Integration by Popular Culture: Brigitte Bardot as a Transnational Icon and European Integration in the 1950s and 1960s

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Abstract
Integration by Popular Culture: Brigitte Bardot as a Transnational Icon and European Integration in the 1950s and 1960s

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This thesis explores the history of European integration in the 1950s and 1960s from a popular cultural perspective anchored to a central figure from the era, Brigitte Bardot, in order to demonstrate that the peoples of Western Europe were engaged in processes of Europeanization that helped legitimize economic and political unions. Yet, official EU policy’s privileging of one (outdated) mode for understanding culture has handicapped alternative interpretations of a common European cultural heritage, failing to embrace a shared popular culture. Bardot is a suitable icon through which to begin an exploration into the diversity and significance of an integrating postwar European popular culture because she was a microcosm of several broad, transnational trends in postwar Europe including the rise of mass mobility, a major shift in European fashions, new gender constructions, and the explicit politicization of popular culture. Her films, career, lifestyle, and representation(s) provide key axes from which one can pivot into interrelated areas of European culture and societies in this era—pop culture; consumer culture; youth culture; mobility culture; media culture; political culture; and gender relations—demonstrating a widely integrating European popular cultural sphere. Within this context, Bardot was representative of broad postwar societal changes, served as a mass diffusion tool in relating these changes to the people of Europe, and functioned as a driving force in creating new transnational popular cultural forms. In addition, Bardot is a figure useful in understanding
the relationship between Europe and the United States, while also demonstrating that economics is not separate from culture and popular culture. The Treaty of Rome, ostensibly about economic integration, further enabled the many circulations apparent in Bardot's career—people, goods, information, and ideas—that were already taking place. Furthermore, popular culture was not irrelevant to, or separate from politics and it helps to explain how the escapism and narcissism of European popular consumer culture could generate a rebellious, but sophisticated political consciousness. Western Europe does indeed have a distinct history of shared popular culture, which should be a factor in discussions of ‘Europeanization’ and the legitimacy of the European Union. It is necessary to explore the roots of this shared popular culture so that it does one day form the basis of a longstanding shared popular culture and can become a recognized element supporting the legitimacy of identities in the European Union in more fluid, dynamic ways.
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INTRODUCTION

At the 8th Franco-German Dialogue meeting in May 2006, Ton Nijuls (Director of the German Institute of Amsterdam) argued that the crises of legitimacy facing the European Union at this time—the rejection of the EU Constitution by France and the Netherlands—was rooted in the fact that “Europe was never a project of the citizens, but of the political elites.”¹ Such a statement reveals more about the significant problems in understanding the emergence of an integrated Europe than about the actual legitimacy of the union itself. The framework for understanding national identities (that privileges a clearly defined political identity supported by actively engaged citizens) has been irresponsibly applied to conceptions of frameworks for understanding an integrating Europe. A European identity (or identities) and the overall process of Europeanization does not have to be political, does not have to be entirely unitary, and does not have to conform to bordered space. In fact, “European state building and national formation and the development of the EU should not be elided with Europeanization, for these processes do not always work in tandem.”² There can be multiple European identities, intersecting, conflicting, and complementing one another and it is through the full assemblage of these shared identities that the building of an engaged political Europe could, and did emerge.

Europe then, was a project of its citizens who engaged with and developed different identities through varied levels and avenues of Europeanization at different times and in diverse places across national spaces; the terrain on which to locate this citizen-based

momentum is the realm of popular culture. The integration of Europe was driven from a far broader and more grass-roots type of Europeanized identity construction based in shared popular cultural forms, symbols, and icons than isolated examination of treaties, governing bodies, and policy formation can explain. The integration of Europe was as much a ‘bottom-up’ as ‘top-down’ process and the forces pushing integration from the bottom-up, rooted in popular culture, require further examination in order to develop a fuller picture of integration in the postwar era.

Doreen Massey suggests that ideas of place-identity “are always constructed by reference to the past;” identities are understood in any given present through the layering of many elements that would have seemed foreign in the past.3 Because an integrating trans-European popular cultural space was a new phenomenon during the 1950s and 1960s, it would have indeed seemed ‘foreign’ at the time. Trans-European popular culture and the emergence of an integrated Europe were new concepts, lacking the established pasts that would have enabled Europeans to identify unifying elements. But the popular cultural phenomena that we will explore have histories that are now a half-century (or more) old, and they demand examination, especially in light of the fact that EU policy makers have failed to build a shared popular cultural tradition into the cultural history of Europe. Rather than accept the frequent co-opting of popular cultural phenomena as distinctly national, we can analyze them at the European level. By shifting our focus away from the nation state and layering elements from the past towards a concept of Europe, budding elements of a European identity are revealed.

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3 Doreen B. Massey, Space, Place, and Gender, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 8.
The present work seeks to explore the history of the popular cultural integration of Europe from the immediate postwar period to 1968—with a specific focus on the period of the mid 1950s to mid 1960s—in order to demonstrate that the peoples of Western Europe were engaged in processes of Europeanization that helped legitimize economic and political unions. This process of Europeanization was impervious to national boundaries and Europe was indeed a project of the citizens, evident in their desire for transnational mobility, the emergence of similar popular cultural constructions across national borders, the increasingly similar tastes in consumer goods, and unified responses to challenges posed from abroad. All of these driving factors were related to popular cultural forms that could not be contained or controlled within sovereign national spaces.

It is, however, difficult to locate the common cultural history of Europe for several reasons, including the long-term lack of any cultural policy at the political level, and privileged definitions of culture itself. The European Union and its forebearers did not have an official cultural policy until the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. Even then, Article 128 stated, “the community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bring their common cultural heritage to the fore,” but without providing any further explanation. The article aimed to promote culture and common heritage, but without defining what types of culture were to be promoted and what was included in this common cultural heritage. According to Monica Sassatelli, the Maastricht Treaty suggests that if “the corpus of European culture is sufficiently promoted and protected, a European

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consciousness will emerge.”⁵ Problematically though, the corpus of ambiguous common
culture exists in ill-defined space(s) and oozes essentialism and elitism while also assuming
that European consciousness had not already been achieved in specific areas of trans-
European collaboration.

Monica Sassatelli, and others including Gerard Delanty, structure the dominant
discourse of a historically shared European culture as the belief in, “Hellenic rationality
and beauty, Roman law, institutions, and ethics…freedom, civilization, democracy and
science” with particular favouring of Europe’s Christian past, the high cultural forms
developing out of the Renaissance, and the conceptions of rational thought and democracy
emerging from the Enlightenment.⁶ This framework, however, does little to differentiate
between pre and post integration Europe, and cannot be effectively applied to cultural
changes occurring during the integration era. This type of model merges Classical,
Medieval, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Industrial, and postwar Europe(s)—from Plato to
NATO—leaving little space for explorations of the critical, but shorter-term changes in
European culture in the aftermath of the Second World War.⁷ Official EU policy’s
privileging of one (outdated) mode for understanding culture has handicapped alternative
interpretations of a common European cultural heritage. In order to better understand the
unifying forces of postwar popular culture, we must examine alternative definitions and
parameters of culture itself.

⁵ Monica Sassatelli, “Imagined Europe: The Shaping of a European Cultural Identity through EU
⁶ Sassatelli, “Imagined Europe,” 438. See and Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity,
⁷ Although beyond the scope of this project, this type of model also ignores the politics of race and
non-Christian religion in European identity. For some development of “from Plato to Nato” and its
associated criticisms see, Cris Shore, “The cultural policies of the European Union and cultural diversity,” in
The structure of the historically shared culture of Europe as advanced by EU officials focuses on an imagination of a stable body of inherited traditions reminiscent of Matthew Arnold’s famous articulation of culture as “the best which has been thought and said in the world.”

And though Delanty outlines a major criticism appearing in discussions of the legitimacy of the European Union as the supposed lack of a shared common cultural element, David Beetham and Christopher Lord have argued that in Europe, “the only longstanding shared culture is a high, not a popular culture.”

Although it may not necessarily be defined as a longstanding culture, Western Europe does indeed have a distinct history of shared popular culture, which should be a factor in discussions of “Europeanization” and the legitimacy of the European Union. It is important to explore the roots of this shared popular culture so that it one day does form the basis of a longstanding shared popular culture and can become a recognized element supporting the legitimacy of identities in the European Union in more fluid, dynamic way. It was not merely coincidental that new forms of common, transnational popular culture appeared throughout Western Europe during the same era that the most radical and essential economic and political steps towards integration were taking place.

Furthermore, it appears that a longstanding shared popular culture was not necessary for the people of Europe to be willing to take large steps towards further integration, but rather, that a short period of intense popular cultural integration actually paved the way for greater and smoother economic integration. The period between the 1951 Treaty of Paris (which resulted in the creation of the European Coal and Steel

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Community in 1952), and the Treaty of Rome in 1957 was one of profoundly shared and integrating popular cultural production in Europe. This period saw the massive rise in inter-European vacationing and its associated propaganda (Chapter 1), the firm establishment of an inter-European garment trade and identity-based aesthetic (Chapter 2), the emergence of new gender constructions to negotiate with a growing consumer society (Chapter 3), and the rapid proliferation of mass mediated popular cultural information across European borders to an engaged European public (Chapter 4). It is only within such a context that the essential step from a union dealing with coal and steel production, transportation, and customs to a fully integrated market with the free movement of people, goods, capital, and services could emerge. People, goods, concepts, symbols, and values were circulating around Europe in the early 1950s, and as the demand for them and their speed and quantities increased, the traditional borders and regulations of a nationalist Europe became unnecessarily cumbersome and were slowly dismantled.

**Methodology**

Thus, when culture is understood as a site of conflict and a site of cooperation and pleasurable exchange, rather than a stable inherited tradition, one can begin to organize alternative interpretations and histories. While a common popular culture was not discussed in official organs during the formative and early years of the Common Market, the concept of culture itself was undergoing radical transformations among cultural commentators and intellectuals. It is problematic that EU cultural policy has never embraced a shared popular culture, failing to make use of some of the exciting new conceptualizations of culture emerging from its own territory (or future territory) during those formative years.
In 1958, Raymond Williams established a major challenge to Arnold and his elite conception of culture by famously arguing that, “culture is ordinary.”\textsuperscript{10} The concept of culture was thrust into a space constantly in conflict, not stable or fixed and hidden away in libraries and museums. Culture, rather, became understood as any terrain where different groups forged and contested meaning and values. Williams generated a shift towards examining more symbolic practices where culture was not confined to specialized knowledge and artistic production, but existed throughout the lived experiences of infinitely larger groups of people in the realm of everyday life. While Williams was working to broaden the understanding of British culture, his re-conceptualization of culture stressed assessment of, “what is common to the people of a community (or a region) as opposed to what divides them.”\textsuperscript{11} Williams’ technique then, can and should be applied to broader transnational spaces through focusing on emerging widespread and meaningful similarities rather than traditional differences. In the case of the history of European integration, such a method is particularly applicable, as the changing economic and political realities of the 1950s and 1960s spawned a massive re-organization of life then enabled Europe to breed its first truly mass popular culture.

Where then, does one begin to locate a shared European popular culture in the early integration period? This thesis will explore popular cultural forms centred around Brigitte Bardot as a microcosm of the larger emergence of a shared European popular culture between the postwar period and 1968. According to French writer Paul Mousset, future historians could look back on the 1950s and 1960s as the “Age of Bardot…they will look back on the period we’ve just passed through in the same way we look back on the

\textsuperscript{10} Raymond Williams, “Culture is Ordinary,” in Conviction, Edited by N. Mackenzie (London: MacGibbon and Kee), 75.
\textsuperscript{11} Williams, 78.
Twenties, as a time of exceptionally sharp social and moral changes, and a kind of popular frenzy.¹² Bardot was at the forefront of the sharp social and moral changes noted by Mousset. Though there have been several studies on the influence of Brigitte Bardot in this era, she is cast as a quintessentially French star representing French cultural changes, rather than addressing her influence across Europe and in fostering an American imagination of Europe.¹³ In fact, Bardot is a suitable place to begin an exploration into postwar European popular culture because she was representative of it, acted as a mass diffusion tool for it, and even served as a driving force for particular new phenomena. Though, while Mousset was implicitly referring to the Age of Bardot in France, his statement should be applied more widely to Western Europe.

All nations geographically located in Western Europe were taking part in the processes characterised by the ‘Age of Bardot,’ demonstrating that popular culture could not be contained within national borders and, most importantly, that political, economic, and legal integration efforts are not the only relevant spaces in which to locate a common Europe. In fact, through popular culture, one can actually trace connections and exchanges that foreshadow future political and economic unions and policies, in this case, particularly the entrance of the United Kingdom into the Common Market in 1973. Scholarship on European cultural integration has not yet provided an adequate assessment of popular cultural developments concurrent with the well-documented and analyzed processes of

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political and economic integration taking place during the 1950s and 1960s, though some key works on the history of sport and television/music have emerged.\textsuperscript{14}

The most serious challenge to establishing a shared European popular culture space comes from the dominance of the nation-state, evident both in historiographies that favour nation-based interpretive paradigms, and in acceptance of the presumed ‘ownership’ of popular culture by the nations from which particular phenomena originated.\textsuperscript{15} In order to break with both the missing elements of popular cultural integration and the dominance of the nation-state in popular cultural studies, the present study embraces a technique similar to that deployed by Victoria de Gazia in \textit{Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe}. Like de Grazia, this study will borrow from Foucault, “to approach politics from behind and cut across societies on the diagonal” “in order to make the leaps of imagination that bring the unlikely together.”\textsuperscript{16} While de Grazia was looking at the march of the United States’ market empire through Europe, the present study seeks to bridge gaps between popular culture and nation-states as well as between economics, politics, and popular culture.

As de Grazia demonstrates, a key agent that cut across European societies on the diagonal was the United States market empire. The United States held a unique position in


the popular cultural integration of Europe during the 1950s and 1960s, and the dialogue between the two was essential to the building of pan-European popular cultural space. Post-national scholars have suggested that Europe looked to the USA as “the Other the Self does not want to be.”¹⁷ I would argue, however, that during the 1950s and at least part of the 1960s, a war-devastated and economically weak Europe was marginalized by the United States, and that elements of the United States’—particularly the high standard of living and purchasing power—formed an Other that the European Self wanted to, and did, emulate. This was cemented in the European acceptance of the Marshall Plan in 1947.

Yet as European markets rebounded in the 1950s, they began to produce popular cultural items that could compete against American counterparts, which was evident in increased American appetite for European popular cultural products.

As new European popular cultural products infiltrated the United States during the postwar period, Americans began to articulate elements of increasing transnationalism within European popular culture. Through this process, the United States indirectly, or implicitly, constructed elements of a supranational European identity from the outside, while also helping Europe see and identify itself from within. As part of a larger trend, during the 1950s and 1960s Europe and the United States served as ‘Others’ respectively, but as largely friendly—though competitive—others, especially vis-à-vis the Communist East.

As the American market empire preferred to approach business across the Atlantic not in terms of nation-states, but as “a generic entity called ‘Europe,’” Americans also received and imagined commodities from across the Atlantic as ‘European’ products rather

than specific products of the nation-state from which they originated.\textsuperscript{18} Americans foreshadowed and embraced Williams’ strategy of focusing on similarities rather than differences, but across the ‘entity’ of Europe rather than through national lenses. Europeans, on the other hand, often viewed elements of their shared popular culture in national terms although these phenomena were not anchored exclusively to the nation-state. It is through the American imagination then, that elements of the shared European popular culture are most clearly articulated in this era.

Using Althusser’s concept of interpellation, but applying it to a continent rather than an individual, we can understand how Europe could come to see itself in the American mirror. According to Althusser, subjects come to recognize themselves in specific (and ideological) roles they inhabit when they respond to being called, or ‘hailed’, in a manner that they knowingly or unknowingly recognize as directed towards them.\textsuperscript{19} As America blurred the lines between the popular cultures of European nation-states, it called to them individually and collectively as ‘Europe,’ and Europe began to respond. It is important to note, however, that despite American economic power, Europe was not merely a passive victim to the market empire or to America’s imagination of it. Europe, from its governments, to its industries, to its citizens, also took part in constructing and disseminating an imagined Europe. Europe then, as it began to recognize itself in these calls, also began building an identity in relation to that image both symbolically and economically.

\textsuperscript{18} de Grazia, 13.
Postwar Europe and Escapism

Immediately following the Second World War, Europe was devastated; friends and family had been killed; cities, homes, and infrastructures were destroyed; food and clothing were scarce; and national pride lay wounded over most of Europe. One of the single most unifying elements emerging from the context of the war and immediate postwar period was a European-wide desire for escapism. In myriad ways, Europeans indulged in the (mediated) creation and consumption of escapist fantasies and associated practices. Yet because scholarship relating to this phenomenon has mainly been confined to national contexts, the integrationist dimension of this trend has not been adequately recognized and assessed.

In *Star Gazing: Hollywood cinema and female spectatorship*, Jackie Stacey outlines the ways that British women used Hollywood films as a means for escapism during the war. By going to see Hollywood films in theatres, British women were able *escape from* the harsh realities of wartime experience (rationing, lines, bombings) in the pleasant environments of the theatre, while also *escaping into* the abundant and glamorous world offered through Hollywood films.²⁰ British women of this era described enjoying these experiences through the “excitement, glamour, and sexuality that were not part of traditional British femininity,” though they would not have access to many of the female consumer goods that they saw in these films until the 1950s.²¹

Escapism, however, went well beyond the world of film. Laura Kaiser Paré develops the consumer escapism of postwar German women through actual interviews to explore how the consumption opportunities offered through the Economic Miracle, “with

²¹ Ibid., 113.
its proliferation of appliances, new cars, and imported fashions and music covered over the psychic wounds of guilt and defeat with a prosperous modern lifestyle whose shiny surfaces deflected and silenced traumatic memories.”

There was more involved in shopping and consumption than simple desire. Similarly, Katrina Sark develops the escapist tendencies evident in the vibrant world of immediate postwar Berlin fashions to demonstrate the ways that women were able to cope with the devastation and shame of the postwar period in Germany, expressing new creativity and freedom in fashion design. Even the voracious West German appetite for inter-European travel had escapist ties to West German youth’s desire to see a world they had been largely shut off from since the Nazis came to power.

In Italy, one of the iconic responses to the conditions in the postwar world was the Vespa motorcycle, designed by Piaggio, which gained popularity all across Europe. In the wake of the war, Piaggio’s Pontedera works were destroyed and the company needed to change production to suit the postwar world, so it developed the small, streamlined, and “self-consciously ‘contemporary’” Vespa. Designed to be “capable of negotiating Italy’s war damaged roads,” it was also intended to meet demand from consumers “deprived during the war years of visually attractive, inexpensive luxury goods.” The Vespa became instantly popular throughout Europe, selling 1 million units by 1960 through its ability to provide modern, stylish, and inexpensive mobility for a generation of young

people eager to travel.\textsuperscript{26} The general escapist drive in postwar Europe, which these few examples highlight, provides an essential context to understand the drift of European popular culture in the postwar years.

Although escapism has not been adequately explored as a homogenizing dimension of European postwar popular culture, there have been several key studies on popular cultural interrelationships among European states and their links to integration that have been published by scholars working primarily in film studies.\textsuperscript{27} Texts like Mark Betz’s \textit{Beyond the Subtitle} have laid a foundation for transnational popular cultural analysis that the present study seeks to build upon. Betz’s analysis of European cinema does an excellent job of exploring the deep inter-European relationships in the film world, as well as some of Bardot’s roles in them. This thesis, however, while focusing on a film star, does not deal with her films and roles as much as may be expected. Rather, it seeks to move beyond the confines of the world of film and to identify a wider popular cultural space where the interrelationships among film, media, advertising, lived experience, travel, fashion, gender roles, and explicit politics can all be linked together, demonstrating a widely integrating European popular cultural sphere separate from, yet as important as, integrationist political developments. Bardot facilitates this purpose.

\textbf{Bardot}

Bardot was among the first truly European popular cultural icons in the postwar era, modelling for \textit{Elle} magazine by 1949, beginning an acting career in 1952, rising to

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 90.
superstardom the same year the Treaty of Rome was signed and remaining in the spotlight into the 1970s. She embodied, reflected, and ushered in changes all over Western Europe, following a timeline wonderfully similar to major turning points in the integration process. The status, length, and breadth of Bardot’s stardom makes her a suitable figure through which to begin to explore pan-European popular culture. Bardot’s fame during this era was astronomical, both within all of Western Europe and North America, and it intersected with all avenues of popular culture in Europe.

Bardot can serve as a vehicle through which to examine popular cultural integration because of her truly iconic status; her films, career, lifestyle, and representation(s) provide key axes from which one can pivot into different interrelated area of European culture and societies during the 1950s and 1960s—pop culture; consumer culture; youth culture; mobility culture; and media culture, not to mention gender relations and lifestyle. Though there is no mistaking or misunderstanding that Brigitte Bardot was French, it will be shown that she can equally be repositioned—and perhaps even better understood—as a distinctly European phenomenon. She was an exemplar of mass trends in Europe (the rise of youth culture, changing attitudes towards sex), served as a mass diffusion tool for new trends (the bikini, jeans, risqué sexual relationships), and was also an engine of pan-European cultural changes (new European body and fashion icon and the embodiment of a desirable lifestyle). This thesis will analyze the career, experiences, lifestyle, and representation of Brigitte Bardot during the 1950s and 1960s, as a means to locate and delineate transnational European popular cultures, and to demonstrate that the nations of Western Europe were living in an increasingly shared world that preceded and foreshadowed closer integration in the economic and political spheres.
In the age of mass media and reproducibility, Europe was working towards a similar language of images and symbols that can be clearly traced via Bardot. Bardot’s reproducibility saw very few boundaries. Her image and likeness appear consistently throughout Europe from the mid to late 1950s through to the end of the early 1970s. Bardot appeared in films, magazines, newspapers, advertisements, television, postcards, travel brochures, political cartoons, photographs, and various other ephemera. Bardot acted in 43 films between 1952 and 1973; appeared in an additional 20 television specials, documentaries, and small cameo appearances over the same period; and released several albums. Her 1955 British film *Doctor at Sea* was one of the top five money-earners in the United Kingdom between 1951 and 1960. Her massive international hit *Et Dieu…créa la femme* set a new box office record for foreign films in the United States (earning $4,000,000) with its overall international gross estimated at $7,000,000. *La Parisienne* grossed an estimated $3,000,000, *Love is my Profession* grossed an estimated $2,500,000, and *Come Dance with Me*, an estimated $2,000,000, though by this point in Bardot’s career (1961) Rauol Levy stated that, “Brigitte sells newspapers and magazines, but she does not sell tickets at the box office.”

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28 Though less well known, Bardot also released several popular albums during the 1960s including the 1963 “Brigitte Bardot,” the 1964 “B.B.,” and a series of singles in 1965. She also sang on the internationally issued LP soundtrack for *Viva Maria!* released several more EPs in 1966, and later, recordings from the New Year’s Eve television special in 1967 “Le Bardot Show” were released as an LP “Brigitte Bardot Show,” which also included Bardot’s best known Serge Gainsbourg track, “Harley Davidson.” Other well known Bardot/Gainsbourg tracks include “Bonnie & Clyde” as well as the infamous and originally unreleased first recording of “Je T’Aime…Mio Non Plus,” that Gainsbourg later recorded and released to huge international scandal and success with Jane Birkin.


31 Ibid.
Bardot appeared on the cover of thousands of magazines across Europe during her career, many of which included posters and pin-ups of the star.\textsuperscript{32} Within these images and symbols were deeply embedded meanings and values—explicit and implicit, encoded and decoded—that moved freely across borders and helped build a shared set of distinctly “European” identity markers. Bardot popularized the bikini, her fashion choices launched European wide trends, and her hairstyle and makeup were copied throughout Europe (Chapter 2). Furthermore, her personal mobility foreshadowed forthcoming European trends, and she contributed immensely to the growing cult of the beach in postwar Europe, popularizing Saint-Tropez as a premier vacation destination (Chapter 1). She was recognized as a new female ‘type’ by none other than Simone de Beauvoir and pushed the limits of women’s position in postwar Europe, blazing a path for alternative constructions of femininity and demonstrating looser sexual morals in the 1950s that would not become normalized until the post-1968 era (Chapter 3). Probably least well known was Bardot’s role in providing European youth imbued with the idiom of popular culture with new ammunition to challenge and criticize contemporary society (Chapter 4).

Brigitte Bardot was born on September 28 1934 into a traditional bourgeois Parisian family, and her later actions, lifestyle, and presentation must be read against this fact. Bardot was a product of a class archetype that existed in various formations all over Europe and that would face relentless challenge from its own children in the postwar era. Bardot grew up in a structured family environment, becoming a skilled ballet dancer, developing a

\textsuperscript{32} Some of the titles that Bardot appeared on the cover of between 1943 and the early 1970s include: Picturegoer, Photoplay, Film, Picture Post, Esquire, Parade, ABC Film Review, Films and Filming, Mayfair (United Kingdom); Epoca, Tempo, Nova, Triunfo, Le Ore, Oggi, Vie Vuove, Incom, Cinema Nuovo (Italy); Elle, Paris Match, Jours de France, Lui, Les Veillees, Noir et Blanc, Cinemonde, France Soir, (France); Cine Revue, Piccolo (Belgium); Filmspeigel, Stern Neue Illustrierte, Quick, Bravo, Bunte, Kristall Germany, Nieuwe Revu (Netherlands); MAAILIMA, APU, Lue, Elokuva-Aitta (Finland); Min Varld, Se, Hemmets Veckotidning (Sweden); Gaceta Illustrada, Garbo, Fotogramas (Spain)
fluidity of movement that would add considerably to her appeal as a star. The young Bardot began appearing as a model in 1948 for emerging fashion magazines such as *Jardin des Modes* and *Modes et Tricots*, and she appeared on the cover of *Elle* magazine, at the age of fifteen, on 2 May 1949. She began appearing in films in 1952, gained trans-European visibility by her 1953 Cannes appearance, reached international superstardom with the trans-Atlantic success (1956-1957) of *Et Dieu…créa la femme*, and had become a fashion icon by 1959.

Bardot served as a symbol of youth culture who bridged two different generations across Europe. She was a leader among her own peer group—those born in the decade prior to the end of the Second World War, but she was also still a symbol of youth—well into her 30s—to those born after the war. In France, for instance, in 1966, 34 percent of the population was below the age of thirty (Bardot was thirty-two) and by 1968, sixteen year-olds—who were four when *Et Dieu…créa la femme* was released—considered Bardot “their ideal.” She was an unofficial leader and icon of a generation. Bardot shocked her audiences (both film and media) with her frank sexuality and unashamed unfaithfulness, irritated the bourgeois further with her unique fashion sense that spread around Europe, and outraged Europe with her rejection of motherhood and wifely domesticity. By the early 1960s, the lines between Bardot’s celebrity and reality began to blur (though this process started with *Et Dieu*) as her film roles mimicked her mediated personality, notably in *La

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34 Bardot’s first Elle magazine cover identified her as ‘BB,’ a nickname that stuck with her throughout her career. It was also this magazine cover which prompted Marc Allégret to contact the Bardot’s in order to see if Brigitte was interested in doing films. It was at Allégret’s apartment that she met her soon-to-be first husband Roger Vadim.
Vérité (1960), Vie privée (1962), and Le Mépris (1963). By the mid to late 1960s though, while still extremely visible, Bardot had become significantly less shocking. Youth culture and trends that she had in many instances paved the way for were accelerating around her as new icons began to replace her in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Bardot retired from films in 1973, entering a period of relative privacy until re-emerging as a dedicated and outspoken animal rights activist in the 1980s.

