prg1), and one announcer for Ravna Gora (Prg2). Nine announcers presented the following 26 broadcasts in the two programs:

- Ancr1: Prg1, January 16, 2010; Prg1, January 23, 2010; Prg1, January 30, 2010; Prg1, February 6, 2010; Prg1, February 13, 2010; Prg1, February 27, 2010; Prg1, March 3, 2010; Prg1, March 27, 2010; Prg1, April 10, 2010; Prg1, April 17, 2010; Prg1, April 24, 2010; Prg1, May 22, 2010; Prg1, May 29, 2010.
- Ancr2: Prg1, January 16, 2010; Prg1, January 30, 2010; Prg1, February 6, 2010; Prg1, February 27, 2010; Prg1, February 6, 2010; Prg1, March 27, 2010; Prg1, April 17, 2010; Prg1, April 24, 2010.
- Ancr3: Prg2, November 17, 2010; Prg2, December 18, 2010; Prg2, December 25, 2010; Prg2, January 15, 2011; Prg2, January 22, 2011; Prg2, January 29, 2011; Prg2, February 12, 2011; Prg2, March 05, 2011; Prg2, March 12, 2011; Prg2, March 19, 2011; Prg2, March 26, 2011; Prg2, April 04, 2011; Prg2, April 09, 2011.
After the programs were recorded, they were transcribed into text and broken up into announcers’ segments. When converted into text, those spoken segments resembled paragraphs. According to Berg, paragraph is often used as the basic unit in content analysis “because of the difficulties that have resulted in attempting to code and classify the various and often numerous thoughts stated and implied in a single paragraph” (2007: 257). Following Berg, the chosen unit of analysis for this thesis became “a speaker’s reading” or “paragraph”.

During the initial process of coding, the open coding, the units of analysis were coded for references to various cultural, ethnic or religious groups. The same paragraph would frequently be coded for more than one group. Consider the following segment:

[Carla del Ponte] neglected the role of Naser Orić in the killings of Serbs around Srebrenica, and instead focused her hatred on Slobodan Milošević. She disregarded the reports of Kosovo Albanians organ trafficking. She was always arrogant and condescending. History will sooner or later declare her a big liar.

(Ancr1, Prg1, January 16, 2010)
As Krippendorff (2004) notes, in a typical narrative, “characters” are rarely dealt one at a time. Rather, they “interact and evolve over the course of the narrative, and information about them emerges in bits and pieces” (2004: 100). The above paragraph was first coded for “the West”, because of the reference to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, “Bosniaks” (because of the mention of the Bosnian Muslim wartime commandant Naser Orić) and also “Albanians” and “Serbs”. During the second stage, axial coding, it was decided that the paragraph should be coded only for the “West” as Carla Del Ponte appeared as the main “character” of the narrative. During the final stage, selective coding, the researcher decided to include the paragraph in the final findings and link it with other themes. When the process of coding was finished, the selected paragraphs were translated by the researcher from Serbian into English.

Following Neuman’s (2007) definition of reliability as consistency, the qualitative researcher ensured that the content analysis was consistent. In terms of validity, Neuman notes that a qualitative researcher’s “truth claims” need to be plausible, meaning that the raw data and the data’s descriptions are not exclusive. This study assures that descriptions of Serbian ethnic media’s representations match the original data. Also, a qualitative researcher’s empirical claims are valid when supported by “numerous pieces of diverse empirical data”, meaning that validity arises out of “the cumulative impact of hundreds of small, diverse details” that tied together create a “heavy weight of evidence” (2007: 223). In accordance to Neuman’s guidelines, this thesis provides numerous examples of Serbian ethnic media’s portrayals of various cultural, ethnic or religious groups in order
to be able to make empirical claims about the representations. As Neuman argues, validity rises as a researcher recognizes a “dense connectivity in disparate details” (Ibid).

Canada’s Multiculturalism Act calls for all Canadians to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage, but also to interact with people of different origins. Ethnic media are one site where this communication can take place. The CRTC’s guidelines for ethnic broadcasting call for ethnic groups to bridge cultural barriers. The multicultural CHIN FM Toronto emphasizes in its mission statement the radio station’s contribution “to the cause of multiculturalism, understanding and tolerance between people of many national, racial and religious origins [that] has been recognized and acknowledged throughout Canada”⁴. CHIN FM’s two Serbian programs are also fittingly described as attracting “different religions such as Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims, and different nationalities such as Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, and Slovenians”⁵. From top to bottom, everything seems to be in harmony. This thesis puts these perfect reflections to the test.

⁴ http://chinradio.com/chin-radio/
⁵ http://chinradio.com/radio-programs/serbochetnic/
This study analyzes the content of CHIN FM Toronto’s programs Šumadija and Ravna Gora in order to investigate the representation of the “Self” and “Others” in Serbian ethnic broadcasting. Since ethnic media are a component of the larger multiculturalism framework, the thesis also explores Serbian ethnic broadcasting’s concurrence with Canadian multiculturalism. This section begins with Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s portrayal of the ethnic community they speak for – the Serbs, followed by representations of other cultural, ethnic and religious groups – Croats, Slovenians and Catholics, Bosniaks, Albanians and Muslims, Montenegrins, and finally the West - a category that certainly cannot be identified as an ethnic or religious, but rather as a global group that in the Serbian national framework presents a relatively coherent entity. While the thesis’s findings are divided into the representations of different groups, this by no means implies that sections are free of references to groups presented in other sections. As argued in the Literature Review, ethnic identity is formed through interaction with “Others”. Even if the main object of representation is an ethnic group, for instance the Serbs, the content will often be speckled with references to other groups: Croats, Muslims, the West etc. Given the dominance of historical accounts in both programs when discussing both past and present events, the sections are organized chronologically, allowing for Serbian ethnic radio’s representations of the past to build the context for representations of the present.
The “Self”: From Einhard to Tadić

Serbian ethnic media self-representations deal mainly with important events from the Serbian past. Even though the “Self” is represented mostly through historical events, other ethnic groups are often at least a minor element of Serbian “Self”-images. This section is presented sequentially, starting with Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representations of the earliest Serbian history and closing with the programs’ debates about the present state of the Serbian nation, mainly the current Serbian government.

“East in the West and the West in the East”

Serbian ethnic programs are teeming with narratives of Serbian antiquity, Christianity and Europeanness, as well as subtle territorial claims to lands not presently within Serbia’s official borders. Borrowing from Serbian historian Dr. Miodrag Purković’s book *Da li se sećate?* [Do you remember?], Šumadija laid out the most important dates in Serbian history in the form of questions and answers. The first question was: “When was the word ‘Serb’ mentioned for the very first time?” (Ancr1, Prg1, February 2, 2010). The reply was “in 822 in *Vita Karoli Magni*” (Ibid). The work of the Frankish scholar Einhard states that the Serbs used to occupy “a large part of Dalmatia” 6 (Ibid). Next, Serbia’s historical entitlement to Bosnia 7 is cued in the answer to the question if Bosnia and Serbia had ever been united before 1918. The answer follows:

Bosnia and Serbia were united under Časlav Klonimirović, who ruled from 927 to 960, and also under King Bodin, from 1082 to 1101. When

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6 Today a geographic region of Croatia.
7 Today part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
the First World War ended on December 1, 1918, Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the newly-created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. (Ancr1, Prg1, February 2, 2010)

Borrowing from a book about the history of the Belgrade fortress Kalemegdan, Šumadija dedicated an editorial to the history of Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. Kalemegdan, located at the confluence of the Sava river into the Danube, used to be “one of medieval Europe’s strongest forts” (Ancr2, Prg1, January 30, 2010). Belgrade’s antiquity is further noted:

As far back as the 4th century BC, Celtic tribes built a mud fortress of the palisade type. Later, in the 1st century AD, the Romans occupied that area and placed in it the famous Roman legion Flavia with 7000 soldiers. (Ancr1, Prg1, January 30, 2010)

It is noted that “after the despot [Stefan’s] death, the Hungarians re-captured the biggest fortress on the Danube, the only one that could successfully resist the Turkish onslaught” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 30, 2010). Today, the fortress is home to the St. Petka church built above a miraculous spring that many believe can cure eye ailments (Ibid). The editorial’s English version re-asserts Belgrade’s ancient times: “The first Belgrade settlement, whose name was Singidunum, dates back to three centuries BC”, its Christianess: “During the reign of Diocletian, the Christians of Singidunum were persecuted”, and liminal geography: “Standing at a frontier crossroads, Belgrade endured constant devastation by migrating peoples: the Huns, Avars, Bulgurs, Ugrians” (Ancr8: Ibid). Belgrade’s Europeanness is also affirmed:

Foreign diplomats and foreigners came to Belgrade as early as the 1400s, various European artists and writers were recording Belgrade’s story. London’s Drury Lane Theatre staged the play The Siege of Belgrade in 1791 and opera by the same name was later performed in New York and Dublin. By the 19th century literary and cultural life gradually developed and flourished in Belgrade. (Ancr8, Prg1, January 30, 2010)
In the closing statement, Belgrade’s borderline status, as well as Serbian resilience is reasserted:

St Sava himself said ‘We are doomed by faith to be the East in the West and the West in the East’. Despite countless setback and destruction by invaders by both the East and the West, this period and the resilience of the White City belonging to the Serbian people endures.

(Ancr8, Prg1, January 30, 2010)

Orthodox Christianity plays a central role in the Serbian national milieu, not only because it marks the boundary between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox, but also because Serbian statehood is directly linked to the establishment of the Serbian Orthodox Church. St. Sava is the most important Serbian patron saint, akin to St. Patrick for Ireland, and St. Stanislaus for Poland. He established the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1219. Since St. Sava was the youngest son of the founder of the Nemanja dynasty, and brother of the first Serbian king, 1219 was also when the close connection between the Church and the Serbian state and nation was established. In Šumadija’s editorial dedicated to St Sava’s day, celebrated every year on 27 January, Serbia’s territoriality was re-affirmed: “[St. Sava’s] father, Duke Stevan Nemanja, wanted for his son Rastko⁸ to govern the territory of today’s Herzegovina⁹” (Ancr4, Prg1, January 23, 2010). Herzegovina’s old-time Serbianness is avowed again in the English editorial: “At the age of 15, Rastko was given the province of Herzegovina to administer. In fact, 17th century Venetian maps identify Herzegovina as the dukedom of St. Sava” (Ibid). The editorial closes with: “Sava’s spirit lingers above the spiritual life of the Serbian people” (Ibid), and “reminds every Serb, no

⁸ St. Sava’s secular name.
⁹ Today part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
matter where he lived, of the duty of guarding his Serbian Orthodox faith” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 23, 2010).

In Serbian national mythology the Battle of Kosovo presents the ultimate testimony of Serbia’s loyalty to Europe and Christianity. On 28 June 1389 Serbia was defeated by the Ottoman army and centuries of Ottoman bondage started. Even though defeated, Serbia significantly weakened the Turks and halted their advance to the rest of Europe. Legend has it that Turkish Sultan Murad perished by the hands of Miloš Obilić. Regardless of whether Obilić was a historical or fictional character, his name looms large in Serbian epic poems about the Battle of Kosovo, as well as the Serbian pantheon of heroes. Borrowing from Serbian historian Rade Mihaljčić’s book 100 Najznamenitijih Srba [100 Most Important Serbs], Šumadija dedicated an editorial to Miloš Obilić’s voyage from anonymity to fame. The Battle of Kosovo is first hailed as a battle for “defence of Christianity”:

Some Western historians wrote that the victory of Christians was celebrated in Paris a month after the Battle of Kosovo. They also wondered how it happened that a Serbian hero killed Sultan Murad at the beginning of the Battle of Kosovo.

(Ancr2, Prg1, February 27, 2010)

It is further noted that “a Parisian historian allegedly informed the French king of Sultan Murad’s assassination and the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris served a mass for the Christian victory” (Ancr1, Prg1, February 27, 2010). To this date, Miloš Obilić instils hopes, beliefs and “ethical and moral ideals” into the Serbian nation and his fame will live “for as long as the Serbian nation lives” (Ibid).

In addition to Serbian antiquity, Europeanness and Christian nature, Šumadija’s historical editorials represent Serbs as stubbornly defying the outside forces intent on
obliterating them. Serbian resilience is asserted in Šumadija’s accounts of Serbia’s uprisings against the Ottomans. The First Serbian Uprising that started on 14 February 1804 marks the beginning of modern Serbian statehood. Even though the 10-year uprising was eventually unsuccessful, it was during this period that the Serbian state was temporarily restored. In Šumadija’s editorial dedicated to the uprising, it is said that “The Serbian nation owes an eternal gratitude to the immortal Karađorđe\(^\text{10}\) and his rebels” (AnCr1, PrGl1, February 13, 2010). In addition,

> The sparkle of freedom that, thanks to Karađorđe and the rebels illuminated the new dawns of the Serbian people, sparked again two years later with the Second Serbian Uprising led by Miloš Obrenović when the gradual, but unyielding liberation of Serbia began.

