THE FULL HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD:
THEOLOGY AND THE
ENCOUNTER WITH GLOBALIZATION

BY
CHRISTOPHER JAMES DUNCANSON-HALES

DISSERTATION

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Faculty of Theology
University of Ottawa

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my mother, (Mary) Catherine Hales who now lives in the eternal hope of new life in Christ, promised to all. Continue to pray for us as we pray for you and may her soul and all the souls of the faithful departed rest in peace.

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The sudden vogue of such a grande idée, crowding out almost everything else for a while, is due, she says, “to the fact that all sensitive and active minds turn at once to exploiting it . . . After we have become familiar with the new idea, however, after it has become part of our general stock of theoretical concepts, our expectations are brought more into balance with its actual uses, and its excessive popularity is ended. A few zealots persist in the old key to the universe view of it; but less driven thinkers settle down after a while to the problems the idea has really generated. (Geertz 1973, 3 ff)

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is la grande idée of the latter 20th and early 21st century (Beyer 2001; Beyer 2006; Beyer 2007; Robertson 1998; Robertson and White 2003). Globalization is a buzzword that often reflects the observer’s perceptions of the world. Andrea Cornwall describes buzzwords as words that “have a multitude of meanings and nuances, depending on who is using it and in what context.” Buzzwords, Cornwall continues, “appear to convey one thing, but are in practice used to mean something quite different, or indeed have no real meaning at all.” Despite a few zealots who persist in this “key to the universe view of it,” the time has come for theology to settle the problem(s) the idea of globalization as a concept creates and as a process, generates.

In his text Faith in History and Society, Johann Baptist Metz makes an important observation that guides our reflection on theology and the encounter with globalization. The intention of theology, Metz argues, “may be defined as ‘an apology for hope.’ ‘Always be ready to make your defense to anyone who demands from you an accounting for the hope that is in you’ (1 Pt 3:15)” (2007, 23). Metz rejects a “solidaristic hope in the God of the living and the dead who calls all persons to be subjects in God’s presence’s” (2007, 23). Having rejected this solidaristic hope, Metz insists that what is at issue “is the concrete historical-social situation in which subjects find themselves: their experiences, their suffer-
ing, struggles and obstacles” (2007, 23). Theology does not need to offer its apologia to these whom Fanon names the wretched of the earth, rather, and more profoundly, it is these subjects who’s encounter with globalization is an encounter with the boundary situation of “suffering, struggles and obstacles” that offer theology a profound insight into the capacity of the human spirit to project hope despite despair.

Theology’s apology for hope begins with a reflection on the situation in which our apologia is offered. Metz identifies two important features that characterize this theology’s encounter with globalization. The first is the imperative that

the social starting point cannot take place today on anything other than a global scale. The growing interdependence of social-political and economic conditions means that it is simply impossible to delineate any situation without this ‘global’ aspect. Every attempt to achieve specificity without attending to these global interrelations is abstract (in a problematic sense). (Metz 2007, 23, emphasis mine)

The second important feature Metz identifies is the significance of recognizing that the world we experience is already a secondary world, highlighting an understanding of the world that in its essence and reality is already thoroughly shaped by theories and global systems and consequently can only be experienced and, to the extent possible, changed, in and through these theories and global structures. Whoever forgets this fact easily falls victim to an uncritical concept of “praxis.” A praxis which does not attend to the complexity of the world or the world of our experience as “secondary” will inevitably be sporadic and ineffective; at best it would stand symbolically for the new reality that is being sought, without however being able to bring it about, since this praxis will be absorbed into the prevailing global systems. (2007, 24, emphasis mine)

Theology does not need to reinvent social theory, but that is not to say that theology must blindly acquiesce to the latest buzz-theory proffered by the social sciences. Theology has a responsibility to ensure that the theories it draws on to understand the world are academically rigorous and robust. Theology can listen to social scientific conversations, and in
some cases, contribute to the conversation without allowing its own epistemological status to be subsumed.

Metz argues that two features of theology’s encounter with the modern age require a fundamental theology that is both apologetic and practical. This practical-apologetic dimension of a fundamental theology places the subject at the centre of theological reflection, “becoming in this way a political theology of the subject” (Metz 2007, 29). Metz explains that taking this practical-apologetic dimension requires a serious reassessment of theology’s self-understanding “as a subjectless foundational system” (2007, 29). To the contrary, Metz maintains that it cannot produce its themes from out of itself or systematically calculate in advance the difficulty of the proofs or the hardships of the challenges. The arena in which it is to prove itself is outside the territory of pre-formulated theological systems. It is ‘defined’ by its social-historical situation, with all of its painful contradictions. From first to last, this kind of theology is bound up with a praxis which resists every attempt to radically condition religion socially or to reconstruct it in terms of an abstract theory. Theology remains bound to a praxis of faith that is dually constituted as mystical-political. (2007, 29)

The arena outside of pre-formulated theological systems in which theology must prove itself is dominated by social theories that attempt to “radically condition religion socially or to reconstruct it in terms of an abstract theory.” Metz categorizes these theories as either

the system that interprets the world and reality in terms of an evolutionary or evolutionistic logic, an approach with its historical roots in the Enlightenment on the one hand and Western bourgeois civilization on the other... [or]... the materialist dialectic of history, which historically speaking should also be understood as a specific way of actualizing the Enlightenment, and which found its historical-social manifestation above all in Eastern socialist societies. (2007, 25)

Whether evolutionary or materialist, theories emerging from these two categories are not neutral or innocent in their relationship with Christianity, or more generally, the global
religions. These theories, Metz argues, “understand themselves more or less explicitly as metatheories with regard to religion and to theology; that is, for them religion can in principle be reconstructed or subsumed and rendered transparent to a more comprehensive system” (2007, 25). Metz argues that “over and above those systemic theories which understand themselves to be metatheories,” religion and more specifically, systematic theology, “must ‘defend’ and ‘justify’ the subject matter of theology—the authenticity of religion. It must ‘render an account’ of it; that is, it must do precisely that which was originally intended by the term ‘apology’” (2007, 26). To do so, Metz continues, theology must both defend the very concept of religion while avoiding the danger of being sublimated and thereby marginalized by evolutionary metatheories of social development.

If globalization is such a comprehensive system, as shall be argued in this project, then theology must find the tools to interpret this system. Catholic theologian William T. Cavanaugh suggests that theology’s encounter with globalization is neglected and marginalized:

Many who write in the Church and politics carry on as if nothing [the phenomenon of globalization] had happened, preoccupied with the question of if and how the Church should enter 'the public realm,' an imaginary national space where conflicts are settled. Globalization is left for those who deal in so-called 'economic ethics,' either to decry transnational firms paying Salvadoran textile workers 33 cents an hour, or to hail the capitalist catholicity. (Cavanaugh 2002, 97)

Either theologians discount globalization outright or they base theological reflection on assumptions that exclusively define globalization as primarily driven by economic integration or domination, by political hegemony or revolution, or by cultural homogenization or diversity (Beyer 1994, 7).

Theological approaches to globalization that uncritically accept a one-dimensional and facile understanding of globalization inadvertently participate in that which they cri-
tique. The lens through which theology reflects on globalization colours its presentation and subsequent theological reflection. Dwight Hopkins typifies this approach to globalization in his essay “Globalization as Religion.” Hopkins presents the argument “that globalization of monopoly finance capitalist culture is itself a religion” (Hopkins 2001). The difficulty with the Hopkins position is that in using a metaphor of substitution that names globalization as religion, the tension between the literal and figurative is lost. Rather than, “the globalization of monopoly finance capitalist culture is like a religion,” we are confronted with, “the god of the religion of globalization is the concentration of monopoly finance capitalist culture.” If globalization is a religion, then should not theology encounter this religion in the spirit of inter-religious dialogue rather than in the tradition of the war of religions? If not, then how can theology engage globalization?

The dangers of accepting a one-dimensional and facile understanding of globalization is further illustrated by the curious theological reflections of the former Secretary General of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Michel Camdessus. Franz J. Hinkelammert recounts a speech delivered by Camdessus to a mostly Catholic audience in which Camdessus portrays “the IMF, structural adjustment and the entire neoliberal concept of society as incarnating the humility and pride of those exercising resistance” (in Batstone 1997, 40). Camdessus formulates the mandate of the IMF in the language of liberation theology, concluding:

Our mandate resounded in the synagogue at Nazareth, and from the Spirit we are given the receiving of that which the apostles of Jesus denied to accept: precisely the realization of the promise made in Isaiah 61: 1-3) beginning with our present history! It is a text of Isaiah which Jesus explained; it says, “The spirit of the Lord God is upon me, he has anointed me in order to announce the good news to the poor, to proclaim liberation to captives and the return of sight to the blind, to free the oppressed and proclaim the year of grace granted by the Lord” (Luke 4: 16-23). And Jesus only had one short response: “Today this message is fulfilled for you that you should listen.”
This today is our today and we are part of this grace of God, we who are in charge of the economy (administrators of a part of it, in any case): the alleviation of the suffering of our brothers and the procurers of the expansion of their liberty. It is we who have received the Word. This Word can change everything. We know that God is with us in the work of spreading brotherhood. (40)

Both Hopkins and Camdessus present a one-dimensional understanding of globalization that universalizes a particular part at the expense of the whole. Missing from both is “an accounting for the hope that is in you.”

Camdessus, however, does raise an important question for theology in its encounter with a globalizing world. Does theology’s encounter with globalization begin with Camdessus’s neo-liberal capitalist interpretation of the Word of God or does his use of religious language conceal a golden calf that seeks to legitimize an exploitive global financial economic system by coopting religious language? If, as I maintain, the latter interpretation is correct, then systematic theology, in dialogue with the globalizing world, must reveal what is hidden.

The guiding assumption of this project is that the undefined, marginalized, and hidden values of globalization are interpreted in the developing world through the language of the religious productive imagination. Theology’s encounter with globalization is an encounter with the capacity of the language of the religious productive imagination to overcome oppression and alienation through its ontological bearing of hope.

While theological reflection on neo-liberal economic policy or the resurgence of po-

1. It is beyond the scope of this project to deconstruct the term “development” and its related terms, “developed” and “developing”. For the sake of clarity, I will use the accepted nomenclature of International Development Studies community to differentiate between the “developed” world and the “developing” world. For an important discussion on the contested nature of these terms, see Gilbert Rist’s chapter, “Development as a Buzzword” in Deconstructing Development Discourse. (Cornwall and Eade 2010)
itical empire building or the homogenization of culture is valuable, even critical, it is a mistake to view any one of these parts as the whole that is globalization. It is therefore necessary to find the analytic tools that can avoid a one-dimensional and facile representation of globalization. To understand the world in which we theologize, we must turn to the disciplines that make the world, and more specifically, society, the focus of study. For the present project, we will turn to the social system theory of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann.

What Luhmann recommends to this present study is his inversion of the action/communication dynamic that bogs similar systems theories down in a never-ending cycle of double contingency. Luhmann’s theory privileges communications about action over action. This reversal of traditional action theory creates the room for the contribution of the phenomenological hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur argues that “a philosophy instructed by myths arises at a certain moment in reflection and wishes to answer a certain situation in modern culture” (Ricoeur 1969, 346).

If, as is the case with this study, globalization is understood as the global expansion of functionally differentiated societies through communications that differentiate subsystems of their environments based on function, then a critical aspect of our understanding of

2. “Double-contingency” is defined by Hans-Georg Moeller “in reference to the fact that the selections in communications are contingent upon two sides.” Luhmann gives the example of a warship and a trading vessel that reach an island from different sides. The warship wants to attack the trading vessel. They both have two options: they can turn either southward or northward to sail around the island. If the trading vessel turns north, the warship will do the same—but if the warship does so, the trading vessel will turn south.” (Moeller 2006, 219) (see below §4.3.1, 87)

3. Culture, as understood here, corresponds with Clifford Geertz’s description of culture as a social system constituting webs of signification that “denote an historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (2000; 5, 89).
global society is the interpretation of these communications. It is the contention of this project that globalization presents such a situation and that the religious language of Rastafari hermeneutics, instructed by the global flow and exchange of symbols and myths, is an important reflection on this boundary situation.

It is through the limit-experiences of life in “Babylon” that Rastafari interprets the limit-expressions and limit-concepts of the scriptures. In this present study, we therefore begin with an understanding of globalization not as a clash of civilizations, but as a conflict of interpretations. Tightening our focus, we will look to the Caribbean and more specifically, Jamaica, whose legacy of colonization, slavery, and exploitation represents the first-wave of globalization that laid the foundations for the continued political, economic, and social exploitation of two-thirds of the world’s population, primarily located in the global south.

The speed with which modern mass communication circulates the globe has shrunk the boundary across which the world’s symbols and metaphors are exchanged and reoriented. The application of Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of the religious productive imagination to the religious language of Rastafari hermeneutics reveals the power of the language of the marginalized to resist the oppressive forces of globalization in the global south. Rastafari hermeneutics are an example of the reorientation and “configuring of the most tenacious and most dense human hope, and by rectifying the traditional religious representation, limit-expressions continue their course beyond a narrative” (Ricoeur 1995, 165). Rather than seeing “the wretched of the earth” as passive victims of globalization, we will explore Ricoeur’s understanding of the religious productive imagination’s capacity to reorient this boundary situation of wretchedness by imagining an epochē of hope towards which praxis is directed.
Old pirates, yes, they rob I;
Sold I to the merchant ships,
Minutes after they took I
From the bottomless pit.
But my hand was made strong
By the 'and of the Almighty.
We forward in this generation
Triumphantly.
PART I: PRE-UNDERSTANDING

In the following section, I will set the context for theology’s encounter with globalization. Chapter 1 will investigate the debate over precisely what globalization is. I will identify Malcolm Water’s guiding axiom of globalization: "material exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic exchanges globalize" as a useful starting point (2001, 20, italics in the original). We must keep in mind, however, that these exchanges are part of a contingent historical process of uneven exchanges, which Enrique Dussel reminds us was initially a violent plundering of the land, people, and resources of the colonized by the colonizers. From Water’s analysis we will conclude that the theory of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann satisfies the criteria introduced by Eduardo Mendieta for a metatheoretical reflexive theory of globalization.

Chapter 2 will further develop this context by exploring globalization through the European colonial expansion and subjugation of the new world and the falsification of the secularization thesis, which normalizes and globalizes the European experience of secularization. In Chapter 3 the experience of Caribbean colonization and slavery will be presented as what Karl Jasper terms a “boundary situation,” the limits of which place a community in an existential crisis. In the case of the Caribbean, we will present the tension between a phenomenology of manifestation and a hermeneutic proclamation as a creative tension that gives rise to Rastafari’s proclamation of a religion of resistance through hope.
The term “globalization” has become somewhat of a cliché. It serves to explain everything from the woes of the German coal industry to the sexual habits of Japanese teenagers. Most clichés have a degree of factual validity; so does this one. There can be no doubt about the fact of an ever more interconnected global economy with vast social and political implications, and there is no shortage of thoughtful, if inconclusive, reflection about this great transformation. It has also been noted that there is a cultural dimension, the obvious result of an immense increase in worldwide communication. If there is economic globalization, there is also cultural globalization. To say this, however, is only to raise the question of what such a phenomenon amounts to.

Peter Berger 1997

CHAPTER 1: GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH

1.1 SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN ARENAS OF EXCHANGE

New Zealand sociologist Malcolm Waters suggests that globalization is a transformation of political exchanges into symbolic exchanges. Waters identifies this transformation as the guiding axiom of globalization: “material exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic exchanges globalize” (2001, 20, italics in the original). Waters’ axiom is useful, so long as we keep in mind that these exchanges are part of a contingent historical process of uneven exchanges, which Latin American philosopher Enrique Dussel reminds us was initially a violent plundering of the land, people and resources of the colonized by the colonizers (see below §1.3.1). The transformation of the uneven exchanges during the present moment in history requires the recasting of the differentiation of social arrangements in the global arenas of economy, polity, and culture. Arenas are abstract places of interaction or exchange. In classic sociological theory, these
arenas of exchange include at a minimum the economic, political, and cultural. While there is widespread agreement on the constitution of the economic and political differentiation of society, there is debate over the constitution of the cultural differentiation of society. Waters summarizes “arenas” as follows:

Following Weber (1978: 928–40) and Bell (1979: 3–30), we can take these three arenas to be structurally autonomous. The argument here, therefore, stands opposed both to the Marxist position that the economy is constitutive of polity and culture and to the Parsonsian position that culture determines the other two arenas. However, it also makes the assumption that the relative affectivity of the arenas can vary across history and geography. A more effective set of arrangements in one arena can penetrate and modify arrangements in the others. (2001, 17)

To arrive at his theorem, Waters traces globalization through the deterritorialization of social arrangements in the arenas of: economy, polity, and culture, each of which corresponds to distinct and independent social relationships based respectively on:

1) Economy: social relations for the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of goods and tangible services
2) Polity: social relations for the concentration and application of power, [...] that can establish control overpopulations and territories. . .
3) Culture: social relations for the production, exchange, and expression of symbols that represent facts, affects, meanings, beliefs, preference, tastes, and values (2001, 17)

Waters’ understanding of globalization centres on the relationship between these social relationships and territoriality, a relationship “established by the types of [material] exchange that predominated in social relations at any particular moment.” In the subsystem of economics, material exchanges “including trade, tenancy, wage-labour, fee-for-service, and capital accumulation dominate social relations, and tend to tie social relations to localities.

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4. For a summary of sociological theories of differentiation see, (Waters 2001, 8ff; Haferkamp and Smelser 1992, 44ff)
In this respect, material exchanges localize” (Waters 2001, 18ff).

In the arena of polity, political exchanges, including “exchanges of support, security, coercion, authority, [and] force,” are dominant and tend to tie relationships to broader territorial boundaries, culminating in the nation-state and territorial sovereignty. Relationships between sovereign nations (international relations) tend to confirm this sovereignty. In this respect, the arena of polity internationalizes political exchanges (Waters 2001, 18). Finally, in the arena of culture, symbolic exchanges dominate social relations “by means of oral communication, publication, performance, teaching, oratory, ritual, display, entertainment, propaganda, public demonstration, data accumulation and transfer, exhibition and spectacle” (Waters 2001, 18). Symbolic exchanges are not geographically or temporally bound.

Waters’ concept of symbolic exchanges is similar to the concept of global flows, first developed by sociologist Manuel Castells, and the imaginary space of “scapes” postulated by Arjun Appadurai. Castells understands the global as “a network of networks, which is a new form of social relations between economics, politics, and culture” (Wilkinson 2007, 378). These networks of networks are characterized by the criss-crossing of “money, power, and images [...] the old and the new, and they create new symbols of meaning, all of which contribute to an increase in social and cultural unease as humanity ponders questions of change, meaning, and identity” (Wilkinson 2007, 378). Whereas Castell’s networks remove agency from the local, Appadurai’s “scapes” allows for local agency. Appadurai argues:

As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories, and reconfigure their ethnic projects, the ethno in ethnography takes on a slippery, non-localized quality to which the descriptive practice of anthropology will have to respond. The landscapes of group identity—the ethnoscapes—around the world are no longer tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, his-
torically self-conscious, or culturally homogeneous. (Wilkinson 2007, 378)

In either case, Waters recognizes that

symbolic exchanges release social arrangements from spatial referents. Symbols can be proliferated rapidly and in any locality. It is much more difficult to monopolize the resources (human ingenuity) required to produce signs than it is to monopolize the resources (capital) involved in producing material objects or those involved in the exercise of power (coercion) and therefore much more difficult to concentrate them in space. Moreover, they are easily transportable and communicable. Importantly, because symbols frequently seek to appeal to human fundamentals, they can often claim universal significance. (2001, 47)

The lack of constraint on production and reproduction provides symbols with mobility and consequently, symbols flow between cultures, societies, and social systems. Sacred symbols that appeal to human fundamentals claim a particular, “universal” significance. Although their origin may be rooted in a “place,” their mobility liberates them from this “place.”

For example, despite being geographically bound to Africa, Ethiopia transcends its continental boundary to become both a place in Africa and a space representing the homeland of all Africans of the diaspora. Ethiopia is geographically rooted in a place, but as a symbol, Ethiopianism transcends place through space. Ethiopia becomes a direction or orientation to which hope is projected, a symbol through space as much as a symbol in place (Robertson 1992, 27). Waters’ guiding theorem of globalization cautions that

*if material exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic exchanges globalize.* We need to make a point here which is subtle and complex but which is extremely important. The apparent correspondence between the three arenas of social life—economy, politics, and culture—and the three types of exchange—material, power, and symbolic—should not mislead us into thinking that each type of exchange is restricted to a single arena. (2001, 20)

Globalization is the deterritorialization of closed social systems through symbolic exchanges. Symbols are central to the process of deterritorialization because they are trans-
ferable and malleable. Waters’ axiom, while useful, needs to be nuanced to avoid the substitution of culture for politics or economics in a one-dimensional and facile understanding of globalization.

1.2 TYPOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION THEORIES

Eduardo Mendieta provides a corrective to this approach by distinguishing three types of analysis of globalization: mono-metastructural theories, matrix rearrangement and differentiation theories, and meta-theoretical reflexive theories. Mendieta bases his categorization on the following four criteria:

1) diffusionism or integrationalism
2) theoretical reflexivity
3) the degree to which the theories offer insights into the autonomy of social subsystems without creating a hierarchy or teleological biases
4) the degree of empirical concreteness of the theories and their theoretical complexity

The distinction between each of the three types of theories is based on the degree to which these criteria are present. Mendieta argues, "The more empirically detailed and textured a theory of globalization is, the more it tends to emphasize the particular process or structure it analyzes" (2001, 47).

1.2.1 Mono-Metastructural Theories

Mono-metastructural theories explain the rise of globalization as a result of the expansion and dominance of one sub-system. Any one of the societal sub-systems can be seen as a catalyst for globalization. For instance, the political subsystem develops and globalizes under the pressure of the economic and/or social subsystems. Theories of this type, according to Mendieta, differ from modernization theory only in quantity and not in kind, raising
the objection that if globalization is neo-liberal capitalist expansion, it should be called neo-liberal capitalist expansion rather than globalization. Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system theory is a paradigmatic example of a mono-metastructural theory of globalization.

Waters’ axiom corrects the excesses of exclusively economic (Freidman) or political (Wallerstein) understandings of globalization, but he does so by introducing a cultural exclusivity that conflates the activity of the cultural arena (symbolic exchange) with the symbols themselves. It is not the arena of culture that dominates economic and political arrangements, but the deterritorialization of symbols that transcends these arenas. Symbols have the capacity to transcend not only geographical and temporal boundaries, but also the boundaries of arenas of exchange, whether economic, political, or cultural. An inadequate theory of symbols constrains Waters’ axiom to a mono-metastructural understanding of globalization.

1.2.2 Matrix Rearrangement and Differentiation Theories

Matrix rearrangement and differentiation (MR&D) theories are more abstract. They put forward building blocks of a global society and present globalization as the process whereby these pre-existing building blocks are rearranged. As the 'in between' type, MR&D types of theories are not easily distinguished from metatheoretical reflexive theories. To illustrate MR&D theories, Mendieta cites Roland Robertson’s model of the *Global Field* (fig. 1) (Robertson 1992, 27).
Robertson’s model is an analytical matrix for understanding how the world is perceived, an “attempt to make analytical and interpretive sense of how quotidian actors, collective or individual, go about the business of conceiving the world, including attempts to deny that the world is one” (Robertson 1992, 29). Robertson’s model operates on a matrix that includes the defining categories of “selves” and “humankind,” “national societies,” and a “world system of societies.” These traditionally rigid components of classic sociological theory are re-conceived in a matrix that is an “ideal representation of global complexity” (29). Each of these major components is autonomous, but in the process of globalization, they are each relativized and thus constrain each other (29). Over-emphasis on any one component leads to a form of reductionist fundamentalism. According to Robertson, “one cannot and should not wish away the reality of one or more aspects of the terms in which globalization has been proceeding” (28). According to Mendieta, MR&D theories are less about the diffusion of one social sub-system and more about the “concep-
tualization and visualization of the new social order in terms of an integrationist perspective,” presupposing the idea of a planetary whole (2001, 49).

Mendieta criticizes this approach for the obviousness of Western categories, like “humanity” and “selves.” He argues that these categories are already detritus of globalization, explaining the whole in terms of the parts that need to be explained in the first place. While Robertson’s understanding of “selves” is rooted in the Western tradition, the Global Field is an “ideal representation” of global complexity. Although his model is presented in synchronic terms, it is in fact applied diachronically “to take strongly into account changes in each of the four major components (societies, individuals, international relations, and humankind) in tandem with shifts in relations between them” (1992, 26). The category of “selves” thus refers not only to a Western understanding of the atomized self, but also to the self-conceived as the nexus of communal and familial relations. Mendieta critiques MR&D theories because he perceives that they are “unable to answer the question, ‘How is the particular theory of globalization being offered itself reflecting on its own globalization?’” (2001, 50). To this Robertson counters:

Of course, we are all in a certain way contestants in this 'postmodern game' of making histories and inventing traditions. The world as a whole is in a sense a world of reflexive interlocutors. One of the major tasks of contemporary sociologists is to makes sense of the vast array of interlocutions in which he or she is at the same time one of the interlocutors. (1992, 31)

In many respects, Mendieta’s second category represents theories of globalization currently in the process of developing into the metatheoretical reflexive theories he favours. Robertson's theory is more nuanced and self-reflexive than Mendieta allows for and it does not preclude economic or political dimensions; it merely recognizes that the cultural dimension of globalization is unattended to. Robertson is here concerned with the forms of globalization that, for Mendieta, falls into the matrix
rearrangement and differentiation category. Robertson does not share the same understanding of the process or directionality of globalization. Robertson remarks when speaking of globalization:

\textit{Per se}, we are referring to the two features of the human condition that have been specified concerning connectivity and global consciousness. These, in combination, constitute the move in the direction of global unity. The form or, more loosely the pattern that globalization has taken, certainly in recent centuries, consists of the four major components mentioned before. (Robertson and White 2003, 6, italics in the original)

While the form of Robertson's analysis of globalization is an example of matrix rearrangement and differentiation theories, Robertson's understanding of the long-haul directionality of globalization corresponds more closely to Mendieta's metatheoretical reflexive theories than to matrix rearrangement and differentiation or mono-metastructural theories. These objections to the MR&D category suggest that although distinct from mono-metastructural theories, MR&D theories are best considered on a continuum between these two more distinct theoretical types.

1.2.3 Metatheoretical Reflexive Theories

Metatheoretical reflexive theories are integrationist, recognizing that the “new global order is not just different in quantity and in order but in kind from what has preceded it.” This approach is metatheoretical; it views the totality of global change and resistance to this change as aspects of a global system. Metatheoretical reflexive theories view globalization as both the forces promoting neo-liberal global economic integration and the forces resisting neo-liberal economic integration. For Mendieta, theories of this type do not view globalization as an empirical issue, but rather as a “conceptual and theoretical challenge that requires we understand not just why a particular system seems to dominate, but why such a
sub-system is thought to be the agent of globalization at the very moment when we are able to see other sub-systems (including resistance) struggling for supremacy” (2001, 50). According to Mendieta, the unity of society must therefore be thought anew. Since “the space that religion occupied somewhere in the interstices of culture, society, state, and personality structure has been reconfigured,” so too must religion and theology be reconfigured (Mendieta 2001, 62).

Mendieta cites sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s social system theory to provide a promising insight into the new ways of thinking about the unity of society. Luhmann's social system theory of the global expansion of functionally differentiated society casts globalization as a reduction in the complexity of the global social system. Complexity is reduced through the differentiation of society’s functions into subsystems, including the economic, the political, the religious, the legal, etc. Paradoxically, the proliferation of functional subsystems has the effect of increasing the complexity of the encompassing system as more and more subsystems form around specific functions. Hans-George Moeller notes that

with functional differentiation as its main structural characteristic, society is no longer primarily divided by regional borders—society is now world-society. From a systemic point of view, the term ‘globalization’ designates the fact that function systems transcend geography. Function systems are no longer confined to specific localities. Society has become a world society and therefore, the social system is a world system. (2006, 52)

The term “globalization” appears only in the title of Luhmann’s essay, “Globalization or World Society?: How to Conceive of Modern Society.” Beyer notes that “Luhmann’s writings on globalization per se are few in number but nonetheless significant because they offer a clear alternative to the more elaborate Wallersteinian and Robertsonian models” (1994, 33). Luhmann’s contribution to the globalization debate emerges implicitly
through his definition of society (1994, 33). Beyer’s interpretation of Luhmann’s definition of society follows:

[Society is] first of all a kind of social system. Social systems, in turn, consist of actions but are based on meaningful communication: ‘They use communication to constitute and interconnect the events (actions) which build up the systems.’ Society is the encompassing social system that includes all communication in a very broad sense of the word; and we only reach the boundary of a society when communication ceases to occur. Therefore, for Luhmann, if we want to talk about societies, there must be a sufficient degree of communicative discontinuity between groups of actors to make the opportunities for communication rare and restricted [...] The definition almost forces one to conceive of the contemporary global social system as a society simply because of the empirical fact that, increasingly, meaningful communication can and often does take place between any two points around the globe. (Beyer 1994, 33)

This point is crucial for the argument that follows. Simply put, the term “globalization” as we are using it is a “prime corollary” of Luhmann’s social systems theory.

Our investigation of Luhmann’s social systems theory is an investigation of the globalization of functionally differentiated society whose sub-systems coalesce around system-specific communications. A central component of Luhmann’s theory is the central place these communications hold in constituting the boundaries of the subsystems of global society.

Luhmann rejects a global system of regional societies in favour of a single world society.

In our context, where we have to decide between assuming a global system of regional societies or a world society, we have now clear and theoretically consistent arguments for a single world society. The autopoietic system of this society can be described without any reference to regional particularities. This certainly does not mean that these differences are of minor importance. But a sociological theory that wants to explain these differences should not introduce them as givens, that is, as independent variables; it should rather start with the assumption of a world society and then investigate how and why this society tends to maintain or even increase regional inequalities. (Luhmann 1997, emphasis mine)
The centrality of symbols to globalization and the universalistic claims of religion lead Waters to recognize monotheistic religions as

a primary long-run driving force in the direction of globalization. It leads to the argument that humanity constitutes a single community that disvalues geographical localities and political territories. Among the universalizing religions, the derivative Abrahamic faiths of Christianity and Islam have proved the most effective globalizers because of their missions of proselytization and conversion. (2001, 162)

Thus, theology’s encounter with globalization is not a clash of regionally particular societies as in Huntington’s clash of civilizations—but rather—a conflict of the interpretation of the communications that constitute the functional differentiated sub-systems of global society (Huntington 1997).

The centrality of religion and more specifically, Christianity, to the advancement of globalization reorients theology’s relation to its “subject.” This reorientation to the social-historical situation turns theological hermeneutics away from the “pre-formulated theological premises” to the “kind of theology bound up with praxis” spoken of by Metz. Being bound up with praxis and reoriented to the social-historical situation that bounds theology to praxis is political. Theological hermeneutics avoids the danger of being subsumed by the social-historical situation—or theories that describe this situation—through its relation to the “the text of faith.” In response to Metz’s assertion that theology bound to the praxis of faith “must allow itself to be systematically interrupted by such praxis,” Ricoeur maintains:

The amplitude of the world of the text requires equal amplitude on the side of the applicatio, which will be as much political praxis as the labour of thought and language. [...] If a hermeneutical theology opens in this way to political practice, as one of the dimensions of application that fulfill understanding, in turn, it does not become absorbed therein, to the extent that it is first of all precisely and fundamentally a poetics. If I have so sought to preserve the poetic qualifications of the naming of God, it is to preserve the precious dialectic of poetics and politics.

Substituting a political theology for a hermeneutical theology, as Metz suggests, is unnec-
necessary in so far as “hermeneutical theology pays heed to the theologies of God’s transcendence, to the extent that it preserves the specificity of the naming of God at the heart of the biblical poem, it also attends to political theologies” (1995, 235).

For much of the world, the encounter with globalization continues to be an encounter with these boundary situations. Ricoeur identifies boundary situations as encounters with “war, suffering, guilt, death, and such which the individual or community experience as a fundamental existential crisis” (Ricoeur 2004, 119). These encounter demand that “we ask ourselves the ultimate question concerning our origins and ends: Where do we come from? Where are we going? In this way we become aware of our basic capacities and reason for surviving, for being and continuing to be what we are” (Ricoeur 2004, 119).

1.3 GLOBALIZATION AND BOUNDARY SITUATIONS

During the course of an interview in On Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva, Richard Kearney asks Paul Ricoeur to clarify his reference to “certain situations in modern culture” found in the conclusion of Symbolism of Evil. Ricoeur responds that he was thinking there of Jasper’s philosophy of ‘boundary situations,’ which influenced [him] so much after the Second World War. There are certain boundary situations, such as war, suffering, guilt, death, and so on, which the individual or community experience as a fundamental existential crisis. (Kearney 2004, 119)

The immediate crisis brought about by boundary situations such as poverty, hunger, natural disaster, economic oppression, genocide, etc., calls for solutions that extend beyond the purely political, economic, and social. Ricoeur follows Jasper’s understanding of boundary situations beyond individual trauma to include collective traumas that have a multigenerational effect on communities.

Edward Craig provides a concise definition of Karl Jasper’s philosophical idea of
boundary situations. Boundary situations are “situations like death, suffering, struggle, and
guilt [that] cannot be overcome by using the objective and rational knowledge that helps us
solve everyday problems. They require a radical change in our attitudes and common ways
of thinking” (Craig 1998, 81). In the late 1960s, Jasper expanded his understanding of
these situations to include the global world order, maintaining that the continued threat of
nuclear annihilation constitutes a global boundary situation “requiring a radical change in
politics and political consciousness” (Salamun 1999, 219).

The Caribbean experience of transatlantic slavery, colonization, decolonization, the
immigration of indentured labour, the continued emigration of West Indians throughout the
globe, as well racism are boundary situations experienced as a fundamental existential

crisis. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon poetically illustrates this crisis:

> In all truth, in all truth I tell you, my shoulders slipped out of the framework
> of the world, my feet could no longer feel the touch of the ground. Without a
> Negro past, without a Negro future, it was impossible for me to live my Ne-
> grohood. Not yet white, no longer wholly black, I was damned. Jean-Paul
> Sartre had forgotten that the Negro suffers in his body quite differently from
> the white man. Between the white man and me the connection was irrevoca-
> bly one of transcendence. (1967, 138)

These collective traumas represent the first wave of the boundary situation of globalization
that requires solutions beyond purely political, economic, or technical means.

Rastafari scholar Dr. Jake Homiak indicates the importance of the Caribbean to
globalization and Rastafari’s response to the encounter in email correspondence:

The Caribbean was the first beachhead of globalization on several fronts: not
merely in terms of having to address ultimate questions of existence—which
slavery certainly did; but also various contradictions and unresolved dia-
logues between free and bond people, black and white, between privileged
and unprivileged. All of these questions go to the core of Rastafari thought
and reasoning in terms of issues of social justice. These contradictions are
currently built into the thought world of Rastafari as an international phe-
nomenon. Is Rasta primarily an exclusively black African heritage; or is it a
universal faith for peoples of all classes, backgrounds, colours? These con-
temporary questions are also built into the history of the Caribbean. For it was there that the free labour of enslaved Africans made possible the development of capitalism. And it was also there that the plantation system after Emancipation required indentured labourers from around the world—making Caribbean societies very multiracial with ties to much of the rest of the world. (Homiak 2010)

Ras Sydney Da, the Rastafari elder who has been most influential in my own research, expressed a similar sentiment as he reflected on his life in Babylon:

But I say, well this place is not for me. Where am I from? How am I here? Why am I here? These are things that make you understand certain things. You have to know where you are, where you come from, and where you are going. You don’t know it. You don’t go on thinking you’re not going to make it to God. If you don’t know where you are coming from, you will never know where the next direction is, where to go. (Hales 2000, 117)

Boundary situations demand that “we ask ourselves the ultimate questions concerning our origins and ends: Where do we come from? Where are we going? In this way we become aware of our basic capacities and reason for surviving, for being, and continuing to be what we are” (Ricoeur 2004, 119). As Dr. Homiak notes above, these questions are at the core of Rastafari thought and reasoning as a global phenomenon both at home in Jamaica and abroad.

Knowing where we are in the global world today requires an understanding of where we have come from. Latin American historian, philosopher, and activist Enrique Dussel argues that this understanding begins with the realization that with globalization, we are dealing with a historical process of uneven, asymmetrical exchanges:

They are economic, political and cultural interests that did not start recently. Globalization takes us back to the 16th century. This was the starting point of so-called Western civilization. It deals with the construction of what is usually called ‘Modernity,’ a phenomenon that denotes the cultural centrality of Europe from the moment when America was discovered (1492). In other words, to speak plainly, since the European invasion of the Amerindian cultures. (Dussel 2006, 492)

Dussel firmly links globalization to modernity. Reminiscent of Waters’ axiom,
“material exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic exchanges globalize,” Dussel’s argues that globalization’s construction of modernity is the result of the convergence of three historical and therefore contingent processes of uneven exchange: colonization (political), capitalism (material), and Eurocentricism (cultural) (Dussel, 2006).

1.3.1 Colonization

Through colonization, Dussel posits, Europe was able to consolidate political control over the expanding world following the age of discovery. In this respect, Dussel identifies the earliest colonization of Latin America, which implicitly includes the Caribbean, as the beachhead for the emergence of modernity and globalization, noting:

Europe integrated a colonial world from which there has only been a partial emancipation through the political independence of these nations, that is, their legal foundations as independent States. Nevertheless, they are kept in subordination by means of economic, technological, and military power. (2006, 493)

Dussel locates the beginning of the historical process that initiates globalization with Christopher Columbus’s invasion of America.5 Karl Marx identifies this period as the “moment” of primitive accumulation that precedes the division of labour in capitalism. Like Dussel,

5. Dussel writes that it,

is the first to leave Europe with official authorization, since, unlike earlier voyages, his was in no way clandestine. Because of his departure from Latin anti-Muslim Europe, the idea that the Occident was the center of history was inaugurated and came to pervade the European life world. Europe even projected its presumed centrality upon its own origins. Hence, Europeans thought either that Adam and Eve were Europeans or that their story portrayed the original myth of Europe to the exclusion of other cultures. (Dussel 1995, 32)
Marx states:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. (1954, 667)

The moment that initiates the process of globalization in Jamaica is Columbus’s encounter with the indigenous population of the island, culminating with the establishment of the first Spanish colony in 1509.

After the British assumed control of Jamaica in 1655 the existing plantations were expanded to satisfy the growing demand for sugar. As was the case with many of the Caribbean Islands, Jamaican planation society was artificially created for the sole purpose of the production and exportation of one commodity: in the case of Jamaica, sugar.

In The Sociology of Slavery, Orlando Patterson describes this society as “a monstrous distortion of human society. It was not just the physical cruelty of the system that made it so perverse, for in this the society was hardly unique. What marks it out is the astonishing neglect and distortion of almost every one of the basic prerequisites of normal human living” (1969, 9). This first wave of globalization was characterized by this “aston-

6. Under Spanish rule, Jamaica was little more than a port of call for explorers, buccaneers, pirates, and privateers. By the British conquest of Jamaica in 1655, the Spanish conquerors had first enslaved and then brutally exterminated the indigenous Arawak population. Writing of the Spanish period, nineteenth-century historian Reverend W.J. Gardner recounts:

Such was the island after nearly a century and a half of Spanish occupation. The Indians had been exterminated, but the soil had not been cultivated to any considerable extent. Cuba and Hayti, with the rich mines of Mexico and the South American States, attracted the Spaniards far more than a country in which honest persevering industry was required to secure the advantages which the island has yielded, and will yet yield to a far larger extent. (1971, 16)
ishing neglect and distortion of almost every one of the prerequisites of normal human living.” Jamaican plantation society was built on the backs of chattel slavery.

Richard Hart’s two-volume work, *Slaves Who Abolished Slavery*, provides important insight into the horrible conditions of slavery. Hart estimates 1,920,000 slaves were imported to Jamaica between 1502 and 1807 when the legal slave trade was banned by the British Parliament. (1980, 62). This figure represents those individuals who were recorded on slavers’ manifests and does not represent slaves who were illegally transported or who did not appear on ship manifests. It also does not include those who were born into bondage. As a base figure, it still represents a mass exodus of humans who were brutally torn away from Africa. Hart illustrates the brutality of slavery with a list of punishments meted out to slaves of the parish of St. Thomas in eastern Jamaica.

Jack, for being a runaway, sentenced to be immediately carried to the place of execution and there to be hanged by the neck until he is dead.
Coach, for ‘uttering many rebellious expressions against Chas. McBean, Overseer’ to be immediately hanged by the neck until dead, and his head to be afterwards separated and exposed.

Adam, for running away, ‘to be taken hence to the place from whence he came, there to have a halter put about his neck, and one of his ears nailed to a post, and that the executioner do then cause the said ear to be cut off close to his head.’ (1980, 100-101).
This list is only a sample of the brutality of slavery. In addition to this physical cruelty, newly arrived slaves were subjected to further social and psychic cruelty during the period known as “seasoning.”

Seasoning was a period of up to six or seven months when mortality rates among newly arrived slaves were particularly high. The high mortality rate was in part a result of weakened constitutions following the Atlantic crossing, being introduced to North American diseases that Africans did not have immunity against, and for some, despondency, which could lead to losing the will to live and suicide. During the seasoning process, slaves were often quarantined and isolated from their fellow slaves in an effort to stave off diseases. In addition to staving off disease, it was also believed that separating tribe and kin groups in this way would head off potential rebellions among the slaves by making them

7. The Dying Negro by Thomas Day and John Bicknell (London, 1773), as recounted by Equiano, is a poignant testimony to the social and psychic cruelty of slavery.

Where slaves are free, and men oppress no more/Fool that I was, inur’d so long to pain,/To trust to hope, or dream of joy again./Now dragg’d once more beyond the western main,/To groan beneath some dastard planter’s chain;/Where my poor countrymen in bondage wait/The long enfranchisement of ling’ring fate:/Hard ling’ring fate! while, ere the dawn of day,/Rous’d by the lash they go their cheerless way;/And as their souls with shame and anguish burn,/Salute with groans unwelcome morn’s return,/And, chiding ev’ry hour the slow-pac’d sun,/Pursue their toils till all his race is run./No eye to mark their sufferings with a tear,/No friend to comfort, and no hope to cheer:/Then, like the dull unpity’d brutes, repair/To stalls as wretched, and as coarse a fare;/Thank heaven one day of mis’ry was o’er,/Then sink to sleep, and wish to wake no more (Equiano & Costanzo, 2002, 114)

The following note appears in the original version of The Dying Negro: “Perhaps it may not be deemed pertinent to add that this elegant and pathetic little poem was occasioned, as appears by the advertisement prefixed to it, by the following incident. A black, who, a few days before had ran away from his master, and got himself christened, with intent to marry a white woman his fellow-servant, being taken and sent on board a ship in the Thames, took an opportunity of shooting himself through the head” (London, 1773). Equiano does not exactly quote the lines from The Dying Negro by Thomas Day and John Bicknell.
more docile and therefore, easier to manage. 

1.3.2 Capitalism and the Trade Triangle

While colonization and slavery subjugated land and people, capitalism emerged from this colonial order as “an economic and civilizing system for which many people consider there is no alternative.” The plundering of the colonies gave European powers access to significant amounts of capital, leading to a comparative advantage over “other civilizations with larger populations and, technically speaking, with more or less the same levels of progress that Europe had during the Renaissance. China is a good example.” (Dussel 2006, 492) This primitive accumulation of capital, in large part through the enterprises of merchant capitalists, laid the foundation for modern capitalism.

8. Olaudah Equiano, in his slave narrative The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, Or Gustavus Vassa, the African, describes the separation of family and friends:

Without scruple are relations and friends separated, most of them never to see each other again. I remember in the vessel in which I was brought over, in the men’s apartment there were several brothers who, in the sale, were sold in different lots; and it was very moving on this occasion to see and hear their cries at parting. O, ye nominal Christians! Might not an African ask you, learned you this from your God, who says unto you, Do unto all men as you would men should do unto you? Is it not enough that we are torn from our country and friends to toil for your luxury and lust of gain? Must every tender feeling be likewise sacrificed to your avarice? Are the dearest friends and relations, now rendered more dear by their separation from their kindred, still to be parted from each other and thus prevented from cheering the gloom of slavery with the small comfort of being together and mingling their sufferings and sorrows? Why are parents to lose their children, brothers their sisters, or husbands their wives? Surely this is a new refinement in cruelty, which, while it has no advantage to atone for it, thus aggravates distress, and adds fresh horrors even to the wretchedness of slavery. (Equiano & Costanzo, 76, 2002)
While the cruelty of slavery is not in doubt, there is debate over the relative productivity of slavery and the contribution of global merchant capitalism through what is known as the trade triangle to the emergence of modern capitalism and globalization (see Figure 2, Morgan 2007, 55). The main question of the debate is whether slavery as a mode of production and merchant capitalism as a mode of capital accumulation were rational in terms of the capitalist economic model of production. Viewing slavery as either a purely cultural condition or a purely economic condition severely limits inquiry into post-colonial New World societies. Fox-Genovese and Genovese argue that the desire for profit should not be confused with economic rationality (Fox-Genovese and Genovese 1983, 469). Historically, many societies have rested on interlocking social and economic systems and have displayed spectacular growth despite the existence of economically irrational social systems.

Plantation and colonial economies were such systems. The macrostructure of a
world market had only an indirect relation to the microstructure of the plantations and colonies. These economies of scale in one or more crops received a viable and sometimes speculative price on the world market, external to the structure of commodity exchange and labour control (1983, 469). Fox-Genovese and Genovese note that the working and living conditions of the slaves and their aggregate performance does not reveal anything about the culture or motive of the system. A balance can only be reached if the desire for profit is defined as economic rationality. If this is not the case,

…then historians and economists must devise tools for interpreting the economic behaviour of individuals who exploit human labour power via slavery to expropriate surplus product without the mediation of a market mechanism and who dispose of surplus in a market that does not impinge on the system of production or upon their relation with the labour force. (1983, Fox-Genovese and Genovese, 469)

Simply put, the plantation economies are economies of scale. Although they sell their surplus on markets that are driven by supply and demand, these markets are separate and distinct from their mode of production and labour control. Thus, the desire for profit does not rationalize the means by which this profit is accrued.

Merchant capital, Fox-Genovese and Genovese argue, served as a primitive form of capital accumulation that fuelled the expansion of—rather than created—global capitalism. The moment of primitive accumulation that precedes the division of labour in capitalism occurs during the period of Europe’s conquest of the New World. As noted in § Marx identified the period of primitive capital accumulation as that which precedes industrial capitalization. “These idyllic proceedings,” it will be recalled, “are the chief moments of primitive accumulation” (Marx 1954, 667).

With its origin at the “dawn of the era of capitalist production,” merchant capitalism looked both backward to the social and political conditions that ensured its continued ac-
cumulation of capital, pilfered from the newly conquered colonies, and forward to the new modes of production which this accumulation made possible. According to Fox-Genovese and Genovese, merchant capital was a proverbial Janus, at once looking forward and backward. It bound within the market system both archaic and revolutionary forces. It even generated rationalized and relatively efficient variants of archaic relations of production—most notably, the slave economies. Within the economic sector, the decisive threshold lay at the transformation of labour-power into a commodity. But commercial capital could not itself cause this transformation, as some scholars—most recently Immanuel Wallerstein—suggest. (1979, 29)

Merchant capitalism acted as a solvent for feudal and seigniorial relationships. From this perspective, globalization is a new quality of world market, not an extension of the world market that existed in the trade of spice and luxury items. This new quality was the development of a consumer market of labour divorced from the means of production and the subsequent emergence of free labour markets. While merchant capitalists assisted in this process by promoting and organizing stable markets for their exchange in luxury and staple commodities, accumulating and plundering capital, and establishing laws, procedures, and accounting for the market, they could not create capitalist social relations or new systems of production. Or, as Fox-Genovese and Genovese maintain:

Commercial capital contributed to organizing economic space and exchange in a way that permitted the eventual emergence of a fully developed capitalist system. An understanding of this process requires full attention to the role of politics, and especially of state power, in assuring the ruling class an adequate command over its resources, including labour, and an adequate share of the international market. (1979, 9)

To maintain the stability of the markets, merchant capitalists favoured existing political and social organizations for the means of production. As such, merchant capitalists supported the existing ruling classes of Europe whose navies protected the merchant capitalists’ commercial interests. Under these conditions, the economic and political systems remain
undifferentiated.