CHAPTER 1

EUROPEAN MOBILITIES

European Integration and the Mobility of Things

There is little of greater importance in the history of European integration than the pursuit of unrestricted flows of people, goods, and services across national borders. In direct opposition to the history of the European nation state, where borders served to delimit sovereign space, as something to define the nation and protect the nation, from the perspective of European integration, national borders are something to be overcome, a cumbersome leftover from the era of hegemonic nationalism that serve to restrict the flow of people, goods, and services. In the aftermath of the Second World War, as Western Europe and their North American allies worked to forge a new and peaceful path for a continent plagued by centuries of warfare and destruction, the ideologies behind national borders came under sharp scrutiny. By the signing of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty / Treaty of Rome) in March 1957, six European nations (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands), all former adversaries with other signatories, agreed to form a customs union that saw internal tariff barriers eradicated by 1968, allowing goods to move freely around the Member States and in from third party states under a single tariff. Furthermore, the free movement of workers and citizens, as well as services and capital of the Member States was protected and promoted by the treaty. Mobility and circulation both within and outside of, but still involving the Member States was of critical importance in the early period of integration and while goods, services, workers, citizens, and capital could all be monitored and
controlled by the appropriate authorities, the circulation of symbols, ideas, and values could not.

This study approaches the movement of pan-European popular culture and their associated (and varied) values as a central force of Europeanization, and one that cannot be effectively controlled by the nation state. As developed in the introduction, for the people of Europe, Bardot was above all else, a symbol, and while representing mobility and circulation within the Common Market, her mobilities also demonstrate the extent to which “European state building and nation formation and the development of the EU should not be elided with Europeanization, for these processes do not always work in tandem.”

Bardot herself, as well as the goods sold around her, moved freely and widely around Europe, well beyond the borders of the Common Market, leaving traces of her symbolic power, sharing new values, and depositing new and exciting elements that groups and citizens around Europe were free to embrace, reject or co-opt in a variety of different ways. Furthermore, Bardot’s largest star vehicle, mass-circulation magazines and newspapers also flowed around Europe in the age of rapidly expanding mass media, either moving with, or finding a receptive audience in, the increasing number of expatriate workers, travellers, and growing numbers of multi-lingual Europeans. Similarly, while the physical presence of Bardot, in the era of her high fame, was an event in itself, her products and representations flowed even more freely—although initially sometimes censored or regulated—across a vast European space irrespective of the borders of the Common Market, though implicitly signalling the potential success of Common Market exports. The endless mediated reproducibility of Bardot, appearing on film, film posters or other

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promotional material, in magazines, in newspapers, in album covers and jackets, in posters and postcards, referenced in popular music, and sartorially mimicked by young women across Europe meant that Bardot could be, and was everywhere, constantly circulating and disseminating. At an even deeper level, Bardot generated demand for products related directly to her, but also for products more loosely associated with the trends and practices she embodied. She represented an early example of the driving force behind the Common Market, the pursuit of moving and selling ‘things’ of all varieties across borders and her export-value did not go unnoticed in France.

The Mobility of People: The Roots of European Mass Mobility

While the movement of goods around Europe was a primary goal and accomplishment of the early integration process, the movement of people would post several challenges unique to human interaction rather than the economics of supply and demand. Even more so than the movement of goods and services across borders, the movement of people by choice across national borders served as a Europeanizing force. While some scholars have noted that tourism in postwar Europe actually served to reinforce prejudice and stereotypes, it is not necessarily traveller’s feelings about other areas and people that build a Europeanizing force, but the fact that they are travelling at all.38 Even federally unified nations, especially those approaching the size of Western Europe, have regional differences and peculiarities that contribute to stereotypes among their own citizens; a newly integrating Europe cannot be expected to be beyond such

38 Alex Schildt notes the stereotyped views held by West German youth travellers concerning Italians in particular, as well as the French in “Across the Border: West German Youth Travel to Western Europe,” in Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Culture in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980 ed. Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried, (London: Berghahn Books, 2005), 153-154.
practices. What was most important was that for the first time, large numbers of Europeans began regularly travelling beyond their nation state and into other areas of Europe.

Inter-European travel became a mass phenomenon for the first time in the 1950s and 1960s, generating a space where movements of people so central to the Treaty of Rome were foreshadowed, practiced, and learned from. In drawing a comparison between Benedict Anderson’s explanation of the unifying identity-building elements colonial bureaucrats’ mobilities and her own research on European civil aviation and the psychological changes brought by the airplane as a new technology of mobility in the interwar period, Kranakis found that “visiting one another’s home territories with growing frequency made European nations seem more closely linked, compatible and co-operative.”

Mass movement across borders in the name of travel and tourism, even when reproducing cultural stereotypes or superficial cultural experiences was certainly superior to the mass invasions by nationalist armies over the first half of the twentieth century. In order to partake in travel though, Europeans needed the time, means, and desire to leave their home regions.

In the postwar years vacationing and leisurely travel were part of the larger trend of escapism that characterized much of European popular culture in this period. The concept of vacationing as escapism was possible both as a fantasy—for those who could not partake—and as a reality for those who could partake; in the 1950s and 1960s, the number of those who could partake was rapidly increasing. By the 1950s, vacationing had entered mass European consciousness as a desirable and pleasurable leisure activity for most.

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classes of society in Western Europe. And while the concept of a vacation as a pleasurable experience is taken for granted today, as Kranakis notes, this was not always the case. In fact, historically, many of the reasons people travelled were unpleasant, involuntary, or for purely economic reasons, but during the interwar years, European airlines targeted elite travellers with promotional materials that connected luxury, speed, and idealised imaginations of other European nations “as desirable, intriguing—worth visiting.”

Furthermore, the technological advancements in air travel, while only accessible to the few and wealthy, still broadened the overall concept of ‘visitable’ space through the time-space compression offered by air travel and the feelings of transcendence—seeing from a bird’s eye view how arbitrary national borders were and how much more connected communities could seem—experienced by its early users. So while few people could actually afford to use air travel, the very existence of it (ability to transcend), dialogues about it (dissemination of information about new experiences), and posters promoting it (presenting viewers with idealized versions of other nations as “desirable ‘others’ to be consumed and enjoyed”) worked as a Europeanizing force where disconnected populations across Europe could imagine a larger community while trailblazers could experience it.

The groundwork for the a more open, curious, and cooperative imagination and visualization of pleasurable inter-European travel laid by airline posters in the interwar period functioned as an early framework contributing to what John Urry has described as the tourist gaze, specifically the point that:

There is an anticipation, especially though day-dreaming and fantasy, of intense pleasures, either on a different scale or involving different senses from those customarily encountered. Such anticipation is constructed and sustained through a variety of non-tourist practices, such as film,

40 Ibid., 311-312.
41 Ibid., 304, 313, 317.
newspapers, TV, magazines, records and videos which construct the gaze. Such practices provide the signs in terms of which the holiday experiences are understood, so that what is then seen is interpreted in terms of these pre-given categories.\textsuperscript{42}

Popular culture is essential to the construction of such gazes. Writing in the period covering the 1980s and 1990s, Urry also noted that international visitors, largely tourists created the potential for new social identity, where “particularly in Europe, people are themselves transformed. The right to travel has become a marker of citizenship…a novel kind of ‘consumer citizenship’” where “citizenship rights increasingly involve claims to consumer other cultures and places throughout the world.”\textsuperscript{43} It seems necessary to combine the groundwork laid by Kranakis’ examination of air travel in the interwar period and Urrys’s analysis of the evident transformations in the 1980s and 1990s to explore the initial rise of mass travel, its relationship with the worlds and fantasies of popular culture, and the discourses if inter-European rights citizenship emerging from the early integration period from the immediate postwar period through the 1960s. Here we find the transition from Kranakis’ few travellers to the masses and the early development of Urry’s right to travel as a marker of citizenship, particularly and importantly, European citizenship.

The roots of mass travel as a legislated right of European citizens can be found in the interwar period, while the ability to actually deploy these rights by partaking in international travel is a product of the postwar period, combining discourses of escapism, rising European affluence, and the proliferation of popular cultural representations of travel and vacationing within Europe as pleasurable and desirable. The dissemination of pleasurable representations of inter-European vacations was explicit, consciously constructed by the tourism industry, like the travel posters examined by Kranakis, but

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 165.
under even greater cooperation and pooling of resources, and implicit, in line with Urry’s popular cultural tourist gaze that provided citizens with an increasing number and variety of potential fantasies to be fulfilled. It is necessary to develop the rise of the right to travel implicit in the notion of legislated paid vacation, then move to a discussion of some of the new types of travellers and their locals before transitioning into a discussion of European identity and mobility, and its relationship with the integration process. In addition, the rising importance of trans-Atlantic travel must also be examined as part of the larger process of Americanization in postwar Europe with specific attention towards the inter-European co-operations in attracting American tourists as well as the homogenizing American tourist gaze towards Europe. Europeanization can and does take place whether its subjects realize it or not, and “identity almost everywhere has to be produced partly out of the images constructed for tourists.”44 In the case of Europe, elements of trans-national European identities were constructed consciously and specifically for American tourists for the economic benefit of Europeans. Finally, Bardot and her specifically European mobilities and locales will be examined in relation to these larger processes as a precursor to greater European mobility in the forthcoming era. As well, the French Riviera town of St. Tropez in particular, will be examined as a case study where all of the abovementioned elements, forces, characters, and dialogues come together in the 1950s and 1960s.

The Right to Travel: A European Right

While Urry, writing in the 1990s saw travel as a right of citizenship, American commentators in the 1950s and 1960s noted that “if the American works for raises and

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44 Ibid., 165.
promotions, the European works for his vacation.”

Taken together, these two points contribute to the development of a key aspect of European identity, rights, citizenship, and lifestyle in the era of early integration; the right to paid vacation and trans-national mobility that was entrenched by the mid 1960s. It is then necessary to examine some roots of the phenomenon and how it relates to the rise of mass European travel contributing to new forms of European identity and Europeanization.

Unlike the United States, where paid vacation was a special privilege of specific classes of workers, in almost all of Western Europe, the paid vacation was part of the social contact although scholars are vague on where and when this came to be a European-wide phenomenon. In Europe, paid vacations were legislated by national governments or lobbied for by various unions; by 1938, “most European countries had enacted legislation on paid holidays” and while most of these were for one week per year, the amount of paid vacation time increased steadily in the postwar era. Austria and Finland both enacted universal paid vacation legislation in the period following the First World War, while France established mandatory paid holidays in 1936. The International Labour Organization’s Holidays with Pay Convention (1936) provided universal paid holidays to workers in the following Western European countries; Denmark, France, Italy, and Spain, going into effect September 22 1939. Increasing numbers of Europeans were becoming entitled to paid vacations; International Labour Organization estimated, in 1939 that these

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48 Legislation on Annual Holidays for Workers in International Labour Review 11, 1925, 60.
49 International Labour Organization
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/index.cfm
numbers were between 70 and 80 million.\textsuperscript{50} In the United States, on the other hand, though by 1935, 80 percent of American salaried workers were entitled to paid vacation, by 1940, only roughly 50 percent of hourly-waged workers were entitled to paid vacations as unions worked towards higher wages rather than increased vacation time.\textsuperscript{51} In the postwar period, governments and unions throughout Western Europe pushed for the establishment of, or increases in paid vacation time as part of the mission of bolstering standards of living. The rebounding, integrating Europe wanted to ensure that economic improvements were complemented by leisure improvements as well, and vacation time was paramount to the European conception of leisure. By 1954, under “widespread or universal practice,” workers were entitled to paid holidays (on average) in; Austria 2-4 weeks, Belgium 1-3 weeks, Finland 2-3 weeks, France 3 weeks, West Germany 2-3 weeks, Ireland 1.4 weeks, Italy 2.4-3.2 weeks, Luxemburg 1.6-3.6 weeks, Netherlands 2-3 weeks, Norway 3 weeks, Sweden 3 weeks, United Kingdom 2 weeks.\textsuperscript{52} By 1962, paid holidays legislated at the national level included as the minimum; Austria, 12 days, Belgium 12 days, Iceland 12 days, Ireland 7 days, Luxemburg 8 days, Portugal 3-12 days, and Spain 7 days. While not contained within national legislation, it was customary, in 1962, to take 12 days in West Germany, 12 days in Italy, 15 days in the Netherlands, and 2 weeks in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{53} These practices are reflected in current European Union labour law, which mandates four to six weeks of paid vacation leave for all fulltime, and some part time workers of Member States. Access to and an increase in vacation time were a major drive

\textsuperscript{50} Furlough, 253, note 19.
in various European nations during the early integration era. Furthermore, the function of vacations—specifically cross-border vacations that became increasingly accessible with increased standards of living and mobility—reflected and promoted the free movement of people—in terms of leisure rather than work—central to the Treaty of Rome. With these holidays, Europeans increasingly visited each other’s nations.

**New Travellers and Their Locales**

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, postwar escapism played an essential role in the rise of mass European travel and in the immediate postwar period, travel destinations unmarked by the horror and destruction of war were especially attractive. Turning to the French Riviera in 1947, we can trace a representation of a rebounding Europe that foreshadows future developments in mass tourism. When the American Charles J. V. Murphy visited the French Riviera in 1947, he expected to find the ‘Europe’ one read about in the political cables, a Europe that “looms as a vast, unrelieved poorhouse,” but instead found “a wholly unexpected Europe.” The Europe he found, largely unscathed by war, became a representation of rebounding Europe, a world in transition. It was in many ways a fantasy Europe, but one that would become more and more of a reality during the 1950s and 1960s. As Murphy found a number of the old pre-war elites he expected to find on the Riviera, “ablaze with diamonds and emeralds the size of baseballs…pockets stuffed with 5,000 franc notes,” an American friend could not shake the feeling that, “I am going to be able to tell my grandchildren that in 1947, I was on the Riviera, watching these people throw out the last firecrackers.” In stark contrast to

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55 Murphy, *LIFE* August 10, 1947.
“international set” of the pre-war elites, Murphy also found Europe’s *nouveau riche* and “other prime beneficiaries of war” mingling with “swarms of middle-class French—small bankers, merchants, manufacturers, tradesmen, restaurant proprietors, chain-store operations, parts manufacturers…the middle men of Europe’s interconnected black markets.”\(^{56}\) Beyond this new Riviera group, Murphy found “yet another level of revellers—the clerks and minor functionaries of one category of another. They were known as the *congés payés*—or paid vacationers—because their fortnightly holidays on the Riviera were underwritten by their employers.”\(^{57}\) The paid vacationers, with their families, took up the rooms in small hotels and pensions, as well as sleeping in tent colonies.\(^{58}\) In further contrast to the pre-war elites, *nouveau riches*, new middle class, and even the paid vacationers, the article ends with an image of housewives protesting against the 250-gram bread ration contrasting sharply with the other opulent images and striking, “a proletarian note in Riviera season.”\(^{59}\) In 1947, then, all the elements of what would become mass-tourism in rebounding Europe were present, as were the tensions between different social classes and vastly different standards of living that the integration process would aim to improve. The pre-war elites would continue to use the Riviera as their playground, but they would be forced to share the space, hugely outnumbered by forthcoming masses of middle class and working class people.\(^{60}\) While the *congés payés* Murphy found in the Riviera in 1947 were largely French, concentrated efforts were going to be made to ensure

\(^{56}\) Murphy, *LIFE* August 10, 1947.  
\(^{57}\) Murphy, *LIFE* August 10, 1947.  
\(^{58}\) Murphy, *LIFE* August 10, 1947.  
\(^{59}\) Murphy, *LIFE* August 10, 1947.  
that a wider group of Europeans had both the time and means to partake in mass vacationing.

The technical ability to take paid vacations provided by governments and employers has already been addressed, but the economic ability and psychological willingness to actually take an international vacation must be examined. Furlough notes that in France, between the 1936 legislation of two weeks paid vacation and the post war era, many of those entitled did not travel during their vacations because of financial, psychological, mobility, and accommodation barriers. Despite restricted access, as the European middle class grew and the economy rebounded, an increasing number of Europeans were “coming to insist upon an annual vacation as an essential part of modern living” during the early 1950s, and their numbers would only increase into the 1960s. Between the late 1940s and 1970s vacations abroad entered the European consciousness, becoming, “a mass phenomenon, literally, and with the proliferation of mass-media cultural representations of vacations.” Those who could still not afford to take a vacation were becoming increasingly aware of vacations, the ideologies behind them, the process of taking them, and the key symbols associated with them, like the freedom of the sun, sea, sand, and sex. Those who could take vacations, did, and in increasingly large numbers. In the early 1950s, then, with some restrictions on foreign currency lifted, limitations on spending abroad loosened, an overall increase in the European standard of living, and

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61 Furlough 258-9.
63 Furlough, 250.
64 Furlough notes that the 1960s French travel market saw the sun, sand, sea, and sex associated with beach locations as the ultimate vacation ideal (whether it could be realized or simply enjoyed through mediated representations) and this dominance was directly related to the complimentary ideals of youth and beauty circulating at the time. The beach was a space for bodily sensations and eroticism linked to Bardot’s role in *Et Dieu...créa la femme* and other popular mediated representations. Furlough, 264, 276-276.
vacation time, larger groups of Europeans began travelling abroad more frequently. As the mass of vacationers grew, they took what is referred to as a socially divisive luxury in histories of the nation state—the vacation—and made it into a trans-European phenomenon. Quite simply, if vacations were becoming increasingly ‘mass-oriented’ and understood within particular nation states, through stepping back to look at the whole of European travel and vacationing, the masses grow exponentially. Millions of Europeans began undertaking the same types of adventures, towards the same types of places, and building upon the foundation of a shared imaginative spaces and into shared experiential spaces.

An important distinction between the interwar and postwar periods was the transition from limited and elite travel to mass travel and tourism, but an equally important trend centred around where the new masses travelled in comparison to the interwar elites and how. The postwar period displays a shift in vacation culture away from colonial territories and towards exoticized European locales and the rise of mass tourism by automobile. Rather than travelling by air from Berlin to Tunis, “under the burning sun of Africa,” from Paris to Casablanca, or from France to English Nigeria and back to Paris, “showing elite citizens their empire through travel,” enhancing “their sense of cultural superiority and ‘ownership,’” postwar Europeans travelled largely within Europe with a greater focus on similarities and co-existence. In replacement of the lost colonies and fantasies of travel and adventure they supported, exotic and remote European locales sprung up—particularly in poorer peripheral states like Spain, Portugal, and Greece—as well as consciously constructed pseudo-colonial travel clubs like Club Med with its

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original Polynesian themed resorts. A central factor in new European mass travel locales was the sun and beach with a marked north to south flow in inter-European tourism between the 1950s and 1960s.

Appendix A presents a table representing an adaptation of a collection of tourism data gathered by Anthony Williams and Wilbur Zelinsky from the International Union of Official Tourist Organizations in Geneva, revealing the aggregate flows for 1958, 1959, 1964, 1965, and 1966 of tourists from Western Europe and the United States, both sent and received. Williams and Zelinsky’s data reveals several interesting European travel trends. First, because the data begins in 1958, there were a number of customs unions in place and certain countries are treated as a unit rather than individual nations. The customs union between Belgium and Luxemburg meant that the researchers were unable to treat the inflows and outflows of tourists among these nations separately, and they are therefore reflected as a unit and flows are only measured into and out of the unit. Similarly, flows among the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark) and Iberia (Spain and Portugal) were also not reported. This fact alone demonstrates early stages of economic integration that were later extended within the Common Market and Schengen Zone. Secondly, the data demonstrates that there was significant movement of tourists around European countries, further supporting the abovementioned claim that the vast majority of European travellers and those travelling within Europe were other Europeans. For the years and nations the data represents, there were more than 300 million intra-European tourist exchanges, and this number does not include the exchanges among

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67 Williams and Zelinsky, 549-567.
Scandinavian nations, Iberia, and Belgium and Luxemburg. While there was still social division among those who could and could not take a vacation—even among those who could go based on where they could go and for how long—the increased intra-European mobility meant that more and more Europeans of different nationalities were coming together, across borders, in the same spaces.

A demographic particularly important to these rising numbers of inter-European travellers was youth. Youth was an especially important category in the postwar era as young people were given a distinct status as empowered consumers with products targeted specifically towards them and travel was no different; "youths functioned as trendsetters due to their above-average travel frequency, their advanced knowledge of foreign languages, as well as the larger willingness for interaction and communication. In this sense, the 1960s were the golden age of youth tourism." While the 1960s may have been the golden age for youth tourism, it had important roots in the immediate postwar period and 1950s as well. Youth across Europe embraced opportunities to travel abroad, West German youth in particular were noted by contemporary observers for an intense desire "to overcome the isolation brought about by the war." Similarly, British youth embraced new opportunities for travelling abroad, specifically to the Continent as did the general British population. In 1951, 4.5 percent of the British population—roughly 1,854,000 of 41.2 million persons—took their annual holidays abroad, with the significant majority travelling across the Channel to the Continent. Of this group, only 36.5 (667,440) percent had taken holidays abroad before the war, while 57 percent (1,056,780) of them had taken

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68 Schildt, “Across the Border: West German Youth Travel to Western Europe,” 151.
69 Ibid., 150.
more than one trip abroad after the war.\textsuperscript{71} Every year since 1947, new British passports were issued at a rate of a half-million per year.\textsuperscript{72} The trend towards lower income and youth travel was becoming clear and was swiftly noted by travel industry experts. Of those surveyed by the British Travel and Holidays Association, as a representative of the British foreign travelling population, 33 percent were below the age of thirty and nearly 80 percent were below the age of 50. In addition, 47 percent of these male tourists and 52.9 percent of these female tourists earned less than £10 per week, demonstrating, “that it is in the lower income groups where prospects for development lie.”\textsuperscript{73} It is not surprising then, that British foreign travel expenditures rose 400\% between 1950 and 1968 with the development of the mass tourist market.\textsuperscript{74} Similar developments in Germany meant that by the end of 1950s, “the percentage of travellers in their teens or twenties was significantly above the national average.”\textsuperscript{75} Youth appeared to be more open towards other European nations, eager, and curious to experience different things, rather than suspicious or indifferent to other nations and ‘cultures.’ Youth could, and did travel around Europe in pursuit of their new popular cultural idols, attending concerts, chasing after film stars. Furthermore, youth in the 1950s and 1960s would have had significantly less, or no memory of the war, instead growing up in an era when European co-operation was in high fashion and economies were booming under the Economic Miracle or \textit{les Trentes Glorieuses}. Travel was urged on young people by social forces and economic conditions,

\textsuperscript{71} Lickorish and Kershaw, “The British Travel Market,” (1952), 42-44.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 43.
\textsuperscript{75} Schildt, “Across the Border: West German Youth Travel to Western Europe,” 151.
and they, as well as other sectors of societies, answered the call, but was Europe ready for these swarms of travellers?

**The Technological and Social Organization of Travel**

We will now move to examine the technological and social organization of travel on two separate but interrelated levels. First it is necessary to address elements of and changes in the travel industry motivated by the desire to keep lucrative tourist dollars flowing around Europe. As has been demonstrated, the demand for travel existed and increasing numbers of Europeans did move across European borders, but how did they move, where did they stay? Second, it is important to examine the consciously constructed discourse of travel and tourism integration and its relationship to other elements of the European integration project in this era, asking what is the relationship between integration and tourist mobilities?

From the industries’ points of view, supporting social, technological, and infrastructural networks that enabled these new masses of tourists to move around Europe was essential to the rise of mass European travel. As Urry noted, technological innovations in and of themselves could not drastically alter travel patterns without the necessary “organizational transformations” enabling people to use them.\(^{76}\) In the immediate postwar period, the potential relationship between air travel and militarism was still prevalent enough to result in the suspension of Deutsche Luft Hansa following the German defeat in 1945 and the delayed reestablishment of a German commercial airline (Lufthansa) until 1954. Furthermore, in the postwar period inter-European air travel was still expensive, catering to the same type of group of wealthy leisure and business elites that characterized

\(^{76}\) Urry, 142.
the interwar period. Of particular importance to the rise of mass travel then, were cheaper alternatives to expensive air travel and their successful implementation. Air service catered to elite travellers and in the ten years after the Second World War, while there had been no decrease in the demand for air travel, there had also been no increase in the demand for air travel relative to the massive increases in total demand for travel.\textsuperscript{77} Air travel however, was essential in the growing number of trans-Atlantic tourist movements, the vast majority of which moved west to east from the United States to Europe (addressed in the next section).

One of the popular alternatives to inter-European air and rail travel was the motor-coach, which in the case of the United Kingdom, grew from making 300 cross-Channel trips in 1939 to over 2500 cross-Channel trips in 1955. International motor-coach touring had been pioneered by the Swedish line Linjebuss beginning in 1947 and making trans-European trips as far as between Sweden and Rome.\textsuperscript{78} International motor-coach touring in this era, however, is best remembered and represented by the Europabus lines established in April of 1951 as a subsidiary of the Union des Services Routiers des Chemins de Fer Européens (URF), which was itself a group of railway administrations from eleven Western European countries. Europabus involved the joint planning of “a network of services with harmonized time schedules. They provided international tickets and organized collective publicity.”\textsuperscript{79} In its inaugural years, Europabus had twenty-eight routes covering 18 5000 kilometres of road and rail, by 1956, Europabus “had more than a

\textsuperscript{78} Frank Schipper, \textit{Driving Europe: Building Europe in roads in the twentieth century} (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008), 234.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 236.
hundred lines and circular tours covering 40,000 km in seventeen countries."\(^{80}\) The motor-coach was representative of the largest and most important new trend in postwar mass travel, the use of motor-vehicles and road networks to reach one’s destination.

While motor-coach touring was popular, especially as a cheap alternative to other means of travel, the privately owned car or motorcycle became the ideal means of travel. And though inter-European air travel was especially fertile ground to promote a more integrated Europe through the feelings of transcendence where one could clearly see “a visibly powerful natural world that displayed no borders,” where “tiny people whose similarities seemed more pronounced than their differences,” were strikingly visible, road travel offered its own elements of transcendence.\(^{81}\) In *Driving Europe*, Frank Schipper quotes a page from *L’Européen* (1929) stating, “Allemand? Anglais? Italien, Français? Sur la route, non. Automobiliste,” to introduce the idea that “driving a car made motorists transcend their national identity. Motorized travelling created a certain fraternity among motorists.”\(^{82}\) And throughout the 1950s, motorists definitely crossed borders and built experiences of different places whether or not these experiences led them to transcend their national identities. Somewhat ironically, though by the mid to late 1960s, this interwar motorist ‘fraternity’ would give way to especially disillusioned and morbid popular cultural characterizations of car travel.

In the 1950s, while air and motor-coach has so far met demand for tourist services, the predictions for a rapid increase in the volume of tourists generated a fear within the tourist industry that “travel may become stabilized in the near future unless the supply of services is adapted to meet the very great potential demand form persons with fairly modest

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\(^{80}\) Ibid., 239.  
\(^{81}\) Kranakis, 304, 306.  
\(^{82}\) “L’automobile en Europe,” *L’Européen* 1, no. 30 (1929): 8, in Schipper, 121 and Schipper, 121.
incomes,” like the abovementioned roughly 50 percent of male and female international British travellers earning less than £10 per week. The services required by these travellers varied from affordable and available accommodation to eateries in tourist destinations, but most importantly, a road network with the necessary travel services, again including accommodations, eateries and gas stations as travel by personal vehicle, even for those with modest incomes, dominated the European travel market. Between 1951 and 1955 for instance, car ownership in Europe jumped from 6.7 million to over 10.4 million in just four short years as part of a larger trend between 1947 and 1973, where “car ownership changed from a privilege to a normality…and the annual family holiday by car became the epitome of a modern, wealthy, twentieth century European.” By 1966, France alone was home to over 8 million cars. International European car traffic increased 250 percent between 1950 and 1956, becoming by far the most popular means for Europeans to travel to vacation destinations throughout Europe. Several examples from different parts of Europe further demonstrate the rapidly increasing popularity of inter-European car travel. In Switzerland, 7,284 touring vehicles entered the country in 1922, increasing to 36,380 in 1925 and 167,463 in 1930. The postwar numbers as significantly more impressive with 1,255,000 foreign vehicles entering Switzerland in 1953, jumping to over 1,800,000 in two years by 1955. Italy’s inflow of foreign vehicles also grew significantly, reflecting both Italy’s popularity as a European-European travel destination (as evident in Table 1) and the growing importance of road travel. Between 1953 and 1955 the inflow of foreign vehicles

84 Schipper, 159.
87 Schipper, 122.
into Italy grew from 950,000 to 1.5 million. In 1952 less than one million German-registered cars and motorcycles re-entered the country after touring abroad, but by 1955 this number was 6.5 million. In the same period, the number of foreign touring vehicles that entered West Germany jumped from less than 1 million to over 4 million. By 1955 France saw an inflow of 4.5 million foreign vehicles while Great Britain shipped 162,000 cars to the Continent in 1955, up from 90,000 in 1950. Private vehicle ownership and mobility across all Western European nations—though at different paces—grew substantially through the 1950s and 1960s.