(AnCr1, PrGl1, February 13, 2010)

In Šumadija’s editorial dedicated to the Second Serbian Uprising (1815-1817) that resulted in Serbian semi-independence from the Ottoman Empire, it is noted that “many Serbian national holidays are tied with religious holidays” (AnCr2, PrGl1, March 27, 2010). The editorial concludes that:

> Karađorđe crafted freedom with the sword, while Miloš used diplomacy to secure the creation of a new, free Serbia. To both of them Serbian people owes eternal gratitude, abiding by Njegoš’s “Blessed is he whose name lives forever, a good reason had he to be alive!”\(^\text{11}\)

(AnCr2, PrGl1, March 27, 2010)

\(^{10}\) The Uprising’s leader.

\(^{11}\) From Montenegro Prince-Bishop Petar II Petrović Njegoš’s 1846 epic poem The Mountain Wreath about struggle against Islam. Translation acquired from http://www.rastko.rs/knjizevnost/umetnicka/njegos/mountain_wreath.html
In addition to the Ottoman period, the Second World War is another exceptionally important part of Serbian history, during which the Serbs suffered massive casualties. The number of Yugoslav casualties is estimated to be between 1 and 1.7 million, the majority of victims being Serbs. Serbia, together with Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Slovenia, was part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time of the Axis powers’ invasion in 1941.

Šumadija reasserted the defiant nature of Serbs in an editorial about the onset of war in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The program noted that the Tripartite Act which the Kingdom had previously signed with Germany prompted crowds in Belgrade and several other cities to take to the streets: “Large demonstrations in Belgrade and all over Serbia angered Hitler who was intent on obliterating the Serbian people” (Ancr4, Prg1, April 10, 2010). On April 6, 1941, Hitler began massive air raids of Belgrade, attacking “Belgrade and Serbia with no declaration of war” (Ancr1: Ibid). The bombing continued until April 17, 1941 when the country surrendered: “Yugoslavia was shattered” (Ancr4, Prg1, April 10, 2010). Šumadija closed the editorial with the following statement: “Hitler, Mussolini and their allies ripped Yugoslavia apart with the intent to destroy the Serbian people. We light a candle to all the innocent victims of the Second World War and pray the Lord for their souls’ peace” (Ancr1: Ibid).

At the beginning of the Second World War, the British and Americans supported the Serbian nationalists resistance movement called the Četniks, but later switched their

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According to Judah (2000), at least half a million victims were Serbs, 192,000 Croats, and 103,000 Muslims, a total of over one million.
support to Josip Broz Tito’s partisans, who eventually defeated the Germans. When the war ended, most Četniks fled Tito’s Yugoslavia and emigrated to the North and South America. Unsurprisingly, post-1945 Serbian émigrés see Tito, an ethnic Croat, as the enemy of Serbs who resented and exploited Serbia, the largest and most powerful republic, in favour of Croatia and Slovenia. Šumadija echoed this sentiment when it blamed Tito for Serbia’s lagging industrial development:

Serbia lost its industry during Tito’s power because Tito, with the help of Serbian communists, transferred it to Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia. A book has been made public that lists all the factories that were removed from Serbia from the fall of 1944 until Tito’s death. This is the reason the Serbian economy is now falling behind Slovenia and Croatia. All because of Tito’s motto: The weaker Serbia, the stronger Yugoslavia.

(Ancr1, Prg1, March 27, 2010)

In the editorial dedicated Šumadija’s 40th anniversary, it was stressed that the program’s first topics were “national, religious and cultural” (Ancr4, Prg1, April 24, 2010). The national editorials were “clearly anticommunist” (Ancr1: Ibid). It is noted that Tito used to be very popular in the West, who believed that the Yugoslav president genuinely wanted to “abolish the communist, international monolith” (Ibid). According to Šumadija, what Tito really yearned for was to,

stay in power, which Stalin tried to prevent. This is why the Informbiro13 resolution was brought. So Tito, in order to keep the control, was assisted by the United States. This situation continued for as long as Tito was useful for the American imperial policy.

(Ancr1, Prg1, April 24, 2010)

13 The Informbiro Period (1948-1953) was the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union caused by Tito’s unwillingness to obey Joseph Stalin.
Tito then turned to the unaligned countries: “With Egypt, India and other unaligned countries he established a third power, travelled the world, spent money and put the country into debt” (Ancr1, Prg1, April 24, 2010).

The hostile relationship between Tito’s Yugoslavia and Serbian diaspora in Canada was demonstrated in Šumadija’s editorial dedicated to Serbian writer and painter Momo Kapor. Kapor visited Canada in 1985 and held lecture at the University of Toronto. Šumadija noted that among the participants were people who “supported the legacy of the partisan revolution” (Ancr1, Prg1, April 17, 2010). It is stressed that “of course”, the majority of those present were “Serbs, anticommunists, who escaped Tito’s dictatorship” (Ibid). Kapor reportedly said he was not a politician, which caused “the leftists” to reprimand Kapor: “Comrade Momo, what would your uncle Ceda, a former partisan, say if he knew you were criticizing Yugoslavia’s regime” (Ancr2, Prg1, April 17, 2010). Kapor replied that he should not be confused with his uncle, because “He is he, and I am me” (Ancr1: Ibid). Content with Kapor’s assumed anti-communist stance, Šumadija’s editor reportedly interviewed Kapor and took a photograph of him at a Četnik gathering in Niagara. Serbian-Canadian pro-communist paper Nasa borba got hold of the photo, published it and criticized Kapor for attending a Četnik picnic. The article was then reprinted by a newspaper in Yugoslavia, which prompted Kapor to successfully sue and donate the money to a psychiatric facility in Croatia, “the Croatian crazies” (Ancr2, Prg1, April 17, 2010).

14 The Yugoslav Partisans was the Second World War anti-fascist resistance movement led by Josip Broz Tito.
“Serbian People, Smarten Up!”

Far away from home, Šumadija and Ravna Gora also construct the present-day homeland, mostly through critique of Serbian President Boris Tadić. Tadić is widely seen as a pro-European leader who balances relations with the United States, the European Union and Russia. While Tadić advocates European integration, he also opposes Kosovo independence. In 2004 Tadić apologized to all those in Bosnia and Herzegovina who suffered crimes committed in the name of the Serbian people. In 2007 he issued an apology to Croatia for any crimes committed in Serbia’s name during the 1990s conflict in Croatia. In December 2009 Serbian parliament started a motion to accept and apologize for the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in which more than 7,000 Muslim boys and men were killed by Serbian troops. In March 2010, Serbian Parliament passed a resolution apologizing for not doing enough to prevent the tragedy. Šumadija was critical of the proposal saying that “Unfortunately, some Serbian politicians are leaning towards declaring Serbs accountable for the Srebrenica killings. Serbian people do not need such representatives” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 30, 2010). Commenting on the motion again in another broadcast, Šumadija lamented that “We have plenty of politicians in Serbia, but we do not have statesmen, this is our Serbian problem” (Ancr2, Prg1, February 6, 2010). Šumadija also questioned Tadić’s loyalty to Russia, who backs the Serbian position regarding Kosovo:

NATO will gladly accept Serbia if Serbia sends its soldiers where? To Afghanistan. Is the Serbian government wise and brave enough to balance between pro-Russian and pro-American sympathies? Serbia’s NATO membership would fail Russia, who is in favour of keeping Kosovo in Serbia. Which empire will Tadić and his government choose? (Ancr1, Prg1, January 30, 2010)
Post-Second World War Serbian émigrés to North America have traditionally been supportive of the Serbian royal family, now residing in the United Kingdom. In one of Šumadija’s news reports, the Crown Prince of Yugoslavia Aleksandar Karadžorđević was said to “be in favour of the parliamentary monarchy in which the King does not govern, as this would be the Serbian government’s role” (Ancr2, Prg1, February 6, 2010). However, the Prince also reportedly backed Tadić’s government pro-European stance: “How useful this is, time will show” (Ancr1: Ibid).

In February 2010, a scandal hit the Serbian Orthodox Church. The head of the Raško-Prizren Eparch of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, Bishop Artemije, was under investigation for appropriating 700,000 Serbian dinars (the equivalent of $9,500 Canadian) meant for a humanitarian campaign for the hungry in Kosovo for personal use. Bishop Artemije, considered to be a nationalist hard-liner, had also been critical of the international community in Kosovo. Šumadija reported that the Bishop was suspended “primarily because he opposes President Boris Tadić, who is fawning over America and the European Union” (Ancr2, Prg1, March 6, 2010).

Šumadija is also critical of Tadić’s improved relations with Croatia. Croatia’s president Ivo Josipović and Tadić are both of pro-European, anti-nationalist orientation. When the two presidents met for the first time in March 2010, they announced a new phase in relations between Serbia and Croatia. Šumadija briefly reported that Tadić and Josipović met and reminded that Croatia sued Serbia of “crimes allegedly committed by Serbian and Yugoslav soldiers from 1991 to 1995”, and also that Serbia filed a counter-suit of “crimes against the Serbian people and ethnic cleansing of Serbs during the Croatian Operations Storm and Flash” (Ancr1, Prg1, March 27, 2010). During the
“friendly meeting” (Ibid), Tadić emphasized that Serbia and Croatia’s goal is to join the European Union, “which for Croatia could happen in a couple of months, and for Serbia in a decade. Who is the liar there?” (Ancr2, Prg1, March 27, 2010).

Serbian President Boris Tadić lost his maternal grandfather and six other relatives in the Croatian Ustaša’s Jasenovac\(^{15}\) concentration camp in the Second World War. This never prevented Tadić from meeting with the Croatian President. Šumadija commented that Tadić should sue Croatia, “the heir of the so-called Independent State of Croatia” and stop meeting up with Josipović as well as suggesting that the European Union should accept Croatia as soon as possible, presumably to assist Serbia’s own entry into the EU (Ancr2, Prg1, April 17, 2010). According to Šumadija, “these are short-term political actions. Serbia needs a statesman that will look after Serbia’s future. Instead, politicians are collecting points, trying to stay in power. Hey, Serbian people, smarten up, it’s about time!” (Ancr1: Ibid).

The Serbian entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also part of Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representations. The president of the Republic of Srpska Milorad Dodik was supported by the West as pro-Western and anti-nationalist when he became the Prime Minister in 1998. Dodik’s recent rhetoric has included thin-veiled threats that the entity might secede from Bosnia, which prompted accusations of Dodik being a nationalist. Šumadija and Ravna Gora portray Milorad Dodik in a positive light. Šumadija reported that the Government of Srpska and the Serbian Orthodox Church would sign an

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\(^{15}\) The Ustaša were a Croatian fascist movement that nominally ruled the Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War. Jasenovac was a concentration camp in established by the Ustaša in 1941 and dismantled in 1945. The largest numbers of victims were Serbs, and also Jews and Roma. According to Bock-Luna (2008), an estimated 500,000 to one million Serbs were killed.
agreement about introducing religious classes in schools: ”An excellent move of Dodik and Serbian bishops in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 30, 2010). Dodik is also viewed favourably for resisting the international community in Bosnia. Šumadija reported that Dodik accused foreign countries for interfering too much into the affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He reportedly verbally “attacked the newly appointed English Minister of Foreign Affairs William Hague who wants the Bosnian government in Sarajevo to be supported, and the Republic of Srpska vanished” (Ancr1, Prg1, May 22, 2010).

“Others”: “The Truth Will Come Out”

As argued in the Literature Review, negative identification of the “Other” is a critical part of the ethno-national identity formation. Serbian ethnic identity is thus partially formed through representations of Serbian “Others”. The process of “Othering” is everything but fixed: an ethnic group’s “Others” fluctuate in intensity and duration, depending upon past and present contextual factors. This section lays out the various Serbian “Others”: the religious “Others” – Catholics and Muslims, that nest into Croats, Slovenians, Bosniaks and Albanians, the unforeseen “Others” – the Montenegrins, and the global “Other” – the West.

_Croats and Catholics: In the Shadow of the Second World War_

Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representation of Croats and Catholicism is deeply influenced by history, notably the Second World War. During the war, the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was divided into two separate territories: one occupied by the
German Nazis that comprised mostly of Serbia, and the fascist Ustaša and German-controlled Independent State of Croatia (NDH) that consisted of Croatia and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Feeling that the Serbs took over Yugoslavia, many Croats supported the Ustaša who pursued a campaign of conversion, expulsion, and massacre of its Serbian population. When the NDH was created, the Catholic Church demanded of the NDH the conversion of Serbs to Catholicism⁶. The Croatian crimes and the Catholic Church’s implication in the NDH’s actions present the foundation of Serbian ethnic programs’ representation of the Croats and Catholicism.

“Let These Crimes Never Be Forgotten”

Evoking April 10, 1941, the day that the Nazi puppet state Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was created, Šumadija recalled the infamous words of the NDH education minister, Mile Budak: “We have three million bullets for Serbs, Jews and Roma. We will kill one third of the Serbs that live in NDH, convert the other third to Catholicism and expel the final third” (Ancr4, Prg1, April 10, 2010)¹⁷. Describing Hitler’s invasion of Yugoslavia and the monarchy’s capitulation on April 17, 1941, it is said that “A day before, German troops went into Zagreb, wholeheartedly welcomed by the Croat population” (Ancr1: Ibid). It is further noted that the establishment of Croatian independence was followed by

¹⁶ Judah (2000) writes that between 200,000 and 300,000 Serbs were forced to convert to Catholicism.

¹⁷ According to Judah (2000), this is the most often quoted statement of Ustaša intentions to exterminate Serbs during the Second World War.
new laws that first forbid the use of Serbian Cyrillic. The first massacre against Serbs was committed in Bjelovar, on the night of April 27, 1941, when the Ustaša butchered between 180 and 190 Serbs. This is how the slaughter and ethnic cleansing of Serbs began.