While this may seem to contradict Dussel’s observation on the historical process of capitalism, this need not be the case. Dussel views this period as the first stage of modernity, arguing:

It matches the spread of mercantilism and goes on until the 18th century. These three centuries are marked by the organization of modern life based on commerce. The silver mines at Potos and Zacatecas, discovered between 1545 and 1546, allowed Spain to become the principal power in the Mediterranean by giving it enough wealth to defeat the Turkish at Lepanto, exactly 25 years after the discovery of the mines. From that moment on, the Atlantic surpasses in importance the Mediterranean and a wider world emerges. (2006, 495)

With little differentiation between the economic and the political systems of society, merchant capitalism resurrected the trade in humans as a commodity, specifically the African slave trade. In doing so, they assisted in creating a ruling class in the New World that was “at once based on slave relations of production and yet deeply embedded in the world market and hostage to its internationally developed bourgeois social relations of production” (Fox-Genovese and Genovese, 1983, 469).

To maintain these social relations, it was necessary for the localized structure of the plantations to be independent from the international structure of the world capitalist mode of production. The profit that the plantation owners accrued was not purely based on the market forces of supply and demand for their crop; it represented rent-seeking behaviour. In the case of the Caribbean, the absentee plantation owners extracted uncompensated value

9. Rent seeking behavior is a “monopolizing activity [...] that produces a social waste rather than a social surplus” (Rutherford 2002).
from slave labour without contributing to increasing efficiencies in production. As Fox-Genovese and Genovese conclude:

> What slavery could not do, despite its economies of scale and its financial advantages, was to lay the foundations for sustained growth and qualitative development. Nowhere did it advance science and technology; generate self-expanding home markets adequate to encourage industrial diversification; accumulate capital within its own sphere for industrial development; or encourage the kind of entrepreneurship without which modern industry would have been unthinkable. In these economic terms, therefore, it produced spectacular growth in response to the demand of an outside society but simultaneously guaranteed stagnation and decline once that support was withdrawn. (1979, 318)

The peculiar prosperity of slave economies occurred under historically specific and contingent conditions that hid “deep structural weaknesses” in the plantation economies, which “condemned slave societies to underdevelopment, eventual stagnation, and political disaster” (Fox-Genovese and Genovese 1979, 9). Under these conditions, merchant capitalism’s exploitation of the trade triangle laid the foundations for global markets without contributing to the shift in the division of labour and production of industrial capitalism. Slave labour was incompatible with emerging global industrial capitalism because slavery commodified human beings as chattel rather than potential labour, thus isolating labour from production and increased productivity.

1.3.3 Eurocentricism

With the foundations for global markets established through the trade triangle and the transport of resources from the periphery to the centre, Europe cemented its dominance as the centre of the world expressed through the hegemony of Eurocentricism. Beyer notes that the colonial vision of the age of expansion imagined the spatial limits of European society as temporary.
The colonialist visions of European soldiers, administrators, explorers, and merchants frequently incorporated this universalizing component. And Christian missionaries, beginning already with the Spanish conquests of the sixteenth century and the Catholic missions of the seventeenth century, envisioned a universal conversion of the heathen quite analogous to what the more sociological thinkers had in mind. (Beyer 2006, 19)

Dussel identifies the advances of seventeenth-century thinkers of the Enlightenment as effects and not starting points for modernity, arguing:

The advances of the 17th century can be attributed to the exemplary figures of Galileo (condemned in 1616), Bacon (who wrote his *Novum Organum* in 1620) or Descartes (*Discourse on Method* 1638), who are, in many ways, the fruit of a century and a half of Modernity. Such advances are effects and not, in the Eurocentric ideology, starting points. It is indeed another reason to explain why Holland (which emancipated itself from Spain in 1610), England, and France continued the path that had been opened originally by Spain, Portugal, and ‘the Conquest.’ (2006, 496)

Dussel maintains that during this phase of globalization, “the European Centre confirmed itself as the axis of the world, and the existence of the ‘other’ is denied by imposing the ‘European ego’ as the only possible one.” Modernity, Dussel argues, appears when Europe organizes the initial world-system and places itself at the centre of world history over and against a periphery equally constitutive of modernity. The forgetting of the periphery, which took place from the end of the fifteenth, Hispanic-Lusitanian century to the beginning of the seventeenth century, has led great thinkers of the centre to commit the Eurocentric fallacy in understanding modernity. (2006, 496)
Dussel recognizes modernity as “undoubtedly a European occurrence;” however, he shifts his perspective from the axis mundi of Europe to a “dialectical relation with non-Europe.” While not necessarily sharing Dussel’s assessment of Eurocentricism, Louis

Figure 3 Title Page of Bacon’s *Instauratio Magna*, 1608
Dupré does share Dussel’s assessment of the origins of modernity. Dupré, like Dussel, locates the origins of modernity through the philosophical and theological innovations of the Renaissance. Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes are representative of the Enlightenment’s response to the Copernican revolution and the “age of discovery.” Eurocentricism relativizes the globe to Europe in the same way that heliocentricism relativizes the earth to the sun.

Maps of the period reflect this paradigm shift. The centre of the world depicted on these maps shifts from Jerusalem, representing the axis mundi of the archaic, to Europe, representing the axis mundi of the modern. The title page of Francis Bacon’s Instauratio Magna, “The Pillars of Hercules,” presents an illuminating illustration of this shift in perspective (see fig. 3). The Pillars of Hercules, representing the limits of the world of the ancients, are vanquished as ships of discovery sail toward and return from beyond the horizon. The limits of the ancients are surpassed by the limitlessness of the horizon of modernity. This is suggestive of faith in the supremacy of western European reason to comprehend and more importantly, to conquer, the limits of the world, economically, politically, and culturally. Louis Dupré writes, “Those who had recently circumnavigated the earth had passed the ne plus ultra of antiquity. [T]hese times may justly bear in their motto—plus ultra—further yet—in precedence of the ancient non ultra—further more” (1993, 34).

Dussel, however, draws our gaze to what is not pictured. When viewed from the other side of history, the Pillars of Hercules are more like la Porte de l'Enfer. Beyond this limitless horizon are the people and lands invaded by Europe, and filling the cargo holes of the returning merchant ships are the plundered resources and bodies of the conquered. Dussel concludes that “the Eurocentric point of view ‘forgets’ very quickly that it was precisely the plundered resources of the colonies that have allowed the European splendour
of the last 200 years” (Dussel 1995, 50). Accompanying this forgetfulness of material plunder is the forgetfulness of our spiritual conquest of the New World. Dussel notes that the Spanish conquest of Latin America required “divine legitimation.” Dussel argues, “Cortés, too, like Descartes, needed God to escape the enclosure of his ego. When Cortés considered the numerical advantages the millions of indigenous Mesoamericans possessed against his handful of soldiers, he decided not to elicit his army’s valour and tenacity by an appeal to banal wealth or honour. Instead, he endeavoured to give their sacrifices an ultimate significance” (1995, 50).

Cortés, Dussel recounts, calls on the name of Christ as mediator to incite the conquistadors on the eve of the conquest of Mexico.

“We understand the task upon which we embark, and through the mediation of our Lord Jesus Christ we have to prepare ourselves fittingly for the battles to come and we will triumph in them. For should we be defeated (which I hope God will not permit), we will never escape, given our small numbers. Since we no longer have ships to flee to Cuba, the only recourse left to our fighting, strong hearts is to turn to God.” Beyond this, [Cortés] drew several comparisons with the heroic deeds of the Romans. (Dussel 1995, 50)

To overcome this forgetfulness of this spiritual plundering requires us to shift our theological perspective from the axis mundi of our theological domination towards a “dialectical relation with the ‘wretched of the earth.’” Dussel extols us to “focus on the immense majority of humanity, the seventy-five percent of the world situated in the southern hemisphere, the ex-colonial world. These exploited, excluded, and poor peoples, whom Fanon termed the ‘wretched of the earth,’ consume less than fifteen percent of the planet’s income. Their history of oppression began five hundred years ago” (Dussel 1995, 9).

Shifting our theological focus requires we look for religion, or more accurately, we listen for religious language, in unlikely places. In so doing, we make explicit the implicit argument that religion matters most especially in the context of the boundary situation of
human insecurity in the developed and developing world.

1.3.4 Human Security and the So-Called Resurgence of Religion

Norris and Inglehart and Peter Berger independently observe that secularization is predominantly a phenomenon of relatively rich industrialized countries where empirical evidence reveals a decline in religiosity. This observation is then used as justification for either ignoring religion in the developing world or presuming religion will fade away with the advances of industrial development. Metz cautions theology against these two encounters between theology and evolutionary or materialistic theories. In these theories, Peter Berger notes:

There does indeed exist the phenomenon of secularization, and more specifically the version of it that one may call Eurosecularity. But one cannot assume that this is the normal concomitant of modernity. On the contrary, in a cross-cultural perspective it is the deviant case. As such, it must be mapped and explained. I would argue that this is the most interesting topic for the sociology of religion today. It begins with the dawning suspicion that British intellectuals are more interesting than Iranian mullahs as objects of sociological research. (Berger 2001, 194)

Secularization theories have gone awry in their application of Eurosecularity to the globe and in the assumption that as Europe, so the world. Empirically, Norris and Inglehart recognize that while there is indeed a secularizing trend in the developed world, the same cannot be said for the developing world, a concept explained by the security axiom.

The security axiom assumes that if religiosity provides security in times and contexts of uncertainty, then the most insecure societies ought to be the most religious. Citing the various indices of health and well-being, Norris and Inglehart convincingly conclude:

The overall trend is clear: within most advanced industrial societies, church attendance has fallen, not risen, over the past several decades; moreover, the clergy have largely lost their authority over the public and are no longer able to dictate to them on such matters as birth control, divorce, abortion, sexual
orientation, and the necessity of marriage before childbirth. (Norris 2006, 25)

This secularization trend in the developed world contrasts with the increasing religiosity of the developing world. Given the demographic reality of the rise in the population of the developing world combined with the increasing religiosity emerging from social and economic insecurity, Norris and Inglehart argue that the world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before—and they constitute a growing proportion of the world’s population. Rich societies are secularizing but they contain a dwindling share of the world’s population, while poor societies are not secularizing and they contain a rising share of the world’s population (Norris 2006, 25). These conclusions lead Norris and Inglehart to speculate, “the expanding gap between the sacred and the secular societies around the globe will have important consequences for world politics, raising the role of religion on the international agenda” (Norris 2006, 25).

The correlation Norris and Inglehart make between security and religiosity is important. Norris and Inglehart borrow the term “security” from international development studies. Originally used in the context of nation states and the security of national borders, Norris and Inglehart expand the term to include human as well as national security. Norris and Inglehart describe the principle idea of security as “freedom from various risks and dangers:”

The traditional view focused upon using military strength to ensure the territorial integrity and security of nation states. During the last decade, this view was revised as analysts began to recognize that this definition was excessively narrow, with many other risks also contributing to human security, ranging from environmental degradation to natural and manmade disasters such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, and droughts, as well as the threat of disease epidemics, violations of human rights, humanitarian crisis, and poverty. (Norris 2006, 14)

Norris and Inglehart go on to observe that daily life in the developing world is char-
acterized by increasing insecurity.

The inhabitants of poor nations remain highly susceptible to premature death—above all from hunger and hunger-related diseases. They also face sudden disasters from drought or flood, or weather-related emergencies. Poor nations have limited access to the basic conditions of survival, including the provision of uncontaminated water and adequate food, access to effective public services offering basic healthcare, literacy, and schooling, and an adequate income. These countries also often face endemic problems of pollution from environmental degradation, conditions of widespread gender inequality, and a legacy of deep-rooted ethnic conflict. Lack of capacity to overcome these difficulties arises from corruption in government, an ineffective public sector, and political instability. Poor nations often have weak defenses against external invasion, threats of internal coups d’état, and, in extreme cases, state failure. (Norris, 2006, 14)

While in general agreement with the modernization thesis that “human development and conditions of economic equality usually generate growing levels of security,” they assert that this is a probabilistic rather than a deterministic correlation. This distinction recognizes that modernization is a contingent and historical process and that the “situation-specific factors make it impossible to predict exactly what will happen in any given society” (Norris 2006, 14). Moreover, they observe that when the relative security enjoyed by the developed world is threatened, there is often an increase in religiosity.

We believe that the public generally gains conditions of greater security during the process of modern development, but this process can always be momentarily halted or temporarily reversed, even in rich countries, by particular dramatic events such as major natural disasters, experience of wars, or severe recessions. Even the most affluent post-industrial nations may experience a sudden widespread resurgence of insecurity. (Norris, 2004, 17)

The relation Norris and Inglehart identify through empirical studies is analogous to the relationship Ricoeur and Jaspers identified as boundary or limit situations. It is useful to recall that Ricoeur speaks of boundary situations as “situations such as war, suffering, guilt, death, and so on which the individual or community experience as a fundamental existential crisis” (interviewed in Kearney, 2004, 119). Whether termed “security/insecurity” or
“boundary/limit” situations, in the developing world, globalization is a fundamental existential crisis that demands answers to Ricoeur’s “ultimate questions concerning our origins and ends: Where do we come from? Where are we going?” (interviewed in Kearney, 2004, 119).

Ricoeur and Norris and Inglehart recognize that while the limit situation may be economic, political, or social injustice, the answers to the existential crisis brought on by these injustices are beyond the limit of what economics, politics, or even social cohesion can offer. In the language of Ricoeur, the encounter with these limit situations puts the whole community into question:

For it is only when it is threatened with destruction from without or from within that a society is compelled to return to the very roots of its identity, to that mythical nucleus which ultimately grounds and determines it. The solution to the immediate crisis is no longer a purely political or technical matter but demands that we ask ourselves the ultimate questions concerning our origins and ends. (2004, 119)

How then is the developed world to respond when two-thirds of our global community remains highly susceptible to premature death and lacks “access to the basic conditions of survival” (Norris, 2004)? If we accept Luhmann’s definition of society as one world society, then the division between “developing” and “developed” is superfluous. The so-called developing world’s encounter with globalization reminds us that we are the whole community and that at moments of economic, political, or social injustice, it is the whole community which suffers and is put into question.

In the following chapter, I will represent globalization as the global expansion of the functional differentiation of society and the religious subsystem’s function “in handling the paradoxes of self-reference” (Luhmann 1999, 33). Society, Luhmann argues, “is that social system that ultimately regulates all the relations of the human being to the world.
Society is the social condition for the constitution of meaningful being-in-the-world. To the extent that one uses the concepts of systems theory to conceive of this constitution, one also conceives of society” (1984, 137). If the whole community is put into question then it stands to reason that theology has much to learn from those parts of the global community that sought answers to the ultimate questions concerning our origins and ends through their encounter with globalization.
No one, I think, will dispute the fact of a global system. Whether we watch the BBC news in Brisbane, Bangkok, or Bombay, its programme preview indicates Hong Kong time and other times so that we can calculate what to see and when to see it wherever we are. And the news comes from all over the world, not just from England. Wherever people have money to spend, they find supermarkets and boutiques aptly named to remind us of an American or a French background, whether or not the items on display retain any connection with American or French culture.

Moreover, the simultaneity of changes all over the world deserves attention. Everywhere, new problems in planning and controlling and innovations in organizations and in production technology arise. Religious, ethnic, and other types of 'fundamentalisms' emerge all over the world and show that those conflicts of interest to which the state apparatus became adapted while developing into a constitutional state and a welfare state are just trivial compared with what we have to expect in the future.

Niklas Luhmann 1997, 67

CHAPTER 2: GLOBALIZATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATED GLOBAL SOCIETY

2.1 SELF-REFERENTIAL SYSTEM

As we noted in the previous chapter the term globalization is a prime corollary of Luhmann’s social systems theory. Systems and their distinction from their environment is central to Luhmann’s theory. Positing that there are observable systems, Luhmann notes, “there are objects of research that exhibit features justifying the use of the concept of system, just as, conversely, this concept serves to abstract facts that from this viewpoint can be compared with each other and with other kinds of facts within the perspective of same/different” (1990, 2). Figure 4 illustrates Luhmann’s conceptual framework for observing systems, noting this framework is “not to be understood as describing an internal system differentiation. . . but [its] observation” (Luhmann 1990, 2). In this figure, the first level of distinction is between different types of systems. Luhmann distinguishes living systems, including organisms and biological “objects,” such as cells, plants, and animals;
psychic systems, which include conscious “meaning/sense processing units;” and social systems, which include informal interactions, formal organizations, and differentiated societies. Informal interactions are those encounters that occur arbitrarily. For the moment of the interaction, a system/environment distinction forms and dissolves upon termination of the interaction. Organizations institutionalize reoccurring interactions around a specific social function of a functionally differentiated system. For instance, the subsystem of religion institutionalizes the interaction between the sacred and the mundane around ecclesiastical institutions.

Luhmann’s understanding of “societies” is the more controversial aspect of systems theory. Contrary to other social theories that posit society as the action of two or more individuals, Luhmann conceives of society as the recursive communications of functionally differentiated subsystems, such as the system of religion, the system of economics, or the system of politics. These systems are closed to the communications of other subsystems.
that are undifferentiated parts of their environments. Communication outside the system is noise. In this abstraction, there is only horizontal comparison across levels of functionally equivalent systems and not vertically between levels of systems. For instance, “it makes little sense. . . to say that societies are not organisms or to distinguish, in the sense of the scholastic tradition, between organic bodies (composed of interconnected parts) and societal bodies (composed of non-interconnected parts)” (Luhmann 1995, 4).

A biological metaphor suggested by Moeller compares societies to organisms, which is a comparison across levels. Moeller postulates that “just as a body consists of biological ‘operations’ that go on within it (blood circulation, metabolism, brain activity) and a psychic system consists of thoughts and feelings in the mind, society consists of the communications that go on within it—of what is said, printed, and broadcasted” (2006, 225). This biological metaphor highlights a weakness in Luhmann’s use of a hierarchical branching tree to illustrate the relationship between systems.

The emphasis on a top-down, hierarchal orientation of systems does not fully illustrate the links between the biological, the social, and the psychic. While distinct and operationally closed, these types of systems are structurally coupled. The relationship between the biological, the social, and the psychic allows the individuality of each type of system to be maintained while insisting that each system shares in the life of the other two. Being “human” is liberated from its humanism and understood as a “community of being” in which each system, while maintaining its distinctive identity, encounters the others and is encountered by them. This conception of “human” emerges as a rejection of the humanist ontology of the Enlightenment that reduces being human to an exclusive phenomenon of one of the three systems. Luhmann favours a deontologized orientation of “human” through self-referential systems.
Systems are self-referential systems because they organize themselves by producing the elements they interrelate by which they they interrelate. (Luhmann 1990, 145). According to Luhmann, societies are a special type of self-referential system that “pre-supposes a network of communication, previous communications, and further communications, and also communications that happen elsewhere” (1990, 145). Communications are only possible within a system of communications that cannot escape recursive circularity. Communication always refers to past communication or anticipates future communication. Even a non-sequitur is recursive as it is out of sequence with the present communication, which refers it to previous communications likewise classified as non-sequitur.

The basic elements or units of communication are recursive, meaning they are only discernable within the system and not with reference to that which is beyond the system—the environment. This is the most important distinction in social systems theory: the absolute distinction between a system and its environment. All other distinctions emerge from this primary distinction. With this distinction in mind, we can turn in more detail to the specifics of Luhmann’s social systems theory, such as Luhmann’s encounter with biology and philosophy.

Luhmann introduces the biological systems concepts of *autopoiesis*, *operational closure*, and *structural coupling* in his major treatise on social systems theory, *Social Systems* (1995). First developed by biological systems theorists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, these concepts mark the completion of Luhmann’s theory. These three concepts are central to Luhmann’s social systems theory.
2.1.1 Autopoiesis

Autopoiesis refers to a living system’s capacity to reproduce itself. Maturana explains autopoiesis as autonomous living systems,

the result of their organization as systems in continuous self-production. This organization in terms of self-production can be characterized as follows. There is a class of dynamic systems that are realized, as unities, as networks of productions (and disintegrations) of components that: (a) recursively participate through their interactions in the realization of the network of productions (and disintegrations) of components that produce them; and (b) by realizing its boundaries, constitute this network of productions (and disintegrations) of components as a unity in the space they specify and in which they exist. (1975, 317)

For Luhmann, autopoiesis transfers the self-reference of a social system from structural formation and organization to the constitution and function of its elements. The consequence of this transfer is to shift attention from creating the circumstances necessary to recreate a structure or organization to the communications of events that connect the constituent elements of a system. While the constituent elements of social systems is individual ‘persons’ these elements are distanciated from the communications that define the social boundaries of systems. A necessary condition and outcome of this shift from action to communication is the operational closure of system.

2.1.2 Operational Closure

Autopoietic systems are operationally closed. This implies that all the elements required to reproduce the system are contained within the system. There are no foreign elements to the system since any element within the system only makes sense within that system. At the cellular level, a biological system maintains closure by producing a mem-
brane that distinguishes the system of the cell from its environment. Contrary to the input/output model of biology that permits the transgression of cellular boundaries, Maturana and Valera’s autonomy model maintains the closure of these boundaries: the membrane of the cell does not allow the environment to take part directly in the internal operation of the cell. This is not to say that the external environment does not influence the cell. The influence of the external environment is an indirect irritation to which the system may or may not respond, depending on the intensity of the irritation. While autonomous, these irritations structurally couple systems to other systems, which is the third concept Luhmann borrows from Maturana and Valera.

2.1.3 Structural Coupling

Structural coupling is the capacity of a system to irritate other systems for which it is the environment. Luhmann uses this term to maintain the autonomy of systems while allowing for mutual influence between systems, avoiding a simplistic cause/effect or input/output dynamic. Contrary to Parsons’s interpenetration of systems (see below), structurally coupled systems maintain autonomy even though they may be existentially dependent on other systems. Consciousness or self is a psychic system distinct from but structurally coupled with social systems of language. According to Luhmann’s theory, the structural coupling of the psychic system with the social system “can only be explained by language” (Moeller 2006, 259). As with the biological metaphor, although psychic systems

10. Moeller notes that Luhmann’s use of the German term “irritation” does not match the common English understanding of “to bother” or “to annoy,” even if the English spelling is identical (2006, 220). A more accurate translation, truer to Luhmann’s use of the term, is “to distract” or “to perturb.”
and social systems evolve simultaneously, they are nonetheless distinct from each other.\textsuperscript{11}

2.2 THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Luhmann’s theory of social systems is an evolutionary theory of society that seeks to reclaim a universal ‘theory of everything’ for sociology. Functionally differentiated society is the latest form that society has taken to differentiate social roles and functions. American anthropologist Alexander Goldenweiser describes the principle of limited possibilities in the development of cultures as those instances,

When a special form of social organization, style of art or mythology, develops in an area, not only does it tend to perpetuate itself, but it also becomes operative in checking other developments in the same sphere of culture. While the bearing of this factor ought not to be overestimated, in view of the undoubted tendency toward the differentiation of culture, it remains of the highest importance as a partial explanatory principle of the fixity and numerical limitation of the characteristic forms belonging to the various aspects of a culture. (Goldenweiser 1913, 24)

Following this principle, Luhmann posits that the primary modes of differentiation available to society are likewise limited. Differentiation emerges from a contingent and thereby accidental combination of internal distinctions between system/environment and equality/inequality (1977, 33). This is the evolutionary aspect of social formation. Luhmann identifies these modes of differentiation as segmentary, stratified, core/periphery and functionally. Figure 5 summarizes the main characteristics of each mode’s internal sys-

\textsuperscript{11} Luhmann’s selection of the theories of Maturana and Valera is not without controversy. Some argue that in the end, Luhmann’s use of Maturana was a poor choice “since that theory has no explanatory power, being purely descriptive” (Viskovatoff 1999, 481). It is beyond the scope or expertise of this thesis to evaluate the ability of Maturana and Valera to explain biology. The choice of theory is not as important as the process of how Luhmann commits to this choice and then synthesizes it to his overall theoretical framework. The originality of this approach will become clearer as we further explore Luhmann’s theoretical borrowings from the sociological traditions.
tem/environment differentiation and figure 6 summarizes each mode’s distinction between equality and inequality and the horizon of the world it inhabits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Mode of Differentiation</th>
<th>Secondary Internal System Differentiation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Segmentary</td>
<td>Archaic: Differentiation is negligible/Kinship, Family/Class, unidirectional logistic systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratified</td>
<td>Hierarchal: Political differentiates from religious, economic, legal etc. based on Family/Class, Class etc. Secularization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core/Periphery</td>
<td>Colonial: Political and Economic differentiates from Religious</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functionally</td>
<td>Modernity: Increasing differentiation based on function</td>
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Figure 5 Primary Mode of Systems Differentiation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Mode of Differentiation</th>
<th>Inequality</th>
<th>Equality</th>
<th>Horizon (World)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Segmentary</td>
<td>between family and class based on access to natural resources</td>
<td>Among family/ class</td>
<td>limited by unproved oral, face to face communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratified</td>
<td>between strata based on control of communication and literacy</td>
<td>within strata defined by birth, rank &amp; entitlement</td>
<td>increases relative to the expansion of written &amp; oral communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core/Periphery</td>
<td>between strata based on ‘class solidarity’ between core and periphery based on proximity to the centre</td>
<td>within strata defined by birth, rank &amp;/or access to capital within strata of core &amp;/or periphery defined by birth, rank, education/Race &amp;/or access to capital</td>
<td>increases relative to the expansion of Core/Periphery relations where Periphery becomes an extension of the core. Multiple core/Periphery relations create ‘internationalism’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionally</td>
<td>within subsystems: problem of social inequality is transferred to the subsystem whose function best addresses problem.</td>
<td>between independent subsystems: access to systems is theoretical equal</td>
<td>increases relative to the global expansion of modern communication</td>
</tr>
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Figure 6 Societal Horizon
2.2.1 Segmentary

The first structural combination identified by Luhmann is segmentary differentiation. Segmentary differentiated societies include clan, tribal, and family societies differentiation “on the basis of descent, communal living or a combination of these two criteria” (Luhmann, In Moeller, 2007, 42) These societies are differentiated based on segments or groupings of individuals, usually related by kinship and/or those who live communally. Sub-systems indicative of later primary forms of differentiation, (ie. economic, religious, political, etc.) remain for the most part, undifferentiated. These societies are characterized by face-to-face communications and are therefore limited in size, both in terms of composition and geographic area. There is no social centre of power in exclusively segmentary differentiated societies. Each segment of the society is theoretically equal with all other segments. Inequality emerges between competing nearby social groups and is most often related to access to natural resources needed for groups survival as opposed to status or position within a hierarchy. While these types of societies were formally referred to as ‘archaic’ or ‘primitive,’ Moeller notes that for Luhmann, the romanticization of these societies as ‘primordial’ is mistaken “…because they seem to be the product of systemic evolution: in these societies one type of differentiation has obviously already gained primacy.” (2006, 42)

2.2.2 Stratified

Stratified differentiated societies evolved as segmentary differentiated societies grew in size and complexity. As segmentary differentiated societies thrive they are less able to maintain the familial and communal living arrangements. As Bellah notes, “whereas
tribal societies consist of small face-to-face groups or of a few adjacent ones, archaic societies were territorially extensive and could include millions of people” (Bellah 2006, 69) This increasing complexity was managed through a shift in the primary mode of differentiation to one based on strata, and not segmentation. While often maintaining kinship and familial types of relations within strata, these societies differentiate vertically between unequal strata. Equality is more or less maintained within strata while the hierarchy between strata is maintained through unequal distribution of wealth and power, most especially through access and command of sacred communication.

In stratified societies religion, politics and economics though distinct, remain fundamentally undifferentiated. Differentiation is between strata rather than between systems. In a feudally stratified society, social cohesion within strata is maintained through happiness or satisfaction with one’s place in the divinely ordained social order. (Luhmann 1997)12 Classic examples of stratified differentiation include the absolute monarchs of Europe when society was differentiated based on patriarchal stratification; and the dynastic realms of Japan where society was differentiated based on the modified Confucian strata of samurai, peasants, artisans and merchants (Varley 2000, 169). In the case of the Medieval Europe, the hierarchal stratification of society was justified by the divine right of kings; and in the case of the Feudal Japan, a divine emperor and a largely aristocratic warrior class maintained the hierarchical orientation of society. In either case, the horizon or world of

12. In his text, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson notes sacred communication was controlled by an almost exclusively male intelligentsia who mediated between the local vernacular and sacred Latin. The mediation between the vulgar language of the people and sacred language of the courts and church reinforced the differentiation between strata. The earthly social order, as interpreted by the literate powers and principalities, mirrored the heavenly order and was therefore divinely ordained and everlasting. (Anderson 1991, 67)
stratified differentiated society is determined by the expansion and control of written communications.

The introduction of the bourgeoisie and different levels of class did not eliminate stratified differentiation; rather it shifted the internal ordering of the strata, from the rank and heredity of medieval Europe to class and ownership of the means of production indicative of the industrial age. Modernity emerges from increased complexity and the resulting functional differentiation of social, economic and political relations characterizing the evolution of the modern global social order. The significance of this shift is not only in the principles of differentiation within society, such as class, nobility, etc.; but more profoundly, it is in the internal re-ordering of society away from stratification, to functionally differentiated systems.13

13. While Luhmann identifies the form with which a society differentiates as its 'primary' form he does not exclude other forms. He notes:

Forms of differentiation do not exclude – they may even presuppose – each other, but there are limits of compatibility. Segmentary societies can only develop in the form of 'pyramidal organization.' They differentiate to a certain extent, situations and family roles with respect to function but they seem to be unable to catalyze enduring social systems around specific functions. Stratified societies need to make use of segmentary differentiating at the secondary level of differentiation, "defining the equality of subsystems and the internal environment status groups." Stratified differentiation is also compatible with functionally differentiated societies. With this, the internal differentiation of a subsystem may be stratified within the overall functionally differentiated society. This is the case with the stratified hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church within the religious subsystem of a functionally differentiated global society. This differentiation, however, becomes increasingly difficult to maintain as subsystems begin to define their members in universalistic terms. Luhmann argues: "…if the society introduces compulsory school education for everyone, if every person regardless of his being nobleman or commoner… is subject to the same legal status… everyone can buy everything and pursue every occupation, given the necessary resources, then the whole system shifts in the direction of functional differentiation" (Luhmann 1977, 40).
2.2.3 Core/Periphery

Societies differentiated on the basis of Core and Periphery represents an evolution in the complexity of stratified societies by internationalizing the strata without shifting the internal dynamics of differentiation. Societies of this type have a dual hierarchal structure where the stratification at the core is mirrored in the stratification at the periphery. In §1.3 we provided an overview of the historically contingent processes of colonization, capitalism and Eurocentricism. The increasing complexity of these processes requires a reduction in complexity that is accomplished through the evolution toward functionally differentiated societies.

2.3 Global Functionally Differentiated Society

Functionally differentiated global societies emerge from Core/Periphery societies as territorial boundaries are eclipsed by the boundary between systems and environments. According to Luhmann, historically the economic system first differentiates itself from the political and religious systems. The religious system then differentiates from the political system, leaving the political system differentiated by default.

2.3.1 Functionally Differentiation

Luhmann attributes the shift to functional differentiation as having risen out of the increased complexity of the globe and the increasing possibilities afforded humanity due to technological advancements, especially in mass communication. According to Luhmann, social cohesion can be maintained only if the surplus of possibilities is limited by the differentiation of functional systems, which in turn reduces the overall complexity of the system.
In the shift from stratified differentiation to functional differentiated society communication processes, controlled within and between the hierarchies of a stratified society, are organized around specialized functional subsystems. Subsystems coalesce around specific functions. This reduces the complexity for the subsystem by making a distinction between the system and its environment; which is everything that is not needed for the system’s function. The reduction of internal complexity is accompanied by an increase in the external complexity of the encompassing environment.

Functionally differentiated society differentiates based on roles, identity and functions; rather than status or strata. For example, the distinction between clergy/laity is primarily a distinction between; roles (preaching vs. listening); identity (Reverend vs. Mister/Miss); and function (shepherding the flock vs. following the shepherd).

While the internal ordering of functional subsystems may not be equal, access to these subsystems must be equal: “nothing but function justifies discrimination” (Luhmann 1977) In this respect, “a functionally differentiated society must become, or pretend to become, a society of equals.” (Luhmann 1977) This is not to say there is no inequality in functionally differentiated societies; there most certainly is. What is important is that there must be the potential (however unrealized) for equal access to the functions of differentiated subsystems.

This potential is illustrated by the myth of the American dream, summarized by Happy Loman in Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman. In the final scene of the play, Happy laments his father’s death claiming his Father’s unrealized dream as his own: “I'm gonna show you and everybody else that Willy Loman did not die in vain. He had a good dream. It's the only dream you can have - to come out number-one man. He fought it out here, and this is where I'm gonna win it for him…” While Happy may realize his potential for inclu-
sion, the case might be different if it were Willy’s daughter’s lament. In the case of gender, so long as gender does not interfere with the functioning of a system, say the economic system, women are equal to men. In the logic of the system, the limiting of a women’s function to the economic system—for instance by childrearing—is the cause of discrimination, not gender. The potential for inclusion remains despite the real discrimination women face in the work place that favours male functions over female functions.

Modern functionally differentiated society is global because the outer boundaries of these subsystems expanded to the point that they are “...fused irresistibly into one global world society because some of their most important functional subsystems did expand so far and could no longer accept narrower boundaries”. (1977, 43) This is most evident in the economic expansion of capitalism, the political expansion of the nation-state, and the social expansion of religion. The expansion of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion leads to increased expectation of social inclusion and equality. The global shift of the 20th century is not a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor, between the north and the south, or between the West and the rest; Luhmann argues that these binary oppositions recycle concepts associated with the now historic dominant social relation of stratification and hierarchy. (1997) The global shift of which we are a part is in the internal differentiation of global society from inclusion and exclusion based on strata, to one based on access to functional systems. The inclusion offered by functionally differentiated society can only be partial as it presupposes the exclusion of those who do not meet the functional criteria of the subsystem. Luhmann argues:

Function systems presuppose the inclusion of every human being, but, in fact, they exclude persons that do not meet their requirements. Many individuals have to live without certified birth and identity cards, without any school education and without regular work, without access to courts and without the capacity to call the police. One exclusion serves as an excuse for
other exclusions. (Luhmann, 1997)

Functional subsystems are socially constructed boundaries of inclusion and exclusion maintained by communication. As communications, they are operationally closed; however, due to structural coupling, they respond to irritants from societal and historical contexts that form the environment of the subsystem. If an irritation finds resonance with a system, Luhmann argues the system’s boundary will expand to include the irritant; if no resonance is found, the system ignores the irritant. However, if the irritant breaches the systems boundary without resonance, than the boundary dissolves and with it, the unique function of the subsystem itself. Those excluded can therefore only be included with the expansion of the boundary, which presupposes the acquisition of the function particular to the subsystem. This is the paradox of globalization. Resistance to globalization is neutralized through the inclusion of resistors in the very system they resisted.

An important consequence of the global expansion of functionally differentiated societies is the speeding up of the process of reciprocation and change through the shrinking of the time horizon. Expectations frequently change. Time is:

the structure of a selection process that continually balances irreversibilities and reversibilities, one can immediately see that the foundations of every selection must be created by selection and be solidified by use in the continuing selection process so that re-dissolution becomes harder, though not, surely, impossible. (Luhmann, 1995, 124)

Time is not simply teleological, but “…[it] is the asymmetrization of self-reference in light of the order of selections, and in the social domain it temporalizes the double contingency of social action, including the self-reference in play therein, with the result that the emergence of improbable order is almost inevitable wherever double contingency is experienced.” (1995, 125)

Luhmann suggests that Parsons hints at this understanding of time when he states
“...punishment or reward by alter is repeatedly manifested under certain conditions,” (Parsons and Shils, 2001, 16) but emphasizes a shared symbolic system as being critical for action as opposed to time. The difference in emphasis is important. If each action, Parsons argues, is contingent on previous action, then time in this system is unidirectional.

Luhmann counters that the indispensable condition for his understanding of double contingency is that “…every selection be experienced as contingent and that a temporal succession be created, so that the selections can reciprocally determine one another, leaping ahead and reverting to what, from their respective temporal positions, is the future and what is the past. Both these together—namely, contingency and time—constitute the basis of the binding.” (Luhmann, 1995, 125) This understanding of contingency and time relates to the encounter between ego and alter, recognizing that contingency is primarily given in a symmetrical form, and is therefore a self-reflective problem. Luhmann writes that “The other is an alter ego... but it is not this alone; it is also an alter ego. One can anticipate another's action and connect onto it if one exploits its temporal localization.” (2001, 125)

The problem of contingency is raised symmetrically, but its solution is found asymmetrically. Ego and alter, before any action, need to make known their wants and needs. They need to risk an encounter that makes their black box, white. To do so each makes assumptions about the other, trusting their self-understanding and self-perception of the unfolding encounter. Action is contingent on these assumptions, which are self-reflective, and are reciprocated, adapted or remain unreciprocated via communication.

Luhmann's significant contribution to thinking society anew is his insistence that society is a social system consisting of actions based on this recursive and meaningful communication. (Beyer, 1994, 32) Not all communication is meaningful and therefore contributes to defining system/environment distinctions. Meaningful communications are
those recursive communications that oscillate between subject and object, and self-reflectively mediate the distinction between the system and its environment. Luhmann is careful to point out that self-reflexivity is not self-consciousness; consciousness, it can be recalled, is internal to the psychic system. According to Luhmann self-reflexivity is the social systems functional equivalent of the psychic systems consciousness. Contrary to prevailing sociological theories, Luhmann argues:

...societies have no collective spirit that has access to itself by introspection. Self-observation on the level of social systems has to use social communication. Self-observing communication refers to the system produced and reproduced by the communication itself. In this sense, self-referential communication refers both to the communicative systems and to itself as part of the system. (Luhmann, 1990,184.)

This boundary-drawing operation of communication leads to the problem of the indeterminacy of double contingency that occurs when:

Differences arise across a boundary, which separates one thing from another, that which has been actualized from that which has not been actualized. The observer draws this boundary in a process of self-reference. This occurs by employing a unity of difference in the process of observation, and it is the observer himself who constitutes this unity of difference. However, since it is impossible to observe this unity of difference while it is operative, it constitutes a blind spot for the observer. (2002, 6)

This indeterminacy is resolved through an oscillation between self-reference and hetero-reference. In the moment of self-reference, the system assumes its self-perception of reality, which is the distinction between a system and its environment to be ‘really real.’

This moment of self-reference leads to the hetero-referential moment. Hetero-reference tests this perception through the communication of this distinction. This communication

14. The ‘social media revolutions’ of early 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Bahrain are striking examples of the power of social communication to define and redefine social boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. While it is too early to draw any definitive conclusions, what we may be witnessing is the result of the internal reorientation of global society from differentiation based on strata to one based on function.
between self-reference and hetero-reference is the boundary-drawing operation of the system. According to Luhmann,

Society constructs its environment around a basic distinction, that between human individuals (bodies and minds) and other environmental facts, which nowadays are called 'ecological' conditions. This distinction is drawn by society itself, by its communicative processes. It has no *fundamentum in re* but varies its meaning according to changing historical circumstances. To distinguish between individuals and other ecological conditions is a projective reflection of communication; it mirrors the requirements of the autopoietic reproduction of the societal system. For only the consciousness of individuals is structurally coupled with the autopoiesis of the societal system. (1997, 71)

Only consciousness can irritate communication in a way that is compatible with the autopoiesis and the operational closure of the social system. All other environmental changes (physical, chemical, biological, e.g. death) can only have destructive effects. (Luhmann 1997, 72) The distinction or unity of difference between ego and alter, between the world as the horizon of the possible, and the world as it is interpreted, between system and environment is determined through the double contingent process of meaningful communication.

2.3.2 Function, Performance, Reflection

While autonomous, subsystems remain structurally coupled to other subsystems through three different system references: function, performance, and reflection. Luhmann argues that functional differentiation “…requires a sufficient capacity at the level of subsystems to differentiate and reintegrate function, performance, and reflection. It is the only way subsystems can attain operative autonomy as systems-in-their-environment” (1977, 37) Further, the successful reintegration of function, performance, and reflection has “important consequence for the temporal structure of the society” (1977, 37). Garrett
Green summarizes the internal differentiation of self-referential systems as; “(1) the relation of the subsystem to the total social system takes the form of function; (2) the relation to other subsystems within society is performance; and (3) its relation to itself is differentiated as reflection” (Green 1982, 25).

1) Function

Function orients a subsystem to the global social system through the selection of a system-specific function that differentiates the subsystem from other subsystems, which are its environment. In *Dogmatic of Religion*, Luhmann assigns the religious subsystem the function of accounting for contingency in the overall system. Garrett Green argues that Luhmann understands religion as performing the “social function of transforming this indeterminable world into a determinable one, one which can compensate for the inevitable risk of selection and protect against the threat of arbitrary change in the relationship of system and environment” (Green 1982, 23). Function determines the relation of the subsystem to its external environment. For a subsystem to be relevant, it must provide a function that it and only it can provide to the encompassing system. The function of a subsystem is present-oriented; it bridges the gap between anticipation based on past performance and expectation based on future performance. Function has to be “a present reality that directs and justifies communication” (1977, 37).

2) Performance

Performance orients a subsystem in terms of input and output. The functional subsystem's input and output must be elastic enough to adapt to the system/environment perspective of other subsystems. (1977, 37) A functional subsystem's performance orientation allows it to be responsive to changes in the needs of other functional subsystems. In the
case of the economic subsystem, the output includes goods and services needed or wanted by non-economic subsystems. The temporal structure of performance is future-oriented; its input/output anticipates the needs and/or wants of other subsystems. A situation of discontinuity emerges when function (present reality) and performance (anticipation of need) are not oriented to the needs of other subsystems within the encompassing system. The 2008/2009 collapse of global financing and credit markets is a paradigmatic example of a situation of discontinuity in which the performance of the economic subsystem did not match the expectations or needs of the social systems. Such discontinuities can only be resolved through the subsystem’s orientation to reflection.

3) Reflection

The third system reference orient a subsystem in terms of reflection. Situations of continuity/discontinuity within a subsystem’s function and performance are resolved by going back to the systems conception of its 'self' identity. This requires a history of the system that can be reduced and reconstructed to account for continuity and/or discontinuity. In the case of the economic subsystem, Luhmann notes “its forms of reflection have changed from profit (in the sense of non-contractual, non-social, and therefore purely economic income) to growth and may have to change again by taking into account problems of ecological balance” (1977, 39) - and one might add, the collapse of global finance and credit markets. Reflection's temporal structure is past oriented; it reconstructs past history, making continuous what appears discontinuous, or investigates the past to confirm what appears continuous. Reflection matches expectations with experience, reinforcing “…the identity of the system so it can survive choices by reconstructing its past history as a consistent chain of intentions and actions.” (1977, 37) Reflection accounts for contingency and
is therefore the primary role Luhmann assigns to the religious subsystem of global society.

2.3.3 Communication and the Global Expansion of Functional Differentiation

The increase in the complexity of modern functionally differentiated society and the speeding up of the process of reciprocated expectation corresponds with the global expansion and increase in the level and density of available communication technology. Communication is the basal structure of global society. According to Luhmann, society “uses communication to constitute and interconnect the events (actions) which build up the system.” (Luhmann 1990, 176) From a Luhmannian perspective, society consists of social communications “...because social action achieves its unity only in interaction with others. In other words, the decision as to what is an act is based on communication. More precisely, what is interpreted by others as a conscious, goal-oriented intrusion into the world qualifies as an act.” (Paul 2001, 374) Since communication is recursive— only what others interpret qualifies as action—it follows that communication is distanciated from the action it reports. The interpretations of communications that defines the boundaries of the subsys-

15. Citing the work of Walter Ong, Luhmann argues that communication technology developed in three stages: from animal communication to language, from language to writing, and from writing to mass distribution. (Luhmann, 1977, 44) Technological advances make wider communication possible, instigating evolution from one stage to the next. The evolution from language to writing in the west, for instance, was precipitated by the invention of the alphabet. Each stage corresponded to a population size that the method of communication could reach, thus binding society to the maximum reach of the communication technology. Likewise, the store of ‘memory’ is limited by the capacity to store communications. In the case of oral communication, the technique of rhythm and rhyme are used to preserve communications. The invention of writing and mass distribution has extended the range of communication, while the digitization of information extends its ‘memory.’ By way of example, the Google Book Project’s stated goal is to “to work with publishers and libraries to create a comprehensive, searchable, virtual card catalog of all books in all languages that helps users discover new books and publishers discover new readers” (books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html; viewed 09/08/09) Within the next ten years, the Google Book Project plans to scan an estimated 32 million books which will be fully indexed and searchable. Citing the work of Walter Ong, Luhmann argues that communication technology developed in three stages: from animal communication to language, from language to writing, and from writing to mass distribution. (Luhmann, 1977, 44)
tems of a functionally differentiated society—not actions—is therefore critical to understanding globalization. Luhmann’s epistemological shift recognizes that ‘action’—or more accurately, the attribution and description of action—is only knowable if communicated.

Functionally differentiated society is global because its outer boundaries have expanded to the point that they are coterminous with the globe itself. These boundaries are defined by the global reach of mass communication furthering comprehension beyond what is possible with face-to-face communication. The global reach of mass communication has brought “about a single system of world society that relies on functional differentiation and on mass distribution of communication” (Luhmann 1977, 44). Luhmann’s understanding of global, mass communication places more emphasis on the impact of communications on the experience of time than theories of communication that emphasize the influence communication has on opinion or action. The publishing and making available of opinions and information requires action to be based on imputed knowledge, whether opinion changes or not. Communication, Luhmann argues, “…continually outruns its own immediate effects and speeds up reactions in a way that may or may not be compatible with a ‘serious account’ of what others are supposed to know already changes the temporal perspective of experience and action” (1977, 45)

The immediate speed of communication, based on imputed knowledge shrinks the time horizon of functional subsystems and thus restricts the possible action available to subsystems based on these communications. Striking evidence of this is the increasing importance of the blogosphere, text messaging and ‘twitter’ to the reporting of news and information. The information flows almost as soon as the event. Controlling the flow of communication thus becomes a priority. Luhmann argues that the plea for political control of mass media is not only a plea for more consensus, “…but also a plea for retaining an
Luhmann describes the process of communication as the recursive movement from information to utterance to understanding/misunderstanding. Information is the selection of what is to be communicated, utterance is the articulation of information, and understanding/misunderstanding integrates the process, completing the arc. (Luhmann, 1995) It is important to reiterate that as a functional theory, successful communication is defined by the integration of these movements and not whether information is understood or misunderstood. It is the global expansion of communication technology that extends the reach of modern functionally differentiated society and inflates the encompassing global society to the degree that ‘society’ is coterminous with ‘social systems,’ and the problem of the indeterminacy of double contingency becomes a problem of ‘making sense’ of today’s interconnected, global world. The experience of Caribbean colonization and slavery is an early encounter with the boundary situation of globalization, the legacy of which continues as an existential crisis for “the sons and daughters of enslaved Africans now exiled in the West” (Homiak 2011).

In the following chapter, we will look to the tension between a phenomenology of manifestation as found in the Afro-Caribbean religious traditions’ resistance to slavery and

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16. The Egyptian government’s initial attempts to suppress the internet and cell phone services during the pro-democracy protests of 2011 is an example of the need to control the flow of information. In the case of Egypt, this had two unforeseen consequences. The first was the emergence of ‘corporate resistance’ to the attempt to block internet and cellular service. This took the form of a partnership between Google and Twitter to combine technologies so as to allow Egyptian’s to record audio messages by regular telephone that were transcribed by Google voice to text technology and subsequently globally distributed via twitter. The other unforeseen effect was to—ironically—dramatically increase the size of the demonstrations as those who were content to follow events via facebook and twitter were forced by the internet blackout to leave their virtual protest to gather with other protestors. In either case it was access to information as much as the desire for profit or participation in history that motivated action.
oppression and a hermeneutic of proclamation as found in Rastafari’s proclamation of freedom from continued slavery and oppression. We will thus discover Rastafari’s insight into humanity’s “basic capacities and reason for surviving, for being and continuing to be what we are.”(Ricoeur, interviewed in Kearney 2004, 119). Rastafari’s insight into this ultimate question reveals the transitory space of exile in Babylon and repatriation to Zion as a uniquely new world and increasingly global religious proclamation of hope that resists the despair of the encounter with the boundary situation of globalization.
The joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the people of our time, especially of those who are poor or afflicted, are the joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the followers of Christ as well. Nothing that is genuinely human fails to find an echo in their hearts. For theirs is a community of people united in Christ and guided by the Holy Spirit in their pilgrimage towards the Father's kingdom, bearers of a message of salvation for all of humanity. That is why they cherish a feeling of deep solidarity with the human race and its history.
Gaudium et Spes, Flannery, 2006

CHAPTER 3: RELIGION AND RESISTANCE TO GLOBALIZATION: MANIFESTATION AND PROCLAMATION

3.1 REVELATION THROUGH MANIFESTATION & PROCLAMATION

In the previous chapters, I argued that while religion may be declining in the developed world, what Berger termed the Eurosecularization thesis, the same is not true for the developing world, where religiosity is as strong as ever. This resurgence of religion is in part an effect of global economic, social, and political insecurity that we have identified as the boundary situation of globalization. The “developing” world’s encounter with globalization reminds us that the whole global community is put into question by the oppressive forces of globalization. To continue setting the context of this encounter, we will explore the distinction Ricoeur makes between “manifestation” and “proclamation.” I will show that in Jamaica, a tradition of resistance to slavery, colonialism, and neo-colonialism has emerged from the tension between the phenomenology of manifestation and the hermeneutic of proclamation. As heirs to this tradition, Rastafari hermeneutics of word, sound, and power embody and continue this legacy of resistance to the forces of oppression and alienation. This will set the stage for a more detailed treatment of Rastafari hermeneutics in Chapter 8.