The traveller with a private vehicle, therefore, was of paramount concern to the growing tourist industry, which foresaw the need for adaptation within the industry and cooperation with various governments responsible for building new roads. Travel destinations’ accessibility played a major role in their development, citing examples of quality roads that were built primarily for tourism, including the French Riviera’s Corniche des Maures (that connected Le Lavandou and the Saint-Tropez peninsula), the Susten Pass in Switzerland, and the Grossglockner Pass in Austria, as well as the need to build more and better roads in popular destinations with limited infrastructure such as southern Italy. Call for cooperation between various European states in the tourist industries, however, ran much deeper than road building, as “satisfied motorists are the fertile soil in which touring by car grows steadily, for the economic good of all countries concerned and the spiritual and cultural benefit of their people.” In the mid to late 1950s trans-national tourism

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89 Ibid., 12.
90 Ibid., 15. For a detailed analysis of the role of roads and road building in integrating Europe see Frank Schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on the Roads in the Twentieth-Century. (Amsterdam: Aksant), 2009.
dialogue both reflected and fuelled the optimism and utopian discourses of the integration period surrounding the Treaty of Rome.

**Tourism and European Integration**

It is in travel, tourism, and their associated mobilities that we can locate an early version of one of the most crucial elements in creating what is a central focus of European identity supported by the European Union today. Tourism and its associated mobilities served as a type of ‘test case’ for the free movement of people—such as the reduction and abolition of documents for the temporary import of vehicles initiated by the Benelux countries and Scandinavia and evident in the 1961 abolition of triptyques in all Council of Europe nations (excluding Iceland and the UK) and also including Portugal, Spain, and Yugoslavia—central to the Treaty of Rome and advancing integration process. In 1955, just prior to the Treaty of Rome, the tourist industry had become “Europe’s largest dollar earning industry; in many European countries it is one of the principal export trades.” In 1955, approximately 30 million tourists travelled in European countries, with the vast majority being other Europeans; Americans—the second largest tourist group—comprised only roughly 500 000 of these tourists. Intra-European tourism in 1955 was two to three times greater than the pre-war levels, with room to expand; tourism was seen as an industry with almost unlimited potential for economic growth. Cooperation among various European nations was absolutely essential to this growth and the industry picked up on the growing integrationist current, seeing in Europeans, “a recognition that their interests

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91 Schipper, 229-320.
extend beyond their natural borders.” Europe and Europeans were starting to realize Ortega y Gasset’s 1930 observations:

For the first time, the European, checked in his projects, economic, political, intellectual, by the limits of his own country, feels that those projects…are out of proportion to the size of the collective body in which he is enclosed. And so he has discovered that to be English, German, or French is to be provincial.

In postwar European tourism, pro-integrationist philosophical currents from the interwar era, economic recovery, and the idealized ‘friendship’ discourses of the integration project came together perfectly; “tourism is considered, in fact, the easiest and most instinctive preparation to the consciousness of European unity—political and economic—that seems to be the historic task of our generation.” Optimists from the A.I.E.S.T. (Association Internationale d’experts Scientifiques du Tourism) believed that tourism had the most positive effect in promoting knowledge and mutual understanding among various European populations as tourism reached increasingly large populations of various classes.

Tourism was the terrain on which the mass intermixing of European peoples could be tested.

Furthermore, tourism was directly linked to the preamble of the Treaty of Rome in terms of “the steady improvement in the lives of the people.” Tourism was believed to

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94 Ibid., 2.
95 Ortega Y Gasset, Revolt of the Masses (1930) quoted in Kranakis, 309-310.
96 Gaetano Falzone, “Possibilità de unificazione legislative e strutturale del turismo europeo,” The Tourist Review 11:1 (1956) 24. Original Italian Il turismo è considerato, in fatti, il mezzo più semplice e più istintivo di preparazione a quella coscienza di unità europea—politica ed economica—che sembra l’obiettivo storico della nostra generazione. See also a well known poster that Italy prepared in 1957 to celebrate the Treaty of Rome where the six signatories are represented by women holding hands wearing skirts in with the colours and patters of the respective countries’ flags. http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/download/photo_download_en.cfm?id=224343&type=4
be able to can play a greater role in demonstrating success in terms of the improvement of
people’s lives; the more people travelled for pleasure, the better their lives had become.
Tourism would reflect success in the integration process as well as be driven towards
greater success by the changes the Common Market would bring, particularly, a future
without foreign exchange restrictions, identifications and travel customs formalities.\(^9^9\)

Prior to the customs unions and other multi-lateral agreements between the original
signatories of the Treaty of Rome, the tourism industry was promoting complementary and
psychologically preparatory practices, including the concept of ‘new spatial thinking.’
New spatial thinking involved broadening conceptions of space / place to extend beyond
national boundaries, focusing on a geographical or topographical similarities across borders
similar to the concept of transcendence developed earlier. It was about looking at
identifiable similarities rather than arbitrary differences constructed through imaginary and
invisible national borders. New spatial thinking was particularly encouraged in potentially
lucrative tourist areas (like the Alps) where the mental, cultural, and historical
understanding of space could be broadened and used in conjunction with foreign transport
networks and growing economic prosperity to boost tourism.\(^1^0^0\) It would facilitate the
drawing of tourists to an imagination of a particular area where better road networks could
then transport them across national borders to continue their adventures and provide an
economic boost to multiple nations. By working together, various national tourist
industries hoped to generate an overall increase in area tourism and benefit from each
other’s promotion, propaganda, and travel services. Even in the lucrative tourist trade,

(1958), 88.
\(^1^0^0\) Ibid., 92.
which could easily lead to national protectionism and selfishness on the part of rebounding economies, it was an era of co-operation over competition.

New spatial thinking was reflected in Augsburg, Salzburg, and Vienna being marked as the “three cities of Mozart” or the Ardennes-Eiffel Group (formed in 1955), which saw France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Germany promote the Ardennes region through publishing common promotional propaganda, improving accommodations, and promoting the movement of vehicles through road-network development. In a peaceful Europe, the Ardennes was re-imagined as a trans-national tourist space with former adversaries working together to promote a region which was the site of a Wehrmacht military offensive (Ardennes Offensive / Battle of the Bulge) a decade earlier. New spatial thinking, while important to the intra-European travel industry and mentality was also targeted towards increasing and sharing the critically important and lucrative American tourist dollar. Turning to American tourism in Europe, the role of the American gaze and American articulations of Europe in the interpellation of Europe as Europe, become clear.

**Selling Europe, Becoming Europe: Catering to American Tourists**

The United States represented a homogenizing force in Europe during the postwar period in terms of both its involvement in European rebuilding efforts—contributing greatly to the development of European road-based transport networks over rail, for instance—as well as through a tourist gaze as more and more Americans made the trans-Atlantic trip to Europe in the postwar era. While tourism was Europe’s largest industry in 1955 and demonstrated a sharing of increasingly European wealth, American tourist dollars

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were particularly attractive. American tourist dollars were seen as a lucrative means to reduce the dollar deficit in postwar Europe. Tourism was seen as a type of ‘invisible’ export because spending by tourists were part of a nation’s foreign claims, without the nation having to manufacture, produce, and distribute physical products. As a singular travel destination for Americans, ‘Europe’ sat on the receiving end of Borocz’s conception of ‘leisure migration’ where “the consumer travels to the commodity, resulting the in the geographical movements of people for the purposes of consumption.” American tourism to Europe had almost reached pre-war levels by 1952, but would greatly exceed pre-war levels in the coming years. American tourists to Europe reached 330,000 in 1952 compared with 350,000 in 1929, but estimates for 1955 were close to 600,000. In 1952, American tourist expenditures in Europe totalled $400,000,000 (USD) and by 1961, US travel expenditures to Europe reached $666,000,000.

The visitors consume the tourist services of their destination, and American expenditures were financially significant. Beyond expenditures on ‘Europe’ as a commodity, American travellers could also stimulate other ‘national’ material exports like French perfume and liqueurs, Italian silk and ceramics, Swiss chocolates and embroideries, and Austrian leather. Europe benefited from both the consumption of services as well as goods with the consumer undertaking all the ‘export’ expense. In later years, such material

103 Ibid., 63.
107 Krapf, (1958), 63.
exports could include things as extravagant as cars, as popular magazines recounted tales of people who had ordered a new Volkswagen, flown to Europe, used the Volkswagen for travelling, and then had it shipped back to the United States.  

What was most important about the increasing numbers of Americans in Europe though, was the American preference for a generic entity called ‘Europe’ rather than the individual nation states. After observing American flows to Europe for several years, the A.I.E.S.T. found that Americans focused more on the concept “awakened in them by the word ‘Europe” rather than focusing on particular countries; the association planned to target their propaganda accordingly. European airlines and tourist organizations were particularly keen to appeal to American desires because American expenditures in Europe were incredibly important economically. One outcome of these types of efforts was the creation of the Eurail pass for North American tourists initiated in 1959. The passes, as “the Master Key to Railroad Travel in Europe,” enabled North American tourists to purchase a single ticket in enabling unlimited rail travel throughout Austria, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland without the hassle of foreign exchange. New spatial thinking and the co-operative groundwork laid by the European Coal and Steel Community as well as European directed rail ventures like the Trans Europ Express, had come a long way.

109 Schwarzenstein, (1960), 199.
111 The Trans Europe Express was created in 1957 by merging sections of formerly national railways of Germany, Italy, Holland, and Switzerland to provide a luxury class trans-national service with customs duties carried out en route to enable border crossings without stoppages. The trains were designed to appeal to internationalism by avoiding the aesthetic of the previous national railways and the Trans Europ
There were four other crucial directives aimed at luring and sharing American tourist dollars. The 1952 introduction of cheaper tourist class airfares played an important role in bringing greater numbers of Americans to Europe. By the mid 1950s, these cheap tourist fares were bringing up to 75 percent of all American tourists to Europe. Shortly thereafter reduced rates for off-season travel were offered as well as small discounts on group travel. The critically important fourth initiative, however, was the invention of ‘travel-now-pay-later’ programs, initially established by the American airline PanAm, and quickly taken up by the European airlines. Tourists could purchase their European vacation on credit with a limited down payment so that by 1956, advertisements in the United States were asking, “why is a trip to Europe like a television set? Because you can pay for both of them the same way—on time!”\textsuperscript{112} In its inaugural year, travel-now-pay-later brought 6.3 percent of all American travellers to Europe, reflecting, “a new market of people who would not otherwise travel abroad.”\textsuperscript{113} Also important in the travel-now-pay-later scheme was the fact that purchasers did not need collateral to secure the credit, thus appealing to the ever-growing youth travel market. The once-daunting trans-Atlantic voyage had become increasingly accessible and enabled growing masses of Americans to experience and reflect on Europe.\textsuperscript{114} This was both a significant source of revenue for European countries, but also a key factor that brought tourists who helped define elements of a European identity, through their own observations (Chapter 2) as well as through European attempts to cater to them.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 4.
An Air France advertisement taken from *New York Magazine* demonstrates almost all these trends, and most importantly, the new spatial thinking deployed by European businesses to appeal to the American preference for the generic concept of Europe with superficial cultural differences. In “The après-skier’s guide to the Alps” readers are offered a choice of several different packages. In the first, “Avec l’auto, pour 2,” couples are offered two transfers from airport to hotel, accommodations for 14 nights in Grenoble, “with the distinctive French touch,” Lucerne, with “good snow. Good sun. The Good people of Switzerland,” or Innsbruck, with “Tyrolean songs and dances for you to join in on,” a vehicle and 1000 kilometres of mileage for $268 (based on roundtrip economy fare from New York to Geneva for groups of 15) and a $70 minimum tour arrangement. “Les Swinging Singles” are offered different accommodations and packages while the rest of the ad highlights the minimum high season hotel rates for Chamonix, Val d’Isère, Courchevel, Megève, Grenoble (France), St. Anton, Kitzbühel, Innsbruck (Austria), Cervina, Sestriere (Italy), Davos, St. Moritz “more ritz than the Ritz”, Zermatt, Lucerne (Switzerland). This ad demonstrates new spatial thinking initiatives targeted at attracting American tourist dollars, superficial anecdotal differences in the ‘cultures’ of Grenoble, Lucerne, and Innsbruck, tourist fares, and group discounts. In addition, almost all the locations mentioned were linked with some reference to celebrity sightings, such as Lucerne where one may find “many celebrities in the arts” or Megève, “known to princes, starlets, artists, politicians,” or Sestriere, “heaven for celebrity seekers.” Europe was being sold as old and new, both glamorous and modern, charming, but convenient, and a place to ‘be seen,’ and if one was going to be seen, one better be looking their best.

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116 Ibid.
For a different class of traveller, and one increasingly prevalent in the postwar travel and tourism circuit, there was the International Beauty Appointment Service offered through a partnership with the European SAS (Scandinavian Airlines), the American beauty product manufacturer Helene Curtis, and beauty salons across Europe. The female traveller was encouraged to partake in the “pleasures of jet age travel” where she could set out on her European vacation “with the confirmation of an appointment of a shampoo and set “over there.” Connections with salons in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, England, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland meant that “you can travel happily, knowing in advance that you can shed your tired-traveler [sic] look for one of glamour once you reach your destination.” Both of these ads demonstrate various levels of cooperation and integration among members of the travel, tourism, hospitality, and beauty industry in an attempt to sell Americans on a specific idea of Europe that was readily consumable. A central element in the consumable Europe were specific ideas of beauty and glamour as well as a rediscovery of the natural beauty of European places like beaches and the Alps. The beauty, glamour, naturalness, and sex appeal of European locales, especially in the American imagination was directly linked to prominent European celebrities of this period, including Bardot.

**Bardot’s Mobility: Proto-Eurostar**

Bardot’s status as a highly visible trendsetter meant that her specific mobilities were constantly monitored and reported on, and contributed greatly to her status as a specifically

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118 Ibid.
European star. Throughout the course of her life and career into the late 1960s, Bardot’s mobilities are in line with overall changes in postwar travel patterns and destinations. Though as the daughter of a wealthy family, and increasingly wealthy throughout the years of her stardom, Bardot’s mobilities did remain elite mobilities and while out of reach for the average European, they still reflected trends and elements of experiences available to the increasing number of mass vacationers in this era. Bardot’s life began in Paris with a short stint in Dinard on the Channel coast during the war years and back to Paris. The Bardot family vacationed regularly in Louveciennes, and took their daughter on a trip to Megève as a reward when Brigitte won a ballet competition as a teenager, in both instances, remaining in France. After meeting Vadim in 1949 and beginning her film career in 1952, Bardot’s mobility broadened in line with the general increase in mobility that occurred after the immediate postwar years started giving way to the economic boom years. Bardot made what appears to be her first international trip in 1951, crossing the France-Switzerland border in the Alps at Megève to obtain an abortion in Switzerland. Next, Bardot visited the French Riviera in 1952 to shoot *Manina la fille sans voiles*, took her first honeymoon in the French Alps, and became the photographer’s dream at the Cannes Film Festival in 1953, crossing the border for her first trip to Italy later in 1953, to shoot *Tradita*. Bardot visited Rome to shoot *Helen of Troy* in 1954 and made her first cross-Channel trip to England in February of 1955 to shoot *Doctor at Sea*. By 1957, she had also visited Germany several times and filmed the first of many of her movies to be shot in Spain. So by the time she was 23, Bardot had crossed at least five European borders at least once, spent considerable time in France’s two largest postwar vacation

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119 Singer, 8, 15.  
120 Ibid., 21.  
121 Ibid., 22-26, 31, 38.
destinations, the Riviera and the Alps, and her mobility would only accelerate into the 1960s. Throughout the rest of the 1950s and 1960s, Bardot made numerous trips to Italy (Spoleto, Capri, Cortina, Florence, Venice, Rome), Switzerland (Geneva, Gstaad, St. Moritz), Germany (Trier, Munich, Hamburg, rural Bavaria), Portugal (Lisbon), Spain (Madrid, Seville, Torrenolinos), and the United Kingdom (London, Scotland).

In discussing European cinema, Mark Betz argues that the female characters “collectively present the image of a flâneuse engaged in a quest for meaning as she wanders the terrain of a changing Europe,” and Bardot is one of numerous “prominent film actors who were in migration across national borders to make European films.” While Betz focuses mainly on mobility as a theme of postwar European cinema, his reference to Bardot as an actress who moves freely around Europe inspires this section. Rather than being on a quest to find meaning like some of her characters, Bardot’s movement around Europe created meaning, adding a detailed layer to the European popular cultural space; “European mobility is sometimes all about regional movement over small distances separated by large national boundaries.” Put simply, Bardot’s mobility was a distinctly European mobility, and she often expressed anxiety at the thought of leaving Europe. Unlike so many other female stars of the era, who made the move from European to Hollywood cinema, Bardot remained firmly in Europe, passing up a lucrative film project with Frank Sinatra, Paris by Night, because she refused to spend four months shooting in

122 Betz, 95, 82.
123 Adrian Favell, Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2008), 10.
124 Bardot rarely left Europe, making her first trans-Atlantic trip to Brazil in 1964 and being entirely dissatisfied in Rio de Janeiro, though very much enjoying the isolated fishing village of Buzios. Bardot was also incredibly anxious to visit the United States for the first time, refusing to do so until 1965. Bardot’s made several extra-European trips during her relationship with German ‘jet-set’ playboy Gunter Sachs including an unpleasant trip to Beruit, Lebanon in 1968.
the United States and Sinatra did not want to shoot in Europe. Americans hoping to get a glimpse of Brigitte had to make the pilgrimage to Europe, as in the 1965 film, *Dear Brigitte*. In this film, James Stewart plays a professor whose son writes love letters to Bardot until receiving an invitation to visit her in Paris. Bardot appears in the film for several minutes presenting her young admirer with a kiss and a puppy. Bardot’s refusal to entertain Hollywood in particular, sets her apart from the other European superstars of her era, making her the European superstar, and a proto-Eurostar.

Adrian Favell’s 2008 book *Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integration Europe* seeks to locate and profile the “small but symbolically powerful population” of Eurostars who are characterized by embracing their rights to live and work anywhere within the European Union, built upon and expanded in the previous fifty years of European integration.” In many ways, Bardot’s life and career was that of a proto-Eurostar. Although importantly never actually maintaining a home outside of her native France, her movements and especially her professional network reflects those of Favell’s Eurostars, particularly her willingness to travel and work around Europe, and resistance towards the United States. Despite being marked by specific nationalisms tied to the nationality of directors, European film was a particularly pan-European industry. Bardot acted in so-called French, British, and Italian films, as well as several co-productions undertaken between France, Britain, Italy, and West Germany. Furthermore, many of these films were multilingual, involved cast and crew from across Europe, and were also physically filmed, edited, scored, and promoted by a variety of European professionals.

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125 Singer, 45.
126 *Dear Brigitte*, Henry Loster, Twentieth Century Fox, 1965.
127 Favell, Preface, x.
128 See Betz, *Beyond the Subtitle*, for a detailed discussion of European cinema and integration.
across a wide European space. Throughout her career, Bardot built a distinctly European, rather than ‘international’ star persona.\textsuperscript{129} This resistance towards travelling too far from her home and roots parallels a key aspect of Eurostar mobility as the desire for “some space and freedom, but not too much,” remaining close to home and family but far enough away to enjoy freedoms from expected social and familial norms.\textsuperscript{130} Even as a young girl, Bardot very much enjoyed getting away; “she loved getting away from a regimented Parisian life of rigid discipline and routines.”\textsuperscript{131} It is not surprising then, that young Bardot, after earning quite a few million francs throughout the 1950s decided to purchase a retreat in the quiet French Riviera town of St. Tropez.

Saint-Tropez

Saint-Tropez is where the overlapping layers of the Bardot myth, trans-European popular culture, and mass tourism come together. Like all mass tourist destinations, Saint-Tropez has a myth of its own. Bardot, however played an especially important role in creating the contemporary myth of Saint-Tropez. The Office de Tourisme de Saint-Tropez website states, “\textit{Le mythe de Saint-Tropez fait toujours rêver. Le village demeure le passage obligé des célébrités, des amoureux de la mer, des passionnés d'histoire, d'art et des férus de patrimoine.}”\textsuperscript{132} Saint-Tropez’s position as a location unavoidable by

\textsuperscript{129} It was widely rumoured that Bardot was offered as much as $250 000 per picture from Hollywood studios. She was also supposedly offered $50 000 from Ed Sullivan for three television appearances. See \textit{Saturday Evening Post} June 14, 1958. Also, Bardot’s Hollywood representative reported receiving offers from all major studios with some willing to pay Bardot one million dollars for one picture or $1500 a week for twenty-five years. See Lloyd Shearer, “Brigitte Bardot: She won’t work in Hollywood,” \textit{Modesto Bee}, January 11, 1959.

\textsuperscript{130} Favell, 10.

\textsuperscript{131} Singer, 11.

\textsuperscript{132} http://www.ot-saint-tropez.com/index.php?page=decouvrir/index&choix_lang=fr – “Saint-Tropez is a myth everyone dreams about. The village remains the unavoidable destination for celebrities, lovers of the sea, art history, and heritage enthusiasts.”
celebrities is inextricably linked to Bardot’s presence there. Its mythic history with Bardot is anchored to its serving as the setting for *Et Dieu* and Bardot making it her home shortly after filming (and maintaining a home there throughout her career). Saint-Tropez’s other past is filled with the more literarily and artistically inspired, including Colette, who kept her home in Saint-Tropez, as well as a small, but important group of painters including Paul Signac, Henri Matisse, Pierre Bonnard, Francis Picabia, Charles Camoin, Maximillen Luce, and Pablo Picasso. Despite a modest number of famous, wealthy visitors, Saint-Tropez maintained its ‘natural’ historic setting in stark contrast to the opulent casinos in other historically popular Riviera towns. Before Bardot and mass tourism, Saint-Tropez had a long quiet history, like other small Provençal fishing villages. The Riviera was always fashionable, but not always accessible, although the construction of the abovementioned Corniche des Maures improved its accessibility. Margaret Turner, whose family who moved to the French Riviera town of Juan-les-Pins from England in 1928 remembered a world very different from the one about to explode on the Riviera in the late 1950s through the 1960s. Turner describes the Riviera as she remembered it from the 1920s:

> It was extremely rare to leave England and come out here. It felt very cut off which is strange when you think about how people move around nowadays…the journey took 20 hours by steam train…there were very few cars or tarmaced roads. People used to walk along the dirt roads into the countryside which came right up to the edge of the town…we had no car, telephone or washing machine.\(^{133}\)

The scene surrounding Saint-Tropez in 1928 was similar to this description of Juan-des-Pins. Between 1958, when Bardot bought her home there, and the close of the 1960s Saint-Tropez became a place very different from Turner’s 1920s Riviera.

\(^{133}\) “When France was a different place,” *The Connexion*, June 2, 2008. [http://www.connexion france.com/when-france-was-a-different-place-10192-news-article.html](http://www.connexion france.com/when-france-was-a-different-place-10192-news-article.html)
By the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, Saint Tropez’s 4000 citizens, who had “long earned their meager living either by fishing of by working at the nearby naval torpedo factory,” faced a masses of tourists every summer season.\(^{134}\) In the postwar era, with increasing access to vacations, and the boom of the economic miracle years, the vast majority of people wanted to, or needed to, take their vacation in the summer. Unlike the pre-war leisure class who travelled at all times of the year, most summer visitors to Saint-Tropez could not be more different from the woman “ablaze with diamonds” on the Riviera in 1947, described by Murphy earlier in the chapter. In fact, Bardot’s representation of youth culture, beauty, rebellion, and sex was the antithesis to the pre-war elite leisure class, as were those who followed her to Saint-Tropez. In Bardot’s era Saint-Tropez developed a unique mythic identity:

The myth is that Brigitte Bardot will suddenly appear from her villa and do something titillating in public, that everyone is slim and fantastic looking, that the air is so heavy with sex and pleasure that good middle-class daughters will travel to the next town down the road to put a less upsetting postmark on their cards home.\(^{135}\)

In 1950s and 1960s Saint-Tropez, instead of aristocrats, millionaires, and snobs, one found “hoards of hitch-hiking, jungle-haired, bloudjinnes-wearing youngsters who swarm down to worship at the shrine of Bardot.”\(^{136}\) The young international tourists piled into Saint-Tropez looking for a fantasy that they hoped Bardot’s Saint-Tropez could meet, as Saint-Tropez held “unique beauty, no kind of comfort, and every kind of freedom” in contrast to

\(^{134}\) “Foreign News: This Happy Few,” *TIME*, July 21, 1958.
the opulence and exclusivity of Cannes or Monte Carlo. Saint-Tropez represented a democratization of space once reserved exclusively for the very wealthy.

When Murphy found the early congés payés in the Riviera in 1947, they were described as swarming the beaches of Jaun-les-Pins and Nice, “at one point they very nearly inundated Eden Roc itself with an influx of shouting, almost naked folk. To keep them out Mr. Sella was obliged to double the price of admission.” The exclusive and luxurious Eden Roc represented an early fight against the democratization of space and an attempt to maintain its elite pre-war status as “the democratization of travel leads to distinctions of taste.” In Saint-Tropez of the 1950s and 1960s, on the other hand, “they hitch-hiked, borrowed cars, played guitars and lived on thin air,” ignoring the fact that there were not enough hotel rooms to house them all, the masses “will sleep in tents, motorcars or on the beach” and descend in the tens of thousands from nearby campsites.

Saint-Tropez built a myth of freedom, sex, and unpretentious glamour that briefly made it:

Perhaps the last town in the Western Hemisphere where there are no class barriers and no sex barriers. Vice and virtue wear the same corsair pants. Rich and poor, town people and ‘foreigners’ call each other mon petit and play pétanque on the same barefooting...you may wear anything...except an old-fashioned bathing suit.

This description of Saint-Tropez reflects an element of optimism and idealism that was both common and important in the era of economic miracles and idealized postwar leisure. The rapid democratization of space represented by Saint-Tropez, however, did not last long.

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138 Murphy, LIFE November 10, 1947.
139 Urry, 130.
and was not without its own tensions representative of deeper and emerging fissures in an increasingly European mass society.

It was not long before the beatniks and masses of restless sexually liberated youth were not welcome in Saint-Tropez any longer. In 1966, Saint-Tropez made a decision to “outlaw foreign beatniks and beatnik types” with Mayor Jean Lescudier announcing “I am anti-beatnik even when it comes to French-born beatniks…Saint-Tropez does not need this surplus of originality.” The beatniks were easily identifiable through their “standard uniform,” becoming the “long-haired, moneyless, jobless, and untidy visitors” that were turned back at the border, thrown in jail, or chased out of town. The freedom of borderless movement had not yet been achieved and the foreign beatniks were pushed out. In the mid to late 1960s, in Saint-Tropez and other Riviera towns, those against the beatniks, were attempting to re-appropriate the democratized shared space.

While much of the Riviera shoreline was technically public space, regular vacationers were finding it increasingly difficult to reach the beach because of privatization of property, while “at the accessible public beaches, concession owners, backed by musclemen euphemistically described as lifeguards, forced tourists off the sands unless they were willing to pay for beach mattresses, umbrellas or change-of-costume cabins.” Democratization had given way to privatization and commodification. In 1965, demonstrators protested the construction of a wall blocking access to Santa Lucia and in 1967, at Le Lavandou “local Provençaux brought out their hunting rifles in an effort to

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liberate the “abusively expropriated” beaches.”  