(Ancr1, Prg1, April 10, 2010)

Almost no present-day story with reference to Croatia escapes the prism of the Second World War events. In 1999, Croatia filed a lawsuit against Serbia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, accusing Serbia of genocide in the 1990s conflicts. In 2010, Serbia filed a counter genocide suit, accusing Croatia of war crimes against Serbs in Croatia. Šumadija reported that the Serbian lawsuit contains a reference to the Second World War when “more than a million Serbs were killed in the Ustaša Croatia” (Ancr2, Prg1, 30 January 2010). In another broadcast, Šumadija reviewed the journal Europe’s World’s story about the Ustaša camp Jasenovac. The article reportedly wrote that “Jasenovac was the cruellest camp for the extermination of innocent Serbs, Roma, Jews and anti-fascist Croats in the whole Europe” (Ancr1, Prg1, February 6, 2010). The journal reportedly blamed the Roman Catholic Church for the genocide: “743 Roman Catholic priests, Franciscans, were members of the Ustaša, and they personally murdered Serbs. Let these crimes never be forgotten” (Ancr2, Prg1, February 6, 2010).

The American State Department’s 2009 report on the status of human rights in Croatia states that in Jasenovac “thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Roma were killed”\(^\text{18}\). Commenting on this report, Šumadija accused Croatia of “trying to drastically diminish the number of Serbian, Jewish and Roma victims in Jasenovac” (Ancr1, Prg1, March 27, 2010). Serbian historian, writer and political commentator Dr. Srđa Trifković reportedly

\(^{18}\) http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136025.htm
demanded from the Government of Serbia to file a complaint to the State Department and insist that the Serbian victims are,

a 100% greater than the numbers that the Croatian government is trying to advance through the State Department with the intent of clearing the Ustaša of the Great Crime, as the Croatian scientist Dr. Viktor Novak called it in his documented book the Great Crime.

(Ancr2, Prg1, March 27)

In the review of Dr. Trifković’s book *The Krajina Chronicle: A History of Serbs in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia*, Šumadija listed the book’s endorsements, including Doug Bandow, former assistant to American President Ronald Reagan who wrote:

This pioneering work takes the reader through more than half a millennium of the rich and tragic history of the Krajina Serbs. They endured an attempt to exterminate them in 1941-45 that horrified even the Germans. Most recently they were ethnically cleansed from Croatia, aided and abetted by the Clinton Administration. Dr. Trifkovic ably shines the light of truth on this, a crime that is still largely ignored in the West.

(Ancr7, Prg1, March 6, 2010)

Ravna Gora also criticized the Croatian education curriculum:

Croats published a school textbook that describes Jasenovac from 1941-1945 as a camp of all luxury. The captives worked, exercised, relaxed, they were clean, it was kind of like a villa, and not a death camp where more than 700,000 Serbs were killed in the Second World War.

(Ancr3, Prg2, March 19, 2011)

The news report concluded with: “We should remember...that everyone has a need to defend themselves, even when they are guilty. Serbs cannot defend themselves, and they are not guilty” (Ancr3, Prg3, March 19, 2011).

As an ethnic Serb born in Croatia, the world-famous innovator Nikola Tesla has been the subject of appropriation of both Serbia and Croatia. At the end of 2009 a story circulated on the Internet that a group of Croatian citizens of Orthodox faith were in the process of establishing a Croatian Orthodox Church. On their website they used a photo
of the Serbian Orthodox monastery Gomirje and an image of Nikola Tesla. Reporting on this story, Šumadija reminded listeners that “Tesla was the son of an Orthodox priest Milutin” (Ancr2, Prg1, 6 February 2010) and that:

Everyone has the right to establish all kinds of religions, but no one has the right to fraudulently use a Serbian spiritual center as some kind of a symbol for some Croatian community, and even less Nikola Tesla. We demand this spreading of lies to be legally banned if Croatia thinks it is some kind of a democratic country. Is this the beginning of a creation of the Croatian Orthodox Church, just like Ante Pavelić\textsuperscript{19} did? (Ancr1, Prg1, 6 February 2010)

Commenting on the story, Ravna Gora cited the Serbian Bishop of Dalmatia saying that the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church meant that “we are in danger of going back to the Second World War period when the ideology of blood and soil ruled, leaving behind numerous bodies of innocent Serbs” (Ancr3, Prg2, January 15, 2011). The Croatian Orthodox Church is a sensitive issue for Serbs, again related to the Second World War and the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). In 1943, the NDH created the Croatian Orthodox Church, headed by an émigré Russian Orthodox priest in an attempt to convert Serbs to Catholicism (Judah, 2000). Ravna Gora reported that Croatia repeated those attempts in the 1990s by advocating the formation of the Croatian Orthodox Church and abolition of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and arguing that there are no Serbs in Croatia, only the Croatian Orthodox, who in fact are not Serbs, but Wallachians. Basically, they wanted to forbid the Serbs to call themselves Serbs. (Ancr3, Prg2, January 15, 2011)

In January 2010 the Social Democrat Ivo Josipović was elected as the new president of Croatia. Akin to his Serbian counterpart, Josipović is widely seen as an anti-nationalist,

\textsuperscript{19} Leader of the Croatian Ustaša.
pro-European leader. In 2010 he apologized for Croatia’s role in the war in Bosnia, which caused criticism from Croatia’s right wing parties. When Josipović was elected as the Croatian president, Šumadija introduced him as “a lawyer, and of course, music composer” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 23, 2010). Josipović’s music – loving persona is juxtaposed to Josipović - the key writer of Croatia’s genocide lawsuit against Serbia: “Just so you are aware of what hides behind the name of Josipović” (Ibid). In July 2010 Josipović met in Belgrade with Serbian president Boris Tadić in what was hailed as a historic visit. From the start of his presidency, Josipović has spoken about the possibility that Croatia might withdraw a genocide suit if the relations between the two countries improve. Josipović’s and Tadić’s clear message has been that both Croatia and Serbia are prepared to move on from their painful past. Even before he was elected, Josipović indicated that Serbia and Croatia should try and leave the past behind and focus on the future. Reporting on Josipović’s stance, Šumadija was doubtful: “Now Josipović...wants Croatian and Serbian crimes to be forgotten, so that the Ustaša genocide is erased forever. In politics, this is called ‘attack is the best form of defence’” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 30, 2010).

Stories about the present suffering of Serbs in Croatia are abundant, even if they do not involve a reference to the Second World War. Speaking of the ktitor20 of an Orthodox church in Croatia, Dušan Torbica, Šumadija claimed that a Croatian newspaper fabricated a story about Torbica being imprisoned in Bosnia and Herzegovina for not paying taxes. “Obviously, in Croatia, only Croats are clean, fair and humane, and Serbs

20 Ktitor is someone who provides the funds for construction or reconstruction of an Orthodox church or monastery, for the addition of icons, frescos, and other works of art. A Catholic equivalent of the term is a donator.
are second-class citizens, thieves, murderers and thugs. This is a true media lynch of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbs in Croatia” (Ancr1, Prg1, 29 May 2010). Still, according to Šumadija, the truth about Croatia’s true nature is slowly being revealed. In another broadcast, Šumadija reported a news story about the autopsy and burials of the bodies of 19 unidentified Serbs killed in November of 1995 near Pakrac, Croatia. It is said that “now, the independent circles in Croatia admit that Croatia planned to hide the murdered Serbs from the eyes of the Western world. The truth will come out” (Ancr6, Prg1, May 29, 2010).

The Croatian ruling elite is also the subject of Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s criticism. Šumadija reported a “sensational” news story claiming that the former Croatian president Stipe Mesić was as a child baptized in a Serbian-Orthodox church, which would make him a de facto Serb. Mesić is criticized for rejecting his Serbianness, as he apparently stated that his wife Milka Dudundić is Ukrainian, and not, as Šumadija claimed, Serbian. Mesić is compared to the first Croatian president Franjo Tuđman, who had reportedly said he was glad his wife was neither Jewish, nor Serbian. Mesić is then equated with people who converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule: “Our Serbian saying is true: The Turkisized is worse than the Turks. The great Serb-hater Stjepan Stipe Mesić is a classic example” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 16 2010). The use of a pejorative saying shows a two-directional detestation of inauthenticity: first of a Croat who abandoned his Serbian ties he reportedly acquired through baptism and marriage, and then of people who during the Ottoman rule abandoned their Orthodoxy by converting to Islam. Stjepan Mesić is the subject of Šumadija’s criticism again a week later when he is accused of interfering into the affairs of the Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Republic of Srpska. Reacting to Mesić’s statement that he would send the Croatian army into Bosnia and Herzegovina if the Republic of Srpska attempted to secede\textsuperscript{21}, Šumadija reminded “little Stipe Mesić that, as the last president of Yugoslavia, he himself facilitated the country’s breakup, and now he wants to become the guardian of Bosnia, again at the Serbs’ expense. Thank God he is not in power any more” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 23, 2010).

“\textit{We Don’t Need the Pope or Catholicism}”

As a consequence of the angst with the Croats, both Šumadija and Ravna Gora are critical of the Roman Catholic Church in general. In one of his January 2011 addresses, Pope Benedict XVI centered his meditation on the Week of Prayer for Christian Unity. Commenting on this story, Ravna Gora stated that:

\begin{quote}
The Roman-Catholic Church did not deserve even after 1000 years of responsibility and separation to call on the Orthodox people to convert and unite with the Roman Catholic Church. Pope Benedict XVI’s announcement implies that Christianity is only present in the Catholic Church, and not in all Christian Churches.
\end{quote}

(Ancr3, Prg2, January 15, 2011)

The Serbian city of Niš will host a celebration of the 1,700\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Edict of Milan\textsuperscript{22} in 2013. There have been speculations that the Roman Catholic Pope may also attend. Ravna Gora commented:

\begin{quote}
I will repeat what the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church said a few weeks ago in Chicago. Asked if the Pope will come to Niš in 2013, the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{21} http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/article/1933453.html?s=1&page=2

\textsuperscript{22} The Edict of Milan was a letter signed by emperors Constantine, who was born in Niš, that proclaimed religious toleration in the Roman Empire.
Patriarch said that some people agree with it, and some people are against it, adding that us, the Serbs, do not need the Roman Catholic Church, they need us, because they are the ones that abandoned Orthodoxy, not us.

(Ancr3, Prg2, March 12, 2011)

Concluding this news reported, Ravna Gora reiterated: “He does not need to come. We don’t need the Pope or Catholicism” (Ancr3, Prg2, March 12, 2011).

The Pope was criticized in another commentary:

Pope Benedict XVI is trying to minimize and justify child abuse crimes committed by Catholic priests all around the world. The Vatican is trembling, and the Catholic Church in the United States has already spent millions and millions of dollars to compensate those who were molested by Catholics priests.

(Ancr1, Prg1, March 27, 2010)

A comment followed: “The truth will come out, keep it up” (Ancr2, Prg1, March 27, 2010). A similar comment was repeated a few weeks later:

Attacks on the Catholic Church, especially the Pope, prompted by the rape of children by Catholic priests are continuing. The Roman Curia is now inflating the Pope’s accomplishments in order to hush up the crimes committed by Catholic priests, and even some bishops. The truth is finally coming out.

(Ancr2, Prg1, April 17, 2010)

The only Catholic nation that was, even if briefly, referenced in a good light were the Slovenians. Šumadija reported that Slovenian children from Kopar, Slovenia were learning Cyrillic in a Serbian church. Classes are organized by three “renowned Serbian women” and supported by the Slovenian Ministry of Culture: “At least one bright point on the gloomy skies of former Yugoslavia” (Ancr1, Prg1, February 13, 2010).
Muslims: From the Ottomans to Ghazi bin Muhammad

Unlike the Croats who represent a 20th century Serbian “Other”, Muslims have been a steady Serbian adversary from the start of the Ottoman rule in the 14th century until the recent wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. As argued in the Literature Review, after the Ottoman occupation ended and conflicts with Croats started, Muslims grew to be a Serbian vague “Other”, since the Serbs viewed Muslims as Serbs gone astray who would eventually return to their true Orthodoxy. The 1990s wars in Bosnia and Kosovo proved this prospect to be flawed: Muslim “Otherness” is now firmly set, putting even Croats’ position as the Serbian ultimate “Other” in jeopardy. This section starts with Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representations of the Ottoman period and the Turks and closes with the more recent portrayals of Bosnian Muslims, Albanians and Islam in general.

“Turkish Zulums”

While he Second World War that was told mainly through the narratives of “Others”, Serbian ethnic programs represented the Ottoman period mainly through the narratives of the “Self”, mainly the Serbian resistance to the occupation. Stories about the Ottoman “Others” present a minor part of the programs’ representations and cover the following three themes: defence of Christianity, conversions to Islam and the Ottoman’s disrespect for Christianity.
Šumadija’s editorial dedicated to Belgrade’s Kalemegdan fortress discussed the 1456 Siege of Belgrade, in which Sibinjanin Janko\(^{23}\) (John Hunyadi) defeated the Turks in the battle called a “Defence of Christianity” (Ancr2, Prg1, January 30, 2010). It is said that the divided Europe and Hungary could not resist the Turkish attacks: “Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and his troops entered the city. Fear and dark thoughts seeped into the Christian Europe” (Ibid). Describing Kalemegdan’s Ružica Church, the Turks are portrayed as barbarians that disrespected the Serbian faith: “The Turks demolished the church and turned it into a gunpowder magazine” (Ancr2, Prg1, January 30, 2010). In the editorial about the First Serbian Uprising of 1804, it is noted that:

From the Kosovo defeat in 1389, the subsequent fall of Smederevo, until The Meeting of Our Lord in 1804, Serbs were the Turkish conquerors’ raja\(^{24}\). Turkish zulums\(^{25}\) tried for centuries to either coerce Serbs to convert and become Muslims, or to completely eradicate them through torture.