Paul Ricoeur’s articles, “Revelation” and “Manifestation and Proclamation,” elabo-
rate an important distinction between revelation as manifestation and revelation as proclamation. Ricoeur cautions against viewing the rupture between a phenomenology of the sacred (manifestation) and a hermeneutic of religious language (proclamation) as complete. The relation between manifestation and proclamation is more complicated as each is maintained in tension with the other.

On the side of manifestation is the “myth of the eternal return.”17 Myth, Mircea Eliade argues, always returns to the origins, to the creation of the world. Change, for good or ill, is explained in relation to origins. The ritual enactment of these myths is not an imitation or mimesis of the origins, but rather, it is a return to the strong time of the origins. The work of the primordial manifestation operates according to the law of correspondence between the sacred and the mundane through the cosmogenic act of creation.

3.1.1 Phenomenology of Manifestation

Ricoeur identifies the following five traits that distinguish the phenomenology of manifestation from the hermeneutics of proclamation:

17. Eliade notes in *Myth and Reality*: Every mythical account of the origin of anything presupposes and continues the cosmogony. From the structural point of view, origin myths can be homologized with the cosmogenic myth. The creation of the World being the pre-eminent instance of creation, the cosmogony becomes the exemplary model for ‘creation’ of every kind. This does not mean that the origin myth imitates or copies the cosmogenic model, for no concerted and systematized reflection is involved. But every new appearance—an animal, a plant, an institution—implies the existence of a World. [...] Every origin myth narrates and justifies a ‘new situation’—new in the sense that it did not exist from the beginning of the World. Origin myths continue and complete the cosmogenic myth; they tell how the world was changed, made richer or poorer. This is why some origin myths begin by outlining a cosmogony. (1975, 21)
1) the awesomeness and efficacy of the ‘numinous’
2) hierophany
3) the symbolism of the sacred and ritual
4) the cosmic role of the elements
5) the logic and meaning of the sacred universe (Ricoeur 1974, 46)

While rejecting Rudolph Otto’s insistence on the irrationality of the sacred, Ricoeur accepts Otto’s identification of the *tremendum* and *fascinosum* of the sacred as the experience of speechlessness associated with encountering the numinous. This experience is a first-order experience that cannot be categorized or understood through the faculties of reason and interpretation. It is by its very nature incommunicable. The encounter with the numinous is the experience of a power that precedes language.

It does not inscribe itself within the categories of the Logos of proclamation and its transmission and interpretation. The numinous element of the sacred is not first of all something to do with language, even if it may become so to a certain extent subsequently. To speak of ‘power’ is to speak of something other than speech, even if the power of speaking is thereby implied. It is a power that does not pass over completely into articulation since it is the experience of efficacy par excellence. (49)

While the numinous element cannot be directly described, following the insights of Eliade, its manifestation as a hierophany can.

The concept of hierophany as developed by Eliade is the observation that while the first-order experience of the numinous is beyond description, a phenomenology of the sacred is possible through the description of how the numinous is manifested. This manifestation is primarily pre-lingual as the numinous can be manifest in any object that is venerated. This point is essential for Ricoeur as it includes cultural forms of ritualistic behaviour along with verbal veneration of the sacred. The sacred is manifest through the profane, transforming the profane into something beyond itself. “That a stone or a tree may manifest the sacred means that this profane reality becomes something other than itself.
while still remaining itself. It is transformed into something supernatural—or, to avoid using theological terms, we may say that it is transformed into something superreal” (Ricoeur 1974, 50). The sanctification of an object delimits otherwise homogeneous space, making extraordinary what is ordinary.

Likewise, time is made sacred just as a primordial founding event or action gives time a centre. To use one of Eliade’s famous phrases, the primordial event that birthed the cosmos occurred in illo tempore (in that time). The temporality of the universe emerges from and returns to that time. Feasts and festivals interrupt homogeneous time, bringing the community closer to that primordial time when the gods created the universe. Echoing Eliade, Ricoeur notes:

Certain founding events give time a centre comparable to the omphalos of space. In sacred time there are strong and weak times. A festival interrupts profane time just as the temple interrupts space. So tempus and templum correspond to each other. The festival is that time when one lives closer to the gods, when the efficacy of being reveals itself within the density of time. (50)

Philosophically, the temporal-spatial characteristics of hierophany require a return to Kant’s categories of imagination.

Ricoeur argues that the productive imagination’s capacity to present our ideas as images gives us more to think about and is precisely the place of the sacred in relation to its manifestations. Using an expression of Henri Cormin, Ricoeur notes “that the sacred unfolds as space of manifestations that must be called imaginary (imaginal) rather than logical in nature” (50). Imagination inhabits the space between the pre-/non-linguistic and the linguistic and will occupy our attention in Chapters 6.

Ricoeur argues that the ‘non-linguisticality’ of manifestation is externalized through the close association of the symbolism of the sacred as both signs to be contemplated and
rituals to be enacted. “The sacred does not reveal itself just in signs that are to be contemplated but also in significant behaviour. The ritual is one modality of acting (faire). It is ‘to do something with this power or powers’” (51). Ricoeur distinguishes between ‘magical manipulations’ that seek to control this power and the manner by which what is seen as aesthetically significant in time and space is signified in ritual action. The symbolism of the sacred in ritual action makes the world sacred. “Thus to every manifestation there corresponds a manner of being-in-the-world. For example, the disposition of space around a centre corresponds to the construction ritual that makes the place inhabitable. Between the sacrality of space and the act of habitation, subtle exchanges occur” (51). The manner of being-in-the-world is the work of manifestation.

Foundational myths possess an element of linguisticality that predisposes them to language. This element is not autonomous but serves to bind the ritual to cosmogenic myth. As Ricoeur notes, myths were not read, as they are today, but were enacted through recitation, which binds them to ritual action (51). Ricoeur cites the example of the Enuma Elish creation myth, which was part of the Babylonian New Year’s festival. The recitation of this cosmogenic myth re-actualizes the original combat between Marduk and Tiamat, thus ensuring the creation of the world. The recitation and re-actualization of myth as the return to origins “makes homo religious participate in the efficacy of the sacred” (51). Relying on Eliade’s Patterns in Comparative Religion, Ricoeur recognizes a series of cosmic polarities in the manifestation of the sacred. The sky corresponds to the transcendence of the most high. Mountains, ladders, towers, central poles of dwellings, and Ziggurats that reach to the sky through their ordinariness in the world, function as a bridge between the immanent and the transcendent. Likewise, the grotto, cave, and womb of childbirth correspond to Mother Earth, whom Ricoeur, quoting the Homeric hymn, describes as “Solid earth, beloved of
gods, who nourished everything in the world, [...] you are the one who gives life to mortal beings and who takes it away again.” In either case, the nearness of the familiar transcends its immanence and in doing so acts as a bridge between, to use another of Eliade’s aphorisms, the ‘real’ and the ‘really real.’

Ricoeur cautions against assuming that these correspondences are unfettered. As was the case with the relation between symbol and ritual, the symbolism of nature is bound by an element of linguisticality that expresses and articulates these hierophanies. In the same way that myth binds ritual, symbols are not free inventions of discourse, but are bound by the configurations of the cosmos. Ricoeur writes:

The ‘bound’ character of symbolism—its adherence—makes all the difference between a symbol and a metaphor. A metaphor is a free invention of discourse, whereas a symbol is bound to the configurations of the cosmos. Thus we said above that water symbolizes something virtual or potential, but we are the ones who speak of virtuality and potentiality, yet it is the epiphanies of water itself that bind this discourse about virtuality, potentiality, the unformed, chaos. (53)

Ricoeur gathers these four traits of the manifestation of the sacred under the fifth trait of the logic and meaning of the sacred universe. The sacred universe is pregnant with meaning and the four traits—which Ricoeur summarizes as “the antecedence of the powerful over its meaning; the aesthetic, that is, the spatial-temporal; the correlation between myth and ritual; and, finally, and above all the bound characters, the adherence to natural symbolism”—are the discourse situation of this universe. Gathered together in the fifth trait, Ricoeur writes, “these traits attest that in the sacred universe the capacity for saying is founded on the capacity of the cosmos to signify something other than itself.” (54)

The logic of meaning emerging from the structure of the sacred universe is a law of correspondences between the ‘real’ and the ‘really real.’ Ricoeur presents the following three tenets of the laws of correspondences, which constitute the logic of manifestation as
the correspondence between creation *illo tempore* and the order of natural appearances and human actions.

1) The correspondence between the macrocosm and the microcosm—for example, the hierogamy of the earth and the sky agrees with the union of male and female;
2) The correspondence between the furrowed earth and the female genital organ, between the entrails of the earth and the maternal womb, between the sun and the eye, semen and seed grain, burial and the death of grain, between birth and the return of springtime;
3) The correspondence in three registers of the body, the house, and the cosmos, which makes the pillars of a temple and the spinal column, the roof of a house and the skull, human breath and the wind, all mutually signify one another—and which makes thresholds, gates, bridges, and narrow pathways outlined by the act of inhabiting space correspond to homologous ‘passages’ assisted by rites of initiation at the critical moments of the human peregrination, including birth, puberty, marriage, and death. (54)

While the manifestation of the sacred through these laws of correspondences is reproductive, this is only so when viewed from a place of distance. *In illo tempore*, the manifestation is not only productive, it is *the only* productive imagination that through the laws of correspondences creates and maintains the cosmic order. Or as Richard Schechner’s notes, “Such performances are not mimetic: they symbolize and actualize simultaneously. In doing so, they mesh the ordinary lives of the performers with the extraordinary activities of culture heroes.’(2008). The manifestation of the sacred is the creation of the universe itself. Nature and the elements mark the manifestation of the sacred as “the point of rupture between theologies of the world in battle with the sacredness of nature [...]]’ (52).

3.1.2 Afro-Caribbean Religions and the Phenomenology of the Manifestation

The earliest expression of a phenomenology of the manifestation in Jamaica was the Afro-Caribbean tradition of Obeah. Obeah men and women used charms and herbs to cast spells on their enemies. European slave owners and overseers were often, though not al-
ways, the targets of the spells. Related to Obeah, but differing in its application of magic, is the tradition of Myalism. The difference between Obeahism and Myalism lies in the intent of the practitioner. Whereas Obeah manipulates the supernatural order to inflict harm on an enemy, Myalism is more cult-like in nature, involving dance and trance to convince suppliants of the power of the Myal person. Using spells and potions, the Myal man or woman would protect others against the power of Obeah. In African cosmology, magic is a neutral power dependant on the intent of the practitioner. Patterson explains, “Myalism [...] was obviously a form of anti-witchcraft and anti-sorcery. The proponents of Myalism were just as aware of the techniques and ‘wons’ of the obeah-men but used them for good rather than evil”18 (Patterson 1969, 188).

The element of dance and trance in Myal was important in the later development of the slave religion known as Kumina. Kumina gained prominence in Jamaica in the later part of the eighteenth century. Whereas both Obeah and Myal attempt to control the natural order by manipulating the supernatural order through spells, fetishes, charms, and potions. Kumina seeks to let the supernatural order control the natural order through spirit possession. In return, adherents expect the spirits to reveal secrets of the supernatural world.

Obeah, Myal, and Kumina form the basis of slave religion. Where the established church had little effect on the slaves, mission churches of the nonconformist traditions boasted greater success. For instance, Patterson attributes the success of the Baptists in Jamaica to their use of ex-slaves as missionaries to slaves and freed persons (1967, 214). Barrett speculates that the “loose rituals of these churches—especially the early Methodists and Bap-

18. West Africa, the word for mystical, medicinal power is ‘won,’ which corresponds to Patterson’s understanding of a won as morally neutral.(Patterson, 146).
tists, with their spirit-filled enthusiasm—fit beautifully with the exuberant religions of the
slaves and brought about an early syncretism between Christianity and various African
religions” (1977, 20). This effort to Africanize the Christian message laid the groundwork
for the later syncretic traditions of Pocomania and Zion collectively known as Revival. In
his article, “Evangelical Networks in the Greater Caribbean and the Origins of the Black
Church,” John W. Carton notes that early evangelical Christianity, heavily influenced by
Myalism, developed into a distinctly Caribbean Evangelical Christianity which in turn
influenced the development and growth of African-American Evangelical Christianity. The
flow between the two traditions accounts in large part for the liberationist and “this-
worldly” tendency that characterizes much of the African-American church to this day.

3.1.3 Hermeneutic of Proclamation

Over and against, or in tension with, the logic of manifestation is the hermeneutic of
proclamation. Ricoeur distances himself from Eliade’s radical separation between manifes-
tation and proclamation, proposing a détente between these two apparently irreconcilable
poles (Ricoeur, 1995, 55). As shall be seen in the following chapter, the productive imagi-
nation of religious language finds expression in the proclamation of the ordinary through
the extraordinary between these poles. Ricoeur finds in Judeo-Christianity the introduction
of the distinction between proclamation and manifestation. Citing iconoclastic passages
from the Hebrew Scriptures, Ricoeur notes, “The Judeo-Christian tradition, it seems to me,
introduced a polarity into the religious sphere that we run the risk of misunderstanding if
we purely and simply identify the religious and the sacred. We need to begin with the
Hebraic domain. There, in effect, the rupture is consummated” (55). 19

Ricoeur’s principal argument is that each criteria of the manifestation of the sacred is uprooted in the Hebraic tradition. This uprooting was a merciless battle, the result of the usurping of cosmic theology by a theology of history. Ricoeur writes:

Listen, for example, to Second Isaiah: ‘You cut down a tree and cut it in two. With one half you make an idol, with the other a fire to warm yourselves!’ Nothing could better express the Israelite refusal of a sacred environment. Yet this radical desacralization also turns back against everything that in a theology of traditions, even in an Israelite theology, would give an assistance comparable to those given to the pagans by the paradigms that governed their myths. (1995, 56-57)20

The uprooting, Ricoeur concludes, displaces and radically reorients the logic of correspondences presented above. The privileging of a theology of history over cosmic theology, Ricoeur argues, marks this reorientation. Ricoeur presents the incarnation of the logos as mediating the tension between manifestation and proclamation, noting:

That word and manifestation can be reconciled is the central affirmation of

19. Ricoeur’s description of this shift bears a very close resemblance to the axial age and the emergence of transcendental visions as described by S.N. Eisenstadt in his introduction to the collection of essays by the same name. Eisenstadt introduces the axial age as a revolution [that] took place in the realm of ideas and their institutional bases, which had irreversible effects on several major civilizations and on human history in general. The revolution or series of revolutions, which are related to Karl Jaspers’s ‘Axial Age,’ have to do with the emergence, conceptualization, and institutionalization of a basic tension between the transcendental and mundane orders. This revolutionary process took place in several major civilizations, including Ancient Israel, Ancient Greece, Early Christianity, Zoroastrian Iran, early Imperial China, and the Hindu and Buddhist civilizations. Although beyond the Axial Age proper, it also took place in Islam. (1986, 1)

20. Biblical scholar William Morrow argues that the axial age as describe above is evident in the Hebrew scriptures “as theological constructs shifted and became increasingly uncomfortable with protest against God, the argumentative prayer tradition was eclipsed by other forms of supplication” (2006, 3). Morrow locates the textual evidence for this shift in “the psalms of protest against national defeat after Jerusalem and its Temple had been destroyed, the argument concentrates on Lamentations, Isaiah 40-55, and the Deuteronomistic History and the contribution of each in reshaping lament and its relation to protest.”(William 2008) Morrow’s study corresponds with the shift from manifestation to proclamation identified by Ricoeur.
the Prologue to John’s Gospel:
So the Word became flesh;
he came to dwell among us,
and we saw his glory,
such glory as befits the Father’s only Son,
full of grace and truth. (John 1:14)

This identification of word and manifestation was the basis for the concept of revelation that from the Greek fathers to Hegel constituted the central category in terms of which thought about Christianity was organized. (Ricoeur 1995, 64)

Ricoeur summarizes how this tension is maintained:

Everything indicates therefore that the cosmic symbolism does not die but is instead transformed in passing from the realm of the sacred to that of proclamation. The new Zion prophetically inverts the reminiscence of the sacred city, just as the Messiah who is to come projects into the eschatological future the glorious royal figures of divine unction. And for Christian Golgotha becomes a new axis mundi. Every new language is also the re-employment of an ancient symbolism. The symbolism of the old is maintained in the language of the new.

This reorientation of an archaic symbolism is fundamentally possible due to the labour of speaking that is already incorporated in it. We earlier insisted on this articulation of a variety of diverse symbols within a central symbolism that must always be reinterpreted. This is what we called the minimal hermeneutic implied in the functioning of any symbolism, in as much as an articulated system calls forth a reinterpretation as regards the kerygma, takes the dramatic form of an inversion, not an abolition. (Ricoeur 1995, 66)

As we shall see in Chapter 9, Rastafari’s hermeneutic of word, sound, and power is an articulate system that calls forth a reinterpretation of the kerygma emerging from the socio-historical situation of slavery, racism, and oppression. Rastafari as a religious tradition emerges from the context of the tension between a phenomenology of manifestation in the form of traditional African-derived religious traditions and the hermeneutic of proclamation of the ritualized drama of word, sound, and power.

While outwardly rejecting much of this Afro-Caribbean religious heritage, Rastafari nonetheless shares some important features with Afro-Caribbean religions, which place it
in continuity with these traditions. Rastafari relations with these traditions represent a movement from a phenomenology of the sacred to a hermeneutic of proclamation.

3.2 Resistance of Revelation and Manifestation

Since the time of slavery, the ideas and practices of African-inspired Jamaican religions have supported and sometimes instigated resistance against oppression and injustice. Eugene Genovese locates the origins of this resistance in the capacity of slaves to “imaginatively create a partially autonomous religion [that] provided a record of simultaneous accommodation and resistance to slavery” (Genovese 1974, 597). Rex Nettleford places Rastafari firmly in this tradition inherited from the African-derived religious traditions of Myalism and Revivalism. Nettleford writes:

Such exercise of creative imagination and intellect remains, then, the most powerful weapon against all acts of inhumanity; and the Rastafarians have drawn on the tradition, which was nurtured since the eighteenth century, to cope with and defy the harshness of twentieth-century indulgences. Wrestling the Christian message from the Messenger as a strategy of demarginalization helped bring slaves and the free peasantry nearer a perceived mainstream as “children of God.” Rastafari were to extend this by proclaiming themselves as “pieces of God.” (Nettleford 1998, 315)

3.2.1 Resistance and the Phenomenology of Manifestation

The law of correspondences exhibited by Afro-Caribbean religions has played a significant role in resisting the dehumanization and brutality of slavery and oppression. Barbara Bush notes that from the very beginnings of the transatlantic slave trade, religion played an important part in both active resistance through revolts and escape and passive resistance through accommodation. Bush writes that the subversive influence of the African religious tradition of Obeah was probably most marked in the African-led revolts of the eighteenth century. During this period, the Obeah man or woman may have been less of a
magician and more of a priest. Because of their powerful status within the slave community, however, spiritual leaders often risked severe penalties. As John Stedman emphasised, the ‘fanaticism’ associated with the practice of Obeah was forbidden by law and its advocates subject to rigorous punishment. British West Indian slave laws likewise incorporated clauses aimed at the suppression of these dangerous and alarming activities. (Bush 1990, 74)

Consequently, religious leaders have played a significant role throughout Jamaica’s history of resistance to slavery and oppression. The power of the religious leader, Bush observes, was “used to inspire a unified resistance to slavery” (1990, 74). Bush concludes that the “fears of whites” were not paranoid fantasy. The leaders of revolts, like the maroon leader Nanny, were often practitioners of Obeah and were often in the vanguard of resistance until the later period of slavery, when slave leadership was taken over by Christian Baptists. Even after Christianity became a more important force, however, Myalism became infused into the new black Baptist sects whilst Obeah persisted as a strong element of cultural resistance.

3.2.2 Religious and Ideology

The religiously-inspired leadership Jamaican resistance to oppression encompass two broad ideological themes that Abigail Bakan identifies as the religious idiom and “the expectation of, or an appeal to, the British Crown as a benevolent and fair ruler protective of the interests of the producing class despite its despotic tradition of government” (1990, 15). As defined by Bakan, the term “religious idiom” identifies a “religious conceptual vocabulary both African and Christian, primarily Baptist, in origin, employed among the Jamaican producing class to express a tradition of resistance to, and liberation from, a socially, politically, and racially oppressive society” (1990, 15). This idiom is distinguished from a theological school of thought because it is not based on a defined set of ideas or
beliefs. It refers to the way ideas are expressed and not the content of these ideas. The religious idiom may share features with millenarian and messianic movements, yet it is distinct from these movements. The salient features of the religious idiom identified by Bakan are: “(1) the use of Biblical teaching to reinforce and justify the struggle to achieve greater rights for the producing classes against the interests of the ruling authorities; and (2) the identification of political and social leadership with religious authority, either officially ordained or self-styled” (1990, 16).

The second ideological theme identified by Bakan is the appeal to the British Crown. The expectation of an appeal to the British Crown operated on the principle that the British rulers often intervened and corrected the excesses of the Jamaican plantocracy (Bakan, 1990, 16). The authorities in Jamaica and the British Crown were distinguished from one another by the slaves. The Jamaican authorities “were directly identified with the condition of racial oppression and economic exploitation […as opposed to…] the more powerful but also more remote British colonial authorities” (Bakan 1990, 16). Both of these ideologies play significant roles in Jamaican resistance to oppression and the emergence of Rastafari.

The religious idiom and the appeal to a benevolent monarch are significant as they place the Rastafari hermeneutic of word, sound, and power in the context of active resistance to oppression, which I defined in my Master of Theological Studies thesis as a political idiom. As I argued in my thesis, Rastafari is not just a political system with a religious idiom but also a religious system in its own right. This religious system has political components that I called the political idiom. The political idiom of Rastafari incorporates the religious and political ideas of the broader Jamaican society that are transformed through the religious productive imagination into explicitly religious expressions of hope.
rooted in what Bakan terms “willed and inherent” ideologies. Although Rastafari has political implications, they are expressed through religious language that incorporates the political as part of a larger Rastafari ontology of hope. As we shall see below, the political is interpreted through the communication of the event of the coronation of Haile Selassie.

3.2.3 Resistance and the Hermeneutic of Proclamation

In her contribution to the volume, *The Reordering of Culture: Latin America, the Caribbean and Canada in the Hood*, Rastafari ethnographer Carol Yawney asks

... In other words, is Rastafari a liberation theology and culture of resistance relevant only to Caribbean people of African descent, or other black folk in the diaspora, or can it be adopted by other people without being appropriated by them? (1995, 58)

These questions returns us to the problem of uneven exchange and the extent that any culture is able to resist appropriation. Rastafari is a liberation theology and a culture of resistance rooted in the history and legacy of slavery and oppression. Rastafari’s encounter with the hegemonic forces of globalization is an important model of the power of the word to overcome injustice. Yawney argues that

The Rastafari response to its globalization is significant then for a number of reasons. It may help to shed further light on the process of how cultures changes and adapts to evolving circumstances. As localized as Rastafari was in Jamaica for a number of decades, it was never isolated from the international arena. In fact, if we adopt the perspective that Jamaica itself was never marginalized hinterland, but rather that it constituted historically an integral part of a much larger picture, then we can partly understand why one of its major exports is its culture. Reggae and Rastafari, for example, resonate globally because they somehow have a universal pulse. (61)
This universal pulse is the root metaphor of the religious imagination’s projection of hope despite the experience of radical evil. Rastafari’s response to globalization reveals a theological response to the process of cultural adaptation and change that is hermeneutical at its core. The symbols and metaphors of Rastafari have the power to “focalize and even mediate certain socio-cultural tensions that have developed on a global scale” (1995, 76) Yawney goes onto highlight the theoretical importance of Rastafari:

Theoretically this is an important line of investigation, for it promises to shed light on the ways in which sacred imagery passes across an ethnic boundary. But it is also worthwhile to reason along these line if only to neutralize ethnocentrism, for there is a pronounced tendency among those not in the Spirit of Rastafari to ridicule its sacred imagery as reactionary, anachronistic, or merely eccentric.(76)

The promise of shedding light on the ways in which sacred imagery passes across boundaries and the neutralization of ethnocentrism are equally important to theology’s encounter with globalization. In the first instance, theology is enriched by rediscovering the capacity for hope in the root metaphors appropriated by Rastafari. But this is only possible if the second theoretical line of investigation, the overcoming of ethnocentrism is realized.

Ethnocentrism can only be overcome if we take seriously Rastafari’s theological reflections of life on the periphery and hope for release from the bondage of modern slavery. To take Rastafari seriously we begin by listening. In the context of Christian preaching, Ricoeur confesses that he is a listener to Christian preaching who “stands ready to describe the ways he understands what he has heard.”(Ricoeur 1995, 217). Ricoeur recognize this confession as a “Break with the project dear to many, and even perhaps all, philosophers” to begin discourse without any presuppositions. . . . Yet it is in terms of one certain presupposition that I stand in the position of a listener to Christian preaching I assume that this speaking is meaningful, that it is worthy of consideration, and that examining it may ac-
company and guide the transfer for the text to life where it will verify itself fully” (Ricoeur 1995, 217). Taking Rastafari seriously begins with an awe-filled silence that respects Rastafari word, sound and power as meaningful “and worthy of consideration and that by examining it may accompany theology’s encounter with globalization “and guide the transfer of text to life where it will verify itself fully” (217).

In listening to Rastafari, requires us to encounter the reuse of biblical symbols in the context of the boundary situation of globalization. Ricoeur’s rejection of Levi-Strauss’ comparison the diachronic fragility of mythological universes to bricolage is instructive.21

A bricoleur Ricoeur explains,

Works with a material he has not produced with its present use in mind; he works with a limited and varied repertory with forces him to work, as one says, with the means at hand. This repertory is made up of the remains of previous constructions and destructions; it represents the contingent state of instrumentality at a given moment. The bricoleur works with signs which have already been used and which thus act as a “preconstraint” in regard to new reorganization. Like bricolage the myth “addresses [it]self to a collection of oddments left over from human endeavours, that is, only a sub-set of the culture” (The Savage Mind, p. 19) In terms of event and structure, of diachrony and synchrony, mythical thought forms a structure from the remains and the debris of events. (Ricoeur 1974, 48)

Many take this approach to Rastafari’s reinterpretation of scripture. The interpretation of professional theologians is privileged over the tinkering of the amateurish reasoning’s of

21. The translator’s footnote to Ricoeur’s use of the term bricolage reads [In The Savage Mind, Levi-Strauss defines this term in the following manner: “In its old sense the verb ‘bricoler’ applied to ball games and billiards, to hunting, shooting and riding. It was however always used with reference to some extraneous movement: a ball rebounding, a dog straying or a horse swerving from its direct course to avoid an obstacle. And in our time the ‘bricoleur’ is still someone who works with his hands and uses devious means compared to those of a craftsman.” (16-17) Because this term has no precise translation in English, we shall follow the lead of the English translation and use the French word---TRANS][ (1974, 43) In present day usage, bricoleur is used to indicate a ‘do-it-yourselfer’ (DIY) or amateur handyman. The 1962 translator of The Savage Mind, further clarifies that “The ‘bricoleur’ has no precise equivalent in English. He is a man who undertakes odd jobs and is a Jack of all trades or a kind of professional do-it-yourself man, but, as the text makes clear, he is of a different standing from, for instance, the English ‘odd job man’ or handyman (trans. note).” (1974, 43)
Rastafari. To the contrary, Ricoeur argues that his reading of the “great symbols of Hebrew thought which I dealt with in *The Symbolism of Evil*, and concerning myths—for example, those of the Creation and Fall—built on the primary symbolic level: these symbols and these myths do not exhaust their meaning in arrangements homologous to social arrangement.” (1974, 47). Levi-Strauss’ *bricolage*, Ricoeur argues, “works with debris; in *bricolage* the structure saves the event; the debris plays the role of a preconstraint, of a message already transmitted. It has the inertia of something presignified.” (1974, 47)

Ricoeur counters that, “the reuse of biblical symbols in our cultural domain rests, on the contrary, on a semantic richness, on a surplus of what is signified, which opens toward new interpretations.” (Ricoeur 1975, 126-127) Theological language is reinvigorated by the encounter with Rastafari’s reuse of biblical symbols. As Yawney notes

Rastafari have chosen to speak in the metaphors of the Judaic heritage, the deepest tradition they could trace, given the disruption of slavery. And this radical simplification of thinks – call it fundamentalism – awakens us. It brings us to our senses. We see the world from the point of view of eternal verities. This is healing work, even though it uses symbols for which we feel only the echo of allegiance” (1995, 83).

Rastafari’s reuse of biblical symbols rests on a “semantic richness, on a surplus of what is signified, which opens toward new interpretations.” (Ricoeur 1974, 48). Rastafari “gives embodiment to an understanding of hope as the unique kind of reply to the confession of radical evil.” (Ricoeur 1995, 92). Rastafari’s hermeneutic of word, sound and power is what Ricoeur identifies as the ‘inverse of *bricolage.*’ Ricoeur reflects, “If one considers from this perspective the series constituted by the Babylonian narrations of the Flood and by the chain of rabitical and Christological reinterpretations, it is immediately evident that these renewals represent the inverse of *bricolage.*” (1974, 48)

Rastafari’s reinterpretation of the biblical symbols, especially Babylon and Zion,
places their reflections in this “chain of rabbinical and Christological reinterpretations.”

(48) Through the creativity of the religious imagination, Rastafari has the potential to reinvigorate theological language, reminding us “because language is creative, it is a code to all the deep layers of our existence by a kind of contamination step by step of all the layers of psychic life. ToTo these layers of depth corresponds new kinds of relation to the world” (Ricoeur 2009, chap. 16).

Rastafari is a paradigmatic example of a theological encounter with the uneven exchange of globalization. Rastafari’s theological reflection on globalization as a “Babylon System” reinforces the importance of myths and symbols in the encounter between religion and globalization. Rastafari’s importance to Jamaica and the world has been acknowledged by scholars like Rex Nettleford, who, in the introduction to Joseph Owens’s Dread: The Rastafarians of Jamaica, argues that Rastafari is “one of the most significant phenomena to emerge out of the modern history and sociology of Plantation America, that New World culturesphere of which Jamaica and the Caribbean are a part” (1979, vii). Rastafari emerged in the 1930s as a religious movement among the poor and dispossessed of Kingston, Jamaica primarily through the street preaching of Leonard Howell and the early followers of Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey (prior to his emigration to the United States). As these early leaders’ followings in Jamaica grew and subsequently spread throughout the world, Rastafari emerged as a “ground-up” theology of liberation, a unique Jamaican contribution that reflects upon the liminality of a people in exile and its salvific hope for repatriation. The core of this hope is found in Rastafari’s InI ontology of hope.

Rastafari’s encounter with globalization begins with the expansion of mass communications typified by the global distribution of the 1931 National Geographic coverage of the coronation of Haile Selassie. Rastafari’s reading of this text is an example of, “the reuse
of biblical symbols in our cultural domain that rests on a semantic richness, on a surplus of what is signified, which opens toward new interpretations” (1974, 48). The Rastafari reading of the National Geographic article is the ordinary experience that is transformed into the extraordinary through the encounter with the limit-expressions of the biblical text. Rastafari’s reasoning advances theological understanding of the symbolic framework of globalization by naming the oppressive context of globalization as Babylon and summoning the material, political and social liberative reality of the Kingdom of God through Zion. The religious language of resistance that emancipates us from mental slavery is the hope that theology makes an account for. The religious communications that define the religious subsystem of functionally differentiated global society transcend the boundaries of their encounter with globalization. In the fullness of language, Rastafari confronts our collective forgetfulness as it chants “Burn, Babylon, Burn!”, while calling forth Zion to stretch out her hands. As divine detectives, theological hermeneutics observes this metaphoric transfer from text to life and in so doing is shown a “reservoir of hope and spirituality” that might otherwise be hidden.

The hermeneutic of word, sound, and power encapsulates the tension between manifestation and proclamation resisting that resists the dominant language of colonial and post-colonial globalization. Through word, sound and power, Rastafari reasoning mines the surplus of meaning in the biblical text. Rastafari holds the Bible in high regard whilst recognizing that the Bible has been used to justify slavery and colonial oppression.\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\) A striking example of this link is the image of an African slave’s flesh being branded with a hot iron as the property of the Church of England presented in Brian McKenna’s 2005 documentary, *Big Sugar* (McKenna 2005).
sequently, Rastafarians acknowledge the biblical text as a mistranslation of the original Amharic that needs to be properly interpreted.23

This interpretation takes place in the context of ritual gatherings known as “reasoning.” Rastafari believe that the ritual use of marijuana, also known as “wisdom weed,” creates a communal exercise of understanding through which the veil of oppression is lifted and true meaning discerned (Yawney, 1978). Barry Chevannes explains the Rastafari’s conviction that words (text) and sounds (oral reasoning) have power as

... a trinity. To them, the word is both sound and power. It is sound not only because its effect is aural but also because it is capable of quality, capable of being ‘sweet,’ of thrilling the hearer. It is power because it can inspire responses such as fear or anger or submission. The articulateness, tonal variation, pitch, and formalism are the Rastafari version of the sweetness of the sermons in lower-class churches, and to describe this level of expression they use the word “to chant.” (1994, 227ff.)

As a religion born in the New World, Rastafari imbues symbols, symbolic language, and action with the power to chant down oppression and resist globalization, perceived as neo-colonial oppression and slavery. What I will define below as Rastafari’s InI ontology of hope emerged from the margins of Jamaican society. Both individually and collectively, Rastas are “like the Old Testament prophet, engaged in word-act—the word is enacted and is indistinguishable from deed” (Erskine 2005, 89). The word indistinguishable from the work is the hermeneutic of word, sound, and power.

The tension between a phenomenology of manifestation and a hermeneutic of proclamation can be seen in the remnants of revival type rituals and actions during Rastafari gatherings. Barry Chevannes, notes that these “pocoisms” it is quietly tolerated but not

23. Amharic is the Afro-Asiatic Semitic language of Ethiopia. Ge’ez is the Afro-Asiatic Semitic language of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Ge’ez is only used for liturgical purposes (Anon. 2011).
sanctioned and often openly opposed. Chevannes recounts one instance when local non-Rastafari villagers attended a Rastafari service. The service included ritual elements reminiscent of revival services, including a table covered with a white cloth, an open Bible, a glass of water, and a vase containing a ganja leaf, which is sacred to Rastafari. The service was preceded by rigorous drumming and chanting, followed by intoning of ‘sankeys,’ as the hymns published by Ira D. Sankey are popularly known through Jamaica. These latter ones were familiar to the Revival tradition and the local people joined in. A series of prayers from other leading elders followed, accompanied by soft humming in the background. Indeed, so close to the surface was Revivalism that young Dreadlocks cautioned one of the villagers against bringing “poco-ism here.” (1994, 23)

What is significant for our study is the caution of the Rasta against bringing “poco-ism” to the community because it illustrates the transition of Rastafari from a tradition predominantly rooted in a phenomenology of manifestation toward a hermeneutic of proclamation. As was the case with the Judeo-Christian tradition, the break is not total but rather a reorientation that holds the Revival elements of manifestation in tension with the emerging Rastafari hermeneutic of proclamation through word, sound, and power.

3.3 RELIGIOUS COMMUNICATION AND RESISTANCE

For much of the world, the encounter with globalization is an encounter with boundary situations of oppression and alienation that demand that “we ask ourselves the ultimate questions concerning our origins and ends: Where do we come from? Where are we going? In this way we become aware of our basic capacities and reason for surviving, for being and continuing to be what we are” (Ricoeur interviewed in Kearney 2004, 119). R.C. Salter introduces the collection of essays, Globalization and Rastafari with the observation that religion in the Caribbean is a product of this encounter with globalization:

Caribbean religion has always been a product of ‘globalization.’ Christianity
has flourished in the Caribbean in its colonial forms, in indigenous forms, and also in new enthusiastic forms that arrived through foreign missions and in turn have migrated with their congregations all over the world. Hindu and Muslim communities have long existed in the Caribbean and in their efforts to guard their identities can be seen as a vanguard of the move to preserve identity through religion that has been remarked upon more generally around the world in the past two decades. Perhaps most importantly, so-called 'syncretic' religions blend African and Christian ideas and practices in the crucible of Caribbean experience and issue forth with forthwith new creations that continue to expand as believers participate in a new Diaspora in search of work and livelihood. Not only do these religions spread 'religious' ideas and practices, but they also have become sources of inspiration for art, literature and music around the world. (2008, 4)

Leslie James notes At the dawn of the third millennium CE Rastafari has left its Caribbean island home and gone “into all the world” . . . [and that] The reasons for Rastafari’s spread must also be sought in the special appeal of its ideological and practical features, one of which is its inherently democratic tendency.” (2008, 138).

The special appeal of its ideological and practical features of Rastafari is its grassroots theological and religious reflection on the forces of economic, political, and social alienation experienced as radical evil. Rastafari configures these forces as ‘Babylon’ and testifies to the ‘real’ story of the legacy of slavery, colonization, and neo-colonization as interpreted by those who’s “cup is full to the brim” with suffering (Banton, 1995).

Rastafari is a global religious movement whose encounter with globalization raises important questions for theology and the encounter with globalization. Drawing substantially on the work of Luhmann in his investigation of religion and globalization, Beyer expands on this understanding of the importance of religion to the emergence of globalization:

Observing religion as a specifically global religious system implies more than mere global extension of a particular way of forming and doing religion. A very pivotal part of the argument is that this religious system, along with various other systems, is an important socio-structural component of what is by now a world society. The historical emergence of the religious
system is an aspect of the historical development of global society. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the globalization of society over the past few centuries is incomprehensible unless one includes what has happened to religion during this time (2006, 23).

Beyer’s concept of what has happened to religion through the encounter with globalization draws significantly on Luhmann's concept of communication’s centrality to social interactions. “The elements of social systems,” Beyer writes “are not people but the communications which they engender… [and] that religion is therefore, sociologically speaking, a certain variety of communication” (see above §2.3, 1994, 5). Communication is primarily, if not wholly, mediated through the exchange of symbols, which, as we saw above is primarily in the arena of culture and is most often an uneven exchange.

Religion, Beyer argues, is best understood as a functionally differentiated system of global society in the plural and not as a single, global religion:

There exists a global religious system but certainly not a single global religion. On the contrary, our social world is populated with an increasing number of mutually identified religions, very much in the plural. And there is much of religious importance that hovers at the margins and even outside of these religions. As with globalization and global society itself, the homogeneity implied by the notion of a global religious system is actually the reverse side of religious heterogeneity, both in conception and in form. The hypothesis of the development of a religious function system and the limitations to what that means are absolutely central to my argument (2006, 4).

What distinguishes this understanding of religion from others is the realization that religion is not a stable subject that can be observed with detached objectivity. Rather, religion is a moving target that can only be described in the particularity of its historical, social and therefore, contingent context. Observing religion as a ‘social phenomenon,’ Beyer continues, “is to observe it as communication, but this is not another way of defining religion. It is only to say that, to the degree that religion is a social phenomenon, it will construct itself as communication and not as something else like experience or consciousness, let alone
Beyer maintains that “treating religion as social communications avoids an essentialist understanding of religion as a ‘social reality’” by shifting focus from the determination of ‘authentic’ religious experience to the interpretation of religious communications. Beyer argues “what counts as specifically religious communication will depend on its thematization as something called religion, usually in implicit or explicit contrast to communication that is not religion. That thematization has to happen in communication, whether religious or not.”(Beyer, 2006, 10). The observation of religion communicated in academic writing becomes a part of religious communication and therefore participates in the construction of that which it observes. In Beyer’s words, the essence of religion has first to be generated as essence in communication. Among the many consequences of this position is, of course, that my observing religion in this way is itself part of the construction of religion, but only if my communication (namely, this writing) is understood and thematized in subsequent communication (Beyer 2006, 10).

Beyer’s reframing of global religions offers an important oeuvre for theological reflection on religion and globalization. The recognition that communication is autonomous, recursive and independent of both the sender and receiver opens globalization theory to the theological concept of revelation through proclamation (Luhmann, 1995).

3.3.1 Generalized Symbolic Communication Medium of Interchange

In Luhmann’s systems theory, the generalized symbolic communication medium of interchange extends our basic perceptions of communication. What is generalized by a subsystem as a symbolic medium is determined by a system-specific basal binary code of the system. (Luhmann, 1990, 90) This binary code reduces the overall complexity of the system in its environment. In a given functional subsystem, communications only ‘makes
sense’ through the basal binary code unique to that subsystem. This unique code has a positive and a negative value which allows the subsystem to ‘make sense’ of its system/environment distinction. Examples of these codes include the distinction, payment/non-payment in the economic subsystem, government/opposition in the political subsystem, true/false in the epistemic subsystem and immanence/transcendence in the religious subsystem. Three consequences emerge from the distinction between communication and meaning: 1) the emergence of paradox, 2) the creation of redundancies, and the 3) deparadoxification of being.

1) Emergence of Paradox

The first consequence of this distinction is the emergence of a paradoxical relationship between communication and meaning. Luhmann argues, “The autopoiesis of communication by communication requires closure” (1990, 146) A retelling of the Greek legend of the Gordian knot serves as a useful illustration of this paradox.

As told in the Greek legend in the ancient Phrygian capital of Gordia, there was a chariot tied with a rope so intricately knotted no one could untie it. Legend states King Midas had tied the Gordian knot. Whoever could untie it would go on to rule the world. After conquering the city, Alexander attempted to untie the knot and, as others who had tried before him, was unsuccessful. The legend continues that Alexander simply cut the knot with his sword thus untying the knot without unraveling its intricacies. (Knight, 2001, 62ff)

The autopoiesis of communication is the intricate tangles of the Gordian knot. With no apparent beginning or end, the knot, like communication, is closed. Alexander solves the problem of untying the knot —that is opening it—by cutting it with his sword, thus
fulfilling the prophecy and presumably destroying the knot in the process.

Luhmann’s solution to untangling the closed knot of communication, while similar to Alexander’s, differs in one important aspect. As in the legend, meaning acts on the knot like the sword, opening it to understanding. Unlike the legend, meaning makes sense of communication through closure, that is, the cleaved knot while open, remains intact. Communication, Luhmann argues, is a closed structure that is recursive and can only refer to past or future communication. Meaning, on the other hand, “…is a completely open structure, excluding nothing, not even the negation of meanings. As systems of meaning based-communication, they gain their openness by closure. ‘L'ouvert s'appuie sur le fermé.’” (1990, 146)

Functional differentiated subsystems coalesce around a particular binary code that reduces the complexity of the system by drawing a boundary between the system and its environment. This boundary drawing operation imparts the system with meaning. Binary codes are internal to the system and operate best when they are not questioned and are taken for granted; in other words, when function and performance coincide. However, when function and performance no longer coincide, when the function of a system no longer performs to expectations, then the system needs to account for the discrepancy through reflection. Reflection is the oscillation between self-reference and hetero-reference that leads, often through misunderstanding, to understanding. This movement or communication makes sense of the system with reference to past communication and future communication. The system is thus operationally closed since communication can only refer to other communication, while paradoxically, it remains 'meaningfully' open.
2) Redundancies

The second consequence of the distinction between communication and meaning is the creation of redundancies. Where communication creates redundancy by conferring information to other systems, meaning creates redundancy by implying a surplus of further possibilities (197). In both cases, redundancy requires the further step of making a selection from the possibilities. This selection is contingent in so far as “…every concrete item… appears as something that could be different” (147) Societies therefore operate in a complex, contingent, and paradoxical world which leads to the final consequence of the distinction between communication and meaning - deparadoxification.

3) Deparadoxification

The final consequence of the distinction between communication and meaning is the paradoxification emerging from the recursiveness of communication and the necessity of contingency. Luhmann argues that the general condition of a self-referential society and the increasing need for self-description of the societal system gives social life an unavoid-able paradoxical experience of plentitude and voidness. (147). Modern functionally differentiated society, Luhmann argues, is encountered as the plentitude and voidness of paradoxical world, which he adds “is the ultimate reality of religion. The meaning of meaning is both richness of references and tautological circularity” (147). The deparadoxification of the plentitude and voidness of a paradoxical world is mediated by the unique function of the religious subsystem to make sense of this paradox.

Plentitude and voidness is the same, meaningful and meaningless life is the same, order and disorder is the same, because the world can be constituted as unity only. But since we cannot accept this last unity as it is, we have to replace it by easier paradoxes: by forms. Forms that retain this functional relation to the ultimate paradox remain thereby religious forms. (148)
For the monotheistic religions, the form that retains a functional relation to the ultimate paradox is God. God is the final paradox, who, paradoxically, deparadoxizes the world and insures the unity of the system. The world, Luhmann argues, is thus, “…the asymmetrical notion of creation and, contingent upon this, the idea of the contingency of the world… the incarnation of God on earth makes the improbable, probable” (1990, 152)

The ‘problem’ with religion to the outside observer is that the solution to the problem includes itself. It becomes “a job, and ‘calling God,’ becomes the solution” (1990, 156)

Both Luhmann and Beyer recognize religion as an autopoietic, self-reflexive system, whose functionally differentiating boundaries are maintained and challenged through a particular type of communication with and about the transcendent.

the transcendent can only be communicated in immanent terms, and this by definition: communication on the basis of meaning is always immanent, even when the subject of communication is the transcendent. Religion, therefore, operates with sacred symbols, ones which always point radically beyond themselves. It deals simultaneously with the immanent and the transcendent (Beyer, 2000, 5).

Theologically, mediation between the transcendent and the immanent is the manifestation of revelation. Whereas religious communication that mediates, the transcendent through the immanent is proclamation about revelation. This important distinction is made by Ricoeur in his analysis of revelation, manifestation and proclamation which completes Luhmann and Beyer’s phenomenological reduction, making the introduction of phenomenological hermeneutics to the analysis of the global subsystem of religions both plausible and possible. While the code of the religious subsystem remains unique and is, for the time being, constant, the program and medium that determine the criteria of suitability through which this particular code is communicated has changed with the increasing differentiation of modern society, and the encounter between the global religions.
3.3.2 Code and Program

Figure 7 identifies the Code, Program and Medium of the Religious Subsystem of Global Society as developed by Luhmann. (Luhmann 1989, 148) In this table, the unity and operation of the subsystem (left axis) are maintained by the code and program particular to each subsystem. The program is the relation between the form and the context and depends on the way in which the form organizes its context. Or in the words of Luhmann, “The religious (or aesthetic or whatever) meaning of forms, then depends upon the way in which the form organizes its context, e.g. the temple organizes the surrounding nature by referring to itself” (Luhmann 1995, 272). The medium is the generalized symbolic communication through which the form organizes its context; in the case of the religious, the context is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Medium of Symbolic Exchange</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td>Revelation</td>
<td>Faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Immanence/Transcendence</td>
<td>Canon/Rule of Holy Scripture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7 Luhmann's Schema of the Religious Subsystem

faith. Luhmann identifies ‘God’ as the contingency formula that translates the indeterminable contingency the world into determinable contingency.
Garret Green notes that Luhmann defines contingency formulas as "symbols or groups of symbols that serve to translate the indeterminate contingency of a particular functional sphere into determinable contingency" (Green 1982, 26). Green goes on to recognize that according to Luhmann,

The religious formula God has traditionally reduced the complexity of the world by grounding its contingency in a supreme principle conceived as both perfect and personal. Luhmann believes that theology has encountered difficulty since the eighteenth century because perfection has been replaced by the principle of development as the highest ideal of bourgeois society. A theology that responds to contingency today with a concept of a perfect God thus comes into conflict with an evolution-oriented science, including sociology (1982, 26).