145 The optimism of the economic boom years, increasing standards of living, and democratized space was transforming into mass discontentment as the wealthy re-colonized space that had been briefly, but importantly, open. In Saint-Tropez and other popular Riviera resort towns, the writing on the walls leading up to May 1968 was being scribbled on the fences of the “beach barons.”  

146 The world surrounding Bardot was changing quickly, more quickly that most people could have imagined.

CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN FASHION

Changes in European women’s fashion accelerated dramatically after the end of the Second World War. Like the other elements of culture examined so far, women’s fashion too reflects the spirit of postwar escapism that lifted Europe from the dreary immediate postwar era. There were also, however, deeper underlying tensions concerning the rise of mass consumption, Americanization, and new social identities for women; fashion functions at the economic level of markets, but also the deeper ideological level of values and identity markers. The first section of this chapter develops a background establishing the importance of fashion as a social signifier and then Paris as the centre of women’s fashion design, specifically after the invention of haute couture in the mid nineteenth century in order to examine some of its deeply trans-European roots as a centre of creativity and establish a base from which to move forward into the postwar era. The next section will address the postwar revival of Parisian couture and the different responses to changes brought by the Second World War and difficult postwar year in relation to the growing presence of the New York fashion scene and the attempted Americanization of Parisian fashion through the Marshall Plan. From here, it is necessary to trace the rise of ready to wear, and most importantly, both its superficial and serious challenges to the fashion-setting hegemony and survival of Parisian haute couturiers, the outcome of this tension being the merging of haute couture and ready-to-wear in the 1960s as “an absolute Paris original.”

Furthermore, the combination of couture, with its association with Old

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Europe luxury and taste, and radical new fashions—specifically the bikini—emerging from non-couture designers and ‘street-level’ cues taken from average people generated a new mass discourse of ‘looking European.’ This ‘European look’ will be addressed in relation to American responses to the rapidly changing fashion scene in Europe through Bardot and the European invention and popularization of the bikini, thus furthering the overall argument that Bardot and her world were a reflection of as well as driving force in the integration of European popular culture and a viable tool for understanding new European identities.

**Fashion: A System of Signs**

Thorstein Veblen’s *Theory of the Leisure Class* serves as the necessary introduction to the social function of fashion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and assists in developing an understanding of the tensions and fissures within the Western fashion world during the mid-twentieth century. According to Veblen, conspicuous consumption served to reflect as well as create new means to restore constantly shifting social boundaries. The leisure class was dominated by men, with women functioning as mediums for displays of conspicuous consumption. For the leisure class, women’s bodies served a critical function in displaying proof that this class had more money and social power than working class people; fashion then, was of critical importance. When Veblen was writing in 1899, the acceleration in the rate of the diffusion of fashion had already given way to early forms of mass consumption of fashion as well as “cheap and nasty” inferior imitations.\(^{148}\) Though while the leisure class may have abhorred such imitations, there was an increasingly large number of Europeans eager to acquire these items.

The ‘invention’ of haute couture in 1858 facilitated both the leisure class and its imitators by establishing rules and regulations to govern the highest form of the production of clothing and ensure a constant cycle of fashion changes. Nancy Green has argued that the increasingly mass production of clothing in the nineteenth century, rooted in the military uniform system, applied to men’s clothing, and creeping into the realm of women’s clothing signalled the “triumph of industry over art;” the haute couturiers then emerged during the mid to late nineteenth century in France to “restore art-in-clothing.”\(^\text{149}\) Haute couture, while furthering a distinct hierarchy in fashion systems and providing a renewed form of conspicuous consumption, had a deeper and more symbiotic relationship with ready-made mass-produced clothing and the forthcoming sartorial crisis of the leisure class.

Turning to Georg Simmel’s influential trickle-down theory, the often misunderstood relationship between haute couture and ready-made mass produced clothing becomes more clear. According to Simmel’s theory, fashion functions both to unify and segregate different social classes, fashion being “merely a product of social demands.”\(^\text{150}\) When the highest classes adopt new fashions, there is a gradual diffusion of the fashion towards the lower classes as they mimic their social and economic superiors. The fashions are then abandoned by the higher classes for new fashions to re-establish distinction.\(^\text{151}\) Haute couture, then, can be viewed as a systematic attempt by the highest levels of the fashion industry to ensure continuous unity among the upper classes and differentiation.

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\(^{150}\) Georg Simmel, “Fashion,” *The International Quarterly* 10 (1904), 134.

\(^{151}\) Ibid., 135.
from lower classes through a mandated constant cycle of fashion changes as designers showed new collections twice yearly.

The couture system, however, also served to hasten the diffusion of styles through its relationship with mass production. Robinson suggests that the establishment of haute couture itself, in 1858, was an early reaction to the growing ready-to-wear market created by the invention of the sewing machine and cut-out patterns that could be copied. Haute couture therefore responded to the need for original models to base these cut-out patterns on and this continued to be the primary role of couture, where “their main business function was the design and hand-made fabrication of models for mass reproductions—in effect, prototypes.”

It was never the copying of couture designs that posed a problem, but rather the increasing speed with which they were copied, as will be demonstrated in a forthcoming section. First, we will turn to the centralization of creative fashion design in Paris to examine its hidden European roots as well as attempted control on issues of diffusion and increasing anxieties in the changing global market after the Second World War.

Paris

In centralizing the design aspects of new fashions in one location, Paris as the home of haute couture, though exclusive, actually functioned as a force of Europeanization since its establishment in the mid nineteenth century. A brief examination of Paris fashion in the twentieth century reveals a complex set of processes at work and a distinctly Europeanized industry exported under the banner of French fashion. Paris had built a reputation for itself as the centre for creative design in fashion during the previous centuries, but the official

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‘invention’ of haute couture in the mid nineteenth century established Paris as the design capital in an era turning more towards industrial production of clothing and the associated standardization. Furthermore, Paris stood as a symbol of Old Europe, luxury and taste in an era when the industrialization and standardization of women’s fashions were becoming more widespread, and in terms of American fashion, entrenched. Paris fashion then, stood as a distinct identity marker based in creativity and artistic freedom.

After the establishment of haute couture in Paris by the Englishman Charles Frederic Worth in 1858, Paris continued to draw the most creative and adventurous European designers into an environment already booming with creativity and skilled artisans. Paris lured talent from across France and Europe with the mixing of this European talent set fashion trends for the Western world. The “internationalization of fashion designers” was a key factor “related to the spatial component of creativity” and represents a hidden Europeanizing aesthetic force.153 Of the 32 most prominent haute courtiers recognized by the Chambre Syndicale between 1858 and 1966, 9 were born outside of France; Charles Frederic Worth (England), Edward Molyneux (England), Nina Ricci (Italy), Elsa Schiapparelli (Italy), Cristobal Balenciaga (Spain), Pierre Cardin (Italy), Valentino Garavani (Italy), Karl Lagerfeld (Germany), Paco Rabanne (Spain).154

Paris was a city large enough that aspiring designers could both escape the provincialism of their home nations / regions, seek refuge from oppression, and give up their previous national identity for a new identity centred around Paris the city and fashion as an art. Similarly, modern ‘Eurocities’ are places “seen as a refuge: from the provinces, from the intolerant, the xenophobia, the small-minded. From persecution. From ingrained

153 Santagata, 75-76.
154 Ibid., 75, 84.
tradition, hierarchy, privilege, thoughtless social preproduction. From other people’s norms. From where you’ve come from.”

Could the prestigious international fashion designers in Paris throughout the twentieth century be proto-Eurostars living in a small-scale proto-Eurocity around the ateliers in Paris? In addition to the creative talent draw from abroad, even within France, the creative draw towards Paris was notable; Jean Patou (Normandy), Madeleine Vionnet (Liotet), Coco Chanel (Maine-et-Loire), Pierre Balmain (Savoie), Christian Dior (Lower Normandy), Yves Saint Laurent (Algeria), André Courrèges (Pyrénées-Atlantiques), and Emanuel Ungaro (Aix-en-Provence). Of these 32 haute courtiers, then, only less than half were born and raised in or near Paris. Paris drew creative talent from around France and Europe because “Paris has always been effective in accommodating a wide range of personalities from all over the world, regardless of their name, nationality or social condition.”

Many of these designers then, gave up elements of their previous national and regional identities, though did not necessarily become French either, but rather, embraced the cosmopolitanism of the elite fashion world in Paris.

These designers gave up their previous national and regional identities to be Parisian designers who set the trends for Europe and North America. Paris fashion’s uniquely cosmopolitan rather than French identity is evident in the fact that until the conscious invention of French prêt-à-porter, Parisian haute couturiers could not, and did not sell their designs to French manufacturers. They were, however, free to sell them to all other European manufacturers as well as North Americans to boost French exports. Thus, the haute couturiers produced official prototypes for clothing industries outside of France but not within. By the end of the nineteenth century, Parisian designs—and the rights to

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155 Favell, 5.
156 Santagata, 85.
reproduce them—were sold largely to English, Dutch, Swiss, Belgian, Italian, German, American and Canadian manufacturers. Until haute couture designs and reproduction rights could be sold to French ready-made manufacturers, Parisian couture had a much more pan-European reach than a French nationalist presence. As haute couture patterns and designs were sold across Europe and North America, the isolated French ready-to-wear industry brought in large profits from colonial markets, enabling the garment trade to become France’s second largest export sector by 1925, playing an important role in France’s balance of payments.

There were, however, serious concerns growing throughout the interwar period within Paris about the level of foreign competition from nations with more industrially advanced techniques. The isolation and nationalism generated by the Second World War had contemporaries worried because “Vienna, Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt etc. are buying their patterns on the German market and from other Axis countries.” Furthermore, competition from across the Atlantic, represented by Seventh Avenue in New York, seized upon Paris’ isolation and the shut-down of several prominent couture houses to declare “Paris fashion dead.” Lastly, the colonial markets so crucial to French ready-made clothing were slipping away in the postwar world.

Paris fashion responded to this series of crises in several distinct ways that are important in understanding the growth of a Europeanizing fashion current in the 1950s and 1960s. The Europeanizing current negotiated a space for Paris between its pre-war status

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158 Ibid., 81.
159 Ibid., 81.
160 Jarilpot from the Sous-Direction du vêtement, quoted in Green, Ready-to-wear and Ready-to-work, 100.
as a centre of Old World ‘taste’ and newly emerging mass markets as part of the increasing democratization throughout society that fashion was not immune to. The first response to be examined is the triumphant re-emergence of the Parisian couturiers and re-establishment of Paris as the unquestioned fashion capital of the world, if only for a short while. The second response entails the negotiation between prêt-à-porter and haute couture culminating in the rise of a ‘Euro-chic’ style and identity embodied by Bardot and copied around Europe at the close of the 1950s and accelerating into the 1960s. A major, early element of this response was the invention of the bikini, which will be addressed as means to better understand the creative forces in Paris and the bottom-up trends in fashion, while accentuating aspects of the American tourist gaze that were essential in building the Euro-chic aesthetic.

**Couture Revival**

The first response to the crisis of postwar fashion was a concentrated effort by those remaining from the pre-war couture world to re-establish Parisian couture as the epicentre of taste and luxury in women’s fashions. The group hoped to stimulate exports, and steer the Anglo-American and general European trend away from techniques and designs used during the years of fabric rationing established throughout the war. The Parisians were prepared because even during the war years, French designers “tended to assume that the more material a garment used, the less the Germans would get.”\(^{162}\) So while the images of postwar Paris women in elaborate, detailed, draping garments shocked many European

\(^{162}\) Ibid., 268.
observers, they concurrently served as a reminder of some of the pleasures the war years had taken away.163

After the liberation of France in 1944, Robert Ricci (Nina Ricci’s son and part of the Public Relations branch of the Chambre Syndicale) was approached about the haute couturiers’ willingness to contribute to the war relief effort. Thereafter, Parisian designers worked together under the direction Chambre Syndicale president Lucien Lelong, to stage the Théâtre de la Mode at the Louvre’s Pavilion de Marsan in April of 1945. The exhibition consisted of 170 miniature outfits designed by forty couturiers, and toured around European cities after its time in Paris.164 The exhibition was designed as an effort to raise funds for the French war relief and rescue the French fashion scene from elements of its collaboration with the Nazis, while also serving as an advertising campaign to “demonstrate the survival of French couture and present the postwar collections, despite shortages.”165 The touring exhibition “took on a magical dimension for its audience, thus pointing not only to a material and political victory, but also to a deliverance of the human spirit after the war; over 100,000 people viewed the collection in Paris alone.”166 The pleasures of fashion were what Paris was immediately willing and able to contribute to a devastated Europe.

The dolls were displayed amidst scenes designed by a variety of artists and filmmakers, collaborators from outside the fashion world. One particularly noteworthy scene was created by Jean Cocteau and “featured beauties in evening dresses posed in front of a crumbled wall.”167 Parisian couture was explicitly situated luxurious postwar fashion

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164 Ibid., 126.
165 Ibid., 122.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid., 125.
as something beautiful that could come out of something ugly and it was a juxtaposition that only European locales could generate and draw specific meanings from. The Cocteau scene from Théâtre foreshadowed the discourses surrounding the forthcoming celebration of the emergence of the now infamous ‘New Look’. In fact, many of the designs from Théâtre de la Mode contain elements of ‘New Look’ before it was officially ‘invented’ in 1947. Despite some prototypes in the Théâtre exhibitions, it was Christian Dior’s ‘New Look’ that captivated the necessary media attention to stimulate demand for postwar fashion and solidify the re-establishment of Paris as the fashion capital of the world, the European fashion capital of the world.

In the world of postwar fashion, especially in relation to the United States, Paris was a symbol for Europe. The beautiful dresses juxtaposed to the destroyed infrastructure of the Cocteau set made a direct point that despite the depravation and destruction, Europe still held the creative capital over the expanding fashion industries of the United States represented by Seventh Avenue in New York City. In 1946, the Théâtre de la Mode collection was updated with 237 mannequins and altered designs for its important tour of the United States, to “win back customers” lost during the war years from isolation and the rise of “creative wartime American couture.”

As Europe, represented by an international set of Parisian couturiers, prepared to flex its creative and artistic muscles against the United States’ fashion market, all it took to rescue Parisian couture was the declaration by the American press that the ‘New Look’ had just come out of Europe. Carmel Snow, editor of the highly influential Harper’s Bazaar declared Christian Dior’s February 1947 ‘Carolle’ and ‘Huit’ lines the ‘New Look.’ In fact, it is generally accepted today that the

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168 Ibid., 126.
‘New Look’ was more of a media sensation than a truly ‘new’ contribution to the fashion world.

The immediate success of the ‘New Look’ reflects a regular trend in the postwar popular cultural dialogue between the United States and Europe. As Europe both embraced and rejected Americanization, there was a general trend towards at least looking for American approval of new popular cultural products before Europe became increasingly interested and confident in them, as evidenced by Bardot’s rapid rise to stardom after winning American recognition. Dior’s ‘Huit’ and ‘Carolle’ lines received attention from media and fashion industry representatives in Paris, but went down in fashion history as the ‘New Look’ and a revolutionary trend in women’s fashion because the American press deemed it to be so. As mentioned above, a number of designs from the 1945 Théâtre exhibition contained elements that became central to the ‘New Look,’ namely the cinched waist above a full long skirt, luxury fabrics, and accentuation of the female form. Dior was not the only designer in Paris experimenting with overtly feminine styles including the re-emergence of boning, padding, corsets, and petticoats that the interwar and war years had seen abandoned.

Writing for the one year anniversary of Dior’s New Look shows in Paris, LIFE magazine insisted that Dior “had begun the third fashion revolution of the 20th century” after Paul Poiret in 1910 and Chanel in the interwar years. All three of their ‘revolutions’ were explained by the same mechanism: “study the fundamental trends of your time and then go against them.” In Dior’s case, the slow standardization of clothing, androgynous styles from the interwar years, and limited use of fabric provided an easy

target to react against. And while by this point, the American press noted that Dior was not alone in attempting to re-feminize women’s fashions, he was more dedicated to it:

Dior went all out for his new line. His wide skirts were not only wide—they stretched up to 45 yards. His narrow waists became as much as 2 inches narrower by means of specially installed corsets. His low necks were so low that they barely stopped at the waist. Other designers might sidle up to old-fashioned femininity and romance; Dior tackled it headlong. In contrast to the tentative experiments of previous progressives, Dior’s clothes constituted a complete turnabout.\(^\text{170}\)

Even contemporary academics were wrapped up in the excitement surrounding the accolades offered to Dior’s New Look. Writing in 1959, Remy Saisselin found the aesthetic of Dior’s fashions, including the amount of fabric, specifically luxury fabrics, as “a reaction against history, against the ugly in life,” including war and masculinized women’s clothing.\(^\text{171}\) Dior’s New Look celebrated femininity in form, elevating fashion back to the status of art and using women’s bodies as “the base for his creation…decreeing what women should be… and the contradiction between fragile appearance and rigorous construction.”\(^\text{172}\) Women then, were little more than the artist’s canvass, whose bodies would conform to the lines of each design. Such rigidity and objectification of women by fashion however, also had its opponents who would only grow in numbers between the revival of haute couture with the launch of the ‘New Look’ and the crisis in couture evidenced by falling sales and limited clients into the 1960s.

Long forgotten was the short-lived excitement around the Théâtre exhibitions, countless European and American women alike wanted Dior, whether their governments, churches, social groups, or other women liked it or not. The English government was

\(^{170}\) Ibid.


\(^{172}\) Saisselin, 113.
particularly opposed to its female citizens’ fascination with Dior’s ‘New Look’ and painted
this type of feminine desire “in express conflict with collectivising and the post war
national good…they placed fashionable women in explicit opposition to the suffering
postwar humanity.”\textsuperscript{173} The American Salvation Army “denounced [the] current fashion as
insulting Christian notions of charity,” and there were, of course, the famous images of
working-class French women ripping the ‘New Look’ dresses of fashionable young
Parisian women.\textsuperscript{174} Regardless of the forces working against it:

Paris fashion rose from the ashes of war, because it still represented the
height of luxury, chic and feminine beauty. Obviously the French state
did its best to promote Paris fashions, but, ultimately, the women of the
world chose to adopt the New Look.\textsuperscript{175}

\textbf{USA Challenge}

While Dior’s ‘New Look’ was busy sweeping the Western World, the United
States was initiating the Marshall Plan, which had specific goals in mind for Parisian
fashion and although the plans targeted the French ready-made industry disjointed from
couture, the ramifications would be more far-reaching. By the end of the Second World
war, “approximately 80 percent of the garment-industry machinery was over twenty years
old” and as new machinery was brought in from Germany and England, “the Marshall
Plan allocated up to $900,000 to $1,000,000 of credit per year to purchase new
material.”\textsuperscript{176} The American system had certain advantages, specifically the speed of
reproductions, over the French ready-made system. In the United States, Dior’s New Look
for instance was entirely diffused through the fashion system in three months. One of

\textsuperscript{173} Peers, 145.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 145, 150.
\textsuperscript{175} Steele, 274.
\textsuperscript{176} Green, \textit{Ready-to-Wear and Ready-to-Work}, 100.
Dior’s dress designs, ‘Margrave,’ was purchased by Bergdorf Goodman and Henri Bendel, copied in American fabrics (the original Dior dress then returned) and sold for $400. Wholesalers, in the mean time, were copying ‘Margrave’ from Bergdorfs or sketches to produce a $100 ‘Margrave’ whose skirt was four yards more narrow than Dior’s, used a zipper rather than buttons and was made from rayon rather than wool. A $45 ‘Margrave’ reduced the yardage even more and used half as many seams in the skirt as Dior had. Using ¾ of a yard less material, a ‘Margrave’ was produced to sell for $25, and finally, “Ohrbach’s in New York was proud to feature their Margrave at $8.95.”177 The acceleration of the diffusion of fashion that climaxed in a major shift in fashion cycles by the 1960s was taking hold. The diffusion of fashion that had previously taken years, was reduced to months and by the end of the 1950s, down to weeks. Before the Second World War, “only a few well-to-do ladies could adopt the ‘new line’ right away; today, every American secretary can wear it within a few weeks.”178 Americanization, democratization, and standardization of women’s fashion in Europe had both its endorsers and opponents in the postwar era.

**European Response**

Because Paris considered itself the capital of European good taste, the postwar intervention of American aid, and designs to modernize/Americanize the French ready-made industry were not warmly received in Paris. By 1948, the “false philanthropy” of the Marshall Plan was harshly criticized…blamed for unemployment as well as the loss of good taste.”179 For the elite women who had been able to demarcate their social superiority

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via fashion, the rapid diffusion of their aesthetic to lower classes at cheaper price points posed a problem. In response, France finally changed the restrictions on French ready-made copies of couture designs and almost all of the haute couturiers began to design, reproduce and sell their own ready-made lines. The “upgrading of confections to prêt-à-porter was begun with the invention of the phrase ‘prêt-à-porter’ in 1948 and the “first prêt-à-porter salon was held in 1957, and soon one more “takeoff” of the ready-made clothing industry was hailed.” The early 1950s saw the beginning of ‘Euro-chic,’ an aesthetic rooted in the discourse of good taste coming out of Paris and manifesting in a combination of couture and ready-to-wear being sold in chic boutiques around major European cities. Designs could still be copied, but with couture designers putting out a variety of different collections yearly, elite buyers could maintain their position by rapid conspicuous consumption. Meanwhile, lower income buyers could purchase a variety of different copies of designs at various price points.

Almost all Parisian haute couturiers designed their own prêt-à-porter lines in order to remain financially viable. Most couture houses, with the exception of Dior had a difficult time staying profitable into the 1960s. Pierre Cardin, as an example that foreshadowed forthcoming trends in product licenses and overall brand development opened his haute couture house in 1953 and by 1954 had opened designer boutiques under the names ‘Adam’ and ‘Eve.’ After the great success of the ‘Eve’ boutique in particular, which was “in effect the first germ of designer ready-to-wear,” in 1959, Cardin opened a prêt-à-porter boutique in the Parisian department store Au Printemps becoming the first couturier to “put clothes bearing his name in a department store.” He was subsequently

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180 Ibid., 102, 101.
kicked out of the Chambre Syndicale but continued to develop innovative fashion licensing practices, designing children’s clothes in the late 1960s and licensing his name to a line of porcelain, “thus birthing the age of fashion designer-endorsed lifestyle goods.”\textsuperscript{182} The traditional sartorial lines of unity and demarcation were being blurred; “the upgrading of confection to \textit{prêt-à-porter} meant a certain downgrading of haute couture.”\textsuperscript{183} This process also, however, enabled the growth of a Euro-chic aesthetic. While there were undoubtedly certain difference between a Cardin haute couture garment, the version of it sold at the ‘Eve’ boutique and the even cheaper version of it sold at Au Printemps, the democratization of fashion served as a homogenizing force in the visible appearance of fashionable European women.

A \textit{New York Times} article from August 1960 suggested that European women should credit Coco Chanel and Brigitte Bardot with the rapid growth of ready-to-wear fashion because Chanel was so easy to copy, and Bardot popularized inexpensive materials.\textsuperscript{184} Beyond copying though, even Chanel, coming out of retirement in 1954 (with enough distance away form her war time collaborations and relationships with Nazis) declared that she “was now going to make clothes not just for the few but for thousands.”\textsuperscript{185} Chanel herself, had turned to view fashion designers as part of consumer society rather than artists, “we are not artists but producers of dresses…we do not need genius, but much workmanship and a little taste.”\textsuperscript{186} Chanel, therefore, produced simple, elegant, and practical clothing for women, but they also happened to be highly reproducible. \textit{Vogue} once described a Chanel ‘little black dress’ as, “a Ford signed

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{183} Green \textit{Ready-to-Wear and Ready-to-Work}, 102.
\textsuperscript{186} Chanel in, Saisselin, 114.
And if one still could not afford even a mass produced Chanel dress, the designs were so easy to copy that any department store in Europe would have some type of version of the dress, much like Dior’s ‘Margrave’ in the United States or the diffusion of Cardin designs from haute couture to department store level. But where did the demand for these newer fashion practices come from?

**Changing Lifestyle**

From the consumption rather than production side of things, there was also pressure to change the structure of European fashion. The initial transition from hand-made to ready-made clothing reflected changes in the organization of women’s daily lives. As women entered the workplace in growing numbers and a ‘leisure’ culture developed around non-working time in Europe, women began buying their clothes from the growing supply of department stores and small shops rather than taking the time to have them made or make the clothes themselves. Even the local sewing women, once a staple of all European towns and communities did not quite fit into the modernizing European world; “the little seamstress who spends almost as much time as a physician to learn her calling, yet earns less than an unskilled laborer in an automobile plant” was slowly disappearing. Economic and social changes, specifically the increasing number of European women working outside the home, even if only for several years until having children, and the new consumer markets associated with young people, created “enormous demand for low-priced, snappy ready-to-wear” for the masses of women “who have less and less time for

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the dressmakers, couturiers and fittings.” In discussing the growing ready-to-wear trade in Denmark, Marylin Bender found that “before the war, the majority of Danish women sewed their own clothes or had them made by a dressmaker. Today more than half of them buy off the racks in department stores and speciality shops.” Magasin du Nord, Denmark’s largest department store chain, although taking stylistic cues from Paris, bought ready-to-wear clothes manufactured in Denmark, Sweden, England, Switzerland, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Europe’s fashion business was growing increasingly interconnected.

The realities of an increasingly European market were becoming more clear. While not all of the nations above were part of the Common Market, the fact of a larger inter-European market, its simplicity and usefulness, was manifest in the design and buying patterns of European shops and department stores. The director of Magasin du Nord’s dress salon was not interested in American ready to wear, “Danes are totally unfamiliar with Seventh Avenue names,” and “America only copies Paris…why make a style cross the Atlantic twice when we can get it direct?” The proximity of Paris and growing ease of inter-European mobility meant that designers could travel to Paris, buy originals, buy design sketches, or simply attend fashion shows and build their own sketches of designs, have them created by various manufacturers around Europe and sold in local shops and department stores. European fashion could develop independently from American fashion and manufacturing, but not independently from other European countries thereby contributing to the overall changes in European fashion that enabled the rise of a distinct

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191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
Euro-chic aesthetic.

The rise of stylish and fashionably acceptable European ready-made clothing responded to several different trends in the postwar world. First, as developed above, stylish ready-made clothing linked to Parisian haute couturiers was part of the response to the threat of Americanization of European fashion in the wake of the Marshall Plan. Secondly, ready-made clothing responded to the changing lives of European women who, on the one hand, had less time and willingness to be fitted by dressmakers, and on the other hand, were growing increasingly wealthy living in postwar economic boom years and therefore could partake in greater levels on consumption. Similarly, younger cutting-edge designers responded to these changes and developed their own lines of luxury ready-made clothing to meet this growing demand. It is however, important to note that it was a younger generation of designers that openly responded to these trends. While an embarrassed Christian Dior signed his first *prêt-à-porter* line ‘Monsieur X,’ Pierre Cardin embraced the growing prominence of luxury mass consumption and Yves Saint Laurent became the official representative of a new younger European fashion scene.

**Euro-Chic: Generational Divides**

Yves Saint Laurent rose to prominence after becoming the head of Christian Dior’s fashion house 1957. Dior had selected Saint Laurent as his heir shortly before his death in 1957. Saint Laurent was only twenty-one years old and in charge of Europe’s most important fashion house. Hailed as one of France’s “Fabulous Young Five,” by the *New York Times*, Saint Laurent was described as having “the air of a well-behaved, tremendously overgrown schoolboy sleepwalking through a world of grown-ups,” whose
“style is marked by an almost fanatical refusal of adulthood.” A “smart Parisienne” described Saint Laurent’s Dior collections by saying, “you would think he was creating these dresses for his little sisters.” Saint Laurent, however, only lasted as the head of the House of Dior until 1960 when he was drafted into the army to fight in his native Algeria. There is much speculation that Dior’s former partner, Marcel Boussac stop protecting Saint Laurent from the draft after his ill-received beatnik collection of 1960. He had pushed the limits between haute couture and youthfully inspired street style too far and was drafted (along with Bardot’s husband, Jacques Charrier, in a highly publicized campaign to boost support for the war in Algeria). After being quickly discharged from the army and hospitalized (much like Charrier), Saint Laurent re-entered the fashion scene, setting up his own house in 1961 with a focus on youth, innovation, and diverse influences. He became the first haute couturier to design a prêt-à-porter line and have it shown in the same prestigious manner—the Parisian fashion show—as couture. Furthermore, Saint Laurent set up one of the most stylish and sought-after boutiques in Europe to sell his prêt-à-porter line in 1966. True to his original beatnik inspiration, ‘Rive Gauche’ became iconic, drawing in fashion conscious young people from around Europe.

