Will to Power:
The Philosophical Expression of Nietzsche’s Love of Life

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Abstract

Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power is the philosophical expression of that love.
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Introduction

In his *Thoughts On Machiavelli*, Leo Strauss characterizes Niccolo Machiavelli as a teacher of evil because he makes plain, and thereby readily available to anyone, the dangerous and amoral principles of political power that had been until then the unspoken understanding of a few (Strauss 1984, 174). If Strauss’ evaluation is correct, then what follows could be condemned for a comparable reason. What follows is an attempt to make plain and readily available one of Friedrich Nietzsche’s most challenging and dangerous theses, which he obscures, perhaps intentionally, with an often complex and convoluted presentation. However, while Strauss believes that Machiavelli’s thesis was dangerous because he explicitly privileged effective governance over moral politics, making plain Nietzsche’s thesis would be making plain his interpretation of philosophy’s will to truth as a contingent historical convention rather than a metaphysical or methodological necessity.

The following analysis, however, is not conditioned by the same horrific social and political climate that conditioned Strauss’ thesis and method. Insofar as it is evaluative, it is evaluative only in a purely academic sense. It seeks to uncover the most consistent and comprehensive account of the concept of the will to power by critically evaluating the relative merits of the available types of interpretative approaches.

Most of the philosophical implications of the will to power will be set aside because the concept radically transgresses so many of philosophical conventions that quietly, though pervasively structure the evaluative process. It is this transgression of the fundamental, and typically unconscious principles of philosophical evaluation that fuels the bulk of the distorting interpretations that condemn it, or that subject it to subsequent
condemnation. Only once the radical quality of Nietzsche’s concept and its context are properly discerned, is the far more modest endeavor of understanding the concept even possible. Therefore, while the odd, disconcerting, and potentially dangerous quality of Nietzsche’s philosophical concept should be kept in mind, it ought to be kept in mind only in order that it may be the more successfully set aside until it can be faced boldly, honestly, and with due diligence.

However, while the criticisms directed against the will to power are often misguided, in that they are criticisms of something that the will to power is not, they do nonetheless reveal the main obstacles to understanding it. Once the two most prevalent and serious criticisms directed against it are shown to rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the context in which the concept is developed, the principle obstacle to understanding the concept will become evident and easily overcome. These two criticisms are Nietzsche’s supposed inconsistency, and what is sometimes called the problem of self-reference. The first of these is a product of Nietzsche’s early and sustained critique of truth, and its relation to his positive philosophical claims. The second refers to the supposed absurdity of his critique of truth as a rejection of truth, which is taken to be a truth-claim whose hypothetical truth is logically impossible. If Nietzsche’s thought is reduced to a set of simplistic logical relations, then these problems seem insurmountable. However, these two objections are sustainable only so long as the impressive self-awareness and subtlety of Nietzsche’s philosophy are either over-simplified, or ignored.

Nietzsche’s critics often cite his concept of the will to power as a prime example of these two supposed failings. The will to power is troublesome because it is a
philosophical concept presented both subsequent to and concurrent with his critique of truth, and it seems to function as the subject of either metaphysically or empirically true claims about the world. However, the serious and careful reader will also discover in the will to power an opportunity to defend Nietzsche against this apparent inconsistency.

The problematic status of the will to power is exemplified in the following posthumously published entry in Nietzsche’s notebook dated 1885:

And do you want to know what ‘the world’ is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable sized, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income; enclosed by “nothingness” as by a boundary; not some blurry or wasted, not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a space that might be “empty” here or there, but rather as force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and flood of its forms; out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most rigid, coldest forms towards the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory, and then again returning home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity of its courses and its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness; this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil”, without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself- do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men?- This world is the will to power and nothing besides! And you yourself are also this will to power- and nothing besides! (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 1968, 1067; Werke VII3, Nachgelassene Fragmente, 38[12])

This passage seems relatively straightforward. Nietzsche is describing the world as “will to power and nothing besides” (Ibid.). However, if this is the case, and the numerous passages like these, which are peppered throughout his oeuvre, though most prominently in the posthumously collected, edited, and published notebooks, are accepted as authentic features of Nietzsche’s philosophy, then their relation to his critique of truth must be clarified. Moreover, because Nietzsche’s description of the world as will to
power and nothing besides is explicitly perspectival, it seems that even if it can be rendered consistent with his critique of truth, it remains nonetheless little more than an idiosyncratic confession with no philosophical value. Consequently, if the will to power is to be a philosophically compelling concept, then it must, in the first place, be rendered consistent with Nietzsche’s early and sustained critique of truth, and in the second, be demonstrably valuable despite its perspectival quality.

At first sight, it seems as though any interpretation of the will to power, given Nietzsche’s critique of truth, must exemplify one of three equally unsatisfying approaches. First, the will to power can be interpreted as inconsistent, either with the other features of Nietzsche’s oeuvre, or with itself; second, the passages that produce these philosophical problems may be rejected in order to save the overall coherence of Nietzsche’s philosophy; or finally, the cosmological tenor of the passages may be interpreted as irrelevant given their idiosyncratically perspectival status. Therefore, the problem of coherence can either guide a given interpretation, be trumped by the principle of comprehensiveness, or be rejected altogether as constituting a genuine problem. None of these, however, actually resolve the problem. They simply accept some version of the problem. Each one chooses a set of problematic consequences that it finds the least troublesome.

Almost the entire history of interpretation of the concept of the will to power can be classified as instances of one of these three approaches. Respectively, the will to power is interpreted either as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, or as an object of interpretive play. While each one, on its own, fails to provide an adequate interpretation of the will to power, a critical assessment of each approach can help delimit
the scope of an acceptable alternative. Moreover, once the sense attributable to the will to power is adequately narrowed, a largely ignored, and otherwise grossly misunderstood fourth approach can provide a final, necessary contribution to a compelling interpretation. This peripheral fourth approach discovers a philosophical justification for Nietzsche’s critique of truth, which has historically functioned as the structuring principle of philosophical discourse, and at the same time, it discovers in Nietzsche a justification for his re- attribution of that structuring function to his concept of the will to power.

If the following analysis is successful, then the will to power should provide an example of how some of the most seemingly incommensurable features of Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole could be rendered consistent parts of a coherent whole. As a result, Nietzsche’s philosophy would become a far more stable and intelligible object of evaluation. Questions regarding its philosophical value, its ethical implications and acceptability, and its function as a determining feature of the subsequent course of philosophy specifically, and the humanities in general could finally be undertaken on a sure footing and in good faith. At this juncture, however, any discussion of these possibilities would mean jumping too far ahead, far too quickly. Instead, this analysis will set upon its carefully delineated task of answering the question: ‘What is the sense of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power?’

As a final introductory consideration, however, given the history of Nietzsche scholarship, this analysis’ choice of primary and secondary source material should be justified. In the first place, the sense of the phrase “Nietzsche’s oeuvre” should be defined given its problematic posthumous history. Though this consideration will be revisited in greater detail in the following chapters, it should be noted that this analysis
takes the moderate methodological position that any relevant available material can and should be used as evidence for, or as counter-evidence to any claim about Nietzsche’s philosophy. Although Nietzsche’s published material will be given precedence, Nietzsche’s notebooks, letters, and biography will also stand as possible qualifying or complementary sources. As was stated above, the criteria of evaluation that will guide this analysis are coherence and comprehensiveness. Consequently, if one of two competing interpretations is to be preferred, then that interpretation will be the one that can be rendered consistent with the greatest bulk of Nietzsche’s oeuvre. However, Nietzsche’s oeuvre does not include the book titled *The Will to Power* as anything other than an extremely problematic collection and organization of Nietzsche’s notebooks. Therefore, though Walter Kaufmann’s translation of *The Will to Power* is cited, it is cited only as an English language source for some useful passages in the notebooks. In order to avoid any misinterpretation of this analysis either as contingent on a mistranslation, or as the product of a philologically problematic posthumous selection and organization of Nietzsche’s notebooks, all citations will also be sourced in the German critical edition of Nietzsche’s *Werke*, edited by Georgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari.

In the second place, some justification should be provided for this analysis’ choice of secondary sources. The secondary sources that are used as examples of the three principal interpretative approaches to the concept of the will to power are chosen for a variety of different reasons. They stand either as very prominent interpretations in

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1 For a sustained analysis of the history of the book titled *The Will to Power* and of its place and function in the history of Nietzsche scholarship, see Wolfgang Müller-Lauter’s essay „Der Wille zur Macht“ als Buch der „Krisis“ (Müller-Lauter, "Der Wille zur Macht" als Buch der Krisis Philosophischer Nietzsche-Interpretation 1995), and Mazzino Montinari’s *La volonté de puissance n’existe pas* (Montinari 1996).
the history of Nietzsche scholarship, as very rich and compelling sources for a possible alternative interpretation to the one that will be forwarded in the present analysis, or as particularly useful sources for a negative qualification or partially positive qualification of Nietzsche’s concept and of its context. However, some very prominent figures are absent. Karl Löwith, for example, does not make an explicit appearance. However, as is evidenced by his reference to G.A. Morgan’s interpretation of the concept will to power as an explanatory principle meant to describe the basic character of “life” (Löwith 1981, 405), his interpretation is indirectly assessed because it is, in this respect, the same as Walter Kaufmann’s. Consequently, because Kaufmann’s interpretation is critiqued on the grounds that it interprets the will to power as an explanatory concept meant to describe “life” as a whole, Löwith’s interpretation is implicitly critiqued in the same manner and for the same reasons. Therefore, though this approach does not aim at a comprehensive and explicit enumeration or treatment of all available secondary sources, it aims at a comprehensive evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the available secondary sources to the extent that the bulk of available secondary literature can be classified as belonging to one of the three principal types of interpretive approaches to the concept of the will to power.

Moreover, this method of evaluating the history of interpretation of the concept of the will to power occasions a smaller number of far more careful and sustained analyses. Rather than citing a large number of interpretations, this analysis presents the smaller number of interpretations it does assess directly in their own terms. Therefore, it can reasonably claim to engage each interpretation and interpretive approach that it does assess in a spirit of charity. Instead of reducing those interpretations to their conclusions,
which are then either accepted or discarded without reference to the premises from which they were inferred, it patiently makes explicit the premises from which those conclusions were inferred. As a result, the analysis is then able both to assess the value of those conclusions in their own terms, and then only subsequently in relation to the object of the present analysis and evaluative criteria according to which it is framed. This method has the advantage of making as transparent as possible the values that underscore my analysis’ criteria of philosophical evaluation, and it provides the reader with a means of consciously positioning himself in relation to those values, given his own.

Having made explicit the object of the following analysis, its method, and the criteria of evaluation that will guide its interpretations of alternative accounts, it is now possible to take the first sure step towards an adequate interpretation of the sense of the concept of the will to power.
Chapter 1: The Will to Power as a Metaphysical Concept

This chapter will evaluate and reject the first of the three conventional interpretive approaches to Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power: the will to power as a metaphysical concept. In doing so, however, it will achieve two ends. First, it will provide an account of what kind of philosophy Nietzsche is not doing: metaphysics. Second, it will allude to the kind of philosophy Nietzsche is doing: philosophy as history.

In order to justify this rejection, and achieve these two ends, this chapter will subject two examples of this approach to a careful analysis and evaluation. These two examples, however, are not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration of the available examples of this type of interpretative approach. Instead, they are presented as representative of the strengths and weaknesses common to this approach as a whole. Therefore, though the interpretations of the concept of the will to power offered by Martin Heidegger and Jürgen Habermas are very distinct, this analysis will not attenuate that difference. Instead, it will show by their very difference to what extent any interpretation of the will to power as a metaphysical concept is subject to a common criticism.

Despite their differences, these two interpretations of the will to power as a metaphysical concept are two consequences of the same problematic misunderstanding. Both interpretations mistakenly attribute to Nietzsche a philosophical method of enquiry that he explicitly, and repeatedly, rejects. They both construe Nietzsche as a metaphysician. Nietzsche’s oeuvre and his biography provide an enormous amount of counter-evidence to this interpretation.
Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power as one of the five major rubrics of Nietzsche’s thought, which opens a way towards understanding his thought as a metaphysics of the will to power, and Habermas’ interpretation of it as a philosophical attempt to engage, not only with resigned unconcern, but enthusiasm, the dissolution of the unity of modern time consciousness, both fail. Both fail because neither acknowledges Nietzsche’s evaluation of the history of philosophy as involving a clear rejection of metaphysics. Furthermore, neither acknowledges the extent to which his positive philosophical analyses are the products of his philological educational background. In the first place, Heidegger’s interpretation will be set against Nietzsche’s arguments for rejecting metaphysics as a valuable type of enquiry. In the second place, Habermas’ interpretation will be rejected because it rests on an inadequate account of Nietzsche’s analysis and evaluation of history as a discipline. However, the over-arching criticism will be that both misinterpret Nietzsche’s method of philosophical enquiry, and the consequent sense attributable to the will to power as a product of that method. Both interpretations will be seen to fall outside even the broadest parameters of what the philosophical sense of the will to power could be, given the type of philosophy that Nietzsche practices.

This account of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, however, is only partial. It may, at times, seem either ambiguous or equivocal, but this is only a product of Nietzsche’s radical use of the term “metaphysics”. Not until the mistaken empirical interpretative approach to the will to power has been critiqued in Chapter 2, will Nietzsche’s use of the term “metaphysics” be adequately defined. Consequently, the qualification that Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics constitutes a rejection of any
claims that purport to correspond to the world, will only be complete once this chapter is
considered in conjunction with Chapter 2. Nonetheless, an account of the radical sense of
Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics is only relevant after having demonstrated that
Nietzsche does in fact reject metaphysics. This critique of Heidegger and Habermas’
interpretations does not, therefore, presume to provide an adequate alternative
interpretation. It will only demonstrate that their interpretations are inconsistent with
Nietzsche’s œuvre as a whole.

1.1 Martin Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Will to Power

Heidegger interprets Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power as a metaphysical
concept meant to capture the sense of his inversion of the historical privileging of Being
over Becoming. It is a metaphysical concept that anchors a conception of life as
Becoming. It is a conceptual permanentizing of Becoming which, while recognizing
itself as a falsification, makes a certain kind of life possible. Heidegger’s interpretation
of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power takes two different, though cooperative
approaches: the will to power as art and the will to power as knowledge. A clear
understanding of Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power requires understanding
each of these two approaches and their relation to each other.

1.1.1 The Will to Power as one of the Five Major Rubrics of Nietzsche’s Thought

Heidegger’s intricate and involved interpretation of the will to power is summed
up in a presentation given in the introductory chapter of the fourth volume of his
treatment of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole. In the fourth volume of Heidegger’s
_Nietzsche_, a text based on a course given at the University of Freiburg in 1940,
Nietzsche’s oeuvre is framed by his reflection on the history of philosophy as the history of nihilism. According to Heidegger, the will to power, nihilism, eternal recurrence, the revaluation of all values hitherto, and the Overman are the five possible perspectival approaches to the whole of Nietzsche’s thought—its “five major rubrics” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Nihilism* 1961, 9). Though an understanding of each one implies an understanding of the others, Heidegger insists that each may be taken as an interpretive start and end point. Therefore, as the purpose of this analysis is highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power, only his interpretation the will to power will be examined.

What then is the sense attributed to Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power in the fourth volume of Heidegger’s treatment of Nietzsche’s thought? Here, the will to power is construed as “the basic character of being as a whole” (Ibid., 6). According to Heidegger, the study of the character of the truth of being as a whole is the study of metaphysics, and every age is sustained by some metaphysics or other (Ibid., 5). According to Heidegger then, Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power is the hub of his own metaphysics, and the framework of his own age.

This, however, is only a description of its philosophical and historical status. It does not elucidate what the will to power is as such. The will to power, claims Heidegger, is an elucidation of the essence of power itself. Power, in the Nietzschean sense, is supposedly nothing other than the increase of power. Consequently, one only has power so long as one increases one’s power. Nietzsche’s concept of power is thus characterized by Heidegger as what would typically be called overpowering (Ibid., 7).
Power is, in this sense, less like an attribute of an entity than it is a quality of an action. When an act is of a particular kind, the ‘actor’ could be said to ‘have power’.

Consequently, if the character of being as a whole is the will to power, and the will to power is an account of the essence of power itself, then the essence of any specific being, as grounded in the essence of power, must be its activity of overpowering. Its essence is the process or the becoming of that act of overpowering. The character of being as a whole is thus not a being in the sense of an entity with determinate and determinative attributes. It is a becoming. It is an activity. But what precisely is this activity that is supposed to characterize being as a whole? What precisely is this activity of overpowering that is the will to power? To answer this question the fourth volume of Heidegger’s treatment of Nietzsche must be set aside, and volumes one and three taken up.

1.1.2 The Will to Power as Art

The summary account of the will to power given in volume four grows out of Heidegger’s preceding treatments of Nietzsche’s thought. In volumes one and three, the will to power is also described as Nietzsche’s characterization of the Being of beings (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art* 1961, 7). Beings are, even at this earlier stage, understood as an active and willful becoming (Ibid.). The becoming essence of the will to power is still construed as the primordial character of the Being of beings. The will to power is thus, even in volume one, the term Nietzsche purportedly uses to designate the essence of his metaphysics insofar as any characterization of the Being of beings is the elaboration of a metaphysics (Ibid., 18). What volume one provides in addition to volume four is an elucidation of just what this “becoming” is. According to
Heidegger, because Nietzsche characterizes art as one configuration of the will to power, an elucidation of art can be used as a means of elucidating the sense of the will to power (Ibid., 33).

But why does Heidegger burden himself with such a roundabout presentation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power? Isn’t invoking art only burdening the metaphysician with the separate question of aesthetics? More importantly, isn’t the sense of the term “will to power” clear enough? Isn’t it simply a species of will; that is, a will whose object is power? Because the will to power is forwarded as the basic character of the Being of beings, it cannot refer to some specific being, or to some specific mode of Being without failing to characterize being as a whole. If the will to power is defined as some species or mode of Being, then its definition will necessarily be too narrow. For example, if the will were construed as a faculty of the psyche, then the will to power, which is supposed to characterize being as a whole, would only constitute one feature of one part of being as a whole, the psyche (Ibid., 38). Therefore, the will to power cannot be a “kind of desiring that has power as its goal instead of happiness, pleasure, or the unhinging of the will” (Ibid., 42). So how then is the becoming that is the will to power correctly understood?

1.1.2.1 Discerning the Sense of Will to Power Via Feeling

Heidegger enquires into the sense of the will to power by exploring the sense Nietzsche attributes to the term will, because the will to power is not only the essence of power, but also the essence of “will” (Ibid., 61). This may seem odd or problematic at first sight. After all, how could a species of a genus be the essence of that genus without necessarily barring the other species of that same genus from participating in their own
essence? If the relation of a genus to its species is to be in some manner essential, ought it not be the inverse; ought not the genus be or house the essential feature of all its species? No, though why this is not the case will only become apparent once the senses of the distinct terms “will” and “power” are elucidated. The first task towards understanding the will to power then is an elucidation of each of its constituent parts. In order to do this, Heidegger refers to section 688 of The Will to Power (Werke VIII3, Nachgelassene Fragmente, 14[121]), which elucidates the sense of the term “will” via three of its discernable instantiations: as an affect, as a passion, and as a feeling.

In each case, the subject of the affect, passion, or feeling is seized in a manner that does not carry a being away from its Being. Affect, passion and feeling, instead, carry one towards it. Each is a basic mode of what Heidegger calls Dasein, the subject as a “there-being”. Each of the three modes of Being forces a confrontation between a Dasein and the openness or concealedness of its Being (Ibid., 45). That is to say, the ‘there-being’s’ being becomes apparent to it. “In feeling, a state opens up, and stays open, in which we stand related to things, to ourselves, and to the people around us, always simultaneously” (Ibid., 51). Dasein’s confrontation with its own being is what Heidegger construes as the Nietzschean sense of the term “feeling”. However, the term “feeling” should not be mistaken as referring to some one specific feeling. It is feeling itself, in any of its instantiations, that reveals the sense of the term “will”. Feeling, either as an affect or as a passion, entails either a blind or lucid seizure of Dasein respectively. Feeling, therefore, is an instantiation of will insofar as it reveals to Dasein its own Being, because such a revealing of being is precisely what Heidegger takes to be Nietzsche’s conception of willing. The Nietzschean sense of the term “will” is the grasping of Being,
and “to grasp Being means to remain knowingly exposed to its sudden advance, its presencing” (Ibid., 59).

Though a clear conception of the sense of the term “will” is, according to Heidegger, necessary to understanding the will to power, the sense of the term “will”, given its instantiation in the phenomenon of feeling, risks becoming more of an obstacle than an aid unless the will is further specified as the will to power. However, in striving to specify the will to power as a species of will, two problems arise. First, as has already been stated, because the will to power is purported to be the basic character of the Being of beings, the will cannot be successfully clarified by determining it as a specific object, or as an attribute of a specific object without becoming overly narrow (Ibid., 60).

Second, what the will wills must be something other than itself if the will to power is to make sense as a term distinct from will. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche overcomes these logical difficulties by claiming that the will, in the will to power, wills an increase of power, but without construing the term “power” as some distinct ‘object’ or ‘entity’.

If the will to power is essentially will, and will is Dasein’s grasping of its Being, which is discernable via feeling either as affect or passion, then what is power if it cannot be construed as a specific and distinct object that the will strives towards? Power, according to Heidegger’s Nietzsche, refers simply to an increase by degree of the affect or passion. After all, if the essential character of beings is a grasping of their Being, then it only makes sense that all any being could strive towards (at least metaphysically) is a more blatant revelation of its Being. Consequently, to become powerful means to increase one’s affective capacity. If the will to power were to hypothetically achieve its object, then the will, discernable as a seizure of Dasein by feeling, which reveals to it its
Being, would increase its capacity to seize its Being. The object of the will’s willing is increasing the strength of its grip upon its Being. The will to power, therefore, is the will to increase the power of one’s will, and not the willed acquisition of something other than will.

1.1.2.2 Art as the Occasioning for a Revealing of the Being of beings

According to Heidegger, because feeling provides a discernable example of the experience of will to power, the will to power can be conceptually discerned as art because occasioning a revelation of the Being of being via feeling either as affect or passion is precisely what art does. “Art is the most perspicuous and familiar configuration of the will to power” (Ibid., 71). But this implies a distinctive conception of art. Just as the will to power cannot be some specific being or feature of a being without being overly narrow, neither can art be some distinctive object or a distinctive and determinate attribute shared by a set of objects called works of art. Because, in the first place, art is a configuration of the will to power; and because, in the second place, the will to power is the essence of the Being of beings; and because, in the third place, the will to power is the activity of overpowering and not some determinate entity or distinctive attribute of entities; art must be something more ontologically akin to an event than to an object. Art “must be grasped in terms of the artist” (Ibid.), and not in terms of its audience.

Art is the event of the revelation of a being’s Being. It is the becoming perspicuous of a being’s Being. In this sense, craftsmen, statesmen, and educators may be artists insofar as they occasion the bringing forth of the Being of some being: either as a product, a body politic, or knowledge respectively. But art, Heidegger cautions, is in
none of these produced objects, events or ideas. Art is not the product of any specific type of individual as manufacturer. Artists are artists insofar as they are producers. However, because the production that makes them artists is not some material or ideal object, but an object that succeeds at occasioning the revealing of its own Being and thereby occasioning the revealing of the Being of beings generally, they are also artists only insofar as their productions subject them to the event of the art they produce. Therefore, art is an event, not an object. In this sense, the artist is integral, but not as the cause of an art object that is art. “Art is the basic occurrence of all beings; to the extent that they are, beings are self-creating, created” (Ibid., 72).

But if Heidegger is correct, then the truth of Nietzsche’s characterization of the Being of beings refers to a feature of artistic creativity, and not to a representation that correctly corresponds to its referent. This seems to engender the problem of self-reference. Remember, Heidegger claims that any study of the character of the truth of being as a whole is the study of metaphysics. He also claims that the will to power is a concept that does just this. However, art is purported to be the most perspicuous form of the will to power. More importantly, art does not refer to a kind of object that could somehow represent the structure of the Being of beings, because art is not a type of object. Art objects are art only insofar as they occasion a revealing of the Being of a being. Consequently, the will to power is a metaphysical concept that cannot define the basic character of the Being of beings, because it does not provide a verifiable representation of it. If Heidegger is correct, then Nietzsche’s metaphysics provides no grounds for discerning whether or not this or that revealing of Being is a true revealing, because it has no determinate content. What is true, therefore, is not rationally
discovered and verified, but artistically occasioned. However, if this is the case, then wouldn’t the truth of the will to power as art rest on a contingent artistic creation, and not on a true description of the world?

The will to power as art seems to require some resolution to “the raging discordance between truth and art” (Ibid., 142). According to Heidegger, the relation of truth to the will to power as a metaphysical concept is only problematic so long as a conventional philosophical conception of truth as correspondence is accepted. But, Heidegger does not believe that Nietzsche accepts this convention. Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power, because it is most perspicuous as art, requires an account of its relation to truth. Consequently, volume 1 of Heidegger’s Nietzsche will be put aside, and volume 3 taken up.

1.1.3 Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics

According to Heidegger, the “raging discordance between truth and art” is only attributable to Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the will to power so long as truth is used in a conventional sense- as some variation of Plato’s conception of truth as the correct representation of the supersensuous. But this is not Nietzsche’s position. Heidegger claims that interpreting the relation of Nietzsche’s conceptions of truth and art as problematic follows from a misunderstanding of Nietzsche conception of truth. One cannot simply ask ‘How is this metaphysical model true?’, because given the role of the will to power as the basic character of the Being of beings, the will to power cannot be an instance of truth. Instead, truth is an instance of the will to power. Only by asking how truth is another exemplification of the will to power can the relation of the two terms be properly grasped and the supposed problem of self-reference dissolved.
1.1.3.1 The Doubly Failed Critique of Incoherence

The history of Western thought has historically construed knowledge as a matter of correct representation, and specific correct representations as individual truths (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics* 1961, 23-24). Nietzsche’s thought as a whole, however, involves a radical revision of this long-standing tradition. According to Heidegger’s Nietzsche, truth in this sense is an honoring of a kind of illusion (Ibid., 24-25). At first sight, this position seems to be in contradiction with itself insofar as the claim that truth is an illusion would have to affect the truth of that very claim and thereby make it an illusion insofar as it purports to be true. Heidegger, however, insists that criticizing Nietzsche’s position in this manner fails in two respects. First, it fails logically insofar as it fails to recognize that the consequence of the dissolution of truth that follows from the original claim must be applied to the critique as well as to the original statement. Logically, it is impossible to refute statements such as Nietzsche’s on the grounds that they cannot be true, because such statements already assume that the conception of truth as correct representation has no foundation (Ibid., 27).

Secondly, and far more importantly, Heidegger insists that this criticism fails because it fails to understand the sense of the term “illusion”. So long as “illusion” is thought of as the logical opposite of “truth”, the statement will be misunderstood. Consequently, the question regarding the truth of Nietzsche’s metaphysics, if it is to be taken seriously, must be engaged according to the conditions of its production. That is to say, asking after the truth of Nietzsche’s metaphysics can no longer have the same sense it would if Nietzsche functioned from within the parameters of a conventional
philosophical model, wherein truths are understood as correct representations. Therefore, before Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power can be properly evaluated, the philosophical parameters in which it functions must be clearly established.

1.1.3.2 The Historical Sources of Truth and Nietzsche’s Re-evaluative Restructuring

In order to clarify what Nietzsche means by illusion, Heidegger refers to another passage in *The Will to Power* where Nietzsche describes truth as “a kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 1968, 493; *Werke VII3*, Nachgelassene Fragmente, 34[253]). The term “truth” does not refer to a ‘true representation’ in the ‘mind’, which correctly corresponds to the world or some feature in it. It refers to a belief that serves or engenders a certain kind of life.

Nietzsche is saying that truth is the structural ground, the basic structure into which life as life is and must be admitted. Thus truth and what is true are not first determined subsequently in terms of a practical use merely accruing to life; rather, truth must already prevail in order that what is alive can live and life as such can remain alive (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics* 1961, 55).

This, Heidegger acknowledges, is at least very odd if not absurd (Ibid.). How can it be true that something must necessarily be held as true, without it being necessary that that belief held as true actually be true? The answer is that philosophy has, according to Heidegger’s Nietzsche, forgotten its history. The philosophical premise that truth is correct representation is a premise that ignores its historical contingency.

Truth was never discovered as correct representation, but inferred as correct representation subsequent to a preceding estimation of value (Ibid., 57). According to Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche does not identify correct representation as the essence of truth. Instead he identifies it as an estimation of value that only subsequently grounds the
conception of truth as correct representation (Ibid.). In order to uncover the essence of truth, the valuation upon which the historically contingent sense of the concept of truth as correct representation is grounded must be identified. According to Heidegger, this valuation is a distinction between a true and an apparent world. This opposition is said to be the origin of Western metaphysics as a whole, including its implicit conception of truth (Ibid., 58).

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s account of the two-world doctrine originates in a specific interpretation of Platonic thought (Ibid.). Plato founds Western metaphysics insofar as he distinguishes between the *ontos on* (being proper or being that is in accordance with the essence of being) and the *me on* (the outward appearance of the *ontos on*). The *me on* has a form, but it is a warped form. It is a sensual instantiation of the pure form that Plato calls the *eidos* (the idea). The table that one sits at for dinner, for example, is an imperfect instantiation of the pure form of a table (what might be called the tableness of a table). All actual tables are tables insofar as they participate in this form, but they always participate in this pure form in an imperfect manner. As a consequence of this two-world account of the Being of beings, knowing is defined as correctly representing this ideal realm of pure form, and truth as a correct representation of some feature of that realm.

As a result, the debate regarding the essence of truth has taken the form of debates over whether or not this or that representation correctly corresponds to the *eidos*. Christianity and Kantianism are, for instance, two examples of the appropriation of this two-world doctrine wherein the *ontos on* and the *me on* become, in the first instance, the eternal realms of heaven and hell in juxtaposition to the impermanent and imperfect
earthly realm, or in the second instance, the noumenal realm of things-in-themselves in juxtaposition to the phenomenological realm of things as they are perceived given the *a priori* categories of experience.

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s account of truth is intriguing because, though sustaining the historically founded sense of truth as a representation of Being or some feature of it, it is grounded upon a more primordial premise: it is grounded upon a certain valuation. That is to say, truth is correct representation, but only because it has been historically posited as such. The sense of truth is not as it is because it must be so *a priori*, but because a certain way of life, founded upon certain valuations, requires it to be so. Consequently, it is valuation itself that functions as the primordial philosophical premise. “The essence of all beings is posited from the very beginning as value in general” (Ibid., 57).

Nietzsche’s conception of the essence of truth, claims Heidegger, is therefore a kind of “taking-as-fixed-and-secure” (Ibid., 63) instead of something like a discovering-of-the-fixed-and-secure. But doesn’t this just dilute the concept of truth to the point where all instances of taking-as-fixed-and-secure are of relatively equal value insofar as they need not actually correspond to the way Being actually is? Doesn’t Heidegger’s Nietzsche, in construing a truth as an illusion that is taken to be true, claim that there is no truth, and thereby become subject to the criticisms of incoherence and self-reference?

According to Heidegger, he does not. Nietzsche only seems to take this problematic position because of his penchant for dramatic statements such as “There is no Truth” (Ibid., 66). According to Heidegger, Nietzsche does not claim that there is no truth. He simply claims that the valuation that defines truth as correct representation cannot
possibly correspond to being as a whole. So long as truth is a correct representation, a taking-as-fixed-and-secure, then the true could never conform to a world that is in fact one of becoming. According to Heidegger, this is the crux of Nietzsche’s position. Being is a Becoming. Consequently, being is incapable of being a truth according to its historically reified sense, a determinate representation of the eidos.

According to Heidegger’s extrapolation of section 507 of The Will to Power, presumably from the phrase “we have made the ‘real world’ not a world of change and becoming, but one of being” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 1968, 507; Werke VIII2, Nachgelassene Fragmente, 9[38]), Nietzsche claims that the world is a world of becoming. “Truth would then be incorrectness, error- an ‘illusion’” (Heidegger, Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics 1961, 64). Therefore, Nietzsche’s claim that “Truth is a kind of illusion” is a dramatized challenge to the history of philosophy’s primordial valuation of being as a set of fixed and static entities and relations. Nietzsche pits the value of Being against that of Becoming. His quirky claims about truth are challenges to the structuring Platonic valuation of being over becoming. Nietzsche’s alternative valuation of Becoming over Being reconfigures truth in light of an opposing and higher value: the value of life’s “will to self-transcendence and becoming” (Ibid.). Truth is not, in its essence, a ‘correct’ ‘holding-to-be-true’ because, as the world is a world of becoming, it is logically impossible for it to be so. Consequently, a truth as a holding-to-be-true must be a fiction. Truth, now that being as a whole is construed as a Becoming, must be a taking-to-be-true, an “illusion”.
1.1.3.4 Knowledge

So what is the philosophical dénouement of this inversion of philosophy’s historical valuation? Nietzsche’s supposed inversion of the priority of Becoming over Being inverts the traditional relation of truth and life. Truth is made to serve life instead of being served by it. That is to say, truths, as static representations, are interpreted as fictions that engender or serve some form of life. With this consequence of Nietzsche’s inversion in mind, it is possible to understand the sense of Nietzsche’s claim that ‘truths’ are in fact ‘false’. Heidegger, however, avoids repeating this confusing formulation by attributing to Nietzsche a curious conception of knowledge that allows for an alternative account. Heidegger claims that Nietzsche remains a metaphysician, but supplants ‘truth as right representation’ for ‘truth as homoiosis’.

Heidegger cites yet another passage in The Will to Power in order to clarify the sense of Nietzsche’s reformulation of truth as homoiosis: “Not ‘to know’ but to schematize- to impose upon chaos as much regularity and as many forms as our practical needs require” (Ibid., 70). To know, for Nietzsche, is to schematize chaos. However, this is far from clear.

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche uses the term “chaos” neither in the ancient Greek, nor in the modern sense. Chaos, as the object of schematization, is not what Hesiod calls the khaos, the “measureless, supportless, and groundless yawning open” (Ibid., 78); nor is it something like Kant’s “manifold of ‘sensations’” (Ibid., 79). Chaos is not the opposite of order. It is not something like matter without form, or the tangled confusion that arises when order is removed as an attribute of some object or state of affairs. It is instead the “unmastered richness of the becoming and streaming of the world
as a whole” (Ibid.). Metaphorically, chaos is not comparable to walking into a room wherein everything is thrown about willy-nilly. It is like walking into a tidy room wherein the principle of its order has not been posited yet.

Given Heidegger’s qualification of Nietzsche’s use of the term “chaos”, schematizing chaos cannot be an imposition of some sort of order upon the disordered. After all, Nietzsche’s chaos already has an order in the sense of some structure or form. Schematizing means the activity of regulating those structures according to the requirements of life. “Praxis”, and not “theory”, is the principle that determines the schemata of the chaos. Because life is Nietzsche’s name for Being, which is itself a “presencing, subsistence, permanence, withstanding disappearance and atrophy” (Ibid., 85), if Being is essentially a Becoming, Being implies an internal tension. Life is a Becoming that has to resist its essential character in order to be. For ‘Becoming’ to ‘be’ it must resist, or transcend itself. Its essential character demands that it urge beyond itself, that it urge towards Being (Ibid.).

This, according to Heidegger, follows from the sense of the term “praxis”. “Praxis”, though traditionally translated from the original Greek as activity or deed, is not essentially an activity or deed, but life itself as the ground for the occurrence of activities and deeds. If this is the case, and Nietzsche is in fact using praxis in this sense, then it is the possibility of the occurrence of life itself that functions as the impetus for a schematization of chaos. “Praxis” is the occurrence of life as the possibility for activity or deed. Consequently, knowledge is not the discovery of meaningful order, but the imposition of the principle of order upon form, so that form becomes an occasion for activity- that is to say, life.
1.1.3.4 Knowledge and Art

It is now possible to see the relation of the will to power and truth within the context of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole. As has been shown, for Heidegger’s Nietzsche, art is construed as the most perspicuous instantiation of the will to power. Moreover, art has been construed as the activity of creatively founding the conditions for a revealing of the character of the Being of beings. In addition, Heidegger claims that, for Nietzsche, knowledge is an “ordering, or schematizing, or transfiguring transposition of life (i.e. chaos)” (Ibid., 123). Consequently, both art and knowledge are forms of the will to power, and forms that have a great deal in common. Both are modes of the creative construction of the grounds of life as activity.

According to Heidegger then, Nietzsche’s use of the term truth has two senses. Nietzsche’s first account of truth, which he believes is a feature of nearly the entire history of philosophy, construes truth as a fixed and constant representation of an essentially unchanging world. His second account of truth, which he posits as a preferable alternative, construes truth as a claim in harmony with life as a Becoming.

In the unequivocal essential definition of truth as error, truth is necessarily thought twice, and each time differently, hence ambiguously: once as fixation of the constant, and then as harmony with the actual. Only on the basis of this essence of truth as harmony can truth as constancy be an error. The essence of truth as harmony here underlying the concept of error is what has been determined since ancient times in metaphysical thinking as correspondence with the actual and harmony with it, homoiosis. In this sense, though Nietzsche’s conception of truth is an inverted Platonism, it is nonetheless conditional upon that Platonism, because while truth as harmony makes of truth as holding-to-be-true a error, art is a true truth insofar as is the a transfiguring semblance- a “shining forth of new possibilities” (Ibid., 126-127).

The will to power, according to Heidegger, is a permanentizing of Being which recognizes itself as artistic. It is the affective stamping of Being upon Becoming that
engenders an opportunity to force being into presence without ever reducing Being to that permanentization. Art and truth are thus two types of the affective imposition of Being upon Becoming. Art and truth are each a species of the will to power that occasion a revealing of Being in its essence. However, essential Being is represented neither by an art object, nor by a correct representation. It is the event of art and knowledge, as activities, as creative becomings, that occasion the revealing of the character of being as a whole.

1.1.4 Heidegger’s Mistaken Reduction of Nietzsche’s Thought to Any One of its Five Rubrics

Though the specific object of this analysis is the will to power, because Heidegger believes that the will to power is an instantiation of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole, critiquing Heidegger’s interpretation of that one concept is, at the same time, a critique of his interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole. However, even though Heidegger claims to interpret Nietzsche’s thought as a whole, he only uses a very small and peculiar selection of texts to do it. In Chapter 2 of the first volume of his courses on Nietzsche (the course he gave in 1936), Heidegger recommended only the Baeumler edition of The Will to Power as the course text, with a collection of his letters and the biography his sister wrote about him as complements. This curious interpretive strategy becomes even odder and bolder by 1939 when he introduces his third set of lectures on Nietzsche. Here he characterizes the will to power as Nietzsche’s “sole thought” (Heidegger, Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art 1961, 10).

Of course, the present book The Will to Power does not reproduce the thought-path of Nietzsche’s will to power, either with regard to its completeness or, above all, with regard to its own pace and law of advance. But the book is sufficient as the basis for an attempt to follow this thought-path and to think Nietzsche’s sole thought in the course of this path (Ibid., 13).
Consequently, Heidegger’s claim that his interpretation of the will to power is an interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole can only be an unjustified premise of his analysis because it rests almost entirely on his analysis of specific passages in one posthumous publication which was collected and edited by someone else. Whether or not Nietzsche would have eventually written a book called *The Will to Power* is entirely speculative, and now largely rejected. More importantly, Heidegger’s interpretation is not actually verified against the rest of Nietzsche’s oeuvre. As a result, Heidegger’s account of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole cannot be, as it is presented, anything more than an unverified, speculative generalization. Therefore, though the will to power may in fact be one of, if not the pivotal concept from which the rest of Nietzsche’s thought can be adequately understood, whether or not this is in fact the case cannot be discerned by virtue of the evidence Heidegger provides.