Beyer critiques this reliance on 'God,' ‘Revelation,’ ‘Holy Scripture’, and ‘Immanence/Transcendence’ as too Judeo/Christocentric. While in fact these terms are Judeo-Christian, Luhmann understands the Judeo-Christian ‘God’ as an articulation of a contingency formula that does not exclude other differing articulations of religiously conceived contingency formula. The criteria by which a contingency formula is deemed ‘religious’ is based not, as it were, on God, but on criteria that refer to the binary code of the system. In the case of religion the binary code is Immanence/Transcendence. As previously stated, communication on the level of coding is closed. A system becomes open at the level of program and meaning. In this particular articulation, ‘God’ is the symbol or group of symbols that serve to translate the indeterminate contingency of the religious into determinable contingency, by deparadoxifing the binary code immanence/transcendence. This is mediated through the program of the revelation of ‘God’, who is simultaneously immanent and transcendent. The operation of this program is through the generalized symbolic communication medium of faith in the revelation found in the canon of Holy Scripture.

In the global religious subsystem, there are varieties of religious programs that Bey-
er terms programmatic patterns that deparadoxify using the binary code immanence/transcendence. Where Beyer departs from Luhmann is with the identification of the binary code of religion as immanence/transcendence, since this totalizing and all-encompassing code must be shared by the variety of programmatic patterns that are the ‘global religions.’ (Beyer 2006, 99)
3.3.3 Code

Luhmann identifies the basal code of the religious subsystem as ‘immanence/transcendence.’ While not rejecting this characterization, Beyer refines Luhmann’s treatment of religion’s basal code by introducing an alternate binary coding of ‘blessed/cursed.’ This refinement has the advantage of not only showing how religious communications mark the boundary between the ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’; but “how that boundary comes to be established and maintained through recursive, self-referential communications” in the first place. (2006, 80)

A central characteristic of Luhmann’s binary codes is that they must be inclusive, totalizing and in some way reflect a positive and a negative value of the inclusion and exclusion. In the analysis of systems structures, Luhmann argues that two levels need to be distinguished: “the level of coding and the level on which the conditions of the suitability of operations are fixed and if necessary, varied” (1989, 45) Beyer proposes the alternate coding ‘blessed/cursed’ rather than ‘immanent/transcendent,’ ‘sacred/profane,’ ‘pure/unpure’ or any other similar configuration of the religious binary as better capturing this first level of coding.

Blessed/cursed totalizes religious communication as it interprets all communication religiously and is paradoxically inclusive recognizing that those who are cursed are excluded which is inclusive of religious communication. In other words, the blessed/cursed binary mediates the paradox of plentitude and voidness as either blessed (plentitude) or cursed (voidness) or in some instances, both.

Michael D. Swartz provides biblical evidence for this binary in his analysis of the
blessing and curses in Hebrew Scriptures. Swartz cites Deuteronomy 28: 3-6; 16-19 as “…one influential example” of their binding;

Blessed shall you be in the city and blessed shall you be in the country. Blessed shall be the issue of your womb, the produce of your soil, and the offspring of your cattle, the calving of your herd, and the lambing of your flock.

Blessed shall you be in your basket and your kneading bowl. Blessed shall you be in your comings and blessed shall you be in your goings. (Dt. 28:3-6)

... Cursed shall you be in the city and cursed shall you be in the country. Cursed shall you be in your basket and your kneading bowl. Cursed shall be the issue of your womb, the produce of your soil, the offspring of your cattle, the calving of your herd and the lambing of your flock. Cursed shall you be in your comings and cursed shall you be in your goings. (Dt.16-19)

Swartz concludes that the “blessing and the curse are closely related not only semantically, but formally as well. The same style used to pronounce Israel’s blessings is used to pronounce its curses” (Swartz 2005, 187). Other religions follow their own program which mediates this paradox (Beyer, 2006). These programs, in the words of Luhmann:

…are given conditions for the suitability of the selection of operations. On the one hand, they enable a ‘concretizing’ (or operationalization) of the requirements that a function system has to satisfy, and on the other, they have to remain variable to a certain extent because of this. On the program level a system can change structure without losing its code determined identity (Luhmann, 1989, 45).

Accepting Beyer’s refinement of the binary code of the religious subsystem opens the unity (God), operation (revelation), and the program (Rules/Canon of Holy Scripture) to scrutiny. Whether these terms are overly Judeo-Christian is not as important as whether or not these programmatic patterns best articulate the blessed/cursed binary of Christianity in the first place and whether there are alternative terms applicable to both the particular program of Christianity and the universal programs of global religions. The difficulty with
the ‘religious’ schema as revised by Beyer is the identification of ‘God’ as the contingency formula, and Revelation and Holy Scripture as the program and operation of the religious subsystem. While the schema may have served Luhmann and Beyer’s purpose it is in need of a theological refinement that Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of the productive imagination provides.

Luhmann’s use the term ‘God’ as an example of a contingency formula does not exclude other contingency formulas so longs as these formula serve the religions systems function of deparadoxification. The Luhmann/Beyer schema’s identification of ‘revelation’ and ‘scripture,’ with the program and operation of the religious subsystem needs to be theologically nuanced. While elsewhere Luhmann recognizes the importance of the demythologization of religious language to the functional differentiation of the religious subsystem his schema does not sufficiently distinguish between the ‘the hermeneutics of religious language’ and the ‘phenomenology of the sacred.’ Our first revision to Luhmann’s schema
addresses this by adding the distinction between manifestation and proclamation in place of revelation and canon/holy scripture and replacing the term ‘God’ with Luhmann’s more generalized term ‘contingency formula.’ (see Figure 8).

This revision nuances the distinction between ‘revelation’ and ‘Holy Scripture’ and addresses the problem of a Judeo-Christian orientation of Luhmann’s understanding. Recognizing Ricoeur’s distinction between ‘manifestation’ and ‘proclamation’ allows us to circumvent the question regional concern of ‘authentic’ ‘revelation’ and ‘Holy Scripture,’ by recognizing what Luhmann understands as ‘revelation’ as the manifestation of the sacred and what he understands as ‘Holy Scripture’ as the proclamation of the manifestation of the sacred.

This distinction is important because it opens up the schema to a broader understanding of revelation and scripture while at the same time balancing the inaccessibility of unmediated revelation through the mediation of a hermeneutics of proclamation. It is important to recall that the identification of the ‘word’ with ‘manifestation’ “was the basis for the concept of revelation” which is expressed in the tension between manifestation and proclamation as discussed in Chapter 3. (Ricoeur, 1995, 66) The identification of the ‘word’ with ‘manifestation,’ Ricoeur argues, indicates that “the cosmic symbolism does not die but is instead transformed from the realm of the sacred to that of proclamation.”(1995, 66) The ‘word’ simultaneously manifests and proclaims revelation through the unity of the ancient symbolism of blessed/cursed.

It is in this respect that, in the words of Ricoeur, “Every new language is also the re-employment of an ancient symbolism. The symbolism of the old is maintained in the language of the new.”(1995, 66) In the following chapters, I will introduce Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of the religious productive imagination as a receptive structure that theology can
use to respond positively to Luhmann’s suggestion that in accepting his theory of religion’s special function in handling the paradoxes of self-reference, theology will discover hidden religious premises in apparently secularized codes. Since most functional subsystems of modern society rely on binary codes to de-paradoxize their operations and observations, a critique of coding as a technique of deparadoxification could launch a movement of ‘religious enlightenment.’ (Luhmann 1999, 33)

This ‘religious enlightenment’ recognizes that these hidden religious premises invite theologians, or in Luhmann’s language, ‘divine detectives,’ to observe the religious code in ostensibly non-religious communications. According to Ricoeur, hermeneutics are interpretations that consist in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning [...] It is in interpretation that the plurality of meanings is made manifest. (1974, 13)

Ricoeur’s semantic structure of the metaphoric transfer of text to life is the narrow gate that theological hermeneutics must pass (Ricoeur 1974, 15). It is important to stress here that this project does not propose that the theories of Luhmann and Ricoeur elucidate the post-colonial experience of Rastafari. Post-colonial and Caribbean scholars I have consulted, including Enrique Dussel, Orlando Patterson, Dale Bisnauth, Barbara Bush, and Richard Hart, as well as extracts from first-person slave narratives, and the writings of Rasta elders more than adequately present the colonial and post-colonial context of Rastafari. Rather, Luhmann and Ricoeur provide what, in the context of Talcott Parson, Max Black describes as an “overarching orientation or theoretical direction.” (1961). Rastafari is an example of the effectiveness of using “a critique of coding” that reveals “hidden religious premises in apparently secularized codes.” Rastafari’s hermeneutic of word, sound, and power is resists the globalization as it names oppression and radical evil, Babylon and liberation and radical hope, Zion. It is the metaphoric transfer from text to life that leads to
the destruction of the manifestation of oppression and a transformation of this sudden
contradiction into a proclamation of liberation.

Rastafari’s encounter with globalization begins with the expansion of mass commu-
nications typified by the global distribution of the 1931 National Geographic coverage of
the coronation of Haile Selassie. Rastafari’s reading of this text is an example of, “the reuse
of biblical symbols in our cultural domain that rests on a semantic richness, on a surplus of
what is signified, which opens toward new interpretations” (1974, 48). The Rastafari read-
ing of the National Geographic article is the ordinary experience that is transformed into the
extraordinary through the encounter with the limit-expressions of the biblical text. Rastafa-
ri’s reasoning advances theological understanding of the symbolic framework of globaliza-
tion as it resists the oppression by naming the oppressive forces of globalization Babylon
and proclaiming the material, political and social liberative reality of the Kingdom of God
through Zion. The religious language of resistance that emancipates us from mental slav-
ery is the hope that theology makes an account for. The religious communications that
define the religious subsystem of functionally differentiated global society transcend the
boundaries of their encounter with globalization. In the fullness of language, Rastafari
confronts our collective forgetfulness as it chants “Burn, Babylon, Burn!”, while calling
forth Zion to stretch out her hands. As divine detectives, theological hermeneutics observes
this metaphoric transfer from text to life and in so doing is shown a “reservoir of hope and
spirituality” that might otherwise be hidden.
Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery;
None but ourselves can free our minds.
Have no fear for atomic energy,
'Cause none of them can stop the time.
How long shall they kill our prophets,
While we stand aside and look? Ooh!
Some say it's just a part of it:
We've got to fulfill the book.
PART II: CONFIGURATION

In the following Section, we will set the epistemological and practical contours for theology and the encounter with globalization. This section will take us over a wide variety of intellectual terrain. Paul Ricoeur’s dialogue with the human sciences especially his rejection of Dilthey’s split between knowledge as explanation and knowledge as understanding and his recognition of the limits of structuralism is the backdrop for this section.

In the following chapters it is important to keep in mind Ricoeur’s distinction between ‘philosophy’ and ‘science.’ Ricoeur writes that

Understanding is not seen here as the recovery of meaning. In contrast to what is stated by Schleiermacher in *Hermeneutik und Kritik* (1828), by Dilthey in his important article “Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik” (1900), there is no “hermeneutic circle”; there is no historicity to the relation of understanding. The relation is objective, independent of the observer. This is why structural anthropology is science and not philosophy. (1974a, 33)

This is not to say Ricoeur totally rejects structuralism, but rather recognizes that structuralism is suspect when it attempts the “the passage from a structural science to a structural philosophy.”(1974, 51)

Ricoeur finds structural anthropology convincing so “long as it understands itself as the extension, by degrees, of an explanation which was first successful in linguistics, then in systems of kinship, and finally, little by little, by the play of affinities with the linguistic model, to all forms of social life.”(51) Ricoeur objects when structural anthropology sets itself up as a ‘philosophy.’

By the same token, it seems to me suspect when it sets itself up as a philosophy. An order posited as unconscious can never, to my mind, be more than a stage abstractly separated from an understanding of the self by itself; order in itself is thought located outside itself. (51)

In the chapters of this section, we will present the Functional-Structuralism Niklas Luhmann’s social systems as a theory whose self-reflexivity satisfies Ricoeur’s “condition
that it does not become alienated from itself in the objectivity of the codes.” (51) This section will serve as a bridge between our understandings of the religions encounter with globalization through the global spread of functionally differentiated society and “appropriation and recognition through which [such] abstract reflection becomes concrete reflection.” (Ricoeur 1974, 51)
At the end of our reflections, we cannot undertake a book with in a book to convert the program for a theory of science hinted at here into a thoroughly plausible statement. Our concluding remarks merely mark the spot to which such investigations could connect . . . We can now encourage the owl of Minerva to stop hooting in the corner and begin its flight into the night. We have instruments to watch over it, and we know that its journey is a reconnaissance of modern society.

Niklas Luhmann 1995, 60.

CHAPTER 4: EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTOURS OF THE DIALOGUE OF THEOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: WHAT CAN I KNOW?

4.1 THE VALUE OF LUHMANN’S THEORY

In his seminal text on the relationship between theology and sociology, Religion and Alienation, theologian Gregory Baum recognizes the need for a dialogue between theology and the sociological tradition. “The sociological tradition contains basic truth that is absent from philosophical and theological thought, truth that modifies the very meaning of philosophy and theological thought. . . . My hope is that more theologians will turn to the sociological literature and enter into conversation with it” (2006, 14). While Luhmann’s social systems theory is both unique and novel, its originality is not ex nihilo, but emerges from his dissatisfaction with the state of theorizing about society and contemporary sociology’s dependency on the idée rescue of classical sociology (Luhmann 1984; Said 1979). Luhmann’s theory is challenging and can seem impossibly obtuse. Without prior preparation, it is all too easy to discount Luhmann as unintelligible (Paul 2001, 372); however, to deprive theology of Luhmann’s insights into the complexity of global society deprives theology of an important tool for comprehending the world in which faith seeks understanding.
Luhmann’s originality lies in expanding his own tools of inquiry and method beyond sociology, integrating biological, sociological, and philosophical theories into a single paradigm (Paul, 2001, 372). Drawing on these disparate disciplines, Luhmann offers “an alternative both to the normative social theories and the theories of rational choice that are increasingly coming to dominate the social sciences as a whole” (Paul 2001, 372). This epistemological shift is appealing for theological inquiry as it de-privileges normative accounts of society and makes room for a constructive encounter between theology and the social sciences. Social systems theory does not critique systems or predict future stability or instability. Instead, it attempts to break through the apparent normality of the “way things are” by regarding experience and habit as contingent perceptions of reality. The “way things are” is neither impossible nor necessary. 24 What is at issue, in Luhmann’s own words, is “an analytic interest: to break through the illusion of normality, to disregard experience and habit, and, in a sense (here, not intended as that of transcendental theory), to effect a phenomenological reduction” (1995, 114). This phenomenological reduction is the recognition that social action theory’s single-minded focus on the regional issues of threats against stability or the maintenance of social relations is inconsequential without first determining how social order is possible. This question can only be considered through the radicalization of the problem of double contingency first elaborated by Talcott Parsons. Luhmann asks “How is social order possible?” in a way that presents this possibility as above all probable. Double contingency seems to condemn the social order to a vicious and

24. Luhmann presents his variant of social systems theory as not oriented to “perfection, or the lack thereof,” but oriented towards understanding the “dissolution and recombination of experiential contents” (Luhmann 1995, 114).
self-referential circle of indeterminacy. Luhmann notes, “if everyone acts contingently, and thus everyone could also act differently and knows this about oneself and others and takes it into account, it is for the moment improbable that one’s own action will generally find points of connection (and conferral of meaning) in the actions of others; self-commitment would presuppose that others commit themselves and vice versa” (1995, 116). The solution to the problem of double contingency is not in action but in communication and the “dehumanization” of social scientific inquiry.

The “dehumanization” of the social sciences is not an attempt to erase or make invisible the individual; rather, it is Luhmann’s response to the inadequacies of the traditional humanist notions of the individual and self. Moeller explains this post-humanism in Luhmann’s theory as an attempt to “step beyond the conceptual limits of the ‘human, all-too-human.’ Traditional humanist notions are too simple to explain the complexity of reality—this is why there needs to be a new theory” (2006, 79). Luhmann’s social systems theory avoids anthrocentricism by decentering the atomized hyper-individual who was the perhaps unintended outcome of Descartes’s bifurcation of the cognito.

Luhmann’s insight is to reintegrate the biological, social, and psychic without allowing one to be subsumed by the other. The ego is not so much eclipsed as it is held in tension with each of these spheres. Luhmann’s “dehumanization” is more like a perichorēsis between “human-the-social,” “human-the-psychic,” and “human-the-biological.” In the context of Trinitarian theology, Alister McGrath defines the concept of perichorēsis as the capacity which “allows the individuality of the [three] persons to be maintained, while insisting that each person shares in the life of the other two. An image often used to express this idea is that of a ‘community of being,’ in which each person, while maintaining its distinctive identity, penetrates the others and is penetrated by them” (1999, 50).
Similarly, Luhmann’s conception of the human-the-social, human-the-psychic, and human-the-biological is likewise a relationship of penetration or interpenetration in which each element maintains its distinctiveness in relation to the other types of systems. What is important for the present study is that in shifting the emphasis of his sociological enquiry from a normative approach to a conceptual abstraction, Luhmann directs our attention away from both the parts and the whole to the distinction between systems and their environment.

4.2 DOUBLE CONTINGENCY

Luhmann’s social systems theory is strongly influenced by Talcott Parsons’s system theory.25 Parsons’s *General Theory of Action* recognizes the critical importance of the interdisciplinary and comparative nature of the study of societies and of developing a general and comprehensive schema of societies (Turner 1999, 4). For Parsons, sociological inquiry’s begins with the objective observation of society as a whole. Society is a metaconcept that includes subsystems, which, despite being social systems, are not in and of themselves, strictly speaking, societies. Society, in general, is “the most self-sufficient type of social system” (1966b, 2). Societies, according to Parsons, are primarily politically orga-

25. The following is from an online biography of Luhmann that explains Luhmann’s connection to Talcott Parsons.

In 1961 Luhmann went to Harvard to study with Parsons during a one year sabbatical. Luhmann was born on December 8, 1927, the son of a brewery owner in Lüneburg. At the age of 15 he was enrolled into the German Luftwaffe, which resulted in a brief stint as an American prisoner-of-war following WW2. He still managed to get his college degree from Johanneum Lüneburg in 1946. From 1946 to 1949 he studied law at Freiburg University. Luhmann then worked for a number of years as a public servant, until, in 1960, he had the opportunity to go to Harvard University to study under Talcott Parsons, the father of modern systems theory. From 1962 to 1965 he worked at the Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften (Public Administration) in Speyer. (Anon. 2011)
nized units, establishing “a relatively effective normative order within a territorial area” (2). Territorially-bound subsystems of a society may, however, interpenetrate other territorially-bound societies.

Parsons places a singular importance on the role of the person in society. Societies consist of the interaction of humans who are distinct biological organisms in the organic world. Organic life, Parsons argues, is subject to evolutionary change, and since humanity is integral to the organic world, human societies must be analyzed as “life-processes,” likewise subject to evolutionary change. Parsons tries to avoid biological determinism and the excesses of Social Darwinism by recognizing that the evolution of societies is not strictly a biological imperative, but “a summary generalization standing for a type of process or change” (1966a, 20). Despite Parsons’s claims to the contrary, his theory of progress is rooted in the generalization of the nature, values, and norms of American society, which he views as the pinnacle of the progress of modernity. Luhmann’s systems theory recognizes the problem of double contingency but rejects Parsons solution in favour of his own.

At the centre of Parsons’s action theory is the interaction of at least two or more persons, or, borrowing from Freud, “ego” and “alter.” Action is contingent upon this interaction. For Parson, ego and alter are not a single consciousness, as for Freud, but rather, they are individual personalities forming the basic interaction of a society. This process of interaction leads to a decision (action), which is “always a consequence of a combination of factors, among which an immediate input is only one. All social processes must be conceived as the combination and re-combination of variable communicable factors” (Parsons 1966a, 20). The whole process “occurs inside that ‘black box,’ the personality of the actor” (20), mediated through cultural objects—the cognitive reference system—internalized as self-object images; through the system of expressive symbolism, internalized by symboli-
cally organized affect; and through the system of moral standards, internalized by superego (Parsons, Bales, and Shils 1953).

According to Parsons, ego acts and alter reacts based on common, universally-shared values. This action/reaction dynamic creates a situation of double contingency, as action is contingent upon reaction, which is contingent on action. This double contingent interaction between ego and alter is the basis of Parsons’ social systems theory and the basic action that constitutes society. Such a social system, argues Parsons, “is a function of the common culture which not only forms the basis of the intercommunication of its members but which defines, and so in one sense determines, the relative status of its member” (1953, 18). Parsons summarizes double contingency as the normative orientation of action, since after alter’s reaction of punishment or reward is superadded to alter’s ‘intrinsic’ or direct behavioural reaction to ego’s original selection. If punishment or reward by alter is repeatedly manifested under certain consequences, this reaction acquires for ego the meaning of an appropriate consequence of ego’s conformity with or deviation from the norms of a shared symbolic system. A shared symbolic system is a system of ‘ways of orienting,’ plus those ‘external symbols’ which control these ways of orienting, the system external symbols bring forth the same or a complementary pattern of orientation in both of them. Such a system, with its mutuality of normative orientation, is logically the most elementary form of culture. In this elementary social relationship, as in large-scale social systems, culture provides the standards (value-orientation) which are applied in evaluative processes. Without culture, neither human personalities nor human social systems would be possible. (Parsons, Shils, and Smelser 2001, 16)

Parsons’s general action theory models “the interaction of a plurality of persons analyzed within the frame of reference of a theory of action.” A successful society is characterized by its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances in its environment, its capacity to identify common goals and directions, its integration and coordination of social relations between individuals, and its capacity to maintain common cultural values and objects that are internalized by persons. Luhmann rejects this understanding as it fails to account for serious
limitations imposed by Parsons’ understanding of double contingency.

4.3 **LUHMANN’S CRITIQUE OF PARSONS**

Luhmann’s critique of Parsons’ theory begins with Parsons’ failure to recognize the inherent indeterminacy of the basic system of the double contingent interaction between ego and alter. Parsons’ starting point is the inability for action to occur “if alter makes his action dependent on how ego acts, and ego wants to connect his action to alter’s” (Luhmann 1995, 103). Luhmann counters that the actions of ego and alter *are* contingent on each other; action and expectation flows from ego to alter and from alter to ego. According to Parsons, double contingency is “inherent in the interaction. On the one hand, ego’s gratifications are contingent on his selection among available alternatives. But in turn, alter’s reaction will be contingent on ego’s selection and will result from a complementary selection on alter’s part” (2001, 16). This leaves the system indeterminable since “ego cannot act without knowing how alter will act and vice versa” (Luhmann 1995, 131). Parsons’ variation of double contingency ends here in indeterminacy. According to Luhmann, this situation of double contingency creates a “pure circle of self-referential determination [that] lacking any further elaboration, leaves action indeterminate, makes it indeterminable. . . . No action can occur without first solving the problem of double contingency” (1995, 104).

The problem with Parsons’ theory is his failure to recognize that ego and alter’s intentions are transparent in the eyes of the other.

The basic situation of double contingency is then simple: two black boxes, by whatever accident, come to have dealing with one another. Each determines its own behaviour by complex self-referential operations within its own boundaries. What can be seen of each is therefore necessarily a reduction. Each assumes the same about the other. Therefore, however many efforts they exert and however much time they spend (they themselves are always faster!), the black boxes remain opaque to one another. Even if they operate in a strictly mechanical way, they must still suppose indeterminacy
and determinability in relation to one another. Even if they themselves operate “blindly,” they proceed in relation to one another. Even if they mutually assume determinability in their system/environment relationship and observe themselves through this. Any attempt to calculate the other will inevitably fail. (Luhmann 1995, 109)

Parsons’ solution to the problem of double contingency is to assume that ego and alter share a common “value consensus, in harmonious normative orientation, in a ‘shared symbolic system’ which possesses normative character, like a code” (Luhmann 1995, 104). Thus, double contingency is mediated through the internalization of a shared cognitive reference system, a system of expressive symbolism and a system of moral standards which is systematized by Parsons’ A.G.I.L. paradigm. Luhmann rejects this paradigm as flawed. The A.G.I.L. paradigm is incapable of answering key questions such as: How does a society adapt to its environment? How generally agreed upon are the goals of a social system? How does a society coordinate and regulate social relations? How shared are these latent cultural objects? How generally understood are the subconscious values and cultural norms that “furnish, maintain, and renew both the motivation of individuals and the cultural patterns that create and sustain the progress of society?” (Ritzer 1996, 70). Luhmann asks how any of Parsons’ key assumptions of adaption, goal attainment, integration, and latency can be validated without first overcoming the problem of the indeterminacy of double contingency?

Luhmann further rejects Parsons’ double contingency because it presupposes that

26. The AGIL is the acronym for (A)daption, the drive for a social system to adapt to its environment; (G)oal Attainment, the generally agreed upon goals of a social system; (I)ntegration, the coordination and regulation of social relations; and (L)atency, or Pattern Maintenance; the often subconscious values and cultural norms that “furnish, maintain, and renew both the motivation of individuals and the cultural patterns that create and sustain this motivation.” (Ritzer 1996, 242)
all culture interactions uncover culture. Luhmann points out that orienting long-term structures that regenerate social order to a cultural inheritance restricts social change to the past. This moves the problem of social progress and change from the political and economic arenas to a problem of socialization in the social arena, where socio-cultural evolution is understood not as social progress, but as deviant socialization (1995, 104). Reliance on the past for cultural inheritance is too limiting and not empirically justifiable. Likewise, the reliance on subjects of an action, who confront one another with self-determined (not just naturally given) needs, and who depend on one another for the satisfaction of their needs, leaves undetermined who these subjects of action, designated as ego and alter are, and what constitutes their ‘organism’ or ‘behavioral system’ or ‘personality,’ especially when these designations are ‘differentiated only within the action system, and are not given in advance to the system.’ (1995, 105)

Parsons’ theory, Luhmann argues, is too concerned with ‘the black box’ of the actor that in his estimation is ultimately not black, but completely opaque and unobservable in social encounters.27 Ego and alter, therefore, can only be determined self-referentially, remaining opaque to one another and the outside observer.

Luhmann advances beyond Parsons’ systems theory by inverting the relation between action and communication. While the basal social situation for social systems theory remains the encounter between at least one ego and one alter who are free in their actions but are influenced respectively by the other, this encounter is distinct from the communications it generates. These communications constitute a social system. ‘Consciousness’ or

27. This does not deny any advances in neuroscience and cognitive science made in recent years with the development of ever more sophisticated brain imaging technology. It simply affirms that in our daily social interactions, we are not likely to have an MRI available to determine the needs and wants of our everyday encounters, for example, with the local baker.


‘sense’ is a psychic system distinct from social systems. The actions that constitute society are based on meaningful communication. Communication is central to Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory. By inverting the action/communication dynamic, Luhmann rejects the structural-functional approach of sociology in favour of a functional-structuralism that privileges communications and not actors as central to the creation and maintenance of social systems. Returning to our discussion on the encounter between ego and alter, at the phenomenological level, ego and alter are conceived as 'meaning-experience-psychic systems' that are “…open [to a] potential for meaning determination that is given in the form of horizons to those who experience this potential in themselves and in others” (Beyer 2006, 99). Meaning-experience-psychic systems are the term Luhmann uses to denote the perichoresis between human-the-social, human-the-biological and human-the-psychic. Moeller adds clarity to this concept by translating the German word, “Sinn” as sense, rather than meaning as is common in most translations of Luhmann.

Sense-experience-psychic systems or sense constituting systems make sense of the world they inhabit. To make sense of the world is to make a distinction between the system (what makes sense) and the environment (complexity, noise, senselessness). Double-contingency is always present in sense constituting systems, accompanying “…all experiencing in an unfocused way up to the point when experience encounters another person or social system to which free choice is attributed.” (1995, 105) At the point of this encounter, double contingency emerges as not merely a fact of encounter, but as the motivating problem: How does one make sense from or of experience? The answer to this question is the oscillation between self-reference and hetero-reference.

Sense is made by communicating with another who either understands or misunderstands the information being communicated. If what is communicated ‘makes sense,’ then
self-reference and hetero-reference are reconciled. However if the communication does not ‘make sense’, the encounter between ego and alter is still communicated, regardless of whether the misunderstanding is corrected through further communication or not. In this respect, Luhmann’s understanding of communication is purely functional, describing the process, not the content of communication. The critical turning point for Luhmann’s theory is the rejection of “the starting point of the subject (action theory) or a theory of signs (language theory, structuralism)” in favour of a theory of radical constructivism (1995, 147).

Luhmann’s theory is a critical deconstruction of the social scientific, humanist concept of society that conceptualizes communication as “the synthesis of three selections, as the unity of information, utterance, and understanding.” Both Ricoeur and Luhmann are responding to what they perceive as the inadequacies of the traditional humanist notions of the individual, the self, and the social. Where Luhmann deconstructs the ontological priority of the psyche to the social, Ricoeur challenges the sublimation of the human science’s epistemological claims to a primordial ontological foundation that locates “being” as the place of “understanding.” The central problem for both Ricoeur and Luhmann is the place of the subject as an object of inquiry.

Ricoeur approaches the subject through the long durée of reflective semantics that eclipses the cogito.

The semantic approach thus entails a reflective approach. But the subject who interprets himself while interpreting signs is no longer the cogito: rather, he is a being who discovers, by the exegesis of his own life, that he is placed in being before he places and possesses himself. In this way, hermeneutics would discover a manner of existing which would remain from start to finish a being-interpreted. Reflection alone, by suppressing itself as reflection, can reach the ontological roots of understanding. (1974, 11)

For Luhmann, ontologies are the “by-products of communications, and they are eventually
more or less dissolved by the codes developed in symbolically generalized media of communication” (1995, 148ff). For both Luhmann and Ricoeur, ontology that neglects the place of the ‘knower’ amidst the ‘known’ limits the value and scope of inquiry.

For Ricoeur, the key to overcoming the inadequacies of such a foundational ontology is reflection and for Luhmann, it is self-reflection, which in the context of social systems, he terms self-reference. According to Luhmann, the concept of self-reference and its corollary, self-referential systems, is of central importance to epistemology:

This is not merely a matter of asking whether systems theory in general is a scientific theory and how, if that is answered in the affirmative, the theory of science must change its self-understanding. One can no longer start out within such bounds after systems theory has incorporated the explosive of self-reference and passed it on to the theory of science as the core of the concept of system. The consequences go far beyond merely adapting the concept of theory to obviously successful innovations. The concept of self-referential systems can and must subsume science and one’s own research. This requires taking leave of ontological metaphysics and apriority. Systems with built-in reflection are forced to forego absolutes. And if science discovers this fact in the domain of its objects, the fact holds irrefutably for science, too. (1995, 485)

Social reflexivity likewise corrects the inadequacies of hermeneutics that use “understanding to fit whatever into an encompassing nexus.” Luhmann maintains:

Only by social reflexivity, only in experiencing the experiences and actions of other systems, does the specific form of meaning processing called ‘understanding’ come into consideration. The grasp of meaning is not in itself understating in this rigorous sense. Instead, understanding happens only if one projects the experience of meaning or of meaningful action onto other systems with a system/environment difference of their own. Only with the help of the system/environment difference can one transform experience into understanding, and only if one also takes into consideration that the other systems and their environments themselves make meaningful distinctions. (1995, 72)

Luhmann’s distrust of foundational hermeneutics is shared by Ricoeur, who sought to recover hermeneutics from what he describes as the identification, central in Dilthey, between understanding and understanding
others, as though it were always first a matter of apprehending a foreign psychological life behind a text. What is to be understood in a narrative is not first of all the one who is speaking behind the text, but what is being talked about, the thing of the text, namely, the kind of world the work unfolds, as it were, before the text. (1991, 131)

For Ricoeur it is the mediating role of the productive imagination through language that “projects the experience of meaning or of meaningful action onto other systems.” (Luhmann, 1995, 72). Experience is transformed into understanding through language and the distinction between system/environment is—like Benedict Anderson nation—imagined.28 It is through language that the productive imagination is directed from the psyche to the world, from oneself to another. Ricoeur maintains that because language is creative—that is, productive—it reorients our ontological bearing:

it is a code to all the deep layers of my existence by a kind of contamination step by step of all the layers of psychic life. To these layers of depth correspond new kinds of relation to the world. ‘The poet speaks on the threshold of being’ (xii). Here expression creates being. Speaking of a new being in our language, this new being expresses us by making us what it expresses. To the extent that there is an ontology of the I, of the ego, this ontology is connected to a similar ontology of reality. (Ricoeur 2009, 3)

In the same way that the poet, “offers a mimesis, a creative imitation of human action” Ricoeur argues “a logic of possible narratives, to which a formal analysis of narrative codes may aspire, finds its completion in the mimetic function by which the narrative re-

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28. Mark Hamilton presents Benedict Anderson’s, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* as “a premier example of constructivist theorising by a comparativist” Anderson defines of ‘nation’ as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign … Anderson asserts that the sense of immortality largely ignored by Liberalism and Marxism – and once offered by religion and dynastic succession – is now imagined within the nation’s creation. Print-capitalism is the primary catalyst for transforming religious language, dynamic organisation, and time consciousness.”(2008, 72) The evolution of print-capitalism as a catalyst for transforming religious language, dynamic organization and time consciousness corresponds to the shift from core/periphery differentiation to functional differentiation. See Figure 5 Primary Mode of Systems Differentiation and Figure 6 Societal Horizon.
makes the human world of action.” (1991, 131). The capacity for language to create being, to “express us by making us what it expresses,” and the connection Ricoeur establishes between an ontology of the I and an ontology of reality is the receptive vessel that theological hermeneutics can use to receive Luhmann’s radical constructivist social systems theory.

Though central to Luhmann’s theory, language remains underdeveloped, which might explain Luhmann’s apparent disdain for hermeneutics:

After the critique of subjectivism, taken to its extreme, a ‘hermeneutic’ concept of meaning eventually establishes itself. It uses understanding to fit whatever into an encompassing nexus, just as text must be understood within a surrounding context. The ‘experience of meaninglessness’ could thereby be formulated as a failure of this fit, as an isolation of the particular, a dependence on the accidental. (1995b, 72)

If theology accepts that the social sciences have foregone absolutes and theology understands itself as a sacred science in the epistemic system of the academe, then theology must likewise forego absolutes. This is not to say that theology denuded of absolutes is silenced, but rather, it prioritizes the search for truth down the more “arduous route” of reflection through language (Ricoeur 1974, 11). Or, as Ricoeur notes, “it is first of all and always in language that all ontic or ontological understanding arrives at its expression” (1974, 11).

By recognizing religion as a necessary and critical functional subsystem of global society, Luhmann explicitly invites theology into a hermeneutical dialogue with the social sciences. The title to Kearney’s text On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva hints at the possible contours of this dialogue. Kearney notes that during his visits to Ricoeur’s home, he was inevitably struck by the collection of owls that adorned Ricoeur’s office and library. Ricoeur, Kearny observes

is in more ways than one, the living epitome of the Owl of Minerva – a thinker who has preferred the long route over the short cut. And has never
written an essay or book until he had first experienced and questioned deeply what it was he was writing about. He, like the Owl of Wisdom in Hegel’s famous example, only takes flight at dusk when he has fully attended to what transpired (as both action and suffering) during the long day’s journey. (2004, 9)

Luhmann, is likewise a living epitome of the Owl of Minerva taking flight only at dusk. This Owl of Minerva whom Luhmann encourages “to stop hooting in the corner and begin its flight into the night,” (1995, 60) observes society through the function, performance and reflection of the differentiated subsystems of global society. These subsystems—of which religion is one—have the instruments to observe each other, as they observe themselves. While their flight makes them metatheoretical, it is the oscillation between hetero-reference and self-reference that makes them self-reflexive. In the following chapters, we will continue our flight as we examine this practical contour of this hermeneutical dialogue between theology and the social sciences.
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I do?
3. What may I hope?

... The third question, namely: now provided I do what I ought, what may I then expect? is practical and theoretical at the same time, so that the practical, only as a clue, leads to the answer of the theoretical, and, if this ascends high, the speculative question. For all hoping leads to happiness, and is in respect of what is practical and the law of morality, precisely the same as knowing and- the law of nature in respect of the theoretical cognition of things. The first (hoping) terminates finally in the conclusion, that something is, (which determines the ultimate possible end); because something should happen: the latter (knowing), that something is (which acts as supreme cause), because something happens.

Immanuel Kant 1838, 605

CHAPTER 5: PRACTICAL CONTOURS OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

5.1 APOLOGIA FOR HOPE?

In the introduction I argued with Metz that the intention of theology may be defined as “an apology for hope … [despite] … the concrete historical-social situation” we find ourselves in (2007, 23). We will now turn more explicitly to the question such a practical-apologetic dimension of a fundamental theology foundational confronts us with. Robert McAfee Brown highlights the following four key questions first presented by Gustavo Gutierrez that must be faced by any theology attempting to engage in "critical reflection on praxis."

1. How are we to talk about a God who is revealed as love in a situation of oppression?
2. How are we to proclaim the God of Life to men and women who die prematurely and unjustly?
3. How are we to acknowledge that God makes us a free gift of love and justice when we have before us the suffering of the innocent?
4. What words are we to use in telling those who are not even regarded as persons that they are daughters and sons of God? (1990, 78)

At the core of these questions is a Kantian reflection on the consequences of radical evil
and the limits of pure reason. By dehumanizing the social sciences, Luhmann unintentionally shifts this question of radical evil from human agency to evolutionary forces beyond human control, leaving unresolved the question of human agency. As a descriptive theory, Luhmann’s theory is ill equipped to answer Kant’s final question—“For what may I hope?” The reflective function of the religious subsystem in global society, however, does leave room to consider these questions. Having assumed Luhmann’s theory we will now—with Ricoeur’s thematic of hope—take flight and make a reconnaissance of modern society and those who watch over it.

The task of theological hermeneutics in a functionally differentiated global society is to seek in religious language a “unique kind of reply to the confession of radical evil [that] mediates between the experience of radical evil and the promise of hope” (1995, 92). Human agency emerges from the mediation between the experience of radical evil and the promise of hope through the praxis of radical constructivism that makes hope real. The tension between the hoped for and the not yet realized, between the abstract, conceptual, and the real, presents a problematic the solution to which Ricoeur seeks in a “post-Hegelian return to Kant” (Ricoeur 1975, 36).29

Ricoeur’s initial reading of Kant—which he acknowledges as essentially correct—maintains that Kant “does not seem to give to religious ‘representations’ (Vorstellungen) an epistemic status distinct from that of ethical statements” (1975, 139). This narrowness denies any cognitive application of speculative theology and “makes the ‘postulates’ of

29. Ricoeur elaborates this post-Hegelian return to Kant in the 1992 article “Une herméneutique philosophique de la religion: Kant,” published in English as “A Philosophical Hermeneutics of Religion: Kant” (Ricoeur 1995, 75 ff)
faith existential propositions (propositions about existence), but their truth value depends
on the validity of the set of practical propositions which concern the a priori synthesis of
freedom and duty” (Ricoeur 1975). John van den Hengel summarizes this reading of Kant
as follows:

What I hope for—freedom and God—I must first despair of reaching and
grasping through knowledge. They are not objects of our knowing. Nor are
they realizable in practical reason. Morality will not provide the supreme
good or happiness. Happiness is not our achievement. It is a gift. I cannot to-
tally actualize my freedom. But if I cannot give myself freedom, I may hope
that it finds us. (2010)

Ricoeur argues that Kant’s representations of religion can only depict the triumph of
Good over Evil and “in this sense, they belong to what may be called the transcendental
imagination of hope, to the extent that they give a content to the third question that can be
raised by philosophy: What can we know? What must we do? What may we
hope?” (Ricoeur 1975, 139). The transcendental imagination of hope does not teach “people
to bear their suffering bravely because they ‘have a pie in the sky and heaven.’” To the
contrary the answer to Kant’s third question is immanently practical: “this hope is entirely
practical, in the sense that it concerns the historical conditions of the actualization of free-
dom” (Ricoeur 1975, 139). Consequently, as van den Hengel notes, “rational and specula-
tive theology, ‘onto-theology,’ must be rejected in the face of the transcendental illusion.
Accordingly, the God of metaphysics is dead as is the God as moral legislator, and the God
whose existence must be justified in the face of evil” (2010).

Kant’s denial of an epistemic content for religion leads Ricoeur to Hegel, where he
finds the synthesis of speculative claim of religion and the epistemological status of philos-
ophy:

In no other philosophy than Hegel’s philosophy of religion has the speculative claim of religion been more emphatically recognized. Religion and phi-
losophy are one and the same discourse of the ‘absolute spirit,’ beyond that of ‘subjective spirit’ (individual consciousness) and that of ‘objective spirit’ (cultural, ethical, and political achievements of the Volksgeist). Religion and philosophy say the same thing, because both express the return of the Spirit to itself as self-consciousness. (Ricoeur 1975, 140)

Ricoeur would later temper his embrace of Hegel, arguing that

religion, owing to its historical, ‘positive’ character, constitutes something specifically outside philosophy, an otherness that philosophy can take into account only as lying at its margin, at its boundaries, and, if I may put it this way, at the inner edge of the line that divides the ahistorical transcendental realm and the historical religious realm. Philosophical reflection will retain from this particular historical genre only what harmonizes with the transcendental realm at the price of a rationalizing reinterpretation of the contents of the representation of belief, and the structuring intentions of the institution of religion. (1995, 75)

Ricoeur distinguishes between Kant’s critical philosophy which limits inquiry to that which can be reasoned alone, represented by the first quotation above, and a philosophical hermeneutic of hope which extends hope beyond the limits of reason, represented by the latter quotation. The narrowness found in the first reading of Kant is due to the absence of a philosophy of the religious imagination, “or, let us say, of the mythopoeic function of the imagination” (Ricoeur 1995, 87). Ricoeur’s post-Hegelian return to Kant looks to religion not to comprehend “how it is possible for a naturally evil man to make himself a good man,” but to show how this change in disposition is operational. Van den Hengel describes Ricoeur’s presentation of the situation of religion as one “grounded in radical evil” out of which hope emerges. For Ricoeur, van den Hengel argues,

there is a radical incapacity, which faces the desire and effort to be. This radical incapacity displays not only the limits of reason and language in the face of evil; it also shows the finitude of practical reason in ethics or politics. In the words of Ricoeur, ‘Evil makes of freedom an impossible possibility. In spite of the fact that evil proceeds from our freedom, it is no longer within our power to change the maxims of our actions, we cannot change the nature of our freedom. Here we reach the bottom of the abyss.’ Religion emerges as a hope for completion and fulfillment. Religion is the expression of the asymmetry in favour of the good. (van den Hengel, 2010)
Religion imagines hope. Ricoeur reorients imagination away from an interiorized image of a reproductive referent to an exteriorized representation of a productive referent mediated through language (See §7.2). This exteriorized productive referent gives content to the third Kantian question of philosophy. It is the practicality of this “transcendental imagination of hope” which distinguishes Ricoeur from Hegel and neo-Kantians alike, prompting Ricoeur to identify himself as a “post-Hegelian Kantian” and champion a philosophical hermeneutic of hope (Ricoeur 1975, 142).

5.2 PRAXIS OF HOPE?

Practical reason, Ricoeur argues, may not need religion to provide a model for how to be an exemplary person, but it does need religious symbolism “to designate the mediation between the confession of radical evil and the confidence in the triumph of the good principle. The Christ figure represents more than a mere hero of duty and less than an actual kenosis of the absolute self; within the strict limits of the theory of analogy, it represents a genuine schematism of hope” (1995, 85). While social systems theory is abstract, the practical consideration of radical constructivism is not. Globalization is not just a theoretical construct but also a practical one. Similarly—Luhmann’s de-humanization of the social through communication may not need religion to provide a model for how to be an exemplary person, but it does need religious symbolism and more importantly, its interpretation to designate the mediation between “the realization [that] reality is not only a possible way of relating to reality, but that reality basically consists of its own realization” (Moeller 2006, 168). Luhmann’s radical constructivism and his search for a path through the impasse of the indeterminacy of double contingency leads him to Kant, prompting some commentators to characterize Luhmann’s sociology as philosophical sociology (See Knodt
At the core of Luhmann’s investigation into the indeterminacy of double contingency is an encounter with Kant’s question of the possibility of cognition (Moeller 2006, 167). Luhmann’s critique of the indeterminacy of Parsonsian double contingency questions the possibility of ego to understand the alter, or vice versa. In his last major text, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (The Society of Society, 1997), Luhmann maintains that, in contrast to Parsons’ operational openness, “Kant’s question about the conditions for the possibility of cognition remains. But the answer is now: operational closure; and thus the focus of research shifts from the conditions of possibility to the possibilities of conditioning in increasingly complex relations” (In Moeller, 167).

Moeller presents the following quotation as Luhmann’s most succinct treatment of the Kantian questions:

The tradition of epistemological idealism was about the question of the unity within the difference of cognition and the real object. The question was: how can cognition take notice of an object outside of itself; or, how can it realize that something exists independently of it while anything which it realizes already presupposes cognition and cannot be realized by cognition independently of cognition (this would be a self-contradiction)? No matter if one preferred solutions of transcendental theory or dialectics, the problem was: how is cognition possible in spite of having no independent access to reality outside of it. Radical constructivism, however, begins with the empirical assertion: Cognition is only possible because it has no access to the reality external to it. A brain, for instance, can only produce information because it is coded indifferently in regard to its environment, i.e. it operates enclosed within the recursive network of its own operations. Similarly, one would have to say: Communication systems (social systems) are only able to produce information because the environment does not interrupt them. And following all this, the same should be self-evident with respect to the classical ‘seat’ (subject) of epistemology: to consciousness. (In Moeller 2006, 242)

Luhmann’s social systems theory is epistemologically rooted in the Kantian question: How cognition is possible given the indeterminacy of double contingency in the encounter between ego and alter? (See above §4.2) In keeping with his dehumanizing project, Luhmann
radicalizes Kant’s cognitive idealism. For Kant, cognition and the structures of cognition are primarily functions of consciousness, which constructs reality. Luhmann expands this understanding of cognition beyond the confines of human-the-psychic with the assumption that “the realization of reality is not only a possible way of relating to reality, but that reality basically consists of its own realization” (Moeller 2006, 168).

Moeller cautions against assuming that Luhmann’s radical constructivism follows the Hegelian understanding of the self-realization of a larger consciousness. For Luhmann, cognition cannot be reduced to a specific ‘essence’ but operates in a variety of modes, depending on the constituted cognitive system. For a biological system, cognition operates materially; for a social system, cognition operates communicatively; and for a psychic system, cognition operates mentally. Moeller observes:

Cognition is based on the establishment of this difference—it does not happen in spite of this difference, but because of it. There is no ‘ontological’ necessity of cognition, but if it is there, and it obviously is, it depends on the differentiation of a cognizing system. . . . Cells, minds, and social systems are all observing systems and are thus systems that construct themselves and their realization of reality by their own cognition. They are able to establish themselves as self-referential, operational sequences of their own kind. (2006, 169)

Moeller concludes that Luhmann’s ‘radicalized cognitive constructivism’ differs from Kant’s ‘constructivism light’ as follows:

Cognition is not per se an act of consciousness. It can take on any operational mode. There is no a priori, transcendental structure of cognition; cognition constructs itself on the basis of ‘operational closure’ and this is an ‘empirical’ process which varies from system to system. No complete description of cognitive structures is possible because these structures are continuously

30 Ricoeur implicitly recognizes these distinctions in his typology of the productive imagination. Ricoeur demarcates the productive imagination into the domains of: 1) the socio-cultural imagination; 2) the poetic imagination; 3) the epistemological imagination; 4) the religious imagination. See below 161.
evolving. Reality is not singular—there is not one specific reality, but a complex multiplicity of system/environment constellations. A description of reality is itself a contingent construction within a system/environment relation (2006, 170ff).

Luhmann’s replacement of the subject/object distinction with the system/environment distinction transfers self-reference from the subject to the observing system. It is here that Luhmann departs from Kant and turns to Husserl for a phenomenological framework with which to integrate his ideas.

Luhmann recognizes Husserl’s philosophical interest not as being rooted in signs, but in references to all meaning—or more accurately, sense making—of the world, in “what consciousness performs within itself for itself” (Luhmann 1995, 146). Luhmann is critical of Husserl’s understanding of communication rooted in inter-subjectivity without an external referent against which to judge; as a result, Luhmann rejects Husserl’s concept of the ‘transcendental subject.’ This concept, argues Luhmann, “exclusively uses the system reference of the psychic system, and it tries to compensate for this one-sidedness through a transcendental theoretical enhancing of the psychic system” 1995, 146).