(Ancr1, Prg1, February 13, 2010)

The incineration of the Serbian patron saint St. Sava’s remains in 1594 (three centuries after he died) by the Ottoman military commander Sinan Pasha is still remembered by the Serbs with disdain. Šumadija’s editorial explains what instigated the burning:

People came to pray to the new Saint’s holy bones. Even the Muslimanized Serbs respected St. Sava and prayed to his life. Angered by this worship, Sinan Pasha, the Muslimanized Mohammedan, took St Sava’s body to Belgrade and burnt his remains in Vračar\(^{26}\). Sinan Pasha hoped that people would stop praying to St. Sava. A magnificent church, the Temple of Saint Sava, today the largest Orthodox church in the

\(^{23}\) (c. 1407-1456). A general and Regent-Governor of the Kingdom of Hungary.

\(^{24}\) Christian peasants (Sremac, 1999).

\(^{25}\) Oppression, violence (Ţanić, 2007).

\(^{26}\) A neighbourhood of Belgrade.
Balkans, was built on the location where his holy bones were incinerated in Vračar.

(Ancr1, Prg1, January 23, 2010).

“Srebrenica is a Fabrication”

In the Serbian national consciousness Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniaks\(^{27}\), present a religious community that was forced to convert to Islam during the Ottoman invasion, but who nevertheless belong to the Serbian nation. Bosniak national identity has never been taken seriously by the Serbs, as Bosnian Muslims preferred to focus on shared cultural practices, social traditions and religious faith, as opposed to ethnicity. The film director Emir Kusturica presents an atypical case of a Bosnian Muslim who acknowledges his Serbian roots. Born in Sarajevo into a secular Muslim family, Sarajevo-born Kusturica frequently asserts that his family converted to Islam 300 years ago only to survive the Turks\(^{28}\). He apparently traced his family origins before conversion to Islam, and got baptized into the Serbian Orthodox Church in 2005. Unsurprisingly, Kusturica is admired by Serbs for accepting his ancient roots, and detested by Bosniaks as a betrayer. Šumadija carried a news story about the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Kirill awarding the “Serbian film director” Emir Kusturica for paying the utmost importance to “the spiritual, above the material life. We congratulate Emir for this important award established with the aim of spreading and solidifying the Orthodox peoples’ unity” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 23, 2010).

\(^{27}\) Since the breakup of Yugoslavia the ethnonym Bosniaks is used interchangeably with the religious designation Bosnian Muslims.

\(^{28}\) http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2005/mar/04/2
This is Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s only positive portrayal of anybody or anything with a Muslim connection. The remainder of the programs’ representations of Bosniaks deal mainly with the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 1995 Srebrenica massacre is presently the crucial identifier of relations between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. Whether the Srebrenica massacre was genocide or not is the subject of many debates. One thing is for sure: in hard-line Serbian nationalist discourse not only does the Srebrenica massacre not qualify as genocide, the killings were also not committed by the Serbs. In December 2009 Serbia’s parliament started a motion to accept and apologize for the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. In January 2010, Šumadija reported that a Bulgarian journalist Germinal Civikov’s book *Srebrenica: The Star Witness* stirred the debate in the Parliament even more. Civikov is said to have “documented in his book lies about the alleged crimes of Serbs in Srebrenica and accused the Hague Tribunal29, as well as the former boss in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown30, of a false portrayal of the Srebrenica events” (Ancr2, Prg1, January, 30, 2010). Civikov’s book quotes statements from:

Dražen Erdemović, one of the key people who falsely accused Serbs, and who himself took part in the killings of Serbs that he presented as actions of the Serbian army. The Bulgarian journalist’s book offsets the lies about the crimes and the so-called genocide in Srebrenica.

(Ancr2, Prg1, January, 30, 2010)

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29 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
30 Former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina
Šumadija also used the global discourse of Muslim fundamentalism to justify the Serb-convenient version of the Srebrenica massacre. In February 2010 BBC news reported a story about the Bosnian police launching a massive operation against a conservative community of Wahhabis, a strict form of Sunni Islam. BBC news also reported that during the war in Bosnia a large number of foreign fighters from the Middle East, known as Mujahidins came to assist the Bosnian Muslim army. Šumadija carried this story and followed it immediately with a story about a Swiss author Alexander Dorin who wrote a “revealing” book, *Srebrenica: A History of Salon Racism* (Ancr4, Prg1, February 6, 2010). It is said that the author, who spent 14 years investigating Srebrenica, found that “the official story of Srebrenica is a fabrication” (Ibid). Serbian Parliament continued its debate on Srebrenica declaration throughout February of 2010. Šumadija wondered why “the Serbs should admit the fictional crimes of 8000 people killed in Srebrenica when General MacKenzie and other distinguished foreigners are negating the genocide? (Ancr1, Prg1, February 6, 2010). It is added that the Bosniaks’ aspiration is to destroy the existence of the Republic of Srpska using Srebrenica” (Ancr2: Ibid). Šumadija repeated the argument that the Srebrenica crimes were not committed by the Serbs in another broadcast:

The war commandant of the Bosniak police in Srebrenica Hakija Meholjić claims that as early as 1993 Alija Izetbegović ordered for 5000 Bosniaks in Srebrenica to be - not killed, but slaughtered. The crime against the Bosniaks was supposed to be executed by Bosniaks themselves, in order to

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31 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8493855.stm

32 Canadian commander of the UN peacekeeping force in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has written and lectured extensively about his experiences in Bosnia. MacKenzie has also questioned the number of those killed in Srebrenica in 1995, taking issue with the classifying of the massacre as genocide (Sremac, 1999).

33 Wartime Bosnian Muslim leader.
blame the Serbs. This statement concurs with General MacKenzie’s statement that Alija Izetbegović believed that if the Bosniaks suffer the loss of 10,000 Bosniaks, of course killed by the Serbs, the West would for sure switch to their side, bombard Serbian positions and accomplish a unitary Bosnia.

(Ancl, Prgl, April 24, 2010)

Šumadija criticized Serbian Parliament’s Srebrenica declaration as being at odds with Meholjić’s statement because it “exclusively condemns Serbs for a crime that was in fact planned by Izetbegović and attributed to the Serbs” (Ancl, Prgl, April 24, 2010). Šumadija also reported that the wartime leader of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadžić persuaded the Hague Tribunal that Germany must submit to the court the documents showing that Germany supplied the army of the Bosniak war-time leader Alija Izetbegović with weapons. It is further said that the weapons ended up in Srebrenica, a supposed free zone, in which only NATO troops were to be stationed. This meant that “what happened in Srebrenica was not genocide, but an army battle of two army units, Alija’s army and the Republic of Srpska’s Army” (Ancl, Prgl, May 29, 2010). Criticizing the UN for ignoring the reports of Serbs being killed in Bosnia, Šumadija reported that Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica

were actually being killed by the Bosniak troops. When the French General Philippe Morillon visited Srebrenica a few months before the Serbian troops entered the area, he asked Naser Orić why his troops were leaving the protected zone and killing Serbian women and old people in Serbian villages around Srebrenica.

(Ancl, Prgl, April 24, 2010)

34 After being on run for 12 years, Karadžić was arrested in 2008 for war crimes against Bosnian Muslims and Croats during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia.

35 Wartime Bosnian Muslim military officer who commanded the Bosniak forces in Srebrenica.
Serbian ethnic programs mitigated the bad reputation Serbs hold as a consequence of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre with the negative status Muslims have been gaining since the 9/11 attacks. Šumadija reported that the lawyers of the victims of 9/11 are investigating the involvement of the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mustafa Cerić in the attacks, “on suspicion that he received 400 million American dollars from south Arab countries to fund the war in Bosnia and bring Mujahidins from Arab countries” (Ancr1, Prg1, February 27, 2010). Of those Mujahidins,

four later took part in the World Trade Center attack in which more than a thousand people died. The money intended to help Alija Izetbegović’s army was wired through Vienna and the TWRA organization, thought to be founded by Osama bin Laden. The organization’s Bosnian branch was founded by Alija Izetbegović and Hasan Čengić. (Ancr2, Prg1, February 27, 2010)

Šumadija reported in another broadcast that the Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Silajdžić informed NATO that “his government insists on sending troops to Afghanistan and joining NATO in their war against the Taliban, and he’s mute about the Taliban, who in Bosnia were called the Mujahidins, who slaughtered Serbs and contributed to Alija Izetbegović’s victory” (Ancr1, Prg1, March 27, 2010). Šumadija also made a link between the same mujahidins that fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina and those involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks: “So now Silajdžić is creating his own version of the story, attacking the Republic of Srpska for not allowing Bosnia to send troops to Afghanistan. Our people say: once a liar, always a liar” (Ancr2: Ibid).

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36 The highest official of religious law in a Sunni or Ibadi Muslim country.
37 Third World Relief Agency
“The truth is coming out” stance expressed in Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representations of Croats and Catholics was repeated in the programs’ representations of Muslims. In 2010 Serbian media reported that during the 1990s wars, the Bosnian Muslim army manufactured poison gases and used them against the Serbian army. In a follow-up to this story, Ravna Gora reported that the poison left a Serbian man from Bosnia handicapped:

It looks like we are again to blame, and not them. And the public is finding out just now, after all these years, this was in 1993 and now it is 2011, and now it is being publically known, slowly but surely, who was responsible for the war and all the crimes.

(Ancr3, Prg2, February 12, 2011)

As in the case of Croats, dialogue with Muslims is reduced to the language of lawsuits. In 2009 a Bosniak family now residing in France filed a lawsuit against the Bosnian Serbs wartime leaders Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Momcilo Krajišnik and Ratko Mladić. Early in 2011 a French court ordered Karadžić and Plavšić to compensate Adil Kovac and his family for 200,000 Euros for the injuries that Kovac sustained. Ravna Gora reported the story and commented that “new untruths are being born everyday all around the world. So many things are so untrue and against us” (Ancr3, Prg2, March 19, 2011). The Republic of Srpska Member of Parliament Slavko Jovičić reportedly invited all Serbs to sue “Muslim, Croatian and Albanian leaders of that time. What they did to Serbs, expelled from their country, starved and impoverished them, murdered them and all, and now the Serbs should sue all of them” (Ibid).

Present relationship between Serbs and Bosniaks is not exempt from a Second World War link. In February 2010 the state-owned Bosnian Federal Television broadcast a YouTube video portraying the President of the Republic of Srpska Milorad Dodik as
Adolf Hitler, and causing fierce reactions from Dodik’s Social-Democrat Party. Šumadija commented: “Look who is calling Serbian politicians the Nazis!” (Ancr4, Prg1, February 13, 2010):

Those whose parents were members of the SS Handschar division\(^{38}\), and now their children, or grandchildren are attacking Serbs in the attempt to cover up the concentration camps and murders of thousands of Serbs during the Ustaša NDH, whose killings the Bosnian Muslims played a big part in.

(Ancr1, Prg1, February 13, 2010)

“\textit{You Are an American Poodle}”

South-east of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kosovo and Albania resides another Serbian “Other” of Muslim faith - the Albanians. Unlike Bosnian Muslims who are of Slavic origin and speak the same language as Serbs, the non-Slavic Albanians are Serbian linguistic “Others”. Albania’s reported ambition for expansion beyond its borders is a recurrent subject of Serbian political and media discourse. Šumadija reflected this widespread belief when it reported that Albania announced at a news conference in London that it would demand a redrawing of the borders between Albania and Montenegro along the Adriatic coastline. Also:

An article in Glas Javnosti predicts that the Albanian actions are moving toward the Croatian side of a greater Albania. The 1998 Memorandum of the Albania Academy of Sciences openly addresses greater Albania which includes Kosovo, parts of Montenegro, Serbia, Greece and Macedonia. In other words, grabbing the territories of neighbouring countries. There has been no international condemnation of this plan.

(Ancr7, Prg1, February 6, 2010)

\(^{38}\) The 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handschar (1st Croatian) was one of the thirty-eight divisions of the Third Reich’s Waffen-SS during the Second World War. Its recruits were composed of Bosnian Muslims and Croats (Tomasevich, 2001). It conducted operations against Yugoslav Partisans in the Independent State of Croatia from February to September 1944.
As noted earlier, the 1389 Battle of Kosovo is etched deep in the Serbian collective memory. The site of many medieval Serbian Orthodox monasteries built as far the 12th century, Kosovo is heralded as the medieval cradle of the Serbs. According to the Human Rights Watch, Albanian rioters burnt 27 Serbian churches and monasteries in 2004, prompting the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to take over the security of these religious sites. At the beginning of 2010 it was announced that the monasteries’ protection would be handed over to Kosovo police run by the Kosovo Albanians. Šumadija reported the decision and evoked the 2004 incident wondering “what guarantees the Serbs have that one by one, the churches and monasteries will not gradually be demolished, burned, destroyed, with the intention of completely burying the Serbian trace?” (Ancr1, Prg1, February 13, 2010).