According to Allan D. Schrift, even if Heidegger does not textually verify his claims about the will to power as an expression of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole, he does nonetheless attempt to justify it philosophically. Heidegger’s almost exclusive use of *The Will to Power* is grounded upon his belief that “the doctrine of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what he says” (Schrift 1990, 15). According to Schrift, Heidegger believes that the unsaid in Nietzsche is unsayable, given the structural limitations of the Western history of metaphysics, of which he believes Nietzsche is a part. The unsaid in Nietzsche, therefore, is the same as the unsaid in the entire history of Western metaphysics: the truth of being. Consequently, the ontological line of questioning to which Heidegger subjects Nietzsche is the same to which he would, or at least could, subject Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, etc. (Ibid., 17). But, while this line of
questioning may be interesting, Heidegger’s unqualified application of it to all objects of analysis seems problematic if the aim, at least in part, is to adequately discern the sense of a specific concept in Nietzsche’s oeuvre. As Schrift notes, Heidegger’s method of textual interpretation devolves into dogmatism. While this dogmatic philosophical concern may reveal something about Heidegger, it does not necessarily reveal the specific features of the Nietzschean concept under investigation. Consequently, a critique of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power must first and foremost be a verification of whether or not this interpretive method is appropriate to the specific object of enquiry at hand.

Heidegger interprets the will to power as one of the five major rubrics of Nietzsche’s thought, from which his thought as a whole can be understood. He concludes his analysis by construing Nietzsche’s thought as a whole as an inversion of the history of philosophy’s tendency to privilege Being over Becoming. This inversion occasions a variety of seemingly unintelligible claims such as the purportedly true claim that “there is no truth”. However, according to Heidegger, these radical claims are neither unintelligible, nor are they unacceptable; they simply require the prerequisite understanding of Nietzsche’s analysis of the history of philosophy as problematically privileging Being over Becoming. Consequently, the ‘truth’ of Nietzsche’s account of being (and truth) rests on a reform of the concept of truth as correct representation. For Heidegger’s Nietzsche, a truth is not a correct representation, but *homoiosis*. Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, therefore, is not a rejection of metaphysics at all. It is a rejection of a certain kind of metaphysics. It is the rejection of a certain criterion for identifying a ‘true’ representation. That is to say, will to power is the philosophical
concept that truly describes Being, because it describes Being as Becoming, and not as a
static set of determinate beings and their relations to each other.

But Heidegger’s analysis of the will to power, even granting that it may be
correct, is not actually representative of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole. There is simply
too much counter-evidence to accept it. Consequently, so long as Heidegger’s
interpretation of the will to power as a metaphysical concept is accepted, then his
methodological premise that it is justifiable to infer from it the sense of Nietzsche’s
thought as a whole has to be rejected, and along with it the internal consistency of
Nietzsche’s oeuvre.

Heidegger mistakenly put the cart before the horse. By generalizing Nietzsche’s
thought as a whole from his interpretation of the will to power, Heidegger construes
Nietzsche’s philosophy as something that Nietzsche explicitly rejects. Nietzsche
explicitly rejects any metaphysical account of the world, especially a metaphysical
account that would purport to account for all of being with a single term. Metaphysical
enquiry is rejected as either valuable or intelligible. It is at best useless and at worse
nonsense. Therefore, if the passages that Heidegger considers so closely do, when
considered independently of the rest of his oeuvre, permit an interpretation of the will to
power as a metaphysical concept, even the most cursory analysis of the remainder of his
oeuvre does not.

Critiquing Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power, therefore, occasions a
first step in delineating Nietzsche’s philosophical method. Insisting upon Nietzsche’s
rejection of metaphysics has two possible consequences: either Heidegger’s interpretation
of the will to power is rejected, or Nietzsche’s oeuvre is interpreted as incoherent.

However, if the first of these two options is chosen the second need not be.

Instead of inferring the sense of Nietzsche’s thought as whole from one of its features, the following analysis will show that it is much more fruitful to do the opposite. The following analysis will show that Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy. Consequently, assuming that consistency with the oeuvre of which it is a part is accepted as one of the criteria of evaluation of a philosophical concept, Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power can only be accepted insofar as the value of the concept it analyzes is rejected.

1.1.4.1 Nietzsche Rejection of Metaphysics: What Nietzsche Is Not Doing

Nietzsche rejects certain expectations about what a successful philosophical enquiry can reasonably produce. Take for instance a passage from a relatively early work often considered indicative of his positivistic phase.

The march of science is now no longer crossed by the accidental fact that men live for about seventy years, as was for all too long the case. Formerly a man wanted to reach the far end of knowledge during this period of time and the methods of acquiring knowledge were evaluated in accordance with this universal longing. The small single questions and experiments were counted contemptible: one wanted the shortest route; one believed that, because everything in the world seemed to be accommodated to man, the knowability of things was also accommodated to human timespan. To solve everything at a stroke, with a single word- that was the secret desire: the task was thought of in the image of the Gordian knot or in that of the egg of Columbus; one did not doubt that in the domain of knowledge too it was possible to reach one’s goal in the manner of Alexander or Columbus and settle all questions with a single answer (Nietzsche, Daybreak 1997, 547; Werke V1, Morgenröthe, Fünftes Buch, 547).

Though what Nietzsche thinks good philosophy is remains unexplored in this passage, it is clear that Nietzsche rejects a certain type of expectation. One ought not expect the world to reveal itself in a single term, or as a single term. To subject the world to the
question of ‘what is it?’ or ‘what is its significance?’ is more likely to reveal something about the psychological needs of the enquirers, than something about their object of enquiry. Insofar as one expects a simple propositional answer of the type ‘the world, or the significance of the world is X’, then one will either be sorely disappointed with what one can discover, or disingenuous in one’s method and the philosophical conclusions that that method produces. Consequently, any metaphysical enquiry that would purport to account for the world by virtue of a single term is not so much a practice that ought to be reformed, as it is one that ought to be set aside.

However, even though Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power as a single metaphysical term that purports to represent being has been shown to be inconsistent with other features of his oeuvre, Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics goes further. Nietzsche rejects not only this specific form of single term metaphysical analyses, but also more complex metaphysical structures.

Nietzsche claims that, even granting the possibility of some metaphysical realm, however intricate, its discovery would be of absolutely no value.

Metaphysical world- It is true, there could be a metaphysical world; the absolute possibility of it is hardly to be disputed. We behold all things through the human head and cannot cut off its head; while the question nonetheless remains what of the world would still be there if one had cut it off. This is a purely scientific problem and one not very well calculated to bother people overmuch; but all that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions valuable, terrible, delightful to them, all that has begotten these assumptions, is passion, error and self-deception; the worst of all these assumptions, is passion, error and self-deception; the worst of all these methods of acquiring knowledge, not the best of all, have taught belief in them… For one could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical world except that it was a being-other, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being-other; it would be a thing with negative qualities.- Even if the existence of such a world were never so well demonstrated, it is certain that knowledge of it would be the most useless of all knowledge: more useless even than knowledge of the chemical composition of water must be to the sailor in danger of shipwreck (Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human* 1996, I, 9; *Werke IV2, Menschenliches, Allzumenschliches*, 1, 9).
In the next chapter, Maudemarie Clarke’s analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of truth will show that it evolves from this early consideration of its irrelevance to a later belief in its unintelligibility. However, because the present analysis only aims to demonstrate that Heidegger’s generalization of his interpretation of the will to power to Nietzsche’s thought as a whole is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s thought as it is expressed in other texts than *The Will to Power*, at this juncture, all that is required is a demonstration that Nietzsche explicitly, self-consciously, and unequivocally rejects metaphysical enquiry as valuable. Claims such as those cited above clearly indicate that whatever it is Nietzsche may be doing, he is certainly not purporting to describe the content or form of some kind of metaphysical realm, and especially not with a single term such as the will to power.

While Heidegger’s interpretation is incorrect, it would be disingenuous to simply ignore or reject the claims on which it is based. However, Nietzsche clearly states that any understanding of his writings requires one to keep clearly in mind what has come before.

> If this book is incomprehensible to anyone and jars on his ears, the fault, it seems to me, is not necessarily mine. It is clear enough, assuming, as I do assume, that one has first read my earlier writings and has not spared some trouble in doing so: for they are, indeed, not easy to penetrate (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* 1989, *The Genealogy of Morals*, 8; *Werke VI2, Zur Genalogie der Moral, Vorrede*, 8).

While Nietzsche’s warning is directed to an interpretation of one specific work, it is reasonable to infer that Nietzsche’s explicit and repeated rejection of metaphysics analogously underscore his later writings. To properly understand the sense and function of the will to power, a relatively late concept in Nietzsche’s philosophical oeuvre, his rejection of metaphysics must be kept clearly in mind. However, this only begs the
question. What is Nietzsche doing with the concept of the will to power if he is not doing metaphysics? Karl Jaspers’ enumeration of certain evaluative criteria for identifying a tenable interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought provides an important clue.

Jaspers elucidates features of Nietzsche’s philosophical reflections that have very significant consequences for any attempt to identify something like a Nietzschean method of enquiry. According to Jaspers, in order to understand Nietzsche, one must first forego the expectation of acquiring some “fixed and final form” of his thought. One must be prepared to remain open to everything, to all questionings, and be patient while understanding its surfaces and plunges (Jaspers 1997, 9). That is to say, understanding Nietzsche is a continuous process. It is not an interpretive state of affairs. When engaging a specific issue, such as the concept of the will to power, one invariably encounters contradictory statements that must be taken together (Ibid., 10). According to Jaspers, the result is an oeuvre that is not a finished product, in the sense of a thesis spoon-fed to its audience. It is one wherein all the phases of an author’s thought are allowed to surface. Nietzsche’s works, therefore, “are to be viewed in their temporal form as the whole of a life” (Ibid., 12).

As a result of these considerations, six methodological imperatives for any adequate interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought are posited: Nietzsche is a philosopher of contradiction; any adequate analysis of Nietzsche’s thought will have to systematically examine its many repetitions and contradictions; an analysis of these contradictions will reveal the dialectical quality of Nietzsche’s thought; Nietzsche’s thought can be grasped as a whole only so long as it is interpreted as a process, and not as a specific belief; his
thought must be read in conjunction with his life; and, finally, that Nietzsche’s thought must be borne out in an analysis of its systematic interrelations.

Richard Lowell Howey, however, critiques Jaspers’ methodological prescriptions as problematically over-formalized. Jasper’s interpretation reconfigures Nietzsche’s thought from an informal practice, into a textual body underscored by a specific philosophical principle. Howey’s specific point of contention is that “self-contradiction is the fundamental ingredient of Nietzsche’s thought” (Howey 1973, 5). If Howey is correct, then Jaspers’ has contradicted his own insight that no single method of interpretation is, alone, adequate to an understanding of Nietzsche’s thought (Ibid., 3). As Howey points out, the variety of types of claims made about any one topic, and the consequent conflicts amongst those claims, are reduced by Jaspers to a set of logical relations wherein Nietzsche’s dialectic is nothing more than a formal dialectic of opposites (Ibid.). What Jaspers calls “real dialectic” thus loses the probing and experimental quality that could have otherwise been attributed to it. However, before making the claim that Nietzsche is in fact motivated by such a spirit of enquiry, Jaspers’ thesis that a formal, logical contradiction underscores each theme in Nietzsche’s oeuvre ought to be tested.

If Howey is correct, and he seems to be given Jaspers’ clear and explicit attribution of a fundamental, methodological principle to Nietzsche’s thought (i.e. self-contradiction), then Jaspers’ formalization is easily rejected. Over and over again Nietzsche describes his mode of thought as precisely not that of a series of instantiations of any one principle. “I favor any skepsis to which I may reply: ‘Let us try it!’ But I no longer wish to hear anything of all those things and questions that do not permit any
experiment. This is the limit of my ‘truthfulness’; for there courage has lost its right” (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 1974, 51; *Werke* V2, *Die Fröhlich Wissenschaft*, 51).

Nietzsche experiments. Nietzsche tries. Nietzsche puts forth possibilities and wonders ‘what if’.

For I approach deep problems like cold baths: quickly into them and quickly out of them again. That way one does not get to the depths, not deep enough is the superstition of those afraid of the water, the enemies of cold water; they speak without experience. The freezing cold makes one swift (Ibid., 381).

If Nietzsche’s thought can be characterized in any specific way, it is as a willingness to experiment. He plays at philosophizing; he does not forward a philosophy. “I do not know any other way of associating with great tasks than play: as a sign of greatness, this is an essential presupposition” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* 1989, *Ecce Homo*, Why I Am So Cleaver, 10; *Werke* VI3, *Ecce Homo*, Warum is so klug bin, 10). It should come as no surprise then that science is, for Nietzsche, a gay affair. For example, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* may be translated playfully as the frolicking trajectories through the fields of ways and modes of knowing.

Be that as it may, characterizing Nietzsche’s method in a positive way is not yet at issue. What is at issue is a clear account of what he is not doing. Nietzsche is not trying to say what or how the world is definitively, especially not in a manner that would purport to reduce the world to a single term such as the will to power. This rejection is clear from almost the beginning (i.e. after the emendation to *The Birth of Tragedy* which explicitly rejects its thesis and its style) to the end of his philosophical career. “I mistrust all systematisers, and avoid them. The will to system is a lack of rectitude” (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist* 2004, *Twilight of the Idols*, Apopthegems and Darts, 26; *Werke* VI3, Götzen: Dammerung, Sprüche und Pfeile, 26).
Nietzsche is not purporting to definitively describe how the world actually is, despite the many claims that might, taken independently, lead one to think so. This consideration of what Nietzsche is not doing is described best in his own words: “Let nobody be led astray: great intellects are skeptical” (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist* 2004, *The Antichrist*, 54; *Werke* VI3, *Der Antichrist*, 54).

So long as Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power is meant to be representative of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole, it clearly fails. Moreover, if the relation of the will to power to Nietzsche’s thought as a whole is abandoned, Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power still renders Nietzsche’s oeuvre incoherent. Nonetheless, if the sense and function of the will to power are determined by Nietzsche’s other analyses (especially by his critique of the history of philosophy and metaphysics) rather than determining the unexamined sense of those other analyses by referring to a very select set of passages, then another, preferable interpretation of the will to power is available. However, prior to evaluating alternative interpretative approaches to the will to power, a second version of the metaphysical approach ought to be considered. After all, it is possible that Nietzsche is in contradiction with himself. Despite having rejected Jaspers’ claim that contradiction is the determinative principle of all of Nietzsche’s analyses, Nietzsche’s philosophical experiments might still be incoherent. They may even contradict each other. In order to evaluate whether or not this is the case, Heidegger’s interpretation will be set aside and Jürgen Habermas’ will be taken up.

1.2 Jürgen Habermas’ Interpretation of the Will to Power

According to Jürgen Habermas, Nietzsche’s thought exemplifies what Max Weber calls the modern dissolution of the synthetic unity of human life (Habermas, *The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 1990, 1). Nietzsche’s will to power, which he interprets as a metaphysical concept, functions as a rejection of the supposed need for discovering a principle for Modernity’s synthesis. Nietzsche, therefore, rejects the claim that Modernity is problematic in the sense Weber claims it is. According to Habermas, however, Nietzsche’s position is untenable. He cites three features of Nietzsche’s thought that, when taken together, constitute an unsuccessful attempt to move past the problem of Modernity.

1.2.1 Habermas’ Philosophical Contextualization of Nietzsche’s Oeuvre

What precisely is the problem that Habermas takes up from Weber? Habermas anchors his appropriation of Weber’s analysis of Modernity in a concept he calls modern time consciousness. The problem of modern time consciousness is a historically and culturally specific problem. According to Habermas’ reading, the challenge faced by Modernity follows from Hegel’s positing of a radical historical break between the Middle Ages and a new historical period dubbed Modernity. That is to say, the problem is a consequence of a specific act of historical periodization. Modernity, as a historical period, begins at the turn of the 16th century with the discovery of the ‘new world’, the Renaissance, and the Reformation. This new historical period is purported to be radically distinct from the Middle Ages and the Ancient periods that preceded it.

Because Modernity is posited as a radical break with the historical periods that precede it, Modernity is Modernity insofar as it is radically new. As a result, it cannot defer to its past as the source of its sense. Moreover, by virtue of understanding itself as radically and essentially new, Modernity’s burden of discovering the source of its sense is perpetually renewed.
Because the new, the modern world is distinguished from the old by the fact that it opens itself to the future, the epochal new beginning is rendered constant with each moment that gives birth to the new. Thus, it is characteristic of the historical consciousness of Modernity to set off: ‘the most recent period’ from the modern age, within the horizon of the modern age, the present enjoys a prominent position as contemporary history (Ibid., 6).

Modernity then is faced with the challenge of “a continuous renewal”, and in light of this continuous renewal, it is faced with the simultaneous challenge of “creating its normativity out of itself” (Ibid.).

According to Habermas, the first attempts to address Modernity’s problem of the dissolution of the synthetic unity of human life were undertaken by Hegel and his direct philosophical descendants. They sought historical self-understanding using the distinctively modern concept of “subjective freedom”. Subject-centered freedom was, practically speaking, stratified into three distinct realms: politically, in the legal guarantee of the right to pursue one’s own interest, and the principle of equal opportunity to participate in the political will; privately, as the pursuit of ethical autonomy and self-realization; and publicly, as the formative appropriation of the subject’s cultural inheritances (Ibid., 83). However, given the self-sufficiency of each of these realms, the principle of subject-centered reason alienates each realm of modern self-consciousness from the other. According to Habermas, both Hegel and the Post-Hegelians were unable to compensate for this stratification of the Modern experience: the former using the principle of absolute spirit, and the latter by privileging of the rights of the present moment and by positing a theory of praxis.

Moreover, because Modernity is defined as a radical break from everything that came before it, it is barred from any possible return to a pre-Enlightenment form of social and ethical synthesis. The very insights that had caused the historical break were highly
critical of the principles of pre-Modern synthesis. Consequently, the Enlightenment could only compensate for its failings by pushing forward, by finding a solution to its own distinctive problems from amongst its own distinctive attributes. The Enlightenment could only hope to overcome its failing by evolving, of finding some way to supplant the discarded social advantages of religion, for instance, with some other, new, and distinctively modern principle.

Habermas’ evaluation of Nietzsche’s thought assesses it as a possible alternative response to a search for a principle of Modernity’s historical synthesis. His evaluation, therefore, hinges on whether or not Nietzsche succeeds at discovering a new and distinctively modern ground for the synthetic unity of Modernity (Ibid., 85).

1.2.2 Nietzsche’s Rejection of History as a Source for Modernity’s Synthesis

Habermas cites “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life” as what he believes constitutes Nietzsche’s rejection that History might serve this end. Nietzsche rejects “antiquarian historiography” as a possible source for a new force of social synthesis (Ibid.). Nietzsche’s analysis of antiquarian history supposedly constitutes a rejection of any attempt to synthesize the present given its relation to its past, because a premise of modern historicism is the historian’s supposedly pure and objective gaze. This gaze, because it is objective, reduces ages past and present to a valueless and “paralyzing relativism” (Ibid.). Far from providing a means for supplanting the lost social and ethical advantages of religion from within the parameters of an Enlightenment worldview, it simply weighs down its subjects with a “chaotic inner world” of foreign “indigestible knowledge stones”. Instead of providing new grounds for
a social and ethical synthesis of modern life, it simply widens the spectrum of its heterogeneous elements. Modern man, therefore, insofar as he is caught up in the novelty of modern historicism, simply compounds his original problem by taking upon himself, not only the burden of grounding his distinctive and distinctively new ‘now’, but all the historically preceding, and culturally alien ‘nows’ of past generations and cultures.

1.2.3 Art and Dionysus as an Alternative Grounding of Modernity

Consequently, according to Habermas, Nietzsche believes that the underlying principle said to define Modernity (i.e. subject-centered reason) must again be subjected to an immanent critique (Ibid.). Habermas believes this critique is found in Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*. *The Birth of Tragedy* is Nietzsche’s first gesture towards an alternative justification of modern life. According to Habermas’ interpretation, though modern historiography is unable to solve the problem of synthesizing Modernity as a historical period, only in historicizing the problem can history overcome itself and the problem it faces. Only by having Modernity turn back towards myth can the lacunae of modern historiography be remedied (Ibid., 86). But turning back to myth, is not simply a turning back towards a previous historical period, at least so long as historical periods are reduced to their representations by modern historiography.

On the one hand, historical enlightenment only strengthens the now palpable diremptions in the achievements of Modernity; reason as manifested in the form of a religion of culture no longer develops any synthetic forces that could renew the unifying power of traditional religion. On the other hand, the path of restoration is barred to Modernity. The religious-metaphysical worldviews of ancient civilizations are themselves already a product of enlightenment; they are too rational, therefore, to be able to provide opposition to the radicalized enlightenment of Modernity (Ibid.).

Habermas, therefore, acknowledges that Nietzsche’s call to mythmaking is not a call backwards, but a call forward. It is an argument for the oracular quality of the past, a
quality discernable only by those building a future (Ibid., 87). Nietzsche’s call to myth is not a call to renew a belief in ancient Greek myths, but a call to the kind of activity the Greeks excelled at: mythmaking. According to Habermas, however, implicit in Nietzsche’s account of the failure of Modernity is a “conspicuous leveling” (Ibid.). Nietzsche, like all other attempts to step out of or beyond Modernity, divests Modernity of its singular status. Nietzsche reduces Modernity to nothing more than the final step in a process of rationalization at the expense of myth. Nietzsche’s specific instantiation of this interpretive failing is contained in his account of Socrates and Christ as two examples of an attempt to supplant the creative activity of mythmaking with some singular, unifying alternative: argumentative rationality and monotheistic cosmology respectively.

Nietzsche’s call to myth, according to Habermas, has two principal features. In the first place, it is a social movement. It is not simply a prescription to some individual action. The call to myth is not simply a call to an individual act of poetic creativity in the discursive context of mythic iconography. It is a call to myth making at the social level. It is a call to a creative mythmaking by society, and for society as a whole. In this way Modernity can, not find, but found new grounds for its own social and ethical synthesis.

Young Nietzsche celebrates Richard Wagner as the locus of precisely such a revolutionary society. The Wagnerians are interpreted as a prime example of the will to overcome the disintegration of society in rationalized Modernity, and discover in its own myths the grounds of a new social unity (Ibid., 88). Nietzsche, however, becomes profoundly disenchanted with Wagner and his followers. He eventually and vehemently rejects Wagner and the Wagnerians (and even the Romantics that preceded him) because
they grossly misunderstood the sense of their own activity. They misunderstood the sense of the central icon of their new, and distinctively modern myth: Dionysus.

Habermas’ Nietzsche believes Wagner and the Romantics problematically conflated Christ and Dionysus. They interpreted Dionysus as a Christ-like figure by making his eventual return from exile analogous to the Christian principle of redemption. However, in doing this, they castrated the ability of the Dionysian myth to fulfill its function as Nietzsche conceived it. By interpreting the new mythic symbol of Dionysus in Christian terms, Dionysus was reduced to little more than a backward looking metaphor for the highest expression of the long-standing and ever worsening degeneracy that it was meant to remedy. It became an instance of the sickness it was meant to counter. For Nietzsche, Dionysus wasn’t meant to be a nostalgic looking back towards ancient Greece for historical examples akin to Modernity’s desire for emancipation. Dionysus represented a radical break. While Christ was conceived as the highest expression of a philosophical degeneracy stemming back to Socrates and Euripides, the function of the Dionysus myth was intended to remedy this degeneracy, not act as a metaphor for it. In conflating Dionysus and Christ, Wagner and the Romantics failed to see how the exiled, “frenzied wine-god” was to make of myth the modern response to the dissolution of modern social synthesis.

Dionysus, at least as Habermas’ Nietzsche would have it, is not the remedy to the modern dissolution of social and ethical synthesis; he is an icon that stands in for the possible veneration of the polymorphos. The stratification or disintegration of Modernity is not a problem to be fixed, but an essential feature of Modernity that should be embraced. Therefore, if Dionysus is to be construed as a redemptive figure, what he
offers is a “radical redemption from the curse of identity” (Ibid., 93), not from the problem of modern heterogeneity. The function of Dionysus in Nietzsche’s philosophy is not a solution to the problem set down by Weber, but something like an attempt to overcome it. Dionysus becomes the mythological personification of Nietzsche’s reinvigorated critique of reason. He represents the radical other to reason.

Habermas claims that, for Nietzsche, this Dionysian feature of life is accessed through art. More specifically, it is modern art. It is Mallarmé’s and the Symbolists’ notion of ‘l’art pour l’art’ that opens up a window onto this most primordial mode of being. This artistic movement is an instantiation of the true presence of a Dionysian nature after the collapse of the principii individuationis. Nietzsche works to purify art of aesthetics, and seeks to make of art the aesthetic experience that dissolves the “world of theoretical knowledge and moral action” to “open up the Dionysian only at the cost of ecstasy - at the cost of a painful de-differentiation, a de-delimitation of the individual, a merging with amorphous nature within and without” (Ibid., 94). In this sense, the Dionysian, accessed theoretically via a specific conception of art, is the means of escape from a problematic Modernity that poses for itself the pseudo-problem of its own synthetic unity. It is a way of bypassing the problem of the coherence of the independent realms of modern life, by dissolving their Apollonian masks and reaching back towards the “archaic realm”, towards “the experiences of self-disclosure of a decentered subjectivity, liberated from all constraints of cognition and purposive activity, all imperatives of utility and morality” (Ibid., 94).
1.2.4 Habermas’ Rejection of the Will to Power

According to Habermas, “the will to power is merely a metaphysical conception of the Dionysian principle” (Ibid., 95). But, if this explains the philosophical sense of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power, it also renders it philosophically unacceptable. In this aesthetic vision, Habermas sees Nietzsche “blinding himself” to a clear contradiction. Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power, as a metaphysical conceptualization of the Dionysian principle, purports to liberate the mythmaker from the principles of theoretical and practical reason. It is a philosophical position justified, not according to the criteria of evaluation that follow from the principles of rational argumentation, but by virtue of the privileged status of art as a means of penetrating the essence of life as a pre-rational, pre-individuated realm of ecstatic chaos.

If this is the case, then Nietzsche’s solution to the problem of Modernity is not grounded upon the distinctive features of Modernity (i.e. subject-centered reason). Nietzsche “splits off the rational moment that comes to expression in the inner logic of avant-garde art from any connection with theoretical and practical reason and shoves it into the realm of metaphysically transfigured irrationality” (Ibid., 94). Consequently, the will to power, as the metaphysical conceptualization of an aesthetic justification of life, is unable to justify itself as anything other than a “theodicy of taste”.

Habermas, therefore, claims that the will to power ought to be rejected because it is nothing more than the conceptual source of an arbitrarily enjoyed illusion. Behind any conventional philosophical claim is simply “the subjective power claims of value appraisals” (Ibid., 95). It is a philosophical concept whose content manifests “in the ebb and flow of an anonymous process of subjugation” (Ibid.). Consequently, it becomes the
“organ of knowledge beyond true and false” (Ibid., 96). It is the metaphysical principle of the artist who has forsaken the philosophical concerns of truth and goodness for the groundless adulation of an arbitrarily constructed conception of beauty.

1.2.5 Critiquing Habermas’ Interpretation of the Will to Power Given His Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Analysis of History

It would be superfluous to reject Habermas’ interpretation of the will to power on the grounds that he, like Heidegger, construes Nietzsche as a metaphysician. Because Nietzsche has already been shown to explicitly reject metaphysics as a valuable form of philosophical enquiry. The point need not be repeated. Instead, the present evaluation will contest a premise upon which Habermas’ interpretation of the will to power rests. It will do this in order to introduce, in broad strokes, Nietzsche’s philosophical method.

Nietzsche is a kind of historian. However, according to Habermas, the sense of the will to power as a philosophical concept rests upon Nietzsche’s rejection of history as a possible means for the synthesis of Modernity. Habermas believes that Nietzsche rejects history’s ability to solve the problem of the synthesis of Modernity as a historical period, because one type of history risks compounding that problem rather than solving it. However, a fuller analysis of Nietzsche’s essay “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life” reveals the inadequacy of Habermas’ interpretation.

Habermas’ account of Nietzsche’s critical analysis of history fails, in the first place, because it fails to acknowledge that the disadvantages of antiquarian history are only one feature of Nietzsche’s evaluation of history as a potentially useful practice. In the second place, it fails to acknowledge the relation “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life” has with Nietzsche’s training as a philologist. An
adequate account of this relation helps condition an interpretation of the purpose of its
thesis. If these two qualifications of Nietzsche’s essay are brought to bear on Habermas’
interpretation, the function of Nietzsche’s critique becomes anything but a clear rejection
of the possible synthesizing function of history for Modernity. It only insists that history
does not necessarily have this function.

1.2.5.1 Rereading “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life”

“On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life” opens with a citation
from Goethe that claims that all instruction ought to serve life, in that it ought to quicken
activity (Nietzsche, On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life 1980, 7;
Werke III, Unzeitgemässe, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie, 7). However,
according to Nietzsche, the model of education that predominates in his society does
precisely the opposite. Instead of education serving life, life is subjugated and squashed
by it. What Nietzsche proposes as an antidote is to learn from youth. He proposes that
his contemporary Germans take the example of German youth, and act and live boldly.
That is to say, he proposes to learn forgetfulness or un-know ledge.

In order to describe why and how one must forget, Nietzsche first sets himself the
task of characterizing Man’s distinctive condition as a historical creature. A man, unlike
a beast, is disturbed in his enthrallment of the moment. The phrase ‘it was’, the
experience of ‘I remember’, is thrust upon him at an early age (Ibid., 9). He is from that
moment, exiled from the empty contentment of animals and infants who live in an
unreflective present. From that moment, his existence becomes a historical one, at once
an advantageous and disadvantageous condition. Man becomes Man (as a necessary if
not a sufficient condition) when, by virtue of remembering the past, he becomes able to conjoin, separate, compare, and reflect upon the constituent moments of that past (Ibid., 11). But, if Man lives by the light of his history, he can also perish by it. He can, in an excess of history, dissolve again into another type of existential vacancy. “A man who wanted to feel everything historically would resemble someone forced to refrain from sleeping, or an animal expected to live only from ruminating and ever repeated ruminating” (Ibid., 10). Man, therefore, must know how and when to remember, but also how and when to forget.

The model of historical education predominant in Nietzsche’s time, apparently, does not respect this balance. Theoretically, a historical education can be useful in three ways. It can, as it does for the monumental historian, provide both a model for great aspirations, and proof that such greatness is humanly possible (Ibid., 14-15). History can also, as it does for the antiquarian, imbue the present with a familiarity and a legitimacy, which aggrandizes the self by imbuing it with a history so much grander than its own (Ibid., 19). Finally, history can, as it does for the critical historian, reveal that all first natures were originally second natures, thereby subjecting all natures to the possibility of reform (Ibid., 22). History can thus account for how constructed natures may become the victorious conquests of new ways of life. It is the ironic narrative of the triumph of life over history. While each one of these three forms of history is a tool needed every once in a while, “our time”, says Nietzsche, serves its history instead of being served by it (Ibid., 23).

The catalyst for this disadvantageous shift is the “demand that history be a science” (Ibid., 23). This demand objectifies the historical as value neutral, and
consequently floods “the soul of modern Man” with a boundless, disconnected throng of historical facts. Because an ordering, evaluative principle is absent, because history as an object of scientific enquiry is no longer grasped in light of a present need or desire, historical knowledge becomes an alien jumble in the soul of modern Man (Ibid., 24). Worse yet, that jumble becomes the soul of modern Man (Ibid., 24). This collection becomes his “inward” life, posited in opposition to the outwardly perceivable form that that inward content takes. Modern Man is like a walking encyclopedia whose merit is ground solely upon the amount of alien culture he can recall and recite; and herein lies the great danger of scientific history.

Because there is no evaluative principle that would determine the historian’s relationship to alien histories, he is weakened. He is weakened because history is not engaged in light of a present need and so the historian need not take it seriously. Moreover, because he is nothing other than this history, he himself is nothing to be taken seriously (Ibid., 25). These modern men thus become mere assemblages that fall to pieces at the slightest touch. There is nothing distinctive about them that would constitute a cohesive agent. Without an organizing, evaluative principle, there can be no adhesive principle to anchor and reinforce that collection of historical facts. Modern Man has no unity. He is a book without a spine.

This critique is said to be particularly true of Nietzsche’s contemporary Germans. They are, Nietzsche believes, a spiritually fractured people. Germans, in their disdain for the felt superficiality of form, load themselves with alien historical and cultural content (Ibid., 26). Unfortunately, they never, in light of their own Germaness, their own form, stitch together “all those beautiful fibers” (Ibid., 26). This is particularly dangerous given
that this inwardness, because it is entirely inward, “may at some time or other evaporate”, leaving no external trace (Ibid., 26). Ironically, the German attempt to become “more German”, by consciously countering a tendency to imitate the French, has left Germany in an even more culturally vacuous state because at least in their previous imitation of the French they had a distinctively German rigor (Ibid., 25). With their new found light-hearted, wandering interest in an ‘objective’ variety of histories and cultures, Germans have become historically weak and lazy; they have become slovenly about their emulations and have begun to do an increasingly poor job. Germans, therefore, instead of concerning themselves with the content of their imitations (i.e. the Frenchness of them), ought to reunify the German spirit by annihilating the opposition between form and content, between inwardness and convention (Ibid., 27). But how?

Instead of seeking to remember, instead of seeking to soak up history and culture, Germans must become cultured themselves. They must learn to forget. They must begin to act. They must re-subjugate history to life. Germany must work to counter a German historical instruction that has bred a kind of “greyheadedness” (Ibid., 44). This greyheadedness is the absurd belief that their contemporary world is an old world, that thousands of years are something more than a blip in history. Modernity, given its pride in its old age, believes it must, like an old man, take stock of its past, instead of its future (Ibid., 44). It looks back nostalgically on what it has done instead of what it might do, or can do; and, in failing to look forward, it “has nothing to do but to continue to live as [it] has lived” (Ibid., 52). But, Nietzsche says, Germans are endowed with a kind of “ironical self-awareness” of their state (Ibid., 43). Their originality, they believe, is precisely this historical nature; but, for this age to be genuinely new, it must turn its historical gaze
upon itself as a historical age. It must see itself as the object of the critical historian’s
gaze (Ibid., 45). It must see itself as a time that may be such-and-such, but which could be otherwise. Germans must turn away from their inherited Christian belief in the impending end of the world. They must overcome its refurbished expression as the Hegelian belief in an impending teleological end of history described as the moment of synthesis of all theses and antitheses, as the ascension of “all possible dialectical steps” to the pinnacle of self-revelation (Ibid., 47). But where can Germany turn to discover another way, a distinctively German way? Wherein lies the German willingness to forget for the sake of action, its willingness to forget the past for the sake of the present?

Nietzsche believes this will resides in German youth (Ibid., 58). From its youth it must heed the call he describes as an a posteriori justification of life, a self-imposed ‘for this’ (Ibid., 55). This gesture can be accomplished by the life-forces of the unhistorical and suprahistorical (Ibid., 62). The unhistorical is that ability to forget the historical and act within a ‘limited horizon’. It is a will to act now, without the castrating burden of the endless narrative of the past with all its mistakes, regrets, and enviable successes. It is to act with a distinctive, if not distinguished and refined, hope and desire for the future. Or again, the will to forget may posture as the suprahistorical, that capacity to see an identity between past and present, to be able to see in them the stable character of types (Ibid., 12), to be able to recognize in each the absolute unoriginality of any act or situation and thus gesture towards the formalism of art and religion (Ibid., 62). These forces can counter the stultifying scientific insistence on the supposedly disinterested nature of truth which “comes to nothing” (Ibid., 33). They can counter their self-dissolution before an immense and value-neutral human history, which becomes even larger when cultural
history is broadened to include biological history (Ibid., 50). In order to grasp these “life-forces”, Nietzsche calls for a reconsideration of the Delphic Oracle’s injunction to “know thyself” (Ibid., 64). But this injunction is an indication, not an instruction. According to Nietzsche, it only tells us that we ought to organize the world such that it may reflect our “genuine needs” (Ibid., 64), it does not tell us what those genuine needs are. Only by organizing the world in this way can we make culture more than a mere decoration. Only by doing so can our will become a distinctive, willful engagement of life.

1.2.5.2 Rejecting Habermas’ Analysis of “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life”

Far from constituting a turning away from history towards art, “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life” is a critical analysis of how history, when it is done well, can serve life. If the passages that Habermas cites are put into context, they are not even obstacles to the specific aim of an ethical and social synthesis of Modernity. However, Habermas is correct in two respects. First, Nietzsche does acknowledge a danger involved in antiquarian history. One can overburden one’s self with a bulk of heterogeneous, inassimilable, and alien facts if history is turned into an objective science, unaffected by any projected, synthesizing value. Second, Habermas is correct in attributing to Nietzsche a rejection of the function that Hegel gives to history. He rejects the attempt to veneer the Christian story of redemption with secular terms, so that the story of human redemption before God becomes the story of the teleological history of absolute spirit. However, Nietzsche does not, on these grounds, turn away from history and towards art. Nietzsche is simply trying to check certain unreasonable expectations of what history, as a discipline, can provide.
History cannot provide the principle of Modernity’s synthesis that Habermas desires in the way a tree provides fruit, but it can provide an occasion for it. In fact, unless the historian falls prey to the danger of antiquarian history, he must do just that. He must, if he is to be a cohesive being, posit a principle for the synthesis of his historical, his modern self. Ironically, an opportunity for doing this is provided by the very advantage Nietzsche ascribes to antiquarian history that Habermas ignores. The benefit of antiquarian history for life is that it can provide the means of assimilating one’s environment into one’s self, in order to make of one’s self, as an individual, a part of a greater whole. Insofar as the individual recognizes himself as a historical being, contingent upon the history he inherits, then the world around him becomes, not something alien to him, but a part of him. History, therefore, can provide an occasion for precisely the type of synthesis that Habermas seems to be looking for. Nietzsche, however, insists that this is not a structural feature of a body of historical facts. Historical cohesion is the product of a careful and self-conscious historical method. Only if the antiquarian and monumental historians are allowed to uncritically heap historical factoids upon the character of a historical being will history be reduced to a set of “indigestible knowledge stones”. Nietzsche’s critique of antiquarian history, therefore, does not constitute a rejection of the utility of history for the synthesis of historical periods.

Modernity, as a synthetic historical period, will not be something like a stage in the teleological evolution of absolute spirit. As the critical historian understands, history teaches the historical contingency of even the most seemingly necessary phenomena. All first natures are, given careful historical analysis, discernable as second natures. Modernity’s synthesis, therefore, cannot be a feature of Modernity in itself, because that
would attribute to Modernity a kind of essential or first nature. Modernity, as a historical object, is something that will be contingent upon the interpretive value or concern of the historian. It requires the historian’s active, synthesizing engagement. Habermas’ expectation that Modernity will contain, in itself, its own synthetic principle is symptomatic of the “greyheadedness” that Nietzsche laments. It presupposes that Modernity is an object that the historian turns back towards as a finished product to be understood, or to be “taken stock of”. But this would only make of Modernity one more indigestible knowledge stone. To synthesize Modernity is not a matter of synthesizing it with itself, but a matter of making it a synthetic feature of a cohesive life in the present that is directed towards the future; that is to say, of making it subject to the concerns of the living historian.

Habermas’ enquiry into Modernity, therefore, if it is read carefully, is problematic because it remains a kind of metaphysical enquiry. Habermas is looking for the synthetic feature of Modernity as it is in itself. Consequently, though Nietzsche’s analysis of history, as presupposing the conditioning interpretive gaze of the historian, makes this impossible, he does not thereby reject history as a method, or a discipline, either given the specific end of synthesizing Modernity or more generally as a mode of enquiry. Insofar as Habermas thinks that Nietzsche has rejected history as a means of discovering the essential, cohesive principle of Modernity, he is correct, but only because Nietzsche has rejected this type of enquiry. Nietzsche’s enquiry is not into essences. That is the metaphysician’s project, and Nietzsche is not a metaphysician. Nietzsche’s essay is directed towards something else. It is an analysis of what a good historical method can provide, be the specific object of analysis Modernity or not.
If this analysis is correct, then Habermas’ interpretation of the will to power must be rejected. Habermas believes that Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power is the conceptual equivalent of his supposed use of modern art as an overcoming of the need to historically synthesize Modernity. Because this use of the will to power is the product of History’s failure to achieve this end, Habermas’ interpretation of the will to power stands or falls according to the acceptability of his interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of history, and Habermas’ interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of history is clearly unacceptable. A full account of the significance of Nietzsche’s analysis of history, and of the consequent scope of Habermas’ failure, however, is still incomplete. The object of Nietzsche’s critical analysis in “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life”, and its relation to his own philosophical method still need to be assessed.