Just before, and following Saint Laurent’s dismissal from Dior in 1960, there was a noticeable new trend in European high fashion, a generational divide. Saint Laurent had been designing for the new masses of wealthy European youth while the head of a fashion house that catered to an older European elite. He recognized that this new trend would transform the traditional system, stating that “the young lead very different lives from the lives of the women who wear couture fashion” and “not all the young would want couture

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even if they could afford the price. Sometimes elegance builds a wall between people. Many young people don’t want that.”\textsuperscript{195} Similarly, Pierre Cardin, whose manufacturing and licensing innovations altered the relationships between couturiers and ready-to-wear, “fostering that first marriage of big-name designer and mass-market sales that is now a dominant force,” was remembered as a man that “together with Courrèges and Saint Laurent…gave young women a wardrobe that was a generational chasm away from their mothers’.”\textsuperscript{196} One of the young people who resisted the wall described by Saint Laurent and popularized the wardrobe so different from her generation’s mothers’ was Brigitte Bardot. She became the fashion icon of a generation (or more), representing the pinnacle of fusion between couture, ready-to-wear, youth, and a newly emerging Euro-chic aesthetic.

**Bardot: Pre Euro-Chic**

Early in her career, Bardot was complicit in the fashion processes described earlier in the chapter where women’s bodies served as the base for the designs of couturiers. Her covers for *Elle* magazine from the early 1950s depict her in formal and rigid Dior-style dresses (and there are numerous early modelling photographs of Bardot actually dressed in Dior.) On the *Elle* covers, Bardot wears complete outfits including hats and gloves as well as displaying a formal hairstyle in line with the new postwar focus on hygiene, grooming, and the use of new products. It was Bardot’s mother, after all, who got her involved in fashion modelling in the first place. Bardot, however, reacted against the growing cult of beauty-domesticity (and pro-natalism) served by new consumer products and ideologies of consumption, becoming instead the unofficial spokeswoman for modern youth culture in

\textsuperscript{195} Yves Saint Laurent, quoted in Steele, 280.

\textsuperscript{196} Polan and Trede, 100.
Europe in the coming years; her rebellion was evident in her drastically changed fashion sense by the mid 1950s and the rise of a Euro-chic aesthetic.

Bardot’s reaction against traditional haute couture clothing and the feminine ideals associated with its design embodied the antithesis in the dialectic of fashion as developed by Remy Saisselin, who was writing in 1959. After the New Look—with the subtext of designer as artist—and the re-entrenchment of the dominance of Parisian couture in the later 1940s and 1950s, the stage where “fashion creates woman” had been achieved, but the level of abstraction, formal aesthetic considerations, and intellectualism developed around this stage created a scenario where ‘woman’ “feels herself threatened…feels herself de-humanized.”

Bardot’s feelings about traditional haute couture clothing demonstrated the extent to which she felt these types of clothes and the entire process of having them made was dehumanizing. Bardot did not like to wait for her clothes and she abhorred coming in for and sitting for fittings. Much in line with her other child-woman qualities, Bardot was impatient and did not like sitting still and being treated like an object as a dress was constructed around her. She supposedly rebuffed Chanel’s offer to dress her by famously quipping, “couture is for grannies,” thus reaffirming her status as a symbol of youth and the growing masses.  

Chanel offered a wild and oft-criticized Bardot elegance, telling her, “dress at my house and I will make you into an elegant woman,” with Bardot responding, “Elegance? I couldn’t care less, it’s old fashioned.”  

Bardot only wanted to wear clothes she was personally comfortable in, disliked the restrictive qualities of hats, and rarely wore

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197 Saisselin, 115.  
198 Steele, 279.  
shoes when she could avoid it.\textsuperscript{200} Despite his own youth and rebellion, even designer Yves Saint Laurent preferred not to dress Bardot, stating, “I could not do her [Bardot] justice…her elegance is of the undressed.”\textsuperscript{201} The clash between Bardot and the couturiers centred around her body. Bardot’s body was deemed to be so perfect and ‘natural’ that dressing it would always be a disservice, both to the body, and to the clothes, because couture clothing was supposed to take centre stage and improve the body, rather than constraint the body seeking freedom. In the face of her possible de-humanization by couture clothing that would objectify her and restrict her freedoms, Bardot completed Saisselin’s dialectic of fashion by “pushing forward with a fashion revolution.”\textsuperscript{202} Bardot’s revolution was built as a myth of the natural and accessible.

\textbf{Bardot: Rise of Euro-Chic}

In order to ‘re-humanize’ her clothes, Bardot turned to mass produced ready-made clothing constructed by machines in infinite identical copies. While turning towards mechanization appears even more dehumanizing, it was the associated ideological shift that brought the mass produced clothes back into the human realm. With identical mass produced fashions, the humanizing element is derived from the consumers \textit{choice} in purchasing the clothes, and the associated myth of individuality in combinations and ‘ways of wearing’ these clothes, like when Bardot “bypassed the French couturiers and blew herself to a London wardrobe—$40,000 worth.”\textsuperscript{203} Any woman was free to go out and choose her clothes, rather than having to serve as an object while the clothes were

\textsuperscript{201} “St. Laurent Declines to Dress Bardot,” \textit{Evening Independent}, November 8, 1958.
\textsuperscript{202} Saisselin, 115.
constructed on and around her, and there are several well-known images of Bardot shopping happily in London among piles of ready-made sweaters. While a Dior cocktail dress was designed to constrain the woman’s figure and display the form of the design at a cocktail party, the endless parade of ready-to-wear clothing did not come with similar constraints in terms of form or ‘place’. Ready-to-wear fashions were geared towards displaying the woman and the body—rather than the clothes as art themselves—and could be mixed-and-matched for a variety of occasions and locales.²⁰⁴ Bardot’s preference for casual ready-to-wear clothes also extended into the world of her films where some of her most memorable characters engage in a sartorial dialogue and rebellion against older generations and ideological opposites.²⁰⁵ A key moment in this shift can be found in a scene from Et Dieu described by Vincendeau:

In answer to the inquisitive look of a snobbish woman on a yacht who gazes at her [Bardot] plain red dress (contrasting vividly with her own flowery and expensive concoction), she insolently replies, “I bought it on the harbour; I’ll give you the address.”²⁰⁶

While in 1956 the snobbish woman on the yacht likely had no interest in Bardot’s ready-made red dress, by 1960, even “the most discerning of clients, the chic French women who heretofore was dressed exclusively by couturiers” “now declare with equal pride that the dresses they are wearing come from Prisunic or Monoprix,” which were low-end French stores similar to Walmart in the United States.²⁰⁷ Euro-chic, as embodied by Bardot and millions of her followers around Europe, entailed a balance between more expensive

²⁰⁶ Vincendeau, 142.
couture items, mid-range boutique items, and casual, cheap, ready-made items with the freedom to wear them in endless combinations whenever and wherever one desired.

**Euro-Chic: Jeans, Bikinis, Ballet, and a Wedding**

The essential element in Euro-chic was a slight turn within the system of symbols and signs that enabled an item or combination of items to be identifiable as ‘European,’ especially to outsiders. One such case was American blue jeans. Bardot helped to popularize blue jeans in Europe, which in Euro-chic fashion were of course, “narrower and shorter than their American cousins” and “look a little sleeker after its stay abroad.”

The casual and highly adaptable garments quickly became “the favourite mountain climbing café-lounging sight seeing costume of Europeans” as American commentators noted with delight the strange European habit of wearing them into the ocean, letting them dry in the sun, because “after that treatment they fit like tights.”

The American tourist gaze, as developed in the first chapter, was quick to distinguish between American and European styles of similar garments. Even an icon of Americana, blue jeans, were appropriated by European producers and consumers to become part of the Euro-chic aesthetic. Once the uniform of American workers, blue jeans became the uniform of a leisurely European lifestyle of adventures in the natural world and café culture. Many of the masses of youth travellers described in the first chapter were wearing blue jeans on their travels and adventures around Europe, but the Americans visiting Europe in the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s had their eyes turned towards bronzed bodies in European bikinis.

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While 1946 is often remembering as the year of the declaration of the United States of Europe, or the year that Christian Dior launched his haute couture house, it was also the year that the bikini—the epitome of Euro-chic in the 1950s—was officially invented. The bikini crept in the back-door of European integration to become the un-official women’s swimsuit in Europe as well as one of the most democratising fashion trends of the twentieth century. The initial invention of the bikini, although surrounded by a level of pseudo-folklore, remains a decidedly European creation. All three creation stories of bikini come from France in between 1945 and 1946, reflecting immediate and radical changes in the postwar attitude towards dressing and displaying the body and some unpredictable after-effects of war-time rationing.

Two-piece women’s swimsuits have a long history predating the bikini, but the movement towards the bikini was a direct result of changes brought by the war years. Fabric rationing lead to swimsuits gradually becoming smaller and plainer during the war years. In the immediate postwar period, however, as traditional haute couture fashion houses exploited loosening of fabric rationing to create opulent glamorous designs, the bikini-inventors embraced using as little fabric as possible while pushing standards of decency in the display of women’s bodies publicly.

In the summer of 1946, fashion designer Jacques Heim created a skimpy-two piece swim suit and named it the ‘atome.’ Those enjoying the sun and sand at Cannes turned towards the sky to marvel at Heim’s advertising strategy; they saw an airplane skywriting, “Atome—the world’s smallest bathing suit.”

Several weeks later, however, Louis Réard delivered his own sky-written message, “Bikini—smaller than the smallest bathing suit in

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Réard’s bikini, unlike Heim’s ‘atome’ unashamedly displayed *le nombril*, and using only 70 centimetres or 27 ½ inches of cloth, Réard claimed to have split the *atome*. Réard made consistent effort to market the new swimsuit as deliberately shocking. Various writers on the bikini have described the naming of the suit as conjuring up images of tattered nuclear survivors and as shocking to the world as the mushroom clouds over Bikini Atoll, just weeks earlier, had been. Réard’s suit was so small in fact, he could not find a fashion model who would dare to wear it and instead hired nude dancer Micheline Bernardini from the Casino de Paris to pose in the suit at the *Piscine Molitar* in Paris on 5 July 1946 (Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Micheline Bernardini in a Louis Réard bikini, Paris, July 5, 1946**

Source: Hulton Archive, Getty Images

In this image, and other publicity shots snapped that day, Bernardini held a matchbox that the bikini was supposed to fit into. Réard’s firm insisted that not any two-piece swimsuit could be called a bikini, because, “a bikini is not a bikini unless it could be pulled through a

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There is, however, a third and less well known bikini creation story that focuses on deeper social and moral changes, initiated by women themselves rather than credited to male designers. Réard had noted that French women doing their own modifications on more modest two-piece swimsuits influenced him. These girls and women were folding the bottoms on their suits down, exposing more of the torso, while also hiking the tops of these suits up in an effort to get more sun on their bodies. A \textit{LIFE} magazine article from 1945 unknowingly documented the bikini before it was officially invented. Just a week before revealing the pre-bikini bikinis, On 9 July 1945, \textit{LIFE} magazine ran an article on the evolution of women’s swimwear between the opening decade of the twentieth century and the current season. The author noted that in 1905, “a lady’s bathing suit was made of ten yards of material. In 1945, it was made from one. Between these two statistics and dates lie a social revolution and an annually expanding area of bare, brown flesh.”\footnote{“Bathing Suits: They have come a long way but can’t go any further,” \textit{LIFE}, July 9, 1945.} The article ran under the title “Bathing Suits – They have come a long way but cannot go any further.”\footnote{Ibid.} On 16 July 1945, \textit{LIFE} ran an article readdressing their report on swimwear from the previous week. After claiming that, “there is—or seems to be—nothing more to cut off,” \textit{LIFE} was promptly proved wrong by pictures taken at the Racing Club de France, of French women’s daring suits (Figure 2).\footnote{“French Bathing Suits: Fashionable ladies of Paris achieve the bare minimum in body covering at Racing Club pool,” \textit{LIFE}, July 16, 1945. Page 55-58.} These French women were not pursuing
shock value, but rather the sun. The ladies were photographed wearing “little wisps of material which they roll down until only a strip across the Bosom and a G-string over the loins come between them and the sun…they are solely and firmly intent on getting brown.”\(^\text{219}\) The accompanying images displayed early bikinis made of equally little, if not less, fabric than the bikini Réard supposedly could not find anyone other than a nude dancer to model. The women and girls cited a variety of sources for acquiring their skimpy suits including having their own dressmaker sew one (Left) modifying their own existing two-piece suits (Centre), and inventing new styles as the two girls who used sheer chiffon handkerchiefs as brassieres had done.\(^\text{220}\) (Right)

**Figure 2: Two-Piece Swimsuits, Paris, July 16, 1945.**

![Two-Piece Swimsuits, Paris, July 16, 1945](source: LIFE, July 16, 1945)

These women were pursuing their freedom to wear what they wanted, how they wanted to, with little regard for stylistic and bodily conventions; they were embracing a freedom and playfulness that would manifest in the forthcoming ready-made European fashion revolution. While the bikini was immediately banned in Catholic-dominated nations like Italy and Spain, it was an almost instant European success.

The early European popularity of bikinis was closely associated with vacation culture as part of the aesthetic of chic beach locations, notably the French and Italian

\(^{219}\) Ibid.  
\(^{220}\) Ibid.
Rivieras. They escapism of travel was complimented by an escapism from formal dress and bodily conventions. By 1959, French swimsuit designer Fernand Lafitte, explained the stylistic bikini preferences of different European nationalities noting that German women, “the soignée, chic women in, say, Berlin, Frankfurt and Duesseldorf, like bikinis. They are work like a pair of socks. Very casually. No one stares.”221 British women, however, were more likely to “wear bikinis if they go to Cannes or Monte Carlo, where everyone else does,” while “A Frenchwoman likes her bathing suit a size too small” as they had been “wearing bikinis for nearly twenty years.”222 Italian women “love bikinis with lots of ruffles if they go to Capri,” all while American women could only be sold one-piece suits.223 While Lafitte pointed to certain national differences in the bikini preferences of European women, the important point is that all these different nationalities were wearing bikinis, while their American counterparts stiff preferred one-piece suits. The popularity of the bikini in Europe was one popular cultural phenomenon that did not seek American inspiration or approval, but rather functioned (eventually) as a popular cultural export and European identity marker in the postwar era.

Bardot is often credited with having played a major role in the mass popularization of bikinis, notably after her bikini-clad appearance at Cannes in 1953.224 Prior to her Cannes appearance, however, Bardot had starred in the first film to narrativize the bikini as a central element.225 *Marina, la fille sans voiles*, released in English-speaking countries as *Manina: The Girl in the Bikini* (USA) and *Manina: The Lighthouse – Keeper’s Daughter*

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222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
225 Vincendeau, 136.
(United Kingdom) was released in France in 1952. In this film, Bardot’s Manina is the daughter of a lighthouse keeper on an exotic island who spends the majority of the film dressed in only a bikini. The American poster for the film—which was released in the United States in 1958 to capitalize off the success of and God Created Woman and other Bardot re-releases—while re-titled, The Girl in the Bikini, was one of the only promotional posters not to show Bardot in her bikini, using Bardot in a white blouse but without showing the navel. The strict Hays Code used by Hollywood filmmakers prohibited display of the navel, but as a European import, Manina could shown under the looser restrictions on imported cinema and formed part of the corpus of European films that were incredibly popular in the United States in this era.\textsuperscript{226} While the poster could not show Bardot in her bikini, the obvious re-writing of the film’s title—the girl in the bikini—served to inform audiences that the exotic European Bardot would appear in the exotic European bikini.

The American relationship with actually wearing the bikini, however, was antagonistic from the start and the bikini was constructed as a particularly European phenomenon by the American press and tourists. American women and fashion editors were not simply ambivalent towards the bikini, preferring more modest one-piece and two-piece suits instead, but actually found it morally incomprehensible. When Jacques Heim first brought a selection of his early bikinis to the United States in 1946, he was met with outright rejection; “American women would never wear such a thing.”\textsuperscript{227} When \textit{LIFE} magazine, in 1949, ran an article on the bikini’s formal introduction to Hollywood as part of a publicity generating fashion show for a benefit at the Country Club Hotel the

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accompanying photographs were prefaced with the note that, “rarely has a gallery of pictures…been assembled which shows so clearly what was wrong with an idea.” The series of photographs of girls in the navel-bearing suits are all captioned with various warnings and judgements against the bikini, from the models’ refusal to get into the swimming pool, “each having deduced what would happen if her suit got the least bit damp,” to the bottoms riding up or down, “making already revolting condition even worse,” and the open display of unattractive abdominal scars that more modest two-piece suits covered up. It appeared that American women were not nearly as comfortable in their bodies as their European counterparts.

Bikinis did not even begin to break the American market until 1959-1960, when the infamous swimsuit, entirely commonplace in Europe by this point, was still considered incredibly risqué, “the most meagre swimsuit a woman can wear without being arrested.” American bathing suit stylist and manufacturer Anne Coles described the bikini as “nothing more than a g-string: it is the razor’s edge of decency.” Despite the prudish rejection of the bikini by U.S. manufacturers and retailers, American women were opening up to the scandalous suits. As a Fifth Avenue shops began stocking bikinis in 1959, they also began immediately finding buyers for them. Even “one of the most conservative stores in America reluctantly bought sixty suits to cover a magazine credit and to its utter confusion, sold every one.” The suits were being sold primarily for two reasons. Firstly, in response to a rapid increase in the number of private swimming pools and need for skimpy suits to sun tan; between 1948 and 1958 the number of privately

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229 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
owned swimming pools rose from 2500 to 87 000. The second factor was the massive increase in travel to Europe as more women saw “Bikinis in the flesh” when passport issues rose from 23 435 in 1948 to 676 898 in 1958. American interest in the bikini did not begin until private swimming pool ownership increased, but its popularity in Europe was always rooted to a public display of the body at sites of leisure, like swimming clubs or public beaches.

As more Americans were exposed to bikinis publicly, they began to tentatively consume them privately although by 1960 bikinis only accounted for merely 5 percent of swimwear sales and quite a few of these sales were for women travelling to Europe. The bikini was constructed as pan-European fashion item via the American tourist gaze. Cannes, Monte Carlo, St. Tropez and Capri were the most prominent examples of locales where the bikini was dominant. Visiting women would don a bikini because “everyone else does,” and after all, “alabaster complexions and one-piece suits are as unfashionable on Capri as pancake make-up and mink coats are on Honolulu’s Waikiki Beach.” Americans were feeling the pressure to respond to European-wide trends in swimwear and their responses reflected the common values shared by Europeans in a changing culture and market. The bikini made American women think of “the pride Mediterranean folk have in their bodies.” One American woman, “felt more like a hospital nurse than a mermaid…watching all the bronzed beauties stripped to the Bikinis, she felt herself weakening…the Bikini looked natural under the Mediterranean sun.” The youthful, playful, sexiness of European women in bikinis was clear to American observers. The

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233 Bid.
supposed naturalness of European women was associated with the geographies of Europe and imaginations of freedoms and a lack of self-consciousness that a more puritanical America could only articulate through exoticization of the European other.

While Bardot played an important role in the popularization of jeans, and bikinis, she single-handedly popularized ballet flats in the 1950s and 1960s, and ballet flats combined with jeans and a variety of clothes made from couturiers to boutiques to department stores, go quite a long ways in appreciating the unique qualities of the Euro-chic aesthetic. First of all, ballet was a distinctly elite European tradition and young bourgeois Bardot was an aspiring ballerina before becoming a film actress and creating a whole new anti-bourgeois fashion trend. In 1956, while filming Et Dieu, Bardot asked ballet slipper maker Rose Repetto to “make her a shoe that was as delicate and easy to wear as a dance slipper but suitable for everyday life.”238 She was given a pair of outdoor-appropriate red ballet flats that she memorably wore with “cropped trousers and a Breton top,” launching an almost immediate European wide desire for ballet flats that could be worn outside a dance studio, making Repetto into a top European brand and pushing the company into the street shoe market.239 While Audrey Hepburn also popularized a flat shoe in Sabrina, now remembered as a ballet flat, they were in fact, just flat shoes and her actual Ferragamo ballet flats in 1957 Funny Face came after Bardot’s authentic Repettos.

So far, the Euro-chic has been addressed through the playful mixing of ‘high’ and ‘low’ fashion, stylized self-conscious sexiness, and playfulness. And while there was something different about wearing a ready-made red dress in the French Riviera, wearing

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239 Ibid.
blue jeans to do just about anything, prancing around beaches in bikinis, or donning ballet shoes in the streets, the means through which Bardot became the fashion leader of Europe and embodiment of a further element of the Euro-chic aesthetic was through her 1959 Esterel wedding dress that she wed Jacques Charrier in. Vincendeau does an excellent job of tracing the excitement around Bardot’s gingham wedding dress, especially in contrast to her 1952 traditional bourgeois wedding dress she wore to the Vadim wedding.\textsuperscript{240} As a \textit{jeune fille} in 1952, Badot wore a long, conservative, velvet dress with a Mao collar, a white veil, and her brown hair styled neatly atop her head. In 1959, however, Bardot wore a pink and white checked gingham dress with \textit{broderie anglaise} trim and her wild blond hair flowing freely; to be married in gingham “was very avant-garde and created a small scandal among bourgeois families.”\textsuperscript{241}

At the age of eighteen, Bardot’s wedding dress was traditional and matronly, yet at the age of twenty-four, Bardot layered her established status as a physical and emotional child-woman with the womanized reinterpretation of fabrics associated with children. While the gingham dress was reproduced en masse by the ready-to-wear industry it was created by couturier Jacques Esterel who had opened his couture house in 1953. Bardot’s choice of the design, and the context in which she wore it, is what made it a success, not the design itself, though the fact that the dress was made of gingham ensured it could be reproduced quite authentically and cheaply. Bardot, as the consumer (like in the case of Repetto ballet flats), sparked the trend rather than Esterel as the couturier/producer. Bardot was pushing fashion towards a more bottom-up process where the consumer was key, rather than accepting the conventions and form of elite designers. While the dress itself

\textsuperscript{240} Vincendeau, 137-138
\textsuperscript{241} Fred Salem in Vincendeau, 138.
was *couture*, it is the fact that Bardot chose to wear the gingham dress *to her wedding* that made it shocking and exciting. Again, it was the terrain of breaking conventions that Bardot and her famous fashion sense were most widely known and replicated for.

**Euro-Chic Circulation: Bottom-Up**

Esterel was not the only designer that Bardot helped push into the elite fashion world. Designer Louis Féraud, who Bardot had met in the early fifties was also made famous by Bardot and represents a reverse trend in the fashion world; a trend where designers created casual ready-to-wear fashions first and were then invited into the haute-couture crowd. Féraud recalled how Bardot helped him become famous when:

> Bardot appeared during the 1955 Cannes film festival to buy a while dress. Photographers and journalists followed her… Within a week, every woman up and down the Cote d’Azure was wearing my little white dress. We sold over 500 of them in a matter of days.\(^{242}\)

After gaining notoriety and a solid following based on Bardot’s endorsement, Féraud was invited to join the *Chambre Syndicale* and began presenting couture collections.\(^{243}\) While Féraud’s success demonstrated Bardot’s ability to alter the flow of fashion design from top-down to bottom-up, there were many other examples of how Bardot made common ready-to-wear designers, and even mass produced fashions the norm. Put simply, when Bardot wore something, it was copied. When Phyllis Lee Levin wrote from Paris that same summer of 1959, she realized that:

> The most influential fashion leader in Europe did not show at the recent Paris collections for fall and winter. This was not surprising, for she is a film star, not a dress designer. Her name is Brigitte Bardot. From

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Edinburgh to Aix-en-Provence and from Geneva to Monte Carlo, thousands of 20 year-olds cling to one design—the star’s favorite.  

Similarly, after a press conference in London, where Bardot wore a black dress with a white swallow’s collar, “the day after, all the shops had the same dress. They must have stitched it up in the night,” Bardot recalled. With the constant, rapid, and far-reaching circulation of Bardot’s images, ready-made manufacturers could, and did, respond to new trends almost instantly, enabling consumers all over Europe to emulate certain styles and trends. The diffusion of fashion trends had been reduced from years, to months, to weeks, and down to days.

Overall, ready-made manufacturers could respond to Bardot trends more quickly than couture trends, allowing Bardot to maintain her position as a fashion leader in quite a different way than couture leaders. When Bardot wore something, it was photographed and disseminated around Europe within a matter of a day or days. Manufacturers could then go about creating copies, or near copies of the design based on the photographs rather than waiting for the couture fashions shows several times a year. Bardot’s influence represented a popularization and democratization of fashion as more people across different countries were given access to fashionable dress and style. They wanted the same things, could be provided with the same things, and established a European-wide phenomenon where fashion leadership was transferred from the old to the young:

Until recently no European woman could qualify as a fashion leader without being over 30 years of age—generally well over—and dressed to the nines by a haute couture designer. But this season France’s newest style setters are younger girls—debutants, aspiring actresses, Parisian working girls and habitués of the Riviera bohemia St. Tropez. They are dressed by new designers, still on the edge of the big time, who are more

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interested in having their clients look young and feminine than elegant. Among these designers are Louis Feraud and Jacques Esterel, who at one time were in business together. Both have made clothes for Brigitte Bardot.\footnote{246}

Women of the couture variety, however, were trying to maintain their distinction amidst a sea of rapidly progressing and easily accessible fashions in the age of mass markets. Despite Bardot’s popularity and massive following as a fashion leader, there were sections of society who disapproved of Bardot’s look and what it stood for. Called the “look of elaborately planned neglect” that represented the apathetic youth of her generation who “disregard conventions, take nothing to heart” and are entirely depoliticized, the Bardot look had opponents.\footnote{247} Traditional bourgeois society, from which Bardot had come, resisted trends influenced by her and copied by her “devotees of the young Left-Bank type.”\footnote{248} Among the more traditionally bourgeois crowd, “even the mention of Brigitte Bardot brings a frown,” and one piece black swimsuits “reign in quite and supreme chic.”\footnote{249} Bardot recalled being constantly threatened, mocked, and attacked by members of this class, and Louis Malle vividly remembered an incident when a “woman in a fur coat came up while Bardot was acting, spat in her face and screamed “you are undermining the bourgeoisie.”\footnote{250} The sector of European society who disapproved of Bardot, her bikinis, her lifestyle and its associated symbols were the members of an ever-shrinking traditional bourgeois. Bardot was wildly popular precisely because she represented something new
and something different from the traditional bourgeois notion of beauty, responsibility, and ‘respectable’ behaviour; she was liberating.

Certain haute couturiers, however, needed to maintain a client base in order to survive and some responded to the popularization of the Bardot look by openly rejecting it as their desired clients did. For example, in 1960, Lanvin-Castillo announced that his Autumn collection would be built around “a type of elegance not found at Saint Tropez,” while Jacques Heim, the inventor of the pseudo-bikini, ‘atome,’ but now president of the Chambre Syndicale explained, “the secret of the new style is a refined and invisible sophistication rather than a visible and aggressive sophistication.”

Both were taking less than subtle stabs at Bardot and her legion of followers. Very few people, however, likely remember the Autumn 1960 Lanvin-Castillo line or what came of Jacques Heim’s suggestion of a new style, but Bardot remains iconic in the fashion world, her contribution to a Euro-chic aesthetic during the late 1950s and early 1960s celebrated a throwing away of conventions, a youthfulness and playfulness in fashion that stripped power away from the Parisian couturiers, thereby opening up the already integrating European fashion scene to radical new influences like those coming from London and Milan.