Serbia is currently in the process of joining the European Union. At the end of 2009 the European Union opened the Schengen Area for Serbia, allowing its citizens to travel most of the EU countries without visas. The visa waiver does not apply to Kosovo, as its independence is not recognized by all EU states. A few months after the decision was made, Šumadija reported that the Kosovo Albanians were reporting a false address in Serbia and paying 5000 Euros in order to apply for new passports:

Šiptars are using the Schengen list, they own the Serbian biometric passport, and are entering the European Union without permission aiming to declaring themselves to be political emigrants because of the alleged regime in Serbia.

(Ancr2, Prg1, March 6, 2010)

39 http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11989/section/1

40 In Albanian, Shqiptarët is an Albanian ethnonym, by which Albanians call themselevs. The Albanian name of Albania is Shqiptarët. However, in Serbian, Šiptar (as opposed to Albanac) is considered derogatory.
The European Union reportedly threatened it would remove Serbia from the list if “the illegal entrance of Šiptars as citizens of Serbia to Europe continues. Money makes the world go round” (Ancr1, Prg1, March 6, 2010).

Negotiations between Serbs and Albanians about the status of Kosovo continue to be difficult. Ravna Gora reported that “they” – the Kosovo Albanians, are ready for another war:

Unrest has begun in Kosovo. Serbs are being detained and pushed around to remind that it is their country. They are saying that if the Serbs do not listen, there will be war, Kosovo division into two parts is out of question, there will only be one, and it will be theirs.

(Ancr3, Prg2, March 12, 2011)

While the politicians are negotiating about Kosovo, “the weapons are clicking” (Ancr3, Prg2, March 12, 2011).

Similar to Šumadija’s view that “the truth is coming out” about the real nature of Croats, Catholics and Bosnian Muslims, Ravna Gora revealed that the world is at long last learning about the Albanian true dark side. In December of 2010 the Council of Europe issued a report written by investigator Dick Marty stating that the Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi was the leader of “Drenica Group” in charge of trafficking organs taken from Serbian prisoners. Ravna Gora introduced the story with: “It happens that unimportant events receive a lot of public attention. On the other hand, events vital to all humanity are often neglected, and not by accident, but on purpose” (Ancr3, Prg2, December 18, 2010). However, “the truth is coming out” (Ibid). Ravna Gora commented on the story in the following programs: “So this is what Albanians did with the abducted Serbs: they would take them to Albania, take their heart and kidneys out and sell them in the East for a lot of money” (Ibid).
In the Serbian national matrix Albanians typically represent backward tribes and “mafiosos” entrenched in criminal activities. Ravna Gora reported a news story from the Serbian news portal Vesti claiming that “Europe is knowingly supporting the mafia” in Kosovo (Ancr3, Prg2, January 29, 2011). French criminologist and writer of the 2002 book *At the Heart of the Balkan Chaos: the Albanian Mafia* Xavier Raufer reportedly confirmed that:

> Everything was exactly like Dick Marty described in his report to the Council of Europe. What is important is that Europe is learning that mafia, through the KLA\(^{41}\), Thaçi’s terrorist group, is in power in Kosovo.

(Ancr3, Prg2, January 29, 2011)

While many countries promptly recognized Kosovo’s independence in 2008, many which have not, like China, Russia, Greece, Spain and - Libya, are hailed as Serbia’s friends. Ravna Gora reported the Economist’s\(^{42}\) “sarcastic, but also funny” story: former Prime Minister of Kosovo Behcet Pacolli allegedly visited Libya to ask Muammar Gaddafi to change his mind and recognize Kosovo (Ancr3, Prg2, March 5, 2011). Gaddafi apparently ordered Pacolli’s delegation to sing and dance and eventually told Pacolli: “You are an American poodle” and “Kosovo is Serbia” (Ibid). Ravna Gora concluded that “I am sorry that [Gaddafi] is on his way out, but it looks like even he does know how to deal with his own people, and the people’s and God’s word go hand in hand” (Ibid).

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\(^{41}\) Kosovo Liberation Army  
“We Cannot Talk about Loving Thy Neighbour”

Adopting the Western media and political discourse on Islam that has been propagated since 9/11, the religion is criticized by Serbian ethnic programs without reference to a specific Muslim nation. Šumadija reported that the new patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church Irinej aspires for a dialogue with Roman Catholics and cooperation with all Christians, and “against the violent Islam that is spreading around the world, including Europe itself” (Ancr2, Prg1, January 30, 2010). Demonstrating how markers of difference shift depending on the programs’ subjects, when Islam enters the conversation the Orthodox and Catholics unite into Christians. Ravna Gora employed a similar rhetoric commenting on the new United Nations resolution that declared the first full week of February the World Interfaith Harmony Week. Ravna Gora commented on a Guardian article43 written by the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Ghazi bin Muhammad, Prince of Jordan. While Blair and Prince Muhammad acknowledged that the UN resolution cannot change the world, they hoped it could encourage those who believe in inter-religious harmony to challenge different attitudes. Ravna Gora reported their idea to invite neighbours for a cup of tea and “discuss religion, and if you keep doing this for years, you will see results” (Ancr3, Prg2, January 22, 2011). Ravna Gora’s remark followed:

My personal comment is that we cannot talk about loving thy neighbour, close cooperation and tolerance with believers that in their program, in their faith, choose jihad, the holy war. Something like that does not exist in the Gospel, in Christian teachings. Love yourself, and respect others, this is the Christian message, and definitely not jihad, the holy war.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/13/love-god-world-interfaith-harmony-week
Montenegrins: “One Nation with Two Names”

The newest antagonists in Serbian nationalist discourse are the fellow Eastern Orthodox Montenegrins. Montenegro has been steadily separating itself from Serbia since the 1990s, finally gaining independence in 2006, when 55.5% of people voted in favour, and 44.5% against breaking up with Serbia. The question of Montenegrin identity remains unresolved, as many citizens of Montenegro consider themselves to be Serbs. In the 2004 census, 31.99% identified themselves as Serbs, and 43.16% as Montenegrins.

Montenegro is patronized and ridiculed by Šumadija and Ravna Gora as small and juvenile, and therefore undeserving of a separate identity. Šumadija tackled the issue of Montenegro’s history, asking “When was Montenegro mentioned for the first time?” (Ancr2, Prg1, February 6, 2011). The answer was - August 6, 1362, five centuries later than Serbia: “We are sure that Milo Đukanović and his scientists would invent another, earlier date” (Ancr1: Ibid). As noted in the Literature Review, Montenegrins are often seen as brave and honourable offshoot of Serbs. Akin to the Serbs, the Battle of Kosovo (1389) is critical for the development of Montenegro’s collective memory. While Serbs lament the defeat, Montenegrins celebrate the victories of the Battle. Speaking of Miloš Obilić, the Serbian assassin of the Ottoman sultan Murad I, Šumadija emphasizes that he was more celebrated in Montenegro, than Serbia, where he “acquired the cult of a

http://www.monstat.org/Popis/Popis01a.zip

Former Montenegrin President and Prime Minister who spearheaded Montenegro's successful campaign for independence from Serbia in 2006.
national hero. Petar Petrović Njegoš instituted the Obilić medal for bravery. This is the highest military honour” (Ancr2, Prg1, February 27, 2011). Montenegro’s inherent Serbianness is attested by the historical popularity of a Serbian hero in Montenegro and Montenegro’s sacrifices for the Serbs. Jumping almost six centuries forward, Šumadija discussed the 1916 Battle of Mojkovac, fought between the armies of Austria-Hungary and Montenegro. The Montenegrin army was led by Janko Vukotić born in Čevo, Montenegro, “in the famed falcon nest, as Njegoš would say, in the family of the great Montenegrins who treasured Serbdom and choose the path of glory, the path of defence of Serbdom” (Ancr2, Prg1, March 6, 2010). The Montenegrin army ultimately defeated the Austro-Hungarian army, halting their advancement and permitting the Serbian army to get over the Albanians mountain and retreat.

Montenegrin identity started to split off after the Second World War, when Josip Broz Tito established Montenegro as one of Yugoslav republics. In a news report, Šumadija blamed “the supporters of King Nikola, the Greens46, Tito, Đilas, and other traitors that swayed Montenegro into becoming a separate republic. At the end, Milo Đukanović detached Serbia from Montenegro” (Ancr1, Prg1, March 6, 2010). Most Montenegrins are Orthodox Christians, followers of either Serbian Orthodox Church, or the more recent Montenegrin Orthodox Church, that is not recognized by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Šumadija reported that Montenegrin president Filip Vujanović

46 Zelenaši, The Greens, a group of Montenegrin dissidents who never accepted the union of the Kingdom of Montenegro with Serbia in 1918. The setting up of a separate federal republic of Montenegro after 1945 as the state of the Montenegrin nation represented victory for Montenegrin Zelenaši.
objected to the Serbian Patriarch Irinej’s statement that Serbs and Montenegrins are the same people, asserting a separate Montenegrin national identity:

What would at this statement, if they were still alive, say Prince-Bishop Petar I Petrović Njegoš, Marko Miljanov and other distinguished Montenegrins who claimed that Montenegrins are the greatest and best of Serbs. Pavelić and Tito unfortunately in two-three generations managed to muddle up the relations of one nation with two names.

(Ancr1, Prg1, February 6, 2010)

Montenegro officially established diplomatic relations with Kosovo by recognizing its independence in 2008, which was seen as Montenegro’s ultimate betrayal of Serbia. Šumadija warned Montenegro that Albania is planning to take over its territory: “The 1998 Memorandum of the Albania Academy of Sciences openly addresses greater Albania which includes Kosovo, parts of Montenegro, Serbia, Greece and Macedonia” (Ancr4, Prg1, March 6, 2010). Šumadija reported that Milo Đukanović, “who became a millionaire through smuggling” (Ancr1: Ibid) stated that “the so-called Montenegrin Orthodox Church is a legitimate Church, even though it is not recognized by the Serbian Orthodox Church” (Ancr6, Prg1, May 29, 2010). By identifying the initiator of the Montenegrin struggle for independence as a criminal, Montenegrin strife for religious independence is also delegitimized. Šumadija added that “Milo is probably expecting the Roman Pope to give his recognition, and this should be enough. So Milo became a religious historian. His Montenegrin anthem is just like him. His so-called Montenegrin Orthodox Church, recognized by no one” (Ancr1: Ibid).

In April 2011, Montenegro held its first referendum since gaining independence in 2006. Announcing the referendum, Ravna Gora commented “One more chance to see and hear who’s a Serb, and who Montenegrin in Montenegro” (Ancr3, Prg2, February 12,
Amfilohije had reportedly been trying to explain to people...that Montenegrins are Serbs. There is also the question of whether the Montenegrin language is Serbian language, so they are working on getting as many people as possible to declare that they are Serbs from Montenegro that speak the Serbian language. (Ancr3, Prg2, February 12, 2011)

**The West: Ally Turned Adversary**

Zooming out of the Balkans, Serbian “Others” start to transcend borders, and several ethnic and religious groups become contained in single, large categories such as Eastern-Europeans, Asians, Easterners, Southerners, and Westerners. While the “West” certainly cannot be classified as an ethnic or religious group, it presents a global cultural group that in the Serbian national paradigm comprises mainly of the British, the French and the Americans. Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representations of the West revolve mostly around Serbia’s alliance with the West in the First and Second World War and the betrayal of Serbia’s past sacrifices by open hatred of Serbs and support of their enemies during the 1990s.

**“Our So-Called Allies”**

Commemorating 22 April 1945, the 65th anniversary of the closure of the concentration camp Jasenovac, Šumadija expressed grief for millions that have paid the ultimate price for the religious, ethnic and racial intolerance, xenophobia, and hatred at the hands of

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47 The largest diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro.
“ruthless governments, ideologies and neighbouring nations” (Ancre4, Prg1, April 24, 2010). While the world is aware of the genocides against Jews and Armenians, it is generally unaware that the wartime Croatia’s Ustaša government’s racist policies against its Serbian population openly called for the extermination of one third of its Serbs, the religious conversion of another third, and the ethnic cleansing of the final third. Most scholars agree that 750,000 to one million Serbs were liquidated there, very similar to the Armenian numbers.

(Ancre4, Prg1, April 24, 2010)

Šumadija is of the view that Serbian victims are forgotten thanks to Josip Broz Tito who attempted to erase the memory of the crimes, but also the West who added insult to injury by failing to invite Serbs to the opening of the Holocaust museum in Washington in the early 1990s (Ancre4, Prg1, April 24, 2010). The West is seen as selective in recognizing different nations’ historical suffering. In one its editorials, Šumadija featured the life of an Austrian woman, Diana Obexer Budisavljević, who was said to have personally saved 12,000 Serbian children from Croatian concentration camps during the Second World War. It is noted that:

The name of the German industrialist Oscar Schindler who saved 1,200 Jews is known to the world. Then there is Irina Sendler who was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for saving 2,500 Jewish children from the Warsaw ghetto. But hardly anyone knows the name of Diana Obexer Budisavljević, the Austrian woman who married Julian Budisavljević, the professor of medicine in Zagreb.