1.2.5.3 Re-conceiving the Thrust of Nietzsche’s Critique of History

If Nietzsche’s essay does not constitute a rejection of history as a possible source for the synthesis of Modernity, what is its function? Nietzsche is very clear about this. Nietzsche’s critique is a critique of the pedagogical model prevalent in 19th century Germany. Nietzsche’s analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of history for life is an active and critical engagement of his own education and an exceptionally self-aware account of his philosophical method.

Given the criteria of any adequate interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought put forth by Jaspers, and tempered by Howey, though a single systematic philosophical method cannot be attributed to Nietzsche, the interpretation of the concept of the will to power as a metaphysical concept becomes untenable because Nietzsche has clearly rejected metaphysics as a tenable philosophical enterprise. However, while it is clear that
Nietzsche is not doing metaphysics in any systematic or unproblematic way, Nietzsche does nonetheless make a very large number of claims about the world. One challenge that his reader faces, therefore, is attributing some philosophical status to Nietzsche’s claims without resorting to metaphysics.

Jaspers, once again, provides a compelling means of doing just this. According to Jaspers, to properly understand Nietzsche’s thought, we must understand it in relation to his life. “The study of Nietzsche’s thinking requires that we constantly remain in touch with the realities of Nietzsche’s life” (Jaspers, 12-13). However, Jaspers once again overstates and overemphasizes his point. For Jaspers, Nietzsche’s thought and his life constitute together an integral part of his “existenz”, the vast and complex network of relations in which each of its features affects the others in the most intimate and determinative way. According to Jaspers, to properly understand Nietzsche’s thought, all features of Nietzsche’s life must be brought to bear on all features of his thought, so that everything bears affectively on everything else. The result, Jaspers acknowledges, is attributing to the object of analysis a vastness and depth that is, at least practically, infinite in scope. The result is an endless hermeneutical process of interpretation.

In the study of Nietzsche the unity of the whole, i.e., of life and thought, of temporal development and timeless system, can only be the guiding idea, for Nietzsche’s thinking will always elude all attempts at a well-ordered presentation. It is impossible to foresee how far one will get, objectively speaking, in an attempt to obtain a definite and well-substantiated conception of the whole. As the study proceeds, one unavoidably devotes himself completely to the empirically given series of actual occurrences in Nietzsche’s life. But one must in addition to this explore his thoughts at length without regard to the time in which they were first entertained. What provides the irresistibly compelling agitation in the study of Nietzsche is precisely this ever-recurring difficulty: neither of these ways makes sense when taken separately while both, taken together, cannot be brought into complete harmony (13).

This hermeneutically troublesome relation of the author’s oeuvre and biography may be both salient and unavoidable. Moreover, it may also be one that is particularly applicable
to Nietzsche given his extensive use of aphorisms and the collage structure. Nonetheless, Jaspers’ extreme application of this principle is both impractical and unnecessary. Jaspers does acknowledge this to a certain extent, but he does not thereby restrain the extent to which this consideration determines his account of the necessary conditions of a responsible interpretation of Nietzsche’s oeuvre or any of its features. He does not restrain this consideration because it helps substantiate his own thesis that a perpetual and formal dialectic resides at the heart of Nietzsche’s thought.

Nonetheless, it is possible to acknowledge the biographical relevance of Nietzsche’s life in any interpretation of his philosophical thought without overstating the case. It is possible to accept Jaspers’ methodological premise without making interpretation either an impossible or an ideal task. In order to understand what Nietzsche is doing in a methodological sense, it can be informative to understand how he was trained. Moreover, by doing this, his essay “On The Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life” can be reconceived as a critical, though not oppositional, perspective upon that training.

To understand Nietzsche’s thought, it is important to appreciate how rigorously he was trained as a philologist. Philology may be described as an attempt to ascertain what the German Phenomenologists of the 20th century will call the Lebenswelt of an author, his life-world. The philologist aims to ascertain the Lebenswelt of an author as a relational set of cultural, historical and biographical circumstances, and literary texts. He accesses this dynamic via a careful analysis of those literary texts and the expressive opportunities provided by the language or languages in which those texts are written. In
a letter addressed to Gersdorff on April 6th, 1867, Nietzsche alludes to the work of the philologist as this type of totalizing gaze.

Il ne faut pas se cacher que la plupart des philologues sont incapables de prendre de l’Antiquité cette exaltante vue d’ensemble, car ils se tiennent trop près du tableau, s’attachant à l’examen d’une tache d’huile, au lieu d’admirer et, qui plus est, de goûter l’allure grandiose et audacieuse de la composition totale… (Janz, Nietzsche : Biographie 1984, 164)

There are two periods of Nietzsche’s life that can help elucidate the methodological framework within which, and out of which, Nietzsche wrote: his adolescent education in Pforta, and his university education in Leipzig.

In the first place, Pforta instilled in Nietzsche (or at least encouraged) a rigorous academic work ethic, and steeped him in the humanities and the classical worlds of ancient Greece and Rome. As Curt Paul Janz recounts in his extensive biography of Nietzsche’s life, as an adolescent, Nietzsche planned to undertake theological studies, an aim concordant with his mother’s wish that he follow in his father’s footsteps (Ibid., 64).

However, Pforta fostered in him a very different, and a very deep-rooted set of intellectual sensibilities. This academic environment, which mediated almost the entirety of the lives of its students, took upon itself the task of fashioning out of children a specific type of highly intellectualized and historicized individual.

Car ici, la discipline et l’éducation forgent des hommes complets, respectueux des lois et de la volonté de leurs supérieurs, formés à l’accomplissement rigoureux et ponctuel de leurs devoirs, à la maîtrise de soi, à un travail sérieux, à une activité intelligente, personnelle et librement choisie, à l’amour de leur tâche, à la profondeur et à la méthode dans leurs études, à un emploi du temps régulier, à un tact sans défaut et à une inébranlable assurance dans leurs relations avec leurs semblables. (Ibid., 54)

Its curriculum was, for the most part, a careful study of the liberal arts. It sought to foster in its students a pointedly philological gaze. As Janz depicts, Nietzsche’s seemingly natural propensity for this type of study, over and against mathematics and the natural
sciences for instance, found at Pforta an extremely fertile soil in which to take root. Therefore, although Nietzsche had not yet chosen any specific career path, the ever-present shadow of an attainable profession in philology was nonetheless provided for him by his early education at Pforta.

After completing his studies at Pforta, Nietzsche spent a year at Bonn, where he attempted a year of theological studies. However, he decisively turned away from that environment and the expectations of his mother, and turned towards further philological studies at the University of Leipzig. Leipzig, and the prominent figure of Albrecht Ritschtl provided Nietzsche with a measure of academic continuity. Ritschtl already knew Nietzsche and his philological promise from his days at Pforta. According to Jaspers, as a student of Albrecht Ritschtl, Nietzsche learned a method for discerning “the real from the unreal, the factual from the fictitious, demonstrable knowledge from mere opinions, and objective certainty from subjective conviction” (Jaspers, 30). It is in this academic context that the ancient Greek world as a whole, seen through the lens of its literary productions, unfolded before Nietzsche. But, if Ritschl provided Nietzsche with a powerful and compelling personification of the value of philology, Nietzsche also quickly discovered its limitations.

Leipzig, Ritschtl, and philology did not merely provide Nietzsche with an opportunity to become a mechanical practitioner of a discipline. It endowed him with the tools to move beyond it. Having studied under Ritschtl did not overly or exhaustively determine Nietzsche’s own method. Far from blindly practicing a method he was taught, the philological method provided Nietzsche with a framework from within which he was
able to begin reflecting on its advantages and its disadvantages. Janz quotes a letter that

Nietzsche wrote to Edmund Oehler in which he says of Ritschl:

Il s’exagérait absolument la valeur de sa discipline, et voyait par conséquent
 d’un mauvais œil des philologues se mêler de philosophie. Il fallait au contraire
 que ses élèves apportassent au plus tôt leur pierre à la science, et il avait
 facilement tendance, dans cette perspective, à quelque peu surmener la veine
 créatrice de chacun. (Ibid., 156)

Even as early as 1868, in a letter written to Rohde, Nietzsche insists that

Pour notre part, en sorte que les jeunes philologues abandonnent toute
 pédanterie et toute surestimation de leur discipline, pour, avec le scepticisme
 nécessaire, devenir les véritables promoteurs des études humanistes. Soyons de
 notre siècle, comme disent les Français : un principe que nul n’oublie aussi vite
 que le philologue de métier. (Ibid., 210)

Therefore, even while he honed his understanding of the philological method, Nietzsche
had already clearly discerned the limitations of philology as a descriptive science. As a
result, the biographical context of Nietzsche’s education, as helpful as it is for
understanding the genealogy of Nietzsche’s method of enquiry, should not be
overestimated. Nietzsche takes an explicitly critical stance towards his chosen discipline.

Even in university, Nietzsche’s self-reflective, critical, and skeptical spirit is evident.

Consequently, it is necessary, though insufficient to consider Nietzsche a
philologist. Nietzsche is a philologist, but he is a philologist who means to subjugate his
discipline to the requirements of life. Nietzsche is a type of historian who would have
history serve life. He studies the past in order to serve the aim of living well and living
critically in the present. This is the central thesis that is unambiguously forwarded in “On
the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life”. Any adequate analysis of
Nietzsche’s essay must acknowledge this. Nietzsche’s essay is a critical consideration of
some features of an acceptable historical method, not a rejection of history as an
advantageous method of enquiry into a distinctive historical period.
While mining a text for some resolution to a specific philosophical or historical concern is not necessarily problematic, it becomes untenable if the specific features of that text are read in contradiction to its main thesis. “On The Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life” is not a rejection of history as a means of social synthesis. It is certainly, on its own, and as an objective science, insufficient. However, taken with the necessary structuring principle that Nietzsche insists the historian must project upon historical facts if those historical facts are to be of any advantage, it can be.

When this essay is taken in conjunction with the biographical considerations of Nietzsche’s academic training, Habermas’ claim becomes, not only inconsistent with the text itself, but unnecessarily abstracted. Nietzsche is not criticizing history’s inability to provide a means of social synthesis as Hegel would have had it. He is cautioning an overly proud 19th century Germany against the social dangers of a naïve historicism. He is checking the pride of his peers. He is insisting that, despite the benefits of philology, its value has limits.

If this analysis is correct, then Habermas’ account of the will to power becomes untenable. If Nietzsche’s account of history in “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life” does not constitute a rejection of history, then Habermas’ subsequent account of Nietzsche’s treatment of art in The Birth of Tragedy as an alternative response to Weber’s need to find a ground for the synthesis of Modernity is misconstrued. Furthermore, because Habermas is mistaken about Nietzsche’s analysis of history and art, the characterization of the will to power as a metaphysical concept which instantiates this supposed Nietzschean alternative to Hegel’s and the New Hegelian’s use of history is equally untenable, at least as it stands.
Conclusion

This critique of the interpretation of the will to power as a metaphysical concept has succeeded in two respects. First, it has clearly demonstrated that Nietzsche has rejected metaphysics as a valuable type of philosophical enquiry.

At present, we possess science exactly to the extent we have resolved to accept the testimony of the senses,- to the extent we have learned to sharpen them, furnish them with appliances, and follow them mentally to their limits. The rest is abortion and not-yet-science: i.e. metaphysics, divinity, psychology, and theory of perception (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist* 2004, *Twilight of the Idols*, 3; *Werke VI3, Götzien: Dammerung*, 3).

Though it may be possible that Nietzsche’s thought is actually inconsistent, either because he is unable to discern the ramifications that the will to power as a metaphysical concept would have upon his other philosophical claims, or because he had some change of heart regarding the value of metaphysics, this is very unlikely. It is unlikely because his rejection of metaphysics is so clear and so consistent. Even in the *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche rejects any talk of metaphysical worlds, of a ‘true’ world lying in wait behind the empirical world of sense experience.

They (the senses) do not deceive in the way the Eleatics believed, nor as he believed,- they do not deceive at all What we make out of their testimony, that is what introduces falsehood; for example, the falsehood of unity, the falsehoods of materiality, of substance, of permanence… “Reason” is the cause why we falsify the testimony of the senses. In as far as the senses exhibit becoming, dissolving, and transforming, they do not deceive… But Heraclitus will always be right in this that being is an empty fiction. The “seeming” world is the only one; the “true world” has been deceitfully invented… (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 1989, 2; *Werke VI2, Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, 2).

Therefore, unless Nietzsche’s thought as a whole is interpreted as incoherent, only by being exceptionally selective can an interpretation of the will to power as a metaphysical concept be textually justified.

Second, this critique has delineated the broadest parameters of any tenable interpretation of the will to power by determining, in broad and incomplete terms,
Nietzsche’s philosophical methodology. Nietzsche’s method has not only been described negatively in relation to metaphysics, but also positively in relation to history. Nietzsche, as a philosopher, is not a metaphysician. He is a type of historian. He is a kind of philologist that insists upon the insufficiency of conceiving of history as an objective science. Therefore, Nietzsche is a historian, but he is a peculiar one. He does not describe the task of the historian as getting history right. History is not an activity of correct representation. The philosopher as historian does not simply represent the histories that function as the objects of philosophical enquiry. He uses them. He uses them as tools to fashion for himself a future.

The real philosophers are commanders and lawgivers. They say, “It shall be so!” They determine the when and the wherefore of mankind. They make use, thereby, of the preliminary labors of philosophical workmen, the overpowerers of the past. They grasp with creative hands towards the future, and everything which is or was becomes their means, their tools, their hammers. Their knowing is creating, is lawgiving, and their Will-to-Truth is Will-to-Power (Ibid., 211).

Nietzsche, therefore, is a kind of hybrid, a philosopher-historian who clearly recognizes that his discipline is imminently intertwined with the imperatives of life as activity. History is not a past to discover and, once discovered, a fact to possess. This would be to construe historical objects as metaphysical objects. It would endow them with some kind of ‘in themselvesness’. But for Nietzsche, history is an activity in the present meant to help affect a desired future. Consequently, the struggle for Nietzsche is not discovering how the ‘true’ world is in distinction to the ‘apparent’ world, but to know the world as an historical object conditioned by present concerns.

In both cases, the interpretations of the concept of the will to power as a metaphysical concept fail because they fail to properly grasp Nietzsche’s philosophical method as a distinctive type of historicism. However, this chapter has not attempted to
formalize Nietzsche’s method in any rigorous way. It has simply sought to erect certain parameters meant to circumscribe what kind of method Nietzsche is and is not using. Nietzsche is clearly not doing metaphysics, and he seems to be doing something like philosophy as history. Nietzsche’s specific, though implicit philosophical method will be further specified as the two other conventional interpretative approaches to the will to power are evaluated.

The next chapter will continue to assess the conventional interpretive approaches to the will to power. Specifically, the interpretive approach to the will to power as either an empirical concept, or as the product of an empirical method will be rejected as misconstruing the full scope of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. Only once the full scope of that rejection, and its effect upon any conception of history as an empirical science are properly understood, is the most comprehensive and compelling analysis of the will to power possible.
Chapter 2: The Will to Power as an Empirical Concept

The previous chapter evaluated and rejected the first of the three principal interpretive approaches to the will to power. It rejected the attempt to construe either the will to power specifically, or Nietzsche’s philosophical method generally, as metaphysical. In addition, it positively characterized Nietzsche’s philosophical method as a kind of historical method. However, this description remains vague. This description of Nietzsche’s philosophical method is still sufficiently ambiguous to permit two additional types of misinterpretations: the two remaining principal interpretive approaches. The present chapter will evaluate and reject the second: the will to power as an empirical concept.

In doing so, the present chapter will once again achieve two ends. First, it will reject an interpretation of the will to power as an empirical concept. Following Maudemarie Clarke’s critique of Walter Kaufmann’s interpretation of the will to power, Kaufmann’s interpretation of the will to power as an explanatory principle able to account for all empirical phenomena will be rejected as tautological. Because Kaufmann interprets the will to power as able to account for all empirical phenomena, the will to power and the empirical phenomena that it is meant to account for become synonymous.

The second end is a further qualification of Nietzsche’s philosophical method. While Kaufmann misinterprets the sense of the will to power specifically, Clarke’s interpretation does not. She interprets the will to power correctly in a broad sense. However, because she misinterprets the sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, her interpretation of the will to power takes on a connotation that is inappropriate given what was said in the previous chapter. Even though Clarke’s account of Nietzsche’s
conception of truth is a feature of her interpretation of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, Nietzsche remains a kind of metaphysician. If Clarke is correct, then Nietzsche remains a metaphysician because only the terms of his discourse change. Its aim remains the same. Consequently, while Clarke’s interpretation will be accepted in a broad sense, it will occasion a further qualification of Nietzsche’s philosophical method. In doing so, it will also occasion a fuller account of his rejection of metaphysics, and the sense attributable to the will to power as a product of that rejection.

In the end, both examples of this interpretive approach will be rejected. Kaufmann fails to interpret the will to power in a philosophically compelling manner, and Clarke fails to account for it as a consequence of his rejection of metaphysics in the fullest sense. Nonetheless, this rejection is relatively mild. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, an adequate interpretation of the will to power will not involve a significantly different approach. Instead, a few important qualifications will be sufficient to correct this relatively strong type of interpretation.

### 2.1 Walter Kaufmann’s Interpretation of the Will to Power

According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power represents a shift in the structure of his philosophical thinking. Nietzsche’s earliest thought is structured dialectically. It is most clearly expressed as such in *The Birth of Tragedy’s* opposition of Apollo and Dionysus. However, from the 1870s onwards, his thought shifts from a two term dialectical structure to a kind of dialectical monism. For instance, the figures of Apollo and Dionysus are fused into a single, internally complex figure that Nietzsche renames Dionysus (a rather confusing choice). Though this shift is prevalent throughout the entirety of Nietzsche’s later thought, it is especially clear in the sense and
philosophical function of the concept of the will to power (Kaufmann 1956, 152).
Kaufmann, therefore, does not interpret the will to power as a philosophical concept that 
Nietzsche posits, but one that he supposedly discovers via a process of philosophical 
experimentalism. It is a concept that evolves into an explanatory philosophical principle over time.

As an experimentally discovered explanatory principle, Kaufmann engages the will to power as an increasingly useful explanatory tool, applicable to an increasingly wide variety of empirical phenomenon. As a result, a full analysis of Kaufmann’s interpretation requires, in the first place, a description of the philosophical genealogy of the will to power in Nietzsche’s oeuvre, and in the second place, a presentation of the explanatory utility of the will to power as a fully matured concept.

2.1.1 The Discovery of the Will to Power as an Empirically Observable Feature of Human Behavior

According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche’s earliest mention of the will to power occurs in his notebooks of the 1870s. Here it manifests as one term within a two term dialectical structure. In this instance, the will to power is posited in conjunction with fear as one of the two principal motivating phenomena of human behavior. Kaufmann, however, insists that in this earliest manifestation, Nietzsche considers the will to power, or more properly power, pejoratively. Power is thought of as “always bad” (Ibid., 154). In this earliest instance, Nietzsche uses the will to power as a means of, first, accounting for Wagner and the Wagnerian movement, and then second, as a means of condemning them. More specifically, Wagner’s thirst for power was used to account for his artistic creativity.
Wagner was only an artist accidentally; art just happened to be the means by which he tried to accrue power.

This use of the concept of power, however, is short-lived. Kaufmann claims that Nietzsche’s skepticism soon takes the upper hand. In Human, all-Too-Human the will to power reappears, but in a dramatically different context. In this work, Nietzsche shifts to an aphoristic mode of philosophical reflection unguided by any over-arching thesis. His thought takes an experimental turn wherein human behavior is engaged by means of an informal form of psychoanalysis. All subjects are treated in the most open and inconclusive manner (Ibid., 157). Given this experimental, aphoristic approach, the will to power, as a part of this process, is also considered an experiment into the explanatory power of a hypothetical philosophical concept.

Proceeding quite unsystematically and considering each problem on its own merits, without a theory to prove or an axe to grind, Nietzsche reverts now and then to explanations in terms of what he was later to call a will to power (Ibid., 158)

Gratitude, pity, self-abasement, independence and freedom are all considered as stemming, not from some kind of altruistic sentiment or moral disposition, but from a desire for power. That being said, Kaufmann is nonetheless at pains to check any facile conviction that Nietzsche is either advocating for, or elevating as an ethical principle, a blind and boundless ambition for power. In fact, far from esteeming power, Nietzsche tends to denigrate it. Kaufmann believes that the tenor of Nietzsche’s earliest treatments of the will to power is almost unflinchingly critical. Only the striving for freedom is likely approved of as an instance of striving for power (Ibid., 160). Consequently, Kaufmann infers that the will to power itself, far from being intrinsically good, is at the very least dangerous, if not predominantly bad.
This earliest manifestation of the concept of the will to power, however, remains merely an experimental foray into a means of accounting for different social and psychological phenomena. Moreover, Nietzsche often seems to conflate and vacillate between the terms “power” and “will to power” so that there could as yet be no distinct sense of the will to power. Consequently, though the recurrent considerations of the will to power as an explanatory principle may be suggestive, especially in retrospect, of a search for some basic principle to which all psychological phenomena may be referred, the text itself does not provide any compelling evidence to suppose it is, at this juncture, advanced as such (Ibid., 159).

Nietzsche’s next two works, *Daybreak* and *The Gay Science*, continue his aphoristic experimentalism. Kaufmann cites *Daybreak* as an experiment into a possible criticism of morality. However, he does not claim that Nietzsche does so according to any systematic method, or in light of any positive thesis. Though Nietzsche does undertake a critical examination of conventional accounts of morality, he does not posit any explanatory principles as true alternatives to altruism. However, Kaufmann finds it notable that power and fear reappear as recurrent suggestions of alternative explanatory possibilities. Consequently, though Kaufmann insists Nietzsche is not committed to these principles, he does claim that any account of morality as stemming from something like altruism is dubious given the tenability of these alternatives. According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche does not posit fear and power as necessarily true alternative accounts of morality. He only claims that they are at least sufficiently compelling interpretations to cast doubt upon the truth of altruism as an explanatory principle of morality. At this stage, Nietzsche remains an experimentalist and a skeptic.
2.1.2 The Congealing of the Will to Power into a Basic Human Drive

According to Kaufmann, it is only when Nietzsche realized that the will to power could be construed as the basic drive that gave rise to Greek culture as whole, that the monistic possibilities of the will to power began to reveal themselves to him. Having already undertaken an account of Greek culture in terms of \textit{agon} (i.e. contest), the transition or transformation of contest into the term “will to power” presented very little difficulty (Ibid., 165). More importantly, accounting for Greek culture with the concept of the will to power afforded him an opportunity to re-evaluate the will to power itself. Now, not only could the will to power account for such conventionally ill-regarded phenomena as usury, but it could account for other phenomena Nietzsche held in exceptionally high regard: such as Greek drama (Ibid., 165). But this insight remains dormant in \textit{Daybreak}. At this chronological stage of Nietzsche’s oeuvre, Kaufmann has only localized the aphoristic experiment that could ground his later treatment of the will to power as a monistic explanatory principle of human psychology.

The will to power is thus not only the Devil who diverts man from achieving culture, or a psychological urge which can be used in explaining diverse and complex types of human behavior: it is also envisaged as the basis of Greek culture which Nietzsche then considered the acme of humanity. Instead of being associated primarily with neurotics who crave pity, with modern man’s lust for money, with the burning of heretics and good books, with usury and counterfeiting, the will to power may now be envisaged as the basic drive of all human efforts. Philosophic discourse, the ancient tragedies and comedies, the Platonic dialogues, and the sculptures of the Periclean age are all understood in terms of the Greeks’ will to outdo, excel, and overpower each other (Ibid., 165-166).

It is not until \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra} that Kaufmann attributes to Nietzsche’s treatments of the will to power some degree of conceptual solidity. In fact, Kaufmann describes \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra} as the product of an inspired flash into the sense and philosophical power of the concepts of the will to power and eternal recurrence (Ibid.,
It is only here that Nietzsche first expounds both concepts conclusively, and as the central hubs of his other philosophical reflections. But Kaufmann does not undertake any further clarification of this third step in the evolution of the will to power until he repeats and elaborates his belief that it would be an interpretive injustice to reduce Nietzsche’s reflections on the will to power to something like a desire for power, in the sense of the capacity for physical or political violence.

Kaufmann believes that the will to power only manifests as a desire to hurt or oppress others in the weak. The powerful do not strive to hurt others. They only do so incidentally as an inherent feature of their expressions of power (Ibid., 167). The will to power only becomes a will to violence when the weak have been frustrated to such an extent that they begin to seek any “petty occasion to assert their will to power by being cruel to others” (Ibid., 198). Moreover, citing a passage wherein Nietzsche first experiments with the possible meta-explanatory capacity of the will to power (Nietzsche, *Daybreak* 1997, 113; *Werke V1, Morgenröthe*, 113), high culture is seen as expressing its will to power, not upon other cultures, but upon itself. High cultures express their will to power as asceticism, and not as a will to domination. Only low or barbaric cultures express their power by torturing or oppressing their neighbor. But this hierarchy is not, for Nietzsche, unproblematic. He also criticizes the supposedly high culture of the ascetic as a “grotesque perversion”. Consequently, though Kaufmann insists that, even at this early stage, power is not reduced to a unit of measurement of a kind of Hobbesian capacity for violence, neither is it blindly esteemed or uncritically condemned.

At this stage, the will to power is qualitatively ambiguous. Nietzsche’s account of Greek culture in terms of the will to power is counter-balanced and qualitatively
problematized by other treatments of power as a kind of demon (Kaufmann 1956, 171). In section 262 of Daybreak, the German Reich is interpreted as slavish. The German Reich’s glorification of power, personified by the figure of Bismark, is construed as slavish because Germany’s political imagination is subjugated to it. Germany seems willing to thoughtlessly sacrifice its life and its goods for an increase of political and state power as a good in itself. As a result, Nietzsche is forced to find some means of resolving the ironic internal dynamic of a German Reich that in idolizing both power generally, and its own powerful political status, slavishly bows down before power as a principle.

Kaufmann believes that this type of passage represents Nietzsche’s tendency to slip back into his old two-term dialectical habits. In order to resolve the problematic irony of revering power in a slavish manner, Kaufmann believes Nietzsche again posits a second principle. The problem of the second Reich is not only its submissive idolization of the principle of power, but that the desire for power is not tempered by any degree of reason (Ibid., 170). Reason slips back in as the second term in a two term dialectic. Therefore, until Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Kaufmann’s Nietzsche, though experimenting with the explanatory reaches of the will to power as a philosophical-psychological principle, maintains his dualistic tendency to counter the will to power with the principle of reason.

2.1.3 The Discovery of the Monistic Character of the Will to Power as an Explanatory Principle

According to Kaufmann, until Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche seems to be at a conceptual crossroads: either reason and power will form a kind of two-term dialectic, or
the will to power will be posited as the conceptual anchor of some kind of monism. However, Kaufmann cautions against mistaking the function of the will to power. Though the aphoristic experimentalism into specific questions has given way to something more sustained and systematic, his “own conception of the will to power is not a ‘metaphysical’ one in that sense of the word which contemporary Positivists would attach to it: it is not a mere phrase but, unlike Schopenhauer’s ‘will’, essentially an empirical concept, arrived at by an induction” (Ibid., 177). His earlier aphoristic experiments into small, single questions and small, single answers (or at least possible answers), do not give way to a metaphysical reflection. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche does not displace the empirical method for a metaphysical method; instead, he simply makes a much broader, sweeping empirical inference.

In order to account for the sense of the will to power as the central term of a dialectical monism, Kaufmann analyzes five of its instantiations. Kaufmann describes the sense of the concept of the will to power in five of its empirically discernable manifestations from which Nietzsche infers its sense and its supposed truth. However, prior to undertaking a fuller analysis of one of the instantiations of Nietzsche’s dialectical monism, it is useful to cite the formal definition of dialectical monism that Kaufmann provides subsequent to those long and winding interpretations.

The oxymoron of attributing to monism a dialectical quality is possible, according to Kaufmann, given Nietzsche’s attribution of a quantitative variability to the qualitative identity of all phenomena. The will to power does not relate to other, qualitatively distinct terms such as reason, but to quantitatively distinct degrees of itself. All of the philosophical terms used by Nietzsche, subsequent to the positing of the will to power as
a monistic principle in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, refer to quantitative variations of the will to power. Consequently, the goal of philosophical analysis is no longer discovering what ‘this’ or ‘that’ is, but discovering what degrees of power ‘this’ or ‘that’ has. The next section will attempt to clarify this notion by fleshing out one instance of the relation of the will to power to itself.

### 2.1.4 Sublimation As An Empirically Discernable Instance of the Dialectical Character of a Monistic, Explanatory Principle

One of Kaufmann’s five analyses of Nietzsche’s dialectical monism explains how the will to power, unchecked by any other philosophical principle, avoids degenerating into a kind of Hobbesian monolith. He wants to show that if everything political is will to power, then not all instantiations of the will to power lead necessarily to political violence and subjugation.

If, as Kaufmann would have it, the will to power is to be the sole philosophical principle on which all philosophical explanations are based, then its application in the context of a reflection on political morality cannot be a matter of tempering or negating the will to power with either reason, or some other principle (Ibid., 185). “In fact, Nietzsche’s monism raises the question as to how there can be any control whatever” (Ibid.).

Kaufmann cites Nietzsche’s seeming admiration for the problematic figure of Cesare Borgia to illustrate this internal, terminologically complex dynamic, and the potentially self-regulating character of the concept of the will to power. According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche’s admiration for Cesare Borgia is not the result of what he did with his strength, but simply the fact that he was powerful. Nietzsche’s admiration for Borgia
supposedly follows from his rejection of the belief that the docility of modern man is indicative of some kind of progress. Even a monster such as Borgia is more admirable than a feeble Parsifal because, though the weak man does not have the means of undertaking the violent and oppressive projects of a Borgia, neither does he have the power to create the beautiful (Ibid., 194). Strength, therefore, is posited as the precondition of any positive, admirable quality, even though it is not admirable in itself. “The Borgia and the beast are both ideograms for the conception of unsublimated animal passion. Nietzsche does not glorify either of them” (Ibid., 195).

But how does power manage the creation of the beautiful if power itself is only the grounds of its possibility? According to Kaufmann, sublimation is one way by which the will to power achieves its status as a dialectical monism. For example, both the sexual impulse and the barbarian desire to torture one’s enemy can be controlled insofar as they can be sublimated into other activities. Sexual desire can be expressed in creative, spiritual activities, and the desire to torture can be redirected into a desire for victory in contest.

Kaufmann likens Nietzsche’s conception of dialectical monism to the Aristotelian conception of matter. Aristotelian matter, according to Kaufmann, qualifies its attributes as merely accidental. Consequently, because the ‘essence’ of all activity is the will to power, the ‘essence’ of any activity may be sublimated into any other. After all, the ‘essence’ of any activity is not reducible to its accidental features. In each case, then, the will to power, though always expressed in some form or other, may be reformed without affecting its ‘essence’. Therefore, though in each case the accidental attributes of the will
to power may vary in their baseness or nobility, the will to power is never reducible to those noble or base manifestations.

Given that the aim of this analysis is not an account of how any specific instance of the will to power avoids degenerating into a Hobbesian desire for absolute domination, this account of Kaufmann’s analysis will not be taken any further. Only the possibility for such restraint is at issue. According to Kaufmann, sublimation is one way in which the will to power, despite being a single term, can be conceptually conceived as dialectical. Because power can be sublimated into a potentially endless variety of activities, it can potentially subvert, constrain, or contest any of its other instantiations. Consequently, power does not compete violently against the powerless, but always and necessarily with multifarious variations of itself.

2.1.5 Kaufmann’s Account of the Relation of the Will to Power to Truth

What then are the consequences of Kaufmann’s interpretation of the will to power on Nietzsche’s oeuvre as a whole? Specifically, what are the ramifications of this interpretation of the will to power on the concept of truth? If all the universe is understood in terms of the will to power, and the will to power is an explanatory principle meant to account for human psychology and behavior, how is it that it is not itself simply an expression of Nietzsche’s own psychological drive: that is to say, of his own will to power?

According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche is unskilled at addressing this type of problem (Ibid., 177). There does not seem to be any satisfactory epistemology that underscores Nietzsche’s specific, empirical analyses. What little there is remains, for the most part, a feature of his notebooks. Still, Kaufmann insists that as bold as this “extreme
generalization” is, it remains an empirical claim founded on specific empirical analyses. Therefore, even though Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power, as an explanatory principle inferred from specific empirical analyses, is epistemologically problematic, and subject to the problems of coherence and self-reference, Nietzsche’s philosophical concept of the will to power is justifiable. Nietzsche justifies it on rather conventional scientific grounds. If Kaufmann is correct, then the question that remains to be asked is not whether or not the will to power is subject to the problem of self-reference, but whether or not it functions as it means to. Does the will to power, as an explanatory principle, adequately account for empirical phenomena (Ibid.)?

2.1.6 Kaufmann’s Misinterpretation of the Will to Power

Kaufmann’s interpretation of the will to power succeeds where the interpretations of Heidegger and Habermas fail. Kaufmann does not misconstrue Nietzsche’s philosophical concept as metaphysical. He does not attribute to Nietzsche a philosophical practice that Nietzsche explicitly and repeatedly rejects. Instead, Kaufmann interprets Nietzsche correctly as a kind of experimental empiricist.

However, a full and careful analysis of Nietzsche’s philosophical method reveals that Kaufmann’s interpretation is inadequate. While he does respect Nietzsche’s philosophical method in the broad sense in which it has so far been described, avoiding a gross misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical method is not a sufficient condition for accepting that interpretation, nor the interpretation of the concepts that follow from it. Moreover, while Kaufmann’s interpretation is consistent with the available sources, this too is only a necessary, and not a sufficient condition for an acceptable interpretation. Therefore, though Kaufmann’s interpretation respects Nietzsche’s method in a broad
sense, and the available sources pertaining specifically to the will to power, it is not, thereby, acceptable. It is unacceptable because the will to power, as a consequence of this interpretation, becomes a meaningless term with no explanatory power.

As Kauffman interprets it, the philosophical function of the will to power is explanatory. It is meant to provide a conceptual apparatus for explaining empirically observable phenomena of all kinds: for instance, psychological, political, and biological phenomena. However, insofar as it is intended to be, at one and the same time, an explanatory principle, and the central term of a dialectical monism, it fails. It fails because, in purporting to account for all empirical phenomena, it can meaningfully account for none of them. If Kaufmann’s interpretation is correct, then Nietzsche’s concept fails to fulfill its intended function. Therefore, insofar as an equally acceptable alternative interpretation of the concept is available, this one ought to be rejected.

2.1.7 The Tautological Consequence of Kaufmann’s Interpretation

Subsequent to rejecting any metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy, it can be tempting to try attributing to all of Nietzsche’s claims an empirical status. It can be tempting to claim, as Kaufmann does, that if the will to power cannot be interpreted as a metaphysical concept, then it must be some kind of empirical concept. It must be an empirically verifiable claim about the world. However, if this interpretation is correct, it renders the concept philosophically worthless.

This follows from the second feature that Kaufmann attributes to the will to power: its monistic character. As Kaufmann interprets it, the will to power is a philosophical concept that can explain all empirical phenomena; or as Nietzsche puts it: “The world is the will to power- and nothing besides!” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power
1968, 1067; Werke VII3, Nachgelassene Fragmente, 38[12]) But if Kaufmann is correct in claiming that the will to power is true of everything empirical, and he seems to be given the conclusion of Section 1067 of The Will to Power, then the concept can be meaningful neither as an empirical feature of the world, nor a philosophical concept meant to explain the world as a body of empirically observable phenomena. So long as, at one and the same time, all phenomena are conceived of as instances of the will to power, and the will to power is not something ontologically distinct from those phenomena, then the will to power can say nothing informative about the world it purports to explain because the terms “world” and “will to power” have the same referent.

Kaufmann’s interpretation claims that Nietzsche believes that the “will to power is the theory that best accounts for the data available from the human perspective and is therefore the one we have reason to consider true” (Clarke 1990, 209). But, as Clarke notes, the explanatory power of the will to power, when it is conceived as such, is undermined insofar as there are no other possibilities for accounting for phenomena. The will to power can only be compelling as an explanatory principle if some other concept can be construed as the cause of some phenomenon; otherwise, the will to power is just a synonym for the phenomena it purports to explain. Therefore, just as ‘gravity’ cannot be used to account for ‘the force that is equal to mass times distance squared’ because that equation is precisely what gravity is, neither would the ‘will to power’ be able to account for ‘empirical phenomena’ if both terms have precisely the same referent. ‘A’ cannot account for ‘B’ if ‘A’ and ‘B’, despite being different terms, refer to precisely the same thing.
This, however, is not a criticism that can be made against Kaufmann. As Clarke notes, Kaufmann does not actually believe that the will to power is compelling as a meta-explanatory principle. In fact, he does not even accord the concept a meaningful role in an attempt to understand Nietzsche’s thought as a whole (Ibid.). The will to power is, according to Kaufmann, an over-zealously sweeping induction made about human behavior. According to Kaufmann, the will to power is an interpretation of the whole world inferred from an interpretation of human psychology. However, Kaufmann fails to acknowledge that even if the explanatory scope of the will to power were reduced to psychological phenomena, it would still fail, and for the very same reason. Therefore, if Kaufmann is correct, then the will to power is not only unconvincing; it is utterly meaningless as anything other than a synonym for “the world”.

While Kaufmann may be satisfied with this interpretation of the will to power and the negative evaluation that follows from it, this analysis is not. Though there is no specific passage that, on its own, could justify a rejection of this interpretation, a careful analysis of a series of passages put into relation with each other can offer a far more compelling alternative. The will to power can be interpreted in a manner that does not undermine its philosophical value. This is precisely what Clarke’s interpretation does.

2.2 Maudemarie Clarke’s Interpretation of the Will to Power

According to Clarke, the will to power is a creative projection of values on the empirical world. It is an instance of the projective and naïve activity of philosophy, which is, at least in this specific case, distinctive insofar as it recognizes itself as such. The will to power is a conscious projection of its author’s own value estimations.
Therefore, it should not be understood as a true claim, in the sense of verifiably corresponding to the empirical world.

An adequate interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power requires, according to Clarke, three steps: first, the analyst must acknowledge and enumerate her own philosophical sensibilities because they determine her interpretations and evaluations of Nietzsche’s philosophical method and concepts; second, she must clarify what she takes to be Nietzsche’s conception of truth in order to delineate the scope of acceptable interpretations of the will to power; and finally, she must actually interpret the will to power.

Clarke claims that any evaluation of Nietzsche’s thought will follow from the philosophical sensibilities that the interpreter brings with her. Moreover, these philosophical sensibilities are an inevitable feature of any evaluation. In order for an evaluation to be possible, some evaluative principle must already be present (Ibid., 29). While this may be the case for any evaluation, it is especially true for any evaluation of Nietzsche’s thought given its aphoristic and experimental style. Because Nietzsche’s writings are often collages of aphorisms of various lengths, his readers will have to make choices regarding the relevance of any number of often seemingly disconnected passages. Additionally, those passages will have to be placed in some logical and rhetorical relation to each other. Clarke, however, laments that too often this evaluative requirement is not taken seriously. Too often, this stylistic feature of Nietzsche’s oeuvre occasions, and even encourages lazy scholarship. Too often “Nietzsche’s interpreters confine themselves to assembling passages to support a particular interpretation and fail to make
explicit the philosophical commitments that motivate the selection and interpretation of these passages” (Ibid., 30).

Consequently, Clarke believes that any serious and sincere interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical concept of the will to power and its relation to the concept of truth must do two things: first, it must determine the evalulative criteria that will condition the interpretation and evaluation in question; and second, it must account for the passages that could function as counter examples to that interpretation.