After establishing her position as a fashion leader in Europe during the late 1950s and early 1960s, Bardot’s fashion sense, however, ceased to be revolutionary as increasingly radical styles coming out of London took centre stage in the fashion debates. Bardot did, however, have a profound impact blazing a path through the postwar fashion changes in rejecting the couture clothing expected of someone in her position and with her wealth, popularizing the bikini, and contributing to early Euro-chic fashion identity.

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markers that still remain popular. By the mid 1960s Bardot’s fashion was no longer radical and the industry worked to profit off her mass popularity. In an effort not to be caught off guard, as they were with the gingham craze in 1959, the fashion industry was well prepared to mass produce Bardot’s fashions by the mid 1960s. For example, in preparation for mass demand for sexy, frilly dresses circa 1900 expected after Bardot filmed *Viva Maria* in 1965, fifty licenses were granted to French manufacturers to produce reproductions. The designs, by Ghislain Uhry were licensed by textile consultant Claude Bernheim to a variety of European manufacturers whose sales were expected to exceed $20-40 million. The industry, then, was gearing up to make choices on the consumer’s behalf before the demand existed and the pseudo-freedom of Bardot’s consumption habits and the pleasures those mimicking her enjoyed were waning. As Bardot’s ready-to-wear fashion revolution was being overshadowed by pursuit of profits, over time, the courtiers themselves were willing to forgive her transgressions against them. The radical nature of Bardot’s ready-to-wear fashion revolution was co-opted by couturiers themselves as fashion designers in the 2000s began to produce collections in direct homage to Bardot’s 1950s and 1960s style. Bardot had certainly left her mark on the European fashion.

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254 Particularly noteworthy is the Chanel 2010/2011 Cruise collection shown in Saint Tropez and concluded with Georgia May Jagger walking down the runway as a young Bardot herself.
CHAPTER 3

THE EUROPEAN CHILD-WOMAN

Postwar Europe saw the powerful emergence of several new gendered phenomena. This chapter will address the changing nature of gender constructions and possible identities in postwar Europe through the constructions of the new woman, *jeune fille*, *enfant terrible*, and child-woman. These constructions had a pan-European base, appeal, and manifestations and will be examined in relation to these European roots as well as their appearance in Bardot as a postwar European icon. While these types and constructions address the roles and identities of women, there were also important implications for male society, giving clues to larger pan-European anxieties like the crises of European masculinity generated by the war, decolonization and the Marshall Plan, or the increasing feminization of a consumer-based society. These new constructions functioned as tools enabling Europeans to make sense of a new and rapidly changing world, both in terms of creating the constructions and negotiating with them.

The new woman, *jeune fille*, *enfant terrible* and child-woman were all interrelated manifestations of changes in the postwar world, but this chapter will focus explicitly on the child-woman because of her relationship to youth culture, new consumer society, male anxieties, and the clear relationship to Bardot through Simone de Beauvoir’s 1959 essay, “Brigitte Bardot and the Lolita Syndrome.” The child-woman was a broad trans-national popular cultural phenomenon throughout Western Europe with two key manifestations in a German tabloid character turned fashion doll, *Bild Lilli*, and Bardot as the ultimate physical manifestation. Furthermore, in order to understand the nature of her Europeanizing force, Bardot has been placed within this wider trans-European phenomenon and dislocated from
her status as a French icon.\(^{255}\) Direct and indirect forces circulating around Western Europe built her highly mediated construction, and she was received and consumed around Europe as a child-woman. Furthermore, these child-woman constructions played an important role in the European resistance and challenge to the Americanization of European popular culture.

The child-woman as a general construction was a young woman (at the very least appearing young), possessing certain characteristics of children, specifically ignorance (in all matters other than the sexual), an impatient demanding nature, a desire and love for consumer goods (like children with toys), selfishness, and a lack of moral conventions and obligations. She was sexually available, eager to consume (often willing to exchange her sexual availability for consumer goods), and thought of little other than her own satisfaction. Furthermore, the child-woman, often identified as beautiful, actually altered the standards of European beauty, forging a space for herself in terms of generating appreciation for less voluptuous figures, which the overt femininity of the immediate postwar period and specifically, American stars, did not represent.

As we will see, though many of the roots of the child-woman phenomena were male creations to serve male needs and quell male anxieties, but women were also able to co-opt these constructions to create new meanings and identities for themselves. Examining Lilli and Bardot allows us to see some of these powerful new female actors in postwar Europe. In the case of Lilli, it was women and young girls who wrestled her away from men, defining her as a ‘girl’s toy. These women and young girls, from around

\(^{255}\) While there are a number of scholars from various disciplines who have addressed Bardot as an important postwar symbol, their treatments focus explicitly on France, her role in the revival of postwar French cinema, her contribution to democratizing French postwar fashion, her relationship to women’s emancipation (or subjugation) in France, or other nationally confined contexts. See Vincendeau, Holmes, and Leahy.
Europe, utilized their increased purchasing power to claim Lilli as their own, altering her development, and demonstrating the economic strength of their trans-European demographic, foreshadowing and complimenting the Common Market. Bardot on the other hand, while economically powerful, was more meaningful for women in terms of breaking down gender boundaries and loosening moral codes and providing a model for various forms of emulation.

**Postwar Woman**

The postwar European woman found herself in a world very different from the one she had known prior to 1939, and the pace of change was only accelerating. In terms of a broad historical context, postwar women found themselves in a world where they had ‘paid their dues’ to society through personal sacrifice during the war, and for middle-class women, through taking up work outside the home. In return, women won certain social and economic freedoms and although these new freedoms varied across Europe, women were generally provided with, or took larger roles in social, political, and economic life. Furthermore, in postwar Europe, women numerically outnumbered men, had gained new political rights in many countries, and found themselves at the forefront a new consumer society, though still burdened with the task of repopulating a war-torn Europe. Amidst the generally optimistic postwar period, however, there were deeper European-wide anxieties surrounding the wounded image of Europe vis-à-vis the United States, the painful and embarrassing process of decolonization, issues of war guilt, and the associated crises of masculinity. New constructions of women served as the terrain on which these different processes and anxieties played out.
Postwar escapism had already been discussed in terms of the desire for greater mobility and travel, but it also applies to the field of gender relations. While many women turned towards travel (Chapter 1) and fashion (Chapter 2) as a means to escape the harsh realities of postwar Europe, men seemingly turned to women, the concept of women, and the identities of women, to escape from their own demons in the postwar world. The child-woman appeared out of a yearning for lost innocence and as a tool to restore the mysterious feminine that women’s wartime activities and new social, political, and economic clout were seemingly destroying. Furthermore, these new constructions helped men replace colonial fantasies that were being quickly lost in the postwar period. The sudden postwar appearance of women’s darker sun-tanned bodies, half-naked in their bikinis, barefoot, ignorant, carefree, and sexually available, surrounded by sun, sea, and sand recalled powerful memories of the colonial adventure and mission. European men could fulfil possibilities, thought lost with the colonies, of taming these ignorant but sexualized child-women and transforming them into good wives and mothers.

The child-woman was a uniquely postwar European phenomenon and beyond a replacement for colonial adventure, the child-woman also reflected the changing nature of gender roles and political rights in Europe. For de Beauvoir, the child-woman appeared—both figuratively and in-the-flesh—repeatedly in the postwar world and was so appealing to men because she retained an air of mystery that the grown woman had rescinded when she entered the male world of political equality: “the child-woman moves in a universe he

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cannot enter.” While de Beauvoir was referencing political equality in regards to France granting women the right to vote granted in 1944, there were other European countries that granted women different levels of political equality in the postwar era (Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Malta, Greece). Even European countries that had already granted women’s suffrage often provided new rights in the postwar world (like Sweden’s 1947 legislation of equal pay for men and women for instance), and faced the increasing public presence and economic power of postwar women. The child-woman therefore, existed to quiet some of the male anxieties in an era where women were gaining and exercising newfound political and economic rights and opportunities. The child-woman was appealing because she was still mysterious (and his inferior), reflecting the male desire to maintain the feminine mystique and infantilizing women in order to do so.

**Jeune Filles and Enfants Terribles**

Other constructions that existed before and concurrently with the child-woman, were the *jeune fille* and her misbehaved sister, the *enfant terrible*. Many scholars have noted the importance of the jeune fille in postwar France, but it is critical to acknowledge the existence of the jeune fille in other areas of Western Europe:

The jeune fille, distinct from the prepubescent *fillette or petite fille*, began to emerge as a specific category of identity in France as in the *larger western culture* in the eighteenth century, testimony to the growing interest in human physiological and hormonal development as well as to the newly acceptable temporal lapse between the onset of menstruation and marriage [my emphasis].

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So while the jeune fille had been circulating around Europe both figuratively and in reality, these young women became increasingly important, specifically as a sector of consumer society in postwar Europe, unmarried, able to partake in consumer society, but ultimately moving through a phase towards marriage and motherhood. If she stayed on course, a jeune fille could become a new-woman, clean and well-groomed, fashionable, domestically competent while making use of new domestic technologies, able to work but taking time to raise her children, expecting some form of sexual gratification (within marriage), but ultimately subservient to her husband. Products, services, and their associated ideological values were targeted towards these young women, reflected and sold in their increasingly visible images in media, advertising, and popular culture around Europe.

An element central to the postwar changes in the jeune fille, while also serving her needs and desires was the rapid proliferation of mass media and consumer society. Mediated products like newspapers, magazines, films, television, advertising, and popular music enabled the mass dissemination of these types and constructions throughout Europe. Beyond media, there was also a growing number of consumer ephemera from sexy postcards to fashion dolls to album jackets that began disseminating new images of young women. Some of the most popular women’s and popular cultural magazines in Europe that would have engaged with the discourse of the jeune-fille and child-woman at this time (and magazine which all included Bardot on their covers at some point) were: Picturegoer, Picture Post, Photoplay, (United Kingdom); Paris-Match Elle, Cinemond (France); Cine Revue, Piccolo (Belgium); Bravo, Bunte, Filmspeigel, Neue Illustrierte, (Germany); Oggi, Epoca, Tempo (Italy); MAAILIMA, Lue, APU, (Finland); Min Varld, Se (Sweden).

Born in 1934, Bardot was the perfect age to become the representation of a postwar jeune fille and before Bardot became the European icon of film and fame, she was a bourgeois, French, jeune-fille fashion model. A French fashion historian, Nicole Parrot, recalls Bardot’s early publicity:

Women of my generation all remember her first cover of Elle in 1950…She had short hazelnut hair and the magnificent posture of a dancer. She represented something that had never had its place before in society or in fashion: that of the jeune fille…On one side there were girls dressed by their mothers in blue navy skirts that they had already outgrown, with clumsy manners and chubby cheeks, and on the other side, married women. Nothing in between.260

The teenage model Bardot was the perfect jeune fille. She was clearly no longer a child, but also not quite yet a woman, certainly not married or a mother, but well on her way to becoming so. Like other postwar magazines, the French Elle and Mademoiselle “imagined the carefree female adolescent in opposition to a maternal figure burdened with war memories.”261 Bardot and other jeune filles dressed in the newest and most chic fashions, had neat and tidy hair, and conducted themselves as ladies. Their fashionability, beauty, and implicit healthiness functioned as yet another element of postwar escapism, beginning to demonstrate the success of postwar economic recovery and pleasures of consumption. But, many of Europe’s young possible jeune filles, fed on a steady diet of increasing affluence and consumption, turned the jolly opposition to their mothers’ generation (like embracing margarine rather than remember its association with wartime rationing) into full revolt (loosening sexual and moral codes); Bardot was poised to become their leader. These girls were the enfants terribles.

260 Nicole Parrot quoted in Poirier, September 29, 2009. Also note that Bardot’s first Elle cover was May 2 1949, not 1950 as recalled by Parrot.
261 Weiner, 103.
For Susan Weiner, there emerged in the postwar world a category in many ways more relevant than the jeune filles. The (female) enfants terribles were the postwar heirs to the *jeune filles*. In order to explain the female enfants terribles, Weiner combines Jean Cocteau’s inter-war work *Les Enfants Terribles* with the sensational postwar rise to stardom of Brigitte Bardot. For Weiner, in Cocteau’s *Les Enfants Terribles*, it is Elizabeth, rather than her brother Paul, who is the more active and manipulative agent, always remorseless in her selfish pursuits and uncaring towards those she hurts along the way. In the postwar era, the “unconventional behavior and ideas of Cocteau’s Elisabeth and their capacity to dismay others became increasingly visible.”

Bardot then emerged in the 1950s with the success of *Et Dieu*, to serve as another narrativized embodiment of this new enfant terrible, both in film and media discourse:

Fixing an image of the nymphet whom not even marriage could really tame…the fiction of female adolescence expanded to draw youth actresses and their screen personae into the scripted confusion between author and protagonist, giving the type a full physical presence—the movement of a body, the sounds of a voice—that went well beyond the already seductive press photo.

The enfant terrible was the natural extension of the jeune fille into a world where generation tensions were mounting. Rather than behave as the jeune fille was supposed to, enfants terribles reacted against their parents, their values, and general societal expectations of them. To better understand a jeune fille turned enfant terrible one need only compare photos and film footage of a young Bardot as a proper bourgeois ballerina with the famous basement mambo scene from *Et Dieu*. Then speculate on how Bardot’s parents felt about the wildly erotic outcome of all those expensive ballet lessons and afternoons spent

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262 Weiner, 14.
263 Weiner, 103.
dancing for Mme. Bardot’s friends at fashion shows in the Bardot home.²⁶⁴ There was, however, a critically important character between Cocteau’s Elizabeth and Bardot, and she emerged out of postwar Germany.

**Child-Woman: Bild Lilli**

Bardot did not manifest into the ultimate enfant terrible in isolation; there were important precedents to her new persona, though her predecessors were literary and mediated constructions. One especially important predecessor emerged in Germany in 1952. *Bild Lilli* is probably best known for being the European model for America’s icon of popular culture, Barbie. Lilli, however, had deeper roots than her 1955 manifestation as a doll and sanitized reappearance as Barbie in the United States in 1959. Lilli first appeared in the West German tabloid *Bild Zeitung* on June 24, 1952, becoming instantly popular and remaining in the tabloid until early 1961 [Figure 1].²⁶⁵

**Figure 3: Bild Lilli Cartoons (Dates Unknown)**

![Bild Lilli Cartoons](http://zenzo.de/homepage/cartoons.html)

Source: [http://zenzo.de/homepage/cartoons.html](http://zenzo.de/homepage/cartoons.html)

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²⁶⁴ Singer, 17-18
She was created by Reinhard Beuthien who originally drew a baby, but adjusted his drawing by adding a curvaceous woman’s body to the already childish face. And though Bardot had already been given the famous initials/nickname BB in 1949, Lilli was in many ways the baby that preceded bébé, described as epitomizing “what would be the Brigitte Bardot era’s idea of ‘sex appeal’ [my emphasis].” The fact that Lilli first appeared in a new form of mass media is important in the sense that it placed her “as a performer of postwar change and modernity” as part of “the new and popularist medium of tabloid newspapers that marked a different—cleansed, transformed—public spirit in West Germany and defined the capitalist character of the new society.” Lilli has been described as a comic strip that became a cult character, representing the “zeitgeist” of the Fifties and Sixties. Furthermore, Lilli’s emergence into a vastly expanded world of consumerism, leisure, household appliances and aesthetically charged clothing modes is the story of both ‘women’ and ‘Europe’ in the postwar era.

Lilli represented Europe and women because she was born from the same conditions, desires, and societal changes that were taking place across Europe at the time. Lilli was a European child-woman straight through from her appearance to her behaviours and she represented a voracious drive for capitalist success through unrestricted consumption. Furthermore, Lilli, like many other postwar women, migrated from the country to the big city, looking for new opportunities and success. Lilli, however, was more a caricature of new European women and metaphor for Europe itself because while she was a postwar

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267 Peers, 146.
268 Deutsche Modepuppen de 50er + 60er. Silke Knaak. Unpublished.
269 Peers, 146.
working-woman, the true nature of her work has drawn some debate. She appears to have represented less a ‘cleansed’ Europe than a re-branded Europe.

Lilli has been described as a very thinly concealed prostitute—in relation to her behaviour and the fact that she lived and worked in Hamburg—certainly, a woman who enjoyed using men for money and material goods.\(^{270}\) She was a sassy, greedy, and manipulative, but exuded such an air of innocence that her uncouth behaviours were often overlooked or justified as appropriate in exchange for her body and sexual availability. She was “an exhibitionist and a floozy” whose favourite activity was manipulating men and appearing in various stages of undress, taunting men with her seductive body and looking for material goods in return.\(^{271}\) Lilli was Europe enticing the Marshall Plan, recently displaced, broke, and desirous for consumer goods.

As in other elements of postwar European popular culture, the United States played a key role in the emergence of the European child-woman. In some ways, all of war-torn Europe was the child woman looking to the United States as her benevolent benefactor. While child-women like Lilli looked to men for money in exchange for their sexual availability, so too did Europe eagerly accept the Marshall Plan, allowing the United States a certain type of ‘entry’ (that of American market forces) in exchange for all the much-needed cash. Lord suggests that Lilli’s focused pursuit of wealth in this era characterized her as “the vanquished Aryan, golddigging her way back to prosperity” while Peers sees Lilli’s free spirit and consumption as “a physical calibration of the climb out of postwar occupation and the humiliation of defeat.”\(^{272}\) As Lilli/Germany/Europe succeeded in

\(^{270}\) Lord, 25.
\(^{271}\) Ibid., 25.
\(^{272}\) Ibid., 29, and Peers, 142.
acquiring money and popularity, she was transformed; Lilli was lifted from the pages of *Bild Zeitung* and given physical form in the Bild Lilli doll.

Lilli dolls, manufactured and sold between 1955 and 1964 were originally gag gifts for men and marketed as such. Lilli was a “mascot for your car,” who promised a “beschwingte Fahrt” (swift ride), and contemporaries remember seeing men “lifting up her skirts and pulling down her pants and stuff.” One German man remembered the Lilli doll as “an irresistible gag…imagine, a doll with big tits, and long legs! Nothing like her existed before.” The irony of Lilli’s sexual availability as a metaphor for Europe’s acceptance of the Marshall Plan and increasing Americanization was either lost on or irrelevant to these men busy enjoying the fruits of consumer society. They were also seemingly unaware of the young women poised to snatch Lilli away from the world of male fantasy and re-establish her in the image of female fantasies, striking another blow to the fragile masculinities of postwar Europe. While Lilli may have been created in the first place out of a male desire to depoliticize women in the wake of their increasing political participation in postwar Europe and sold to men as an object for playing with, the increasingly active and powerful female consumer group in postwar Europe was poised to take her for themselves.

Despite the fact that Lilli dolls were originally created and marketed to be sold to men, women and young girls quickly became their main consumers, pushing Lilli from a gag gift to a fashion doll, demonstrating women’s increasing economic power and ability to alter male constructions. When Lilli dolls were released in 1955, they came with a number of different outfits (that the men liked taking off), but that women and young girls enjoyed

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273 Peers, 139.
275 BillyBoy*, 4.
for their playful fashionability. In the first collection of Lilli outfits, “absolutely everything was skintight—knit jersey, slacks, capris, sheaths…cincher belts, darted waists and rib-knit waistbands.” Lilli was fashionable and thereafter, “girls and women raised Lilli into a cult object. Teenagers and children began buying her in large quantities as a toy” and these girls’ and women’s “colonisation of this adult mascot made the production of innumerable fashionable dresses for Lilli economically viable.” Lilli’s wardrobe was greatly expanded in response to this new opportunity. The dolls were sold beyond Germany as well, being particularly popular with girls in Italy and Scandinavia, where “her fashions were enjoyed for their own sake,” ensuring that the masses of female European consumers could appropriate the original plaything of West German males. Her clothes may still have been put on and taken off, but the meaning behind this practice was altered when young women appropriated Lilli as part of their own pleasures of consumption rather than the male pleasure of objectification and sexual manipulation.

Furthermore, Lilli’s fashions, which could be bought ready made (rather than home-sewn like pervious dolls’ clothes), served as a precursor to and reflection of the transition towards prét-a-porter fashions in postwar Europe and that Lilli’s casual yet sexualized fashion reflected a popularity of West German fashion that has since been forgotten. One reason that Lilli’s fashion may have quickly been forgotten is that Bardot, after rising to a level of notoriety that Lilli could have never imagined, popularized the same fashions. Most of Lilli’s wardrobe look like miniature versions of many of

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276 BillyBoy*, 4.
277 Peers, 147.
278 Peers 149.
279 Ibid.
Bardot’s signature looks. But while Lilli was enticing rich men into buying her things, though, Bardot was still transitioning between a jeune fille and enfant terrible.

**The Rise of Bardot: Lolita meets Lilli**

All that the little jeune fille Bardot from *Elle* magazine had to do was “grow up, expose herself to a minimum of learning and marry within her class.” Instead, and because of her bourgeois mother’s choice to put her on the cover of *Elle*, Brigitte met Roger Vadim—a quintessential Left Bank bohemian wannabe filmmaker with no steady job—and began her transformation into an *enfant terrible*. Bardot was sneaking around from the age of fifteen onwards to meet Vadim and have premarital sex, refusing her parent’s wishes that she to stop seeing him, and attempting suicide—ironically by sticking her head into a shiny-new postwar gas oven—and while promising to try again if she was not allowed to marry him. While Lilli was wearing ready-made capri pants and tight blouses in 1952, young Bardot was still modelling in haute couture and getting ready to be married in a very traditional wedding dress. The images of Bardot from 1952, in her bourgeois wedding dress, however, appear somewhat humorous when the circumstances of this wedding are known, but at the time, enfant terrible/child women did not yet have a new wardrobe, though Lilli, Bardot, and manufacturers around Europe would provide her with it shortly (Chapter 2). Before the rise of Bardot, however, there was another essential construct that would be important in creating fertile ground for the rise of Bardot as the ultimate child-woman.

When Simone de Beauvoir wrote one of the key pieces on Bardot after her rise to superstardom in the mid to late 1950s, she titled it “Brigitte Bardot and the Lolita

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281 Singer, 22.
Syndrome” in reference to Bardot’s obvious childishness and the overall European popularity of these childish women in literary and filmic representation. For de Beauvoir, Bardot was the perfect Lolita-type:

The most perfect specimen…seen from behind, her slender, muscular, dancer’s body is almost androgynous. Femininity triumphs in her delightful bosom. The long voluptuous tresses of Melisande flow down to her shoulders, but her hair-do is that of a negligent waif. The line of her lips forms a childish pout, and at the same time those lips are very kissable.282

Bardot combined the appearance of a woman with that of a child and was almost irresistible because of it. De Beauvoir saw Bardot, who lacked the curvaceous maturity of stars like Marilyn Monroe, Sophia Loren, and Gina Lollobrigida, as a ‘new Eve’ created by “merging the ‘green fruit’ and ‘femme fatale.’283 Bardot was a Lolita, but unlike Lolita, who actually was a child, although with the sexual prowess of a woman, Bardot was a sexually capable woman who both looked and acted like a child.

Nabokov’s Lolita was originally published in France in 1955, later becoming a best-seller in England and translated into French, Dutch, German, Danish, Italian, Finnish, and other European languages.284 Its plot centres around the obsession of a middle-aged man (Humbert) with an twelve year old girl (Lolita) that builds until the young Lolita both shocks and pleases Humbert by seducing him, and fulfilling his fantasy to have sex with her. The two maintain a complicated relationship on the road for several years until Lolita is abducted by another man, escapes him, winds up pregnant and married at 17 and contacts Humbert because she needs money. Like Lilli, Nabokov’s nymphet Lolita

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282 de Beauvoir, 11.
283 de Beauvoir 12 and Howard, Saturday Evening Post, June 14, 1958, which notes that the enfant terrible and femme fatale are not new creations, but it is the combination of these constructions within Bardot that create and sustain the Bardot phenomenon.
284 de Beauvoir, 10.
possessed “charms entirely physical” with Humbert enjoying her “carnal richness” despite her “mental baseness” evident in her desiring and enjoying all of the consumer products she saw and could get access to from banal advertisements to popular films. Fittingly, Bardot, as the new Lolita herself would appear through the medium of popular film.

Bardot’s rise to superstardom as a ‘new Lolita’ came with the 1956-1957 success of *Et Dieu* in the United States and Europe. Vadim, who wrote the film himself, could not have been unaware of or uninfluenced by both Lilli and Lolita. Bardot’s Juliette from *Et Dieu* has characteristics of Bild Lilli and Lolita. She looked more like Lilli, who herself looked quite a lot like a child based on her original drawing as a baby and Bardot coincidentally acquired Lilli-style big blonde hair at this time as well. Bardot’s Juliette, however, acted more like Lolita. In *Et Dieu*, Curd Jürgens’ character, lusting after Juliette, acts as her protector rather than pursuer though, and he gifts her with a little toy car—like Humbert gifting Lolita—highlighting her childishness while making no secret of her sexual allure. Bardot became world famous for her ability to demonstrate “in any stage of dress or undress” her unique ability to “instantly become a child.” In *Please! Mr. Balzac*, for instance, though “she does strip dances, she also brushes her teeth. No husband and father, watching her trying as prettily as a 6-year-old to spit past her lower lip, could help but be ashamed of himself.” Bardot transformed entire male audiences into Humberts,

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286 At this time, Vadim worked for the French tabloid *Paris-Match* and would have been entirely aware of the German *Bild-Zeitung* and its popular cartoon strip. Also, as a Left Bank bohemian, Vadim would have also been privy to the stir caused by Nabokov’s *Lolita*. The fact that he wrote *Et Dieu* with Juliette as a new Lolita and had Bardot’s image remade to resemble Lilli is more than coincidental.


288 Ibid.
tantalizing Americans with her nudity and fulfilling escapist dreams of her European male audiences through her childish innocence.

As it was Lolita who originally seduced Humbert, it would be Bardot who seduced her male companions both on and off screen. Unlike Lilli who appears to act as though she knows what she is doing is wrong but does it anyways (sexual promiscuity is worth it for the material compensation), for Lolita, Bardot, and growing masses of European enfants terribles, morality was entirely out of the picture. Owen Aldridge has described Lolita’s indifference to the moral consequences of her sexual relationship with Humbert; “making love is an act less significant than going for a walk or eating cake.”

Similarly, in one of the classic scenes from *Et Dieu*, Bardot’s Juliette weds Michel and gets him beat up on the way home from the wedding, so after getting home, the two disappear upstairs, seemingly for his new wife to tend to his wounds. After a delay long enough to make all the guests uncomfortable, however, Juliette appears, half naked, hair a-mess, and without shoes on. She walks up to the dinner table where the family is all eating takes the closest plate and fork to poke at some food, grabs a bottle of wine and marches right back up the stairs to the bedroom, impervious to everyone’s shock and dismay. As de Beauvoir described Bardot, “she eats when she’s hungry and makes love with the same unceremonious simplicity.”

It was not only Bardot’s film characters, however, that shocked people, the ‘real Bardot’ was equally, if not more shocking than her on-screen characters. Bardot was shocking not only because of her actions, but also because of her motivations. Bardot was not trying to scandalize, she just did, “morality does not have a chance with her…good and

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289 Aldridge, 25.
290 de Beauvoir, 16-17.
evil are part of conventions to which she would not even think of bowing.”

This complete indifference to morals, conventions, good, and evil is what truly set Bardot apart, made her the icon of a generation, or more, and established her as a precursor to the loosening of sexual morals in the late 1960s. Unlike Lolita, who took little pleasure from sexual encounters and demanded material goods in return, Bardot turned the Lolita complex on its head, taking pure pleasure from sexual relationships and, as one of the wealthiest women in France, without needing the material compensation. In many ways, she represented the desire of postwar women to be financial and sexual equals in their partnerships, and/or financially independent and sexually aggressive. While her on-screen characters were most often rehabilitated by patriarchal order, Bardot herself resisted and refused to be rehabilitated in the same way. For viewers of her films and consumers of her mediated personality, the contrast would have been obvious, and all the more enticing.