(Ancre7, Prg1, April 17, 2010)

Serbian angst with the West is hardly contained to the betrayal of Serbian sacrifices during the Second World War. Šumadija dedicated an editorial to Serbian academic Dr. Nikola Moravčević’s books and interviews, in an attempt to explain why “our so-called allies, first and foremost England and America, and to a degree France, turned their back
on Serbs and helped Serbian enemies in the 1992 - 1995 civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Ancr1, Prg1, April 24, 2010). Who is to blame that “the Serbian people are being called genocidal, who is at the roots of putting Serbs in such a position?” (Ancr2: Ibid). Dr. Moravčević’s book explains that the Serbs “carry some responsibility, because in the last 200 years we wanted to play politics with the powerful forces, which cost us great losses, since they only wanted sacrifices from us” (Ancr2, Prg1, April 24, 2010). Paraphrasing Moravčević, Šumadija explains that the blame lies mainly with England and America, especially former American president Bill Clinton, his wife Hillary and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. It is a well-known fact that “The first two, the Clintons, were 100% against Serbs in the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo” (Ibid). It is, however, difficult to understand why Albright would despise the Serbs so much: “Serbs saved her family twice. First, when the fascist troops entered Czechoslovakia, and her father [a Czech Jew] fled with her to Serbia” (Ancr2, Prg1, April 24, 2010). When Albright’s family immigrated to the United States, “the young Madeleine” married into the rich American Albright family (Ibid). She did not live with her husband long as “he found a younger and more beautiful wife, and [Madeleine] got $15 million from the divorce” (Ancr2, Prg1, April 24, 2010). At Columbia University Albright met Zbigniew Brzezinski, “known as the hater of the Russian people, Serbs as well” (Ancr1: Ibid). When she became the State Secretary, Madeleine Albright “eagerly followed Clinton’s orders to block reports that portrayed Serbs positively” (Ancr2, Prg1, April 24, 2010). Albright also reportedly prevented reports of Serbian deaths from being read by other members of the United Nations Security Council. Towards the end, the editorial comments that “Unfortunately, we doubt
that Obama will do anything about this, because he follows Clinton’s foreign policy towards the Balkans, especially hatred of Serbs” (Ancr1: Ibid). Revisiting the First World War when Serbia was France and England’s ally, it is lamented that “Serbia paid the allies for every bullet, rifle, even shoelaces on the Serbian soldiers’ boots. Our people say: God save me from friends like this, I can protect myself from my enemies” (Ancr1, Prg1, April 24, 2010).

“America Sold Its Soul to Šiptars”

Serbian ethnic programs portray the West as disappointing Serbia to this date: it was the West that facilitated the Kosovo independence and caused Serbia’s agony over losing its historical land. The West is the key player in the plan to drive Serbs out of Kosovo:

Behind the curtains, the authorities in Kosovo, together with the European Union representative Peter Fate, are preparing to liquidate the existence of Serbian authorities in the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica in May, through some kind of a referendum, aimed at eliminating Serbian presence in the Serbian enclave.

(Ancr1, Prg1, January 23, 2010)

Šumadija also reported that the United Nations mission in Kosovo concealed 17,000 Serbian lawsuits concerning the abuse of Serbs in Kosovo:

It looks like the world’s most powerful forget the human rights of Serbs, but they had no problem bombarding Serbs for 78 days during the NATO aggression in 1999 and the action called the Merciful Angel. God save us from such angels, and from such mercy.

(Ancr1, Prg1, April 10, 2010)

At the beginning of 2010 it was announced that the security of Serbian monasteries in Kosovo would be handed over from KFOR to Kosovo police run by Kosovo Albanians. Šumadija quoted an Italian general’s statement: “However many troops you send to Afghanistan, the same number of soldiers will defend your monasteries in Kosovo and
Metohija” (Ancr1, Prg1, January 30, 2010). The news story concluded with: “We hope that the Serbian government will voice disapproval about these statements and the intention to discontinue the protection of Serbian monasteries” (Ibid).

When Patriarch Irinej became the new leader of Serbian Orthodox Church, it was announced that:

His consecration will take place April 25th in the Pec patriarchy, the original seat of our Serbian Orthodox Church in the heart of Kosovo. Ironically, his holiness will have to ask the permission of the Kosovo authorities via the European Union representative to allow the hierarchical service, the participation of foreign guests and dignitaries. (Ancr4, Prg1, February 6, 2010).

Serbia’s frustration with the Kosovo status goes beyond its medieval churches. Šumadija reported that the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremić described his last meeting with the United Nations Security Council as “tense” (Ancr1, Prg1, May 22, 2010). The United States, England, France and Germany insisted that Serbia should recognize Kosovo, while Russia, China and Brazil insisted that Belgrade and Pristina meet again and start negotiations. Jeremić was quoted as saying: “I hope that no one will come to your country and tell you it has been decided where your border is” (Ancr4: Ibid). The United States is said to have been requesting the International Court of Justice to make a ruling about the status of Kosovo in order to pressure Serbia to recognize Kosovo: “This same America does not accept the International Court’s decisions, but demands from Serbia to comply with the Court’s decisions that shrink someone’s else’s country. What a perfidy!” (Ancr1, Prg1, May 22, 2010). Serbia’s powerlessness is conveyed again in Ravna Gora’s news story about the website Wikileaks report regarding the future of Serbia:
Recognition of Kosovo, and then joining Europe, not sooner than that. This is America’s unchanging attitude towards Serbia, and this secret document exposes this and proves that America, and the whole world community, decided that Kosovo will belong to Šiptars, whether we want it or not, with no shame or guilt.

(Ancr3, Prg2, December 18, 2010)

Ravna Gora is also disgruntled with the West’s expectation that Serbia forgets the historical fact that “Kosovo is Serbia” and instead looks into the future:

America sold its soul to Šiptars, and there is no hope for us that America will tomorrow defend Serbia, this is my comment...Basically, dialogue does not depend on Serbia, or either side, but on the foreign forces that made Kosovo into what it is – The Balkan Powder Keg.

(Ancr3, Prg2, March 19, 2011)

Commenting on the reports that Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi was involved in trafficking Serbian prisoners’ organs, Ravna Gora reported that “Thaçi, the former leader of the terrorist group KLA in Kosovo and Prime Minister of Kosovo, blessed by America, is involved in human organ trafficking” (Ancr3, Prg2, December 25, 2010).

Ravna Gora commented that:

The humanitarian America whose democracy has defended the whole world for many centuries, fed the hungry, defended the weak, unprotected nations and peoples, has now crossed the line of decency in the defence of the weaker people and just deed. We wonder why America is silent when she knows that Hasim Thaçi, the Kosovo terrorist, the chief dealer of human organs, is guilty. Why is America not saying anything? Not only is she approving, she is defending Thaçi’s crime of human trafficking. This is really an inhumane crime of silence.

(Ancr3, Prg2, December 18, 2010)

Serbia’s Kosovo predicament is also placed in a global context in order to unveil the perceived Western hypocrisy. As Šumadija reported, the South American state of Bolivia might face the same fate as Serbia. The story has a Balkan twist: Branko Marinkovic, a Bolivian politician and entrepreneur of Croatian and Montenegrin background was
reportedly under investigation for plotting the assassination of Bolivian president Evo Morales. Marinkovic’s “gang” is said to be “at war” with Morales’s clan that is protected by “unemployed Serbs who are fighting with Marinkovic’s gang” (Ancr1, Prg1, May 22, 2010). Marinkovic is also the leader of the autonomy-campaign of Bolivia’s richest province, Santa Kruz: “America shares his attitude and America wants to get hold of the vast territory and wealth in that province. A typical copy of Kosovo – first kill and then demand separation, all, of course, with the help of America” (Ibid). Ravna Gora again revealed the supposed American hypocrisy in a story about Africa’s “5-6 oil-rich provinces” that want to secede “from their motherlands, but America says no, they cannot be independent, Kosovo is an exception” (Ancr3, Prg2, January 15, 2011). Libya was also compared to Kosovo when Ravna Gora reported that the United States was planning to close the military base Bondsteel in Kosovo:

Commentators from all over the world make it clear that America needs money and military for the new conflict in Libya and other countries, while others comment that Bondsteel was CIA’s headquarters and that CIA will relocate to Dedinje\(^{48}\) and form an even stronger axis in the Balkans, they will not part with the Balkans just like that.

(Ancr3, Prg2, April 2, 2011)

NATO’s 1999 bombing of Serbia is still profoundly vivid in the Serbian collective memory. Recalling the 78-day bombardment, Šumadija asserted Serbian resilience and ability to rise from the ashes in a report stating that the Avala Tower, “the symbol of Belgrade” had been rebuilt (Ancr2, Prg1, April 24, 2010). The tower was destroyed during the NATO bombing “violating international laws. During the destruction of the

\(^{48}\) The wealthiest neighbourhood of Belgrade, a site of many embassies and diplomatic residences.
Avala Tower, many people lost their lives” (Ibid). By rebuilding the tallest structure in the region, Serbia “showed to the world that we are still a force in the Balkans, and our engineers and artisans the best in the Balkans” (Ancr2, Prg1, April 24, 2010). Šumadija also reduced the rationale behind the bombing to the belongingness to the Serbian nation: “the Serbian Patriarch Irinej served a requiem mass for the victims of NATO’s aggression of March 24, 1999. The Patriarch said they died only because they belonged to the Serbian people” (Ancr2, Prg1, March 27, 2010). As noted in the Literature Review, Serbia used to view the United Kingdom, France and England as its supporters because of Serbia’s collaboration with the Allies in the First and Second World War. The 1999 NATO bombing shattered this image. Evoking the raids by “our allies” on the 12th anniversary of the bombing, Ravna Gora channelled this disillusionment: “The attacks started on March 24, 1999 around 8 PM...and continued all this time under the command of Javier Solana, the then-president of NATO, who hated the Serbs” (Ancr3, Prg1, March 26, 2011). The bombardment ceased when Serbia agreed to withdraw its troops from Kosovo and allow NATO to enter: “and they are still there, working on it that the whole world recognizes Kosovo, which the Serbs never will” (Ibid).

“The New Western Democracy”

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague is another thorn in the side of the Serbian national flesh for its perceived bias against Serbs and favouring of Muslims. Speaking of the former Chief Prosecutor of the Hague Tribunal Carla del Ponte, Šumadija lamented that her books are full of lies and slandering of the Serbian people: “She invented the crime in Srebrenica, even though General
Mladić ordered for buses to take women and children from Srebrenica to Tuzla” (Ancr9, Prg1, January 16, 2010). Del Ponte is said to have neglected the role of the former Bosniak military officer Naser Orić in the killings of Serbs around Srebrenica. She is also accused of disregarding the reports of Albanian organ trafficking and instead focusing her hatred on Slobodan Milošević: “History will sooner or later declare her a big liar” (Ancr1: Ibid). Ravna Gora commented that:

The Hague Tribunal always finds something to blame on Serbia, then they quiet down a little bit, and then they start repeating the old stuff like parrots. Where is Mladić. Where is Hadžić⁴⁹? Then they torture Serbian leaders in The Hague, at the moment Šešelj and Karadžić.

(Ancr3, Prg2, November 27, 2010)

The wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić’s daughter reportedly complained that her father was being tortured by the Hague Tribunal,

with some irrelevant documents that Karadžić needs to read in order to prepare his defence. He doesn’t cope with this well, it drains him, he is often sick, with no immune system, and he cannot do a lot of writing, because he has to read from 1,500 to 15,000 pages about some witnesses that said this and that. It takes him 20 hours a day to read things he should use to defend himself, and he doesn’t want lawyers.

(Ancr3, Prg2, November 27, 2010)

Karadžić’s daughter also visited Pale, the wartime Bosnian Serbs headquarters, where she spoke to a man who carried Karadžić’s picture in his wallet: “I carry this photo with pride’, he said and other people around him confirmed and said: “He is a good man, our hero, and our first president” (Ancr3, Prg2, November 27, 2010). The report concluded expressing Serbian world-weariness with the treatment of the West:

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⁴⁹ Goran Hadžić, wanted by the ICTY for war crimes in Croatia.
We always have more news than time to tell you about everything that burdens us, because Serbia and the Serbian people are still under a lot of pressure from the West and somehow we have always been exposed like that.

(Ancr3, Prg2, November 27, 2010)

The wartime commander of the Bosnian Serb Army Ratko Mladić was arrested on May 31, 2011 for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. However, Mladić was still on the run during the data collection for this research. Ravna Gora commented on that:

Since he is at large, the authorities want to punish Mladić’s family, this is apparently the new Western democracy. Newspapers write that the court will soon allow Mladić’s son’s property to be sold, because it is his father’s legacy. If they ever capture General Mladić, who will be next, because it seems like they only want sacrifices from Serbs?