### 2.2.1 Clarke’s Analysis of Truth

According to Clarke, Danto comes closest to describing Nietzsche’s conception of truth. Danto attributes to Nietzsche a pragmatic theory of truth. Truth is what works, “in the sense of what satisfies practical interests such as survival or happiness” (Ibid. 31-32). However, according to Clarke, this means that Nietzsche would risk violating the equivalency principle which states, according to its formulation as Tarsky’s Convention T, that any sentence “S” in any language is true if and only if S. This practical conception of truth risks violating the equivalency principle because it is often the case that false beliefs are more practical, or more pleasant than true ones (Ibid.). Consequently, if Nietzsche does have a pragmatic theory of truth, then truth simply cannot mean what it does for conventional English and German speakers, because “equivalencies of this form seem trivially true for anyone who knows the language(s) involved, and it is difficult to see how one can reject them and still claim to share our concept of truth” (Ibid., 32). Clarke, therefore, insists that any conception of truth must involve the principle of correspondence if it is to be at all compelling; otherwise, whatever it is that Nietzsche might be talking about, it has no relation to truth as truth is
conventionally understood, because truth, as it is conventionally understood, involves some version of the equivalency principle.

Two alternative interpretations of Nietzsche’s conception of truth, which attempt to strengthen Danto’s approach by making certain emendations, are even more problematic. These two variations of Danto’s thesis are even more dramatic and unequivocal rejections of the equivalency principle. The first are Müller-Lauter’s and Grimm’s interpretations, which state that Nietzsche’s conception of truth “considers true any belief that satisfies a particular practical interest, that of increasing power” (Ibid., 33). Müller-Lauter’s and Grim’s interpretations, therefore, make explicit the practical interest that Danto’s interpretation left unspecified. According to Müller-Lauter and Grimm, that practical interest is always “an increase in power”. Unsurprisingly, Clarke cannot accept this interpretation. Besides repeating that any compelling conception of truth must involve some version of the equivalency principle if it is to be at all compelling, she rejects Müller-Lauter’s and Grimm’s interpretation because it cannot locate in Nietzsche any acceptable reason for such a reformulation of the concept of truth. Moreover, Clarke believes that this conception of truth is logically untenable. It contradicts itself by making a conventionally true claim that truth refers to an increase of power, and not necessarily to a correspondence with the world. This redefinition of truth presupposes the conventional definition of truth because it presupposes the possibility that this or that belief truly does (in the conventional sense) increase power. Therefore, Nietzsche’s redefinition of truth, as that which has the consequence of an increase of power, cannot be a rejection of the conception of truth that involves some form of
correspondence, because it presupposes it. Nietzsche’s supposed redefinition would only
succeed in confusing the concept by rendering it equivocal.

The second variation of Danto’s approach is Jacques Derrida’s. Clarke interprets
Derrida as saying that Nietzsche rejects truth because the concept of truth is necessarily
metaphysical. Nietzsche does not offer an alternative conception of truth. He simply
rejects it. Clarke does not find this second variation any more compelling than the first.
She does not accept this interpretation because she does not accept the inference that a
rejection of any correspondence conception of truth follows from a rejection of a
correspondence conception of truth that aspires to Cartesian certainty. Nietzsche’s claims
about the relation of resentment to morality, for instance, need not be metaphysically true
for them to be historically true (Ibid. 33).

As a result, Clarke insists that Nietzsche cannot, if he is to be at all compelling,
reject the conventional conception of truth as correspondence as she believes Danto’s
Nietzsche does in a moderate manner, and Müller-Lauter’s and Grimm’s Nietzsche does
in a more dramatic manner. Neither could he reject truth altogether as though it
necessarily implied certain metaphysical presuppositions, which Clarke believes is
Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth. According to Clarke, any
compelling conception of truth must involve some version of the principle of
correspondence. The challenge, therefore, is attributing to Nietzsche a correspondence
conception of truth that is consistent with some of his more radical statements: such as,
“There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes- and consequently there are
many kinds of ‘truths’, and consequently there is no truth” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power
1968, Section 534; Werke VII3, Nachgelassene Fragmente, 34[230]).
2.2.2 Nietzsche’s Early Conception of Truth

Subsequent to stating her own philosophical commitments regarding truth, Clarke endeavors to interpret Nietzsche’s philosophy as consistent with those commitments. As she interprets it, Nietzsche’s conception of truth becomes consistent with her own once it has matured. This process of maturation evolves over two phases. The first of these two phases is worked out in Nietzsche’s early essay “Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”.

Very often this essay is read as a thesis about truth, which is grounded upon an insight into the metaphorical nature of language; however, Clarke insists that Nietzsche’s treatment of truth follows instead from “a representational theory of perception and the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth” (Clarke 1990, 77). According to Clarke, Nietzsche’s use of the term “metaphor” does not attempt to clarify something about language. It is meant to clarify something about perception. Perception is described analogously to metaphor as a linguistic device. We perceive an object in the same way we describe an object metaphorically (Ibid., 78). The thrust of Nietzsche’s claim is directed against the belief that we perceive objects as such. All we perceive are the sensorial metaphors for those objects: our sense impressions.

At this juncture there seems no basis, at least according to Clarke, to believe that Nietzsche rejects the claim that things have some kind of extra-mental existence. He simply insists that we have no discernable access to them. As our access to objects is always mediated by the senses, our perceptions of those objects are never direct (Ibid., 81). Consequently, when we refer to a ‘body’, we do not refer to something existing outside the mind, but to precisely those subjective perceptions, or metaphors for objects that we designate as the ‘body’.
“Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”, however, far from expressing an idealist position, is an extended example of Nietzsche’s rejection of idealism. According to Clarke, this follows from Nietzsche’s careful distinction between the “thing itself”, and the “thing-in-itself”. In the first case, the “thing itself” simply refers to the object that causes the mental perception; or again, it is the cause of the sensorial metaphor. The “thing-in-itself”, on the other hand, is the thing as it appears independently of the mediation of the human faculties of perception; it is what Nietzsche calls the mysterious ‘X’. In this essay, Nietzsche makes the ever-popular metaphysical inference that if there are human perceptions, there must be things that are perceived. However, according to Clarke, Nietzsche does not thereby accept any discussion of the “thing-in-itself”.

This should not be mistaken as an idealist position. Nietzsche’s “Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” is both a rejection of idealism, which would posit that our perceptions admit only of the existence of things in our minds; and, at the same time, it is a rejection that, based on these perceptions, one can infer some kind of knowledge of things-in-themselves. It is crucial to note that

far from rejecting the conception of truth as correspondence, Nietzsche’s denial of truth evidently presupposes the metaphysical correspondence theory. He concludes that truths are illusions because he assumes both that truth requires correspondence to things-in-themselves and that our truths do not exhibit such correspondence (Ibid., 83).

According to Clarke, at this stage of the evolution of Nietzsche’s position on truth, Nietzsche accepts the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth. That is to say, Nietzsche accepts that there is a real world, independent of our capacity to know it, and that any true claim about the world must correspond to that metaphysical realm (Ibid., 86). However, he also claims that we have no grounds to suppose that our perceptions
actually correspond to those objects. We cannot know that they are true representations of the world.

Clarke stresses that while, for Nietzsche, this metaphysical realm seems to be independent of our cognitive capacities, it is not thereby independent of our cognitive interests (i.e. “the cognitively relevant properties we want from a theory or set of beliefs other than truth” (Ibid., 48)). In “Truth and Lies in a Non Moral Sense,” Nietzsche claims that our rational capacities have evolved biologically and physiologically as a device to maintain us in existence. Consequently, the truths that Nietzsche describes as illusions are inextricably intertwined with humanity’s pragmatically conditioned cognitive capacities. However, this cannot justify the belief that they correspond to the things they describe as they are in themselves. Therefore, “when he identifies the thing-in-itself with the “pure truth apart from consequences,” Nietzsche cannot mean that the pure truth (unlike our illusions) is independent of our practical interests, but must mean that it is independent of our cognitive interests” (Ibid., 88). If this is the case, then Nietzsche must implicitly accept that the concept of truth involves some kind of metaphysical realism and that any claim, to be true, must correspond to the structure of this metaphysical realm.

2.2.3 Nietzsche’s Later Conception of Truth

Clarke claims that Nietzsche, as early as Human, All-Too-Human, begins to reform his conception of truth. As it was posited in Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense, metaphysical truth is independent of both our cognitive faculties and our cognitive interests. A metaphysical realm is, after all, a realm radically separate from the empirical world: “it is a second real world” (Ibid., 98; Nietzsche, Human, All-Too-Human 1996, 5;
Werke IV2, *Menchliches, AllzuMenscheliches*, 5). But, with *Human, All-Too-Human*, metaphysical truth begins to shift connotation in Nietzsche’s writings from something unattainable to something absurd. The metaphysical world becomes “more useless even than knowledge of the chemical components of water must be to the sailor in danger of shipwreck” (Clarke 1990, 9). But this, says Clarke, is far from clear based on *Human, All-Too-Human* alone.

In *Human, All-Too-Human*, Clarke claims that Nietzsche’s position has shifted, but only to the extent that a metaphysical realm is not presupposed. Nietzsche, it seems, has become agnostic about the existence of a metaphysical realm. It is only with *Beyond Good and Evil* that Nietzsche holds what Clarke construes as his fully developed view of truth. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche claims that the thing-in-itself, the central tenet of metaphysics, involves an internal contradiction. “That ‘immediate certainty,’ as well as ‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing-in-itself’, involve a *contradicto in adjecto*” (Ibid., 99; Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 1989, 16; Werke VI2, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, 16). However, it is only in *The Gay Science* that Nietzsche offers anything resembling a justification for this claim— at least in his published works. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche wonders what “an appearance” might refer to. It could not be something in opposition to an “essence”, because Nietzsche can think of nothing an essence might be besides something discernable through its apparent attributes. “It is certainly not a mask that one could place on an unknown mysterious X” (Ibid., 100; Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 1974, 54; Werke V2, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 54).

Be that as it may, Clarke acknowledges that her interpretation could be contested. The evidence that she presents to support her interpretation rests less on *The Gay Science*

> And what magnificent instruments of observation we possess in our senses!... Today we possess science precisely to the extent that we have decided to accept the testimony of the senses- to the extent to which we sharpen them further, arm them, and have learned to think them through. The rest is miscarriage and not-yet-science- in other words, metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology- or formal science, a doctrine of signs, such as logic and that applied logic which is called mathematics. In them reality is not encountered at all, not even as a problem- no more than the value of such a sign-convention as logic (Ibid., 105; Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist* 2004, *Twilight of the Idols*, 3; *Werke* VI3, *Der Antichrist*, 3).

This passage illustrates that Nietzsche’s earlier representational conception of truth, which involves the falsification of the ‘true world’, gives way to a view that ‘reality’ is precisely what one encounters via the senses. Nietzsche even goes so far as to claim that any science that does not deal with the testimony of the senses does not deal with ‘reality’. Therefore, given that *The Genealogy of Morals* explicitly acknowledges the existence of truths, and that *The Twilight of the Idols* explicitly claims that such truths are inferences made from the testimony of the senses, Nietzsche’s position has evolved beyond the one presented in *Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*. This, Clarke believes, justifies her interpretation of the passages cited from *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil*. 

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2.2.4 Knowledge as Perspectival

So what then are the philosophical consequences of Nietzsche’s conception of truth? Clarke grapples with this question in light of the sense attributable to Nietzsche’s epistemological concept of perspectivism. According to Clarke, Nietzsche’s account of knowledge as perspectival helps a great deal in clarifying his conception of truth. Perspectivism involves an anti-foundationalism; however, it does not thereby involve the falsification thesis. Nietzsche’s conception of truth as perspectival makes any analysis of a specific truth claim revisable in light of the revisable cognitive interests of any supposed knower.

According to Clarke, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is a metaphorical account of his later conception of truth. Literally, perspective refers to a feature of sight, and perspective in this sense refers to the spatial relation of the eye and the object that it perceives (Clarke 1990, 129). Non-perspectival seeing would be seeing from an eye that is not in space and does not have a determinate spatial relation to the object seen. That is to say, non-perspectival seeing is seeing without an eye, and seeing without an eye is absurd because an eye is a condition of possibility of seeing. Perspectivism is the analogous application of this condition of possibility of seeing to knowing. To aspire to a knowledge of things-in-themselves is analogous to aspiring to seeing without an eye (Ibid., 132). But this is nonsense. Looking necessarily involves an eye. It necessarily involves a perspective. The look of a thing from nowhere is a contradiction in terms. “As there is nothing to see of a thing except what it looks like from various perspectives, there is nothing to know of it except how it is interpreted from various cognitive perspectives” (Ibid., 133).
Perspectivism, therefore, does not imply an absolute rejection of truth. Simply because knowing, like seeing, must be done from somewhere, that does not mean that one cannot know. The rejection of truth only makes sense so long as a correspondence conception of truth is conflated with a metaphysical conception of a correspondence theory of truth. However, Nietzsche’s position, as it evolves, does not assume that truth must necessarily involve the metaphysical conception of the correspondence theory of truth. We cannot know the thing-in-itself because the thing-in-itself is an absurdity. It would make no sense to relate knowledge to such an in-itself, because knowledge refers necessarily to the testimony of the senses, and sensorial perception necessarily involves the perspectival relation of the object perceived and the faculty of perception.

The crux of the matter is that perspectivism excludes only something contradictory. As creative power is not limited by the inability to make a square triangle, cognitive power is not limited by the inability to have nonperspectival knowledge… Perspectivism therefore undercuts the basis for TL.’s commitment to the falsification thesis (Ibid., 134).

2.2.5 The Will to Power as a Projection of Nietzschean Values

Given Clarke’s analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of truth, one would think that she subscribes to Kaufmann’s interpretation of the will to power, and considers it an empirical concept. As Nietzsche is purported to have rejected metaphysics in favor of the testimony of the senses, and the metaphysical world in favor of the empirical one, the will to power, as a concept that surfaces relatively late in Nietzsche’s oeuvre, would seemingly have to be a term that is meant to describe the empirical world in light of empirical experience and not a priori principles.

However, unlike Kaufmann, Clarke insists that if the will to power is to be at all compelling as an empirical concept, it must be subject to counter-examples. That is to
say, so long as the will to power is said to be true of everything, it can be meaningfully true of nothing because it would have no cognitive content. It would only be tautologically true (Ibid., 210). More specifically, while Clarke follows Kaufmann in considering the will to power to be a conceptual account of certain empirically observable, psychological phenomena in human beings, this can only be the case insofar as other psychological motivating principles are also attributed to humans. It is only under these conditions that the will to power can have any explanatory power.

But if this is the case, then any argument that claims that the world is will to power would be very troublesome. Though this claim does appear in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, given that Zarathustra is a fictional character, the intended philosophical status of this claim, and of its possible status as representative of Nietzsche’s actual position are uncertain. Beyond Good and Evil contains the only published argument that the world is will to power. However, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche does not present a proof of the will to power, but only a conditional statement regarding it. The will to power would only be a valid inference if certain premises about the world contained in the antecedent of the hypothetical claim were accepted as empirically true. The three premises are as follows: “that no reality is given to us except that of our passions or affects; that the will is a causal power; and that our entire instinctive life can be explained as a development of one form of will: the will to power” (Ibid., 213). But Clarke contends that Nietzsche cannot actually accept these premises as true given some of his other surrounding claims.

According to Clarke, because the first premise states that no reality is given to us except that of the will, and because this premise is clearly not true of our experience of
the external world, it cannot be taken as an empirical claim. It is an *a priori* claim of the type Descartes makes about the “indubitability of our internal world” (Ibid., 213-214). In Section 34 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche explicitly rejects this type of claim. Moreover, even if it were not the case that this were an implicitly rejected *a priori* claim, it would still be incompatible with Section 19 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, in which Nietzsche critiques Schopenhauer’s belief that the will is the best known thing in all the world.

The second premise of Nietzsche’s only published argument for the will to power, which states that the will is a causal power, is analogous to the first. It cannot be a claim that Nietzsche actually holds to be true given everything else he has said. In *The Gay Science*, Section 127, Nietzsche attributes a belief in the causal power of the will to thoughtless people. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Part II, Section 5, and *The Antichrist*, Section 14, Nietzsche accounts for the will as nothing more than a word and a “resultant” respectively. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Part VI, Section 3, the causal quality of the will is described as a will-o-wisp of the “inner world”. Perhaps most importantly, given its proximate location to Section 36 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche accounts for the will, not as a brute datum, but as a word that refers to the empirical complex of sensations, thoughts, and affective commands. The will, therefore, far from explaining anything, is something that needs to be explained.

Consequently, Clarke believes that the hypothetical argument given in Section 36 of *Beyond Good and Evil* cannot be what Nietzsche thinks is actually the case. But, if he does not believe these premises to be true, why doesn’t he explicitly reject them? According to Clarke, understanding Nietzsche’s rhetorical strategy requires the subtlety
of interpretation that Nietzsche praises in the introduction to *The Genealogy of Morals*. Clarke claims that, in order to properly understand the sense and philosophical status of Section 36, it must be put into context. Its interpreter must seek out the proximate clues that Nietzsche may have left. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 5, Nietzsche explicitly states that philosophers who perpetually misapprehend their activity as one of discovery are naïve. Philosophers do not make discoveries; they make projections. They believe they discover truths where in fact they only baptize their prejudices with the name ‘truth’ (Ibid., 219; Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 1989, 5; *Werke VI2*, *Jenseits von Got und Böse*, 5). The seemingly cosmological tenor of the will to power must be read against what Nietzsche describes as the activity of philosophy or metaphysics, an exposition of “a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract” (Ibid.).

The philosopher does not discover the world. He constructs the world in the image of his own values. Nietzsche uses the Stoics as an instantiation of this practice in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 9.

But this is an ancient, eternal story: what formerly happened with the Stoics still happens today, too, as soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the ‘creation of the world’, to the *causa prima*. (Ibid., 220)

If this is the case, and Nietzsche is consistent, then Nietzsche’s own ‘philosophy’ (i.e. his own metaphysic or cosmology) must be a projection of his own values upon the world (i.e. the empirical world).

In fact, Nietzsche admits this in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 22. Here he describes the will to power as interpretation and bad philology (at least to the extent that it is not admitted to be one interpretation among others). “This passage suggests that such metaphors have no cognitive function, but only extend to the universe our sense of
morality, generalizing and therefore glorifying what we consider important” (Clarke 1990, 222). Consequently, of the two alternative interpretations of physics as Nature’s conformity to law, or as the exercise of the basic principle of the will to power, neither is true in the sense of distinctively correlative to the empirical world. They are both projections of the philosopher’s values: in the first instance, the philosopher projects democratic values; in the second instance, he projects aristocratic, or noble, or what Nietzsche takes to be pre-Socratic Greek values.

According to Clarke, Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power is not a factual claim about the world. It is not an empirically verifiable claim about the world. It is the creative expression of everything Nietzsche finds worthwhile (e.g. music, art, virtue, dance, spirituality, reason, etc.) (Ibid., 226; Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 1989, 257; Werke VI2, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 257).

2.2.6 The Scope of Clarke’s Misinterpretation

The following critique of Clarke’s interpretation of the will to power is not a rejection of her interpretation of the will to power specifically. In fact, her interpretation of the will to power is exceptionally compelling. It is a careful and meticulous consideration of its sense as it appears in Nietzsche’s published texts. Moreover, it engages it in light of all the other relevant philosophical concepts that Nietzsche forwards: most notably truth and perspectivism. She successfully renders these concepts consistent with each other, and individually compelling. Nonetheless, while her interpretation of Nietzsche may be compelling, it is also problematic.

Her interpretation is problematic because it is not consistent with all the available sources. This inconsistency is a product of her belief, which she shares with Nietzsche,
that any interpretation and any evaluation will be conditioned in part by the values of the interpreter. In positing her own philosophical sensibilities as the structuring values of her analysis, some of what Nietzsche says appears either inconsistent or unacceptable. As a result, she rejects the sources that contain those passages, specifically, *The Will to Power* and the rest of Nietzsche’s posthumously published notes. However, this inconsistency is not a feature of Nietzsche’s philosophy. It is a consequence of one of the philosophical sensibilities that condition her interpretation. Because one of them is dramatically inconsistent with Nietzsche’s own, some of the things that Nietzsche says seem inconsistent. Clarke’s analysis of truth, while perhaps compelling in its own right, is not consistent with Nietzsche’s. Her conception of what truth must be if it is to be at all compelling is a variation of what Nietzsche rejects when he rejects metaphysics. As a result, because some of what Nietzsche says presupposes a different understanding of the sense of that term, some of what Nietzsche says seems either inconsistent or unacceptable.

2.2.7 Clarke’s Misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s Rejection of Metaphysics

Against the interpretation that construes Nietzsche as a metaphysician, Nietzsche has been presented as a kind of historian. He is a kind of philologist who subjects the historian’s method to the requirements of life; that is to say, to the organizing and potentially synthesizing principle of life as activity. Therefore, insofar as the will to power is a philosophical concept produced by Nietzsche’s philosophical method, and insofar as Nietzsche’s philosophical method is some type of historical method, the will to power cannot be a metaphysical concept. Moreover, the will to power cannot be interpreted as an explanatory principle inferred from, and applicable to all empirically observable phenomena without becoming tautological, and thereby useless in its intended
function. This, however, is still only a very partial account of Nietzsche’s philosophical method, and the senses attributable to the will to power as a product of that method.

If Nietzsche is a kind of historian who subjects the historical method to the organizing principle of life as activity, he remains relatively silent about what the philosophical status of those historical claims would be. There are a few types of claims, however, that they would certainly not be. They are not some type of metaphysical claim. Neither could they be some kind of objective, descriptive claim. Nietzsche rejected the method of the objective historian because it reduced the historical individual to a fragile conglomerate of alien factoids. Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, even in conjunction with his historicism, is insufficient to constitute an alternative philosophical method. Therefore, until the interpretive approach to the will to power as an empirical concept, or as a concept whose function within an empiricist philosophical framework has accounted for the philosophical status of Nietzsche’s distinctive brand of historical/philosophical claims, the sense of his claims remain very ambiguous.

To Clarke’s credit, she understands this. However, despite an admirable transparency, the interpretive strategy she uses to engage Nietzsche’s philosophy generally, and the will to power specifically, is problematic. While she acknowledges that Nietzsche has rejected metaphysics, her own philosophical sensibilities encumber an understanding of the full sense of that rejection.

Clarke claims that any philosophical evaluation ought to, first and foremost, enumerate the evaluative principles that condition that evaluation. It ought to clarify the conditions under which an interpretation would be considered a good interpretation, and
under which a philosophical concept would be considered a good philosophical concept. She holds this view because she seems to share two of Nietzsche’s supposed beliefs. First, she believes that a good philosophical claim must be true. And second, she believes that while truth may or may not be independent of our cognitive capacities, it is certainly not independent of our cognitive interests.

To some extent, she is very Nietzschean. She is Nietzschean insofar as she believes that even truth, as an object of analysis and evaluation, is subject to the conditioning evaluative principles (i.e. the values) of its analysts. Even truth is an object whose sense and value follow, at least in part, from its relation to the values of the analyst. This relation of truth to the cognitive interests of those who have a will to truth is a species of Nietzsche’s belief that historical analysis ought to be subjected to the demands of life as activity, in this case, to the interests of philosophical analysts.

However, while Clarke shares at least this one very important methodological principle with Nietzsche, she posits another that Nietzsche does not accept. One of the cognitive interests that she attributes to “us” (speakers of English and German) is very un-Nietzschean. Specifically, her insistence that any theory of truth must be some variation of the correspondence theory is, in fact, a variation of the “metaphysics” that Nietzsche rejects.

If truth, as Clarke believes, must involve some version of the correspondence theory, then Clarke assumes that truth must be a variation of the Platonic correspondence between something like the *ontos on*, a thing’s essence, and something like the *me on*, an individual thing that participates in that essence. While, the terms that Clarke uses to draw out the sense of her commonsense correspondence conception of truth are certainly
not Platonic, there is a striking structural parallel. The representing and the represented still relate to each other in the same way as the *me on* and the *ontos on*, even though the *me on* is now construed as the linguistic representations of the *ontos on*, and the *ontos on* as the empirical world of sense perceptions. Clarke’s interpretation of Nietzsche as a kind of empiricist is distinct from an interpretation that construes him as a metaphysician only by virtue of the terms in which his philosophical project is described. The project itself is very much the same, a correct representation of the ‘real’ world.

In Book 5 of *The Gay Science*, an additional section appended to the text in 1887, five years after its original publication, Nietzsche explicitly equates these two versions of truth.

No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this ‘other world’- look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, our world? - But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests- that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine. - But what if this should become more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more unless it were error, blindness, the lie- if God himself should prove to be our most enduring lie? (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 1974, 344; *Werke* V2, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 344)

According to Nietzsche, these two conceptions of truth are genealogically related. The modern, anti-metaphysical faith in scientific truth is a Christian faith, which is itself a Platonic faith. So long as the scientific project is conceived as correct representation, Nietzsche would describe it as a variation of the metaphysical project. Therefore, if Nietzsche is interpreted as rejecting one version of the correspondence theory of truth, he must also reject the other.

Even if the unpublished notes are not accepted as legitimate sources, Nietzsche’s conception of truth is still not what Clarke contends it is. Nietzsche may accept that
truths exist; however, this does not mean that truths are what Clarke feels they ought to be if they are to be at all compelling. If Nietzsche rejects metaphysics as a valuable mode of philosophical enquiry, and considers the scientific will to truth a reformulation of the metaphysical will to truth, then Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics is also a rejection of Clarke’s correspondence theory of truth.

The genealogical relation of the metaphysical and correspondence theories of truth can help elucidate the sense of an earlier passage in *The Gay Science*. In Section 125 of *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche dramatizes this genealogical relation. He dramatizes Modernity’s failure to recognize its scientific spirit as a reformulation of its metaphysical ancestors.

The madman. —Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: “I seek God! I seek God!”—As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated?—Thus they yelled and laughed.

The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. “Whither is God?” he cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him—yes and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 1974 125; Werke V2, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 125).

If this passage is in fact a dramatized version of passage 344, then the townsfolk are 19th century Europeans. They are the children of the Enlightenment, full of faith in the promise of science. They do not worry about the absence of God because, as modern, secular, and scientific people, they believe God has become unnecessary. However, if
they believe that God is unnecessary, it is not because they believe that God’s function is unnecessary. They have not forsaken the reward of their covenant with, and subjugation to God, they only believe that God is unnecessary to that reward. They still expect a revelation.

Their light-hearted laughter at the madman who fears the loss of God is unjustified because it is they, and not the madman who are acting foolishly. It is the townsfolk who misunderstand the full significance of the absence of God. Their indifference to the absence of God follows from their pride and self-assurance in their belief that a careful scientific method will reveal truth, as they once believed their faith in God would. But, the townsfolk can laugh at the madman and remain indifferent to his concern only because they fail to discern the full sense of their touted secularism. They fail to see that their secularism is not a rejection of God, but only a displaced or sublimated faith in God. Their secularism is simply a faith in God couched in the novel terms of science. The madman understands this. To lose God means to lose with him the promise of revelation, because God was necessary to that promise.

But how did we do this? How did we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through a infinite nothing… do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him (Ibid.).

Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics is analogous to the madman’s lament of the loss of God. A rejection of metaphysics is not just a rejection of a specifically Christian conception of God, or a specifically Platonic conception of truth. It is a rejection that there is any absolute reference point from which our claims can be true or false. It is the
loss of our horizon, of all up and down. There is nothing left that is independent of our own beliefs to which our claims or beliefs may correspond. It is, at its heart, a rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, irrespective of the terms in which that theory is couched.

Therefore, if Clarke is Nietzschean, she is a Nietzschean who rejects at least one important feature of Nietzsche’s philosophy. While she shares Nietzsche’s belief that any evaluation is contingent upon the evaluative principles of that evaluation, and that those principles are potentially shifting, she posits at least one evaluative principle that contradicts Nietzsche’s. In itself, this is not a problem. Clarke can posit any evaluative principle she likes, and Nietzsche would readily accord her this freedom (even if he would not necessarily endorse her use of it). Clarke, however, posits an evaluative principle inconsistent with the sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. Clarke’s philosophical analysis and evaluation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power are products of a particular conception of what truth must be if it is to be at all compelling. However, this conception of truth is the very heart of what Nietzsche rejects when he rejects metaphysics. Clarke believes that truth must be understood, at the very least, as a correlation between our representations of the world and the world, but Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics is precisely a rejection of this type of philosophical project: making claims that correspond to the ‘real’ or ‘true’ or ‘actual’ world. They are, at least according to Nietzsche, terminological variations upon the metaphysical, Platonic relation of essences and appearances, or the Christian relation of divine and human perspective.
Therefore, though Clarke correctly interprets the will to power as a projection of Nietzsche’s values, she does not acknowledge that Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy, as involving a projection of values, affects the sense attributable to all of Nietzsche’s philosophical concepts, including the concept of truth. While she correctly interprets the will to power as an exemplification of Nietzsche’s values, she resists what that would imply for Nietzsche’s conception of truth. According to her own reading, because they are both philosophical concepts, they both ought to be construed as the products of a projection of Nietzsche’s values. Though she may reasonably reject Nietzsche’s philosophical concepts as projections that imply values she does not share, she cannot reasonably interpret one of his philosophical concepts according to his values and another according to her own without making the whole either inconsistent, or the interpretive process equivocal. As a result, insofar as Nietzsche does construe the scientific faith in a correspondence theory of truth a variation of the Platonic and Christian conceptions of truth, the sense of the term “truth” must be significantly different for Nietzsche than it is for her.

2.2.8 Clarke’s Problematic Evaluation of the Relative Importance of Nietzsche’s Published and Unpublished Works

Even though the philosophical status of Clarke’s interpretation of the will to power needs to be reconsidered subsequent to a correction of her interpretation of his concept of truth, her interpretation of the will to power and of the philosophical method that produces it remain very compelling. Nonetheless, a second problem, which is intimately tied to the first, needs to be acknowledged.
Clarke’s rejection of the posthumously published notes from her analysis cannot be accepted. Though she may believe that Nietzsche’s philosophy is better without them, she cannot thereby interpret Nietzsche’s philosophy as though they were not available, or not relevant.

All Nietzsche scholarship is inevitably faced with the question of determining the relative significance of the published and unpublished material. For instance, construing Nietzsche as metaphysician is possible only if Nietzsche’s earliest publication, *The Birth of Tragedy*, and either the latest text problematically attributed to Nietzsche himself, *The Will to Power*, or the posthumously published critical edition of the notebooks are given a preponderant role. On the other hand, construing Nietzsche as an empiricist has a tendency to privilege the published texts, especially those subsequent to *The Birth of Tragedy*, and prior to those of 1888. Nonetheless, the debate surrounding the relevance and priority of sources has become something of an empty convention. It often seems as though taking this or that position within the debate is determined, not according to some consideration of the formal features of what constitutes a good interpretation, but whether or not this or that position will enable the interpreter to attribute to Nietzsche what they take to be a desirable philosophical position. The concern, therefore, seems to be establishing the conditions whereby one can get what one wants from an interpretation, and not of working through the conditions that could produce a good interpretation. As a result, much of this debate seems disingenuous and/or self-serving.

Though many interpretations may hinge on the relative importance of the various available sources, this consideration cannot, on its own, justify any of the positions within it. A justification that all of Nietzsche’s writings are testaments to his thoughts, and that
they must all, consequently, be considered as such, cannot constitute a serious debate. The debate over the relative importance of Nietzsche’s various texts is not markedly different than it is for any interpreter of any oeuvre. The interpreter must assess the sense, the status, and the value of the available sources that constitute an author’s oeuvre, and their relation to each other. Therefore, if Clarke is correct, and some of the passages regarding the will to power in Nietzsche’s notebooks negatively affect the value of the concept, then the consequence ought to be a criticism of Nietzsche’s concept, and not a rejection of those sources. While there may be some reasonable disagreement as to the status of those claims, insofar as they may or may not be representative of what Nietzsche would have said had he lived longer, this represents only a playful exercise in the game of historical ‘what ifs’. Good interpretation, however, must acknowledge and work with the available facts, and not with a set of hypothetical possibilities. That such an unflinching interpretive gaze might risk the philosophical value of at least one of Nietzsche’s concepts is not only an unavoidable consequence of a sound interpretive method; it is one of Nietzsche’s own methodological premises.

Undesired disciples.- ‘What can I do with these two young men!’ cried an irritated philosopher who ‘corrupted’ the youth as Socrates once had done; they are unwelcome students. This one can’t say ‘no’ and the other one says ‘half and half’ about everything. If they adopted my doctrine, the first would suffer too much, for my way of thinking requires a warlike soul, a desire to hurt, a delight in saying no, a hard skin; he would languish from open and internal wounds. And the other would strike a compromise with everything he represents and thereby make it into a mediocrity- such a disciple I wish on my enemies (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 1974, 32; Werke V2, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft).

Therefore, the passages in the notebooks cannot be rejected simply because they risk weakening Nietzsche’s philosophical arguments, because a feature of Nietzsche’s published philosophical arguments about what constitutes good interpretation is accepting the risk that a good interpretation might produce a negative evaluation.
But isn’t this self-evident? Isn’t it obvious that ignoring possible counter-evidence is a disingenuous and unacceptable interpretative strategy? Clarke, after all, makes this very claim herself. According to Clarke, a thesis must test itself against what might stand as possible counter-evidence. If this is true, then only insofar as her thesis can incorporate all the available sources ought it be accepted, at least insofar as her thesis is meant to be descriptive. Insofar as her thesis is meant to be critical, then it ought to be a rejection of, at the very least, Nietzsche’s conception of truth. However, neither of these need be the case if Clarke is willing to abandon her belief that any compelling philosophy must involve some version of the correspondence theory of truth.

Conclusion

This chapter has succeeded, as did the previous one, in two respects. First, it has successfully rejected the second type of interpretive approach to the will to power. It has rejected the interpretation of the will to power as an empirical concept, and it has rejected the will to power as an explanatory principle that purports to account for empirical phenomena. It is not, as Kaufmann would have it, an explanatory principle inferred from small, specific empirical enquiries, which are subsequently generalized. If this were the case, the will to power would become tautological, and thereby unable to fulfill its purported function.

Additionally, a rejection of this interpretive approach also involves a rejection of the interpretation of the will to power as a feature of a particular conception of the empiricist method. The will to power, as Clarke would have it, is a projection of values upon a world to which true claims must correspond if they are to be true in any philosophically compelling way. While her interpretation of the will to power is
compelling, her interpretation of the philosophical context in which she places it is problematic. If Clarke is correct, and all of Nietzsche’s claims regarding it are taken together, then the will to power is an ambiguous, equivocal term. So long as it functions within a philosophical context that accepts the correspondence theory of truth, much of the unpublished material must be rejected as either inconsistent or unacceptable.

The chapter has also succeeded in further qualifying Nietzsche’s philosophical method. This has been done, once again, in two ways: negatively and positively. First, this chapter has fleshed out the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics involves more than a rejection of the terms in which the metaphysical project is posited. It is a rejection, at its root, of a correspondence theory of truth. It is a rejection of truth as correct representation. Therefore, in this respect, Heidegger is correct. Heidegger, however, is wrong to attribute to Nietzsche an alternative type of correspondence theory of truth: truth as *homoiosis*. Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics is a rejection of the philosophical project of a correct representation of the true world, whether or not that ‘true’ world is made up of metaphysical essences or empirical appearances, whether or not that ‘true’ world is a world of being or of becoming.

Nonetheless, the astute analyses of both Kaufmann and Clarke have contributed positively to an acceptable interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical method, and the possible sense attributable to the will to power as a product of that method. Kaufmann’s interpretation of Nietzsche takes seriously Nietzsche’s willingness to experiment with the possible utility of various hypotheses. In Nietzsche’s own words, Kaufmann recognizes Nietzsche’s method of taking quick, shallow dips in cold water. Consequently,
Kaufmann’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought as a whole, but also his interpretation of the will to power specifically, is able to render all of the available sources consistent. Each source, whatever its claim, represents a stage in the historical (though non-teleological) evolution of Nietzsche’s thought, and of the historical evolution of each one of his philosophical concepts. The will to power is treated as an experiment that Nietzsche returns to over and over again. It is interpreted as a concept with a history, whose sense is defined by that history. It changes and evolves over time, so that any adequate interpretation of the will to power, despite being a philosophical concept, must recognize it as a historical object.

Clarke’s analysis, on the other hand, contributes both towards clarifying Nietzsche’s philosophical method, and towards an acceptable interpretation of the sense of the concept of the will to power. She aptly put a variety of passages in *Beyond Good and Evil* into a mutually informative relation, which cohere with his published oeuvre in general. She carefully accounted for Nietzsche’s philosophical method as a projective activity of a philosopher’s values upon the world. She has clarified the textual grounds for attributing to Nietzsche a remarkable self-awareness of this conception of philosophy, and of his willingness to allow that conception to determine the sense and status of his own philosophical work. Moreover, her interpretation of the will to power itself is aptly interpreted as a product of that method. It is a projection of the values that Nietzsche esteems and aspires to. It is a projection of Greek, or noble, or master values on the world as he experiences it.

Unfortunately, Clarke’s own evaluative principles stand in the way of allowing her interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical method and his concept of the will to
power to condition all the features of her interpretation. Specifically, she does not allow his conception of philosophy to determine the sense the term ‘truth’ as a philosophical concept. As a result, much of what Nietzsche says in the unpublished sources seems inconsistent. However, if truth is subjected to the same type of analysis as the will to power, then the oeuvre in its entirety can be interpreted as coherent. What remains to be considered, therefore, is the full significance of Nietzsche’s philosophical method as Clarke describes it. If philosophy is as Clarke’s Nietzsche believes it is (i.e. a projection of the philosopher’s values upon the empirical world), then the status of any philosophical claim can render a spectacular variety of claims consistent with one another.

If Clarke is correct, then an appropriate evaluation of Nietzsche’s philosophy requires two steps. In the first place, all of Nietzsche’s philosophical concepts would have to be interpreted as projections of his values upon the empirical world. Nietzsche even says as much. Nietzsche is very clear about the status of philosophical claims as a consequence of the type of activity that philosophers are engaged in.

They [(Philosophers)] pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed to the mystics of every rank, who are more honest and doltish- and talk of “inspiration”); while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of “inspiration” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 1989, 5; Werke VI2, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 5).

In the second place, if this conception of philosophy does in fact determine the status of the philosophical claims Nietzsche makes, then the values that constitute the content of those projections would have to be evaluated as either consistent or inconsistent with the values of his judges. The question the interpreter turned judge must ask himself is not whether or not those values are true, and thereby acceptable first premises of a
philosophical argument, because truth, as a philosophical concept, is as contingent on the values of the philosopher’s values as would be any other philosophical concept (e.g. the will to power). Instead, an evaluation of Nietzsche’s philosophy has to be an evaluation of whether or not his projection is a desirable one. It has to be an evaluation of whether or not the philosopher and the judge are willing to accept the values of the philosopher from which follows the philosophical argument in question.

Nietzsche is fully aware of the radical consequences that follow from the lack of any absolute evaluative criteria (i.e. the rejection of metaphysics as a rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, which is dramatized as the murder of God). The responsibility and the burden of positing the criteria that condition any philosophical evaluation is now ours (i.e. we must become gods ourselves to be worthy of the murder).

Towards new philosophers; there is no choice; toward spirits strong and original enough to provide the stimuli for opposite valuations and to revalue and invert “eternal values”; towards forerunners, toward men of the future who in the present tie the knot and constraint that forces the will of millennia upon new tracks. To teach man the future of man as his will, as dependent on a human will, and to prepare great ventures and over-all attempts of discipline and cultivation by way of plotting an end to that gruesome dominion of nonsense and accident that has so far been called “history” (Ibid., 203).

In Nietzsche et la conversion métaphysique, Simone Goyard-Fabre acknowledges the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. She insightfully invites readers to accord Nietzsche a measure of artistic freedom in evaluating his philosophical claims, because his philosophical claims, as he understands them, do not rest on truths, but on the values or inspirations of their author. This is a license that Clarke seems to be unwilling to accord Nietzsche, preferring to engage him with an unflinching philosophical will to truth as correspondence. For Clarke, any compelling philosophy has to involve a conception of truth as correspondence. In this respect, she engages Nietzsche as a
philosopher whose project is valuable to the extent that it coheres with the history of philosophy as the history of metaphysics.