Communication, Luhmann argues, is not consciousness nor can it carry bits of consciousness (2002, 156-157). Replacing the subject with a semiology based on difference is equally untenable. The weakness in applying either approach to the social sciences is that both approaches share an insufficient understanding of communication. With Luhmann’s variation of double contingency, the assumptions that guide self-perception are communicated in the encounter between alter and ego based on conditioned responses to previous encounters (horizons). Variation and chance are incorporated into a system by self-perception as further experience and therefore choices for responses in future encounters (expanding horizons). Every selection is contingent, creating a temporal succession “so that
the selections can reciprocally determine one another, leaping ahead and reverting to what, from their respective temporal positions, is the future and what is the past. Both these together—namely, contingency and time—constitute the basis of the binding” (Luhmann 1995, 125).

What Luhmann here identifies as constituting the basis of the binding he elsewhere defines as language. Language “uses symbolic generalization to replace, to represent, or to put together perceptions and to solve the resulting problems of mutual comprehension. In other words, language specializes in creating the impression of mutual understanding as the basis for further communication, however fragile the ground for that impression may be” (1990, 90) Both Luhmann and Ricoeur recognize a fundamental claim to universality rooted in consciousness exteriorized through language, which Luhmann terms, the capacity to form episodes. (1995, 273). It is this “capacity to form episodes,” that Luhmann argues, “transfers social complexity into psychic complexity.” (1974, 48).

While understated in Luhmann’s theory, the treatment of precisely how language transfers social complexity into psychic complexity or vice versa and develops the capacity to form episodes is central to Ricoeur’s investigations into language and its interpretation. Language, Ricoeur argues, explains understanding, and through explanation makes praxis possible.

This leads the van den Hengel to ask, what then is understanding? Van den Hengel argues that for Ricoeur, understanding was the human mode of existence. The uniqueness of humans, according to Ricoeur, is that we ‘are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we orient ourselves comprehensively in those situations.’ Understanding is the human way of being in the world. It orients them to shape the world as a dwelling for humans. In other words, humans are identified by understanding; they are a self, constituted by understanding. Now understanding is not first of all a theoretical practice. It is
Ricoeur develops this practical understanding, “the human way of being in the world,” by digging “beneath the epistemological enterprise itself to uncover its properly ontological conditions” (Ricoeur 1981, 53). Ricoeur arrives at this “properly ontological condition” through two related movements. The first movement is the two-fold inversion suggested by Heidegger in *Time and Being*. In Heidegger, the first inversion subsumes the epistemological aspirations of the human sciences with a concern for the primordial ontological condition of understanding. The second inversion de-psychologizes hermeneutics by reorienting Being from the existentialist’s relation of being-*with* to an ontological situation of being-*in-the-world*. This first movement of two-fold inversion of the ontological condition of understanding is followed by the second movement of a return to epistemological claims through Gadamer’s synthesis of the hermeneutics of Schleimacher and Dilthey.

Heidegger’s two-fold inversion is of interest to Ricoeur because it asks what “is the question of the *meaning* of being” (Ricoeur 1981, 54). *Dasein* (Being) is not an existential state, but rather, an ontological state of *being-there that we are*. Being is irreducible and ontologically hermeneutical and precedes any question of subject/object split (Stiver 2001, 38). *Dasein*, Ricoeur argues, “is not a subject for which there is an object, but is rather a being within a being. *Dasein* designates a *place* where the question of being arises, the place of manifestation; the centrality of *Dasein* is simply that of a being that understands being” (1981, 54).

This inversion of *Dasein* creates an opposition between the epistemological grounding of the human sciences and the ontological foundations of a philosophical and theological hermeneutic. What is at stake, argues Ricoeur, “is the explication of those beings with regard to their basic state of being. This explication will add nothing to the methodology of
the human sciences; rather it will dig beneath this methodology in order to lay bare its foundations” (1981, 55). Heidegger’s hermeneutics reflects on the primordial ontological grounds for understanding upon which the epistemological foundation of the human sciences is conceived and is thus “called ‘hermeneutical’ only in a derivative sense: the methodology of the human sciences” (Ricoeur 1981, 55).

According to Ricoeur, this first inversion from epistemology to ontology is followed by a second inversion where the question of being-in-the-world is a necessary precondition to the existential question of being-with-another. If Dasein, as Ricoeur argues, “designates a place where the question of being arises, the place of manifestation;” then understanding is not found in relations between beings, a la Dilthey, but through being-in-the-world. This variant reading of Dasein, Ricoeur argues, is “completely misunderstood” by existentialist interpretations of Heidegger. The “refined existentialist psychology” of being-towards-death or other “uncommon states of mind” does not comprehend or sufficiently recognize “that these analyses are part of a meditation on the worldliness of the world, and that they seek essentially to shatter the pretension of the knowing subject to set itself up as the measure of objectivity” (Ricoeur 1981, 56). Ricoeur questions the authenticity of this pretension, noting that “if there is a region of being where inauthenticity reigns, it is indeed in the relation of each person with every other; hence the chapter on being-with is a debate with the ‘one,’ as the centre and privileged place of dissimulation” (55). The “being-with another who would duplicate our subjectivity” and the “capacity to transpose oneself into the mental life of others” runs aground against the unknown of the ”other” and myself.

Ricoeur’s objection to an existentialist reading of Dasein provides a critical response to similar objections raised by the black intellectual, Franz Fanon. In his first book,
Black Skins, White Masks, Fanon presents the compelling argument that ontological investigations in situations of oppression are derailed by circumstances of, (in Fanon’s experience), being black in a world defined by “white.” Most famously, Franz Fanon argues that much of the debate over “otherness” and the relation between subject and object ignores the question of “race:”

As long as the black man remains on his home territory, except for petty internal quarrels, he will not have to experience his being for others. There is in fact a ‘being for other’ as described by Hegel but any ontology is made impossible, in colonized and acculturized society. Apparently, those who have written on the subject have not taken this sufficiently into consideration. In the weltanschauung of colonized people, there is an impurity, or a flaw that prohibits any ontological explanation. Perhaps it could be argued that this is true for any individual but such an argument would be concealing the basic problem. Ontology does not allow us to understand the being of the black man, since it ignores the lived experience. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. (Fanon 1967, 89-90)

Fanon makes explicit what is implicit in Ricoeur’s critique of an existential reading of Dasein. Dasein as being-in-the-world does not ignore the lived experience of the oppressed; rather, it gives priority to, without succumbing to, the alienation inherent in the situation of being-in-the-world.

For Ricoeur, understanding arises out of this power-to-be, not in a linguistic or literary form, but rather as an orientation to a situation. Ricoeur argues this is the first function of understanding: “So understanding is not concerned with grasping a fact but with apprehending a possibility of being. . . . To understand a text, we shall say, is not to find a lifeless sense which is contained therein, but to unfold the possibility of being indicated by the text” (Ricoeur and Thompson 1981, 51). Understanding, then, is a projection emerging from the situation of being-in-the-world, or as Ricoeur puts it, “a projection within a prior being-thrown” (51). Interpretation or the exegesis of a text emerges as a third position
following the exegeses of things, forming the triad situation/understanding/interpretation. This third position adds nothing new to a text but allows what is already there to emerge. Interpretation manifests meaning “as a development of understanding which ‘does not transform it into something else, but makes it become itself’” (Heidegger, quoted in Ricoeur 1981, 57).

Being-in-the-world precedes understanding and anchors the whole linguistic system, “including books and texts... which is not primordially a phenomenon of articulation in discourse” (Ricoeur 1981, 55). Being-in-the-world requires that we first find ourselves and feel for ourselves before orienting ourselves to understanding. Rather than exploiting fear, anguish, and alienation in the “one” who exists, Ricoeur recasts these feelings as revelatory experiences that disclose our link to “a reality more fundamental than the subject-object relation. In knowledge we posit objects in front of us; but our feelings of the situation precede this vis-à-vis by placing us in the world” (Ricoeur 1981, 56). This placing in the world, this ontological a priori is the place from where we hope. As van den Hengel notes, this ontological priority of being thrown into the world “is first of all practical. Its task is to give shape to a possible world in which we might live. Understood as understanding, human existence is a project for human action, a creative mimesis” (2010).

Dasein “designates a place where the question of being arises, the place of manifestation.” But, as shall be seen below, the “place” from where the question of being arises is projected from a suspension of place. It is from this epoché that the social imagination is conscious of being-in-the-world. Viera Pinto, describes this place of being-in-the-world as the essence of consciousness.

The essence of consciousness is being with the world, and this behaviour is permanent and unavoidable. Accordingly consciousness is in essence a ‘way towards’ something apart from itself outside itself, which surrounds it and
which it apprehends by means of its ideational capacity. Consciousness is thus by definition a method, in the most general sense of the word. (56)\textsuperscript{31}

The pedagogy of the wretched of the earth is a process of consciousness-raising. We cannot stop with the ontological condition of being-in-the-world; our attention to the lived experiences of suffering and despair is only part of the journey. The journey is completed through the epochê of despair where being can be imagined beyond suffering and oppression, where an ontology of alienation gives way to an ontology of hope.

To arrive at this epochê from where hope is projected we need to realize with Ras Da Silva that “this place is not for me,” and to come to this realization we “have to know where [we] are, where [we] come from and where [we] are going” (Hales 2000). In §1.3, §2.1, §2.2, §2.3, and §2.4, I have in part shown where we come from. The Eurocentric worldview discussed in section §1.3.3 plagues much of the analysis and descriptive writing that surrounds globalization. Mendieta notes that this restricts the available critiques of globalization to two options: “euphoric celebration, or cynical rejection. The possibility for radical critique is undermined by the ineluctability with which the process is thought to have developed” (2001, 48). To overcome the impoverishment of the Eurocentric theoretical perspective, Mendieta recommends shifting our gaze toward theories of globalization that are self-reflexive and truly global. This approach, Mendieta suggests, “tries to think its object and subject at the same time” (50).

\textsuperscript{31}While the translation of the Portuguese word con is “with,” the semantic sense of the phrase is closer in meaning to “being-in-the-world” than “being-with-the-world.” “With” as used here is not indicating a relationship with another but rather, a “meditation on the worldliness of the world,” which Ricoeur reads as “being-in-the-world.” Consciousness is not located in a relation between an ego and alter but rather, is “something apart from itself. This more closely corresponds to a definition of “with” in reference to an abstract thing as “to be with, to accompany, attend.’ Also in reference to God, combining the ideas of presence or companionship and favour, assistance, or the like” (“with, prep., adv., and conj.”(OED Online 2010).
5.3 Epoché of Hope?

Mendieta identifies Luhmann’s theory of social systems as a theory that by including itself in its observation is self-reflexive and truly global. Self-referential systems, Luhmann argues,

select their own histories and futures; they build up their own chains of causation. A (sociological) observer cannot predict or explain the futures and histories of self-referential communication systems since autopoiesis and contingency mean that such systems themselves decide whether and how they are to be continued or terminated, how they draw systemic boundaries, [and] what types of self-descriptions they select. (1988, 24)

Mendieta concludes that as a consequence of this self-reflexivity, society can no longer conceive of itself as an aggregation of somewhat interrelated parts and elements such as humans, selves, societies, cultures, and so forth. Were this to be the goal, the self-description and self-observation of society would become paradoxical and incomprehensible. Consequently, to think globalization requires that we think the unity of society in different terms. In fact, we must think society anew. (2001, 51)

Theology is an academic discipline that encounters globalization both as a detached observer and as a participant in that which it observes. Luhmann’s theory of social systems is a conscientious attempt to “think society anew” that recognizes religious systems and theologians as contributors to the process of this self-observation. Stephan Fuchs characterizes Luhmann’s theory as the only general social theory that can claim to introduce a new paradigm to the field. Utilization of research traditions external to particular scientific disciplines always impedes the recognition and eventually the adaptation of innovative paradigms. But if accepted, Luhmann’s proposal will radically change the conventional ways of doing social theory. (Luhmann and Fuchs 1988, 21)

Since Luhmann’s theory is grounded in the role of cognition to perceive the world, it rejects all the prevailing sociological theories that attempt to account for the presence of social order as a result of the selection of action between one or more individuals. The social “is not a special case of action; instead action is constituted in social systems by
means of communication and attribution as a reduction of complexity, and an indispensable self-simplification of the system” (Luhmann 1984, 137-138).

The self-simplification of systems, communicated through irreducible binary codes, make sense of the internal complexity of autopoietic, self-referential systems. Global society’s shift to functionally differentiation as the primary method of differentiation requires a “rephrasing [of] the problem [by] replacing the humanistic approach and it’s affectionately social concern by the question: what does it mean and how is it possible that a system can change its dominant form of internal differentiation?” (Luhmann 1997, 70). More than the “utilization of research traditions external to particular scientific discipline,” Luhmann’s “turn to communication” is a fundamental shift in the basic epistemological assumptions of the social sciences. System formation is evolutionary and ultimately unpredictable because whereas a system can be observed from the outside, any changes to the system can only come from the inside. Or, as Luhmann argues, “neither distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ nor the distinction between ‘experience’ and ‘action’ can be used to ground a being outside of society. We are therefore dependent on the concept of society. We must begin with its analysis” (Luhmann 1984, 4).

Theology need not accept Luhmann’s concept of society without reservation nor wait for Luhmann's proposal to be accepted as a grand theory of everything. If in Luhmann’s way of doing social theory, theology finds affinities that advance theological reflection, then theology need not shy away from the complexity of the theory. This place of meaningful being-in-the-world is the ontological a priori that Ricoeur identifies as the place from where we hope and that Luhmann describes as the global expansion of functionally differentiated society which theology encounters as globalization.

The revised schema of the religious subsystem represents the schematization of re-
ligious language. Proclamation recognizes both those religious traditions where the manifestation is proclaimed in through dogma and scripture and traditions and where the manifestation is proclaimed through ritual and action. As stated in Chapter 3, Ricoeur cautions against viewing the rupture between a phenomenology of the sacred (manifestation) and a hermeneutic of religious language (proclamation) as total. It is religious language that maintains the tension between manifestation and proclamation.

For specifically historical manifestation of revelation, such as Christianity, what becomes critical is the process through which religious language is re-employed in the text which is ‘word made flesh.’ For both Christianity and Rastafari the historically contingent circumstances of God’s incarnation are proclaimed through a historic event. For specifically historical manifestations of the sacred, Ricoeur’s phenomenology of the three-fold enactment of traditionality/traditions/Tradition is critical in opening our horizons to the past, crossing the gulf between our-being-affected-by the past and making us heirs to the past and our encounter with truth revealed in dialogue between the past and the present. But this distinction can be taken further still through an exploration Ricoeur’s reconfiguration of the productive imagination as central to the reciprocity of intention and recognition at practice in successful communication. The mediating role of a hermeneutic of the productive imagination is the capacity of the ‘imagination’ to, in a Ricoeurian sense, propose a world, or in a Luhmannian sense, construct reality.

It is the productive imagination that mediates the bidirectional transfer of social complexity to psychic complexity and develops the capacity for the productive referent of language to form episodes. Whereas Luhmann confines the ego to psychic systems, Ricoeur eclipses the ego through a sympathetic reading of alienating distanciation mediated by language. Ricoeur’s long route of interpretation and Luhmann’s deontologised ‘person’
rejects the prevailing humanist ontology of Being-in-relation in favour of a hermeneutic where the meaning of Being is “mediated through an endless process of interpretations—cultural, religious, political, historical and scientific.” (Kearney 2004, 1) Interpretation “explodes the confines of the timeless reflective subject and discloses us as language-using beings in a world with others” (Kearney 2004, 4)

Ricoeur’s analysis of the productive imagination’s capacity to project an epoché of hope breaks the pure circle of self-referential determination despised by Luhmann. The nexus of social systems theory and phenomenological hermeneutics is the space where the global subsystem of religion’s productive imagination encounters the self-reflexivity of the global expansion of functional differentiation. Bringing these theories together bridges the gap between the psychic system and the social system by revealing that while communication is closed and recursive, the apprehension of meaning, which is open; is a function of the productive imagination. In the following chapter we will examine how Ricoeur’s phenomenology of the three-fold enactment of traditionality/traditions/Tradition when combined with interpretation, liberates tradition from the immutable past crossing the gulf between our-being-affected-by and heirs to the past and our reception of the inheritance of truth revealed in the dialogue between the past and the present.
The phenomenon of meaning appears as a surplus of references to other possibilities of experience and action. Something stands in the focal point, at the centre of intention. And all else is indicated marginally as the horizon of an ‘and so forth’ of experience and action. In this form, everything that is intended holds open to itself the world as a whole, thus guaranteeing the actuality of the world in the form of accessibility. Reference actualizes itself as the standpoint for reality.
Niklas Luhmann 1995, 60.

CHAPTER 6: HEREMENEUTICAL CONTOURS OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

6.1 RELIGION IN A TEMPORAL CONTEXT:

Richard Kearney argues that the ultimate agenda of Ricoeur’s philosophical work is the exploration of a poetic hermeneutic of imagination. Ricoeur’s hermeneutic discussion of the function of imagination in Kearney’s own words “represents the most powerful reorientation of a phenomenology of imagining towards a hermeneutic of imagining” (Kearny 2004, 37) Kearny readily admits the episodic nature of these investigations, but maintains that this reorientation is Ricoeur’s ultimate hermeneutic project. In the following section, we will consider tradition in anticipation of our consideration of imagination in the following chapter. We will enter this hermeneutic circle at the point of tradition because whereas the hermeneutic of imagination is the agenda of Ricoeur’s philosophical project, tradition is the cornerstone that anchors this project in historical contingency.

To begin it is important to note that Ricoeur’s understanding of ‘historical contingency’ is grounded in a two-fold understanding of historicity. Since “semantic regulation proceeds from the excess of potential meaning over its use and function inside the given synchronic systems that the hidden time of symbols can carry the two-fold historicity” (Ricoeur 2010, 2). This two-fold historicity, Ricoeur continues, consists “of tradition, which transmits and sediments the interpretation, and of interpretation, which maintains
and renews the tradition.” (49)

Ricoeur’s encounter with tradition begins with the rejection of any claim to a ‘totalizing mediation’ of history in the form of Absolute Knowledge. Along with the rejection of any form of absolute knowledge, Ricoeur rejects the pretension that the self-understanding of historical consciousness is unaffected by events. On the contrary, Ricoeur argues:

to admit that the self-understanding of the historical consciousness can be so affected by events that, to repeat, we cannot say whether we produced them or they simply happened, is to admit the finitude of the philosophical act that makes up the self-understanding of the historical consciousness.

In contrast to finitude, Ricoeur proposes an “open-ended, incomplete, imperfect mediation, namely, the network of interweaving perspectives of the expectation of the future, the reception of the past, and the experience of the present with no Aufhebung into a totality where reason in history and reality would coincide” (Ricoeur, Blamey, and Pellauer 1988, 207). Rather than viewing tradition as a fait accompli, Ricoeur reconfigures tradition as “an ongoing dialectic between (a) our being-affected-by-the-past and (b) our imaginative projection of history-yet-to-be-made (la visee de l’histoire a faire)” (Kearney 2004, 60).

In the case of the former, history is not something that ‘happened back then,’ but is something back then that affects us now. In the case of the latter, our expectation of the future is the world we hope for, a projected utopia. For this utopia to become real, our expectations must be realistic and therefore grounded in the ‘field of experience,’ including our experience of the past and our experience of the present. Intermediary projects in the realm of social action bring our hope for a better world closer to reality.

This is an approach to history shared by Rastafari. Rastafari does not view historical events as something that ‘happened back then.’ History for Rastafari is continually relived in the day-to-day lives of people. For some Rastas this, has led to a belief in quasi-
reincarnation, as expressed by a Rasta who queried me about my interest in Rastafari and my continual return to Jamaica. Ras Daniel, a student at the University of West Indies reasoned that I must have been a benevolent overseer during slavery and my interest in Rastafari and Jamaica is an effort to atone for the sins I committed in this past life as an oppressor. (Hales, 2000)

Rastafari elder Mortimo Planno poetically describes the Rastafari approach to history as ‘Echoes of the Memories’ that links the tribulations of slavery as a memory that reverberates in “the minds of the yet unborn.” Planno invites the reader of his text, The Earth’s Most Strangest Man: The Rastafarian, to

Approach

The Echoes of the Memories of Slavery resounded in the minds of the yet unborn of those who passes through the tribulation of Slavery Truth can only be identified by Truth. So I approach the Haunting Memories of Slavery! I may caution here that I believe, that Education should be a Right and not a privilege, yet I Education is limited as the Colonial System Represent. There is an old saying. “They have to fool mi to Rule mi” The British has completely fool our ancestors to Rule them. But we are made products of our own produce, by our acceptance of their Political System. Here is where I am trying to paint a picture that can be seen by even the Color Blind. The British I an I Slavemaster write various conflicting Histories on African Slavery, lies, lies, lies, most of the Truth of African Slavery has been written in other foreign languages but not the British. I an I firmly know that Ruler's were not made But were Born. In as, Men made Rulers days are numbered. But He who Born to Be Earth Rightful Ruler, will have to Rule or esle the turn and overturn will never stop until who'se Right He will get it. (Planno, 1ff).

Rastafari’s approach to history seeks to correct the distortions of the past, reveal the oppression of the present and project the hope for liberation through repatriation in the future. This view of history conforms with Ricoeur’s challenge to rediscover tradition not as something that is dead and consigned forever to the past, but rather as a living tradition, as “an ongoing history, thereby re-animating it’s still unaccomplished potentialities.” (Kearny, 2004, 61.) Ricoeur proposes a critical reinterpretation of tradition that respects historical
continuity and discontinuity, mediating between our being-affected-by-the-past and our imaginative projection of history-yet-to-be-made—a reinterpretation shared by Rastafari hermeneutics.

Ricoeur distinguishes between three different categories of historical memory: traditionality, traditions, and Tradition. Ricoeur’s three-fold investigation of traditionality/traditions/Tradition illustrates the mediation of myth and the claim to universality. Ricoeur’s poetic hermeneutic of imagination reinterprets “cultural heritages received from the past and the interest in the futuristic projections of a liberated humanity.” (Ricoeur, 1981, 100)

6.1.1 Traditionality

The first category Ricoeur develops is traditionality. Traditionality is the dialectic between sedimentation and innovation. Kearney argues that in the third volume of *Time and Narrative* Ricoeur extends the range of traditionality to include the general sense of a formal style that communicates the heritages of the past.32 This precondition for communicating actual historical meaning is a “temporalizing of history by means of a dialectic between the effects of history upon us (which we passively suffer) and our response to history (which we actively operate)”. (Kearney, 2004, 62) In doing so, the past is made available as a horizon with which our present affected experience fuses. The past, Kearney writes, is thus opened up as a historical horizon, which is at once detached from our contemporary

32. While Ricoeur and Kearney uses the descriptor, ‘transmission’ to indicate this passing, I have chosen to heed Ricoeur’s admonishment of decentring the thinking subject, and have chosen Luhmann’s term ‘communicates’ as, despite Ricoeur’s qualification below, transmission still implies a ‘sender’ and a ‘receiver.’ This creates a window for the ‘thinking subject’ to quietly re-enter the circle.
horizon and included in it. (Kearney, 2004, 62) Kearney continues, quoting Ricoeur:

> It is in projecting an historical horizon that we experience, through its tension with the horizon of the present, the efficacy of the past, for which our being-affected by it is the correlate. Effective-history, we might say, is what takes place without us. The fusion of horizons is what we attempt to bring about. Here the work of history and the work of the historian mutually assist each other. (62).

According to Ricoeur, traditionality is not an inert deposit, but it “signifies that the temporal distance separating us from the past is not a dead interval but a transmission [communication] that is generative of meaning… tradition is an operation that can only make sense dialectically through the exchange between the interpreted past and the interpreting present.” (Ricoeur, 1988, 221)

Traditionality is analogous to the “Echoes of the Memories,” in the above excerpt. Planno begins his presentation of ‘The Rastafarian’ by recounting the tribulation and suffering of slavery: “The Echoes of the Memories of Slavery resounded in the minds of the yet unborn of those who passes through the tribulation of Slavery Truth can only be identified by Truth. So I approach the Haunting Memories of Slavery!” This description of slavery experienced as echoes of memories is analogous to Ricoeur’s understanding of Traditionality as something that is a “transmission [communication] that is generative of meaning… tradition is an operation that can only make sense dialectically through the exchange between the interpreted past and the interpreting present.” (Ricoeur, 1988, 221)

The distance between ‘then’ and ‘now’ is expressed in terms of ‘echoes’ and ‘memories,’ which suggests a chain of indirect communication experienced not as direct memory, but as the reverberation of memories. As we shall see below, these memories are not interior perceptions of an inaccessible imagination, but are bound images of the productive imagination (see §6.2). This chain of indirect communication is the material apprehension of the
legacy of slavery and oppression. Traditionality, then, is a formal conceptualization of time and space between then and now; a space crossed by ‘traditions’, which corresponds with Planno’s echoes of the memories.

6.1.2 Traditions

The next category Ricoeur develops is traditions. Whereas traditionality is conceived as a formal concept, and is therefore somewhat abstract, traditions is the material content of traditionality. (Kearney, 2004, 63) Traditions mark the transition between form and content that is necessitated by act of interpretation. The essential characteristic of this transition is the situation of being heirs to the past. “The notion of tradition, taken in the sense of traditions, signifies that we are never in a position of being absolute innovators, but rather are always first of all in the situation of being heirs.” (Ricoeur, 1988, 221) This situation of being heirs, is a result of “the language-like [langariere] structure of communication in general and of the transmission of past contents in particular.” (Ricoeur, 1988, 221) Experience is only manifest as traditions when it is proclaimed. Ricoeur likens transmission to the passing of time; “trans-mission’ (translated into the German Überlieferung) is a good way of expressing this dialectic internal to experience. The temporal style that it designates is that of time traversed.” (Ricoeur, 1988, 220) Transmission is the dialectic between “the efficacy of the past that we undergo and the reception of the past that we bring about.” (Ricoeur, 220) The communication of traditions, which is essentially linguistic, includes not only the ‘natural languages’ “but things already said, understood and received.” (Ricoeur, 220) In this sense, traditions form a symbiotic relation with communication, as far as the things already said, understood, and received are communicated ‘along the chains of interpretation and reinterpretation.” (Ricoeur, 1988, 221)
Ricoeur is careful to note that his reliance on texts does not invalidate oral traditions, but merely recognizes that, “Without... neglecting the oral tradition, the efficacy of the historical past can be said to coincide in large part with that of texts from the past.” (Ricoeur 1988, 222) It might be added that many of the world’s oral traditions are being gathered in recordings and texts so these traditions can be communicated to future generations. Ricoeur understanding of tradition:

As soon as one takes traditions to refer to those things said in the past and transmitted [communicated] to us through a chain of interpretations and re-interpretations, we must add a material dialectic of contents to the formal dialectic of temporal distance [that is, traditionality]. The past puts us into question before we put it into question. In this struggle for the recognition of meaning, the text and the reader are each in their turn familiarized and defamiliarized. (Ricoeur 1988, 3:222)

Communication that is generative of meaning is metaphorically described by Planno as the ‘Echoes of Memories’ that is communicated through the minds of the unborn. This reference to the yet unborn indicates a chain of communication from the time of slavery to the present. Elsewhere in the text, Planno describes this chain in the context of colonization as the passing of truth from the old to the young; “The old man who has the knowledge of the true History of Slavery and Colonialism, pass down to his Son the Truth. His Son in turn Seek to find the method of approaching this Colonization.” (Planno 2006, 55). Planno links this oral approach to the communication of ‘Traditions,’ with a systematic search for truth through education arguing that the method of approaching this truth “is in education. Thats

33. It is interesting to note that current research into the origins of written language reveals that whereas oral language is instinctive and wired into the neurological structure of the brain, written language is not and needs to be learned. Written language involves both visual and auditory parts of the brain and is therefore not analogous with spoken language. It is in this respect that oral tradition is not neglected and that the effectively of the historical past can be said to coincide not only with the texts from the past, but also with the development of written language. (Wolf and Kennedy 2003)
why these Schools and University Revolutionary demand is so much felt because the cry is Dissatisfaction of so much things” (Planno, 55). Ricoeur’s three-fold analysis of Tradicionality/traditions/Tradition saves the question of ‘truth’ for the last category- Tradition. Ricoeur does this to give the things said and the formal dialectic of temporal distances the space needed to question before we have a chance to impose truth on the past. The material dialectic that recognizes the truth of the past through the chain of interpretations and reinterpretations is what Ricoeur calls “Tradition” which he capitalizes to distinguish it from ‘traditions’.

6.1.3 Tradition

Ricoeur leaves the question of ‘truth’ and ‘authority’ for consideration under the term Tradition. The term Tradition indicates that the interpretation and reinterpretation of ‘traditions’ is not exclusively subjective. There is a ‘truth’ that a tradition proposes and that interpretation and reinterpretation seeks to understand. This truth is not consigned to the past, but is revealed in dialogue with the present. The present, Kearney argues, “listens to the truth claims of memory” before passing judgement on these claims. Kearny presents this third instance of historical past as follows: “we are spoken to before we speak; we are posited in tradition before we posit tradition; we are situated before we are free to criticize the situation… the Enlightenment claim to neutral, ahistorical judgement, residing above all prejudice, is itself a prejudice” (Kearney, 2004, 64).

Every proposal of meaning, argues Ricoeur, is a truth claim subject to judgement; however, this judgement is prejudiced not in the Enlightenment’s limited and limiting understanding of prejudice, but a rehabilitated prejudiced proposed by Gadamer. Ricoeur argues Gadamer rehabilitates prejudice by turning it against itself. In Ricoeur’s own words:
it is in relation to the claim of traditions to truth, a claim included in the holding-for-true of every proposal of meaning, that these three controversial notions are to be understood [prejudice, authority, tradition]. In Gadamer's vocabulary, this truth claim, insofar as it does not proceed from us, but rather rejoins us as a voice coming from the past, gets enunciated as the self-presentation of the “things themselves.” The prejudged is thus a structure of the pre-understanding outside of which the “thing itself” cannot make itself heard. It is in this sense that his rehabilitation of prejudice takes on the Enlightenment's prejudice against prejudice. (Ricoeur 1988, 222)

Tradition, argues Ricoeur, carries us along as it situates us in a chain of interpretation and reinterpretation. This chain is not infallible. Being situated in a ‘Tradition’ means we accord ‘Tradition’ the benefit of a presumption of truth. This presumption is not in the absolute sense, but in the sense that we presume the truth of ‘Tradition’ until a better argument prevails. (Kearny, 2004, 65). Since tradition(s) is/are not the immutable past and the presumption of truth is not absolute, it is then important to be able to distinguish true interpretation from false interpretation.

A critical hermeneutics of Tradition rejects the pretension that the past can be reproduced and experienced today, and is aware of the temporal distanciation between then and now. The question that remains is the legitimacy of interpretation. Who has the authority to judge Tradition? Rather than looking to an ideal of undistorted communication that runs the risk of presenting an indefinite and ultimately unrealizable future (a la Habermas). or a monological transcendental self-reflection devoid of a conversation partner (Husserl), Ricoeur proposes a historical dialectic between a determined horizon of expectancy and a specific space of experience to validate interpretation. This historical dialectic of truth is encountered:

in the anticipations of agreement operative in every successful communication, in every communication where we actually experience a certain reciprocity of intention and recognition. In other words, the transcendence of the idea of truth, which is a dialogical idea from the onset, must be perceived as already at work in the practice of communication. Thus reinstated in our
The ‘material content’ of traditions is the ‘truth’ as interpreted. It is in this respect that Planno can proclaim “Truth can only be identified by Truth,” or in Ricoeur’s slightly less poetic words, “tradition is an operation that can only make sense dialectically through the exchange between the interpreted past and the interpreting present.” (Ricoeur, 1988, 221).

In Planno’s expression, the tradition and legacy of slavery can only make sense dialectically through the exchange between the Truth of the interpreted past and the Truth of the re-interpreting present and this exchange is only possible through the capacity of the productive imagination to bring near what is far. Bringing near what is far and making sense of odd predications is the function of metaphoric truth.

6.2 THE REORIENTING THE IMAGINATION

George H. Taylor notes that one of the insights emerging from Ricoeur’s reconfiguration of the imagination is its central place in human creativity “whether that creativity takes the form of social, epistemological, or poetic imagination” (2006). Ricoeur has expressed an understanding of the relationship of the productive imagination to the problem of creativity as the one problem that has continually interested him from the beginning of his career. In a 1981 interview, Ricoeur points out that he has:

worked from the angle of individual psychology in my early work on the will, then on the cultural level with my studies on symbolisms. My present work on narrative puts me right at the heart of this social, cultural, creativity - because story-telling is the most abiding act of all societies. In telling their own stories, cultures continue their creative activities. Consequently, I am drawn right into the heart of the problem of creativity on the collective and communal level. Yes, I have been silent on the level of practice and commitment, but not at all on the theoretical level, for that I have already published on the relation between ideology and utopia is at the center of my concerns. Ricoeur finds the answer to the problem of creativity through the productive imagination. (Ricoeur 1981, 213)
While never systematised in his published work, Ricoeur is explicit in his presentation of the role of the productive imagination in the historical dialectic, arguing

the possibility of historical experience in general resides in our capacity to remain exposed to the effects of history, to borrow Gadamer’s category of *Wirkungsgeschichte*. However, we continue to be affected by the effects of history only to the extent to which we are capable of broadening our capacity to be so affected. *Imagination is the secret of this competence* (Ricoeur 1991, 2:181).

The imagination gives us the capacity to enter the world the text opens to us. The imagination enables us to be receptive to the effects of history, to receive ‘tradition’. Ricoeur’s three-fold investigation of traditionality/traditions/Tradition illustrates the reflective power of a hermeneutic of imagination. Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of the productive imagination goes further and reinterprets “cultural heritages received from the past and the interest in the futuristic projections of a liberated humanity” (Ricoeur, 1981, 100). The imagination envisions a world different from the one we experience. What is critical to understanding this capacity to imagine is the movement from the ‘reproductive imagination’ to the ‘productive imagination.’ This movement shifts the focus of philosophical reflection from the dominant approach of a reproductive imagination rooted in ‘image’ to Ricoeur’s alternative productive imagination rooted in the framework of the semantic and linguistic orientation developed in his theory of metaphor.

Ricoeur reflection on the productive imagination begins with the question: What is it to have an image? He notes that a philosophical investigation into this question is immediately confronted by “a series of obstacles, paradoxes, and stumbling blocks that, perhaps explain the relative eclipse of the problem of imagination in contemporary philosophy” (1991, 168). Chief among these obstacles is the empiricist theory of knowledge that privileges reproductive imagination’s focus on the *image*. 
Ricoeur’s main concern is that the term *image* is generally understood as “a mental, private, and unobservable entity.” This understanding relegates imagination to the realm of the interior mental representation, or in Luhmann’s terms, the psychic system, which both Ricoeur and Luhmann argue is inaccessible to outside observation. As Taylor notes, in the words of Ricoeur, this

imagination is not at all an alternative to perception [as it is in Hume] but [is] an ingredient of perception. It’s encapsulated within the framework of perception.” Elsewhere in these materials Ricoeur argues that “[w]e can no longer oppose . . . imagining to seeing, if seeing is itself a way of imagining, interpreting, or thinking (2006, 94).

The false opposition between ‘imagination’ and ‘perception’ is the blind alley on which philosophical reflections on imagination have stumbled. Through a detailed deconstruction of Graham Ryle’s grammar and John Paul Sartre’s phenomenology of the imagination, Ricoeur identifies the following three inadequacies in theories of the reproductive imagination: 1) the reliance on an already existing referent, 2) the marginalization of the appearance of reality 3) and the isolation of the image from a broader framework.

6.2.1 Phenomenology of Absence

For both Ryle and Sartre, image refers to something that is absent. As an image of something that is absent, the reproductive imagination is derivative and never original. As Taylor summarizes:

For Ricoeur, this model of original and copy exemplifies reproductive imagination. The image as copy is at best derivative from the original – from reality. At worst, to the degree the imagination tries to portray something different from the original, it is simply marginal, an escape or flight from reality; it produces nothingness (2006, 95).

The nothingness of absence, Ricoeur argues, annihilates the object imagined, replacing it with a quasi-object (Sartre) or a pretend object (Ryle). In either case, the imagined is unre-
al, “the negativity of nothingness, alongside the non-existence of the fictional object” (2009, chap. 15) Ricoeur counters that Sartre’s presentation of the general category of nothingness and the sub-categories of nonexistence/absence, existence/elsewhere, and neutralized presence is inaccurate because “presences and absences are two modes of the giveness of real” (2009, chap. 15). What distinguishes them is the mode of givenness rather than the generalized categories presented by Sartre.

Nothingness, argues Ricoeur, is a fundamental trait of the object. It is the inaccuracy of Ryle and Sartre’s construction of the concept of ‘nothingness’ that limits their theory of the imagination to the reproductive. Ricoeur rejects a nihilistic understanding of ‘nothing’ in favour of a formation of ‘nothing’ as the utopic epoché of/from reality. This utopic nowhere is not a duplicate of an ‘original,’ reality but rather expands our understanding of reality. Taylor, quoting Ricoeur, writes that utopia is “the possibility of [the] nowhere in relation to [our] social condition. At its best, the utopia is not only an escape from reality, but it points to a new kind of reality” (2006, 96). This concept of ‘no place’ liberates the productive imagination from the referent of the ‘image’ or the ‘original’, giving the productive imagination the capacity to imagine something truly new.

In contrast, limiting a theory of the reproductive imagination is the fascination with ‘replicating reality.’ The fascination with replicating or reproducing reality turns the imagination in on itself and away from a more productive relation to reality that Ricoeur provisionally terms the ‘productive referent.’ The productive referent opens new insights into reality by creating its own original:

The image already has a reference that is not its own reference but the reference of the perception, the possible perception of the thing, what we call the original of the copy, the original of the photograph, even the original of a painting. But we shall see that in painting we have more than a copy, we have a certain creation of its own original (Ricoeur 2009, chap. 15).
The productive imagination does not create without a referent so much as, to use Ricoeur’s language, the referent of the productive imagination is produced by the imagination.

6.2.2 Marginalization of Appearance and the Productive Referent

Ricoeur contrasts the productive referent’s relation to image without an original against that of the reproductive referent’s relation to an image that already has an original. Such an image can only try to approximate that which it reproduces, which is not the original object’s reference, but a reference of the possible perception of the object (2009, 3).

Ricoeur uses the difference between a painting and a photograph to illustrate the difference. By exposing film to the light reflected by the subject, a camera produces a photograph that is a reflection of the light of the original. The original subject exists only in the moment of the opening and closing of the camera’s shutter. The photo is the ‘original of the photograph.’ Ricoeur explains:

When I look at a photograph, I no longer posit the nonexistence of the photographic subject’s presence. I neutralize this positing in order to direct myself to the absent object, which exists elsewhere. To look at a picture with a kind of mock observation preserves both the likeness and the nothingness. But this interplay of likeness and nothingness has no influence on the object as such. It is only for reflection that the appearance raises a problem of its own, that this appearance is marginal in relation to the real object. (2009, chap. 15)

Ricoeur contrasts marginalization of reality by the reproductive imagination versus the augmentation of reality by the productive imagination. A painting, for instance, is not only a ‘copy of an original’ but it is also a creation of its own origin. Within the work of a painting, framed, is the creation of a reality that is more than the image reproduced.

Ricoeur notes early photography developed for the purpose of preserving fleeting
memory and fleeting images of reality. As such, it was reproductive. Painting had to distance itself from photography because it could no longer re-present reality as photography could. Impressionism emerged to overcome photography by “creating a new alphabet of colors capable of capturing the transient and the fleeting with the magic of hidden correspondences. Once more, reality was remade with an emphasis on atmospheric values and light appearances.” (2009, chap. 15) With the advent of digital manipulation, the art of photography has shifted from the reproductive to the productive. This only strengthens Ricoeur’s point as the manipulation of photographs more often than not involves improving the image by removing blemishes, adjusting lighting levels, or pasting a more aesthetically pleasing body type for the one originally photographed. Ricoeur explains the paradox of the non-referential referent, in the context of fiction, arguing:

... only when we start from the fiction, which seems to be non-referential in the sense that it has no object, that a new kind of reference may be opened thanks to the absence of a real referent, of an original. Whereas the reproductive image is marginal as regards reality, it’s the function of productive imagination – of the fictional – to open and change reality. Productive imagination may enlarge and even produce new worldviews, new ways of looking at things. It may finally change even our way of being in the world (2009, chap. 16).

The image conceived as absence- as a “substitute for a perceptible reality”- is surpassed by the image that has the capacity to change reality. Ricoeur terms this the Iconic Augmentation of Reality. Borrowing from literary critic Francois Dagognet, Ricoeur argues that, “through the image we may have an augmentation of reality and not merely a shadow within ourselves. To the extent that the image is not the copy of something exterior without an original, then it adds to reality” (2009, chap. 16).
6.2.3 The Work

Ricoeur does not conceive of a ‘free-for-all’ augmentation of reality by every exteriorized thought any individual might have. Ricoeur restricts his analysis of the productive imagination to *techne*, or ‘work.’ A work is both an action, (the work of painting or writing), and an object, (a work of art and/or a work of fiction). In either case, Ricoeur argues that work entails an intentional framing of the productive referent. In the case of the former, comparing painting to poetry, Ricoeur argues that

A painting must be a work or a frame, while a poem historically is a kind of language game that has its own dimensions. Construing a hypothesis or a scientific model, involves elaborating its project, its strategy for action in order to make a decision. There must always be some new project encompassing the production of imagination. (2009, chap. 16)

In the case of the latter, Ricoeur presents work not only:

as it is used when we speak of the work of art, but I should like to show the procedure of a work, because the word ‘work’ introduces into the field the productive dimension. The word is borrowed from the field of action, of *techne*, in the sense that work is applied to some material; the material is shaped by our action. The “work” is a category that belongs in the large sense to aesthetics, but it’s only when images are works in the second sense that imagination is productive (2009, chap. 16).

The bound ‘work’ of poetic language and the development of odd predicates in the metaphoric statement exemplifies the capacity of the productive imaginations to augment reality.

6.3 THE RELIGIOUS PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION AND METAPHORIC TRUTH

For Ricoeur, the power and creativity of the productive imagination is in the dialectic between the verbal and the visual. Ricoeur rejects the traditional reproductive model of image as “first and foremost a 'scene' unfolding in some mental 'theatre' before the gaze of an internal 'spectator’ relegating image to the inaccessible realm of the interior mental
representation of perception. On the contrary, seeing and image, Ricoeur suggests, is an ingredient of perception that is encapsulated in the framework of perception. Or, as Ricoeur argues “[w]e can no longer oppose ... imagining to seeing, if seeing is itself a way of imagining, interpreting, or thinking.”(2006, 94)

Ricoeur proposes a semantic model of the productive imagination where, in conjunction with a metaphoric use of language, the verbal and the visual are placed in a dialectical situation. “It's only when language is creative” Ricoeur argues “that imagination is creative ... Imagination, then, should be treated as a dimension of language. In that way, a new link would appear between imagination and metaphor.” Liberating imagination from the psyche through a semantic approach releases the creative potential of the productive imagination. Ricoeur’s student interpreter, Richard Kearney, summarizes the main problem Ricoeur addresses with the productive imagination as:

Ricoeur’s preference for a semantic model of imagination over a visual one makes possible a new appreciation of this properly creative role of imagination. If images are spoken before they are seen, as Ricoeur maintains, they can no longer be construed as quasi-material residues of perception (as empiricism believed), nor indeed as neutralizations or negations of perception (as eidetic phenomenology tended to believe). Ricoeur’s privileging of the semantic functioning of images illustrates his conviction that the productive power of imagination is primarily verbal (Kearny, 2004, 40).

The productive imagination is the “apperception the sudden glimpse, of a new predicative pertinence, namely, a way of constructing pertinence in impertinence” (Ricoeur, 1991, 173). Ricoeur further argues in the Imagination Lectures “First, it’s in and through language that imagination may become creative. It’s to the extent that the process of imagination is involved in a creative process of thought and language that imagination itself is productive” (2009, chap. 16). A semantic model of productive imagination opens a “horizon of hope” where the possible is made probable, bridging the distance between the oth-
erwise closed psychic system and social system. Or, as Kearney notes:

The metaphors, symbols or narratives produced by imagination all provide us with ‘imaginative variations’ of the world, thereby offering us the freedom to conceive of the world in other ways and to undertake forms of action, which might lead to its transformation. Semantic innovation can thus point towards social transformation. The possible worlds of imagination can be made real by actions (42).

Moreover, these variations emerge from ‘nothing,’ thereby avoiding the derivative fate of the reproductive imagination.

The productive imagination’s capacity to create and ‘disclose new dimensions of reality’ is most acutely experienced in the fiction of narrative and poetry; however, as was the case with Ricoeur’s effort to de-regionalize hermeneutics, Ricoeur de-regionalizes the productive imagination by demarcating it into four domains:

1) the socio-cultural imagination,
2) the poetic imagination,
3) the epistemological imagination, and
4) the religious imagination.

Each of these domains share the capacity to use language to imaginatively re-create reality, that is, augment reality. What distinguishes these domains is the language code they use to augment reality. Language is the nexus where the domains of the productive imagination meet the functionally differentiate subsystems of social system. Ricoeur argues that “because language is creative, it is a code to all the deep layers of my existence by a kind of contamination step by step of all the layers of psychic life. To these layers of depth corresponds new kinds of relation to the world” (2009, chap.16).

Luhmann and Ricoeur both return to the Kantian question of cognition and the capacity of the mind to think which we discussed in the previous chapters. Ricoeur’s approach to the question of cognition is to recognize:
to invent by a creative use of imagination is a general mode of the functioning of thought. The universality of productive imagination implies that we find parallels in the functioning of productive imagination on the sides of both poetry and science. Establishing these parallels is the only way for a philosophy of imagination to get out from the ghetto of poetics (2009, 2).

Using the parallels between the epistemological imagination and the poetic imagination,

Ricoeur maintains:

there is a unity in the functioning of thought in both poetic language and in science. There is not on the one hand science, which tells the truth, and on the other poetry, which expresses our emotions. The question of the unity of thought is at stake. If we can show that imagination is creative in the same way in models and in poetry, then we have a unifying view of the way in which thought in general is capable of novelty (2009, 18).

To maintain this fundamental unity, a unity between the other domains must be demonstrable. Ricoeur develops this unity by presenting the ‘work’ as the frame through which the productive imagination acts on reality through a transposition that creates new concepts out of old concepts. Creativity is found in the productive imagination’s capacity to not merely extend symbolic relations, but to criss-cross and transpose these relations. It is through transposition that new concepts emerge from old concepts. In this respect, Luhmann’s social system theory is a model of functionally differentiated society that displaces previous models of society and thereby extends our concept of reality. This is the function of the productive imagination of the epistemological domain. In the words of Ricoeur:

because it’s with the model that we understand better how fiction has a heuristic function. The heuristic dimension — heuristic being the Greek word for the capacity of discovery — is easier to see in the case of models. Through the example of models, we see how all creativity in discourse is rewarded by an extension of our concept of reality. The extension of our language is at the same time an extension of our world. (2009, 3)

Ricoeur furthers this point by developing the parallelisms between the models of the epistemological imagination and the metaphoric process of the poetic imagination, arguing:

The parallelism between models and metaphors may be extended to the
problem of reference beyond the first stage that we considered in the last lecture, which pertained only to the functioning of imagination in extending our concepts. What I want to show in the present lecture is that this displacement of concepts is at the same time an extension of the reality, of the world in which we live and orient ourselves. In other words, if imagination is the intimation of new connections, it’s also an intimation of new dimensions of reality. Therefore, the second stage of this inquiry into epistemological imagination will be addressed to the notion of the extension of our concept of reality. It’s only now that we come to grips with the paradox of productive reference. As I keep saying, fiction does not reproduce previous reality, as does the picture; it opens new reality. (2009, 1).

As an epistemology, social system theory is a model of, not a model for, global society.

Ricoeur notes in the *Imagination Lectures* that the model is to the epistemological imagination what the metaphor is to the poetic imagination. Each of the domains of the productive imagination shares a capacity for suspension and the projection of new possibilities to redefine the world. For the social imagination, the concept of utopia is the *epoché* that enables the projection of new possibilities of what Pablo Freire terms, *conscienciation*. For the religious imagination, it is *parabolizing* that suspends ordinary reference, enabling the projection of new possibilities. Underlying the *epoché* of each of these domains of the productive imagination is a modern theory of metaphor which is the breakthrough that de-regionalizes the productive imagination. The work of the productive imagination is most developed through Ricoeur’s analysis of a modern theory of metaphor. A detour through this analysis is the long route we must take to arrive at an understanding of the encounter between the religious imagination and globalization.