(Ancr3, Prg2, March 12, 2011)

Interestingly, there was a twist in Ravna Gora’s portrayal of the Hague Tribunal. Reporting a news story, Ravna Gora apologized for accusing the Tribunal of being hostile to Serbs, and setting “Albanians, terrorists and their leaders free” (Ancr3, Prg2, December 18, 2010). Ravna Gora first lamented that the former Prime Minister of Kosovo Ramush Haradinaj was charged for war crimes and subsequently acquitted in 2008, while “Milošević died in prison, Šešelj has been in prison for 7 years, Karadžić around 2 to 2.5 years, they are lying in prison and many Serbs have been imprisoned to sit in jail from 2 to 20 years, to life” (Ibid). However, the former Kosovo leader was arrested again in June 2010 and transferred to Hague for a repeated trial: “Still, the Hague was fair, they are keeping him in prison, just like the Serbs” (Ancr3, Prg2, December 18, 2010). The Hague Tribunal reportedly did another good deed: former Montenegrin

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50 Former leader of the Serbian ultra-nationalist radical party.
officer in the Yugoslav People’s Army Veselin Šljivančanin’s sentence was reduced from 17 to 10 years based on a witness testimony: “It looks like, as the Hague Tribunal is approaching its end, it is realizing its own mistakes” (Ibid). Ravna Gora also changed its opinion of the former Hague prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, who had always been “rude, and had many times treated Serbs as war criminals, how she called them, unjustly. She always favoured the Albanians, she was even bad-mannered, calling the Albanians unarmed civilians, and the Serbs criminals, armed to the teeth” (Ancr3, Prg2, March 3, 2011). Del Ponte reportedly stated that “she would like to lead the commission for the investigation of human trafficking. Carla says she is well-informed about this, and she has written about this before, but no one before paid any attention” (Ibid).

While the former Prosecutor may have been converted, in the eyes of the Serbs, from the rude, bad-mannered Del Ponte, to Carla, the potential Serbian ally, Richard Holbrooke, the chief negotiator of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, never rose to a more favourable light. He died on December 13, 2010. Joining Tito, Mesić, Albright, the Clintons, Brzezinski, Solana and others on the list of Serb-haters, Ravna Gora commented on Holbrooke’s death:

Richard Holbrooke, God save his soul, did not deserve to be respected or mourned by the Serbs. His nickname was the Raging Bull. He was always against Serbian leaders, Serbian people and Serbian state. God will be his judge, Serbs cannot be.

(Ancr3, Prg2, December 18, 2010)

Serbian ethnic programs also present Serbia as a marionette in the hands of the West. Ravna Gora reported that “A few years ago the European Union and NATO brought forth

51 When Carla Del Ponte resigned as Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY in 2008, she wrote a book *The Hunt: Me and War Criminals* in which she wrote about Albanian crimes against the Serbs.
a law that Serbia, as an aggressive country, has no right to have a military and weapons” (Ancr3, Prg2, January 15, 2011). This means that “Serbia is not a free country, she is dependent and occupied” (Ibid). Serbia, however, now manufactures and exports weapons. Reporting on the Economist’s story52, Ravna Gora said that Serbia’s export of weapons, mainly to North Africa, is worth hundreds of millions: “Still, it is strange that America allows Serbia to export weapons, and doesn’t allow Serbia to keep weapons for its own defence” (Ancr3, Prg2, January 15, 2011).

“Don’t Go There and Pay Later”

Šumadija and Ravna Gora repeatedly advocate that Serbia should not join the European Union. One of the reasons cited is historical: the United Kingdom let the Serbs down during the Second World War, and also actively worked on the Kosovo independence during the 1990s conflict: “this is why personally I am of the opinion that it is better for us not to join the European Union, than to go there and pay later. The European Union is weak, it has already started criticizing itself” (Ancr3, Prg2, March 26, 2011). Commenting on the international community’s hunt for Ratko Mladić, it is said that without Milošević, whom “they have already killed, Karadžić, Hadžić, Šešelj and finally General Mladić in prison, Serbia cannot become a member of the European Union or the NATO alliance” (Ancr3, Prg2, December 25, 2010). Also, Mladić was still on the run:

I pray that they never capture him, because Serbia would never join the European Union and NATO, she would free herself of occupation and start looking after herself and her future without the intervention of the European Union or other powerful forces.

52 http://www.economist.com/node/17862268
The West reportedly only wants “Serbia to join the European Union and NATO so that they have greater control, and not to help Serbia” (Ancr3, Prg2, December 25, 2010). Commenting on the global economic crisis, Ravna Gora reported that Serbia hopes that the European Union will save it. Alluding to the Serbian national motto, “Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava” [Only Unity Saves the Serbs], it was commented that: “Only the European Union Saves the Serbs, could be these politicians’ motto” (Ancr3, Prg2, March 13, 2011). When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Serbia in March 2011, Putin and Serbian president Boris Tadić discussed the ways to raise cooperation between the two countries, including the South Stream Pipeline\textsuperscript{53} that will run through Serbia. Commenting on the visit, Ravna Gora wondered what the West would think of Serbia’s collaboration with Russia:

The European Union is rapidly dragging Serbia into its partnership, where Serbia will not be able to make its own decisions and accept agreements with its own countries, but do what the European Union approves, because Serbia would belong to them more than anybody else, and it would not be independent, as it should be.

(Rancr3, Prg2, March 26, 2011)

Ravna Gora made it clear that “us in diaspora are not for the European Union and NATO” (Ancr3, Prg2, January 22, 2011).

While Serbia’s membership in the European Union is questioned, Serbian Europeanness is not. Europe is apparently starting to change its opinion of Serbia. At the

\textsuperscript{53} A planned pipeline that will transfer Russian natural gas from the Black Sea to southern Europe, running through Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria. The South Stream pipeline is seen a rival to the Nabucco pipeline, backed by the EU and the US.
2011 Lepizig Book Fair in Germany, Serbia was the special guest country: “Europe is realizing that Serbia is a cultured country and her citizens educated, wise and cultured” (Ancr3, Prg2, March 5, 2011). Ravna Gora reported that the International Red Cross Organization in Geneva praised Serbia for compassion shown in 1885: “So the Serbs have finally been commended for a precedent in the world’s history of warfare” (Ancr3, Prg2, February 12, 2011). The report ended with: “Remember, Serb, good deeds will never be forgotten and will always be honoured” (Ibid).

“Canada Made a Mistake”

Despite Canada’s involvement in the 1999 bombing of Serbia and its swift recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Canada is predominantly absent from Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representations. In February 2011, Canada refused the Serbian writer Srđa Trifković to enter the country and deliver a speech at the University of British Columbia. Trifković is a foreign-affairs editor of the paleoconservative magazine Chronicles and the author of Ustasa: Croatian Separatism and European Politics, as well as The Sword of the Prophet: The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam: History, Theology, Impact on the World. Ravna Gora reported Canada’s decision to refuse Trifković’s admission:

The reason given is that he is known as a defender of criminals, so they decided that his lecture would be detrimental for all Canadians, because it would spread hatred among ethnic groups...I believe that Dr. Srđa’s articles about the situation in America, the war in Iraq, the role of America in relation to Israel and Palestine contributed to this situation. He earlier

54 This refers to the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict in 1885-1886 when Bulgaria badly needed humanitarian help and Serbia apparently opened its borders for the Austrian Red Cross to help Bulgaria, even providing its own medical supplies to the enemy.
Since “Dr. Srđa” only writes the truth, “Canada made a mistake” and should not have refused Trifković an entry based on “someone’s, in this case Albanian assumption that Dr. Srđa’s lecture would be spreading hatred and false information” (Ancr3, Prg2, March 5, 2011). The program addressed Dr. Trifković directly: “Dr. Srđa, your missions have always been the difficult paths of the whole Serbia nation. Thank you for investing your whole being into the defence of justice and truth. This is my message to Mr. Srđa” (Ibid).

Discussion

The common thread of the Serbian ethnic media narratives is the implosion of the past. Šumadija and Ravna Gora project history onto the present, producing “timeless, continuous, unchangeable version of the past, producing fixed, untranscendable ‘truths’” (Bock-Luna, 2008: 229). The unsettled accounts of the Second World War in particular are used to explain the new unsettled accounts of the 1990s conflicts, define the Serbian “Self” and the current relations with Serbian “Others”.

As argued in the Literature Review, the negative press the Serbs have received because of the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo was felt immensely by the Serbs in various Western diaspora settings. The findings show that, in order to counterbalance the negative image and prove the Serbs are not all “bad guys”, Serbian ethnic programs present their ethnic group through narratives of Serbian antiquity, Christianity and Europeanness. As Ćolović notes, one of the most important **topoi** of Serbian nationalistic mythology is the Serbian people’s ancient character: “The Serbian nation is the oldest
nation in the world, all other nations originated from it” (2002: 7, emphasis in original). While Šumadija and Ravna Gora certainly do not claim the Serbs’ ultimate primordialism, they repeatedly emphasize that the Serbs have been around for a long time.

As Petrović (2008) notes, Antemurale Christianitatis and defending Europe from Muslims is common place in European political discourses, particularly in the Balkans. Serbian ethnic radio programs continually emphasize their ethnic group’s Christianness through stories of persecuted Christians of Singidunum, ties between Serbian statehood and Orthodox Christianity and, most importantly, the defence of Europe and Christianity in the Battle of Kosovo and the subsequent domination by the Ottomans. As Čolović (2002) writes in his analysis of Serbian ethno-national myths, the sacrifices Serbia made for Europe, guarding its spirit and frontiers on the field of Kosovo, makes questioning Serbia’s belonging to Europe unjustified, unhistorical and absurd. Serbia’s defence of Europe and Christianity is not confined to the 14th century. On the contrary, the programs suggest that the West is to this date failing to realize that during the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo the Serbs were only trying to protect the Christian Europe from the same Muslims who later attacked the West on 9/11. The programs’ positive identification of Serbia as European closely matches Edward Said’s conceptualization of what the perceived European values entail: “rational, virtuous, mature, ‘normal’” (1978: 40). Šumadija and Ravna Gora stress that foreigners came to Belgrade “as early as” the 15th century, Belgrade’s cultural life flourished in the 19th century and Serbia was the West’s

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55 Belgrade’s Roman name.
loyal ally in the two World Wars. Serbia’s status as a special guest at a book fair in Germany shows that Europe recognizes the Serbs as cultured, refined people.

The theme of Serbia’s Europeanness ties closely with Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s critique of the West. The programs’ representation of the West corresponds with the previous studies of diasporic Serbs. Politically, the West is seen as continually working against Serbia’s interests: the West repaid Serbia’s sacrifices in the two World Wars by causing the turmoil in the Balkans, demonizing and bombarding the Serbs in the 1990s and helping Serbian enemies. The West is viewed as disrespectful of the Serbian faith and Serbia’s borders, the West’s leaders hate the Serbs, claim Serbia’s former leaders are war criminals and refuse the Serbian side of the story to be heard. As Čolović (2002) writes, a characteristic of the Serbian myth of Europe is that of ingratitude for all the sacrifices Serbia has made. The Serbs are the ultimate non-Europeans because they are outside of the main currents of “profane European history” and at the same time the only real Europeans, because “the deep history of the European spirit endures in them” (2002: 41). As European as Serbia is, Šumadija and Ravna Gora are categorically against Serbia’s accession to the European Union, as the membership would cost Serbia independence and authenticity. Čolović notes that Serbia’s “return to Europe” is inappropriate because it would be a regression to a “biologically and morally degenerate apparition” that is Europe, against Serbia, “the guardian of authentic European values” (Ibid: 39).

The programs’ representation of Serbian “Others” is characterized by themes of crimes, injustice and prospect that one day “the truth will come out” about the true nature of Croats, Catholics, Bosniaks, Albanians and the West. Corresponding to the previous
studies of long-distance nationalism, this thesis finds that the Serbs and Croats remain each other’s ultimate antagonists in Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representations. As illustrated in the Literature Review, during the 1990s conflicts many diasporic Serbs believed that the West had wrongly put itself on the side of Croats and Muslims and declared the Serbs to be the “bad guys”. In order to offset this negative image, Serbian ethnic programs reduce the modern-day Croatia to its Nazi past. Examples of Croatia’s present maltreatment of the Serbs include the lawsuit against Serbia for crimes Serbia is not responsible for, belittling the Jasenovac crimes by decreasing the number of victims and presenting the death camp more like a summer camp, media-lynching Serbian priests and inappropriately appropriating Nikola Tesla. Croatia’s Nazi past found its way into almost every Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representation of the present-day Croatia. Because of the angst with the Croats, the Roman-Catholic Church is also portrayed negatively: the Pope’s message of reaching out to all Christians is seen by Ravna Gora as rude, since Catholics apparently abandoned Orthodoxy. The Pope is also not welcome in Serbia in 2013 because, according to the programs, the Serbs do not need Catholicism, and the real truth about the Roman-Catholic Church is coming out through the reports of child abuse.

Compared to the portrayals of the Second World War and the subsequent troubles with the Croats, Šumadija and Ravna Gora represented the 500 years of the Turkish domination of Serbia much less fiery. The Ottoman period is represented mainly through narratives of Serbian resilience and the Ottomans’ disrespect for the Serbian faith. As noted in the Literature Review, prior to the 1990s conflicts Bosnian Muslims were considered either ethnic Serbs or Croats who were forced to abandon their true identity
after the Ottoman invasion. As MacDonald writes, the 1990s wars in Bosnia and Kosovo proved that Muslims had no intention of being “incorporated into an expanded Serbian or Croatian state” (2002: 223). It is not surprising then that Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representations of Muslims deal mainly with more recent events, the 1990s wars in Bosnia and Kosovo and post 9/11 representations of Islam, since that is when Muslims solidified into the ultimate Serbian “Other”. The Serbian responsibility for the massacre in Srebrenica is presented as a fabrication and ascribed to Bosnian Muslims themselves. Also, Albanians are stereotyped as cruel “Mafiosi”. Confirming Petrović’s (2008) and Erjavec and Volčič’s (2008) arguments that Serbian nationalistic discourse has borrowed elements of anti-Muslim discourse of terrorism observed in Western media after 9/11, the programs openly label Islam aggressive, rationalizing the attribute by Islam’s diametrical opposition to the programs’ measure of all things - Christianity. While the Roman-Catholic Church is also stereotyped as violent (for its role in the Second World War) and immoral (because of the child-abuse scandals), when Islam enters the conversation, the East-West Christian schism is discarded as Catholics and the Orthodox swiftly fuse into Christians, confirming Stuart Hall’s insight that “the boundaries of difference...are continually repositioned in relation to different points of reference” (1990: 227).