While Clarke is free to posit whatever values she wishes to condition her evaluation of Nietzsche, her choice seems odd given the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. As Goyard-Fabre notes, “Cette mort [God’s death], à nulle autre pareille, bouleverse en effet toutes les perspectives, et la philosophie d’après la mort de Dieu ne pourra absolument pas ressembler à la philosophie d’avant la mort de Dieu : seuls, les « sans peur » y auront accès” (Goyard-Fabre 1974, 105). Goyard-Fabre, in juxtaposition to Clarke, forwards an interpretation of Nietzsche generally, and an interpretation of the will to power specifically, which take seriously Nietzsche’s reforms to the philosophical method as a projection of values rather than a discovery of truths. Consequently, she evaluates Nietzsche in light of rather different criteria.

Goyard-Fabre’s interpretation of Nietzsche understands that after Nietzsche, philosophy can no longer provide what Socrates, Aristotle, Kant and Descartes hoped it would. Though what a correct representation of the world would be like is spectacularly different for each, each is unlike Nietzsche insofar as each strives towards an exclusively correct, definitive, and relatively intelligible representation of the world. Goyard-Fabre acknowledges that this is simply not what Nietzsche is doing. She acknowledges that Nietzsche is not forwarding a distinctively correct representation of the world as a definite object.
The next chapter, in critiquing the third principal interpretive approach to the will to power, will flesh out precisely what Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics does not mean for philosophy, its method, and for the sense of the will to power as a product of that method. Specifically, it will describe what a full rejection of metaphysics does not entail for the philosophical concept of truth.
Chapter 3: The Will to Power as an Instantiation of Interpretive Play

The previous two chapters analyzed and rejected the two first principal interpretive approaches to the will to power. In the first chapter, the interpretation of the will to power as a metaphysical concept was rejected because it was inconsistent with Nietzsche’s clear and consistent rejection of metaphysics as a valuable type of philosophical activity. In the second chapter, the interpretation of the will to power as an empirical concept, or as an empirically derived explanatory principle, was rejected because it either became synonymous with the empirical phenomena that it was trying to explain, or because it reformulated the metaphysical discourse that Nietzsche was supposed to have rejected.

However, while both interpretive approaches to the will to power were in the final analysis rejected, both critiques occasioned a positive, though incomplete interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical method. Nietzsche is a kind of historian for whom history must be made to serve life as activity. Nietzsche’s philosophical analyses, therefore, as a species of his historical method, cannot simply aspire to correct representation. They are not positivistic attempts to get things right. They necessarily involve establishing the conditions in which those analyses can be made to serve life, which in the context of the activity of the philosopher, is the activity of projecting values. Philosophy, however, becomes problematic because it becomes a kind of projective activity. It seems as though the value of any philosophical analysis is either utterly relativistic or irrelevant, because the conventional criterion of evaluation for any philosophical analysis (i.e. its truth) does not condition the philosopher values, but is conditioned by the philosopher’s values. Any
adequate interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power, therefore, at least insofar as it accepts that the philosophical method Clarke attributes to Nietzsche is correct, and at the same time rejects Clarke’s analysis of what truth must be if it is to be at all compelling, must account for the sense and function of truth within Nietzsche’s post-metaphysical, philosophical method. Consequently, though both the negative and positive determinations of Nietzsche’s philosophical method help constrain the scope of any acceptable interpretations of the will to power as a philosophical concept, on their own, they are still insufficient.

The third and final of the three principal interpretive approaches to the will to power, despite avoiding the same mistakes as the first two, is either inadequate or incorrect in its own right, because it is unable to flesh out the full consequences of Nietzsche conception of truth subsequent to his rejection of metaphysics. The present chapter, whose aim is once again to analyze and evaluate one of the three principal interpretive approaches to the will to power, will once again reject what it evaluates. This third interpretive approach pushes the negative features of Nietzsche’s philosophical critique too far, and is, as a result, unable to adequately determine its positive features. It is unable to account for the sense and status of truth in a manner that can still afford Nietzsche a means of justifying the philosophical value of the will to power.

In the first place, Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth, from which an interpretation of the will to power is interpolated, only adequately accounts for its negative features. Though Derrida successfully interprets Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics in its fullest sense, he does not go beyond that critique. Derrida does not consider what philosophy would be once metaphysics and the correspondence conception
of truth that defines it are rejected. Consequently, while his analysis is apt, it is also insufficient.

In the second place, de Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth, though similar in tone to Derrida’s, is incorrect. De Man bases his interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth upon Nietzsche’s conception of language. His interpretation, however, fails to adequately contextualize the passages he analyzes. Because he fails to place them within the texts and the oeuvre from which they are taken, his interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth becomes inconsistent with a great deal of Nietzsche’s other philosophical claims. Specifically, he fails to acknowledge that Nietzsche’s conception of truth changes. While Clarke’s analysis was, on the whole, rejected, the following critique of de Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conceptions of language and truth will substantiate her analysis of Nietzsche’s early conception of truth, and her claim that this conception is later displaced. Because de Man pushes Nietzsche’s negative analysis of truth too far in trying to describe its positive consequences, de Man’s entire interpretation becomes untenable. Moreover, because de Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power is interpolated from his interpretations of language and truth, and because these analyses are unacceptable, de Man’s interpretation of the will to power must be rejected as well.

However, while the third principal interpretive approach to the will to power is rejected, it will occasion the final negative qualification of Nietzsche’s philosophical method necessary for determining the scope of allowable interpretations of the will to power as one of its products.
3.1 Jacques Derrida’s Approach to the Will to Power

According to Derrida, the will to power is a textual object that affords an opportunity for interpretive play. It is not something to be discovered, but something to be playfully posited, and posited as ever subject to re-positing. This interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power, however, will have to be, to a large extent, extrapolated from his considerations of Nietzsche’s treatment of three other terms. In fact, the only reference to the will to power in Derrida’s Éperons, the textual hub of the following exposition, is a short passage meant to elucidate his interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth. “Si Nietzsche avait voulu dire quelque chose, ne serait-ce pas cette limite de la volonté de dire, comme effet d’une volonté de puissance nécessairement différentielle, donc toujours divisée, pliée, multipliée?” (Derrida 1979, 112) However, even though there is only one specific reference to the will to power, attributing to Derrida an interpretation of the will to power is still possible.

The passage cited above endows Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power with at least a few specific attributes. Consequently, attributing to Derrida a ‘would be’ reading of the will to power is not as bold as it might seem. So long as the phrase “necessarily differential, and always divided, folded and multiplied” can be clarified, then Derrida’s conception of the will to power can be clarified as well, at least in this specific respect. Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought provides the means for doing precisely this. Derrida’s analyses of three other terms in Nietzsche’s oeuvre provide the means of setting up an elucidating, analogous relation. Because Derrida interprets three other terms he finds in Nietzsche’s oeuvre as differential and folded, these three terms can provide an insightful analogy of what Derrida likely means by characterizing the will to
power in the same way. Therefore, to understand what Derrida says about the will to power, it will be useful to understand what he interprets Nietzsche to be saying about “woman”, “truth”, and “my umbrella”.

### 3.1.1 Woman

The first stage of Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought is an account of his supposed characterization of the term “woman” as “distance”. In section 60 of *The Gay Science*, woman is characterized as distance. Insofar as she remains at a distance, she maintains the charm and the desirability that supposedly define her. Man, on the other hand, is like a shipwrecked sailor. He is always struggling to stay afloat and not drown. His life and his work, his ambitions and his toil are, metaphorically, the torrents of an angry sea that perpetually bombard him. He is tired and always on the verge of death. In the context of this metaphor, woman is like a passing ship, whose prow cuts through the stormy seas with ease. She is a kind of naval beacon that stands for the desperate hopes of tired, shipwrecked sailors who pine for a respite from their trials. Woman stands as the promise of peace and security.

But the charm of woman, as a potential rescue from life and work, sustains itself only so long as she stays at a distance and remains a mere promise or hope. Nietzsche claims that, far from providing peace, this boat simply subjects the tired sailor to another form of turmoil. If the exhausted sailor were to be fished out of the sea by the passing ship, far from saving him, it would drown him in a new torrent of petty and distracting noise. It would drown him in a mindless, pathetic, and far less noble kind of torrent. Derrida’s Nietzsche may perhaps be imagining the kind of storms that Ulysses would have had to weather had he never left Calypso’s island. The desirability of woman,
therefore, is contingent upon her status as a promise, and not upon her fulfillment of that promise (Ibid., 36).

But distance, Derrida claims, is not only a possible feature of the relation between man and woman. It is an essential feature of woman herself. Distance is not an accidental, relational feature of two types of entities. Woman is not an entity that can be brought closer to another entity to the extent that the distance between them is eliminated. Woman is distance itself, at least to the extent that woman is also and essentially the desirable promise of peace. Woman is not some type of entity that is desirable to the extent that she is kept at a distance, because woman is precisely that desirable promise of peace, so that in the absence of that distance, she cannot be the kind of entity that she supposedly is. Therefore, because woman is woman to the extent that a distance between her and man is maintained, then distance must also be an essential feature of woman (Ibid., 37-38).

If this is the case, and Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of woman is correct, then “woman” is a rather complex concept. The essence of woman is distance, and as such neither approachable- without contradicting what she essentially is-, nor discardable or exilable- without forsaking her desirable promise of peace. Woman can neither be brought close nor pushed away. Consequently, Derrida believes that woman becomes for Nietzsche the conceptual standard for dissimulation, affectation, lying, art, and artistic-philosophy (Ibid., 53). She is ever out of reach, and yet full of promise. She is what one strives for, but her value is contingent on never actually attaining her. To acquire her is to lose precisely what one was seeking, and to turn away is to be left alone with the sea.
In an attempt to clarify the sense of woman as distance, Derrida interprets Nietzsche’s concept of the idea. In *The Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche places the two concepts into an analogous relation. Specifically, in the second stage of the section titled “History of an Error: or How the True World Finally Become a Fable”, woman is posited as a metaphor for the “idea”. Derrida uses Heidegger’s interpretation of this passage to frame his own. According to Heidegger, this passage represents a “magnificent moment of vision” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art* 1961, 202). Nietzsche’s Fable is interpreted as an analysis of the history of Western thought, which is divided into six stages that culminate in the reversal, and then negation of the Platonic association of the supersensuous with real being. By highlighting the metaphorical presence of woman in the second of the six stages, Derrida attempts to flesh out the sense of the Platonic reversal that Heidegger only hints at. Derrida answers Heidegger’s open-ended question about the extent of Nietzsche’s own understanding of the significance of his philosophical project. Heidegger asks whether or not Nietzsche fully grasps that a reversal of Platonism cannot simply be a putting of “what was at the very bottom [(the sensuous)] at the very top [(the supersensuous)]. A new hierarchy and new valuation mean that the ordering structure must be changed. To that extent, overturning Platonism must become a twisting free of it” (Ibid., 209-210).

According to Derrida, the analogical relation of the “idea” and of “woman” clues the reader into Nietzsche’s sensitivity to the sense of what a genuine Platonic inversion must entail. Woman is explicitly described as analogous to the idea in stage two of the history of Western thought. In this stage, the “idea” is alienated from the thinker. It is placed beyond his epistemological horizon.
This historical stage is the Christian stage. The “idea” is Christian truth, which though beyond the reach of the thinking subject, it not entirely discarded. It is only differed. It is promised. The “idea” is the Christian promise of revelation. It is the revelation of God’s promise of an eternal paradise after death, which is promised as the great reward bestowed upon the faithful and the virtuous.

Woman, therefore, as supposedly analogous to the idea, is not something that one can acquire. The sailor cannot simply swim closer towards woman in order to get a better look at her, or to get a clearer notion of what she is, of what the specific content of her promise is. To get close to her, he would have to drown. To attempt to reach woman is to seek self-destruction. If the sailor seeks the fulfillment of the promise of woman, he seeks death. Woman, according to Derrida’s reading, is not some entity that has some essence, which simply finds itself at a relational distance to the sailor. Woman, as analogous to divine revelation, is separated from man by death. It is not a relational dynamic of entities in a living world, but the state of being that awaits man, as soul, beyond it. Woman’s promise, therefore, despite being desirable, is the promise of death.

3.1.2 Truth

According to Derrida, Nietzsche’s analysis of “woman” is meant to clarify the quirky character of truth (Derrida 1979, 43). If truth is correct representation, and correct representation is the correct enumeration of an object’s actual attributes, then the truth of woman simply cannot be. In this context, the essence of woman would be that she has no essence. “Il n’y a pas d’essence de la femme parce que la femme écarte et s’écarte d’elle-même. Elle engloutit, envoie, par le fond, sans fin, sans fond, toute essentialité, toute identité, toute propriété. Ici aveuglé le discours philosophique sombre-
The truth of woman, therefore, if truth is correct representation, is a non-truth. The essence of woman renders a true account of her essence impossible because it will, like the ever deferred Christian promise of paradise, slip away from the reaching grasp of intelligible thought.

Because an essential feature of woman is a lack of a determinacy, she is a non-truth. But this, ironically, is the truth of woman. Consequently, truth itself must not be something like the correct representation of an object’s attributes, because the truth of woman, as a kind of (representational) non-truth, means that truth could be a non-truth. Consequently, the essence of truth is not correct representation, but some kind of perpetual dissimulation, affectation, lie, or art (Ibid., 53). If the truth of woman is a non-truth, then truth must be, or must at least be able to be, non-truth as well.

According to Derrida, woman is Nietzsche’s word for “this non-truth of truth” (Ibid., 39). Derrida cites section 339 of The Gay Science, wherein Nietzsche parallels woman with life.

I mean to say that the world is overfull of beautiful things but nevertheless poor, very poor when it comes to beautiful moments and unveilings of these things. But perhaps this is the most powerful magic of life: it is covered by a veil interwoven with gold, a veil of beautiful possibilities, sparkling with promise, resistance, bashfulness, mockery, pity, and seduction. Yes, life is a woman (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 1974, 339; Werke V2, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 339).

To truly know the world, then, would be to know it as a veil spun of gold. The world is a veil that cannot be ripped off, because the world is not what lies beneath the veil. It is the veil. Truth, therefore, like woman, is a distance, a dissimulation- something like a more or less beautiful seeming. The “dogmatic philosopher” (Derrida 1979, 40) misapprehends the world if he expects true claims to reveal its determinate essence. This
dogmatic philosopher who seeks truth, as a total body of correct representations, is like the sailor who expects peace and shelter in domesticity.

Nietzsche’s conception of truth is thus, at least according to Derrida, no longer anything other than a matter of style. If it is a golden veil, then any profundity it has is a feature of its folds that will always shift and become otherwise (Ibid., 46). Truth is not what lies behind the veil, but the manner in which one wears it. The dogmatic philosopher who seeks to rip of the veil and see behind it is the Christian in the second stage of the history of an error. He anxiously waits upon the promise of divine revelation. He lives for the eventuality of his death.

Dès lors que la question de la femme suspend l’opposition décidable du vrai et du non-vrai, instaure le régime époqual des guillements pour tous les concepts appartenant au système de cette décidabilité philosophique, disqualifie le projet herméneutique postulant le sens vrai d’un texte, libère la lecture de l’horizon du sens de l’être ou de la vérité de l’être, des valeurs de production du produit ou de présence du présent, ce qui se déchaîne, c’est la question du style comme question de l’écriture, la question d’une opération éperonnante plus puissante que tout contenu, toute thèse et tout sens (Ibid., 86).

3.1.3 The Will to Power

If Derrida’s interpretations of the senses of the terms “woman” and “truth”, and their relation to each other are correct, then the project of discerning the sense of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power cannot be correctly representing its attributes. Because truth is not reducible to correct representation, defining the will to power cannot simply be a matter of discovering its determinate and definitive list of attributes. Any definition of the will to power can be nothing other than one more fold in the golden veil, which may shimmer prettily in this or that light, but will give way, over and over again, to new configurations every time someone takes it up. To take it up is to affect the folds that the philosopher mistakes for profound, determinate essences. Each gaze bestows
upon the golden veil new folds and new configurations of folds. Each gaze, therefore, creates new truths.

Though Derrida does not interpret the will to power specifically, his interpretations of the terms “woman” and “truth” affect the possible philosophical status of any textual object’s sense. To flesh out the philosophical consequence of Nietzsche’s conception of truth as a shifting golden veil, Derrida uses Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic passage, “I forgot my umbrella”. However, if Derrida’s interpretation of this passage is understood, then the possible sense attributable to the will to power can also be understood because the sense of both will follow from Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth.

In the first instance, Derrida acknowledges the expressive clarity of the passage. “Cette phrase est lisible... son contenu paraît d’une intelligibilité plus que plate” (Ibid., 108). Nonetheless, despite the seeming unproblematic sense of this passage, it is very problematic. Why is it written at all? What could Nietzsche possibly have had in mind in writing such a thing? The editors of Nietzsche’s notebooks claim to have retained only what represents a sustained, or elaborated work on his part, but make no mention of how this passage might respect that criterion. Moreover, even if it is factually possible that at some juncture the meticulous research of some editor succeeded in making something out of the contextualized sense of the passage, the fragment may at the same time remain precisely that: a fragment. It may remain a kind of textually floating testament to the interpretive abyss of authorial intention (Ibid., 104). “Nous ne serons jamais assurés de savoir ce que Nietzsche a voulu faire ou dire en notant ces mots” (Ibid.).
Moreover, it is also possible that the issue is of no consequence. Maybe the sense of this passage is irrelevant. Derrida claims that the text and author secrete, or ooze out of each other (Ibid., 106) so that purporting to explain one by reference to the other becomes a meaningless tautology of the type A = A. The impossibility of penetrating into this abyss is simply something that must be accepted. It represents a hermeneutical horizon (Ibid., 107). It is truth, as the golden veil, made manifest in the activity of reading.

Derrida, however, does not deny the possibility of interpretation. He cites, as an example, a possible psychoanalytic approach to the passage.

On sait ou l’on croit savoir quelle est la figure symbolique du parapluie : par exemple l’éperon hermaphrodite d’un phallus pudiquement replié dans ses voiles, organe à la fois agressif et apotropaïque, menaçant et/ou menacé, objet insolite qu’on ne trouve pas toujours par simple rencontre avec une machine à recoudre sur une table de castration (Ibid., 110).

However, if the psychoanalytic approach is deemed unacceptable or undesirable, there could also be some kind of ontological reading that takes the being of such passages seriously. Such an interpretation may assume that the passage will yield its essential sense if it is asked the right questions. Still, the limitation imposed upon the interpreter by the structure of this passage, claims Derrida, confounds itself with the passage so that the interpreter is pushed ever deeper into the abyss of the passage’s playful willingness to be read over and over again, and with different results each time. It will never bottom out. It will never afford its reader any interpretive insight that could help it overcome this hermeneutical horizon.

According to Derrida, the passage “I forgot my umbrella” stands as a kind of instantiation of the essential opacity of the text. The umbrella is interpreted as a kind of self-reflective metaphor for reading. The sense of a text is not something hidden in the
folds of the umbrella; it is these folds. “Si Nietzsche avait voulu dire quelque chose, ne serait-ce pas cette limite de la volonté de dire, comme effet d’une volonté de puissance nécessairement différentielle, donc toujours divisée, pliée, multipliée?” (Ibid., 112)

The will to power then, as any text or term in a text, is not an object whose sense is to be discovered in any determinate way. It is but a fold in an umbrella. A “hiding” that affords an opportunity for interpretive play. It is woman, and a woman is the unattainable promise of the safety of a steady boat to a sailor caught in a torrent. It is a stylistic flair. It is opportunity for the act of reading, and not one for the discovery of a definitive interpretation. It is an opportunity for dissimulation. It is the telling of a lie as an act of knowing.

3.1.4 Derrida’s Interpretation of the Will to Power as Correct in a Negative Sense

Set against the critiques of the two previous interpretive approaches, Derrida’s interpretation of the will to power is correct, but only to the extent that it does not make the same type of mistakes. However, while it does not repeat the mistakes of two previous interpretive approaches, neither does it contribute to a positive description of an acceptable interpretation of the will to power. Derrida only attributes to Nietzsche a claim about what philosophy cannot do, and thereby an account of what the will to power cannot be, as a product of Nietzsche’s philosophical method.

Chapter 1 rejected the interpretation of the will to power as a metaphysical concept. Nietzsche was shown to explicitly and repeatedly reject metaphysics as a valuable type of philosophical enquiry, so that the will to power, as a product of Nietzsche’s philosophical method, could not be a metaphysical concept without implying
a rejection of everything besides a very select set of passages. Only if *The Birth of Tragedy* and *The Will to Power* were problematically accorded a central place in Nietzsche’s oeuvre, could such an interpretation even be possible, let alone compelling. However, insofar as this interpretive strategy is adopted, the concept of the will to power becomes inconsistent with the bulk of Nietzsche’s oeuvre.

In Chapter 2, the interpretation of the will to power as an empirical concept was rejected with a number of qualifications. The empirical interpretive approach to the will to power was rejected because it failed, either to forward a philosophically compelling interpretation, or to properly discern the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. However, this interpretive approach, despite being rejected, contained some very constructive features. Both examples of this interpretive approach provided far more compelling interpretations of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy than did Chapter 1. Kaufmann’s interpretation correctly interpreted the will to power as a concept with a history. Kaufmann understood that its sense follows from its totality of appearances in Nietzsche’s oeuvre, and the relation of those appearances to their function in the texts in which they appear. Moreover, he understood that those appearances were not expressive variations of some essence. They represent a concept that changed and evolved over time. Kaufmann, therefore, rightly interpreted the will to power as a product of Nietzsche’s reform to the philosophical method. He took seriously Nietzsche’s rejection of philosophy as metaphysics, in favor of philosophy as a type of history.

Clarke’s interpretation of the will to power was even more constructive. Her interpretation of the will to power took seriously the hypothetical status of the only
published argument for it, and explained the function of that hypothetical argument given its relation to Nietzsche’s published texts, especially *Beyond Good and Evil*. Clarke interprets Nietzsche’s hypothetical argument for the world as will to power as a feature of his analysis of the prejudices of philosophers, the first book of *Beyond Good and Evil*. Philosophy is the practice of projecting one’s values upon the empirical world, and the will to power is consequently interpreted as one possible type of philosophical projection. The will to power, therefore, is interpreted by Clarke as a product of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy. However, while Kaufmann and Clarke, when they are taken together, engender an interesting interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy as the activity of projecting the philosopher’s values on the empirical or historical world, neither adequately interprets the consequent reform Nietzsche brings to the criteria of evaluation for competing philosophical analyses. Clarke’s analysis of truth, which could have fulfilled this function, is inconsistent with the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. Consequently, her interpretation of what truth must be if it is to be at all compelling becomes inconsistent with features of Nietzsche’s oeuvre.

Clarke’s evaluation of the necessary conditions of any adequate conception of truth, while perhaps philosophically compelling in its own right, is inappropriate. If Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy is a projection of a philosopher’s values upon the empirical world, and the will to power is the anchoring term of that projection, then insofar as Nietzsche’s conception of truth is interpreted as a philosophical concept, it would also have to be some kind of projection of the philosopher’s values. If Nietzsche is to be consistent, then all of Nietzsche’s philosophical concepts must be instances of the will to power as an expression of his values. Truth would have to be some variation of
the will to power. Consequently, Clarke’s analysis of truth, and her interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy are inconsistent because truth as will to power, is not consistent with a correspondence theory of truth. While Clarke’s own philosophical sensibilities may seem more acceptable to her readers than Nietzsche’s, her imposition of her own philosophical sensibilities on Nietzsche’s oeuvre make features of that oeuvre unacceptable and inconsistent. As a result, Clarke refused to accord Nietzsche’s notebooks a role in her interpretation.

Derrida’s interpretation, however, while not contributing any further insights into an acceptable interpretation of the will to power, does contribute to an interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth that is far more consistent with Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy. Specifically, Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth is consistent with Clarke’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power.

According to Derrida, Nietzsche’s conception of truth is an instance of his conception of the will to power. This, remember, is Heidegger’ interpretation (see section 1.1.3). Though Heidegger’s interpretation of the will to power was rejected, his interpretation of the relation of the will to power to truth has some merit. Derrida recognizes this. However, he does not make the mistake Heidegger does of arguing that the will to power is a metaphysical concept. Even though Nietzsche’s conception of truth is an instance of the will to power, that does not make the will to power a metaphysical concept.

Unlike Clarke’s interpretation, Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth is consistent with the critical analyses of Chapters 1 and 2, which revealed an incomplete interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy. According to Derrida, Nietzsche’s conception of truth is analogous to his conception of woman and to
the Christian conception of divine revelation. It is essentially unattainable. Truth perpetually withdraws, at least insofar as it is a desirable object that the enquirer tries to acquire. Truth is beyond the hermeneutical horizon of any interpretation. In this sense, it is consistent with what Clarke describes as the first stage of Nietzsche’s conception of truth (see section 2.2.2). According to Clarke, Nietzsche’s early analysis of truth is a rejection of the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth. Insofar as truth is a correspondence between a representation and its object, and the object of that representation is the object as it is in itself, truth is not something that can be known. However, while Clarke interprets Nietzsche’s conception of truth as evolving into an alternative kind of correspondence theory of truth, Derrida does not. Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth does not acknowledge any change or shift. It remains nothing other than a rejection.

While Derrida does offer a positive formulation of his interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth, this positive account is unintelligible. According to Derrida, Nietzsche’s conception of truth is a kind of un-truth. But, if Nietzsche’s account of truth is some kind of un-truth, then Nietzsche’s conception of truth involves a clear breach of the principle of non-contradiction. Truth is both itself and its opposite. Consequently, whether or not Nietzsche is correct about describing truth as such, precisely what such a concept might mean is impossible to discern.

Truth becomes an ambiguous, equivocal concept that cannot constitute a constructive feature of a method for philosophical evaluation. Truth as un-truth, therefore, must be set aside as a philosophical criterion of evaluation. However, if Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth involves a rejection of truth as
a criterion of evaluation, no other criterion is offered in its place. Because Derrida offers no analysis of what might constitute an alternative ground for philosophical evaluation, the product of any philosophical evaluation remains, at best, utterly relative.

Instead of working to clarify the evaluative ambiguity that follows from Nietzsche’s rejection of the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth, Derrida playfully fleshes out the full scope of this confusing intellectual sphere. By undertaking an analysis that accepts the fullest sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, without clarifying the formal and methodological consequences of that rejection for further philosophical enquiry, the status and function of Derrida’s analyses become philosophically ambiguous themselves. For instance, does Derrida suppose that his interpretation of Nietzsche’s concepts “woman”, “truth”, and his interpretation of the passage “I forgot my umbrella” are correct in the sense of correspondent to their object? Does Derrida even accept Nietzsche’s supposed rejection of the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth? What is the philosophical status of Derrida’s analyses of those concepts and that passage? Derrida’s interpretation does not provide the tools for answering these questions. Whether or not Derrida is satisfied with Nietzsche’s supposed description of this hemeneutical situation, however, is not the concern of this analysis. What is of concern is whether or not Derrida would attribute to Nietzsche a belief that philosophy is necessarily relegated to this hemeneutical situation. Derrida does not specify whether or not he thinks this is the case; however, this analysis will. It will contend that Nietzsche does not. Clarke is correct in attributing to Nietzsche’s analysis of truth something more than a rejection of the metaphysical correspondence theory (which is, in the fullest sense, a redundant formulation). Though the previous chapter
has rejected Clarke’s analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of truth as an empirical variation of the correspondence theory, a further consideration of the consequence of Nietzsche’s conception of truth is necessary if philosophy is to be endowed with any but the most relativistic evaluative criteria.

While Derrida’s interpretation remains primarily negative, others take up his interpretation, and make bolder, more positive claims. Paul de Man’s interpretation pushes Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s rejection of truth further. De Man construes Nietzsche’s rejection of the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth as a rejection of any referential relation of terms to the world. According to de Man’s interpretation, Nietzsche believes that terms refer only to each other. Truth, therefore, cannot be any kind of correlation between terms and the objects to which they refer, because terms cannot refer to anything but themselves.

3.2 Paul de Man’s Approach to the Will to Power

De Man’s analysis aims, at least in part, at determining the positive consequences of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics; specifically, the consequence it has for Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy and the philosophical function of truth. His analysis, however, does not include an explicit interpretation of the will to power. Consequently, it too will have to be interpolated. It will have to be interpolated as an implicit consequence of his analysis of the concepts “language” and “truth”, and their relation to each other.

De Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth follows from his analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of rhetoric. Specifically, he highlights Nietzsche’s attempt to move beyond the issue of rhetoric as a technical consideration of eloquence
and persuasion, by showing that rhetoric rests on an available taxonomy of tropes, or figures of speech (Man 1979, 105). According to de Man, the significance of this account of rhetoric rests on the antecedent that, for Nietzsche, tropes are not a derived linguistic form or stylistic ornament, but the linguistic figure that characterizes language as such (Ibid., 105). Consequently, de Man constrains the possible status of any of Nietzsche’s claims to literary instantiations of figural, intra-linguistic relations.

As a result, while he does not undertake any specific analysis of the sense of the concept of the will to power, it can be interpolated as nothing more than a term that refers metaphorically to other terms. Because terms never refer to anything external to the linguistic structure in which they appear, because they never refer to some kind of objective, empirical world, because they can only ever refer metaphorically to each other, the will to power cannot be a correlation between a linguistic representation and the world. It is nothing more than a feature of a formal linguistic structure with no referential content.

3.2.1 Language as Purely Figural and Its Philosophical Consequences

This account of language represents a significant deviation from other more conventional accounts. Nietzsche’s straightforward affirmation that the paradigmatic structure of language is rhetorical rather than representational or expressive of referential, proper meaning is… a full reversal of the established priorities which traditionally root the authority of the language in its adequation to an extralinguistic referent or meaning, rather than in the intralinguistic resources of figures (Ibid., 106).

De Man also insists that this conception of language is not an anomaly of Nietzsche’s philosophy. It is not an idiosyncratic feature of an early course he gave, but a position that he maintains throughout his oeuvre.
He attempts to justify this claim by gleaning from the structure of an argument in the *Will to Power*, written in 1888, an implicit, though consistent account of language.

The chronological reversal which makes the cause reach consciousness later than the effect. – We have seen how pain is projected in a part of the body without having its origin in there; we have seen that the perceptions which one naively considers as determined by the outside world are much rather determined from the inside; that the actual impact of the outside world is never a conscious one… The fragment of outside world of which we are conscious is a correlative of the effect that has reached us from outside and that is then projected, *a posteriori*, as its “cause” (Ibid., 107).

According to de Man, this passage is not simply a description of consciousness’ tendency to fallacious chronological reversals, which take causes for effect and effects for causes. He believes that the explicit content of the passage is only a philosophical platitude until its relation to Nietzsche’s conception of language is drawn out. Nietzsche concludes his consideration of consciousness’ fallacy of mistaking causes for effects and effects for causes with the claim that

> the whole notion of an ‘inner experience’ enters our consciousness only after it has found a language that the individual understands- i.e. a translation of a situation into a familiar situation:- ‘to understand’, naïvely put merely means: to be able to express something old and familiar” (Ibid., 108).

De Man believes that the status of Nietzsche’s account of consciousness must itself be conditioned by this underlying conception of language. Because Nietzsche’s account of consciousness is subject to his account of language, and because Nietzsche’s conception of language is supposedly reducible to a locus for figural substitution and reversals, to instances of the act of translating some unfamiliar situation into a more familiar one, Nietzsche’s account of consciousness can have no truth-value. It cannot say anything about the world as something external to the text of which it is a part, because language cannot refer to something extra-textual. It only ever refers to other rhetorical figures and tropes that are more or less familiar.
If de Man’s interpretation of these two passages are correct, and if de Man is also correct in claiming that these two passages condition all of Nietzsche’s other philosophical claims, then none of his philosophical claims could ever refer to anything other than the tropes and figures that constitute Nietzsche’s philosophical discourse. A philosophical concept, given these linguistic conditions, cannot refer to some external, objective world (be that world conceived in metaphysical or empirical terms). Words and phrases refer, not to objects in the world, but only to other configurations of words or phrases.

Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, for instance, can no longer be thought of as a reversal of metaphysics or of Platonism, because metaphysics and Platonism both involve a belief in extra-linguistic entities to which words and concepts refer. Metaphysics and Platonism use words to make truth claims about a world of extra-linguistic entities. Consequently, if de Man is correct, and language cannot refer to anything outside of language; and if, moreover, Nietzsche’s philosophical reflections are necessarily and consciously conditioned by his conception of language; then, Nietzsche is not saying anything about metaphysics or Platonism. He is only playfully re-organizing the intra-linguistic tropes and figures that constitute their metaphysical discourse. Nietzsche is not saying anything about the factual possibility of the priority of the sensual or non-sensual, and thereby something about metaphysics or Platonism. He is simply playing with these philosophical reflections as one would play with blocks.

**3.2.2 The Inescapable Reduction of Philosophy to Trope**

If this interpretation is correct, and this is in fact what Nietzsche is doing, de Man wonders whether there remains an alternative rhetorical paradigm within which truth-
claims are possible. “Is it not possible to progress from the rhetorical language of
literature to a language that, like the language of science or mathematics, would be
epistemologically more reliable?” (Ibid., 110)

To answer this question, de Man turns to Nietzsche’s essay On Truth and Lies in
a Non-Moral Sense. De Man cites Nietzsche’s explicit description of truth as

A moving army of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms, in short a
summa of human relationships that are being poetically and theoretically
sublimated, transposed, and beautified until, after long and repeated use, a
people considers them as solid, canonical, and unavoidable. Truths are illusions
whose illusionary nature has been forgotten, metaphors that have been used up
and have lost their imprint and that now operate as mere metal, no longer as
coins (Nietzsche, The Nietzsche Reader 2006, On Truth and Lies in a Non-
Moral Sense, 117; Werke III2, Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge in aussermoralischen
Sinne, 374-375).

Because truths are conceived as metaphors, truths are not a specific type of relation
between claims and that which they purport to represent. Truths are only relations of
some terms to other terms. Consequently, a discursive context that would purport to
make truth-claims, in the sense of making claims about a world external to the linguistic
structure within which those claims are made, misunderstands itself.

The only difference between literature and any other type of discourse is the
extent to which each recognizes that its claims are playful organizations of intra-linguistic
relations. Discourses such as science and mathematics have a tendency to forget the
figural essence of language given their more or less consciously reified body of
metaphorical relations. They have forgotten that their own discourses rest on
metaphorical, and not on referential relations. But, of course, this simply begs the
question: how does this account of language’s error of forgetting that it is grounded upon
un-truth not denounce its own position?
According to De Man, Nietzsche does not attempt to avoid or counter the conception of truth as a form of deception. Instead, he undertakes a figural reversal of the original deception. That is to say, it is once again a matter of figure, and not of reference. If truth is an army of metaphors, then Nietzsche could not presume to assert something true about truth or about language. The figural inversion of truth as metaphor also posits that metaphors are truths. Therefore, the criticism that metaphors cannot be truths, without implying an absurdity, becomes an incomplete consideration of the sense of the literary trope of reversing the position of both terms. The claim that truth is merely a metaphor is not rendered absurd by virtue of its having presupposed the truth of its own claim because the linguistic structure called metaphor has also been reconceived as truth. Truth is not made out to be lies without also making the qualification that lies are true. The lie is thus not made out to be true, but “raised to a new figural power” (de Man 1979, 112). So long as the reversal is thought to be a means of re-establishing the grounds of literal truth, all that has happened is that the reversal has “driven us further into the complications of rhetorical delusion” (Ibid., 113). But, de Man insists, this is not Nietzsche’s mistake. This is, at most, the mistake of some of his readers.

De Man, therefore, acknowledges that a text like *Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*, does not escape its own thesis. More importantly, he insists that it does not presume to. The result of the arguments found in a text like *Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense* is not the attainment of the truth that truth is a lie, but something akin to art’s recognition that its objects of play are appearances and not essences. Art does not deceive itself about being deceptive. It acknowledges this and acquires, consequently, a greater degree of artistic freedom.
The result of this interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth as a rhetorical, figural, intra-linguistic trope that refers to nothing outside of the formal structures of linguistic utterances is consciously self-destructive. However, de Man insists that this self-destruction is perpetually displaced. After all, the text that would purport to demonstrate the truth of the self-destructive quality of the valid inferences that follow from this claim would also have to be subjected to its own claim and thus be nothing more than an intra-linguistic series of figural reversals. “The wisdom of the text is self-destructive (art is true but kills itself), but this self-destruction is infinitely displaced in a series of successive reversals which, by the endless repetition of the same figure, keep it suspended between truth and the death of truth (Ibid., 115).

De Man insists that this conceptual quagmire ought to frame any interpretation of Nietzsche’s other claims. De Man, however, does not purport to actually undertake this project. Consequently, the following interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power is not De Man’s as such. The following interpretation of the will to power is an interpolation of the possible sense of the concept given De Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of the possible philosophical status that any claim could aspire to.

3.2.3 Interpolating an Interpretation of the Will to Power from de Man’s Interpretation of Nietzsche Theory of Language as Trope

Because language cannot be representational, the will to power can be neither a metaphysical concept, nor an empirical concept; at least insofar as metaphysical and empirical concepts purport to refer to something extra-linguistic. The will to power is a term locked inside a linguistic system that refers only to the other terms within that system. It is a term in a metaphor, which is in turn merely a figure that constitutes the
contingent structural state of a given instance of language. It says nothing about the world as a super-sensuous, eternal realm of pure forms, nor does it say anything about the world as a body of empirical experiences, be those either ideal or material. It is a kind of constituent feature of a kaleidoscopic configuration of colors that has no iconographical content.

Fleshing out all of the statements that Nietzsche makes about the will to power, and the metaphorical structures into which Nietzsche places the concept, will reveal a particular literary playfulness on his part. However, insofar as this is all that the concept purports to do, this analysis will not burden itself with drawing out a series of irrelevant relations that say nothing about the world. It will not burden itself with the meticulous and arduous task of identifying the specific metaphorical relations into which it is placed, if those relations say nothing about the world as something other than a linguistic structure which is inward looking and totally irrelevant, if not arbitrary.

3.2.4 De Man’s Failure to Provide an Acceptable Alternative Conception of Truth

Subsequent to a critical analysis of the first two principal interpretative approaches to the will to power, a few features of Nietzsche’s philosophical method have been established. In addition, and as a consequence of that method, so have a few features of Nietzsche’s philosophical concept of the will to power. In a negative sense, Nietzsche’s philosophical method involves a rejection of metaphysics. He rejects metaphysics in the sense of rejecting any correlative conception of truth, whatever the terms in which that discourse is posited. In a positive sense, Nietzsche’s philosophical method is some kind of historical method, wherein the objects of any philosophical
analysis are analyzed as historical objects. However, a proper historical analysis is not a purely objective analysis of history as a body of chronological facts, but the historian’s subjugation of those facts to the requirements of life as activity. The will to power then, as a product of Nietzsche’s philosophical method, must be a concept that is what it is by virtue of its history, which is at least partially conditioned as such by the concerns of its author. Clarke provides an apt theoretical account of this kind of philosophy.

Philosophy, in this sense, is a projection of values. The will to power, therefore, as one of Nietzsche’s philosophical concepts, is Nietzsche’s projection of values on the empirical world. However, Clarke’s analysis of truth, as necessarily involving some version of the correspondence theory, undermines the macrocosmic application of her interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy to his oeuvre. That is to say, because Clarke’s analysis of truth is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s own, truth engenders a seeming inconsistency in his oeuvre.

Therefore, what remains to be determined is the sense and function of truth as a central philosophical term, subsequent to having posited philosophy as a projection of values. In a negative sense, this is precisely what Derrida does. According to Derrida, truth is a kind of hypothetical. It is a promise whose appeal is sustained only so long as it is never actualized. Truth is the hypothetical fulfillment of metaphysics, which is instantiated in the history of Western thought as, for example, the Christian promise of divine revelation, and as the Platonic realm of true forms. Nietzsche rejects this metaphysical conception of truth. Nietzsche, however, does not reduce philosophy to metaphysics because philosophy is a historical object. It can change. Consequently, if truth is a philosophical concept, and if philosophy is not reduced to metaphysics, then
truth could be something other than a metaphysical concept. The philosopher should be able to subject truth to a kind of philosophical analysis that would provide both a positive and acceptable account of its sense, given Nietzsche’s reform to the philosophical method.

De Man’s use of Nietzsche’s course on rhetoric, given in 1872-1873, does not succeed in this respect. Despite avoiding the failures of the previous two interpretive approaches, it is unconvincing. According to de Man, it contains a description of language as essentially metaphorical. In this respect, de Man is correct. However, his interpretation of the sense of that description is not. De Man’s interpretations of language and truth are myopic. His interpretations are not adequately conditioned by the contexts in which its objects are found; they fail to acknowledge how they actually function in “On Rhetoric” and “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”.