6.4 **METAPHOR AND THE PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION:**

Ricoeur’s extensive work on metaphor is found in a number of his published and unpublished works, including the soon to be published *Imagination Lectures*. George Taylor notes that these lectures are the central juncture where “Ricoeur is crystallizing his
thoughts on poetics (and so fulfilling in a recast way the third part of his Philosophy of the
Will). Imagination lies at the heart of his thinking at this time” (2006, 93). Corroborating
Taylor’s observation is Ricoeur’s conclusion to his article “Metaphor and the Main Prob-
lem of Hermeneutics” (Ricoeur 1974) Anticipation his work on the relationship between
metaphor and imagination, Ricoeur concludes this article with the observation that a mod-
ern theory of metaphor that stresses opening up a world should also open up new vistas on
the problem of the imagination.

We are prepared to inquire into the power of imagination, no longer as the
faculty of deriving “images” from sensory experiences, but as the capacity
to let new worlds build our self-understanding. This power would not be
conveyed by emerging images but by emerging meanings in our language.
Imagination, then, should be treated as a dimension of language. In that way,
a new link would appear between imagination and metaphor. (Ricoeur 1974,
110)

The text where Ricoeur develops this link most fully is The Rule of Metaphor. In this as in
the earlier texts “Metaphor and the Main Problem with Hermeneutics” and the article “Bib-
lical Hermeneutics,” Ricoeur develops this link by reorienting the rhetorical theory of
metaphor as substitution with an expanded understanding of metaphor in tension (Ricoeur
1975; Ricoeur 2003; Ricoeur 1974).

6.4.1 Rhetorical Theory of Metaphor

Ricoeur recounts the legacy of a rhetorical theory of metaphor with six generally
accepted propositions. The first proposition recognizes metaphors as a trope. As a trope,
metaphors are a figure of discourse concerned with naming, either by stylistic choice or to
fill a lexical gap. Proceeding from this first proposition, the second, metaphor is an exten-
sion of naming where there is a divergence between the literal or proper sense of a word
and a figurative or improper sense of the word. The third proposition recognizes a resem-
blance between the figurative and the literal as the cause of this divergence. The fourth proposition locates the function of resemblance as the grounds for substituting the figurative sense of a word by borrowing from the literal sense of word. Since we are operating at the level of words, the fifth proposition reduces metaphor to a semiotic interpretation. The substitution of sense is not a semantic innovation at the level of the meaning of the sentence. Finally, since there is no semantic innovation, metaphor gives no information about reality and is therefore an ornamental addition to discourse, serving an emotive rather than rational function. These propositions, Ricoeur concludes, “are called into question by a modern semantic of metaphor” (Ricoeur 1975, 77)

6.4.2 Semantic Theory of Metaphor

A semantic theory of metaphor concerns itself with the semantics of the encompassing sentence before the semiotics of the word. Metaphor proceeds from a tension between two terms in a metaphoric statement. Ricoeur terms this tension a ‘semantic impertinence’, which is a phenomenon of predication at the level of the whole statement. The absurdity of a literal interpretation in the semantic context of the statement leads to the destruction of the literal and a transformation of this sudden contradiction into a meaningful contradiction that makes sense (Ricoeur 1974, 102). In Ricoeur’s words,

Logical absurdity creates a situation in which we have the choice between either preserving the literal sense of both the subject and the modifier and concluding to the meaninglessness of the whole sentence-or attributing a new meaning to the modifier such as the whole sentence makes sense. Then we have not only a self-contradictory attribution, but a significant self-contradictory attribution. When I say “man is a fox” (the fox has chased the wolf), I must shift from a literal to a metaphorical attribution if I want to save the sentence. But, where do we have this new meaning from? (Ricoeur 1974, 102)

It is the role of resemblance that shifts from a resemblance of substitution to a resemblance
of tension where the distance, (and therefore absurdity), between the literal interpretation is brought closer by the figurative interpretation. Rendering close what seems far resolves the semantic dissonance between two seemingly incompatible ideas. Ricoeur argues that far from being ornamental, metaphor “consists rather in the reduction of the shock between two incompatible ideas, it is in this reduction of the shift, in this rapprochement, that we must look for the play of resemblance. What is at stake in a metaphorical statement is making a ‘kinship’ appear where ordinary vision perceives no mutual appropriateness at all” (Ricoeur 1975, 78).

This semantic innovation displaces a theory of metaphor as substitution or naming with a theory of metaphor in the tension between odd predicates. In Ricoeur’s words:

in metaphor, on the contrary, the tension between the words and especially the tension between two interpretations, one literal and one metaphorical, in the whole sentence, gives rise to a veritable creation of meaning of which rhetoric perceived only the end result. In a theory of tension, which I am here opposing to a theory of substitution, a new signification emerges which deals with the whole statement. In this respect, metaphor is an instantaneous creation, a semantic innovation which has no status in established language and which exists only in the attribution of unusual predicates. In this way, metaphor is closer to the active resolution of an enigma than to simple association by resemblance. It is the resolution of a semantic dissonance. (1975, 79)

A tension theory of metaphor operates on three distinct levels. The first level is the tension between the subject and the predicate of the metaphoric statement. They do not belong together in the semantic context or as Ricoeur writes, “There is an incongruity in their semantic coexistence” (2009, chap. 16).

The second level is the tension between the two interpretations of the metaphoric statement where the literal/proper interpretation collapses, making room for the figurative/improper interpretation to extend meaning. It is in the transition from the ‘literal incongruence’ to the ‘metaphoric congruence,’ that the imagination is productive. Ricoeur
My hypothesis is that imagination plays a role in the transition from literal incongruence to metaphorical congruence, in the birth of a new pertinence, a new appropriateness. Likeness here has nothing to do with the association of ideas. We must forget the mechanical model of balls hitting one another, as in the Newtonian model of the association of ideas. It’s not at all an association by resemblance. There is no parallelism between similarity and contiguity. Instead, we try to derive likeness from the functioning of an odd predicate and derive imagination from likeness. (Ricoeur 2009, chap. 16)

The following implications emerge from this semantic innovation. Firstly, since tension displaces substitution, metaphors are untranslatable. A metaphor may be paraphrased but the paraphrase can never exhaust the inherent meaning of the metaphoric statement.\(^{34}\) Substitution metaphors easily shift between literal and figurative meaning, but tension metaphors create new meaning precluding the restoration of the ‘proper’ meaning of the odd predicates. The second implication is radical in its simplicity. Metaphor is not an ornament of discourse. Metaphor says something new about reality and in doing so, it has the capacity to shape reality. Ricoeur links his analysis of metaphor to the productive imagination through the role of resemblance in the production of new meaning. He argues that, based on a semantic theory of metaphor, “Imagination has to be linked to the role of likeness in the production of a new meaning, a new sentential meaning, a new predicative meaning” (2009, chap. 16). The role of the imagination in the transition from literal incongruence to metaphorical congruence returns Ricoeur to the question of cognition. Ricoeur defines the stakes of this inquiry as nothing less than “a conception of the mind, of thought at large (2009, chap. 16).

\(^{34}\) Ricoeur is not referring here only to the translation between languages, such as from English to French, but the translation of the meaning of a metaphoric statement from metaphoric to literal language.
6.4.3 A Preliminary Concept of Metaphoric Truth

Ricoeur offers the following conclusions towards a metaphoric concept of truth. First, a metaphoric concept of truth recognizes that the poetic function and the rhetorical function “cannot be fully distinguished until the conjunction between fiction and redescription is brought to light” (Ricoeur 2003, 291) The rhetorical function is the inverse of the poetic function. The rhetorical function contributes ornamentation to discourse adding nothing new to the generation of meaning, and the poetic function “seeks to redescribe reality by the roundabout route of heuristic fiction” (Ricoeur 2003, 291). Second, this indirect route is undertaken by metaphor, which Ricoeur describes as “that strategy of discourse by which language divests itself of its function of direct description in order to reach the mythic level where its function of discovery is set free” Finally, Ricoeur concludes that to speak of metaphorical truth in order to designate ‘the realistic’ intention that belongs to the redescriptive power of poetic language . . . it implies that the theory of tension (or of controversy), which has been the constant guiding thread of this investigation, might be extended to the referential relation of the metaphoric statement to reality. (Ricoeur 2003, 122)

This theory of tension manifests itself in three applications of metaphoric truth;

1) in the tension between the “tenor and vehicle, between focus and frame, between principal subject and secondary subject,” that emerges within the metaphoric statement;
2) in the tension between the “literal interpretation that perishes at the hands of semantic impertinence and a metaphorical interpretation whose sense emerges through nonsense” of the metaphoric statement
3) in the tension “between identity and difference in the interplay of resemblance” that emerges out of the relational function of the metaphoric statement (Ricoeur 2003, 292)

I have emphasized ‘emerges within,’ ‘emerges through,’ and ‘emerges out’ to indicate the metaphoric process. This process begins from the inside with the internal semantic
structure of the metaphoric statement and moves through the semantic impertinence of the meaning of the statement towards the redescription of reality in the relational function of the metaphoric statement. Ricoeur concludes that a metaphoric concept of truth is inescapably paradoxical:

The paradox consists in the fact there is no other way to do justice to the notion of metaphorical truth than to include the critical incision of the (literal) ‘is not’ within the ontological vehemence of the (metaphorical) ‘is.’ In doing so, the thesis merely draws the most extreme consequence of the theory of tension. In the same way that logical distance is preserved in metaphorical proximity, and in the same way as the impossible literal interpretation is not simply abolished by the metaphorical interpretation but submits to it while resisting, so the ontological affirmation obeys the principle of tension and the law of ‘stereoscopic vision.’ It is this tensional constitution of the verb to be that receives its grammatical mark in the ‘to be like’ of metaphor elaborated into simile, at the same time as the tension between same and other is marked in the relational copula. (Ricoeur 2003, 302)

Undergirding Ricoeur’s understanding of metaphoric truth is a conception of the productive imagination’s capacity to re-imagine reality by critically and imaginatively inserting the literal ‘is not’ within the ontological vehemence of the metaphorical ‘is’. Or, as Ricoeur writes,

The question then is whether the iconic moment of metaphor stands outside every semantic approach, and whether it is not possible to account for it starting from the paradoxal structure of resemblance. Would not the imagination have something to do with the conflict between identity and difference?” (Ricoeur 2003, 235)

The religious imagination of Rastafari expressed through ontology of hope mediates between the paradox of plentitude and voidness encountered in the reception of a biblical message of hope, received in the time and place of the voidness and despair. With the religious imagination, Rastafari’s ontology of hope is a model for the corrective function of parabolization of discourse that “dynamizes the text, makes meaning move, and gives rise to extensions and transgressions—in brief, insofar as it make the text work” (1995, 148).
This new kind of relation to the world encounter through oppression, asks the ultimate question, what may we hope for? It is to the religious expression of this conflict we now turn.
'Cause all I ever had:
Redemption songs -

All I ever had:
Redemption songs:

These songs of freedom,
Songs of freedom.
PART III: APPROPRIATION

To this point, we have spent a great deal of time speaking of the metaphoric process. This detour—while long—has been necessary as it leads us to a better appreciation of the encounter between theology and globalization. Viewing social system theory as a model of global society extends our knowledge of reality through a conceptual abstraction that makes comparison possible. It is the capacity to compare — *theorein to omoion* — that links metaphor, model, utopia, and the parable and it is the productive imagination that makes this comparison possible (Ricoeur 1978, 147).

Ricoeur’s semantic innovation proposes an analogical relation between cognition, imagination, and feelings that incorporate the psyche into a complete semantic theory. Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutic of the productive imagination is a positive response to Luhmann’s invitation to accept religion’s special function in handling the paradoxes of self-reference.

Since theological hermeneutics “consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning . . . it is in interpretation that the plurality of meanings is made manifest,” it is the tool required to discover ‘hidden religious premises in apparently secularized codes.” Accepting Luhmann’s interpretation of social systems expands theology’s ‘subject’ beyond the religious subsystem to all subsystems whose binary codes seek to “deparadoxize their operations and observations.”(Luhmann 1988, 33). Luhmann’s proposed ‘religious enlightenment’ begins with the religious language of limits.

In this final Section, we will conclude our analysis by appropriating Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of the religious productive imagination as a receptive structure theology can
use to positively respond to Luhmann’s proposal that in accept the theory that religion has its special function in handling the paradoxes of self-reference theology will “discover hidden religious premises in apparently secularized codes. Since most functional subsystems of modern society rely on binary codes to deparadoxize their operations and observations, a critique of coding as a technique of deparadoxification could launch a movement of “religious enlightenment.” (1999, 33)

To accomplish this we will explore the implications the functional-structuralism of Luhmann’s social system theory. We will be guided by Ricoeur’s suggestion first proposed in his encounter with the structural anthropology of Levis-Strauss but equally valid in the case of Luhmann’s social systems theory that reflective philosophy that understand itself as a hermeneutics creates a receptive structure for, in Ricoeur’s case, a structural anthropology, and in our case a functional-structuralism (1974, 51). I will argue with Ricoeur that “it is the function of hermeneutics to make the understanding of the other—and of his signs in various cultures—coincide with the understanding of self and being” (1974, 51), and that this function corresponds with the function of deparadoxification proposed by Luhmann. I will conclude this section with an exposition of a theological hermeneutic emerging from Rastafari’s encounter with globalization. Rastafari’s word, sound and power is an example of a theological hermeneutic that in seeking understanding reconciles the experience of “a prior being-thrown” in Babylon with an ontology of hope in the promise of Zion.
I am certain of nothing but the holiness of the Heart's affections and the truth of Imagination - What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth—whether it existed before or not—for I have the same Idea of all our Passions as of Love they are all in their sublime, creative of essential Beauty . . . The Imagination may be compared to Adam's dream - he awoke and found it truth.

John Keats, Letter to a Friend (Motion 1999, 208 quoted in)

CHAPTER 7: PARABOLIZATON AND THE METAPHORIC TRANSFER FROM TEXT TO LIFE

7.1 THE RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE OF LIMITS

Ricoeur’s analysis of the relation between metaphor and the productive imagination maintains, “there is a structural analogy between the cognitive, the imaginative and the emotional component of the complete metaphorical act and the metaphorical process draws its completeness from the structural analogy of this complementary functioning” (Ricoeur 1978, 159). The structural analogy of this complementary functioning extends the metaphorical process beyond the fiction of the poetic imagination to the parable of the religious imagination. Ricoeur first outlines the movement from the poetic function of the metaphorical process to the parabolizing of religious language in the essay “The Specificity of Religious Language.” (1975) Ricoeur’s work on biblical hermeneutics includes analysis of the various types of language or discourses found in the biblical texts. These discourses include narratives, legislation, hymns, prophecy, and wisdom literature (Pellauer 2007, 87). Writing of the function of poetics in the narrative discourse of parables, Ricoeur acknowledges that his analysis may lead to the impression that religious language is nothing more than a variety of poetic language. Ricoeur conceded this characterization, with the proviso that:

we do not identify “poetic” and “aesthetic” and that we respect the scope of the poetic function such as I have defined it, namely, as the power of making the description of reality correspond with the power of bringing the fictions of the imagination to speech. Because the poetic function of discourse was
conceived in this way, the religious language of the parables is an instance of poetic language (1975, 107).

Religious language, Ricoeur continues, modifies poetic language through procedures “such as intensification, transgression, and going to the limit, which make it, according to Ian Ramsey’s expression, an ‘odd’ language” (1975, 107). As David Pellauer points out, it is only later communities that interpreted biblical texts as similes. Jesus’ parables, Pellauer argues,

are narratives, but narratives marked by a certain ‘extravagance’ in that in speaking of the kingdom of God they mix the extraordinary with the ordinary. They have a metaphorical, redescriptive aspect in that they are more than similes. It was the later tradition that read them that way and sometimes embedded them in the gospels along with interpretation that reduced them to directly descriptive language or allegorical language (2007, 86).

Extravagance is encountered in the text as limit-expressions that qualify the experience of the ordinary, which Ricoeur identifies as limit-experiences.

7.1.1 Limit-Experiences and Limit-Expressions

Ricoeur argues that the religious language of limit-expressions contains highly conceptualized theological discourse whose expression through the language of the religious imagination functions as “a ‘model’ with regard to the whole of human experience” (1975, 107). The model and qualifier aspect of the limit-expressions of religious language re-describes limit-experiences. Limit-experiences, Ricoeur argues, “are not only experiences of crisis and decision, as in many theologies of crisis, nor just experiences of distress as in the thought of Karl Jaspers. They are also experiences of culmination, as in the parable of the pearl of great price where ‘finding the inestimable’ constitutes the supreme joy” (1995, 61).

The movement, Ricoeur initially argues, is in one direction from the distinctive
traits of religious discourse which he identifies as parables, proverbs, proclamation, wisdom, and prophecy applied to the corresponding traits of the limit-experiences and not vice versa. Ricoeur will later modify this understanding as he more fully appreciates the intertextual resources of the embedded narrative-parable.

Ricoeur’s understanding of limit-experiences includes the related concept of limit-situations. Recalling the interview in the *Owl of Minerva*, Ricoeur clarifies his understanding of these situations. Certain limit-experience, Ricoeur argues, are encountered by an individual or community “as a fundamental existential crisis” (Interviewed in Kearney, 2004, 119). In chapter 2 we argued that the immediate crisis brought about by boundary situations such as death, poverty, hunger, natural disaster, economic oppression, etc. require solutions beyond purely political, economic, or technical means. It demands, as Ricoeur posits, “we ask ourselves the ultimate question concerning our origins and ends: Where do we come from? Where are we going? In this way we become aware of our basic capacities and reason for surviving, for being and continuing to be what we are” (2004, 119).

While these boundary situations are limit-experiences, limit-experiences are not confined to traumatic events; rather, they paradoxically include “culminatory experiences—‘peak experiences’—especially experiences of creation and joy, such as are described in the parable of the pearl and the lost coin, are no less extreme than are the experiences of catastrophe. Nor are they less baffling. They even have a greater capacity to reorient life, in a way that no plan or rational project could equal or exhaust, than to break it” (Ricoeur 1994, 36)
7.1.2 Limit-Concepts

The interpretation of limit-experiences, including limit-situations, is interpreted through the models and qualifiers of limit-expressions. The limit-expressions of the biblical narrative are directed towards these ordinary experiences of life. Certain limit-expressions are more enigmatic then others. Ricoeur distinguishes these more enigmatic limit-expressions with the term, *limit-concepts*. Limit-concepts transpose the meaning beyond the limits of the narrative of the text that paradoxically and enigmatically surpass the limits of a figurative mode of expression to a conceptual mode of expression (Ricoeur 1975). It is this capacity to hold in tension the still more beyond the text that distinguishes limit-concepts from the less enigmatic limit-expressions. Limit-concepts correspond with Luhmann’s understanding of contingency formulas. Contingency formulas, it will be recalled, are “symbols or groups of symbols that serve to translate the indeterminate contingency of a particular functional sphere into determinable contingency” (Green 1982, 26).

Similarly limit-concepts—‘the kingdom of God’ being the most recognizable—under the pressure of the extravagance of the narrative, “become a limit-expression that breaks open the closed representations” which is to say translate the indeterminate contingency (closed representation) into determinable contingency (open representation) (Ricoeur 1994, 36). Limit-concepts are the sword that cleaves the Gordian knot with out destroying the knot or—to use a biblical examples—the fire that burns without consuming the bush.

The movement from limit-expression to limit-experience and from the figurative to the conceptual is simultaneous and bi-directional. Religious language, Ricoeur argues: projects its radical vision of existence and ordinary experience makes explicit its potentially religious dimension; in tension and conflict, I might add, with all the traits that carry this experience towards shadowy humanism, or
even an aggressive atheism. But the Biblical text only finds its final referent when ordinary experience has recognized itself as signified, in its breadth, its height, and its depth, by the ‘said’ (le dit) of the text. (Ricoeur 1975b, 128)

Thus the ordinary is reoriented to the extraordinary and the appropriate referent of religious language is not the limit-concept, or the limit-expressions—it is the ordinary experience transformed into the extraordinary through the encounter with the limit-expressions of the text.

7.2 SCHEMATIZING THE PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION

In the essay, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling”, Ricoeur asks whether a semantic theory as outlined here is “complete without including as a necessary component a psychological moment of the kind usually described as ‘image’ or ‘feeling’” (1978, 143). Ricoeur’s semantic innovation proposes an analogical relation between cognition, imagination, and feelings that incorporate the psyche into a complete semantic theory. Ricoeur’s approach to the psychological moment of ‘image’ or ‘feeling’ “attempts to derive the alleged significance of metaphorical phrases from their capacity to display streams of images and to elicit feelings that we mistakenly hold for genuine information and for fresh insight into reality” (1978, 143). Ricoeur expands his semantic innovation by “assigning a semantic function to what seems to be mere psychological features and without, therefore, concerning itself with some accompanying factors extrinsic to the informative kernel of metaphor” (1978, 144). To do so, Ricoeur returns to Kant’s concept of the productive imagination as “schematizing a synthetic operation” (147).

The passage from text to life, which Ricoeur argues governs the semiotic phase of interpretation to its existential phase,” is the text’s horizon of structuration or schema (1978, 166). The biblical form of the imagination “is indivisibly a narrative and a symbolic
form of imagination” that follows the three-fold movement of thinking, seeing and the epochê of sense and reference. To arrive at this conclusion, Ricoeur follows three steps or movements to “complete semantics of metaphor by having recourse to a psychology of imagination” (147). The first movement, thinking produces new types of assimilations between the nearness and farness of the metaphoric statement by ‘seeing’ similarities. The second movement, ‘seeing’, incorporates the pictorial element while avoiding a weakened sensorial model of image. Seeing introduces the formula for the constructions of icons controlled by semantics, which, to repeat Ricoeur’s description, schematizes “the way in which depiction occurs in predicative assimilation: something appears on which we read the new connection” (150). The third movement creates an epochê where the literal and descriptive sense and reference of language is suspended by the metaphorical sense and reference of the odd predicate. Ricoeur presents the idea of ‘split-reference’ as a suitable description of the negation implied in his understanding of epochê. These three movements culminate with genuine feelings understood as reverberations of images displayed as verbal structures.

7.2.1 Thinking & Seeing

With the first two movements—thinking and seeing—the imagination produces new types of assimilations between the nearness and farness of the metaphoric statement by ‘seeing’ similarities. Ricoeur argues that this, “is homogenous to discourse itself, which effects the logical discourse, the rapprochement itself. The place of and role of the productive imagination is there in the insight, to which Aristotle alluded when he said that to make good metaphors is to contemplate likeness—*theorein to omoion*” (1978, 147). This insight
involves both ‘a thinking’ and ‘a seeing.’ The insight into likeness is ‘a thinking’ in so far as it has the effect of restructuring the semantic field and ‘a seeing’ “to the extent that the insight consists of the instantaneous grasping of the combinatorial possibilities offered by the proportionality and consequently the rapprochement between two ratios” (148). Ricoeur argues that the proportional metaphor, or what Aristotle terms ‘metaphor by analogy, is the most conspicuous example of the seeing aspect of the imagination. Together, ‘thinking’ and ‘seeing’ are the productive character of the predicative assimilation.

While the terms ‘seeing’ suggests ‘image’, Ricoeur notes that this first aspect of the imagination is quasi-verbal and must be understood “according to Bachelard's remark in the Poetics of Space, as ‘a being pertaining to language.’ Before being a fading perception, the image is an emerging meaning.”(Ricoeur 1978, 149) This leads Ricoeur back to Kant’s concept of the productive imagination and schematization35, as he refines the quasi-verbal aspect of the productive imagination. “Such is, in fact, the tradition of Kant's productive imagination and schematism. What we have above described is nothing else than the schematism of metaphorical attribution” (Ricoeur 1978, 149).

Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor incorporates of the pictorial dimension of the imagination without “introducing an obsolete theory of the image, in the Humean sense of a weakened sensorial impression” (149). Ricoeur avoids this weakened sensorial impression by recalling Kant’s observation that one of the functions of schema is to provide images for

35. Paul Guyer presents Kant’s development of schema as emerging from Kant’s development of a foundation for the natural sciences. Guyer writes, “First, he argues that the categories, which thus far have merely logical content, must be made ‘homogeneous’ with experience, or be recast in forms we can actually experience. Since time, as the form of both outer and inner sense, is the most general feature of our sensible experience, Kant argues that the categories must be made homogeneous with experience by being associated with certain determinate temporal relations or ‘schemata.’” (Guyer 2004)
concepts. These images are iconic presentations that are described by the metaphoric statement. What is presented is not a ‘weakened sensorial impression,’ but rather a “formula for the constructions of icons.” At issue is not the presentation of an image, but the extent to which the iconic presentation is controlled by semantics. Or as Ricoeur writes, “What is at issue is the development from schematization to iconic presentation” (150). The pictorial element is incorporated into a semantic theory of metaphor through the enigma of the iconic presentation. The development from schematization to iconic presentation is, in Ricoeur’s own words, “the way in which depiction occurs in predicative assimilation: something appears on which we read the new connection” (150). Since a metaphor is “closer to the active resolution of and enigma than to simple association by resemblance,” the enigma cannot be solved if the pictorial aspect of metaphor is treated as a mental image or “as a replica of an absent thing.” It is only when the image is understood as a “concrete milieu in which and through which we see similarities” that the enigma of the iconic presentation depicts predicative assimilations. Consequently, image then is intrinsic to the metaphoric process in so far as the “production of images channels the schematization of predicative assimilation.” Ricoeur argues that:

by displaying a flow of images, discourse initiates changes of logical distance, generates rapprochement. Imagining or imaging, thus, is the concrete milieu in which and through which we see similarities. To imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of something but to display relations in a depicting mode. Whether this depiction concerns unsaid and unheard similarities or refers to qualities, structures, localizations, situations, attitudes, or feelings, each time the new intended connection is grasped as what the icon describes or depicts (150).

Using the experience of reading, Ricoeur argues that the images channeled by the schematization of predicative assimilation are not wild, stream of consciousness images that interrupt, disrupt or distort reading.
These ‘wild images’ “induce the reader, who has become a dreamer, to indulge himself in the delusive attempt described by Sartre as fascination, to possess magically the absent thing, body, or person” (150). Rather, the images channeled are ‘bound images’ that are concrete representations invoked by the “verbal element and controlled by it” (150). While these bound images may emerge from wild images, it is only when they are tamed—that is schematized by the predicative assimilation—that they are incorporated into a theory of metaphor.36

Metaphoric meaning blurs the distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘reference.’ Poetic language “not only merges sense and sound, but sense and senses, meaning by that the flow of bound images displayed by the sense” (151). The blurring of this distinction, as Ricoeur writes,

By blurring this distinction, the metaphorical meaning compels us to explore the borderline between the verbal and the non-verbal. The process of schematization and that of the bound images aroused and controlled by schematicization and that of the bound images displayed by the sense” (151). The blurring of this distinction, as Ricoeur writes,

36. Samuel T. Coleridge’s introduction to his poem, Kubla Khan provides an interesting example of the movement between wild and bound images. Coleridge writes on the experience of a flood of ‘wild’ images brought about in an ‘anodyne’ induced three-hour sleep. Upon awaking, Coleridge claimed to have perfect recollection of two or three hundred lines of verse. Before he could set pen to paper Coleridge was:

called out by a person on business from Porlock and detained by him above an hour and on his return to his room, found, to his no small surprise and mortification, that though he still retained some vague and dim recollection of the general purport of the vision, yet, with the exception of some eight or ten scattered lines and images, all the rest had passed away like the images on the surface of a stream into which a stone has been cast, but, alas! without the after restoration of the latter! (Spurr 2000, 65 quoted in)

Coleridge is unable to bind in verse the images experienced in dream, the loss of which, ironically, he describes metaphorically. In contrast to the mental images lost, Coleridge constructs a concrete representation of ‘these images’ in the poetic language of the introduction to the poem. In an excellent metaphoric expression of a weakened sensorial impression, Coleridge binds the image of a stream and stone with the experience of mental images passing “away like the images on the surface of a stream into which a stone has been cast, but, alas! without the after restoration of the latter!” Coleridge illustrates Ricoeur’s conclusion that the second step incorporating the pictorial element into a theory of metaphor brings us “to the borderline between a semantics of productive imagination and a psychology of reproductive imagination” (1978, 151).
tization obtain precisely on that borderline between a semantics of metaphorical utterances and a psychology of imagination. (1978, 151)

This borderline brings us closer to the notion of ‘reverberations’ that traverse the verbal and the non-verbal, the semantic and the psychological.

7.2.3 Epochê of Sense

Ricoeur completes his theory of metaphor by introducing (returning to) the concept of epochê. In the phenomenological tradition of Husserl, epochê is the act of setting aside or bracketing all empirical knowledge in order to better understand phenomena on its own terms. Ricoeur appropriates the term ‘Epochê’ in the literary sense, as “the moment of negativity brought by the image in the metaphoric process” (1978, 151). The negation Ricoeur indicates as the moment of negativity is not the place of the transcendental subject, as with Husserl, or the parasitic image he has thus far denounced; rather, it is the negation that “appears because the image places the sense in the dimension of suspension, of Epochê, of fiction” (1978). Epochê returns Ricoeur to a basic understanding of meaning in the relationship between sense and reference in a metaphorical expression (1978, 151).

The traditional relation between sense and reference in poetic language that interiorizes meaning is inverted by Ricoeur’s semantic theory of metaphor. Of the traditional relation, Ricoeur writes “not only poetry but literature in general implies a mutation in the use of language. This redirects language towards itself to the point that language may be said, in Roland Barthes’ words, to ‘celebrate itself’ rather than celebrate the world” (1978, 153).

Ricoeur suggests, “we take the expression ‘split reference’ as our lead in our discussion of the referential function of metaphoric statement. This expression, as well as the wonderful ‘it was and it was not’ contains in nuce all that can be said about metaphorical
reference” (1978, 153). The term ‘split reference’ denotes the capacity for poetic reference to make communication ambiguous rather than negating the referential function. Ricoeur extends this characteristic of metaphoric sense emerging from the negation of the literal sense to ordinary descriptive language arguing that:

The suspension of the reference proper to ordinary descriptive language is the negative condition for the emergence of a more radical way of looking at things, whether it is akin or not to the unconcealing of that layer of reality which phenomenology calls preobjective and which according to Heidegger, constitutes the horizon of all our modes of dwelling in the world. Once more, what interests me here is the parallelism between the suspensions of literal sense and the suspension of ordinary descriptive reference. This parallelism goes very far. In the same way as the metaphorical sense not only abolishes but preserves the literal sense, the metaphorical reference maintains the ordinary vision in tension with the new one. . .” (154).

This capacity to maintain ordinary vision in tension with the new vision cleaves the Gordian knot of communication without destroying it, bringing Luhmann and Ricoeur closer to a radical constructivist understanding of reality.

Ricoeur concludes that giving a concrete dimension to epoché is one of the fundamental functions of the imagination. The function of the productive imagination, Ricoeur insists, gives a concrete dimension to the epoché of split reference that rejects the problematic Husserlian transcendental subject. Or in Ricoeur’s own words,

My contention now is that one of the functions of imagination is to give a concrete dimension to the suspension or epoché proper to split reference. Imagination does not merely schematize the predicative assimilation between terms by its synthetic insight into similarities nor does it merely picture the sense thanks to the display of images aroused and controlled by the cognitive process. Rather, it contributes concretely to the epoché of ordinary reference and to the projection of new possibilities of redescribing the world (154).

This concrete dimension of epoché distinguishes it from Husserl’s more transcendental epoché, thus addressing Luhmann’s critique of Husserl’s unsuccessful attempt to
“compensate for this one-sidedness [of subjectivity] through a transcendental theoretical enhancing of the psychic system” (Luhmann, 1995, 146).

7.2.4 Feeling

Ricoeur’s treatment of the relation between ‘feeling’ and a semantic theory of metaphor, like his treatment of the relation between the cognitive and the pictorial, avoids a romanticized understanding of ‘feeling’ as emotion. This traditional, and in Ricoeur’s estimation, mistaken, treatment is characterized by:

(1) inwardly directed states of mind, and (2) mental experiences closely tied to bodily disturbances, as is the case in fear, anger, pleasure, and pain. In fact both traits come together, to the extent that in emotion we are, so to speak, under the spell of our body, we are delivered to mental states with little intentionality, as though in emotion we ‘lived’ our body in a more intense way. (1978).

In Ricoeur’s judgment, ‘genuine feelings’ or ‘poetic feelings’ are not emotions but are reverberations of images “properly displayed by the poem as a verbal texture” (156). Feeling is linked to meaning via three movements, which I termed ‘thinking, seeing and sensing.’ Being included as ‘knowing’ is the first movement linking feeling to meaning. This ‘thinking’ aspect of the schematization of the predicative congruence is an instantaneous insight into like and not like that is ‘felt’ as well as ‘seen’. The understanding that this insight is felt includes us in the process of predicative assimilation. Or as Ricoeur writes, “By saying that it is felt, we underscores the fact that we are included in the process as knowing subjects. If the process can be called, as I called it, predicative assimilation, it is true that we are assimilated, that is, made similar, to what is seen as similar” (156). The capacity to feel similarity or to be assimilated by similarity is a case of Selbst-Affektion, which corresponds to the third movement and Luhmann’s Communication arc, understand-
The Kantian notion of *Selbst-Affektion* is a part of poetic feeling whose function is to bridge the distance between the ‘knower’ and ‘the known’ while maintaining the distancing implied by the cognitive structure of thought. Feeling, Ricoeur argues “is not contrary to thought. It is thought made ours. This felt participation is a part of its complete meaning as poem” (156). The ‘seeing’ aspect of feeling completes imagination “as picturing relationships” (156). Ricoeur understands this aspect of ‘feeling’ in a similar manner as the literary critic Northrop Frye understands the ‘mood’ of a poem. According to Ricoeur’s presentation of Frye:

Each poem, he says, structures a mood which is *this* unique mood generated by *this* unique string of words. In that sense, it is coextensive to the verbal structure itself. The mood is nothing other than the way in which the poem affects us a an *icon*. Frye offers strong expression here ‘The unity of a poem is the unity of a mood”; the poetic images “express or articulate this mood. This mood is the poem and nothing else behind it. In my own terms, I would say, in a tentative way, that the mood is the *iconic as felt* (15).

Ricoeur cautions against a return to an understanding of feelings that is interiorized and ineffable. On the contrary, the terminology is itself a linguistic descriptor that articulates the ‘seeing’ aspect of feelings.

Finally, Ricoeur identifies what in his estimation is the “most important function of feelings” which he relates to the third movement in the imagination, sensing and the split reference of poetic discourse. In the same manner the imagination implies a split reference between the *epochē* of direct reference and a model for a new conception of reality, feeling involves a split reference between the *epochē* of our “bodily emotions” and the feelings engendered by the iconic representation. Or as Ricoeur writes:

Feelings are negative suspense experiences in relation to the literal emotions of everyday life. When we read, we do not literally feel fear or anger. Just
as poetic language denies the first-order reference of descriptive discourse to ordinary objects of our concern, feelings deny the first-order feelings which tie us to these first-order objects of reference. (Ricoeur 1978a, 157)

This denial of first-order feelings overcomes the subject/object duality of double contingency by enabling our being-in-the-world in a non-objectified manner. It is on this basis that Ricoeur is able to return to the Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, arguing “feelings have ontological bearing, that they are ways of ‘being-there’ of ‘finding’ ourselves within the world... because of feelings we are ‘attuned to’ aspects of reality which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects referred to in ordinary language” (158). Ricoeur concludes his analysis with the suggestion “there is a structural analogy between the cognitive, the imaginative and the emotional component of the complete metaphoric act and the metaphoric process draws its completeness from the structural analogy of this complementary functioning” (159). The structural analogy of this complementary functioning extends the metaphorical process from the poetic imagination of fiction to the religious productive imagination of the parable.

7.3 INTERTEXTUALITY OF METAPHORIZATION: MODEL OF THE SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE THROUGH PARABOLIZATION

Missing from Ricoeur’s analysis of parables in the Semeia article, but alluded to above, is an understanding of the intertextual resources of the narrative-parable within the encompassing narrative of the Gospels. In his later article, “Biblical Imagination,” Ricoeur recognizes this lacuna noting:

I must admit that this aspect of the problem completely escaped me in my earlier work on parables published in Semeia. I got trapped there by the question, ‘What makes us interpret the narrative as a parable? I did not see the resources for responding to this question offered by the too easily overlooked trait that the narrative-parables are narratives within a narrative, more precisely narratives recounted by the principal personage of an encompass-
ing narrative (1995, 149).

Parabolization is the metaphorization of biblical text by the religious imagination. Ricoeur explains:

We may now approach by itself the phenomenon of parabolization through intertexuality that we have had to anticipate in order to account for the very dynamic of the narrative. I shall now take the two expressions “parabolization” and “metaphorization” as synonyms, it being understood that a metaphor can occur not only between words but between whole sequences of sentences. The isotopies play a role at this discursive level comparable to that of the semantic fields that enter into interaction in metaphor-sentences. Parabolization is the metaphorization of discourse. In the case of the narrative-parables, it consists of the metaphorization of a narrative taken as a whole. Intertextuality thus becomes an extension and consequently a particular interaction I have place at the center of my theory of metaphor (1995, 161).

Ricoeur’s presentation of parabolization is important because it is the hermeneutic frame that guides the religious imagination. It opens the world in the text to the world of the text. Ricoeur frames his analysis of the parabolization and the biblical imagination by outlining four suppositions.

The first supposition reconsiders the ‘imagination’ under the traits of rule-governed invention and imaginative redescription. Ricoeur correlates these traits with the traits of reading the biblical text such that the act of reading is dynamic and not “confined to repeating significations fixed forever, but which takes place as a prolonging of itineraries of meaning opened up by the work of interpretation” (Ricoeur 1995, 145). The act of interpretation, Ricoeur argues, is rule governed by the work of the productive imagination within the text itself. The limit-expressions of the texts are the key to the rule-governed imagination. This first trait gives way to the second trait, redescription, where:

in the reading of a text such as the Bible a creative operation unceasingly employed by decontextualizing its meaning and recontextualizing it in today’s Sitz-im-Leben. Through this second trait, the act of reading realizes the
union of fiction and redescription that characterizes the imagination in the most pregnant sense of this term (1995, 145).

In Ricoeur’s second supposition, the act of reading is presented as the nexus where the domains of productive imagination meet. As Ricoeur writes, “By placing myself, at the very heart of the act of reading, I am hoping to place myself at the starting point of the trajectory that unfolds itself into the individual and social forms of the imagination” (145).

Ricoeur third and fourth suppositions limit his analysis of the religious imagination in the biblical texts by focusing on the narrative form of discourse, which he argues, “offer a remarkable example of the conjunction between fiction and redescription” (1995, 145). While narratives are fictions, Ricoeur argues, “it is through these fictions that we give a narrative form to our experience, be it individual or communal” (1995).

Ricoeur’s fourth supposition further narrows his analysis by focusing on narrative-parables as the key to the enigma of the movement from narrative to paradigm, which he argues governs the movement from narrative to ‘life.’ The narrative-parable, Ricoeur argues, is the type of religious discourse most favourable to investigating the link between a narrative and an image because the metaphorization process of a simple narrative is contained in the text itself by virtue of its literary form. To put it another way, the narrative-parable is itself an itinerary of meaning, a signifying dynamism, which transforms a narrative structure into a metaphoric process, in the direction of an enigma-expression, (once again this is Almeida’s term), the kingdom of God, an expression that orients the whole process of transgression beyond the narrative framework while at the same time receiving in return the content of the provisory meaning from the narrative structure (1995, 147).

Intertextuality maintains the integrity of the text as “the work of meaning through which one text in referring to another text both displaces the other text and receives from it an extension of meaning” (1995, 148).

Demonstrating these suppositions requires three steps. Ricoeur undertakes the first
step by showing that intertextuality is the operation that ensures the metaphoriza-
tion/parabolization of the biblical narrative, leaving the second and third steps for future
consideration. The second step is to show that the intertextuality at work in the parables is
also at work in non-parabolic narratives, such as between “narratives and laws in the Old
Testament and the overall intersection between the Old and the New Testaments” (148).
Successfully accomplishing this step, Ricoeur argues, brings us closer to the “conditions of
the first Christian hermeneutics, which was effectively engendered by the intertextuality
between “the one and the other testament” (148). The third step of demonstrating that the
narrative-parable brought to its highest level by intertextuality is the key to understanding
the religious productive, rule-governed, imagination will be our task in the next chapter.

Ricoeur develops the first step through an investigation of the narrative-parables of
the wicked husbandman and the parable of the sower. Central to his argument is the
demonstration that the meaning of each of the parables is imbedded in the other. The im-
bedding of meaning within the narrative-parable is what Ricoeur defines as the metapho-
riorization of intertextuality. Ricoeur summarizes this exercise of the productive imagination:

In sum, the whole meaning of my essay is contained here. A parable, the
sower, contains in the perimeter of its periscope a first crisscrossing between
the vegetative plane of fecundity and the more verbal one of communication
of the message. This first crisscrossing produces the metaphor of a sown
word or of a sowing that becomes a message. Then two parables taken to-
gether, the wicked husbandman and the sower, created a second degree
crisscrossing, this time within the micro-universe of the parables. This criss-
crossing between the euphoric process of the word and the dysphoric pro-
cess of the body’s march toward death in turn prepares the way for a still
more fundamental intersection between the two parables taken together and
the narrative, which tells of the one relating the parable, that encompasses
both. Finally, it is the same process of embedding that we try to follow in
the writing other than the Gospels, then between the Gospels and these other
writings. In this series of embeddings, the same process of metaphorization
is at work to guide the reader and to engender in him or her the capacity to
pursue the movement of metaphorization beyond his or her reading (1995,
The meaning of the text is revealed through this series of embeddings between narrative-parables, the encompassing narrative, and beyond the narrative into the world of the reader.

Northrop Frye in large part completes the second step of demonstrating the “restricted intertextuality at work in the case of the parables, works as well in the case of the nonparabolic narratives. Two possible examples could be the intersection between narratives and laws in the Old Testament and the overall intersection between the Old and New Testament” (Ricoeur, 1995, 148). This is most evident in his presentation of typology as the intertextual ‘great code’ to reading the Bible. Frye explains typology as:


Frye’s typology demonstrates Ricoeur’s second step of the narrative intersection between the Old and the New Testament, and “regains the level of our second presupposition that revelation is the transfer from *this* history to *our* history” (1995, 148). Or as Frye writes:

> It is our only real contact with the so-called “Jesus of history” and from this point of view it makes good sense to call the Bible and the person of Christ by the same name. It makes even better sense to identify them metaphorically. This is a conception of identity that foes far beyond “juxtaposition,” because there are no longer two things, but one thing in two aspects” (Frye, Lee, and O'Grady 2000, 95).37

The third and final step proposed by Ricoeur posits that the narrative-parable

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37. There is much more that can be said of the influence of Ricoeur on Northrop Frye and vice versa. Frye acknowledges Ricoeur, along with Gadamar and Ong, as “being influential on this book, if not necessarily always in ways that they would endorse” (2000, 13). This suggests a possible avenue for further investigations.
brought to its highest level by intertextuality is the key to understanding the religious pro-
ductive, rule-governed, imagination. Ricoeur argues:

"the privileged way of narrative, invites the reader to continue, on his or her
own account, the Bible’s itineraries of meaning. If this analysis can one day
be carried through, we shall have recovered the level of our first presupposi-
tion that the biblical form of imagination is indivisibly a narrative and a
symbolic form of imagination (1995, 149).

It is this symbolic form of imagination where the metaphoric transfer of text to life we will
carry through in the following chapter. The parabolization of the dialogue in the embedded
narrative-parable recounted by the principal personage is the model Ricoeur proposes for
interpreting the dynamic between limit-experiences of life and limit-expressions of the text.

Our analysis follows Ricoeur’s conclusion that a methodology which follows the meaning
vectors of the enigma-expressions indicated by the recovery of the narrative and symbolic
form of imagination ought to:

- show how these enigma-expressions mobilize in the reader opaque and mute
  expectations concerning liberation from evil and the regeneration of the
  “evil-imagination.” These limit expression, in effect, would be nothing
  more than hollow words if, on the one hand, human beings did not have
  some experience of limit-situations such as evil and death and a strong de-
  sire to be freed from them. It is these fundamental experiences that the
  enigma-expressions come to configure. But they would still only we words,
  if, on the other can, they were not preceded by religious representations
  borne (chariées) by an older culture that these limit-expressions come to
  correct. It is the task of hermeneutics to correlate what these limit-
  expression intend with human experience in its religious quality and with the
  available representations already qualified as religious by our culture. In
  brief, it is in configuring the most tenacious and most dense human hope,
  and by rectifying the traditional religious representation, that limit-
  expressions continue their course beyond a narrative. (Ricoeur 1995, 165)

This methodology relativizes culturally specific meaning and encourages a language of
‘double-history’ “that of the language from which it comes, and that of the language into
which it is translated” (165). Religious language, Ricoeur continues, “Picks up new meta-
phors, new rhetorical devices, and also new conceptual dimensions, which make the original language capable, or at least not too inadequate, to deal with other religions, foreign cultures, and with philosophy itself” (1975, 136).

We concluded chapter three with a schema for the functioning of the religious subsystem of functionally differentiated society (Figure 8, 104). We can now return to this schema and with the insights of the metaphorization of parable and advance a revised schema that takes into account the previous discussion (Figure 9). Recalling the schema of the function of the religious subsystem, Limit-experiences and Limit-expressions correspond to what Luhmann identifies as the *form* for the *program* of the binary code blessed/ cursed. Luhmann identifies the program as ‘revelation’ which we termed ‘manifestation’ and the form of the program ‘Rule of Canon/Sacred Scripture’ which we termed ‘proclamation’ as these term more closely resembles the concepts Luhmann is

![Figure 9 Schema of the Rule Governed Religious Productive Imagination](image)
presenting and can include moments of ritual and dogma that proclaim the religious
narrative through liturgy, worship, prayer and/or ritual action.

The unity of the form (manifestation) and program (proclamation) is the
contingency formula, whom Luhmann argues is the paradoxical ‘God,’ who deparadoxizes
the plenitude and voidness of life by maintaining the tension between manifestation and
proclamation. We can now further refine the program of the religious subsystem by adding
to the concept of manifestation; limit-experiences/situations that have the capacity to
reorient life and to the concept of proclamation; limit-expressions that guide the metaphoric
transfer beyond the narrative of the text.

The unity of the form and program can be revised by the term limit-concept which
we earlier identified as a contingency formula. This term has the advantage of
encapsulating the unity of the paradox while maintaining a sufficient level of conceptual
abstraction so as not to be limited to a specific religious or cultural expression and to
distinguish it from the related term, limit-expression.

The binary code blessed/cursed corresponds to the deep code that Ricoeur identifies
as “a code to all the deep layers of my existence by a kind of contamination step by step of
all the layers of psychic life. To these layers of depth correspond new kinds of relation to
the world.” (Ricoeur 2009, 3). This leaves the final concept, medium which Luhmann,
Beyer and others identify as ‘faith’ or ‘piety.’ The enigmatic nature of this religious
communication medium is less tangible and more ambiguous. It is important to recall at
this point that the term medium is a shortened version of the wordier phrase ‘generalized
symbolic communication medium of interchange,’ and that Luhmann identifies language as
the foundational communication medium of interchange that extends our perception reality.
Though important to religion, reducing the communication medium of religion to ‘faith’ or ‘piety,’ runs the risk of reducing religious communications to fideism and pietism. It is the crisscrossing of the unity/operation and the code/program of the religious sub-system, which, through what Ricoeur develops in the process of redescription and metaphorization signifies promise and hope. Or, as Ricoeur puts it, “In brief, it is in configuring the most tenacious and most dense human hope, and by rectifying that traditional religious representations, that limit-expressions continue their course beyond a narrative.” (165).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Epochê of Ordinary Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Formula: Limit-Concept</td>
<td>Manifestation: Limit-Experience of Reorientation</td>
<td>Projection of New Possibilities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td>1) Life</td>
<td>Ontology of Hope in Liberation from Death through Rebirth in Christ: Christ has died, Christ has Risen, Christ will come again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Death</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blessed/Cursed</td>
<td>1) Prologue of John's Gospel: Logos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Kerygma: Promise of the Kingdom through the Pascal Mystery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10 Schema of the Christian Rule Governed Religious Productive Imagination
Put more succinctly, the generalized symbolic communication medium of the religious subsystem enables the religious imagination to give concrete dimension to epochè of ordinary reference from which a sign of hope and promise is projected. If, as we noted above, the foundational medium that extends our basic perceptions is language then religious language is the foundational language that extends our perception of reality by projecting a concrete sign of hope through the process of parabolization. The ‘hope in what’ is determined by the religiously and culturally specific forms that the crisscrossing takes.