**Bardot: Film Characters and Mediated Character**

Bardot came to embody a central shift in popular culture, film, media, and representation that Walter Benjamin had begun to describe decades earlier. Benjamin argued that in an age were exhibition value dominated, the film star’s “greatest effects are almost always obtained by ‘acting’ as little as possible.”

The purpose of a film star was to represent themselves rather than a character, which the traditional stage actor would strive to represent. The film star “offers not only his labour but also his whole self, his

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291 de Beauvoir, 16.
heart and soul” in order to create and cultivate a personality that is also a commodity.  

Bardot became a multifaceted commodity with incredible reach; her films and records were consumed, the mediated versions of her private life were consumed, her image was consumed, her fashions were consumed, even her home in Saint Tropez was consumed. The cult of Bardot was built around her supposed private life, more so than her films, and the confluence between the two was part of the key to her success.

Bardot herself was the child-woman and her characters played off her mediated personality more than she took on elements of her characters. Claude Chevereau recalled that when shopping in a Berlin department store with Bardot’s little sister in the early 1960s, Mijanou “selected a toy car as a present for Brigitte. She explained that her sister liked toy ones better than real ones.”  

The lines between Lolita, Juliette, and Brigitte were completely blurred. Bardot was described as being in “early adolescence—a spoiled, rebellious adolescence.” Her child-woman qualities were highlighted by press stories like the time during the filming of La Vérité, when Henri George Clouzot required a six-foot teddy bear for a particular scene and Bardot “volunteered to bring one—from her apartment.” Only a child-woman would keep in an apartment, the site of numerous seductions, a six-foot teddy bear.

As Vadim famously stated, “Brigitte does not act—she exists” and the publicity around Bardot reinforced this position in building Bardot as “all animality, sensuality and femininity unfolded…everything was done to convince the public that acting was now old-

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293 Benjamin, 112-113.
296 Ibid.
fashioned and passé.”

Even the American media, working to explain the incredible popularity of Bardot in the wake of the *Et Dieu* phenomenon found that while the Bardot myth “has been carefully fabricated for the box office, reinforced in film after film and embellished by scrap after scrap of well-timed publicity…the remarkable thing about it is that Brigitte herself…has made it true.”

By 1958, after acting in almost two dozen films and facing the media frenzy around her every move and relationship, Bardot was keenly aware of the confluence between her ‘self’ and her film roles; “these characters I play are not characters at all. They are the real me.” Such a mixture is also part of what made Bardot so appealing to the European masses. They could consume Bardot on screen and through popular media, believing that they were watching a real woman, and a woman they even had a slight chance to encounter. Similarly, young women, in believing that the Bardot of film was indeed the Bardot of ‘real life,’ found a model for emulation in numerous ways.

Self Identification and Empowerment

While de Beauvoir believed the child-woman existed to quell male anxieties, there were multiple possible readings of the child-woman and of Bardot as child-woman. Kristin Ross utilizes Francoise Giroud—editor of *Elle* magazine 1946-1953 and founder-editor of *L’express* 1953-1971—to express how de Beauvoir was “detached from the lot of ‘everyday women.’” Through her detachment, de Beavoir missed alternative readings of

Bardot’s star image. For many young women, Bardot’s representation as a sexual aggressor, as something more than an object, and someone unashamed of her own sexuality, was what made her both so appealing and such an accurate representation of changing Europe. Prior to de Beavoir’s article, Seymour Peck noted:

> Intellectuals, many of whom have hopped aboard the Bardot bandwagon with a frenzy usually reserved for the verse of Dylan Thomas or a new novel by Vladimir Nabokov, profess to see in her a compelling symbol of defiance and emancipation, B.B., they say…is challenging the restraints a self-conscious world has placed upon itself.\(^{301}\)

Beyond the intellectual scene, Bardot “became a symbol, almost a product of the collective imagination of adolescent females, who yearned for lives of action and intense experience rather than those led by their mothers.”\(^{302}\) But it was not just young people who were drawn to Bardot’s “insolent flouting of her elders and their sacred institutions,” because even among “older persons, she conjures up fantasies and day-dreams of a sexual prowess…and adventure and fulfilment they have never known in their own lives.”\(^{303}\)

Bardot, therefore, was a powerful model across generational lines. But was her model empowering for the masses of European women exposed to it?

Scholars writing on Bardot’s star status have noted the tension between Bardot’s position as an emancipatory figure and her complicity in maintaining patriarchal order. Similarly, scholars assessing Bardot’s film characters trying to locate the conflict between the representation of emancipation and the restoration of patriarchal order have demonstrated that Bardot’s characters ultimately fail to subvert male dominance by being

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\(^{300}\) Ross, 68.

\(^{301}\) Seymour Peck, “It Must be more than Sex,” *New York Times* September 14, 1958.


killed, committing suicide, or ending up broken and alone.\textsuperscript{304} This position is problematic in two ways. Firstly, there is no way to know how the female audiences of these films received the Bardot characters and their downfalls. The fact that the characters were ultimately recuperated would not always be immediately accepted by viewing audiences as justified or appropriate endings. Secondly, the ‘real’ Bardot, or at least the Bardot of media construction, was infinitely more popular than her characters and did not meet the same types of fates as her characters.

While it is difficult to accurately gauge the impact that Bardot had on the masses of her contemporaries, there were other prominent women in Europe who admitted to being positively influenced by Bardot and articulated the types of empowering effects that adopting and playing with elements of her star image and persona could bring; one such figure was the female British Pop Artist Pauline Boty.\textsuperscript{305} Pauline Boty acquired the nickname ‘the Wimbledon Bardot’ during her time at Wimbledon School of Art; she was young, pretty, blonde, and took part in a type of performative art as well as painting, “enacting what was, for the times, an outrageously up-front sexuality.”\textsuperscript{306} By the time of Boty’s arrival at Wimbledon in the mid 1950s:

\begin{quote}
Bardot was already Fleet Street’s original ‘sex kitten,’ but inscrutable, intimidating, and cool with it… like many other art-school girls, Pauline modelled herself on Bardot…Pauline would more often go gingham
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{306} Tate, 17.
Bardot in the other teenage uniform of ballet pumps, (‘patent flatties’), white ankle socks, and flared dresses over big petticoats.\textsuperscript{307}

Boty embraced Bardot’s image, like women and girls all over Europe, and although she likely did so in a more self-aware way than many girls, the playfulness, pleasure, and power of this image could be empowering for women in this era.

While many women undoubtedly took part in the pleasures of consumption, fashion, and beauty related to Bardot, for Boty, and others, there were deeper implications in Bardot mimicry. For these women, Bardot’s stardom was an alternative to traditional postwar gender relations and contained signs and markers that could be deployed in meaningful ways to challenge traditional order. Furthermore, Boty actually articulated many of the reasons and pleasures involved in this type of mimicry. This wonderful description goes a long way in explaining how and why the Bardot phenomenon was so pervasive and powerful across Europe in this era:

I think having any hero or heroine is like building an extension into your own personality. You see, people aren’t just made up of actions alone. Everyone has dreams and fantasies and other lives going for them as well as their everyday lives, and one of the concrete aspects of this is revealed in our idols. Our fears, hopes, frustrations, and dreams. We can pin them on a star who shows them to millions. And if you can do that you’re no longer alone.\textsuperscript{308}

Through this understanding of mimicry, we can see how meaningful Bardot’s star image could be and how many related but diverse readings could be taken from it for women across Europe. Bardot was a beautiful and fashionable woman, but she was also powerful, economically independent, unapologetic about her behaviours which were deemed immoral

\textsuperscript{307} Adam Smith, \textit{Now You See Her: Pauline Boty, First Lady of British Pop}, (2002), 20, www.writing-room.com Accessed March 5 2011. Boty can also be seen in the 1962 Ken Russell BBC documentary \textit{Pop Goes the Easel} performing herself preparing to perform her Bardot; she backcombs her hair and lines her eyes with black liner. Also in this film, Boty impersonates Shirley Temple, referencing the prevalence of the child-woman in postwar popular culture and deploying it in a self-conscious way.

and corrupting; she lived in the present, took pleasure when it was available, but also faced harsh criticism in the press both at home and abroad. Women watched and experienced both the celebration and lambasting of Bardot, learning what was acceptable and unacceptable, feeling her pleasures and plain in their own lives as well. Any woman in postwar Europe who was accused of immoral behaviour or lack of respect for conventions could turn to Bardot and instantly feel less alone. Any girl accused of being a sinner could likely identify with the giant image of Bardot erected at the Vatican Pavilion of the 1958 Brussels World Fair as a symbol of sin (which ironically had to be taken down because it attracted so much adoring attention) and realize that Bardot stuck it out and survived it all.

Beyond her playful physical impersonation of Bardot, Boty also took part in meaningful behaviours related to Bardot and women’s roles in postwar Europe. Boty “demonstrated concern with women’s duality in postwar media as either mother/wife and household consumer or as a consumable object of male desire, be it star or pin-up.”

Boty’s work thus represented a female view of Pop Art that acknowledged “an autonomous female sexual pleasure and desire…articulated a female subjectivity: giving expression to the empathetic pleasures of female fandom…using the visual language of mass culture to explore a gendered politics.”

Boty, consciously aware of her performance of Bardot and femininity, used it as a means of play and critique on the dominance of the male gaze both within society, and specifically within the British Pop Art Movement which itself was a reflection of contemporary popular culture. Boty and Bardot both subjugated men to the female gaze as a reversal of their own objectification by the male gaze.

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309 Minioudaki, 415.
310 Tate, 20.
Like Bardot, Boty developed some of her work in a way “that locates female desire with Pop’s iconology…that validates the pleasure of the female gaze.” Boty’s celebrity portraits, specifically *With Love to Jean Paul Belmondo* (1962) acknowledged the pleasures of female fandom and provided a female reversal of the male gaze directed at stars like Bardot. Furthermore, Boty explained her portrait of Belmondo in relation to Bardot:

He’s a masculine and potent extension of the kind of myth BB engendered. He lives carelessly like young people of today and according to his own morality. He’s lawless. He creates about himself a feeling of anarchy. You feel he is completely free. He has no guilt, and I think this in particular is a contemporary feeling. His freedom makes him full of a marvellous kind of wild energy, and he belongs to the here and now.

Boty’s explanation points to Bardot as the original trailblazer and Belmondo as a masculine version of Bardot’s myth; all these qualities of Belmondo were represented already, for women, and by a woman, through Bardot. Belmondo, however, seems to represent only the pleasurable and fun version of living youthfully and carelessly; unlike Bardot, he was not expected to be a wife and mother.

**Bardot and Motherhood**

When the pregnant Bardot married Jacques Charrier in 1959, she had an opportunity to redeem her public image as a child-woman corrupting European youth. She could remain faithfully married to Charrier, himself from an upstanding French family, raise her child, even while continuing to be an actress. She had lived out the period in her life to be both a jeune fille and enfant terrible. She had become a fashion model, a film star, a sex symbol, enjoyed torrid love affairs, travelled around Europe, and made tens of...
millions of Francs working as an actress. The pregnancy and marriage gave Bardot a chance to redeem her image and build a new career as many people in the film industry and close to Bardot supposedly believed “that the future of the 24-year-old golden girl as a star…depends heavily on the success of her marriage to Jacques Charrier” and “if Brigitte develops into a happy, mature young woman she may have a chance to learn to be an actress and to become a permanent adornment of French films.” Rather than develop into a happy and mature young wife and mother, however, Bardot lashed out against motherhood and began a new love affair and attempted suicide shortly after the birth of her son in 1960. Bardot appeared incapable of growing up and accepting the responsibilities of being a wife and mother and Charrier had failed to restore European masculine pride and confidence by reforming Bardot.

Unlike the Bardot characters that are recuperated and punished for their misbehaviour, it was marriage, monogamy, and motherhood and the associated pressures that pushed Bardot towards her 1960 suicide attempt. She felt trapped by the role expected of her and the criticism that came from not fulfilling it. Her suicide attempt was not punishment for her misbehaviour, but rather a reaction against the possibility of having to give up her misbehaviour. After surviving the suicide attempt, Bardot did not reform her ways. She remained distant from her child, having him raised largely by Charrier’s family and her own family. Furthermore, though she usually avoided talking about motherhood publicly, when she did, she was honest about her feelings, “I am in no sense a mother…and I could not wish to be described like that. I am not made for that role.” She continued to live carelessly and without guilt. As a leading star in a pro-natalist Europe, this was a

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313 Singer, 56-57.
profoundly shocking statement, though one that many women who also did not see futures for themselves as mothers may have appreciated. There was no turning back for Bardot after this; she would remain a child-woman as long as she was in the spotlight. And though there was speculation that Bardot would be washed up before 1960, she arguably became a bigger (though less sensational), star, though a media star rather than a film star, after 1960.

**Pop Culture: The European Challenge**

Finally, the Lilli and Bardot child-woman constructions posed a timely and powerful challenge to the Americanization of European popular culture, playing a key role in both establishing and boosting postwar European popular culture confidence against aggressive forces of Americanization, though in somewhat different ways. Lilli was, on the one hand, a European celebration of American-style consumerism, providing the women and young girls the fulfilment of a fantasy because “being able to buy a range of ready-made clothing presented the real possibility of shopping till one dropped, unencumbered by rationing. Shopping until one dropped overwrote dropping dead due to wartime conflict.”

The economic miracle was here, whether seen in the first Lilli dolls hanging from the rear-view mirrors of German sports cars or in the abundance of quickly consumable options enjoyed by women and girls around Europe. The strength of Lilli’s potential export power to the United States however, was largely lost to her creators and original European consumers when she was copied, slightly altered, and reproduced across the Atlantic as Barbie. Though great efforts were made to erase her European past, the

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315 Peers, 149.
316 The original 1959 Barbie was based completely on Bild Lilli’s physical structure and appearance after Barbie creator Ruth Handler bought a Lilli doll in Europe and later had it copied, then *slightly* altered and prepared for consumption in the United States. For a detailed explanation of how Lilli was transformed into Barbie see M.G. Lord, *Forever Barbie*. 
uncovered story of Lilli’s transformation into Barbie demonstrates a certain (although squandered) level of success in the postwar European popular cultural production; Europe was learning how to play the game, developing successful and highly desirable popular cultural products that could have competed with the United States, though they gave Lilli away for almost nothing.

Bardot, however, was a more powerful European popular cultural response in the postwar period. Like Lilli, Bardot represented a rebounded Europe, childishly young and newly innocent, beautiful, sexy, and fun and highly consumable. Bardot films were just the beginning of her export power, which included things like fashion, beauty products, and the most lucrative of ‘export’ products, trans-Atlantic vacations. On top of these accomplishments, Bardot’s explosive power in the United States contributed greatly to the increased American appetite for European films. The consumption of the Bardot star image and its associated markers in the United States forcefully demonstrated Europe’s ability to compete in the popular cultural realm. Furthermore, unlike many of her European counterparts, Bardot was happy to remain in Europe; her massive success in the United States and refusal to work in Hollywood established her as a European star representing European consumption patterns and the postwar European ‘good life.’ Her conscious decision to ignore Hollywood efforts to lure her to the United States was a bold representation of European confidence.

Americans, specifically, were enchanted by Bardot’s naked body. Similarly it was the engineering of Lilli’s doll body that enticed her American captors, fulfilling Handler’s

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dream of a doll for children with a woman’s body. Bardot’s and Lilli’s bodies were neither that of malnourished immediate postwar European women nor that of exaggerated American stars like Marilyn Monroe or Jayne Mansfield. Bardot’s body was a new European body, childish and slim, made to look good in a bikini, or the bikini was made to look good in this body. And it was Lilli’s Bild Zeitung after all who published the famous statement—reproduced by United Press International in newspapers across America—about Mansfield; “we are amused when she strains to pull in her stomach to fill out her bikini better.” This ‘we’ is the Germany postwar press, it is a Europe now enamoured with slim Bardot-bodies, and a Europe that was confident enough in their new ideal to be amused with heavier, more voluptuous American stars struggling to pull off the European bikini. Bardot and the distinct new European ideal was a body that slid comfortably and naturally into the bikini. The child-woman reigned supreme.

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318 Though there are some well-known and serious anatomical exaggerations and impossibilities in Barbie’s more recent body transformations, the original Lilli cartoon had displayed a slim but womanly figure, like Bardot. The original Lilli dolls, however, contain exaggerated and fetishized female characteristics, and sadly for Lilli, a foot that is actually a high heel shoe.

CHAPTER 4

POP POLITICS

This final chapter aims to bring together elements of the previous three chapters to further, and more explicitly demonstrate that popular culture is neither separate from political culture nor irrelevant to its dynamic. This chapter will explore several cases where Bardot’s star status was redeployed in overtly politicized contexts in the 1960s, drawing towards the synthesis of popular culture and radical politics that characterized the student uprisings in Europe in 1968. In addition, these anecdotes serve as potent reminders of elements of Bardot’s stardom and influence all around Europe between the 1950s and 1968 that are absent from the accounts of her life and scholarly works dealing with her life, films, career, and position in postwar Europe. As Leahy demonstrates, Bardot was put into a cage of patriotism and childish femininity “to contain the potentially explosive nature of her sexuality and star sign.”

Despite efforts to contain her ability to spark dialogue, controversy, uprising, and revolt, Bardot’s star image could not be contained. As one of the by-products of the proliferation of mass media, increasingly interconnected European society, and freer movement of people, goods, and services brought with the Common Market, Bardot and her associated sings, symbols, and ‘explosive’ capacities circulated around Europe disseminating meaning as well as picking up new meanings.

This chapter will explore four cases where Bardot’s star image was deployed in different ways that were all directly related to the realm of politics. First, we will explore a satirical case where Bardot joined the British House of Commons, followed by her 1966 marriage to Gunter Sachs as an expression of Franco-German friendship and unity. Then,

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moving to more radical politics leading up to and including the events of 1968, Bardot’s star status will be used to explore the growing dissatisfaction among European youth radicals with one of the great successes of the Common Market, mass consumption, focusing on specific developments that occurred in France and then in Germany. The radical student movement in France and Germany utilized Bardot’s image to forge powerful critiques of contemporary society throughout the 1960s. An analysis of Bardot’s European influence helps us understand more clearly the relationship between consumer culture, youth culture, mediated culture and the emergence of a politicized student movement.

**Bardot: Member of Parliament**

Like most of British society, British politicians and political commentators were drawn to Bardot.321 Their deployments of Bardot’s symbolic importance reveal deep anxieties in the United Kingdom regarding legal changes during the era of European integration. At the same time, Bardot served as a highly visible and poignant symbol for change and breaking with tradition, acting as a dual symbol of France and the Common Market, and relaying British excitement and anxieties over possible entrance into the Common Market.

In 1961, discussing the possible entrance of Great Britain into the Common Market, a London correspondent to the *New York Times* could not “get over the idea that there is

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321 A good portion of Bardot’s pre *Et Dieu* fame in Europe was initiated by the British. It was a British newspaper writer and photographer that first ‘found’ the young bikini-clad Bardot in Cannes and published pictures of her in the British press in 1953. Then, in 1955, she shocked her British co-workers by appearing naked to shoot a scene for the film *Doctor at Sea*. The next day, newspapers and gossip magazines all put out pin-ups of Bardot. Also, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Bardot drew huge crowds in the United Kingdom, whether she was filming or visiting, and British male youths were known to travel to Saint-Tropez hoping to get a chance to meet the star.
something ridiculous about the whole thing: like a marriage between John Bull and Brigitte Bardot.”

Within several years, however, rather than the wife of John Bull, Bardot was being imaged as an independent female Member of Parliament. In 1965, a fictional Bardot gained a seat in the British House of Commons and was a central component in a satirical legal case centred on the United Kingdom’s entrance into the Common Market. The case took up a central division between the United Kingdom and Continental Europe that Macmillan voiced as the “wholly different development of our legal, administrative and, to some extent, political systems.”

Satirist A.P. Herbert developed a commentary on possible interpretations of the Treaty of Rome in the United Kingdom and paid particular attention to Article 177, whereby the European Court of Justice would have the jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning, “the interpretation of this Treaty; the validity and interpretations of acts of the institutions of the Community; the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council where those states so provide.”

Furthermore, the national courts of Member States could request the European Court of Justice to give rulings on questions it considered necessary to give judgement, and “where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.”

In this context, Herbert posed a case based on interpretation of the Treaty of Rome which tackled the questions, “Can Mlle. Brigitte Bardot now be elected to the House of Commons? And, if not, why not? Must British courts, even the House of Lords, take

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324 Treaty of Rome, Article 177, 1957.
325 Treaty of Rome, Article 177, 1957.
orders from Brussels on such a question?”

The case revolved around the election of foreigners—a Mlle. Brigitte Bardot and a Signor Garibaldi—to the British House of Commons; they were two of five foreigners elected in the ‘Little Election.’ Justification of their election was based on interpretation of Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome which removed obstacles to the free movement of persons, services, and capital, and Article 60(d), which defined one such service as “activities of the liberal profession,” and finally, Article 48 which ensured the “free movement of workers…the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration, and other working conditions.”

Bardot was described as “a public entertainer, but, like so many others of her profession, has shown a serious interest in political questions,” and secured more votes than anyone else in the election.

The Attorney General, however, opposed the election of Bardot and Garibaldi, hoping to have them disqualified. The narrator, though, reminds the reader that it was the Attorney General’s own government that brought the Treaty of Rome to the United Kingdom.

Arguments were made justifying the election of Bardot based on all of the abovementioned articles until reaching the opposition of two British statutes. The older (purely British), stated that only British subjects could be elected to Parliament, but the newer article (brought in with the Treaty of Rome) prohibited “any discrimination on the grounds of nationality.”

Justice Owle, presiding over the case, chose to use the second statute because it was newer, but the Attorney-General drew their attention to Article 177

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326 A. P. Herbert, More Uncommon Law (London: Methuen, 1982), “Introduction,” vii Throughout this work, the author refers to the European Court of Justice as ‘Brussels’ despite the fact that the court was actually located in Luxemburg.
328 Ibid., 264-265.
329 Ibid., 266.
from the Treaty of Rome where questions on the interpretation of the treaty *shall* refer the matter to the European Court of Justice. Owle ruled that Bardot and Garibaldi were duly elected, and without the case pending, the matter was closed. Upon moving into the House of Lords, however, the case could be reassessed and sent to the ECJ. The Attorney-General quipped that he was sure the ECJ would read Justice Owle’s ruling “with great interest,” but Owle replied that, “at some future date somebody in Brussels may decide that they are not [duly elected]. And how, I wonder, will Parliament like *that.*”\(^{330}\)

At this point in the case, the dialogue concerns British interpretation of the Treaty of Rome as a British statute after joining the Common Market and the possibility of interference in British interpretation of the treaty by the ECJ. The choice of Bardot as a candidate in this case was an extremely important one. Bardot certainly represents a clear union with France, but also (in conjunction with Garibaldi) and more importantly, with an already integrated Continental Europe. It was Bardot’s popularity in the United Kingdom that made her such an appealing candidate to voters and the Justices fighting for her ability to serve. It is through Bardot’s popularity that the space in increasingly common European popular culture becomes more clear. The deployment of the Bardot icon in this case, demonstrated what was truly appealing about integration with Europe; She represented a ‘new Europe’ that appealed to the British, especially in contrast to more disagreeable characters like Charles de Gaulle. She represented all that is new and exciting coming from the Continent, things that the United Kingdom could not take equal part and pleasure in until joining the Common Market.

The case was reassessed six months after the election of Garibaldi and Bardot. Bardot was noted to have become extremely popular within the House and even

\(^{330}\) Ibid., 266.
transcended traditional gender boundaries. She was “one of the few women Members who venture boldly into that citadel of Man, the Members’ Smoking Room, and are always welcome.”

Again, we see Bardot—even a fictional Bardot’s—flouting of convention, nonchalantly entering a traditional male space and not thinking twice about it, entirely un-self conscious about it. This construction played off Bardot’s status as a free-living, empowered woman with little regard for gender conventions (Chapter 3) and was warmly received in the United Kingdom.

Despite Bardot’s acceptance, popularity, and even swearing the Oath of Allegiance, the Attorney-General appealed the original decision by the Justices that, “they were not bound to refer the matter to the European Court,” and the Court of Appeal voted three to two that the Justices had “decided wrongly,” and with no way to resolve the matter, the case was required by Article 177 to be referred to the ECJ. The ECJ decided that the article of the Treaty of Rome, “‘for the free movement of labour and services’ were not intended to cover service in any Parliament…Bardot and Garibaldi should not have been elected and should now be removed from Parliament.”

The ruling came to the dismay of the Justices and narrator who felt that Bardot and Garibaldi should stay despite the ruling because, “the fair exchange of goods is a splendid thing: in the exchange of laws we stand to lose.” The judges and narrator were expressing legitimate British trepidations over the legal ramifications of integration, but expressed a stronger belief in the benefits of the integration process. Bardot’s symbolism as a European icon, and one representing the benefits of integration at that, must not be overlooked. This case demonstrates not only her

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332 Ibid., 277-8.
333 Ibid., 278.
334 Ibid., 278.
representation of European unity, but also the usefulness of deploying popular cultural symbols to articulate densely complicated political and legal ramifications of the integration process. The Bardot star image, though, could also be deployed in more playful and fun ways for those already enjoying the friendship and cooperation of the Common Market.

**A Franco-German Marriage**

While Bardot was symbolically disqualified from membership in the British House of Commons, she had more success promoting European integration on the Continent. Reflecting the cooperative and optimistic spirit of the times and the notion of the free movement of people across borders in the Common Market and the advancement in personal mobility, on July 14, 1966 Brigitte Bardot and Gunter Sachs (von Opel) were married in Las Vegas. Though I have thus far argued that Bardot was indeed a European icon, in the specific context of her marriage to Sachs, her symbolism was deployed as specifically French. Similarly Sachs was coded as specifically German and his pedigree fit wonderfully with stereotypical imaginations of industrial Germany. Sachs’ father, Willy Sachs was the owner of Fichtel & Sachs ball bearing manufacturers, and his mother, the daughter of Wilhelm von Opel, who sold her von Opel shares to General Motors for millions of dollars. Bardot, on the other hand, when weighed against Sachs, was a quintessential symbol of French beauty and passion, but their marriage was a symbol of European unity and success.

Bardot met Sachs in May 1966 after cruising down to Saint-Tropez in her Rolls Royce packed with Beatles records, where he, with an identical Rolls Royce, owned a

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335 Singer, 82.
ready-to-wear clothing boutique. After meeting in Saint-Tropez, dropping hundreds of roses on her villa from a helicopter, and gifting her with three bracelets of ruby, sapphires, and diamonds— together as an homage to the French flag—they were off to Las Vegas in July. Bardot and Sachs were married as unglamorous beatniks in casual clothes with unkempt hair, with Sachs slipping a complementary set of red, white, and blue rings onto Bardot’s finger. They were the epitome of success of the Common Market and New Europe, young, beautiful, wealthy, well-travelled, stylish, and modern.

Their union formed the popular cultural equivalent to the 1963 Élysée Treaty between French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and demonstrated that it was not just politicians who developed meaningful friendships and networks across national boundaries. In a special to the New York Times from Bonn, Germany, Bardot was said to “have pledged her famous face and figure today to the cause of Franco-German friendship” by her rumoured desire to obtain a German passport. The marriage of the two key symbols for their respective countries triggered much interest from the European media as popular culture was paving the way for political culture. Sachs told the German magazine Bild und Funk, “that by acquiring a German passport his wife wanted to ‘set an example for the oft-discussed, but little practiced French-German reconciliation.’“

Although perhaps seeming like a superficial gimmick to sell newspapers and magazines, the symbolism of the Bardot Sachs marriage was important. It was a well

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336 Singer, 82.
publicized media event that thrust issues of Franco-German friendship and the wellness of the Common Market into a wider sphere than traditional political news-information; everyday people uninterested in politics were drawn into the integration dialogue, seeing the beautiful, rich, and leisurely outcome of economic cooperation and increased ‘friendship’ among nations. Although their marriage only lasted until 1969, and was not without infidelity by both parties, it was and is still a powerful symbol of European unity, both the benefits and the struggles. Bardot and Sachs marriage followed an anecdote used by Garel-Jones to comment on an integrated Europe; “in the politics of Europe, monogamy is a sin, polygamy a virtue. France and Germany are joined in holy wedlock. Although they are unfaithful to each other from time to time.”340 Their marriage was a literal manifestation of integrationist dialogue. Bardot’s star image, though, would take on decidedly more radical political tones among students dissatisfied with the outcome of the first ten years of integration.