3.2.5 De Man’s Misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s Conception of Language

De Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of language is an interpretation, for the most part, of only one passage in one small section of his course on ancient rhetoric. The passage around which de Man’s interpretation pivots is an analysis of the relation of ancient rhetoric to language.

According to Nietzsche’s course on rhetoric, rhetoric is one of the liberal arts. It is a “republican art”. It is an art for free men who, being free of the burden of producing what is needed for the sustenance of the body, can aspire towards producing what is needed for the flowering of the soul. Specifically, rhetoric is the art of persuasion. It is particularly useful in an age where the hub of its worldview is myth and not fact, because in such an age, historical accuracy or the power to demonstrate is less relevant than
eloquence and the power to convince. Therefore, rhetoric is a “republican art” because it is the means of effective political activity. It is “the highest spiritual activity of the well-educated political man” (Nietzsche, Darstellung der antiken Rhetorik 1989, Section I, 3).

Nietzsche’s analysis of rhetoric is a historical analysis. It is a historical survey of ancient theoretical conceptions of rhetoric. According to those ancient accounts, Nietzsche interprets “what is natural” as an integral feature of what is considered good rhetorical style. However, according to Nietzsche,

it is not difficult to prove that what is called ‘rhetorical’, as a means of conscious art, had been active as a means of unconscious art in language and its development, indeed, that the rhetorical is a further development, guided by the clear light of the understanding, of the artistic means which are already found in language (Ibid., Section III, 21).

In order to justify this claim, Nietzsche makes a claim about language. Nietzsche claims that there is no “naturalness of language”. Language is always an affectation. It is always affected or rhetorical, because language does not seek to instruct. It seeks to compel or convince.

Nietzsche infers this quality of language from a theory of perception. “Man, who forms language, does not perceive things or events, but impulses: he does not communicate sensations, but merely copies of sensations” (Ibid.). The referent to which any word refers is not a thing, but an impression of a thing in the “soul”, produced in the “soul” by the nerves, which are the body’s faculties of perception. According to Nietzsche, therefore, what language represents is not “the full essence of things” (Ibid., 23), but only the sensorially mediated representations of those things. Words refer to impressions or appearances, not to essences. Consequently, the referential content of language is doxa (opinion), not episteme (knowledge) (Ibid.).
If this interpretation is correct, then de Man’s interpretation is incorrect. Nietzsche’s claims that “tropes are not just occasionally added to words but constitute their most proper nature”, and that “it makes no sense to speak of a ‘proper meaning’ which is carried over to something else only in special cases” (Ibid., 25), are not claims that the essence of language is the relation of terms to other terms. Nietzsche is making a claim about the type of objects to which terms refer. They refer to impressions, not to the causes of those impressions, not to the objects themselves.

De Man has misunderstood the sense of Nietzsche’s description of language as essentially metaphorical, because he misinterpreted the metaphorical relation essential to language as that between terms and other terms. What Nietzsche calls the metaphorical essence of language does not refer to a linguistic device, but to the theory of perception described above. Nietzsche’s theory of perception contextualizes his claim about the essence of language. Words are terms that refer to sense impressions, and sense impressions are “the soul’s” metaphors for objects. The essence of language is, at least insofar as it is presented in this text, an extra-textual referential relation of words to sense impressions. The essence of language is metaphorical, therefore, because words refer to the “metaphors” for objects that the body produces when it perceives those objects, not because terms are only able to refer to other terms.

3.2.6 De Man’s Misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s Conception of Truth

If this analysis of Nietzsche’s account of language in his course on rhetoric is correct, then instead of justifying the inference that de Man makes about Nietzsche’s conception of truth, it justifies Clarke’s account of Nietzsche’s early conception of truth as Neo-Kantian. This interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of language provides
further evidence for Clarke’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s early conception of truth as a metaphysically realist position.

According to Clarke, Nietzsche’s early analysis of truth is a rejection of truth as correspondence between claims and the world as it is in itself (see section 2.2.2). Nietzsche’s early rejection of truth is a rejection that any claim could ever be known to correspond to a *noumenal* realm, because all claims are made from within the confines of the phenomenal realm. De Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth, as an inversion of intra-textual terms is consequently incorrect because it misinterprets the sense of Nietzsche’s description of language as essentially metaphorical.

3.2.7 Nietzsche’s Conception of Language as a Discursive Variation of his Rejection of Metaphysics

Nietzsche’s conception of language, at least as it is presented in “On Ancient Rhetoric” and “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”, is simply another version of his early rejection of metaphysics. While Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, in its full sense, involves a rejection of any version of the correspondence theory of truth (see section 2.2.7), even this fully fleshed out version does not necessarily imply a rejection of a referential linguistic model wherein terms refer to something extra-textual. At least, Nietzsche makes no claim that it does.

In any case, Nietzsche’s conception of language, as it is presented in the two cited texts, claims that language is referential. Nietzsche’s early account of language involves an account of precisely what it is terms refer to, and precisely what they do not. Terms do not refer to objects in the world. They refer to objects in what Nietzsche uncharacteristically calls the soul. They refer to impressions. Nietzsche’s critique of
language, therefore, is not a rejection of a referential linguistic structure, but a claim about what can, and what cannot be the referent objects of any term. A term cannot refer to an object as it is in itself. It refers to the metaphor of those objects in the soul; that is to say, it refers to impressions.

Over the course of his oeuvre, Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics is fleshed out in a variety of contexts. This is as much the case in 1888, as it was in 1872. In Section 5 of *Twilight of the Idols*, titled “Reason in Philosophy”, Nietzsche frames his rejection of metaphysics in linguistic terms. According to Nietzsche, many metaphysical prejudices are so intertwined and entangled within the structure of language that the structure of language often problematically encourages unacceptable metaphysical beliefs. The cross-fertilization of language and metaphysics throughout history encourages these kinds of errors, and it is these kinds of errors that he is at pains to reveal.

At present, on the contrary, we see ourselves entangled in some measure in error, necessitated to error precisely as far as our rational prejudice compels us to post unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, materiality, what is; however certain we are, by means of a strict recalculation of the account, that the error is found there… In its origin, language belongs to the age of the most rudimentary form of psychology: we come into the midst of a gross fetish system when we call up into consciousness the fundamental presuppositions of linguistic metaphysics (i.e. the presuppositions of “reason”). This system sees everywhere actors and action; it believes in will as cause in general; it believes in the “ego”, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance; and it projects the belief in the ego-substance on to everything- it first creates thereby the conception “thing”… Being is everywhere thought into, and foisted upon things, as cause; it is only from the conception “ego” that the derivative conception of being follows (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist* 2004, *Twilight of the Idols*, Reason in Philosophy, Section 5; *Werke* VI3, Götzen- Dämmerung, Die „Vernunft“ in der Philosophie, 5).

However, Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics does not constitute a rejection of the potentially referential quality of language simply because language is historically affected by metaphysics. Even though terms seem to function according to certain metaphysical principles, or at least in a manner consistent with certain metaphysical prejudices,
Nietzsche does not purport to deny the potentially referential function of language. He does not throw the baby out with the bathwater so to speak. “We cease to think when we refuse to do so under the constraints of language; we barely reach the doubt that sees this limitation as a limitation. Rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we cannot throw off” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 1968, Section 522; Werke VIII1, Nachgelassene Fragmente, 5[22]). Nietzsche only insists that an analysis of language should not blind itself to the influence that metaphysics has had on the development of language. Consequently, Nietzsche’s early analysis of language should not be mistaken as a rejection of any type of referential linguistic structure. Instead, Nietzsche only denies that the referential structure of language involves a relation between terms and objects themselves. Terms only refer to our impressions of objects. So long as the influence of the history of metaphysics is acknowledged, and that certain analogous qualities of language and metaphysical systems are not mistakenly taken as an empirical justification for those metaphysical systems, then certain dubious inferences about the ‘true’ world from language can be avoided.

Any further analysis of language is unnecessary. The extent to which Nietzsche’s conception of language may shift in light of his shifting conception and evaluation of metaphysics must be relegated to some other study. It is sufficient to show that even if Nietzsche’s texts “On Ancient Rhetoric” and “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” constitute an expression of Nietzsche’s unchanging conception of language, which is highly unlikely to say the least, and that that conception of language could condition an interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth and the will to power, de Man would still be incorrect. De Man’s reading of these texts is unacceptable because it mistakes the
sense of Nietzsche’s description of language as metaphorical. Consequently, his interpretation of truth, and the interpolated interpretation of the will to power attributed to de Man must also be rejected.

**Conclusion**

The present chapter’s critique of the third principal interpretative approach to the will to power has delineated the limits of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics and the limits of the negative affect that that rejection has on Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy. Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics was a rejection, not only of the philosophical aspirations of making correct claims about the ‘true’ world as a world of permanent essence (for instance, what Socrates calls the *ontos on*), but also of the philosophical aspiration of making correct claims about the empirical world. Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics in its fullest sense was a rejection of any version of the correspondence conception of truth. However, Nietzsche’s rejection of truth as correspondence is not, thereby, an unqualified rejection of truth.

Derrida and de Man’s interpretations fail to properly account for the positive consequences of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics in relation to his conception of the philosophical sense and function of the concept of “truth”. Derrida’s analysis, even though it takes an eccentric approach, successfully interprets the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. However, he does not address what the sense and function of the concept of truth might be subsequent to that rejection. Derrida does not describe what Nietzsche’s alternative conception of philosophy entails for one of its historically central concepts. Consequently, while Derrida’s analysis provides an interesting analysis of
what truth and what the will to power are not, he does not identify the conditions under which a positive account of these concepts becomes possible.

De Man, on the other hand, takes Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics too far. De Man believes that Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics is part of a linguistic theory that denies words any referential function. Words become nothing other than a feature of metaphorical structures with no extra-textual referents. Consequently, Nietzsche is able to make claims such as lies are truths and truths are lies, because neither term refers to anything except the relations that an author can more or less meaningfully posit. Moreover, the will to power can be nothing other than a term that relates to other terms in the history of philosophy. It may be more or less interesting, and it may be more or less creative or idiosyncratic, but it can say nothing about the world as something external to the text.

Nietzsche’s concept of truth, however, can go beyond Derrida’s analysis, without being pushed into irrelevance as it is by de Man’s. In fact, all of the necessary conditions for determining the philosophical sense and status of truth have already been established. So long as the parameters of what any philosophical concept can mean are kept in mind, Nietzsche’s conception of truth, as a philosophical concept, is rather unproblematic. Relative to the history of philosophy, it is extremely radical; however, relative to his conception of what philosophy cannot be, it is little more than an unsurprising inference.

The next chapter will clarify the sense and function of the philosophical concept of truth in the context of Nietzsche’s conception philosophy. It will show that the will to power is consistent with truth, and that it does not engender the problem of self-reference. Moreover, unlike the three most popular interpretive approaches to the will to power, a
fourth approach will be interpreted as consistent with the whole of this critical analysis. Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of the will to power as the genealogical principle of philosophy, and his interpretation of Nietzsche’s re-conceptualization of the philosophical method as a kind of genealogical analysis, despite being largely ignored or misunderstood, are consistent with the critical considerations forwarded in the previous three chapters, and consistent with the entirety of Nietzsche’s oeuvre. More importantly, Deleuze will provide a positive account of the manner in which philosophical arguments can be evaluated subsequent to the displacement of truth as the structure principle of philosophical evaluation.
Chapter 4: Truth, The Will to Power, and Gilles Deleuze’s Contribution to a Preferable, Alternative Interpretation

The previous three chapters critically assessed the value of the three principal interpretive approaches to the will to power: the will to power as a metaphysical concept, the will to power as an empirical concept, and the will to power as an object of interpretive play. Each interpretive approach was rejected as incompatible with some feature of Nietzsche’s oeuvre.

Interpreting the will to power as a metaphysical concept is inconsistent with some part of almost every text that Nietzsche published. This type of interpretation ignores Nietzsche’s explicit and repeated rejections of metaphysics as a valuable, or even an intelligible form of enquiry. For instance, Habermas and Heidegger, two of the most prominent examples of this interpretive approach, ignore almost the entirety of Nietzsche’s published oeuvre. They privilege instead Nietzsche’s very earliest and very latest texts: *The Birth of Tragedy* and the posthumously published notebooks (which is particularly problematic when those notebooks are reduced to the book titled *The Will to Power*). Habermas uses *The Birth of Tragedy* to argue that Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power is a prominent feature of an aesthetic metaphysics, which implicitly rejects the supposed problem of Modernity’s lack of social and historical synthesis. Heidegger, on the other hand, uses a very small selection Nietzsche’s posthumously edited, structured, and published notebooks titled *The Will to Power* to argue that his philosophy as a whole culminates in a metaphysic of the will to power, which inverts the historical privileging of Being over Becoming. However, Nietzsche’s training as a philologist, and texts such as *The Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life* suggest a much less
eccentric, and far more comprehensive approach to Nietzsche’s oeuvre. Nietzsche’s philosophy is an instance of historical analysis, and not metaphysical analysis. Consequently, the will to power, as a product of his historical philosophy, is a type of historical concept, not a metaphysical concept.

However, even though the will to power is best understood as some kind of historical concept, interpreting it as an empirical concept either fails to produce a compelling interpretation, or fails to discern the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. Kaufmann’s interpretation of the will to power as an empirical concept construes it as an explanatory principle that Nietzsche applies to all empirical phenomena. However, because it is interpreted as an explanatory principle, applicable to all empirical phenomena, it becomes tautological and fails to explain anything. Alternatively, Clarke interprets the will to power and the conceptualization of philosophy that produced it as the expression of the philosopher’s innermost values. This interpretation is extremely compelling; however, because it is complemented by an interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth as a version of the commonsense correspondence theory, much of Nietzsche’s unpublished notes have to be discarded. Much of The Will to Power must be ignored or discarded because its descriptions of truth and the will to power are inconsistent with Nietzsche’s supposed acceptance of a commonsense, correspondence conception of truth. Consequently, while Clarke’s interpretations of the will to power and of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy are compelling independently of each other, truth has to be reinterpreted if Nietzsche’s oeuvre as a whole is to be rendered coherent.
The interpretation of the will to power as an object of interpretive play, despite succeeding where the previous interpretations fail, is either unwilling or unable to adequately account for the sense and function of the term “truth”, and its relation to the will to power. Though Derrida aptly, if somewhat eccentrically, interpreted Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, he did not account for the sense and function of truth subsequent to that rejection. As a result, Derrida’s interpretation works towards fleshing out, not resolving, the problematic ambiguity of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. De Man, on the other hand, does attempt to resolve it. However, his positive account of Nietzsche’s conception of truth is incorrect. It mistakes the sense of Nietzsche’s early claim that language and truth are metaphorical. De Man claims that, for Nietzsche, the referential relations of terms are purely intra-textual. Terms only metaphorically refer to each other, not to objects in the world. This, however, is incorrect. The texts on which de Man bases his interpretation do claim that terms refer to ‘objects’ in the world. They refer to impressions or appearances, what Nietzsche calls the metaphors for objects in the soul. Therefore, what Nietzsche calls the metaphorical essence of language is a characterization, and not a rejection of the referential essence of language. Consequently, the interpretation of the will to power as an object of interpretive play, which functions as a term within a purely intra-textual linguistic structure, must be rejected as following from an incorrect interpretation of Nietzsche’s very early, and largely revised claims about the metaphorical nature of language and truth.

While each one of the three principal interpretive approaches to the will to power has been rejected, the critical analysis of each has provided some very constructive guidelines for an acceptable interpretation. These guidelines follow from attributing to
the will to power the status of a philosophical concept. Because the will to power is a philosophical concept, it must be accounted for as a product of Nietzsche’s philosophical method, and three important features of Nietzsche’s philosophical method have been determined. In the first place, Nietzsche is a kind of historian. Consequently, his analyses of philosophical concepts are analyses of their appearances in specific philosophical texts. They are defined by their historical appearances. However, a historical analysis is not simply a summary account of supposedly objective, true, and observable facts. Good historical analysis is not simply a matter of collecting and enumerating the appearances of some phenomenon, including the textual appearances of a given term. It involves the activity of organizing those historical appearances to advantageously serve life as activity. Consequently, the historian must contribute an organizing principle to his analysis. Clarke’s interpretation of the will to power construes it as an ideal candidate for this function in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Because Clarke interprets Nietzsche’s conceptualization of philosophy as an expression of a philosopher’s innermost values, and the will to power as an instance of such an expression, the will to power can function as the projected organizing principle of Nietzsche’s historical analyses. In this conceptual context, Kaufmann’s genealogical account of Nietzsche’s discovery and development of the will to power as a concept with a history renders the will to power coherent with Nietzsche’s own brand of critical historicism. When Clark’s and Kaufmann’s analyses are taken together, the will to power exemplifies Nietzsche’s analyses of history and philosophy as reciprocally determinative. Kaufmann interprets the will to power as a philosophical concept with a history, as a kind of historical object, and Clarke interprets it as a candidate for the
function of organizing the content of historical analyses to render them advantageous for
life.

However, this interpretation of the will to power is incomplete. Until its relation
to truth is drawn out, its value as a philosophical concept remains ambiguous. According
to Nietzsche, philosophy has historically valued philosophical concepts and claims to the
extent that they are believed to correctly correspond to the world they purport to describe.
That is to say, philosophy has historically been a will to truth, and truth has been some
version of the correspondence theory. But, the will to power is a philosophical concept
enmeshed in a rejection of the correspondence conception of truth. Its value, therefore, is
unclear. As a result, the will to power must be rendered consistent with Nietzsche’s
rejection of the correspondence conception of truth; however, it must do so without
undermining the conditions of possibility of its own philosophical value.

Once the relations of truth to philosophy and to the will to power have been
accounted for, an alternative philosophical criterion of evaluation will have to be posited.
What, for Nietzsche, if not truth as correspondence, constitutes the value of any
philosophy or philosophical concept such as the will to power? To answer this question,
a fourth interpretation of the will to power will be analyzed and assessed. Gilles
Deleuze’s interpretation of the will to power as a genealogical concept will be shown, in
the first place, to respect all of the negative and positive critical considerations that
condition an acceptable interpretation of the will to power. In the second place, it will be
shown to provide an alternative criterion for the evaluation of philosophies and their
products. And in the third place, it will be shown to adequately account for the will to
power’s effect upon philosophy at the theoretical level, without undermining its first two strengths.

**Part I- Nietzsche’s Radical Conception of Truth**

**4.1 Truth as a Philosophical Concept**

**4.1.1 The Problematic Implication of Clarke’s Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Conception of Truth**

The acceptability of a correspondence conception of truth is irrelevant to an interpretation of Nietzsche. What must be assessed is not whether Nietzsche could have, or ought to have subscribed to a correspondence theory of truth, but whether he did. To answer this question, Nietzsche’s conception of truth must be subjected to the same type of analysis as Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power. Because an analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of truth is meant to determine whether or not it is consistent with Nietzsche’s philosophical concept of the will to power, an analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of truth is an analysis of truth as a philosophical concept. Consequently, Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy should determine what truth is, because truth as a philosophical concept is a product of that type of activity. Strangely, Clarke’s exceptionally compelling interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy does not condition her interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth.

Instead, Clarke’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth is conditioned by what she thinks he must mean if his philosophy is to be compelling. Because she believes that any “reasonable interpretation clearly demands that we attribute to a text the best position compatible with the relevant evidence about its meaning” (Clarke 1990,
and because any compelling philosophy does accept the commonsense conception of the correspondence theory of truth, Clarke believes that Nietzsche must accept it (Ibid., 31; see section 2.2.1). However, while Clarke may be correct insofar as she claims that Nietzsche’s philosophy will only be compelling if he accepts the common sense correspondence theory of truth, and that any reasonable interpretation ought to attribute the best position compatible with a text, her claim that Nietzsche does accept some version of the commonsense correspondence theory does not necessarily follow. Moreover, it seems to conflict with other features of her own interpretation. Specifically, her interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth is inconsistent with her interpretation of his conception of philosophy as a projection of the philosopher’s values.

If Clarke is correct, and Nietzsche conceives of philosophy as a projection of the philosopher’s values, then truth, at least insofar as it is a philosophical concept, must also be a projection of the philosopher’s values. Moreover, because Clarke has described the will to power as the philosophical conceptualization of Nietzsche’s values, truth must be some variation of the will to power. This, however, is not Clarke’s interpretation. Clarke does not interpret Nietzsche’s conception of truth in this manner because it would transgress what she believes to be a necessary condition of a positive evaluation of his philosophy.

It seems that if Clarke rightly values Nietzsche’s philosophy, she must either be wrong about Nietzsche’s conception of truth, or wrong about his conception of philosophy. However, this need not be the case. This problematic dichotomy is the consequence of an equivocal use of the term, “philosophy”. Clarke’s analysis of truth
implicitly involves a conception of philosophy that is significantly different than Nietzsche’s as she interprets it.

If any acceptable conception of philosophy must involve a common sense conception of truth as correspondence, then any acceptable conception of philosophy at least implicitly purports to make true claims about the world. It follows that philosophy would be good philosophy only when those claims are in fact true, and they are only true when they in fact correspond to the world they purport to describe. However, according to Clarke, this is not Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy. According to Clarke, Nietzsche conceives of philosophy as a projection of the innermost values of the philosopher on the empirical world. Consequently, Clarke’s evaluative criteria, whether or not they are acceptable on their own terms (perhaps as projections of her own innermost values on the empirical world of Nietzsche’s oeuvre), are inappropriate to an interpretation and evaluation of Nietzsche’s philosophy because philosophy for Clarke and philosophy for Nietzsche are two very different things.

4.1.1 Truth as a Historical Object

Nietzsche’s conception of truth does not follow from the necessary conditions that would determine what truth has to be if it is to be worthwhile or compelling. Defining truth as a product of something other than its empirically observable instantiations (i.e. its appearances in the history of philosophy) is an investigation into the \emph{a priori} attributes of truth. This type of enquiry into truth is metaphysical, and Nietzsche explicitly and repeatedly rejected both the value and the intelligibility of this type of enquiry (see section 2.2.3). It is a useless enquiry at best. At its worst, it is nonsense.
In Section 1 of *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche explicitly rejects Clarke’s assumption that any good philosophy must respect the conditions that make truth a valuable philosophical concept. Far from assuming that truth is a valuable philosophical concept, Nietzsche’s analysis of truth is, at least in part, an enquiry into whether or not it is a valuable philosophical concept. Nietzsche’s analysis of truth, therefore, cannot be an analysis of what truth must be if truth is to be of any philosophical value, because Nietzsche does not assume that it is. Consequently, the philosophical value of truth cannot be a premise that determines either Nietzsche’s conception of truth, or his mode of enquiry regarding the concept. “Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 1989, 1; Werke VI2, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, 1)

Nietzsche’s conception of truth as a philosophical concept is the product of a different kind of analysis. It is not an enquiry into what truth must be under certain determinative conditions, but an enquiry into what truth is as a historical object. Nietzsche’s analysis of truth, as a philosophical concept, is an analysis of a term as it appears in a specific discourse, which is discernable by, and defined as its appearances in that discourse. Nietzsche’s analysis of truth, therefore, proceeds in much the same way as his analysis of rhetoric: a survey of the historical appearances of a concept in a given discourse, observable in a determinate body of texts.

As a result, Nietzsche’s analysis of truth is perhaps the most striking instance of his reform to the philosophical method. The assumption that philosophy is endowed with the power to make claims that correspond correctly to the world does not condition Nietzsche’s interpretation of truth, because such a conception of truth is not presupposed
as conditioning the value of philosophy. Nietzsche does not even assume that philosophy has any value. As a result, Nietzsche is able to subject truth to a historical, and not a metaphysical analysis. Nietzsche defines truth by the history of its use, not its desired or intended function. Nietzsche’s analysis of truth, therefore, because it has historically defined the sense and value of philosophy as an activity, is an unmistakable instance of the forfeiture of the whole of philosophy to history.

Forfeit to history.- The veil-philosophers and world-obscurers, that is to say all metaphysicians of finer or coarser grain, are seized with eye-, ear-, and toothache when they begin to suspect that the proposition ‘The whole of philosophy is henceforth forfeit to history’ is quite true. On account of the pain they feel they must be forgiven for throwing stones and dirt at him who speaks thus: the proposition itself, however, can thereby become dirty and unsightly for a time, and its effectiveness be diminished (Nietzsche, Human, All-Too-Human 1996, Vol. 2, Assorted Opinions and Maxims, 10; Werke IV2, Menchliches, AllzuMenscheliches, Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche, 10).

4.1.2 Philosophical Truths as Prejudices

If Clarke is correct, and Nietzsche’s analysis of the history of philosophy interprets philosophy as a projection of the philosopher’s innermost values, then Nietzsche’s conception of truth, insofar as it is analyzed as a philosophical concept, must refer to some type of projection of the philosopher’s innermost values. Section 5 of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil provides precisely this type of account. “Truth” is described as the name that “all philosophers” give to their prejudices.

What provokes one to look at all philosophers half suspiciously, half mockingly, is not that one discovers again and again how innocent they are- how often and how easily they make mistakes and go astray; in short, their childishness and childlikeness- but that they are not honest enough in their work, although they all make a lot of noise when the problem of truthfulness is touched even remotely. They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed to the mystics of every rank, who are more honest and doltish- and talk of ‘inspiration’); while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of ‘inspiration’- most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract- that they defend with reasons they have sought after the fact. They are all advocates who resent that name, and for the most part even wily spokesmen for their prejudices which they baptize ‘truths’- and very
far from having the courage of the conscience that admits this, precisely this, to itself; very far from having the good taste of the courage which also lets this be known, whether to warn an enemy or friend, or, from exuberance, to mock itself (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 1989, 5; Werke VI2, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 5).

Philosophical arguments, therefore, can always be contested. They can always be contested because they are always in need of justification, and they are always in need of justification because they are always based on unjustified claims, on prejudices. Demanding a justification for a philosophical argument’s first premises, however, can only ever engender a further argument. Because all arguments rest on prejudices, to the extent that a philosophical argument’s first premises become interim conclusions, they can only be justified as valid inferences that follow from some other set of equally unjustified first premises. This, Nietzsche argues, is an empirically observable, structural feature of all arguments.

As an example, Nietzsche cites Descartes’ self-proclaimed indubitable first premise that his doubt provides him with a clear justification for a belief in his own existence. Nietzsche uses Descartes’ cogito to demonstrate that even his relatively simple and straightforward “I think” is not an intuited certainty. It is a daring assertion that involves a multitude of implicit evaluations.

There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are ‘immediate certainties’; for example, ‘I think’, or as the superstition of Schopenhauer put it, ‘I will’; as though knowledge here got hold of its object purely and nakedly as ‘the thing in itself,’ without any falsification on the part of either the subject or the object. But that ‘immediate certainty,’ as well as ‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing in itself,’ involve a contradicio in adiecto, I shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!
Let the people suppose that knowledge means knowing things entirely; the philosopher must say to himself: When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, ‘I think,’ I find a whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove; for example, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an ‘ego’, and, finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking- that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’? (Ibid., 16)

Be that as it may, if philosophical arguments are based on prejudices and not on truths as correct representation of the ‘real’ world, the result is not a condemnation of philosophy. Nietzsche’s analysis of truth does not imply either a positive or negative evaluation of philosophy as such. He is merely acknowledging what philosophy has tendency to disavow: the contingency of its conclusions.

Philosophical arguments constitute a series of logical inferences that follow from a philosopher’s prejudices. These unjustified evaluations are always subject to further analyses and evaluations, which can only ever reveal that they are also justified by nothing other than a further set of prejudices. Consequently, if truth, in addition to being a noun, is also an adjective attributable to a philosophical argument, it must refer to some feature of the relation between a philosophical conclusion and the prejudices from which it is inferred.

4.1.3 Philosophical Truths as Valid Argumentative Inferences Based on True/Prejudicial Premises

Nietzsche’s habit of rendering his philosophical conclusions in such exceptionally short aphorisms is, as often as not, more confusing than elucidating. For instance, in The Gay Science, Nietzsche describes “two” as the “beginning” of truth. “One is always wrong; but with two truth begins.- One cannot prove his case, but two is always irrefutable” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 1974, 260; Werke V2, Die fröhliche
Wissenshaft, 260). Taken on its own, this passage is at the very least ambiguous. However, if the sense of truth, as a noun that refers to the philosopher’s prejudices, is brought to bear on this passage, its sense is clear.

If truth, as a philosophical concept, refers to a philosopher’s prejudice, then true, as a quality attributable to a philosophical argument, must refer to the function of those prejudices in an argument. Because arguments are founded on the unjustified evaluations implicit in the first premises of all arguments, if an argument is qualified as true, it can only mean that all the features of an argument (i.e. its interim and final conclusions) are consistent with one another. With two consistent claims, truth as an attribute becomes possible. Truth, therefore, is the quality of consistency amongst the claims that constitute a philosophical argument.

Moreover, unless they are structurally faulty, arguments are irrefutable. “Two” are irrefutable because they are based on prejudices or assumptions, and not some metaphysical truth in the sense of a set of claims that actually corresponds to some kind of ‘real’ world. Any argument that critiques another is simply one more argument that assumes the grounds of its own justification. The critical argument, therefore, can contest the original argument, but only by assuming a new set of prejudices, which produces an alternative set of possible conclusions. Philosophies cannot be known to correspond to the world as some kind of objective, independent entity, because they only assume the conditions of their truth; they do not discover them. Philosophy, therefore, is not a description of the world, but a description of one’s self. It is an exposition of one’s fundamental beliefs. “Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary
and unconscious memoir” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 1989, 5; Werke VI2, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 5).

Moreover, if philosophy is a confession of the philosopher’s values or prejudices and not a description of the world, then philosophy cannot prescribe some way of life as more or less consistent with the way the world actually is, and thereby of highest value given that it respects the evaluative principle of truth as correspondence. Philosophy is only ever a description of the way a philosopher lives or wants to live, never a way that someone has to live.

That individual philosophical concepts are not anything capricious or autonomously evolving, but grown up in connection and relationship with each other; that, however suddenly and arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they nevertheless belong just as much to a system as all the members of the fauna to a continent— is betrayed in the end also by the fact that the most diverse philosophers keep filling in a definite fundamental scheme of possible philosophies. Under an invisible spell, they always revolve once more in the same orbit; however independent of each other they may feel themselves with their critical or systematic wills, something within them leads them, something impels them in a definite order, one after the other— to wit, the innate thinking is, in fact, far less a discovery than a recognition, a remembering, a return and a homecoming to a remote, primordial, and inclusive household of the soul, out of which those concepts grew originally: philosophizing is to this extent a kind of atavism of the highest order (Ibid., 20).

But this begs the question: What are the grounds for positing consistency as an evaluative criterion of a philosophical argument? If an argument is true by virtue of its claims being consistent with one another, it seems that the principle of consistency would have to bear the burden of corresponding to the world. It seems as though conceiving truth as coherence has only displaced the application of the principle of correspondence. This objection, however, is simply a repetition of the metaphysician’s mistake. The principle of consistency is not posited as an evaluative criterion of philosophical arguments because it corresponds to the way the world actually is. It is simply one of the prejudices, or unjustified evaluations that conditions most of, if not all of philosophy.
Consistency is at most a historically observable convention of philosophical evaluation that Nietzsche believes could very well be consistent with our needs as historical organisms; however, it is not thereby forwarded as a metaphysically true feature of the ‘real’ world.

Not ‘to know’ but to schematize- to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require.

In the formation of reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the need, not to ‘know’, but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation.- (The development of reason is adjustment, invention, with the aim of making similar, equal- the same process that every sense impression goes through!) No preexisting idea was at work here, but the utilitarian fact that only when we see things coarsely and made equal do they become calculable and usable for us- Finality in reason is an effect, not a cause: life miscarries with any other kinds of reason, to which there is a continua impulse- it becomes difficult to survey- too unequal.

The categories are ‘truths’ only in the sense that they are conditions of life for us: as Euclidean space is a conditional ‘truth’. (Between ourselves: since no one would maintain that there is any necessity for men to exist, reason, as well as Euclidean space, is a mere idiosyncrasy of certain species of animal, and one among many-).

The subjective compulsion not to contradict here is a biological compulsion: the instinct for the utility of inferring as we do infer is part of us, we almost are this instinct- But what naiveté to extract from this a proof that we are therewith in possession of a ‘truth in itself’!- Not being able to contradict is proof of an incapacity, not a ‘truth’ (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 1968, 515; Werke VIII3, Nachgelassene, 14[152]).

The relatively unchallenged evaluative function of the principle of consistency is at most an example of the tendency for contingent conventions to appear as essential if they remain unquestioned for any extended period of time. The longer a convention stands, the more likely it can be passed off as something essential.

Nietzsche often describes how prejudices or assumptions become reified over time. For instance, this is the sense of the heavily contested passage in Nietzsche’s essay “Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which,
after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins (Nietzsche, *The Nietzsche Reader* 2006, “Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”, 117; *Werke* III2, „Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge in aussermoralischen Sinne“, 117).

Nietzsche is not making a claim that truths are lies, in the sense that claims that purport to correspond to the world actually do not. This, according to the account of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, would constitute a metaphysical claim. Nietzsche does not make metaphysical claims. He is making a historical claim. He is noting the historically observable tendency to forget the historical origins of certain claims. He is noting the tendency to forget that even the most widely accepted claims are grounded on prejudice. If this tendency is observable in discourses such as politics, morality, and religion, it is especially prevalent in the history of philosophy.

Philosophy, therefore, makes arguments based on truths, but only to the extent that truths are prejudices, or projections of unjustified evaluations. Philosophies do not prove anything about the objective world (whatever such a term might mean, or the entity it purports to correspond to might be). Instead, philosophy only describes the prejudices of its practitioners. For instance, its use of rational argumentation, and the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction that constitute the fundamental principles of rational argumentation, are nothing more than testaments to the values that philosophers share. The disagreements that fuel the specific arguments that constitute the content of philosophy are testaments to the values that they do not. Philosophies, therefore, are nothing more than descriptions or confessions of a way of life. They are the products of a kind of activity.
4.1.4 Nietzsche’s Perspectival Conception of Truth

If this interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth is correct, then Clarke’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism is analogously problematic to her interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth.

In Chapter 2, Clarke was shown to distinguishes between the “thing in itself” and the “thing itself”, because she hoped, thereby, to justify attributing to Nietzsche some version of the correspondence conception of truth. However, this interpretation forced her to reject much of the unpublished material, and even some of Zarathustra’s speeches as not necessarily indicative of Nietzsche’s actual convictions. Alternatively, this analysis interpreted Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics as an unequivocal rejection of the correspondence conception of truth. Nietzsche rejects a correspondence conception of truth whether the object to which philosophical claims are meant to correspond are “things in themselves”, or “things themselves”. Sections 244 and 125 of The Gay Science were used to justify the claim that the distinction between the “thing in itself” and the “thing itself” is little more than a Modern, pseudo-secular reformulation of a metaphysical worldview. It is the Enlightenment’s appropriation of the Christian worldview, which was an appropriation of the Platonic worldview. It is not a genuine alternative to metaphysics, but simply a reformulation of the terms in which the metaphysical project is couched. Clarke’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism is analogous to her interpretation of truth: it aims to justify her attribution of a correspondence conception of truth to Nietzsche.

Clarke refuses to attribute to Nietzsche a rejection of facts (Clarke 1990, 130). A denial of facts would constitute a denial of a condition of possibility for the
correspondence conception of truth. If there are no facts, then there is nothing to which claims could correctly correspond. In an attempt to justify this claim, Clarke cites Section 59 of Nietzsche’s *The Antichrist*. It describes “a sense for facts” as the “last and most valuable sense”. To a certain extent, Clarke is correct. Nietzsche does express a powerful respect for facts, and does so explicitly in this passage. This, however, does not necessarily contradict section 481 in *The Will to Power*, which describes facts as interpretations. “There are no facts, but only interpretations” (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* 1968, Section 481; *Werke* VIII1, *Nachgelassene*, 7[60]).

Nietzsche’s analysis of facts is neither an acceptance, nor is it a rejection of the existence of some type of objective feature of the world. This would be an existential analysis of a metaphysical entity. Given Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics as a valuable or even intelligible form of enquiry, Nietzsche cannot claim anything about facts in this sense. Because all philosophical arguments are contingent on the unjustified evaluations that are posited as first premises, if a fact is an object of philosophical analysis that is not subject to the structure of philosophical argumentation, then Nietzsche knows perfectly well that he is ill equipped to say anything about them, either in a positive or negative sense. However, a fact, as a term, clearly does exist. It exists as a term that can be subjected to the same type of historical analysis as the terms “truth” and “rhetoric”.

Clarke’s intention in citing Section 59 of *The Antichrist* is contesting that Nietzsche’s perspectivism implies the falsification thesis (i.e. that our faculties of perception falsely represent the objects of perception) (Clarke 1990, 127). Clarke argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is a metaphorical account of his Neo-Kantian position on
truth (i.e. that truths are correlations between claims and empirical phenomena, not between claims and metaphysical noumena). This follows from her over-arching methodological premise that Nietzsche, if he is to be compelling, must accept a correspondence conception of truth. Clarke’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth, therefore, is supposedly consistent with his rejection of metaphysics, because his rejection of metaphysics is a rejection of the philosophical pretention of making claims that correspond to the noumenal realm, when in fact they can only meaningfully or intelligibly correspond to the phenomenal realm. But Clarke’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of truth as Neo-Kantian has been rejected because this condition, while perhaps philosophically compelling in its own right, is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s philosophical method. Nietzsche rejects any version of the correspondence conception of truth. Clarke’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, as a concept that refers to how philosophical arguments are representative of the world, is incorrect because Nietzsche makes no such claim about the possibility of any correspondence between claims and the objective world.

Perspectivism is simply a name that Nietzsche uses to describe the contingent status of any true philosophical claim. Clarke, therefore, is correct, but not to the extent that she believes. Nietzsche does not accept the falsification thesis, but only because the falsification thesis would at least implicitly involve some knowledge about the world as an objective entity independent of the philosophical prejudices that condition the philosopher’s perspective. The falsification thesis involves claims that aspire to correspondence with the world. It is a claim about how the world is not. Nietzsche’s perspectivism, however, presumes no such metaphysical knowledge.
Perspectivism is not a claim about what we cannot know. It is simply the term Nietzsche uses to refer to the contingency of all philosophical truths, and true philosophies.

How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without ‘sense’, does not become ‘nonsense’; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially actively engaged in interpretation— that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these. We cannot look around our own corner: it is a hopeless curiosity that wants to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives there might be (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 1974, 374; *Werke* V2, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 374).

Perspectivism is not an epistemological concept that refers to Man’s determinate and determinable epistemological horizon. It is a term that refers to a structural feature of Nietzsche’s philosophical method. Perspectivism does not refer to what Nietzsche believes are the epistemological confines of Man, because he does not presume to have any such knowledge of any such essential feature of Man. It only refers to an observable feature of the structure of one type of intellectual activity.

### 4.2 The Will to Power

The will to power, therefore, in a certain respect, is precisely what Clarke contends it is. It is an expression of Nietzsche’s values. It is the necessary, preceding evaluation that structures all of Nietzsche’s philosophical analyses; at least those that he presents subsequent to its gradual discovery. Kaufmann does an excellent job of narrating the story of this discovery (see section 2.1.1-2.1.2). However, Kaufmann is incorrect about its philosophical function. Nietzsche uses the will to power as a terminological umbrella for the aristocratic, or master values that he esteems, which functions as the organizing principle (not the explanatory principle) of his...
philosophical/historical analyses and evaluations. For instance, Nietzsche greatly values contest and conquest, be that contest political or artistic, and be that conqueror a Cesare Borgia or an Aschylus.

However, whatever Clarke’s own values might be, there are not two distinct species of philosophical claims in Nietzsche’s oeuvre: those that express his values as will to power, and those that express a will to truth as correct representation. Nietzsche does not make some philosophical claims that follow from his values, and others that purport to correspond to the ‘real’ or ‘actual’ world. Because Nietzsche’s self-understanding was the gradual product of a long process of self/philosophical exploration, Clarke is correct to identify in his earliest texts the influence of his early philosophical mentors: Kant and Schopenhauer. However, as Kaufmann and Clarke both acknowledge, subsequent to The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s skepticism seems to take the upper hand. Nietzsche subjects even the most sacred and appealing values to trial. One can almost imagine Nietzsche, at the gates of a Renaissance Italian princedom that Jacob Burkhardt so aptly describes as the product of political artistry, asking the personification of truth why it ought to be let in through the gates of his city.