In the case of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the specific form of the communication medium, interpreted through the language of the religious imagination, would look like Figure 10 Schema of the Christian Rule Governed Religious Productive Imagination. In this case, the generalized symbolic communication medium of the religious imagination of Christianity that enables the religious imagination to give concrete dimension to the epochè of ordinary reference and the projection of new possibilities, is found in the double crisscrossing of Codes: Blessed/Cursed, and the Program: Manifestation of the Limit-Concept, God in the Limit-Experience of Life and Death with the Operation of the Proclamation of the Limit-Expression encountered in the Prologue to John’s Gospel, the Kerygma of the Promise of the Kingdom of God and the Pascal Mystery.

The epochè of ordinary reference completes the metaphoric transfer through the projection of new possibilities realized in an ontology of hope in liberation from death through rebirth in Christ, confessed as Christ has died, Christ has risen, Christ will come again. This crisscrossing is the generalized symbolic communication medium of interchange that religious language parabolizes, “configuring the most tenacious and most
dense human hope” in the promise of the resurrection through rebirth in Christ. It is this hope, which Ricoeur argues is ‘transcendental,’ both as it extends the narrative of the proclamation beyond the schema —from text to life—and is in and of itself, an encounter through the resurrection, with the living Christ. To once again quote Northrop Frye,

> It is our only real contact with the so-called “Jesus of history” and from this point of view it makes good sense to call the Bible and the person of Christ by the same name. It makes even better sense to identify them metaphorically. This is a conception of identity that goes far beyond “juxtaposition,” because there are no longer two things, but one thing in two aspects” (2006, 95).

In the next chapter we will take up our inquiry where Ricoeur leaves off, through an exploration of the significance of word, sound and power to Rastafari theological reasoning. This religious form of the productive imagination is the parabolization of sacred and profane text through which Rastafari encounters being-in-the-world. We will continue this analysis of parabolising by examining Rastafari word, sound and power as an example of the use of split-reference to transpose the biblical narrative from the language of oppression to the language of liberation.

In this way, we leave the interpretation that is internal to the text “for a hermeneutic of the text’s referential intentionality” (Ricoeur 1995, 166). In doing so, we will continue to be guided by Ricoeur’s observation that

> the passage from the text to life, which governs the passage from the semiotic phase of interpretation to its existential phase, is still guided by something that takes place in the text that . . . I have called the text’s horizon of structuration. The new configurations of people’s religious experiences and the rectification of their representations are still accompanied by the re structuration that the expression-enigma “kingdom of God” and other similar to it impose on the signifying dynamism working in the narrative-parables. In short, it is still the parabolizing of narrative, brought to its highest degree of incandescence that gives rise to the transition from semiotic interpretation to existential interpretation. Here is where we pass from the work of the imagination in the text to the world of
Confronted with the legacy of slavery and the experience of racism and extreme poverty, Rastafari’s biblical hermeneutic interprets a new being-in-the-world. Parabolization is the theological hermeneutic of word, sound and power Rastafari’s uses to interpret the boundary situations of slavery and oppression through the tools of extra-textual limit-experiences crisscrossed with the intertextual limit expressions of the biblical text. In the following chapter we will explore Rastafari reasoning through word, sound and power as a paradigmatic example of the religious productive imagination’s capacity to project hope from despair. Rastafari is a critical resource for theological reflection on theology’s encounter with globalization. Rastafari provides not only an example of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of the productive imagination at work in a Christian derived tradition but also a living example of the power of the word to resist alienation and oppression through the metaphoric transfer from text to life.
Babylon you gone down
Babylon you gone down
Babylon you gone
Babylon you gone
Babylon you gone
And your throne gone down
Rastafari Chant

CHAPTER 8: RASTAFARI AND THE ENCOUNTER WITH GLOBALIZATION

8.1 RASTAFARI SCHEMATIZATION OF THE RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION

The coronation of Haile Selassie in 1931 represents the “catalytic event that called the Rastafarian movement into existence” (Edmonds 1993, 92). This event embodied Rastafari hope for liberation through repatriation. Images of proud warriors, colourful honour guards, and colour plates of an African Emperor and Empress would have a profound influence on the early leaders of Rastafari. Garvey’s now famous slogan, “Africa for Africans” would have a renewed, mystical and prophetic resonance. These images of an African King and Queen stand in stark contrast with the reality of grinding urban poverty, unemployment, and a racially stratified society.

The coronation of Selassie is a powerful myth and symbol that gives rise to thought, recognizing and summoning forth Zion and highlighting the gap between life as experienced in the diaspora and the expectation of a ‘better’ life promised by Black Nationalism and back-to-Africa movements. The proclamation that naming Rastafar-I the living God and ruler of all creation and Ethiopia as Zion, results in a new awakening of the self, resulting in a high anthropology that contradicts the ‘anthropological poverty’ that was the lot of Rasta’s before this new consciousness. The mark of anthropological poverty in Babylon is the need to look to authorities outside of self, the tendency to deprecate self and to marginalize self as was typical in colonial and neocolonial Jamaica. (Erskine 1988, 90).
In his 1999 text, *Dread Jesus*, William David Spencer rightly notes that accompanying globalization is a shift in the centre of Christianity from the north to the two-thirds world of the global south. This should come as no surprise, given our observation in Chapter 3, as Beyer notes:

The historical emergence of the religious system is an aspect of the historical development of global society. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the globalization of society over the past few centuries is incomprehensible unless one includes what has happened to religion during this time. Religious constructions and transformations are by far not the only such vital factor, but they are one (Beyer 2006).

This shift has the potential to displace Western dominated theologies with theological traditions emerging from this encounter globalization. The decentering of Christianity prompts Spencer to ask the questions:

How will Christianity understand itself in the twenty-first century as the effect of its two third world incarnation continues to impact it? What will the figure of Christ become as new definitions replace older, increasingly obsolete western images? Further, what is the place of a movement like Rastafari within the history of Christian orthodoxy? (xvi).

Rastafari has spread from its beginnings in the squatter settlements of Kingston, Jamaica to a global spiritual, religious and cultural phenomenon. In this chapter, we will continue our analysis of an ontology of hope through its expression in the Rastafari schema of the religious productive imagination. In so doing I will approach Rastafari theological hermeneutics as a contrapuntal dialogue partner and therefore as part of the global Christian narrative.

In the context of postcolonial literary critique, Edward Said suggests that a contrapuntal analysis of the varied experiences of the colonial past allows us to appreciate the silenced experience of the oppressed as a contrapuntal narrative that plays alongside and throughout the dominant narrative of oppression and colonization. Said’s approach recog-
nizes that the history of colonization and post-colonization is made up of what he calls, “a set of intertwined and overlapping histories” (Said, 1994, 18-19). In positing a contrapun-
tal analysis of the past, Said hopes to:

Formulate an alternative both to a politics of blame and to the even more destructive politics of confrontation and hostility. A more interesting type of secular interpretation can emerge altogether more rewarding than the denun-
ciations of the past, the expressions of regret for its having ended, or—even more wasteful because violent and far too easy and attractive—the hostility between Western and non-Western cultures that leads to crises. The world is too small and interdependent to let these passively happen (Said 1994, 18-19). 38

This approach does not eclipse the dominant, Eurocentric narrative of globalization, but rather attunes us to the contrapuntal melody of the oppressed.

8.1.1 Rastafari Hermeneutic of Word, Sound and Power

The metaphorical transfer from text to life is encounter in Rastafari through the contrapuntal hermeneutic of word, sound and power. It is useful to recall Chevannes’ description of word, sound and power as a trinity where,

the word is both sound and power. It is sound not only because its effect is aural but also because it is capable of quality, capable of being “sweet,” of thrilling the hearer. It is power because it can inspire responses such as fear or anger or submission. The articulateness, tonal variation, pitch, and for-
malism are the Rastafari version of the sweetness of the sermons in lower-
class churches, and to describe this level of expression they use the word “to chant.” (1994, 227ff.).

The chant of word, sound and power completes metaphoric process where life en-

38. The term ‘contrapuntal’ is borrowed by Said from his classical musical training. Said explains that “in the counterpoint of western classical music, various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege being given to any particular one; yet in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an organized interplay that derives from the themes, not from a rigorous melodic or formal principle outside the work” (Said, 1994, 59-60 ).
counters text and feelings “are ‘attuned to’ aspects of reality which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects referred to in ordinary language” (Ricoeur 1978, 158). While the verbal and visual features of Rastafari are studied, less attention has been given to the hermeneutics of Rastafari discourse.

Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutic of the religious imagination provides an important link between the verbal and the visual features of Rastafari discourse and the theological and metaphorical reasoning of Rastafari hermeneutics. For Ricoeur, the power and creativity of the productive imagination is housed in the dialectic between the verbal and the visual. As we have noted, Ricoeur rejects the traditional reproductive model of image. Or, as Ricoeur argues, “[w]e can no longer oppose… imagining to seeing, if seeing is itself a way of imagining, interpreting, or thinking.” (2006, 1994) Ricoeur proposes a semantic model of the productive imagination where in conjunction with a metaphorical use of language, verbal and visual are placed in a dialectical situation. “It’s only when language is creative.” Ricoeur argues, “that imagination is creative… Imagination, then, should be treated as a dimension of language. In that way, a new link would appear between imagination and metaphor. Here is where we pass from the work of the imagination in the text to the world of imagination about the text, which we have framed with the Rastafari Schema of the Religious Imagination.

This first movement in the metaphorical transfer from the work of the imagination in the text to the world of imagination about the text — thinking—is illustrated by the reasoning of Rastafari elder Mortimo Planno from his text, Rastafarian the

*A Text is taken to draw a conclusion* which can be counted upon as a test. I an I take up a Bible and opened it. So I an I began in Genesis I. *Question asked who spoke? Answer given God spoke! Understand! Words are life!!* I an I accept the word is God! Here. but where will we go from here?(Planno
The phrase, “Question asked who spoke? Answer given God spoke! Words are life!!” illustrates the imagination’s production of new types of assimilations between the nearness and farness of the metaphoric statement by ‘seeing’ similarities. In this case, Planno begins with the act of reading, as he takes up a text. This act prompts the question, “Question asked who spoke? Answer given God spoke! Words are life.” The words of the text are read by Planno but the question asked in the text is: “who spoke?” The proclamation of the text is linked to the manifestation of creation: “God spoke!” in the declaration “Words are life!! I an I accept the word is God,” thinking ‘sees’ the assimilation between word as text, word as sound and word as power. Planno does not stop here with the text but looks beyond the text asking, “Here. But where will we go from here?”

God created all these beautiful things, it appear that God had eyes to see so he looked around and said come let us create man and man was created, Both male and female. I an I accept that God is the word the word made into flesh and God become a man and finish creation as a man. (Planno 2006, 12)

The second movement in the metaphoric transfer from the work of the imagination in the text to the world of imagination about the text — seeing—is illustrated by the phrases ‘eye to see,’ ‘appear,’ ‘look around,’ and ‘I and I.’ It will be recalled that seeing is identified by Ricoeur as the schematization of iconic presentations. To reiterate in Ricoeur’s words:

by displaying a flow of images, discourse initiates changes of logical distance, generates rapprochement. Imaging or imagining, thus, is the concrete milieu in which and through which we see similarities. To imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of something but to display relations in a depicting mode. Whether this depiction concerns unsaid and unheard similarities or refers to qualities, structures, localizations, situations, attitudes, or feelings, each time the new intended connection is grasped as what the icon describes or depicts (1978, 150)

The iconic presentation that is schematized is the concrete milieu of creation through which
Planno sees the similarities in God speaking creation and sharing in that creation through the incarnation of the word made flesh. Or, as Planno writes, “I an I accept that God is the word the word made into flesh and God become a man and finish creation as a man. So he God created I an I in his own image and likeness” (Planno 2006, 13). InI is the assimilated predicate of the metaphorical statement and an example of a Rastafari contingency formula.

The importance of ‘sight’ to Rastafari is illustrated by Planno’s use of the trope vision in his description of the manifestation of the word of God, spoken in creation: “it appear that God had eyes to see so he looked around and said come let us create man and man was created, Both male and female. I an I accept that God is the word made into flesh and God become a man and finish creation as a man.” The iconic representation is schematized as creation and recognizes the similarities between the words speaking, seeing and creating.

Planno’s assertion that “I an I accept that God is the word the word made flesh and God become a man to finish creation as a man,” is an affirmation of a new type of assimilation between the nearness and farness of the metaphorical statement by ‘seeing’ similarities between God and humanity. Seeing similarities, Ricoeur argues, “is homogenous to discourse itself, which effects the logical discourse, the rapprochement itself. The place of and role of the productive imagination is there in the insight, to which Aristotle allude when he said that to make good metaphors is to contemplate likeness—
theorein to omoion” (1978, 147).

I-talk is a primary example of an odd predicate that Rastafari uses to re/create, through language, the world. The semantics of I-talk ‘sees’ the incarnation of the word as a split-reference, between the first person singular, the third person plural, and the incarna-
tion of God. Edmonds notes:

“‘I’ in Rastafarian thought signifies the divine principle that is in all humanity, “I-an-I” is an expression of the oneness between two (or more) persons and between the speaker and God (whether Selassie or the god principle that rules in all creation). “I-an-I” also connotes a rejection of subservience in Babylon culture and an affirmation of self as an active agent in the creation of one’s own identity. In Jamaican patois, “me” or “mi” is used as both object and subject. In Rastafarian understanding, this is an indication that people conceive of themselves as objects. In contrast, Rastas use “I-an-I” as subject (even when the sentence calls for an object), to indicate that all people are active, creative agents and not passive objects (1998, 33).

The Rastafari term, ‘citing-up’ is a useful metaphoric statement that captures the essences of Rastafari hermeneutic of word, sound and power. If one can get past Murrell and William’s essentialization of Rastafari, their description of ‘citing-up,’ is instructive. They write:

Essentially, Rastas have adopted an Africa-centered and “free-style” reading of biblical materials; but they are not united on matters of biblical interpretation, and except for the practice of “citing-up” the Bible, they have not defined or developed a consistent methodology for interpreting biblical texts. The art of citing-up places less emphasis on syntax, context, and literary genre of the text and more on the speaker, the setting, and the scene.

Murrell and Williams suggest Rastafari ought to develop a consistent methodology for interpreting biblical text, despite the fact that Christian hermeneutical approaches to biblical text is equally, if not more inconsistent, than Rastafari. Their insistence on a consistent method blinds these exegetes to the underlying hermeneutic implicit in Rastafari’s approach to the Bible.

Despite this short-coming, Murrell and Williams go on to provide a good description of reasoning. “Citing-up involves a combination of proof text, running oral and written commentaries (in somewhat of a rabbinic style), associations of traditional myths and stories with contemporary parallels, double-intentional (i.e., having double layers of mean-
ing) symbols, and very loose, free-style interpretations of biblical materials.” (Murrell 1998, 328). Citing-up is what Ricoeur identifies as the phenomenon of parabolization through intertextuality. This approach, it will be recalled, takes:

the two expressions “parabolization” and “metaphorization” as synonyms, it being understood that a metaphor can occur not only between words but between whole sequences of sentences. The isotopies play a role at this discursive level comparable to that of the semantic fields that enters into interaction in metaphor-sentences. Parabolization is the metaphorization of discourse. In the case of the narrative-parables, it consists of the metaphorization of a narrative taken as a whole. Intertextuality thus becomes an extension and consequently a particular interaction I have placed at the center of my theory of metaphor (1995, 161).

‘Citing-up’ is both a method and a metaphoric statement. The word ‘citing’ plays on the sight trope motif that is so important to Rastafari. Citing refers to the citing of biblical narratives and to the sighting of the metaphoric truth between the text and the context. Additionally, ‘citing-up’ refers to the re-citing of the word of God in praise to Jah Rastafari, and the sighting of Jah Rastafari in the text and context of the ritualized action of word, sound and power. Through citing-up, Rastafari’s gain insights into their lived experience in exile and the promise held out in the recognition of their divinization through the indwelling of Jah, Rastafari. It is this insight that Rastafari proclaims as they chant down Babylon.

Rastafari hermeneutics is a free invention of discourse and is consciously metaphoric. When the symbols of are reinterpreted through Rastafari word, sound and power, they transcend the logic of correspondences by the metaphoric process of the productive imagination. This reorientation of biblical symbolism, as was the case with the logos in the Gospel of John, and symbols more generally:

is fundamentally possible due to the labor of speaking that is already incorporated in it. We earlier insisted on this articulation of a variety of diverse symbols within a central symbolism that must always be reinterpreted. This is what we called the minimal hermeneutic implied in the functioning of any
symbolism, in as much as articulated system calls forth a reinterpretation as regards the kerygma takes the dramatic form of an inversion, not an abolition (Ricoeur 1975, 54).

The Rastafari hermeneutic of word, sound and power is a biblical hermeneutic that in the setting of the ritualized drama of reasoning, intentionally calls forth a reinterpretation of the Christian kerygma in the context of slavery, colonization and continued oppression experienced as globalization.

8.1.2 Rastafari Hermeneutics and Reasoning

In their text, “The Black Biblical Hermeneutics of Rastafari” Nathan Samuel Murrell and Lewis Williams note that it is difficult to speak of a single, Rastafari biblical hermeneutic. For instance:

Contrary to Owen’s view that ‘in contrast to the fundamentalists, the Rastafarians shy away from any strictly literal interpretation of scripture,’ Rastas have not completely freed themselves from a literal reading of Scripture; many Rastas also have a strict fundamentalist view of the Bible. There is also no unified Rastafarian hermeneutic, but different approaches to the Scriptures. (Murrell 1998, 327)

Contra Murrell and Williams this apparent lack of hermeneutic is itself a hermeneutic. What Murrell and Williams fail to recognize is the centrality of the ritual drama of reasoning and word, sound and power to Rastafari.

Chevannes describes the form of Rastafari reasoning as “a ritual drama (Turner 1968) in which the main element was centered not on action, as in religious and secular rites, but around words. This may at first seem strange, but it becomes intelligible when examined against the background of the folk culture of the peasantry, among whom is a deeply rooted predilection for the spoken word” (1994, 225). This conflict of interpretations is precisely what makes word, sound and power a compelling hermeneutic.
What distinguishes this hermeneutic from those more familiar to Western theology is that the variety of approaches - both literal and figurative – that the Rastafari apply to their interpretation of biblical text is embodied in the ritualization of word, sound and power. Murrell and Williams continue their account of Rastafari biblical hermeneutics:

the Bible is understood as “a history and a prophecy” rather than a “religious text.” Essentially, Rastas operate a canon within the biblical canon: “the Bible contains the Word of God, but Scripture shows that half of this has not been written save in your hearts. “The Scripture is like an open canon, in which Rastas' new insights are as inspired as the written text (Murrell 1998, 328).

The half written on the heart is more than an open canon; it has a quality of the logos from John’s prologue.

Joseph Owens emphasizes the sacramental characteristic of reasoning, arguing:

it is a sacramental act which makes the Lord himself present and reveals the depth of reality to the brethren. Brethren sit together and reason for Jah say : wherever two or three sit together touching anything according to my name, behold, I am there (Owens 1973, 230).

What Owens asserts is that the scriptures are much more than an open canon in which Rastas’ new “insights are as inspired as the written text.” Manifestation and proclamation are held in tension by the half that is written in scripture, and the half that is written on the heart together make up the canon.

The elevation of humanity to the status of shared identity with God not only exorcises the spirits, it elevates the WORD, read and spoken in reasoning to the Word of God, logos, the WORD among us, Jah Rastafari. Word, sound and power is the consistent hermeneutic method of parabolization that “consists of metaphorization of a narrative taken as a whole” (Ricoeur 1995, 161). In the case of Rastafari, the narrative that is taken as a whole is the ‘half written in scripture and the half written on the heart.’ The ritual drama of
Rastafari reasoning is itself an odd predication. The historical, social, political, and eco-
nomic context of slavery, colonialism, racism, and oppression are experienced through the 

lens of Biblical text. On this account, Murrell and Williams are correct in their assessment 
of how the Bible is read by Rastafari.

Rastafarians use the Bible to address their specific historical, economic, po-
litical, and social situation while seeking ways to express and interpret the 

epoch-making rise of Selassie as a salvific event for black people. “Rastas 
move freely between the figurative and literal senses of the Bible and search 
for texts that they believe speak to specific contemporary events and issues. 
They “see clear parallels between ancient biblical and modern times” and 
place both past and current events “within the biblical context.” Different 
personalities and events portrayed in the Scriptures are seen as present in 


The movement between the figurative and the literal, past and current, personalities and 

events in scripture, and personalities and events in the world today, are all inventions of the 

free discourse of metaphor. Viewed this way, word, sound and power is the hermeneutic 

that parabolizes the narrative of slavery and continued racial and economic oppression 

which is expressed through Rastafari’s chant.

8.1.3 I-n-I Consciousness as an Epochē of Ordinary Reference

I-n-I consciousness is an epochē of ordinary reference where new possibilities of 

being are projected. In her discussion of “I-n-I consciousness,” Carol Yawney links the 

Rastafari sacrament of smoking ganja to the unity expressed through I-n-I consciousness. 

among the Rastafarians there is an additional dimension to ‘I-and-I’ con-
sciousness, which promotes the experience of intersubjectivity and thus 

heightens the emphasis on egalitarianism. Here we are referring to an altered 
state of consciousness produced by the ingestion of cannabis. The culturally 
valued goal among the brethren is a transcendental experience much like 

In this state of I and I consciousness Rastafari is able to see their true being ordinarily
obscured by oppression and what Bob Marley famously names “mental slavery.” InI consciousness, Rastafari proclaims:

> opens the door to inspiration and illumination. God dwells in every man, and through the use of herbs one knows the divine within oneself. Inspiration assists in matter of reasoning. Herbs make people confront their problems, not escape them. Rastas say that to *hear the sounds* is the beginning of truth. Do not rush the search for truth or it will overcome one; God will appear when one is ready (1978, 181).

“Knowing God” through the inspiration brought about by the ritual act of smoking ganja allows Rastas to find their inner unity with God. Through this inner unity with the divine, Rastas find unity with each other. Again, to quote Carol Yawney:

> probably the most obvious feature of this experience that we have discussed to this point is their [Rastas] insistence upon the primary state of “I-and-I”. Here they describe the merging of the individual with all life forces, the realization that all life flows from the same source, and the collapse of the distance between internal and external, subject and object. This the brethren assert with certitude for they say knowledge is power, while mere belief implies doubt (1978, 201).

While ganja is ritually and sacramentally important to Rastafari, it is not the sole means to InI consciousness, but it helps. As explained by one Rasta during a casual conversation on the grounds of the University of West Indies during by Master’s fieldwork, slavery and oppression has so “chained the brain” that God left the herb to allow Rasta to transcend their oppression and realize their true being as sons and daughters of God.

This transcendence is Rastafari’s InI ontology of hope. Through InI consciousness, Rastafari reasoning projects a concrete epoché of hope in liberation from Babylon through repatriation to Zion. Rastafari’s InI consciousness is an important example of a theological encounter with globalization. The global flow of Rastafari’s reinterpretation of symbols and metaphors is made possible by the productive imagination’s capacity to transcend territorial and temporal boundaries.
Globalization, as we noted in Chapter 1, is a historical process of uneven exchanges. Through InI consciousness, Rastafari reasoning projects a concrete epoché of hope in liberation from Babylon through repatriation to Zion. In its early years repatriation to Africa was taken quite literally, more recently it has been reoriented under the pressure of limit-expression to represent repatriation to Ethiopia. The qualified limit-concept Kingdom of God, metaphorically transfers Zion beyond the text to the African Kingdom of Ethiopia. Liberation from Babylon and repatriation to Zion are Rastafari’s InI ontology of hope. Ricoeur reminds us that the productive imagination’s projection of images is not a stream of consciousness that becomes lost in fascination. On the contrary, the process of metaphorization must be bound by the schema or model.

In Chapter 4, we concluded that the generalized symbolic communication medium of religion is the communication beyond the narrative of a sign of hope. We presented the specific form of the religious schema, interpreted through the language of the religious imagination of Christian in figure 10. We concluded that the religious form of the productive imagination is the parabolization of sacred and profane text and that it is through this parabolization that we encounter being-in-the-world. We will continue this analysis of parabolizing by examining the specific form of the Rastafari religious schema interpreted through the religious language of word, sound and power. It is through this process of parabolization that Rastafari confronts the dark side of globalization and through the symbolically generalized medium of hope, liberates the biblical narrative from the bonds of oppression.
The Schema of the Rastafari Religious Imagination (see figure 11) is a model for the exchange of symbols made possible through Rastafari’s encounter with globalization. This exchange actively resists In this application of the model, the Generalized Symbolic Communication Medium of Interchange - Epoché of Ordinary Reference - is found by first crisscrossing the Code ‘Blessed/Cursed’ and the Program - Manifestation of the Limit-Experience of Reorientation - of the Experience of Reading Communications of the Coronation of Haile Selassie in Mass Media. This initial crisscrossing is followed by the second degree crossing of the Unity of the Limit-Concept Jah Rastafari and the Operation of the Proclamation of the Limit-Expressions through the metaphoric transfer of Globalization to

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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Program</th>
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<td><strong>Contingency Formula:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Manifestation:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Projection of New Possibilities:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Limit-Concept</strong></td>
<td><strong>Limit-Experience of Reorientation</strong></td>
<td><strong>InI Ontology of Hope in Liberation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Jah Rastafari</strong></td>
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<td><strong>from Babylon through Repatriation to Zion</strong></td>
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<td>InI Consciousness</td>
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<td><strong>Unity</strong></td>
<td>1) Experience of reading NG (1931) Coronation Coverage</td>
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<td>2) Experience of globalization as a lived memory of slavery and oppression.</td>
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<td><strong>Binary Coding:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Blessed/Cursed</strong></td>
<td>1) Zion: through ethiopianism to Ethiopia</td>
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<td>2) Babylon: through slavery and colonization to globalization</td>
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Figure 11 Schema of the Rastafari Rule Governed Religious Imagination
Babylon and Ethiopia/Ethiopianism to Zion. This double crisscrossing projects the Kingdom of God as a concrete Epoché of Hope which in the case of Rastafari is the *InI Ontology of Hope* in liberation from Babylon through repatriation to Zion “for there the Lord God, Jah Rastafari has commanded the blessing, even life for evermore”. With this schema to guide us, we will now turn to Rastafari’s hermeneutics as an illustration of the parabolization of discourse culminating in Rastafari’s InI ontology of hope.

8.2 Manifestation of the Limit-Experience of Reorientation:

There are two limit-experiences that have reoriented Rastafari’s experience of poverty, and oppression toward an ontology of hope. In Chapter 1, we maintained that the Caribbean’s encounter with globalization began with colonization, slavery neo-colonization and continued oppression. The continuing experience of poverty is a boundary situation that confronts Jamaican society with a fundamental existential crisis. Rastafari emerged from this crucible of oppression, poverty, death and alienation giving the name Babylon to the oppressive force of globalization, while projecting their hope for liberation in Zion. The experience of the coronation in the text of the National Geographic is a limit-experience that brings into sharp relief the racial and economic oppression of the poor and marginalized of the slums of Kingston, Jamaica with the contrasting regal power and authority of a long anticipated Ethiopian King.

The first Rastas proclaimed their experience to the poor and marginalized of Jamaica in the context of the grinding urban poverty and violence of the 1930’s in Kingston, Jamaica. The paradox between urban poverty and oppression and regal might and majesty is a manifestation of what we previously identified as the paradox between plenitude and voidness. From their reading of the accounts of the coronation of Haile Selassie, the first
Rastas proclaimed the coronation as the fulfillment of the prophecy of Psalm 68: 31:
“Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God.”

8.2.1 Reading and the Coronation of Haile Selassie

There are two limit-situations that have reoriented Rastafari’s experience of poverty, and oppression toward an ontology of hope. In Chapter 1, we maintained that the Caribbean’s encounter with globalization began with colonization as well as slavery neo-colonization and continued oppression. The continuing experience of poverty is a boundary situation that confronts Jamaican society with a fundamental existential crisis. Rastafari emerged from this crucible of oppression, poverty, death and alienation giving the name Babylon to the oppressive force of globalization, Babylon while projecting their hope for liberation in Zion. The first Rastas proclaimed their experience to the poor and marginalized of Jamaica in the context of the grinding urban poverty and violence of the 1930’s in Kingston, Jamaica. The paradox between urban poverty and oppression and regal might and majesty is a manifestation of what we previously identified as the paradox between plenitude and voidness. The coronation of Haile Selassie represents a limit-experience of not only “crisis and decision” or “experiences of distress”, but also an experience “of culmination, as in the parable of the pearl of great price where ‘finding the inestimable’ constitutes the supreme joy” (1995, 61).

The experience of reading about the coronation of Haile Selassie in the text of the National Geographic is a limit-experience that brings into sharp relief the racial and economic oppression of the poor and marginalized of the slums of Kingston, Jamaica with the contrasting regal power and authority of a long anticipated Ethiopian King. From their reading of the accounts of the coronation of Haile Selassie, the first Rastas proclaimed the
coronation as the fulfilment of the psalmists prophecy “Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God” (Psalm 68:31).

The model and qualifier aspect of the limit-expressions of religious language that re-describe limit-experiences of Rastafari is the coronation of Haile Selassie as reported in the 1931 special issue of the National Geographic (NG) magazine (Southard 1931). This text, Ennis Edmonds says:

drove the first confessors of Selassie's divinity to their Bibles further underscores Rastafari's links with its predecessors. The purpose for searching the Bible was to see if they could find any evidence that Selassie was the fulfillment of a prophecy concerning their liberation. As it turned out, the title taken by Haile Selassie at his coronation seems almost calculated to encourage them to find proof of his messianic identity. Part of his title was “Ras Tafari, son of Ras Makonem of Harar, King of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Lord of Lords, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah.” Several biblical texts (Rev. 5:2–5; 19:16; and 1 Tim. 4:13–14 are examples) about the “king of kings, lord of lords” and the “lion of the tribe of Judah” proved to those steeped in biblicism and “proof texting” that Haile Selassie was indeed the messiah prophesied in the Bible and hoped for in the African diaspora (Edmonds 1994, 36)

The first confessors of Rastafari encountered the biblical and apocalyptic language embedded in the National Geographic text, along with the odd predication of the images of the Black King and Black Warriors (see Appendix I). These textual and iconic images were read intertextually and metaphorized through the embedded narrative of salvation and liberation of the scriptures. The ‘ordinary’ National Geographic article is the ordinary experience transformed into the extraordinary through the encounter with the limit-expressions of the biblical text embedded in the article itself.

The coronation of Haile Selassie represents a limit-experience of not only “crisis and decision” or “experiences of distress,” but also an experience “of culmination, as in the parable of the pearl of great price where ‘finding the inestimable’ constitutes the supreme
joy” (Ricoeur 1995, 61). The manifestation of the limit-experience of the event of the coronation occurred when the communication of the coronation in text and iconic imagery was read by the early confessors of Rastafari. Men like Joseph Hibbert, and Leonard Howell encountered the coronation in the pages of the National Geographic and other emerging mass Medias. It is important to remember that one of the indicators of the global expansion of functionally differentiated society is the enlarging of the horizon of society relative to the global expansion of modern communication technology. The National Geographic report of the coronation is indicative of the expansion of this horizon. It was the proclamation of the coronation by those who could read rather than the direct testimony of ‘eye witness’ to the coronation, where most Jamaicans learned of the coronation of the Black king.

This claim may raise some objections. For instance, William David Spencer’s commentary on The Promise Key, —a first generation Rastafari text by Leonard Howell— rejects a ‘Q’ like status for the NG stating categorically that

Howell did not rely on the National Geographic (1931) articles, “Modern Ethiopia” and “Coronation Days in Addis Ababa” is fairly conclusive. Neither phrasing nor details are the same. Further, the article “Modern Ethiopia” observes, “the Ethiopians list their Kings from Ori, of 4418 B.C., to Haile Selassie the First, of A.D. 1930” Howell, however, begins his dating at 4004 B.C.E. some 474 years after Ethiopia’s monarchy list begins . . . further all Howell’s glowing accounts of obeisance are not in the “Modern Ethiopia” article. The entry of the royal couple is chronicled differently, and in place of Howell’s list of gifts, National Geographic author Addison Southard merely notes: “Bestowals of the imperial scepter of ivory and gold and a golden globe of the earth follow.”(Spencer 1998, 365)

Were we to apply a metaphoric theory of substitution to our analysis, we might reach the same conclusion. However, as Ricoeur notes, a theory of substitution offers no new insight into the metaphoric statement. As we shall see below, it is the parabolization of the NG where the religious imagination reveals its productivity.
Spencer’s conclusive rejection of the NG (1931) articles is premature. George Simpson - one of the first academics to study Rastafari in any details - provides an important direct observation of the importance of the text of the National Geographic special issue to early Rastafari communities. Simpson’s account of his research among Rastafari communities in the 1930’s is instructive.

The next speaker may use an article entitled “Modern Ethiopia” which appeared in the June, 1931, issue of the *National Geographic* magazine as his text. This article deals with the coronation of Haile Selassie as Emperor of Abyssinia, and it is often quoted almost sentence by sentence with appropriate interpretations by the speaker. The splendour of the coronation is dwelt upon, and emphasis is placed on the alleged bowing down of the kings and presidents of the earth before Haile Selassie. Haile Selassie's power, the speaker contends, is acknowledged by the mightiest rulers of the world. (Simpson, 1955, 137)

Simpson’s actual observation of the use of the National Geographic text is compelling evidence that this text profoundly influenced early Rastas. An excerpt from this text gives a clearer understanding of the ‘splendour’ referred to by Simpson. The author of the text is Addison E. Southard, Ambassador of the United States of America to Ethiopia who was present at the coronation. The splendour of the coronation is captured by the biblical tone of Southard’s account:

The studded doors of the Holy of Holies open ponderously. Through them rolls, in giant and stirring hum. The seemingly far-off chant of hundreds of priests, probably exactly as it would have sounded on an Ethiopian coronation day a thousand and more years ago.

ENTER THE CONQUERING LION

39. The canonical status of the National Geographic June 1931 issue to Rastafari is in need of further research. An investigation of George Simpson’s research materials archived at the Smithsonian in Washington D.C. and conversations with the remaining first generation of Rastafari elders who are still alive needs to be undertaken.
The Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah and his Empress have just completed a night of prayer and devotion at the most holy altar within. Preceded by waving incense-hunters. His Majesty enters now the main part of the Cathedral and takes his throne.

The thrilling but solemn silence gently breaks to the throaty voice of His Holiness the Abuna Kyrillos:

“Ye princes and ministers, ye nobles and chiefs of the army, ye soldiers and people of Ethiopia, and ye doctors and chiefs of the clergy, ye professors and priests, look ye upon our Emperor Haile Selassie the First, descended from the dynasty of Menelik the First, who was born of Solomon and of the Queen of Sheba, a dynasty |perpetuated without interruption from that time to King Selrale Selassie and to our times.”

SEVEN SYMBOLS OF AWE AND MAJESTY ARE BESTOWED

For five hours then we witness the unfolding of the ancient and traditional Hebraic-Christian ceremony of the crowning of a ruler of the Empire of Ethiopia. Forty-nine bishops and priests of this ancient Christian country, in groups of seven, have held place for seven days and nights in the seven corners of this national Cathedral to chant without ceasing nine Psalms of David. They are now joined by hundreds more. The Established Coptic Church is revered and all-powerful in Ethiopia. This is a day when it may, and does, show its impressive might and splendor.

The Emperor whose name may he Anglicized as Power of the Trinity, is vested first with his sword of gold studded with precious stones. Chanting and prayers to the God of Gods rise from a multitude of priestly throats and reverberate from the lofty ceiling of the Cathedral. Bestowals of the imperial scepter of ivory and gold and a golden globe of the earth follow. The diamond-incrusted ring, the two traditional lances filigreed in gold, and the imperial vestments are all bestowed in turn with appropriate and lengthy ceremony. Seventh and last comes the magnificent crown. Seven differently scented ointments of ancient prescription are received on the imperial head, brow, and shoulders—one with each of these seven ornaments of the coronation (see Appendix II).

After the completion of the coronation ceremonies for the Emperor, the Empress enters and takes her throne. She is crowned with less elaborate but always impressive rites, conducted also by the archbishop, his bishops, and his priests. The final ceremony is a grand tour of the Cathedral by Their Imperial Majesties. They are escorted by the bishops and priests, the princes and high dignitaries, assistants, and others, carrying palm branches and chanting in mighty volume, “Blessed be the King of Israel.”
Shortly after noon the cannons boom. There is the fanfare of a thousand trumpets. The triumphant ululation of tens of thousands of waiting women is released in waves over the city of the “New Flower.”

We go forth in proud procession, with escorts to his “Hill of the Palace,” across the city, the three hundred and thirty-fourth of all the kings of Ethiopia and the one hundred and thirty-fourth of the Christian Kings of the Empire. The Ethiopians list their kings from Ori. of 4478 B.C., to Haile Selassie the First, of A. D. 1930—with time out, naturally, from the date of the Deluge until the Fall of the Tower of Babel. What matters time in a country which can reach with such apparent certainty directly back into the dim mists of the past!(Southard 1931)

This excerpt is representative of the religious language of both the “Modern Ethiopia” and the “Coronation Day in Addis Abbis” articles. The proclamation of this text that Simpson witnessed occurred approximately 20 years after the coronation and illustrates its centrality to Rastafari. In a telephone conversation, Dr. Jake Homiak, Director of Acquisitions for the Natural History Museum at the Smithsonian commented that many of the Rastafari elders he interviewed in the course of his research would cite from memory long passages from this NG, especially the bestowal of the seven symbols.

As far, as can be known, the actual coronation of Haile Selassie was not attended by any of the early confessors of Rastafari. Furthermore, the language of the coronation would have been Ge'ez, the language of court and liturgy in Ethiopian. The descriptions of the language of the coronation are presumably translations of the coronation liturgy. Taken together, it was not the event of the coronation, but rather the communication of the event through global mass media where the manifestation of the limit-experience of reorientation was encountered. This limit-experience sent the early confessors of Rastafari to the biblical and extra-biblical texts where, like the first Christians, they encounter the language of limit-expression to uncover the truth of the Bible which oppression conceals. While the oral vs. textual origins of Rastafari may be of some interest, what is more important is how Rastafa-
ri brings together the oral and textual resources to make sense of the paradoxical relation between plenitude and voidness experienced in the revelatory moment of contrast that the coronation represents.

8.2.2 Experience of Globalization as a Lived Memory of Slavery and Oppression

Rastafari insights into colonialism and their profoundly anti-colonial stance recognizes that the oppression experienced as slavery continues in the oppression experienced as modern economic, social, and political globalization. Rastafari recognize in globalization a colonial posture that “implies that truth-metaphysics, logic, epistemology—and right action—ethics and politics are functions of superior power; that power and might reside in and issue from a superior people; and that those who possess and exercise this power as might must be right” (McFarlane, 1998, 108). This colonial posture is strongly opposed by Rastafari who see a direct link between the colonial view of power and the present condition of Jamaicans and Africans in the diaspora under globalization. Carole Yawney expresses this link as the realization by Rastafari that when “looking into the process and institution of slavery… [they]… see little difference between this historical epoch and the situation of poor people in Jamaica today -the slave chains, they argue, were simply melted down into money, for if one is poor one is still a slave” (1978,97).

Mortimo Planno links slavery, colonialism and continued oppression further illustrating the relation between the experiences of globalization as a lived memory of slavery:
Colonialism is only another name for Slavery and if our Leaders fail from seeing how close they are taking us back to this Slavery, it would be time to start think in a different perspective. It takes a lot of sacrifices to overcome the obstacles which is set before the entire African People. Let us all commit ourselves of learning from the Pass, what I an I have done why we are to be brought into Slavery and when the time come for us to be free we notice another type of Slavery. We notice the Slavery in economy no money no ownership. The struggle of Africa Liberation. I an I try to endorse to the world a new system of peace and love in poverty. Then I an I began to show signs of claiming our King as our Living God, it started to worry the church leader because this Doctrine broke open a new era, Evangelism. The endorsement to the world of a new system of peace and love in poverty is the proclamation of the limit-expression through the metaphoric transfer of globalization to Babylon and the Ethiopia/Ethiopianism to Zion.

8.3 Proclamation of Limit-Expression: Metaphoric Transfer

The productive referent of the Rastafari’s religious imagination makes sense of these boundary situations through a metaphoric transfer from the biblical text and the lived experience of globalization. The form these limit-expressions take is Babylon and Zion.

8.3.1 Babylon:

The binary code for ‘cursed’ takes the form of the limit-expression, ‘Babylon’. Babylon represents the world Rastafari finds itself thrown into and Zion is “a projection, within a prior being-thrown” (Ricoeur, 1981, 51). Together, the Babylon/Zion couplet constitutes for Rastafari the ontological condition of globalization as Being-in-the-World. Rastafari lawyer and advocate Dennis Forsythes explains that the Rastafari imagery of Babylon:

is the first-person, gut-level experiences of alienation and frustration under
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40. The term ‘Scarifices’ is not a typographical error but is an example of Rastafari’s metaphoric use of language. In this instance the word ‘Scar’ is inserted into the word Sacrifice, to indicate the embodiment of sacrifice through the scars of lash.
slavery, colonialism and their legacies. It is not an imposed concept, but one that has grown out of the gut feelings and experiences of “souls on ice,” and of dismembered beings. Babylon is the psychic image sustained by real life experiences, busted hopes, broken dreams, the blues of broken homes and of disjointed tribes of people trapped by history. It is an image of fire and blood, of being on the edge, in limbo, in the wilderness, in concrete jungles. It is a desolation in which man feels disjointed and out of line with the plans of creation.

Rastas use the biblical formulary of Babylon to understand the systems of the colonization that brought the slaves out of Africa as well as the economic, social, and political globalization that keeps them in bondage. Carole Yawney, in her article “Remnants of All Nations: Rastafarian Attitudes to Race and Nation,” observes: “The Rastafarian world view conceives of health and disease, purity and danger, the sacred and the profane, in terms of Babylon and Zion respectively. All the activities of life relating to both the self and others are experienced and envisaged in terms of these two categories” (Yawney, 1976, 237). Babylon’s most recently manifests itself through the oppressive forces of globalization. Ennis B. Edmonds in his essay, “Dread ‘I’ In-a-Babylon: Ideological Resistance and Cultural Revitalization,” echoes this view, arguing “Rastas may differ among themselves concerning many of their important beliefs, but all are in accord regarding the Babylonian nature of life in the Africa Diaspora” (1998,24). Edmonds is not surprised that Rastafari adopted the scriptural term Babylon as a figure for the West – an observation that is equally applicable to globalization. Babylon, Edmonds writes, “embodies the cultural ethos of the forces that work against the people of God, the Hebrews” (1998,23). In addition, Babylon is “mentioned in eighteen books of the Bible, as well as in Revelations [sic] where it represents the final earthly city [that] epitomizes everything that is evil and oppressive in the world” (23). Babylon is the site of the final battle between Christ and Satan, who, in the end, is utterly and completely destroyed. Rastafari take this “idiom and imagery…[as]…
most fitting for conceptualizing that which they wish to chant down and destroy” (1998, 23). Reflecting the Rastafari approach to history, Edmonds notes “Rastas can recite, almost endlessly, historical atrocities of Babylon, from its days as a Middle Eastern world power to its contemporary Euro-American manifestations. As the conqueror of the ancient world, Babylon wreaked havoc on Jerusalem and deported the ancient Hebrews (whom the Rastafarians believe to have been Black people) to Mesopotamia” (1998, 25). In short, globalization is a direct result of and a continuation of the colonial system of slavery. Babylon is globalization.

8.3.2 Ethiopia and Zion:

The binary coding for ‘blessings’ takes the form of the limit-expressions Ethiopia and Zion. The image of Ethiopia has a long history in the African diaspora that can be traced back to early slave narratives. Ernest Cashmore notes Ethiopianism was

The expression of black nationalistic-messianic movements organized around the vision of an Africa redeemed and liberated from colonial rule. Its sources derive from nineteenth-century chilastic Christianity, missionaries, and black nationalism, whilst its origins lie in the sixteenth century. As Jenkins points out in his Black Zion: “From the first day on which an African was captured then blessed by some swaggering Portuguese cleric and consigned to a terrible Atlantic crossing, there have been two distinct Africas. There is the geographical entity with its millions of social realities, and there is the Africa of the exiled Negro’s mind, an Africa compounded of centuries of waning memories and vanquished hopes translated into myth.” (Cashmore 1996, 116)


from certain shared political and religious experiences of English-speaking Africans during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It found expression in the slave narratives and in the exhortations of conspiratorial slave preachers, and in the songs and folklore of the slaves of the Old and the peasants of the New South. “ (1978, 156).
Ethiopianism has played an important role in the development of Jamaican nationalism. Deborah Thompson locates the emergence of Ethiopianism with the establishment of the first Baptist church on the island in 1784 (2004, 46). Thompson predates the Italian invasion of Ethiopia that “brought middle-class Jamaicans” to a new ideological interpretation of Jamaica’s poverty that “stressed the wickedness and inevitable consequent decline of the white man” (205). Ideological interpretations that remains central to Rastafari ethos. In Jamaica and beyond, Ethiopianism was capitalized by Black intellectuals to mobilize Africans of the Diaspora around a religiously charged image of repatriation. “One of the most vivid expressions of Ethiopianism,” notes Cashmore:

came in the 1920s with the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), under the leadership of Marcus Garvey, whose slogan “‘Africa for the Africans’” captured the philosophy of the movement. Blacks in the USA and the West Indies were implored to abandon hopes of integration into white society and turn their sights toward Africa.

Garveyism—the Black pride movement led by Jamaican activist Marcus Garvey—politicized and gave Ethiopianism its concrete form. Abgail Bakan describes Garvey as one of the Jamaican leaders “emerging from the ranks of the black labouring classes and...[that he],...expressed ideologies that were in certain respects simply more articulate versions of inherent traditional elements” (1990. 98). What set Garvey apart from other political agitators of the time was the more pronounced religious character of his organization and his promotion of a form of Black Zionism through which African’s of the diaspora were to be repatriated to African aboard Garvey’s Black Star Shipping Line. Garvey’s repatriation to Ethiopia and black Zion are an enigmatic concept. It encapsulates Rastafari’s projection of hope found in the coronation of the Black King, Haile Selassie and has evolved into a more complex understanding of liberation from Babylon through repatriation
to Zion.

RasDa Silva expresses a more theologically nuanced understanding of Ethiopianism in his reflection on Zion. Da Silva often quoted Psalm 133 which spoke to his hope of being released from bondage in Babylon. Referring to the scriptures as ‘me teacher’ Da Silva explains:

but me think, me teacher say “Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity! It is the precious ointment upon the head, that ran down on the beard, even Aaron's beard: that went on to the hem of his garments; As the dew of Hermon, and as the dew that descended upon the mountains of Zion: for there the Lord God, Jah Rastafari has commanded the blessing, even life for evermore.” Now that is my wake up tune and my bed tune. (Hales 2000)

The biblical image of Zion is used by Ras Da Silva to explain the centrality of scripture to Rasta and the importance of ‘livity’ in Rasta’s relation with God. The metaphoric statement “drunk of Hermon with the dew of the mountains of Zion” represent blessings and the promise of life evermore. Ras Da Silva continues his reinterpretation of the Psalm as it relates to life:

We have to follow the scriptures but that show how Rastas interpret life. Now if you keep on that track, keep on that track and do the things, because Rastafari is a livity. It not because your dreadlocks [motions to length] or your beard, it's a livity; you live the life. (Hales, 2000)

Da Silva’s reflection begins the movement from the world of the text to the world beyond the text. The term livity is an example of Rastafari’s manipulation of language to indicate their interpretation of, in this case, divinization. The term livity is a combination of the words ‘live’ and ‘divinity’. The ‘di’ in divinity suggests the death of the divine, which Rastafari rejects. The first two letters of live, ‘li’ are substituted for ‘di’ creating the new word ‘livity.’ Livity indicates that the divine is not dead, but alive. Rastas argue that Zion is not a place for the dead, but a place for the living.
Zion, like the Kingdom of God, is “an expression that orients the whole process of transgression beyond the narrative framework while at the same time receiving in return the content of the provisory meaning from the narrative structure (Ricoeur 1995, 147). Ethiopia is both the earthly kingdom, the true home of Africans everywhere and the heavenly kingdom that encounters and eventually will overcome Babylon. Under the pressure of limit-expression ‘Zion’ Ethiopia stretches out her hands as the dew that descended upon the mountains of Zion: for there the Lord God, Jah Rastafari has commanded the blessing, even life for evermore.” (Hales 2000)

8.4 InI Ontology of Hope:

The crisscrossing of Unity of the Limit-Concept, Jah RastafarI and the Operation of the Proclamation of the Limit-Expressions through the metaphoric transfer of globalization to Babylon and Ethiopia/Ethiopianism to Zion projects the Kingdom of Jah as a concrete epoché of ordinary reference. In the case of Rastafari this epoché of ordinary reference is InI Ontology of Hope in liberation from Babylon through repatriation to Zion.