**Student Movements**

Popular culture and mass culture go hand in hand. Furthermore, both are related to the increasing democratization in postwar Europe, but also to larger questions of democratic politics. In the student movements in both Germany and France, new mass media played an essential and important role. In the French case, it was more of a theoretical attack that centred around the increasingly mediated nature of everyday life and the problematic type of democracy (consumerist) that it supported. In Germany, there were direct and malicious attacks and counter attacks between radical students and the mass media, *Bild Zeitung* in particular. Rather than focusing on the liberating, optimistic,

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democratizing forces surrounding Bardot during the advent of the age of mass media and
mass consumption, we must turn towards the darker side of these phenomena that
foreshadow a critical turn in the further development of integration and the path that
Europe would take post-1968. Finally, turning attention towards 1968 transitions
understanding of the relationship between popular culture and politics from a meaningful,
but subtle connection to a direct, well articulated, and unavoidable terminus. We are no
longer approaching politics from behind, but facing it head-on.

France

Young people’s anger escalated throughout the 1960s and was increasingly evident
in the popular cultural products being produced and especially in the new ways consumers
were using them. The proliferation of images driven by mass media, mass consumption,
and mass society provided dissidents the material to demonstrate their discontent while
building complex critiques of society. Not surprisingly, in Europe, popular cultural
products related to Bardot were particularly popular in this regard, especially because her
star symbol was so densely coded with both liberating as well as complicit signs and she
was, after all, the first European superstar in the age of mass media. This section will deal
with the relationship between Bardot’s star image and the radical politics of the Situationist
International.

The Situationist International reflected certain elements of an increasingly
integrated Europe (in terms of their trans-national formation and goals), albeit from a
decidedly more radical perspective than anything examined thus far. The SI was formed at
a 1957 meeting in Northern Italy between several small trans-national avant-garde artist-
praxis groups and had members from Algeria, Belgium, England, France, Germany,
Holland, Italy, and Sweden. In 1958, the Situationist International produced its first bulletin, *Internationale Situationniste* #1. Upon reaching the last page, the reader was presented with this message calling for young men and women to join the group; “talent wanted for getting out of this and playing, whether you’re beautiful or you’re bright, History could be on your side.” Next to this open call was a constructed image of Bardot, “supine on horseback, raising her breasts into the air.” Is Bardot situated as the object of the male gaze, or is there more complex reason for Bardot’s inclusion?

In scholarship dealing with the Situationist International, the deployment of women’s bodies—often naked or partially naked—has been largely ignored or developed as a critique of the group for ignoring women or seeing women as “sex objects in the most banal sense.” Kelly Baum, however, through turning a critical eye towards the proliferation of images of women’s bodies in Situationist visual production finds that while the SI “reproduced the gender biases of their time, biases that plagued other radical artistic and political movements of the 1960s… images of women were in fact one of the many platforms from which the Situationists launched their rebuke to capitalism and spectacle.” Specifically, because the Situationists images were first and foremost about *détournement*, “the images of women cannot but represent more than just the ravenous

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Throughout its existence (1957-1972), the group averaged 10-20 members, with a total of 63 men and 7 women from 16 different countries.


345 Baum, 24.
male gaze, since this what they represented in their original incarnations.”346 The imagined community of images, in which Bardot was critically important provided a powerful tool with which to launch critiques of society. The use of the image of Bardot on the horse in this context is particularly complicated and can be read several different ways depending on the viewer’s position. On the one hand, the image makes reference to both Joan of Arc and Napoleon and can be read as a critique of nationalism, dictatorship, the Catholic church, and colonialism, serving as a rallying call towards the disaffected youth who saw liberation in Bardot.

Bardot’s image placed on the horse in the style of Joan of Arc or Napoleon was disruptive in its relation to a type of desire distinct from capitalist desire and supported by the Situationist International, who believed meaningful desire “was also a fact of the body, of its needs, drives, and impulses, and the expression of embodied desire constituted a revolutionary act in itself.”347 Bardot, especially in 1958, represented a new and shocking reaction against bourgeois moral values through her unashamed and much publicized bodily impulses that included a divorce and a well publicized string of affairs with both single married men. Her own ex-husband described Bardot in 1958 as living “in a world where one can no longer cling to the moral code or values held up by our elders, has no other rules to live by than the impulses of her heart and her senses.”348 The SI strongly supported “opposition to the dominant social order by asserting its independence from established moral codes...“we unconditionally support all forms of liberated mores,

346 Détournement was defined by the SI as the short-form for “détournement of preexisting aesthetic elements” (IS #1, “Definitions” June, 1958) and was a tactic deployed by the group for creating new and critical meanings from the proliferation of images they saw as central to the spectacle. The goal was to ‘turn’ the images to at once critique their original context while providing new and possibilities for meaning. Baum, 28.
347 Baum, 36.
everything…the bourgeois or bureaucratic scum call debauchery.” In this light then, in 1958 the Situationists would have been in support of Bardot’s rejection of her bourgeois upbringing, values, and societal expectations, especially in light of the scathing stories the mainstream press printed about her sexual adventures. The SI, however, was an international group and a key member from outside of Western Europe did not see Bardot, and her famous incarnation on the horse the same way as Western European members. The Hungarian Attila Kotannyi “hated Brigitte Bardot’s tits in the bulletin. As he grew up in a different society, with a different kind of experience of dictatorship, the famous détournement might have seemed childish and also dangerous in his eyes.” To those that shared the integrated popular cultural space of Western Europe, however, the 1958 representation of Bardot was an effective ideological rallying call.

As the years went by and the mediated popular cultural space and Bardot’s position within it evolved, her symbolism to the SI changed as well. While further images of Bardot did not appear in the SI publications, her hyper-mediated circulation in Western Europe was related to the other images of women in their publications and discussion of Bardot herself became part of certain Situationist critiques. According to Baum, images of women, including those of celebrities function in “two different yet overlapping categories: images of women as objects and images of women as images.” Images of women function as objects of desire and were wrapped in the feminine, post-WWII discourse of consumption. The détourned images of women in SI propaganda were meant to remind the viewer of the alienation in the capitalist world order and the propagation of desire driven

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349 Baum, 37 and anonymous Situationist in Baum, 37.
351 Baum, 24.
by consumer society and translated into images, which in reality can never be fulfilled under this system. In this sense, Bardot functions as a tool of capitalism and part of the spectacle because “the world of Brigitte Bardot” was “the world of the representation of life for the passive masses excluded from life.” And as we have seen, whether she intended to or not, Bardot sold things; films, records, postcards, newspapers, magazines, beauty products, fashion, and vacations. The proliferation of images of Bardot served to establish desire for consumption. Bardot had been recuperated, not by any moral systems, but by the capitalist system, though this was not surprising to Situationists because:

anything which resists the alienation, separation, and specialisation of the spectacle must be brought within the confines of commodity exchange…The Situationists argued that collapses of the marvellous into the mundane or the critical into the counterrevolution are never signs of natural destiny or apolitical degeneration. On the contrary, such shifts are effected in order to remove the explosive content from gestures and meanings which contests the capitalist order.

Bardot’s challenge to bourgeois society through her new moral code and lifestyle was repositioned in capitalist society as an unattainable ideal. Through desire, this ideal drove various consumption habits of the masses, distracting them from the struggles and warfare in Africa and Asia, and the Eastern bloc, the civil rights movement in the United States, and the oppressive measures undertaken by national governments and bureaucracies in Western Europe.

By the mid 1960s, the originally radical nature of Bardot’s revolt was replaced by ‘plastic antagonism’ where media debates about Bardot and other controversial topics

352 Baum, 25.
reproduced by passive citizens were not only meaningless, but actually blocked more
troubling and problematic occurrences:

In a caricature of antagonisms, power urges everyone to be for or against
Brigitte Bardot, the nouveau roman, the 4-horse Citroen, Italian cuisine,
mescal, miniskirts, the UN, the classics, nationalization, thermonuclear
war and hitchhiking. Everyone is asked their opinion about every detail in
order to prevent them from forming one about the totality.\textsuperscript{355}

Vaneigem argued that passive citizens were being manipulated by politicians, bureaucrats,
the economic elite and their tool, the media, to feel as though they were criticizing and
challenging society, but without doing so in a meaningful way. To be for or against Bardot
or any other of the popular cultural and political items mentioned was a reductive means to
keep the masses from forging a larger opinion on consumer society, exploitation, war, and
people’s complicit participation within the system supporting them. When Vaneigem
published the passage above again (only slightly modified) in his 1967 book \textit{The
Revolution of Everyday Life} he added “There is no one who is not accosted at every
moment of the day by posters, news flashes, stereotypes, summoned to take sides over each
of the prefabricated trifles that conscientiously stop up all the sources of everyday
creativity.\textsuperscript{356} Vaneigem believed that the tactic of mediated and reproduced, but ultimately
harmless antagonisms was an effective means to keep the masses passive. But as “the
salesmen in charge of peddling it from door to door, waking up to their own alienation”
began showing signs of revolt there was continued hope for change and revolution. Bardot,
a salesmen herself was seen as alienated by her own stardom and role within the system;
“signs of revolt are already appearing among the actors—stars trying to escape publicity,

\textsuperscript{355} Raoul Vaneigem, “Basic Banalities II,” \textit{Internationale Situationnist} #8 January 1963, Translated
by Ken Knabb. http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/si/basic2.html
\textsuperscript{356} Raoul Vaneigem, \textit{The Revolution of Everyday Life} Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith
rulers criticizing their own power (Brigitte Bardot, Fidel Castro). The tools of power are wearing out; their desire for their own freedom is a factor that should be taken into account.

Bardot then, was both an agent / ‘salesman’ and victim.

Bardot reacted against her publicity during the late 1950s and early 1960s. She suffered multiple suicide attempts, tried to hide out at La Madrague in Saint Tropez—that is until it quickly became a premier tourist destination largely due to Bardot’s residence there—and would break out into cold sores under the scrutiny of the press. Bardot was suffering because she had given herself and her personality to the movies and the press. She had become a total commodity, with little in her life that was not available for mass public consumption. Bardot articulated the loss of herself when she stated:

If something is printed about me, I cannot deny it because if I do they will say it must be true otherwise why bother with denial. If I remain silent, they say it must be true otherwise why doesn’t she deny it? There is very little in my life that I can call my own.

Bardot talked constantly of retiring from acting, hoping to escape from the press, but too often found that she was safer from crowds on isolated film sets and in protected movie studios than she was on the streets. Bardot fought to have privacy legislation changed in France, sued magazines that printed unauthorized nude pictures of her and had friends and boyfriends fight off photographers, tourists, and admirers alike, but she could not escape and Vaneigem saw her fear and desperation as a dysfunction of mass mediated culture.

Germany

Across the border in Germany, the relationship between the integrated sphere of popular cultural anchored to Bardot, the radical student movement, mass media and

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358 Vadim, 34.
359 Haining, 103.
democratic politics existed as well. Rudi Dutschke was one of the best known radical student leaders in Germany during the 1960s, and the assassination attempt on him was the key event thrusting the West German student movement into attacks on mass media enterprises and violent street battles with West German police. Dutschke was inspired by a Brigitte Bardot film. Dutschke first saw Viva Maria! starring Brigitte Bardot and Jeanne Moreau and directed by Louis Malle in February of 1966. He was reported to have watched the film at least eight times and his wife recalled that Dutschke absolutely never fell asleep during this film, unlike many others.\(^{360}\) Dutschke was a radical member of the West German SDS, raised in East Germany and then trapped in West Germany as a visiting student at the Free University when the Berlin Wall went up in 1961.\(^{361}\) Joining with Dieter Kunzelmann’s Subversive Aktion group (his previous artist group Gruppe SPUR became an affiliate of the SI), Dutschke and Bernd Rabehl formed a faction within the SDS focused on the politics, war, and uprisings in the Third World as well as the connection between those struggles and struggles in West Germany.\(^{362}\) Building upon this Third World working group, and sometime after seeing Viva Maria!, Dutschke formed the Viva Maria Group, in 1966.\(^{363}\) One must ask though, what fascination did a politically motivated radical youth activist in West Germany have in a campy, part-musical comedy, influenced by American Westerns, set in Latin America at the beginning of the twentieth century, starring two of France’s most famous and commercialized actresses (Bardot and


\(^{361}\) Brown, 73.

\(^{362}\) Ibid., 73-75.

Moreau) as travelling circus performers? The answer lies in the fact that the travelling circus performers were revolutionaries, and not just any revolutionaries, but the embodiments of revolutionary debate.

Bardot, as Maria II (Maria Fitzgerald O’Malley) played a life-long Irish radical revolutionary who had learned revolutionary techniques from her father until he was killed in Mexico. As the quintessential child-woman, Bardot played the younger, wilder, more passionate Maria (managing to invent the striptease) and unwary about the use and role of violence in revolution. Moreau, as Maria I, played the older, more sophisticated and calmer Maria, only becoming involved in revolutionary tactics after being unable to accept the poor treatment of the local peasants and after the revolutionary leader, Flores (George Hamilton) was killed. Moreau represented a more theoretical and ideological Marxism while Bardot represented a more violent, anarchistic, revolutionary zeal.

Dutschke’s wife described part of Viva Maria!’s appeal to Rudi as based on its “wonderfully romantic telling of revolution in the Third World.”\(^{364}\) Bernd Rabeohl described the film’s appeal to the group through the political role models and revolutionary drive of Bardot and Moreau’s characters. Watching and analyzing the different Marias, the Viva Maria group had to determine which Maria they were more similar to, and which one they wanted to be more similar to. Bardot’s anarchism and anti-authoritarian attitude both complemented and contrasted Moreau’s more philosophical Marxism and the group planned to synthesize these archetypes:

Marxism is no longer the subject of philosophical seminars, but the theory of revolt against capitalist domination...Marxism is understood by us as a method of analysis of social reality, at the same time as an uncompromising struggle for the anti-authoritarian revolutionaries. The scientific and anarchist components of Marxism

\(^{364}\) Dutschke, Der Spiegel 34, August 19, 1996.
has become for the first time since Lenin’s revolution of 1917 again fully conscious. Maria and Maria have come together. Viva Maria!  

This group literally based their revolutionary ideology on interpretations of a Brigitte Bardot film. After forming the Viva Maria Group in 1966, Dutschke and other group members “triggered an intensive argument within the SDS over the question of violence” with the Viva Maria Group coming out on the more radical side of the debate.  

Timothy Brown has argued that the Viva Maria Group’s response to the film demonstrates “the importance of popular culture in the formation of radical political identities in the 1960s and the necessity for the historian to use an active model of cultural reception; Dutschke and Kunzelmann saw in the movie what they wanted to see, taking from it what was useful in their particular situation.” This point compliments ideas developed by German director Vilker Schlondorff. Discussing the influence of *Viva Maria!* on Dutschke, Schlondorff stated that “In France, “Viva Maria” was no model for May 1968. This was a speciality of Berlin, Brigitte Bardot with a small bomb must have seemed very exotic to students” and though there were extremely radical views in the film, they “were there to startle the citizens, not as instructions.” Dutschke and the Viva Maria Group, however, did receive the messages from the film in the form of pseudo-instructions, and in their quest to bring the struggle of the Third World into the First world, to force their fellow citizens to see the relationship between the excess of the First World and struggles and war in the Third World, they worked to develop “an effective revolutionary praxis: the


367 Brown, 78.  

founding of a revolutionary urban commune.” 369  They founded Kommune I which explored sexual liberation as part of a “revolution of lifestyle that would destroy bourgeois rule at its source, in the relationships and conditions of everyday life,” deployed situationist tactics, and became the explicit targets of the anti-communist press dominated by the media holdings of Alex Springer, and Bild Zeitung in particular. 370

Radical communist and socialist student groups posed a threat for the tabloid newspaper that spawned the capitalist poster child-woman Lilli, and it was Bild Zeitung that fuelled the assassination attempt on Rudi Dutschke in 1968. Lilli’s world was one of economic recovery, feminine beauty, and capitalist desire, while Dutschke’s was one of communist revolt and criticism of the exploitation of capitalist empire and the control of the mainstream media. The student groups saw the mainstream mass media as manipulating and anti-democratic, controlling the necessary access to information that fuels a truly democratic society. Bild Zeitung, Germany’s widest circulated paper, and other branches of Springer’s media empire called on its readers to exact their own vigilante justice against the radical student protestors; “one should not let the police and their water cannon do all the dirty work.” 371

Dutschke’s shooter, Josef Bachmann admitted at his trial that he had taken cues from Bild-Zeitung: “I have taken my daily information from the Bild-Zeitung.” He believed the newspaper reflected the standing of the majority of Germany society, in stating “very many are of my opinion. Or more correctly: I am of

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369 Brown, 79.
370 Ibid., 79, 81.
their opinion.” Bachmann “shot Dutschke because he felt it was what Bild, and therefore the readers who sympathized with its pronouncements wanted.

The students responded by attacking Springer-owned buildings and trying to stop the circulation of Bild-Zeitung in the days following the shooting. In an interesting twist of popular culture, it had been Lilli that influenced and paralleled Bardot in the 1950s, Bardot who then influenced Dutschke in the mid 1960s, and Lilli’s newspaper and one of its many loyal readers that came back to attack Dutschke, whose followers then attacked Bild-Zeitung; the circulation of and meanings taken by popular culture could not be controlled or confined within national boundaries. After the assassination attempt and attacks against Bild-Zeitung the main thrust of the student movement was weakened and largely dissipated, though Bild-Zeitung would become one target of an even more radical group, the Red Army Faction, in the 1970s.

As these case studies of the politicization of Bardot’s commodified images help to reveal, popular culture and politics were explicitly interrelated phenomena in this era. In the case of Bardot and the British Parliament, popular culture provided a seemingly benign avenue through which writers could relay pertinent political debates and challenges to large groups of readers. Within this context, Bardot was understood as a symbol of change and a symbol of European integration for those who were not included. Within the Common Market at the time of the Bardot-Sachs marriage, on the other hand, Bardot was deployed as a symbol of France, who together with Sachs as a symbol of Germany, were promoting the desirable outcome of inter-European friendship and cooperation. Together, they provided an image of a more sexy, fun, and desirous pair than de Gaulle and Adenauer

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372 Josef Bachman, quoted in Thomas, 170.
373 Thomas, 170.
could have ever hoped to be, especially for young people. Around the same time, though, Bardot’s image was being deployed by the Situationist International to launch critiques of the experience of a mass mediated consumer society. For them, and others, popular culture was a powerful tool for building new critiques that a generation of youth raised on a steady diet of popular culture could understand and take meaning from. And in Germany, a Brigitte Bardot film found its way into the ideological framework of important left-wing student leaders. They in turn used this framework to attack once celebrated popular cultural mediums like the tabloid press Bild Zeitung as tools of manipulation for control of the masses in a falsely democratic society. Together these examples help reveal the path by which the growth of a mass consumer society, although visibly fostering escapism and narcissistic materialism, nevertheless also led toward new political understandings and initiatives that challenged the postwar economic and political order in new and meaningful ways.
CONCLUSION

The Age of Bardot drew to a close with the end of the 1960s, but her impact on European popular culture and her representation of the drive towards greater integration had much longer lasting effects. Bardot and the popular cultural phenomena surrounding her gave Europe a voice and identity that have evolved, but still contain central elements that emerged in this period, such as the increased inter-European mobility brought about with the erasure of the European Union’s internal borders, and the representation of an ideal European lifestyle, where paid vacations and the associated leisure time exist as legally protected rights of European citizens. Today’s ‘Eurostars’ share many of the same qualities that Bardot and her professional and personal network foreshadowed. Even her marriage to Sachs contained many of the central elements and tensions experienced by modern inter-European couples. The integrating role played by creative centres like the Parisian ateliers throughout the twentieth century, which drew diverse individuals with specific skills to a central area for improved economic output, is also more than evident today in other modern Eurocities like Amsterdam, Brussels, London, and Berlin.

Furthermore, Bardot’s unique fashion sense from the 1950s and 1960s became part of the repertoire of European fashions and contributed significantly to the popularization of stylish, always changing, ready-made clothes, now represented by the hugely successful “fast fashion” system pioneered by European companies like Zara, Benetton, Topshop, and H&M. The chicness attributed to these chains in North America had its roots in the 1950s and 1960s fashion revolution that Bardot helped to shape and diffuse. Even the sexual and body politics that Bardot championed in Europe throughout this era still figure prominently in the North American imagination of the European Other, evidenced by a modern version
of the ‘Grand Tour,’ where young people travel (with a Eurail pass, of course) to Amsterdam, to sample its legal drugs and window-shopping style of prostitution; to Berlin, to experience its infamously wild selection of nightclubs; and to the Riviera, to gawk at casually nude Europeans on the beach. Cool, fun, sexy Europe is a byproduct of the popular cultural forms that began circulating in the Age of Bardot and were both championed and challenged by the youth of the 1950s and 1960s.

The combination of new avenues of mass consumption, new mass mediated popular cultural representations and a generation of young people who enjoyed all the postwar escapist constructions, but without the memories of the actual war led to the emergence of a new distinct entity that became a distinct political identity throughout the 1960s: youth. As late as 1958, however, this generation was believed to be entirely apolitical. This generation in France, for instance, represented by Brigitte Bardot, along with Francois Sagan, Bernard Buffet, Roger Vadim, and Yves Saint Laurent, was regarded as:

An absent generation… they hold a belief typical of youth in all times—that the world into which they were born is wrong—but they are the first not to want to change it… They neither judge nor revolt: they are the unangry young men.374

If young people in France, across Western Europe, and around the world, were not angry in 1958, then they certainly were ten years later. By the mid to late 1960s, the young masses had developed the tools necessary to demand new political rights, an independent political voice, and to react against the consumer trends and forms that had brought their rise to prominence in the first place. In many ways, this generation was defining which elements of postwar trans-national popular culture and its associated ideologies it supported and which elements it did not support.

Youth embraced mobility, but of a very specific variety. As Brown demonstrated in ““1968” East and West: Divided Germany as a Case Study in Trasnational History,” the student movement was indeed transnational and deployed new forms of mass mobility to further their goals of mass dissent and mass political action by travelling, exchanging ideas, agitating potential supporters, and building a mass movement. There was, however, a type mobility that they did not support, which was directly related to their main criticism of consumer culture and over-commodified existence.

Jean-Luc Godard’s Le Weekend (1967) presents a humorous and somewhat prophetic look at the vacation culture specifically linked to the supposed freedom of automobile travel and ‘tourist roads’ that played a central role in the discourse surrounding increased standards of living in postwar Europe. This film contains an eight minute long scene of a traffic jam which takes place on a country road as vacationers set out for a summer weekend. The agonizing traffic jam is punctuated by honking horns and extremely irritable travellers who appear unmoved by the cause of the traffic jam, the bloody bodies of a family of car accident victims. The travellers are undisturbed by the blood scene; they are irritated and annoyed at being stuck in the traffic jam. As the film draws towards an end, the main couple—who set out on this weekend trip to kill each other and/or the woman’s parents in order to receive an inheritance—are captured by revolutionary cannibal hippies. The commodification of leisure and the exaggerated representation of the breakdown in relations between people that many critics felt the rapid development of consumer society brought with it were displayed at their worst and most farcical. Le Weekend was released before the main events of 1968 only in France; the rest of its European releases

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375 Jean-Luc Godard, Le Weekend, 1967.
came afterwards, ironically earning a nomination for the Golden Bear Award from the Berlin International Film Festival in 1968.

As *Le Weekend* demonstrated, rather than the idealized discourse of tourism and vacations described by members of the industry, film, and media, the disaffected youth of the late 1960s saw another commodity being sold to recoup the economic losses of their free time; the holiday was part of ‘spectacular time,’ “moments portrayed, like all spectacular commodities, *at a distance* and as desirable by definition…presented as moments of real time whose cyclical return we are supposed to look forward to.” The break-up of the work year with a determined slot of non-working vacation time functioned to dispel the working masses’ potential dissatisfaction with their present circumstances by deferring to a desirable future. Furthermore, “in its most advanced sectors, concentrated capitalism increasingly tended to market “fully equipped” blocks of time” like “touristic pseudo-travel” which reflected “the modernization of sales techniques by being able to pay on credit.” Even the vacation time was co-opted back into the system. The massive general and wildcat strikes of May 1968 in France, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, restored a concept of leisure and time that had long be forgotten and subsumed by capitalist production and spectacular time. May 1968 was believed to have given “real holidays to people who had only known working days and leaves of absence.” Unfortunately though, for many of the optimistic youth trying their hand at active, democratic political engagement, the ability to make lasting radical change was limited in the long term.

Europe moved forward surprisingly quickly and smoothly following the events of

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378 Rene Vienet in Plant, 100.
1968, as dissent was co-opted back into the dominant capitalist political system. Bardot herself transitioned from one of the most polarizing figures in France and Europe into the literal embodiment of the French Republic. In 1969, Bardot became the first real woman to be sculpted and cast in bronze as Marianne in 1969, where she was multiplied and put on display in government administrative centres throughout France. She was moreover an economically powerful force for France itself and representative of a strong European Common Market. Bardot was celebrated for overshadowing Renault as France’s number one export and as Jacques Servan Schreiber, founder of L’Express (1953) and author of Le Défi Americain (1967) observed, she was “as valuable to French exports as Roquefort cheese or Bordeaux wine.” By the late 1960s, her transgressions against bourgeois morals and sexuality had been forgiven and her invitation to become Marianne signalled in many ways that France actually supported her modernizing effects, while also subtly negating her pan-European influence by attempting to re-appropriate it as specifically French.

At the broadest level, the trans-European popular cultural exchanges that occurred in the period between 1945 and 1956 demonstrate the extent to which the Treaty of Rome was made conceivable and practically possible by ‘bottom-up’ processes. The incredibly significant change from the European Coal and Steel Community, with its narrow focus on free movement of goods, capital, and labour related exclusively to coal and steel production, to the Treaty of Rome, with its vast plan for the unrestricted free movement of all people, goods, capital, labour, and services, cannot be adequately understood without taking into account the popular cultural processes at work in this period. The profusion and

380 de Beauvoir, 6 and Schreiber, in Vinen, 51.
rapid circulation of pop culture trends and elements throughout Europe played a significant role in helping to make this encompassing, revolutionary treaty seem both reasonable and necessary. From this perspective, the Treaty of Rome can be seen as embodying recognition and legalization of a phenomenon that was already underway on a vast scale throughout Western Europe, further encouraged by ongoing trans-Atlantic dialogue and exchange. Moreover, this organic and popular integration process was also underway in areas excluded from the Treaty of Rome, and the interrelationships developed in this era between excluded nations and the Common Market foreshadowed the eventual entrance of almost all Western European nations into the European Union. At the same time, it was a pan-European popular culture that helped Europe to establish counterweights strong enough to challenge the forces of Americanization in Europe and abroad.

As Europe rolled through the 1960s, however, with pan-European popular culture becoming increasingly commodified and regimented, new criticisms of the consumer luxuries offered through the Common Market were enunciated by the very generation that had first eagerly sought them out. What had first appeared liberating to postwar Europe now seemed increasingly controlling and stultifying. Perhaps here we see the organic origin of the “democratic deficit” that has come to signify growing doubts about the integration process, its aims, and the purposes it serves.
### Table 1: Aggregate Tourist Flows in Millions for 1958, 1959, 1964, 1965, and 1966

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