Only after a number of years do his negative critiques of the history of philosophy and its pretensions to truth as correspondence give way to his positive inspirations. Only after years of playing the lion, of ripping and tearing his way through old idols, does he begin to play the child and build upon the inspirations peppered throughout The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The inspired visions that produce the will to power and the eternal return eventually afford a distinctive perspective from which Nietzsche is able to undertake a sustained critique of philosophy from a positive perspective. In the
first book of Beyond Good and Evil, “The Prejudices of Philosophers”, Nietzsche evaluates philosophy in a consciously perspectival manner. He evaluates it as the product of prejudice. After describing “every great philosophy” as a “personal confession”, Section 6 describes the organic relation of philosophy and prejudices. It describes the prejudices of philosophers as the genealogical principles of their philosophies.

Indeed, if one would explain how the abstrusest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what morality does all this (does he) aim? Accordingly, I do not believe that a ‘drive to knowledge’ is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has here as elsewhere, employed understanding (and misunderstanding) as a mere instrument. But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to see to what extent they may have been at play just here as inspiring spirits (or demons and kobolds) will find that all of them have done philosophy at some time- and that every single one of them would like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives. For every drive wants to be master- and it attempts to philosophize in that spirit (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 1989, 6; Werke VI2, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 6).

But this is not a criticism. It is simply a historical claim about what philosophy, as a set of historically observable practices seems to be. In fact, Nietzsche engages in this very practice of describing the world perspectivally. He describes the world as it appears to him, given his own unjustified values. The notebooks, in this context, are useful because they provide an account of the specific content of his prejudices. As Clarke aptly notes, Beyond Good and Evil only describes the hypothetical possibility of the will to power as a structuring principle for the evaluation of interpretation of the world (see Section 2.2.5). The notebooks contain a number of exceptionally self-conscious expressions of Nietzsche’s own unjustified evaluations. He explicitly accounts for his prejudices as prejudices. Because Nietzsche’s published works provide an explicit account of philosophy and philosophical evaluation as the product of a philosopher’s
prejudices, the notebooks can provide a clue as to the specific content of Nietzsche’ own
prejudices, and the source of his own philosophy and philosophical evaluations.

And do you want to know what ‘the world’ is to me? Shall I show it to you in
my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a
firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not
expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable sized, a
household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income;
enclosed by ‘nothingness’ as by a boundary; not some blurry or wasted, not
something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and
not a space that might be ‘empty’ here or there, but rather as force throughout,
as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time and many,
increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing
and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with
tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and flood of its forms; out of the
simples forms striving toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most rigid,
coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory, and
then again returning home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of
contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity
of its courses and its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as
a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness; this, my Dionysian
world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery
world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my ‘beyond good and evil’, without
goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels
good will toward itself- do you want a name for this world? A solution for all
its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid,
most midnightly men?- This world is the will to power and nothing besides!
And you yourself are also this will to power- and nothing besides! (Nietzsche,
The Will to Power 1968, 1067; Werke VII3, Nachgelassene Fragmente, 38[12])

The will to truth and the will to power, therefore, are somewhat synonymous:
both are names philosophy gives to its prejudices. However, while the former either
ignores or denies that those values are prejudices, the latter does not. The will to power
admits that it refers only to how the “world appears to me”. It does not presume to reveal
the world itself or the world in itself.

If this is the case, and the will to power is a term that refers to the aristocratic
values that structure Nietzsche’s philosophical evaluations, two questions remain. First,
why does Nietzsche esteem these values? And second, what is the consequence for
philosophy if Nietzsche’s values are not assumed to determine the specific sense of the
will to power?
The answers to these two questions are provided by Gilles Deleuze’s interpretations of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy, and his concept of the will to power. Deleuze’s interpretation identifies in Nietzsche’s published oeuvre, the fundamental prejudice, or the fundamental value that produces in Nietzsche the belief that the will to power is better than the will to truth as the structuring prejudice of philosophy as an activity.

Part II- Nietzsche’s Alternative Criterion of Philosophical Evaluation

4.3 Gilles Deleuze’s Interpretation of the Will to Power

According to Deleuze, the will to power is a genealogical concept. Making sense of this characterization involves all of the critical considerations of the previous three chapters. It presupposes a clear understanding of the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, as a rejection of a correspondence conception of truth, and the ambiguity that must be resolved if Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics is to produce a compelling alternative conception of philosophy.

Because Deleuze’s interpretation involves an acceptance of the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, it avoids the problems of inconsistency and lack of comprehensiveness that plague the other three interpretive approaches. It renders Nietzsche’s philosophy coherent, at least given the typically troublesome relations amongst Nietzsche’s concepts of the “will to power”, “history”, “perspectivism”, and particularly “truth”. Moreover, in addition to an interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy as coherent, Deleuze’s interpretation contributes to an interpretation of the will to power as a compelling philosophical concept. Deleuze identifies in Nietzsche’s published work a justification of the will to power that is both convincing and consistent with his claim
that all philosophical arguments and evaluations are the organic products of a philosopher’s prejudices. That is to say, Deleuze identifies in Nietzsche’s oeuvre a type of philosophical justification other than truth. Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power and its function in a reformed conception of philosophy is persuasive, not because it is distinctively true of the ‘real’ world, but because the prejudice it expresses is very appealing as a structuring principle for philosophical interpretation and evaluation. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy is compelling (at least to Nietzsche) because it is consistent with the fundamental prejudice that it instantiates. Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy, and the will to power as a product of that type of activity, is an expression of his profound love of life.

Deleuze’s interpretation, however, is often difficult to understand. Given the novelty of using the term “genealogy” as a qualifying attribute of a philosophical concept, its sense is far from clear. Characterizing the will to power as a genealogical concept means construing it as the conceptual anchor of a philosophical account of life as activity, with the activity of the philosopher being one of many possible instantiations of an active life. In a sentence fraught with interpretive perils, the will to power is the principle from which flow a force’s acts of domination; and, though it is ‘essentially’ unintelligible, the will to power is empirically observable in the endlessly variable history of its unessential, incomprehensive instantiations.

Though Deleuze tends to write esoterically, it is not because he fails to appreciate the challenge of adequately interpreting and evaluating the will to power. According to him, the will to power is a challenging concept because it presupposes a perspective beyond metaphysics. It presupposes a perspective from beyond what he calls the
problematic confines of nihilism and a nihilistic conception of philosophy. However, because Nietzsche believes that the history of philosophy is overdetermined by a nihilistic temperament, a temperament that stems all the way back to Socrates and Euripides, understanding the genuinely new and revolutionary concept of the will to power involves an immanent and total critique of that history. The will to power is a concept that runs counter to the entire history of which it is a part. The esoteric quality of Deleuze’s analysis, therefore, is at least partly the product of acknowledging and being conditioned by a new interpretive and evaluative criterion of philosophical evaluation. The methodological premises that have determined nearly the entire history of philosophical enquiry and evaluation must be fundamentally revised if they are to adequately assess the sense and value of the will to power. Until Nietzsche’s radical new premises are clarified and brought to bear on the concepts that follow from them, any criticism of the will to power will entirely miss the point. It would be like a monkey criticizing an apple for being bad fruit, because it has only ever had eyes for bananas.

Consequently, the strength of Deleuze’s interpretation follows from the features that render it so difficult to understand. It accepts Nietzsche’s revolutionary reforms to the philosophical method. Instead of critiquing those reforms, Deleuze simply mentions them in passing, while he reflects on their philosophical ramifications. As a result, much of what Deleuze says seems objectionable, but that is only because much of what Nietzsche says seems objectionable. However, the preceding critical evaluations of the three principal interpretive approaches to the will to power, and this chapter’s positive analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of truth, have provided a critical framework that should help render Deleuze’s analysis less alienating. On the other hand, because
Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche is consistent with those critical assessments, much of Deleuze’s analysis of Nietzsche’s reform to the philosophical method will also seem repetitive. Nonetheless, it is crucial that Deleuze’s awareness of Nietzsche’s reform to the largely unquestioned values that determine the history of philosophical interpretation and evaluation be made explicit. Only once all of the critical considerations of the previous three chapters are shown to more or less explicitly underscore Deleuze’s interpretation, will its oftentimes odd, disconcerting, and almost unintelligible claims be adequately clarified and justified.

In the final analysis, Deleuze’s interpretation will contribute compelling responses to two unanswered questions: how does Nietzsche justify his preference for philosophy as a will to power instead of as a will to truth, and what becomes of philosophy if Nietzsche’s evaluation is accepted as a condition for any further philosophical analysis.

4.3.1 Deleuze’s Interpretation as Consistent with the Preceding Critical Analyses of the Three Principal Approaches to the Will to Power

According to Deleuze, the Rosetta Stone for understanding Nietzsche’s revolutionary reform to philosophy is *The Genealogy of Morals*. In the first instance, Deleuze claims that *The Genealogy* functions as a kind of interpretive instruction manual for how one ought to philosophize. In the second instance, he claims that its analysis of truth as a historical object, exemplifies why the philosophical method ought to be reformed. Consequently, it is both an example of, and an implicit argument for a new conception of philosophy (Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* 1962, 99).

If this is the case, and Deleuze’s analysis of Nietzsche’s reforms to the philosophical method, and his analysis of the will to power as a product of that method, is
in fact consistent with the critical considerations of the previous three chapters, then *The Genealogy of Morals* should contain a repetition, synthesis, and justification of Nietzsche’s critique of truth as it is presented in *The Gay Science* and in *Beyond Good and Evil*.

In Chapter 2, Clarke’s contention that Nietzsche accepted a correspondence conception of truth was rejected because, besides requiring the rejection of the notebooks in their entirety, it contradicted two mutually informative passages in *The Gay Science*: Section 344, an exposition of the genealogical lineage of the correspondence conception of truth, as rooted in Platonic metaphysics and a Judeo-Christian conception of the divine; and Section 125, a dramatized account of the consequence of the death of God or the rejection of metaphysics, as the wiping away of a belief in a transcendent, ‘real’ world to which our beliefs could potentially correspond (see section 2.2.7). Taken together, these two passages constitute a genealogical account of a correspondence conception of truth as a Modern reformulation of the metaphysicians’ goal of knowing essences, or of being granted divine revelation. Consequently, Nietzsche was interpreted as critiquing the Enlightenment’s desire for truth as correspondence, because it is inconsistent with its touted secularism. Despite Modernity’s ignorance of the significance of its secularism, its rejection of metaphysics constitutes a rejection of truth as correspondence, because God, truth, and metaphysics are nothing more than terminological variations of one another. This is why the madman laments Modernity’s loss of God. He understands its full significance. It acknowledges a significant, and typically ignored consequence of modern secularism.
We have killed him [God], you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this?.. Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon?.. Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 1974, 125; Werke V2, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 125).

This description of Modernity’s rejection of God, as involving an unconscious and unrecognized rejection of a correspondence conception of truth, took a positive turn in Beyond Good and Evil. In 1882, Nietzsche’s concern that humanity is not great enough for this greatest of deeds is displaced by a far more positive inspiration. Nietzsche stops decrying a loss that he believes no one can either recognize or live up to, and instead asks after its consequences (see Section 4.1.1). Nietzsche begins to accept the death of God and the rejection of metaphysics as a rejection of a correspondence conception of truth. He begins to posit these rejections as the conditions of what is to follow. They become the premises of his subsequent philosophical arguments and evaluations.

The will to truth which will still tempt us to many a venture, that famous truthfulness of which all philosophers so far have spoken with respect- what questions has this will to truth not laid before us! What strange, wicked, questionable questions! That is a long story even now- and yet it seems as if it had scarcely begun. Is it any wonder that we should finally become suspicious, lose patience, and turn away impatiently? that we should finally learn from this Sphinx to ask questions, too? Who is it really that puts question to us here? What in us really wants ‘truth’?

Indeed we came to a long halt at the question about the cause of this will- until we finally came to a complete stop before a still more basic question. We asked about the value of this will. Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 1989, 1; Werke VI2, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 1)

Deleuze recognizes these textual interrelations. He recognizes that they represent the full sense of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics. The third chapter of his Nietzsche et la philosophie is an analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy and the values that philosophy, as an activity, presupposes. His interpretation of Nietzsche’s analysis of truth, the eleventh subsection of the third chapter, opens with a citation of
Section 24 of *The Genealogy of Morals*. In this passage, Nietzsche repeats both the need for truth to justify itself as a ground for philosophical interpretation and evaluation (Book 1 of *Beyond Good and Evil*), and the genealogical relation of a correspondence conception of truth, to Platonic and Judeo-Christian metaphysics (Sections 125 and 344 of *The Gay Science*). In this passage, Nietzsche even makes one of these textual relations explicit. He refers to Section 344 of *The Gay Science* as an interpretive guide to his claim that truth, because it constitutes nothing other than a reformulation of Platonic essence and a Judeo-Christian notion of the divine, has yet to justify itself as a principle for philosophical interpretation and evaluation, on grounds other than faith and divine authority.

At this point it is necessary to pause and take careful stock. Science itself henceforth requires a justification (which is not to say that there is any such justification). Consider on this question both the earliest and most recent philosophers: they are all oblivious of how much the will to truth itself first requires justification; here there is a lacuna in every philosophy—how did this come about? Because the ascetic ideal has hitherto dominated all philosophy, because truth was posited as being, as God, as the highest court of appeal—because truth was not permitted to be a problem at all. Is this ‘permit’ understood? From the moment faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, a new problem arises: that of the value of truth.

The will to truth requires a critique—let us thus define our own task—the value of truth must for once be experimentally called into question.

(Whoever feels that this has been stated too briefly should read the section of *The Gay Science* entitled ‘To What Extent We, Too, Are Still Pious’ (Section 344), or preferable still the entire fifth book of that work, as well as the Preface to *The Dawn*) (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* 1989, On the Genealogy of Morals, III, 11; *Werke VI2, Zur Genealogie der Moral*, III, 11)

This passage, however, does not function as so many of his shorter aphoristic claims do. It is not an implicit argument, reduced to a conclusive statement. As Deleuze notes, it is part of Nietzsche’s most systematic text (Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* 1962, 100). It is not a claim that the reader must, himself, bring into various argumentative relations. It is one of *The Genealogy of Morals* interim conclusions. It
functions as a justification of Nietzsche’s rejection of philosophy as a will to truth, and as the conclusion of his genealogical, or historical analysis into “Good” and “Evil”.

Consequently, a careful analysis of *The Genealogy of Morals* should provide, in the first place, a justification for his rejection of metaphysics. In the second place, it should provide a justification for his supposedly preferable alternative conception of philosophy as a will to power. Therefore, if Deleuze is correct in attributing to *The Genealogy of Morals* the elucidating quality of providing one interpretive key to Nietzsche’s reforms to philosophy, and another to Nietzsche’s own philosophy, then Deleuze’s analysis will successfully render Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics, as a rejection of a correspondence conception of truth, consistent with his concept of the will to power.

### 4.3.2 *The Genealogy of Morals*: Nietzsche’s Rejection of Philosophy as a Will to Truth

According to Nietzsche, the history of philosophy construes truth as a transcendent principle that justifies existence. Nietzsche’s critique of, and reform to the history of philosophy, therefore, is a critique of, and reform to the history of philosophy’s attribution of this function to truth.

According to Nietzsche, however, truth is formally incapable of adequately fulfilling this function. Philosophy cannot be a will to truth, because a will to truth is ontologically vacuous. It undermines its conditions of possibility. According to Nietzsche, the philosophical will to truth is nothing other than a purification and distillation of the slave’s desire for revenge against his master. The inversion of the master’s values, which founds the moral vision of the slave, which in turn generates the
conditions that determine the sense of truth as a transcendent, redemptive principle, implicitly involves a more or less conscious will to self-destruction. The ontological condition of possibility for the conception of philosophy that follows from slave morality is the master morality the slave seeks to destroy. Consequently, the hypothetical triumph of the slave’s values necessarily involves the destruction of the master’s ethos, and by extension the possibility of the slave’s ethos. Therefore, so long as the philosophical good is construed in slavish terms as truth, the hypothetical triumph of the philosophical good implies its own destruction. If truth is considered the philosophical good, then truth is a fruit that poisons the tree that bears it.

Nietzsche’s claim that philosophy, as a will to truth, is ontologically vacuous can only be drawn out following a meticulous analysis of *The Genealogy of Morals*. Only once the relation of the slave’s moral inversion to philosophy and asceticism has been clarified, will Nietzsche’s reform to philosophy as a will to power be adequately justified. Moreover, because Deleuze’s interpretation of the will to power presupposes a meticulous understanding of *The Genealogy of Morals*, and because Deleuze’s esoteric style does not take the time to provide this analysis itself, his interpretation of the will to power must be momentarily set aside.

*The Genealogy of Morals* is divided into three, mutually informative essays. The first is a genealogical account of the senses of “good” and “evil”, as the product of a critical inversion of their original sense as “good” and “bad”. The second is an account of the distinct genealogical origin of the concepts of “punishment” and “guilt”. The third is an analysis of how the competing moral structures of the “master” and the “slave”, and the confusion regarding the concepts of “punishment” and “guilt”, engender a long
philosophical confusion, the consequence of which is an unconscious will to self-destruction. Only once the relations of these three essays have been spelled out will Nietzsche’s critique of philosophy as a will to truth as the philosophical distillation of the slave’s will to self-destruction, and his adoption of an alternative conception of philosophy as a will to power be rendered both clear and compelling. Moreover, only then can Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power, which presupposes a meticulous understanding of the critical and positive arguments that *The Genealogy of Morals* contains, be adequately understood and assessed.

4.3.2.1 “Good and Evil,” “Good and Bad”

The genealogical account of the “good” forwarded by the English psychologists exemplifies, according to Nietzsche, the utter absence of a historical spirit in themselves and in philosophers generally. They claim that un-egoistic actions were originally applauded because, from the point of view of the observers of those actions, they were deemed beneficial (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* 1989, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, I, 2; *Werke VI2, Zur Genealogie der Moral*, I, 2). Nietzsche believes this is absurd. Why would those to whom actions were “shown” determine the good? Wouldn’t it be those who act, that first determine what is considered good? If people can do what they want, then they do what they think is best. Otherwise, if they did not feel that way, they would simply have acted differently. Originally, there was no impetus for defining “good” in the abstract. It was simply an implicit feature of observable activity. Consequently, the attribution of goodness to selflessness would only have come about subsequent to the decline of the powerful who, until that decline, had simply acted in a manner they saw fit. Only once the powerful were somehow inspired
or compelled not to do what they wanted, would a preceding, abstract conception of goodness have determined any given action (Ibid.).

Instead of accounting for the origin of “goodness” psychologically (Ibid, 3), Nietzsche accounts for the concept etymologically (Ibid., 4). All the various languages that Nietzsche surveys supposedly reveal that the current conceptions of goodness are the result of a conceptual transformation. In each language that Nietzsche surveys, it is the noble or the aristocratic that are the etymological roots of the concept of goodness. Nietzsche’s etymological survey reveals the overarching “coarseness”, “straightforwardness”, and “unsymbolic” quality of the original meaning of the term “good” (Ibid., 6). “The good”, originally, refers to “power”, “wealth”, and “possession” (Ibid., 5).

While it may seem as though there are some glaring counter-examples to this account of the origin of the sense of goodness, Nietzsche insists that this is not, in fact, the case. The correlation between superiority in a political sense and superiority in a spiritual sense does not constitute an exception to the rule, for instance, as when the powerful are a priestly caste. However, Nietzsche does acknowledge that such a political scenario does afford an opportunity for the manifestation of very strange and very consequential phenomena. Purity, for example, was posited as the source or the sense of goodness for both the “knightly” and “priestly” castes. As a result, though each faction fights for its particular conception of the good in light of a particular set of worldly interests, the outcome of the contest may be far from linear (Ibid., 7). The Jewish inversion of the etymological sources of goodness is Nietzsche’s example par excellence. In fact, *The Genealogy of Morals* is almost entirely devoted to demonstrating precisely
how this particular set of interests succeeded so spectacularly and so consequentially that their victory is not only uncontested, but taken to be incontestable.

They inverted the sense of goodness as power into the good as depravity, sickness, and ugliness. This, however, is not an odd or idiosyncratic aesthetic choice. Given their own political impotence as an enslaved people, and their hatred of their subjugation (having once been a free and powerful people themselves), Nietzsche describes their conceptual inversion of the senses of the ethical terms “good” and “bad”, into a moral dynamic of “good” and “evil”, as a slave’s revolt against his master (Ibid.). According to Nietzsche, the Jewish people were so successful that the entire known history of morality is the history of the triumph of this Jewish act of revenge. The known history of morality is the history of the Jewish appropriation of goodness by inversion as a means of conquest and warfare. By abstractly inverting the sense of goodness so that it no longer applied to the powerful who subjugated them, but to themselves instead, they were eventually able to engender the subjugation of their oppressors (Ibid., 8).

The Jewish revolt begins when “ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values” (Ibid., 10). As was described above, the powerful act, and in acting they define goodness by logical implication. The slave on the other hand, begins with a “no”. The slave begins by denying and condemning the “yes” of the noble, who acts in a manner that suppresses his own ability to act and affirm. Thus, while the master acts, and in light of his action determines what the sense of the good would be if it were considered in the abstract, the slave begins by an abstract condemnation of what the master does, and then infers what must be good insofar as it is opposed to that abstraction.
In this sense, slave morality “always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all- its action is fundamentally reaction” (Ibid.). To substantiate his claim, Nietzsche points to, among many other examples, the Greek relation between the terms “well-born” and “happy”. The “well-born” do not need to theoretically ground their belief in their happiness. It is simply the case that in doing what they wanted, they did what was good, for what they wanted was what they implicitly thought was good, and that was a happy condition. The slaves on the other hand, if they wanted to appear good to themselves, then they first had to construe their inability to do as they pleased as a feature of their own good because they could not do as they pleased. As a result, the slave becomes much cleverer than the noble given the complex requirements of his own good. But the happiness of the noble, what the Athenians called rhathymia, and what Thucydides recounts as a quality praised by Pericles, is an ease of mind which persists through all danger. It is a joyfulness that scorns any form of security that would come at the cost of the “voluptuousness of victory and cruelty” (Ibid., 11). Nietzsche, therefore, finds the modern conception of culture, as the domestication and suffocation of the “beast of prey” in civilized Man, very strange. Nietzsche believes that this “highest man”, who is praised for his mediocrity and insipidness, who is loved because he is “ill-constituted, sickly, weary and exhausted” to the point of being of no consequence at all, is a horrid conception of progress (Ibid.).

But why does Nietzsche have such a pejorative estimation of “slave morality”? Because, according to Nietzsche, it is absurd. The demand that the strong not express their strength is as absurd as praising the weakness of the weak as a “voluntary achievement, willed, chosen, a deed, a meritorious act” (Ibid., 13). In both cases there is
the fallacious attribution of a substratum to the effect. According to Nietzsche, there is no reason to believe that there is some kind of thing that has some accidental quality called strength, which it might not otherwise have, or might not otherwise use. Strength is the name of the very effect. To be strong is not to be able to overcome, or to be able to do x, y, or z. Strength is that very overcoming. Strength is the doing of x, y, or z. It is “a desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs” (Ibid.). Lightning, for example, is not what causes the flash of light. It is the flash of light. Consequently, to ask the bird of prey not to prey is nonsense. It amounts to asking the bird of prey not to be a bird of prey.

So, what then is the aim of the slave’s revolt? In its own terms, its goal is justice (Ibid., 15). However, one is left wondering about the actual content of this “justice”. “Justice”, according to the slave, is an end to his subjugation; however, because the master is the very act of domination that subjugates the slave, the slave is actually wishing for the annihilation of his master. According to Nietzsche, far from being anything like “justice”, the slave’s conception of justice is in fact the extreme manifestation of the slave’s wished-for revenge. Though the slave calls the event of “justice”, “The Last Judgment”, or “The Kingdom Of God”, underneath the gloss of these expressions, rendered so impressive and compelling after two millennia of polishing, is a realm where the slave becomes eternally and absolutely powerful. What the slave calls “heaven” is a realm where he dominates, and where those who had dominated become subjected to eternal damnation, punishment, and torture. This is what the slave calls “hell” (Ibid.). The slave’s conception of justice, therefore, is not the end of slavery, but
the enslavement of his former masters. It is the wish of a resentful lamb that would like to prey on the bird of prey.

4.3.2.2 “Guilt,” “Bad Conscience,” and the Like

While in the first essay Nietzsche accounts for the cause of the odd breach between classical and modern conceptions of the good, it is only in the second essay that he accounts for the puzzling phenomenon of the slave’s spectacular success.

Nietzsche rejects the English philosophers who account for the modern conception of justice using the principles of “guilt”, “responsibility” and “punishment”. Beginning an account of justice using these concepts is to begin, very nearly, at the end of the story. “Guilt” already presupposes such psychological constructs as “intentionality” and “freedom of the will”, and most fundamentally, “consciousness” and “responsibility”. Before these concepts can contribute to a genealogical account of the moral dimension of human behavior, their own genealogies have to be analyzed. The processes by which they were bred into the human psyche have to be understood.

“Conscience” is what the “sovereign man” calls “his extraordinary privilege of responsibility” (Ibid., II, 2). Anyone can, of course, make the sounds ‘I promise such and such’, but the sense of such a statement, the self-sourced guarantee that such a promise can and will be kept is something that requires three inter-related conditions: he must be able to remember (Ibid., 1); he must be a calculable, determinable creature; and, perhaps most importantly, he must have some reason to want to make promises at all.

“Action”, however, in opposition to “conscience”, requires the ability to forget. Consequently, a genealogical account of “conscience” has to answer the questions: “How can one create a memory for the human animal? How can one impress something upon
this partly obtuse, partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a way that it will stay there?” (Ibid., 3)

According to Nietzsche, in order to remember, a person must be branded. A person must be subjected to a pain that will never dissipate, so that its mark will always be felt. Religious rites, such as sacrifices and mutilation, and punitive measures, such as torture and execution, are cited as some of the many means by which this long, slow, and laborious historical process of breeding into Man a set of ‘I will not’s’ was accomplished (Ibid., 3).

Nietzsche argues that the meting out of punishment was, first and foremost, an early, corporeal means of compensation for a social transgression, administered amongst people of equal power. The history of higher culture, Nietzsche claims, is steeped in blood because, at least in part, Man takes pleasure in cruelty (Ibid., 6). As it was described in the First Essay, power is affective action, and not some quality attributable to a substratum of that action. Consequently, Man takes pleasure in power, because power is Man doing what he wants. Moreover, because power is the name given to the affectation of one’s will, to do what one wants, to measure power against power was the most rudimentary form of social organization from which all other forms evolved (Ibid., 8). Acting, and the consequences that affective action has on the possibility of other actions, are the genealogical seeds of social organization.

“Justice”, “fairness”, and “good will”, therefore, cannot be the determinative principles of an original social contract. These concepts, in their broadest senses, only arise in contests amongst people of equal strength. So long as one is powerful, the issue of justice never arises because one simply does what one wants. Only when two equally powerful affective forces meet does some form of negotiation ensue. “Justice” is the
name for this type of negotiated settlement. “Justice” is the product of the kind of contest that arises when the affective power of the contending parties is insufficient to determine a course of action.

Nietzsche believes that this type of negotiation is the most rudimentary form of buying and selling. Because justice, “on this elementary level, is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, to reach an ‘understanding’ by means of a settlement- and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves” (Ibid., 8), any breach of these agreements engendered the creation of a “debt”. Community, therefore, is the original locus for the administration of debtors and creditors. The community’s most rudimentary means of distributing economic retribution for a breach of contract is expulsion from the community: either as exile or as torture (Ibid., 9 and 10).

This, however, is not meant to be a pessimistic account of human civilization. The human love of power, given Nietzsche’ genealogical analysis of power, cannot be qualified as despicable without at the same time qualifying Man himself as despicable. If power is affective action, then a condemnation of power is an expression of Man’s “feeling of shame at Man” (Ibid., 7) as an affective being. But why did Man become ashamed of himself? How did the slave manage to invert his master’s ethos, so that the master became ashamed of his ability to do what he wants? Why does modern morality condemn power and the powerful?

Because Nietzsche defines power as affective action, all power is necessarily power over something. Consequently, the more one wants to test and exercise one’s power, the more one comes into various power relations. Moreover, if power is affective
action, and justice is the goodwill that power has towards other, equal quanta of power, then “injustice” is not some type of act, or struggle, or opposition, or conquest that transgresses the \textit{a priori} principles of morality. “Injustice” is not an act of violence, in the sense of an act, which as an expression of power, constrains the possible affective action of another would-be quantum of power. “Injustice”, understood as such, is a consequence of having already accepted the slave’s moral inversion of the master’s ethos. It is the slave’s attempt to impose constraints on life as activity. Metaphorically, it is the slave’s attempt to annihilate the bird of prey.

The origin of “punishment”, therefore, is not the same as the origin of “responsibility”. “Punishment” is a rudimentary form of “debt collection”. It is the original expression of a socialized power nexus. When one of two equal forces transgresses the agreement arrived at through negotiation, that transgression or “debt” is paid either by exile or by torture. If Nietzsche is correct about the genealogy of punishment, then he still has to account for the phenomena of “responsibility”, or “guilt”, or “bad consciousness”, and the relation that the history of morality posits between these terms and “punishment”.

According to Nietzsche, the origin of “bad consciousness” is the internalization of the instincts of Man. Enclosed within the walls of society and peace, Man can no longer give vent to his instinct for contest, domination, violence, destruction and cruelty. This has two consequences. First, lacking external enemies, the powerful turned their expressions of power inward. They turn their will against themselves, their only remaining opponent (Ibid., 16). Second, when the most powerful imposed form on the various communities they ruled, and as a necessary consequence of that rule, squashed or
constrained the capacity for those weaker than them to act as they wanted, they forced the will of the subjugated members of the community to turn their wills inward as well (Ibid., 17). “Bad conscience”, therefore, constitutes the historical break of power’s turning inward. It is the “ineluctable disaster” of the socialization of power, wherein the will turns against itself.

4.3.2.3 What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?

In the third and final essay of *The Genealogy of Morals*, the moral and historical consequences of the slave’s inversion of the master’s ethos are drawn out. According to Nietzsche, the slave’s moral inversion of the master’s ethos, which becomes exacerbated as social networks become increasingly complex and consolidated, is refined and distilled in what he calls the ascetic ideal.

The earliest contemplative men, those who lived in the political and ethical worlds determined by noble people of action, were either feared or despised, as much by themselves as by their contemporaries. In order to counter this, and thereby foster conditions beneficial to their self-preservation and empowerment, they sought to inspire fear of themselves in others.

These contemplative people, to the extent that they were active, were and continue to be necessarily cruel and violent. This, according to the first essay, is true by definition. Because action is defined as the exercise of power, and power is defined as the event of being affective, then action necessarily implies violence and cruelty. To the extent that one acts affectively, one is cruel and violent towards that which is being affected, and towards that which would be otherwise affective. However, these contemplative men, being contemplative men and not warriors, perpetrated their acts of
cruelty and violence on the only objects that they could themselves. They burned upon themselves the principles of their own strength and the grounds of their belief in their own innovations. In order to represent to others and to themselves the sense of their values, they had to express themselves from within some recognizable context. Consequently, these contemplative men, what Nietzsche calls the earliest philosophers, deferred the sense of their values to the institution of the ascetic ideal and to its foremost representative- the ascetic priest.

This alliance, however, is practical, not moral. The philosopher’s disparagement of sensuality, or the “three glittering loud things: fame, princes, and women” (Ibid., III, 8), is nothing more than the conditions of the philosopher’s success. To avoid these glittering things is the philosophical instinct to ruthlessly dispose “of all other stores and accumulations of energy, of animal vigor”. He does this “for the benefit of the evolving work: the greater energy uses up the lesser” (Ibid.). If Nietzsche is correct, and the philosopher denigrates sensuality because of its negative effect on his contemplative work, then it should come as no surprise that philosophy finds a kindred spirit in the ascetic priest and his ideals (Ibid., 9) of poverty, humility, and chastity (Ibid., 8).

What is surprising, however, is that they are both so successful at reproducing themselves. According to Nietzsche, the ascetic value of abstinence is an observable feature of every culture and of every new generation of every culture. In fact, the ascetic value of abstinence is so successful at reproducing itself that it can be tempting to interpret it as a condition of life itself. That is to say, the historically consistent reproduction of the ascetic value of abstinence seems to suggest that life itself is premised on its antithesis.
But how can a creature that posits a value inimical to life, inimical to the “whole sphere of becoming and transitoriness” (Ibid., 11), be a consistently observable feature of that which it fundamentally contradicts? How can something produce its opposite? The answer is simple, if somewhat surprising. The ascetic ideal is not in fact inimical to life. It is simply a strange way of life. However, despite its oddity, it is nonetheless a way of life. It is a way of life that “springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life” (Ibid, 13). A way of life that denigrates life is a way of life that denigrates the conditions that subjugate individuals and groups. It is an ironic act of self-defense. The ascetic ideal, therefore, is an instance of the slave’s expression of his will to life, when life as activity only subjugates him to the will of others. The ascetic ideal is the slave’s way of affecting his will in a world that does not provide him with an opportunity to express that will externally. When the will is too weak to act affectively in the world, it turns against itself as the only object it can affect. The ascetic, therefore, is a historical expression, or product, or distillation of the slave inverted ethos. The ascetic ideal is a refined instance of the slave’s moral inversion. Moreover, it becomes an increasingly popular means of affective action, as the process of socialization described in the second essay becomes widespread.

This genealogy has significant consequences for philosophy. If the values that condition the success of philosophy are the same as those of the ascetic priest, and if ascetic values are the historical product of the slave’s inversion of the master’s ethos, then philosophy is one instantiation of a slave’s way of life.

According to Nietzsche, because philosophy is an activity that instantiates slave ethos, philosophy amounts to a renunciation, by the philosopher, of his ego, of his reality,
of his senses, and even a renunciation of his reason (Ibid., 12). The slave, because he is subjugated to his master, acts or affects the world in the only way he can. He inverts the noble’s values so that his weakness becomes his strength. He inverts his master’s ethos so that his master’s good becomes a transgression of the good given its inevitably violent and cruel consequences. However, because power is not some feature attributable to the substratum of an action, power cannot be abstracted or negated without at the same time negating the supposed substratum. Because power is not the cause of the effect, but the effect itself, and because the master is not what he is by virtue of some kind of intrinsic quality, but simply by virtue of being the discernable source of affective action, the slave’s inversion of the master’s ethos constitutes, most fundamentally, a condemnation of activity itself, not any specific activity. Moreover, because Nietzsche believes that life is activity, the slave’s condemnation of action is a condemnation of life. As a result, it is not the strong, despite their cruelty and their violence, that represent the greatest danger to Man, but the sickly, nauseated man who has no drive to live except to condemn life, to resentfully decry the “unfair” victories and successes of the powerful (Ibid., 14).

Nietzsche insists that the Enlightenment estimation of science over religion does not constitute an actual shift in this tradition. “Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as science ‘without any presuppositions’… a philosophy, a “faith”, must always be there first of all, so that science can acquire from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to exist” (Ibid., 24). Nietzsche believes that science presupposes the “Man of Truth”. He believes that the scientific will to truth is nothing other than the latest reconfiguration of the philosopher as contemplative man or ascetic priest. The scientific man believes that there is a true world to be discovered (albeit scientifically instead of
religiously) hiding behind this world, behind the perspectival “our world” (Ibid.). But, doesn’t the Enlightenment’s faith in science and objective truth also need to be justified?

“Because truth was posited as being, as God, as the highest court of appeal—because truth was not permitted to be a problem at all,” truth has not accounted for its value. Its value is an assumption. It is a prejudice. It is the fundamental faith of the Enlightenment. If Modernity is the triumph of science over religion, Modernity is not thereby a triumph over the ascetic ideal. It is, in fact, its highest expression and “spiritualization” (Ibid., 27).

To the extent that science tries to redeem life from its inevitably violent and cruel features, science shares in the common feature of the ascetic ideal. It is an attempt to justify life by virtue of a transcendent principle. Greek metaphysics, religion, science, Kantianism, even the Copernican scientific revolution all posit principles which, in themselves, are supposed to redeem life (i.e. Truth, God, truth, Reason, and the scientific method respectively). Each of these principles is an abstracted justification that ‘real’, ‘true’ life, which is ‘good’, involves a halt to the eventual self-destruction of all great things (Ibid., 27). They are, most fundamentally, a refined distillation of the slave’s resentment towards a historical world of becoming that squashes and subjugates him.

4.3.3 Deleuze’s Analysis of the Genealogy of Morals

The preceding exegesis of Nietzsche’s *The Genealogy of Morals* has provided a framework for assessing Deleuze’s claim that it can provide an interpretive key to understanding Nietzsche’s supposed justification for rejecting philosophy as metaphysics (i.e. a rejection of any correspondence conception of truth) in favor of his conception of philosophy as genealogy. However, to this end, only two features of Deleuze’s
exceptionally rich interpretation will be analyzed and assessed: its interpretation of
Nietzsche’s philosophy as a typology and topology of forces, and its interpretation of
Nietzsche’s reform to philosophy given that typology and topology.

If Deleuze is correct, and Nietzsche does provide a philosophical justification for
his rejection of philosophy as metaphysics, or as a will to correspondent truth, then
Nietzsche must posit some new criterion of philosophical evaluation. However, because
Nietzsche has rejected the value of a correspondence conception of truth, it seems as
though whatever criterion he would posit either amounts to an idiosyncratic principle, or
to an implicit belief in the correspondent truth about what constitutes the best possible
criterion of philosophical evaluation. Therefore, it seems as though any evaluative
criterion that Nietzsche could posit to justify his justification for rejecting philosophy as
metaphysics in favor of philosophy as an expression of a philosopher’s prejudices would
either be irrelevant or inconsistent. Deleuze, however, does not attribute to Nietzsche
either of these two positions. According to Deleuze Nietzsche provides a kind of
justification that is not susceptible to either of these two critiques. He provides a
genealogical justification.

The phrase “genealogical justification”, however, is rather odd. How could a
species of descriptive analysis constitute an argument? Normally it wouldn’t, but truth,
as the history of philosophy conceives it, is a rather special case. According to Deleuze,
Nietzsche’s critique of truth does not constitute a rejection in the conventional sense. In
*The Genealogy of Morals* it is not Nietzsche that rejects truth, but the logic of truth itself
that rejects truth. That is to say, the sense and function attributed to truth by the history
of philosophy more or less consciously seeks the annihilation of its conditions of
possibility. Consequently, if philosophy is conceived as a will to truth, then philosophy aims at its own annihilation. Nietzsche’s rejection of philosophy as a will to truth, however, is not a rejection of this type of activity as inherently bad because it is inconsistent. He acknowledges the possibility and historical event of philosophy as a will to truth, the values on which he believes that that conception rest, and the consequences that he believes ensue from that activity; he then states clearly and unequivocally that those values are fundamentally incompatible with his own. Simply put, philosophy as a will to truth, because it seeks its own annihilation, runs contrary to his profound love of life.

Nietzsche, therefore, does not repeat what Deleuze calls the pseudo-critiques that constitute the history of philosophy’s analyses of truth. He does not, like Kant for instance, critique and correct the supposedly incorrect truth claims about truth. He critiques the concept itself. He identifies the inevitably problematic outcome of the sense and function that the history of philosophy attributes to it (Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* 1962, 100). However, because Nietzsche’s analysis of philosophy as a will to truth is only one feature of Nietzsche’s genealogical account of morality, Deleuze does not interpret *The Genealogy of Morals* so much as use it.