This study identified Montenegrins as the most recent Serbian long-distance “Other”. Even before its separation from Serbia in 2006, Montenegro has been struggling to renegotiate its position in the Balkans and define and preserve distinct notions of Montenegrin identity. Šumadija and Ravna Gora reflect the belief that Montenegrins were and still are ethnic Serbs from the medieval times to present. The programs slam Montenegro for betraying its centuries long loyalty to Serbia and the status of “the best of
Serbs”, jab at Montenegro’s attempt to separate from the Serbian Orthodox Church and establish its own, sneer at Montenegro’s anthem, and subtly caution Montenegro that it will be punished for recognizing Kosovo by losing its territory and identity to the expanding Albania. Šumadija and Ravna Gora project a modern concept of nationhood back in the time, which, according to Pavlović (2003), is faulty because it is difficult to apply the concept of national belonging or awareness to periods before that logic existed. As Anderson (1990) argues, the concept of nation was non-existent before the emergence of capitalism. Pavlović writes that it is not possible to speak of identity in terms of finality, but rather in terms of an “ongoing process of accommodation, adjustment and re-definition” (2003: 83). While Serbian ethnic programs view national identity as stable and fixed, the fact that they represent Montenegrins as semi-“Others”, as opposed to the earlier subordinate “Self”, shows that a separate Montenegrin identity is starting to solidify in the Serbian national framework. By acknowledging Montenegrin “Otherness”, Šumadija and Ravna Gora also inadvertently recognize a distinct Montenegrin identity.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

Significant Findings

The Canadian Multiculturalism Act calls for all Canadian groups to identify positively with people of different origins via various means, including ethnic media. The Canadian media regulator CRTC reflects this principle and calls for ethnic broadcasters to work towards bridging cultural barriers. Toronto’s multilingual radio station CHIN FM emphasizes in the mission statement its contribution to understanding and tolerance between diverse groups. Its Serbian programs are said to attract not only Serbs, but also Croats, Muslims, Macedonians, Slovenians and others. From the Multiculturalism Act down, everything seems to be in accord.

This study shows that Canada’s call for respect and cooperation among ethnic groups, reflected in the Multiculturalism Act, CRTC’s Ethnic Broadcasting guidelines, CHIN FM’s mission statement and the Serbian radio programs’ online descriptions, gets lost in translation. As if following Rousseau’s advice to Poles to be as different from the Russians as possible, Šumadija and Ravna Gora are gripped with negative Orientalisation/Balkanizations of non-Serbian ethnic, religious and cultural groups, corresponding closely with the Benedict Anderson’s gloomy vision of long-distance nationalism. The programs’ representation of the Serbs and “Others” are partitioned along Stuart Hall’s good/bad dichotomy. Because of the perceived negative image of the Serbs, thought to be caused by the other ethnic groups’ manipulations and lies, it is necessary to present the “Others” as negative in order to prove that the “Self” is good. As
Kecmanovic (1996) notes, the need for demarcation and dichotomization is a fundamental component of ethnic nationalism. A significant finding of this thesis is that negative identification of “Others” observed in Serbian ethnic media runs counter to multiculturalism’s call for a positive evaluation of other cultural, ethnic, religious and racial groups.

In order to present Serbs as positive, the programs employ the narratives of Serbian antiquity, Christianness and Europeanness. The qualities of being old, Christian and European bear less relevance in the homeland where most Serbian “Others” claim the same attributes. In diasporic contexts, where a group shifts from a majority, dominant status in the ancient homeland (Serbian lands) to a minority status in a younger hostland (Canada), the need for antiquity claims leverages the feelings of marginality. In the same vein, the Christian and European character of Serbs is less important in the homeland context where these characteristics do not stand out and where the nation has an abundance of symbolical resources to draw confidence from. It rises in significance in the Christian West, where a minority group’s Christianness and Europeanness is perceived as a measure of its civilizatory properties, especially since 9/11 and the influx of non-Christian immigrants from Asia and Africa.

While Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representation of Croats and Catholics match the previous studies of long-distance nationalism among the Serbs (and vice versa), this study identified new Serbian long-distance “Others”: previously marginal Muslims and non-existent Montenegrins. As argued by Petrović (2008) and Erjavec and Volčič (2008), Serbian nationalistic discourse has borrowed elements of anti-Muslim discourse of terrorism observed in Western media after 9/11 in order to justify ethnic violence against
Muslims during the 1990s conflicts in former Yugoslavia. In order to absolve the Serbs from any responsibility for the Srebrenica massacre, Šumadija and Ravna Gora present the killings as a fabrication and support the claim by associating Bosnian Muslims with terrorism, and even Fascism. This strategy carries different weight for Serbs in the homeland and Serbs in diaspora. For one reason or another (most recently the arrest of the Bosnian Serbs’ wartime military commander Ratko Mladić), the break-up wars of Yugoslavia and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, regularly described as Europe’s worst massacre since the Second World War, still occasionally make the news. While many Serbs feel unfairly labelled as “genocidal”, diaspora Serbs feel even more exposed since the group’s only mention in the media may be in the context of war crimes.

Another significant finding of the thesis is that it identifies Montenegrins as new Serbian “Others”. Participants in the previous studies of Serbian long-distance nationalism barely ever made a reference to Montenegro, likely because they were conducted before Montenegro’s independence in 2006. If Orientalising/Balkanizing “Others” is a vital part of the identity formation of the “Self”, this thesis shows that diasporic ethnic identities are constantly undergoing transformations and adjustments to current contexts. As Stuart Hall notes, “at different places, times, in relation to different questions, the boundaries are re-sited” (1990: 228). The process of “Othering” is thus inherently fluid and enduring constant change.

Šumadija and Ravna Gora and Ravna Gora are categorically against Serbia’s accession to the European Union. While this apprehension about the EU membership is not uncommon in the Balkans (and not only Serbia), the Serbian ethnic program’s location, Toronto, Canada, perhaps make the anti-European Union stance seem slightly
paradoxical. Canada and the countries that Šumadija and Ravna Gora criticize - the United States and the most powerful European Union countries, the United Kingdom, France and Germany - share a similar profile: located in the West, members of NATO and the original G7, or what the programs call “the powerful forces”. The study’s relevant finding is not so much that the programs are critical of the West in which they live, but that Canada is largely absent from those representations, even though it recognized Kosovo’s independence and the NATO bombing of Serbia involved Canadian planes. The representation is limited to Canada’s refusal to allow Serbian historian Srđa Trifković’s entry to Canada. Even though the silence may indicate Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s reverence for Canada, the programs’ criticism of the Serb-hostile Western politics Canada itself has taken part in, implicates Canada as well, even if its name is not mentioned.

**Limitations and Implications**

This study analyzed the convergence of Serbian ethnic radio long-distance nationalism with Canadian multiculturalism. The thesis’s is focus was on the meanings of the text, as opposed to the motives behind it, or the programs’ effect on the recipients. A future study may investigate the phenomenon of long-distance nationalism in ethnic media by interviewing the media product’s producers, or observing audience responses to selected media content.

Šumadija and Ravna Gora are produced by post-Second World War exiles and target older audiences. This may make the programs seem irrelevant for the future generations of Serbian Canadians. However, the programs are presented by several
announcers of various ages, including young speakers. This attests to Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s potential appeal to all age-groups. The study’s findings correspond with the most recent scholarship about Serbian long-distance nationalism that spans all age-groups, including more recent migrants and second-generation Serbs. The results match the latest research on the effect of 9/11 on Serbian stereotyping of Muslims that is not limited to older people, but rather extends over generations. Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representation of Montenegrins also confirms that the programs are not simply “stuck in the past”, but that they closely reflect the latest changes in the identity politics of former Yugoslavia.

As argued in the Literature Review, long-distance nationalism is not endemic of the Serbs. As argued in the Literature Review, several studies have identified the phenomenon among Croats, Slovenians, Tamils, Hindus, Tibetans, Haitians and others. A limitation of the study is that it isolates Serbian long-distance nationalism and stereotyping practices. Future research may examine long-distance nationalism in other ethnic minority groups, especially those with smaller minority presence, similar to those of former Yugoslav groups. Analysis of ethnic media representations of ethnic groups who used to be in conflict, or whose compatriots are still involved in a conflict in the homeland would contribute to the research of the role of ethnic media in multicultural societies. Future research of long-distance nationalism may also extend to television, print, the internet and would not need to be limited to Canada. For example, Australia’s Special Broadcasting Service, partially funded by the Government, provides radio and television services in multiple languages in support of Australian diversity. There are also separate Australian ethnic media not funded by the Government. Future research of
ethnic media would benefit from a comparative analysis of ethnic media funded by government and non-government bodies.

**Thesis Summary**

The thesis began with a discussion of the criticism Western multiculturalism has been facing in the last two decades. The currently dominant discussion of multiculturalism in the context of Muslim communities was expanded into the debate of long-distance nationalism identified among all migrants, including European diasporas. The increased presence of ethnic media was discussed and linked with the growing debates on multiculturalism and the phenomenon of long-distance nationalism.

The literature review began with a discussion on the origins of multiculturalism and nationalism by looking at Jean Jacques Rousseau’s 18\(^{th}\) century writings. Rousseau argued that the need to compare with others created categories of superior/inferior and prompted those perceived as inferior to seek recognition. Charles Taylor (1994) took this notion further to argue that Rousseau’s insights are at the origin of today’s politics of recognition, or multiculturalism and that positive evaluation by others is a vital human need. Rousseau’s problem of comparison was advanced by Stuart Hall’s (1997) argument that representation of the “Self” and “Others” is crucial in the process of identity formation, and geographically localized in Edward Said’s (1978) analysis of the Middle East’s designation as inferior in comparison with the “superior” Europe. Maria Todorova (1994) applied Said’s Orientalism theory to the Balkan Peninsula to argue that the region was Balkanized by the West, not as an outsider, but as the marginal “Self”. The Balkans internalized the West’s label and further split into numerous “Others” within, creating a
web of Orientalist/Balkanist/Occidentalist identities. Rousseau’s solution to the problem of disparity caused by comparison is to redirect the injured pride into the love of fatherland, and try to make the nation as different from others as possible. As Benedict Anderson (1992) argued, nations or “imagined communities” are not tied by position: local attachments migrate with their subjects, transforming into long-distance nationalism. At the end of the chapter, long-distance nationalism and Balkanism were discussed in the context of Western democracies, Canadian multiculturalism and the role of ethnic media.

Chapter 3 outlined the methodology used to conduct the study. First, the key terms were identified and conceptualized in order to understand the terms used in the Chapter 4. News reports and editorials of two Serbian ethnic radio programs broadcast on Toronto’s CHIN FM were studied using qualitative content analysis in order to identify how the programs represent various ethnic, religious and cultural groups. Content analysis captured the programs commentaries in an unobtrusive manner, allowing for unfiltered opinions to be expressed. Using purposive and sequential sampling, 26 programs of Šumadija and Ravna Gora were captured and translated by the researcher into English.

Chapter 4 was broken down into the programs’ representations of various ethnic, religious and cultural groups. The first section, the “Self” was presented chronologically, starting from the Serbian ethnic media representations of early Serbian history and closing with the portrayals of the present-day governments of Serbia and the Bosnian entity of the Republic Srpska. Content analysis identified the themes of antiquity, Europeanness and Christianity, as well as opposition to communism and the European
Union as dominant in Serbian ethnic media representations of the “Self”. Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s representations of “Others” were divided into the portrayals of Croats and Catholics, Bosniaks, Albanians and Muslims, and finally the Montenegrins and the West.

Chapter 5 identified the most significant findings of the study. Serbian ethnic programs’ negative representations of “Others” were found to be at odds with Canada’s multiculturalism. It was also argued that Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s identify the Serbs as old, Christian and European in order to alleviate feelings of marginality. In order to offset the group’s perceived negative image gained since the breakup of Yugoslavia, the modern-day Croatia was pictured as the heir of the Fascist Independent State of Croatia and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre was dismissed as a fabrication. The study identified Serbian “Others” that were either marginal or unmentioned in the previous studies of Serbian long-distance nationalism: Muslims and Montenegrins. This shows that the process of identity formation, “Othering” being a crucial part of it, is unstable and undergoing constant change. Finally, it is argued that Šumadija and Ravna Gora’s straightforward reprimand of Western countries actions against Serbia implicates Canada as well, even though the country the programs broadcast from is virtually nonexistent in their representations.
References


Winland N. Daphne. (2007). *We are now a nation: Croats between “home” and “homeland”*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