8.4.1 Limit-Concept

The Kindgom of Jah is an important limit-concept that Rastafari shares with Christianity, qualified by the limit-experience of the coronation of Haile Selassie. As we shall see below, this limit-concept is expressed through binary coding blessed/cursed of the proclamation of the limit-expressions, “Babylon” and “Zion”. “Babylon” and “Zion” represents the ordering of the cosmos into the cursed and the blessed.

Under the pressure of the extravagance of Rastafari’s intertextual narration, Babylon/Zion are the binary coding that “become limit-expression that breaks open the closed
representations” (Ricoeur, Blamey, and Pellauer 1988, 165). The movement from limit-expression to limit-experience, from the figurative to the conceptual is simultaneous. The contingency formula, Jah Rastafari qualifies the limit-concept ‘Kingdom’ and the limit-expressions Babylon/Zion. This qualifier recognizes the historicity of Jah's power in the world. It is through the power of Jah that Babylon will be destroyed. While awaiting the fall of Babylon, Rastas participate in its downfall through the formalized ritual gatherings of reasoning sessions and the ever vigilant and hopeful anticipation of repatriation to Zion. The final manifestation of Jah's power will come with the destruction of Babylon and the repatriation of all Africans to Ethiopia, Zion. By recognizing the alienation of globalization, Rastafari recognizes that they, as sons and daughters of Africa no longer belong in Babylon.

Ras Da Silva continues his reasoning on the contingency formula of Jah Rastafari, by affirming the status of the divinity of Haile Selassie:

That's why we know the majesty is the almighty God because him live the personality of Christ. That's why we know HIM is the Almighty. And so death, when you talking about death you know, the thing is, I know that man is supposed to live, man was put on earth, man and woman on earth to live all right. And you must live and do what is to be done, and when there is nothing to be done you must decide what you want and I say that to show that we no want to reach 130-140. ... if you put that to one side, we don't count death, the people, cause people say dem want to go to heaven but they want death to go to heaven, right? I don't wan go to heaven, I no wan death, and I wan God for have me. It's a different thing. But its people I hope and pray don't think this way. You don't have to death, you don't have to die. No. we are a people who live. We are supposed to live. (Hales, 2000).

What begins with a biblical image of unity commanded by God evolves into a reflection on divine life and the conquest of death through the personality not the person of Christ. The distinction between personality and person is significant, suggesting the person, Haile Selassie, lives in the ‘personality’ of Christ, which is in turned ‘lived’ in Rastafari. In its
own way, this distinction responds to Ricouer’s recognition that . . . This understanding of
divinization is expressed below as Ras Da Silva continues his reflection expounding on the
name Rastafari:

the thing is Rastafari is a new name right, let me say. We don't really call
him God, him King of Kings, Lord, right. When everybody calls him God.
Every body's God, but my lord, my king dwell it in I and because of that, as
I tell you already I was born again, I was a Catholic, doing something that
my parents legacy left with me, realizing that, that is not the proper thing
and that I born again and take on the conception of God of Christ you know.
We see Christ as a living person ... I think of that kind of Christ.

The kind of Christ Ras Da Silva presents is the living Christ. The apparent contradiction
between ‘God’ and ‘my lord’ reflects Rastafari’s distrust of the Western European model of
God who is at best remote and at worst, dead. Rasta’s often view Christian belief in a ‘liv-
ing God’ as hypocritical. If the Christian overseers believed in a ‘living God,’’ then how
could they oppress slaves and their descendants?

Ras Da Silva concludes this reflection with a summary of ‘the full. . .’

We see Christ as a living person... I think of that kind of Christ. I know him.
I find him and I serve him. I take a vow take a vow and that vow put in this
condition here. That vow that I take and that's how I end up right so, that is
the full philosophy of my history... . You have to (see)k the keeper the
kingdom of God, you know. And who does see the keeper of the Kingdom
of Jah in all things, you find all things when you seek, you find it. (Hales,
2000).

At the conclusion of his reflection, Ras Da Silva completes the metaphoric transfer as he
assimilates the personality of Christ. The metaphoric transfer is the ‘full philosophy’ of
Ras Da Silva’s reinterpretation of the kerygma expressed through the enigmatic limit-
concept of the ‘Kingdom of Jah’.

On the interview tapes, the word ‘seek’ is clearly pronounced as ‘see.’ The context-
tual meaning of this language shift reflects the significance of ‘sight’ to Rastafari herme-
neutics that seeks to recreate the world. The Rastafari argot, I-talk, transforms Standard Jamaican Creole into a language of transformation and resistance. The far-seeing ‘I’ sees beyond the oppression of Babylon to the promise of Zion. InI consciousness recognizes in word, sound and power that through the assimilation of the individual, the communal and the divine, God/Jah lives.

8.4.2 Epoché of Ordinary Reference

InI consciousness is the epoché of ordinary reference from which the ontology of hope in liberation from Babylon and repatriation to Zion is thrown. The limit-experience of ‘self’ is reoriented by the boundary situation of globalization and the limit-experience of the coronation of Haile Selassie. InI is the limit-concept that unifies the code and program of Rastafari through the ‘something more’ of religious language. Through the indwelling of the ‘I’ principle, all Rastas are linked to the transcendental as well as to one another. Jah mystically and mysteriously lives on in all who profess him as the living Lord. Rastas take this incarnational theology to its logic conclusion with the belief that, by virtue of the indwelling of Jah Rastafari's real presence in the world, they not only share in this divinity; they are made divine through union of the self and the divine.

Since in InI there is one God, Rastas are united as one manifestation of Jah to the world. This notion of indwelling is expressed by the Rastafari use of the term “InI” as both a personal pronoun and as a group pronoun. The term “I” represents both the individual self and the God principle. InI represents the unity of selves through the consciousness of the indwelling of Jah, RastafarI who as the unity deparadoxifies the binary code blessed/cursed.
The binary code, ‘blessed/cursed’ is professed through the limit-expressions of Babylon and Zion. Together, Babylon/Zion serve as an ontological heuristic that interprets Dasein as both being thrown into the world of oppression in terms of the biblical formulary of ‘Babylon’ and as an anticipation of an ontology of hope in liberation and repatriation expressed through the biblical formulary of ‘Zion.’ The Babylon/Zion paradigm is the form that organizes the context of Rastafari’s religious productive imagination and orders the Rastafari’s ontological horizon of hope.

Rasta’s Dasein is the awareness of the captivity of being-in-Babylon and the ontological hope for the freedom of being-in-Zion. This awareness can only be experienced through InI consciousness from an epochē of hope. It is this reorientation of ‘I’ under the pressure of the limit-expressions that reverberates the ontological hope of Rastafari and it is through the Epochē of InI that this hope is projected.
The deproblemization of the future, within a mechanistic understanding of history whether from the right or from the left, necessarily leads to an authoritarian death or negation of the dream, of utopia, of hope. Within a mechanistic and thus deterministic understanding of history, the future is already known. The struggle for a future already known a priori requires no hope. Deproblematizing the future, no matter in the name of what, is a breaking away from human nature, which is socially and historically constituted. The future does not make us. We make ourselves in the struggle to make it.

Paulo Friere 2004, 34

CHAPTER 9: THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS

My encounter with Rastafari has been an encounter with a “reservoir of human hope and spirituality.” This encounter began in 1985 when I went to Jamaica for what we now call an ‘exposure’ trip. I went to Kingston with the religious community of Father Richard Ho Lung and the Brothers of the Poor. While in Jamaica, I had an experience with a Rasta reminiscent of Rabbi Hillel’s encounter with the scoffing heathen. As the story goes, the heathen challenges Rabbi Hillel to reach him the Torah while standing on one foot. Rabbi Hillel responds, “You want to learn a great deal quickly, don’t you? Very well, I shall teach you the Torah while you stand on one foot. This is our Holy Torah: ‘what is hateful to you, do not do unto others . . . “That’s it my son. That’s the meaning of the whole Torah. All the rest is only an explanation of that. Go, go, my son. Go and study it.”(Lurie 1931). While waiting for a bus in Papine, a poor neighbourhood close to the even poorer community of Mona Commons in the West end of Kingston, I encounter a Rasta, who I engaged in conversation. Up until this point I had only seen Rasta’s, I had not met any Rastas and did not know anything about them. All I knew of Rastas was their fierce dreadlocks and strange lifestyle. Despite of, or maybe inspired by, this dread I asked the Rasta to explain, right there and then, Rastafari. He looked at me, and with a serenity and patience that belied his
appearance explained Rastafari with one word, “Love.” For a naïve, fifteen year old ‘exposure trip tourist’ the contrast between the fierce, Lion of Judah warrior image of Rastafari, and the words spoken by this Rasta would brand me for life. This Rasta whose name is lost to the experience, embodied a semantic shock, that ignited in me the spark of meaning. Through this seemingly transient encounter Rastafari gave me the gift of “the sudden glimpse, of a new predicative pertinence, namely, a way of constructing pertinence in impertinence” (Ricoeur 1991, 171).

There are number of issues emerging from our reflection on theology’s encounter with globalization with which we will conclude. The first is the epistemological status of theology after its encounter with Luhmann and Ricoeur. Does Luhmann’s system theory confine theological enquiry to the religious system, thus muting its voice and impact beyond the religious sphere? If not, then what can a theological hermeneutic tell us about the encounter between the global religions on the polyphony of names for God?

Another issue emerging from our study looks beyond globalization to a concrete epoché of ordinary reference from which hope is projected. While our exploration used Rastafari as an example of how in one religion the global manifests itself, the method with which we arrived at our conclusion is a conceptual framework through which theology can engage in interfaith dialogues of hope, the efficacy of which can only be explored through future encounters of global religions. Dialogue that begins with the Kantian question, “What May I Hope?” rather than ‘this I believe,’ invites us to respectfully listen to the hope of the other (Kant 1838, 605). We may not share these hopes, but we cannot deny them. A final issue is how can this approach make the return journey through an epistemology informed by the capacity of the productive imagination to project hope? We will consider
these issues under the general titles of Theology after Luhmann and Ricoeur and Theology beyond Globalization, and Theology and Rastafari.

9.1 Theology and Metatheoretical Reflexivity

While Luhmann’s theory is a universal theory, it is not a universalizing theory. Two factors keep social systems theory from “a theoretically unexamined totalizing tendency” (Metz 2007, 25). The first is the place of the observer in Luhmann’s theory and the second is the distinction Luhmann makes between systems and their environment. In the first instance, for systems theory to have any validity as a metatheory it must account for the place of the observer in the theory. Eva M. Knodt summarizes Luhmann’s unique approach to the problem of subjectivity:

There is no longer an Archimedean point from which this network could be contained in an all-embracing vision. And yet—and this is perhaps Luhmann’s most controversial proposition—the theory of social systems, like any “supertheory,” insists on the universality of its claims. This is not to say that the theory claims an exclusive right to some ultimate, non-contingent truth, but that it must account for the self-implicative nature of its own observations: a general theory of social systems must deal with everything social, including itself as a contingent part of the reality it describes. (Knodt, 1995, xiii).

The significance of this for theology is that by “including itself as a contingent part of the reality it describes” social systems theory makes room for the observations of other functionally differentiated systems. Each subsystem views all other subsystems as its environment and its own communications as totalizing. Luhmann’s theory is a conceptual framework that indicates how this second order observation is possible without a sociological analysis of the functionally differentiated subsystems. In the words of Knodt, “Systems theory . . . simulates complexity in order to explain complexity, and it does so by creating a flexible network of selectively interrelated concepts that can be recombined in many differ-
ent ways and thus be used to describe the most diverse social phenomena” (Knodt, 1995, xix). It is the conceptual framework of functionally differentiated society that is most useful to theology and not the conflict of interpretations that characterize the sociological analysis. Thus religion observes social systems theory as much as social systems theory observes religion.

Luhmann recognizes that his “theory design pushes the presentation to unusually high levels of abstraction.”(Luhmann 1995, 1). This higher level of abstraction, Luhmann argues,

should not be misunderstood as pure artistry or as a retreat to a ‘merely analytically’ relevant, formal science. No one would deny that there are such things as meaning, time, events, actions, expectations, and so on in the real world. All of this is both an actuality that can be experienced and a condition of the possibility of the differentiation of science. The corresponding concepts serve science as probes by which the system controlled by theory adapts to reality; with them indeterminate complexity is transformed into determinable complexity(1995, 1i).

Luhmann concedes that “one could even say that concepts form science’s contact with reality (including, here as anywhere else, contact with its own reality) as the experience of difference. And the experience of difference is the condition of the possibility of acquiring and processing information” (1i). The condition of the possibility of acquiring and processing information through a ‘concepts contact with reality,’ Luhmann maintains,

goes beyond a point-for-point correspondences. It does not restrict itself to copying, imitating, reflecting, representing. Instead it organizes experiences of difference, and with them the acquisition of information, and it develops a complexity of its own adequate to do so. In the process, a reference to reality must on the one hand, be safeguarded. On the other, however, science, especially sociology, should not allow itself to be duped by reality (1995, 1i).

What Luhmann describes here is what Ricoeur identifies as the productive imagination of the epistemological domain. (see above §7.3). On the one hand safeguarding reality and on
the other hand not being duped by reality is to this domain what the split between sense and reference is to the poetic and religious imagination. While avoiding the Diltheyan separation of ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic is a critical praxis that that allows us to “attend to the complexity of the world and the world of our experience as ‘secondary’” (Metz 2007)

Garrett Green argues that Luhmann’s work on society, religion and theology raises two issues of significance to theology that we previously encountered with Metz. These are “the social location and significance of the theological enterprise itself, and the need for a new kind of theory independent of metaphysical and ontological presuppositions.” (Green 1982, 20). Luhmann’s sociological analysis of religion locates theology around the communication of the religious subsystem that serves the function of ‘reflection’ and maintains religion’s over all identity. This social location is a result of the evolutionary character of social systems, of which religion is one part. Green writes,

Theology, or “religious dogmatics”—Luhmann uses the terms almost interchangeably—emerges in the course of the religious evolution of Western Christendom. Two sorts of differentiation that occur in social evolution must be distinguished, both of which play a role in the emergence of theology. First, the social system develops in such a way that the religious function comes to be differentiated as a special subsystem enjoying considerable independence from the total system as well as from other subsystems. Modern global society has largely moved beyond the earlier stages of segmentary and stratified organization, becoming highly differentiated into autonomous functional subsystems for politics, economy, science, religion, etc. The religious system retains a connection to the total society but specializes in fulfilling a particular function. (1982, 25)

Green concludes that by assigning theology the reflexive role of the religious subsystem, Luhmann limits theology’s subject matter to primarily the identity of the system itself:

Theology accordingly emerges in social evolution in response to threats to
religious identity, which may be occasioned practically by the failure of religious intentions in reality, socially by encounters with other religious systems, and temporally by increasing distance from its historical origin and source of revelation. (Green 1982, 25)

Green challenges this understanding arguing that it is too restrictive ultimately confining theological reflection to only that which is expressly religiously. “If Luhmann is right,” Green argues, “theology in fact has no other ground, subject matter, or raison d'etre than religion; it is by definition the self-reflection of religion, the instrument by which the religious subsystem maintains its identity and regulates its intercourse with the whole social system and with its sister subsystems” (1982, 25).

In his recent Ph.D. dissertation, Young Bin Moon takes a slightly different tack, arguing that theological discourse is obviously a special kind of religious communication that properly belongs with the religious subsystem. Yet, as Moon notes, the historical and empirical evidence suggest theology’s first home is in the epistemic subsystem. To support his claim, Moon points out not only that theology was one of the oldest disciplines (along with medicine and law), offered in the first-born universities, but also that theological training was the prime motive behind their inception. Moreover, one cannot challenge this empirical evidence, namely that despite the secularization of contemporary society and the concomitant marginalization of religion, theology remains an academic discipline in many prestigious universities in the West, such as Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Cambridge, Oxford, Tiibingen, Heidelberg, etc. (Moon 2006, 67)

This places theology ‘betwixed and between’ the religious subsystem and the epistemic
Moon introduces *quasi-system* as a fine-tuning of Luhmann’s systems theory that overcomes theologies liminality by embracing it.

Quasi-system are more lax than subsystems and therefore overcome the problem of theology’s fuzzy social location. Moon summarizes his notion of quasi-system as follows:

In this sense, we suggest calling it a *quasi-system*. The notion of “quasi-system” suggested here can offer a fine-tuning revision to Luhmann's distinction of *function system (code)* and *program*, which as it is, cannot do justice to conceptualizing theology, which locates itself *in-between* the two. (Moon 2006, 70)

Moon’s suggestion of a *semi-self-referential quasi-system* overcomplicates the problem. The difficulty with Luhmann’s treatment of the social location of theology and religion is not with the conceptual framework of social system theory but with the application of his theory to theology and religion. A less complicated solution to this problem is indicated by this conceptual framework itself.

Luhmann maintains that the question of reference and observation, including self-reference and self-observation are introduced “with respect to the operative handling of a distinction” (Luhmann, 1995, 440). In the case of religion and theology, once the distinction between the two is assumed, then the question of reference and observation become pertinent. These questions ask, what is theology’s ultimate referent; what does theology observe? Green and Moon’s response to this question is ‘theology observes God,’ a referent shared by the religious subsystem.

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41. For the sake of clarity I have chosen to follow Ricoeur’s nomenclature choosing the term epistemic system over science system as favour by Luhmann. While the term ‘science’ can be broadly applied to all types of knowledge, it is most often understood in the narrower sense of the natural sciences. Epistemic has the advantage of signifying ‘knowledge’ in its broadest sense, including human, social and theological knowledge.
What our analysis reveals is the ultimate referent of the religious subsystem proclaimed through text is the limit-experience of boundary situations of life reoriented to the extraordinary. The appropriate referent of religious language is not the limit-concept, or the limit-expressions per se but rather the ordinary experience transformed into the extraordinary through the encounter with the limit-concept and limit-expressions of the text. Ricoeur asks

Could we not say that a poetic language, such as that of the parables, proverbs, and proclamation sayings, redescribe human reality according to the “qualification” conveyed by the symbol Kingdom of God? This would indicate that the ultimate referent of parabolic (proverbial, proclamatory) language is human experience centered around the limit-experiences which would correspond to the limit-expressions of religious discourse. (Ricoeur 1975, 34)

Religious language communicates a distinction between blessed and cursed which through parabolization/metaphorization, transfers the text to life. Rastafari is an example a people’s encounter with the boundary situation of globalization that reconfigures this experience according to the qualifications conveyed by Zion and Babylon. Luhmann’s inversion of the action/communication dynamic requires us to look beyond God to the communications about God. It is the distanciation of communication about God (proclamation) from communication with God (manifestation) that we identified as missing from Luhmann. God is treated as the originator of religious communication but as we showed in chapter 3 the experience of the manifestation of God is mediated through language; the interpretation of which is communicated through proclamation.

The capacity for religious language to reorient the ordinary to the extraordinary is not limited to overtly religious communication but extends to all communications. The political, economic or social are qualified by the religious language of ‘still more’. In Ric-
of every form of religious discourse also modifies every expression, be it speculative, practical, ethical, or political. None are privileged, all are affected. I too am therefore ready to speak of the Gospel as a project of a liberated humanity and to develop the political implications of this project. What I am saying is that the properly religious moment of all discourse, including political discourse, is the “still more” that it insinuates everywhere, intensifying every project in the same manner, including the political project. (Ricoeur 1975, 127).

What Luhmann and Moon both fail to appreciate is that while theology may in fact reflect on the religious subsystems distinction between blessed/cursed it communicates this reflection through the binary code, ‘truth/falsity.’ In Luhmann’s conceptual framework, it is the religious communication qua communication that is subject of study and not the originator of the communication. Political discourse, Ricoeur notes,

is no less oriented, disoriented, and reoriented than any other form of discourse; and the specific way in which it is disoriented and reoriented is that it becomes the place for the insertion of an impossible demand, a demand that we can validly interpret in Utopian terms, meaning by this a quest that cannot be exhausted by any program of action. Paradox then does not strike praxis any less than it does theoria, political praxis any less than the praxis of private morality. It just prevents us from converting religious discourse entirely into political discourse—for the same reasons that it forbids its conversion into moral discourse, even if this morality is elevated to the dignity of proverbial wisdom (Ricoeur 1975, 127).

Understood this way, in the passage from Luke used by former IMF President Michel Camdessus to justify the mandate of the IMF, it is not economic or political language that qualifies the kingdom proclaimed, but rather it is religious language that qualifies and prevents the conversion of religious discourse into political discourse. The insertion of the ‘impossible demand’ places Camdessus’ justification of the IMF mandate in conflict with the proclamation of the Kingdom of God. The metaphoric transfer of religious language from text to life is political.
The story of Jesus in the synagogue is religious language that models the relation between communication by God and communication about God illustrates this distinction. The text from New Revised Standard Version of Luke’s Gospel reads,

He stood up to read, and the scroll of the prophet Isaiah was given to him. He unrolled the scroll and found the place where it was written: “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to bring good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, to proclaim the year of the Lord's favor.” And he rolled up the scroll, gave it back to the attendant, and sat down. The eyes of all in the synagogue were fixed on him. Then he began to say to them, “Today this scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing.” All spoke well of him and were amazed at the gracious words that came from his mouth. They said, “Is not this Joseph's son?” (Luke 24: 16-24).

Rather than a justification for neo-liberal economic policies of global financing, this passage illustrates the fulfillment of the scripture in the metaphoric transfer from the written text, “he found the place where it is written,” through speech and hearing “he began to say to them, ‘Today this scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing’” to life, “All spoke well of him and were amazed by the gracious words that came from his mouth.” Despite this declaration that the scripture are fulfilled, the crowd turns on Jesus and “drove him out of the town, and led him to the brow of the hill on which their town was built, so that they might hurl him off the cliff.” (Luke 4: 29b).

In this illustration, it is the word of God in the Hebrew scripture that is communicated to those listeners in the synagogue, and by extension, those who read and listen to this passage as proclaimed in the New Testament today. Jesus’ declaration, “Today this scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing” is a command to fulfill the scripture we have heard today by bringing good news to the poor, proclaiming release to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, letting the oppressed go free, and proclaiming the year of the Lord's favor. This does not relegate God to the background of religious communication, but rec-
ognizes that the *social* communication of religious experience is a proclamation of the word *about God*, which Ricoeur maintains becomes the word *of God* through the incarnation of the logos. The manifestation of God is maintained through the proclamation of the word made flesh. This distinction properly locates theology as a part of the epistemic subsystem structurally coupled to the religious system and through its teaching function, the educational subsystem.

Luhmann’s understanding of structural coupling is instructive here. Structural coupling is the capacity of a system to irritate other systems for which it is the environment. This relation allows the autonomy of the subsystem while allowing for the mutual influence between systems. Structurally coupled systems, we argued, maintain autonomy even though they may be existentially dependent on other systems. This is precisely the relation between theology in the epistemic subsystem and, in the case of Roman Catholicism, the Magisterium in the religious subsystem.

In Luhmann’s model, social systems further differentiate based on interactions, organization and societies (see above fig. 5). Functionally differentiated global society encapsulates organization and interactions to the degree that society is indistinguishable from social system. The organizations of the religious system are the specific programs that form the unity and code of the system, which Beyer identifies as global religions. The distinction we are making between church and theology is horizontally at the level of organization between the epistemic system and the religious system, and further between the institution of the academe and the institution of the church. This relation is expressed by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) as reciprocal, “The living Magisterium of the Church and theology, while having different gifts and functions, ultimately have the
same goal: preserving the People of God in the truth which sets free and thereby making them ‘a light to the nations’. (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1990) The cen-
suring of theologians such as Roger Haight illustrates how these structurally coupled sys-
tem’s communications irritate each other. The CDF’s Notification on Roger Haight’s Je-
sus: Symbol of God, concludes that the CDF “is obliged to declare that the above-
mentioned assertions contained in the book Jesus Symbol of God by Father Roger Haight
S.J. are judged to be serious doctrinal errors contrary to the divine and catholic faith of the
Church.” (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2004). Viewed through the conceptu-
al framework of systems theory Haight’s communication Jesus: Symbol of God irritates the
religious system to the point that the religious system censures further communications
from Haight. The notification concludes that “As a consequence, until such time as his
positions are corrected to be in complete conformity with the doctrine of the Church, the
Author may not teach Catholic theology” (CDF, 2006).

This exchange is an example of the recursivity of communication among three
structurally coupled systems of functionally differentiated global society; the epistemic,
(truth/falsity), the religious (blessed/cursed) and the educational (enlightened/ignorant).
Haight’s initial communication (epistemic, truth/falsity) irritates the magisterium (religious,
blessed/cursed) which responds with a communication that maintains doctrine (religious,

42. The CDF documents elaborates this relation as a service to the ecclesial community that brings the
theologian and the Magisterium into a reciprocal relationship. The latter authentically teaches the doctrine
of the Apostles. And, benefiting from the work of theologians, it refutes objections to and distortions of
the faith and promotes, with the authority received from Jesus Christ, new and deeper comprehension,
clarification, and application of revealed doctrine. Theology, for its part, gains, by way of reflection, an
ever deeper understanding of the Word of God found in the Scripture and handed on faithfully by the
Church’s living Tradition under the guidance of the Magisterium. Theology strives to clarify the teaching
of Revelation with regard to reason and gives it finally an organic and systematic form.(CDF, 2006).
blessed/cursed) by restricting Haight’s capacity to communicate theology through teaching (educational, enlightened/ignorant). This communication is a communication of the religious subsystem, not the epistemic subsystem. Removing Haight’s faculties to teach is communicated only to those institutions that remain undifferentiated from the church, few of which are located in North America. The CDF’s notification than is a recursive communication of the religious subsystem.

In the same way that the religious system is differentiated by a plurality of global religions, the epistemic system is differentiated by a plurality of academic disciplines. Moon recognizes this state arguing that the epistemic system comprises diverse research programs dedicated to observe specific systems: physics are entitled to observe physical systems; biology, biological systems; psychology, psychic systems; sociology, society as a whole; political science, the political subsystem; economics, the economic subsystem, and so forth. Each academic discipline does this in terms of its own “programs” (say, paradigms, theories, schemas, models, canons) following its own conceptual tradition(s). Long after “the unity of science” movement fell apart in the middle of the twentieth century, it is generally believed that the academic disciplines are irreducible to one another (Moon 2006, 68).

While not irreducible to one, theology and these disciplines share a unity in the functioning of thought through the epistemological productive imagination’s capacity to produce paradigms, theories, schemas, models, canons of what it observes. Figure 8, Schema of the Religious Productive Imagination is an epistemological model developed from a theological reflection on theology and the encounter with globalization. I claim this is a ‘true’ representation of this encounter, however, under the scrutiny of the reader of this text this claim may in part or whole be named, ‘false.’ The communication is thus truth/falsity and not blessed/cursed. Ricoeur’s insight is the recognition that models, metaphors, utopias, and parables are functional equivalents of the domains of the productive imagination. From a
Luhmannian perspective, theology is a:

case of orientation to the *unity to the difference*, which we will call distance. In other words, systems gain distance from information (and possibly from themselves) if they make the distinctions that they use as difference accessible to themselves as a unity. The concept should make it possible to formulate connections between the differentiation of social systems and gaining distance (Luhmann, 1995, 440).

Theology is distanciated from religion. It cannot impart meaning on the religious system; however, it can observe the meaning of not only the religious system, but all other systems and communicate the truth/falsity of these systems through the program and coding of blessed/cursed. Theology does not observe religious experience (manifestation) directly, nor does it observe communications about religious experience (proclamation).

Theology observes the metaphoric transfer of religious communication from text to life. It is this third order of observation that places theology firmly in the world. The schema of the religious imagination is an epistemological model of how theology can communicate the truth/falsity of the functional differentiated systems of global society based on the religious subsystems code blessed/cursed. Structural coupling makes the introduction of subsidiary quasi-systems unnecessary.

The second issue raised by Green is theology’s perennial quest “for a new kind of theory independent of metaphysical and ontological presuppositions.” It is this second issue where Green finds Luhmann’s works most compelling. The search for a new theory corresponds to Metz’ foundational issue of locating the social starting point of theology on the global scale. Our encounter with Luhmann is an acknowledgment that in its essence and reality theology “is already thoroughly shaped by theories and global systems and consequently can only be experienced and, to the extent possible, change, in and through these theories and global structures.” (Metz 2007, 24)
Theology and religion are an integral part of globalization. Green finds in Luhmann’s systems theory an ally for theology’s quest to seek understanding in this world. The “persistent problem of relating theology to its social environment” Green suggests, “would seem to be the point at which functional systems theory could make its greatest contribution to the work of theology. Luhmann explicitly offers the aid of his theory in the diagnosis of social structures in their interaction with religion.” (1982, 27).

While not out rightly rejecting Luhmann’s offer, Green in the spirit of Metz cautions that theology must recognize in Luhmann’s theory a “very real danger represented by Luhmann's transformation of social function into dogmatic norm.” (1982, 29) The difficulty is inherent, Green argues, in Luhmann’s concept of theory and the claims he advances on behalf of it. A theory, according to Luhmann, is an instrument for dealing with social problems, and it is subject to the criterion not of truth but of success in problem-solving. Such a theory is fixed in none of its terms, any one of which can be modified if the need should arise. The very modesty of this concept of theory becomes the basis for Luhmann's immodest claim to present a super-theory (Messner: 1), a sociology conceived as the queen—a more fitting title would be manager—of the sciences, theology included. Here the danger is not reductionism, which has so often been the case with social-scientific theories of religion, but imperialism (1982, 29).

Recognizing this apparent danger, Green suggests Luhmann’s theory ought not to frighten off theologians too quickly,

For Luhmann belongs to that select group of thinkers whose failures can be more interesting and instructive than the successes of less gifted and more timid minds. In the first place, even if he cannot tell theologians what they ought to be doing, he can at least do them the service of shedding new light on religion. … Luhmann's vision of the social world, and of religion as one of its aspects, is surely one of the most original, sophisticated, and conceptually powerful theories to come along for some time (1982, 29).

Luhmann’s contribution to theology then, is not the regionalization of theology but the development of a conceptual framework whereby theology can think society anew. This
approach, Green contends,

is a conceptual arrangement that is flexible and adaptable, admittedly circular, and able to bring otherwise unrelated phenomena into comparative relationships based on their relations to a common problem. “Foundational security,” he claims, “is in fact scientifically dispensable” (1982, 30).

It is therefore the conceptual framework of social systems theory and not the sociological analysis that recommends Luhmann to theology. This conceptual arrangement, Luhmann explains, is a radical shift in the scientific program towards abstraction;

The guiding question is then no longer: How has this or that concrete state come to be? Instead, it becomes: How is abstraction possible? This change makes it possible to include science (and especially knowledge) within science’s own epistemic program. Sciences’ concepts, statements and theories are not to be explained only as instruments more or less suitable for understanding or even reflecting the concrete. They are abstractions that, by selection, seek to outlast the transiency of the moment. If one wishes to know how this is possible, one must first ask how abstraction in general is possible on the basis of a concrete reality composed of events. If the explanation is aiming toward what is abstract, then this implicitly steers science toward self-explanation. In the process of gaining knowledge, science also come to learn something about how knowledge is possible (Luhmann 1995, 291).

Luhmann’s understanding of the epistemological status of ‘science’ brings us full circle to Kant’s three questions, “What can I know, What ought I do, What may I hope.” (Kant 1838, 605) At stake for Luhmann, as for Ricoeur, “is nothing less than the axiology of a philosophy of consciousness that has determined modernity’s self-description since the end of the eighteenth century.” (Knodt 1995, xxv) It is here where Ricoeur’s observation on the epistemological productive imagination is most relevant.

Ricoeur’s approach to the question of cognition is to recognize that “to invent by a creative use of imagination is a general mode of the functioning of thought. The universality of productive imagination implies that we find parallels in the functioning of productive imagination on the sides of both poetry and science” (Ricoeur 2009, 2) The productive
imagination is the how of abstraction. Ricoeur, it will be recalled, argues that

there is a unity in the functioning of thought in both poetic language and in science. There is not on the one hand science, which tells the truth, and on the other poetry, which expresses our emotions. The question of the unity of thought is at stake. If we can show that imagination is creative in the same way in models and in poetry, then we have a unifying view of the way in which thought in general is capable of novelty(2009, 2).

For Ricoeur the unity of functioning of thought is not established at the level of a concept, but at the level of a schema that using the language of modern epistemology Ricoeur identifies as models:

These schemas are models; that is, rules for producing figures of the divine: models of the monarch, the judge the father, the husband, the rabbi, the servant. These models are not just, nor even principally, models for figures of the divine, but for figures of God’s accompanying God’s people, human beings, all of humanity. These schemas or models remain very diversified and heterogeneous and are incapable by themselves of forming a system. After all, the only systems are conceptual systems. (Ricoeur 1995e, 233)

It is here where Luhmann’s conceptual frame work of systems meets Ricoeur’s conceptual frame work of the productive imagination. Schema’s, Ricoeur argues are prone to anthropomorphic representations that run the risk of becoming idols, as was the case with Camadeus’ interpretation of Luke 4: 16-23. This risk is set within “a dialectic of the Name and the idol. The name works on the schema or model by making it move, by making it dynamic, by inverting it into an opposed image . . . in the demand to ‘think more’, the Name subverts every model, but only through them.”(Ricoeur 1995, 233) This is what Metz identifies as the totalizing tendency of evolutionary theories and what Green identifies as the elevation of sociology to ‘queen of the sciences.’ From a theological perspective both these idol/ideo/logical excesses are tempered by the Name of God, leaving us with the question; how is biblical polyphony impacted by the encounter of global religions through globalization?
9.2 Theology Beyond Globalization

What Ricoeur offers in response to this question is the recognition that the biblical polyphony is not in fact caused by the encounter with globalization and global religions, but rather is embedded in the very narrative structure of the Christian scriptures:

Through its narrative structure, it recalls the original rootedness of the language of faith in narratives. Through its metaphorical process, it makes manifest the poetic character of the language of faith as a whole. And finally, in joining metaphor and limit-expression, it furnishes the matrix for theological language in as much as this language conjoins analogy and negation in the way of eminence: “God is like …, God is not …” (Ricoeur 1995, 230)

Given the biblical polyphony, it should come as no surprise that the coronation of a black king of Ethiopia, whose coronation name means, Might of the Trinity, whose coronation epitaph reads, King of Kings, Lord of Lord, Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah and who traced his family lineage to King Solomon, should raise messianic hopes among the marginalized and disposed of Kingston, Jamaica. Rastafari’s innovation is not the naming of Haile Selassie, God, but in the anthropomorphic insight that proclaims selves as “pieces of God.”

Ricoeur anticipates that some might find his analysis of the naming of God in the scriptures as too ‘biblical.’ The opposite objection that our analysis is ‘not biblical enough’ might be raised. Clinton Chisholm, for instance, argues that for Rastafari to be taken seriously, it “must examine the evidence undergirding its fundamental tenets, lest its attractive sociocultural edifice begins to reveal the cracks that result from a faulty historical-theological foundation” (1998, 175). The principle objection would seem to be the attribution of divinity to the name, Haile Selassie. Ennis Edmonds argues that Rastafari is in the process of routinization of its historical-theological foundations. A significant part of this routinization is serious reflection on the place of the divinity of Haile Selassie to the Rasta-
An important feature of Rastafari hermeneutics is the avoidance of ‘fundamental tenets.’ As the Rasta’s say, ‘isms leads to schisms.’ Rastafari is not so much concerned with the quest for the historical Selassie, as it is with the quest for the personality of Christ. In this respect, Rastafari’s reflection on the divinity of Selassie and the indwelling of God through InI consciousness is profoundly Christological. Ricoeur’s own reflection on the personality of Christ is instructive in this respect.

Ricoeur’s reflection on the personality of Christ begins with a qualified Jesus as the foundation, Ricoeur argues that

If one says that the God we ought to renounce knowing has been made known in Jesus Christ, this proposal does not make any sense unless, in confessing the initiative of Jesus’ words we name at the same time Jesus’ God. Jesus’ humanity is not thinkable as different from his union with God. Jesus of Nazareth cannot be understood apart from God, part from his God, who is also the God of Moses and the prophets (Ricoeur 173)

The foundation ‘Jesus’ is qualified by naming Jesus’ words and Jesus’ God. Naming Jesus’ God, the God of Moses and the prophets, is intertextual, and requiring us to name God in life. This, Ricoeur argues, means we can no longer begin to write Christology from above or below. Christology that begins from above with the Trinitarian speculation is contingent and Christology that begins from below with the historical Jesus of Nazareth is inaccessible, unless, as Ricoeur suggests

at some point it intersects with the whole naming of God that encompasses Jesus’ message and his message about God. This point of intersection is the place where Jesus is signified and understood by the confessing community as “the man whose existence is determined by the God he proclaimed” (Wolfhart Panneberg).

43. Edmonds uses the term entrenchment and routinization synonymously “to signify the process by which an emergent charismatic movement institutionalizes itself and secures a permanent existence (Edmonds 1994, 173).
Rastafari is a diverse community whose theological reflection confesses the knowledge of a living God. This confession is profoundly sacramental as it sees in all humanity the indwelling of God and seeks the point where the historically contingent Haile Selassie "intersects with the whole naming of God that encompasses Jesus’ message and his message about God." (Ricoeur 1995, 231).

Ricoeur notes that the expression "God’s determining the existence of Jesus and the naming of God by all the biblical texts" must be understood together, suggesting that "we need to enlarge this circle to include the whole of history, to the extent that we need to see it as the history of the question concerning God and the history of the failure of the quest for God." It is this continuing quest for God which Rastafari’s encounter with globalization reveals to us.

Ricoeur recognizes the inherent circularity of this quest in the "relation between the Christological ground and this mediation through the whole of history of the names of God." Rather than shying away from what appears a futile quest, Ricoeur commends us to courageously assume this circle, beginning

with the cross and resurrection. But the cross does not allow itself to be spoken of or understood as the relinquishment of God except in relation to all the signs of God’s weakness that belong to the whole naming of God. And the resurrection may be understood only through the memory of God’s liberating acts and in anticipation of the resurrection of every human being (Ricoeur 1995, 231)

Courageously assuming this circle requires us to seek God’s name wherever it may be found. Globalization is the socio-historical context in which we seek to understand the cross, “in relation to all the signs of God’s weakness” and the resurrection, “understood only through the memory of God’s liberating acts and in anticipation of the resurrection of every human being.”(Ricoeur 1995, 231)
9.3 Theology after Rastafari

In his reflection on the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, Ricoeur suggests theology take the path suggested by Heidegger of “bringing the language we speak to the language which is the saying of being, the coming of being in language.” While recognizing that this is not the only path for theology, it is the longer path. This longer path, Ricoeur suggests,

is the path of patience and not of haste and precipitation. On this path the theologian must not be in a hurry to know whether being for Heidegger is the God of the Bible. It is by postponing this question that the theologian may later think again what the expressions “act of God” and “action of God in his word” denote. To think the expression “word of God” is to agree to be engaged on paths which may become lost. In Heidegger’s own words, “it is only by beginning from the truth of being that the essence of the Sacred lets itself be thought. It is only by beginning from the essence of the Sacred that the essence of divinity is to be thought. And it is only in the light of the essence of divinity that whatever the word God Names can be thought.” (Ricoeur, 1974, 400)

The path of patience we have taken through Rastafari requires us to postpone judgment on the divinity of Haile Selassie. More important than judgment is what we theologians can learn from Rastafari’s encounter with—and theological reflection on—globalization.

Liberation theologian Jon Sobrino concludes his essay, *Extra Pauperes Nulla Salus* with a text from Latin American theologian Ignacio Ellacuría written on the eve of Fifth Latin American Bishops Conference in Aparecida, Brazil. Sobrino introduces the text as a “text on the option for the poor, and . . . a text on the option of letting ourselves be saved by them.” To be saved by the poor requires we listen to the poor.

The great salvific task, then, is to evangelize the poor so that out of their material poverty they may attain the awareness and the spirit necessary, first to escape from their indigence and oppression, second to put an end to the oppressive structures, and third to inaugurate a new heaven and a new earth, where sharing trumps accumulating and where there is time to hear and enjoy God’s voice in the heart of the material world and in the heart of human history. The poor will save the world; they are already saving it, though not yet. Seeking salvation by some other road is a dogmatic and historical error.
If this means to hope against all hope, it is most definitely a sure guarantee that all this will be attained someday. The poor continue to be the world’s great reservoir of human hope and spirituality (Sobrino 2008, 76)

Emerging from Rastafari’s ‘reservoir of hope and spirituality’ is an ontology of hope. Recalling the words of Rex Nettleford, the religious imagination of Rastafari is a legacy of resistance and a weapon against oppression that has wrested “the Christian message from the Messenger as a strategy of demarginalization helped bring slaves and the free peasantry nearer a perceived mainstream as “children of God.” Rastafari were to extend this by proclaiming selves as ‘pieces of God’” (Nettleford, 1998, 315). The proclamation of selves as ‘pieces of God’ reverberates the ontological bearing of hope that Rastafari and more generally, Christianity proclaim.

On this path we have encountered Rastafari hermeneutics as an example of the truth of being; being in Babylon, hoping for Zion. Rastafari enlarges our Christological horizon by looking to Africa for the fulfillment of the psalmist prophecy, “Ethiopia shall stretch out her hands.” Rastafari’s encounter with globalization is a witness to hope that in naming God recognizes God’s liberating acts and anticipates the resurrection of all people. The Rastafari ontology of hope transcends first-order feelings of object/subject duality enabling a being-in-the-world in a non-objectified manner. It is through InI that Ricoeur’s ontological bearing of feelings is joined. Feelings, Ricoeur argues, “have ontological bearing, that they are ways of ‘being-there’ of ‘finding’ ourselves within the world… because of feelings we are ‘attuned to’ aspects of reality which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects referred to in ordinary language” (158). Rastafari’s InI ontological bearing, their ‘being-there,’ conceptually framed by the religious imagination recognizes the world of oppression and alienation as Babylon and the world of hope and liberation as Zion.
In this project, through the long durée of systems theory, phenomenological hermeneutics and Rastafari InI ontology of hope I have presented one interdisciplinary method with which theology might attune its ears to the good news of the poor. More needs to be done. For instance anthropologist and ethnographer Dr. Jake Homiak highlights the need for further hermeneutical investigations of the type proposed here. Homiak notes that

While there have been many studies on Rastafari ideology over the past three decades, most of them have been superficial and few of them manage to get at the underlying ideological dynamic of Rastafari thought which enables it to enfold ever-changing aspects of collection experience and to make its discourse meaningful under conditions of globalization. Studies of the type proposed here are increasingly relevant to Rastafari as a proclaimed universal theology as the movement seeks to transcend its Afro-Centric and Caribbean-centric origins under conditions of globalization.(Homiak 2011)

Paul Ricoeur’s semantic model of the productive imagination provides an important link between the theological and metaphorical reasoning of Rastafari hermeneutics that can be applied to analyse not only Rastafari verbal and visual ethnographic material but other ethnographic materials of primarily oral religious traditions. This unique approach recognizes the ethnographer as a witness and ethnographies as testimonies of that which the ethnographer has observed. Applying a phenomenological hermeneutic of the productive imagination to archival materials has the potential to advance ethnographic and anthropological research by introducing phenomenological hermeneutics as a tool for analysis and theological enquiry by introducing otherwise unavailable oral text to our reflections.

Theologically, theologian Jürgen Moltmann names Rastafari as “one of the most interesting modern forms of expression of the ‘religion of the oppressed’”(Moltmann 2000, 199). Moltmann recognizes Rastafari’s unique achievements in the “development of its own underground culture, a counter-culture to the culture of the white rulers, the transformation of the dominant language into a counter-language, and the conversion of the domi-
nant religious symbols into a subversive religion.” (2000, 199) These achievements stabilize the inner liberation from mental and spiritual oppression and “raise up and liberate the descendants of black slaves.” Moltmann concludes that

In the language and music of the Rasta, in their way of life and their cults, the home country 'Africa' lives as a utopian world which does not yet exist. 'Ethiopia' is a transferable symbol for 'the promised land' and for 'heaven on earth'. The 'Babylon system' is an expandable symbol for the slavery of body and soul in its old and new forms, a symbol used for thousands of years by the oppressed and persecuted Jews and Christians and their martyrs. The fact that in Garvey's time, and even today, hardly a single black person in Jamaica and the United States wants to return to Africa as it really exists, but that black people can nevertheless present themselves as independent, free human beings in the alien culture which oppresses and humiliates them, gives the utopia 'Ethiopia' its critical justification. 'Free our minds from mental slavery,' as Bob Marley sang

Bishop Ellacuría is right to say, “The poor will save the world; they are already saving it,” however with all humility, his assertion that “the great salvific task, then, is to evangelize the poor,” needs to be corrected. Those who Fanon calls the wretched of the earth do not need us to evangelize to them; they are the evangelizers of this present age, “in their way of life and their cults, in the utopian worlds which does not yet exist, in the transferable symbols for 'the promised land' and for 'heaven on earth'. Recognizing the religious imagination’s capacity to project hope through the metaphoric transfer of text to live opens theology’s eyes to see and ears to listen. As theology continues to look beyond apparently, secularized codes it will find other counter-cultures of the oppressed. In these emerging global religions, it will find the dominant language of oppression encountered through globalization transformed into a counter-language of hope and the conversion of the dominant religious symbols—co-opted by colonizers and oppressors—into a subversive religion of liberation. This is theology’s encounter with globalization.

My personal journey with Rastafari began with one word, Love and continues with
another; Hope. Rastafari, like the marginalized and dispossessed throughout the ages, is attuned to the reality of oppression encountered in this present age as globalization. This specific example of an ontology of hope emerging from despair is a testament to the religious imagination’s capacity to configure “the most tenacious and most dense human hope, and by rectifying the traditional religious representation, that limit-expressions continue their course beyond a narrative” the full of which has never been told (Ricoeur 1995, 165).
EPILOGUE

Won't you help to sing

These songs of freedom?
'Cause all I ever have

Redemption songs
Redemption songs
Redemption songs

Emancipate yourselves from mental slavery
None but ourselves can free our mind
Woh, have no fear for atomic energy
'Cause none of them-a can-a stop-a the time

How long shall they kill our prophets
While we stand aside and look?

Yes, some say it's just a part of it
We've got to fulfill the book

Won't you help to sing
These songs of freedom?
'Cause all I ever had
Redemption songs

All I ever had

Redemption songs
These songs of freedom
Songs of freedom

Bob Marley
Figure 7 Luhmann’s Schema of the Religious Subsystem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Medium of Symbolic Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>God</td>
<td>Revelation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Immanence/Transcendence</td>
<td>Canon/Rule of Holy Scripture</td>
<td>Faith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 Revised Schema of the Religious Subsystem

<table>
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<th>Program</th>
<th>Medium of Symbolic Exchange</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contingency Formula</td>
<td>Manifestation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blessed/Cursed</td>
<td>Proclamation</td>
<td>Faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>Medium of Symbolic Exchange</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Formula</td>
<td>Manifestation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit-Concept</td>
<td>Limit-Experience of Re-orientation</td>
<td>Projection of New Possibilities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Blessed/Cursed</td>
<td>Proclamation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limit-Expression of Metaphoric Transfer</td>
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Figure 9 Schema of the Rule-Governed Religious Productive Imagination

<table>
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<th>Epochê of Ordinary Reference</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Contingency Formula: Limit-Concept</td>
<td>Manifestation: Limit-Experience of Reorientation</td>
<td>Projection of New Possibilities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>God</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) Life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Death</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Binary Coding: Proclamation: Limit Expression of Metaphoric Transfer</td>
<td>Ontology of Hope in Liberation from Death through Rebirth in Christ: Christ has died, Christ has Risen, Christ will come again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blessed/Cursed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) Prologue of John's Gospel: Logos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Kerygma: Promise of the Kingdom through the Pascal Mystery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10 Schema of the Christian Rule-Governed Religious Imagination
Figure 11 Schema of the Rastafari Rule-Governed Religious Imagination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Epochē of Ordinary Reference</th>
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</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Formula:</td>
<td>Manifestation: Limit-Experience of Reorientation</td>
<td>Projection of New Possibilities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit-Concept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jah Rastafari</td>
<td>1) Experience of reading NG (1931) Coronation Coverage</td>
<td>Inl Ontology of Hope in Liberation from Babylon through Repatriation to Zion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inl Consciousness</td>
<td>2) Experience of globalization as a lived memory of slavery and oppression.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary Coding:</td>
<td>Proclamation: Limit Expression of Metaphoric Transfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blessed/Cursed</td>
<td>1) Zion: through ethiopianism to Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Babylon: through slavery and colonization to globalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


———. *Societies; Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*. Prentice-Hall, 1966b.