He identifies in it the simultaneously, co-productive dynamic of the fundamental, productive prejudice of philosophy as a will to truth, and the implicit conception of philosophy that is presupposed in that fundamental prejudice. Because these values and the type of activity that it produces are inconsistent with his own prejudices, Nietzsche turns away from them. This incompatibility is the non-normative grounds of Nietzsche’s justification for his philosophical evaluation of the history of philosophy.
4.3.3.1 The Evaluative Presuppositions of Philosophy as a Will to Truth

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche identifies two basic presuppositions to a conception of philosophy as a will to truth. It presupposes both a veridical world (Ibid., 109), and a veridical man (Ibid.) (or what Kaufmann translates as a “truthful man”). If truth, as a concept that structures philosophical interpretation and evaluation, is a quality attributable to certain philosophical claims or objects of analysis, then truth presupposes an object to which it can be attributed. Truth, therefore, presupposes some kind of true world (Ibid.). However, just as truth presupposes an object to which it can be attributed, it also presupposes its other. If there is a true world, there must also be a false one; otherwise, the true world and the world would be one and the same.

Moreover, if truth, as an attribute, presupposes objects to which it can (a true world) and cannot (a false world) be correctly attributed, then a true world also presupposes a “truthful man” (Ibid.). The fact that philosophy as a will to truth posits a true and a false worlds cannot, alone, account for the function of those worlds in the history of philosophy because if the world, and everything in it, were false, then truth would be inconceivable as anything other than a greater degree of falsity. In this context, truth and falsity would only be different by degree. This, however, is not the case. The history of philosophy conceives of truth and falsity as either logical or empirical opposites. Consequently, if in the first place, the concept of truth is a discernable feature of the history of philosophy; and if, in the second place, truth and falsity are posited as opposites; and if, in the third place, the history of philosophy is a history of a will to truth, then the origins and the history of philosophy presuppose a type of person that
Because an implicit evaluation of truth and falsity are presupposed by philosophy as a will to truth, Nietzsche’s *The Genealogy of Morals* provides a genealogical account of philosophy as a will to truth to the extent that it provides a genealogical account of the philosopher’s implicit, underlying estimation of truth as valuable (or at least as more valuable than error). Consequently, if Deleuze is correct, it must answer the question that opens Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good and Evil*: why does the philosopher want truth? “Why not rather untruth?” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 1989, 1; *Werke VI2, Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, 1)

### 4.3.3.2 Nietzsche’s Genealogical Account of the History of Philosophy’s Estimation of Truth

First, because one cannot reasonably strive for what one already has, if the “truthful man” wants truth, it must be because he does not believe that he possesses it.
As Deleuze notes, “si quelqu’un veut la vérité, ce n’est pas au nom de ce qu’est le monde, mais au nom de ce que le monde n’est pas” (Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie 1962, 109). Implicit in the philosopher’s desire to discover a true world, is his belief that the world he lives in is a world of lies and falsehoods (Ibid., 109). Consequently, if truth is the goal of philosophy, and if wanting truth implicitly characterizes life as lies and falsehoods, then truth is posited in opposition to life as the philosopher believes he lives it. The genealogical principle of philosophy as a will to truth, therefore, is the philosopher’s desire that life be something other than what he thinks it is. Philosophy as a will to truth is an expression of the philosopher’s denigration of life.

This is why Deleuze finds The Genealogy of Morals so useful for understanding Nietzsche’s evaluation of the history of philosophy. It subjects that history to an analysis of the prejudices that function as its methodological premises. It traces the genealogy of this evaluation of life as bad.

According to The Genealogy of Morals, the philosopher is a species of the contemplative man, and the contemplative man is contemplative because he is unable to act as he sees fit when his will to affective action is subjugated to the will of another. Because the will is not an accidental feature of some substratum, it cannot simply be annihilated or suppressed. If the will is weak and subjugated, it does not thereby cease to will. Because the will is effective action, an annihilation of the will would signify the annihilation of that supposed substratum. Consequently, the contemplative man does not
cease to will simply because his will is weak, simply because he is weak. His will changes direction. It redirects itself towards something that it can overcome. Being unable to overcome other wills, the will turns inward and attempts to overcome itself (See sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.3).

The philosopher’s redirection of his will is, according to Nietzsche, a “purification” or “distillation” of the slave’s moral inversion of his master’s ethos. Nietzsche believes that philosophers are a species of the slave. They are weak individuals whose frustrated will to dominate, conquer, and do violence find what remaining outlets are available to them. Being unable to act as they see fit, they act in the only way that they can; they react. They act in response to the wills to which they are subjugated. In moral terms, they invert the ethical qualification of their master’s actions, in order to redeem their own. ‘My good is unattainable because of my master. Therefore, my master is bad; and, because I am not like my master, I am good.’ In social-political terms, they make themselves responsible for their own weakness and punish themselves for it. They thereby empower themselves by endowing themselves with the capacity to remedy that weakness. They appear powerful by burning upon themselves the signs of their own strength. They become symbols of their capacity to overcome, though that overcoming is an overcoming of themselves and not an overcoming of the wills that subjugate them (See sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2).

According to Nietzsche’s analysis then, the philosopher and the slave are two variously sophisticated, historical instantiations of reactive forces. This, according to Deleuze, is the reason why Nietzsche rejects philosophy as a will to truth. The history of philosophy as a will to truth is the product of a type of force that Nietzsche does not like.
It is one historical instantiation of the triumph of the reactive forces over the active. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche does not like reactive forces because their principle ally is nihilism. Because philosophy as a will to truth is a product of reactive forces, and because reactive forces ally themselves with nihilism, philosophy as a will to truth is contrary to Nietzsche’s own most fundamental value: his love of life. This feature of Deleuze’s analysis, however, will remain ambiguous and potentially problematic until the terms in which it is posited are clarified.

4.3.3.3 The Terms of Deleuze’s Analysis: Nietzsche’s Reform of Philosophy in Terms of Active and Re-Active Forces

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche’s evaluation of philosophy as a will to truth is challenging because it is forwarded from a perspective that accepts its alternative. It is presented from a perspective Deleuze describes as beyond the problematic confines of nihilism. To this extent, *The Genealogy of Morals* is not only an argument for philosophy as genealogy; it is philosophy as genealogy. However, if the terms of philosophy as genealogy are particularly unconventional, then only once those terms are clarified could the sense of a philosophical justification in this new methodological context be properly understood. Only once the sense of a philosophical justification in this new context is clarified can the value of Nietzsche’s justification be appropriately assessed.

What then constitutes a justification in the context of philosophy as genealogy? The answer to this question follows from Nietzsche’s re-conceptualization of the object of philosophical analysis. According to Nietzsche, subsequent to the rejection of metaphysics, which is in its fullest sense a rejection of any correspondence conception of
truth, the concepts of “sense” and “value” supplant “truth” as the structuring principles of philosophical interpretation and evaluation (Ibid., 1).

4.3.3.2.1 Sense and Value

In the first place, the introduction of value as a structuring feature of philosophical discourse implies more than insisting on the contingency of any philosophical analysis on an underlying set of values. It involves the recognition that underlying those conditioning values is already an implicit evaluation.

D’une part, les valeurs apparaissent ou se donnent comme des principes : une évaluation suppose des valeurs à partir desquelles elle apprécie les phénomènes. Mais, d’autre part et plus profondément, ce sont les valeurs qui supposent des évaluations, des « points de vue d’appréciation », dont dérive leur valeur elle-même. Le problème critique est : la valeur des valeurs, l’évaluation dont procède leur valeur, donc le problème de leur créations (Ibid.).

Philosophical analysis, therefore, cannot be an attempt to correctly represent the world, because the world, as some kind of objective entity, is not what philosophy as genealogy analyzes. Philosophy as genealogy enquires into the productive conditions of a contingent object.

The name of that contingent object is, according to Deleuze “le sens”. If philosophical enquiry proceeds in good faith, then because it is analyzing the values that are presupposed by any object of analysis, and the evaluations that those values themselves presuppose, its task is discovering, not the essential or accidental features of an objective entity, but the evaluative assumptions that are presupposed by the sense or meaning in question (Ibid., 2). Philosophy as genealogy is an enquiry into the necessary conditions of a contingent historical and cultural construction, not into an objective, or metaphysical, or a-temporal entity, or term, or proposition. An object of philosophical
enquiry, therefore, is no longer an object in the conventional sense, but the differential
between “the creative and created nature of values” (Ibid., 1). As a result,

À la dualité métaphysique de l’apparence et de l’essence, et aussi à la relation
scientifique de l’effet et de la cause, Nietzsche substitue la corrélation du
phénomène et du sens. Toute force est appropriation, domination, exploitation
d’une quantité de réalité. Même la perception dans ses aspects divers est
l’expression de forces qui s’approprient la nature. C’est dire que la nature elle-
même a une histoire. L’histoire d’une chose, en général, est la succession des
forces qui s’en emparent, et la coexistence des forces qui luttent pour s’en
emparer. Un même objet, un même phénomène change de sens suivant la force
qui se l’approprie. L’histoire est la variation des sens, c’est-à-dire « la
succession des phénomènes d’assujettissement plus ou moins violents, plus ou
moins indépendants les uns des autres » (Ibid. 4; Nietzsche, On the Genealogy
of Morals and Ecce Homo 1989, On the Genealogy of Morals, II,12; Werke VI2,
Zur Genealogie der Moral, II, 12)

Deleuze’s analysis is particularly applicable to Nietzsche’s agricultural metaphor
in the introduction to The Genealogy of Morals. Philosophy does not investigate objects
as objectively given, and subjectively discovered. It is an analysis of the co-productive,
contingent dynamic of the relationship between the conditions of agricultural production
and various produce.

Our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us with
the necessity with which a tree bears fruit- related and each with an affinity to
each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, one sun.- Whether you like
them, these fruits of ours?- But what is that to the trees! What is that to us, to us
philosophers! (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo 1989,
On the Genealogy of Morals, Prelude, 2; Werke VI2, Zur Genealogie der Moral,
Vorrede, 2)

The philosophical investigation into values and senses is analogous to an agricultural
investigation into the co-dependent productive relation between a set of environmental
conditions and the products that can be produced in those conditions. Neither term is
posited as absolute or necessary, though they each presuppose certain conditional features
in the other. This may be radical given the history of philosophy, but it is far from
fantastic. It is empirically observable. A change in environmental conditions tends to
produce a change in the forms of life in those conditions; and reciprocally, if there is a
change in the organisms that populate an environment, they also tend to produce a change in the environmental conditions.

According to Deleuze then, Nietzsche’s reformed conception of philosophy is, first and foremost, a reform to what constitutes an object of philosophical analysis. It shifts from an analysis of a given, objective entity and its essential and accidental features (i.e. metaphysics as a will to truth), to an analysis of the reciprocally conditioned and conditioning dynamic of a set of values and philosophical conclusions.

**4.3.3.2.2 Force and Pluralism**

These creative and contingent valuations, which determine the equally contingent objects of philosophical analysis called senses or meanings, are what Nietzsche calls forces. Because a force is an activity and not a determinate object or entity, it cannot be accounted for with a static, determinate list of defining attributes. To describe a force, one can only proceed as a doctor does in describing an illness- that is, as a set of symptoms (Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* 1962, 3). However, this analogy risks encouraging the misunderstanding that Nietzsche’s philosophical reforms are simply a matter of displacing by degree the source of a philosophical object’s determinacy. If a force is discernable by its symptoms, it is not because its symptoms are themselves definitively given either in themselves or in their relation to a force.

Symptoms are determined as such, only because they are interpreted as such. Certain phenomena manifest as the symptoms of other phenomena in light of the activity of an interpreting force. A plethora of phenomena, therefore, may be deemed the discernable features of the sense of potentially any other phenomenon because the relations posited amongst phenomena are determined, not by virtue of the metaphysically
or objectively given essence of the ‘object’ in question, but by the interpreters’ evaluative acts of appropriation, domination, or exploitation. The phenomena that are taken to be the symptoms of some philosophical object of enquiry are its symptoms only insofar as they are interpretively construed as such (Ibid., 4). Therefore, interpretation is not only the means of discovering or understanding appropriative forces; it is also a creative, affective force that produces those very objects of philosophical enquiry.

Consequently, to the extent that the objects of philosophical analysis are the contingent products of creatively interpretive forces, the sense of any object of philosophical interpretation is not singular. It is pluralistic. Senses may be legitimately construed in any number of ways depending on the contingent values that produce them.

Toute force est donc dans un rapport essentiel avec une autre force. L’être de la force est le pluriel ; il serait proprement absurde de penser la force au singulier. Une force est domination, mais aussi l’objet sur lequel une domination s’exerce. Une pluralité de forces agissant et pâtitant à distance, la distance étant l’élément différentiel compris dans chaque force et par lequel chacune se rapporte à d’autres (Ibid., 4).

If this is the case, and the objects of philosophical analysis are the pluralistic products of appropriative forces, what grounds could possibly remain for philosophical evaluation? If any object of philosophical analysis is a “sense” that is contingent on the potentially shifting values of any one of its multitude of potential interpreters, then how can there be any determinable grounds for philosophical evaluation?

In a certain sense, there aren’t. Nietzsche does not posit any, at least not in absolute or universal terms. He accepts the dissolution of metaphysics in its fullest sense (as the dissolution of any version of the correspondence conception of truth), and the consequent dissolution of any distinctively correct interpretation or evaluation. However, he does not thereby discard philosophy or philosophical evaluation as a valuable form of discourse. The value of any specific philosophical position becomes determinable, not
given its coherence with a purportedly universal set of values or true first premises, but
given its coherence with the values it presupposes.

Certain values engender certain philosophical positions. As the value of any
philosophical position always refers back to those founding values for its sense, its value
as a philosophical position can only follow from its coherence with those very values.
They are, after all, the only remaining discernable values that could provide a possible
ground for evaluation. The question of the philosophical value of any claim is thus, not
whether this or that philosophical growth is true or false, or truly good or truly bad, but
whether or not it is a fruit that would destroy the tree that bears it. If a philosophical
position is incoherent with the values that give rise to it, then the adherents to alternative
positions need not demonstrate the falsity of those self-contradicting claims. They need
not fall into contradiction with themselves by claiming some absurd philosophical
position false. They can simply allow those positions to annihilate themselves in
practice. In this way, Deleuze’s Nietzsche avoids the responsibility of taking upon
himself the burden of proving his opponents incorrect, and thereby falling into
contradiction with his denunciation of truth as the grounds for philosophical evaluation.
He does not, however, necessarily lose the means of discriminating amongst a variety of
competing claims.

4.3.3.2.3 Will

If an object of philosophical analysis is no longer an object in the sense of an
entity with determinate and defining attributes, but a “sense” or “interpretation” that
follows from the implicit prejudices or values of a philosopher, and if the interpretation
which gives rise to a particular dynamic of senses and values is what Nietzsche calls a
“force”, and if a force produces a pluralistic object of interpretation given the variety of forces that could potentially and legitimately evaluate it, then “will” is the name Nietzsche gives to the genetic principle of a force’s activity. “Le concept de force est donc, chez Nietzsche, celui d’une force qui se rapporte à une autre force : sous cet aspect, la force s’appelle une volonté” (Ibid., 7).

An object of philosophical analysis is the product of a willful, interpretive construction. Consequently, the challenge is not so much discovering some alternative grounds for philosophical evaluation subsequent to the rejection of a correspondence conception of truth, but of recognizing that philosophical objects and interpretations presuppose a preceding evaluation. Philosophical interpretations and evaluations imply one another. To this extent, philosophical interpretation, when it is conducted in good faith, does not involve a will to objectivity, but a will to acknowledge and affirm one’s distinctive perspective (Ibid., 10). It is what Deleuze calls a will to difference. It is a will to make a necessarily non-normative, creatively appropriating evaluations.

Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s critique of philosophy as a will to truth, therefore, is not a claim about the manner in which such a conception fails to respect the true criteria of good philosophy. Nietzsche’s evaluation of philosophy as a will to truth does not presuppose a normative principle of evaluation. It is an unflinchingly non-normative claim. It is an evaluation that presupposes only Nietzsche’s own values, or what Nietzsche himself calls his prejudices. Nietzsche’s philosophical evaluation of the
history of philosophy, therefore, is a self-conscious, willful projection of his own
prejudices.

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche’s willingness to make transparently non-universal, non-normative claims is what radically distinguishes his philosophy and philosophical method from historical philosophical conventions. However, Nietzsche’s willingness to make these kinds of claims, as Kaufmann made abundantly clear, does not rest on his love of some kind of Hobbesian principle of power as a means of violence, and dominance, and control. The fundamental value or prejudice that produces this conception of philosophy is his profound, though unjustified love of life.

4.3.3.3 The Philosophical Will to Truth as Nihilistic

If Nietzsche aims to provide a justification for rejecting philosophy as a will to truth in favor of philosophy as genealogy, then, given the terms of his reform to the philosophical method, it cannot be a justification in the conventional sense. It is not a truth claim about the ‘real’, or ‘true’, or ‘actual’ value of philosophy as genealogy. Nietzsche’s justification is a presentation of two different sets of contingent values and the philosophical concepts and evaluations that those values produce. He analyzes the products of two sets of values, the possible coherence of those products with the values that produced them, and the possible coherence of those dynamics with his own prejudices.

This is why Deleuze finds The Genealogy of Morals so useful. It provides a typology and topology of the forces that produce philosophy as a will to truth and the forces that produce philosophy as genealogy. Because Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis produces an interpretation wherein the force that produces philosophy as a will to truth is
intimately tied to nihilism, it provides him with a ground for preferring the one above the other. Because the force that produces philosophy as a will to truth is nihilistic, it more or less consciously seeks its own destruction. Consequently, Nietzsche does not value this conception of philosophy because it is inconsistent with his love of life.

According to Deleuze, The Genealogy of Morals’ analysis of the slave’s moral inversion of his master’s ethos exemplifies the link between the productive capacity of reactive forces and nihilism. Because philosophy as a will to truth is one possible historical product of the activity of reactive forces (see section 4.3.3.1), and because the fundamental evaluation that underscores the slave’s moral inversion of his master’s ethos is another, if there is a problematic link between the slave’s reactive, moral inversion of his master’s ethos and nihilism, then there is an analogous problem with a conception of philosophy as a will to truth. If the slave’s moral reaction contradicts Nietzsche’s own fundamental values, then he can reject both it and philosophy as a will to truth in favor of some other set of productive values.

The slave is weak. When he attempts to do as he pleases, he fails if what he wants is opposed by the wants of someone more powerful. Consequently, if the slave is to empower himself, he must begin by affecting himself. He must make himself want what he can attain. His will must direct itself against itself. In moral terms, the good, which is originally nothing other than the logical implication of choosing one thing over another when presented with a choice, becomes complicated. The slave’s good becomes conditioned by his subjugation. The genetic principle of his conception of his own good, therefore, starts with a “no” to his master’s choice that constrains his own power to choose. Because the master’s ability to act as he sees fit comes at the expense of the
slave’s ability to do the same, the slave’s good is, first and foremost, the suppression of the master’s good. However, because the slave is relegated to a condition wherein he cannot overpower the master (which would effectively reverse the master slave dichotomy), the slave can only reconceptualize his own good as the opposite of the master’s. He ‘redeems’ himself so to speak, by condemning the master, and conceiving his own powerlessness as his own good.

But this engenders a practical problem. The hypothetical success of the slave’s moral inversion undermines a condition of possibility of his conception of his own good. Because the slave’s good is defined as the master’s bad, the triumph of the slave’s good is the annihilation of the condition by which he defines that good. To the extent that the slave seeks his own good, therefore, he seeks his own destruction.

This problem, however, is not a feature of the slave’s moral inversion of his master’s ethos exclusively. It is an example of the logic of reactive forces. It is an example of the productive capacity of reactive forces. If a force defines its activity in negative terms, as the opposite of an active force (such as the slave’s “no” to the master’s “yes”), then its hypothetical success annihilates the active force on which it is based because they are posited as mutually exclusive to one another. The reactive force, therefore, aspires more or less consciously to its own destruction.

This is why, according to Deleuze, the principal ally of the reactive is nihilism. Nihilism, however, does not mean non-being. Like all objects of philosophical analysis, nihilism is a sense, or a meaning, or an interpretation. It is not a determinate entity, or term, or concept. It is a product of a productive set of fundamental values or prejudices.
Consequently, nihilism is not some kind of ‘non-being,’ but a term that refers to an evaluation of being. Specifically, it is an evaluation of life that depreciates life.

Dans le mot nihilisme, nihil ne signifie pas le non-être, mais d’abord une valeur de néant. La vie prend une valeur de néant pour autant qu’on la nie, la déprécie. La dépréciation suppose toujours une fiction : c’est par fiction qu’on fausse et qu’en déprécie, c’est par fiction qu’on oppose quelque chose à la vie. La vie tout entière devient donc irréelle, elle est représentée comme apparence, elle prend dans son ensemble une valeur de néant. L’idée d’un autre monde, d’un monde supra-sensible avec toutes ses formes (Dieu, l’essence, le bien, le vrai), l’idée de valeurs supérieures à la vie n’est pas un exemple parmi d’autres, mais l’éléments constitutif de toute fiction. Les valeurs supérieures à la vie ne se séparent pas de leur effet : la dépréciation de la vie, la négation de ce monde (Ibid., 169).

According to Deleuze’s interpretation, nihilism is the name that Nietzsche gives to the logic of the reactive force. It is, for example, the willfulness of the slave, who wills its own annihilation rather than willing nothing at all.

Nietzsche’s justification for his evaluation of philosophy as genealogy over philosophy as a will to truth is the presentation of two possible conceptions of philosophy as activities or ways of life. Nietzsche is making a choice between two ways of life, as products of two distinct prejudices. Nietzsche’s philosophical justification for philosophy as genealogy is nothing other than the consequence of his own prejudice that life is valuable, even given the inevitability of political, philosophical, and conceptual subjugation. It is a willingness to posit necessarily un-universalizable and non-normative values, because while life as activity can potentially produce anything, it cannot produce everything.

4.3.4 Deleuze’s Interpretation of the Will to Power

Given the pluralistic character of Nietzsche’s conception of the objects of philosophical enquiry as senses, his philosophical concept of the will to power ought not be misconstrued as some kind of singularly determinate and determinable concept. The
will to power is a concept whose sense and value shift given the prejudices or fundamental values of the philosophical discourse within which it is posited.

The two philosophical discursive contexts elaborated by Nietzsche in *The Genealogy of Morals* engender two distinct senses of the will to power, which though incommensurable, are perfectly consistent with one another. If the concept of the will to power is described and evaluated from within the evaluative strictures of philosophy as a will to truth, then what is evaluated is only “la ratio cogniscendi de la volonté de puissance en général” (Ibid., 198). In this context, the sense of the concept of the will to power will be endowed with an intelligible determinacy, but only at the expense of becoming inconsistent with the values and evaluative principles that condition it as such. Why? Because the values that give rise to the concept of the will to power are incommensurable with the values that produce and are produced by the conception of philosophy as a will to truth. To assess the will to power in this way is like trying to weigh the distance between Montréal and Ottawa. It is doomed to absurdity.

On the other hand, if the concept of the will to power is described and evaluated from within the strictures of philosophy as genealogy (i.e. philosophy as self-consciously requiring a will to found the contingent grounds of its own sense and value), then the will to power will remain unintelligible, though not thereby absurd. The will to power, as the philosophical conceptualization of the activity of positing values that in turn produce non-normative and un-universalizable philosophical evaluations, will necessarily lack the determination of a static given entity because in this context, philosophical objects of enquiry (e.g. the will to power and truth) do not presuppose that their sense is singularly determinate or determinable. The will to power is precisely the will to affirm an un-
universalizable value. One such instance of this willfulness is Nietzsche’s estimation of the noble values of contest and power, and his consequent evaluations of philosophical claims that assume the value of deference or pity. It is precisely this type of activity that makes possible any interpretation or evaluation of the sense and value of any philosophical claim. “L’affirmation, à son tour, n’est pas seulement une volonté de puissance, une qualité de volonté de puissance, elle est ratio essendi de la volonté de puissance en général” (Ibid., 199).

According to Deleuze then, though the concept of the will to power may be construable in a variety of ways depending on the discursive conditions within which it is analyzed and assessed, to consider it in its most compelling light is, quite naturally, to consider it in relation to the values that give rise to it. The will to power is, in this sense, the conceptualization of the genetic principle of life as activity. It is the act of positing necessarily un-universalizable and non-normative values that necessarily subjugate or are subjugated by other alternative values.

**Conclusion: The Advantage of the Deleuzian Interpretation**

A careful analysis of Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s reform to philosophy provides the means of discovering in it a justification for that reform. Consequently, not only does it avoid the serious problems of the three principal interpretative approaches, it also makes something more of the will to power than an idiosyncratic alternative to the history of philosophy. It is a concept that refers to the genealogical principle of a genuinely new type of activity, produced by a distinct and compelling fundamental value or prejudice. It is a coherent and comprehensive philosophical expression of Nietzsche’s profound love of life.
In the first place, if the will to power were acceptably interpreted as a metaphysical concept at the center of a cosmology, then Nietzsche would be in irredeemable contradiction with himself. As early as his essay “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”, he insisted that metaphysical enquiry involved certain unacceptable philosophical assumptions. As Clarke points out, this position evolved in its presentation from an account of certain epistemological limitations, to that of an inherent logical absurdity. However, his rejection of metaphysics is, in one form or another, sustained throughout the rest of his oeuvre. Therefore, if Nietzsche’s will to power is a metaphysical concept, then either his critique of metaphysics or his concept will to power must be rejected. Deleuze’s interpretation on the other hand is able to fortify Nietzsche’s position against this internal contradiction. Because the will to power is a genealogical concept, appropriating it within the evaluative strictures of a metaphysical discourse is appropriating into a discursive context wherein it cannot be adequately assessed. Therefore, the criticisms leveled against the will to power from within this context are misattributions. The will to power is not a metaphysical concept because it does not purport to determine the empirical world by positing some determinative principle extrinsic to it. As a result, it cannot but fail as a tenable philosophical concept when it is judged as such. However, this consideration does not prevent the experiment of viewing it from within such a discursive context, so long as this one particular expression of the concept is not mistakenly considered adequate or comprehensive of its pluralistic sense.

In the second place, if the will to power is interpreted as an empirical concept, then either it is true of everything and therefore meaningless or uninteresting, or some abstract treatments of the will to power in the notebooks must be rejected as inconsistent.
with the hypothetical arguments made in the published accounts. However, in both cases, the empirical reading of the will to power functions within the conventional model of philosophy. Though it does avoid falling into conventional variations of metaphysical abstraction, it purports to assess the value of philosophical claims insofar as they are able to give exclusively true accounts of the world or some feature in it, and thus implicitly concedes metaphysical status to at least one term—"truth". Consequently, many of Nietzsche’s denunciations of truth and the will to truth, and their relation to his positive philosophical claims require a great deal of interpretive qualification if they are to be coherent with this or that strict and purportedly true conception of truth. Others have to be outright rejected or ignored. Alternatively, according to Deleuze, the claims made about the will to power need not be perfectly analogous to one another in order to be coherent with one another. An analysis and evaluation of each is determined, not in light of some set of universalized principles of evaluation (one of the history of philosophy’s purportedly true conceptions of truth), but in light of their respective discursive contexts and the values that determine their specific sense in each one of their specific instantiations. The sense and function of truth and of the will to power are changeable; they are pluralistic. Consequently, the relevance of the relation of the discursively specific senses of these terms to each other will change, as will their respective value. Each type of claim made about the will to power, because all philosophical terms are accepted as pluralistic, may therefore be philosophically good, despite being incommensurable with each other. What renders them coherent despite their incommensurability, at least in one specific evaluative context (i.e. Nietzsche’s own), is
that the sense of philosophical terms are pluralistic, and that their values are discursively contingent.

In the third place, if the will to power is interpreted as nothing other than an object of interpretive play, then all of Nietzsche’s critiques must be taken as play as well. However, though Deleuze’s reading accepts Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, he does not accept the extreme interpretation that would purport to infer the complete rejection of truth as a functional philosophical term. Truth is never taken to be a term that Nietzsche rejects outright. That is to say, truth is never purported to be false. Nietzsche only insists that its sense is determined historically and genealogically, not metaphysically. Truth is, like all terms, an object to be contested and appropriated in light of the values that underscore its sense in some specific discourse. For example, according to Nietzsche’s *The Genealogy of Morals*, the sense of truth is currently determined by a nihilistic, slavish resentment towards life as activity and becoming. This claim, however, should not be mistaken as reducing a discussion about truth to mere word play. The success or overcoming of the nihilistic worldview is not irrelevant simply because its value does not rest on its coherence with some absolute set of values, or some kind of metaphysical reality. It has profound consequences in the manner in which we can live our lives. Though the truth is always contingent on a constructed and contestable set of values, those constructions are objectively constitutive of our lives, and thus of great importance. Nietzsche recognizes this very clearly, and in a remarkably self-aware manner he discriminates among various philosophical claims given their coherence with his own values.
Moreover, Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power is preferable to the three principal interpretative approaches because, beyond simply avoiding their mistakes, it is able to provide a justification for the radical reform of philosophy of which it is a product. Nietzsche believes that the will to power, as the conceptualization of an alternative ground for philosophical evaluation, is preferable to the conventional principle of truth as some kind of correspondence to the ‘real’, or ‘actual’, or ‘factual’ world because it does not imply the slave’s self-annihilating ethos. The fundamental value from which Nietzsche infers his concept of the will to power, and of his conceptualization of philosophy generally, is a profound love of life. The history of philosophy, and the values that motivated its analyses and evaluations are rejected because they are reactive. They are analogous to the slave’s attempt to empower himself by more or less consciously enticing his master and himself to annihilation. Nietzsche rejects the conventional aspiration of philosophy (i.e. a will to truth) and its consequent criteria of evaluation because they are poisoned fruit that can’t help but kill the tree that bears them. They are the products of resentment. Instead, Nietzsche allows his unjustified love of life to seed his garden, despite being self-consciously unable to provide any absolute justification for why life ought to be loved at all.

Moreover, Deleuze’s interpretation of the will to power is advantageously affected by his acceptance of the premises that produce the concept. Beyond simply referring to Nietzsche’s specific values, the will to power is able to function successfully at the theoretical level. At the theoretical level, the will to power becomes indeterminate. It refers, not necessarily to Nietzsche’s own values, but to the practice of positing one’s own values as the structuring principles of philosophical interpretation and evaluation.
As a result, Deleuze’s interpretation justifies Nietzsche’s radical reform without contradicting the values on which it was founded. The will to power can be philosophically valuable without having to be correspondently true, and not only for Nietzsche and his own estimation of aristocratic values, but potentially for any other values that may otherwise be produced; though, for Nietzsche to accept them as valuable, they would have to be the products of, or at least consistent with a profound love of life.
Conclusion

Though the main object of this analysis has been the sense and function of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power, only by virtue of an interim analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of, and reforms to philosophy could it be adequately interpreted. This roundabout method was a response to the will to power’s problematic susceptibility to being interpreted as a metaphysical concept (in the full sense of a concept that aspires to some version of truth as correspondence). Because an interpretation of the will to power as a metaphysical concept would render it inconsistent with the bulk of Nietzsche’s published oeuvre, it seemed as though either Nietzsche’s variously repeated and reformulated versions of his rejection of metaphysics would have to be abandoned in favor of his account of the world as will to power, or the concept of the will to power would have to be abandoned in favor of his rejection of metaphysics. The only alternative seemed to be a rejection of Nietzsche’s value or skill as a philosopher. Either Nietzsche changed his mind about metaphysics, changed his mind about the will to power, or he was inconsistent.

Despite the immense amount of scholarly debate that more or less consciously subscribes to this evaluative conundrum, there is a preferable alternative. Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power does not engender this set of unappealing choices if its sense and function are interpreted as something radically new. If this is the case, then understanding the sense of the will to power is as rewarding as it is challenging. It is a philosophical concept that presupposes an interpretation of a radical reform to philosophy, to its method, and to its goal; however, subsequent to such an involved
analysis, the will to power reveals itself as a genuinely new type of philosophical concept, which embodies a new and exciting type of philosophy.

Subsequent to what Kaufmann calls Nietzsche’s inspired flash of 1881 (Kaufmann 1956, 162; Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* 1989, *Ecce Homo, Why I Write Such Good Books, Zarathustra, 1*; *Werke VI3, Ecce Homo, Warum ich so gute Bücher schreibe, Zarathustra, 1*), his critical considerations take a positive turn. His rejection of metaphysics in a negative sense is displaced by a positive, though radical account of truth and philosophy. Nietzsche the lion becomes the Nietzsche child. Truth is no longer criticized in light of the function attributed to it by the history of philosophy, but defined in positive terms as the name that philosophers give to their prejudices. The history of philosophy, therefore, as a will to truth, is interpreted as the product, or the organic growth of a set of historically contingent prejudices. Philosophy becomes, not a more or less successful description of how the world really is rather than how it seems, but an expression of a philosopher’s fundamental values and the philosophical arguments that those values produce. Philosophies are interpreted as the perspectival, contingent, and non-universal descriptions of how their authors’ believe that their lives, and our lives are, or could be, or should be.

But doesn’t this conception of philosophy contradict itself? Doesn’t it presuppose a truth claim about philosophy, while at the same time rejecting that any claim can be true to the extent that truth is conceived as correct correspondence to the ‘real’ world? No, it does not. This type of criticism is blind to the powerfully self-aware character of Nietzsche’s reforms.
Deleuze’s largely ignored, and otherwise grossly misunderstood interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception and reform of philosophy is spectacularly useful for resolving this seeming contradiction. Deleuze’s interpretation, however, does not provide an adequate contextualization of the interpretive conditions that make his interpretation so valuable. The typical misrepresentation of Deleuze’s interpretation follows from his having assumed what most scholarship is at pains to understand. It presents Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy, and his reforms to the philosophical method from a perspective that assumes the acceptability of those reforms. Though Deleuze’s analysis opens with a summary account of the terms of Nietzsche’s reformed conception of philosophy, he does not explain why the terminological revision is necessary or how it helps avoid the interpretive quagmire in which the three principal interpretive approaches lose sight of the complex and unconventional coherence of Nietzsche’s oeuvre.

Consequently, the long and winding road from historical convention to radical reform remained unmapped. Many of Deleuze’s readers lose themselves in unfamiliar and potentially alienating new philosophical horizons. However, in conjunction with the critical assessments of the three principle interpretative approaches to the will to power, and the interpretation of Nietzsche’s positive account of truth as it functions in the history of philosophical discourse, Deleuze’s interpretation becomes at once impressive for having avoided the missteps of the other interpretative approaches and, more importantly, constructive to the extent that it is able to discover in *The Genealogy of Morals* a unique type of justification for Nietzsche’s reforms to the philosophical method.

Mapping the route Nietzsche travelled from convention to reform, and making explicit the manner in which those reforms do not undermine themselves is this analysis’
original contribution to Nietzsche scholarship. It did this by organizing the body of
Nietzsche scholarship that interprets the sense of the concept of the will to power into
three categories, or into three types of interpretative approach: the will to power as a
metaphysical concept, the will to power as an empirical concept or as a concept produced
by an empirical method of enquiry, and the will to power as a literary object of
interpretive play. Using this organizational tool, it made explicit the fundamental
misunderstanding that produces each one of these three problematic approaches. It has
shown that each one follows from a misunderstanding of the sense and function that
Nietzsche attributes to the philosophical concept of “truth” and of its relation to the sense
and function of philosophy as an activity. Once Nietzsche’s concept of philosophy has
been, for better or worse, clearly accounted for as a form of history that is to be made
subject to the requirements of life; and that truth, as a philosophical concept, has been
clearly accounted for as a term defined by the history of its use in a specific discourse;
then, Nietzsche’s radical reform to the concept of “truth”, to its function, and to its
acceptability as the structuring principle of philosophical evaluation can be rendered
consistent with his concept of the will to power.

Because Nietzsche has defined philosophy as the product of the philosopher’s
fundamental values or prejudices, Nietzsche’s justification for his proposed reforms to
the method of philosophical analysis and evaluation does not aspire to normativity or
universality. He simply provides a perspectival interpretation of the historical source of
the divergence between his own conception of philosophy, and the historically
conventional conception. He identifies what values he thinks produce a certain
conception of philosophy and the implicit evaluations that produce those values, and then
confesses that those fundamental values are inconsistent with his interpretation of his own fundamental values. Nietzsche’s critique of philosophy as a will to truth, however, is not thereby characterized as false or incorrect. It is simply, at least for Nietzsche, undesirable. Because the history of philosophy as a will to truth is, according to Nietzsche’s perspectival interpretation, intimately tied to nihilism, Nietzsche does not reject it as false or inherently bad, but as undesirable given its inconsistency with his own unjustified love of life.

The will to power, therefore, is confusingly ambiguous at the theoretical level. It allows for the possibility of empirical multiplicity and inconsistency. At the theoretical level, the will to power is the name of any philosophical first premise, which can be any claim whatsoever. However, such claims never function as anything other than a convenient or practical starting point on an infinitely regressive structure of argumentative justification. At the empirical level, the will to power is the specific content of any of those first premises; that is to say, it is the specific values and the specific evaluations that those values presuppose that produce any specific philosophy. To this extent, the will to power is a concept that can house any number of inconsistent claims. The will to truth, for example, is one ironic instantiation of the will to power. It is a value that produces a specific type of activity, metaphysics. The will to power, therefore, is the name Nietzsche gives to the genetic principle of philosophy as an activity, which can manifest in a potentially infinite variety of specific forms.

This is the sense of Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy as genealogy. It is a conception of philosophy as a will to power, or a will to posit the necessary, though necessarily unjustifiable conditions for practicing philosophy.
To this extent, the activity of philosophy, and the productions of that activity become historically contingent. However, because Deleuze simply assumed the acceptability of those reforms, the value of his interpretation, and the value of Nietzsche’s reforms remained unclear. This analysis has contributed a detailed account of precisely how Nietzsche, through a lifetime of experimental philosophical reflection, produced a conceptual context in which the will to power could be posited as a compelling and preferable structuring concept for philosophical discourse (at least insofar as Nietzsche fundamental values, and the historical interpretations produced by those values are also accepted as compelling). Moreover, this analysis has shown that the concept of the will to power, while critiquing the philosophical value of the concept “truth”, does not thereby undermine its own philosophical value, or problematically supplant the concept of “truth” as the central concept of an internally inconsistent metaphysical system. The will to power acknowledges itself as a perspectival description of world, produced by its author’s prejudice. Whether or not the concept is deemed compelling given its coherence with the values that structure the evaluations of other philosophers, this interpretation has rendered Nietzsche oeuvre formally coherent. Nietzsche’s specific philosophical experiments into religion, politics, morals, etc., may house a vast number of contradictory claims; however, Nietzsche’s philosophical method is internally consistent with the fundamental value that produces it.

But what is this value? What is Nietzsche’s prejudice that produces his philosophy of the will to power? It is Nietzsche’s profound love of life. It is an unequivocal ‘yes!’ or at least a desire to proclaim unequivocally and in good faith ‘yes!’ to the demon who would creep into his room, in his loneliest loneliness and ask:
“This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence- even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!”… (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 1974, 341; *Werke* V2, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 341)

If this analysis has answered two intertwined questions, ‘What is Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power?’ and ‘What is the conception of philosophy that produces it?’, it engenders a far more important, and still answered third question: ‘What are the moral or ethical ramifications of this conception of philosophy?’ This, of course, represents an entirely new enquiry. Nonetheless, I would like to forward one qualification of what this concern cannot reasonably entail. Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy does not make ethics, as a branch of philosophy, obsolete. It does not reduce philosophy to a species of aesthetics, what Habermas calls an aesthetic of personal taste. In fact, far from any such consequence, Nietzsche’s reform to the philosophical method, as it is expressed positively in his concept of the will to power, is a call to an honest engagement in ethics and politics. It is an expression, not of their end, but of their beginning. Nietzsche shows precisely what our ethics and our politics are; they are the social deliberation of what we should value. Simply because there is no necessity to any specific political proposition does not make the question either irrelevant or arbitrary. Because values are always revisable and always contestable, so too is our responsibility towards them. The historically contingent social and political world we live in is the product of what we hold, more or less consciously, most sacred. It is, for better or for worse, the expression of what we love. If we love the world we live in, then we can be contented that the values that produce it are good because this is what Nietzsche thinks
“good” means; but, if this is the case, we are also responsible for maintaining the world in such a state by fighting for the preservation and perpetuation of those values. On the other hand, if we do not love the world as we find it, then we must acknowledge that our values, either as the products of our choices, or as the burden of our historical inheritances, have to be changed. Whichever we believe to be the case, we have a very great deal of very important work to do.
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